THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

VOLUME VI

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
20 December 1977

The War History Compilation Committee

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Second Edition
(15 December - 1981)
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In today's troubled world there are many nations under constant communist threat. Efforts to bring about a better understanding of the historic events of the Korean War, in which the communist intrusion precipitated the nation into the worst misery of her history of five millennia, are welcomed by freedom-loving nations. By 1977 the Ministry of National Defense's War History Compilation Committee had published its six-volume History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, a work which documented a new era in international cooperation and showed the UN taking a first major step toward achieving the ideal of a concert of nations opposed to wars of aggression particularly through the Korean War waged by North Korea at the USSR's instigation. This edition published by this committee during the period of 1972-1977 drew widespread attention abroad and continues to be sought after 28 years after the truce, bearing testimony to the value of history. Its high demand has necessitated this second edition.

Regretably, Korea remains the most volatile spot vulnerable to communist threat in Asia and a hair-trigger truce is all that prevents the military situation along the DMZ from erupting at any time into a full scale war. In 1980 alone, North Korea was charged with 8,330 violations of the armistice and proved its hostility toward not only the Republic of Korea, but all of the free nations of the world. The unpredictability of North Korea always obliges us to think deeply about the requirements of national security and it forces the examination and reevaluation of the military and non-military defensive posture of this country.

What looms large and clear in the present world situation is the urgent need for all freedom-loving nations of the world to stand together against communist aggression. To our greatest regret, however, the 28 years since the armistice have seen the secession of Ethiopia, one of the sixteen participant nations in the Korean War, from the United Nations, the fall of Indochina into Communist hands, and the recent tragic affair of Afghanistan that warrant the death of enthusiasm for the collective security shown by the free nations at the time of the Korean War. No matter where Communist aggression appears, its end is the same--global conquest. Any meaningful response from the free world must therefore come on a global level, with the total weight of the free world staunchly
and completely behind it.

Although to most it appears hopeless, the Republic of Korea will continue its efforts, by peaceful means, to realize its aspiration for a unified country. This reflects the will of all of the Korean people as a single race. In the meantime, the highest priority will be placed on preventing another fratricidal war, not only for the sake of our own survival, but also for the sake of regional stability and world peace.

In dedicating this book to all of the comrades in arms from the United Nations, those countries that came to the aid of Korea and fought Communist aggression in the early 1950's, the Republic of Korea's deepest gratitude is extended, especially to those men who gave their lives on Korean soil for the common cause of freedom and peace.

15 December 1981
Seoul, Korea

Park Chung In
Chairman
War History Compilation Committee
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. Contents.
   This volume, which is compiled into three separate parts, namely, a brief outline of the war, contribution of each participated nation, and appendixes, contains brief accounts of all nations who fought in Korea under the United Nations Command during June 1950 through July 1953.

2. Equation of Times.
   Dates and times used in this volume are those of the place in which the event occurred. There is a time difference of fourteen hours between Seoul and New York. And, Korean standard time is that of the 135th meridian, nine hours ahead of Greenwich Mean time.

   Place-names are spelled in accordance with the ROK Army Map Service spellings which are coincided with the McCune-Reischauer System of Romanizing the Korean Alphabet. The breve mark, however, has been omitted. In case of nominal changes new names are indicated along with the old ones. Some place-names are followed by a descriptive, hyphenated suffix.

4. Appendixes.
   Related reference information and materials, including chronologies of the war, truce talks and post-armistice; glossary; abbreviations; gross contents of the preceding five volumes; and general index to Volumes I to V are contained in the Appendixes.

5. General Index.
   In the General Index entries, which have volume and page references, there are also cross references to help finding easier for certain parts.
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PART ONE

THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Background

The Korean War - in which the forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and of the free allies of the United Nations fought against those of the North Korean (NK) Communist puppet regime and of Chinese Communists who were supported by the Soviet Union - began on 25 June 1950, when the unprovoked NK armed forces invaded the Republic. Thus, the Communist aggressors sparked off a bitter, bloody war that was to last three years, one month and two days; a hot conflict that was the first real trial of strength between the opposing ideologies of democracy and communism. On 27 July 1953, it ended in a frustrated stalemate when, after protracted talking, delaying tactics at the truce tents by the Communists, an armistice was signed, leaving the Korean Peninsula still divided.

Heavily and mortally beaten on the battlefield, the Communist aggressors sought for months to minimize their battle defeat by political, psychological and diplomatic means. The shooting war was terminated only because the Communists became convinced that they could never gain military victory and they also cared that the United Nations Forces, in which the United States took leading part, had finally lost patience and was about to carry the war, perhaps, with more terrible weapons, to the Chinese mainland, perhaps, Manchuria, which had been until then a secure sanctuary, arsenal, source of supply and reinforcements and training ground for over one million Chinese Communist soldiers south of the Yalu River.

In another words, the Korean War had been a collective effort of Free World allies against the NK and Chinese Communist aggressors, and Korea became a testing ground where the Free World had to use its strength against the forceful expansion of communism.

To understand the true causes of the war and also to put the contribution of the United Nations Forces into proper focus, it is necessary, first of all, to mention a brief background that led to the outbreak of the war.

Until June 1950, so little was generally known to the outside world about Korea that it was sometimes called the "Hermit Kingdom." Founded by ""King
Tangun” 4,310 years ago, Korea is also known as “The Land of the Morning Calm.” The Korean peninsula extends southward from Manchuria, forming a natural land bridge between the Asian mainland and the Japanese islands, and it separates the Western Sea (or Yellow Sea) on the west from the Eastern Sea.

Thus, situating in a strategically important location like a springboard toward both directions, one to the Pacific areas and the other to the Asian continent, the history of Korean nation is that of continuous trials and challenges as well as that of unswerving struggle. This meant Korea was constantly subjected to external invasions since ancient ages.

In modern times, Korea was then a crossroad where the interests of major great powers of the Far East intermingled, as it is still now. Lying as it did at a point where ambitious China, Russia and Japan met and conflicted, Korea became a most attractive prize, particularly for these three-power rivalry. In consequence, as the focal point of triangular struggle of these countries, the Korean peninsula had been subjected to plot of aggression by either of the other two.

The newly rising might of Japan faced the declining strength of China and Russia, and one of the first moves in this triangle struggle was in 1876 when, in defiance of China, Japan forced a new trade treaty on Korea. This eventually caused to follow Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). As a result, China and Russia were removed from influence over the peninsula, and Korea was finally forced to annex to Japan in 1910, lasting 36 years until mid-August 1945. The remote cause of the Korean War, therefore, can be traced back to these two victorious wars of the Japanese against Chinese and Russians, because the land of Korea was artificially divided into two sides after its liberation from the Japanese colonial rule.

Toward the end of World War II, when the tide of war was turned in favour of the Allies, at the Cairo Conference in December 1943, attended by Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-sok, Korea was promised eventual unity and independence. Further, decisions taken at Potsdam by the Allied Powers in July 1945 confirmed the Cairo Declaration. Russia likewise endorsed this pledge in her declaration of War against Japan in August 1945.

But, the danger of an explosion on the Korean Peninsula had been present ever since the end of World War II, when the United States and Soviet Russia rushed into the political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan in August 1945. The surrender terms called for a joint American and Soviet occupation, with the 38th Parallel serving as a temporary line of demarcation. The 38th Parallel was designated just as a matter of military convenience.

But, the Soviet Russia at once made it as a “iron curtain,” thus organizing North
Korea into her satellite, and converted the Parallel into a sealed political boundary, entirely rejecting all American attempts at unification. Moreover, Russia centered her all-out effort in building up the NK Communist puppet army. On the sharp contrary, the American occupation forces in the south repeatedly attempted to settle the artificially divided land by peaceful means. Every effort was resulted in vain due to the Soviet Russia’s reject. In the end, the United States requested the UN General Assembly to take up the Korean question, and the Republic of Korea formally came into being on 15 August 1948, following the free, general elections under the U.N. supervision. In December that year, the United Nations recognized the Republic of Korea Government as the only lawful authority for the whole country.

In December 1948 the Soviet Union announced that its occupying forces had completed their withdrawal from Communist-held North Korea, and when the last American troop, namely the 5th US Regimental Combat Team, left the Republic of Korea in June 1949, the two parts of the divided country were left alone to face each other, which they did in an atmosphere of growing tension and hostility.

Ever since the Soviet forces entered in North Korea in 1945, they concentrated all their efforts to organize, train and equip their puppet army to the north for offensive purposes. By June 1950, the overall strength of the NK Communist puppet army – equipped with Soviet aircraft, tanks, artillery and other weapons – amounted to over 135,000 all ranks.

The armed forces of the Republic of Korea made a much slower start, chiefly because the United States thought that a small armed gendarmerie to maintain internal security would be enough. More worse, the ROK Army was badly equipped; it had no tanks, no field artillery, inadequate transport and it was short of ammunition.

Tension between the divided halves increased due to the provocations perpetrated by the NK Communists. Raids by NK Red troops across the 38th Parallel became a frequent occurrence throughout 1949. One of these forays, supported by artillery, was a large scale NK Communist thrust into the Ongjin Peninsula. Heavy fighting resulted before the invaders were driven back into their northern zone. The Communists, thus attempted to testing the ROK defense capabilities.

An opportune moment for Stalin to order Kim Il-sung, chieftain of NK Communist puppet clique, to attack the Republic of Korea came in June 1950, when it was obviously much stronger than ROK Army and should have been able to crush it quickly and without a great deal of trouble. Furthermore, they seem to have taken encouragement from the American policy which left Korea outside the
US defense line in the Far East. Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, had publicly declared on 12 January 1950 that Korea was beyond the American defense perimeter. In broad terms American foreign policy was to contain the Soviet Union and its Far East basic military mission was to protect Japan against any sudden move by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Soviets appear to have been certain that the United Nations would not intervene, nor the United States would take counteraction.

In short, the NK puppet regime felt secure, having friendly land frontiers to the north and west across which massive Communist support could quickly be sent in an emergency. Confident and ready, the NK Communists waited for the signal to attack and during June 1950, their divisions deployed in secret to positions just north of the 38th Parallel.

**Communist Invasion — Outbreak of the War**

On the early morning of Sunday, 25 June 1950, the NK Communist army, following a long coordinated artillery and mortar volley, struck across the 38th Parallel, thus provoking the three years of bloody, antinational fratricidal act against God and man.

Supported by ample gun fire and spearheaded by hundreds of Russian-built T-34 tanks, they began to move southward in a full-scale effort at 0400 hours with seven infantry divisions and an armored brigade in the attack. Two more enemy divisions were in immediate reserve. The main onslaught rolled down the Uijongbu corridor, quickly crushing the ROK defenses at the Parallel. Supported by hundreds of Russian-made airplanes, they entered Seoul in three days. Secondary thrusts down the center and down east coast kept pace with the main drive.

Completely caught by the surprise attack, entirely unprepared, ill-trained and ill-equipped ROK Army units were no match against such a tremendously overwhelming force in numbers, although they offered stubborn resistance with an indomitable spirit. Notwithstanding, the ROK forces had no alternative, but to withdraw in an attempt to conduct an effective delaying action, and those troops driven out of Seoul forced to abandoned most of their equipment because the bridges over the Han River were prematurely demolished. The enemy forces halted after taking Seoul, but only briefly to regroup before crossing the Han.

**U.N. Action**

The Free World nations, also caught by the Communist surprise aggression, took
up immediate reaction in righteous fury. In Washington, the United States, where a 14-hour time difference made it Saturday, 24 June when the NK Reds unleashed the unprovoked and cold-blooded attack upon the Republic of Korea, the first report of the invasion reached that night. Early on the 25th, the United States requested a meeting of UN Security Council. In a series of resolutions, the Security Council denounced the aggression, called upon UN member nations to come to the aid of the Republic of Korea and designated the United States as executive agent for a unified command to direct and coordinate the UN collective effort. Grounded on the UN Security Council's resolution, US President Truman ordered US air and naval forces to support the ROK forces; then authorized use of ground troops, air bombardment of military targets in the Communist-held north and a blockade of the coast. He further ordered General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, US Far East Command, to command the "United Nations Forces."

The Republic of Korea had welcomed contribution from the Free World as many as possible, large or small in military help and moral sustenance against the Communist aggression. Many peace-loving Free World nations rushed to the aid of the Republic. Although the Republic was not a U.N. member, 21 nations came to her aid, 16 of which displaced fighting forces. They were, in alphabetical order, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden also furnished medical assistance.

All of these nations and their peoples believed that if the Republic of Korea, a free nation and an outpost of the Free World in Asia, was left to its own defense and fell, no other small nation would have the will to resist aggression, and Communist bosses would be encouraged to override other free nations elsewhere.

Thus, one of the strangest wars in history, the Korean War was started. The Communist aggression, therefore, in a narrow sense, marked the beginning of a fratricidal war between peoples of a divided country. In a large sense, the cold war between the Great Power Blocs - the Free World and the warlike Communists - had erupted in open, hot war.

It was not an all-out war, although a total war as far as the Republic of Korea was concerned, fought to win a decisive military victory, but a limited police action fought and talked to reach a compromise truce. During the one year of
fierce fighting and two years of heavy talking battles there were times of defeat, sweeping victory, deep frustration and helpless stalemate. The eyes of the world had watched the ebb and flow of battle on this tiny Asian peninsula for three years. In fact, the Korean War was an unprecedented, national tragedy from the beginning and a strange war. There were victories without final victory. And the line between military and political objectives always was obscure. There were also peculiar international haggling on a political level, right to the last moment of signing the armistice. As far as the United Nations was concerned, it seemed to draw some satisfaction from the basic military meaning of the war, because the first military command ever set up by an international organization repelled the first post-World War II aggression made by the Communists.

**Losses and Damages**

To Koreans the Korean War of 1950–1953 was total war, although it has been called a “limited war.” Hundreds of thousands of Koreans died or were mutilated, nearly the whole country was ravaged by the war disaster, and the cities and villages suffered unprecedented destruction in history.

In deed, it was absolutely unparalleled war in the history of the Korean nation. Tens of thousands of the ROK civilians were massacred by the NK Communists. 3,700,000 ROK peoples were made homeless, 400,000 having fled from the yoke of Communist-rulled North Korea, and about 400,000 homes were destroyed.

As for ROK casualties, according to an U.N. release of 23 October 1953, totalled 1,313,836, including about a million civilians. No definite official breakdown of the ROK military casualties has ever been publicized by the ROK authorities, but the estimated figures are approximately 47,000 killed, 183,000 wounded, and 70,000 missing or prisoners, making a total of 300,000 casualties.

Of the estimate of UN Forces’ losses, 187,000 men killed and some 800,000 wounded in which the ROK Forces suffered the most. Total enemy casualties reached an estimated 1,420,000, of which Chinese Communists totaled 900,000 dead or wounded while NK Communists numbered 520,000 dead or wounded.

**Commanders in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC)**

Gen. of the Army  Douglas MacArthur  24 Jul 1950 – 11 Apr 1951

(Gener. MacArthur was named to have a unified command in Korea on 7 July 1950, and the UN Command was formally established on 24 July 1950)
Introduction

General Matthew B. Ridgway 11 Apr 1951 – 12 May 1952
(Promoted to Gen. 11 May 1951)
General Mark W. Clark 12 May 1952 – 7 Oct 1953

Post-War CinCUNC

General John E. Hull 7 Oct 1953 – 7 Apr 1955
General Maxwell D. Taylor 1 Apr 1955 – 5 Jun 1955
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer 5 Jun 1955 – 1 Jul 1957
General George H. Decker 1 Jul 1957 – 30 Jun 1959
General Carter B. Magruder 1 Jul 1959 – 30 Jun 1961
General Hamilton H. Howze 1 Aug 1963 – 30 Jun 1965
General Dwight E. Beach 1 Jul 1965 – 30 Aug 1966
General Charles H. Bonesteel, III 1 Sep 1966 – 1 Oct 1969
General Donald V. Bennett 31 Aug 1972 – 31 Jul 1973
General John W. Vessey, Jr. 8 Oct 1976 – Present

Note: Headquarters of the U.N. Command was moved to Seoul, Korea on 1 July 1957 and, since then its Commander-in-Chief was also assigned in the command of the Eighth US Army in Korea.

Senior Armistice Delegates, UN Command

Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, USN 10 Jul 1951 – 22 May 1952

Casualties of UN Forces (16 Nations)
(June 1950 – 27 July 1953)

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## Introduction

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<td>299</td>
<td>57 (41)</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. South Africa</td>
<td>AF (826)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Thailand</td>
<td>Army (4,000)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy (2,281)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF (45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>129 (93)</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,273</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Turkey</td>
<td>Army (14,936)</td>
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<td>2,068</td>
<td>407 (244)</td>
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<td>15. United Kingdom</td>
<td>Army (39,000)</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>1,102</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy (17,000)</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marines (N/A)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>2,583</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>4,485</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. United States</td>
<td>Army (2,834,000)</td>
<td>37,133</td>
<td>77,596 (WIA)</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>119,387</td>
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### U.N. Forces in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Nation</th>
<th>Branch of Service*1</th>
<th>Deaths *2</th>
<th>WIA/Injuries</th>
<th>MIA/POW *3</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>(1,177,000)</td>
<td>4,501</td>
<td>1,576 (WIA)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>(1,285,000)</td>
<td>7,084</td>
<td>368 (WIA)</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>7,725</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>(424,000)</td>
<td>5,528</td>
<td>23,744 (WIA)</td>
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<td>29,466</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>(5,720,000)</td>
<td>54,246</td>
<td>103,284 (WIA)</td>
<td>5,178</td>
<td>162,708</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>57,512</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</table>

*1 Bracketed figures indicate total number of participated personnel.

*2 Bracketed figures show KIA.

*3 Bracketed figures indicate repatriated number.

### Strength of UNC Ground Forces in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>ROK*4</th>
<th>U.S.*5</th>
<th>Other UNC Nations</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>30 June 1951</td>
<td>554,577</td>
<td>273,266</td>
<td>253,250</td>
<td>28,061</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 June 1952</td>
<td>678,051</td>
<td>376,418</td>
<td>265,864</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 July 1953</td>
<td>932,539</td>
<td>590,911</td>
<td>302,483</td>
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</table>

*4 Includes Marine and Navy Personnel under operational control of U.S. Army.

*5 Includes KATUSA, ROK marines under operational control of U.S. Army, and civilian trainees.

### Strength Distribution by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>30 June 1951</th>
<th>30 June 1952</th>
<th>31 July 1953</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totalary</td>
<td>28,061</td>
<td>35,769</td>
<td>39,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Commonwealth</td>
<td>15,723</td>
<td>21,429</td>
<td>24,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8,278</td>
<td>13,043</td>
<td>14,198</td>
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Introduction

Australia 912 1,844 2,282
Canada 5,403 5,155 6,146
New Zealand 797 1,111 1,389
India (medical unit) 333 276 70
Turkey 4,602 4,878 5,455
Belgium (including 44 Luxembourgians) 602 623 944
Colombia 1,050 1,007 1,068
Ethiopia 1,153 1,094 1,271
France 738 1,185 1,119
Greece 1,027 899 1,263
Netherlands 725 565 819
Philippines 1,143 1,494 1,496
Thailand 1,057 2,274 1,294
Italy (medical unit) 0 64 72
Norway (medical unit) 79 109 105
Sweden (medical unit) 162 148 154

Exchange of Prisoners of War – Repatriates

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Little Switch</th>
<th>Big Switch</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td>75,823</td>
<td>82,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK Communists</td>
<td>*a 5,640</td>
<td>*b 70,183</td>
<td>75,823</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese Communists</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>*c 5,640</td>
<td>6,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>12,773</td>
<td>13,444</td>
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<td>U.K.</td>
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<td>Filipinos</td>
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<td>Canadians</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombians</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>U.N. Forces in Korea</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frenchmen</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealanders</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Included 446 civilian internees, of which 3 were female and 38 female POW's.
*b Included 60,788 male POW's, 473 female POW's, 23 children, and 8,899 civilian internees.
*c Included 1 female POW.
CHAPTER II GROUND OPERATIONS

South to the Naktong

Having an overwhelming superiority in men and weapons, the NK invaders made rapid advance, while the ROK defenders fought delaying action trading ground for time, pending military buildup strong enough to push the enemy back and destroy him.

The Communist armed aggression in Korea, as already mentioned earlier, exploded in the Free World like a delayed-action bomb. Within a matter of hours the swift enemy advance warned the world of the power of the aggressors. The Republic of Korea, the last Free World outpost in Northeast Asia, was crumbling. At this most precarious moment, the Free World nations, particularly the United Nations as well as the United States who helped at the birth of the Republic of Korea, made their great, historical decisions to provide military forces, materiel and even moral support in repelling the aggression.

1 July saw the arrival of the first US contingent, Task Force Smith from the 24th US Division in Japan, which made initial contact on 5 July with the enemy north of Osan. The remainder of the division followed to arrive without delay, while the US Far East Air Force, and aircraft of US Navy and Marines came into action on all fronts in the early war.

The momentum of the enemy attack began to slow down as the ROK-US allied forces were gradually building up. Yet, the enemy had seized nearly half of the south by 13 July, when Lt. General Walton H. Walker became commander of all US Army forces in Korea. That date the friendly ground forces deployed west to east were the 19th RCT, 24th US Division at Taejon; 34th US RCT at Kogiu; 21st US RCT at Tuman-ni with elements at Chochiwon; 17th ROK Regiment along railroad between Chochiwon and Chongju; 1 ROK Corps at Chongju; Capital ROK Division north of Chongju; 2nd ROK Division (−) at Maam-ni; 23rd ROK Regiment at Yongdok. Eighth US Army Advance Headquarters and the 27th US Regiment (−) was at Taegu with elements at Pohang and the 25th US Division command post was at Yongchon.

Meanwhile, on 8 July, General MacArthur was appointed Commander in
Chief, UN Command, but it was not until the 14th that President Syngman Rhee formally placed all ROK forces under General MacArthur's command.

After its brief pause for reorganization, the enemy resumed its attack, pressing hard against the ROK formation and the 24th US Division. On 20 July, Taejon fell into the enemy hands and Major General Dean, Commanding the 24th US Division became missing in action at the city. After being in the mountains for about a month, he was taken prisoner by the Communists.

After the fall of Taejon, it was a desperate race for space against time—for space on the part of the enemy, and for time on the part of the UN forces.

By the end of July, ROK and US units were squeezed into the Naktong Perimeter, where three US and five ROK divisions slugged it out against ten NK divisions, an armored division and two separate regimental sized-units.

Throughout July, men, arms and ammunition had begun to flow into the port of Pusan. The 1st US Cavalry Division was sent into action to relieve the 24th US Division moving to Yongdong. In addition, 29th US Infantry RCT arrived in Korea from Okinawa on 26 July, while 5th US RCT and 1st US Marine Brigade came in from Hawaii and US continent respectively. The 27th British Brigade also arrived from Hong Kong in late August. By the end of that month the UN forces had over 500 M-26s and M-4s, as against the 100 or so T-34s which it was estimated all the enemy left in running order.

The UNC ground strength rose to about 180,000 including 92,000 ROK troops, of which a proportion were in labour units. By 19 August, the 2nd US Division had arrived in Korea.

By the end of August, although it gained considerable ground, the enemy manpower loss was greatly mounting and was unable to exploit his limited success. By now lengthened supply lines caused the enemy to reduce his initiative.

In late August, the weight of enemy attacks increased, but by mid-September, despite continuing enemy pressure, UNC ground forces firmly held the Naktong River defense line. Thus, as the NK Communists lost irreplaceable men and equipment, UNC forces acquired an offensive capability.

The Inchon Landing

Against the gloomy prospect of trading space for time, General MacArthur, at the early days of the war, had perceived that the deeper the Communist drove, the more vulnerable to a decisive, amphibious envelopment.

On 15 September, X US Corps had landed at Inchon, and by the morning on
the 16th, the city was under control. The landing at Inchon and recapture of Seoul by 28 September, was a stunning tactical blow by the United Nations Command that broke the backbone of the enemy forces, and led to their great defeat.

**Breakout to the 38th Parallel**

The Inchon landing had also been the signal for the rest of the UNC ground forces to breakout the Nakdong Perimeter. On 16 September, ROK and Eighth US Army forces attacked out of the perimeter and gained slowly at first; but on 23 September, after the portent of X Corps’ envelopment and the Eighth Army’s frontal attack became clear, the NK Red forces broke. The Eighth Army, by then organized as four corps, two ROK and two US, rolled forward in pursuit, linking with the X Corps units on 27 September at Osan.

The breakout netted more than 12,000 prisoners and about 30,000 NK troops escaped above the 38th Parallel. By the end of September the enemy forces ceased to exist as an organized force anywhere in the south.

**North to the Yalu**

On the east coast, the I ROK Corps crossed the 38th Parallel on 1 October and rushed for north to capture Wonsan on 10 October. The II ROK Corps at nearly the same time opened an advance through central North Korea; and on 9 October, after the United Nations sanctioned crossing the Parallel, I US Corps moved north in the west. Against slight resistance friendly forces captured Pyongyang on the 19th and in five days advanced to the Chongchon River. The II ROK Corps veered northwest to come alongside. To the east, I ROK Corps units were continuing their offensive against scattered opposition. On 20 October, the III ROK Corps became operational. The UN forces hot pursuit, chasing the fleeing enemy, was in full swing. By 26 October, elements of the 6th ROK Division had already advanced to the Yalu River at Chosan.

Meanwhile, more UNC contingents were arriving: The 29th British Brigade, Turkish Brigade, and Canadian, Thailand and Netherlands Battalions. Many thought them too late, because the enemy forces were nearly in dying condition.

By the end of October, the NK Communist army had dissolved; 135,000 prisoners had been taken. Thus, the outlook for the UN forces in the last week of October was distinctly optimistic. For all practical purposes, the Communists
appeared to exist only as a "rat in a trap, and on 24 October General MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army and X Corps for attacks that he hoped would carry these forces to the northmost border before the onset of the winter. General MacArthur did not aware there was something in the offing.

Chinese Communist Aggression – The New War

In November, friendly activities centered mainly around the preparation for further offensive in the latter part of the month. On 24 November, Eighth US Army began its final offensive to end the war in which little contact was saw with the enemy during the first day. On the following day the attack units continued the advance against increasing enemy resistance. But soon the situation was to change with devastating suddenness. On the night of 26–27 November, the entire II ROK Corps was under heavy enemy pressure. The Turkish Brigade was repeatedly ambushed and the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was blocked by heavy concentration of Chinese Communist troops. Elsewhere along the Eighth Army front there was Chinese Communist pressure. By the 28th, the Eighth Army units were withdrawing southwards, with the Chinese Communist forces hot on their heels.

To the east, meanwhile, on 21 November, units of the 7th US Division had taken Hyesanjin on the Yalu River, and the Capital ROK Division captured Chongjin on the coast. There was little contact with the Chinese Communist forces until 20 November, when the main action took place near the Changjin Reservoir. The UN Command ordered the X US Corps on the 30th to withdraw from northeast Korea against an anticipated CCF attack. The long, dangerous withdrawal to Hungnam began, and the evacuation of the I ROK and X US Corps units began from there on 12 December.

Thus, the ROK and UN allied forces missed a golden opportunity when the unification of the Korean peninsula was in sight within a matter of hours, not because of neglect, but because the Chinese Communists provoked aggression into Korea, thus turning the tide of war into an entirely new phase of war.

On 23 December, General Walker was killed in a road accident, and Lt. General Matthew B. Ridgway took command of the Eighth US Army on the 24th, the day the Eighth Army fell back across the 38th Parallel.

On 27 December, the X Corps became a part of the Eighth Army. Now, UNC ground forces were to stabilize a defense line as quickly as possible, and then to stimulate their units into a counteroffensive. But, after daybreak on 1 January 1951, following a night-long volley of fire, 500,000 enemy troops, comprising of
seven CCF armies and two NK Communist corps, attacked down all along the front, making their main effort against the I and IX US Corps on the UNC left flank and center. In the face of this overwhelming onslaught in numbers, the ROK and UN forces once again abandoned Seoul on 4 January.

Thereafter, the new enemy did not pursue far below the capital city, while farther east a major CCF-NK Communist attack drove down Wonju. By mid-January, the enemy push had begun to diminish. The Communist forces ran out of gas. Friendly forces lined up along the Pyongtaek–Samchok line, and General Ridgway ordered ground forces to wage battle of maneuver in an effort to inflict maximum enemy casualties, “slashing at the enemy when he withdraws and fighting delaying actions when he attacks.”

Thus, the UN forces once again began a methodical, limited advance on 25 January 1951, when I and IX US Corps started a cautious probing attack northward, called Operation Thunderbolt. This operation would follow up by Operations Killer, Ripper and Rugged which would carry the UN forces forward: “Thunderbolt” met little resistance until 30 January, then the enemy began fighting obstinate delaying actions below Seoul, only to withdraw suddenly on 9 February. Inchon and Kimpo Airfield were recovered on the 10th in the west, while Wonju was taken in the center.

On 5 February, the X US and III ROK Corps had begun a similar offensive. On the night of the 11th, a large CCF-NK Red forces counteracted against the 3rd, 5th and 8th ROK Divisions, and with followed-up forces, they drove toward Wonju. At Chipyong-ni, their advance struck the 23rd US Regiment and the French Battalion, but was beaten off in three days of hard fighting. Farther east, NK hordes threatened Chechon, but were contained.

By 18 February, however, the enemy, crippled by a shortage of supplies and constant UNC air attacks, had begun to slip away northward. Now the tide of situation was shifted to UNC’s turn. On 21 February UN forces again attacked in the center, while forces in the west also resumed the advance on 7 March and found Seoul abandoned on the night of 14 March. This operation, called “Ripper,” was very successful from the beginning and it had pushed the enemy forces above the 38th Parallel by the end of March.

On 5 April, UN forces were again on the move toward a new objective, Line Kansas, roughly 16 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. It was coded “Rugged” that succeeded “Ripper.” After reaching the objective line at mid-April, General Ridgway ordered his forces to advance to Line Wyoming to seize the Iron Triangle area in the west — central zone. But suddenly, on 22 April, enemy resistance became notice all along the whole front.
Dismissal of General MacArthur

General MacArthur, meanwhile, clashed with US President Truman over the extension of the war beyond the Korean border. Seeking a decisive military victory, he wanted to hit the complex of CCF bases in Manchurian sanctuary just north of the Yalu River. President Truman, fearful of enlarging the Korean War, probably to a general or global war, was decided to limit it to Korea.

The sudden, dramatic turn of the tide of war in November 1950 gave a deep shock not only to the ROK people but also to Western opinion. Hopes of a united Korea vanished as did the hope of an early end to the fighting. Another fact that shook the West was the realization that Communist China was now a military power. In consequence, General MacArthur came in for criticism, especially over the failure of his intelligence service which had failed to anticipate Chinese Communist intentions, and to foresee the huge number of CCF soldiers that had poured secretly into Korea.

As a result, on 11 April, President Truman relieved General MacArthur and named General Ridgway as his successor. On 14 April, General Ridgway turned over the command of the Eighth US Army to Lt. General James A. Van Fleet.

CCF Major Offensives

On the night of 22 April 1951, 21 CCF plus nine NK Communist divisions launched heavy attacks in western sector and lighter attacks in the east, with the major effort aiming at Seoul. The UN forces withdrew step by step to pre-established defenses north of Seoul at where they finally contained the enemy advance. The enemy was seriously hit by friendly artillery and airpower.

Enemy forces renewed their determined attack again in a full-scale after darkness on 15 May, this time directing their hardest thrust on the ROK divisions in the east-central sector. The ROK and UNC allied forces exacted heavy enemy casualties by placing more troops in the path of the enemy attack and laying down tremendous weight of artillery fire, thus again repulsing the Red hordes by 19 May. It was the UNC's turn to take up the offensive. Determined to prevent the enemy from regathering strength for another offensive, General Van Fleet ordered UNC ground forces forward in counterattack. The enemy forces, disorganized after their own attacks, resisted only where their supply installations were threatened. Elsewhere, all friendly forces advanced almost surprising ease and
Ground Operations

by 31 May was back on Line Kansas. The next day, part of the UNC ground forces advanced toward Line Wyoming in the Iron Triangle and occupied it by 11 June. Two days later tank-infantry task forces moved to Pyonggang, but withdrew to the Chorwon area.

Armistice Talks – The Static War

As the first year of the war drew to a close, the enemy activity began to slacken down, indicating, without doubt, that the enemy had been mortally hurt, particularly during their two major offensives in April and May. The enemy losses within a month span from 22 April to May 1951 ran as high as 200,000 men. They lost their will to fight any longer, and finally sought to gain their plot not on the battle ground but on the talking front.

On 23 June 1951, when UNC forces were well above the 38th parallel and ensconced on favorable terrain, the Russian delegate to the United Nations proposed cease-fire negotiations, implying Chinese and NK Communists' willingness to discuss a truce.

President Truman authorized General Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief, UN Command, to arrange armistice talks with the Communist forces. On 10 July, the armistice conference met for the first time at Kaesong. The enemy initially turned it into a propaganda farce to prove that the UN forces had been defeated and was suing for peace.

Both sides agreed that the fighting would continue until a truce agreement was signed, but no more large ground offensives were mounted by either side during the remainder period of the war. Two opposing forces prepared their defenses stronger behind screens of outposts and patrols. But fierce clashes between these outpost positions were taken place ceaselessly as both sides fought valiantly for a defensive boundary. During this positional warfare along what is now the Demilitarized Zone, peculiar names of battle sites, such as Little Gibraltar, Old Baldy, Porkchop, Arrowhead, White Horse, Triangle Hill, Finger Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, Bloody Ridge, and the Punchbowl Hill would become famous.

Late in August 1951, the truce talks broke down. General Van Fleet thereupon launched a series of limited attacks to strengthen the UNC defense line, clear the Punchbowl area, and drive the enemy farther back from the Hwachon Reservoir and the Chorwon-Seoul railroad.
By late October, all objectives had been secured, and the enemy interested in resuming the truce negotiations. The talks were shifted to Panmunjom. On 12 November 1951, the UN Command ordered General Van Fleet to cease offensive operations and begin an “active defense.”

During 1952, the enemy forces steadily increased to an estimated 850,000; modern Russian-built artillery appeared in large quantities and was employed with increased skill. Bitter and bloody battles far capture and control of key outpost along the entire front flared up during the summer. General Mark W. Clark succeeded General Ridgway on 12 May, when the UN Command was seriously concerned with the Communist prisoner riots on Koje-do. Ground action continued to be minor but constant. In early October, a CCF attack struck I and IX US Corps boundary northwest of Chorwon; the French Battalion defeated it, and the Ethiopian Battalion distinguished itself in severe action.

The intensity of the fighting during November showed a marked decline over that of the previous month and the battle front became more quiet as the winter deepened.

On 11 February 1953, Lt. General Maxwell D. Taylor assumed command of the Eighth US Army from General Van Fleet, when most of ground fighting was still confined to patrol clashes and harassing attacks against outposts by both sides.

On the talking war front, meanwhile, General Clark, in the hope of prompting a resumption of truce negotiations, proposed in February to the Communists that the two sides exchange sick and wounded prisoners, and near the end of March, about three weeks after the death of Josep Stalin, the enemy expressed a willingness to accept the proposal. With that, the armistice conference resumed in April, and an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was carried out that same month.

In May, as negotiations at Panmunjom appeared a decisive stage, the Communist forces began launching a series of determined attacks. Beginning on 11 May, the enemy made limited objective attacks with forces ranging in strength from company to regiment. For the most part, these attacks were directed against outposts and MLR positions held by the IX US and II ROK Corps with attacks on a smaller scale in the I US Corps sector.

A large battle flared on 10 June when the Communist forces launched the attacks with their main effort directing at the II ROK Corps east of the Pukhan River. They penetrated to some depth, suffering a heavy toll of casualties.

On 18 June, President Rhee, who from the beginning had objected to any armistice that left Korea divided, ordered the release of 27,000 anti-Communist prisoners who had refused repatriation. This historical action was replied by
another violent Communist attack on 12 July. Six CCF divisions, aiming at wresting more ground from UNC control before reaching an armistice, struck against positions held by the II ROK and IX US Corps in the Kumsong area. It was the strongest Communist offensive to have taken place since their April–May offensives in 1951. The friendly forces contained the enemy onslaught and then counterattacked. But General Taylor halted the attack when the II ROK Corps advanced to and seized a line along the Kumsong River compartment on 20 July short of the original line since by that date the armistice negotiations had come to a final point.

After a week of dealing with administrative matters, The Military Armistice Agreement, signed at 1000 hours on 27 July 1953 at Panmunjom, put an end to the three years of bloody fighting and destruction effective at 2200 hours that night.

During the fighting the United Nations Forces in the field totalled, at peak strength, almost three quarters of a million men – about 400,000 ROKs, 250,000 Americans, and 35,000 of other UNC member countries. In the 37th months of fighting, total UNC casualties reached over 550,000, including almost 95,000 dead. The estimate of enemy casualties, including prisoners, exceeded 1,500,000, (estimated at two millions), of which 900,000, almost two-thirds, were Chinese Communists.
CHAPTER III NAVAL OPERATIONS

Introduction

At the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, with so few allied combat forces initially available in the theater of operation, control of the seas was a prerequisite in implementing the United Nations decision to repel the NK Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea. Without the capability to use the seas, the decision would have been meaningless and unenforceable.

In response to the UN's call, naval ships of the free world nations converged on Korea from every one of the seven seas in support of the Republic. The ships came under the command of US Naval Forces, Far East, as they arrived in the Korean theater of operations and became components of the United Nations naval forces.

Although the bulk of the UNC naval ships belonged to the United States, as many as ten other UN member nations provided their ships varying from carriers to frigates, the British ships being the second largest in number. Usually attached to the Blockade and Escort Force, under Task Force 95, these ships joined with US Navy vessels in the constant surveillance of both east and west coasts of Korea. They effectively prevented the Communist enemy from re-supplying his forces by sea or from redeploying his forces or making amphibious assaults against UNC ground forces.

The UNC naval forces, represented by Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States in alphabetical order, relentlessly struck the Communist aggressors from the outset and quickly secured control of the sea lanes of supply and the sea approaches to the Korean peninsula and continued to remain in control until the end of the war. Thus, the UNC forces could freely move, land, and evacuate their troops and supplies throughout the three years of the Korean War.

The general activities of the following three task forces, which actually formed the UNC naval forces, give some idea of the overall UNC naval operations during the Korean War:

(1) Fast Carrier Task Force 77, which normally included two Essex class carriers,
a supporting cruiser and a destroyer screen, ranged up and down the Korean east coast in the Eastern Sea, launching air strikes against the Communist enemy principally in close air support missions and in interdiction of the enemy supplies flowing southward from the Manchurian border. (2) Second of the task forces, and largest in number of ships, was the United Nations Blockade and Escort Force, Task Force 95. Ships of this force included carriers, a battleship, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, minesweepers and many miscellaneous vessels. They effectively covered almost the entire coast line of Korea, sweeping mines, destroying enemy shipping and fishing boats, protecting supplies lines, and bombarding enemy troop concentrations, emplacements and supply points. (3) Task Force 90, the amphibious force, made military history at Inchon, Hungnam, Chinnampo and Wonsan. Between such major operations, this force was maintained in a high state of readiness to carry out landing or redeployment missions when and where required.

In retrospect it is not too much to say that without command of the seas in the Korean theater of operations, the Korean War, as fought, most certainly would have been lost both militarily and politically, simply because the operations by ground and air forces in Korea were completely dependent on a steady flow of personnel and supplies, the bulk of which came across the vast Pacific Ocean.

The First Year of War
(June 1950 – June 1951)

On 25 June 1950, when the North Korean Communist forces invaded the free Republic of Korea, the United States naval forces in Japanese waters consisted of one cruiser, the USS Juneau, and four destroyers. Operating out of the Philippines was the Seventh Fleet, consisting of the Essex class carrier Valley Forge, the heavy cruiser Rochester and a squadron of destroyers. Visiting Japanese ports at the time were approximately ten British Commonwealth ships of the Far East Station including the light carrier Triumph and the cruiser Belfast. In a matter of weeks this light naval force became a formidable fleet of nearly 400 ships.

On 29 June 1950, a salvo of shells from the cruiser USS Juneau near Chumunjin announced to the enemy the beginning of the UNC naval forces’ direct support of the United Nations’ war effort in Korea. Following this first salvo the naval forces were tirelessly directed from Pusan to the Yalu, by air, from the sea and on land, in support of the ground forces as the battle lines surged south, then north, then south again.

On July 2 1950, the UN naval units engaged and destroyed five out of a group
of six NK Communist motor torpedo boats off the east coast near Samchok. Two days later a blockade of the Korean peninsula was ordered and systematic destruction of enemy naval forces began with the sinking by the cruiser *Juneau* of six more enemy ships.

Naval air power was thrown into the war on 3 July, when Corsairs, Skyraiders and Panther jet fighters, launched from the USS *Valley Forge* in the Western Sea, struck enemy airfields in the Pyongyang area. The first two days of action by US Navy and British Navy carrier pilots resulted in the destruction of two YAK-9s in the air, eight other enemy planes on Pyongyang airfield, 13 locomotives, three trains, two gunboats, trucks, airplane-hangers, bridge approaches and enemy troops.

Early in August the 1st US Marine Brigade stepped ashore in Korea and took their place beside other UN ground forces attempting to stem the Communist advance down the peninsula. The day following the Marine landing, Marine flyers from the escort carriers USS *Badoeng Strait* and USS *Sicily* saw their first Korean action as they struck enemy targets in the Chinju sector.

As August ended, UN ground forces had turned the enemy and had begun attacks which were to carry them successfully to the Manchurian border. On 15 September, at Inchon on the west coast of Korea, the Navy put ground forces ashore which stabbed toward Seoul and the center of the peninsula. Enemy forces, fleeing from the south, were forced into a disorganized retreat to the north of the 38th Parallel.

The name of the battleship USS *Missouri* appeared in the war news on the same day when her 16-inch guns began a bombardment of the east coast port of Wonsan, intending to divert enemy strength from the center and western part of the lines. She continued to throw the weight of her big guns against the enemy targets for six months, then was relieved by the newly recommissioned battleship USS *New Jersey*.

With November came the apparent death blow to North Korean organized resistance. But the Chinese Communists countered UN success with overwhelming numbers pouring down into Korea from Manchuria. The tide again turned and UNC ground forces found themselves faced with the bleak prospects of withdrawing hastily in the sub-zero cold and blizzards of December and January.

Again UN naval units played their appropriate role. Thousands of friendly Korean civilians were evacuated from the Chinnampo area. Then UN troops reached the ports of Wonsan, Inchon and Hungnam and the greatest redeployment by sea in history began.

During the two-week period ending on 24 December, 193 ships of various
types removed 105,000 military personnel, 91,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles and 340 tons of supplies from the Hungnam beach alone, including the valiant Marines who fought their way down to the sea from encirclement at Changjin.

The longest sustained naval bombardment of a city in history began in mid-February. By the first anniversary of the war the east coast port of Wonsan had been shelled by naval guns for 130 consecutive days. During the siege more than 8,000 enemy casualties were reported, with highway bridges, buildings, railroad facilities and gun emplacements receiving terrible damage from gunfire. At Songjin, 60 miles north of Wonsan, the enemy had been receiving a daily diet of shells from sea-based artillery since the second week in March.

The following naval activities by each task force were characteristic of the first year period of the war.

The Naval Surface Operations: The UN ships patrolled thousands of miles of coast, bombarding enemy targets such as rail lines, vehicles, bridges and road junctions. More than 1700 junks, sampans and other small vessels were sunk or destroyed.

The accurate fire of blockade ships, from the 16-inch naval guns of the battleships USS Missouri and USS New Jersey, to the 20 millimeter batteries of minesweepers, effectively denied to the enemy the use of rail and road lines along the coasts. He was forced to move his supply lines inland or to use coastal routes only at night. Even during darkness the ships teamed up with Air Force and Navy intruder planes to blast enemy truck convoys and other supply movements, lighting a suspected area with star shells, then firing according to the air spotter's directions.

UN minesweepers were constantly busy since the opening days of the war, combating the menace of extensive minefields sowed on both coasts by the Communists. Four US sweeps were sunk by mines in carrying out their missions. Three destroyers were damaged by underwater explosions attributed to mines.

The little sweeping vessels preceded the amphibious assaults at Inchon and Wonsan, cleared the assault areas of mines so that the big ships and landing craft could approach the beach. Despite the exhausting aspects of their work, which constantly varies between the extreme tension of danger and the boredom of routine, the sweeps continued to maintain clear channels for UNC ships on both coasts as well as to seek out and chart unexplored minefields. Every means of spotting enemy mines were employed, including helicopters and patrol planes.

During amphibious operations, the Blockade and Escort ships joined with the fast transports, combat cargo and landing ships, helping to neutralize the
beachhead area with thousands of rounds of shellfire. For example, at Hungnam, naval units maintained a protective ring of bombardment around the ground troops as the latter withdrew to the docks and boarded naval transports.

Some of the blockade ships had a chance to vary their duties by joining the carrier task forces as protecting anti-aircraft and anti-submarine screen ships.

The Naval Air Operations: Off shore, in the Eastern Sea and in the Yellow Sea, carrier planes were launched round-the-clock for close and deep support of friendly ground forces in Korea. Navy and Marine pilots flew more than 67,000 sorties during the first year of war, losing 300 aircraft in the period.

As evidence of their ability to deliver destruction to the enemy statistics show that Corsaire and Skyraider aircraft splashed more than a million pounds of deadly napalm on enemy targets in less than a year.

Naval airmen fought a different kind of war over Korea than during World War II. There were practically no effective air opposition since the first few weeks of the war, and targets were enemy troops, supply lines and supply dumps rather than hostile aircraft, enemy ships and tropical island bases. Through weather ranging from the edges of typhoons to the extreme cold of Korean winter, the planes hammered relentlessly at the enemy from just a few yards past UNC front lines to within sight of the Yalu River. They provided an air “umbrella” which protected the ground forces in their retreat from the north after the Chinese Communists’ invasion; they pin-pointed strategic targets such as bridges, road junctions, rail lines and vehicles to such an extent that Communist supply traffic on the east coast of Korea dropped from about 40 per cent of the total southward traffic to about one per cent in a period of a few months. Although close air support by Navy and Marine pilots were of great value, probably the Navy’s most important achievement in direct attack upon the enemy were the sustained interruption of Communist supply traffic toward their front lines from the Manchurian border. Forced off the road and rail lines by the incessant bombing, rocketing and napalming of supply routes, the Reds took to using pack animals and even civilians to carry the necessary thousands of tons of supplies southward.

Military officials estimated that the Communist spring offensive, which proved so costly to them in men and material, was delayed week after week past their planned kick-off date because of the effectiveness of the air interdiction by UNC planes.

The enemy’s appreciation of this effectiveness was shown in his tremendous increase in anti-aircraft weapons, which he placed over the entire North Korean area at locations likely to be attacked by UNC aircraft. By requiring the enemy
to devote so much effort to protecting himself from air attack, the UN air forces further limited the Communists’ ability to bring down their own offensive weapons and reinforcements.

The record showed that Navy and Marine pilots accounted for 6,500 enemy troops in only 380 sorties during the Red spring offensive.

Marine Air Wing pilots were operating from both land and ships bases. From Korean airfields, they flew hundreds of missions in support of Marines and other ground forces in the front lines. These missions often saw Marine pilots called to bomb, rocket or napalm enemy troops and gun positions within a hundred or so yards of friendly troops. Marines also operated from the little escort carriers such as the USS Sicily and USS Badoeng Strait off the Korean coast in the Yellow Sea.

The records of naval aviation saw many “firsts” entered in the books. Grumman Panther jet fighters met enemy jets in aerial combat for the first time in Navy history; in April, 1951 jet fighters carrying bombs were launched from carriers for the first time; Douglas Skyraider attack bombers made their first drop of aerial torpedoes -- against the Hwachon Reservoir gates -- and the first use of those weapons since World War II.

The Amphibious Operations: The “amphibs” made history at Inchon in September 1950, when, despite natural conditions such as 30-foot tides, treacherous channels and dangerous currents, they successfully landed Marine assault troops together with 7,000 tons of supplies on the first day of the attack.

Other amphibious operations which brought the attack transports, combat cargo ships, LSTs, rocket launching landing ships and the specialized groups of large and small landing craft into action, took place at Chimaipo, Wonsan, Pohang, Iwon and Hungnam. The ability of UN forces to land or withdraw by sea contributed substantially to the defense of the Republic of Korea.

Between operations, amphibious units were called upon to carry out a variety of missions for which the vessels are peculiarly suited. And even as they carried the fighting to the enemy, the amphibious men learned valuable lessons from the problems presented by the peculiarities of Korean hydrography.

But behind the naval combat forces, and without which their effectiveness would have been extremely limited, stood the service forces -- the transports, supply ships, reefers, oilers and ammunition ships which kept the Navy in action month after month despite the appalling distance of the scene from home bases. Across 4,000 or more miles of ocean, through every kind of weather which the Pacific area can present, the thousands of men and the millions of tons of equipment and supplies of every sort had been carried in Navy and Military Sea
Transport Service vessels. The bombs, rockets, shells and other explosives which daily blast the enemy were carried by ammunition ships from the United States to Japan and from Japanese depots to the task force ships at sea off Korea.

The Second and Third Years of War
(July 1951 – July 1953)

With the commencement of the "truce talks" on 10 July certain aspects which were hitherto tactically unimportant assumed significance. One of the proposed locations for a neutral site was aboard a neutral ship in Wonsan harbor, which was rejected by the Communists. With the agreement that Kaesong be the site, the UNC Navy put into effect an operation to indicate that the Communists did not control the area about that city as they had contended. This was in the form of a carrier bombardment of the city of Haeju to the west of Kaesong, and bombardment of the area surrounding Kaesong by ships in the Han River approaches. The effect of the operation upon the truce talks was quite considerable when the truce delegates in late July took up the question of the military demarcation line. Especially the Han River operation, conducted mainly by the British ships, lasted until 27 November 1951, at which time the armistice negotiators agreed upon a provisional cease fire line. The disputed territory was recognized as in UNC hands.

Also in July an interesting operation took place off the west coast. A Russian MIG-15 which had crashed in shallow water was recovered. Besides providing the salvage personnel for the operation, the UNC Navy provided gunfire support, and air cover for the salvage ships. This was the second attempt which the Navy had made to salvage a MIG-15. The earlier attempt had been unsuccessful due to inability to locate the sunken craft in the vicinity of Taehwa-do. At that time the enemy retaliated in attacking the task unit with 3 YAK type aircraft, two of which were shot down by the ROK Navy.

During the August—October period the UNC naval operations complemented the air and ground attacks for the most part. Naval and Marine aircraft struck at the Communist communications, supply areas and troop positions, and although weather conditions were unfavorable during much of August, they mounted over 7,300 sorties.

During the bombing of Najin on 25 August, the naval fighters escorted the B-29s -- the first time that this had happened during the Korean War. And when the Air Force launched its rail-cutting program in September, the naval squadrons from Task Force 77 shifted from close support and bridge interdiction operations
and helped to cripple the enemy rail transport.

Task Force 77, with British naval aircraft assistance, struck at Wonsan on 18–19 September and then raided Kojo on 10 October with Australian carrier planes participating in the attack. The US Marine aviation in the meantime concentrated on close air support and provided air strikes along the front lines for the limited ground offensives.

Naval surface craft, also furnished aid and assistance to the ground forces with the resumption of naval gunfire support in the I ROK Corps sector in August. To create a diversion on the east coast and draw the NK Communist forces away from the X US and I ROK Corps area during the August offensive, General Ridgway ordered ComNavFE to carry out a large-scale amphibious demonstration at Changjin.

On 31 August the amphibious forces arrived at the target area. First the fire support group poured high explosives on the beach with the US battleship New Jersey providing the big guns. When the surface craft completed their task, naval air forces followed with a rocket saturation of the beach area. Landing boats were lowered from the transports and the troops took their stations. After a pass at the beach, they returned to their mother ships and the surface craft moved in for a few final salvos. The operation was completed without any incidents or losses and probably caused some anxious moments among the NK Communist defenders around Changjin.

Farther north the UNC naval forces continued their siege of Wonsan. Daily this important enemy port received naval bombardment. Twice during August 1951 British Marine Commandos landed near Wonsan and raided enemy installations. On 5 October Hungnam was also bombarded, but the resistance to this move proved intense. During the fight the USS Ernest G. Small, a radar picket destroyer, was mined and suffered heavy damage.

Naval blockade along the coast, surface raids, and bombardment behind the front lines, and naval gunfire to assist the ground attack formed but one side of the coin. On the other lay the close air support of the Marine squadrons, the interdiction cooperation of the Navy planes and their service as escort fighters. Although the interdiction operations in the air were more widely publicized, the UNC naval surface vessels also contributed greatly to the effort, especially along the eastern coast of North Korea. During poor flying weather the guns of the fleet destroyers kept the coastal railroad under fire. The destroyer barrage could not make the initial break in the rails, but they could help keep the line out by harassing fire.

Along the east coast, the heavy ships such as USS New Jersey, Wisconsin, Toledo, Los Angeles, Rochester, and St. Paul, and the light cruiser Manchester
supported the I ROK Corps during November and December close to the bombline. Farther north British Marine Commando units carried out several raids on Tanchon and one on Wonsan Harbor during December 1951.

Defense of Islands: In the meantime, the Communists became active on the coastal islands. Under cover of night they landed raiding parties on offshore islands held by ROK adherents north of the 38th Parallel. The vulnerability of many of these islands lying close to the coast to seizure by determined enemy efforts led ComNavFE to seek ways and means to strengthen the guerrilla garrisons. By adding ROK Marine units as reinforcements to the guerrillas, Admiral Joy hoped to stiffen defensive capabilities. On 6 January 1952 the responsibility for island defense north of the 38th Parallel was turned over to the Navy, and Task Force 95 was given the task of providing support for the ROK Marines and guerrillas holding the outposts.

As the island defenses were lightened, the Communists encountered more resistance in their amphibious attempts. In February a battalion-sized attack on the island of Yang-do about twenty miles northeast of Songjin on the east coast was repulsed as United States and New Zealand surface vessels helped the ROK Marines and guerrillas. Eleven sampans were sunk by naval gunfire and over 75 of the attacking forces were killed. After this setback the enemy shifted his attack back to the west coast and in March overwhelmed the ROK Marine garrison on a small island between Cho-do and Sok-to in the Chinnampo approaches and eliminated the ROK defenders.

At Cho-do improved defensive arrangements were followed by the installation of radar and antiaircraft weapons in February, and in March by a helicopter detachment; these facilities, together with naval patrol of the surrounding waters and a rescue B-29 which orbited overhead, made the Cho-do area a useful bail-out and rescue zone for pilots from the Yellow Sea carrier and from the Fifth Air Force. Elsewhere the offshore positions continued to provide bases for intelligence and guerrilla activity.

Maximum Effort Strikes: So far in the Korean War interdiction on transportation facilities had been primary missions flown by the naval aircraft, but the interdiction policy began to be modified somewhat in an attempt to counter the Communist's ability to quickly repair rail and road damage. This new policy was a coordinated air-gun strike on vital enemy targets. Three such strikes were made in April 1952. They were to continue as routine until the end of the war. The first one consisted of several heavy ships lying off Chongjin, backed up by destroyers, shelling that city. At the same time more than 240 UNC aircraft hit the same area. Wonsan sustained two such strikes during April, with Hungnam,
Songjin, and other coastal areas subsequent receiving their share of the punishment. The surface ships were equally pleased with the new system. The coordination of the firing with the bombing improved the accuracy of each while reducing the danger of all. But deserving targets were limited, and in June the work of the carrier air groups was shifted inland beyond gun range of the surface ship.

By June it was conceded that the enemy had changed some of his transportation policies, and the only way to further hamper his industrial war potential was to strike at his manufacturing facilities. This brought about one of the outstanding events of the war, with devastating raids made on North Korea’s huge hydro-electric plant complexes on 23 and 24 June. More than 200 aircraft of Task Force 77 teamed up with aircraft of the Air Force and Marine Corps to smash four power complexes. Among them was Supung, the Orient’s largest, and reputedly the world’s fourth largest hydro-electric plant. This was the largest air operation since WW II, and the first mission to employ aircraft from all services in Korea. The Naval air hit Pujon and Kyongson Reservoirs. The AF and MC hit Changjin Reservoir. The Supung attack was a joint operation in which the carrier pilots had the place of honor. A total of 11 hydro plants were put out of operation as a result of this attack.

In the course of the summer of 1952 the maximum effort strikes continued. On 11 July 822 Air Force, Marine, and Navy planes, led by 106 from USS Bon Homme Richard and Princeton, struck Pyongyang gun positions, supply and billeting areas, and factories. Although weather prevented the carriers from launching more than one strike group and hindered shore-based operations, the demolition of designated targets was extensive. On 20 August a sizable combined Navy-Marine-Air Force effort was conducted against a large west coast supply area.

On 29 August Pyongyang was again heavily attacked by Task Force 77 in an operation named “All United Nations Air Effort.” This second raid was even larger (1,403 sorties) than the (1,254 sorties) on 11 July. Everyone and his cousin got into the act this time, for in addition to aircrafts from Fifth Air Force, Task Force 77, and the Marine Aircraft Wing, the British carrier and the ROK Air Force also took part.

Like the earlier interdiction programs, the maximum effort strikes soon reached the stage of diminishing returns, and with the approach of autumn the activities of Task Force 77 returned gradually to the bombing. No support of ground forces had been provided by the fast carriers in the first six months of 1952. By August, however, an average of 12 sorties a day was being flown in support of X US Corps and I ROK Corps on the eastern front, and with
increasing ground action this contribution was to grow. Mid-summer had seen some enemy raids, September brought assaults on UNC outposts and increased artillery expenditure, and with October came the hardest fighting in more than a year. With these developments the ground support gained operational importance.

In the meantime UNC naval surface ships continued routine patrol and blockade of the Korean coast, mine sweeping operations, and the shelling of targets along the coast to harass and interdict the Communist lines of communication. For the I ROK Corps the naval surface guns provided splendid artillery support whether on offense or defense. But the biggest naval operation was the demonstration at Kojo on the east coast of Korea.

The Kojo Demonstration: This operation was planned to lure enemy defense forces into the open, thereby allowing a field day to UNC air and surface craft. Under Vice Admiral Clark, the Seventh Fleet Commander, Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven was set up and 15 October established as the target date. The demonstration was scheduled for the area near Kojo and planning for the land, sea, and air phases proceeded at a swift pace. For purposes of deception, only the highest echelon of command knew that the maneuver was to be only a demonstration. In this feint even the 187th Airborne Regiment was to be withdrawn and prepared for an airdrop and Eighth Army was to prepare for an offensive to link up with the amphibious forces simply to confuse enemy intelligence.

On 12 October rehearsal operations held at Kangnung ran into high surf conditions and had to be broken off. For the next three days, FEAF and naval planes hit the enemy positions around Kojo and naval surface craft, led by the US battleship Iowa, shelled the beach area. The assault troops climbed down to the assault landing craft in the early afternoon of 15 October and made a pass at the shore. Sudden high winds made recovery of the boats a difficult task, but there were no serious casualties.

The enemy response to the elaborate scheme was disappointing. Little evidence of significant troop transfers came to light and the Communist shore batteries threw only a few answering shells at the assault force. Whether this denoted a lack of mobility to respond quickly or perhaps a preference to wait until the UNC troops had landed and then to launch a counterattack was impossible to surmise. Evidently the discovery that the operation was only a feint added to the frustration of all the UNC personnel who had not been in on the secret. The realism of the planning and mounting of the operation had built up UNC expectations and although the training was adjudged valuable, the
damage to morale served to balance this off.

The Cherokee Strikes: The tacit admission of the failure of aerial interdiction which led to the coordinated maximum-effort strikes against industrial and other military targets in the enemy territory has already been mentioned. The maximum effort strikes, which began in June 1952, continued throughout the remainder of the year, but as the supply of suitable targets began to run out it was supplemented, beginning in October 1952, by what was called the “Cherokee strikes.” Cherokee strikes were designed to hit the enemy targets which were near the front line yet out of range of artillery fire and outside of the area normally covered by the close-support aircraft. This program met with considerable success and, except for a lull in January and February 1953, was continued throughout the war.

The first Cherokee strikes were flown on 9 October 1952. Three strikes, totalling 91 aircraft, were launched from USS Kearsarge, Princeton and Essex on troop and supply areas beyond the range of the X US Corps artillery. By mid-October Task Force 77 had gradually shifted a large portion of its strike effort to the Cherokee program until about 50 per cent of its air attack potential was being devoted to this type mission. This program met with a great success. Especially happy was the foot soldier in the line. To him, the various concepts of close support, its mechanics, and its method of control, were meaningless. To him, the sight of a large number of planes, from whatever source, demolishing enemy targets with heavy bombs was an exhilarating tonic. As always, damage assessment remained the problem, but POWs reported results in excess of the pilots’ estimates and UNC officers were high in their praise.

The Siege of Wonsan: On 16 February 1953, the UNC naval fleet celebrated its completion of a two year siege of Wonsan. This was the longest successful siege ever to have been maintained by the UNC naval forces. The city of Wonsan, formerly with a population of 108,000 had been reduced to a population of about 6,000 plus some 30,000 troops which had been maintained in the area to repel the UNC amphibious potential. In addition the industry had either been destroyed, driven out, or driven underground, which necessarily limited the extent of its operations.

But enemy pressure against the Wonsan harbor islands still continued to increase. Previous December a CincPacFleet appreciation had foreseen a Communist attempt to recapture the harbor islands, and this prospect was emphasized by the events of early spring. The record 523 rounds which fell upon the islands in March doubled in April, while another 553 rounds were aimed at the UN siege ships with great accuracy. From March through May 1953 five destroyers and
the cruisers *Los Angeles* and *Bremerton* were hit, and casualties were incurred both by their crews and by the island garrisons. April, May, and June witnessed the heaviest volume of enemy fire as the Communist fired approximately 1,600, 1,300, and 1,100 rounds respectively -- more than half of them at the siege ships.

The Red shore batteries in Wonsan were to succeed in neither of their missions: they could neither sink a ship nor could they drive the UN naval forces out of the harbor.

The harbor islands were abandoned on the day of the truce. Yo-do, with its more extensive installations, took longer to evacuate; equipment had to be removed, storage dumps emptied, fortifications destroyed. The last two ships to leave the harbor -- *USS Bremerton* and *Cunningham* -- did so on the late afternoon of 1 August.

The siege of Wonsan had demonstrated the courage and tenacity of the UNC naval forces. In a land-locked harbor which had been heavily mined and which the enemy had sought constantly to re-mine, where shallow, shoal-filled waters abounded, and despite the most intense enemy opposition, a siege of 861 days had been imposed with skill, determination, and success by a tireless and efficient team of the UNC naval personnel.
CHAPTER IV  AIR OPERATIONS

Control of the Skies

At the Opening of the War: In any war the foremost task for the air force is to secure and maintain "Air Superiority." The Korean War was no exception to this basic principle upon which all air doctrine is based. Air-superiority campaign under the limited conditions of the Korean War, however, did not resemble to those of the past, and the UNC air forces in many cases were prevented from fighting the war according to the established air doctrines.

For the first few weeks of the war, the US Far East Air Forces (FEAF) aircraft maintained an umbrella over the Republic of Korea, shooting down any North Korean Air Force (NKAF) aircraft that ventured south of 38th Parallel. As soon as the UNC air forces were given the green light to operate north to the Yalu River, a concentrated effort was directed against the Red North Korean airfields and aircraft on the ground. By late July, the NKAF had been reduced to a token force of not more than 18 aircraft. Thus, without hazard of hostile air attack, UNC ground forces could maneuver freely by day to resist the more powerful Communist ground forces, who were able to move and fight only at night.

On 1 November 1950, however, Russian-built jet fighters of the Chinese Communist Air Force made their initial appearance in Korean skies when MIG-15's attacked UNC F-51's over Namsidong. Eight days later the first MIG was destroyed by a US FEAF B-29 tail gunner. Thus, a new force, the CCAF, and new equipment, the MIG fighter, entered the Korean War.

The UNC air forces quickly encountered by dispatching its latest fighter aircraft, F-86 Sabrejets, to Korea, and thus the stage was set for the air-to-air fighting that was to continue for the remainder of the war.

Limitations on UNC Air Action: While the Korean air war was marked by many unusual aspects, the counterair phase was even more heavily influenced by considerations rendering it unique. For political reasons and in accord with U.S. JCS instructions, the United Nations Command maintained an artificial foul line, beyond which UNC aircraft were not authorized to fly without special order. Under no circumstances were UNC aircraft permitted to violate the
sanctity of the Manchurian or Siberian borders of Korea. This line of restriction constituted a barrier behind which enemy aircraft could take off, form, climb, and maneuver for penetration southward into the battle area completely unmolested. Moreover the enemy was able to withdraw from the battle area and recover for landing under the same conditions.

With a few exceptions the northwestern quarter of the Communist North Korea was the scene of counter-air operations. The sea in which the enemy was normally contacted was even more restricted, lying between the Chongchon and Yalu Rivers, bounded on the west by the Korean Bay and on the east by a line running roughly between the Supung Reservoir and the town of Huichon. This area was popularly called “MIG Alley.”

The MIG's were based just north of the Yalu River -- safe in Communist China. Based at the Antung, Tautungkou, Takushan, and Fenchen airfields, his short-range MIG interceptors could be quickly alerted and take off, form up climb to superior altitude, and maneuver for a speedy penetration southward, all the while remaining within the Manchurian sanctuary. The friendly Sabrejets each day would fly into the northern-most extreme of Korea, throwing down a challenging gauntlet to them. When the MIG's accepted the challenge and crossed the river, the Sabrejets destroyed them. The Communist air force was pursued just as relentlessly on the ground in the Communist North Korea wherever he appeared.

A major puzzle was Communist persistence in constructing new airfields in Red North Korea without any sizable attempt to operate aircraft from them. By the end of the first year, the Communists were constructing 34 airfields with runways of 5,000 feet or longer. These airfields were under regular surveillance by air reconnaissance, and runways persistently were bombed whenever repairs neared completion. Yet no military profit was returned by these airfields, except possibly in absorbing a certain percentage of the total bomb tonnage which otherwise might have been dispatched to more sensitive targets. However, the threat posed by these bases was such that their continued neutralization was imperative, and the last great UNC air offensive of the Korean War was an intensive campaign aimed at rendering unserviceable all Red North Korean airfields, thus denying the Communists a Red North Korean air force in being when the armistice was signed.

Air-to-Air Combat: Early in the Korean War UNC airmen were able to destroy most of the Communist North Korean Air Force on the ground at its airfields, where counterair efforts are always most effective. Beginning on 1 November 1950 and through January 1951, however, small formations of MIG's appeared intermittently in small sections, seldom venturing more than a few miles south
of Yalu, their common tactics being hit and run passes against UNC aircraft. As the Red air strength increased between February and April 1951, MIG's were frequently engaged over the Sonchon-Taechon area, still well within the relative safety of "MIG Alley."

During May and June 1951 the MIG's edged down to the end of "MIG Alley," being frequently encountered over Sinanju and showing themselves to scattered observations as far south as Pyongyang. In late summer and autumn of 1951 the Communists made their bid for air superiority in tactics employing superior numbers of inferior pilots in maneuvers calculated to encircle and overwhelm the UNC air forces. Day after day the enemy committed more than 100 MIG's in pincer and envelopment tactics. Often a force of 60 to 80 MIG's crossed into Korea in the vicinity of Supung on a southeastern heading, dropping off flights or small sections to engage UNC Sabre patrols north of the Chongchon.

Evaluation of the patterns of Communist air activities clearly indicated that the Reds began to implement a new air campaign designed to establish air superiority over MIG Alley in the latter part of July 1951. Exploiting their numerical and altitude superiority, the Red airmen evaded Sabre patrols at the Yalu and then continued southward at altitudes above 35,000 feet as far as Pyongyang, where they turned back and left down to attack the fighter-bombers they sighted while en route homeward to Antung. Effective on 1 June 1951, the US FEAF had already placed MIG Alley off limits for all Bomber Command aircraft not accompanied by fighter escort. Now the Red tactics hazarded unescorted jet-reconnaissance planes and fighter-bombers.

As the truce talks at Kaesong had broken down on 23 August, and since the "Operation Strangle" had commenced 18 August 1951 to hammer the Red North Korea's railway lines of communications, the Communist air forces, employing an order of battle which had grown to 525 MIG's, launched into a bitter and all-out air campaign on 1 September 1951. As many as 90 MIG's now entered into the Red North Korea at one time, and with so many aircraft in the skies the Reds employed practically any formation they desired. During September 1951 pilots of the 4th US Fighter-interceptor Wing sighted 1,177 MIG sorties over the Communist North Korea and engaged 911 of the MIG's in combat.

All through the month of October 1951 the Communist air forces were operating at high tide over the Red North Korea and the UNC air superiority was in jeopardy. During the month UNC pilots had sighted 2,573 airborne MIG's, and 2,166 of these MIG sorties had been willing to engage in combat with the UNC aircraft. Made bold by their success, the Communist moved their aircraft across the Yalu to Sinuiju and Uiju airfields. For the first time some 26 MIG's
were dispersed at Uiju, and some 64 conventional aircraft were now parked at Sinuiju. So far, moreover, the US FEAF attacks had not neutralized the new airfields at Saamcham, Nansi, and Taechon. Thousands of laborers were refilling bomb craters and were building other facilities.

With the beginning of winter in 1951 the growing Communist air order of battle based in Manchuria and Communist China forced the United Nations Command to make some reassessment of its emergency plans. Movement of a new Chinese Communist air regiment to Takushan brought the aircraft complement at the Antung bases to 290 MIG-15 fighters. Other MIG’s based at such rearward bases as Anshan, Liaoyang, and Mukden swelled the number of airborne sorties counted over northwestern Korea by staging forward through Antung. In the skies over the Red North Korea US Sabre pilots began to encounter large numbers of new and improved MIG’s. Employing their superior numbers of aircraft at a respectable operations rate, the Communists sent 2,326 observed sorties over the Communist North Korea in November and 3,997 observed sorties in December 1951. On 3 and 8 December flights of high flying MIG’s were sighted south of Seoul.

The growing Communist air capabilities gravely concerned US Air Force leaders in Washington and Tokyo. Up until now the United States policy had assumed that the UNC air forces would be allowed to retaliate against the Communist Chinese Manchurian air bases if the Red air forces attacked the UNC installations in the Republic of Korea. In Washington General Vandenberg’s planners advised him that in case of the Communist air attacks from north of the Yalu, the USAF should be cleared to obliterate the Antung bases. This course of action was accepted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs and approved by the U.S. National Security Council in December 1951. While awaiting the open Communist air attacks made against the UNC installations from Antung bases, or a change in UN policies accompanied by a marked augmentation of the US FEAF, General Weyland knew no course of action except to continue to battle the Red jets over the Red North Korea and to give the highest priority to the neutralization of airfields in the Red North Korea which could support Red jet air operations against the UNC installations.

In the early months of 1952, enemy attacks against the UNC fighter-bombers numbered eight in January, six in February, ten in March, nine in April, and jumped to 25 during May 1952. With two exceptions, all of these attacks were made while the UNC fighter-bombers were attacking enemy rail targets between the Yalu and the Chongchon. Only eight of this type of UNC aircraft were lost in the air-to-air action between January and June 1952. On the other hand, the UNC Sabres destroyed 44 MIG’s in April and 32 MIG’s in May 1952. Probably
MIG-15 flown to a ROK air base by Ro Kum Suk, the defecting Communist NK pilot.

in context with their losses, the enemy severely curtailed their MIG operations in June and July 1952.

Maintenance of Air Superiority: Awareing that air power was the key to victory and that the UN Command might extend air attacks to other Far East target area, the Red powers had been hurriedly building major air forces around the periphery of Korea. By June 1952 the Chinese Communist Air Force evidently reached its authorized strength of 22 air divisions and 1,830 aircraft, including 1,000 jet fighters. Some 1,115 of these planes were massed at airfields within Manchuria. During the first half of 1952 Soviet air units in the Far East also reached a probably authorized strength of approximately 5,360 aircraft. After June 1952 the Communist air order of battle in the Far East remained stable at approximately 7,000 aircraft, some 5,000 of them belong to Russia, 2,000 to Communist China, and about 270 to Red North Korea. While the numbers stable, the Red nevertheless conducted a vigorous modernization program, replacing conventional planes with modern jet types. In November 1952, for example, the US FEAF learned that the Red Chinese had obtained 100 latest-model IL-28 light jet bombers and had them stationed in Manchuria. The Communist air order of battle in the Far East not only dwarfed the UNC air forces, but the Reds also possessed more modern planes than did the UNC air forces.

Meanwhile, after June 1952, the Communist air-defense system featured fighter-interceptors, ground control intercept radar, antiaircraft artillery, and searchlights, but the major threat to United Nations Command air superiority was still the MIG-15. These Red interceptors were not only a threat to the success of the air pressure operations, but as planes they represented a not-
inconsiderable cost to the economy of Red China. To make the war expensive to the Reds, General Weyland wanted to destroy as many of the Red interceptors as possible in air-to-air combat. Under the circumstances wherein the Communist MIG pilots possessed sanctuary bases just beyond the Yalu, flew an aircraft with a higher service ceiling than any UNC fighter, and possessed ground-control intercept radar direction, the Communist air forces had almost all of the natural advantages for aerial combat in the segment of airspace north of the Chongchon River called “MIG Alley.” Nearly 90 percent of the MIG’s sighted in Red North Korea after June 1952 would be in MIG Alley. Charged to protect friendly fighter-bombers against an enemy who was able to choose when he would commit his aircraft and whose MIG’s were nearly always able to initiate combat from higher attitudes, the UNC Sabre wings were forced continually to revise their tactics to thwart the tactics of the enemy.

Since the mid-1952 the aggressive pilots of the UNC fighter-interceptors met the threats of superior numbers of the Communist MIG’s. The Communist air forces, in the meantime, began to follow a new concept of operations which involved exploitation of all phases of their developing air-defense system. Although the Red did not oppose the UNC air attacks against their Supung hydroelectric plant, the Red air forces in June 1952 evidently decided to employ quality instead of quantity. Only 298 MIG sorties were sighted in the air over the northwestern Korea in June 1952 but the Red airmen who met the Sabres were aggressive and willing to fight. The Sabres, however, still had the edge in June’s combat. At a cost of three friendly lost, the Sabres destroyed 20 MIG’s.

When the UNC airmen began massed attacks against more significant air pressure targets in July 1952, the Communist airmen made good use of their defense system. Profiting from radar control and cloudy weather, the MIG pilots made “end runs” around the Sabre screen at the Yalu. Some MIG’s decoyed or engaged the Sabres, while other attempted to set up attacks against UNC fighter-bombers. During the July 1952 the Reds flew only 404 observed daytime sorties, but the MIG pilots were more adept than usual. Evidently rankled by the UNC destruction operations and having profited from three months of reduced activity, the Communist air forces surged back into full action on 1 August 1952, as if by special order. The increased tempo of the air-to-air war, marked by sightings of 1,155 MIG’s, permitted the Sabres to destroy 33 enemy aircraft at a cost of only two UNC interceptors.

As the UNC air forces badgered the Reds by attacking targets close to the Yalu during September 1952, the Reds responded with 1,857 observed sorties. In this month of intensive air actions the UNC air forces lost six Sabres and three
Thunderjets, but the Sabres racked up a new monthly high of 63 MIG’s destroyed in combat. With the beginning of October 1952 some 1,360 Communist aerial sorties were observed but most of the Red pilots were unaggressive. At the end of October 1952 two years of jet air warfare were drawing to a close in Korea. In these years the Sabre pilots had been destroying MIG’s with a margin of superiority of eight to one, and the Sabre victory must have been persuasive to the Communist aggressors everywhere. The ability of UN Command pilots to take the MIG has undoubtedly slowed the Russian in his headlong rush into another war. It has made him consider the fact that he is not quite ready yet, and it must have rankled him to know that UNC air forces were getting better and stronger all the time. But the story of the air war over the Red North Korea was not as one-sided as it appeared, for the Communist air defense has given the UN Command much concern in the latter half of 1952.

During the January 1953 pilots of the UNC air forces sighted a total of 2,621 MIG-15’s over Red North Korea, succeeded in engaging a total of 333 of these sighted aircraft, and destroyed 32 of those engaged. After this month, which represented the peak sighting of MIG’s during the last year of the war, the number of MIG’s sighted each month was less than the month before, and, since the ratio of MIG’s sighted to MIG’s engaged remained approximately constant, combat kills fell off. The UNC air forces’ Sabre potential was increasing at the same time that fewer MIG’s were available for destruction. In April, relatively favorable flying weather allowed the UNC Sabre wings to fly on most days but the MIG’s were not yet willing to fight. Only 1,622 MIG sorties were sighted, and in sporadic combat, the Sabres destroyed 27 MIG’s and lost four of their own number. During the period of 1-15 May, Sabre pilots observed 608 MIG’s, of which 138 or 22.7 percent were encountered by the F-86’s. In the last half of May, however, 899 MIG’s were observed and 399 or 45 percent of them were encountered in combat. Thus, in May, 56 MIG’s were destroyed and 27 were damaged. The loss to enemy action was one F-86, and the pilot of this plane was successfully rescued.

In June 1953 the total monthly sighting of MIG aircraft was even less than it had been in May 1953. But during this month the Sabre pilots effected the peak kill of the Korean War. The Sabres observed 637 MIG’s but only 184 of them could be engaged in combat. During the last half of June the MIG pilots continued to be neither alert nor aggressive, but a combination of circumstances permitted the Sabres to engage 317 of 613 MIG’s observed. Whatever the Communist reasoning may have been, the air combat during the last half of June 1952 was characterized by an unusually high proportion of encounters below 40,000 feet. During the month of June 1953 the Sabres made their peak monthly
kill of the Korean War: 77 MIG’s destroyed and 41 damaged. The UNC Sabre wings lost no F-86’s to the enemy, and only one F-86 received major damage in combat with Red aircraft.

Although the Communists were reckless with their ground troops in the line and continued useless ground attacks in July 1953, they played it safe with their planes in the “MIG Alley” during this last month of the Korean War. The Sabres got only 32 MIG kills in July. On the last day of the war, 27th July 1953, 369 Sabre sorties saw only 12 MIG’s, all headed for home in Manchuria.

**Air Interdiction**

At the Initial Stage of the War: At the outset, UNC air effort was being directed against the advancing NKPA and in close support of the UNC ground forces. Although it would have been highly profitable for air to interdict the enemy main supply route behind the front lines, it is doubtful if the UNC ground forces could have held until full effects were left. The air effort had to be committed to reinforce the hard pressed ground forces. Close support by air had to make up for a lack in ground forces organic support fire. The use of air power enabled the UNC ground forces to trade space for time and by volume of fire-power delivered against the enemy forces, they weakened and pinned down the North Korean Communist advance until the UNC ground forces could be consolidated on the Naktong perimeter.

In late July UNC air attacks began to concentrate on enemy MSR’s in the rear areas as the interdiction campaign was initiated. This was to be an around-the-clock effort, since the enemy had begun to use darkness as protection for moving supplies and personnel. The B-26s bore the main burden of this night effort. The air effort devoted to interdiction reduced the enemy’s forward flow of supplies from a 206 ton average in early July to a mere 21.5 tons during the period of the Naktong perimeter defense.

Since the middle of August, the UNC ground forces in the Naktong perimeter had been steadily augmented to a total of four US infantry divisions, seven ROK divisions, and one British brigade. With this build-up, on 16 of September, the UNC ground forces started the break-out from the Naktong perimeter. The Inchon landing was begun one day earlier. At this time it became readily apparent that the air force had done its job well. The Communist North Korean around the Naktong perimeter was nothing more than a skeleton which had been depleted by direct destruction and starved by the interdiction program. The UNC forces pushing north met little organized resistance. The forces landing at
Inchon likewise met no determined enemy opposition and in addition were protected by the immobilizing effects of previous UNC air attacks and concurrent strikes on enemy reinforcement routes. In fact the UNC air interdiction had been so effective that the northward movement of friendly forces and supplies was considerably impeded.

In the four-month period, July to October 1950, that elapsed before the remnants of the North Korean Communists were driven to the Yalu, destruction from the air made it a high priced war for the enemy. During the period the enemy airfields were knocked out and kept unserviceable, and ports, marshalling yards, communication centers, and supply areas were kept under constant attack, preventing the build-up and stockpiling of war materiel.

As the elements of the UNC ground forces reached the Yalu in late October 1950, it seemed that the Communist North Korean forces had been defeated and the war was over. But a war with a new enemy was about to begin. During the two months subsequent to the CCF aggression the UNC air forces reverted to their first Korean mission, as the effort was directed toward preventing the UNC ground forces’ envelopment as they withdrew. Here again interdiction and close support allowed UNC ground forces a “breather” during daylight hours, as the enemy was forced to move and fight at night for his own self-preservation.

As the enemy was advancing, the cumulative effects of the UNC air strikes began to be felt. Forced to move over secondary roads and overland trails, mostly at night, the CCF logistic system finally collapsed. The enemy could not support its general offensive because back-up supplies were denied him by intensified air attacks. Reinforcing units required two and one-half to four months to travel from the Yalu to the front, according to prisoner-of-war reports, and arrived in no physical condition for combat. Constant harassment of overextended supply lines prevented adequate materiel support.

Taking advantage of this situation, the UNC ground forces initiated a counteroffensive which carried them by the first of April to a line just north of the 38th Parallel. Here the enemy was able to make a stand. With a relatively static line, the enemy was able to build up supplies sufficiently to make two more attempts to drive UNC forces from Korea. Both failed because the CCF logistic system could not operate under UNC air pounding. Furthermore these offensives brought the enemy troops into the open and exposed them to UNC air attacks. These destructive UNC air attacks pinned the two CCF armies against the Hwachon Reservoir and the subsequent around-the-clock battering by the UNC air forced the enemy to escape. Having fallen back to a line just north of Seoul, the UNC ground forces broke the enemy’s attack, and in turn on 22 May launched an offensive which was to carry them north again to the Line
Jamestown for next two years.

**Rail Interdiction (Operation Strangle):** Since the initial stage of the Korean War, acting in conjunction with the UNC ground forces, the UNC air forces had contributed greatly to the achievement of a series of ground operations. Events since 25 June 1950 had clearly indicated that air operations had been one of the most decisive elements in stopping the enemy's offensives and reducing its capacity to wage ground warfare. Under the favorable circumstances of air superiority, the UNC air forces had inflicted tremendous destruction upon the Communist forces. But the question confronting the UNC air commanders and planners in July 1951 was the determination of strategy for an air campaign against the Red aggressor in the Communist North Korea.

At the beginning of the truce negotiations at Kaesong on 10 July 1951, the UNC air forces did indeed possess an opportunity clearly to demonstrate the innumerable advantages of air power as a predominant weapon. Unlike the ground forces, now in July 1951 were limited by directive to an active defense of currently held positions, the air force could range far and wide over
the Red North Korea and by selective target motivate the enemy to accept such UNC terms as were offered at the armistice conference table. Unfortunately, however, the UNC air forces were not going to be permitted to exercise these decisive attributes of air power for some while. In Korea the Communist forces drew their sustenance from areas beyond the Manchurian and Siberian borders, the areas which because of political reasons could not be attacked by the UNC aircraft. Major targets remained in the Red North Korea, but most of these major targets -- such as the Supung hydroelectric plants -- were politically sensitive.

Thinking in terms of a surface strategy, although no ground campaigns were under way, General Ridgway feared that the Communists might take advantage of the respite of truce negotiations to rejuvenate their ground armies and accumulate forward logistical stocks large enough to enable them to mount an invincible ground offensive. Since interdiction attacks at the rear of the Communist armies had prevented the Reds from overwhelming UNC ground forces during the major campaigns of 1950 and 1951, General Ridgway wanted UNC air forces to continue to interdict the enemy’s lines of communications. Thus, on 18 August 1951, the UNC air forces commenced comprehensive railway-interdiction campaign.

Launched suddenly and without warning, on 18 August 1951, the UNC air campaign against the Red North Korea’s railway system soon gave evidences of its apparent success. Day after day, following 18 August 1951, the Fifth US Air Force scheduled its Fighter-bomber wings for rail-cutting attacks in northwestern sectors of the Communist North Korea, aiming its heaviest air attacks against the double-tracked rail lines between Sonchon and Sariwon. It also attacked the single-track rail lines which connected Huichon, Kunuri and Sunchon. Simultaneously with the fighter-bomber strikes, the US FEAF Bomber Command’s B-29’s attacked the key railway bridges at Pyongyang, Sinanju, Sunchon, and Sonchon as a second priority to a continued neutralization of Communist airfields in the Red North Korea.

By mid-September 1951 the UNC air attacks had reduced the main line from Sinuju to Sinanju to 70 percent single track, from Sinanju to Pyongyang to 90 percent single track, and from Pyongyang to Sariwon to 40 percent single track. After early part of October 1951 the Communists were unable to make any rail movements on the line between Sariwon and Pyongyang and the stretch of rail line between Sukchon and Sinanju was completely unserviceable.

Just when victory for the comprehensive rail attacks seemed to be in sight, however, Communist countermeasures to the UNC rail campaign began to work against the UNC cause. The Communists reacted quickly in an all-out effort to
recuperate from the UNC interdiction campaign. The enemy developed remarkable ingenuity and perseverance in rehabilitating his railroad and bridge system and in dispersing, hiding his supplies and equipment.

In December 1951 photo interceptors indicated that Communist laborers, beginning work at dusk, could repair a rail cut within eight hours, thus opening a railway track for traffic between midnight and sunrise. Communist repairs progressed so rapidly that the Fifth US Air Force intelligence, late in December 1951, acknowledged that Red railway repairmen and bridge builders have broken our railroad blockade of Pyongyang and won the use of all key rail arteries.

**Operation Saturate:** Since December 1951 the UNC commanders puzzled over the results of "Strangle." During the early months of 1952 the UNC air forces considered the means by which its rail interdiction effort might be improved. Although the rail lines were being cut daily at many points, the obstructions were not being maintained at night, in bad weather. The enemy had revealed a persistent ability to repair small cuts in a few days. After a thorough study and review of the results of the interdiction program, the UNC commander had reached the conclusion that the air interdiction campaign had slowed and seriously affected the enemy's supply operation and had increased the time required to move supplies to the front lines. On the opposite side of ledger, however, General Ridgway noted that the air-interdiction program had not prevented the enemy from moving the supplies he needed to support a static defense or from making troops movements into the Red North Korea. Under conditions of static defense, General Ridgway recognized that the Communists could eventually accumulate the supplies they needed to support a major offensive despite the aerial interdiction. If the program should be discontinued or reduced, however, the UNC commander thought that the enemy could, in a relatively short period of time, accumulate sufficient supplies to permit him to launch and sustain a major offensive.

Since both Generals Ridgway and General Weyland were in favor of continuing the Red North Korean railway interdiction campaign, the Fifth US Air Force targets division study issued on 25 February 1952 asserted the requirement for 24-hour interdiction with a sufficient concentration of effort being expended to mutilate and, if possible, to destroy selected stretches of the road beds of the key rail lines. Four main lines were recommended for such intensive interdiction: Kunu-ri to Huichon, Sunchon to Samdong-ni, Sinanju to Namsidong, and Pyongyang to Sariwon to Namchonjom.

Thus, the Fifth US Air Force put Operation "Saturate" into effect on 3
March 1952. Unlike the earlier operational pattern, the Fifth US Air Force Joint Operations Center now picked exact targets and closely controlled all flights of aircraft, directing routes of approach, initial points, withdrawal procedures, and altitudes to be flown to and from each target, the time interval of the attacks and to shift targets when weather or flak dictated. Among other considerations, the Fifth US Air Force attempted to select targets which were as free of flak as possible.

Having been shown to be practicable, the “Saturate” concept continued until the first half of May 1952, when the UNC air-operations planners were seeking an application of efforts which would be more profitable than interdiction had been.

**Massive Air-pressure**

**Attacks on Enemy Electric Power**: For over two years UNC combat aircraft ranged at will over Communist North Korea, tearing up roads and rail tracks; blowing up supply and troop concentrations, bridges, factories, and ammunition dumps; bombing and strafing every type of target, moving or stationary, that was of military or strategic value to the enemy. However, it did not place enough military pressure upon the Reds to force them to accept UNC armistice terms. With the advent of General Clark as the UNC commander in May 1952, a significant change in combat-operations policy took place. The scope of interdiction operations was expanded to include destruction of important targets, target complexes, and target system.

The decision came on 9 June 1952 for a joint concentrated attack on the whole Red North Korean power complexes. The initial attack on the power system was launched at 1600 hours on 23 June 1952. In one thunderous sweep a combined aerial task force of more than 500 combat aircraft from Fifth US Air Force, Navy, and Marine units closed in on the key hydro-electric plants at Supung, Pujon, Changin, and Hochon. This biggest single strike proved the effectiveness of interservice planning and coordination of the UNC air forces in the Korean War. Over 230 carrier-based planes from the Boxer, Princeton, and Philippine Sea, and Bon Homme Richard of the Navy’s combined Task Force 77, joined with more than 270 fighter-bombers from Fifth US Air Force’s Korean-based fighter-bomber wings and Marine air groups to strike the four major power systems simultaneously.

There was no doubt that the attacks against the Red North Korea’s hydro-electric facilities put military pressure upon the Communists, not only in Red
North Korea but in Communist China and Russia. The rapidity with which the Reds sent scarce Russian and Communist Chinese technicians to try to repair the ruined plants bespoke the importance of the power plants to the Soviet bloc.

**Attacks against Pyongyang:** At the outset of the air pressure campaign, the UNC target experts had made detailed studies of command posts, communication centers, troop billets, and supply warehouses which had sprung up in the city of Pyongyang. The Red North Korean capital had not been subjected to air attack for nearly a year and it was crowded with military targets. On 5 July 1952, General Clark directed US FEAF Commander to attack specific military targets in Pyongyang and to make every effort to avoid needless civilian casualties.

On 11 July 1952 the strikes went off well. The examination of bombing assessment photographs showed that the aerial blow was quite successful against the command posts, supply aggregations, factories, troop billets, railway facilities, and gun positions marked for destruction in Pyongyang. Off the air for two days, *Radio Pyongyang* finally announced that the “brutal” strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had inflicted 7,000 casualties.

**Attacks Against Red Industrial Remnants:** Approaching their problem with the view toward making the war expensive to the Communists, the destruction strategy, moreover, turned up an entirely new target category -- the Red North Korean metals and mining business. On 15 July 1952 the Fifth US Air Force sent 171 sorties to gut the Sungho-ri cement plant and an adjacent locomotive repair shop. On 27 July 1952, carrier-based aircraft attacked and destroyed the Sindok lead and zink mill, a facility was reportedly shipping 3,000 tons of processed ore to Russia each month. Late on the afternoon of 5 August 1952, 111 fighter-bombers attacked a tungsten mine at Kilju. The heaviest all-Navy attack of the Korean War was made on 1 September 1952 against the synthetic oil production center at Aoji, a target only four miles from Manchuria and only eight miles from the Siberian border. In August and September 1952, the US FEAF attempted to destroy as many Red North Korean mines, smelters, and ore concentration facilities as was practicable with air action. The Hoechang Ore Processing Plant, reported to be processing gold for shipment to Red China, was 90 percent destroyed. One of the largest of these mining enterprises was the gold mine and smelter at Soktal-li.

**Attacks on Enemy Irrigation Dams:** In June 1952, after a year of fruitless armistice negotiations UNC air forces were granted to attack and destroy one of the so-called sensitive targets -- Communist North Korea’s vast electric power
industry. This was considered a test of whether destruction of sensitive enemy targets would goad the enemy into major reprisals. Electric power was attacked and destroyed in a series of simultaneous air strikes, and it became apparent that the enemy was in no position for reprisals, nor did he wish to expand the war.

As the armistice negotiations dragged on and were finally suspended in October 1952, UNC air forces began targeting a second sensitive target system -- a system so vital that its simultaneous destruction (like that of the electric power complex) might well produce sufficient military pressure to bring about immediate armistice agreement or even capitulation of the enemy forces. This target system was formed by the irrigation dams that furnished about 75 percent of the controlled water supply for the growing of Red North Korea's most important food, rice. The immediate objective of breaking the dams was the wholesale disruption which a series of flash floods would bring to the entire west coast transportation system. This sudden and prolonged cut-off of the small amount of supplies getting through to the front could be fatal for the enemy.

The first irrigation dam selected for attack was the structure holding back the waters of the Toksan Reservoir. Located about 20 air miles north of Pyongyang, the dam, 2,500 feet long and 270 feet thick at its base, backed up the waters of the Potong River into a three-mile-long, one-mile-wide lake. On the afternoon of 13 May 1953, fighter-bombers of the ROK-based Fifth US Air Force hit the dam and caused a breach that rapidly eroded during the night and emptied the reservoir. Over 6,000 feet of rail bed was washed out, plus the elimination of a by-pass truck and 3 rail bridges, which were part of the main supply route from the Yalu to the front lines. The flood accomplished completely what dozens of interdiction strike on the same section of rail bridge and roadbed had only partly achieved.

Another irrigation dam scheduled for attack was the Chasan earth-works. Through an irrigation network similar to the Toksan system and spider-webbing down a broad flat valley which ran into the Taedong River. Several miles below the dam, a vital rail line -- from Manchuria to Kaechon to Sunchon to Pyongyang -- crossed the broad valley over a series of rail viaducts and bridges. A main highway likewise ran for miles across the low flatlands of the valley. It was estimated that a major washout on the rail and highway system, following the Toksan raid, would close the enemy's two main north-south lines of transportation for over two weeks.

On the afternoon of 16 May 24 F-84's pinpointed their bombs and opened an initial breach. Onrushing waters surged over the field after field of rice paddy. Bridges, rail trackage and highways were washed out. Once again, the power
of nature, aided and abetted by man, had accomplished in one stroke what dozens of preceding attacks against the rail and road system had failed to produce.

Located about halfway between Chasan and Pyongyang, Kuwonga dam backed up a small river flowing south out of the central mountain range towards the Taedong River. The fertile agricultural lands irrigated by the waters from its reservoir were crossed by the main highway and the rail line connecting Kaechon and Sunchon with Pyongyang, the same routes which the Chasan flood had washed out 15 miles to the north.

On the night of 21-22 May seven B-29’s scored four direct hits on the crest of the dam. The dam did not break, and the Reds had learned an effective countermeasure. They reduced the reservoir’s water level by 13 feet, thus taking strain off the weakened dam and widening the thickness of the earth which the B-29’s would have to breach. On the night of 29 May 14 B-29’s scored five direct hits with 2,000-pound bombs, but the Superfort attacks failed again because the Reds had rapidly devised effective countermeasures. The Reds prevented flood damages, but they deprived adjacent rice fields of necessary irrigation water.

Ending the War

The Korean armistice agreement signed on 27 July 1953 marked a temporary suspension of hostilities in Korea. Why the Communists finally accepted the United Nations Command’s terms for ending the Korean War was a secret which would remain locked in the archives of Moscow and Peking. One thing, however, was clear that the pressure of air attack had forced the Reds to accept the armistice terms. The United Nations Command had established a pattern of destruction by air which was unacceptable to the enemy, and the degree of destruction suffered by the Communists, in relation to its resources, was greater than that which the Japanese islands suffered in World War II.
Reference Data, UNC Air Operations

(1) Total Sorties of UNC Air Forces: 1,040,708

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<td>N/A</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>6,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous*</td>
<td>222,078</td>
<td>24,852</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>13,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Miscellaneous includes reconnaissance, air control, and training.

(2) Delivery of Ordnance by UNC Air Forces Against Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEA F</th>
<th>US Navy</th>
<th>US Marines</th>
<th>Other UNC Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>476,000 tons</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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</table>

(3) Combat Claims by UNC Air Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Destroyed</th>
<th>Total Damaged</th>
<th>Total Destroyed</th>
<th>Total Damaged</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>118,231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>82,920</td>
<td>33,131</td>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>8,663</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>8,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>10,407</td>
<td>22,674</td>
<td>Oil Storage Tanks</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cuts</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28,621</td>
<td>Barges &amp; Boats</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>184,808</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER V RETROSPECT AND POST-ARMISTICE

Retrospect

In retrospect, the first year of the Korean War was likened ebb and flow as the fighting had ensued up and down the peninsula. By mid-June 1951, having come to a halt on orders from the US joint Chiefs of Staff, the UNC line across Korea, which then included the strategically important Iron Triangle area, was stabilized. The decision to halt the UNC advance at that stage was certainly wrong from a military point of view, since the Red Chinese forces were still in very poor condition and only limited defensive capabilities. The UNC forces could have pushed on farther north with little difficulty before hardening resistance slowed them down.

By that time, high hopes had arisen in the Western Allies that the war in Korea was virtually over. Both the U.N. and U.S.A. hoped that restraint and a lull in operations might produce an atmosphere conducive to bring about a cease fire and on 23 June Jacob Malik proposed a cease-fire conference.

Thus, after the first year of the war, which ended with the defeat of the Communist forces in the battle field, there followed two more years of dragging stalemate during which protracted truce negotiations took place.

The war of movement ended and no more large offensives were mounted by either side. There were, however, countless numbers of bitter, ceaseless battles fought within limited scales, mainly for the possession of tactical features along the length of the stabilized and fortified front lines. These flare-ups, which gained little territory but cost many lives, often coincided with the breakdown of truce negotiations. Overhead the air war was intensified and on the high seas the naval operations continued, while fire duels were routine affairs on the ground.

At any rate, the UN Command agreed to halt its forces with the commencement of the negotiations to settle the war not by a decisive military victory but by a political means. Thus, it allowed the heavily beaten Communist forces to stabilize a fortified line across the peninsula. The enemy forces dragged out negotiations, from the beginning until the last munite, employing every tactic in the psychological warfare book.
The Korean War has frequently been described as a "limited" one, but this is only partly corrected. It was a limited one for the United Nation Command, seeking to prevent its spread outside the Korean peninsula; but it was a total war at the time as far as the Republic of Korea was concerned.

On the part of the Communists, it was certainly not limited one. They recognized no limits except those enforced by UNC fire power as well as air and naval power. If the Chinese Communists had possessed atomic bombs, they would almost certainly have used them.

Another historical feature of the Korean War was that the United Nations showed for the first time its authority and the fact that a combined U.N. force materialized in Korea must have given the Communist aggressors cause for reconsideration. The weight of the burden of the fighting developed on ROK forces, and without fighting men and material aid from the free nations, particularly from the United States, the Korean War could not have been waged for very long.

**U.N. Collective Action against the Communist Aggressors**

In looking back at the war in Korea, the first question to consider is who won, and who gained what? In any war, at best a truce is a compromise in a common sense, and in this case it enables both sides to claim partial victory and various other gains. But, the Korean truce is a peculiar one in nature. From a shooting point of view the war bogged down into a deadly stalemate, which neither side launched a decisive large-scale offensive during the last two years of the war. Yet, it was a global war fought by the Free World nations in a collective security action against a Communist armed aggression for a common cause – freedom, peace and justice. If the United Nations had not stepped promptly in the Republic of Korea, perhaps, would have fallen, thus setting a precedent that would inevitably have resulted in many other small or weak Asian countries being swallowed up in turn.

Nevertheless, the UN Command success strengthened the possibility of keeping or restoring peace through the U.N. machinery.

Thus, the Korean War was ended in UNC's victory, because the UN Forces had repelled the Red aggression and secured the integrity of the Republic of Korea.

In short, the Korean War, the first U.N. war, was fought by a heterogeneous command which included, in addition to the ROK, 16 free nations. With all its inherent difficulties, the UN Command represented the greatest historical mustering of Free World nations under the banner of the United Nations.

The Korean War was a war in which the United Nations, led by the United
States, chose to accept something less than total victory, in the interests of averting a major, and possible nuclear war. It is still too early to judge the wisdom of this U.S. course of action; the facts exist, however, that the Republic of Korea was saved and the Communist aggression was defeated.

Today, combined forces of the United Nations Command are firmly standing on guard as a ever-strong shield to defend “Frontier of Freedom” – the Republic of Korea, and to meet and destroy any external aggression against it.

Post-Armistice

It has passed a quarter century since the Armistice Agreement, signed on 27 July 1953, put an end to the full-scale shooting, touched off in June 1950 by the NK Communists’ brutal armed aggression. The Land of the Morning Calm, however, is still divided, this time by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) within a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), with the armistice terms remaining fragile.

Korea’s no-man’s land, existing under history’s longest truce, is a potential reinvansion route for warlike NK Communist puppet regime, because they have never abandoned or changed their plot and goal designed to communize the whole Korean Peninsula by force. As far as the NK Communists are concerned, the Armistice Agreement is merely a scrap of paper, and the post-armistice years have been a continuation of the NK Communists’ military provocations, violence and harassment in the air, at the sea and on the ground that often ended up just a step or two short of a war of aggression.

In fact, according to all indications and every evidence we have seen are that they have been beefing up their military forces for offensive purposes throughout years since the armistice came into effective, and they are now prepared for another invasion. They often show rudeness and resort to violence to express their feelings against every effort attempted by the Republic of Korea to pave the way toward the national reunification by peaceful means at any cost.

Thus, their warlike proclivity steeped ever deeply in hostile designs against the Republic has its most vivid illustration in the fact that the NK Communists have committed, as of the end of 1977, no fewer than 41,633 violations of the armistice terms. Of these violations, as many as 107 were perpetrated in the air and 86 on the sea while the rest occurred on the land, that is, in the Demilitarized Zone.

These are official figures charged by the UNC Military Armistice Commission (MAC) against Communists. In addition, there are so many other provocations for which the UNCMAC took no actions officially to bring the matters to the atten-
tion of the Communist side at the truce village in Panmunjom. Yet even more
dumbfounding is the NK Communists’ utter brazerness shown in denying all but
two of these tens of thousands violations in the face of glaring evidence presented
in various forms that permit no equivocation. The brazen face of the Communist
puppet regime in Pyongyang, a most hostile, unpredictable, bellicose and reckless
enemy in the world, is now also intensifying its disguised propaganda warfare
in an attempt to mislead the world attention, hiding its aggressive scheme behind
its iron curtain.

To cite a few of the major Communists’ armistice violations, they attempted
a commando raid on the ROK Presidential Mansion; seized USS Pueblo on the high
seas; abducted two ROK commercial passenger planes in separate hijackings;
shot down an unarmed US Reconnaissance plane in international air space;
attacked by their gunboats on ROK Navy patrol boats; and have even assaulted
ROK fishing boats peacefully engaging in normal fishing. Further, they dug
southward invasion tunnels under the DMZ. All these years, the NK Communists’
infiltration of specially trained espionage agents has been virtually routine affairs.
Recently, two American officers were hacked to death by Communist guards in
group at the truce village in the Panmunjom neutral area. More recently, the
Communists have increased their efforts in crossing the seaward extensions from
both sides of the armistice line.

Whatever the motives of these and other Communist violations and inhumane
acts, at least one thing is certain. The Communist regime to the north is constantly
threatening the Republic of Korea to wage another tragedy of war.

The uneasy armistice, however, endured up to now so far, largely, in dead,
owing to the presence of the UN Command standing on guard with determination
as a strong deterrent force against recurrence of Communist aggression.

The situation in the Republic of Korea today is distinctively different in all
areas and aspects than in June 1950, 27 years ago. The Republic is now a highly
developed nation, particularly in economic development and defense effort as
well. She will continue all her efforts to accelerate the growth of national strength,
thereby contributing to the maintenance of stability and peace not only on the
Korean peninsula, looking forward to attain peaceful unification of Korea, but
also to preserve the over-all peace in this part of the world.

Should the NK Communists perpetrated again antinational acts of a fratricidal
war of aggression, by their misjudgement, they can expect to gain nothing except
their total self-destruction.
### Armistice Violations by Communists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>708</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2,483</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,983</td>
<td>4,985</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>979</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>1976</td>
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<td>7,220</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>1,295</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>41,440</td>
<td>41,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures just show the number of Communist violations officially charged by the United Nations Command. Therefore, there are so many other violations in addition to these figures.
PART TWO

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
CONTINGENTS BY NATION
THE AUSTRALIAN FORCE
THE AUSTRALIAN FORCE

1. Introduction

Of the 53 nations that endorsed the United Nations resolution to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea (ROK) to repel the Communist invaders, 16 eventually sent combat forces. One of the first non-American nation of these to come into action was Australia.

On 30 June 1950 the Prime Minister of Australia Menzies announced that two Australian Navy ships in Japanese waters had been placed at the disposal of the United Nations in support of the Republic of Korea. Next day, on 1 July 1950, the Premier announced in Canberra that Australia had offered No. 77 Squadron for service with the U.S. forces in Korea.

In Australia, on 7 July 1950, a specially summoned meeting of both Houses of the Federal Parliament unanimously approved the Government’s action in placing naval and air units at the disposal of the United Nations in support of the Republic of Korea. The Prime Minister put the Government’s view in these words: “As we are subscribers not only to the letter but to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, so we must be ready to give force and meaning to the letter and the spirit of the Charter. In one breath to speak of our allegiance to the Charter and in the next to ignore the resolution of the Security Council would be either hypocrisy or cowardice, of neither of which has Australia ever been adjudged guilty.”

Addressing the United States House of Representatives on 2 August 1950, meanwhile, Australian Premier Menzies promised that Australian ground troops would be serving in Korea within a few weeks, saying that the time factor was so important that a comparatively small force in Korea speedily prepared and despatched would be better than a large force postponed for many months.

On 27 September 1950, the officers and men of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment embarked on the U.S. vessel Aiken Victory for Pusan, Korea. The full establishment was 960 all ranks who were all volunteers, either from Australia or from 67th Australian Infantry Battalion, on occupation duties in
Japan, and were chosen for their infantry experience and physical fitness.

Thus, as a former member and stalwart supporter of the United Nations in its formative years, the Australian Government decided to throw the weight of its Army, Navy and Air Force to the following effect behind the world body's effort in Korea against the Communist aggression.

**Duration of the participation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>28 Sep 1950 — Apr 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1 Jul 1950 — 12 Feb 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2 Jul 1950 — 27 Jul 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Size of Forces:**

- Army
  - One infantry battalion (30 Sep 1950 — Mar 1951)
  - Two infantry battalion (Apr 1951 — 27 Jul 1953)
- Navy
  - 9 vessels
    - Carrier 1
    - Destroyer 4
    - Frigate 4
- Air Forces
  - One fighter squadron
  - One transport unit

**Casualties (as of 27 July 1953):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of the 33 POW's 26 were repatriated.

2. **Ground Force**

**Operations in 1950**

**Crossing the 38th Parallel:** On 30 September 1950, two days after the ROK and US forces retook Seoul on 28 September after the successful Inchon landing.
the 3rd Australian Battalion of 960 all ranks joined the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade at Songju–Waegwan area, north-west of Taegu, where the Australian soldiers, fully alive to the pride of their volunteer traditions, made their first operational patrols on 2 October.

On 5 October, reassembling at Taegu airstrip, the Australians, together with the Argylls and Middlesex Battalions of the 27th British Brigade, were airlifted to Kimpo airfield, near Seoul, to join the ROK and US ground forces in a drive to northward.

On 11 October the main advance began across the Parallel up a narrow valley between high mountain ranges through much more rugged terrain than further north. The immediate objective of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade as part of the I US Corps was Kumchon, about 30 kilometers above the 38th Parallel. With tanks of B Company, 6th US Medium Tank Battalion, in support, the 27th Brigade had crossed the Imjin River and moved northwest through the mountains for a close-in envelopment of Kumchon.

As the 7th US Cavalry Regiment on its west had taken Kumchon without opposition on 15 October, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade rapidly covered more than 60 kilometers to establish itself 5 kilometers north of the town. There, the 27th Brigade was ordered to capture Sariwon that was reputed to be the Adershot of Communist North Korea.

By the early morning of 17 October the 27th Brigade passed through the lines of the 7th US Cavalry at Sohung and took up the advance along the main highway toward Sariwon. Argylls led the attacks and the British now entered the Sariwon which found to be badly damaged by bombing. Early evening on that day the 3rd Australian Battalion passed through the Argylls in the town and advanced eight kilometers north of it toward Hwangju. There the Australians went into a perimeter blocking position in front of a range of hills strongly held by the enemy, and prepared to make an attack in the morning. During the night, however, the 3rd Australian Battalion reaped a harvest, capturing 1,982 enemy prisoners at its roadblock.

It had become clear by the time the UNC troops reached Sariwon that the remaining NK forces could not attempt a strong defense of Pyongyang without incurring total destruction or capture. By evening of 17 October four ROK divisions were racing each other, as well as the American and British Commonwealth units of the I US Corps, to be first in reaching Pyongyang.

On 19 October 1950, the ROK and US forces took Pyongyang without much resistance and the advance to the "MacArthur Line," the line roughly 56 kilometers south of the Yalu River, continued. The 24th US Division, with the
27th Brigade attached, was to lead this attack. At noon on 21 October, in this
general advance, the British Commonwealth Brigade crossed the Taedong River
at Pyongyang and headed north on the main highway running toward Sukchon,
with the immediate mission of reaching the Chongchon River. Approaching
Yongyu that evening, Brigadier Coad decided to halt for the night.

At first light on the 22nd, two companies of the Argylls advanced into Yongyu.
There the 3rd Australian Battalion passed through them, with its Company C in
the lead riding tanks of D Company, 89th US Tank Battalion. It was in this
juncture that C Company (Captain A.P. Denness) of the Australians became
involved in a sharp engagement with a party of enemy from a nearby orchard.
In this resolute action, in which the whole of the Australian Battalion was de-
ployed, accounted for 270 enemy killed and more than 200 captured; incredibil-
y, the Australian had only approximately seven wounded.

Still in the van, on the early morning of 24 October 1950, the 27th British
Commonwealth Brigade was set the task of securing a bridgehead across the
Chongchon River at Sinanju and capturing Pakchon and Chongju, on the main
routes from Pyongyang to the Manchurian border. Consequently, the Australians
crossed the river at the Anju ford. By late afternoon the Australians were about
two kilometers south of Pakchon, a village where the main road to Manchurian
border turn west, and the D Company cleared the town on that same evening.

Next objective for the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was Chongju,
neatly the western coast and roughly 60 kilometers from the Manchurian border.
In the early morning of 28 October, the British and Australian troops spearheaded
the west coast advance. The Argylls, on tanks, were in the van, but, 6 kilometers
from Chongju, the Australian Battalion took the lead. In the afternoon of 29
October the Argylls cleared the ruined and burning town of Chongju without
much opposition. The same evening, Lieutenant Colonel Green, the 3rd Australian
Battalion Commander, was mortally hit by enemy shells landed in the command
post area and died on the way to a surgical hospital at Anju.

Chongju marked the limit of the advance, so far as the 27th British Common-
wealth Brigade was concerned, and the nearest the Australians ever got to the
Yalu River. On the afternoon of 30 October, 1950, Major General Hobart Gay,
Commanding the 1st US Cavalry Division, ordered Brigadier Coad to withdraw
the brigade back to Pakchon.

At Pakchon, the evening the British Commonwealth Brigade arrived, it was
learned among the troops that the Red Chinese invaded Manchurian border.
The development, as it turned out, certainly changed the Communist tide of
battle from defense to attack and necessitated an entire reassessment of the
situation from the United Nations Command point of view. When the defeat of the Red North Koreans was decisive, the Communists committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record by moving without notice of belligency elements of Chinese Communist forces across the Manchurian border into North Korea and massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divisions with adequate support behind the privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border.

Withdrawal from North: The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was now concentrated at Pakchon. Its mission was to cover the north-western corner of a perimeter guarding the river-crossings at Taeryong and Chongchon River. During the next few days the Australian and British troops had stopped the Chinese Communist breakthrough and kept open the vital withdrawing routes south across the Chongchon River. There was no doubt that the Red Chinese had put up a wall of manpower between the UNC forces and the Yalu River.

After 5 November 1950 the British Commonwealth Brigade inched slowly forward from the Chongchon River line. By middle of November, bitter cold
howled in from Siberia, and the temperature dropped below zero in a deep freeze, foretaste of winter to come. Bitter winds began to moan down the frozen valleys and glanced like icy daggers off the frost-sheeted paddy fields.

As the "end-the-war offensive" butted forward on 24 November 1950, the Australians together with Argylls and Middlesex were ordered in reserve. This luxury, however, did not last long. On 27 November, as the front situation developed critical, the Australian and British troops were forced to pack up and crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju on 28 November, moved southeast to Chasan and then northeast toward Kunuri.

By 1 December the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, now under 1st US Cavalry Division, was in or around Chasan, eight kilometers south of Sunchon, the east flank of UNC forces' withdrawal. Next day on 2 December, the Australians were ordered to move about 16 kilometers south and defend the new bridge under construction by US engineers across the upper Taedong River, which flowed through Pyongyang to the Western Sea. The new bridge was intended to be an withdrawing route for the elements of Argylls and the 1st US Cavalry Division who were engaging with the enemy at Unsan-ni area.

When the Australians arrived at Apa-ri, however, about 1,000 of the enemy were located on and around a hill about 3,000 meters from the bridge, and were already causing casualties among the American bridge-builders. Behind a terrific barrage of mortar and artillery fire the Australian Battalion, with its A Company in the vanguard, launched an attack against the hill and soon dispersed the enemy.

The Australian withdrawal across the upper Taedong River at Apa-ri began early morning of 3 December. The withdrawal to Yu-Hi, the 50 kilometers journey under the bitter cold, lives in the memory of many 3rd Australian Battalion men as their worst day in Korea. Next day the Australians withdrew another 50 kilometers south to Singye, where they came under command of IX US Corps. As the UNC ground forces continued to fall back steadily, with the Communist Chinese flooding after them, the Australians pulled out of Singye on 8 December to Sibyon-ni, then, on 11 December, to Uijongbu, 24 kilometers north of Seoul.

The retreat had been an orderly withdrawal of more than 320 kilometers in nine days. At every stopping place they dug in and sent out patrols, both up and down the main supply route and out on the flanks. At Uijongbu, the Australians continued to send out patrols and lost one man killed and one wounded in clashes with enemy guerrilla forces.

On 1 January 1951 the Australians went to furthest forward to Choksong, ten kilometers northwest of Uijongbu to help cover one of the main retreat
routes for the UNC ground forces from the north. As the UNC troops fell back
the enemy spearhead kept at their heels to take over the key centers they
evacuated on their way south. On 3 January 1951, the Australian Battalion
together with the Middlesex were assigned defense positions on the Uijongbu-
Seoul road to cover the withdrawal of the 19th and 21st US Regimental
Combat Teams. With D Company of the 6th US Tank Battalion under command
and supported by a US artillery battalion located south of Han River, the
Australians had the right forward position astride the road about ten kilometers
north of Seoul. While the US tanks and supporting artillery fire kept up defensive
and harassing fire throughout the night, withdrawing elements of the 8th US
Army had passed through safely and the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade
withdrew from Seoul early morning of 4 January 1951, leaving the burning city
of Seoul to the Communists.

After the infamous retreat from Seoul, outpacing the Communists, the UNC
forces flowed south. By the evening of 7 January 1951 the Australians, with
its parent unit of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, reached Changhowon-
ni, approximately 110 kilometers south of Seoul, and moved to the new defensive
positions seven miles west of the town to dig in along Frostbite Ridge where
the Australians spent 28 bitterest cold days of that freezing winter, covering a
front of 3,500 yards with five companies (one company of Middlesex was attached
to the Australians).

**Operation in 1951**

**Second Advance North:** Beginning on 25 January 1951 the UN Command
made a cautious limited offensive (Operation Thunderbolt) within the elbow of the
Han River and advanced about 27 kilometers north of its Suwon–Ichon–Yoju
line, through a succession of phase lines. While the UN Command limited
offensive was in progress the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was in IX
US Corps reserve in and around Changhowon-ni.

On 4 February 1951, because of a threatened Chinese Communist offensive,
the brigade moved to Yoju, and the Australians maintained regular contact
patrols between Yoju and Chipyong-ni without serious contact with the enemy.
On 14 February the brigade came under command of 2nd US Division and was
ordered to cross the Han River at Yoju and advanced to relieve the 23rd US
RCT and French Battalion who had been cut off in the Chipyong-ni area.

On 20 February, when the IX US Corps was assigned the task of trapping a
large force of Communist forces reported to be moving southeast of Wonju, the
Australians, out on the right flank of the IX US Corps, met stiff opposition at Hill 614, east of Chipyong-ni, held up the brigade advance four days.

On 7 March, as the “Operation Ripper” was under way for the “Line Idaho” (Chunchon–Hongchon), the Australians were given objective to cut the main supply route to Chunchon, a Communist-held town just below the 38th Parallel. On 13 March, the day before UNC troops recaptured Seoul, the Australians together with its parent brigade went into Corps reserve near Chipyong-ni for the first time in six months for about ten days.

On 25 March, the whole brigade came under operational control of the 24th US Division at Taebu-ri, north of the Pukhan River, about 48 kilometers northeast of Seoul. For the next fortnight the Australians were always near the front in a rather uneventful general UNC advance in force across the 38th Parallel. On 5 April, as the Eighth US Army launched “Operation Rugged” with the objective of establishing “Line Kansas” roughly along the 38th Parallel, the Australians

**KAPYONG BATTLE (23–25 Apr 1951)**
moved forward for the opening phase of the operation on 13 April, and, on 15 April, were across the Parallel again fighting to gain hills forming part of a razor-back ridge which led to "Line Utah," just north of the 38th Parallel. At this line, the 19th Regiment, 6th ROK Division, took over from the British and Australians who went into Corps reserve at Kapyong, on the Pukhan River, about 50 kilometers to the southeast from "Line Utah."

The Battle of Kapyong: On 20 April the Argylls gave a farewell party to the remainder of the brigade. The Middlesex and Argylls were due to leave Korea when the 28th British Brigade arrived at the front. 22 April was a Sunday and all the British and Australians attended a united church parade for the Argylls who were due to leave next morning for embarkation at Inchon.

Along the front that night, the Communist Chinese began their offensive. At the central front they hit the 6th ROK Division, west of Hwachon, which had relieved the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade five days before. This was where the breakthrough occurred, and estimated 30,000 men of the 20th CCF Army pouring through the gap the 6th ROK Division had yielded between the 1st US Marines and the 24th US Division. Early morning of 23 April the British and Commonwealth battalions were ordered to take up blocking positions across the probable enemy approaches from the north.

Australians were assigned a position along Hill 504 covering crossroads, and over the Kapyong River and one of its small tributaries. After dark the Red Chinese began to flood through the Kapyong Valley. Thus the famous Kapyong battle began and heavy fighting continued throughout the night of 23 April and all next day. With an endless stream of reinforcements to throw in, the Communist kept coming in one after the other in a mad rush over their own dead and wounded in an attempt to break in.

All night and all day the gallant Australian rifle companies had held their positions, exhausting and demoralizing the enemy, and gradually blunting the Chinese Communist offensive. In this combat the Australian cost was heavy -- 31 killed, 58 wounded and three missing, afterwards known to be POWs. But, with support of the Canadian infantry, the American tanks and the New Zealand gunners, the Australian Battalion was a major factor in halting the Reds advance long enough for the UNC ground forces to reinforce the Kapyong River front.

Immediately after the Kapyong battle, on the

Lt Col. I.B. Ferguson, 3rd RAR Battalion Commander.
night of 25–26 April 1951, the 3rd Australian Battalion was incorporated into the new 28th British Commonwealth Brigade and the Battalion moved with the brigade to take over from the 19th US Infantry Regiment at Yangsu-ni on the Pukhan River, about 24 kilometers east of Seoul.

**In the Western Sector:** Following the disastrous defeat of the Communist forces in April and May, the fighting became stabilized close to the 38th Parallel. With beginning of the truce negotiations on 10 July 1951, the United Nations Command had abandoned its political and military objective of winning the war, and the new phase of war, the static war, had begun.

By the end of July 1951 the 3rd Australian Battalion was still the only Australian ground force in Korea, but the officers and men had turned over several times. Reinforcements were fed in rotation from a Reinforcement Holding Unit in Japan. On 28 July 1951, the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade, including the Australian Battalion, came under the command of a newly-formed 1st British Commonwealth Division, which began its operational life under the command of I US Corps in the western sector.

Ground operations in October 1951 were primarily of a offensive nature, marked by an increased number of limited-offensive attacks. The most biggest operation in scale in the autumn was “Operation Commando” which began on 3 October and aimed to buckle the enemy’s defenses and establish a new forward UNC defense line, Jamestown. In this first major battle for the 1st British Commonwealth Division, the Australians under the 28th Brigade were to play decisive role in the battle of Maryangsan feature, in which Hills 355, 317 and 217 were enemy key defense points. The new front, Line Jamestown, was about 20 kilometers north of 38th Parallel. Here the Australians spent next few weeks consolidating the new positions.

**Operations in 1952**

After a spell in reserve, the 28th Brigade including the Australians, moved back into the front line on 18 January 1952. On the western slopes of Hill 355 (Kowang-san or Little Gibraltar) the Australians were dug in along the brown hilltops looking over five double aprons of barbed wire and minefields to the valley which climbed up to another ridge a few thousand yards away, where the Communist defense lines were based. Every day at dawn and dusk the whole battalion stood for about an hour, ready for anything that might happen during the Chinese Communist favourite times of attack. Men not on alert usually had
a couple of hours sleep in a sheltered quarters, and at night patrols slipped out through the wire and minefields to test the position of opposite defenses.

On 3 April the 1st Australian Battalion, the second Australian contingent, arrived Korea, and moved into the 1st British Commonwealth Division area during the second week in April. Upon completion of a six week period of intensive training the battalion moved into the front line to take its place with the 3rd Australian Battalion on 1 June.

The battalion claimed the honour of its first operational engagement on 19th June. In fact, the line was particularly quiet and, despite intermittent shelling, the new Australians suffered no casualties until 22 June, when an ambush patrol lost one man. A daylight raid, on 2 July, on the notorious enemy-held Hill 227 was the first major operation for the 1st Battalion. Although the assault party could not take a prisoner they destroyed the bunkers and used flame throwers with telling effect on the enemy. Except for a couple of days in reserve the 1st RAR Battalion remained at the sharp end of the area until 25 September.

As the year of 1952 was drawing to its close the patrol activity to clear the no-man's land of forward enemy positions became more vigorous. One of the most successful of these was "Operation Fauna" on the night of 10 December. In freezing weather, the 1st Battalion with the cooperation of 3rd Battalion sent its B Company deep into the enemy positions and extricated his men skillfully when they had completed a successful assault against heavy enemy positions. The remaining months of the year had gone with no particular incidents, except carrying out the monotonous, nerve-racking stand-to and patrol routine at platoon to company strength during the night.

Operations in 1953

At the end of January 1953, as the 1st British Commonwealth Division was relieved on the line by the 2nd US Division, the Australians moved into the Camp Casey, in Tongduchon, where it would remain for over two months as a 1st US Corps reserve. The months of February and March were spent mostly in developing camps and positions in addition to the intensive field training.
Ground Force

On 17 March, meanwhile, the advance elements of the 2nd Australian Battalion, the 3rd Australian contingent, has arrived Korea to relieve the 1st RAR Battalion, which left Korea for Australia at the end of March 1953, after serving in Korea for a year since April 1952. On 21 March, at Camp Casey in I US Corps reserve area, detachments from 1st, 2nd and 3rd RAR Battalions paraded together for the first time in Korea.

Early April the 1st British Commonwealth Division went back to its old sector on western front to relieve the 2nd US Division. On the night of 6–9 April, the 28th Brigade to which the Australian battalions, the 3rd and 2nd were attached, had taken over the positions around Hill 355 in the right sector of the division.

As the month of April began, meanwhile, a new stage developed in the armistice negotiation at Panmunjom. On 6 April, the representatives of UN Command and the Communist delegates resumed the talks for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. On 11 April, within five days after the talks had begun, both sides agreed to return the disabled prisoners in their custody, and the week-long "Operation Little Switch" began the morning of 20 April. By the time it ended on 26 April, the Communists released 684 captives of which five were Australians.

April had passed with no particular incidents to note for the Australians. On 4 May the 2nd RAR Battalion went into the line for the first time in the area along southwest of Hill 355, including Hill 159 near Chomul. Hereafter, the battalion stayed in Line Jamestown until 16 June when it turned over the sector to its sister battalion, the 3rd, and moved into the blocking positions as a brigade reserve.

As early as 10 June, after the Terms of Reference had been signed at Panmunjom, most remarkable aspects of the Korean War were that the chief target of the enemy assault were the sectors guarded by ROK forces. Beginning 10 June the Communists shifted their offensive threats from east flank to the II ROK Corps and X US Corps lines in the Eighth US Army center. In this last vicious push in June and July the Red Chinese made approximately ten kilometers of penetration and the weight of their assault had cut off and disorganized many of the ROK divisions facing them. On the other hand, the price that the enemy had paid to sustain this major offensive was also high. The UNC firepower inflicted appalling casualties upon the Communists.

On 9 July the 2nd Australian Battalion was again in the forward line, in the Hook salient.
known as a troublesome sector on Sami-chon (River), the boundary with the 1st US Marine Division on its left. Jutting as it did towards the Communist lines, the salient formed a J-shaped bulge in the main line which established the vulnerability of the position, and the ridgeline on which the Hook was located continued northwest into Communist-held territory, lay only about 500 yards northwest of the Hook.

Aware of its tactical weight, the Communists had made repeated attempts to capture this area but without success and towards the end of July, the Red Chinese launched another major attack. The main objective was a feature in the US Marine sector, but Australians were also under attack. During this abortive action, which continued until early morning of 27 July when the truce was signed, the Australians displayed fully the pride of their volunteer tradition and marked the final activity of the Australian battalions in the Korean War.

Post-Armistice Activities

When the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, the Australian battalions were in the Hook sector and taken up with preparing for the evacuation of forward positions. The 2nd Battalion moved out at 1000 hours on 30 July and withdrew to the Kansas Line before moving to a permanent truce area, where the 1st Battalion took over for another turn of duty in March 1954. The 3rd Battalion remained in Korea for several more months after the arrival of the 1st Battalion.

Command List of 1st, 2nd and 3rd RAR Battalions

(a) 3rd RAR Battalion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion Commanders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.H. Green</td>
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<tr>
<td>L.B. Ferguson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.G. Haslet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I. Hughes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.E.M. Newton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.G. Henderson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L. MacDonald</td>
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### Second in Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T/Major</td>
<td>I.B. Ferguson</td>
<td>27 Sep 1950 – 30 Oct 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.F. Brown</td>
<td>1 Nov 1950 – 18 May 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.P. Denness</td>
<td>25 May 1951 – 4 Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>J.W. Carey</td>
<td>4 Oct 1951 – 19 Dec 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Gerke</td>
<td>26 Dec 1951 – 2 Jan 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.M. Hardiman</td>
<td>9 Jan 1952 – 12 Mar 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H.A. Hind</td>
<td>19 Mar 1952 – 2 Jul 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.E. Finlayson</td>
<td>9 Jul 1952 – 17 Dec 1952</td>
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### Company Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain (T/Maj)</th>
<th>R.A. Gordon</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>H.A. Hind</th>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>A.F.P. Lukyn</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>A.R.S. Doddrell</td>
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<td>E.N. Ayrton</td>
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<td>P. Richardson</td>
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<td>W.M. Stones</td>
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<td>W.I.'Crosby</td>
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<tr>
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<td>D.P. Laughtin</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>R. Sutton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (Prov)</td>
<td>B.S. O'Dowd</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>C.H. Brown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain (Prov)</td>
<td>W.J. Chitts</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>J.A. Kennedy</td>
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<td>J.E.M. Trenerry</td>
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<td>S.W. Ness</td>
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<td>J.W. Norrie</td>
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<td>Captain</td>
<td>J.C. Moloney</td>
<td>Captain (T/Maj)</td>
<td>C.E.M. Newton</td>
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<td>Captain</td>
<td>J.T. Waterton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain (Prov)</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>E.M. Griff</td>
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<td>W.G. Henderson</td>
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<td>W.M. Ryan</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>G.C. Hogan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>A.C. Smith</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>W.H. Wansley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>W.F. Finlayson</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>W.V. Routley</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>J.F. White</td>
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### (b) 1st RAR Battalion

### Battalion Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>M. Austin</td>
<td>5 Nov 1952 – 24 Mar 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second in Command

Major
D.C. Sharp
26 Mar 1952 – 24 Mar 1953

Company Commanders

Captain
S.P. Weir

" D.R. Angus
" D.S. Thomson
" A.S. Mann

Captain
B.B. Hearn
C.D. Kayler-Smith
Skinner

(c) 2nd RAR Battalion

Battalion Commander

Lt. Col.
C.F. Larlin
17 – 27 Mar 1953

Second in Command

Major
L.I. Hopton
17 – 27 Mar 1953

Company Commanders

Major
K.B. Thomas

" F.L. Skinner
" T.H. Wilson

Major
F.H.R. Woodhouse
J.E. Kerr
V. Passlow

(d) 28th British Commonwealth Brigade

Brigade Commanders

Brigadier
G. Taylor
J.F.M. MacDonald
T.J. Daly
J.G.N. Wilton
Apr
Oct 1951
Oct 1951 – Jun 1952
Jun 1952 – Mar 1953
Mar
– Oct 1951
– Jul 1953

(e) Total Number of Australian Army Participants: 5,038

(f) Casualties: KIA WIA MIA POW Total
261 1,034 37 26* 1,358

* all POW's are released

Honours and Awards

(a) George Cross

Pvt H.W. Madden
3. Naval Force

Operation in 1950

Australian ships were officially and actually one of the first non-U.S. ships to come into action in the Korean War in response to the United Nations appeal. At the outbreak of the Korean War, the Australian ships, as a unit of British Commonwealth Forces, had already been serving on the Far Eastern Station. Destroyer HMAS *Bataan* and frigate HMAS *Shorahaven* had arrived at Hong Kong on 21 June just before the outbreak of the Korean War.

On 29 June, following the announcement of the Prime Minister of Australia Menzies to support the United Nations effort in Korea, the two ships had been placed under the Commander of US Naval Forces, Far East, and sailed from Hong Kong to Okinawa. Arriving Okinawa on 30 June, frigate *Shoalhaven* joined the US Support Group, Task Group 96.5 for the escorting operations of shipping between Sasebo, Japan, to Pusan, Korea.

Having finished its first escorting operational mission by 6 July, the Australian
frigate sailed for west coast to join the Commonwealth units of Task Group 96.8 which was on the mission of blockade and inshore work north of 37th Parallel in the Korean waters. The remainder of frigate Shoalhaven's service in Korean waters was spent escorting Sasebo–Pusan convoys until 6 September 1950, when she left Kure, Japan, en route to Australia.

Meanwhile, the Australian destroyer HMAS Bataan was assigned to Task Group 96.1, the US Escort Group, and engaged in convoy escorting duties in the Korean Strait until 13 July 1950, when the destroyer was placed under Task Force 90 for the planned amphibious landing operation to take place at Pohang harbor, located approximately 98 kilometers north of Pusan. It was her first hostile operation in which she had faithfully carried out her mission as a member of the gunfire support group with other US destroyers. On 21 July 1950, HMAS Bataan was released from TF 90 and sailed for Haeju-man area to join the British Commonwealth ships.

August opened in an atmosphere of crisis. All early estimates of the Korean problem had been invalidated, and anticipations of speedy victory were dead. On the ground one defensive line remained, the Naktong River Perimeter. It seemed that only proper employment of Navy and Air Force could offset the enemy's presumed superiority of numbers. On the west coast, however, the month of August was proved to be a quiet period for the Australian destroyer Bataan except for a brief fire exchange with an enemy coastal battery on 1 August when Admiral Andrewes took Belfast and Bataan into the Haeju-man approaches to bombard the enemy shore batteries guarding the potential source of enemy seaborne supply.

Meanwhile, on 28 August, HMAS Warramunga arrived at Pusan port. After a few days of acclimatization of herself to new circumstances, the new Australian destroyer joined the other Commonwealth blockade force in the west coast. Her active duty began on 3 September when she was assigned to screen the carrier HMAS Triumph, performing the usual type of carrier operation in the west.

HMAS Bataan, when returned from screening assignment to the west coast on 1 September, resumed the blockade patrol in company with other UNC naval ships by day, and was detached by night for inshore blockade at the probable approaches to Inchon and Kunsan. The operations against Inchon and Kunsan were of particular importance for the planned amphibious landing operation at Inchon.

At the time when the great amphibious landing operation was to begin, the Australian frigate Shoalhaven, as already mentioned above, left the battle field for home. She steamed 17,600 kilometers during her tour of the Korean War
for two and a half months. Since then, only two destroyers -- HMAS Bataan and Warramunga -- served in the Korean waters until the arrival of another Australian frigate Murchison in May 1951.

On 12 September, Bataan joined HMAS Warramunga which then was screening HMS Triumph in support of the amphibious landing at Inchon scheduled for 15 September. After the success of Inchon landing, on 27 September, Bataan relieved HMCS Sioux and in company with other Commonwealth ships assumed responsibility for blockading the Kunsan area. On 29 September, meanwhile, Warramunga, a brief visit to Sasebo, returned to west coast and joined her sister destroyer Bataan at Kunsan. They carried out patrol and bombardment missions in the area until 4 October when they embarked for Sasebo.

On 8 October, Warramunga joined the British Commonwealth ships which were then scheduled to support the amphibious landing at Wonsan. Consequently, on 10 October, she left Sasebo for the eastern coast to join Gunfire Support Group (TG 95.2), where the Australian destroyer, together with the other Commonwealth destroyers, played a great role in screening the battleship USS Missouri and cruisers USS Helena, Worcester and HMS Ceylon which were engaging in their bombardment of the industrial city of Chongjin. Until the 20th since then


**Warramunga**'s operations went with TG 95.2 along the east coast spent on courier duties to the carriers at sea and as control ship at Wonsan.

While **Warramunga** was serving on the east coast, destroyer **Bataan**, returned to the west coast on 14 October and had operated in the approaches to Incheon under TG 95.1 until the 20th of the month when it sailed for Kure, Japan. Being assigned for screening British carrier **Theseus** off Chinnampo on 29 October, **Bataan** acted as a senior ship of the screening destroyers during the patrol which ended on 7 of November. Thereafter, joining CTF 95.12 on 14th of the month, destroyer **Bataan** acted mostly as a station ship at the entrance of Chinnampo, while screening HMS *Ceylon* in the area.

As the month of November was drawing to its close, while the UNC naval forces were sailing with impunity around the coastal waters of the Korean peninsula, the situation of ground forces became entirely different. The invasion of the Communist Chinese into Korea turned the tide of the war into reverse, and the UNC ground forces had been thrown into a serious retreat after retreat. The rapid southward movement of the allied ground forces on the western front threatened to leave Chinnampo uncovered, and called for urgent evacuation of the port.

On 4 December, the Australian destroyers, **Bataan** and **Warramunga**, took part in the evacuation of Chinnampo together with three Canadian ships and an US destroyer. Shortly after the inception of the operation, however, **Warramunga** ran a ground on a bank of sand. She soon managed to work herself free but was forced to return to the replenishment area south of Cho-do (designed as Area Shelter), and she took no further part in the operation which was successfully completed by the evening of 5 December.

During the remainder of the year of 1950 through early 1951, the Australian destroyer remained in the operational area on the west coast. From 7 to 17 December, **Bataan** and **Warramunga** took their turns on the carrier screen of HMS *Theseus* at Incheon, who was in direct support of UNC ground forces. Thus, the carrier screening mission at Incheon marked the close of six months arduous service in the Korean waters for the Australian destroyers.

**Operations in 1951**

During the early days of January 1951 when the UNC ground forces were conducting strategic retreat in an orderly manner to the defense positions prepared some 25 kilometers south of the Han River, HMAS **Warramunga** and **Bataan** were at Incheon port assisting the evacuation of the UNC ground forces. On 3rd Febru-
ary, of the two Australian destroyers, *Warramunga* joined the TG 95.2 led by USS *English* on the east coast off Kangnung city for screening of cruiser USS *Manchester* and battleship USS *Missouri*. The screening mission continued until 12th of the month when the cruiser USS *Manchester* had completed a shelling of Tanchon, just below Songjin, and the Task Group 95.2 withdrew to the south enroute to Sasebo.

Late February, HMAS *Warramunga* in company with HMS *Belfast* and USS *Land*, performed some impressive exhibitions of rapid inshore bombardment at Wonsan port after navigating some 37 kilometers of channel through minefields. *Warramunga*'s operational mission on the east coast ended on 4th of March when she was relieved by the USS *Borie*.

On 22 February, while *Warramunga* was serving on the east coast, *Bataan* was assigned cruiser screen mission of HMS *Belfast* in the west coast. The patrol which continued until 6 March under Arctic weather consisted of inshore patrols between Inchon and Chinnampo and a full-scale amphibious demonstration at the north of Haeju designed to relieve pressure on the central front where CCF were massing to assume offensive. In this patrol action which lasted for ten days, *Bataan* was responsible for escort and bombardment. On 6 March, as released from the cruiser, she sailed for Sasebo.

Meanwhile, due to the damage suffered from gales, HMAS *Warramunga* was forced to be idle in March and early April. On 11 April she returned to the west coast and relieved HMS *Blank Swan* as CTE 95.12, West Coast Blockade Group. On 7 April, the Australian destroyer turned over command of TE 95.12 to HMS *Belfast* and proceeded to Haeju-man to assume control of ROK naval sweepers. After two days of supervision of the sweeping operation, she joined HMS *Comus* for mine search patrol and bombardment until 21 April. For nine days from 26 April to 4 May 1951, *Warramunga*, as the screen commander, led the screening of HMS *Glory* in the west coast.

HMAS *Bataan*, on the other hand, left Sasebo on 8 April for the east coast to join in the attacks the enemy communications system along the Wonsan port. Returning to the west coast on 16 April the Australian destroyer underwent series of carrier screen operation until the 20th of the month and steamed for Sasebo. During the period of 28 April to 6 May, *Bataan* joined the other destroyers in the west screening USS *Bataan* and HMS *Glory* then were in direct support of the I US Corps, Eighth US Army. On 18 May 1951, after a year of operational duty in the Korean waters, HMAS *Bataan* headed for Kure, Japan, to make preparation for her homeward passage. There she was relieved by HMAS *Murchison* (Lieutenant Commander A.M. Dollard) and steamed for Hong Kong where the
destroyer left for home on 29 May 1951.

Meanwhile, HMAS *Warramunga*, after a period of exercise with US submarine *Redfish* at Yokosuka in mid-May, returned to the west coast on 1 June and spent quiet days until the 12th of the month, screening USS *Bataan* and the USS *Sicily* which replaced USS *Bataan* on 4 June.

By mid-1951 the battle line had stabilized in Korea roughly along the 38th Parallel and the drawout truce talks were beginning at Panmunjom. The period was anything but dull for the navy. The effect of truce talks on naval warfare, however, particularly on the west coast, was occasionally quite considerable. The campaign involving the west coast islands when they became valuable bargaining counters in the truce negotiations was most important and exciting operations in which the Australian destroyers participated after the talks began. During the period of 24 to 29 July 1951, HMAS *Warramunga* with the other destroyers screened HMS *Glory* and USS *Sicily* (TE 95.11) in a concerted attack to cut the Communist forces off from their northern supply bases in a narrow neck of Red North Korea between 38°15' and 39°15' North Latitude. On 29 July, after logging a record mileage of 8,625 during the month, *Warramunga* returned to Sasebo. On 1 August, after one night at Sasebo, she proceeded to begin her last patrol and joined the TE 95.12 at Haeju and began bombardment from as close inshore as possible. On 6 August *Warramunga* temporarily detached from TE 95.12 and proceeded north to the Yalu Gulf to carry out surveillance in an attempt to estimate enemy activities. Backing at Haeju-man on 7 August she fired a final bombardment of 110 rounds as a parting gesture, bringing a year's operational service to a close.

HMAS *Murchison* began Korean operational duty with two uneventful west coast patrols in June. In early July she joined the TG 95.12 operating off the mouth of the Yalu River and the approaches to Chinnampo. This phase of operation ended on 24 July with a successful bombardment of enemy tanks and vehicles south of Cho-do Island, the approach to the Taedong River estuary.

On 25 July *Murchison*, in company with HMS *Cardigan Bay* and ROK frigate PF 62, initiated operations to probe the Han River to the upper limits of navigation, as a demonstration of Allied control of the area. Except for a brief visit to Sasebo, the Australian frigate *Murchison* remained in the Han River area maintaining harassing fire and daily progressing the survey to the close of August.

The end of August saw three additional Australian ships entered the Korean theatre: The carrier HMAS *Sydney* arrived the Korean theatre on 31 August; the destroyer HMAS *Anzac* on 24 August; the destroyer *Tobruk* reached Sasebo on 31 August.
HMAS Anzac, upon arrival on 24 August, relieved the destroyer Warramunga at Sasebo on 24 August. Taking over his mission from Warramunga, Anzac departed the harbour as a unit of TE 95.11 screening USS Sicily and participated in the west coast blockade operation until the end of month. Early September Anzac was detached from the group to proceed to the vicinity of Haegu Gulf with orders to bombard selected targets and returned to Sasebo on 7 September. On 12 September, Anzac departed Sasebo, and proceeding to Wonsan on the east coast, assumed the duties of Commander TE 95.22. Duties of the group were blockade of the east coast of Korea from a point 23 miles south of Songjin to some 34 miles south of the Korean-Siberian border. The operation continued until 26 September when Anzac parted company for Kure, ending her first tour of duty in the Korean theatre. On 30 September, after some 23,000 miles of operational steaming, Anzac departed Hong Kong escorting HMS Glory for Australia.

Meanwhile, the Australian frigate Murchison returned to the scene of her old hunting ground on the Han River on 17 September. This was her fourth Han River patrol and resumed her previous pattern until 1 October when she proceeded for Kure for docking. Returning to duty on the west coast, Murchison joined HMNZS Hawea on 21 October for a patrol in the Yalu Gulf, and patrols off Chinnampo. In the following month Murchison returned to the Han River for her usual task of escort to the Fleet Oiler on 1 November, she then relieved HMS St. Brides Bay as “Sitting Duck” on the coast in the area of Sok-do, a small island covering the Taedong River estuary.

On 3 October, HMAS Tobruk who relieved her sister-ship Anzac in September began operational duty and reported for duty on the screen of the Carrier Task Element 95.11 with HMC ships Athabaskan and Sioux in company. From this time until the destroyer returned to Sasebo on 18 October she remained on the screen of the Carrier Task Element on the west coast. Tobruk began her second west coast patrol in company with HMS Cockade screening USS Rendova on 26 October and remained there with the carrier unit 4 November when the three ships proceeded to Sasebo. Her third patrol began on 8 November, the venue changing to the east coast, where she spent twelve days as one of TG 95.2, Blockade Group East, attacking enemy targets between Songjin and Chongjin. One hundred and sixteen targets were engaged during the course of the operations and Tobruk fired 1,200 rounds of 4.5-inch ammunition. After a week's rest at Kure, Tobruk resumed her fourth patrol on 28 November protecting the US Carrier Rendova. This patrol, which lasted for 26 days, covered three period as screen to USS Rendova (1-6 December) and HMAS Sydney (7-17 December)
and as a unit of TE 95,12, the west coast bombardment force.

Meanwhile, the Australian frigate *Murchison* which had spent ten days in Kure after the Han River operation, arrived at Paengnyong-do on 27 November, en route to take up anti-invasion duties protecting the islands of Taehwa-do until close of the month. On 30 November she resumed the role of “Sitting Duck” in the Sokdo-Chodo area until 3 December when she sailed for Inchon for escort duties to the Carrier Task Group and thence to Sasebo and to Hong Kong.

On 5 November, the Australian carrier *Sydney* returned to west coast and resumed her operations. At this time, *Sydney* was the commander of TE 95.11, and screened by HMC ships *Athabaskan, Cayuga* and *Sioux*, and US ships *Hanna* and *Collett*. Her aircraft hit the usual targets for the following nine days, but unfortunately the preliminary sorties of the operation brought her first casualty -- Lieutenant N.E. Clarkson, was killed when his aircraft failed to pull out of a strafing dive against enemy transport. By 12 November carrier *Sydney* reached her thousandth sortie in eighteen and a half flying days since her arrival in the theatre.

On 18 November the Australian carrier sailed again from Sasebo forming part of TG 95.8 under the command of Rear Admiral A.K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN, in *HMS Belfast*, for a coordinated strike against the Red industrial center of Hungnam on the east coast. Flying more than 100 sorties in the two days operation, *Sydney* proceeded for the west waters on 21 November. On 7 December when HMAS *Sydney* returned to the west coast after a week’s maintenance at Kure, representing the Carrier Element of TE 95.11 and was joined by HMAS *Tobruk*. They remained in company until 17 December. During the operation she lost second pilot from her complement. Lieutenant R.R. Sinclair, operating a *Sea Fury*, north-west of Chinnampo was hit by flak and successful in bailing out, died from injuries inflicted by his falling airplane’s tail. Four other aircraft were hit on this day and one *Sea Fury* was forced to land on Paengnyong-do with its wheels up. The closing day of the patrol were occupied in support of incoming convoys CTE 95.12, in his anti-invasion operations in the Cho-do–Sok-to area. The patrol ended on 17 December with a total of 383 sorties of her aircrafts. Twenty-five aircraft suffered flak damage including five lost. And the Australian destroyer *Tobruk*, at this time, marked her lengthened stay of 106 days at sea since October with some 30,000 miles of steaming.

After this operation was completed, the carrier *Sydney* returned to Kure for ten days’ refit, and the destroyer *Tobruk* was transferred to TE 92.12 until 20 December when she returned to Kure. Toward the end of the year the Australian carrier *Sydney* had been on duty on the west coast. The other Australian two
ships, *Tobruk* and *Murchison*, joined company at Kure around the end of the year.

1952

During the first month of 1952 the three Australian ships were relatively busy. On New Year's Day 1952, both *Sydney* and *Tobruk* were performing their missions on the west coast. The carriers aircraft resumed their offensive role, giving assistance to the UNC troops on the island of Yongyu-do which had been invaded by the enemy early that morning. *Tobruk* greeted the New Year by commencing her fifth patrol when she relieved HMS *Whitesand Bay* in the Haeju area, operating mainly in defense of Yonpyong-do.

The sixth and last patrol of *Tobruk* on her first Korean tour of duty began on 16 January as she joined the ships of TE 95.11 screening HMAS *Sydney*. *Sydney* and *Tobruk* began their last series of sorties in bad weather on 17 January. The operations which were the Australian carrier’s last day of Participation in the war continued until 25 January. During this period 17–25 January *Sydney* flew a total of 293 sorties. On 25 January *Sydney* and *Tobruk* proceeded for Sasebo and the following day *Sydney* in company with *Tobruk* departed for Australia.

Throughout a half-year in the war, HMAS *Sydney* spent 64 days in the operational area mainly as British Commonwealth carrier of the west coast patrol. Of these days 9.5 percent was taken up by replenishment or passage between west and east coasts. A total of 2,366 sorties was flown, and the average daily sortie rate was 55.2 per full flying day. Ammunition expenditure during the course of patrols totalled 269,249 rounds of 20-mm, 6,359 rocket projectiles and 902 tons of 1,000 lb. and 500 lb. weight.

On the other hand the Australian destroyer *Tobruk* had steamed some 39,000 miles and fired 2,316 rounds of her 4.5-inch armament, spending 89 days at sea during her four months of first service in the operational area. When they left for home on 26 January, *Sydney* was relieved by HMS *Glory* and *Tobruk* by HMAS *Warramunga* which returned to the Korean waters for a second tour of duty.

In the meantime, the Australian frigate *Murchison* returned on 22 January to join HMS *Belfast* anchored off Taechong-do and assumed the duty of Commander *TU* 95.12.3 being the Han River defense unit. On 28 January *Murchison* left the Han estuary and proceeded to Taechong-do to take over the defense of the Yuk-do island. Returning to Han River on 30 January, *Murchison* was handed a list of thirteen targets on which one hundred and fifty rounds of 4" ammunition
was expended. Taking farewell of the Han River, Sasebo was reached 2 February bringing Murchison's eight months of Korean service to a close. Two days later she was relieved by the old timer, HMAS Bataan which arrived at the area for her second tour of duty.

The old timers, Warramunga and Bataan began their patrol of their second tour of duties early February on the west coast. On 6 February Warramunga began her first patrol of her second tour screening HMS Glory on the west coast. After ten days of patrol with Glory she detached for Kure on 16 February. On 25 February she crossed the 38th Parallel on the east coast and reported to CTG 95.8 at Wonsan and was ordered to relieve Taupo at Songjin. The following two days the Australian destroyer bombarded Songjin and Yang-do, and coastal railway communications.

HMAS Battan who relieved frigate Murchison on 4 February, began her patrol mission on 8 February as she joined Task Unit 95.12.1 for operations in the Sok-to-Cho-do area, south of Chinnampo. During the patrol which ended on 24 February, Battan fired five hundred and forty-three rounds of 4.7-inch and seventy-five rounds of 4-inch ammunition. Battan returned to the west coast on 7 March to screen TE 95.11, and was designated screen commander. The patrol covered the coast and offshore islands between Changsan-got Point and Paengnyong-do with orders for harassing fire. On 13 March the patrol ended and she retired to Sasebo.

During the first days of March Warramunga continued to operate as one of the units blockading and bombarding the north-east coast. On 8 March, after a fortnight of strenuous patrol on the east coast, the Australian destroyer reached Wonsan, and to Sasebo. She began her third patrol screening Glory on the west coast on 13 March, ending in gales and rain on 22 March when Glory and she sailed south for Sasebo.

Bataan, meanwhile, relieved HMCS Nookta as CTU 95.12.4 being a detachment from TE 95.11 with flag in Belfast on 10 April. The task of the unit was the defense of islands in friendly hands in the Haegyu estuary in cooperation with west Korean island Guerrilla and Marine forces. The axis of Bataan's responsibility lay in the island of Taeyongpyong-do which was essential to hold. The patrol ended on 20 April.

On 10 May Warramunga returned to operations with her second east coast patrol, where the day before USS Jameson Owens had suffered 10 hits from an unrepentant Songjin battery. On 17 May a change of venue came for Warramunga when she relieved USS Thomas at Chongjin covering the operating sweepers. Operating between Chongjin and Songjin constantly on the move, she continued
to maintain a high rate of harassing fire until 24 of May when the patrol ended. On 28 May she handed her patrol over the HMCS Nookta. HMAS Warramunga, after spending 10–18 June screening USS Bataan on the west coast, joined TU 95.12.1 in defense of the islands of Sokdo and Cho-do on 29 June.

The first two months of the second half of 1952 saw two Australian destroyers left theatre for home after completing their second Korean tour of duty in the Korean War: Warramunga on 26 July and Bataan on 31 August.

Meanwhile, early August, the Australian frigate Condamine arrived Korea and began her operational duty in the Haeju area on the west coast as a unit of TU 95.12.4 on 4 August 1952, and fired her first shots of the war with a bombardment of enemy positions on the mainland opposite Mudo island. On 8 August she relieved USS Kimberly as CTU 95.12.1 in defense of the Sok-to–Cho-do area at the entrance to Chinnampo. After a week of daily bombardment of the mainland largely in cooperation with TE 95111, she reached Sasebo on 19 August.

On 22 August Condamine reported for duty to CTE 95.22 at Yang-do. She was the first Australian frigate to operate in that area. There she, with other ships of the element, began defense of Yangdo and coast patrol north to Chongjin for nineteen operational days until 11 September when she was relieved by HMS Charity. After ten days (13–22 September) at Kure Condamine returned to the Haeju area on 23 September, where she relieved HMS St. Brides Bay as CTU 95.12.4. A fortnight was spent in defense of the offshore islands of the area. On 7 October she patrolled the Sok-to–Cho-do area and after six uneventful days, she proceeded for Sasebo.

At the time when the new comer Condamine had first served on both coasts through the first two months since her arrival at the theatre early August, the other Australian old timer, Anzac (destroyer) returned to Korean waters to begin her second tour of duty. Reaching Hong Kong on 16 September, where she relieved Bataan on the station, proceeded for Sasebo on 27 September, for duty on the west coast of Korea. The following day Anzac joined HMS Newcastle and HMNZ Rotoiti at Paengyong-do to begin coast patrol. In this, Anzac’s role was six days with the west coast bombardment and Blockade Group followed by nine days on the carrier screen. The closing days of the month found her on patrol some 50 miles south-east of the Yalu River.

On 4 October, Anzac completed her patrol and proceeded to operate on the screen of HMS Ocean which ended on 13 October, and proceeded for Sasebo and thence to Kure. On 29 October returned to the west coast patrol as a unit of TU 95.12.1 in defense of the islands of Sok-to and Cho-do. Anzac’s period of
patrol and bombardment ceased on 17 November. Active operational duty was resumed on 27 November, on the west coast, screening HMS Glory in company of HNLMS Piet Hein and USS Hickox.

Meanwhile, the Australian frigate Condamine’s fourth patrol began with four days as CTU 95.12.2 at Paengnyong-do in the middle of October. Due to the bad weather, however, her patrol mission was reduced to routine watch over the offshore islands. Two days at Sok-to supporting the minesweepers brought a quiet month to a close. The patrol finally ended with the frigate operating at Haeju on 8 November. A return to the Haeju-man area on 28 November followed a week at Kure. Ten days on patrol and thence to Sasebo and back to the west coast on 23 December with patrols off Paengnyong-do and Haeju-man extending to the 6 of January 1953.

HMAS Anzac, meanwhile, relieved HMCS Crusader and resumed bombardment and patrol duties in the vicinity of Cho-do and Sok-to islands. On 13 December, being relieved in turn on the 12th, she returned to Sasebo. On 19 December, Anzac departed Sasebo for her last patrol of the year, the venue switching to the east coast, as a unit of TE 95.22 relieving HMCS NATDA. Base of operations was the Yangdo island, the defense of which was the unit’s chief mission, ending on 3 January 1953.

1953

At the beginning of the year of 1953 the whole front still remained static on the ground. The war on both waters, however, went on day and night along the coasts. During the last six months of the war, the Australian ships took up most of their time in carrier screening and inshore patrols on the west coast.

The first fifteen days of January 1953 were relatively quiet for the Australian ships, and they could spend some days in January together in Kure for the first time since the beginning of hostility in Korea.

The Australian destroyer Anzac’s west coast patrol was resumed on 21 January as a unit of CTU 95.1.2 for protection of Sok-do and Cho-to area. On 25 January, Anzac was relieved by HMS Birmingham and herself relieved HMS Cockade as CTU 95.1.4. Operations of this group, followed the usual pattern, being allocated daily for gunfire support against the Red mainland. On 29 January she was once more back in Sasebo. Beginning on 5 February 1953, when she left Sasebo screening Glory, Anzac began a eleven weeks of almost continuous service on the west coast patrol. It ended on 23 April, when the destroyer left Yonpyong-do for
Hong Kong where she remained until 7 May 1953.

At the meantime, HMAS Condamine was operating on the Haeju-man and Cho-do areas. She patrolled in both areas from 21 January through to 15 March 1953, when she completed her final patrol with more than 22,000 miles steaming in the Korean waters. On 14 April Condamine was relieved by her sister ship HMAS Culgoa.

The months of April and May 1953 saw new development at Panmunjom. They reached agreement to exchange wounded prisoners and reopening of plenary session, attracting attentions of the world to the truce site at Panmunjom.

Culgoa began her operation on 19 April when she arrived off Paengnyong-do to relieve HMS Whitesand Bay on the west coast patrol. She remained on patrol until 28 April, and was relieved by HMNZS Kanire. On that same day Culgoa proceeded to the Cho-do—Sok-to area to operate under the orders of CTU 95.1.4 in HMCS Haida on bombardment support until 3 May. Culgoa began her second patrol on 18 May in the Cho-do area, spending next five days in daily bombardment of enemy positions on the Amgok Peninsula.

In June Culgoa spent two uneventful weeks on the west coast patrol in the Haeju area, mainly on the task of protecting Taeyonpyong-do from Red invasion. On 23 June, the Australian frigate, after cooperating with USS Bairoko in a strike against Chomi-do, joined the bombardment of Communist troops invading the island of Yongmae-do. The patrol ended on 29 June when after handing over to HMS Charity the frigate proceeded for Hong Kong.

The Australian destroyer Anzac, meanwhile, left Sasebo, in company of HMS Ocean, for her final patrol of the war. On 13 June 1953, Anzac was relieved by HMAS Tobruk, ending her second tour of duty for nine months in the Korean War.

During the months of June and July 1953, heavy fighting flared up on the ground front when the Reds launched their last minute offensive against the ROK-held sectors of the line, and many of the UNC ships, particularly the carriers and the ships of bomb-line unit, were called upon to intensify their operations against the Reds.

HMAS Tobruk returned to Korean waters on 26 June 1953 and reported for duty to CTU 95.1.2 at Taechong-do as relief to HMAS Anzac for west coast operations. Her next mission was with TG 95.2 as part of the Yangdo Blockade and Patrol Group on the east coast. She reached the island on 14 July where she relieved HMCS Huron. On 16 July she sank a large enemy motor sampan suspected of operating as a minelayer, on the 24th she fired her last rounds of 4.5-inch at the Red radar post installations between Chongjin and Yang-do.

On 27 July 1953, the day the armistice was signed, the Australian frigate
Culgoa had returned to the west coast of Korea and relieved HMNZS Hawea at Paengnyong-do to assume the duties of CTU 95.1.5, and began the first of a series of "Armistice patrols."

Some related records and statistical data are given below for further reference.

a. HMAS Service Period and Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Service Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bataan</td>
<td>Cdr William B.M. Marks</td>
<td>1 Jul 1950 – 18 May 1951</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cdr Warwick S. Bracegirdle</td>
<td>4 Feb 1952 – 31 Aug 1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoalhaven</td>
<td>Cdr Ian H. McDonald</td>
<td>1 Jul 1950 – 6 Sep 1950</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cdr James M. Ramsay</td>
<td>6 Feb 1952 – 26 Jul 1952</td>
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<td>Murchison</td>
<td>Lt Cdr Alan N. Doolard</td>
<td>18 May 1951 – 2 Feb 1952</td>
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<td>Anzac</td>
<td>Cdr John Plunkett-Cole</td>
<td>24 Aug 1951 – 26 Sep 1951</td>
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<td>Capt Galfrey G.O. Gatacre</td>
<td>27 Sep 1952 – 13 Jun 1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Capt David H. Harries</td>
<td>31 Aug 1951 – 26 Jun 1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobruk</td>
<td>Cdr Richard I. Peek</td>
<td>31 Aug 1951 – 26 Jun 1952</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cdr Ian H. McDonald</td>
<td>26 Jun 1953 – 12 Feb 1954</td>
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<td>Condamine</td>
<td>Lt Cdr Robert C. Savage</td>
<td>4 Aug 1952 – 14 Apr 1953</td>
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<td>Culgoa</td>
<td>Lt Cdr Donara A.H. Clarke</td>
<td>14 Apr 1953 – 29 Jun 1953</td>
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b. Strength (Complements of ships employed)

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<th>Officers</th>
<th>Sailors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bataan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>284</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoalhaven</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>183</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warramunga</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>294</td>
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<td>Anzac</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
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<td>Tobruk</td>
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<td>296</td>
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c. Casualties:

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d. HMAS Miles Steamed

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<td>Warramunga</td>
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<td>Murchison</td>
<td>36,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anzac</td>
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</table>

Sydney 40,000  
Tobruk 39,000  
Condamine 31,000  
Culgoa 16,000  
Total 463,000

e. Ammunition Expended by HMAS Sydney

1000 lb. Bombs 18  
500 lb. Bombs 784  
20 mm. Cannon 269,249 rounds  
Rocket Projectiles 6,359

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<tr>
<th>HMAS</th>
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<th>4.5&quot;</th>
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<td>Tobruk</td>
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<td>Shoalhaven</td>
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<td>Murchison</td>
<td>5,634</td>
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Total 9,515 5,576 9,983 50,417 9,921

f. HMAS Sydney’s Air Squadrons

Air Squadron 805 Lt Cdr Walter G. Bowles  
Air Squadron 808 Lt Cdr John L. Appleby  
Air Squadron 817 Lt Cdr Ronald B. Lunberg

Air sorties flown 2,366  
Number of flying days 42.8  
Daily sortie rate 55.2  
Aircraft lost 11  
Aircraft damaged 77

g. Honours and Awards

Commander of British Empire Captain D.H. Harries
Distinguished Service Order

Captain G.G.O. Gatacre

Captain O.H. Becher

Member of British Empire

Lt Cdr R.J. Tunstall

Command Engr Officer J.B. Carter

Distinguished Service Cross .......................... 11

Bar to Distinguished Service Cross ...................... 3

Distinguished Service Medal ............................ 3

British Empire Medal ................................. 4

Mention in Despatches .................................. 36

American Awards

Legion of Merit ........................................... 9

Bronze Star ................................................ 1

4. Air Force

Contribution of No. 77 RAAF Squadron

In 1950: One week after the Red North Koreans launched their offensive, the Australian fighter squadron with a brilliant record from the Pacific War flew its first operational mission. At 0500 hours of 2 July 1950, Australian Mustangs took off from Iwakuni, Japan to escort US B-26's on an bombing mission and to cover US B-29's for an attack on the Communist North Korean airfield of Yonpo near Hamhung. Five days later the No. 77 RAAF Squadron suffered the first casualty. Squadron Leader Graham stout dived on his target -- the Samchok railway station on the east coast of Korea -- and failed to pull out.

While the UNC ground forces were hanging on desperately to Naktong River Perimeter in those fateful weeks of July, August and September, the UNC air forces had switched from emphasis on ground support to a planned interdiction programme designed to cut the Communist supply routes. Most of the B-29's effort, the fighter-bomber strength operated against the rolling stock, bridges, truck convoys and other lines of communication south of the Yalu River. The 77th RAAF Squadron played an active part throughout the Naktong River line defense period. During the month of August alone the squadron flew 1,745 hours in combat operations. Forty pilots shared 812 sorties. From the beginning of the war to the end of August the Australian Mustangs had destroyed 35 enemy tanks besides 182 trucks, 44 other vehicles, 4 locomotives, and many ammunition and fuel dumps.
On 12 October, after UN Command's successful landing at Inchon, No. 77 RAAF Squadron moved from Iwakuni, Japan, to Pohang, on the east coast of Korea, where aircrews were quartered in tents erected on the concrete airstrip. As the UNC ground forces advanced northward, 19 November, the Australian squadron moved with the 35th US Fighter Group to Yonpo, south of Hamhung in Red North Korea. Although a more settled base than Pohang, Yonpo was extremely cold and desolate. Ice, snow and bitter winds made conditions almost intolerable. Ground crews had to sweep snow from the wings of the Mustangs before the pilots could take off. Serving aircraft was a constant battle against freezing temperatures and the weather was a major hazard to planes which had to maintain maximum effort to hold off the Chinese Communists.

With no air opposition and comparatively little enemy anti-aircraft fire the first six months of the war had been effective and dangerous but non-spectacular for the pilots of Australian squadron. Then, in November, came rumours that Russian-type aircraft had been seen south of the Yalu River. Two Yaks had strafed ROK troops and US pilots had seen MIG-15's patrolling in groups of four along the Manchurian border. Nobody worried about the Yaks but the MIG's were a different proposition. The US fighter pilots, in their F-86 Sabre jets, were confident. But prop-driven Australian Mustang were obsolete as combat fighters in a jet age. The Australian Air Force would have liked F-86 Sabres for the eager pilots of No. 77 Squadron to try themselves out on MIG's. However there were no Sabres available until the end of 1950.

By late November as the UNC offensive in Red North Korea collapsed and the UNC ground forces began to withdraw, elsewhere in Communist North Korea the tactical wings pulled out as quickly as air and surface movement permitted. No. 77 RAAF Squadron and the 35th US Fighter - Interceptor Wing at Yonpo (K-27) were ordered to move the bulk of its troops and property by LST to Pusan (K-9) on 3rd December. The movement was accomplished without interruption to combat missions and within a few days the Mustangs were operating as smoothly as ever. During the period of October through December 13 Mustangs out of 19 Australian squadron aircraft participated in combat. Total sorties flown were up to 868, and lost one aircraft due to enemy ground fire in a close support sortie.
In 1951: In early 1951 the Australians had to take Meteors, the second-best jet fighter. Squadron Leader Cresswell and Lieutenant Desmond Murphey were the first Australian pilots to fly jets in combat over Korea. As a preparation for rearming the squadron they attended a conversion course on American jet aircraft at Itazuke, Japan, where the 8th US Fighter Group taught them to fly the F-80 Shooting Star and coached them in jet jockey jargon.

Meanwhile, the Mustangs were at Pusan hammering away at Chinese Communist troops and supplies and flying direct support missions for the UNC ground forces now moving up to the Han River. In mid-February 1951, fourteen pilots of No. 77 RAAF Squadron received the US Air Medal for meritorious service in combat. Two of them -- Flight Lieutenant R. Coburn and Flight Lieutenant L. Olorenshaw had carried out 98 missions. Meanwhile, during March in 1951, several Australian Mustangs were hit by enemy ground fire. Two pilots -- Warrant Officer C.R.A. Howe and Flight Sergeant H.W. Meggs -- were forced to crash-land near the front line but were uninjured and rescued by US helicopter. Another pilot, Sergeant Cecil Sly, had a remarkable escape from capture or death when he was forced to bale out from his disabled Mustang after being hit by enemy ground fire, north of Seoul.

Warrant Officer Howe was on armed reconnaissance north of Seoul when his engine packed up. He climbed to 10,000 feet and headed back to base. His Mustang, however, could not maintain height and he belly-landed on an island in the Han River. He was unhurt and a US helicopter picked him up within twenty minutes.

A few days later Meggs and Sergeant Sly were on a armed reconnaissance patrol north of Seoul when Sly’s cockpit filled with smoke, temporarily blinding him. His No. 2 Sergeant Meggs, called up Sgt Sly and said that the aircraft was streaming smoke. The smoke, filtering in from down near the port fuel gauge, had filled the cockpit so that he could not see the instruments. He opened the canopy and headed south, obtaining alterations of course from Meggs until the smoke cleared sufficiently for him to read the compass. All engine instruments appeared normal at this stage but the motor became very rough and soon began running intermittently. Showers of sparks and flames were coming from the exhaust stubs and passing the cockpit. Meggs told Sly that his aircraft was on fire and advised to abandon it.

The aircraft was then at 1,500 feet and losing altitude. Sgt Sly undid his safety harness, switched on the emergency radio, trimmed, and attempted to abandon the aircraft on the right side. As the canopy was already open he forgot to jettison it and, as a result, his parachute pack caught under the canopy edge.
After about three seconds his legs shot free and he felt the drag of the slipstream, which levered him out in a somersaulting motion. He struck the tail plane and bruised his right side. The heavy clothing he wore and a food package on his belt saved him from serious wounds.

Having cleared the aircraft Sly pulled the rip-cord and the parachute opened with a heavy jolt. As he floated down he heard rifle shots and bullets whistled passed him. He landed on the side of a rocky hill and he made for a ditch a few yards away. He removed all food and medical packs from the life vest and threw it away as it was too colorful. The enemy were dug in almost all around Sly, both on the hill behind and across the small stream in front. The UNC aircraft had arrived on the scene and provided constant cover with napalm, rockets and 50-caliber machine guns.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Meggs had alerted the US rescue helicopter and called up flights of Mustangs to keep Sly covered. Four US Mustangs were there within a few minutes, followed by four Australian pilots, and these planes put a curtain of fire around Sly. The first of the rescue helicopters arrived in about half an hour and Sly crawled down the ditch towards a sandy river bed to get as close as possible to an easy landing ground. The enemy fire was so intense and accurate that although the helicopter descended to within 50 feet it was unable to reach Sly. Heavy ground fire riddled the machine and it had to return to base on a groggy motor. Fresh flights came in with napalm to work over the area across the river and near an orchard, where most of the enemy fire came from.

By this time, a second helicopter arrived. Just two hours after bailing out, the second helicopter approached his position and hovered within a few yards of him. Sly crawled out to meet it, taking advantage of all possible cover and timing his arrival to coincide with

Wing Cdr Jack Kinninmont, CO, 77th Squadron, climbs into the cockpit of his meteor jet for another raid on Reds.
the moment the helicopter touched down. This left both of them vulnerable to enemy fire as short of a time as possible. It took only three seconds for the helicopter crews to drag him inside and the copter left the ground toward Suwon base.

During January through March 1951, the squadron possessed 19 Mustangs and 15 of them were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 1,212. By this time the squadron had completed just over nine months in combat and lost ten pilots in action.

On 10 April 1951, No. 77 RAAF Squadron pilots at Iwakuni, Japan, began training on Gloster Meteor VIII jet fighters, a twin jet with an altitude of 40,000 feet, powered by two Rolls Royce Derwent engines and capable of speeds up to 500 miles an hour.

By the end of June, the squadron was ready to return to operations in Korea, eager to test its Meteors against the MIG’s, which had continued to make spasmodic raids from across the Manchurian border. In “MIG Alley,” above the land between the Yalu River at Antung and the Chongchon River, the Australians joined with US jets -- Sabres and Thunderjets -- against the Russian-built planes which were gradually becoming a major factor in the air war in Korea. On combat experience it looked as if the single-engined Russian-built jet was as good and better than anything the UNC air forces had to put up against it. The MIG could fight at a higher speed, at a greater height, and carried heavier armament which had a slower rate of fire. Below 25,000 feet the Sabre jet could outfly and outfight the MIG, between 25,000 feet and 50,000 feet, however, the MIG had the advantage. Nevertheless, over a long period, the American Sabre pilots claimed more kills, about 12 to 1 in favor of the Sabres.

The Meteor VIII had never been tried out in combat although an earlier type had been operated against the V1 flying bomb in the closing stages of World War II. The Australian pilots knew its limitations, particularly a blind spot on a 30 degree arc on either side astern, but were confident that they could outmanoeuvre any aircraft they were likely to meet. But, for more than a week, the Meteors operated in bad weather over “MIG Alley” without hearing or seeing a MIG.

Then, one day in mid-August 1951, when the Meteors were providing top cover for US F-80 Shooting Star jets attacking enemy supply-lines near the Yalu River, the Australian pilots saw their first MIG’s, a tight little bunch of about 20 squat-nosed outlines high in the blue about a mile away. The Meteors immediately broke towards the enemy jets but the MIG’s refused combat and left the area.

The first clash between Meteors and MIG’s took place on 29 August 1951. Eight Meteors were on a fighter sweep 35,000 feet above Chongju when they
saw six MIG's above them at 40,000 feet. They turned to keep the "bandits" in
sight when Squadron Leader R. Wilson saw two more MIG's below them at 30,000
feet. Calling to his No. 2 Sergeant N. Woodroffe, he peeled off into a dive,
followed by Woodroffe. The two MIG's dived off but Woodroffe's Meteor twisted
into a spin, taking him out of the fight. Wilson, stick back and throttles open,
pressed the attack, but almost immediately a shudder shook his Meteor. A MIG
had jumped out of the sun and scored hits. Wilson wrenched his Meteor around,
the blood rushing from his head in a limit-rate turn as he endeavoured to shake
the MIG off his blind tail. Flight Lieutenant Cedric Thomas and Flying Officer
Kenneth Blight, the two other members of Wilson's section, screamed down to
the rescue and the MIG's broke off after an ineffective attempt to get on Blight's
tail.

Meanwhile, the MIG's had got well on to the other section of four Meteors,
led by pilot Geoffrey Thornton. Thornton saw them coming out of the sun and
yelled to his companions to break away. When the section straightened out again
one aircraft, piloted by Warrant Officer R.D. Guthrie, was missing. He was taken
prisoner and released after the armistice.

A week later the Meteors again tangled with MIG's and came off second best.
Six Meteors were providing fighter cover for two Shooting Stars on a photographic
reconnaissance mission near the Manchurian border. Flight Lieutenant Victor
Cannon, the flight leader, saw the red-nosed swept-wing enemy fighters first,
at 12 o'clock high, moving to 9 o'clock ready for an attack. Flight Lieutenant
Joe Blyth saw the MIG's dive down on pilot W. Michelson and Dawson. Blyth
yelled over his radio to break starboard.

Down they came, right on the Meteors' blind tails, six of them, two at a time,
one pair after the other. Michelson and Dawson broke as the tracer shot above
them. Then Michelson felt his kite shudder and it flipped over on to its back
and spun down out of control. At 10,000 feet Michelson regained control and
headed for base.

A few days later, Flight Lieutenant R.L. Dawson, scored No. 77 RAAF
Squadron's first effective hit against a MIG. Twelve Meteors were on a fighter
sweep near Anju, when fifteen MIG's jumped them. Enemy cannon fire damaged
eone Meteor but not severely. Meanwhile, Dawson and his No. 2 Sergeant Max
Colebrooke, turned in on two MIG's and Dawson scored with a long burst from
his 20-mm. cannon.

On 1 December 1951, in the last Meteor-MIG battle of the year, twelve Meteors
were on a fighter sweep north of Pyongyang in clear cold weather at 19,000 feet
when between forty and fifty MIG's swept down on them out of the sun. In a
few seconds the whole sky was filled with thundering jets, the Meteors outnumbered four or five to one. It was all over quickly. Once they had lost their initial advantage the MIG's soon turned their red-noses for the Manchurian sanctuary but not before they had torn holes in the Australian Squadron. Three of the twelve Meteor pilots were missing.

During the dogfight, several pilots got in burst against a MIG but the fight was so furious that they didn't have time to observe the results. However, another MIG was seen streaming to earth and several pilots shared credit for this kill. The battle had lasted ten minutes and it was now clear that, despite the Australians' undoubted courage and skill, the Meteor was no match for the MIG. In three encounters the Australians had lost four pilots and two badly damaged aircraft. The Meteors were rugged, and could take terrible punishment, but they were not nearly fast enough and they could not climb high enough to engage the MIG's on even terms and, with their blind spots astern, they were sitting ducks for the swept-wing enemy fighters as they came thundering down from out of the sun. Nobody was surprised, therefore, when No. 77 RAAF Squadron was taken off fighter interception duties.

In 1952: When Squadron Leader R.T. Susans, D.F.C., took over from Wing Commander Steege on 26 December 1951, the squadron was sitting on Kimpo airfield on call for the air defense of the Seoul area, against aircraft that never appeared. Early January 1952, the new Wing Commander saw the Commanding General of the Fifth US Air Force to ask for a more active role, and the squadron was allocated to the dual role of patrolling the Kimpo–Seoul area and ground attack duties. Heartened by their success in this new role, the pilots voluntarily set themselves the target of 1,000 sorties a month, which they maintained despite the bad weather.

As the number of mission rose, so did the grim toll of pilots lost to the increasingly accurate enemy ground fire. From January to April 1952, six pilot were reported missing in action. During this period, the squadron had kept up an unrelenting campaign with cannon and rockets against enemy supply lines and troop concentrations. Although none of the Australian pilots had previously fired rocket projectiles from jets, their record of destruction soon became highly satisfactory as they accustomed themselves to the new techniques required. In addition to rocket and strafing missions against selected targets, the squadron maintained a constant daylight patrol north of the bomb-line. These patrols enabled the Meteors to give almost immediate cover to pilots shot down behind the enemy lines.

By this time, the Australian pilots were finding Meteor jets a highly efficient
aircraft for the hard-hitting role assigned them. Although the jet planes lacked the range of piston-driven aircraft they provided easier maintenance problems and showed a remarkable capacity to take punishment and fly home. Despite the greater speed pilots found that the absence of a forward engine and propeller gave them a much better view of small targets than they had thought possible.

Early in 1952, the MIG's became bolder. Bigger enemy patrols flew over the Yalu and extended further south than hitherto. This gave the Meteors another opportunity to do some fighter sweeps but this time at a lower level. On 4 May, patrolling south-west of Pyongyang, Pilot Officer J.L. Surman attacked and destroyed a MIG and four days later Pilot Officer W.H. Simmonds shot down another. On 15 May, however, Pilot Officer D. Robertson, a recent graduate from RAAF College was killed when his Meteor crashed over the target during a rocketing missing. A month later Pilot Officer Surman, another RAAF graduate, was lost in a similar manner.

In June, Wing Commander Susans relinquished command to Wing Commander J.R. Kinninmont, D.F.C. and Bar, and the squadron continued its steady routine of interdiction missions, escorts, strikes, patrols and fighter sweeps. On 29 August, the squadron formed part of a 420 fighter-bomber force which made a devastating attack on Pyongyang, bombing and strafing airfields, power stations, factories and anti-aircraft positions. Meanwhile, peace talks dragged out at Panmunjom and the squadron's casualties mounted. During the months of August to October another two Australian pilots were lost. Flying Officer M.O. Bergh parachuted after being hit by enemy fire and was taken prisoner and Flying Officer O.M. Cruikshank was killed while attempting to bale out after being hit by fire from a MIG. On 24 December, ground fire killed Flight Lieutenant F.J. Lawrensen. Although, since June 1952, the operational tour of duty for pilots had been
reduced from nine months to six months, the Australian Air Force was finding it difficult to keep up the flow of trained pilots to the No. 77 Squadron.

In 1953: The squadron began the year of 1953 with a total of 15,000 individual sorties since the war had begun, of which 11,000 were in Meteor jets. On 20 January, Wing Commander Kinninmont handed over command to Wing Commander J.W. Hubble, A.F.C.

On 16 March, the squadron carried out a successful attack on an enemy convoy of about 150 trucks. The Meteors destroyed at least 24 vehicles and damaged 74. They also strafed and trooped billets and supply stacks and damaged several enemy buildings. The Commanding General, US Far East Air Force, sent the squadron a congratulatory message for this attack. Warrant Officer Bob Turner saw the enemy trucks when he was flying on a road patrol south of Wonsan, along the east coast. In the dawn light he saw a three-mile long convoy. He dived to attack the head of the line and blew up the first two lorries, the circled back to hit the last four. This trapped the Communist column in a narrow pass between steep cliffs and sheer drops. Turner flew back to base and returned with other planes to finish off the convoy in what turned out to be one of the biggest lorry-busting forays in the Korean War.

Eleven days later, the squadron had another successful tangle with MIG's, and destroyed one and damaged another without loss. The action took place over Sinmak, south-east of Pyongyang. Sergeant George Hale and his wingman, Sergeant David Irlam, were about to start a patrol along an enemy supply route when Hale saw what he thought was a MIG chasing two US Shooting Stars. As he dived on the last plane he realized that all three were MIG's. Hale opened fire and one MIG broke off and headed north. The other two made a pass at the Meteor from the starboard. Hale made an S-turn into the MIG's, jettisoned his large ventral fuel tank and got behind the enemy. He fired two high explosive rockets which flashed between the MIG's causing them to break apart and head in different directions. Hale was trying to get on to the tail of one of these when another MIG overshot him in an attempt to attack into his blind spot.

For a second the MIG was flying parallel with Hale and about 50 yards ahead Hale could see the enemy pilot clearly as he swung behind the MIG, and hammered at him with 20-mm. cannons. Strips of metal began to peel from his fuselage and the MIG rolled on to its back and headed straight down from 10,000 feet. Two more MIG's came at Hale with guns blazing and again Hale managed to S-turn on to their tails. The Meteor was flying like a bomb. MIG's tried to climb away and as Hale blasted at one he saw bright flashes near his wing root and the aircraft began to pour out white smoke. Hale's gun stopped firing as he was
out of ammunition. He climbed to turn away from the MIG’s and for base.

During the months of April to June the squadron concentrated on napalm-rocket attacks on enemy troop billets, villages and supply centers. The napalm rocket evolved by Australian technicians and was first employed against the enemy in February 1952, as a new and deadly weapon, was suited for Korean conditions. Later records over a period showed that 75 percent of the napalm rockets recorded direct hits.

No. 30 RAAF Transport Unit

When the Korean War began No. 77 Squadron had an attached communications flight consisting of one Dakota. This was the nucleus of No. 30 Transport Unit which did most of the aerial supply and medical evacuation for British Commonwealth forces until it grew into No. 36 Transport Squadron in March 1953.

In its first sixteen months’ operations, No. 30’s aircraft flew more than a million and a quarter nautical miles during more than ten thousand hours in the air. To maintain such a high rate of effort there were seven complete crews to man the seven freighter and one VIP aircraft, all Dakotas.

The principal task of the Australian Transport unit was the aerial evacuation of wounded from Korea to base hospitals in Japan, a job which averaged between thirty and thirty-five such flights each month. Australian Dakotas flew more than 12,000 wounded out of Korea. Although a typhoon in October 1951 “grounded” all aircraft in the area, one No. 30 Australian Dakota kept its schedule to fly out the wounded.

Pilots found that flying in Korean weather conditions was valuable experience and they quickly became good instrument fliers. Navigators, too, found that this type of flying greatly improved their navigation, and they were able to bring their cargoes of mails and wounded right on destination airports, either in Japan or Korea, in the worst of weather. With so poor visibility, the Dakota crews made 30 to 100 “ground controlled approach” landings each month. This landing aid, coupled with the experience of the aircrews, enabled the unit to maintain its record of flying, even in the face of a typhoon. During the nine months’ tour of duty for a crew in the area the average crew-member logged between 900 and 1,000 hours in the air. Many men applied for extension of their tours, for they realized the value of the experience gained in the area, and also because the work in support of United Nations Command forces in Korea was most satisfying to them.

Thus, the members of No. 30 RAAF Transport Unit, which expanded into
No. 36 RAAF Transport Squadron, achieved and maintained a record of efficiency which would be of credit to any civilian airline operating in any area.

**Operational Records and Statistical Data**

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<td>Sqn Ldr R.C. Cresswell Sep 50 – Aug 51</td>
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THE BELGIAN-LUXEMBOURG FORCE
THE BELGIAN-LUXEMBOURG FORCE

1. Introduction

The two Governments of Belgium and Luxembourg each sent its ground combat troops to the Republic of Korea in support of the United Nations resolutions in June 1950. The Belgian Government contributed an infantry battalion and the Luxembourg Government a rifle platoon, but the latter, in view of its relatively small force, willingly attached it to the Belgian Battalion for the operations in Korea. Thus, the combined force of the two brotherly nations fought in Korea as a single unit with the Luxembourg platoon incorporated into A Company of the Belgian Battalion.

The Belgian Government continued to maintain a battalion-sized force in Korea from January 1951 until June 1955 when its last troops left Korea, while the Luxembourg Government had two rifle platoons join the Belgian Battalion with one serving after the other, the second leaving Korea January 1953.

During the static war which took place for the greater part of the time the troops of the two nations were in Korea they fought various fierce battles such as the Imjin River Battle from 22 to 25 April 1951 and the Haktang-ni Battle from 11 to 13 October 1951, and established a high reputation as gallant soldiers. Yet, the most significant feature of the two nations’ participation in the United Nations operations in Korea was the establishment of a precedent; when subsequent international crises arose there was no question of standing aside.

For the convenience of dealing with the two nations’ troops in a single unit, it must be understood that the unit is referred to as the BELUX Battalion (Belgian—Luxembourg Battalion), and when the Belgian force operated without the Luxembourg platoon the force is of course referred to as the Belgian Battalion.

2. Summary of Operations

Operations in 1951

On 31 January 1951 the BELUX Battalion consisting of a Belgian battalion
and a Luxembourg platoon disembarked at the port of Pusan, Korea. Upon its arrival at Pusan the BELUX Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Crahay moved to the United Nations Reception Center located at Tongnae in the northeastern outskirts of Pusan. There the battalion underwent a strenuous training course which lasted until 9 February when it received orders to conduct special operations in the vicinity of Waegwan about 20 kilometers north of Taegu.

At Waegwan where the battalion arrived on 11 February, its mission was to protect the main supply route and the railway from the local Communist guerrilla activities, particularly along Taegu—Waegwan route. Although the guerrilla hunting drive was dangerous and uninteresting, the battalion carried out the mission over three weeks on the rugged high mountains.

On 7 March the BELUX Battalion was ordered from Waegwan to Suwon, where it was attached to the 3rd US Infantry Division for its operational control.

From this time the battalion continued to operate under the command of the 15th Regiment, 3rd US Division until early days of April 1951 when the BELUX Battalion advanced up to Tongduchon area, and was detached from the control of the American regiment and newly attached to the 29th British Brigade then operating also under the 3rd US Division. The battalion would have been

Troops of the Belgian—Luxembourg Force raise the flags of both Belgium and Luxembourg in Korea.
attached to the 29th British Brigade earlier if the brigade had not been in reserve when it came to Suwon on 7 March since the British and the BELUX troops were using the same type of weapons and equipment. On 20 April the BELUX Battalion relieved the Ulster Rifles Battalion of the 29th British Brigade on positions then defending Kungmul-san (Hill 196) area along the north bank of the Imjin River in the vicinity of the river junction with Hantan-gang. It was right here along the Imjin River that the defenders of the BELUX Battalion experienced their first major test during the so called “CCF Spring Offensive.”

The Imjin Battle (22–25 April 1951): On 22 April, just before midnight, the so called Chinese Spring Offensive began. The greatest weight fell in the west, against the I and X US Corps. In the sector of the I US Corps, the heaviest Chinese Communist attack fell on the line of the Imjin River from inclusive Choksong on the left to the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right. The line was held by the 29th British Brigade to which the BELUX Battalion was attached. The BELUX Battalion and “B” Troops, the 170th British Mortar Battery, were only units positioning on the north side of the Imjin River on the right flank. The defense of the other units lay along the south bank.

On the 22nd the 29th Brigade sent its usual patrols across the river, and later in the evening, one of the BELUX Battalion patrols belonging to A Company made enemy contact.

It was clear that considerable parties of Chinese were on the move and reports from prisoners indicated that an attack was imminent.

At about 0200 hours unknown number of enemy attacked on the BELUX Battalion and soon succeeded in placing a machinegun at the foot of southern edge of C Company position and began pouring its effective fire against the C Company defenders. The defenders made desperate attempts to silence the enemy machinegun, which was finally silenced by the defenders’ bazooka. The enemy attack, however, continued on assisted by his artillery and mortar fire. The gallant defenders held their fire until the enemy reached the first wire barrier. When the enemy finally reached the wire, the men of C Company opened fire with rifles and machineguns, and tossed grenades down the hill. The enemy attempts to break through the wire were completely frustrated by the defenders’ gallant stand.

About an hour later another strong enemy attack signalled all along the B Company’s front. For the first few minutes the enemy attack stalled under friendly mortar fire, but its attack in strength finally succeeded in penetrating into the gap between the Battalion headquarters and forward companies. Soon, hand-to-hand fight ensued. In the meantime, at about 0400 hours, C Company, which had been initially attacked from southwest direction, started now receiving another
new attack from the north direction. This situation drove the company into a great confusion. Thus, by the first light on the 23rd, despite the defenders' gallant resistance, the enemy had managed to penetrate into C and A Companies' positions, while another fresh party attacked B Company. (See Sketch Map 1.)

Under this critical situation one thing about which the battalion commander worried was the safety of the bridge over the Imjin River that was vitally important in case of battalion's withdrawal. So, Colonel Crahay formed a combat patrol consisting of Lt. Hosdain's platoon of A Company and machinegun platoon of D Company under the command of his assistant, Capt. Poswick. Unfortunately, the patrol was ambushed by the enemy as it reached near the bridge. Six men of the patrol were taken prisoners in the ambush. It was apparent that by that time the enemy had already penetrated to the south side of the river and established themselves south of the battalion troops.

At about 1,000 hours Colonel Crahay, through Major Moreau de Melen, Liaison Officer to EUSAK, requested to the 29th Brigade headquarters for an immediate reinforcement which was granted. An American tank platoon of the
Summary of Operations

7th US Regiment soon came to the rescue. The tank platoon under the command of Major Moreau de Melen proceeded to the open area beyond the south bank of the Hantan River and succeeded in clearing the enemy off the bridge area assisted by the gallant defenders. C Company completely surrounded by the enemy was successfully able to withdraw to the east across the Imjin from its isolated position north of the river. Sometime later C Company under 1st Lieutenant Janssens made a furious counterattack to recover its lost position. The counterattack was desperate and the battle became again hand-to-hand fight: Soon the enemy began to collapse before the fierce onslaught and terrifying bayonets of the attackers.

Despite of the successful counterattack, however, the BELUX Battalion had to break off the contact, because by the time the situation on the left flank became so deteriorated. At about 1300 hours Brigadier Brodie, the 29th British Brigade Commander, decided to pull out the BELUX Battalion to fill a gap created between the Gloucesters and Fusiliers Battalions. Soon the BELUX Battalion's withdrawal was carried out in face of enemy mortar fire around the bridge site supported by a battalion from the 7th US Regiment without loss of a single vehicle and heavy equipment. The battalion withdrew to Sinsan-ni just north of Kwangsuwon, and established blocking positions on Hill 320 placing A and B Companies on the top and C Company in the back.

During the night of the 24-25th orders for the 29th Brigade units to withdraw to a position just north of Seoul were issued, and at 0500 hours on the 25th the leading troops began to disengage. The withdrawal was very closely pressed by the enemy and proved a most difficult, confused and costly operation. In order to open the withdrawal route and to cover the Ulsters and Fusilier Battalions, the BELUX Battalion, at about 1000 hours on the 25th, moved to the road junction in the vicinity of Hansan-ni (also called Sinan-ni) about two kilometers northeast of Sinsan-ni, where A and C Companies established blocking positions. In the meantime B Company came under the command of the brigade for its use.

In the general withdrawal to follow, the BELUX Battalion and the Ulsters. Rifles had a more difficult task and parties of the both units had to fight desperately on the way. Some took to the hills nearby and others became casualties. It was during the withdrawal that Colonel Crahay was wounded and Executive Officer Major Vivario was an inspiration to all the members of the battalion. Major Vivario, in the course of the withdrawal, kept moving from one place to another to check the enemy pursuit and on occasions he mounted on the friendly tanks and fired machinegun against the enemy approaching so closely. Thus, the BELUX Battalion covered the withdrawal of the brigade units in an exemplary manner.
The stand made by the BELUX Battalion noteworthily contributed in frustrating the Communist plan to break the Eighth Armies' western front. For the outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in this four day action the BELUX Battalion was awarded an American Presidential Unit Citation on 6 September 1951.

The BELUX Battalion, upon reoccupation of the old Imjin River line position in closing days of May, continued to send aggressive patrols deep into the Communist territory until the battalion was released from the 29th British Brigade's control in August 1951.

The strength of the battalion dropped sharply on 20 August when the first party of 424 Belgians and Luxembourgians consisting of 21 officers, 67 noncommissioned officers, and 336 enlisted men left the battalion area to return home after about a year service in Korea departing port of Inchon on the 25th aboard US Army transport. With the 424 rotatees including whole members of the 1st Luxembourg Detachment withdrawn from the battle zone, the battalion strength was now reduced to about 500 Belgian fighters. The reduced strength as a battalion presented in effect a matter of grave concern to the battalion commander as well as to staff of higher UNC headquarters. But there was no immediate action taken. A plan to highly mobilize the battalion to cover the weakness of manpower strength was recommended to the Eighth Army which ignored the idea. Eventually the Belgian Battalion was detached from the 29th British Brigade and newly attached to the 3rd US Division for retraining and reorganization which lasted until October when the Belgians were ordered to a new assembly area northwest of Chorwon. Then the battalion came again under the 15th Regiment, 3rd US Division.

By this time the 3rd US Division had been advancing north to secure a new objective assigned under the code-named Operation "Commando" which began on 3
October. This was the I US Corps operation and the mission given to the 3rd US Division on the corps' right flank was to advance and capture Hill 281, nine Kilometers northwest of Chorwon, and Hills 373 and 324 some 11 kilometers west by north of the city. The Belgian Battalion participated in the division's attack.

The Haktang-ni Battle (11–13 October 1951): On 10 October the Belgian Battalion advanced on orders northeast along the road leading to Pyongyang as far as a small village called Haktang-ri near Hill 388 (Hill 391 on old map) about 10 kilometers to the northeast from Yulchi-ri three kilometers southwest of Chorwon. The advance was relatively easy as the advance route was taken in the open area. Upon arrival in the village the battalion established its defense positions on Hill 388 with C Company on the crest, B Company in the middle
knob and A Company on the southern knob, and immediately started sending out its patrol parties to the surrounding area with special caution directed toward Hill 448 (Palli-bong). No enemy contact was made on that day.

At 0500 hours on the following day, however, unknown number of Chinese Reds attacked the Belgian C Company positions. Soon a brief fire exchange was ensued in still darkness. After a few minutes of fight, the Belgian defenders were able to drive the enemy back to the Palli-bong area. This was the first enemy Probe. As the evening came the Chinese Communists now started concentrating their artillery and mortars on the Belgian positions. This was the signal of the enemy attack at midnight. (See Sketch Map 2.)

As expected, at 0150 hours on the 13th an estimated enemy company in strength attacked the Belgians. The Belgian Battalion, now greatly under strength especially after the 1st Luxembourg Detachment had left, had to experience a bitter fight with the assaulting Chinese well supported by their artillery and mortars. The courageous Belgians, however, strongly resisted with all available weapons inflicting heavy casualties upon the enemy. At the same time friendly artillery pounded on the pin-pointed enemy directed by the battalion’s patrol. This fight continued until 0300 hours when the enemy broke off the fight and fled to the north.

At 2345 hours on the 12th came another Chinese attack of a reinforced company. The Battalion outposts and C Company position were soon taken under the enemy effective fire. The Belgian defenders refused to give way. Every defender at his post bravely resisted with small arms, automatic weapons, and grenade to halt the attack. The Chinese again had to fall back to the north toward the Palli-bong area. This action ended with the Chinese Communists suffering so heavy casualties.

On the 14th, despite of the Belgians’ gallant stand against the enemy’s repeated attacks, the Battalion had to withdraw from the Haktang-ni village to the old position in the vicinity of Yulchi-ri. This pull-out, however, was to reinforce the elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

On 15 October the Belgian Battalion went under the operational control of the 1st US Cavalry Division and joined as reinforcement the 5th Cavalry Regiment in the vicinity of Hill 230 to the northwest of Yonchon. Here in the Cavalry Division zone, for about one month the Belgian troops played a great role in assisting the division when it needed reinforcement so badly in the course of Operation Commando. The 1st US Cavalry Division met the most strong enemy resistance in the 1 US Corps operation.

After the successful completion of the 1 US Corps operation, in the middle of November the Belgian Battalion came back again under the 3rd US Division and
operated in the general area northwest of Yonchon. The Korean winter in December was bitingly cold, the temperature dropping 20°C below zero. The Belgians experiencing the first Korean winter suffered intensely from the cold, but they remained unmoved in the bulwark of the struggle, fighting heroically not only against the enemy but against nature.

**Operations in 1952**

The new year of 1952 found the Belgian Battalion still on the front northwest of Yonchon in Sangwan-ni—Sangmae-dong area. The routine patrolling activity was conducted continuously, and as time passed the patrolling was gradually developed to the system of carrying out the smallscale night raid when necessary or the ambushes to be set up along the enemy route of approach, but generally the months of January and February passed relatively uneventfully.

While the Belgians were still alongside the Imjin-gang—Yokkok-chon area northwest of Yonchon, on 26 March a new Luxembourg platoon arrived in Korea, which was the 2nd Detachment led by Lieutenant Rodolphe Lutty. The arrival of this fine Luxembourg unit was most welcome to the Belgian Battalion whose strength had been still left reduced. The Luxembourgians joined the battalion just in time to get a full course of field training as the all units of the 3rd US Division were soon to come off the frontline.

The field training for the BELUX Battalion was conducted in the vicinity of Pochon about 30 kilometers southeast from the battleline and lasted until 5 July. The battalion went back to the old frontline position near the Kojak-kol—Sadong area, relieving elements of the 1st ROK Division.

The BELUX Battalion immediately started sending out aggressive patrols north to Yokkok-chon and west to the Imjin River line. But enemy contacts were rarely made. The newly arrived Luxembourgians became so quickly familiar with the terrain around their positions. Several raids along the riverline enemy positions were conducted without much success. The enemy in front of the battalion seemed to make no offensive patrols of their own, but they resisted strongly any attempt by the battalion to capture prisoners.

Throughout the battalion’s occupation period along the Imjin River—Yokkok-chon area, the raiding or patrol parties were ceaselessly sent out toward the river lines without much success, but the one raid conducted on 12 September against Hill 168 right close to Yokkok-chon was very successful killing many Communists and destroying their bunkers.

On 24 October the BELUX Battalion left the long acquainted area along the
Imjin River—Yokkok-chon and moved east to the Chorwon area in the IX US Corps sector along with units of the 3rd US Division. The battalion took over the frontline position by relieving elements of the 9th ROK Division in the Umdong area, approximately two and a half kilometers south of Hill 395 (White Horse Hill).

The BELUX Battalion operated in this Chorwon sector until 28 December when it was relieved by elements of the 2nd ROK Division and retired to Unsan-ni some 18 kilometers due south from Chorwon.

Unlike the occasion of the early October days when the bloody fightings on the White Horse Hill were fought by the men of the 9th ROK Division, the succeeding BELUX Battalion spent a relatively quiet period. It was apparent that the Chinese Communists, after its bitter defeat in October offensive, retired into his deep bunkers and caves to hibernate and thus action on the front settled down again to old routine of small-scale raids, patrols and small unit skirmishes.

So ironically, however, the 65th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on the right in the Haktang-ni area was heavily involved in the prolonged fightings with the Communists and was forced to give up the position on Hill 388, where the Belgian Battalion had repulsed repeated Chinese attacks during 11–13 October 1951.

Operations in 1953

The New Year of 1953 found the men of the BELUX Battalion south of Chorwon in Unsan-ni. In early days of January the 2nd Luxembourg Detachment was busy preparing for its departure from Korea after completion of one year service, finally leaving the Republic of Korea on 20 January. It was again a matter of deep regret to miss the small but fine unit, especially to the Belgian fighters.

After the departure of the Luxembourgians, the Belgians continued to remain in the assembly area until 28 January when the battalion was ordered to move further east to the central front northwest of Kumhwa where the units of the 3rd US Division were to relieve the 25th US Division.

At the end of February, after about a month in reserve at Ugu-dong west of Kumhwa, the Belgian Battalion took up the defense positions in the Sangdong-ni—Chat-kol—Paecktong-ni area some five kilometers northeast of Kumhwa, relieving a battalion of the 65th Regiment. In this general area around Chat-kol the Belgian fighters were to operate until the closing days of the war.

While on the Chat-kol line, the Belgian Battalion received a number of Communist attacks mainly directed on the Belgian outpost positions (Alice, Barbara
and Carol from left to right), but the Communists' attacks could never capture the Belgian positions. The Belgian Battalion's gallantry as well as their firm stand during the Chat-kol area actions became known to the UN troops as an example of soldiership.

On 27 July the armistice was finally signed at Panmunjom at 1000 hours, and all fighting ceased at 2200 hours, but the Belgian Battalion continued to remain until 15 June 1955 when its last troops left Korea.

Reference Data

(1) Personnel:

From the time the original Belgian – Luxembourg Force of about 700 men set foot in Korea on 31 January 1951 until June 1955 when the last Belgian troops left Korea, a total of 3,587 members of the force served in Korea, the total representing 3,498 Belgians and 89 Luxembourgians. This was no small contribution by way of comparison, and indeed significantly larger than some other more populous members of the United Nations.

The following is a list of commanders of the BELUX Battalion during the period of their participation in the Korean War.

| Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Crahay       | 28 Sep 50 – 21 Nov 51 |
| Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Cools         | 21 Nov 51 – 23 Feb 52 |
| Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Vivario       | 23 Feb 52 – 13 Feb 53 |
| Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy             | 13 Feb 53 – 12 Jul 53 |
| Lieutenant Colonel Bodart                | 12 Jul 53 – 19 Dec 53 |
THE CANADIAN FORCE
THE CANADIAN FORCE

1. Introduction

The Canadian Government was one of a few UN member countries who had contributed of three branches of its armed forces to the United Nations effort in support of the Republic of Korea during the Korean War.

Throughout the war, the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade maintained an enviable record as a first-class fighting force. From the time the first Canadian soldiers set foot in Korea on 18 December 1950 until 27 July 1953 when the armistice was signed, 21,940 members of the Canadian Army served in the Korea War theater of operations. The peak Canadian Army strength in the Far East was 8,123 all ranks, reached in January 1952. At the time of the armistice there were 7,134 Canadians serving in the theatre. The 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade fought many fierce battles with the Communist Chinese, particularly in the areas of Hongchon, Kapyong, Unchon and Imjin River line. During the later half part of the war, after the line had been generally stabilized, the brigade continued to remain until the armistice in firm hold along the Imjin River. The static war which took place for the greater part of the time the Canadians were in Korea naturally accounted for what was a very low casualty. In all, the Canadian Army suffered 1,543 battle casualties in Korea. Of these 11 officers and 298 other ranks were killed in action, died of wounds or were officially presumed dead, 59 officers and 1,143 other ranks were wounded or injured in action, and 2 officers and 30 men survived as prisoners of war. Putting briefly, Canada's contribution of the ground troops was important, and indeed significantly larger than some other more populous members of the United Nations.

The Royal Canadian Navy was much earlier in arriving in the theatre than the ground force. On 30 July 1950, the three Canadian destroyers Cayuga, Athabaskan and Sioux arrived at Korean waters under orders to join the United Nations forces fighting in Korea. Since the time until 7 September 1955, when the last destroyer left the war theater, the Canadian Navy maintained a total of eight destroyers, each of which performing a great variety of tasks: Maintaining a blockade of the enemy coast; protecting the friendly islands on both coasts'.

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flanks of the UN forces; bombarding Communist installations, gun emplacements, troop concentrations and performing the countless other tasks. In short, the eight destroyers of the Royal Canadian Navy played their important and effective part in the cause of the United Nations.

In addition to the Army and Naval contingents, the Canadian Government in late July 1950 offered No. 426 Transport Squadron, Royal Canadian Air Force, for service with the UN forces. This squadron, however, was to serve under the operational control of the United States Military Air Transport Service (MATS) with the task of airlifting of personnel and equipment to and from the Korean theater of war. The squadron continued to operate until 9 June 1954. When its airlift commitment ended, the squadron had flown 599 round trips (34,000 flying hours) over the Pacific Ocean carrying 13,000 personnel and 3,000 metric tons of freight and mail without any loss. Besides the contribution of the squadron, the Korean War saw 22 Canadian fighter pilots of the Royal Canadian Air Force serving with the Fifth US Air Force. With the loss of one pilot on 5 December 1952 (Squadron Leader A.R. Mackenzie repatriated), the pilot force destroyed and damaged many enemy aircraft and wrought great damage upon the enemy personnel. Considering such a small group of pilots, their devotion to duty certainly helped the UN forces to enjoy complete supremacy in the air.

2. The Canadian Ground Force

Operations in 1950--1951

The 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade was formed as the Canadian Army Special Force to be sent to the Korean War with Brigadier J.M. Rockingham as its commander in August 1950. But the unit did not join the UN forces' operations in Korea as soon as originally planned. By the time the advance party of the brigade arrived in Korea, certain changes in the war situation had developed. At the time, ROK and other UN forces had already crossed the 38th Parallel and were advancing toward the Yalu River, the boundary between Korea and Communist China. In view of the prospect of military victory and an apparent lessening in the need for further ground forces, the immediate Canadian commitment was cut to one infantry battalion. It was in these circumstances that the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), left for the Far East on 25 November 1950.
This battalion arrived at Pusan on the USS *Pvt. Joe P. Martinez* on 18 December 1950. The next seven weeks had been spent mostly near Miryang, on the main road between Pusan and Taegu. Here the unit completed its training, and also engaged in operations to suppress guerilla bands in the area. On 17 February 1951 the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI, joined the 27th Commonwealth Brigade in the vicinity of Changhowon about 80 kilometers southeast of Seoul. From this time until the arrival of the rest of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade in May 1951 the Patricias operated under the command of the 27th and 28th Commonwealth Brigades respectively. During the period of the Chinese spring offensive in April 1951 the Patricias experienced their first major test and distinguished themselves in the 27th Commonwealth Brigade at the battle of Kapyong. The gallant stand of the Canadians at Kapyong was later recognized by the American government with award of U.S. Presidential Unit Citation. The outlined battle story is as follows.

**Battle at Kapyong (24–25 April 1950):** On the night of 22–23 April, Chinese Communist force struck a mighty blow in the Kapyong area. The 6th ROK Division, falling back through the Kapyong valley, was in grave danger of being cut off. To hold open a withdrawal route for the 6th ROK Division the 27th Brigade, then in the IX US Corps reserve, was ordered to establish a defensive position north of Kapyong.

The Canadian Battalion dug in on Hill 677, the Australian battalion on Hill 504 and one British battalion three kilometers south of the Canadians. The leading elements of the 118th *CCF Division* reached the 27th Commonwealth brigade area late in the evening on 23 April. The Australians were the first to come under attack.

While the Australians were engaged, the Canadians energetically improved their own positions. The weight of the defense faced northwest, A Company holding the right, C Company the center, and D Company the left flank. B Company, on the southeastern portion of Hill 677, guarded the right rear.

At 2130 hours 24 May some 400 enemy formed up for an attack on the right rear. Despite artillery and mortar fire, the enemy surged up the hill to crush the foremost platoon position. The platoon disengaged itself, and by 2300 hours had completed a withdrawal to the company defensive perimeter. The enemy did not press his attack in this area. (See Sketch Map 1.)

In the meantime, two parties of Chinese had attempted to infiltrate at points still more to the south. Both were driven off by machine gun fire. The Canadians counted 71 Chinese dead on the river banks next morning. The next attack was to come from west of the hill, in the rear of the Canadians’
position. At 0230 hours the Chinese, about 200 strong, assaulted D Company. One platoon was cut off, while another platoon position and a machine-gun section were overrun. The company commander now called for supporting fire right on his own positions. Blasted off his newly gained ground by artillery and mortars, the enemy reorganized for a fresh attack. But this and further attempts, in which they persisted all night, were effectively countered by supporting fire. As daylight approached on the morning of the 25th the Chinese withdrew, and thereafter contented themselves with harassing D Company with machine-guns and mortars. The isolated platoon remained where it was, while the position which had been lost was reoccupied.

Although the enemy had failed even to close with the main defenses of the Canadian battalion, he now apparently surrounded the battalion position. The battalion was cut off from the rest of the brigade -- the supply route to the rear was held by the enemy -- and the ammunition stocks and emergency rations had been depleted. The battalion commander requested air supply and at midmorning ammunition and rations were dropped on the area. By 1400 hours the road leading into the Canadians position was reopened. Additional supplies
were ordered forward by vehicle.

By late afternoon of the 25th, the area was quiet, and the Canadian battalion was able to take stock of the situation. It had maintained its positions intact, and these positions covered the ground vital to the defense of the brigade area.

Canadian losses in this action numbered 10 killed and 23 wounded. Today at Naechon village about 6 kilometers north of Kapyong, there is a monument commemorating the heroical stand by the men of the PPCLI Regiment on 24–25 April 1951.

In connection with the Kapyong Battle, it is interesting to note here that the camp of the PPCLI Regiment at Winnipeg, Canada, was named “Kapyong Barracks” on May 7 1973, in memory of the Patricias who fought the Kapyong Battle during 22–25 April 1951, and that the selected students of Kapyong North Middle School were honoured to receive the scholarship from the PPCLI Regimental Executive Committee.

Meanwhile, on 4 May the 25th Canadian Brigade (less the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI) arrived in Korea with the following formation:

- Headquarters, 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment
- 2nd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment
- "C" Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse
- 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
- 27th Independent Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers.

When the Patricias left for the war theater the rest of brigade was left behind at Fort Lewis, a US Army Camp near the port of Seattle in State of Washington pending a decision as to its future employment. When the Chinese Communists came into the Korean War it soon became clear that the full Canadian contingent would be required. Training at Fort Lewis was conducted at a high tempo, under the tireless direction of Brigadier Rockingham.

Upon arrival in Korea the 25th Canadian Brigade, after some important changes in equipment -- which included the conversion of the armoured squadron from self-propelled anti-tank guns to Sherman tanks -- engaged in a brief period of training. On 15 May a forward move to a concentration area near Kumnyangiang (16 kilometers east of Suwon) began. On 24 May the brigade had reached an assembly area northeast of Uijongbu and came under command of the 25th US Division. Here the 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team was placed under the brigade. The role of the 25th Division was to advance to the 38th Parallel. Operation "Initiate," the brigade’s first operation, began at 0930 hours on 25 May. By mid-afternoon the battalions of the 2nd Royal Canadian Regiment
(RCR) and the 2nd 22\textsuperscript{e} Regiment had made contact. By the 27\textsuperscript{th} the brigade had advanced farther and on the 29\textsuperscript{th} it took part in Operation "Followup," which was a move on the Uijongbu–Kumhwa road towards the "Iron Triangle," over which the CCF spring offensive had been launched. By the evening Unchon had been reached and here some opposition was encountered. On the 30\textsuperscript{th} a very sharp engagement took place at Chail-li, in which the 2nd RCR Battalion encountered very stubborn opposition. By this time the Canadians' advance had outstripped, by some eight kilometers, the troops on either flank. In view of this, and the now determined resistance of the Communists, Brigadier Rockingham very wisely ordered the 2nd RCR Battalion to withdraw, and organized his troops into a compact defensive perimeter.

The 2nd Battalion, PPCLI came under command of the 25\textsuperscript{th} Canadian Brigade on 27 May when it moved to Sambi-ri on the north bank of the Han River, and it waited for a few days preparatory to actually joining the brigade.

On 1 June the bulk of the brigade -- now under command of the 3rd US Division, which had relieved the 25\textsuperscript{th} US Division on this axis -- was relieved by the 65\textsuperscript{th} US Regiment, which assumed control of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Philippine B.C.T. The 2nd R 22\textsuperscript{e} R Battalion remained in position on the right of the 65\textsuperscript{th} Regiment and the 2nd Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Regiment continued in support of the formation. The rest of the brigade moved into reserve covering Seoul.

On 18 June the 25\textsuperscript{th} Canadian Brigade was placed under command of the 1st US Cavalry Division, and given task of relieving the elements of the 3rd US Division in the Chorwon area -- about 24 kilometers north of the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel.

After a difficult move forward from its reserve area south of the Imjin, the brigade was in position by noon on the 19\textsuperscript{th}. The front was 7,500 yards long, with the right flank on the western outskirts of Chorwon. The forward areas
were held by the 2nd PPCLI Battalion left and the 2nd RCR Battalion right with the 2nd R 22nd R Battalion in reserve.

On 21 June the 2nd RCR Battalion provided the two infantry companies for the first of a series of deep patrols. Others taking part were two troops of tanks, a troop of field artillery and a tactical air control party. Patrols of this kind were a feature of operations about this time. The brigade provided a number of patrols on this, and on a smaller, scale during the ensuing weeks.

On 16 July the brigade came under the orders of the 25th US Division again, and on the 18th it was relieved by the Turkish Brigade. It was not destined for a period of rest, however, as it went straight up to another frontline position to the west and immediately north of the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers. The new position was astride the Imjin River where it runs due north and south. Here the 28th Commonwealth Brigade was on the left of the Canadians and 27th Regiment on the right. The front was about 5,000 yards long.

This very important, but somewhat precarious, position was held with the 2nd RCR Battalion, forming a bridgehead west of the river and the rest of the brigade group on the eastern bank. In carrying out this role Brigadier Rockingham experienced many difficulties and irritations. Frequent changes in dispositions were ordered by higher headquarters, and the footbridge and ferries by which the troops on the western bank were supplied were constantly going out of action owing to the seasonal rise in the river.

It had been thought that the Chinese Communists were on the point of launching an attack in this area; but by 21 July the tension had eased and all was quiet. On the 22nd the 25th US Division issued orders for the withdrawal of all troops from the west side of the Imjin, except the companies of the 2nd RCR Battalion.

On 26 July the 25th Canadian Brigade came under direct command of the 1st US Corps and moved to an assembly area in rear of the 28th Commonwealth and 29th British Brigades. Thus, the three British Commonwealth Brigades were for the first time located together holding the line of the Imjin River between Choksong on the left (29th Brigade) and the junctions of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right (28th Brigade) with the 25th Canadian Brigade in reserve in rear of the two brigades.

The three infantry brigades were supported by armour, artillery, engineers and administrative units substantially equivalent to those which are normal in a division, and they were deployed on a divisional basis.

By this time all arrangements had been made for the integration of the three brigade groups to form a Commonwealth division, the 1st Commonwealth Division.
On 28 July 1951, near Tokchong, a short ceremony was held attended by General Van Fleet (Commander, Eighth Army), Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson (Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces in Japan) and other senior Commonwealth and American officers to mark the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division with Major General A.J.H. Cassels as its commander. Here for the first time a Commonwealth Division flag was flown alongside the flags of Commonwealth countries and that of the United Nations.

After the formation of the division the 25th Canadian Brigade continued to remain in reserve until early in September when it relieved the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in the right sector of the Imjin River line. During the period the Canadians carried out a number of active operations.

The first of these tasks occurred early in August, during Operation "Slam." For this purpose the 25th Canadian Brigade was placed under the command of the 1st US Cavalry Division on 3 August, with role of holding defensive positions in order to free the Cavalry Division for mobile operations north of the river. The task of the rest of the Commonwealth Division was to advance with, and protect the left flank of, the Cavalry Division in a combined crossing of the Imjin and an advance north of some six kilometers. Two battalions each from the 29th and 28th Brigades crossed the Imjin and began to move north and west, the 5th Cavalry Regiment conforming on the right. The American encountered some resistance, but the Commonwealth troops advanced 6,500 yards north of the Imjin without contact. As it had done before, the Imjin flooded, forcing resort to air supply and delaying the withdrawal of the troops until last light on 6 August. On 8 August the 25th Brigade was relieved and moved back into reserve.

Operations "Dirk" and "Claymore" followed. The first was a battalion patrol by the 2nd RCR Battalion to raid on an enemy objective about 7,000 yards north of the Imjin River on 13 August. Contact was made and some casualties inflicted on the enemy. The raiding battalion withdrew to the south bank of the river at dusk on the 14th.

The second one (Claymore) was a more ambitious raid carried out by the Canadians during 22–24 August. The brigade (less the 2nd Battalion, RCR) crossed the river and advanced on two objectives 6,000 and 10,000 yards to the north respectively. Slight contacts with the enemy were made, but both objectives were reached without difficulty and casualties. Two friendly air strikes were estimated to have killed more than 50 of the enemy. Some interesting and useful documents were captured.

In the following two months the 25th Canadian Brigade participated in two
major operations "Minden" and "Commando" in which the brigade along with other Commonwealth elements was to advance to the "Wyoming" and "Jamestown" lines.

Particularly operation "Commando" was ambitious one which began on 3 October and conducted by the 1 US Corps, and involved an advance on the whole corps front to secure the "Jamestown" line. The 1st Commonwealth Division was required to advance from 6,000 to 8,000 yards from the seized objectives along the "Wyoming" line. The operation, however, went on successfully, and the 25th Canadian Brigade met relatively less opposition, and by the 5th, the Canadians had captured all their objectives, and were in touch with troops of the 12th ROK Regiment on their left. In the operation the Canadians suffered four killed and 28 wounded. Now it should be noted that the new line attained through operation Commando was the scene of the Commonwealth Division's activities for the next 22 months.

On the conclusion of Operation "Commando" the 1st Commonwealth Division continued to hold and consolidate the position which it had captured on the "Jamestown" line. The enemy was similarly concentrating on the construction of a new line which the capture of his old positions had made necessary. But the enemy immediately began a series of probing attacks against the 1st Commonwealth Division front. The attacks continued into November. Although the enemy continued for a short time on other parts of the front, they made a series of local but determined attacks against the division front. It had been a time of some anxiety. Any deep penetration followed by resolute exploitation would have led to a serious situation owing to the lack of depth in the defense.

These attacks were notable for the greatly increased enemy artillery fire, which was heavier than anything experienced before. On 4 November it was estimated that 10,000 shells fell in the divisional area and that at one time 90 to 120 rounds per minute were being received by the 28th Brigade on the right of the 25th Brigade.

On 22 November the Commonwealth Division finally turned over its right sector to the 3rd US Division, which had relieved the 1st Cavalry Division. The 29th British Brigade took over from the 1st ROK Division a portion of the line west of Sami-chon, the 28th Brigade became division reserve, and the Canadian brigade assumed responsibility for a front of about six kilometers extending northeast from Sami-chon. The new front could now be held by two brigades leaving a complete brigade in reserve. This solved the problem of the over extension of the division front.

Before the adjustment of the division's frontage, on 4 November the relief of the 2nd Battalion by the 1st Battalion, PPCLI was completed. This was the
first of a series of theater reliefs of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade, in which the 2nd Battalions in Korea were relieved in April 1952 by the 1st Battalions from Canada.

Even after the re-deployment of the division, the enemy attacks continued. The enemy formations opposing the division at this time were the 190th and 191st CCF Divisions.

On 23 November, one day after the divisional re-deployment, the enemy made a strong attack against the 7th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on the right of the Canadians and captured Hill 355, which the 1st Commonwealth Division had captured in Operation "Commando." This was a serious matter as the hill feature dominated most of the divisional front. Its recapture was a matter of some urgency, and vital to the security of the division. Late that night the 2nd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment, was also attacked several times after heavy shelling, but no ground was lost. This was a very creditable performance as the position was dominated by the enemy, now on Hill 355, only about 100 yards away.

The mortar position of the 2nd Bn., R22eR, after the Chinese attack on 24 November 1951
The 24th was a day of desperate fighting for the American regiment on the Canadians' right in their efforts to recapture Hill 355. The Commonwealth Division gave the full weight of its artillery support, and eventually the Americans were successful in reoccupying the position. The 2nd Battalion, R 22e R -- now holding the features immediately east of Hill 227 -- was also heavily attacked again on this night. One platoon position was overrun, but it was recaptured soon after midnight.

On the following day the 7th US Regiment consolidated on Hill 335 and linked up with the Canadians.

The period from 27 November to the end of the year was a quiet one. There was some enemy shelling and a few minor incidents; but activities were mainly confined to strengthening the defences, improving communications, training, receiving distinguished visitors and preparing for eventualities which rarely occurred.

Operations in 1952

On 19 January 1952 the 25th Canadian Brigade was relieved by the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in the right sector of the divisional front. The Canadians had been in the line continuously since 4 September 1951. Upon relief they moved back to the Imjin in reserve, where they were engaged in planning a reserve position in the vicinity of the river.

On 10 March the Canadian brigade took over now the left sector from the 29th British Brigade, west of Sami-chon. About two weeks later on the night of 26–27 March the Communists launched an attack, at about company strength, against a platoon of the 1st Battalion, PPCLI, holding a spur south-west of Umdalmal west of Sami-chon (river), which later became known as "The Hook." The attack lasted from 0130 to 0330 hours. There was no withdrawal and for a time the platoon was surrounded; but eventually the Chinese were beaten off. This attack was followed by one against the 2nd Battalion, RCR, on Hill 163. This group was forced to withdraw. The Patricias had four men killed and 10 wounded and the RCR men two killed and six wounded -- mostly from heavy artillery concentrations put down along whole Canadian Brigade's front. Thirty-one enemy dead were later counted in front of the platoon's position and one prisoner was captured.

In mid-April, the 1st Commonwealth Division was again redeployed as follows: Left boundary - Sami-chon, with the 1st US Marine Division to the west of the river, and right boundary - Including Hills 355 and 238, with the 45th US Infantry
Division on the eastern flank.

As a result of the redeployment the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade held the left sector of the position and the 29th British Brigade the right. “C” Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, was in support of the Canadians, while the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade was in reserve.

In the later half of April the relief of the 2nd Battalion, RCR, and the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R, by the 1st Battalions of their respective regiments took place. This, together with the relief of Canadian units of other arms and services, was in accordance with Canadian policy, whereby units were relieved by other from Canada after approximately one year in Korea.

On 27 April Brigadier J.M. Rockingham also handed over command of the 25th Canadian Brigade to Brigadier M.P. Bogert. The outgoing commander’s tenure of command had been a notable one. His military skill and cooperative spirit were major contribution to the success of the Commonwealth Division. He returned to Canada to be Director-General of Military Training, and was awarded the C.B. for his services in Korea.

In the month of June while the 25th Brigade on the line in the left sector, the Canadians continued to carry out combat patrol missions or raids primarily with the objective of taking prisoners. In these days taking the prisoners was regarded as a most important task. For instance, the Canadians carried out four raids one each during the night of 21–24 June as follows:

(a) Night of 20–21 June:

Carried out by the 1st Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry. The party encountered very heavy enemy defensive fire when only about 50 yards from the objective
and they were forced to withdraw. Out of a strength of 2 officers and 30 other ranks, 6 were killed and 17 wounded.

(b) Night of 21–22 June:

This was made by a company of the RCR Battalion against Hill 113, a feature where previously little opposition had been met. On this occasion, however, heavy defensive fire was encountered and the company was forced to withdraw with the loss of 1 killed and 20 wounded.

(c) Night of 22–23 June:

This raid against Hill 227, following an air strike, was carried out by a company of the 1st Welch. The troops reached the objective without serious opposition, but were then subjected to heavy defensive fire and forced back. The casualties were 3 killed and 19 wounded.

(d) Night of 23–24 June:

The last raid of the series was carried out by a party from the 1st R 22e Battalion against Hill 118 and followed much the same pattern as the other three. The Canadians lost 4 killed and 6 wounded.

None of these raids had produced any prisoners and they were accompanied by heavy casualties. The wisdom of such operations was in doubt, and after two more, which were hardly more successful, enterprises of this kind were curtailed.

On 29 and 30 June the 25th Canadian Brigade was relieved by the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, and went into reserve.

After about six weeks in reserve the Canadian Brigade returned to the front on 10 August by relieving the 29th British Brigade in the Commonwealth Division’s right sector between the villages of Paujol-kol and Kojanhari-saemal. During the following three months in the line the Canadian Brigade was to experience heavier shelling and mortaring than in any other period in the line. Heavy rains occasionally silenced the enemy’s artillery, but would then further damage the trenches and bunkers; and as the skies cleared and the mud began to dry, the Chinese would resume shelling on a still greater scale.

During the afternoon of 23 October, the 1st Battalion, RCR, in the area of Hill 355 or Kowang-san was heavily shelled, and just before dark the bombardment became intense. The greater part of the shelling fell on B Company area between Hills 355 on the right and 220 on the left. Soon a fierce night action ensued. The action was one of the heaviest fightings the Canadians had fought during 1952 operations.

**Battle on Hill 355:** Between 8 and 10 August, the 25th Canadian Brigade relieved the 29th British Brigade in the Commonwealth Division right sector, opposite the boundary between the 39th and 40th CCF Armies. The brigade
front lay between villages of Paujol-gol and Kojanghari-Saemal, the Royal 22° Regiment being on the left, the PPCLI on the right and the CR on Hill 355 in the center.

During the following three months the Canadian brigade was to experience heavier shelling and mortaring than in any other period in the line. On the afternoon of the 23rd the 1st RCR Battalion in the area of Hill 355 was heavily shelled. The Company dispositions on the evening of 22 October were as follows: A Company in a line running due west from the summit of the hill 355; B immediately east of the saddle of Hill 355; E specially created from unit resources, to the left of B, and G and D Companies behind E and A, respectively.

The enemy's artillery and mortars had been very active against the area which B Company occupied. The field defenses were very badly damaged and most of the telephone lines cut. So grave was the state of the defenses and shelters on the right that, on 23rd, the B Company commander withdrew the 6th Platoon from that flank and doubled it up with 5th, in the center. Enemy shelling during the day caused several casualties and kept most of the company underground. Shortly after 1800 hours the enemy put down a very heavy artillery concentration.
-- a thousand rounds within ten minutes on B Company alone -- and then assaulted with infantry. (See Sketch Map 2.)

Owing to the darkness, the confused nature of the fighting and the lack of communications, the situation unfolded itself only gradually during the next three hours. The 4th Platoon on the left had been dislodged by the first rush. The B Company commander, his last link with Battalion Headquarters gone, had transferred his command post to A Company’s area, while the platoon leader of the 5th had established a position between his former area and the new company CP. The battalion’s acting CO, now ordered tank and mortar fire on the ground that had been lost, and called D Company forward for a counterattack.

The counterattack force, having turned over its position to a British Company, arrived at about 2100 hours; but the battalion commander decided not to commit it immediately. First he brought down all available supporting fire on B Company’s former area to forestall a threatened attack on E Company, and ordered out a patrol from latter to investigate. The patrol, returning at about 2330 hours, reported light machine-guns firing from B Company’s bunkers. The counterattack went in towards midnight, one platoon of D Company moving up through A, another through E. The left hand platoon encountered considerable resistance and suffered some casualties, but by the time the two groups reached the objective the enemy was no longer there.

The last troops to leave the position, however, were not the Chinese. Some men of the 6th and 7th Platoons had held out to the last stand, and then played dead.

The casualties sustained by the whole of the 1st RCR Battalion on 23 and 24 October 1952 amounted to 18 killed, 35 wounded and 14 prisoners of war.

In late October the 1st Commonwealth Division took over the sector of the right battalion of the 1st US Marine Division west of the Sami-chon and handed over the battalion sector on the extreme right of the front to the 1st ROK Division. The sector on the left, taken over from the Marines, included the vital “Hook” position, which was to be the scene of much bitter fighting by Commonwealth troops some months later.

On 29 November the redeployment of the division on a new “layout” began. It was now proposed to have all three brigades up, each with two battalions in front line and one in reserve. It was considered that this gave better control by brigade commanders, with their own reserve for counterattack. This redeployment was completed on the night of 1–2 December with the 25th Canadian Brigade on the left, 29th Brigade on the center and 28th Brigade on the right.

The month of December was relatively quiet for the 25th Canadian Brigade except for a raid by the 3rd Battalion, PPCLI, which relieved the 1st Battalion.
in early November.

Operations in 1953

The New Year period which followed was also quiet, although in the second week in January 1953 there was a noticeable increase in enemy shelling and mortaring. On 27 January various adjustments in the divisional layout began, with the object of facilitating the impending relief by American troops. The relief itself began on the 29th and was completed by the 31st. And so the Commonwealth Division (less its artillery) withdrew out of contact with the enemy for the first time since its formation almost exactly 18 months before. It was to be placed in a reserver for two months.

During the period in reserve all kinds of training exercises were held. Between 22 and 28 February each brigade carried out an exercise set and conducted by the divisional commander, and between 1 and 7 March the I US Corps exercise "Eveready" -- designed to test the action of reserve formations and units -- took place. On 25 March the 3rd RCR Battalion relieved the 1st RCR Battalion.

Early in April the three brigades of the division returned to the same sector of the front relieving the 2nd US Division and were disposed with the 25th Canadian Brigade in center and 29th and 28th Brigades on its left and right. Within the Canadian sector, the R 22ª R Battalion was on the left, the PPCLI Battalion on the right, and the RCR Battalion in reserve near the junction of the Sami-chon and Imjin Rivers.

The month of April was also relatively quiet and the Canadian Brigade settled back into its front line routine without serious interruption from the enemy. On 20 April the 3rd RCR Battalion relieved the 1st R 22ª R Battalion which had recently been relieved in the theatre by the 3rd R 22ª R Battalion.

On the night of 2 May the enemy raided part of the position held by the 3rd RCR Battalion. The action began at 2230 hours, when a Canadian patrol was engaged by a CCF party just outside their position. The patrol suffered heavy casualties and withdrew, but soon after sent out a second patrol. At midnight heavy enemy shelling and mortaring began on the position held by the right forward company, and at 0005 hours a strong enemy party rushed and overran the forward platoon. The platoon leader, and a few others who remained hidden in bunkers, reported the situation by radio, and at 0015 hours called for artillery fire to be directed on to the position. This proved very effective and at 0130 hours the enemy withdrew, spending the rest of the night attempting
to recover his dead and wounded. The Canadians' casualties in the action were heavy -- 16 killed, 32 wounded and 16 missing, plus two ROKs wounded and four missing. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was estimated at 2,000 rounds and in reply the division artillery fired about 8,000 rounds.

The two final months of the Korean War were relatively uneventful as far as the Canadian infantry was concerned. All this time the normal routine of life in the line continued, while the reported developments at Panmunjom caused expectations of an armistice to rise and fall. The battalions of the 25th Brigade continued in their attempts to dominate no-man's-land, and finally on 27 July when the armistice was signed, the brigade found itself on the right of the divisional front with the 28th Brigade on the left and 29th in the center. In the Canadian sector, the Patricias were on the right, in the Hill 355 area; the RCR companies were lined up from east to west on the hill feature to the southwest. The R 22e R Battalion was in reserve along the division's right boundary.

The Canadian troops continued to participate in a UNC "presence" in Korea in gradually diminishing strength until the last major infantry unit embarked for home in April 1955. The Canadian Medical Detachment, the last to leave, officially ceased to exist on 25 June 1957, the main body of the force sailing from Inchon on 28 June 1957.

Reference Data

(1) The following is a list of major Canadian infantry units and their commanders who served in the Korean War.

The 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig.</td>
<td>M.P. Bogert</td>
<td>28 Apr 1952 – 20 Apr 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.</td>
<td>J.V. Allard</td>
<td>21 Apr 1953 – 14 Jun 1954</td>
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</table>

The Royal Canadian Regiment

2nd Battalion (5 May 1951 – 25 Apr 1952)

|----------|----------------|---------------------------|

1st Battalion (20 Apr 1952 – 25 Mar 1953)

| Lt. Col. | P.R. Bingham   | 16 Dec 1948 – 31 Jul 1953 |

3rd Battalion (23 Mar 1953 – 27 Mar 1954)

Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

2nd Battalion (18 Dec 1950 – 4 Nov 1951)
Lt Col. J.R. Stone
18 Aug 1950 – 4 Oct 1953

1st Battalion (29 Oct 1951 – 4 Nov 1952)
Lt. Col. N.G. Wilson-Smith
16 Sep 1950 – 20 Apr 1952
Lt. Col. J.R. Cameron
1 May 1952 – 11 Apr 1955

Lt. Col. G.C. Corbould
30 Nov 1950 – 15 Mar 1951
Lt. Col. H.F. Wood
19 Mar 1951 – 5 May 1953
Major C.E.C. MacNeill (Acting)
5 May 1953 – 15 May 1953
 Lt. Col. M.F. MacLachlan
16 May 1953 – 8 Jan 1954

The Royal 22nd Regiment

2nd Battalion (4 May 1951 – 24 Apr 1952)
Lt Col. J.A. Dextraze
17 Aug 1950 – 15 Dec 1951
Lt Col. J.A.A.G. Vallee
16 Dec 1951 – 26 Aug 1956

1st Battalion (20 Apr 1952 – 21 Apr 1953)
Lt. Col. L.F. Trudeau
14 Jan 1950 – 21 Nov 1954

3rd Battalion (16 Apr 1953 – 15 Apr 1954)
Lt. Col. H. Tellier
3 Jan 1951 – 14 Oct 1951
Lt. Col. J.L.G. Poulin
15 Oct 1951 – 31 Aug 1954

The Black Watch of Canada

2nd Battalion (29 Oct 1953 – 3 Nov 1954)
Lt. Col. R.M. Ross
23 May 1952 – 23 Oct 1955

The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada

2nd Battalion (26 Mar 1954 – 6 Apr 1955)
Lt. Col. W.H.V. Matthews
9 May 1952 – 31 Aug 1956

The Canadian Guards

Lt. Col. V. Leduc
28 Apr 1952 – 14 Jan 1955

(2) The following is a list of all Honours and Awards received by the members of the Canadian Army for the service in the Korean War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
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<tr>
<td>Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire</td>
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Ground Force

Distinguished Service Order ........................................ 8
2nd Bar to Distinguished Service Order ............................... 1
Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire ........ 17
Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire ........ 58
Royal Red Cross ..................................................... 1
Military Cross ....................................................... 33
Distinguished Flying Cross ........................................... 1
Associate of the Royal Red Cross .................................... 1
Distinguished Conduct Medal ......................................... 7
Bar to Distinguished Conduct Medal .................................. 1
George Medal ........................................................ 1
Military Medal ....................................................... 53
British Empire Medal ................................................ 21

American Awards:
Legion of Merit — Degree of Officer ................................... 4
Legion of Merit — Degree of Legionnaire ................................. 2
Bronze Star with "V" Device .......................................... 1
Bronze Star Medal ...................................................... 5
Distinguished Flying Cross ............................................ 4
Air Medal ............................................................ 5

Belgian Awards:
Officier De L'ordre De Leopold II Avec Palme and La Croix De Guerre 1940 Avec Palme ......................... 3
Chevalier De L'ordre De Leopold II Avec Palme and La Croix De Guerre 1940 Avec Palme .................. 1
Chevalier De L'ordre De La Couronne Avec Palme and La Croix De Guerre 1940 Avec Palme .............. 1
Decoration Militaire 2ème Class Avec Palme and La Croix De Guerre 1940 Avec Palme .................... 1

(3) Battle casualties, Canadian Army units, for period of their participation in the war are as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Killed in Action</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
<th>Missing</th>
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<td>Officer</td>
<td>Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Rank</td>
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<tr>
<td>298</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>30</td>
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3. The Canadian Naval Force

Operations in 1950

On 30 July 1950 the three Canadian destroyers, Cayuga, Athabaskan and Sioux arrived in the theater of operations. Cayuga and her consorts were allocated to the British task element, commanded by Rear Admiral Andrewes, Cayuga being assigned to the west coast support group and Athabaskan and Sioux to TE 96.50, fast escort elements convoying ships between Pusan and Japan.

The first weeks in Korea were far less hectic for the Canadian destroyers than one might have expected considering the critical state of the land war at this time. The Canadian naval force’s operations were confined mainly to blockading the enemy coast and to ensuring the safe passage of men, ammunition and supplies to the battle area since the front lines are out of range of its gun-fire.

On 15 August Cayuga fired her first ranging shots and placed 94 rounds of 4-inch high explosive upon the harbour installations of Yosu port in enemy’s hands. The target was not completely destroyed, and perhaps the bombardment did not have any direct effect upon the battle for the Naktong Perimeter, but the importance of the Yosu bombardment was that it marked the first time since the end of the

The first three Canadian destroyers, Cayuga, Athabaskan and Sioux, leave Hongkong to participate in the Korean operations.
Second World War that the Royal Canadian Navy engaged the enemy.

In early September, preparations for the Inchon landings were nearing completion, but the Canadian destroyers were not given a spectacular role to play in the operation. During and after the landing operations, the Canadian destroyers carried out the duties of providing escort for the logistic support group supplying the attacking force; of enforcing a blockade of the coast between 35° 45' and 36° 45' North; and of maintaining a hunter-killed group to deal with enemy submarines in the unlikely event that they made their appearance in the area. Their activities, however, appeared so dull since there was no opposition from the enemy to the passage of the logistic support ships and no hostile submarines to pursue. In the operations' however, the Canadian destroyers were able to operate as a unit for the first time under their own commander, Captain Brock.

During the Wonsan landings in mid-October 1950, one of the Canadian destroyers, Athabaskan, joined the Gunfire Support Group (TG 95.2) of Joint Task Force 7, the organization that was conducting the landing. Throughout the entire operation Athabaskan did not once fire a gun at the enemy, for even when she was escorting the heavy ships on bombardment duties she was unable to take part because of the limited range of armament. Athabaskan did, however, receive much valuable training in fleet work during her sojourn on the east coast.

It was one of rare occasions that the west coast ships under Admiral Andrewes operated on the east coast. In the Wonsan landing, the landing was given the character of a United Nations rather than a purely United States Navy Operation, so token forces from as many of the UN navies as possible were included.

While Athabaskan was serving with the US Navy on the east coast, Cayuga and Sioux continued to be employed with TG 95.1 on the west coast. Their duties here involved mainly blockade patrol along the coast north of Inchon, the escorting of supply ships and the screening of the British carrier Theseus.

In the meantime the land war had been going rather well for the United Nations during October. Pyongyang had fallen on the 19th, and the Eighth Army continued to press northward against intermittent resistance, reaching Chongju by the end of the month. The ROK's continued to drive north along the east coast at high speed, and elements of the 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on the night of 25 October. UN troops striking from Wonsan and Iwon also made good progress against only sporadic resistance.

The optimistic situation favorable to the UN forces, however, changed practically overnight as the UN forces' final offensive on 24 November was crushed by an overwhelming Chinese counterattack. On the western front the Eighth Army had by 28 November been thrown into a general withdrawal southward. The
X US Corps on the eastern front was also forced to retreat. While the land situation was deteriorating the ships of the United Nations forces were sailing with impunity throughout the coastal waters of the entire Korean peninsula. But the Red Chinese strong on the southward disappointed the men of the Canadian destroyers who had entertained hopes that they would soon return to Canada.

As the full extent of the strong Chinese Communist aggression that had overtaken the Eight US Army on the west front became apparent, orders went out to evacuate the port of Chinnampo and to make preparation for a withdrawal from Inchon as well should this become necessary. Overall responsibility for this redeployment lay with Commander, Amphibious Force, Far East (Task Force 90), and for this operation the ships on the west coast were placed at his disposal.

Captain Brock’s Task Element 95.12 was in the thick of things. It was then strongest force on the west coast available to support the redeployment as most of the heavy ships under Admiral Andrewes had not returned from Hong Kong where they arrived before the Chinese big attack. Captain Brock was instructed to assist in the Chinnampo evacuation on 4 December. By the instruction his force of six destroyers (the three Canadian destroyers Cayuga, Sioux and Athabaskan, the two Australian destroyers Warramunga and Bataan, and the US destroyer Forrest Royal) were required to enter the Chinnampo port to help in its defense. This Chinnampo evacuation is detailed since the “Chinnampo affair” was without a doubt the most important mission performed by the Canadian Destroyer Division as a group during the entire Korean War.

Chinnampo Evacuation: The passage up-river to the Chinnampo port was not an operation one could look forward to with delight. Chinnampo, which serves as the port for the NK Communists’ capital of Pyongyang, is situated near the mouth of the Taedong River. The channel up the estuary is in places narrow, tortuous and shallow, and to add to its hazards the NK Communists had filled it with mines before their departure. The USN and ROKN minesweepers had swept a safe path through these minefields some 500 yards wide which they had marked with unlit buoys. Unfortunately the high tidal range and the vicious five-knot current made it unsafe to assume that the marker buoys would always be found in their original positions. Navigational conditions to seaward of the Taedong estuary were little better. Through the centries the strong current of the river had brought down countless millions of tons of mud and silt which now form a maze of islands and mud-flats far out to sea. A ship making the passage up to Chinnampo even at high tide on a fair day is thus faced with a hazardous
voyage of more than twenty miles. Captain Brock had to make the hazardous passage even on moonless night.

At midnight Captain Brock in Cayuga began the torturous trip, not expecting more than three of his six destroyers to complete the journey. Four made it. The Sioux and Warramunga, with Lieutenant Commander Gladstone, formerly head of the Chinnampo Pilots’ Association navigating, went aground. Both ships later extricated themselves and reported no serious damage.

The Cayuga led the way. The trip was a navigational miracle performed by Lieutenant Andrew Collier, RCN. Working almost entirely by radar, he fixed Cayuga’s position 132 times during the four-hour voyage and passed his information to the ships following. It was better than one fix every two minutes. Lieutenant Collier almost wore the corticine off the deck between the radar set and the Chart table. There was no doubt the other ships following also had hard time making their own fixes.

On arrival in Chinnampo in the early hours of 5 December, the four destroyers deployed about the city, their guns trained to cover the entire area. The transports and landing craft of the evacuation fleet were loaded during the day with personnel and equipment. In addition, thousands of civilians piled into rickety junks with patched sails, their belongings strapped to their backs or balanced on their heads to flee from the city. They, too, were protected by the destroyers.

By 1700 hours the transports and LST, settled low under the weight of personnel, guns, trucks, jeeps, and supplies, weighed anchor and headed out of Chinnampo. The destroyers then opened fire on the military targets along the water front. Marshalling yards, oil storage tanks, freight cars, and radio stations were shelled. In forty minutes, 800 bursting shells set all military targets ablaze. Unless the Communists could utilize charcoal, they would find little loot on their arrival in Chinnampo.

The destroyers and evacuation ships anchored in a sheltered area just outside the city and waited for dawn before beginning the hazardous journey back down the Taedong estuary to the open sea. At 1000 hours 6 December, the entire force nosed out of the tricky channel. The transports and LSTs went south under
escort, and Captain Brock could report "Mission successfully completed." Admiral Andrewes and Admiral Joy, ComNavFE, sent their warm congratulations to all hands for a job well done.

During this time the total "bag" of destroyed targets included: 190 buildings, 21 trucks and lorries, 5 locomotives, 12 factories and warehouses, 5 power stations, 19 oil dumps and tanks, 86 junks and coastal vessels, and approximately 2,000 enemy troops killed or wounded.

After the Chinnampo evacuation, the ships of the Canadian Destroyer Division continued to remain in the operational area on the west coast. Their duties were varied but not very interesting. All of the ships took their turns on the carrier screen of HMS Theseus, whose aircraft were flying armed reconnaissance in support of Eighth Army, conducting anti-shipping patrols and acting as spotters for naval bombardments. When not with the carrier, the Canadian ships escorted shipping, carried out blockade patrols and provided anti-aircraft protection and general support for the forces evacuating Inchon. This latter duty was always welcomed; at least it was better than patrolling inshore among the islands, rocks and mud flats in blinding snow squalls or biting winds.

Towards the end of the year the Canadian destroyers, who had been on continuous duty on the west coast since 20 November, were beginning to feel the need for a few days in harbour to effect necessary repairs and to catch up on routine maintenance tasks. Athabaskan was the first one relieved; she arrived at Sasebo on 22 December and was immediately taken in hand by the Japanese dockyard crews. Sioux returned to Sasebo on 2 January and spent the next two weeks repairing for her voyage home to Canada. Cayuga, after setting a record for the Commonwealth destroyers by completing 50 days on patrol, joined her consorts in Sasebo on 8 January for a well earned docking.

Operations in 1951

In January Sioux was relieved by Nootka, and in the middle of March Cayuga left for Canada after being relieved by Huron, and Athabaskan left for home in May when Sioux arrived in operational theatre to serve its second tour of duty.

In the first three months of 1951, the Canadian destroyers had a relatively quiet time except for a few minor clashes with the Communists. Much of the time spent on operations by the Canadian destroyers during the early months in 1951 was devoted the carrier screening. Usually all three worked together under Cayuga, with a British destroyer making the fourth member of the screen. The British carrier on the west coast at this time was Theseus who alternated with
a US light carrier in providing the air power for TG 95.1. Occasionally one of the three Canadian ships was fortunate enough to draw an assignment with the blockade and patrol element TE 95.12.

Things, however, began to change in April; not only did the Canadians draw more "free lance" missions on the inshore patrol, but the patrols themselves became more eventful. The period of offensive and counter offensive on the land from April to June 1951 was a busy one for the Canadian ships.

In early April Athabaskan and Huron joined in the east coast operations with the mission of screening HMS Theseus leaving Nootka on blockade patrol with TE 95.12 under the orders of HMS Kenya. Especially after the beginning of the famous "siege" of Wonsan on the east coast, which was to continue throughout the war, the Canadian destroyers began to operate more frequently on the east coast.

In early May Sioux had returned for her second Korean tour (relieving Athabaskan who sailed homeward on 3 May) and was very soon in the thick of things on the inshore patrol on the west coast. Since the beginning of General Ridgway's first offensive in January, it had been the policy of the UN Naval forces on the west coast to keep continual pressure on the enemy by the threat of amphibious operations in the area between Chinnampo and Inchon.

Nootka also did some service with the west coast blockade forces during May and found it considerably more congenial work than carrier screening although she did not operate with Sioux. One of Nootka's assignments in this period was the anti-shipping patrol in the northern Yalu Gulf which was the nightly task of one or more of the destroyers of TE 95.12. Nootka was transferred to the east coast later in May and took part in the inshore blockade operations of TG 95.2 on that coast for the first time as a Canadian ship. On 31 May Nootka was given a new assignment, this time with TE 95.28, the bombline element supporting the ground troops in front line. Oddly enough Nootka's service with this bombardment element involved far less bombardment than did service with TG 95.2. There were in fact not many suitable targets to be found within range of a destroyer's guns in the area patrolled by TE 95.28 at this time.

While Nootka was operating in the east, both Sioux and Huron continued to operate on the west coast. But on the whole the west coast patrol continued to be relatively uneventful. There were not many important bombardment targets available, and the most important task of the ships of TE 95.12 was to bar the blockade area to the enemy craft, including fishing vessels. For these reasons CANDESFE welcomed the recently adopted practice of keeping one of the Canadian ships on the east coast whenever possible.

On 4 June Sioux appeared in the east coast and relieved Nootka which then
returned for a much-needed docking in Kure. *Sioux* joined TE 95.28 and became
the second Canadian destroyer to enjoy the effects of the adopted policy of
keeping one of Canadian ships on the east coast. During her patrol *Sioux* was
sent twice north to join Task Element 95.21, the element conducting the siege
of Wonsan.

In mid-June *Sioux* set out for Hong Kong where she was forced to remain until
24 August to repair one of the superheater elements in No. 1 boiler. During the
two months she was out of action the RCN maintained only two destroyers with
the UN forces in Korea.

*Nootka* and *Huron* both carried out missions with the west coast patrol during
June. For various reasons there was not a great deal of naval activity on the
west coast at the time. *Huron* spent five days in Hong Kong and another six in
Kure, while *Nootka*, who was soon to return to Canada, only took the six days
at Kure.

*Cayuga* arrived for her second tour of duty in the war theatre and relieved
*Nootka* who sailed on 20 July for home. *Cayuga*’s second Korean tour opened
with the usual carrier screening mission on the west coast. *Cayuga* and *Huron*
continued to operate until 4 August on the west coast carrying out screening
duties for HMS *Glory*. For a time *Cayuga* was the only Canadian ship in action
in the Far East. *Huron* left Sasebo for home on 14 August; her relief, *Athabaskan*
did not arrive until 31 August; and *Sioux* did not complete repairs in Hong Kong
until 24 August.

**Defense of West Coast Islands:** In September, however, the Canadian ships
were much more active. All three destroyers, *Cayuga*, *Athabaskan* and *Sioux*,
put in a great deal of time on carrier screening. By this time the duties of inshore
patrol on the west coast became very important, particularly around Cho-do–
Sok-to islands which were to be one of the chief centers of activity for the
Canadian destroyers throughout the remainder of the war. The truce talks instead
of lightening the task of the naval forces had actually increased it, as high
command, finding that land operations were too costly in men, began more and
more to utilize the navy and air force when it was necessary to put pressure on
an enemy who was using “every trick in the book” to try to win by diplomacy
and trickery what he had failed to win by force of arms.

The next three months (October, November and December 1951) were the
period in which the Communists intensified their efforts to seize the UN held
western islands, and all the three Canadian destroyers saw service with the island
defense forces of TE 95.12. Indeed, it was the defense of those islands that
became the most important and certainly the most dangerous and exciting of
the many duties of the Canadian destroyers on the west coast.

 Particularly in the defense of Cho-do—Sok-to area, the Canadian destroyers took an active and important part. The backbone of the naval defenses there always included at least one Canadian destroyer. The ships were stationed so that they could cover with their radar and their guns the most likely invasion routes. It should be noted that of the destroyers and frigates on the west coast, only Canadian ships were equipped with HDWS.

**Operations in 1952–1953**

In January 1952 the Canadian destroyers were relatively busy, with *Sioux* carrying out two carrier screening missions, *Athabaskan* one carrier mission and one east-coast patrol and *Cayuga* one important west-coast inshore patrol. On the whole, during the first half of 1952 the Canadian destroyers were engaged chiefly in island defense work, usually in the area south of the Hwanghae Promontory below the 38th Parallel but occasionally in the familiar Cho-do—Sok-to stamping ground. Incursions by RCN ships into the east-coast waters controlled by TG 95.2 were rare in this period; only *Athabaskan* and *Nootka* were given the opportunity of duelling with the sharp-shooting Red gunners around Wonsan and Chongjin. Carrier screening on the west coast took up a great deal of the Canadian ships' time.

*Sioux* completed her second tour on 12 February when she turned over to *Nootka* at Sasebo before sailing for home on the 14th. Her last mission had been an inshore patrol from 29 January to 11 February around Cho-do—Sok-to area. *Nootka*, the latest member of CANDESFE, returning for the second tour of duty in Korean waters, was sent straight out on island defense duties on the west coast on 15 February.

The whole of the ![A rescue helicopter prepares to take off from *Sioux* after delivering a patient from Cho-do (island).](https://example.com/147)
month of March 1952 was singularly uneventful for the ships of CANDESFE. Except for *Athabaskan*’s tour of duty as CTU in the Haeju Man during the first eight days of the month and a similar tour by *Nootka* during the last five, the Canadian destroyers spent the rest of their operational time on carrier screening. No event of any great moment occurred.

During the following three months of April, May and June while the situation at Panmunjom grew steadily worse and the hopes for an armistice faded, the Canadian destroyers carried on operations much as in the preceding three months. One of them, *Nootka*, served a stint on the east coast where she added to her reputation for efficiency and aggressiveness. All performed screening missions and carried out numerous inshore patrols.

On 12 June *Iroquois* arrived in the war theatre to take the place of *Cayuga* who had left on the 1st for Canada. *Iroquois* remained in Sasebo until 23 June and for the remainder of the month served on an eventful patrol with the carrier on the west coast, USS *Bataan*. In June *Athabaskan* also left the operational theatre for home after being relieved by *Crusader*. Thus, for the next few months the Royal Canadian Navy would be represented in Korea by the team of *Iroquois*, *Nootka* and *Crusader*. One of this Canadian team, *Iroquois*, was to suffer the first and last casualties in the Korean War while being assigned an east coast duty during the month of October.

On 2 October *Iroquois* was hit by shells from a Communist shore battery when bombarding enemy shore installation on the east coast near Songin. One officer and one rating were killed, one died of wounds, and ten wounded by the enemy fire. These were the only operational casualties suffered in the Canadian naval personnel during the war.

On 6 November HMCS *Haida*, another Halifax-based destroyer, arrived in the operational theatre and relieved *Nootka* who three days later left for Hong Kong on the first leg of her passage home. *Nootka* was the first of the Canadian destroyers to take the route home via Suez. The second Canadian ship to return home during November was *Iroquois*. After the arrival of the relief ship, *Athabaskan*, late November *Iroquois* sailed for home via Pearl Harbor. HMCS *Athabaskan* was now back for her third tour in Korean waters.

The New Year of 1953 found the three Canadian destroyers, *Athabaskan*, *Crusader* and *Haida*, operating on the west coast. From January to July 1953 when the Korean War stopped, it was “business as usual” for the Canadian destroyers. Carrier screening and inshore patrols on the west coast took up most of their time, and usually these missions were dull and uneventful. East-coast patrols provided considerably more action however, and the Canadian destroyers
was fortunate in that each of its ships received two such assignments during the period. All of them took full advantage of these opportunities to give tangible evidence of their gunnery skill in the exciting game of "train busting."

In mid-June two Canadian ships, *Haida* and *Crusader*, left for Canada completing their first and last war-time tour in Korean waters. The both ships earned high reputation not only for their gunnery, but also for their general, all-round efficiency. Their places were taken by HMC Ships *Iroquois* and *Huron* who returned to the theatre for their second Korean tours.

When the cease-fire came on 27 July 1953 only *Athabaskan* was on active operations, forming part of the screen of USS *Bairoko* in the Yellow Sea. *Iroquois* was in Sasebo making preparations to rejoin the west coast task units, while *Huron* lay in dry dock at Sasebo repairing the damage caused by her grounding on 13 July while patrolling on the east coast.

Even after the armistice the Canadian Navy continued to maintain two destroyers as usual in the immediate war area on rotational basis. Thus, the last Canadian destroyer, *Sioux*, did not leave the Korean theatre until 7 September 1955, more than two years after the signing of the armistice. But the activities of the Canadian destroyers during the post-war period were mainly of a routine nature.

Reference Data

During the five years and more that the Canadian Navy maintained a force in the Korean theater, the eight destroyers serving in that force performed valuable services in the cause of the United Nations. The following statistics, it is hoped, give an idea of the contributions made by the Canadian Navy.

(1) Personnel and Awards

Some 3,621 officers and men of the Canadian Navy served in Korean waters during the period from July 1950 to July 1953. If one takes into account the fact that many of these officers and men served more than one tour, it may be stated that the RCN provided personnel for 4,269 tours of duty in Korea. If the RCN contribution from the armistice to 7 September 1955, when the last destroyer (*Sioux*) left Korean waters, were taken into consideration, these figures would of course be substantially higher. in the Korean War theatre, 1950–1955, the following honours and awards were presented to the members of the Canadian Navy.
**British Awards:**

- Distinguished Service Order ........................................ 1
- The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire ................. 3
- Bar to the Distinguished Service Cross .......................... 1
- Distinguished Service Cross ....................................... 9
- Distinguished Service Medal ........................................ 2
- British Empire Medal .................................................. 4
- Mentioned in Despatches ............................................. 33

**American Awards:**

- Legion of Merit — Degree of Commander ........................ 1
- Legion of Merit — Degree of Officer .............................. 4
- Legion of Merit — Degree of Legionnaire ....................... 2
- Distinguished Flying Cross ......................................... 1
- Bronze Star Medal ..................................................... 1

(2) **Service of HMC Ships in Korean waters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Departed</th>
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</table>
| Arhabaskan | Commander R.P. Welland  
            | Commander D.G. King 
            | Commander J.C. Reed | 30 Jul 50  
            | 1 Sep 50 
            | 26 Nov 52 | 3 May 51  
| Cayuga   | Captain J.V. Brock 
            | Commander J. Plomer 
            | Commander W.P. Hayes | 30 Jul 50  
            | 20 Jul 51 
            | 1 Jan 54 | 16 Mar 51  
| Crusader | Lieutenant-Commander J.H.G. Bovey 
            | Commander W.H. Willson | 21 Jun 52  
            | 20 Nov 53 | 18 Jun 53  
| Sioux    | Commander P.D. Taylor 
            | Commander P.D. Taylor 
            | Commander A.H. Rankin | 30 Jul 50  
            | 30 Apr 51 
            | 14 Dec 54 | 15 Jan 51  
| Haida    | Commander Dunn Lantier 
            | Captain J.A. Charles | 6 Nov 52  
            | 5 Feb 54 | 12 Jun 53  
| Huron    | Commander E.T.G. Madgwick 
            | Commander R.C. Chenoweth | 15 Mar 51  
            | 18 Jun 53 | 14 Aug 51  
|         | Commander T.C. Pullen (CO from 21 September 1953) | 5 Feb 54 | 5 Feb 54  
| Iroquois | Commander W.M. Landymore  
            | Captain W.M. Landymore | 12 Jun 52  
            | 18 Jun 53 
            | 22 Aug 54 | 26 Nov 52  
|         | Lieutenant-Commander S.G. Moore (from 1 November 1953) | 1 Jan 54 | 1 Jan 54  
| Nootka  | Commander A.B.F. Fraser-Harris 
            | Commander R.M. Steele | 14 Jan 51  
            | 12 Feb 52 | 20 Jul 51  
            | 9 Nov 52 |
(3) Battle Casualties suffered by the members of the Canadian Navy during the war:

- Killed in action: 2
- Died of wound in action: 1
- Wounded in action: 10

4. The Canadian Air Force

The Royal Canadian Air Force's part in the airlift operations in the Korean War theatre received its share of public attention during the four years in which it was being played. Statistics of the work done during the four years of the airlift are impressive. In 599 round trips, No. 426 Transport Squadron carried 13,000 personnel and 7,000,000 lbs. of freight and mail. This added up to 34,000 flying hours, during which not a pound of cargo or a single life was lost.

In view of the fact that the airlifting of personnel and equipment to and from the Korean theater of operations was one of the most demanding and pressing tasks during the war, particularly in its early stage, the contribution made by No. 426 Transport Squadron was great. In the early hectic days of the war the squadron operated on a schedule several times heavier than that which had been expected. By mid-August, the six North Stars and twelve crews had to fly from McChord Air Base one round-trip per day over a route of 10,000 miles. This meant that aircrew began a new trip every eleven or twelve days, sometimes logging 150 hours or more per month, while each North Star was flying more than 300 hours per month. But the cargos were as vital as the schedule was heavy. Often the entire load consisted of fully-armed infantry or bazooka rockets. Speed was the essential factor to be considered.

After the first hectic months, the airlifting operation (more often called "Operation Hawk") settled down to a routine of fifteen trips per month. By June 1951 the squadron returned from McChord Air Base, USA, to Dorval Airport, Canada, and continued to carry out its airlift commitments as well as its other flying duties. One year later the schedule was reduced to eight trips per month, and it remained at that rate until the end of the operation. Thus, the airlift operation which began on 25 July 1950 was concluded on 9 June 1954, when trip no. 599 was greeted at Dorval by a modest concluding ceremony. The three commanders who commanded the squadron during the operational period were:
Wing Commander C.H. Mussels
Wing Commander J.K.F. Macdonald
Wing Commander H.W. Lupton

In addition to the airlift contribution just described, the Canadian Air Force also sent its veteran pilots to fly combat missions with USAF squadrons during the Korean War. The Canadian airmen contributed their part with gallantry, courage, and devotion to duty. They shot down at least nine MIGs and damaged many more during the war.

It should be noted that the RCAF pilots did not participate in the Korean air war as a unit, but on an individual basis under the rotation program, and they were to serve only a tour of 50 missions or six months, whichever came first. The main purpose for the pilots in Korea was to gain enough combat experience to make them useful to the service in passing on their knowledge. So, each of the pilots was to be attached to the USAF fighter-interceptor wings, and for those who lacked combat experience there was on-the-spot instruction from the USAF pilots, who bore the brunt of the air fighting in "MIG Alley."

It was so fortunate that all of those RCAF pilots were able to return home with valuable combat experience although one pilot (S/L A.R. Mackenzie) was released in December 1954, two years after his capture and 17 months after an armistice.
THE COLOMBIAN FORCE
THE COLOMBIAN FORCE

1. Introduction

The Republic of Colombia, the only country in the South America to participate in the Korean War, contributed one infantry battalion and one frigate. The 1,060-strong infantry battalion arrived at Pusan on 15 June 1951 and after a six-week training period was attached to the 24th US Division.

The first major battle of the Colombian Battalion took place during 13–23 October 1951 when the Colombian fighters advanced toward Kumson on the mid-eastern front in which they repulsed repeated Chinese attacks at the cost of six killed and 23 wounded including the battalion commander. The remainder of the year was spent in defense of the Kumson area.

From early 1952 after the 24th US Division had left Korea, the Colombian Battalion operated under the 7th US Division at Kapyong, Inje, Kumhwa and in the general neighborhood of the 38th Parallel. In closing days of 1953, the battalion moved to the western front to defend T-Bone Hill area with the 31st Regiment of the 7th Division. During 23–24 of March, the battalion was subjected to its fiercest fighting in Korea, when the Chinese Communists launched a large-scale attack on the Colombian outpost “Old Baldy.” In the action the Colombians courageously resisted, suffering 95 killed and 97 wounded and 30 missing, but the enemy casualties were estimated at over 500 men.

During two years and 42 days, from the time the 1st Colombian Battalion set its first foot on Korean soil until the armistice was signed, a total of 4,314 members of the Colombian Army served in the Korean War. During the period, the Colombian Army continued to maintain one infantry battalion with rotation of four battalions. Although the Colombian fighters were relatively late in their arrival in the battle scene they had fought many of the fiercest battles across whole Korean peninsula from east to west and established its brilliant battle records which were second to none. Brigadier General Blackshear Bryan commanding the 24th US Division late in 1951 praised the Colombian Battalion so highly by saying “I have fought in three wars. I have commanded and seen the best soldiers in the world fight. I think that nothing new remains for me to see in the
field of human heroism and intrepidity, but having seen the Colombia Battalion fight, I have seen the grandest, most superb of my life.”

The Republic of Colombia, prior to the dispatch of its ground troops, also sent a naval frigate, *Almirante Padilla*, to Korea and thereafter, maintained one frigate continuously in the area for the United Nations naval operations, an effort which involved all three of Colombian Navy’s ships and five tours of duty. They participated in various operations such as patrolling, escorting, bombardment on the enemy gun positions and communications routes. The Colombian naval contribution was by no means inconsiderable.

2. The Colombian Infantry Battalion

The Colombian Infantry Battalion consisting of 1,060 officers and enlisted men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania Puyo, landed in the port of Pusan, Korea on 15 June 1951 when the Korean War came close to one year. So, it seems worthwhile to briefly state the general situation of the war at the time in which the Colombian Infantry Battalion would start fighting on the Korean soil.

After the United Nations Command had halted the Communist Chinese offensives in the spring of 1951, there had been no effort by the Eighth US Army under which all UN ground forces were to operate to launch a counter-attack. As the fighting became stabilized close to the 38th Parallel and specially after the relief of General MacArthur in April 1951, reliance on the military victory in Korea had wanned. The costs had become too high and risks too great. But the war still continued and had to be prosecuted until a settlement was secured. This had turned thoughts of the military leaders to the negotiation of an armistice.

On 23 June 1951, while the Colombian Battalion was still under training at the UN reception center at Tongnae near Pusan, the Soviet representative to the United Nations hinted a Communist disposition to negotiate the Korean problem. Thus, the first session of military armistice conference was held on 10 July, at Kaesong between the delegations of the UN Command and the Communist forces.

As the UN objective in the Korean War shifted from the military victory to political settlement, the Eighth Army Commander, General Van Fleet, therefore, decided that the most profitable employment for the UN troops was to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain north of the 38th Parallel, and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the UN forces. This decision in fact marked the end of the fluid phase of the
Korean War and the start of the new war -- a positional war.

**Operations 1951**

On 30 July, the Colombian Battalion commenced its first movement north through Chunchon—Hwachon route to the designated assembly area in the vicinity of Sabanggo-ri some 10 kilometers northwest of Hwachon, arriving there at midnight. On the following day (1 August), the battalion was attached to the 24th US Infantry Division and further attached to the 21st Regiment of the division for the operational control. From this time until closing days of January 1952 the Colombians fought side by side with the elements of the 24th Division.

While in Sabanggori area, the Colombian Battalion was ordered to carry out painstaking patrol missions into surrounding highlands. This was to help the other units of the 24th US Division conducting limited objective attacks to establish strong OPLR along the Wyoming Line. The Colombian patrol activities were comparatively uneventful for several days. A bad day came for the

![The Colombian Battalion moves forward to the front.](image)
Colombians on 6 August, when a combat patrol infiltrated courageously deep into the enemy territory five kilometers north of friendly MLR positions, and were suddenly attacked by numerically superior enemy. In the ensuing fire fight the patrol suffered casualties of 11 wounded. This was the Colombians' first combat and first casualties suffered on the Korean soil.

On 7 August the Colombian Battalion along with the 21st US Regiment was relieved by the elements of the 7th US Division and moved down to Taeri-ri along the Kansas Line near Hwachon where the battalion underwent another hard training. The training lasted until 5 October when the Colombians were called for frontline duty again.

From 13 to 23 October the Colombian infantry men together with the other units of the 24th US Division were to engage strenuously in a series of limited attacks toward Kumsong area. In the race the Colombian Battalion was the first unit among the 24th Division's units to reach the final objective "Polar Line" by securing Hill 552 about five kilometers southwest of Kumsong on the 20th. During the course of the attack, the Colombian Battalion repulsed repeated Chinese attacks. The enemy losses inflicted by the battalion alone amounted to 84 killed and six captured as against the Colombian losses of six KIAs and 23 WIA's. Of the 23 wounded was included the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania Puyo. The bravery and brilliant battle achievements shown by the Colombians during the Kumsong attack period (13–23 October 1951) resulted in winning the US Presidential Unit Citation on 9 December 1952.

In the following few months until January 1952, the Colombian Battalion continued to remain in the proximity of Kumsong conducting aggressive patrol activities mainly from Hoegogae which the Colombian Battalion maintained as its outpost. The outpost of Hoegogae was held usually by one company and one of the important positions in the central section of the front defended by the 24th US Division. From the outpost position the Colombian patrols started out every night. Enemy was seldom seen during the daylight hours. Enemy action mostly took place at night, under cover of darkness and unhindered by air surveillance, and even at night the enemy confined themselves primarily to small-scale patrols and limited probes of the friendly outpost positions. Some of friendly patrols exchanged shots with the enemy and inflicted casualties, but made no close contact; many returned with negative reports, for they had found no one to capture or even to shoot at. This was the pattern of the Colombian patrol activities during those days.

The Korean winter in January was bitingly cold, the temperature dropping 30°C below zero. The men of the battalion, although suffering intensely from the cold, remained unmoved in the bulwark of the struggle, fighting heroically
not only against the enemy but against nature.

Operations in 1952

On 28 January 1952 the Colombian Battalion parted with the 24th US Division to which it had been attached about six months and newly went under the 7th US Division, then in the X US Corps sector, and moved to Wondang-ni some 10 kilometers north-northeast of Yanggu. From this day the battalion did not stay for long at one place. The Colombians were busy moving from one place to another; from the IX Corps to the X Corps sector on various missions as assigned. The battalion was badly needed in rear zone until the 7th US Division was put on the frontline positions again in late April.

On 28 April the units of the 7th US Division relieved the MLR positions then defended by the 2nd US Division along the Missouri Line near Kumhwa southwest of Kumsong.

The defense sector assigned to the Colombian Battalion was one of the important strategic portions on the Missouri Line since the area covered the most needed supply road connecting Kumhwa and Pyonggang – two points of Iron Triangle.

From 11 May to 10 June, the Colombians took part in patrol and ambush operations continuously. At the time the enemy in front of them was very active in sending out its Col. Polania, Lt. Bernardo Lema-Henao and First Corporal Francisco Espinel-Mejia after being decorated.
patrols mostly at night. It was apparent that the enemy was determined not
to give away even an inch of its ground. His artillery and mortar rounds directed
on the Colombian outpost positions increased day by day in number, and the
enemy fire became more and more accurate. Most of the Colombian casualties
suffered during this period were by the artillery and mortars rather than small
arms fire.

On 10 June, after one month on the MLR positions, the Colombian fighters
went into reserve in the vicinity of Wasu-ni about five kilometers southwest of
Kumhwa. While manning a blocking position near the village, the Colombians
underwent retraining and conducted aggressive patrol actions to raid or probe
deep into the enemy-held positions. Worthy of particular mention was an action
of a company size combat patrol conducted by A Company of the battalion on
21 June. The heroic action of the patrol members in the raid is detailed as follows.

The Raid on Hill 400: The battalion commander and his staff carefully planned
the combat patrol and assigned the patrol mission to A Company under the
command of 1st Lieutenant Luis Galindo. The mission was to raid enemy-held
Hill 400 to kill or capture any enemy encountered. The Hill 400 was a strongly
fortified outpost position only 1,500 meters apart from friendly outposts then
defended by the elements of the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment. The enemy
strength on the hill was estimated at one platoon reinforced.

On 21 June at 0400 hours the Colombian special patrol consisting of two
platoons (support and assault) moved toward the objective under the support of
seven American tanks positioned both on the outpost line and MLR. The patrol
advanced swiftly under the cover of darkness until it reached unnoticed within
about 80 meters from the enemy bunkers on Hill 400. At this point the support
platoon led by Lt. Galindo himself took up its advantageous terrain.

In spite of the difficulty of moving on the steep slope, the men of the assault
platoon, under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Mario Bernal, managed to work
their way up the crest of the hill and immediately started concentrating their
fire into the enemy bunkers as they were found. The enemy was completely
surprised by the assault platoon. By that time the enemy soldiers from their
bunkers had started appearing in the communication trench and opened fire
aimlessly. But the Colombians either killed them or drove them back into their
bunkers in the close quarters fight. Apparently the Colombian fighters held
the initiative maintaining a heavy rate of fire, and soon the enemy bunkers were
exploded one by one. It was during this time that Corporal Mario Delgado put
up the Colombian colors on the crest of the hill as a sign of the Colombian
occupation of it. Having judged that the mission was accomplished, Lieutenant
Galindo decided to withdraw and called for tank and artillery concentrations on the hill to prevent enemy from probable counterattack. Then the special patrol quickly withdrew covered by artillery support to the friendly outpost position at 0530 hours. The Colombian patrol most successfully raided the enemy positions with the brilliant result of 20 enemy counted dead, eight presumed killed, two prisoners captured and 11 bunkers destroyed as against two friendly killed and 15 wounded. (See Sketch Map 1.)

The effective use of friendly artillery and tank fire on the hill and on the enemy troops following the Colombian patrol back toward its base prevented further casualties. Patrol members gave full credit to the artillery and tank support for their successful return. For the courageous actions in the raid, Lieutenant Bernal and all members of his platoon were honored with special medals from the 7th US Division.

On 13 July the Colombians came back again on the line relieving the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment. Upon completion of the relief, the old pattern
of strenuous patrol was automatically started since they were so familiar with the surrounding terrain. The battalion sent out at least one patrol and set up several ambushes for the enemy every night. The patrols were mainly directed toward the two hills 324 and 400 that were the strong enemy OPL facing friendly OPL with less than one kilometer distance apart. The patrol action conducted by the Colombians was matched by the similar actions by the Communists on the opposite front.

In the meantime the Colombians never neglected to fight against nature. By this time the Korean rainy season had started. The onset of the rainy season made operations exceedingly difficult to carry out. In the main positions as well as outpost positions many trenches collapsed, and for a period of July the Colombians were completely cut off from its supply due to flood water in the river valleys.

Entering the month of August, combat activities along the front line generally became eased. In front of the outpost positions defended by the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment, however, there were frequent patrol clashes in August and early September. This situation finally called upon the Colombian fighters in reserve to reinforce the battalion on the OPLR. Thus, three companies of the Colombian Battalion rushed to the rescue; A Company moved in on the 1st of September; B Company on the 2nd; and C Company on the 5th. The rest of the battalion continued to remain in the reserve camp in the vicinity of Hasong-dong below Wasu-ri.

On 24 September the Colombian Battalion handed over the defense positions to the Ethiopian Battalion and moved to the rear to organize a blocking position and consolidate defense of the Wyoming Line in the vicinity of Sindae-dong some seven kilometers northwest of Chorwon. It was the first time for the Colombian fighters to relieve with an UN unit other than American troops. The Ethiopian Battalion had been assigned to the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division since its arrival in Korea in May 1951.

By 2 October the Colombian Battalion had completed its defense work assignments on the Wyoming and was ordered the 31st Regimental reserve. But the frontline situation at the time was not good enough to permit the Colombians to stay long in reserve. On 7 October less than a week in reserve, the Colombians moved to the vicinity of Igil-li four kilometers north of Sindae-dong, and there came under the 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division. On the same day the Colombians took up the MLR positions held by the 17th Regimental unit.

This new MLR position the Colombians were to defend was three-kilometer wide front surrounded by thickly wooded hills with the highest Hill 438 on its
right. On the both flanks of the Colombians the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 17th Regiment deployed and the 17th Regiment was bordered by the 9th ROK Division unit on the left and by the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division on the right.

During the following 35-day period in which Colombian fighters manned the position the Colombians had to double their defense effort and vigilance by conducting aggressive reconnaissance activities to the enemy zone which resulted in relatively high casualties of Colombians being suffered mostly due to the enemy’s intense mortars and artillery fire. In connection with the Colombian Battalion’s defense effort, it should be noted that a big operation called “Showdown” took place during the period getting whole three regiments of the 7th US Division involved in the operation leaving the Colombians on arduous missions of MLR defense.

The operation “Showdown” started on 14 October. Less than five kilometers from Kumhwa the 7th Division and enemy troops manned their positions that were but 200 meters apart. On Hill 598, better known as Triangle Hill, and Sniper Ridge, which ran northwest to southeast to a little over two kilometers northeast
of Hill 598, the opposing forces looked down each other's throat and casualties were correspondingly high. The Showdown was designed to mend this situation and to seize the initiative on the ground action by improving the IX Corps defense lines. While the 7th Division troops were carrying out the operation, the Colombian Battalion continued to hold fast to the MLR positions until the middle of November when the Colombians along with other 7th Division units came off the line by being relieved by the 25th US Division units.

On 23 November while in reserve at Hwachon area with the 31st Regiment, the Colombian Battalion participated in the tactical maneuvering exercise conducted by the 31st Regiment and won the top performance citation from the 31st Regimental Commander.

On 9 December the Colombian Battalion held a colorful ceremony in commemoration of the Ayacucho war of their country. Among the programs scheduled for the day, the highlight event was the presentation of the US Presidential Unit Citation to the battalion by General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander. This highest award was won by the Colombian Battalion for its glorious battle achievements during the Kumsong attack period, late October 1951.

Operations in 1953

In the closing days of 1952, upon completion of its reserve period at the Hwachon area, the Colombian Battalion with the 31st Regiment followed its parent unit to the western front in the I US Corps sector. Here the 7th US Division relieved the 2nd US Division then defending the Porkchop—Old Baldy—T-Bone area, and opened its CP in the vicinity of Changgo-ri about seven kilometers north of Yonchon on 29 December.

While in this sector the Colombian Battalion carried out a variety of missions such as defending MLR positions, holding blocking positions, and undergoing training. Especially during the reserve period, the battalion conducted a number of raiding operations. One of the raids, worthy of particular mention, was the action of a company-size surprise attack on 10 March against the enemy-held Hill 180, about 500 meters from the friendly MLR positions. In the action the enemy personnel losses alone were estimated at more than 150 casualties, while friendly suffered a casualties of 19 killed, 44 wounded, and eight missing. This action is detailed in Volume III of this series.

On 23 March the Colombian Battalion’s hardest test came when the Communist
Chinese made a double-barreled attack on both Old Baldy and Porkchop outposts.

The Old Baldy Battle:
On 13 March at 0455 hours, the Colombian Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment on MLR positions. Now the Colombians were to defend the Togun-kol area with their outpost on Old Baldy manned with one company strength. The American Regiment's 2nd Battalion deployed on its left and the 3rd Battalion on the right in the Porkchop Hill sector. One company from the relieved 1st Battalion manned the blocking positions prepared behind the three frontline battalions.

On 20 March the 7th Division had indications that the enemy contemplated an attack in the Old Baldy-Porkchop area. The increase in artillery and mortar rounds on the division's positions on these long-contested hills usually signified a Communist offensive move, and the capture of two deserters in the sector strengthened the belief that the enemy action would soon be forthcoming.

At 2105 hours of 23 March the Communist Chinese started a double-barreled attacking on both Old Baldy and Porkchop. A mixed battalion from the 423rd Regiment, 141st CCF Division, directed its main attack to the Old Baldy outpost which had been manned by Company B under Captain Irmer Perea. At the time of enemy attack, B Company was in the middle of relieving with C Company commanded by Captain Acevedo who had commanded the raid of the enemy strong points on Hill 180 on the 10th. Taking advantage of the Colombian relief, the Chinese closely followed an intense artillery and mortar concentration upon
the Colombian troops and fought their way into the Colombian trenches. By this time all communication lines to the battalion CP had been cut off except the line between A and C Companies. Soon the Old Baldy became a shambles with many of the bunkers afame and many dead and wounded. The Colombian casualties rapidly mounted. Despite the Colombians' courageous resistance against the overwhelming enemy the two Colombian companies on the outpost lost 60 percent of their strength. In addition the Colombians' ammunition began to run low. At last the Colombians were forced to withdraw to the southeastern slope of the outpost. A few minutes earlier Battalion Commander Colonol Alberto Ruiz Novoa, however, was authorized to put under his operational control a reinforcing American company from the 31st Regiment to mend the situation. The reinforcing company led by 1st Lieutenant Jack M. Patteson moved toward Old Baldy at 2130 hours. As the company drew near the outpost, the Chinese first called in intense artillery and mortar fire along the approach routes, then took Lieutenant Patteson's men under fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. The American company slowly made its way into the first bunkers on Old Baldy at 0200 hours the following morning and began to clear them out one by one. As the company came up against the main strength of the Chinese on Old Baldy, however, progress lessened and then ground to a halt. Throughout the rest of the night there was only intermittent fire exchange between the opposing forces. (See Sketch Map 2.)

This situation led to the employment of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment on the 24th to counterattack for the Old Baldy. Unfortunately, however, the 1st Battalion still failed in improving the situation despite of the repeated counterattacks over two days. Finally the American battalion was ordered to withdraw from Old Baldy during night of 25-26 March.

The over two days of fighting for Old Baldy had been costly both for the Colombian and American troops. The Colombian casualties alone had amounted to 95 dead, 97 wounded, and 30 captured. Of the 30 Colombians captured, 28 were repatriated during the prisoners of war exchange period. This was a great loss equivalent to one rifle company. Although the Chinese casualties inflicted by the Colombian fighters were estimated at over 500, the enemy had committed his troops freely to maintain possession of Old Baldy.

There were many interesting episodes of the Old Baldy battle. For an example, when the Colombian combatants entered into one of the numerous bunkers on the outpost to avoid enemy artillery and mortar shellings, they received very kind greetings and even cigarettes from some soldiers already in the bunker who looked like ROK Army soldiers. When the artillery fire was lifted those strange soldiers
all of sudden started moving out of the bunker. After they had left, the
Colombian wondered and wondered about what their identity might be. It was
several days later that they learned those strange soldiers were not friendly, but
Communist Chinese. The Colombians found out that both the friendly ROK
Army and the Communist North Korean troops had not fought in the Old Baldy
battle.

According to reports made later by Colombians who had hidden in bunkers
during the Chinese domination of the heights, it appeared that the Chinese troops
left the Old Baldy when the friendly air strikes came, and this, incidentally, had
enabled the Colombians to make their way back to the friendly lines. It is un-
certain, however, that the safely returned Colombians were the same soldiers
who were kindly greeted by the Chinese soldiers in the same bunker.

Even after the Old Baldy fight, the Colombian Battalion continued to remain
on the line along the Jamestown defense line until April when the battalion joined
the 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division and participated in field training in
Yonchon area.

On 20 May the battalion took over the defense of Sonbyok area, central portion
of the 7th US Division sector relieving the 1st Battalion of the 17th Regiment.
This was the last defense position held by the Colombians before the armistice was

DEFENSE ON OLD BALDY (23–26 Mar 1953)
Although the Korean War ended by the armistice, the Colombian Battalion continued to participate in a UN “presence” in Korea in gradually diminishing strength until the last unit embarked for Colombia on 29 October 1954.

Reference Data

(1) The following is a list of the Colombian Infantry Battalions and their commanders who served in the Korean War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other ranks</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Jaime Polania Puyo (15 June 51–4 Jul 1952)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Alberto Ruiz Novoa (4 Jul 52–25 Jun 53)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>878</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Battalion</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Carlos Ortiz Torres (25 Jun 53–29 Oct 54)</td>
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</table>

(2) The following is a list of all Honors and Awards received by the members of the Colombian Battalions in the Korean War.

Korean Award

“Ułchi” Medal ........................................ 1

Colombian Awards

Honor al Deber Cumplido con V ..................... 114
Honor al Deber Cumplido ............................ 231
Cruz de Hierro ........................................ 117

American Awards

Silver Stars .......................................... 18
Bronze Stars with “V” .............................. 25
Bronze Stars ......................................... 9
Legion of Merits ..................................... 2
Presidential Unit Citation .......................... 2

(3) The following is the battle casualties suffered by the Colombian Battalions in the Korean War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>Missing</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>69 (28 repatriated)</td>
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</table>
3. The Naval Contribution

The first Colombian frigate "Almirante Padilla" commanded by Captain Julio Cesar Reyes Canal arrived in the Korean waters on 8 May 1951. From the time until 11 October 1955 when the same frigate, after serving its second tour of duty, left the war theater, the Colombian Navy maintained one frigate continuously in the area, an effort which involved all three of its frigates and five tours of duty.

In view of the hydrography of the Korean west coast, which restricted the movement of heavy ships, the Colombian frigates played an important role, particularly conducting inshore patrols in the early stage of the war.

A total of more than 1,000 Colombian officers and sailors served in the Korean waters, but luckily no one was killed during their tours of duty in the war theater. Although always charged with such roles as patrolling, escorting convoy or defending islands under the command of other UNC unit commanders, they were nevertheless noted many times for superb seamanship and devotion beyond the call of duty. For the United Nations cause, it must be emphasized that the three Colombian frigates, two of which made two tours, played their small but effective part. The following shows the tours of the three ships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Commanders' Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARC Almirante Padilla</td>
<td>Captain Julio Cesar Reyes Canal</td>
<td>May 51 – Feb 52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC Capitan Tono</td>
<td>Captain Hernado Beron Victoria</td>
<td>Apr 52 – Jan 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC Almirante Brion</td>
<td>Captain Carlos Prieto Silva</td>
<td>Jun 53 – Apr 54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC Capitan Tono</td>
<td>Captain Jorge Tana Suarez</td>
<td>Apr 54 – Mar 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 tours)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC Almirante Padilla</td>
<td>Captain Dario Ferero Gonzalez</td>
<td>Mar 55 – Oct 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 tours)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE ETHIOPIAN FORCE
THE ETHIOPIAN FORCE

1. Introduction

When the United Nations resolved to an application of the ideal of collective security against the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea, Emperor Haile Selassie had instantly decided the Ethiopian commitment. The Emperor's enthusiasm for the Ethiopian participation was so great that he readily came to a decision to send his own Security Guard.

In August 1950, the formal order was issued in Ethiopia for the formation of the first Kagnew Battalion. The organization of the first Kagnew Battalion took place with an exceptional speed in the military annals of Ethiopia. Within twenty-four hours of the issuance of the order for the formation, the Battalion had been formed and Lieutenant Colonel Teshome Irgetu had assumed the command.

The Kagnew Battalion was placed in an intense training for eight months at a specially designed camp in the mountainous region. They paid particular attention to the training in the combat patrol and ambush actions in the field. Upon completion of the special training in early April 1951, the Ethiopian infantry fighters embarked on the American transport General Macrea and departed for Korea on the night of 16 April 1951.

Arriving in the port of Pusan on 7 May 1951, the Ethiopian soldiers were heartily welcomed by President of the Republic of Korea Syngman Rhee, who presented a bouquet to Lieutenant Colonel Teshome Irgetu, the Battalion Commander, and the US Ambassador John J. Muccio. After the welcome ceremony, they were transported to the UN Command Reception Center at Tongnae in northern outskirts of Pusan, and were put to familiarization training with US Army weapons and equipment to UNC troops as determined essential for operations in Korea.

2. Operations
At Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san): After completion of the six-week training, on 9 July the 1st Kagnew Battalion was attached to the 7th US Division as 4th Battalion of the 32nd Regiment. At the moment, the 7th US Division was in the IX US Corps reserve at Kapyong, awaiting an important assignment to the central front on the Kansas Line.

When the 7th US Division moved to Hwachon and relieved 24th US Division on 7 August, the Kagnew Battalion advanced north to a new position near Sanyang-ni on 9 August for active defense mission. Sanyang-ni was halfway on the highway connecting Hwachon and one point of Iron Triangle, Kumhwa. About 10 kilometers northwest of this town was Pandangdong-ni, one of the most important strategic positions in the central section of the front held by the 7th Division. To the south of the town was situated the mountain mass
called Chokkun-san (Hill 1073). Being the highest among the hills in the division sector, this Hill 1073 was an outstanding observation site and so of great importance to friendly and enemy forces alike.

The enemy tried to occupy this hill so desperately that the danger was also great. To avert the danger and to defend the hill, the 7th US Division took all the necessary precautions together with strong action of the patrols and ambushes around Hill 1073. The Ethiopians took part in this allied effort to defend Hill 1073 and contributed excellently to frustrate the continued enemy attempts to approach the hill, and finally to the successful defense of the hill.

On 14 August, one Ethiopian platoon led by 2nd Lieutenant Gebresus set out at 1600 hours from Hill 1073 with a mission of inflicting casualties on the Red Chinese troops and taking prisoners. At 0145 hours the next morning, segments of the platoon which had been broken down into squads were brought under enemy mortar fire in the area, three kilometers northeast of Hill 1073. The platoon assembled at the rally point and Lieutenant Gebresus ordered immediately to set up its defensive position so as to prevent the enemy from gaining the hill it was defending, and at the same time he asked for fire missions back to K Company, 32nd US Regiment. This action lasted for about four hours, and the enemy was forced to give up their attempts to occupy the hill and finally withdrew.

On 15 August, the Ethiopians were ordered to move ten kilometers northwest of the current positions. This new site was surrounded by numerous hills; Hill 690 to northeast near Malkogae, Hill 697 to south and Hill 683 to southwest, and considered an important traffic route of friendly and enemy forces. Hereafter, from 16 August to 26 September, the Kagnwe Battalion engaged in a series of notable battles which resulted in not only a defense of their lines from the furious enemy assaults, but in violent and heavy attacks, to drive the enemy from strategic positions.

Patrol Activity in Samhyon Area: Samhyon, three kilometers northeast of Pandangdong-ni, near Hill 602, had been a frequent friendly and enemy patrol route so that many other contacts were made. Among them, a patrol on 10 September raged probably the heaviest engagement.

In the morning of 10 September, a company size-patrol encountered with a strong Red Chinese counterpatrol near Hill 602 and was placed under torrential enemy fire. As soon as the patrol withdrew to a more advantageous position, the Ethiopians began to deal with the flooding Communist Chinese with mortar and small arms. Forward observer radioed to K Company, 32nd US Regiment, giving the exact locations of the enemy's heavy and automatic weapons, and
soon the friendly artillery began to strike the enemy troops and weapons emplacements. Overwhelmed by the Kagnew patrol's stubborn resistance and approximate 2,500 rounds of the friendly artillery fire, the enemy commenced to withdraw. In this battle, 100 enemy were killed by the patrol alone in addition to another 150 by the artillery fire. The Kagnew losses were only three killed and three wounded.

On 11 September, an Ethiopian platoon led by 1st Lieutenant Wolds Sadic Tesfaye made an ambush assault near Hill 600. At 2030 hours, when the patrol reached west of the hill, the platoon received heavy automatic weapons fire from enemy bunkers on the ridge to Hill 600. Ordering his men to cover, Lieutenant Tesfaye maneuvered to the right flank of the enemy, and then ran through the fireswept area to within a few meters of enemy bunker. He threw a grenade and destroyed the enemy emplacements. The platoon returned without casualty at 2100 hours. Lieutenant Tesfaye's heroic action later won the Bronze Star Medal from the U.S. Government.

In the morning of 12 September, the 1st Company of the Kagnew Battalion was ordered to launch an attack with one platoon against the Hill Devil, near Hill 600, with a mission to inflict casualties upon the enemy. Captain Tefera selected 2nd Lieutenant Eyob as leader of the force for the assault against the enemy. It was still dark at 0630 when the Ethiopians departed on their mission, and when, after two and one half hours, they reached their objectives, they were met by a strong enemy force. The Red Chinese had well estimated the importance of that hill for the defense of their MLR and fortified it strongly, while keeping Red reserve forces behind the hill ready to counterattack. Strenuous fighting took place on that hill between the Reds and Ethiopians. Finally the Ethiopians broke the Red defense and succeeded in climbing the hill. But immediately the reserve forces of the Reds counterattacked in many points, and a new struggle started between the Ethiopians and Reds. The aim of the Red Chinese, who was numerically superior to the Ethiopians, was to encircle the Ethiopian platoon. In the most critical moment of the battle, 2nd Lieutenant Eyob was seriously wounded, and it was impossible for him to continue conducting the battle. His men were in a critical situation and the danger of encirclement of the platoon was great. In that critical moment, a brave Ethiopian soldier, Lema Morra, on his own initiative, occupied one position on the hill and with his machine gun kept the enemy at bay, opening a route for the men of the platoon to withdraw. The hero, Lema Morra, remained in that position, restraining the enemy until the moment that the Ethiopian platoon returned with its wounded leader to the line of the Kagnew Battalion. All returned but Lema Morra. He remained in that position on top of the hill, faithful to the silent oath that he had given; one for all,
Operations

and all for one.

**Operation Cleaver:** Late September from 16 to 26 September the Ethiopians marked the most glorious pages of their history in the Korean War. Hill 700 stood about two kilometers northwest of the Kagnew Battalion’s position and further to the north of it was Hill 602. These two hills and another, Hill 600 to the south, were all ahead of the friendly line and considered as CCF’s important defensive positions. The weight of these hills to friendly operations was so great that the objectives for the Ethiopians in the Operation Cleaver, scheduled to begin on 21 September, were to attack and seize them.

During the days of the 16th to 20th, prior to the onset of the operation, the Battalion conducted intensive and extraordinary aggressive patrol activities, with the intention of securing vital information for the impending assaults on the objectives.

On 17 September, Sergeant Major Teguegu Aneleye and his platoon was engaged against a well-entrenched hostile force on a commanding terrain in the vicinity of Hill 602. The assault platoon, coming under devastating small arms and automatic weapons fire from the summit of Hill 602, was forced to seek cover. Constantly vulnerable, while evacuating the wounded, and then, rallying and urging them forward, he led them in a daring charge up the hill routing the enemy defenders, and seized the objective. Although wounded in this action, Sergeant Aneleye refused aid and, after consolidating his men upon the hill, directed the platoon’s defense in repulsing two counterattacks.

On 19 September, one company of the Kagnew Battalion Commanded by Captain Mesheshe Assefa was ordered to attack and capture an enemy’s well-fortified strong point near Hill 602. After deploying the company in tactical positions to provide flanking fire, the Company Commander ordered the leading platoon forward. But the assault was repulsed by the Red automatic and small weapons fire, and severe fire fight broke out between the friendly supporting platoons and Red defenders. When the assaulting platoon barely succeeded in reaching the summit of the hill, friendly air strike, Captain Assefa called in previously, placed a heavy bombardment on the enemy-held positions. By the time the Kagnew assault platoon finally silenced the Reds after three hour’s fighting, the hill reeked of blood and was deformed by bomb blasts. The striking contrast in the number of casualty bore witness to the combat efficiency of the Ethiopian fighters; the Kagnew patrol killed 35 enemy and wounded 50 in exchange for a few friendly wounded in addition to 6 enemy bunkers smashed.

On 21 September, D-day came. The 2nd Company commanded by Captain Merid Gizaw was given the mission of taking Hill 700 while the objective Hill 602
was to be taken by 1st Company then commanded by Captain Tefera.

Captain Merid Gizaw led his men toward Hill 700, defended by approximately a battalion of Red Chinese. The company attack progressed, and after one and a half hours of close combat succeeded in dislodging the enemy from the frontal part of the hill. Then the enemy remainder withdrew toward an outpost that they had established in front of Hill 602. It was apparent that the Reds rather decided to duel on Hill 602. Hill 602 was then defended by a reinforced Red Chinese battalion. The defense positions were well fortified and camouflaged. The enemy, moreover, was one of the best fighting units that the Red Chinese boasted.

Following the initial success, the 1st Company was immediately ordered to attack Hill 602, and jumped off Hill 700, the newly-won 2nd Company position. As the company neared the crest of the objective, it was under heavy enemy
small arms and automatic weapons fire from the unknown enemy bunkers and well covered positions. Realizing that his men were threatened with annihilation in their present untenable positions, Captain Tefera moved among them, reorganizing and speaking words of encouragement. Then, shouting directions to his men, he left his position of cover and charged directly into the intense enemy fire. His men inspired by his fearlessness, swept up the hill behind him and began to drive the enemy from the objective. The battle became a bloody hand-to-hand fight as more and more Red forces were committed out of reserve. The Ethiopians tried desperately to capture the hill and so did the enemy not to lose it with apparent superiority in number. It was during the peak of the battle that Captain Tefera was critically wounded. Bleeding profusely and in great pain, the heroic captain refused to abandon the fight. Inspired by his courageous action, his men inflicted numerous casualties upon the enemy. But the enemy artillery and mortar fire also grew stronger as the evening set in: Judging continued attack would result in many casualties by the unusual enemy artillery fire, the Battalion ordered withdrawal at 1700 hours.

Early in the following morning, the 1st Company resumed attack. This time the tank-infantry columns spearheaded the assault just below the hill and thence infantry crept up under support of division artillery fire. At 1400 hours the 1st Company succeeded in bringing two platoons on the top of the hill where they met enemy main strength in close quarters fight. By 1500 hours the Reds were in such confusion that they were unable to protect themselves, and began to withdraw from the hill. The number of Red casualties was impossible to estimate but 200 CCF were believed to be killed and 20 others wounded, plus one CCF captured. (See Sketch Map 2.)

At Heartbreak Ridge: The long recessed truce negotiation since late August was brought to life on 24 October. This resumption of the armistice talk at Panmunjom effected another lull on the battlefield at the end of October 1951. Eighth US Army, taking advantage of the respite, had effected transfer of its X US Corps divisions into reserve positions. The 7th US Division thus was first released from the IX US Corps to relieve the 2nd US Division in the X US Corps zone, and was placed at Kapyong. On 6 October the Kagnew Battalion moved to Kapyong, and was put under another hard training for about two weeks until 20 October when the 7th US Division relieved 2nd US Division in the Heartbreak Ridge area.

From the end of October through February 1952, the activity of the Kagnew Battalion on the Heartbreak Ridge was confined to routine patrol and the fortification of bunkers along the forward slope of the front line positions.
Despite this apparent lull in the front, the Ethiopians kept constant alert and sent out frequent patrols, some of which contacted minor enemy force of usually platoon size.

On 19 November 1951, after the period of eight days as regimental reserve at Chipo-ri camps, the Kagnev Battalion relieved the frontal battalion of 31st US Infantry on the position at Nae-dong. The Battalion’s boundary was stretched along the high terrains and was responsible for the eastern sector of the division’s main line of resistance, which was known difficult area to defend because of the land contours and thickly wooded hills. All the more, as it lacked good lookout points, the enemy could approach the line without being detected. During the first few days that the Ethiopians were in this position, the enemy attacked on several occasions in company and platoon strength. The contacts with the Ethiopian fighters during this period convinced the enemy to drop all his intentions of attack. The enemy losses up until 1 December 1951, when the Kagnev went into reserve, totaled 200 killed, 86 POW’s and 40 emplacements destroyed.

At Punchbowl Area: On 27 December 1951, after two months at Heartbreak sector, the Ethiopians moved to Punchbowl along with the elements of the 7th US Division. Punchbowl lay east of the Heartbreak Ridge and 30 kilometers northeast of the Hwachon Reservoir.

The most significant battle of the Kagnev Battalion in the closing days of 1951 was the continuous two day battle when the UNC main line of resistance was attacked by the Red Chinese on 28 and 29 December. On New Year’s Day of 1952, the Ethiopians went into regimental reserve and spent a fortnight at the regiment reserve camps near northwest of Yanggu.

As the 7th US Division was relieved by the 2nd US Division in March 1952, the Kagnev Battalion moved out of the Punchbowl, and moved to Kapyong for another mission that was to come in May.

End of Tour: On 25 March 1952 the 1st Kagnev Battalion completed its tour of service in Korea and, on 27 March, left Kapyong for Pusan, where the Battalion was to embark for home. The first party embarked on the US transport General Macrea and departed for home on 30 March 1952, arriving in the port of Djibouti on 23 April 1952. Meanwhile, the second party left Pusan, Korea, for Ethiopia in June 1952.

2nd Kagnev Battalion
(29 March 1952 – 31 March 1953)

On Line Missouri: On 13 April 1952, arriving in Korea on 29 March 1952,
the 2nd Kagnew Battalion cleared out of Pusan. Arriving at the Training Center in Kapyong, the Battalion was directed into training on coordinated unit maneuver until 2 June, and placed under the 32nd Infantry Regiment, 7th US Division, then was in IX US Corps reserve. Next day, on 3 June, the Ethiopian Battalion was ordered to Haggaly and assigned with the defense line forming a front of four kilometers on Line Missouri about 11 kilometers northeast of Chorwon.

The first enemy contact was made by the 2nd Kagnew Battalion on 6 June when Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue, the Battalion Commander, ordered 1st Company to dispatch night patrol to enemy-held Hill 472. The patrol, composed of 14 men under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Asefa Getahun, started off on its mission at 2030, and proceeded toward objective. However, an estimated Red Chinese platoon which had apparently observed from the departure of the Ethiopian patrol, allowed it to approach closer Hill 472, and then opened fire with automatic weapons.

The Ethiopian patrol was not to be taken completely by surprise. On the contrary, the patrol had discovered the enemy’s presence, and soon as reaching the position, attacked the Reds with hand grenades. The enemy outnumbered the Ethiopians in a counterattack that followed and the struggle took the form of a fierce hand-to-hand fight which lasted for thirty minutes. When the Reds were forced to withdraw, the Ethiopians counted seven enemy dead with no friendly losses. Having accomplished its mission, the patrol returned to its base.

On 25 June, the Kagnew Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion of 32nd US Regiment and moved to the rear as a regimental reserve. During the period in which the Ethiopians were in reserve at Kapyong, they continued their training, while taking part in occasional patrol actions to capture enemy prisoners and to obtain information on enemy defense.

On the night of 3 July, a patrol of 14 men led by 2nd Lieutenant Beniyan Bulbula was ordered to prove enemy positions on Hill 358, 2,000 meters north of friendly MLR. The patrol left the MLR at 2300 hours and arrived at Hill 358 just before midnight. Even though the patrol had taken all necessary precautions, the Reds, on the east side of the hill, had observed the movement and attacked the patrol with a platoon strength. The Ethiopians were forced to pinned down until 0100 hours next morning. By the several Ethiopian fighters succeeded in coming close to the Reds. Lieutenant Bulbula called out his men to attack and pursue the enemy. The men of the patrol dauntlessly attacked the enemy, and after a forty-five minute battle, forced the Red Chinese to run for their lives, leaving behind twenty dead. The results were entirely satisfactory.
At 0400 hours, the Ethiopians returned to their line in jubilation and with their morale soaring high. The casualties of the patrol were two wounded, who had fought heroically up to the last minute.

During the months of July, August, and September 1952, the Kagnew Battalion took part in many excellent patrol activities. On the night of the 24 July, a combat patrol of company strength under Lieutenant Tilaye Wondimagegenahu was ordered to operate against Hill 358 with the aim to inflict damages upon the fortified enemy positions and to capture prisoners. At 2230 hours, the patrol departed and advanced toward the objective. But as the patrol approached Hill 358, it received violent fire from the enemy near-by Hill 472. Lieutenant Tilaye Wondimagegenahu and his men fearlessly advanced and occupied suitable positions, in accordance with a well-prepared plan. The fighting began in earnest and the Ethiopians were gaining ground.

They were nearing the enemy positions and there remained only last push forward. But, just as he shouted the order for the final charge, Lieutenant Tilaye Wondimagegenahu was shot down. Almost at the same time, his sergeant was also killed, leaving the Ethiopian fighters without a leader at this critical moment. But, calm and well-trained as they were, these fighters of the Kagnew Battalion spread out and commenced individual fighting under the instigation of Corporal Berhanou Degagga. Each man of the patrol fought alone, according to his special training. The courageous men of the company, though without strong leadership, fought that night so valiantly that they inflicted unusually heavy casualties upon the enemy. After the bodies of their dead comrades and wounded had been collected, part of the patrol withdrew to a sheltered area in order to avoid the continuing enemy artillery and mortar fire. From there they returned to the MLR of the battalion.

On the other hand, the news of the heroic death of Lieutenant Tilaye Wondimagegenahu was transmitted to the remainder of the Kagnew Battalion. When the report reached the commander of the Kagnew Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue ordered the Operations Officer to dispatch the 2nd Company. When the order was being communicated to Captain Melaku Bakele of the 2nd Company, Colonel Asfaw Andargue specified that the 2nd Company dispatch one squad near the enemy positions to collect the dead and wounded, while the rest of the force cover with its fire the withdrawal of the remainders of the 1st Company.

Men of the 2nd Company moved at 0200 hours, and the relief party led by 2nd Lieutenant Yilma Woldemariam and Debebe Woldemariam reached the point where the fight had taken place, they found the men of the 1st Company
scattered and fighting isolated from one another. They also found six wounded Ethiopians unable to move because of fatal wounds. When the enemy perceived the movement of the relief unit near their positions on Hill 358, they shelled fiercely with artillery and mortar fire against the unit. The Ethiopian fighters approached within 100 yards of the enemy position. It was impossible, however, for them to advance further to reach the bodies of those who had been killed there. This was reported to the commander of the Kagnew Battalion. Thus he conceived a plan to operate a combined infantry and tank attack against the enemy to recover to dead Ethiopian soldiers. His plan was immediately reported to the Commander of the 32nd US Regiment, who gave it a ready consent.

At daybreak, four US tanks with a group of sixteen men of the Ethiopian battalion and nine men of the US mine detection squad, under the command of Lieutenant Duffera Obsa, set out to collect the dead. As the tank cannon covered the advance of the infantry, they approached the area where the bodies were lying. With extreme daring, they collected and transported the dead Ethiopians to the MLR of the Battalion despite the heavy shelling by the enemy. It was 0900 hours when the operation was over, and the tanks and infantry returned to their base. The result of the entire encounter, which lasted about twelve hours, was that four Ethiopians including Lieutenant Tilaye and his sergeant were killed and six wounded. The enemy casualties amounted to 25 known killed, and 40 wounded.

At Iron Triangle: In the second week of October 1952, the Battalion was ordered to defend a strategically vital point on the Kumhwa front, the “Iron Triangle.” The Kagnew Battalion, upon receiving orders, established a defense line in that defense sector, a valley led to the well-known Triangle Hill, which also known as Hill 598, and was vital in that area.

On 14 October, Operation Showdown touched off and bloody battles ensued. But, no contact had been made on the Kagnew line until the night of 23 October.

The attack started after twenty minutes of a well-prepared artillery and mortar fire. A reinforced battalion size of Red Chinese rushed in and attacked the Ethiopian 4th Company with its main effort to capture the valley that was defended by two platoons. The Ethiopian fighters, calm and assured, allowed the Communists to approach as near as one hundred and fifty yards from their positions. They then opened fire with automatic weapons, while the mortars of the battalion and US artillery shelled fiercely in support of the 4th Company, inflicting disastrous damage to the attacking Communist forces. Notwithstanding the heroic defense of the Ethiopians, the human-sea of the Reds continued to flow in with sole aim to break through the valley. In an instant, the situation
became uneasy for the Ethiopians. The Communists had penetrated deep into the valley. Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue, who was personally directing the artillery fire, asked for an artillery barrage on a point twenty-five meters from the positions of Ethiopian fighters. The request astonished the Americans. Seldom was the target of artillery fire less than 70–80 meters from friendly positions. However, the Colonel's request was granted and the barrage of friendly artillery began to pound on the Reds.

By that moment, 2nd Company launched a counterattack against the enemy from the flank, and the remnants of the 4th Company joined the counterattack by making frontal attack against the Reds, forcing the enemy to give up his penetration effort and retreat.

Victory and glory crowned once more the honoured weapons of Ethiopians. The fighters of the 2nd Kagnaw Battalion demonstrated fully their gallant deeds in those battles, and proved that they were worthy successors of the 1st Kagnaw Battalion.

On 30 October, following heavy artillery preparations, estimated two battalions of Reds came back to repeat their efforts to break through the line of the Kagnaw Battalion. The main effort of the enemy was directed toward the 2nd Company, the outpost of which fought a hand-to-hand battle. The legendary bayonets of the Ethiopians, again, worked its miracle. After this wild struggle, which had lasted about four hours, the Ethiopian fighters proclaimed themselves invincible against numerically superior enemy forces.

Next day, on 1 November, estimated two battalions of Red Chinese came back and repeated their effort to breakthrough the Ethiopian positions held by the 2nd Company. Before the attack, the enemy shelled the Kagnaw MLR for eight hours from 1400 through 2200. About an hour later, at 2300 hours, the Red assault began in successive waves. While the Ethiopian defenders of 2nd Company were trying to drive off the enemy, the 1st Company reinforced by another company size of strength was throw in for diversionary attacks. Throughout the night the Reds made three successive assaults, but in vain. The heroic men of the Kagnaw Battalion were again successful in defending their positions against the Red attacks.

After the bitter fighting of October and early November 1952, the approach of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the scale of operations at the front. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves, and the action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols and small unit skirmishes as the weather permitted. The Ethiopian Battalion had been no exception. It dispatched patrols and raid teams with an identical mission of capturing prisoners and destroying
Operations

fortified positions.

End of Tour: On 14 November, as the 7th US Division was relieved by the 25th US Division, the Ethiopians were pulled out of the Triangle Hill positions and moved back to Kapyong reserve camps. In closing days of 1952 7th US Division and the Kagnew Battalion moved into 1 US Corps area on the western sector to relieve the 2nd US Division. The Ethiopians were on the line through the months of January and February 1953, with a customary routine break of a fortnight at Yonchon, and, in March, they were dislocated from the line.

Next month, in April 1953, the 2nd Kagnew Battalion left Pusan for home, leaving all to its worthy successor, the 3rd Kagnew Battalion.

3rd Kagnew battalion
(16 April – 30 July 1953)

At Yoke-Uncle Hill: Within seventy-two hours, after arriving in the port of Pusan on 16 April 1953, the 3rd Kagnew Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta was ready to move to front. On 20 April, the Ethiopian fighters arrived in Chorwon, and remained in that area until 10 May for the training in the use of new-type US weapons which are unfamiliar to them.

On 10 May the Ethiopians moved to the front line and relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment at Yoke-Ucle positions in the vicinity of the “Iron Triangle.” The ridge rose about 300 meters above the valley floor, forward of which approximately 750 meters were the outpost hillocks, Yoke and Uncle. The Yoke was just large enough to accommodate a platoon. As with a hundred other such small hill positions forward of the Eighth Army’s main line, the twofold objective in garrisoning Yoke was to parry any attack to lure the enemy into the open where he could be blasted by the markedly superior UN artillery.

On the first night of its establishment on the front line, the Kagnew Battalion was attacked by the enemy. The Red assault had been organized on a scale of a reinforced company, aiming to take the adversary by surprise, and to inflict upon the Ethiopians as many casualties as possible. But the commander of the Kagnew Battalion was prepared for any eventuality. When it became dark, he placed an ambush in front of the MLR of the battalion. The enemy, not expecting to meet an Ethiopian ambush, were stunned. With the first burst of fire from the Ethiopian fighters, the Reds dispersed, and returned to their lines in disorder. That was the first contact of the fighters of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion.
For the purpose of securing the control of No-Man's-Land, that is, the area between the MLR of Kagnew Battalion and the Communists, the battalion commander had planned dispatch of patrols, which would operate in this buffer zone to prohibit enemy movement in the area. The first patrol of the Kagnew Battalion went into action on 13 May, which was typical enough to deserve a full description. It was a combat patrol, consisting of 22 men led by 2nd Lieutenant Wonogells Kosta of the 2nd Company. With the mission to proceed to the Alligator Jaws, the patrol departed the company line at exactly 2000 hours. In less than a half hour, in dark and over rough country, it had progressed as far as average infantry would go in twice the time. By 2028 hours the Ethiopians had arrived at the tip of the Alligator Jaws and they had already set up their weapons and were ready to fight.

The ridges which bound the Yokkok-chon Valley are exceptionally rugged and deeply eroded. From 2nd Company's position on the big ridge to the patrol's
rendezvous at the extreme end of the forked, low-lying ridge called Alligator Jaw was 2,000 air meters. (See Sketch Map 3.)

Where they had decided to rig their intended deadfall, the upper end of the Alligator Jaws tapered down to the valley floor. An irrigation ditch looped around this extreme finger-like projection of the ridge. Atop the finger, approximately 100 meters from the ditch, and rising not more than 100 meters above the valley floor, was a last knob, shaped like a camel's hump, with space enough to seat at least half the patrol.

Assault group under Corporal Raffi Degene was put on the high ground. Nine armed with M-1’s, one with a carbine. All carried four handgrenades apiece. They sought rock cover and did not dig in. Meanwhile, the supporting party was led to the ditch, a dirt-banked structure raised a foot or so above the flat confronting it. The ditch turned sharply at the point where the seven men of the party were gathered. The weapons available to hold the ditch were three M-1’s, two BAR’s, two carbines, and forty hand grenades. They were split in two wings, so that three men faced north on the right of the turn and four men faced west to left of it. Besides, one BAR man, Corporal Tiggu Waldetekle, was left in direct charge of the support. Taking along his runner and the two aid men, the patrol leader then moved upside to a point halfway between assault and support. He was connected with both parties by phone and with higher level by phone and radio.

Until exactly 0300 of next morning, the hill was absolutely quiet. The men had been on position six hours and 32 minutes. But the Ethiopian fighters were awake and watchful. At fifteen-minutes intervals, each junior leader made his rounds, crawling from man to man and pressing the man’s hand. The man pressed twice in response. It was their way of assuring an alerted unity.

As Corporal Waldetekle slid back into his position with the support group, he saw the men on the left, pointing vigorously out into the enveloping darkness with their rifles. He moved to them. Then he could see a figure in clear silhouette standing not more than 20 meters beyond the ditch. He hurriedly backtracked along the ditch, then crawled to Lieutenant Wonogells Costa, saying nothing, but pointed with his rifle as his men had done. The Lieutenant sent his runner uphill to give the same signal to Corporal Degene and his men. The alert had been carried out quietly. All weapons were now pointed in the direction where the one Red Chinese had been seen. Lieutenant Wonogells Costa was confident that his own presence and preparations had not been detected.

 Corporal Waldetekle crawled back to the Lieutenant again, gesturing more vigorously with the rifle. It was the sign that he had seen several other Reds
moving along the same axis. To Lieutenant Costa’s left, a shallow gully ran unevenly toward the ditch. He signaled his runner to unpin a grenade, crawl down the gully and bomb into the enemy group. Private Tilahullninguse, the runner, was 13 meters uphill from the nearest enemy when he lost his throw. As the grenade exploded, by its light, the patrol leader could see about twenty of the enemy.

As the scene went dark again, the Reds opened fire against the ditch with rifles, grenades, and submachine guns. Not more than five seconds elapsed between the explosion and the answering volley before Lieutenant Costa had time to shout an order, and the left wing of the support group had joined the fight with full blast of their rifles and BAR’s.

The opposing lines were just a little less than 13 meters apart. At that range, as the shooting began, the odds were four riflemen against twenty. Only Corporal Waldektekle’s left wing was free to trade fire with the enemy. His right flank weapons were interdicted by the turn in the ditch. From its position on the knob, the assault group could not bring weapons to bear on the Reds without risking the four Ethiopians who were fighting. These things weighed on the Lieutenant for the first few seconds while watching the fire flash.

He made his decision and ordered assault group through sound-powered phone not to fire or move. Then he turned to his runner and two aid men, and signaled them to follow him. On hands and knees, he moved down the gully which cut through Waldektekle’s position, stopping every few feet to fire his carbine. The three men behind him did the same.

The ditch, which was running about one foot of water, was deep enough to provide full body cover for the line of riflemen. But to fire, a man had to come head and shoulder above the embankment, and the Waldektekle’s men and chosen to face it, though bullets beat like hail against the bank. A grenade sailed in, bounced off the bank and exploded as it struck just above Corporal Waldektekle’s elbow. His right arm was completely blown off just below the shoulder socket. He uttered neither cry nor groan. The others did not know he was hurt until with his left hand he passed the BAR to private Yukonsi, saying, “Fire, and keep it low.” Private Yukonsi triggered the weapon for only a few seconds. Then a burp gun burst hit him in the left arm, shredding it from wrist to shoulder. The BAR was still in working order. Yukonsi handed it to Private Tilahulllinguse without a word, then collapsed in the ditch unconscious from loss of blood.

Yelling to the two aid men to take over the grenading, Lieutenant Costa propped against the ditch bank and let go with the carbine, firing full automatic. The point-blank exchange continued for another fifteen minutes. Once all five
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weapons were brought to bear in volume, the enemy fire ranged increasingly
higher, and there were no more casualties in the ditch. A messenger from the
assault group came crawling down the gully. The Battalion Commander, Colonel
Wolde Yohannis, was asking, "Shall I send help?"

Lieutenant replied, "Tell him no. Tell him I can hold this field with my
own men." The messenger left and he resumed fire. Action was temporarily
suspended when Lieutenant Costa yelled to his men, "Hold fire. There is nothing
coming back." It was true that either the enemy had been wholly destroyed or
its remnant had been driven off. There was no firing from the Reds.

By radio Lieutenant Costa called for illuminating fire over the position.
Within the next minute he got four rounds. They lighted the hill and the
ditch bright as day. As light came on, the Ethiopian fighters, deployed in
skirmish order, advanced up the nose of the ridge. The line of approximately
fifty men was in that second still upright and marching straight toward the
assault group. In the next second, the line had gone flat, thereby foiling the
lights. The Reds were still about 90 meters short of the position on the knob.

From his post in the ditch, Lieutenant Costa radioed to the artillery for
VT fire. He got his barrage in exactly thirty second and the shells came in as
he directed. He could see the rounds exploding into the enemy line and he
could hear the outcries of the wounded. In less than one minutes the enemy
formation was broken. Some of the Reds ran for the base of the hill. Others
ran forward looking for a hole or a rock.

There had been no letup in the barraging of the nose of the ridge. Lieutenant
Costa simply had it shifted forward a short space to choke off the Red escape.
The patrol merely continued to hold ground, neither shifting its positions nor
firing a shot. Unassisted, the artillery broke the back of Red attack.

At 0430 hours the patrol was ordered to withdraw and it returned to its
company lines at 0535 hours. They counted 22 enemy dead and two badly
wounded prisoners had been taken. They were confident that with the help of
the artillery, they had wounded as many more Reds.

On 14 May another Ethiopian ambush patrol of 21 men was engaged by an
eeny platoon in the No-Man's Land. The patrol leader, Lieutenant Fasika,
oberved the enemy platoon approaching the ambush positions. He allowed the
Reds to approach within a few meters and then ordered his men to hurl their
hand grenades. As a fierce close battle ensued, the Reds were completely taken
aback. At the same time, Lieutenant Fasika called for division artillery fire and
was rendered at once. The casualties of the Reds that night amounted to 8
killed, and about 20 wounded. The Ethiopian ambush suffered one wounded.
During the period in this area, the Ethiopians executed total seventy-one night patrols, and repulsed successfully numerous enemy attacks. Having remained approximately three months on the front line, the Kagnew Battalion was relieved on 1st July and ordered to regimental reserve camps at Yonchon.

**Ending the Fighting:** The 3rd Kagnew Battalion returned to the front line on 8 July, this time, near Porkchop area. However, except for a few minor patrol contacts and the operational moves arising from reliefs in the line, there was little else to record of the battalion. Then, at last, on 27 July the armistice was signed.

The armistice found the Ethiopian Battalion near Porkchop Hill. At 2200 hours, 27 July the guns and mortars which had so long pulverized the Korean soil fell silent. The Kagnew Battalion, in common with the other UNC units in Korea, had to complete withdrawal to positions south of the Demilitarized Zone by 2200 hours on 30 July.

The Ethiopian troops continued to participate in a UNC presence in Korea in gradually diminishing strength until the last unit embarked for home on 3 January 1965.

### 3. Reference Records and Data

**a. Ethiopian Force in Korea**

1. Duration of service ........... 7 May 1951 – 3 January 1965
2. Size of force ................. One infantry battalion
3. Total number of personnel ... 3,518 (exclusive of noncombat personnel)
4. Casualties as of 27 July 1953
   - Killed in action 121
   - Wounded in action 536
   - Total 657

**b. Honors and Awards**

1. **Republic of Korea decorations**

   - Ulchi Col. Kebbede Guebre 15 Jul 1952
   - Ulchi Lt. Col. Aslaw Andargue 20 Mar 1953
   - Ulchi Lt. Col. Wolde Yohannis Shitta 14 Oct 1953
   - Ulchi Lt. Col. Teshome Irgetu 23 Feb 1954
Reference Records and Data

Hwarang with Silver Star
2nd Lt. Aseffa Getahun 5 Dec 1952
Hwarang without Star
2nd Lt. Wolde H. Mamo 2 Nov 1953
Hwarang without Star
2nd Lt. Asfaw Zenebe 2 Nov 1953

(2) U.S. decorations

Silver Star Capt. Tefera Waldetensye
Bronze Star 2nd Lt. Abeba Kassahun
Bronze Star 2nd Lt. Gebresus Mickael
Bronze Star Sergeant Molla Kebebe
Bronze Star Private Gifar Fitalla
Bronze Star Capt Tefera Waldetensye
Bronze Star 1st Lt. Desta Gemeda
Bronze Star Private Negga Tessema
Bronze Star Capt Meshehe Assefa
Bronze Star 1st Lt. Tariku Berhanu
Bronze Star Private Hailemarial Isheta
Bronze Star Capt Negatu Wandemu
Bronze Star Capt Merid Gizaw
Bronze Star Private Kasaye Wolde
Bronze Star Private Bayesa Kenate
Bronze Star Private Meshehe Haile
Bronze Star Capt Tamrat Tessema
Legion of Merit Lt. Col. Teshome Irgetu
Legion of Merit Lt. Col. Asfaw Andargue

C. Commanding Officers

Commander of the Ethiopian Force in Korea
Colonel Kebbede Guebre

Battalion Commanders

Lt. Colonel Teshome Irgetu 7 May 1951 – 30 Mar 1952
Lt. Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta 16 Apr 1953 – 30 Jul 1953
### Company Commanders

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THE FRENCH FORCE

1. Introduction

As a stalwart supporter of the United Nations effort in support of the Republic of Korea in its war against the Communist invaders, French Government sent the frigate "La Grandiere" on 22 July 1950 and by the end of November 1950 one infantry battalion was in Korean soil and operational.

The French Battalion was attached to the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Division, and participated in various battles such as those in Wonju, Twin Tunnels, Chipyong-ni, Heartbreak Ridge, T-Bone Hill, Arrowhead Ridge, and Chungga-san areas. From the outset the French Battalion was flung into action and was to

French Battalion, after returning home, parades triumphantly at Champs-Elysees.
lead mass attacks against the Red hordes swarming from the north.

Contributions of French Forces to the Korean War

Duration of Participation:
Army: 29 November 1950 – 6 November 1953
Navy: 22 July 1950 – Not available

Size of Forces: Army; One infantry battalion
Navy; Frigate . . . . . 1

Number of Participants:
Army: 3,421
Navy: Not available

Casualties:
KIA WIA MIA *POW Total
Army: 262 1,008 7 12 1,289
Navy: Not available

* All POWs are returned after the armistice was signed.

TRACES OF THE FRENCH BATTALION (29 Nov 1950–6 Nov 1953)
2. Ground Force

Operations in 1950

The French Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar, a veteran of the Foreign Legion who had willingly given up his three-star rank of "General de Corps d’Armee" to command the battalion in Korea, disembarked at the port of Pusan on 29 November 1950 and headed northward to reach at the United Nations Reception Center in Taegu on that same day.

On 10 December 1950, after a brief spell of times in Taegu, the Battalion was ordered to move to Suwon, and attached to 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Division on 11 December 1950. However, as the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) were at UNC forces’ heels in a swarm, the 2nd US Division with French Battalion attached moved out of Suwon and headed southeast to Chungju on 21 December. There, the French Battalion took up new positions near Muksok-dong and began to send feeler patrols northward to locate the enemy and establish contact until 25 December when the French Battalion was ordered to occupy the positions along the road leading to Wonju and block the enemy advance.

It was imminent then that the CCF would take an all-out offensive toward Wonju area. To cope with the growing threat of the CCF mass attack, the French Battalion was assigned to cover the withdrawal route of the friendly forces in and around Wonju area and by 29 December the battalion had moved into the northern part of Wonju.

Operations in 1951

Battles in Wonju area: In early January 1951 the French Battalion played a decisive part in the battles at Wonju area during the January offensive of the Red Chinese forces, and helped the UNC ground forces to start rolling northward once again.

Following an enemy force of more than 10,000 troops surged toward the line between Wonju and Chechon on 6 January, three Communist divisions began hitting at Wonju from southeast on January, while another Red NK division drove down the main supply route from Hongchon. Furthermore, unidentified Red Chinese forces launched their attacks from the west on the stout defenses
of the 23rd and 38th Regiments of the 2nd US Division. Thereupon intense fighting raged all day of the 7th and by midnight an enemy force had succeeded in infiltrating the lines of 23rd Regiment and entering Wonju. The two regiments made slight withdrawal on division order, but halted on the high ground south and east of Wonju and prepared to stand.

Early morning of 8 January, orders came from the X US Corps that Wonju must be retaken. The French Battalion and the 23rd and 38th US Regiments were to hold the defensive positions on the high ground south of Wonju while a battalion of the 23rd Regiment was to attack and clear Wonju and secure the airstrip on the southern edge. However, enemy reinforcements poured against both flanks of the attacking battalion and it was forced to withdraw to its former positions.

The following day, 9 January, another attempt by the 23rd Regiment to clear Wonju met second failure. On 10 of January thousands of enemy troops swarmed southward from Wonju and began to attack the defenses of the 23rd and 38th US Regiments. There soon ensued the heavy and see-sawed battles during which the French Battalion repulsed four successive enemy attacks to envelope its positions. In the end, Hill 247, an enemy infested hill mass, was taken by the French Battalion only after the French troops fixed bayonets and cut their way to the top.

By the 23 January, after a stiff battle, the 2nd US Division retook Wonju and the enemy had abandoned its stubborn offensive in the central front.

The Battle of Twin Tunnels: At that time, the Commanding General of the X US Corps directed the 2nd US Division to send a reconnaissance patrol northward to the vicinity of two railroad tunnels, approximately eight kilometers south of Chipyong-ni.

On 29 January, a planned patrol from the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment was sent out to the Twin Tunnels area. Upon nearing the area, however, the friendly patrol was ambushed by estimated two battalions of enemy and a call for aid was sent back. Next day, 30 January, orders went out to the French and 3rd Battalions to move up to an assembly area, six kilometers south of the tunnels to counter the developing enemy threat.

The French Battalion in line with the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry took the lead northward toward the Twin Tunnels area. Reaching the rim of Hill 543 (Korean-san) by late hours of 31 January, the Frenches took up defensive positions on Hills 279 and 459 near a village, called Kudun, and also threw up a tight perimeter astride of the road leading to Chipyong-ni. The French Battalion Commander placed the 3rd Company in a perimeter that lay across the railroad
facing northwest of Hill 279, with right flank bent northeastward to face Chipyong-ni, and 2nd Company in the Muwang-ni Valley ranging from the southern rim of Hill 279 to the valley itself. The 1st Company was placed on Hill 453, one and a half kilometers northeast of Hill 543. To the north and east side of the French Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment put its companies around the hills to Kudun from Chowang-kil. (See Sketch Map 2.)

Upon taking over the position the companies dug in and operated patrols to the encompassing high ground. Early in the morning of 1 February, enemy guns, mortars and small-arms broke the silence of the frosty night and the defense perimeter began to blaze with fire. The French Battalion came under enemy surprise from both north and south, and the Red Chinese kept maneuvering around the French perimeter to break through the line. However, the French defenders stubbornly refused to give away the high ground. The French Battalion immediately launched counterattack to succeed in halting the wave of the enemy and the enemy withdrew at first light. However, soon a strong enemy column from three sides burst into the French positions. As the enemy skirmishers crawled up at the battalion positions the hill slopes flamed and roared with sounds of firing. In this wild engagement Lieutenant Nicolai of the 3rd Company was killed. A 57-mm. Recoiless Rifle crew of the 2nd Company knocked down twenty-three of enemy with five bursts of fire. The machine gunners of Headquarters Company successfully defended the battalion command post from enemy penetration by directing baptism of fire against the enemy. It was during this combat that the Headquarters Company Commander, Captain Le Maitre, mortally hit by an enemy bullet.

Meanwhile, Major Barthelemy and Captain Serre, of the 3rd Company Commander were badly wounded and remained in their positions fighting. The ammunition was getting scarce and the officers kept cautioning their men to use it sparingly. The 3rd Company was completely surrounded by the enemy and was in bad need of supplies. The Assistant Commander of the 2nd US Division immediately reported to his Division Commander and requested an air strike and an air drop of supplies to the encircled companies.

The first help for the surrounded members of the French Battalion came in an hour. Major Beaufond with a platoon of ROK Army led by Lieutenant Ko Jai Pil had arrived, and soon a friendly plane appeared above the companies. The men watched as it circled above them and they screamed with delight when the first fighter plane appeared. The first plane fired machine-guns and threw rockets down. The second plane carried napalm bomb that burst into orange blossoms of flame among the enemy positions. Immediately following the air strikes six
cargo planes appeared and dropped bandoleers of rifle ammunition, cases of machine-gun ammunition and other supplies. Except for some of supplies, all of those fell on the perimeter. As the air strikes were over the fire fight had flared up again, and the enemy crawled up close to the perimeter and filched some air-dropped supplies. The French defenders stood firm and directed all the weapons available against the Red attackers. The enemy who was also in complete exhaustion finally had given up its offensive and began to withdraw. Thus, the gallant French Battalion had maintained its positions intact, and these positions could cover the grounds vital to the defense of the regimental perimeter. The French cost was high; 27 killed, 97 wounded and three missing.

Lieutenant Colonel Monclar's outstanding leadership during this action led
the battalion to the awards of the US Presidential Unit Citation and the Unit Citation of the French Army for the first time.

At the Chipyong-ni Perimeter: After the Twin Tunnels Battle, the French Battalion, together with the 23rd US Regiment proceeded on the afternoon of 3 February to the town of Chipyong-ni and set up an all-around defense.

The French Battalion Commander placed all three of his rifle companies on the forward positions to cover the assigned sector of two kilometers long from the southern rim of Hill 106 to the northern area of Yongmal which was in the western plane of Chipyong-ni. The rifle companies dug in across a section of frozen paddies, and on the other side of the valley that lay across a series of low hills. They emplaced machine guns, registered mortars, sowed mines, and operated daily patrols to the encompassing high ground.

While the French Battalion built up its defenses, a brief Eighth US Army offensive got under way on 5 February, and the X US Corps on the central front advanced toward Hongchon in an attempt to make a double envelopment of the area. The attack moved slowly until the night of 11 February when the Reds launched a counteroffensive. The vigorous enemy offensive drove the UNC forces' advance into a withdrawal that rolled the front lines south between eight and 35 kilometers, and Chipyong-ni became a conspicuous bulge on the left of the X US Corps front.

At the French perimeter, the usual patrols for the daylight hours of 13 February reported increased enemy activity crowding close to Chipyong-ni, and also the observation plane reported enemy groups moving toward the perimeter.

The early part of the evening was quiet. However, the men had to stay awake in their foxholes. The French Battalion was required to be on a fifty percent alert at all times, which meant that one man in each foxhole had to be awake while the other slept. It was about 2200 hours of 13 February when the first firing broke out all along the Seoul—Wonju axis simultaneously. The enemy crawled up along the spur of ground that led to the French Battalion. However, no close action developed until about 0200 hours on 14 February when a platoon-size of enemy made an attack against the French Battalion just to the right of the machine gun outpost. The Red Chinese swarmed up the small hill which French defenders occupied, and launched attack, blowing whistless and bugles. When this noise started, the French soldiers began cranking a hand siren they had, and one squad started running toward the Reds, yelling and throwing grenades. When the two forces were within ten meters of each other the Red Chinese suddenly turned and ran in the opposite direction. It was all over within a
minute. After this incident it was relatively quiet in the area.

While the entire perimeter of Chipyong-ni was under pressure, the main Red Chinese blow fell against the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment. The Reds tried to come through the soft belly of the regiment, and the Americans resisted stubbornly all day during 15 February, and the pushing back and forth continued until 1800 hours when the Task Force Crombez of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment entered into Chipyong-ni and blunted the Red offensive.

The gallant stand of the French Battalion at Chipyong-ni was later recognized by the ROK and US Governments with the awards of the Presidential Unit Citations and also won the Citation Francaise a l’ordre de L’arme.

Across the Parallel: After the Chipyong-ni battle the French Battalion, together with the 23rd US Regiment, moved to the southern portion of Wonju on 18 February 1951. Four days later, on 22 February, the French Battalion reached an assembly area and went into the division’s reserve at Chechon for reorganization.

Moving out of Chechon on 2 March, the French Battalion began to advance northward and joined the 23rd Regiment near Hoengsong on 7 March, and the advance continued until the last day of March toward Hongchon. Assembling in the vicinity of Hongchon on 1 April, the battalion moved into the city of Chuncheon on 3 April. Next day, the French Battalion along with the battalions of the 23rd Regiment relieved the elements of the 5th US Marines at Sugu-dong area and began to advance along the road of Chuncheon—Yanggu toward Hill 1198 (Samyong-san), dominated southern portion of the Hwachon Reservoir. Advancing up the eastern route of Sugu-dong—Oum-ni, the French Battalion crossed the 38th Parallel for the first time on 5 April and reached Oum-ni on 8 April. There the battalion reinforced by the Ranger Company and the Reconnaissance Company of the 2nd US Division occupied hills between Yuchon and Hill 1198, southwest of Yanggu, and took the eastern area of Suri-bong, without enemy resistance, where the battalion remained for the next ten days sending patrols in conjunction with the 23rd US Regiment.

CCF Spring Offensive (22 April – 22 May 1951): Toward the end of April, the Red forces launched an offensive against the entire UNC line. When the Red attack began on 22 April 1951 Chinese Communist forces concentrated on the west half of the line, aiming the heavy punch at Seoul. The Red North Korean attacks on the east end of the front were only scant efforts and small advances.

The offensive opened in the mountains of central front and, spread, by daybreak, across the whole front. Moving in almost at arm’s length behind the
artillery barrage and hurling grenades without regard to losses, the great number of enemy foot soldiers infiltrated friendly positions, and, under orders, units of Eighth US Army began falling back.

The 2nd US Division was occupying the area of north and south of Yanggu. The French Battalion was on the important Wolmyong-bong area since it guarded the crossing site of the Hwachon Reservoir, west of Yanggu, while the other battalions of the 23rd US Regiment were on the ridges overlooking the important Yanggu—Chunchon road. In the meantime, to cover the western flank of the division, the Task Force Zebra was organized on 24 April. It was composed of the French Battalion, elements of the 72nd US Tank Battalion, one reconnaissance company and one ranger company of the division. On 26 April the 23rd US Regiment and the Task Force Zebra were ordered to protect the axis of Yanggu—Chunchon and, by the evening, the Task Force Zebra positioned on the saddle of Hill 663, one kilometer north of Chujon-ni.

The Task Force Zebra began to withdraw on an axis parallel to the other friendly forces and it relieved the 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division in positions at the Chaun-ni area, some 30 kilometers south of Yanggu. Here the French Battalion as the component of Task Force Zebra was ordered to block possible enemy penetrations down the Yanggu—Hongchon axis. However, on completion of the withdrawal, the enemy offensive had ended and the withdrawal of Eighth US Army had stopped. The French Battalion mined and wired its positions against a possible resumption of the Red offensive and, sent tank-infantry patrols to probe north and northeast without making serious contact until 12 May when it was relieved in positions by the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment and moved south, to an area north of the village of Hangye as a division reserve.

When the Red second spring-offensive began on 17 May and increasing pressure was placed on the 2nd US Division along the crest of a great rugged hill mass separating two rivers – Hongchon and Soyang, the French Battalion was ordered back to Chaun-ni, some 10 kilometers north of Hangye, for the mission to clear the penetrated enemy in the Sonpyong Valley.

The gallant French attackers supported by a US tank squad progressed into the valley and began to beat off the swirling Red attackers, holding its precious high ground. But the sheer weight of numbers was the decisive factor. The Red Chinese invaders outnumbered the French attackers holding the gaps. On the afternoon of 18 May the French Battalion was ordered to pull to south of Hangye in the loop of Hongchon River. The situation, however, was changed completely favorable to the friendly forces by the 21 May and, when daylight of the 22nd
came, the enemy abruptly broke off their attack and disappeared. On that day, being relieved by the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team, the 23rd Regiment and French Battalion moved to an assembly area, approximately three kilometers east of Hongchon.

At the Heartbreak Ridge (Hill 931) Area: On 23 June 1951, after the miserable defeat of Red spring offensive, the Communists suggested armistice talks in Korea, and on 10 July the official representatives of the opposing supreme commanders met at Kaesong for the first session of the military armistice conference. Soon as the truce talks started the Communist delegates began to stall by keeping harps on endless and pointless argument.

Meanwhile, being in Corps reserve at Inje since 27 June, the French Battalion underwent the field training designed to harden the troops and practice in the new tactics until 15 July when it departed Inje for taking over the new positions from the elements of 5th US Marine Regiment at Hudong-ni area of Inje. During the period of July to the end of August, except for the frequent patrol clashes, the activities were mainly confined to strengthening the defenses, improving communications.

In the central-east sector held by the X US Corps, the 36th Regiment of 5th ROK Division was first ordered to attack Taeu-san (Hill 1178 or Hill 1179 on new map) and Bloody Ridge (Hill 983) on 17 August, and the ROK attackers captured the hills after a four-day battle. However, on the night of 27–28 August, as the Red’s counterattacks began against the ROK elements holding the Bloody Ridge, the 23rd US Regiment with the French Battalion attached was committed to envelop the ridge from both of east flank and rear. The Red North Koreans, weakened by heavy losses, had finally give in and withdrew, leaving substantial stores of supplies. Acting swiftly, the Eighth US Army ordered X US Corps to take the ridge just north of the Bloody Ridge, taking advantages of the fact that immediate thrusts would keep the enemy off balance and would gain the new ridge before the Communists had a chance to cover. Thus the task of taking the peaks north of Bloody Ridge fell on to the 2nd US Division, and the fighting reached a bitter climax when the elements of 2nd US Division, with the French Battalion attached, pushed farther northward to struggle for and win key high ground known as Heartbreak Ridge.

Beginning on 13 September, this bitter operation had lasted until the daybreak of 13 October, when the elements of French Battalion made a final assault and secured the peak of Heartbreak Ridge. The cost of the long battles was also high. The French Battalion had suffered 260 casualties; 200 wounded, 60 killed including Captain Goupil, a legendary hero of the French Battalion.
Being relieved on the Heartbreak Ridge by the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division on 22 October, the French Battalion, together with the elements of the 2nd US Division, proceeded to a bivouac area near Kapyong and went into a reserve period.

Training and equipping for the approaching winter became the order of the day in the battalion. Meanwhile, on 6 December 1951, Lieutenant Colonel Monclar departed for France after passing over his command to Lieutenant Colonel Borreil. He was presented with U.S. Legion of Merit by the Eighth US Army Commander, General Van Fleet, in recognition of his outstanding leadership in the battle field.

Operations in 1952

At the Iron Triangle Area: As training progressed into December 1952, the expected order to move back on line appeared. The massive relief of the 25th US Division, north of Kumhwa on the central front was completed and the 2nd US Division assumed control on 20 December 1951. The new sector thus occupied was located in the eastern part of the former Communist stronghold known as the Iron Triangle, marked by the cities of Chorwon on the west, Pyonggang on the north and Kumhwa on the east.

The French Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of the 27th US Regiment on the positions at Wasu-ri, approximately ten kilometers northeast of Chipo-ri on 18 December 1951, while the 23rd Regiment placed its battalions on the Ugodong-Paejae line, about ten kilometers north of the French Battalion positions.

Though the situation through the early months of 1952 was relatively static when compared with the war up to that time, the defense carried out by the French Battalion was an active one. Extensive reconnaissance by ground patrols was conducted until 29 January 1952 when it was relieved by the Thailand Battalion and moved to the rear assembly area of Sunbawi, eight kilometers north of Chipo-ri.

The period at the reserve area was short lived. In mid-February 1952, the French Battalion moved again forward and took up the positions on the ridges overlooking the Chorwon-Kumhwa railroad that ran across the plain in front of the battalion positions. It occupied bunkers and foxholes covering the frontage of approximately two kilometers. The Battalion established two patrol bases about three kilometers north of the main positions.

As the defense positions were drawn tighter, enemy groups of five to ten were often met, but only light opposition developed. The French elements continued
to try to make contact with the enemy through patrols and raids, but in vain, until the battalion was relieved in the positions on 18 March by the 1st Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment and pulled back to the Sunbawi area again.

Returning to the front on 8 April, the French Battalion relieved the elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry and the Netherlands Battalion on the line. Eversince the battalion resumed its patrol missions vigorously in conformity with orders laid by the regiment for three weeks until 28 April when it was relieved by the elements of the 7th US Division.

On 28 April the battalion was in the familiar training site, Chukwon-ni, some seven kilometers northeast of Kapyong. Taking part in another period in Corps reserve, strenuous programs, interspersed with recreation and organized athletics, occupied the time of the battalion through May, June and early July. As the summer days grew hotter, the battalion put finishing touches on training and prepared to return to the front west of Chorwon.

At T-Bone Hill Area: The French Battalion, after some eleven weeks in reserve, moved into the line on 17 July and had completed its relief of the elements of 179th Infantry of the 45th US Division on Line Jamestown by 18 July 1952.

When the Battalion returned to the front, it saw an important changes in the enemy tactics.

The enemy increased the volume of its harassing fire on the friendly line and supported its raiding activities by powerful concentrations of mortar and artillery fire.

On 18th July a company of Red Chinese, taking advantage of the relief, mounted a strong probing attack against the outpost positions of the French Battalion. Through quick reinforcement of the outpost, the French defenders repelled the enemy assault at early hours next day.

In the meantime, on the night of 17–18 July, a reinforced battalion of
Red Chinese made an assault on Hill 275 (Old Baldy) of 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment. In the next four days the hill changed hands a number of times. A five-day siege of heavy rain beginning on 26 July hindered operations for both sides and permitted the 23rd US Regiment to prepare for its next counter-attack. It came on the night of 31 July when the 1st Battalion moved up with a double envelopment which successfully seized Old Baldy and put the 23rd Infantry there to stay.

Meanwhile the Red Chinese had also committed a battalion in the outposts held by the elements of the French Battalion on the T-Bone Ridge and another finger to the east on 24 and 28 July. The gallant French defenders beat off every effort of the Communists without loss of any of the outposts.

For the first three weeks of August 1952, men of the French Battalion worked day and night on their positions in spite of the red harassing fire and torrential rains. The battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry on 19 August and moved to a reserve area, approximately four kilometers southeast of Yonchon.

The Battle of Arrowhead Ridge (Hill 281): In mid-September 1952 the 23rd US Regiment had relieved the 9th US Infantry in the right sector, and its attached French Battalion completed its movement into a regimental reserve area on 20 September. On 3 October the French Battalion was ordered to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment on the extreme right sector of the 2nd US Division.

Indications were that the Communists might be preparing to strike in that zone. This belief was borne out by a great increase of incoming shells and in sightings of enemy movement during the first few days of October. A Red Chinese officer deserter picked up in the area disclosed that a big attack would probably take place soon against Arrowhead (Hill 281) and Hill 395 (White Horse Hill), which was three and half kilometers northeast of Hill 281, held by elements of the adjacent 9th ROK Division.

The companies of the French Battalion were deployed with the 1st Company to the right around Hill 281, the 2nd Company to the extreme left portion of the battalion on Hill 289 and northward, and the 3rd Company in the center and on the right slope of Hill 281 respectively. The pioneers were deployed on the small features some 300 to 500 meters north of the 1st Company.

Just before the Red Chinese began their offensive on 6 October, they opened the floodgates of Pongnae-ko Reservoir, which was located about 12 kilometers north of the friendly positions, evidently in their hope that Yokkok-chon which ran between the 9th ROK Division and the French Battalion would rise
sufficiently enough to block reinforcements of the UNC troops when the situation developed critical.

Arrowhead Ridge was receiving heavy fire from all types of enemy weapons; 200 rounds on 3 October and 600 rounds on the 5th. The preparatory fires received there on 6 October were beyond anything the French Battalion had known in its previous considerable military experience. This relentless pounding was taking its toll of lives on Arrowhead. A US forward observer was killed and Lieutenant Liron, the French company commander was gravely wounded.

Effective at 1845 hours on 6 October, the Red Chinese began to move in on the pioneer positions. The Red Chinese struck, almost precisely as intelligence had forecasted, against White Horse Hill and Arrowhead.

Bursting shells, tracers, and illuminating rounds lit up the night and threw grotesque shadows across the nightmare scene. By 1917 hours the outposts held by the men of 2nd Company were hit by the strong enemy force and forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, from the main forward trenches on Arrowhead the officers and men of the 1st Company could see in the light of flares groups of Red Chinese swarming around the French pioneers. At 1940 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Borsell saw that his right company under Lieutenant Barres, although in contact and hard pressed, had things under control. So he ordered his heavy weapons company to shift all its fires to support the pioneers. The Pioneers had fought like tigers—first as a team and then as individuals. Many of the platoon were killed, wounded and captured. When the positions were overrun, Lieutenant Perron joined Sergeant
Ground Force

Gavriloff by making his way up a trench the Reds had not found. Enroute he killed large numbers of the enemy at close range with grenades when he spotted their close packed formations by the light of shells and flares. Several times he lay while they passed close enough to touch. He was hit in the side just before he reached his platoon sergeant's position, and then in the arm. Lieutenant Perron was hit a third time on the head and jaw. A few minutes later, another head wound. Revived by the pain of a fifth wound in the left thigh, he took another hit in the right biceps.

Four artillery battalions were now supporting the French Battalion at a rate of 6,000 rounds an hour. The platoon from the regimental tank company in the French sector fired almost 1,200 rounds of 76-mm. that night. The French Heavy Weapons Company fired 800 rounds of 81-mm. mortar and 150 rounds of 75-mm. recoiless. 1st Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment to the left of Arrowhead was supporting with everything within range.

In spite of this tremendous fire support it was not until 2100 hours that the first enemy attack was stopped. But plenty of them got to the very edge of the position -- close enough to be brought down with handgrenades, aimed
rifle shots. When the initial assaults were repulsed, the Red Chinese survivors and reinforcements began to dig in all along the French front.

Before midnight, the 1st Company on Arrowhead was reinforced by the bulk of K Company, 23rd US Regiment, a provisional platoon from the French Battalion trains, and the support platoon of the 2nd Company. Its attachments before the attack included a provisional platoon from Battalion Headquarters Company in addition to the Pioneers. So the “combined command” now numbered approximately 500 men and included two tanks, a section of 4.2 mortars, and a platoon from the French Battalion’s Heavy Weapons Company. At about midnight Major Bertrand de Seze, the battalion executive officer, moved up to take the command of the sector.

The Red Chinese hit Arrowhead twice more during the first night -- at 0140 and 0330 hours. They made a major effort at infiltrating along the river gorge which was the boundary between the left and center companies. They probed Arrowhead position from flank to flank looking for a soft spot. The gallant French defenders, however, together with the ROK soldiers attached to the French Battalion, fought off the Reds streaming into the friendly positions. The supporting artillery units kept pounding against the Red avenues of approach and its rear areas.

At dawn the French were out between the lines policing up the battle field. Patrols picked up two prisoners in front of the right company and eight in front of Arrowhead including two officers. They also brought back 80 Red Chinese-made rifles; 25 US-MI’s, 60 Russian Tommy guns, seven 60-mm. mortars, six bazookas, and innumerable gas masks, Bangalore torpedoes, and engineer tools.

The Red Chinese did not come back the night of 7 October, though ROK company just to the right of the French got into a real slug-fest at about 2130 hours with an enemy company that tried to find a weak spot along the corps boundary. The ROK troops drove the enemy back only after the most violent hand-to-hand fighting. The French Battalion received about 3,000 rounds of incoming mortar and artillery during the day.

By 8 October, it was apparent that the enemy was shifting his main effort to Whitehorse Hill after having been so viciously repulsed on Arrowhead. An enemy company was spotted in front of the 3rd Company at 0800 hours heading for Whitehorse. During the day the Reds kept up their attacks on the ROK front, and the Whitehorse Hill changed hands several times. The French took advantage of good observation and the tanks in support of them to bring devastating fire against the exposed enemy flank. At nightfall the enemy
brought heavy fire to bear on the French positions all along the line. At 1900 hours the outposts of the 3rd Company reported two Chinese Communist battalions out in front of them. At 2305 hours a hundred Red Chinese were reported on the former Pioneer outpost positions and the 3rd Company again came under heavy fire. The enemy hit again along the corps boundary. Twenty minutes after midnight the 2nd Company was in contact with a Red Chinese company and ten minutes later an enemy company hit Arrowhead. The enemy maintained contact across the entire French Battalion front that night but had no success in penetrating the lines.

On 13 October the elements of the 9th ROK Division to its right finally recaptured the Whitehorse Hill. However the situation was not completely restored until 15 October.

Throughout the fight, the timely support from the air, armour, and artillery sparked the French Battalion’s effort in both defense and offense. The battalion had withstood the determined drive of the Red invaders, and it provided an excellent testimonial to the leadership, skill, and valour of the French soldiers. Exceptional services of the Pioneer Platoon during the battle was recognized by the French Government with the award of "une deuxieme citation a l’ordre de l’armee."

For the French Battalion the rest of the month, after the bitter fighting of October 1952, was fairly quiet. The approach of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the operations at the front. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves to hibernate in November, and action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols, and small unit skirmishes.

On the night of 20 November, the French Battalion was relieved on the line by the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry, and moved into a reserve area at Sintan-ni, approximately eight kilometers south of the front line. On 28 November, the second rotation batch of the French Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Germiny arrived at the reserve area to replace the outgoing companies. On 1 December 1952 Lieutenant Colonel Germiny relieved Lieutenant Colonel Borreil in command of the battalion. The outgoing members paraded at the battalion headquarters at Komun-ni, some eight kilometers northeast of Chonggok-ni. In this ceremony the French Battalion was presented with a Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea in recognition of the outstanding accomplishment in the Arrowhead battle.

The first week of December opened with the visit of General Eisenhower then US President-elect. On 4 December he was received by the honour guard of the French Battalion, and later was delivered an insignia of the battalion.
Operations in 1953

At West of the Imjin River: During the January of 1953, the French Battalion was in reserve at Umhyon-ni, being placed under operational control of the 38th US Regiment.

The training program during the reserve period was aimed at integrating the new men into their units, including a map reading course, patrolling and various phases of attack and defense by small units. In the last week of January 1953 the French Battalion was alerted to relieve the elements of the 1st British Commonwealth Division.

On 31 January the French Battalion went back on line, and it relieved the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch Regiment under the 1st British Commonwealth Division. The battalion’s positions were in the area of Songgok, about 20 kilometers northwest of Chonggok-ni.

When the battalion took over its new area, the French found the no-man’s-land in its sector dominated by the enemy. Moreover, most of the members of the battalion were new to action in Korea, and the disadvantages arising from their lack of experience were aggravated by the countryside and enemy tactics both of which were strange to them. It was apparent that any attempt to wrest control of no-man’s-land from the enemy would require careful preparation. Accordingly the battalion had increased its patrol activities in number to accustom its officers and men to the terrain and enemy in front of them.

Patrolling and defense against Red probes continued to be the most significant operations for the French Battalion during February in spite of the hazards and difficulties presented by the snow-covered terrain. On the night of 9 February a patrol entered deep into an enemy territory to engage an enemy squad, and killed three Red soldiers without suffering no friendly casualties. The largest of the Red probes against the French Battalion during February was two platoon-size Chinese Communist push on 14 February. On 22 February the French Army General Juin visited the battalion. Accompanied by General Clark, General Juin was briefed on the situation at the French Battalion command post.

Shortly after dark on 1 March an estimated enemy battalion supported by artillery fire struck the French main positions. In this combat which lasted for one and a half hours, the rugged determination of the French defenders kept the enemy making any progress and the enemy withdrew.

Meanwhile, the 23rd US Regiment was relieved of its security mission at the prisoner of war enclosures on 21 March and returned to the division area.
Accordingly the French Battalion reverted to the operational control of the 23rd Regiment on 25 March. On 1 April the French Battalion was relieved by the 2 Battalion of the 23rd Regiment on the line and moved to Tongduchon.

The Last Months: On 7 April 1953 and 2nd US Division was relieved by the 1st British Commonwealth Division and the 23rd Regiment with the French Battalion moved into I US Corps reserve at Camp Casey in Tongduchon. During the following two months the French Battalion was to participate in two blocking operations, the first on the Wyoming Line and the second on the Kansas Line.

As the 2nd US Division went under IX US Corps from I US Corps on 27 April, the French Battalion assumed the mission of IX US Corps reserve at Chipo-ri, where it was to remain in active training until it relieved the elements of the 15th US Regiment in the Chorwon sector in the middle of June.

The first blocking operation, conducted on the central front along the Wyoming Line was in anticipation of a possible Communist attack on "May Day." The French Battalion and the elements of the 23rd US Infantry traveled from Camp Casey to the Wyoming Line via boxcar. From the commanding terrain of the area, the men could look down upon Hill 281, a short distance to his front, or on Hill 395, farther to the east. From behind Hill 281 the artillery was bombing out its cannonades. Beyond Hill 281 the jets could be seen passing the enemy hill masses with rockets, five-hundred pound bombs, and the much feared napalm. Communication trenches were dug, individual fighting positions built and bunkers were erected.

Operations on the Kansas Line was similar to that on the Wyoming Line; defensive positions were improved, new communication trenches were cut through sand-stone, and sand bags by the thousands were filled. Completing its mission on the Kansas Line, the French Battalion moved on to Chipo-ri where it began an intensive seven weeks training program. Particular emphasis was placed on individual and small unit training, battle drill and night patrolling. Words such as dispersion, all round security, cover and concealment, and fire and movement became familiar everyday expressions. Squad, platoon, company, and battalion-sized tactics in all phases of the attack, defense, withdrawal, and raid were stressed. Hills were assaulted, defensive positions were dug. The men put in long hours and was often weary from their exertions. Then there were the air raid alerts at night, which interrupted their sleep. A short distance to the north the French soldiers could watch the nightly fireworks, the flares lighting up along the front, and the deadly VT bursting over the enemy's positions.

Meanwhile, during the period many distinguished figures visited the battalion. Among them were M. Paul Reynaud, Admiral Auboyneau, the Commander of
the French Marines in Indochina, Dejean, French Ambassador to Japan, and Captain Maincent, the French liaison chief to the United Nations Command.

On 20 June the French Battalion departed its reserve area at Chipo-ri and moved forward to relieve elements of the 15th US Regiment in the Chungga-san area. The front was generally in a static condition with sporadic enemy probes striking the strong point outposts. An aggressive daylight and night patrolling program enabled the French Battalion to dominate the ground forward of its positions. Tactical wire entanglements, trip flares, and mine fields also acted as a buffer between the Reds and French positions. Many patrols were run. Some of the patrols were of the ambush type, others consisted of three or four men daylight reconnaissance. Though contacts with the enemy were infrequent, those that were made proved bloody.

For the first half of mid-July considerable enemy patrol activities were noticed close to the battalion’s forward positions. On 18 July unknown number of enemy, following close on the heels of its own mortar bombardment, hit the Lieutenant Dureau’s outpost and rushed in through the wire entanglement. The gallant French defenders, however, stood firm and repelled the attackers by directing mortar and artillery fires against them.

In the following days on the line a large enemy buildup was noted to the front of the French Battalion positions. However, the anticipated large-scale enemy attack never materialized for at 1000 hours on the morning of 27 July a truce was signed at Panmunjom. At 2200 hours that night more than three years of continuous warfare came to a close.

Cease-fire and Afterward: Under the provisions of the truce, within seventy-two hours following the cease-fire, both forces were to drop back two kilometers from their former forward positions. During this period, the French Battalion executed a vast dismantling, savaging, and pulling-back operation. All available manpower and transportation was utilized for this operation.

By the close of the seventy-two hour period, constant vigilance was at hand. July passed into August and the building up of the French Battalion fighting machine continued. Barbed wire barricades were set up in addition to road blocks to add security to the new defense perimeter. Along with the military preparedness, emphasis was placed on training course for the men.

As the leaves began to fall heralding the coming of autumn, the rumbling of the war clouds in Indo-China grew louder. The French valours, who fought courageously during their Korean service and earned themselves the respect and admiration of all who served beside them were to leave soon for the new war zone.

Finally on 23 October, the first elements of the French Battalion departed
Reference Records and Data

the port of Inchon for Indo China. The last batch of the French Battalion left Korean soil on 6 November 1953, leaving behind a token force of approximately 50 members under the command of Lieutenant Caldairou. This unit, which had later reduced to 15 men, served in Korea under the banner of the United Nations until it left Korea in June 1965.

3. Reference Records and Data

a. Commanders

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>l’Heritiier</td>
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b. Honors and Awards

**Republic of Korea Decorations**

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**Unit Citations**

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THE GREEK FORCE
THE GREEK FORCE

1. Introduction

Background

When in June 1950 Greece was called upon by the U.N. Security Council to participate in the U.N. effort in Korea against the Communist invasion, she hastened to offer within her capabilities her manpower and material contribution. She had previously experienced Communist aggression within the country during the 1946—1949 period.

Faithful to its history and tradition, Greece rushed to the assistance of the Republic of Korea with an armed force, better known as "The Hellenic Expeditionary Force in Korea," and participated in the defense of freedom, democracy and peace against the Red aggressors.

The Greek Force consisted of one reinforced infantry battalion and one flight of transport.
aircraft consisting of seven C-47 aircraft to which two more were added later. While serving in Korea from 1950 to 1955, the Greek Force sacrificed its 196 men of noble lives in total (Army 184 and Air Force 12), among 10,581 men of total participants (Army 10,184 and Air Force 397), for the cause of freedom and justice against a common foe. A brief summary account with respect to the participation of the Greek Force in military operations carried out in Korea against the Communist forces of violence was as follows.

Infantry Battalion

The Greek Battalion arrived at the port of Pusan, Korea in the morning of 9 December 1950 and disembarked the following day. Then it was attached to the 7th US Cavalry Regiment and undertook a defensive role northeast of Seoul. It participated in the operations continuously until the truce in July 1953, and attached consecutively to the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, the 5th US Cavalry Regiment and the 15th US Infantry Regiment.

During the full five-year period from December 1950 to December 1955, a total of 10,184 soldiers of the Greek Army had served in Korea. The casualties of the Hellenic Battalion were 184 men killed and 543 men wounded in total, while the ascertained enemy casualties caused by the battalion were 1,218 dead and 208 prisoners.

The Greek Battalion was awarded many distinctions among which are the U.S. Presidential Unit Citations and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. The Greek infantry force remained in Korea until 11 December 1955 when its last contingent in company-size departed for Greece except a small symbolic detachment of 10-man strength.

Air Transport Flight

The 13th Hellenic Air Force Flight arrived in Japan on 1 December 1950. Three days later, on 4 December, it was placed under the 21st US Transport Squadron, later known as the 6461st Squadron, and undertook operational mission in Korea. The first mission of the 13th Hellenic Flight was to participate in the operation of air lifting 1,000 wounded men from Hagaru-ri north of Hambung of the encircled 1st US Marine Division. This airlift was carried out under unfavourable weather and operational conditions, and provided the chance to the friendly troops to withdraw from the encircled area
without serious casualties.

The operational activity of the flight continued undiminished from various airbases. Among the various missions accomplished by the 13th Hellenic Flight, transport of personnel, wounded, prisoners and casualties; supplies including ammunition, fuel, medical equipment, air-drops of ammunition and supplies to forward or cut-off friendly troops; and special missions in great depth over the enemy territory are included.

Among the honorary distinctions which were awarded to the Hellenic Flight, the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation for its contribution to the operation of Hagaru-ri evacuation in December 1950 and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation (23 October 1953) are included.

After the armistice was signed, the Hellenic Flight continued its activities from K-14 airbase from 11 June 1954 until the end of March 1955 when it was ordered to prepare for the triumphal return to its homeland. Then, the remaining five aircraft of the flight departed from Japan on 8 May 1955, arriving at Elefsis Airport in Greece on 23 May 1955.

Some reference data on the Hellenic contribution in Korea are as follows.

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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>543</td>
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<td>543</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>729</td>
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* Includes 9 non-battle deaths, of which 4 were during the post-armistice service.

2. Combat Account of the Greek Battalion
Organization

Initially, it was planned by the Hellenic Government that a ground force to be deployed to Korea be of a brigade sizing about 2,500 men in strength. However, it was finally decided that an infantry battalion of 50 officers and 738 men strength plus a reinforcement unit for this battalion of three officers and 58 men strength be sent to Korea.

The Hellenic Expeditionary Force Command was organized with nine officers and some privates (drivers and clerks), while the Greek Infantry Battalion was consisted of a command team, Headquarters Company and three rifle companies. The Headquarters Company was consisted of 81-mm. Mortar Platoon, Machine-gun Platoon (.30 caliber), Signal Platoon, Pioneer Platoon, Litter Bearer Platoon, Transportation Platoon, Management Platoon and Repair Shop Section. Each rifle company was manned with six officers and 136 men comprising three rifle platoons and one Weapons Platoon (0.30 machine-gun team and 60-mm. mortar team). Each rifle platoon was organized with one officer and 39 men in average.

On 15 November 1950, the first contingent of the Hellenic ground force, organized with 53 officers and 796 men, namely “the Greek Battalion,” embarked on the American ship, “General Han,” which departed Piraeus harbor the next day. The battalion arrived at the port of Pusan, Korea on 9 December and in the morning of the following day it was taken to a reception center near K-1 Air Base (Kimhae) 27 kilometers north of Pusan, where it remained until 14 December in order to complete its supplies in armament, equipment and clothings.

In general, its weapons consisted of M1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols, .45 submachine guns, 1.30 caliber BARs, four 57-mm. recoilless rifles, 13 30-mm. Browning machine guns, two 50-mm. browings, six 81-mm. mortars, nine 60-mm. mortars, nine 2.36-inches antitank rocket launchers, nine 3.5-inches antitank bazookas and two flamethrowers.

The First Commitment Into Combat
(18 December 1950 – 23 January 1951)

On 12 December 1950, the Greek Battalion was ordered to move to Suwon south of Seoul, attaching to the 1st US Cavalry Division effective on the 13th. In the afternoon of 14 December, it was entrained at Kupo railway station, north of Pusan, arriving at Suwon at noon of 15 December. Here it was further attached to the 7th US Cavalry Regiment on the 18th. The Greeks stayed in
Greek Battalion

Suwon until 30 December during which they underwent an intensive training program.

On 30 December, the Greek Battalion moved to the Kumo-ri area 24 kilometers northeast of Seoul where it organized a defensive position together with the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment under the operational control of the 24th US Infantry Division.

On the New Year’s Eve, the Chinese Communist forces launched a general attack against the sectors in front of Seoul and Wonju with the main objective to capture Seoul. On 3 January 1951, the UN forces began to withdraw toward the next defensive line, thus abandoning Seoul on the 4th. The Greeks covered the withdrawal of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment along the Seoul–Suwon axis.

In the late afternoon, 4 January, the Greek Battalion started movement to the vicinity of Chungju, arriving there at 0130 hours of the following day. It was in this place where the battalion lost its first man, Private Drankopoulos Stayos, who froze to death. It stayed there until 14 January, when it was attached to the 5th US Cavalry Regiment. There it was assigned a guerrilla mopping-up operation in the mountainous area. The battalion returned to the Chungju area, again under the operational command of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, and stayed there until 23 January, engaging in ambushing and patrolling missions.

The Battle on Hill 381 in Kwan-ni
(Night of 29–30 January 1951)

By mid-January 1951, the UN forces retreat reached its limit, and the line ran from the west coast near Pyongtaek, to near Wonju in the center, and thence to the east coast at Samchok. Now, the Eighth US Army ordered all units to carry out reconnaissance in force and local counterattacks. On the morning of 24 January, the Greek Battalion moved as a spearhead of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, carrying out offensive reconnaissance along the Chungju–Ichon–Kwan-ni axis, trying to contact with the enemy. On 26–27 January, it sent out patrols from the highground northwest of Ichon towards Sugwang-ni and Sojong-ni. The patrols overran advanced enemy elements, and observed enemy positions. All patrols were suddenly fired on by enemy automatic weapons and mortars from a close distance resulting in four dead and two wounded men.

On 28 January, the Greek Battalion moved further west and established itself for defense on the highground north of Kwan-ni, its mission being to defend the
position with a company-size outpost on Hill 381.

In the night of 29–30 January a CCF regiment in strength attempted a series of determined attacks against Hill 381, using mortars, automatic weapons and grenades. The 3rd Greek Company on Hill 381 faced the attack with coolness and repelled vigorously the successive CCF waves who fell in masses against the Greek defenders. After neutralizing BAR crews, an enemy group succeeded once in climbing the hill, but was driven out with bayonets. The fighting was a close and tough one. The 3rd Company Commander and two platoon leaders were wounded. The battle continued for four hours and ended at 0430 hours, with complete failure of the enemy’s effort to seize Hill 381, north of Yanghak-san (also Hill 381).

Concurrently with the attack against Hill 381, another enemy attack fell on Hill 307 defended by the 1st Company, but also failed, having fallen into a Greek platoon ambush. The enemy casualties were 28 dead counted at a cost of 11 Greeks killed including Lt. Statthias, a platoon leader, one man missing, and 13 wounded in action. (See Sketch Map 1.)

It was the first big and victorious battle fought by the Hellenic Battalion in
Korea. This victory became known all over the world. Many world press publicized details and full accounts about the battle and praised the Hellenic bravery. This enemy attack taught the Greek Battalion the enemy tactics. The Reds relied upon the large numbers, carried heavy infantry weapons with them and they suddenly opened fire from a very close distance in order to neutralize the defenders, while successive waves followed to complete the work of destruction. The importance of hand grenades in defense was emphasized once again whereas the element of the timely counterattack was a striking characteristic during the battle on Hill 381.

The Attack on Hill 402
(8–10 February 1951)

On 2 February 1951, the Greek Battalion moved from Hills 381, 307 and 258 to a new area and occupied Hills 579 and 301. It was send out patrols toward Hills 402 and 227 and unnamed hills further north, north of Kojiam-ni (or Konjae), on which elements of the 334th and 335th Regiments of the 38th CCF Army occupied fortified positions.

The battalion was further ordered to move to the Kojiam-ni area on the morning of 6 February, and at 0730 hours, 8 February, the 1st Company attacked along the narrow nose with no results due to unfavorable weather conditions and strongly organized-positions north of Hill 402.

The next day the 1st Company resumed the attack and succeeded in reaching the top of the first unnamed highground, but the enemy resisted obstinately on the opposite slope. Two platoons of the company were outrivaled and the company was forced to withdraw from the highground under heavy enemy pressure.

On 10 February, following strong artillery preparation, the attack was continued this time by the 3rd Company, and after repeated attempts it seized Hill 402. During this three-day battle, the Greeks suffered one officer (Lt. Manassis) and five men killed and one officer and 20 men wounded. The enemy losses were 150 dead counted on the scene and four prisoners captured. In addition, the Greeks captured four machine guns, four mortars, four M-3 automatic weapons, 13 submachine guns, 45 various rifles, the flag of the enemy regiment, various engineering equipment and a large amount of ammunition.

The Greek Battalion remained there until 15 February when it moved to the Sintan-ni area to support the other battalions of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment which were attacking on Hill 578. It relocated to Changhowon on the 16th and
thence to the vicinity of Yoju the next day. Then, on 22 February, it moved to Koksu-ri where it remained as a reserve of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, carrying out security mission for the 1st US Cavalry Division Artillery.

Advance Along the Yoju—Chunchon Axis
(2 March – 25 April 1951)

The Battle of Hill 326 (7–8 March): The 1st US Cavalry Division had already been operating along the Yoju—Hongchon—Chunchon axis. On 2 March 1951 the Greek Battalion relieved elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment and gained contact with the enemy on Hills 318 and 297 south of Yongdu-ri. While on Hill 318 it suffered three men killed and seven men wounded caused by the enemy artillery concentration fire.

On 5 March the battalion was ordered to attack and take Hills 326 and 443 east of Yongdu-ri. On 7 March, supported by a tank platoon, the 2nd and 3rd Companies launched an attack against Hill 326, which was fell into the Greeks’ hands in a few minutes by the bayonets during which a CCF battalion commander was killed. Soon the enemy attempted a futile counterattack. A second and third enemy attacks which followed resulted in the same outcome. During the mopping-up action, more than 20 Reds were captured. During the day the Greeks completed the capture of Hill 443. In this two-day combat the battalion suffered three men killed and three men wounded. In addition, it captured three 81-mm. mortars, three heavy guns, three machine-guns, four carbines, twenty five rifles, one radio and one telephone. The enemy losses were 40 dead counted and 22 prisoners.

The battalion continued its offensive action for a next few days during which it captured four more prisoners at a cost of two killed and one wounded. By the 14th it had advanced to an area southwest of the Hongchon River curve.

The Battle on Hill 325: On 17 March, after a 3rd Company platoon managed to cross the Hongchon River despite very difficulty, the 2nd Company launched an attack in successive platoons at 0630 hours to capture Hill 325 north of the river. The 1st Platoon seized the first objective from which the attack was continued towards the next objective. Two supporting tanks could not proceed beyond the first objective because of rugged slopes. The enemy launched immediately a counterattack which momentarily managed to climb on the second objective hill. The 2nd Company Commander was wounded and was evacuated to the rear.
A new attack launched against the second objective resulted in its final capture. The third one was also seized following an unsuccessful enemy counterattack. Then, at about 1600 hours, the 2nd Company attacked with bayonets and seized finally Hill 325. There more than 150 Red Chinese corpses were found along Hill 325. The casualties of the 2nd Company were one man killed and six wounded. The following day, the 1st Company captured Hill 655. Thus, the Greek Battalion opened the way to the UN forces' advance toward Hongchon—Chunchon.

On 19 March, the Greek Battalion assembled in an area, one kilometer southwest of Hill 655 in order to reorganize, and remained there until 27 March when it moved to the Chunchon area and organized its defensive positions on Hills 125 and 153, five kilometers east of Chunchon. During the period of 3–5 April, the battalion seized a series of enemy-held hills, including Hills 655 and 653 after a series of successive attacks. During these actions, it suffered one officer and four men killed and one officer and 10 men wounded.

Along the Seoul—Uijongbu—Imjin River Axis
(26 April — 31 May 1951)

On 11 April, the Greek Battalion went into a reserve along with the 7th US Cavalry Regiment. When, on 22–23 April, the Communist forces launched a general attack, it started moving at 1400, 26 April, towards Uijongbu in order to reinforce the western front. There the battalion occupied a defensive position north of Seoul, and was ordered to cover the withdrawal of friendly units which moved back along the Uijongbu—Seoul axis. Having accomplished that mission, it occupied positions on the northwest edge of Seoul to block the Kaesong—Seoul road, remaining there until 4 May when the general advance of the UN forces to the north began.

When the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered to advance along the Seoul—Uijongbu axis, the Greek Battalion was to protect the Division Artillery and control the areas on either side of the road with patrols. On 10 May, the Greek Battalion took up positions north of Uijongbu with an outpost on Hill 337. From the 11th to the 15th, it conducted offensive patrolling to the north. The next day it advanced towards Hill 446 and Hill 332. During this activity it captured 36 men including six enemy officers, and killed 62 enemy of which three were officers. On 18 May the battalion relocated to the northwest outskirts of Seoul to reorganize, and remained there until 22 May.
On 23 May, the Greek Battalion moved from Suyu-dong to the vicinity of Kumo-ri north of Uijongbu, and it further moved to the Tokto-ri area the next day, and on the 25th, it celebrated for the first time in Korea the Hellenic Independence Day. On 26 May, the battalion continued to move forward meeting the light enemy resistance on Hill 675. Two days later it forwarded patrols towards the north as far as the Imjin River every day. Then, on the 30th, it moved to an area located eight kilometers northeast of Nam-myön, where the Greeks stayed for three days.

During the period of 3–31 May the battalion had one officer and three men dead and six men wounded, while the enemy losses were 13 officers and 130 men killed, two men wounded (captured) and six officers and 46 men captured. Besides, the Greeks captured a great number of enemy equipment including three light machine-guns, seven SMGs, two 60-mm. mortars, one antitank rifle, 27 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition.

Stabilizing the Front
(2 June – 30 September 1951)

Offensive Action (2 June – 3 August): From 2 June 1951, the Greek Battalion operated in the Yonchon area. On 5 July, it attacked and seized Hill 165, on which it repelled two vigorous enemy counterattacks in the same night. The attack continued successfully until 10 June. From 10 to 17 June, it organized the occupied positions. On 18 June, the whole disposition advanced north of Yonchon. On 28 June, the battalion carried out successfully an offensive reconnaissance supported by a tank element and an artillery battery. On the 30th, it moved to the Chorwon area, after being relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry in place. Then on 15 July it went into corps reserve, along with the US cavalry units stationing south of Yonchon until 3 August. During the above period the battalion suffered five men dead and one officer and twenty men wounded, while the enemy casualties were 48 dead and 20 prisoners. It also captured two 60-mm. mortars, six submachine guns, five automatic weapons and 20 rifles of various types.

Defensive Action (4 August – 30 September): From 4 August 1951 the Hellenic Battalion was relocated to the north of Yonchon where it organized its defenses, conducting aggressive patrolling ceaselessly. A significant action was taken place on 18 August when two CCF platoons attacked suddenly Hill 339, 10 kilometers northeast of Yonchon, held by a Greek platoon. At the end
of close fighting the enemy was driven off, carrying heavy casualties with him.

On 21 August, the battalion moved to an area, seven kilometers northeast of Yonchon and occupied positions the next day. At 0210 hours, 27 August, two CCF platoons launched an attack against a 2nd Company platoon from an anonymous hill near Hill 343. Following a fierce fighting the enemy assault was repelled with his heavy casualties. At 0420 a new enemy attack, stronger than the first one, was also defeated back. On 30 August the enemy again attacked with more forces. However, reinforced with two new platoons from the 3rd Greek Company, heroic resistance of Hill 343 defenders was not bent, thus the Reds failed in capturing the hill for the third time. In this vigorous action the Greeks inflicted 41 killed and 25 wounded upon the enemy at a cost of one man killed and two men wounded. In the meantime, the 4th and 5th replacement contingents, consisting of 42 officers and 393 men had arrived in Pusan on 23 August.

From 31 August to 6 September the Greek Battalion continued improving its defenses and patrol activities. On 7 September, it moved and occupied positions in an area north of Yonchon where it engaged in a training program until 22 September, when it relocated and occupied positions in the vicinity of Sonbyok in preparation for Operation Commando. On the 24th, the disposition advanced north, occupying positions at a distance of two kilometers north of Chibak-kol, from where the battalion sent out continuously aggressive patrols during the rest of the month. There it was hammered ceaselessly by the enemy artillery and mortar fire. In this period the Greek casualties were one officer and four men killed and eight men wounded.

The Battle of Scotch Hill
(3–5 October 1951)

On 1 October 1951, the Greek Battalion was ordered by the 7th US Cavalry Regiment to attack, within the frame work of Operation Commando, in the direction of Hill 313 (Scotch) and Hill 334 (Neb), which were firmly held by the Red Chinese. This operation, designed to occupy and secure the Jamestown Line, was one of the toughest and bloodiest. The Greek Battalion decided to carry out the attack in two steps; the first to seize Hill 313 by the 1st Company, and in the second Hill 334 by the 3rd Company. D-Day would be 3 October.

In the morning, 3 October, the 1st Company began the attack against Hill 313 defended by four CCF companies, and soon fell into a severe hand-to-hand fighting. As a result, the attackers were forced to withdraw. A renewed attack
failed again only meeting the determined enemy resistance. In the afternoon, with the heavy support of airstrikes, the Greeks resumed the attack and had reached short of the objective by the nightfall. They already lost four officers and 24 men, and withdrew for the night.

On the following morning, the Greek Battalion dipositioned the 3rd Company two kilometers south of Scotch, and the 1st and 2nd Companies on the line of departure. An 8th Cavalry Regiment's battalion was to reinforce the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry to attack on Hill 418 northeast of Hill 313. The success of the Greeks depended upon the seizure of Hill 418, but the situation did not develop as planned. Now, the Greeks had to fight and capture Scotch by their own means. That morning, a 2nd Company platoon had already neared to the enemy positions by a flanking maneuver. Thus, at 1400 hours, the 2nd Company jumped off toward Hill 313 under the fire cover of the 3rd Company. The first effort to climb the hill was resulted in vain by shower of enemy grenades. At 1530, the company attacked for the second time and succeeded to climb within the enemy bunkers, but was again forced to withdraw. The Reds were being continuously reinforced. The development of the battle
made it clear that, in spite of the attackers’ gallant fighting, Scotch could not be seized without fire superiority over the enemy. In consequence, the 2nd Company withdrew on order under the cover of smoke screen.

On the morning of 5 October, friendly airplanes and artillery threw in tremendous bombs and shells on Hill 313, and the 2nd Company had ascended on the hill by 1430 hours, thus penetrating into the enemy fortified positions. Nearly all enemy defenders were dead and survivors were taken prisoners. The Greek casualties during the Scotch battle were three officers and 25 men killed and two officers and 75 men wounded. The enemy losses were 150 dead counted in addition to 12 prisoners. A great quantity of enemy weapons and ammunition were scattered all over the scene. (See Sketch Map 2.)

Upon the arrival of the 3rd Company on Hill 313, the 2nd Company began to exploit the success and sent out a reinforced platoon-size patrol party towards Hill 334, while the 1st Company remained in reserve. The patrol discovered that the objective was already empty when it reached within 300 meters from the enemy positions, and withdrew on order to Hill 265. For its gallant action in this Scotch area the Greek Battalion was awarded later two Presidential Unit Citations, one from the Republic of Korea and the other from the United States.

**Action in the Hills 347–275 Area**

(6–26 October 1951)

On 6 October, after the capture of Hill 313, the Greek Battalion had to move its companies to the southeast of Hill 347 in an effort to cover an attack of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry. At 0900, 7 October, a patrol from the 1st Greek Company which had overrun an enemy platoon was heavily fired from a saddle. However, it succeeded in occupying the saddle. Another enemy element in company strength attempted a counterattack, but was defeated back with heavy casualties. The saddle position was held by four CCF rifle companies plus a support company.

The 2nd and 3rd Companies launched their attacks at 1400 hours, employing one platoon each. Both attackers penetrated into the enemy trenches under heavy enemy fire, neutralized most of the resistance and killed a large number of enemy troops in the ensuing hand-to-hand fighting which followed.

The next morning, on the 8th, the 1st and 3rd Companies sent out patrols of a reinforced platoon size each and they soon broke through into the enemy positions. The 3rd Company lost no time in exploiting the success, thus advancing as far as within 700 meters south of Hill 275, better to be known as
"Old Baldy," which was the final objective of the Greek Battalion. The 2nd Company followed up the 3rd Company, while the 1st Company remained on the objective as a reserve. The leading 3rd Company advanced under heavy indirect and flat trajectory fire from Hill 223 (Chink Baldy) and whereabouts.

During this three-day combat the Greek Battalion suffered one officer and three men killed, one officer and 11 men wounded. In contrast this, the enemy casualties were 110 men killed and 10 men wounded.

The following day the battalion forwarded combat patrols to a great depth where they engaged with the Red Chinese killing eight and capturing another five men. On 11 October, the Greek Battalion was attached to the 8th US Cavalry Regiment, and the 2nd Company had completed its movement to Hill 300 by 1900 hours. From 9 to 26 October the Greek Battalion suffered in total one officer and four men killed and nine men wounded in action. During the same period the enemy losses were 182 dead counted.

**Defensive Action in the Kalgak Area**

(1–14 November 1951)

On 28 October the Greek Battalion observed at Sinchon the anniversary of the Italian invasion against Greece in 1940. On the 30th it returned back on the line, taking up the defense positions north of Tokhyon-ni and Hill 287.

On 1 November, the battalion relieved the Belgian Battalion in the Kalgok area when the 1st Company occupied its position southeast of Hill 200, the 2nd Company on Hill 287 and the 3rd Company positioned a kilometer south of Hill 200. Thereafter the battalion was involved primarily with the task of improving its positions and patrolling actions until 14 November when it moved to an area behind the line as the 1st US Cavalry Division went into reserve. From 27 October to 14 November the Greek Battalion suffered one artillery observer (US soldier), who was then on temporary duty with the Greeks, was killed and one officer and four men wounded in action.

**The Change of Attachment**

From 15 to 18 November, the Greek Battalion conducted training. On 19 November, the 6th replacement contingent consisting of 20 officers and 243 men arrived from Greece. That day the battalion was placed again under the 7th
Greek Battalion

Cavalry Regiment.

On 28 November, it was attached to the 3rd US Division since the 1st US Cavalry Division, to which the Greeks attached ever since they had first arrived at Su-won in December 1950, departed from Korea to Japan. Since then onward the Greek Battalion conducted training until 26 December 1951 when it was ordered to relocated to Singmang-ni, two kilometers northeast of the Imjin River near the Nori area, placing under the operational command of the 65th Regiment of the 3rd US Division. There it took over the frontline positions from the Belgian Battalion and assumed the missions to maintain the integrity of the defense positions against any enemy attacks.

A observation post of the Greek Battalion surrounded by a snowfield in 1951.

The Battles of Kelly – Little Nori and Big Nori

(2–18 March 1952)

The Raid on Kelly (2 March): From 1 to 16 January 1952 the Greek Battalion demonstrated a remarkable patrol and ambush activity. On the 18th, it was attached to the 15th Regiment, 3rd US Division and occupied positions on Hill 238. From 20 January the battalion, as always, started intensively to organize the ground and conducted reconnaissance in force towards all directions within its zone of action.

On 2 February, the Greek Battalion was honored with the Presidential Unit Citation awarded by General Van Fleet in the name of the U.S. President, dated 7 January 1952, for the heroic fighting in the Sonbyok area (Hills Scotch and Neb) from 3 to 10 October 1951.

On the night of 27–28 February 1952, the battalion advanced about two kilometers ahead. Further north, it relieved the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Regiment on the line. From 28 February to 2 March the battalion sent out offensive patrols to Kelly and Big Nori situated on the west of the Imjin River. At 1720 hours, 2 March, a 1st Company patrol was fired upon by the enemy automatic weapons from a close distance as it climbed on Hill Kelly situated on
the west of Koyangdae. The patrol fired back and killed two Reds. After it withdrew the 15th US Regiment ordered the battalion to capture the hill. The first effort of the same patrol to climb on Kelly was failed. But the second effort of a squad-patrol quickly succeeded forcing the enemy to abandon the hill at a cost of three men wounded.

**The Battle of Little Nori (Night of 17–18 March):** On 3 March, a platoon-size patrol moved out towards Little Nori and thence to Hills 117 and 134, and at the evening it heavily engaged in fire fight when the enemy poured on a heavy volume of fire including mortars from Hill 134 and Hill 121.

From 4 to 16 March intensive patrol actions were noted from the both sides. At 1000, 17 March, the entire Greek Battalion positions were heavily struck by enemy artillery and mortar fire. Soon followed by intensive artillery duels lasting for hours, and at 1820 hours, reports reached the battalion command post from all outposts including Kelly and Little Nori that numerous Red Chinese forces were moving near their positions for encircling them. Since there could be no fighting against such outnumbered odds, the Battalion Commander ordered them to withdraw. Friendly artillery and mortar units poured heavily

**BATTLE OF KELLY & NORI OUTPOSTS (2–18 Mar 1952)**

![Map of Battle of Kelly & Nori Outposts](Sketch Map 3)
bombardment into the enemy held-positions. The rate of fire became more intense as the darkness fell on the scene. Then the enemy hastily approached closer to the 1st and 2nd Companies. The battalion fire plan was put into effect upon the first fire. A violent close fighting took place lasting five hours under the aerial illuminating bombs and other trip flares. The successive CCF assaults resulted in a complete failure. The enemy constantly committed new forces into the fighting. However, the Greek fighters were ready to maintain their positions at any cost. In the long run, at 2300 hours, the enemy lost his will to fight and gave the fighting up before the Greek troops' courage and valor. 65 enemy dead were counted in front of the battalion positions.

From 2345 to 0300 hours, the enemy artillery struck the Greek positions in order to cover the retreat of the Red hordes. In the morning of 18 March, the Greeks found a great number of CCF corpses, weapons, and various types of equipment along the approaches. The enemy force which launched the night attack was estimated to be of a reinforced battalion in strength. The total Greek casualties during this battle were five men dead and seven men wounded. (See Sketch Map 3.)

Behind the Front Line
(19 March – 25 July 1952)

From 19 March until 25 July 1952, the Greek Battalion remained in the second line, and later became a reserve unit, engaged in training and various minor tasks, among which was its participation with one company in settling down the riot of Communist prisoners held in the camps on Koje-do (island).

On 19 March, the Greek Battalion moved to the southeast of the Imjin River curve where it remained in reserve until 13 April. During the period, on 24 March, it was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea by the Minister of National Defense for its outstanding service in the Sonbyok area combat from 3 to 10 October 1951. On the 25th the battalion celebrated for the second time in Korea the Hellenic Independence Day.

On 13 April, the battalion moved little further north and organized the blocking positions. Then, on the 18th it was relieved in place by a 29th British Brigade battalion and moved to Samgo-ri on the east bank of the Imjin River, becoming a reserve to the 15th US Regiment.

On 26 April the Greek Battalion moved to the Kisan-ni area northeast of Pochon where it camped and conducted training until 25 July. During the period, on 23 May, the 1st Greek Company was ordered to move to the Koje-do POW Camp
in order to reinforce the UNC garrison there. On 3 July, the company after the completion of its mission on Koje island returned to the parent battalion. On 5 July the battalion was relocated to a new place in Tongduchon and was placed as a reserve of the 3rd US Division.

**Outpost Battles**
(26 July – 25 September 1952)

From 26 July until 11 September 1952, the Greek Battalion was on the front line, again in the Chungsar-ri sector, on the east bank of the Imjin River. While there, an enemy attempt of attack failed and the enemy suffered heavy losses. The patrolling action was continued and minor raiding operations were conducted, which caused damage to the enemy. It is worthwhile mentioning the enterprises accomplished on the nights of 26–27 July and 6–7 August.

On 26 July, the Greek battalion returned back on the line northeast of Imjin-gang (river) where it relieved the Belgian Battalion. At 0200, 27 July, an enemy element started raiding against a Greek platoon on Hill 199. The Greek fighters awaited until the enemy came closer and suddenly opened up severe fire. The enemy being surprised withdrew disorderly carrying a heavy toll of own casualties with him. The following day, the same Greek platoon was attacked again and enemy mortar fire was heavily directed on the 2nd and 3rd Companies. The Greeks defeat off the enemy, thus firmly securing their positions.

During the night of 6–7 August, two Greek platoons raided enemy positions on Hill 167 to keep the enemy off balance and to destroy his fortifications. The enterprise succeeded, and the objective was seized after a man-to-man fight. After the enemy had been completely neutralized and 12 pill boxes, observation posts and various other installations destroyed, the Greek fighters returned to their positions. The battalion lost five men, and two officers and 32 men were wounded. Further, seven men received light wounds, but were not evacuated. Thereafter the battalion concentrated its effort to intensify patrolling action and to improve defenses until the first two weeks of September.

During 9–11 September, the battalion was relieved on position by the 3rd Battalion of the 65th US Infantry and moved to a reserve area on the 12th, placing under 15th US Regiment again. On 25 September 1952, it returned back on the MLR by taking over positions from the Puerto Ricon on the east bank of the Imjin River near Nori. From 19 March to 25 September 1952 the Greek Battalion suffered six men dead and two officers and 32 men wounded. In addition, there were seven men slightly wounded who were not evacuated. The enemy casualties
during the same period were 45 dead and 12 pill-boxes and five observation posts were entirely destroyed.

The Battle of Big Nori
(26–30 September 1952)

Situating in the north of Little Nori, Big Nori is a highground the top of which is almost a mathematical point that could hardly accommodate an infantry platoon. The only course of action for capturing the hill would be through a frontal attack.

On 26 September, the Greek Battalion was ordered to attack on Big Nori. Following artillery harassing and concentration fire, the 1st Company occupied positions three kilometers southeast of Little Nori at 1830 hours and was placed as a battalion reserve. At 2000 hours, Greek elements relieved the American outpost on Little Nori. Next day, the enemy fired about 200 artillery and mortar shells onto the battalion positions and in particular on Little Nori.

At 0450, 28 September, the friendly tanks and heavy weapons started firing and at 0500 hours the 1st Platoon of the 2nd Greek Company started moving towards Big Nori Hill. The objective was taken through a courageous and fast assault at 0530 hours. After ten minutes the enemy launched his first counter-attack but was repelled. However, at 0540 hours the 1st Platoon Leader 1st Lieutenant Fotios Bekiaris was seriously wounded. The battalion committed a squad to reinforce the platoon. The arrival of the squad on the hill coincided with the enemy’s second counterattack but was again resulted in his failure. The enemy was determined through his successive counterattacks to capture Big Nori by all means, however the Greeks were more determined to hold it. At 0630 hours an additional reinforcing squad arrived on the hill. At the same time a platoon from the 1st Company moved to further reinforce the Greek fighters. At 0700 and 0710 hours the enemy renewed counterattacks stronger than previous ones which were again repelled. At 0745 and 0830 hours the friendly air force attacked successfully on the enemy positions.

At 0945 hours, the enemy launched a strongest counterattack and soon took place a fierce fighting. The Hellenic fighters exhibited the combat superiority for 15 minutes and the friendly airplanes overflew. Everybody was certain that the enemy counterattack would fail when, all of a sudden, two bombs of the friendly aircraft fell by mistake on the Hellenic positions. As a result, 1st Lieutenant Andrew Vozikis was wounded and four men were killed. The enemy took advantage of this situation and increased his pressure. This tragic mistake
caused the Greek defenders to abandon the hill. Soon afterward the Greek Battalion Commander ordered the 2nd Company to attack and recapture Big Nori. It had to be cancelled, however, due to the enemy's strong artillery and mortar fire.

On 30 September, at 0125 hours, artillery and mortar preparation started against the hill. At 0130 hours, the attack began, capturing Big Nori at 0200 hours. But, at 0250 hours the hill was abandoned again due to the enemy's repeated counterattacks. That night the battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 15th ROK Regiment. During this severe battle it suffered two officers and 14 men killed and 3 officers and 24 men wounded, while the enemy casualties were 22 dead counted and 15 wounded men were taken as prisoners.

**In the Fall of 1952**

(1 October – 31 December)

On 1 October 1952, the Greek Battalion moved back to an area 15 kilometers north of Yonchon, becoming a corps reserve together with the entire 3rd US Division. This very same day, the 12th replacement contingent consisting of 14 officers and 200 men arrived from Greece. The next morning the 9th contingent with 20 officers and 241 men departed for Greece. From 4 to 27 October the battalion conducted training. On 28 October it celebrated the Hellenic National Holiday.

On 29 October, the Greek Battalion was ordered to move to the Chorwon area and had relieved the 1st Battalion, 65th US Infantry by 2200 hours, becoming a reserve of the 15th US Regiment. From 30 October to 3 November it constructed trenches and conducted reconnaissance for future operations and diversionary movements in the 15th US Regiment's zone of responsibility.

On 4 November, by 2240 hours, the battalion had relieved the 3rd Battalion, 65th US Regiment in an area six kilometers west of the previous one. From 5 to 14 November the battalion set up ambushes and listening posts and had remarkable patrol activities in its sector. From 5 to 30th November the usual activities of patrol, ambushes, listening posts, observation posts and the exchange of mortar and artillery fire were continued by both sides. Also several minor clashes took place in patrolling with heavy enemy casualties.

On the 24th the Greek Battalion Commander was pinned the Legion of Merit by General Van Fleet. Intense patrol actions were continued deep into December. During the period, on 2 December, a Greek platoon took part in the welcome activities of U.S. President-elect General Eisenhower.
At 2215, 12 December, a platoon-size ambush from the 3rd Company forced an enemy unit of about company size to enter the fire entrenchment where the ambush weapons had been pre-placed. The fire that followed was accurate on time. Upon the exchange of fire, two elements of 20 men each departed from the MLR and rushed to reinforce the fighting ambush. The battle continued until 2310 hours when the two reinforcements launched an assault and thus gave final blow to the enemy. On the following morning the Greeks found 23 CCF dead and many weapons and equipment on the battle scene.

On 19 December the battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 65th US Infantry and assembled in a new area becoming a reserve of the 15th US Infantry. From 1 October to 31 December 1952 the total casualties of the battalion were three men and one American from the 15th Regimental Intelligence Team dead; and 14 men plus five U.S. and one ROK soldiers who were on TDY with the Greek battalion, wounded; and one man missing. The enemy casualties were 90 men dead counted. Besides, the Greeks captured 10 rifles and a great deal of ammunition.

Defensive Actions in the Iron Triangle Sector
(1 January – 17 June 1953)

As the severely cold winter deepened, the front line became more inactive. Accordingly, early in 1953, there were no noticeable actions until early March except the customary patrol and ambush activities. On 29 January the Greek Battalion occupied positions on the Wyoming Line in the Iron Triangle area, where it relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 14th US Regiment.

In the night of 12 March a Hellenic patrol from the 2nd Company conducted reconnaissance in force deep into the enemy-held area two and a half kilometers east of Hill 420, better known to UN troops as Harry Hill. At 0210 hours that
night an enemy force of reinforced company-size, supported by artillery and mortars, launched a night attack on the Greek positions in particular against the forward platoons of the 2nd and 3rd Companies. Seizing this opportunity, the aforementioned patrol element opened fire upon the enemy attackers from a very close distance. The enemy was caught in a complete surprise and stopped his maneuver. However, soon afterwards he resumed the attack this time against the patrol which was forced to withdraw. The enemy continued moving towards the forward platoon positions. Now the entire Greek Battalion was already alerted waiting for the enemy assault which soon followed. The ensuing fighting was very hard and violent lasting until daybreak, when the Reds retreated back under cover of fog. A great deal of enemy artillery and mortar shells ceaselessly fell on the whole battalion positions. The enemy suffered very heavy casualties. Friendly artillery supported the battalion with final protective fire. Until 25 March the artillery duels continued. On the 25th the battalion celebrated the Hellenic National Independence Day for the third time in Korea.

The same battle situation ensued until 2 April when an unusual increase of enemy artillery and mortar shells against the Greek Battalion was noticed. At 0130 hours, 3 April, approximately a CCF regiment in strength attacked against the Greek Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the 15th US Regiment. The main enemy effort was directed on the US battalion and in particular against Harry Outpost. The Greek Battalion immediately put its fire plan into effect. In the light of this well-adjusted fire plan, the enemy was forced to halt his attack before reaching the first defensive positions. The battle lasted until 0530 hours when the enemy retreated back with a toll of casualties.

At 0235 hours of 25 April the Hellenic Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Regiment and it moved southward to Yangimal area, where it was placed as a reserve until 16 May. Meanwhile, on 30 April, 12 officers and 352 men departed for Greece. From 1 January to 16 May 1952, the Greek Battalion suffered two officers and eight men dead and 22 enlistedmen wounded. Besides, nine were lightly wounded and not evacuated.

From 25 April to 17 May, the Greek Battalion remained in reserve. Then, on 18 May, it was back to the front when it took over the MLR positions, 10 kilometers northeast of Chorwon, from the 3rd Battalion, 15th US Regiment. In its new place the battalion gave full attention to the ground organization and at the same it developed an excellent patrol activity. The activity of both opponents continued to be lively and at the same pace.

On the night of 6 June, an ambush with a strength of one platoon from the 3rd Company was planned. At 2240 hours, at a point about 1,500 meters
northwest of Hill 420 (Harry), the ambush noticed the enemy moving towards the battalion main positions. When the enemy approached close to the ambush it started a surprise fire at him forcing him to launch his attack earlier and thus the enemy lost the element of surprise-night assault. The Hellenic outpost elements delayed the enemy attack. The fighting was fierce lasting until 0330 hours, when a platoon counterattacked, thus forcing the enemy to withdraw leaving on the battlefield 30 dead men. Two other similar enemy attempts in the early morning hours of 10 and 12 June also failed.

On 16 June, at 0300 hours, the battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 15th US Infantry and moved to the east in the same sector, neighbouring with a company of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment on its left flank. The battalion casualties from 16 May 17 June were 12 men dead, two officers and 17 men lightly wounded. The enemy losses were 40 dead counted, and a proportional number of wounded.

The Battle of Harry Hill
(Night of 17–18 June 1953)

Early in June 1953, Outpost Harry on Hill 420 was held by the 2nd Battalion, 15th US Regiment. The enemy made repeated efforts till 13 June to capture Harry for its tactical weight. Now, Harry Hill position, northeast of Mirok-tong, was manned by the Hellenic fighters. At the time serious enemy action was expected at any time in the 3rd US Division sector against which the Chinese Communist forces had concentrated four divisions and 15 artillery battalions with about 126 guns. More specifically the enemy had four battalions in line and nine in reserve against the 15th US Regiment. Having occupied their position on Harry, the Greeks began to work on defenses.

At 2345 hours, 17 June, the enemy started a heavy bombing on the entire battalion front and especially against Harry Hill. The enemy soon launched a night attack in three consecutive assaults, and taking advantage of his artillery gaps he made a steady approach. The enemy made the first assault by two battalions in strength through two converging directions towards Harry, his first objective. The men of the 3rd Greek Company on Harry Hill fought heroically and thanks to the friendly artillery fire, the enemy was repelled with serious casualties.

At 0200 hours, 18 June, the enemy for the second time repeated his efforts to take Harry and further penetrate through the line of the Hellenic Battalion sector. Supported by artillery, a new enemy attack stronger than first one (with
three battalions) directed on Harry again. The 3rd Company fought with the same strength and decisiveness as during the previous battles. However, the enemy with numerical superiority, managed to enter the first trenches. The Greek defenders fought hand to hand with the Red Chinese. While the latter were trying to hurl their hand-grenades, the Greeks took advantage of that opportunity to kill Reds with their bayonets or with their small arms.

Despite all these a new wave after wave of CCF infantry-men attempted to climb on Harry Hill and the situation would have been fatal for the Greeks if it had not been for the battalion which launched a strong counterattack to the eastern flank. In fact a small infantry and tank unit maneuvered against the flanks and rear of the enemy, who not knowing the real size of the attacking element, was surprised and thus was forced him to retreat in disorder. However, at 0340 hours the enemy

**BATTLE OF HARRY** (17–18 Jun 1953)
carried out his third attack with much more force than all previous ones. It seemed that the enemy had prepared well his attack and without taking into consideration his casualties he succeeded to infiltrate into Harry trenches. Meanwhile, the Hellenic Battalion succeeded in reinforcing in time its 3rd Company by the 1st Company which was already moving on. Therefore, the garrison on Harry Hill was reinforced in time, thus repelling the Red hordes for the third time. The Greeks lost no time in pursuing the enemy beyond their positions in order to exploit and consolidate their victory. During the night of 17–18 June the battalion faced successfully a reinforced CCF regiment.

During the above battles the Hellenic Battalion suffered five men dead, one officer and 19 men wounded. The enemy had also enormous casualties. From 15th US Regiment official report the following data were drawn regarding the battles of Harry Hill from 10 to 17 June by the 15th US Regiment and the Hellenic Battalion: The enemy attack was launched in piecemeal by the entire 74th CCF Division; total enemy casualties were 223 killed (found) and it is estimated that 1,450 were killed in total; and 3,800 were wounded. The friendly casualties were 102 killed, 553 wounded, and 44 missing in action. (See Sketch Map 4.)

The Battle of Kumsong Bulge
(17–26 July 1953)

From 19 June to 12 July 1953 the Greek Battalion remained in the same positions on and around Harry Hill. The relief of the battalion by the 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Division took place during 2100 hours of 13 through 0500 hours of 14 July. The total casualties of the battalion from 19 June to 16 July were 16 men dead, and one officer and six men wounded.

Hoping to win somewhere in the battlefield so they could exercise some pressure on the U.N. Command at the truce talk tents and also to gain better ground for the post-armistice, the Communist forces, on the night of 13–14 July, attacked friendly forces in the Kumsong sector. They succeeded in breaking through the front and creating a wide and deep gap. The IX US Corps ordered the 3rd US Division, to which the Hellenic Battalion was attached, to fill the gap. On 14 July, despite heavy rain, the Greek Battalion followed the 15th US Regiment to move into a newly designated position and arrived and occupied its position after a forced-night march. During 15–16 July the enemy continued the attack in order to widen the gap he had made in the initial attack.

At 0400 hours on the night of 16–17 July, the enemy launched a large-scale
attack on a broad front and assaulted the Greek Battalion position, but the enemy was repelled after a tough fighting that took place in trenches. On the 18th, the Greeks captured 15 Red Chines those who hiden near the battalion positions.

During the night of 19–20 July the battalion was relieved on position by the 1st Battalion of the Cavalry Regiment, Capital ROK Division. Then on 20 July, it moved eastward and occupied a key area within the sector of the 15th US Regiment, some three kilometer north of Samchon-bong (Hill 815). On 24 July, the enemy also shifted his main effort eastwards where the 15th US Regiment was responsible for.

At 2000 hours, 24 July, the 15th US Regimental Commander visited the Greek Battalion Commander and ordered him to study a withdrawal plan. The Battalion Commander assured him that he could hold the present positions at any cost if he granted to have enough artillery support. The request was accepted and the battalion remained in its position ready to counter the enemy attack. The following day, 25 July, the enemy increased his offensive effort, and at 2100
hours the 15th US Regimental Commander visited the Greek Battalion Commander again and asked his opinion about a possible withdrawal. The answer, however, was firm that the battalion would be able to confront the enemy attack.

At 2230 hours, the battalion encountered a fiercest enemy attack. The enemy, estimated more than a battalion, attempted to break through between the 2nd and 3rd Company positions. There flared up severe fighting for two and a half hours. As a result, the Greeks managed not only to maintain their positions intact but also to defeat back the enemy onslaught inflicting serious casualties upon him. The following day, the enemy using a similar number of forces and weaker artillery support repeated his offensive efforts which were repelled easily. It was the last serious task the Hellenic Battalion accomplished in Korea.

From 17 to 26 July the Greek Battalion suffered 13 men killed, four officers and 24 men wounded in action, while the enemy lost 150 plus 15 prisoners during the same period. (See Sketch Map 5.)

At 1015 hours, 26 July 1953, the Greek Battalion received a message from the higher command that an armistice agreement would be signed at 1000, hours, 27 July and the armistice would come into effect at 2200 hours. At 2030 hours, 27 July, the enemy, being deceitful again, fired against the Greek positions with artillery and mortars. Three officers and five men were wounded, and one man killed who was the last battle victim of the Greek Battalion in this war.

Post-Armistice
(August 1953 – December 1955)

At 0600 hours, 30 July, the Greek Battalion moved to a new area where it occupied defense positions. Since then onward the post-armistice service was started. An important event to note was that, on 29 November 1953, the Inauguration of Saint Nickolas, orthodox church which was built by funds provided by the Hellenic Battalion, took place in Seoul.

In autumn 1953 the Hellenic Government decided to augment the Greek Battalion up to a regiment level in order to bridge the gap created by the departure of the French Battalion for Indochina. As a result, additional Greek contingent, which consisted of 87 officers and 1,580 men plus four officers and 27 men from the Greek Air Force, embarked on the ship “General Blatchford” on 20 December 1953 and arrived in Korea on 13 January 1954. The Hellenic Regiment was attached to the 3rd US Division.

On 1 May 1954, it relieved in place the 224th Regiment of the 40th US Division which had occupied defensive positions on a hilly area east of Chorwon,
where it remained until 27 July 1954. On 15 June, 73 officers and 1,182 men were returned to Greece. On 28 July the two battalions of the Greek Regiment were relieved in position by the two battalions of the 15th US Regiment, one of which was the Belgian Battalion.

From 8 to 14 September 1954, the Greek Regiment moved to a new general reserve area. Then, as the 3rd US Division started in September to depart from Korea, the regiment was attached to the 7th US Division, I US Corps effective on 11 October, remaining its position south of Chorwon.

On 10 March 1955, the Greek Regiment was reduced to a battalion size by an order of the Hellenic Army Command. And on 28 April a parade took place by the 7th US Division honoring the departure of a Hellenic battalion from Korea. After 8 May only one Greek battalion remained. On 12 July, following an order of the Hellenic Army General Staff, the Hellenic Force in Korea was limited to a reinforced infantry company level. At the end of July the company occupied defensive positions east of Tongdunchon. The Greek Company was attached to the 31st US Regiment on 26 July.

In October 1955 the deactivation of the Greek Company in Korea was decided, and as a result, the Hellenic Government ordered the company to return to Greece, leaving a small detachment of 10-man strength behind. On 11 December 1955, the Commander of the Eighth US Army, in the name of the President of the United States, awarded a citation to the Greek Unit and decorated its colors.

Then, all personnel of the Greek Company consisting of nine officers and 174

President Syngman Rhee awards a commemorative plate to the Greek Forces in Korea.
men departed Korea for Greece except a small symbolic detachment of one officer and nine enlisted men who remained in Korea. Finally, the last contingent of the Hellenic Army Force left Korea after a full five-year period of the contribution. Thus, the participation of Greece in the Korean War which was instigated by international communism and triggered by the Communist puppet regime in the north in June 1950 was terminated.

In conclusion, it can be said, that during the Korean War, the Hellenic Force executed very successfully all the missions which were assigned to it. The Greek Force was distinguished among the U.N. Command contingents and was greatly praised and highly admired for its military profession, heroism and its self-sacrifice.

In deed, the Hellenic Army Force which had already defended its country from Communist tyranny had played an important and distinct role in the fighting here in Korea against the Communist aggressors. Defending freedom in Korea the Hellenic values proved that they are worthy heir of Marathon and Thermopylae traditions and that the sacred flame of freedom always burns deep in the hearts of the contemporary Greeks.

The total casualties of the Greek Army Force in Korea were 184 dead, of which four were non-combat deaths during the post-armistice period; 543 wounded; and two men missing in action who were repatriated during Operation Big Switch from enemy prisoner camps.

Reference Records and Statistical Data
Greek Army Force

a. Participated Period:

| Date of embarkation from Greece: | 16 Nov 1950 |
| Date of arrival in Pusan: | 9 Dec 1950 |
| Departure of last contingent: | 11 Dec 1955 |

b. Total number of participants:

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*1 — Included 9 non-battle deaths (1 officer plus 8 EMs), of which 4 enlistedmen were during the post-armistice service.

*2 — This figure included 33 (2 officers and 31 EMs) injured in accident.

d. Command List:

(1) Greek Liaison Officers to the U.N. Command

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<td>Nikolaos Tassonis</td>
<td>May 52</td>
<td>Nov 52</td>
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<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
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<td>Nov 52</td>
<td>Jun 53</td>
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<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>George Vlasis</td>
<td>Jun 53</td>
<td>Dec 53</td>
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<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Alexandros Christeas</td>
<td>Dec 53</td>
<td>Oct 54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John Gennimatas</td>
<td>Nov 54</td>
<td>May 55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Panagiotis Christopoilos</td>
<td>May 55</td>
<td>Jan 56</td>
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(2) Greek Force Hq Command in Korea

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<td>Col.</td>
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* This Hq Command was abolished in August 1951.

(3) Greek Force Battalion Command

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<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Arboutgis Dionysios</td>
<td>Nov 50</td>
<td>Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Spiliooulos Kyriakos</td>
<td>Aug 51</td>
<td>Apr 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Tamvakas Nicolas</td>
<td>Apr 52</td>
<td>Jan 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Koumanakas George</td>
<td>Jan 53</td>
<td>Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Prokos Elias</td>
<td>Jul 53</td>
<td>Jan 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Greek Force Regimental Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Executive Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Prokos Elias</td>
<td>Jan 54 – Jul 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Stavreas Fotios</td>
<td>Jul 54 – May 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1st Battalion Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Stavreas Fotios</td>
<td>Jan 54 – Jul 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Mandougos Basil</td>
<td>Jul 54 – May 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2nd Battalion Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Koureleas Panagiotis</td>
<td>Jan 54 – Jul 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Panagiotakos Gregory</td>
<td>Jul 54 – Dec 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Savakis Pantelis</td>
<td>Dec 54 – Feb 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Papacois Alexandros</td>
<td>Feb 55 – May 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **Greek Force Battalion Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Papacois Alexandros</td>
<td>May 55 – Jul 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Greek Force Reinforced Company Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(7) **Successive Company Commanders (Dec 1950 – Jul 1955)**

**Initial Group (arrived on 9 Dec 50)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj.</td>
<td>Varnavas Stavros</td>
<td>Maj.</td>
<td>Kalamakis Padelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Mantzarlis Theologos</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Karamazakis Ioannis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Zafiris Haraclitus</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Missas Panagiotis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2nd Rifle Group (arrived in Apr 1951)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Lecanides Jojef</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Armaoutis Michael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Boucouvalas Christos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3rd Rifle Group (arrived in Jun 1951)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Giakoumakis Elefterios</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>T Janetakos Evagelos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Milonas Panagiotis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Subsequent Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Voulgaris Aristidis</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Elafros George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Ardavanis Dionissios</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Tsolakas Xenofon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Goumas Jim</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dollys Agelos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Capt. Papadimitropoulos George  
Capt. Dertilis Nicolaos  
Capt. Moukas Konstantinos  
Capt. Stamatelopoulos Jim  
Capt. Koutsmanis Konstantinos  
Capt. Agrafiatis Konstantinos  
Capt. Petrakis Christos  
Capt. Koutzegalou Miltiadis  
Capt. Kraseras George  
Capt. Manzarlis Basil  
Capt. Thomopoulos Stavros  
Capt. Maniatis John  
Capt. Hatzidakis George  
Capt. Adonatos Zissimos  
Capt. Lellas Ektor  
Capt. Halikias Panagiotis  
Capt. Loukas Konstantinos  
Capt. Panagopoulos Jim  
Capt. Tsepas Dionissios  
Capt. Korais George  
Capt. Tsakayannis Spiros  
Capt. Rogakos Elefterios  
Capt. Leledakis John  

Capt. Seidas Leonard  
Capt. Fragakos Stavros  
Lt. Panagiotopoulos Anastassios  
Capt. Giannakouris Anastassios  
Capt. Tjanetos Panagiotis  
Capt. Tjadas Venizelos  
Capt. Podikas Efthimios  
Capt. Lafiropoulos Alexander  
Capt. Pirochos Jim  
Capt. Bonitis Konstantinos  
Capt. Vlachos Spirios  
Capt. Versis Nikolaos  
Capt. Anastasopoulos Panag  
Capt. Agorastopoulos Epaninodos  
Capt. Sfakanakis George  
Capt. Tjamaloukas Othon  
Capt. Athanasios Dimosthenes  
Capt. Michalakakos Thomas  
Capt. Avedakis Panagiotis  
Capt. Bouros George  
Capt. Moniakis Adrew  
Capt. Sgouros Antony

e. List of Officers Killed in Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Stathias Apostolo</td>
<td>30 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Manassis Ioannis</td>
<td>9 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Arvanitis Georgios</td>
<td>3 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Nicolaidis Athanasios (in acdt)</td>
<td>3 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Platis Demetre</td>
<td>24 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Koutsoukos Spyridou</td>
<td>28 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Mournoussis Patroklos</td>
<td>3 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Tanis Athanasios</td>
<td>3 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Mavromatis Stefanos</td>
<td>4 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Matsoukas Georgios</td>
<td>7 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Stassos Ioannis</td>
<td>9 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Vocikis Andreas</td>
<td>28 Sep 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. Citations and Decorations

(1) ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered &amp; Place of Action</th>
<th>Dated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Greek Inf Bn      | 3–10 Oct 1951
Hill 313 (Scotch) – Hill 334 (Neb) and in the vicinity of
Hill 275 in the Sonbyok area | 24 Mar 1952 |
| 13th Greek AF     | 1 Dec 1950 – 31 Mar 1953                                                  | 23 Oct 1953 |
| Flight*           |                                                                           |          |

(2) U.S. Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered &amp; Place of Action</th>
<th>Dated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Greek Inf Bn in Korea* | 3–10 Oct 1951
Hill 313 in the vicinity of Sonbyok                                    | 7 Jan 1952 |
| Greek Inf Company in Korea | 17–18 Jan 1953
Hill 420 (Harry) in the Iron Triangle area                             | 16 Nov 1954 |

*Copies of citation are annexed herewith for further reference.

(4) Number of Individual Decorations

ROK Decorations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decoration</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ulchi Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungmu Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwarang Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War Service Medal</td>
<td>9,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United Nations Decorations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decoration</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Medal with “KOREA” Clasp</td>
<td>7,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Greek Decorations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decoration</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Cross B’ Class</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cross of Commandery of King George 1st’s Order with Swords ............................................ 1
Cross of Superior Commanders of Our Order of Plan with Swords ........................................ 2
War Cross A’ Class (Unit Citation) ............................................ 1 (On flag)
Silver Medal of Valour ..................................................... 186
Commander of the Order of Medal of Valour (Unit Citation) ............................................ 1 (On flag)
War Cross C’ Class .............................................................. 760
Medal of Distinguished Actions* ........................................... 2,069
Promotion of Battle Field Action ........................................... 27
Gold Medal of Valours ..................................................... 121

U.S. Decorations*

Silver Star ................................................................. 14
#(46)
Legion of Merit ............................................................. 4
#(7)
Bronze Star Medal ......................................................... 166
Bronze Star Medal (V) ..................................................... #(122)
Bronze Star Medal (M) ..................................................... #(223)

* Indicates number of decorations awarded to personnel of Greek forces in Korea to include 30 September 1954. (Quoted from U.S. military source)

* According to the official statement of the U.S. representative at the United Nations session on December 8, 1953, fighters of the Greek Army Battalion were decorated 6 War Crosses, 32 Silver Stars, and 116 Bronze Stars during the period January 1951 – August 1953. Consequently, the Greek Army Battalion was the top in the honorable distinctions in comparison with the other equivalent units which took part in the Korean War during the same period of time, according to the above statement.

Belgian Decorations

La Croix D’officier de L’ordre de la Couronne Avec Plame ..................................................... 6

Colombian Decorations

Medal “Honor al Deber Ganplido” of the Colombian Order ............................................. 1

g. Enemy Losses:

Estimated enemy Casualties Caused by the Greek Battalion

Killed enemy in action ................................................. 1,656 men *^1
Greek Battalion

Wounded enemy in action .................. 1,139 men *2
Captured enemy prisoners ............... 80 men *3

*1. This shows ascertained figure counted in the battle field.
*2. This indicates verified figure in the battle field. It has been, however, estimated that they must be over than 5,500.
*3. Officially 80 men have been registered on the official records. They were, therefore, much more, because during offensive actions of the Greek Battalion, the prisoners of war were customarily forwarded immediately to the higher echelon, that was American regiment to which the battalion was attached, without any registration. Such cases were many. Greek source claimed that the ascertained number of captured prisoners totaled 208 enemy officers and men at least.

Enemy Material and Equipment Captured

Automatic weapons, various types .................. 52
Rifles, various types .................. 232
Rifles, пулемет gun types .................. 4
Machine guns, various types .................. 70
Mortars, various types .................. 22
Radio Sets .................. 3
Anti-tank guns .................. 4
Trucks, Russian-built .................. 6
Pickaxes .................. 2,653
Telephone sets and bugles .................. a non-fixed number

Ammunition .................. a lot as indicated below:

- Mortar's .................. Approximately 2,500 projectiles
- Light machine gun's .................. Approximately 22,500 cartridges
- Rifle's .................. Approximately 65,000 cartridges
- Handgrenades .................. Approximately 4,200

Note: Number of material and equipment actually captured was much higher, because those items were not officially registered or kept records in many cases, and they were abandoned on the terrain in order not to present transportation difficulties to the Greek Battalion.
HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY, KOREA (EUSAK)
Office of the Commanding General
APO 301

7 January 1952

GENERAL ORDER
NUMBER 16

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

By direction of the President, under the provision of Executive Order 9396 (Section I, WD Bul 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (Section III, WD II, 1942) and pursuant to authority in AR 260-15, the following unit is cited as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction for service as set forth in the following citation.

The GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES BATTALION, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA, is cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy in the vicinity of Sonbyok, Korea during the period 3 to 10 October 1951. While attached to the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st US Cav Division, the GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES BATTALION was assigned the mission of seizing and securing and area of vital strategic importance from a numerically superior enemy force. After an intense friendly artillery barrage, the GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES BATTALION moved forward aggressively toward their objective. Their route of attack led them across a wide expanse of exposed terrain and the leading elements were subjected to a heavy volume of mortar and artillery fire from the well-entrenched and heavily armed enemy. Under fire by the intense fire, the friendly force continued to advance until they reached the base of the enemy-held hills.

Three times they charged up the steep slopes toward the enemy positions constantly closing with the enemy in savage hand-to-hand combat but they were repeatedly forced to withdraw because of the overwhelming number of enemy troops which faced them. After experiencing a superb disposition to overcome all opposition during a three-day period of the most bitter and violent fighting, the GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES BATTALION forced the enemy not only to relinquish valuable terrain but also to commit their primary defense force as well as many of their reserve troops in resisting the unrelenting pressure of the friendly force. This action enabled the friendly flanking units to launch a series of attacks which drove the enemy troops from their positions with heavy casualties. With their first objective secured, the troops of the GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES BATTALION continued to advance until they were halted by fanatical enemy troops occupying a commanding ridge. Once again, the courageous members of this Battalion launched a series of assaults up the rugged slopes directly into the devastating volume of fire directed against them by the well-entrenched enemy. Displaying unsurpassed tenacity, they reached the enemy emplacements and, in the bitter battle which ensued, vast numbers of the enemy were killed and wounded and finally were forced to abandon their positions. The routed enemy force left behind large stores of ammunition and weapons in their haste safety from the unrelenting fury of the GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES BATTALION. The steadfast determination and selfless heroism displayed by the members of the battalion of all those with whom they served. The GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES BATTALION displayed such gallantry, devotion to duty and spirit de corps in accomplishing its mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as set it part and above other units participating in the action.

The extraordinary heroism displayed by the members of this unit reflects great credit upon themselves and the military service of the Kingdom of Greece.

KAG-MD 200.6
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL JAMES A. VAN FLEET

C.C. MOOD
Brigadier General,
Chief of Staff

Introduction

The Greek Air Force following its tradition, history and the country’s centry old fights for freedom and civilization, sent to Korea one flight of transport aircraft DAKOTA C-47 called “The 13th Greek Flight,” or 13th Hellenic Transport Flight, or the Royal Hellenic Air Force Flight No. 13. The flight was activated on 13 October 1950 and it came from the 355th Greek Transport Squadron which was stationed in Elefsis Airfield and had participated in the operations against Communist guerrillas from April 1946 to 1949.

The Hellenic Flight consisted of seven C-47 aircraft and 67 experienced officers and enlistedmen of which 27 were pilots. Upon the completion of all preparations the flight was ordered to depart for Korea. At 0830 hours on 11 November 1950, seven aircraft took off Elefsis Airfield heading for Korea. Following a number of landings on Cyprus, Dahran, Karachi, New Dehli, Calcuta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, Manila and Fukuoka, the flight finally landed on Itazuke in Kyushu, Japan at 0557 hours on 1 December 1950 after a 57-hour and 46-minute trip.

First Operational Missions
(4–31 December 1950)

Upon its arrival at Itazuke, Japan, it was attached to the 21st US Troop Carrier Squadron, later called the 6461st Troop Carrier Squadron. On 2 December, at about 1600 hours, Major General William H. Turner, Commander of the US Far East Air Force Cargo Command and the 315th Air Division, welcomed the flight personnel and explained to them that due to the unfavourable development of the tide of war in Korea, it was necessary to take part immediately in the air operations.

Facing with a completely new phase of war, as Red China made the armed aggression into the Korean territory in a total war effort with the overwhelming strength, the ROK–UN Allied forces were in the serious situation. Therefore, from 4 December 1950 the Greek Flight undertook war missions over the northern territory starting from an airstrip in Hungnam called K-27. The Hellenic aircraft
along with the aircraft of the 21st US Squadron evacuated 1,000 wounded of the encircled 1st US Marine Division from Hagaru-ri. They were completely isolated following a rapid advance of Chinese Communist forces.

During the period from 4 to 10 December 1950 the contribution of the Hellenic Flight to the UN forces was significant. The flight transported a variety of equipment, passengers, and wounded men from advanced airstrips after the friendly units withdrawal. The flight aircraft crossed the enemy-held territory, despite the unfavourable weather conditions and severe snow storms, landed on narrow strips under enemy fire and evacuated therefrom the greatest possible number of wounded men to K-27 and then to hospitals in the rear areas. These successful missions resulted in the evacuation of all wounded men and therefore gave the opportunity to the troops to withdraw from this dangerous area without considerable casualties. For this outstanding achievement, the Greek Flight was decorated with the U.S. Presidential Citation and nine officers, six non-commissioned officers and four men with the U.S. Air Medal.

Impending now the capture of the Hagaru-ri area by the enemy, the Greek Flight abandoned the airstrip and moved to K-9 Airfield near Pusan, from where it operated till the end of 1950. From 4 to the end of December 1950, the flight realized 67 war missions, corresponding to 260 hours and 45 minutes of war flights, during which 424,767 pounds of equipment, 607 wounded men and 154 passengers were transported. During the same period 73.25 air training hours, 97 link hours and 89-hour ground training was conducted.

1951

From January 1951 the flight was based at Tachikawa, near Tokyo, Japan, where it remained until the end of July 1951. At the same time half of the flight strength was moved to K-2 Airbase in Taegu where it continued its contribution to the UNC’s war effort until 13 May 1951, when it moved again to K-14 (Kimpo). The threat of enemy air raids during the last ten days of June 1951 against K-13, K-14, and K-16 Airbases near Seoul as well as the Red Chinese radio threats about mass air attacks against the friendly territory from 25 to 29 June did not influence the morale or decrease the activities of the pilots.

During July 1951 the operations were conducted by the Greek Flight from Tachikawa Airbase and by its advance echelon from K-14. At the end of July, the advance echelon in Kimpo moved to Ashiya Airbase in Japan, wherefrom it continued its action until 15 January 1952, when it moved back to K-sites. The Greek planes were relocated to Ashiya, Kyoshu during 18–22 August 1951.
in order to avoid a strong typhoon. It was during this month when the missions to the airstrip on the beach of Paengnyong-do, an island in the Western Sea off the Ongjin Peninsula, and opposite the enemy-held coast, started. However, landings on the island took place during certain hours of that day due to the ebb and the tide which covered the entire landing strip.

In September 1951 the Hellenic Flight conducted 82 operation missions. It continued its actions during October from Ashiya Airbase; although the base was struck by a strong typhoon. It continued its activities from there until the end of 1951. During 1951 the 13th Greek Transport Flight accomplished a total of 741 operation missions; completed 4,047.45 hours and evacuated 3,846 wounded men; and transported 13,866 passengers and 5,168,134 pounds of equipment.

The continued activities of the Hellenic aircraft and especially their landings and take-offs on unsuitable airstrips which did not comply with the security or safety rules resulted in a number of accidents in 1951. In fact, on 4 January 1951 the first air accident took place. Number 617 aircraft, while trying to land with a load of 4,800 pounds, was severely damaged due to the soft and muddy ground of the airstrip. Then the plane was destroyed in order not to be taken by the enemy who occupied the airstrip after a few days.

On 26 May 1951, the first serious accident occurred in the Greek Flight in Korea. Number 612 aircraft while flying at a low altitude from K-2 to K-5 Airbase because of bad visibility crashed into a hill and caught fire. As a result the pilot, Lieutenant Manyoukas Anastasios, co-pilot Lieutenant Mamakis Nick, technicians Artsitas Andreas and Ekonomopoulos Spyridon and 1st Lieutenant Yan Pok of the ROK Army were killed.

1952

On 15 January 1952 its location moved from Ashiya, Japan to K-16 airstrip (Yoi-do, Seoul) and then to K-14 Airbase (Kimpo). Although the weather was not favourable during the first months of 1952, the operation missions were carried out very successfully. After March as the weather improved the flight missions were increased. The annual missions of the Greek Flight in 1952 exceeded every previous one. It carried out 899 operation missions and completed 3,613.40 flight hours. Further, it performed 8,300 supply and parachute droppings, evacuated 1,433 wounded men; and transported 17,662 passengers and a load of 3,043,619 pounds.
The bright merits of the Hellenic Flight during 1952 were overshadowed by two fatal accidents. On 22 December 1952 a U.S. F-80, while taking off from K-13 Airbase in Suwon, collided against Number 616 Hellenic aircraft which was full of wounded men and ready to take off. The aircraft was completely destroyed and all its personnel (Major Panayotis Fragoyannis, the Flight Commander; 1st Lieutenant Perrakakis Angelos, co-pilot; and Sergeant Tzinakos Georgios, Sergeant Eleftheriou Alexametros, a nurse and six American wounded men). Five days later another accident happened. On 27 December No. 2-632 Hellenic aircraft, during a night courier mission, collided against a hill shortly after its off from K-10 Air Base, caught fire and fell down from a height of 150-feet into a ravine. In this accident 1st Lieutenant Papadakis Vassiliios, 2nd Lieutenant Katsantonis Vassiliios, Sergeant Major Labrou Panagiotis, Sergeant Billas Georgios, one US engineer and nine passengers (eight Americans and one Philippino) were killed.

1953

The activities of the Greek Flight which had been temporarily stopped because of the repeated accidents in 1952, started again from 9 January 1953 with its base at K-16 in Seoul. In February and March 1953 its efficiency was increased and the reduced number of aircraft did not influence the flight activities in comparison with the past. In May, in spite of personnel strain, due to repeated alerts and continuous flights, the number of missions further increased. It was an indication of the prevailing spirit of self-sacrifice and complete understanding of task undertaken by the Greek airmen. The missions of the Hellenic Flight were further increased in June and July 1953 when the large-scale operations conducted along the front due to the Communist forces launched their last minute offensives flouncing about like mad dogs. Furthermore, the Panmunjom talks for reaching an armistice between the UN forces and Communist aggressors created the urgent need for transportation of wounded soldiers to the rear areas.

After the armistice was signed in July 1953, the flight continued rendering its services to the Republic of Korea with the same zeal until the end of 1973. Thus, the operation missions accomplished in 1953 by the Greek Flight amounted to 657 with a total of 3,087.40' flight hours. During the first six months, it conducted 12,550 air-drops of supplies and equipment, and within the entire year it evacuated 2,857 woundeds and transported 24,838 men and a load of 1,521,432 pounds.

In recognition of the service and sacrifice rendered by the Hellenic Transport
Flight to the United Nations Command's war effort in Korea for the cause of freedom, its personnel were honored by numerous awards and won the admiration and respect of the ROK and UN forces comrades in arms. For instance, on 23 October 1953, the Republic of Korea Government awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the Hellenic Flight for its distinguished service from 1 December 1950 up to 31 March 1953.

Post-Armistice Service
(1954–1955)

Since the threat for world peace, particularly on the Korean peninsula by the Communists, was continued, the 13th Hellenic Air Transport Flight was constantly on the alert to act. In 1954 the remaining five Greek aircraft were fully ready with a 100 per cent availability. The flying personnel were constantly renewed every six months whereas the ground personnel every nine months.

Thus, the Greek Flight personnel continued their service from K-16 Air Base in Korea with the same enthusiasm as in the war period, willingly undertaking and carrying out the missions assigned to them both during day and night time. The flight remained in K-16 until 19 December 1954. Then it returned to K-14 Air Base. During the first five months of 1954 the flight completed a number of 176 missions during which it evacuated 378 wounded and transported 6,010 passengers and a load of 381,785 pounds, covering 877.30 flight hours. On 7 April 1954, in recognition of its accomplishments, came the second citation which was awarded by the President of the Republic of Korea to the 315th US Air Division and its attached air units for exceptionally valuable services rendered to the Republic during the period from 1 July 1951 to 7 April 1954. From 11 June 1954, the Hellenic Flight continued its activities from K-14 Air Base where it remained until the end of March 1955 when its return to Greece was decided.

During the period from 4 December 1950 to 26 March 1954 that the Hellenic Flight participated in the Korean operations, it carried out a total of 2,983 missions in all representing 13,777 flight-hours. Moreover it evacuated 70,568 passengers and 11,104,550 pounds of equipment and also conducted drops of 17,000 pounds of ammunition and supplies. The flight lost four aircraft and 12 men including one of the Flight Commanders.

Upon receipt of the return order to Greece the five remaining Greek aircraft departed from Japan on 8 May 1955 and following a number of touch-downs at various airports, arrived at Flefsis airport in Greece on 23 May 1955 after a
flight of 54 and a half hours. Thus, the Hellenic Flight contributed to the United Nations Command operations for preserving the principles of freedom and justice, for which it sacrificed the blood of its twelve heroic men.

As a small taken to the above sacrifice, the Republic of Korea Government offered a suitable place in the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Pusan where the Hellenic flag was hoisted and has been waving ever since. This is a reminder, in this far away corner of the world, of the presence of the Hellenic soul in the fight for freedom and justice against the Communist aggressors.

Reference Records and Data
Greek Air Force

a. Participated Period:

| Departure from Greece: | 11 Nov 1950 |
| Arrival at Itazuke, Japan: | 1 Dec 1950 |
| Starting of War missions: | 4 Dec 1950 |
| Departure of the last unit from Kimpo: | 1 Apr 1955 |
| Departure of last five aircraft from Japan: | 8 May 1955 |
| Arrival of last air unit at Elefsis, Greece: | 23 May 1955 |

b. Total number of participants:

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<th>Period</th>
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<th>EM</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Dec 1950 – 27 Jul 1953</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-armistice until 1 Apr 1955</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>397</td>
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</table>

c. Total Losses:

Personnel, KIA | 7 | 5 | 12 |
Aircraft | | | 4 |


Operation mission | 2,983 missions |
Operational flight hours | 13,777 flight-hours |
Evacuated | 9,243 wounded |
Transported .................................. 70,568 passengers
11,104,550 lbs of equipment

Aerial drops .................................. 17,000 lbs of ammunition
and supplies

e. Commanders of the Greek Air Flight:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Chatzakis John</td>
<td>11 Nov 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Demiris Panagiotis</td>
<td>9 Apr 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Plionis George</td>
<td>15 Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Panayotis Fragoyannis</td>
<td>30 Aug 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Kostakos Jaoumes</td>
<td>4 Jan 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Voutsas Jaoumes</td>
<td>12 Oct 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Boujouvalas Theodros</td>
<td>1 Jun 1954</td>
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f. List of KIA Personnel:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<th>Date of Death</th>
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<tr>
<td>Group Capt.</td>
<td>Fragoyannis Panagiotis</td>
<td>22 Dec 1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>Squadron Ldr.</td>
<td>Papadakis Vasilios</td>
<td>22 Dec 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Lt.</td>
<td>Perakakis Agelos</td>
<td>23 Dec 1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flight Lt.</td>
<td>Vamvykas Anastas</td>
<td>26 May 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Officer</td>
<td>Mamalis Nikolaos</td>
<td>26 May 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Officer</td>
<td>Katsantonis Vasilios</td>
<td>27 Dec 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Officer</td>
<td>Artsitas Andreas</td>
<td>26 May 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sgt.</td>
<td>Labrou Panagiotis</td>
<td>27 Dec 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Sgt.</td>
<td>Bilias Georgios</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Sgt.</td>
<td>Eleftherious Alexandros</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>Oikonomopoulos Spiridon</td>
<td>26 May 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airman</td>
<td>Tsinakos Grigorios</td>
<td>22 Dec 1952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SYNGMAN RHEE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

(Translation) 23 October 1953

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in citing

THE 13TH GREEK FLIGHT OF THE GREEK AIR FORCE

for outstanding and superior performance of duty during the period 1 December 1950 to 31 March 1953

The 13th Greek Flight of the Greek Air Force was distinguished for its heroic service during the period from 1 December 1950 to 31 March 1953 when it participated in the combat against a common enemy of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations.

Having left its homeland just after a three year war against the same enemy the 13th Greek Flight travelled thousands of miles and was among the first organizations which came to help the Republic of Korea. Attached to the 21st US Troop Carrier Squadron which later was redesignated as the 461st Troop Carrier Squadron, the 13th Greek Flight operated continuously day and night under all weather conditions as a kind of nonequipped transport aircraft unit. The missions were carried out throughout the combat areas in Korea. Landing were carried out in landing strips of the front and hundreds of wounded Republic of Korea soldiers were safely transported to hospitals in the rear areas and thus many lives were saved. Landings were also carried out in dangerous insular beaches while the friendly strategic detachments were far away in the rear enemy lines where enemy attacks were imminent at any moment.

During this period of operations, the 13th Greek Flight carried out 1,795 operational missions and covered 8,388 war flight hours, transported 34,610 men, evacuated safely 5,938 wounded, transported 8,823 pounds of cargo, and conducted drops of 16,900 pounds of food and ammunition.

In these accomplishments, the 13th Greek Flight lost 45 per cent of its active aircraft, 14 per cent of its flying personnel and suffered the loss of one of its commanders.

Through its self-sacrifice, the outstanding devotion to duty and its determination to overcome all the presented difficulties, the 13th Greek Flight demonstrated exceptional heroism and its contribution to the Republic of Korea and to all the world who love freedom and had confidence in the Greek Air Force was immeasurable. The outstanding service of the officers and men of the 13th Greek Flight reflects great credit upon themselves and is in accord with the highest traditions of military service.

By this citation each member of the 13th Greek Flight who served in Korea during the stated period is entitled to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon.

/s/ SYNGMAN RHEE
(Presidential Seal)
THE NETHERLANDS FORCE
THE NETHERLANDS FORCE

1. Introduction

In response to the United Nations ideal of collective security action against the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands Government, on 14 July 1950, decided to send an infantry force of volunteers to Korea, and the Netherlands Detachment to the United Nations Forces in Korea was activated on 15 October at New Alexander in Hague. It consisted of headquarters, two rifle companies and a support company, and was placed under the command of Major Den Ouden.

Thus, on 26 October 1950, a total of 636 men of the Korea-bound Netherlands Detachment – the Netherlands Infantry Battalion – embarked on Zuiderkruis at Rotterdam and arrived at Pusan, Korea on 23 November. Disembarking at Pusan on the following day, the Detachment was moved to the United Nations Reception Center at Taegu for ten days of equipping and familiarization training.

Ever since, throughout the entire period of its service in the Korean War, the Netherlands Battalion displayed gallantry, determination and esprit-de-corps in accomplishing its mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions. The individual and unit heroism displayed by the soldiers of the Netherlands Battalion in their valiant stand against the Communist forces in the battles at Hoengsong, Wonju, Soyang River, and Iron Triangle have gained the highest reputation not only for themselves, but also for their home-country and the United Nations Forces in the Korean War as well.

2. Ground Force

Operations in 1950

On 5 December the Netherlands Battalion arrived at Suwon and on 11 December
the Battalion was attached to the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd US Division which was then at worst status in combat capabilities. The first combat mission in the Korean War for the Battalion was to screen the remnants of the Red NK guerrillas around Suwon. The screening operations continued until 23 December and the Battalion was ordered to move to Hwanggi-ni, 15 kilometer east of Chungju.

The mission of the Battalion was to secure MSR between Chomchon and Chungju in the rugged mountain passes. On 25 December the Battalion was ordered to move further over the Sobaik Mountains to Mungyong for MSR security between Chungju and Hamchang including famous Sae-jae (Mungyong Pass) with 1,100 meters height. By the end of December the guerrilla activities in the area were scarcely found.

Operations in 1951

At Hoengsong Area: As expected, the enemy offensive began on New Year Eve with seven CCF armies and two NK corps toward Seoul and Wonju. The entire UN troops were ordered another withdrawal to a line “D” running from west coast 80 kilometers bellow Seoul at Pyongtaek, eastward connecting the towns of Wonju and Samchok. At this juncture, the defense responsibility of the Wonju area was assigned to the 2nd US Division on 2 January 1951. Upon completion of Mungyong area security mission, the Netherlands Battalion was brought to the Hoengsong front north of Wonju where a coordinated CCF-NK penetration had heavily pressed the 23rd US Infantry defense line. Moreover the elements of the II ROK Corps, on the right flank of the 2nd US Division, moved southward, leaving a big pocket east of Hoengsong. Upon arrival at Hoengsong on 3 January, the Netherlands A Company aggressively patrolled the northeast route from Hoengsong to Choheyon-ni, while B Company moved to Chowon-ni for covering the northwest route of Hoengsong sector. Rest of the Battalion (staff and Weapons Company) closed in Hoengsong on the next day.

To probe the Communist penetration on the east of Hoengsong, 100 men of A Company were dispatched into Choheyon-ni and Yudong-ni area where Reds were suspected to concentrate. As the Netherlands patrol approached to a last gorge of village, it met 15 enemy busily engaging in mining the road. They surprised and killed them by machinegun fire and searched the village under heavy enemy fire. Suffering 2 KIA and 7 WIA in this fire-baptism, the patrol broke contact with this enemy and withdrew to Hoengsong by order before sunset. It suffered 2 more wounded during the withdrawal.
On the next day, while B Company still held Chowon-ni positions, A Company carried out another motor patrol mission between Hoengsong and forward command post of the 38th US Infantry in 15 kilometers distance. The first patrol was conducted at night and no sooner the fifth was to be despatched in the early next morning the order was received from Division to cancel the patrol and return to Hoengsong where a major enemy thrust was directed.

The Communists’ attack had succeeded in breaking through the right flank of the 2nd US Division as far as Tanyang, and the Division was ordered to abandon Hoengsong and establish new positions in the vicinity of Wonju—Chechon in conjunction with the 7th US Division on the east.

**Wonju Battle:** NK Communists’ major thrust commenced on 5 January toward Wonju—Chungju corridor. The Netherlands Battalion was, too, ordered to move Musil-li, two kilometers south of Wonju, for protecting and covering the withdrawal of other friendly troops, astriding Wonju—Chungju road. The enemy had entered Wonju by midnight of the 7th. When the last elements of the 38th US Infantry completed its withdrawal through the Netherlands covering positions, the Battalion broke contact with the follow-up enemy and moved further south into regimental reserve near Yangachi. And there A Company patrolled eastward and found no enemy activity in the vicinity of Oduri while B Company was despatched westward for making the contact with the elements of the 8th ROK Division blocking the enemy’s flanking attack in the Taesu-ri area. By 12 of January, the Netherlands Battalion as well as other elements of the 2nd US Division were formed into one defensive perimeter on the high ground south of Wonju. Two days later, however, the Battalion was further ordered to move southward to a new defensive positions on Modified Line D. Then it went into a reserve at Pyondon-ri.

On 23 January an armoured patrol reached Wonju and reported that there was, also, little enemy resistance. The elements of the 2nd US Division entered Hoengsong on 2 February. The Netherlands Battalion was ordered to join the 38th US Infantry which had already closed in Wonju. It soon sent out patrols to clear the enemy northwest of Wonju during which its suffered 2 KIA and 2 WIA on 3 February.

**Hoengsong Battle:** The Eighth US Army planned “Operation Round up” with the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps in the attack. The 2nd US Division was to support the ROK division’s attack. Coincident with jumping off of “Round up,” the Netherlands Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of the 38th US Infantry in positions north and east of Hoengsong to support the 8th ROK Division’s efforts. But NK forces counterattacked the Corp’s right flank, and the 5th ROK Division,
therefore, took up blocking positions, and the 3rd ROK Division was brought up for the mission of continuing attack on Hongchon from the east.

When the Round-Up troops moved forward to Changbong-ni half-way between Hoengsong and Hongchon, the elements of the 40th, 66th CCF Armies and the V NK Corps launched a overwhelming frontal assault, and outflanked UNC units by penetrating deep into the rear and setting up road-blocks in the vicinity of Chowon-ni and further south at Haktan-ni. All UN troops, the forward units north of Hoengsong, became disorganized and streamed southward fighting desperately through the caldron of enemy fire at road-blocks. Withdrawing individuals and units gathered at a bridge near Kungol, the Red’s last road-blocks, but they were unable to breakthrough Massacre Valley to Hoengsong where the gallant Dutch volunteers were maintaining strong blocking positions to cover the withdrawing forces. A reinforcing force, consisting of a company of the 187th US Airborne RCT, a platoon of the 72nd US tank Battalion, and a ROK battalion, fought their way northward, made a link-up with the trapped ROK–U.S. troops (4,000 men), and the combined units fought back through Hoengsong held by the Netherlands defenders, southward to Wonju. The Netherlands Battalion were soon engaged bitter fighting as a last covering force on the night of 12 February.

The first and brief engagement with pursuing enemy took place in the A Company sector at the beginning of dusk and then enemy heavy pressure on the Netherlands positions was gradually mounting when darkness deepened. The 38th US Infantry moved its command post to south of Amnaemul river, 600 meters south of Hoengsong. However the Netherlands command post remained in Hoengsong and was ready to withdraw in loading state. A guard near auto-park observed some ten men in a group approaching toward the Battalion command post area from northeast shouting “Don’t shoot, ROKs.” The guard ceased his firing, thinking the men could be part of many withdrawing ROK troops, and the group walked into perimeter of the headquarter area and into the Support Company. Upon receiving the report on the strangers the Battalion Commander sent the Intelligence-Sergeant with an interpreter for detailed information. No sooner sergeant shouted “they are chinks, look out!” than the infiltrated soldiers, who were all Red Chinese, opened fire on command post area. Immediately fierce hand to hand fighting took place in and around the command post perimeter.

Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Marinus P.A. Den Ouden personally ran from place to place in order to lead his men to a high ground near a church, but there were confusion and mounting casualties by the CCF surprise attack. The isolated Battalion Commander was soon subjected to concentrated enemy fire and an explosion of handgrenade killed him. In the meantime the forward two
A battle monument erected at Hoengsong in memory of the Netherlands servicemen who fought there on 12–13 February 1951.

rifle companies were unaware of this command post engagement.

Though a part of the Headquarter Company was overrun by CCF surprise, another CCF attack onto support Company was repulsed by a gallant Dutch corporal, disregarding his hand being hit, continued grenade hauling by removing safety-pins with his teeth.

On the other hand, as the elements of trapped Support Force 21 and ROK troops almost completed their withdrawal, A Company, on south-bank of T'wineumul river northwest of Hoengsong, was ordered to move southward and crossed a bridge of Amnaemul at 2200 hours. At an hour later Support Company passed successively through the Amnaemul bridge, leaving behind CCF weird cacophony with bugles and whistles.

B Company, the only remained unit north of Amnaemul river, having communication trouble both in wire and radio, began its way back toward Amnaemul by the time the Support Company had crossed Amnaemul bridge, by breaking through the heavy rain of CCF's machinegun and mortar fire. Tanks and Quad' 50 ceaselessly pounded on CCF at the heel of slow moving column that could move only 600 meters in two hours.
Hoengsong being still torching, the Netherlands Battalion assembled at Wonju airstrip at 0400 hours on the 13th after suffering 54 casualties of which 17 were killed (including Battalion Commander, Chaplain and Personnel Officer) and 37 were wounded (including S-3, S-4, LNO, Transporation Officer and HQ Company Commander). On this day Major W.D.H. Eekhout, the Battalion Executive officer, assumed the command of the Battalion.

At Hill 325: The UNC troops had arrived at Wonju under the cover of Netherlands and were breathlessly working on the new defense line just north of the city during the next day. The Battalion deployed its companies of slightly over 500 men on the high ground north of Majon-station, six kilometers west of Wonju, with A Company on Hill 325 and B Company on the left of A Company. While flares soared high in extreme left sector of the 2nd US Division at Chipyong-ni where the 23rd US Infantry and the French Battalion were fiercely defending the vital road junction against three CCF divisions on the 13th, the hordes of CCF continued their attack to the new Wonju defense line in the early morning of the 14th. The enemy first attack launched on Hill 342 east of Hill 325 in the sector held by the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team and then main efforts directed on the front of Netherlands’ sector with overwhelming strength of 1,000 to 2,000 in an attempt to breakthrough Hill 325. B Company was heavily hit and was forced to withdraw to the next ridge and became a regimental reserve upon being relieved by US troops, while the gaps of the Chamyon-ni, on the right sector of the Netherlands, was plugged by a counterattack of the 187th US Airborne RCT.

In order to retake Hill 325, the Commander of the 38th US Infantry ordered a coordinated-counterattack with the Netherlands Battalion assaulting on the right under fire support of the Ranger Company of the 187th US RCT, while the 2nd Battalion attacking on the left. When the Dutch men were discussing with the rangers for coordination, five South African Fighter planes mistook the platoons of the Netherlands and the US rangers as the enemy and began strafing. In spite of ground troops attempt to stop the air-attack, they salvaged three runs more. Whole Netherlands men were completely dispersed and abandoned their mission of attack. In this accident the Dutch suffered 11 casualties including 2 dead. However, the US troops, maneuvering left side, seized the objective, Hill 325, and the defense line was restored.

The Netherlands Battalion, for narrowing the over-extended sector of rangers, assumed additional defense sector on the right portion of Hill 325. Being both in mentally and physically exhausted conditions, Battalion Commander organized provisional two rifle platoons with less being tired men, a platoon from the
Weapon Company and the other from administration personnel even including clerks, drivers and cooks. At midnight of the 14th, a newly organized provisional company (minus) led by A Company executive officer took the ranger positions over.

Shortly after the midnight, CCF renewed their attack under the mortar support fire. The US defenders on Hill 325, were forced to withdraw, some fled to Netherlands positions. Friendly counterattack immediately followed with the Netherlands Battalion and the 2nd US Battalion in the lead but advance of US troops did not progress as expected since they were far behind in reserve. A platoon of the provisional company desperately repeated its attack and at last eight men of the platoon gallantly spearheaded the column, at 0705 hours, and re-captured the Hill 325. In this action the Dutch suffered 20 casualties.

On 16 February the Battalion turned their mission over US troops and moved to Kujong southskirt of Wonju, becoming a regimental reserve with the strength of only 439 men, reduced to 70 percent from original strength of 636 men. Two days later the Battalion moved to Yanghyon- ni (Kanhyon-ni), 4 kilometers west of Hill 325, assuming a full-battalion sector. Ever since, the Battalion spent comparatively quiet days until the time when the 38th US Infantry with the Netherlands Battalion went into Corps reserve in the Chupori—Chechon Area.

Reserve period: The Battalion arrived in a well-deserved rest area at Chupo-ri on 23 February for rehabilitation. But they devoted two third of their reserve period to patrol missions. During this period from 23 February to 7 April 1951, they stayed a week at Chupo-ri, 10 days at Wonbong-ni, and rest of the duration at Chechon.

On 8 April the Battalion returned to front line and positioned at Chugutan, 15 kilometers northeast of Hongchon, as a reserve of the 2nd US Division to take part in Operation "Rugged" aimed at advancing to Line Kansas. On 12 April the Battalion began its movement and they backed up the positions near Chuyang-ni by making round auto-march through Hongchon and Chunchon to reinforce the 23rd US Infantry's northward attack. The Battalion dispatched A Company (reinforced with US tanks) to Oum-ni 15 kilometers northwest of Chuyang-ri for clearing this road but returned to previous position of Chuyang-ni on the next day. On 15 April, the day of the dismissal of General Douglas MacArther, when the forward elements secured their objective, Hwachon Reservoir-Line KANSAS, the Battalion was ordered another movement to Chuguton as a reserve.

CCF Spring Offensive: At the early evening hours of 23 April the frantic hordes of CCF armies launched their first step of the 5th Phase Offensive against the elements of the 6th ROK Division in the vicinity of Kwangdok-san, south of
Kumhwa, and penetrated deep into the Line Kansas toward southward to the
town of Kapyong. Meanwhile, the 1st US Marine Division, on the 6th ROK
Division’s right was also forced to pull back in order to prevent CCF exploitation
on its left flank. To maintain the contact and cope with the withdrawal of the
1st US Marine Divisions, Task Force “Zebra,” composed of the Netherlands Bat-
talion, French Battalion, two US Reconnaissance Companies and a tank company,
was formed by the 2nd US Division. The Netherlands Battalion, accordingly,
was dispatched to the extreme left flank of a reservoir near Yuchon-ni and Oum-ni
in coordination with other elements of the task force. The screening actions at the
west of the reservoir lasted until 24 April. The Battalion hurriedly moved to Yang-
gu next day and defended there till 26 April, when the troops on the southern
part of the high ground of reservoir were ordered to retire step by step toward a
designated general defensive line – No Name Line – to take up newly established
strong defense positions by the UN Command.

While the 38th US Infantry in reserve was deployed on No Name Line, orders
went out to forward elements to fall back behind the No Name Line under the
cover of the Netherlands Battalion who positioned at Naepyong-ni near the Soyang
River crossing on 27 April. On the next day the elements of the 23rd US Infantry
and French Battalion commenced its withdrawal in succession, and then the
Netherlands Battalion, after completed the covering mission, broke contact with
the enemy and started its withdrawal on foot through roadless and rugged
Napyong-ni Hangye narrow valley without any food and drinks since the breakfast
of the 27th till they found “C” rations next day near Panmegi-ri at 0900 hours.
They called this as “hunger march.” The Battalion arrived at Chuguton at 1400
hours on that same day.

At the end of April the Battalion was again ordered to move westward to an
area between Hill 638 and Hill 736 north of Hongchon for filling a 5-kilometer
gap of the 38th US Infantry’s MLR on the No Name Line where they devoted
their every effort to lay mines, register artillery fire, set up interlocking machinegun
fire and to string barbed wire including trip flares and booby traps.

On 13 May the Netherlands Battalion was ordered to turn over its sector to
elements of the 9th US Infantry and moved, for reinforcing the right portion of
the 38th US Infantry sector, to Hill 710 near Kunmul-gol behind the 1st Battalion
where the mass of CCF movement was detected. A platoon sized patrol from A
Company departed in the early morning of 16 May to locate and harass the enemy
patrols who were probing the friendly positions.

The patrol encountered with the enemy at the southern slope of Hill 781
five kilometers northwest of Hill 1051 and called artillery mass fire on the CCF
troops, and brought an enemy prisoner, who gave the information that their main attack would be commenced at 1800 hours of 16 May. The platoon, instead of returning to join with the parent company, was placed into the gap between two US platoons of A Company, the 38th US Infantry, on the west spur of Hill 1051, and the Netherlands A Company (minus) which took more closer blocking positions on Hill 975, at the end of southern ridge on the vital and dominating Hill 1051. (See Sketch Map 1.)

The CCF second step of the 5th Phase Offensive commenced toward Kari-san (Hill 1051) at 1800 hours, employing "human sea" tactics with whistles and bugle calls, but repulsed by friendly artillery concentration fire. Following the first wave, CCF repeatedly resumed their attacks at an one hour interval. At 2030 hours, Following intense preparation fire, the outnumbering strength of CCF launched a decisive assault against the Dutch positions. Together with US platoons, the Netherlands platoon stood firm and repulsed the CCF assault after
severe hand to hand fighting. However a US platoon, on the left of Netherlands platoon, was overran by CCF waves. And then the penetrated elements of the 117th CCF Division immediately directed their heavy pressure toward the Netherlands platoon from west and south, while a US company, positioned on the northeast spur of Hill 1051, could not stand and eventually withdrew leaving the open gap at east of Kari-san. The Netherlands platoon was also forced to withdraw toward Mullol. Soon the French Battalion was dispatched to plug the gap on the right of Kari-san, Hill 883 area, and the Netherlands Battalion was ordered to prepare to send B Company up to Hill 975 to join A Company for a counterattack to seal off Hill 1051.

When they reached the attacking positions on the ridge at the first light of the 17th, the Dutch attackers saw the stream of CCF troops all around their positions. All available fires, mortars, machine guns, recoiless rifles and the supporting artillery began to pound on those enemy concentrations. However, enemy resistance was so stubborn that the Battalion could make no progress in its counterattack. As the sun declined toward the west, there was no hope of holding the ridge line any longer. As the battered Netherlands Battalion was ordered to move to a reserve area, 4.5 kilometers south of Kungwang, Hill 1051 and its spurs fell to the enemy.

Late in the evening the Netherlands Battalion left the area to move again southward along the valley to Yasidaeri. The situation stabilized gradually in the afternoon of the 18th. On 19 May the Battalion was ordered back to front line on Hill 425 near Hangye road junction as a blocking unit of the 23rd US Infantry and secured there until its operational control was converted to the 9th US Infantry which shifted its sector eastward to the Naechon and Toroyongdong area for an attack to the north on 23 May.

Pursuit northward along Hyon-ni Axis: At 0800 hours of 23 May the 2nd US Division began its counteroffensive to capture Inje and cut off the rear of the CCF remnants estimated to 30,000-strong in front of the division.

On the left, the 187th US Airborne RCT, also attached to the 2nd US Division, was to drive northeast as a mobile task force along the Hongchong-Inje-Kansong road through the line of the 23rd US Infantry as main thrust, while, to its right, the 38th US Infantry with the Netherlands Battalion, was to advance northward through the rugged Hangye-Hyon-ni-Inje road. In the center the 9th US Infantry was to sweep the area between the pinching two mobile forces.

In a heavy pouring rain the Netherlands Battalion moved eastward to Wadunji near Pungam-ni, and there the Battalion Commander dispatched its A Company, reinforced with tanks, 5 kilometers further east to set up the screening positions to block the enemy penetration in Sanggunduri basin on the night of the 23rd.
After a brief engagement with enemy patrol, the company returned to Wadunji in the afternoon next day. The 38th US Infantry made its steady way along the Hyon-ni axis.

On 25 May, after the long voyage from Amsterdam, the Third Rifle Company arrived and joined with the Battalion at Waya-ri. The Netherlands Battalion was now in full strength for the first time since its operation in Korea.

Breaking through the sporadic and light enemy resistance at Amdaltong in midway to Inje, the Battalion seized Hill 1017 dominating Hyon-ni valley and stayed for a night at Yongpo and Soho (or Sobasu). Early in the morning of the 27th the Battalion resumed its advance and occupied intermediate objective, east side of Hyon-ni, while the 187th ARTC captured the Inje on that same day. There, the Battalion engaged in mopping-up actions for the CCF remnants in the Pandae valley, inflicting heavy casualties to the foe of 30 KIA and 25 POW against the Battalion suffering only 3 WIA. On the following day the Dutch Battalion moved out of Hyon-ni and kept its advance northward until 1245 hours, 29th when it crossed the 38th Parallel and joined the 187th US Airborne RCT and the 23rd US Regiment at Inje.

The Fighting at Inje: At the end of May the X US Corps reached a general line of the Soyang River. On the left, the 1st US Marine Division had control of Yanggu and, on its right, the 2nd US Division had secured Inje. The Netherlands Battalion together with the 23rd US Infantry deployed on the high hills east of Inje to protect divisions’ right flank, while the 9th US Infantry, in Corps reserve, maintained its positions for providing the security of the Soyang bridge site at Kwandae-ri.

At 0400 hours on 31 May, the enemy launched a new attack on the Netherlands Battalion’s defensive positions on Hill 549 and soon developed into the heavy fighting. B Company on the left sector was forced to withdraw. All available fires were directed on Hill 549, while the Battalion prepared for a counterattack. At dawn of 1 June, platoons from A and B Companies, launched the counterattack and regained the lost positions.

A succession of enemy counterattack followed and bloody pushing back and forth combat for Hill 549 continued until 2 June when the 27th Infantry of the 5th ROK Division reached in front of Hill 549 and eliminated the enemy pressure from the east of Inje. During the bloody Inje Battle, the Netherlands Battalion suffered 20 KIA, 31 WIA and 1 MIA, while there counted 300 enemy dead and captured 7 enemy POW’s. On 6 June, relieved by the 5th ROK Division, the Netherlands Battalion together with other elements of the 2nd US Division moved into a Corps reserve area, near Hongchon.
During the reserve period at Sinjomal 7 kilometers north of Hongchon, the Battalion learned the news that the second replacements of 158 men would join with the Battalion prior to 1 July and another 300 men by the end of August so as to permit the first contingent to return home.

Meanwhile, the Netherlands Battalion underwent the field training designed to harden the troops and practice on small arms and then unit training of coordinated attack with ground and air support. In addition to the battle drill the battalion maintained daily patrol around the Hongchon area.

By the end of the first year of the Korean War, the UNC troops were backed on Line Kansas, and, as the Communists proposed cease-fire negotiations on 23 June and UN Command agreed to talk. A new phase of war was about to begin.

Taeu-san: From 15 to 17 July, the 2nd US Division with its attached Netherlands and French Battalions relieved the 1st US Marine Division on the southwest positions of the Punchbowl, and was ordered to capture Taeu-san (Hill 1179) to establish a patrol base. Upon completion of the relief at the west spur of Tosol-san (Hill 1148) which facing perpendicular to Taeu-san, the Netherlands Battalion initiated patrolling toward balded Hill 1120, south spur of Taeu-san, on the 19th, and intensified its patrolling to the area for next few days.

The attack on Taeu-san began in the foggy morning of the 26th. While the 23rd US Infantry maneuvered in a feint on the far right in the basin of the Punchbowl, the 38th US Infantry jumped-off toward Hill 1179 in two columns – the Netherlands Battalion would secure the intermediate objective Hill 1120 from which it could provide fire support to the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry assigned to take the crest of Taeu-sa from its right. When the Netherlands C Company approached 100 meters below the crest of Hill 1120, they were pinned down by the enemy fire barrage. Furthermore the supporting fire, both air and artillery, requested by the Netherlands, were not adequately provided and their ammunition was running short. The assaulting company was in a dilemma and the casualties
were mounting. The regimental commander ordered the attacking columns to withdraw under the cover of darkness and smoke screen.

In the early next morning the attack on Taeu-san was renewed, but the Netherlands Battalion was ordered to provide fire support only in present positions to the 1st US Battalion, reinforced with the 3rd US Battalion, while the French Battalion took a part in the attack to press the rear of Taeu-san from the Punchbowl in order to cut off the enemy reinforcements. Progress was slow but partially succeeded in securing the vital foothold on Hill 1100, 800 meters east of Hill 1179. On 30 July, the 3rd US Battalion made a final assault and advanced inch by inch, taking a whole day long, to dislodge the stubborn enemy defenders from bunkers and trenches on the hill. At 1745 hours, Taeu-san fell to friendly hands. The Netherlands Battalion immediately seized Hill 1120 for protecting left-wing against the enemy counter-action and organized all-round defence positions from which the patrols were dispatched deeply into the enemy territory until the Battalion turned over its sector to the 1st US Battalion and went into division reserve at Kwandae-ri near 38th Parallel for recuperation.

During the reserve period, the Battalion implemented the rotation of the 1st contingent with the 2nd contingent. 50 men of the 1st contingent departed for Tokyo, Japan, and left there by plane heading Armsterdam on 14 August. The rest of 1st contingent (413 men) left the unforgettable battle grounds of Hangye Hongchon, Hoengsong and Wonju by vehicle and train further to Pusan for embarkation. On the other hand, remainders (about half of the Battalion in strength) moved to a reserve camp in Chungju to join with the new comers.

On 22 August USS General MacRae, transporting the third Netherlands contingent, arrived at Pusan. Main strength (252 men) of rotates landed on and entered the UNRC, while the 50 men from New Guinea including 24 Surinam natives and some of Curacao who transported by air joined with the main body at UNRC. On 2 September, 302 men of the third replacements moved to Chungju for joining with the main body of the Battalion. Thus, the newly organized Battalion (minus a rifle company) with 131 men of KATUSA underwent a series of intensive training. The Battalion was ordered to move in line near Hugong-ni and again attached to the operational control of the 38th US Infantry on 23 September while the other elements of the 2nd US Division engaged in bitter struggle of bloody battle at Heartbreak Ridge.

One more worthwhile event during the reserve period took place on 9 August in which Battalion was awarded with the United States Presidential Unit Citation for its bravery in "The Battle of Hoengsong-Wonju."

Mundung-ni Battle: For giving the more security to Line Kansas, while
removing the sag of UN front line in the Punchbowl area and forcing the Communists to consent UNC truce terms, the higher command ordered continuation of hard elbow push toward further north but the enemy reactions were sharp and sensitive.

After the almost one month of futile attacks on the enemy strong-points on Heartbreak Ridge since 13 September, the new assault plan, Operation Touch Down, was issued on 2 October. D-Day for operation was 5 October.

Three regiments began their attacks respectively on schedule; the 9th to Hill 867 in the west, the 38th to Hills 905 and 605 through Peam—Mundung-ni valley in the center, and the 23rd to Hill 931 (Heartbreak Ridge) in the east. The Netherlands Battalion moved closely behind the attackers in supporting positions of Hill 785 northwest spur of Bloody Ridge, Weapon Company deployed on Hill 582 just behind the line of departure for providing fire support to the 9th Infantry and the rest of the Battalion poised at Tondal farther south in reserve.

When the US tanks cut off the enemy reinforcement from northwest (near Mundungni) to Heartbreak Ridge, the two assault columns — the French Battalion from the north and the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry from the south —

The Netherlands Battalion is awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation by Gen. Van Fleet. Lt. Col. Ekkhout stands beside Gen. Van Fleet.
finally captured the peak of the Heartbreak Ridge on 6 October. Meanwhile the Netherlands Weapon Company further advanced north near Sagonbae and rendered brilliant fire support to the attacking elements to the 9th Infantry on Hill 867 with direct fires of the 75-mm. recoilless rifle. On 8 October, with a view to completely control and dominate the Mundungni–Naeri Valley for cutting off the enemy counterthrust, the 38th US Infantry brought the Netherlands Battalion near Paeam at night for attacks on hill mass between Hill 905 and Hill 605 which overlooking Mundungni. (See Sketch Map 2.)

Under the rain of heavy mortar shells the B Company on the left moved into attacking positions on a 600-altitude saddle and sent a platoon-size combat patrol toward Hill 905 for the contact with US troops on that hill but met heavy enemy machinegun fire and returned to the saddle, while the A Company on the right, seized its objective, left spur of Hill 605. As B Company, deploying its two platoons in front and the remainders at rear for fire support, advanced on assault positions just bellow the crest, the enemy poured machinegun and mortar fire which lasted about 25 minutes. This caused over 60 casualties to the attacker including the Company Commander and forced B Company to withdraw to the saddle where it reorganized in order to make one more attempt of assault at noon
on 10 October.

When the 2nd Battalion, the 38th Infantry, renewed its attack on Hill 905 in this afternoon, B Company also resumed the attack under the cover of darkness, and reached the ridge line at 2100 hours from where the company was to provide flanking fire support to US attackers.

During this action the Battalion suffered 10 KIA (including 2 KATUSA) and 67 WIA of which two were dead.

In ensuing days they vigorously patrolled in front of their positions until they were ordered to another westward movement on blocking positions between Hill 905 and Hill 974, east finger ridge of Hill 1220 on the 13th.

On 14 October, while the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry launched its final attack on Hill 1220, the highest crest in this area, two rifle companies of the Netherlands Battalion seized the northernmost Hills 920 and 841 and there the Battalion provided direct fire support to the attackers who were still struggling to take Hill 1220, while dispatching patrols and ambushes deep into the valley between Hill 1090 (Christmas Hill) and Naeri to cut off the enemy reinforcements.

Owing to the battle-wise support of the Dutchmen, US troops pushed upward with bayonet charge in hand to hand fighting and finally captured the crest of Hill 1220 on 15 October, marking Operation Tochdown praiseworthy.

Thereafter the Battalion was relieved by the elements of the 7th US Division on 24 October and moved through Sagonbae to an area west of Hwachon Reservoir for establishing a blocking positions as a reserve of the 38th US Infantry while the bulk of division units proceeded to Kapyong Camp as the reserve of the IX US Corps.

During the reserve period, the ceremonial parade held on the occasion of the presentation of the Distinguished Unit Citation for “Soyang River Battle” of last May to the Netherlands Battalion as well as other elements of the 2nd US Division on 24 November. The Vice President of the United States, Alben W. Barkley, awarded the Battalion with the Presidential Unit Citation, and praised the heroic actions of Hollanders. On 7 November Lieutenant Colonel G.H. Christian took over the command and reorganized the battalion, activating C Company with newly arrived 118 replacements in late November. Individual and unit training were conducted in November and December until the 2nd US Division returned to line for relieving the 25th US Division.

The Netherlands Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion of the Turkish Brigade in position on 20 December near Hajin-ni 12 kilometers west of Kumhwa in the Iron Triangle area.

**Outpost Battles in Iron Triangle area:** On the next day immediately following
completion of the relief, a platoon-size surprise attack was conducted against
an estimated CCF platoon position at steep Manusamahe Hill (named by platoon
leader) for taking prisoners but in vain. On the following day in an attempt to
capturing POW, a platoon of A Company reinforced by US tanks was dispatched
to Silverstar Hill, 500 meters north of Manusamahe. The platoon seized the in-
termediate objective of Leeringschans Hill (also named by platoon leader) 1000
meters west of Manusamahe and captured two CCF prisoners in addition to
counting 4 enemy dead and continued their attack on Silverstar Hill. No sooner
ten minutes preparatory fires ended than they rushed upward to hilltop but the
Netherlands attackers confronted heavy enemy mortar barrage and forced to
withdraw under the cover of smoke screen. The enemy mortar shelling was heavy
that the Netherlands raiders were suffered five wounded during the withdrawal.
When they returned to friendly line, the Division Commander awarded them with
five Silver Star and four Bronze Star medals for their distinguished actions.

As the year 1951 drew to a close, the situation of front was marked with a

**NETHERLANDS BATTALION IN IRON TRIANGLE** (Dec 1951 - Apr 1952)
lull but for the local patrol clashes, raids for hills, and mostly confined to "active defense."

Operations in 1952

Raid on Silver Star Hill: As the year 1952 opened, the Netherlands Battalion spent most of its time in active ambushing and patrolling actions to probe enemy defense in front of their sector, near Sagimak, and the battle lines were comparatively quiet.

On 4 January, a combat patrol made a raid on Silver Star Hill where the Communist troops dug in deep for avoiding the UNC's air and artillery bombardments by fortifying their defense positions with bunkers on the forward slope, which led into the tunnels or covered trenches to the rear. In order to avoid the failure of previous day's attack, a squad-size (carefully selected 9 men) of raiders, having through a rehearsal of the attack on the similar terrain feature nearby the battalion positions, knocked off the CCF on Manusamahe Hill and secured the base for further attack on Silver Star Hill at night. Meanwhile another two squads, main efforts of a platoon of C Company to Silver Star Hill, maneuvered through the gully on the left of Manusamahe Hill and made a final assault on Leuringchans and further Silver Star Hill at day break. The aggressive Netherlands raiders threw the flame-ray and handgrenades and seized the CCF strong outpost on Silver Star. They counted more than 50 enemy dead and captured a wounded prisoner and returned to their positions.

On 9 January the Battalion went into regimental reserve at Hari-dong (or Sindae-dong) for a brief rest and returned to the line at Sagimak. However, the Battalion soon left the line and moved again back to Hari-dong reserve area on 5 February for home-bound rotation.

Attack on Star Hill: Ending the operation "Clam-up" which was designed to lure enemy patrols into friendly hands, the division commander ordered raids on Star Hills held by an estimated CCF company, to the reserve battalion to destroy the enemy defenses and capture CCF prisoners.

Upon completion of two days reconnaissance and preparations prior to attack, Division Tank Company advanced deep into enemy territory, Hell Port, near To-dong, to harass the rear of Henry Hill and the Regimental Tank Company provided close fire support from both sides at valley of Hill 381 near Miroktong and Sagimak. The Netherlands Battalion support weapons took positions near Hill 381 and Harry Hill while two assault platoons of B Company led by the
Battalion Commander, who took a part in assault column, jumped off the line of departure on Star Hill. The platoon on the right seized Star Hill in 15 minutes in spite of heavy casualties (4 KIA and 13 WIA) caused by friendly artillery, but the left platoon met stiff enemy resistance and was forced to pin down. At this juncture, the right platoon continued its attack toward Star Hill North and increased its pressure on the right flank of the enemy positions, enabling the platoon on the left to renew its attack and pushed the enemy off Star Hill North within 22 minutes. As a result of the raid, the Netherlands counted 7 CCF dead on the scene and killed more than 200 CCF fleeing to the north by massing all available fires, while friendly sustained 5 KIA and 29 WIA.

On 13 March the Netherlands Battalion took over the left sector of the division, where they mainly devoted to strengthen the famous “Charly” outpost, while sending patrols as far as Hell Port and Poyang-ho. Effective counter-mortar and artillery informations was provided with accurate pinning data of enemy gun positions by the sound and radar post which were conducted by the Netherlands. In addition, war-dogs were employed for searching the CCF locations and its activities from March. On 27 March the Battalion turned over its sector to the 3rd US Battalion and swung to the reimental right sector, north of Hajin-ni, to relieve the 2nd US Battalion. In addition to dispatching patrols to Hill 528, the strongest enemy outpost in the Iron Triangle zone, they engaged in destructing
the enemy strong holds of Sobang-san, Musheroom, and Hills 658 and 528 by employing various caliber of guns and air strikes until the Battalion was relieved by the elements of the 32nd Infantry, the 7th US Division, and went into regimental reserve at Kangsan-ni. On 14 April the Battalion retired from front line and moved to Hari-dong.

Koje-do: The Battalion was alerted for a movement to Koje-do (island) for the security missions of POW camps. The long trip commenced on 17 April and arrived at Kojedo on 22 April. Having brought the POW camps under complete control and restored the Communist recalcitrants into order, the Battalion turned over their mission to US troops and embarked on LST on 9 July, arriving at Inchon on the 14th and returned to the sensitive front line near Yonchon, west of Chorwon, where the 45th US Division had newly established eleven outposts during Operation Counter in June.

The Netherlands Battalion again joined with the 2nd US Division who was to relieve the 45th US Division on 18 July. The Battalion remained at Nungnae-dong, 4 kilometers east of Chonggok-ni, as a division reserve until they entered the front line to relieve the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry in position, including Prokchop, Hill 200 and Snook facing CCF positions of Hasa-kol, Hill 265 and Pokkkae on 20 August. In the latter half of August the weather was seriously worsened and heavy downpour of rain completely wiped out all the bridges, bunkers and trenches. With the opening of September, as the weather condition restored, routine artillery duels, patrols and ambushes were intensified with zeal. On 5 September the Battalion was off the line for two weeks at Mokkol and swung to the east and took over the T-bone sector as of 18 September.

The Battalion concentrated its efforts to strengthen the two key outposts, Arsenal and Eerie, as well as a 800-meter-long line of communication trench connecting these two outpost, while sending patrols as far as Yokkok-chon. Since then, the patrols clashed with the enemy patrol in no-man’s land at every night for denying and off balancing the enemy intentions to close in friendly positions. From 24 October for one month the Battalion stayed at Kososong east of Chonggok-ni as a reserve and returned to the fighting front on the right sector of T-bone at low Alligator’s Jaw at the beginning of cold weather. Except for the routine patrol actions no significant enemy activities were reported in front of the Netherlands sector. On the day of Christmas the Battalion was relieved by the elements of the 23rd US Infantry and went into Kososong camps as a 7th US Division reserve until 13 January, when they returned to the 2nd US Division assembly area at Soyo-dong, 20 kilometers north of Uijongbu, as a reserve of the I US Corps.
Operations in 1953

Battle at Nude Valley: As the year of 1953 opened the disposition of opposing forces across the front remained unchanged and activity was relatively quiet due to the winter lull. On 28 January the Netherlands Battalion advanced to east bank of Sami-chon to relieve the 1st Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment, Canada, and again left the reputable trace of Hollanders in this Nudae battle field.

The Battalion organized the main defenses on the high ground over-looking Sami-chon valley with five outposts setting up on Adele, Amsterdam, Rita, Meppel and Groningen in front of MLR. No notable actions took place during the first quarter of 1953 except that the platoon to company-size strength of CCF launched surprise night attacks four times at the end of March in an attempt to breakthrough these outposts.

The first clash was taken place near Rita in the entrance of Nudae valley on the night of 15-16 March. When a 4-man patrol was enroute to Rita for screening the sector between Amsterdam to Rita, some 50 CCF troops crossed Sami-chon and ambushed the patrol in surprise, killing two men and wounding the other two, and continued their attack onto Rita outpost. The CCF attack was repulsed by the members of gallant Rita defenders prior to the arrival of 15 men of a rescue patrol. Due to the sensitiveness of Nudae, the Battalion added two more outposts, Bernhard and Puck, between Rita and Amsterdam.

On next night, a Netherland patrol of two squads encountered with a CCF patrol on its way back to Sami-chon bank, and the second clash took place in the area 300 meters south of Rita outpost. But friendly mortar quickly responded and beat them off as well as another CCF feint on newly established Bernhard outpost.

On the following day the Reds attempted the third one. Shortly after midnight Bernhard being heavily attacked and overran by the ten times superior strength of the 40 CCF, the Rita was soon subjected to another hard pressure. By the sporadic light of bursting shells the defenders of Rita saw hundreds of CCF swarming up toward the outpost. However, the Reds were dispersed and forced to withdraw when they ran into mines under heavy fire barrage. One company was hurriedly sent for rescue and evacuation of casualties. On their way back to friendly line, a platoon engaged 10-minute fire fight with another 24 CCF ambush patrol. In an effort to improve the security of outpost line, the Battalion strengthened these outposts as strong as MLR with trip flares, napalm, wire and double
guardmen as well.

The CCF launched its fourth determined one to the Nudae positions on the night of 28 March. Immediately following the concentration of 5-minute preparation fire, a company-size CCF broke through the Bernhard at first and continued to attack toward Nudae ramparts. Together with infantry's organic small-arms fire, all of friendly availble weapons participated in setting up the final protective fire. As being faced with the havoc of hammering, the CCF threw up their attempt and began to retreat. On the other hand another 150 of enemy who made an assault on Meppel outpost farther south of Rita, also met the tremendous mortar and artillery barrage fire and fled westward across Sami-chon to their positions of Hongkong and Shanghai before daybreak carrying with their casualties.

For the successful defense of the Nudae on Line Jamestown the Netherlands Battalion suffered 2 KIA and 8 WIA while inflicting the enemy some 300 casualties including 4 POWs.

On 7 April the Netherlands Battalion was relieved on the line by the elements of the 29th British Brigade, the 1st Commonwealth Division and moved to Tokchong camps as Corps reserve, ten kilometers north of Uijongbu. During the reserve period from 7 April to 14 July the Battalion devoted most of its time and effort for training and improving the blocking positions on Line Kansas.

The Last Action: When the five CCF armies broke through the bulged front of Kumsong on the right of Iron Triangle on 13 July, the Netherlands Battalion
returned to the line near Hajin-ni and prepared themselves for the coming battle. A Company occupied a salient position over the Chungmoksil valley on the south spur (Hill 340) of the Hill 528 and consolidated its defenses with an attached US engineer platoon. On 19 July the enemy, in two-company strength, hit A Company as smashing the two listening posts at 2220 hours and then completely beleaguered Hill 340 under the cover of fire. Soon the fierce hand to hand fighting followed over the hill and entangled each other. When some enemy succeeded in reaching the crest of Hill 340 and the men of the 2nd Platoon crawled into their bunkers, the commander asked for the proximity-fuzed shells on top of A Company for a few hours. At beginning of the morning a platoon of Company C, in reserve, counterattacked in surprise with the support of artillery fire and restored the positions. While in pursuit of the retreating enemy, the platoon counted 19 enemy dead in front of the hill slope and captured a wounded Chinese prisoner. The Battalion was suffered 4 KIA and 6 WIA against 100 casualties to the foe in this engagement.

On the night of 25–26 July the last patrol (12 men) was sent out for checking the whole no man’s land in front of the Battalion sector. When the patrol was on its half way to the assigned route, they were surprised by enemy ambushes. Another rescue patrol dispatched and found that 5 were killed, 3 wounded and 2 missing. These two missing were repatriated later during prisoners exchange of Operation Big Switch. This was the last action of the Netherlands Battalion in the Korean War. On 27 July at 1000 hours, the truce was signed and cease-fire was effected at 2200 hours of the same day.

Post-armistice Activities

In accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement the Netherlands Battalion devoted, for three days, to dismantle the defenses on present positions as destroyed 80 bunkers and removed 60,000 sand-bags in the hot heat of summer and torrential rain, and then left the Demilitarized Zone on 30 July to occupy a new Post-Armistice Main Battle Positions (PAMBP) on the high ground (around Hill 331), south of Hantan-chon immediate southwest of the vital road junction, chorwon to the west, Chipori to the south and Kumhwa to the east, with its administration post at Chipo-ri and the rear installations in Yongdungpo, Seoul.

During the occupation in the post armistice positions the Battalion was awarded with the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea for its distinguished battle account during the period from 23 November 1950 to 7 April 1953 in the ceremony attended by high ranking ROK and UNC dignitaries. 

On 23 August 1954 the Netherlands Government passed a resolution of the pullout of its troops from Korea and the Netherlands Battalion converted its operational control from the 2nd US Division, being scheduled to leave Korea on 28 August, to the IX US Corps. In late August the comrades of KATUSA who had been attached and fought side by side with the Netherlands Battalion left the camp and returned to ROK units. The Netherlands Battalion officially completed its operational mission on 1 October 1954.

The Battalion was then moved to Pusan by the Eighth Army order on 17 October. After farwell ceremony at the UN Memorial Cemetery, where the 117 honorable dead of the Netherlands Detachment were buried, the Battalion began its embakation on 10 September and main body (272 men) was shipped to home land on 9 November 1954, and the last group (46 men) left on 6 December 1954 by air-way. From there the main body went by shipwise to Marseille (France) via Japan, Singapore, and then entered the homeland at the border town of Roozendaal by train on 15 December. There they met the commanding officer of the Regiment Van Heutz being accompanied by the air-returned battalion commander.

The Netherlands Battalion of the United Nations Command was finally disorganized as it turned over the colors which were embroidered with "Its extraordiinary valor in the combat of Korean War," to the commander of parent unit, Regiment Van Heutz.
Reference Records and Data

(1) Organization of the Netherlands Battalion.

(a) Basic Organization:

```
   Strength 896
     /\  
    /   
   HQ 175
   /\  
    /   
   190 x 3 = 570
   /\  
    /   
   Weapon 151
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HMG . . . 3
3.5 RKT—5
BAR . . . . 45
3.5 RKT . . . 9
60mm. MOT . . . 9
57mm. RR . . . 9

LMG . . . . 9
HMG . . . . 3
HMG . . . . 2
3.5 RKT . . . 6
80mm. MOT . . . 4
75mm. RR . . . 4

(b) Initial Components (less one rifle company)

HQ and HQ Company .......... 117
2 Rifle Companies .... 190 x 2 = 380
Weapon Company .......... 139
Total ........ 636

(2) The Battalion Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank and Name</th>
<th>Duration of Service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. M.P.A. den Ouden</td>
<td>9 Sep 50 — 12 Feb 51</td>
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<td>Lt. Col. W.D.H. Eekhout</td>
<td>13 Feb 51 — 7 Nov 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. G.H. Christan</td>
<td>7 Nov 51 — 20 Aug 52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. C.M. Schilperoord</td>
<td>20 Aug 52 — 3 Aug 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. C. Knust</td>
<td>3 Aug 53 — 8 Jul 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. J. Raaymakers</td>
<td>8 Jul 54 — 15 Dec 54</td>
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(3) Honours and Awards

(a) Unit Citation:

The US Presidential Unit Citation, for “Hoengsong–Wonju Battle,” 12–15 February 1951.

The US Presidential Unit Citation, for “Soyang River Battle,” 16–22 May 1951.

The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, for “the Battalion’s Contribution,” 25 November 1950–7 April 1953.

(b) To all Ranks:

The Republic of Korea : Korean War Service Medal
(c) Individual Decorations:

The Republic of Korea

Ulchi ......................................... 3
Chungmu, Gold Star ................................ 6
Chungmu, Silver Star ................................ 12
Wharang, Gold Star ................................ 7
Wharang, Silver Star ................................ 15

The Netherlands

Military Willesorde 4th Class ..................... 3
Bronze Lion ...................................... 5
Bronze Cross .................................... 19
Cross of Merit ................................... 4

The United States of America

Silver Star ...................................... 14
Legion of Merit .................................. 4
Bronze Star ...................................... 62

(4) Casualties

Dead: KIA .................... 112  Sick ............... 2
       Accident ............. 6  Total ............ 120

Wounded: WIA .................. 381  * 292 recovered
          Accident ........... 52  262 discharged
          In exercise .......... 26  91 disabled
          Sick ................ 186
          Total .............. 645

Missing: Repatriated .......... 3


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<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
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<th>Enlistedmen</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>3,972</td>
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</table>
3. Naval Force

Summary of Operations

Although there was then no available active ground force in the Netherlands to send troops to the Korean battle field, the Netherlands Government decided to send a naval force at once. During the whole service duration in the Korean waters the Netherland's six naval ships (three destroyers and three frigates) were always incorporated into UNC naval forces under command of British or American officers and they carried out innumerable duties such as patrolling, bombardment of targets on ashore, support of troops landing behind the enemy lines or of ground actions, escorting of minesweepers and minelayers, antiaircraft duties and others.

**Evertsen:** A destroyer HNLMS *Evertsen* who then anchored in Indonesia arrived at Sasebo naval base in Japan on 16 July 1950 and began to participate in the Korean War on 19 July as placed under the West Coast Support Group (Task Unit 96. 8. 2) commanded by Admiral Andrew who was then Flag Officer Second in Command of the British Commonwealth units in Far Eastern Station. With the mission of blocking and patrolling the sea traffic passing around the headlines of west coast, bombarding the enemy rear facilities and support the inshore patrol action of the ROK Navy, *Evertsen* together with Commonwealth ships completely controlled the Western Sea.

After taking part in the bombardment on Inchon on 6 August, *Evertsen* was assigned to TE 91 (Blockade and Covering Force) to conduct special reconnaissance mission and provide cover for the landing troops en route to Inchon by escorting and screening the outer area of harbor during the period of Inchon Landing Operation. To assist the UN ground forces counteroffensive, a "Wonsan Siege" began on 16 February 1951 and Songjin on 8 March by the TE 95.22 consisting of HNLMS *Evertsen* with other elements of destroyer, mine-sweepers and frigates.

**Van Galen:** A destroyer, HNLMS *Van Galen* being commanded by Commander A.M. Valkenburg officially took over the mission of *Evertsen* on 18 April 1951, and entered the Western Sea to join TE 95.1. *Van Galen*’s first Korean tour opened with the usual carrier screening mission. Besides whose escorting the carrier, the nightly patrol was also undertaken by each of the destroyers in at
the vicinity of the 38th Parallel to maintain radar watch against a surprise night attack on the carriers.

On 18 November, when a routine rotation in Japan was ended, Van Galen sailed with a special Task Group (TG 95.8) from Sasebo to take part in a combined air naval bombardment against the east coast port of Hungnam. In late November she was detached from this bombardment task group and proceeded for the west waters. As assuming the defence mission of the friendly-held islands which were used as radar, and of air-sea rescue bases and garrisons for friendly partisans to operate deep into the enemy territory, she aggressively patrolled up and down along the west coast for the purpose of protecting those bases. In early 1952 she still remained in the Western Sea and her last duties were mainly to engage in bombarding the Haeju-man area and close covering the non-completed evacuation of island in that area.

Piet Hein: On 2 March 1952 HNLMS Piet Hein under Commander A.M. Valkenburg completed the relief of HNLMS Van Galen. During Piet Hein’s service period, the UN naval ships were busy in hunting the enemy train on east coast of the Songjin-Hungnam railway. The first member of this trainbusters club was the destroyer USS Ordeek and the members were soon increased to all 18 ships including HNLMS Piet Hein.

Johan Maurits van Nassau: Upon completion of the relief of the Piet Hein on 18 January 1953, HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau with Commander N.W. Sluijter, as a part of Task Group 95.1 under the Command of Admiral Clifford (British), carried out a bombardment of recently emplaced gun positions on the Angok Peninsula and on the north shore of the Chinamho estuary.
Naval Force

Notwithstanding after the cease-fire came on 27 July 1953, Johan Maurits van Nassau was on active operations until 5 December 1953 when she was relieved by the frigate HNLMS Dubois.

**Dubois and Van Zijl:** After the armistice, two more frigates of the Netherlands had served on the Korean theatre. One was a frigate Dubois commanded by Lieutenant Commander T. Jellema and the other was a frigate HNLMS Van Zijl under Commander F.G.H. van Straaten who served from 10 September 1954 when she relieved HNLMS Dubois and ended its tour of Korean waters on 24 January 1955.

**Reference Data**

(1) **Duration of Participations:** 16 July 1950–24 January 1955

(2) **HNLMS' Service Period and Commanders.**

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<td>Evertsen</td>
<td>Lt. Cdr. D.J. van Doorninck</td>
<td>16 Jul 50 – 18 Apr 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Van Galen</td>
<td>Cdr. A.M. Valkenburg</td>
<td>18 Apr 51 – 2 Mar 52</td>
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<td>Piet Hein</td>
<td>Cdr. A.H.W. von Freytag Drabbe</td>
<td>2 Mar 52 – 18 Jan 53</td>
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<td>Johan Maurits</td>
<td>Cdr. N.W. Sluijter</td>
<td>10 Jan 53 – 5 Nov 53</td>
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<td>Lt. Cdr. T. Jellema</td>
<td>5 Nov 53 – 10 Sep 54</td>
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<td>Van Zijl</td>
<td>Cdr. F.G.H. van Straaten</td>
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(3) **Number of the Personnel Served.**

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THE NEW ZEALAND FORCE
THE NEW ZEALAND FORCE

1. Introduction

Upon the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the New Zealand Government decided without delay to contribute both naval and ground troops to the United Nations effort in support of the Republic of Korea.

Two New Zealand Navy frigates, HMPNZS Pukaki and HMPNZS Tutira, were despatched to Korea on 3 July 1950. Throughout the war two New Zealand vessels were maintained in the theater of operation, the original frigates being followed, at intervals by HMPNZ ships Rotoiti (two tours), Hawea (two tours), Taupo and Kaniere. The duties of the frigates consisted mainly of interminable, but essential, patrolling as part of the successful UN effort to command the seas in the region. Islands held by ROK forces were defended from enemy attack, raiding parties were supported, supply operations protected, and enemy shore positions and communications bombarded. In all, some 1,350 men of RNZN – half of its complement – saw service during the war.

The ground force, known as “Kayforce”, took rather longer to arrive in the operational war theater as the force had to be specially recruited and trained. It left New Zealand on 11 December 1950 and became operational on 22 January 1951. The main component of the ground force was the 16th Field Regiment, New Zealand Artillery, which was equipped with 25 pounder guns. The regiment provided artillery support for the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and later for the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and other units of the 1st Commonwealth Division. New Zealand also contributed minor units to this division, including a transport company, the New Zealand component of the Divisional Signals Regiment, a division HQ transport platoon, and staff officers to serve in the divisional units.

The main body of the New Zealand ground force arrived in Korea on 31 December 1950, some months after the Communist Chinese had attacked in strength and flung the United Nations troops far back from the Yalu River. On many occasions it took part in desperate fightings to stem the Communist advance, particularly distinguishing itself during the CCF Spring Offensive in
1951. From 22–25 April 1951, at the Battle of Kapyong the New Zealand gunners gave almost continuous support to units of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and the 6th ROK Division as they dealt with a very dangerous situation that had emerged. For their efforts in this action, the artillery regiment was awarded the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. During the later battles after the line had been generally stabilized, it often gave artillery support to American units. By the time of the armistice on 27 July 1953 it had fired over three quarters of a million shells, the highest total of any field regiment in the war. Most of the New Zealand ground troops were withdrawn from Korea in November 1954.

2. The 16th Field Artillery Regiment and Supporting Units

With the 27th Commonwealth Brigade

The main body of the New Zealand Kayforce, comprising the 16th Field Artillery Regiment equipped with 25 pounder guns, a transport platoon, a base HQ unit and a reinforcement training unit, landed at Pusan on 31 December 1950. The guns and equipment had arrived two weeks earlier aboard the freighter Ganges.

Within a fortnight the 16th Field Artillery Regiment suffered its first two casualties even though at that stage it had not gone into action. It happened on 13 January when the regiment moved to Miryang, about 60 kilometers north of Pusan, to calibrate the guns. One vehicle was found to have dropped behind the convoy and not arrived at the scheduled time. Warrant Officer R.G. Long and his driver, Gunner R. MacDonald, went back by jeep to search for the missing vehicle. Somewhere along the way they must have mistakenly turned off the main supply route and run into a party of Communist guerillas. They were later found shot dead in the vicinity of Samnangjin, about 16 kilometers south from Miryang.

After a week’s training and preparations for action at Miryang the 16th Regiment on 20 January headed north to move into position in support of the 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade which, as the first Commonwealth formation, had arrived from Hongkong the previous August, and on 22 January the regiment arrived at Tohwasong 12 kilometers due south of Changhowon, where the 27th Commonwealth Brigade had established its command post.

At 0600 hours on 28 January the regiment took over support of the Commonwealth brigade from a US artillery battalion which had been equipped with
16th Field Artillery Regiment

105-mm. howitzers. Then shortly after midday on the 29th, the wireless in Roger Battery command post crackled out the warning for the regiment’s first rounds to be fired. “Battery Target... Suspected enemy movement in village.” The ranging gun barked into life and the first Kiwi shell screamed on its way toward the Communist enemy. Down came corrections from the forward observation officer and the whole battery opened up. The regiment was in action for the first time.

In mid-February the 16th Field Artillery Regiment moved north across the Han River at Yoju to support the 27th Brigade in “Operation Killer.” The week-long advance continued over about 30 kilometers. During this time, the regiment fired its first creeping barrage. As the infantry would move in close to the protective line of artillery fire, the range of the guns would be lifted another two or three hundred yards to establish a further barrage line.

The brigade’s advance was terminated on 19 April when the brigade was relieved by elements of the 6th ROK Division north of Kapyong. The New Zealanders, however, were ordered to remain in support of the ROK division.

The Kapyong Battle

The New Zealanders’ unforgettable battle as well as their first major test came during 22–25 April 1951 when the CCF Spring Offensive struck in great strength on central-western front in the Kapyong area.

At midnight on 22 April, the Communist Chinese launched a full-scale offensive to halt the Eighth US Army’s advance and break the UN front in two.
The 6th ROK Division front north of Kapyong was hit hard and collapsed under the heavy enemy concentration leaving a ten-mile gap. The Communist troops poured through in pursuit, the New Zealanders pounding the advancing enemy as the ROK troops retreated through the gun lines. The Middlesex Battalion of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade then in reserve was rushed up to provide the New Zealand gunners with local cover.

The Continuing enemy hard pressure finally led the New Zealanders to withdraw on the night of the 23rd. Now the main task of the guns in the valley was to cover the Middlesex while they came down from their protective perimeter in the surrounding hills. Firing at almost point-blank range, the gunners put down a heavy curtain of fire as the British infantry withdrew from the high ground. As each company reached the valley floor, one troop was taken out of action, the infanteers scrambled up on the guns and vehicles and the dash back to new positions started. One gun tractor, towing a trailer and a gun, moved out with more than twenty British soldiers clinging to every conceivable handhold. The orderly withdrawal continued until only the four guns of B Battery remained in action. They continued firing at increasingly shorter range until the last of the infantry were ready to pull out. Then the batteries, bringing the last few infanteers with them, joined the mad race out of the valley. It was a nightmare journey along a narrow, winding road. No lights were allowed and the road was clogged with disorganized, withdrawing ROK troops.

In the meantime, the rest of the 27th Brigade, which had been rushed up from reserve to stem the gap, hastily prepared positions to form a second line of defense. The New Zealand gunners sped back into position and immediately opened up in support of the Australian and Canadian infantry. At 0100 hours on 24 April, the eve of ANZAC Day, the New Zealanders were forced to move again -- back to Kapyong. By the time, the Australians were bearing the full brunt of the savage Chinese attack about forty miles north-east of Seoul. Under the command of the New Zealand regiment were seven American batteries to give added fire power to the defense. The Australians, under very heavy pressure, were cut off for some time. In almost every company there was bitter hand-to-hand fighting. The New Zealand gunners, stripped to the waist, continued to pound the enemy relentlessly, but in spite of heavy losses, the Communists repeatedly threw wave after wave of troops into the artillery barrage in suicidal attempts to overrun the Australian positions. During the thirty hours preceding the dawn of ANZAC Day, the regiment fired about 10,000 rounds at targets ranging in distance from 10,000 yards to 3,000 yards. The amount of artillery available permitted the 27th Commonwealth Brigade to stem the savage Chinese attack during 22–25 April.
Throughout the battle of Kapyong the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment stood the first major test in Korea with the fame which would last in the annals of Anzac traditions.

For the New Zealand gunners' heroic actions in the Kapyong battle, the 16th Field Artillery Regiment received a ROK Presidential Citation on 20 February 1952. Shown below is the Presidential Citation which, together with the translation, now reposes at the School of Artillery, Waiouru in New Zealand.

The 1st Commonwealth Division

In three months between the Kapyong and Imjin River battles, the latter of which fought by the 29th British Brigade, were relatively quiet. It enabled the 27th (now the 28th) Commonwealth and 29 British Brigades to re-organize after the hard fighting to stop the Chinese Spring Offensive and prepare for the
creation of the 1st Commonwealth Division in history. The 25th Canadian Brigade Group was formed and New Zealand's Kayforce was enlarged. The transport platoon became the 10th Company of the R.N.Z.A.S.C., a New Zealand component was added to the Divisional Signals Regiment. Another addition was the Light Aid Detachment of the Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

On July 26 the three brigades were together holding the line of the Imjin River between Choksong and the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers. Near Tokchong on July 28, 1951 at a brief ceremony the 1st Commonwealth Division's flag was flown and the formation came into being with Major General A.J.H. Cassels of the United Kingdom as the first commander of this historic "community" of 20 thousand men from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and India. The formation of the division meant, among other things, an elevation in prestige and in increased participation in the planning of the major operations.

The division's chief role was to maintain its defensive positions and to harass the enemy by vigorous patrolling and raids. General Cassels expected some teething trouble but these were very few. Within three months the division took part in very active defensive fighting, carried out a virtually unopposed advance in Operation "Commando" in October 1951 to secure a strong line of defence forward of the Imjin River, and fought a major offensive against strong opposition. The ubiquitous New Zealand gunners became part of the divisional artillery in this merger and remained in support of the 28th Brigade.
Winter 1951 – 1952

Through the bitter 1951–1952 winter the war was semi-static, the troops living in improvised shelters below ground. The armistice talks, which began at Panmunjom at the time the Commonwealth Division was formed in July, 1951, dragged on. There was no slackening, however. Defences were strengthened, communications were improved, training continued and there was considerable patrolling to keep Intelligence informed of the enemy’s battle order.

For the gunners there was little movement but there was a great deal of bombardment and counter-bombardment, the New Zealanders sending over 10,387 shells in one twenty-four hour period to establish a regimental record and carry the regiment toward the distinction of having fired in action more rounds than any other United Nations unit.

There were other diversions, pleasant and unpleasant. The Chinese took to ambushing behind the United Nations line: an ice-hockey match was staged between Australians and New Zealanders who had never even seen skates before; a Chinese was caught behind the lines with a sackful of Christmas Cards from the Chinese. Early in 1952 the 16th Field Regiment was presented with the ROK Presidential Citation for their part in the Kapyong Battle at a ceremony on 20 February. A few days earlier the regiment fired a salute against the enemy on the death of King George the Sixth and a salute for Queen Elizabeth.

Static War Goes On

At Panmunjom the “cease fire” talks continued, relieved in the spring of 1952 by local operations, patrolling and shelling and counter-shelling by both sides, the Chinese having by that time deployed a great weight of artillery and mortars which they used in a very efficient system of defensive fire by night and by day. This phase of the war was a very difficult one for the New Zealanders, as it was for every other unit. It was necessary to maintain their spirits and prevent boredom, but there was no question of relaxing at the front. The main fighting activity was to dominate “No Man’s Land” by continuous patrols, ambushes, and shelling, and there were constant clashes on and about “The Hook”, a spur southwest of Umdalma which was held by infantry of the 28th Brigade, supported by the New Zealand gunners.

With the summer of 1953 came the end of the fighting which had bogged down along the same front, more or less, since the 1951–1952 winter. In the last few
months of the war there were increased patrol activities and shelling culminating in an enemy concentration of artillery and mortar fire on "The Hook" which some eye-witnesses considered as the heaviest bombardment of the war, as a prelude to an all-out attack on the spur late in May. This battle was the division's last sizeable engagement of the war. The attack was repulsed with heavy enemy casualties. The divisional artillery fired 32 thousand shells, over a third coming from the New Zealand guns. The day Queen Elizabeth was crowned on June 2, 1953, the New Zealanders with the rest of the divisional artillery fired concentrations of red, white and blue smoke. The following month, on July 27, the truce was signed and the shooting war stopped.

Post War

The fighting had stopped but the war was still on and hostilities could start again. The New Zealanders carried on static training for all, live shell practices, digging gun-pits and bunkers, improving communications, maintenance and overhaul of guns and transport.

Early in 1954 the regiment was badly under strength. The British officers attached to the regiment were joined by ten gunners drawn from among British National Servicemen. The experiment was successful and 70 more from among 200 volunteers were taken on, all serving until October 1954 when the regiment became "non-operational." It was Lt Col. J.A. Pountney's duty to disband a unit which the Commander of the Commonwealth Divisional Artillery, Brigadier M.A.W. Rowlandson, in a farewell letter to the regiment on 6 October, the day before it ceased to exist, said: "I lose a fine regiment from my command" and then paid the men the highest tribute from one artillery man to others when he said they were "good gunners."

Reference Date

(1) Personnel and Awards:

From the time the first New Zealanders (Kayforce) set their foot in Korea on 31 December 1950 until November 1954 when the main body of the force left Korea, the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment maintained traditions of the highest order in the Korean artillery scene. Although the New Zealand Government initially sent a force of about one thousand, the strength of the force was substantially increased in July 1951 when the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division called for some additional units, and New Zealand's ground commitment in Korea rose sharply to serve in the divisional
units in the interests of integration. During the period, a total of 3,794 members of the New Zealand’s ground force (Kayforce) served in Korea.

Commanders of the 16th Field Artillery Regiment

Lt. Col. J.W. Moodie Dec 50 – Sep 51
Lt. Col. R.J.H. Webb Sep 51 – Mar 52
Lt. Col. McK. Paterson Mar 52 – Feb 53
Lt. Col. J. Burns Feb 53 – Mar 54
Lt. Col. J.A. Pountney Mar 54 – Nov 54

Honours and Awards

Companion of the Bath .................................................. 1
Distinguished Service Order ........................................... 4
Members of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire .......... 13
Military Cross ............................................................. 11
Distinguished Conduct Medal ......................................... 1
Mentioned in Despatches ................................................ 50
Foreign Decorations ..................................................... 4

(2) Battle Casualties suffered by the members of the New Zealand Kayforce during the Korean War:

Killed in Action .......................................................... 22
Wounded in Action ......................................................... 79
Missing in Action .......................................................... 1

3. The New Zealand Frigates

The New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment’s fine records can possibly be matched by the actions of the New Zealand frigates of which the first two, HMNZS Pukaki and HMNZS Tutira, arrived in Korea five months before the Kayforce. From 1 August 1950 until early March 1954, the Royal New Zealand Navy maintained two frigates continuously in Korean waters, an effort which involved all six of the New Zealand frigates and eight tours of duty. It also involved approximately one half of the Navy’s average manpower strength. The total personnel involved was approximately 1,350 and only one rating was killed in action during the Rotoiti’s first tour. Although always charged with such
minor roles as patrolling, escorting convoy or defending islands under the command of other national division commanders, they were nevertheless noted many times for superb seamanship and devotion beyond the call of duty.

Throughout the entire United Nations naval operations in the Korean War the most unforgettable and spectacular one was the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950 in which two New Zealand frigates participated. For the amphibious operation, *Pukaki* and *Tutira* were assigned to Task Group 90.7 (Screening and Protective Group) under American commander. They escorted a force of cruisers and destroyers which took charge of convoy to the beaches for the assault at dawn.

It was a matter for national pride that the New Zealand ships, which had been so prompt to answer United Nations appeal, were still at their posts when the fighting stopped on 27 July 1953. The last frigate *Kaniere* returned to New Zealand in March 1954. For the United Nations cause, it must be emphasized that the six frigates of the Royal New Zealand Navy played their small but effective part.

### Reference Data

(1) **The ships and commanders**

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<td><em>Rotoiti</em></td>
<td>Cdr. B.E. Turner</td>
<td>7 Oct 50 – 21 Nov 51</td>
<td><em>Hawea</em></td>
<td>Capt. G.R. Davis-Goff</td>
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(2) **Honours and Awards made to the members of the New Zealand Navy:**

- Distinguished Service Cross ........................................ 6
- Bar to Distinguished Service Cross .................................. 1
- Second Bar to Distinguished Service Cross ............................ 1
- Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire ........... 1
- Distinguished Service Medal ......................................... 2
- Mentioned in Despatches ............................................ 7
THE PHILIPPINE FORCE
THE PHILLIPPINE FORCE

1. Introduction

When the North Korean Communists launched armed attack on 25 June 1950 against the Republic of Korea and on 27 June the Security Council of the United Nations asked the members of UN to furnish armed assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Red invasion, the Philippine Government, to respond to the UN decision, decided to send one battalion combat team.

The first military unit to represent the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK) was the 10th Battalion Combat Team. Among existing ten battalion combat teams in the Philippines, the 10th BCT was the only seasoned troops in the anti-Huk campaign.

The Battalion had a complement of 64 officers and 1,303 enlisted men. It consisted of an infantry battalion, a company of medium tanks, a company of light tanks, armored reconnaissance cars, a battery of self-propelled artillery and supporting elements. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mariano C. Azurin, it was designed to operate independently.

On 2 September 1950 the Philippine Flag, which the Battalion was to carry in battle field, was handed to the commander by the President Elpidio Quirino at the send-off ceremony at Rizal Memorial Stadium in Manila where a multitude of 60,000 people rallied. Personnel of the “Steady on” (Motto of the 10th BCT) battalion stayed at Camp Murphy until they boarded on the USS Sergeant Sylvester Antolak on 15 September.

Early in the morning of 19 September 1950, the transport Antolak sailed in Pusan dock. On the following day all ranks of the 10th BCT landed on the “Land of the Morning Calm” and proceeded by train to Miryang where the troops set up their bivouac camp beneath chestnut trees some 5 kilometer from the railroad station. Training on small unit tactics was intensively undertaken.

2. Ground Force
Operations in 1950

On its arrival in Korea, the Battalion was attached to the 25th US Division which was then pursuing the retreating enemy toward Chinju in southernmost Masan sector.

The Battalion received a first mission for providing the security of the airfield at Sachon on 30 September 1950, but short lived. On 8 October the Battalion moved by motor to Chinju where it entrained for Waegwan. On arrival, the Battalion was given the mission of securing the MSR running from Taegu to Waegwan and thence to Kimchon against the enemy guerrillas.

In conjunction with the UN troops rapid advance, the 10th BCT left the Kimchon area on 30 October by order of the Eighth US Army to advance into north Korean territory. On 1 November the battalion crossed the 38th Parallel and arrived in Pyongyang by train where it was attached to the 187th US Airborne RCT with the mission of securing the MSR from Kaesong to Pyongyang. The Battalion established its Headquarters at Hwangju and then fanned out its subordinates; Tank Company to Haeju, Reconnaissance Company to Hanpo-ri, B Company to Namchonjom and C Company to Chungwa for clearing the enemy guerrillas.

A patrol team led by Lieutenant Serrano with 12 men, followed by three companies, distinguished in a surprise raid which netted 77 NK soldiers, four machine guns and 68 Russian-built rifles on 3 November.

On 10 November, the Battalion set off a first battalion-size combat from Sinmak against two Communist battalions well-entrenched in mountain village of Singye. The Battalion assembled at preparatory positions in Namchonjom and on the following daybreak it moved out for a mission of reconnaissance in force toward Singye 30 kilometers northeast of Namchonjom in the heavy snow. At the outskirts of Mui-dong, on the way of Singye, a truck at the head of the cautiously moving column was hurled into air in splinters by an explosion of land mine and then the Battalion met heavy fire from the high ground east of the road. The Battalion deployed for combat formation and its artillery and mortar fire pounded the enemy on high ground as well as emplacements in the heart of Mui-dong. Flushed out, the enemy troops rushed southward in a desperate attempt to occupy a new position but they committed the fatal mistake of coming right in front of A Company and were quickly moved down. When the battle of Mui-dong was over, 50 Communists were killed, while the Battalion lost only one and several wounded.

The 10th BCT continued to secure the MSR until 18 November when it was
ordered to assemble at Sariwon for security of rear installations behind the lines. When UN Forces' final offensive to the Manchurian border was launched across Chongchon River late in November, the Battalion was ordered to dispatch its subordinate companies to different directions -- A Company to Kunu-ri, C Company to Sinanju airstrip and Suckchon quartermaster depot respectively, while the rest of the Battalion was assigned to secure the MSR from Kaesong–Hanpo-ri–Sariwon–Pyongyang with its headquarter in Pyongyang. However, CCF entered the war and friendly troops were pushed back by this new foe. A and B Companies had to withdraw and joined the Battalion at Pyongyang in the evening of 1 December.

To help the general withdrawal of the UN forces, the Battalion established roadblocks at Sariwon on 2 December and Kumchon on the 4th. At Kumchon, the Battalion cleared the area of Sibyon-ni–Kumchon–Kaesong and then moved eastward to Wichon-ni on 10 December through Taegong-dong, Chudong and Kulsuri under the operational control of the 187th US ARCT. The Battalion pulled out from Wichon on the 13th and proceeded down to Munsan-ni, where it was diverted its attachment to the 1st US Cavalry Division and further moved back to Suwon, south of Seoul for rehabilitation. On the second day in Suwon the Filipinos inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy guerrillas; 14 KIA at Chudong and 20 KIA at Suhoe-dong during the patrol clashes.

Operations in 1951

At the daybreak on 1 January 1951, the enemy launched an offensive all along the front, directing main effort toward Seoul. In accordance with the planned withdrawal, the 10th BCT moved rearward through Kwangdong-ni, Sangju, Taepyeong and to an army reserve area at Oksan-dong north of Kimchon. On 14 January the Battalion was placed under the direct control of the EUSA with the mission to secure the MSR from Kimchon to Taejon. The Battalion set up its command post at Yongdong and dispatched a company each to Okchon, Hwanggan and Kimchon respectively for screening the MSR by intensive patrolling.

By mid-January the CCF had halted their offensive for resupply and reorganization. Accordingly, the UN forces initiated a series of limited counterattacks such as Operations “Round-up and Killer” in February and then “Ripper” in March. On 9 March the 10th BCT was attached to the 3rd US Division and advanced to the south bank of the Han River in abreast with the Belgian Battalion
Second advance to the north: On 13 March, the Battalion successfully crossed the Han River and seized Tuk-to (Chamsil-ri). On the next day, UN troops moved to deserted Seoul. The Philippine Battalion proceeded northward to Chonmung-dong area eastern outskirts of Seoul on 20 March to take part in the US Corps's continuing advance toward the Imjin River that scheduled on 22 March. The Battalion, being attached to the 65th US Infantry, advanced 10 kilometers a day through rugged terrain. Upon securing the intermediate objectives of Tche-yasun on 23 March and Kobigol (near Hill 441) northwest of Uijongbu on 24 March, it continued to attack northward as far as south bank of the Imjin. Thus the 10th BCT had seized the objectives, Hill 357 on the left and Hill 675 (Kamak-san) on the right, near Choksong northwest of Tongduchon by midnight of 30 March 1951, resulting in 11 enemy KIA and 18 POWs. On the contrary the Battalion suffered 2 KIA and 2 WIA.

After a week-long blocking mission at Choksong, under the 29th British Brigade's control, the Battalion went into reserve at Songna-ri (Musugomi) south of Tongduchon, placing under the 65th US Infantry's control on 4 April.
BATTLE OF YUL-TONG (22–23 Apr 1951)

When Operation Rugged was launched on 5 April to secure Line Kansas on the north of the 38th Parallel, the Philippine Battalion moved to front line near Kusok-tong across Hantan-gang west of Chongok and joined the "Rugged," passing through elements of the 7th US Infantry. On 11 April the Battalion jumped-off toward Line Utah. Taking full advantage of effective air and artillery support, the 10th BCT advanced rapidly along the east bank of the Imjin River northwest of Chongok, killing 28 CCF enroute. 54 more CCF were killed in next day to wrest another cluster of hills, and 28 more CCF were killed and 2 CCF were captured on 13 April in an attack onto Line Pansy northwest of Yonchon. Between 11 and 14 April, the BCT suffered 4 KIA and 28 WIA against the enemy losses of 115 KIA and 3 POWs. On 17 April, the Battalion went into a regimental reserve.

Battle of Yultong (First CCF Spring Offensive): The 10th BCT returned to frontline relieving the 1st Battalion of the 65th US Infantry on early morning of 22 April. The Battalion deployed its A, Tank (tank less) and B Companies on line. Reconnaissance and C Companies remained in reserve. It neighbored with the 2nd Battalion of the 65th US Infantry on the left and the 2nd Battalion
of the Turkish Brigade on its right.

Just after the dusk, supported by the heavy bombardment of mortar and artillery, the hordes of CCF unleashed their First Spring Offensive toward Seoul, directing their main effort against the 1 US Corps along the Chorwon-Seoul corridor. The Turkish were the first to hit and their lines were penetrated as far as reserve battalion position. This sudden situation caused to expose the right flank of the Philippine BCT’s B Company. The CCF forces shifted their assault toward B Company by a frontal attack 30 minutes after the midnight and then another enemy wave hit the gap between B and Tank Company positions. The whole Battalion was soon subjected to intensive small arms and artillery fire. The left platoon (led by Lieutenant Artiaga) of B Company was pushed back from their position at 0300 hours and, after four hours of furious combat, the enemy infiltrated as deeply as C Company position in the reserve area. Each company was dispersed and fought in confusion without contact among and between the units. The Battalion command post also became a target of small arms fire. Notwithstanding, battered B Company succeeded in closing the perimeter of C Company at dawnbreak of the 23rd. All of cooks, chaplain, medics and drivers came to pick up guns and committed into the last stand. C Company was ordered to withdraw at 0640 hours when it was counterattacking.
with the support of Reconnaissance Company.

Three rifle companies also pulled out from their positions under the cover of Reconnaissance Company but Tank Company could not contacted until the radio communication became operational at noon.

In the meantime Tank Company desperately held its positions and made a counterattack to retake the position of Lieutenant Artiaga's platoon in order to recover the dead and wounded. When the radio communication was restored at 1230 hours, Captain Yap, Commander of Tank Company, was ordered to withdraw. However Captain Yap and his men were on their way to counterattack. When a hill was taken, they counted less than one squad was left of this platoon and found still missing Corporal Bengal. Captain Yap called for volunteers to further search. It was two hours before sunset. A burst of fire from concealed nest had caught Captain Yap squarely on the front. For this action, he was posthumously awarded the Philippines Medal of Honor. During this action, the enemy losses were more than 500 killed and two captured, while the BCT suffered with 12 KIA, 38 WIA and 6 MIA.

The entire Battalion broke contact with the enemy at 1800 hours, 23 April and assembled at Tuseong-ni. The Battalion was given a new mission next day to reinforce the beleaguered Gloucester Battalion (British) which was heavily fighting to hold Hill 235 near Solma-ni. At 0730 hours the Battalion jumped-off from Sinsan-ni (Kwangsuwon) and secured top of the precious mountain pass near Sagimak on the half-way to the objective within four hours.

When a tank-infantry column, spearheaded by three M-24 light tanks of Reconnaissance Company and followed by a squadron of British Centunian tanks with C Company of the 10th BCT in support, proceeded last approach within 2.5 kilometers, the CCF trapped the column in surprise. The leading tank was directly hit and set on fire. Infantry men, also, attempted to breakthrough the roadblock in several times but frustrated, suffering one KIA, 10 WIA and 3 MIA. Being heavily pressed by superior CCF troops in strength, the Battalion was ordered to withdraw at 1730 hours.

On the next day the Battalion reverted to the control of the 65th US Infantry and set-up the successive blocking positions on Hills 194 and 106. Just after the mid-night of 25 April, the blocking positions became untenable under the heavy weight of CCF exploitation. The Battalion disengaged with the enemy on order and began another withdrawal heading south in column. The columns soon met an outflanking ambush near Yongam-ni and fought their way out of encirclement, sustaining one KIA, 3 WIA and 44 MIA. The Battalion closed in an assembly area at Nuwon south of Uijongbu for reorganization, and further moved southward to Ui-dong under the cover of element of the 1st US
Cavalry Division. And then the BCT went into reserve at Hongnung when the 3rd US Division turned over its sector to the 1st US Cavalry Division on 28 April.

On the following day, as the CCF April drive had been halted, the Battalion diverted its attachment to the 25th US Division and moved eastward to Hwangan on the southbank of the Han River east of Seoul, relieving elements of the Turkish Brigade.

Third Advance to the North: On 23 May the 10th BCT was attached in place to the newly arrived 25th Canadian Brigade. On the following day it moved to Sunae-ri east of Uijongbu as a reserve and then continued northward advance through Pochon and crossed the 38th Parallel on 27 May near Mansedari. The Battalion participated in Operation Followup in the left sector of the Canadian Brigade on 29 May, securing the objective Hill 457 (Kumjang-san) on the south bank of Hantan-chon. During this advance, the Filipinos accounted 8 CCF KIA and 10 POWs.

In early June, the UN Command decided to launch Operation Piledriver toward Line Wyoming on the Chorwon—Kumhwa base of the Iron Triangle area. While the 25th US Division shifted its attack eastward to Kumhwa, the attachment of the Philippine Battalion reverted in place to the 3rd US Division which was to attack Chorwon due north. By 12 June the Philippine Battalion had seized the Hak irrigation dam and began positional warfare.

At noon of 14 July, a 32-man patrol of A Company, led by Lieutenant Salting, encountered an enemy company in surprise ambush near Sagimak 5 kilometers in front of MLR and severe hand to hand fighting ensued until a few of the patrol members got out of the trap. When a rescue patrol reinforced by tanks arrived at the scene at 1445 hours, they found that 32 enemy dead were spread over the valley. However the patrol members also heavily suffered with 10 killed, 3 wounded and 9 missing in this action.

By the time, the strength of the Battalion was hardly half what it had been. Colonel Salvador Abcede, 20th BCT Commander, joined the 10th BCT with 10 other officers on 16 August. Four days later, a contingent of 9 officers and 418 enlistedmen joined with the advance party. The new commers were immediately assigned to the different companies to replace the 9 officers and 313 enlistedmen who were sent to the rear for return to the Philippines. When the Battalion returned to line at Oe-dong east of Hak dam on 31 August, the bulk of the personnel were there from the 20th BCT.

The 20th BCT: The 20th BCT officially took over the mission of the 10th
BCT that reduced its strength to zero at mid-night of 5 September 1951. The last home-bound batch of the 10th BCT left Pusan on 30 September, leaving the 58 fallen heroes in the UN Memorial Cemetery at Tangok, Pusan.

The 20th BCT was attached to the operational control of the 3rd US Division from 5 September 1951 to 11 April 1952 and of the 45th US Division from 12 April 1952 until its departure for Philippines on 10 June 1952.

Between 6 and 26 September, actions of the Battalion were concentrated in setting-up strong patrol bases on Hills 321 and 313 north of Hak dam and carrying out combat patrols deep into no-man’s land. When the I US Corps began to launch Operation Commando toward newly designated Line Jamestown on 3 October, the 20th BCT firmly held outposts on Hill 395 (White Horse Hill) and adjacent Hill 284 by executing tank-infantry patrollings. And then the Battalion took part in an attack against objective “Butler,” twin peaks of Hills 324 and 360 (Low Alligator Jaw) and seized the objective on 7 October. The Battalion continued its advance onto “Upper Alligator Jaw” just south bank of Yokkok-chon and aggressively patrolled along Chorwon—Sibyon-ni road as far as Orijong north of T-bone ridge until it was relieved in positions by the 3rd Battalion of the 8th US Cavalry and went into reserve at Mal-mi northeast of Uijongbu.

From 29 October to 20 November, the 20th BCT was attached to the 25th US Division which was to launch a limited objective attack toward Line Duluth. The Battalion proceeded to Kumhwa, right base of the Iron-Triangle sector, and executed a probing assault to Osong-san (Hill 1062) in the vicinity of Snipper Ridge during Operation Persuade of the IX US Corps in early days of November. On 20 November the Battalion was reattached to the 3rd US Division which was to relieve the 1st US Cavalry Division in the Imjin River sector.

Upon extending the 3rd US Division’s frontage westward to Hill 355 (Little Gibraltar), the Battalion moved to Hill 199 near Koyangdae west of the Imjin River where it relieved elements of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on 22 November. When elements of the 7th US Infantry were in struggle for recapturing lost Hill 355, the Battalion repelled the CCF attacks in front of positions for three consecutive nights from 23 to 25 November.

**Operations in 1952**

As the year of 1952 opened, the activities of front remained generally quite except patrols to contact with the enemy and to gain prisoners for information,
while both opponents engaged in routine artillery duel.

During the lull period of January, the 20th BCT continued to carry out its mission of maintaining the MLR and OPLR, and raided enemy positions at regular intervals with less than platoon-size patrols as far as Ojang-dong (Hill 135) across the Hoesan-dong valley beyond the Koyangdae complex (Kelly, Tessie and Nickie) in cold winter weather. According to the routine rotation program of the 3rd US Division, the Battalion left the line and went into Taebong-chon reserve position 8 kilometer northeast of Yonchon on 3 February and then returned to line on 2 March in the vicinity of Hill 202 east bank of the Imjin River. There it ceaselessly sent out patrols toward Norum-kogae (Hill 171) along the east bank of the Imjin and further north to Nalgun-dong (Hill 223) for screening Yokkok-chon.

Upon completion of the defense mission in the Imjin River sector, the Battalion went into Corps reserve at Sindam-ni near Hantan-chon. And its attachment diverted to the 45th US Division (National Guard) and further attached to the 179th US Infantry on 11 April. On 29 April the Battalion was brought up to the
line in T-bone ridge sector on Line Jamestown. The Battalion engaged with
the CCF in nine separate combats; six of which were close quarter fights at Eerie,
Hill 191 and Arsenal in patrol-clashes all in the T-bone ridge sector. Of these
outposts, Eerie, at the foot of T-bone ridge, had been quiet since CCF swept
the Eerie on 23 March 1952 and no attempt was made by friendly troops to
occupy it. However, it was determined by the 45th US Division not to allow
the enemy to use Eeries as his outpost any longer. Therefore a series of dawn
and dusk raids were executed by the 20th BCT during the period of 18–21 May.

**Attacks on Hill Eerie:** A series of raids began at 0915 hours on 18 May
when a patrol encountered with 8 CCF at Eerie. The enemy fled to the north,
leaving one killed and two wounded caused by friendly fire. The same afternoon,
a platoon led by lieutenant Rodolfo Maestro raided the Eerie. There were 28
CCF dead on the hill after a torrid 30-minute fire fight. On the next day two
daylight patrols also raided the shank of T-bone ridge for 35 and 13 minutes
respectively and killed 23 Reds before disengaging with the enemy, while tanks,
air-strikes, motar and artillery added more casualties.

The final raid on Hill Eerie was launched in the early morning of 21 May 1952.
Lieutenant Fidel V. Ramos of the 2nd Reconnaissance Platoon, with 3 officers
and 41 men, organized his men into four teams as scout, rifle, snipper and forward
observer teams. At 0407 hours raiders crossed their designated line of departure
and reached the attacking position of an irrigation ditch, 400 meters from top of
the Eerie.

Eerie, well fortified with bunkers and communication trenches, was then
defended by an estimated reinforced CCF platoon. Immediately after the planned
preparation fires pounded the hill, Filipinos began to assault up to the crest
at 0700 hours. Within 10 minutes they reached the barbed wire entanglements of
Eerie. Lieutenant Ramos and Corporal Palis's scout team (11 men) attacked
through right finger to the right of the hill and rushed into bunkers, killing 8 CCF
defenders. Attached engineers blasted and sealed bunkers without delay. On the
other hand, the rifle team led by Sergeant Drapeza advanced its way on the left
finger toward top and as soon as making the physical contact with the scout team
on the right, engaged in covering fire while the engineers busied themselves in
blasting the bunkers.

Lieutenant Dizon's sniper team, being tasked to prevent enemy supporting
fire from Hill 191 immediate northwest of Eerie, was on their designated position
on the southwest saddle of the Eerie and neutralized the enemy machinegun fire.
At 0728 hours while engineers were demolishing the rest of bunkers, the enemy
mortar shells began to hit the hill. But this mortar fire was too late to be of any
help to their beleaguered comrades. The enemy outwitted by this surprising raid that lasted for twenty minutes. Their mission was accomplished. Lieutenant Ramos fired the signal to withdraw at 0730 hours. All participants were returned to their base without casualty. With exceptional gallantry, they destroyed 6 bunkers, 7 more damaged and 76 CCF were killed during the period of 18–20 May.

On mid-night of 31 May, the 20th BCT was relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 180th US Infantry and went into a division reserve at Camp Casey near Tong-duc-hon, so as to allow the second contingent to prepare for returning home. In 10 months of continuous combat duty, the 20th BCT suffered 13 KIA, 100 WIA and one MIA.

The 19th BCT: In January 1952 the 19th BCT was alerted to replace the 20th BCT. After undergoing 16 weeks of intensive training, the 19th BCT, consisted of 37 officers and 921 men under Colonel Ramon Z. Aquirre, was shaped to Korea. On 8 May the first batch of the 19th BCT consisted of 9 officers and 390 men under the Battalion Executive Officer Major Zoilo M. Perez arrived at Pusan, Korea and was already at the front line, joining with the 20th BCT at Chobak-kol south of Eerie three days later. For familiarization and on-the-spot training purpose, they were assigned to corresponding duty by rotating the equal numbers of the 20th BCT. On 6 June the command group of the 19th BCT arrived at Camp Casey, and by the following day, the rest of the second group had joined the Battalion.

On 10 June Colonel Aquirre officially assumed the command as the relief between the 19th and 20th BCT’s was completed.

Upon completion of the rotation, those soldiers of the 20th BCT began returning to their homeland. Like its predecessors of the 10th and the 20th BCTs, men of the 19th BCT (Bloodhound) did not have long to wait before they proved themselves on the field of battle. By the time, the 45th US Division to which the 19th BCT was attached, had successfully carried out its Operation Counter with the seizure of the eleven key outposts, thus strengthening the line of combat outposts in front of MLR by 14 June.

Arsenal and Eerie Defense: On 16 June the 19th BCT relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 179th US Infantry in the T-bone ridge sector. In addition to its defensive mission on the MLR positions just northwest of Chondok-san (Hill 477), the Battalion was assigned to man on Outpost 7 (Uncle and Yoke), Outpost 8 (Hill 191 and Eerie) on the next day.

On 18 June the Battalion’s positions on these hills received intensive artillery and mortar bombardments. Friendly artillery and mortars threw in counter-
fire. The above bombardment resulted in 2 KIA and 4 WIA to the 19th BCT. The following day K and I Companies were relieved by L and Reconnaissance Companies. The enemy resumed their bombardments and probed the 2nd Platoon, L Company, west of Hill 191 at night but repulsed. On this day the Battalion lost 2nd Lieutenant Cosme Acosta and suffered 8 other wounded. All indications revealed that a CCF counterattack was imminent. Colonel Aquirre and his men worked over the plans for the defense and counterattack by 20 June. At 1700 hours, all was set. (See Sketch Map 2.)

It was 2205 hours of the 20th when the enemy began to attack with intensive mortar and artillery concentration. Flare revealed hordes of the enemy in waves coming from all points toward Hills 191 and Eerie. The enemy fires were terrific with seventy or eighty rounds per minute. L Company Commander reported that an enemy battalion in strength was attacking the company positions from

**BATTLE ON ARSENAL AND EERIE (20–21 Jun 1952)**
three directions, putting their main effort on the left flank with fire support from T-bone and Pokkæ area.

Friendly artillery and mortar, together with all available firepower of infantry’s organic weapons and tanks, poured overwhelming shower of volleys at the assaulting waves. Due to this fire wall, the enemy attack was begun to staggering and weakened at mid-night. But when few minutes past mid-night, the enemy resumed his determined attack toward Porkchop, Hill 200, Hill 334 (on MLR) and Philippine’s outpost Hills 191 and Eerie with intense supporting fire including tanks. The enemy frontal attack was repulsed but he shifted his effort to the Reconnaissance Company on Eerie. Some enemy troops were able to close in the rampart. A savage hand to hand fighting ensued until 0340 hours, when the enemy attackers gave up the controversal ground. Thereafter both sides engaged mainly in exchanging artillery duel till daybreak. It was in this action that Lieutenant Apollo B. Tiano, the 2nd Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, heroically died.

An after-action report on Hills 191 and Eerie revealed that the enemy attack was conducted by two regiments supported by tanks. The 19th BCT had smashed two enemy tanks, and an estimated number of enemy KIA were 500, while the Philippino suffered 8 killed and 16 wounded. The 19th BCT distinguished itself in this four days action and received the Korean Presidential Unit Citation for the Arsenal and Eerie Battle.

**On Mid-Eastern Front:** After turning over the sector to elements of the 2nd US Division on 18 July, the Battalion moved long way eastward to Yanggu area as a reserve of the X US Corps on 19 July. The battalion spent summer months there and returned to rugged mountainous front on Line Minnesota at Sohwa-ri northeast of the Punchbowl when it relieved elements of the 8th ROK Division on 21 September 1952.

Two companies occupied the outposts at Hwanggi that dominated the vital north-south valley of the Soyang River between the two critical terrain feature, Hills 812 and 854. The rest of the Battalion remained at Sohwa. Activities in these days were comparatively quite except small-scale patrol clashes took place at times in the Norumegi and Kundul (Hill 570) area. On 10 October the Battalion went into divisional reserve at Inje and stayed there until the entire division was relieved by the newly activated 12th ROK Division.

**Operations in 1953**

When the reserve period was terminated, the Battalion returned to the line and
relieved elements of the 223rd Infantry, the 40th US Division, and was at first placed in a regimental reserve position at the village of Mul-kol in the basin of Punchbowl under the control of the 5th US RCT which was then attached to the 45th US Division. On the night of the 3 January, the Battalion proceeded to the most sensitive sector of Hill 1242 (Kachil-bong) on the northwest rim of the Punchbowl. Activities afterwards were quite by winter lull. The 19th BCT brilliantly fought with the enemy whenever patrol clashes took place until the Battalion left the line for their home-bound processing. On 23 March 1953 the Battalion was relieved by elements of the 5th US RCT and moved back to Inje reserve camp for implementing the rotation program.

It was revealed later that the Filipino had captured the enemy’s self-surrenders, the most of whom were ROKs captured by the enemy during the confused-withdrawal of the III ROK Corps divisions in Second CCF Spring Offensive of 1951 and were forced to joined into Communists army. In an effort to induce enemy surrender, an intensive program of psychological warfare was carried out with ground speakers and leaflets toward Hill 1212 (or 1210) and Mae-bong (1290) on the opposite side of Kachil-bong.

**The 14th BCT**: The 14th Philippine Battalion Combat Team, “Avengers,” so named for its splendid record of “Anti-Huk Campaign,” under colonel Nicanor Jimenez, stepped on Korean ground on 28 March 1953. From Pusan the Battalion proceeded to Chunchon by train, then by truck to Inje valley where the battle-wearied 19th BCT was bivouacked in reserve. The 14th BCT officially took over the mission of the 19th BCT on 3 April 1953 and remained as a reserve until it was committed to first combat mission on 15 May.

On that same day the Battalion took over the sector of the 1st Battalion of the 180th US Infantry. The sector was stretched for 1.5 kilometers astride Satae-ri Valley. With B Company on the left ridge of Sandbag Castle, A Company, supported by a platoon of tanks, on the valley floor and C Company on the right spur of Heartbreak Ridge, the Battalion engaged in defending the Satae-ri valley. During these days’ battle situation, routine activities were patrolling actions and the 14th Philippine BCT was no exception. When the sector of the 45th US Division was shifted westward to Hill 1142 (Paek sok-san), the Battalion, after suffering 4 KIA and 27 WIA in defending the Satae-ri Valley, turned over its sector to elements of the 224th US Infantry, the 40th US Division, and moved 10 kilometers westward onto Hill 1142 for securing the life line of supply and become a reserve on 6 July. The Battalion maintained the Paek sok-san positions for 8 days.

On 14 July the Reds began to launch their last offensive along the corridor of
the Pakhan River with intensive artillery fire for more than 12 hours. In one night of Red's artillery fire, the 14th BCT lost one KIA and 6 WIA including two officers. Lieutenant Dominado was killed, while Lieutenant Miravite was paralyzed.

On 18 July, while A Company, reinforced by Reconnaissance Company, relieved elements of the 279th US Infantry on OPLR immediate east of Hill 1090, the main body of the Battalion took over the MLR positions on Hill 1100. The ridge opposite A Company was towering M1 Ridge at which changed hands twenty-three times during the severe battles of mid-June 1952.

**Last Battle:** Enemy movement was first noticed in front of a platoon of A Company at 2130 hours of 18 July. Flares were requested and revealed that an estimated enemy company in strength was skirting the concertina wires. Orders were passed along the line not to waste ammunition and wait until they come closer. When the enemy closed in within 30 meters, a prearranged flare was fired and all of the guns opened fire. The enemy was forced to fall back.

From 19 July, the activities of front line were gradually tapered out by the rapid development of Panmunjom truce talks, except the mortar and artillery duels were intensified. Between the 24th and the 26th A Company was received 500 rounds. The entire Battalion was bombarded with more than 1,000 rounds
for ten hours. The 14th BCT’s battery engaged with the CCF artillery in all-out duel.

Post-Armistice Activities: At 2200 hours on 27 July 1953, the entire front suddenly became silent almost in unison. The following day, 28 July, the Battalion began to dismantle its fortifications, blasted the mines and rolled up the concertina wires in order to clear the Demilitarized Zone. On 30 July, the Battalion moved back to Yanggu valley near Orinac and set-up the camp Dominado which was named in honour of Lieutenant Teodorico Dominado Jr. who lost his life at Paekso-k-san.

Since the time they camped at Yanggu, the Filipinos devoted themselves not only in military drill but also in reconstructing the ravaged villages near camp. For its efforts, the 14th BCT received the Korean Presidential Unit Citation on 15 December 1953 and the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation upon return to homeland on the last week of March 1954.

The 2nd Battalion Combat Team: When the tour of the 14th BCT was about to terminate, the 2nd was alerted for an eventual overseas duty in Korea. Aware of the truce, the Philippine Government, nevertheless, sent advance elements of this battalion in December 1953 and the main body of the 2nd BCT began the voyage to Korea on 12

A monument erected by the ROK Government in memory of the Philippine Force in Korea. Unveiled on 2 October 1974, it stands at the road-side of Tongil-ro northwest of Seoul.
April 1954. The 14th BCT was relieved by the 2nd BCT under Colonel Antonio de Veyra in Yanggu and returned to homeland on March 1954.

Among the Philippine prisoners of war, Sergeant Juanito C. Magno who captured by the enemy during the battle of Yul-tong on 22 April 1951, was repatriated during Operation "Little Switch" at Panmunjom in April 1953. And the rest of 40 men were repatriated during Operation "Big Switch" in August 1953. The repatriates included two officers, Lieutenant Tomas Batilo and Bienvenido Salting. The former was captured together with his sixteen men in a fierce action of the 10th BCT for making an attempt to reinforce the Gloucestershire Battalion on 24 April 1951. The latter was captured together with 4 of his men by the CCF surprise trap near Sagimak, Iron Triangle zone, in the patrol action on 14 July 1951.

After accomplishing an uneventful 12-month of alert duty in the Yanggu Camp, the last contingent returned to home in 13 May 1955. They still clothed with the same glory set by her predecessors that fought and died in the actions of 1951 through 1953. Outstanding performance of the Philippine BCTs since its assignment to the UNC, not only exemplified high standard of combat proficiency and espirit de corps among the UN Forces but also left the great inspiration to all freedom-loving peoples as having up-held in every respect the gallant reputation of the Filipinos.

Reference Records and Data

a. Organization of the Philippine Battalion:

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b. Participation:

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Ground Forces

327

c. The Battalion Commanders:

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<td>10th BCT</td>
<td>Col. Dionisio S. Ojeda</td>
<td>5 Dec 1950 — 4 Sep 1951</td>
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<td>20th BCT</td>
<td>Col. Salvador Abcede</td>
<td>5 Sep 1951 — 9 Jun 1952</td>
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<td>19th BCT</td>
<td>Col. Ramon Z. Aguirre</td>
<td>10 Jun 1952 — 2 Apr 1953</td>
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<td>14th BCT</td>
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<td>2nd BCT</td>
<td>Col. Antonio De Veyra</td>
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d. Honors and Awards:

(1) Unit Citation

The ROK Presidential Unit Citation

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<td>11 Jun 1952</td>
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<td>The 19th BCT</td>
<td>Arsenal and Eerie outposts</td>
<td>Jul 1952</td>
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<td>The 14th BCT</td>
<td>Satae-ri valley and Paeksook-san</td>
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The Philippine Presidential Unit Citation

"B" Company (Less 2nd Platoon) and Tank Company of the 10th BCT

Yultong Battle 5 Sep 1951

Whole service period Mar 1954

(2) Individual Decorations

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U.S. Distinguished Service Cross ............... 2
U.S. Silver Star .................................. 8
U.S. Legion of Merit ................................. 2
U.S. Bronze Star (V) ................................. 5
U.S. Bronze Star (M) ................................. 58
U.S. Air Medal ................................. 5

e. Casualties:

KIA ............... 112  WIA ............... 299  MIA ............... 57*

* Of 57 missing in action 41 were repatriated during prisoners of war exchange.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE

1. No. 2 SAAF Squadron to Korea

On 4 August 1950 the South African Government, now the Republic of South Africa, announced its intention of placing a squadron of the South African Air Force (hereinafter abbreviated as SAAF) at the disposal of the United Nations Command for service in the Korean War, and that the distinction of serving in Korea fell to No. 2 SAAF Squadron. This squadron, known as "The Flying Cheetahs" has a proud record of service in Eastern Africa, Ethiopia, Sicily, Italy and the Middle East during World War II.

In order to have adequate liaison and communications links with the UN Command, SAAF Liaison Headquarters was accordingly established on 5 September 1950 and later was stationed in Tokyo, Japan for the duration of the Korean War. It was also decided, meanwhile, that no aircraft or technical equipment would be sent from South Africa, but that all equipment would be purchased locally from United Nations sources, so as to be available immediately on the arrival of the Squadron in the Far East.

The squadron left Pretoria on 25 September, 1950 and embarked on MV Tjisidane at Durban the next day. On arrival at Yokohama, the Squadron left for Johnson US Air Base in Kyushu, Japan for approximately six weeks of familiarization and training with the new equipment supplied to it. An advance flight and supporting personnel, however, proceeded almost immediately to K-9 Airfield near Pusan, Korea, where it formed part of 12th US Fighter Squadron under command of the 18th US Fighter-Bomber Wing. The association of No. 2 SAAF Squadron with this Wing was to persist for the duration of the Korean War.

2. Chronological Summary of Operations
Operations in 1950

On 16 November 1950 five Mustangs, and a detachment of ground personnel in two C-47's were flown to K-9 airfield that three days later the first South African Air Force combat sortie in Korea was flown and entered the Korean War for the first time. On Sunday, 19 November 1950 four SAAF pilots led by Commandant S. Van Breda Theron, Commander the No. 2 SAAF Squadron, flew Mustang in close support of UNC ground advance to the border. They took part in strafing, bombing and rocket attacks against Communist supply lines and rolling stocks, mainly over the central sector in Red North Korea.

By 22 November 1950, after the first hectic days, the 18th US Fighter Bomber Wing to which the No. 2 SAAF Squadron was attached moved to K-24 airfield at Pyongyang. This November movement placed the SAAF Mustang Squadron in a more advantageous range of the battle line. From Pyongyang missions were much shorter, targets more effectively identified in the greater time so allowed, and external fuel tanks were unnecessary. While flying missions from Pusan (K-9), the Squadron’s Mustange had trouble reaching the bomb line, finding targets, and returning to base with sufficient fuel after four or five hours flying. Such advantages of range, however, were partly offset by the primitive operating facilities at K-24 just barely adequate for the rugged Mustangs.

At this stage more SAAF fighter pilots flew in from Japan in their F-51’s and all immediately went into battle to check the southward advance of the Chinese Communist forces, which had recently entered the war. The younger pilots without the experience of World War II, were learning the hard way. K-24 airfield had a bumpy grass runway, there were no hangars. In addition the Korean winter was already causing temperatures to drop below those to which the men were not accustomed.

By the end of November 1950, as the tempo of the war increased, K-24 was in imminent danger of falling into enemy hands. Consequently the No. 2 SAAF Squadron began evacuating Pyongyang East (K-24) early on the morning of 1 December 1950, and it completed its move to K-13 airfield near the town of Suwon on 4 December, only a few hours before the enemy troops reached Pyongyang. The Suwon airfield, as already judged unfit for jet operation, possessed a badly damaged concrete runway. From there the South African Air Force pilots continued to stage Mustang missions for attacking enemy troops, trucks, and supplies daily from dawn to dusk.

No. 2 SAAF Squadron's first battle casualty occurred on 5 December 1950 when the SAAF Detachment was assigned to demolish the UNC railway cars
that apparently loaded with explosives and had fallen into the hands of the enemy about six miles north of Pyongyang. Armed with six rockets each and a maximum load of .50 caliber ammunition, Captains J.F.O. Davis and G.B. Lipawsky set out for the mission. The railcars were soon sighted and the attack begun. Captain Davis dived to attack, firing rockets. In making assurances doubly sure he pressed his final button with deadly accuracy, but, at too low an altitude. His rockets struck one of the cars amidships and caused a terrific explosion which, in turn, severely damaged Captain Davis's aircraft and knocked him unconscious for a few seconds. Fortunately, the plane had been trimmed tail heavy in the attacking dive, which, when the pilot was knocked out, caused the aircraft to gain enough altitude to clear some high hills which lay directly ahead. Upon regaining consciousness the pilot found that his aileron and elevator controls were inoperative, the engine was streaming glycol, the windscreen and canopy had been blown off, and the fuselage was a mass of holes. Anxious moments followed these discoveries, but by calmness and sound judgement Captain Davis crashlanded the stricken F-51.

The 2nd SAAF Squadron personnel boarding an aircraft for Korea.
at 180 air miles per hour when the engine ceased completely. While this little drama was being played out below, Captain Lipawsky kept upstairs to ward off any surprise attacks by enemy aircraft. On being advised of events and the intentions of Captain Davis over the radio, which was still, by some miracle, operational, Captain Lipawsky alerted rescue facilities and continued to fly a combat air patrol over the downed pilot. Unfortunately, at that time, no rescue facilities were readily available so that it became a case of waiting and hoping. Fate, however, was kind, for a USAF helicopter with a Captain Lawrence as pilot and Captain Lewis Millit as observer of the 25th US Division, happened to be in the vicinity on a routine observation flight and, appreciating the situation, decided to try to be of assistance. Skillfully the helicopter was lowered between the jagged rocks and nuts of the Korean hillside. Captain Millit climbed out and gave his seat to Captain Davis who, though not injured, was shaken up by his emergency landing. This act of Captain Millit was all the more noteworthy when it was considered that he remained in the area unarmed, and well aware that there were enemy troops in the area. In fact, before the helicopter was able to return to pick Captain Millit up, he had been killed by fire from the enemy occupying the surrounding hills. With this act another courageous deed was written in the annals of the war as a symbol of true comradeship.

On 17 December 1950, however, the squadron was again ordered to fall back to K-10 at Chinhae on the south coast. Although Chinhae's short sod runway was surrounded by such hazards to flights as hangars, a sea wall, and nearby mountains, the new base proved to be "a veritable heaven" after the cold and mud at Pyongyang and Suwon. Simultaneously with the movement, all SAAF personnel still remaining in Japan were flown over to K-10 airfield with the result that the squadron was happily reassembled as a military entity. K-10 was hereafter to become home base for the SAAF Squadron for two years, right up to the time when it was re-equipped with F-86 Sabre aircraft in January 1953.

Operations in 1951

As the Chinese Communist offensive was slowly brought to a halt by the United Nations forces in the spring of 1951, the squadron settled down to a routine operational life at K-10. Pilots began to complete their allotted 75 missions comprising a tour of duty and were gradually being replaced by new flying personnel. In March 1951 it became apparent that the runway of K-10 was badly in need of repair. Accordingly the squadron moved temporarily to K-9, returning after one month to find a vastly improved runway at K-10 as well as better living
Summary of Operations

conditions.

The change in the course of the war became apparent when a forward detachment was once again to K-13 a month later. After a few days this detachment was moved to K-16, the municipal airport of Seoul. This remained the Squadron's advance base up to October 1951, when K-46 near Wonju became their advance base. A system known as "staging" was now introduced. According to this system, pilots spent a certain time at the advance base to be relieved later by pilots from the permanent base. This system was retained until the end of 1952.

By 12 April 1951, just two months after its 1,000th sortie, No. 2 SAAF Squadron had completed 2,000 combat sorties in support of the UNC forces in Korea. This continuing high sortie rate is most noteworthy. Beside the high sortie rate, the gallantry and fighting courage displayed by the Cheetahs evoked the admiration of all other UNC air forces. Thus, here is such an act of gallantry as that of May 11 1951, when four of the Squadron's F-51's went on a ground strafing mission in enemy territory.

At 1640 hours an 11 May 1951 while four F-51's of the Squadron were on an interdiction mission seven miles west of Singye, the aircraft of Lieutenant V.R. Kruger was hit in the mainplane by enemy ground fire. The F-51 caught fire and the wing collapsed, but the pilot was fortunate to abandon his crippled machine by parachute before it was too late. Lieutenant Kruger had been injured and suffered a dislocated shoulder, a crack of the right scapula, second degree of the right hand and fingers and abrasions and second degree burns of the left hand and face. As the pilot floated earthwards his comrades above set about flying a combat air patrol over him. Captain Clulow tried without success to alert rescue facilities, while Major Blaauw and Lieutenant M. Mentz remained close to the downed pilot. After a while shortage of fuel compelled the pilots to make a final decision. Captain Clulow and Lieutenant Mentz were ordered to return to K-16, while Major Blaauw continued to provide cover to his comrade on the ground.

At 1845 hours, shortly after the arrival of a flight of aircraft to take over the "capping", Major Blaauw's F-51 ran out of fuel, and he decided to crash land his aircraft with wheels retracted next to Lieutenant Kruger. Major Blaauw sustained abrasions and bruises on his nose and eyes in the crash landing but immediately went to the assistance of the wounded officer. At 1915 hours a helicopter arrived and rescued both Major Blaauw and Lieutenant Kruger.

SAAF first encounter with MIG aircraft was made on 8 July 1951 when Commandante Armstrong led two flights of four SAAF F-51's as a squadron, in a 32-aircraft strike against Kangdong Airfield northeast of Pyongyang. They
were briefed to dive-bomb the airfield immediately after the last USAF aircraft had left the target. The US aircraft attacked in flights of four in line abreast tracking across the airfield. The South African flights were ordered into echelon right by their Squadron Commander and were led down the length of the runway. This simplified their sighting problems. Fifteen of their sixteen bombs dropped hit the runway. After bombing each aircraft broke right and climbed away, reforming in battle formation.

Shortly after forming up the leader heard an American pilot report "MIG's." He saw the US aircraft orbiting to the north of the SAAF formation. One MIG was seen trying to turn with an US F-51 and fired a few bursts of machine gun fire. A few seconds later the MIG's shifted their attention to the South Africans. The SAAF formation was flying east at 7,000 feet at the time as two MIG's
came in from the south. Two were seen flying top cover above the formation. As the MIG's came in astern of the South Africans the leader gave a turn about and each aircraft turned 180 degrees. This enabled the formation to reverse the leading and turn in towards the MIG's who pulled up almost vertically without firing. The MIG's attempted another attack which was dealt with as before. After about five minutes the enemy pilots decided that they had enough, broke off the engagement and headed north. During the action several bursts of 37-mm. antiaircraft fire were observed by the formation.

The 23 of July 1951 was a sad day for the Squadron and will be long remembered in its history in the Far East. On that day three pilots in one flight of four F-51's were reported missing in action. The ill-fated flight was led by Captain F.M. Bekker with Lieutenant R.M. du Plooy and Second Lieutenants D.A.R. Green and M.I.B. Halley as wingmen. The flight was briefed to carry out a weather reconnaissance of the west coast. Each F-51 was loaded with two 500-pound bombs (10-15 second delayed fuses), six rockets and maximum .50 mm. ammunition. The flight became airborne at 1505 hours and proceeded up the Han River in battle formation at approximately 1,500 feet. At the mouth of the Han River the flight turned east and found that the weather was deteriorating steadily for the cloud base had descended to 600 feet above the ground.

After repeated attempts had been made to get through to the north, the leader decided to abandon the idea and started searching for targets in the area east of Haeju. As no suitable targets were found there the flight proceeded farther east along the Han River and then along the Imjin River. The aircraft were flying in line astern formation with cloud base alternating between 700 to 1,500 feet above ground level. The flight then headed north by north-west and kept more or less to the river area apparently making for the secondary target at Sibyoni. The time was then 1530 hours and due to the adverse weather encountered there, it became impossible for the flight to proceed farther north for the cloud ceiling was 8/8th at 1,500 feet with low clouds and rain covering about 4/8th down to 700 feet. The air itself was very unstable, causing the wingmen difficulty in keeping station. The perseverance was rewarded and at 1540 hours the leader found a suitable road bridge over the river. This bridge the flight proceeded to bomb by carrying out a glide from approximately 1,800 feet down to a release height of about 50 feet. After destroying the bridge completely the flight formed up in close formation in line astern, echelon starboard and continued searching for more targets.

As the flight passed over a small hill estimated at 300 feet high, the right inner mainplane of the F-51 piloted by Captain Bekker was seen to burst into
flames and as the canopy of the stricken aircraft came off so the whole of the starboard side of the fuselage became enveloped in fire. Captain Bekker was seen quite clearly in the cockpit as the flames were sucked in. The burning F-51 porpoised twice, lost altitude and plunged into the ground. Just prior to the crash the wingman flying in No. 2 position was forced to break right to avoid a piece of flaming wing which had broken off in the air. This bit of violent evasive action took Second Lieutenant Green into cloud and caused his instruments to become inaccurate due to the toppling of the gyros. He managed to keep control and descended in a steep diving turn to port, and as he broke cloud, he passed over Captain Bekker’s burning F-51.

The wreckage was strewn over 200 feet on the downward slope of the hill and was burning furiously. Second Lieutenant Green kept his F-51 in a tight turn and descended to about 20 feet over the destroyed aircraft to see whether there were any signs of life in doing so, he observed a parachute descending directly over the position at a height of about 200 feet. Radio contact was immediately made with the rest of the flight and it was then discovered that the parachute was that of Second Lieutenant Halley who had been forced to abandon his aircraft. The remaining members of this flight, Lieutenant R.M. du Plooy and Second Lieutenant Green watched Lieutenant Halley land safely and it was assumed that he was uninjured, for he waved to his comrades overhead.

The weather by now had worsened considerably, and the radio made it almost impossible to pass messages. It was then decided that Lieutenant du Plooy would remain over the area and fly a combat air patrol over the downed pilot, while Lieutenant Green ascended to establish better contact with the rescue organization. As Lieutenant Green pulled up he came under fire and noticed tracers pouring past his wings and bursts of 20 mm. fire forward and above his port mainplane. Rescue facilities were eventually contacted on the radio and instructed to proceed to a rendezvous ten miles east of Kaesung for the downed pilot’s position was difficult to find in the adverse weather. While the helicopter was en route to the scene Lieutenant Green alternated his position between the downed pilot and the rendezvous point but found that the weather was closing in rapidly. Further he was forced to fly low for on every occasion on which he attempted to ascend he was fired on from the surroundings.

During this period regular contact was kept with Lieutenant du Plooy over the radio and it was learned that this officer was being kept fully occupied preventing the enemy troops from capturing the downed pilot. The enemy was kept at bay by means of .50-mm. ammunition fire from the over-heated guns of Lieutenant du Plooy’s F-51. Two unidentified flights heard the reports over
their radios and offered their assistance, but they did not locate the scene possibly due to the adverse weather prevailing over the area. For 45 minutes Lieutenant du Plooy put up an heroic fight against the enemy, but at 1630 hours he reported that his ammunition was exhausted and that the enemy was closing in on Lieutenant Halley.

Visual contact had now been made with the rescue helicopter and Lieutenant Green was escorting it in when Lieutenant du Plooy reported that the enemy had at least succeeded in capturing the downed pilot. The helicopter pilot was so informed and told to return to base. He, however, refused to comply and stated that he would stand by in case of a further emergency. Approximately one minute after last hearing from Lieutenant du Plooy, Lieutenant Green sighted the Wreckage of another smouldering aircraft, as well as a parachute. Lieutenant Green called Lieutenant du Plooy on the radio but received no reply.

While circling the area Lieutenant Green met with intense and accurate fire from the ground and was obliged to take evasive action in and out of the low-lying clouds. The smouldering wreckage was not identified for the helicopter had entered the flak area and it was necessary to escort it out safely before Lieutenant Green’s F-51 ran out of fuel, for he had but 15 gallons left in his tanks.

Lieutenant Green landed safely at base, but Lieutenant du Plooy never returned from this action. The day ended with everybody in the Squadron feeling gravity of the event for three pilots had been reported missing in action in one day. Months later it was reported officially that Second Lieutenant M.I.B. Halley was a prisoner of war in Communist hands and that Lieutenant R.M. du Plooy, although still missing, had received the high U.S. award of the Silver Star for his outstanding bravery and determination in attempting to protect a comrade from capture in the face of intense and accurate enemy ground fire.

September 1951 opened with the Squadron losing both another pilot and aircraft. Second Lieutenant M.O. Grunder led four F-51’s on a rail interdiction mission. After making three rail cuts the flight proceeded with its reconnaissance of the enemy’s main supply routes. After completing the road and rail reconnaissance and while they were heading south over Youngdong Lieutenant Grunder sighted a small wooded area which he wanted to investigate closer. Flying low over the area a burst of antiaircraft fire was observed behind him, and he called on the radio and reported that he thought that he had been hit.

However, he still proceeded to rocket and strafe the position and then called the remainder of the flight down to do likewise. In all, six antiaircraft positions were observed, attacked and silenced, but while pulling up into the sun from one strafing run, one pilot observed an aircraft canopy and some papers stream
past him. A radio check in was immediately carried out, but no response was received from Lieutenant Grunder. On the ground the pilots noticed two fires; one of grass, the other from a crashed aircraft. The remainder of the flight searched the area for 20 minutes but did not observe a parachute either on the ground or in the air or any signs of life near the wrecked aircraft. Lieutenant Grunder was reported missing in action.

By 26 September 1951, exactly one year after leaving the shores of South Africa, the No. 2 SAAF Squadron ran up a total of 4,920 sorties (1,320 missions) and a total of 11,052.20 operational hours plus 2,191.05 non-operational hours.

Operations in 1952

20 March 1952 will remain an important date in the annals of the South African Air Force, for on that day the propeller driven F-51's had their second taste of aerial combat with the speedy enemy MIG type aircraft. This day opened with eight of the Squadron's aircraft taking part in an 18th US Fighter Bomber Wing attack on the enemy's rail communications in MIG Alley, close to the Yalu River.

As the flight pulled off the target, after an attack carried out in the face of heavy and intensely accurate flak, it was attacked by five MIG's. The F-51 piloted by Lieutenant D.L. Taylor was the first that the MIG's hit, and it was not long until this aircraft was seen to be streaming glycol and black smoke. The F-51 appeared to remain under control, and the pilot headed south, with the remainder of his comrades trying to provide a protective screen. It was soon found that this would be impossible though, for the members of the flight had to defend themselves time and again by turning into the repeated attacks of the MIG's which were making passes anywhere from three through nine o'clock. In an apparent effort to reduce their speed enough to keep from overshooting the SAAF planes, the faster MIG's were seen to lower their dive breaks.

As one of these MIG's did this, Lieutenant J.S. Enslin managed to maneuver his plane into position for an attack and fired a long burst at the slowed-up MIG. The bullets were seen to strike the right wing of the MIG which then emitted a large puff of black smoke, broke away from the attack, dove toward the ground and headed north to the Yalu River. During the meantime, Lieutenant V.F. Kuhn had been separated from the rest of his flight and was attacked three times by two MIG's. Again, because of the slower speed of the F-51's, he was able to send a few bursts into one of the attackers, and finally succeeded in evading the enemy jets by entering a cloud bank. This day's action against the
enemy jets greatly enhanced the morale of the Squadron pilots, though this was naturally somewhat offset by the loss of Lieutenant D.L. Taylor who was officially listed as missing in action.

The most outstanding aerial event of June 1952 was maximum effort strike by the UNC air forces at the hydro-electric plants in Communist North Korea, in which the 18th US Fighter Bomber Wing took part. The bombing of these hydro-electric plants came as a surprise not only to the Communists, but to the rest of the World as well.

On the morning of the 23 June 1952, every available aircraft of the Fifth US Air Force, as well as those from the US Far East Bomber Command, was airborne,
for one of the greatest aerial strikes of the Korean War. Commandant Burger, then Commander of No. 2 SAAF Squadron, led six of the SAAF's F-51's along with the aircraft of the 67th US Squadron against one of the hydro-electric installations. This power plant was completely destroyed. The remainder of the squadron, led by Captain Gove and Lieutenant Bosch attacked another plant five miles to the south. When reconnaissance photography had been developed, it showed this plant to be completely destroyed without loss to the United Nations air forces.

On the morning of 24 June, the hydro-electric plant south of Chosan was the target. Unfortunately, bad weather over the target area made it necessary for the aircraft to return to base. In the afternoon, however, 11 SAAF F-51's led by Lieutenant McGlure set out again to destroy this plant. Although low clouds made it impossible to observe the actual results, they were expected to be good.

Despite the two large raids and the numerous other interdiction and close support missions flown by the Squadron, June 1952 became a casualty free month for the SAAF.

Meanwhile, during June 1952, the No. 2 SAAF Squadron and the 18th US Fighter Bomber Group leaving the 18th US Wing as the rear echelon at Chinhae (K-10), moved up to Hoengsong Airfield (K-46). At this airfield the Mustangs only 100 kilometers behind the front lines, they could reduce their flying time to the enemy territory.

When the UNC air pressure attacks were about to get under way in June and early July 1952, the massive assault against Pyongyang and attacks against targets of military significance which were so situated that their destruction would have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively engaged in the logistic support of the enemy forces.

On 11 July 1952 every operational air unit in the Far East, aircraft from the Republic of Korea, the Fifth US Air Force, the South African Air Force, the 1st US Marine Wing and Seventh Fleet, savagely assaulted 30 targets designated in Pyongyang. Photographs showed that the aerial blow was quite successful against the command posts, supply concentrations, factories, troops billets, railway facilities and gun positions marked for destruction in Pyongyang. *Radio Pyongyang* announced that the strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had inflicted 7,000 casualties.

In October 1952, South Africa's Minister of Defense, F.C. Erasmus, visited the Squadron. During his visit, the Squadron's Senior Air Liaison officer, colonel D.A. du Toit, made a plea for the Squadron to be equipped with jets and was
promised that, should this be done, it would write a new chapter in the Squadron's history.

On 2 November 1952, twenty-one non-commissioned officers attended a familiarization course at Tsuiki, Japan, on F-86F aircraft and a week later one officer and sixteen other ranks also left for Tsuiki, to be followed on 23 November by four other ranks. No. 2 SAAF Squadron flew its last operational sortie with F-51 Mustang aircraft on 27 December 1952. On this day all operational aircraft were flown from the various advanced bases to K-10, Chinhae for handing over to the United States Air Force.

Slippage in programmed deliveries of the Sabre fighter-bombers delayed initiation of the South African Air Force and the 18th US Wing's conversion. On 30 December 1952, however, the No. 2 SAAF Squadron and 18th US Wing moved from Chinhae Airfield (K-10) to the new base K-55 Airfield still under construction at Osan, 65 kilometers south of Seoul.

Operations in 1953

The new Sabre jets of South African Air Force No. 2 Squadron, and 18th and 8th US Wings greatly increased the Fifth US Air Force counter-air capabilities, and permitted the Australian Air Force No. 77 Squadron to convert to fighter-bomber work. Assured by the possession of new Sabres and the improved performance of these planes, the South African pilots were ready to fight out with Communist interceptors.

On 11 March 1953, Major J.S.R. Wells and Captain J.F. Nortje were the first SAAF pilots to fly Sabre aircraft in an operational sortie when they accompanied two US pilots. On 12 March, the Squadron started its operational tour with Sabres when four missions on the Yalu were completed. Dive-bombing training was accordingly begun in the Squadron on 1 April and 14 April the Squadron and 18th US Wing made their first combined combat attack using jet aircraft against enemy targets. Relatively favorable flying weather allowed the SAAF Sabre Squadron to fly on most days in the later part of April, but the MIG's were not yet willing to fight.

As early as 10 June 1953 the Communist Chinese had launched a heavy attack against the lines of II ROK Corps on the east-central front. Striking down the valley of the Pukhan River the Red Chinese forced back the II ROK Corps in confusion as the heaviest fighting since the spring offensives of 1951 flared up. Beginning on 12 June, the Fifth US Air Force's new commander, Lieutenant
General Samuel E. Anderson ordered his wings to give all-out support to the II ROK Corps. The Communists evidently expected frontal weather to cover their ground offensives, but ground radar control allowed UNC pilots to attack targets they could not see. UNC pilots hit the advancing Red ground troops until the friendly ground forces got their lines stabilized on 19 June.

Directed by day Mosquito airborne controllers and by tactical air control parties and at night or in bad weather by tactical air direction post radars, the UNC air close support effort was at a high level all during June, and was large enough to swamp all of the control facilities on 15, 16, 26, and 30 June.

In order to blunt the force of the expected Communist ground offensive the UNC air force began interdiction strikes early in July, but marginal flying weather did not allow the airmen to get off attacks. The heavy rains and low clouds over the area which prevented interdiction attacks permitted the Communists to prepare for another all-out ground offensive on the central front.

The blow fell on the night of 13 July when the Red Chinese broke through the ROK-held right flank of IX US Corps. All UNC air commanders reacted swiftly. The curtain of fire laid down by the UNC air forces planes on the Red troops during July 1953 utilized 43 percent of the month’s combat effort in close support of ground troops.

Upon receiving General Clark’s warning that the armistice was imminent on 19 July, General Weyland, US FEAF Commander, called on all UNC air commands to reinstate the joint airfield neutralization program. Getting under way on the night of 20 July 1953, UNC bombers closed out the war in a blaze of glory.” Employing 500-pound, the medium bombers attacked the runways at Uiju, Sinuiju, Namsi, Taechon, Pyong-ni, Pyongyang, and Saamcham. The 18th US Fighter Bomber Wing began to attack the dispersed Red aircraft at Sinuiju and Uiju airfields on 18 July, and they continued to make raids against these objectives until 23 July. The combination of the B-29 fragmentation attacks and the Sabre-bomber strikes against Uiju destroyed at least 21 MIG’s.

With the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953, the Squadron settled down to a period of training and routine patrol missions. On 3 September, however, the announcement came through that the Squadron would be withdrawn from the Republic of Korea. Evacuation plans were formulated, equipment was handed back to the US Air Forces and the Squadron, split into successive drafts, was evacuated beginning on 7 September. By the end of October no South African personnel were left in Korea.
3. Reference Records and Data

The record the South African Air Force has left behind was a proud one. During its stay of approximately three years in Korea, the Squadron with its support personnel, had in total 826 men in the field. Apart from the short period during the conversion from Mustangs to Sabres, the Squadron had been continuously employed in operations, mainly comprising armed reconnaissance, interdiction and close support of the UNC ground forces. The Mustangs often operated to a depth of more than 300 kilometers beyond the bomb line, right under the noses of the MIG-15's.

a. Total Number of Participants

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<td>Officers</td>
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<td>Ground Personnel</td>
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<td>Army Officers and Men</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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b. Mustang F-51

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<tr>
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<td><strong>Total Sorties</strong></td>
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c. Sabre F-86

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<td><strong>Total Sorties</strong></td>
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d. Casualties

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e. Damage to Targets

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<td>Field Guns</td>
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<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>353</td>
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Oil and Lubricant Dumps 49  South Africa 29
Other Supply Dumps 243  87
Rail and Road Bridges 46  106
Buildings 3,021  6,816

The Squadron was also credited with cutting the permanent rail supply lines in 472 places.

f. Honors and Awards

(1) Republic of Korea decorations

Ulchi with Silver Star
   Comdt R.F. Armstrong
Ulchi
   Capt M.J. Uys
Ulchi Major M.D.V. Cloete
Ulchi
   Capt D.J. Hamman
Ulchi
   Major J.P.D. Blaauw
Ulchi
   Comdt S.V.B. Theron
Ulchi
   Capt J.S.R. Wells
Chungmu with Gold Star
   Major R. Clifton
Chungmu with Gold Star
   Capt R.H.D. Rogers
Chungmu with Gold Star
   Capt P.A. le Grange
Chungmu with Gold Star
   Major H.J.P. Burger
Chungmu with Gold Star
   Major B.A.A. Wiggett
Chungmu with Silver Star
   Capt S.N. Brace

The Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea.

OREPUB OF KOREA

The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in sitting for exceptionally meritorious service and heroism by
NO. 2 SQUADRON SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE
for the award of
THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

This Unit was deployed from South Africa in support of the United Nations forces in Korea. It was equipped with F-11 aircraft and has functioned continually in support of operations of Eighth Army.

Through the gallantry and devotion to duty of its personnel it has earned high praise and its losses in pilots have been heavy.

It continues to meet cheerfully and efficiently all tasks allotted to it and gives a higher performance than is normally expected.

Chungmu with Silver Star
   Capt W.G.A. Rogotta
Chungmu with Silver Star
   2nd Lt D.J. Earp
Chungmu with Silver Star
   Lt J. de Wet
Hwarang with Gold Star
   Lt G.G. du Pessis
Reference Records and Data

Chungmu with Silver Star  Hwarrang with Gold Star
Capt M. Strydom  F. Sgt H.L. Minnaar

Chungmu with Silver Star  Hwarrang with Silver Star
Capt L.P.T. Eager  WO II W.P.B. Botha

Chungmu with Silver Star  Hwarrang with Silver Star
Capt W.G.A. Rogotta  Air Sgt A.J.A. Templeman

(2) Other decorations

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g. Commanders of No. 2 SAAF Squadron

Commanding Officers

Cmdt S.V.B. Theron  27 Aug 1950 – 16 Mar 1951
Cmdt R.F. Armstrong  27 Mar 1951 – 26 Jul 1951
Cmdt J.P.D. Blaauw  26 Jul 1951 – 26 Sep 1951
Cmdt B.A.A. Wiggert  27 Sep 1951 – 27 Jan 1952
Cmdt R. Clifton  28 Jan 1952 – 13 Jun 1952
Cmdt R.A. Geneke  22 Sep 1952 – 30 Apr 1953
Cmdt J.S.R. Wells  5 May 1953 – 7 Sep 1953

Second in Command

Major J.P.D. Blaauw  27 Aug 1950 – 26 Jul 1951
Major R.V. Lyon  7 Nov 1951 – 14 Mar 1952
Major C.P. Mouton  14 Mar 1952 – 23 May 1952
Major H.J.P. Burger  23 May 1952 – 12 Jun 1952
Major D.L. Hefer  13 Jun 1952 – 5 Aug 1952
Flight Commanders

A. Flight
Captain J.F.C. Davis
Captain F.A. Swemmer
Captain D.D. Deans
Captain J.C. Millers
Captain H.T. Snyman
Captain W. Van Den Bos
Captain M.S. Pretorius
Captain J.S. Montgommery
Captain D.R. Leathers
Captain J. Joubert
Captain A.C.J. Bosch
Captain D.J. Stewart
Captain F.A.C. Pienaar
Captain A.D. Lawson
Captain N.A. Stocks

B. Flight
Captain H.O.M. Odendaal
Captain G.P.M. Kotze
Captain J.W. Swanepoel
Captain F.M. Bekker
Captain M. Parker
Captain B. Wilson
Captain McLeod
Captain J. Tindall
Captain R.W. Clark
Captain D.L. Hefer
Captain J. Naude
Captain J. Bolitho
Captain V.F. de Villiers
Captain J.F. Nortje
Captain J.R. Morris

C. Flight
Captain G.B. Lipawsky
Captain F.A. Swemmer
Captain J.A. Joubert
Captain L.P.T. Fager
Captain A.J. Van Rensburg
Captain T. Trotter
Captain N.C. Van Zyl
Captain J.A. Joubert
Captain D. Leathers
Captain J.G. Newton
Captain J. Groenewald
Captain B.J. Grove

D. Flight
Captain W.J.J. Badenhorst
Captain A.D. Maclean
Captain J.M. Sweeney
Captain P. Clurow
Captain R. Rogers
Captain B. Martin
Captain J. Meiring
Captain J. Rautenbach
Captain A. Van der Spuy
Captain V.F. Kuhn
Captain J. Van der Merwe
Captain R. Mcluoc
Captain A.J. Cooney
THE THAILAND FORCE
THE THAILAND FORCE

1. Introduction

The Kingdom of Thailand was among the first to pledge the full support for the U.N. effort in Korea and was the first country to send armed forces into the Korean War against the Communist aggression. On 30 June 1950, five days after the North Korean Communist (NKC) army invaded the Republic of Korea smashing south across the 38th Parallel, the Thai Government cabled a reply to the U.N. Secretary General on the Security Council’s call, stating that it decided to support the Council resolutions, willing to furnish any form of assistance, particularly foodstaff. The Secretary General, in turn, suggested the Thai Government in his memorandum on 14 July to dispatch an armed force, preferably ground troops so as to help building up the UN forces’ strength in Korea.

On 20 July, the Thai Government came to a decision to deploy an infantry brigade over the Korean soil, but it was altered subsequently to dispatch elements of Three Services under “The Royal Thai Expeditionary Forces to Korea” with Major General Prince Pisit Dispongsa Diskul in command. Thus, the Thai Force was to compose of a full-sized infantry regimental combat team plus a Navy and an Air Force component in its initial plan.

Having gone through all necessary preparations, on 22 September 1950, the Royal Thai Army activated the 21st Regimental Combat Team, appointing Colonel Boriboon Chulacharitta as parent Regimental Commander at home, while Major General Pisit Dispongsa Diskul, Prince, assumed the command of the Korea-bound regiment.

The Royal Thai Navy also organized a corvette unit on 1 October, composing of two corvettes plus one transport vessel, whose first mission was to transport and escort troops of the 21st Regimental Combat Team to the Korean shore. Commander Uthichalmarp Wathichai was assigned on 13 October to command the frigates unit.

Prior to deployment of combat elements, Major General Pisit Dispongsa Diskul, in the capacity of Commanding General, Royal Thai Expeditionary Forces, came to
Korea for pre-coordination with the United Nations Command. He was accompanied by a 11-man group of representatives from the Three Services, which eventually became the Thai Liaison Officer Group to the UN Command with Major General Pisit concurrently assuming the Group Chief. An advance party of 31 personnel from the 21st Thai RCT, led by Major Surakit Mayalarp, also flew to Korea on 10 October in an effort to make necessary arrangements in detail before the deployment of the main body.

The 1st Battalion and Headquarters elements of the 21st Thai RCT plus a Red Cross medical detachment left Bangkok on 22 October for Korea, boarding on a chartered Danish commercial vessel *Hertamaersk* and HMTS *Sichang* under the escort of two frigates, HMTS *Prasae* and *Bangpakong*. Upon arrival at the port of Pusan, Korea on 7 November, the Thai troops entrained for Taegu and, there they took a three-week orientation and familiarization course of intensive training at the UNC Reception Center, later called "Camp Walker," before their combat commitment.

Meanwhile, the Thai Naval Corvette Unit, composed of HMTS *Prasae*, *Bangpakong* and *Sichang*, left Pusan on 9 November, anchoring at Sasebo, Japan, the next day. Basing there, it would take part in the UNC naval operations under the operational control of the Task Force 95, US Navy until 21 January 1955.

In addition to these ground and sea forces, a flight-sized Thai air unit, organized with three twin-
engined C-47's cargo planes and an air medical team, was also dispatched to the
Korean theater of operations in June 1951. This Thai AF Transport Detachment
took off Don Muang Airport near Bangkok on 18 June and landed at Tachikawa
Air Base, Japan, on 23 June. Basing there the Thai Air Transport Detachment,
together with its medical team would commence to take part in the UNC airlift
operations. Noteworthy is that the Thai Air Force elements had served under
the UN Command (Rear) until 26 July 1976, when the 25-men Thai AF
Detachment departed Tachikawa AF Base, Japan via its two C-123 aircraft for
home country.

During the Korean War, as a whole, the Thailand Forces played a distinctively
sensitive and important part in the fighting against the Red aggressors until the
cease fire brought an end to active battle. To wit, the Thai Battalion's performance
of duty and display of courage in the fierce fighting on Porkchop Hill was an
example of the outstanding skills and bravery of the Thai soldiers to such an
extent that they received the name "Little Tigers" from General Van Fleet, Eighth
US Army Commander.

The commitment to help the Republic of Korea and the Free World and to
safeguard its freedom is deeply recognized by the Thai people. Thais are the last
nation other than the Unite States to maintain an operational unit in Korea until
June 1972 under the UN Command flag. In addition, basing at Tachikawa Air-
base in Japan, the 25-man Thai Air Force Detachment equipped with C-123
aircraft had served with Headquarters, UN Command (Rear) by 26 July 1976.

Based on the best available information, the Thai Forces' casualties (except
Air Force Detachment) that suffered during the Korean War (November 1950–
27 July 1953) are as follows.

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,269</td>
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2. Thai Infantry Battalion

Background

The 21st Thai Infantry Regiment was first formed on 22 September 1950 for deployment to Korea and, its first contingent, consisting of Regimental Headquarters and the 1st Battalion, arrived in Korea on 7 November the same year. Since then onward, the Thailand force remained at battalion size until in 1955 when its strength was reduced to a company-sized-unit, while the elements of the Regimental Headquarters returned home to Thailand in May 1951. In other words, Thailand maintained actually an infantry battalion in Korea dispatched from the 21st Thai Regiment throughout the war period. The last company-sized contingent departed for Bangkok on 23 June 1972, leaving, besides a UNC liaison officer, a small-token contingent of soldiers in the United Nations Command Honor Guard in Korea it is even today.

Famed for their nick-names, "Little Tigers," the soldiers of the Thailand Battalion had established themselves as a respected member of the United Nations Forces in Korea from their first actions at Pyongyang during the first Korean War winter through the defense of Kaesong to the gallant stand on Porkchop Hill and the final phase in the Boomerang. During the period, serving with the 187th US Airbone RCT, the 29th British Brigade, the 1st US Cavalry Division and the 2nd US Infantry Division, the men of the Thai Battalion had played an important part in the success gained by the UNC ground forces. The vigorous part which the Thai soldiers had contributed to the cause of freedom against the Communist aggression will linger long in memory of the Korean people. (See Sketch Map 1.)

For their glorious battle accounts, the Thailands enjoyed themselves with so many of distinguished service medals, unit citations and commendations awarded by the Republic of Korea and the UN Command. In the 3rd Rotation Contingent alone the Thai soldiers honored with 39 courage medals consisting of one Legion of Merit, 12 Silver Stars, and 26 Bronze Stars for their brave stand at the Battle of Porkchop in the fall of 1952.

Until the armistice brought the shooting war to a halt, a total of some 4,000 men of the Thai Battalion members served in Korea, suffering 1,169 casualties including 125 deaths and five missing, while the whole total personnel served in Korea mounted up to 19,000 men when the last company-sized contingent left Korea on 23 June 1972.
North to Pyongyang, South to Sangju
(28 November 1950 – 8 March 1951)

Upon the completion of training at Taegu, the 1st Battalion, 21st Royal Thailand Regiment (hereafter refer to as the Thai Battalion) moved north on order to Pyongyang where it was placed under the operational control of the 187th US Airborne RCT with the mission of local security when its main force arrived there on 28 November 1950. On 2 December, however, the Thailanders, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kriengkrai Attanantna, were ordered to pull back to the east bank of the Taedong River on the 4th as the Chinese Communist forces suddenly triggered an entirely new war against the ROK and UN forces. Thereafter the battalion moved farther back to Kaesong where it assumed the security mission until 13 December when it was ordered to move to Munsan. It continued moving backward to Suwon and Osan the next day.

On 1 January 1951, the Thai Battalion was detached from the 187th US ARCT, newly attaching to the I US Corps in Yongdungpo. When it arrived at the Corps Headquarters the next day, the battalion was further attached to the 29th British Brigade then in corps reserve at Kupabal north of Seoul. To cope with a growing expectation of a CCF mass offensive, the Thai Battalion was now assigned to cover retirement of the friendly forces and took up defensive positions in Kupabal. The heavy enemy attack at last came on the 3rd, concentrating a great blow against the British brigade sector. Although there ensued a fierce fighting back and forth in and around Koyang, the enemy penetrated to a considerable depth. Late in the afternoon, the Thai Battalion and the brigade started withdrawing to Suwon, crossing the Han River just before dawn on 4 January. After two days in Suwon, the battalion again moved to Pyongtaek, where it remained in reserve for two weeks.

On 18 January, the Thai Battalion was transferred to the IX US Corps in Sangju far down the south, where it was primarily involved with security of MSR 13 under control of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment. There it performed the assigned mission with a particular attention on Communist guerrilla activities along the Mungyong—Sangju road and the Mungyong—Yongpung road as well.

Advance to the Hwachon Reservoir
(26 March – 10 April 1951)

Since the Red guerrilla activities had greatly been dropped by the early days
of March, the IX US Corps began consideration to commit the Thai Battalion into battle. On 9 March, upon being relieved by the 9th ROK Security Battalion, the Thailanders moved to the 1st US Cavalry Division area near Kwangyang south of Chipyong-ni. Remaining its attachment under the 5th US Cavalry, the battalion underwent an additional course of field training until 25 March to accustom themselves with inherent Korean terrain feature before move into the battle lines.

On 26 March, Thais moved on order from Koksu to the vicinity of Chunchon to join the 1st US Cavalry Division then advancing toward the Hwachon Reservoir. It was diverted to the 8th US Cavalry's control upon arrival there and soon began to participate in patrolling in force toward the north bank of the Soyang River line. On 3 April, when the 1st US Cavalry Division started a deliberate offensive operation heading for the Hwachon Reservoir, the Thai Battalion took part in the division's main attack. Attacking first with the 1st and 2nd Companies abreast, it quickly advanced along the east side of the Pukhan River, forcing the enemy to disperse and retreat to the north. The battalion continued the attack despite encountering a massive barrage of mortar and automatic weapons en route. Maneuvering through by cross century, it had reached the objective on the Kansas Line by 9 April.

During the period 3–10 April, the Thai Battalion suffered one man killed plus an officer and 10 men wounded in action. They rescued four US soldiers then being in captive by the enemy, and captured a number of prisoners. For their exceptionally distinguished battle merits, 1st Lieutenant Pirapul Chotochong, Private First Class Satim Kauetong and Private Chuopol Siita were awarded later the American Bronze Star Medals by the UN Command.

**Action in the Western Sector**

(11 April – 16 July 1951)

**First CCF Spring Offensive**: As the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered by the Eighth US Army on 10 April to shift to the western front, the Thai Battalion was relieved in place by elements of the 5th US Marine Regiment and, after once assembling at Korak across the Pukhan River, it moved to an area near Kumgok, 20 kilometers northeast of Seoul on the 11th. While bivouacked there until 26 April, the Thailanders, now having an exceptional privilege to wear the 1st US Cavalry Division's insignia, went through a refresher training course, with a particular emphasis on physical reconditioning to prepare themselves for forthcoming commitment.

In the meantime, the Chinese Communist forces newly launched an all-out
offensive beginning on the night of 22 April that caused the UN forces to withdraw some depth, down to Line Delta in the case on the western front — where the most heaviest weight of the enemy attack fell on aiming at capturing Seoul.

On 26 April, the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered to secure the Han River line and, immediately after the situation was stabilized, it would step up to resume the advance northward. In consequence, the Thai Battalion moved to the Chang-dong area northern outskirts of Seoul on the following day. On the 28th, it maneuvered in motor serials to the bottom of Hill 716 (Namjang-dae), where the battalion took up blocking positions. During the night of 28–29 April, the enemy penetrated the Thai outpost line near Ui-dong, but was repelled by a counterattack on the following morning. By the end of the month, the CCF offensive was ended, getting a fatal blow both in manpower and materiel. Thus, now was the UN forces' turn to attack and, the I US Corps began launching a heavy counterattack, driving the enemy back more than 16 kilometers to the north.

From 4 to 15 May, the Thais took part in cautious but aggressive probing-advance undertaken by the 8th US Cavalry Regiment. It attacked forward through the vicinity of Ui-dong–Ponghak-dong – Hill 452 north of Seoul. Meanwhile, the Headquarters of the 21st Thai Regiment had been prepared to return home and, on 12 May the Thai Battalion was filled up with some of the Regimental Headquarters personnel. The remainders were went back to Thailand, arriving at Bangkok on 3 July 1951.

Second CCF Spring Offensive: On the night of 15–16 May 1951 the Chinese Communists began another determined offensive, this time carrying their main effort onto the east-central front. Over in the 1st US Cavalry Division sector, however, friendly forces' defense was firm, although patrol bases were ordered to pull back to within the MLR wherefrom all units were to continue aggressive patrolling actions to determine the enemy situation. During these days the Thailands sent out patrols forward to the maximum extent practicable, mostly to the Ansu-bong–Nojok-bong area.

On the early morning of 20 May, the Thai Battalion crossed the line of departure and attacked north through the axis of Chung-kol–Ssangmun-ni–Paegundong – Hill 204 east of Tongmak, thus reaching Uijongbu the next day. Meanwhile, the second step of the CCF spring offensive came to a standstill by 20 May, again only resulting in their own serious defeat. On the 22th, the Thai battalion continued to attack northeast of Uijongbu and, by 25 May it had reached the Chohae-dong area, after advancing through the Hill 341 – Yanggu–Pulguk-san (Hill 361)–Sapsa-dong–Tokchon-ni–Polmoru axis.
Resuming Advance: On the morning of 26 May, the battalion was relieved by elements of the 8th US Cavalry and moved from Chohae-dong in the evening to the east of Tongduchon. It resumed the advance from there to Kuksa-bong on the 28th and crossed the Hantan River. The next day the battalion received a shower of enemy artillery and mortar fire which did not incur any casualties of damage, however. On the 31st, the Thais maintained blocking positions in the west of Chonggok (Chonggong-ni), remaining there until 4 June.

On the morning of 6 June the Thai Battalion repulsed an enemy probing attack in company strength west of Yul-tong on the morning of the 6th. After daybreak the next day, a Thai company attacked and advanced to the San-kol area, meeting moderate enemy resistance with small arms. Shortly after midnight, 9 June, the Thais beaten off a small-scale of enemy counterattack. After reaching the south bank of the Imjin River, the Thailanders were kept busy in organizing patrol bases on the one hand, while combat patrols were repeatedly sending out on the other hand.

By 18 June the eastern end of the I US Corps had advanced to Chorwon, when the Thai Battalion was holding high ground northeast of Hill 167 east of the Imjin River, where it remained in a general area of the Chaegun-dong—Chungsa-ri line until 16 July when the 1st US Cavalry Division became a corps reserve. During the period, the battalion maintained the present positions in main, dispatching patrols deep into the enemy-held area day and night. At this stage of the war, neither side attempted a large-scale offensive operation as the truce negotiations were going on at Kaesong since 10 July.

Patrolling Clashes
(16 July – 18 November 1951)

On 16 July 1951, the Thai Battalion went into a I US Corps reserve together with the 1st US Cavalry Division, upon being relieved by elements of the 35th Regiment, 25th US Infantry Division. After remaining in reserve at Kilm Yong-dong southwest of Kisan-ni (Ilton) for two weeks, the battalion was returned back in the line on 31 July when it took positions on the highground in and around Sammyochon, northwest of Yonchon, from the 35th US Regiment. There the Thais were involved mainly with routine patrolling actions, in addition to maintenance of the present main battle positions. What was often described at the higher levels as “routine patrolling” at this stage could be anything but routine when one got down to company for battalion level. Such actions were carried out by the Thailanders during these days. They went out as deep as
possible into the enemy-held territory to detect and probe the enemy defenses and also to keep him off balance.

To wit, on 3 August, a Thai patrol engaged with and dispersed an enemy group at Hill 242 four kilometers west of Samnyochn, while another party raided and occupied Hill 216 in Kai-dong, more than a kilometer northwest of Hill 242, the next day. On the 6th, a Thai patrol party observed an enemy group near Chokko-ri, two kilometers due north of Hill 242, and directed friendly artillery fire on the enemy, presuming with a successful result. Maintaining a strong patrol base on Hill 216, which was constantly subjected to enemy raids, the Thai Battalion continued such aggressive patrolling in this sector until 8 September when it was ordered to assemble and became a division reserve with the 8th Cavalry at Kusok-tong west of Chongong-ni (Chongok), some six kilometers south of Yonchon. In the meantime, in early August Lieutenant Colonel Kriengkrai Attananta, the Thai Battalion Commander, was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Prayauth Nuchakanjonkul.

On 29 September, the Thai Battalion became a reserve of the 8th US Cavalry with one company on the regimental MLR. It remained assembled at Kusok-tong until 4 October and then moved north to Yul-tong, two kilometers west of Sinmang-ni. On the 6th, when Operation Command was in full swing, the Thai Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion, 8th US Cavalry, taking up positions on the highground in the Karhyon-ni area. Maintaining its main defenses on and around Hill 327, the battalion conducted ceaseless patrolling actions in force against enemy outposts, particularly on the T-Bone Hill ridge and Alligator Jaws across an open valley.

On 18 October, the Thai Battalion sector was shifted eastward by taking over new positions along a line covering northwestern outskirts of Hill 477 (Chondonk-san) through the highground in Toksan-ni, just vacated by the 3rd Battalion, 15th US Regiment. Remaining in this general area until 19 November, the Thailandeers engaged so frequently with the enemy during their patrolling and raids. On 7 November, for example, a Thai patrol fought furiously with enemy troops at Hill 179 situating like an isolated island in front of T-Bone Hill (Hill 290 or Song-san) in full daylight, while a Thai platoon-sized outpost, led by 1st Lieutenant Damtong Yupo, 2nd Thai Company, at the southwest edge of the T-Bone ridge was raided by a reinforced CCF platoon that night. During the night of the 13th, the enemy again attempted to raid the very same outpost, this time employing two companies in strength with the support of tanks. There soon followed a bitter hand-to-hand fighting during which the Thai defenders held their positions firm until the enemy disengaged at daybreak. Lieutenant Damtong, who killed in this action, was honoured with Thai and US distinguished
service medals for his outstanding leadership, determination and courage. The Thai platoon suffered eight killed, 15 missing and some wounded. This particular battle ground became to fame later as "Outpost Eerie" for its peculiar landscape.

Change of Attachment
(19 November 1951 – 22 October 1952)

Beginning on 19 November 1951, the 1st US Cavalry Division was relieved on the line by the 3rd US Division and, upon relief in place by the 3rd Battalion, 180th US Regiment, 45th US Division, the Thai Battalion was placed under the control of the 3rd US Division along with the 8th US Cavalry Regiment on the 20th until 15 December when it was assembled in Chonggok. The Thai Battalion was passed to operational control of the I US Corps on 19 December as the 1st US Cavalry Division was scheduled to leave from Korea very shortly.

On 26 December, it was transferred to the IX US Corps and attached to the 2nd US Division for further attachment to the 9th US Regiment, when it moved to Wasu-ri in the reserve area of the 2nd US Division, and remained there until 25 January 1952. Then, it took over the French Battalion sector on the MLR in and around Tap-kol northwest of Kumhiwa. There it was primarily to strengthen the main defensive positions during the winter lull.

With the arrival of the spring season, the Thailanders were kept busy in sending out patrols and setting up ambushes. It was in this period that Lt. Col. Prayuth Nuckakanjonkul, the Thai Battalion Commander, was rotated to home after turning the command over to Lt. Col. Oang Potikanita. Late in May the battalion was relieved on position by elements of the 7th US Division and became a corps reserve for two and a half months.

During 16–18 July 1952, the 2nd US Division relieved the 45th US Division along the Yokkok River on the 1 US Corps front, while the Thai Battalion was placed in reserve stationing at Tongduchon for the 9th US Regiment until 22 October 1952. By this time, the enemy artillery power was remarkably increased and began to attempt a series of nightly probes on the UNC's key outposts, Hill 275 (Old Baldy), Hill 234 (Porkchop), and Outpost Eerie in particular in this Yokkok-chon sector. As the summer deepened, the enemy activities became more aggressive, but the fighting was still confined to a pattern of raids and limited attacks chiefly against outpost positions.
The Battle of Prokchop Hill
(31 October – 11 November 1952)

Prologue: In the fall of 1952, when the talking war front struggling for a cease-fire was recessed indefinitely, the Communist forces’ actions sharply increased on the fighting front as the enemy sought to improve and strengthen his defensive positions before the onset of winter. To cope with the situation, the UNC ground forces also reacted very aggressively to hold the ground, some time by launching limited attacks aimed at forcing the enemy to come back to the truce talk table at Panmunjom.

The enemy made repeated, tenacious effort to take friendly positions, chiefly most sensitive outposts on the critical terrain feature. These savage battles were a sort of hill warfare characterizing this stage of the Korean War, struggling for control of key and dominant outpost hills all along the frontline. Perhaps, one of the most typical hill battle contests to take and hold the ground was waged at Porkchop Hill then held by the Thais.

The bitter infighting, which took place in the entrenched positions on Porkchop, encountering the overwhelming Red Chinese in number, was as hard pressed and bloody as ever seen before. Jumping at a conclusion before everything, the Thais won the fighting, not simply by the superior weight of friendly air and artillery power, but because the Thai infantry, man for man in the hand-to-hand fighting, outgamed the Chinese Communist infantrymen at Porkchop. Situated at just north of a branch stream of the Yokkok River, Porkchop Hill itself was a contemptible hill, ill-formed for all round defense, and was more like an isolated hill surrounded by hill mass complexes overlooking the Yokkokchon Valley.

On 23 October 1952, the Thai Battalion moved on order from Camp Casy in Tongduchon to the Sinhyon-ni–Karhyon-ni sector and took up positions on and around Hill 347 and Hill 327 with two companies on the line which extended from Hill 234 to Hill 187 (Snook Hill). Hill 234 (Hill 255 on the old map), better known as “Porkchop” for its peculiar shape, was manned initially by a rifle platoon and an additional rifle squad reinforced with HMGs and LMGs under the responsibility of the 1st Company led by Captain Juan Vanart. It was the very place, where the Thailand soldiers would write soon a new chapter of victorious records ever told in a series of unprecedented bloody battles. The enemy facing the Thais was the 337th Regiment of the 113th CCF Division supported
by the bulk of artillery and mortar.

The Development of the Battle: During the period from 31 October through 11 November 1952, in an-all out effort to capture Porkchop Hill, the Chinese Communists attempted five times, first two to probe the defense strength and last three to take the hill, but all were resulted in vain on account of the gallant stand of the heroic Thailand troops.

After patrolling actions and probing raids on the outpost lines were repeated each other between the two opponents for a week, the bloody fighting for Porkchop was begun on the night of 1–2 November when an enemy force, about two battalions in strength, following a four-hour long volley of artillery and mortar fire, flooded bilaterally toward Porkchop with two assault echelons abreast at nightfall. This first battle ensued until 2030 hours when the Red hordes broke off the fighting and fled to the north leaving their 50 deads on the scene. The Thais suffered eight killed and 14 wounded including Capt Juan.

Another determined CCF onslaught was followed on the night of 6–7 November beginning at the midnight. The Reds charged in like the tenacious beast upon the Thai bunkers and a bloody contest was raged between the attackers and defenders lasting until 0330 hours when the enemy gave up the fighting. The enemy losses were at least 58 killed counted at a cast of four Thais killed and another four wounded in this second battle.

Despite the wholesale defeats of the previous two attacks, the third CCF attack fell on the night of 10–11 November, distinctly different this time in far strengthened number than ever before. At about 1900 hours on the 10th, the enemy commenced to pound his artillery fire at the adjacent friendly positions and at 2300 hours, finally began to volley at Porkchop. Soon the Reds made a dashing assault, putting a regimental force in the onrush. Friendly artillery poured in heavy bombardment resembling a storm of rain to stem the Red onslaught. Notwithstanding, the enemy managed to penetrate a heavy fire barrage and repeated barriers, thus reaching within the Thai bunker positions. The Ranger Platoon was already climbed up the hill to beefing up the defense power and the Thais fought to the death to repel the Red odds by committing last minute reserve troops even including clerks and cooks onto the embattled positions. A bitter hand-to-hand fighting was followed there when the Thais displayed stubborn resistance by hurling grenades and charging in with the bayonets. As a result, the enemy odds could not continue the fighting any longer and finally had begun to fall back by daybreak, carrying a heavy toll of casualties with him. Thais suffered in this last fighting 12 KIA and 47 WIA including 1st Lieutenant Vicchien Sangkapranwan and 2nd Lieutenant Pilis Kanvilai. 204 enemy bodies were
exposed on the battle scene in addition to four CCF prisoners. The enemy KIA were farther increased by the estimate of the 2nd US Division with additional 150 killed and more than 250 enemy wounded.

Recapitulating, during a series of the battles at Porkchop, The Thailanders inflicted enormous casualties upon the Chinese Communists; at least 322 killed and four prisoners besides countless wounded at a cost of 25 own killed and 76 wounded in total. For this gallant fighting at Porkchop alone the Thais received one Legion of Merit, 12 Silver Stars, and 26 Bronze Star Medals from the UN Command, and they were further honored with the name “Little Tigers,” meant the soldiers fighting like ferocious tigers, given by General James A. Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander.

Winter Lull
(11 November 1952 – 28 February 1952)

The remaining days of November 1952 passed without any major incidents. And, thereafter the Thai Battalion experienced comparatively a quiet period until early spring the following year. During the period, the Thailanders moved to the Chura-dong area immediately behind the MLR late in November. Then, on 3 December, they were returned back on the line by relieving the 3rd Battalion, 9th US Infantry in the vicinity of Yangimal and Togun-kol with the battalion command post at Naechon near a tributary of the Imjin River. There the battalion saw occasional enemy probing-raids such as on 13 December and during the night of 20–21 December on the its left flank. On 29 December, the Thai Battalion was relieved by the Ethiopian Battalion, when a relief took place between the 2nd and 7th US Divisions. The Thailanders went into reserve bivouacking at Kuchae-mal south of Pisokkori.

As the year of 1953 came in across the frozen battle-ground, the Thai Battalion was still in reserve at Pupyong-ni where it occupied with preparation for training program of a four-week course. But the training was discontinued as the 2nd US Division was to relieve the 1st Commonwealth Division in the Hook – Little Gibraltar sector west of the Imjin River late in January. The division relief itself began on the 29th, while the battalion was still remained in reserve of the 9th US Regiment in the new sector for another two weeks. On 13 February, the Thai Battalion found itself on the highground west and northwest of Naechon or Nabu-ri after taking over the area from the 1st Battalion, 9th US Infantry.
The Last Spring
(March – June 1953)

As March began, the Red Chinese came up to an offensive action again but on a limited-scale in an attempt to regain the initiative. On 1 March, beginning at 0300 hours, the enemy employed heavy weight of artillery and mortar fire into the Thai Battalion sector, heralding the imminent attack. But the enemy attackers in two company strength could not penetrate the Thai positions. Now a Thai patrol party jumped off to wipe out the fleeing enemy, suffering six killed, 23 wounded and one missing. Thereupon, except for a few similar encounters, the patrolling was uneventful, nor did the enemy beset himself actively in the Thai sector. Thus there was followed a brief lull along the front.

Heavy rain fell during the last ten days of March, but a Thai outpost was attacked on the night of 24–25 March by a numerically superior foe, an estimated reinforced CCF battalion, and a hand-to-hand combat plus a frisk fire fight ensued for twenty minutes before the enemy began to disengage. On 8 April, the Thai Battalion was relieved in place by elements of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and moved to Pupyong-ni east of Uijong-bu where it was to retrain for another 20 days.

With the 2nd US Division transferring from the I US Corps to the IX US Corps on 27 April, the Thai Battalion moved to the Kansas Line and then relocated to Kyo-dong west of Unchon on 4 May. While remaining there in IX Corps reserve, the Little Tigers continued to conduct a series of training programs until early July. The period from 4 May through 21 June 1953 was served by the 5th Thai Rotation-Contingent and Lt. Col. Parti Yotesakrai succeeded the command of the battalion.

The Battle in the Vicinity of Boomerang
(14–27 July 1953)

On 12 July, the Thai Battalion was alerted for tactical commitment in the west of the Boomerang sector northwest of Kumhwa, where it had previously battled from 26 December 1951 to 20 May 1952.

That day, an advance party of the Thai Battalion made a terrain reconnaissance trip to an new area and, the main body followed it on the 14th, arriving at Ugu-dong southwest of Kumgong-ni (Kumgok) at noon. There the Little Tigers were assigned the left portion of the 9th US Infantry’s sector.
With its command past at Ugu-dong, the Little Tigers Battalion disposed its three companies on the OPLR as a forward security force of the 2nd US Division's MLR; the 1st Company on the left occupying a ridge in Hadong-ni, the 2nd Company on the center around Hill 351 in Sangdong-ni, and the 3rd Company in and around Paem-kol and Naechon to the north and on the right, while the 4th Company was positioned in depth behind the 1st and 2nd Company positions.

There they had to start out with the task of rebuilding shelters and bunkers damaged by the heavy rain on the night of 14–15 July. During the night of the 15th, the 1st Thai Company, Captain Pryoon Plomukda was commanding, engaged with a group of the enemy when a ROK-US special agent team, equipped with full armament in CCF uniform, was run over a friendly mine-field on its way to infiltrating into the enemy-held territory. At the very moment when the buried

**THAI BATTALION IN THE BOOMERANG SECTOR (14–27 Jul 1953)**
mine was exploding, a CCF group rushed to the 2nd Platoon position under the artillery covering fire. The 1st and 3rd Platoons were ordered to provide the fire support, while the 2nd Platoon attempted to pin down the enemy approach. A fierce firefight ensued until 0140 hours. At about 0240 hours, another two CCF platoon-sized force attempted to take a 2nd Company outpost near Naechon, support, while the 2nd Platoon attempted to pin down the enemy approach. A fierce firefight ensued until 0140 hours. At about 0240 hours, another two CCF platoon-sized force attempted to take a 2nd Company outpost near Naechon, but was ended in vain. Meanwhile, a patrol from the 2nd Company spotted two enemy tanks in the vicinity of Hill 259 and directed friendly artillery to hit them very successfully.

On the night of 17 July, following an extensive volley of artillery and mortar fire from the north and northwest of Hill 325 across the Hantan River, an enemy force crossed the river and continued to move on apparently heading for the 2nd Platoon position of the 1st Company. The Thai Battalion employed all its organic firepower to stem the Red onrush, and the platoon fought courageously against such an outnumbered enemy, thus forcing him to retreat. At 2200 hours, the CCF horde attempted again a futile attack on the left flank of the 1st Company. No particular incidents were happened during the rest of the month, except customary patrolling as well as harassing fire duels, until the shooting came to a halt on 27 July by the armistice.

Post-Armistice
(28 August 1953 - 23 June 1972)

Since the signing of the armistice, and the subsequent cessation of shooting, the Little Tigers had stood alert, working long, hard hours in the preparation of new defensive positions, and guarding against any further possible outbreak of war.

After taking up the post armistice main battle position (PAMBP) around the highground north of Ugu-dong in Tochang-ni, the Thai Battalion moved back to Sagumhak three kilometers south of Ugu-dong on 18 August and remained there until 25 September as a 2nd US Division reserve.

On 26 September, it moved to Choom-ni, some three kilometers northwest of Sagumhak where it took over positions from the 2nd Battalion of the 9th US Infantry, becoming the regimental reserve until 14 November. On 14 November, the Thai Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion, 9th US Regiment on the frontline in the vicinity of Hate-dong northeast of Ugu-dong.
Thai troops are moving out on foot from their camp in Unchon for field training.

On 8 April 1954, the Thai Battalion was awarded the ROK Presidential Unit Citation for its brilliant battle account during the period from 28 November 1950 to that date. It was honored again with the second ROK Presidential Unit Citation, dated 20 May 1954, for its distinguished service from 21 June 1953 through 2 May 1954, in particular for the brave fighting at Hill 351 in the west of Boomerang, where it hit a fatal blow upon the CCF units, killing 100 Reds and wounding 300. The Thais were privileged by the 2nd US Division to wear the “Indianhead” patch and the infantry blue shoulder cord on the right shoulder as a permanent part of their service uniform.

Since the arrival of the 7th rotation-contingent in July 1956, the Thai force was reduced from the battalion size to a company level until 23 June 1972 when the last contingent left Korea.

In September 1954, the Little Tigers were detached from the 2nd US Division
which was scheduled to pull out from Korea shortly and were deverted to the I US Corps control. Since then onward, remaining under the 7th US Division control, they stationed at Unchon near Camp Kaiser until 15 November 1970 when the battalion was ordered to relocate to Camp Mermaid south of Uijongbu.

On 11 June 1968, when a change of command ceremony for the Thai contingent was held at Yongsan, the outgoing 19th Rotation Company, commanded by Major Arron Parivattidham, was awarded the ROK Presidential Unit Citation. Four years later, on 21 June 1972, the last and 23rd Thai Rotation Company was honored in ceremonies prior to its departure for Bangkok and it finally left Korea on the 23rd, leaving a liaison officer and a small, token contingent in the UN Command Honor Guard. Except for the ROK and the US forces, the Thai contingent was the only member of the original UN Command which continued to maintain combat troops in Korea up to such a long span of time. Incidentally, the 21st Thai Infantry

On 21 June 1972, the 23rd Thai Rotation Company -- the last contingent -- is honored in ceremonies at Yongsan's Knight Field prior to their departure for Thailand two days later.
Regiment, now in Bangkok, is the Queen's Guard Unit to Her Majesty the Queen Sirikit, and thus is called the 21st Infantry Regiment, Queen's Guard.

In retrospect, since arriving in Korea in November 1950, the Thais had exhibited the esprit de corps, cooperation, professional skill and valor so necessary for success in battle, thus compiling a very brilliant record with the UN forces during the hot war in Korea.

In deed, in no small part, they had contributed to the UNC success. Subjected to vicious enemy attacks in the Porkchop sector, for instance, they taught the Communists that the Thai were their masters. In bitter fighting, over prolonged period, they stood their ground, fighting with bayonets and knives in bloody hand to hand encounters.

There is now a monument standing on the highground in the vicinity of Unchon that erected by the ROK Government in remembrance of the Little Tigers as well as all members of the Royal Thai forces those who fought in the Korean War.

3. Thai Naval Corvette Unit

The Royal Thai Naval Unit, composed of HMBS Prasae, Bangpakong, Sichang and a chartered commercial vessel left Bangkok on 22 October 1950, carrying the first contingent of the 1st Battalion, 21st Royal Thai Regiment aboard, and arrived at the port of Pusan on 7 November the same year. Then it sailed out Pusan on 9 November, anchoring at the Sasebo dock, Japan the next day. Basing there the Thai Corvette Unit took part in the UNC naval operations under the operational control of Task Force 95 until it finally departed Sasebo on 21 January 1955, arriving at Bangkok, Thailand on the 31st of the month.

During its service in the Korean waters for four years, three months and 18 days, mostly operating off Wonsan and Songjin in the Eastern Sea, the Thai Corvette Unit consisted of two frigates and a transport, had performed such missions as bombardment on the coastal targets, escorting for UNC supply vessels and water patrolling. Their service rendered in the Korean waters was exceptional. On 7 January 1951, for instance, HMBS Prasae, in company with HMBS Bangpakong, was participating in a highly effective gunfire support mission, bombarding Chinese and NK Communist targets near Chodo-ri. While she was endeavoring to maneuver into favorable gun range of the enemy shore positions in poor visibility and heavy seas, HMBS Prasae struck the reef in the shallow shore near the enemy-held territory on the morning of 8 January 1951. Through the
attempted salvage operations which took place under extremely hazardous conditions the courage and devotion to duty displayed by the Thai crew-members were of highest order. Their efforts to save their ship were marked by many individual acts of heroism. Only the continued heavy weather which ultimately rendered the ship totally unseaworthy caused the cessation of these efforts on 13 January. It was just such spirit and teamwork as these Thai naval members displayed that would ultimately enable the UN Command to prevail over the forces of Communist aggression.

To cite another incident, on 30 April 1951, HMTS Bangpakong was getting underway from her anchorage and stood in toward Kalma-gak to engage in a shore bombardment mission. At about 1720 hours, the Bangpakong being at general quarters commenced fire on the assigned targets before being directed to retire. While retiring she continued to fire at targets. At about the Bangpakong was again directed by Commander, Task Element 95.21 to stand in and fire counter battery fire on the targets. The Bangpakong stood in 8,000 yards range and commenced fire on targets. Upon the completion of her fire mission the Bangpakong retired and anchored in her assigned berth.

Throughout the whole period, a total of four frigate-type ships (HMTS Frasae First, Bangpakong, Tchin and Prasae Second) and one transport (Sichang) and 2,485 seamen (204 officers and 2,281 men) inclusive of liaison officers had participated in the war. The Thai Navy had lost of one frigate (HMTS Frasae First) and suffered four lives, two each in action and disease.

4. Thai Airlift Detachment

On 18 June 1951, a Thai Air Force Flight, consisted of three C-47’s took off Don Muang Airport near Bangkok, arriving at Tachikawa Air Base in Japan on 23 June 1951. The Thai air unit was attached whereupon to the 21st Squadron of the 374th Troop Carrier Wing under the 315th US Air Division. Based in Tachikawa, Japan, the Thailand aircraft was employed primarily in hauling supplies and troops airlift between air bases within Japan throughout the Korean War. During the period, particularly noteworthy was that the Royal Thailand Air Transport Detachment was honoured with the commendation plaque by the 374th Troop Carrier Wing for its distinguished air service while flying to the UN allied forces in Korea, airlifting urgently needed equipment and supplies. The commendation emphasized in particular that despite the fact that flights
were often over hazardous terrain and landings were made on short and dangerous airstrips, the safety record of the Thailand Detachment had been one hundred per cent perfect during these continuous flights covering from June 1951 to 1 March 1953.

Remaining at the Tachikawa Air Base, the Royal Thai Air Transport Detachment with three C-47's had continued the post-armistice service, sharing a notable part in the UNC air efforts until 6 November 1964. During this period, the Thai C-47 Air transport unit performed customarily their airlift missions, between Tachikawa and the other local air bases in Japan and also K-sites in Korea.

After the C-47 air contingent was returned home to Bangkok, The Thai Air Force continued to maintain C-123 aircraft unit in support of the UN Command. And, on 26 July 1976, the 25-man Thai Air Force Detachment, assigned to Headquarters, UN Command (Rear) and stationed at Tachikawa Airbase, Japan, finally departed via its two C-123 aircraft for permanent deployment in home country. This Bangkok-directed action marked an end of 25 years of the Thai air cargo support for UNC operations.

5. Thai Medical Service Detachment

In addition to the armed force of three services, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Thailand Government also dispatched the three separate medical service elements to assist the UNC effort in the conduct of the Korean War. These non-combatant elements were the Thai Air Force Medical Detachment, Red Cross Medical Service Detachment, and Mobile Surgical Hospital personnel.

The air medical detachment had engaged in treating the wounded while in flight and also taken part in treating and nursing at the UNC hospitals, including evacuation of the wounded to Thailand. During the period of service until 1954, it earned the highest respects and appreciation from all with whom they had been associated in the common effort for their exceptional service.

The Royal Thai Red Cross Medical Detachment, consisted of the medical doctors and nurses, came to Korea by the same ship with the first contingent of the Thai Army troops. Since it arrival at Pusan on 7 November 1950, the detachment served in the Korean War until the last team returned to home on 13 November 1953. During the period, this peculiar medical service detachment saw the service of 66 doctors and nurses in four time rotations.

Taking into consideration the proportion in which the Thai doctor wounded
were accommodated, they were assigned in such a way that five to six members to then US hospitals in Tokyo, one to two Yokohama, two to three in Osaka, one to two in Hukuoka and two to three to Korea. In Korea they served mainly with the UNC medical facilities in Pusan and Seoul alternately. And, the Thai Red Cross personnel had frequently visited the Thai fighting troops in an effort to stiffen the morale. In addition to numerous letters of appreciations, Dr. Kasem Chinprahas and nurse Prance Intuset were awarded the US Medal of Freedom for their exceptionally outstanding service.

Furthermore, another medical service element, quite different in nature, was in Korea in the last stage of the war. This element, composed of an air force surgeon officer and two nurses, had served from 19 February 1953 at the various UNC hospitals in Korea and Japan, primarily for the purpose of on the job training.

Command List

(Parenthesized number indicates serial order of each rotation contingent)

a. Thai Liaison Officer Group to the U.N. Command:

Chief, Liaison Officer Group & Army Representative

(1) Maj Gen Piti Dusponga-Diskul, Prince  (2) Col Chan Amsguchote
(3) Col Vistton Hansaves  (4) Col Pralong Virapriya
(5) Col Prayuth Charumani
Navy Liaison Officer

(1) Capt Nai Nopkun
(3) Capt Vichien Prantapoka
(5) Lt Cdr Porn Pantasapya

(2) Capt Charoon Chalermtthiarana
(4) Cdr Chaloen Aranyaputhi
(6) Lt Cdr Pantum Tuwiwongsa, M.R.

Air Force Liaison Officer

(1) Wing Cdr Suan Jirpaiboon
(3) Wing Cdr Euan Kemasingki
(5) Wing Cdr Wachrintr Sunrupth
(7) Wing Cdr Swaeng Pramothayakul
(9) Wing Cdr Prasert Srichurai
(11) Wing Cdr Snga Patchwee
(13) Wing Cdr Prapa Wechaparn
(15) Wing Cdr Surapon Saipapongs
(17) Wing Cdr Bundit Susilvorn

(2) Wing Cdr Usaha Chinam
(4) Wing Cdr Prakong Pintabutr
(6) Wing Cdr Aroon Dispaethya
(8) Sqn Ldr Ranakaj Thiosopop
(10) Wing Cdr Taklaeo Susiluanna
(12) Wing Cdr Prasith Jaengchenkich
(14) Wing Cdr Janya Suchothsap
(16) Wing Cdr Suraphong Kachachiva
(18) Wing Cdr Buddhi Vacharasathian

b. Army Unit Commanders:

Commander, 21st Regimental Combat Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank &amp; Name</th>
<th>Departed Thailand</th>
<th>Returned to Thailand</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col Boribbon Chulacharitta</td>
<td>22 Oct 50 - 16 Oct 51</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1st Battalion

(1) Lt Col Kriengkrai Attanantaphod    22 Oct 50 - 16 Oct 51
(2) Lt Col Pryauth Nuckakanjonkul      26 Jul 51 - 18 Aug 52
(3) Lt Col Ong Potikanita Maj Kriangsak Chomanant (Acting) 5 May 52 - 13 Feb 53
(4) Maj Boon Rangkaratana             27 Dec 52 - 10 Sep 53
(5) Lt Col Parti Yoesakrai            20 May 53 - 18 Jun 54
(6) Lt Col Amunay Somanas             22 May 54 - 31 Mar 55

1st Infantry Company

(Thai Battalion was reduced to a company level unit since the 7th rotation contingent.)

(7) Capt Ruangsak Chumsartul 22 Jun 55 - 10 Jul 56
(8) Maj Pramoth Tawonchanta       27 Jun 56 - 27 Jul 57
(9) Maj Tuantong Suanatath         13 Jun 57 - 19 Jul 58
c. Naval Corvette Unit Commanders:
(22 Oct 1950 – 31 Jan 1955)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Unit/HMTS</th>
<th>Rank and Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Unit Commander &amp; Captain, Praeac</td>
<td>Capt Nai Nopkun</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Cdr Uthaichalermarp</td>
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<td>Uthichai, Prince</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Captain, Bangpakong</td>
<td>Cdr Oab Sundrasima</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
<td>Captain, Sichang</td>
<td>Lt. Prasert Chun-Ngarm</td>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>Captain, Bangpakong</td>
<td>Cdr Juab Hongsakul</td>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>Captain, Sichang</td>
<td>Lt. Wichien Sangkoratnakich</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Unit Commander</td>
<td>Capt Wichien Pantapoka</td>
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<td>(3)</td>
<td>Captain, Tachin</td>
<td>Cdr Charoon Osararoop</td>
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<td>(3)</td>
<td>Captain, Praeac II</td>
<td>Lt Cdr Anorn Sinkaya</td>
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<td>(4)</td>
<td>Captain, Tachin</td>
<td>Lt Cdr Suvuchien Fungладda</td>
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<td>(4)</td>
<td>Captain, Praeac II</td>
<td>Lt Cdr Chedchai Tomya</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Captain, Tachin</td>
<td>Lt Cdr Snorn Nisalaksna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Last naval unit returned home to Bangkok on 31 January 1955.)

d. Commanders of Thai Air Transport Detachment:

(1) Sq Ldr Pramoth Puthipanta
(2) Sq Ldr Kaiwal Thawornthan
(3) Sq Ldr Surayuth Rungswang
(4) Sq Ldr Jua Eamkanuch
(5) Wing Cdr Sart Wanamra
(6) Wing Cdr Singh Sirikupth
(7) Sq Ldr Jaras Suraswadi
(8) Sq Ldr Chalemn Pungkilpa
(9) Sq Ldr Chumpol Radungkich
(10) Sq Ldr Narong Karthiyachpte
(11) Sq Ldr Pridoo Israngkul-Nr-Ayuthya
(12) Sq Ldr Chitlom Suthat-Na-Ayuthya
(13) Sq Ldr Charoo Sa-Nguanpokai
(14) Sq Ldr Udom Rithibutr
(15) Flt Lt Wattana Phongsawasdi
(16) Sq Ldr Somboon Rahong

e. Chiefs, Air Force Medical Team

(1) Wing Cdr Tharakul Thawornwech
(2) Wing Cdr Prayath Kanchonwirowch
(3) Sq Ldr Sdab Thirabutr
(4) Capt Suthep Kajornboon
(5) Capt Noi Panikbutr
(6) Wing Cdr Prawing Somboonnawanch
(7) Sq Ldr Chalit Chulmokka
(8) Sq Ldr Thaorn Suknenya
(9) Sq Ldr Thawan Wiriyakul
(10) Capt Sutee Limaksrn
(11) Capt Sujin Charujinda
(12) Capt Songkram Sukontman
(13) Sq Ldr Sana Chulkarathna
(14) Capt Oumsin Srivadi
(15) Sq Ldr Pajith Siripota
(16) Capt Narong Suwanawisut
(17) Capt Paichok Paopijitr
(18) Sq Ldr Sertsakdi Mananee
(19) Sq Ldr Siri Roompradit
(20) Sq Ldr Arnont Innoy
(21) Sq Ldr Kosol Manechak

Reference Records and Data

a. Duration of Participation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>Departure from Bangkok</td>
<td>22 Oct 50</td>
<td>22 Oct 50</td>
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</table>
Reference Data

Arrival at Pusan
7 Nov 50
7 Nov 50
23 Jun 51
(Tachikawa, Japan)

Pullout from Korea
23 Jun 72
21 Jan 55
6 Nov 64 (C-47’s)
26 Jul 76 (C-123’s)
(Tachikawa, Japan)

Arrival at Bangkok
31 Jan 55

b. Size of Force:

Army
Infantry Battalion
Nov 50 – Jul 56
Infantry Company
Jul 56 – Jun 72

Navy
Corvette Unit
HMPS Prasae First
7 Nov 50 – 13 Jan 51
HMPS Pangpakong
7 Nov 50 – 16 Feb 52
HMPS Prasae Second
29 Dec 51 – 21 Jan 55
HMPS Tachin
29 Dec 51 – 21 Jan 55
HMPS Sichang
7 Nov 50 – 15 Jul 51

Air Force
3 C-47’s Detachment
23 Jun 51 – 6 Nov 64
2 C-123’s Detachment
– 26 Jul 76

c. Total Participants:

Army
7 Nov 50 – 27 Jul 53 . . . . . . . . . Estimated 3,650 men
7 Nov 50 – 22 May 54 . . . . . . . . . Estimated 10,315 men

Navy
7 Nov 50 – 31 Jan 55 . . . . . . . . . Estimated a total of 2,485 men

Air Force
Jun 51 – 27 Jul 53 . . . . . . . . . 45 officers and crew-members

d. Awards and Decorations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROK Presidential Unit Citation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unit</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 21st Thai Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 21st Thai Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Thai Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>(19th Rotation Co)</td>
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<td>Awarded By</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>U N. Service Medal</td>
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* For the Thai Army unit covers from the 1st contingent through the 14th rotation contingent.
THE TURKISH FORCE
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1. Introduction

When the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of June 1950 was passed out to the Turkish Government, it took no time to resolve to the dispatch of the ground force, the most needed form of assistance, to the Republic of Korea that was under the Communist invasion. Within a month, on 25 July, Ankara announced the activation of the first Korea-bound Turkish Brigade.

From the time the First Turkish Brigade set foot in Korea on 19 October 1950 until the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, 14,936 of the Turkish Armed Forces served in Korea in three batches. The number of the Turkish Brigade reached its peak in 1953 totaling 5,455 men, 853 men more than the 1st Brigade and 577 men than the second. This was not a small contribution, especially so in comparison of the population. Except the number of the ROK and U.S. and the Commonwealth forces, it was the largest body among other nations that took part in the Korean War.

Throughout its stay in Korea, the gallant Turkish soldiers set on the whole another legend as the first-class fighting force whose quality was unanimously expressed in the words of other observers as rough, tough bayonet-wielding Turks. Nevertheless the Turkish forces suffered a great deal of casualty. At Kunuri alone the Turkish Brigade had more casualties in two days than the greater part of 1952–1953 when the static war brought about at very low casualty rate.

On the whole, the Turks' relish for hand-to-hand fighting, their first-class leadership, their discipline under fire -- these were attributes of the Turkish fighting men which the fighters of other nations admired much. And the overall contribution of the Turkish forces to the Korean War could be summed up to the following effect.

Duration of Participation: 19 October 1950–Mid-Summer 1954

Size of Forces: One Infantry Brigade

Total Strength: 14,936 (Exclusive of 4th Brigade)
Total Casualties ................................. 3,506
Killed in Action .................................. 741
Wounded in Action ................................. 2,068
Missing in Action ................................. 163
Prisoners of War ................................. 244
Non-combatant casualty ......................... 290

2. Operations

1950

Moving North to Kunu-ri: Upon arrival at Taegu on the afternoon of 19 October 1950, the Turkish Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici went under operational control of the IX US Corps, and was accommodated in the United Nations Reception Center for a brief period of familiarization course.

By the end of October 1950, to take a brief look at the general situation of War, the UN Command forces were in hot pursuit of the remnants of Red North Korean Army toward the Yalu, and two powerful formations of the UN Command thrust deep into Red North Korea -- the General Walker's Eighth US Army on the west coast and General Almond's X US Corps on the east coast. The drive seemed to encounter no mentionable enemy resistance and some of the higher commanders were even contended, predicting by the pace of race, that they could promise to their jaded men "Home by Christmas."

But in November, when the Turks were still at Taegu, the picture had abruptly changed. The Chinese Communist Forces swarmed into the Red North Korea across the Korean border and by the end of the first week in November it became obvious that the Red Chinese massive aggression was underway.

The Turkish Brigade received its first operational order on 10 November from IX US Corps to move north for its security mission of the MSR between Changdan and Munsan. On 13 November, upon completion of its movement, the Brigade was attached to the 25th US Division and was assigned with the sector astride the route connecting the Imjin-Bridge north to Sibyon-ni.

On 22 November, after putting an end to the spotted enemy nests in the area, the Turkish Brigade cleared out of Changdan area and headed north toward Kunu-
ri and marshalled its troops on the IX US Corps' right flank. The Brigade’s artillery battalion also moved and took positions in the new area in line with other artillery units.

However, as the month of November progressed and the Red Chinese did not show up, the fear and suspicion died gradually. UNC intelligence seemed to reach conclusion that the Communist Chinese action was limited and confined to a mere bluff to deter final victory of the UN Command. On 24 of November General MacArthur launched his promised “end-the-war offensive.” For the following two days the I US Corps on the west advanced without heavy resistance, but the II ROK Corps, which formed the right wing of the Eighth US Army in the mountainous central front, reported strong enemy opposition and was generally held down. General MacArthur, cognizant of favorable progress of the Eighth US Army drive, ordered another force to attack Mupyong-ri to squeeze the Reds between the advancing elements of the two major commands. He wanted the swift attainment of his objective -- the destruction of the last remnants of the enemy.

The Battle of Wawon: On 26 November, however, the Red Chinese launched strong counterattacks against the I and IX US Corps, while its main force poured down the central mountain ranges to disanchor the II ROK Corps from Tokchon. Next day the ROK’s collapsed and the Reds continued to push south to Kaechon. It was now the IX US Corps to meet with the Red Chinese onrush.

Early in the afternoon of 26 November, General Yazici was shown to the situation map in the Corps command post that was indicating approximately 4,000 strong CCF at Tokchon which had smashed the II ROK Corps there, and learned that his brigade was soon to be committed into action.

The Turks were to proceed on the Kuru-ri road to Tokchon in order to block the CCF spearhead surging from Tokchon. General Coulter, the IX US Corps Commander, hoped that by regaining possession of this route he would temper the right flank of his corps that had arisen from the collapse of the II ROK Corps. It was, in the words of a well known observer of battle, like applying an aspirin bottle cork to the bunghole in a beer barrel. The only support General Yazici received at the Corps CP was a tank platoon and truck transportation in addition to the reversion to him of the Brigade’s artillery from the 25th US Division.

Upon returning to his Brigade at Kuru-ri, General Yazici ordered his men immediately to move toward Wawon, about 18 kilometers northeast of Kuru-ri. Before the nightfall the Turks reached Songbul-gol, roughly one kilometer to Wawon, blocking a path leading out of Tokchon, and the Brigade set to bivouac the night.

At the daybreak following, the Turkish Brigade resumed its march toward
Tokchon. Neither enemy contact nor message was there from the Corps. Since the trucks furnished by the Corps in the preceding day had turned around after they transported the Turks from Kunu-ri to Wawon, the point cars led the infantry foot column, followed by interspersed artillery, anti-aircraft gun, mortar, engineer, and signal units. The path was steep and narrow, limiting column mobility and vitiating mutual support.

At 1430 hours on 27 November, Captain Lorenzo, the US signal liaison officer to the Brigade, picked up a Corps message in which the Corps Commander wanted the Brigade to turn back to the village of Wawon instead of advancing east toward Tokchon. His message also suggested to the Brigade that it should tie in with the 38th US Regiment's right flank and secure a retreat route to the west.

The relay of the message was delayed with the congestion of the road, and two hours had passed when General Yazici learned of the Corps message. By then the lead column was on the road 10 kilometers south of the reported enemy area, and six kilometers east of Wawon. When the column was ordered to turn about, it had to fight for a space to turn about. The time was running with the winter sun rapidly declining beyond the steep mountain ridges.

The wrist watches clicked past zero hour into another day when the advance element in backward orders began to arrive at Wawon, and enemy small arms began to spit fire upon the Turks. Enemy machine guns chirped and mortars banged. It was now obvious that the enemy regiment had caught up with the Turks before the Brigade completely curled back into its defense position in Wawon. The Brigade's reconnaissance elements in the rearmost desperately
attempted to hold down the enemy pursuit, but not for long.

At the first sound of the enemy fire on the Brigade’s rear column, General Yazici was sure what he had feared most was at hand -- being caught up by the enemy in-between his troop movement. He once again ordered his column to turn about, and ordered his 3rd Battalion to become the frontmost in order to counter the enemy. Its 10th Company was ordered to form the Brigade’s general outpost line on an extensive frontage.

As the November 28 broke clear, the enemy began to fire on the besieged Turks in Wawon position. Aware of the Turk’s determination to defend the approach route, the enemy took to the wooded area in an attempt to outflank the Turks. Turkish 3rd Battalion Commander unleashed his 9th Company to defend the 10th left flank and 11th Company on the 10th right. This soon proved to be a timely deployment. The enemy push on 10th front eased but its pressure on the 9th and 11th stiffened.

In the mid-morning the enemy mounted thrust on the 3rd Battalion’s left and fell on the 9th Company positions, soon breaking through the 9th left and eventually overran the whole company positions. The 2nd Battalion rushed into counterattack and toward noon it succeeded in blunting the enemy attacks, though leaving a wide gap between positions of 9th and 10th Companies. This gap was later covered by the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion.

Meanwhile, in the sector of the 1st Battalion that had been placed to protect the Brigade’s right and rear, the enemy reinforcements from north attempted to encircle the whole Brigade position. The enemy, however, disengaged toward noon, as its main attack was blunted at the 3rd Battalion area.

**Battle at Sillim-ni:** General Yazici now could clearly see the whole problem. To the right, about 30 kilometers east to Tokchon, there was no flank for the Brigade by the moment, but the gapping void brought about by the destruction of the II ROK Corps. And the Red Chinese were pouring it in great numbers. The Turks were now in the trap which the Reds began to close by moving troops southwest from Tokchon, while threatening to cut off the 2nd US Division at the northwest of that town. If the threat was effecting, the Reds could then race due west to the Western Sea undeterred and seal off the routes for retreat at somewhere below Sinanju.

The Brigade reached the village of Sillim-ni at 2000 hours of 28 November, and took positions extending some 10 kilometers in road distance over Kaechon—Sillim-ni road. General Yazici ordered 2nd Battalion on the front, 1st Battalion in the rear, and between them was the 3rd Battalion with artillery and mortar company positions around Sillim-ni. Geographical conditions, however, hampered
each battalion to form coherent position. Thus, each was held together somewhat scattered around tenable spots.

At midnight, the predicted enemy attack fell on the 3rd Battalion. Reds had evidently bypassed the 1st Battalion and rushed into the village, where they struck the emplacements of Turkish artillery and mortar pieces and men of the 3rd Battalion. Enemy burp guns, mortars and rockets broke the silence of the frosty night. Soon large number of Red reinforcements swarmed upon the village from behind northern hills. The 3rd Battalion launched counterattacks immediately and succeeded in halting the first Communist tide, but the Reds were so close to the village that it was too late for the battalion to call for the artillery support.

At the Brigade Command Post, General Yazici saw that his worst fate was nearby. He knew what the enemy had in mind -- to gash deep the road in order to destroy the 1st Battalion by encirclement. Apart from this, he was put in a great quandary of endangered artillery and the 3rd Battalion. Every moment his thoughts oscillated between saving artillery and other heavy weapons at the cost of more casualties, and abandoning his indispensable weapons by pulling out the 3rd Battalion first.

When General Yazici came to a decision and ordered 3rd Battalion to withdraw to west pandemonium already took hold of Sillim-ni. At dawn, another enemy columns joined the attack from the south and pushed its way into the village. Toward morning saw the 3rd Battalion struggling to beat their way back to west and the close battle continued until noon when the Turks broke the Red encirclement. Easing the Turks withdrawal US planes bombed the pursuing enemy troops.

While the 3rd Battalion was desperately beating their way out of the Red encirclement, the 1st Battalion was also brought to full battle and the brave Turks had dealt the Red Chinese a bloody repulse. About noon, the battalion was also ordered to retreat to Kaechon.

On the Kaechon-Tokchon road, the Turks had gained precious three days for the 2nd US Division by blocking and stemming the Red rushing tide. But General Yazici lost many of his men and equipment. When the Brigade closed in Kaechon at 1400 hours only a few of its companies were combat-fit. It is even now impossible to establish exact estimate of the casualty of the battles at Wawon and Sillim-ni. Although the first report said that the 4,000-strong Brigade had been virtually wiped out, but its total casualties were later estimated at close to 1,000.

In consequence, the Turkish Brigade, in its first engagement on Korean soil, being tossed into the center of the caldron, was left alone, unheeded and unguided in a situation which was equally desperate and obscure. However, Tall, pale-eyed
men with dark faces, in heavy great-coats, wielding long bayonets, the Turks had refused to lose at Wawon and Sillim-ni.

The Gauntlet: It was 1800 hours of 28 November when the Turks were ordered by the 25th US Division to build up the right flank of the 38th US Regiment of the 2nd US Division, which then was near northeast of Kunu-ri.

The moon came up when the Brigade started moving out of Kaechon in an attempt to link up with the elements of the 38th US Infantry. March was much hampered by the traffic of troops and vehicles. Abandoned tanks and trucks blocked the columns movements and corpses of friendly and enemy alike lay along the path. Strangely enough, the enemy loosened his pursuit so that only clanking sounds of the vehicles and foot-march on icy roads broke the silence of wintry night. In the air, four US planes dropped illuminations on its way toward Kunu-ri. At 0400 hours on 29th, the Turkish Brigade finally arrived at Kunu-ri.

At Kunu-ri, the 2nd US Division was hectic in preparation for the ride-out. The 9th US Regiment of the Division had already gone down the road to clear the pass little after midnight. At 1430 hours in the war room of General Keiser at Chichon, about one kilometer southeast of Kunu-ri, General Keiser and General Yazici got down to the Brigade's withdrawal plan. The results of an hour's discussion were: General Yazici himself would lead his CP and artillery battalion via the Anju road along with the 25th US Division, while his infantry battalions would retreat through the Kunu-ri—Sunchon route to link up with the 9th US Regiment.

At 0700 hours General Yazici found himself standing on a snow-covered truck deck to bid temporary farewell to his infantry men. Over the icy and foggy terrain, the Brigade's infantry proceeded with no enemy contact. At mid-morning when the Turks reached the 9th US Regiment's columns, however, they found there a great confusion. The regiment was in full contact with the enemy. It was to prove that the hour-long struggle by the elements of the 9th Infantry to break through the roadblock had been so far abortive, while the Turks and elements of the 2nd US Division ran down the road. Rushed into this pass was also the 3rd ROK Regiment besides the Turks and the 2nd US Division. Thus they were sent completely unprepared into the gauntlet.

Toward noon after the two-kilometer-long column having halted about two hours, General Keiser formed a tank-ridden point column out of the 38th US Regiment to break open the pass. The Turks were ordered to give infantry back-up to the spearheading tanks.

The Turks fixed up their bayonets and charged up the left ridges. Ponderously,
like a great snake uncoiling, the two-kilometer-long column thrust its head between
the hostile hills, picking up speed. However, the first to find that these columns
were moving into a dire enemy trap was the head column riding the tanks.
Approximately three kilometers from the 38th Regiment’s position in the midtrail
it ran into a damaged tank, a truck, and an M-39 carrier, all pointed north. As
the leading tank stopped, machine gun fire poured upon it from all sides. Tank
crew chief of the regiment instantly knew, from all the evidences around the
damaged vehicles, the Reds had already built up at least a division-strength
roadblock. In a second, he knew the whole party was speeding into a trap. But
it was too late to stop, too late to do anything except to try to barrel through.

The head column lost only a few minutes, but these were enough to stop the
entire convoy behind them. And from this halt, it would never completely recover.
Once irrevocably committed in motion, the single forlorn hope of the entire
mortar column to clear the gauntlet rested on its momentum. But the single
roadblock by the vehicles, which delayed head column for half a dozen minutes,
dealt this slender hope a fatal wound.

As the long, serpentine column braked to a halt behind the lead tank, a hail
of gunfire beat against its exposed sides like rain, killing men, exploding trucks,
driving riders into the ditches. Still moving, stricken vehicles could have slid
off right away. Destroyed while at the halt, they plugged the narrow road for
those pressing on behind. Wounded and dead clogged the ditches. Some lay
apathetically, while others ran desperately trying to hitch a new ride. Men
grabbed hold of others as they raced by. No longer was there any national
identity to set up easily. The troops were so intermingled and mixed up that
there could be no turning back. It was like going through several kilometers
of hell.

The greater part of the leading serials, however, came through, though
blooded. Their momentum and the furious strafing of the encircling hills by
the US Air Force took them through. Then, about midafternoon, the path
itself was blocked and closed.

In the subzero weather, Turks were becoming exhausted and apathetic.
Americans, Koreans as well as Turks lay on the ground, shocked, uncaring,
while the Red Chinese fire beat the earth about them. Over the pass now, friendly
jets were strumming in full fury, rocketing napalm, stinging the rockets with
machine gun fire. By the end of the day, roughly 3,000 of the 7,000 men who
had run the gauntlet were dead or wounded — and the loss of the vehicles was
also enormous.

1st of December marked the reunion of General Yazici’s party and the Turkish
infantry battalions at Pyongyang. The Brigade spent two days there for reorgani-
zation and a brief rest. Next day it resumed march towards south. The retrograde movement from Pyongyang was generally uneventful, and the Turks marched through Kaesong to Sosa, a little village midway between Seoul and Inchon, where they went into the Eighth US Army reserve.

1951

The Battles at Kimuyangjang-ni—Osan Area: After the fall of Seoul on 4 January 1951 the Red Chinese halted their offensive. Advanced units probed down as far as Suwon, some 28 kilometers south of Seoul, but the bulk of the enemy forces remained north and east of Han River which, after passing eastward through Seoul, turns south-east and forms a boundary between the western coastlands and the central and eastern mountains.

Turkish Brigade was released from the operational control of the 25th US Division and attached to the 1 US Corps on 3 January, and fell back to Ansong, about 70 kilometers southeast of Seoul. On 6 January, being in corps reserve, it further moved to Chonan where it stayed three weeks.
On 25 January, as the "Operation Thunderbolt" got under way, the 1 and IX US Corps began a cautious, limited advance within the elbow of the Han River. The objective of this limited offensive was to locate and destroy the enemy south and west of the Han River by moving on a wide front through a succession of phase lines to north of the Yoju—Ichon—Kumnyangjangni—Suwon front. During this operation the Turks were ordered to advance north to Suwon.

Having moved out of Chonan on 24 January, the Turkish Brigade effected unopposed march to Songjon-ni by next dawn. From there, the road forked in two direction; one leads due north nine kilometers to Kimnyangjang-ni and then turn east to Suwon, and the other stretches about same distance west to Osan and leads up to the objective. Because of this geographical peculiarity, the Brigadier decided to send his 2nd Battalion through Kimnyangjang-ni and the 1st and 3rd Battalion via Osan road.

By midafternoon of the 25th the 2nd Battalion under Major Kuranel succeeded to approach within eight kilometers of Kimnyangjang-ni. The advance so far had been typical of tank-infantry movement under the mortar fire support. As the attack sign flared, two companies, the 5th Company on the left, and the 7th Company on the front, rushed toward the village. By the evening of the day the 7th Company led by Captain Turhan San could close in about 1.5 kilometers to the village, while the 5th Company led by Captain Olhon was blocked by the enemy anti-tank mines. The road was severely mined and the effort of the company's mine-clearing crew was useless. At daybreak of 26th the battalion resumed its attack and moved into the village at 1700 hours.

Meanwhile, the 1st and 3rd Battalions which were to push through Osan road encountered with the strong enemy resistance at the east of Osan. On 26th the 3rd Battalion commanded by Major Bilgin had engaged with an estimated enemy battalion on Hill 151, the biggest battle since the Kunu-ri gauntlet, in which the battalion counted 474 enemy dead and captured 23 CCF POW's, while it lost 13 including one officer and 29 wounded. The gallant action of the Turks in this battle was later recognized by the Government of the Republic of Korea with the award of the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea.

At dawn of the 27th the snowy hills were streaked with blood where the enemy had dragged off their many dead. The hill was a key point in the area and its loss would have exposed the flanking Turks to the danger of encirclement. After clearing the enemy opposition in the area of Osan and Kimnyangjang-ni, the Brigade moved into Suwon late on 27 January.

Across the Parallel Again: On 28 January, after a day's stop-over at Suwon, the Turks were again ordered to advance northwest and secure Suri-san (Hill
431), then proceed northward to break through the main supply route to Sosa, a little village midway between Seoul and Inchon.

Generally speaking the advance was made against only light opposition. With the spring thaw melting the ice on the Han River the Reds were apparently reluctant to commit large numbers of troops south or west of the river. On their winter southward drive the Communists had been able to swarm over the frozen rivers because they had no equipment to hamper them. With the thaw they would have to use the fords or bridges, making themselves vulnerable to the UNC air power. Here and there, however, the Red Chinese resisted determinedly and the Turks had a particularly stiff fight at Suri-san (Hill 431), northwest of Suwon.

Beating off the Reds of Suri-san area, the Brigade continued its advance toward north and reached southern bank of the Han River on 10 February. The Turks dug in defensive positions around the town of Yongdungpo and assumed patrol missions for next several days.

On 14 February, as the 25th US Division, to which the Turkish Brigade was attached, went into the corps reserve near Anyang, some 12 kilometers south of Seoul, the Turks relieved the elements of the 1st ROK Division on a small hill south of Anyang, and the whole Brigade except the 3rd Battalion which then was on patrol duty at Sosa enjoyed seven days of well-earned rest after a long drudgery of combat.

Beginning 21 February through to the end of March the Turks were to experience the monotony of a rather uneventful general advance in force. By 2 March the Turks stood on the southern bank of Han River, about 30 kilometers northeast of Seoul. The Turks were at enemy’s heels, advancing day and night, and by 31 March reached Ankol road juncture about 12 kilometers south of Pochon and went into the 25th US Division’s reserve.

Early in April, the UNC’s coordinated air-ground actions had driven Communist forces back to the 38th Parallel, and the UNC’s ground forces had crossed the Parallel in most places. The Red Chinese, bleeding badly from triple wounds inflicted by air, sea, and ground action, were hurrying more and more troops into Red North Korea, apparently in preparation for another all-out offensive.

Meanwhile, upon relieving the 27th Regiment of the 25th US Division on the positions along the southern bank of Hantan River at Yonchon area on 5 April, the Turks resumed their advance across the Hantan River on 10 April. Although the intelligence report kept warning the imminence of the CCF general offensive, the advance met only scattered enemy resistance. By the 21st of April, just a day before the CCF’s full-scale offensive, the Turkish Brigade could advance as far as 10 kilometers southwest of Chorwon, some 15 kilometers north of Hantan River.
Chinese Spring Offensive: When the CCF spring offensive began, on the night of 22 April, the Turks were at about 11 kilometers southeast of Chorwon. The 1st Battalion, with 9th Company attached, under Major Kurunel was positioned along the Hill 425, just below Mungmuk-kol, as the right echelon of the Brigade. On its left stretching to Chomchon area was the 2nd Battalion led by Major Ulunlu and, as a Brigade's reserve, Major Bilgin's 3rd Battalion was deployed between Toridul and Naesan-ni. The Brigade's 105-mm. howitzers were positioned on the right of the Brigade command post.

No sign of enemy grave attack was seen during the early evening of the 22nd, and the Turks maintained positions on general line and patrolled with no enemy contact. At midnight, however, the artillery and mortar barrage began and the enemy infantry swarmed up toward Hill 425 in the 1st Battalion sector. The Red Chinese had already washed off the resistance of the 24th US Regiment and were on its way to Hill 425. Soon the 1st Battalion was under full weight of the Red attacks and the well-famed bayonet and close-quarter tactics of the Turks were to create another legend. However, slowly the numerical superiority played dominance over the courage and toughness of the Turks, forcing them to withdraw tying in with positions of the 24th US Regiment on the right flank of the Brigade.

By the daybreak of 23 April elements of the Brigade began to cross back the Hantan River. In the same afternoon the Brigade opened its CP near Omaek-kol bringing whole of its men south of the river near Kayang-ni. The casualty count revealed that the Brigade lost five officers including Captain Akinci, the 2nd Company Commander, three NCO's, 58 other ranks. In addition to it 35 were wounded and more than 100 were estimated missing during the previous night action.

In line with the general setback of the entire UNC front, the Brigade's retreat continued and by 29 April it reached Kwangam-ni, some five kilometers southeast of Seoul, where it went into the Division reserve.

During the first ten days of May, when it looked as if the enemy would concentrate his attack west of the Pukhan River against Seoul, General Van Fleet had strengthened the west portion of his line. Accordingly, the Turkish Brigade moved out of the reserve area and advanced eight kilometers north near Toegyewon-ni and established blocking positions.

At last came the expected Red Chinese second offensive for which the UNC forces made ready to stand firm. After darkness fell on the night of 15—16 May, estimated twenty-one Red Chinese divisions flanked by three NK Communist divisions in the west and six in the east, struck down the center of the UNC line against the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps. While the battle raged on the central front, the enemy struck the western sector and by the night of 17
May, an enemy force estimated at 25,000 struck down the Pukhan River toward the Han River held by the elements of the I and IX US Corps. However, the 25th US and 6th ROK Divisions stopped this drive in three days of hard fighting and, by the 20 May, the UNC troops had brought the second CCF offensive to a halt.

As the UN Command, having once more stopped the CCF offensive, took up its offensive again, the elements of the Turkish Brigade leaped forward toward north and by 24 May the Turks were just above Uijongbu. On 24 Major Bilgin, the 3rd Battalion Commander, unfortunately hit the mine laid by the retreating enemy at a narrow gully near Malgu-ri and was killed.

*In Defense of Kumhwa and Chorwon Area:* On 25 May the Brigade fell out of the line and moved down to Uijongbu as I US Corps reserve. On 4 June, after ten days of respite, the Turks were ordered to advance north to Kumhwa area and three days later, on 7 June, they passed through the 35th US Regiment of the 25th Division around Hill 800 (Paktal-san) and Hill 445 (Toppyong-ni) on their way to Kumhwa.

Reaching several kilometers south of Kumhwa on 12 June, the Brigade had the 1st Battalion on the right advanced through Nung-kogae, to Asa-ri and the 2nd Battalion readied around Songju-kogae, some two kilometers southwest of Kumhwa, while kept the 3rd Battalion in reserve.

On 13 June, as the Brigade’s artillery began its mass strikes on Hill 507, the 1st Battalion launched three-pronged assault toward Kumhwa. Soon the fighting developed into the bitter close-combat of back and forth which lasted for three days until 15 June when the Reds finally gave in and ran out of the town.

After the clearance of Kumhwa, the Turks were ordered on 20 June into the 25th Division’s reserve and moved to Naegong-ni, some 25 kilometers northeast of Seoul, where they stayed until July 17 to see the arrival of the 2nd Turkish Brigade.

Having been relieved by the second Turkish contingent at Naegong-ni, 15 kilometers northeast of Seoul, two thirds of the 1st Brigade left for Pusan to embark for home. Meanwhile, the new Brigade was ordered to northwest of Chorwon on 18 July and was placed under operational control of the 25th US Division.

The comparatively quiet period of semi-positional warfare continued and the Turks had seen little actions since they moved into the front positions. Construction of bunkers and relocation of gun positions, while sending patrols into the no-man’s-land were the daily routine. On 5 August, after being relieved by the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on positions, the Turks moved to
On 26 July 1951 a Turkish patrol digs into position, some two kilometers northwest of Chorwon.

east of Chorwon to relieve the 7th Regiment of the 3rd US Division along the river junction of the Hantan—Namdae-chon.

Upon completion of the relief, the Turks busied themselves improving their positions and consolidating the ground they had won during the preceding months. Actions were characterized by artillery fire and air strikes. Combat patrols went out regularly. Offensive action consisted chiefly of limited company or platoon attacks designed to seize more favorable terrain, capture prisoners, and keep the enemy from nosing too close to the Brigade's line. On 30 August Brigadier General Yazici promoted to Major General and left Korea for Turky, ending his service in Korea.

"Operation Commando" began in early October and aimed to buckle the enemy's defenses and establish a new forward UNC defense line. Along with the elements of the 25th US Division, the Turks were assigned the major task to assault Hills 372 and Hill 358, key features in the enemy defenses.

In darkness on the morning of 3 October the attack began. The Turks were in the center, with the 7th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on the left flank and the 24th Regiment of the 25th US Division on the right. The enemy was well dug in and had ample artillery protection. Advancing toward the objectives, the elements of the 1st Battalion seized Hill 372, while the gallant Turks of the 3rd Battalion secured Hill 358 with light enemy resistance.

As the line readjusted after "Operation Commando," the Brigade had its 1st
Battalion deployed on the right covering Hills 430 and 438, and the 3rd on the left along Sagimal through Hill 358 to Mirok-tong, with its 2nd Battalion around Kirinkol and Hill 372 as a Brigade reserve.

Ever since "Operation Commando," the Turkish Brigade had concentrated its efforts to organize an outpost line well forward of the main line of resistance, and the battle for the outposts went on steadily. Starting early in November the Turks engaged in a bitter struggle for Hills 412, 533 and 450 (Star Hill). The battle raged for a week until 11 November when "Star Hill" fell to the Turks. The enemy repeated its attempts to probe and regain his lost ground, but with the support of artillery bombardment the Turks stood firm and maintained control of the terrain features all along the Brigade's front.

On 16 December, the 25th US Division was relieved on the line by the 2nd US Division and the Turks together with the elements of the 25th Division moved into the IX US Corps reserve camps at Sidang-ni, some 15 kilometers northwest of Chunchon, where they were to stay until 24 February 1952.

1952

At the Heartbreak Ridge Area: On 24 February the 25th US Division, to which the Turkish Brigade was attached, departed its reserve area at Sidang-ni and moved forward to relieve the 7th US Division which was holding down positions on the east of Heartbreak Ridge, some 50 kilometers northeast of Chunchon. Next day the Turkish Brigade relieved elements of the 32nd US Regiment with the Ethiopian Battalion attached. Here the Turks were to stay for next eight months until the 3 of October 1952.

On 25 February the relief was complete and the Turks were in control of this section of the line. The Brigade established its CP south of Piduk-koge flanked by two steep ridges forming a natural sheltered-lot, and put its artillery plus a US tank company at Piai, two and half kilometers away from it. The other elements of the Brigade was deployed along the Sata-ri and Kachil-bong line. The 1st Battalion on the right covered along Hills 1065 and 841 while the 2nd Battalion occupied positions around Hill 750 and west of Hill 841, and the 3rd was in Brigade reserve near Yao-dong.

From an overall viewpoint, the situation remained quiet throughout the entire period of eight months. Patrol actions and defense against enemy probings of squad or platoon size were the main activities of the Brigade. On the other hand, the Red Chinese appeared to be content to let the Turks take initiative for contacts and patrols. When later in the period enemy patrols became more
aggressive, close coordination with the Brigade artillery and other supporting weapons enabled the Brigade to inflict heavy casualties on enemy probes and patrols. Unfortunately, however, in late afternoon of 5 June, the Assistant Brigade Commander, Colonel Pamir, who was on his way back from the customary inspection tour of Hill 1065, ran into an enemy daytime patrol. Colonel Pamir was wound up in enemy mortar fire barrage and was mortally wounded.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Turkish Brigade arrived at Pusan on 5 July. Upon relieving the 2nd Brigade on 20 August, the newly arrived Turks were ordered into the division reserve for familiarization training.

The movement back to battle came on 31 October when the 25th US Division relieved the 7th US Division on the central front. Location of the Brigade was the left sector of the 25th US Division's defensive line, west of Kumhwa. Enemy outposts included the nearby Star Hill, Silver Star Hill and Monk's Hood Hill, among others. His main line of resistance was on the higher ground to the north, around the Hill 717 complex. Actions during the winter campaign through the month of January 1953 consisted almost solely of patrol contacts as the truce negotiations having held up any further offensives.

Soldiers of 10th Turkish Company leave a hill outpost via a trench into swampy land, near Kumhwa, on 16 November 1952.
Battle of Nevada Complex: On 29 January 1953 the Brigade dropped out of the battleline and went into the division reserve. However, the Turkish artillery remained on the line to support other elements of the division. Strenuous training programs, interspersed with recreation and organized athletic, occupied the time of the Turks through March, April and early May. As the spring days grew warmer, the Turks together with the other elements of the 25th US Division put the finishing touches on training and prepared to take over the sector of the 1st US Marine Division on the western front, and by 8 May the relief was completed.

As May began and the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom seemed approaching decisive stage, there were signs that the enemy intended to increase the size and frequency of his attack. But, there were still no indications that the Communists intended to broaden the scale of operations into a general offensive in the western sector. Rather they seemed to be concentrating upon winning dominant terrain features along the line to strengthen their position both on the battlefield and at the truce talk front. The most ambitious CCF offensive came in the closing days of May.

When the 25th US Division took over the new sector from the 1st US Marine Division, Major General Williams, the 25th US Division Commander assigned the responsibility for the defense of the area of Nevada Complex and neighboring outposts, Berlin and East-Berlin, to the attached Turkish Brigade under Brigadier General Sirri Acar.

Brigadier General Acar had deployed his 1st Battalion on the left, the 2nd Battalion on the center, which included Vegas, Carson, and Elco, and the 3rd Battalion on the right in the outpost Berlin and East Berlin sector. The 2nd Battalion had its attached 3rd Company to man Vegas (140 men) and one platoon each to Carson (44 men) and Elco (33 men) from its 6th Company.

Facing the Turkish Brigade were the 358th, 399th and 360th Regiments of the 120th Division, 46th CCF Army.

After the change of lines, the Red Chinese lost little time in testing the Turks defenses. Shortly after 0200 on 15 May, the CCF directed a two-battalion probe on the Carson-Elko-Vegas trio and the Berlin, East Berlin outposts held by the Turkish Brigade. Supported by heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery, an estimated Red Chinese battalion moved against each of the two major defense complexes. Turkish artillery and American tanks accounted for heavy enemy
losses in the action.

It was not until 25 May, however, that Red Chinese artillery really began to open up on the Nevada complex, and the situation changed abruptly on 28 May. Beginning at 1800, major elements of the 120th CCF Division launched simultaneous attacks on the Nevada complex and the outposts of Berlin and East-Berlin. Following an intense artillery and mortar preparations, the 120th CCF Division sent four battalions forward -- two to the east against the main objective, Vegas, one to the south against Carson and Elko, and one in a diversionary attack against Berlin and East Berlin. The last was halted and broken off early in the evening.

As the night wore on the situation in the Nevada outposts was getting more grimmer. The Turkish defenders held out Vegas and Elko against continuing Red assault, but the Turks on Carson were dying one by one. By morning of the 29th Carson had fallen into the enemy hands and Elko was heavily besieged. Shortly hereafter, convinced of the enemy determination to take the Nevada outposts General Williams placed the 1st Battalion of the 14th US Regiment under General Acar's command so that the Turkish Brigade could commit its
reserve for the counterattack.

During the early morning of the 29th, in a desperate effort to blunt the Red Chinese drive, the Turks began a counterattack to clear Vegas and control of the Vegas outpost -- where the 1st US Marine Division had fought and died exactly two months earlier -- changed hands several times between the indomitable Turkish defenders and the persistent Red Chinese. By dark, the CCF had wrested the northern crest from Turks who still held the southeastern face of the position.

Meanwhile, General Acar ordered Lieutenant Colonel Car E. Mann, the 1st Battalion Commander of the 14th US Infantry to send his companies to reinforce Elko and to retake Carson. On the morning of 29th, B Company of the battalion was dispatched and approached outpost Elko from the southeast to beat off the enemy holdings around the outpost, and secured the objective. Upon securing the Elko, B Company then advanced westward to Carson. On its half-way from Elko to Carson, however, the company began to receive heavy enemy fire concentrations and was forced to withdraw back to Elko. Company B tried repeatedly to gather momentum enough to break through the enemy wall of fire from Carson, but in vain. Each time it failed and had to turn
back. At Vegas, in the meantime, strength was down to some 40 Turks.

With both Carson and Vegas went under enemy control, the Elko became untenable without the support of its sister outposts, General Clarke, I US Corp Commander, and General Williams felt that the enemy intended to remain on the offensive until the outposts were taken. Thus, at 2300 hours on 29 May orders went out for the Turks to withdraw from Vegas and for the 14th US Infantry to withdraw its troops from Elko. By daybreak of 30 May the withdrawal was completed and began to regroup on the main line of resistance.

Over 150 men had been killed and 245 had been wounded in the battle of Nevada outposts. On the other hand, the Red Chinese casualties were estimated roughly at 3,000.

It had been a bitter struggle as the losses on each side attested. Over 117,000 rounds of artillery fire and 67 close air support sorties had aided the Turks in withstanding the determined assault of the Red Chinese. The enemy had sent 65,000 rounds artillery and mortar fire in return.

At the End of the War: On 6 July 1953 the leading elements of the 4th Turkish Brigade arrived at Uijongbu, some 24 kilometers north of Seoul, and relieved one battalion of the 3rd Turkish Brigade. Nevertheless, the activity of the new Brigade was little to note since the war was to end on 27 July when the armistice was signed.

Throughout the post-truce period, the Brigade busied itself with the strenuous training program in mobile warfare in mountainous country. The morale of the Turks remained high and were ready for any eventuality. After winter in Korea the 4th Turkish Brigade embarked for home in mid-summer of 1954.

Command Structure

A. First Brigade

Commanding General


(a) 1st Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major Imadettin Kuranel 19 Oct 1950 – 11 Apr 1951
Company Commanders

Captain  Hidayet Ipek  19 Oct 1950 – 14 Aug 1951
Captain  Ramazan Akinci  19 Oct 1950 – 24 Feb 1951
Captain  Necdet Sarman  18 Feb 1951 – 22 Oct 1951
Captain  Riza Vuruskan  18 Feb 1951 – 22 Oct 1951

(b) 2nd Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major  Mithat Ulunlu  19 Oct 1950 – Martyr

Company Commanders

Captain  Cevat Olhon  19 Oct 1950 – Martyr
Captain  Besir Gunay  19 Oct 1950 – 14 Aug 1951
Captain  Nail Turhan San  19 Oct 1950 – 14 Aug 1951
Captain  Nedim Aydinoglu  19 Oct 1950 – 14 Aug 1951

(c) 3rd Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major  Lutfu Bilgin  19 Oct 1950 – Martyr

Company Commanders

Captain  Turan Ergungor  19 Oct 1950 – 14 Aug 1951
Captain  Huseyin Catalpinar  19 Oct 1950 – 14 Aug 1951
Captain  Ahmet Celebi  19 Oct 1950 – 14 Aug 1951
Captain  Halil Cayan  18 Feb 1951 – Martyr
Captain  Hamit Yuksel  19 Oct 1950 – 30 Aug 1951

B. Second Brigade

Commanding General

Brig Gen.  Namik Arguc  Mid-July 1951 – 12 Sep 1952

(a) 1st Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major  Tahir Aiybayyil  Mid-Jul 1951 – 7 Aug 1952
Operations

Company Commanders

Captain  Hakki Tolga  Mid-Jul 1951 – 7 Aug 1952
Captain  Kemał Toker  Mid-Jul 1951 – 7 Aug 1952
Captain  Cevat Sirin  Mid-Jul 1951 – 7 Aug 1952
Captain  M. Cahit Orel  16 Aug 1951 – 12 Sep 1952

(b) 2nd Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major  Enver Saltik (Atak)  16 Aug 1951 – 12 Sep 1952

Company Commanders

Captain  Sadullah Bilgin  22 Oct 1951 – 22 Sep 1952
Captain  Omer Sarier  22 Oct 1951 – 22 Sep 1952
Captain  Riza Salgırtuğ  16 Aug 1951 – 12 Sep 1952
Captain  Cihat Ozkok  16 Aug 1951 – 12 Sep 1952

(c) 3rd Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major  Yekta Koran  16 Aug 1951 – 12 Sep 1952

Company Commanders

Captain  Halim Onal  16 Aug 1951 – 12 Sep 1952
Captain  Halil Nogayoglu  16 Aug 1951 – 12 Sep 1952
Captain  İhsan Berkay  Mid-Jul 1951 – 7 Aug 1952
Captain  Ruknettin Onal  Mid-Jul 1951 – 7 Aug 1952

C. 3rd Brigade

Commanding General

Brig Gen.  Sirri Acar  30 Jul 1952 – 4 Sep 1953

(a) 1st Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major  Fahrettin Ulukan  30 Jul 1952 – 4 Sep 1953

Company Commanders

Captain  Necati Atıl  9 Jun 1952 – 27 Aug 1953
Captain Halil Altuna 9 Jun 1952 — 27 Aug 1953
Captain M. Ali Ezgu 9 Jun 1952 — 27 Aug 1953
Captain Serafettin Orcinos 9 Jun 1952 — 27 Aug 1953

(b) 2nd Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major Niyazi Bengisu 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953

Company Commanders

Captain Ahmet Ozdiler 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953
Captain Muzaffer Acar 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953
Captain Mehmet Tarcan 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953
Captain Ismail Karkmaz 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953

(c) 3rd Battalion

Commanding Officer

Major Turgut Vural 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953

Company Commanders

Captain Cemil Sozdinler 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953
Captain Izzet Olcun 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953
Captain Selahattin Altug 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953
Captain Feti Ortas 30 Jul 1952 — 4 Sep 1953
THE UNITED KINGDOM FORCE
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1. Introduction

When the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950 the United Kingdom was one of the first nations to respond to the UN Security Council's call for military assistance to the Republic of Korea. By 30 June the United Kingdom's fleet in the Far Eastern waters had started work with the United States Navy in Korean waters, and at this time the British naval forces on the spot were numerically about as strong as those of the United States Navy. Although over 1,000 miles from the nearest British base, the ships were logistically self-supporting. From the outset the British fleet played a most active and prominent part in establishing that complete naval supremacy so essential to the conduct of operations on land.

During the war the United Kingdom Government continued to maintain two infantry brigades with considerable combat support arms, totalling approximately up to 40,000 officers and men. The first of the British infantry battalions to land in Korea were the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Middlesex. Outstanding work was done by the Gloucesters who in one stand at Solmari suffered over 1,100 casualties, with only four officers and 36 other ranks fighting their way back to Allied lines. Of the Gloucester's imperishable fight, General James Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander at the time, described it as “the most outstanding example of unit bravery in modern warfare.”

The United Kingdom, in addition to its ground and naval forces, also had a Marine unit in Korea during the war. This peculiar combat unit, a reinforced company, conducted raiding operations deep into the enemy territory under the operational control of ComNavFE. Indeed, the British Government contributed the second largest forces next to America in the joint UN effort in the Korean War. Furthermore, to the credit of the leadership extended by the British Government, there were considerable forces contributed by other Commonwealth nations, namely from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and India.

The last contingent of British Army troops left Korea in September 1956, leaving a group of liaison officers with the United Nations Command, while the Royal British Navy retained some ships in or near the Korean waters, even long
after the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953.

During the Korean War the United Kingdom’s forces suffered 686 killed, 2,498 wounded, 1,102 missing and POWs on land, and 58 killed, 85 wounded and 27 missing at sea. This makes a total of 744 killed in action, 2,583 wounded in action and 1,129 missing in action and POWs.

2. The British Ground Force

The British Army started its initial contribution of ground troops with sending about 1,500 men of the 27th British Infantry Brigade, Kilt-wearing, proud Scottish regular army organization, which arrived at the port of Pusan, Korea on 28 August 1950. The fine British unit, consisting of one battalion of the Argyll and Southerland Highlanders and one of the Middlesex Regiment, arrived at Pusan from Hong Kong just in time to participate in the Eighth US Army’s desperate efforts to halt what an American general called the North Korean Communists’ “one final blast.”

It should be noted that, by the time of the British unit’s arrival, the NK Communists had invaded about two thirds of the Republic of Korea. The hard pressed ROK and US Army troops held the Naktong Perimeter in the south east corner, and were badly crippled, but the line held as more troops and supplies were unloaded at the port of Pusan.

Upon arrival in Korea, Brigadier B.A. Coad, commanding the unit, realized from the quick look round that his unit would have to take the battle field at once, before its transport could be unloaded, even without its own artillery. There was no time for special indoctrination, and so he decided to skip that (and a lot of other things) and march to the sound of the guns.

Northward Advance

Spending a few days at an assembly area near Kyongsan, 12 kilometers southeast of Taegu, the 27th Brigade had to move forward to the front to help defend the Naktong River Perimeter. The brigade moved forward on 5 September and took over a portion of the defence line on the Naktong River near Hyunpung, southwest of Taegu, which had been held by the 23rd US Infantry Regiment. This was the British brigade’s first commitment in the battle line. At this time US supporting
arms included one battery of 105-mm. howitzers, one battery of 155-mm. guns and some Sherman tanks, these being attached to the British brigade.

The fortnight the 27th Brigade spent here in the Naktong defence was so invaluable to the officers and men alike, for it accustomed them to the peculiar condition of the Korean War, and gave them their first experience of the NK Communist enemy and his tactical habits. In the defense of the Naktong Perimeter the British suffered its first battle casualties including Captain C.N.A. Buchanan of the Argyll.

Beginning the middle of September, the tide of the war started to turn in favour of the UN forces who had held the perimeter for so long. The UN Command’s build up had now reached the point when large-scale offensive action could be carried out. The NK Communists, who had counted on a quick and overwhelming conquest, was given a stunning shock during the last two weeks of September: The X US Corps swept into Inchon from the Western Sea and the ROK and Eighth US Army broke through the Naktong Perimeter.

By 18 September the 24th US Division, to which the 27th British Brigade was attached, had crossed the Naktong River west of Taegu and was fighting its way north astride the Taegu—Seoul road. The 27th Brigade left its defence positions and moved north, with the task of crossing the Naktong some eight kilometers south of Waegwan and advancing on Songju, a small town about 11 kilometers to the west. This advance was designed to protect the left flank of the American’s main attack. By the early hours of 22 September, the two battalions of the brigade were across and ready to attack the fleeing Communists, now known to be holding the high ground on either side of the road to Songju. The advance began at dawn, led by the Middlesex on the right of the road. The Argylls followed and later deployed to the left of the road.

The Battle on Hill 282: Supported by American tanks the Middlesex Battalion attacked and seized a small hill, called by the men Plum Pudding Hill, on the right of the road and continued to attack the higher ground immediately to the northeast, known to the British as Point 325, and soon captured it. While the Middlesex Battalion attacked Hill 325, the Scottish Highlander Argyll Battalion moved up to attack neighboring Hill 282 on the left of the road. Starting before dawn on 23 September, B and C Companies after an hour’s climb seized the crest of Hill 282. Across a saddle, and nearly one and half kilometers away to the southwest, higher Hill 388 dominated the one they had just occupied. C Company started toward it. But enemy troops occupying this hill already were moving to attack the one just taken by the British. The enemy supported their attack with artillery and mortar fire, which began falling on the British. The action continued
throughout the morning with enemy fire increasing in intensity. Shortly before noon, with American artillery fire inexplicably withdrawn and the five supporting US tanks unable to bring the enemy under fire because of terrain obstacles, the Argylls called for an air strike on enemy-held Hill 388. (See Sketch Map 1.)

Just after noon the Argylls heard the sound of approaching planes. Three F-51 Mustangs circled Hill 282 where the British displayed their white recognition panels. The enemy on Hill 388 also displayed white panels. To his dismay, the tactical air control party was unable to establish radio contact with the flight of F-51's. Suddenly, at 1215, the Mustangs attacked the wrong hill; they came in napalming and machine-gunning the Argyll position.

The terrible tragedy was over in two minutes and left the hilltop a sea of orange flame. Survivors plunged fifty feet down the slope to escape the burning napalm. Major Kenneth Muir, second in command of the Argylls, who had led an ammunition resupply and litter-bearing party to the crest before noon, whatching the flames on the crest die down, noticed that a few wounded men still held a small area on top. Acting quickly, he assembled about thirty men
and led them back up the hill before approaching enemy reached to top. There, two bursts of enemy automatic fire mortally wounded him as he and Major A.I. Gordon-Ingram, B Company Commander, fired a 60-mm. mortar. Major Muir’s last words as he was carried from the hilltop were that the enemy “will never get the Argylls off this ridge.” But the situation was hopeless. Major Gordon-Ingram counted only ten men with him able to fight, and some of them were wounded. His three Bren guns were nearly out of ammunition. At 1500 the survivors were down at the foot of the hill.

The next day a count showed 2 officers and 11 men killed, 4 officers and 70 men wounded, and 2 men missing for a total of 89 casualties; of this number, the mistaken air attack caused approximately 60. For his splendid leadership and courageous example shown during the action, Major Muir was posthumously awarded a Victoria Cross which is the British supreme award.

On 24 September the elements of the 24th US Division attacked south from Pusang-dong on the Waegwan—Kumchon highway and captured Songju. From there it moved to link up with the 27th British Brigade below the town. That day and the next the British and American units mopped up in the Songju area. On the afternoon of 25 September the British Brigade, released from attachment to the 24th US Division, reverted to I US Corps control.

On 28 September the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment arrived in Korea, and on 1 October it joined the 27th Brigade, which was then renamed “The 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade.” The arrival of this fine Australian unit, up to strength and well equipped, was most welcome and gave the Brigade the tactical scope which had been lacking with only two battalions.

On 5 October, now the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade moved to Taegu airstrip for an airlift to Kimpo, and from Kimpo the brigade’s rapid advance north started. By 11 October it had crossed the Imjin River and followed the 5th US Cavalry Regiment northeast out of Kaesong. The plan of the commander of the 1st US Cavalry Division, now with the 27th British Brigade under its control, was for the brigade to move northwest through the mountains for a close-in envelopment of Kumchon. The road taken by the British, little more than a cart track, dead-ended in the mountains. The Middlesex Battalion got lost on this trail, turned back, and tried another. Despite an arduous effort in the mountains, the British troops never got into the fight for Kumchon.

On 17 October, however, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade passed through Sohung and took up the advance along the main highway toward Sariwon. The Argylls, who were leading, supported by American tanks, encountered slight resistance a few miles south of Sariwon, but this was quickly overcome and the
battalion spent the night of the 17th in the town. The 3rd Australian Battalion had advanced through Sariwon just before dark and taken up positions on the northern outskirts. As darkness fell on the town, which had been heavily bombed, small parties of the enemy appeared and there was much confusion. There was not much fighting at first in the town itself, but the Australians accounted for a number of the enemy attempting to escape to the north and captured some 2,000 prisoners who blundered into their positions. Later 1,257 of the enemy was killed by the Argylls in the town.

At daybreak on the 18th the British advance continued and early on the 19th ROK troops entered Pyongyang, NK Communist's capital, from the east, to be followed a little later by the leading battalion of the 27th Brigade -- the Middlesex -- from the west. After a brief halt the Brigade was placed under the control of the 24th US Division and ordered to lead its advance on Chongju via Sinanju.

During the advance toward Chongju where the brigade reached on the 29th, enemy opposition was negligible except for the Australians who met very heavy opposition just east of Chongju. On the highground overlooking the town the Australian Battalion received a heavy blow. It was in Chongju that the much admired Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Green, the Australian 3rd Battalion Commander, was struck in the stomach by a enemy shell fragment, which resulted in his death two days later.

On 30 October the 21st US Regiment of the 24th Division passed through the British to lead the advance. By this time the British troops were very tired, and the brigade commander, Brigadier Coad, asked the 24th Division commander to pass a regiment through the brigade. Thus, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade went into reserve for the first time for eight weeks. For the past two weeks it had led the advance, to within 40 miles of the Manchurian border. By this time the NK Communists had not only been defeated, but almost completely destroyed. It was no longer an effective fighting force, and it appeared unlikely that it could be resuscitated. So, it seemed that the Korean War was over, and even in the highest quarters there was talk of "home by Christmas."

The optimism was, however, short lived. The war, almost won by the UN forces, suddenly turned into an entirely new war by the aggression of the Chinese Communists. The Chinese threat soon ended the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade's rest.

The 27th Brigade now had to redeploy, and on 3 November orders were received to withdraw to positions north of the Chongchon River covering Sinanju. The movement was closely pressed by the Chinese Reds. In the defense of the
Chongchon River bridgehead elements of the brigade got involved in some very confused fighting. The Chinese had suffered very heavily in the fight with the brigade and on 6 November they broke contact and withdrew several miles north. After the Chinese withdrawal the 27th Brigade eventually reestablished its old positions near Pakchon, in conjunction with strong American troops.

The UN forces renewed their advance to the Yalu River on 24 November in full expectation of "home for Christmas," but their hopes were again short lived.

On the very same day of the UN forces' attack, the Chinese Reds, gathering strength, renewed their offensive and this had nipped in the bud the UN advance. Confronted with the renewed strong offensive, the UN forces' retreat was inevitable.

On 27 November the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was withdrawn from north to south of the Chongchon and moved to Kunu-ri, where they came under the direct control of the IX US Corps. On the 28th the brigade fell back further on Sunchon. At this juncture the brigade was the only uncommitted body of troops available to form a reserve for the IX US Corps.

On 30 November the Middlesex were ordered to retrace their steps to secure a pass on the Kunu-ri–Sunchon road and help part of the 2nd US Division, which

Men of the 1st Bn., the Middlesex Regiment and American tanks moving toward Kunu-ri in support of the 2nd US Division.
was withdrawing from Kunu-ri, but the Middlesex attempts to enter the pass were met by strong opposition. Holding a position south of it, the battalion became involved in heavy close-quarter fighting. In the fight the battalion suffered about 30 casualties.

On 2 and 3 December the 27th Brigade, moving from Sunchon—Chasan area to Pyongyang, covered the withdrawal of American troops. The situation was extremely obscure and much confused fighting, moves and counter-moves occurred, in which the Argylls were mainly involved. By the evening of 3 December the 27th Brigade had reached an area a few miles north of Pyongyang, where the brigade found itself together with the 29th British Infantry Brigade, which was holding a bridgehead north of Taedong River covering the withdrawal of American troops. On the morning of the 4th the 27th Brigade continued their withdrawal, passing through the 29th British Brigade. They had been among the first to enter the NK Communists' capital, Pyongyang, during the advance, and had formed the rearguard up to its northern outskirts during the retreat.

In the meantime the 29th Brigade consisting of the 1st Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, the first Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles, and other supporting units, sailed from England during the first week in October 1950, and disembarked at Pusan between 3 and 18 November. The whole brigade commanded by Brigadier T. Briddie, was concentrated at Suwon by 19 November, and on the same day it moved to Kaesong, where it came under control of the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Then, on its way up to the battle-front, the brigade fought with NK Communist bands of guerillas, operating far in the rear of the main battalines and inflicted heavy losses on them. By the last days of November the brigade with leaving the Northumberland Fusiliers behind at Kaesong, advanced north as far as Sukchon through Pyongyang. From Sukchon the brigade fell back a few kilometers to Yongyu in the support of the 1st ROK Division, which was in process of withdrawing. By the evening of 3 December, the brigade had withdrawn to an area a few miles north of Pyongyang where it found itself together with the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade in the same area.

Southward Withdrawal

Although the two British and Commonwealth Brigades happened to be in the same area, they had to operate separately under the different commands with the 27th under the I and 29th under the IX US Corps. The separate operations of the two units were to continue until late July 1951 when the 1st Common-
wealth Division was formed.

By the time the 29th Brigade withdrew to the vicinity of the Taedong River north of Pyongyang to hold a bridgehead, the United Nations forces were in full withdrawal in face of a steady, but not very swift, advance by the Red Chinese. Operation at this time centered round Pyongyang, where US and ROK forces, forming the I and IX US Corps, were converging on the town.

While the 29th Brigade was holding the bridgehead covering the friendly withdrawal, the 27th Brigade continued its withdrawal for about another 190 kilometers to just north of Uijongbu, about 24 kilometers due north of Seoul. The long march in Korean winter by way of indifferent Korean roads played havoc with the brigade's transport. In Uijongbu, for the time being, conditions were peaceful; but the cold was bitter.

Two events occurred while the Commonwealth troops were in Uijongbu: On 14 December the 60th Indian Field Ambulance joined the brigade; and on the 23rd the Eighth US Army Commander, General Walker, had most unfortunately been killed in a motor accident while on his way to present a Presidential citation to the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade for its gallant defense of the Nakdong River line and its advance thereafter. The presentation was eventually made by Major General Milburn, then I US Corps Commander and the acting Eighth Army commander, on the following day.

The Red Chinese attack resumed on New Year's Eve and on the morning of 1 January the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was ordered to advance to an area about nine kilometers north of Uijongbu and then act as rear-guard to the 6th ROK Division. With the mission completed, the brigade withdrew to Seoul, where it covered the withdrawal of the 1st US Cavalry and 24th US Divisions. Then, the 27th Brigade's southward movement continued to Suwon, then to Changhown-ni, about 45 miles southeast of Seoul arriving there on 6 January.

In the meantime, on 5 December the 29th British Brigade also began its withdrawal from Pyongyang area to a defensive position at Sinmak. The brigade remained at Sinmak area until the 11th, when it came into the I US Corps reserve at Changdan, about 80 kilometers further south and 16 kilometers southeast of Kaesong. Here the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, who had been left at Kaesong area, rejoined the brigade.

By the first days of January the Chinese Communist forces had caught up with UN forces and had begun his offensive again. On the western flank this was directed against the I US Corps, which was covering Seoul by holding a line north of the Han River with the 1st and 6th ROK and 24th and 25th US Divisions. On 3 January the 29th British Brigade with the Thailand Battalion attached, was
maintaining defensive positions around Koyang about 18 kilometers north of Seoul to the east of the main supply route Number 1 to Pugong-ni and was to receive a strong Chinese attack in which the two battalions of the Ulster Rifles and Northumberland Fusiliers were heavily involved with severe casualties suffered.

Despite of the British’s successful hold of the positions, the UN force as a whole had to withdraw south of the Han River. During the British withdrawal part of the Ulster Rifles were surprised by an enemy ambush, which attacked their flank. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place in which some 200 of the enemy were killed. In the final stages of this action Major Blake, the Acting commanding officer of the Ulster Rifles, and Captain Astley-Cooper of a tank company were both killed. In its first serious engagement in Korea, the 29th British Brigade’s losses had been heavy -- about 230 killed, wounded and missing in the Ulsters Rifles, about 50 in the 5th Fusiliers and some 20 (together with the loss of some tanks) in “Cooper Force.”

On 4 January the 29th Brigade was across the Han to the south. By the end of the first week of January the brigade found itself about 30 kilometers south of Pyongtaek. By 6 January 1951, the hard pressed retreat ended with the 29th British Brigade on the extreme left of the Eighth US Army’s new line, near the western coast, and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade some 56 kilometers inland to the east at Changhowon-ni. There was to be a brief period of rest for the both brigades.

**The Second Northward Advance**

On 7 January 1951 the 29th Brigade was on the extreme left of the line round
Pyongtaek, with the 3rd US Division on its right, while the 27th Commonwealth Brigade took up defensive positions about Changhowon-ni, with its main activity of long-range patrols, mostly to the Ichon area. The 6th ROK Division was on the left and the 5th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th US Division on the right. There was a gap of some two kilometers between the brigade’s left and the ROK troops.

The 27th Commonwealth Brigade: On 22 January the 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment joined the 27th Brigade in Changhowon as its supporting unit. On 25 January the Eighth US Army offensive began. The 27th Brigade, however, did not participate in the offensive in the initial stages, but remained deployed in its positions at Changhowon. On the 27th the brigade vacated its positions and concentrated at Changhowon-ni, with the Australians guarding the IX US Corps Headquarters, under which corps the brigade went for direct control on the 30th.

On 4 February the Red Chinese attacked on the 24th US Division on the brigade’s right north of Ichon. The enemy attack met with some success and as a precautionary measure the Argylls were moved forward that morning to Yoju, 19 kilometers east of Ichon.

On 14 February the brigade came under the operational control of the 2nd Division of the IX US Corps, to which it was attached for four days till 17 February, and received orders to cross the Han River at Yoju at once and advance north to relieve the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Division and the French Battalion, who had been attacked by an estimated two CCF divisions, and who had formed a perimeter position in the Chipyong-ni area some 16 kilometers north of Yoju. Now the 27th Brigade got the second northward advance started with its advance directed on Chipyong-ni.

On the way to Chipyong-ni the 27th Brigade was continuously on the move, pressing forward against a stubborn enemy who was skillful at rear-guard fighting. By the evening of the 14th the Middlesex, who led the advance, had captured Hill 112 from which elements of the 2nd US Division withdrew. The Australians moved up to another feature on their left, and the Argylls took up positions on the right. On the 15th the Middlesex were counter-attacked and the following day the Australians had a sharp encounter. These enemy stubborn resistance plus mountainous terrain without roads caused a delay in the brigade’s advance.

In the meantime the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division had organized a task force for the relief of Chipyong-ni. This force moved due north up the road on the left of the 27th Brigade and by the evening of the 17th had reached the isolated 23rd US Regiment. This action relieved the urgency of
the 27th Brigade's task; but, nevertheless, the brigade's advance continued.

On 18 February a Canadian battalion (the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) arrived to join the 27th Brigade. The brigade now consisted of an Australian battalion, a Canadian battalion, an English battalion, a Scottish battalion, a New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment and an Indian Field Ambulance, and was commanded by Brigadier Coad. It is interest to note here there is no record of any other brigade -- or force of similar size -- composed of so many contingents of different Commonwealth countries. It seems unlikely that there is a parallel in the history of any army.

On the 19th the 27th Commonwealth Brigade's advance continued day by day until 27 February. At first opposition was slight, but it increased considerably as the leading troops approached Hills 419 and 614, two prominent features on a good defensive position about nine kilometers north east of Chipyong-ni. On the right the Australians after severe fighting captured Hill 614 on the 27th and on the next day the Canadians made a successful attack on Hill 419 on the left. On the afternoon of the 28th the Australians repelled a counter-attack. The brigade's methodical advance continued.

On 8 March 1951 the enemy forces withdrew on all fronts, leaving behind a good deal of equipment. And on 13 March the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was relieved by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment and concentrated in a river-bed near Nolbunyo-ni, about four kilometers north of Chipyong-ni. The Brigade remained there until 24 March in IX US Corps reserve for rest and refit. On 23 March, Brigadier Coad left the brigade, being relieved by Colonel B.A. Burke, the deputy commander of the 29th Brigade.

On 25 March the 27th Brigade moved 80 kilometers by motor transport to Hyon-ni, just northwest of Chongpyong, where they came under the command of the 24th US Division. A few days later the brigade took over from the 19th US Regiment in the front line just north of Hyon-ni.

The advance continued until 16 April. The last week, up the Kapyong road, was a very strenuous period for the whole brigade. Several small engagements took place and a number of casualties were suffered in minor actions. The Argylls lost two officers killed and some men wounded in the last engagement.

On 19 April 1951, the 27th Brigade was relieved by the 19th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division, and returned to Kapyong area in IX US Corps reserve. The New Zealand gunners, however, remained in support of the ROK troops.

29th British Brigade: As stated earlier, the 29th British Brigade arrived in the Pyongtaek area on the left of the Eighth US Army line near the western
coast and about 64 kilometers south of Seoul, and here it remained until the end of January, moving on 1 February to Osan about 19 kilometers to the north, on the Seoul road. At the same time the 45th British Field Artillery Regiment and “C” Squadron, 7th Tank Regiment, were detached from the brigade in support of the 1st ROK Division and 25th US Division respectively.

On 11 February a somewhat hurried move north to Pabalmak 33 kilometers northeast from Osan was made, where on the 12th the brigade relieved the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division. For the next ten days the brigade was engaged in hill fighting in cooperation with the 24th Regiment of the 25th US Division. The Gloucesters and Ulster Rifles, with C Squadron of the 8th Hussars were the units mainly engaged in these operations.

On 23 February the 29th Brigade returned to Suwon, where it came into the IX US Corps reserve. Here its only task was to devise a deception plan to cover the crossing of the Han River by the 25th US Division. It was a quiet period for the brigade, which moved to Ichon on 7 March and then to Yongdungpo on the 21st.

On 30 March the 29th Brigade came under the command of the 3rd US Infantry Division and on the following day took over the line of the Imjin River, which was to be the scene of the brigade’s epic stand during the battle of 23–25 April 1951. The position, extending from Choksong on the left to the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right, was held with three infantry battalions forward: The 1st Battalion, the Northumberland Fusiliers on the left, the 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team, which was attached to the brigade, in center and the 1st Battalion of the Ulster Rifles on the right.

The next three weeks was a period of intensive patrolling and preparation for a continuation of the methodical advance which had been going on along practically the whole front since the end of January. On 4 April the Belgian Battalion joined the 29th Brigade and relieved the Philippine Battalion, which then left the brigade.

The Chinese Spring Offensive

During the early days of April 1951, the UN forces continued its methodical advance north, with the object of securing a line of commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel. On the other hand, the Communist Chinese were preparing another large-scale offensive of their own, designed to check the UN forces’ advance.

In order to interrupt the enemy preparations for attack, the 1 and IX US Corps
on 9 April launched an offensive south of the Iron Triangle area. Resistance was stiff and progress slow, but by 21 April the UN troops had secured an intermediate line, and arrangement were made to push forward along practically the whole UN front. These offensive moves may have hindered the enemy preparations, and possibly delayed him; but they did not prevent the launching of his attack, which began on 22 April. Eventually the 29th British and 27th Commonwealth Brigades were to be involved so heavily in the bitterest fights resulted from this CCF Spring offensive.

On the day the Chinese communist attack started (22 Apri 1951) the two brigades were located as follows: The 29th British Brigade, under the I US Corps, in front line was holding the line of the Imjin River from inclusive Chosksong on the left to the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right, while the 27th Commonwealth Brigade under the IX US Corps, was in support of a ROK division north of Kapyong.

The Battle of the Imjin River: Of the two brigades, the 29th was the first to feel the weight of the Chinese attack. The Chinese attack came in strength before midnight by striking against the Gloucesters on the left, and an hour later the fighting had spread to other forward companies. The engagement which followed was very severe and may rank high among the great feats of arms in history.

The 29th Brigade had suffered very heavily in the battle. More than 25 per cent of its fighting men had become casualties, the Gloucester Battalion having been practically wiped out. The stand made by the brigade had, however, completely frustrated the Communist plan to break the UN forces’ front. All had fought bravely and well. The stand of the Gloucesters was worthy of the highest traditions of British infantry. For the detailed account of the Imjin River battle as a whole, see Volume II of this series.

Today at Solmari there is a tablet commemorating the Gloucesters’ heroism on 22–25 April 1951. The inscription states: “This memorial on Gloster Hill commemorates the heroic stand of the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment and C Troops, 170th Light Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery. Surrounded and greatly outnumbered they fought valiantly for four days in defence of freedom.”

The 29th British Brigade, after its heavy losses in the battle, spent the next month on the Kimpo peninsula. Conditions here were quiet and the brigade spent its time patrolling, absorbing reinforcements, reorganizing and training. In a very short time units were again battleworthy. The Gloucesters, whose fighting personnel had nearly all become casualties at the Imjin, were made up to
strength and became operationally fit in a very few days.

At the end of May 1951 the brigade moved to the left sector of its old Imjin River positions, where it set about the task of digging, wiring and mining the defences. The Belgian Battalion remained with the brigade.

The Kapyong Battle: At the same time the 29th Brigade was fighting the Chinese on the Imjin, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade on the east in the area of Kapyong River also came under heavy attack mostly on the front of the Australian and Canadian battalions.

The 27th Commonwealth Brigade, which had been relieved by troops of the 6th ROK Division on 19 April, had withdrawn to the Kapyong area where it was the IX US Corps reserve, with the brigade headquarters located in the vicinity of Kapyong. The 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment had not withdrawn with the rest of the brigade, but remained in support of the ROK troops to the north.

During the night of 22 April the Reds attacked the ROK troops. The attack met with considerable success and the ROKs were soon in full retreat. With some difficulty the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment disengaged and came into action just south of the important road junction about six kilometers north of Chongchon-ni. On 23 April, however, an order was issued that the New Zealanders be rushed forward again in support of the ROKs with the 1st Middlesex Battalion for its protection. The both units of the brigade then advanced north to take up positions. It soon became clear, however, that the ROK troops were continuing their retreat and that the New Zealanders and 1st Middlesex were in a precarious position. Both units were then ordered back.

Meanwhile the rest of the brigade had taken up defensive dispositions astride the bend in the Kapyong River, north of Chongchon-ni. The forward battalions were the 2nd PPCLI Battalion, left, on Hill 677, and on the right the 3rd Australian Battalion on Hill 504, these positions being about five kilometers north of Chongchon-ni, where the brigade headquarters was located.

These two Australian and Canadian infantry battalions and the New Zealand Artillery Regiment were heavily involved in the Chinese attack in the Kapyong area. The full account of the Kapyong battle which ended on the 25th, are described in the respective nations’ part.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion of Argylls and Sutherland Highlanders, who had just been relieved by the 1st Battalion of King’s Own Scottish Borderers, remained in the assembly area and moved to Inchon on 24 April, for embarkation to Hongkong. During the same day the new battalion moved forward to positions near the brigade headquarters.
The record of the Argylls during their eight months' service in Korea had been a fine one, and will rank high in the history of this famous regiment.

At midnight 25–26 April 1951 the 27th Commonwealth Brigade changed its commander and its designation. It became the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, and Brigadier G. Taylor took over from Brigadier B.A. Burke. The composition of the brigade remained the same. On 26 April the brigade withdrew south on relief by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment.

Early May 1951 found the 28th Commonwealth Brigade to the east of Seoul, on the left flank of the 24th US Division and under its command. Contact with the enemy was not close, but on 17 May there was some activity on the front of the American troops on the right, but no serious engagement ensued.

On 14 May the 1st Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry relieved the 1st Middlesex Battalion, thus completing the relief of the original units of the 27th Brigade. The "Die Hards" had fought in the manner expected of them during the early, and most difficult, months of the Korean War. The Middlesex battalion returned to Hongkong.

On 21 May the IX US Corps assumed the offensive, in which the 28th Brigade participated. Led by the Australians and the K.O.S.B., little opposition was encountered although the K.O.S.B. met with some resistance. There followed a week of steady advance and several minor engagements in which all battalions were involved. On 29 May the brigade came under the command of the 1st US Cavalry Division in the I US Corps, and took up positions on the line of the Imjin River. During this period the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI, left the 28th Brigade to join the 25th Canadian Brigade which arrived in Korea during the first week in May.

The following two months until the formation of the Commonwealth Division at the end of July were comparatively quiet, although the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade was to experience some sharp fighting. On 26 July the Canadian brigade also came under command of the I US Corps and moved to an assembly area in rear of the 28th Commonwealth and 29th British Brigades.

As of 26 July the three British Commonwealth Brigades were located together with the two forward brigades (29th and 28th) holding the line of the Imjin River, between Choksong on the left and the junction of the Imjin and Hantan on the right, the Canadians being in reserve. On the left flank was the 1st ROK Division and on the right the 1st US Cavalry Division. The three infantry brigades were supported by armour, artillery, engineers and administrative units substantially equivalent to those which are normal in a division, and they were deployed on a divisional basis.

The stage was set for the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division. Major
General A.J.H. Cassels, the Divisional Commander-designate, and most of his staff, had been in the theatre of operations for some weeks, and all arrangements had been made for the integration of the three brigades under his command.

Operations after the Commonwealth Integration

The Commonwealth Integration: Near Tokchong at midday on 28 July 1951, a short ceremony was held -- attended by General James A. Van Fleet, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson (Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces in Japan) and other senior Commonwealth and American officers -- to mark the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division. Here for the first time a Commonwealth Division flag was flown alongside the flags of Commonwealth countries and that of the United Nations.

In the course of the next two years, it should be noted, many changes were made among units and personnel composing the division; but the division's truly Commonwealth character was not altered, and the Commonwealth spirit was maintained throughout.

The period from the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division until 3 October was a comparatively quiet one, but included a practically unopposed advance of the divisional line to the north of the Imjin River and a number of minor actions. The principal enemy of the division at this time, and during the ensuing operations, was the 64th CCF Army, consisting of the 190th, 191st and 192nd Divisions. When the Commonwealth Division was formed on 28 July 1951, it was actually faced on its front by the 192nd CCF Division, with two regiments in front line -- each regiment consisting of about 2,000 men. At that time...
time the enemy held a very light outpost screen some 2,000 to 3,000 yards north of the Imjin River, with well-prepared defensive positions from 6,000 to 8,000 yards in rear.

Operation Commando: On 21 September 1951, orders were received for the 1st Commonwealth Division to take part in a full-scale Corps offensive called Operation Commando with the objective of advancing some 6,000 to 10,000 yards along the whole corps front to establish a new line, Jamestown Line, with D Day fixed for 3 October 1951. In the operation, the 1st Commonwealth Division was required to advance from 6,000 to 8,000 yards along the whole divisional front.

The attack was planned to take place in three phases: (1) an attack on the right on D Day by the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade to secure Hill 355; (2) an advance by the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade on the left on D plus 1 to secure a line of high ground about 3,000 yards from their present positions; and (3) exploitation to the objective line (Jamestown) by the 25th Canadian Brigade on the left and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right. Phases 1 and 2 were planned for two successive days in order to permit each brigade in turn to have the support of the whole Divisional Artillery plus 8-inch and 155-mm. batteries of the I US Corps Artillery.

The attack of the 28th Brigade was launched at first light on 3 October -- 1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry left, 1st King's own Scottish Borderers center and 3rd Royal Australian Battalion right. Prior to the attack, and throughout the day, the enemy had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, some 27,000 rounds being fired by the Division Artillery.

In the first day of the attack, the troops of the 28th Brigade could not reach their assigned objectives. Particularly the K.S.L.I. and K.O.S.B. met strong enemy opposition and their progress was slow. By the 4th, however, the K.S.L.I. had captured the initial objective, Hill 210, and the K.O.S.B. had captured Hill 355, but only after fierce fighting.

On the left, the 25th Canadian Brigade went in with little opposition encountered, and by the 5th they had captured all their objectives, and were in touch with a ROK regiment on the left. On the further left the Ulster Rifles of the 29th British Brigade, conforming to the advance of the Canadians, also made rapid progress. It should be noted here that the battalions of the 29th Brigade in the operation had been arranged to be employed individually to support other brigades, rather than used as a whole brigade. On the 5th the Ulster Rifles were withdrawn from the line owing to their impending relief and move to Hong Kong, and were replaced by elements of the Royal 22e Canadian Regiment.
Again on the right, two remaining objectives (Hills 217 and 317) assigned to the 28th Brigade still defied capture. The former was to be the scene of bitter, and almost continuous, fighting for four days before it was finally occupied. The attack on the 5th was one of the severe fighting on the 28th Commonwealth Brigade’s front. This brigade had attached to it the 5th Fusiliers of the 29th Brigade and they and the Australians set about the task of capturing Hills 217 and 317. In the afternoon the Fusiliers took Hill 217, but just before dusk they were forced to withdraw by enemy’s heavy counterattack. The Australians, after a successful air strike and a heavy bombardment, captured Hill 317.

On the 6th vigorous attempts were made by the 5th Fusiliers and the Australians to capture the only part of the divisional objective not yet reached, Hill 217. The Fusiliers after capturing it were again forced back by heavy fire. The division suffered 95 casualties on this day, nearly all in the 5th Fusiliers.
On the 7th the Australians now made strenuous efforts to capture Hill 217, but were unable to make progress. Heavy shelling of the Australians and 5th Fusiliers positions continued all day. Several air strikes on enemy gun positions were made, culminating in the dropping of four 500 Lb. bombs by American B29 aircraft during the night of the 7th. During this night the Australians beat off several counterattacks.

On the evening of 8 October, following three air strikes, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers occupied Hill 217 unopposed. With the capture of Hill 217, the 1st Commonwealth Division's part in Operation Commando was completed.

On 8 October, then, the 1st Commonwealth Division lay on the Jamestown Line between Sami-chon and the Imjin River. It held a broad front of approximately 21,000 yards.

The CCF Attacks on Hills 217 and 317: On 9 October the dispositions of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade were adjusted. The K.S.L.I. Battalion took over the area of Hills 227 and 355 on the left, while the K.O.S.B. Battalion was ordered to take over the area of hills including Hills 217 and 317 and the Australian Battalion the area about Hill 199 in the extreme right. The left sector was held by the 25th Canadian Brigade.

The rest of October was comparatively quiet period, although there was some shelling and minor probing attack. The enemy were concentrating on the construction of a new line which the capture of his old positions had made necessary. But the first and middle part of the November days was to see a series of local but determined attacks against the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. One of the bitterest fightings took place on 4 November. On this day extremely heavy shelling began along the whole front, and from about 1300 hours it was intense against the brigade. Soon after noon some enemy tanks were reported in a very forward company position. These may have been self-propelled guns; but whatever they were, they were engaged by aircraft and four were believed to have been destroyed. About 1645 hours the enemy launched a heavy attack from the north against the K.O.S.B. and the left of the Australians, followed later by an assault on the K.S.L.I. The battle raged until midnight, with the main effort against the K.O.S.B. This battalion was eventually forced back from the two dominating features, Hills 217 and 317, which had been the scenes of such bitter fighting, and were so hardly won, on Operation Commando. In this phase of the action the K.O.S.B. lost very heavily, their effective strength being reduced to the equivalent of about two companies.

It was on this day that Private W. Speakman, 1st Battalion of K.O.S.B., so
greatly distinguished himself. Private Speakman, a member of "B" Company Headquarters, collected a party of six men armed with grenades. He led some ten charges, and, after being wounded, continued to resist several enemy assaults. For this almost incredible feat of arms Private Speakman was awarded the Victoria Cross.

Soon after midnight increased shelling and other activities indicated that the second phase of the attack would begin soon, but it did not materialize. It was thought that the concentration of troops was broken up by two bombing attacks and heavy artillery fire by Commonwealth gunners.

At first light on the 5th it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to his original positions, except on Hills 217 and 317, which he held in strength. At about midday a new commer, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Leicestershire Regiment was committed for counterattack on Hill 217 and the Australian Battalion made a diversional attack towards Hill 317. The Leicesters fought hard all day, but were unable to reach their objective. Both features in fact were destined to remain in the enemy hands.

It subsequently became known that the battalion had been attacked by a Red Chinese division of the 64th CCF Army, some 6,000 strong and that, in the course of the battle, the enemy had casualties of over 1,000 killed. It was also revealed that during the fight the Commonwealth Divisional Artillery fired 30,829 rounds.

Adjustment of Divisional Front: By 19 November the enemy's series of autumn attacks against the Commonwealth Division ended, although they continued for a short time on other part of the front. It had been a time of some anxiety. Any deep penetration followed by the enemy resolute exploitation would have led to a nasty situation owing to the lack of depth in the defenses. On the night of 21–22 November the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right of the divisional sector was relieved by the 7th US Cavalry Regiment; practically the whole of the front including Hills 355 and 220 held by the 28th Brigade was taken over. Instead of this on the left flank the division was to take over a portion of the line held by the 1st ROK Division west of Sami-chon. Thus, the new division area, after the adjustment, had a slightly shorter front and permitted some defense in depth. The new front could now be held by two brigades leaving a complete brigade in reserve.

On 23 November various moves were in progress all day to complete the redeployment of the division. In the evening the enemy made a strong attack against the 7th US Cavalry Regiment on the right and captured the important feature Hill 355 (Kowang-san) which the Commonwealth Division had captured on Operation Commando. This was a serious matter as the feature dominated most
of the divisional front. Its recapture was a matter of some urgency, and vital to
the security of the division.

On the following day the 7th US Cavalry Regiment fought desperately in its
effort to recapture Hill 355. The Commonwealth Division gave the full weight
of its artillery support, and eventually the US Regiment retook the hill.

Operations in 1952

On 27 November 1951 the UNC and Communist delegates at Panmunjom
finally agreed upon the line of demarcation which had been debated for so long.
Thus, the existing front became what would have been the demarcation line in
the event of an armistice. Theoretically the demarcation line should have had no
influence on the fighting, as it had no significance until an armistice agreement
was actually signed -- an event which did not take place for another twenty
months. In practice it did have much influence on ground operations.

Fifteen days before the agreement on the demarcation line, and partly in
anticipation of an early cease-fire, the UN Command had ordered the Eighth US
Army not to engage in further offensive operations but instead to maintain an
active defense. Local attacks were permitted only where necessary to strengthen
the main line or to establish outposts three to five thousand yards in front.
This UNC policy on the conduct of the fighting in fact brought along the
battlefield the stalemate which lasted until July 1953.

Active Defence: The period from late November to the end of the year was
a comparatively quiet one. There was some enemy shelling and a few minor
incidents, but activities were mainly confined to strengthening the defenses im-
proving communications, training, receiving distinguished visitors and preparing
for eventualities which rarely occurred. The periods of inactivity on front were
on many occasions accompanied by insatiable demands on the part of the higher
level intelligence staff for prisoners in order to help their attempts to keep pace
with changes in the enemy order of battle. This led to much patrolling in which
the division suffered a few casualties almost every night.

For instance, on 10 February Operation Snare was carried out by the division
troops on the orders of the I US Corps. This was a somewhat novel operation,
whereby the whole Eighth Army maintained its existing positions for a period of
seven days without engaging to enemy with any form of fire, except small-arms
fire in the event of an actual attack. It was thought that this would mystify
the enemy and cause him to patrol actively in order to find out what was
happening. This would give the UNC troops the opportunity to capture prisoners — so it was hoped. General Cassels, the division commander, was by no means convinced of the wisdom of this plan, and as far as the 1st Commonwealth Division’s front was concerned it did not work well. The Chinese Communists sent out a few small patrols, and when they discovered that the positions were still occupied returned to carry on digging. By this means the enemy was able to continue work on strong and deep bunkers on the forward slopes, near the Commonwealth troop positions, without interference.

On 10 March the 29th British Brigade was relieved by the 25th Canadian Brigade in the left sector, west of Sami-chon. Thus, as of 10 March the 1st Commonwealth Division held the line with the Canadians on the left and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right, the 29th British Brigade being in reserve.

The later part of March had produced one sharp brush with the enemy. During the night of the 26th the Chinese Communists launched an attack, at about company strength; against the Canadian position on the left, which later became known as “The Hock.” For a time troops of the PPCLI Battalion were surrounded, but eventually the Chinese were beaten off. On the right a company of the K.O.S.B. in the 28th Brigade sector was attacked on the night of 6 April, but the attack was beaten off.

During the second week in April the Commonwealth Division received a most welcome reinforcement. The 1st Battalion of Royal Australian Regiment completed its concentration in the divisional area. It immediately began a six-week period of intensive training. On 1 June, it was to take its place with its sister battalion (the 3rd R.A.R.) in the 28th Commonwealth Brigade.

Between 15 and 19 April, the Commonwealth sector of the Jamestown Line was altered. The division gave responsibility for the area west of Sami-chon to the 1st US Marine Division and accepted responsibility from the 3rd US Division for Hill 355 (Kowang-san). The 29th British Brigade took over in the right brigade sector; this had been extended northeast to include Hill 355 area. On conclusion of Operation Commando the division’s front had included Hills 217 and 317 and had stretched northeast to the Imjin River. Now the line of the forward defended localities ran close to Hill 355, the outposts on Hills 217 and 317 having been lost to the enemy sometime before. The 29th Brigade that had relieved the 28th Brigade, held its sector with the 1st Battalion, the Royal Leicestershire Regiment on Hill 159, and the 1st Battalion, the Welch Regiment in the Hill 355 area, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Norfolk Regiment being in reserve. The rest of the line running northeast to the Imjin River was held by the 3rd US Division.
During May and June no major operational incidents occurred, except minor patrol clashes. The units of the Commonwealth Division patrolled vigorously in conformity with a policy laid down by the 1 US Corps. An unusual task was assigned to the Commonwealth Division during May: On 25 May General Cassels was ordered by the Eighth US Army to send two companies at once to Koje-do, off the south coast and about 40 kilometers southwest of Pusan, where many thousands of war prisoners were kept in compounds. The two companies were to reinforce the guard strength there following a series of the prisoner incidents. B Company, 1st K.S.L.I., and B Company, 1st Royal Canadian Regiment, had been dispatched. These two companies carried out guard duties for a period of six weeks, under very difficult conditions, in an exemplary manner. On 29 and 30 June the 28th Commonwealth Brigade relieved the 25th Canadian Brigade in the front line.

July and August were a period of heavy rain. The weather had become very hot and sultry, combined with spasmodic heavy rain and occasional gales. This rainy season caused many difficulties in carrying out ground operations, especially for the 1st Commonwealth Division troops who were holding the line of the Imjin River which rose over 39 feet during the peak raining period. Despite of the natural obstacle patrols and raids had to be sent out continuously with the objective of capturing prisoners.

In the half-dozen raids since the middle of June more than 120 casualties had been suffered. The heavy casualties showed that by this time the enemy had perfected their defensive fire arrangements to an extent which made patrols and raids very hazardous undertakings.

On 4 August the 1st Battalion, King's Major General A.J.H. Cassels, 1st Commonwealth Division Commander, decorates an Australian soldier with the Military Medal.
Own Scottish Borderers left for the United Kingdom, on relief by the 1st Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, and a few days later the 29th British Brigade in the right sector was relieved by the 25th Canadian Brigade.

Entering September and October the Chinese in front became more aggressive along the whole front, although at first there was no noticeable increase in activity on the front of the Commonwealth Division. Attacks at battalion strength were made in several sector and resulted in heavy fighting. Several bitter fighting took place in the adjoining division sectors both on the left and right.

On 11 September the 1st Battalion of the Durham Light Infantry arrived in Korea and started training to relieve the 1st Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry, and on the 21st the 1st Battalion of the King's Liverpool Regiment arrived in relief of the 1st Battalion, the Royal Norfolk Regiment. On 27 October the 3rd RAR Battalion (28th Brigade in reserve) relieved the 1st Welch (29th Brigade) in the line. The latter departed for Hongkong, being relieved by the 1st Battalion of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, who arrived in the area on 31 October.

In late November there was a hot battle with a battalion-sized enemy in the Canadian position on the right of the divisional sector. On 23 October the enemy attack came and directed against Hill 355. After a fierce fighting, a Canadian counterattack company managed to drive the attackers off the overrun positions. In the action the Canadian casualties were heavy—15 killed and 82 wounded and missing. This was the hottest single engagement which had taken place on the divisional front for some time.

During October another adjustment of the divisional front was made. On the 23rd, the division received orders to take over the sector of the right battalion of the 1st US Marine Division west of Sami-chon and to hand over the battalion sector on the extreme right of the front to the 1st ROK Division. There adjustments began on the 27th. The sector on the left, taken over from the Marines, included “The Hook,” which was to be the scene of much bitter fighting by Commonwealth troops.

The Battle of “The Hook”: On 4 November a standing patrol of the 1st Black Watch, in front of “The Hook” position, on the left of the divisional front, was rushed by some forty of the enemy. The patrol lost 1 officer and 5 other ranks killed, 6 other ranks wounded and 2 missing. This was the first enemy attack on “The Hook” position since its take-over from the American Marines.

About 16 November the enemy began to shell “The Hook,” still held by the Black Watch, with increasing tempo, and on the night of 18th—19th he made a determined assault on the position. The action started at 1900 hours when a
Black Watch patrol of 1 officer and 10 men found itself surrounded by Chinese on a spur running northeast from the "The Hook." Towards midnight A Company was attacked in company strength from three different directions, the enemy advancing with, or even in front of, his own artillery and mortar fire. From this time onwards the divisional artillery and that of the 1st US Marine Division on the left fired almost continuously throughout the night in support of the defenders of "The Hook." At about 2150 hours the platoon on the west end of the feature went to ground and brought down defensive fire on its own positions. By 2250 hours a Canadian battalion had been alerted and one company of the battalion had relieved B Company of the Black Watch, who were preparing to counterattack.

At about 2220 hours "The Hook" was reported clear of enemy; but soon after heavy shelling began again. At 0030 hours the enemy attacked again and succeeded in getting a footing on the position. At 0130 hours a deliberate counterattack, supported by a heavy artillery bombardment and one tank, was launched. The counterattack made good progress, and after a pause another was launched which got farther forward. The rest of the night was occupied with hard and confused fighting, but the Black Watch held firm. By 0430 hours they were engaged in mopping up a few enemy parties remaining on the position, and by 0630 hours the enemy had withdrawn. At about 0615 hours a Canadian company relieved A Company, Black Watch, on "The Hook." By this time all casualties had been evacuated.

It was estimated that the enemy employed one battalion in this action. More than a hundred of his dead were actually counted. The Black Watch casualties were: 5 officers wounded and 1 missing; 12 other ranks killed, 67 wounded and 20 missing. Among supporting units one man was killed, five wounded and four missing.

Operations in 1953

On 27 January 1953 various adjustment in the divisional layout began, with the object of facilitating the impending relief by the 2nd US Division. The relief itself began on the 29th and was completed by the 31st. And so the Commonwealth Division (less its artillery) withdrew out of enemy contact for the first time since its formation almost exactly eighteen months before. The division remained in two months' rest and a period of training until early April when it returned to the same sector of the front. In late May the division was to heavily get involved in the battle of "The Hook," the last sizeable engagement fought
The Last Battle on "The Hook": In the middle of May 1953 a lot of enemy vehicle movement was seen some 6,000 to 7,000 yards north of "The Hook," and engaged by divisional artillery. During the period of the 18th to 29th it became apparent that the enemy was building up his strength in front of the 29th Brigade, and a Chinese deserter who surrendered on the 18th stated that an early attack on "The Hook" was planned. Several probing attacks, and increasing artillery and mortar fire, were directed against this feature. Counter-measures to meet an attack in this area were taken and included harassing fire by artillery (including 1 US Corps artillery which fired 5,000 rounds in one night) and 24 air strikes (102 sorties - 129 tons of bombs). The Black Watch were also moved to "The Hook" area to strengthen the defences, and the Royal Fusiliers to the reserve position vacated by the Black Watch. (See Sketch Map 3.)
On 25 May the 1st Battalion, the King’s Liverpool Regiment carried out a raid, which was intended to be a diversion for activities in “The Hook” area. The raiders had several men killed and wounded by a mine en route, but reached the objective, where they killed some Chinese and blew up several bunkers.

By 27 May there were signs that the expected attack on “The Hook” was imminent and that it would be on a bigger scale than any which had taken place for some time. Further measures were taken to strengthen the position, including an additional battalion in the front line. When these measures were completed, the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, was on the left, holding “The Hook” itself, and the 1st Battalion, the King’s Liverpool Regiment, held the right sector of the area. It should be noted that “The Hook” is only a small feature in the general area of the engagement.

Shelling and mortaring increased in tempo and became intense at 2000 hours on 28 May. Some eyewitnesses considered it to have been the heaviest enemy bombardment in the Korean War. The first wave of the Red Chinese troops advanced against D Company of the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment on “The Hook”, throwing grenades and assault charges into the positions. Gradually the defenders were forced to withdraw into their tunnels. By this time the division and corps artillery were bringing down the full weight of their fire on prepared targets. There is little doubt that this decimated the second and third attacking waves.

At 2045 hours, a second attack was launched against the right platoon of the forward company on “The Hook.” This attack, although badly mauled, succeeded in getting into the position; but the situation was restored when the platoon was reinforced by men from another platoon.

About 2200 hours two enemy companies formed up to assault the left rear company (Company B), but they were caught by artillery fire and failed. An hour later enemy shelling increased on Hill 146 to the right. In the light of searchlights large numbers of Chinese were seen forming up to attack, and were dispersed by artillery fire. Later it was discovered that this attack was in battalion strength and that the enemy suffered heavy casualties.

The last attack came against “The Hook” at 0030 hours on 29 May, and was beaten off. By 0430 hours “The Hook” position -- and all other Commonwealth positions in the vicinity -- were reported clear of the enemy. An engineer reconnaissance carried out at once disclosed that all main bunkers had been damaged and many trenches, some eight feet deep, had been levelled.

This attack by two enemy reinforced regiments in strength had been prepared over a long period, and ended in failure. Over 100 enemy dead were counted on or near “The Hook,” and another 70 were seen in enemy-held territory. It
was estimated that the enemy had lost 250 men killed and 800 wounded. Commonwealth casualties were: Officers, 3 killed and 2 wounded. Other ranks, 20 killed, 103 wounded and 20 missing. Of this total of 148, 126 were suffered by the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, who fought with the greatest tenacity throughout the night.

Incoming shells and mortar bombs were estimated at 1,000 by day on 28 May, and 10,000 on the night of 28–29 May 1953. The Commonwealth Division Artillery fired over 32,000 rounds and 1 US Corps Artillery nearly 6,000.

Before and After the Armistice: During June and July 1953 the Red Chinese concentrated on the ROK and US formations, mainly with the object of pushing the armistice demarcation line as far south as possible. Around the middle of July, the Kumsong salient in central front was reduced by very powerful enemy attacks, the heaviest since April 1951. Then, immediately prior to the signing of the armistice, a series of heavy attacks fell on the American Marines and the Commonwealth Division gave them fire support.

Following a very quiet night, the truce was signed at Panmunjom at 1000 hours on 27 July 1953, and the armistice found the division in the long-held sector on the Jamestown Line with the 28th Brigade astriding Sami-chon (river) on the left, 29th British Brigade in the center and the Canadians on the right.

On the 28th the division troops, according to the armistice agreement, began to withdraw from the Demilitarized Zone to post-armistice positions, locations north and south of that portion of the Imjin River which had been held when the division was formed exactly two years before.

The Commonwealth force had to remain in the new area constructing such defensive works and accommodation as were considered necessary in the area and be prepared to

Old and new commanders of the 1st Commonwealth Division, Major Generals M.M. A-R-West and H. Murray, with 8th US Army Commander, General Taylor.
resume hostilities at short notice should the armistice agreement break down or violated.

As time passed, the continued build-up of the ROK Army to a point where it could, if necessary, wage a successful defensive war, enabled the UN Command to reduce its own strength. Accordingly by 1955 the Commonwealth Division had become in effect a brigade group, the 29th British Brigade’s headquarters becoming an integrated “divisional” headquarters. The Commonwealth force was gradually reduced from a brigade group to a battalion group (Commonwealth Contingent) and in 1957, by which time its complete dissolution was in sight, the Commonwealth contingent consisted of 1,628 British, 74 New Zealand, 69 Australian and 33 Canadian officers and men.

Reference Data

(1) The following is a list of major British infantry unit commanders.

Commanders, 1st Commonwealth Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>M.M. A-R-West</td>
<td>Sep 1952 – Oct 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>H. Murray</td>
<td>Oct 1953</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Commanders, 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>B.A. Coad</td>
<td>Aug 1950 – Mar 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>B.A. Burke</td>
<td>Mar 1951 – Apr 1951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commanders, 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>G. Taylor</td>
<td>Apr 1951 – Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>T.J. Daly</td>
<td>Jun 1952 – Mar 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commanders, 29th British Infantry Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>T. Brodie</td>
<td>Nov 1950 – Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>D.A. Kendrew</td>
<td>Dec 1952 – Nov 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>R.N.H.C. Bray</td>
<td>Nov 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>From</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (27th Brigade)</td>
<td>G.L. Neilson</td>
<td>Aug 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>K.O.N. Foster</td>
<td>Nov 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>M.C. Speer</td>
<td>Apr 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Gloucestershire Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>J.P. Carne</td>
<td>Nov 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Gloucestershire Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>D.B.A. Grist</td>
<td>Apr 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. King's Own Scottish Borderers (27th and 28th Brigades)</td>
<td>J.F.M. Macdonald</td>
<td>Apr 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. King's Own Scottish Borderers (27th and 28th Brigades)</td>
<td>D.H. Tadman</td>
<td>Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Kings Shropshire Light Infantry (28th Brigade)</td>
<td>V.W. Barlow</td>
<td>May 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Royal Norfolk Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>H.R. Oriebar</td>
<td>Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Leicestershire Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>G.E.P. Hutchins</td>
<td>Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Welch Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>H.H. Deane</td>
<td>Nov 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Black Watch (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>D.McN. C. Rose</td>
<td>Jun 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Royal Fusiliers (28th Brigade)</td>
<td>G.R. Stevens</td>
<td>Aug 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Durham Light Infantry (28th Brigade)</td>
<td>P.J. Jeffreys</td>
<td>Sep 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Kings Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>A.J. Snodgrass</td>
<td>Sep 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Royal Scots (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>M.B. Melvill</td>
<td>Jul 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Essex Regiment (28th Brigade)</td>
<td>P.S.C. Smith</td>
<td>Aug 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The Royal Warwickshire Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>R.C. Macdonald</td>
<td>Sep 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn. The King's Own Royal Regiment (29th Brigade)</td>
<td>W.P. Scott</td>
<td>Oct 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The following is a list of all honours and awards received by the members of the British Army for service in the Korean War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Cross</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Cross</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight Commander of the British Empire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the most Excellent order of the British Empire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer of the most Excellent order of the British Empire</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the most Excellent order of the British Empire</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Empire medal</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order (3rd Bar)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order (2nd Bar)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order (1st Bar)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Cross (1st Bar)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Cross</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Medal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Conduct Medal</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Medal</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentioned in Dispatches</td>
<td>571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Decorations</td>
<td>77</td>
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</table>

(3) Battle casualties, British Army units (24 August 1950 – 27 July 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Killed in Action</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Other Ranks</td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures do not include the casualties suffered by the 41st Independent Commando, British Marines.

3. The British Naval Force

The Korean War began on 25 June 1951. On 29 June, following the vote of
the U.N. Security Council for military assistance to the Republic of Korea, the British Admiralty placed the Royal Navy units in Japanese waters at the disposition of the Commander, US Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE).

Twenty-two ships of the Royal British Navy were at the time in far eastern waters several of them cruising in the Japanese area. Under the Admiralty direction Rear Admiral W.G. Andrews, Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, concentrated his available force so quickly that on 30 June five days after the war began the light fleet aircraft carrier Triumph, the cruisers Belfast and Jamaica, the destroyers Cossack and Consort, the frigates Black Swan, Alacrity, and Hart, and auxiliaries of the fleet had started to operate with the United States Navy off the coasts of Korea, and at that time British naval forces on the spot were numerically about as strong as those of the US Navy. Thus, from the outset the British Navy ships in the Far East played a most active and prominent part in establishing that complete naval supremacy so essential to the conduct of operations on land.

During the war the British naval contribution consistently comprised aircraft carriers with operational aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and a supporting fleet train. These forces were mainly responsible for the control of sea communications on the west coast of Korea and seaborne air and gun support on the left flank of the UN ground forces. Ships of the British Navy from time to time also operated off the east coast of Korea. They worked frequently with the ships of the navies of other United Nations, and for the most part with the support of ships of Commonwealth navies. Tactical cooperation when mixed national forces were employed was excellent and effective throughout.

**Operations of British Aircraft Carriers**

It is felt that the surface operations in the both coasts by the British ships were covered in detail in the Volume II of this series while air power contributions of the British carriers were much ignored. So, the following accounts of carrier operations are added in an effort to complement the ignored portion.

The spearhead of the Commonwealth naval forces in Korean waters was the striking power of the air squadrons in aircraft carriers. Five carriers operated in the war zone, their tours of duty lasting approximately six months. They were HMS Triumph, Theseus, Glory, and Ocean, and the Australian carrier Sydney. HMS Glory did three tours of duty, HMS Ocean two, and the other ship one tour each. Fourteen British and two Australian squadrons operated in these
ships, embracing approximately 480 aircrews. These squadrons flew something in the region of 25,000 operational sorties for the comparatively low casualty record of 22 aircrew killed in action, mostly shot down by anti-aircraft fire, and 14 killed in accidents.

HMS Triumph: Triumph was the first aircraft carrier to engage in war operations and she flew 437 operational sorties between 2nd July and 1st August 1950, her aircraft being airborne for 613 hours. Owing to the type of her aircraft -- Seafires and Fireflies -- most of her duties were providing carrier air patrols and anti-submarine patrols an unexciting but important job. She lost two Seafires during operations. Lieutenant P. Cane, R.H., was recommended for the American Air Medal for rescuing an American pilot in a Sea Otter amphibian air-sea rescue aircraft in very unpleasant conditions. During the commission, which included this tour of duty off Korea, HMS Triumph’s aircraft flew 7,837 hours, in which they made 3,933 deck landings and fired 3,400 rockets and 170,000 rounds of 20 mm. cannon shell.

HMS Theseus: Probably more typical of the service rendered by aircraft carriers during the Korean War is that of HMS Theseus, who relieved HMS Triumph in 1950. When the Admiralty announced that the Theseus was to go to the Far East, the Korean War had not started, and most of those on board looked forward to a pleasant winter away from England, with possible visits to Australia, New Zealand, and Hongkong, but the outlook changed when the NK Communists invaded the Republic of Korea. On board the Theseus, a note of urgency crept into preparations for the far eastern tour of duty. The ship left Portsmouth on 14th August of that year and, after embarking aircraft and receiving the then Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet (Admiral Sir Philip Vian) on board, intensive flying practices became the order of the day, and the general atmosphere of the
ship was one of hustle. A non-stop run was made to Malta, and from the George
Cross island further exercises were carried out before passing through the Suez
Canal into the Red Sea and onwards to the Far East.

Members of the ship's company went on leave at Hongkong, but the atmosphere
was not as peaceful as they had anticipated. During a week's stay in this great
port the carrier air group was busy rehearsing the technique of operating with
the Army, and HMS Triumph arrived on 29 September to 'turn over.' The Theseus
left three days later and sailed into a typhoon, which was a new experience for
almost all the ship's company and tested the excellent sea-keeping qualities of
the ship. While passing through the Formosa Straits she went to action stations
as an aircraft circled the ship, but the machine passed over and soon disappeared
in a low cloud. By 8 October she was operating off the west coast of Korea,
and almost immediately had her first taste of war when one of her pilots,
Lieutenant S. Leonard, R.N., was shot down over enemy territory. An American
helicopter was called up and made a gallant rescue. Within a day or two,
Lieutenant Leonard, who was wounded, was in hospital in Tokyo.

There followed a period of intensive operations with only two brief intervals
for oiling at anchor at Inchon, which had by then been occupied by the UN forces.
Allied troops were advancing north, and it appeared that the war might be drawing
to an end, a hope later shattered by the Red Chinese invasion. Extremes of
weather were endured by the ship's company. Training on the outward passage
was carried out in very hot and humid conditions, but in the Western Sea a bitterly
cold winter with snow and ice had to be contended with. Mist and fog provided
additional hazards during operational periods, but the work of the air group was
of such high quality that the Boyd Trophy for 1950 was awarded to them for
their excellent performance, which included 1,000 accident-free deck landings.
Fifty sorties a day was the minimum number planned during each operational
period, and this was achieved unless the weather interfered.

Here are some statistics for the period from 18 August 1950 to 15 April 1951,
when the Theseus concluded her operations in the Korean War:

- Number of deck landings ........................................ 4,594
- Number of Catapult launchings ................................ 3,593
- Number of hours flown ........................................... 10,189
- Number of flying days ............................................ 114
- Average number of hours per pilot ............................ 268

During operations the ship steamed 36,401 miles, and her aircraft flew 3,446
sorties. During 86 flying days, the area covered by her reconnaissance aircraft
was equivalent to 23,492,730 square miles. Ammunition expended included
523,220 rounds of 14 mm. shell, 6,617 rockets, 1,390 500-lb. bombs, 84 1,000-lb. bombs, and 76 depth charges. Targets attacked included rolling stock, railway bridges, store dumps, warehouses, tunnels, gun positions, tanks, factories, power stations, etc. Four pilots were injured during the operations and six aircrew force-landed or crashed into the sea. Four of these were picked by helicopters and two by a destroyer.

**HMS Glory:** After the *Theseus*, HMS *Glory* took on the carrier duties off Korea. She went to the Far East from the Mediterranean and did the three tours of duty, her first beginning in April 1951, and her last ending in May 1953. On returning to Portsmouth after her final tour she had steamed well over 160,000 miles since leaving home waters, and during this overseas service her aircraft made more than 12,500 flights.

In March 1952, her air squadrons flew 105 sorties in one day. This was later surpassed by the squadrons of HMS *Ocean*, which set up the record of 123 sorties against enemy positions in one day, but when the *Glory* returned for her final tour of duty she equalled the *Ocean*’s record. In her three tours of duty she flew 9,500 sorties in Korean waters.

**HMS Ocean:** The *Ocean*’s performance was outstanding. In her two tours of duty she flew 7,964 sorties, nearly 6,000 of these on her first tour when she set up the record. The following gives some idea of the high rate and widespread nature of her operations during that tour:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sorties for the tour</td>
<td>5,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average daily rate (throughout tour)</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest daily total</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest number of sorties per patrol (nine flying days)</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total flying days</td>
<td>79</td>
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</table>
Ammunition Expended

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000-Lb. bombs</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-Lb. bombs</td>
<td>3,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket projectiles</td>
<td>16,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-mm. (rounds)</td>
<td>approx. 1.5 million</td>
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Damage Inflicted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridges, road</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge, rail</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail wagons</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor transport</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox carts</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water craft</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun positions</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical installations</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy killed in action (pilots' observation)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>1 MIG-15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For one period during the Korean War the British carriers were relieved by HMAS light fleet carrier *Sydney* which had a fine record of operations in spite of the fact that, for part of the time she was in Korean waters, she experienced Arctic weather, snowstorms, high winds, and temperatures far below freezing.

The 41st Marine Independent Commando

This is a convenient place to briefly mention the actions of a small body of British Marines in connection with the British naval operations. This peculiar combat unit, composed of a reinforced company in strength, was formed in August 1950 at its parent unit -- the 41st Marine Independent Commando -- and sent out to Japan early in the war.

The British Marines of 14 officers and 211 men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, were specially trained for raids on enemy communications behind the front line. Suitable targets were few, but they carried out a number of raids, operating from ships of the United Nations under the control
of ComNavFE. When the Inchon landing took place they carried out a
diversionary landing at Kunsan from the British frigate Whitesand Bay alongside
American special troops.

One of their toughest fights, for instance, took place when they fought their
way from Hamhung up the tortuous mountain road to join the US Marine division
at Hagaru-ri. The Commando fought its way with American troops through the
mountainous passes and at one time had Chinese Communists firing into the
vehicles from the ditches six yards away at the side of the road. It was here that
the Commando was split, their rear party being cut off when a phosphorus bomb
set fire to an ammunition truck, making it impossible for the following vehicles
to continue up the road. The ones ahead kept going until they joined the 7th
US Marines at Hagaru-ri at 2300 hour. The Commandos were mustered and
there were no more than 63 present. That night 55 more fought their way
through.

Reference Data

(1) Personnel and Awards

The total number of Royal British Navy, Marines and Fleet Auxiliary
personnel who served in Korea is not known precisely, but approximately 17,000
officers and men served afloat in Korean waters and a further 4,300 served in
Japan or ashore in Korea. The number at sea at any given time varied appreciably,
but up to August 1951 there were approximately 5,500 men aboard HM ships
on station, falling to 3,600 men until the end of that year, after which it rose
again to about 4,800 for the remainder of the war. During the war three British
admirals commanded the ships of the Commonwealth navies:

Rear Admiral A.K. Scott-Moncrieff 10 Apr 1951 – 23 Sep 1952
Rear Admiral E.G.A. Clifford 23 Sep 1952 – Jul 1953

A total of 165 of the British naval personnel received decorations for dis-
tinguished services against the enemy, and a further 289 were mentioned in
dispatches.

United States decorations:

4 Silver Stars (all to British Marine officers, including two awarded to one
officer)

30 Legion of Merit (29 RN officers, 1 RM officer)
17 Bronze Stars (7 RN officers, 3 RM officers, 7 RM other ranks)
1 Air Medal (RN officer)

(2) The Strength of British Ships

The strength of the Royal British Navy's Far East Fleet was maintained at the July 1953 level for the several months after the Armistice. One carrier, one cruiser and between six and eight escorts were maintained within easy reach of Korean waters until November 1953, when Rear Admiral Clifford (FO 2nd in Command, FE Fleet) hauled down his flag at Hongkong.

During the Korean War a total of 76 warships of Commonwealth navies and of the Royal British Fleet Auxiliary Service served off Korea for varying periods, these comprising 34 ships of the Royal Navy (including four aircraft carriers and six cruisers), 18 ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Service, one hospital ship, nine ships of the Australian Navy (including one aircraft carrier), eight destroyers of the Canadian Navy, and six frigates of the New Zealand Navy. The HM ships that served in Korean waters were:

Triumph, Ocean, Theseus, and Glory, light fleet aircraft carriers; Unicorn, replenishment aircraft carrier; Belfast, Jamaica, Ceylon, Kenya, Newcastle, and Birmingham, cruisers; Cossack, Consort, Comus, Concord, Constance, Cockade, Charity, destroyers; Mounts Bay, Morecambe Bay, Whitesand Bay, Cardigan Bay, St. Brides Bay, Alarcrity, Alert, Modeste, Black Swan, Hart, Opossum, Sparrow, Crane, Amethyst, frigates; Tyne, depot ship; Maine, hospital ship; Ladybird, headquarters ship.

(3) Fuel Consumption and Steaming Milage, British Naval Ships:

Fuel ........ 663,150 tons       Steamed ........ 3,100,550 miles

(4) Ammunition Expenditures:

6-inch shell ......................... 23,000 by ships' bombardments
4.7 or 4-inch shell ................... 148,000
bomb (various weights) .............. 15,200
3-inch rocket shell ................... 57,600 by aircraft
20 mm. aircraft gun shell ............ 3,300,000

In order to maintain ammunition and other supplies of the fleet, ships of Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service steamed more than 300,000 miles.
(5) Casualties of British Navy and Marines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.O.W.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ratings and other Ranks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Captivity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.O.W.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large number of these casualties were suffered by the 41st Independent Commando, British Marines, during the withdrawal from the Hungnam area of northeastern Korea following the United Nations withdrawal after the CCF aggression in November 1950. Air operations in carrier-borne aircraft constituted another important hazard, and in attacks on enemy troop concentrations and targets of varying sizes and importance 22 pilots of the Fleet Air Arm were killed.
THE UNITED STATES FORCES
THE UNITED STATES FORCES

1. Introduction

War account of the United States Forces that contributed to the defense effort of the Republic of Korea is very highly distinctive in the world military annals, in particular in the Korean War of 1950–1953. Following the North Korean Communist invasion of the fledged Republic on 25 June 1950, U.S. President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to give the ROK Armed Forces cover and support and, within a few days, he further committed American ground forces into Korea to help repel the Communist aggression. Since then onward, taking the leading part in the UNC operations, the U.S. Forces' history in Korea is written with the blood of many brave soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines until the shooting war came to an end on 27 July 1953.

In 37 months of the fighting, the United States sent 5,764,143 men into combat and 54,246 American servicemen were died (33,629 KIA and 20,617 died of non-combat causes), while 103,284 were wounded and 5,178 missing or captured in action. In addition, the war cost the United States an estimated 20 billion Dollars.

During the war, the Eighth US Army, which was synonymous with the American ground force committed to this beleaguered country by the Communist armed aggression, began the fighting as a 500-man strong task force, and ultimately expanded to three corps, composed of six Army and one Marine divisions. The Eighth Army units were often outnumbered but never outfought. They fought valiantly from the Naktong River front, better known to UNC troops as “Pusan Perimeter,” to the Yalu River, including the battles of Old Baldy, Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges, Porkchop Hill, Iron Triangle and the Punchbowl. Thus, the US Army forces, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the ROK soldiers as well as forces from other UN member countries, stemmed the tide of aggression. They suffered 27,704 battle deaths and earned 78 Medals of Honor in Korea.

American naval forces had also played a great role in repelling the Communist aggressors. Enjoying with the complete command of sea from the beginning, the
U.S. Navy units have established an enviable record of success in carrying out their assigned missions. U.S. battleships had completely blocked the both coasts, Eastern and Eastern Seas, throughout the war period and kept the enemy activities silent by constant shelling coastal targets. Their supporting efforts for ground operations were also remarkable. In addition to the surface operations and sea transport service, the American naval air forces also distinguished themselves in striking and bombing on strategic targets far back behind the enemy lines. Carrier-based aircraft flew 275,912 combat sorties (including Marine aircraft), inflicting 86,265 troop killed upon the enemy. The US Navy sacrificed 4,501 lives (including 4,043 non-battle deaths), plus 1,576 wounded in action.

An immeasurable share of credit for smashing up the Communist aggressors must go also to the indomitable American Marines, both ground and aviation, who fought at Chindong-ri, Inchon, Changjin Reservoir, the Punchbowl and Bunker Hill (Hill 122). During the period of the war, an estimated 424,000 Marines served in total, both ground and air, and their casualties numbered 30,544 of which 4,262 were killed in battle, an additional 244 were listed as non-battle deaths, and 26,038 were wounded. Of this toll, 258 air Marines had been killed (including 65 MIA and presumed dead) and 174 wounded. A total of 436 Marine aircraft were also lost in combat or operational accidents. For their outstanding valor, 42 Marines were awarded the Medal of Honor, 26 of them posthumously.

On the other hand, American Air Force operations were also proud records of courage and achievements. Playing havoc with enemy forces, U.S. Air Force had denied the enemy freedom of movement during daylight hours and forced movement by night. Maintaining the air supremacy throughout the war period, it ruined all strategic targets in the enemy-held territory south of the Yalu River. However, the prohibition against bombing the Manchurian sanctuary imposed enormous haddicaps to effective bombing, due to the fact that the enemy concentrated his anti-aircraft weapons to cover east-west bombing approaches. Notwithstanding, the American Air Force recounted when the shooting war came to an armistice that it flew 716,589 sorties, killed 145,416 enemy, destroyed 74,589 enemy vehicles and 9,417 railroads. The price was also high. It sustained 1,200 battle deaths.

As for the Fifth US Air Force, in over 625,000 combat sorties flown before the truce, 27 July 1953, its pilots and crews destroyed nearly 1,000 enemy aircraft - 808 of them MIGs - and damaged another 925. In close support and interdiction missions some 82,750 vehicles and 11,000 rail cars and locomotives were put out of action. Tactical airpower also accounted for about 47 per
cent of all enemy troop casualties.

After the armistice, the United States has posted many hundreds of thousands more servicemen under the United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea. Facing with the most belligerent NK puppet clique to the north even among the Communist world, the uneasy armistice in Korea has endured largely because the UN Command, under the leadership of the U.S. Forces, has stood on guard to prevent any renewal of Communist aggression.

Today, the Eighth Army, which is the bulwark of the United Nations Command in Korea, stands ready to meet external aggression against the "Frontier of Freedom" – the Republic of Korea. Under the Eighth Army, 1 Corps (ROK-US) Group, consisting of a combined force of ROK and US soldiers, including the 2nd US Infantry Division, now continues to carry out a vital role in deterring recurrence of Communist invasion.

Moreover, 314th US Air Division, a major component of U.S. Forces in Korea today, is sharing the air defense responsibility with the ROK Air Force.

Furthermore, the Republic of Korea has received 4.9 billion Dollars in American economic aid and 6.7 billion Dollars in military assistance over the last quarter century.

In short, U.S. Forces persevered through three years of bitter fighting and at last accomplished their mission: They helped the ROK Armed Forces repel the NK Communist invaders and fought the Chinese Communist aggressors to a standstill, thus preserving the integrity of the Republic of Korea, and made possible not only the rebuilding of the economy and institutions of this war ravaged nation but also the gigantic growth of the national strength, in economy and military as well in particular.

Some key data and reference statistics relating with the U.S. Forces' contribution by branch of service are annexed in the following pages. Further, major U.S. units which participated in the Korean War are:

**Army:**
- Army Forces, Far East; Eighth Army; I, IX and X Corps; 1st Cavalry Division; and 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th, 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions.

**Navy:**
- Naval Forces, Far East; Seventh Fleet; and Task Forces 77, 90 and 95.

**Air Force:**
- Far East Air Forces (FEAF); Fifth, Thirteenth and Twentieth Air Forces; FEAF Bomber Command; FEAF Logistical Forces; and 314th and 315th Air Divisions.

**Marine Corps:**
- 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing.
COMMANDERS IN CHIEF, FAR EAST (CINCFE)

Gen. of the Army  
(Gen. MacArthur was named to have a unified command in Korea on 7 July 1950, and the UN Command was formally established on 24 July 1950)

General  
Matthew B. Ridgway  
11 Apr 1951 – 12 May 1952  
(Promoted to Gen. 11 May 1951)

General  
Mark W. Clark  
12 May 1952 – 7 Oct 1953

POST-WAR CINCFE

General  
John E. Hull  
7 Oct 1953 – 7 Apr 1955

General  
Maxwell D. Taylor  
1 Apr 1955 – 5 Jun 1955

General  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
5 Jun 1955 – 1 Jul 1957

Note:

1. Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Command had two other posts; Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan.

2. GHQ, Far East Command was disorganized on 1 July 1957 as its missions and functions were transferred to the Pacific Command (CINCPAC). The United Nations Command was moved to Seoul, Korea from Tokyo, Japan the same date. (See a list of CINCUNC in PART ONE for further reference.)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS AND CASUALTIES

U.S. FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR

(25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Service</th>
<th>Number Serving</th>
<th>Battle Deaths</th>
<th>Other Deaths</th>
<th>Wounded Not Mortal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>2,834,000</td>
<td>27,704</td>
<td>9,429</td>
<td>77,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,177,000</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>4,043</td>
<td>1,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,285,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>5,884</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>424,000</td>
<td>4,267</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>23,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,720,000</td>
<td>33,629</td>
<td>20,617</td>
<td>103,284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:

1. Tentative final data based upon information available as of 30 Sept. 1954, at which time 24 persons were still carries as missing in action.

2. Casualty data are confined to dead and wounded personnel and therefore exclude personnel captured or missing in action who were subsequently returned to military control.
**GRAND TOTAL OF U.S. DEATHS OF THE KOREAN WAR**

(25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>MC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Battle Deaths</td>
<td>33,629</td>
<td>27,704</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Non-Battle Deaths</td>
<td>20,617</td>
<td>9,429</td>
<td>4,043</td>
<td>5,884</td>
<td>1,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths</td>
<td>54,246</td>
<td>37,133</td>
<td>4,501</td>
<td>7,084</td>
<td>5,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BATTLE CASUALTIES OF U.S. FORCES**

(25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953)

The following statistical figures reflect findings of presumptive death and other determinations, changes in status, and revisions processed through 30 September 1954, according to Press Release No. 1088-54, dated 5 November 1954, by Department of Defense of the United States of America.

(1) Total Battle Casualties of All U.S. Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Case</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>142,091</td>
<td>109,958</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>28,205</td>
<td>1,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Deaths</td>
<td>33,629</td>
<td>27,704</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>19,334</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action and</td>
<td>7,828</td>
<td>6,440</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presumed Dead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>103,284</td>
<td>77,596</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>23,744</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>5,178</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Military</td>
<td>5,133</td>
<td>4,637</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Missing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*1. According to the above source, medical records indicate that of the wounds, 85 percent have been returned to duty.

*2. These figures show returnees from previously reported captured or missing status.
*3. Excludes 21 Captured Army personnel who refused repatriation.

*4. This indicates 21 captured U.S. Army personnel refused to repatriate when the exchanges of prisoners of war took place after the armistice agreement was signed.

(2) Breakdown of Total Battle Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>MC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Total Battle Casualties</td>
<td>142,091</td>
<td>109,958</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>28,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2+4b+5b+5c+6b+6c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Total Deaths</td>
<td>33,629</td>
<td>27,704</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3+4a+5a+6a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Killed in Action</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>19,334</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>3,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Wounded in Action</td>
<td>105,785</td>
<td>79,526</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>24,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Died</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Other</td>
<td>103,284</td>
<td>77,596</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>23,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Missing in Action</td>
<td>5,866</td>
<td>4,442</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Died</td>
<td>5,127</td>
<td>3,778</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Returned</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Current Missing *1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Captured or Interned</td>
<td>7,140</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Died</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Returned</td>
<td>4,418</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Refused Repatriation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Of the 24 personnel reported missing as of 30 September 1954, only 15, all Air Force fliers, are definitely known to be alive. The Chinese Communists admit they are holding them as "political prisoners" who were allegedly captured in Manchuria outside of the war zone. The Army and Marine Corps no longer list any personnel as "missing.

The report as of 30 September 1954, excludes casualties since 27 July 1953, but includes changes in classification occurring through 30 September 1954, such as "Died of Wounds" and findings of presumptive dead.

MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS IN KOREA

The Medal of Honor stands at the top of the "Pyramid of Honor to be awarded to members of the
U.S. Armed Forces. By an act of Congress, the Medal is awarded "in the name of Congress," and this is why it is often called "the Congressional Medal of Honor."

In Korea once again U.S. military personnel proved that the individual fighting man is still the most important element of success in battle, and 131 members of the U.S. Armed Forces (Army 78, Navy 7, Marine Corps 42, and Air Force 4) were awarded the Medals of Honor for their heroic exploits—conspicuous gallantry, the intrepidity, and the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty.

Of these 131 men only 39 lived to receive their awards. Several officers and men were promoted in addition to being awarded the Medal of Honor. Listed below, by branch of military service, are the men who awarded the Medal of Honor in the Korean War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Division/Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sgt. 1/C</td>
<td>Adams, Stanley T.</td>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>(24th Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt.</td>
<td>Barker, Charles H.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(7th Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfc.</td>
<td>Bennett, Emory L.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(3rd Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Bleak, David B.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(40th Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt. 1/C</td>
<td>Brittin, Nelson V.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(24th Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfc.</td>
<td>Brown, Melvin L.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(1st Cav Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Burke, Lloyd L.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(1st Cav Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt. 1/C</td>
<td>Burris, Tony K.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(2nd Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Charlton, Cornelius H.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(25th Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Collier, Gilbert G.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(40th Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Collier, John W.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(25th Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Coursen, Samuel S.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(1st Cav Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Craig, Gordon M.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(1st Cav Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Crump, Jerry K.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(3rd Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Dean, William F.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>(24th Div)</td>
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<tr>
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2. U.S. Army in Korea

SENIOR US ARMY COMMANDERS

Commanding Generals, Eighth US Army, Korea (EUSAK)
Date of Entry into Korea: 13 July 1950

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker 13 Jul 50 - 23 Dec 50
(EUSAK was established on 13 July 1950)

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn 23 Dec 50 - 26 Dec 50
(Gen. Milburn, then CG, I US Corps, was acting CG, EUSAK,
following General Walker’s killed in accident on 23 Dec.)

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway 26 Dec 50 - 14 Apr 51

Gen. James A. Van Fleet 14 Apr 51 - 10 Feb 53
(Promoted to Gen. 1 Aug 1951)

(Promoted to Gen. 23 June 1953)

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer 1 Apr 55 - 25 Jul 55

Gen. Isaac D. White 26 Jul 55 - 30 Jun 57

Gen. George H. Decker 1 Jul 57 - 30 Jun 59

Gen. Carter B. Magruder 1 Jul 59 - 30 Jun 61

Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Jr. 1 Jul 61 - 31 Jul 63

Gen. Hamilton H. Howze 1 Aug 63 - 30 Jun 65
Wartime Deputy Commanders, Eighth US Army in Korea

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<th>Rank</th>
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<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>William K. Harrison</td>
<td>3 Jan 52 – 17 Jun 52</td>
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Commanding Generals, I US Corps in Korea

Date of Entry into Korea: 12 September 1950

I US Corps was reactivated on 2 August 1950 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and advance elements of the headquarters took their place in the Pusan Perimeter on 27 August.

The Corps was reconfigured into a combined ROK–US Corps group on 1 July 1971 and continues its heritage still remaining in Korea today to serve the cause of free men by standing on guard against aggression.

In fact, it maintains the utmost readiness and vigilance to deter Communist aggression, with a firm determination, that if aggression is ever renewed by the NK Communists, the Corps forces will defeat the aggression right at the DMZ.
(Promoted to Lt. Gen. 11 Feb 1951)

Lt. Gen. Frank W. Milburn 11 Sep 50 – 23 Dec 50
(I Corps became operational in Korea on 12 Sep 1950)

Maj. Gen. William B. Kean (Acting) 23 Dec 50 – 26 Dec 50
(Acting for Gen. Milburn while the latter was acting CG, EUSA, following Gen. Walker’s death)

Lt. Gen. Frank W. Milburn 26 Dec 50 – 18 Jul 51
(Promoted to Lt. Gen. 8 Feb 1951)


Lt. Gen. Paul W. Kendall 29 Jun 52 – 10 Apr 53
(Promoted to Lt. Gen. 16 Sep 1952)


Commanding Generals, IX US Corps

Date of Entry: 12 September 1950

Maj. Gen Frank W. Milburn 10 Aug 50 – 11 Sep 50


(By 23 Sep 1950 IX US Corps was operational in Korea)

(Gen. Moore died following a helicopter accident on 23 Feb 1951)

(Gen. Smith, then CG, 1st Marine Division, took temporary command of IX Corps after General Moor’s death)

Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge 5 Mar 51 – 23 Dec 51
(Promoted to Lt. Gen. 3 June 1951)


(Gen. Cleland was in command of the 40th US Division)
Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins
(Promoted to Lt. Gen. 8 Nov. 1952)
Maj. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey
Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder
Maj. Gen. Samuel T. Williams

9 Aug 52 — 9 Aug 53
10 Aug 53 — 12 Aug 53
13 Jan 54 — 12 Apr 54
12 Apr 54 — 13 Aug 54

Commanding Generals, X US Corps
Date of Entry: 15 Sep 1950

X US Corps began to participate in the Korean War on 15 September 1950 when it launched the landing operation at Inchon. The Corps was initially operated under the direct control of the UN Command until 27 December 1950 when it was passed to operational control of Eighth Army.

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond
(Promoted to Lt. Gen. 12 Feb 1951)
Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers
Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer
(Promoted to Lt. Gen. 10 June 1952)
Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift (Acting)
(Gen. Swift was then commanding the 25th US Division)
(Gen. Ruffner was then in command of the 45th US Division)
MAJOR UN C UNITS ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED TO EIGHTH US ARMY IN KOREA

(1) Assigned Units

I US Corps ............... 11 Aug 1950 – **
IX US Corps .............. 23 Sep 1950 – **
X US Corps ............... 26 Dec 1950 – **
2nd US Log Comd ......... # 19 Sep 1950 – 16 Oct 1952 (Transferred to KCOME)
1st US Cav Div ............ * – 22 Dec 1951 (Trfd to FEC)
7th US Inf Div ............ * – 30 Aug 1950 (Asgd X US Corps)
24th US Inf Div ........... * – 7 Feb 1952 (Trfd to FEC)
   (-Arty Bn & AAA Btry) 13 Jul 1952 —
187th US Abn RCT ......... 13 Jul 1952 - 16 Oct 1952 (Trfd to Fec)
1st US Marine Div ......... 19 Dec 1950 — **
2nd US Inf Div ............. * — **
3rd US Inf Div ............. 26 Dec 1950 — **
5th Inf RCT ............. 1 Aug 1950 — **
7th US Inf Div ............. 26 Dec 1950 — **
25th US Inf Div ............. * — **
40th US Inf Div ............. 22 Jan 1952 — **
45th US Inf Div ............. 17 Dec 1951 — **
187th US Abn RCT ......... 23 Jun 1953 — **

* Indicates unit was already assigned to Eighth US Army on 13 Jul 1950.
** Indicates unit remained assigned to Eighth US Army on 27 Jul 1953.
# Indicates unit was activated and or organized this date.
### Indicates unit was inactivated, discontinued, or disorganized this date.

(2) Attached Units

(a) U.S. Infantry Units

65th US Inf RCT ......... 22 Sep 1950 - 5 Nov 1950
34th US Inf RCT ......... 19 Jul 1950 — **

(b) ROK Forces

I ROK Corps (Opnl Control) ......... 17 Jul 1950 — **
II ROK Corps (Opnl Control) ......... 17 Jul 1950 - 10 Jan 1951 ##
   #5 Apr 1952 — **
III ROK Corps (Opnl Control) ......... 2 Oct 1950 - 26 May 1951 ##
   #1 May 1953 — **
Capital ROK Div (Opnl Control) ......... 17 Jul 1950 — **
1st ROK MC Regt (Opnl Control) .. 11 Dec 1950 — **
1st ROK Div (Opnl Control) ......... 17 Jul 1950 — **
2nd " " ......... 17 Jul 1950 — **
3rd " " ......... 17 Jul 1950 — **
5th " " ......... 17 Jul 1950 — **
6th " " ......... 17 Jul 1950 — **
7th " " ........ 17 Jul 1950 – **
8th " " ........ 17 Jul 1950 – **
9th " " ........ 18 Dec 1950 – **
11th " " ........ 23 Nov 1950 – **
12th " " ........ 5 Dec 1952 – **
15th " " ........ 12 Jan 1952 – **
20th " " ........ #9 Feb 1953 – **
22nd " " ........ 14 Jul 1953 – **

(c) Other UNC Contingents

1st British Commonwealth Div .... 28 Jul 1951 – **
27th Brit Inf Brig ............... 29 Aug 1950 – 25 Apr 1951
29th " ......................... 3 Nov 1950 – **
(Asgd 1st Brit COMWEL Div on 28 Jul 1951)
28th Brit COMWEL Brig ........... 25 Apr 1951 – **
(Asgd 1st COMWEL Div on 28 Jul 1951)
25th Cadian Inf Brig ............. 5 May 1951 – **
(Asgd 1st COMWEL Div on 28 Jul 1951)
Belgian Inf Bn .................. 21 Jan 1591 – **
Colombian Inf Bn ............... 15 Jun 1951 – **
Ethiopian Inf Bn ................ 6 May 1951 – **
French Inf Bn .................. 29 Nov 1950 – **
Greek Inf Bn ................... 9 Dec 1950 – **
60th Indian Amb & Surg Unit ...... 20 Nov 1950 – **
Italian Red Cross Hosp 68 ....... 16 Nov 1951 – 13 Aug 1952 (KCOME)
Netherlands Bn .......... 24 Nov 1950 – **
Norwegian MASH ............ 22 Jun 1951 – **
Philippine Bn ............. 19 Sep 1950 – **
Swedish Field Hosp ...... 28 Sep 1950 – 13 Aug 1952 (to KCOMZ)
Thailand Bn ............. 7 Nov 1950 – **
Turkish Inf Brig .......... 17 Oct 1950 – **

** Indicates unit remained attached to Eighth US Army on 27 Jul 1953.
# Indicates unit activated and or organized this date.
### Indicates unit was inactivated, discontinued or disorganized this date.

(3) Detached Units From Eighth US Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Detached To</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th US Inf Div</td>
<td>X US Corps</td>
<td>30 Aug 50–26 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
224th US Inf Regt  KCOME  21 Aug 52—23 Sep 52
2nd US Log Command  KCOME  21 Aug 52—16 Oct 52
3rd US Log Command  KCOME  21 Aug 52—16 Oct 52
7th US Trans Major Port  KCOME  21 Aug 52—16 Oct 52
35th US Inf Regt  KCOME  14 Sep 52—20 Nov 52
17th US Inf Regt  KCOME  9 Nov 52—17 Jan 53
23rd US Inf Regt  KCOME  6 Jan 53—25 Mar 53
279th US Inf Regt  KCOME  17 Mar 53—3 Jun 53
160th US Inf Regt  KCOME  27 May 53—20 Jul 53
44th US AAA Brig (Prov)  Fifth US AF (Opnl Control)  15 Jun 53—**

** Indicates unit was still detached on 27 July 1953.

**ROK PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATIONS**

Awarded to Eighth US Army and Its Corps in Korea

**Eighth US Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co; Special Troops; Band; and Honor Guard</td>
<td>22 Apr 51—1 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co; Special Troops; and Band</td>
<td>2 Jul 52—7 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, Eighth Army only</td>
<td>4 Jul 50—2 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Army Ranger Company, attached 8213th AU</td>
<td>19 Sep 50—31 Jul 52</td>
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</table>

**I US Corps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co; and Corps Artillery</td>
<td>12 Sep 1950—14 Jul 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Btry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps Artillery Hq &amp; Hq Btry</td>
<td>19 Sep 1950—31 Jul 1952</td>
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**IX US Corps**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co; and Military Intelligence Service Dept.</td>
<td>23 Sep 1950—2 Nov 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co; and Corps Artillery</td>
<td>15 Feb 1952—27 Jul 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Battery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Artillery Hq &amp; Hq Btry</td>
<td>19 Sep 1950—31 Jul 1952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
US ARMY CASUALTIES

(1) Breakdown of Battle and Non-Battle Casualties
(25 June 1950 — 27 July 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle Casualties</th>
<th>109,958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Battle Deaths</td>
<td>27,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Killed in Action)</td>
<td>(19,334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Died of Wounds)</td>
<td>(1,930)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Died of Missing in Action)</td>
<td>(3,778)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Died during Captured or Interned)</td>
<td>(2,662)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded in Action Not Mortal</td>
<td>77,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Returned from Missing in Action</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Currenly Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Repatriated from POW Status</td>
<td>3,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Refused Repatriation</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Battle Casualties</th>
<th>347,804</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Non-Combat Deaths</td>
<td>9,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Non-Combat Injuries &amp; Others</td>
<td>365,375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Casualties 484,762

(2) Battle Casualties by Category, Branch and Unit
25 June 1950 — 27 July 1953
(As of 30 September 1954)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category, Branch and Unit</th>
<th>Total Battle Casualties</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>Total KIA</th>
<th>Total WIA</th>
<th>Total MIA</th>
<th>Captured or Interned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109,958</td>
<td>27,704</td>
<td>19,334</td>
<td>79,526</td>
<td>4,442</td>
<td>6,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Forces Total</td>
<td>109,574</td>
<td>27,598</td>
<td>19,275</td>
<td>79,275</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>6,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Combat-Total (a) *</td>
<td>108,934</td>
<td>27,444</td>
<td>19,162</td>
<td>78,802</td>
<td>4,391</td>
<td>6,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional-Total (b)</td>
<td>98,255</td>
<td>24,963</td>
<td>17,278</td>
<td>70,845</td>
<td>4,056</td>
<td>6,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav Div</td>
<td>16,498</td>
<td>3,811</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>12,378</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Inf Div</td>
<td>25,093</td>
<td>7,094</td>
<td>4,367</td>
<td>16,575</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>2,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Inf Div</td>
<td>10,078</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>7,939</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf Div</td>
<td>15,126</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>2,521</td>
<td>11,164</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Inf Div</td>
<td>11,889</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td>7,576</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>1,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>13,685</td>
<td>3,048</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>10,451</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Inf Div</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Inf Div</td>
<td>4,038</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Divisional-Total (c)</td>
<td>10,679</td>
<td>2,481</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>7,957</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>6,337</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>4,971</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>192</td>
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<tr>
<td>187th Abn RCT</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Inf RCT</td>
<td>4,222</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>3,266</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (a): Shows a total of (b) Plus (c).

(3) DIA and WIA during Major Offensive Operations, U.S. Army Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Nr of divs</th>
<th>Div days</th>
<th>Mean div strength</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA CRO</th>
<th>WIA Adm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breakout of Naktong Perimeter (16-27 Sep 50)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15,217</td>
<td>4,334</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>3,204</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.9)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(4.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inchon Landing and Liberation of Seoul (18-30 Sep 50)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14,217</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>319</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counteroffensive against Chinese Communist Forces (25 Jan - 20 Feb 51)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>16,495</td>
<td>3,788</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>2,903</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Nr of</td>
<td>Div</td>
<td>Mean div strength</td>
<td>Total hit</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA CRO</td>
<td>WIA Adm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>divs</td>
<td>days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Killer—to reestablish UNC Line east of Wonju (21 Feb - 7 Mar 51)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16,135</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>804</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Ripper—to out-flank Seoul and Capture Chunchon (7 Mar - 4 Apr 51)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>16,562</td>
<td>3,786</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>2,891</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Rugged—to secure phase Line KANSAS (1-15 Apr 51)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17,278</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Dauntless—to secure phase Line UTAH (10-22 Apr 51)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18,479</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>983</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Detonate—to retake Line KANSAS after Chinese Communist Forces Spring Offensive (20 May-8 Jun 51)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>19,201</td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Piledriver—to secure Line WYOMING and Iron Triangle (3-12 Jun 51)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18,622</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1,408</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.09)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Commando—to secure Line JAMESTOWN (3-15 Oct 51)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19,942</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2,008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.28)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Nomad and Polar—to secure Lines later designated MISSOURI (13-22 Oct 51)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21,585</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.12)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>17,164</td>
<td>25,737</td>
<td>3,943</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>19,515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) KIA and Admission for WIA, Disease and Nonbattle Injury
US Army Divisions and Separate RCTs
1950–1953

(Rates Expressed as Number of Cases Per 1,000 Average Strength Per Year)
KIA and Admission for WIA, Disease and Nonbattle Injury
US Army Divisions and Separate RCT's
1950–1953

(Continued)
(5) KIA and WIA during Defensive (Enemy Offensive) Operations, US Army Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation *</th>
<th>Nr of divs</th>
<th>Div days</th>
<th>Mean div strength</th>
<th>Total hit</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA CRO</th>
<th>WIA Adm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delaying NK Invasion (4 Jul - 3 Aug 50)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>12,043</td>
<td>4,579</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Naktong Perimeter (4 Aug - 15 Sep 50)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>14,345</td>
<td>11,431</td>
<td>2,623</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>8,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF Counteroffensive, North Korea (25 Nov - 15 Dec 50)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16,778</td>
<td>3,684</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF Counterattack, Wonju-Chipyong Area (12 - 21 Feb 51)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17,220</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF First Spring Offensive, 1951 (22 - 29 Apr 51)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18,343</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>1,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF Second Spring Offensive, 1951 (17 - 22 May 51)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19,520</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF Attack, Western and Central Front, 1952 (6 - 13 Oct 52)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17,395</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF Attack II ROK Corps Front, 1953 (10 - 18 Jun 53)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22,957</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle of Kumsong River Salient (14 - 20 Jul 53)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21,860</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>15,484</td>
<td>27,235</td>
<td>6,881</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>18,475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Inclusive dates within which one or more U.S. Army divisions (including attached separate Regimental Combat Teams) contributed combat days to the indicated operation.
1st US CAVALRY DIVISION IN KOREA

Date of Entry into Korea: 18 July 1950

(On 18 July 1950, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived at Pohang, Korea and on 21 July the division was committed to stem the tide of the NK Communist forces’ offensive.)

Commanding Generals

(18 Jul 1950 – 22 Dec 1951)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Note:
1. The 1st Cavalry Division began moving forces out of line in December 1951 and commenced moving echelons back to Japan where it was reassigned to Headquarters Far East Command on 22 December 1951.
2. On 15 October 1957 the 1st Cavalry Division came back to Korea and, on 30 June 1965, it left Korea for home country.

Commanders, 5th Cavalry Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Marcel B. Crombez</td>
<td>18 Jul 50 – 4 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co.</td>
<td>Irving Lehrfeld</td>
<td>15 Dec 50 – 22 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The 5th Cavalry left Inchon, Korea on 7 December 1951)

Commanders, 7th Cavalry Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Cecil W. Nist</td>
<td>18 Jul 50 – 21 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(77th FA Battalion Commander)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>William A. Harris</td>
<td>21 Oct 50 – 24 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Dan Gilmer</td>
<td>25 Apr 51 – 26 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Frank E. Stillman</td>
<td>27 Nov 51 – 22 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The 7th Cavalry left Korea on 18 December 1951)

Commanders, 8th Cavalry Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Raymond D. Palmer</td>
<td>18 Jul 50 – 14 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Harold K. Johnson</td>
<td>15 Dec 51 -- 21 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Eugene J. Field</td>
<td>22 Apr 51 – 22 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The 8th Cavalry left Korea on 30 December 1951)
Battle Casualties

Killed in Action 2,823
Died while Missing in Action 479
   Died while POW 217
Died of Wounds 292
Total Deaths 3,811

Wounded in Action 12,086
Missing in Action or Captured 601
   Returned to Military Control 108
      from Missing in Action
   Returned to Military Control 491
      from Captured or Interned
   Refused Repatriation 2
Total Casualties 16,498

Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division (entire division)</td>
<td>16 Aug – 26 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>11 Jul 52 – 1 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Field Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>18 Apr – 11 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Engineer Battalion (Combat)</td>
<td>11 Jun 52 – 1 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. U.S. Unit Citations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A and Company B, 5th Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>Distinguished Unit Citation</td>
<td>30 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company L, 5th Cavalry</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company K, 5th Cavalry and supporting elements from Company M; Det. Med Co; and Regimental Radio Team</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>Period Covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hill 31th Southeast of Tabuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry and supporting elements</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 - 27 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 7th Cav and supporting elements</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 12 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry</td>
<td></td>
<td>19 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment including 2nd platoon, Heavy Mortar Company</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hill 570, SW of Kasan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Pltn. Co. F., 8th Cav Regt only</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st FA Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 77th FA Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 - 27 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 77th FA Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 12 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Platoon, Company B, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 - 27 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Squad, 1st Platoon, Company A, 8th Engineer Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339th Radio Team, 13th Signal Company</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 - 27 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Reconnaissance Company</td>
<td>Distinguished Unit Citation</td>
<td>14 - 19 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd and 3rd Platoons, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 - 27 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 70th Tank Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. C, 70th Tank Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 12 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Signal Company</td>
<td>Meritorious Unit Commendation</td>
<td>25 July 50 - 17 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th QM Company</td>
<td></td>
<td>22 Jul 50 - 31 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance Company, 15th Medical Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 July - 31 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Company, 15th Medical Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>22 Jul 50 - 30 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Replacement Company</td>
<td></td>
<td>27 Jul 50 - 30 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>Period Covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Ordnance Maintenance Company</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>18 Jul 50 – 28 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191st Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10 Jul 50 – 30 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division Band</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>22 Jul 50 – 22 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2ND US INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA

Date of Entry into Korea: 31 July 1950

(The first members of the advance party of the 2nd Division set foot on Korean soil on 29 July 1950, and the 9th Regimental Combat Team dispatched from the 2nd US Division landed at Pusan, Korea on 31 July 1950, and the entire division was on the peninsula by 20 August 1950).

Commanding Generals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Laurence B. Keiser</td>
<td>8 Jul 50 – 6 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Robert B. McClure</td>
<td>7 Dec 50 – 14 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Clark L. Ruffner</td>
<td>14 Jan 51 – 1 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Former Chief of Staff, X US Corps)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Thomas E. Deshazo (Acting)</td>
<td>2 Sep 51 – 20 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Robert N. Young</td>
<td>21 Sep 51 – 4 May 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>James C. Fry</td>
<td>5 May 52 – 4 May 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>John F.R. Seitz</td>
<td>Apr 54 – Aug 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. 2nd US Division left Korea on 21 September 1954 and returned to its home country.
2. The division came again in Korea on 1 July 1965, and has been remaining on the peninsula up to now as a strong deterrent force for any eventuality, with a determined enemy north of the DMZ committing provocative acts despite a military armistice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Leland G. Cagalan</td>
<td>Jun 68 – Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Salve H. Watheson</td>
<td>Sep 69 – Oct 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U.S. Army

Maj. Gen. Henry E. Emerson 3 May 73 – 29 May 75
Maj. Gen. David E. Grange 18 Jan 78 – Present

Commanders, 9th Infantry Regiment
(9th Regiment arrived at Pusan on 31 July 1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John G. Hill</td>
<td>12 Jul 50 – 4 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Charles C. Sloan</td>
<td>5 Sep 50 – 6 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Edwin J. Messinger</td>
<td>7 Dec 50 – 30 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Olinio M. Barsanti</td>
<td>1 May 51 – 11 Jul 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John M. Lynch</td>
<td>12 Jul 51 – 24 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Wilbur Wilson</td>
<td>24 Dec 51 – 2 Sep 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Maurice D. Stratta</td>
<td>3 Sep 52 – 9 Feb 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Richard Steinbach</td>
<td>9 Feb 53 – 20 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Julian J. Ewell</td>
<td>20 Jul 53 – 8 Dec 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commanders, 23rd Infantry Regiment
(23rd Regiment arrived in Korea on 4 – 5 August 1951)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Paul L. Freeman</td>
<td>8 Jul 1950 – 14 Feb 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Colonel Freeman wounded in action on 14 February)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John H. Chiles</td>
<td>15 Feb 51 – 23 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Frank Mezzar</td>
<td>25 Jun 51 – 6 Jul 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>James Y. Adams</td>
<td>7 Jul 51 – 17 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Col. Adams was wounded in action)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>George C. Mergens</td>
<td>5 Jan 52 – 6 Aug 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr.</td>
<td>6 Aug 52 – 30 Apr 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Chester A. Dahlen</td>
<td>1 May 53 – 27 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commanders, 38th Infantry Regiment
(38th Regiment arrived in Pusan Korea on 19 August 1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>George B. People</td>
<td>8 Jul 50 – 28 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John C. Coughlin</td>
<td>29 Jan 51 – 26 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Col.       Frank T. Mildren     27 Jun 51 – 22 Apr 52
Col.       William F. Kernan   23 Mar 52 – 23 Sep 52
Col.       Archibald W. Stuart 23 Sep 52 – 26 Mar 53
Col.       Stephen O. Fuqua, Jr. 27 Mar 53 – 6 Aug 53

**Battle Casualties**

**Deaths**

- Killed in Action: 4,367
- Died of Wounds: 338
- Died of Missing in Action: 1,042
- Died of Captured or Interned: 1,347

**Wounded in Action**

- Died of Wounds or Injuries: 338
- Returned to Duty: 14,683
- Remaining Hospitalized or Separated for Disability: 1,554

**Missing in Action**

- Died in Missing: 1,042
- Returned to Military Control: 246

**Captured or Interned**

- Died in Captivity: 1,347
- Returned to Military Control: 1,504
- Refused Repatriation: 12

**Total Battle Casualties**: 25,093

**Citations and Decorations**

**a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Division</td>
<td>1 – 5 Sep 50 (Yongsan, Changnyong, Hyonpung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Division</td>
<td>16 Sep 50 – 27 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Mortar Company, 9th Regiment</td>
<td>10 – 14 Jan 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation (in the name of the President)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered &amp; Place of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Division and attached units</td>
<td>16 – 22 May 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Hongchon area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Regiment</td>
<td>13 – 15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Chipyong-ni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 23rd Regt</td>
<td>30 Jan – 2 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Twin Tunnels east Chipyong-ni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th FA Battalion (less Btry A)</td>
<td>21 – 24 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Naktong River Perimeter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th FA Battalion</td>
<td>13 – 15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Chipyong-ni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd AAA (AW) Battalion</td>
<td>13 – 15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Chipyong-ni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B,</td>
<td>13 – 15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Engineer Battalion (Cbt)</td>
<td>(Chipyong-ni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Clearing Plat, Clearing Co.,</td>
<td>13 – 15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Medical Battalion</td>
<td>(Chipyong-ni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Tank Battalion</td>
<td>31 Aug – 3 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Naktong River Perimeter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 72nd Tank Battalion</td>
<td>24 – 25 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cheryong-ni near Kapyong)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Individual Awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>2,161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3RD US INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA

Date of Entry into Korea: 10 November 1950

(65th Regiment of the 3rd Division landed at Pusan on 26 September 1950, but main force of the division landed at Wonsan on 10 – 11 November 1950)

Commanding Generals

Maj. Charles D.W. Canham 1 Nov 53 – Nov 54

(3rd US Infantry Division left Korea in January 1954.)

Commanders, 7th Regiment

(7th Regiment finished landing at Wonsan on 17-September 1950)

Col. John S. Guthrie Nov 50 – Mar 51
Col. Edwin A. Walker 24 Oct 51 – 21 Jun 52
Lt. Col. Donald R. Ward 24 Jan 52 – 7 Aug 52
Col. Jessi C. Drain, Jr. 8 Aug 52 – May 53
Col. Ernest F. Easterbrook May 53 – Oct 53

Commanders, 15th Regiment

(On 11 November 1950, the regiment landed at Wonsan)

Col. Dennis M. Moore 11 Nov 50 – 13 Apr 51
Col. Thomas R. Yancy 14 Apr 51 – 25 Jun 51
Col. Thomas A. O’Neil 26 Jun 51 – 26 Oct 51
Col. Eric P. Ramee 27 Oct 51 – 16 Feb 52
Col. William T. Moore 17 Feb 52 – 19 Apr 52
Col. Richard R. Middlebrooks 30 Apr 52 – 1 Sep 52
Col. Carl B. Herndon 2 Sep 52 – 30 Sep 52
Lt. Col. Donald R. Ward 1 Oct 52 – 3 Nov 52
**Commanders, 65th Regiment**

(65th Regiment landed at Pusan on 26 September 1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Richard G. Stilwell</td>
<td>4 Nov 52 – 21 Mar 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Russell F. Akers, Jr.</td>
<td>22 Mar 53 – 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>William W. Harris</td>
<td>Nov 50 – 25 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Eain O. Gibson</td>
<td>26 Jun 51 – 23 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Julian B. Lindsey</td>
<td>24 Nov 51 – 31 Jan 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Juan C. Cordero</td>
<td>1 Feb 52 – 10 Oct 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Chester B. Degavre</td>
<td>11 Oct 52 – Jul 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Battle Casualties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>1,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>186*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared Dead while MIA</td>
<td>287**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died while POW</td>
<td>30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>7,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>186*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Duty</td>
<td>7,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Hospitalized or Separated for Disability</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared Dead</td>
<td>287**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Military Control</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured or Interned</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died</td>
<td>30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Military Control</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused Repatriation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Battle Casualties</strong></td>
<td>10,078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Citations and Decorations**

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Inf Division</td>
<td>18 Apr – 11 May 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Inf Division</td>
<td>10 – 14 Jun 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 15th Regt</td>
<td>19 Sep 50 – 31 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Tank Battalion</td>
<td>19 Sep 50 – 31 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7th Inf Regiment:
- 1st Plat, Med Co;
- Intel & Recon Plat, Hq & Hq Co;
- 1st Battalion;
- 1st Plat, Hvy Mortar Co;
- 3rd Ptn, Tank Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 – 25 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7th Inf Regiment:
- 1st Plat, Hvy Mortar Co;
- 2nd Plat, Tank Co;
- 3rd Plat, Med Co;
- 3rd Plat, Tank Co;
- 1 Company, 3rd Bn only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun – 4 Jul 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7th Inf Regiment:
- 2nd Sec, Hvy MG Plat, Co M;
- 2nd Sec, 75mm Recoilless
  - Rifle Plat, Co M;
- Det, Med Co only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 – 7 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7th Inf Regiment
- Battle Patrol, Hq & Hq Co;
- Countersfire Plat, Hq & Hq Co;
- Intel & Recon Plat;
- 1st Plat, Tank Co;
- 2nd Battalion;
- 2nd Litter Sec, Med Co;
- 2nd Plat, Hvy Mortar Co;
- 2nd Amb Sec, Med Co;
- 2nd Med Plat, Med Co;
- 3rd Plat, Tank Co.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 – 25 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15th Inf Regiment
- 2nd Battalion;
- 2nd Plat, Hvy Mortar Co;
Unit | Period Covered
--- | ---
2nd Wire Team, Comm Plat; Hq & Hq Co & Antitank Mine Plat only | 
15th Inf Regiment Company B, only | 11 – 12 Jun 53
15th Inf Regiment Company K only | 10 – 11 Jun 53
65th Inf Regiment Company F only | 10 Jun 53
10th FA Battalion | 23 – 25 Nov 51
  Liaison Section 2, Hq & Hq Btry; Forward Observation Team No. 35, 36 & 37, Btry B only | 
10th FA Battalion | 6 – 7 Sep 51
  Forward Observation Team, Btry C only | 
39th FA Battalion | 23 – 25 Nov 51
  Liaison Sec 2, Hq & Hq Btry; Forward Observation Team No. 35, 36 & 37, Btry B only | 
39th FA Battalion | 30 Jun – 4 Jul 41
  Liaison Sec No. 244, Hq Btry; Forward Observation Sections 1, 2, & 3 Btry B only | 
64th Tank Battalion Company A only | 18 Jul 53

c. Statistics on Individual Awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1,309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7TH US INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA

Date of Entry into Korea: 17 September 1950

(7th US Division participated in the Korean War on 17 September 1950 when the division advance elements landed at Inchon)
### Commanding Generals
*(Sep 1950 — Apr 1971)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>David G. Barr</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>11 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Claudes B. Ferenbough</td>
<td>12 Feb</td>
<td>4 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Lyman L. Lemnitzer</td>
<td>5 Dec</td>
<td>3 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Edmund B. Sebree</td>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>31 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Paul W. Caraway</td>
<td>1 Aug</td>
<td>20 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Ralph J. Butchers</td>
<td>21 Apr</td>
<td>13 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Thomas J. Sands</td>
<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>13 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>N.A. Costello</td>
<td>15 Jun</td>
<td>2 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Teddy H. Sanford</td>
<td>3 Jul</td>
<td>18 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Francis T. Pachtler</td>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>3 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Frank S. Henry</td>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>13 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Chester A. Dahlen</td>
<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>26 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Ferdinand T. Unger</td>
<td>1 Sep</td>
<td>19 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Robert B. Smith</td>
<td>20 Aug</td>
<td>31 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Chester L. Johnson</td>
<td>1 Sep</td>
<td>27 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>F.W. Boye</td>
<td>28 Jul</td>
<td>5 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>T.J. Camp, Jr.</td>
<td>6 Jul</td>
<td>11 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>W.A. Enomach</td>
<td>12 Sep</td>
<td>13 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>James K. Terry</td>
<td>14 Jul</td>
<td>31 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>O.A. Leahy</td>
<td>1 Aug</td>
<td>25 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>James K. Terry</td>
<td>26 Nov</td>
<td>17 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Edward P. Smith</td>
<td>18 Jan</td>
<td>17 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Kenneth L. Johnson</td>
<td>18 Feb</td>
<td>10 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Harold G. Moore</td>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>2 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Commanders, 17th Infantry Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Herbert B. Powell</td>
<td>Aug 49</td>
<td>29 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>William N. Quinn</td>
<td>30 Jan</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Hal O. McCown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Col. Richard A. Risden
Col. Royal Reynolds, Jr.
Col. William L. Hardick Nov 52 –

Commanders, 31st Infantry Regiment

Col. Richard P. Ovenshine Sep 50 – 9 Oct 50
Col. Allan D. Maclean 10 Oct 50 – 27 Nov 50
Lt. Col. Don C. Faith 27 Nov 50 – 2 Dec 50
Col. John A. Gavin 8 Dec 50 – 11 Mar 51
Lt. Col. Glen A. Nelson 17 Dec 51
Col. Noel M. Cox 18 Dec 51 – 10 Jun 52
Col. Lloyd R. Moses 11 Jun 52 – 9 Nov 52
Col. William B. Kern 10 Nov 52 – 4 May 53
Col. Carl T. Schmidt 5 May 53 – 24 Jul 53

Commanders, 32nd Infantry Regiment

Col. Charles E. Beauchamp Sep 50 – Mar 51
Col. Charles M. Mount, Jr. Mar 51 – Jul 51
Col. John M. Hightower III Jul 51 – Feb 52
Col. William A. Dodds Feb 52 – Sep 52
Col. Joseph R. Russ Sep 52 – Jan 53
Col. George L. Van Way Jan 53 – Jul 53
Col. Stanley N. Lonning Jul 53 – Feb 54

Battle Casualties

Killed in Action 2,521
Declared Dead while MIA 946
Died while POW 132
Died of Wounds 306
Missing in Action 22
Wounded in Action 10,858
Total Battle Casualties 14,785*

* In addition to 14,785 casualties, there 339 returned to military control from captive status and 2 others who refused to repatriate to home, thus totalling at 15,126 casualties.
Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered &amp; Place of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th US Division and all its assigned and attached units</td>
<td>15 – 27 Sep 50 Inchon landing and subsequent operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th US Division and all its assigned and attached units except 73rd Tank Bn (see below)</td>
<td>30 Sep 50 – 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>11 Jul 52 – 1 Oct 53 Masan and Chinju areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd FA Battalion, 8th Artillery, 7th Division</td>
<td>Munson area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd FA Battalion, 8th Artillery, 7th Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd Tank Battalion</td>
<td>19 Sep 50 – 31 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd Tank Battalion</td>
<td>30 Sep 50 – 10 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. U.S. Presidential Unit Citation (Navy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered &amp; Place of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31st Inf Regiment (following components only)</td>
<td>21 – 26 Apr, 16 May – 30 Jun, 11 – 25 Sep 51 Hwachon Reservoir Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq Co; Co B, 1st Bn; 2nd Bn; Tank Co &amp; Prov Bn; Dets of 31st RCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Inf Regiment (following components only)</td>
<td>27 Nov – 11 Dec 50 Changjin Reservoir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq Co; Co B, 1st Bn; 2nd Bn (less Co E); Tank Co and 3rd Bn (attached to Prov Bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Regiment</td>
<td>15 Sep – 11 Oct 50 Inchon Landing and Subsequent Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Regiment (1st Bn Only)</td>
<td>27 Nov – 11 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Regiment</td>
<td>21 – 26 Apr, 16 May – 30 Jun and 11 – 25 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn and Prov Bn attached to 32nd RCT only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th FA Battalion</td>
<td>15 Sep – 11 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
57th FA Battalion
Company B, 13th Eng Bn
27 Nov -- 11 Oct 50
15 Sep -- 11 Oct 50
Inchon landing and
subsequent opns

7th Medical Battalion
Ambulance Co, I Plat and
Cleating Co, I Plat only
15 Sep -- 11 Oct 50
Inchon landing and
subsequent opns

7th Reconnaissance Co.

7th Signal Company
Signal Detachment only
15 Sep -- 11 Oct 50
Inchon landing and
subsequent opns

c. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citations

Light Aviation Sec, Distinguished Unit
7th Inf Div Hq Co only Citation
28 Nov -- 5 Dec 50

31st Regiment, Navy Unit Commendation
7th Division, Hq Co;
Co B, 1st Bn; 2nd Bn
(less Co E); Tank Co &
Prov Bn, Dets of 31st
RCT only
Panmunjom area
11 Aug 52 -- 5 May 53 and
7 -- 27 Jul 53

32nd Regiment, Distinguished Unit
7th Division, 3d Bn;
1st Plat, Tank Co; 2d
Plat Hv Mort Co; and
3d Plat, Med Co only
23 Apr 51

32d Infantry Regt, Distinguished Unit
1st Bn only Citation
15 -- 20 Oct 52

32d Infantry Regt, Navy Unit Commendation
1st Ban and prov Bn
attached to 32d
Regimental Combat
Team only
Panmunjom area
11 Aug 52 -- 5 May 53 and
7 -- 27 Jul 53.

48th FA Bn, Liaison Distinguished Unit
Team, Hq Btry & Forward Citation
Observation Team, Btry
C, only.
23 Apr 51

d. Statistics on Individual Awards

Medal of Honor ........................................... 12
Distinguished Service Cross ......................... 92
Distinguished Service Medal ........................... 8
Silver Star ............................................. 1,359
Legion of Merit ....................................... 71
Bronze Star Medal ..................................... 312
Air Medal ............................................... 992
Total .................................................. 2,842

24TH US INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA
Date of Entry into Korea: 1 July 1950 and 3 July 1953

Commanding Generals

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean 5 Oct 49 - 21 Jul 50
(General Dean became captive on 28 August 1950 while he was reported
as missing in action during the night of 20 - 21 July 1950 at Taegon)


Note: 1. 24th Division was replaced by the 40th Infantry Division, commencing in early
January 1952, and in February the former was moved to Japan, leaving behind the
5th Infantry Regiment which had been attached to it in Korea.

2. 24th Division came into Korea again from Japan in 1953 and the 34th Regimental
Combat Team arrived in Korea on 3 July.

Brig. Gen. Carl I. Hutton 12 Jan 54 - 28 Feb 54
Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins 1 Mar 54 - 10 Jul 54
Maj. Gen. Mark McClure 11 July 54 - 31 Mar 55
Brig. Gen. Martin J. Morin 1 Apr 55 - 6 Jul 55
Maj. Gen. S.B. Mason 7 Jul 55 - Oct 56
Brig. Gen. C.H. Bonesteel, III 1 May 57 - 15 May 57

(On 15 October 1957 the 24th US Infantry Division was inactivated.)
Commanders, 19th Infantry Regiment

(19th Regiment arrived in Pusan on 4–6 July 1950 and it came again into Korea arriving at Pusan on 11 July 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Guy S. Meloy, Jr.</td>
<td>14 Jul 50 – 17 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Ned D. Moore</td>
<td>17 Jul 50 – Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Paul S. Shoemaker</td>
<td>6 Dec 52 – 19 Aug 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commanders, 21st Infantry Regiment

1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment (Task Force Smith) arrived at Pusan on 1 July 1950, and the rest of the regiment arrived on 4 July. The regiment came again Korea on 12 July 1953.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Richard W. Stephens</td>
<td>Jul 50 – 15 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Gines Perez</td>
<td>15 Feb 51 – 22 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Herbert J. Vander Heide</td>
<td>22 Aug 51 – 10 Mar 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Frederich B. Alexander</td>
<td>4 May 53 – 27 Nov 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(For the period 27 August 1950 to 9 August 1951 the regiment was at zero strength.)

Commanders, 34th Infantry Regiment

(34th Regiment began arriving at Pusan on 2 July 1950, and came again Korea on 3 July 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Jay B. Loveless</td>
<td>2 Jul 50 – 6 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Robert R. Martin</td>
<td>7 Jul 50 – 8 Jul 50 (KIA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Colonel Martin was killed in action at Chonan on 8 August and was awarded posthumously the first Distinguished Service Cross of the Korean War on 11 July)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Robert L. Wadlington (acting)</td>
<td>8 Jul 50 – 15 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Charles E. Beauchamp</td>
<td>16 Jul 50 – 30 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Richard W. Stephens</td>
<td>31 Jul 50 – 5 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Charles E. Beauchamp</td>
<td>6 Aug 50 – Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Glen A. Farris</td>
<td>10 Sep 50 – 15 Sep 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Hardin L. Olson</td>
<td>3 Jul 53 – 2 Mar 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Battle Casualties**

- Killed in Action: 2,639
- Died of Wounds: 181
- Declared Dead while MIA: 345
- Died While POW: 570
- **Total Deaths**: 3,735
Wounded in Action (excluding 181 DOW) 7,395
Missing in ACTION (excluding 345 declared dead) 152
Captured or Interned (excluding 570 died while POW) (604)
Returned to Military Control (604)
Refused Repatriation (3)
Total Battle Casualties 11,889

Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th Inf Division (less Tank Bn)</td>
<td>2 – 22 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Inf Division (less 34th Regiment and also less 6th Tank Bn, except for Co. C, less 2 platoons)</td>
<td>11 Jul 52 – 1 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>19 Sep 50 – 31 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Inf Regiment (2nd Bn Only)</td>
<td>1 Aug 52 – 30 Sep 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Inf Regiment 3d Plat, Med Co; 3rd Bn Sec, Service Co; and 3rd Bn only</td>
<td>11 Jul 52 – 1 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63rd FA Battalion</td>
<td>16 Sep 50 – 31 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th AAA (AW) Bn Btry C &amp; D only</td>
<td>28 Jan – 4 Feb 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Tank Battalion Company C, less 2 platoons</td>
<td>28 Jan – 3 Feb 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th Inf Division (less 6th Tank Bn)</td>
<td>2 Jul – 15 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19th Inf Regiment 18 – 23 Apr 51
Co K; Forward Mortar Observation Team,
Co M; MG Sec, Co M;
and Med Aid Team,
Med Co only

21st Inf. Regiment 27 May 51
Hq & Hq Co and
Medical Co only

21st Inf Regiment 14 – 18 Oct 51
Company G only

6th Tank Bn 15 Feb 51
Company D only

c. Statistics on Individual Awards

Medal of Honor .................. 7
Distinguished Service Cross ........ 104
Silver Star .................. 942

25th US INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA
Date of Entry into Korea: 10 July 1950
(25th Division units landed in Korea between
10 and 15 July 1950)

Commanding Generals


(25th Division had withdrawn from Korean in October 1954)

Commanders, 24th Infantry Regiment
(24th Regiment arrived in Korea on 12 July 1950)

Col. Horton V. White 12 Jul 50 – 6 Aug 50
Col. Arthur S. Champney 7 Aug 50 – 6 Sep 50
Col. John T. Corley 4 Sep 50 – 6 May 51
Col. Henry C. Britt 7 May 51

(On 1 October 1951, 24th Infantry Regiment organized with all black-colored personnel, was inactivated and the 14th Infantry Regiment replaced it.)

**Commanders, 14th Infantry Regiment**

(14th Regiment arrived in Korea on 1 August 1951, and, replaced the 24th Infantry Regiment on 1 October 1951)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Roy B. Porter</td>
<td>27 Aug 51 – 12 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Richard W. Whitney</td>
<td>13 Dec 51 – 21 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>R. V. Strauss</td>
<td>22 Apr 52 – 11 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Robert W. Page, Jr.</td>
<td>12 Jun 52 – 5 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John R. Wright, Jr.</td>
<td>6 Jul 52 – 26 Oct 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Henry C. Learnard</td>
<td>27 Oct 52 – 6 Feb 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Kelso L. Reaves</td>
<td>7 Feb 53 – 16 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>C.G. Simenson</td>
<td>26 Jul 53 – 13 Feb 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commanders, 27th Infantry Regiment**

(27th Regiment landed at Pusan on 10 July 1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John H. Michaels</td>
<td>7 Jul 50 – 13 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Clibert J. Check</td>
<td>14 Feb 51 – 10 Jul 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>George B. Sloan</td>
<td>11 Jul 51 – 22 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Norman B. Edwards</td>
<td>23 Dec 51 – 16 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Leland G. Cagwin</td>
<td>17 Jun 52 – 14 Sep 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Albert O. Connor</td>
<td>15 Sep 52 – 13 Mar 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>David W. Gray</td>
<td>19 Mar 53 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commanders, 35th Infantry Regiment**

(35th Regiment arrived at Pusan between 13 and 15 July 1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Henry G. Fisher</td>
<td>13 Jul 50 – 8 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Gerald C. Kelleher</td>
<td>9 Dec 50 – 3 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Thomas W. Woodyard</td>
<td>4 Jun 51 – 28 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Sidney B. Baker, Jr.</td>
<td>29 Dec 51 – 12 Jan 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John D. Cone</td>
<td>13 Jan 52 – 17 Sep 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Aurey J. Maroun</td>
<td>18 Sep 52 – 25 Apr 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Emil P. Eschenburg</td>
<td>26 Apr 53 – 14 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Battle Casualties**

- Killed in Action: 2,253
- Died of Wounds: 265
Declared Dead while Missing in Action 300
Died while POW 230
Total Deaths 3,048

Wounded in Action 10,186
(excluding 265 DOW)
Missing in Action (returned) 67
(excluding 300 deaths)
Captured or Interned (excluding 230 deaths) 384
Returned to Military Control (383)
Refused Repatriation (1)
Total Battle Casualties 13,685

Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Division</td>
<td>1 – 11 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less 14th Regiment, 21st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA (AW) Bn, and 89th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Division</td>
<td>5 May – 9 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less 25th AAA AW Bn, 24th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment, 159th FA Bn, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Tank Bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>19 Sep 50 – 31 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>11 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company M only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>11 Jul 52 – 1 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25th AAA AW Bn (SP),</td>
<td>1 – 4 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Plat, Btry A only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th AAA AW Bn (SP),</td>
<td>25 – 27 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Plat, Btry A only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>23 – 26 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less Tank Co and 3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>21 – 24 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less Tank Co)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27th Inf Regiment
Company B and 81-mm
Mortar Sec, Co H only

27th Inf Regiment
3rd Bn only

35th Inf Regiment
1 – 4 Sep 50
Near Koman-ni

35th Inf Regiment
Co; I; Co L; Hvy Mg Plat,
Co M; and 75-mm Recoilless
Rifle Plat, Co M, only

8th FA Battalion
23 – 26 Jul 50
(less Btry C)

8th FA Battalion
21 – 24 Aug 50
(less Btry C)

64th FA Battalion
1 – 4 Sep 50
Chirwon, Chongri, and
Koman-ni in the Nam River Line

90th FA Battalion
1 – 4 Sep 50
Btry C only

90th FA Battalion
11 – 12 Aug 50
HQ Btry; Btry A; and
Vicinity of Pongam-ni,
1st Ammo Train Sec,
northwest of Chindong-ni

21st AAA AW Bn
7 Mar 51
1st & 2nd Plats, Btry
B, only

79th Tank Battalion
23 – 27 Jul 50
Company A only

79th Tank Battalion
25 – 27 Jan 51
Company A only

89th Tank Battalion
26 – 27 Nov 51
Assault Gun Plat only

89th Tank Battalion
1 – 4 Sep 50
Company A only

89th Tank Battalion
7 Mar 51
3rd Plat, Co C only

89th Tank Battalion
25 – 27 Jan 1951
Company D only

65th Engr Bn (cbr)
23 – 27 Jul 1950
Company A only
U.S. Army

65th Engr Bn (Cbt) Company B only
65th Engr Bn (Cbt) Company C only

1 – 4 Sep 50
21 – 24 Aug 1950

Statistics on Individual Awards

Medal of Honor ........................................... 13
Distinguished Service Cross .......................... 118
Distinguished Service Medal .............................. 4
Silver Star ............................................. 1,508

40TH US INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA
Date of Entry into Korea: 22 January 1952

(First elements of the 40th Division arrived at Inchon on 11 January 1952, and the division had taken over the 24th US Division sector in the vicinity of Kumsong by early February).

Commanding Generals

Maj. Gen. Ridgely Gaither 19 Apr 53 – 17 Jan 54

(40th Division left Korean in March 1954)

Commanders, 224th Infantry Regiment

Col. James L. Richardson Jan 52 – Jun 52
Col. John Gaddis Jun 52 – Jul 52
Col. Hugh P. Harris Jul 52 – Feb 53
Col. George T. Duncan Feb 53 – Jun 53
Col. Glover S. Johns Jun 53 – Aug 53
Col. Louis A. Walsh, Jr. Aug 53 – Feb 54

Battle Casualties

Killed in Action 311
Died of Wounds 47
Declared Dead while MIA 17
Died while POW 1
Total Deaths 376

Wounded in Action (exclusive of 47 DOW) 1,457
Missing in Action (exclusive of 17 declared dead) 0
Captured (returned) (exclusive 1 died) 15
Total Battle Casualties 1,848

Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40th Inf Division</td>
<td>22 Jan 52 - 15 Jan 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entire division)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>160th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>11 Jul 52 - 1 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224th Inf Regiment</td>
<td>11 Jul 52 - 1 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
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</table>

b. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140th Tank Bn</td>
<td>1 - 5 Jun &amp; 16 - 18 Jul 53</td>
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</table>

C. Statistics on Individual Awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>246</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>2,458</td>
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45TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Date of Entry into Korea: 10 December 1951
(The first troop echelons of the 45th Division arrived in Korea at Inchon harbor on 1 December 1951)

Division Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Paul D. Harkins</td>
<td>1 Dec 53 - 16 Mar 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The 45th US Division left Korea in May 1954)

Assistant Division Commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Robert L. Dulaney</td>
<td>10 Dec 51 - 26 Apr 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Wayne C. Smith</td>
<td>27 Apr 52 - 1 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>John F. R. Seitz</td>
<td>1 Jul 53 - 1 Apr 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commanders, 179th Infantry Regiment
(On 17 December 1951 the 179th Regiment arrived at Inchon)

Colonel
Frederick A. Daugherty 1 Dec 51 — 9 Jun 52
Lt. Col.
Joseph C. Samdlin 10 Jun 52 — 9 Sep 52
Colonel
Jefferson J. Irvin 9 Sep 52 — 3 Jan 53
Lt. Col.
Adrian A. D’Esmoind 3 Jan 53 — 10 Jan 53
Colonel
Forrest Caraway 11 Jan 53 — Jul 53

Commanders, 180th Infantry Regiment
(180th Regiment arrived in Korea on 5 December 1951)

Colonel
James O. Smith 10 Dec 51 — 10 May 52
Lt. Col.
Ellis B. Richie 11 May 52 — 21 Jun 52
Colonel
Blair A. Ford 22 Jun 52 — 27 Nov 52
Colonel
Charles S. D’Drsa 28 Nov 52 — 26 May 53
Colonel
Thomas H. Beck 27 May 53 — Dec 53

Commanders, 279th Infantry Regiment
(279th Regiment entered Korea on 29 December 1951)

Colonel
Preston J.C. Murphy 10 Dec 51 — 1 Aug 52
Lt. Col.
Dovre C. Jensen 2 Aug 52 — 17 Aug 52
Colonel
Claude N. Shaver 18 Aug 52 — 10 Sep 52
Colonel
O.C. Krueger 11 Sep 52 — 28 Mar 53
Colonel
D.A. McPherson 29 Mar 53 — 27 Jul 53

Battle Casualties

Killed in Action 707
Died of Wounds 88
Declared Dead while Missing in Action 39

Total Deaths 834

Wounded in Action (exclusive of 88 DOW) 3,170
Missing in Action (exclusive of 39 declared dead) 1
(returned)
Captured or Interned (returned) 33

Total Battle Casualties 4,038

Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

Unit 45th Inf Division
(Entire division)

Period Covered 10 Dec 51 — 31 Jul 53
279th Inf Regiment
245th Tank Battalion

U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

180th Inf Regiment 13 - 15 Jun 52
3rd Battalion only

180th Inf Regiment 6 - 17 Jun 52
Co A, B and F only

245th Tank Battalion 13 - 15 Jun 52
4th Plt, Co B, only

171st FA Battalon 13 - 15 Jun 52
Forward Observer Teams 1, 2, and 3, Btry C and Liaison Team, Btry C, only

120th Engr Bn (Cbt) 13 - 15 Jun 52
1st Squad, Co B, only

180th Inf Regiment 14 - 28 Jun 53
Co B, E, I, and K, Only

5TH US REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM IN KOREA
(First echelon of the 5th Infantry Regimental Combat Team arrived in Korea on 31 July 1950)

Col. Godway Ordway, Jr. 29 Jul 50 - 15 Aug 50
Col. John L. Throckmorton, Jr. 16 Aug 50 - 20 Apr 51
Col. Arthur H. Wilson, Jr. 21 Apr 51 - 15 Sep 51
Col. Alexander D. Surles, Jr. 16 Sep 51 - 25 Apr 52
Col. Lee L. Alfred 26 Apr 52 - 11 Jan 53
Col. Harvey H. Fischer 12 Jan 53 - 25 Apr 53
Lt. Col. William H. Kasper 26 Apr 53 - 27 Apr 53
Col. Lester L. Wheeler 28 Apr 53 - 27 Jul 53

Battle Casualties

Killed in Action 708
Died of Wounds 78
Declared Dead while Missing in Action 54
Died While POW 27

Total Battle Deaths 867
Wounded in Action (exclusive of 78 DOW) 3,188
Missing in Action (returned) 16
Excluding 54 Declared Dead
Captured or Interred (returned) 151
Excluding 27 Died
Total Battle Casualties 4,222

Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Regimental Combat Team (entire RCT)</td>
<td>31 Jul 50 – 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Regimental Combat Team (entire RCT)</td>
<td>23 Jan – 10 Feb 52 &amp; 22 Oct 52 – 30 Jan 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Regimental Combat Team (entire RCT)</td>
<td>19 Sep 50 – 31 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th RCT</td>
<td>12 Jun 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A and 1st Sec, MG Plat, Company D, only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th RCT</td>
<td>9 – 13 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Plat, Hvy Mortar Co; 3rd Bn; 3rd Plat, Med Co; 3rd Plat, Tank Co; and Hq Sec, Hq Plat, Tank Co, only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics on Individual Awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>1,390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
187TH AIRBORNE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM

Date of Entry into Korea: 19 September 1950
16 May 1952; 21 June 1953

On 19 September 1950, Hqs, the 187th Airborne RCT arrived at Ashiya Airfield, Kyushu, Japan and, on the 20th the first troops of the RCT set foot on the ground at Moji, Japan. Then, on 24 September the paratroopers were in action against NK Communist forces at Kimpo Airfield.

Commanders in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Frank S. Bowen, Jr.</td>
<td>1 Aug 50 — 11 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Promoted to Brigadier General in Oct 50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Promoted to Brigadier General on 5 Oct 51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>William C. Westmoreland</td>
<td>1 Aug 52 — 19 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Promoted to Brigadier General on 7 Nov 52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Battle Casualties

- Killed in Action: 372
- Died of Wounds: 49
- Declared Dead while MIA: 17
- Died while POW: 4
- Total Deaths: 442

- Wounded in Action (excluding 48 DOW): 1,656
- Missing in Action (excluding 17 dead) (returned): 7
- Captured or Interned (excluding 4 dead) (returned): 10
- Total Battle Casualties: 2,115

Citations and Decorations

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Period Covered &amp; Place of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>187th Airborne RCT</td>
<td>1 Aug 52 — 30 Sep 53 Kunhwa Sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

3rd Bn, 187th RCT
Company E, 187th RCT
2nd Section, Antitank Gun
Plat, Support Company

20 – 22 Oct 50
14 Feb 1951
20 – 22 Oct 50

Hill 163, Near Opa-ri-Yongyu
Wonju area
Sukchon operation

3. U.S. Navy in Korea

SENIOR US NAVAL COMMANDERS OF THE KOREAN WAR

Commanders, Naval Forces
Far East (COMNAVFE)

US naval battleships conducted first bombardment of the Korean War on 29 June 1950.

Vice Adm. Joy
Vice Adm.

Charles Turner Joy
Robert P. Briscoe

26 Aug 49 – 4 Jun 52
4 Jun 52 – 27 Jun 53

Vice Adm. Briscoe

Commanders, Seventh Fleet, Task Force 70

Vice Adm.
Vice Adm.

Arthur D. Struble
Harold M. Martin

6 May 50 – 28 Mar 51
28 Mar 51 – 3 Mar 52
Vice Adm. Strubble  
Vice Adm. Martin  
Vice Adm. Clark

Vice Adm.  
Robert P. Briscoe  
Joseph J. Clark  
3 Mar 52 – 20 May 52  
20 May 52 – 27 Jun 53

Commanders, Task Force 77  
(In order of appearance)

CCD:  Commander Carrier Division.  
OTC:  Officer in Tactical Command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Duration of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. J.M. Hoskins</td>
<td>CCD 3</td>
<td>Valley Forge</td>
<td>OTC TF 77 during period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25 Jun 50 – 25 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>22 Oct 50 – 5 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. E.C. Ewen</td>
<td>CCD 1</td>
<td>Philippine Sea</td>
<td></td>
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<td>25 Aug 50 – 22 Oct 50</td>
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<td>5 Nov 50 – 25 Dec 50</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>9 Jan 51 – 19 Jan 51</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12 Feb 51 – 26 Feb 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. R.A. Office</td>
<td>CCD 5</td>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>25 Dec 50 – 9 Jan 51</td>
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<td>19 Jan 51 – 12 Feb 51</td>
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<td>26 Feb 51 – 4 Apr 51</td>
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<td>19 Apr 51 – 6 May 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. W.G. Tomlinson</td>
<td>CCD 3</td>
<td>Boxer</td>
<td>4 Apr 19 – 19 Apr 51</td>
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<td>17 May 51 – 18 May 51</td>
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<td>19 May 51 – 2 Jun 51</td>
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<td>Boxer</td>
<td>1 Jul 51 – 14 Jul 51</td>
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<td>10 Aug 51 – 22 Aug 51</td>
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<td>19 Sep 51 – 3 Oct 51</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Dates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. G.R. Henderson</td>
<td>CCD 5</td>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>6 May 51 - 17 May 51</td>
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<td>Princeton</td>
<td>18 May 51 - 19 May 51</td>
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<td>2 Jun 51 - 30 Jun 51</td>
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<td>14 Jul 51 - 10 Aug 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. John Perry</td>
<td>CCD 1</td>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>22 Aug 51 - 19 Sep 51</td>
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<td>Essex</td>
<td>3 Oct 51 - 7 Oct 51</td>
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<td>Essex</td>
<td>17 Oct 51 - 31 Oct 51</td>
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<td>Essex</td>
<td>29 Nov 51 - 12 Dec 51</td>
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<td>28 Dec 51 - Feb 52</td>
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<td>20 Feb 52 - 5 Mar 52</td>
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<td>Valley Forge</td>
<td>23 Apr 52 - 14 May 52</td>
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<td>26 May 52 - 11 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. J.J. Clark</td>
<td>CCD 3</td>
<td>B.H. Richard</td>
<td>19 Sep 51 - 3 Oct 51</td>
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<td>B.H. Richard</td>
<td>7 Oct 51 - 17 Oct 51</td>
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<td>B.H. Richard</td>
<td>31 Oct 51 - 29 Nov 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. F.W. McMahon</td>
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<td>Valley Forge</td>
<td>12 Dec 51 - 28 Dec 52</td>
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<td>1 Feb 52 - 20 Feb 52</td>
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<td>5 Mar 52 - 2 Apr 52</td>
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<td>Valley Forge</td>
<td>16 Apr 52 - 23 Apr 52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. A. Soucek</td>
<td>CCD 3</td>
<td>Philippine Sea</td>
<td>2 Apr 52 - 16 Apr 52</td>
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<td>Boxer</td>
<td>14 May 52 - 27 May 52</td>
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<td>Boxer</td>
<td>11 Jun 52 - 6 Jul 52</td>
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<td>Boxer</td>
<td>4 Aug 52 - 4 Sep 52</td>
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<td>Valley Forge</td>
<td>4 Jan 53 - 22 Jan 53</td>
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<td>11 Feb 53 - 15 Mar 53</td>
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<td>29 Mar 53 - 11 Apr 53</td>
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<td>Valley Forge</td>
<td>22 Apr 53 - 15 May 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. H.E. Regan</td>
<td>CCD 1</td>
<td>B.H. Richard</td>
<td>6 Jul 52 - 4 Aug 52</td>
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<tr>
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<td>B.H. Richard</td>
<td>4 Sep 52 - 21 Sep 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B.H. Richard</td>
<td>18 Oct 52 - 1 Nov 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. R.F. hickey</td>
<td>CCD 5</td>
<td>Kearsarge</td>
<td>21 Sep 52 - 18 Oct 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kearsarge</td>
<td>1 Nov 52 - 25 Nov 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kearsarge</td>
<td>18 Dec 52 - 4 Jan 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kearsarge</td>
<td>22 Jan 53 - 11 Feb 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kearsarge</td>
<td>15 Mar 53 - 29 Mar 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kearsarge</td>
<td>11 Apr 53 - 22 Apr 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. W.D. Johnson</td>
<td>CCD 1</td>
<td>B.H. Richard</td>
<td>25 Nov 52 - 18 Dec 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boxer</td>
<td>15 May 53 - 4 Jun 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lake Champ</td>
<td>14 Jun 53 - 27 Jun 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lake Champ</td>
<td>14 Jul 53 - 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. R.E. Blick</td>
<td>CCD 3</td>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>4 Jun 53 - 14 Jun 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>27 Jun 53 - 14 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: The above represents 56 changes of command among 13 Rear Admirals during 37 months of combat.

**Amphibious Task Force (TF-90)**

- Rear Adm. J.H. Doyle 25 Jun 50 - 27 Sep 50
- Rear Adm. L.A. Thackrey 27 Sep 50 - 11 Oct 50
- Rear Adm. J.H. Doyle 11 Oct 50 - 24 Jan 51
- Rear Adm. I.N. Kiland 24 Jan 51 - 3 Sep 51
- Rear Adm. T.B. Hill 3 Sep 51 - 8 Oct 51
- Rear Adm. C.F. Espe 8 Oct 51 - 5 Jun 52
- Rear Adm. F.X. McINERNEY 5 Jun 52 - 21 Nov 53

**Blockade and Escort Force (TF-95)**

- Rear Adm. J.M. Higgins 25 Jun 50 - 25 Jul 50**
- Rear Adm. C.C. Hartman 25 Jul 50 - 12 Sep 50
- Rear Adm. A.E. Smith 12 Sep 50 - 19 Feb 51
- Vice Adm. W. Andrews, RN 19 Feb 51 - 3 Apr 51
- Rear Adm. A.E. Smith 3 Apr 51 - 20 Jun 51
- Rear Adm. G.C. Dyer 20 Jun 51 - 31 May 52
- Rear Adm. J.E. Gingrich 31 May 52 - 12 Feb 53
- Rear Adm. C.E. Olsen 12 Feb 53 - 27 Jul 53

* On 3 April 1951, Task Force 95 was placed under 7th Fleet for direct operational control in Korean operations.

** Then “Japan-Korea Support Group.” UNC Blockade and Escort Force was first organized on 12 September 1950.

**Statistical Summary of U.S. Naval Operations**

Total of U.S. Navy Participants and Casualties
(25 June 1950 - 27 July 1953)

- Total Number Serving ........................................ 1,177,000
- Total Deaths ......................................................... 4,501
- Battle Deaths ....................................................... 458
- Other Deaths ......................................................... 4,043
- Wounds Not Mortal ............................................... 1,576

Total U.S. Navy Battle Casualties
(25th June 1950 - 27 July 1953)

Grand Total .......................................................... 2,087
Total Deaths 458
  Killed in Action 279
  Died of Wounds 23
  Missing in Action and Known or Presumed Dead 156
Wounded in Action 1,576
Missing in Action 53
  Returned to Military Control 44
  Current Missing 9*

Total of Net Battle Casualties
(Excluding 44 returned personnel) 2,043


Breakdown of U.S. Navy Battle Casualties
(25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953)

Total Casualties 2,087
  Total Battle Deaths 458
  Killed in Action 279
  Wounded in Action 1,599
  Died 23
  Others 1,576
Missing in Action 174
  Died 152
  Returned 13
  Current Missing 9
Captured or Interned 35
  Died 4
  Returned 31

U.S. Navy Ships Lost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USS</th>
<th>Date &amp; Cause</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magpie</td>
<td>29 Sept 50</td>
<td>36–20N</td>
<td>Blew up, 21 MIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AMS–25)</td>
<td>Mined</td>
<td>129–28E</td>
<td>12 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirate</td>
<td>12 Oct 50</td>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AMS-275)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pledge</td>
<td>12 Oct 50</td>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AM-277)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patridge</td>
<td>2 Feb 51</td>
<td>38-20N</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MMS-31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sari</td>
<td>17 Aug 52</td>
<td>Hungnam</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ATE-111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistics on Accomplishments of U.S. Naval Operations**

a. **Naval Air Combat Operations**

(1) Combat Sorties (including Marine aircraft): 275,912

25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953

- Offensive Sorties 204,995
- Defensive Sorties 44,160
- Reconnaissance 26,757

*The total figure does not include non-combat flights.

(2) Ordnance Expenditures by Navy/Marine Aircraft:

- Bombs (tons) 163,062 (178,399)*
- Rockets (number) 267,217 (274,189)*
- Ammunition (thousands of rounds) 68,608 (71,804)*

* Figures in parentheses are estimates for period ending 27 July 1953. Other figures are through 31 May 1953 only.

(3) Damage inflicted on enemy:

25 June 1950 – 8 June 1953

- Troop killed 86,265
- Buildings destroyed 44,828
- Locomotives destroyed 391
- Railroad cars destroyed 5,896
- Vehicles destroyed 7,437
- Bridges (rail and road destroyed) 2,005
- Tanks destroyed 249
- Bunkers destroyed 20,854
- Power plants destroyed 33
- Supply dumps, shelters, stacks destroyed 1,900
(4) Enemy aircraft destroyed by Navy and Marine Corps
(25 June – 31 May 1953):
   Aerial Combat ........................................ 23
   Destroyed on ground ................................... 74

(5) Navy Marine aircraft lost to enemy
   Aerial combat ........................................... 5
   Anti-aircraft fire ...................................... 559

b. Naval Surface Operations:
(25 June 1950 – 31 May 1953)

(1) Shipboard ammunition fired
   (rounds – 16" to small arms) .......................... 4,069,626

(2) Damage inflicted on enemy
   (June 1950 – June 1952):
   Buildings destroyed ................................. 3,334
   Vessels and small craft destroyed .................. 824
   Locomotives destroyed ...................... 14
   Trucks destroyed ................................ 214
   Tanks destroyed ................................ 15
   Bridges destroyed ................................ 108
   Supply dumps destroyed ......................... 93
   Mines destroyed ................................. 1,535
   Troops (Casualties) ............................. 28,566

(3) U.S. Navy Ship Casualties:
   Ships damaged ...................................... 73
   Ships sunk (4 minesweepers, 1 tug) ................. 5

c. Military Sea Transport Service:*
(June 1950 – June 1953)

(1) Cargo (Measurement tons) .......................... 52,111,299
(2) Passengers ........................................... 4,918,919
(3) Petroleum (Long tons) ............................. 21,828,879

* Figures to, from and within the Far East.
### UNIT CITATIONS AND COMMENDATIONS

#### U.S. Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship or Squadron</th>
<th>Covering Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter Squadron ONE</td>
<td>3 Jul 50 – 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighting Squadron 214</td>
<td>3 – 6 Aug 50; 8 – 14 Sep 50; 12 Oct – 26 Nov 50; 15 Dec 50 – 1 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighting Squadron 323</td>
<td>3 – 6 Aug 50; 8 – 14 Sep 50; 12 Oct – 26 Nov 50; 15 Dec 50 – 1 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Chatterer</em> (AMS 40)</td>
<td>10 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Incredible</em> (AM 249)</td>
<td>10 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*USS <em>Kite</em> (AMS 22)</td>
<td>10 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Merganser</em> (AMS 26)</td>
<td>11 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Mocking Bird</em> (AMS 27)</td>
<td>10 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including ComMinDiv 31 and staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*USS <em>Osprey</em> (AMS 28)</td>
<td>10 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Partridge</em> (AMS 31)</td>
<td>10 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Priate</em> (AM 275)</td>
<td>11 – 12 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including ComMinDiv 32 and staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Pledge</em> (AM 277)</td>
<td>10 – 12 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*USS <em>Redhead</em> (AMS 34)</td>
<td>11 – 24 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Observation Squadron SIX</td>
<td>2 Aug 50 – 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### U.S. Navy Unit Commendation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship or Squadron</th>
<th>Covering Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Squadron SIX</td>
<td>30 Jul 50 – 16 Jan 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Cacapon</em> (AO 52)</td>
<td>8 Aug – 27 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Graffias</em> (AF 29)</td>
<td>23 Sep – 30 Dec 50; 23 Jun 52 – 9 Mar 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Grasp</em> (ARS 24)</td>
<td>1 Feb – 15 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Henrico</em> (APA 45)</td>
<td>15 Sep – 25 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*USS <em>Kite</em> (AMS 22)</td>
<td>18 – 29 Jul 52; 15 – 26 Nov 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Boat Division ONE</td>
<td>7 – 20 Apr 52; 7 Aug – 2 Sep; 12 – 15 Oct 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U.S. Air Force

**USS Mount Katmai (AE 16)**  
18 Aug – 28 Dec 50

**USS Murrelet (AM 372)**  
10 – 31 May 52

**USS Noble (APA 218)**  
15 Sep – 25 Dec 50

**USS Osprey (AMS 28)**  
16 Apr – 19 May 52; 12 Oct – 15 Oct 52

**USS Redhead (AMS 34)**  
7 May – 5 Jun 52; 12 Aug – 8 Sep 52; 12 Oct – 15 Oct 52

**T.E. 90.32 (LSTs 799, 857, 859, 883, 989, 914, 973 and 975)**  
15 – 16 Sep 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Air Group</th>
<th>Covering Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Badoeng Strait</em> (CVE 116)</td>
<td>CVG 7</td>
<td>3 Aug 50 – 1 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Bon Homme Richard</em> (CVA 31)</td>
<td>CVG 7</td>
<td>22 Jun – 18 Dec 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Essex</em></td>
<td>CVG 5</td>
<td>21 Aug 51 – 5 Mar 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Leyte</em> (CVA 32)</td>
<td>CVG 3</td>
<td>9 Oct 50 – 19 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Philippine Sea</em></td>
<td>CVG 11</td>
<td>4 Aug 50 – 30 Mar 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CVG 2</td>
<td>31 Mar 51 – 31 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CVG 9</td>
<td>31 Jan – 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Princeton</em> (CVA 37)</td>
<td>CVG 19</td>
<td>5 Dec 50 – 10 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CVG 19</td>
<td>15 Apr – 18 Oct 52</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CVG 15</td>
<td>13 Mar – 15 May 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CVG 15</td>
<td>11 Jun – 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Sicily</em></td>
<td>CVG 5</td>
<td>3 Aug 50 – 1 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Valley Forge</em></td>
<td>CVG 5</td>
<td>3 Jul – 18 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ATG 1</td>
<td>11 Dec 51 – 11 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note that the *Kite, Osprey* and *Redhead* received both the Presidential Unit Citation and the Navy Unit Citation.

### 4. U.S. Air Force in Korea

**COMMANDERS OF MAJOR US AIR FORCES**

**Commanding Generals, Far East Air Forces (FEAF)**

(U.S. Far East Air Forces planes began to enter combat over Korea on 27 June 1950)
Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer 26 Apr 49 — 21 May 51
Lt. Gen. Earle E. Partridge (Acting) 21 May 51 — 10 Jun 51
General Otto P. Weyland 10 Jun 51 — 27 Jul 53

(Promoted to Lt. Gen., 28 July 1951; to General, 5 July 1952)

Note: FEAF was designated Pacific Air Forces and moved Hawaii in July 1957.

Commanding General, Fifth Air Force

Lt. Gen. Everest

Lt. Gen. Barcus

Lt. Gen. Anderson

Lt. Gen. Frank F. Everett 1 Jun 51 — 30 May 52
Lt. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus 30 May 52 — 31 May 53
Maj. Gen. | Walter E. Todd | Acting for 17 days in June
Lt. Gen. | Frederick H. Smith, Jr. | 30 Jun 56 — 4 Aug 58
Maj. Gen. | Fred J. Ascani (Acting) | 12 Jul 66 — 1 Aug 66
Lt. Gen. | Seth J. McKer | 1 Aug 66 — 1 Jul 68
Lt. Gen. | Thomas K. McGehee | 13 Jul 68 — 24 Feb 70
Lt. Gen. | Gordon M. Graham | 23 Feb 70 — 15 Nov 72
Lt. Gen. | Robert L. Pursley | 15 Nov 72 — 9 Feb 74
Maj. Gen. | Edward P. McNeff (Acting) | 19 Feb 74 — 17 May 74
Lt. Gen. | Walth To Galligan | 17 May 74 — 31 May 77
Col. | Glenn Nordin (Acting) | 31 May 77 — 22 Jan 77
Lt. Gen. | George G. Loving, Jr. | 22 Jan 77 — Present

**Vice Commander, Fifth Air Force (Wartime)**

| Brig. Gen. | James Ferguson | 18 Jun 51 — 26 Jan 52
| Brig. Gen. | Dudlet D. Hale | 26 Jan 52 — 23 Sep 52

**Commanding General, Thirteenth Air Force**

| Brig. Gen. | John W. Sessums, Jr. | 10 Oct 52 —

**Twentieth Air Force**

| Maj. Gen. | Alvan C. Kincaid, | — 31 Jul 50
| Brig. Gen. | Fay R. Upthegrove | 8 Feb 53 —

**FEAMCom and FEALogFor**

| Brig. Gen. | John P. Doyle | — 10 Jun 52
| Maj. Gen. | Paul E. Ruestow | 10 Jun 52 —
314th Air Division and Japan Air Defense Force*1

Wartime Commanders

Maj. Gen. Roy H. Lynn *2 20 Jan 53 – 1 Sep 54

*1 Japan Air Defense Force inactivated on 1 Sep 1954 at Nagoya, Japan.


FEAF Combat Cargo Command (Provisional) and 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo)

Brig. Gen. John P. Henebry 8 Feb 51 – 26 Feb 52
Col. Cecil H. Childre 26 Feb 52 – 10 Apr 52
Maj. Gen. Chester E. McCarty 10 Apr 52 –

3rd Bombardment Wing (Light)

Col. Thomas B. Hall 14 Aug 50 – 14 Aug 50
Col. Virgil L. Zoller 14 Aug 50 – 23 Aug 50
Col. Donald L. Clark 23 Aug 50 – 1 Dec 50
Col. Virgil L. Zoller 1 Dec 50 – 24 Jul 51
Col. Nils O. Ohman 24 Jul 51 – 4 Mar 52
Col. Eugene B. LeBeauly 14 Aug 52 –
Col. Cecil P. Lessig 31 Oct 54 –

8th Fighter-Bomber Wing

Col. John M. Price 9 Dec 50 – 9 Dec 50
Col. Charles W. Stark 9 Dec 50 – 7 Apr 51
Col. James B. Tipton 7 Apr 51 – 7 Apr 51
Col. Raymond K. Gallagher 7 Apr 51 – 7 Apr 51
Col. James J. Stone, Jr. 24 Jan 53 – 29 May 53
Col. William E. Elder 29 May 53 – 31 Oct 53
Col. William W. Momer 31 Oct 54 –
### 17th Bombardment Wing (Light)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Albert W. Fletcher</td>
<td>10 May 52 – 3 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Glenn C. Nye</td>
<td>3 Jun 52 – 7 Oct 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>William C. Lindley, Jr.</td>
<td>7 Oct 52 – 10 Oct 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Clinton C. Wasem</td>
<td>10 Oct 52 – 31 Oct 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Howard F. Bronson, Jr.</td>
<td>31 Oct 54 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Curtis R. Low</td>
<td>30 Nov 50 – 1 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Turner C. Rogers</td>
<td>1 Feb 51 – 2 Feb 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Ernest G. Ford</td>
<td>2 Feb 52 – 7 Mar 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>William H. Clark</td>
<td>7 Mar 52 – 1 Jan 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Frank S. Perego</td>
<td>1 Jan 53 – 15 Jun 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Maurice L. Martin</td>
<td>5 Jul 53 – 31 Oct 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John B. Murphy</td>
<td>31 Oct 54 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 27th Fighter-Escort Wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Ashley B. Packard</td>
<td>– 1 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Raymond F. Rudell</td>
<td>1 May 51 –</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 35th Fighter-Interceptor Wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Virgil L. Zoller</td>
<td>– 14 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Thomas B. Hall</td>
<td>14 Aug 50 – 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Frederic C. Gray</td>
<td>1 Dec 50 – 17 Feb 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Brooks A. Lawhon</td>
<td>18 Feb 51 – 12 May 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Transferred to Japan Air Defense Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Fred D. Stevers</td>
<td>31 Oct 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 49th Fighter-Bomber Wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Jack S. Jenkins</td>
<td>– 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Aaron W. Tyer</td>
<td>1 Dec 50 – 31 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Joe L. Mason</td>
<td>1 Sep 51 – 31 Jan 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>David T. McKnight</td>
<td>1 Feb 52 – Aug 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Robert J. Rogers</td>
<td>Aug 52 – 1 Apr 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing

Col. William W. Ingenhutt 1 Apr 53 – Apr 53
Col. Edwin A. Doss 2 Apr 53 – 31 Oct 54
Col. John P. Randolph 31 Oct 54 –

58th Fighter-Bomber Wing

Col. John W. Weltman 19 Sep 49 – 23 Apr 51
Col. Oliver G. Cellini 24 Apr 51 – 31 Oct 51
Col. William P. Litton (Acting) 1 Nov 51 – 2 Nov 51
Col. George R. Stanley 2 Nov 51 – 6 Nov 51
Col. Francis S. Gabreski 6 Nov 51 – 13 Jun 52
Col. John W. Mitchell 13 Jun 52 – 31 May 53
Col. William C. Clark 31 May 53 – 9 Aug 53
Col. Ernest H. Beverley 9 Aug 53 – 11 Sep 53
Col. William C. Clark 11 Sep 53 – Nov 53
Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. Nov 53 – 2 Jul 54
Col. Barton M. Russell 2 Jul 54 – 1 Aug 54
Col. Travis Hotter 1 Aug 54 – 9 Aug 54
Col. Hilmer C. Nelson 9 Aug 54 – 16 Aug 54

67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

Col. Karl L. Politka 25 Feb 51 – 1 Jul 51
Col. Bert N. Smiley 2 Jul 51 – 4 Jul 51
Col. Vincent W. Howard 4 Jul 51 – 31 Oct 51
Col. Edwin S. Chickering 31 Oct 51 – 13 Aug 52
Col. Russell A. Berg 13 Aug 52 – 1 Jul 53
Col. Charles F. Knuerim Jul 53 –
Col. Earle E. Bates, Try 54 –

136th Fighter-Bomber Wing

Col. Albert C. Prendergast – 5 Nov 51
Col. Alfred G. Lambert, Jr. 5 Nov 51 – 10 Nov 51
Col. James B. Buck 10 Nov 51 – 9 Jul 52
**452nd Bombardment Wing (Light)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Luther W. Sweetser, Jr.</td>
<td>10 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Brooks A. Lawhon</td>
<td>12 May 51 –  Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Reginald J. Clizbe</td>
<td>Sep 51 –  Feb 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Albert W. Fletcher</td>
<td>Feb 52 –  10 May 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**474th Fighter-Bomber Wing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>William W. Ingenhutt</td>
<td>10 Jul 52 – 1 Apr 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6002nd Tactical Support Wing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Curtis R. Low</td>
<td>1 Aug 50 – 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6131st Tactical Support Wing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Robert W. Witty</td>
<td>8 Aug 50 – 16 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Charles W. Stark</td>
<td>16 Aug 50 – 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6133rd Tactical Support Wing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Virgil L. Zoller</td>
<td>1 Sep 50 – 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6149th Tactical Support Wing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Aaron W. Tyer</td>
<td>5 Sep 50 – 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6150th Tactical Support Wing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Frederic C. Gray</td>
<td>5 Sep 50 – 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**19th Bombardment Group (Medium)**

*(10th AF, Okinawa)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Theodore Q. Graff</td>
<td>26 Sep 50 – 1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Payne Jennings, Jr.</td>
<td>26 Sep 50 – 29 Mar 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Donald O. Tower</td>
<td>29 Mar 51 – 26 Jul 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Adam K. Breckenridge</td>
<td>26 Jul 51 – 6 Feb 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Julian M. Bleyer</td>
<td>6 Feb 52 – 8 Dec 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Willard W. Smith</td>
<td>8 Jul 52 – 24 Dec 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Harvey C. Dorne</td>
<td>24 Dec 52 – 1 Jun 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19th Bombardment Wing (Medium)
(20th AF, Guam)

Col. Harvey C. Dorney 1 Jun 53 —

22nd Bombardment Group (Medium)

Col. James V. Edmundson (TDY Kadena Air Base, Jul 50 -- Oct 50)

92nd Bombardment Group (Medium)

Col. Claude E. Putnam, Jr. (TDY Yokota Air Base, Jul 50 -- Oct 50)

19th Bomb Group B-29s
(20th AF, Kadena AB, Okinawa)

28th BS, 30th BS 1950 -- 1953

98th Bombardment Group (Medium) and 98th Bombardment Wing (Medium) (Advon)

Col. Richard H. Carnichael — 31 Mar 51
Col. David Wade 31 Mar 51 — Sep 51
Col. Edwin F. Harding, Jr. Sep 51 — Nov 51
Col. Lewis A. Curtis Nov 51 — May 52
Col. Winton R. Close May 52 — 16 Jun 52

98th Bombardment Wing (Medium)

Col. Winton R. Close 16 Jun 52 — 26 Oct 52
Col. Charles B. Westover 26 Oct 52 — 17 Jun 53
Col. Edgar S. Davis 17 Jun 53 —

307th Bombardment Group (Medium) and 307th Bombardment Wing (Medium)
(Combat Echelon) (Okinawa)

Col. John A. Hilger — 15 Mar 51
Col. John M. Reynolds 15 Mar 51 — 20 Aug 51
Col. William H. Hanson 20 Aug 51 — 4 Feb 52
Col. John C. Jennison, Jr. 4 Feb 52 — 8 May 52
Col. Raymond L. Winn 8 May 52 — 16 Jun 52
### 307th Bombardment Wing (Medium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Raymond L. Winn</td>
<td>16 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>C.S. Overstreer, Jr.</td>
<td>Sep 52 - 29 Dec 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Austin J. Russell</td>
<td>29 Dec 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Troop Carrier Group (Medium) Provisional**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Edward H. Nigro</td>
<td>21 Oct 50 - 10 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 61st Troop Carrier Group (Heavy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Frank Norwood</td>
<td>14 Feb 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Hal E. Ercanbrack</td>
<td>14 Feb 52 -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 314th Troop Carrier Group (Medium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Richard W. Henderson</td>
<td>27 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>William H. Delacey</td>
<td>27 Aug 51 - 29 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>David E. Daniel</td>
<td>29 Sep 51 - 1 May 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 315th Troop Carrier Group (Medium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Kenneth W. Northamer</td>
<td>10 Jun 52 - 26 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Robert O. Good</td>
<td>26 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 374th Troop Carrier Wing (Heavy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Troy W. Crawford</td>
<td>10 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Charles W. Howe</td>
<td>9 Apr 51 - 9 Aug 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>James W. Chapman, Jr.</td>
<td>9 Aug 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 403rd Troop Carrier Wing (Medium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Chester E. McCarty</td>
<td>10 Apr 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Philip H. Best</td>
<td>14 Apr 52 - 15 May 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Maurice P. Casey, Jr.</td>
<td>15 May 52 - 1 Jan 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 437th Troop Carrier Wing (Medium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>John P. Henebry</td>
<td>25 Jan 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Col. John R. Roche  25 Jan 51 –  May 52
Col. Kenneth W. Northamer  May 52 – 9 Jun 52

403rd Troop Carrier Wing (Medium)

Col. Maurice F. Casey, Jr.  1 Jan 53 –

CASUALTIES, USAF

Total Participants and Casualties,

Total Number of Participated Personnel  1,285,000
Total Number of Battle Deaths  1,200
Total Number of Other Deaths  5,884
Total Wounds Not Mortal  368

Total Battle Casualties By Case
(As of 30 September 1954)

Total Casualties  1,841
(1) Total Deaths  1,200
(2 + 3a + 4a + 5a)
(2) Killed in Action  379
(3) Wounded in Action  379
  a. Died  11
  b. Other  368
(4) Missing in Action  859
  a. Died  806
  b. Returned  38
  c. Current Missing  15*
(5) Captured or Interned  224
  a. Died  4
  b. Returned  220

* According to available information, 15 AF fliers are definitely known to be alive. The Chinese Communists admit they are holding them as "political prisoners."
**Battle Casualties By Type of Operation**
*(As of 30 June 1954)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Air Operation</th>
<th>Ground Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1,330)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(894)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(124)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA to KIA</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>979*1</td>
<td>25*3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(764)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10*2</td>
<td>1*4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(243)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10*2</td>
<td>1*4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Duty, and Evacuated, Etc.</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(237)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(964)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing to KIA</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>979*1</td>
<td>25*3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(764)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Military Control</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Duty</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Wounds</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From POW (Repatriated)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(152)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Missing</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures shown in brackets indicate officers.
### Operational Statistics, USAF

By type of Operation by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Operation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jun-Dec 1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1 Jan-27 Jul 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Losses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Theater</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Action</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Enemy Action</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown or Missing</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Operational</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Claims -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Acft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Destroyed</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-Ground</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-Air</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MIG-15)</td>
<td>(823)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable - Total</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-Ground</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-Air</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MIG-15)</td>
<td>(145)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged - Total</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-Ground</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-Air</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MIG-15)</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sorties**

By Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Korean Opas</th>
<th>710,886</th>
<th>92,858</th>
<th>243,427</th>
<th>231,151</th>
<th>143,450</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>699,030</td>
<td>90,299</td>
<td>239,108</td>
<td>227,559</td>
<td>142,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Effective</td>
<td>11,856</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>4,319</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>1,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>595,086</td>
<td>90,122</td>
<td>210,017</td>
<td>183,059</td>
<td>111,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night</td>
<td>115,800</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>33,410</td>
<td>48,092</td>
<td>31,562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# U.S. Air Force

## By Type Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Korean Operations</th>
<th>710,886</th>
<th>92,858</th>
<th>243,427</th>
<th>231,151</th>
<th>143,450</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bomber</td>
<td>20,448</td>
<td>5,347</td>
<td>10,571</td>
<td>5,214</td>
<td>3,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bomber</td>
<td>60,096</td>
<td>5,984</td>
<td>19,718</td>
<td>20,518</td>
<td>13,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter</td>
<td>276,796</td>
<td>25,416</td>
<td>81,244</td>
<td>97,253</td>
<td>72,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Fighter</td>
<td>64,475</td>
<td>18,248</td>
<td>32,510</td>
<td>13,301</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>45,839</td>
<td>3,349</td>
<td>13,180</td>
<td>20,636</td>
<td>8,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>185,528</td>
<td>25,075</td>
<td>71,988</td>
<td>56,237</td>
<td>32,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>57,704</td>
<td>9,439</td>
<td>18,072</td>
<td>17,992</td>
<td>12,201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## By Type Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total All Operations</th>
<th>751,672</th>
<th>96,969</th>
<th>257,194</th>
<th>244,033</th>
<th>153,476</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra Japan</td>
<td>40,786</td>
<td>4,111</td>
<td>13,767</td>
<td>12,883</td>
<td>10,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Opns</td>
<td>710,886</td>
<td>92,858</td>
<td>243,427</td>
<td>231,151</td>
<td>143,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Combat</td>
<td>461,554</td>
<td>58,643</td>
<td>158,338</td>
<td>151,264</td>
<td>90,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Support</td>
<td>92,603</td>
<td>27,294</td>
<td>23,732</td>
<td>18,185</td>
<td>23,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction and Armed R Recon</td>
<td>220,168</td>
<td>23,925</td>
<td>93,284</td>
<td>71,066</td>
<td>31,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Air Offensive</td>
<td>73,887</td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>36,272</td>
<td>36,272</td>
<td>21,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Air Defensive</td>
<td>12,931</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>2,898</td>
<td>3,871</td>
<td>5,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon</td>
<td>60,971</td>
<td>3,648</td>
<td>26,668</td>
<td>21,864</td>
<td>10,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Combat Support</td>
<td>249,332</td>
<td>34,215</td>
<td>85,089</td>
<td>79,887</td>
<td>50,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue</td>
<td>15,192</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>6,763</td>
<td>4,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>176,503</td>
<td>25,654</td>
<td>68,911</td>
<td>51,837</td>
<td>30,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>34,836</td>
<td>6,639</td>
<td>7,998</td>
<td>12,360</td>
<td>7,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>22,801</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>4,647</td>
<td>8,927</td>
<td>8,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. U.S. Marine Corps in Korea

COMMANDERS OF MAJOR US MARINE FORCES

1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE

(1st Provisional Marine Brigade, date on which its formation was directed, began arriving at Pusan, Korea on 2 August 1950)

Commander: Brig. Gen. Edward A. Craig 7 Jul 50 – 13 Sep 50
Deputy Comdr: Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Cushman
Chief of Staff: Col. Edward W. Snedeker

5th Marine Regiment

Commander: Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray 7 Jul 50 – 13 Sep 50
Ex Officer: Lt. Col. Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.
CO, 1st Bn: Lt. Col. George R. Newton
CO, 2nd Bn: Lt. Col. Harold S. Roise
CO, 3rd Bn: Lt. Col. Robert D. Taplett

(1st Prov Mar Brig disbanded on 13 September 1950, units and detachments reverted control to parent organizations of division.)

Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Air Wing

Commander: Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Cushman 7 Jul 50 – 13 Sep 50

(Concurrently Deputy Commander of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade)

1ST US MARINE DIVISION

(The division entered into action on 15 September 1950 when the landing operation was launched at Inchon)

Division Commanders

Brig. Gen. Lewis B. Puller (acting) 24 Feb 51 – 4 Mar 51
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Oliver P. Smith</td>
<td>5 Mar 51 - 24 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Gerald C. Thomas</td>
<td>25 Apr 51 - 10 Jan 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commanders, 1st Marine Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Lewis B. Puller</td>
<td>4 Aug 50 - 24 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Francis M. McAlister</td>
<td>25 Jan 51 - 19 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Wilbur S. Brown</td>
<td>19 May 51 - 17 Jul 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Thomas A. Wornham</td>
<td>18 Jul 51 - 12 Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Sidney S. Wade</td>
<td>13 Oct 51 - 9 Apr 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Walter N. Flournoy</td>
<td>10 Apr 52 - 24 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Walter F. Layer</td>
<td>25 Jul 52 - 20 Nov 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Hewitt D. Adams</td>
<td>21 Nov 52 - 30 Apr 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Wallace M. Nelson</td>
<td>1 May 53 - 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commanders, 5th Marine Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Raymond L. Murray</td>
<td>3 Jul 50 - 23 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Raymond L. Murray</td>
<td>24 Jan 51 - 13 Mar 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Richard W. Hayward</td>
<td>14 Mar 51 - 6 Aug 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Richard G. Weede</td>
<td>7 Aug 51 - 18 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Frank P. Hager, Jr.</td>
<td>19 Nov 51 - 22 Feb 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Thomas A. Culhane, Jr.</td>
<td>23 Feb 52 - 15 Aug 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Eustace R. Smoak</td>
<td>16 Aug 52 - 9 Dec 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Lewis W. Wait</td>
<td>10 Dec 52 - 13 Apr 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Harvey C. Tschirgi</td>
<td>14 Apr 53 - 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commanders, 7th Marine Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.</td>
<td>21 Sep 50 - 15 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Herman Nickerson, Jr.</td>
<td>16 Apr 51 - 19 Sep 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>John G. Wermuth</td>
<td>20 Sep 51 - 12 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>John G. Wermuth</td>
<td>13 Dec 51 - 10 Mar 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Russel E. Honswetz</td>
<td>11 Mar 52 - 10 Jun 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Thomas C. Moore, Jr.</td>
<td>11 Jun 52 - 4 Nov 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Loren E. Haffner</td>
<td>5 Nov 52 - 26 Mar 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Glenn C. Funk</td>
<td>27 Mar 53 - 27 Jul 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commanders, 11th Marine Regiment (Artillery)

Col. James H. Brower 15 Sep 50 - 30 Nov 50
Lt. Col. Carl A. Youngdale 1 Dec 50 - 5 Mar 51
Col. Joseph L. Winecoff 6 Mar 51 - 4 Aug 51
Col. Custins Burton, Jr. 5 Aug 51 - 16 Nov 51
Col. Bruce T. Hemphill 17 Nov 51 - 26 Mar 52
Col. Frederick P. Henderson 27 Mar 52 - 20 Sep 52
Col. Harry N. Shea 21 Sep 52 - 21 Feb 53
Col. James E. Mills 22 Feb 53 - 4 Jul 53
Col. Manly L. Curry 5 Jul 53 - 27 Jul 50

1st Combat Service Group

Col. John N. Cook, Jr. 15 Sep 50 - 10 Jun 51
Lt. Col. John M. Brickley 10 Jun 51 - 8 Aug 51
Col. Joseph P. Sayers 9 Aug 51 - 29 Sep 51
Col. Russell N. Jordahl 30 Sep 51 - 28 Jun 52
Col. Kenneth A. King 30 Jun 52 - 7 Nov 52
Lt. Col. Sidney F. Jenkins 8 Nov 52 - 9 Dec 52
Col. James T. Wilbur 8 Dec 52 - 7 Feb 53
Col. Edwin C. Ferguson 8 Feb 53 - 7 Jul 53
Col. James A. Moreau 8 Jul 53 - 27 Jul 53

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

Commanding Generals

Maj. Gen. Field Harris 28 May 51
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Cushman 29 May 51 - 26 Jul 51
Maj. Gen. Clayton C. Jerome 12 Apr 52 - 8 Jan 53

(Beginning in June 1956, initial units of the 1st Marine Wing were withdrawn from Korea and relocated at Iwakuni, Japan)
US MARINE CORPS CASUALTIES

Total Number of Serving and Casualties
(August 1950 – July 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number Serving</td>
<td>424,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Deaths</td>
<td>4,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Deaths</td>
<td>1,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded Not Mortal</td>
<td>23,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Casualties</td>
<td>29,272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Battle Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Battle Casualties</td>
<td>28,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths</td>
<td>4,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>3,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>24,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action (Died)</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured or Interned</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Military Control</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Casualties and Aircraft Losses of the 1st Marine Wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>258 air Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including 65 MIA and presumed dead)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>174 air Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Loss</td>
<td>436 aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNIT CITATIONS

a. ROK Presidential Unit Citation

1st Provisional Marine Brigade 2 Aug – 6 Sep 1950
(entire brigade)
(The citation dated 29 Sep 1950)
Chundong-ni, Sachon,
Kosong, Obong-ni

1st Marine Division, Reinforced 26 Oct 50 – 27 Jul 53
(All organic and reinforced units)
b. U.S. Presidential Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Event Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinforced</td>
<td>7 Aug – 7 Sep 1950</td>
<td>Nakdong River Perimeter near Kujin-san</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all of the brigade except the 1st Amphibian Tractor Co., and reinforced units)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Division, Reinforced</td>
<td>15 Sep – 11 Oct 1950</td>
<td>Inchon landing and subsequent operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all assigned and reinforced units)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Division, Reinforced</td>
<td>27 Nov – 11 Dec 1950</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Division, Reinforced</td>
<td>21 – 26 Apr, 16 – 30 May, 11 – 25 Sep 1951</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all assigned and reinforced units)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Observation Squadron, Six</td>
<td>Aug 50 – 27 Jul 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Wing, Fleet Marine Force)</td>
<td>22 Nov – 14 Dec 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Division: (DA GO NO. 16, DATED 3 MAR 1954)</td>
<td>28 – 29 May 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 1st Marine Tank Bn,</td>
<td>Outposts Elko, Carson, and Vegas near Munsan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C, 1st Marine Tank Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trukish Liaison Det, 8215th Army Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. U.S. Navy Unit Citation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Division, Reinforced</td>
<td>11 Aug 1952 – 5 May 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all assigned and attached units)</td>
<td>7 – 27 Jul 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced</td>
<td>1 Aug 1952 – 27 Jul 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEDICAL SUPPORT UNITS
MEDICAL SUPPORT UNITS

Modern warfare is pretty generally a story of mounting horrors. It was true in the Korean War, too. But it is heartening to learn that some humanitarian service units can be employed in war to ease the suffering and even save the lives of war's victims.

During the Korean War, besides the 16 nations who provided fighting forces, there were five other free nations who contributed the very humanitarian services to ease the suffering and even save the lives of the war victims. These nations are Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden in alphabetical order.

Although this section outlines the medical contributions rendered by these nations, each of whom maintained a medical unit during the war time, it must

A monument erected by the ROK Government at Taejongdae, Pusan in 1976, in memory of the medical contribution during the Korean War of Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
be understood that the activities of these medical units not only included medical care for the victims of the war, military and civilian, but also many other aspects of health and welfare, especially for the war refugees and for civilian populations impoverished by the war.

1. The Danish Red Cross Hospital Ship, Jutlandia

Summary of activities

On 7 March 1951 Jutlandia, hospital ship, arrived at the port of Pusan, Korea, carrying a team consisting of about 100 highly qualified medical personnel. The floating hospital began to receive patients from the first day of her arrival. From 7 March 1951 until 16 August 1953 when Jutlandia left Korea for good, she made three tours of duty in Korea, each tour lasting about five to eight months. Jutlandia had to make homeward voyages for the purpose of replenishing medical supplies as well as rotating the hospital personnel. She first left Korea on 24 July 1951 and returned to Korea for her second tour on 16 November 1951.

The hospital ship operated mainly in Pusan port, but it often moved to other ports to treat or transport the critical cases, sometime disregarding its own danger. At the time many wounded UN soldiers who could not expected to return to duty within 30 days were evacuated to the hospital in Japan in Jutlandia. While she was absent temporarily from station, some of the Danes volunteered to work at other UNC hospitals in forward area, and lent their skillful hands to the hospital personnel.

The presence of an ambulance-helicopter in the hospital ship was especially helpful in speedy evacuation of the serious casualties. The smooth ride and the rapid arrival at the hospital from the battlefield caused a lower rate of shock fatalities.

From March 1953 when the truce talks were in progress at Panmunjom Jutlandia was able to extend its merciful hands to many ROK civilians. Working in close cooperation with the local hospitals, the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea (UNCACK) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), she worked as a diagnostic hospital for civilians, mostly war refugees.

The Danish Red Cross Hospital Ship continued its medical effort for a while
The fully manned Danish hospital ship "Jutlandia" stands by ready to care for the wounded at Pusan port.

even after the war came to an end. On 16 August 1953, upon her departure, the Danes handed most of medical stocks such as instruments and drugs over the UNKRA, which in turn distributed all the items to the Korean local hospitals.

The postwar contribution made by the Danish Government is also worth mentioning. This was about the creation of the National Medical Center in Seoul, which came into existence on 30 September 1958 as one of the biggest general hospitals in Korea. Although it was built through the joint efforts by the ROK Government, the UNKRA and the Governments of the three Scandinavian Kingdoms, the part played by the Danish Government in the efforts was immeasurable. Many Danish medical personnel had worked in the medical center until 30 September 1968 when the whole administration and operational control of it was transferred to the Republic of Korea.
Reference Data on the Danish Red Cross Hospital Ship

a. *Jutlandia's three tours*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left Denmark</th>
<th>Returned to Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Tour</td>
<td>23 Jan 1951</td>
<td>15 Sep 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Tour</td>
<td>29 Sep 1951</td>
<td>8 Jun 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Tour</td>
<td>20 Sep 1952</td>
<td>16 Oct 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Members of the ship and key personnel

Figures are not available for the individual tours but the following is a survey of the total staff who served on board the *Jutlandia*.

(1) For hospital and ship jointly:

- Head of mission ........................................... 1
- Ship's and hospital chaplains ............................ 4
- Press attaches ............................................. 2
- Secretaries ................................................. 7

(2) Ship's officers and crew:

- Captain .................................................... 1
- Chief Engineer ............................................ 1
- Deck, engine, mess ........................................ 312

(3) Hospital staff:

**Administration**

- Hospital directors ......................................... 3
- Hospital inspector (Consultant) ......................... 1
- Hospital supervisors ....................................... 3
- Matrons ..................................................... 3
- Officers of the watch ..................................... 4
- Store-room superintendent ............................... 2
- Dispatcher .................................................. 1
- Secretaries and clerks .................................... 5

**Physicians and others**

- Chief surgeons ............................................. 8
- Chief doctors, internal medicine ........................ 6
- Radiologists ................................................. 3
- Head of laboratory ......................................... 1
- Psychiatrists and neurologists ............................ 2
- Senior surgeons ............................................. 8
- Anaesthesiologists ........................................ 5
- Ophthalmologists .......................................... 2
- Assistant doctors (surgery - int. medicine) ............ 10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interns</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Danish doctors</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nurses and others</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head nurse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward, operating theatre, X-ray nurses</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linen-room superintendent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab technicians, pharmacy assistants, Physical therapists, Medical secretaries</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manual skills group</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental technician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medics</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts - and repairmen</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>American Red Cross</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare officers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN liaison group</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison officers and chief petty officers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted men and others</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Staff</strong></td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On each tour, the average number of ship’s officers and crew was 105 and of hospital staff 115 (15 doctors, 42 nurses, 28 medics and craftsmen, 20 administrative people including the UN liaison group and other non-Danish personnel, chaplain, press attache and others).

The average period of service was 15 months for the ship’s crew and approx. 11 months for the hospital staff.

Of the ship’s staff, the captain, chief engineer, chief steward plus 10 persons served during the entire period. Of the hospital staff, 3 nurses, 1 dental technician and 1 medic served during the entire period; altogether 19 persons including the head of mission=3 per cent.

Personnel who were re-hired and thus did not serve continuously for the full period count as new employees statistically.

About 25 per cent of the participants in the tours were women. (8 doctors, 20 secretaries and 11 lab technicians, 105 nurses and physical therapists, 31 stewardesses and laundry assistants, and 5 American Red Cross welfare officers).

Key personnel of the ship are listed below with the duration of their service:
Commanding officer  Kai Hammerich  23 Jan 51 – 16 Oct 53
Heads of the hospital  Mogens Winge  1 Oct 50 – 20 Sep 51
  "  Harry Brocks  20 Sep 51 – 5 Dec 51
  "  Hakon H. Zinsen  6 Dec 51 – 28 Feb 53
  "  Helge Tramsen  1 Mar 53 – 16 Oct 53
Chief engineer  Axel Axelsen  23 Jan – 16 Oct 53
Chief officer  Flemming Bech Petersen  23 Jan 51 – 2 Jul 52
  "  Johann Ernst Paulsen  15 Sep 52 – 16 Oct 53

c. Patients treated

The total number of patients examined and treated by Jutlandia was about 6,000. But according to Mr. Kai Hammerich, commanding Jutlandia, more than 15,000 patients were examined and treated on the ship. Although Jutlandia received a great number of critical surgical cases, there were only 25 death cases due to their fatal injuries in battle. All the outstanding records of such achievements were resulted from the faithful attitude of the whole members of the hospital combined with well advanced surgical skills, excellent facilities and equipment.

2. The 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit

Summary of Activities

On 20 November 1950 the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit landed in the port of Pusan with a total strength of 346 consisting of 17 officers (four surgeons, two anesthetists, eight GOMOs, one dental surgeon, one motor-transport and one quartermaster officers) and 329 enlisted ranks. The unit brought with them its own equipment.

It should be noted, however, that unlike other four medical units contributed each from Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden, the 60th Indian Ambulance Unit had to operate in Korea with the unit team divided into two parts; the principal part commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Rangaraj to serve for the Commonwealth troops in the battle zone, while the rest of the Unit under Major N.B. Banerjee to work for the ROK hospitals in the Taegu area. This division of the unit was inevitable due to the critical war situation at the time of the unit’s arrival in Korea when the medical support was badly needed both in the front and rear areas. Thus, from the outset the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit had a twofold mission to tend the sick and wounded UN
fighting men in the battlefield and to provide medical assistance to the local ROK hospitals in the rear area.

On 4 December 1950 the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit (main force) advanced north as far as Pyongyang, the NK Communist Capital City, along with the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, but only to meet the UN forces' general withdrawal forced by Chinese Communists' aggression. It was on this day that the ambulance unit was ordered to evacuate Pyongyang. They were told that, as there was no transport available, they must burn all their medical stores and equipment. This was too much for Colonel Rangaraj, who was determined to prevent such a disaster if it was possible to do so. Eventually they found a railway engine and a few trucks in a siding, filled the engine with water by means of "jerry cans" and a chain of men, and then gathered wood to run the engine on, as no coal was available. In the early hours of 5th December two Indian soldiers, with previous railway experience, drove their small train over the last bridge, just before it was demolished. It would be difficult to imagine a fine example of initiative and devotion to duty than this.

There were many occasions where the Indian Ambulance Unit operated like a combat unit rather than mere medical unit. On 23 March 1951, for instance, the Indian unit joined a parachute landing in the Munsan area to trap the Communist enemy fleeing north. This operation was carried out by elements of the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team. In the operation a selected team of the Indian unit led by Colonel Rangaraj was to accompany the airborne troops to render medical service on the spot.

The Indian paratroopers jumped into the enemy-held territory from the US C-119 aircraft and could hear a considerable amount of small

arms fire below while they were descending. Upon landing the dedicated Indian healers cleared their parachute harness and headed for the American regiment assembly area. There 102 American fighters injured in the jumping were waiting for the skilful hands of the Indian healers. Promptly the Indian surgical team bandaged the wounds and arranged emergency treatments on the spot. Ten serious injuries were carried by the Indian medics to the helicopter ambulance. Upon completion of the landing operation, the Indian paratroops joined safely their parent unit in the vicinity of Yoji.

The 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit continued to support the 27th and 28th Commonwealth Brigades and later the 1st Commonwealth Division until 29 August 1953 when the unit left the Commonwealth Division area to join the Indian Custodian Force whose first contingent sailed from Madras on 18th August 1953.

In the meantime, while the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit was supporting the Commonwealth units in the battlefield, the Taegu Detachment personnel under Major N.B. Banerjee were spending hectic days in Taegu city to help relieve the suffering and disease that was so apparent in the city at those days.

In February 1951 the detachment moved into the 1st ROK Army Hospital in the city to provide medical assistance. There they found a badly disrupted organization, shortage of medical supplies, doctors, nurses, food and other necessaries. Originally built as a 1,000-bed hospital, it was badly overcrowded with patients of all kinds put together. After weeks of painstaking work they brought back cleanliness and order in the hospital, organized regular supplies of food and medicine. They also trained 30 men and 4 women doctors to act as anesthetists and surgeons to give the sick and wounded ROK soldiers immediate treatment of the best kind available.

Following the medical assistance in the ROK Army hospital the detachment moved to the West City Hospital, a civilian hospital also in Taegu. Here they found the hospital conditions were even worse. All kinds of patients were lying on bare floors in the wards and corridors, dead and dying mixed together. Whole families were eating and sleeping in these premises. Babies were being born into a world full of disease and filth. An improvised operating theater was immediately set up, and for two whole weeks the Indian surgeons and medical officers worked day and night to produce order out of the chaos and to complete all the necessary life-saving operations. The building were thoroughly cleaned, food was applied for from Korean and UN sources. Medical supplies, particularly drugs, were obtained with great difficulty from various authorities.

In the civilian hospital alone, up to February 1953, about 1,400 serious operations had been performed. In June 1952, an outdoor dispensary was opened,
A member of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit takes down data as a nurse orderly bandages the head of a wounded British soldier.

to cope with the very large number of out-patients and by February 1953, about 50,000 out-patients had been treated.

Reference Data on the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit

a. Personnel and Awards

From the time the 60th Indian Ambulance Unit landed in Korea on 20 November 1950 until 23 February 1954 a total of 627 officers and men of the unit served in Korea, the original contingent comprising 346 men. During the period the unit was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Rangaswamy from 20 November 1950 to 27 February 1953 and Lieutenant Colonel M.B.K. Nair from 28 February 1953 to 9 February 1954 with Major N.B. Banerjee commanding Taegu Detachment of the unit. The following are the Honours and Awards presented to the individual members of the unit for their outstanding services in Korea:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korean Awards</th>
<th>Indian Awards</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Chungmu” Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>Maha Vir Chakras</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vir Chakras</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mentioned in Despatches</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
American Awards    Bronze Star .............................................. 2

The unit earned numerous commendations from the ROK and US military authorities and other medical organizations for its outstanding medical contribution.

b. Patients treated

It is difficult to estimate the accurate number of the patients, military and civilian, treated by the unit, but the following gives some idea of its activities:

Surgical operations .......... 2,324    Inpatients ............... 20,000
Outpatients ................ 195,000    Dental cases ............ 5,000

3. The Italian Red Cross Hospital 68

Summary of Activities

The Italian Red Cross Hospital personnel consisting of 67 medical officers and men arrived in Korea on 16 November 1951 and a few days later on 6 December they officially began the hospital work at a school building located in Yongdungpo area. In the beginning the hospital started as a 50-bed capacity hospital. It should be noted, however, that the Italian hospital supported its own logistics, completely financed by the Italian Red Cross.

The Italian hospital continued to maintain the structure of field hospital of 50-bed capacity until 30 November 1952, when the hospital building was burnt down by a violent fire (perhaps caused by the partisans). On 23 February 1953 the hospital was reopened with increased capacity of 145 beds – 80 patients in the surgical department, 50 in the medical department and 15 paediatrics department. With the increased capacity, the hospital facilities including medical equipment were also greatly improved. In those days about 300 patients were consulted on a daily basis, most of whom were local civilians. Of the patients some serious cases were admitted for hospitalization. It was quite a heavy workload at the time considering the limited number of the hospital staff. The Italian doctors and nurses were busy working amid the mourns, screams and delirious ravings of the patients.

During the period from 1 July to 30 June 1953, the Italian hospital treated a total of 1,639 inpatients and 74,600 outpatients. Of the 74,000 outpatients, the department of medicine treated 35,000; surgery, 15,000; ophthalmology, 6,200; antituberculosis, 18,400.
Italian Red Cross Hospital

Besides its medical activities in Korea, it should be noted, the Italian hospital sent a team of its staff to the Island of Kyushu, Japan, in June 1953 when violent floods hit Japan. The team stayed there a month and treated more than 2,000 patients. Thus, the Italian Red Cross Hospital fully displayed the humanitarian character of Red Cross spirit.

On 2 January 1955 the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 terminated its operations in Korea. On this day the Italian Red Cross handed over all the hospital equipment to the Korean authorities and left Korea for Italy.

Reference Data on the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68

a. Personnel and Awards

From 16 November 1951 until 2 January 1955 a total of 128 staff of the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 served in Korea. The following is the breakdown of the staff:

- Officers .......................... 19
- Voluntary nurses ...................... 8
- Non-commissioned officers ............. 12
- Soldiers .............................. 89
- Total ................................ 128

During the period the hospital was commanded by Medical Captain of the Italian Red Cross, Dr. Luigi Colo from 16 November 1951 to 29 August 1952 and Medical Major of the Italian Red Cross, Prof. Fabio Pennacchi, from 29 August 1952 to 2 January 1955.

The Italian Red Cross Hospital was praised so highly from ROK and UN
authorities on numerous occasions for its superior performance of its humanitarian mission in Korea. It is remarkable, particularly, that the hospital was awarded the ROK Presidential Unit Citation twice, one on 6 October 1952 and the other on 20 December 1954.

A number of individual awards were made to the members of the hospital staff. The Korean "Chungmu Medal with Gold Star" went to Major Fabio Pennacchi for his excellent leadership as the hospital commander.

b. Patients treated by the hospital

The following statistical figures give some idea of the hospital operations in Korea:

- Surgical operations .................... 3,297
- Inpatients treated ........................ 7,250
- Outpatients treated .................... 222,885
- Dental patients treated ................. 1,155
- Pathological tests ....................... 8,444
- X-ray examinations ..................... 17,115
- Total days of hospitalization .......... 131,513

4. The Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital

Summary of Activities

The Norwegian medical unit first came to Japan on 31 May 1951 by air to receive medical equipment from US authorities there. After arrival at Pusan, Korea on 22 June 1951, it established the Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (NORMASH) initially in the vicinity of Tongduchon on 19 July 1951. It officially opened with a personnel set-up of 83 Norwegians, 40 Americans and some Korean personnel. In about six months when the second Norwegian contingent arrived, the hospital staff swelled up to about 190, of whom 106 were Norwegians.

With the personnel increase the hospital capacity was also increased from the regular 60 beds to 200 beds. Thus, the NORMASH was able to operate on equal footing with equivalent American field hospitals, both medically and tactically.

Accordingly the Norwegian hospital, as usual for the American MASH, consisted of a hospital section and an administrative section. In the hospital section was also included a dental office and a drug supply unit. The administrative section embraced equipment and transportation and a guard unit in addition to the administration office, kitchen, mess hall, sleeping quarters, etc.
The NORMASH, unlike other hospitals in fixed station, had to satisfy certain demands regarding armed preparedness and mobility. So, it was necessary to arrange for special training of the personnel after their arrival in Korea. This training dealt, in particular, with subjects such as packing of equipment, putting up and dismantling of the tents, evacuation and moving of the hospital, small arms exercises and defense of the hospital. When it moved to another location the hospital section was closed and the patients were sent to other hospitals for the duration of the movement.

As in any field hospital, the most important aspect of hospital activities in the field can be seen in surgical operations. During the whole period of its medical service in Korea the NORMASH performed more than 9,600 minor and major operations, which averaged eight (8) operations a day. This number of surgeries per day varied between one and 64. If the fact that in many cases, several operations were performed on one patient were taken into consideration, the total figures would of course be substantially higher.

- Most of the operations were done under general anesthesia using intravenous pentothal or citopan plus ether and oxygen. Local anesthetics were used only

The operating room of the NORMASH close to the front lines.
for very minor wounds and a few delayed primary closures. Employment of spinal anesthesia was very limited. Curasit was used from 1953 in many cases with good results.

Reference Data on the NORMASH

a. Personnel Served, 19 Jul 51–18 Oct 54:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacist</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male nurses</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Commanders, NORMASH:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Hermann Ramstad</td>
<td>1 May 51 – 31 Dec 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Arne Hvoslef</td>
<td>1 Dec 51 – 15 May 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Erling Falsen Hjort</td>
<td>3 May 52 – 22 Sep 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Petter Ingvald Sundt</td>
<td>12 Sep 52 – 30 Nov 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Erling Borch-Johnsen</td>
<td>7 Nov 52 – 14 May 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Egil Moe</td>
<td>10 Apr 53 – 21 Oct 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Erl Thoresen</td>
<td>11 Sep 53 – 28 Feb 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Rangnar Nordlie</td>
<td>22 Jan 54 – 20 Jul 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Aile Berg</td>
<td>20 Jun 54 – 15 Nov 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Honors and Awards:

(1) ROK Presidential Unit Citation: Nov 1952; Oct 1953
(2) Decorations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medals</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>&quot;Ulchi&quot; Medal with Gold Star</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Ulchi&quot; Medal with Silver Star</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Patients Treated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inpatients</td>
<td>14,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpatients</td>
<td>55,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpatients, X-Ray Department</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Patients</td>
<td>9,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. The Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital

The Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital was the first medical unit, other than United States, to come to Korea in support of the United Nations operations during the war in the country. After it departed Stockholm, Sweden on 24 August 1950, the Swedish medical team of about 160 personnel, under the command of Colonel Carl Erik Groth, arrived in the port of Pusan on 23 September 1950.

Within a few days of necessary preparations the well-equipped Swedish hospital was put into operation at a two-story school building in Pusan. The hospital started initially as a 200-bed capacity hospital, but the urgent and large requirements of medical service at that time soon compelled it to expand to a 400-bed and then to a 450-bed capacity hospital. This hard-pressed situation eloquently testifies to the fact that the Swedish hospital staff from the outset had to handle a tremendously heavy workload at the time.

The Swedish medical personnel treated and nursed the sick and wounded UN soldiers pouring into the hospital day after day. The 400-bed hospital was constantly full of the patients of all kinds. Surgeons performed complex

The Swedish Red Cross Hospital celebrating the second anniversary of its arrival in Korea. The Swedish flag is seen on the extreme right.
operations ceaselessly, nurses cared the mourns with their whole hearts, and administrative personnel improved its medical management.

From June 1951 when the fighting became stalemated, the number of the war casualties also began to decrease. This reduced workload enabled the Swedish hospital staff to devote more time on the civilian population. Korean civilians, mostly refugees, were admitted to the hospital in great number. Numerous outpatients were examined and given medical treatment by the hospital.

During the period from 1 June 1951 to 30 June 1952, the Swedish hospital treated approximately 900 civilian inpatients whose stay in the hospital aggregated 23,000 days. The X-ray department examined 7,800 civilian during the same period.

The Swedish Red Cross Hospital was provided a large amount of medical goods and up-to-date equipment by the Swedish Red Cross. The Swedish Red Cross at home also sent a number of additional surgeons, physicians, and other medical personnel to Korea to join the original hospital team. Thus, the Swedish modern equipment together with the highly qualified medical specialists led the hospital to earn an enviable reputation for its high quality of medical service.

The hospital did not confine its medical activities to the sick and wounded persons coming to the hospital. The Swedish physicians and surgeons made frequent visits to the local civilian hospitals in Pusan City and gave them their technical assistance as well as medical supplies. The Pusan Railway Hospital and the Chokki Hospital, for instance, were typical general hospitals in the area which were greatly improved through the technical and material assistance provided by the Swedish hospital.

Although the fighting war ended in July 1953 the Swedish Red Cross Hospital continued to render its humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Korea until 10 April 1957 when the Swedish medical team finally left for home planting the imperishable spirit of the Swedish Red Cross Hospital in the minds of the Korean people. The Commanders of the Swedish Hospital in Korea were as follows:

| Carl-Erik Groth                     | Bo Ewert          |
| Nils Tolagen                       | Einar Franke      |
| Arne Ekengren                      | Ake S. Häger      |
| Rolf Kaijser                       | Bergvik           |
| Bodo Von Garrelts                  | Sture Röden       |
| Gunnar Jungner                     | Gösta Rylander    |
| Ola Mansson                        | Friz Karlström    |
| Sven Akesson                       | Sven Rydman       |
PART THREE

APPENDIXES
APPENDIX I
CONTRIBUTION OF TWENTY-ONE U.N. ALLIES
IN KOREA

Of the 53 nations that endorsed the United Nations decision to take action in Korea against Communist aggressors, 16 nations provided combat forces, while five provided medical elements. By 2 January 1951, 40 countries had offered assistance, military and otherwise, to the United Nations Forces in Korea in support of the Republic of Korea. But some of the offers were not accepted by the United Nations for various reasons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>*2 inf bns</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 destroyers</td>
<td>1 fighter &amp; 1 air-trans sqdn</td>
<td>(A) 28 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 1 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 2 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>*1 inf brig, 1 FA regt, 1 armed regt &amp; support units</td>
<td>3 destroyers 1 air-trans sqdn</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 30 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 25 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
<td>(A) 15 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 22 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 7 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 gunboat</td>
<td>(A) 29 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 22 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 air-trans flight</td>
<td>(A) 9 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 13 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1 inf plat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 destroyer</td>
<td>(A) 23 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 16 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>*1 FA regt &amp; support units</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 frigates</td>
<td>(A) 31 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 1 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Contribution of Twenty-One Allies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 fighter-bomber sqdn</td>
<td>(A) 19 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 corvettes, 1 transport ship</td>
<td>1 air transport flight</td>
<td>(AF) 16 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 7 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 23 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 inf brig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 19 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>*2 composite inf brigs with supporting units</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 3 frigates &amp; several auxilliary ships</td>
<td>(A) 29 Aug 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 29 Jun 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Army Forces, FE Eighth Army; I, IX &amp; X Corps; 1st Cav Div, 2nd Inf Div, 3rd Inf Div, 7th Inf Div, 24th Inf Div, 25th Inf Div, 40th Inf Div, 45th Inf Div</td>
<td>Naval Forces Far East; Seventh Fleet; TF 77, 90 &amp; 95 1st Mar Div</td>
<td>FEAF, 5th AF, 13th AF, 20th AF; FE Bomber Command; Log Forces; 314th Air Div, 315th Air Div</td>
<td>(A) 1 Jul 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 27 Jun 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 27 Jun 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Most of these units were merged into the 1st British Commonwealth Division when it was formed in July 1951.

**Medical Assistance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Kinds of Aid</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 hospital ship &amp; medical team</td>
<td>7 Mar 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 field ambulance unit</td>
<td>20 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 Red Cross hospital unit</td>
<td>16 Nov 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 mobile army surgical hospital</td>
<td>22 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 field hospital unit</td>
<td>23 Sep 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Date is based on the arrival of first echelon or advance party)
APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES

a. Plans and Operations

Apache: An ambitious operation plan prepared by General Van Fleet and recommended to General Ridgway in August 1951, calling for a general advance in September by the IX and X US Corps as well as I ROK Corps. But, it was not accepted by the UN Command.

Big Stick: Operation plan presented by the Eighth US Army to the UN Command on 2 February 1952 to destroy the Communist supply complex based on Sibyon-ni, to advance the left flank of the UNC lines to the Yesong River, and to regain Kaesong. But it was not realized. If it could be realized in mid-April 1952, an amphibious feint at Kojong on the east coast was to execute by the 1st US Marine Division to expedite its chances of success. (See Home Coming)

Big Switch: Processing operation for repatriation of prisoners of war which took place in August—September 1953. During Big Switch 12,757 UNC personnel were repatriated, while UNC sent back 70,159 NK Communists plus 5,640 CCF prisoners.

Blackbird: Helicopter-lift operation conducted by the 1st US Marine Division in a small-scale on 27 September 1951.

Bluehearts: Code name for the original plan for UNC amphibious landing behind enemy lines on or about 22 July 1950, abandoned by 10 July 1950 because of the inability of the ROK and US forces in Korea to halt the southward drive of the enemy. This plan was succeeded by Operation Chromite. (See Chromite.)

Buckshot: Operation conducted by the 7th US Marine Regiment in July 1952 to capture Yoke Hill northeast of Punchbowl.

Buckshot 16: Operation carried out by the 11th Division, I ROK Corps on 8 July 1952 to take prisoners in the area west of the Nam River on the eastern front.

Cherokee Strikes: Naval airpower strikes launched by the Seventh Fleet in order to destroy enemy supplies and enemy artillery pieces at the front in October through December 1952 with Air Forces joining the operation.

Chopstick 6: Operation plan proposed by General Van Fleet in April 1952 for an envelopment of the highground south of Pyonggang in the Iron Triangle area by a reinforced ROK division.

Chopstick 16: Plan for a two-division attack to drive the enemy from the area east and south of the Nam River on the eastern front. General Van Fleet, however, decided to suspend this
plan indefinitely on 29 April 1952, the day after “Package Proposal” was present at Panmunjom.

**Chromite**: Code name for UNC amphibious operations in September 1950, one of which was a landing at Inchon to drive the North Korean Communist puppet forces back across the 38th Parallel. Originally, Chromite called for an amphibious operation in September 1950 and postulated three plans – (1) landing at Inchon, with a simultaneous attack by ROK and Eighth US Army forces; (2) landing at Kunsan; (3) landing near Chunchon. (See Bluehearts.)

**Clam Up**: Operation conducted by the UNC ground forces to delude the enemy which imposed silence along the front lines from 10 to 15 February 1952. Thus, the operation was to feign a withdrawal and lure the enemy into sending out patrols which would yield prisoners to UNC ground units.

**Cleanup**: Operation conducted by a reinforced regiment of the 3rd US Division, I US Corps designed to clean up the enemy-held area north of Chorwon, starting on 18 September 1951.

**Cleaver**: Operation conducted on 21 September 1951 in the IX US Corps sector to raid from Kumhwa to Pyongyang. Kumgang and Chuktak to destroy enemy personnel and materials.

**Collier**: Operation carried out by the 50th US Tank Battalion in the Yookkok-chon area in November 1951 to destroy as many of new enemy bunkers and emplacements as possible.

**Commando**: Operation launched by I US Corps during 3–19 October 1951 to establish a new defense line called “Jamestown.” All of four divisions under the I US Corps plus 25th US Division of IX US Corps were committed in this offensive operation.

**Counter**: Operation carried out by the 45th US Division, I US Corps from 6 to 29 June 1952 to capture strategic outpost sites in the Yookkok-chon sector.

**Courageous**: Operation launched by General Ridgway, commencing on 22 March 1951, in a general advance effort except in the westmost sector, to a line generally between the confluence of the Han River and Yosong River on the west coast and Yangyang on the east coast.

**Creeper**: Operation conducted by the X US Corps and I ROK Corps on the eastern front during 18–26 August 1951 to improve the UNC defensive positions far above Line Kansas.

**Cudgel**: Plan drew up by General Van Fleet in September 1951 for an ambitious advance on the 1 and IX US Corps front from Line Wyoming to drive the enemy further north so as to protect the Chorwon–Kumhwa railroad line and to force the enemy to give up his key forward positions. This plan was to be followed up by an amphibious operation called “Wrangler,” on the east coast. (See Wrangler.)

**Decoy**: A naval operation carried out by the Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven on 15 October 1951. It was a feint operation in the Kojo area, after “Wrangler” was disapproved, in an effort to draw enemy reinforcements from frontlines and also to create an enemy psychological reaction favorable to the UN forces.

**Doughhunt**: Operation conducted by the 3rd US Division during 2–4 July 1951 to attack against Hills 508, 785 and 717 south of Pyongyang in the Iron Triangle sector.
Duluth: Line of defense to be established operation “Sundial,” which was planned by General Van Fleet late in October 1951 in an effort to advance further north in the Iron Triangle sector and the Kumsong area, putting the I and IX US Corps units in the attack. The offensive plan was cancelled, however, because of the debate over the line of demarcation that the UNC frontlines might be withdrawn several kilometers to the south in the event of a cease-fire. (See Sundial.)

Highboy: I US Corps artillery operation conducted in January 1952 to bring direct fire onto enemy positions and bunkers not accessible to other artillery and mortar fire. It was a field experiment designed primarily to reduce enemy fortifications located on steep mountain slopes.

Home Coming: Limited operation plan proposed by General Van Fleet on 22 February 1952 to be executed on or about 1 April as substitute for Big Stick. (See Big Stick.)

Kick-off: Operation carried out by UNC naval forces in July 1951 against enemy positions in the Wonsan area on the east coast.


Little Switch: Operation for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war. Based on an agreement signed on 11 April 1953 at Panmunjom truce tent, the repatriation began on 20 April, lasting until 26 April during which the UN Command handed over a total of 6,670 sick and wounded Communist prisoners, while the Communists sent back 684 UNC POWs.

Mixmaster: Operation designed not for real fighting but for relocation of units, which took place in the spring of 1952, when the UNC and Communist forces were facing each other from static positions and fighting local engagements. Mixmaster was a complicated rearrangement of UNC divisions across the entire front during March, and involved the shuffling of about 200,000 men and their equipment over distance from 40 to 288 kilometers. In another words, it was a severe test of Eighth Army mobility at the time.

Mongoose: Operation carried out by ROK forces in the summer of 1952 in mopping up Communist remnants and guerrillas around Chiri-san region and other districts in the rear area.

Overwhelming: Plan for a joint amphibious and overland offensive operation toward the Pyongyang–Wonsan line. It was prepared by Eighth Army early in July 1951 to pinch off and destroy a large fraction of the Communist forces there starting the offensive about 1 September so as to carry UNC defense lines far north of the present lines.

Package and Derail: Both were shore line targets suitable both for naval ships and airplanes designed to increase effectiveness of naval gun fire and to coordinate it with airstrikes of Task Force 77, early in January 1952.

Polecharge: Operation plan executed by the 1st US Cavalry Division for capture of hill objectives on the Jamestown Line during the final phase of Operation Commando in mid October 1951.
**Code Names**

**Pressure Pump:** Operation took part by every operational UNC air unit in the severe aerial attacks against enemy targets in the Pyongyang area on 11 July 1952.

**Ratkiller:** Operation conducted by Task Force Paik to wipe out Communist remnants and guerrilla bands scattered around Chiri-san and Cholla-pukdo during 2 December 1951–31 January 1952.

**Rebuild:** This was a logistical operation of the U.S. Far East Command for a gigantic production of ordnance materiel required for conduct of the Korean War. During the first three months of the war practically all ammunition the U.N. and ROK forces used came from rebuild stocks in Japan.

**Red Cow:** Operation carried out by the Fifth US Air Force between 8 and 25 October 1952, in conjunction with Naval Task Force 77, in an effort to destroy enemy positions and troops close to the main line of resistance and the neutral zone.

**Ripper:** Offensive operation executed by IX and X US Corps during 7–31 March 1951 to seize and secure, from west to east, a line running from the Han River to Hongchon–Hachinbur–Kangnung, then in conjunction with the restoration of Seoul by I US Corps, to launch a decisive offensive up to the 38th Parallel. This operation was the continuation of “Operation Killer” and was so successful from the beginning.

**Round-up:** Operation conducted by X US Corps to advance northward on the central front during 5–24 February 1951. This operation would follow up by “Operation Killer” a week later.

**Rugged:** Operation conducted by General Ridgway, commencing on 5 April 1951, following “Operation Ripper,” to advance toward a new objective, Line Kansas.

**Saturne:** Air operation for interdiction of enemy railway lines that initiated by UNC air forces in March 1952 to focus the destructive airpower upon specific stretches of the roadbeds of the key rail lines in the northern zone.

**Showdown:** Operation launched by the 7th US and 2nd ROK Divisions in October 1952 to seize Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge so as to improve IX Corps defense line positions north of Kumhwa.

**Slam:** Operation conducted by the IX US Corps with units of the 1st British Commonwealth Division and 1st US Cavalry Division in the lead in the Imjin River sector during 4–8 August 1951.

**Smack:** Operation launched by the 7th US Division in the western I US Corps sector in late January in an air-ground, (air-tank-infantry-artillery) coordinated test strike.

**Strangle:** Air operation to disrupt the enemy logistics in the north by interdiction bombing. This peculiar term had been loosely used for rail interdiction operations from April 1951 on, but more properly covers the period of August 1951–March 1952.

**Summit:** Helicopter-lift operation conducted by the 1st US Marine Division in September 1951 in the wildly mountainous area in the eastern sector. The operation marked the first helicopter-borne landing of combat unit in history.
**Sundial**: Operation plan to establish “Duluth” defensive line north of the Iron Triangle area and the Kumson sector. (See Duluth.)

**Talons**: Outline plan submitted by General Van Fleet to General Ridgway in early autumn 1951, after “Plan Apache” was cancelled, for test strike in a limited advance to remove sagas on the eastern front. Thus, it was primarily designed to shorten UNC lines still further. However, General Van Fleet decided not to carry it out as he felt that the plan would not worth the probable cost in lives and materiel. Instead, he planned to carry his limited advance on the UNC right flank in September 1951.

**Thunderbolt**: Operation conducted by Eighth US Army during 25 January—4 February 1951 in order to feel out the enemy situation. Although it was a large reconnaissance operation in force in nature, the UN forces assumed such an offensive operation first time ever since the Chinese Communist forces had crossed the Yalu River into Korea in full-scale aggression.

**Tomahawk**: Vertical assault operation launched by the 187th Airborne RCT on 23 March 1951 in an effort to cut the enemy’s escape routes along the Seoul–Munsan highway in conjunction with Task Force Crowden which attacked northward on the ground from the south.

**Touchdown**: Operation launched by the 2nd US Division and its attached French and Netherlands Battalions to gain control of Heartbreak Ridge during 5–14 October 1951.

**Wolfrondd**: Operation executed by UNC forces on the western front in mid-January 1951 to probe the enemy situation.

**Wrangler**: Plan to follow up “Cudgel” with an amphibious operation on the east coast to cut off the enemy forces opposing the I ROK and XUS Corps on the east. If this operation were successful, the UNC forward lines would run between Pyonggang and Kojo. (See Cudgel.)

b. Defense Lines

**Line Davidson**: Line of defense designed for a final Pusan perimeter defense organization in the event the UNC ground forces could not stop the North Korean Communist forces at the Nakdong River perimeter. This line, outlined by General MacArthur in early August 1950, began on the east coast at Sodong-ni, approximately 13 kilometers north of Ulsan, and extended generally westward along the high ground to a point northeast of Myyang, then curved down the ridge east of Muan-ni, from where turned south across the Nakdong River and anchored on the high ground northeast of Masan.

**Line Duluth**: A defense line to be established by Operation Sundial. In late October 1951 General Van Fleet, using the I and IX US Corps, intended to take over the high ground north of the Chorwon–Kumikwa Railroad and establish a firm screen along the defense line, south of Pyonggang and north of Kumson. (See Sundial.)

**Line Gary**: This line connected the IX US Corps and X US Corps. It ran generally in an easternly direction, west to east from Hill 548, east of the confluence of Kumson-gon and the Pakhan River to Hill 629–Hill 949–Hill 973–Hill 883 north of Sokchang-ni.
Line Idaho: Objective line for Operation Ripper conducted by the IX and X US Corps. Established in mid-March 1951, it ran west to east from Yoko-chon on the Han River through Osandong to Pigum-ni to Hill 900 three and a half kilometers west of Pyong-nan-ni to Mak-kol in Cheryong-ni to Pukpu-san to Sungdam-san to Mulo-ri to Pungam-ni to Hill 1181 in Saengpung-ni to Kyebang-san to Hwangbyong-san to Hapyong-dong.

Line Jamestown: This was the objective line for Operation Commando, as well as a new defense line to be occupied by I US Corps and western elements of IX US Corps in October 1951. The line extended generally parallel to, but about 10 kilometers forward of Line Wyoming. Beginning on the west bank of the Imjin River, it lined Sami-chon, Kyeho-dong, Yokkochon, Chutoso and ending 8 kilometers northeast of Chorwon. Except for relatively minor changes, it was the same as the main line of resistance held by UNC forces on 27 July 1953.

Line Kansas: It was the objective line of “Operation Rugged” that established by the UNC ground forces during period 3–20 April 1951. The Kansas Line began near the mouth of the Imjin River and snaked to the northeast on the south side of the river. Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, Kansas veered toward the Hwachon Reservoir and then angled to the Taebaek Mts. until it reached the east coast some 40 kilometers north of the Parallel.

Line Missouri: A defense line constituting the central MLR of UN forces in April 1952. It lined the heart of Iron Triangle that connected Pyonggang on the apex and Chorwon and Kumbwa on its left and right bases. Line Nomad and Line Pglar.

Line Nomad: This was the objective line secured in mid-October 1951 by the IX US Corps. This line was approximately seven kilometers south of the key highway center of Kumsong and ran west to east from Haso–Kyojon-ni east to Hill 434–Wolbong-san–Nungdong across Kumsongchon to Hill 585 - the confluence of Kumsong–chon and the Pukhan River.

Line No Name: A defense line established by General Van Fleet immediately after the Chinese Communist spring offensive in late April 1951 had been stopped. General Van Fleet, not yet aware of the enemy’s immobility, decided to hold at the No Name line, rather than to gather his reserves and strike. The line began at a point north of Seoul, gently rising northeast to Sabangu in the center, then slanting sharply northeast to Taepo-ri on the east coast, still above the 38th Parallel.

Line Polar: This was the objective line established by the IX US Corps upon the capture of Line Nomad on 17 October 1951. This line was approximately three kilometers south of Kumsong, running west to east from Yanggin–Ochadong–Pyonghwasa–Kyoam–san to a point two and a half kilometers west of Songsil–Hill 529–IX and X US Corps boundary at the junction of the Pukhan River and Kumsong-chon.

Line Utah: On objective line to be established by Operation Dauntless in April 1951. Line Utah ran from Taeil on Line Kansas north along Imjin River to Tampko-ri–Pongman-ni – a point two kilometers west of Kodae-san thence generally east to Kumbwak-san–Munbye-ri southeast to Hill 795–Chipo-ri–Kwandrhyon–Cholkol on Line Kansas.

Line Wyoming: It was a defense line to be established by the UNC ground forces during “Operation Dauntless.” Due to success of “Operation Rugged” in April 1951, “Dauntless” was initiated with Line Wyoming as its objective line. Seizure of this line would threaten the
enemy build-up in the Chorwon–Pyongyang–Hwachon Triangle. The CCF spring offensive, which began on 22 April 1951 precluded occupation of Line Wyoming at that time. The line was finally seized in June 1951. Wyoming looped northeastward from the north of the Imjin River towards Chorwon, swung east to Kumhwa, and then fell off to the southeast until it rejoined Line Kansas near the Hwachon Reservoir. In the spring of 1951 it served as an outpost line screening Line Kansas.
APPENDIX III
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA  Anti-aircraft Artillery
AAM  Air-to-Air Missile
A & SH The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Brit)
Abn  Airborne
ACB  Amphibious Construction Battalion
Acct  Accident
ACI  Air Combat Information
ACT  Air Control Team
Acty  Activity
ADC  Air Defense Command
ADCOM  Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea
Adm  Admiral
AdSec  Advanced Section
Adv  Advance or Advancement
Admin  Administration
AF  Air Force
AFFE  Army Forces Far East
AFB  Air Force Base
Afd  Air Field
ALO  Air Liaison Officer
AO  Ammunition Officer, or Aerial Observer
AOP  Air Observation Post
AP  Armored-piercing
Armd  Armored
Arty  Artillery
Asg  Assignment or Asgmt, or Assigned (Sometime Asgd)
Asst  Assistant
Assn  Association
AT  Anti-tank
Atch  Attach or Attachment
Atchmnt  Attachment
Atk  Attack
Attn  Attention
Austr  Australia, Australian
Avn  Aviation
AW  Automatic Weapons
A/W  All-weather

Assy  Assembly
ASW  Anti-submarine Warfare
AT  Anti-tank
Atchmnt  Attachment
Atk  Attack
Attn  Attention
Austr  Australia, Australian
Avn  Aviation
AW  Automatic Weapons
A/W  All-weather

BAR  Browning Automatic Rifle
BC  Border Constabulary
BCFK  British Commonwealth Forces in Korea
BCT  Battalion Combat Team
Bdry  Boundary
Belg  Belgium; Belgian
Belg  Belgium

BG  Brigadier General (or Brig-Gen), Bombardment Group (AF)
Bldg  Building
BLT  Battalion Landing Team
BM  Bench Mark
BMCT  Beginning of Morning Civil Twilight (See EECT)
BMNT  Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight (See EENT)

Bn  Battalion
BomCom  Bomber Command
Br  Branch
Brg  Bridge or Bearing
Brghd  Bridgehead
Brig  Brigade; Brigadier
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brit</td>
<td>British; Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brity</td>
<td>Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Black Watch (Brit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs or Civil Action</td>
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<td>Can</td>
<td>Canada; Canadian</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combat Air Patrol</td>
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<td>Cap</td>
<td>Capital</td>
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<td>Capt</td>
<td>Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Air Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cav</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdr</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
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<tr>
<td>ChlComm</td>
<td>Chinese Communist</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIB</td>
<td>Canadian Infantry Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>CioC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinCFe</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinCPac</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinCUnc</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Sometimes CinCUNCC)</td>
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<td>Comm</td>
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<td>ComNavFE</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
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<td>CTE</td>
<td>Commander, Task Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commander, Task Force</td>
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<td>CTG</td>
<td>Commander, Task Group</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
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<td>DFC</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
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<td>Daily Intelligence Summary</td>
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<td>Div</td>
<td>Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>The Durham Light Infantry (Brit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
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<td>DS</td>
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<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
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<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
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<td>DZ</td>
<td>Drop Zone</td>
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<td>The Duke of Wellington (Brit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDT</td>
<td>Eastern Daylight Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>EECT</td>
<td>End of Evening Civil Twilight (See BMNT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEFK</td>
<td>Ethiopian Expeditionary Force to Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>Essential Elements of Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>EENT</td>
<td>End of Evening Nautical Twilight (See BMNT)</td>
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<td>ETE</td>
<td>Estimated Time of Enroute</td>
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<td>Eth</td>
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<td>Meaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETR</td>
<td>Estimated Time of Return</td>
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<td>EUSAk</td>
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<td>Evac</td>
<td>Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ExOff</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
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<td>Field Artillery</td>
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<td>Forward Air Controller</td>
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<td>Fifth Air Force in Korea</td>
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<td>FBG</td>
<td>Fighter-Bomber Group</td>
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<td>FDC</td>
<td>Fire Direction Center</td>
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<td>FIAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Forces</td>
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<td>Forward Edge of Battle Area</td>
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<td>Far East Command</td>
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<td>Fighter-Escort Wing</td>
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<td>Fighter-Interceptor Group</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Forward Observer, or Field Order</td>
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<td>FOF</td>
<td>Field of Fire</td>
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<td>Fr</td>
<td>France; French</td>
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<td>FSCC</td>
<td>Fire Support Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTC</td>
<td>Field Training Command, or Field Training Center</td>
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<td>Ft</td>
<td>Fighter (Airplane)</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>Fwd</td>
<td>Forward</td>
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<td>G-1</td>
<td>Personnel section of division level</td>
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<td>Intelligence section</td>
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<td>Operations and training section</td>
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<td>General</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLO</td>
<td>Ground Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Gnr</td>
<td>Gunner</td>
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<td>GO</td>
<td>General Order</td>
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<td>Gp</td>
<td>Group</td>
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<td>GR</td>
<td>General Reserve or Graves Registration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gr</td>
<td>Greece; Greek</td>
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<td>GR</td>
<td>Gunnery Range</td>
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<td>General Support or General Staff</td>
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<td>GZ</td>
<td>Ground Zero</td>
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<td>High Explosive, Antitank</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>HEI</td>
<td>High Explosive Incendiary</td>
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<td>HELITEAM</td>
<td>Helicopter Team (Sometime Heliteam)</td>
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<td>Hist</td>
<td>History, Historical</td>
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<td>HMA</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Australian Ship</td>
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<td>HMCS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNZS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMTS</td>
<td>His Majesty’s Thai Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNLMS</td>
<td>Her Netherlands Majesty’s Ship</td>
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<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>Ifa</td>
<td>Indian Field Ambulance</td>
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<td>Intev</td>
<td>Interview</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Initial Point</td>
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<td>Islands</td>
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<td>It</td>
<td>Italy (Some Times Italy)</td>
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<td>JAS</td>
<td>Joint Administration Services</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSA</td>
<td>Joint Security Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSPOG</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATC</td>
<td>Korean Army Training Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>KATCOM</td>
<td>Korean Augmentation to Commonwealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>KATUSA</td>
<td>Korean Augmentation to the United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KComZ</td>
<td>Korean Communication Zone (Sometimes KOMIZ)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIFIA</td>
<td>Killed in Flying Action</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>KMAG</td>
<td>United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMC</td>
<td>Korean Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>KOSB</td>
<td>King's Own Scottish Borderers (Brit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>Korean Service Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSLI</td>
<td>King's Shropshire Light Infantry (Brit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCVP</td>
<td>Landing Craft Vehicle-Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Line of Departure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ldr</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>Light Machinegun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln (LN)</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Logistical; Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>LogCom</td>
<td>Logistical Command</td>
</tr>
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<td>LogEx</td>
<td>Logistical Exercise</td>
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<td>LP</td>
<td>Landing Point</td>
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<td>LS</td>
<td>Logistical Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSMR</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Medium Rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Utility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Ltr</td>
<td>Letter</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LVT</td>
<td>Landing Vehicle, Tracked</td>
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<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>Landing Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Armistice Commission; or Military Airlift Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Marine Amphibious Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Marine Air Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Marine(s); March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASH</td>
<td>Mobile Army Surgical Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATS</td>
<td>Military Air Transport Service</td>
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</table>
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBF</td>
<td>Order of British Empire</td>
<td>PUC</td>
<td>Presidential Unit Citation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obj</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>Private</td>
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<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>PW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War (See POW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OI</td>
<td>Operation Instruction</td>
<td>Qm</td>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Officer in Charge</td>
<td>QOR</td>
<td>The Queen’s Own Rifles (Can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Observation Post</td>
<td>Qty</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt</td>
<td>Optical</td>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Royal Army, or Royal Artillery (Brit), or Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCODE</td>
<td>Operation Code (Sometimes OpCode)</td>
<td>RAdm</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLR</td>
<td>Outpost Line of Resistance</td>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CpNav</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>OpnCtl</td>
<td>Operational Control (Sometimes OPCON)</td>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
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<td>OpnO</td>
<td>Operation Order or OpOrd (Operational Order)</td>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Royal Australian Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpnPlan</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
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<td>Ord</td>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Record</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAMP</td>
<td>Post-Arrest Main Position</td>
<td>RCE</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command (US)</td>
<td>RCHA</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Horse Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Para</td>
<td>Parachute</td>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penin</td>
<td>Peninsula</td>
<td>RCR</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhibGru</td>
<td>Amphibious Group</td>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Rd</td>
<td>Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Periodic Intelligence Report</td>
<td>Recon</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plat</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Regt</td>
<td>Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plng</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Reinf</td>
<td>Reinforce or Reinforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLR</td>
<td>Periodic Logistics Report</td>
<td>Res</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
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<td>Pllbrg</td>
<td>Panel Bridge</td>
<td>Ret</td>
<td>Retire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>Port of Debarkation</td>
<td>RF</td>
<td>The Royal Fusiliers (Brit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>Port of Embarkation</td>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>Royal Fleet Auxiliary (Brit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POR</td>
<td>Periodic Operation Report</td>
<td>RHAF</td>
<td>Royal Hellenic Air Force (Gr)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
<td>Rhd</td>
<td>Railhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPCLI</td>
<td>Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry</td>
<td>Riv</td>
<td>River (Sometimes R, specially in the situation maps)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prchst</td>
<td>Parachutist</td>
<td>RLT</td>
<td>Regimental Landing Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prcht</td>
<td>Parachute</td>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy (Brit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov</td>
<td>Provisional</td>
<td>RNF</td>
<td>Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Brit)</td>
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<td>Pan</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>RNR</td>
<td>The Royal Norfolk Regiment (Brit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Pacific Standard Time</td>
<td>RNZA</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Artillery (or Army)</td>
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<td>PsyOps</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>RNZN</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psywar</td>
<td>Psychological Warfare</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Point</td>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pub</td>
<td>Publication</td>
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</table>
Appendixes

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKMC Republic of Korea Marine Corps
ROKN Republic of Korea Navy
RP Release Point
Rpt Report
R&R Rest and recuperation
RR Railroad (or R.R.)
RTAF Royal Thai Air Force
RTC Replacement Training Center
R22eR Royal 22e Regiment (Can); (or R. 22e R.)
RUR Royal Ulster Rifles (Brit)
RW Railway
S-1 Personnel Section of Regiment or Battalion Staff
S-2 Intelligence Section
S-3 Operation and Training Section
S-4 Supply Section
SAAF South African Air Force
SAC Strategic Air Command
SA South Africa
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SCM Security Consultative Meeting (ROK-US)
SCR Set Complete Radio
SENL Standard Equipment Nomenclature List
SEATO South Asia Treaty Organization
Sec Section
Ser Serial
SFC Seageant First Class
SGS Secretary of General Staff
Sgt Seageant
SHF Super High Frequency
SHORAN Short Range Aid to Navigation
Sig Signal
SJS Secretary of Joint Staff
SN Service Number
SNCC South-North Coordinating Committee
SO Supply Officer
SOF Agreement
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SP Self-propelled, or Supply Point

Spt Support
Sq Support
Sqd Squad
Sqn Squadron
Sr Senior
Sgt Secondary Target
Str Strength
StrRS Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron
Src Service
Swbd Switchboard
Swed Sweden; Swedish
TAC Tactical Air Command
Tac Tactical
TACC Tactical Air Control Center
TacCP Tactical Command Post
TACP Tactical Air Control Party
TacRS Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
TacSptGp Tactical Support Group
TADC Tactical Air Direction Center
TCI Terrain Clearance Indicator
TD Table of Distribution, or Tank Destroyer
TDY Temporary Duty
TE Task Element
T/E Table of Equipment
TF Task Force or Training Film
Tfc Traffic
TG Task Group
Tgt Target
Thai Thailand
TkBn Tank Battalion
Tng Training
TNT Trinitrotoluene
T/O Table of Organization
TO Technical Order
TOC Tactical Operation Center
TOD Time of Delivery
TOE Table of Organization and Equipment
TOps Theater of Operations
TOT Time on Target; Time over Target
TR Transportation Request
Trfd Transferred
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Tributary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trk</td>
<td>Truck</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trp(s)</td>
<td>Troop(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Task Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Underwater Demolition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>Unit of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations (or U.N.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCAK</td>
<td>United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCOK</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCURK</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| UNKRA        | United Nations Korean
Reconstruction Agency |
| UNRC         | United Nations Reception Center |
| UNTCOK       | United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea |
| USA          | United States of America; U.S. Army |
| USAF         | United States Air Forces     |
| USARPAC      | United States Army, Pacific |
| USFK         | United States Forces, Korea  |
| USMC         | United States Marine Corps   |
| USN          | United States Navy           |
| USNS         | U.S. Naval Ship              |
| USS          | United State Ship            |
| VAdm         | Vice Admiral                 |
| Val          | Valley                       |
| VB           | Vertical Bomb                |
| VC           | Victoria Cross (UK); Viet Cong |
| Veh          | Vehicle                      |
| Vel          | Velocity                     |
| Vic          | Vicinity                     |
| VHF          | Very High Frequency          |
| VO           | Verbal Order                 |
| VT           | Variable Time Fuze           |
| WD           | War Diary                    |
| Wea          | Weather                      |
| Wg           | Wing                         |
| WIA          | Wounded in Action            |
| WO           | Warrant Officers; Warning Order |
| WP           | White Phosphorous Shell      |
| Wpn(s)       | Weapon(s)                    |
| WSP          | Water Supply Point           |
| WSup         | Water Supply                 |
| WWII         | World War II                 |
| ZI           | Zone of Interior             |
APPENDIX IV
KOREAN WAR CHRONOLOGY
(JUNE 1950 – JULY 1953)

1950

25 Jun
North Korean Communist puppet army invades the Republic of Korea, driving across the 38th Parallel in its all-out attack.

25 Jun
In its first resolution on the NK Communist invasion, the UN Security Council proclaims the Communist attack a breach of world peace, and calls for an immediate cessation of the attack and withdrawal of the NK Communist invaders to the north of the 38th Parallel. (26 June, Korean time)

27 Jun
The UN Security Council adopts a second resolution on the NK invasion, asking UN member nations to assist the ROK in repelling the Red aggressors. (28 June, Korean time)

27 Jun
US President Harry S. Truman authorizes General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to use US air and naval forces in support of the ROK against the NK invading forces south of the 38th Parallel, and also to neutralize Taiwan by using the US Seventh Fleet.

28 Jun
Seoul, Capital of the Republic of Korea, falls into the enemy hands.

29 Jun
US President decides (Washington time) to employ US naval and air forces against military targets in northern Korea and to defend Taiwan by naval and air action. This directive will be reached Gen MacArthur on 30 June, Far Eastern time.

29 Jun
The British Admiralty places its Navy units in Japanese waters at the disposition of ComNavFE for operations in the Korean War.

29 - 30 Jun
The Australian Government places two naval ships in Far Eastern waters at the disposal of the United Nations. Commits No. 77 Air Fighter Squadron and one C-47 Dakota airplane for service with the UN forces.

30 Jun
US President orders his JCS to commit US ground troops into Korea against the NK forces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul</td>
<td>Task Force Smith, first American ground troops arrived in Korea, makes first contact with Communist forces near Osan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>UN Security Council, adopting its third resolution on Korea today (New York time), authorizes formation of the United Nations Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jul</td>
<td>General MacArthur is named Commander-in-Chief, UNC today (Washington time).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jul</td>
<td>Lt General Walton H. Walker is named CG, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jul</td>
<td>Gen Walker assumes command of all US Army forces in Korea, when Eighth Army becomes operational in the ROK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jul</td>
<td>President Syngman Rhee places the ROK Armed Forces under operational control of Gen MacArthur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>The Netherlands Navy places its destroyer HNLMS Evertsen under the command of Task Force 96, US Naval Forces, Far East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul</td>
<td>Taegon falls to Communists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>Canadian No. 426 Air Squadron begins its operation in support of UN forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jul</td>
<td>Gen MacArthur formally establishes the UNC, a first international unified command in history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>Canada sends its destroyer into Korean waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug</td>
<td>New Zealand Navy ships arrived in Korean theatre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>Nakdong River Perimeter (Pusan Perimeter) is established by UNC in southern end of Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td>Three west coast barrier stations are established between 38°08' and 36°45'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>The X US Corps is activated for forthcoming Inchon-landing operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>The 27th British Brigade arrives at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep</td>
<td>I and IX US Corps become operational in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>Inchon landing outflanks the enemy forces, thus completely turning the tide of war in great favor of the UN forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep</td>
<td>UNC forces recaptures Kimpo Airfield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>The first Philippines Infantry Battalion arrives at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Sep</td>
<td>Swedish Red Cross Medical Team arrives at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sep</td>
<td>UNC forces recapture Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sep</td>
<td>The 3rd Battalion of Australian Regiment arrives at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 3rd ROK Division crosses the 38th Parallel.

UN General Assembly passes a resolution authorizing the UN forces in formality to advance to the northern territory and to set up UNCURK.

UN Interim Committee (the Little Assembly) adopts a resolution on the administration of the territories occupied by the UN Forces.

Turkish Brigade arrives at Pusan.

The ROK and UN Forces capture Pyongyang, capital of Communist North Korea.

6th ROK Division reaches Yalu River at Chosan.

Communist Chinese first-phase offensive is launched.

South African No. 2 Fighter Squadron arrives at Johnson Air Base in Japan.

Canadian ground force disembarks at Pusan.

Thailand ground and naval forces arrive at Pusan.

29th British Brigade arrives at Pusan.

Thailand Navy frigates arrived at Sasebo naval base in Japan.

Italy Red Cross Hospital Unit arrives in Korea.

The 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit arrives at Pusan.

1st Bn, 17th Infantry, 7th US Div reaches Hyesanjin on the Yalu River.

Netherland Battalion disembarks at Pusan.

General MacArthur announces "win the war" offensive. UN Command begins advance toward Yalu.

Capital ROK Div drives into Chongjin.

Communist Chinese second-phase offensive is launched.

Greek AF Flight arrives at Itazuke Air Base in Japan.

French Battalion arrives at Pusan.

As a UN's multilateral agency for Korean reconstruction from the ravage of war, UN General Assembly adopts a resolution to establish UNKRA.

ROK and UN allies abandon Pyongyang.

Greek Battalion arrives at Pusan.

Redeployment from Hungnam begins.

UNC establishes new defensive line along the at 38th Parallel.
23 Dec  Lt General Walker, commander of all UNC ground forces in Korea, is killed in jeep accident.
26 Dec  Lt General Ridgway takes command of the Eighth Army.
27 Dec  X US Corps is placed under the control of Eighth US Army.
31 Dec  New Zealand Artillery Regiment disembarks at Pusan.
31 Dec - 5 Jan  Communist Chinese third-phase offensive is launched.

1951
4 Jan  Seoul falls again to Communists.
7-15 Jan  UNC sets up new defensive line along Pyongtaek–Wonju–Samchok line, at 37th Parallel.
15 Jan  Operation Wolfhound jumps off on the western front.
18 Jan  The UN Memorial Cemetery is established today in Daeyon-dong, Pusan by the UN Command to bury the heroic dead of many allied nations who sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom and world peace. Interments are begun and remains transferred from six other cemeteries located at Kaesong, Incheon, Taejon, Taegu, Miryang and Masan.
25 Jan  UNC resumes offensive. Operation Thunderbolt begins.
31 Jan  Belgium Battalion arrives at Pusan.
31 Jan  Luxembourgian Platoon disembarks at Pusan.
1 Feb  The UN General Assembly names Chinese Communists as “Aggressors.”
5 Feb  Operation Roundup begins. X US Corps begins advance on eastern front.
11-17 Feb  Red Chinese fourth-phase offensive is launched.
21 Feb  Operation Killer. US IX and X Corps begin a general advance.
7 Mar  Operation Ripper begins in central and eastern front. IX and X US Corps cross Han River.
7 Mar  Danish Hospital Ship Jutlandia anchors in Pusan.
14 Mar  Seoul is retaken by UNC forces.
31 Mar  UNC forces seize the Idaho Line.
5 Apr  Operation Rugged, a general advance to the Kansas Line, begins.
5 Apr  The UN Memorial Cemetery is dedicated today at Pusan.
22-28 Apr  First effort of Communist fifth-phase offensive is launched.
Communist forces suffer a fatal blow, being in utter fatigue in men, materiel, and morale.

4 May Canadian 25th Brigade arrives at Pusan.
7 May Ethiopian Kagnew Battalion arrives at Pusan.
8 May A Colombian frigate joins Task Force 95 to operate in Korean waters.
16-23 May Second and final effort of Communist fifth-phase offensive is launched.
18 May The UN General Assembly resolves the additional measures to be employed to the CCF aggression.
30 May UNC ground forces are back on Kansas Line again.
15 Jun Colombian Infantry Battalion disembarks at Pusan.
22 Jun Norwegian Medical Unit arrives at Pusan.
23 Jun Soviet's UN delegate, Yakov Malik, proposes cease-fire talks.
23 Jun Thai Air Transport Flight arrives at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan.
30 Jun Gen Ridgway, on orders from Washington, notifies to Communists of his readiness to discuss an armistice.
10 Jul Truce talks begin at Kaesong and fighting dies down along front.
28 Jul 1st British Commonwealth Division is activated.
22 Aug Communists halt cease-fire talks, charge UN aircraft has violated neutral zone.
30 Aug 1st US Marine Division opens assault at Punchbowl.
2 Sep 2nd US Division opens attack against Heartbreak and Bloody Ridges.
18 Sep US Marines advance to the Soyang River, northeast of Punchbowl.
3-12 Oct The I US Corps advances to Line Jamestown.
15 Oct 2nd US Division takes Heartbreak Ridge.
25 Oct Truce talks resume at new site, Panmunjom.
12 Nov Gen Ridgway orders Gen Van Fleet to cease offensive operations and begin active defense.
16 Nov Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 anchors in Pusan.
18 Dec Prisoners of war lists are exchanged by UNC and Communists at Panmunjom.

1952

2 Jan UNC proposes principle of "voluntary repatriation" in POW exchange.
3 Jan  UNC proposal on voluntary repatriation is violently rejected by Communists.

Jan - Apr  Communist prisoners of war in UNC prison camps disorder as screening of prisoners begins.

12 May  Gen Mark W. Clark succeeds Gen Ridgway as CinCUNC, upon latter’s departure to assume NATO command after Gen Eisenhower.

22 May  Maj Gen William K. Harrison succeeds Adm Joy as chief of UN delegation at Panmunjom.

6 Jun  Operation Counter begins to occupy eleven patrol bases.

23 - 27 Jun  UNC Air and Navy pilots neutralize major Communist hydroelectric plants at Supung, Pujon, Changjin and Hochon.

29 Aug  UNC air bombs NK Communist Capital, Pyongyang.

2 Dec  President-elect Eisenhower begins a three-day tour of Korea.

3 Dec  The UN General Assembly resolves on the release and repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea.

1953

Jan - Feb  Winter lull in fighting. Cease-fire talks remain suspended.

11 Feb  Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor assumes EUSA command from Gen Van Fleet.

22 Feb  UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POW’s, as preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners.

5 Mar  Joseph Stalin of Russia dies.

20 - 26 Apr  Exchange of sick and wounded POW’s, “Operation Little Switch,” takes place at Panmunjom.

26 Apr  Truce talks resume at Panmunjom.

28 - 30 May  CCF launch regimental-strength attack against I US Corps Sector. Heavy action is taken place at outposts of 25th US Division.

8 Jun  Agreement is reached on POW question.

10 - 17 Jun  Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years against II ROK Corps sector in Kumsong bulge.

18 Jun  Breakout of 27,000 NK anti-Communist prisoners of war from ROK POW camps, assisted by ROK guards.

27 Jul  Armistice Agreement is signed at Panmunjom at 1000 hours effective at 2200.
APPENDIX V
CHRONOLOGY OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS
(JUNE 1951 – JULY 1953)

1951

23 Jun

30 Jun
General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, radios head commanders of NK and Chines Communist forces in Korea that he has been informed that the Communists might desire a military armistice conference. He proposes a meeting aboard a Danish hospital ship *Jutlandia*, in Wonsan Harbor.

1 Jul*Kim Il-sung*, supreme commander of the North Korean Communist puppet army, and *Peng Teh-huai*, commander of the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea suggest a meeting in the vicinity of Kaesong between 10 July and 15 July.

3 Jul
General Ridgway accepts the Communist suggestion of Kaesong as a site for a military armistice conference, suggesting a 5 July meeting of liaison officers to make necessary arrangements.

8 Jul
UNC liaison officers land at Kaesong at 0922 hours. After exchanging credentials, they confer on arrangement for the first meeting. They decide first meeting will be held on 10 July at the same location: Kwangmungdong, north of the center of Kaesong.

10 Jul
1st Session of military armistice conference. Senior UNC Delegate Admiral Joy proposes that 20 newsmen be permitted, as part of the UNC delegation, to come to the conference area, but not into the conference house. Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup was among the UNC delegates.

27 Jul
Agreement is reached upon an agenda for the regulation of the military armistice conference.

10 Aug
20th Session. Communist delegation refuses to discuss any line of demarcation other than the 38th Parallel and any agenda item other than Item Two -- fixing a military demarcation line.
Chronology of Armistice Negotiations

2 Sep  Major General Lee Hyung Koon is named as alternate ROKA member of UNC delegations, replacing Major General Paik Sun Yup.

27 Sep  Military armistice conference liaison officers meet. A message from General Ridgway to the Communists proposes a new meeting place approximately midway between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-ni.

7 Oct  The Communists counterpropose that henceforth both sides should assume responsibility for maintenance of the neutral zone; the scope of the neutrality zone be expanded to Kaesong and Munsan; the conference site be moved to Panmunjom; and at the first meeting the security of the neutral zone be agreed upon.

20 Oct  Liaison officers meet. Agreement reached on neutral zone “corridor” dimensions.

22 Oct  Liaison officers meet. Agreement is signed for resumption of talks. It contains eight points including (1) Panmunjom as conference site; and (2) defines the neutral areas as three miles around Kaesong and UNC camp area and two hundred meters to either side of the Kaesong-Munsan road.

28 Oct  Communists agree generally to the UNC concept of the battle line as the demarcation line.

5 Nov  18th subcommittee meeting. UNC introduces new proposal calling for:
    (1) A demarcation line the same as the battle line;
    (2) A demilitarized zone four kilometers wide;
    (3) A Committee to determine actual contact line at any time; and
    (4) A recommendation that the main delegations continue with negotiations of other items while a bilateral committee developed an agreed contact line.

10 Nov  UNC proposes line and zone be based on line of contact at time of signing.

17 Nov  UNC proposes the establishment of a provisional line of demarcation which will be included in any armistice signed within thirty days.

23 Nov  35th subcommittee meeting. Agreement is reached on the following points:
    (1) The actual line of contact will be the demarcation line. At a specified time, both sides will withdraw two kilometers; and
    (2) The subcommittees will immediately determine the line of contact. If an armistice is signed within thirty days after the delegations approve agreement, the line should not be changed regardless of changes in the battle line during the thirty days.
26 Nov  In staff officers' meeting, agreement is reached on location of the entire line of contact. Officers on both sides initiate maps, indicating acceptance.

27 Nov  28th Session. Agenda Item Two is formally ratified by the delegations in the first Plenary Session since 25 October. Seven principles for a detailed solution of Item Three are introduced by the UNC.

18 Dec  UNC and Communists are exchanged POW lists. UNC list contains 132,472 names. Reds provide UNC with the list of 11,559 POW's held by them.

21 Dec  General Ridgway broadcasts a message requesting the Communists to allow Red Cross inspection of Communist POW camps.

22 Dec  UNC invites Reds to inspect UNC POW camps to see that 37,500 Koreans previously listed as POW's have been removed from POW status after being investigated. UNC tells Reds their POW list omitted 1,000 soldiers (mostly U.S.) previously reported held by Reds; demands explanation. UNC proposes immediate exchange of all sick and wounded POW's.

23 Dec  Reds reject POW exchange until armistice is signed. UNC says 65,363 UN soldiers are holding as POW's by Reds through first nine months of war according to accumulated information, demanding explanation of 50,000-plus not on Red list (mostly ROKs).

26 Dec  Both subcommittees meet. Reds say that of the 1,058 UNC soldiers not on the 18 December list, but previously reported informally, 571 died, 152 escaped, and 3 were released. They claim they are trying to locate the other 332.

29 Dec  62nd subcommittee meeting. The Communists agree to exchange list of prisoners of war who have died or escaped from UNC POW camps.

1 Jan  1952  Communists agree in principle to repatriation of civilians, and to supply additional information on 50,000 UN soldiers not on Red POW list of 18 December.

2 Jan  20th subcommittee meeting on Item Four. 29th subcommittee meeting on Item Three. The UNC proposes:

(1) Exchange of 11,559 or more prisoners under UNC for an equal number of Communist-holding POW's;

(2) Exchange of 105,000 more UNC-holding prisoners on a man-for-man exchange for ROK civilians holding by the Communists;

(3) Unlimited exchange of displaced civilians; and
(4) Supervision by IRA to insure all repatriations are voluntary. The UNC scales down its list of UNC-holding POWs from 132,474 to about 116,000, explaining that the difference is persons who have been reclassified as civilian internees. The ROK Government estimates that 113,000 ROK civilians have been abducted by the Communists. The Communists claim that the UNC has taken 500,000 North Koreans to the South.

28 Jan
The UNC turns over to the Communists four rosters with the names of 132,080 POWs holding by the UN Command.

16 Feb
The Reds are named Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia as their nominations for the neutral nations inspection teams. UNC states that Russia is unacceptable. "Freedom Gate Bridge" opens across the Imjin on the road to Panmunjom.

2 May
Communists reject UNC solution. Propose instead that they will withdraw name of Soviet Union if the UNC will in turn forcibly repatriate 132,000 prisoners in exchange for 12,000 men, and will also accede to airfield build-up. This proposal is summarily rejected by Admiral Joy.

12 May
The Reds launch their most vicious propaganda tirade of the entire armistice proceedings.

22 May
Major General William K. Harrison succeeds Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy as Senior UNC Delegate.

28 May
For the first time the UNC reveals at the Plenary Session the questions asked POWs in the screening program. Brigadier General Lee Han Lim, ROKA, replaces Lieutenant General Yu Ji Heung, ROKA, on UNC delegation.

15 Jun
Reds continue to reject UNC offer for impartial rescreening.

17 Jul
UNC liaison officers deliver a list of 1,014 Communist POWs whose names were submitted to the UNC on 11 March and 4 April.

25 Jul
112th Plenary Session meets at Panmunjom, marking the end of secret sessions which had run since 4 July. The Communists request the cessation of executive talks after eighteen fruitless sessions in which the Communists refused to accept the UNC's firm objection of forced repatriation of prisoners of war.

27 Jul
Nam II dispatches a lengthy letter to General Harrison reiterating demands for full repatriation of prisoners of war -- forced or otherwise.

28 Jul
Recess of Plenary Sessions at Panmunjom. Staff officers meet forty minutes in "rewording" efforts on Draft Armistice Agreement.
Recess at Panmunjom. Staff officers continue sessions on rewording of Draft Agreement. General Harrison dispatches a letter to Nam II, via liaison officers, requesting information as to status of 45 UNC individuals on “Supplemental List VI” and 1,881 others on whom information have been sought earlier. General Harrison’s letter states evidence indicated all have been taken prisoners of war by the Communist forces. General Van Fleet tells newsmen “present trends show less chance for an armistice than ever before.”

UNC resubmits to the Communists a request for permission to ship individual packages to prisoners of war in Communist custody.

General Harrison sends a letter requesting Communists to clarify status of their POW camps Number 6 and 9.

UNC again proposes POW’s of both sides be permitted to receive comfort packages.

121st Plenary Session at Panmunjom. General Harrison presents the Communists three alternative proposals for a solution to the prisoner-of-war question. The Communists hold firm for no voluntary repatriation of prisoners. The two delegations agree to a ten-day recess until 8 October.

Senior UNC Delegate, in a letter to Nam II, reiterates UNC proposals to permit prisoners of war to receive comfort packages as described in Article 72 of the Geneva Convention. The letter proposes a specific plan for exchange of parcels by both sides.

122nd Plenary Session. Senior UN Delegate informs the Communist delegates the UNC is not terminating the talks and will be readily available should the Communist accept one of the UNC proposals on the POW’s or submit in writing a constructive proposal of their own.

UNC liaison officers deliver a letter from General Mark W. Clark to Kim Il-sung and Peng Teh-huai requesting immediate exchange of all sick and wounded prisoners of war and proposing liaison officers meet to prepare for such action.

Communists send a reply to General Clark’s letter of 22 February, stating agreement with proposal to exchange sick and injured prisoners during the period of hostilities.

Liaison group meeting. Both sides give first figures of sick and wounded to be repatriated.

A liaison group meeting agrees ratio of exchange of 500 Communist sick
and wounded to 100 UNC per day until repatriation completed. Agreed to begin repatriation no later than ten days after signing of agreement.

15 Apr UNC requests Communists to repatriate proportionate numbers by nationality on first day of exchange.

18 Apr Staff officers' meeting. Communists state they will begin repatriation at 0900 hours 20 April.

20 Apr Repatriation of sick and injured POW's is commenced.

1 May At 128th Plenary Session General Harrison reiterates request that Communists name their nominee for neutral nation to serve as nonrepatriated POW custodian. At liaison group meeting, Admiral Daniel accuses Communists of holding 375 UNC sick and wounded POW's eligible to return.

2 May At 129th Plenary Session, Communists ask UNC to consider sending nonrepatriated POW's to homelands of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, (Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia). UNC reafirms stand that custody by neutral nations should be maintained in Korea. Communists do not nominate India, Burma, Pakistan, and Indonesia as Asian neutrals as POW custodians, and charge UNC has rejected Asian nation as neutral. General Harrison denies the charge. At liaison group meeting, Admiral Daniel insists 375 remaining sick and wounded POW's be repatriated.

3 May Repatriation operations are completed for both sides; 6,670 Communists and 684 UNC personnel repatriated. Communists have not yet replied to Admiral Daniel's charge.

5 May 131st Plenary Session. UNC delegation states POW's refusing repatriation should not be moved out of Korea by force.

6 May 132nd Plenary Session. UNC renominates Pakistan as neutral POW custodian. General Harrison states that further discussion of the POW handling is premature until neutral nations are selected. Communists reiterate stand that nonrepatriated POW's should not be sent to neutral nation homelands.

7 May 133rd Plenary Session. In a new group of proposals the Communists agree to UNC stand on not removing nonrepatriates prisoners from Korea by force.

12 May UNC states there is no guarantee that political conference can settle repatriation problem.

13 May 138th Plenary Session. UNC submits counterproposal to Communists' proposal, naming India to supply armed forces for Custodial Commission.
14 May 139th Plenary Session. Communists completely reject UNC counter-proposal of 13 May.


18 Jun Letter from General Harrison to Nam Il, announcing escape of 27,000 North Korean anti-Communist POW's is delivered to Communists at Panmunjom.

26 Jul Liaison officers meet in executive session. General Mark W. Clark announces that UNC and Communists have reached agreement on terms of armistice and that signing is scheduled for 27 July.

27 Jul 159th Plenary Session at 1000 hours at Panmunjom. UNC Senior Delegate Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., and Communist senior delegate Nam Il sign the Armistice Agreement. General Mark W. Clark, CinCUNGC signs the agreement in the afternoon at Munsan Base Camp. Thus a march of the longest truce negotiations in history -- 2 years and 17 days, is arrived at an end putting a halt to 37 months and 2 days of bloody shooting war in Korea effective at 2200 hours today.
APPENDIX VI
CHRONOLOGY OF THE POST-ARMISTICE PERIOD
(JULY 1953 – DECEMBER 1977)

1953

5 Aug  Repatriation of prisoners of war, known as Operation “Big Switch” begins at Panmunjom. The repatriation processing will be lasted until 6 Sep.


28 Aug  The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution, limiting participation in the political conference, to be held in accordance with Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, to those 16 nations who fought in Korea against the Communist aggressors and the ROK on one side, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Communist NK on the other. Neutral nations are to be excluded.

1 Sep  A custodial force (1,500 troops) from India arrives in Korea to work with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission on the POWs repatriation matters.

4 Sep  Maj Gen William F. Dean is repatriated, arriving through the Freedom Gate at Panmunjom. The General was listed as missing in the battle of Taegon on 20 Jul 50, when he commanded the 24th US Inf Div.

6 Sep  Operation Big Switch is ended. Between 5 Aug and 6 Sep the UNC transferred 75,823 (in Little Switch 6,670) POWs directly to the Communists in the DMZ and the enemy sent back 12,773 (in Little Switch 684) persons to the UNC.

21 Sep  NK air force Capt Ro Kum-suk defects, landing at Kimhae air base with MIG. He is entitled to receive $100,000 from the UNC. Late in Apr 1953, Gen Clark, CINCUNC, broadcasted and delivered leaflets as far as the Yalu River, offering $100,000 reward and political asylum to the first Communist pilot in Korea to deliver the friendly forces an
undamaged MIG and $50,000 and asylum for each succeeding MIG pilot who flew the UNC side a Communist jet airplane.

23 Sep The UNC turns over more than 22,000 non-repatriates (POWs) to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) and the Indian Custodial Force in the DMZ.

24 Sep The Communists deliver 359 UNC personnel who do not wish to return home to NNRC.

1 Oct Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and US is formally signed at Washington by Foreign Minister Y.T. Pyun for the ROK and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for the USA.

7 Oct Gen Mark M. Clark leaves the UNC and Gen John E. Hull assumes CINCUNC.

26 Oct The 1st preparatory meeting of the Political Conference is convened at Panmunjom with futile result as the Communists using the conference table as a propaganda maneuver site.

31 Oct South African AF Fighter Squa leaves Korea heading for home country.

3 Nov The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution on the impartial investigation of charges of use by UN forces of bacteriological warfare.

6 Nov French Army Battalion leaves Korea after participating the UN war effort against Communist aggression in Korea, thus upholding the cause of freedom and peace.

12 Nov US Vice President Richard M. Nixon arrives in Seoul for consultations with the ROK Government of the ROK-US cooperation, particularly for the ROK security and economical assistance.

3 Dec The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution on atrocities committed by the NK Reds and Chinese Communists against the UNC prisoners of war held by the Communists.

23 Dec Explanation processing for non-repatriates comes to an end.

1954

Jan The 3rd US Inf Div leaves Korea.

22 Jan The Panmunjom meeting of preparatory political negotiations is broken off.

23 Jan At midnight on 22 Jan, 7,604 NKD prisoners and 14,235 Chinese Communists who chose freedom by refusing to return to Communist hands, marched out of the DMZ and at one minute after midnight
on 23 Jan they cross Freedom Bridge over the Imjin River into the UNC lines, thus becoming free civilians. The Chinese prepare to sail to Taiwan from Inchon, and the Koreans report to the ROK authorities.

12 Feb Royal Australian naval unit returns its home country.

18 Feb A meeting of four foreign ministers of US, UK, France, and Russia takes place in Belin between 25 Jan and 18 Feb and they agree today to meet in Geneva on 26 Apr 54 to hold political conference on the Korean question.

Mar The 40th US Div withdraws from Korea.

Apr Australian Army unit pulls out from Korea.

26 Apr Political conference on the Korean question begins in Geneva. The conference will be lasted until 15 June.

27 Apr Foreign Minister, Y.T. Pyun, presents the ROK position of the Korean unification at the Geneva political conference.

May The 45th US Div departs from Korea.

22 May Representative of the ROK proposes at the Geneva Political Conference to establish a united, independent and democratic Korea by free elections under the UN supervision.

15 Jun The 16 allies who contributed the military forces to the ROK made public a joint declaration at Geneva, stating that "... The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement ... The Communist repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the UN in Korea and have labelled the UN itself as the tool of aggression ... In the circumstances, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose. ..."

16 Jun The Geneva Political Conference is completely broken off due to the Communists' insincerity and obstinate estrangement.

21 Sep The 2nd US Div leaves Korea for its home country.


5 Nov Through Office of Public Information, the US DOD makes public US battle casualties during the period 25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953 in the Korean area as of 30 Sep 54. The battle casualties totaled 142,091: Deaths, 33,629; returned to military control, 5,133; refused repatriation, 21; and current missing, 24.

9 Nov The main body of the Netherlands troops leaves Korea by water today. The remainder will be moved out on 6 Dec.

Canadian AF pilot McKenzie is released by Communists.

The main body of the Netherlands force returns homeland.

1955

13 Jan Additional Greek contingent, consisting of 1,667 troops, arrives in Korea, thus augmenting the Greek Bn to a regimental size.

24 Jan Last Netherlands naval ship Dubois ends its service tour in the Korean waters.

5 Feb A RB-45 type UNC aircraft is suddenly attacked upon by four Russian-built MIG-15 over the Yellow Sea at 1340 hours. The UNC plane was on a routine aerial reconnaissance mission. There soon follow air fighting between US jet fighters and MIGs, resulting in one MIG-15 damaged and two others MIGs shot down.

9 Feb At the MAC meeting at Panmunjom, two sides charge each other about the 5 Feb air fighting. The UNC strongly charges the Reds that the Communist airplanes illegally attacked on the UNC plane over the international waters.

23 Feb US State Dept announces on the 5 Feb aerial incident that the Communists not only violated the Armistice Agreement but also seriously violated international law.

Mar The 1st US Marine Div leaves from Korea after its relief on 17–18 Mar by the 24th US Div.

10 Mar The Greek Regiment in Korea is reduced to a battalion-size. After 8 May, by an order of the Hellenic Army Command, only one Greek Bn will be remained.

1 Apr Gen Maxwell D. Taylor assumes CINCUNC.

1 Apr Last Greek AF Flight departs from K-14 airbase.

8 May Last five Greek aircraft departs from Japan, heading for Greece. The aircraft will be arrived at Elefsis, Greece, on 23 May.

13 May Philippine BCT leaves Korea.

31 May Four US airmen are released from Communist hands.

5 Jun Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer assumes CINCUNC.

21 Jun At 1515 hours, NKC pilot Senior Capt Lee Un-yong and radio-operator NKC 2nd Lt Lee In-sun are defected to ROK by landing at Seoul airfield with a YAK-18 aircraft.

12 Jul Greek Bn is limited to a reinforced-infantry company level.
Chronology of Post-Armistice

3 Aug 11 additional US airmen are released by the Communist side.

11 Dec Last contingent of the Greek Army unit departs from Korea.

15 Dec The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution to establish and maintain a UN Memorial Cemetery in Korea in honor of those fell in the Korean War.

1956

1 Jan The Committee of the UN Commission for the UNCRK, consisting of the representatives of Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, holds its first meeting and establishes its headquarters in Seoul.

Jun Beginning in Jun, initial units of the 1st US Marine Aircraft Wing are withdrawn from Korea and relocated at Iwakun, Japan.

1957

21 Jun The UNC, at the 75th MAC meeting, announces to the Communist side that the UNC abrogates the provisions of sub-paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement, charging the Communists' gross violations of the provisions. In fact, the sub-paragraph has long been null as far as the Communists are concerned.

1 Jul US Far East Command is disbanded.

1 Jul Headquarters of the UN Command moves to Seoul, Korea and, effective today, CINCUNC assumes two additional commands of US Forces, Korea (USFK) and Eighth US Army.

1 Jul Gen George H. Decker assumes CINCUNC, Commander of USFK and CG, Eight US Army.

15 Oct The 1st US Caval Div returns to Korea after it had left Korea to Japan in Dec 51.

29 Nov The UN General Assembly, in its resolution on the Korean question today, reaffirms the UN objectives based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the UNC participated-nations at Geneva Conference.

1958

16 Feb A DC-3 type passenger plane of the Korean National Airline (KNA), with 34 men aboard including a National Assemblymen, a US officer, and three crew members, is hijacked in the sky over Pyongtaek and diverted to the Communist-ruled North.

6 Mar NK Communists return only 26 men back trough Panmunjom leaving
the 5 principal hijacked offenders and their 3 family members.

10 Apr Today, a Communist agent, directed by NKC clique, attempts to hijack a ROKAF transport aircraft, C-46-593.

24 Apr NKC gun-boats kidnapped a fishing boat peacefully engaging in fishery works off Yonpyong-do in the Western Sea.

30 Sep The National Medical Center in Seoul opens today. The three Scandinavian nations of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, who contributed a great deal of medical aids to the ROK and UNC forces, took part in building the medical center.

6 Oct At the Western Sea waters some distance from Incheon, a coastal patrol force seizes NK Communists' armed espionage boat with five espionage agents aboard.

7 Nov 11 fishers are kidnapped together with their two fishery boats to the Red North by the NK naval gunboats when they are engaging in coastfishery.

6 Dec 42 fishermen and their 7 fishing boats are kidnapped by NK Communist gunboats in the Eastern Sea.

1959

27 Jan Lee Tong-jun, a journalist of "Pravda," a Soviet Union's organ, extricates himself from the Communist hell to the free land, the ROK, at Panmunjom.

1 Jul Gen Carter B. Magruder takes over the command of CINCUNC from Gen Decker.

27 Jul A naval force sends one NKC armed-ship to the bottom, killing 5 NK Reds and capturing two others.

6 Nov A formal agreement between the ROK and the UN is signed on the establishment of the UN Memorial Cemetery in Korea. The UN will assume the Administration of the Cemetery effective on 31 Mar 1960.

10 Nov A security agency arrests NK Communists' army Lt. Col. Shin Um-bum on the charge of spying activities.

26 Nov A coastal security unit sinks down a NKC espionage ship, capturing 4 operators.

31 Dec The UNKRA which has been established in Korea based on the UN General Assembly's resolution of 1 Dec 50, is terminated.

1960

20 Jun US President Dwight D. Eisenhower arrives in Seoul for a state visit
to Korea. He meets top ranking ROK leaders and visited the UN Command and reviewed contingents representing UN Forces which are helping to defend this key Free World position. ROK Prime Minister Huh Chung and President Eisenhower issue a joint communique today, stressing to maintain vigilance and strength, patience and foresightendness, in carrying out the purposes for which the alliance between the ROK and US stands.


30 Jul A coastal security force captures a NKC sailor off Kojin-ri on the east coast, when the Communist sailor is attempting to infiltrate into the south through the waters.

3 Aug NKC 2nd Lt Chung Nak-Hyun defects to the Free South, landing at Duepo-ri airstrip north of Yangyang with a Soviet-built MIG aircraft.

15 Aug The NK Communists' chieftain Kim Il-sung states his new unification plan in a speech celebrating the 15th anniversary of Korean liberation, calling for the creation of a "confederated government" between the south and north.

1961

7 Apr In the Eastern Sea 6 fishing boats are kidnapped to the Communist North by specially-trained Red agents.

21 Apr A friendly sabre-jet plane is attacked by three Communists' MIG's over the coast waters off Kunsan.

16 May A chaotic national situation -- political and social wranglings -- is narrowly averted as the Military Revolutionary Council, led by General Park Chung Hee, assumes power in order to save the nation which is in imminent peril. Thus, a historical new era begins to lead the nation's unprecedented development, modernization and prosperity.

1 Jul Gen Guy S. Meloy, Jr. assumes command of the UNC/USFK/Eighth Army.

6 Jul Kim Il-sung, visiting Moscow, concludes a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union to bolster NKC's armed forces.

11 Jul Kim Il-sung, making begging tour to his Communist bosses, concludes a mutual defense treaty with Communist China at Peking.

25 Aug NK Communist troops are intruded the south of the DMZ and assault upon a UNC civil guard post, murdering the guards.
Chairman Park Chung Hee of the ROK Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) and US President John F. Kennedy conclude today a friendly exchange of views on the current Korean situation and the various matters of common interest of the two countries.

1962

22 Jun 9 NK Red espionage agents, disguised a fishery-men, are arrested by a security unit.

7 Jul A friendly gun-boat sends a NK Red espionage ship down to the bottom in the Eastern Sea.

5 Sep Three NK Communist soldiers are killed by forward line troops when the Red hordes attempted to assault on friendly guards just south of the DMZ.

Nov The NKG regime sends its military delegation to Moscow to obtain increased Soviet military aid but the delegation is cold-shouldered by the Soviet regime that is pursuing a policy of detent with the West.

23 Nov NK Communist troops shot two US soldiers to death in the area of the southern-half military demarcation line.

3 Dec A coastal security unit kills three NK Red espionage agent at the west coast.

23 Dec At 1100 hours, heavily armed two NKC P.T. high-speed gun boats assault in surprise upon a UNC patrol boat in the neighboring waters off Yonpyong-do, causing 6 killed and wounded.

1963

17 May A US OH helicopter is crashed to the ground within the Communist-held territory and is kidnapped to the Red North.

29 Jul Three UNC soldiers are killed and wounded when a small band of intruded-NKC troops raided friendly guard posts south of the DMZ.

1 Aug Gen Hamilton H. House takes over CINCUNC; Commander, US Forces, Korea; and CG, Eighth US Army from outgoing Gen Guy S. Meloy, Jr.

4 Aug NKC troops assault on UNC guard posts in the vicinity of the southern half of the military demarcation line. There ensues a two-hour engagement.

Dec The Third Republic is born with a civil government through the general, national elections that gave General Park Chung Hee a popular mandate as President. Thus, the ROK begins the formidable task of modern-day nation-building.
1964

14 Jan  One ROK AF F-86D fighter is plunged to the ground within the DMZ by NK anti-aircraft fire when the plane is on a routine air alert mission.

25 Jan  One ROK tourist is kidnapped by NK Communist agents at Panmunjom.

27 Jan  The NK Communists return the pilot's dead body of the 14 Jan incident through the MAC but the plane. The UNC Sr Delegate vigorously claims the Communists' delegate to salute the body apologizing for their murder.

29 Jan  President Park and US Secretary of State Dean Rusk announce a joint communiqué at Seoul, pledging themselves to continued, close cooperation in the economic, military and political fields.

26 Feb  A fleet of some 50 Red Chinese fishing vessels are invaded in the neighboring waters of Huksan-do, southwest of Mokpo.

20 Mar  NK Communists kidnap 26 ROK fishery-men together with their two fishing vessels by force.


1965

3 Jan  Ethiopian Battalion, which came to the ROK's aid on 7 May 51, leaves Korea for its home country.

5 Mar  A ROK coastal security unit seized a NK Communists' armed-espionage boat and 6 armed NKC secret agents when they are attempting to land at the coast in the Eastern Sea off Samchok.

26 Apr  13 fishers and their fishing boat "Taeyong-ho No. 6" are kidnapped to the Communist North by a NKC naval patrol ship while they are drifting due to the boat's engine trouble at high sea 45 miles southwest of Taechong-do in the Western Sea.

27 Apr  NKC's MIG fighters fire guns against US airplanes over the Eastern Sea.

17 May  President Park Chung Hee arrives in Washington for a ten-day state visit to the US and meets US President Johnson to exchange views on the current international situation and matters on common interest.

18 May  An Army aviation aircraft is shot down by NK Communists' ground fire in the vicinity of the DMZ.

1 Jul   The 2nd US Inf Div returns to Korea.

1 Jul   Gen Dwight E. Beach assumes command of UNC/USFK/Eighth US Army after Gen Hamilton H. House.
Four armed NKC espionage agents infiltrate in the Songchu public garden west of Uijongbu, resulting in two policemen killed and two Reds captured.

Dr. Syngman Rhee, first President of the ROK, is passing away today in Hawaii following an exile brought about by the April 1960 Student Revolution.

Five armed NK Red agents assault innocent villagers in the Sorak-san area, kidnapping or bloodshing four peoples.

A band of NKC armed espionage agents raids farmerhouses in the mountainous areas in Yuyang and Andong, indiscriminately murdering innocent villagers.

4 to 5 NK Communist armed espionage agents assault Lt. Col. Kim Du Pyo's house and outrage cruelly an atrocity, killing Col. Kim and all four of his family including a six-year old child.

109 ROK fishers are kidnapped to the Communist North by a sudden assault of NKC warships in the coastal waters off Kwanghwa-do.

A heavily armed-fishing vessel from Communist China is cruised in the ROK waters and kidnapped by force 14 fishery-men and their boat "Kilyong-ho" in the waters near Kyongnyolbi-yolto, a chain of islands in the Western Sea.

Two fishing boats, namely Tongmyong-ho and Yonggung-ho, are kidnapped to the north by NK Communist naval vessels.

Armed vessels of Communist China attempt to kidnap ROK fishing boats by chasing them for one and a half hours in the sea near Taechong-do.

A three-man band of NKC armed-espionage agents infiltrates into Kangnung on the east coast and engages with local policemen suffering one Red killed.

The 16th Turkish Armed Forces Company, 262 officers and men, departs Korea leaving only ROK, US, and Thai combat troops remaining of the original UN Command.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and his party, arrive in Korea for 27-hours visit to complete ROK-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiations.

ROK-US SOFA is signed in Seoul. Agreement becomes effective 3 months after ratification by the ROK Parliament.
29 Jul  An 11-man Turkish Honor Guard Team arrives for 1-year rotation tour with the UNC Honor Guard.

30 Jul  7th US Inf Div, in Korea since 16 Sep 1950, celebrates its 7,000th day of continuous service in the Republic of Korea.

3 Aug  A 16-man contingent of the British Army based in Hong Kong, British Crown Colony (BCC), arrives for replacement tour with the UNC Honor Guard.

26 Aug  Gen. Dwight E. Beach, CINCUNC/Commander, USFK/CG, Eighth US Army, leaves Korea to become CINCUSARPAC.

31 Aug  Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, arrives to succeed Gen Beach, outgoing CINCUNC.

21 Oct  At 1711 hours, a ROK trucks transporting the evening meal for guard troops is ambushed by NK Communist troops, in the western sector, 50th of MDL.

31 Oct  US President Lyndon B. Johnson arrives in Korea for a 44-hour state visit, marking the second visit of an American President to the Republic of Korea.

2 Nov  An eight-man UNC patrol was ambushed and attacked by NK Communist infiltrators half-mile south of the DMZ. Six US soldiers and one KATUSA of the 1st Bn, 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Inf Div were killed in ambush, and a US soldier, the only survivor of the patrol, was wounded in the grenade attack. The Communist attack, the most serious involving American troops since the Armistice, came 8 hours before President Johnson left Korea for the United States.

1967

19 Jan  In the afternoon, two NKC gun boats sink PCE-56, ROK naval vessel during a 20-minute in the international waters. The unprecedented Communist attack results in some 40 men killed and wounded plus some 30 men missing. The ROK ship was protecting ROK fishery vessels.

3 Feb  A group of NK infiltrators attack a ROKA guard post in the central sector of the DMZ, resulting one NKC killed. Unprovoked enemy attacks in and near the DMZ were to become an almost daily occurrence in 1967.

9 Feb  The SOFA becomes effective throughout the Republic of Korea.

9 Feb  16 members of the 2nd Bn, United Kingdom's Queen's Regiment, arrives in Korea for a three-month tour with the UNC Honor Guard.

23 Mar  Lee Su-kun, Vice Chief of the NK Communist Central News Agency,
defects to the Republic of Korea at the conclusion of the 242nd MAC meeting at Panmunjom. (Refer 13 Feb 1969.)

7 Apr Groundbreaking ceremonies are held at Kapyong for a British Commonwealth Korean War memorial honoring UNC forces from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

12 Apr A reinforced platoon of 40 to 60 NK Communist troops cross the MDL and are repulsed by a 48-man force from a ROK regiment. In the six hour engagement, the UNC side used artillery for the first time since the Armistice.

17 Apr ROK Air Force jets sink an armed NK Communist espionage vessel on the Western Sea, about 60 miles southwest of Inchon, six of the fifteen men aboard the craft are captured by a ROK Navy patrol ship.

3 May Another contingent of the 18th Light Regiment, Royal Artillery from the United Kingdom, arrives in Korea for a three-month tour with the UNC Honor Guard.

6 May President Park Chung Hee is declared victor of the 1967 Presidential Election.

22 May Two soldiers of the 1st Bn, 23rd Infantry, 2nd US Inf Division, are killed and 16 others injured when several enemy-planted satchel charges shatter their barracks near the western sector of the DMZ. The explosions were the result of NK Communist sabotage, the first of its kind since the Armistice.

31 May The 7th US Inf Division celebrates 20 consecutive years of service in Korea in a ceremony attended by ROK and US officials.

8 Jun The second 18-man Turkish armed forces contingent to be assigned to the UNC Honor Guard arrives for one-year tour.

15 Jun The 19th Royal Thai Infantry Company arrives for one-year tour in Korea with the 7th US Inf Division. Except for the ROK and US, the Thais are the only members of the original UNC who still maintain combat forces in Korea.

16 Jul Three 2nd US Inf Div soldiers are killed during an attack by an unknown number of NK Red intruders 300 meters south of the southern boundary of the DMZ.

10 Aug Three 7th US Inf Div soldiers are killed and 16 wounded in an unprecedented daylight ambush by NK Communists south of the DMZ.

22 Aug In a Viet Cong-type tactic, one 2nd US Inf Div soldier is killed and one injured when their jeep hits an enemy claymore mine and they are fired upon by NK Red intruders.
Chronology of Post-Armistice

28 Aug

In a NK Communist attack on a US Army engineer company working 200 yards northeast of UNC Joint Security Area (JSA) advance camp but south of the DMZ, 4 UNC personnel are killed (2 KATUSAs, 2 US soldiers), and 26 wounded (14 Americans, 9 KATUSAs, and 3 ROK civilians).

30 Sep

A monument commemorating the participation of the forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the Korean War is dedicated at Kapyong, site of a famous battle (22-25 April 1951). ROK Premier, Ambassadors of the Commonwealth nations honored, and CINCUNC presided at the unveiling.

30 Sep

A ceremony is held to unveil a monument commemorating the heroic battle fought by Australians at Chuktong-ri (Moktong-ri), Kapyong-gun in April 1951.

7 Oct

One 2nd US Inf Div soldier drowns after being wounded by NK Red gun fire which raked a US patrol boat on the Imjin River about 2,400 feet south of the DMZ.

15 Oct

ROK Defense Minister Kim Sung Eun officiates at a Manila ceremony honoring 112 Philippine soldiers killed in the Korean War.

3 Nov

The 1st Bn, Lancashier Fusiliers arrive in Korea for a three-month tour as the British contingent of the UNC Honor Guard, replacing the 1st Bn, Welsh Regiment.

1968

19 Jan

ROK and US troops conduct search operations for a group of 31 armed NK Red marauders sighted near Pobwon-ri, 24 kilometers below the American sector of the DMZ.

21 Jan

A band of 31 armed NK Communist agents are intercepted by national police in northern suburbs of Seoul. In fire-fights throughout the night, intruders suffer five dead, one captured. Friendly casualties, all civilians, are six dead, five wounded.

23 Jan

A US electronic intelligence ship with 83 crewmen aboard is seiged by four armed NK Communist patrol boats and two MiG jets. The first American ship to be seized in 100 years, the USS Pueblo is boarded in international waters 25 miles from the Korean mainland and forced into the NKC port of Wonsan on the east coast.

29 Jan

Members of the 2nd US Inf Div repel four separate armed Communist agent teams attempting to infiltrate into the south.

1 Feb

An intelligence agency announces the arrest of a 32-man espionage ring which had been collecting and transmitting information since Oct 1965
on UNC forces as well as the political and economic situation in the ROK.

Feb 7  USS Enterprise is reported to have been moved from the East Sea where it had been deployed following the Pueblo incident.

Feb 11  US President Johnson's special envoy, Cyrus R. Vance, arrives to discuss with President Park Chung Hee the "current situation brought about the recent actions of NK Communists."

Feb 15  US Presidential envoy Cyrus R. Vance concludes four days of high level ROK-US talks and returns to Washington. Both nations pledge in joint communique to conduct "immediate consultations" and to "decide promptly what action to take" whenever NK Communist actions threaten the ROK security.

Feb 23  US Secretary of State Dean Rusk announces that talks with NK Reds on the release of the Pueblo are "over the preliminaries and we are now getting to the heart of the matter."

Mar 21  Rear Admiral Nils E. Oedman, incoming Swedish alternate member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, arrives in Korea to replace Maj Gen Carl G. Smedmark.

Mar 22  The deployment of 318th US Fighter Interceptor Squadron to Osan AFB, marks the first time in history that US Aerospace Defense Command F-106 fighter interceptors have flown to a critical overseas area, using inflight refueling along with tactical air units.

Mar 27  Three NK Communist infiltrators are thwarted in their attempt to penetrate southward by guards from a ROK division and a Quick Reaction Force from the 2nd US Div on the western front.

Apr 14  NK Communists ambush and kill four UNC soldiers, two KATUSAs and two Americans, and wound two others 800 yards south of the Joint Security Area. The soldiers were aboard a truck making a routine trip in the Hqs area of the Military Armistice Commission, taking UNC guards to the JSA, when the Communist attack came at 1100 hours.

Apr 17  President Park Chung Hee meets with US President Johnson in a one-day summit session held in Honolulu, Hawaii. They discussed about mounting pressure by NK Communists against the Republic of Korea, as well as the conduct of the Vietnam War and President Johnson's bid for peace talks with Hanoi.

Apr 21  A US patrol and a NK Red force of 50-75 men clash in the southern position of the DMZ, leaving one American dead and three wounded, and four Communists dead. The incident brings the total number of US casualties cased by Communist provocations since 1 January
1968 to five killed and 20 wounded.

26 Apr  The Pentagon, USA, announces a plan to reinforce US forces in Korea with two armored divisions and elements of a mechanized division, in the event current NK Communist border raids develop into large-scale fighting.

27 Apr  A KATUSA is killed and two American soldiers of the 7th US Inf Div are wounded when their patrol is ambushed by NK marauders near Panmunjom.

30 Apr  A bomb is hurled into the Korean International Telecommunications Center injuring seven persons. Communication facilities are undamaged by the blast which is believed to be an act of NK Communist sabotage.

27 May  A two-day meeting between ROK Defense Minister and US Secretary of Defense (Clark Clifford) begins in Washington to discuss modernization of ROK military equipment to effectively counter NK Communist provocations.

13 June  The first joint ROK-US, mass-tactical airborne maneuvers in Korea since 1952 are held, dropping to the banks of the Han River in a training exercise.

25 June  In two brief engagements along the eastern front of the DMZ, ROKA defenders kill four NK Communist infiltrators while ceremonies in Seoul mark the tragic 18th anniversary of the start of the Korean War.

1 Jul  The Fifth USAF Advance Command at Osan AFB announces a rotation of one of its new tactical fighter/interceptor units in Korea, AF build-up in Korea began with the NK Communist attempted Blue House raid and USS Pueblo crises in Jan 1968.

11 Jul  Three NK Communist infiltrators are killed by ROKA guards on the eastern front of the DMZ while attempting to penetrate into the south.

21 Jul  A KATUSA and US soldier of 2nd Bn, 38th Inf, 2nd US Inf Div, are wounded in a firefight between a 2nd Div patrol and a band of NK Red infiltrators.

30 Jul  In a pair of clashes with NK infiltrators south of the DMZ, one NCO of the 2nd US Inf Div is killed and three other Americans are wounded.

5 Aug  NK Communist infiltrators kill a US soldier, 1st Bn, 38th Inf, 2nd US Inf Div, and wound four other members of his UNC patrol.

18 Aug  Two NCOs of the 7th US Inf Div are killed when eight NK intruders clash with a UNC patrol south of the DMZ.

2 Sep  Three US officers are assaulted in the JSA at Panmunjom by 15 to 20
members of a NKC work crew after the US officers attempted to return a dropped hat to a NKC guard. The officers were able to drive away from the melee, escaping serious injury.

19 Sep Four armed NKC infiltrators are killed in a firefight in the 2nd US Inf Div area that claimed the life of a KATUSA soldier of the division. The clash, in which seven KATUSAs were also wounded, took place shortly before the opening of the 278th meeting of the MAC at Panmunjom.

24 Sep ROK soldiers kill seven of a large band of NKC intruders on the western front south of the MDL in a series of three engagements without sustaining a casualty.

25 Sep The 7th US Inf Div celebrates its, 7,777th day in Korea.

3 Oct Lt Gen Kebade Gebrie, Ethiopian Defense Minister visits the war monument constructed near Chuncheon for the Ethiopian soldiers who gave their lives during the Korean War.

4 Oct In a UNC report to the U.N. Security Council, it is pointed out that armed bands of NKC infiltrators caused 304 serious incidents in the first eight months of 1968. The report, which serves to focus attention on the continued failure of NKC to abide by the 1953 Armistice Agreement, lists 62 UNC personnel killed and 130 wounded in those incidents. Verified NKC casualties during the same period have been 121 killed and four captured.

7 Oct Secret sessions at Panmunjom engender hope for release of the Pueblo crew by Christmas.

11 Oct A patrol from the 2nd US Inf Div kills two NKC infiltrators in the southern half of the DMZ as they are attempting to exfiltrate the MDL.

21 Oct The ROK Government submits a 37-page position paper to all 125 UN member nations charging that NKC regime had built up its military establishment and increased its threats, and asking the United Nations for continued military support to meet these threats. The document states that serious military incidents along the DMZ increased 11-fold in 1967, bringing Communist violations of the 1953 Armistice Agreement to a total of 6,337 proven cases by land, sea and air. The memorandum warns "... today, the NK Communists are more militant, more extreme, more adventurous and more dangerous than ever before."

23 Oct A soldier is killed, and five other Americans of the 2nd Bn, 38th Regt are wounded during a firefight with NKC infiltrators 400 yards north of the security fence in the 2nd US Inf Div sector of the DMZ.

3 Nov Nine NKC intruders are killed during separate attacks on three ROKA
outposts in the central and eastern sectors of the DMZ. Three ROK troops are killed and one is wounded in the engagements.

13 Nov
Counter Espionage Operations Hqs (CEOH) announces that NKC landed another 30 armed agents along the east coast near Samchok early this month. This infiltration by some 60 men is the largest since the 1953 Armistice and is believed aimed at establishing bases for guerrilla warfare in the South.

16 Nov
Counter Espionage Operations Hqs announces the capture of two officers, both members of the 124th NKC Army Unit, during east coast mop-up operations. Their capture brings to 32 the number of NKC commandoes neutralized.

20 Dec
The UN General Assembly approves a resolution upholding the UN's aims for a democratic, unified Korea by a vote of 71 to 25 with 20 abstentions, and rejects overwhelmingly a Communist demand for the withdrawal of all UNC armed forces.

23 Dec
The 82 crewmen of the USS Pueblo return to freedom.

28 Dec
ROK joint task forces operating in the Kangwon province kill four more NKC guerrillas.

1969

20 Jan
1 Corps (Gp) begins an extensive five-day FTX on the eve of the first anniversary of the abortive NKC commando raid on the "Blue House."

20 Jan
Richard M. Nixon inaugurated as 37th US President.

31 Jan
A total of 218 fishermen of 24 fishing boats are being detained in the Communist North after they were abducted by Communist gun boats in the Eastern Sea.

4 Feb
Seven Chinese Communist patrol boats hijack a ROK fishing vessel about 110 miles west of Inchon.

25 Feb
The Counter Espionage Operations Hqs announces the neutralization of a 15-member NKC espionage ring in the Ulchin—Samchok area of the east coast.

25 Feb
A maritime police boat intercepts and sinks a NKC spy ship south of the MDL off the west coast following a 15-minute running sea battle.

15 Mar
A NKC guard post opens fire on a 10-man work party of the 2nd US Div replacing markers on the MDL.

18 Mar
Counter Espionage Opns Hqs announces that police and home militia kill eight NKC infiltrators who had landed by rubber raft at Chunmunjin
48 km south of the DMZ.

19 Mar  US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the threats of the NKC regime are underlined “by their attempt last year to assault against the Blue House, their seizure of USS Pueblo, ... and their continued efforts to infiltrate armed bands into the South”.

26 Mar  In separate incidents, two UNC guard posts in the DMZ receive several hundred rounds of AW fire from NKC guard posts and return the enemy fire. The second incident begins while the 287th MAC meeting is in progress at Panmunjom.

28 Mar  Former US President Dowight D. Eisenhower dies today.

7 Apr  NK Communists fire 300 rounds in 40 minutes into UNC positions in the central sector of the DMZ, UNC forces return the fire in the heaviest DMZ firefight of this year.

12 Apr  In the first ROK-British combined exercise, three Royal British Navy ships with a complement of 2,000 men join with the ROK Marines, Navy and AF to stage “Exercise FOAM Lift,” a three-day sea-to-land heliborne assault directed by the UNC.

15 Apr  Two NKC MIG fighters intercept and shoot down an unarmed USN EC-121 reconnaissance plane with 31 men aboard. The four-engine, popellor-driven aircraft is down in the Eastern Sea, 95 miles south of Chongjin, NKC-held territory.

17 Apr  US President Nixon orders continuance of reconnaissance plane flights near the Communist North and adds that they will be protected from armed attack. In response to the decision, US warships and planes head for the Eastern Sea.

23 Apr  NK Communists open fire on a UNC guardpost in the southern half of the DMZ with recoiless rifle and machine gun fire.

29 Apr  US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird discloses that the US is studying a plan to set up a munition factory in Korea capable of producing M16 rifles.

12 May  The Government circulates a 10-point memorandum to members of the UN. The paper condemns increased provocations by NKC and asks for UN support in constraining NKC aggression act.

23 May  In a report to the UN Secretariat, UNCURK concludes that a UN presence should remain in the ROK as a restraining influence in the serious confrontation between the South and North.

25 May  ROK troops defending in the western sector of the DMZ kill three of
five NKC infiltrators and repel the other two.
out that only Vietnam and Korea "have been the front line" for the
defense of freedom against Communist aggression.

4 Jun
At the conclusion of the ROK-US Ministerial Conference, ROK Defense
Minister (Im Chung Shik) and US Deputy Defense Secretary (David
Parkard) issue a joint communique which reaffirms ROK-US efforts
to strengthen the ROK Armed Forces.

8 Jun
Coastal defense forces sink an armed NKC boat attempting to land
Communist agents off Pukpyong on the east coast. Five civilians were
killed by a shell fired from the NKC boat.

13 Jun
ROK forces capture a 75-ton NKC boat killing seven Communist agents
aboard near Taehuksan Island off Mokpo.

14 Jun
Five NKC MIG fighters appear over the DMZ in the central sector near
Chorwon, but flee northward after ROK and USAF units scramble two
F86 Sabrejets and two F100 Sabres over the area.

17 Jun
ROKA, police and reservists kill six members of a Communist infiltration
team on Taehuksan Island. Seven other members were killed after their
high speed craft was intercepted and captured four days ago.

23 Jun
The 20th Thai Rotation Company passes its colors to the incoming 21st
Thai Company.

21 Jul
NKC infiltrators are repulsed by 2nd US Div troops after a 35-minute
firefight.

25 Jul
US President Nixon makes informal remarks with newsmen at Guam
on American policy in the Pacific, to be known later "Nixon Doctrine."

25 Jul
Three NKC armed agents are tracked down and killed by police and local
defense reservists on Taehuksan-do off Mokpo.

25 Jul
Three NKC armed intruders and two ROK soldiers are killed in three
separate firefights in the southern half of the DMZ.

30 Jul
45 NKC guards attack 15 UNC personnel with first and clubs at the JSA
truce site.

31 Jul
US Secretary of State William P. Rogers arrives for a two-day visit to
discuss security measures with ROK officials.

10 Aug
NK Communists attack a ROK patrol in the eastern sector of the DMZ,
resulting in one ROK soldier killed and two wounded.

12 Aug
A high-speed NKC boat attacks a ROK fishing vessel off the southern
islands of Cholla province killing two men and wounding three others,
before escaping northward.
An unarmed US OH-23 helicopter with three members of the 59th Avn Co aboard is shot down over NKC held-territory after the pilot became dis-oriented and inadvertently overflew the DMZ.

President Park Chung Hee, who left for San Francisco on 20 Aug, returns from summit talks with US President Nixon.

Three NK Communist infiltrators are killed and one captured in the eastern sector of the DMZ.

Gen C.H. Bonesteel, CINCUNC, departs Korea and, Gen J.H. Michaelis, currently Deputy CG, Eighth Army assumes command of USAF and Eighth Army. He will assume command of UNC on 1 Oct.

Four NKC agents are killed and their infiltration boat is captured by joint ROK Army, Navy, Air Force, HDVF, and National Police forces near Kunsan on the west coast.

NKC howitzers and recoilless rifles open fire on a ROKA guardpost in the central sector of the DMZ.

ROKN destroyer Pusan-Ham sinks a NK spy boat after a running gun battle off the southwest coast. All aboard the agent-infiltration craft, an estimated 15 men, are killed and six sailors are injured.

Frontline troops kill two NKC infiltrators and repel a third after a 15-minute firefight in the central sector of the DMZ.

The ROKN destroyer Chungmu-ham, aided by ROK AF F5A jets, sink a 75-ton NKC gunboat after a running sea battle off the southwest coast.

Two NKC agents who had appeared on the western front on 12 Oct are killed by Marines when they attempt to cross the Imjin River and escape north.

Four soldiers of the 7th US Div are killed in a daylight ambush by NK Communists.

Former US Vice President, Hubert H. Humphrey, begins a four-day visit to Korea.

Three Crewmen of US OH-23 helicopter are released at Panmunjom after 180 days in Communist captivity.

A KAL turboprop YS11 enroute from Kangnung to Seoul with 51 Korean nationals aboard is hijacked to a NKC airport near Wonsan.

Counter Espionage Ops Hqs announces that a total of 367 NKC agents attempted to infiltrate the Republic of Korea in 1969 on 153 occasions. Of the 367 NKCs, 79 were captured and 93 were killed. Captured
equipment included three heavily armed espionage boats between 50 and 75 tons, eight rubber or wooden rafts, 38 SMGs, 37 pistols and more than 8,000 rounds of ammunition.

1970

21 Jan UNCURK representatives from Australia, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Chile and the Netherlands begin closed meetings in Tokyo to discuss political, economical and military aspects of the Korean peninsula and the hijacking to NKC of a KAL airliner on 11 Dec 69.

14 Feb 39 passengers of the KAL plan are released to UNC military authorities at Panmunjom.

19 Feb A Japanese government investigation confirms that NKC had ordered cholera, pest, and bacillus anthracis germs from a Japanese firm.

24 Feb US Senate subcommittee on US Security Agreements opens hearing which will focus on the presence of 50,000 US troops in Korea and on future US military involvement in Korea in the event of a renewed war. US Ambassador to Korea W.J. Porter and Gen J.H. Michaelis, CINCUNC are in Washington to testify.

4 Apr ROKN destroyer Koje-ham intercepts and sinks a 50-ton NKC espionage boat with all aboard, about 20 miles northwest of Kunsan off the west coast.

8 Apr Army troops, home defense reservists, and police kill 3 NKC infiltrators in the hills about 30km northwest of Seoul.

8 Apr ROK troops and home defense reservists intercept and kill 3 NKC infiltrators.

30 Apr A ROKA patrol kills three armed NKC infiltrators in a DMZ firefight in the western-central sector.

3 May An Army task force kills 3 armed NKC agents on the west coast while a counter-intelligence unit captures a 21-man Communist espionage ring.

3 Jun As ROK forces in the western sector drive 4 NK infiltrators back across the Imjin River, heavy covering fire from Communist guns north of the MDL wounds two ROK civilians.

5 Jun High-speed NKC naval vessels fire upon and seize a ROKN patrol boat south of the Western Sea MDL. Friendly craft, with 20 crewmen aboard, was assigned to protect a fishing fleet in international waters northwest of Yonpyong-do. See fated vessel is first ROKN ship to be captured by the Reds since the Korean War.
President Park Chung Hee says a withdrawal of any substantial part of the US Military force in Korea at this time would be unacceptable to the ROK Government.

In three separate infiltration attempts along the DMZ, 3 NKC armed agents are killed and several repelled.

Troops battle three NKC infiltrators in a mountainous area 24 km north of Seoul, killing one of the Reds.

The 22nd Thai Company arrives at Osan AFB as the 21st Company departs.

The last member of a trio of NKC infiltrators is hunted down and killed on Noko Mountain some 27 km northeast of Seoul, ending a tense 96-hour manhunt.

Two or Three NKC agents attempt to place a time bomb in a gate of the National Cemetery in Tongjak-dong, Seoul, but fail as the bomb explodes, killing one of the Red terrorists.

ROK AF and Navy forces disable and capture a 6-ton NKC infiltration boat, equipped with radar and rocket launchers, near Yonghung Island, 20 miles southwest of Inchon. 6 armed NKC agents are killed by homeland defense reservists and police coastal watchers on Yonghung-do after a one-hour firefight. Two policemen and one home militiaman were killed in action and 6 other police men were wounded.

Two NKC agents, believed to be the survivors of the terror squad which attempted to plant a time bomb at the National Cemetery on 22 Jun, are ambushed and killed on the Kimpo peninsula by a ROK special force patrol.

Five small ROK fishing boats, with a total of 29 crewmen aboard, are hijacked to the Communist North by three-speed NKC patrol boats. This rare incident took place two miles from the ROK-held island of Pyongnyong-do.

The two-day ROK/US Defense Minister's Meeting ends in Hawaii. The US side assures the ROK minister that the US will render prompt and effective assistance in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty in the event of an armed attack against the ROK.

ROKAF jets sink a 60-ton NKC infiltration craft off the east coast near Kojin.

The first in a series of talks at UNC Hqs is held to discuss details of modernizing ROK armed forces in light of planned US military cutbacks here.
Chronology of Post-Armistice

15 Aug
President Park Chung Hee, in an Independence Day speech, expresses a willingness to take "epochal and realistic measures toward reunification of the peninsula if NKC regime would give up its aggressive designs on the Republic of Korea."

22 Aug
Former members of the 1st ROK Div and the 27th US Inf Regt hold a 20th anniversary reunion at Tabu-dong, the site of the 1950 battle which turned back a critical NKC strike at Taegu, the anchor of the Nakton River Perimeter.

31 Aug
In separate incidents on each of the last three days, ROK and 2nd US Div troops intercepted and fired at several NKC infiltrators as they fled north across the DMZ.

7 Sep
Marines repel 3 armed NKC agents crossing the Imjin River about 48 km northwest of Seoul.

16 Sep
Lt Gen. Georges Vivario, Belgian Armed Forces Chief of Staff, arrives for a 3-day visit.

19 Sep
ROK security forces kill two NKC infiltrators on Yongjong-do 6 miles northwest of Inchon.

22 Sep
Seven NKC agents attempt to infiltrate into the south in the eastern sector of the DMZ, resulting in one NKC agent killed by ROK guards. The other six escaped north after a exchange of fire.

27 Sep
Two NKC armed agents landed by speed-boat on Kadok Island 185 miles southeast of Seoul are killed by ROK security forces.

1 Oct
A US Army helicopter, flying a routine patrol mission along the Imjin River 48 km north of Seoul, is fired upon by NKC gun positions north of the DMZ.

10 Oct
A heavily armed NKC agent boat is sunk off Kojin-ni on the eastern coast by ROKN patrol craft.

12 Oct
Seven UNC Security personnel at the Panmunium Joint Security Area are injured as a result of an unprovoked attack by club-wielding NKC guards and civilian laborers in the truce zone.

17 Oct
At the 306th MAC meeting, UNC Sr Member proposes that JSA security forces of both sides be disarmed as part of "an attempt to preclude tension at the truce site and reestablish a proper environment for the continuing business of the MAC, NNSC and subordinate elements."

23 Oct
ROK Army and Eighth US Army agree to reconfigure the present I US Corps in Korea into a combined ROK/US Corps group effective 1 Jul 1971.
29 Nov  NKC releases 32 fishermen who return home aboard their boats after 8 months of captivity. They were seized by the Reds last April while peacefully fishing in international waters.

3 Dec  A NKC pilot, Maj Park Sung-kun, lands his MIG 15 on the eastern seacoast near Kansong.

7 Dec  The UN General Assembly decides by an overwhelming majority to maintain the military and political presence of the UN in the Republic of Korea. The vote was 67-28 with 22 abstentions.

7 Dec  A NKC seaman, Lee Soung-kun, defects to the Republic of Korea after jumping ship in Hong Kong and turning himself in to ROK authorities there.

26 Dec  The ROKN chases back two NKC patrol boats after they tried to kidnap a ROK fishing vessel off the east coast.

1971

6 Jan  NKC warships fire on two ROK fishing vessels sinking one and crippling the other before it is rescued by ROKN ships.

12 Jan  Turkey has decided to withdraw its detachment serving with the UNC in Korea.

13 Jan  Gen Mark W. Clark (Rtd), former CINCUNC and signor of the Korean Armistice Agreement, arrives in Korea for a 3-day visit, heading a 25-man delegation of the American Battle Monuments Commission.

3 Feb  ROK and NKC troops engage in a 20-minute firefight across the DMZ after NKC fire machine guns at a ROK outpost.

3 Feb  Thai Premier Thathan Kittakachorn announces that Thailand will withdraw its 120-man inf company from Korea by Jul 72.

20 Mar  33 ROK fisherman and their 6 vessels are released by NKC after a 9-month detention by the Reds.

27 Mar  A special farewell ceremony is held at Eighth US Army to honor the 7th US Inf Div and its troops. President Park is on hand to present the division with a ROK Presidential Unit Citation.

1 Apr  The 7th US Div is pulled out from Korea.

1 Apr  The functions formerly performed by the US Army, Navy, and AF advisory groups in Korea are consolidated under a single Hqs called JUSMAG-K.

22 Apr  A memorial ceremony marking the 20th anniversary of the Battle of Yultong fought by the Philippine BCT is held in front of the Philippine
monument at Yuljong-nil, 80 km north of Seoul. Of the 7,420 Philippine soldiers who served in Korea during the war, 125 were KIA and 329 WIA.

24 Apr The 20th anniversary of the heroic action of the British Gloustershire Regiment troops near Solma-nil near Choiksong along the Imjin River during 1951 is marked in ceremonies at the battle site.

25 Apr ANZAC Day. In ceremonies at the UN Memorial Cemetery in Pusan, Australian and New Zealand Korean War dead are commemorated today.

27 Apr The UNC requests information from NKC concerning the status of 389 Americans, 1,647 ROKs, 167 Turks and 30 other UNC military personnel believed to have been alive and in the custody of NKC at the time of the signing of the Armistice Agreement in Jul 53. However, the Communists ignore the request.

4 May One coastguardsman is killed and another seriously wounded in a gun battle with NKC infiltrators attempting to land near Inchon. The Red agents escaped in their high-speed boat.

7 May The 20th anniversary of the arrival of Ethiopian troops in Korea to fight against Communist aggressors is commemorated at the Ethiopian monument in Chunchon.

14 May A 50-ton NKC infiltration boat, equipped with radar and heavy weapons, is sunk by joint ROK AF and Navy forces on the east coast with an estimated 15 agents aboard.

19 May Ceremonies paying homage to the 200 Colombian soldiers killed in the Korean War are held at the UN Memorial Cemetery in Pusan on the 20th anniversary of the arrival of Colombian combat troops in Korea.

1 Jun A joint ROK AF/Navy operation sinks a 70-ton NKC infiltration speedboat off the west coast 96 km south of the DMZ. The heavily armed craft normally carries a complement of 17 agents.

9 Jun Gen J.H. Michaelis, CINCUNC, testifying in Washington before the Sub-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, states that based on a realistic assessment of the NKC threat the US must continue to help develop the defense capability of the ROK.

12 Jun At the 317th meeting of the MAC, the UNC, in a historic first, proposes to NK Communists that the DMZ be cleared of all fortifications and reclaimed for peaceful civil pursuits. The radical NKC's reject the proposal.

13 Jun Chinese Communists notify the UNC of its intention to send a Red Chinese Sr Member to the MAC meeting. The ChiComs have been absent from the conference table for five years.
A change of command ceremony is held for the outgoing 22nd Thai Rotational Company and the incoming 23rd at Yongsan, Seoul.

One NKC infiltrator is killed and a second wounded and captured on Sukmo Island about 64 km northwest of Seoul by a homeland defense reserve force patrol. A third intruder is killed by Marines in brief firefight on 22 June.

Three NKC armed infiltrators are killed in the western sector of the DMZ by ROK guards.

President Park Chung Hee begins his third term as chief executive of the Republic of Korea by taking oath of office during inauguration ceremonies at Capital Plaza.

1 US Corps (Gp) begins operations as a combined ROK/US Corps Group with ROK and US personnel sharing staff duty and command and control.

For the first time since 5 Aug 66, a Red Chinese member, Ho Chun-po, sits at the Panmunjom conference table to take part in the 318th MAC meeting.

14 crewmen of a fishing boat, seized by the Soviet Union on 31 May near Kamchatka Peninsula, return to Pusan via Japan.

A NKC corporal defects to the South after swimming four 6.5 km down the Han River. He says he was influenced by ROKA loud speakers telling of freedom in the Republic of Korea.

Troops guarding the eastern sector of the DMZ kill five NKC infiltrators in a series of firefights.

At the 320th MAC meeting, the UNC renews its proposal for clearing the DMZ of armed personnel and military installations and reopening it to peaceful civilian pursuits. The Communist side again rejects the proposal and repeats their demand for the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.

A NKC machine gun position north of the DMZ fires some 60,000 rounds at a ROKA guardpost in the South, wounding two children in a village near the guardpost.

A fishing boat with 30 crew members is hijacked by a NKC patrol boat off the east coast.

For the first time since they were Korean War allies, Communist China sign an agreement with NKC to provide free military aid.

A fishing boat with 20 crews is seized by a Red patrol boat near the MDL in the Eastern Sea.
26 Nov  
Premier Kim says that the concept of national defense has changed in such a way that "defense of Seoul virtually means defense of Korea."

30 Nov  
Defense authorities say, NK Communist regime is prepared to fight a 20-day war to take over the South, a blitzkrieg reminiscent of the Israeli seven-day victory over the Arabs.

1972

6 Jan  
A ceremony is held at the memorial monument at Tabu-dong dedicating to the men of the 27th US Regiment for their valor in the "Battle of the Bowling Alley" in 1950. Gen Michaelis, CINCUNC, who commanded the 27th Infantry at the time, is among honored at the ceremony.

4 Feb  
5 ROK fishing boats are hijacked and one sunk by NKC gunboats in international waters near the Island of Puengnyong in the Western Sea (Yellow Sea).

15 Feb  
US Defense Secretary Laird warns that, although aid from the Soviet Union or Communist China would be necessary to support sustained large-scale NK military operations against the ROK, the Communists in the north have the capabilities of undertaking a variety of unconventional warfare operations independently.

30 Mar  
President Park, speaking at the Military Academy graduation ceremonies, calls upon the NK Communists to show their sincerity for peaceful reunification by renouncing their aggressive intents. He lists five demands, including a cessation of infiltration operations against the South and the dismantling of fortifications in the DMZ.

18 May  
UNC MAC reiterates UNC charges that NKC has repeatedly violated the Armistice Agreement by building fences and fortified positions within the DMZ.

24 May  
Military sources report that the NKCs have reinforced their ground power with new Soviet ground-to-ground missiles and sophisticated T55 tanks.

2 Jun  
A US B-29 Superfortress of WWH and Korean War fame arrives in for display at the Korean War Memorial in Yoido, Seoul.

19 Jun  
Thai Army Chief of Staff Gen Gurakit Mayalarap arrived in Seoul to arrange for the 23rd June withdrawal of Thai Company from Korea and the UNC.

4 Jul  
In a dramatic joint communiqué issued simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang, the Free South and the Communist North, announce that secret high-level meetings have been held in Seoul and Pyongyang to
discuss improving relations and peaceful reunification of the country. The seven-point agreement included provisions for the establishment of a hot line between the South and North and a mutual promise to refrain from armed provocation and propaganda defamation.

17 Aug 20 direct line between Seoul and Pyongyang are connected in Panmunjom to facilitate full-fledged Red Cross family search talks.

7 Sep More than 160 ROK fishermen and their boats are released by NKC after 13 months in captivity.

14 Sep NKC release more than 90 ROK fishermen and their craft who recently entered NKC territorial waters.

12 Oct Political delegation from South and North meet for four hours at Panmunjom in the DMZ.

6 Nov US President Nixon is reelected by a landslide margin over US Senator George McGovern.

23 Dec President Park, reelected to a new 6-year terms by 2,357 of the 2,359 members of the National Conference for Unification.

26 Dec Former US President Harry S. Truman dies.

1973

14 Jan A Japanese newspaper reports that Red China has decided to resume its grant-type military aid to NK Communists.

28 Feb Lt Gen Carl Eric Almgren, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Army, arrives for a 4-day visit with Swedish members of the NNSC and UNC officials.

5 Mar Two or three suspected NKC espionage agents killed a civilian guard on an islet near Cheju-do.

7 Mar In the first fatal DMZ incident since 17 Sep 71, 2 ROK soldiers are killed and another wounded by NKC fire while on a work detail.

17 Apr 2 NKC agents are killed by frontline troops as they attempt to infiltrate the South through the central sector of the DMZ.

24 Jul Newly appointed US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger warns a US Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee that peace and stability in northeast Asia could be disrupted unless the ROK five-year modernization program is fulfilled.


1 Aug NKC releases 80 ROK fishermen who were captured by Red gunboats last summer.
23 Aug  At the 342nd MAC meeting, UNC Sr Member tells NKC side to stop using the commission as a propaganda medium and start responding to the 3,745 NKC violations charged since 1 Jan 73.

4 Sep  US Secretary of State (Designate) Henry A. Kissinger tells the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that while “we have no desire to maintain US forces in mainland Asia, substantial reductions cannot be made until detente develops and peace returns to the Korean peninsula.

3 Oct  President Park urges NKC to resume the suspended South-North dialogue, adding that the continued Pyongyang boycott is rekindling tension on the peninsula.

27 Oct  The Government, in a memorandum submitted to the UN General Assembly, reiterates its strong opposition to the withdrawal of the UNC from Korea. It pointed out that an unconditional removal of the UNC may invalidate the Armistice and further endanger peace in East Asia.

16 Nov  US Secretary of State Kissinger arrives in Seoul to confer with President Park.

24 Dec  At 347th MAC meeting, UNC spokesman refutes the Communist North’s claim that a provincial boundary line referenced in paragraph 13b of the armistice accord cedes them the coastal water surrounding the five ROK islands in the Western Sea. He accuses the Communists of deliberately misinterpreting the Agreement.

1974

5 Jan  ROK Navy patrol boats chase off a NKC naval vessel intrusion of territorial waters surrounding five ROK islands off the west coast.

18 Jan  President Park, in a national broadcasted press conference, proposes a non-aggression pact between the South and North.

26 Jan  NKC rejects ROK proposal for an non-aggression pact between the South and North.

15 Feb  Fishing boat Suwon-ho No. 32 and Suwon-ho No. 33 is sunk hijacked by NKC gunboats in international waters west of Paengnyong-do in the Western Sea. 13 crewmen are believed dead while 15 are held by the Communists in this first naval attack since 4 Jul 72.

16 Feb  The Commission for the UN Memorial Cemetery in Korea, represented by the 11 countries whose fallen remains are entombed in Pusan, commence to function in administering the cemetery.
In an unprovoked incident at Panmunjom JSA, 120 NKC guards riot, inflicting minor bruises on 4 UNC guards (1 ROK, 3 US) and slightly damaging 4 UNC sedans.

Maritime Police Boat No. 863, escorting fishing craft off the east coast near the seaward extension of the MDL, is encircled by three NKC gunboats and subsequently sunk after a two-hour firefight. A rescue attempt by ROK planes and ships -- which spot MiGs within two miles of the area -- is thwarted by poor weather conditions.

Staff elements of Hq UNC/USFK/Eighth US Army are merged into a single staff. This is the first major organizational change of the tri-headquarters since the move of Hq UNC from Tokyo, Japan to Seoul, Korea on 1 Jul 57.

A ROK Navy patrol craft sinks 33-ton NKC agent boat 20 miles south of Song-do, an island near Pusan.

While on an emergency landing pattern south of the Han River 40 km north of Seoul, a KAL 707 jetliner with 152 passengers aboard is fired upon by a NKC antiaircraft battery positioned north of the Han River estuary. The plane lands safely at Kimp'o, however.

Three ROKN patrol boats detect a 30-ton NKC spy ship two and a half miles east of Ochung-do, 25 miles off Taech'on on the west coast, and capture it after a 35-mile running gun battle in the Yellow Sea.

US Vice President Gerald R. Ford is sworn in as the 38th US President following resignation by Richard M. Nixon today.

Madame Park, First Lady is shot to death by a Communist bullet intended for President Park Chung Hee.

In the first of a planned series of war memorials to UN allies in the Korean War, MND honors the men of Turkish Brigade by dedicating a battle monument to their memory at Yongin near Suwon.

MND honors the contribution of four more Korean War allies with monuments at selected sites. Dedicated are those for the Philippines (Koyang) and Thailand (Unchon). Tomorrow memorials will be unveiled for Greece (near Ichon) and France (Suwon).

Security authorities disclose the 10 Oct 74 arrest of 8 agents and 10 collaborators in Seoul and Kwangju for alleged involvement in a NKC espionage network.

A ROKA squad on the routine morning patrol in the west-central sector of the DMZ notes steam rising from airholes and uncovers a NKC-built underground tunnel extending 1,000 yards into the UNC side of the Armistice zone.
20 Nov  An enemy device explodes during a joint ROK/US investigation of the extensive NKC-built tunnel complex. Killed by the blast are a ROKMC major, and USN Cmdr Robert M. Ballinger; injured are six servicemen, five US and one ROK.

22 Nov  US President Gerald R. Ford, accompanied by Secretary of State Kissinger and a party of nearly 500, arrives in Seoul for a 23-hour state visit.

17 Dec  The UN General Assembly decides by majority vote (61–43 with 31 abstentions) to maintain UN military presence in the ROK until the Security Council decides otherwise, and urges continued dialogue between South and North.

1975

14 Jan  President Park, at a nationally broadcasted press conference, says he would not oppose dissolution of the UN Command provided that effective measures were implemented to maintain the 1953 Armistice Agreement. He added that loss of the UN banner in Korean would have no bearing on the continued presence of American troops here, since they are deployed under the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.

30 Jan  Lt Gen James F. Hollingsworth, CG, I Corps (ROK/US) Gp, tells reporters there are indications that the Communists have built more tunnels in the DMZ. He also confirms recent NKC movement of long-range artillery and construction of heavily reinforced concrete positions near the truce line.

15 Feb  Following an hour-long gun battle off the east coast, ROK planes, ships and shore batteries sink a NKC spy boat south of seaward extension of Military Demarcation Line.

22 Feb  In a report to the US Senate Armed Service Committee, Senators Strom Thurmond and William Scott, who visited Korea last Dec, note that NK Communist regime is “the most intransigent and Stalinist of all Communist nations and satellites ... intent on expanding its control into South Korea (ROK).” Among their recommendations are: (1) Establishment of a ROK/US combined headquarters; (2) retention of Honest John elements; (3) transfer of I Corps (ROK/US) Gp’s mission to ROKA; and (4) designation of the 2nd US Div as a Pacific Command contingency force with additional air mobile assets.

26 Feb  Two armed NKC craft cross south of the Western Sea’s MDL extension and are intercepted by ROKN ships.

19 Mar  UNC discloses that a suspected tunnel-like cavity has been confirmed in southern portion of the DMZ, approximately 13 km northeast of
Chorwon. Photographs from a bore-hole camera show the 170-foot sub-ternairean excavation to be man-made. Interior is estimated to be six feet high, five feet wide, and 2,300 yards long with a 1,000-yard extension into UNC side of truce zone.

20 Mar
At the 361st MAC meeting, UNC presents video-tape interviews with two NKC defectors who had first-hand knowledge of Communist Tunnel construction beneath the DMZ. Kim Po-sung, a compressor operator in drilling activities since May 72, came south last Sep; Lt Yu Tae-youn, who fled the North this month, had also observed tunneling since spring 1972. The NKC spokesman makes no comment.

24 Mar
Six NKC MIGs from a formation of 30 aircraft enter UNC airspace over west coast island of Dangnyong-do and Sochong-do. Intruders fly northward when ROKAF planes scramble to within 20 miles of the area.

30 Apr
Saigon falls into Communist hands, ending 35 years of fighting in Vietnam.

3 May
The second of two heavily armed NKC infiltrators who were sighted in Pusan last week is captured in Seoul.

9 Jun
Two NKC MIG-21s overfly the Western Sea island of Dangnyong-do and flee north as ROKAF get fighters scramble to intercept.

11 Jun
At the 363rd MAC meeting today, NKC again refuses to participates in a joint investigation of tunnels under the DMZ, and brands the tunneling allegation and the UNC’s charge of a 9 Jun intrusion of ROK airspace as “no more than a fabrication.”

15 Jun
Revisit Korea Program begins. A group of 52 Korean War veterans and their families from the UNC member nations arrive in Seoul.

27 Jun
US Ambassador to the UN John Scali sends to the Security Council President outlining a ROK/US proposal for terminating the UN Command effective 1 Jan 76, provided alternate arrangements are made to maintain the Armistice Agreement. Letters suggests ROK and US designate military officers as “successors in command” to enforce provisions of the Armistice, now responsibility of CINCUNC.

30 Jun
US Major William D. Henderson, is attacked at Panmunjom by 10 NKC guards. Incident occurs while 364th MAC meeting is in progress. Maj Henderson suffers a fractured larynx and will be medically evacuated to the United States.

5 Jul
On this silver anniversary of the first encounter of US ground troops in the Korean War, the 150 American soldiers of Task Force Smith, 24th US Div, who killed, wounded or missing, are honored in ceremonies at Chukm-ryong north of Osan. The occasion is highlighted by
attendance of the task force commander Brig Gen (then Lt Col) Charles B. Smith (Ret), who during his one-week visit to Korea, will be awarded the ROK’s highest military medal by President Park Chung Hee.

7 Jul The UNC MAC Sr Member requests Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to assist in halting Communist incidents at Panmunjom such as last week’s violent assault on a UNC officer.

27 Aug In a joint communiqué issued at close of ROK/US Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul, the US (represented by Defense Secretary Schlesinger) assures its “readiness and determination to render prompt and effective assistance to the ROK in event of armed attack on the ROK.”

1 Sep US Defense Secretary Schlesinger, upon returning from Korea, says the 42,000 US troops in Korea should not be withdrawn for at least another five years.

22 Sep Home Ministry establishes a Civil Defense Corps, which is separate from the Homeland Defense Reserve Force.

24 Sep MND honors the men of the Colombian Bn by unveiling a battle monument to their memory near Inchon.

26 Sep MND dedicates a monument north of Tongduchon in honor of the Belgium—Luxembourg combat contribution to the UNC war effort.

29 Sep Ceremonies are held today at Hyongsong near Wonju to dedicate a memorial to the Netherlands servicemen who fought in Korea. Among invitees for the unveiling are 23 war participants from Holland.

3 Oct MND hosts unveiling ceremonies today at Freedom Bridge spanning the Imjin River, for memorials honoring US participation in the Korean War and the US President who authorized the initial commitment of forces.

6 Oct Following a 3-hour running gun battle, ROK AF and Navy elements sink a NKC agent boat about 50 miles south of Taehuksan-do, an island off southwest coast.

7 Nov For honoring Canadian forces’ contribution in Korea, unveiling ceremonies for a memorial monument take place today at Igok-Illih, Puk-myon, Kapyong-gun.

19 Nov The UN General Assembly simultaneously endorses two rival resolutions on the Korean question. The pro-West’s proposal, recommending dissolution of the UNC by 1 Jan 76 pending negotiations among parties directly concerned on alternative arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement, is adopted by a 59-51 vote (29 abstentions); while the pro-NKC submission, calling for immediate removal of the UNC and withdrawal of all foreign forces serving under
its bumer, passes by a 54-43 margin (42 abstentions).

22 Dec In ceremonies at Ansong the MND dedicates a memorial to the South African contingent in the Korean War.

1976

1 Jan President Park Chung Hee, in a New Year’s address, stresses that South-North dialogue is most effective way to prevent recurrence of war on the peninsula and pledges utmost efforts toward that end.

18 Jan Lt Gen Carl G. Eklund, Chief of Swedish Defense Staff, arrives for a four-day visit.

12 Feb Lt Gen James F. Hollingsworth passes command of I Corps (ROK/US) Gp to newly assigned Lt Gen John H. Cushman.

24 Mar United Kingdom rotates its UNC Honor Guard detachment, a contingent from the Grenadier Guards’ 2nd Bn replacing an element from 10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles.

19 Apr UK Secretary of State for Defense Roy Mason arrives in Seoul for three days of talks with key ROK/US military and government leaders.


21 Jun Three NKC infiltrators are hunted down and killed in separate armed encounters over past 42 hours. The Red team was first spotted after crossing the east-central sector of the DMZ.

22 Jul US Secretary of State Kissinger proposes that South and North Korea, Communist China and the US meet in New York during this fall’s UN General Assembly session to negotiate ways of preserving the Armistice and reducing tension on the Korean peninsula.

26 Jul The 25-man Thai Air Force Detachment, assigned to Hqs UNC (Rear) and stationed at Tachikawa AFB, Japan, departs via its two C-123 aircraft for permanent deployment in home country.

5 Aug A NKC guard post in the east-central portion of the DMZ opens fire with MG and recoilless rifles on a UNC OP.

18 Aug American Capt Arthur G. Bonifas and 1st Lt Mark T. Banett, both assigned to a UNC support unit for guard duty in the joint Security Area (JSA), are savagely and brutally murdered and nine other UNC personnel (5 ROK, 4 US) injured at Panmunjom when they are attacked upon by some 30 NK Red guards wielding axes and metal pipes. The UNC soldiers were supervising and providing security for five KSC personnel who were trimming a poplar tree inside the JSA when the barbaric assault occurred.

20 Aug A task force of 110 UNC personnel enters the JSA, cuts down the
poplar tree which was focal point of 18 Aug Axe-wielding murder incident, and removes two illegal road barriers constructed by the Communists.

21 Aug In a private session at Panmunjom, the NKC senior delegate to the MAC gives the UNC spokesman a personnel message from his boss Kim Il-sung which terms "regretful" the 18 Aug murder of two US officers.

30 Aug NK Communists seize a ROK fishing boat with crew of 23 which inadvertently strayed into Communist-controlled eastern waters during a storm.

22 Sep MND honors the medical contributions during the Korean War of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, India and Italy by unveiling a monument in Taegongdae, Pusan to their humanitarian efforts.

30 Sep US Secretary of State Kissinger states at the UN General Assembly that the US would support a phased approach for adopting the Armistice Agreement to new conditions and replacing it with more permanent arrangements.

8 Oct Gen John W. Vessey, Jr. assumes command of UNC/USFK/EUSA.

14 Oct NK Reds release 23 ROK fishermen and their boat which was captured 30 Aug by the Communists.

31 Oct Records of UNC Armistice Affairs Division reveal that 382 MAC meetings have been held at Panmunjom since 27 Jul 53 Armistice. Of these the Communists called 283 or 74 percent.


5 Nov UK rotates its UNC Honor Guard detachment, a contingent of the Gurkha Transport Regt replacing an element of the 1st Bn, Light Infantry.

24 Nov A groundbreak ceremony is taken place near Munsan for construction of a monument honoring the 18 war correspondents killed while covering the Korean War.

21 Dec Responding to a question at a news conference today, US president-elect Carter reaffirm his plans to withdraw US ground troops from Korea after close consultations with governments concerned.

1977

12 Jan President Park tells a press conference that he would not oppose a drawdown of US troops in Korea if NKC accepts his earlier (Jan 74) proposal for a South-North non-aggression pact.
610

Appendixes

Jan 20 James Earl Carter, Jr, is inaugurated as 39th US President.

Feb 25 UNC charges that 11 NKC guards at Panmunjom illegally fired automatic weapons while hunting near the JSA.

Mar 13 Testifying before a US Senate committee, Admiral Weisner, NKC-PAC, says NKC remains a “volatile and unpredictable threat to peace in Asia.”

Apr 16 The US Army starts withdrawing its obsolete Sergeant missiles from the ROK.

Apr 27 In a planned revisit program, 67 retired or active journalists who covered the Korean War attend ceremonies at the Munsan Park dedicating a memorial to the 18 war correspondents killed in the war. Some 221 former newsmen from 16 UNC nations were invited to the unveiling and a tour of the Republic.

May 3 NKC ambushed a ROK guard patrol, killing one soldier and wounding another. The Red attack, first serious DMZ incident since 18 Aug 76, takes place in mid-western sector, north of Chorwon.

May 21 US President Carter recalls Maj Gen Singlaub, Chief of Staff, UNC/USFK/EUSA, for publicly criticizing a matter of policy.

May 28 NKC spy agent, Yun Hye-dong, residing in Japan, surrenders to ROK authorities in Seoul, Yun’s mission was to form a united front of anti-ROK organizations and activities in Japan.

Jun 2 A group of Chinese Communist fishing vessels seize a ROK fishing boat with a crew of eight in disputed international waters between Cheju-do and mainland China.

Jul 16 NKC releases US CW2 Glenn M. Schwanke after 57 hours of captivity. Also turned over to UNC at Panmunjom are bodies of three other crew members killed when their CH-47 was shot down after straying over NKC airspace.

Jul 22 UK rotates its UNC Honor Guard Detachment, a contingent of the 2nd Ghurka Rifles replacing an element of the 7th Ghurka Rifles.

Aug 1 NK Communist puppet regime establishes 50 mile sea-limit, from which foreign vessels are barred. This unprecedented proclamation is timed with establishment of its 200-mile economic zone.

Sep 4 A group of 26 US Korean War veterans, composed of former USMC and USN officers who participated in Gen MacArthur’s famed Inchon Landing, arrive today as guests of the Government.

Sep 30 MND reveals defection of NKC army Cpl Lee Yong-sun, who swam across the Han River Estuary last month.
3 Oct  In testimony before a US House sub-committee, General Stilwell, former CINCUNC, warns that NK Communists could invade the ROK without the Soviet Union's knowledge or consent and could sustain independent action for up to 90 days. In that period, he adds, the Communist North could engulf Seoul.

24 Oct  On this "UN Day," in ceremonies at the UN Memorial Cemetery in Pusan, representatives of the Government, UN allies, citizens and students of Pusan, honor the thousands of allies who gave their lives during the Korean War. Of these, 2,274 are interred in the Cemetery, namely 281 from Australia; 378, Canada; 44, France; 117, the Netherlands; 34, New Zealand; 1, Norway; 36, the ROK; 11, South Africa; 462, Turkey; 884, United Kingdom; and 11, United States, are interred in the Cemetery today. During the period from 1951-1954, remains of about 11,000 men of the UNC forces were gathered here, and remains from Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, the Philippines and Thailand, as well as the majority of those from the United States and some from France and Norway, were repatriated to their home countries.

13 Dec  Gen Richard G. Stilwell of the US Army, ret., former CINCUNC warns that if the US withdraws from the ROK unilaterally and the likelihood of conflict will soar. Expressing his view in a commentary on article, Gen Stilwell says that the US military presence in the ROK plays a vital role in deterring warmonger Kim Il-sung and his clique from the direct application of force to consummate their mission of "war of national liberation."
APPENDIX VII
ASSIGNMENT OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

Letter from President Syngman Rhee to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
July 14, 1950

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
General Headquarters, Far East Command, Tokyo.

Dear General MacArthur:

In view of the joint military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander, United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities; such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.

The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier, who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have joined together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land.

With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal regard.

Sincerely yours,

[s] SYNGMAN RHEE

Reply of General MacArthur to President Rhee
Through U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio in Korea
July 18, 1950

Please express to President Rhee my thanks and deepest appreciation for the action taken in his letter of 15 July. It cannot fail to increase the co-ordinated power of the United Nations forces operating in Korea. I am proud indeed to have the gallant Republic of Korea forces under my command. Tell him I am grateful for his generous references to me personally and how sincerely I reciprocate his sentiments of regard. Tell him also not to lose heart, that the way be long and hard, but ultimate result cannot fail to be victory.

[s] MacArthur
APPENDIX VIII
AGREEMENT FOR THE REPATRIATION OF SICK AND INJURED CAPTURED PERSONNEL
April 11, 1953

The Senior Member of the United Nations Command Liaison Group and the Senior Member of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers Liaison Group, in order to effect the repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, agree to the following:

1. Repatriation shall be accomplished at Panmunjom.

2. Repatriation shall commence at Panmunjom not later than ten (10) days after the signing of this agreement.

3. a. The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel at the rate of approximately one hundred (100) per day until delivery of all sick and injured captured personnel to be repatriated by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers is completed. The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be contingent upon the ability of the United Nations Command to receive them, but delivery shall in any case be completed prior to the termination date of this agreement.

   b. The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel at the rate of approximately five hundred (500) per day until delivery of all sick and injured captured personnel to be repatriated by the United Nations Command is completed. The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be contingent upon the ability of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to receive them, but delivery shall in any case be completed prior to the termination date of this agreement.

4. The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel in groups of approximately twenty-five (25); the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel in groups of approximately twenty-five (25). Each group shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include:

   a. Name
   b. Rank
   c. Interment or military serial number

5. After each group of sick and injured captured personnel is delivered and received, a
representative of the receiving side shall sign the roster of the captured personnel delivered as a receipt and shall return this to the delivering side.

6. In order to insure that the sick and injured captured personnel of both sides are given maximum protection during the full period of repatriation, both sides agree to guarantee immunity from all attacks to all rail and motor movements carrying sick and injured captured personnel to Kaesong and Munsan-ni, respectively, and thence through presently established immunity routes to Panmunjom, subject to the following conditions:

a. Movement of motor convoys to Kaesong and Munsan-ni, respectively, shall be restricted to daylight hours, and each convoy shall consist of not less than five (5) vehicles in close formation; except that north of Panmunjom, because of actual conditions, the latter provision shall apply only to the route from Pyongyang to Kaesong.

b. Each car in rail movements and each vehicle in motor convoys shall display clearly visible identification markings.

c. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the Liaison Group of the other side with a detailed description of the markings utilized to identify motor convoys and rail movements. This shall include color, size and manner in which the markings will be displayed.

d. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the Liaison Group of the other side with the sites and markings of the bivouac areas and night stop-over locations for motor convoys.

e. Each side shall inform the Liaison Group of the other side, twenty-four (24) hours in advance of each movement, of the selected route, number of cars in rail movement or number of vehicles in motor movement, and the estimated time of arrival at Kaesong or Munsan-ni.

f. Each side shall notify the Liaison Group of the other side, by the most expeditious means of communications available, of the location of emergency stop-overs.

7. During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the October 22, 1951 Agreement Between Liaison Officers, with the exception of the part therein provided for in Paragraph 8 of this Agreement, shall continue in effect. Liaison Groups of both sides and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement within, the Panmunjom conference site area. The composition of each Liaison Group and its party shall be as determined by the Senior Member thereof; however, in order to avoid congestion in the conference site area, including captured personnel under its control, shall not exceed three hundred (300) persons at any one time. Each side shall transfer repatriated personnel out of the Panmunjom conference site area as expeditiously as possible.

8. During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the armed military police of each side, who undertake to maintain order within the conference site area, shall be increased from the maximum number of fifteen (15), as provided for in the October 22, 1951 Agreement Between Liaison Officers, to thirty (30).

9. Other administrative details shall be mutually arranged by officers designated by the
Repatriation of Sick and Injured

Senior Member of the Liaison Group of each side.

10. This agreement is effective when signed and will terminate twenty (20) days after the commencement of repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel at Panmunjom.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, this 11th day of April 1953, in the English, Korean and Chinese languages, all texts being equally authentic.

(signed)
LEE SANG CHO
Major General
Korean People's Army
Senior Member
Korean People's Army and
Chinese People's Volunteers
Liaison Group

(signed)
J.C. DANIEL
Rear Admiral
United States Navy
Senior Member
United Nations Command
Liaison Group
APPENDIX IX
TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

A. ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
(July 27, 1953)

Korean Armistice Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, together with Annex and Supplementary Agreement.

Preamble

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korea conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

Article I

Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) Kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military
Armistice Agreement

Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map (Map 2). Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese people's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.
Article II
Concrete Arrangements for Cease-fire and Armistice

A. General

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

(a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement become effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the demilitarized zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the demilitarized zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the MAC by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the MAC. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under MAC supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the MAC and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

(b) Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAEDO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of
the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3)

(c) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel with cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

(d) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirements for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the MAC and the NNCS; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. The NNCS, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof.

(e) Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

(f) In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea
under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

(g) Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (see Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

(h) Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

(i) Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective part of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

(j) Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all
Armistice Agreement

measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively co-operate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. Military Armistice Commission

1. Composition

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general of flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. (a) The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

(b) Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.
25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

(a) Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

(b) Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

(c) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

(d) Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

(e) Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

(f) Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

(g) Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

(h) Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

(i) Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communication with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

(j) Provide credential and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice
Armistice Agreement

Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. General

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. Composition

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action
whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate member of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. (a) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

(b) Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. Functions and Authority

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervisions, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

(a) Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
(b) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

(c) Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nation Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs of characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

(d) Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

(e) Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

(f) Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

(g) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels used in the performance of this mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCHON ........................................... (37°28'N, 126°38'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAEGU ........................................... (35°52'N, 128°36'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUSAN ........................................... (35°06'N, 129°02'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANGNUNG ....................................... (37°45'N, 128°54'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNSAN .......................................... (35°59'N, 126°43'E)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and The Chinese People's Volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SINUIJU ........................................... (40°06'N, 124°24'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHONGJIN ......................................... (41°46'N, 129°49'E)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HUNGNAM ........................................... (39°50'N, 127°37'E)
MANPO ............................................. (41°09'N, 126°18'E)
SINANJU ............................................ (39°36'N, 125°36'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).

3. General

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.
50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

Article III

Arrangements Relating to Prisoners of War

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

(a) Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and interment or military serial number.

(b) Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto, "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

(c) So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, (退還) "Song Hwan" in Korean, and (贄返) "Ch’ien Fan" in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in
the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation
Prisoners of War.

56. (a) A committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall
be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed
jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the
Chinese People’s Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and
direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for co-ordinating the specific
plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution
by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation
of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to co-ordinate the timing of the
arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from
the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements
as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners
of war; to co-ordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57
hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of
the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53
and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of
prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners
of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of
prisoners of war.

(b) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the
Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the
Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners
of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice
Commission.

(c) The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military
Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. (a) Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red
Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of countries
contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of
the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and representatives of
the Red Cross of the People’s Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The
joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this
Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-
paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian
services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish
this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of
prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war,
and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and
to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war.
The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner
of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.
(b) The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be co-ordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives, from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(c) The Commander of each side shall co-operate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(d) The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all of the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. (a) The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:
(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

(b) If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58 (a) hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

(c) Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. (a) All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement become effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and who on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers to return to the area south Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

(b) All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control of contents of the provisions of this sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.
Armistice Agreement

(c) Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59 (a) hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59 (h) hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

(d) (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfilment of its mission.

Article IV

Recommendation to the Governments
Concerned on Both Sides

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides by held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

Article V

Miscellaneous

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until
expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 10:00 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

KIM IL SUNG
Supreme Commander,
North Korean People’s Army

PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander
Chinese People’s
Volunteers

MARK W. CLARK
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations
Command

PRESENT

NAM IL
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the North Korean People’s
Army and the Chinese People’s
Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command
Delegation

B. AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR
(June 8, 1953)

ANNEX

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

(See Sub-paragraph 51 b)

I. GENERAL

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Repatriation of both
sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent of effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons of affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II. CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and rest raining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III. EXPLANATION
8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

(a) The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5);

(b) The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

(c) All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

(d) Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph;

(e) The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV. DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies
Armistice Agreement

so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

V. RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI. PRESS COVERAGE

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VII. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.
15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

VIII. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX. PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.
X. MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist People’s Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation

C. AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR
(July 27, 1953)

In order to meet the requirements of the disposition of the prisoners of war not for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in Paragraph 61, Article V of the Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following Temporary Agreement supplementary to the Armistice Agreement:
1. Under the provisions of Paragraphs 4 and 5, Article II of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the Military Demarcation Line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone between the Imjin River on the south and the road leading south from Oknum-ni on the northeast (the mainroad leading southeast from Panmunjom not included), as the area within which the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated and whom the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, inform the side of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war held in its custody.

2. If there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the Military Demarcation Line and the western and northern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone, as the area within which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.

3. In accordance with Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, Article I of the Armistice Agreement the following paragraphs are hereby provided:

(a) After the cease-fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned area designated by their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.

(b) A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the area under the control of their own side.

(c) The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the functions provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.
4. The provisions of Sub-paragraph 3 (c) of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under Paragraph 11, Article I of the Armistice Agreement.

5. This Agreement shall be abrogated upon the completion of the mission provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 10:00 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

KIM IL SUNG
Supreme Commander,
North Korean People’s Army

PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander,
Chinese People’s Volunteers

MARK W. CLARK
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command

PRESENT

NAM IL
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist People’s Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate, United Nations Command

D. SUPPLEMENT TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION HEADQUARTER AREAS, ITS SECURITY AND ITS CONSTRUCTION
(September 6, 1976)

1. Supplement to Paragraph c, Article II

On the basis of a joint survey, the Military Demarcation Line at the Conference Buildings site in the Joint Security Area shall be marked only by cement pavement, 50 centimeters wide and 5 centimeters above ground level, and in other sectors only by concrete posts of 10 centimeters by 10 centimeters and 1 meter in height placed in the ground at 10 meter intervals. The Conference Buildings’ site covers the 7 buildings on the Military Demarcation Line and the yard surrounding them, that is, 7 buildings and the areas 10 meters from the building of the western end and 10 meters from the building of the eastern end.

The responsibility for the work of the marking from Military Demarcation Line Marker No. 0099 to the western boundary shall be assumed by the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers side, and from Military Demarcation Line Marker No. 0099 to the eastern boundary by the United Nations Command side, except where the trace of the Military Demarcation Line enters the stream bed on the southwest corner of the Joint Security Area
where markers will be placed on alternate banks by the appropriate side.

The responsibility for the maintenance and control of the markers shall be assumed by the side which marked the line.

2. Supplement to Paragraph d, Article II

All military personnel, including the security personnel in the Joint Security Area, shall not go into the area of the other side crossing the Military Demarcation Line in the Joint Security Area; provided that this Agreement excludes the personnel of the Military Armistice Commission, Joint Observer Teams, and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, in accordance with Paragraph 11 of the Armistice Agreement, and that not more than 1.5 Military Armistice Commission and its assistants from each side shall be allowed to cross into and remain in the area of the other side at one time. Free movement is allowed to both sides in the jointly used buildings and to the side in the buildings for its unilateral use built on the Military Demarcation Line in the Joint Security Area.

Military personnel who will have to go into the area of the other side crossing the Military Demarcation Line for the maintenance and control of the communication facilities in the Joint Security Area or for other authorized activity by named military personnel, shall get approval of the other side.

All non-military personnel of both sides are allowed to freely move crossing the Military Demarcation Line in the Joint Security Area. However, they shall cross the Military Demarcation Line only at the Conference Buildings' site in the Joint Security Area to permit their proper identification. Vehicles shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line in the Joint Security Area only with prior consent of the other side.

Neither military personnel nor non-military personnel of both sides are allowed in the Joint Security Area to make contacts infringing upon each other's safety.

Each side shall responsibly assure the safety of the personnel of the other side who legally come to the portion of its side in the Joint Security Area.

3. Supplement to Paragraph h, Article III

Guard posts needed by either side in the Joint Security Area shall be set up in its Area only.

To assure the observance of safety assurances of Paragraph d, Article II, neither side shall erect visual or other barriers that would obstruct observance of the other side.


- The Supplement shall become effective ten days after the day the Supplements are approved by the Senior Members of both sides.

- The Joint Survey Team shall be composed of an equal number from each side of professionally qualified personnel for the joint survey and for the marking of the Military Demarcation Line and shall be guaranted safety and protection by both sides under the observation of a Joint Observer Team.
The following shall be implemented between the approval and the effective date of the Supplements.

The marking of the Military Demarcation Line according to the Agreement reached between both sides shall be completed.

Both sides shall withdraw their guard posts, security personnel, and other facilities from the area of the other side; provided that the telephone and its facilities installed in the office of the Joint Duty Officer of the respective sides are excluded.

The guard posts of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side located in the United Nations Command side's portion shall be withdrawn.

The respective sides will, in the period between the approval by the Senior Members of both sides and the effective date of the Supplements, guarantee the safety of personnel from the other side by issuing and enforcing orders prohibiting contacts infringing upon the other's safety or interfering in the performance of tasks leading to implementation of the Supplements.
APPENDIX X
SIXTEEN NATIONS DECLARATION CONCERNING
THE KOREAN ARMISTICE
At Washington, July 27, 1953

We the United Nations Members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea, we will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.
APPENDIX XI
R.O.K.-U.S. MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY,
Signed at Washington, October 1, 1953

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

Article II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

Article III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous
to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of Korea and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

Article VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of October 1953.

For the Republic of Korea:
Y.T. Pyun

For the United States of America:
John Foster Dulles
APPENDIX XII
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION

A. RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST INVASION

1. Calling for the Cessation of Hostilities and Withdrawal of North Korean Communist
Forces, June 25, 1950.

The Security Council

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that the
Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective
control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Com-
mmission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people
of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of
the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary
Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions of 12 December
1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequence with might follow unless Member States refrained
from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing
about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the
situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the
safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead
to open military conflict there;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from
North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

I Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of
North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;

II Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea
(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with
the least possible delay;
(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

III Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

2. The Military Assistance to the Republic of Korea, June 27, 1950

The Security Council

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace;

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities; and

Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel; and

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security; and

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

3. The Establishment and Operation of a Unified Command for U.N. Forces in Korea,
July 7, 1950

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

4. Condemning the North Korean Communist Regime: The Draft Resolution Submitted by the United States of America, September 6, 1950

The Security Council,
Condemns the North Korean authorities for their continued defiance of the United Nations;
Calls upon all States to use their influence to prevail upon the authorities of North Korea to cease this defiance;
Calls upon all States to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities and to refrain from action which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security.

5. Regarding Retention of the Korean – Chinese Frontier, November 10, 1950

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution of 25 June 1950, determining that the North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace and calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,
Recalling the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in respect to Korea,
Having noted from the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea dated 5 November 1950 that Chinese Communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations in Korea,
Affirming that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly dated 7 October 1950,
Insistent that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to
other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security,

*Calls upon* all States and authorities, and in particular those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea;

*Affirms* that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;

*Calls attention* to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy;

*Requests* the Interim Committee on Korea and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon as possible, and pending its arrival, that it utilize the assistance of such States members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose.

### B. RESOLUTIONS OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(1947–1974)

1. **Recommending Measures for Korean Unification and Setting up the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, October 7, 1950**

   *The General Assembly,*

   *Having regard* to its resolutions of 14 November 1947 (112 (II)), of 12 December 1948 (195 (III)) and of 21 October 1949 (293 (IV)).

   *Having received and considered* the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

   *Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea.*

   *Recalling* the General Assembly declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea.

   *Having in mind* that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in
accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea.

1. Recommends that

(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

(b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea;

(c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government;

(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above;

(e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

2. Resolves that

(a) A Commission constituting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission on Korea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;

(b) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the governments of the States represented on the Commission should or an Interim Committee composed of representatives meeting at the seat of the United Nations to consult with an advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations; the Interim Committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

(c) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

The General Assembly furthermore,

Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude,

3. Requests the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within three weeks of the adoption of the present resolution by the General Assembly within three weeks of the adoption of the present resolution by the General
Assembly;

4. Also recommends the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of longterm measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

5. Expresses its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and alternate from each of the States members of the Commission.

2. Establishing the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency, December 1, 1950 (Excerpts)

A

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolution of 7 October 1950 on the problem of the independence of the independence of Korea,

Having received and considered a report of the Economic and Social Council submitted in accordance with that resolution,

Mindful that the aggression by North Korean forces and their warfare against the United Nations force and their warfare against the United Nations seeking to restore peace in the area has resulted in great devastation and destruction which the Korean people cannot themselves repair,

Recognizing that as a result of such aggression the people of Korea are desperately in need of relief supplies and materials and help in reconstructing their economy,

Deeply moved by the sufferings of the Korean people and determined to assist in their alleviation,

Convinced that the creation of a United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation for Korea is necessary both to the maintenance of lasting peace in the area and to the establishment of the economic foundations for the building of a unified and independent nation,

Considering that, under the said resolution of 7 October 1950, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is the principal representative of the United Nations in Korea and hence must share in the responsibility for the work undertaken by the United Nations in furtherance of the objects and purposes mentioned in the said resolution,

Considering that it is nevertheless desirable to set up a special authority with broad powers to plan and supervise rehabilitation and relief and to assume such functions and responsibilities related to planning and supervision, to technical and administrative matters, and to questions affecting organization and implementation as are to be exercised under the plans for relief
and rehabilitation approved by the General Assembly, such authority to carry out its responsibilities in close cooperation with the Commission.

A. Establishment of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea

1. Establishes the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) under the direction of a United Nations Agent General, who shall be assisted by one or more deputies. The Agent General shall be responsible to the General Assembly for the conduct (in accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly and having regard to such general policy recommendations as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may make) of the programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea, as that programme may be determined from time to time by the General Assembly;

2. Authorizes the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea:
   
   (a) To recommend to the Agent General such policies concerning the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency’s programme and activities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective discharge of the Commission’s responsibilities in relation to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea;

   (b) To determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographical areas within which the Agency shall operate at any time;

   (c) To designate authorities in Korea with which the Agent General may establish relationships; and to advise the Agent General on the nature of such relationships;

   (d) To take such steps as may be needed to support the Agent General in fulfilling his task in accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly for relief and rehabilitation;

   (e) To consider the reports of the Agent General to the General Assembly and to transmit any comments thereon to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly;

   (f) To call for information on those aspects of the work of the Agent General which the Commission may consider necessary for the proper performance of its work...

3. Setting up a Cease-Fire Group of Three Persons, December 14, 1950

The General Assembly,

Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,

Requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.
4. Branding the Communist Chinese as Aggressors in Korea, February 1, 1951

(Resolution adopted on the Report of the First Committee)

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea,

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has not accepted United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,

1. Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

2. Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

3. Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression:

4. Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

5. Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

6. Requests a Committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee referred to in the following paragraph reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

7. Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

5. The Additional Measures to be Employed to Meet the Communist Aggression in Korea, May 18, 1951

The General Assembly,
Noting the report of the Additional Measures Committee dated 14 May 1951,
Recalling its resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951,
Nothing (Noting) that:

(a) The Additional Measures Committee established by that resolution has considered additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea,
(b) The Additional Measures Committee has reported that a number of states have already taken measures designed to deny contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the United Nations in Korea,
(c) The Additional Measures Committee has also reported that certain economic measures designed further to deny such contributions would support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea and would assist in putting an end to the aggression,

1. Recommends that every State:

(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war;
(b) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo;
(c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution;
(d) Co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo;
(e) Report to the Additional Measures Committee, within thirty days and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution;

2. Requests the Additional Measures Committee:

(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as appropriate, on the general effectiveness of the embargo and the desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it;
(b) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

3. Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the General Assembly to continue its good offices.

6. The Convening of a Special Session Regarding the Armistice Negotiations, February 7, 1952

The General Assembly,

Desiring to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the negotiations in Panmunjom and the
conclusion of an armistice in Korea, and

Wishing to avoid premature consideration of items 17 and 27 of the agenda of the present session.

I

Decides that:

(a) Upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, the Secretary-General shall convene a special session of the General Assembly at the Headquarters of the United Nations to consider the above-mentioned items; or

(b) When other developments in Korea make desirable consideration of the above-mentioned items, the Secretary-General, acting in accordance with Article 20 of the Charter and with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, shall convene a special session or an emergency special session of the General Assembly at the Headquarters of the United Nations;

II

Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds established by General Assembly resolution 571 B (VI) of 7 December 1951 to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions to the programme of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

7. Proposing a Solution for the Release and Repatriation of the Prisoner of War Problem, December 3, 1952

The General Assembly,

Having received the special report of the United Nations Command of 18 October 1952 on "the present status of the military action and the armistice negotiations in Korea" and other relevant reports relating to Korea,

Noting with approval the considerable progress toward an armistice made by negotiation at Panmunjom and the tentative agreements to end the fighting in Korea and to reach a settlement of the Korean question,

Noting further that disagreement between the parties on one remaining issue, along, prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on which this remaining issue can be resolved,

Mindful of the continuing and vast loss of life, devastation and suffering resulting from and accompanying the continuance of the fighting.

Deeply conscious of the need to bring hostilities to a speedy end and of the need for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question,

Anxious to expedite and facilitate the convening of the political conference as provided in article (paragraph) 60 of the draft armistice agreement,
1. **Affirms** that the release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement;

2. **Affirms** that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all time be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of the Convention;

3. **Accordingly requests** the President of the General Assembly to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appropriate.

8. The Exchange of Sick and Wounded Prisoner of War, April 18, 1953

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* its unswerving determination to spare no efforts likely to create conditions favourable to the attainment of the purpose of the peace and conciliation embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,

*Noting,* following the United Nations Command initiative for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, the communication by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China dated 31 March 1953 to the President of the General Assembly and the exchange of communications between the United Nations Command and the Commanders of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army in regard thereto,

Confident that a just and honourable armistice in Korea will powerfully contribute to alleviate the Present international tension,

1. **Notes with deep satisfaction** that an agreement has been signed in Korea on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war;

2. **Expresses the hope** that the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war will be speedily completed and that the further negotiations at Panmunjom will result in achieving an early armistice in Korea, consistent with the United Nations principles and objectives;

3. **Decides** to recess the present session upon completion of the current agenda items and requests the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the present session to resume consideration of the Korean question (a) upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the signing of an armistice agreement in Korea; or (b) when, in the view of a majority of Members, other developments in Korea require consideration of this question.
9. The Convening of a Political Conference on Korea Pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, August 28, 1953

A

(Implementation of Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement)

The General Assembly:

1. Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July 1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major step has thus been taken towards the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

3. Notes the recommendation contained in the Armistice Agreement that "in order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.");

4. Welcomes the holding of such a conference;

5. Recommends that:
   (a) The side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea shall have as participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to the call of the United Nations which desire to represented, together with the Republic of Korea. The participating governments shall act independently at the conference with full freedom of action and shall be bound only by decisions or agreements to which they adhere;
   (b) The United States Government, after consultation with the other participating countries referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, shall arrange with the other side for the political conference to be held as soon as possible, but not later than 28 October 1953, at a place and on a date satisfactory to both sides;
   (c) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, if this is agreeable to both sides, provide the political conference with such services and facilities as may be feasible;
   (d) The Member States participating pursuant to sub-paragraph (a) above shall inform the United Nations when agreement is reached at the conference and keep the United Nations informed at other appropriate times;

6. Reaffirms its intention to carry out its programme for relief and rehabilitation in Korea, and appeals to the governments of all Member States to contribute to this task.
The General Assembly,

Having adopted the resolution entitled “Implementation of paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement,”

 Recommends that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires it.

C

The General Assembly,

Requests the Secretary-General to communicate the proposals on the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the seventh session and recommended by the Assembly, to gether with the records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly, to the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and to the Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea and to report as appropriate.

10. Paying Tribute to U.N. Forces in Korea, August 28, 1953

The General Assembly,


Having received the report of the Unified Command dated 7 August 1953,

Noting with profound satisfaction that fighting has now ceased in Korea on the basis of an honourable armistice,

1. Salutes the heroic soldiers of the Republic of Korea and of all those countries which sent armed forces to its assistance;

2. Pays tribute to all those who died in resisting aggression and thus in upholding the cause of freedom and peace;

3. Expresses its satisfaction that the first efforts pursuant to the call of the United Nations to repel armed aggression by collective military measures have been successful, and expresses its firm conviction that this proof of the effectiveness of collective security under the United Nations Charter will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

11. The Inhuman Treatment of the United Nations Prisoners of War, December 3, 1953

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item “Question of atrocities committed by the North Korean and
Chinese Communists forces against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea” proposed by the United States of America in documents A/2531 and A/2531/Add. 1 of 30 and 31 October 1953.

Recalling that the basic legal requirements for human treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in connexion with the conduct of hostilities are established by general international law and find authoritative reaffirmation in the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and in the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war,

Recalling that these Conventions also embody a precise and detailed provisions for giving effect to the basic legal requirements referred to above and that these provisions, to the extent that they have not become binding as treaty law, have been accorded most general support by the international community.

Desiring to secure general and full observance of the requirements of international law and of universal standards of human decency,

1. Expresses its grave concern at reports and information that North Korean and Chinese Communists forces have, in a large number of instances, employed inhuman practices against the heroic soldiers of forces under the United Nations Command in Korea and against the civilian population of Korea;

2. Condemns the commission by any governments or authorities of murder, mutilation, torture and other atrocious acts against captured military personnel or civilian populations, as a violation of the rules of international law and basic standards of conduct and morality and as affronting the human rights and dignity and worth of the human person.


The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea signed at Seoul, Korea, on 17 August 1954,

Having received the report on the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva from 26 April to 15 June 1954, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953,

Noting that the negotiations in Geneva have not resulted in agreement on a final settlement of the Korean question in accordance with the United Nations objectives in Korea,

Recognizing that these objectives should be achieved by peaceful methods and by constructive efforts on the part of the Governments concerned,

Noting that paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 17 July 1953 provides that the Agreement “shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides”;

1. Approves the report on the Korean Political Conference;

2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful
means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of
government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

3. Expresses the hope that it will soon prove possible to make progress towards these
objectives;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to place the item on the provisional agenda of its tenth
session.

13. The Establishment and Maintenance of a U.N. Memorial Cemetery in Korea, December
15, 1955

The General Assembly,

Desiring to pay tribute to all those who, pursuant to the call of the United Nations, laid down
their lives in resisting aggression in Korea and in upholding the cause of peace and freedom,

Noting that, in a cemetery at Tanggok, near Pusan, in the Republic of Korea, there are the
graves of nearly two thousand men who served with forces which fought under the United Nation
Command,

Noting further that up to the present time this cemetery has been cared for by the United
Nations Command but that permanent arrangements have not yet been made for it
maintenance,

1. Decides that the cemetery at Tanggok, near Pusan, in the Republic of Korea, should
be established and maintained as a United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea in honour of
the dead;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, acting on the advice of a Committee consisting of
representatives of those countries whose men still lie in

(a) To arrange for the negotiation of an agreement with the Republic of Korea in
order to secure the permanent use of the site of the memorial cemetery;

(b) To make all necessary arrangements for the establishment and permanent mainten-
ance of the cemetery;

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to make provision in budget of the United Nations for
the allocation of the necessary funds for this purpose.

14. Reaffirming the U.N. Objectives Based on the Fundamental Principles for Unification
Set Forth by the UNC Participated Nations at Geneva Conference, November 29, 1957

The General Assembly,

Having received and noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea,
Recalling its resolutions 195 (III) of 12 December 1948, 498 (V) of 1 February 1951, 811 (IX) of 11 December 1954, 910 (X) of 29 November 1955 and 1010 (XI) of 11 January 1957,

Noting that the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains in effect,

1. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations are to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Urges that continuing efforts be made to this end;

3. Calls upon the communist authorities concerned to accept the established United Nations objectives in order to achieve a settlement in Korea based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, and reaffirmed by the General Assembly;

4. Requests the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly.


The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea,

Reaffirming its resolutions 112 (II) of 14 November 1947, 195 (III) of 12 December 1948, 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949, 376 (V) of 7 October 1950, 811 (IX) of 11 December 1954, 910 A (X) of 29 November 1955, 1010 (XI) of 11 January 1957 and 1180 (XII) of 29 November 1957,

Noting the exchange of correspondence between the Communist authorities and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on behalf of the Governments of countries which have contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, in which these Governments expresses their wish to see a genuine settlement of the Korean question in accordance with United Nations resolutions their willingness at all times to further the consideration of measures designed to effect reunification on this basis, and stated that, in accordance with the existing recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly have been fulfilled,

Noting further that in this exchange the Governments concerned, observing that the greater part of the forces sent to Korea in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations have already been withdrawn, welcomed the announcement that the Chinese communist troop were also to be withdrawn from North Korea,

1. Calls to the attention of the communist authorities concerned the continued determination
of the United Nations to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Calls upon these authorities to accept the established United Nations objectives in order to achieve a settlement in Korea based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, and reaffirmed by the General Assembly;

3. Urges these authorities to agree at an early date on the holding of genuinely free elections in accordance with the principles endorsed by the General Assembly;

4. Requests the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly.

16. Urging the Continuation of the South-North Dialogue, December 17, 1974

The General Assembly,

Desiring that progress be made towards that attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people,

Recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the Joint Communiqué at Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 July 1972, and the declared intention of both the South and the North of Korea to continue the dialogue between them,

Aware, however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area,

Recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula,

1. Reaffirms the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973, and urges both the South and the North of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea;

2. Expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the two Korean Governments leading to a lasting peace between them.
C. RESOLUTION OF THE U.N. INTERIM COMMITTEE

1. Authorizing the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea to Observe Elections in Korea, February 26, 1948

The Interim Committee,

Bearing in mind the views expressed by the Chairman of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea;

Deeming it necessary that the programme set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 be carried out and as a necessary step therein that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea proceed with the observance of elections in all Korea, and if that is impossible, in as much of Korea as is accessible to it; and

Considering it important the elections be held to choose representatives of the Korean people with whom the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may consult regarding the prompt attainment of freedom and independence of the Korean people, which representatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National Government of Korea;

Resolves

That in its view it is incumbent upon the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, under the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947, and in the light of developments in the situation with respect to Korea since that date, to implement the programme as outlined in resolution II, in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission.

2. The Administration of the Territories Occupied by the U.N. Forces October 12, 1950

The Interim Committee on Korea,

1. Considering the provisions of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October, under which the Interim Committee on Korea is requested to consult with had advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the recommendations contained in that resolution;

2. Having regard to the General Assembly recommendation that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea;

3. Recalling that the Government of the Republic of Korea has been recognized by the United Nations as a lawful Government having effective control over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult, and that there is consequently no government that is recognized by the United Nations as having legal and effective control over other parts of Korea;

4. Advises the Unified Command to assume provisionally all responsibility for the Government and civil administration of those parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the United Nations as being under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the outbreak of hostilities, and which may now come under occupation by United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea of the administration of these territories; and

5. Recommends that the Unified Command take immediate steps to associate with all authorities established for civilian administration in accordance with the present resolution officers from the several forces of members of the United Nations under the Unified Command in Korea;

6. Invites the Unified Command to keep the Interim Committee informed of the steps taken in response to this resolution, pending the arrival of the Commission in Korea.

3. The Question Relating to the Northern Frontier of Korea, November 7, 1950

The Interim Committee on Korea,

Taking note of the Special Report dated 5th November 1950, from the United Nations Command in Korea to the Security Council, which Report was brought to the attention of the Committee by the Unified Command on 6th November 1950,

Believes that it should concern itself with question relating to the northern frontier of Korea in order that the frontier may be fully respected and that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, when organized and convened, should automatically continue to concern with this question,

Decides, in view of the urgent nature of the problem reflected in the Special Report of the United Nations Command referred to above, that such representatives of its Members as are in Korea will, on behalf of the Committee, and subject to its authority, lend all practicable assistance in respect of questions relating to the North Korean frontier,

Requests the Secretary-General to provide necessary staff and facilities to carry out these functions.

D. RELATED DOCUMENTS ON THE KOREAN UNIFICATION PROBLEM,
PRE-KOREAN WAR (1943-JUNE 25, 1950)

1. The Cairo Declaration, December 1, 1943

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa.

The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their
purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

2. The Potsdam Proclamation Defining Terms for the Surrender of Japan, July 26, 1945

(Excerpt)

(1) We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out ...

3. Resolution of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea After the May 10 Elections, June 25, 1948

The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea,

Having observed, in accordance with the terms of the resolution of 14 November 1947 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the elections which were held on 10 May 1948 in that part of Korea accessible to the Commission,

Having previously declared that there existed in that part of Korea a reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom, of speech, press and assembly were recognized and respected,

Having taken into account the reports of its observation groups that such a free atmosphere existed during the elections,

Having satisfied itself that the electoral procedures which it recommended had on the whole been correctly applied,

Resolves:

To record its opinion that the results of the ballot of 10 May 1948 are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea.

4. Statement by the U.S. Department of State on the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Korea, June 8, 1949
On January 1 of this year the United States Government extended full recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea. In so doing, the United States welcomed into the community of free nations a new republic, born of the efforts of the United Nations, and of the United States as a principally interested power, to give effect to the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to freedom and national independence.

The United States Government, inspired by its historic ties of friendship with the Korean people and by its sincere interest in the spread of free institutions and representative government among the peoples of the world, entertains a particularly deep and sympathetic concern for the welfare of the Republic of Korea. As evidence of this concern, the United States is currently carrying out in Korea a program of economic and technical assistance designed to provide the economic stability without which political stability would be impossible. A request for authorization to continue and to strengthen this program during the coming fiscal year has already been submitted to the Congress. The United States has, moreover, maintained in Korea a military training mission whose function it has been to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of Korea in the development of its own security forces, in consonance with the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution of November 14, 1947, and has transferred to that government for those forces substantial amounts of military equipment and supplies under the authority of the Surplus Property Act. The transfer of such equipment and supplies is continuing, while the military training mission has recently been placed on a more formal basis with the establishment of a United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea. Other forms of assistance, such as that in the fields of education and vocational training, also have been and are being given to the Republic of Korea by the United States Government.

In pursuance of the recommendation contained in the General Assembly’s resolution of December 12, 1948, to the effect that the occupying Powers should “withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable,” the United States Government will soon have completed the withdrawal of its occupation forces from that country. As is clear from the broad program of assistance outlined above, this withdrawal in no way indicates a lessening of United States interest in the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another step toward the normalization of relations with that republic and a compliance on the part of the United States with the cited provision of the December 12 resolution of the General Assembly.

While the United States has given unstintedly of its material assistance and political support in order that the Republic of Korea might grow and prosper, this government recognizes that the Korean problem remains one of international concern and that it is only through continued support by the entire community of nations to which that republic owes its existence that the security and stability of this new nation can be assured during the critical months and years that lie ahead. So long as the authority of the Republic of Korea continues to be challenged within its own territory by the alien tyranny which has been arbitrarily imposed upon the people of north Korea, the need for such support will be a vital one.

The United States Government has already pledged its support to the United Nations Commission on Korea in its efforts to assist the Korean people toward the goal of a free and united Korea. It believes, however, that this goal can be achieved only through the continued strengthening of the freely elected and democratic Government of the Republic of Korea as an embodiment of the hopes and aspirations of all Koreans to the freedom and independence for which they have worked and waited so long.
This afternoon I should like to discuss with you the relations between the Peoples of the United States and the peoples of Asia, and I used the words, "relations of the peoples of the United States and the peoples of Asia" advisedly. I am not talking about governments or nations because it seems to me what I want to discuss with you is this feeling of mine that the relations depend upon the attitudes of the people; that there are fundamental attitudes, fundamental interests, fundamental purposes of the people of the United States, 150 million of them, and of the peoples of Asia, unnumbered millions, which determine and out of which grow the relations of our countries and the policies of our governments. Out of these attitudes and interests and purposes grow what we do from day to day.

Now, let's dispose of one idea right at the start and not bother with it any more. That is that the policies of the United States are determined out of abstract principles in the Department of State or in the White House or in the Congress. That is not the case. If these policies are going to be good, they must grow out of the fundamental attitudes of our people on both sides. If they are to be effective, they must become articulate through all the institutions of our national life, of which this is one of the greatest-through the press, through the radio, through the churches, through the labor unions, through the business organizations, through all the groupings of our national life, there must become articulate the attitudes of our people and the policies which we propose to follow. It seems to me that understanding is the beginning of wisdom and therefore, we shall begin by trying to understand before we announce what we are going to do, and that is a proposition so heretical in this town that I advance it with some hesitation.

Now, let's consider some of the basic factors which go into the making of the attitudes of the peoples on both sides. I am frequently asked: Has the State Department got an Asian policy? And it seems to me that that discloses such a depth of ignorance that it is very hard to begin to deal with it. The peoples of Asia are so incredibly diverse and their problems are so incredibly diverse that how could anyone, even the most utter charlatan believe that he had a uniform policy which would deal with all of them. On the other hand, there are very important similarities in ideas and in problems among the peoples of Asia and so what we come to, after we understand these diversities and these common attitudes of mind, is the fact that there must be certain similarities of approach, and there must be very great dissimilarities in action.

Let's come now to the matters which Asia has in common. There is in this vast area what we might call a developing Asian consciousness, and a developing pattern, and this, I think is based upon two factors which are pretty nearly common to the entire experience of all these Asian people.

One of these factors is a revulsion against the acceptance of misery and poverty as the normal condition of life. Throughout all of this vast area, you have that fundamental revolutionary aspect in mind and belief. The other common aspect that they have is the revulsion against foreign domination. Whether that foreign domination takes the form of colonialism or whether it takes the form of imperialism, they are through with it. They have had enough of it, and they want no more.
These two basic ideas which are held so broadly and commonly in Asia tend to fuse in the minds of many Asian peoples and many of them tend to believe that if you could get rid of foreign domination, if you could gain independence, then the relief from poverty and misery would follow almost in course. It is easy to point out that that is not true, and of course, they are discovering that it is not true. But underneath that belief, there was a very profound understanding of a basic truth and it is the basic truth which underlies all our democratic belief and all our democratic concept. That truth is that just as no man and no government is wise enough or disinterested enough to direct the thinking and the action of another individual, so no nation and no people are wise enough and disinterested enough very long to assume the responsibility for another people or to control another people’s opportunities.

That great truth they have sensed, and on that great truth they are acting. They say and they believe that from now on they are on their own. They will make their own decisions. They will attempt to better their own lot, and on occasion they will make their own mistakes. But it will be their mistakes, and they are not going to have their mistakes dictated to them by anybody else.

The symbol of these concepts has become nationalism. National independence has become the symbol both of freedom from foreign domination and freedom from the tyranny of poverty and misery.

Since the end of the war in Asia, we have seen over 500 million people gain their independence and over seven new nations come into existence in this area.

We have the Philippines with 20 million citizens. We have Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and Burma with 400 million citizens, southern Korea with 20 million, and within the last few weeks, the United States of Indonesia with 75 million.

This is the outward and visible sign of the internal ferment of Asia. But this ferment and change is not restricted to these countries which are just gaining their independence. It is the common idea and the common pattern of Asia, and as I tried to suggest a moment ago, it is not based on purely political conceptions. It is not based purely on ideological conceptions. It is based on a fundamental and an earthly and a deeply individual realization of the problems of their own daily lives. This new sense of nationalism means that they are going to deal with those daily problems—the problems of the relation of man to the soil, the problem of how much can be exacted from them by the tax collectors of the state. It is rooted in those ideas. With those ideas they are going forward. Resignation is no longer the typical emotion of Asia. It has given way to hope, to a sense of effort, and in many cases, to a real sense of anger.

Let’s consider for a moment another important factor in this relationship. That is the attitude of our own people to Asia. What is that fundamental attitude out of which our policy has grown? What is the history of it? Because history is very important, and history furnishes the belief on the one side in the reality and truth of the attitude.

What has our attitude been toward the peoples of Asia? It has been, I submit to you, that we are interested—that Americans as individuals are interested in the peoples of Asia. We are not interested in them as pawns or as subjects for exploitation but just as people.

Through all this period of time also, we had, and still have great interests in Asia. But let me point out to you one very important factor about our interests in Asia. That is that our interests have been parallel to the interests of the people of Asia. For 50 years, it has been the fundamental belief of the American people—and I am not talking about announcements of government but I mean a belief of people in little towns and villages and churches and missionary
forces and labor unions throughout the United States—it has been their profound belief that the control of China by a foreign power was contrary to American interests. The interesting part about that is it was not contrary to the interests of the people of China. There was not conflict but parallelism in that interest. And so from the time of the announcement of the open door through the 9-power treaty to the very latest resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we have stated that principle and we believe it. And similarly in all the rest of Asia—in the Philippines, in India, in Pakistan and Indonesia, and in Korea—for years and years and years, the interests of Americans throughout this country have been in favor of their independence. This is where their independence societies, and their patriotic groups have come for funds and sympathy. The whole policy of our government insofar as we have responsibility in the Philippines was to bring about the accomplishment of this independence and our sympathy and help. The very real help which we have given other nations in Asia has been in that direction, and it is still in that direction.

Now, I stress this, which you may think is a platitude, because of a very important fact: I hear almost every day someone say that the real interest of the United States is to stop the spread of communism. Nothing seems to me to put the cart before the horse more completely than that. Of course we are interested in stopping the spread of communism. But we are interested for a far deeper reason than any conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. We are interested in stopping the spread of communism because communism is a doctrine that we don’t happen to like. Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has ever been devised, and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism which would, if it could, take from these people what they have won, what we want them to keep and develop, which is their own national independence, their own individual independence, their own development of their own resources for their own good and not as mere tributary states to this great Soviet Union.

Now, it is fortunate that this point that I made does not represent any real conflict. It is an important point because people will do more damage and create more misrepresentation in the Far East by saying our interest is merely to stop the spread of communism than any other way. Our real interest is in those people as people. It is because communism is hostile to that interest that we want to stop it. But it happens that the best way of doing both things is to do just exactly what the peoples of Asia want to do and what we want to help them to do, which is to develop a soundness of administration of these new governments and to develop their resources and their technical skills so that they are not subject to penetration either through ignorance, or because they believe these false promises, or because there is real distress in their areas. If we can help that development, if we can go forward with it, then we have brought about the best way that anyone knows of stopping this spread of communism.

It is important to take this attitude not as a mere negative reaction to communism but as the most positive affirmation of the most affirmative truth that we hold, which is in the dignity and right of every nation, of every people, and of every individual to develop in their own way, making their own mistakes, reaching their own triumphs but acting under their own responsibility. That is what we are pressing for in the Far East, and that is what we must affirm and not get mixed up with purely negative and inconsequential statements.

Soviet Attitude

Now, let me come to another underlying and important factor which determines our
relations and, in turn, our policy with the peoples of Asia. That is the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Asia, and particularly towards those parts of Asia which are contiguous to the Soviet Union, and with great particularity this afternoon, to north China.

The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, long antedates communism. This is not something that has come out of communism at all. It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills, and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This [These] Communist concept[s] and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces [areas] of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in Outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchuria, and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are very happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what is going on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast areas—populated by Chinese—the detachment of these areas from China and their attachment to the Soviet Union.

I wish to state this and perhaps sin against my doctrine of non-dogmatism, but I should like to suggest at any rate that this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power with Asia.

The consequences of this Russian attitude and this Russian action in China are perfectly enormous. They are saddling all those in China who are proclaiming their loyalty to Moscow, and who are allowing themselves to be used as puppets of Moscow, with the most awful responsibility which they must pay for. Furthermore, these actions of the Russians are making plainer than any speech, or any utterance, or any legislation can make throughout all of Asia, what the true purposes of the Soviet Union are and what the true function of communism as an agent of Russian imperialism is. These I suggest to you are the fundamental factors, fundamental realities of attitude out of which our relations and policies must grow.

Now, let’s in the light of that consider some of these policies. First of all, let’s deal with the question of military security. I deal with it first because it is important and because, having our policy in that regard, we must clearly understand that the military menace is not the most immediate.

What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?

In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American—and there are Australian—troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.

We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements
between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by military means.

Susceptibility to Penetration

The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments which have little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from very serious economic problems, some of them growing out directly from the last war, others growing indirectly out of the last war because of the disruptions of trade with other parts of the world, with the disruption of arrangements which furnished credit and management to these areas for many years. That has resulted in dislocation of economic effort and in a good deal of suffering among the peoples concerned. In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the great social upheaval about which I have been speaking, an upheaval which was carried on and confused a great deal by the Japanese occupation and by the propaganda which has gone on from Soviet sources since the war.

Here, then, are the problems in these other areas which require some policy on our part, and I should like to point out two facts to you and then discuss in more detail some of these areas.

The first fact is the great difference between our responsibility and our opportunities in the northern part of the Pacific area and in the southern part of the Pacific area. In the north, we have direct responsibility in Japan and we have direct opportunity to act. The same thing to a lesser degree is true in Korea. There we had direct responsibility, and there we did act, and there we have a greater opportunity to be effective than we have in the more southerly part.

In the southerly part of the area, we are one of many nations who can do no more than help. The direct responsibility lies with the peoples concerned. They are proud of their new national responsibility. You can not sit around in Washington, or London or Paris, or The Hague, and determine what the policies are going to be in those areas. You can be willing to help, and you can help only when the conditions are right for help to be effective.

Limitations of U.S. Assistance
That leads me to the other thing that I wanted to point out, and that is the limitation of effective American assistance. American assistance can be effective when it is the missing component in a situation which might otherwise be solved. The United States cannot furnish all these components to solve the question. It can not furnish determination, it can not furnish the will, and it can not furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. But if the will and if the determination exists and if the people are behind their government, then, and not always then, is there a very good chance. In that situation, American help can be effective and it can lead to an accomplishment which could not otherwise be achieved.

So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitation, and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries) of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them.

E. RELATED MATERIALS ON THE KOREAN UNIFICATION,
AFTER JUNE 25, 1950, THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

1. Telegram From the U.N. Commission on Korea at Seoul to the U.N. Secretary-General,
June 25, 1950

Government of Republic of Korea states that about 04:00 hrs. 25 June attacks were launched in strength by North Korean forces all along the 38th parallel. Major points of attack have included Ongjin Peninsula, Kaesong area and Chunchon and east coast where seaborne landings have been reported north and south of Kangnung. Another seaborne landing reported imminent under air cover in Pohang area on southeast coast. The latest attacks have occurred along the parallel directly north of Seoul along shortest avenue of approach. Pyongyang radio allegation at 13:35 hrs. of South Korean invasion across parallel during night declared entirely false by President and Foreign Minister in course of conference with Commission members and principal secretary. Allegations also stated People’s Army instructed repulse invading forces by decisive counterattack and placed responsibility for consequences on South Korea. Briefing on situation by President included statement thirty-six tanks and armoured cars used in northern attacks at four points. Following emergency Cabinet meeting Foreign Minister issuing broadcast to people of South Korea encouraging resistance against dastardly attack. President expressed complete willingness for Commission broadcast urging cease-fire and for communication to United
Nations to inform of gravity of situation. Although North Korean declaration of war rumoured at 11:00 hrs. over Pyongyang radio, no confirmation available from any source. President not treating broadcast as official notice. United States Ambassador, appearing before Commission, stated his expectation Republican Army would give good account of itself.

At 17:15 hrs. four yak-type aircrafts strafed civilian and military air fields outside Seoul destroying planes, firing gas tanks and attacking jeeps. Yongdungpo railroad station on outskirts also strafed.

Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary-General to serious situation developing which is assuming character of full-scale war and may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It suggests that he consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of Security Council. Commission will communicate more fully considered recommendation later.

2. Message From the ROK National Assembly to the U.N. General Assembly, June 26, 1950

Beginning in the early morning of 25 June the North Korean Communist Army began armed aggression throughout the 38th parallel area. For self-protection our brave and patriotic army and navy opened heroic defense operations. This savage and unlawful act of the rebel force is the commission of an unpardonable sin. We, representing 30,000,000 Koreans, hope the United Nations General Assembly realizes that our defensive fight against aggression is the inevitable reaction of our people and Government. We also appeal for your immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security not only for Korea but also for the peace-loving people of the world.

3. Telegram From the U.N. Commission on Korea at Seoul to the U.N. Secretary-General June 26, 1950

North Korean advances have created dangerous situation with possibilities of rapid deterioration. Impossible estimate situation which will exist tomorrow in Seoul. In view Commission's past experience and existing situation Commission convinced North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept UNCOK good offices. Suggest have Council give consideration either invitation both parties agree on neutral mediator either to negotiate peace or requesting Member governments undertake immediate mediation. Commission decided stand by in Seoul. Danger is that critical operations now in progress may end in matter of days and question of cease-fire and withdrawal North Korean forces suggested Council resolution prove academic.

4. Telegram From the U.N. Commission on Korea at Seoul to the U.N. Secretary-General June 26, 1950

Commission met this morning 1,000 hours (10 o'clock) and considered latest reports on
hostilities and results direct observation along parallel by UNCOCK Military Observers over period ending 48 hours before hostilities began. Commission's present view on basis this evidence is, first, that judging from actual progress of operations Northern regime is carrying out well-planned, concerted, and fullscale invasion of South Korea, second, that South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis in all sectors of the parallel, and, third, that they were taken completely by surprise as they had no reason to believe from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent. Commission is following events and will report further developments.

5. Telegram From the U.N. Commission on Korea at Seoul to the U.N. Secretary-General
June 26, 1950

Commission informed adoption U.S.-sponsored Security Council resolution. It had contemplated action this direction and expresses unanimous gratification at Security Council move. Commission will be glad undertake task efforts by Council but likes to point out that its efforts to contact North during last eighteen months met only with negative response.

6. Draft Resolution Regarding to the Korean-Chinese Frontier Submitted to the U.N.
Security Council, November 10, 1950

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution of 25 June 1950, determining that the North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace and calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,
Recalling the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in respect to Korea,
Having noted from the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea dated 5 November 1950 that Chinese communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations in Korea,
Affirming that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly dated 7 October 1950,
Insistent that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security,
Calls upon all States and authorities, and in particular those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea;
Affirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;
Calls attention to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy;

Requests the Interim Committee on Korea and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon as possible, and, pending its arrival, that it utilize the assistance of such States members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose.


1. The Government of the United States, in its capacity as the Unified Command, presents herewith a special report concerning certain action recently taken by the United Nations Command in order to maintain a relative military balance in Korea and thus to preserve the stability of the armistice.
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*(June 1950 – June 1951)*

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<td>Yoon Chung Sik Lt. Col., Army</td>
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