THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
THE HISTORY OF
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IN THE KOREAN WAR

VOLUME V

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The War History Compilation Committee

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PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE
Minister of National Defense  Suh Jyong Chul
FOREWORD

Twenty-three years have elapsed since the armistice was signed in July 1953, leaving the Korean peninsula divided. It was something more than merely a three-year war in a once little known land. The armistice has been, and still is, an uneasy armed truce. This is due to the constant threat from North Korea, which has been evidenced by innumerable acts of provocation in wanton violation of the Armistice Agreement.

During the post-armistice period, the Republic of Korea, taking a series of initiatives that included South-North dialogue, has been making every effort to ease tension on the Korean peninsula and pave the way toward national unification by peaceful means.

In sharp contrast to the Republic's peace-oriented moves, the Communists to the north are still belligerent and intractable, pursuing dangerous courses of action that could lead to renewed hostilities. They seem never to relinquish their dream of unifying the peninsula under communism through subversion, an upheaval in the south or direct aggression. They are, in short, as hostile and intransigent as ever.

War preparations by the Communists are continuous and vicious as evidenced in the construction of secret troop infiltration tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone that divides north and south. Thus, they have been engaged in seeking new opportunities to re-invoke the Republic of Korea in a so-called decisive moment, while boycotting repeated urgings by the Republic to resume the stalemated South-North dialogue.

The Republic of Korea has, on numerous occasions, urged the Communist regime in the north to conclude a non-aggression accord in order to prevent a recurrence of war. But, the Communists rejected every overture and, instead, repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. To preclude attempts to communize the entire peninsula should American forces be withdrawn from the Republic, we are now making every possible effort toward a self-reliant defense capability.

Although losing ground diplomatically and facing economic bankruptcy at home, the militant Communists increased their provocative acts and propaganda. Their purpose is to divert the attention of the enslaved north Korean people from their own problems while attempting to mislead people in other countries.

Recently, on 18 this year, two American officers were hacked to death at the Panmunjom armistice site by north Korean guards wielding axes. The Communist guards mounted a surprise and unprovoked assault upon a U.N. Command's work detail which was pruning a tree in the Joint Security Area, a neutral zone. This inhumane act of murder in broad daylight dramatized to the world
the barbaric character of the north Korean Communists.

Driven by their desire to communize the whole of Korea, by force, if necessary, they will no doubt commit more provocative acts and treachery in the future. We have long since learned that they do not hesitate to choose any means available to further their cause.

Peace and prosperity can only be assured when war is prevented. Our national policy is to strengthen our defenses so that the tragedy of war on this peninsula will not be repeated. If the Communists to the north miscalculate and launch a new war against the south they will gain nothing but their own self-destruction.

Despite the threat of renewed aggression from the north, the Republic of Korea is pursuing a gigantic economic development program which is becoming a model for many other countries. The continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea contributes greatly to our economic progress and symbolizes the long ties of friendship between the Republic of Korea and the United States. Moreover, the United States has not only assisted the Republic of Korea in achieving its national independence, but also contributed greatly, as the principal United Nations ally, to defending the nation from external aggression.

This close-tie comradeship in arms, sealed in blood between our two countries, still constitutes the most powerful deterrent against aggressive provocations from the north, and surely contributes to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula as well as in all of Northeast Asia.

At this juncture, it is most befitting to publish Volume V of “The United Nations Forces in the Korean War,” which primarily covers the combat actions of the U.S. Forces during the last two years of the war. It is hoped that this work will serve to enhance the strong comradeship between the Republic of Korea and the United States which was forged in battle and strengthened through years of joint vigilance to preserve the uneasy peace which exists in Korea.

In closing, this publication is reverently dedicated to all the American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who served in the Korean War, with deepest gratitude for their distinguished military services and noble sacrifices beyond all description. Their immeasurable contribution to the cause of freedom enabled the Republic of Korea to preserve its integrity, and laid the groundwork for her rehabilitation and continued national growth.

20 December 1976
Seoul, Korea

SUH JYONG CHUL
Minister of National Defense
PREFACE

This is the fifth in a series of five historical volumes dealing with the effort of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953). It is a sequel to Volume IV which presented operations by the United States Forces through the first year of the war and covers U.S. combat actions until the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 ended the fighting on the Korean peninsula.

The first three volumes traced the outstanding contributions of other United Nations Command participants in helping to drive the Red aggression from the Republic of Korea. Therefore, no further coverage is given to other U.N. Command contingents other than as necessary to understand the employment of the U.S. forces in combat.

In preparing this volume, the Committee made principal use of materials furnished by U.S. military sources. Secondary sources were internal publications and records. It is to be regretted, however, that unavailability of reliable documentation and reference materials on all major participating units denied the fullest coverage of certain battles. Nonetheless, every possible effort has been exerted to give an objective and accurate description of the principal engagements by committed U.S. units with particular emphasis on smaller but significant actions that most typically portray the war during stalemated periods. The Committee accepts sole responsibility for any substantive errors that appear in this work.

Having completed the five basic volumes, the Committee will publish Volume VI as a supplementary edition next year. It will be designed to complement the history of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War by offering a summary of the U.N. Command effort complete with statistics and other supplemental information. For this project, the Committee would greatly appreciate if each participant nation in the Korean War would render it continued cooperation in the collection of necessary information and reference materials.

In conclusion, the Committee owes thanks to those agencies and individuals who helped in the research phase of Volume V and a special debt of gratitude goes to Mr. Herman M. Katz, the Command Historian of the U.S. Forces in Korea, for his sincere advice and cooperation which greatly lightened the task of publishing this volume.

LEE HYUNG SUK
Chairman
War History Compilation Committee

20 December 1976
Seoul, Korea
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. Contents.

This volume, which is compiled into three separate parts of the ground, naval and aerial operations, contains primarily a comprehensive account of the United States armed forces during the last two years of the Korean War from July 1951 to July 1953.

2. Equation of Times.

Times and dates used in this volume are those of the place underdiscussion. It must be kept in mind for reference that there is a time difference of fourteen hours between Seoul and New York. And, Korean standard time is that of the 135th meridian, nine hours ahead of Greenwich Mean time.


Korean names are given according to the Korean custom, that is with the surname first. Korean personal names ordinarily consist of three monosyllables.


Place-names are spelled in accordance with the ROK Army Map Service spellings which are coincided with the McCune-Reischauer System of Romanizing the Korean Alphabet. The breve mark, however, has been omitted. In case of nominal changes new names are indicated along with the old ones. Some place-names are followed by a descriptive, hyphenated suffix. See Appendix III for further reference.

5. Maps and Illustrations.

Sketch maps and photographs have been used to illustrate personnel, events, moves, actions, geographical locations and terrain features in the hope that this arrangement will make the narrative easier to follow. In addition, the situation maps are also annexed at the end of Appendixes to illustrate the development of the battle actions more in detail.
6. **Italicization.**

In printing, the Italic typesetting is applied to some words and phrases that are often italicized in English context or to the specific terms and some quotations in order to distinguish it from normal narrative. Names and designations of enemy elements and units are also italicized to discern from the friendly ones.

7. **Abbreviations.**

As a general rule, the first time a unit and other terms are mentioned they have been given their full titles, but thereafter generally accepted abbreviations have been used as listed in Appendix IV. Unit designations and place names are further shortened in order to avoid repetitious monotony, such as “the 1st Republic of Korea Army Regiment” and “the Yalu River” may enter as “the 1st ROK Infantry” and “the Yalu” respectively.

8. **Appendixes.**

Chronology, the status of military supports and medical aids rendered by the U.N. allies, bibliographical references, glossary, and related documents, including the texts of the Armistice Agreement, declaration by sixteen-U.N. allies at the Geneva Political Conferences, and the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, are also contained in the Appendixes.

9. **Index.**

Relevant names of personnel, units, places and certain operations are enumerated in the Index in alphabetical order at the volume’s end for cross-reference.
THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR

JUNE 1950 – JUNE 1951
CONTENTS

PART ONE THE GROUND OPERATIONS... 1

PART TWO THE NAVAL OPERATIONS.... 515

PART THREE THE AIR OPERATIONS ....... 611

APPENDIX ............................................. 741

INDEX ................................................... 789
PART ONE

THE GROUND OPERATIONS

JULY 1951 to JULY 1953
CONTENTS

CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION
   Section 1.  The First Year, June 1950 — June 1951 ...................... 5
   Section 2.  Initiating the Armistice Negotiations ........................... 27

CHAPTER II  THE NEW PHASE OF WAR
   Section 1.  The Unique, Limited War  ........................................... 38
   Section 2.  Inactive and Limited Battle Front ................................. 48
   Section 3.  The Western and West-Central Front ............................... 59
   Section 4.  The East-Central Front ............................................... 77
   Section 5.  The Mid-Eastern Front ................................................ 91
   Section 6.  The Eastern Front ..................................................... 109

CHAPTER III  LULL AND RENEWAL OF FIGHTING
   Section 1.  Initiating the Limited Objective Offensive ..................... 111
   Section 2.  The Battles of the Punchbowl and Mundung-ni Sectors ............ 124
   Section 3.  Limited Attacks in the Other Sectors .............................. 159
   Section 4.  The Battles of the Mundung-ni and Soyang River Areas ........... 170
   Section 5.  Limited Attacks Continued ........................................... 187

CHAPTER IV  OPERATIONS IN THE FALL
   Section 1.  Limited Offensive in October ...................................... 201
   Section 2.  The Renewed Battle for Heartbreak Ridge ......................... 202
   Section 3.  Advance in the West .................................................. 219
   Section 4.  Offensive in the Kumsong Sector .................................... 238
   Section 5.  Action in the Soyang River Area .................................... 246
   Section 6.  Internal Changes and Alterations ................................... 249
Chapter V  Stalemate
Section 1.  Lull and Static Warfare .............................................. 277
Section 2.  The Beginning of the Outpost Battle ......................... 285
Section 3.  Behind the Line ..................................................... 288

Chapter VI  The Spring Action
Section 1.  Patrolling Warfare .................................................. 304
Section 2.  The Package Proposal ............................................. 314
Section 3.  Outpost Struggles .................................................. 316
Section 4.  Communist Prisoner Riots on Kojedo ......................... 327

Chapter VII  Outpost Battles in Stalemate
Section 1.  Outlook of the Battle Scene .................................... 340
Section 2.  Operation Counter .................................................. 342
Section 3.  The Battle for Key Outposts ................................... 347

Chapter VIII  Autumn Operations
Section 1.  The Summary Account of Operations ......................... 359
Section 2.  Flare-up Again on Key Outposts ............................. 361
Section 3.  Operation Showdown .............................................. 384

Chapter IX  Cold Front
Section 1.  The Demise of Military Victory ............................. 394
Section 2.  Winter Action ....................................................... 396
Section 3.  Use of Artillery Firepower .................................... 407
Section 4.  The Opposing Forces at Year's End ........................ 410

Chapter X  Prethaw Front
Section 1.  Active Defense on the Frozen Scene ....................... 413
Section 2.  Renewing the Outpost Battles ............................... 423

Chapter XI  A New Development
Section 1. Negotiations Resumed ............................................. 432
Section 2. Tightening Battle Front ........................................ 436

CHAPTER XII  THE FINAL STAGE OF WAR

Section 1. The Release of Anti-Communist Prisoners ............... 449
Section 2. The Last Battles ............................................... 452
Section 3. The Signing of the Armistice ................................ 467

CHAPTER XIII  THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER

Section 1. Cease-Fire and the Aftermath ............................. 475
Section 2. Retrospect and Lessons ..................................... 481
Section 3. Korea Today .................................................... 506
CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION

Section 1.  The First Year, June 1950—June 1951

A full year of bitter fighting, pushing up and down the peninsula, had served only to bring the war momentum to a lull. By the first of July 1951, huge waves of the Korean War had come to an end and the battle lines began to stalemate, signaling an entirely new phase of war. With the armistice negotiations opening on 10 July 1951, the United Nations, and especially the United States objectives in the war shifted from military victory to a political settlement. This impetus for a negotiated cease-fire generally along the 38th Parallel carried with it a restriction on military operations. Here was the basic pattern of the United Nations Command operations throughout the rest of the war.

The first year had been quite different. When the North Korean Communist puppet forces invaded the Republic of Korea in an all-out effort on 25 June 1950, the United Nations, led by the United States of America and her allies, had supported the Republic of Korea with all means available to repel the Communist aggression. Only the aggression of the Chinese Communist forces into the war in November 1950 -- another Communist armed aggression -- had prevented the United Nations effort from attaining clear-cut military victory as well as a potential triumph in the unification of Korea.

From this juncture on, the war had become more complicated, with political considerations increasingly overshadowing the battleground.

By mid-January 1951, the pace of the Red Chinese onslaughts was slackened, suffering tremendous casualties. The UN forces stiffened and struck back at the enemy pushing the Communists north of the 38th Parallel. Then, the Chinese Communist forces attempted a final duel in the spring in a total effort employing all their available forces. But they gained nothing only resulting in their own mortal blow. Lashing back in vigorous and successful counter-offensive, the ROK and UN allied forces drove the enemy back northward with an irresistible force. The enemy was at death’s door.

In short, the plot to communize whole Korea planned by the Communist
puppet regime in the north and its Soviet and Red Chinese masters had backfired. The Communists proved themselves in their most decisive, final offensives in April and May 1951 that the flood of their human-sea tactics could never win the battle against the ROK-UN allied forces. On the contrary, the UN forces had rebounded to win their greatest victory of the war’s first year. The Communists must have realized that their plot of aggression had turned out to be a futile dream. Their combat power was on the verge of death, while the UN forces were growing stronger hourly. To say in one word, the Communists were at the end of their rope. The most they could hope for was a stalemate. As a result, on 23 June 1951, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations proposed a cease-fire. This move immediately brought a momentary lull and then a two-year long, tedious stalemate in the fighting.

Outbreak of the Communist Aggression
(25 June – 20 July)

That Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, Communist artillery suddenly began to pound frontier defensive positions of the Republic of Korea near the 38th Parallel around 0400 hours. By daybreak, spearheaded by Russian-built T-34 tank columns, the Communist puppet forces swept across the Parallel driving down southward with a blitz.

The North Korean Communists’ puppet forces were apparently confident that they could easily take all of the southern peninsula within a short span of time before any outside power could participate effectively in support of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Well-equipped and trained by the Soviet Union during and after occupation of the northern half after World War II, the North Korean puppet army was an efficient combat force carefully prepared for the armed invasion.

By sharp contrast, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) of ill-equipped and poorly trained men was a highly ineffective force. Actually it was more of a constabulary than an army organized purely for maintenance of social security. Thus the ROK armed forces were no match for the Red Korean columns in number, equipment, and firepower from the beginning. The ROK Army had no heavy artillery, tanks or any anti-tank weapons. The ROK Navy was merely a token force and, the Air Force was likewise; they had neither few battleships nor warplanes.

Taken by complete surprise, ROK frontier units put up an ineffectual resistance despite brave fights here and there against the flood of the overwhelming
Introduction

Communist onslaughts in numbers. On 28 June three days after the opening attack, a tank-infantry force leading the main Communist thrust entered Seoul. By 13 July the Communists had reached the Kum River line, and Taegon fell on 20 July.

U.N. and U.S. Actions

The Communist aggression marked an eruption of tensions between the two biggest power blocs, the "Free World" and Communists. This was the first time that a Soviet puppet regime had been permitted to go as far as open war. And the news came like a thunderclap in the Free World. Thus, the scene was set for the nations of the Free World to prove that such acts of armed aggression would no longer be tolerated.

Response by the Free World was immediate. Stunned by this well-planned Communist aggression, the Free World turned to the United Nations. For the first time since its founding, this world body faced a full-scale war. Matters had come to a too serious point, and it could only be interpreted as an open challenge triggered by world Communists to the free nations of the world. In other words, the Communists triggered upon the United Nations, because the Republic of Korea was formally found on 15 August 1948 under the supervision of the United Nations, and the U.N. General Assembly had recognized the Republic of Korea Government at its third general meeting in Paris on 12 December 1948 as the only and legitimate one on the Korean peninsula.

In a series of Security Council resolutions, the United Nations swiftly denounced the NK Communist aggression and decided to fight by force against the aggressors. On 25 June (26 June in Korea), the U.N. Security Council demanded immediate cessation of the Red Korean aggression), and when that failed, the Security Council, on 27 June (28 June in Korean time), urged U.N. member nations to furnish military assistance to the Republic of Korea.

For the national traitor Kim Il-sung and his conspirators as well as his Communist masters, such prompt and determined U.N. reactions came like a bolt from the blue.

Meanwhile, the United States reacted swiftly to the NK Communist invasion. Acting through the United Nations, President Harry S. Truman of the United States instructed General of the Arm Army Douglas MacArthur, then commanding the U.S. Far East Command, on 26 June (27 June in Korea), to employ U.S. air and naval forces and attack NK Red troops and targets found south
of the 38th Parallel. Then on 29 June (30 June in Korea), President Truman broadened the range of U.S. air and naval attack to targets in Communist held-northern territory, and further announced on 30 June that U.S. ground troops would be committed to battle.

But neither the U.S. Far East Command nor Washington appeared to have any prepared plan for eventual support of military operations in Korea. The historical decision to go into Korea with ground forces apparently was an off-the-cuff decision supported by a spontaneous recommendations from the Far East Command without reference to availability in troops and logistics.

General MacArthur had at hand four divisions all under the Eighth US Army in Japan, and a separate regimental combat team on Okinawa. None of these was fully prepared for battle. Each division lacked a third of its organic infantry and artillery units and almost all of its armor, and its existing units were far understrength equipped with warworn remnants of World War II.

Following the withdrawal of U.S. military occupation forces from Korea in 1948–June 1949, the U.S. Far East Command had no mission to defend the Republic of Korea against aggression. In a speech delivered on 12 January 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson publicly stated that the U.S. Far East defense perimeter ran from the Aleutians to Japan through the Ryukus to the Philippines. Such an announcement informed the world that Korea lay outside the unilateral military cognizance of the United States. Many observers in the free world viewed that the Secretary Acheson’s statement had encouraged and prompted Kim Il-sung, the ringleader-warmonger of the puppet clique in the Communist North, to launch the tragic, bloody internecine war against God and man.

Nevertheless, American ground troops immediately began to rush piecemeal to Korea. On 2 July, the first contingent of the 24th US Division flew to Pusan and then moved to positions near Osan, where the first, heroic American ground battle took place on 5 July. The remainder of the division was to follow at once to Pusan by air and water. Shortly thereafter the 25th US Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions plus support units, began movement from Japan to Korea. The advance echelon of the Eighth US Army Headquarters arrived in Taejon by air from Japan late on 7 July, but was moved to Taegu to set up the command post in that city when Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker assumed command of the Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK) on 13 July. Needless to say the morale of the ROK forces was greatly inspired by the arrival of the U.N. helpers.

In addition to the United States forces, many other U.N. allies offered in
a steady stream to dispatch armed forces to participate in the U.N. effort in Korea, striving to be the foremost. Australian air and naval forces were already in action, and British naval forces in the Japanese waters were also ordered to take part in the U.N. police action against the Communist aggressors.

Actual and probable commitment of military forces from the U.N. members, meanwhile, posed a problem as new as the U.N. organization in one respect and old as the unity of command principle in another. Consequently, by resolution on 7 July (New York time) the U.N. Security Council asked the United States to form a unified command and to appoint a commander to direct and coordinate the U.N. military effort.

The United States accepted the request and President Truman complied by designating General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as the "Commander-in-Chief" of the U.N. military forces's unified command on 8 July. General MacArthur was further directed to use the U.N. flag in the course of operations against the NK Communist aggressors. Then, on 24 July, he established a formal United Nations Command (UNC) with headquarters in Tokyo, Japan.

President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea placed the ROK armed forces under General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

In such a way the United Nations (Communist bloc excepted) for the first time committed military forces by a collective action to enforce its resolutions, although the Republic of Korea was not a U.N. member. Under American leadership, the UN Command eventually developed into an international group of ground, air, and naval forces representing the Republic of Korea, twenty U.N. member countries, and one other non-U.N. nation.

Of the U.N. contributors, in alphabetical order, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom (Great Britain), and the United States furnished ground combat troops. Naval forces arrived from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Air forces came from Australia, Canada, Greece, South Africa, Thailand, and the United States. India, Norway, and Sweden supplied ground medical units, and Denmark sent the hospital ship *Jutlandia*. Italy, then a non-U.N. country, sent a hospital unit late in 1951. These U.N. Crusaders for the cause of freedom, justice, and peace of mankind joined the United Nations Command as they reached the theatre of operations.
The Naktong River Perimeter
(21 July – 14 September)

Meanwhile, due to the enemy's overwhelming weight of numbers, ROK and US units were forced to engage in defensive operations for the next two months. They were to delay the enemy advance to the south so as to cover buildup for future offensive operations. During this period, air, naval and ground forces from some member states of the United Nations arrived to resist and repel the Communist aggression.

Throughout July, the ROK and American forces fought magnificent, gallant battles in a series of delaying actions, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. By the end of the month, eleven enemy divisions had been identified on the line of contact. The enemy dispositions formed a disconnected line from Chinchu through Kochang and Yongju to Yongdok, with greatest concentration of divisions in the central part of the line.

As for the friendly forces, besides five ROK and three American divisions, the 2nd US Division and the 5th US Infantry Regimental Combat Team began to arrive in Korea from the United States mainland and Hawaii respectively on 31 July. The 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade also began to arrive on 2 August. A pattern was now beginning to be established in the fighting. The enemy supply lines were lengthening longer, and friendly air support was playing havoc with enemy forces, denying them freedom of maneuver during daylight and forcing movement by night. Moreover, British and American naval warships had wiped out the enemy's naval opposition. Before August was out Great Britain committed its 27th Brigade from Hong Kong. By early August, the ROK and American allied forces were squeezed into the Naktong River Perimeter, where still out-numbered UN ground forces slugged it out against overwhelming Red Korean forces.

Meanwhile, to offset the enemy tactics that had made strong thrusts at the UNC flanks, probed for weak spots in the center, and infiltrated troops to the rear, friendly forces worked out a constant movement and shifted forces to meet each serious threat as it arose, and some time before. An enemy breakthrough at this stage could have meant complete disaster. In this crucial moment, on 29 July, General Walker made a famous "stand or die" statement that there would be no Dunkirk and Bataan. "We must fight until the end," he went on, "we are going to hold this line (the Naktong Perimeter). We are going to
As August deepened, the weight of the enemy’s impetuous pressure and attacks increased, but ROK and Eighth US Army units firmly held the Nakdong Perimeter, through desperate fighting and brilliant maneuver until mid-September. At this point, it must not go any farther without mentioning specifically the battle for Tabu-dong and whereabouts fought by the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Division and the 1st ROK Division.

At the time, the enemy prepared to make an all-out frontal attack on Taegu. By then, to the north of Taegu, though the 1st ROK Division fought valiantly, the enemy was able to penetrate within artillery range of Taegu. At this juncture, on 15 August, General Walker shifted the 27th US Regiment to the Taegu front. The 27th Regiment took up positions along the road leading into Taegu from Sinjumak and Chongpyong-dong north of Tabu-dong, and two enemy divisions, supported by the bulk of T-34 tanks, began the first of seven successive night attacks on the night of 18–19 August down the Taegu–Sangju road, which later became known as the “Bowling Alley.” But the attack was repulsed. Preceded by a heavy volume of artillery and mortar fire, the enemy again launched a major attack at midnight, 21 August. This night battle lasted about five hours during which American troops knocked out nine enemy tanks, four self-propelled guns, and several trucks and personnel carriers. After daylight they counted numerous enemy dead, and estimated the enemy had suffered 1,300 casualties in this night action alone. Enemy prisoners said that the action had decimated their units. By 21 August there were 1,000 enemy troops infiltrated into the rear of the American positions. The 23rd Infantry of the 2nd US Division was sent in to clean them out which they did successfully.

During the night of 22–23 August, the enemy made another futile attack against the 27th Infantry. Then, shortly after midnight of 24 August, the enemy attacked down the Bowling Alley but the 27th Infantry again broke up this fruitless attempt. The confirmed enemy losses from 18 to 25 August included 13 T-34 tanks, five self-propelled guns, and 23 vehicles. Thus the 27th US Regiment (commanded by Colonel J. H. Michaelis, who later was to command the UN Command in 1969—1972), in defending Tabu-dong, handed the enemy forces their first resounding defeat of the war. It must not unnoticed that the 1st ROK Division must receive a generous share of the credit for holding the front north of Taegu.

The successful defense of the northern approach to Taegu in this week-long fighting not only saved the city but gave the UN forces a strong salient. It
was the beginning of the end for the Communist invaders.

**General Counteroffensive**
**(15 – 30 September)**

Almost from the outset of the war General MacArthur worked out on plans for a decisive blow that would turn the tide of war. He planned an amphibious landing at Inchon west of Seoul. In concert with this maneuver, the ROK and Eighth Army forces were to make a general counteroffensive northward.

The X US Corps, a separate command under the UN Command, had landed at Inchon under strong cover of airstrikes and naval gun fire on 15 September. Despite grave risk -- great tide variation and a narrow channel -- General MacArthur's brilliant action, one of the outstanding feats in military history, had given the UN forces a strong beachhead there within a very short period of time, thus restoring Inchon by early morning of the following day. The corps units completely cleared the enemy out of Seoul on 28 September.

The Inchon landing had also been the signal for the rest of the UN ground forces to breakout from the Naktong Perimeter. On 16 September, General

Walker’s command, now consisting of the I US, I ROK and II ROK Corps and within a week the IX US Corps as well, launched a long-awaited general counteroffensive with irresistible force, trapping thousands of Communists enroute.

When the portent of the X US Corps’s envelopment and the Eighth Army’s frontal attack became clear to the Reds, they lost the will to fight and fled to the north. The Eighth Army rolled forward and linked up with the X Corps at Osan on 26 September. The enemy casualties were extremely high. By 30 September the UNC’s prisoners of war inclosures held over 100,000 captives. Remnants of six NK divisions hid in the mountains in the south, posing a large enough threat for the UN Command to commit the IX US Corps against them. The Red Korean army, nevertheless, had ceased to exist as an organized battle force below the 38th Parallel by the end of September. Now, the UN forces possessed the initiative for the first time in the war.

Drive to the North
(1 October – 25 November)

After driving the enemy above the 38th Parallel, the ROK and UN allied forces rolled ahead like turbulent waves toward the Manchurian border, sweeping everything before them. In the east, the I ROK Corps crossed the reproachful Parallel on 1 October and advanced up the east coast, while the Eighth US Army forces, with triumph on the horizon, pushed northward against crumbling enemy opposition, after jumping off on 9 October.

The United Nations General Assembly, meanwhile, had formally ratified the UN forces’ advance on 7 October for the restoration of peace and security throughout Korea, thereby giving tacit approval to attack far deep into the Communist-seized northern territory by the U.N. military forces. This new resolution signified that the U.N. political objective in Korean unification was to be achieved through an expanded military objective which now was to liberate and occupy the northern half and unify all of Korea under the banner of "TAEGUKKI," the national flag of the Republic of Korea.

The momentum of the rapid attacks continued and the I US Corps in the west occupied Pyongyang within ten days. Three days later the Eighth Army forces were in Sinanju, and within another week, the 24th US Division crossed the Chongchon River and reached a point only 18 air miles from the Manchurian border. The 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division farther east went even deeper. It dashed like a violent wind toward the border and took Chosan on 26 October, becoming the first contingent of the ROK-UN allied
forces to reach the Yalu River border.

In the meantime, the X US Corps, still under the direct control of the UN Command, made its second landing, this time on the east coast of the northern territory -- the 1st US Marine Division at Wonsan and the 7th US Division at Iwon. They met no opposition since both landing areas had already fallen to the I ROK Corps. The ROK corps farther advanced up to Chongjin, the American Marines struck for the Changjin Reservoir, and the 7th US Infantry Division attacked northwest toward the Pujon Reservoir and the Yalu River. Incidentally, the 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division would become the first unit among the non-ROK forces to batter into the Manchurian border line, when it captured Hyesanjin on 21 November.

The enemy's fate, being covered with wounds and damages all over, now hanged like a candle flickering in the wind.

By the end of October 1950, the NK Communist army had dissolved; 135,000 prisoners had been taken. The remnants of the decimated enemy forces had been forced into the northwestern part of Korea closer to the northernmost border between Korea and Manchuria (Red China). Thus, the outlook for the ROK and UN forces was distinctly optimistic. In other words, for all practical purposes, the NK Red forces appeared exist only as "rabble at arms" or like "as rat in a trap." In fact, the Korean War, which was triggered by the NK Communists, appeared to be
just about over within a matter of hours when reports of Chinese Communist forces’ troops in Korea were confirmed at the end of October. After a brief moment of doubt, General MacArthur decided to continue the general advance to the Yalu River line in a final effort to finish up the shooting with a complete military victory.

General MacArthur had issued orders for the attacks on 24 October by the two major forces, the Eighth Army and X Corps, that he hoped would carry these forces to the Manchurian border and restore complete peace to Korea before the onset of winter. But, enemy resistance soon stiffened as the Yalu River came close, with Red Chinese troops between 25 and 28 October posed a new threat. Yet, it was not clear whether a few makeshift units of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) had reinforced the NK Reds or whether the presence of them represented full aggression by Communist China in force.

Battles with the Red Chinese, costly to both sides, continued through the first week of November. Then, on 8 November the larger Red Chinese forces abruptly broke contact with the UN forces and withdrew, obscuring their purposes and intentions in Korea.

General MacArthur, nevertheless, ordered the Eighth Army to resume the final drive to the northernmost limit of the Korean peninsula starting on 24 November, while the X Corps units were to make an enveloping maneuver to the northwest, beginning on 27 November. But, within 24 hours the complexion of the war was to change with devastating suddeness.

By 1 November, Russian-built MIG-15 jets made their first appearance. At the time the newly introduced American F-86 “Sabre jet” scored a 14 to one “kill” ratio over MIGs.

Chinese Communist Aggression
(25 November 1950 – 24 January 1951)

The entirely new war opened 25 November when massed, fresh Chinese Communist forces struck and heavily hit friendly forces, particularly on the Eighth Army’s right flank, causing the ROK and UN units to pull back from the north to stabilize the lines. (See Sketch Map 1.) The prohibition against bombing Manchuria imposed enormous handicaps to effective aerial bombing and strikes on the massive CCF onslaughts.

By the end of November, in addition to the 3rd US Division and the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, the UN forces were augmented by an additional Great Britian brigade, a Turkish brigade, battalion each of Australia,
Canada, France, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Thailand. They were further reinforced by an air fighter squadron of South Africa, with a Greek infantry battalion and a New Zealand artillery regiment soon to arrive in December. Thus, in November, the UN forces approximated 400,000 troops of which 200,000 were ROKs and 177,000 were Americans.

However, the UN forces were still no match with the new enemy, in strength in particular. With these new, too greatly overwhelming invaders in numbers pressing at their heels, the ROK and UN allied forces had no alternative but to withdraw back from the north, leaving their tears of indignation behind. It was true that the United Nations Command had no other choice at the
Introduction

juncture unless it was authorized by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry the war across the Yalu River into Manchuria, sources of war potential in Red China, as what General MacArthur asserted strongly. Neither President Truman nor the American Joint Chiefs of Staff listened to General MacArthur's concept of strategy, thus leaving Manchuria as a military sanctuary.

In short, the nightmare of the Red Chinese aggression had turned the tide of war again, signaling an entirely new phase of the Korean War. Thus, realization of the unification of Korea -- the national heart's desire cherished for years and awaited impatiently ever since the national liberation from the Japanese colonial yoke in August 1945 -- came to naught when it seemed at hand, just because of the Chinese Communist aggression. The Republic of

THE ADVANCE TO THE NORTHEAST (24 Oct–26 Nov 1950)
Korea and her people, even down to the whole future generations, can not
and will never forget forever this additional bitter tragedy caused by the illicit
Red Chinese aggression.

Due to the enemy's overwhelming weight of numbers, UN and ROK forces
were compelled to engage in defensive operations for the next two months.
They fought a series of retrograde movement actions, forcing the enemy into
prudence as slowing his southward advance.

While the I and IX US Corps and II ROK Corps were continuing to fall
back as the entire western front had been hit by an estimated 18 CCF divisions,
the X US and I ROK Corps in the east, accomplished successful evacuation
from the Hungnam port during 11 - 24 December. (See Sketch Map 2.)

There, the U.S. Navy played its historical role by evacuating 105,000 friendly
troops, 98,000 refugees, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies.

By the end of December 1951, the Eighth Army organized a 224-kilometer,
coast to coast defense line just below the 38th Parallel. Along this line were
the I and IX US Corps west and north of Seoul, the III, II, and I ROK Corps
to the east, in that order. The X US Corps, now being under the Eighth Army
command, went into Army reserve.

The enemy's combat forces in Korea were now estimated to exceed 400,000
troops, including a quarter of a million Red Chinese. 740,000 CCF troops
were estimated in nearby Manchuria, bringing the total available enemy forces
to 1,140,000 -- three times the United Nations Command's ground strength.
There was every indication of an impending large-scale enemy offensive with
a number of enemy units impressively increasing hourly.

**UNC's Offensive**
(25 January - 21 April)

The year of 1951 was opened with the Red Chinese attacking down along
the entire front, directing their major effort against Seoul, as expected. The
enemy offensive was blunted within a few weeks when, again, enemy ranks
were depleted and ran out of gas. And, by mid-January, the momentum of the
war began to slack. The Chinese Communist forces had outdistanced their
supplies and began to suffer heavier casualties.

Toward the end of January, the UN forces began the northward drive.
Then, General Ridgway gave the UN ground forces their objectives for the
next four months when he declared that "We are interested only in inflicting
maximum casualties to the enemy with minimum casualties to ourselves. To do this we must wage a war of maneuver -- slashing at the enemy when he withdraws and fighting delaying actions when he attacks."

To attain this objective, the Eighth Army began a probing advance on 25 January. Moving on a wide front through a succession of phase lines, UN troops attacked slowly northward.

On the night of 11 February, the Red Chinese forces unleashed a major offensive, directing their main attack on the Wonju front, where they experienced their first tactical defeat of the war.

Shortly thereafter, General Ridgway launched Operation Killer, a counter-offensive which pushed the Communists north of the Han River. The UN ground forces now began to capitalize on the enemy's extended supply lines, hitting them with air and artillery bombardment. By 19 February, the initiative had returned to the UN Command. And, the UN forces had regained the lower bank of the Han River by 1 March.

Operation Ripper pushed the enemy forces above the 38th Parallel. It began on 7 March, restoring Seoul on 14 March. The capital city was not lost again. The momentum of this offensive carried friendly forces over the Parallel.

The UN forces were again on the advance in northern Korea by April. The tides of battle were beginning to stabilize, and the UN forces were forcing the Communist aggressors back up the peninsula. Thus the balance of forces now favored the UN Command to some degree.

But, an unforgettable disappointment to the people of the Republic of Korea was unexpectedly happened on 11 April 1951, when General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was relieved of his United Nations Command, after a series of public utterances revealed sharp differences over American national policy and military strategy on Korea.

There was a great conflict of policy and strategy between President Truman and General MacArthur in the military and political problems of how to end the Korean War. Upon his return to the United States, General MacArthur stated his conviction as to the war in Korea during the "MacArthur Hearing" that "There were three choices, either to pursue it to victory; to surrender to an enemy and end it on his terms; or what I think is the worst of all choices, to go on indefinitely, neither to win or lose ..." He further expressed that "with no policy for winning in the normal way, the war would go on with no mission for the troops except to resist and fight in this accordion fashion --
Ground Operations

up and down -- which means your cumulative losses are going to be staggering.”

To end the purgatory of the so-called “Limited War,” General MacArthur proposed an ultimatum to Communist China to withdraw their forces and cease their depredations in the area of northern Korea. The course of action he proposed, he said, would bring the war in Korea to a decisive end and avoid World War III.

With its emphasis on sea and air power, on Asia as the center of the world struggle, on the quick, total solution and above all on unilateral American action, General MacArthur, as a whole in his testimony, said that “There was no substitute for victory; containment meant appeasement, defeat, death. If necessary, the Korean War would have to become the final crusade, a last crusade to destroy communism and carried out by the United States.”

On the other hand, leading opposition to the General MacArthur’s strategy in Korea was Secretary of Defense (21 September 1950 to 12 September 1951) George C. Marshall followed by Generals Bradley, Collins and Vandenberg and Admiral Sherman, all members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The President Truman’s Administration’s two most obvious points against General MacArthur that argued time and again were simple and predictable. First, “limited war” in Korea gave the Western Allies time to build up their own strength against the growing Communist threat in Europe. Second, General MacArthur’s strategy might not end the Korean War by defeating Red China; and if applied, his offensive against the Red Chinese mainland might bring in the Soviet Russia and so trigger off World War III when the United States would be disastrously separated from its North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) allies.

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that “Korea, in spite of the importance of the engagement, must be looked upon with proper perspective. It is just one engagement just one phase of the battle . . . . The course of action often described as a “Limited War” with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.”

In short, in General MacArthur’s judgement there was “no substitute for victory” and the restriction of Korea did not lend themselves to such prospects. He was convinced that, in sound military logic, victory demanded hitting the enemy where he was most vulnerable and where it would do the most good — not in Korea, but in Red China, Manchuria in particular.

At any rate, the release of General MacArthur provoked a bitter debate in the United States between the supporters of General MacArthur and those of President Truman, but the excitement caused by the General MacArthur’s
removal did not stop the fighting in Korea. The war raged on.

Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway immediately succeeded General MacArthur with a rank of full general on 11 April and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet arrived and assumed the Eighth US Army command on 14 April. Thus, the change of higher commands took place during the midst of the UN forces’ advance toward an objective designated “Kansas,” 16 kilometers above the 38th Parallel, and also Line Wyoming which looped above the mid-western portion of Line Kansas. As the UN forces advanced above the Kansas Line, more evidences of the enemy’s buildup appeared.

CCF Spring Offensive
(22 April – 19 May)

The threatened enemy major offensive came on the night of 22 April committing an estimated half of the 700,000 CCF and NK Communist troops in Korea, with massed CCF infantry assaults in echelon against the UN lines, accompanied by the familiar sound of whistles, horns, bugles and gongs. After the Red Chinese forces carried their attack in the west below the 38th Parallel, they concentrated their main effort to isolate and capture Seoul. In the east, their onslaught also carried below the Parallel but not in such depth as in the western sector.

Accordingly to pre-arranged plans, General Van Fleet withdrew the UN ground forces through a series of delaying positions, finally establishing defenses north of Seoul that designated as “No-Name Line,” along which the enemy’s decisive blow was halted by the end of April. The Chinese Communist forces suffered seriously heavy casualties. The Red Chinese called the general attack the “First Step, Fifth Phase Offensive.”

General Van Fleet planned counteroffensive designed to carry the UN forces back to Line Kansas, but signs of another enemy offensive led him to postpone it.

He was right. After dark on 16 May the Chinese Communist forces reopened their spring offensive, employing an estimated twenty-one divisions, with nine NK Communist divisions on the flanks, but this time the enemy drove a salient into friendly east-central positions, ROK and UN forces exacted heavy enemy casualties again and contained the Red onslaughts by laying down tremendous amounts of artillery fire. By the third day the enemy had been stopped and was unable to continue the attack. The Chinese Communists called the futile attack the “Second Step, Fifth Phase Offensive.”
It should not be passed at this point without making a note about the gallant battle for the Hangye area, specifically at Bunker Hill or Hill 800, during 16 – 19 May. When the enemy’s heaviest blow fell against the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps on the night of 16 May, the 2nd US Division held the right portion of the X Corps line with the 1st US Marine Division on its left and the 7th and 5th ROK Divisions on its right.

The 2nd US Division occupied a rugged hill mass area separating two rivers -- the Hongchon and the Soyang, with a tank-infantry task force on the right half of its sector and the 38th Infantry Regiment on the left. Within the 38th US Infantry, the 3rd and 1st Battalions were stationed on No-Name Line, on and around Hill 800 and Hill 1051 respectively, from left to right.

Hill 800 was situated 16 kilometers or more from the main supply road, the right half of its sector and the 38th Infantry Regiment on the left. Within the 38th US Infantry, the 3rd and 1st Battalions were stationed on No-Name Line, on and around Hill 800 and Hill 1051 respectively, from left to right.

Hill 800 was situated 16 kilometers or more from the main supply road, and all the supplies and equipment had to be carried over footpaths to the top, where twenty-three bunkers were manned by troops of K Company.

Meanwhile, the 7th and 5th ROK Divisions were heavily engaged in the vicinity of Inje north and northeast of Hangye, and then fell back after holding their ground for a time, while before daylight on 17 May, the Red Chinese penetrated the 1st Battalion lines and seized the top of Hill 1051. Shortly before the midnight, the enemy suddenly began to attack on Hill 800. There followed the fiercest battle to take and hold the hill between the friendly and foe until the early morning of 19 May when the Chinese Communist forces abruptly broke off their attack, only suffering a heavy toll of their own casualties.

Thus, on the left shoulder of the enemy salient, the 2nd US Division, including the French and Netherlands Battalions, withstood resolute enemy attacks until 18 May, and then, together with the 1st US Marine Division, moved over to the right to plug the gap in the line. The IX US Corps extended its front to the right to fill the area left by the 2nd US Division and the Marines. Lieutenant General Van Fleet then sent the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division from Seoul to bolster the western face of the salient, while rushing its 7th and 65th Regiments to blocking positions at the southernmost of the enemy penetration.

The swarming columns of the Chinese Communist and NK Communist forces soon almost surrounded the 2nd US Division, pushing against its front, right, and rear, with its main supply route severed. But a coordinated attack
Introduction

by the 9th US Infantry driving northward, and the 23rd and 38th Infantry Regiments attacking southward along with their attached French and Netherlands Battalions, regained control of the route. The enemy persistently threw in violent, repeated attacks to capture Hill 800 but all were beaten off by valiant, courageous counteractions. The 2nd US Division stood fast and punished the enemy heavily. The 38th US Field Artillery Battalion alone firing 12,000 rounds of 105-mm. shells in twenty-four hours, most of which fell between 2200 and 0400 hours on the morning of 19 May, helped stand off the enemy and cost him seriously.

When daylight came on the 19th the enemy had disappeared, and situation maps showed the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry, holding the northern point of a deep bulge in the front lines. During the defense of the Hangye area the 2nd US Division suffered 900 casualties -- killed, wounded, and missing, while the enemy losses were estimated at 35,000 men.

The UN forces, having handed the Chinese Communist forces the bloodiest and most decisive beating in their history, were now poised to strike north again. Determined to exploit the great success and to prevent the enemy from regathering strength for another attempt, General Van Fleet ordered his ground forces to launch a series of counteroffensives. Disorganized after their own attacks, the Red Chinese forces attempted to resist stubbornly only where their supply installations were threatened. Elsewhere, ROK and UN forces advanced with almost surprising ease, and by 31 May was just about the Kansas Line, crossing the 38th Parallel for the third time. The Parallel, of course, had no longer any significance in the tactical situation. Thereafter, part of the friendly forces prepared to advance to the Wyoming Line.

These two successive major offensives in April and May 1951 were the Chinese Communists' final tries to push UN allied forces out of the Korean peninsula, but ended with complete failures only suffering a fatal blow in personnel, materiel, and morale as well. During their two full-scale offensives the Red Chinese had suffered vital losses -- 70,000 from 22 to 30 April and 90,000 from 17 to 23 May. There could now be no hope for them to win the battle in Korea; the Chinese Communist hordes would have to seek out some other way to settle the Korean question.

UNC's Counteroffensive
(20 May – 30 June)

Meanwhile, by 19 May the enemy was at standstill, and it was the UN
forces' turn to take up offensive, pursuit and exploitation. Toward the close of the month the UN forces' front was back again on Line Kansas without encountering serious opposition. But, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff restricted the United Nations Command not to advance to the north beyond the Kansas and Wyoming Lines without its prior approval. General Ridgway, the UNC's Commander-in-Chief, was to consider primarily the security for his own UN forces, maintaining contact with the enemy and keep him off balance. General Van Fleet, the EUSAK Commander, therefore, ordered frontline units to strengthen positions along the Kansas Line on 1 June, while at the same time he directed limited-attacks toward the Iron Triangle in the center and toward the Punchbowl in the east. He then designated the Wyoming Line, along with the Kansas Line elsewhere, as the main line of resistance.

In fact, as the fighting ebbed back and forth in the spring of 1951, it became evident that neither side would win a decisive military victory, unless the ROK and its UN allied forces would attack farther northward and advance to the Yalu River border, without restrictions for bombing on the Red Chinese operation bases in Manchuria.

Thus, the UN forces shifted from the offensive to the defensive in mid-June 1951 when they reached Lines Kansas and Wyoming. General Van Fleet had no other choice since present objectives marked generally his north limit of advance. Recapture of these lines meant that all of territory below the 38th Parallel except for a small area in the west was clear of enemy troops. To compensate for the enemy's hold south of the Parallel, UN forces held territory far north of the Parallel in central and eastern Korea. Upon halting, friendly forces began to fortify their positions and, aside from patrolling and clashing with enemy screening forces, spent the remainder of June developing their defenses. The enemy used the respite to reorganize after losing heavily. (See Sketch Map 3.)

In deed, as the first year of the war ended, the fighting took the appearance of a stalemate. Since that time on, UN ground units would engage with the enemy in bitter patrol and small-scale actions in defense of the main line of resistance and the outpost line as well and in struggles for locally important strongpoints and tactically significant terrain features.

In brief, the present line held by the UN forces in June 1951 would remain unchanged with slight alterations until the shooting war was ended more than two years later.
Summing Up and the Prognosis

The resentful first anniversary of the Communist aggression was overshadowed two days earlier by the news that the Communists had taken the initiative in proposing truce talks. On 23 June 1951, Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet Union’s delegate to the United Nations made the proposal in a New York radio address, implying the Chinese Communist and NK Communists’ willingness to discuss terms of an armistice. It was a great turning point that decided fate of the Korean War.

As the armistice negotiations began at Kaesong early in July, United
Nations ground forces in Korea exceeded 550,000 men, the bulk of which comprised ten ROK and seven US divisions, four brigades of the UN member countries, one separate regiment, and nine separate battalions.

The strength of the enemy forces totaled at 459,000 divided among 13 CCF armies and seven NK Communist corps. The sufficient point of difference was in available reserves. Whereas the UN Command had no appreciable source of reinforcements anywhere, the enemy had close at hand some 743,000 CCF troops in Manchuria. Yet, at the time the Communist armies were on the most wobbly legs, and they were punch drunk and ineffective. Especially, the willingness of the Red Chinese to negotiate an armistice rather than comit their large reserve to battle undoubtedly was prompted in large part by the tremendously high losses they had sustained since entering the Communist aggression war eight months earlier.

By 10 July 1951, an estimated total enemy casualties had risen above 1,250,000 men, divided almost evenly between the Chinese Communists and NK Communist forces. Apart from results accomplished by other Services, the ROK Army claimed that it alone had inflicted 321,800 enemy losses in total (292,600 killed, 28,200 captured, and 1,000 self-surrendered) by 30 June 1951, in addition to countless enemy wounded that reached astronomical figures.

The cost to the United Nations forces also had been dear. By the end of June 1951, the ROK Army casualties were numbered 212,500, including 21,600 dead. American combat losses stood at about 78,800, of whom approximately 21,300 were killed in action or subsequently died as a result of their combat participation. Losses among other U.N. contingents were in proportion to the Americans. Besides, the ROK civilian population had paid a still higher price, suffering some 469,000 casualties, of whom at least 170,000 had been killed. There had, however, no official announcement ever been made by the ROK authority with regard to the ROK casualties both for military and civilian losses.

Although the United Nations Command had not won a complete military victory through the first year of the war, at least it had met its objective of repelling the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea, for with the exception of a small area in west, the Republic had been cleared of the invading enemy and even large territory above the 38th Parallel now was under the United Nations Command control, thus executing the missions that were within its power to accomplish. On 25 June 1951 the Communists held less territory by 2,100 square miles than they occupied when they began the armed aggression a year ago.
Introduction

As for Communist China, its aggression had raised prestige of Mao Tse-tung’s Communist regime in the Communist bloc and the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) won a front-rank position as a military power, even though Red China was branded as an “Aggressor” by the U.N. General Assembly on 1 February 1951.

Thus, whereas neither of the U.N. Command and the CCF aggressors had been able to achieve a final, complete military victory, both felt that each had made significant gains. While Red China was still far to reach the ranks of the world powers, especially by a lack of an atomic capability and a dependence on the Soviet Russia for industrial and technical support, its new prominence was certain to upset the political balance in Asia.

As a result, the tragic Korean War now had set the scene for what could prove to be a long, tedious stalemate at two locations, in the truce tent and on the fighting front.

Section 2. Initiating the Armistice Negotiations

On 23 June 1951, Jakob A. Malik, the Soviet Union’s delegate to the United Nations, proposed that discussions should be started for a ceasefire and an armistice in Korea. Two days later the proposal was endorsed in a radio broadcast by the Chinese Communist regime. Then, on 27 June, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko informed American Ambassador Alan G. Kirk in Moscow that the strictly military armistice should be negotiated by the field commanders but any political or territorial matters.

In the meantime, President Harry S. Truman of the United States, two days following Malik’s statement, said that the United States “is ready to join in a peaceful settlement in Korea . . . a real settlement which fully ends aggression . . . We must build up our strength but we must always keep the door open to a peaceful settlement of differences.”

The U.N. legal advisor Abraham Feller also informed U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie that the United States had the right to conclude a ceasefire or armistice without further authorization from the United Nations as long as the negotiations were limited to military matters and the end result was reported to the U.N. Security Council.

Following President Truman’s authorization, the Command-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, General Matthew B. Ridgway radioed the enemy
on 30 June 1951, proposing a conference to discuss an armistice at the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia, stationed at the Wonsan Harbor. On the following day, the NK Communist puppet regime's boss Kim Il-sung and Peng Teh-huai of the Chinese Communist forces agreed to such a meeting, counter-proposing Kaesong as the meeting site. The outcome was an agreement that representatives of both sides would meet on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong near the 38th Parallel, then located between the opposing lines on the western front. Thus, an entirely new, long volume of the Korean War, unparalleled in war history, was begun to write at the talking war front.

**Motive Behind the Communist's Proposal**

Why had the Communists been first to ask publicly for a truce conference? All of eminent political and military leaders of the Republic of Korea as well as many foreigners believed at the time that the answer might have been traced to military necessity than any genuine desire for peace.

At the time when Malik made the cease-fire proposal, the Communist forces were utter fatigue in men, materiel, and morale; they had heavily suffered an estimated 200,000 casualties within one-month span in April and May 1951 in particular. Thus, the Communist aggressors had completely failed to achieve their goals of driving out of all the ROK and U.N. allied forces from the peninsula, even south of the 38th Parallel, the exigencies of the moment, for their part, indicated a worsening position.

In fact, in sharp contrast with the Communist forces, the UNC forces were on the offensive and pushing the enemy back to the north. Under these circumstances it was wise for the Communist hordes to seek out such a cease-fire as their last resort before other gains were lost. And, they took the initiative before too late.

The Communist aggressors knew themselves that their bluster and reckless dream to communize whole Korea by force of arms was ended in vain. They had lost face particularly by the serious failure of the their long heralded "Fifth Phase Offensive" in the spring of 1951.

It was, therefore, a chance for the UN forces to finish off the U.N. effort -- the attainment of a free, independent, democratic, and unified Korea. But, the United Nations led by the United States had confined the war to a limited area, more or less along the old 38th Parallel.

Even many foreign war-correspondents at the front at the very moment suspected the Communist proposal, saying that "it was just a crafty trick devised
Introduction

by the Communists to gain time and build up again the badly mauled Red Chinese armies."

In essence, it is the real character of the Communists by nature and physiology that they play on other's weakness for the satisfaction of their own plots. It is the original nature and true colors of the Communists that they usually attempt to attack upon the weaker or prey on a sore spot, but they retreat or try to negotiate when they realize they have no hope to win or if they face a stronger opponent.

It might have been recalled at this time that the Chinese Communists had used truce negotiations for military purposes during the Chinese Civil War (1946 – 1949) after World War II. In 1945 and 1946, when prospects for a Chinese Nationalist victory were bright, the Chinese Communists took advantage of American peace efforts by agreeing on several occasions to meet for truce conferences. And while prolonging the talks by all manners of subterfuges, the Communists profited from the breathing spells by reorganizing their forces and planning new offensives. Owing largely to such a trick -- camouflaged peace move -- the Red Chinese gained their final triumph.

History repeated itself in June and July 1951 when events of the next two years were shaped by the political decisions of a few summer weeks. The Communists wanted no real peace from the beginning, unless an agreement reached on terms of their favor.

More very recently, in the Vietnam War, the Red Vietnamese, sponsored by the Red Chinese and Russians, had proposed cease-fire talks to the Free, Southern Vietnamese when the tide of war was completely turned to great favor of South Vietnam and her Allied forces. As a result, an agreement was reached to end the shooting at the so-called "Paris Peace Conference" after many turns and twists of the armistice negotiations that lasted from 13 May 1969 to 27 January 1973.

Worse, the Communist forces soon broke the agreement unilateraly even before the signing ink on the armistice terms was not dried up, thus renewing an all-out war and overrunning whole Vietnam in a lightening tactic. It should be noted that all of Free Allied Forces in Vietnam, including the United States and ROK forces, were withdrawn after the signing of the armistice agreement, and shortly thereafter the Red forces overran South Vietnam. Of course, this tragedy happened well after the Korean War.

Now, back in Korea, the Communists also aimed at the propaganda effect so craftily, because they knew that the mere public announcement of the
possibility of truce talks would have a tremendous appeal in the United States and other free nations as well. And while a cease-fire remained even a remote prospect, American public opinion would demand a slackening of offensive military operations with their attendant casualties.

Furthermore, the Communists were fully aware of the dissidence of President Syngman Rhee, who had made known his strong refusal to accept any armistice terms less than complete unification of Korea under sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. To suggest truce would thus cause a split in the UN Command ranks and embarrass the Free World. There was no reason why the Communists not to grasp such a rare moment and exploit it for their plots. Fishing is good in troubled waters.

The news of the armistice negotiations shook the hearts of the people of the Republic of Korea and immediately led them to flare up. Under the leadership of President Rhee, they started a nation-wide anti-armistice movement. They wanted no armistice because it would leave the Korean peninsula still divided. Their determination was desperate and the severe demonstrations spread all over the south and continued unlimitedly. This anti-armistice campaign would last until just short of signing the armistice agreement more than two years later.

The Impetus Toward a Political Settlement

In retrospect, from the beginning of the Korean War the United States and other members of the United Nations who extended support to the Republic of Korea held to a basic policy that the local Korean War must not be allowed to spread. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had stated: "The whole effort of our policy is to prevent war and not have it occur. Our allies believe this just as much as we believe it, and their immediate danger is much greater than ours because, if a general war broke out, they would be in a most exposed and dangerous positions."

 Particularly, opposition to any enlargement of the Korean War was very determined in Great Britain, second-most important contributor to the United Nations Command; thus Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee stated flatly: "Our view had always been that the Far Eastern war should be confined to Korea and that it would be a great mistake to have larger forces committed to a major campaign in Asia."

As a result, as gradual development, particularly since the time of the Chinese Communist forces' invasion, the objective of the United Nations Command in the Korean War suddenly shifted from a military victory to a
political settlement.

As early as on 14 December 1950 (New York time), the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution to set up a three-man cease-fire group to explore a cease-fire in Korea, stating that "immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea from spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself." By January 1951 the committee reported its complete inability to inveigle the Communists into even discussing the matter. The Chinese Communists had a futile dream to take the whole of Korea under their sphere of influence. Another cease-fire effort was tried on 13 January 1951, but again rejected by the Communists. Consequently, the General Assembly, on 1 February 1951, branded Red China, like NK Communist clique, as an aggressor.

By February the question was again being raised as to the desirability of recrossing the 38th Parallel. Yet the feeling was beginning to permeate Washington officials that a truce line generally at the 38th Parallel might be practical. Such a consideration was, of course, repugnant in the extreme to President Syngman Rhee and General MacArthur. President Rhee wanted no armistice under any circumstances without seeing unification. General MacArthur wanted to completely disable the Communist aggressors. He expressed that conditions in Korea did not favor a truce line at any particular line across the peninsula. A force large enough to hold the 38th Parallel would be large enough to drive the enemy out of Korea, the General said. The ROK people gave him the whole-hearted support.

Following the release of General MacArthur from the United Nations Command on 11 April, the UN Command was more clearly forced to localize the war, and the impetus for a truce approach appeared to be in the offing more actively on the political scene. President Truman described in his memories that the U.S. National Security Council discussed Korean objectives on 2 and 16 May 1951, when the American Government distinguished between the political aim and the military aim in Korea. As a whole, it defined the military aim to repel the aggression and terminate the fighting under an armistice agreement.

Based on this new policy of 16 May 1951, the objective of the United Nations Command’s military mission was to create conditions favorable to the settlement of the Korean War which would, as a minimum, (1) terminate the fighting under appropriate armistice agreement, (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea south of a northern boundary line suitable for defense and administration and not substantially below the 38th Parallel, (3) provide
for the withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from all of Korea in appropriate stages, and (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed NK Communist aggression.

This new policy was a similar approach to Korea in principle which had been adopted during the meeting between President Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee of the United Kingdom in early December 1950 after the Chinese Communist aggression.

Moreover, on 17 May 1951, American Senator Edwin C. Johnson introduced a resolution asking the United Nations to urge the belligerents in Korea to declare an armistice by 25 June 1951, the unpleasant and hateful first anniversary of the Communist aggression, along the 38th Parallel. These proposals were, undoubtedly, significantly given full coverage by the Soviet Union’s press and radio.

Senator Johnson’s resolution was followed by a radio talk ten days later on 26 May by the President of the U.N. General Assembly, Lester Bowles Pearson (then Canadian Minister of External Affairs), sponsored by the United Nations, in which he said that the complete surrender of the Communist aggressors in Korea might not be necessary, and it would be sufficient to achieve the objective of stopping the aggression against the Republic of Korea.

This was again followed by Secretary General Trygve Lie of the United Nations on 1 June, who said that a cease-fire around the 38th Parallel would fulfill the main purpose of the Security Council’s resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 but nothing was mentioned about the General Assembly’s resolution of 7 October 1950. The latter resolution had specifically defined the objective of the U.N. war effort in Korea, stating that the essential objective was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea. It further noted that the U.N. forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in the October 7 resolution: Bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea.

The same day, Secretary Dean Acheson made the most authoritative attempt yet of the American Government’s Korean objective. Replying to Senator Tom Connolly he differentiated between the long-term aim of Korean unification which had been an American objective since the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 and an U.N. objective since 1947 (adopted in the General Assembly’s resolution of 14 November 1947), and the immediate aim of restoring peace and ending the Communist aggression in Korea.
Secretary Acheson formally reversed the U.S. Government's policy of the previous autumn. He wearyly replied the next day on 2 June when he was asked again by a Republican Senator, Alfander Smith, saying that "if a cease fire were arranged around the 38th Parallel, that would accomplish the military purposes in Korea." Expounding similar ideas with U.N. Secretary General Trygove Lie, Secretary Acheson said that the U.N. troops had been sent to Korea to deal with the military aggression and to solve the military problem. He further told the American Senate investigators that the UN forces in Korea would agree to a reliable armistice on the 38th Parallel.

In short, by the time when Soviet's Malik had proposed the cease-fire question on 23 June 1951, the both sides, the United States and her allies and the Soviet Russia and Communist China, recognized that further fighting was adding nothing toward the realization of their original goals, thus seeking out a political settlement. On the part of the United States, it was aware that any further effort to achieve the political objective of Korean unification solely by military means would be to incur the risk of an Asiatic or general war, either prospect being equally repugnant to the United States and to the other nations supporting the UN Command in Korea. As for the Communist aggressors, as already mentioned earlier, they had entirely miscalculated from the outset and they were driven to the wall.

Yet, by the closing days of June 1951, no one really knew how the cease-fire talks would begin, even though informal and secret talks between the West and the East began in the diplomatic corridor.

With the military and political objectives in Korea now agreed within the U.S. Government and with its Allies, it only needed some indication from the Communists that they were willing to take for negotiations to begin. But how was this first move to be made? A direct approach by the West was out of the question, implying as it did a position of weakness.

It was the Chinese Communists who had twice in two months, April and May 1951, attempted unsuccessfully to drive the UN forces out of Korea. Keeping up the military pressure, combined with assurances to negotiate an armistice on the basis of the "status quo" seemed the only way. The UN Command launched heavy, continuous counteroffensives, rushing toward the north.

Inasmuch as the UN forces were advancing and had already made significant gains above the 38th Parallel, particularly in the strategically important area of the Iron Triangle and on the mid-east and eastern front, as last on 23 June 1951, Jakob Malik proposed a cease-fire talk on "The Price of Peace" in the
same series over the United Nations radio station in New York which President Lester Pearson of the U.N. General Assembly had spoken on 26 May almost a month earlier.

It must be noted that the Communists had withdrawn their previous demands that cease-fire talks be contingent of withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country, that Korean domestic affairs must be settled by Koreans, and that a U.N. seat should be given to Red China. They had given up their ambition of taking the whole peninsula. In essence, the proximate cause for the Communists to take the initiative in proposing the truce talks can be traced to their moral blow that suffered in the spring of 1951 -- the greatest defeat of their own

Conference site in Kaesong, 10 July 1951, the day the truce negotiations opened.
major offensives in April and May had forced them to open the way to armistice negotiations. The United States and her allies were on tiptoe with expectation. Thus, for different reasons both the UN Command and Communist side had decided to accept a stalemate in Korea.

But, the Republic of Korea Government immediately reacted its strong opposition to any armistice whatever may happen as long as the nation remained divided.

On 30 June 1951, President Syngman Rhee clearly stated the conditions for acceptance of an armistice. These included: (1) The Chinese Communist forces must withdraw north of the Yalu River without further hostile actions or damage to property; (2) complete disarmament of all NK Communist armed forces; (3) the United Nations guarantees that no third power would assist the NK Reds either militarily or financially; (4) the Republic of Korea to have full participation in any international conference considering not only the cease-fire but any phase of the Korean problem; and (5) a refusal to accept any situation that conflicts with the national sovereignty or territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea. And again on 4 July, President Rhee made it quite clear that a cease-fire at the 38th Parallel would not be acceptable. He added his demands for a continuation of the war and the realization of complete unification of Korea.

The Initial Negotiations

From the outset of the armistice talks it was apparent the UN Command was no match for the Communist in low cunning. The United Nations Command suggested, for instance, that the truce teams would meet on the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia. Here, surely, was neutral ground, since Denmark had no combat troops in Korea. Moreover, the ship was to be anchored in Wonsan harbor within range of the enemy shore batteries. But the Communists counterproposed to meet at Kaesong. This counterproposal was a “face-saving” device, in which the Jutlandia was technically the UNC territory, from which organization the Red Chinese and NK Communists had been excluded.

Thus the Communists won the first of many such concessions with their refusal. They insisted that the talks be held at Kaesong, and the UN Command let them have it their way. The reason for the enemy decision was soon made evident. Kaesong was in the path of the advancing UN forces, which meant that the strategically important road center would be immune from UNC’s attack. Further, though Kaesong was originally in no man’s land, the Communists soon
managed to include it within their lines.

Thus, from the beginning of the truce talks, the Reds had evidently determined to seize every advantage which could be wrung from such discussion. Designation of Kaesong as the meeting site was a shrewd stroke which not only allowed the Reds to realize the psychological advantage of meeting on the soil south of the 38th Parallel but also created a neutral zone--called the Holyland--around Kaesong which greatly hampered UNC air and ground operations at the western end of the battle line.

A vehement anti-armistice demonstration in Seoul.
At 1100 hours, 10 July 1951, the UNC delegation, headed by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy (Commander of US Naval Forces, Far East Command), and the Communist delegates commenced the negotiation talks at Kaesong. But the enemy delegates immediately began to devote time to propaganda work.

All delegates were requested to display white flags on their vehicles for identifications. Communist photographers were on hand to snap countless pictures of UNC delegates in order to fabricate alike that the beaten UN Command had sent representatives to plead for terms. If any doubt remained, other photographs showed that unarmed UNC delegates being herded about Kaesong by scowling Communist guards with burp guns.

Oriental custom, in the seat setting, prescribed that at the peace tables the victors face south and the losers face north. Needless to add, the Communists had arranged for the UNC delegates to seat at Kaesong with a view to enhancing the enemy prestige.

It was also significant that the enemy delegation contained three NK Communists and two Red Chinese, even though the Chinese Communists had 95 per cent of the front line troops. This was obviously a propaganda move.

Some of the Red propaganda schemes bordered on the ridiculous. At the first meeting of the delegates, the Reds had provided a chair for Admiral Joy which was considerably shorter than a standard chair, while the enemy senior delegate, across the table, was provided with a chair much higher than usual chair. This condition of affairs was promptly rectified when Admiral Joy changed his chair for a normal one, but not before the enemy photographers had exposed reels of film.

At the first conference at Kaesong the two delegations agreed that the fighting would continue until an armistice agreement was signed. Yet it seemed unlikely that either side would open any large-scale offensive as long as the cease-fire talks were in session.

After 27 July 1951 when an agreement reached upon an agenda for the regulation of the military armistice conference, the enemy delegates seemed more concerned with gaining concessions than compromising differences. To the UNC delegates it appeared that the enemy sought to delay negotiations so as to gain time to build up his forces. The Communists would continue to delay the talks until 22 August 1951 when they finally broke off negotiations on the pretext of reckless charge that UN aircraft had attacked neutral Kaesong.
CHAPTER II  THE NEW PHASE OF WAR
(1 – 31 July 1951)

Section I.  The Unique, Limited War

A New Policy and Direction

Up to June 1951, the Korean War direction had been changed several times resembling ebb and flow and also alike a swinging pendulum, arching first below and then above the 38th Parallel in 1950 and repeating it again in the early months of 1951. But the swinging had been lost momentum gradually as the execrable and unforgettable first anniversary of the war came near. The war was forced by an alien influence to shift its direction toward an uneasy, unique settlement not by military means but by negotiations at the talking front from a political angle.

As early as on 1 May 1951, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched a new instruction to the United Nations Command, restricting General Matthew B. Ridgway on any general advance to the north beyond the Kansas–Wyoming Line. General Ridgway himself had placed a comparable restriction on the Eighth US Army in his earlier instructions to Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet dated 22 April 1951. Thus General Ridgway was strictly prohibited any large-scale ground operations unless he obtained both political and military clearance from Washington beforehand.

On 17 May 1951, President Harry S. Truman of the United States approved the U.S. National Security Council’s statement of policy, a guide for all U.S. agencies in the government’s effort to combat the spread of communism not only in Korea but throughout southeast Asia and the Pacific area. With the respect to Korea, the U.S. National Security Council adopted the course of action and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and confirmed the ultimate objective of the United States, which was to solve the Korean situation primarily by political negotiations, as distinguished from military means alone, so as to provide for a united, independent, and democratic Korea.
In short, the United States would keep up the current course of action in Korea in furtherance of an acceptable armistice, awaiting with impatience that the Communists might openly move to propose for a cease-fire talk. And, the new policy of 17 May 1951 determined the course of the UN Command’s combat operations for the two long years that were to elapse between its approval and the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953.

Then, as the unforgettable anniversary of the first year of the Korean War came, on 23 June 1951, the first effort from behind the Iron Curtain was started toward negotiating a truce, as already described in the preceding chapter. An unprecedented, new war in history had already begun. (See Sketch Map 4.)

Reaction at the Front

With the initiation of truce negotiations at Kaesong, the tempo of operations on the battlefield impressively slackened, largely because the prospect of an
early end to the fighting made the UN Command's commanders and troops eager to prevent any unnecessary loss of life. The root of such a hasty judgment and forecast, of course, was resulted fundamentally from the lack of discretion about true color and concealed motive of the Communist aggressors deeply hiding behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

The American policy of limiting military operations to the territorial confinement necessarily restricted effectiveness of UNC operations within Korea. Above all things, Communist forces in Korea were accorded privileged rear areas for assembling and equipping, and the sources of Communists' war materiel in Red China's Manchuria were free from UNC's attack in particular, remaining intact as "Privileged Sanctuary."

Notwithstanding, at the fighting front, ROK and UN allied combat troops, long familiar with Communists' crafty tactics, did not remiss in the discharge of their combat duties a bit, thus taking precautions against the enemy movement.

All along the front - - which now extent from the Imjin River to Chor-won on the central front, paralleled the base of the famed Iron Triangle, swung southeast to the lower edge of the Punchbowl in the mid-eastern sector, and then ran north and east to the Eastern Sea above Kansong of the east coast - - no major
ground offensive was launched by either side. However, during the two-year period of cease-fire talks, local, fierce fighting within limited objectives took place from time to time on a 16-kilometer-wide strip of land across the battle lines that straddled the 38th Parallel on the western end and reached toward the north along the east coast, as both opponents fought for defense boundary and to gain better ground and hold it.

Because of the forward defense lines along Lines Kansas and Wyoming were mostly covered with an intricately mass of hills and ridges, and the enemy line likewise, all the ground battles were chiefly taken place on hilltops and ridge-lines generally within the same front and same zones of action with minor alterations until the shooting was ended. For the most part, however, the front was static, and the character of the war was defensive.

In brief, during the unprecedented limited, positional warfare along what would become the Demilitarized Zone at the close of the war such peculiar strange names as Heartbreak Ridge, Bloody Ridge, Triangle Hill, Outpost Harry, White Horse Hill, Arrowhead Hill, Alligator’s Jaw, T-Bone Ridge, Old Baldy Hill, Prokhop Hill, Little Gibralter, Bunker Hill, and many others became famous. After the ground fighting flared up beginning in late July and in August 1951, there waged almost endless bloody battles by both sides up and down the rugged hills and steep slopes hither and thither along the “Limited War” front, as the two opposing forces struggled endlessly for control of favorable terrain features until the signing of the armistice agreement in July 1953.

U.N. Command’s Ground Forces

General Ridgway was responsible for the conduct of operations in Korea as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNA) and the defense of the Far East Command area as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCUSE). Normally, he received instructions and directives relating to the Korean War from the U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff who acted as executive agent for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and forwarded biweekly reports to the U.N. Security Council although it had no command authority, because the United Nations Command was functioned under the United States based on the U.N. Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950.

Most of the officers on General Ridgway’s staff performed multiple duties as he used them interchangeably in the UN Command and Far East Command. Lieutenant General Doyle O. Hickey, for example, was Chief of Staff for all
Chart 1 – Channels of Command, July 1951

Among major forces under the General Ridgway's command, there were US Army Forces, Far East, consisted of the Eighth Army in Korea and XVI US Corps in Japan; US Naval Forces, Far East, comprising of the Seventh Fleet and attached UN naval forces; Far East Air Forces, composed of the Fifth Air Force and attached UN air forces and also Strategic Air Command; Japan Logistical Command; and Headquarters and Service Command. But, Headquarters, US Army Forces, Far East did not become operational until 1 October 1952 although it had not been inactivated. (See Chart I)

The ground weapon of the U.N. Command in Korea was the Eighth US Army under Lieutenant General Van Fleet, which included ROK and UNC units participating in the war. Organized into four corps, the Eighth Army had a total strength of 554,577 at the end of June 1951. There were 17 divisions
under the control of the Eighth Army, of which seven were American and the remaining ten were ROK Army. In addition, there were four brigades (28th British Commonwealth, 29th British, 25th Canadian, and Turkish Brigades), one separate regiment, and nine separate battalions. The breakdown in strength figures showed 253,250 U.S. troops, 28,061 other U.N. contingent personnel, 260,548 ROK troops, and 12,718 Korean who were assigned to serve with the U.S. units, as Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA). (See Chart 2.)

By the end of June 1951, combat, support, and medical units from twenty U.N. member nations joined the Republic of Korea, with the United States taking the leading part, against the Communist aggression.

Apart from the United States forces, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Turkey had each sent a brigade, and other members of the British Commonwealth nations, including Australia and New Zealand had formed a fourth. Belgium-Luxembourg, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Thailand provided battalions. India, Norway, and Sweden had sent medical and hospital units and from Denmark had come a hospital ship. There would be a Red Cross hospital unit came from Italy in mid-November 1951. Naval forces were contributed by the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Thailand, also with the exception of the United States. And air squadrons or flights also came from Australia, Canada, the Union of South Africa, Greece, and Thailand, in addition to the U.S. air forces.

As for reinforcements of the US ground forces in Korea, meanwhile, in May 1951 General Ridgway had recommended to Washington expressing that all U.S. forces in the Far East ought to be assigned to the UN forces under his UN Command, whereas the 40th and 45th US National Guard Divisions of XVI US Corps in Japan were excluded from this command. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unwilling to leave the defenses of Japan to the Japanese National Police Reserve. At last, on 31 May 1951, a new directive, which clearly separated and distinguished the responsibilities under two commands, the UN Command and Far East Command, was dispatched to General Ridgway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new directive was spelled out that the 40th and 45th US Divisions would be used only in defense of Japan except one specific authority from the Joint Chiefs.

Developing the ROK Army

As the Korean War entered a new phase in the summer of 1951, the build-up
question of the ROK Army, one of the essential problems pending between the Republic of Korea and the United States, came to the fore more positively. But ahead lay the great period of expansion when the ROK Army would double the numbers of personnel, arms, equipment, and divisions under its jurisdiction.
The New Phase of War

Since the United States intended to place more responsibility for the defense of the Republic of Korea upon the ROK forces whether the armistice negotiations were successful or not, now it became essential to expand the strength and to improve the caliber of the ROK Army. Most of the weakness that had appeared in the ROK forces could be traced to inadequate training.

When the war had broken out in June 1950, approximately 95,000 men of the ROK Army had not even completed the company phase of their training. In the haste to stem the NK Communist forces' advance, recruits were rushed into uniform, given weapons but little or no training, and then sent to the front to fill a gap in the line.

By October 1950, there were five ROK divisions in action and five more in the process of activation and organization. At the time, General MacArthur recommended that a postwar army of ten divisions with a total strength of 250,000 men be authorized, and the Department of the U.S. Army and President Truman approved it in early November 1951.

After the Chinese Communist forces had joined the Communist aggression, the situation forced the ROK Army to further reconstitute and rebuild. General MacArthur, however, still clung to the ten-division ROK Army as sufficient to maintain order and repel aggression in the postwar period.

The Republic of Korea Government did not share General MacArthur's misgivings over the fighting capability of the ROK soldier. After General MacArthur's recall in April 1951, the ROK Government launched a campaign in the United Nations and in the United States to have an additional ten divisions organized and equipped with American arms. On 18 April 1951, Limb Ben Chik, the ROK representative to the United Nations, publicly appealed for U.S. arms for 375,000 ROK men. President Rhee followed on 23 April with a request to General Ridgway that the United States arm and equip ten additional divisions.

Unfortunately, the ROK request was poorly timed for on 22 April the 6th ROK Division broke and ran before inferior enemy forces when the Chinese Communist forces launched one of their heaviest offensives in scale and strength throughout the Korean War. This incident led Ambassador Muccio and General Van Fleet to blame on the lack of leadership in the ROK Army, saying that what the ROK Army needed most were good leaders and better training, particularly in officer and non-commissioned officer ranks, not manpower and equipment. In the meantime, the U.S. Army G-3, Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, came to the Far East Command and Korea on his fact finding tour of how to improve the ROK Army. He reported to General Collins on 15 May that the hasty and inadequate training that was unavoidable under the
circumstances and the absence of proper support units might have resulted in such a case as mentioned above. Basic training, he further pointed out, often lasted only ten days for recruits and emphasis had been placed particularly upon keeping units in action. But little attention had been given to long-range planning for the development of an effective ROK military forces in a year or two.

On the other hand, General Ridgway and General Van Fleet, after a study, agreed to set up a training command within the ROK Army and directed Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, then Deputy Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Far East Command, to head such a training command concept program similar to the replacement and school command established by the US Army during World War II. Colonel Champeny had been the Director of National Defense under U.S. Military Government in Korea when the Korean Constabulary was formed in January 1946. After a survey in Korea and also having made a study tour personally over the U.S. service schools, Colonel Champeny recommended that groups of 150 to 200 ROK officers be trained at a time at the Infantry and Artillery Schools in the United States, since he felt that the ROK Army needed infantry and artillery officers most. As a result, the first student groups of 150 infantry and 50 artillery officers reported to the respective American service schools at the end of September 1951 to take a special twenty-week course.

Upon their return from American schooling, most of these officers were to be assigned as instructors or cadre personnel at the various ROK Army training installations.

During the summer of 1951 with the benefit of the lull on the battlefield that succeeded the opening of armistice negotiations, General Ridgway went ahead his plans to develop the ROK Army. For the first time there seemed to be enough time to institute training program in full scale.

By the first of October 1951, the ROK Army school system was operating with a capacity of over 10,000 students at a time. The Replacement Training and School Command, later called the Korean Army Training Command (KATC), had facilities for over 23,400 trainees. Schools for training infantry, artillery, and technical officers were in operations, and the Command and General Staff College was reopened on 11 December 1951 at Taegu, while the Korean Military Academy was due to resume courses in early 1952.

But, the future strength of the ROK Army was as yet undetermined by General Ridgway, for ten divisions seemed to be all that the Republic of Korea could develop within two or three years in his point of view.
The New Phase of War

In addition, General Van Fleet established the Field Training Command (FTC) in late July 1951 under Brigadier General Thomas J. Cross, then Deputy Commander of the IX US Corps, in an effort to bolster the morale and combat capabilities of the troops at the front. During the succeeding three months four FTC training camps, one for each corps area, were established to retrain the ROK Army.

Furthermore, General Van Fleet had planned to increase the effectiveness of the ROK combat forces by providing them with more support in the field. In the past the ROK infantryman often had to double as a porter. With the permission of General Ridgway, General Van Fleet increased the Korean Service Corps (KSC) to 60,000 men. General Ridgway eventually hoped to increase it up to 75,000 so that the infantrymen could concentrate upon their primary mission—fighting the enemy.
Ground Operations

What another essential need for the ROK Army was to build up artillery power for it only had one 105-mm. howitzer battalion assigned to a division while the American counterpart had three 105-mm. and one 155-mm. howitzer battalions as a normal complement. Moreover, the American division also had a tank battalion and heavy mortar companies to call upon for additional fire support. However, General Ridgway and the Eighth Army staff felt that the rugged terrain, difficulty of ammunition resupply, and the shortage of artillery pieces all argued against expansion.

Time and the stalemate at the front overcame these objections. In September 1951 General Ridgway authorized four 155-mm. howitzer battalions to be activated before the end of the year. Then, three headquarters batteries and six 105-mm. howitzer battalions were authorized in November 1951 and began their training two months later. General Ridgway set up a program that eventually would produce more battalions to give each of ten ROK divisions a full complement of three 105-mm. and one 155-mm. howitzer battalions.

Thus, only after the battle front became static along the Lines Kansas and Wyoming, the ROK Army, now commanded by Major General Lee Chong Chan, Chief of Staff, since 23 June 1951 after Lieutenant General Chung II Kwon, had gradually begun to build up its organic equipment and weapons under an appropriate training system. Such a fruit of the build up of the ROK Army was largely attributable to General Van Fleet’s enthusiastic effort.

Section 2. Inactive and Limited Battle Front

Fighting Front At a Glance

Across the front, now ranging approximately 248 kilometers in width from the mouth of the Imjin River to the east coast, four corps forces -- the I US Corps, IX US Corps, X US Corps, and I ROK Corps -- were defending the friendly lines under the operational command of the Eighth US Army.

The decision made by General Ridgway in June 1951 halting the UN ground forces’ advance just north of the 38th Parallel along Lines Kansas and Wyoming committed the ROK and EUSAK forces to a primarily defensive role. Accordingly, following the opening of armistice talks at Kaesong on 10 July, the main objective of the UNC’s operations was to keep pressure on the enemy and to inflict maximum casualties on the Communist forces in order to force an
agreement that would end the fighting. In other words, by the policy which had been set up by the U.S. JCS directive of 1 May 1951 and confirmed by the U.S. National Security Council's statement of 17 May, the northern limit of any advance of the EUSAOK forces was clearly defined. On the ground, however, limited offensive actions sufficient to harass, unbalance, and confuse the enemy were maintained. Thus, major efforts of the friendly frontline units were turned to strengthen the current defensive positions, while conducting active patrolling actions.

The enemy also maintained a defensive attitude throughout the month of July, having appeared to have established outpost line of resistance positions approximately one to five kilometers in front of the friendly forces. Consequently, during July, Lines Kansas and Wyoming formed the base for the ROK and UN allied operations. Outside of patrols, the majority of ground actions were generally limited-objective attacks of one to two days duration based on corps orders.

The cease-fire negotiations at Kaesong continued intermittently throughout the month. But, the negotiation talks itself was entirely a function of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, and the EUSAOK was concerned only with the responsibility of establishing and supporting the UNC Base Camp at Munsan for the negotiation delegation. As a whole, as the armistice talks continued the friendly ground forces maintained an attitude of watchful waiting, building up defensive positions and constantly harassing the Communist forces by patrolling actions combined with ground fire and airstrikes.

As of 1 July 1951, the friendly Order of Battle across the front from west to east was: In the I US Corps sector the 1st ROK Division, 29th British Brigade, 1st US Cavalry Division with the 25th Canadian Brigade and 28th Commonwealth Brigade attached, 3rd US Division with the 9th ROK Division attached, and the 25th US Division and Turkish Brigade in reserve; in the IX US Corps the 2nd ROK Division, 24th US Division, 6th ROK Division, with the 7th US Division preparing positions on Line Kansas; in the X US Corps the 7th ROK Division, 1st US Marine Division, 5th ROK Division, with the 2nd US Division and 8th ROK Division in reserve; and in the I ROK Corps the Capital, 11th and 3rd ROK Divisions.

Plan Overwhelming

In the meantime, when the U.S. National Security Council was formulating
its new policy, General Van Fleet, even though he felt that the Kansas-Wyoming Lines could be the best favorable positions to meet the enemy under the existed conditions, recommended to General Ridgway that he be permitted to launch a joint amphibious and overland operation toward far north of the present lines to pinch off and destroy a large fraction of the Red Chinese and NK Communist forces there. Submitted to General Ridgway in early July, “Plan Overwhelming” outlined a major offensive operation that would take the ROK and UN allied forces to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line starting 1 September 1951, provided that certain conditions were satisfied. Namely, if there were a major deterioration of enemy forces or a withdrawal to the north, if the mission of the EUSAK were changed, or if additional forces were allocated to the Eighth US Army, General Van Fleet felt that “Overwhelming” might be feasible.

But, General Ridgway took no action on “Overwhelming,” deciding to observe the course of truce talks before acted on it. This meant he turned down the plan. In his judgment, General Ridgway felt that it was not possible under existing conditions, and might result in heavy casualties. In stead, his plan was to continue an orderly advance to Line Wyoming while holding Line Kansas.

Consequently, General Ridgway and General Van Fleet began looking ahead to a possible armistice, and they agreed that the best defensive position to be held during an eventual armistice would be along the Kansas Line. General Ridgway had been advised by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that an armistice probably would provide for a demilitarized zone 32 kilometers or 20 miles wide. It was also estimated that the center line of this zone would be the actual line of contact at the time the cease-fire became effective and that troops on both sides would have to withdraw 16 kilometers from the line of contact. Hence, as a minimum, the UN forces should hold a cease-fire line at least 32 kilometers beyond the Kansas Line, in order to be able to retain an outpost zone 16 kilometers deep in advance of the Kansas Line. With this in prospect the American Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the advisability of removing the existing restrictions on any advance beyond the Kansas-Wyoming Line.

On 20 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff queried General Ridgway about a possible change of any tactical restrictions on UNC’s advancing to the north so as to be in a better position for an armistice.

But General Ridgway replied indicating that he was not planning anything other than local operations. And he suggested that a cease-fire line preferably should extend from the confluence of the Han and Yesong Rivers in the west and thence generally northeast past Chorwon and Kumhwa to Kosong on the east coast. He called attention to the fact that this line was below the 38th
Parallel on the west coast, but said the difficulties of defending the isolated Ongjin and Yonan peninsulas did not warrant including them within the cease-fire line. Their loss would be more than compensated for by the more important area to be included north of the Parallel in the Chorwon—Kumhwa area and east of the Hwachon Reservoir.

Then, on 10 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Ridgway of the UN Command that President Truman had approved the removal of restrictions on tactical operations. But both General Ridgway and General Van Fleet, after touring the front together on 22 June, had already decided not to advance north of the Kansas—Wyoming Line. In their judgment a movement 32 kilometers beyond “Kansas” was feasible but the probable cost in casualties was too great to pay.

At any rate, the removal of restrictions on limited advances to reach desirable cease-fire line permitted General Van Fleet to launch limited attacks on his own initiative, but the selection of Kaesong as the truce talk site eliminated one of the areas that he planned to attack. Thus, the starting of the armistice talks, made both opponents reluctant to expend men and materiel during most of July. And it was not until the end of the month that General Van Fleet issued his first attack order since early June 1951. This does not mean that there were no ground battles. Limited, local fighting in scale, mostly probing and patrolling actions, waged everywhere across the forward lines. Thus, in brief, friendly ground action was confined to mount limited objective attacks and frequent patrols were sent out to collect information on enemy activities and to prevent UN troops from losing their fighting edge.

The New Military Strategy

As the two opposing sides had started the armistice negotiations at Kaesong, July 1951 ushered in a new phase of war in Korea. The UN Command and the enemy had abandoned their political objectives of unifying all of Korea by force, and both had given up the military objectives of capture and control. Each side now intended to accomplish the political and military objectives by an armistice on favorable terms. The freedom-loving nations and the Communist aggressors are radically implacable enemies in the same boat, but the two sides began to talk at the truce tent.

As a result, the military strategy of the UN Command was changed. The ground forces were to stabilize and maintain a strong defensive line generally
along the Kansas and Wyoming Lines; the naval forces were to continue the blockade of the northern coasts and also to maintain the associated siege of Wonsan, Hungnam and Songjin which would tie down numbers of enemy troops deployed against a possible UNC’s amphibious operation; and the air forces were to deny the enemy capability to maintain and sustain further decisive ground offensive, to maintain maximum air pressure on the enemy in the northern territory, thus to create a situation conducive to a favorable armistice. In fact it was such a radical change that the nature of the Korean War became an entirely new war.

After the great success of the U.N. Command in crushing two successive, decisive Communist offensives in April and May 1951, there had no effort been made by either side to launch any large-scale offensive operations. It was not that the ROK and UN allied forces lacked the capability to force the enemy to retreat far north of the 38th Parallel, but the chief question was how far north to advance in order to hit the greatest damages on the enemy forces. Both the Chinese Communist forces and North Korean puppet armies, of course, suffered a fatal blow during the spring battles of 1951 in men and equipment to such an extent that they would require a considerable period of time to regroup and resupply before they could renew a large-scale offensive. The Communist forces, being seriously demoralized, fell at times on hopeless confusion from their offensive formation, and ran helplessly down the craggy mountains before the pursuing UN forces. Thus, the enemy’s mortal defeat in the spring marked the end of the Communist dreams of pushing the UN force into the sea. Yet, the Red Chinese still had far greater uncommitted war potential in “Privileged Sanctuary” of Manchuria than was available in Korea to the UN Command.

Most important of all, Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, as the Commander of the UN ground forces in Korea, had to keep in mind two overriding factors: He did not have sufficient forces to destroy the enemy by maneuver and encirclement; and he could not advance beyond the Kansas—Wyoming defense lines that straddled the 38th Parallel without the express permission of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief, the United Nations Command. In view of these restricting elements and the reluctance of the majority of the friendly nations composing of the UN Command to advance again toward the Yalu River, it was hardly surprising that in June 1951 General Van Fleet concluded: “Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither tactical nor expedient. The profitable employment of the UN ground forces, therefore, was to establish a defense line on the nearest
commanding terrain north of the 38th Parallel, and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the UN forces." The decision to strengthen the defensive lines of the UN forces and to confine offensive action at the front to limited advance marked the end of the fluid phase of the Korean War and the beginning of the new war.

With the beginning of July 1951, UN troops ousted themselves improving their positions and consolidating the ground they had won during the preceding months. Action was characterized by artillery fire and air strikes, plus continuing naval bombardment along the North Korean coasts. Combat patrols went out regularly. Offensive action consisted chiefly of limited regimental or battalion attacks designed to seize more favorable terrain, capture prisoners, and keep the enemy from nosing too close to the UN forces’ lines. With the exception of the flare-up that followed the breaking-off the truce negotiations in August 1951, this general pattern of warfare was to prevail until just before the signing of the armistice in July 1953.

On the other hand, the enemy also appeared to follow the same lines as that of the UN forces. Friendly intelligence concluded that the Red Chinese forces were being strengthened. New Red Chinese units were identified northeast of the Iron Triangle, in front of the IX US Corps below Kumsong, and in the vicinity of the Punchbowl. The enemy, like the UN forces, appeared to be holding a main line of resistance with screening forces in front rather than relying on defense by maneuver.

But, throughout the summer months of 1951 there was continuous, although local, fighting for limited objectives, and no day passed without casualties. In general, after the armistice talks had begun, the front lines remained stable except in the Iron Triangle on the central front and the Punchbowl in the mid-eastern sector. The action at the Triangle area focused on Sobang-san (Hill 717) and its surrounding hills which the Red Chinese forces had reoccurred after being driven out during the UN forces' June offensive.

The Kansas - Wyoming Line

Line Kansas, the defense line selected by General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, in the spring of 1951, began near the mouth of the Imjin River 32 kilometers north of Seoul and snaked its way to the northeast on the south side of the river through low barren elevations which gradually gave way
to higher. Where the Imjin River crossed the 38th Parallel, the Kansas Line veered eastward and upward toward the Hwachon Reservoir and then angled northeastward again across the steep forest, South Taebaek Mountains, until it reached the east coast some 40 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. The defensive strength of Line Kansas was increased by taking the full advantages of the dominating terrain and the numerous water barriers along the route.

Guarding the approaches to Line Kansas on the western front, Line Wyoming looped northeastward from the Imjin River near Chongok towards Chorwon (Cholwon), swung east to Kunchwa, and then fell off to the southeast until it rejoined Line Kansas near the Hwachon Reservoir. In the spring of 1951, it served as an outpost line screening the Kansas line.

Although Line Kansas permitted the enemy to retain control of the communication complex of the area called the Iron Triangle (Chorwon-Kunchwa-Pyonggang), General Van Fleet felt that the line afforded the UNC forces the advantages of a defensible terrain, satisfactory road and railroad net, and logistic support. In the event of a cease-fire he recommended in early June that the ROK and Eighth US Army forces be at least 16 kilometers in advance of Line Kansas in case a 16 kilometer (10 mile) withdrawal by both sides to form a buffer zone be made as part of terms. For planning purposes General Ridgway agreed.

In the meantime, General Van Fleet instructed all corps commanders to fortify Line Kansas in depth and also to build hasty field fortifications along Line Wyoming to delay and blunt the forces of enemy assaults before they reached Line Kansas. On the eastern front, the X US and I ROK Corps would establish patrol bases ahead of the main line of resistance to maintain contact with the enemy.

Since the terrain became more mountainous in the east and was served by a poor communications network, General Van Fleet had deployed his four corps accordingly, with the I ROK Corps forming the eastern anchor, flanked by the X US Corps in the east-central sector, the IX US Corps in the west-central area, and the I US Corps defending the broad sector on the west. The first three corps fronts were narrower because of the rugged mountains and lack of good roads. Most of the ROK divisions were placed where the least logistical support could be provided since they required less to live on and fewer auxiliary units.

By 1 July the main fortifications of the Kansas Line were nearly completed. To expedite the work, General Van Fleet had sent three ROK Service Corps (KSC) divisions forward to serve as labor troops, one to each U.S. corps. The log and sandbag bunkers, usually adjoining and forward of lateral trenches, were
dug into hillsides or saddles on the military crests with the larger ones on the higher hills serving as forward command and observation posts. In defilade on the reverse slope of the hills, protected mortar firing positions were constructed and roads were cut to permit tanks to move up and fire from parapeted frontline positions.

To delay enemy offensives barbed wire fences were laid out and mines were planted in patterns that would funnel attackers into the heaviest defense fires. Due to hasty works, structural weakness soon appeared in many of fortifications, particularly during the heavy July rains. But most of the deficiencies had been corrected by the end of July and Line Kansas was considered strong enough to stop any thing less than a full-scale enemy offensive.

Instead of the usual general and combat outpost system, U.N. ground forces organized their outposts as a series of patrol bases. Patrol bases, which were established up to 16 kilometers in front of the main battle line on commanding terrain, afforded depth to the defense line. Usually, general and combat outposts were organized to provide early warnings of enemy attacks and to fight delaying actions only, while the patrol bases became outposts that were to be defended except in the case of an all-out offensive.

These patrol bases, developed initially by the frontline units across the whole front, were later manned by reserve troops, usually a reinforced company, for distance up to 2,000 yards and by a battalion or regiment at the more advanced bases. The bases were often subjected to the enemy’s favorite tactics - the night attack - but they were harder to infiltrate than outpost lines and units could withdraw intact to the main line of resistance in the event of any major enemy offensive.

The patrol base system and the lull in operations during July caused by the armistice negotiations gave the ROK and UN forces to improve the defense of Line Wyoming, too. General Van Fleet decided to add depth to his defenses by making the Wyoming Line a permanent line and on 30 July he told all corps commanders that it would be regarded as the main line of resistance. Only in the event of heavy losses would the Eighth US Army withdraw to Line Kansas to launch its counterattack.

By midsummer the UN ground forces had established their defensive positions and were prepared either to conduct local offensive operations or to punish any attempt by the enemy to penetrate the Kansas and Wyoming Lines.

The Enemy Situation

During June and July 1951, the enemy forces showed no offensive action,
while continuing their efforts to bring up supplies forward by rail and road to strengthen their defensive positions.

On 1 July the Communist forces in Korea totaled 459,200 men (CCF 248,100 and NK Communist forces 211,100), according to the Eighth US Army intelligence estimates. In addition, there were 7,500 NK Communist guerrillas operating in the southern areas. Operations of the enemy forces, both Chinese Communists and North Korean puppet forces, appeared to have been directed by Peng Teh-huai from his headquarters in Mukden, Manchuria. At the front the Red Chinese had five army group headquarters, each of which controlled two or more armies.

In the Red Chinese military organization the army was the principal self-sufficient tactical unit. At full strength it had between 21,000 and 30,000 men, and each army contained three divisions and usually included an artillery regiment, security reconnaissance, engineer, and transport battalions, a signal company, and an army hospital. Owing to tremendous battle losses during their spring offensives the thirteen plus CCF armies in Korea were at reduced strength on 1 July. Seven CCF armies (64th, 65th, 47th, 26th, 20th, 27th, and 42nd from west to east) were deployed along or close to the western and central fronts and the other six were in reserve. The 39th CCF Army, with the 115th, 116th, and 117th Divisions, was at Songchon and the 38th CCF Army, with the 112th, 113th, and 114th Divisions, and the 40th CCF Army, with the 118th, 119th and 120th Divisions, were unlocated.

The CCF infantry division was triangular and an average regiment consisted of approximately 3,000 men, armed with a miscellaneous collection of Russian, Japanese, American, and domestically manufactured copies of foreign weapons, such as 60-mm. 81-mm. and 120-mm. mortars; 57-mm. recoilless rifles; rocket launchers; and 70-mm. infantry howitzers. The artillery regiment, which was attached to each division, usually consisted of three battalions and contained 36 pieces, ranging from 75-mm. guns to 155-mm. howitzers.

In the Red Chinese tactics real estate meant little to them and withdrawal was as important a part of their favorite tactics as was the advance. In sharp contrast with the Red Chinese, the North Korean Communists fought for the land and consistently showed a strong disinclination to abandon territory.

The military organization of the North Korean puppet regime was varied from the CCF system. Under a so-called general headquarters, Front Headquarters was charged with the tactical command on the battlefield. The corps was the main NK Communist forces' tactical unit and approximated two American divisions in strength. Unlike the Red Chinese they shifted divisions from corps
to corps as the need arose.

There were seven NK puppet corps in July 1951, three on the west (VI Corps in Yonan, I Corps in the north of Kaesong, IV Corps in Chinnampo) and four corps on the east (V in the area northeast of Hwachon Reservoir, II in the vicinity of Mundung-ni and Punchbowl, III along the Nam River on the east coast, and VII in Wonsan). In addition to guarding the flanks against UN forces' amphibious landings, they anchored the Communist line at the front.

The following table shows the Eighth Army estimate of enemy forces as of 1 July 1951. Besides these units, it suspected but had not as yet confirmed the presence of six CCF armies and two-thirds of a seventh.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese Communist Forces</strong></td>
<td><strong>248,100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Army</td>
<td>16,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st, 34th, 35th Divisions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Army</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th, 44th, 45th Divisions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Army</td>
<td>16,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th, 59th, 60th Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Army</td>
<td>19,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th, 77th, 78th Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Army</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th, 80th, 81st Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th Army</td>
<td>13,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112th, 113th, 114th Divisions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Army</td>
<td>24,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>118th, 119th, 120th Divisions</td>
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<td>42nd Army</td>
<td>18,500</td>
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<td>124th, 125th, 126th Divisions</td>
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</tr>
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<td>47th Army</td>
<td>8,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>140th Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>60th Army</td>
<td>13,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th, 180th, 181st Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63rd Army</td>
<td>13,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187th, 188th, 189th Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Army</td>
<td>17,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190th, 191st, 192nd Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
65th Army  
193rd, 194th, 195th Divisions  

North Korean Communist Army  

I Corps  
8th, 19th, 47th Divisions  

II Corps  
2nd, 13th, 27th Divisions  

III Corps  
1st, 15th, 45th Divisions  

IV Corps  
4th, 5th, 105th Armored Divisions and 26th Brigade  

V Corps  
6th, 12th, 32nd Divisions  

VI Corps  
9th, 17th Mechanized, 18th, 23rd Divisions  

VII Corps  
3rd, 24th, 37th, 46th Divisions, 63rd Brigade  

Other forces  

Grand Total  

16,100  

211,100  

15,800  

18,700  

30,400  

29,200  

14,300  

35,500  

35,500  

31,700  

459,200  

In July 1951, the Communist forces could match the U.N. troops in manpower, but they were deficient in artillery and armor. The enemy had about 350 artillery pieces including 105-mm., 120-mm., and 150-mm. guns and howitzers spread along the front, and had no organic armor to the infantry units. The lone NK puppet tank division was stationed on the west coast north of Pyongyang, while all of the CCF armored divisions were in Red China.

There were indications, however, that the Communists might be preparing to challenge the almost complete domination of the air enjoyed by the U.S. Far East Air Forces (US FEAF). According to the EUSAK intelligence estimates, total aircraft based in Manchuria and available to the enemy reached at 1,050, including 595 fighters. Some 445 of fighters were jet-propelled and included the fast Russian MIG-15 which was in some respects superior to the best UNC fighters. The Far East Air Forces estimated that the Russians were furnishing the aircraft as quickly as the Chinese Communist air force trained pilots and maintenance crews.

Thus, the enemy offensive capability was increasingly mounting during the month of July, seemingly preparing for the next offensive. The ROK and UN forces remained alert and wary. But, General Van Fleet did not think that
the enemy was strong enough to launch an all-out offensive, while saying that "we must be prepared to meet his (the enemy's) maximum capability and we must be ready to meet him if the cease-fire negotiations fail."

Section 3. The Western and West-Central Front
(1 – 31 July 1951)

I US Corps

In the spring of 1951, the Communist forces, disregarding their heavy personnel and equipment losses, hurled masses of forces against the well-prepared I US Corps defense lines on the western front. The corps units made a tactical withdrawal temporarily, trading ground for fatal enemy casualties. Before the enemy reached short of Seoul, his all-out offensive was halted.

The corps turned to the counteroffensive again, and by 27 May 1951, it had firmly established the offensive posture along the Imjin River for further attacks to the north. However, action along the front was light for the remainder of the summer on account of the truce negotiations.

Now, in July 1951, the I US Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Frank W. Milburn, was responsible for a considerably wider frontage extending from the west coast to the Chorwon–Kumhwa area, and it had the three American and two ROK divisions, four brigades (28th Commonwealth, 29th British, 25th Canadian, and Turkish), four UN allied battalions (Belgian, Greek, Philippines, and Thailand), and the 5th ROK Marine Battalion and a ROK Army security battalion under its operational control. (See Sketch Map 5.)

The main line of resistance along the Kansas and Wyoming Lines was manned, from west to northeastward, by troops of the 1st ROK Division and the attached ROK Marines; the 29th British Brigade with the Belgian Battalion attached; the 1st US Cavalry Division (with the 28th Commonwealth and 25th Canadian Brigades and the Thai and Greek Battalions attached); and the 3rd ROK Division (with the 9th ROK Division and 10th Philippines Battalion attached). The 25th US Division together with the Turkish Brigade was remained in corps reserve, while the 13th ROK Security Battalion continued its local security mission in the Suwon area south of Seoul.

The enemy forces facing the corps were the 64th, 65th, 47th, and 26th, CCF
Armies' holding the 63rd, 60th, 15th, 12th, and 42nd CCF Armies in reserve. In addition, there were the 8th, 19th, and 47th Divisions of the 1 NK Corps taking positions in the western sector, while the VI NK Corps units were defending along the west coast line near Yonan. Thus, the Red Chinese had deployed the bulk of forces against the I US Corps front, where the most critical routes and avenues of approach leading into Seoul were existed.

As the initial talking battle for a cease-fire was taking place at the truce tent front, the United Nations Command took no active action at the fighting front, trying to see how the wind would blow at Kaesong. Consequently, as a whole, the ground battle situation in the I US Corps sector had remarkably slackened down, although there were minor actions and sporadic patrol clashes everywhere. Top of all, the operations of the I US Corps were greatly limited owing to the location of the truce talk site. Before the opening of negotiation, Kaesong
was no man's land but was being under the threat of the friendly attacks. It was one of the essential objectives to be attacked by the corps sooner or later but now became a neutral area.

On 6 July, the I US Corps was ordered by the Eighth US Army to establish an exempted zone within 16 kilometers (10 miles) corridor centered on a line from Kumchon through Kaesong to Munsan and limited by Kumchon on the north and Munsan on the south effective at 1800 hours, 7 July and pending further notice. Within this zone action was to limit: (1) The UN forces would not attack by any means or undertake any acts of armed nature except purely self-defense, and (2) no artillery fire would be placed nor would air strikes be directed within the prescribed area.

It was further ordered the same day that (1) effective at 0400 to 1400 hours, 7 July a 16-kilometer wide corridor centered on Pyongyang—Sariwon—Namchang-jom—Kaesong road would be kept free from attack or entry by the UN or ROK forces, and (2) effective at 1200 hours, 7 July and pending further instructions an area of eight kilometers (five miles) radius centered on Kaesong would be kept free from attack or entry by the UN or ROK forces.

These restrictions meant that the enemy’s critical main supply route was granted as a sanctuary from attack by any means of the UN forces. Thus, the armistice negotiations were started under the enemy’s favorable terms from the beginning.

Major General John W. O’Daniel succeeded the command of the corps on 19 July after Lieutenant General Milburn. Meanwhile, on 16 July, the 1st US Cavalry Division was relieved by the 25th US Infantry Division and went into corps reserve, and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade was passed to the operational control of the I US Corps. The 1st British Commonwealth Division was activated on 28 July placing under the I US Corps command.

Toward the end of the month, the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered to return to the line and relieve the 25th US Division in place, while the latter division was to move to the Kumhwa sector.

The Western Sector

The 1st ROK Division: At the close of June 1951 the 1st ROK Division was maintaining defensive positions along the Imjin River line in the westmost sector of the I US Corps front. With the opening of July 1951 the division, now under the command of Brigader General Park Im Hang (effective on 2 July);
continued to build up its defensive positions extending from the Kuhwa-ri area toward westward to the vicinity of Kaesong, securing strongholds in the vicinity of Paekhak-san (Hill 229), Sokchuwon-ni and Hill 207 north of the Imjin River. The attached 5th ROK Marine Battalion had been carrying out the security mission of the Kimpo peninsula.

There followed no significant battles during the month except aggressive patrolling actions toward the northern zone of the Imjin River. All actions were particularly restricted because Kaesong, the site of truce talks, was too close to the division positions.

The British Commonwealth Forces: During the early weeks of July 1951 combat units from the British Commonwealth nations had been operated independently; the 25th Canadian Brigade and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade consisting of the 3rd Australian Battalion, 1st Battalion of King's Own Scottish, 1st Battalion of King's Shropshire Light Infantry, and the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment (artillery) were then attached to the 1st US Cavalry Division for operational control. The 29th British Brigade, consisting of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment, 1st Battalion of the Royal Ulster Rifles, and supporting armored and engineer units, was under direct control of the I US Corps.

During the whole period of July these Commonwealth units were remained in comparatively quiet state as a whole as far as battle fighting was concerned, although the 25th Canadian Brigade (consisting of the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment, 2nd Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment, 2nd Field Regiment of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, and supporting units), and also the 29th British Brigade were to experience some sharp fighting.

The 29th British Brigade and its attached Belgian Battalion had spent most of their time in preparing defensive positions south of the Imjin River southwest of Chongok, and the 25th Canadian Brigade, being under the operational control of the 1st US Cavalry Division remained in the Chorwon area until 16 July, when it came under control of the 25th US Division. But it became I US Corps reserve on 26 July when the 28th Commonwealth Brigade was passed from the 1st US Cavalry Division to the operational control of the corps.

The three British Commonwealth brigades were now located together on 26 July, holding the line of the Imjin River, between Choksong on the left (29th Brigade) and the junctions of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right (28th Brigade) with the 25th Canadian Brigade in reserve. In consequence, the 1st Commonwealth Division was formed on 28 July, integrating the three brigade groups under the command of Major General A. J. H. Cassels.
The Mid-Western Sector

The 1st US Cavalry Division: Farther east of the 29th British Brigade sector, the 1st US Cavalry Division, under Major General Charles D. Palmer, was now holding strong defensive positions on Line Wyoming extending from the Imjin River west of Chongok up to Chorwon. After seizing Line Kansas in May and Line Wyoming in June, each of its assigned regiments, and attached units had established company size patrol bases to their front. Having attached the 25th Canadian Brigade, 28th Commonwealth Brigade, and the Greek and Thailand Battalions under its operational control, the 1st US Cavalry Division continued its efforts to keep the enemy off balance by vigorous patrolling and to fortify defensive positions further stronger.

With its command post at Yonghyon-dong about six kilometers south of Chongok (Chongong-ni), the division held a firm defense line disposing its subordinate units, from south to northeast, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 8th Cavalry Regiment, Thai Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment and the Greek Battalion, and 25th Canadian Brigade, along the high ground south and east side of the Imjin River, then generally astride the road (Route 3) running through Chongok—Yonchon—Taegwang-ni—Sintan-ni—Mohyodong—Chorwon (old).

Continuing offensive patrol actions, the 1st Cavalry Division units remained in this sector without serious engagement until 16 July, when the division became corps reserve. Patrol bases were then so closer to the enemy outpost line of resistance located in the particularly rugged heights in mass.

The Communist forces immediately opposing the division front during the period included the 65th and 47th CCF Armies. They also busily engaged in digging and building trenches and bunkers along their forward lines, while sending out probing patrolling in small group, and also pouring artillery and mortar fire to harass the friendly positions.

During the serialized patrolling actions in July, division troops encountered the enemy activities quite often and demonstrated themselves highly skilled profession. For instance, one day an enemy group attempted an ambush on a small group of men from the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion who were engaged in road work. Although these men were prepared to perform a non-combat duty, they responded quickly to the situation, and in a brisk firefight repelled the enemy attack, killing 30 Reds. On the early morning of July, a patrol
element of the 7th Cavalry Regiment engaged with the 100 Red Chinese, later
reinforced to a battalion size, lasting until 1500 hours when the cavalrymen
withdrew to their base, after directing artillery fire on the foe.

A tank-infantry patrol team from the 5th US Cavalry moved deep into the
element's outpost line on 6 July, and at 1300 hours engaged two CCF companies
in the vicinity of Chaktong-ni far west of the Imjin River. After firefight for
a short while, the cavalry patrol maneuvered through farther west in an attempt
to outflank enemy positions. It returned to the friendly lines before dark
without incident.

That day, in the 8th Cavalry area, a patrol directed airstrikes on Red Chinese
positions covering Hills 230–267–287, seven kilometers northwest of Sang-ni
(Sinnang-ni), with excellent results.

Outpost elements of the 5th Cavalry were attacked by approximately 20
enemy in the vicinity of Hill 182 south of the Imjin River at 2315 hours, 7
July, but the enemy fled to the west after firefight. On the same day, some 60
element attempted a probing attack against an outpost of the 3rd Battalion of
the 7th Cavalry situated in the hill mass west of Taegwan-ni, where soon fell
into hand-to-hand fighting, and in the ensuing battle, the cavalrymen wielded
bayonets and fists to defeat the enemy assault. The outpost was secured firmly,
killing 25 enemy. An outpost of the 8th Cavalry, northwest of Yonchon, was
attacked by 200 Red Chinese carrying mortars and automatic weapons on the
early morning of 14 July. With the support of friendly artillery fire, the outpost
troops dispersed the Red attack, suffering no casualties.

Meanwhile, on 13 July, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment
was relieved in place by the other battalion elements including the Greeks, and
after assembling in the Chongwanggok area at 1800 hours, it departed at 0530
hours the next morning to Munsan to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 27th US
Regiment. Being placed under the EUSAK control effective at 1300 hours, 14
July, the battalion served there as guards at the truce talk area including the
forward UNC Base Camp until it returned to the parent division.

On 14 July, the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered by the I US Corps that
it be relieved by the 25th US Infantry Division, initiating the relief on 15 July,
by the 25th US Infantry Division; pass control of the 28th Commonwealth
Brigade to the corps upon order; and move one regiment immediately upon
the relief to an assembly area in the Songdong–Yongpyong area south of
Unchon, and be prepared to operate offensively anywhere in the Corps zone,
with particular emphasis on the right flank.

The relief of the 1st US Cavalry Division units by the 25th US Division
was started in position, regiment by regiment, on 15 July, and the movement of the relieved units into reserve was commenced simultaneously, with the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments moving first.

The 7th Cavalry Regiment (minus 2nd Battalion and the Greek Battalion attached) was relieved by the 24th US Regiment in place by 1200 hours, 15 July; the cavalry elements had assembled in Chosong-ni, three kilometers south of Chongok and also in the vicinity of Nung-kol farther southeast, while the Greeks had closed in an assembly area near Suruk-kol more earlier, by 1200 hours, 15 July. The 8th Cavalry Regiment (the Thailand Battalion attached), after relieved by the 35th US Regiment at 1500 hours, 16 July, had completed its move and assembled in the area south of Chongok and in the Pong-dong area farther south by 1530 hours, 17 July. The Thai troops assembled near Chokam-ni southwest of Chongok. Meanwhile, the 5th Cavalry (less 1st Battalion), upon the relief of defense sector by the 27th US Regiment, had assembled its elements in the vicinity of Kisan-ni and at Paja-kol, two and a half kilometers southwest of Kisan-ni by 1800 hours, 18 July. Its 1st Battalion was relieved in position by the 2nd Battalion of the Royal 22 Regiment (R 22 R Battalion), 25th, Canadian Brigade by 1535 hours on the 18th.

Thus, although the division became corps reserve effective at 1800 hours, 16 July, full reserve status was physically assumed by the entire division on the 18th when the 5th Cavalry completed the move.

But, most artillery units were ordered to remain in position in support of the 25th Division. The division opened its new command post in the vicinity of Tak-kol, some seven kilometers south of Tongduchon at 1526 hours, 17 July. Brigadier General Thomas L. Harrold, who had been the Deputy Commander, 1 US Corps, assumed the command of the division on the 17th upon the departure of Major General Palmer for new assignment in the United States. On the 25th the four inch rain fell, which marked the beginning of the wet season that added to the burden of fighting.

During the reserve period, the division constantly carried out intensive, rigorous training, specializing its troops to fit battle conditions that could found on the battle ground.

On 25 July, the division was ordered by the corps to move one battalion reinforced with tanks and 4.2-inch mortars to an area designated by the Commanding General of the 25th US Infantry Division to whom it would be attached upon arrival there. Consequently, the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, together with the 4th Platoon of B Company, 70th Tank Battalion and a platoon of 4.2 mortars were sent forward to the lines. under operational control of the
25th US Division. They were further attached to the 27th Infantry Regiment at 1050 hours, 26 July. This was initiation for the cavalry division to return to the frontlines.

On 28 July, orders had been issued to return the cavalry division to the same zone of responsibility where it had held before the reserve period. According to the EUSA-K orders, the division would initiate relief of the 25th US Division on 30 July and complete it by 2100 hours, 1 August. On the following day, a ceremony was held by the cavalry division to unveil the granite monument that marks the point where the North Korean Communist aggressors first crossed the 38th Parallel to start the war. The stately stone memorial was erected on the Uijongbu--Seoul axis, marking the point where the 1st US Cavalry Division for the third time advanced across the Parallel into northward, during the spring counteroffensive in May.

The relief movement was executed on schedule. The 5th Cavalry Regiment relieved the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Division at 1105 hours on 30 July and occupied positions with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions on line along the Imjin River between northwest of Chongok and Yonchon, where the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments had held before the reserve status. The 8th Cavalry relieved the 35th US Regiment at 1150 hours, 31 July, occupying positions on the right of the 5th Cavalry, with the 3rd, 2nd and Thai Battalions on line, from south to north. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry assembled at Korim-dong northeast of Yonchon. Thus, by 31 July the phasing-in had been completed for the 5th and 8th Regiments, and the complete return of the whole cavalry division to the line was actually effected on 1 August, as the 7th Cavalry (Greek Battalion attached) took over a sector from the 24th US Infantry Regiment, immediately northeast of the 8th Cavalry, covering Hills 266–267–309 near Taegwang-ni and Sintan-ni, the exactly same locality the 7th Cavalry had occupied before. In formality, however, the 1st Cavalry Division assumed the responsibility for the 25th Division sector at 1330, 31 July. The Turkish Brigade was remained in position on the rightmost flank of the 1st US Cavalry Division sector under the division control until 3 August.

In short, the division placed three regiments on line, where it had occupied the outpost line of resistance in mid-July. But, most of the patrol bases held previously were now no longer in the friendly hands, which would cause difficulty for future patrolling. The division opened its command post at Yonghyon-dong, the same place it had set up before.

During the opening of August only light contact was made, and the enemy continued his heavy buildup of men and material on line generally beyond the
range of friendly artillery. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry again became a security force at the truce talk delegation camp at Munsan.

The 25th US Division: In the early summer of 1951, the 25th US Division took part in the EUSAK's successful counteroffensive operations and seized Kumhwa and its vicinity one base of the area popularly known as the Iron Triangle.

Then, during 20–21 June the division was relieved in zone by the 3rd US

New replacements for the 1st US Cavalry Division arriving at Yonchon, north of Tongduchon.
Division, becoming 1 US Corps reserve, with its new command post at Kumodont south of Tongduchon. Having the Turkish Brigade under its operational control and the Division Artillery detached, the 25th US Division engaged thereafter in an intensive field training during the reserve period until 14 July when it was ordered to initiate a relief on the next day of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

On 14 July, the 25th Division saw the change of command. Major General S. Sladen Bradley, who had been commanded the division since 26 February 1951, handed the command over to Major General Ita P. Swift effective on the following day. The 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment was also ordered to return to the parent control upon the completion of relief of the security mission for the UNC Representative Base Camp at Munsan by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

Movement for relief between the 25th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division began regiment by regiment. The 24th Infantry Regiment took over the 7th Cavalry Regimental sector north of Taegwang-ni and Sintan-ni on the 15th; the 35th Infantry relieved the 8th Cavalry sector northwest of Sinmang-ni on the 16th; and the 27th Infantry relieved the 5th Cavalry sector immediate east of the Imjin River on the 18th.

Thus, the 25th US Division completely relieved the 1st US Cavalry Division on the 18th, but it assumed the responsibility for the new sector effective at 1800 hours, 16 July. At the same time the 25th Canadian Brigade was placed under the 25th Division control, after being released from the 1st Cavalry Division control. The Turkish Brigade still remained in the assembly area.

The 25th Division Artillery was returned to the parent control from the 3rd US Division on the 16th, while the majority of the cavalry division artillery units was ordered to remain in position, placing under the 25th Division control.

With its new command post at Tongmak-kol, five kilometers north of Tongduchon, the 25th Division now held its defensive positions on Line Wyoming from the Imjin River line to the southwest of Chorwon, where it would spend the rest of the month.

During the period there occurred no remarkable activities except patrolling actions. A particular emphasis was placed on ambush patrols during the night. Quite often friendly night patrols operated up to 3,000–4,000 yards in front of the friendly outpost lines with no enemy contact. Outpost elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment and the 25th Canadian Brigade were often subjected to enemy probing attacks in small-scale but all were driven off after fire fights. During 19–20 July there were heavy rains lasting 36 hours, but road conditions
Riflemen of the 7th US Regiment are jumping off to attack
Hill 717 in the Iron Triangle, 3 July 1951.

remained fair with no major difficulties being encountered in the division zone.
On 26 July, the 25th Canadian Brigade was released from the operational control. Two days later, on the 28th, new EUSAK orders reached the 25th Division through the corps, instructing that the division would hand the present sector over to the 1st US Cavalry Division effective on 30 July, and would initiate a relief of the 9th ROK Division in zone on 2 August.

In other words, the 25th Division was to shift to the Iron Triangle area in the I US Corps' rightmost sector. The relief was commenced with the 27th Regiment moving out first, after being relieved by the 5th Cavalry Regiment before 1200 hours, 30 July, and the responsibility for the current sector was completely taken over by the 1st US Cavalry Division at 1330 hours, 31 July.

In turn, the 24th Regiment of the 25th Division (with the 3rd Battalion, 35th Regiment attached) relieved the 30th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division effective at 1000 hours, 2 August and occupied new positions from the high ground situated on the east side of Namdae-chon up to Songjae-san (Hill 471) with the 3rd Battalion of the 35th Infantry on the left, the 1st Battalion on the center, and the 2nd Battalion on the right, while the 3rd Battalion took up blocking positions immediately behind the 1st Battalion.
The 27th US Regiment relieved the 28th ROK Regiment at 0830 hours and occupied positions in the hill mass area, including Hill 604 or Kyeung-san, north and northeast of Kumbhwa with the 1st and 2nd Battalions on line. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled south of Asa-ri. The Turkish Brigade, after being relieved by the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division in place, followed up and completed the relief of the 7th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on position along a line extending from Tongmang-ni to Hato-ri at 0815 hours, 5 August. In such a way by 5 August the 25th US Division had assumed the responsibility for the entire new sector.

The Central Sector

The 3rd US Division: After its participation in the EUSAK's counteroffensive, called "Operation Piledriver," during the latter part of May and early June 1951, which greatly succeeded in driving the Chinese Communist forces well north of

THE IRON TRIANGLE AREA
Puerto Rican infantrymen, 65th Infantry of the 3rd US Division, in an enemy-built trench.

the 38th Parallel, the 3rd US Infantry Division, then commanded by Major General Robert H. Soul, had been holding its positions on Line Wyoming from Chorwon to Kumbwa on the central front.

Back in May, the division, consisted of the 7th, 15th and 65th Infantry Regiments, made a long rush from army reserve to the east-central front to block a flood of Communists' human-wave pouring through a gap between the 2nd US and 8th ROK Divisions on the 17th. On the following day, spearheaded by the 15th US Regiment, the 3rd US Division units were employed behind the 7th ROK Division in the vicinity of Hoengsong to protect the right flank of the 2nd US Division in the X US Corps sector. The line was forced back and forth until Operation Piledriver stabilized the position which was to become Line Missouri.

Then, the division moved to the central front to crack the famous "Iron Triangle" area. Its first mission was to seize Chorwon, the western anchor of the Iron Triangle. On 11 June, it captured Chorwon, while the 25th US Division took Kumbwa in the east, leaving only Pyonggang to be cleared. On the 13th, leading elements of the 3rd US Division -- Task Force Hawkins composed of the 64th US Tank Battalion, a company from the 7th US Infantry,
one battery of self-propelled field artillery, a platoon of self-propelled antiaircraft artillery, and two infantry platoon from the 65th US Infantry -- entered Pyonggang about at 1530 hours and the Iron Triangle had been cleared. After linked up with Task Force Hamilton of the 25th US Division an hour later, Task Force Hawkins was ordered to return to the original lines. (See Sketch Map 6.)

There followed a period of comparative quiet during which the 3rd US Division spent most of the summer keeping the enemy forces out of the triangle area, while further strengthening defensive positions.

Toward the close of July 1951, the division held a wide front ranging 26 kilometers, which ran from the eastern outskirts of Soi-san (Hill 362) northwest of Chorwon to the repeated hill mass areas eastward including Hills 441, 485, 401, and 604 (Kyeung-san) northeast of Kumhwa.

The division was opposed at this time by the 42nd CCF Army (124th, 125th and 126th Divisions) and the 26th CCF Army (76th, 77th and 78th Divisions). These Red forces were controlling an extremely rugged, mountainous complex overlooking the friendly main line of resistance. The prominent hills included Sobang-san (Hill 717), Hill 785 and Hill 689 below Pyonggang, and Hill 773, Osong-san (Hill 1062) and Hill 912 north of Kumhwa.

Facing the enemy, the 3rd Division, having the 9th ROK Division, 25th US Division Artillery and 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team under its operational control, defended its MLR positions with the 65th and 7th US Regiments and the 30th and 28th ROK Regiments on line, keeping the 15th US and 29th ROK Regiments in reserve.

The Attack on Sobang-san and Pyonggang: On 30 June, the 3rd US Division was ordered by the I US Corps to launch a limited attack the next day toward Pyonggang, destroying the enemy strongholds south of the town. The attack was designed to determine the location, disposition, strength and defenses of the Communist forces in front of the division, inflicting maximum destruction to enemy. The division organized Task Force Hawkins composed of the 64th Tank Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 65th, Infantry, a company of the 10th Engineer Construction Battalion to conduct armored-infantry reconnaissance in two columns commencing at 0730 hours, 1 July on the Chorwon-Pyonggang axis and Kumhwa-Pyonggang axis, and inflict maximum destruction to enemy and prevent withdrawal from or reinforcement of area inside the apex of the two axes.

The 7th US Regiment (minus) would attack at 0530 hours and secure Hill 717 (Sobang-san) and Hill 689 (Turyu-bong), then return to the original positions on order, while the elements of the 65th Infantry was to attack on Hill 488
(Palli-bong) prior to 0800 hours, cover passage and withdrawal of Task Force Hawkins from Chorwon through the vicinity of Hill 488, and then return to the lines on order.

The 9th ROK Division, then commanded by Brigadier General Choi Suk, was ordered to take part in the attack, committing the 1st Battalion of the 29th Regiment to seize Hill 324 prior to 0800 hours, while the 3rd US Division Reconnaissance Company was to conduct motorized screening operations along the Kumhwa–Pyonggang road in the rear of Task Force Hawkins.

On 1 July, the attack was started with left elements of the 7th US Regiment in the center sector jumping off first at 0400 hours. They advanced against no notable opposition until 1730 hours, when they began receiving heavy enemy resistance as they nearing to Hill 717. A right column of the regiment also moved out more earlier, but it encountered a heavy volume of enemy fire when it reached below Hill 386. They continued the attack under increased enemy fire barrage and they had to organize a perimeter before getting dark when then neared to Hill 689 (Turyu-bong or Hill 682 on the old map).
Meanwhile, in the east, the 1st Battalion of the 29th ROK Regiment had secured their objective Hill 324 by 0640 hours and continued to advance, reaching the south of Tuchon-ni at 0840. The rest of the regiment remained assembled in the vicinity of Changching-ni and Songjuk-kol. (See Sketch Map 7.)

On the other hand, a tank-infantry column, consisted of one tank company and one infantry company from the 65th US Infantry attacked with a blitz and secured the assigned objective, Hill 488 situated in the north of To-dong at 0730 hours.

The west side elements of Task Force Hawkins had made a good progress, clearing Hill 453 (Ori-san) by 1100 hours. They continued the attack toward the objective, despite encountering enemy artillery and mortar fire enroute.

The east element of the Task Force Hawkins, meanwhile, had also advanced to the area north of Hill 327 by 1045 hours. Then, as it had accomplished the mission to detect the enemy situation there, the task force initiated to
return to the friendly lines at 1800 hours. Elements of the 65th Infantry and 64th Tank Battalion thereafter assembled at Naepo-ri at 2345 hours while the other elements and tanks of the 65th Infantry closed in the vicinity of Hill 279 at 0130 hours, early next morning. Thus, Task Force Hawkins was dissolved at 0135 hours, 2 July.

Operation Doughhunt: On 2 July, elements of the 65th US Regiment, reinforced with the 64th US Tank Battalion (minus C Company), the 10th Field Artillery Battalion and the 3rd Reconnaissance Company, moved out to a forward assembly area near Hill 488 at 2030 hours. They were to attack against enemy strongholds on Hill 608 (Wangjae-bong) and Hill 785. Infantry elements jumped off at 0600 on the following day and continued the attack during the day against stubborn resistance making only very limited gains. At 0930 hours, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 7th US Infantry on Hill 689 received enemy’s concentration fire, and after a short while engaged with the enemy in company strength, while other elements near Hill 717 (Sobang-san) also battled with a reinforced CCF company.

Sobang-san (Hill 717) south of Pyonggang.
Elements of the 65th Infantry continued the attack on 4 July and by 1500 hours had advanced to the vicinity of Hill 785 against small arms fire and then returned to Hill 608 for the night. The 64th Tank Battalion and the reconnaissance elements were ordered to return to the main line positions. (See Sketch Map 7.)

The 7th US Regiment also continued the attack on the 3rd and by 1500 hours had secured positions for the night along Sobang-san – Hill 689 – Hill 612. The regimental elements were subjected to a series of enemy concentration fires of all types throughout the day and at 1730 hours the left flank elements on the western crest of Sobang-san received a futile counterattack. Again, they were counterattacked at 0300 hours on the 4th but the enemy was repulsed by 0530 hours.

In the meantime, also on the 4th, elements of the 65th US Infantry further attacked from Hill 785 and had seized Hill 396 while others had linked up with elements of the 7th US Regiment at Chungdong-ni southeast of Hill 785.

A tank force from the 64th Tank Battalion departed at 0500, 4 July and by 0800 hours had occupied positions in the northern outskirts of Wangjae-bong (Hill 608), some four kilometers due south of Pyonggang to support actions of the 65th and 7th Regiments. The enemy units, which had been resisting in the vicinity of Hills 717, 689 and 612, suddenly broke contact at 0620 hours, and the friendly units spent rest of the day destroying enemy built-bunkers. All attackers were ordered thereupon to return to the friendly main lines during the night. Thus, the action called "Operation Doughhunt" ousted the Red hordes from strongholds in the Sobang Mountain area which formed the center of the Iron Triangle. In deed, the operation ended with the Communists sustaining tremendous losses. (See Sketch Map 7.)

There ensued another comparatively quiet period until the end of July except routine patrolling actions. On 16 July, the 25th US Division Artillery was reverted to the parental control, because the division was expected to move into the Kumhwa sector in early August. On 28th the 3rd US Division was ordered by the corps that its sector would be moved about six kilometers westward beginning on 2 August, making a room for the 25th US Division to move in from the west of the 3rd Division.

The relief had begun to take place with 9th ROK Division units moving out from their positions first on 2 August. The 30th ROK Regiment was relieved by the 24th Regiment of the 25th US Division and assembled in Haksau-ni near Namdae-chon, the 28th ROK Regiment was relieved by the 27th US Regiment, and the 29th ROK Regiment moved to a new assembly area at Tok-kol.
The 15th US Regiment relieved the Turkish Brigade at 1400 hours on the 3rd and occupied positions along the high ground between Sintan-ji and Soisan (Hill 362) generally astride Route 3, putting the 1st and 3rd Battalions on line. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to remain in the assembly area at Toksodang-ni establishing blocking positions around there. The 65th Regiment remained in the current positions.

On 5 August, the 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team moved to north of Hwaji-ri where it had assembled by 0800 hours. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 7th US Regiment were completely relieved by the Turkish Brigade at 0815 hours, while the 3rd Battalion remained on line. The relieved 2nd Battalion moved to and assembled in Chorwon and Samyul-li farther south respectively. Thus, the predesignated new boundary between the 3rd US Division and 25th US Division became effective at 0815 hours, 5 August. Thereafter the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th US Infantry relieved the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 65th US Infantry in positions along line extending from the southeast of Soisan through Hill 313, Hill 279 to Hill 216 east of the Hak Reservoir by 1030 hours the next day. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 65th US Regiment closed in the assembly areas at Hwaji-ri and Chonhwa-ri at 1330 hours respectively.

Meanwhile, the 28th, 29th, and 30th Regiments of the 9th ROK Division were remained in the assembly areas, waiting for further orders.

Section 4. The East-Central Front
(1 - 31 July 1951)

The IX US Corps

By the end of June 1951, the IX US Corps had driven the Communist forces back north of the 38th Parallel and sealed off the right corner of the Iron Triangle formed by the three towns of Chorwon, Kumhwa, and Pyonggang, a vital, strong area of the enemy defenses.

Late in May 1951 the IX Corps had routed the Communist forces in their last spring offensive and began pursuing them north, chopping them to ribbons at every opportunity. During the early weeks of June the corps resumed the pursuit three divisions abreast, the 7th US Division on the center, the 2nd ROK Division on the left and the 6th ROK Division on the right, pressing hard
on the heels of enemy.

By 13 June the corps had seized and secured its objective line "Ermine," clearing the enemy out of Hill 889 (Taesong-san), Hill 1174 (Mosong-san), Hill 815 (Samchon-bong), Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san), Hill 645 (Chupa-ryong), Hill 895, Hill 1057, Hill 871, Hill 782, Hill 1074 (Chaean-san), and Hill 691 one after another or concurrently. During the offensive the friendly forces had inflicted upon the Red foe a toll of casualties, thus achieving a high morale as well as a great battle victory.

The opening of July 1951 saw the IX US Corps, with Lieutenant General William M. Hoge in command, carrying out a defensive role on the eastern half of the central front extending from the east of Kumbwa to the west bank of the Pukhan River, with its command post at Sangmunjong-ni, about four kilometers northeast of Chunchon. (See Sketch Map 8.)
Now, facing the forces of the 20th and 27th CCF Armies entrenched on precipitous mountains and heights, the IX US Corps defended its front, maintaining the 2nd ROK Division, 24th US Division and the 6th ROK Division on line along the north of the Wyoming Line. The 7th US Division was in corps reserve since 23 June 1951, conducting an extensive training and fortifying positions on the Kansas Line.

This particular front was surrounded by typically rugged, high terrain features -- mountain upon mountain soaring into the sky -- covered with the luxuriated forest all over the area. Above all, there were commanding hills under the friendly control such as Hills 889, 1174, 1073, 1046, 1057 and 1074, overlooking all quarters within the corps zone of action.

The corps units heavily engaged thereupon in patrolling and occasional limited objective attacks in addition to preparing and reorganizing their defensive positions on Line Wyoming and also on Line Kansas throughout the summer months of 1951. The static battle situation at the time, mostly caused by the beginning of the truce negotiations, eventually permitted all units to devote themselves to building up their defenses. Furthermore, taking into consideration the enemy's artillery potential rose, all troops were forced to strengthen defense positions utilizing all means available.

The purpose of limited objective attacks and raids, varying from company to regimental size units, were generally to maintain contact with the enemy and deny him the use of favorable terrain features closer to the friendly main line of resistance on Line Wyoming, destroy as much of his personnel and defense setup as possible, and at the same time keep friendly troops in an aggressive attitude. Primary concern by all forward commanders was to determine the enemy situation and to disrupt his buildup, however.

In brief, all actions and activities prevailed in July 1951 within the corps front, as a whole, may be properly termed as "stabilized warfare," during which time no major attacks were launched by either side.

It is worthwhile to make remarks at this point that during the period the Ethiopian Infantry Battalion, the only ground combat contingent came from the African continent, was attached to the IX US Corps for further attachment to the 7th US Infantry Division on 11 July. And, the Colombian Infantry Battalion, also the only combat force came in Korea from the South America, was attached to the 24th US Division effective on 1 August.
The Kumhwa Area

During the second week of June 1951, the 2nd ROK Division, consisted of the 17th, 31st, and 32nd Infantry Regiments, had participated in the UN offensive as the left wing of the IX US Corps advance, occupying critical terrain features between the east of Kumhwa and west of Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san). In late June the division's elements further attacked northward in an effort to gain better outposts and also to hinder enemy build-up in front of the division sector.

With the opening of July 1951, the situation in the division sector became to stabilize. Under the commander of Brigadier General Ham Byung Sun, the division continued its efforts to prepare defensive positions more strongly. In addition, a particular emphasis was placed on aggressive, tireless patrolling actions to screen friendly positions and activities from the enemy forces, to locate and destroy the enemy positions, and to capture prisoners.
The New Phase of War

The division now held the frontline positions with the 32nd and 17th Regiments on line along Hill 459 – Hill 457 – Hill 815 (Samchon-bong), while the 31st Regimental elements remained in blocking positions to provide protection for the left flank neighboring with the 28th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division.

Throughout the month of July the division units concentrated their efforts on fortification of the main positions on Line Wyoming, while continuing active patrol activity. On 2 July, company size patrol engaged for a short while with an enemy battalion in the vicinity of the Sondol village about two and a half kilometers north of the main line during the midday. Another company size patrol also encountered an enemy company near Hill 735 from 1230 to 1615 hours the same day, and with the support of artillery fire it forced the enemy to retreat, killing nine enemy, in addition to an estimated 30 CCF wounded.

A company-size patrol from the 31st Regiment again engaged with two enemy companies on the southern slope of Hill 735 the next day afternoon killing 49 enemy and capturing five Russian rifles plus 250 grenades. There were too numerous to mention similar actions, and constant engagement in minor probing or aggressive patrolling as illustrated above were nothing more than peculiar characteristics of the ground activities at this stage of war after the truce talks had started.

To wit some other event and activity during the month, the 109th Mortar Battery was newly attached to the 2nd ROK Division on 17 July, and outpost troops of the 31st ROK Regiment manned on Hill 785 in front of the 17th ROK Regiment positions were assembled in Sagok-ni (Sagong-ni) on the left flank of the division sector on the 24th after being relieved by elements of the 17th Regiment. On 29 July, the 32nd Regiment was relieved by the 31st Regiment on position, becoming division reserve.

The Chokkun-San–Chupa-ryong Sector

The 24th US Division: The beginning of the second year of the war found the 24th US Infantry Division defending the center portion of the IX US Corps front north of Sabanggo-ri with two regiments on line, the 5th Infantry on the left and the 21st Infantry on the right, along Hill 1073 – Hill 680 – Hill 736 – Hill 645 – Hill 534 – Hill 895 – Hill 1046, keeping the 19th Regiment (minus) in reserve. This area was occupied by the 7th US Division during the second week of June 1951, and Hill 1073, better known to the local inhabitants as Chokkun-san, was a critical, dominant terrain feature surrounded with rugged
ridges and steep slopes, overlooking all directions, particularly Kumhwa, Kumsong and Hwachon.

Late in May 1951 the 24th US Infantry Division, had participated in the United Nations forces’ counteroffensive which carried to the north of the 38th Parallel within one week, and continued in pursuit of the enemy in the IX US Corps sector west of the Hwachon Reservoir until 4 June. On 5 June, the division went into corps reserve upon the relief by the units of the 2nd ROK Division and the 7th US Division.

The division underwent thereafter an intensive training and construction of a portion of Line Kansas, particularly by the 5th and 19th Regiments, until 23 June, when the division relieved the 7th US Division and assumed the responsibility for a sector situated between the 2nd ROK Division and the 6th ROK Division.

The 19th Infantry Regiment (minus) had launched a limited-scale attack from 26 to 29 June to seize an objective bounded by the rugged mountains about six kilometers north of Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san) and to destroy the enemy south of the objective area. Its main purpose was to screen friendly main positions and activities from the enemy. As a result, the 19th US Infantry destroyed 572 enemy bunkers, and captured 112 M-1 rifles, 23 Thomson submachine guns, one 75-mm. howitzer, 95 Russian rifles, 33, 60-mm. mortars, and countless quantity of ammunition. The 5th US Regiment, which joined the attack later, also destroyed 112 bunkers and a great deal of ammunition.

Under Major General Blackshear N. Bryan, the 24th Division spent most of July 1951 preparing and defending the Wyoming Line northwest of Hwachon, because the static situation on the battle ground permitted the division units to fortify the main line of resistance. On the other hand, all units continued their effort to dispatch patrols forward day and night, usually 4,000–5,000 yards north of the friendly outpost line, with the only minor contact. There was a battalion size patrol base in front of the 5th Regimental positions manned by the 3rd Battalion of the 19th US Regiment. In some cases, company or battalion sized-attacks were launched from the patrol bases in an attempt to keep the enemy off balance and to disrupt enemy buildup. Among many others, some typical actions which took place during the month are given as follows. On 2 July, a company size patrol moved out 3,000 yards north of the patrol base where they were supported by heavy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar as well as artillery fire at 1100 hours. They returned to the original base at 1600 hours after directing artillery fire on the identified enemy positions thus neutralizing several enemy mortar and machine gun positions.
The New Phase of War

On the 3rd, the 19th Infantry’s elements patrolled far deep into the enemy held-area as far as ten kilometers north of the friendly main line, and received 40 rounds of 76-mm. howitzer fire from the enemy positions on Hill 585. The friendly patrols immediately requested air strikes and withdrew.

On the following day, a 19th Infantry’s company size patrol moved out 3,000 yards northward. At 1245 hours, it engaged with an enemy group employing small arms and grenades in the vicinity of Hill 602 in Samhyon. Another patrol team moved to the west from the south of Hill 602 to assist. As a result, the friendly patrols withdrew an hour later, hitting an estimated CCF company, 4,000 yards south attempting to block the friendly withdrawal. The patrols fought through the enemy blocking position and by 1500 hours they had returned to the base without mishap.

The Attacks on Hills 602, 596 and 851: On the other hand, on the east flank of the division sector, the 8th Ranger Company departed in the afternoon about at 1430 hours followed by the 2nd Battalion of the 21st US Regiment half an hour later. Both units had reached the southern ridge of Hill 1118 northwest of Paikam-san or Hill 1179 by 2000 hours and prepared to remain there during the night. On the following day, the 5th, the battalion advanced to seize high ground, including Hill 851 (Hugunto-ryong), about six kilometers north of the 21st Regimental main positions, while the 8th Ranger Company blocked and contained the enemy counteraction from Hill 1118. The battalion elements began at 0500 hours the limited objective attack and by 0825 hours the leading elements had already advanced one kilometer without enemy contact. The battalion continued to attack northwestward, with G Company finally seizing Hill 851 at 1115 hours after short fire fight. Whereupon F Company attacked through G Company at 1130 hours, engaging with two CCF companies in strength when it moved 300 meters north. There waged a severe fire fight which lasted until 2000 hours when F Company withdrew to form a perimeter with G Company along the military crest on Hill 851. The remainder of the 2nd Battalion closed in the southwest of the hill, while the 8th Ranger Company remained in the blocking positions southwest of Hill 1118. During the action the friendly units suffered two killed and 28 wounded. The next morning the battalion elements began to withdraw at 0600 hours after being under heavy enemy pressure.

On 6 July, the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry departed its assembly area in Myongjae at 0700 hours and relieved the 3rd Battalion on a patrol base north of Hill 631 at 1125 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the 21st Infantry was returned to the original position on Line Wyoming by 1700 hours also on
the 6th without further engagement. The 8th Ranger Company, after covering the withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion of the 21st Infantry, departed the blocking positions at 1630 hours, closing in an assembly area near the division command post in Kudunji south of Sabanggo-ri at 2100 hours.

On the morning of 8 July, the 2nd Battalion on a patrol base, about two kilometers north of Hill 631, launched a limited objective attack at 0600 hours toward Hill 602 in Samhyon. It assaulted against the objective at 0945 hours
meeting stubborn resistance from the Reds well dug in and supported by the bulk volume of mortar and artillery fire, and the attackers climbed up the hill but still 100 yards short of the objective.

Meanwhile, a reinforced platoon from the 5th US Regiment also moved out at 0600 hours heading for Mudong-ni southeast of Hill 602 to secure the right flank of the operation now being conducted by the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry. There soon fell into a bloody scene. The attackers and defenders struggled for the hill to take and hold each other by all means available. As a result, the friendly units reached the objective at 1520 hours but the enemy resistance continued until 1750 hours when it was broken by friendly air and artillery strikes. The 2nd Battalion of the 19th US Infantry finally closed into a perimeter on Hill 602 and its vicinity. The enemy casualties counted there seven killed in addition to estimated 30 more killed. All patrols returned to their respective bases by 1700 hours. (See Sketch Map 9.)

Again, on 12 July, the 24th US Division launched a limited objective attack early in the morning with the following objectives: The 21st Regiment with the 8th Ranger Company attached would take its objective, a general area covering Hill 851 (Hugunto-ryong), Hill 596, and high ground in the vicinity of Pamsongs-kol farther north; the 5th Regiment would take Hill 461 and high ground west of the hill, and would prepare to relieve elements of the 21st Infantry in the vicinity of Hill 461; and the 19th Regimental elements were to take up blocking positions in the east of Hill 602, in addition to seize high ground covering from Hill 602 to eastward to the Korisil village area.

The 5th Infantry units had advanced to Hudong-ni by 1400 hours dispersing a small group enemy. Tank elements encountered intense enemy fire at 1725 hours during the advance and one tank was damaged by enemy mines but was recovered soon. The 21st Infantry’s elements advanced to Hill 851 where the leading elements were counterattacked by an estimated CCF company at 1730 hours. The friendly elements disengaged at 1900 hours and soon established a perimeter defense on the high ground southwest of Hill 851 for the night. In the meantime, the 19th Regimental elements advanced to the vicinity of the objective without engaging any notable actions. They also closed into a perimeter in the south of Samhyon for the night.

The 21st Regimental elements and the 8th Ranger Company continued the attack on the following morning to take the assigned objectives. At 0700 hours they assaulted on to Hill 851 and nearby high ground but failed. The enemy employed twelve machine guns and large quantity of TNT on the assaulting forces. Consequently, an air strike was called upon the enemy positions by
0915 hours, and the friendly elements continued the assault after the airstrike and artillery fire were placed on the enemy-held hill. Then, they repulsed the enemy counterattack at 1430 hours and seized Hill 851 at 1545 hours. Reserve elements passed through the position on Hill 682 and continued the attack toward Hill 596, and by 1945 hours they had engaged with an unknown number of enemy well dug in on the Hill.

The 19th Infantry attackers destroyed several enemy bunkers in the vicinity of Korisil and killed nine Red Chinese and took one prisoner during the attack.

On the 14th, all the attacking echelons resumed the attack to the north at 0500 hours but immediately came under heavy short range fire from the enemy well dug in on the high ground.

The 6th US Tank Battalion (minus one company) moved out at 0800 hours and advanced to the vicinity of Pamsong-kol near the Kumsong River two hours later. It had farther advanced up to the north of Pyoru along the river by 1630 hours, receiving mortar and artillery fire during the advance. Then, it disengaged and returned to Sabanggo-ri by 1900 hours with the results of 75 CCF killed, six enemy bunkers destroyed, four 82-mm. mortars and one 105-mm. artillery piece destroyed, suffering two own wounded. (See Sketch Map 9.)

During the second half of the month the division units continued similar actions placing an emphasis on night patrol, primarily to capture prisoners, disrupt the strength of enemy defenses and keep the morale as well as aggressiveness of friendly troops higher. A peculiar action occurred on the night of 21–22 July. A night patrol from the 5th US Regiment advanced as far as to Hill 547 about six kilometers north of the friendly main positions before midnight, meeting no enemy reaction, and while returning it engaged with an enemy squad near Hill 602 at 0120 hours, capturing one prisoner of war. While bringing in the prisoner the patrol unexpectedly became engaged with an unknown number of enemy under darkness in a hand grenade fight and the prisoner was killed as well and suffered one each of killed and wounded in this action.

On 23 July elements of the 19th US Regiment moved out in the early morning for reconnaissance in force to seize three high terrain features in the vicinity of Hill 547 and at 0930 hours began receiving a barrage of automatic weapons fire from an estimated 100–150 Red Chinese who were on the objective. Artillery fire was placed on the objective and the friendly troops reached there at 1300 hours, finding ten Reds dead. From the objective they directed artillery concentration fire on an estimated CCF company in strength and then continued to advance northeastward. The friendly casualties were one killed and eleven wounded in action. The reconnaissance troops returned to the former positions
The New Phase of War

before the darkness fell.

Elements of the 19th US Regiment in the assembly area at Changpyong-dong had relieved elements of the 31st Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division which manned a patrol base on Hill 785 by 1530 hours, 24 July.

On 28 July, the 24th US Division was ordered by the Eighth US Army to have the Colombian Infantry Battalion under its operational control upon the arrival of the battalion at Chunchon.

Elements of the 19th US Regiment on the patrol base in the neighborhood of Hill 785 was relieved by elements of the 17th ROK Regiment by 1600 hours, 28 July, and moved to an assembly area in Changpyong-dong. A patrol from the 21st US Regiment observed and directed artillery fire on an estimated CCF company in the vicinity of Hill 851 (Hugunto-ryong) at 1230 hours, 30 July, resulting in an estimated 40 Reds killed and the remainder seriously wounded.

Thus, as of 31 July 1951 the 24th US Infantry Division maintained its main defensive positions with the 5th Regiment along Hill 1073—Hill 680—Hill 736—northeast of Hill 652, and the 21st Regiment along Hill 645 (Chupa-ryong)—Hill 534—Hill 1046. The 19th Regiment remained in the assembly areas with the 3rd and 1st Battalions at Changpyong-dong and Sanyang-ni, while the 2nd Battalion still maintained a patrol base along Hill 975—Hill 793.

The first day of August saw the 24th US Division was added more strength. The newly arrived Colombian Battalion was attached to the division for further attachment to the 21st US Regiment at the same time, when the battalion assembled in Hamasan-dong in the early morning.

In August the 24th Infantry Division was engaged primarily in the defense of Line Wyoming, while construction of fortifications of Line Kansas was also continued ceaselessly. Besides, a limited objective attack to Line Utah was executed on 2–3 August in conjunction with adjacent divisions' attacks. The division would remain in the present sector until 9 August with the mission remained unchanged.

The Huinbau-san Area

In the early days of July 1951, the 6th ROK Division, consisted of the 2nd, 7th and 19th Infantry Regiments, continued to improve and defend the assigned positions in the rightmost sector on the IX US Corps front neighboring with the 7th ROK Division on the X US Corps front.
During the preceding month the 6th ROK Division took part in the IX US Corps offensive, attacking from the Hwachon Reservoir area toward Hill 1074 (Chae-an-san) and Hill 1179 in conjunction with the advance of the 7th US Division on its left. In consequence of the ensuing attacks, the division had seized its part of the phase line “Ermine,” the corps objective, by mid-June, and had established the defensive positions along the present line extending from Hill 915 to the west bank of the Pukhan River south of Susang-ni.

At of 1 July 1951, the 7th and 19th ROK Regiments were positioned on the main line of resistance, while units of the 2nd ROK Regiment manned on farther forward positions with a battalion size patrol base position on Hill 1051 east of Hill 1179 or Huinbau-san. A battalion of the 2nd ROK Regiment maintained blocking positions on and around Hill 508 near Pungsan-ni, while a battalion of the 19th ROK Regiment remained assembled in the vicinity of the Hwachon Reservoir.

Under the command of Brigadier General Chang Do Yung, the primary mission of the 6th ROK Division was also to strengthen and defend the present positions,
constantly hindering enemy buildup by aggressive patrolling and raids deep into
the enemy positions. Therefore, the pattern of activity during the month of
July in the division sector can best be summarized as patrol action as exemplified
in the following activities.

On 4 July, a company size patrol of the 2nd ROK Regiment from positions
on Hill 523 near Pannamun-kol moved to Hill 819 a strong enemy outpost
position, where it engaged with an estimated two CCF companies in fire fight
for two hours.

On 7 July, a daylight patrol from the 2nd Regiment engaged with an esti-
mated reinforced-enemy company in the vicinity of Hill 819, then continued to
advance toward objective, a kilometer farther north, and returned to its base
without mishap. On the same day, meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 7th
ROK Regiment departed old positions in and around the Hill 282 area at 0600
hours, closing in the vicinity of Mae-bong at 1400 hours for employment along
the Kansas Line in rear.

On the 13th, a two company-sized patrol group of the 2nd ROK Regiment
encountered with two enemy companies again in the Hill 819 area at 0900
hours. The engagement continued until 1800 hours when the patrol group
disengaged to establish a perimeter defense for the night at the high ground
northwest of Hill 662. The patrol group resumed the attack to the north at
0700 hours the next day. Other elements of the 2nd Regiment in Pungsan-ni
was ordered to move to the west of Hill 1074. The two attacking companies
departed at 0600, 14 July toward high ground northeast of Hill 819. One
company was to assume blocking positions there while the other company would
attack to the south to aid other elements attacking north from the south of
Hill 819. They engaged there with two enemy battalions in strength on Hill
819 during the day until 1700 hours when they were ordered to return.

About this time night ambush-patrol was strongly emphasized to carry out
by all front line units. On 20 July, four ambush patrols operating 2,000–6,000
yards in front of the friendly positions during the night made no enemy contact.

There followed comparatively a quiet period except minor patrol clashes in
nature. For instance, on 28 July, a company size patrol of the 19th Regiment
moved up to the vicinity of Hill 819, where the patrol fell into a bitter fire
fight with two reinforced enemy squads at 1530 hours, resulting in ten Reds
killed and one friendly wounded. On the other hand, another company size
patrol from the 7th ROK Regiment encountered with two enemy companies
in the vicinity of Tungdae-ri, about one and a half kilometers northeast of Hill
819 during 1400–1530 hours that day. The patrol withdrew leaving there
some troops in ambush positions around an estimated enemy company. There
was no further incidents, however.

In such a way the 6th ROK Division had spent the whole month of July without being experienced any significant, serious battles, and at the close of the month the 7th ROK Regiment maintained the main defensive positions along Hill 871—Hill 782, three and a half kilometers south of Hill 1179 (Paikamsan or Huinbau-san) with the 1st Battalion assembled in the Mae-bong area; and the 2nd ROK Regiment maintained the positions with one battalion along Hill 523—Hill 596, another battalion on Hill 1051 or Sopaikam-san (Little Paikam-san), and the other battalion back in reserve position on Hill 1074 (Chaean-san). The 19th ROK Regiment held the positions along the high ground extending from Hill 574 (northwest of Tanggo-ri)—Hill 303 on the west bank of the Pukhan River. The division units remained in this sector deep into August seeing no notable actions.

In the meantime, in June 1951, the 7th US Division, consisted of the 17th, 31st and 32nd Infantry Regiments, took part in the friendly counteroffensive, assuming a major role of the IX US operations on the central front. Charged with a main effort of the corps advance, the 7th US Division, under the command of Major General Claude B. Ferebaugh, had attacked through the Hwachon—Sanyang-ri—Hill 1073 axis, thus taking and securing the assigned objectives area east of Kumhwa, including Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san) one of the strongest enemy-held defenses, by 13 June, trapping thousands of the enemy during the attack. The division was remained in this east anchor of the Iron Triangle until 23 June, when it went into corps reserve on order.

Thus, the division had gained an opportunity to take a rest for the first time since the Inchon landing in September 1950. After being relieved by the 24th US Division in zone, the 7th US Division assembled its subordinate units in the scattered areas: The 17th Regiment in the vicinity of Hataeri-ri, Hwachon, and Changgo-ri near Pukhan-gang; the 31st Regiment in the vicinity of Hill 1436 (Mae-bong), Sanjori west of the Chunchon Reservoir, and Kosirak-kol also west of the reservoir; and the 32nd Regiment near Aegi-kogae three kilometers southwest of Hill 1125, (Choktage-bong), Chingwachon two and a half kilometers southwest of Hill 1125, and Sogok about seven and a half kilometers northeast of Kapyong.

At any rate, the whole reserve period, lasting until 7 August, was by no means a rest or break; all units had engaged in hard, intensive training as well as fortification of defensive positions on Line Kansas. During the period, the division saw an addition of the strength. The newly arrived Ethiopian Infantry Battalion was attached to the 7th US Division effective on 11 July when it arrived in Kapyong. The battalion was further attached to the 32nd
US Infantry Regiment at the same time, and soon became famous as the Kagnew Battalion. In early August the division would return to the same line where it had held in June.

Section 5. The Mid-Eastern Front
(1 – 31 July 1951)

The X US Corps

The month of July 1951 found the X US Corps firmly securing its part
of the Kansas Line on the mid-eastern front, extending from the west bank of Pukhan-gang to Hill 1019 (Sanmorigok-san), eight kilometers east of the Soyang River. In the preceding months the corps units had established an unprecedented, high standard of combat profession, particularly during a series of counteroffensives in May and June against the Communist odds.

On the night of 16 May, the Chinese Communist forces launched another decisive, concerted offensive with five army groups against the X US Corps line. But, by the third day the enemy had been stopped and was unable to continue the attack. A general advance was then initiated by the UN forces across the entire front. The X Corps units lost no time to pursue the fleeing enemy and exploited the success deep into June. It was a disastrous fight of beaten enemy troops under very little control in most instances. For the X Corps it was another great, decisive triumph, leaving its name in the war history forever in addition to that of the historical landing operations at Inchon in September 1950.

Now, back in the early days of July 1951, the X Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, held its defensive front with the 7th ROK, 1st US Marine and 5th ROK Divisions on line and the 2nd US and 8th ROK Divisions in corps reserve, continuing fortification of Line Kansas. (See Sketch Map 10.)

The terrain feature in front of the corps zone was the typical Korean mountain complex situated with high, rugged hill after hill all directions. The mountain slopes rose sharply, especially on the west and south faces, and accessible roads were almost non-existent. Mountain trails, defiles or stream-beds were the only route that friendly foot troops could take as their avenue of approach to the enemy-held positions. (See Sketch Map 3.)

Taking such a great advantage of the natural barrier, elements of the 6th, 27th, and 2nd NK Divisions were busily engaging in fortifying their defensive positions, keeping the bulk of reserve forces their immediate behind.

At this juncture, taking into consideration the enemy situation, the Eighth US Army ordered the X Corps on 1 July to conduct coordinated, intensive artillery fires and airstrikes to weaken enemy positions and encourage the enemy desertion and surrender. Time on target (TOT) fires were to be placed on three target areas specified by the X Corps artillery on and around (1) Hills 1013, 1059, 928, and 792; (2) Hills 1179 (Taeu-san), 1100, and 948; and (3) Hills 983 and 938, all situated in the west of the Punchbowl. Aware of heavy tactical weight of these prominent hills, from which they could overlook into
American engineers preparing road damage caused by heavy rains near Inje, 21 July 1951.

the friendly main line of resistance, the Communist forces had made the hill mass area a formidable fortress. At the time the corps had to take some actions on these heights before they became too serious threat. The air-artillery interdiction effort was effected on 2–3 July resulting in a great success. On the 2nd, 586 rounds of artillery were fired into the Area 1, while 1,159 rounds were poured into the Area 3 the following day. Besides, 1,050 rounds of artillery were shelled into the high ground just north of Talsal-lyong, northeast of the Punchbowl, and 1,138 rounds on Hill 598 in the northern out-skirts of the Punchbowl. Observation was hampered due to the restricted visibility.

There followed a series of attacks against Hill 1179 (Taeu-san, Hill 1178 on new map), an enemy-held commanding terrain in the Punchbowl sector. On 7 July, the X Corps ordered the 1st US Marine Division to attack on the controversial mountain the next day and establish a patrol base on it. As a result, the 1st ROK Marine Regiment launched the attack on the 8th, lasting until the 11th, when it was ordered by the division to discontinue the assault due to torrential rains.

On 15 July, Lieutenant General Almond was succeeded by Major General Clovis S. Byers, and the 1st US Marine Division was relieved by the 2nd US Division, between 15 and 17 July, becoming corps reserve. During 20–21 July
the 5th ROK Division was also relieved by the 8th ROK Division. The former went into corps reserve, stationing in the vicinity of Inje.

Meanwhile, the fiercest fighting within the X Corps front, perhaps across the entire UN front during the month, took place again in the Taeu-san sector. In compliance with the Eighth US Army orders dated 21 July the X Corps directed the 2nd US Division to capture and set up a patrol base on Taeu-san (Hill 1179). On the 26th, the division began the attack with the 38th US Regiment in the main effort. The Netherlands Battalion and elements of the 23rd US Regiment also took part in the attack, which lasted until the 30th, when the division completely cleared Hill 1179. Thus, Taeu-san, firm in the control of the friendly forces, had eliminated the enemy threat, and the X Corps units now poised to advance farther northward. Yet, extremely heavy rains that made roads and trails impassable and restricted air and artillery support delayed the launching of further operations in the Punchbowl area until mid-August.

The Paeksok-san–Tusol-san Sector

The 7th ROK Division: In mid-June 1951 the 7th ROK Division had occupied its part of the Badger Line north of Yanggu on the X US Corps front, and left sector of the corps, neighboring with the 6th ROK Division on the left and the 1st US Marine Division on the right.

As of 1 July 1951, under the command of Brigadier General Kim Yong Bae, the 7th ROK Division was still remained in the sector with one regiment securing forward positions along the Badger Line and two regiments on the Kansas Line. The 5th ROK Regiment maintained defensive positions from the east bank of the Pukhan River eastward up to Suip-chon with its main body on the high ground along Hill 807–Hill 731–Hill 561–Hill 513, while the patrol base line was manned by a battalion in strength farther north taking positions on Hills 892, 609, 917, and 550. The 3rd and 8th ROK Regiments were remained on Line Kansas in the vicinity of the Hwachon Reservoir, heavily engaging in field fortification.

On the other hand, the enemy forces facing the division had been busily building up in strength and supplies as well as defenses with the 6th and 32nd NK Divisions operating on their forward lines.

Throughout July the division continued to maintain the current defensive positions, conducting patrolling actions as its routine task in addition to improving defense set-up without exception. Patrols were sent out day and night
and, usually in a day a dozen patrol contact was made with the enemy ranging in size from squad to company, generally 3,000–4,000 yards beyond the front line positions. Besides frequent patrol clashes, there were occasional probing raids launched by both opponents. Friendly units often conducted probing attacks against the enemy held-positions in an effort to screen the area to the front of the friendly patrol base positions.

To give some illustrations, on the night of 4–5 July, there were three enemy platoon-size probing actions along the front of the 5th ROK Regiment starting at the midnight. All were repulsed without loss of ground by 0230 hours. Three days later eighteen patrols of various sizes from squad to reinforced platoons were dispatched by the 5th ROK Infantry to sweep the area forward of friendly patrol bases.

During 9–11 July the 5th ROK Regiment was relieved in position by the 8th ROK Regiment and a contact point was established between the 8th ROK Regiment and elements of the 6th ROK Division on the east bank of the Pukhan River at 1500 hours, 12 July.

On or about 24 July, the 6th NK Division was relieved by the 12th NK Division on line and went into the V NK Corps reserve.

A biggest action during the month within the 7th ROK Division took place on the 27th. Elements in company strength from the 8th ROK Regiment attacked and occupied Hill 934, about two and a half kilometers south of Paeksok-san (Hill 1142) at 1130 hours and were counterattacked an hour later by an estimated enemy battalion in strength. On the other hand, two companies of the Reconnaissance Battalion advanced to the vicinity of Hill 556 in Songhyon-ni and engaged an estimated two enemy companies also at 1130 hours. The former company withdrew from Hill 934 and directed an airstrike on the enemy resulting in an estimated 50 NK hordes killed. This patrol group then moved to the left flank of Hill 556 to assist the reconnaissance elements. Three companies broke contact and returned to the original patrol bases without incident.

There were too numerous to illustrate similar actions in nature and scale. The units of the 7th ROK Division continued to remain in the sector constantly dispatching extensive, aggressive patrols from the bases along Line Badger.

The 1st US Marine Division: During the first week of July 1951 the 1st US Marine Division (with the 1st ROK Marine Regiment attached) was defending the center sector of the X US Corps with the 1st US, 1st ROK and 5th US Marine Regiments on the forward line, while the 7th US Marine Regiment was remained in division reserve. These frontline units had occupied the defensive
positions along the high ground northeast of Yanggu, disposing their main forces on or in the vicinity of Hills 736, 735, 787, 872, 1148 (Tusol-san) 1018, 907, and 480, with their patrol bases farther north.

Facing the Marine division was the 27th NK Division under the 11 NK Corps. The enemy division took over this front from the 12th NK Division which had moved westward in front of the 7th ROK Division on or about 19 June 1951, and its 32nd Regiment occupied Taeu-san (Hill 1179), fortifying the whole mountain as an enemy's most stronghold on the mid-eastern front. (See Sketch Map 5.)

Late in June 1951 all three frontline regiments of the 1st US Marine Division were ordered to establish battalion-size patrol bases on the Badger Line, about two and a half to four kilometers forward of the present positions. And, it was further ordered by the X US Corps early in July that a patrol base be established on Taeu-san. This highest mountain in front of the Marine division afforded excellent observation eastward into a basin, which would soon become famous as the "Punchbowl" and westward into the Sochon (river) valley. At the time the Communists horde was using this prominent hill mass area as a strong point of their forward line. Furthermore, there was an enemy’s formidable, fortified stronghold on and around Kachil-bong (Hill 1242) about five kilometers north of Taeu-san.

On the morning of 7 July, the 1st US Marine Division, commanded by Major General Gerald C. Thomas, was warned by the X Corps to prepare for an attack on Taeu-san the following day in order to set up a strong patrol base there.
In turn, the 1st ROK Marine Regiment was alerted by the division for planning and organizing the attack.

The 1st ROK Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Kim Dae Shik, hastily organized a composite battalion of the three companies -- two companies from the 2nd Battalion and one company from the 3rd Battalion, since the ROK Marines could not be relieved for responsibility for their sector.

There were two avenues of approach, one along an open ridgeline that extended from the Marine positions, and the other called for a descent into the stream bed generally parallel to the main line of resistance and a steep climb up a ridge leading directly north to Taeu-san.

The attacking Marines jumped off at 1030 hours on 8 July, immediately following artillery preparation fire lasting half an hour long. The attack was also to have been preceded by airstrikes, but bad, low ceiling weather kept the aircraft grounded.

An attacking company, on the right, which had moved out from Hill 1001, nearly two kilometers north of Tusol-san (Hill 1148), was soon pinned down by a heavy weight of enemy mortar and machine gun fire, while the other two companies on the left gained a foothold on Hill 1100, about one and a half kilometers in front of the objective, where they had to dig in for the night and repulsed a series of enemy counterattacks.

On the following morning, the entire 1st Battalion was committed to the attack on the right, but failed to advance farther than the company of the day before. Meanwhile, the two companies on the left were driven off Hill 1100.

Colonel Could P. Groves, senior American liaison officer with the 1st ROK Marine Regiment recommended that the two companies be withdrawn. The 1st Battalion had managed to capture Hill 1001, but could not advance close to Taeu-san, encountering stubborn enemy resistance aided by repeated mine fields. In addition, the raining weather impeded the attack any further.

On 12 July, the 1st US Marine Division reported to the corps that positions held by the ROK Marines just forward of Hill 1001 fulfilled the requirements of an advance patrol base.

A sequel to this battle story of 8–11 July would be written late in July after the 2nd US Infantry Division relieved the 1st US Marine Division, when the X US Corps again ordered the capture of Taeu-san as a patrol base.

Although the fighting had not been severe for other units of the 1st US Marine Division during the first week of July, the casualties, including the ROK Marines, were 55 killed, 360 wounded, and 22 missing in action -- a total of 437.
In the meantime, the 1st US Marine Division was received a notice from the X US Corps to prepare for relief by the 2nd US Infantry Division between 15–17 July. The relief was completed by the 2nd US Division on the 15th, and the 1st US Marine Division became corps reserve effective at 1800 hours, 16 July. By the 17th all the Marines were on their way back to assembly areas in the X Corps rear with the 5th US Marine Regiment (Colonel Richard W. Hayward) remaining near Inje.

Since then onward most of the 1st US Marine Division units were remained in X US Corps reserve during the last two weeks of July, while the 5th US Marines remained in "ready reserve" under the direct control of the corps. Toward the end of the month, the 3rd Battalion of the 11th US Marine Regiment (Colonel Joseph L. Wmcoff) was passed to the operational control of the 2nd US Infantry Division. The 7th US Marines (Colonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.) and Division Reconnaissance Company moved to the Yanggu area to give hands in the construction of defensive positions and under-go special training. The American Marine division would remain in reserve until 26 August when it was ordered to return to the fighting line.

The Attack in the Punchbowl Sector

The 2nd US Division: The first two weeks of July 1951 found the 2nd US Infantry Division units remaining in the X US Corps rear area except the 23rd US Infantry Regiment. The 38th and 9th US Regiments had been continuing extensive training in individual and small unit tactics, and firing of crew served weapons. The 38th Infantry had the Netherlands Battalion under its operational control. The 23rd US Regiment (with the French Battalion attached) was being placed under the direct control of the X Corps, stationing in Inje.

During the past two months the 2nd US Division and attached units, under the command of Major General Clark L. Ruffner, had distinguished themselves in the repeated, fierce battles against the overwhelming Communist forces in strength. One of the most notable, brilliant battle accounts of the division during the period, among many others, was the battle for Hill 800, better known as "Bunker Hill", northwest of Hangye. There the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wallace M. Hanes, won the glorious, immortal victory with gallant stand during 16–19 May 1951, thus contributed greatly to the successful offensive operations of the UN forces in the immediate future.

Early days in June before it went into corps reserve, the 2nd US Division
was committed into a determined-offensive by the X US Corps to capture commanding heights in the rugged hills forward of the Inje—Soyang bridgehead. After initiating the moves on 2 June the energetic attacks of all three assigned regiments continued for three days and by 5 June all objectives were secured. This unprecedented outstanding success of battle brought forth, for the first time, a powerful counterattack which followed on the heels of one of the most spectacular defensive stands of the war.

On 5 June, the 2nd US Division began its movement into corps reserve in the vicinity of Hongchon, and by 11 June the move was completed. The division, more known as the “Indianhead Division” or “Second to None,” remained there until 15 July when it initiated relief of the 1st US Marine Division on the X US Corps front.

The relief was taken place with the 23rd US Regiment starting first. By 1300 hours of the 15th, the French and 3rd Battalions of the 23rd US Infantry were entrenched on the Kansas Line, taking over positions from the 5th US Marine Regiment. The French Battalion disposed its troops on the rightmost flank of the division sector. The following day the 38th US Regiment, with the 3rd Battalion of the 9th US Regiment attached, relieved the 1st ROK Marine Regiment and the 1st US Marine Regiment. Actually, the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion of the 7th US Marine Regiment on the leftmost flank, while the Netherlands Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 1st ROK Marine Regiment. To the rear, the 9th US Regiment (less 3rd Battalion) and 72nd US Tank Battalion went into division reserve with the 9th US Infantry occupying and improving the Wichita Line, a X US Corps secondary defense that extended from Hill 248 in Sanguman (three kilometers northeast of Yanggu) to Hills 517, 730, 1057 and 873 and then to Torichon north of Wontong—Wontong-o-ri—Hill 496 some two kilometers south of Hill 1430 (An-san).

Thus, the 2nd US Division, with its command post opening at Kwandae-ri at 0800 hours, 16 July, now returned to the fighting line from the longest non-combat period experienced by the division since its first members had set foot on the Korean soil at 1320 hours, 29 July 1950. It assumed the responsibility for the 1st US Marine Division sector effective at 1800 hours on the 16th.

The attack on Taeu-san: Aggressive patrols were immediately dispatched from the forward positions to feel out enemy positions, while major troops kept busy in consolidating and improving their defensive positions all across the sector. Patrol reports revealed that the North Korean Red odds were exploiting
a full advantage of a high, precipitous hill mass with hill 1179 or Taeu-san as the main peak of mountains, from which to observe all activities and movements of the division on the Kansas Line and 20 kilometers to the south. There a full regiment of the 27th NK Division, 1,700-man strong at least, was defending on Taeu-san alone.

In another words, in July 1951 the NK Communist forces held the commanding terrain on this mid-eastern front overlooking all directions, seriously threatening the friendly main line of resistance. They could direct artillery fire upon Line Kansas. In an effort to lessen the enemy threat of attacks, Lieutenant General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, on 21 July directed the X US Corps to draw up plans for seizing the these threatening heights in the west rim of the Punchbowl. In turn, the 2nd US Division was ordered by the corps to prepare plans immediately for an attack on the hill mass. The division drew up the plans without delay. Running north and south, the whole hill complex cut through both the enemy main line of resistance.
and friendly positions. The side having control of it possessed a definite, great advantage over the other.

Patrols went out incessantly across the entire front in the succeeding days so as not to tip off the enemy to the forthcoming attack. The 23rd US Infantry, operating on the right flank of the line, sent patrols into the Punchbowl, a marked depression in the hilly terrain of the area situated east of Hill 1179 and Hill 1100, another prominent section of high ground which controlled the approaches to Hill 1179.

The attack was scheduled for 26 July and the 38th US Infantry (Colonel John C. Coughlin in command) was ordered to launch main attack, while the 23rd US Infantry (Colonel James Y. Adams) was to execute a series of diversionary attacks to seize three objectives in the Punchbowl from which it could cut-off escape of enemy elements from Hill 1179 and also provide fire support for the 38th Infantry attack. (See Sketch Map 11.)

On 24 July, D minus Two, the division sent out nine patrols ranging from squad to platoon size to deceive the enemy as to the real intention of the attacks. The following day, D minus One, a company-sized patrol from the 23rd US Regiment moved out up to within 200 yards of Hill 515 (Hill 525 on the old map) situated in the west section of the Punchbowl. After seizing Hill 515 at 1230 hours without meeting opposition, the company patrol returned friendly lines. The patrol was Company I of the 3rd Battalion.

Air and artillery pounded the enemy positions also on the 25th in preparation for the attack the next morning. 54 air sorties were directed against the objectives and 7,000 rounds of artillery were hurled on to the well-bunkered enemy positions.

At 0615 hours, 26 July, the 1st Battalion of the 38th US Infantry moved out from the positions in the vicinity of Hill 1001 north of Tuseo-san with "C" Company in the lead, in a dense morning fog, to take Taeu-san, then known to the American troops as "Fools Mountain." All the organic weapons of the 38th Infantry plus the Heavy Mortar Company of the 9th Infantry furnished the fire support, although poor visibility hampered. "A" and "B" Companies followed as they inched forward up the ridge east of the objective. The leading foot elements advanced slowly and met no resistance until 0930 hours, when the enemy opened up solid streams of automatic weapons fire from deep entrenchments and bunkers providing interlocking fields of fire. The attackers crawling up the sheer heights were alternately pinned down or driven back, but they attacked again and each time gained a little more ground as air and artillery fired in maximum support.
Meanwhile, I Company of the Netherlands Battalion attacking from the south to take Hill 1100 in support of the 1st Battalion was also halted and failed to make any farther gains after 1100 hours.

To the west, tanks from the 38th Regimental Tank Company and "A" Company of the 72nd Tank Battalion nailed thousands of rounds a carpet of steel against the sides of adjacent hills to prevent enemy reinforcements from the west. Eastward, the 23rd US Regiment also attacked to occupy its three objectives and met with heavy enemy resistance en route. At 1445 hours an airstrike was directed against an estimated NK battalion on Hill 1100. As evening
approached, plans were made to have the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry hold-up for the night near a ragged mass of rock east of Hill 1179. However, a tragic error forced the battalion to pull back from its hard won gains where it went into a perimeter defense. During air sorties, one of the aircraft released its napalm on "C" company, inflicting severe casualties.

The first day's action sketched the picture of the enemy defenses. He was determined to stay on Hill 1179 at all costs. The enemy had constructed a formidable fortress around there with plenty of ammunition stocks. His all-out resistance in face of terrific concentrations from all the supporting fire weapons including nine battalions of artillery indicated the fight for Taeu-san would be more difficult than first anticipated. That night, the skies were kept a flaming red as the artillery fire was intensified.

Mist again filled the air as dawn broke on the 27th. At 0600 hours, the attack was resumed with Company B of the 38th US Infantry jumping off first through the haze and streams of enemy tracers. Company B of the 9th US Infantry, and Companies A and C of the 38th Infantry closely followed behind the leading company. By 1000 hours the leading elements had advanced to the vicinity of a ridgeline, about half a kilometer east of Hill 1100, where they received a moderate volume of heavy machine guns fire. Despite encountering heavier fire barrage and dense mine fields as they inched closer to the objective Hill 1179 a little by little, the B Company troops continued to move up carrying flame throwers and preparing to assault on to the enemy positions. But, there made no farther advance, and bitter fighting raged throughout the day to take and hold Taeu-san.

Supported by tanks, Company C of the 23rd US Regiment, on the right, also jumped off at 0600 hours and had advanced closer to Hill 502 in the Punchbowl valley by 0815 hours without enemy contact and maneuvered westward by flanking through from the east.

In the meantime, that day, the 3rd Battalion of the 9th US Infantry reverted to the parental control at 1010 hours, remaining in the current positions, while the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Regiment which in turn moved to join the 1st Battalion at the same time. Remainder of the 9th Infantry (Colonel Edwin J. Messinger) continued to remain in Chang-ni southeast of Yanggu. The 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry relieved the 3rd Battalion on position at 1645 hours, while the latter battalion assembled in and around Naesimjon just behind the French Battalion positions.

At 1530 hours, a new attack began, this time with Company B of the 9th Infantry in the lead and elements of the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry
in support. Moving forward with the two "B" Companies of the 9th and 38th Regiments in a skirmishers line toward the ridge and Company A of the 38th Infantry flanking in a column to the right, the brave force inched upward. Suddenly the sun broke through the clouds, giving artillery and mortar observers a clear view of the enemy positions. The infantry surged forward, following the artillery bursts within 75 yards, throwing hand grenades and firing every available weapons.

By nightfall the inspired foot troops had battled to within 50 yards of the crest of a no-name hill east of Taeu-san and there they halted, digging in to wait until daylight for the final assault.

Eastward, meanwhile, Company C of the 23rd Infantry had been struggled to take Hill 1059 situated nearly two kilometers northeast of Hill 1179, and by nightfall its every effort to seize the hill was failed by the stubborn enemy resistance. The enemy, hanging onto Hill 1059 to keep open his supply route to Hill 1179, was apparently determined to stay there at all costs, taking a
advantage of rugged terrain feature. As a result, the company withdrew back and the 23rd US Regiment prepared plans to renew the attack the following day.

Friendly artillery harassed the enemy held-areas, Hill 1179 in particular and laid a protective screen for the advanced friendly units throughout the night.

On 28 July, the 38th US Regiment resumed the attack towards Hill 1179 at first light. Again, spearheaded by Company B of the 9th US Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry jumped off at 0500 hours to take the peak guarding the natural, east approach to Hill 1179. By 0830 hours leading elements had advanced 500 meters where they came under a heavy enemy barrage fire. Limited visibility due to fog and clouds hindered the operation. Nevertheless, under constant cover of close support fire, the attackers continued upward, thus finally occupying the hill, an intermediate objective, by the evening. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry arrived soon afterward and reinforced the ranks of the 1st Battalion for the night's vigil.

On the other hand, elements of the 23rd US Regiment reoccupied Hill 515 in the Punchbowl at 0830 hours, while other elements maneuvered into position from which to attack Hill 1059 from the east and northeast.

As the fanatic enemy persisted in his attempt to hold Hill 1179, equally determined Red odds held-out against every effort by the 23rd Infantry to take Hill 1059. Major General Ruffner ordered Colonel Adams to cover the occupied slopes with tank and artillery fire and also to prepare a renewed attack the following day.

The expected counterattack against the hill now held by the 38th Infantry came during the night of 28–29 July but the troops refused to yield and repulsed the NK Reds with heavy losses.
The 38th Infantry, reinforced by Company B of the 9th Infantry, spent the morning and early afternoon of 29 July in preparation for another attack on Hill 1179. That morning, the weather was marginal low ceilings and poor visibility, restricting close air support mission. In stead, murderous artillery concentrations were poured into the slopes.

After artillery preparation including precision registration on the enemy positions, "I" and "K" Companies of the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry struck out at 1600 hours in face of the enemy cross fire. They advanced against automatic and mortar fire securing a high point 800 yards east of Hill 1179 at 1720 hours and repulsed counterattacks by several enemy groups at 1745 hours. The assault was carried out with such vigor that the two attacking companies had reached the crest and seized Hill 1179 by the evening. This enemy's strongest fortress in the Punchbowl sector fell after some of the most intense, fierce offensive fighting the 2nd US Division had undergone in months. The fanatic Red hordes had to be dug out of their deep entrenchments and it was a slow, bloody battle, the enemy was pushed off suffering more than 2,000 casualties with the annihilation of one complete regiment and the crushing of another. The decimated 27th NK Division ran away to the north in confusion loosing the will to fight. (See Sketch Map 11.)

A nominally attempted-counterattack by the NK Communists, an estimated battalion in size, was completely disorganized, being frightened out of their senses, on the following morning, when a six battalion artillery TOT (time on target) slaughtered the enemy before he could get in range of the 38th US Regiment.

That day, the 30th, the 38th Infantry units continued the attack westward to clear the whole mountain and, by 1745 hours Hill 1179 was secured by the 3rd Battalion against moderate to light enemy resistance. The Netherlands Battalion had relieved the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry on the high ground 900 yards east of the hill. Thus, the enemy resistance was completely ceased by 1800 hours.

More than 115 tons of bombs had supported the attack on Taegu-san, in addition to a total of 74,823 rounds of artillery and more than 49,000 pounds of mortar.

This was the second battle for Taegu-san (Hill 1179), after the one fought by the 1st ROK Marine Regiment against the same enemy units during 8–11 July. Having this prominent hill in its hands firmly, the 2nd US Division was now in ready position to step on the ladder to the north up in an effort to occupy and control another hills and heights still overlooking the western portion of the Kansas Line, namely Hills 983, 940, and 773 which were now being used by
the enemy as observation posts. This specific chain of mountains would become famous later as "Bloody Ridge."

East of the Punchbowl

The 5th ROK Division: The first days of July 1951 found the 5th ROK Division defending and improving its positions along the Kansas Line in the eastmost sector of the X US Corps front. Under the command of Brigadier General Min Kee Shik, it had then the 16th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division under the operational control since 25 June 1951 in addition to the three assigned regiments, the 27th, 35th, and 36th. Neighboring with the 1st US Marine Division on the left and the Capital ROK Division on the right, the division held the high ground east of the Punchbowl with the command post at Songko-ri. Elements of the 35th, 36th, and 16th Regiments were on the main line of resistance, while troops of the 27th Regiment manned on the outpost line. The division units had been continued to improve field fortifications along the main line, sending out aggressive patrols from the positions on the Badger Line ever since mid-June 1951. There followed no significant actions except minor patrol clashes and some probing attacks on the outposts by the two opponents. For instance, on 3 July, light probing attack against the outpost positions of the 36th ROK Regiment in the vicinity of Hill 774, south of Puyon-dong, was repulsed without losses in the night.

On 6 July, 21st ROK Regiment was attached to the 5th ROK Division at 1130 hours, while the 16th ROK Regiment was reverted to the parental control effective at 1200 hours the same day. Furthermore, the division was ordered to assume the operational control of the 10th ROK Regiment upon its arrival at Wontong and employ the regiment to relieve the 21st ROK Regiment.

On 11 July, elements of the 21st ROK Regiment reoccupied Hill 1056 against no notable enemy resistance and established there a strong patrol base. The 3rd Battalion elements of the 21st ROK Infantry established blocking positions on the western slope of Hill 1031, after a brief engagement with an estimated enemy company near Hill 874 at 0600 hours, 14 July. That night they repulsed two enemy counterattacks. Elements on Hill 1056 received attacks by an estimated enemy company at 2300 hours the next day, lasting until 2325 hours when the enemy disengaged and withdrew.

On 16 July, the 10th ROK Regiment relieved the 21st ROK Regiment on position at 1200 hours. This was a prelude for relief of the 5th ROK Division
by the 8th ROK Division very shortly. But, the 27th ROK Regiment launched an attack at 0600 hours, 20 July, and reached the enemy defensive positions on Hill 924 northwest of Yalsal-lyong, where an estimated enemy company was emplaced behind a single apron barbed-wire fence with anti-personnel mine fields to the front of the force. The attacking elements were subjected to heavy enemy fire of all types of weapons including artillery. After directing artillery fire on the enemy the firely unit broke contact and returned to the lines at 1500 hours. Poor visibility due to the rain and coulds hampered the operation and observation of artillery fire.

The 35th and 36th Regiments were relieved by the 21st Regiment of the 8th ROK Division by 1600 hours, 20 July, while the 27th Regiment was relieved in position by the 16th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division the following day. Thus, the 5th ROK Division had turned its sector over to the 8th ROK Division by 1500 hours, 21 July, becoming corps reserve. Then the division and its subordinate units would remain in and around Hyon-ni until mid-August, when the 36th and 27th ROK Regiments were to take part in decisive attacks against various dominant hills held by the enemy in the vicinity of the Punchbowl.

The 8th ROK Division: With the 10th, 16th, and 21st Regiments under its command, the 8th ROK Division had been taken part in Communist guerrilla hunting operations in the Chirisan area and whereabouts since October 1950 until 19 May 1951 when it was ordered to move up the frontline. Facing onslaughts of the Red Chinese forces in human-wave tactics, the division was committed into the Pyongyang–Hongchon–Inje areas, carrying out primarily the security mission as a X US Corps reserve.

On 20 July, 1951, the division (less 16th Regiment), with Brigadier General Choi Yung Hee in command, began to relieve the 5th ROK Division on the Kansas Line on order. The 21st Regiment relieved the 35th and 36th ROK Regiments on the 20th, while the 10th Regiment merely adjusted its positions, returning to the parental division control. The 16th Regiment, releasing from the 5th Division control, had completed the relief of the 27th Regiment by 1200 hours, 21 July, taking up positions on the outpost line of resistance. Thus, the 8th ROK Division assumed the responsibility for the 5th ROK Division sector at 1500 hours 21 July.

Since then onward, facing the 27th and 12th NK Divisions, one time or another, the 8th ROK Division continued to conduct extensive patrolling actions, remaining in the same sector until the first week of August when it would participate in new, limited objective attacks against the Hills 445, 562, and 785 in the vicinity of the Nojon-ni area.
Section 6. The Eastern Front
(1 – 31 July 1951)

Late in May 1951, the I ROK Corps, with Major General Paik Sun Yup in command, had launched an offensive northward two divisions abreast in the remote east coast sector. The Capital ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Song Yo Chan, attacked with lighting speed on the left shoulder of the eastern front, while the 11th ROK Division, with Brigadier General Oh Duk Jun in command, pursued the fleeing enemy, advancing at will on the right shoulder. Thus, the corps had seized and secured the Hyangno-bong (Hill 1293) – Kansong line by the end of the month.

After halting its attacking momentum for a little while so as to maintain the balance of the advance line with the mid-eastern front, the 11th Division resumed the attack in the first week of June, seizing and organizing the main line of resistance along the Hill 1079–Kombong-nyon (Hill 911) line.

On 4 June, the Capital Division also renewed the attack against the enemy strong points on Hill 1019 (Sanmorigok-san) and Hill 940. As a result, it had occupied all the assigned objectives by 12 June and established a contact point at Hill 1019 with the adjacent 36th Regiment of the 5th ROK Division on the X Corps’ right flank.

Since then onward, the corps units were kept busy, primarily for consolidating and improving the defensive positions on the one hand and for conducting reconnaissance in force to the front on the other hand until late July.

Late in July, General Van Fleet ordered the X US and I ROK Corps to attack on and occupy numerous critical, high terrain features then held by the enemy in the vicinity of the Punchbowl. These hills were dominating the friendly positions on the Kansas Line. It was estimated at the time that the enemy had deployed six NK divisions plus a number of artillery pieces around the whole neighborhood of the Punchbowl.

General Paik held at the time an additional post of the UNC’s delegation to the armistice negotiations at Kaesong, and Brigadier General Chang Chang Kook, the Deputy Corps Commander, assumed the acting duty for General Paik while he was absent. Consequently, General Chang issued the attack orders based on General Van Fleet’s concept of operations to commence at 0800 hours, 27 July. The Capital Division would attack on the Hill 924–Hill 751 line, while
the 11th Division was to assault on and occupy the Hill 884–Hill 591 line. The 3rd ROK US Division, commanded by Brigadier General Paik Nam Kwon, would maintain the present northmost and eastmost positions along the east coast under the support of the naval gun fire.

The attacks, however, were forced to defer indefinitely because of the unprecedented spell of torrential rains lasting for weeks without a lull. The planned limited objective attacks would be executed in mid-August when the weather became clear.
CHAPTER III  LULL AND RENEWAL OF FIGHTING
(1 August - 30 September 1951)

Section 1. Initiating the Limited Objective Offensive
(17 August 1951)

The Battlefield Situation

During the month of August 1951, the ROK and UN allied ground forces maintained strong defensive positions along Lines Wyoming and Kansas, keeping up long range reconnaissance patrols and limited objective attacks from these positions. UNC air power also roamed up and down the lines attacking any targets that came into view, and was extensively employed to disrupt the enemy rear areas, thus inflicting considerable attrition on the Communist armies and their supplies.

In August the strength of all forces operating under the command of General Van Fleet, who was promoted to full general on 1 August, numbered 586,769 men at its peak. This figure included, in addition to 299,339 in the Eighth US Army proper, 357,430 from the ROK forces, the US Marines, the Fifth US Air Force personnel in Korea, and the other UNC contingents. By now the Colombian Battalion had arrived in Korea to join in the fighting against the Communist aggressors.

The enemy’s attitude was generally passive, up to now so far, except in the event of a strong UNC probing attack of his outpost line of resistance or a limited objective attack on key terrain feature, in which case enemy units frequently offered strong resistance or launched counterattacks. One of notable characteristics in the enemy’s defensive action was that he began an extensive effort in construction of heavy bunkers, underground supply centers, trenches, tunnels, and well protected artillery and mortar positions. In consequence, close air support became less remunerative and the enemy could stockpile supplies and equipment with the expectation of limited attrition. This type of defensive action further strengthened the July indications that the enemy had
changed from his usual mobile defense to a line type defense. This meant that the enemy was now following the UNC ground force strategy. Thus the pattern of the ground fighting was shifted from movement or manuever to a position warfare, resembling that of World War I.

This period also saw the birth of a new type patrol. The night ambush was initiated and soon became a normal activity, particularly during the period of comparative quiet. The enemy more preferred to launch attacks under cover of darkness and complete before dawn, thus attempting to escape from suffering more casualties by UNC's air attacks.

Taking the Initiative

In late July 1951, General Van Fleet wanted to probe the Communist defenses and keep them off balance, since the enemy had used the respite on the fighting front, while the cease-fire talks were in session, to build up his supplies and bring his combat units up to strength. General Van Fleet also wanted to sharpen the fighting edge of UNC troops by conducting offensive action, while improving his own defensive positions along the front by seizing dominant terrain which would remove sags in the line or threats to the UNC lines of communication.

Consequently, after a pause in operations during mid-summer the Eighth US Army Commander decided on a limited offensive with three objectives: First he intended to keep the Communists away from the Hwachon Reservoir, the source of Seoul's electric power; second, to protect the road and railway which ran north from Seoul to Chorwon, the pivot of the central and western fronts and also a base of the strategically important Iron Triangle area, and thirdly, as always, he wanted to inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy with UNC's firepower.

Accordingly, General Van Fleet ordered the X US Corps to make a limited-objective attack in the Punchbowl area in the east, while the IX US Corps in the mid-eastern sector was to attack and occupy several key terrain features more forward. The I US Corps units were ordered to initiate diversionary attacks in the Iron Triangle area and in the farther west.

As a result, however, due to the extraordinarily torrential rains, the newly initiated attacks in the X Corps sector were ended with the capture of Hill 1179, called Taeu-san, on the southwestern wall of the Punchbowl, by the 38th Regiment of the 2nd US Division during 26–39 July, as already described in detail in Section 5, Chapter II. Thus the heavy monsoon rains delayed the continuation of further attacks in the Punchbowl sector until 18 August when the improved
Lull and Renewal of Fighting

weather would permit to renew the fighting.

The I US Corps: Meanwhile, on the central front, the 3rd US Division launched a limited objective attack against Sobang-san (Hill 717), Turyu-bong and Pyong-gang in the Iron Triangle area on 1–4 August as also already covered in Section 3, Chapter II.

The diversionary raids by the 1st ROK Division, 1st British Commonwealth Division and 1st US Cavalry Division of the I US Corps on 4–8 August encountered little enemy opposition, but most of difficulties came from the swollen rivers and trencherous roads that greatly hampered unit maneuver and vehicle traffic.

The heavy summer rains of the area hit full stride on 4 August, when six inches of rain fell in a few hours and created a precarious position for the entire crops zone.

Notwithstanding, the planned attacks were began on 4 August. The subordinate units of these three divisions conducted strong assaults north and west of Line Wyoming toward objectives, Pick, Slam and Dig. For this purpose the 25th Canadian Brigade was placed under the command of the 1st US Cavalry Division on 3 August, with the role of holding defensive position in order to free the cavalry units for mobile operations north of the Imjin River.

Toward objective “Slam,” Operation Slam was conducted with aggressive raids in strength across the Imjin River, with troops of the 1st British Commonwealth Division crossing from the south and units of the 1st US Cavalry Division from the south.

In the 1st US Cavalry Division zone, the 5th Cavalry Regiment assumed the main effort in the attack. Spearheading the attack, the 1st Battalion of the regiment attacked through Hill 189, meeting sporadic enemy resistance, while, on its right, the 2nd Battalion advanced toward Hill 199 along a ridgeline just west of the Imjin River line, engaging with an estimated enemy company in strength enroute.

Elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 8th US Cavalry Regiment also advanced to the vicinity of Hill 202 east of the Imjin near Huksock-tong. The hill was a commanding terrain overlooking the Koyangdae and Nori Hill area. Another elements of the 8th Cavalry also attacked and occupied Hill 216 in Kai-dong nearly two kilometers northeast of Hill 202. The attack met only light opposition, but heavy rains hampered the operations.

All bridges were out along the main supply route, and much equipment was lost, simply by the huge amount of water that floated some items away. A few
cavalrymen were isolated by sudden barriers of water.

The run-off water was unusually fast down inclines and caused alarming rises of the streams to depths of 10 to 20 feet within a few hours. Such a sudden advance smashed the bridge, key MSR line across the Hantan River and briefly this severed the supply line to the regiments and other forward elements. The 8th US Engineer Battalion promptly planked over the railroad bridge nearby, which had withstood the flood, made connecting roads, and thus renewed the vital flow of supplies to the front.

And, the cavalry units in the western area of the Imjin River were ordered to the east bank of the river by darkness, 7 August, leaving a strong patrol base west of the river. On the following day, the 5th Cavalry relieved the 25th Canadian Brigade before 1100 hours and established positions along a line running from Hill 196 (Kumgul-san) to Hill 124 west and northwest of Chonggong-ni (Chonggok).

On the other hand, a company size raiding patrol of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment engaged an estimated 300 enemy in the vicinity of Hill 487 or Yawol-san, six kilometers north of Taegwang-ni, starting at 1100 hours on 7 August. Under cover of artillery fire the patrol attacked on the enemy-held hill, but received a counterattack by the enemy from the hill at 1500 hours. With the support of excellent airstrikes on the enemy position, it repulsed the enemy attack by 2015 hours.

On the following day, the cavalrymen in the vicinity of Hill 487 repulsed another enemy counterattack at 0415 hours. During the attack the friendly elements received 100 rounds of 105-mm. artillery and 150 rounds of 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortar fire. At 0730 hours, Company L passed through Company I and resumed the attack on Hill 487. By 0825, Company L had made very limited progress and was receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from the front and flanks. But due to the limited visibility Company L was ordered back to Company I positions, after directing artillery concentration fire on the enemy positions.

Thus, the cavalry attack was ended, largely due to the seasonal rains. As for the enemy reaction, even as the problems of the mud persisted, the Communists were showing renewed aggressiveness with patrols and defense against friendly patrols, which probed northwest in the direction of Sibyon-ni and to the north toward Chorwon. This meant that the enemy was building up his offensive strength near the Iron Triangle area.

During the ensuing period, action involving units generally of company size or less continued. The 5th Cavalry Regiment remained forward of the Imjin
River to conduct harassing actions. On 11 August, the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry was moved to Munsan, where it took over the security guard mission for the UNC's armistice negotiation delegation from the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry.

The first task of the newly activated 1st British Commonwealth Division was to take part in Operation Slam in close coordination with the 1st US Cavalry Division. In the plan, the 25th Canadian Brigade, less the 2nd RCR Battalion, was to attack and occupy positions along the east bank of the Imjin River, north of its junction with the Hantan River, as those positions were vacated by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment, while the rest of the Commonwealth division was to advance with, and protect the left flank of, the cavalry division in combined crossing of the Imjin River and an advance north of nearly six and a half kilometers.

Early on 4 August two battalions each from the 29th British and 28th Commonwealth Brigades crossed the Imjin River and began to move north and west, when the 5th US Cavalry was attacking on the right.

While the American cavalrymen encountered some resistance, the leading units of the Commonwealth forces crossed the river and had reached their objectives, about 6,500 yards distant, by 1600 hours.

In the 29th British Brigade area, the Belgian Battalion advanced to a line covering Hwasan-dong through Nopun-gol in the vicinity of Sami-chon at 1500 hours, 4 August, while the KSLI Battalion under the 28th Commonwealth Brigade secured the objective Slam, near Ochon, six and a half kilometers west of the Imjin River, at 1600 hours without meeting opposition.

It had planned that both brigades would withdraw on the following day; but torrential rain, which caused the Imjin River to rise to depth of 20 feet, dislocated the arrangements. Consequently the troops remained cut off north of the river until 6 August, and were supplied by air. They withdrew successfully just before dark on 6 August. On the 8th the 25th Canadian Brigade was reverted to the 1st Commonwealth Division and went into its reserve positions.

In the 1st ROK Division area, meanwhile, elements of the 11th Regiment attacked and occupied Hill 52 at 0400 hours, 5 August, while elements of the 12th Regiment attacked at 0300 hours, 5 August and advanced to the assigned objective area, encountering enemy resistance employing heavy automatic weapons and artillery fire. At 0600 hours, the Reconnaissance Company of the division occupied the area in the vicinity of Hill 237.

The 2nd Battalion of the 12th ROK Regiment continued to attack during the day and it dispersed an estimated two enemy platoons or more. It again
engaged with another enemy platoon in force near Hill 125 at 1030 hours. By 1230 hours, the leading elements had reached close to Hill 224, observing 600 to 800 enemy concentration in the vicinity of objective, the high ground in Saengchon-dong. Having accomplished the diversionary attack, the attacking units were ordered to return back to the original lines.

The IX US Corps: In early days of August, the IX US Corps was lined up its main line of resistance with the 2nd ROK Division, 24th US Division and 6th ROK Division, from left to right. The 7th US Division (with the Ethiopian Battalion attached) was still in corps reserve.
The mission of the corps ordered by General Van Fleet to launch limited attacks was to probe the enemy defenses and keep him off balance, thereby setting up strong outposts on favorable terrain features more forward. Such attacks were to commence on 2 August by the 24th US Division and the 2nd ROK Division in the main. The 6th ROK Division would continue to sending out aggressive patrols forward to divert the enemy attention.

The 24th US Division was to conduct a limited objective attack in zone to establish a strong outpost line of resistance on most favorable terrain along Line Utah and to continue occupation of key terrain features on Line Wyoming, while the 2nd ROK Division would attack primarily on Hill 734 (Hill 735 on new map) and its vicinity northeast of Mahyon-ni.

**The Attack on Hill 734:** Despite the wet weather, the 2nd ROK Division (commanded by Brigadier General Ham Byung Sun) started the attack at 0600 hours on 2 August with the Ranger Company in the lead. The Ranger Company rushed for the hill, a strong enemy hold, defended by elements of the 238th Regiment of the 89th CCF Division. The attackers soon fell into a bitter fighting with hand grenades on Hill 734 at 0930 hours, when elements of the 17th ROK Regiment also advanced to the same hill against resistance by an estimated company or more. But as of 1830 hours, the attacking elements had not attained the objective. Then, both the elements of the 17th ROK Regiment and Ranger Company disengaged and withdrew to a position south of the objective hill at 2100 hours without further action.

The attack was resumed at 0500, 3 August and secured Hill 734 at 1500 hours against the enemy resistance. As a result of the action, 156 enemy and two friendly were killed, and 61 friendly troops were wounded. During the period a patrol of the 31st ROK Regiment had engaged an estimated two enemy platoons near Hill 373 at 1120 hours, 3 August.

On 5 August, elements of the 17th ROK Infantry on Hill 734 engaged an enemy company from 0630 hours to 1330 hours at which time the enemy withdrew leaving 34 enemy dead.

A week later, on 14 August, the enemy counterattacked against Hill 734, but resulted in vain. 26 enemy dead were counted and an estimated additional 50 enemy were killed on the reverse slope of Hill 734 as the result of artillery fire.

For the 2nd ROK Division this limited attack was the first battle for Hill 734, and there would be the second one on 1–3 September for the defense of the hill.

**The Attack on Hills 462 and 819:** On the other hand, elements of the 2nd Regiment, 6th ROK Division had attacked toward Hill 462 in the vicinity of
the Bukhan River and advanced to about a kilometer short of the hill by 1250 hours, 14 August, where they received heavy volume of fire from an estimated one enemy battalion on Hill 462 which was continued until 1400 hours.

Another elements of the 7th Regiment also under the 6th ROK Division encountered a severe fighting at Hill 819, about three and a half kilometers north of Huihau-san (Hill 1179), remaining in contact until dark when the patrol began to withdraw to the main lines.

**The 24th US Division:** Under the command of Major General Bryan, the 24th US Infantry Division was now added more strength with the attachment of the newly arrived Colombian Battalion on 1 August, and held its main defenses on the center portion of the IX US Corps front. Adjoining with the 2nd ROK Division on its left and the 6th ROK Division on the right, the division defensive line was extended from Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san) toward southeast through Hill 736 to Hill 935. The forward positions of the division sector were defended by the 5th and 21st Infantry Regiments from left to right, while the 19th Infantry was in division reserve with a battalion-size patrol base in front of the 5th US Infantry.

On 1 August, the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry relieved the 3rd Battalion at 1100 hours, taking over a patrol base located along a rugged ridge line including Hill 797—Hill 634, northeast of Chokkun-san.

On the morning of 2 August, the division started a limited-objective attack as scheduled by the IX Corps orders. The attack was to be carried out by the 5th and 21st US Regiments. For the 24th US Division, the attacking objectives were nothing new since it had similar attacks against them and had occupied once and then had abandoned them during the first half of July, as already stated earlier in Section 4, Chapter II.

At 0400 hours, on the 2nd, elements of the 5th US Infantry jumped off and by 0710 hours had advanced to their objectives. Hill 567 situated southwest of Chu-dong, and Hill 449, south of Tari-dong. Elements of the 21st US Infantry also began the attack at 0430 hours toward high ground just west of Hill 1118 on the right. A company-size patrol of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, meanwhile, had advanced to its objective including Hill 689, Hill 752, and Hill 750 meeting no opposition.

The next day, the elements of the 5th US Infantry continued the attack toward the next objective Hill 461 north of Tari-dong at 0800, and secured it at 1500 hours without enemy resistance, while other elements made a diversionary effort toward Hill 682 southwest of Hill 696. The attackers on Hill 682 reported that enemy resistance was ceased by 1630 hours. 30 enemy dead were counted
plus 35 more were killed in estimate at a cost of 25 friendly wounded in action during the day. (See Sketch Map 12.)

Thus, the 24th US Division's attack was ended within two days, seizing all objectives easily. But at 2335 hours, 3 August an outpost of the 21st US Infantry in the vicinity of Hill 851 (Hugunto-ryong) withdrew because of heavy enemy fire from an estimated two CCF companies. Shortly after that the main line of resistance began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire which lasted until 0655 hours the following morning when the enemy withdrew. Friendly firepower had beaten the enemy heavily. The results were an estimated 50 enemy killed and 100 wounded.

On 6 August, all units on Line Utah except the 2nd Battalion of the 19th US Infantry began withdrawal on order to Line Wyoming at 0800 hours; the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry continued to maintain a strong patrol base on and around Hills 796 and 631 northeast of Hill 1073. And, on the following
day the 24th US Division was ordered to be relieved by the 7th US Division by 1800 hours, 9 August. The division was placed in corps reserve upon the relief, with its command post in the vicinity of Nongae on the west bank of the Chunchon Reservoir on 9 August.

The Defense of Hill 461: Hill 461 was situated north of Tari-dong three kilometers north of the friendly main lines in distance, and it was nicknamed by troops of the 3rd Battalion, 5th US Infantry Regiment as “Million Dollar Hill.” Its name was an indication of the cost rather than the value of the hill. Initially, the Eighth US Army did not want to occupy and hold the hill since to do so would form a bulge in the UNC’s ground defensive line. But it was valuable terrain to the enemy, and now selected as the objective of one of several limited objective attacks to keep the enemy off balance, capture prisoners, gain information, and prevent the enemy from crowding too close against the friendly main line of resistance.

Accordingly, the Eighth US Army instructed that the hill be captured. The order went through the corps to the 24th US Division, and then down to the 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Infantry Regiment.

Million Dollar Hill was prominent, and troops of the 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Infantry later named such a strange nickname because they realized that ammunition worth at least that much had burst in flame and flash upon its crest. To the Chinese Communists, the hill offered good observation of the 24th US Division’s line. In friendly hands, it dominated the main enemy supply route to the north.

The attack against Hill 461 by Companies I and L of the 3rd Battalion (commanded by Major Ernest H. Davis), 5th US Regiment, began on the morning of 2 August and lasted for two days, as already stated earlier. A worthwhile story to write more about hereunder is the gallant defensive action distinguished itself by Company K, which relieved the attacking companies after the hill fell into the friendly hands.

The relief was to begin on the evening of 3 August. Men of Company K started up the trail at 2100 hours with the 2nd Platoon (Lieutenant Wilbur C. Schaeffner) leading the first column. The platoon reached the crest of the hill an hour later.

1st Lieutenant Robert H. Hight, commanding the company, brought up the remainder of the company. The relief was completed shortly after first light the next day when Companies I and L moved back to reserve positions on the ridgeline just south of the hill.

Meanwhile, before dawn, the enemy was harassing the men of the 2nd Platoon when they were kept busy in preparing their own positions, since neither Company
L nor Company I had time to construct defenses. Before the men finished digging in the gun positions or their own foxholes, several mortar rounds fell on the area.

Then a Red Chinese suddenly threw a grenade at the machine-gun emplacement. The gunner and the two BAR men opened fire together and killed the enemy.

This action immediately drew fire from an enemy machine gun firing from the extremest tip of the ridge not more than 60 yards away. The two machine guns traded short bursts for about 40 minutes. The American defenders had only the ammunition they had carried up themselves.

When the morning came on 4 August, the company decided and organized a tight perimeter rather than outposts that might become isolated and surrounded.

Lieutenant Hight and Lieutenant Mack E. Magnum, artillery forward observer from Battery C, 555th Field Artillery Battalion, then planned and registered their protective concentration around their position.

The men put out trip flares and other warning devices around their area. Small arms ammunition, grenades, and other supplies were brought up by the Korean carrying parties throughout the day.

For night illumination there were on call artillery and mortar flares that were adjusted to illuminate the northern slope of the ridge, while the south side was to be illuminated by three 60-inch air-warning searchlights.

Just as the last light left the sky it began to rain, and the searchlights came on. The men were waiting quietly in the rain. Then, at 2115 hours, two flares went up in the valley. The Red Chinese were several hundred yards away and nearer the reserve units of the 3rd Battalion, which fired toward the area from which the trip flares came.

Within a few minutes the machine gun at the east end of the ridge opened fire and, at about the same time, a CCF group climbed up the steep side of the ridge against the center of the company's perimeter. Apparently the enemy had planned a three-pronged attack against the company.

The main action occurred at the eastern end of perimeter in the 2nd Platoon sector. A CCF group crawled up and threw sixty hand grenades at the platoon's men. The enemy attackers were so close and the ridge so narrow.

At this juncture, Sergeant Deckard and the two BAR men gathered up their grenades and crawled up to the ridgeline where they knelt side by side, peering at the enemy below them. In the heavy rain it was difficult to see more than a few yards. But they dropped grenades on the enemy whom they could hear crawling through the brush below them.
At the same time, the machine gunners and riflemen were aiming a heavy volume of fire across the tip of the ridge to keep the enemy from occupying area. The fire fight lasted about 20 minutes before the enemy moved back. The close action ended, although the enemy kept up steady rifle fire and long range supporting fire from machine guns located directly to the north. It was now close to 2200 hours, when there was loud, rumbling thunder. The rain fell steadily, slanted by a hard wind.

After a lull for half an hour or more, the action again flared up when the enemy attempted to sneak up to within 20 feet of the machine gun position. It was raining very hard at the time, causing the defenders more difficult to see or hear anything.

The Red Chinese fired a red flare that landed on the ground in front of the machine gun emplacement. The gunner set off a long burst, killing the enemy soldier who fired the red flare, but soon another Red Chinese pitched a grenade in the machine-gun pit.

This seriously wounded two gunners. The squad leader sent his assistant to take over the gun, but a grenade burst wounded him seriously. The squad leader Sergeant Deckard manned the machine gun himself since it held the critical point on the line and had to be kept in action.

Worse, members of the BAR teams with the machine gun were wounded. The squad leader called for the reserve squad to plug his line. Now, there were fire men, a brawling automatic rifle and the machine gun missing from his line.

The rain and the fighting increased in intensity at the same time. There were four heavy machine guns on the enemy position 400 or 500 yards to the north which were firing into the 2nd Platoon area. Another enemy machine gun on the eastern tip of the ridge kept up a heavy and steady fire. Added to the enemy fire about 40 enemy riflemen were firing at the 2nd Platoon, and grenade and mortar explosions were magnified by the rain. And, there were flares in the sky two thirds of the time during the heavy fighting.

Nevertheless, under Lieutenant Hight's leadership each man had confidence in the others and knew that when morning came, unless wounded, the man in the next hole would still be there.

Lieutenant Schaeffner asked by telephone for the special support squad. Lieutenant Hight, K Company Commander, dispatched eight men at once and asked for an increase in the 4.2-inch mortar fire. He also arranged to replace the machine gun with the one from the 3rd Platoon. The 2nd Platoon's fire fight continued until half an hour past midnight. This rate of fire had used up the original basic load of ammunition.
K Company Commander called the 3rd Battalion Commander, reporting him that he had the situation under control but that he needed more ammunition. The enemy’s second heavy assault ended before 0100 hours, 4 August, and the volume of the rain also slackened a little by this time but was coming down steadily. The enemy continued firing from a distance. At the end of two hours thereafter K Company had received neither the enemy’s next assault nor the ammunition.

Finally, an officer with several tanks stationed down near the road called the Company Commander, telling him that the KSC personnel carrying the ammunition had returned to the base of the hill after having been fired upon during the trip up. Then, Lieutenant Hight kept his platoon leaders informed the ammunition situation. Some of men had their ammunition in their guns.

To save the ammunition he had on Hill 461, the K Company Commander again called for the artillery and heavy mortars to lay down his final protective lines. The fire continued for an hour and a half until 0430 hours, when Lieutenant Hight called it off because the enemy’s fire had almost ceased. During this time the 4.2-inch mortars alone fired 2,165 rounds.

The rain ended soon after it began to get light on the morning of 5 August. The enemy activity was also over except for several groups that attempted to get back to recover some of their equipment. The American troops counted 26 Red Chinese in these groups and fired upon them with machine guns and mortars, killing seven and wounding others. They also counted 39 enemy bodies in front of their perimeter, and believed they had killed or wounded many others. Company K had suffered five men wounded from the action.

Late that afternoon the company was ordered to abandon Hill 461 that evening.

This fighting was a remarkable example of the successful conduct of a defense under a peculiar circumstance at this stage of the Korean War.

As a whole, limited-objective attacks that the Eighth US Army had taken up the initiative in late July and early August were resulted in unsuccessful than General Van Fleet had expected mainly due to the unusually heavy rains. Thus operations across the front throughout the first two weeks of August were hampered by rains, rising streams and rivers, and muddy roads, seriously imposing restrictions on transportation, artillery observation, and air operations.

Especially, such a raining situation worked a great hardship on the engineers, particularly in regard to bridges and roads which run paralleled to and a level with the many streams in the forward combat zone.

During the period, therefore, no remarkable actions took place. except in
the following areas.

On 8 August, the 65th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd US Division in the Iron Triangle sector launched a probing attack up to Pyonggang; while that same day, a probing patrol group of the 38th Regiment of the 2nd US Division engaged an estimated 150 enemy firmly entrenched on Hill 703 in the Punchbowl sector; and units of the 8th ROK Division in the eastern sector attacked and seized Hill 728, Hill 445, Hill 785, and Hill 562. Attack and counterattack back and forth for control of Hill 785 between the 8th ROK Division units and the enemy continued until 13 August when the hill remained in the friendly hands in the long run.

In the I ROK Corps sector, the 1st Infantry Regiment and Cavalry Regiment of the Capital ROK Division attacked on 14–15 August toward Hill 1031 northwest of Kosong-jae and Hill 924 respectively, but failed to dislodge the enemy from the hills.

There were also some displacements of units. On 7 August, the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Division was ordered to move one battalion (less Heavy Weapons Company) to Sangdong and Yongwol to assume a security role for the mining operations. Furthermore, the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st US Cavalry Division, was ordered to move to Munsan and relieve the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment for the security mission there.

Section 2. The Battles of the Punchbowl and Mundung-ni Sector
(18 August – 7 September 1951)

The Punchbowl

32 kilometers northeast of the Hwachon Reservoir or, about 40 kilometers north of Inje and also the same distance from the east coast, lay a circular valley known as the Punchbowl.

Situated near the zone boundary of the X US Corps and I ROK Corps, at the time its rim was very sharp all around the edges, rising abruptly to heights of 1,000 to 2,000 feet above the valley floor; and thickly wooded on every side. The Soyang River ran south in the valley to the east of the Punchbowl, and the west So-chon (river) and one of its tributaries separated the Punchbowl from
the next series of ridges.

The enemy, taking a full advantage of terrain features, was solidly entrenched on the rim with fortifications and well-armed with artillery and mortars. The enemy could observe the friendly main defenses and activity. Seizure of such enemy position on the commanding heights would lessen the threat of enemy attacks in that quarter, provide better observation, and straighten and shorten the UNC line.

Consequently, late in July, General Van Fleet decided to step up to a more active defense - - conduct of limited-objective attacks, particularly in the vicinity of the Punchbowl area, where much high ground still remained in enemy hands.

The first outcome of General Van Fleet's decision was that the 2nd US Division attacked and won a foothold on Taeu-san during the closing days of July. No further offensive action was attempted not because of the enemy reaction but because of the torrential rains.

Now, as the wet weather improved in mid-August, General Van Fleet decided to renew the attacks in the Punchbowl sector in an effort to get the enemy off commanding terrain features so as to secure the Kansas Line from the enemy threat.

For this end, however, much blood was to be spilled in the ensuing months to win control of this area. Efforts to take and hold such commanding ground near and around the Punchbowl area would meet bitter and bloody fighting, as the enemy had organized a strong fortified defensive line with screening positions out front - - a line the enemy meant to hold at all costs.

In fact, as the Korean War entered its second year, most of the extensive fighting took place in the vicinity of the Punchbowl and the Iron Triangle areas, with perhaps the most blood spilled in fighting to take, hold, and retake the hills and ridges that dominated the deep valley of the Punchbowl.

**Operation Creeper**

In mid-August, the Eighth US Army issued its operation orders to its corps: "(1) CG, X US Corps: Utilizing the 8th ROK Division and in close coordination with the I ROK Corps attack at date and time mutually agreed upon with CG, I ROK Corps to seize Hill 1031 and Hill 965; and (2) CG, I ROK Corps: Utilizing the Capital and 11th ROK Divisions and in close coordination with CG, X US Corps attack at date and time mutually agreed upon with CG, X US Corps to
Heartbreak Ridge from the northwest.
The Punchbowl area is at the upper left.

seize and hold a ridge line from Hill 924 to Hill 884.”

In addition, the 1st US Cavalry Division of the I US Corps was assigned to launch a diversionary attack in the west.

Based on these Eighth US Army orders, the respective corps had issued their own operation orders to the subordinate divisions as the gist written below.

**X US Corps:**

(1) Launches a coordinate attack on D-Day, H-Hour to seize Hill 983 and Hill 618, and simultaneously attack in conjunction with the I ROK Corps to seize high ground from Hill 965 to Hill 1031.
(2) 2nd US Division: One regiment from the 5th ROK division is attached to the 2nd US Division effective upon closing in the vicinity of Chisong-ni (eight kilometers northeast of Yanggu). Attack D-Day, H-Hour and seize Hill 983, and support the 7th ROK Division's attack by tank and artillery fire.

(3) 7th ROK Division: Attack D-Day, H-Hour and seize Hill 618, coordinating with the 2nd US Division. Use of the 5th ROK Regiment (minus one battalion) north of Line Kansas is authorized.

(4) 8th ROK Division: Employ minimum one regiment to attack D-Day, H-Hour and seize objective Hills 965–1031. Coordinate with the Capital ROK Division, and employ one regiment of the 5th ROK Division in the defense of Line Kansas in the sector.

(5) 5th ROK Division: Move one regiment to the location designated by the 8th ROK Division, and the regiment is attached to the 8th ROK Division upon arrival.

I ROK Corps:

(1) Attack on D-Day, H-Hour in conjunction with the X US Corps to seize a ridge line from north of Hill 1031 to Hill 884.

(2) Capital ROK Division: 26th Regiment attack on D-Day, H-Hour and seize high ground extending from Hill 924 southward to a kilometer in distance.

(3) 11th ROK Division: 9th ROK Regiment attack D-Day, H-Hour and seize Hill 591 and Hill 884.

(4) 3rd ROK Division: 22nd ROK Regiment execute a diversionary attack to the north and northwest from present positions at H minus six hours.

All units, directly related with the newly ordered attacks, immediately began to prepare and arrange in detail for impending operations. The 36th Infantry Regiment was detached from the 5th ROK Division and attached to the 2nd US Division effective 1200 hours, 16 August, and the boundary between the 7th ROK Division and the 2nd US Division in the X US Corps was changed effective 1800 hours, also on 16 August as follows: Hill 735 in the vicinity of Songgol-lyong—Hill 734—just east of Hill 478—Kong-kol—Tutayan. The 27th ROK Regiment of the 5th ROK Division was also attached for operational control of the 8th ROK Division at 0415 hours, 17 August. And, more earlier, the 81st ROK Artillery Battery was passed from the operational control of the 11th ROK Division to the Capital ROK Division effective 1200, 14 August.

The weather was marginal and friendly air forces were to provide the close support preferentially for the operations of the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps.

To sum up the Eighth Army's new operation concept, General Van Fleet had planned to improve the UNC's defensive positions by launching a series of limited objective attacks, while the Communist forces were attempting to fight delaying action at the truce tent front to gain time so as to reorganize and buildup their combat capabilities.

In other words, the X US and I ROK Corps in the eastern sector would fight
for terrain objectives nine to some eleven kilometers above the Kansas Line, among them J-shaped ridge, Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, and Yoke Ridge in the Punchbowl area, to drive enemy off the positions that favored an attack on the friendly main line of resistance on Line Kansas. In the east, the I US Corps was to strike northeastward to secure better ground more forward.

Grounded on these plans, the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps launched the offensive operations simultaneously on 18 August. Thus, ground action was focused again in the zone of the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps to the east. Both corps, the latter supported by gunfire from UNC's battleships lying off the east coast, attacked to the northeast and west of the Punchbowl, and other friendly forces on the western portion of line sent out aggressive raiding units and combat patrols to divert the enemy reserves. One noticeable fact was that the X US Corps and I ROK Corps offensives were carried out almost exclusively by the ROK units. But on the night of 27–28 August, when the 36th ROK
Regiment of the 5th ROK Division, then operating under the 2nd US Division’s control, found itself under a heavy enemy counterattack delivered against its newly captured hill mass named Bloody Ridge west of the Punchbowl, the 9th US Regiment of the 2nd US Division was committed. It was failed to recapture the lost ridge.

When he issued his operation orders, General Van Fleet had instructed the X US Corps Commander to use ROK units in order to develop their combat experiences. In consequence, Major General Byers of the X US Corps employed the 8th ROK Division to attack against J-shaped ridge in a coordination effort with the I ROK Corps, called “Operation Creeper,” while the 2nd US Division used the 36th ROK Regiment to launch an attack to seize a hill mass of Hills 983, 940 and 773. (See Sketch Map 13.)

The Attack on J Ridge
(18 – 26 August)

On 18 August, a limited objective attack, called “Operation Creeper,” designed to give UNC control of the Nam River Valley area, was initiated by units from the 11th and Capital ROK Divisions of the I ROK Corps and from the 8th ROK Division of the X US Corps. Objectives were a J-shaped ridge that lay northeast of the Punchbowl. The ridge was constituted with a chain of high heights including Hills 1031, 1056, 929, 981 and 840, from north down to south. Hill 1031 was little more than eight kilometers from the northeast rim of the Punchbowl and Hill 840 was situated on the southern position of the east rim.

These two hills were main objectives, both dominating terrain features of the J-shaped ridge line which ran generally perpendicular to and south of the Nam River.

Under the command of Major General Paik Sun Yup of the I ROK Corps, the 11th and Capital ROK Divisions began to attack at 0600 hours against Hill 884 and Hill 924 respectively from the east at 0500 hours, while the 8th ROK Division of the X US Corps struck north against the hook of the J-shaped ridge with Hill 1031 as its main objective. (See Sketch Map 14.)

The 9th Regiment of the 11th ROK Division attacked at 0800 hours and by 0900 hours had moved up to the eastern slope of Hill 591, while the 26th Regiment of the Capital ROK Division had reached the eastern slope of Hill 924 within two hours.

The 10th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division advanced against moderate resistance and at 1930 hours encountered anti-personnel mines and soon began
to receive small arms fire.

The 26th ROK Regiment continued the advance against stubborn resistance from well dug in enemy units, and at 1600 hours Hill 924 was seized. Then it received a counterattack at 1645 hours which was repulsed at 1850 hours. At 2000 hours, there followed another counterattack at 2000 hours, forcing the regiment to withdraw slightly before the counterattack was repulsed.

Meanwhile the 9th ROK Regiment had seized Hill 591 by 1200 hours and withdrew at dark to better positions.

During the night the 10th ROK Regiment was attacked by two enemy companies in strength but positions were restored by a counterattack by 2040 hours. It resumed the attack at 0600, 19 August to take Hill 1031, and by 2030 hours leading elements had attained the crest of Hill 1031 against determined

THE ATTACK ON J-RIDGE  (18–28 Augt 1951)
enemy resistance.

On 20 August, the 10th Regiment finally seized the objective Hill 1031 at 1115 hours with the support of artillery fire, while another elements advanced to the vicinity of Hill 965 against stubborn enemy resistance supported by artillery and mortar fire.

On the other hand, the 26th ROK Regiment still pushed forward against Hill 924, but it had gained little progress by 1550 hours, 20 August against strong resistance of well entrenched enemy. Some elements of the regiment had engaged in hand to hand combat and gained the eastern part of the crest by 2130 hours; the enemy still held greater heights on the western part of the crest.

The 26th ROK Regiment occupied Hill 924 at 1650 hours, 20 August, while the enemy in the vicinity was still offering resistance. The 9th Regiment on Hill 884 was attacked by an estimated two enemy battalions and was forced to withdraw approximately 1,500 yards.

On the night of 21–22 August the 10th ROK Regiment on Hill 1031 encountered a futile enemy attack and elements of the 16th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division attacked and seized Hill 965 at 1440, 23 August. But these elements, together with the elements of the 10th ROK Regiment were counterattacked at 2100 hours by an estimated 100 enemy and were driven off by 2300 hours.

On the following morning the 16th Regiment launched a counterattack and retook Hill 965 at 1010 hours.

Meanwhile, the 26th ROK Regiment had suffered 450 casualties by 2400 hours, 21 August for the current operations; 160 were suffered on 21 August. The regiment prepared to continue the attack at 0300 hours, 21 August to clear the enemy from positions west of Hill 924. The 3rd Battalion, which had been attacking the enemy on the northeast slope of Hill 924, now linked up with the rest of the regiment at 2030, 21 August.

The Cavalry Regiment of the Capital ROK Division was moved to the vicinity of Hill 924 in preparation for relief of the 26th Regiment by 23 August. And the 26th Regiment had completed clearing Hill 924 by 1630 hours, 22 August.

The Capital ROK Division counted the enemy losses from 17 to 22 August 712 killed and ten captured. Besides, the division captured 75 automatic weapons, 52 rifles and 9,000 grenades.

On 23 August, the Cavalry Regiment relieved the 26th Regiment on Hill 924 at 0600 hours but the relieved elements remained on the hill for the night.

On 24 August, the 1st Regiment of the Capital ROK Division attacked north at 1500 hours and took Hill 751 at 1630 hours without enemy resistance, while
the 9th Regiment of the 11th ROK Division attacked and occupied Hill 884, one of the main objectives of the operation, at 2030 hours the same day. The Communists’ resistance was negligible following an excellent airstrike. But soon followed a strong enemy counterattack forcing the friendly units to move off the hill. The 10th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division was continuing to improve its defensive positions in the vicinity of Hill 1031 at the time, and advance units north thereof adjusted positions to tie in with other elements of the I ROK Corps.

On 26th August, the 20th Regiment of the 11th ROK Division prepared to pass through elements of the 9th ROK Regiment and to attack on Hill 884 and Hill 591. Then, at 0610 hours, the next day, elements of the 20th Regiment began the attack southwest to Hill 884, and advanced to within 150 yards of the crest at 0900 hours against light to moderate opposition. At the same time, elements of the Cavalry ROK Regiment also attacked north for Hill 884 and advanced to within 100 yards of the crest at 0900 hours.

The Cavalry Regiment continued the attack to the north to seize Hill 884 in support of elements of the 11th ROK Division attacking from northeast and south. Finally the objective was taken by 1450 hours on the 27th. Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment halted its attack at 1130 hours when it moved up to within 150 yards of the crest while ten air sorties were directed on the objective. The attack was resumed at 1410 hours and the hill was taken at 1500 hours. That night, however, the regiment was counterattacked by an estimated four NK Communist battalions at 2215 hours. The regiment held the positions firmly and repelled the enemy attack with the aid of close in artillery support by the midnight.

Thus, by 28 August Operation Creeper was ended with the complete capture of “J-shaped Ridge.” Thereafter, the capital ROK Division units continued to attack farther to the west along the ridge against heavy resistance, and the 26th ROK Regiment units maintained positions on the western, northwestern and northern slopes of Hill 884, while some elements continued to attack to the northwest and took Hill 601 at 1510 hours, 29 August. Another elements also attacked and seized Hill 591 by 1450 hours, 29 August, driving the enemy to the north.

The division counted 232 enemy killed and 76 various weapons captured during this action. As of 1915 hours, 29 August, the regiment, reported that one round per minute of 120-mm. enemy mortar was falling on the friendly positions in the vicinity of Hill 884.

For the eleven-day fighting, the ROK forces met with stubborn resistance from elements of the 45th, 13th, and 2nd NK Divisions.
There is a significant lesson which might be worthwhile to note. When the friendly attacking troops reached their objectives on the ridge lines, they were not reinforced in time to withstand the enemy counterattacks that swiftly followed. The pattern of attack and counterattack without a decision continued until General Van Fleet visited the I ROK Corps command post and pointed out such a tactical mistake. In the next attempt the attackers were reinforced in time, seized the hook of the J-shaped ridge on 28 August and cleared the stem two days later.

At any rate, by 28 August, the major objectives of Operation Creeper were secured and the possession of the J Ridge provided protection for the friendly forces' supply route along the Soyang Valley, thus holding the dominating terrain from which enemy position and troop movement north and northwest of the Punchbowl could be observed.

The Initial Battle of Bloody Ridge
(18 - 29 August)

**Bloody Ridge:** There is always just one more hill to seize and keep the current positions secure in any war. It was more true in the Korean War-in particular. Around the Punchbowl, the hills seemed to be elbowing each other in their effort to look down into the hollow of the crater.

Another range of hills west of the Punchbowl, about four kilometers through six kilometers southwest of Hill 1179, called Taeu-san, became known as Bloody Ridge, from the price paid to win and hold it from the enemy. These hills were well organized for defense and stubbornly held by the NK Communist divisions.

Bloody Ridge was so named by "Stars and Stripes." Troops of the 9th Regiment of the 2nd US Division, fighting there, read stories of the action which, for security reasons, Star and Stripes did not clearly identify and wondered in what sector this bloody battle was raging.

The 2nd US Division units here met the fiercest opposition of the war, often finding themselves shoved off a ridge they had just occupied and having to fight their way back to it in a matter of hours. In one 24-hour stretch, the 2nd US Division threw as many as eleven assaults against a single ridge and still could not clear it of the enemy. But by 5 of September 1951 Bloody Ridge came under the friendly control and by the end of the month the Punchbowl itself was in the friendly hands to stay.

Bloody Ridge consists of three hills - -983, 940 and 773 - - and their connecting
ridges. Four razor-back ridges converge on the western extremity of Bloody Ridge to form Hill 983, a sharp and well-defined point and the highest peak of the ridge. To the east and separated from Hill 983 by a steep draw, the 1,100-yard-long center section of Bloody Ridge comes to a peak at Hill 940. Another thousand yards east of this peak is Hill 773 south of Piduk-kogae or Piduk Pass.

The enemy trenches on the ridge made it clear to air observers that Bloody Ridge had been fortified. The trenches connected many bunkers which the enemy had built strong enough to withstand artillery fire and air strikes. The larger ones sheltered as many as six men. Some protected small artillery pieces or mortars. Detection of enemy positions from the grounds was extremely difficult because the hills were partially wooded and enemy soldiers were very skillful with camouflage. (See Sketch Map 15.)
The planning and fighting for Bloody Ridge took place while armistice negotiations droned on at the Kaesong talks. This east-west ridge was considered a desirable terrain feature for purposes of observation, but from Eighth US Army's overall point of view it had little value. The battle for Bloody Ridge was one of several limited-objective attacks by which the Eighth US Army leaned against the enemy in order to prevent the enemy from leaning against it.

The first attack against the ridge was launched by the 36th ROK Regiment operating under the control of the 2nd US Division beginning on 18 August. But on the night of 27–28 August, when the regiment could not hold on its newly occupied hill mass of Bloody Ridge against an enemy counterattack, the 9th US Regiment was committed by the 2nd US Division. The second attack by the 9th US Infantry on the ridge at the end of August and the opening days of September also failed to dislodge the enemy, however. Whereupon a double envelopment of Bloody Ridge was executed by the 23rd and 38th US Regiments.

M4 tanks firing in support of the 2nd US Division, north of Pia-ri near Hill 773, 18 September 1951.
on 4 and 5 September while the 9th US Infantry continued its assault on the ridge itself. As a result, the ridge was finally fallen into the friendly hands after almost three weeks of bitter fighting since the commencement of the first attack on 18 August.

The First Battle (18–22 August): Major General Byers of the X US Corps was ordered by General Van Fleet to eliminate important enemy observation and outpost positions that directed heavy and accurate artillery fire upon the Kansas Line positions from the ridge, later called Bloody Ridge. General Byers was further directed to use ROK units in assault since General Van Fleet believed that the ROK troops needed experience to develop faith in their own abilities. In consequence, the 36th Regiment of the 5th ROK Division was attached by General Byers to the 2nd US Division effective 1200 hours, 16 August. The 2nd US Division in turn assigned the 36th ROK Regiment to attack and seize an east-west ridge with three peaks, Hills 983–940–773 which formed the crossbar of an H-shaped hill mass that overlooked the forward positions of the 2nd US Division, some three kilometers south of Hill 983 in distance.

In support of the attack, each of the 2nd US Divisions organic regiments was also given a mission. The 38th US Regiment, in addition to maintaining one battalion on Hill 1179 (Taeu-san), was to occupy two hills northeast of the ROK objectives from which it could support the ROK attack by fire and prevent enemy counterattack or reinforcements. The 23rd US Regiment was to launch a diversionary attack on Hill 1059 and send reinforced patrols across the Punchbowl. Air and artillery priority was given to the attacking ROK units.

Prior to D-Day, all available means of preparatory action were employed to weaken the enemy defenses. The night of 15–16 August, twenty-eight close support air sorties were flown in the 2nd US Division sector. Fighter bombers napalmed, rocketed and strafed enemy positions along the ridgeline dominated by the three objectives and one radar controlled B-26 dropped eight 500 pounds bombs to the rear of the three hills.

Meanwhile, as the 2nd US Division prepared the this new maneuver, Brigadier General George C. Stewart, who had served as Assistant Division Commander since 16 December 1950, left the division for rotation to the home country. Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner arrived to fill the vacated post.

The attack by the 36th ROK Regiment was set for 0600 hours, 18 August and the 2nd US Division air and artillery were ordered to do their utmost to soften the way for the attackers.

All the supporting fires of the 2nd US Division were utilized in the preassault softening up of the ROK regimental objectives on 17 and 18 August.
Thus, on the morning of 18 August, the same day that the attack against J Ridge had began in the northeast of the Punchbowl, the first attack for Bloody Ridge was all set to flare up beginning at 0600 hours.

Following a heavy volley of artillery preparation fire for half an hour-long, the 36th ROK Regiment jumped off at 0630 hours with two battalions abreast; the 3rd Battalion moved out from an area about two kilometers north of Changpyong-ni toward Hill 983 on the left, while the 2nd Battalion attacked from Worun-ni to take Hills 940 and 773 on the center and right. They met only light resistance in the initial stage of the attack. But at 1000 hours, the attackers were under small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from the enemy on Hill 983. Nevertheless they continued the attack against an enemy dug in and well-supported by artillery and had reached within a little more than a half kilometer from the crest of Hill 983 by 1730 hours, while the 2nd Battalion elements were in position short of Hill 773.

The enemy reaction grew more fierce as the attackers closed in onto the objective hills and the enemy fire became so intense. The 36th ROK Regiment reported to the 2nd US Division it had planned a night attack. Major General Ruffner, the 2nd US Division Commander alerted the 9th US Infantry to be ready to move out and hold the hills if the ROK regiment succeeded in taking them.

On the other hand the 23rd US Infantry, making a diversionary attack in the east, met heavy resistance and, although Company G succeeded in securing the heights of Hill 1059, Company E was forced to pull back after being subjected to an intense artillery barrage. The 38th US Infantry occupied its objectives on the high ground northeast of the ROK objectives and immediately had its fire support team in action.

Back in the ROK regimental sector, the 2nd Battalion attacked in the night pressing with determination and by 0350 hours the early next morning had seized the high ground within a few hundred yards of Hill 983. The remainder of the regiment, which had been remained for the night 500 yards south of Hill 983 and Hill 773, continued the attack to gain these two hills at 0630, 19 August. But they had to climb up the hills inch by inch due to the enemy mine fields and stubborn resistance of an estimated three enemy companies in the vicinity of Hill 940, and one more enemy company near the western slope of Hill 983.

Enemy defensive strength obviously improved during the summer respite. The assaults were continued doggedly the second day and in face of intense enemy fire the ROK attackers inched forward to within 50 meters of the crest
of Hill 940 and within 200 meters of the crest of Hills 983 and 773. The 38th US Regiment, supporting the ROK attackes by fire, came under heavy artillery and mortar fire during the period but held its positions.

On 20 August, the third day, the two ROK attacking battalions resumed the attack at 0600 hours, and advanced to the vicinity of the crest of Hill 940 and Hill 773, still being in bitter action with an estimated two enemy battalions disposed between Hill 983 and Hill 773. Other elements made only minor gains up the south slope of Hill 983.

After repeated assaults the 2nd Battalion finally had seized and secured Hill 773 by 1600 hours. That night the ROK troops repulsed a counterattack attempted by an estimated enemy company between 2100 hours and 0200 hours.

21 August witnessed the 36th ROK Regimental units hurling themselves up
the crest of Hill 940, thus occupying the hill. The most bloody fighting was waged on Hill 983 on 22 August when the 3rd Battalion assaulted onto the crest in a desperate effort. The critical terrain finally fell into the friendly hands that afternoon.

Thus, after five days of repeated frontal assaults, the 36th ROK Regiment took one of the most critical terrain features in the Punchbowl sector. The enemy forces were the 12th NK Division under V NK Corps on and around Hill 983 and the 14th Regiment of the 27th NK Division under the II NK Corps.

To make remark in one word, the ridge of Hills 983, 940 and 773 was bloody ridge for the troops of the 36th ROK Regiment also, although such a peculiar name as “Bloody Ridge” was yet given by anyone at the time. During the whole period of the fighting there the ROK regiment had taken a toll of 62 Communist prisoners in addition to 1,250 enemy killed. Moreover, large stores of weapons, ammunition and supplies were also captured. The friendly cost was also dear. The regimental casualties counted 139 killed, 894 wounded and 200 missing in action.

The Second Battle (23–29 August): On 22 August the 36th ROK Regiment won control of the bloody battle ridge as a result of repeated, inch-by-inch assault, and it had used up nearly all of its ammunition on hand.

That day, Colonel Rupert D. Graves, Chief of Staff of the 2nd US Division, who was serving as Major General Ruffner’s personal representative with the attached 36th ROK Regiment, reported to the 2nd US Division Commander that a determined counterattack by the enemy might succeed, for the ROK regiment was short of food and munition. Immediately, the 38th US Regiment was alerted to send reinforcements.

The night of 22–23 August passed without incident and the 2nd US Division made plans to exploit the success of the 36th Regiment by having it continue forward and capture three hills just north of it newly won positions. Designated Objectives A, B and C were a continuation of the sharp hill masses which dominated the area north of the Kansas Line.

As a result, elements of the 36th ROK Regiment renewed an attack toward the new objectives at 1000 hours, 23 August, but proceeded slowly for the next two days with the enemy resisting with all his available forces and employing his artillery to the maximum. As the ROK elements moved forward, meanwhile, the regiments of the 2nd US Division all sent out patrols which met light contact.

Then, on 24 August, the enemy counterattacked in a regiment strength checking the friendly attack. At the same time, other enemy units struck at patrols of the 38th US Regiment and engaged the 2nd US Division units on Hill
1059 and the surrounding area.

As the situation became worse, the ROK attackers were ordered to concentrate their effort on Objective C, an unnumbered hill north of the ridgeline connecting Hills 940 and 773. The 9th US Regiments, meanwhile, moved out and established contact with the 36th ROK Regiment on the southwest of slope of Hill 983 and the 38th US Regiment did the same near the crest of Hill 773.

The next day, 25 August, was relatively quiet except the 36th ROK Regiment was continuing to press against objective C but without success.

The quiet was broken that night when two NK Communist battalions struck at Hill 983 at 1245 hours, 26 August from the north while other company-sized elements executed an enveloping maneuver on the height. The Communist attacks were accompanied by assaults of other enemy units which installed themselves on the saddle between Hill 940 and Hill 983 from which they put heavy pressure onto the ROK defenders on Hill 940. Thus the enemy had penetrated between elements of the 36th ROK Regiment by 0600 hours but the friendly elements still could manage the enemy attack so far during the morning hours.

The 3rd Battalion was now relieved by the 1st Battalion, closing in an assembly area behind the line at 1315 hours. By noon of the 26th, Hill 983 was completely surrounded and 1500 hours those troops had not been killed or seriously wounded were forced off the hill.

On the other hand, Companies F and G of the 38th US Infantry were also under heavy enemy attack in their positions north of Pia-ri and were forced to pull back 1,000 meters south of the village where they were joined by Company E, dispatched forward from the Kansas Line for reinforcement.

The friendly forces immediately prepared counterattack plans to retake Hill 983. This time, the 9th US Regiment was given the mission to occupy and defend the Hill 983-940 ridge and was ordered to launch the counterattack in conjunction with the remaining elements of the 36th ROK Regiment which still held Hill 940. The 38th US Infantry was assigned to provide fire support to the ROK regiment who would move westward along the ridgeline extending between Hill 940 and Hill 983.

Some elements of the 9th US Infantry had already launched a probing attack against Hill 983, thus assaulting to within 1,000 meters of the hill by 2000 hours. They established a perimeter for the night and continued to contact exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire with the enemy throughout the night, while friendly artillery pieces were ceaselessly pounding a heavy volume of shells.

At 2250 hours, the 2nd Battalion of the 38th US Regiment was ordered to move to Hill 773 to bolster the ROK elements who had defended it successfully
against several enemy counterattacks during the daylight hours.

Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment of the 5th ROK Division arrived at Tokko-ri at 1700 hours, 27 August, coming under the 2nd US Division control effective 2400 hours.

On the morning of 27 August, the 9th US Infantry launched a determined attack toward Hill 983 and made only minor gains against stubborn enemy resistance throughout the day. That night artillery of the 2nd US Division unleashed the most intense artillery barrage of the war on the slopes of Hill 983 as more than 22,500 rounds were sent screaming into the hillside during the hours of darkness.

Meanwhile, during the early hours of 28 August, two companies of the 36th ROK Regiment on Hill 940 and Hill 773 became disorganized and scattered. The steadily mounting casualty list led to a decline in morale among the troops. The enemy counterattacked in force in the night. The 9th US Regiment, which had placed its 2nd Battalion in supporting positions on Hill 940, attempted without success to seize Hill 983, during which time elements of the 36th ROK Regiment broke and fled, spreading panic among the elements of the 9th US Infantry as well. The ROK elements had vacated their positions by 0350 hours, 28 August and approximately one battalion had been assembled in the vicinity of Worun-ni by 0700 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the 9th US Regiment also withdrew that night, going all the way back to Worun-ni.

On the 28th, the 3rd Battalion of the 9th US Infantry was ordered to attack at 0900 hours and retake the two hills vacated by the ROK units. As the 35th ROK Regiment had occupied blocking positions on the high ground and astride the mountain road running to the northward from Worun on the night of 27 August, the 36th ROK Regiment was ordered to return to the parent control effective 1000 hours, 28 August.

On 28 August, heavy rains turned the roads and trails leading to the battle area into rivers of mud. As a result, the 3rd Battalion of the 9th US Regiment could not jump off until 1300 hours. The battalion, attacking the long ridge from the east, failed to reach even the first objective, Hill 773. Faced with a surprise attack that night, it also fell back to Worun-ni. Thus, before the 1st Battalion made its first attack against the Blood Ridge hillmass, the friendly forces had captured the long ridgeline only to lose it again, hill by hill.

A terrific rain, which had fallen intermittently during the day, built up to a virtual flood that night as more than four inches of rain coursed down the hills, making roaring rivers out of the mountain streams.

The bloody fighting on the scarred hills continued during the following day and the 2nd US Division released the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry from the
Kansas Line to reinforce the other two battalions who had battered against the enemy positions. It was only a matter of time before the nickname of "Bloody Ridge" was known, not only to the weary, wet and bloody attackers, but to all back in the United States who read the news report of the gallant fighting here on the hill mass of Hills 983, 940, and 773 in the Punchbowl sector.

A Limited Advance of X US Corps

The deterioration of the situation on Bloody Ridge led General Byers of the X US Corps on 28 August to alter his approach and he decided upon a limited advance along the whole corps front. Plans were immediately drawn up and orders were issued for the limited offensive operations for all units in the X Corps, scheduling for 0600 hours, 31 August.

The X US Corps, by applying pressure over a broad front, intended to force the enemy to disperse his firepower and to halt the flow of reinforcements to Bloody Ridge. As a whole, the X US Corps's intention called for a limited offensive to the newly designated "Heys Line."

Political causes had a good deal to do with the renewal of action for the X US Corps late in August. Apparently the Communist forces had been given enough time to recuperate and reorganize from their crucial defeat in April through June 1951. Despite UNC's constant and consistently successful aerial effort to knockout the enemy's railways and bridges, to demolish marshaling yards and deny the roads to enemy traffic, supplies had been continued to flow down from Manchuria. Artillery activities of the Chinese Communist forces as well as the NK Communist forces were greatly increased, helping to slow all UNC's ground operations. Thus the enemy brought more and more supplies and troops forward from the rear, and had been building up forward defensive positions with ample firepower in support.

The recent battles, particularly on Bloody Ridge itself, had fully proved that the enemy had been greatly profited from the armistice negotiations. Needless to say it was one of the Communists' essential strategies from the beginning when they had proposed for the truce talks.

Meanwhile, the X US Corps rearranged divisional objectives along the corps front. Effective 1800 hours, 28 August, boundaries between the 8th ROK Division and the 1st US Marine Division, the 2nd US Division and the 1st US Marine Division, and the 2nd US Division and the 7th ROK Division were re-established. Further, the 1st US Marine Division was ordered on 28 August to relieve as early
as possible some elements of the 8th ROK Division in the assigned sector.

According to the X US Corps orders, the 5th ROK Division was assigned to seize the northwest rim of the Punchbowl and the 1st US Marine Division was given to take and secure the northeast rim. While the 2nd US Division would renew its efforts to capture Bloody Ridge, the 7th ROK Division was to attack and capture key terrain features west of the Bloody Ridge. (See Sketch Map 16.)

During the course of this new limited advance by the X US Corps, although the 1st US Marine Division and its attached 1st ROK Marine Regiment met little opposition on 31 August as they began their advance, the enemy forces stiffened the following day. Yet despite the increasing resistance the Marines were able to push forward and capture several key hills on the northern rim of the Punchbowl. By a stroke of good fortune, the III N K Corps was in the process of moving from the I ROK Corps front and of taking over the defense of this sector from
the II NK Corps. As the 2nd NK Division began the relief of the 1st NK Division, the Marines hit the latter's positions. By the time the relief was completed, in the opening days of September, the Marines had won control of Yoke Ridge, the northern lip of the Punchbowl.

**Flare-up Again on Bloody Ridge**

(30 August – 5 September)

Now, back again in the Bloody Ridge sector, the 2nd US Division's principal objective was a north-south hill mass extending three kilometers in length in the eastern portion of the division zone, and dominated by Hill 1242 (Kachil-bong), a roky, crag-covered peak, honeycombed with enemy bunkers. On the east, the 5th ROK and the 1st US Marine Divisions would push out to take the extension of the hill mass which, in their sectors, curved into the east-west ridge which lined the northern rim of the Punchbowl. In the new attack, the 2nd US Division front was greatly narrowed, excluding the Punchbowl from the division zone.

The attack plan called for the 9th US Regiment to assault and seize Hills 940 and 983 then move north and secure the 36th ROK Regiment's former objective C. The 23rd US Infantry would keep one battalion on the Kansas Line and hold two other battalions in reserve for commitment anywhere in the division zone. The 38th US Infantry was given the mission of seizing Hill 1243 (Kachil-bong or Hill 1242 on new map). All units began immediate preparations for the attack.

Supporting units were numerous during the entire Bloody Ridge battle. Included were four artillery battalions of the 2nd US Division; two additional battalions of medium artillery; one additional 105-mm. battalion; two heavy mortar companies; two regimental tank companies; and one company from a medium tank battalion. The fires of all these units were coordinated by the 2nd US Division Artillery Headquarters. (See Situation Map 1, Appendix IX.)

The First Step for Hill 773: On 30 August 9th US Regiment renewed its effort to retake Hills 940 and 983 in the early morning. A part of the 35th ROK Regiment also attacked to take Hill 773.

Making a frontal assault, the 9th US Infantry put the 1st and 2nd Battalions in the attack straight north against Hill 940, while the 3rd Battalion moved up onto Hill 773 but it became engaged with a large enemy force and in the ensuing firefight was forced back down the hill. The 3rd Battalion reorganized at Worun-ni
and then stepped off again to assault and take the crest of Hill 773. But again its effort failed.

Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions had reached within a few hundred yards of the crest of the ridgeline of Hill 983 before the enemy fire halted the attack. Casualties were heavy; Company A was reduced to half strength, one platoon leader was killed and the company commander and other platoon leaders were wounded. Lieutenant John H. Dunn took charge of the company. When the darkness fell on the scene, the entire "Bloody Ridge" was still in the enemy hands. The battalions attempted to take the western portion of the ridge but the attempt ended in vain due to fire from 1,000 enemy reinforcements. It had been a day of bitter battle with heavy casualties on both sides.

Both battalions were ordered by the regiment to withdraw as it became apparent that neither battalion would reach the objective by dark. During the withdrawal, seven artillery battalions fired a smoke mission as the infantrymen carried the wounded men down the hill. They had to leave the dead and much equipment behind.

Not until about 0400 hours, 31 August did the entire 1st Battalion (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gaylord M. Bishop) reassembled in the area it had occupied before the attack. After a two-or three-hour wait the battalion moved by trucks to an assembly area south of Worun-ni where to have two hours in which to reorganize before attacking another hill. It was foggy and unseasonably cold.

Eastward, the 38th US Infantry (commanded by Colonel Frank T. Mildren) girded itself for a new offensive. At the 2nd US Division command post Brigadier General Thomas E. De Shazo, commanding the division artillery, prepared to replace temporarily Major General Clark L. Ruffner, the Commanding General of the 2nd US Division. General Ruffner was ordered to a new post in Washington and would depart the first of September.

**The Second Step for Hill 773**: On the early morning of 31 August, the 9th US Regiment renewed the attack with the 1st Battalion launching first a new assault on Hill 773, this time from the east. Company C led the company columns.

At the eastern tip of the ridgeline, where Bloody Ridge ended at the road pass between Worun-ni and the Pia-ri Valley, Company C turned left and climbed toward the first knoll on the ridgeline leading toward Hill 773, the knoll was already in friendly hands, since the 38th Regiment had maintained an outpost there for several days.
As the attacking company columns were climbing up the ridge, an enemy machine gun suddenly commenced firing from a knoll 100 to 200 yards beyond the front of columns, setting off a blazing ten-minute fire fight. Lieutenant Orland Campisi, commanding Company C, and one of the platoon leaders suffered wounded in this first action. Upon learning of the situation by radio, Lieutenant Colonel Bishop ordered Company B to attack through the stalled Company C and continue up the ridge. At the same time he sent his S-2 Lieutenant Charles W. Mallard to take command of Company C and provide as much supporting fire as possible for the attacking company. Fog prevented the use of artillery firepower.

When the fog lifted occasionally, the supporting weapons shaddled up quickly and started up a volley of fire up the ridgeline. At the same time, assaulting men charged in all at once onto the crest where the enemy defenders were throwing hand grenades from their well-entrenched bunkers. Soon severe fighting ensued in close quarter. The riflemen dropped to the ground as the grenades rolled downhill toward them.

More and more grenades followed, but the enemy threw them so hard and they landed among the rear elements of the attackers. Despite heavy assaulting fire, grenades and an occasional burst of machine gun fire continued to come from the enemy bunkers.

Company B (commanded by Captain Edward G. Krzyowski) sent up three BAR teams to help the assaulting elements and to compensate for the loss of the machine gun support. The supporting weapons continued to fire at the enemy bunkers while riflemen tried to get close enough to use grenades effectively.

It was the hardest assault these attackers had ever experienced. They had to charge in inch-by-inch. It was now late in the afternoon, and Colonel Bishop ordered to his three rifle companies to establish a perimeter for the night.

The fog disappeared at dawn on 1 September. The 1st Battalion of the 9th US Regiment shifted Company A into the leading position for the attack and called for artillery fire to cover the ridgeline between Hills 773 and 940. Company C (now commanded by Lieutenant Charles W. Mallard) adjusted mortars and machine guns to fire at the objective.

Moving up by assaulting fire under this protection, the assault elements climbed up inch by inch, but a shower of enemy fire from the bunker positions had caused trouble on 31 August, again halted the attack.

When the forward men were suffering wounded, Lieutenant Elden K. Foulk, commanding Company A, started forward, leading another platoon to bolster the assault, enemy machine gun bullets struck his leg, wounding him seriously. Several other men were wounded at the same time. Thereupon, Colonel Bishop
decided to commit Company B again.

Company B worked up close enough to get grenades into the enemy bunker. After a five minute grenade fight, the men seized the bunker that had been blocking the 1st Battalion's attack.

The first action was over by 1000 hours, with the 1st Battalion holding the three prominent knolls on the ridgeline leading to the top of the hill. The highest point on the ridge, Hill 773, was the next prominent knoll. It was about 250 yards away at the hook end of a narrow ridgeline.

Hill 983, crest of Bloody Ridge.

At about 1400 hours, 1 September, Company B resumed the attack on the ridgeline. After attacking forward about a hundred yards, the leading elements came upon three enemy bunkers. Immediately, the enemy threw grenades and an enemy machine gun opened up fire from a position on Hill 940.

Company B had to pull back slightly, calling Company A to borrow a bazooka and several rounds of ammunition for it. It also got in touch with Company C and adjusted 60-mm. mortars to shell directly on the crest of Hill 773. This fire
kept the enemy partly neutralized while men of Company B, carrying the borrowed bazooka, crawled forward and silenced the first bunker. Then, other men crawled on and dropped grenades into the second bunker, while others worked into the third one, thus ending the enemy reaction there. Thereafter the men established a perimeter for the night.

Early next morning, 2 September, 156 replacements, including six officers, joined the 1st Battalion. A tank came into a position on the Worun-ni road from where it could fire at enemy positions on Hill 940.

Now it could direct effective use of the heavy mortars from an observation post on the crest. While massed fire on Hill 773, an artillery forward observer covered Hill 940 and air planes made strikes against the west end of Bloody Ridge. There was no attack on 2 September, however.

**Last Step for Hill 773:** Four fighter planes began to drop napalm bombs on the objective at 1030, 3 September. Another flight followed, this time dropping anti-personnel bombs equipped with proximity fuze. Then the planes made
strafing runs on the objective. As the planes cleared the area, artillery and mortar fire began to hit on Hill 773 and Hill 940.

Shortly after 1400 hours foot troops jumped off and soon came under heavy enemy fire from Hill 940. The assault elements reduced the first two bunkers but suffered so many casualties, mostly caused by grenades that came from enemy soldiers entrenched on the opposite side of the sharp edged ridge, only a few yards away. But the attackers moved up disregarding enemy grenades and fire.

Now, six men, carrying three flame throwers, came in the middle of the afternoon, arriving at Company C. The flame thrower teams and reserve platoon moved out at once. An enemy bullet pierced the pressure tank on one flame thrower, making it useless. The other two operators, however, crawled almost to the crest of the ridge and worked on the reverse slope of the ridge, forcing the enemy out.

At the same time, the rest of Company C continued around the curve of the enemy bunkers, destroying one bunker after another, thus finally seizing the very top of Hill 773.

Company A held Hill 773 facing the enemy on Hill 940, 1,000 yards to the west. Company C which numbered about 85 men at noon before the action commenced, now had only about 30 men. All the companies reorganized for the night. Captain Krzyozowski was killed by bullets from the enemy machine gun on Hill 940, when he had barely completed movement of his Company B into the positions vacated that afternoon by the other two companies. This left Lieutenant Lacaze of Company A and one other officer in charge of all the men who remained in the three companies of the 1st Battalion, 9th US Regiment. (See Sketch Map 17.)

**Fighting for Hills 940 and 983:** The next objectives were two remaining peaks on Bloody Ridge, Hills 983 and 940. The two heights were bare now. All vegetation had long since withered under the constant pounding of artillery and tank fire. Now only dusty, rock studded, brown silt remained.

Those who succeeded in grasping their way close to the enemy bunkers were greeted by the shower of black smoke and sharp steel as grenades were thrown down upon them. They tried again, circled, climbed, slid, suffered, rolled, crouched and grabbed upward only to meet again the murderous fire, the blast of mortar and shower of bullets and jagged fragments. The battle for Bloody Ridge was like that for days.

The 1st Battalion of the 9th US Regiment tried to reach the top on 1 September but never had a chance. It was the same on the 2nd, and on the 3rd finally gained Hill 773.
Hill 953 from the northwest. Its behind is Bloody Ridge (Hill 983).

Each day locked in struggle and each day stopped short of the crest which meant an end, at least temporarily, to the endless fight.

Then, on 4 September, air and artillery spread new destruction and havoc on the slopes of the blood-stained ridge. Constant pounding of shells, bursting of bombs, dropping of napalm, roar of rockets and strafing of airplane machine guns comprised the preparations for another assault upward on Hills 940 and 983.

But there was additional help for the 9th US Infantry this time. The 23rd US Infantry made ready to move around to the west and tackle the ridgeline stretching north from Hill 983 to Hill 778; Objective "N" was its name. Furthermore, the 38th US Infantry was also now in position to provide fire support and block reinforcements from the northeast, for on 4 September it moved westward and captured Hills 754 and 660 overlooking the main supply route north of Pia-ri.
All that planned for an all-out attack was in readiness as 4 September faded away.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 9th US Regiment moved out on 5 September to capture Hill 940. It was tough going but not to be compared with the previous, frustrating efforts. At 1400 hours, the troops of the 9th Infantry were on the crest without opposition. The enemy, those that remained alive, were fleeing to escape the trap. Over 500 of NK Red dead were strewn on the heights, surrounded by plenty of their ammunition and supplies. Later the enemy casualties were revealed, according to the 2nd US Division estimate, that during the period from 18 August to 5 September, 1,389 enemy were counted killed; 4,288 estimated killed under the attacks; an additional 9,422 had been badly wounded in the vain attempt to defend the hills; and 264 prisoners were taken. Thus the defense of Bloody Ridge had cost the enemy over 15,300 casualties. On the other hand, after almost three weeks of bloody fighting, the friendly forces had
won the ridge, suffering 326 killed, 2,032 wounded, and 414 missing in action during the same period. These friendly figures included the 2nd US Division and its attached units.

It was a bitter, fierce, and literally bloody battle. None can deny that the men of the 1st Battalion, 9th US Infantry Regiment, fought, bled, and died gallantly for the cause of freedom of mankind against the Communist aggressors on Bloody Ridge.

In the meantime, the supporting attack of the 23rd US Infantry proceeded equally as well as the 19th Infantry. By 1615 hours, 5 September, the 2nd Battalion, advancing under accurate and devastating fire from “B” and “C” Companies of the 72nd Tank Battalion, had secured Objective “N.” 15 minutes later the 1st Battalion was on the uppermost height of Hill 618, which blocked the northward curl of the main supply route west of Bloody Ridge and forced it to curve to the east.

The 9th US Infantry began moving out of the line on 6 September to reorganize, resupply and integrate replacements after the days of battle preceding the fall of Hill 940. The 23rd US Infantry moved up to relieve the 9th Infantry, assuming responsibility for its sector. The 38th US Infantry continued organizing defensive positions along a ridge running north from Hill 1179 (Taeu-san) to Hill 1243 (Kachil-bong, now Hill 1242 on new map).

During the day, the 23rd Infantry moved out from Objective “N”, sending Company E to occupy Hill 785 and Company F to Hill 778, two peaks north-west and northeast from Objective “N,” respectively. Company I repulsed an enemy counterattack in company size at 2130 hours from its positions on Hill 618.

The 2nd US Division zone of responsibility was shifted westward 900 meters on 7 September, the 5th ROK Division taking over the hard-won ridgeline from the 38th US Regiment. To better control of the division, the 2nd Division command post moved to a valley north of Yanggu off the eastern tip of the Hwachon Reservoir. Patrols, meanwhile, reported contact with enemy groups on Hill 868, west of Hill 1118, and on Hill 702, the next high ground north of Hill 660 which was in the hands of the 38th US Infantry.

**Diversionary Efforts**

*(18 – 26 August)*

On 18 August, Operation Creeper was preceded by a diversionary attack by
the 22nd Infantry Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division in the I ROK Corps sector. Elements of the ROK regiment attacked northward and westward at 0300 hours, H minus six hours, and they advanced toward high ground northwest of Anho for six hours without encountering the enemy resistance until 0900 hours, but the Ranger Company of the 18th ROK Regiment had engaged with an enemy group at 0730 hours. Thereafter, the elements of the 22nd ROK Regiment suddenly encountered a heavy anti-personnel mine field and began to engage with an estimated enemy company at Hill 269 and drove them to the north at 1130 hours.

In the meantime, in the X US Corps sector, elements of the 3rd Regiment of the 7th ROK Division had secured Hills 550 and 556 by 0830 hours against moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire. Other elements were within 150 yards southwest of Hill 732 in moderate enemy contact and attempted to flank the position from the west. The Reconnaissance Company of the division was assaulting on Hill 537 at 0900 hours, meeting light resistance.

The 3rd ROK Regiment continued the attack against light to moderate enemy resistance and at 1430 hours elements secured Hill 883 northwest of Songhyon-ni while the Reconnaissance Company secured Hill 537 at 1830 hours.

At 2000 hours, the elements of 3rd ROK Regiment on Hill 883 received an enemy counterattack and were forced to withdraw 600 yards back. At 2030 hours the 3rd ROK Regiment on Hill 556 received a counterattack and was heavily engaged, but it drove off the enemy attempt after a short while. Elements of the 3rd Regiment who were forced to withdraw from Hill 883 by an enemy counterattack at 2000 hours, regained the hill at 0620, 19 August. Thus, on the second day of the attack, the 3rd ROK Regiment maintained positions on Hill 883 and Hill 556 (northwest of Sol-kogae or Hill 490), both still receiving small arms and automatic fire from undetermined number of enemy. Other elements continued that attack on Hill 732 southwest of Hill 883.

The 3rd Regiment secured Hill 732 firm by 2000 hours, 19 August, and then elements of the 5th ROK Regiment took over Hill 732 at 2100 hours and the relieved elements moved to assist other elements of the regiment in taking Hill 901 by an attack against the hill from the west. As of 0600 hours, 20 August they had advanced to the vicinity of eastmost slope of Hill 934 and were engaged with an enemy group.

During the third day of the attack the 3rd ROK Regiment maintained position on Hill 883, while other elements on Hill 732 found 115 enemy killed and took six prisoners. Other elements continued the attack and following effective air strikes they secured Hill 901 at 1830 hours, 20 August. But two units
on Hill 883 and Hill 901 each received a two-battalion sized-counterattack at 0600, 21 August and the elements on Hill 883 had withdrawn 500 yards to the southeast and the elements on Hill 901 had been forced off the crest and were holding positions 300 yards back from the crest. As of 0830 hours, 21 August the enemy attacks were contained and friendly units were counterattacking to regain the lost ground. At 0830 hours, 21 August an air observer reported a large enemy concentration 1,000 yards north of Hill 901, and air strikes were immediately called in for.

The 3rd ROK Regiment remained engaged with an estimated enemy four battalions during the rest of the day. Elements in the vicinity of Hill 883 were surrounded by the enemy at 1500 hours, but they could manage to break out by 1700 hours and at 2000 hours were consolidating positions on Hill 732. The remainder of the regiment withdrew from Hill 901 and at 2000 hours were consolidating positions on Hill 556. The enemy units continued to attack against Hills 732 and 556 at 2130 hours. A company of the 5th ROK Regiment was penetrated at 2110 hours by an estimated enemy battalion. Now on 22 August, the 3rd ROK Regimental elements on Hill 556 were attacked at 0400 by an enemy company and forced to withdraw at 0800 hours. Then they counterattacked and re-secured Hill 556 at 1300 hours, remaining in contact with the enemy until 2130 hours.

Hill 732 was again attacked at midnight of 22–23 August by an estimated enemy battalion and forced to withdraw at 1130 hours, the next day. Elements of the 3rd ROK Regiment in the south of Hill 732 were under continued pressure by an enemy battalion. They took up a counterattack and had resecured Hill 732 by 1945 hours. Meanwhile, an outpost a kilometer northwest of Hill 732 was forced to abandon at 1440 hours due to a heavy attack by an estimated enemy battalion.

By 2100 hours, 23 August, the 3rd ROK Regiment was relieved by the 8th ROK Regiment on position, and closed in on Line Kansas by 0400 hours, 24 August.

During the morning hours of 25 August, the units of the 7th ROK Division encountered only light, probing attacks, but elements of the 5th ROK Regiment in a reinforced-company strength attacked during early morning and reoccupied Hill 732 by 1300 hours against stubborn enemy resistance.

The 8th ROK Regimental elements and Tank Destroyer Battalion attacked at 0500 hours, 26 August and by 0845 hours had secured Hill 537 in the vicinity of Hill 534 against light resistance.

The 3rd and 5th ROK Regiments had encountered no notable activities during
the rest of the month except minor probing and light action.

The Battle for Yoke Ridge
(31 August – 3 September)

The 1st US Marine Division: On 26 August 1951, the 1st US Marine Division, which was then in X US Corps reserve since 16 July, was ordered to move back to the fighting line in order to initiate an offensive action in the immediate future. On that day the Marine regiments were disposed as follows: The 1st US Marine Regiment near Chogutan; the 5th US Marine Regiment near Inje; the 7th US Marine Regiment near Yanggu; and the 1st ROK Marine Regiment at Hangye. The 11th US Marine Regiment (minus), with the 9th Field Artillery Battalion, US Army, attached, constituted the 11th Marine Group, an element of the X Corps artillery.

The 5th and 7th US Marines and also the ROK Marines were alerted to move up to the combat areas south and west of the Punchbowl on 27 August, while the 1st US Marine Regiment was to remain in division reserve, and the 11th Marines reverted to parent control. Thus, the 1st US Marine Division was back in action again. But it would have to fight its first battles against the rain and the mud. Recent rains had turned roads into bogs, and fordable streams into torrents. Bridges were weakened by the raging current in the Soyang River, and landslides blocked the road everywhere.

Yoke Ridge: The new Marine zone of action, in the Punchbowl area, was as break and forbidding as any expanse of terrain in Korea. Dominating the Punchbowl from the north and blocking any movement out of it was “Yoke Ridge.” Looking somewhat like an alligator on the map, Hill 930 represented the snout. Hill 1000 was the head, and the body extended eastward through Hills 1026 and 924.

Two smaller hills, 702 and 602, spread off southeast and northeast respectively to the Soyang River and its unnamed tributary from the west. On the either side of Yoke Ridge were numerous sharp and narrow ridges. Some of the hills were wooded with enough scrub pine to afford concealment for outposts and bunkers. Altogether, it was an area eminently suited for defense.

The enemy defenders of this area were troops of the 6th Regiment of the 2nd NK Division, II NK Corps. Apparently they had plenty of supporting weapons, for positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines on Hill 680 were hit by an estimated 200 mortar and artillery rounds during daylight hours of the
Troops of the 5th US Marine Regiment slog through flooded area.

30th. The US Marines and the 1st ROK Marines had relieved elements of the 2nd US Division and 8th ROK Division on the Kansas Line after struggling hard against adverse circumstances. They had marched in a downpour on 27 August, and the rain had reached torrential proportions at 2100 hours when their vehicles finally arrived at the new area. The movement took until 0330 hours on the 28th to reach the new command post of the 7th Marines at Sohwa-ri, just southeast of the junction of the Soyang and a tributary from the east.

At any rate, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st ROK Marine Regiment were behind the line of departure on Hill 755 by 30 August, ready to attack in the morning. The 2nd Battalion, after relieving the French Battalion in place, remained on the Kansas Line.

Meanwhile, the elements of the 7th US Marines had completed the relief of elements of the 8th ROK Division on the hill mass about two and a half kilometers north of Tonpyong. These elements were first to come under fire as the enemy
sent over a few mortar rounds after dark on the 29th.

The 1st US Marine Division under Major General Gerald C. Thomas was assigned by the X Corps to take Objective Yoke, in conjunction with the attack on Bloody Ridge by the 2nd Division. In turn, the division ordered the 7th US and 1st ROK Marine Regiments to attack at 0600 hours on 31 August and seize a ridge-line on the Yoke running from Hill 930 on the west through Hills 1026 and 924 on the east. Objective 1, the hill mass about two and a half kilometers northeast of Tonpyong, was already occupied by the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines.

The 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines was to take Objective 2 east of Hill 924. The 1st ROK Marine Regiment would seize Objective 3, consisting of Hills 924 and 1026.

The Attack on Yoke Ridge: Priority of air support on 31 August was assigned to the two ROK Marine battalions. They jumped off in column against light to moderate resistance, with Hill 924 as their first objective. Mine fields gave them more trouble at first than scattered enemy mortar and machine gun fire. Forward movement and maneuver were resisted as the 1st Battalion passed through the 3rd Battalion at 1445 hours to continue the attack against stiffening resistance. (See Sketch Map 18.)

On the right the 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Marines also encountered light opposition in the morning which increased as the assault elements neared the objective. On the regimental right flank, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines supported the attack of the 3rd Battalion with mortar fire. Both the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines and the ROK Marines were within 1,000 yards of their objectives late in the afternoon when a halt was called for the day.

On 1 September, the ROK Marines resumed the attack and took heavy losses from enemy mines and mortars as well as machine guns fire from hidden bunkers. The converging attack made progress when one company of the 3rd Battalion of the ROK Marines drove within 200 meters of the top of Hill 924 at 1700 hours. But, it took four more hours of hard fighting to secure the objective. The evening the 2nd Battalion of the ROK Marines was relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Marines.

Throughout the day, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines slugged it out in the vicinity of Hill 702 with an enemy battalion. Four enemy counterattacks were launched from Hill 602. Two airstrikes helped to break up the main enemy attack, and the 11th US Marines (Colonel Custis Burton, Jr.) poured in a deadly concentration of artillery fire.

At midnight a surprise enemy counterattack forced the ROK Marines to with-
draw from the top of Hill 924 and a terrific fight ensured before the enemy was
in turn evicted shortly before noon.

After securing of Hill 924, the 2nd Battalion of the ROK Marines passed through
the 1st and 3rd Battalions to spearpoint the attack west toward Hill 1026.

The 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Marines repulsed an enemy counterattack
at 0700 hours, 2 September. Thereafter it swept the crest of Hill 602, securing
Objective 2. Three company-sized enemy counterattacks were repulsed before
the enemy withdrew to the north at 1500 hours.

The 2nd Battalion of the ROK Marines fought its way to a point within 800
yards of Hill 1026 before dusk. The ROK Marines continued the attack on the
morning of 3 September toward Hill 1026. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marines
was brought up from reserve to help cover a new sector that included Hill 924.

THE BATTLE FOR YOKE RIDGE (31 Aug-3 Sept 1951)

Sketch Map 18
The attack led by the 2nd ROK Battalion collided with a large-scale enemy counterattack. By midmorning, the ROK Marines had secured Objective 3, but they soon received an enemy counterattack at 1230 and a hot fight ensued for two hours before the enemy retreated.

The battle for the X Corps’ Objective Yoke was completed at 1800 on 3 September, when the 1st US Marine Division was in full possession of the Hays Line, dominating the entire northern rim of the Punchbowl. The Marine action had greatly assisted the 2nd US and 5th ROK Divisions then attacking in the west of the Marines.

The victory in the four-day battle of the Marines had not been brought cheaply. They suffered a total of 109 killed and 494 wounded in action including the ROK Marines. The enemy casualties were 656 counted killed and 40 prisoners in addition to large numbers of badly wounded in estimation.

Section 3. Limited Attacks in the Other Sectors
(18 August - 10 September 1951)

In the meantime, on 30 August 1951, in the IX US Corps sector, the 7th US Division was ordered to attack with two regiments abreast on 31 August to seize a mountain mass around Hill 851 or Hugunto-ryong to destroy enemy construction and strong points in the area, and to protect Line Wyoming against the enemy threat.

In the X US Corps sector, the 5th ROK Division was given the mission to attack at 0600 hours, 31 August in zone and seize and secure Objective W, Hill 1242 or Kachil-bong in coordination with the 2nd US Division’s attack on its left, while the 7th ROK Division was to attack also at the same time to occupy Objective S, a hill mass south of Hill 1024 and west of Kung-dong with main effort on Hill 901.

The 1st US Marine Division would attack in zone to seize and secure Objective Y, a hill mass extending from Hill 930 eastward to Hill 1026 and Hill 924. The 2nd US Division was to continue its efforts to take Bloody Ridge.

Thus, in general, units of all corps were to begin a series of small-scale attacks designed to destroy enemy outpost positions, but fierce fighting in considerably large-scale was to take place in the X US Corps sector.

As August faded into last day, the EUSAK maintained positions, probing enemy positions. The cease-fire negotiations continued, with no important
development which effected the UNC front.

During September 1951, battleline remained unchanged along the Wyoming and Kansas Lines, and patrol, reconnaissance in force, and limited-objective attacks accounted for the majority of the action. The highlights of the battle situation in September were as follows.

In the 1 US Corps, a reinforced regiment of the 3rd US Division participated in Operation Cleanup designed to clean up the enemy-held area about ten kilometers north of Chorwon, starting on 18 September. In the IX US Corps sector, Operation Cleaver was executed on 21 September, which called for four tank-infantry task forces to raid along the main road from Kumhwa to Pyonggang, Kumsong and Chuktae to destroy a maximum of enemy personnel and material.

On the other hand, the X US Corps had the heaviest fighting in the month when the battles were fought for key terrain features, including Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge. The enemy was solidly entrenched in well-fortified bunkers and tunnel complexes, and even 8-inch howitzer concentration frequently failed to neutralize them.

The 1 ROK Corps had light action and its units established a new defensive line approximately five kilometers forward of Line Kansas against practically no resistance.

The Battle in the Hill 461–Hill 851 Sector
(26 August – 4 September)

The 7th US Division: In the hot, humid days of late August 1951, the 7th US Division (with the Ethiopian Battalion attached) slashed viciously at the dug-in enemy. The ten-day fighting (from 26 August to 4 September) in which the division battled for five different hills (Hills 461, 596, 682, 752 and 851) accounted for some of the most bitter fighting in the gallant history of “the Bayonet Division”.

Despite heavy concentration of artillery, air strikes and rockets, the attacker scalped the steep objectives under a flaming hail of hand grenades and automatic weapons fire. The Beyonet infantrymen closed with the enemy and destroyed him with hand grenades and in hand-to-hand combat. Again, the Communists met their death at the point of the bayonet, the silent and deadly symbol of the 7th US Infantry Division. The detailed account of the fighting is as follows.

The First Attack: On 25 August 1951, the IX US Corps ordered the 7th US Division to seize and secure without delay the high ground about one and a half
The 31st US Field Artillery Battalion pours a hail of shells into the Communist positions facing the 7th US Division sector.

kilometers south of Hill 851 (Hugunto-ryong) and utilize it as a patrol base; maintain a minimum of total of one battalion on the current patrol base in the vicinity of Hill 1118; establish a patrol base with minimum of one battalion on Hill 461 not later than 27 August; maintain the current patrol base on Hill 739 with minimum of one battalion; and initiate immediately development of all roads capable of supplying units at these patrol bases.

At 0600 hours, 26 August, elements of the 17th US Regiment and the 32nd Regiment attacked for the objective south of Hill 851 and the other in Hudong-ni respectively. By 0800 hours, elements of the 17th Infantry were on Hill 541 and Hill 682, after dispersing small groups of enemy, while elements of the 32nd Infantry had reached Hill 567 without enemy contact.

By 1345 hours, elements of the 17th Infantry had secured the objective south of Hill 851, while the elements of the 32nd Infantry still continued the attack encountering the enemy opposition enroute.
The attack was continued the next day, and the attackers of the 32nd Infantry engaged with an estimated 100 enemy dug in. The casualties of the 32nd US Infantry for the night of 26–27 August in engagement in the vicinity of Tari-dong were nine killed and 72 wounded in action. The enemy losses were 46 killed. There was an estimated enemy battalion on Hill 461 and its surrounding heights. Results of the engagement near Hill 851 or Hugunto-ryong were four enemy killed counted and ten estimated killed.

The 32nd Regiment secured and maintained positions on Hill 752 on 28 August. A patrol composed of an infantry platoon and a tank platoon advanced to Hill 461 at 1120 hours when it received a shower of small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from the enemy on the hill. Thus the probing attacks of the 7th US Division were ended temporarily without much gains.

**The Second Attack:** The 7th US Division prepared to renew the attack to take and secure the same objectives, this time with the 17th and 31st Regiments abreast. The division opened its new command post at Puchon two kilometers south of Sobanggo-ri on 30 August. The 31st Infantry elements attacked the next morning and by 0915 hours had secured Hill 658, northwest of Chu-dong. The elements of the 17th Infantry also started the attack at the same time and by 1450 hours the right flank elements had seized the objective, Hill 851, against heavy enemy resistance. The left flank elements continued the attack for the high ground including Hill 461 and Hill 596 and by 1515 hours were 300–400 yards short of the objective and meeting heavy enemy resistance. At 1640 hours, elements south of Hill 596 repulsed the enemy counterattacks by groups of 200 enemy.

During the night no significant action was happened except that the 1st Battalion of the 17th US Infantry remained engaged until 2400 hours, while the elements of the 2nd Battalion of the regiment on Hill 851 were counterattacked. Only one company had secured Hill 851 and due to the enemy pressure and the inability to resupply, the company was ordered to withdraw at 2400 hours to the battalion perimeter which was established about two kilometers farther south.

The 17th Regiment resumed the attack on the morning of 1 September to secure Hills 462, 682 and 851. The left elements sent a tank platoon to the west flank of Hill 461 where it encountered two enemy platoons at 1000 hours and placed tank fire on the enemy and killed 30 Reds.

The 1st Battalion attacked against Hill 461 at 1340 hours and seized it at 1430 hours. The 2nd Battalion had also secured Hill 682 by 1445 hours. Right flank elements attacked onto Hill 851 at 1100 hours and seized it by 1135 hours after
an airstrike. Two platoons continued to the high ground northeast of Hill 851 where they engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1400 hours. At 1900 hours the zone of action was all quiet.

At the midnight the 2nd Battalion of the 31st US Infantry was attacked by an enemy company which built up to a battalion size, but the enemy was repulsed by 0225 hours, 2 September. 200 rounds of enemy mortar fire fell on the friendly positions at 0315 hours but diminished to sporadic fire by 0450 hours.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 17th US Infantry was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion on Hill 851 at 0615 hours, causing slight penetration of positions. The enemy was repulsed by a counterattack by 0935 hours. Thereafter the enemy attempted several futile counterattacks, only suffering his own casualties.

On 3 September, the enemy continued to attempt to retake the lost ground but all failed. And by 0700 hours, 4 September all enemy activity ceased in the
7th US Division zone. Thus the 7th US Division now completely occupied a new outpost line and held it firm as was ordered by the corps.

**Fighting for Hills 717 and 689**  
(9 – 10 September)

The 25th US Division: Late in August 1951, the 25th US Division (with the Turkish Brigade attached) was still defending in the middle of the Iron Triangle area under the command of Major General Ira P. Swift. In addition to its three organic regiments, the division had then the Turkish Brigade and the 34th Regiment (less 3rd Battalion) of the 24th US Division under its operational control.

Toward the closing days of August, the 25th US Division was released from the I US Corps control and attached to the IX US Corps effective at 1800 hours, 28 August.

Maintaining its main defensive positions firmly in the Iron Triangle area, the 25th US Division spent most of early days of September in sending out aggressive patrolling to develop the enemy movement.

The Turkish maintained positions along a line extending from Tongman-ni through Hato-dong to Hill 401; the 24th Regiment held positions on the high ground along Ugu-dong — Hill 495 on the center; and the 27th Regiment maintained main defenses along Hill 411 (Songjae-san) — Hill 604 (Kyeung-san) — Kam-bong-ni on the right. The 35th Regiment remained assembled behind, with some elements in the blocking positions on and around Hill 387 east of Kumhwa, while the 14th Regiment also remained assembled farther behind on the left. The forward units maintained patrol bases for forward of the main positions, thus screening enemy activity.

Shortly after the midnight of 6 September, the enemy attempted to raid such key patrol bases. A company each of the 35th US Regiment manned on Hill 717 (Sobang-san) and Hill 682 (Hill 689 on new map) or Turyu-bong received the enemy attacks at 0115 hours and 0030 hours, 7 September respectively. Then the company on Hill 682 or 689 received 20-minute enemy artillery barrage beginning at 0115 hours. But by 0200 hours the enemy attacks had diminished to sporadic fire and the enemy action increased later to an estimated battalion in strength.

The Turkish Brigade dispatched a company-size patrol at 0600 hours, and the other outposts manned by the elements of the 24th US Regiment in the vicinity of Paektun-ni and Kumgang-ni (or Kumgok) were attacked at 2330
hours, 6 September and both attacks were repulsed by 0440 hours the next morning.

On the 7th, the two companies of the 35th Regiment maintained the patrol bases on Hill 717 and Hill 682 at 1150 hours when the enemy in a battalion size disengaged. In the morning the remainder of the 3rd Battalion of the regiment departed the main line of resistance to reinforce the two companies at 0830 hours. At 0955 hours the 3rd Battalion (minus) engaged with an unknown number of enemy on Hill 432 and by 1130 hours had advanced to Hill 528 and established defensive positions. The two companies on Hill 717 and Hill 682 were ordered to withdraw at 1700 hours due to impressively increasing enemy pressure, and they joined the remainder of the battalion on Hill 528.

Recovery Operation for Friendly Personnel: On 8 September, the 25th US Division was ordered by the IX US Corps to assume operational control of the 19th Regiment (minus) of the 24th US Division, and, it was further ordered to attack on corps order on 9 September, utilizing the 19th US Infantry reinforced, into a general area of Hill 717 and Hill 682 to recover friendly personnel and equipment and to inflict maximum punishment and casualties on the enemy. The attack was to terminate on corps order approximately a duration of 48 hours.

In preparation for the new attack, the 2nd Battalion of the Turkish Brigade moved from Hill 430 to Hill 503. The Division Reconnaissance Company and a company of tanks advanced to the vicinity of Hill 326 along the Hantang River, where they fired on the suspected enemy positions. (See Sketch Map 19.)

On the other hand, the 2nd Battalion of the 27th US Infantry moved out from its assembly area and by 1900 hours had reached up the south slope of Hill 528. The 1st Battalion was relieved on the blocking position on Hill 387 by elements of the 14th US Regiment and at 1915 hours was enroute to join the 2nd Battalion on Hill 528. The 3rd Battalion, less K Company and elements of M Company remained assembled in Chigyong-dong. As of 1900 hours the casualties of the 3rd Battalion were 21 killed and 33 wounded.

The 1st Battalion of the 14th US Regiment relieved elements of the 35th Infantry at 1910 hours and occupied blocking positions around Hill 387, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalion still remained assembled in the rear.

On 9 September, the 2nd Battalion of the Turkish Brigade began the attack from Hill 503 at 0530 hours and advanced to Hill 438 at 0830 hours without enemy contact. Elements of the 24th Regiment in company size seized and secured Hill 351 at 0205 hours after dispersing the enemy on the hill. The 2nd Battalion of the regiment on Hill 528 met an unsuccessful enemy attack, while the 1st Battalion had closed position on Hill 432 by 2230 hours on the 8th.
Aid station housed in bunkers along the side of a mountain.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the attached 19th US Regiment closed the lines of departure in the vicinity of Chongyon-m at 0840, 9 September to advance to the assigned objective along a line including Turyu-bong or Hill 682 (Hill 689 on new map) and Yonggi-kogae.

The 2nd Battalion of the Turkish Brigade continued the attack and by 1300 hours had advanced to short of Hill 488 and was pursuing an estimated two enemy companies. It occupied Hill 466 at 2000 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the 35th Regiment continued the advance and encountered with an estimated 400 enemy on the ridge between Hill 717 and Hill 682 following an airstrike which was placed on the enemy at 1125 hours. At 1825 hours, the 2nd Battalion was on Hill 717 and was still in light contact. The 1st Battalion of the regiment advanced to the south of Turyu-bong and engaged with elements of 400 enemy. As of 2030 hours the battalion was about 1,500 yards short of Hill 682.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 19th US Infantry had secured Hill 387
or Pyoryu-bong (Hill 386 on new map) by 2000 hours, while the 2nd Battalion continued the attack and assisted elements of the 24th US Regiment in dispersing the enemy in the vicinity of Hill 432.

On the following day, 10 September, the 1st Battalion of the 35th US Infantry resumed the attack at 0610 hours toward Hill 682 with the 3rd Battalion following, while the 2nd Battalion was attacking toward Hill 259 (Hill 250 on new map) along the valley.

The 2nd Battalion of the Turkish Brigade screened the area from the southwest of Hill 717 to Hill 608 without enemy contact. A Company from the 1st Battalion of the 35th US Infantry was attached to the Turkish Brigade and occupied position on Hill 432.

The 1st Battalion of the 35th Infantry had secured Hill 682 by 0925 hours, and thereafter the 1st and 3rd Battalions started to return to the main line of

FIGHTING FOR HILLS 717 AND 689 (9-10 Sept 1951)

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**LEGEND**
- Main Attack
- Divergentary Attack
- Screening Area
- CCF Main Attack
- CCF Front
- Friendly Patrol Base
- Friendly Outpost

Sketch Map 19
resistance at approximately noon and by 1830 hours all elements had closed within the main line. (See Sketch Map 19.)

During the action 47 friendly bodies were recovered and four friendly missing in action were also recovered. As of 2130 hours, 10 September, the friendly casualties were 70 killed, 74 wounded and 41 missing. As for the enemy losses, 117 enemy were counted killed on Hill 717 and 250 enemy killed on Hill 682.

The 1st Battalion of the 19th US Infantry secured Hill 586 near Turyu-bong at 1115 hours and received 15 to 20 rounds of enemy artillery fire enroute. The 3rd Battalion had advanced to Hill 387 (Pyoryu-bong) by 1000 hours without enemy contact. By 1400 hours the 1st and 3rd Battalions started to withdraw to the main line of resistance while the 2nd Battalion covered the withdrawal from position on Hill 351 in Sangdong-ni.

With the completion of the action, the 19th US Regiment (minus) was reverted to parental control effective at 2015 hours, 11 September.

Fighting for Patrol Bases
(17 August – 6 September)

The 1st US Cavalry Division: During the second half of August 1951, the 1st US Cavalry Division (with Greek and Thai Battalions attached) under Brigadier General Thomas C. Herrold had maintained positions on the Wyoming Line, primarily conducting aggressive patrolling and probing enemy positions. In front of the division the enemy's prime targets and his main supply route lay generally beyond the range of friendly artillery, and they were protected by screening elements of platoon and company size.

On 17 August, a patrol base of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment was attacked by the enemy at 0435 hours. A counterattack, including tanks, defeated the enemy off with 31 Reds killed and 33 prisoners taken.

On the following day, two companies of the 8th US Cavalry launched an attack to take Hill 272 west of Omgogae and at 0715 hours the attacking elements found themselves involving in a heavy fighting with the Communists on the hill, but the objective was seized by 1540 hours after the third assault. The 7th US Cavalry furnished flank protection for the 8th Cavalry by dispatching a company to screen the area.

On 19 August, the 7th Cavalry set off a limited objective attack with K and L Companies accompanied by a tank platoon from the 70th Tank Battalion. Two of three objectives were taken, but the third position was left to enemy
forces after the attacks encountered well-dug in Communists.

During the morning of 23 August, "C" Company of the 8th Cavalry was in position and ready to retrieve tanks from an intended raiding mission which had been stopped by the excessive rainfall of 4 August. The operation recovered two M-32's and one M-39, all damaged by the enemy during the interval. That day, elements of the 5th US Cavalry in the south of Chunggojan west of the Imjin River received 400 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire during the period from 1700 to 1900 hours, while other elements in the vicinity of Nungkol, also west of the Imjin River, received 175 rounds.

The remaining days of August were highlighted by active patrolling action, preparing to meet any eventuality of an enemy offensive. The patrolling continued into the first days of September until a significant action, led by Company K of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment, took place on the night of 5–6 September 1951.

The Battle in the Nung-kol Vicinity: On the night of 5–6 September, "K" Company of the 5th Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division was attacked at first by an estimated 200 to 250 enemy. The company was located on a patrol base west of Nung-kol, approximately six and a half kilometers forward of the main line of resistance with the 2nd Platoon of "A" Company, 70 Tank Battalion. one section of 75-mm. recoilless rifle, two section of 81-mm. mortars, two sections of heavy machine guns from "M" Company. The company at the time was composed of a majority of replacements, many of whom had never participated in an all-out fight. The unit moved up to the patrol base on 2 September and promptly set about establishing defenses and stockpiling ammunition.

Just before midnight on 5 September, a series of sounds in the defensive barbed wire nets put "K" Company on an intense alert. Moments later a heavy barrage of artillery and mortars began raining down on the company position. When the fire was lifted several hundred Chinese Communists launched an attack on one of the platoon positions. During the remaining hours before dawn a series of attacks, against one platoon at a time, were continued.

At 0400 hours, 6 September, a new enemy force, estimated at 300, made the second and heaviest attack. Additional small units, of a diversionary nature, were thrown in to support this main attack, but all without success. By dawn the company had run desperately low ammunition, for the volume of the Red attackers had forced the expenditure of an average of four basic loads of ammunition. Just as daylight came, a daring action resupplied the company. A company jeep, loaded with ammunition, tore forth across the six and a half kilometer
distance over a heavily mined route. Enemy on both sides of the road fired upon 
the driver and two riders, all from Company K. The riders, armed with an 
automatic rifle and an M1, shot the enemy positions out along the route and 
their volume of fire enabled the loaded item to get through safely.

Relief was sped to the beleaguered patrol base with Company L moving 
forward, followed shortly by "I" Company. Bitter fighting continued throughout 
the morning. An air strike was called at 0830 hours and early afternoon by 1500 
hours four M-4 tanks and an M-16 half track had reached the scene.

The Red Chinese losses had been sustained a staggering rate, but each fallen 
enemy was quickly replaced and the enemy effort was continued at full fury 
despite the terrible losses of men.

The patrol base remained engaged with an estimated four CCF battalions until 
1730 hours at which time K Company was forced to withdraw. Under such 
fantasticism, the withdrawal was conducted under the cover of artillery fire. The 
cavalry elements had returned to the main line of resistance by 2000 hours 
intact.

A complete estimate of enemy casualties was credited with 500 killed and 
1,000 wounded. Air observers estimated twice these figures with the addition 
of the artillery inflicted casualties. Interrogation of the 27 prisoners taken further 
emphasized the importance of the engagement. Two CCF regiments had been 
engaged in the mission of annihilating the patrol base, and thus, the stand of 
the cavalrymen had broken the back of an enemy division in the outstanding 
feat.

The 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Cavalry suffered 13 killed, 62 wounded and 
three missing in action. Because of the extreme gallantry displayed by the cavalry 
unit, it was awarded an immediate commendation by General Ridgway, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the UN Command and later a unit citation.

Section 4. The Battles of the Mundung-ni and Soyang River Areas 
(13 – 30 September 1951)

Operation Plans Apache and Talons

The new limited advance by the X US Corps in August 1951 demonstrated
once again the reluctance of the enemy forces to part with any of the Communist-held ground. Taking excellent advantage of the terrain and constructing well placed-defenses, they had fought bitterly to hold on to their observation posts on Bloody Ridge. Only when the attack had been broadened to apply pressure at several points along the corps front, and the 2nd US Division had committed elements of all three of the division's regiments and only after enemy forces suffered tremendously severe casualties did the NK Communists concede and abandon the ridge, fleeing to their next defensive positions.

At any event the battle of Bloody Ridge had its after effects. During the battle General Van Fleet submitted several plans to General Ridgway recommending more ambitious advance to the north. As a result, on 29 August, he issued Operation Plan Apache, calling for a general advance in September by the IX and X US Corps and the I ROK Corps. However, the plan was cancelled on 8 September, as advantage to be gained by success of the operation, in the UN Command's judgement, did not compensate for probable friendly losses.

General Van Fleet also submitted another plan, called “Operation Talons,” to General Ridgway. This advance was to range from one and a half to almost 24 kilometers to remove the sag in the same general sector of the eastern front. General Ridgway had turned down more ambitious plans for an amphibious landing near Wonsan and deep advance into the northern Korea, but he had no objection to a modest ground offensive. Thus, preparations for Operation Talons, primarily designed to shorten UNC lines still further, continued until 5 September, when General Van Fleet took a close look at the final casualty totals of the Bloody Ridge battle. Since "Talons" would be on a much large-scale, General Van Fleet decided that the operation would not worth the probable cost in lives and material. Instead he planned to carry his limited advance on the UNC's right flank during the remainder of September, using "elbowing" tactics without any definite objective line assigned. Thereafter around 1 October he would shift the weight of Eighth US Army effort to the west, the zone belonging to the I US Corps, to launch an offensive operation around mid-October. If his I US Corps maneuver were successful, General Van Fleet would follow up with an amphibious operation on the east coast near Tongchon about halfway between EUSA'K's right flank and Wonsan. This would link up with a land advance north-east of Kumhwa.

The quick change in plans by General Van Fleet caught General Ridgway by surprise. While he withheld approval of the proposed amphibious landing, General Ridgway interposed no objection to the continuance of the limited-objective attacks for important terrain features.

As a result of this, General Van Fleet initiated a plan to seize and hold ground
The First Battle of Heartbreak Ridge
(13 – 28 September)

On 8 September 1951, acting swiftly, General Van Fleet issued a general directive to his corps commanders emphasizing limited-objective attacks, reconnaissance, and patrolling. He further instructed the same day the X US Corps to take another ridge north of Bloody Ridge in the Punchbowl area. Since the enemy opposite the X Corps had just sustained a heavy defeat on Bloody Ridge, General Van Fleet thought that immediate thrusts would keep the enemy off balance and would gain the new ridge lines before the Communists had a chance to recover.

Heartbreak Ridge: There is a narrow, rocky, mountain mass running north and south between the Mundung-ni Valley on the west and the Satae-ri Valley on the east. This hill mass ridge, with three main peaks of Hills 894, 931 and 851 dominating the two valleys, was later so named as "Heartbreak Ridge" by news correspondents covering the action. The south and east slopes were extremely steep. From these slopes the Punchbowl and Hill 1179 (Taeu-san) could be seen in the distance. Both prominent terrain features had already fallen into the friendly hands as already prescribed in detail earlier.

Hill 894 was the southern terminus which dominated the approach from Bloody Ridge, nearly five kilometers to the south; Hill 931, the highest peak in the ridge, lay 1,300 yards to the north; and 2,100 yards north of Hill 931 rose needlelike projection of Hill 851.

The enemy-held ridgeline was ideally suited for defense, as was the entire area. The most important of it was that extending from Hill 894 north to Hill 851. It was to be the scene of bitter battle for many months.

After fleeing from Bloody Ridge, the NK Reds had fallen back to well-fortified defense covering the approach ridge to Heartbreak Ridge. The respite between the end of the Bloody fighting in September and the assault on Heartbreak Ridge eight days later permitted the enemy to strengthen his defenses even further and to reinforce the units defending the ridge and its approaches. Due to a moderate slope to the west and north, the enemy supplies were moved up in position with a minimum amount of labor.

In the Mundung-ni Valley the 12th NK Division of the III NK Corps controlled
the hills on the western side of Suip-chon (river) and the 6th NK Division of
the same corps was responsible for the Heartbreak Ridge and Satae-ri Valley
sectors. The enemy troops were deeply entrenched in their well-camouflaged
bunkers. The heavy foliage of late summer made it doubly difficult to spot the
these strong points, but airstrikes and artillery destroyed all individual conceal-
ment when the fighting was raged there.

The Attack Plan: The 2nd US Division was assigned the main effort of dis-
lodging from Heartbreak Ridge the NK Communists who had dug themselves
in securely, with well-camouflaged bunkers and weapon emplacements.

Brigadier General Thomas E. De Shazo, the Acting Commander of the 2nd
US Division, ordered the 23rd Regiment to assume the main role in the attack. The 23rd Infantry, under Colonel James Y. Adams, would approach from the east across the Satae-ri Valley and cut Heartbreak Ridge between Hills 931 and 851. One battalion would then turn north to seize Hill 851 while a second would move south to capture Hills 931 and 894. As soon as Hill 894 came under the control of the 23rd Infantry, the 9th US Infantry, commanded by Colonel John M. Lynch, would attack and take Hill 728, 2,000 yards to the west and slightly south of Hill 894. (See Sketch Map 20.)

On 13 September the units of the 2nd US Division were ready to attack. The French Battalion had taken over the 38th Regiment on Hill 868 some three kilometers east of Hill 931, and the 38th Regiment was poised to attack on Hill 728 when the 23rd Infantry gained Hill 894. The 38th Infantry had taken Hill 868 after repeated, heavy assaults on it on 10–12 September, and it was now placed in division reserve.

The 37th US Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzer), under Lieutenant Colonel Linton S. Boatright, would provide direct support for the 23rd US Regiment, while the 503rd Field Artillery (155-mm. howitzer), 96th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzer), 38th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzer), and Battery C of the 780th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzer) were to give general support.

The battle for Heartbreak Ridge was to start on the morning of 13 September. Little did anyone know that in a short time the people of the free world would be well acquainted with the rugged peaks of “Heartbreak Ridge.”

The Initial Step: At 0530 hours, 13 September 1951, the artillery preparation began for thirty minutes and the guns pounded enemy positions on or Heartbreak Ridge. At 0600, Colonel Adams, the 23rd Regimental Commander, gave the signal to move out. The 3rd Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Virgil E. Graven, led the way in a column of companies onto Hill 931, central peaks of the three heights, followed by the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry F. Daniels.

As the assault troops moved north from Hill 702 up the Satae-ri Valley to reach the east-west spur ridge that would serve as the approach to Heartbreak Ridge, the enemy’s heavy artillery and mortar fire began to pour in on the two attacking battalions. Despite the growing casualties the 3rd Battalion continued to press on, and it ran into a hornet’s nest when it reached the east-west spur and headed up the hill to split the Heartbreak Ridge line.

Supported by artillery and mortar, the 1st Regiment of the 6th NK Division manned a series of concealed, mutually supporting bunkers that covered the
approach ridge with machine guns and small arms. For the 2nd US Division troops there loomed ahead to experience another "Bloody Ridge." Thus the first day's fighting brought little success.

The Second Step: Realizing he had underestimated the enemy's defensive capacity, Brigadier General De Shazo, the Acting Division Commander, now ordered Colonel Lynch on 14 September to commit his 9th Regiment against Hill 894 instead of attacking on Hill 728. He estimated that a successful seizure of Hill 894 could relieve some of the pressure on the 23rd Regiment.

On the 14th, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th US Infantry moved out at 0630 hours against Hill 894, supported by company B of the 72nd Tank Battalion, the Heavy Mortar Company, and a 155-mm. howitzer battalion. It had climbed to within 650 yards of the crest of Hill by 1700 hours but there it was stopped.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 23rd Infantry, meanwhile, attacked at 0900 hours and had succeeded in gaining the crest of the ridge which joined Hills 931 and 851 and at 1900 hours it set up defenses for the night.

The 9th Infantry jumped off again to gain Hill 894 at 0700 hours on the 15th. Fighting fiercely against determined enemy resistance, the regiment took the crest by 1445 hours and immediately sent strong forces down the ridgeline south and west from the peak and northeast toward Hill 931. Up to this point the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry had only eleven casualties, but the next two days cost it over 200 more as enemy counterattacked fiercely and repeatedly in a vain attempt to drive it off the crest of Hill 894.

On the other hand, elements of the 23rd Regiment made only minor gains against stubborn enemy resistance. Thus, possession of Hill 894 by the 9th Infantry failed to relieve the pressure on the 23rd Regiment as it sought again to cut the ridgeline between Hills 931 and 851. The French Battalion also launched an attack on Hill 841, a peak east across the main supply route, but met with no success.

On the 16th, 23rd Infantry renewed its attack. This time with two battalions abreast instead of using the column formation. Thus, while the 3rd Battalion attacked due west, the 2nd Battalion swung to the southwest and approached Hill 931 along another spur. Meanwhile, C Company of the 1st Battalion passed through Hill 894 and attempted to take Hill 931 from the south. But the three-point attack made little headway against heavy curtain of enemy fire. Since the enemy controlled the Mundung-ni Valley, the enemy could bring reinforcements and supplies to Heartbreak Ridge without much difficulty. The 6th NK Division sent its fresh 13th Regiment in to replace the 1st NK Regiment on 16 September.
Shortly after midnight, the enemy probed the positions of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment, and at 0300 hours the next morning two enemy companies struck at Company C from the north. Then an entire enemy battalion assaulted down from Hill 931, thus penetrating the company position. At 0730 hours, Company A pushed through Company C and together the two companies hit the wall of the enemy attackers, forcing them back and regaining the lost positions.

At 1300, 17 September, the enemy hurled another battalion-sized attack against the 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment. Immediately a devastating rain of artillery was called in. And Company A counterattacked again, pushing north onto the ridgeline. At the same time, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions struck again toward Hill 851, crawling their way through a heavy curtain of fire. When they neared 1,000 yards from the crest the night had fallen and all three battalions dug-in to hold their gains.

On 18 September, the 23rd Regiment renewed its efforts on the ridgeline and made only minor gains as two enemy regiments were now defending Heartbreak Ridge to the death. No amount of artillery fire could drive them from their bunkers on the rear slopes where they took refuge until the artillery lifted and the infantry assault began. All day it raged with every foot forward paid for in human life.

The 1st Battalion was within 500 meters of Hill 931 by nightfall when the enemy counterattacked again. Determined to hold, the 23rd Regiment called again on the superb artillery support to turn the enemy back.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, after dueling with the enemy all day, decided on a night attack against Hill 851. Under cover of darkness they moved forward as the artillery rolled ahead of them. Assaulting the enemy in his foxholes, terrifying him with flame throwers, the attackers crawled upward, and the lead elements of the 3rd Battalion seized the top of Hill 851 shortly after midnight.

But the capture was short lived. At 0100 hours, 19 September, an enemy company struck L Company on the crest. By 0200 hours, the enemy had grown to a battalion size and the defenders were forced to pull back.

The Third Step: On the 19th, Colonel Lynch recommended to the division to broad the attack. He suggested to let the 1st Battalion of his 9th Regiment move across the Mundung-ni Valley and capture Hills 867 and 1024, southwest of Hill 894, because this attack might cause the enemy to divert men and guns to block the attack as he assumed the 9th Infantry’s attack marked the beginning of an envelopment of Heartbreak from the west. But General De Shazo rejected the recommendation, since the General Byers, the X US Corps Com-
mander, had earlier directed that Hill 931 be given first priority.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, passing through the 3rd Battalion, counterattacked at 1230, 19 September to retake Hill 851, raging hand-to-hand fight all over the crest. And as the friendly and the foe grappled, a strong, reinforcing enemy descended and counterattacked in the early morning hours of the 20th.

On the other hand, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 9th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment renewed their attacks on the 19th. 37 fighter-bombers roared out of the sky and covered the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry as it struck at the hill mass connecting Hills 485 and 728 north of Imokchong on the west of main supply route, while the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment again pushed up the steep slope of Hill 931. But neither battalion was successful. The 3rd Battalion of the 9th Regiment sent out a patrol onto Hill 1024 but was returned before nightfall after meeting determined enemy defenses.

The 2nd US Division was now in contact with four NK Communist divisions on 20 September, when Major General Robert N. Young arrived to assume the command of the Indianhead Division.

General Young decided that Colonel Lynch's plan was sound, thus ordering the 9th Regiment to take Hills 867 and 1024. Colonel Lynch scheduled the attack on Hill 1024 for 23 September; Hill 867 would be seized after Hill 1024 fell.

In the meantime, General Van Fleet told General Byers that it would be desirable for the X US Corps to advance its western flank to bring the front line into phase with the IX US Corps. Thus, General Byers, on 22 September, ordered the 7th ROK Division to capture Hill 1142 (Paeksok-san), located about 2,000 yards northwest of Hill 1024.

The double-barreled attack upon Hills 1024 and 1142 (Paeksok-san) might well cause the enemy to take the threat seriously and lessen their capacity to resist on Heartbreak Ridge.

Action on the entire front of the 2nd US Division was relatively quieter on 21 September than it had been in weeks with the enemy putting up only a passive resistance to patrols sent out from the regiments.

On 22 September, the fighting flared up again as the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 23rd Infantry launched another coordinated attack on Hill 931. The 1st Battalion, under Major George H. Williams, Jr., had tried again from the south, while the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel, came in from the north. They made little success, however. The 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment also gained minor heading for Hill 728.

The 15th NK Regiment threw a strong counterattack against the 23rd US
Regiment during the night supported by heavy mortar concentration. Fighting fiercely, the 23rd Infantry repulsed the attack.

The two days of 22 and 23 September developed into a tragic act which helped to give further backing to the label “Heartbreak Ridge.” Desperate to end the continual fighting, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment, beginning at 0500 hours, again forced its way up the slopes of Hill 931, supported by fire of the 2nd Battalion. There it grappled with the enemy commencing first assault at 1000 hours on the 22nd and inflicted severe casualties, all the time moving upward. At 1400 hours, Company A found itself within 50 meters of the crest but was driven back. Again and again it tried to move upward under a heavy curtain of the enemy’s mortar, grenade, and bullet. A fourth assault met with failure, and the dauntless men moved out again and by sheer dint of courage the valor of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry finally reached the crest of Hill 931 at 1750 hours, 23 September in the long run. At 1950 hours everything was quiet. They repulsed a light enemy counterattack at 2145 hours but the seizure of Hill 931 short lived. At 0220 hours, 24 September, the 3rd Regiment of the 12th NK Division launched a fierce counterattack, assaulting onto the friendly positions in mass, hurling grenades and directing fire into the bunkers which they had built and knew so well. It was too much for the thinned, battle-weary men to resist and at 0330 hours the friendly forces were forced to withdraw from the hill. At 0445 hours, with A Company again in the lead, the 1st Battalion counterattacked. At 0610 hours, B and C Companies were engaged with 200 enemy pouring down from Hill 931 and the fighting continued throughout the day until nightfall when the friendly forces went into positions for the night. The results of the engagement were 250–300 enemy estimated killed.

The Fourth Step: In the meantime, across the Mundung-ni Valley, the diversionary attacks against Hills 1024 and 1142 by the 9th US Regiment and the 7th ROK Division made good progress. There the heart-rending story of frustration was repeated in the 9th US Infantry sector during the same two day period.

The 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment attacked at 0340, 23 September to take Hill 1024 but met with failure. It had advanced to within 600 yards southeast of the crest by 2200 hours but no farther advance was made and came under a heavy volume of mortar fire throughout the afternoon.

An attempt to take Hill 728 by elements of the 1st Battalion on the 24th, again bypassing Hill 931, had also failed. The 2nd Battalion of the regiment attacked on the left flank of the 23rd Regiment on 23–24 September but failed to gain due to stubborn enemy resistance. The action continued endlessly.
Lull and Renewal of Fighting

For eleven days since 13 September, the 23rd and 9th US Regiments had given every energy and reserve they had in order to take objectives. Time and again they had met with failure. Each day was like the last fight, moved upward and moved out, suffering casualties. But like all wars, there was no rest. The objective had to be taken.

On 25 September, the 9th and 23rd Regiments again moved into battle. The 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry attacked and led by Company A attacking from 800 meters below the peak had secured the crest by 1145 hours. The rest of battalion was on the hill by 1500 hours and four hours later was tied in with the units of the 7th ROK Division on the left. There counted 115 enemy dead on the hill and large quantities of small arms ammunition, hand grenades and some automatic weapons.

The 3rd Regiment of the 7th ROK Division, meanwhile, attacked at 0930 hours on the 25th and by 1300 hours had advanced to western slopes of Hill 1024, thus having a coordinated position with the 1st Battalion of the 9th US Regiment.

The 2nd Battalion of the 5th ROK Regiment attacked on the right flank of the regiment and by 1450 hours. 26 September, had gained Hill 1142 (Paeksoksan) against heavy enemy resistance, and by 1800 hours all enemy opposition had ceased.

Now, recognizing the threat to neighboring Hill 867, a key terrain feature dominating the valley to the north, the enemy quickly shifted the 3rd Regiment of the 6th NK Division from Heartbreak Ridge to defend the hill.

This enemy deployment, however, did not help the embattled 23rd US Regiment to capture Hill 931. Although the French Battalion replaced the 2nd Battalion and tried to advance south along the ridge line while the 2nd Battalion sought to press north toward the crest of Hill 931, the 15th NK Regiment fought them off on 26 September.

In the meantime, the Netherlands Battalion was moved from Chungju into the 2nd US Division area, arriving at Koindol, about four and a half kilometers south of Worun at 1500 hours, 23 September, whereupon came under the operational control of the division. It was further attached to the 38th US Regiment at the same time.

The Fifth Step: Back in the 23rd US Regiment, its tanks were able to advance far enough north in the Satae-ri Valley to hit direct fire against some of the enemy's bunkers covering the eastern approach to Heartbreak Ridge, but could not destroy the heavy mortars and machine guns that halted the 2nd US Division attack.
On the other hand, on Hill 1024, the 1st Battalion of the 9th US Regiment contained strong enemy counterattacks on the night of 26–27 September, while the 2nd Battalion repulsed equally strong attacks against Hill 582.

After almost two weeks of unsuccessful pounding at the enemy's defenses on Heartbreak, Colonel Adams told General Young on 26 September that it was "suicide" to continue adhering to the original plan. His own 23rd Regiment had already suffered over 950 casualties and the division total for the period was over 1,760 men. As Colonel Lynch of the 9th Regiment said the week before, Colonel Adams favored broadening the attack and dispersing the enemy's capability to resist on Heartbreak.

By 28 September General Byers and Young had come to agree with Colonel Adams and further assaults by the 23rd Regiment on Heartbreak were called off. Thus the peacemeal commitment of units was to be avoided from now on. Up to this point, the enemy's mortar fire had caused about 85 percent of the 2nd US Division's casualties. Therefore, the division now initiated a new plan to carry out shortly.

On the morning of 27 September, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment was relieved by the refitted 2nd Battalion, and the 38th US Regiment became engaged on the 27th for the first time since its return from reserve. Its 1st Battalion encountered enemy on the slopes of Hill 1052.

On the 28th the enemy made a concerted effort to recapture Hill 1024 from the 9th US Regiment. Thirteen separate counterattacks were made against the 1st Battalion but all were turned back with a heavy toll of casualties. Immediately afterward, a narrowing of the 2nd US Division front placed the peak in the zone of the 7th ROK Division and at 1300 hours, the ROK elements relieved the 1st Battalion of the 9th US Infantry on Hill 1024.

Activity elsewhere in the 2nd US Division sector on the 28th was relatively light compared to previous days but clearing weather permitted a record number of air sorties. 128 fighter aircraft were employed in the division sector with excellent results.

The Battle for Hill 1142
(28 September - 1 October)

In the 7th ROK Division sector, meanwhile, the 8th ROK Regiment on Hill 1142 (Paeksok-san) was attacked by an estimated two enemy battalions at 0400 hours, 28 September and was forced to withdraw about 200 yards south of the
crest by 0430 hours.

The 3rd and 8th Regiments of the 7th ROK Division were attached to the 8th ROK Division effective at 1700, 28 September, and the 7th ROK Division was relieved in place by the 8th ROK Division the same day. The 7th ROK Division was reverted to the ROK Army control effective 30 September and went to reserve for training.

The 8th ROK Regiment attacked at 1145 hours that day to regain Hill 1142 and immediately engaged in a hand grenade and automatic weapons battle which continued until 2400 hours when the enemy action diminished to sporadic small arms fire.

The results of the 7th ROK Division's operation against Hill 1142 from 24 to 27 September were 740 enemy killed, 52 prisoners taken, and 23 more enemy self-surrendered. Besides, it had captured countless enemy weapons including heavy and light machine guns and large quantities of ammunition.

Paeksok-san (Hill 1142).
The 1st Battalion of the 10th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division started an attack toward Hill 1142 at 0635, 29 September, and by 1900 hours it had reached within 50 yards of the top of Paekosok-san at which time the action ceased. Meanwhile, the 10th ROK Regiment had completed the relief of the 3rd and 8th ROK Regiments in place by 1045 hours, 29 September when the latter two regiments were reverted to the parent 7th ROK Division's command.

While the 16th and 21st ROK Regiments of the 8th ROK Division maintained positions with no enemy contact, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 10th ROK Regiment continued the attacks at 0700 hours on 30 September and had secured the whole southwest and southeast ridgeline of Paekosok-san (Hill 1142) by 2045 hours that night, but the peak was not yet secured.

At the time the 12th NK Division, with its command post at Hill 1220, had deployed its 1st, 2nd and 3rd Regiments in front of the 10th ROK Regiment and held strong fortified positions in deep depth along the ridgeline running between Hill 1142–Hill 1088–Hill 1220. Surrounded with Hills 1088, 1040, and 920, Hill 1142 was an ideal defensive terrain and the enemy was taking a full advantage of the height against the friendly attacks.

On the morning of 1 October, the 10th ROK Regiment resumed the attack on Hill 1142, supported by air strikes and a heavy volume of artillery concentration fire at 0600 hours. Despite stubborn enemy resistance the regiment fought gallantly, engaging in bitter hand to hand fighting throughout the morning hours. Finally, the regiment had completely seized and secured Paekosok-san by 1420 hours inflicting a toll of enemy casualties from 30 September to 1 October--111 enemy killed, 85 wounded and 28 prisoners taken.

Flare-up Again in the Soyang River Sector  
(11 – 20 September)

While the 2nd US Division was ordered by the X US Corps to attack and seize Heartbreak Ridge, the 1st US Marine Division, after the capture of Yoke Ridge north of the Punchbowl, was assigned to renew its limited advance to the north and take Hills 673, 749, and 812 situated in the west and southwest of the Soyang River line. There were more dominant hills such as Hill 1052 and Kanmu-bong in the west and northwest of these objective hills.

The Attack on Hill 673 (11–12 September): On 9 September, based on the X Corps orders, the 1st US Marine Division issued a new operation order, calling
for the 7th US Marine Regiment (Colonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.) to jump off at 0300 hours, 11 September and attack and seize Hill 673 and 749, while maintaining contact with the 8th ROK Division on the right.

The area ahead of the 7th US Marines was ideal for defense. From Yoke Ridge the attackers had to descend into a narrow valley and climb Kanmu-bong Ridge on the other side. This formidable piece of terrain was dominated by three enemy positions, Hills 812, 908, and 1052. The attack of the 7th Marines had as its primary purpose the securing of initial objectives on Kanmu-bong Ridge that would give access to the main enemy defense line, some 4,000 yards to the north.

The 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Griffin) was to maintain patrolling action on the left, while the 3rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel B.T. Kelly) in the center and the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Kelly) on the right were to attack.

The 1st Battalion attack was pinned down, while troops of the 2nd Battalion succeed brilliant maneuver, thus having two platoons in position undetected behind the enemy to lead the attack.

The assault exploded with complete surprise as the 2nd Battalion swept to the crest of Hill 673 against confused opposition. The 1st Battalion slugged its way to the summit of Hill 673 at 1415 hours while the 2nd Battalion was attacking on Hill 749.

The 3rd Battalion had seized its initial objective, the 2nd Battalion occupied Hill 673, and the enemy was still holding Hill 749. Casualties of the Marines on 11 and 12 September were 22 killed and 245 wounded. Enemy losses included 30 counted killed and 22 prisoners.

The Attack on Hill 749 (13–16 September): On 13 September, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st US Marine Regiment jumped off to the attack at 1200. Stiff opposition was encountered from the beginning, and heavy engagement ensued throughout the day.

On the left, the 3rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. Lahue) could not make much progress toward Hill 751, while the enemy was active on Hill 749. A second attack of the 2nd Battalion at 1500 hours drove to the crest of that height, but there was still much fighting to be done before the entire objective would be secured. Since the enemy bunkers hidden among the trees remained to be neutralized. So fierce was enemy resistance in this area that the 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart) took until 2025 hours to complete the relief after fighting for every foot of ground.

During the night of 13–14 September the 3rd Battalion repulsed a series of
American Marines advance across a fog-filled valley while supported by machine gun fire.

counterattacks by an estimated 300 enemy. The 1st US Marines (Colonel Thomas A. Wornham) continued the attack at 0800 14 September. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions inched their way forward against a heavy volume of well-aimed enemy barrage. The 2nd Battalion had advanced 300 meters by dusk enabling the 3rd Battalion to fight its way to Hill 751.

15 September was a relatively quiet day, while the 2nd Battalion continued the attack against Hill 749. The battalion jumped off at 1710 hours but was halted at 1800 by a terrific pounding from the enemy mortars and artillery coupled with a crossfire of machine guns from concealed bunkers.

In the meantime, the 5th US Marine Regiment (Colonel Richard C. Weede) moved up to assembly areas on the 15th in preparation for passing through the 3rd Battalion of the 1st US Marines the following day to continue the attack.
However, a minute after midnight of the 15th, the enemy launched a savage four-hour attack forcing the 2nd Battalion to pull off Hill 749. The battalion elements took a frightful pounding from 76-mm., 104-mm., and 122-mm. artillery supplemented by 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortars. Soon the enemy attackers assaulted at the thinned Marine elements. The fighting was noteworthy for examples of individual valor. Corporal Joseph Vittori of “F” Company rushed through the withdrawing troops to lead a successful local counterattack. As the all-night fight continued, he leaped from one foxhole to another, manning a machine gun when the gunner was struck down and making repeated trips through the heaviest shell fire to replenish ammunition. Corporal Vittori was mortally wounded during the last minutes of the fighting, thus becoming the second Marine of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st US Marines within a 48-hour period to win the Medal of Honor.

Not until 0400 on the 16th did the enemy waves of attack subside on Hill 749. The enemy strength was estimated at a regiment. A combined assault by 150 enemy on the 3rd Battalion positions to the west in the vicinity of Hill 751 was repulsed shortly after midnight.

At 0830, 16 September, the 1st Battalion of the 1st US Marines moved out to pass through the 2nd Battalion and continue the fight. Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gormen took the command of the battalion this date after Lieutenant Colonel Edgar Carney, Jr.

The enemy resistance stiffened as the battalion attacked along the ridgeline leading toward Hill 749. At 1800, after a hard day’s fighting, Objective B, Hill 749 was occupied.

Around Hill 751, the 3rd Battalion remained in control, while the other two battalions held a defensive line about 1,500 yards long on both sides of Hill 749.

Casualties of the Marine division during the four-day battle for Hill 749, most of them suffered by the attacking regiment, were 90 killed, 714 wounded, and one missing. Enemy losses for the same period were 771 counted killed, although more than twice that number were estimated killed, and 81 prisoners.

The Attack on Hill 812 (16–17 September): The 1st US Marine Division was now in position to attack against Hill 812 northwest of Hill 749. The main eastwest ridgeline leading to Hill 812 was crossed by a north-south ridgeline. Again, as on Hill 749, the attackers had to fight their way through a vicious cross fire.

The main effort was given to the 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff) of the 5th US Marines. The 3rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Ponald R. Kennedy) was to advance on the left, preparing to seize Hill 980 on order,
while the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston) remained in reserve. The assault got under way in early afternoon on 16 September. Progress was slow against heavy enemy fire. The attack was resumed at 0400, 17 September. The 2nd Battalion was delayed until 0700 hours in jumping off. Rapid progress was made at first toward Hill 812. The attacking elements, after waiting an air-strike in vain, drove toward the peak with the support of artillery and mortars.

At 1100, Lieutenant Colonel Stiff ordered an all-out assault for the objective, following a preliminary barrage of everything that could be thrown at the enemy. As soon as the bombardment lifted, one element was to drive straight ahead while another element made a flank attack.

This maneuver turned the trick, taking the enemy by surprise. And in just 36 minutes the assault troops were on the peak after a hard fight at close quarters with automatic weapons and grenades. Remarkably fast progress was made against an enemy who appeared to be thrown off balance. But, the units on Hill 812 were under fire from Hill 880 and Hill 1052. (See Sketch Map 21.)
The Defense on Hill 812 (18–20 September): At 0430, 18 September, the enemy launched a counterattack, forcing the Marines to give ground, and a second counterattack that followed at 0840 hours was repulsed. Enemy fire from Hills 980 and 1052 continued all day long, and the 2nd Battalion of the 5th US Marines suffered 16 killed and 98 wounded in action during the day.

On the following day, the enemy on these two commanding hills was still looking down the throats of the 2nd Battalion, but his action was confined to incessant long-rang fire during the daylight hours of the 19th.

At 0315 hours, 20 September, however, the enemy made a desperate effort to retake Hill 812. The Marines counterattacked and the NK Communists fled to the northern side of the ridge, leaving 60 counted dead behind.

During this three-day attack, from 18 to 20 September, the Marines suffered 33 killed and 235 wounded. These losses were incurred for the most part by the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marines.

This was the last action of a battle that had occupied all three Marine regiments from 11 to 20 September inclusive while the 1st ROK Marine Regiment patrolled aggressively on the division left flank. It was the last action of mobility for the American Marines in the Korean War, because the warfare of movement came to an end on 20 September, and the warfare of position began.

Section 5. Limited Attacks Continued
(18 – 30 September 1951)

Sectors of Major Units

On 16 September 1951, General Van Fleet made an inspection tour around the front lines and was so concerned with the morale of the 2nd US Infantry and 1st US Marine Divisions, both of which had suffered heavy casualties during the recent, repeated battles in the X US Corps sector. He found the morale of the X Corps units so good. While on this tour of inspection, however, he issued the directives to the X US Corps which included that: "The Corps Commander firm up his line by 20 September and plan no further offensives after that date, as it was unprofitable to continue the bitter operation."

This directive made a turning point that warfare of position replaced a warfare of maneuver throughout the remaining 22 months of the Korean War.
On 18 September, General Van Fleet reiterated his instructions in a confirming directive to the effect that the X US Corps continue making limited attacks “until 20 September, after which . . . units were to firm up the existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it.”

At this turning point, on 20 September 1951, the UNC ground forces had 14 divisions from four corps committed along a 200-kilometer (125-mile) front across the peninsula. These units were distributed as follows.

**The I US Corps:** The 1st ROK Division held the left anchor along the Imjin River in the westmost sector with the 5th ROK Marine Battalion controlling on the Kimpo peninsula; the 1st British Commonwealth Division was defending also across the Imjin River to the northeast; the 1st US Cavalry Division (Greek and Thai Battalions attached) defended still farther to the northeast in the area northwest and north of Toegwang-ni; and the 3rd US Division (Belgian Battalion and 20th Philippine Battalion Combat Team attached) had the responsibility for the vital Chorwon area.

**The IX US Corps:** The 25th US Division (Turkish Brigade attached) was defending the area west of Kumhwa; the 2nd ROK Division held a sector east of Kumhwa; the 7th US Division (Ethiopian Battalion attached) positioned in the Chokkun-san area on the right; the 6th ROK Division had a narrow sector as far east as the Pukhan River, the corps boundary; and the 24th US Division (Colombian Battalion attached) was in corps reserve south of Hwachon.

**The X US Corps:** The 8th ROK Division was on the left flank of the corps front; the 2nd US Division (French and Netherlands Battalions attached) held left central portion of the corps front; the 5th ROK Division was occupying a narrow sector to the east; and the 1st US Marine Division was holding eastern portion of the corps front.

**The I ROK Corps:** The 11th ROK Division was responsible for left of the corps front; the Capital ROK Division held the line eastward to the Eastern Sea of Korea; and the 3rd ROK Division was in reserve at Yangyang for a period of field training.

**The Strategy and the Opposing Forces**

On 30 September, General Van Fleet made a statement explaining the purpose of his strategy. “My basic mission during the past four months,” he said, “has been to destroy the enemy, so that the men of the Eighth US Army (UNC ground
forces) will not be destroyed . . . Each loaded enemy weapons was a definite threat to the Eighth Army. It was imperative that we knock out as many of those weapons as we could . . .”

“In prodding the enemy in the deep belly of the peninsula,” General Van Fleet continued, “We have taken many casualties . . . It was mandatory that we control the high ground features, so that we could look down the throat of the enemy and thereby better perform our task of destruction . . . In seizing these hills we lost men, but in losing a comparative few we saved other thousands.”

Estimated casualties, inflicted on the enemy by the UNC ground forces alone from 25 May to 25 September 1951, were announced as 188,237 by the Eighth US Army Commander. “As we opened our autumn campaign,” he added, “the enemy potential along the front line has been sharply reduced by our hill-hopping tactics. The Communist forces in Korea are not liquidated but they are badly crippled.”

Even so, EUSAK G-2 summaries credited the enemy on 1 October 1951 with more than 600,000 troops at the front, or in reserve and awaitable as immediate reinforcements. Six CCF armies and one NK Communist corps were capable of reinforcing the units on the main line of resistance or participating in an offensive. The Communists also had an estimated 7,000 men in guerrilla forces behind the UNC lines.

On the other hand, the maximum strength of the UN forces in Korea during October 1951 was 607,300. This total included 236,871 US Army troops, 21,020 Fifth US Air Forces personnel, 30,913 US Marines (including 5,386 officers and men of the 1st US Marine Aircraft Wing), 286,000 men in the ROK units, and 32,172 other UN allied contingents.

Although it might appear that the opposing forces were about equal, it must be remembered that well over one-fourth of the UNC troops were engaged in administrative or maintenance duties behind the frontline. Thus the Communists still had a numerical advantage of at least four to three on the fighting line. This was not at all unusual, since they had enjoyed a preponderance in manpower from the beginning.

**Operation Cleanup**  
(18 September)

In the I US Corps sector, in mid-September 1951, the 3rd US Division was
ordered by the corps to launch Operation Cleanup as a part of the Eighth Army plans to secure certain key terrain features along the battle front.

In turn, the 3rd US Division ordered Task Force Cutthroat, composing of the 65th Regiment and 64th Tank Battalion less one company, to attack at 0530 hours, 18 September, and seize Objective Razor which included Hills 324 and 373 north of Packsok-tong and Hill 285 near Chungto-dong in an effort to disrupt the enemy communications, destroy enemy artillery and mortar positions north of Chondok-san (Hill 477)—Yawol-san (Hill 487) ridge, determine enemy disposition south of Yookkok-chan, and inflict maximum casualties. In conjunction with the attack the 15th US Regiment was ordered to attack with one company and seize Objective Stab, the height in Sangto-dong and block the right flank between Taema-ri and Sahu-dong with one company. One company of the 7th US Regiment was to conduct screening operations in the vicinity of Hill 395 and the 3rd Reconnaissance Company was assigned to screen farther east in the area of Chunggasan-ni and Hill 245 at 0530 hours, 18 August.

Besides its 7th, 15th and 65th Regiments the 3rd US Infantry Division had the 20th Philippine Battalion Combat Team and the Belgian Battalion under operational control.

On 17 September, Task Force Cutthroat was organized by 1330 hours, and the leading elements of the 65th Infantry departed an assembly area at 0200 hours, 18 September, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions closed position in Chunggosong and Hongye-dong by 0515 hours and attacked southwest at 0530 hours. A company from the 15th Infantry crossed the line of departure at 0445 hours and advanced toward north. One company from the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry advanced to Kalmi-dong where it engaged an unknown number of enemy from 1530 to 1800 hours as a diversionary effort to the attack by the 65th Infantry.

The company was ordered to disengage and return to the original line at 1800 hours. The Reconnaissance Company also screened 4,000 to 5,000 yards west of the patrol base near Chinggang-ni.

In the meantime, Task Force Cutthroat attacked southwest at 0530 hours. The 1st Battalion of the 65th Infantry advanced to Hill 292 where elements repulsed two company-sized counterattacks between 0730 hours and 0800 hours. It continued the attack and at 1430 hours assaulted onto the objective and as of 1615 hours was within 100 feet of the top of the objective Hill 373 and was receiving heavy pressure from an unknown number of enemy and a heavy hand grenade attack. The battalion disengaged at 1730 hours and was enroute to a regimental perimeter in Mohyo-dong.
The 3rd Battalion of the 65th Infantry, meanwhile, attacked against Hill 285 and after assaulting the objective at 1430 hours it fell into a heavy fighting with an estimated enemy battalion well-emplaced on the hill at 1645 hours. The battalion also disengaged at 1730 hours and was enroute to the regimental perimeter thereafter. The 2nd Battalion established blocking position near Hill 265 to protect the rear of the attacking elements. This battalion was also ordered to establish a defensive perimeter for the night in Mohyo-dong.

On the other hand, the 64th Tank Battalion (minus), after advancing up to the northeast of Hill 373, returned to Chorwon for the night. During the day it had one tank damaged by enemy anti-tank fire and three tanks damaged by mines. Two tanks were recovered, however.

On 19 September, the 2nd Battalion of the 65th Infantry was attached to the 15th Infantry effective at 1530 hours. And, the 65th Infantry (minus) had assembled in Sangno-ri and Chorwon by 1615 hours.

Thus, Operation Cleanup was a one-day action primarily designed to clean out the area far forward of the main line of resistance. The friendly casualty rate was high and the enemy began to reinforce. Therefore, the operation was cancelled and units returned to the main defensive positions.

Repeated Battles on Patrol Bases
(21 – 30 September)

As September deepened, friendly patrols and patrol bases reported an increasing amount of enemy artillery fire and a general increase in counter-patrolling action throughout the forward area of the 1st US Cavalry Division sector.

At the time 7th US Cavalry Regiment (with the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry attached) maintained a patrol base in company size on Hill 288 near Sonchong-nal, about three kilometers south of Chondok-san (Hill 477). The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry remained in the vicinity of Hill 337 east of Chura-dong with a company on Hill 306 east of Chobat-kol. The 7th Cavalry had also established a company-sized patrol base on Hill 321 north of Hill 370 at the midnight of 20 September. Thus the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry occupied patrol base positions on the high ground around Kalgok and Hyonjo including Hill 339.

On the night of 21–22 September, both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment were hit by an intense enemy artillery barrage. This was immediately followed by a CCF battalion-sized attack on the 3rd Battalion. At 2310 hours that night, an enemy company struck on Hill 339 which was beaten
Gun crew of Battery C, 204th Field Artillery Battalion, firing a 155-mm.
self-propelled gun at enemy positions north of Yonchon.

off at 2400 hours. The enemy again attacked at 0010 hours, 22 September, this
time in battalion strength, but was again repulsed by the friendly defenders
although the enemy attackers reached within grenade throwing distance of the
cavalry positions.

A similar attack was launched against the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry by
an estimated CCF battalion, first on Hill 337 at 2310 hours, and then on Hill
306 at 0130 hours, in which the enemy closed with friendly forces and hand to
hand fighting followed. The enemy was driven away from friendly tanks and
mortar positions, leaving the area littered with his dead.

There continued to follow similar enemy raids during the ensuing days but in
smaller scale and all were beaten off easily.

On the night of 27–28 September, an estimated CCF battalion attacked again
against the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, this time on Hill 315 north of Chura-dong. The enemy attempted a complete envelopment and penetrated the battalion perimeter, but a counterattack by Company I restored the position.

On 29 September, artillery struck back with an outstanding display of counterbattery fire. While rain hampered infantry activities air observers directed friendly fire that destroyed eight enemy guns and damaged at least four more.

During the same period, patrols of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment discovered an unknown number of enemy entrenched on Hills 313 and 418. Although the cavalry men were not then aware of it, these terrain features were soon to fight prominently in the extremely bitter fighting of an approaching I US Corps offensive, named "Operation Commando" in October.

**Operation Cleaver**
(21 September)

On 20 September 1951, Lieutenant General William M. Hoge, commanding the IX US Corps, ordered his attached divisions to launch a coordinated attack, called Operation Cleaver, on 21 September in his zone of action to inflict maximum enemy personnel and materiel losses. The gist of the corps orders was as follows. (See Sketch Map 22.)

1. The 25th US Division would conduct raids along the axis from Hill 602 (north of Samhyon) to Hill 347 (near Kahyon-ni) and Hill 350 (near Oeya-dong) on 21 September.

2. Task Force Byorum -- consisting of the 2nd Battalion of the 21st US Regiment, a tank battalion, a platoon each from engineer and anti-aircraft artillery from the 24th US Division -- was to conduct raids along the axis from Song-dong (north of Hill 457) northeastward to Hill 434 and overrun and capture or destroy enemy personnel and materiel in Objective A covering Hachinhoen, Chortae-ri, Wolbong-ni, and Hapung-dong, about six to nine kilometers north of Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san) on 21 September.

3. The 2nd ROK Division would attack on 21 September and secure the objective Number 1 through Number 4 immediate behind the attacking area of Task Force Byorum, all situated in the north of Samchon-bong (Hill 815) and Chokkun-san (Hill 1073). This attack was to assist the operation of Task Force Byorum and establish strong outpost position on the objective on 21 September.

4. The 7th US Division was to conduct raids on 21 September along the axis running from Korisil to Chuktong generally astride Kumsong-chon, employing a
strong tank-infantry force and overrun and capture or destroy enemy personnel and materiel in objective (the area covering Hill 479, Sangsan-ni, Hill 384 in Kaeya-ri, and Hill 468 south of Hu-dong), to eliminate all the enemy elements south of the Kumsong River in the eastern half of the division sector and destroy all emplacements and fortifications.

(5) The 6th ROK Division was assigned to send strong combat patrols north in support of the attacking forces on 21 September.

The 25th US Division: On 21 September, in the 25th US Division, Task Force Lynx, composed of a company from the 14th US Regiment, a company from the 89th US Tank Battalion, the 25th Division Reconnaissance Company, a platoon each from engineer and anti-aircraft artillery battalions, departed at 0545 hours
toward the assigned objective, Yongmi-kogae southeast of Pyonggang and had advanced to Chigam-ni by 0805 hours.

Task Force Hamilton, consisting of a company from the 35th US Regiment, a company from the 89th Tank Battalion, a platoon each of engineer and anti-aircraft automatic weapons battalions, moved out at 0545 hours toward its objective in Kahyon-ni north of Namdae-chon and by 0700 hours had advanced to the vicinity of Hill 424 in Hakujong, where it received enemy mortar fire. By 0815 hours it had already advanced to Salgijong.

Task Force Lynx continued the attack in the west and at 0940 hours encountered a shower of artillery and mortar fire when it reached eastern slope of Pyoryubong. Nevertheless, it continued the advance up to the north of Mane-sgyo by 1105 hours where it remained until 1215 hours without further enemy contact. Then two platoons of infantry farther advanced to the objective near Yongmi-kogae by 1445 hours. At 1530 hours these platoons were ordered to withdraw. Thereafter Task Force Lynx returned to the main line of resistance at 2035 hours with the reports that it had inflicted 100 enemy casualties during the operation to include 16 enemy killed.

Meanwhile, Task Force Hamilton continued the attack and advanced to about 500 yards north of Salgijong where it received a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons and artillery fire from the enemy at 1000 hours. The task force remained engaged until 1720 hours when it disengaged and started to return. It encountered enemy mines and anti-tank fire and suffered four tanks damaged by anti-tank fire and one tank damaged by mines. The enemy anti-tank gun was destroyed near Salgijong by friendly artillery and tank force. An airstrike was directed on the enemy on Hill 452 at 1245 hours resulting 15 enemy killed.

Thereafter Task Force Hamilton returned to the main line of resistance at 2045 hours with the reports that it had inflicted 70 enemy casualties, and destroyed 60 enemy bunkers and three anti-tank guns during the operation. Four friendly tanks damaged were recovered.

Task Force Byorum: At 0610 hours, 21 September, Task Force Byorum moved out toward the assigned objective and it had advanced to Panton-ni by 0905 hours and encountered enemy mine field and anti-tank ditch by which two tanks were damaged.

The task force continued to advance after passing anti-tank ditch and the infantry element had advanced up to short of the village of Sondol and the tank elements encountered a heavy barrage of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and artillery. The progress was slowed by enemy mines and four tanks were
damaged. Before reaching its final objective, the task force was ordered to return at 1615 hours, thus closing within the main line of resistance by 1815 hours.

The results were 168 enemy killed, 175 more estimated killed, 208 enemy estimated wounded, five prisoners taken, 107 bunkers and three enemy machine guns destroyed. Five friendly tanks damaged were recovered.

The 2nd ROK Division: In the meantime, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 32nd Regiment in the 2nd ROK Division sector started an new attack at 0630 hours, 21 September, from the Hill 637 area north of Chaegung-dong and the area in the vicinity of Samchon-bong. The 1st Battalion had advanced to the high ground about one and a half kilometers north of Hill 785 by 0830 hours, where it heavily engaged with the enemy. The 3rd Battalion also encountered stubborn enemy resistance at 0830 hours when it reached Objectives 3 and 4 west of Hill 633.

The 1st Battalion of the 32nd ROK Regiment had secured Objective 1 east of Pang-dong by 1200 hours without enemy contact, while other elements continued to advance to Objective 2 and had secured it by 1430 hours against heavy enemy resistance from an estimated enemy company resulting in 34 enemy killed and four friendly killed and seven friendly missing.

The 3rd Battalion of the 32nd ROK Infantry, on the other hand, had seized Objective 4 against heavy enemy resistance from an estimated enemy company reinforced by 1430 hours. The friendly units were ordered to withdraw at 1700 hours. The results were 60 enemy killed, one prisoner taken and five friendly killed and 49 missing.

The 7th US Division: At 0500 hours, 21 September, the 2nd Battalion of the 31st US Regiment jumped off and the lead elements had already advanced to Hill 633 by 0850 hours with no enemy contact, while the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment reinforced with a tank company started the attack at 0710 hours and by 0850 hours had advanced to Hudong-ni meeting no enemy reaction.

On the other hand, a company of the Ethiopian Battalion attacked toward Hill 602 in Samhyon and became to involve in heavy engagement with an undetermined number of enemy force in hand to hand combat on the objective from 1230 hours until 1615 hours, when the friendly elements disengaged and returned at 1810 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Infantry, reinforced with a tank company and a AAA platoon, advanced to the Korisil village at 1200 hours after having a tank damaged by a mine and encountering light small arms fire enroute. The units thereafter received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire on the objective and placed artillery fire on the enemy. The tank element then advanced farther north up to Sehyon-ni by 1810 hours when it started back.
One rifle company advanced to the southwestern slope of Hill 570 by 1100 hours and then returned at 1630 hours, while another company also advanced to the southeastern slope of the same hill by 1020 hours without meeting opposition and returned by 1945 hours.

During the operations, the Ethiopian Battalion inflicted 179 enemy killed 29 more enemy estimated killed, 21 enemy estimated wounded and one prisoner taken. The 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Infantry returned to the main line of resistance with the reports that it had killed 60 enemy, estimated wounded 10 enemy and taken one prisoner. Three friendly tanks damaged were recovered.

Thus, Operation Cleaver of the IX US Corps was a one-day action like Operation Cleanup in the I US Corps. But the results were noteworthy with 1,093 enemy counted killed, 763 estimated killed, 823 estimated wounded and 79 prisoners taken in total. Besides, large quantities of enemy materiel and equipment were destroyed.

Helicopter Operations
(20 - 27 September)

On 20 September 1951, after three weeks of continual combat, the 1st US Marine Division had disposed its units from left to right as follows.

The 1st ROK Marine Regiment (Colonel Kim Dae Shik, commanding) occupied the Hays Line on the left flank; the 5th US Marine Regiment (Colonel Richard G. Weede) held a wide sector in the center, with Hill 812 as the principal terrain feature; the 1st US Marine Regiment (Colonel Thomas A. Wornham) was in process of extending eastward to the corps boundary just beyond Hill 884; and the 7th US Marine Regiment remained in division reserve at Wontong-ni.

Securing Hill 884: The Marine division was to relieve the 8th ROK Division and take over its sector by 21 September. The division ordered the 1st US Marines to relieve the ROK units on Hill 854, and the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines was to take over the front of the 1st US Marines on the Hays Line.

The 1st Battalion of the 1st US Marines relieved two battalions of the 10th ROK Regiment in the Hill 854 area, suffering eleven casualties from mines. The 3rd Battalion relieved two battalions of the 21st ROK Regiment. Although the 8th ROK Division had fought its way to the summit of Hill 854, employing all three regiments, the ridgeline to the southwest still remained in the enemy's hands. Accordingly, an attack by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st US Marines was planned for 1530 hours on 20 September, supported by artillery and an air
strike. But the attack was postponed until 1720 hours due to the delayed arrival of the airplanes.

H Company jumped off at 1720 hours but the attack was called off at dusk, because a man was killed and another wounded by mines when the company had advanced 50 yards. This halt allowed the ROK elements to remove the explosives they had planted.

On the following day, again the attack was delayed as F-51s delayed to arrive. At 1220 hours, following artillery preparation, H Company spearheaded the battalion attack which met stiff enemy opposition. The assault continued with mortar and artillery support until 1745 hours, when H Company secured the ridge-line.

Casualties of the 3rd Battalion for the two days were nine killed and 55 wounded, while the enemy losses totaled 159 counted and 150 estimated killed, 225 estimated wounded, and 29 prisoners.

Operation Summit: With the X US Corps boundary extending eastward, the Marine division was ordered to take over a portion of the 11th ROK Division sector. This would have meant an exhausting 15-hours march for the relieving troops mere-

Sikorsky helicopter hovering over Hill 884, south of Nam-gang in the eastern sector.
A helicopter evacuates a Marine soldier who was wounded while treating a brother-in-arms.

ly to climb Hill 884. The position was accessible only on foot, and supplies had to be brought on the backs of cargadores.

Because of the isolation of this wildly mountainous area, a reconnaissance was deemed essential. The division assigned that mission to the Division Reconnaissance Company after deciding a troop lift by helicopter. It must be noted that no such a helicopter-lift operation had ever been undertaken in the past.

Moreover, an air reconnaissance of Hill 884 disclosed only two accessible locations for landing sites, both approximately 50 feet square with a sheer drop on two sides.

At any rate, Operation Summit was set to begin at 1000 hours, 21 September. But the execution was delayed half an hour by the ground fog.

Maintaining two radio communication nets between the landing sites and orbiting aircraft, aircraft landed at 30-second intervals, each carrying five fully equipped men who disembarked in average time of 20 seconds.
As a result, a total of 224 men was lifted in flight time of 31.2 hours and overall time of four hours. In addition, 17,772 pounds of cargo were landed.

From a tactical viewpoint, the importance of Hill 884 lay in its domination of enemy-held terrain. The difficulty of reaching the remote position had been overcome by the helicopter, and this marked the first helicopter-born landing of combat unit in history.

**Operation Blackbird:** After having a successful helicopter-lift operation, the Marine division now decided to make another operation in the night, since a surprise attack was most likely to occur at night.

This new operation, called "Blackbird," was planned to execute in the darkness of 27 September after a detailed day time rehearsal. E Company of the 2nd Battalion, 1st US Marines was selected as the infantry unit to be lifted.

At 1930, 27 September, the operation got underway. Three-minute intervals were required between aircraft operating on a shuttle system. A total of 223 troops were landed in over all time of two hours and 20 minutes instead of the nine hours a movement by foot would have required. Six helicopters were employed. Operation Blackbird remained the only night helicopter troop lift during the Korean War.
CHAPTER IV  OPERATIONS IN THE FALL
(1 October - 31 December 1951)

Section 1.  Limited Offensive in October

Ground operations in October 1951 were primarily of an offensive nature, marked by an increased number of limited-objective attacks. The main line of resistance in the western and central sectors, for instance, was advanced up to ten kilometers against varying degrees of opposition.

The most biggest operation in scale in the autumn was Operation Commando implemented by the 1st US Corps on 3 October. The five divisions -- the 1st ROK, the 1st British Commonwealth, the 1st US Cavalry, 3rd, and 25th US Divisions -- attacked north across a 65-kilometer front from the vicinity of southeast of Kaesong to Chorwon to advance the front five to seven kilometers, establish a new line, Jamestown, and thus protect the Chorwon-Seoul railroad. Attacking units overcame resistance and occupied positions on Line Jamestown by 6 October, with the exception of Objective Coursen in the vicinity of Hill 346. Attacks on Coursen continued until 9 October when Operation Commando was terminated. The 1st US Cavalry Division secured Objective Coursen on 18 October.

The IX US Corps, to the right, followed with limited attacks and aggressive patrolling toward Kumsong. On 13 October, the 2nd and 6th ROK Divisions and 24th US Division attacked in the eastern sector of the corps front to secure Line Nomad, which was approximately seven kilometers south of the key road center of Kumsong. Nomad was secured on 15 October. The attack was continued to Line Polar, which was approximately three kilometers south of Kumsong. By 20 October, the objective was taken and an outpost line of resistance was immediately established against stubborn enemy resistance.

In the X US Corps sector, meanwhile, action was generally confined to limited-objective attacks to seize and secure key terrain features and strengthen defensive positions. Particularly, in the Mundung-ni area, the 2nd US Division launched Operation Touchdown on 5 October to seize and secure Heartbreak Ridge as well as its neighboring key heights. The last ridge finally fell into
the friendly hands on 13 October, thus removing the sag in the Punchbowl area.

During the remaining days of the month, in general, UNC ground units conducted aggressive patrolling and armored reconnaissance against light resistance and consolidated newly won positions. And by the end of the month, the UNC main line of resistance had been advanced well north of Lines Wyoming and Kansas.

In the meantime, General Ridgway of the UN Command had attempted to persuade the enemy to resume the cease-fire negotiations on 4 October, while the 2nd US Division was fighting hard in the Mundung-ni area. Six days later liaison officers met again, this time at Punmunjom, north of the Imjin River. Then on 25 October, after a recess, the armistice talks resumed once more that were to continue for many weary months.

Section 2. The Renewed Battle for Heartbreak Ridge
(5 – 14 October 1951)

Operation Touchdown

The Operation Plan: In the X US Corps sector, a new plan for ending the seemingly endless struggles for the hills on and near Heartbreak Ridge, consisting of Hills 894, 931 and 851, was prepared in late September by the 2nd US Division, and on 1 October 1951, Major General Young, commanding the division, decided the laying of plans for an all-out assault. Heretofore, the regiments had jumped-off on their own objectives one at a time. Consequently, the defending NK Communist hordes were able to concentrate their fire support weapons, especially mortars, on the single attacking element of the 2nd US Division. Added to the ideal defensive terrain, this had been enough to drive back every effort of the division in the preceding weeks.

According to the new plan, all three regiments of the 2nd US Division would launch concentrated and coordinated attacks simultaneously on the division front, supported by all the division's artillery, by a full-scale of armored drive by the 72nd US Tank Battalion up the Mundung-ni Valley on the west coupled with a tank-infantry task force foray up the Satae-ri Valley in the east. Purpose of these armored attacks was to break behind the enemy lines, disrupt his defenses and inflict the greatest number of casualties.
The Attack Objectives: On 2 October, General Young issued the operation order under the code name "Touchdown," assigning the following objectives to his subordinate regiments. (1) The 9th US Regiment would advance on the western side of the Mundung-ni Valley and seize Hills 867, 1005, 980, and 1040, dominating the ridgeline north of Hill 1024 to the west; (2) the 23rd Regiment was to attack and secure Hill 931 and the ridge running west of that peak. In addition, the 23rd Infantry would be ready to attack Hill 728 or to help the 38th Regiment capture it, as the case might be, and to take Hill 520, west of Hill 851; and (3) the 38th US Infantry, in the center of the division sector, would secure Hill 485 and then provide infantry support to the 72nd Tank Battalion. The 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion was to exert its maximum effort on the valley road below Mundung-ni, attaching C and D Companies to the 38th Infantry, A Company to the 19th Infantry and B Company to the 23rd Infantry. One platoon of D Company of the engineers was to support the tank thrust up the valley. Target date for Operation Touchdown was 5 October. (See Situation Map 2, Appendix IX.)

The Attacking Preparations: The preparations for Touchdown required a period of tremendous activity on the part of 2nd Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Love. The road along the Mundung-ni Valley was a rough track unsuitable for the medium Sherman tanks of the 72nd Tank Battalion.

The enemy had planted mines along the track all the way. At one point the enemy had heaped large rocks six feet high. The engineers put 110 pounds of explosives around this roadblock. Working with shovels because their bulldozers were undergoing repair and would, in any case, have drawn artillery fire from the enemy on the heights further up the valley, the engineers fashioned a useable road. To take care of the mines along the trail, they placed chain blocks at 50-foot intervals on the sides of the track and then set off.

While the engineers prepared the path for the tank attack, the 2nd US Division regiments received replacements to bring their battalions up to full strength and built up their supplies of food, equipment, and ammunition for the upcoming operation. The 23rd US Regiment pulled each of its battalions out of the line for 48 hours so that the replacements could be integrated while the units were in reserve rather than on the line. The division established supply points forward of Line Kansas to insure that the operation did not fail because of ammunition shortages.

General Young also wanted to be certain that his battalion commanders would make full use of all the firepower at their disposal. Each battalion had
to submit fire plan showing how it intended to employ its tanks, automatic weapons, small arms, and mortars in "Touchdown." Sand-table models of the Heartbreak Ridge sector were used extensively in positioning the division's weapons in the best possible locations.

By 1800 hours of 4 October, all the three regiments were in position for the attack scheduled for 2100 hours the following morning. The 9th US Regiment was poised on the left flank to attack upon Hill 867 while the 38th US Regi-

**THE SECOND BATTLE FOR HEARTBREAK RIDGE (5-13 Oct 1951)**

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Sketch Map 23

Legend:
- Friendly Advance
- TF's Assault
- Enemy Obstacles
- CCF Reinforcement

0 1.5 Km
ment, under Colonel Frank T. Mildren, was going up the Mundung-ni Valley. The 38th US Infantry would stop near Saegonbae, southwest of Hill 894. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry was to be the division reserve and could be used only with the permission of Major General Young. The attached Netherlands Battalion, however, provided the 38th Regiment with three full battalions. The 23rd US Regiment maintained two of its four battalions including the attached French Battalion on the lines between Hill 894, 931, and 851.

The tank-infantry task force under Major Kenneth R. Sturman of the 23rd US Regiment was organized on 3 October to operate in the Satae-ri Valley area so as to protect the division's right flank. This force subsequently bore the commander's name.

Composed of the 23rd US Tank Company, the 2nd US Reconnaissance Company, a French pioneer platoon, and an infantry company from the special divisional security forces, Task Force Sturman had the secondary mission of destroying enemy bunkers on the east side of Heartbreak Ridge and of acting as a decoy to draw enemy fire away from the 23rd US Infantry foot troops on the ridge.

On 4 October, 49 fighter-bombers worked over the 2nd US Division sector and Task Force Sturman raided the Satae-ri Valley, proving to be highly successful in knocking out enemy emplacements. The other units of the 2nd US Division underwent final rehearsals for the attack.

One fortunate break occurred during the early hours of the 4th when a patrol from Company F of the 38th US Regiment reported Hill 485 unoccupied. The remaining elements of Company F immediately moved onto the hill, securing it and thus placing one of their objectives in their hands before the main assault had begun.

The first indication of the reappearance of the Chinese Communist forces into the X US Corps zone came from prisoner of war reports on 5 October, the day the offensive of the 2nd US Division was scheduled to get underway. One prisoner taken up by the division reported a CCF reconnaissance party on Hill 931, the center of Heartbreak Ridge. Later in the day, X US Corps intelligence officers relayed a message from the 8th ROK Division that two civilians had been picked up in its sector who admitted being CCF agents. These reports were the first of CCF troops so far eastward since their full-scale May offensive.

**The Initial Attacks:** In the late afternoon of 5 October, the artillery preparation opened up as the 2nd US Division's artillery battalions commenced to pummel the following enemy units facing the 9th and 38th US Regiments
in the Mundung-ni Valley. Deployed from west to east the 3rd Regiment, 12th NK Division, occupied Hill 867; the 1st Regiment, 6th NK Division was spread from Hill 636 northwest to Hill 974; and the 15th Regiment of the 6th NK Division was dug in on Hill 931. As a result of the constant pressure exerted by the 2nd US Division on these units during September and early October, none of them had a strength that reached 1,000 men. The 12th and 6th NK Divisions were both far under-strength by the eve of Operation Touchdown.

Air strikes by American Marine Corsairs sent napalm, rockets and machine gun bullets into the NK Communist lines before the attack jumped off that evening.

(1) The 9th Infantry: At 2100 hours, 5 October, Operation Touchdown started with all regiments on line. On the west the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 9th Infantry moved toward Hill 867 as the 2nd Battalion remained in reserve. By nightfall, after a day without notable enemy contact, the two
attacking battalions had secured the high ground south and east of their objectives and prepared to make their main assault the next day. The 3rd Battalion then swung northwest toward Hill 961 while the 1st Battalion attacked upon Hill 666. Both hills fell on 8 October.

The 9th Infantry continued the attack now to take Hill 1005 northwest of Hill 666 and after a bayonet assault took possession on 10 October. The next objective was Hill 1040. The enemy was unable to mount his usual last-stand defensive actions after his defeat on Hill 1005, and 9th Regiment had won the hill by 1610 hours also on the 10th, thus completely occupying the entire ridgeline of Hills 867, 1005, and 1040. On the following day the 8th ROK Division gained Hill 1050 and the so-called Kim Il-sung Range to the west of the 9th US Regiment.

(2) The 23rd Infantry: In the meantime, over in the sector of the 23rd US Regiment (with the French Battalion attached), the 2nd Battalion moved out from the south and under enemy mortar fire advanced toward the ridge-line jutting west from Hill 931, the battered crest which had been wrestled momentarily from the enemy on 23 September. Supported by the 3rd Battalion, the 2nd Battalion slowly approached the hill. The 37th US Field Artillery Battalion threw in a heavy weight of shells on all known enemy mortar positions as the attack got underway.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion was making a diversionary effort north against Hill 851, while the French Battalion feinted south toward Hill 931.

Helped by the effectiveness of the counter-mortar fire, the 23rd Infantry men could close with the enemy after only light losses. Flame throwers, grenades, and small arms rooted the enemy from the formidable bunkers that had blunted the regimental advance for so many weeks. By 0300 hours on 6 October, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions won the southern half of Hill 931. The expected enemy counterattack in battalion-size came soon and was repulsed after a brief but sharp fire-fight. The assault resumed with the coming of daylight and the 2nd Battalion moved onto the peak. The French Battalion moved in from the north and by 0630 hours, it had tied in with the 1st Battalion. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions finally secured Hill 931 before noon as a result of the outstanding successful night attack.

The 3rd Battalion then pushed on to join the 1st Battalion in its assault against the last objective on Heartbreak Ridge -- Hill 851.

(3) The 38th Infantry: In the center of the division zone, in the meantime, the 38th Regiment had also made good progress. On 5 October, its 1st Battalion, less Company B which remained on Hill 778, moved out toward Hill 728 over-
looking the west main supply route. And the objective was taken encountering only light opposition. Company A then extended north and east and tied in with elements of the 23rd US Regiment on the ridgeline west from Hill 894.

Down in the valley, the 2nd US Engineer Battalion engaged in the tremendous task of making a passable route for the tanks to advance north to Mundung-ni. Enemy mortar and automatic weapons fire poured into the area, seriously hampering but failing to stop the engineer effort. B and C Companies of the 72nd Tank Battalion (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John O. Woods) stood by, firing in support of the attack on the hills dominating the road and awaiting the opportunity to break through the obstacles which the engineers were clearing.

The 2nd Battalion of the 38th Infantry, meanwhile, had advanced up the Mundung-ni Valley and took Hill 636 on 7 October. With Hills 728 and 636 in possession the clearance task for the tank trail was now able to complete by the engineers.

On 7 October, the 72nd Tank Battalion was attached to the 38th Regiment and the regiment was given three new objectives: Hill 605, 2,000 yards north of Hill 636; the Hill 905–Hill 974 ridge which extended northwest from Hill 636 toward Hill 1220 on the Kim Il-sung Range; and Hill 841, 1,000 yards north of Hill 974. Hills 905, 974 and 841 were situated in the central sector of the 2nd US Division zone and they comprised the next ridgeline north of that under attack by the 9th US Regiment.

On 7 October, the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry moved onto Hill 867 south of the new objective ridgeline, and planned to continue its advance the next day to the unnumbered hill between Hills 867 and 1005. The 2nd Battalion, sweeping through the 8th ROK Division zone on the west, succeeded in cutting the ridgeline between Hills 867 and 1005. Initial resistance was light but it increased with every move upward. The advance continued throughout 7 and 8 October and the morning of the 9th found the 2nd Battalion near its objective but held up by the enemy’s stubborn resistance. Fixing bayonets, the attacking elements rushed forward and routed the enemy, thus taking the hill by late afternoon.

Hill 636, the gateway to the ridgeline objectives of the 38th Regiment, was stubbornly defended by the enemy and the initial attempt by the 2nd Battalion failed. The second attempt was made immediately and succeeded in capturing the crest by nightfall on 9 October. But the enemy clung to battle into the hours of darkness before relinquishing his positions. (See Sketch Map 23.)

The Final Stage: On 10 October, the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Infantry
moved out from Hill 636 heading for Hill 905 and the high ground to the northeast. Again the going was extremely rugged and it had to struggle every foot of the way with stubborn enemy resistance. The advance was halted by a strong enemy counterattack in the afternoon but the attackers moved out again as soon as the enemy attack died down. Finally, the 2nd Battalion fought its way to the top of Hill 905 on the following day and there pulled into a perimeter for the night.

Back in the valley, the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry was moving north to launch an assault on Hill 605 which, if successful, would place it closer to Mundung-ni than any major friendly element had yet been.

Further south, the engineers continued the hard task of clearing the obstacles on the roadway which prevented the tanks from thrusting into Mundung-ni itself. On 10 October, Serman tank of the 72nd Tank Battalion, accompanied by Company L of the 38th Infantry and an engineer platoon, began roaring north up the valley. By a fortunate coincidence the enemy was caught in the middle of relieving the rapidly disintegrating elements of the VNK Corps in the Heart-
break Ridge—Mundung-ni sector. Advance elements of the 204th Division, 68th CCF Army, were in the process of taking over positions already vacated by the NK Communists. The tank thrust coupled with the general forward movement of the rest of the 2nd US Division found the Chinese Communists still in the open en route to their new positions. The tank columns raced to Mundung-ni, inflicting heavy losses upon the CCF troops and cutting off the supply and replacement routes up the western slopes of Heartbreak Ridge. Operating without infantry in the northern reaches of the valley, the tanks were able to cover each other and fire at targets of opportunity. They disrupted the enemy relief completely and made the effort of the infantry much lighter in the days that followed. It was apparent that the enemy had thought that tanks could not be used in the Mundung-ni Valley and the feat of engineers in opening the tank way had taken the enemy by surprise.

The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment, taking advantage of the tank advance, continued to attack forward up the valley in face of ceaseless, heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire. After two days of desperate advance under cover of supporting fire from the 38th Regimental Tank Company, the battalion had assaulted onto Hill 605 and secured it against counterattack. The Netherlands Battalion tied in on the left and Company L tied in with the 72nd Tank Battalion on the right. I Company was to remain attached to the tank battalion for the duration of the operation. (See Sketch Map 23.)

On the other hand, the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Regiment had failed to capture Hill 905, and it renewed the attack from Hill 636 the next day with the 1st Battalion following up. Forging upward against moderate resistance, the 2nd Battalion captured Hill 905 and the 1st Battalion passed through and secured the high ground between Hill 905 and Hill 974 to the north. On 12 October, the 38th Regiment was ordered to prepare to take Hill 1220 four kilometers northwest of Paeksoon-san (Hill 1142) as the division boundary shifted to the west.

Meanwhile, indications of an entrance of Chinese Communist forces into the Mundung-ni area had been increasing during the preceding few days operations. Finally, on 10 October, a patrol from the 38th US Regiment captured a prisoner who was identified as being from the 204th CCF Division. The prisoner indicated that the Red Chinese division was planning a counterattack against the 2nd US Division within two days after the relief was completed. It was now evident that the 68th CCF Army had relieved the V NK Corps with the limiting point for the Red Chinese and NK Communist forces at the northward projection of the Mundung-ni road.
The Attack on Hill 520: In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment was ordered by the regiment to take a new objective, Hill 520, the end spur of a long ridgeline running west from Hill 931 the main peak of Heartbreak Ridge. The rest of the 23rd US Regiment was directed to make a new assault onto Hill 851 the northern peak of Heartbreak Ridge, while the 72nd Tank Battalion was reverted from the 38th US Regiment to the 9th Regiment and was to continue its thrusts into Mundung-ni itself. (See Sketch Map 23.)

In the complex structure of enemy defensive positions protecting the 11-kilometer-long hill mass - - Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 520 was only a small, subsidiary position.

On 10 October, the friendly forces had already secured the steep part of the spur ridge that slanted down toward Hill 520. That part of the Hill 520 ridge still in the enemy hands consisted of several humps, the last and highest of which was Hill 520 at the blunt tip of the ridge. Situating near the road leading into Mundung-ni, Hill 520 acted as a strong obstacle particularly for friendly tank elements. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel, commanding the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry, assigned his Company G to make main attack to capture this enemy stronghold.

By 10 October, enough replacements had joined to build the strength of each platoon of the company up to about 23 men. Lieutenant Raymond W. Riddle, a combat-experienced executive officer, was in command for the attack. Lieutenant Riddle decided to commit his 3rd Platoon to make the first move.

The other two companies from the 2nd Battalion were in positions to support the attack. Company F, located on the same ridge just behind Company G, was prepared to pass through Company G and continue the attack, if necessary. Company E was to support the attack by firing from a parallel ridge 500 yards to the south.

The flat top of Hill 520 was not more than 200 yards beyond Company G’s line of departure. After considering the shape of the ridgeline Lieutenant Riddle decided to launch a direct assault along the ridgeline. There were enemy minefields in the Mundung-ni Valley. He could see some enemy movement on the objective. He ordered everyone in the company to fire on the objective for 30 seconds. The enemy, however, did not return fire.

Then, Lieutenant Riddle called for supporting fire from the artillery, heavy machine guns, and E Company’s 57-mm. recoiless rifles. At about 1300 hours, after 10 or 15 minutes of preparation, he stopped the artillery and ordered the 3rd Platoon to dash in under cover of fire. Once there, the platoon was to
set up its base of fire and make the final assault on the objective.

Moving quickly, the 3rd Platoon reached the knoll without difficulty. The crew-served weapons opened fire on the main objective. The 3rd Platoon soon began to receive plenty of fire. Lieutenant Riddle, therefore, ordered the support elements to intensify their fire, especially on the south side of the objective.

One soldier with the 3rd platoon had yellow panel wrapped around his waist. His mission was to stay with the lead assault elements so that the supporting elements would know where the platoon was. He made it easy for every friendly element to identify the most forward position of the attacking platoon.

While the rest of the platoon fired at bunkers on the east end of the hill, the platoon leader sent one squad around the left side of the objective. Brisk enemy fire drove the squad back to the platoon base, proving that both the preparatory and supporting fires had been ineffective against the enemy bunkers. The attacking squad began to wound and a shower of enemy fire had caused more casualties. The Platoon Leader radioed to the Company Commander for reinforcements.

Loading the 1st Platoon with ammunition, the Company Commander committed it to assist in the attack. As the 1st Platoon crawled toward the 3rd Platoon position, several men were wounded not far beyond the line of departure. Lieutenant Jay M. Gano, the newly arrived 1st Platoon Leader, was killed when he had almost reached the intermediate knoll on his first attack.

Soon some enemy defenders came out of their bunkers and suddenly appeared on the slope of Hill 520 descending toward the 3rd Platoon. The platoon’s riflemen opened fire, the ammunition bearers fired their carbines, and even the machine gunner began firing his pistol.

A brush fire had started in the area between the 3rd Platoon and the company’s original position. The haze and smoke from the fire drifted north over the 1st Platoon, making it impossible for the company commander to see the objective. Seizing a chance, he ordered his machine guns at the line of departure to fire on Hill 520 and the fire was very effective.

Under cover of the machine gun fire the 1st Platoon Leader sent wounded men to the rear and then worked his platoon forward, meeting eight or ten wounded men from the 3rd Platoon who were making their way back to the company. The 3rd Platoon needed more ammunition, and Lieutenant Riddle sent a squad from the 2nd Platoon up with eight boxes.

In the meantime, the 3rd and 1st Platoon Leaders planned their assault.
Several enemy mortar shells now fell among the 1st Platoon, wounding six more men. The platoon now had eleven men besides the leader; the 3rd Platoon about twelve. After the ammunition arrived, the two platoon leaders called off their long-range supporting fire and then assaulted with his men deployed in a skirmish line, firing as they moved forward.

60 yards of open ground lay between the jump-off point and enemy trenches on the slope of the objective. All went well until, halfway across, the enemy commenced firing automatic weapons. Nevertheless, the advance continued. When the skirmish line reached the base of knoll, the enemy stopped firing and began throwing fragmentation and concussion grenades, causing trouble on the attackers. One of the grenades wounded the 3rd Platoon Leader. One corporal, seeing the skirmish line falter, picked up his machine gun and walked forward, firing as he advanced. When he reached the base of the hill an enemy grenade exploded at his feet and broke both of his legs. But he set up his gun and continued to fire until the attack stalled. Two men dragged him back. The wounded man was Corporal Arne Severson.

The 1st Platoon prepared to make a second attempt, this time a close-in envelopment of the objective. The 1st Platoon Leader called off the supporting fire again and led a dozen of his men down the hill toward the south, where they could move without being seen or fired upon by the enemy. They then climbed up the hill, moving north to the top of Hill 502. When they broke defilade, the enemy opened fire and began throwing grenades again. A concussion grenade hit the platoon leader. His men struggled back to the platoon base, believing the platoon leader dead. But Corporal High, Acting Platoon Leader, regained consciousness within a few minutes and returned to the platoon base where he reorganized the remaining men — about twenty in all.

The 23rd US Regimental Headquarters, meanwhile, had sent three flamethrower operators to the 2nd Battalion, two of them designated for Company G and one for Company F. The G Company Commander sent all three flamethrowers with three men to the 1st Platoon. One operator was wounded almost immediately upon leaving the line of departure. The other two were sent out directly to the front upon their arrival at the 1st Platoon.

The operators crawled into positions from where they could place flame on the foremost bunker on Hill 520. As soon as this bunker was destroyed the 1st Platoon Leader led his platoon around to the left and a skirmish line facing another enemy bunker on the south side of the hill. But the flame thrower failed to work.

There were now only two enemy bunkers hindering the assault. A machine
gun was firing from each. The assaulting platoon decided to assault without the flame thrower. A BAR team moved forward to hit one bunker while the platoon leader, together with a rifleman and the third flame-thrower operator, walked toward another. Ten yard from the objective bunker, the second flame thrower failed to work too. Standing exposed to enemy fire, the operator took it apart but was unable to repair it.

The Platoon Leader nevertheless prevented the enemy from firing and neutralized the bunker. Just about that time an automatic weapon began firing from another bunker on the left. The Platoon Leader approached it from one side, a man from another, while a third man covered them. A private threw a grenade into the bunker, and the gun stopped firing.

With only a few men firing, the Platoon Leader and his four or five men launched the final assault on the top of Hill 520. The assault group moved on around the hill, firing into three other bunkers and all were empty. The attackers observed from the top of the hill that eight enemy soldiers running over the hill toward the northwest. On the north side of Hill 520 there was a bunker that had been the enemy's command post. The Platoon's men fired upon eight enemy soldier, still holding their weapons, and the NK Communists threw up their hands and surrendered themselves. A few minutes later, four more enemy soldiers came out of another bunker that had been bypassed and surrendered. Some of the prisoners were carrying UNC safe-conduct passes in their hands.

The knoll was secure at 1600 hours, 10 October and by 1800 hours the whole of Hill 520 was cleared of the enemy. Company G of the 23rd US Regiment had suffered slightly over 30 casualties, most of them were due to minor grenade wounds.

Thus, the attack on Hill 520 started at 1300 hours and ended at 1600 hours.

Thus one company-sized attack - - 200 yards from the line of departure to the objective - - required three hours and over 30 casualties. The assault for this peculiar hill was one of typical actions conducted by a small unit by at this stage of the ground battle.

The men of Company G, the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment fought the battle courageously throughout the attack action. They must be commended very highly for their courage, their determination, and their aggressive action.

Upon the seizure of Hill 520, the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry tied in on its left with the 72nd Tank Battalion, completing a defensive line across the high ground separating the Mundung-ni Valley and the Satae-ri Valley in the 2nd US Division zone.

On the other hand, at 1300 hours on the 12th, the 1st Battalion of the 38th
Operations in the Fall

Infantry attacked against Hill 974 which was fallen two hours later. Now it poised to attack on Hill 1220.

Both Task Force Sturman and the 72nd Tank Battalion made new thrusts on the 12th, again inflicting heavy enemy casualties. The tanks of the task force concentrated their efforts on Hill 851 where the enemy had resisted every effort of the 23rd Regiment to reach the crest.

During the two days of 11 and 12 October, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry as well as the French Battalion inched up the hill, bunker by bunker, where the 23rd Regiment of the 13th NK Division was defending, supported by the 21st NK Regiment in the immediate rear and the 19th NK Regiment in the Satac-ri Valley. The 3rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Craven) shifted to the spur between Hills 520 and 851 to apply pressure from the west.

On the night of 12–13 October, the 1st Battalion and French Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Monclar) launched a night attack against Hill 851 where the bitter fighting raged throughout the night. At 0530 hours, 13 October, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment and the French Battalion launched a final assault storming the peak of Hill 851 and by 0630 hours they had captured the long-sought crest. After thirty days of hard fighting, the 23rd US Regiment had taken the whole Heartbreak Ridge to stay.

The Battle for Hill 1220: Heartbreak Ridge was now in the friendly possession but westward, on 13 October, the 1st Battalion of the 38th US Regiment was still struggling to take Hill 1220, the so-called Kim Il-sung Range. The attackers dug-in for the night while the Netherlands Battalion, relieved by the 9th US Regiment, moved up behind to assault the next morning. (See Sketch Map 24.)

On 14 October, the Netherlands Battalion jumped off at first light against Hill 841, the peak flanking Hill 974 to the north, and by 1430 hours it had secured the crest against moderate resistance.

Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry attacked up to Hill 1220. The attacking elements had reached to within 250 meters of the crest by 1430 hours, but could not inch further upward thereafter. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment, meanwhile, had moved up during the attack and tied in with the 1st Battalion on the ridgeline leading to Hill 1220 at dusk.

On 15 October, the 3rd Battalion moved out to take Hill 1220 at the first light, passing through the 1st Battalion. It pressed hard the attack under cover of heavy fire support and captured the final objective of the 38th US Regiment by mid-afternoon.

The capture of Hill 1220 brought the 2nd US Division abreast of a new defense line. Stretching from the peak of Hill 1220 in the west, it arched east-
ward across the peaks of Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 1243, and thence into the northern rim of the Punchbowl. Operation Touchdown was over.

The struggle to secure this new line had been one of the most vicious offensive actions the 2nd US Division had ever undertaken.

With the successful end of Operation Touchdown the X US Corps had removed the sag in the Punchbowl and Mundung-ni areas, thus shortening the X corps' lines and bringing them into phase with those of the IX US Corps to the west.

On 20 October, the relief between the 2nd and 7th US Divisions began in place, and by 22 October the 2nd US Division was headed southward in trucks to become corps reserve after 103 days of continuous combat.

**The Battle Losses:** The costs for long, bitter battle in the Punchbowl and Mundun-ni area were high for both sides.
Operations in the Fall

On the enemy side, the V NK Corps had been destroyed and replaced by the 67th CCF Army. The II NK Corps had also been decimated. The 6th, 12th, and 13th NK Divisions and 204th CCF Division all suffered seriously. On Heartbreak Ridge, the 23rd US Regiment had captured prisoners from six Communist regiments. And all of these had taken place during the period when the truce talks had been suspended.

Estimates by the 2nd US Division of the enemy losses totaled close to 25,000 men, including 1,473 counted killed, 8,389 estimated killed, 606 prisoners, and 14,204 estimated wounded. Approximately half of these casualties had come during Operation Touchdown.

The 2nd US Division had suffered 3,745 casualties, including 597 killed, 3,064 wounded, and 84 missing in action, during the period from 13 September to 15 October, with the 23rd US Regiment and its attached French Battalion
incurred almost half of this total. The 23rd US Regiment took 1,832 casualties during the Heartbreak Ridge action.

On the other hand, ammunition expenditures were also high. Besides the millions of rounds of small arms ammunition that were used, the 2nd US Division infantrymen received the following artillery support: 76-mm. gun - 62,000 rounds; 105-mm. howitzer - 401,000 rounds; 155-mm. howitzer - 84,000 rounds; and 8-inch howitzer - 13,000 rounds. The division's mortar crews sent over 119,000 rounds of 60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortar fire and 57-mm. recoilless rifle teams directed nearly 18,000 rounds at the enemy.

Moreover, the Fifth US Air Force flew 842 sorties over the Heartbreak Ridge area, dropping 250 tons of bombs on the enemy. Against the deep bunkers of the enemy, anything less than a direct hit was ineffective, but the airstrikes were so good for morale.

The Battle Lesson: There were many points of similarity between the battles of Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge. In both cases, the enemy had organized strong defensive positions in depth and had advantage of defiladed routes to bring in logistical support and reinforcements. The UNC ground forces had to advance over exposed routes which the enemy artillery and mortar fire hit very effectively.

On Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 931 itself was the center peak of three that were within small arms range of each other. While continuing to hold it the enemy could put down well aimed and observed fire on the neighboring two peaks. But what added even more to its strength for the enemy was the fact that its slope on the eastern side facing the 2nd US Division troops was rocky and almost perpendicular for the last 250 to 300 yards. Ascent by foot troops was necessarily slow. On the reverse or western side, the slope was less steep and was of dirt. Into this slope, the enemy had dug his many bunkers of such strength as to resist even a direct hit from friendly 105-mm. howitzers. These bunkers, only 25 to 35 yards from the topographical crest of the hill, were numerous enough to provide complete protection to some 400 to 500 men.

During artillery and air bombardments, the enemy troops remained in their strong bunkers, and when the artillery or air attacks were lifted they had ample time to return to their entrenched positions before friendly troops could scale the last very steep and rocky slope 200 to 300 yards on the attacking side.

Another lesson to note in that initially, in attacking Bloody and Heartbreak, enemy capabilities had been underestimated. Each had been planned as a small-scale advance to straighten out a front line sag and each had suffered from a lack of adequate reserve to reinforce and consolidate the objectives after they
were won. The 38th US Regiment, for instance, had remained in division reserve until October despite the need for its reserve.

At any rate, the battles for Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges were, perhaps, the most fiercest battles that had experienced yet up to that time in the Korean War. The deeds which the 2nd US Division once again distinguished itself in the Punchbowl and Mudung-ni area constituted a shining chapter in the battle history of the US Army.

Section 3. Advance in the West
(3 – 31 October 1951)

Operation Plans Cudgel and Wrangler

Shortly after the operation for Heartbreak Ridge got under way in September 1951, General Van Fleet drew up a plan, called "Operation Cudgel," for an ambitious advance in the I and IX US Corps sectors on the west and central front. This operation was to be followed up by another equally amphibious operation, called "Operation Wrangler," on the east coast.

Since the vitally important Chorwon–Kumwha railroad was exposed to enemy artillery fire and attack, Plan Cudgel envisioned a 15-kilometer advance forward from the Wyoming Line to protect the railroad line and to force the enemy to give up his forward positions.

Plan Wrangler was aimed at cutting off the enemy forces opposing the I ROK and X US Corps on the right flank of the UNC front. If this operation were successful, the forward UNC line would run between Pyonggang and Kojo, a town on the east coast about 40 kilometers below Wonsan. For the landing force, General Van Fleet proposed to use US Marine forces with a ROK division following them into the Kojo beach area. He frankly recognized himself that this operation would be a calculated risk and might lead to a dangerous enemy counterattack on the west flank as the amphibious forces tried to link up with the IX US Corps along the Kumsong–Kojo road.

General Van Fleet submitted these plans, the first one on 19 September and the other on 23 September, to General Ridgway, recommending for a quick decision on them. But a few days later he discarded both plans himself as he had cancelled out "Plan Talons" earlier on 5 September. Taking into con-
sideration the probable costs of "Plan Cudgel," General Van Fleet preferred to take another course of action which far less ambitious and less hazardous one in the I US Corps zone. Originally, this new plan was recommended by Lieutenant General J. W. O'Daniel, the I US Corps Commander at the end of September. According to the plan, called "Operation Commando," the I US Corps was to advance ten kilometers to a new defense line called Jamestown, which would allow the corps to strength its supply lines by reducing the truck hauls during the winter months, thus enabling the friendly forces to develop the rail line from Seoul to Chorwon to Kumhwa.

**Operation Commando**

(3 – 19 October)

Operation Commando, developed initially from Operation Plan "Cudgel" by process of amendment, was a complicated and ambitious offensive, involving all four divisions of the I US Corps and the 25th US Division of the IX US Corps, as a part of an over-all Eighth US Army operation being conducted during the autumn months of 1951.

Earlier in late August, the truce talks at Kaesong had ground to a halt, and the Communist forces had put the summer lull to use digging in their lines and building up their strength. Then they began throwing occasional probing attacks against UNC's outposts all along the line.

To counter such an enemy show of force, the UNC ground forces were carrying out limited-objective attacks at various enemy-held key terrain features during September. To the east, the X US Corps launched a series of determined attacks to remove the sag particularly in the Punchbowl sector and in the Mundung-ni area. There raged bitter fighting continuing into October, and Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge changed hands repeatedly; each time at heavy casualties to both sides, reminding the world that the fighting of the Korean War had by no means faded as had the armistice talks.

General Van Fleet had decided to prevent the UNC forces from stagnating by launching limited-objective attacks, and also to keep the enemy off balance and seize more and more key terrain along the front.

While the bitter battle for Heartbreak Ridge still raged in the east, the I US Corps with its main command past at Uijongbu, had completed the plans for the new offensive in the west. As early as 24 September, initial plans were issued for this general advance of the I US Corps lines. These plans had been
Operations in the Fall

revised by the end of September. The new offensive action was named "Operation Commando," and 3 October was fixed as D-Day. The corps opened a new tactical command post in the vicinity of Korim-dong, about four and a half kilometers north of Yonchon, at 1630 hours, 3 October.

Line Jamestown: In the I US Corps sector, strongly dug-in Communist forces held a commanding series of ridgelines, especially in the west of Yonchon and Chorwon, entirely too close to the railroad running northward from Seoul through Yonchon and Chorwon to Kumhwa. Disruption of this railroad would have meant disruption of what became a friendly main supply line to the west-central sector. Accordingly, the Eighth US Army had ordered the I US Corps to seize and secure a new forward line, named "Jamestown," by a corps-sized offensive operation.

The Jamestown Line began on the west bank of the Imjin River about 14 and a half kilometers northeast of Munsan, then arched gently northeast to the village of Samichon on Sami-chon (river). For the next 16 kilometers Jamestown ran northeast, rejoining the Imjin River near Kyeho-dong, then hugged the high ground south of Yokkok-chon (river) for some 15 kilometers until it reached the Chutoso area, nearly 10 kilometers northwest of Chorwon. From Chutoso, Jamestown ran east by north for about 16 kilometers, ending approximately eight kilometers northeast of Chorwon at the village of Chungasan.

Seizure of the key terrain features along this line would screen the Yonchon-Chorwon Valley lines of communication from enemy observation and artillery fire, permit line of resistance to be advanced. Furthermore, the I US Corps offensive would keep the enemy off balance and prevent the UNC ground troops from getting stale and stir up troops with fighting spirit.

Concept of Operations: Operation Commando called for the I US Corps to employ all of its four divisions in the offensive on the whole corps front to secure the Jamestown Line and one from the neighboring IX US Corps to prevent the development of a sag along the corps boundaries.

On the western flank of the I US Corps, the 1st ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Park Im Hang, would leave the Wyoming Line, cross the Imjin River, and move toward Kaesong. The 1st British Commonwealth Division, under Major General A. J. H. Cassels, was on the east flank of the 1st ROK Division and would seize the high ground between Sami-chon and Kyeho-dong. Still farther east, the 1st US Cavalry Division, commanded by Major General Thomas L. Harrold, was to attack to the northwest on a 13-kilometer front between Kyeho-dong and Kamgol. On the right flank of the I US Corps, the
3rd US Division, with Major General Robert H. Soule in command, would advance and capture Hill 281, over nine and a half kilometers northwest of Chorwon, and Hills 373 and 324, some 11 kilometers west of the city. The 3rd US Division was also to link up at Chungasen with the 25th US Division of the IX US Corps, commanded by Major General Ira P. Swift, as the 25th US Division advanced to take over defensible terrain north of the confluence of the Hantangang River and Namdae-chon northeast of Chorwon.

Elements of five CCF armies -- the 65th, 64th, 17th, and 42nd -- would have to be pushed back before the Jamestown Line could be reached, but the basic mission of the Eighth US Army was to seek out and destroy the enemy, as General Van Fleet remarked to the press on 30 September.

**Operation Orders:** The gist of the operation orders related with Operation Commando was as follows. (See Sketch Map 25.)

The I US Corps:

1. The I US Corps attacks at 0600, 3 October to seize and secure critical terrain, to organize, occupy and defend along Line Jamestown.

2. The 1st ROK Division attack at 0600, 3 October in zone and seize objective Moon (Hill 146–Hill 191 west of Pungryi) and organize, occupy and defend from positions along Line Jamestown.

3. The 1st Commonwealth Division attack at 0600, 3 October in zone and seize objective Foster (including northern portion of Pungryi through Hill 187) and objective Moore (which included Maryang-san–Kochon-ni west of the Imjin River) and organize, occupy and defend from positions along Line Jamestown.

4. The 1st US Cavalry Division:

   a. Attack at 0600, 3 October in zone northwestward with two regiments, seize and secure objective Coure (Hill 287–Hill 346–Hill 243–Hill 250 south of Yokkuk-chon) and objective Craig (Hill 327 in Kahyon-ni and Hill 347) and organize, occupy and defend from positions along Line Jamestown.

   b. After the seizure of objective Craig, be prepared to assist in the seizure of objective Butler (Hill 324 in Tumul-li–Hill 299–Hill 255 in Chunto-dong) from the west. Provide flank security for the north flank of an exploitation force.

   c. Be prepared for one regiment from the 3rd US Division reinforced with armor to pass through the cavalry division zone to seize objective Butler, and coordinate movement with the 3rd US Division.

5. The 3rd US Division:

   a. Attack at 0600, 3 October in zone with two regiments to seize objective (Hill 281–Chungnye-ri–Hill 266 in Sanglejak) and organize, occupy and defend from positions along Line Jamestown.

   b. Be prepared to attack, on corps order, with one regiment reinforced with armor, through zone of the 1st US Cavalry Division to seize objective Butler from the west. This plan to be implemented only if enemy resistance precludes envelopment of objective Butler from the north and east.
Operations in the Fall

(c) Be prepared for the 1st US Cavalry Division to assist in the seizure of objective Butler after objective Craig has been seized.

(d) Coordinate movement in the 1st US Cavalry Division zone with the 1st Cavalry Division.

(6) Boundary between the 1st ROK Division and the 1st Commonwealth Division changed effective at 1315 hours, 1 October.

(7) Following the boundary change between the 1st US Cavalry Division and the 3rd US Division to be effective only if alternative plan of seizing objective Butler from the west is implemented.

The IX US Corps: In coordination with Operation Commando of the I US Corps left flank elements of the IX Corps attack at 0600, 3 October to seize and secure most favorable terrain along a line (Chungasan—Chongyon-ni) and prepare new defensive position along the new line. Establish contact with the 3rd US Division in the vicinity Chungasan.

The 1st US Cavalry Division: During the attack preparation, in the 1st US Cavalry Division sector, patrols went out as usual to screen the impending operation, and their reports, coupled with intelligence reports and the results of aerial reconnaissance, gave a general idea of the nature of the enemy defenses in the areas to be attacked. The enemy was obviously well dug-in in depth along his main line. Particularly, rugged hills and ridges were protected by an extensive system of bunkers and trenches. The bunkers were deep and carefully built.

Furthermore, the enemy troops holding these excellent positions were well supplied and equipped. The summer lull, while the truce negotiations continued, had given the Communist forces a good opportunity to prepare themselves well.

Operation Commando began at 0600 hours, 3 October, and the 1st ROK, 1st Commonwealth, 3rd US, and 25th US Divisions met relatively light to moderate opposition as they advanced to take their assigned objectives along the Jamestown Line, while the 1st US Cavalry Division units had to battle for every foot of ground. The enemy concentrated his resistance in the 1st Cavalry Division zone, where the savage resistance showed beyond expectations in its intensity.

Elements of the 139th and 141st Divisions of the 47th CCF Army manned the enemy’s main line of resistance facing the 1st US Cavalry Division and they had constructed defenses similar to those encountered on Heartbreak Ridge by the 2nd US Division in the east - - strong bunkers supporting each other with automatic weapons fire, and with heavy concentrations of artillery and mortars interdicting the approach routes to the hills and ridges. Barbed wire aprons and mines guarded the trenches and bunkers and the Red Chinese were
well stocked in ammunition and supplies.

The enemy strongholds in the 1st Cavalry Division objective areas included Hill 230, Hill 250 and a huge, rock-like mass, Hill 346. From there the objective line followed the ridges north, past Hill 287 and Hill 313, to another particularly well fortified position on Hill 418 west of Chorwon. Within these limits, the 1st Cavalry Division was to drive the enemy from his excellent defensive positions and secure them.

The 1st Cavalry Division had the 70th US Tank Battalion under Major Carrol
McFall's, Jr., and the 16th Reconnaissance Company operate as a task force on his left flank.

The mission of Task Force Mac, as it was called, was to advance along the east bank of the Imjin River toward Kyeho-dong, tying with the 1st Commonwealth Division's attack to the west and protecting the left flank of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment. The 5th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Irving Lehrfeld, and the 7th US Cavalry, under Colonel Dan Gilmer, would attack abreast across the division front. The 8th US Cavalry Regiment, with Colonel Eugene J. Field in command, was placed in division reserve.

All of the division artillery battalions were to participate in the operation. The 61st and 82nd Field Artillery Battalions, 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers respectively, would support the 5th Cavalry, while the 77th and 99th (minus) Field Artillery Battalions, both 105-mm. howitzer, would support the 7th Cavalry.

In addition, the following units of the I US Corps field artillery were to provide general support to the 1st Cavalry Division: The 936th Battalion (155-mm. howitzer): A Battery, 17th Battalion (8-inch howitzer); and A and B Batteries, 204th Battalion (155-mm. guns). These artillery battalions were along the main line of resistance, six and a half to nine and a half kilometers from the Jamestown Line.

(1) The Initial Phase: An hour before the attack was launched, the artillery along the I US Corps front began to soften up the enemy defense positions. Then at 0600 on 3 October the five UNC divisions moved out toward their respective objectives.

In the 1st US Cavalry Division sector, the enemy response was immediate and violent. All units of the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments immediately ran into a wall of steel. The 5th Cavalry was to take the four intermediate hill objectives, namely Hills 222, 272, 346, and 287.

The Communist forces directed artillery and mortar fire at the three battalions of the 5th Cavalry as they attacked up the hills, and as soon as the I US Corps artillery lifted, the Red Chinese rushed out to their fighting positions and added heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and grenade fire to half the attack.

That first day, the 5th Cavalry could secure only Hill 222; the 3rd Battalion captured the hill by a frontal assault. Farther north, its 2nd Battalion assaulted Hill 272 six times and won a foothold on it, but could not maintain its position against six enemy counterattacks. Thus withdrawing later in the day. Against Hill 346, the key stronghold in the 5th Cavalry sector, almost no progress at
all was marked.

The situation in the 7th Cavalry area to the east was quite similar as the enemy reacted in equally violent fashion. Attacking with the 3rd, Greek, and 2nd Battalions abreast, the 7th Cavalry attempted to storm Hills 418 and 313 along with the ridge and high ground extending from these points. The Greek Battalion, attached to the 7th Cavalry, assaulted Hill 313 and heavily engaged in hand to hand battle. Extremely heavy casualties finally forced the Greeks to pull back for the night. The 2nd Battalion met similar action when it stormed against Hill 418 where it suffered also heavy casualties from the Red Chinese counterattacks that followed. Many positions changed hands three or four times during the course of the day.

Meanwhile, Task Force Mac on the left flank encountered heavy mine concentrations coupled with a heavy weight of artillery and mortar fire. By the end of the day, it had made little gains.

By the end of the first day, the supporting artillery had fired over 15,000 rounds at the enemy and the Chinese Communist hordes had committed the bulk of their 2nd CCF Artillery Division to help back the advance of the 1st US Cavalry Division. The enemy employed most of his available artillery against the 1st US Cavalry Division by committing the artillery pieces in direct support and counterbattery roles. In the process, however, enemy artillery locations were revealed and soon began to receive attention from the 1 US Corps artillery and Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers.

On 4 October, the pattern of fighting was similar to the first day. Again units of the 5th Cavalry reached Hill 272, only to suffer casualties, thus being driven off by furious Red counterattacks. Other elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment attempted to close in on Hill 346 and Hill 230, but were halted far short of their objectives.

Similarly, all the attacks of the 7th Cavalry against Hill 313 and Hill 418 were unsuccessful. Elements of the 8th Cavalry reinforced the 7th Cavalry Regiment on the right and assaulted the ridges west of Hill 418, but the enemy clung tenaciously to his positions.

When the enemy was driven off, he expended manpower freely to retake the lost ground. Each enemy company was using ten to twelve machine guns and large quantities of hand grenades. The latter caused the bulk of the 1st US Cavalry Division’s casualties as the close combat grew more bitter just like the 2nd US Division had encountered on Heartbreak Ridge.

During the second day the 1st US Cavalry Division marked one small gain in the seizure of some high ground near Hill 287, from which the Red defenders
Operations in the Fall

withdrew to Hill 287 itself.

After two days of bitter fighting, it was evident that none but the most strenuous efforts would drive the communist odds from their strong defenses. Estimates of needed replacements, ammunition and other supplies were all being revised upward in the face of this all-out resistance.

During the day units of the 104th CCF Division moved up to reinforce the 139th CCF Division which had been hard hit by the 1st US Cavalry Division’s continued battering of the enemy positions. The cavalry division, in its advance towards Yokkok-chon and Line Jamestown, now had to contend with the bulk of the fresh 47th CCF Army.

Cavalrymen now had a much clearer idea of how well the Red Chinese had fortified themselves. Their defensive positions were elaborate. They had built huge, deep bunkers, covered at times with as much as fifteen feet or more of logs, rocks and earth. Between these strong points, along the reverse slopes of the hills, ran an intricate network of trenches.

More than this, the enemy had built up his firepower enormously. His emplacements were defended by a surprising number of machine guns, delivering carefully interposed fire. From the rear, Red mortars and artillery fired a unprecedented number of rounds, even when under the observation of UNC’s airplanes. During one 24-hours period, for example, some 3,300 rounds were reported to have fallen in the 7th US Cavalry Regimental sector alone.

The extreme difficulty of the operation, however, was perhaps mainly due to the enemy’s willingness to expend his manpower lavishly, holding positions and counterattacking to regain hills and ridges, once they were lost. The Red Chinese had never changed their human-wave tactics. Many of these persistent counterattacks were launched by fresh troops who had been held behind the lines, close to the fighting but out of contact. However, difficult as it was to gain positions it was even more difficult to hold them, in these early stages, against the repeated desperate CCF assaults. (See Situation Map 3, Appendix IX.)

Nevertheless, by the end of the third day the enemy main line of resistance had begun to crack in the 7th US Cavalry Regimental sector to the north. The 2nd Battalion of the regiment moved out and took just a side of the peak of Hill 313. On the other hand, the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry moved to the division’s right flank and secured Hill 418 against scattered resistance during the night. By the afternoon, the 1st Battalion was able to tie in with the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on the east flank of the corps front.

On the following day, 6 October, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry launched
an attack on Hill 334, west of Hill 418, and after two attempts, seized the objective. Farther south, at Hill 287, over 4,000 yards southwest of Hill 334, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry fought its way toward the crest and gained a foothold on Hill 287 at nightfall.

Prisoners of war taken on 5–6 October indicated that the Red Chinese were falling back on newly prepared defense lines 5,000 to 7,000 yards to the northwest and that many units had been decimated in the opening days of the offensive: food and ammunition stocks, they also reported, were becoming exhausted.

On 6 and 7 October, these successes were consolidated. At this time units were shifted along the line, and the Thailand Battalion moved from division reserve to be attached to the 8th US Cavalry Regiment.

On 7 October, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry cleared Hill 287 of all opposition, while the 3rd Battalion, despite seriously depleted, beat off several counterattacks and pushed forward to seize Hill 347, a little over three kilometers southwest of Hill 418.

The 3rd Battalion, attacking from the south and southeast, began to clear the hill at the end of the day, while the 2nd Battalion was taking Hill 334. The capture of Hill 347 meant that the 1st US Cavalry Division now dominated the high ground comprising Line Jamestown in the northeastern half of the divisional sector.

Up to this time, the Chinese Communists fought bitterly before relinquishing
this cavalry sector, and a maximum effort was required to drive them out. For its part in the action on Hill 313 and neighboring high ground, the Greek Battalion later received a distinguished unit citation, another indication of the outstanding heroism and fierce determination that were exhibited during successful completion of Operation Commando.

To the south, however, the breach in the northeast had little immediate effect upon the enemy defense of the hills across the 5th Cavalry front. The battered enemy line still held, in spite of the overwhelming firepower thrown against it. The formidable system of heavy bunkers, interconnected trenches and escape routes offered such security that bitter hand to hand combat often was necessary to breakthrough and seize the ground.

During an artillery barrage, the Reds could withdraw by means of these trenches and re-enter when the artillery lifted. When friendly troops neared the emplacements, therefore, they were met with a shower of grenades and a wall of fire through which it was necessary to charge in order to overrun the trenches and destroy the enemy. The advances of the 1st Cavalry Division, thus far, were slow and bitter.

(2) The Second Phase: After five days, the enemy forces had given up part of their line, but they held tenaciously to the remainder of the defenses, in spite of constant bombardment that took a great toll. In many cases, the dogged enemy defense system produced a situation in which the American assault forces attained an objective in insufficient strength to resist the enemy counterattacks that followed.

During the next week, the attack went on with slight variation as the 1st US Cavalry Division devised new ways of making the enemy defenses untenable. From the air, B-26 bombers and UNC's fighters battered the enemy with napalm and with 1,000-pound bombs. Two self-propelled 155-mm. guns and one self-propelled 8-inches, attached to the division, ranged up and down the sector delivering direct fire against the enemy's fortified positions and installations.

Despite the use of every available weapons, the attacking troops could make only inch-by-inch progress for most of the next week.

On 9 October, the 3rd Battalion of the 8th US Cavalry Regiment attacked up a ridgeline to the right of Hill 346, after a softening-up barrage by seven artillery battalions. The 8th Cavalry men seized and secured their first objective and pushed on toward another peak, closer to Hill 346. Heavy fire from enemy bunkers, however, soon halted this advance. Other elements moved slowly closer to the opposing lines. The closer they came, the more desperate became the resistance.
On the morning of 10 October, when a company of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment received a strong "suicide charge" attack that continued for several hours, friendly air support arrived and forced the enemy to break contact and withdraw. A more fierce enemy counterattack came, on the night of 11 October, against the 1st Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment. In the north-central sector of the division zone, this battalion had moved out along a ridgeline running northwest from Hill 287 to positions forward of Line Jamestown. During the dark early morning hours, an estimated enemy battalion hit the 7th Cavalry elements with three vicious attacks, all of which were repulsed. A fourth attack came at 0430 hours and made success in assaulting against the friendly defenders who had been weakened greatly by the previous assaults. The enemy cut wire communication lines and jammed radio channels throughout the night, and the resulting disruption of communication contributed materially to his success. A company of the 8th US Cavalry Regiment was sent to aid the beleaguered companies and helped the survivors in withdrawing.

Meanwhile, the bombardment went on. On 10 October, after fifteen months of action, the one-millionth artillery round was fired by artillery batteries organic to the 1st US Cavalry Division.

Three days later, another major crack appeared in the enemy lines. After eight days of UNC pressure against Hills 346, 230, and 272, the Red Chinese still refused to give ground. But, now unable to withstand the heavy bombardment any longer, the Red defenders of Hill 272 pulled back on 12 October and elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment took possession the next day without contact.

(3) The Final Phase - Operation Polecharge: With the fall of Hill 272 on 13 October in the 1st US Cavalry Division's offensive, greater portion of Line Jamestown was in friendly hands, a number of unit command posts displaced forward. Particularly, control of Hill 272 opened the eastern approach to the key hill in the enemy's remaining defense line -- Hill 346.

To bring all the regiments up to the Jamestown Line thus successfully concluding Operation Commando, a new operational plan, called "Polecharge," was put into effect on 15 October. This Operation Polecharge aimed to seize the key terrain in the 5th US Cavalry Regimental sector, which had given the cavalrmen so much trouble ever since the start of the attack, and which the enemy still held. The primary objectives of Polecharge were the enemy strongholds on Hill 230, Hill 250 and Hill 346, plus the high ground around these hills and beyond them in the direction of the Yokkok River. (See Sketch Map 25.)
Operations in the Fall

The 5th and 8th US Cavalry Regiments were ordered to assume the main role of this wind-up operation, while the 7th US Cavalry Regiment and other units, such as the engineers were to consolidate, patrol and begin organization of that part of the Jamestown Line already in friendly hands. Of the attacking regiments, the 5th Cavalry was reinforced with the Belgian Battalion from the 3rd US Division and given the mission of taking Hill 346 and then pushing on to Line Jamestown, while the 8th Cavalry, on the right of the 5th Cavalry, would move in from Hill 272 and if necessary assist the 5th Cavalry.

On 16 October, at 0300, the final phase of Operation Commando began as the 1st Battalion of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment jumped off from the base of Hill 346 up the sheer face to assault positions. After two hours the companies were near the crest, but had come under intense fire despite the cover of darkness, A and C Companies were nearly successful. Heavy fighting along this commanding ridge, however, cost heavy casualties, including most of the officers leading the attack, and the 5th Cavalry men were forced to withdraw. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry encountered the same fashion of resistance and failed in its attempt against Hill 230. The 8th Cavalry’s attack northeast of Hill 346 made some progress, yet could not flank the objective.

Troops of the 1st US Cavalry Division are occupying an enemy-held commanding terrain during Operation Commando in October 1951.
The attack was resumed on 17 October. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry managed to seize Hill 340, just to the left of Hill 346, and the assault on the latter hill itself continued without success. The 2nd Battalion, meanwhile, was flanking Hill 346. To the left of Hill 346, the 3rd Battalion attempted to take Hill 250. But its attempt was blocked and fell back into a defensive perimeter at the end of the day.

That night the enemy units gave up their defenses and retreated to the north. Then on the morning of 18 October the 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry moved forward and took Hill 346 meeting virtually no opposition. The 3rd Battalion also occupied Hill 230 and secured it the same day. The almost constant pounding of these strongholds by every weapon at the command of the division had finally taken such a terrible toll that the Communists could hold their positions no longer.

By nightfall, the 8th US Cavalry had pushed well beyond Hill 287 and controlled the area north and northwest of Hill 346. The enemy resistance here was strong at the start, but a napalm saturation bombing during the day forced the enemy to relinquish this ground.

By 19 October the 1st US Cavalry Division had gained the last of its objectives marking the end of Operation Commando, except for wiping out a scattered pockets of resistance.

The enemy retreated north of Yokkok-chon to his next line of resistance. The sensitivity of the Red Chinese forces to the 1st US Cavalry Division’s advance toward their supply base at Sangnyong did not end with the completion of Commando. Friendly patrols could range freely some 3,000 to 4,000 yards in front of the main line of resistance position on the east, the enemy reacted strongly to every attempt to send probes and patrols across Yokkok-chon toward Sangnyong.

During Operation Commando, the Chinese Communist forces had shown how valuable they considered the control of the terrain in this sector. For the first time they had shifted from the fluid defense system that formed part of their basic tactical doctrine and had dug in depth. The deep bunkers, complex system of trenches, and large stocks of food, supplies, and ammunition stored at the front line positions showed that they intended to stay and defend in place.

Only when losses in men and exhaustion of ammunition supplies forced the Reds to withdraw, could the 1st US Cavalry Division take possession of the Jamestown Line.

In any case, Operation Commando was costly to the Red Chinese forces. They lost not only a carefully prepared winter defense line but large numbers of
men as well. The once powerful 47th CCF Army remained only as a battered remnant. Those who survived had withdrawn to the northwest, where they were feverishly preparing positions, not knowing whether the UNC offensive would be continued.

The 1 US Corps estimates of enemy losses during the 3–19 October period placed the total at well over 21,000 men, including over 500 prisoners. Close to 16,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the enemy by the 1st US Cavalry Division alone, as it reduced the 47th CCF Army to half strength.

The attacking 1 US Corps units suffered also. The corps had taken over 4,000 casualties during the 17-day operation, with the 1st US Cavalry Division suffering over 2,900 of the total. During the period, the cavalry division was engaged almost constantly in the most bitter fighting of the entire Korean War. The effort required in driving an entire CCF army from an excellent defense line was so great as to almost defy description. One of the regiments had committed fully two-thirds of its rear area personnel to plug the gaps left by heavy casualties.

On the other hand, the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, under the command of Brigadier General John H. Hinds, fired the amazing total of 380,856 rounds during the sixteen day period. This caused critical shortages of ammunition, and the seriousness of the situation required excessive speeds and overloading by supply vehicles. Ammunition trains traveled a total of nearly 150,000 miles during the Commando operation in supplying the Division Artillery.

But the task of the 1st US Cavalry Division was not yet ended. There was no relaxation even after 18 October. Its primary interest then centered on the organization and defense of the Jamestown Line. The plan for this work was called Operation Stonewall, approximately enough, since the aim was to create a wall through which the enemy could not possibly counterattack. The cavalrmen could use some of the old CCF defenses against the Chinese Communists but had to be rebuilt, or redug, elsewhere.

One of the biggest tasks confronting the cavalry division, after it had finally gained the Jamestown Line, was the seizure and organization of an outpost line of resistance, several thousand yards in front of the main line. The battle for the outposts would go on steadily until the end of October.

The 1st Commonwealth Division: While the 1st US Cavalry Division sought to capture its assigned objectives against stubborn enemy resistance from the beginning, the 1st British Commonwealth Division, under Major General Cassels, also took part in Operation Commando in its zone of action west of the Imjin River.

The division was to advance from 6,000 to 8,000 yards along the whole
divisional front, and General Cassels assigned the 28th Commonwealth Brigade to take Hill 355 or Kowang-san on the right, while the 25th Canadian Brigade would attack on the left and secure Hill 187, Hill 159, and the neighboring high ground, starting on D plus one. The 28th Brigade was to lead the advance commencing at 0600, 3 October. By the evening of 2 October, all preparations were complete, and troops anticipated that stiff fighting lay ahead grounded on every enemy indication. (See Sketch Map 25.)

Following artillery preparation, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade began the attack at 0600 hours, 3 October with the 1st King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI) Battalion on the left, the 1st King’s Own Scottish Borders (KOSB) Battalion on the center and the Australian Battalion of the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment on the right. In the first day’s attack their progress was slow except the Australian Battalion, which had reached Hill 199. Throughout the day the enemy was hit by a heavy artillery and mortar fire.

On the second day, the KSLI Battalion attacked at first light and had seized Hill 201 by 1000 hours, while the KOSB Battalion had captured Hill 355, the most commanding terrain in the entire divisional sector, by 1300 hours encountering fierce battle.

The 25th Canadian Brigade moved out at 1100 hours on the left of the 28th Brigade, and it captured Hill 187 after two hours of close combat. It continued the attack under heavy enemy bombardment to seize the high ground west of Hill 187.

The third day of the attack, 5 October, the 28th Brigade experienced severe battle. The 3rd Royal Australian Battalion and the 5th Fusiliers Battalion (attached to the 28th Brigade from the 29th Brigade) tried hard to take Hills 317 and 217 respectively, and the Fusiliers failed to capture the objective although it encountered heavy fighting back and forth. The Australian Battalion, under the support of an airstrike and heavy artillery fire, finally captured Hill 317 one of key terrain features in the sector.

In the meantime, during the day the 25th Canadian Brigade encountered relatively lesser resistance and had gained all its objectives by the late afternoon, thus tying in with the 12th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division on its left flank. Results of the third day’s attack, the division inflicted over 100 enemy casualties counted and 36 prisoners taken.

On 6 October, the 5th Fusiliers and the Australian Battalions made desperate efforts to capture their objectives. The Fusiliers once captured Hill 217 but was again fallen back due to a heavy volume of an enemy barrage.

The Australian Battalion made vigorous attempts to take Hill 217 on the
Operations in the Fall

following day but was also failed. American B-29 aircraft dropped four 500 pounds bombs during the night of 7–8 October, while the Australians defeated off the enemy's several night counterattacks.

Following three air strikes on the evening of 8 October, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers Battalion took Hill 217 meeting no opposition, thus completing the capture of the 1st Commonwealth Division's objective in the Commando operation.

On 9 October, the Commonwealth units began to consolidate the newly won positions to meet any eventuality and hold on them.

Thereafter, the 1st Commonwealth Division would find itself a comparatively quiet period during the rest of October, engaging in continued consolidation of its new defense line.

The 3rd US Division: On the east flank of the I US Corps, the 3rd US Division (with the 20th Philippin Battalion Combat Team and the Belgian-Luxembourg Battalion attached) was already in position to complete the seizure of objective Whatts, when the Commando operation was launched. Because the division had been in action to capture the objective for days since late September. Its main effort, therefore, was to concentrate on objective Butler. (See Sketch Map 25.)

Prior to the commencement of Operation Command, the 3rd Battalion, 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division had attacked at 1000 hours, 1 October toward Hill 477 (Chondok-san), a commanding hill south of Yokkok-chon. The 2nd Battalion (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. Cates) was then on Hill 487, better known as Yawol-san, and elements of the 3rd Battalion under Major Clyde H. Baden had seized and lost its intermediate objective Hill 333 southwest of Hill 477 five times against stubborn enemy resistance by nightfall of 1 October.

On 2 October, the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Regiment resumed the attack at 1000 hours from Hill 270 and advanced about 250 yards to the west meeting tenacious enemy opposition, and the attacking elements were forced to return to the starting position in the late afternoon. In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion of the 65th Regiment attacked from Hill 292 north of Hill 487 (Yawol-san) at 0730, 2 October and by 1400 hours had advanced about 300 yards to the northwest heading for Hill 324 against heavy enemy resistance. Attacking elements received 400 rounds of enemy artillery shelling during the attack.

On D-Day for Commando, 3 October, the 15th US Infantry Regiment, with Colonel Thomas A. O'Neil in command, began the attack at 0600 hours with two battalions abreast. The 3rd Battalion continued its main effort to capture Hill 477 by a frontal attack, while the 2nd Battalion advanced from the east.
By 1600 hours, the 3rd Battalion advanced to within 100 yards south of Hill 477 where it engaged in heavy fire fighting with an unknown number of enemy well emplaced in bunkers.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 65th Infantry (with the 20th Philippine BCT attached) maintained positions on the right of Hill 362 while the 2nd Battalion maintained positions along a line extending from Hill 271 to Hill 362 (Soi-san) on the left of the 1st Battalion. The 3rd Battalion was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division effective on 2 October.

The 7th US Regiment, on the other hand, maintained positions along a line extending from Hill 284 in Chungmasan through Hill 255 in Sambong-dong to northeast of Hill 362 (Soi-san).

A company of the 20th Philippine Battalion had been established a patrol base on Hill 284, while the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry maintained a patrol base on Hill 395, to be better famed as White Horse Hill in October 1952.

On the night of 2–3 October, the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Regiment received an enemy counterattack in the vicinity of Hill 477 at 2100 hours and was forced to withdraw approximately 400 yards south by 2250 hours. The 2nd Battalion was also attacked by an estimated two enemy companies about half a kilometer south of Hill 477 but had repulsed by 0615 hours the next morning.

On the second day of the new attack, the 3rd Battalion assaulted and captured the crest of Hill 477 by 1030 hours against moderate enemy resistance. Ten minutes later an estimated 200 enemy began a strong counterattack to retake the hill, but with the aid of friendly small arms and automatic weapons, mortar and artillery fire the battalion repelled the enemy counterattack. At 1230 hours, the enemy again counterattacked lasting until 1540 hours when the friendly battalion was forced to withdraw about 500 yards for the night and also to re-line up the attack posture.

In the meantime, in the 7th US Regimental attack, the 1st Battalion mopped up an estimated enemy company on Hill 281 (to be famed later as Arrowhead Hill derived from its peculiar shape) who offered only light resistance. The 3rd Battalion maintained its position on Hill 266 without enemy contact and dispatched an infantry company and a tank company who established a road block in the vicinity of Taema-ri by 1800 hours. The 2nd Battalion still maintained position on Hill 395, sending out a company-sized patrol to the west of the hill. Thus the 7th US Regiment had secured objective Whatts, one of the 3rd US Division objectives within the two days of the Commando operation,
now threatening the enemy defending on Hill 324 from the northeast. The 65th US Regiment continued to maintain its present positions extending from Hill 362 westward through Rongyang-dong and Hill 265 to Hill 292.

On 5 October, the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Regiment resumed the attack to recapture Hill 477 (Chondok-san) at 1020 hours and retook the hill at 1140 hours with light enemy contact consisting of mortar fire. Elements of the regiment linked up with elements of the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment in the vicinity of Hill 431.

The 20th Philippine Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion, 65th US Regiment at 1130 hours, 5 October on and around Yawol-san, attaching to the 7th US Regiment for operational control effective at 1500 hours.

On 6 October, the 2nd Battalion of the 15th US Infantry jumped off at 0600 hours and rushed in against Hill 324 in Tomil-li and took the hill at 0730 hours. The 1st Battalion moved to the high ground northwest of Yawol-san (Hill 487) and took up positions vacated by the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment at 1145 hours. The 3rd US Division had secured its assigned objectives Bulter and Watts in four days after Operation Commando was launched since 3 October.

Thus, the I US Corps had ended up the large-scale offensive operation for the first time in many months with a great successful result. Henceforth, action for remainder of the year continued light throughout the corps front.

The 25th US Division: In conjunction with the Commando operation in the west by the I US Corps, the 25th US Division of the IX US Corps was ordered to take over defensible terrain north of the confluence of the two rivers, Hantan-gang and Namdae-chon. The Turkish Brigade maintained positions the high ground along the south of the Hantan River northeast of Chorwon with a company-size patrol base in the vicinity of Tin-kol from which patrols were sent out frequently to Hill 503. The 14th and 35th US Regiments also maintained their defenses without meeting any notable incidents, while the 27th US Regiment was remained in division reserve. The 24th US Regiment (minus) closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of Chipo-ri on 1 October 1951 and prepared for inactivation.

On 2 October, a one day before Operation Commando was commenced by the I US Corps, a patrol from the 89th US Tank Battalion of the 25th US Division advanced to the Kumgang-ni (Kumgok) northwest of Kumhwa where it engaged with an unknown number of enemy at 0940 hours until 1010 hours resulting in six enemy killed and four enemy wounded. Thus the entire zone of the 25th US Division sector was relatively quiet during the early days of October. (See Sketch Map 25.)
Elements of the 14th US Regiment started an attack at 0500, 3 October and advanced to the high ground northwest of Hill 430 at 0830 hours without meeting noticeable resistance. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Turkish Brigade attacked at 0500 and 0600 hours respectively and by 0830 hours had advanced to a line extending from the village of Polmal to the northeast of Hajin-ni. The brigade established a company-size patrol base on Hill 376 at 1300 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the brigade occupied a new position on Hill 372 north of Won-ni at 1000 hours.

The 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment established position on Hill 430 at 0830 hours, while 35th US Regiment maintained positions along the high ground from the village of Saemal to the west bank of Kumsong-chon. As a whole, the 25th US Division under Major General Ira P. Swift spent most of time in conducting aggressive patrolling during the first half of October 1951.

Section 4. Offensive in the Kumsong Sector
(13 – 20 October 1951)

While the I US Corps sought to organize the gains of Operation Commando, the IX US Corps made plans to launch a similar operation toward Kumsong. Prior to the new advance operation, the 24th US Division was ordered to initiate relief of the 7th US Division in the current sector starting on 5 October 1951. The 24th US Division opened its new command post at Pafari, seven kilometers northwest of Hwachon, at 1630 hours, 3 October 1951, while its organic regiments and attached units were moving from Kapyong and were assembling in the vicinity of the Hwachon Reservoir.

The 7th US Division (minus two infantry regiments and division artillery), then commanded by Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh, was ordered to move to the vicinity of Kapyong, where it would become EUSAK reserve upon arrival there, while preparing for an employment in the zones of the I and IX US Corps on order. One regiment and the remainder of the division were ordered to remain attached to the IX US Corps.

The 21st Regiment (minus) of the 24th US Division departed the assembly area near Wollo-dong at 0500, 5 October and enroute to relieve the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division, while the 19th Regiment (minus) of the 24th US Division closed in an assembly area south of Chupa-ryong at 1100 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the 21st US Regiment remained with Task Force Byorum in
Operations in the Fall

Jaegung-dong:

The 1st Battalion of the 19th US Regiment relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment in Chu-dong and Tan-dong at 0730, 6 October, while the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion of the 31st US Regiment in place, occupying positions along the high ground on or around Changgo-bong at 1200 hours the same day. The 3rd Battalion took up position on Hill 645 (Chupa-ryong) and neighboring ridge.

The 1st Battalion of the 21st US Regiment maintained positions on the high ground southwest of Chupa-ryong including Hill 534, the 2nd Battalion remained assembled in the rear with Task Force Byorum, and the 3rd Battalion established position along Hill 851 down to the west of Hill 1118 and patrolled to Hill 588 northeast of Hill 851 (Hugunto-ryong). The Colombian Battalion maintained position along the ridge west and northwest of Hill 682 on the west of Hill 851, while the 5th Regiment was still preparing to complete the relief of the 7th US Division elements on 7 October. The 24th US Division, with Major General Blacksheer N. Bryan in command, assumed the responsibility for the 7th US Division sector effective at 1200 hours, 6 October.

On the other hand, the 17th US Regiment less the 2nd Battalion was passed to the EUSAK control at 1500, 6 October and the 2nd Battalion was further attached to the I US Corps control at the same time with the mission of security guard at Munsan.

On 7 October, the 5th Regiment of the 24th US Division relieved the 31st
US Regiment and the Ethiopian Battalion in place; the 3rd Battalion occupied new positions on and around Hill 1073 (Chokkun-san), the 2nd Battalion established position along a line extending from Hill 793 to Hill 752 to Hill 750, and the 1st Battalion occupied along the ridgeline extending from Hill 799 down southeastward to the west of Hill 655 after relieving elements of the 35th Regiment of the 7th US Division at 1200, 7 October. The 24th US Division immediately began to send out patrols forward to develop the enemy situation prior to launch a new IX Corps operation in mid-October.

**Operation Plan**

On 9 October, General Van Fleet visited the IX US Corps command post at Hamunjong-ni and found Lieutenant General William M. Hoge and his division commanders eager to carry out local advances along the corps front. The objectives would be to improve the defensive positions of the divisions in the corps line and to maintain pressure upon the enemy. Since the designed objectives coincided with Eighth US Army directives, General Van Fleet gave his approval. In case of a successful IX US Corps advance, however, there would be one disadvantage. The sag in the X US Corps, which had just eliminated recently, would be replaced by a bulge on the IX US Corps front.

At any rate, the IX US Corps prepared to launch the new offensive with the 24th US Division on the center, the 2nd ROK Division on the left and the 6th ROK Division on the right to advance to a line some six kilometers south of Kumsong. Thus the 24th US Division was flanked by the two ROK divisions on either side and was expected to give tank support to the 2nd ROK Division.

On 10 October, the IX US Corps issued its operation orders as the following gist.

(1) The IX Corps would attack at H-Hour, 13 October 1951 to seize the objective Line Nomad extending from Hoeu on the east bank of Namdae-chon northeastward to Kyojon-ni thence to east to Hill 434—in east to Hill 482 (Wolbong-san)—434 east of Kung-gol to the high ground on and around Hill 479—Hill 504—Hill 551—Tungdae-ri—Hill 462, south of the confluence of Kumsong-chon and Pukhan-gang. Upon the seizure of the objective line “Nomad,” the corps divisions were to prepare defensive.

(2) Approximately 2,000 yards forward of the line, the corps units would send strong patrol in a zone formation. Maintaining contact with the 2nd ROK Division, the 24th US Division would attack and seize Line Nomad in zone, and support the attack of the 2nd ROK Division with minimum two tank
Operations in the Fall

companies.

(3) The 6th ROK Division would attack and seize Line Nomad in zone.

(4) The 31st US Regiment was to prepare to move and occupy the 6th
ROK Division position on Line Wyoming when the 6th ROK Division attacked
toward Line Nomad and to protect the corps right flank north to Line Wyoming.
The IX US Corps adjusted the division boundaries effective at 1900 hours,
12 October, and the 24th US Division opened its new tactical command post
a little north of Sabanggo-ri at 1400 hours the same day, while the 6th ROK
Division opened the tactical command post in the same general area at the
same time.

Offensive on Line Nomad

On the morning of 13 October units of the three divisions moved out and
made gains of some three kilometers during the first day.

In the 24th US Division's offensive, the 19th US Regiment was assigned
to attack on the center, the 5th Regiment on the left and the 21st Regiment
on the right. The 3rd Battalion of the 19th Infantry attacked at 0500 hours
and by 0700 hours had advanced to the high ground north of Hudong-ni where
it engaged with the enemy until 1500 hours. The Colombian Battalion advanced
countering enemy resistance and by 1615 hours secured Hill 569 (Hill 570
on new map) against moderate resistance. The 1st Battalion of the 19th
Regiment established position in the vicinity of Pamsong-kol, while the 2nd
Battalion remained in reserve.

To the right, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment attacked at 0520 hours,
while the 1st Battalion started the attack at 0500 hours. The Colombian
Battalion attacked at 0530 hours, while the 2nd Battalion was attached to the
5th Regiment effective at 0600 hours, 11 October.

The 3rd Battalion dispersed enemy resistance at the north of Hill 851 after
an hour-long fire fight and continued on to establish position for the night
in the vicinity of the southern ridge running from Hill 570.

On the left, meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Regiment
attacked at 0450 hours, and the 1st Battalion met enemy opposition at Hill
519, while other elements continued to advance toward Hill 633 farther north.
The 2nd Battalion of the 5th US Regiment battled with an unknown number
of enemy south of Hill 602 at 1100 hours and at 1730 hours repulsed an
enemy counterattack.
On 14 October, elements of the 19th Regiment in the north of Hudong-ni were forced to withdraw by an enemy counterattack at 0220 hours. But the 1st Battalion of the regiment resumed the attack at 0530 hours, and had advanced to the north of Korisil by 1320 hours when it became engaged heavily. By 1830 hours it farther advanced to Nodong-ni.

The 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry was advanced to Soun-ni by 1830 hours without meeting notable opposition. A tank element also moved up the north along Kumsong-chon and reached Pyoru at 1400 hours.

In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion of the 21st Regiment passed through the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment at 0715 hours and advanced to the north of Hill 735 at 0845 hours dispersing enemy opposition enroute. It farther attacked and advanced through Hill 633 and had reached within short of Hill 482 by 1810 hours.

On the following day, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Infantry resumed the attack at 0625 hours and had secured position on the high ground north of Tusok-tong by 1800 hours. Then the battalion was attached to the 21st US Infantry at the same time.

The 2nd Battalion of the 19th US Infantry had advanced to the objective Hill 479 without meeting enemy contact, while the 3rd Battalion had seized Hill 630 north of Paeson-kol by 0700 hours also without enemy contact.

On 16 October, the 2nd Battalion of the 21st US Infantry continued the attack and at 1100 hours engaged an enemy battalion in the vicinity of Hill 482 (Wolbong-san). The enemy battalion was dispersed north by 1230 hours and the 2nd Battalion advanced to Hill 479 at 1450 hours.

The 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Regiment continued the attack and secured its objective in Wayadunji at 1800 hours against light enemy resistance. The Colombian Battalion closed in a new assembly area in Tongmak-kol also at 1800 hours.

The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment dispersed an estimated enemy battalion near Hill 475 at 1230 hours and by 1820 hours had advanced to Hill 434 near Kung-gol where positions were secured for the night. The 3rd Battalion of the regiment battled with an enemy battalion from 1100 to 1800 hours near Hill 476. The 2nd Battalion continued to advance, thus reaching a line extending from Chuk-tong to Hill 479 during the day.

**Offensive on Line Polar**

Despite stubborn enemy resistance and intense concentrations of artillery fire.
the 24th US Division, 2nd ROK Division, and 6th ROK Division seized and secured Line Nomad on 16 October. The successful outcome led Lieutenant General Hoge of the IX US Corps to issue another order to advance some three kilometers closer to Kumsong. The gist of the operation orders was as follows.

(1) The IX US Corps would resume the attack to seize and secure Line Polar at H-Hour on 17 October 1951.

(2) Objective Line Polar was defined from a point on the 25th US Division—2nd ROK Division boundary at Haso-ri—Ocya-dong—Ponghwa-san (Hill 477)—Kyoam-san (Hill 770), then southeastward to Songdong-ni down to the mouth of Kumsong-chon east of Hill 529.

(3) The 2nd ROK Division, 24th US Division, and 6th ROK Division would:

(a) Continue the attack to seize and secure Line Polar in zone.

(b) Upon the seizure of the objective Line Polar, the divisions were to prepare strong defensive position utilizing most favorable terrain, establish strong outpost line and send strong patrols north in zone to maintain contact with the enemy.

The pattern set up during the initial phase of the IX US Corps advance was repeated during the second phase. General Hoge reported that the enemy reaction seemed to be one of delay rather than a serious effort to hold the line. The Chinese Communist attacks varied from platoon to battalion size and most frequently were launched during the night or just before dawn, heavy artillery and mortar fire accompanied the enemy attacks and hand grenades were used plentifully. Further detailed records of the fighting, primarily on the part of the 24th US Division, is given below.

On 16 October, the boundary between the 2nd ROK and 24th US Divisions was changed: From a point on the present boundary in the vicinity of Hapung-dong—west of Hill 552—Chingmok-tong—Sinyang-dong—Hill 615—due north to Kumsong-chon.

Major General Blackshear M. Bryan, commanding the 24th US Division, assigned the 19th and 21st Regiments to continue the attack toward Line Polar, while the 5th Regiment would attack and destroy the enemy on and around Hill 729. The Colombian Battalion was to move out from Hugunto-ryong (Hill 851) to take part in the advance.

On the central sector of the division front, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 21st US Regiment and two tank companies began to attack at 0530 hours, 17 October. The 1st Battalion advanced, defeating reaction by an enemy
battalion between 1230 and 1440 hours, and by 2000 hours it consolidated
position along Wolbong-ni–Namaun-ni.

The 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry attacked at 0500 hours, and by 1745
hours it established positions on Hill 368 in Tongsan-ni and in Kung-gol. The
3rd Battalion had also advanced to Hill 434 by 1745 hours. Meanwhile, the
Colombian Battalion took up blocking position on Hill 630 north of Paeon-kol,
and under operational control of the 19th Regiment at 0735 hours.

The 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked at 1130 hours from position
on Hill 602 in Samhyon and reached Paeon-kol by 1440 hours.

On 18 October, the Colombian Battalion moved out at 0440 hours and
occupied the objective Hill 476 at 0445 hours without enemy contact. At 0930,
it continued the advance toward Kung-gol.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 21st US Regiment resumed the attack
at 0900 hours and the latter battalion advanced to Hill 552 where it engaged
in a severe battle lasting until 2000 hours. The 3rd Battalion, on the other hand,
Operations in the Fall

upon its relief of the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Regiment, advanced to Hill 468 north of Chon-kol by 1320 hours with no enemy contact.

The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Regiment was reverted to the parent control at 1800 hours, 17 October, and it continued the advance and remained engaged with the enemy on Hill 384 until 1250 hours when the enemy was driven off, thus securing its objective hill.

In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Infantry relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Infantry and occupied position Hill 384 at 0940 hours. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment had secured position in Kuhyon-ni, while the Colombian Battalion continued to screen and patrol the high ground in the vicinity of Hill 630.

On 19 October the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment continued the attack starting at 0715 hours and reached Kahang-ni at 0840 hours meeting no enemy reaction. The 2nd Battalion continued the attack against moderate opposition and had secured the high ground in Nung-dong for the night.

The 2nd Battalion of the 21st Regiment had established position on a ridge line west of Hagogae by 1930 hours, and the 1st Battalion took up a position on Hill 463 for the night. The 3rd Battalion was also had taken a position in Hagogae before nightfall. The Colombian Battalion was reverted to the operation control of the 21st Regiment on 19 October.

On 20 October, the 19th US Infantry attacked for Hill 770 (Kyoam-san) at 0600 hours with the 1st and 2nd Battalions abreast. The 1st Battalion advanced to Hill 467 at 1300 hours where it engaged in bitter fighting until 1645 hours when the enemy was forced to retreat back. The 2nd Battalion secured positions in Sangsan-ni while the 3rd Battalion advanced to Yongo-ri without encountering enemy reaction during the day.

In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked at 0600 for the objective, Chimi-kogae, while the 3rd Battalion, after attacking at the same time, advanced to Hill 379 where it engaged in a bitter battle from 1100 hours to 1740 hours when the friendly elements disengaged and secured positions in Yangyon-ni. The 1st Battalion advanced to a new blocking position facing northeast in Kahang-ni.

The 2nd and 1st Battalions of the 21st US Regiment maintained their positions on Hill 553 and Hill 415 respectively, while the 3rd Battalion jumped off at 0600 hours heading for the objective Hill 477 (Pongwha-san). The Colombian Battalion departed at 0600 hours to screen the area near Hill 552. A tank element was moved out toward Kumsong and by 1615 hours it reached short of Kumsong against light small arms and automatic weapons fire. The tank
element returned to the original position.

On 21 October, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 19th US Infantry attacked at 0700 to take the objective Hill 770. The 3rd Battalion attacked northeast from position on Hill 467 to Yong-ri and then turned and attacked onto Hill 770 from the northwest. The battalion finally seized and secured at 1745 hours against moderate enemy resistance. The 1st and 2nd Battalions assisted in the attack from the southwest and secured position along the high ground south of Kyoam-san (Hill 770) by 1800 hours.

The Colombian Battalion, operating under the 21st US Regiment, secured Hill 393 in Huchon-ni at 1600 hours, while the 2nd Battalion of the 5th US Regiment also secured Hill 442 in Panpyong-ni with no further enemy contact during the day.

Thus, by 21 October, the 24th US Division had gained its second phase objectives. And the IX US Corps, having won through to its second objective line "Polar," now began to organize the defenses. During the following days the 24th US Division sent out several tank forays. One penetrated into Kumsong itself and blew up several enemy installations and a tunnel.

When the operation came to an end on 23 October, General Van Fleet highly commended the 2nd and 6th ROK Divisions for their outstanding showing against the enemy. They had taken their objectives and beaten off the Chinese Communist counterattacks. The sensitivity of the Communists to probes and advances in the Kumsong area was demonstrated by severe losses that they sustained in the 13–23 October period while trying to delay the IX Corps offensive.

With the removal of the sag as well as the control of better defensible, dominant terrain features by the X US Corps in the east and also with the successful attainment of the commanding heights in the Kumsong sector by the IX US Corps, the UNC ground forces were now in further better position to fight at the truce negotiation front with accelerative pressure upon the Communist aggressors on the one hand and also to seek out more ambitious, larger offensive operation to the north if the circumstances were permitted on the other hand.

Section 5. Action in the Soyang River Area
(1 – 31 October 1951)

During the fall of 1951, the 1st US Marine Division still remained in the
sector north of the Punchbowl defending the right flank of the X US Corps front.

From 1 to 13 October seven battalions, with the 2nd Battalion of the 1st US Marine Regiment in immediate reserve, manned the main line of resistance--three ROK Marine battalions on the left of the division sector; two 5th US Marines battalions (relieved by the 7th US Marines on 11 October) in the center; and two 1st US Marines battalions on the right. Patrolling and sniper teams were employed throughout the period, with contacts few and far between. More destruction was inflicted on the enemy by observed artillery, tank, and mortar fire.

A new emphasis was placed on psychological warfare during these defensive operations. 87 NK Communist soldiers surrendered from 1 to 3 October, but whether they responded to leaflets fired by the 11th US Marine Regiment could not be determined.

The mission of the 1st US Marine Division remained essentially unchanged from 14 to 31 October. Foot patrol ranged farther into enemy-held territory, and tank-infantry raids in company strength, supported by air and artillery, were dispatched at every opportunity.

Typical of these operations was the raid staged on 16 October by elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th US Marines, supported by tanks, air, artillery, and engineers. Company C, commanded by Captain John R. McMahon, was the main unit involved. The objective was an enemy strong point overlooking the village of Changleh on the east and the flats on both sides of the Soyang River to the south and southwest. The mission of the company was to reduce all fortifications and installations and to seize, occupy and hold ground until the area was thoroughly mined, booby-trapped and infested with trap flares.

A small-scale battle flared up for a few minutes as the enemy put up a stiff resistance with artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. Superior Marine firepower soon prevailed, and at 1540 hours the attackers reached their objectives. By 1700, hours enemy installations were destroyed and the strong point rendered untenable by mines and booby traps. The Marines withdrew at 1700 after sustaining casualties of three killed and 18 wounded in action. Enemy losses were 35 counted killed.

On the following day, a reinforced ROK Marine company, supported by tanks, air, artillery, and engineers made a similar raid on enemy positions about 875 yards northwest of Hill 751 and 1,500 yards south of Hill 1052. 25 enemy bunkers were destroyed with losses to the enemy of 15 counted killed, three prisoners, and captured five machine guns.
On 21 October the 1st US Marine Division front was shortened a kilometer and half when elements of the 3rd ROK Division relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 1st ROK Marine Regiment on the left flank by order of the X US Corps. Six battalions now manned the main line of resistance.

A strong enemy position, threatening the forward elements, was located the north of the 1st Battalion in the 1st US Marines sector. Preceded by three days of detailed preparation, the destructive raid executed on 30 October. Company C, reinforced with heavy machine guns, was held up by the enemy resistance in company strength. The Marines fought their way up to a ridgeline, throwing white phosphors grenades into enemy bunkers. Pinned down momentarily by the enemy mortar and small-arms fire, they reached a defilade position and withdrew under cover of artillery, air, mortars, and heavy machine guns. At a cost of one wounded, the Marine raiders inflicted 65 counted killed on the enemy and destroyed an estimated 40 enemy bunkers.
Operations in the Fall

All three regiments on Line Minnesota were directed by Major General Gerald C. Thomas, commanding the 1st US Marine Division, to fight the enemy whenever possible with his own weapons in the form of ruses and night ambushes. On 31 October, the 3rd Battalion of the 1st US Marines feigned preparations for an attack even to the extent of a brief artillery barrage. When the firing let up, the Marines sounded an enemy bugle call as a signal for enemy troops to rush out of bunkers and main open trenches. Thus exposed, they became the victims of intense Marine mortar and artillery fire which inflicted an estimated 47 killed and 48 wounded casualties.

Enemy forces facing the Marines at various times in October were believed to comprise the 2nd Division, II NK Corps, the 1st and 15th Divisions of the III NK Corps, and the 19th Division, VI NK Corps. The NK Communist casualties during the month were announced by the 1st US Marine Division as 709 counted and 2,377 estimated killed, 4,927 estimated wounded, and 571 prisoners. The Marines, including the 1st ROK Marine Regiment, suffered losses of 50 killed, 2 missing, and 323 wounded in action.

Section 6. Internal Changes and Alterations

During October 1951, there were many alterations in the disposition of the major UNC ground forces. Particularly, the limited offensive operations of the UNC forces across the front lines petered out in late October as the Panmunjom talks reconvened on 25 October and another lull set in on the battlefield, General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, took advantage of the respite by transferring several of battle-exhausted X US Corps divisions into reserve positions. The Eighth Army, for instance, was able to use the 2nd US Division and its attached French Battalion as IX US Corps reserves by exchanging them with the 7th US Division and its attached Ethiopian Battalion from the IX US Corps. In another case, the 5th ROK Division was shifted over to the I ROK Corps reserve sector and sent the 3rd ROK Division to the X US Corps. Further detailed alterations were as follows.

On 3 October, the 7th ROK Division was detached from the X US Corps' operational control and reverted to the parent ROK Army for reorganization and training, while in the I US Corps the 9th ROK Division relieved the 3rd US Division in place on 17-20 October. The latter division was placed in corps reserve stationing in the general area of the 9th ROK Division's former position.
The 3rd ROK Division was ordered by the Eighth Army on 18 October to be attached from the 1 ROK Corps to the X US Corps effective on 20 October, while the 5th ROK Division was ordered to release from the X US Corps control and move into FTC #2 in Yangyang placing under the 1 ROK Corps.

Then, on 20 October, the 7th US Division was received orders to move from the IX US Corps to the X US Corps area beginning on the following day and it was placed under the X US Corps' operational control upon the completion of relief of the 2nd US Division in place. The 2nd US Division was attached to the IX US Corps effective upon closing in the general vicinity of Hwachon and Kapyong, where it remained in corps reserve.

Furthermore, on 29 October, the 20th Philippine Battalion Combat Team was detached from the 3rd US Division of the I US Corps and attached to the 25th US Division of the IX US Corps.

One change of particular significance took place on 1 October. The 24th US Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Division was inactivated and the 14th US Infantry Regiment replaced it as the third regiment of the division. The 24th Infantry Regiment had been all manned with colored Americans. As early as when General Ridgway had assumed the command of the Eighth US Army, Major General William B. Kean, then commanding the 25th Infantry Division, brought the matter of an integration of white and colored troops to the attention of the EUSAK Commander. General Kean felt that, both from a human and a military point of view, it was wholly inefficient to segregate soldiers this way. Feeling the same view, General Ridgway had planned in mid-March 1951 to seek authorization from General MacArthur who would in turn sound out Washington, to commence integration at once. At the time in both the 9th Regiment of the 2nd US Division and the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division there was a battalion of colored troops and the Eighth Army had numerous other combat and support units with all colored personnel, except for officers. But no action was initiated at the time because the Eighth Army was in the middle of major spring offensive.

General Ridgway had an opportunity after he had taken the UN Command to discuss this matter with Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, then the US Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, who had come to the theater of Korean operations on an official tour. General Ridgway suggested him that, if the approval of higher authority obtained, to effect full integration beginning with the largest all-colored combat units, the 24th Regiment and the two battalions, one in the 9th Regiment and the other in the 15th Regiment. After that the UN Command could break up the smaller all-colored combat units of artillery and
Operations in the Fall

armor and finally do the same with the numerous small service units of supply. Only in this way the UN Command could assure the sort of esprit a fighting army needed, where each soldier stands proudly on his own feet, knowing himself to be as good as the next comrade in arms.

Major General Taylor heartily agreed with this suggestion and commented that this was a most auspicious time to make it, inasmuch as it was bound to have profound effect upon the whole regular army from this time forth.

The gradual shift in Army integration policies and the relative stability of the battle situation in Korea enabled General Van Fleet of the Eighth US Army to turn his more attention to solve the problem.

Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War the US Army had issued Army regulations in January 1950 which stated that all manpower would be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency in the Army without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.

With the outbreak of war in Korea, colored enlisted men grew and colored-men units in Korea had little difficulty in maintaining their authorized strength. By early 1951 Eighth US Army began to assign excess colored men to understrength white units and the results were highly gratifying on the whole.

Thus, the favorable experience in integration in Korea led General Ridgway in May 1951 to recommend the use of a percentage of colored troops in all units in the Far East Command as a means of improving the over-all combat effectiveness of the UNC forces.

As a first step in eliminating the all colored-infantry units, the 24th Regiment was to inactivate and distribute its personnel among all-white or integrated organizations in the Far East Command. The Department of the U.S. Army approved on 1 July 1951 and later in the month announced that the process of integration of combat units in the Far East Command would be spread over six months and that service-type units would also be effected eventually.

In addition to the integration of the 24th Regiment's personnel as of 1 October, several other all-colored units were split up during the late summer and early fall of 1951. The colored men in the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Regiment were distributed throughout the 2nd US Division and those in the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Regiment were integrated with other infantry elements in the 3rd US Division. Some members of the 64th Tank Battalion and of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion were sent to white tank and armored field artillery units in exchange for white personnel. In most cases, such integration took place whenever the unit was placed in reserve and the exchanges of personnel could be easily carried out.
Besides, there were some changes in the American division commanders during the period under discussion. Major General Robert N. Young took the command of the 2nd US Infantry Division on 21 September after Major General Clark B. Ruffner, and Brigadier General Thomas J. Cross took over the command of the 3rd US Infantry Division from Major General Robert H. Soule who was returned home on regular rotation.

Furthermore, the Royal Ulster Rifles Battalion of the 1st British Commonwealth Division was relieved by a battalion of the Royal Norfolk Regiment on 18 October and prepared to return to Hongkong.

In the meantime, back on the battlefield, the limited offensives of the UNC forces in September and October had brought the friendly main line of resistance well forward of the Wyoming and Kansas Lines, and all frontline units were being kept busy in organizing the outpost line of resistance and fortifying the main defense positions as well.

As of 31 October, the Order of Battle across the UNC front from the west to east was as follows: In the 1 US Corps sector the 1st ROK Division, 1st British Commonwealth Division, 1st US Cavalry Division and 9th ROK Division, with the 3rd US Division in reserve; in the IX US Corps the 25th US Division, 2nd ROK Division, 6th ROK Division, with 2nd US Division in reserve; in the X US
Operations in the Fall

Corps area the 8th ROK Division, 7th US Division, 3rd ROK Division, 1st US Marine Division, with 7th ROK Division in reserve; and in the I ROK Corps sector the 11th ROK Divisions and Capital ROK Division, with the 5th ROK Division in reserve. (See Sketch Map 26.)

Section 7. Active Defense
(1 November – 31 December 1951)

Truce Talking Front

By the end of October 1951, the UNC ground forces had secured strongest possible defense line far beyond the Wyoming and Kansas Lines, as a result of a series of limited-objective attacks that launched since late August through October all along the front.

Thus, the UN Command was now in better position to mount more pressure upon the Communist forces to come closer toward an agreeable settlement at the truce negotiation front, while all the ground units maintaining and improving their hard won current defensive positions dominating the enemy's outpost line of resistance.

When the armistice negotiations resumed at the new site at Panmunjom on 25 October 1951, Item 2 -- the line of demarcation -- was still in dispute and the knotty problems arising from Items 3 and 4 but dimly envisioned. In the light of past experience, however, the task of threshing out a truce proposal acceptable to both sides promised to become a long, drawn-out affair. There was little doubt that the UNC casualties inflicted during the recent limited objective offensive must have contributed to the depletion of the offensive capabilities of the Communists and had influenced them to return to the conference table. But whether they had come back to conclude an agreement or simply to continue the discussions remained to be seen.

Under the circumstances there were two courses open to UN Command: (1) To keep pressure upon the enemy until a satisfactory settlement was reached; or (2) to accept the Communist appearance at the negotiating table as a sign that the enemy was now willing to end the fighting. If the latter proved correct and a line of demarcation was to be established along the general trace of the battle front, then further sustained fighting and heavy casualties would be wasteful and unnecessary. On the other hand, if the Communists intended to
use the negotiations to win a breathing period while they replenished their battered forces and strengthened their defenses, the first course offered certain long-term advantages. It might be far less costly to keep up the limited offensive punch already developed and maintain the initiative until the Communists come to UNC terms rather than to permit the enemy to regain his balance and settle down to a long war of attrition.

The lack of enthusiasm for ambitious offensive operations while the line of demarcation was being arranged was clearly reflected in General Ridgway’s 12 November directive to General Van Fleet to assume the “active defense.” Along the general trace of present positions, the order ran, from now on, General Van Fleet would seize terrain most suitable for defense. He would, however, limit his offensive action to the taking of outpost positions not requiring the commitment of more than one division. At the same time, the Eighth US Army Commander would be prepared to exploit favorable opportunities to inflict heavy casualties upon the enemy. On the following day the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff sustained the UN Command approach. Evidently the U.S. JCS and General Ridgway both believed that the Communists were ready to come to terms or perhaps the wish was father to the thought. At any rate General Ridgway informed General Collins, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, that he believed the Communists had been badly hurt by the UNC offensives and wanted the earliest possible suspension of hostilities.

In the light of this general feeling of optimism in Tokyo and Washington, it was not surprising that Eighth US Army should absorb some of the complacency. As soon as the line of demarcation was agreed upon on 27 November 1951, General Van Fleet told his corps commanders that they would make sure that every UNC soldier was aware that hostilities would continue until the armistice was signed. He then went on to instruct them that they would reduce operations to the minimum essential to maintain present positions regardless of the agreed-upon military demarcation line. Counterattacks to regain key terrain lost to enemy assault would be the only offensive action taken unless otherwise directed by this headquarters. Every effort will be made to prevent unnecessary casualties.

As the order filtered down to the small unit level, few commanders were willing to risk the lives of their troops unless it became a case of necessity. Since the line of demarcation was agreed upon on 27 November 1951, apparently neither side, and especially the UN Command, would undertake offensive operations during the thirty-day period if territorial gains would have to be relinquished when an armistice was signed. The Communists had thus gained a
thirty-day *de facto* ceasefire on the ground. This concession to the Communists was the turning point of the armistice conference. Thereafter, because the fighting slackened, we lacked the essential military pressure with which to enforce a reasonable attitude towards the negotiations. As no general agreement was signed at Panmunjom by 27 December 1951, in attempting to trade a temporary cease-fire for a quick armistice the U.S. Administration had lost its gamble.

**Plans for the Duluth and Sundial Offensives**

Late in October 1951 General Van Fleet submitted to General Ridgway an ambitious offensive operation plan designed to advance further north in the Iron Triangle area and the Kumsong sector putting both the I and IX US Corps units in the attack. But General Ridgway ordered held in abeyance, because indications of progress in the cease-fire talks inclined him to withhold approval of the plans. Rather he intended to continue a major air effort, called Operation Strangle, which had been in progress since the spring of 1951.

At any rate, General Van Fleet issued the operation plans to his corps commanders on the morning of 31 October as the following gist.

1. Utilizing the I and IX US Corps, EUSAK would conduct a limited-objective attack on 1 November 1951 to seize Line Duluth and encircle and destroy enemy forces in zone.

2. The I US Corps would attack on 1 November, occupy and defend favorable terrain along the general line Duluth in zone; protect the Army west flank; and move one battalion of 155-mm. howitzer to position designated by the Commanding General of the I US Corps to close not later than 0800, 31 October 1951.

3. The IX US Corps would attack on 1 November 1951 to seize and occupy favorable terrain along the general line “Duluth” in zone; one 155-mm. howitzer battalion from the I US Corps would release to the IX US Corps control on arrival in the area designated by the IX Corps Commander; and would be prepared on order to continue the advance in zone.

4. Restrictions on use of US Divisions in both corps reserved to remain in effect.

5. Line Duluth would be a point on the present line of contact in the vicinity of Yaktak-chon north of Hill 324 toward generally north and east to Samnyong-ni (northwest of Hill 396)—Yongyon-ni—Pyonggang—Mayon-ni—Songna-san (Hill 578)—Ochon-ni (northwest of Suri-bong)—Hill 393 just southwest of Kumsong— to a point on the present line of contact of Chimi-kogae (near Sachon-ni on the
The mission and objectives of the attacking divisions were as follows:

(1) The I US Corps would attack on 1 November to seize Line Duluth in zone.
   (a) The 9th ROK Division would seize the objective, Hill 459 and was to prepare to advance and seize Line Duluth and the objective, Hill 480 and also objective 3 in the vicinity of Hill 389 (west of Ori-san or Hill 453) on order.
   (b) After Line Duluth had been secured, it was to organize and defend from the most favorable terrain and continue combat patrolling to maintain positive contact with the enemy.
   (c) The attacking division would coordinate with elements of the IX US Corps during the advance.
   (d) The remainder of the I US Corps was to maintain the present position and to continue combat patrolling.

(2) The IX US Corps would attack on 1 November 1951 to seize and secure Line Duluth, encircle and seize objective and destroy enemy forces in zone.

   (a) The 25th US Division was to attack and seize objective A in the vicinity of Hill 608, continue the attack and occupy objective B, Hill 717, Hill 682 (or Hill 689 on new map), Hill 586, and would continue the attack and seize objective C in the vicinity of Hill 453, Hill 551 and Hill 557. It would continue the advance and seize objective D in the vicinity of Hill 574 and Hill 503. In addition, it was also to protect the corps west flank, and movement through the zone of the I US Corps and direct coordination with the 9th ROK Division were authorized.

   (b) The 2nd ROK Division would attack on corps order and seize objective C, the high ground including Hill 590–Hill 642 (Suri-bongs). The continued attack was required to seize objective D, Hill 667, Hill 768, Hill 750 and Hill 723 and Line Duluth in the zone. Two tank companies from the 24th US Division were ordered to support the attack.

   (c) The 24th US Division was to attack on corps order and seize objective C, a hill mass in the vicinity of Kuryong-ni, and Line Duluth in the zone. It would support the attack of the 2nd ROK Division with two tank companies.

   (d) The 6th ROK Division would continue the current mission.

   (e) Maximum effort would be made to encircle, isolate and deny enemy reinforcement capability on a hill mass north of Hill 741; maximum utilization of tank forces had to make in the attack from the flanks and roads. Upon the seizure of the assigned objectives, all attacking units would prepare defense positions along the most favorable terrain on Line Duluth, establish an outpost
line; and use of the Kumhwa–Kumsong Valley by the 25th US Division and the 2nd ROK Division were authorized. This operation, if carried out, would isolate Osong-san (Hill 1062), the enemy's strongest fortified-defense position in front of the whole UNC forward lines.

In that very afternoon, however, the aforementioned plans and orders were postponed by General Van Fleet, with the mention that pending further instructions the I and IX US Corps were to prepare to launch the attack on 24 hours notice.

On the following day, 1 November 1951, these two corps were further ordered that the planned attack was further postponed indefinitely. And General Van Fleet instructed the corps that a minimum of three days would be given in case of the execution, and the attachment made in the previous orders for the attack was remain in effect.

On 11 November all the operation plans in connection with the advance to Line Duluth were cancelled and the Sundial offensive was automatically faded away because of the debate over the line of demarcation, since the U.S. JCS believed that ultimately the UN Command might have to modify its stand and withdraw several kilometers to the south. If this proved to be true, there seemed to be little reason to take casualties for territory that would soon have to be evacuated.

The Battle Situation
(1 – 30 November)

In November 1951, operations of the UNC ground forces consisted primarily of maintaining positions, aggressive patrolling, and repulsing a series of enemy probing attempts and limited small-scale attacks on key terrain features, particularly aiming at retaking of his lost ground during the recent UNC's offensive operations, from 3–8 November and 16–25 November, centered in the I US Corps sector. The UN forces initiated only one attack other than those launched to regain positions lost to the enemy action.

During the month enemy attacks on the I US Corps front were heaviest in the sectors of the 1st British Commonwealth Division, the 1st US Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Division. The most noteworthy actions and events were as follows.

In the I US Corps sector, on 5 November, the 1st Commonwealth Division lost Hills 217 and 317 by enemy's determined attacks and the division launched unsuccessful counterattacks. On the following day, the 1st US Cavalry Division
units were also attacked by the enemy and were forced off Hill 200 in Sinhyon-ni, which changed hands four times, being secured by friendly forces on 8 November. In the 9th ROK Division sector Hill 395 also changed hands nightly from 3 to 8 November.

During the period from 16 to 25 November, the enemy directed a series of attacks at the I US Corps units. But the 1st Commonwealth Division units and the 7th and 15th Regiments of the 3rd US Division repulsed the bulk of these enemy attacks. The 3rd US Division conducted a determined defense on Hill 355 (Kowang-san) and by 25 November the Chinese Communists fled to the north, having been decisively defeated with a tremendous toll of their losses.

In the IX US Corps sector, meanwhile, on 17–18 November, the 8th ROK Division attacked and secured its objective, called Line Gary, which connected the IX and X US Corps main line of resistance, while the 25th US Division maintained firm defenses in the Kumhwa sector.
Operations in the Fall

Some units alternations were also took place in November. On 20 November, the Capital, 8th, and 3rd ROK Divisions were relieved from the X US Corps and passed to control of the parent ROK Army, while the 3rd US Division completed the relief of the 1st US Cavalry Division on 20 November. The cavalry division, thereafter, began to prepare for movement to Japan upon arrival of the 45th US Infantry Division from Hokkaido, Japan.

The 45th US Division was scheduled to come from Japan to Korea in three increments, commencing not later than 1 December 1951, and was to relieve equal increments of the 1st US Cavalry Division. This was to be the first complete replacement of one US division by another since the American forces had participated in the Korean War in support of the Republic of Korea.

On 25 November, the ROK Army issued orders to activate Task Force Paik, which became operational on 29 November when the Capital and 8th ROK Divisions moved into the vicinity of Chiri-san to mop up Communist guerrillas around there. This task force was later to become the II ROK Corps.

Another noteworthy was that the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 became attached to the Eighth US Army on 16 November.

Back at the truce front, on the other hand, cease-fire negotiations had continued through the month, and on 27 November, the military line of demarcation was agreed upon by the conferences. General Van Fleet directed that the fighting would continue until signing of an armistice. But operations were to be reduced to the minimum level necessary to maintain positions.

The Battle for Hill 200

After Operation Commando on 3–18 October 1951, the 1st US Cavalry Division had been concentrated its efforts to organize an outpost line well forward of the main line of resistance. Further, the battle for the outposts went on steadily until the end of October. The enemy repeatedly attempted to probe and regain his lost ground during the Commando operation, but with the support of heavy bombardment the cavalrymen withstood hard in maintaining control of key terrain features all along the division front.

Hill 200 and its neighbor, Hill 199 in Sinhyon-ni, were subjected to constant enemy attempts and were taken by the enemy in late October. The 7th US Cavalry Regiment planned to take them back. The 2nd Battalion of the 5th US Cavalry, then operating under the control of the 7th Cavalry was to participate with the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment in a two-battalion night attack, one of the largest night assaults executed by the 1st US Cavalry Division.
At 0230 hours, 28 October, the two attacking battalions jumped off and fought desperately until past noon when the objectives were finally secured. Hill 200, especially, was defended with the same fanaticism that had characterized much of the enemy's defense of his old main line of resistance, particularly in the Commando offensive.

During the latter stage of the assault on Hill 200, 1st Lieutenant Lloyd L. Barke of G Company, 5th US Cavalry Regiment, led a striking force of 35 men against the enemy positions that threatened to halt and throw back the 2nd Battalion. Lieutenant Burke's heroic action won for him the sixth Medal of Honor to be awarded to a member of the 1st US Cavalry Division during the Korean War.

October ended with the Jamestown Line and its outpost line of resistance seemingly secure in friendly hands. But the enemy attempted again and again to retake Hill 200. A massed night attack would overwhelm the defenders, but next morning the hill would be deserted.

In view of this continuing show of Red Chinese force, the 1st Cavalry Division planned to lay a trap on Hill 200 for them by planting a huge number of trip flares. Sure enough, an enemy battalion was observed approaching just after midnight, on 8 November. The patrol made contact to draw the enemy and quickly withdrew at the proper moment, and a prearranged artillery barrage was directed on the
Operations in the Fall

attacker, with the results that 135 enemy dead were discovered the next morning.

Night laid by the enemy continued, but, from about this time on, they lacked the vigor of the previous assaults. This fact seemed to indicate that the enemy had given up all hope of regaining any of valuable positions he had lost in October. Furthermore, the friendly lines were so strong now that nothing short of a major effort on the part of the Chinese Reds could have smashed through them.

The enemy's occasional tentative probing attacks were countered by constant patrolling. Moreover, the friendly artillery, coupled with daily air strikes, continued to disrupt the enemy forces in their digging in and regrouping across the Yokkok River.

On 11 November, the 70th US Tank Battalion began Operation Colbber, the aim of which was to destroy as many of the enemy bunkers and emplacements as possible. Early that morning, tanks moved up the roads to firing positions generally along Line Jamestown. For three days the operation continued during which time many enemy installations were destroyed and much enemy effort disrupted.

**The Battle for Hill 355**

*(23 – 25 November)*

On 20 November 1951, the 3rd US Division, then commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cross who took over the command on 20 October exactly a month ago, relieved the 1st US Cavalry Division on Line Jamestown in the I US Corps sector. Before it moved into this new area, the division had launched Operation Cleanup in September and took part in Operation Commando in the early days of October to seize and secure certain key terrain features along the assigned battlefront.

As soon as it took over the 1st Cavalry Division sector, the 3rd US Division centered its efforts to strengthen the defense positions in the Imjin River area and the high ground south of the Yosok River. Within the division sector there was a commanding terrain Hill 355 or Kowang-san, better known to UN troops as Little Gibraltar and Dagmar or Armistice Hill to the 3rd US Division troops because the men of "Rock of the Marne" (nicknamed name of the division) could overlook the truce tent area of Panmunjom from the hill.

With its command post in the vicinity of Todong-dong about two kilometers north of Yonchon, the 3rd US Division sent out patrols constantly to develop the enemy situation while engaging in intensive fortification works all along the
Patton tank on the main supply route in the 3rd US Division sector, 17 November 1951.

forward positions. In addition to its three organic regiments - the 7th, 15th, and 65th Regiments - the division had then the 20th Philippine Battalion Combat Team, the Belgian, Greek and Thailand Battalions under the operational control. The Greek, Tailand and Belgian Battalions had been attached to 1st US Cavalry Division before the 3rd US Division came in this new sector.

On 23 November, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Regiment on Kowang-san (Hill 355) received a heavy artillery barrage at 1615 hours and at 1635 hours were attacked by an estimated enemy battalion and forced to withdraw. At 1800 hours, the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment was ordered to counterattack
to secure Hill 355, while the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry was assembling in the village of Ukkowangsan without any casualties. The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry continued the counterattack for Hill 355 through position of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, and by 0645 hours the next morning the leading elements were within 40 yards from the crest of the hill being under automatic weapons fire. When the friendly elements were preparing to assault onto the enemy positions an airstrike was being placed on the groups of enemy withdrawing to the north.

The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Regiment moved up at 1700 hours to take back Hill 355 and retook it at 1830 hours. The airstrike resulted in 250 enemy killed.

However, at 2105 hours, 24 November, G Company position of the 15th Regiment on Hill 355 was attacked again by the enemy and was forced off the hill, while E Company was under a heavy enemy attack. E and F Companies, nevertheless, firmly held their positions on the hill but were receiving heavy tank fire causing heavy casualties.

At 0300 hours, 25 November, the Chinese Communists finally retreated back before they would have been annihilated by the gallant action of the 3rd US Division.

The 1st Battalion of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry moved to relieve the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment on Hill 355 on the morning of 35 October. The enemy made no attempts any more thereafter against Hill 355.

Thus the 3rd US Division had hardly established positions when the Chinese Communist forces, with bugles flaring, launched a considerably large-scale attack against the strategic Hill 355 located in the vicinity of the boundary between the 3rd US Division and the 1st British Commonwealth Division. More than 600 enemy dead were counted on the forward of the hill after the fighting. It was no difficult to estimate that the enemy had suffered great number wounded.

The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Burdell, of the 15th US Regiment was awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation for its part in the action on and around Hill 355 during 23–25 November 1951.

The 15th US Regiment (with the Belgian Battalion attached) was then commanded by Colonel Eric P. Ramee who took over the command on 27 October after Colonel Thomas A. O'Neil.

During the remainder of the fall of 1951, the 3rd US Infantry Division occupied defensive positions on the Jamestown Line, engaged in aggressive patrolling actions, and conducted a strenuous training program.
The 2nd US Division

In the meantime, the 2nd US Division had been in IX US Corps reserve remaining in Kapyong since late October. During this reserve period the division was honored by visits from prominent U.S. government officials. Top of all, on 24 November, Vice President Alben W. Barkely was on hand to add to the division’s colors the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation earned at the battle of the Soyang River in May 1951.

As training progressed into December, the division received the warning order for the relief of the 25th US Division, north of Kumhwa on the control front. The massive relief was completed without mishap and the 2nd US Division assumed the responsibility of the new sector on 20 December. The tactical situation saw the division manning a four-regiment front, the 25th US Division having left its 14th Regiment occupying one of the sectors. With the extra regiment, the 2nd US Division was spread across a 22,000-meter line with only two infantry battalions and the 72nd Tank Battalion remained in division reserve. The sector thus occupied was located in the eastern part of the Iron Triangle. Overlooking the western portion of the division line was an enemy-held hill mass topped by Hill 717 or Sobang-san, while to the east towering Hill 1062, tunneled with enemy fortifications, was directly to the front.

Though the battle situation was relatively static when compared with the fighting up to that time, the 2nd US Division carried out an active defense. Extensive patrolling was a daily task and continuous improvement of positions was underway.

On 27 December, the Thailand Battalion joined the division. The battalion was immediately attached to the 9th US Regiment. The French Battalion and the Netherlands Battalion had been previously attached to the 23rd and 38th Regiments respectively. Thus each regiment now was equivalent to four battalions.

During the winter activity was primarily confined to patrolling and defensive measures. But effective harassing action aimed at denying the enemy use of his prepared bunkers and shelters was carried out ceaselessly.

Marine Operations

Throughout November 1951 the 1st US Marine Division continued to occupy
the eastern portion of the X US Corps defense sector. From left to right the 1st ROK Marine Regiment, 7th US Marines, and 1st US Marines held the main line of resistance with two battalions each. The 5th US Marines remained in reserve until 11 November, when it relieved the 1st US Marines. That regiment went into the new reserve area at Mago-ri.

The enemy forces facing the Marines were the 1st, 15th, and 19th Divisions of the III NK Corps. The Marines continued to organize artillery-and air-supported tank-infantry-engineer task forces in company strength for raids. Squad size patrols were sent out nightly to ambush the enemy, employing ruses whenever possible.

The howitzers of the 11th US Marine Regiment and the 90-mm. rifles of the 1st Tank Battalion were kept busy throughout the month. On 7–8 November, for instance, Marine artillery fired 257 observed missions in 24 hours -- including
34 on enemy artillery positions, 32 on mortar position, 25 on bunkers, 22 on machine gun positions, four in support of friendly patrols, three on supply dumps, two on trucks, and one each on a bridge, command post, and a 57-mm. recoilles rifle position.

Marine operations in December were comparatively light in term of hot action. From 1 to 10 December, units of the 1st US Marine Division along the main line of resistance consisted from left to right of the 1st ROK Marine Regiment, 7th US Marines, and 5th US Marines. The only major change took place on 11 December, when the 1st US Marine Regiment relieved the 7th Marines and the latter went into division reserve. Enemy units in front of the divisions were the 1st, 15th, and 19th (soon relieved by the 47th) NK Divisions with an estimated strength of 25,750.

Heavy snow on 26 December impeded foot-patrol activity and increased the danger of mines. During the month, not a single large-scale combat had been experienced, yet 24 Marines were killed (including ROK Marines) and 139 wounded in patrol actions. The enemy losses for the month in the Marine sector consisted of 246 counted killed and 56 prisoners.

The Beginning of Positional Warfare

From this breathing space given the Communists in November—December 1951 dated the construction of the vast fourteen-mile deep defensive network which protected the Communist ground troops for the remainder of the Korean War. It was deep and was even engineered for defense against nuclear attack. The Eighth US Army's MLR, on the contrary, consisted of a bunkered trench system slashed across the Korean hill-tops from the Western Sea to Eastern Sea, with an occasional half-organized secondary line. Both sides were really immobilized under the conditions they had chosen to fight. The Communist artillery, heavily reinforced by the end of 1951 was dug in so deeply that it could not be moved out and up to support an advance of their infantry. Relying on its firepower to offset the prodigal use of Communist Chinese manpower, the United Nations Command firepower itself was not enough to neutralize the enemy fortifications and the air and artillery bombardments had little effect upon the enemy in his deep, protected bunkers and caves.

As the year 1951 drew to a close the fighting tapered off into a monotonous routine of patrol clashes, raids, and bitter small-scale struggles for key outpost positions. By the end of the year a lull had settled over the battlefield with the opposing sides deployed along the defense lines that spanned the breadth of the
Operations in the Fall

peninsula. The friendly lines to be defended were extended from the Western Sea in a great arc eastward for 248 kilometers to the shores of the Eastern Sea.

Defending the Eighth US Army's left wing, the I US Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, occupied a defense line originating at the confluence of the Imjin and Han Rivers northwest of Seoul and extending northeast to a point midway between Chorwon and Kumhwa. On the I US Corps right flank the defenses of IX US Corps under Major General Willard G. Wyman began, bulging northward toward Kumsong and cast to the Pukhan River, which formed the corps' right boundary. East of the Pukhan the X US Corps, under Major General Clovis E. Byers from 15 July to 5 December 1951 and thereafter under Major General Williston B. Palmer, extended its lines eastward over the mountainous spine of the peninsula to the Nam River, to meet the left boundary of the I ROK Corps. This latter corps, commanded by Major General Paik Sun Yup, defended the Eighth US Army's right wing, the zone extended due north along the east coast from the Nam River to Kosong.

On the enemy side, according to the Eighth US Army intelligence report, the I NK Corps had moved from its positions on the western sector of the enemy battle front to reserve positions in the eastern sector. As a result the Chinese Communists now defended the entire western and central parts of the enemy line. This concentration of the Red North Korean forces in the rugged eastern sector, where there was little likelihood of a major UNC attack, indicated that the Red North Korean forces might be suffering from a manpower shortage.

Action on the Eighth US Army front during the last two months of the year was limited mostly to patrol clashes and repelling light enemy attacks. Blanketed by UNC harassing artillery fire, the enemy moved only at night.

As the discussion on the line of demarcation came to an end in late November, a change in enemy tactics was completed. The enemy had begun to shift from their customary tactics based upon fluid warfare during the early autumn of 1951. The static conditions of December 1951 allowed them to finish their switch to fixed, positional warfare. Adopting a defense-in-depth pattern, the Communists proceeded to fortify their lines. However, the UN Command had made little attempt to disturb the enemy's efforts to strengthen his defenses. Not that the thirty-day limit on the line of demarcation dictated a suspension of hostilities, but rather a self-imposed restriction on large-scale operations in December precluded any moves of great tactical significance. In turn the Communists launched mostly company and platoon-sized attacks on the UNC
outposts. Only rarely was a battalion-sized assault mounted.

Lest the Eighth US Army lose its edge completely, General Van Fleet instructed his corps commanders to intensify their programs to capture enemy prisoners of war through ambush. If it appeared that the peace-talks would fail, new plans would be prepared around 20 December 1951 for a series of limited objective attacks in early next year designed to strengthen defensive positions. As the thirty-day limited expired on 27 December 1951, General Ridgway asked Eighth US Army Commander for a report on his plans to return to the offensive. The Eighth US Army Commander’s reply showed clearly the change in the tactical situation. He contemplated no offensive action in the near future. In the eyes of his commanders, minor attacks to strengthen the present UNC positions would be costly and without value.

On the other hand, the Communists, obviously, were now well entrenched and immune to normal artillery preparation. Only by bold assault could the enemy be dislodged and this could not be done at a low cost. The benefit to be won, General Van Fleet concluded, would not justify the casualties certain to be incurred.
Operation Rat-Killer

The calm on the battlefield, however, did permit more attention to be paid to one troublesome problem that bothered the UN Command almost from the beginning of the Korean War. Behind the lines in the Republic of Korea there were over 8,000 guerrillas and bandits, 5,400 of whom were reported armed. Concentrated mainly in the mountains of the rugged Chirisan area of southwestern Korea, they were a constant thorn in the side of ROK Government. Although they were chiefly of nuisance value, there was always the chance that in the event of a major offensive, they could pose a real and dangerous threat to supply and communications lines and to rear areas.

During November 1951 there was an upsurge in raiding operations as the guerrillas launched well-coordinated attacks upon rail lines and installations. Fortunately, the raids were lacking in sufficient strength to follow through and inflict serious damage, but General Van Fleet decided that the time had come to eliminate this irritation. In mid-November 1951 he ordered the ROK Army to set up a task force composed of the Capital and 8th ROK Divisions, both minus their artillery units. General Van Fleet wanted the group organized and ready to stamp out guerrilla activity by the first of December. Since the Chirisan held the core of guerrilla resistance, General Van Fleet directed that the first phase of the task force operations cover this mountains stretch some 32 kilometers northwest of Chinju.

On 1 December 1951 the ROK Government took the first step by declaring martial law in southwestern Korea. This restricted the movement of civilians, established a curfew, and severed telephone connections between villages. On the following day Task Force Paik, named after the commander, Major General Paik Sun Yup, initiated its anti-guerrilla campaign, called Rat-Killer. Moving in from a 260-kilometer perimeter, Task Force Paik closed on the Chirisan. The 8th ROK Division pushed southward toward the crest of the mountains and the Capital ROK Division edged northward to meet it. Blocking forces, composed of ROK National Police and security forces located in the area, were stationed at strategic positions to cut off escape routes. As the net was drawn tighter, groups of from ten to five hundreds guerrillas were flushed, but only light opposition developed. After twelve days, Task Force Paik ended the first phase on 14 December 1951 with a total of 1,612 reported killed and 1,843 prisoners.
The hunt shifted north to Cholla Pukto Province for the second phase with the mountains around Chonju the chief objectives. From 19 December 1951 to 4 January 1952 the 8th and Capital ROK Divisions ranged the hills and sought to trap the guerrillas and bandits hiding in the rough terrain. By the end of December 1951 it was estimated that over 4,000 men had been killed and another 4,000 had been captured.

**Major Activities in the Fall**

(1 – 31 December)

As the end of the year came closer the battle situation gradually began to freeze and frontline units were heavily engaging in building up bunkers and shelters for the winterization. There were, of course, constant, sporadic engagements in minor attempts and continuous alert that characterized the fall activities of 1951.

Thus, during December, action was comparatively light throughout the front, attacking only when necessary to regain key terrain features lost to the enemy's probing or very limited-objective attacks in minor-scale. Major activities and events occurred in December were as follows.

On 2 December, Task Force Paik launched an anti-guerrilla attack known as Operation Rat-killer in the Communist guerrilla stronghold area of Chiri Mountain. By 26 December, as a result, 8,900 guerrillas had been killed or captured by Task Force Paik.

The first echelon of the 45th US Division arrived at Inchon on 5 December and the 1st echelon of the 1st US Cavalry Division departed by water on 7 December.

During the period of 17–31 December, the 45th US Division, commanded by Major General James C. Styron, became assigned to the Eighth US Army and attached to the I US Corps on 18 December. By 23 December the division had relieved the 1st US Cavalry Division and assumed responsibility for that sector. On 22 December, the 1st US Cavalry Division was relieved from the Eighth Army and assigned to the Headquarters, Far East Command and further attached to the XVI US Corps in Japan.

During the period, plans were issued outlining the defensive line to be occupied in the event of an armistice by 27 December, and outlining retrograde movement through a series of defensive lines in the event of the UNC ground forces were forced to withdraw south of Line Kansas. The 40th US Division
was scheduled to come from Japan to Korea starting on or about 5 January 1952, to relieve the 24th US Division. The 24th US Division was scheduled to move back to Japan.

In December, tentative plans were made to reform the II ROK Corps. The staff of this new corps was to be made up from Task Force Paik. The Korean Army Training Command and the Korean Military Academy were opened.

On 16 December, the 2nd US Division relieved the 25th US Division in place in the IX US Corps area and the 25th Division went into corps reserve. And the Thai Battalion was detached from the 1st US Cavalry Division and attached to the 2nd US Division effective on 26 December as the 1st Cavalry Division was leaving Korea.

The month of December also saw many command changes. On 14 December, Major General Clevis N. Byers left the X US Corps and Lieutenant General Willston B. Palmar assumed the command, while Lieutenant General William M. Hoge turned over the command of the IX US Corps to Lieutenant General Willard M. Wyman on 24 December.

On 5 December, Major General L. L. Lemitzer took over the command of the 7th US Division after Major General Clandes B. Fercnhough; Major General Blacksheer N. Bryan of the 24th US Division was ended up with his tour of duty as the 24th US Division Commander on 20 December; and Major General Thomas C. Harrold left the 1st US Cavalry Division on 22 December, succeeded by Major General Arthur G. Trudeau.

At the end of 1951, the friendly Battle of Order across the front from west to east was as follows: In the I US Corps sector the 1st ROK Division, 1st British Commonwealth Division, 3rd US Division, 45th US Division, and 9th ROK Division; in the IX US Corps the 2nd US Division, 2nd ROK Division, 24th US Division, 6th ROK Division, with the 25th US Division (minus) in reserve; in the X US Corps sector the 7th ROK Division, 7th US Division, 1st US Marine Division, with the 3rd ROK Division in reserve; and in the I ROK Corps the 11th ROK Division on line and the 5th ROK Division in reserve.

Section 8. The Roles of Air and Naval Support

The Air Forces in Support

Taken as a whole the ground fighting from November 1951 to the end of the
year produced few surprises and change in the ground defensive positions held by either side. While the UNC planes were devoting their activities to the sky and hunted their targets mostly by day, the Red Chinese enemy kept to his caves and bunkers and appeared chiefly at night. As the pressure on the ground subsided, the emphasis on the war in the air mounted. The US Far East Air Forces, US Marine and Navy planes under the United Nations Command provided the main offensive punch during the long winter of 1951.

Basically the UNC air interdiction campaign which began since August 1951 was designed as a preventive measure to interfere with and disrupt the enemy’s line of communication to such an extent that the enemy would be unable to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces or be unable to mount a sustained offensive himself. During the summer and early fall of 1951 both UNC Air Force and Navy efforts to concentrate on disrupting the enemy supply lines with some success. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the truce negotiations resumed at Panmunjom in October and ground operations sputtered out, the air interdiction campaign received top priority.

By striking at enemy communication lines and supply points, the UN Command could take full advantage of its dominance of the air over Communist North Korea and make good use of the mobile firepower represented in its air forces. The destruction of enemy equipment and war materials would hinder the development of reserve stocks so necessary for a sustained offensive, and the disruption of transportation lines would further snarl the logistics problems facing the Communists. For an example, during the World War II the values of comprehensive interdiction program had been well demonstrated during the Allied invasion of Normandy and the battles of France, when air attacks against enemy railway lines and bridges had prevented the marshaling of enemy strength upon the battlefields. However, the strategic background for an air interdiction program in Korea was quite dissimilar to interdiction operations of World War II. In Europe the interdiction campaigns to the rear of the enemy armies had always been in combination with the forward surge of friendly ground troops, thus catching the enemy where he could neither resupply his battle expenditures nor reinforce himself. In Korea, however, the ground front was stabilized and interdiction could only hinder a major enemy offensive by delaying the movement of materiel and personnel to the front. Even on minimum rations, the feeding and supplying of one-half to three-quarters of a million men represented a real challenge to the enemy so long as UNC planes ranged constantly overhead.

Thus, during the November to the end of 1951 period, the UN Command air forces averaged over 9,000 sorties a month on interdiction and armoured re-
Operations in the Fall

connaissance missions while close air support sorties varied from 339 to 2,461 a month. Although the interdiction campaign was undertaken with the approval of General Van Fleet, the disparity between the two efforts occasioned some comment at the time and in this connection General Weyland, the US FEAF Commander later wrote a defense of the distribution that in the fall of 1951 it would have been sheer folly not to have concentrated the bulk of our effort against interdiction targets in the enemy rear areas. Otherwise the available fire power would have been expended ineffectively against relatively invulnerable targets along the front, while the enemy was left free to build up his resources to launch and sustain a general offensive. Such a general offensive, if it could have been sustained with adequate supplies and ammunition, might well have been decisive. Failure to appreciate these facts caused some adverse comment about the amount of close support given the UNC ground forces, particularly during late 1951 and early 1952.

In view of the situation on the ground in this period, there was considerable justice in General Weyland’s observations. Desultory throughout October of 1951 the UNC ground fightings were virtually halted by General Ridgway’s order on 12 November 1951. Reasoning that the reopened armistice negotiations at Panmunjom offered such a good prospect for cease-fire as to rule out large-scale ground offensives by either side, and noting that the cost of major attacks against Communist defenses could not be justified in terms of the limited results which would ensure. General Ridgway directed the Eighth US Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of its front. There was no important ground offensives that got beyond the tentative planning or contingent phase and even limited objective attacks found little favor after November 1951. With the enemy well dug in and protected by heavy overhead shelter, only accurate flat trajectory fire or a direct hit by a bomb had any effect upon the enemy. Airplanes could not possibly provide the former and found it extremely difficult to carry out pinpoint bombing of such small and well-camouflaged enemy targets.

Under the circumstances, in the winter of 1951, the UNC air forces had reason to expect that ground commanders would request a minimum of close air support and that, as long as the ground fighting remained static, interdiction seemed to be the most efficient use of the UNC air capability.

The other side of the coin was the effect of the interdiction campaign upon the enemy. As the pace of Operation Strangle quickened in November 1951, the UNC air forces and navy pilots sought to cripple the railroads of Communist North Korea. Fighters and the fighter-bombers attacked locomotives, railroad
cars, and vehicular traffic as well without serious challenge from the Communist air forces. Light bombers (B-26's) covered the main supply routes at night and medium bombers (B-29's) kept the enemy airfields unserviceable in addition to bombing enemy marshalling yards and flying close support missions.

On 18 November 1951 carrier-based aircraft inaugurated a combined program of bridge and rail destruction. Naval reconnaissance jets carrying 1,000-pound bomb loads were sent out regularly for the first time in the Korean War against Communist rail facilities and proved to be excellent at cutting roads. By December it often took the enemy as much as three days to repair the railroad breaks he had previously restored in a single day. Yet, despite this, enemy rail traffic continued to move. The Communists succeeded in bringing up and issuing winter clothing to the front troops even though it often had to be hand-carried on a piecemeal basis. As a whole, the interdiction campaign made enemy transportation more difficult, but not impossible.

The reasons for the failure of Strangle to live up to the expectations of the optimistic code name were the ingenuity of the enemy in devising countermeasures to negate the interdiction program, and the inadequate computation of the force capabilities of the UN Command air forces required to effect the desired degree of interdiction of the Communist North Korean railway system. Despite the fact that the success of the railway-interdiction program would depend upon the enemy's countermeasures, the UNC air operations officers called for no enemy reaction estimates. Back of the lines, the Red North Korean railroad bureau managed a crude but wonderfully effective rail-recovery effort. Units of 50 rail-repair troops were stationed at major rail stations while crews of ten men were located every four miles along the tracks. Because of the abundance of unskilled labor and the crudeness of the repairs, the section gangs were able to repair rail cuts in a remarkably short time. According to UNC air surveillance studies, the Reds fixed rail cuts in from two to six hours, made bridge repairs in from two to four days. At the key railroad junction at Sunchon, northwest of Pyongyang, pilots reported in early November 1951 that the railroad bridge was still out of service since two spans were missing. It was only after a night photo was taken that the UN Command discovered that the Communists brought up removable spans each night and had been using the bridge right along.

In the meantime, the UNC air planners did not adequately compute the force capabilities of the UNC air forces required to effect the desired degree of interdiction of enemy railway system in Red North Korea. At the beginning, the UNC air planners apparently assumed that the UNC air forces had the capability to destroy the enemy's rail system in Red North Korea.
At the end, the UNC air forces failed in their efforts absolutely to interdict Communist North Korean rail transportation because they lacked sufficient aircraft strength to maintain by day and night the intensive rail cuts required to keep all the enemy rail lines out of operation. "Nothing is so bad in air campaigns as not to have enough force to do a job completely," commented General Weyland. "For example," he added, "all but four or five percent of pre-war rail traffic in Red North Korea was stopped, but this was sufficient to form a solid base upon which to add enough truck and A-frame transportation to maintain a static supply line."

At the beginning of 1952, General Ridgway sent his assessment of the interdiction program to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was convinced that the air campaign had slowed down the enemy's supply operations, and raised the time required to get supplies to the front. It had also diverted personnel and material from the front to maintain and protect the line of communications. By destroying rail and road transportation and a significant quantity of the goods carried, interdiction had placed increased demands upon the production facilities of Communist China and the USSR. These were all valuable, General Ridgway went on, but under static defense conditions the Communists were still able to support their troops adequately, and the UNC air forces within their current resources could not hope to prevent them from continuing to do so: Over a period of time the enemy could manage to stockpile supplies at the front and to build up his forces as well, the UNC Commander maintained, and the improvement of Communist countermeasures would weaken the effects of the interdiction program in the future. In other words, although the enemy was being hurt and impeded in his build-up, the UNC Commander believed that unless there was a change in the battle situation in which the Communists were forced to increase their expenditures of supplies and ammunition, eventually they would be in a position to launch and sustain a major offensive.

The Naval Support

Although the interdiction operations in the air were more widely publicized, UNC naval surface vessels also contributed to the effort, especially along the eastern coast of Red North Korea. During the poor flying weather the 5-inch guns of the fleet destroyers kept the coastal railroad under fire. The destroyer barrages could not make initial break in the rails, but they could help keep the line cut by harassing fire.

Heavy naval ships concentrated on troop targets along the east coast. The
battleships *New Jersey* and *Wisconsin*, the heavy cruisers *Toledo, Los Angeles, Rochester*, and *St. Paul*, and the light cruiser *Manchester* supported the 1 ROK Corps in the east coast during November and December 1951 close to the bomb line. Farther north British Royal Marine Commando units carried out several raids on Tanchon and one on Wonsan Harbor during December 1951. In the meantime, the Communists became active on the west coast. Under the cover of night they landed raiding parties on offshore islands held by ROK adherents north of the 38th Parallel. The vulnerability of many of these islands lying close to the coast to seizure by determined enemy efforts led Admiral Joy to seek ways and means to strengthen the guerrilla garrisons. By adding ROK Marine units as reinforcements to the guerrillas, Admiral Joy hoped to stiffen their defensive capabilities. Thus, as of 6 January 1952 the responsibility for island defense north of the 38th Parallel was turned over to the Navy, and Task Force 95 was given the task for providing support for the ROK Marines and guerrillas holding the outposts.
CHAPTER V  STALEMATE  
(January - March 1952)

Section 1  Lull and Static Warfare  
(January - February 1952)

The opening of 1951 saw the battle lines and disposition of the ROK and UN allied forces across the entire front remained unchanged. And this battle line-up would continue to remain until the second half of March 1952, when the newly reactivated II ROK Corps became operational, with the exception of the following alterations.

On 12 January, last elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division outloaded on the same transport ship used by the 40th US Infantry Division (California National Guard) and departed for its new station, Hokkaido, Japan. One day earlier, 11 January, first elements of the 40th US Division arrived at Inchon and the division was assigned to the Eighth US Army and attached to the IX US Corps on 22 January, and assumed responsibility for the 24th US Division sector on the central front on 28 January. For the 40th US Division, this was the second time to come to Korea in six years.

On 11 January the 5th ROK Division was attached to the I ROK Corps and relieved the 11th ROK Division on line in the remote eastern sector, while the latter went into EUSAK reserve, remaining at FTC #2 in Yangyang. On the following day, the 6th ROK Division also went into reserve for training at FTC #3 in Yanggu, after being relieved in position in the Kumsong sector by the 3rd ROK Division. Such a rotation system of divisions had been carried out at the time primarily for a nine-week period of intensive field training and rehabilitation as set forth by the Eighth US Army.

On 23 February, the 25th US Division completed the relief of the 7th US Division in the IX US Corps, assuming the responsibility for the defense of a sector on the Minnesota Line, while the 7th US Division went into IX US Corps reserve.

On the other hand, the enemy order of battle in front of the UNC's forward lines west to east was: The 40th NK Brigade in the extreme western sector; the 65th, 63rd, 64th and 39th CCF Armies on the western front; the 42nd, 26th,
and 12th CCF Armies on the central front; the 68th CCF Army and II NK Corps in the mid-eastern sector; and the III and I NK Corps in the remote eastern sector.

The first two months of 1952 was a typical period of dull and static warfare, caused not only by the impasse of the truce negotiations at Panmunjom plus the peculiar cold winter weather, but also by an enforced operation, called “Clam Up”.

During the period, other than small-scale raids, the only aggressive actions taken by the friendly forces were those to restore ground lost to enemy attacks. As a whole, no positions of friendly forces were threatened, and most of frontline actions were localized to patrol bases or outpost positions. There was an exception, however, that considerably large-scale operations were carried out for mopping up Communist guerrillas in the remote rear areas.

Highlights of combat activity during January were the battle for Hill 104 and its vicinity in the I US Corps sector, and another battle for Hill 1090, so-called “Christmas Hill,” in the X US Corps sector.

Late in December 1951, the Chinese Communist forces had taken Hill 104 (or Tum-e-ri Hill) and its neighbouring key terrain features including Noname Hill or Hill B from the 12th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division in the western sector.

Following the Eighth US Army’s order to attack and regain lost ground, a series of daylight attacks were made by the 12th and 15th Regiments of the 1st ROK Division during 3 – 8 January 1952.

After repeated attacks and counterattacks up and down the hill, Hill 104,
situatied five kilometers west of Korangpo, was finally in the friendly hands by 8 January, thus inflicting heavy casualties upon the 523rd Regiment of the 118th CCF Division. Friendly units counted 1,611 enemy dead on the scene, captured four prisoners and many weapons. The friendly losses were also dear; suffered 129 killed and 585 wounded in this heroic action.

Another closest battle in the month had taken place in the mid-eastern sector. On the night of 3 January, an outpost position of the 3rd Regiment of the 7th ROK Division atop Hill 1090, about six kilometers west of Mundungni, was attacked by the 612th Regiment of the 204th CCF Division. But the 3rd ROK Regiment counterattacked and restored the outpost by the early morning on the 4th. The enemy attempted swiftly to retake by a counterattack thereafter but resulted in vain.

Operation Clam Up
(10 – 15 February)

A peculiar operation “Clam Up” was conducted by the Eighth US Army during the period from 10 to 15 February. This new type of operation in nature was a scheme to lure enemy patrols into capture through discontinuance of patrolling, deceptive troop’s movement, discontinuance of northbound of vehicle and foot traffic visible to the enemy, and fires, noises, and light aviation flights over the enemy held-territory were held to the minimum. All firing, except that dictated by emergencies and to assist in the capture of enemy groups was to be suspended. Every effort was expended to conceal the true situation and lead the enemy to believe the friendly forces had been withdrawn. Friendly advantages in this uncommon tactics were: Providing valuable information, capturing prisoner, decreasing casualties, reduction in ammunition expenditure, and increased moral higher through a change of routine.

While the operation “Clam Up” was carried out, the enemy launched a battalion-size attack against two outposts on the IX US Corps front. The 614th Regiment of the 204th CCF Division raided on Hill 1090 (Christmas Hill) in the 7th ROK Division sector, attempting to seize the outpost three times during 11 – 13 February. After three days of bitter fighting the Reds were beatened off and costed 40 dead. On the contrary, friendly suffered 18 casualties. Meanwhile, elements of the 12th CCF Army attempted to envelop and eventually took the Hill 662 (9 kilometers west of Hill 1090) outpost positions from the 22nd ROK Regiment, the 3rd ROK Division on 15 February.

On the following day, elements of the 22nd ROK Regiment counterattacked
and restored Hill 662, suffering 70 casualties including 28 killed.

When Operation Clamp Up came to an end on 15 February, results were far under the EUSAK's expectations. In practice the Communists sent out the few reconnaissance forces and detected that the UNC positions were still occupied and then returned to strengthen their defensive positions by utilizing immunity from UN fire, without interference.

New Operation Plans

The inactivity at the battle front at this stage of war did not mean that there was a lack of planning. During the winter and early spring, the Eighth US Army staff prepared and forwarded new operation plans to the UN Command, recommending a variety of limited operations that might be worked out, particularly when the cease-fire negotiations at Panmunjom failed. The first of the plans, called "Big Stick," was presented on 2 February, proposing to

![White-clad reconnaissance patrol from 2nd US Division moving out, 1 January 1952.](image-url)
Stalemate

destroy the enemy supply complex based in Sibyon-ni and to advance the left flank of the Eighth Army to the Yesong River, about 30 kilometers northwest in distance from the current main line of resistance. In the course of the advance Kaesong would be captured and four CCF armies dispersed. The plan estimated that this Big Stick could be realized with present capabilities on or about 15 April and would use an amphibious feint at Kojo and whereabouts on the east coast by the 1st US Marine Division to exploit its chances of success.

On 22 February, General Van Fleet proposed a second plan, called "Home Coming." This was a more limited type operation intended to employ only ROK forces. Its objectives were similar to Big Stick in that the Yesong River and Kaesong would be targets, but the attack toward Sibyon-ni and the amphibious feint would be omitted. General Van Fleet wanted, if Big Stick were ruled out, to try Home Coming on or about 1 April.

But, General Ridgway did not favor any operation that would lead to an increase in casualties, as the truce negotiations were making some progress by the end of February. On 2 March, General Ridgway sent a message, instructing General Van Fleet to confine offensive action to such reconnaissance and counter-offensive actions as necessary to maintain integrity of the UN forces. Instead, the UN Command then had been concentrating the bulk of its effort against interdiction targets in the enemy rear areas by employing air power including carrier-based plane. In addition, harassing bombardment on the enemy targets all along the west and east coasts by the UN naval forces was continued day and night.

Yet, still anxious to use ROK divisions in a series of limited objective attacks, General Van Fleet did not give up to try again on 1 April, thus preparing another plans, called Chopstick 6 and Chopstick 16. Chopstick 6 was to envelop the high ground south of Pyonggang in the strategic Iron Triangle area by a reinforced ROK division, and Chopstick 16 would force the enemy to retreat back from the area east and south of the Nam River on the eastern front. In both, the ROK forces would be strongly supported by air and artillery and could take advantage of their cross-country mobility and gain valuable training. (See Sketch Map 27.)

General Ridgway, however, turned the first one, because he felt the objective terrain would not be favorable to defend. Instead, he approved the concept of Chopstick 16 on 16 April with the proviso that no US troops would be used. In addition, he further placed a more strong string to restrain if it were to execute -- General Ridgway wanted General Van Fleet to report him before the operation was carried out. But, as had happened so often in the past, General
Van Fleet decided to suspend Chopstick 16 indefinitely on 29 April, the day after the so-called “Package Proposal” was presented at Panmunjom. Thus, such determined new offensive operation plans were did not materialize, perhaps, because the attacks would cause a high rise in casualties upon the UN forces, comparing with ground which was to gain

**New experiments**

While Operation “Ratkiller” was carried out in the rear, at the front, small-scale patrols and raids were to become a routine action, characterizing the lull and static war, during which time serveral military experiments were taking place in various fields.

The 1 US Corps artillery conducted a fire attack operation, called “High Boy.” At the time normal artillery fire could not effectively destroy the enemy’s fortified positions unless it threw in more than 500 – 1,000 pounds’ bombardment.
Particularly, the 105-mm. howitzer was not effective against enemy bunkers. The enemy's deep communication trenches and firing bunkers were covered with timber or logs which could tolerate artillery shellings. Prime moving and self-propelled heavy artillery mounted on the tops of hills or ridges and poured direct fire with high explosive shells into the strong-points. Thus, this "High Boy" operation was effectively employed in weakening enemy fortifications on the south slope of the mountains but could not destroy entire enemy fortification by field artillery alone.

Another experiment was a helicopter lift. In combat, the capability of transportation for troops and supplies is of an essential factor that greatly affects upon the conduct of successful operations. To meet requirements for more quick and effective mobility, particularly in the mountainous areas like in Korea, the US forces had been developing to utilize the characteristics of helicopters to the maximum extent. Thus, the helicopters were already being used in the Korean War, but large-scale helicopter troops lifts were still at the theoretical stage. Late in September 1951, a company-size troop lift to the top of Hill 884 by helicopter was successfully carried out in the wildly mountainous area by the 1st US Marine Division, marking a bright new chapter in the employment of helicopters. Since then onward, helicopters had demonstrated their ability to carry out on shortest notice an emergency resupply and evacuation of troops including sick and wounded soldiers in combat.

For instance, on 10 January 1952, troops of the whole 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Marine Regiment relieved the 1st Battalion of the 5th US Marine Regiment again on Hill 884 by HMR-16 helicopter lift, which was called Operation Change-Change.

One more noticeable experiment that developed during the Korean War was body armor. Its first large-scale test in the field was experienced by American Marines during 14 June to 13 October 1951, when a joint Army-Navy Medical Commission endorsed vests worn in action by troops of the 5th Regiment of 1st US Marine Division plus the 23rd and 38th Regiments of the 2nd US Infantry Division. As a result, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters approved on 16 November 1951 the standardization and procurement of vests to be designed by the U.S. Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory and airshipped to Korea not later than 31 January 1952. There were still remained some problems to be solved before vests became available to use in the field. Wearers of the M-1951 vest were warned that it would not stop rifle or machine gun bullets unless they had lost much of their velocity at long ranges. The vest was protection against most grenade, mortar, and artillery fragments, as well as .45 caliber pistol and burp
gun slugs of less than 1,000 feet per second initial muzzle velocity.

The first 500 vests reached Korea with only a few days to spare. The first test in actual combat proved that, among ten men, nine men hit while wearing the vest. One was killed outright as a 120-mm. enemy mortar round landed right in his lap. The other eight, however, showed excellent results. All of the eight were wounded in other places not covered by the vest -- but they were all wounded instead of killed in action. Such an effectiveness was of particular importance in overcoming the numerical superiority of the Communists, thus reducing casualties. It would be a significant addition to a unit's numerical strength as well as combat morale. Thus through a thorough trial, armed vests became standard issue equipment.

The armed vest was issued first time to infantry men in the spring of 1952. The statistic revealed that fatal wounds were received 75 per cent at upper portion of body, 25 per cent below abdomen. Fragments caused 60 per cent, the remainder was charged to small-arms. Statistics from World War II, foot soldiers suffered 94.5 per cent of the casualties which caused 61.3 to 80.4 per cent by fragments.
Section 2. The Beginning of the Outpost Battle
(1 – 31 March 1952)

The lull continued through March. During the month ground mobility was further hampered by the beginning of the spring thaw. Although hills and ridges were still covered with thick, frozen snow, both sides managed to employ small-scale action; the enemy conducted chiefly at night avoiding UN forces’ observation and air surveillance, while the friendly forces conducted mostly at daylight under cover of UN air forces.

On the western front of the I US Corps, on 1 March, the 45th US Division launched so-called “fire attack,” employing a company-size tank force in close coordination with artillery, mortar and recoilless rifle, against the Porkchop area. The fire attack lasted four hours. The Communists reacted by returning fire with various weapons. One tank was hit and burnt by enemy mortar fire and three tanks were damaged by enemy mine demolitions.

On the same day, on the central front, the 40th US Division of the IX US Corps also conducted a fire-assault upon the enemy positions in the Kumsong area by employing a tank company task force with five artillery battalions in support. As a result, the fire-attack destroyed 21 fortified enemy bunkers at the cost of six tanks damaged but later two were recovered.

Meanwhile, on the mid-eastern front of the X US Corps, an enemy force in two company-size attempted a night raid on 13 March against friendly key outpost positions on Heartbreak Ridge and Hill 1242 (Kachil-bong) manned by elements of the 25th US Division. During a 30-minute long fire fight the enemy had fired 1,000 rounds of artillery. The enemy was beatened off leaving ten Red dead behind and carrying heavy wounded with him. Friendly suffered six killed and 25 wounded.

Back in the rightmost sector of the I US Corps, elements of the 117th Division of the 39th CCF Army launched a fierce attack on 21 March against Outpost Erie (Hill 190.8), then manned by the 179th Regiment of the 45th US Division, commencing at 2300 hours. This peculiar outpost, consisted of nine defensive bunkers covered with logs and sandbags, was manned by a platoon-size force 1,400 meters away from the friendly main line of resistance. Despite being placed under a heavy barrage of the friendly defensive fire the enemy
attempted to close in, and a heavy fire fight ensued untill the next early morning, when, at 0130 hours, a company-size enemy group suddenly broke through three separate barbed-wire obstacles and seized the northern half of the outpost. But, the lost ground was regained with the arrival of reinforcements by 0210 hours, resulting in 31 enemy killed and one captured. The friendly losses were eight killed, four wounded, and two missed in action. (See Situation Map 4, Appendix IX.)

This kind of small clashes were just a few examples out of the hundreds that encountered by the UN forces during the winter rull and static period. On the night of 21 March alone the entire UNC troops sent out 41 combat patrols, 59 reconnaissance patrols and 118 ambush patrols, and the Communists matched with similar actions. This was the pattern of ground activities at this stage of the war.

A number of offensive operational plans were prepared and examined by General Van Fleet but discarded one after another, taking into consideration that such actions would be too costly in casualties or would influence upon the course of truce talks. Therefore, the activities on the front dramatically depressed.
The beginning of the static war was to show the nature of inactivities in decreasing casualties of two opposing forces. The enemy side's a month casualties dropped from 80,000 in October 1951 to about 13,000 in January through April 1952. The friendly casualties also decreased notably from 20,000 in October 1951 to 2,500 a month rate in February through April 1952.

Now, taking a look at the force situation, the Communist forces in Korea had grown to 866,000 men by April 1952 from 377,000 in November 1951, while the UNC ground strength including the ROK forces was increased from 579,000 in November 1951 to 636,500 by the end of April 1952, resulted mostly from the growth of the ROK Army. During the period the increase of the enemy artillery power was worthy of close attention; his artillery units had climbed from four CCF divisions up to eight CCF divisions and four well-equipped NK Communist artillery brigades with plenty flow of ammunition supply. Furthermore, Friendly intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had newly added two CCF and one NK Communist armored divisions plus one NK Communist mechanized division, equipped with over 500 tanks and self-propelled guns in total. Thus the combat capabilities were steadily mounting as the truce talks kept going on.

Alterations

In the meantime, in March, taking advantage of the continued lull on the battle front and also with the completion of the guerrilla mopping-up operations "Ratkiller" in the rear, General Van Fleet reorganized portion of UNC's front to give greater tactical unity and strength to the UN ground forces.

Accordingly, during 18–29 March 1952, Task Force Paik passed from a status of attachment for training to that of operational control of the IX US Corps. Initially, on 13 February, Headquarters of Task Force Paik was ordered to move to the vicinity of Hwachon, and was attached to the IX US Corps on 18 February for intensive orientation and training so as to assume the role of Headquarters, II ROK Corps on 5 April.

Subsequently, the 3rd ROK Division, 6th ROK Division, and Capital ROK Division, which were to eventually become attached to the II ROK Corps (formerly Task Force Paik), were attached to the IX US Corps one after another.

By 29 March, the 6th ROK Division had completed the relief of the 40th US Division. The newly trained 8th ROK Division also replaced the 1st US Marine Division in the Punchbowl area and the 1st US Marine Division was
shifted to the west, where, on 25 March, it relieved the 1st ROK Division, which moved to the Field Training Center =1 at Pupyong-ni to begin a course of training.

In addition, to improve the security of Kimpo peninsula and to provide an integrated defense line, the Kimpo Provisional Regiment was organized under the command of Colonel Edward M. Staab, Jr. by the 1st US Marine Division. As it had been planned, the II ROK Corps became operational effective on 5 April in the long run, with the 3rd, 6th, and Capital ROK Divisions under its operational control, and thereby assumed responsibility for a 25-kilometer sector in the right portion of the IX US Corps. The II ROK Corps was released from operational control of the IX US Corps at this time.

Thus, the UNC's front was now defended by units of the three US corps on the western front and two ROK corps on the eastern front.

Section 3. Behind the Line

Augmentation of the ROK Army

The Eighth US Army, as the highest, unified command over all the UN ground forces fighting in Korea under the United Nations Command, had the multiple roles in accomplishing its military operations. Military affairs were but one principal aspect of the problem of conducting the Korean War. In addition to tactical operations, it had to take care of civil affairs, prisoners of war, logistical problems, lines of communication, improvement of the ROK Army, and many other matters.

Particularly, the absence of conclusive developments either at the truce talking front or on the fighting front led the Eighth Army to focus more attention upon the flow of affairs in the rear areas. As the battle-field had been stabilized relatively, General Van Fleet, now began to turn his eyes to some problems that had been nagging at him for months. Perhaps, one of his top concern to solve was the improvement of the ROK Army both in quantity and quality.

The further augmentation of the ROK Army was rather serious matter more concerned by the Government of the Republic of Korea. As long as the war continued, the Republic of Korea would remain the most critical link in the
defense chain, and as long as the Communists held the northern half, the ROK forces had to be strengthened at least up to a self-reliance force in strength and modern equipment. However, on 23 January 1952 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the U.S. Secretary of Defense that the economical situation of the Republic of Korea did not have the capability to sustain a significant expansion of military forces in the near future.

In their opinion, the present ROK units of a ten division, 250,000-man army, for which both Generals MacArthur and Ridgway had consistently favored, could constitute a sufficient deterrent to further aggression, when properly trained, equipped, and led or, they could delay Communist advance until reinforcements could be brought in, if the occasion demanded. But it was not the full reason but one facet. Perhaps, a more strong reason was that the United States had had to supply the bulk of the military requirements to its NATO allies and to look after the Japanese defense. Thus, the United States attitude moved toward a conclusion that the ROK Army expansion would have to await a more opportune moment, taking into consideration such heavy demands at home and abroad, comparing to a limited-scale production.

On the other hand, the ROK Government did not, of course, agree that an army of ten divisions would be enough to defend the country, particularly in case of the postwar period. But this strong opinion of the Republic of Korea Government did not disclose until late March 1952, when Secretary of U.S. Navy Dan Kimball discovered during his inspection tour to Korea that General Van Fleet favored the formation of ten additional ROK divisions. The Secretary's report on the matter was the first intimation that the U.S. Army had received of strong support for the ROK Army expansion. In any event, General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on 9 April 1952, immediately asked General Ridgway for an explanation.

General Ridgway forthwith queried General Van Fleet, and was reported by the latter on 9 April that he did believe in the expansion of the ROK Army to twenty divisions. General Van Fleet, being of the same opinion with the ROK Government, maintained his stand that the Republic of Korea had the manpower and the desire to fight and the United States could support ROK troops in Korea much more economically than American forces. General Van Fleet further referred General Ridgway to an interview he had just published in the U.S. News and World Report, dated 28 March, if the latter desired more information on his views.

At any rate, General Ridgway flatly disagreed with General Van Fleet on doubling the ROK Army. In fact, General Ridgway had complained about
the lack of leadership in the ROK Army even before he had handed the Eighth US Army command over to General Van Fleet in April 1951. In his report to General Hull who would become Commander-in-Chief, UN Command (7 October 1953 – 7 April 1955) after General Clark, General Ridgway told him that the Republic of Korea had no economical capacity to sustain additional forces, and he emphasized that the development of the Japanese defense forces should be given preference at this time. He also mentioned that the training program for the ten ROK division army was just beginning to bear fruit, but it would take another ten months before it completed. If the United States start to organize ten additional divisions, he went on, it would require eighteen months to prepare them for action and it would cost the United States to furnish equipment and supplies.

Subsequently, General Ridgway's disapproval was enough to prevent an increase in the ROK ground forces and no change had been made in the size of the ROK Army when he left the UN Command and Far East Command in May 1952 for a new post at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe.

Prospect of the ROK Army expansion was seemingly began to blight in mid-1952, when General Mark W. Clark assumed the UN Command and U.S. Far East Command in May. General Clark was inclined from the beginning toward the enlargement of the ROK Army.

Actually, the ROK Army had grown steadily above the 250,000-man level and had long been overstrength. Just before General Ridgway had left the theater he had submitted a new troop list totalling over 360,000 spaces, covering the additional artillery, tank, and security forces being organized and providing ten additional infantry regiments. The ten-division ceiling had been retained, but the independent regiments could be used as cadres for new divisions if and when this became desirable.

As General Clark pointed out in June 1952 to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ROK Army had supplanted the ROK National Police in the corps areas and had taken on increased security duties for the prisoners of war camps and also in suppressing Communist guerrillas in the rear. In addition, the replacement and training system which produced seven hundred soldiers a day had begun to pile up surpluses. But, General Clark did not forget to mention that there were 30,000 patients carried on the rolls because the Republic of Korea had no veteran's organization to care for them. In the end, on 9 June 1952, General Clark reported to Washington that the U.S. Army should grant him authorization for 92,100 bulk personnel (which included patients, trainees, interpreters, general prisoners, etc.) and 19,458 to form six separate regiments.
Four days later, 23 June, he forwarded another request, recommending to add two more ROK divisions to the troop list and increase the total for logistical support from 363,000 to about 415,000. He emphasized that when the ROK Army was enlarged with the new divisions, the number of Asians fighting communism would rise and the number of American casualties would decline. This would help make the best use of the ROK manpower.

Yet, the movement for expanding ROK ground forces appeared to be a long way to go. In mid-June 1952, the ROK Ambassador in Washington urged the U.S. State Department to adopt a three-year plan for building up the ROK Air Forces tactically. But the matter of the Air Force ran into more difficulty. As early as on 27 March 1952, General Ridgway had forwarded his views to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating that such a small, ineffective ROK Air Force could offer no real opposition to a feature Communist air sweep and would probably be wiped out quickly, and maintenance of a tiny, important force was wasteful, since the United States would still have to provide air support for the Republic of Korea, in the event of renewed Communist aggression. Thus, General Ridgway had opposed the existence of the ROK Air Force. But he found that it was next to impossible to abolish a service once it gained a firm foothold. But the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken no action on General Ridgway's recommendation, and, at the end of June 1952, they decided to hold to the ten division, 250,000-man ROK Army and the existing Navy and Air Force.

When General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army visited Korea he approved to raise the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) to 2,500 men per division. General Mark W. Clark had to inform General Van Fleet not to activate further separate light infantry regiments and that the ROK Army strength could not exceed 352,945 men.

General Collins' tour and his discussions with Generals Clark and Van Fleet bore fruit in early August, when he approved the requested bulk allotment of 92,100 men and directed his staff to support for a two-division augmentation for the ROK Army. General Collins envisioned this expansion program would be fitted within current budget guidelines and availability of logistical resources. He also felt it would be desirable to capitalize on the ROK capability to supply trained manpower economically and to pave the way for the eventual withdrawal and redeployment of the U.S. Army forces.

While the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the implications of adding two divisions, the strength of the ROK Army grew to over 350,000 men in August. Since KATUSA was not included in the ROK Army totals, General Van Fleet asked General Clark to seek a further increment in KATUSA strength to a
ceiling of 27,000. General Clark, in turn, urged.

General Clark's recommendations for augmenting the ROK Army and KATUSA were passed along to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with his third request of 1 September 1952 covering the enlargements of the ROK Marine forces from 12,376 to 19,800 men. However, as for a three-year plan for the ROK Air Force build-up, on 19 September, they did not agree and determined to maintain as it was.

The following week, on 26 September, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved to increase the ROK Army, Marine forces, and KATUSA, lifting the troop ceiling for the ROK Army and Marines to 463,000. Yet, this new ceiling would not be finalized, largely due to the logistical problems including equipment and supply for the ROK increments, until the end of October 1952 when President Truman approved it.

On the other hand, General Ridgway, who held fast to his view that a ten-division, 250,000-man ROK Army be maintained, showed his concern to improve artillery capability for the ROK Army. The US Far East Command had long frowned on any increase in ROK Army artillery. They felt that the terrain, the extreme difficulty of ammunition resupply over very poor roads and precipitate ridges, combined with the lack of trained ROK artillerymen and shortage of pieces, provided reason enough for opposing expansion.

They dealt with things in the abstract by way of a makeshift. The Communist aggressors had brought the bulk of artillery pieces forward without difficulty from the beginning and had used artillery firepower very effectively. Moreover, the Republic of Korea had enough manpower to train artillerymen if equipment and instructors were provided. Particularly, a major feature of the Korean War was to build up friendly forces' firepower against the overwhelming enemy forces in manpower.

But as the fighting declined in intensity, thus slowing down noticeably, and the flow of ammunition increased, General Ridgway began to incline his ear to the request presented by the ROK Government in this respect of a ROK Army artillery expansion program. He felt that the ROK units must have long-range artillery to be capable of mutual support, division to division, along the UNC's thinly manned line. In the end, in March 1952 General Ridgway approved a full complement four artillery battalions, three 105-mm. howitzers for each of the ten ROK divisions. In May the Department of the U.S. Army sent interim authorization for the Far East Command to go ahead with this program. By this date, ROK Army officers were returning from artillery school in the United States to add incentive to the expansion.
Thus, the process of improving the combat capabilities of the ROK Army was eventually on its way by April 1952. Schools and training programs to raise the leadership level and confidence of the troops had been started and began to produce demonstrable results. Increased service and combat support was being organized and equipped.

By October 1952, 16 battalions (105-mm. howitzer) would become available and four more would activate before the close of 1952. By November six (155-mm. howitzer) battalions were also to join the ROK troops. In addition, one tank company for each ROK division would be available by October 1952.

With such an expansion in men and equipment, even though still not enough, ROK Army troops would give full play to their genius, outstanding combat ability in the Punchbowl sector, White Horse Hill, Capital Hill, and elsewhere, particularly during the late summer and autumn of 1952. What they only need were sufficient firepower plus more mobility in arms and equipment coupled with proper training. Many of UNC's offensive operations from now onward on the eastern and east-central front would be carried out almost entirely by ROK forces, demonstrating themselves their distinguished combat efficiency superior to the enemy forces.

Ammunition Problem

Modern warfare required a substantial cushion for meeting materiel requirements during the first one to two years of a war before industrial mobilization permits current demands to be met from new procurement.

With the end of World War II, the phenomena of the United States industry, particularly for military munition, had completely converted into a peace time industry. This meant that the lack of postwar orders sent the ammunition industry into eclipse. Thus, equipment and ammunition left over from World War II provided the only cushion in the Korean War.

Probably no items of logistical supply attracted more public attention than ammunition. It seemed incredible to many that American production still had not been able to overcome all shortages of ammunition more than two years after the outbreak of the Korean War.

It was true that total stocks in the U.S. Far East Command, for a number of significant types of artillery and mortar ammunition, frequently did fall below the authorized level of supply (90 days), and at times dropped well below the 60 days of supply defined as the safety level. It should be noted that the day of supply at the time, of course, was based upon World War II
experience.

Reasons given for the failure to maintain full authorized levels were; (1) The unusually high rate of fire deemed necessary by General Van Fleet to offset the enemy's large numbers in particular situation; (2) the fact that no ammunition production lines of any consequence were in operation in the United States; and (3) the long lead time — about a year and a half — required to establish production lines and get quantity production.

In January 1951, the U.S. Congress acted and approved the first large appropriation for ammunition. But it was estimated to take eighteen to twenty-four months in reverting factory, manufacturing, and arriving the end products available at the battle front. This indicated that the vital ammunition problems would not solve before the fall of 1952 or early months of 1953.

As the Korean War ground to a slower momentum in mid-1951, artillery assumed a new importance, because static warfare required more artillery missions to harass and interdict the enemy. In fact, all commanders of tactical units in the field had repeatedly emphasized that the Korean War had been essentially a contest between enemy manpower and UNC's firepower.

During a 60-day period from 19 August to 18 October 1951, 158,303 tons
of ammunition were delivered to regiments and battalions of the I, IX, and X US Corps from 17 forward ammunition supply points.

Paradoxically, the enemy’s “human wave” tactics and the mountainous terrain had made Korea a battle ground of artillery and hand grenades. As a result, according to the statistics, in this same sixty-day period, the UN ground forces delivered across the front 3,092 rounds to each 105-mm. howitzer; 2,579 rounds to each 155-mm. howitzer; 1,803 rounds to each 155-mm. gun; 1,631 rounds to each 8-inch howitzer -- but only 391 rounds to each 60-mm. mortar and 546 rounds to each M1 rifle. Over 400,000 hand grenades were used by the Eighth US Army. One infantry regiment used over 900 rounds in one night.

In brief, with the talking battle going on at Panmunjom, ground battle all across the front became the pattern of a artillery duel between the two opponents. Comparing with the small number of casualties inflicted upon the enemy during the early part of 1952, the Eighth US Army expenditures of artillery ammunition appeared rather high. Thus UNC’s artillery required a greatest demand of ammunition supply.

General Collins, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, asked the United Nations Command on 10 March 1952, to see the whether major reductions should not be made at once and retained unless large-scale fighting resumed. General Ridgway in turn assigned the problem to the Eighth US Army. General Van Fleet forwarded to General Ridgway a reply, reporting that if savings were mandatory, the only category that he could afford to reduce was interdictory fire. Since 66 percent of the Eighth Army’s missions were interdictory, as against 19 percent for counterbattery and 15 percent for meeting enemy actions, General Van Fleet was ordering his corps commanders to cut interdictory fire by 20 percent, but this was fairest limit he could go.

On the other hand, restrictions in the number of rounds that could be used each day caused the men at the front to complain and brought the whole matter to the attention of American Congress and the public. Facing this ammunition crisis, the principal enemy was time. Until production could begin on a larger-scale that would replenish stocks as well as current needs, the crisis would go on. Another key factor directly related with the matter was the enemy’s decision and will whether he would enlarge the war or not. Fortunately, the Communists matched the UN Command in their disclamation to press the fighting on the battlefield or to broaden the war. At any rate, the ammunition problem would live long until such a time that enough production could offset the demand in the field.

Regardless of the ammunition problems that continued to plague General Van
Fleet in conducting the operations, the fighting at the front continued day and night. It is usually referred to this stage of the Korean War as a time of so-called stalemate. However, it did not mean the fighting was any less bitter. Friendly forces were paying a dear price, adding casualties on the list every day.

By the end of June 1952 General Clark of the United Nations Command had become gravely concerned over supplies particularly of 155-mm. howitzer shell. The Communists had almost doubled their artillery and mortar fire during the month and the UN ground forces had to increase their expenditures in self-defense. The 105-mm. howitzer was not effective against enemy bunkers and lacked the range for counterbattery fire. General Clark pointed out that when six ROK 155-mm. battalions became active, the Far East Command would have to supply 486 pieces instead of 378. He had to restrict the expenditures of the 40 rounds authorized day of supply (40 rounds per tube) to 15 rounds a day. Besides, the scheduled delivery of 155-mm. ammunition would require further limitations. General Clark arrived at a conclusion to reduce theater stocks to about 350,000 rounds or only 62 days supply instead of 90 days up to 1 September 1952.

In early July 1952, General Clark was informed from Washington of the flow of supply coming into the theater. Only about 100,000 rounds of 155-mm. ammunition were coming off the lines each month and this would gradually climb up to 650,000 rounds a month in approximately a year. To provide the Far East Command with the full 40 rounds a day for 486 pieces would require about 583,000 rounds a month, a rate that would not be reached until March 1953. This did not mean, of course, the Eighth US Army could not fire whatever was necessary to meet the situation if the enemy launched a major offensive, but it would take time to replace ammunition expended at a higher daily rate than 15 rounds. Moreworse, the steel strike, which had begun on 2 June 1952, caused further delay in the improvement of the ammunition situation.

General Van Fleet was then seriously concerned with the urgency of the 155-mm. shell situation because major field commanders brought the matter to his attention during the early days of July. He informed his subordinates that the Eighth Army would employ its 155-mm. shells only on the most remunerative targets, using other caliber weapons and tactical air wherever possible as substitutes.

On 13-14 July, General Collins and his Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Major General William O. Reeder, visited the Eighth Army and assured General Van Fleet that he would get a minimum of five rounds of 155-mm. ammunition per day per tube including the tubes in the new ROK battalions.
General Reeder suggested that the Eighth US Army might convert some of its 105-mm. to 8-inch howitzer battalions since tubes were available and ammunition was plentiful.

General Clark did not go along with such a low figure of the daily rate and authorized General Van Fleet in early August to expend fifteen rounds of 155-mm. howitzer shells a day per tube. General Collins approved this rate later in the month by curtailing other allocations severely, and in mid-August he further agreed a nine-day level at the full rate of 40 rounds per day per tube. This would mean that, the Far East Command could only requisition ammunition on the basis of the number of rounds actually fired.

As the action on the front mounted in September and October 1952, ammunition expenditures on both sides climbed sharply. In one week in September the UNC artillery and mortar units hurled over 370,000 rounds at the enemy and received over 185,000 in return. During the fierce battles of October, the Eighth US Army sent 423,000 rounds of 105-mm. howitzer shells at the Communists in a six-day period. Subsequently, ammunition restrictions would remain until production facilities reached their peak in 1953.

On the other hand, friendly intelligence reports revealed that the enemy’s major field commanders were gathered at Pyongyang in early April 1952 and were directed a new concept of operations: “Victory would rather be gained by artillery effort than the power of air, naval and infantry.” And the enemy’s weight of artillery had been considerably mounted in terms of number of pieces, shells and accuracy month after month ever since the armistice negotiations were started.

Despite the limitations the UN forces would manage the firing-war during the stalemate period in hurling artillery shells at a ratio of friendly 8 to enemy 1 and mortar shells 4 to 1 until the close of the war.

**Psychological and Propaganda Warfare**

As their territorial expansion strategy by means of military action -- the aggression war -- finally fell into impasse, the Communist aggressors now turned their efforts to propaganda assault, aiming at misleading the world attention. At first the Communists attempted to use and exploit the conference bable for the armistice negotiations at Kaesong as their propaganda-drama stage. They tried to exert themselves to press upon the United Nations Command, launching a series of propaganda attacks.
There were two occasions of misbombing incidents by UNC's airplanes. On 11 December 1951, a light bomber had strafed a truck in the Kaesong neutral zone, and the other, on 17 January 1952, had dropped a bomb also on Kaesong, all due to the pilots' unintentional, navigational mistakes. The Communists accepted the expression of regret and no attempt exploited the incidents for propaganda purposes. But the Communists' true face of lie-tactics unmasked on 25 January 1952, when Soviet delegate to the United Nations Jakob Malik accused the United States of using poison gas in the Korean War. Needless to say it was a pure fabrication on the Communists' part. Although this kind of fabricated charges made by the Communists was not new, it seemed significant that Malik made it himself. It caused a flurry in the U.S. Government since it might be a warning that the Communists were preparing to employ gas warfare themselves.

Moreover, Moscow, Peking, and Pyongyang began a series of biological warfare propaganda campaigns by all means such as radio and newspapers to loud the voices of charging that the United Nations Command was using germ in the northern territory of Korea and Manchuria. Again, it was an entirely fabricated propaganda in order to discredit the United States as well as the UN forces.

U.S. Secretary of State Acheson immediately issued a statement strongly denying the use of germ warfare and requested the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) to investigate the fact. But the Communists refused the investigation. All these false propaganda issues were nothing more than the Communists' propaganda shows.

On 8 March 1952 Chou En-lai of Red China broadcast if the Red Chinese caught U.S. airmen engaged in germ warfare, they would be treated as war criminals. The U.S. authorities once more worried about the treatment of friendly prisoners, and General Ridgway issued a strong statement warning the Communists to treat prisoners of war properly. The U.N. World Health Organization volunteered to send technical assistance about epidemics and, the United States agreed but the Communists refused to receive the teams. True facts about the treatment of friendly prisoners of war revealed in later that the Communists had handled them too miserably and did not treat them as humanbeing. Worst, the enemy put prisoners to the torture in an attempt to produce fabricated propaganda data and information.

Meanwhile, the UN Command executed psychological warfare program at the front. For some instances, on 30 April 1952, the 35th Regiment of the 25th US Division in the X US Corps broadcasted to the enemy troops by loud
speakers, telling them the following gists. The UN forces were always welcome their surrender, and assured them they would be treated properly in obedience to the Geneva Convention when they surrendered to the UNC's hands, but their fate would only meet worthless dead by overwhelming UNC's firepower, otherwise. Further, the broadcast told them that there was no a slim chance and would await no a gleam of hope before them as long as they continued to fight against the UN forces. It was and would be a mere chance for them to escape from the hell of the Communists' sphere, the broadcast went on. Then, in order to stimulate them to get home sick, some entertainment musics and true news were followed. Usually, the enemy replied to such friendly broadcasts by long-range artillery fire. In fact, it was the best chance for Communist troops to free themselves from the fetters of cruel, coerce Communists control, or being killed in the fighting. A similar psychological activity was carried out everywhere throughout the front.

On the other hand, tens of millions of leaflets, including certificate card of surrender, were hurled into the enemy held-territory by artillery shells. Actually, all defectors brought the certificate cards with them when they were captured by the UN troops.

Prewarning of the UN air bombings against the military targets such as in Pyongyang were delivered to the people there by a leaflet form in order first to let non-combatants remove to safer places in advance, and secondary to making the Communists' war effort in disorder and disruption. UN aircraft dropped such leaflets, notifying them the exact time and targets of bombardment prior to the action, and carried it out as exactly as notified them.

Consequently, if leaflets gave the information about an amphibious landing at Wonsan, the enemy was forced to prepare against the forthcoming landing there, while friendly forces had no intention of actual amphibious assault.

In another field, as the negotiations stumbled along in the truce tent, the Communist prisoners of war held at the UNC's camps began to stir, in response to their high level's directions, including Kim Il-sung and Nam Il, and to coincide with the almost daily charges of villainy on the part of the UN forces that wearied the ears of the UNC's negotiations.

The prisoner camps under the Eighth US Army supervision were run in strict accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention, with the clear implication that prisoners merited humane treatment because they were no longer waging war. But, neither NK Communists nor Chinese Communists had ever declared their adherence to this convention nor would they permit, as the UN Command did. The UN Command had already observed the attitude of the cruel NK Communists
toward prisoners, who they would shoot in the back of the head after wiring
their arms together behind their backs. Having the impudence to act, however,
the Communists delegates at Panmunjom and the Red prisoners at the UNC's
POW camps had charged tenaciously upon the UN Command that the
friendly forces were not treating the prisoners based on humanism. All these
were nothing more than the camouflaged-propaganda tactics that craftily planned
by the Communists.

Operation Ratkiller
(6 -- 31 January)

The temporary agreement at the Panmunjom negotiations for the limited
thirty-day "cease-fire" led the situation of the entire front to become notably
inactive in the fall of 1951. Taking advantage of this lull, General Van Fleet
was now in position to execute an antiguerilla operation called "Ratkiller"
in the rugged mountains of southwestern provinces. There were considerably
a large number of Communist guerrillas who had taken refuge after the Communist
forces' retreat, and now was a good time for the Eighth US Army to eliminate
a persistent annoyance, as neither side had any appetite for a large-scale offensive.

General Van Fleet organized and committed "Task Force Paik," composed
of the Capital and 8th ROK Divisions, to undertake the mission. The first phase
of Operation Ratkiller was initiated from 1 December 1951 lasting for a half-
month period in the Chiri-san area, and the second phase was carried farther
north into the Cholla Pukdo Provincial district from 19 December to 4 January
1952. The third phase "Ratkiller" was conducted again in the Chiri-san area
in an effort to clean up the remnants of the Communist guerrillas there. The
last action was performed on 19 January by the Capital ROK Division. When
the 26th ROK Regiment encircled the guerrillas completely in an outer blocking
ring by lining up hand by hand leaving no gap even an inch, the 1st and Cavalry
ROK Regiments squeezed onto the crest of the mountain in an inner circle
formation, compressing the ring. The outcome was annihilation of the Red
guerrillas.

When the third phase was ended at the close of January nearly 20,000
Communist guerrillas had been killed or captured. Late in February, the 8th
ROK Division was ordered to become Eighth Army reserve moving up to Pupyong-
ni, where it would remain until mid-March when it was to relieve the 1st US
Marine Division in the Punchbowl area. The Capital ROK Division was also
scheduled to return back to the front line and would take over a defense sector in the Paekam-san (Hill 1179) and Hugunto-ryong (Hill 851) area.

Communist-led Riot at Compound 62
(18 February)

By the early months of 1952, there were over 137,000 prisoners of war under the custody of the UN Command on the Koje Island. While a violent debate was continuing at the Panmunjom negotiations upon the prisoner repatriation issue, these prisoners were more anxious to learn about their future fate. The biggest dissidence between the two negotiation opponents was of whether voluntary repatriation or otherwise. The UN Command had maintained its firm position that all prisoners should decide themselves whether or not to return to the land whence they came from, while the Communists wanted all the prisoners to be returned to their original land regardless of their individual will.

There were two opposing groups within the prisoner camps on Koje-do: The one, who strongly united themselves in an ideology and thought with keen anti-communism against the Communists, was vehemently opposing compulsory repatriation, and the other one, needless to say, was the violent pro-Communists. Among the latter groups there were some specially trained agents craftily sent in by the Communist bosses. Such agents were disguised themselves as prisoners, thus laying down their arms at the front on purpose. The Communist high level bosses considered these prisoners as their combat troops and thoroughly expendable for their plots. Unfortunately, however, the UN Command was not aware of it in the initial stage and did not foresee this fact. Upon being prisoners in the camps, the trained, camouflaged prisoners began to organize, plan and stage troubles as they were trained and ordered by their high commands.

The first signs of real trouble came in January 1952 with the attempt to sort out the prisoners into those who would accept repatriation and those who would resist it. There had been a previous screening, the year before, to separate the ROK civilians who had been pressed into service, either as soldiers or laborers, by the Communist aggressors. At that time no resistance was met and 37,000 captives had been classified as civilian and set free. Accordingly, the UN Command had not envisioned a need for any special concern to take strong steps to deal with hard-core rebels in the prisoner camps.

There had been miscellaneous disorders in the camps from time to time, but nothing occurred seriously. As 1952 began, however, the UN Command had
taken more concrete stand that it would never agree to the sending into Communist China or any Communist held-territory of any prisoners who did not want to go. The Communist delegation at Panmunjom wanted to know how many prisoners would be returned and how many otherwise. Of course it was a Communists’ trick, but the UN Command set out to conduct another screening. This time, there was violent resistance, on direct orders from the Communist delegates at Panmunjom, as the UN Command later learned. The Communist leaders needed a strong showing in favor of forcible repatriation in order to build up their hands at the bargaining table.

While the violent Communist prisoners struggled to reign the compounds, anti-Communist group, composed of the Chinese Nationalist soldiers, civilian internees, and anti-Communist NK prisoners, stepped up defensive measures. Such an uneasy atmosphere suddenly led to bloody clashes between the anti-Communists and the other elements.

Despite numerous incidents all 37,000 civilian internees were screened by the UN Command to listen their will during early February except for 5,600 inmates of Compound 62. Here the hard-core Reds had thoroughly controlled and refused the screening teams to enter. They were a combat force armed with every type of makeshift weapons such as pick handles, barbed-wire fails, knives and axes put together and sharpened in secret out of odd bits of metal, even tent-pole spears.

At this juncture, on 18 February, the 3rd Battalion of the 27th US Infantry Regiment moved into the compound with bayonets fixed, and four companies rushed through the gate to keep order while the ROK screening committee counted noses. Conscious of the importance of avoiding any casualties -- which could be magnified by the Communists into a massacre -- the security troops used concussion grenades to hold back the rioters.

But, the Communists still refused to obey orders. Between 1,000 to 1,500 internees were under control but the remainder attacked against subjugated internees. The concussion grenades failed to stop the insane Communists’ assault, and there was no alternative but the circumstances forced the troops to fire into the rebels, and only then did the rioters pull back and the compound became quiet. Fifty-five prisoners were killed immediately and 22 more died at the hospital as against one American killed and 38 wounded.

Some of the prisoners’ dead and wounded were resulted from the fighting among themselves. This was a high price for the Communists to pay, but the Communists counted human life for little. One significant point to note is the ROK civilian internees were actually not prisoners of war because they were
forced by the Communist aggressors either to serve as soldiers or laboreres. They could and should have been considered as an internal affair of the Republic of Korea Government, but inhumane Communist delegates at Panmunjom obstinately stuck to their gun, saying they were prisoners.

Immediately following this riot at Compound 62, General Van Fleet of the Eighth US Army appointed Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd as Commandant of the prisoner camp on Koje-do to further secure law and order there. And the UN Command decided to disperse the POW camps to Cheju-do and Pongam-do and to increase the number of guard troops, taking into consideration the grave potential consequences of further rioting. But it still had not really grasped the intricacies and the depths of the Communists' plot. There would be another bloody encounter in mid-March between the anti-Communists and Communist sympathizers in the camps, and the disorders would multiply throughout the spring, of course, directed by the Communists' high level leaders.
CHAPTER VI  THE SPRING ACTION
(April – May 1952)

Section 1.  Patrolling Warfare
(1 – 30 April 1952)

As the spring of 1952 opened, the enemy’s attempts to probe friendly forward positions began to increase, but such attempts did not indicate that the Communist forces had changed their defensive attitude.

During April 1952, across the entire Eighth US Army front, the pattern of patrol clashes, raids and small-scale struggles for possession of outpost positions was routine activity. Therefore, all friendly units on the line were ordered to further strengthen their defensive positions, including communication trenches and bunkers before the rainy season came.

On the other hand, the enemy was also kept busy in engaging similar activity, according to friendly intelligence reports. The Communist forces had well-organized, fortified positions in depth with plenty of communication trenches and supplemented by a thick barrier, mostly organized with mines and barbed-wires. They secured and maintained a great deal of supply stocks sufficient to sustain operations for a certain period of time, and they also brought personnel replacements and reinforcements forward. These facts proved themselves that the Communists had been exploiting the battle lull to build up their fighting capability. In short, again, the Communist forces had proposed the cease-fire negotiation for gaining time and thereby intended to regroup their battered armies. Yet, the enemy did not take up any large-scale offensive as long as the UN Command confined its operations to a limited war, intending not to expand the war into Manchuria or elsewhere. At any rate, the war was going on and not a day was passed without casualties.

The Western Front

The 1 US Corps, with Lieutenant General J. W. O'Daniel in command, was
comprised of two US infantry and one Marine divisions, one Commonwealth division, and other attached units. These friendly units had deployed more or less along the Imjin River line facing four CCF armies.

In the extreme left sector of the western front, the 1st US Marine Division, commanded by Major General John T. Selden, was busily engaging in adjusting the newly assumed defensive sector upon arrival there from the Punchbowl sector a week ago.

On 1 April, the 584th Regiment of the 195th CCF Division launched a two-company-size night attack against Hills 86 and 45, friendly outposts manned by troops of the 1st ROK Marine Regiment, east of Sa-chon (river). The outposts were fallen twice by repeated enemy assaults, but the ROK Marines restored them by counterattacks. The enemy's third attack was also ended with his failure. Again, on the 17th, the enemy attempted a futile attack in company-size in the same area. The ROK Marines inflicted 106 enemy killed and six captured at a cost of 21 casualties in this action.

In the meantime, in the 1st British Commonwealth Division sector, the 1st British King's Own Scottish Borders (KOSB) Battalion was shelled about 5,000 rounds during a five-hour period on the night of 6 April. It was a prelude to storm. The enemy soon attempted two unsuccessful probing attacks, only suffering his own casualties. The division artillery pounded more than 7,000 rounds on the enemy. When daylight came the friendly units counted and confirmed that dead ratio between the friendly forces and the enemy during the action was two to 28, thus showing accuracy of the friendly artillery power.

During 14–19 April, Operation "Westminster," designed for readjustment of unit disposition caused by the change of division boundaries within the 1 US Corps, was carried out. Namely, elements of the 1st Commonwealth Division handed the "Hook" area, west of Sami-chon, over to the 1st US Marine Division, and slightly shifted to eastward, taking the left sector of the 3rd US Division. Accordingly, the 29th British Brigade took over the Hill 355 area from the 3rd US Division.

In the right center sector of the 1 US Corps front, the 3rd US Division units were positioned along the Imjin River under the command of Brigadier General Thomas J. Cross. During the first half of April there was no action bigger than squad-size patrol clashes throughout the division sector. The 15th US Regiment, then commanded by Colonel William T. Moore, controlled outposts Big Nori and Little Nori across the Imjin River, facing the enemy's strong outpost on Hill 117 about 400 meters north of Big Nori. The two Noris, together with Outpost Betty, were friendly patrol bases in this particular
sector. From 21 to 25 April, taking the initiative the 3rd US Division ceaselessly dispatched aggressive patrols deep into the enemy-held area forward of the Jamestown Line, in order to harass and keep the enemy off balance. When they made contact with the enemy, friendly patrols swiftly withdrew, then placed fire in mass on the enemy with artillery, tank and airstrike in support.

The 3rd US Division was relieved by the 1st ROK Division during 24–26 April, and was placed in Eighth Army reserve on 29 April until 30 June 1952. Meanwhile, also on 29 April, Major General (then Brigadier General) Robert L. Dulany assumed the command of the 3rd US Division after Major General Cross, and Colonel Moore of the 15th US Regiment was also succeeded by Colonel Richard R. Middle Brocks the next day.

On the right flank of the I US Corps, Major General James C. Styron's 45th
US Division held its main line of resistance on the Jamestown Line, including Porkchop and Old Baldy Hills, along the immediate south of the Yokkok-chon Valley. There the division units constantly made contact with the enemy in the no man's land between the two opposing forces but characteristics of action were filled with patrolling similar to elsewhere. Friendly units employed many ambushes and listening posts here and there on the forward edge of the outpost line of resistance so as to detect the enemy move and to provide early warning of any enemy attacks.

Frequently, brief skirmishes took place when friendly patrols made contact with the enemy patrols, usually in a squad-size or less. The enemy activities in the no man's land were light; the enemy customarily abandoned his positions there during the daylight hours and occupied and manned during the dark hours.

Thus, main action of the 45th US Division during April was confined to active patrol activity as the division devotedly continued the defense and improvement of Line Jamestown, where it would remain until mid-August 1952. (See Sketch Map 28.)

The Central Front

In April 1952, the central front, which contained the Iron Triangle area and the most critical front across the entire UNC's front in terms of strategic and tactical weight, was defended by the IX US and II ROK Corps units.

Opposing to the 42nd, 15th, 12th, and 68th CCF Armies, the two friendly corps were responsible for considerably a wide frontage that extended from Hill 395 (White Horse) west of Chorwon through Kumhwa to Tongsong-gol far north of the Hwachon Reservoir with their main defensive positions along the Missouri -- Minnesota Line.

The IX US Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Wyman, was comprised of the 2nd and 40th US Divisions plus the 9th ROK Division. The II ROK Corps (formerly Task Force Paik) was officially reactivated on 5 April 1952 at Hwachon, with Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup in command, having the 6th, Capital and 3rd ROK Divisions under its operational control.

On the IX US Corps front, the 9th ROK Division held the left sector positions under the command of Brigadier General Pak Byong Kwon, and its units spent most of the month keeping the enemy out of the White Horse area by conducting constant, aggressive patrolling to the north. In the center portion of the corps front, activity of the 2nd US Division, with Major General Robert N. Young
commanding, was also confined to an active defense role to such an extent that
troops were fed with hot meals, and they could enjoy with hot showers even
close behind the battle lines at intervals of everyone.

On 7 April, elements of the neighboring 40th US Division took over the
left battalion zone of the 23rd Regimental sector of the 2nd US Division,
causing a boundary change throughout the regiment. This shift of unit disposition
was a signal for another relief that the 2nd US Division would again be relieved
sooner or later. The rest of the month passed with continued patrolling and
light action.

On 16 April, the 38th US Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
William F. Kernan, was ordered to alert for move to Koje-do, where it was to
assume guard duties for the prisoners of war camps under the 2nd Logistical
Command control. The regiment, together with the 3rd Battalion of the 9th
US Regiment, commenced the movement the next day, thus arriving at the island
by 22 April.

The 2nd Division (minus) was completely relieved by the 7th US Division
during the period from 26 to 29 April, when it went into IX corps reserve,
stationing in the familiar training site near Kapyong but with few of the
subordinate units actually present for training. Major General James C. Fry
would assume the command of the division after Major General Young on 5
May during the reserve period. The 9th US Infantry (minus) was occupying
the blocking positions west of the Hwachon Reservoir; the 2nd Battalion of the
23rd US Infantry was dispatched into the Sangdong area to guard vital tungsten
mines; the entire 38th US Infantry, as already noted, embarked for the Koje-do
prison camp. Beside, the Division Artillery was ordered into the 9th ROK
Division sector, while the 72nd Tank Battalion moved back to the Heartbreak
Ridge area under the X US Corps. The division would remain in corps reserve
until mid-July when it was ordered to relieve the 45th US Division in the Old
Baldy and T-Bone Ridge sector west of Chorwon.

In the right sector of the IX US Corps, Major General Daniel H. Budelson,
commanding the 40th US Division, shifted its sector slightly to the west where
right elements of the 2nd US Division were manning on 7 April and, thereafter,
the division units dug in on Sniper Ridge and Jane Russell Hill.

Action of the division here also limited to aggressive patrolling and raids
that launched primarily to maintain contact with the enemy and destroy him
at every opportunity. One of such typical actions was taken place on 15 April,
when the division employed fifty-four tanks from the 140th US Tank Battalion
to destroy the enemy strongholds that threatened friendly main defenses.
The Spring Action

These tanks hit enemy's fortified positions and trenches in front of Line Nomad near Kumsong-chon by the direct fire. As a result, the tank action destroyed 53 enemy bunkers and 27 other facilities, seriously damaged 101 enemy defenses, and killed eleven enemy at the cost of a friendly tank damaged by the enemy mine but restored later.

It was also during this period that company-size raiding groups were organized temporarily, with each regiment making one such raid every third night. In all cases these raids were conducted without artillery preparation to take advantage of surprise as much as possible, and the results were very successful.

In the meantime, in the II ROK Corps sector east of the IX US Corps, the 6th ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Paik In Yup, engaged a
three-day bitter fighting during 16 through 18 April struggling for control of Hills 575 and Hill 690 (Finger Ridge), four kilometers northwest of Capital Hill. Elements of the 12th CCF Army launched a battalion (minus)-size attack against these two key outpost positions. But after a series of counterattacks, gallant troops of the 6th ROK Division repulsed the Communist attacks, thus clearing the enemy off the hills on 18 April. The cost of the enemy attacks were 136 killed and two prisoners against 90 friendly casualties including 16 killed in action. There would be two more severe battles for Hill 575 within a few months, one late in May and the other in mid-June 1952.

Except the 6th ROK Division sector, the rest of the II ROK Corps front was relatively static when compared with the battle situation elsewhere. In other words, there were no noticeable actions in the Capital ROK Division, then commanded by Brigadier General Song Yo Chan and the 3rd ROK Division with Brigadier General Paik Nam Kwon in command as well. (See Sketch Map 29.)

The Mid-Eastern – Eastern Front

During the spring period of 1952 the X US Corps divisions occupied and defended the mid-eastern sector of the UNC’s front with no major actions attempted by either the friendly or enemy forces. Accordingly, friendly units spent most of their time to intensify their positions stronger on the one hand, while they also devoted themselves to reorganize and retrain the battle weary troops on the other hand whenever they seized the opportunity. The result of this training of ROK units by the X Corps strengthened troops capable of fighting themselves with any Communist attacks.

Then, the X US Corps, with Lieutenant General Williston B. Palmer in Command, had deployed its whole three divisions on the line; the 7th ROK Division, 25th US Division and 8th ROK Division from west to east, with its command post at Kwandae-ri. All ground actions across the X US Corps front, without exception, were confined to localized, customary patrol and ambush mostly in the no man’s land situated between the two opposing forces.

The most aggressive actions launched by friendly units at the time were occasional raiding attacks in a squad-scale or less in force designed primary to protect the friendly main line of resistance and also to keep the enemy out of critical outpost positions. At this stage of war it was hard to observe enemy activities during the daylight hours: even no targets were appeared to shoot at and only the sound of explosion broke the quiet by long and frequent pauses between the rounds whenever harassing and interdiction fire mission was
carried out. This meant the most ground actions were characterized by an artillery duel almost all along the front.

Meanwhile, in the center portion of the X US Corps front, elements of the 35th Regiment of the 25th US Division had defended Hill 1242 (Kachil-bong) a commanding terrain, situated seven kilometers east of Heartbreak Ridge and the north edge of the west rim of the Punchbowl. The opposing enemy of the American regiment was the 27th NK Division under the II NK Corps deeply dug in on the rugged, high hill complex. From Hill 1242, 600 meters of steep descent to a valley and 500 meters of steep ascent, there was a finger-shaped Noname Ridge, and Hill 1210 (the enemy called as Hero Hill). situating a kilometer northwest of Hill 1242, was an enemy’s strong, fortified outpost position.

On the night of 3 April, the 35th US Infantry dispatched a two squad-size patrol to Noname Ridge to probe the enemy defenses and capture prisoners. The members of the patrol were carefully selected and were given intensive
training, particularly for night raid beforehand. It was a policy of the higher commands that all such patrols had to be preplanned in detail and rehearsal had to be preceded thoroughly prior to actual action. To cite furthermore, standing on the high ground overlooking the objective, selected members surveyed the maneuvering route and enemy defenses; using sand table models of exactly similar to the objective area and terrain feature, members were trained and carefully studied the raiding tactics by repeated miniature rehearsals. (See Sketch Map 30.)

The patrol party was organized with two squads as one assault team reinforced with two browning automatic rifles plus other fire support element equipped with two light machine guns, two grenade launchers, two signal flares, a sound phone telephone and a portable SCR-300 radio.

An initial round of harassing fire was fired at 2100 hours as a signal for jump off. Although the spring thaw had already come, the ground was still covered with the remaining snow which hampered the night maneuver. By 0150 hours the next day the patrol had reached just short of the objective crest.

At 0210 hours, when the patrol reached assault point, one of the members stepped over the trip wire and an explosion broke the silence. The patrol party lost no time to throw a shower of assault fire into the objective all at once and charged in onto bewildered enemy positions. The enemy reaction was mainly relied upon the grenades against the friendly assault, especially in the rugged terrain like this night raid. The Communists simply threw grenades from their bunkers down the slope when the friendly assault troops were climbing up toward the crest. Two members were wounded in this enemy tactics. After half an hour-long hand-to-hand fighting the two friendly assault teams began to withdraw orderly, thus achieving their mission successfully, while, supporting artillery and mortar pounded concentration fire upon the enemy attempting to follow up in pursuit of the withdrawing troops. When the friendly patrol party arrived at a point on the foot of the ridge at 0530 hours, the morning twilight had become plenty enough to observe that the enemy artillery fire was being greatly increased in an attempt to pin down the patrol group. At this juncture, the friendly artillery and tanks also increased their fire power protecting the withdrawal of the partol members under a smoke screen.

The patrol had safely returned to the main line of resistance by 0630 hours. During this successful night action friendly artillery had fired more than 2,000 rounds in support of the action. The result reported eleven enemy killed in addition to countless enemy wounded at the cost of ten friendly wounded in action.
The Spring Action

In the left sector of the X US Corps, where the 7th ROK Division (commanded by Brigadier General Lee Sung Ka) was defended, activity was comparatively light, while the 8th ROK Division (commanded by Brigadier General Choi Yung Hee until 15 April, then by Brigadier General Lee Hyung Suk) in the corps' right sector, had also little activity other than patrolling action in force. These two divisions were mostly concerned with the critical terrain features within their zones of action such as Hill 851 (Heartbreak Ridge), Hill 812 (Luk's Castle) and Hill 854.

On the eastern front where the I ROK Corps, under the command of Major General Lee Hyung Keun (promoted to lieutenant general on 19 May 1952), was defending with its two divisions on the line, there had been no mentionable actions during the period except sporadic night ambush clashes hither and thither.

With its command post at Sokcho, the I ROK Corps had the 5th ROK Division (then commanded by Colonel Lim Boo Taik) and the 11th ROK Division under the operational command, and facing the enemy units of the II and I NK Corps, it had constantly dispatched night patrol and ambush teams forward to keep the enemy off balance and to obtain latest enemy information. The 11th ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Oh Duk Jun, ceaselessly sent out about 30 night ambush teams a night in average, each team consisted with three to four men. These ambush-patrols were employed along the east bank of the Nam River in main. On the other hand, activity of the 5th ROK Division in the eastmost sector was also no more than similar ones. Therefore, the main task of troops there was chiefly involved with the reconstruction of defensive positions because the early thaw had caused considerable damages on bunkers and communication trenches everywhere.

At this point it will be worthwhile to note that the IX US Corps conducted the first large-scale atomic defense training maneuver during the month. This was designated "Exercise MUSHROOM" and was ensued throughout March, April, May and June 1952 in an effort to develop the technique for passive defense against nuclear attack. All other US corps sent selected individuals to observe and study the disposition of corps units.

At the end of April the friendly Order of Battle across a 248-kilometer front, from west to east, was as follows: In the I US Corps the 1st US Marine Division, 1st British Commonwealth Division, 1st ROK Division, 45th US Division, in the IX US Corps sector, the 9th ROK Division, 7th US Division, 40th US Division, with the 2nd US Division (minus) in reserve; in the II ROK Corps the 6th ROK Division, Capital ROK Division, 3rd ROK Division; in the X US
Corps the 7th ROK Division, 25th US Division, 8th ROK Division, with the 5th US Regimental Combat Team in reserve; and in the I ROK Corps sector the 11th ROK Division and 5th ROK Division. In addition, there were the 3rd US Division and 2nd ROK Division remaining in Eighth Army reserve.

Section 2. The Package Proposal

Among the five items of the armistice negotiation agenda, the most delicate and prolonged dispute fought by the both sides was of item 4 relating to the prisoner question. The talking battle for the prisoner issue had been deadlocked from the beginning and it would last until a full agreement for the armistice was reached. The chief debate, among many other struggles on the prisoner questions, was the repatriation issue. The Communists were determined to have all prisoners exchanged as the UN Command was to permit the prisoners to decide for themselves whether they should return to the land from whence they came. The United Nations Command had been asserted vigorously all the way from the beginning and the end that the repatriation should be effected on the voluntary principles and not by force, while the Communists maintained their position that all Communist prisoners must be returned to their control by coercive measures.

Again, in short, a key difference between the UN Command and the Communist aggressors was: The UN Command was firmly determined never to force any man to return against his own will to the land from which he had defected. The Communists, to the sharp contrast, demanded the total repatriation of all prisoners. Particularly, the UN Command asserted to respect provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention which was written for the protection of the prisoners of war and not for the benefit of the place or state of his origin.

In the past, many member states of the United Nations, particularly those dispatched combat troops in support of the Republic of Korea, had experienced during World War II. At that time many millions had fled from the Communist orbit, only to be returned to the Communists at the end of hostilities to suffer the indignities of punishment of one type or another. Thus the UN Command knew that the issue of prisoner repatriation was inextricably associated with the ultimate outcome of the war, and it had but one choice -- nonforcible repatriation. And the Communists were certain to capitalize on the issue to force the UN Command’s hand into accepting their demands.
The Spring Action

It will be as well to cite one significant example at this time that the Communists have never in their entire history fulfilled a pledge or kept a promise in regard to the return, repatriation, or even a full accounting of civilian or military personnel falling into their hands. Thousands of Germans, Austrians, Japanese, and others still remained behind the Iron Curtain to this day, and the Communists refuse even to discuss their fate and even an exchange program of letters between families and or relatives concerned.

On 19 April 1952, when the UN Command presented a round figure of the Communist prisoners who preferred to return to the Communist side, the Communist delegates immediately rejected to accept. As a result of screenings, 70,000 Red prisoners (7,200 civilian internees, 57,700 NK Communists, and 5,100 Chinese Communists) out of 170,000 in total (132,000 military prisoners plus 37,000 civilian internees) expressed their wishes to return to the Communist land.

On the other hand, the Communists submitted their round figure of around 12,000: 7,700 ROK prisoners and 4,400 non-ROKs. It was a flagrant, strange figure that no one could trust in the world. In the early stage of the prisoner exchange debate, on 18 December 1951, the Communists had handed the UN Command their list showing 11,559 friendly prisoners in total the Communists held at the time.

The wide discrepancy between the lists, the Communists handed the UNC delegates and the UN Command records of men missing in action itself proved that the enemy, without doubt, either killed large number of friendly soldiers and or took many ROK soldiers into the Communist armies. The eccentric Communist delegates had repeatedly tried to make an insidious, artful excuse at Panmunjom that most of the UNC prisoners had been released at the front and killed by UNC’s air bombings or raids. On 23 April the UN Command offered to rescreen all the prisoners by a cooperative effort with them, but the Communists again rejected.

Thus, the prisoner issue seemed to be prolonged without finding an end, and the UN Command began consideration to solve Agenda Item 3 and Item 4 together at the same time. This led the UN Command to submit its compromised “Package Proposal” on 28 April 1952.

That day, the delegates of the two sides met at Panmunjom, and Vice Admiral Joy requested a executive session and after a recess, the Communists agreed. Admiral Joy then went through over all the outstanding issues and presented the UNC solution -- a complete, incorporated draft of the armistice. It mentioned that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was to be composed of
Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and all prisoners held in the custody of each side at the time the armistice agreement became effective should be repatriated as soon as possible. It further prescribed that the release and repatriation of prisoners of war should be effected in conformity with lists that exchanged and checked by the both sides beforehand.

This meant that the UN Command would swamp the 70,000 repatriates that it held for the 12,000 in enemy custody. But, the Communists rejected the "package proposal" and then called for an indefinite recess. This Communist rejection would bring the armistice negotiations to a virtual standstill until 28 March 1953 -- eleven months later.

In the meantime the battle at the front would go on, essentially a defensive war on both sides, in which the two opponents would fight endlessly to take, retake and control key terrain features on the forward battlefield.

Section 3. Outpost Struggles
(1 – 31 May 1952)

As the spring deepened, activity on the battlefield across the entire front became more active. The Communists gradually became bolder in May 1952 with increased probing raids and attacks, intensified artillery fire, and more aggressive patrolling. Yet, these enemy attempts did not mean the Communist forces had changed their defensive attitude. The United Nations Command had either unchanged its course of action in the conduct of war, and still firmly stuck to its policy -- not to expand the war and thereby to limit the ground action.
By this time the ground situation had been stabilized since the fall of 1951 and no a large-scale offensive was launched by either side. And the present condition across the front was truly represented a fair balance of power, with the enemy still enjoying the superiority in strength. The friendly strength on the line was about 250,000-men against the enemy in 300,000-man strong. The total strength of the UN forces in Korea, including reserve, now reached at 700,000 men, while an estimated 1,000,000 men of enemy troops were in the enemy held-territory as of 7 May 1952. One noteworthy is that the enemy had added artillery pieces in numbers with plenty of ammunition stocks. For instance, the enemy mounted his artillery shelling from 2,388 rounds in April to 6,843 rounds in June 1952. Besides, the Communists had impressively improved his antiaircraft weapons power in volume and quality, being even equipped with radar-controlled aiming devices.

At all events, the battle action was going on, and in order to keep the enemy off the key terrain features in the forward lines and also to disturb the enemy build up, limited raids and attacks were to be major, continued-efforts of the friendly forces ahead in every sector.

During the month of May, friendly action, superior in tank and mobility, was highlighted by tank-infantry team’s daylight operation against enemy fortified-positions and installations to destroy or neutralize those positions close-into and threatened the security of the main line of resistance.

On the I US Corps front, on 9 May, a company-size combat patrol from the 5th Marine Regiment (Colonel Thomas A. Gulhane, Jr. in command) of the 1st US Marine Division, supported by a tank platoon, raided during the daylight hours on “Outpost 3,” three kilometers northeast of Panmunjom in the western sector. All elements moved out under cover of darkness in the early morning heading for the assigned objective area. Throughout this raiding maneuver the assault elements remained under constant, heavy artillery fire and as they neared the objective they encountered a more heavier stream of defending fire. But the Marines continued to dash on despite even meeting a strong counterattack. Yet, successive waves of Chinese Communists still attempted to fight back the main body of the assault force, but failed. Thus the enemy had been driven off the objective area and the friendly troops began to withdraw, but this time the Communists blanketet the withdrawal route with a heavy barrage, firing over a 400 rounds in a five minute period. All supporting ground weapons helped in the withdrawal. Of course, tanks acted the great role in carrying out this particular mission successfully, especially when the raiding group began the withdrawal. Moreover, during the enemy’s heavy artillery and mortar shelling,
tanks successfully brought emergency supplies forward and evacuated casualties.

The result of the assault was great, although it was small in scale. The assault was one of the biggest offensive actions the 1st US Marine Division had made in 1952 up to the date. The American Marines counted 35 enemy dead, 53 wounded, and one prisoner, in addition to an estimated 70 more enemy had been killed and 105 wounded, while they suffered seven killed and 66 wounded in this action.

On 28 May, Colonel Russell E. Honisowetz, commanding the 7th US Marine Regiment, conducted a limited attack to seize two parcels of high ground to the regimental right front with the intention to deny to the enemy using key terrain in front of the outpost line of resistance, and at the same time to neutralize two CCF positions west of the main objective, Hill 104 and Tum-eri Hill, less than a kilometer further north. A heavily reinforced company of the 1st Battalion (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George W. E. Daughtry) was to carry out main effort to the right, while a reinforced platoon would conduct a feint on two enemy positions to the left. Another support was to come from

THE BATTLE OF HILL 104 (28 May 1952)
the 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel George B. Thomas) of the 11th US Marine Regiment (Colonel Frederic P. Henderson), two tank platoons, and from air. (See Sketch Map 31.)

Both the main and secondary attack forces jumped off at 0300 hours, and the main force swiftly rushed on close to the foot of Hill 104 before the enemy in a reinforced-platoon strength began to counterattack. There immediately became the scene of close battle as the leading platoon charged in. The heavy volume of the enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to hinder the attacking momentum.

On the left, meanwhile, the feinting platoon was ordered to advance the closer of its two objectives. Then, the platoon began to attack at 0550 hours. In the end, it seized the objective hill at 0700 hours after hand-to-hand fighting and soon began to support the main effort force. But the platoon was returned on order to the original lines by 0930 hours due to the unexpected heavy casualties.

Back on Hill 104, the friendly casualties were mounting mostly caused by downpour of enemy fire as the attack company nearing the crest. With the arrival of a reinforcing platoon the company was ordered to withdraw. It was able to return safely to the main line of resistance by 1405 hours under cover of air and artillery.

Due to considerably heavy casualties the Marines failed to take all the assigned objectives. They suffered nine killed and 107 wounded including all three platoon leaders of Company A. The enemy losses were 45 killed and three wounded. In addition, 40 more enemy were killed and 40 more wounded in estimation. The fighting set a highest record of enemy incoming shelling during a 24-hour period. The Marines received 4,053 rounds.

To the farther northeast, there were a number of strange, peculiar nicknamed outposts, not far in distance from the north bank of the Imjin River where the first horseshoe bend of the river is situated. Among many others, outposts Kelly, Tessie, Betty, Big Nori, Little Nori, Queen, and Mike now manned by troops of the 1st ROK Division were subjected to a series of enemy night probes and raids, ranging from squad up to company-size in strength, throughout the month beginning from 3 May.

A plan was developed by the friendly forces in order to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy if he attempted to seize these outposts. When they were attacked by the enemy, outpost troops would resist for more or less ten minutes, then they would withdraw 100 to 200 meters back, allowing the enemy to take the vacant outpost. Whereupon, friendly artillery and mortar were to
pound pre-coordinated concentration fire upon the enemy.

The effectiveness of this plan worked perfectly on 3 May when an estimated company from the 39th CCF Army launched a night attack against one of these outposts. Defending troops of the 1st ROK Division followed the plan, and the enemy hastily broke contact and began to retreat as friendly firepower poured in, carrying heavy casualties with them. ROK troops could re-occupy the outpost positions without contact and counted 61 enemy dead on the scene. In almost every case similar to this action was repeated thereafter with surprisingly effective results.

Meanwhile, the next in the line was the 45th US Division sector on the right flank of the 1 US Corps front. Here in late May, enemy forces demonstrated a sharply increased ability to penetrate the UNC’s outpost line of resistance and reach the main line of resistance positions.

On the night of 25–26 May, elements of the 39th CCF Army launched a battalion-size attack in force against an outpost position on Hill 200 across a tributary to Yokkok-chon in Sinhyon-ni, a little more than a half kilometer southeast of Porkchop Hill (Hill 234). Defenders of the hill were troops of the 179th Infantry Regiment commanded by Colonel Frederick A. Daugherty, under the 45th US Division now commanded by Major General David L. Ruffner since four days ago, 21 May, after Major General Styer.

Commencing at 2245 hours, 25 May, Chinese Communist forces threw a shower of artillery preparation fire in mass into Hills 200, 334 and 347, mounting 2,245 rounds in total. As the enemy artillery shifted firing the enemy’s foot elements began to approach toward Hill 200 from the three directions simultaneously, one attempting frontal attack from the north and the other two flanking from the east and west. Their attacking momentum displayed that they intended to seize the key outpost, Hill 200, at one effort with a lightening speed. The Red Chinese continued to rush onto the hill, putting their main attack on the left flank. (See Sketch Map 32.)

Meanwhile, friendly artillery and mortar, in addition to all available firepower on the outpost, poured in a heavy curtain of volley at the assaulting enemy. While, aided by illumination flare, friendly reinforcements were hastily come to the aid of the defenders and beat off the main flanking enemy after a close fighting. Thus the 45th US Division troops forced the attacking enemy to retreat back, suffering heavy casualties. At daybreak, on the 26th. American troops found 32 enemy dead and captured three wounded prisoners on the scene plus an estimated 100 more enemy casualties. Friendly losses were six killed and 21 wounded in action.
THE BATTLE OF HILL 200 (25 May 1952)

Now, it will be as well to illustrate a friendly raid with engineer troops in support. It was true that most of small-scale raids or attacks launched by friendly forces during these days were co-ordinated efforts of infantry plus either one or more of artillery, tank, air and some time naval force. Especially, tank "fire attack" was a prevailing daily practice everywhere throughout the front as much as circumstances were permitted. It was designed not only to exploit tank's firepower, mobility and other characteristics of iron-clad but also to overcome the ammunition problem. At the time availability of artillery shells were greatly limited against actual requirements for combat use.

Yet, quite often engineers were attached to infantry patrol team in an effort to destroy enemy patrol bases or sometime enemy outpost positions. To cite a typical instance, on 19 May, the 20th Philippine Battalion Combat Team, then attached to the 45th US Division, raided an enemy outpost position on the "Eerie" ridge, situated in the southern edge of the T-Bone Hill ridge across the
Yokkok-chon Valley, roughly two kilometers north of Hill 200.

In that early morning, a Philippine platoon patrol team moved out under cover of darkness together with an attached American engineer team and rushed on to the objective. The Chinese Communists were completely caught by this surprising raid and fell themselves into a panic and confusion, thus fleeing to the northwest on the wings of the wind. The raiding elements lost no time and charged in upon the enemy positions and destroyed them. The engineers did most of the work in blasting the bunkers and shelters. While the assault infantry team killed eleven enemy, the engineer demolition team destroyed seven large bunkers. Undoubtedly, all those enemy who ran away from the bunkers were seriously wounded if they still alive.

To add another significant role of combat engineers, during the operations of the 2nd US Division along the Soyang River back in the first week of April 1951 a year ago, the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion kept a number of aggressive engineer reconnaissance teams searching for new access roads through the mountains and for obstacles requiring engineer clearing.

They had done excellent jobs in such missions. Their operation was typical, and their results were speedy support by the engineers and rapid advance by the infantry.

In this way, ground action along the I US Corps front during the whole period of the month was nothing more than a skirmish pattern which might be a prelude to what field troops expect to be. And all troops of the corps units were forced to concentrate their efforts on fortifications of their defensive positions so that they could prepare for any eventual enemy attacks that might come. Moreover, the spring thaw following the winter weather caused to weaken many positions and bunkers that had to be repaired or rebuilt if necessary, and they also had to repair or construct road nets before the rainy season arrive. In short, as a whole, the fighting lines on the western front were sufficiently maintained.

Now, casting a look at the IX US Corps on the central front of the Iron Triangle and its vicinity, corps units were severely engaged in strengthening and rebuilding positions before the summer rainy season came, while conducting intensive, customary patrolling actions and destructing or neutralizing enemy strongholds by fire power. On the other hand, Corps Commander General Wyman deployed three divisions on line and a division in reserve. Each frontline division had two regiments forward and a regiment back in reserve.

While the 9th ROK Division firmly held the corps left sector, including Hill 395 (White Horse Hill), and Chorwon, the 7th and the 40th US Divisions
defended the right leg of the Iron Triangle and the Hill 598 area.

In the center of the IX US Corps front, the 7th US Division, then commanded by Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, held a portion of Line Missouri in the Iron Triangle area facing the Communists' fortified positions on Hill 717 (Sobang-san), Hill 528, and Hill 689 (Turyu-bong). The division executed platoon to company size raids, some times reinforced by tanks, against these enemy strong points, mostly to capture prisoners and maintain close contact with the enemy. In addition, tank elements were repeatedly employed in destroying enemy fortified positions during May 1952.

In the western portion of the division sector, the 32nd Regiment, commanded by Colonel William A. Dodds, committed tanks and destroyed enemy strongholds by direct fire almost every day during the daylight hours. For instance, during the period from 17 to 21 May, it had putted the Regimental Tank Company reinforced with more tanks from the 73rd Tank Battalion into action and destructed the Communist defenses erected on a series of hills including Harry, Stars, and Hill 528, and the results were remarkable. On 21 May alone 19 enemy fortified positions were almost completely damaged in an intensive seven-hour long direct hit on the triangle area plus heavy shelling onto the
Poyang-ho hill area for a four-hour period. (See Sketch Map 33.)

The 31st US Regiment, then defended on the right flank of the division, also conducted a similar operation against Triangle Hill (Hill 598) and its surrounding hills including Jane Russel, Sniper Ridge, Pike's Peak, Sandy Ridge also on 21 May, resulting in 48 enemy bunkers, two outposts and a ammunition supply point destroyed.

The 7th US Division would remain in this Kumhwa sector of the Iron Triangle until early November 1952 when it was relieved by the 25th US Division and went into corps reserve at Kapyong.

Meanwhile, the 40th US Division, with Major General Hudelson in command, was conducting a similar action during the most of May. One day it launched a firing type attack against an enemy held-stronghold on the eastern finger of Hill 1062 (Osong-san) north of Kumhwa. Employing a tank column,
the action destroyed 123 enemy bunkers and seriously damaged all other build-
up on the hill.

On 21 May, the 160th Regiment of the division conducted a tank fire action
with its organic tanks to destruct enemy strong points on Suri-bong and
its vicinity. As a result, 30 enemy bunkers, six machine gun positions and ten
other installations were destroyed. On the other hand, A and B Companies
of the 140th US Tank Battalion had been carried out many similar tank actions
in support of the 40th US Division. C Company of the tank battalion was
assigned to support the 6th ROK Division of the II ROK Corps on the immediate
right flank of the 40th US Division. Its mission was to provide supporting
fire in eliminating the enemy's key outpost positions threatening the ROK main
defense lines. The American tank troops pounded direct fire into the enemy
defenses on Hills 533 (Song-san), 434 (Ongnyo-bong) and 436 (near Kyongpa-ti)
just north of Kumsong, thus destroying a 76-mm. enemy gun and neutralizing
other positions.

On another occasion, 31 May, the 223rd Regiment of the division organized
a task force with the special mission to rescue an American pilot who made
an emergency landing by a parachute in the enemy held-area, in the vicinity
of the eastern slope of Hill 1062. The task force moved out in a surprise effort
and brought the pilot back to the friendly main line of resistance within half
an hour by an exceptionally gallant and prompt action. The 40th US Division
would remain in this right leg of the Triangle area, defending the rightmost
sector of the corps, until 30 June when it was relieved by the 2nd ROK Division
and moved into a reserve area for training and rehabilitation.

Besides the 9th ROK Division, 7th US Division and the 40th US Division,
the IX US Corps, under Lieutenant General Whyman, also had the 2nd US Division,
der under its operational control, and the 2nd US Division was in corps reserve
remaining at Kapyong since it was relieved by the 7th US Division on 26 April.
During the period under discussion the division saw a change of the command.
On 4 May, Major General Robert N. Young turned over the division command
to Major General James C. Fry (then brigadier general) who officially assumed
the command the next day.

Meanwhile, in the II ROK Corps sector, the next in the line to the east,
the 19th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division (then Colonel Kim Young Ju was
acting commander) organized a company-size patrol group reinforced with two
tank platoons and a engineer platoon, assigning the mission to raid and destroy
an enemy-held outpost on the right finger ridge of Hill 575 situated in the
northwest of Capital Hill.
On 31 May, the patrol party began the infantry-tank-artillery attack at 0330 hours, and it had driven the enemy off the ridge by 0600 hours. At the same time the engineers began to destroy the bunkers and communication trenches. Then the patrol group returned to the own lines. As a result, the enemy losses were 22 killed, one prisoner, the engineers destroyed five enemy bunkers and 50 yards' trenches. The friendly suffered four killed and 35 wounded in this action.

During the spring of 1952, the X US Corps, then commanded by Major General Palmer, (promoted to lieutenant general on 10 June 1952) occupied the mid-eastern sector of the UNC's front and saw no major actions with no mentionable gains by either the friendly or enemy forces. Taking advantage of this static period, the corps constantly participated in reorganizing and re-training the ROK Army units. It had deployed the 7th ROK, 25th US and 8th ROK Divisions on the line and the divisions spent most of their efforts and time for training and intensifying the defensive positions whenever they seized the opportunities. They also sent out aggressive patrols to maintain contact with the enemy, capture prisoners, and detect the enemy movement.

The 25th US Division, which was defending on the center portion of the corps front around the rugged hill mass area west and northwest of the Punchbowl under the command of Major General Ira P. Swift, encountered no notable actions during this time. Accordingly, action was confined for the most part to small raids, patrol in force and ambushes, with the mission of probing the enemy outpost line and capturing prisoners.

The division now had the 5th US Regimental Combat Team under its command since early May 1952 when the regimental combat team was attached to it and relieved the 14th US Regiment on Line Minnesota. The 5th US RCT would remained in the Punchbowl area until 22 October 1952, when it was attached to the 40th US Division as the 25th US Division went into reserve on that date.

In the meantime, while argument continued on the disputed issue relating with repatriation of prisoners of war at Panmunjom, General Van Fleet had appointed Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd as commandant of the UNC's POW camp on Koje-do on 20 February 1952 in order to tighten up discipline.

But, General Dodd was seized by Communist prisoners there on 7 May lasting until 10 May. In an effort to strengthen the security force on the island, the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, was airlifted from Japan to Koje-do where it was assigned the mission of quelling POW riots on the island, attaching to the 2nd US Logistical
The Spring Action

Command on 17 May 1952. In addition, on 23 May, a company of 1st King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI) Battalion and a company from the 25th Royal Canadian Brigade and a company of the Greek Battalion were dispatched to the island to reinforce the POW guard forces. The 64th US Tank Battalion (minus two companies) of the 3rd US Division (then in EUSAK reserve) was also ordered to move to Koje-do, placing under the 2nd Logistical Command control on 16 May 1952.

Thus, fighting on the battleground tapered off to patrolling, raids, and small battles for destroying and possession of outposts in no man’s land, and toward the close of May the lines remained unchanged, although the momentum of battle followed the seasons, quickening during thaws and spring. Thereupon furious, savage battles would flare up during coming summer and autumn everywhere along the no man’s land such as at the Hook, Old Baldy, and Sniper Ridge.

Section 4. Communist Prisoner Riots on Koje-do
(March – May 1952)

Deliberate Plans

After the Communist prisoners’ riot at Compound 62 on Koje-do was suppressed by 18 February 1952, the uneasy situation of the island continued to remain unchanged. Rather, the island was shrouded in dark clouds to stir up another Communist-led riots at any moment as the Communist prisoners under custody of the UN Command were forced by their high-level bosses to make troubles within the POW camps by all means. Actually, the first riot was craftily led by secret directives came from Kim Il-sung. In the midst of heavy fighting then flared up at the truce tent front on the POW repatriation question, the Red prisoners realized that their future fate was at stake and many had professed strong anti-Communist sentiments and were afraid of return. The Communist high commands, therefore, had sent specially trained-agents into the south, ordering them to give themselves up or to be captured at the front on purpose, so that they could infiltrate the prisoners’ camps. Needless to say that they were given secret directives in detail beforehand by the Communist high commands to instigate riots at POW camps, on the pretext of demonstration to express their own will that all prisoners held by the UN Command be repatriated
to the Communist side.

In fact, the recent riot in Compound 62 proved strong evidence that many of the compounds were controlled by the violent leadership of Communists.

The POW quarrel had been heightened since January 1952 after the UNC delegates proposed at Panmunjom to give captives a free-choice in repatriation proceedings. By the Geneva Convention of 1949, which govern present-day warfare, prisoners of war to be "set at liberty" at the end of a war. Accordingly, the United Nations Command maintained that those prisoners who did not wish to return to Communist control could and should be repatriated to elsewhere as they wished. But, the Communists protested vigorously, insisting that all captives held by the UN Command be returned to the Communist side. The enemy well knew that many of Communist prisoners under the UN Command's custody did not want to return to the Communist side and the Communist prisoners found themselves that they were divided into two groups, vigorous Communists and anti-Communists. Then, the enemy began a new move toward anti-Communist prisoners with a pledge from Red representatives at Panmunjom that there will be no retaliation against the anti-Communists who wish to return home, even those Nationalist Chinese.

Further, the prisoners were reminded to think of their families and friends back home -- that if they chose not to be repatriated, they would face a life in which they could be sure of nothing but hardship, and they would probably never see their families or homes again. On the contrary, the UN Command constantly maintained the principle of voluntary repatriation and not by force whatever.

But, the severe struggles between the pro-Communists and anti-Communists among the prisoners on Kojido grew as days passed by, and suddenly led to another bloody clash on 13 March 1952, when ardent Communists stoned an anti-Communist detail and its ROK guards. The ROK guards, retaliated with gunfire, who had no choice, were compelled to use arms as an emergency measure and fired on the rioters just owing to the circumstances beyond control, killing twelve prisoners and wounding 26. One each of ROK civilian and American officer who tried to stop the shooting, were injured.

**Struggle for Repatriation Question**

On 2 April the Communist showed their interest in finding out the exact number of prisoners that would be returned to the Communist control, if
screening was executed. In consequence, the UN Command started a new screening to determine an exact, definite figure. As a result, among 17 compounds, ten compounds were screened and the rest were rejected to interview. In other words, only about 70,000 out of the 170,000 military and civilian prisoners expressed their decision and consented to go back to the Communist side voluntarily. The Communist delegates at Panmunjom as well as their bosses in the north were seriously disappointed and upset, when the UN Command presented to the Communists on 19 April with the round number it had compiled through the screenings---70,000. And soon began another smoke-screen maneuver, using their favorite trick of false propaganda warfare. To the Communists, 70,000 had caused too great a loss of their face. Accordingly, the Communists immediately and forcefully rejected to accept the UN Command’s figure. It was not difficult to anticipate another and more rough incident might come because the Communists would, to be sure, sent another secret directives to the prisoners to behave more rudely.

In anticipating of eventual trouble, late in April, General Van Fleet moved the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Regiment, 2nd US Division to Koje-do to reinforce the 38th Infantry Regiment and ordered the 1st Battalion of the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division and the 20th ROK Regiment to move to Pusan. Further, a company of the 64th Tank Battalion from the 3rd US Division was dispatched to Koje-do. The General intended to begin screening shortly after 1 May.

Meanwhile, on 23 April, the UN Command offered to the Communist delegates at Panmunjom to rescreen all the prisoners of war cooperatively with the Communist side in an effort to fighting back the repeated Communist false propaganda warfare. However, the brutal Communists rejected this faithful offer saying that “Our side absolutely cannot agree to any such course of action.”

On 28 April at Panmunjom a compromise “package proposal” was presented by the UN Command to help settle the prisoners’ debate and gave the Communists until 8 October to accept the new proposal, at which time it unilaterally called for a recess. Yet the Communists had decided not to concede on the repatriation issue. Their only hope was to discredit the United Nations Command and its members, with the chance that UN Command might be euchred into capitulating to their minds. They were in no hurry.

The possibility of new incidents that might embarrass the UN Command, especially at Panmunjom, led General Ridgway to remind General Van Fleet that proper control of the prisoners had to be maintained regardless of whether screening was conducted or not. General Van Fleet reported to General Ridgway
on 5 May saying that there was no cause for “undue anxiety” about Koje-do.

Thus, on 7 May there appeared to have come a stalemate. The UNC security forces had exterior control, but could not get in without violence, while the Communist prisoners had interior control, but could not get out without violence. In these, defiance was at a peak and it was clear that only forcible entry and restraint, which certain loss of life on both sides, could permit a proper counting of those both for and against repatriation. But, General Van Fleet reported to General Ridgway of the outlook, pointing out that the compounds already screened would undoubtedly join in the resistance if force were used in the recalcitrant compounds. Yet, General Ridgway still did not realize the enemy plot that how far the Communist clique might have gone in its readiness to sacrifice the lives its puppet fellow people in order to achieve a goal of plot -- a propaganda objective. Afterward, he concluded to suspend further screening and merely to count all the men in the defiant compounds as having declared in favor of repatriation. This meant that any prisoners in those compounds who strongly opposed repatriation would be able to make their feelings known before the actual exchange took place, or even while it was being effected.

With the cancellation of forced screening, the UN Command indicated that it was willing to accept the “status quo” rather than initiate another wave of bloodshed in the prisoner camps. The next move was up to the Communists, and it did not take long for the Communist prisoners to act.

The riots among the prisoners on Koje-do, Cheju-do, and elsewhere were ordered to make and were given full play by the Communist propaganda machine to demonstrate that the UN Command was really coercing the prisoners into refusing to be repatriated.

It was later revealed that the person who directed these riots was the Communist senior delegate at the armistice negotiations, Nam Il. It was no doubt that he was directed by Kim Il-sung to handle the riots. The Communists’ aim at the time was “mass mutinies, riots, and breakouts which had as their goal an eventual link-up with the Communist guerrillas and bandits in the southern mountain areas,” and “direct violence designed to produce propaganda which might influence the armistice negotiations.”

By the time the UN Command presented its “package proposal” on 28 April the Communists’ propaganda sources were running thin. This was well illustrated by the accusation that, at one point, the UN Command was training a monkeys to throw grenades on the front lines. In the end such false propaganda tactics maneuvered by the Communists caused only to suffer their own damages.
The disclosures of the Red riots by the UN Command to the world was a great victory on the UNC's part, because the riots and their publicity provided much grist for the propaganda mills of the UNC's opponents. The capture of Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, the Commandant of the Koje Island stockade, by the Communist prisoners in early May 1952 served to embarrass further the United Nations Command.

Trap at Compound 76

On 7 May, General Dodd was seized by the Communist prisoners when he was talking with them at the unlocked gate of Compound 76 at their request. The General was caught in a filthy, dirty trap deliberately preplanned by the Communist prisoners.

On the evening of 6 May members of a Communist work detail from the Compound 76 told Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur R. Raven, commanding the 94th US Military Police Battalion that guards had beaten some prisoners of the compound and searched them for contraband. The story, of course, was a entirely fabricated show the Communists made careful plans.

At any rate, when Colonel Raven promised to investigate the charges, the Communist prisoners asked to see General Dodd on the following day to discuss matters of importance. Consequently, General Dodd went up the compound shortly after 1400 hours on the 7th. As usual they talked at the unlocked gate and the Communists launched a whole series of miscellaneous questions. Several times they asked General Dodd and Colonel Raven to come inside the gate and sit down so that they could carry on the discussion in a more comfortable atmosphere. Of course, this was a second step of their planned trap, and neither General Dodd nor Colonel Raven yet became aware of the crafty trap. But Colonel Raven turned down these asks bluntly since he himself had previously been seized and held.

In the meanwhile, more and more prisoners had gathered in the sally port and General Dodd permitted them to come closer and listen to the conversation.

In the midst of the talk, a work detail of 15 prisoners turning in tents for salvage came through the sally port and the outer door was opened to let them pass out. Suddenly they caught General Dodd and took them into the compound about at 1515 hours. The prisoners told General Dodd that the kidnapping had been planned.

Then, the Communists lost no time in carrying out the next phase. They
soon hoisted large a sign announcing "if there happen brutal act such as shooting, his (General Dodd) life is danger." And General Dodd was threatened to ask that no troops be sent in to release him.

The incident was reported to General Van Fleet through the chain of command and General Van Fleet instructed Brigadier Paul F. Yount of the 2nd US Logistical Command not to use force to effect General Dodd's release. General Yount attempted to localize the incident but failed. Representatives of the Communist prisoners from all of the other compounds were gathered at Compound 76 where the prisoners held a meeting to work out the demands that would be submitted to the UN Command. Lee Hak-koo, who had surrendered to the UN forces at a place near Samsan-dong south of Tabu-dong on 21 September 1950 with a rank of senior colonel of the NK Communist puppet army, entered Compound 76 and remained there becoming the spokesman of the Communist prisoners.

Colonel William H. Craig, who then Chief of Staff of the 2nd Logistical Command came to Koje-do and assumed the command of the UNC's security force after General Dodd's incident, kept the UNC troops just under general alert orders and the night of 7 May passed without further development.

On the following day, the Communist prisoners held a representatives meeting and presented General Dodd with a list of their demands. They first asked the formation and recognition by the UN Command of an association of prisoners with telephone facilities between the compounds and two vehicles for intracompound travel. Although he had no authority to make any agreements, General Dodd consented most of the items that the prisoners had insisted upon him.

On the other hand, General Van Fleet sent Brigadier General Charles F. Colson, Chief of Staff, the I US Corps, to assume the responsibility of the Koje-do camp and get General Dodd out. Based on General Van Fleet's instructions, that reached him on the 8th through General Yount, his first demand was sent to the Communists on the morning of the 9th, asking that General Dodd be freed safely immediately. The prisoners were also informed that General Dodd was no longer in command and could make no decision. Six hours later General Colson issued a second order. But Lee Hak-koo ignored it, even though he was well informed that the Communist prisoners held responsibility for General Dodd's safety when force was used to rescue him by the UN Command. Yet, the Communists showed no intentions to release General Dodd until they had gained their purposes.

Now, General Colson arrived at a conclusion that there remained only one
choice to present an ultimatum with a time limit, but he decided to wait until
tank elements from the 64th US Medium Tank Battalion arrived from the
mainland. This meant that he could not begin such an combat action until
the following morning because the tanks would not arrive until late on the
9th May.

While so-called "People's court" was continuing inside Compound 76, charging
upon General Dodd as a murder, the camp security forces, reinforced with
more troops and arms, encircled the compound, showing to the Communists
that the UN Command was preparing for a decisive action. Then, the Communists
came again to a promise that General Dodd would be freed after their meeting
if all went well, and the prisoners were informed that they could continue the
meeting in safety. The Communists were still exploiting their crafty trap tactics
to gain time.

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Colson ordered Lieutenant Colonel William
J. Kernan, commanding the 38th US Infantry Regiment, to prepare for forcible
entry into Compound 76, using all available means such as tanks, flamethrowers,
armored cars, 50-caliber multiple mounts, tear gas, riot guns, and the like.
The target date for the negotiations was set 1000 hours on 10 May, and the
deadline was notified to the prisoners.

In the early afternoon of 9 May, General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army
Commander, flew into Koje-do to get firsthand information. He had discussed
about the island situation with General Ridgway and General Mark W. Clark,
who had arrived in the Far East on 7 May to take over the United Nations
Command from General Ridgway effective on 12 May. All they wanted General
Colson to be sure to give every opportunity to nonbelligerent prisoners to
surrender peaceably while he engaged in battle for control of the compound.

That night General Dodd, forced by the prisoners, phoned General Colson
asking for an extension of the deadline until noon the next day. General Colson
refused the ask. At this juncture, the Communists asserted that they had
intended to continue meetings for ten days.

Twenty tanks, five equipped with flamethrowers, were brought into position
during the night, and heavy rain came down steadily all night. General Colson
was ready to go as dawn arrived in despite the weather. As daylight broke
the Communists presented new type demands - this time they attacked against
UNC prisoner policy, repatriation, and screening. They were ran out of gas
to demand, and they just attempted to gain more time to prepare for something
else - they were preparing to stage a mass breakout if the UNC's security
forces began to assault into the compound.
In order to keep General Dodd safety General Colson had no alternative but to expire the deadline due to the new demands. General Colson replied to the Communists in writing, accepting the demands with minor adjustment, and he added that General Dodd must be freed by noon and not later. The Communists were apparently determined to gain something more from the UN Command before they surrendered. The uneasy situation continued until the evening as the prisoners argued about the wording of General Colson’s answer.

Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet were seriously concerned about the prospect of the incident, particularly the General Colson’s letter, and in the last, General Dodd, with the prisoner leaders sitting beside him, passed on their and his own suggestions through telephone conversation for preparing General Colson’s reply in an acceptable word and form and then offered to write in the changes the Communist prisoners considered mandatory. After reporting the matter to General Yount, General Colson attempted to meet the prisoners’ demands clearly so that there would be no further excuse for delay. He asked the Communists that General Dodd must be freed at 2000 hours. Thereafter so much time had been spent in translating and discussing the changes. Finally, the Communists decided that they had owned their main objectives, and at 2130 hours, General Dodd walked out of Compound 76 in the long run.

Thus, General Dodd was saved from the Communists’ captive, but the incident soon encountered bad consequences. General Dodd’s humanitarianism in treating brutal, aggressive Communist prisoners and his careless attitude against the Communists met serious blames from all directions, up from Washington, the UN Command and Eighth US Army.

Since the press becoming impatient for getting more and detailed information, General Clark, who just assumed the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command on 12 May, decided to publish a statement on the incident. In general the response of the incident and the letter was unfavorable and further at Panmunjom the tricky Communist delegates made full use of the propaganda value of the story to discredit and discomfort the UNC representatives. Both General Clark and General Van Fleet were so upset, charging strongly on actions that had taken by Generals Dodd and Colson. General Clark proposed reduction in grade to colonel for both Generals Dodd and Colson and an administrative reprimand to General Yount for failing to catch several damaging phases in General Colson’s statement. The U.S. Department of the Army approved General Clark’s action.

Such a quick and summary punishment of the ranking officers involved
did not solve the essential problem of what to do about General Colson’s statement or the more basic questions of how to clean up the long-standing conditions in the POW camps.

Meanwhile, when the situation on the Koje Island seemingly got out of control, the 187th US Ariborn Regimental Combat Team was alerted for a new move, and on 15 May it was airlifted from Kyusyu, Japan to Pusan, Korea where it was hurriedly shipped by water to Koje-do to quell the Communist prisoners. The Netherland Battalion was already on the island, and other UNC contingents -- a company each from the British, Canadian, and Greek forces -- were also dispatched to Koje-do to provide a UNC’s flavour. Thus over 11,000 troops were now stationed on the island.

General Van Fleet, on 12 May, appointed Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, Assistant Division Commander of the 2nd US Division, as the new commander of the Koje Island. And the UN Command was now in much better position to handle the Communist prisoners properly.

On 19 May, General Van Fleet approved the first use of force to clean out the recalcitrant hospital enclosure #10 at Pusan where 3,500 patients and attached work details were remained to be unscreened. Infantrymen of the 15th US Infantry Regiment and couple of tanks surrounded one of the three defiant compounds and when infantrymen moved cautiously into the compound, Communists rushed out of their huts to the attack with crude spears, barbed-wire flails, gasoline grenades and rocks. Using concussion grenades and tear gas, the infantrymen pressed their pushing advance with bayonets fixed. After all the Communist threw their weapons away, there counted one prisoner was killed and twenty-nine were wounded, against one friendly injured. The rest prisoners of two compounds unharmly removed into new smaller segregation compounds.

By early June General Boatner was prepared to test his plan for securing control of the Communist compounds. Despite repeated orders to remove the Red flags that were being holdly flown in the three compounds, the Reds ignored his commands. On 4 June, members of the 38th US Regiment, supported by two tanks moved into Compound 85 and half an hour later into Compound 76. Tanks smashed down the flagpoles, while troops rescued 86 anti-Communist prisoners who escaped from the Red controlled-compounds. At Compound 60 infantry troops chopped down the poles without tank support, suffering no a single casualty by either side, and gained an experience for other compounds. Meanwhile, the prisoners of Compound 76, controlled by Lee Hak-ko, was preparing for a brutal rioting battle.
On the morning of 10 June, Brigadier General Boatner ordered Lee to assemble the prisoners in groups of 150 men and move to new, separate compounds within thirty minutes to segregate. In stead the prisoners brought forth their knives, spears, and tent poles and took fighting positions in their trenches. Paratroopers of the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team had no alternative but to advance without firing a shot. Employing concussion grenades, tear gases, bayonets, and fits, they drove it dragged the rioting prisoners out of the trenches. As a half-dozen Patton tanks rolled in, the rioters’ resistance finally collapsed, and Lee was captured. Thus Compound 76 was restored its order. During the two-and-a-half hour battle, 31 prisoners were killed, many by the Communist prisoners themselves, and 319 were wounded. One American was speared to death and 14 were injured. After Compound 76 had been cleared, a tally of weapons showed 3,000 spears, 4,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline grenades, plus an undetermined number of clubs, hatches, barbed-wire flails, and hammers. These weapons had been fashioned out of scrap materials, metal tipped tent poles by the prisoners.

The aftermath proved how quickly the lesson was learned. Leaders of Compounds 78 and 77 swiftly obeyed to move where General Boatner wanted them to. In Compound 77 the bodies of 16 murdered men were found. Of course this was done by pro-Communist prisoners against their rivals.

Yet, on 12 June, when a segregation operation was taking place to displace
the prisoners to new compounds, some 400 anti-Communist prisoners ran out of the moving line at Compound 75, and 282 prisoners asked for protection to the UNC’s guards the next day. A dramatic scene was taken place on 18 June, when 304 men of anti-Communist prisoners scrumed tightly each other so as to protect themselves from the Communist prisoners and ran out from Communists’ ruled Compound 85.

The transfer of the other compounds on Koje-do to new stockades was successfully completed during the rest of June, and by the end of the month the process of screening was completed, revealing that the actual numbers of prisoners referred to repatriate to the Communist side were slightly over 83,000 persons.

Thus, thereafter despite spasmodic violence and some acts of defiance, the POW camps were under control. The non-Communist prisoners were placed in separate compounds, while the Communists were split into groups of five hundred or less, and subsequent riots were quickly quelled by tear gas.

On 10 July 1952, the Korean Communication Zone (KCOMZ) was established under the U.S. Far East Command and took over responsibility for rear area
activities from the Eighth US Army, thus dividing the theater of operations
into the combat zone and communication zone. The Eighth US Army was
now freed from heavy burden directly concerned with the administration of its
communication zone, and was in position to concentrate its effort and efficiency
in carrying out its primary mission -- to fight the enemy.

The Lessons

In retrospect, as far as the Communists were concerned, they regarded all
prisoners in the UNC's camps as still in combatant status, and used them in
planned military operations. It is noteworthy that the reason the Communists
ignored the Geneva Convention which forbids such rioting was that they con-
sidered the prisoners of war as still being "fighters in the war." To the Com-
munists, any international laws or agreements meant nothing unless these
laws and rules favorably applied to their side.

Nam Il, who then senior delegate of the Communists for the armistice talks
at Panmunjom, had deliberately planned and master-minded the riots among
the prisoners in the UNC's stockades. He was directed personally by Kim Il-
sung the additional task of forming trouble in the prisoners camps. The
Communists had organized a special unit to take the leadership in making the
POW combatants. The unit had two specific missions: First, it was to train
agents who would permit themselves to be captured so that they could freely
go into the camps as prisoners and carry out specified leadership missions, and
the second was to furnish intelligence to the Communist negotiations at Pan-
munjom.

Thus, during small skirmishes with the UN forces at the front, such trained
agents were either surrendered or were captured, and were easily and openly
sneaked into the normal UNC prisoner camps. Women agents were sent south
as refugees with instructions to find work jobs in or near prisoner hospitals or
camps so they could help the Red agents inside the barbed-wire compounds.

The agents were also instructed to emphasize to the Communist prisoners
that more modern, strong equipment was being given to the NK Communist
puppet forces by Soviet and Communist China and that their high command
was so concerned about their welfare and they would be highly respected and
treated when they returned. And, the Communist never missed a chance for
psychological effect. The trained agents were strongly directed to counteract
their own propaganda which created fear that all Communist prisoners of the
UN forces were killed.
Moreover, each agent was ordered to set up "cell organization committees" in each POW camp. Communist officers were to be assigned responsible positions within the cell net works so that they could enforce rigid military discipline. As the cells grew strong enough, and their control of the POW compounds became trustworthy, they were to instigate and carry out strikes, protests and demonstrations.

Another function of the agent was to investigate the attitude and conduct of each prisoner. Their specific mission was to obtain the names of those who had deserted or surrendered voluntarily.

In fact, the expected slaughter of the several hundred POW's in the UNC camps was of little concern to the Communist bosses. They just wanted to utilize these Communist prisoners as a means for their goals and their lives meant nothing as long as they could use them as a device or tool for their plots.

To capitalize on the riots the Communists employed every medium. To illustrate, they had supplied many photographs to the western correspondents at Panmunjom -- pictures showing the good life in a POW camp in the Communist-held north, and pictures of the riots in the UNC camp on Koje-do. These pictures were depicted death, rioting, and massive propaganda signs erected in the compounds by the Communist prisoners. The contrasts of treatment were conspicuous.

In short, the POW maneuvers launched by the Communists at both fronts, one at the truce tent and the other at the rear front such as on Koje-do, were preplanned operations instructed by their Communist bosses.
CHAPTER VII  OUTPOST BATTLES IN STALEMATE
(June – August 1952)

Section 1. Outlook of the Battle Scene

Both the shooting war and the armistice negotiations were in a complete deadlock as the war went into its third year. And along the battle lines the fighting continued to dwindle to patrol clashes, raids, small-scale attacks and artillery duels.

Taking full advantage of this lull on the battlefield, General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, instructed all his corps commanders in mid-May 1952 to improve their defensive positions. He further instructed, at the beginning of June 1952, a program of limited attacks against enemy outposts which threatened the UN Command's main line of resistance. The mission in each case was to destroy enemy positions, capture prisoners of war, and establish new outpost positions for better defensive set-up. In this instruction he placed special emphasis upon the areas opposite the 45th US Division in the I US Corps sector and the 6th ROK Division in the II ROK Corps sector.

In consequence, the most bitterest battles took place in these two sectors during the month of June 1952. On the night of 6-7 June, the 45th US Division launched "Operation Counter" and seized eleven enemy-held outposts in the vicinity of Yokkok-chon northwest of Taegwang-ni. Repeated counterattacks by the Communists during the rest of the month failed to dislodge the gallant troops of the division.

Meanwhile, on 12 June, the 6th ROK Division launched an attack and seized portion of a hill mass situated in the east of Kumsong in the mid-eastern sector. During the rest of the month the enemy repeatedly attempted to regain the lost positions. But the ROK division firmly held the newly won outposts.

One divisional relief was made on the left of the 6th ROK Division in the IX US Corps sector in June. On 28 June the 2nd ROK Division came up on the battle line relieving the 40th US Division on the right flank of the IX US Corps defenses. Major General Willard M. Wyman, the IX US Corps Commander, now had two ROK Divisions and 7th US division defending his corps front.
Entering July 1952, ground action across the entire UNC front was highlighted by the fighting on Old Baldy (Hill 275) in the 2nd US Division sector of the 1 US Corps, and on Anchor Hill (Hill 351) in the 5th ROK Division sector on the far eastern front. At the end of the month, Anchor Hill was in the friendly hands while the 2nd US Division continued to fight to retake Old Baldy Hill.

In the meantime during July two divisional reliefs were made in the 1 US Corps sector: On 5 July, the 3rd US Division completed its relief of the 1st ROK Division, and on 18 July, the 2nd US Division relieved the 45th US Division. Upon being relieved, the 1st ROK Division assembled in 1 US Corps reserve temporarily, and the 45th US Division assembled in X US Corps reserve.

At the time, increased bandit activity of Communist guerrillas around the mountainous Chiri-san region and other districts threatened UNC's rear area installations and lines of communication. The 1st ROK Division, therefore, was ordered to the areas of Namwon and Miryang to participate in the bandit elimination action, which was known as "Operation Mongoose."

As a whole, July was a relatively quiet period largely because of prolonged torrential rains that greatly hampered troop maneuver and exploitation of mobility, in addition to uncertain prospect of the truce talks.

As soon as the summer rainy season cleared up, ground action began to flare up again gradually throughout the entire battle lines. August 1952 was highlighted, among numerous battles, by fights for possession of strategic terrain features forward of the main line of resistance, particularly in the western and central sectors.

On 1 August, two reinforced companies of the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Division in the 1 US Corps sector attacked and occupied Hill 275 (Old Baldy). Friendly troops sustained repeated enemy counterattacks for the following two days. Also in the 1 US Corps sector, on 9 August, a tiny outpost manned by elements of the 1st US Marine Division was attacked and occupied by the enemy. The Marines then shifted their attack to nearby Hill 122 (Bunker Hill) which dominated the tiny outpost and caught the enemy unawares. From 12 to 14 August the American Marines turned back repeated Communist counterattacks of up to a battalion in strength. Despite the failures of these attempts, the enemy tried again on 16 and 25 August, sustaining heavy casualties and no success in its efforts to drive off the Marines.

On the 11 ROK Corps front, in the meantime, during 5–9, Capital Hill, situated in the east of Kumsong in the Capital ROK Division sector was attacked and occupied by the enemy. The position changed hands several times with
the friendly forces retaining possession.
It will be as well to note at this point that on 21 August, the Korean Communication Zone (KCOMZ), a subordinate command of the US Far East Command, assumed the operational control of the 2nd Logistical Command and units under the control of that command. This removed many of the administrative burdens from the Eighth US Army.

Section 2. Operation Counter
(6 – 29 June 1952)

Operation Counter was one of the most ambitious and successful operations carried out by the UN forces who were to operate under the frigid set of military restrictions and political frustrations. This operation succeeded in bringing a chain of strategic outposts in the Communist zone to the UN hands.

In the operation that lasted from 6 to 29 June, 1952, the 45th US Infantry Division committed its whole regiments, to say nothing of supporting units, and sustained 1,004 casualties, but the Communist Chinese lost an estimated 5,000 men, including thirty prisoners captured. The full account of the operation is here detailed to show how keenly the Communists reacted to the UNC seizure of their outposts, especially the Old Baldy outpost. (See Situation Map 5, Appendix IX.)

The 45th US Division of the 1 US Corps commanded by Major General David L. Ruffner was holding down the extreme right flank of the 1 US Corps battle lines from Hill 281 (known as Arrowhead), eight kilometers northwest of Chorwon, to the village of Togun-gol, about 17 kilometers also northwest of Chorwon. Except for Hill 281, all of the 45th Division front lines lay south of Yokkok-chon which meandered through a rice paddy valley overlooked by lowlying, forested hills. Elements of the 38th and 39th CCF Armies controlled the dominant terrain to the north and in many cases were close enough to the 45th Division’s main lines to enjoy excellent observation of the division’s activities and to have convenient bases for dispatching their nightly raids and probes. General Ruffner, since 21 May when he assumed command of the division, felt that if his division could establish a chain of strong outposts across its front, it could deny enemy observers the use of much of the surrounding terrain dominated by the outposts and could also provide additional defensive depth to the division’s lines. So, General Ruffner planned an operation to take and establish eleven outpost sites situated at strategic locations across his division front. This
operation, known as Operation Counter, was to begin on 6 June. Anticipating that the enemy might react quickly and strongly to the UNC move, General Rudder instructed his regimental commanders to carry out the operation after dark and to follow up immediately with sufficient reinforcements to fortify the seized outposts before daybreak.

The 279th US Regiment, under Colonel Preston J.C. Murphy, holding the eastern half of the division front, would take and hold objectives 1 through 6 and the 180th US Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ellis B. Ritchie, would seize and occupy objectives 7, 9, 10, and 11 in the first step operation. Objective 8, known as Outpost Eerie, would be taken in the second step operation at a later date. (See Sketch Map 34.)

During the daylight hours of 6 June several air strikes on known enemy strongpoints close to the outpost objectives took place. Then, after dark, the two attacking regimental commanders sent out their units, ranging from a squad to almost a company, to take possession of the outposts. The attack units encountered little opposition except at outpost 10 on Hill 234 (known to UN

**OBJECTIVES FOR OPERATION COUNTER** (6–29 June 1952)

![Sketch Map 34](Image)
troops as Porkchop) and outpost 11 on Hill 275 (known as Old Baldy). The former was taken by two platoons from 1 Company, 180th Infantry, after a 55-minute fire fight with two CCF platoons. On Hill 275, which had won the name of Old Baldy when artillery and mortar fire destroyed the trees on its crest, two squads from A Company, 180th Infantry, exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire with two enemy squads. The Old Baldy hill was taken shortly after midnight.

Once the outposts were seized, the task of organizing them defensively got under way. The men of the 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments worked through the night. They built bunkers with overhead protection so that their own artillery could use proximity fuze shells when necessary. Thus, the outposts became strong defensive positions. By morning the new 24-hour outposts were ready to withstand enemy counterattacks, and garrison forces of from 18 to 44 men were left behind as the bulk of the forces of the regiments withdrew to the main line of resistance. The enemy followed up with a series of counterattacks during the following few days, but those were successfully repulsed.

On 12 June the 45th US Division opened the second step of Operation Counter to seize the last objective, Outpost Eerie, which the division had abandoned in March when the 26-men-outpost was taken by surprise by an estimated reinforced CCF company. The outpost lay at the southern tip of a T-shaped ridge line about 13 kilometers west and slightly north of Chorwon. The struggle for the height began with an air strike and a preparatory artillery bombardment on it. The 2nd Battalion of the 180th Infantry then crossed the line of departure and engaged the CCF at close quarters. The attacking troops hung on tenaciously until the Communists broke off the engagement. Next day the regiment's 3rd Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion and secured the outpost. United Nations aircraft flew fifty-eight close support missions during the first eighteen hours, and UN guns fired 43,600 rounds during the forty-eight hours battle. At noon on 14 June the second step operation ended with the new chain of outposts, two to three kilometers in front of the main battle lines, secured in the division's hands.

On 16 June the 179th US Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Sandlin, relieved the 180th Regiment on the line and took over the outpost positions on Old Baldy, Porkchop and Eerie. Communist attacks during next ten days ranged from platoon to battalion strength, demonstrating the Communist determination to eliminate these outposts. By the same token, the 45th Division's repulse of the repeated Communist counterblows along this line attested to the division's equal determination not to be dislodged.
On 26 June the fight for the Old Baldy outpost became very heated. About 400 meters west of the Old Baldy hill, the Communists had established strong positions on Hill 233 that posed a constant threat to the 45th Division outpost and the 179th Infantry Regiment’s troops in the area. Colonel Sandlin decided to destroy the enemy strongpoints on the hill held by about two CCF companies.

C Company (reinforced), 179th Infantry, under 1st Lieutenant John B. Blount, and F Company, 180th Infantry, under Captain Jack M. Tiller, which was attached to the 179th, attacked after artillery and mortar preparations. With C Company moving in from the left and F Company, supported by a tank, coming in from the right finger of Old Baldy, the assault forces soon ran into heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from Hill 223. After an hour of fighting the enemy suddenly pulled back and directed artillery and mortar fire upon the attacking units. When the fire ceased, the enemy quickly came back and closed with the men of C and F Companies in the trenches. With the help of a reinforcing company from the 179th Regiment the attack force managed to
regroup and resumed the attack. For two hours the battle continued as the
Communists used hand grenades and machine guns to repel each attempt to
drive them from their positions.

During the night of 26 June and the following day the three American com-
panies, after the enemy had evacuated his positions, dug in to consolidate their
defense positions on Old Baldy. On the afternoon of 27 June, L Company,
197th Regiment, took over defense of the crest and F Company, 180th Regi-
ment, moved back to a supporting position. C Company and elements of the
reinforcing company held the ground northwest of the crest which had been
won from the Communists.

When night fell, enemy activity around Old Baldy increased. Mortar and
artillery fire began to come in on the 179th Regiment’s positions and enemy
flares warned that the Communists were on the move. At 2200 hours the
Communists struck the defenders of L Company from the northeast and
southwest.

An estimated reinforced battalion pressed on toward the crest until it met a
circle of defensive fire. From the MLR, artillery, mortar, tank, and infantry
weapons covered enemy avenues of approach. Unable to penetrate the ring, the
enemy withdrew and regrouped at midnight.

The second and third attacks followed the same pattern. Each lasted over an
hour during the early morning of 28 June and each time the enemy failed to
break through the wall of defensive fires. The Communists finally broke off
the fight after suffering casualties estimated at between 250 and 350 men. The
179th Regiment suffered six men killed and sixty-one wounded during the three
engagements.

Late in the evening of 28 June, the enemy signaled the approach of another
attack by pounding the Old Baldy positions. About at 2300 hours the CCF’s
main assault began with a force estimated at two reinforced battalions moving in
from the northeast and northwest behind a very heavy artillery and mortar
barrage. This time the Communist troops penetrated the perimeter and hand-to-
hand fighting broke out. Shortly after midnight, with the help of a UNC flare
plane which illuminated the battle area, the troops of the 179th Regiment on
the hill were able to concentrate all the available defensive fire on the enemy.
By 0100 hours on 29 June the CCF troops finally disengaged to the north,
having suffered losses estimated at close to 700 men. In return the enemy had
fired over 4,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire and the 179th Regiment had
suffered 43 casualties, including eight killed in action.

The enemy made more attempts to wrest control of Old Baldy outpost on
Outpost Battles in Stalemate

the night of 3–4 July. Three separate attacks -- the last in battalion strength -- met the same fate as their predecessors before the concentrated defensive fire power of the 45th US Division.

In retrospect, the thorough manner in which the division had organized the defense of the outposts and skills with which it had used its weapons during the fighting were a testimonial to the leadership on all levels and to the courage of its troops.

For this victorious combat achievement the 45th US Division won a commendation from General Van Fleet, the Eighth Army Commander. On 18 July the 45th US Division turned over its defense sector, including Old Baldy, to the 2nd US Division and moved to the X US Corps area to the east.

Section 3. The Battle for Key Outposts
(June – August 1952)

The I US Corps Sector

Following Operation Counter successfully carried out by the 45th US Division, there also flared up sporadic but bitter fights in the I US Corps sector. On 1 July 1952 the 1st ROK Division, on the 45th US Division’s left, had carried out a successful battalion raid against Chinese Communist positions west of the Imjin River. This raid by the 15th ROK Regiment resulted in the enemy casualties of 112 killed and more than 156 estimated killed or wounded as against friendly loss of five killed.

On 3 July the 1st US Marine Division in far western sector sent a company raiding party against the Communist strong outpost positions on Hill 159 (known to the American Marines as Yoke Hill) in Panji-ri about five and a half kilometers northeast of Panmunjom. The Marines destroyed enemy troops and bunkers, then withdrew to the friendly lines. Three days later the Marine division again struck on Yoke Hill with intent to obtain prisoners and information. The raid was code named “Operation Buckshot” and the first large-scale operation since the 1st US Marine Division had moved to the west. Here the action is detailed.

Operation Buckshot (6–7 July): Before dusk on 6 July, the reinforced 1st Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George W.E. Daughtry, 7th US Marines, moved into position - - on the left, a tank-infantry force (A Company) to create diversion; in the center, the main assault force (C Company); and on the right, a reinforced platoon from B Company to support the attack by fire from
positions close to the objective, Yoke. Earlier, three reinforced squads from A Company occupied combat outposts in the area of operations to deny the use of key terrain to the enemy and to provide additional fire support in the attack.

At 2200 hours, C Company, the main assault force, crossed the line of departure and set its course for Yoke, about 12 kilometers northeast. Five minutes later the B Company support unit moved out to occupy the intermediate objective, eight kilometers southeast of Yoke. As it took up positions on the intermediate objective, men of the support unit discovered that no Communists were in its vicinity; in fact, the platoon was not to encounter any enemy forces during the operation.

Even though B Company failed to engage any Communists, the remainder of the battalion encountered more than its share. About 450 meters southwest of the objective the C Company attack force was hit by an enemy ambush, which cut off the C Company’s lead element. Although the Communists directed strong efforts at halting the Marine advance, they were unsuccessful in this attempt. The Marines pressed the attack and seized Yoke 20 minutes after midnight.

On the left, the diversionary attack unit, A Company supported by the five tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion, and by a section of flame tanks from the armored battalion headquarters, began its mission at 2355 hours. In 45 minutes, the tank-infantry unit reached its objective, the first high ground southwest of Yoke. Tanks turned their 90-mm. guns on known Communist positions on the hill to the north. During the next hour, the big guns of the M-46 medium tanks sent 49 rounds into enemy emplacements. The Marine tanks ceased fire at 0113 when A Company commander was alerted to assist C Company. He left one rifle platoon with the tanks.

Over on the high ground to the north and east, the attack force was under heavy fire from Communist mortars and artillery and was also receiving a number of enemy small-unit probes. At 0200, A Company made contact with C Company. A Company commander found the attack force somewhat disorganized as a result of the wounding of its company commander, the loss of several key officers and NCOs, and the effects of the lead element of the company being ambushed and cut off. After being briefed on the situation by the wounded commander and conducting a reconnaissance, A Company commander recommended to the battalion commander that the entire force be recalled before daylight. At 0310 hours the two companies at Yoke began to disengage, returning to the main line of resistance by 0636 on the 7th, without further casualties.

The one platoon of A Company and seven tanks of the diversion unit were
still in their forward positions on the left and had prepared to resume firing. At
dawn the M-46s relaid their guns on targets that had become visible. Tank
gunners destroyed two enemy observation posts and three machine gun positions
and damaged many feet of trenchlines. The tankers inflicted 19 counted casu-
alties on the Communists during the operation.

With the return at 0645 of the tank-infantry diversion force, the special op-
eration for obtaining prisoners and information ended. No Communists had been
captured and no data gleaned from the Communist casualties, listed as the 19
reported by the tankers and an estimated 20 more wounded or killed. Marine
casualties from the operation “Buckshot” were out of proportion to the results
achieved -- 12 dead, 85 wounded, and five missing. It had been a high price to
pay for a venture of this type, particularly when the primary objective went
unaccomplished.

Entering mid-July the Old Baldy (Hill 275) fight resurged, now getting the 2nd
US Division troops embroiled in the same bitter battle as experienced by the
45th US Division.

Battle for Old Baldy (17 July–4 August): On the night of 17–18 July,
Chinese Communists mounted two attacks against Old Baldy in strength ex-
ceeding a reinforced battalion. The Communists apparently took advantage of
the relief of the 45th and 2nd US Divisions as they attacked. However, the
men of the 2nd Battalion, 23rd US Regiment, who had just relieved elements
of the 45th Division on Old Baldy, managed to repel the first enemy assault
through quick reinforcement of the outpost and heavy close-defensive fire.
But the second enemy attack finally took the Old Baldy positions. For four
days a seesaw battle raged for the blasted, denuded hill. The 23rd Infantry
eventually had elements of E, F, I, L, B, K, and G Companies on the hill at
one time or another: it took hundreds of casualties. The enemy secured a
foothold on the slope which they reinforced and then exploited. The CCF
artillery and mortar fire became very intense: then the enemy infantry followed
up swiftly and seized the crest. By 20 July, however, after numerous counter-
attacks, the elements of the 2nd US Division had regained only a portion of
the east finger of Old Baldy. The onset of the rainy season made ground oper-
ations exceedingly difficult to carry out during the rest of the month. So far,
in the fight for Old Baldy the 2nd US Division, commanded by Major General
James C. Fry, suffered heavy casualties of 39 killed, 234 wounded, and 84
missing although the Communists suffered much more heavy casualties --
estimated 1,093 killed and wounded in the action.

Although the totals were not unusually high considering the intensity of
the fighting and the artillery exchange, it is not difficult to understand the deep concern of General Clark, the UNC Commander, over the casualties suffered in the fight for one more hill.

General Clark's concern over the merit in seizing terrain features like Old Baldy was apparently caused by the resurgence of activity in that area in mid-July. As a result of his concern, General Clark told his staff that he intended to discourage attacks against hills like Old Baldy in the future. The General wanted the UN Command to confine itself to patrolling and let the enemy do the attacking.

When the heavy rains eased off at the end of July the 2nd US Division now sought to secure complete control of Old Baldy which could accommodate comfortably only a single rifle company and which had become an objective of the UNC commander's concern. Since the enemy had an estimated two platoons on the Old Baldy crest, the 23rd US Regiment sent two reinforced companies up the slopes on the night of 31 July, after artillery and mortar preparation fires on the Communist positions. Edging toward the enemy defense the 2nd Division troops used small arms fire and hand grenades as they reached the enemy trenches. After fierce hand-to-hand combat, the two companies finally gained the crest early on 1 August and dug in to prepare for the Communist customary counterattack. Two hundred flares were distributed around the friendly positions and forty-two air sorties were flown during the day in support. That night the Communists sent first mortar, then artillery, fire at the crest, dropping an estimated 2,500 rounds on the 23rd Regiment's troops. But the enemy counterattacks were driven off.

Mines, bunkers, and additional wire helped to strengthen the 2nd US Division's hold on Old Baldy on 2 August and extremely heavy and effective artillery fire broke up another enemy assault on 4 August. For the remainder of the month, the enemy refrained from further attempts on Old Baldy.

**Battle for Bunker Hill (9–16 August):** Given the fanciful name "Bunker Hill," this battle took place in the central part of the 1st US Marine Division line of the I US Corps sector. This battle resulted in the first major US Marine ground action and victory in the western sector.

Before describing the battle of Bunker Hill, it seems necessary to distinguish Bunker Hill (Hill 122) to be dealt with here from another famed Bunker Hill (Hill 800). Although both hills were given the same name coincidentally since bunkers and also to take and hold bunker positions elsewhere all across the front were in everyone's mind and frontline units were heavily involved in the bunker construction program, the latter (Hill 800), it must be remembered, was
located in the eastern Korea along the rugged hill mass separating Hongchon and Soyang Rivers where troops of the 2nd US Infantry Division fought bravely during the Second Spring CCF Offensive in May 1951.

The first round in the battle of Bunker Hill (Hill 122) began as fight for Hill 58A. Since Hill 58A was located halfway between the Marine MLR and the CCF's OPLR, the Marine seizure of the hill prevented the enemy from holding terrain suitable for employing their mortars against Marine frontline troops. Strong enemy outposts on Hill 120 to the northwest and Hill 110 to the northeast constantly threatened the squad on Hill 58A. From these two forward positions, the enemy easily on 9 August 1952 streamed down to Hill 58A, launching in the process the Bunker Hill battle. (See Sketch Map 35.)

Before dawn an estimated four enemy squads fell upon Hill 58A, outposted from E Company of the 1st US Marines, forcing the outnumbered Marines on the hill to withdraw. Marine counterattack was immediately followed. As a reinforced E Company platoon reached the area near the base of the hill, heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire again forced the Marines to withdraw.

**BUNKER HILL AND VICINITY (9–16 Aug 1952)**

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**Sketch Map 35**

Legend:
- Friendly MLR
- CCF OPLR
The second counterattack was made by a unit of the 1st Marine reserve battalion, supported by a platoon of E Company. As before, the enemy response was a devastating barrage from their supporting weapons. The Marine assault against Hill 58A brought down the full weight of enemy firepower. Shortly before noon of the 9th, nevertheless, the hill was recaptured by the Marines. Quickly the attack force began to organize a defense to repulse the Communist counterattack, which was certain to come. As expected the enemy counterattack came with a hail of mortar and artillery shells which forced again the Marines to withdraw with heavy casualties. The hill had changed hands twice and the enemy had fired 5,000 rounds of artillery in the contested ownership. By midnight of the 9th the Marines managed to retake the hill after a fierce fire fight. At daybreak on 10 August, however, the enemy, in estimated company strength, strenuously renewed his counter-fire and, for a third time, forced the 1st Marines to retire from the disputed hill.

This successive Marine withdrawal from Hill 58A finally led to a regimental staff meeting later that day. Colonel Walter F. Layer, commanding the 1st Marines, and his staff officers evaluated the cause of their unit failures being resulted from the intense enemy shelling. The key to its effectiveness was the observation provided the CCF troops from Hills 122 and 110. Heavy enemy fire had also caused most of the Marine casualties, 17 killed and 243 wounded, in the 1st Marine ranks. Based upon the evaluation Colonel Layer now decided to shift the battle area to better restrict the enemy capability not only to observe Marine troops movements but also to call down accurate fire upon friendly attacking units.

Hill 122 (Bunker Hill), a Communist outpost, a little southwest of Hill 58A, was selected as a new objective. Possession of Bunker Hill instead of Hill 58A presented the following three major advantages: (1) Bunker Hill offered excellent observation into the rear of enemy outposts; (2) possession of Bunker Hill would greatly strengthen the MLR in the regimental sector, effectively neutralize Hill 58A, provide dominating terrain that was more defensible than Hill 58A; and (3) Bunker Hill offered an excellent opportunity for an attack employing the element of surprise against the Communists.

To help preserve this tactical surprise, the plan for the Bunker Hill attack included a diversionary attack against Hill 58A. Making this secondary effort would be a reinforced rifle platoon and a composite unit of gun and flame tanks. For main attack, lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterson, commanding the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Marines, would employ a reinforced rifle company with supporting artillery and tanks, if needed. The operation would be
conducted at night, to further ensure the opportunity for tactical surprise. For the same reason, the attack was not to be preceded by artillery preparation on either objective. To the right of the 1st US Marines, however, the 5th US Marines commanded by Colonel Thomas A. Culhane Jr. would support the diversion by artillery and tank fire placed on enemy strongpoints in the Ungok area, about two kilometers northeast of Hill 58A. During daylight, air, artillery, and tanks attacked targets on both Bunker Hill and Hill 58A.

At dusk on 11 August the diversionary attack teams proceeded to their preselected positions and performed their part of the diversionary effort around Hills 56A and 58A. A platoon of D Company advanced from the MLR to complete the infantry part of the effort. The platoon had swept over Hill 56A at 2255 and immediately struck out for the further objective, Hill 58A supported by tanks.

About ten minutes after the diversionary infantry had cleared Hill 56A while enroute to 58A, the main attack force, B Company, which had come under operational control of the 2nd Battalion, crossed the line of departure. Moving at a fast pace to preserve the element of surprise, the attack force under Captain Serono S. Scranton, Jr., soon deployed by platoon against near side of the objective, Bunker Hill. By 2330 hours one platoon of the attacking company had gained the top of Hill 122 and one was at the base of the hill, both moving northward along the forward slope.

As the led platoons neared the end of their sweep forward, they began to come under enemy’s small arms fire but the B Company troops continued to advance, returning well-placed small arms fire.

Soon the intensity of enemy small arms fire increased; at the same time enemy mortar and artillery opened up on the company. The Communists stubbornly resisted with a hail of hand grenades. After a brief but vicious fight at point-blank range, the Communist defenders gave ground on the eastern side, heading uphill. By 0300 hours, 12 August the battle had quieted down and for a short while all firing ceased. Then, the Marines began to dig in anticipating the Communist customary counterattack. The counterattack, however, did not come although the enemy mortars unleashed a heavy fire against the newly won position. Dawn on 12 August revealed that thus far in the Bunker Hill fighting one Marine of B Company had been killed and 22 were wounded. The earlier diversionary attack on Hill 58A had resulted in only one Marine casualty.

At noon, the 1st US Marine Regiment passed to its 3rd Battalion the responsibility for Bunker Hill and operational control of B Company.
Consolidation of Bunker Hill continued until about 1500, when the Communist
Chinese had launched an intense mortar and artillery attack against the hill.
The continued enemy shelling at last forced B Company to pull back from
the ridge and take up positions on the eastern slope of Bunker Hill. At this
point, with reduced B Company forces and with no radio communication be-
tween B Company and the 3rd Battalion, I Company, under Captain Roward J.
Connolly, was sent forward from the MLR to reinforce B Company. Shortly
before 1600, a force of more than 350 CCF troops lunged out of the low ground
of Hill 123, southwest of Bunker, to attack defensive positions along the ridge
between Hills 124 and 122. Striking in rapid succession first the west side and
then the northern side of the B Company position to find a weak spot in the
defense, the Communist counterattack finally concentrated on the southwestern
part of the hill.

An intense exchange of fire raged here until 1715 hours, when the defending
fire of B Company plus the added weight of the I Company reinforcements
combined to stall the enemy advance. Having failed to recapture Hill 122, the
Communists abruptly broke off their artillery and mortar fire and ordered their
infantry to withdraw. They pulled back only to the far side of the hill, however.
By 1740 the CCF elements were occupying their new position on the northern
slope. Enemy supporting fires had lifted and a lull ensued in the fighting.

In the meantime General Selden shifted most of his reserve into the zone
of action. Before the end of the day the Marine position on the newly seized
hill became tenable. Priority of artillery support went to the Bunker Hill
regiment. Supplies and fortification materials, meanwhile, were being carried
forward to consolidate the precarious foothold.

At 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald T. Armitage, commanding the 3rd
Battalion, 1st Marines, reported to division that his troops on Hill 122 occupied
the entire reverse slope and that his I Company and B Company were digging
in and consolidating their scant defenses. So far in the fighting for Bunker
Hill, the Marine troops suffered casualties of 35 killed and 29 wounded. By this
time as many as 406 Communists had occupied the ridge on the other side of
the slope from the Marines. Opposing Marine and Communist troops were thus
lined up for a continuation of the battle for Bunker Hill.

It appeared that the Communists wished to attempt a diversionary tactic of
their own. To draw attention away from Hill 122 they engaged a Marine
outpost east of Bunker and a ROK Marine ambush far to the left before attacking
Bunker again. After their diversion against the two outposts, west and east,
the Communists then initiated their main thrust to retake Bunker Hill.
Shortly after 0130 a large enemy force moved up directly for its part of the
hill. For nearly four hours the battle raged at Hill 122. Unsuccessful enemy
frontal assaults were followed by attempts to dislodge the defenders from the
rear. In their continuing thrust against the hill, the Communists were repulsed
by Marine coordinated support fires—tank, rocket, artillery, and mortar.

After the immediate danger of the CCF onslaught had ended Colonel Layer,
commanding the 1st Marines, ordered the 7th Marines H Company that had
been attached to his regiment as reserve, forward to relieve I Company men
at the contested height. The relief of units was completed before noon of the
13th. By late afternoon all units of the 7th Marines that had moved up to rein-
force the 1st Marines had returned to the regimental reserve area. The Bunker
Hill action on the night of 12–13 August resulted in 25 Marines killed and 214
wounded. On the right, in the 2nd Battalion sector, an additional 40 Marines
were listed as casualties, including seven killed in the defense of Hill 48A
(Stromboli), the Communist diversionary objective far east of Bunker Hill. The
CCF known dead numbered 210, plus an estimated 470 killed and 625 wounded.

At dusk on 13 August the CCF attack came again on the contested hill with a
diversional attack on the western flank at the extreme left of the 3rd Battalion
sector. At 2100 hours, while continuing his shelling of the left end of the 3rd
Battalion sector, the enemy lifted his preparation on Bunker Hill to permit a
CCF reinforced company to make a new assault there on the position of H
Company under Captain John G. Demas that had just relieved I Company of the
1st Marines. The renewed Communist attack, however, failed again before unrelenting Marine artillery and mortar concentrations. The enemy withdrew at
2215 hours with heavy casualties suffered. Communist incoming was again
heavy during this action, with a reported 3,000 rounds falling in the sector.

At midnight on the 14th the 1st Marines received a report about the outbreak
of a small arms clash between the defenders on the left flank of Bunker and an
enemy unit farther west. At 0118 hours on 15 August what initially appeared
to be a minor contest suddenly erupted into a heated fire fight all along the
Bunker ridge complex. At this time, Communist troops in the draw running
alongside the Hills 124–122 ridge were massed for an assault on Bunker Hill
from the northeast. A fighting fight from a tank on the main line intercepted
the enemy in this state of their preparation. In a matter of moments, Marine
artillery, mortar, and tank fire struck the enemy and scattered the formation.

Unable to make a sneak attack, the Communists now reverted to their usual
procedures, employing a preassault bombardment prior to their infantry assault.
While supporting weapons pounded the Marines, the Red Chinese regrouped and
moved forward and fired on the Marines of H Company, who replied with rifles and machine guns and artillery fires. This defensive fire finally held the attackers in check. The Communists gradually decreased their small arms and artillery fire. Thus, by 0400 across the entire 1st Marines front, all was quiet again.

Again on 16 August at 0040 hours a Communist force, later estimated at a battalion, came out of positions to the west and north of Bunker Hill. Supported by mortars at first, and later on by artillery, the enemy battalion sent one company against the Marine outpost. Several attacking elements were able to penetrate the Marines' defensive fires. These Communist elements reached the crest of the hill and began using their rifles, automatic weapons, and hand grenades against the Marine defenders. At this point a reinforcement was called in by Captain Scranton of B Company, 1st Marines, that had returned to Bunker Hill relieving H Company. A bitter fight ensued. By 0315 hours, however, the Communists were forced to withdraw.

In retrospect, the Marines' capability to defend Bunker Hill was enhanced by close coordination among artillery, air, and tank units although the victory over the hill should largely be attributed to the ground Marines' well thought-out plan and its skillful execution. One measure of the results of the Bunker Hill fighting is seen in the price paid. The Communists losses were estimated by the 1st US Marine Division at approximately 3,200, including more than 400 known dead. American Marine casualties in the action were 48 killed and 313 seriously wounded.

The Mid-Eastern Sector

While the 45th US Division got into its second step of Operation Counter in the I US Corps sector, the 6th ROK Division of the II ROK Corps in the Kumsong area also launched an ambitious limited objective attack to seize a critical terrain feature consisting of two heights, A and B, about two and a half kilometers southeast of Kumsong on 12 June 1952. Supported by American tanks and artillery the troops of the 2nd ROK Regiment swept into the Chinese Communist positions with a diversionary attack directed on Hill 373, one and a half kilometers to the left of the main objective. After fierce hand-to-hand combat, the Communists were forced to withdraw and the objective was completely secured in the ROK's hands.

On 18 June, the Communists, this time supported by artillery and six tanks, attacked with a battalion-sized force against the A and B heights in a desperate
attempt to retake them, but without success before the determined the ROK troops. In the two separate actions the 6th ROK Division troops suffered casualties of 47 killed and 159 wounded as against the enemy losses of 157 killed and an estimated 139 killed plus eight prisoners captured.

On 8 July the Capital ROK Division on the right of the 6th ROK Division also launched an attack similar to the one carried out by the 6th ROK Division to seize a Communist outpost on northern Finger Ridge near Yulsa-ri, about twenty-four kilometers northeast of Kumhwa employing one company from the 1st ROK Regiment while directing another company from the 26th ROK Regiment against Hill 621 near Chwasu-dong as diversionary attack. The result, however, was unsuccessful.

The Capital ROK Division would become embroiled in fierce and bloody struggle in the early days of August 1952. On the night of 5–6 August Chinese Communists struck a key outpost, later to be known as Capital Hill, then outposted with a platoon of the 26th Regiment of the Capital ROK Division.
Building up from a reinforced platoon to two companies, the Communists hurled their troops against the hill. For three days control of Capital Hill seesawed back and forth, but the 26th ROK Regiment stubbornly resisted and finally drove the Reds off the outpost after repeated counterattacks. By 0400 hours the hill was completely secured in the hands of the ROK troops.

In the action the Red Chinese suffered casualties of 369 dead, an additional 450 estimated dead, and 190 wounded. The 26th Regiment lost 48 killed and 150 wounded during the action. For the ROK troops’ courageous defense General Van Fleet commended the unit very highly.

The Eastern Sector

In the I ROK Corps on the far eastern front, the 5th ROK Division was attacked on 10 July as the 86th NK Communist Division threw a two company-sized force against the ROK positions on Hill 351 (Anchor Hill) close to Oemyon-hyon about eleven kilometers south of Kosong on the east coast. One ROK company from the 35th Regiment on the hill stubbornly resisted for a while and was forced to withdraw to the southern base of the hill with heavy casualties suffered. Despite the repeated counterattacks by the 35th Regiment’s troops, the NK Communists held firm the hill for three days before they were finally forced to retreat at midnight of 13 July. In the fight for Hill 351 the ROK division lost 68 men killed, 167 wounded, and 103 missing as against 445 NK Communists killed and four captured.

Elsewhere in the UNC front remained relatively quiet during the last week of July and the first week of August except minor and routine clashes between the two opponents. It was largely due to the torrential rains in the period which restricted activity along the front.
CHAPTER VIII  AUTUMN OPERATIONS
(September – October 1952)

Section 1.  The Summary Account of Operations

As the autumn of 1952 set in, the enemy became more and more aggressive in the struggle for control of strategic high ground all along the friendly main line of resistance. It was obvious that the Communist aggressors, balked on the POW question at Panmunjom, intended to gain better ground before the onset of the winter, and also to put pressure upon the United Nations Command in an attempt to conclude the war on their favorable terms. It should be noted it was during this period that the Communists apparently seized the initiative on the ground which in turn put the UN ground forces on the defensive.

In September 1952, the western and central sectors became the areas of fierce and bitter fighting, and toward the close of the month, the enemy also made frequent, probing raids of friendly main defensive positions in the eastern sector. In the I US Corps sector, American Marines on Bunker (Hill 122) and the troops of the 2nd US Division on Old Baldy (Hill 275) successfully defended repeated Communist attacks on these positions, while the Communists succeeded in taking Outpost Kelly defended by elements of the 3rd US Division in Jamestown Line. In central sector, two strategic outposts known as Capital Hill and Finger Ridge, both defended by the Capital ROK Division, were attacked and occupied by the Communist attackers. However, subsequent counterattacks by the ROK division succeeded in regaining these positions.

During 21–25 September, in the meantime, the 45th US Division relieved the 8th ROK Division on Line Minnesota in the X US Corps right sector. The American division would remain there until the end of December when it was relieved by the newly activated 12th ROK Division.

On 30 September, the 1st ROK Division relieved the 3rd US Division on MLR positions in the Imjin River line.

In the early part of October 1952, the Communist forces began a series of determined attacks, again in an effort to seize dominating terrain features
in the western and central sectors. As a result, several strategic hill positions were lost during the height of the enemy drive. The ROK and UN allied forces, however, successfully blunted the main enemy efforts. Some of the bitterest battles that took place in October are given below.

During 6–12 October, the French Battalion, then attached to the 2nd US Division, sustained repeated enemy attacks of up to a regiment in strength against its positions on Hill 281 (known as Arrowhead), overlooking the Yokkok-chon Valley in the I US Corps right sector. In the IX US Corps sector, one of the most dramatic battles throughout the Korean War took place also in the vicinity of the Yokkok-chon during 6–15 October. The 9th ROK Division sustained twenty enemy attacks of Communist troops ranging from a regiment up to a division-size strength against Hill 395 (better known as White Horse), nearly three and a half kilometers northeast of Hill 281. This particular strategic hill position changed hands so many times with the friendly forces retaining possession. Another important outpost positions of the 9th ROK Division on Hill 388 (Hill 391 on the old map) — known to UN troops as Jackson Heights — was also attacked by the Communists during 6–12 October. Units of the 9th ROK and 3rd US Divisions made counterattacks closely one upon the other to recapture the hill during 14–29 October, but without success.

The enemy’s early October offensive also struck on the long-disputed battlefields, Finger Ridge and Capital Hill in the Capital ROK Division sector without success, but in the course of defending these critical outposts, the ROK division lost a critical outpost, Hill 575, on the left of Finger Ridge.

On 14 October, the 7th US and 2nd ROK Divisions in the IX US Corps sector launched “Operation Showdown” to seize Hill 598 (Triangle Hill) and Sniper Ridge, respectively. The 7th US Division attacked and captured Hill 598, but on 30 October, an enemy attack of a regiment-sized force succeeded in retaking the hill from the 2nd ROK Division who had taken over the battle zone from the 7th Division. In the meantime the 2nd ROK Division continued the bloody seesaw battles on Sniper Ridge.

Back again in the I US Corps sector, the 1st ROK Division lost two outposts, Nickie and Tessie, to an enemy attack on the night of 6–7 October. In the far west in the ROK Marine line, however, the ROK Marines gallantly repulsed a massive Communist attack directed against four outposts simultaneously on the night of 31 October. Thus, the month of October 1952 was filled up with the most heaviest outpost battles in more than a year.

After the enemy’s October offensive had successfully been checked by the UN troops, the Eighth US Army made several divisional reliefs. On 22 October, the 40th US Division relieved the 25th US Division in the X US Corps
sector; the 3rd US Division relieved the 9th ROK Division in the IX US Corps sector on 25 October; and the 8th ROK Division relieved the Capital ROK Division in the II ROK Corps sector also on the 25th.

Section 2. Flare-up Again on Key Outposts  
(September – October 1952)

The 1 US Corps Sector

The Marine Action: Communists’ obstinate drives to take Bunker Hill (Hill 122) back seemed never to cease. After the heavy rains of August had come to an end Chinese Communists renewed the Bunker Hill fighting in the 1 US Corps sector. On 5 September 1952 the Marine positions were first subjected to a heavy artillery concentration and then to an assault by an estimated battalion force. For two hours the bloody contest for the heights swung back and forth. But the gallant Marine defenders would not give in. Finally the Communists began to disengage with heavy casualties suffered. Still not discouraged, the persistent enemy sent over next ten days a number of raids and harassing expeditions against Bunker Hill with the American Marines successfully defending the critical terrain feature on each occasion.

One day after the failure of the Bunker Hill attack, 6 September, the Red Chinese now struck against the outpost positions defended by the 1st ROK Marine Regiment attached to the American Marine division. The ROK Marines, holding down the western flank of the 1st US Marine Division line along east bank of the Sachon River, maintained several key outposts guarding their main lines. Of those, Outpost 36 (Hill 36) was nearest to the Communists and had constantly been a main objective of their attack in the ROK Marine sector because of the effective harrassing fires from the outpost that had struck the Red Chinese main line troops.

On the evening of 6 September an estimated CCF company, after crossing the Sachon just north of highway bridge (now known as the Freedom Gate Bridge since the wounded POWs had been repatriated in April 1953), assaulted the ROK Marine position then defended by one platoon strength with a diversionary attack on Outpost 37 (Hill 37), one and a half kilometers to the north. The ROK defenders managed to repulse the attack after fierce fight. On that night the enemy’s second and third attacks followed in a determined
effort to take the outpost. An intense enemy artillery barrage, joined by tank
fire, preceded their third attempt. Each attempt met the same fate. The ROK
defenders reported that although the Communists had taken much of the hill,
they had subsequently withdrawn, apparently because their losses had been so
heavy. In the action more than 110 enemy were estimated to be killed or
wounded. The friendly losses were nine killed and seven wounded. The Com-
munists did not give up their attempt to capture the outpost.

On 19 September, a CCF infantry company supported by artillery, mortars,
and tanks, scrambled up Outpost 36, and gained control of the hill. The enemy
then withdrew and soon came back in strength. This new-enemy assault came
in a complete surprise that a number of the ROK Marines found themselves
encircled and trapped at their posts.

On the following day, 20 September, the ROK Marines counterattacked to
regain the outpost, following artillery preparation and two air strikes. The U.S.
Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) air sorties, destroying many CCF automatic
weapons and mortars and breaking up a company strongpoint, helped the ROK
Marine troops’ counterattack and overran the dazed Communist defenders.

Two Marine platoons, supported by artillery, mortar, and tank fire, assaulted
the outpost and soon secured the hill positions after overcoming a token enemy
resistance. The escaped enemy, however, still continued to remain in the low
area to the northwest, close to the east side of the Sachon River. No serious
attempt was made by the Communists to occupy the outpost for the rest of
September. This action resulted in an estimated 150 Communist casualties,
including 20 counted dead as against the ROK Marine losses of 16 killed, 47
wounded, and 6 missing.

On 1 October 1952 the 1st ROK Marine Regiment became the ROK Marine
Combat Group fully capable of fighting as a regimental combat team.

The Battle for Old Baldy and Porkchop: In the meantime the battle for
Old Baldy resumed on the right flank of the I US Corps in the 2nd US Division
sector. The Chinese Communist troops who had refrained from further attempts
on the Old Baldy outpost (Hill 275) after their repeated failures, resumed their
ever-determined attempt to retake the hill.

On the night of 18 September 1952, after their artillery and mortars had
smothered the hill then defended by elements of the 38th Regiment, 2nd US
Division, with 1,000 rounds, an estimated CCF battalion reinforced with
tanks, swarmed up the slopes and assaulted the outpost from all sides and rapidly
seized the crest, while a diversionary attack also took Porkchop Hill (Hill 234),
to the northeast of Old Baldy. The American defenders were forced to withdraw
about 400 yards and established new positions, then counterattacked. But the heavy and accurate Chinese Communist artillery fire prevented the assaulting troops from making any headway. Thus, the first counterattack failed.

On the night of 20 September the 38th Regiment, with its 2nd Battalion, counterattacked to retake the hill after heavy artillery and mortar preparation. After slow progress through heavy enemy fire the 2nd Battalion troops, reinforced by a platoon of tanks, made a coordinated assault that carried them to the crest of the hill. The Communists fell back as the attacking infantrymen swept over the hilltop and secured the outpost position. In the action troops of the 2nd US Division killed or wounded more than a thousand Communists.

The fight for Old Baldy was typical of the outpost battles waged during the summer and fall of 1952, a savagely contested, seemingly endless struggle for control of another hill. And there seemed to be little hope there would be any significant change in the pattern of the Korean War.

The Battle of Outpost Kelly: Although many outpost battles, such as the battle for Old Baldy or the battle for Bunker Hill, were regarded as examples
of well executed operations, not all battles were quite so fortunate. The battle for Outpost Kelly in September was an example of the latter cases from which we also should learn valuable combat lessons.

In mid-September 1952 the Chinese Communist forces continued to probe soft spot in the UNC defenses in their front. On the front of the 3rd US Infantry Division, which took over the central east sector of the I US Corps line from the 1st ROK Division on 5 July 1952, there were a series of outposts manned by forces varying from a squad to a company in strength on the lowlying hills in front of the main line of resistance. One of these was Outpost Kelly, situated four and a half kilometers south of Kyeho-dong and about one and a half kilometers west of the double horseshoe bend of the Imjin River. To the east
of Outpost Kelly, very close to small village of Koyang-daeg, there were four other
outposts -- Hill 105 and Betty to southeast, and Tessie and Nickie to east.
(See Sketch Map 36.)

The front of the 3rd US Division, commanded by Major General Robert L.
Dulaney with the Greek and Belgian Battalions attached, had been relatively
quiet except small-scale clashes between the patrols of the opposing forces
until 17 September when an estimated CCF company probed against Outpost
Kelly, then defended by one company of the 65th Regiment of the division.

Facing the 65th Regiment in the area around Kelly were the 2nd and 3rd
Battalions, 348th Regiment, 116th Division, 39th CCF Army. There had been
an increase in the number and aggressiveness of enemy patrols in the entire 65th
US Regimental sector during September and also an increase in the frequency
of enemy mortar fire. These signs usually heralded an impending enemy attack.

On the night of 17 September an enemy force of one company-size from
the 2nd Battalion, 348th CCF Regiment, probed against the Kelly defenses.
When C Company on the outpost, under the operational control of the 2nd
Battalion of the regiment, requested reinforcements to fight off the enemy
attack, Colonel Juan C. Cordero, commanding officer of the 65th Infantry,
ordered B Company to relieve C Company on Kelly. B Company took over
Kelly and passed to the operational control of the 2nd Battalion Commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Betances-Ramirez, early in the morning of 18
September.

Throughout the 18th, the enemy mortar fire on Kelly continued and 1st
Lieutenant William F. Nelson, B Company Commander, in the early evening
requested that the artillery supporting his position be prepared to fire variable
time fuze shells in the event of an enemy attack. Less than an hour after his
request an estimated two CCF companies from the same enemy battalion
attacked the outpost from the southwest, northwest, and northeast. The
northeast attack evidently surprised the men of B Company, for the Communist
Chinese swept across the hill and took the B Company machine gun position
on the northwest corner of the hill from the rear. Killing the gunner, the
enemy advanced along the trenches and closed in hand-to-hand combat. The
battlefield became confused, and the B Company men's casualties mounted.
Furthermore communications between Kelly and the 2nd Battalion Headquarters
were cut off. Stragglers of B Company kept coming to the rear, and their
reports indicated that the outpost had been lost by midnight.

The regimental intelligence officer ordered the 2nd Battalion to send a
platoon as quickly as possible from E Company to reconnoiter the hill to find
out whether the enemy intended to occupy the outpost. The patrol cleared
the MLR shortly before daylight on the 19th, but soon ran into enemy machine gun and rifle grenade fire as it advanced up the hill.

Convinced that the Communists planned to remain, Colonel Cordero made an assessment of the situation. The heavy mortar fire and the attack that had followed had badly depleted B Company, although there might be some remnants of the company still on the hill. He assumed that the enemy now held the position with small arms, light machine guns and light mortars. There was a waist-deep, circular trench that ringed the military crest of the hill completely and four bunkers. At the base of the hill, on the approaches, the enemy had established combat outposts of squad-size.

Lieutenant Colonel Betances-Ramirez, ordered two platoons from E Company to advance on Kelly on the morning of 20 September. By late afternoon one platoon under the company commander had fought its way to the top. The second was still on the porters' trail moving forward slowly. By this time the enemy had reinforced their defending force on Kelly and strongly organized the defense. The platoon led by the company commander began to take casualties, and the second platoon was forced to fall back. Faced with the Communist Chinese determination to hang on to the outpost and the mounting casualty list, the two platoons of E Company withdrew to the main line of resistance.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, that had been in regimental reserve and commanded by Major Albert C. Davies, prepared to counterattack through the 2nd Battalion's positions. During the evening of 20 September, A Company moved forward to take up the attack from the south and C Company advanced to the base of the hill on which Kelly was located. The enemy mortar and artillery became very heavy as the men crossed the valley floor enroute to the hill approaches.

As A and C Companies began their attack, B Company moved forward toward the outpost line to support the counterattack. Enemy mortar fire came in swiftly and with deadly effect as casualties cut the strength of B Company to twenty-six men and forced the cancellation of the company mission.

The enemy fire was also taking its toll of the attacking force of A and C Companies. In addition, the CCF troops used time-fuzed artillery fire as the 1st Battalion troops edged their way to the top. The airbursts over the heads of the attacking troops were demoralizing and caused confusion. A Company had to fall back and reorganize, while C Company clung to a finger of the hill with two platoons. The forces of the two companies totalled about 60 men each at this juncture, while the enemy had an estimated 100 men on the hill.
and was reinforcing freely.

Early in the morning of 21 September artillery in support of the counter-attack pounded the Communist positions on Kelly. But when the troops of A and C Companies tried to close in on the Chinese Communist positions, the enemy again met them with small arms and hand grenades. Two squads from the C Company almost reached the crest of Kelly shortly before noon only to receive enemy's intense mortar concentrations that forced them to fall back to the trenches. No sooner had the enemy mortar fire cease when the enemy counterattacked and forced C Company to pull out completely. In the early afternoon the 1st Battalion commander ordered, A, B, and C Companies to return to their company areas. The 1st Battalion had suffered over seventy casualties so far in the counterattack. That night the 1st Battalion was ordered to take over the positions of the 3rd Battalion on the 2nd Battalion's right. Colonel Cordero now planned to make another counterattack employing the 3rd Battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd E. Wills, who had assumed command of the 3rd Battalion on 20 September, and his staff, drew up an attack plan to recapture Outpost Kelly. In the meantime the action around Kelly slowed down for several days with the outpost in the enemy hands.

Since the previous efforts by forces of the 1st Battalion ranging from one to four platoons had failed to dislodge the Communists, Colonel Wills now received approval to use his three rifle companies. K Company would attack from the east and L Company would come in from the west. I Company would be the reserve.

On 24 September, at 0520 hours, the 58th US Field Artillery Battalion pounded the Chinese Communist positions on and around Kelly for thirty minutes. Meanwhile a platoon of tanks from the 64th US Tank Battalion rumbled into position to support the 3rd Battalion attack. Artillery and tanks sent 25,000 rounds against the enemy in support of the attack. K and L Companies were in their attack positions by 0540 hours and launched their assault half an hour later. As K Company troops approached Kelly, the Communists on the hill opened up with intense small arms, machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire and soon had K Company troops pinned down. The heavy enemy concentration of firepower and the growing list of casualties led to a great confusion in the company.

With control of the company disintegrating and the casualties mounting, the K Company Commander asked for permission to pull back and reorganize. The regimental commander at 0700 hours ordered that this request be denied.
and that K Company continue its attack. Shortly thereafter contact with K Company was lost. The artillery forward observer managed to hold together ten men from the company, however, and the 3rd Battalion Commander instructed him to continue the attack on Kelly with his small force.

On the western slopes of Kelly, L Company assaulted the Chinese Communist positions at 0635 hours. Despite heavy mortar fire, one squad reached the top at 0720 hours and quickly asked for tank fire. Clinging to trenches on the south slope of Kelly, the L Company squad was unable to move forward against the stubborn enemy resistance. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to be very heavy.

Since contact with K Company had not been regained by 0800 hours, the regimental commander ordered I Company to move from reserve to rear of Hill 105, 800 yard southeast of Kelly, and to prepare to take over K Company zone. I Company Commander moved his men toward Hill 105, but the enemy artillery zeroed in on the company and scored several direct hits. The I Company troops began to scatter and drift back to the main line of resistance. The 3rd Battalion Commander then sent his S-3 to help reorganize the company, since contact with I Company had been lost after the enemy artillery concentrations had begun. The battalion commander left at 0900 hours to take over the reorganization of both I and K Company stragglers as they returned to the main line of resistance without weapons or equipment.

With only the small force of L Company still on Kelly, and the other two companies depleted and demoralized, the situation appeared grim. The two squads from L Company hung on to one of the trenches on the south slope and at 0920 hours Colonel Cordero, the 65th Regimental Commander, ordered them to stay there at all costs.

At the time contact between the battalion and I Company was regained. I Company had reorganized and had two platoons intact; the remainder of the company's whereabouts was unknown. That was only force left available for combat. The battalion was ordered to cease to attack and to continue the reorganization of the battalion, which had suffered 141 casualties in the action. By early afternoon the squads from L Company had been withdrawn and the stragglers reassembled. But the Division Commander, General Dulaney, decided that the battalion and the regiment should not resume the battle for Kelly. The 3rd Battalion went into reserve positions on the night of 24 September and the 65th Regiment confined itself to routine patrolling until 30 September when the 1st ROK Division came back on the line relieving the 3rd US Division.

During the action between 17 and 24 September for Outpost Kelly and
the surrounding outposts, the 65th US Regiment suffered casualties of approximately 350 men, or almost 10 percent of its actual strength.

Thus, the 3rd US Division's effort to recapture Outpost Kelly ended with only heavy casualties on the part of the 65th Regiment. Colonel Cordero, commanding the 65th Regiment, attributed the poor performance of his regiment to its personnel weakness including the rotation program of those days. Basically, this must be true. In many cases, as soon as the company and platoon leaders became casualties, the inexperience and lack of depth at the combat company level became readily apparent. There was a failure to sustain the momentum of the attack and a tendency to become confused and disorganized after the leaders became casualties. Truely, the 65th US Regiment lacked in the combat-trained personnel.

On the other side, however, the fact must also be admitted that the determination and skill with which the enemy of the 348th CCF Regiment had attacked and defended Outpost Kelly. The Communists had used their artillery, mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms fire extremely effectively and had sent in reinforcements freely to blunt and turn back the 65th Regiment’s attacks. Therefore, the failure of the 65th Regiment to take the outpost back could be attributed both its personnel weakness and the Red Chinese obstinate human wave tactics and skill in using their weapons.

The Battle for Arrowhead Hill: Entering the early days of October the French Battalion, then attached to the 2nd US Division in the I US Corp’s right sector, became heavily embroiled in a fierce and bloody battle as a battalion-sized Communist force, on the night of 6 October, attacked against Hill 281 (Arrowhead), the eastern anchor of the 1 US Corps line about three kilometers southwest of Hill 395 (White Horse Hill) across the Yokkok-chon Valley.

Actually it was an enemy’s diversionary attack to pin down the French Battalion astride Hill 281 during his main attack on White Horse Hill. The gallant French troops fought desperately and repelled the assault, but before the night was over six additional enemy companies joined in the action. The French troops held firm, and as the battle progressed the enemy continued to build up their attacking strength. By dawn, they had an entire regiment hammering away vainly at the French. Finally, with hundreds of their dead and wounded strewn about the besieged position, the Communists broke off the attack and withdrew. They kept up pressure against the French-held hill for next few days, but on 12 October abandoned further attempts to capture it. As a diversion to the main attack on White Horse Hill, this French-held hill proved effective but so expensive.
The Battle of the Koyangdae Area: Another wave of the Communist offensive on 6 October struck the 1st ROK Division troops on two outposts, known as Nickie and Tessie, northeast of, and close to, Koyangdae in the vicinity of the double horseshoe bend of the Imjin River. At about 2200 hours on 6 October, after a daylong artillery bombardment, the Communist troops of two-company size stormed up the two outposts and took the positions. Two platoons of Reconnaissance Company of the 15th ROK Regiment on the outposts had to fight desperately hand-to-hand combat with their communication lines cut off. The ROK troops, after a brief but bloody fight, managed to withdraw to their main positions with heavy casualties suffered.

For the following three days the ROK's counterattack after counterattack was made supported by air and artillery, but the Communists, who were able to continue to supply with their reinforcements from Maryang-san base, resisted stubbornly to the end. The two important outposts fell to the enemy hands. In this Nickie – Tessie action the 1st ROK troops suffered heavy casualties of 233 as against estimated enemy casualties of 175.

The Outpost Battle in the Sa-chon Vicinity: Remainder of October was relatively quiet in the I US Corps sector until the last day of the month when the Chinese Communist forces struck hard on four outposts in the ROK Marine sector again simultaneously employing eight infantry companies. In both the early and late October outpost battles the Communists had attempted to seize critical terrain on the flanks of the 1st US Marine Division in far western Korea. Although the majority of these attacks failed, the enemy had acquired six outposts early in the month – three in the western ROK Marine sector and three north of the right regimental line.

At 1000 hours on 31 October the Communist Chinese launched their assaults against the ROK Marines' four outposts that screened Hill 155, the most prominent terrain feature in the entire Marine zone. The fighting that developed was brief but very sharp and would be the most costly of all ROK Marine clashes during this third winter of the war. The 31 October attack came as no real surprise to the men of the 5th ROK Marine Battalion, occupying Outposts 39, 33 and 31 in the northern sector, or the 2nd ROK Marine Battalion men at Outpost 51 in the southern half of the MLR. (See Sketch Map 37.)

The four outposts assisted in defense of the MLR, afforded observation of Communists' approach routes, and served as a base for friendly raids and offensive operations. Hill 155 overlooked both the wide Sa-chon Valley and enemy frontline positions to the west. This critical hill (Hill 155) also commanded a view of the Panmunjom truce talk site and the 1st US Marine Division
area east of the ROK Marine sector.

Actually, the probability of a determined Communist attack against the four ROK Marine outposts had been anticipated since early October following the CCF seizure of three outposts (37, 36 and 86) in their strike against the ROK Marine regimental outpost line of resistance (OPLR). The enemy had then proceeded to organize an OPLR of his own with the two northern outposts, 37 and 36. It was apparent that, with this OPLR once firmly organized, the Communists intended to jump off towards their next objectives, Outposts 39 and 33.

Sporadic probes throughout the month in the Outposts 39 and 33 areas indicated continued enemy interest in the positions. Outpost 51, to the south, was considered another likely target because of its location immediately east of Outpost 86, previously seized by the Communists.

Beginning at 2200, 31 October, the Communists delivered an intensive eight-minute 76-mm. and 122-mm. artillery preparation against the four outposts.

THE OUTPOST BATTLE OF SA-CHON VICINITY (31 Oct 1952)
Communist assault forces from four different infantry regiments then launched a simultaneous attack on the positions. Moving in from the north, west, and south, two CCF companies (one from the 581st CCF Regiment and the other from the 582nd CCF Regiment) virtually enveloped the northern outpost, Outpost 39. Two more CCF companies lunged against the two central outposts, Outposts 33 and 31, a company at each position. The southern and most heavily defended post, Outpost 51, where a company of ROK Marines was defending, was attacked by four Communist companies (one company from the 584th CCF Regiment and other three companies from the 585th CCF Regiment). Even though the Communists exerted their strongest pressure against the outpost, the position held and the Communists broke off the attack there earlier than at the other outposts.

At Outpost 31 a heavy fire fight raged until 0155 hours, when the defending ROK Marine platoon halted the Communist attackers and forced them to make a partial withdrawal. To the northwest, at Outpost 33, the enemy encountered less resistance from the two squads manning the outpost. The Communists achieved some success in penetrating the defenses and occupied several positions. After heavy close fighting and with the friendly artillery support, the ROK defenders expelled the Communists at 0515, 1 November.

The enemy’s efforts appeared to have been most successful, temporarily, at Outpost 39, the northern outpost and one nearest to Hill 155. Although the Communists wrested some ground from the ROK platoon, artillery fires continued to punish the enemy and by 0410 had forced him to pull back. A small enemy force returned at 0600 but after a 15-minute exchange of small arms it left, this time for good. At about this same time the last of the Communists had also withdrawn from the two central outposts, 33 and 31.

In terms of sheer numbers, the enemy’s strongest effort was made against Outpost 51. This was the most isolated of the ROK Marine positions and, at 2,625 yards, the one farthest from the MLR. Ironically, in the week preceding the attack, Outpost 51 was least harassed by Communist artillery although it had received 20 rounds of 90-mm. tank fire, more than any other position. On the 31st, elements of three CCF companies struck the southwestern trenches and defenses, while a fourth attempted to break through from the north. As it turned out the action here was the least intense of the outpost clashes. After initial heavy fighting the Communists seemed reluctant to press the assault even though they vastly outnumbered the ROK defenders deployed at the outpost. In the early morning hours the enemy broke contact and by 0330 had withdrawn from Outpost 51.
Autumn Operations

During the night approximately 2,500 rounds of CCF artillery and mortar fire lashed the positions. The ROK Marines, aided by friendly artillery, repelled the assault and inflicted heavy casualties on the Communists. Supporting fires included more than 1,200 rounds of HE shells from the 4.2-inch Mortar Company. The Communist casualties were listed as 295 counted killed, 461 estimated wounded, and nine POWs. The ROK Marines losses were 50 killed, 86 wounded, and 18 missing. By first light the Marine outposts had thrown back the Communist’s latest well-coordinated attack. This ended the last significant action of October in the 1st US Marine Division sector.

The IX US Corps Sector

During the month of September 1952 the IX US Corps sector remained relatively quiet except routine small-size raids and patrol clashes between the two opponents despite the heavy battles raging in its left and right sectors. To the IX US Corps troops, however, the month of October 1952 was one of bitterest periods in which the entire divisions of the IX US Corps were heavily involved in the most bloody and costly battles in the Korean War. In these battles, as related earlier, the 9th ROK Division defended White Horse Hill (Hill 395); the 7th US and 2nd ROK Divisions carried out “Operation Showdown.” The 3rd US Division, that relieved the 9th ROK Division late October, also had to struggle for Hill 388 (Jackson Heights).

The two battles for White Horse Hill and Jackson Heights are detailed here while Operation Showdown is covered in the following separate section.

The Battle of White Horse Hill: Perhaps one of the heaviest and dramatic fightings during the Communist offensive in the early October days took place on a strategic outpost, Hill 395 (White Horse Hill) northwest of Chorwon on the left flank of the IX US Corps sector. Hill 395, overlooking the Yokkok-chon Valley, dominated the western approaches to Chorwon. Loss of hill would force the IX US Corps to withdraw to the high ground south of Yokkok-chon in the Chorwon area, would deny the IX Corps use of the Chorwon road net, and would open up the entire Chorwon area to enemy attack and penetration. The 9th ROK Division Commander, Major General Kim Jong Oh, assigned the mission of the defense of the hill to the 30th Regiment of the division when the battle flared up.

In front of the 9th ROK Division, the 38th CCF Army after its relief of the 42nd CCF Army on 16 May 1952, deployed the two divisions on MLR with
Hill 395 (White Horse Hill), northwest of Chorwon.
Vehicle is a 90-mm. gun motor carriage M36.

the 113th Division on the left flank along Koam-san (Hill 780) and 114th Division on the right flank along Hyosong-san (Hill 619) and placed the 112th Division in reserve in Namsan-gok.

On 3 October the Eighth Army learned through interrogation of a Chinese Communist deserter that the enemy proposed to attack White Horse Hill. Since other intelligence sources supported the prisoner's story, the IX US Corps reinforced the 9th ROK Division with additional tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, and antiaircraft weapons to be used in a ground role. With these reinforcing elements adequately disposed, General Kim stationed two battalions of the 30th Regiment on the White Horse Hill positions and held the 28th Regiment plus a battalion in ready reserve. Thus, as the hour of the enemy attack approached, the 9th ROK Division and its attached units were well prepared.

Just before the Communists began their attack on White Horse on 6 October, they opened the floodgates of the Pongnae Reservoir, which was located about eleven kilometers north of the hill, evidently in the hope that Yokkok-chon which ran between the 9th ROK and the 2nd US Divisions on its left would rise
sufficiently to block reinforcements during the critical period. Although the water level rose several feet, at no time did it present a tactical obstacle. But the Communists did not rely upon nature alone. They threw a battalion-sized force at Hill 281 (Arrowhead), a little over three kilometers southeast of White Horse Hill across the valley on the eastern end of the 1 US Corps boundary, to pin down the French Battalion astride the hill and to keep the 2nd US Division on the left occupied.

In the meantime, two battalions of the 340th Regiment, 114th Division, 38th CCF Army, at 1915 hours on the 6th, moved up to the northwest end of White Horse Hill. After heavy artillery and mortar fire upon the 30th ROK positions on the heights, the Communist troops tried three times to penetrate the ROK defenses until the first light in the following morning. Each time they were hurled back by the troops of the 30th and 28th Regiments, suffering an estimated 800 casualties in the three attacks as against 300 for the ROK defenders. In the third attempt the CCF committed the remnants of the original two battalions and reinforced them with two fresh battalions from the same division. Although large part of the attackers were repulsed, the CCF succeeded in leaving a company-sized force on a no-name hill just west of Hill 395 as they withdrew. This small enemy force had been gradually reinforced into two company strength by 1200 hours on the 7th and eventually became a great threat to the defense of White Horse. An immediate counterattack by the 30th Regiment to repulse the threatening enemy from the hill was made without success. Cutting off the 11th Company outpost on Camel Back Ridge, the CCF pressed on and forced the elements of the 30th Regiment to withdraw from the White Horse crest. Less than two hours after the loss of the peak, two battalions of the 28th Regiment commanded by Colonel Lee Chu II mounted a counterattack that swept the enemy out of the old ROK positions. Again the enemy losses were heavy and a Communist prisoners later related that many of the CCF companies committed to the attack were reduced to less than twenty-men after the second day of fighting.

By the third day (8 October) the CCF's diversionary attacks elsewhere along the IX US Corps front decreased and the main enemy effort concentrated on White Horse Hill. Chinese Communist artillery and mortar fire averaged 4,500 rounds a day in support of the infantry assaults, and the enemy continued to assemble fresh troops to renew the battle. Despite of the heavy casualties suffered so far, the element of the 334th Regiment, 112th Division, which had been in 38th CCF Army reserve, moved up at 0530 hours and fought their way to the crest. Although the troops of the 28th ROK Regiment in the
midst of reorganizing after their successful counterattack fought bravely hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, the peak finally fell again to the enemy during the afternoon. At 1700 hours another counterattack by the elements of the 28th Regiment was mounted under the support of all available fire including air strikes around the crest, and by 2305 hours the peak was again cleared of the enemy.

On the following day, before dawn the Communists committed another battalion to the attack for the Hill 395 peak. General Kim, the Division Commander, moved two battalions of his 29th Regiment over to Hill 395 to help the 28th Regiment. The 29th Regiment that had defended the right sector of the division, handed over its sector to the 51st Regiment attached to the ROK division and moved up to the battle area where the 28th and 30th Regiments had been depleted.

Throughout the day the battle seesawed as first one side controlled the peak, then the other. Finally the counterattack by two battalions of the 29th Regiment succeeded in repelling the enemy from the crest and early on 10 October, the 29th Regiment reported that it was in possession of the crest. Now, with the crest in friendly hands again, all troops on the main battle positions were prepared against further enemy counterattacks. The division troops on the line as of early 10 October were: The 29th Regiment and one battalion of the 30th Regiment around the crest (Hill 395) on the left, two battalions of the 28th Regiment on the central left, one battalion of the 30th Regiment on central right, and the attached 51st Regiment on the right.

By 10 October the pattern of the fighting was well established. Regardless of casualties, the enemy continued to send masses of infantry to take the disputed hill. Evidently, once given a mission, Communist commanders adhered to it despite their losses. On White Horse, the CCF kept funnelling their combat troops into the northern attack approaches where UNC artillery, tanks, and air power could wreak havoc. The enemy's determination to win the crest made sitting ducks out of the Communists as the IX US Corps defenders saturated the all-out assaults with massed firepower of every caliber.

There was a break in the bitter struggle on the night of 11 October. The Communists again seized the crest. On the morning of the 12th, the 30th Regiment passed the dug-in 29th Regiment and counterattacked. The 28th Regiment also moved up through the 30th Regiment and pressed the assault in the morning. Leapfrogging the battalions of the leading regiment and substituting attack regiments from time to time, the 9th ROK Division began to inflict extremely large casualties on the enemy. By 15 October the battle for
White Horse was over. (See Sketch Map 38.)

During the ten-day battle for White Horse the CCF had used a force estimated at 15,000 infantry and 8,000 supporting troops, but they had failed to budge the determined troops of the 9th ROK Division. Despite the division losses of over 3,500 soldiers during the nine ROK and twenty-eight Communist attacks, the 9th Division and its supporting troops had exacted a heavy toll from the 38th CCF Army. Seven of the 38th CCF Army's nine regiments had been committed to the White Horse and Hill 281 (Arrowhead) and taken close to 10,000 casualties.

In retrospect, many things had contributed to the success of the 9th ROK Division. Above all, however, the timely injection of fresh troops by Major General Kim Jong Oh on both offense and defense throughout the battle had sparked the division's effort. The ROK troops had withstood the determined drive of the Communists and taken over 55,000 rounds of enemy artillery during the battle. The performance of the division troops under the Communist's
intense fire provided an excellent testimonial to the type of leadership, skill, and experience that the ROK Army was capable of developing. This White Horse battle eloquently proved the Army of the Republic of Korea now had come of age.

Secondly, the 9th ROK Division received outstanding support from the air, armor, and artillery units that backed up the division. During the daylight hours, the Fifth US Air Force had dispatched 669 sorties and another 76 sorties had been sent out on night bombing missions. In ten days the tactical air support had dropped over 2,700 general-purpose bombs and 358 napalm bombs and launched over 750 5-inch rockets at enemy concentrations and positions. From the 1X US Corps artillery alone, 185,000 rounds of artillery ammunition had been hurled at the enemy. Tanks and antiaircraft quad-50's had protected the flanks of the White Horse positions and prevented the enemy from dispersing its attacks. At White Horse, prebattle preparation, made possible by effective intelligence, added to well-trained troops, skillfully employed, and backed by coordinated air, armor, and artillery support, demonstrated what might be accomplished on defense. There was no question that the 9th ROK Division won the high praise from General Clark, UNC Commander, as well as General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander.

On 25 October the 9th ROK Division turned its battle torn sector over to the 3rd US Division and was dislodged for field training.

The Battle of Jackson Heights: The fight for Jackson Heights (Hill 388) was closely related to the battle of White Horse Hill. To attack White Horse Hill the Chinese Communists had attempted to disperse the 9th ROK forces by threatening the ROK outpost positions on Jackson Heights, about eleven kilometers northeast of White Horse Hill. Sporadic and indecisive fighting continued on Jackson Heights from 6–12 October when the Communist troops of two-company size made a serious effort to storm the hill, then defended by one company from the 51st ROK Regiment attached to the 9th ROK Division in its extreme right sector. The ROK defenders were forced to withdraw. The 9th ROK Division at the time, with its all efforts directed to White Horse Hill fight, had to request help from the IX US Corps. A reinforced company from the 7th US Division on the 9th ROK Division’s right arrived and attempted in vain on 13 October to regain the lost Hill 388 positions.

Once the White Horse dispute was settled, the 9th ROK Division sent a battalion from its 28th Regiment to clear Hill 388 on 16 October. The battalion won through to the crest and was able to maintain control until 20 October, when Communist counterattacks regained possession of the hill for the next
two days. On 23 October, after a bitter hand-to-hand combat, elements of the 51st ROK Regiment drove the enemy off again, repulsed a counterattack, then withdrew. On the following night the 65th Regiment of the 3rd US Division relieved the 51st ROK Regiment as the American division took over responsibility for the 9th ROK Division sector.

The defense of the high ground immediately south of Hill 388 was taken over by G Company, commanded by Captain George D. Jackson on the night of 24–25 October. Jackson Heights, as it was soon to be called after the name of the company commander, had enough bunkers to house whole the company, including the forward artillery observer, but none of these was adequate for fighting off an attack. And the CCF’s accurate artillery and mortar fire gave little chance for the defense improvement. Furthermore, elements of the 65th US Regiment still had the weakness of its personnel even after they underwent two weeks of intensive training following their unsuccessful battle for Outpost Kelly in September.

On the evening of 27 October an estimated CCF company from the 3rd Battalion, 87th Regiment, 29th CCF Division, attacked on G Company positions. Captain Jackson and his men managed to beat off this attack using mortars, automatic weapons, small arms, and hand grenades. The second enemy attack of the evening came after the Communist artillery and mortar crews had fired an estimated 1,000 rounds at Jackson Heights. One estimated CCF company struck from the north and a second from the south. G Company men withdrew.

As daylight broke on the 28th, Colonel Chester B. De Gavre, commanding the 65th US Regiment, sent two companies (A and F) toward Jackson Heights. Despite the enemy intense fire the two companies fought their way up to the crest. The operation seemed to be well in hand, until the Communist artillery put all of A Company’s officers on the hill out of action.

The loss of leadership became immediately apparent, for enlisted men in both A and F Companies began to bug out. By late afternoon only F Company Commander and his company officers remained on the hill; all of his men had left along with those of A Company. When night fell, the remaining F Company officers were ordered to withdraw.

On the following day, 29th, the 65th US Regiment made one more effort to take Jackson Heights. This time C Company was assigned the mission. The company moved up and took possession of the hill without encountering any enemy resistance. Again all seemed well. The enemy artillery was quiet and no counterattack developed. Suddenly fear set in and the enlisted men left en masse. The company commander and his fellow officers found themselves
alone with a handful of men. Soon they were ordered to the main line of resistance.

This proved to be the last attempt of the 65th Regiment to take Jackson Heights. Beginning that same night the 15th Regiment, 3rd US Division, was ordered to take over responsibility for the 65th Infantry sector by the division commander.

In retrospect, this battle for Jackson Heights was a repetition of the failure of the battle for Outpost Kelly that was fought, and lost to the enemy, by the 65th US Regiment. Two weeks of training given to the 65th Regiment could not remedy the basic weakness of the regiment -- the lack of experienced noncommissioned officers at the infantry platoon level. Thus, the failure of the 65th Regiment to take Jackson Heights could again be attributed both to its personnel weakness and the enemy's skill in using his weapons, especially artillery and mortars.

The II ROK Corps Sector

Capital Hill and Finger Ridge: To the IX US Corps right, in the II ROK Corps sector Chinese Communists resumed their attacks on outposts guarding the main defenses of the Capital ROK Division. On 6 September 1952, one month after their last failure the Communists hit Capital Hill hard. On the night of 6 September the enemy unleashed a large volume of mortar and artillery fire against Capital Hill and Hill 633 where observation post of the 2nd Battalion of the 26th ROK Regiment was located.

It was to herald the opening of their attack. The Communists' attack force estimated at three companies soon took the outpost despite of the determined and stubborn resistance of the 5th Company men, all of whom were later reported killed in their defense of the outpost. Part of the enemy even infiltrated into the main position on Hill 633, but was repulsed by the ROK defenders.

The Communists who had taken Capital Hill continued to remain on the crest of the hill until the 26th ROK Regiment joined troops with 1st ROK Regiment, that had been in reserve, to retake the hill on 9 September. On the night of the 9th, after a series of air and artillery bombardments during the daylight, troops of the 1st Regiment launched a determined counterattack on Capital Hill while the troops of the 26th Regiments, as a diversionary force, attacked against Hill 621 on the left of Chwasu-dong with all available fire support directed on the hill.
The counterattack made a very good progress and achieved the element of surprise, and by midnight, the crest of the hill fell again to the 1st ROK Regiment. Up to three CCF companies sought to fight their way back to the top at a time, but the ROK troops refused to be dislodged again.

About three kilometers west of Capital Hill a friendly outpost position on Finger Ridge was also taken by the CCF troops on 6 September -- the same night the Communists launched their assault on Capital Hill. The southern half of Finger Ridge was occupied by the troops of Capital Division while northern half was under the control of the enemy. Each side had sought to secure complete control of the whole Finger Ridge repeatedly, but neither succeeded on each occasion. On the night of 6 September the Communists after their customary artillery and mortar preparation, struck against a ROK platoon-outpost (Hill F), which was nearest to the enemy and guarded main ROK position immediately to the rear. One reinforced Communist company swarmed up the slope behind their mortar and artillery barrage. The outnumbered ROK defenders had to withdraw to the main position with their communication lines completely cut off. An immediate counterattack was followed, but the counterattack force was also forced to withdraw as the enemy increased his defending troops. Up the hill, down the hill went friendly and Communist troops as they wrestled for control of Hill F until 18 September when troops from the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Regiments of the ROK division made a determined counterattack without artillery preparation and finally drove the surprised Red Chinese off the outpost hill.

Despite their heavy losses suffered in the two battlefields, the Communist attacks on the Finger Ridge outpost and Capital Hill continued during the rest of September and well into October 1952.

**Eagle and Blood Hills:** On the right of the Capital ROK Division where the 3rd ROK Division defended the right flank wing of the II ROK Corps defense lines the Chinese Communists struck against two separate UNC outposts. The 22nd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division defended the left flank sector of the division including two outpost positions, Hill 572 (known as Eagle Hill) on the left and Hill 748 (known as Blood Hill) on the right.

On the night of 28 September the Communists attacked with three infantry battalions, one battalion against Hill 572 on the left and two against Hill 748 on the right, each defended by one company strength of the regiment. The superior enemy number soon seized the two outpost positions and drove the ROK defenders off the hills. Despite the 22nd Regiment’s repeated counter-
attacks, the Chinese Communist forces continued to remain in the possession of the two hills until 2 October when the regiment assisted by the 18th Regiment (3rd ROK Division reserve) counterattacked and retook only Hill 748 on the right while giving up Hill 572 on the left. In the bitter five-day fight the ROK division's troops inflicted heavy casualties upon the Communists, killing 664 Chinese counted dead as against the ROK's losses of 109 men killed.

**Fighting at Hill 575**: Back again in the Capital ROK Division sector, on the night of 6 October two CCF companies again, attacked against Capital Hill outpost directly supported by four tanks. As before, elements of the 26th ROK Regiment defending the outpost made a determined stand and repelled the Communist attack inflicting heavy casualties on them.

In the ROK division's left sector, manned by troops of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, however, the ROK defenders on Hill 575, one kilometer northwest of Finger Ridge, had to fight a hand-to-hand combat on the same night with their communication lines cut off as another estimated two CCF companies assaulted up the crest also supported by tanks after a day long artillery bombardment of the hill. The ROK defenders withdrew and regrouped to counter-attack. But the ROK Cavalry Regiment had little chance for an early counter-attack, since by this time still another Communist attack struck from the north against the contested outpost positions on the Finger Ridge, to the right of Hill 575, and quickly seized the positions finally forcing the ROK defenders (11th Company of the cavalry regiment) off the outpost positions.

With the two guarding outposts lost to the enemy, the Division Commander, Brigadier General Lee Yong Mun, decided now to concentrate all the division's efforts on Finger Ridge to restore the lost positions at any cost, while giving up the effort to recapture Hill 575. A full preparation of counterattack got under way.

The division's successive counterattacks, however, continued without success until the night of 13 October when two battalions from the 1st ROK Regiment that had been in division reserve stormed up the ridge without artillery preparations and succeeded in driving the CCF back after about two hours of bloody fighting. In the action that lasted from 6 to 14 October, the CCF casualties were estimated by the ROK division at approximately 1,900, including 995 men counted killed. The ROK's casualties during the action were 332 killed and 1,222 wounded.

On 25 October the 8th ROK Division commanded by Brigadier General Kim Ik Yul relieved the battle worn Capital ROK Division troops on positions.
The X US Corps

In the X US Corps sector on the east-central front the corps divisions had remained relatively quiet except minor patrol clashes until later part of September 1952 when the 8th ROK Division was heavily attacked by NK Communist enemy on its critical main line positions.

The 8th ROK Division’s defense area on Line Minnesota was highly mountainous, the critical terrain along the MLR being Hills 812 and 854. These two prominent hill masses were considered prime objectives for enemy attacks. On the night of 21–22 September, while the 45th US Division was in the process of relieving the 8th ROK Division, the NK Communists employing two battalions of the 45th NK Division occupied the western slope and crest of Hill 854 on the ROK division’s right flank defended by elements of the 16th Regiment while directing another attacks as a secondary effort on Hill 812 in the division’s left sector.

The diversionary attack on Hill 812 was repulsed by the ROK defenders of the 16th Regiment. On the Hill 854, however, driving the ROK defenders back about 1,000 yards, the enemy then swung to the westward to widen the penetration. But the ROK defenders on the left of the penetration held firm and managed to halt the further penetration.

At noon 22 September, after artillery fire and air strikes had blanked the enemy penetration, elements of the divisional reserve regiment (the 21st Regiment) counterattacked supported by tanks from the 45th US Division and drove the NK Communists back. By nightfall the main line of resistance had been restored and all enemy driven out. During the following two days the NK Communists made several weak effort to penetrate the 8th ROK Division main line without success. Meanwhile the 45th US Division continued its relief of the 8th ROK Division, completing it on 26 September.

Christmas Hill and Hill 1090: Entering the month of October, the Chinese Communist offensive in the early October reached as far east as the 7th ROK Division sector in the X US Corps.

In the 7th ROK Division sector on the left wing of the corps an outpost (later became known as Christmas Hill), manned by one platoon from the 9th Company, 3rd ROK Regiment, fell to the Communist hands. On the night of 6 October two CCF platoons broke through the obstacles laid in front of the ROK outpost positions and continued to press right up to the crest from two
directions disregarding the intense defensive fire concentrated upon them. The ROK defenders, though outnumbered, resisted stubbornly fighting a hand-to-hand combat with the Communist penetrators until friendly reinforcing troops arrived to repel the Communists.

On the following day, before daylight, a Communist force of two-platoon size came back to renew the Christmas Hill fight under the cover of deep fog and supported by its intense artillery and mortar fire. This time the outnumbered ROK defenders withdrew and an immediate counterattack was followed, but without success. It was apparent by then that the Communists intended to hold the hill to use it as their base to make their further attack on a critical feature (Hill 1090), about 800 meters south of Christmas Hill, where two ROK infantry companies defended in depth, the 9th Company (-) defending a height immediately in front of Hill 1090 crest.

As estimated, on the night of 13 October two reinforced-CCF companies struck on the 9th Company positions from three directions after heavy artillery concentrations on the height. Despite the coordinated defensive fire delivered from all available arms of the 3rd ROK Regiment, the Communist succeeded in penetrating the fire line and fought their way up to the crest, and here a confused bloody fight ensued, with the 9th Company’s communication lines completely cut. As the battle progressed, the defenders’ casualties mounted, while the Communist attackers were freely reinforced from the rear.

The isolated men of the 9th Company, however, continued to fight gallantly under the strong leadership of their commander until friendly reinforcing troops arrived and drove the Communists off the height. By 0300 hours the following morning, the 9th Company positions were completely restored.

On 18 October the 40th US Division relieved the 25th US Division in the center of the X US Corps sector on the right of the 7th ROK Division.

Section 3. Operation Showdown
(14 October – 24 November 1952)

As the indications that the Communists were seizing the initiative on the ground became more apparent in late September and early October 1952, General Van Fleet grew concerned. Consequently, General Van Fleet urged General Clark to approve an attack by the IX US Corps to seize the Hill 598 –
Sniper Ridge complex north of Kumhwa. At the time, UN troops in the area had been suffering considerably from the Communist fire, controlled by observation from Hill 598 (Triangle Hill) and its surrounding hill mass. It was estimated by the IX US Corps that two battalions, one from the 7th US Division and the other from the 2nd ROK Division, would be sufficient to accomplish the mission.

General Van Fleet had proposed several limited objective attacks, but General Clark, like his predecessor General Ridgway, had turned down most of operations of this nature, either because such attacks would be too costly in casualties or would adversely affect the truce negotiations. However, General Clark estimated that this one, called “Operation Showdown”, offered a better than average chance for winning its objectives without excessive casualties, thus approving it on 8 October 1952, when the bloody seesaw battles were continuing at White Horse Hill and Arrowhead Hill west of Chorwon.

On 14 October Operation Showdown was started, the 7th US Division attacking on Triangle Hill, and the 2nd ROK Division attacking on Sniper Ridge respectively. (See Situation Map 6, Appendix IX.)

The Battle of Triangle Hill
(14 October – 5 November)

The Hill 598 complex, the objective of the 7th US Division in the center of the IX US Corps, was V-shaped with its apex at the south. At the left extremity of the V lay Pike’s Peak and on the right arm were two smaller hills christened Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge, from north to south. The resemblance of the Hill 598 complex to a triangle soon led to the designation of the area as Triangle Hill. On 14 October 1952 the hill mass was defended by a battalion of the 135th Regiment, 45th Division, 15th CCF Army. As usual, the Communists were well dug in and had adequate ammunition supply, and defiladed reinforcement routes. (See Sketch Map 39.)

Major General Wayne C. Smith, the 7th US Division Commander, assigned the mission of taking Triangle Hill to the 31st Regiment, commanded by Colonel Lloyd R. Moses. Although the original plan had called for the use of one battalion in the assault, Colonel Moses and his staff estimated that enemy resistance would be greater than previously anticipated and that it would be impossible for one battalion commander to control all the forces operating in the entire objective area. Thus, he assigned the task of seizing the right arm of Triangle Hill to the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Myron
McClure, and the mission of gaining possession of the left arm to the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Major Robert H. Newberry. The troops committed to the assault had doubled before the attack began.

After the air strikes and artillery preparations had placed tons of explosives on Triangle Hill, the 3rd Battalion, in a column of companies, moved out to take the apex of the hill complex. L Company moved out first, followed by K Company. In reserve, ready to assist either of attacking companies, was I Company.

As L Company troops got out of the assault positions, it ran into immediate trouble. From a strongpoint on Hill 598 the enemy sent hand grenades, shaped charges, bangalore torpedoes, and rocks to disrupt the company’s attack. In less than half an hour, the company commander and his platoon leaders became
casualties and the remainder of the company was pinned down in a small depression below the enemy strongpoint.

After the assault bogged down, K Company moved forward. Securing tank fire to knock out the enemy strongpoint that dominated the fight thus far, K Company Commander rallied L Company and got the men again moving ahead. A few men from the two companies managed to work their way into the outlying trenches on Hill 598, but the enemy evidently had no intention of withdrawing from the crest. They threw numerous hand grenades and freely expended small arms ammunition, shaped charges, and torpedoes to repel the 3rd Battalion.

With the casualty list mounting and the attack again slowing down, the 3rd Battalion Commander now committed I Company to the battle. I Company Commander took his men up Sandy Ridge, which had been captured by the 1st Battalion, and then moved southwest along the ridge line toward Hill 598. Since the enemy was well dug in, I Company had to proceed slowly, rooting the enemy out of the holes and trenches. As night fell, the I Company men began to meet with increasing enemy artillery and mortar fire. The Communist troops were spotted massing for a counterattack and the company commander called for defensive fire. Disregarding the artillery and mortar concentrations laid down by units supporting the 3rd Battalion, an estimated two companies from the 135th CCF Regiment passed through the fire and hit I Company with small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades.

In the early evening the two commanders of the regiment and battalion reviewed the situation and decided to pull back all three companies to the main line of resistance. By 2100 hours, the 3rd Battalion had reassembled and taken up blocking positions.

In the meantime, on the 1st Battalion front, Colonel McClure, selected A Company, reinforced, to lead the attack against Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. B and C Companies would be in reserve.

Part of the experience of the 3rd Battalion was repeated as the 1st Battalion attacked. An enemy strongpoint on Jane Russell Hill quickly pinned down A Company men with small arms and automatic weapons fire. The company commander became an early casualty during the action and had to be evacuated. Then, B and C Companies were committed to reinforce the assault and to get the troops moving forward again. By early afternoon members of B and C Companies had fought their way to the crest of Jane Russell Hill and began to prepare defensive positions to repel the expected enemy counterattack.

Soon, in a very violent reaction to the loss of Jane Russell Hill, the Communist
troops mounted four counterattacks to regain possession. Each was preceded by heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire. By the end of the third enemy assault, the 1st Battalion men were in trouble, because their supply of ammunition was running low.

As a reinforced battalion from the 135th CCF Regiment began the fourth counterattack, the CCF troops moved right through both their own artillery and mortar fire and the final protective fire called for by the 1st Battalion. With a disregard for their own safety, the enemy elements closed in on the trenches in hand-to-hand combat. By this time the 1st Battalion had run out of ammunition and the battalion commander decided to pull his troops back. The battalion returned to the MLR shortly after midnight. Thus, the 31st Regiment's attack on the first day failed.

On 15 October General Smith committed two fresh battalions to take Triangle Hill. The 1st Battalion, 32nd Regiment, was placed under the operational control of the 31st Regiment and given the mission of taking Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. For the attack on Hill 598 the 31st Regimental Commander had his 2nd Battalion, commanded by Major Warren B. Phillips.

Major Phillips decided to use the same plan employed by the 3rd Battalion that attacked Hill 598 the day before. The battalion would attack in a column of companies, with E Company leading off, followed by F and G Companies.

After artillery and mortar preparatory fire had been laid on the hill mass, E Company moved out toward the crest. Against light enemy artillery and mortar fire, E Company reached the outlying trenches and started to clean out the bunkers and strongpoints. The E Company troops won possession of Hill 598 without meeting strong resistance and then pushed on to the base of Pike's Peak where they found the CCF entrenched in deep caves and tunnel capable of holding entire units.

In the meantime, men of F Company moved through E Company position on Hill 598 and continued to advance along the northeast arm toward Sandy Ridge. G Company moved up to the crest of Hill 598 to reinforce its sister companies in case of trouble and to help prepare the defensive positions for Communist counterattacks.

On the front of the 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment, for Jane Russell Hill, the 1st Battalion Commander also employed a column of companies against the hill. A Company spearheaded the attack, followed by C Company. B Company was in reserve.

The attack started auspiciously as A Company, supported by elements of B Company, met only light resistance. As they neared the crest a reinforced
battalion from the 135th CCF Regiment swept down and counterattacked vigorously. The enemy assault forced the 1st Battalion to withdraw and regroup. I Company of the 31st Regiment was placed under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Regiment. The 1st Battalion (reinforced) then joined the 2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment, on Sandy Ridge to prepare for the enemy counterattack.

Late on 15 October operational control of the 2nd Battalion, plus I Company of the 31st Regiment passed to the 32nd Regiment, commanded by Colonel Joseph R. Russ. Colonel Russ, therefore, became responsible for the direction of the fight for Triangle Hill at this point. Heavy artillery and mortar barrages were laid on the American positions on Triangle during the night of 15–16 October, but the CCF attacks were platoon size and repulsed without difficulty.

On the morning of 16 October General Smith approved the attachment of the 2nd Battalion (less F Company), 17th Regiment, to the 32nd Regiment for another assault upon Jane Russell Hill that afternoon. Under Major Louis R. Buckner, the 2nd Battalion won possession of the hill without meeting serious opposition.

On the left arm of Triangle Hill, however, the 2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment, had made no progress in its effort to take Pike's Peak. With the approach of darkness of 16 October, the enemy began a series of counterattacks on the 2nd Battalion positions abutting the peak. During one of these, the gallant commander of E Company lost his life. The troops of the 2nd Battalion fought off the CCF attempts to dislodge it, but in turn could not budge the enemy from Pike’s Peak on 17 October.

The situation at this juncture found colonel Russ with three battalions atop Triangle Hill. His own 1st Battalion was on Hill 598; the 2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment, was on left arm facing Pike’s Peak; and the 2nd Battalion (minus), 17th Regiment, occupied Jane Russell Hill. The enemy, in the meantime, had committed the 134th Regiment, 45th CCF Division, to the fight. They still held the well-fortified Pike’s Peak positions.

On the afternoon of 17 October the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel James L. Spellman, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment, in place. At the same time the 1st Battalion, 32nd Regiment, was withdrawn from Triangle Hill. Colonel Russ, therefore, was in operational control of two battalions of the 17th Regiment as the fight entered its fifth day.

The 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, took the task of seizing the one remaining objective, Pike’s Peak, on 18 October. After heavy preparatory fires were laid on the CCF positions, L Company fought its way to the top and began to
organize the defense. I Company then passed through L Company and tried to drive the enemy entrenched on the fingers, off the hill. Again the Communists showed that they would not be ousted and forced I Company to break off its attack.

During the early evening of 19 October two companies from the 134th CCF Regiment stormed into Company L's trenches and hand-to-hand combat ensued. The 3rd Battalion Commander quickly asked for a reinforcing company, since the L Company Commander had been hit and the enemy had rewon possession of Pike’s Peak. Platoons from M and H Companies, 17th Regiment, were rushed up to the aid of L Company, which by this time had lost all of its officers and was falling back southeastward toward Hill 598. To make matters worse, artillery and mortar fire supporting the 3rd Battalion began to land uncomfortably close to the withdrawing troops and had to be lifted until the situation became more stable.

Two companies from the 1st Battalion, 32nd US Regiment, were dispatched by Colonel Kuss to help the beleaguered 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and all available artillery and mortar fire was directed against the left arm of Triangle Hill to break up the fierce enemy attack. The reinforcements and the intense firepower finally slowed and then stopped the enemy. Colonel Spellman, about 0600 on 20 October, reported that some of the enemy troops were beginning to withdraw. He asked that the heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire be continued on withdrawal routes to Pike’s Peak. As the withdrawal became general, Colonel Spellman requested regimental headquarters to hit Pike’s Peak with all available weapons. The enemy, however, managed to flee to their caves and tunnels on Pike’s Peak.

In the lull that followed, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 32nd US Regiment, relieved the 17th US Regiment’s forces. On 22 October the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment, relieved the 1st Battalion on the left arm of Triangle Hill. The 3rd Battalion defended the right arm.

On 23 October the action picked up when the enemy made another attempt in force to clear the 32nd Regiment’s force from the hill complex. Shortly after the nightfall the Communist artillery and mortar units opened up and pounded the 32nd Regiment’s positions on Triangle Hill for an hour. Then a force estimated at from three to six companies from the 45th CCF Division advanced from Pike’s Peak on F Company’s defensive positions, using small arms, automatic weapons, machine guns, and hand grenades as they closed in. For almost an hour an intense fire fight went on. Elements of G Company had to move up and reinforce F Company before the Communist attack faltered.
Autumn Operations

At the same time as the assault on the left arm of Triangle Hill, over at right arm (Jane Russell Hill) an estimated two Communist companies had launched an attack. Only a slight penetration was made in the 3rd Battalion lines and this was quickly restored as reinforcements counterattacked.

On 25 October, according to the IX US Corps orders, the 7th US Division turned over the battleground around the Triangle Hill complex to the 2nd ROK Division still leaving Pike’s Peak in the enemy hands.

Twelve days of combat by the 7th US Division had involved eight of its nine infantry battalions and cost the division over 2,000 casualties, mostly in these eight battalions.

The 31st Regiment, 2nd ROK Division, commanded by Colonel Kim Yong Sun, after it had taken over Hill 598 and Jane Russell Hill from the 7th US Division, continued to strengthen the defensive positions on the heights, while managing to repel the Communist repeated small-size attacks. Before dawn of 30 October, however, Communists launched a fierce attack with a larger force against the Triangle – Sniper Ridge complex in a desperate attempt to take the whole hill complex. For Triangle Hill alone, the enemy threw three battalions. Despite the stubborn resistance of the ROK defenders, the Communists swept over the crest of Hill 598 and on 1 November the enemy also seized Jane Russell Hill after an attack in force. The CCF troops then beat off the ROK counterattacks until casualty lists caused the IX US Corps Commander, General Jenkins, to suspend further attacks on the Triangle Hill complex on 5 November.

The Battle of Sniper Ridge
(14 October – 24 November)

Under the same concept of plan “Showdown” the 2nd ROK Division, on the 7th US Division’s right and right wing of the IX US Corps, started its part of the operation on 14 October to seize the Sniper Ridge complex, but the division became unexpectedly embroiled in one of the most bloody and prolonged outpost battles in the Korean War that continued until late November when the ROK troops took only part of the ridge.

Sniper Ridge, the objective of the 2nd ROK Division, ran northwest to southeast a little over one and a half kilometers northeast of Hill 598 (7th US Division’s objective) and consisted of several heights with approximate elevation, each ranging from 350 to 500 meters. Each of these heights on the ridge
was held by the Communists as their strongpoint. The enemy strength on the Sniper Ridge complex was estimated at one infantry battalion from the 133rd Regiment, 45th CCF Division. (See Sketch Map 39.)

The 2nd ROK Division Commander, Lieutenant General Chung II Kwon, assigned the mission of taking Sniper Ridge to his 32nd Regiment, commanded by Colonel Ryu Keun Chang.

On the early morning of 14 October, after the airstrikes and artillery preparations had placed tons of explosives on the objective area, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Regiment, that had been in reserve, stormed up slopes of the ridge and succeeded in advancing close to the initial objectives (Hill A and Rock-stone Ridge) against moderate enemy opposition, but soon had to fall back and regroup after having met with the Communist intense small arms fire and numerous handgrenades from their well-dug in positions.

At this point Colonel Ryu immediately reinforced the attacking forces while directing his two battalions on MLR to cover the attacking troops with their all available weapons. Thus, by early afternoon the reinforced ROK troops had fought their way through the initial objectives to the final objective (Hill Y) and began to prepare defensive positions to ward off the expected enemy counterattack. As expected, the enemy artillery and mortar concentrations pounded heads of the ROK troops on the newly seized positions, which was soon followed by the enemy counterattack in an estimated battalion strength. The enemy assault centered on the final objective (Hill Y) from three directions. A bloody hand-to-hand combat ensued and the battleground became confused, forcing heavy casualties upon the ROK troops. The ROKs pulled back to the main line of resistance.

The following day, 15 October, Colonel Ryu now decided to commit for the second attempt the 2nd Battalion, 17th ROK Regiment, that had been attached to him for the operation. At 0930 hours the troops of the 17th Regiment jumped off with a tank platoon in direct support, and rapidly swept over the initial objectives and drove the enemy off the heights. The stricken enemy, however, was still not disappointed. Entering evening hours the Communist second counterattack came, preceded by intense artillery and mortar concentrations on the ROK troops who were in the midst of defense preparation. Again a bloody hand-to-hand fight developed under dark and confused situation. The Communists, though temporarily, succeeded in penetrating a portion of the ROK defense on Hill A, but before long the regrouped ROKs of the 17th and 32nd Regiments managed to repel the enemy to the north by assaulting vigorously from two sides. Thus, on the second day of the fighting, the initial objectives (Hill A and Rock-stone Ridge) on Sniper Ridge were taken by the
gallant ROK troops.

The following day the enemy again counterattacked and regained possession of Hill A. Thereafter, attack and counterattack had followed as the CCF and ROK troops had struggled for possession, but neither could win complete control of the ridge. Thus, on 25 October when the 2nd ROK Division assumed responsibility for Triangle Hill by relieving the 7th US Division’s troops on the positions, it was still engaged in a bitter and frustrating fight for Sniper Ridge.

Beginning on 25 October the 2nd ROK Division had to fight two battles, one for Triangle Hill on the left and the other for Sniper Ridge on the right, to carry on Operation Showdown to the successful end. It was, however, an excessive and additional burden for one division to carry when even two divisions had never proven their ability to. Thus, Operation Showdown was doomed to an ironic ending. The 2nd ROK Division lost Triangle Hill as the Communists attacked with a regimental-sized force on 31 October, and on 5 November farther attacks on Triangle Hill were suspended by the IX US Corps order, while the battle for Sniper Ridge on the right continued with Hill A and Rockstone Ridge still remaining in friendly possession.

On 15 November Hill A and Rockstone Ridge fell to the Communist hands again as the enemy made their 27th counterattack with a force of battalion size. The Sniper Ridge battle continued until 18 November when the ROK units took Hill A and Rockstone Ridge back again for the fourteenth time since the initiation of the operation. At this point the CCF pressure slackened and the probes and light attacks against the ROK forces during the remainder of the month were repulsed.

Thus, after six weeks of hard fighting, as of 24 November, the 2nd ROK Division controlled a portion of Sniper Ridge and none of Triangle Hill.

On 25 November the 2nd ROK Division turned its sector over to the 9th ROK Division who had been in corps reserve after the White Horse Hill battle.

In retrospect, Operation Showdown was a complete failure on the part of UN forces. The original two battalion-attack lasting five days and costing 200 casualties had drawn in over two divisions and cost over 9,000 casualties. Although estimates of the CCF losses ran to over 19,000 men, the enemy had no shortage of manpower. The Communists, time and again, had shown themselves willing to incur heavy casualties in order to hold on to key terrain features. At Triangle Hill they gained face as their tenacious defense reversed the offensive defeat at White Horse Hill and forced the UN Command to break off the attack. It was the most costly operation during the period under review which lasted 42 days.
CHAPTER IX  COLD FRONT
(November – December 1952)

Section 1. The Demise of Military Victory

As the fighting settled down into a deeper stalemate with the passage of time, General Clark of the United Nations Command, reported to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressing his grave concern that the failure to achieve an armistice was caused by a lack of military pressure on the Communist forces. He, of course, knew that the UN Command would not be able to take a decisive military action with the forces then available to him. He also knew well that the Korean War could not be ended decisively without the kind of military action which might enlarge the war.

However, General Clark had developed an outline plan that would force the enemy to seek or accept an armistice at an earliest date, in his estimate. He sent three of his staff officers to Washington in mid-October to explain and support it.

In essence, the draft plan called for a giant drive to the line Wonsan–Pyongyang in three stages, each lasting about three weeks. It included enveloping attacks by ground forces, a major amphibious assault, airborne operations as opportunities might develop, and sea and air action against targets in Chinese mainland. A considerable increase in forces would be needed to sustain the operation. In addition to troops already constituting the UN Command, three US divisions (one infantry, one airborne and one Marine), two ROK divisions, two Chinese Nationalist divisions, twelve field artillery battalions, and twenty anti-aircraft battalions would be required.

Though such a force augmentation, under the existing conditions, was most unlikely, rather, in fact nearly impossible, General Clark wanted to be prepared in the event that a new American Administration, to be elected in early November 1952, might wish to make a major military effort to end the stalemated Korean War. However, this dramatic plan died, just disappearing itself.

President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States, accompanied by designated Secretary of Defense Charles E. Willson, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General of the Army Omar N. Bradely, and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, arrived in Korea on 2 December 1952. President-elect Eisenhower visited President Syngman Rhee, toured the front with Generals Clark and Van Fleet, and talked to commanders of all ranks as he assayed the war situation.

The President-elect, at a press conference in Seoul at the end of his visit, admitted that he had "no panaceas, no tricks" for bringing the war to a close.

General Clark was somewhat disappointed that, although he was almost constantly with President-elect Eisenhower, he was never given an opportunity to present his plan and the estimate of forces required to obtain a military victory in Korea. General Clark became convinced that the new President would seek so-called an honorable armistice. In fact, when General of the Army Eisenhower became the President of the United States on 20 January 1953, John Foster Dulles succeeded Dean Acheson as U.S. Secretary of State. Yet General Clark’s presentment soon came true. There was no basic change in U.S. policy insofar as the Korean War was concerned. The new American Administration had no intention of expanding the military pressure to force a settlement upon the Communist aggressors.

U.S. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower talking to one of “Can Do” troopers, south of Chorwon. At his right is Col. Richard G. Stilwell, CO of the 15th Infantry, 3rd US Division.
In short, on the whole, President Eisenhower adopted the policy of watchful waiting pursued by the President Truman's Administration.

In the meantime at Panmunjom, the truce conferences had been hopelessly stalled still by the prisoner exchange deadlock. After continued Communist intransigence, on 28 September 1952, Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, who had become the senior UN delegate in late May, laid on the conference table three different plans to guarantee prisoners the freedom of choice in accepting or refusing repatriation. One of these would bring prisoners to the Demilitarized Zone, where they would be told the position of the Communist and UN Command lines. Then they would be released, free to move in either direction. The Communists rejected this plan, too, and on 8 October the UN delegate broke off the talk with the remark: "We will meet with you whenever you indicate that you are willing to accept one of our proposals or have presented in writing the text of any constructive proposals, designed to achieve an armistice, which you may desire to make. The plenary session now stand in recess."

Since the UN Command had fallen back upon its final negotiating position, the discussion phase and the period of maneuvering were at an end. Until a break occurred in the adamant fronts presented by both sides, the prospects for a settlement by the truce negotiations also remained remote.

Thus, with both fronts of the battleground and the truce negotiations still remaining deadlocked at the end of 1952, the future course of the war seemed likely to be a repetition of what had gone before -- a continued war of stalemate.

In fact, the stalemated war was the Communist-planned game, in which the Communists were fighting, not really for territory that had little value, and would be abandoned anyway according to the agreement already signed at Panmunjom in November 1951, but in a test of wills to gain their political advantage to force the UN Command to give up on the POW question, and to end the war on their terms. While it seemed foolish to expose men to danger and death on worthless real estate, the UN Command was being forced to play the Communist game which meant more men, more casualties, more expenditures, and more resources.

Section 2. Winter Action
(November December 1952)

As cold weather approached, the intensity of the fighting began to decline
markedly. Accordingly, the pattern of the ground action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols, and small unit attacks against outposts. It was believed that the severe losses inflicted upon the Communists by the UNC troops in October and the adverse winter weather evidently dampened their desire to conduct further large-scale attacks against the UNC battle line.

Interrogation of prisoners revealed no knowledge of a general offensive, and the disposition of enemy forces along the front gave no indication of other than a usual defensive alignment.

The 1 US Corps Sector

Although most of the UNC front remained relatively quiet during the period, in the 1 US Corps sector over on the western front, the Communists tried hard to seize several critical outposts all along the corps defense lines.

In the early November the Chinese Communists attacked on the outpost positions on Hill 234 (Porkchop Hill) in the 2nd US Division sector of the 1 US Corps right, one and a half kilometers northeast of the contested hill, Old Baldy. They attacked the hill twice, once by one company and the second time by two companies. The Thailand Battalion, then attached to the 2nd US Division, held firm on each occasion. On 7 November a heavy artillery and mortar concentration on Porkchop heralded the enemy attack. After a 45-minute fire fight the Communists broke off and regrouped, then stormed back again and was repulsed. Four days later, the Communist intense bombardment of Porkchop announced the second assault. Approaching from the north, east, and southwest, two enemy companies reached the Thailand troops' trenches before they were thrown back. Later that night the Communists made two further attempts to penetrate the Porkchop positions and then disengaged completely. The Thailand troops thereafter became well known for this gallant defense of Porkchop. It is interesting to note that Thai soldiers wrote on their bunker walls “Take a good care of our Porkchop” when they turned the Porkchop sector over to the 7th US Division on relief at the closing days of December.

To the left, in the 1st British Commonwealth Division sector, on the night of 18 - 19 November the Communists made a massive attack. After shelling heavily the positions of the 1st Battalion, British King's Liverpool Regiment, as a diversion, the Communist troops quickly shifted their efforts to a hill known as the Hook then held by the 1st Battalion of the British Black Watch. The Hook was part of an east-west ridge about six and a half kilometers northwest of the
Sand-bagged emplacements on the Hook, which saw the most of activity of the 1st British Commonwealth Division line.

confluence of Sami-chon and Imjin River and had a good observation of the lower Sami-chon Valley. For this reason its retention by the UN force was essential. Forty-five minutes of heavy firing followed; then an enemy company sought to close with the Black Watch troops. But the Black Watch took cover in nearby tunnels and directed an artillery concentration on the Communist assault troops. As soon as the artillery ceased, the Black Watch seized the initiative, and drove the enemy off the Hook. While the Communists tried to regroup on adjacent ridges, artillery and tank fire forced them to disperse.

On the following day the enemy brought up reinforcements and sent two companies against the Hook. Commonwealth tanks and reinforcements moved up and after a hard-fought exchange that witnessed hand-to-hand combat, the Black Watch troops turned the Communists back. Again the Communists re-organized and dispatched a company to pierce the Black Watch line. The third try effected a penetration of 100 yards before it was contained. Finally, the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry mounted a counterattack and in close combat ejected the Communists. It was estimated that the enemy employed one battalion in this action. More than a hundred of his dead were actually counted. The casualties in the British battalion were
five officers wounded and one missing, 12 other ranks killed, 67 wounded and four missing. Evidently convinced that the British intended to hold the Hook, the Communists made no further serious attempts to seize the hill. But the Hook position was to play a prominent part in the fighting again in March 1953 after the 2nd US Division had taken over the Commonwealth Division’s sector.

In the early part of December Chinese Communists struck hard on the outpost positions on the Imjin River line held by the 1st ROK Division troops. The first ten days of December gave little indication that the enemy again intended to test the 1st ROK Division’s defense in the vicinity of the Koyangdae hill complex where the Nicki—Tessie outpost fighting took place on 6 October.

On the west bank of the Imjin River, as it began first horseshoe turn, lay a law hill complex known as Nori; Big Nori formed the north-western half of the ridge and Little Nori the south-eastern half. The 15th ROK Regiment, 1st ROK Division, maintained outposts on these hills and also on Hill Betty, about 1,200 meters south of Little Nori, and on Hill 105, approximately 1,600 meters southwest of Little Nori. The CCF troops controlled outposts on the terrain to the north and west of Nori, but had remained fairly inactive in that sector since the fighting on Nickie and Tessie. (See Sketch Map 40.)

On 11 December, however, two battalions of the 420th Regiment, 140th Division, 47th CCF Army, closely followed 800 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in an attack upon the ROK position on Little Nori, Betty, and Hill 105. The main weight fell on Little Nori as two enemy companies sought to dislodge the men of the 9th Company of the 15th ROK Regiment on the hill. After a bitter three-hour exchange at close range, the ROK defenders were ordered to pull back to Hill 69, about 300 yards to the east of Little Nori. After regrouping, the ROK troops launched two counterattacks, but the two Platoons committed failed to drive the enemy off the heights. The Chinese Communists waited until the attack troops neared their defensive positions, then hurled hand grenades and loosed a withering artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. Later in the morning, however, a small force from the 11th ROK Regiment, which had been attached to the 15th ROK Regiment, reoccupied Little Nori at 1100 hours.

In the meantime, the ROK units on Betty had held, but those on Hill 105 had to fall back temporarily. Evidently the Chinese Communist movement against Hill 105 was only a diversion, for the enemy left shortly thereafter and the ROK troops reoccupied the positions without incident.

On the night of the 11th, the Communists first again launched a two-company drive against Little Nori, then increased the attacking force to a battalion, and the ROK’s again withdrew to Hill 69. Air support was called in and six
B-26's dropped over one hundred 260-pound fragmentary bombs on the hill. Twelve battalions of artillery poured a continuous hail of shells on the Communists, but four counterattacks by the 11th ROK Regiment on 12 December failed. Despite the punishment administered by large and small arms and the mounting toll of losses, the Communist troops refused to be budged.

The artillery concentrations went on during the night of 12-13 December and when morning arrived, a battalion from the 11th ROK Regiment moved in with two companies in the attack. Fighting steadily forward, they won their way back to Little Nori, but met with little success in their efforts to clear Big Nori. On the evening of the 13th, the ROK troops dug in and awaited the expected enemy counterattacks. Two Communist companies vainly attempted to penetrate the ROK positions during the night and as the morning of 14 December dawned, the contest resolved itself into a stalemate.

Although this encounter lasted but four days, the statistics are quite significant. The entire action on Big and Little Noris, took place in an area
300 yards wide and 200 yards deep. During the engagement the UNC artillery fired 120,000 rounds, and the mortar crews over 31,000 while tankmen added over 4,500 90-mm. shells to the deadly concentration. Supporting aircraft flew 39 missions of 177 sorties to bomb and strafe the enemy positions with napalm, high explosives, and rockets. In return the ROK's received over 18,000 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire from the enemy. Not counting the aerial contribution, the UNC forces took one round for every eight they hurled at the enemy. It was an excellent example of air, artillery, and tank coordination in support of the infantry. As for casualties, the 1st ROK Division suffered 750, including 237 dead, while the estimated total for the Communists ranged between 2,300 and 2,730 men.

After the Nori contest had become a stalemate the Chinese Communists now struck against the corps right wing outpost. This time they chose Christmas Eve to launch an attack upon the outposts of the 2nd US Division on T-Bone Ridge. The southern tip of T-Bone, which contained the outposts of Eerie and Arsenal, lay approximately three kilometers northeast of Porkchop Hill. On 23 December, two platoons of B Company, 38th US Infantry Regiment, manned
Arsenal, located about 600 yards north of Eerie. On the terrain to the north two battalions of the 336th Regiment, 113th Division, 38th CCF Army, held the enemy lines.

Despite the all battalions of the 38th US Regiment had been fully alerted of a Communist attack either on the night of the 23rd or the morning of the 24th by the enemy massage intercepted, the enemy achieved the element of surprise when the three companies of 338th CCF Regiment, opened their attack about midnight. Without their customary tactic of heavy preparatory artillery and mortar fire before the assault, they infiltrated the B Company outposts on Arsenal, cutting through the barbed wire and successfully bypassing the listening posts. Soon, hand-to-hand combat with the defenders of B Company in the friendly communication trenches ensued.

Colonel Archibald W. Stuart, the Commander of the 38th Regiment, quickly alerted his 3rd Battalion Commander to move his four companies forward to reinforce the 1st Battalion. This quick action embarrassed the enemy.

The battle in the Arsenal trenches had also turned against the CCF troops. B Company had requested close defensive fires to deter the enemy from reinforcing the infiltrators and then set about to wipe out the Communists already in the outpost positions. The defensive fires were extremely effective. The B Company men also mounted a stout defense.

In this action the CCF battalion had been heavily hit with 11 counted killed in action and estimated casualties of 500 more. The 38th US Regiment suffered 47 casualties, including six killed in action.

The action was also an excellent example of how close defensive fires were effective and destructive in preventing enemy from getting his reinforcements. The men of B Company had fought bravely and systematically cleaned out the enemy infiltrators. Yet without the superb defensive fire that had been provided by the artillery, mortar, tank, and anti-aircraft artillery units in direct support of the 38th Regiment, the infantrymen might not have fared so well. The enemy had wanted desperately to reinforce his attacking forces on Arsenal, but had been unable to get them through the heavy curtain of fire laid down by the direct support crews. The success could justly be shared by infantrymen and gun-crew members alike.

On 29 December the relief of the 2nd US Division by the 7th US Division was completed in this sector and the enemy evidently decided to take advantage of the change-over. A reinforced Communist company that night hit on outpost at Chongjamal, a little over three kilometers southwest of Old Baldy (Hill 275), and forced the new defenders to pull back. Since the American artillery units had the co-ordinated fire plans of the outpost, they began to zero in on the
Communists and the punishment finally forced the enemy to evacuate the position.

**The IX US Corps Sector**

To the 1 US Corp’s right, in the west central area, the IX US Corps had taken the brunt of the Chinese Communist attacks at Hill 395 (White Horse Hill), Hill 598 (Triangle Hill), Sniper Ridge, and Hill 388 (Jackson Heights) during and after the CCF’s October offensive, but the pressure along the corps front eased after mid-November. Only in the Sniper Ridge sector north of Kumhwa did the CCF troops continue to demonstrate their sensitivity to ROK possession of outposts on the ridge.

In November two divisional reliefs occurred on the corps sector. On the 14th, the 25th US Division relieved the 7th US Division. The 7th US Division assembled in the corps rear zone, becoming Eighth Army reserve. On the 25th the 9th ROK Division relieved the 2nd ROK Division and the latter moved to Field Training Center #5 for training and rehabilitation. Both of these changes were routine as the IX US Corps rotated its divisions on the line.

On 2 December a Communist platoon probed the contested outposts on Sniper Ridge now held by the troops of the 9th ROK Division and a second enemy platoon joined in the action. Intense fire from artillery and mortar was exchanged for a time, and then the CCF troops advanced and won the crest. But the UNC artillery concentrations soon made enemy possession of the newly won position too costly. As the Communists withdrew, the ROK forces returned to the outpost. A brief respite followed, then a second CCF attack led to a hand grenade duel.

Once again the 9th ROK defenders fell back. On the next day two ROK platoons carried on a seven-hour battle with the enemy before regaining the crest. During the ensuing ten days, the Communists launched 40 probes against Sniper Ridge without success. It is surprising to note that of the 114 probes reported along the corps front during December, the Communists directed 105 against the 9th ROK Division. The pattern held steadily through January 1953 as the Communists sent frequent probes of up to three platoons in strength against the Sniper Ridge outposts with no success. Outside the 9th ROK Division area, the CCF troops were hard to find.

In the meantime, two changes in the IX US Corp’s battle line were made during December as ground fighting slowed to a near halt. To strengthen the
Kumhwa—Chorwon sector of the Iron Triangle, General Van Fleet increased the number of frontline divisions in the corps. The front of the 9th ROK Division, on the corps' right flank, was narrowed and the left boundary of the II ROK Corps shifted several kilometers to east. The Capital ROK Division then filled in the resulting gap on 12 December. The other change occurred on 29 December when the 2nd ROK Division relieved the 3rd US Division on the corp's left flank. Lieutenant General Reuben E. Jenkins, the IX US Corps Commander, now had three ROK divisions and one US division, the 25th, defending his corps front at the end of December, 1952.

In the II ROK Corps sector to the right, the three ROK divisions of the corps (6th, 8th, and 3rd, left to right) had patrolled vigorously during the period under review, but operations had remained on a small scale without major challenge from the Communists.

The X US Corps Sector

In the X US Corps sector, to the II ROK Corps right, there continued relatively uneventful days after the bitter battle in the 7th ROK Division sector during the early October 1952. The quiet on the front, however, was broken on the night of 3 November when a reinforced battalion of NK Communist forces struck on the Heartbreak Ridge area in the 40th US Division sector.

On Hill 851 in the Heartbreak Ridge area, the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Regiment, 40th US Division, manned the UNC battle lines. The terrain north of the 2nd Battalion defensive positions was held by the 14th Regiment, 1st Division, II NK Corps. In the opening days of November the NK Communist artillery and mortar units devoted increasing attention to the Hill 851 area.

For the defense of Hill 851, four rifle companies, including two attached
companies from the 1st Battalion; had been deployed from west to east along the battle line and two additional companies kept in reinforcing positions immediately south of Hill 851.

On 3 November the NK Communists artillery and mortar fire became intense. Approximately 4,500 rounds were hurled at the 2nd Battalion during the night. At 2030 hours a reinforced battalion from the 14th NK Regiment attacked from the north in a general assault along the 2nd Battalion front. Proceeding along the ridge which ran north and south and up the draws that led to the 2nd Battalion’s positions, the enemy closed and made slight penetrations in the sectors of the three of the four companies on line. Based on later evidence from POW interrogations, the enemy apparently intended to seize, hold, and reinforce Hill 851, then strike south against Hill 931.

The NK Communist attack failed as the four front line companies threw back the enemy assault without calling for reinforcements. Direct fire from the supporting units helped to disrupt and decimate the Communist troops. When the enemy broke contact four hours later, he had suffered 140 counted casualties and 7 prisoners of war had fallen into the 2nd Battalion’s hands. The 160th Regiment had taken 73 casualties, including 19 dead, in the fight.

T66 multiple rocket launchers in action, 40th US Division sector, November 1952.
In the meantime the 45th US Division, next on the line to the east, in the right wing sector of the X US Corps, had also no major actions except minor patrol clashes around the Hills 812 and 854 where the 21–22 September battle took place during the division’s relief of the 8th ROK Division.

Entering the closing days of December, however, NK Communist units started attacking again the positions. This time they chose Christmas Day to make their serious attack. Hill 812, eight kilometers north of the Punchbowl, was their objective, where the 8th ROK Division had experienced a bitter battle in the midst of its relief of the 45th US Division as the NK Communists attacked with main attack directed on Hill 854 on the right on the night of 21–22 September.

On Hill 812, K Company, 179th Regiment, 45th US Division, manned the outpost positions on the northern slopes of the hill. Before dawn on Christmas morning the NK Communist guns and mortars opened up and sent about 250 rounds on the K Company positions. During the bombardment, a reinforced company from the 45th NK Division advanced from a rocky hill nearby, and overran the forward positions defended by K Company. Captain Andrew J. Gatsis, the company commander, called for artillery and mortar fires. Tanks from 179th Tank Company joined with artillery and mortar to halt the Communist advance.

Captain Gatsis then sent his 2nd Platoon to counterattack. The platoon closed with the NK Communists and pushed them back. In the hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches, the platoon leader, Lieutenant Russel J. McCann, was killed. Colonel Jefferson J. Irvin, the regimental commander, attached A Company to K Company, and E Company was ordered on hand to reinforce K Company’s positions, if necessary. During the early morning hours, the NK Communists sent three platoon-sized attacks and over 2,000 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire against the K Company defenders, but failed to dislodge the gallant men of the company.

The company suffered 25 casualties in the Christmas holiday fighting, including five dead, while the enemy incurred an estimated 36 casualties.

On 27 December the newly organized 12th ROK Division began to take over the 45th US Division’s sector on Line Minnesota and the relief was completed on 30 December.

The 1 ROK Corps Sector

In the 1 ROK Corps front along the east coast the NK Communists had meanwhile been more active. The ROK main line of resistance rested on Hill
351 (Anchor Hill), about six kilometers south of Kosong. On 9 November, 1952, two NK battalions struck Hill 351 and pushed the 5th ROK Division's defenders off the crest. It was only after two counterattacks marked by hard close fighting and backed by intense artillery and mortar support that the ROK troops were able to eject the enemy and restore their positions. At the same time, further to the south, the NK enemy dispatched a platoon-sized force to assault Hills 268 and 345, about four and half kilometers south of Hill 351. On Hill 268 the Communists won a brief foothold but were driven off on 10 November. Close defensive fires dispersed the enemy attack force as it approached Hill 345. Despite their heavy losses the NK Communists hit both hills again on 11 November with a larger force and engaged the ROK troops for an hour and a half before they withdrew. The failure of this effort marked the beginning of a period of comparative calm on the ROK Corps front.

Active patrolling and small skirmishes occurred frequently through December, but the overall situation was not affected. It seemed that the NK Communists gave up any further attempts to infiltrate the ROK defenses around Anchor Hill.

Section 3. Use of Artillery Firepower

In the first year of the Korean War the preponderance of manpower of the Communist enemy was fairly evenly balanced by the superior ground weapons and air power of the UN Command. The UNC's artillery, among other, had been overwhelmingly superior to that of the Communists in quantity and technique, and in the amount of ammunition available. Since entering summer of 1952, however, it was no longer the case. The Communists now deployed a great weight of artillery and had evolved a very efficient system of defensive fire by night and by day, which eventually made the UN troops' patrols and raids very hazardous undertakings.

The extent of the Communist artillery buildup, in the face of continued heavy and accurate bombardment by the UNC air and naval forces, could be measured in the steady increase in the number of artillery rounds of all calibers that dropped into the UNC front-line positions. On one day in September 1952, more than 45,000 rounds fell on the UNC lines. In October, a record 93,000 rounds fell in one day. The enemy had increased his accuracy too and had improved his tactics. He now could concentrate his fires on a single target and then
move his guns frequently to prevent the UNC's pinpointing their positions.

The increased and improved use of the Communist enemy's artillery, however, was still never to be compared with that of the UNC troops. During the period of October-November 1952, the UNC troops on the line fired eight rounds of artillery and four rounds of mortar fire for every enemy round received. By December, although the UNC mortar ratio dipped to three to one, the preponderance in artillery rounds favored the UNC Command by nineteen to one. The attempt to bury the Communists under tons of explosive hardware generated two interesting experiments.

General Van Fleet was quite concerned over the Eighth Army's use of artillery during the fall of 1952. After conferring with his corps commanders in September, he decided to alter the ratio of 155-mm. guns to 8-inch howitzers. The Eighth Army had forty-four 8-inch howitzers and twenty-eight 155-mm. guns in September and was in the process of converting a battalion of 155-mm. guns to 8-inch howitzers. General Van Fleet halted this conversion and ordered the conversion of a 105-mm. howitzer battalion to 8-inch howitzers instead. When the change-over was completed, the Eighth Army would have forty-eight 8-inch howitzers and thirty-six 155-mm. guns. General Van Fleet believed that this ratio would provide his army with a better balance in heavy artillery and allow it to get maximum benefit from its superior firepower.

Once he had reorganized the heavy artillery, General Van Fleet determined to try out his plan to concentrate heavy firepower against the Communists' artillery. Choosing the Triangle Hill — Sniper Ridge area in the IX US Corps sector as a locale for the test, General Van Fleet attached the 1st US Observation Battalion and major elements of two 8-inch howitzer and two 155-mm. gun battalions from the I and X US Corps to the IX US Corps artillery. During the long and difficult struggle for control of this hill complex, General Van Fleet wrote to General Clark, each time that the UNC forces had gained the top, intense artillery and mortar fire had made retention of the crest too expensive. When the Communists had moved onto the heights, the UNC artillery had forced them to withdraw. The only way to break this sequence, General Van Fleet went on, was to destroy the Communist artillery. Then, the 2nd ROK Division could seize and hold on to the hard-contested hill mass.

General Clark was willing to permit General Van Fleet's counterbattery program to proceed and countenance the extra expenditure of ammunition for a five-day period, but he did not want the 2nd ROK Division to renew the battle for Triangle until he was sure the results would be commensurate with the risks. If excessive casualties or abnormal ammunition outlays were going to be requir-
An 8-inch howitzer and crew.

ed to keep Triangle, General Clark was opposed to the move.

Using aerial photography and sound, flash and radar plots, supplemented
by shelling reports, the IX US Corps artillery staff compiled a target list of
enemy weapon locations. On 3 November 1952 the experiment began as the
greater part of three 8-inch howitzers and three 155-mm. gun battalions fired
single guns and salvos at the Communist gun positions. During the next week
the heavy artillery shot close to 20,000 rounds in an effort to eliminate the
Communist artillery in the vicinity of Sniper Ridge and Triangle Hill. But the
success was only limited. Artillery observers estimated that it took approximate-
ly 50 rounds of accurate fire to achieve destruction of an enemy artillery piece
because of the Communists' skillful use of caves, tunnels, and heavy overhead
protection. During the test period over 250 enemy gun emplacements were
damaged or destroyed, but only 39 artillery and 19 antiaircraft pieces were put
out of action. The Communist artillery was not silenced and the battle for the
hill complex continued.

General Clark was not averse to the continuance of a counterbattery program, but he told General Van Fleet on 10 November that it would have to be carried on within the normal ammunition allocations authorized to the Eighth Army — at least, until the over-all supply of heavy artillery shells increased.

One more experiment was conducted at the request of the Fifth US Air Force in September and October 1952 also in the IX US Corps front. Major General Glenn O. Barcus, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, requested a flak-suppression effort by the Eighth Army artillery units in conjunction with close support strikes by his fighter-bombers. He believed that the use of artillery against enemy antiaircraft artillery weapons before and during the strikes would help cut down the Fifth US Air Force plane losses to enemy antiaircraft artillery fire. General Van Fleet approved a thirty-day test period that began on 25 September. As fighter-bombers approached the target in the IX US Corps sector, the artillery fired proximity fuze shells at the known enemy anti-aircraft artillery positions in the area. When the planes closed on the target, the artillery switched to quick-fuze ammunition and continued to fire until the air attack was over.

At the conclusion of the experiment on 25 October the Fifth US Air Force reported only one plane had been lost and 13 had been damaged by enemy antiaircraft fire during the test. A total of 1,816 sorties had been flown and, according to statistics based on previous experience, the losses should have been between four and five planes destroyed and about 64 damaged. No the Fifth Air Force plane had been hit by the IX US Corps artillery fire during the test. In view of the favorable outcome of the experiment under static ground front conditions, Generals Barcus and Van Fleet instructed their units to make the flak-suppression program standard operating procedure in the future.

Section 4. The Opposing Forces at Year's End

At the end of 1952 General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, had sixteen divisions manning the UN Command's battle line. In the far-west, the I US Corps positions were manned (left to right) by the 1st US Marine, 1st British Commonwealth, 1st ROK, and the 7th US Infantry Divisions. Next in line was the IX US Corps which now had a divisional line up of the 2nd ROK Division on the left, the 25th US and 9th ROK Divisions in the center, and the
Capital ROK Division on the right. In the central part of the UNC front, the 6th, 8th, and 3rd ROK Divisions manned the II ROK Corps line. To the right of the II ROK Corps sector, the X US Corps manned its line with the 7th ROK, 40th US, and the 12th ROK Divisions. At the far right of the UN Command’s line the I ROK Corps front was held by the 11th ROK Division at the X US Corps boundary and the 5th ROK Division along the eastern coast. Contingents of troops from other United Nations countries reinforced the United States divisions, and the 1st ROK Marine Group became an important adjunct to the 1st US Marine Division. The Eighth US Army Commander also had four divisions available as reserve forces—-one ROK and three US divisions. The thousands of service and security troops that supported the combat divisions brought the UN Command’s total strength to nearly 768,000 men.

By giving the ROK forces responsibility for defending nearly 75 percent of the UNC front, General Van Fleet remained confident that the ROK forces he had helped build up into an efficient and reliable army could meet the Communists head on at any time and emerge victorious. It was evident that the ROK Army, trained and equipped by the US Army, was now a fighting force capable of effective defense.

To oppose the UN Command’s twenty divisions the Communist enemy disposed a formidable array of manpower along his front. Seven Chinese Communist armies and two NK Communist corps, totaling about 270,000 troops, manned the enemy defense line. Another eleven CCF armies and NK Communist corps with an estimated strength of 531,000 remained in reserve. With service and security forces, the total enemy strength in Korea amounted to more than a million men. (See Sketch Map 41.)

The Communists deployed their forces along a battle line that roughly paralleled that of the UN Command. The Chinese Communists occupied about three fourths of this line; their armies extended from the far west coast eastward to the Nam River. East of the river the NK Communists manned the remainder of the line to the Eastern Sea.

In retrospect, for over a year now a stalemate had existed in the Korean War. Both sides had constructed defense lines so powerful that their reduction could be accomplished only at a prohibitive cost. This had limited the UN Command’s offensive operations during 1952 to small-scale attacks to prevent the Communists from holding key terrain features close to the UNC’S main line of resistance and raids to hamper the enemy’s build-up of defensive positions.

During the year the UN forces also conducted a vigorous defense of its outpost positions. These outposts, located on high ground to screen the UN Com-
mand's main line of resistance, became the objective of frequent enemy attacks, particularly in the latter half of the year. The UN forces threw back the great majority of the Communist assaults and inflicted thousands of casualties upon the Communists. The friendly positions that did fall, owing to the weight of enemy numbers, were quickly restored by the counterattacking troops of the UN Command. Rarely an outpost position had to be abandoned when it became clear that the Communists intended to seize and hold the position at any cost. In this case the outpost lost its usefulness as the price of holding it or retaking it outweighed its tactical value in delaying Communist attacks on the main line of resistance. In short, the ROK and UN allied ground forces had successfully defended their defensive positions all along the front line despite the frustrating conditions on the stalemated battle field and at Panmunjom.
CHAPTER X      PRETHAW FRONT
(1 January – 31 March 1953)

Section 1. Active Defense on the Frozen Scene

In January 1953, the disposition of friendly forces across the entire front remained unchanged until the closing days of the month when a number of division reliefs had taken place.

On 30 January 1953, the 2nd US Division relieved the 1st British Commonwealth Division in the I US Corps, and on 28 January the 3rd US Division relieved the 25th US Division on line in the IX US Corps, while the 45th US Division in the X US Corps moved into line and permitted the 40th US Division to pull back into corps reserve on 1 February. The 5th US Infantry Regiment (then a regimental combat team in size), which was attached to the 40th US Division and had been positioned on the northern rim of the Punchbowl since it relieved elements of the 45th US Division there on 8 January 1953, was placed under the 45th US Division control on 30 January 1953 and would remain in the area until 20 April when its operational control was transferred to the 3rd US Division. Meanwhile, on 31 January 1953 the newly activated 15th ROK Division took over the 5th ROK Division’s sector in the I ROK Corps. A change of command also took place within the 45th US Division on 16 March with the arrival of Brigadier General Philip D. Ginder who took over command of the division from Major General David L. Ruffner. And, on 26 March, the newly activated 20th ROK Division was assigned a defensive sector in the X US Corps, making total of 17 divisions now deployed on the main line of resistance positions across the UNC front.

The Communist forces facing the friendly line were seven CCF armies; the 65th, 40th, 47th, 38th, 15th, 67th, and 60th Armies, from west to east, holding the line from the western coast extending eastward to the Punchbowl, and the III and I NK Corps on the remainder of line to the Eastern Sea, of which the I NK Corps was replaced by VII NK Corps on 19 January 1953.

The front was relatively quiet during the month of January, 1953, and friendly
forces were mostly in active defense, while conducting small-scale raiding and patrolling actions under the severe cold weather. The highlight of combat actions during the month was, even though ill-fated, the air-ground coordinated raiding action, well known as "Operation Smack" on an enemy strong-point, conducted by the 7th US Division in the western I US Corps sector in late January, 1953.

In February 1953, the battle lines and the deployment of friendly divisions on the front remained unchanged. The 20th and 21st ROK Divisions which had been under formation in January 1953 were activated on 9 February. On 11 February, General James A. Van Fleet handed over command of the Eighth US Army in Korea to Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor who had been serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, the Department of the United States Army.

The ground activities during the month were confined mostly, as in January, to skirmishing in between the two stalemated main defense lines. In the western sector, however, where friendly units took the initiative in conducting aggressive raiding operations, a number of sharp clashes in no-man's-land resulted in several Communist cutbacks but the overall situation was not affected. Of these, the most significant enemy encounter occurred on 3 February when a tank-infantry raiding group from the 5th US Marine Regiment, supported by air and artillery fire, made an assault on enemy positions in the vicinity of Ungok, 16 kilometers

Enemy terrain as seen through chicken wire in front of an outpost.
north of Munsan-ni.

As March progressed enemy ground activities increased sharply throughout the entire front with the I US Corps bearing the brunt of enemy attack, particularly in the 7th US Division sector.

The Western Sector
(I US Corps)

The entire front was, as a whole, relatively quiet during the month of January, 1953. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves to hibernate, and actions were confined mostly to small-scale patrols and raids.

The first enemy encounter of the month came on 2 January when an enemy company attacked friendly outpost on Hill 105 in the vicinity of Koyangdae, one kilometer southwest of Nori complex, held by the 11th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division. Soon, a bitter, close combat ensued on the hill between the two opponents in which friendly elements were forced to withdraw to Outpost Betty nearly 600 meters east of Hill 105. Taking advantage of having the initiative in the attack, the enemy increased his pressure against friendly defenders and further attempted to seize Outpost Betty, but was forestalled by a friendly counterattack that followed immediately. Fighting steadily forward, friendly counterattacking forces won the way back to Hill 105.

Afterwards, the sector remained quiet until 25 January when the 7th US Division under Major General Wayne C. Smith, in compliance with the General Clark's directive, conducted an air-tank-artillery-infantry raid, better known as "Operation Smack", against the enemy strongpoint on the eastern side of shank of T-Bone Ridge (Hill 191), about 1,300 yards north of Outpost Eerie.

For the attack, the 2nd Platoon, E Company of the 2nd Battalion, 31st US Regiment under Colonel William B. Kern, and three platoons of medium tanks mounting 90-mm. guns were designated. Two additional platoons of infantry, one tank company, and six platoons of medium tanks were to support the attack. In addition to it, 125 fighter-bomber sorties and 8-12 radar-controlled light and medium bomber sorties of air bombardment on selected targets in the T-Bone Ridge area were scheduled to be carried out in three phases, while one field artillery battalion and elements of six other battalions with 78 light and medium artillery pieces were planned to fire immediately after the air strikes in direct and general support of the raiding party.

As the last air strike was completed and the supporting tanks and artillery
were pounding the objective area, the 2nd Platoon led by Second Lieutenant John R. Arbogast, Jr., moved forward to the base of T-Bone Ridge in personnel carriers and quickly dismounted as it reached the foot of the hill. The platoon leader divided his platoon into two groups and had one group go up the northern finger and the other take the southern finger of the hill. As the platoon neared the point where the two fingers met, reuniting the assaulting groups, the enemy reacted strongly and its machine gun fire became so heavy that the friendly assaulting platoon was driven into the basin between the two ridge fingers. The hollow gave the platoon protection from the enemy machine gun fire, but exposed them to the enemy hand grenades. As the Red Chinese threw hand grenades onto the friendly attackers that were boxed in a small area, the friendly casualty list mounted. The platoon leader was hit in the arm, but refused to be evacuated. To break up the enemy hand grenade attack, Lieutenant Arbogast ordered the two flame thrower teams to move up the crest. However, one of the operators was killed by an enemy rifle bullet on his way up to the crest, and the other flame thrower malfunctioned.

Under the circumstances, Major Phillips, the 2nd Battalion Commander, ordered the 1st Platoon to reinforce the 2nd Platoon. The 1st Platoon took the same route up the finger but it also was forced to pin down due to the heavy enemy machine gun fire. Efforts by the supporting tanks and air to neutralize the enemy automatic weapons met with little effect. The 2nd Platoon Leader tried every means available to get his platoon moving out of the enemy trap. But he was hit again by hand grenade fragments in the face and eye and had to be evacuated.

With the 2nd and 1st Platoons pinned down short of the objective, the battalion commander decided to commit the 3rd Platoon to the attack, but the end result proved to be the same. The 3rd Platoon was soon caught under enemy automatic weapons and small arms fires coupled with the hand grenades which inflicted tremendous casualties on the platoon.

Upon learning the ill-fated situation, Colonel Kern, the Regimental Commander, called off the attack and ordered all the assaulting platoons to withdraw. By this time, friendly casualties had reached 77 men including three platoon leaders who were badly wounded. On the other hand, the enemy casualties were fewer than 65 men even if the highest estimate was accepted.

Considering the tremendous amount of ammunition expenditure in the Operation Smack; 224,000 pounds of bombs and eight napalm tanks by air force; 12,000 rounds of 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers; nearly 100,000 rounds of 50 caliber and 40-mm gun ammunition; 2,000 rounds of 90-mm gun and over
75,000 rounds of lesser caliber gun from tanks; 4,500 rounds of heavy mortar; over 50,000 rounds of machine gun and small arms and 650 hand grenades by infantry assault ing platoons, the experiment had ended in a complete failure. The enemy using only a fraction of this amount of ordnance had inflicted much greater losses upon the 7th US Division.

It was an expensive lesson to demonstrate again that the enemy were so well dug in that UNC fire power itself was not enough to neutralize the enemy fortifications, and that the air and artillery bombardments had little effect upon the enemy in his deep, protected bunkers and caves.

As February progressed the war reawakened in the western sector, where the enemy became more sensitive and had shown strong reactions to friendly patrols. And, as March bageden, the Chinese Communist forces dropped the passive role of the early winter period and went over to the offensive again, to be sure, on a limited scale. The enemy endeavored to break through the main line of resistance by launching attacks on UNC outposts on the key hills that were in the hands of the 1st US Marine Division and 7th US Division. At tremendous cost in lives they achieved near break-throughs and shoved the ROK and UN allied defenders off the top, only to pull back in the face of friendly counterattacks, and suffering further heavy losses as UNC massed artillery pounded the routes of their retreat.

On 3 February 1953, the 5th Marine Regiment of the 1st US Marine Division (Major General Edwin A. Pollock) conducted a tank-infantry daytime raid (Operation Clambake) against Hill 101 and Ungok hill mass, 16 kilometers north of Munsan-ni. With the support of air and artillery, the raid was carried out as planned. Although it failed in capturing prisoners, counted 90 enemy dead and 300 more were estimated dead or wounded.

Early daylight hours of 25 February, reinforced two platoons from 5th US Marine Regiment made a successful raid on Hill Detroit, a little over a two kilometers southeast of the "Hook." Artillery preparatory fires had been employed successfully to isolate the area and howitzer and tank missions supported the raid. However, due to the bad weather prevented the use of almost all the planned air strikes, the assault Marines found the majority of enemy installations were relatively undamaged.

On the front manned by the 7th US Division (Major General W.C. Smith), on 20 February, estimated two CCF companies launched an attack on twin outposts (Eerie and Arsenal) just south of Hill 191 (T-Bone Ridge) in the Yokkok-chon sector and caught a 7th US Division ambush patrol under attack. Reinforcements from the 17th US Regiment were rushed forward to bolster the patrol and
finally a platoon of tanks moved forward to screen the battle field and evacuate the wounded. Although all the members of the patrol were either killed or wounded they had evidently staved off a battalion-sized assault on the outposts. Another estimated CCF company caught a 7th US Division patrol under heavy fire across the valley at the lower Alligator’s Jaw (Hill 324) which was located about two kilometers and a half northeast of outpost Eerie, on 24 February. In this engagement, the entire 20-man patrol were killed or wounded.

On the 1st of March, the Red Chinese launched their first major attack on the positions held by the 9th Regiment (Colonel Richard Steinback) of the 2nd US Division. Shortly after supper, a tremendous barrage of artillery and mortar rounds started to fall on the friendly positions at the low left finger of Hill 355 (Little Gibraltair) and fifteen minutes later an estimated battalionsized Red Chinese force pushed in the outguard. Storming through his own falling mortar and artillery fire, the enemy swept up into the friendly positions. A period of confused and vicious hand-to-hand fighting took place with the enemy and the men of 9th Regiment inextricably mixed in the trenches. Then, friendly men, combined with reinforcing elements, made a counterattack that succeeded in throwing the Communists from the positions. The enemy was pinched between the counterattackers and artillery fire that was following on his escaping route.

On the night of 3 March, following an intense artillery and mortar preparation on the “Hook” area, a CCF platoon struck and overran a friendly outpost from the 38th US Regiment (Colonel Archbald W. Stuart) on Hill Warsaw. Reinforcements were dispatched and drove the enemy off the area.

Three days later, on the night of 6 March, a combat patrol from 31st Regiment of the 7th US Division intercepted an estimated CCF battalion apparently on its way to attack Hill 234 (Porkchop) and the surprise contact disrupted the enemy plan. The Red Chinese dropped 8,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on the hill during the night, but made no serious attempt to push on toward the outpost.

That same evening, the scene moved to the 11th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division where the Red Chinese launched two fruitless company-sized attacks on the outposts (Hill 105 and Hill Betty) which were located at approximately four kilometers northeast of Hill 355 (Little Gibraltair) or Kowang-san.

There was brief lull along the front with the advent of the late winter rains. Mud restricted the movements of vehicles but did not deter the enemy from resuming the attack shortly after the middle of March.

On 17 March estimated a reinforced CCF battalion caught 2nd and 3rd Battalions of 9th Regiment. 2nd US Division in the middle of their relief on Hill 355.
As the elements of L Company came up the reverse slope trenches to relieve Company G, a strong enemy force poured over the forward slope, breaching the wire entanglements and pushed through the mine fields into the main battle positions on the left finger of the hill. A storm of fire greeted the relieving elements of L Company trying to move forward into the position. In the confused battle that ensued, elements of G and L Companies played a murderous game of hide-and-seek in the bunkers and trenches with the enemy. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions then threw every available fighting men into the welter of flying grenades and small arms fire. As a cold dawn broke over the furious fighting, the Red Chinese who drove in fully intended to stay, had been thrown out, and while retreating, suffered additional casualties from heavy artillery and mortar fire chasing the withdrawing route. Enemy casualties were estimated at 315 and the action cost the 9th Regiment slightly over a hundred.

The Central Sector
(IX US and II ROK Corps)

The winter lull did not seem to last in the central sector until the months of January through March 1953. On the IX US Corps front, the 3rd US Division (plus Greek Battalion, Belgian Battalion, and Turkish Artillery Battalion) under Major General George W. Smythe, devoted most of the period in aggressive patrolling and extensive fortification works since it had moved into the present sector of Line Missouri on 28 January 1953.

On 29 January, the division commander assigned the sector which included the troublesome trio of outposts; Tom (Hill 270), Dick, and Harry (Hill 420), extending to the east from Chorwon at the base of the Iron Triangle, to the 15th US Regiment (plus Greek Battalion) commanded by Colonel Richard G. Stilwell, with the 65th US Infantry (plus Belgian Battalion) on its right and the 7th US Regiment in reserve.

Opposing the 15th US Regiment were the elements of the 211th and 212th Regiments, 71st Division of the 24th CCF Army. The 211th CCF Regiment was deployed on a hill mass known as Jackson Hights in Haktang-ni. The 212th CCF Regiment had one battalion on line from Hill 472 to Star Hill mass, with the other battalion on Hill 717 (Sobang-san). The enemy had dug extensive communication trenches on these terrain features in front of Outposts Dick and Harry.

Keenly aware of the importance of the key outposts, Colonel Stilwell allocated most of the time in rebuilding and strengthening the main battle positions and
the outposts. During the month of February, program of harassing and interdicting fires, coordinating all the weapons available in the division sector, was conducted successfully to inflict extensive damage on the enemy. On the other hand, the majority of the enemy fires, consisting of 76-mm., 105-mm. and 82-mm. rounds, fell on the trio outposts during these days.

On 20 February, Lieutenant General Taylor visited the 15th US Infantry. Accompanying General Taylor were Lieutenant General Jenkins, the IX US Corps Commander and Major General Smythe. On 6 March, the 15th US Regiment and the Greek Battalion were visited by General Clark, Lieutenant General Taylor, Lieutenant General Jenkins, and Major General Smythe.

On 21 March, Colonel Stilwell handed over command of the 15th US Regiment to Colonel Rissel F. Akers, Jr. and was appointed Senior Adviser to the I ROK Corps. Incidentally, Colonel Stilwell later became the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command (1 August 1973–8 October 1976) with a rank of general.

On 5 March a company from 30th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division made an assault on enemy strong-point on the Sniper Ridge which was roughly five kilometers northeast of Kumhwa. The CCF defenders resisted desperately but in vain. After two days of intense fighting the men of 9th ROK Division succeeded in driving the enemy off and secured the hill by the evening of the 6 March. Friendly artillery and mortar had fired 35,214 rounds in support of the operation. Besides, the IX US Corps dispatched over 2,500 patrols during February and March and fewer than a hundred enemy encounters were reported. During March the corps witnessed the capture of only one enemy prisoner of war by a patrol.

On the II ROK Corps front, on 1 March, following heavy artillery and mortar fire, a CCF company launched an attack on friendly positions on Hill 663, about 500 yards southwest of Capital Hill, held by a platoon from the 21st Regiment of the 8th ROK Division. Soon, despite the immediate response of fire by the friendly defenders, the outnumbering enemy had penetrated the lower trenches of the friendly positions and fierce close combat had broken out. Two hours after the onset of the attack, under the perimeter of exploding shells and hand grenades the friendly platoon held positions successfully off the enemy. Two days later, on 3 March, one more heavy enemy engagement occurred on the II ROK Corps front. Estimated an enemy platoon, reinforced soon by one more CCF company, launched an assault on UNC outpost positions some three kilometers southeast of Kumsong defended by a company from the 2nd Regiment of the 6th ROK Division. As the Red Chinese swept up into the friendly positions, the fire fight soon developed into the savage hand-to-hand fighting,
Patrol of the 35th US Infantry studying a map of enemy-held terrain.

Shortly after, friendly reinforcing elements were sent out to bolster the defenders and there again ensued fierce battle back and forth until the next day when friendly forces were ordered to withdraw from the hill and directed a deluge of artillery and air strafe onto the enemy. As the artillery fire lifted, friendly counterattacking elements were able to retake the hill with only light enemy resistance. In this fighting which lasted for about sixteen hours, enemy fired 1,623 rounds of artillery and mortar, while UNC artillery threw in 7,731 rounds on him.

The Mid-Eastern and Eastern Sectors
(X US and 1 ROK Corps)

On the X US Corps front one important encounter with the enemy had taken place in early February. On the night of 2 February, 1953, the 37th Regiment of the 12th ROK Division reported enemy troops were concentrating for an
attack. Intense artillery fire poured into the enemy assembly area, but a NK
Communist battalion pushed on toward the Hill 812. A savage hand grenade
battle broke out within fifty yards of friendly positions and lasted until a
reinforcing company turned the tide. The enemy forces used close to 7,000
rounds of mortar and artillery and suffered over a hundred estimated casualties.
They received over twice as many rounds from the UNC artillery.

During the remainder of February and the following month, operations in the
X US Corps sector were more or less routine.

One noteworthy enemy activity marked in the I ROK Corps sector early in
January. On 7 January a patrol from the 5th ROK Division located a tunnel
entrance and ventilating shaft near Hill 351 (Anchor Hill), where the Communists
were digging their way close to the positions held by the elements of the 5th
ROK Division. After the enemy's work detail entered the tunnel, the friendly
patrol blew up the entrance and sealed the shaft with explosives. Within a few
days the enemy had reopened the entrance, so the friendly troops called for an
Section 2. Renewing the Outpost Battles
(23 – 29 March 1953)

The Battles of Old Baldy and Porkchop
(23 – 26 March)

As March 1953 was drawing to its close, the impetus of enemy action began to increase sharply and launched a series of attacks ranging in strength from battalion to regimental size, particularly on the long-contested friendly outposts in the western I US Corps sector.

As already discussed before, the bloody action to capture, recapture and defense of the key outposts was one of the intense, contained struggle which came to characterize the latter part of the Korean War. As the truce talks dragged on and the Communists started to use the battle ground to apply pressure upon the negotiations the outposts came to have an increasing political value. Thus, they had cast covetous eyes on friendly-held hills and the Communists had little hesitation in expending human lives to take a few more hills when sacrifice seemed to promise a future political gain.

On 20 March the 7th US Division had indications that the enemy contemplated an attack in the Old Baldy-Porkchop area. The increase in artillery and mortar rounds on the division’s positions on these long-contested hills usually signified a new Communist offensive move, and two Red deserters captured in the sector testified giving additional evidence to the belief that action would soon be forthcoming.

The Old Baldy-Porkchop area was held by the 31st US Regiment and its attached Colombian Battalion. Colonel William B. Kern, the Regimental Commander, had deployed his 2nd Battalion on the left, the Colombian Battalion
under Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruiz-Novoa in the center, which included Old Baldy (Hill 275), and the 3rd Battalion on the right in the Porkchop (Hill 234) sector. One company from the 1st Battalion manned the blocking positions behind each of the three front-line battalions.

Facing the 7th US Division were two CCF armies. The 141st Division, 47th CCF Army, manned the enemy position opposite Old Baldy and to the west and the 67th Division, 23rd CCF Army, defended the terrain from the Porkchop Hill area to the east.

On the evening of 23 March the Chinese Communists staged a double-barreled attack on outposts Old Baldy and Porkchop. At 2030 hours, a mixed battalion from the 423rd Regiment, 141st CCF Division attacked and caught B Company of the Colombian Battalion, under Captain Irmer Pera, in the middle of relieving the Company C outpost on the hill. The Red Chinese closely followed an intense artillery and mortar concentrations upon the friendly positions and fought their way into the trenches. Soon Old Baldy became a shambles with most of the bunkers aflame and all communication lines to the battalion command post had been cut off. Colonel Kern, to reinforce the Colombian Battalion, placed Company B, 31st Regiment under Colonel Ruiz-Novoa’s operational control.

At 2230 hours B Company led by 1st Lieutenant Jack M. Patterson advanced toward Old Baldy, approaching from “Westview,” the next hill to the southeast. As B Company drew near the outpost, the enemy first called in intense artillery and mortar fire along the approach routes and then took B Company under fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. The company slowly made its way into the first bunkers on Old Baldy at 0200 hours and began to mop up the enemy one by one. As it came up against the main strength of the Reds on Old Baldy, however, progress lessened and was forced to withdraw to southwest slope of the hill. (See Situation Map 7, Appendix IX.)

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, who assumed the command of the 7th US Division on 21 March after Major General Wayne C. Smith, ordered the 31st US Regiment to carry out a counterattack to regain Old Baldy, placing the 1st Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment under its operational control. Company B of the 73rd US Tank Battalion was to support the attack in addition to its organic and attached tank units. Colonel Kern, the 31st Regimental Commander, in turn, assigned the attack mission to Lieutenant Colonel Juskalian, the 1st Battalion Commander of the 32nd Regiment, to retake Hill 275 (Old Baldy) with the support of tank columns.

A tank-infantry composite task force, organized with two tank platoons from the 73rd US Tank Battalion plus a platoon of the 31st Tank Company and
Prethaw Front

Company B of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, was to spearhead the counterattack from the southwest, jumping off at 0730 hours, 24 March. The enemy met the assaulting units with incessant barrage of artillery and mortar that continued to cause heavy casualties on friendly attackers. As the men crawled forward slowly, the Red odds opened up with small arms and automatic weapons which were so heavy that B Company was unable to advance further. Thus, at 1430 hours, the 1st Battalion’s assault stalled on the southwest finger of Old Baldy.

Colonel Juskalian, the 1st Battalion Commander, reorganized his forces and sent B Company and A Company, under 1st Lieutenant Jack L. Conn, in a second attack at 1535 hours on the 24th. The two companies reached positions of B Company, 31st Regiment, and passed through them. By 1830 hours, they had won back one quarter of Old Baldy, but soon were forced by enemy resistance to dig in and hold. During this fighting Lieutenant Patterson, the B Company Commander, suffered a broken jaw and had to be evacuated.

At 0430 hours on 25 March, the 1st Battalion Commander sent Company C, under 1st Lieutenant Robert C. Gutner, around the right flank to attack up the northwest finger of Old Baldy. The men had scarcely gone a half mile before being shelled. After briefly taking cover the men moved out again, only to draw individual and crew-served weapons fire from the enemy at Old Baldy. By 0930 hours, after five blistering hours of fighting, Colonel Juskalian reported that B and A Companies were one-third the way up the left finger, where they pinned down by small arms and hand grenades. C Company was “pretty well shot up” and had to be withdrawn and reorganized. Some members of the company were still pinned down on the right flank of Old Baldy and could not get out. Colonel Juskalian called for tank support to knock out the CCF bunkers being used to pin down the 30 to 40 men of Company C left on the hill.

By 1315 hours, in spite of the tank support, the 1st Battalion’s situation had not improved. Colonel Juskalian’s three rifle companies were clinging to their positions, but A Company had only two officers and 14 men; B Company and C Company had two officers and 40 men between them. Colonel Juskalian asked for a smoke screen and medical aid so that he could evacuate his casualties.

On the night of 25–26 March, the 1st Battalion now numbering less than 60 effectives after repeated assaults to regain the Old Baldy high ground was ordered to withdraw from Old Baldy.

UN Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighters and bombers mounted air strikes against nearby hills, strong-points, and supply routes during the night and then hit Old Baldy the next morning after the 1st Battalion had cleared off the hill.
Ground Operations

Lieutenant General Kendall, I US Corps Commander, ordered the 7th US Division another attack to regain Old Baldy to be scheduled for either 27 or 28 March after rehearsal had been held. Major General Trudeau, to carry out the assault, selected the 2nd Battalion (Major William M. Colnan), 32nd Regiment (Colonel George L. Van Way), and the battalion held two rehearsals on terrain similar to Old Baldy in the closing days of March and was prepared to execute the attack. General Taylor, the Eighth US Army Commander, after considering the psychological, tactical, and doubtlessly the casualty aspects of the planned operation, decided that Old Baldy was not essential to the defense of the sector and that consequently no attack would be carried out.

The development at Porkchop (Hill 234), meanwhile, was also serious. At 2105 hours on 23 March, with five tanks in support, a CCF battalion from 291st Regiment, 67th CCF Division, thrust into the positions held by L Company, 3rd Battalion, from frontal and flank attacks. The Communists, as in the Old Baldy assault, had laid down heavy artillery and mortar concentrations on the L Company positions before they assaulted. Despite the immediate response of fire support, and desperate resistance by L Company led by 1st Lieutenant Forrest Crittenden, which fought until the ammunition began to run low, the enemy outnumbered the company holding the outpost. By 2345 hours the Communists had penetrated into the lower trenches of Porkchop and L Company had to pull back from the crest of the hill for resupply and reinforcements. Proximity fuze fire was laid directly on Porkchop while ammunition was brought forward and Company A, under Lieutenant Gerald Morse, advanced to the aid of L Company. Elements of I Company were ordered to secure Hill 200, some a kilometer and a half southeast of Porkchop, which had also been reported as under attack.

At 0045 hours on 24 March, Lieutenant Colonel John N. Davis, the 3rd
Battalion Commander, launched a counterattack against Porkchop, with Companies A and L abreast, left to right. The two attacking companies met only light resistance from the few Chinese Communists left on the crest.

The two days of fighting for Old Baldy and Porkchop had been costly for the 7th US Division. Casualties had run over 300 were killed, wounded and missing.

Although Red Chinese losses were estimated at between 600 to 800 men, the enemy had committed his troops freely to maintain possession of Old Baldy. The enemy's willingness to expend their manpower resources offered a clear contrast to the UNC reluctance to risk lives for tactical objective of questionable value at this stage of war.

The Battle at the Trio-Outposts
(26 - 29 March)

A trio of outposts, Hill 110—Hill 148—Hill 175, strangely nick-named as Carson—Reno—Vegas were located at 1,500 yards ahead of the main line of resistance on the far western front held by the 1st US Marine Division under Major General Edwin A. Pollock.

The semi-circular looking net of outposts lay just below the 38th Parallel, approximately 16 kilometers northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance north of Munsan-ni.

As being repeatedly stressed on the tactical importance of holding key terrain features that could be of major tactical value to the enemy, the American Marines were on constant alert and prepared fully for an attack. Particularly, Hill 148 (Reno) and Hill 175 (Vegas) were considered likely target for renewed enemy offensive in the near future. The object of increasing CCF attacks since 1952, outpost Reno was the closest of the trio outposts to CCF lines and tied in geographically with two of the enemy's high ground positions — Hill 190, to the northeast, and Hill 101, overlooking the site of the village of Ungok. Reno's companion outpost on the right, approximately 1.310 yards in front of the main line of resistance, Hill 175 (Vegas) was the highest of the three while Hill 110 (Carson), on the left flank, overlooking enemy terrain to the northwest and dominated an important approach to the Seoul road, was nearest to Line Jamestown and assisted in defense of the outposts - - Reno and Vegas.

The defending components, left to right, were 1st and 5th Marine Regiments of the 1st US Marine Division. The 7th Marine Regiment relieved by the 1st
Marine Regiment early in the month was now in division reserve.

Occupying the far eastern end of the division sector, which included the trio of outposts, Colonel Lewis W. Walt, the Commander of 5th Marines, had deployed his 1st Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Platt, with Companies A, B, and C on the line, from left to right, and 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Odly, with its Companies H, G, and I on forward, from west to east. In regimental reserve was 2nd Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Finch.

Outpost troops, numbering about 40–43 men from Company C were stationed on Carson and Reno. Outpost Vegas, due to its proximity to the boundary between 1st and 3rd Battalions, was defended by Company H personnel of 3rd Battalion while placed under operational control of 1st Battalion.

In support of the 5th US Marines, the 11th Marine Artillery Regiment, under Colonel James E. Mills, had its 1st Battalion (light) in direct support and 2nd Battalion (light) to reinforce the fires of 1st Battalion. The 4th Battalion (medium) of the regiment and attached 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery was in general support. Active armoured support for the 5th Marines were Company A's M-46s, flame tanks, and retrievers of the 1st Tank Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel John I. Williams.

At precisely 1900 hours on 26 March the 358th Regiment, 120th Division, 40th CCF Army began to swarm down from Ungok and Hill 190 and launched a massive assault in regimental strength against the 5th Marine sector.

The attack primarily centered on a trio of peaks. At the enemy regiment advanced toward its objectives in a coordinated three-prolonged attack, the American Marines called down artillery and mortar barrage on the outposts and route of enemy approach. Despite the immediate response of fire support, the CCF invaders outnumbered the Marine platoons holding the outposts by a 20 to 1 ratio. The sheer weight of numbers was the decisive factor.

By 1935 hours the enemy had penetrated the lower trenches of both Carson and Reno. Outpost Reno, by 2000 hours, was vastly more ominous at two companies of CCF thrust into the position and began to batter the Marine post. Within half an hour of the assault, Reno defenders fell back on a cave defense. At the menatime, at 2000 hours, an hour after the onset of the attack, the Marines defending outpost Carson were having close combat to throw back the Communist forces with bayonets and bare fists to hold successfully the outpost off the enemy. At Vegas, the situation was also deteriorating. More than a hundred of Red Chinese had moved up in the midst of exploding shells and Marines defensive fires into the lower trenches, and, by 2000 hours, the Marine
defenders on Vegas also were forced to give way to the overwhelming number of enemy troops which began to swarm over the outpost.

While development at the outposts Reno, Vegas had grown so critical, reinforcements back at the main line of resistance and in the reserve quickly saddled up. Relief units to Reno, composed largely of F Company and C Company of 5th Marines, were dispatched at 2105 and 2030 hours respectively by way of the Reno-Block, but they could scarcely make their way farther from Reno-Block before being shelled or ambushed. Meanwhile, a reinforcement platoon from D Company of 5th Marines ordered to Vegas, at 2129 hours, encountered strong opposition in the Block vicinity, but it threw back the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting and made its way to the Reno-Block positions.

While the Reno and Vegas relief units were pinned down at the Block the situation at the outposts remained critical. At Reno, the immediate situation was most grim. A message, at 2145 hours, reported the enemy still in the trenches, trying to dig down into the cave while the Marines were attempting to work their way out by hand. The final report from Reno received late that night, about 2300 hours, was weak and could not be understood.

At Vages, meanwhile, communications failure continued to complicate defensive measures at the outpost. Because of this, on the order of Regimental Commander, Colonel Walt, operational control transferred at 2119 hours from the 1st Battalion to 3rd Battalion. A platoon of E Company of 5th Marines jumped off at 2323 hours for the Vegas position, but three minutes before midnight all contact with Vegas was lost.

Thus, these early attempts to rescue Reno and Vegas were initially being thwarted, and, by midnight on the 26th, after five blistering hours of battle which developed into five days of intense fighting and continuing counterattacks, the enemy seized two of the trio-outposts. (See situation Map 8, Appendix IX.)

Initially, the 5th US Marines had planned to launch an immediate counterattack to regain the outpost Reno. However, by the early hours of the 27th the reinforcing elements that jumped off for Reno at 2105 hours of 26 March had been unable to mount out effectively from the Block for Reno. At 0144 hours, Captain Ralph L. Waltz, the commander of F Company of 5th Marines, reported that he had only one platoon left.

On the other hand, the Vegas reinforcing units, in those dark early hours of the 27th, had come closer to the objective. Shortly after midnight two platoons, composed of elements from Company D and Company C of 5th Marines, had reached a point 400 yards from the outposts. As the enemy threw in powerful new assault forces at Vegas, Company F of 7th Marines, was placed
under operational control of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, and moved out to reinforce the forward relief units. However, at 0300 hours on the 27th when the forward relief units reached within 200 yards of Vegas, it was found that the enemy was in complete control of Vegas as well as Reno.

Early on the 27th, at 0345 hours, as the 5th US Marines prepared for the counterattack, the 2nd Battalion, 7th US Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Alexander D. Cereghine, was placed under operational control of the 5th Marines. At the time, a change in the counterattacking plan was also made when it was decided to limit the assault to Vegas and not to retake Reno but rather neutralize it by fire.

At 1120 hours, while artillery, air, mortar and tanks pounded the objective, D Company, 5th Marines, under Captain John B. Melvin, crossed the line of departure. Half an hour later the company was pinned down by a plastering of 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortar shells falling everywhere in its advance. The Marine unit continued to claw its way through the rainy-swollen rice paddies and up the muddy slopes to within 200 yards of the outpost by 1210 hours.

Back at the battalion command post two more companies were being readied to continue the Vegas assault. The Provisional Company and Company E of 5th Marines moved out at 1215 hours of 27 March. Company E under Captain Herbert M. Lorraine, had moved up from the rear and was ordered, at 1440 hours, to pass through Company D ranks at lower slopes of Vegas, continue the attack and secure the crest of the outpost. Although Company E succeeded in moving into Company D positions, the deluge of the enemy mortar and artillery were so heavy that Company E was unable to advance beyond this point. At 1530 hours, as the counterattack made little progress, Companies E and F, 7th Marines were dispatched to reinforce the assault and reached the advanced positions of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines within an hour. By 1800 hours, Company F was approximately 400 yards from the outpost summit. Combining with Company E of the 5th Marines, for a total strength of three platoons in Captain Ralph F. Estev, the Commander of F Company, 7th Marines, was able to retake part of the objective. Meanwhile, E Company of 7th Marines advanced to the right of the outpost where at 1930 hours it began to consolidate.

Throughout the night of the 27th the enemy repeated futile counterattacks. Between 1830–2400 hours, Company F repulsed three CCF onslaughts. Although the composite two-platoon element from Company F of the 7th Marines and from Company E of the 5th Marines had partially won Vegas back in ten hours of savage fighting on the 27 March, it was a precarious hold. The enemy troops were still clinging to the northern crest.
At 0335 hours on 28 March when the 11th US Marine Artillery Regiment began to belch forth its streams of fire on the enemy troops at the northern slopes, F Company of 7th Marines moved out and reached within the hand grenade range of the objective within half an hour. An intense shower of enemy small arms and mortar fire, however, forced the Marines to pull back to the southern slope of Vegas. Again, F Company, after failure in another earlier attack at 0600 hours, jumped off in attack at 0920 hours, and crawled their way across the height to within 15 yards of the trench line on the left finger of Vegas by 1015 hours. Meanwhile, E Company of the 5th Marines, with Company D of 7th Marines in column behind it, had moved out and relieved Company F, 7th Marines and completed its passage of lines through Company F by noon.

Heavy air attacks assisting the artillery in blasting out Communist defenses of the Vegas area and east slope of Reno, Hill 190 and resupply points continued until 1245 hours when the Company E of the 5th Marines had moved up to within 150 yards of the crest. At Marine supporting fire lifted from Vegas to enemy assembly area, E Company launched its final assault and, at 1307 hours, its 1st Platoon led by Staff Sargeant John J. Williams, had succeeded in retaking the top of Vegas outpost. (See Situation Map 8, Appendix IX.)

Altogether, during the night of 28–29 March, two CCF battalions had made three separate ventures to retake the Vegas crest, but were thrown back by the American Marines. Recapture and defense of the Vegas outpost was the most bloody action that the US Marines on the western front had yet engaged in. Its cost can be seen, in part, by the casualties sustained by the 1st US Marine Division. Marine losses were 1,915, or 116 killed, 811 wounded, and 98 missing, of which 19 were known to be prisoners.

Enemy casualties were listed conservatively as 2,200. This represented 536 counted killed, 650 estimated killed, 170 counted wounded, 840 estimated wounded, and four prisoners.
CHAPTER XI A NEW DEVELOPMENT
(1 April – 31 May 1953)

Section 1. Negotiations Resumed

The prospect of a new stage in the off-and-on truce negotiation had come late in March, 1953 when the fighting on outpost in the western sector was at its height. On 28 March 1953 the Communists informed General Clark, UNC Commander-in-Chief, of their willingness to discuss the UNC proposal for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

Back on 13 December 1952, the Executive Committee of the League of International Red Cross Societies in Geneva had passed a resolution calling for the immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. The U.S. Government, although it did not think the Communists would agree to such an exchange in the light of their previous reaction to similar proposal, had decided to support and propose the resolution for the political advantage in its psychological and publicity aspects.

A letter written on 22 February 1953 by the UNC Commander-in-Chief requesting an immediate exchange of ailing prisoners of war had been delivered to the Communist heads.

Initially the Communist answer was an oppressive silence that lasted for more than a month. During this time the Communist hierarchy had been stunned by the death of Joseph V. Stalin on 5 March and marked another transition period for world communism. Whether the policies of the new Russian controlling group surrounding Georgi M. Malenkov would differ radically from those of Stalin was unknown. Under the circumstances, the United States and its allies cautiously awaited indications of the direction that the new Russian regime intended to take.

Then, on 28 March, in a letter that reached General Clark, came an unexpected response from Communists. Replying to General Clark’s letter, Kim Il-sung and Peng Teh-huai not only agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded
prisoners but also proposed that the both sides resume the armistice talks immediately for the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war. The Communists' new move astonished not only the UNC Commander but the rest of the world as well.

Exchange of Sick and Wounded Prisoners
(20 – 26 April)

While the world looked to Panmunjom for the next set of signals in the war, a new stage developed in the truce negotiations. On 6 April 1953, the delegations met at Panmunjom to resume the negotiations that had been stalemated for six months since 8 October 1952, and agreed to return the sick and wounded prisoners in their custody.

Final papers for the exchange were signed at noon on 11 April 1953 by Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, for the United Nations Command, and the head of the Communist delegation. However, the earnest effort of the United Nations Command to encourage the Communists to return as many prisoners as possible met with a very disappointing response. The Communists announced that they intended to return 600 sick and wounded UNC prisoners (450 ROK's and 150 non-Korean), a figure which Admiral Daniel called "incredibly small." For its part, the UNC indicated to transfer 700 Red Chinese and 5,100 NK Communists, for total of 5,800 men.

The week-long transfer of sick and wounded prisoners, better known as "Operation Little Switch," was scheduled to begin at 0900 hours, 20 April at Panmunjom, with the Communists delivering 100 and the UN Command 500 a day in groups of 25 at a time. On 14 April, twenty-three vehicles left the enemy prison camps
with the first contingent of UNC sick and wounded. And, on 19 April, the first train-load of enemy prisoners set out from Pusan to Munsan.

As Operation "Little Switch" got under way on 20 April, hoping more UNC personnel away from the enemy, the UN Command added 550 more enemy prisoners to its list. But on 26 April the Communist side abruptly stated that his side had completed its share of the exchange. Faced with an unyielding stand, the UN Command finished delivering the last group of Communists that it intended to turn over.

The final tally of deliveries disclosed that the UN Command had relieved itself of 5,914 NK Communist and 1,030 Chinese Communist prisoners and 446 NK Communist civilian internees, for a total of 6,670. In return the Communists had brought 684 (471 ROKs, 149 U.S., 32 British, 15 Turkish, 6 Colombian, 5 Australian, 2 Canadian, 1 Greek, 1 Netherland, 1 Filipino, and 1 South African) assorted sick and wounded to Panmunjom.

It was only later, much after 26 April 1953, when the exchange had ended, that the people of the free world learned that the enemy had not played fair -- many of the exchanged on "Little Switch" were not ailing prisoners but those amendable to the Communists expected to give a favorable picture of their captivity on return.

Agreed on the POW Issue
(26 April – 8 June)

The change in the Communist negotiating position on the repatriate question dangled the prospect of an earlier settlement before the eyes of the United States and its allies.

On 26 April 1953, the plenary sessions of the negotiations reconvened at Panmunjom. During this plenary session the Communists presented a six-point Communist proposal which, briefly, called for an agreement to send all non-repatriated prisoners to a neutral state outside Korea within three months of the signing of the truce. During the next six months agents of their governments concerned would have facilities to persuade the prisoners to come home. After the expiry of this time, all remaining non-repatriates would be kept in the custody of the neutral state until the post-war political conference envisaged by the armistice terms provided for their disposal. As these proposal indicated strongly that the non-repatriates might be incarcerated indefinitely if -- as seemed only too likely -- the conference failed to agree, Lieutenant General Harrison rejected the Communist plan. The provision which required the movement of the non-
Thousands of ROK students in anti-truce demonstration in Pusan displaying “Unification or Death” posters.

repatriates outside Korean was also unacceptable to UN Command. As for the duration of custody General Harrison insisted that sixty days were sufficient to determine the attitudes of the prisoners.

With this immediate impasse the prospect of an early truce had become far-fetched and the proceedings at Panmunjom reverted to normal with angry, abusive exchange of recriminatory charges and counter-charges. Arguments flew back and forth on the place of custody for non-repatriates, duration of custody and which neutral state should look for the prisoners. Most of the month of May was spent in arguing modifications of the above questions.

On 23 May the policy makers in Washington completed and forwarded their conclusions to the UN Command. The final offer embraced terms in general consonance with the Indian resolution since the United States had supported
the Indian resolution of 3 December 1952. They provided for the transfer of all prisoners to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) which would be constituted with an Indian chairman and Indian custodial forces alone. After a sixty-day period for repatriation of those who wished to return home, a period of 90 or 120 days for ‘explaining’ would be allowed after which non-repatriates would either be released as civilian or else their disposition would be referred to the U.N. General Assembly. Thus the final UNC proposal was tabled in the executive session on 25 May and was accepted by the Communists with minor changes at the plenary session on 4 June 1953.

There was a small amount of haggling over the number of ‘explainers,’ and the Communists refused to accept the U.N. General Assembly as a possible custodian because the United Nations were belligerents in Korea. On the other hand, the longer wardship proposed for the non-repatriates in the proposal of 25 May was an UNC concession, as was Washington’s agreement to turn over all prisoners to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Thus, on 8 June, after eighteen months negotiation over the trouble-some question of Item 4 of the Armistice Agenda, the ‘Terms of Reference’ were signed by the both delegations. The armistice agreement, but for the drawing of the final demarcation line, was complete.

It should be noted at this moment that President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea and his nation had protested strongly against the truce negotiation from its outset, and shortly before the 8 June agreement on the POW question the ROK anti-armistice campaign became more vociferous. President Rhee and the whole ROK nation rekindled their opposition campaign displaying ‘unification or death’ posters to block a truce that did not meet their term.

On 1 April, the ROK National Assembly adopted a resolution urging the U.S. Government to avoid any negotiation with Communists not guaranteeing the complete unification of Korea. President Rhee in his address on the first anniversary of the II ROK Corps, on 5 April, called for military victory and a drive to the north rather than a truce along present lines. Thus, in its path to the armistice, the UN Command had faced with a strong, delicate obstacle that had to be overcome.

Section 2. Tighting Battle Front
(1 April – 31 May’ 1953)
In April 1953, with the truce negotiations again taking one of their spasmodic swings at Panmunjom and the negotiators were arranging the details for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and for the resumption of the plenary conference, the flurry of activity in the battlefield during March had been superseded by a return to routine patrolling and small-scale probing activities along the entire UNC front. Seldom was an enemy attack mounted with more than two companies.

During this period, the Eighth US Army effected some changes affecting the designation of the UNC main line of resistance. The Allied front called Line Jamestown in the 1 US Corps, and variously in other parts, as Missouri, Duluth, Minnesota and Cat., were redesignated simply as "Main Line of Resistance"; beginning 28 April 1953, and, was to be so known in all future orders and communications throughout the entire Eighth US Army. The relocation of the Eighth US Army Headquarters began during May when sections of the headquarters moved from Taegu to Seoul.

Besides, in early April, despite the possibility of cease-fire, General Clark made an suggestion to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that he be granted authority to build up the ROK Army to a balanced twenty-division force of approximately 655,000 men. At the present rate, this would be reached in a few months and would constitute the ultimate strength of the Republic of Korea Army. In April, General Clark urged the continuance of the ROK Army twenty-division program and asked for authorization to activate two new ROK divisions and he further desired that the Department of U.S. Army to provide enough equipment to take care of the two new divisions. He pointed out, if the war went on, the expanded ROK Army could either contribute toward the winning of a military victory and, if the war ended, it could help to guarantee ROK independence. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson granted General Clark permission on 17 April to raise the total of activated ROK Army divisions to sixteen and General Clark was informed that an increase of 65,000 men in the ROK Army ceiling strength was under consideration.

Meanwhile, in the matter of Marine, Navy, and Air Forces, President Rhee of the Republic of Korea had expressed a personal interest in the status of the augmentation of the ROK Marine Corps in late of April and had secured a favorable response from U.S. President. In mid-May, President Eisenhower approved an increase in ROK Marine Corps to 23,500 men, along with new personnel ceiling of 10,000 for the ROK Navy and 9,000 for the ROK Air Force.

Thus, General Taylor effected an activation of the 22nd and 25th ROK
Infantry Divisions on 21 April, in accordance with the plan that was approved on 17 April, bringing total of the ROK divisions up to sixteen.

Since April was the spring-thaw period, the sloppy condition of the ground caused to restrict the scale of operations. The uncertain status of negotiations might have been also a factor. Eighth US Army intelligence reports estimated that the enemy would continue to employ the active defense with twenty-nine divisions available in or near the front line and would not stage a general offensive in the near future.

The Western Front

On the I US Corps front in the west, taking advantage of this quiet period, the 1st British Commonwealth Division came back into its old positions on 8 April in two months and ten days permitting the 2nd US Infantry Division to move into corps reserve at Pupyong-ni. On 10 April, a change of command occurred within I US Corps as Lieutenant General (then Major General) Bruce C. Clarke took over command of the corps from Lieutenant General Paul W. Kendall, who was leaving Korea to take up a new appointment.

Although ground activities along the front followed a fairly persistent pattern, the possibility that the enemy might attempt to jockey for their improved defensive posture along the front in anticipation of an armistice remained to be a constant concern to the field commanders. Particularly along the western sector of the I US Corps front the war still a daily survival contest. On 9 April, following a heavy two-hour ballistic downpour of 2,000 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery, a reinforced CCF company launched a strong probe against friendly outpost "Carson" defended by the 7th Marine Regiment of the 1st US Marine Division. Attacking in two echelons, the enemy approached from north and west ridgeline. In an hour, the enemy had reached the Marine trenches and protective wire. For an hour and a half a heavy fire fight raged at the outpost while intruders and defenders battled at pointblank raged to settle the dispute. Following artillery and mortar concentration on the enemy a reinforced platoon supported by tanks was dispatched and drove the Red Chinese off. The enemy assault had cost him 60 known dead and 90 men were estimated killed, while the America Marine losses numbered 14 killed, four missing and 44 were wounded. The period up to the middle of April had been passed without major incidents except for customary patrol and probing actions.
The Battle for Porkchop
(16 - 18 April)

With Old Baldy gone, Porkchop (Hill 234) was flanked by the enemy-held hills and by military logic should have been abandoned, too. But now the UN Command was beginning to realize the political nature of these hill battles. The enemy was fighting, not for territory that had little value, but in a test of wills. And it was becoming apparent that each relinquished hill only whetted the enemy appetite, and made the Communists more intransigent than ever. In their own way, they were trying to force the UN forces to give up on the POW question, and to end the war on their terms. The UN Command stubbornly refused to give up Porkchop, and here, UNC troops engaged in another heavy fighting.

On the night of 16 April 1953, two under-strength platoons of Company E, 31st Regiment, 7th US Division under Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, had just taken over the outpost positions on Porkchop Hill. Altogether there were 96 men on the hill, including engineers, medics and artillery-men, twenty of these were on outguard duty in the listening posts on the forward slopes of the hill. The scene for the fight had been set by the sound of dirge-like Chinese music which had drifted over from Hassakkol, approximately seven hundred yards northwest of the hill, in the early evening. For the next few hours all was silent as the outguards settled down in their foxholes and a small patrol probed the valley floor below Porkchop Hill.

The division intelligence had the information from secret line-crossers of an imminent attack, and had informed 1st Lieutenant Thomas Harrold, the E Company Commander. But somehow the word had not passed down to the outguards beyond Porkchop. With dark, the night was clear, and starlit.

At 2300 hours, two CCF companies from the 201st Regiment of the 67th CCF Division slipped out of Hassakkol, jagged across the valley, and swarmed into the ramparts of Porkchop, before the alarm could be given, in the confusion of battle as the patrol and outguards had clashed with enemy attackers. In E Company's command post at the rear of the hill, the company commander lost contact with his 1st Platoon on the left of his positions as the Red Chinese barrage came in, and his communication line to the battalion also went dead. He fired a red flare, signifying he was under serious attack; then a second, requesting a "flash" curtain barrage of V7 proximity fuse and high explosive shells to stop the CCF follow-up. However, by 2325 hours, the enemy units
were all over the 1st Platoon’s sector, and close-in, hand-to-hand fighting erupted across the Porkchop. Lieutenant Harrold, together with his CP personnel turned his command post into a blockhouse barring the rear of the hill. But the enemy outnumbered the platoons holding the outpost and continued to batter the positions inflicting heavy casualties on the friendly defenders.

The regiment sent two platoons to reinforce Company E, one each from F Company and L Company. The platoon from F Company, however, became lost in the dark, and did not arrive; the men from Company L, misestimating the situation, walked up the hill and came under enemy fire. They did not know the hill was already under enemy control, and being taken under heavy enemy fire, they pulled back down into the valley. (See Sketch Map 42.)

By 0200 hours of the 17th, Porkchop was fallen. Lieutenant Harrold, and a number of his men, piling sandbags, ammunition boxes against the bunker entrances and embrasures, fought the enemy off, but they could not afford to hold the positions.

THE BATTLE FOR PORKCHOP (16–18 Apr 1953)
Colonel Kern, the 31st Regimental Commander decided to relieve Porkchop and, shortly after 0300 hours of 17 April, Company K under 1st Lieutenant Joseph Clemens, Jr., was ordered to move forward just behind Porkchop, while two platoons from Company L went up the hill from the right. It took K Company almost thirty minutes to reach the top of the ridge. And there close fighting broke out between K Company and the Red Chinese. Enemy artillery and mortar kept dousing the hill in regular intervals. In two hours the assaulting element was carried forward only some two hundred yards. Meanwhile, the platoons from L Company, coming up on the right, had been beaten by the entrenched enemy on the crest.

By 0800 hours of 17 April, K Company was out of water and running short of both ammunition and men, a few feet away from the enemy. Companies K and L, and men of Company E led by Lieutenant Harrold, had taken casualties
too heavy to mop up the enemy and they were trying to hold their own. Meanwhile, at noon, G Company of the 17th US Regiment under 1st Lieutenant Walter Russel, was struggling up the cratered slopes to reinforce the relief elements and encountered with a fresh CCF company that pushed up onto the other end of the ridge and the fierce battle blazed up again. Stumbling, shooting, and grenading about in the fantastic jumble of trenches, shattered bunkers, neither side was able to make progress. The barrage of enemy fire was incessant and almost unceasing. Soon the company was forced to disengage and pinned down.

While the situation on the hill was getting serious, the 1 US Corps Commander and the 7th US Division Commander were brooding over the problem of whether to continue the fight. If the outpost Porkchop fell, the Communist could next hit the main defensive positions and with the truce talks about to resume any weakening of the front could not be risked. Then final decision was made to make a counterattack and hold the hill. The division commander placed Company F of the 17th US Regiment under operational control of the 31st US Regiment at 1930 hours on 17 April to launch a counterattack and, at the meantime, the 1st Battalion of the 17th Regiment (commanded by Major Earl C. Acuff) was also ordered to move to Porkchop area.

At 2030 hours, F Company jumped off the line of departure and fought their way to the top of the hill by 2130 hours. The enemy poured on the attackers the heaviest barrage of fire. Following the disintegration of F Company, at 0100 hours of the 18th, E Company of the 17th Infantry was attached to the 31st Regiment and had to be committed, too. Company E reached the hill by storming north into enemy-held no-man's-land and to the face of the hill, with their backs to Pokkae. The Communists fought back with grenades and automatic weapons but by 0250 hours the regimental command post was reported that Porkchop Hill was under friendly control. Soon, more Red Chinese came in from Hassakkol and Pokkae, and as the second dawn of the battle came up, Company A of the 17th Infantry was committed to bolster the defending of the hill. As the fighting went on throughout the day, F, E, and A Companies took the same damage that the earlier relieving companies had suffered. Thus, at last although the cost was high by 1800 hours of the 18 April, the 7th US Division once again held the long-contested Porkchop Hill.

During the rest of the month of April, little ground action took place in the western sector. Both infantry and artillery units noticed an unusual lull across the front.

On 27 April, the 2nd US Division, after three weeks of training, was released
from the 1 US Corps and placed under the IX US Corps' operational control, and moved into the blocking positions on the Kansas Line in preparation for a possible "May Day Push" by the Chinese Communists. On 4 May, Major General William L. Barriger took over command of the 2nd US Division from Major General James C. Fry. In exchange for the 2nd US Division, on 5 May, the 25th US Division, with the Turkish Brigade attached, commanded by Major General Samuel T. Williams, had shifted over from the IX US Corps to the I US Corps and completed the relief of the 1st US Marine Division on the line on 8 May.

As May began and the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom seemed approaching decisive stage, there were signs that the enemy intended to increase the size and frequency of his attack. But, there were still no indications that the Communists intended to broaden the scale of operations into a general offensive in the western sector. Rather they seemed to be concentrating upon winning dominating terrain features along the line to strengthen their position both on the battlefield and at the truce talk front. The most ambitious CCF offensive came in the closing days of May.

The Struggle for Nevada Complex
(28 – 29 May)

Since the enemy seizure of outpost Reno in late March 1953, the troublesome area of Nevada Complex had remained quiet except for the customary probes and patrols. But the enemy capability of mounting a large-scale assault upon the Vegas, Elko, and Carson from Reno and other nearby enemy-held hills posed a constant threat that demanded constant vigilance.

When the 25th US Division took over the new sector from the 1st US Marine Division, Major General Williams assigned the responsibility for the defense of these positions and neighboring outposts, Berlin and East Berlin, to the attached Turkish Brigade under Brigadier General Sirri Acar.

Brigadier General Acar had deployed his 1st Battalion on the left, the 2nd Battalion on the center, which included Vegas, Carson, and Elko, and the 3rd Battalion on the right in the outpost Berlin and East Berlin sector. The 2nd Battalion had its attached 3rd Company to man Vegas (140 men) and one platoon each to Carson (44 men) and Elko (33 men) from its 6th Company of the 3rd Battalion.

Facing the Turkish Brigade were the 358th, 359th and 360th Regiments of the 120th Division, 46th CCF Army.
After the UN Command had made its final offer at the truce talks, the increased activity by the enemy artillery and enemy troop movements in the area indicated that soon enemy assault would be forthcoming.

This latter situation changed abruptly on 28 May. Beginning at 1800, major elements of the 120th CCF Division launched simultaneous attacks on the Nevada Complex and the outpost Berlin East Berlin. Following an intense artillery and mortar preparation, the 120th CCF Division sent four battalions forward -- two to the east against the main objective, Vegas, one to the south against Carson and Elko, and one in a diversionary attack against Berlin and East Berlin. The last was halted and broken off early in the evening.

As the night wore on the situation in the Nevada outposts was grimmer. The Turkish troops held out Vegas and Elko against continuing enemy assault, but the Turkish defenders on Carson were dying one by one. By morning of the 29th Carson had fallen into the enemy hands and Elko was heavily besieged.

Shortly thereafter, convinced of the enemy determination to take the Nevada outposts General Williams placed the 1st Battalion of the 14th US Regiment under General Acar's command so that the Turkish Brigade could commit its reserve to the counterattack.

During the early morning of the 29th, in a desperate effort to blunt the Red Chinese drive, the Turkish soldiers began a counterattack to clear Vegas hill and it changed hands several times between the indomitable Turkish defenders and the persistent Red Chinese. Meanwhile, General Acar ordered Lieutenant Colonel Carl E. Mann, the 1st Battalion Commander of the 14th US Infantry to send of his companies to reinforce Elko and to retake Carson. On the morning of 29th, B Company of the battalion was dispatched and approached outpost Elko from the southeast, overran the enemy holdings around the outpost, and secured the objective. Upon securing the Elko, B Company then advanced westward on Carson. On its half-way from Elko to Carson, however, the company began to receive heavy enemy fire concentrations and was forced to withdraw back to Elko. Company B tried repeatedly to gather momentum enough to break through the enemy wall of fire on Carson but in vain. Each time it failed and had to turn back.

With both Carson and Vegas went under enemy control, the Elko became untenable without the support of its sister outposts. Company B, stoutly supported by artillery, tank and mortar, forced the enemy to break off the attack each time and outpost Elko remained in UNC possession by midafternoon, 29 May.

However, General Clarke, I US Corps Commander, and General Williams felt
that the enemy intended to remain on the offensive until the outposts were taken. Thus, at 2300 hours on 29 May orders went out for the Turks to withdraw from Vegas and for the 14th US Regiment to withdraw its troops from Elko. By daybreak of 30 May the withdrawal was completed and began to regroup on the main line of resistance.

Over 150 men had been killed and 245 had been wounded in the battle of Nevada Complex. On the other hand, the Red Chinese casualties were estimated roughly at 3,000 men.

The military leaders felt that the enemy assault following the submission of the UN Command 25 May proposal at Panmunjom was to demonstrate his strong military hand and win improved positions along the front in anticipation of an armistice. It was not believed that the CCF effort was an attempt to expand their operations into a general offensive.

The Central Front
(IX US and II ROK Corps)

There were some changes on friendly disposition on the line during the period. On 18 April the 5th US Regimental Combat Team was attached to the IX US Corps and further was placed under the 3rd US Division control on 20 April. A part of the 5th RCT units, on 25 April, relieved the Greek Battalion on the line, while its main body went into the reserve positions. On 16 May, the 5th RCT moved to Chipori for a training program and was placed back under the 3rd US Division control on 5 June when it completed the training program. In the II ROK Corps sector, on 18 April, the 5th ROK Division that was on the training under the X US Corps moved back into the II ROK Corps area and relieved the 3rd ROK Division, which went into Eighth US Army reserve on 19 April.

As for the ground activities, toward the end of April, the friendly observers reported that there were unusual changes in enemy movement. The Red Chinese were bringing down their troops from north to take positions close to the battle lines, while moving their artillery and tanks into forward positions to provide close support. This was well proved to be reliable by the fact that during April and May UNC patrols met enemy forces far more frequently on the prowl in area between the outpost lines.

In the IX US Corps sector, the Chinese Communists made a series of limited objective attacks ranging in strength from a platoon to a company, during the
two months, on the outposts positions along the Boomerang and Sniper Ridge area held by the 9th ROK Division and the Star Hill area in the Capital ROK Division sector. The friendly defenders stubbornly refused to give away the key terrains and sometimes resulted in sharp clashes between the opponent forces but overall situation was not affected.

Meanwhile, the II ROK Corps guarding the right sector of the central front met with several enemy assaults during the two months as the enemy sent troops against the friendly forward positions manned by the 8th ROK Division in responsible for the middle sector of the corps which included Finger Ridge and Capital Hill. During the period of 13–17 May the enemy from the 602nd Regiment of 207th CCF Division made several attempts to break through the friendly outpost position on Horse Shoe Hill, about two kilometers of Capital Hill, manned by the 10th ROK Regiment. After five days of severe fighting the hill fell into enemy hands.

The most noteworthy action of the month took place in the II ROK Corps sector when the Red Chinese made an attack on the friendly position on Hill 689. Hill 689 was a platoon-size outpost position manned by a platoon of the 18th Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division. On the morning of 5 April, a friendly relief was in progress when two enemy platoons assaulted and seized the position. During the week following, with succession of counterattacks, the position changed hands ten times until 12 April when the friendly units succeeded in regaining the position. On 28 May, the friendly outpost positions on Texas Hill in the vicinity of Hill 689 now defended by the 27th Regiment of the 5th ROK Division also were subjected under heavy enemy attack. Despite the desperate resistance of the ROK defenders the hill went under enemy control by the next morning.

**The Mid-Eastern and Eastern Fronts**

(X US and I ROK Corps)

In the X US Corps Major General Ridgley Gaither replaced Major General Joseph P. Cleland as Commanding General of the 40th US Division on 17 April and the division moved into the line in the Punchbowl area on 27 April. Meanwhile, in the I ROK Corps sector, the newly activated 21st ROK Division which was under the Eighth Army control was attached to the I ROK Corps on 15 April and moved into the area as corps reserve. One of the noteworthy events occurred during the period was the reactivation of the III ROK Corps on 1 May at Kwandae-ri, and was attached to the X US Corps for a training.
Little enemy activity marked the period of April and May in the mid-eastern and eastern sectors. The X US Corps and the I ROK Corps were in their active defense, while conducting small-scale patrolling and raiding actions. As the month of June began, however, the North Korean Communists launched a large-scale attack ranging from a company to a battalion against the friendly MLR positions in the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps sectors. On the evening of 1 June, estimated two North Korean Communist companies attacked the friendly MLR positions and seized Hill 812 from the 37th Regiment of the 12th ROK Division on 2 June. In the meantime, another NK Communist company hit the
friendly main defensive positions on Hill 351 (Anchor Hill) in the I ROK Corps sector on 2 June. Despite heavy friendly counteattacks, the NK Communists ignored their casualties and continued to reinforce the attacking forces. On 3 June, in view of growing toll of the friendly losses, the 39th Regiment of the 15th ROK Division was ordered to pull back from Anchor Hill. (See Sketch Map 43.)
CHAPTER XII   THE FINAL STAGE OF WAR
(10 June - 27 July 1953)

Section 1. The Release of Anti-Communist Prisoners

The close relationship between the Communist military operations and the truce negotiation at Panmunjom was apparent through the April–July period. As the two sides moved toward settlement, the intensity of the enemy's operations varied according to the prospects for reaching final agreement.

While the negotiations dragged in late April and early May, the tempo of enemy action slackened. In the closing days of May, after the 25 May UNC proposal, which seemed to offer the possibility of a truce within the near future, the Communist attacks commenced to pick up impetus once again. The Communists were beginning to increase the size and frequency of their attacks. Troops movements indicated that they were shifting their forces from the northern-coastal areas and concentrating them in more forward area. Their artillery and armour were being positioned in depth and their troops were realigned on the front and enemy patrols showed considerable tightening of the enemy counter-reconnaissance screen. Then the agreement on long-troublesome prisoners of war question on 8 June was followed by the large-scale assaults of June which aimed at attaining better terrain positions and providing the Communists with a propaganda mantle of a military victory. The Chinese Communists had launched a heavy attack against the line of the II ROK Corps which formed a shallow salient pointing toward Kumsung on the central front. Striking down the valley of the Pukhan the Red Chinese had forced back the II ROK Corps in confusion nearly five kilometers on a 13-kilometers front by 18 June. Then the release of the Korean anti-Communist prisoners of war by President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea on 18 June 1953 reintroduced the elements of uncertainty into the negotiating situation and the ground operations again declined.

Since the agreement on the prisoner of war issue, the anti-truce campaign by the Republic of Korea Government and its nation moved into top gear. To them, having experienced repeated catastrophic invasions and were made acutely
aware of foreign threat and betrayal, the armistice without answering to the vital problems to the future of their nation was nothing but an another building betrays great antiquity to abandon the Republic of Korea after the armistice was signed. What if the United States should fail Koreans?” The United States failed Koreans at Portsmouth in 1905 and at Yalta in 1945, which inspired Koreans with anything but confidence. “Who knows but that she will fail us again this time?” This was a question that racked Korean minds at that moment. With the memory of Secretary of State Acheson’s publicity of the U.S. Far East defense perimeter on 21 January 1950, omitting Korea from it, still vivid in their heart, they were convinced strongly that the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea meant another Communist aggression of Korea, soon or later. It was hardly surprising therefore that from 25 May 1953 onward the Republic of Korea boycotted the armistice negotiation, and the ROK delegate, Major General Choi Duk Shin, was not present at Panmunjom when the final offer was made on 25 July.

On 6 June, two days before a draft agreement, called “Terms of Reference,” was signed at Panmunjom, President Eisenhower of the United States stated in a letter to President Rhee: “The enemy has proposed an armistice which involves a clear abandonment of the fruits of aggression. The armistice would leave the Republic of Korea in undisputed possession of substantially the same territory which the Republic administered before the aggression: indeed this territory will be somewhat enlarged ... The unification of Korea is an end for which the United States is committed, not once but many times, through its World War II declarations and through its acceptance of the principles enunciated in reference to Korea by the United Nations.” To reassure President Rhee of continued support, President Eisenhower declared that the United States would continue to seek unification by all means, it would enter into a mutual defense pact with the Republic, and it would continue economic aid to the Republic of Korea.

But, President Rhee, who from the beginning had rejected to any armistice that would leave Korea divided, still remained adamant, and his steadfast resistance finally reached its peak on 18 June 1953, when he ordered the release of those anti-Communist NK prisoners who had refused repatriation. Between midnight and dawn approximately 27,000 anti-Communist POWs broke out the UNC prisoners of war camps.

President Rhee promptly announced that the mass release had been planned and executed upon his order, and that the responsibility for the outcome was solely his.
Since these captives had been guarded by ROK troops, UNC officials disclaimed responsibility of the break, but, savagely upset by the happening, the Communists demanded the return of the escaped prisoners, and guarantees against further release.

It was anticipated that the Communists would make capital of this situation as a means of further embarrassing the United Nations Command and, if it could gain a propaganda victory, no matter how small, the Communists would exploit the chance to the maximum extent. On 21 June General Clark denied any collusion in the breakouts, saying that “the entire responsibility rests squarely upon the President Rhee and the Government of the Republic of Korea.” And the UN Command decided to divert valuable units to the camp areas as POW guards against any further efforts by President Rhee to release more prisoners.

Aware of the seriousness of President Rhee’s counteraction to the armistice, President Eisenhower sent Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson to Korea to explore the nature of President Rhee’s discomfort and to find a suitable solution. Assistant Secretary Robertson arrived on 25 June and immediately began discussions with President Rhee. But the discussions took nearly two weeks to come to a conclusion.

In the meanwhile, the enemy delegates at Panmunjom denounced that the 18 June action was a serious breach of faith, while the UN Command had taken more than a month to settle the situation. The enemy forces used this period to wrest as much ground as possible from UNC’s control.

By the time when Assistant Secretary Robertson arrived in Seoul on 25 June it was clear that the Communists were not going to repudiate the agreement, although they were accusing the UNC Command of conniving in the kidnapping of the prisoners. The Communists now needed an armistice too much to risk a general war.

The talks between President Rhee
and Assistant Secretary Robertson lasted until 12 July when the latter left Seoul carrying with him a letter from President of the Republic of Korea to President Eisenhower promising not to obstruct armistice. Understandably, the Communists wanted assurance that the UN Command would support the armistice whatever the Republic of Korea had done and would do. Thus, on 10 July, the truce meetings resumed and, then, in their largest offensive since the spring of 1951, the Communists sought to repeat the June objectives on a larger-scale. With the end of hot war at long last in sight, the Communists were faced with their final opportunity to give the Republic of Korea and the world a convincing display of Communist military might and to improve defensive terrain positions in the bargain. The June offensive had accomplished these aims to some degree, but much of the Kumsong salient still remained. Furthermore, it was generally considered a retaliatory move for the 18 June mass release of anti-Communist prisoners by the President of the Republic of Korea.

Section 2. The Last Battles

The Battle of Capital Hill—Hill 883
(10 – 18 June)

The pace of battle quickened in June 1953 when the Chinese Communists launched a series of large attacks against the UNC main line of resistance, which were the strongest enemy onslaughts since April–May 1951. A large battle flared in the central sector on 10 June, when the bulk of enemy forces struck down to both sides of the Pukhan River, ranging in strength from a battalion to two divisions. The enemy's main effort was directed at the II ROK Corps, and the initial large-scale penetration was made east of the Pukhan River in the sector of the 5th ROK Division to a depth of several kilometer.

There were no changes made on the disposition of friendly forces throughout the line by early June since the months of April and May when a number of routine division reliefs between front and rear had been effected. Of total 24 divisions, 17 divisions on line -- 11 ROK, five US Army, one British Commonwealth -- plus five divisions in corps reserve (one US Army, one US Marine, and three ROK), and newly activated 22nd and 25th ROK Divisions were in Eighth US Army reserve.

Opposite the UNC front the enemy had seven CCF armies; 65th, 45th, 1st,
23rd, 24th, 67th, 60th, from west to east, and two NK Communist Corps, III and I, deployed on the line.

The chief targets of the Chinese Communist assaults were to bulge in the UNC line where the ROK forces were concentrated. The UNC positions in the bulge that began roughly five kilometers northeast of Kumbwa and forming a shallow salient pointing toward Kumsong and to the northeast of Heartbreak Ridge were manned mostly by the II ROK Corps units guarding the eastern sector of the central front.

The II ROK Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Chung II Kwon had 6th, 8th and 5th ROK Divisions, from left to right, on the line with the Capital ROK Division of the IX US Corps on its left and the 20th ROK Division of the X US Corps on its right. The 3rd ROK Division (with Brigadier General Lim Sun Ha in command) was in corps reserve. Since the terrain was very rough, ranging from hills 400 to 600 meters high in the west to somewhat over 1,000 meters at the eastern end of the bulge, the friendly forces defending the sector had great difficulties in maintaining the lateral line of communication.

Facing the II ROK Corps units were three Chinese Communist armies: 67th, 68th and 60th CCF Armies, of which the 68th CCF Army was brought in during the early days of June for the use in their planned offensive. In addition, the enemy had strengthened the 60th CCF Army by attaching to it the 33rd CCF Division. According to the later reports, the enemy had worked out detailed plans and, before the attack, carefully rehearsed on terrain similar to the contemplated objectives. It was found that the four new CCF divisions had also gone through the training on a similar type of terrain in the rear before being committed into the front.

At exactly 2125 hours on 10 June, following the intense artillery and mortar preparations the Red Chinese elements of both the 68th and 60th CCF Armies, ranging from a battalion to a regiment in strength, followed up with the coordinated attacks on the positions held by the 5th ROK Division under Brigadier General Kim Chong Kap. Smashing through the outposts within half an hour after the onset of the attack, the enemy began to build up its pressure against friendly MLR positions of the 27th ROK Regiment. By midnight of the 10th, the Chinese Communists swarmed up the friendly positions forcing the friendly defenders to pull back from Hills 973 and 883, 15 kilometers northwest of Heartbreak Ridge and part of the UNC main line of resistance. Lieutenant General Chung, the II ROK Corps Commander, placed the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division under operational control of the 5th ROK Division on 11 June, to redress the enemy enroads. Early morning on 11 June, the 5th ROK
Division Commander committed two battalions of the 35th Regiment to make a counterattack, to recapture Hill 973, but were only partially successful. The enemy assaulting forces moved to the offensive again and forced the ROK counterattackers to pull back 800 meters south of Hill 973. On that same day, another attempts were made by two battalions of the 22nd ROK Regiment to regain Hill 883 and were able to reach the crest and dug in. In an effort to rewin the two hills, the 5th ROK Division threw in the 22nd, 27th, and 35th Regiments to launch counterattacks on 12 June, but were unable to drive the enemy off the hills. Heavy enemy incomings of artillery and mortar, coupled with its reinforcements to counterattack the friendly assaulting elements, prevented the ROK counterattacking forces from regaining their lost terrain.

The enemy broadened the pressure upon the II ROK Corps on 12 June by attacking upon the 8th ROK Division under Brigadier General Lee Myung Jae, on the left flank of the 5th ROK Division. On the evening of 12 June, estimated two Chinese Communist companies, reinforced later with three more, made an assault on UNC outposts in front of Capital Hill, ten kilometers northwest of Hill 973, which were defended by the 21st ROK Regiment. The enemy invaders outnumbering the ROK platoons holding the outposts penetrated the friendly outpost line and continued its pressure against the MLR positions of the regiment.

On the night of 12–13 June, a part of the enemy forces penetrated into the main line of resistance positions of the 21st ROK Regiment. The regimental commander made several attempts to reinforce the MLR but were unsuccessful and savage fire fight continued until the morning of 13 June when both the enemy and friendly disengaged.

The 8th ROK Division ordered the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 10th Regiment to move up to counterattack on the morning of the 13th, but were unable to restore the original line. Another enemy attack by an estimated two Red Chinese companies during the afternoon on that same day forced the abandonment of outposts and further withdrawal of the ROK defenders from the main line of resistance.

Although on the morning of 14 June the Chinese Communists continued the offensive, employing several companies to sustain pressure against the 21st Regiment, the ROK defenders stood firm and fought off the repeated enemy drives, and bloody fight continued until evening of the day. However, all the sudden, the situation developed into very disastrous when, on that same evening, an enemy battalion enveloped the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment while another two companies of Chinese Communists hit the 1st Battalion, forcing the battalions to scatter into small groups and pull back. In the meantime, a third
enemy battalion also surrounded the 2nd Battalion completely. Assembling behind the lines, the remnants of the 21st ROK Regiment managed to establish a new main line of resistance at approximately 1,000 meters south of the original main battle positions, which was to prove short lived.

Meanwhile, in the sector of X US Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Issac D. White, the 20th ROK Division under Brigadier General Song Suk Ha on the right flank of the 5th ROK Division, guarding the sector known as Christmas Hill, six kilometers southeast of Hill 883, had also been subjected to enemy attack. On the night of 10 June, unknown number of Red Chinese from the 33rd CCF Division launched coordinated attacks along the friendly outpost positions held by the 61st and 62nd Regiments, and a company outpost on the approaches to Hill 1220, part of the Christmas Hill area fell into enemy hands late in the evening of the 10th. The 61st Regiment sent a company, early morning of 11 June, to recapture the outpost and rewon it after three hours of close combat. Enemy’s counterattacks continued but the ROK defenders refused firmly to give away. Thus, the pushing back-and-forth fighting on the outpost continued into 13 June.

The development at the 5th ROK Division front, also, remained vastly more ominous as the enemy renewed the offensive. A battalion from the 33rd CCF Division came back to hit the friendly MLR positions on Hills 973 and 883 on the evening of 13 June, and smashed through the lines by early morning of 14 June. Desperate attempts to recover the lost MLR positions by the elements of the 5th ROK Division continued all day of the 14th, but in vain. The Communists indicated strongly that they intended to retain the possession of Hills 973 and 883 by showing quick reaction and managed to blunt all counterattacks by the 5th ROK Division.

Under the circumstances, the X US Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Issac D. White, moved up the 7th ROK Division commanded by Brigadier General Kim Yong Bac, the corps reserve, and placed it in depth on the left flank of the 20th ROK division. The enemy pressure against the 5th ROK Division increased during the night of 14 June, and forced the division to fall back, mostly, south of the Pukhan River. This withdrawal exposed the flank of the 7th ROK Division which had just moved up its defensive positions. X US Corps artillery and Fifth US Air Force close air support were concentrated on the enemy units facing the 5th ROK Division while the 7th ROK Division readjusted its front-line positions to tie in with the new line established and manned by the 36th Regiment of the 5th ROK Division. On the left flank of the 5th ROK Division, the 8th ROK Division also had to retreat over 1,500
In the evening of 14 June, the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division was moved from the sector east of the 8th ROK Division along the southern bank of the Pukhan River to the north of the 5th ROK Division. The 3rd ROK Division was deployed to the north of Christmas Hill in order to maintain the line of defense set up on 12 June. The 3rd ROK Division was in the southern part of the line and was positioned to support the 2nd ROK Division. The 5th ROK Division was located in the central part of the line and was responsible for the defense of the Pukhan River area. The 7th ROK Division was located in the northern part of the line and was responsible for the defense of the area north of the Pukhan River.

To control the urgent situation, some changes had taken place within the II ROK and X US Corps. New combat boundaries were established between the two corps, giving the responsibility of the ground east of the Pukhan River to the X US Corps as of 1030 hours on 15 June, and the 5th ROK Division was attached to the X US Corps simultaneously. The two remaining regiments of the 3rd ROK Division were in the morning of 15 June to resume responsibility for the sector east of the 5th ROK Division along the southern bank of the Pukhan River, where they served to strengthen the left flank of the 5th ROK Division. As the 3rd ROK Division took over its defensive positions, the 22nd Regiment reverted to the control of its parent unit. The X US Corps immediately made efforts to speed supplies and equipment forward to the 5th ROK Division and to replace its personnel losses. Since lateral roads were scarce, twelve H-19 helicopter were allocated to help out and they lifted a quarter of a million pounds of material forward to the front. On 16 June, at the meantime, the 11th ROK
Division shifted over from the I ROK Corps area to become II ROK Corps reserve.

During the next few days the action tapered off. In the 8th ROK Division sector west of the Pukhan River, early morning of 16 June, an enemy battalion made attacks on an outpost of the 16th Regiment on Finger Ridge, roughly three kilometers northwest of Capital Hill, but the enemy broke contact and withdrew that evening. Another two enemy companies penetrated the main line of resistance of the 16th Regiment, 8th ROK Division, along southeast of Finger Ridge, on that same night, but the enemy did not attempt to follow up the breakthrough. This, by the evening of 16 June, enemy operations on the 8th ROK Division front had become sporadic and the situation began to be stabilized by 18 June.

In this nine-day Chinese Communist offensive, the ROK units had taken a total of over 7,300 casualties while enemy losses were estimated at over 6,600. Besides, the enemy had driven the ROK forces back an average of 3,000 meters along 13,000-meter front in width and in the process had taken over a series of hill positions east of Pukhan-gang.

After 18 June the whole Eighth Army front settled back to the old pattern of only small unit actions, patrols, and probes. However, the release of the anti-Communist prisoners by the President of the Republic of Korea on 18 June introduced a new note of uncertainty into the course of military operations and the truce negotiations as well. Thus, the possibility existed that the fighting might flare up again later on. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Taylor was promoted in early June to full general.

Over on the II ROK Corps and the X US Corps front the quiet period of 18–24 June had been spent in reorganizing the 5th ROK Division. The combat boundary between the II ROK Corps and the X US Corps was realigned and returned the responsibility of guarding the ground east of the Pukhan River back to the II ROK Corps as of 1800 hours on 21 June. The control of the 5th ROK Division also returned to the II ROK Corps simultaneously, and by 26 June the 5th ROK Division was completely adjusted ready for action once again.

On the night of 26 June the 179th Division of the 60th CCF Army committed one regiment against elements of the 5th ROK Division east of the Pukhan River and another regiment against units of the 7th ROK Division on the main ridge leading to Hill 1220. The enemy penetrated friendly main battle positions of the 36th Regiment of the 5th ROK Division and the ROK elements were forced to give ground and retreated to a next terrain line. At the meantime, the enemy pressed on and managed to smash through the 7th ROK Division's
positions on Hill 938 just northwest of Hill 1220 on the night of 26 June. The 7th ROK Division opened succession of counterattacks to regain Hill 938, but the enemy refused to yield possession of the hill. On 29 June the 7th ROK Division threw in two battalions of the 3rd Regiment to recoup the hill but was unsuccessful.

The IX US Corps Sector

While the main CCF offensive was in progress in the II ROK and the X US Corps sectors, the Chinese Communists had mounted a series of diversionary attacks on the IX US Corps front. In the 9th ROK Division sector, three enemy companies from the 70th Division of the 24th CCF Army launched a drive late evening of 11 June at outposts on Sniper Ridge of the 29th Regiment, 9th ROK Division under Brigadier General Lee Han Lim. The next day, on 12 June, another two enemy companies penetrated the main line of resistance, roughly six kilometers west of Sniper Ridge in the area known as "Boomerang," defended by the 30th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division. During the action the enemy was reinforced with four more companies and the 9th ROK Division Commander brought up six infantry companies and one tank company before the enemy broke off the engagement. On the night of 13 June the Chinese Communists committed three battalions of the 70th CCF Division in the same sector and threw in another three battalions on the following night. However, on each occasion the enemy made no effort to hold on to the terrain gained and withdrew before the daylight. The three-day assault on Boomerang proved to be costly for the 70th CCF Division for its casualties were estimated at over 2,200 and close to 2,000 of these were estimated killed.

As the brief respite ended, on the night of 24–25 June, the 70th CCF Division again threw in two separate company-sized attacks against the main line of resistance positions of the 29th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division in the Boomerang area, and rapidly reinforced them to a battalion size. Meanwhile, in the Sniper Ridge area, a reinforced enemy company drove the ROK defenders from the outpost of the 29th Regiment on 24 June and refused to be ejected in turn. The Chinese Communists tried again to seize neighboring outpost on 25 June, but the ROK troops clung tenaciously to their positions despite the loss of over 240 dead and wounded. In repulsing the enemy drive, the 29th ROK Regiment estimated that the enemy casualties were more than double their own.

On the front of the 3rd US Division (plus 5th RCT, Greek and Belgian
Battalions) under Major General Eugene W. Ridings, on the left flank of the 9th ROK Division had also been subjected to enemy attack. On 10 June the 74th CCF Division opened a succession of assaults against outpost Harry (Hill 420), four kilometers southeast of Jackson Heights, guarded by the 15th US Regiment with its attachments of the Greek Battalion and Division Reconnaissance Company. Beginning with a company, the enemy added two battalions and penetrated the outpost. Counterattack was followed by counterattack with the US forces emerging on top on the morning of 11 June. The enemy came back with an estimated regiment on the morning of 13 June and the pattern of the preceding encounter was repeated. There was a small-scale probe on 14 June and then a two battalion-size assault on 18 June, but the end result was the same. The Communist efforts to take outpost Harry during the nine-day period were also proved to be costly as the enemy casualties were estimated by the 3rd US Division to be over 4,000.

Elements of the 2nd ROK Division guarding the left flank of the IX US Corps was also caught by an enemy attack. On 11 June a company-sized Red Chinese hit the friendly outpost in the Arrowhead (Hill 281) area, approximately eight to nine kilometers northwest of Chorwon. Next day, an estimated enemy battalion borke through three friendly outposts of the 32nd ROK Regiment in the vicinity of White Horse Hill (Hill 395), but the enemy did not retain possession long. In the early morning hours of 15 June the enemy pulled back to his own lines.

**Western and Eastern Sectors**

*(1 US and 1 ROK Corps)*

During the big offensive of 10–18 June the 1 US and 1 ROK Corps sectors were quiet, with only small unit actions, patrols, and probes. As June progressed, however, in the 1 US Corps sector, the increase in vehicle traffic and in artillery fire from the enemy along the corps front warned that the enemy was preparing for an offensive late in June.

On 25 June elements of two regiments of the 7th Division of the 1st CCF Army, supported by heavy artillery fire, struck the outposts on Bak, Hannah, and Hill 179 which lay along the southeast of the Imjin and Yokkook River’s juncture in the 1st ROK Division’s sector of the 1 US Corps. Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke, the Commanding General of the 1 US Corps ordered Brigadier General Kim Dong Bin, the Commander of the 1st ROK Division guarding the outposts, to hold on despite the strength of the enemy and friendly artillery fire.
started to interdict the enemy routes of approach to the friendly positions. Gradually the Red Chinese pushed their way into the trenches and bunkers where bitter hand-to-hand fighting broke out. Hand grenades flew back and forth. Bit by bit the ROK forces were forced to pull back until the Communists won the crests of the outpost hills. By the morning of 26 June the Communists were in possession of outposts Bak, Hannah, and Hill 179. The 12th ROK Regiment moved up to reinforce the 15th ROK Regiment, which had borne the brunt of the battle, and they launched a two battalion-sized counterattack on outpost Bak on 26 June and one on Hill 179 on 27 June. Neither was able to regain the outposts. The Communists pushed forward against nearby outpost Queen on 28 June and penetrated friendly positions on this hill. Counterattacks against the Communist forces on outposts Queen, Hill 179, and Bak on 28 June were all unsuccessful. On 29 June the I US Corps Commander broke off the efforts to rewin the lost outposts.

The Battle of the Kumsong Bulge
(13 – 20 July)

As the ground operations declined since the release of anti-Communist Korean nonrepatriates on 18 June, General Clark ordered the 187th US Airborne RCT under Brigadier General William C. Westmoreland to airlift from Japan to Korea on 20 June to bolster the front. In the meantime to prepare for the future eventuality in the rear areas and the security of the prisoner of war camps, General Clark in late June ordered the 24th US Infantry Division, under Major General Charles L. Dasher, Jr., to prepare for a move from Japan to Korea. Moving by air and sea the 34th RCT (minus) arrived in the Korean Communications Zone on 3 July; the 19th Infantry Regiment followed on 11 July; and the 21st Infantry Regiment unloaded at Pusan on 12 July. Besides, on 18 June, orders were issued to activate the 26th and 27th ROK Divisions raising the total of ROK divisions to eighteen, but it would take months before they came into being existed.

Meanwhile, on the mid-eastern front, the reports from intelligence sources that the enemy intended to launch a major offensive in the II ROK – X US Corps sector, with the Hwachon Reservoir as the main objective, led General White, the X US Corps Commander, to redeploy his forces in an effort to strengthen the right flank of the II ROK Corps. Beginning on 1 July he sent the 45th US Division under Brigadier General Philip D. Ginder westward to relieve the 20th ROK Division and the 5th Regiment of the 7th ROK Division. The latter
became responsible for a smaller segment of the front and was placed under the III ROK Corps commanded by Major General Kang Moon Bong, which then were under the X US Corps. On 10 July the 20th ROK Division relieved the 40th US Division and the 40th US Division under Major General Ridgely Gaither assumed responsibility for the defense of the Heartbreak Ridge sector from the 45th US Division.

The X US Corps was also reinforced by the movement of the 5th US Regimental Combat Team from the IX US Corps into the corps area on 1 July, and was attached to the 45th US Division on 14 July. Then, on 18 July, the 45th US Division took over the 7th ROK Division sector, releasing the 7th ROK Division to the II ROK Corps control. By 23 July, the III ROK Corps Headquarters had moved to the east and assumed control of the 12th and 20th ROK Divisions.

In the western I US Corps sector, relief of the 25th US Division under Major General Samuel T. Williams by the 1st US Marine Division (plus 1st ROK Marine Regiment and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion) commanded by Major General Randolph McC. Pate got under way on 6 July and was completed on 13 July.

During the first days of July the Communists carried out few attacks in strength, but the United Nations Command had no illusions about the future. It was clear, however, that the resumption of armistice negotiations on 10 July had provided an incentive for the last Communist offensive. Reports of troop movements, heavy traffic, and stockpiling of supplies behind the enemy lines alerted all friendly commanders that the Communists were preparing to strike again in force. Enemy counter-reconnaissance screens made it difficult to assertion how much strength the Communists were massing, but the concentrations were greatest on the central front around Kumsong.

The last and severest battle began on 13 July when six CCF divisions of the five CCF armies attacked positions held by the II ROK Corps and IX US Corps in the Kumsong area. By a considerable margin, it was the most extensive action to have taken place since April and May 1951.

Nine ROK and US divisions were employed in blocking or counterattack missions to stem the Communist effort. The heaviest enemy blows fell on the Capital ROK Division. Of the six CCF divisions committed to the action, three struck outpost and main line of resistance positions of the Capital ROK and the 9th ROK Divisions simultaneously.

By evening of 13 July the Communists had moved elements of five Chinese Communist armies into attack and support positions along the central sector that encompassed the Kumsong salient.
The UN forces facing them from west to east were the 9th and Capital ROK Divisions of the IX US Corps and the 6th, 8th, 3rd, and 5th ROK Divisions of the II ROK Corps.

The increase in the tempo of artillery and mortar fire on 13 July corroborated earlier intelligence reports that the Communists were about to launch a major drive aimed primarily at ROK units on the central front. After darkness descended, a reinforced regiment from the 72nd Division of the 24th CCF Army struck the 9th ROK Division's right flank while the 203rd Division of the 68th CCF Army smashed into the Capital ROK Division guarding the left shoulder of the Kumsong bulge. As wave after wave of Chinese Communists joined the assault, friendly outposts of the 26th and 1st Regiments of the Capital ROK Division under Brigadier General Choi Chang Un fell into enemy hands. By midnight of 13 July the enemy assaulting units broke through the main line of resistance held by the Capital ROK Division at right flank of the IX US Corps and forced the 26th ROK Regiment to withdraw east of Namdae-chon. The 28th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division in the Sniper Ridge sector also had to pull back approximately two kilometers south on the evening of 14 July to tie in defense line with the Capital ROK Division.

The fighting soon spilled over into the II ROK Corps sector once again. In the area of the 6th ROK Division, under Brigadier General Kim Joum Kon, adjacent to the Capital ROK Division, four battalions from the 204th Division of the 68th CCF Army hit the outpost of the 19th ROK Regiment on 13 June and had penetrated into the MLR positions of the regiment by the morning of 14 July.

The 8th ROK Division commanded by Major General Song Yo Chan and the 3rd ROK Division to the east of the 6th ROK Division had also been subjected under heavy attack by a reinforced Communist battalion respectively on 13 July, while the enemy made diversionary attacks against the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions' front.

On 14 July the enemy began to build up its pressure upon the 3rd ROK Division. Wave after wave of the Red Chinese ranging in strength from a reinforced battalion to a regiment supported by heavy artillery and mortar broke through the outposts and drove into the main battle positions of the 22nd and 23rd Regiments of the 3rd ROK Division. Then, as the enemy sent part of the assaulting forces behind the 23rd Regiment through the 5th ROK Division sector in an effort to envelop the regiment, the 3rd ROK Division began to withdraw.

As the Chinese Communists broke through the ROK lines along the central front and cut off units from their parent organization, the situation became
very confused and critical. Lateral and front-to-rear lines of communication were soon out of order. Between the sister units were often out of contact and unaware of the situation in other unit area. (See Sketch Map 45.)

In the first day of their offensive, the Communists concentrated major elements of their six divisions on the Capital ROK and 3rd ROK Divisions' sectors and made serious inroads in the shoulders of the Kumsong-salient. With their flanks exposed, the 6th ROK and 8th ROK Divisions were in danger of enemy envelopment. Therefore, on 14 July, General Taylor ordered the Capital, 6th, 8th, 3rd, and 5th ROK Divisions to fall back south of the Kumsong River at the base of bulge to straighten out the defensive line and shorten the front to be covered.

As the situation in the central front became critical some changes were made on the disposition of friendly forces along the front lines. In the IX US Corps sector, on 14 July, the 187th US Airborne RCT was attached to the 2nd US Division and on that same day the 2nd US Division took over the 3rd US

THE BATTLE OF THE KUMSONG BULGE (13-20 July 1953)
Division's positions, having its attached 187th Airborne RCT to relieve the 30th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division to narrow the 9th ROK Division's front and to strengthen the left flank of the withdrawing Capital ROK Division. In the meantime, the 3rd US Division shifted over into blocking positions behind the Capital ROK Division to block the enemy advance. On 15 July, as the Capital ROK Division fell back and passed through the 3rd US Division's area, the 3rd US Division took over the Capital ROK Division's sector and also assumed operational control of the Capital ROK Division. By now the enemy attack had penetrated through the main line of resistance to a depth of approximately ten kilometers within the II ROK Corps sector.

At this juncture, the Eighth US Army released the 11th ROK Division from the II ROK Corps on 14 July and the corps committed the division forward to take over the 6th ROK Division's sector on 15 July. The 3rd and 6th ROK Divisions that had been pushed back from the lines were reorganized and resupplied. Thus, on 15 July, the II ROK Corps had the 11th, 8th, and 5th ROK Divisions on the line from west to east, thus interlinking with the 3rd US Division and the remnants of the Capital ROK Division of the IX US Corps on its west and the 45th US Division of the X US Corps on its east.

On 16 July, the Eighth US Army ordered the II ROK Corps to counterattack and re-seize the high ground running westward from Hill 462 along the southern flank of the Kumsong River cross-compartment, and to a limiting point in the vicinity of Kan-chimhyon-ni - - called Objective Island; and the II ROK Corps launched counterattacks on that same day. Between 16–19 July, having the 11th, 8th, and 5th ROK Divisions to attack abreast with the 6th, 3rd, and 7th ROK Divisions in reserve, the II ROK Corps had seized the objective. On 19 July Lieutenant General Chung Il Kwon had the 6th ROK Division to pass through the 5th ROK Division and take over the responsibility for its sector while ordering the 7th ROK Division to move into the newly assigned forward positions between the 11th ROK and 8th ROK Divisions on 20 July. The II ROK Corps, thus, reached the Kumsong River line on 20 July and held it.

In this last vicious push the enemy made approximately ten kilometers of penetration and the weight of their assault had cut off and disorganized many of the ROK divisions facing them. On the other hand, the price that the enemy had paid to sustain this major offensive was also high. The Eighth US Army estimated that over 28,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the Communists during their breakthrough. Once again UNC firepower had inflicted appalling casualties on the Communists, but the Chinese Communist artillery fire itself had been of an almost unbelievably high concentration.
The Final Stage of War

Friendly field commanders thought that the Communists had been using up in June and July all the shells stockpiled near the front during the stalemate period. Altogether there were over 1,400 UNC casualties, most of which were the ROK soldiers.

The IX US Corps Sector

While the heaviest engagements were taking place in the II ROK Corps sector, the Communists exerted pressure upon several scattered points along the entire UNC front in an effort to take long-contested hills and outposts in the IX and I US Corps sectors.

On the IX US Corps front, on 6 July, elements of the 73rd CCF Division struck two UNC outpost positions on Arrowhead (Hill 281) held by the 32nd Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division. For over thirty hours the ROK defenders had to repel the Communist forces, often at close range. The enemy drew back on 8 July to regroup, but that night they returned following intense artillery and mortar fire, and won possession of the northern slope of one of the ridges. The 2nd ROK Division's counterattack on 9 July failed to out them and action became intermittent. Despite the stubborn resistance of the friendly defenders the enemy seized crest of the hill on the night of 10 July. Early on 11 July, two ROK companies counterattacked and forced the Red Chinese to pull back after three hours of savage hand-to-hand fighting. The six-day engagement for Arrowhead caused over 500 casualties for the 2nd ROK Division while the enemy losses were estimated slightly over 750.

The I US Corps Sector

In the Porkchop Hill area, the 7th US Division under the I US Corps met an attack from the unknown number of Red Chinese on the night of 6 July. The enemy forces fought their way up the outpost positions on Porkchop Hill now held by the 1st Battalion of the 17th US Regiment. The 17th US Regiment quickly reinforced its defenders at the outpost to three companies, but, by early morning of 7 July the enemy took up a part of the crest. Major General Trudeau ordered to make a counterattack and on the night of 7-8 July the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment launched two counterattacks to drive the Communists from the crest with no success. Throughout the night the situation was chaotic as both sides went on reinforcing and as hand-to-hand fighting continued. By
Porkchop Hill, as seen from the main line of resistance at Hill 347. The picture was taken the day Porkchop was evacuated by 7th US Division, 11 July 1953.

the evening of the 8th the position was still inconclusive and the 7th US Division tried to counterattack again on 9 July, but neither could dislodge the other.

At a conference on the night of 10 July in the 7th US Division command post attended by Generals Taylor, Clarke, and Trudeau, the army, corps, and division commanders decided reluctantly that the Red Chinese disregard for casualties and obvious intent to hold on to the outpost on Porkchop outweighed the tactical value of UNC retention of the position. On the afternoon of 11 July, all friendly troops were withdrawn from the hill by the armoured personnel carriers without incident. The daytime evacuation using the carriers convinced the enemy that the vehicles were moving forward to support another attack rather than a withdrawal.

Despite their preoccupation with the heaviest offensive action against the ROK forces in the central front, the Red Chinese had not forgotten the outpost Berlin complex held by the 1st US Marine Division in the I US Corps sector. On the night of 19–20 July, the Communists in reinforced battalion strength lunged against the two Marine outposts. Concentrating their main assault efforts on the Berlins, the Chinese Communists struck first at East Berlin, where 37 Marines were on duty, and then at outpost Berlin, held by 44 men. By midnight the situation was in doubt and early morning of 20 July the twin outposts were
officially declared under enemy control. Nearly 3,000 rounds of enemy incomings were estimated to have fallen on the Marine positions by that time.

During the early morning hours of the 20 July, the US Marines were to launch a two-company counterattack. However, the Marine assault was cancelled by the I US Corps. A decision subsequently rendered from I US Corps directed that the positions not to be retaken.

Section 3. The Signing of the Armistice

With their last and reckless offensive now over, the Communists clearly indicated they were ready to conclude the armistice on 19 July, when the 158th plenary session meeting was held at Panmunjom. In their final ten-day, frantic push against the ROK and UN allied forces the Red aggressors undoubtedly suffered extremely heavy casualties. The UNC senior delegate suggested 1400 hours, 24 July as the signing date, and that the armistice should become effective twelve hours after the signing. The Communists tentatively agreed, but this date was subsequently advanced to 27 July due to delays in completing final matters. Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr. further told the Communists that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should be ready to take over the non-repatriates as soon as the armistice went into effect, and until that time each side should be responsible for the safety of the members it had nominated.

The Communists suggested that the "supreme commander of both sides" not to attend the signing, recommending instead that the documents be sent to them for their signatures and returned to Panmunjom for the senior delegates' signatures. They based their proposal on the release of anti-Communist prisoners by President Rhee on 18 June 1953. The UN Command wanted the highest commanders' presence for the signing. The Communists finally agreed to the UN Command stand on the assumption that the press would not witness the signing, and that the UN Command would keep any persons of the Republic of Korea and Nationalist China out of the conference site. This was the ridiculous Communists' old trick to discredit the prestige of the Republic of Korea. In this respect, the Communists knew too well that President Rhee would not send any ROK representatives to the site. In fact, President Rhee had agreed reluctantly to the UN Command in concluding the armistice against his will.

At last the Communists' proposal was resolved by the compromise that the
press and other news media personnel would witness the signing by the senior delegates at Panmunjom, and then the documents would be delivered to the supreme commanders at their respective headquarters for signatures.

The Communists also agreed that the staff officers should now begin at once to settle all the points still in dispute.

On the following day the liaison officers met and started to iron out some of remaining problems including the revision of the demarcation line and demilitarized zone as well as reviewing the wording of terms. Top of all a most complex problem was to settle the line of contact, particularly in such places where recent fighting shifted the front line as both sides sought to retain possession of as much favorable terrain as possible. Thereafter the liaison and staff officers met every day at the subsequent executive sessions and lasted until 26 July.

By 23 July the working level meetings had agreed that the non-repatriates
would be delivered to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission in the demilitarized zone near Panmunjom. All that now remained was
for the staff officers to draw the final demarcation line from which each side
would withdraw two kilometers, finalize the wording of the agreement, arrange
the date of signing which was fixed for 27 July 1953, and to make the necessary
arrangements for the signing procedures.

As for the final demarcation line, the most northerly point of the line was
64 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel on the eastern coast below Kosong,
from where it curved sharply south to above the Punchbowl before turning in an
east-west direction to the south of Kumsong and north of Kumhwa and Chorwon.
From the western side of the Iron Triangle the boundary then dipped sharply
south-westwards, slicing across the Imjin River to Panmunjom and so to the Han
River estuary which was neutralized by the Agreement. To the west of the
Han River, the five groups of offshore islands (Paengyong-do, Taechong-do,
Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do, and U-do) south of the 38th Parallel and in sight of
the Communist mainland remained in the hands of the Republic of Korea, but
all other UNC-held islands above the 38th Parallel were abandoned. (See Sketch
Map 47.)

Then, at last, on 26 July, the very final arrangements were completed for the
truce to be signed by the two senior delegates at 1000 hours at Panmunjom
on 27 July, fixing 2200 hours, 27 July as cease-fire time.

General Taylor of the Eighth US Army paid a courtesy call on President Rhee
on the eve of the armistice and reported him that the armistice would be signed
on the next day. President Rhee had seemed relieved that long and trying
struggle for unification of Korea as well as for anti-armistice was almost over.

On the morning of 27 July, General Clark, accompanied by General Taylor
and American Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs, visited President Rhee at 0830 hours
and reassured the latter that the United States would provide the maximum
civil assistance for the post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction program and
continue to build up close-tie relationship to meet any eventuality such as a
renewal of Communist aggression. President Rhee had no choice but to tell
General Clark that he would tell the people of the Republic of Korea that the
nation would co-operate with the armistice.

Thus, by 27 July all was in readiness for the signing of the armistice. Members
of the Military Armistice Commission, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com-
mmission, and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission were all on hand
to execute their respective duties under the terms of the armistice agreement.
The representatives from all the nations fighting in Korea except the ROK
representative against the Communist aggression were gathered in the Armistice Building at Panmunjom to witness the signing.

At 0957 hours, 27 July, Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior United Nations Command Delegate, and Nam II of the Communist side entered the building. The 159th and final plenary session of the armistice conference was immediately followed without any speeches, and the two delegates signed the eighteen copies of the Armistice Agreement, six in English, six in Korean, and six in Chinese, at 1000 hours.

While the signing event was taking place, General Taylor, the Eighth US Army Commander, ordered troops of the whole United Nations ground forces in Korea to cease fire effective at 2200 hours that night.

Then, nine copies of the armistice documents were taken to the UNC Advance Headquarters at Munsan, where General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, surrounded by top military commanders and
representatives of the UN Forces, countersigned the blue-bound copies at 1300 hours that afternoon. Among attendants there were General Taylor of the Eighth US Army, Vice Admiral R. P. Briscoe of U.S. Far East Naval Forces, Lieutenant General Otto P. Weyland of U.S. Far East Air Force, Lieutenant General Samuel E. Anderson of Fifth US Air Force, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark of Seventh Fleet, Lieutenant General H. Wells, Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces Korea, and the representatives from the other UN contingents. Major General Choi Duk Shin, the Senior Delegate of the ROK Armed Forces for the truce talks, who had boycotted the talks from 25 May 1953, was present there as an observer, being filled with deep grief, largely because the shooting war was just about to end while the Communist aggressors remained undefeated. They still controlled the northern half of the peninsula.

General Clark finished the signing within two minutes, and in marking the event he cautioned that the armistice was only a military agreement to cease fire until the parties concerned reached a political settlement. Until the opposing
sides negotiated a permanent conclusion. General Clark warned, there could be no UNC withdrawal nor any lessening of alertness and preparedness.

While the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command was speaking, the guns along the front continued to hurl shells on the enemy lines. Even though ground activity had come to a halt, artillery and mortar fire lasted until the end. In the air the UNC planes pounded the enemy airfields, rail lines, and road systems far deep in the northern territory in a last-ditch effort to curtail Communist activities until the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams could begin to function. On the sea the UNC naval warships also bombarded on the enemy held-costal areas and finally ended the longest naval siege in history by shelling Wonsan for the last time.

President Eisenhower of the United States, meanwhile, observed the signing event with cautious reflection: "In this struggle we have seen the United Nations meet the challenge of aggression -- not with pathetic words of protest, but with deeds of decisive purpose... At long last the carnage of war is to cease and the negotiations of the conference table are to begin... We have won an armistice on a single battleground -- not peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard or cease our quest." And, he added later in a speech at Columbia University: "The armistice in Korea has inaugurated a new principle of freedom -- that prisoners of war are entitled to choose the side to which they will be released. In its impact of history, that one principle may weigh more than any battle of our time."

On the other hand, on 27 July 1953 in Washington, the sixteen nations whose soldiers, sailors, and airmen stood under the banner of the U.N. Command against the Communist aggressors throughout these long and bitter months since the Republic of Korea was invaded on 25 June 1950 had prepared a joint declaration providing for "greater sanctions" in the event the Communists began anew the war in Korea. However, the strong indication that the ROK forces might again resort to arms if and when the political conference failed prevented the U.N. participants from issuing the joint declaration on 27 July 1953 and they decided, instead, to give publicity of their commitments through the special report that the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command would submit to the United Nations on the armistice about a week after it was signed. Thus, in General Clark's report on the armistice negotiations to the United Nations on 7 August 1953, the following joint declaration was included in place of an independent statement which would have given broad distribution:

We, the United Nations members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action, support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United
40th US Division troops all packed and ready to leave Heartbreak Ridge in accordance with the armistice terms.

Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent, and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in reparring the ravage of war.

We declare again our faith in the principles and purpose of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.
Thus, the tragic shooting war in Korea, which was triggered by the Communist aggressors, was ended at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953, leaving the Korean peninsula still divided. (See the Armistice Agreement, Appendix VI.)

In accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement, the ROK and its UN allied forces ceased firing at 2200 hours on 27 July, and began preparation for withdrawing to new main positions, two kilometers to the rear of the former front line.

On 27 July 1953, the friendly Order of Battle across the UNC front from west to east was: On the western front, the 1st US Marine Division with 1st ROK Marine Regiment attached, 1st British Commonwealth Division, 1st ROK Division, 7th US Division, with the 25th US Division in reserve under the I US Corps; on the central front, the 2nd ROK Division, 2nd US Division, 9th ROK Division, 3rd US Division, with the Capital ROK Division in reserve under the IX US Corps; on the east-central front, the 11th ROK Division, 7th ROK Division, 8th ROK Division, and 6th ROK Division under the II ROK Corps; on the mid-eastern front, the 45th US Division, 40th US Division, III ROK Corps consisted of the 20th and 12th ROK Divisions under the operational control of the X US Corps; and in the I ROK Corps, the 21st and 15th ROK Divisions. Army reserve consisted of the 22nd, 25th, 5th, and 3rd ROK Divisions.

By 2200 hours, 30 July, the UN forces had completed their withdrawal to designated post-armistice main battle positions (PAMBP) just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and began an extensive program designed to maintain the fighting efficiency of the units and insure preparedness for instant action in the event of the re-opening of aggression by the Communist forces.
CHAPTER XIII THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER

Section 1. Cease-Fire and the Aftermath

A General Summary

As stipulated in the Armistice Agreement, all fightings stopped at 2200 hours, 27 July 1953. It was three years, one month, and two days since the fratricidal tragedy of the Korean War began on 25 June 1950 triggered by the Communist puppet regime in the north.

The Korean War has been called a "limited war," particularly by foreigners, but to Koreans it was a total war. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans died or were mutilated, the country was ravaged, and the cities and towns endured destruction matching the worst of World War II. Another noteworthy is it involved several million men in a bitter struggle of conflicting ideologies between the two big blocs, the Free World and Communists, and had consumed the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians from nations all over the face of the globe. Many had died who a short time before had known Korea only as an exotic place name on a map.

In addition to the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, sixteen nations from the Free World -- Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in alphabetical order -- had sent combat forces in support of the Republic of Korea, and these crusaders of freedom had fought in a determined collective effort to restore international peace and security under the flag of the United Nations for the first time in history.

Confronted by most arduous conditions, the UN allied forces had participated in the Korean War and had fought with great bravery and gallant, courageous acts against the Communist aggression.

India, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Italy had also furnished medical units. (See Appendix II.)
STRENGTH OF THE UNC GROUND FORCES IN KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>ROK*¹</th>
<th>U.S.*²</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.N. Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1951</td>
<td>554,577</td>
<td>273,266</td>
<td>253,250</td>
<td>28,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1952</td>
<td>678,051</td>
<td>376,418</td>
<td>265,864</td>
<td>35,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 1953</td>
<td>932,539</td>
<td>590,911</td>
<td>302,483</td>
<td>39,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*¹ Includes KATUSA, ROK marines under operational control of U.S. Army, and civilian trainees.

*² Includes Marine and Navy personnel under operational control of U.S. Army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>30 June 1951</th>
<th>30 June 1952</th>
<th>31 July 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28,061</td>
<td>35,769</td>
<td>39,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Commonwealth</td>
<td>15,723</td>
<td>21,429</td>
<td>24,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8,278</td>
<td>13,043</td>
<td>14,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>2,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,403</td>
<td>5,155</td>
<td>6,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>1,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (medical unit)</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4,602</td>
<td>4,878</td>
<td>5,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium and Luxembourg</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>1,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>1,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>1,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>2,274</td>
<td>1,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (medical unit)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (medical unit)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (medical unit)</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At peak strength the United Nations forces in the field totaled almost three quarters of a million men -- about 400,000 ROKs, 250,000 Americans, and 35,000 of other UNC contingents. In the three years of battle, the UN forces sustained almost half of a million casualties. The NK Communist puppet and Chinese Communist forces' losses are estimated at two million men.

An estimated 2,407,000 persons were killed or maimed in Korea as a whole. Of this, the Communists suffered, including prisoners, over 1,500,000, of which 900,000 dead or wounded, almost two-thirds, were Chinese Communists, while the NK Communists suffered at least 520,000 dead or wounded.

The noble price paid by the UNC forces for the cause of freedom, justice and peace against the Communist aggressors during the 37 months of fighting was very dear. Of total UNC's losses of 187,000 killed and more than 800,000 wounded, the ROK Forces suffered the most, which reached roughly 140,000 dead and more than 700,000 wounded.

In the Republic of Korea, 3,700,000 human beings were made homeless, 2,000,000 having fled from the yoke of the Communist-held northern territory. A large number of refugees came to the south with naught but determination and courage to build a new, free life in the Free South, and this they have done. But unfortunately more greater numbers had missed chances to escape from the Communists. About 400,000 homes were destroyed up and down the peninsula.

Among the UNC forces, the United States Forces' casualties numbered 142,091 in total, of whom 33,629 were killed in battle while thousands more died of non-combat causes. The bulk of these casualties occurred during the first year of the fighting. In addition, the war cost the United States an estimated 20 billion dollars. The breakdown of the American forces' casualties by service are as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of Deaths</td>
<td>33,629</td>
<td>27,704</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>19,334</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>3,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>7,828</td>
<td>6,440</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Wounded in Action                       | 103,284| 77,596| 1,576 | 1,368     | 23,744       |
|                                        | (85 percent were returned to duty) |
| Missing in Action                       | 5,178  | 4,658 | 53    | 273       | 194          |
Current Missing 24 0 9 15 0
Returned from Previously Reported Captured or Missing 5,133 4,637 44 258 194
Refused to Repatriate 21 21 0 0 0
Total 142,091 109,958 2,087 1,841 28,205

By the terms of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, the line of demarcation between the UN forces and Communist aggressors closely approximated the front line as it existed at the final hour. Slanting as the line did from a point on the west coast 24 kilometers below the 38th Parallel northeastward to an east coast anchor 64 kilometers above the Parallel, the demarcation represented a much advance of border line to the north, except in the westmost territory, than the prewar division. Within three days of the signing of the armistice, each opposing force withdrew two kilometers from this line to establish a demilitarized zone that was not to be trepassed.

To oversee the enforcement of all armistice terms and to negotiate settlements of any violations of them, a Military Armistice Commission composed of an equal number of officers from each side was established. This commission was assisted by a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission whose members came from Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Actually, however, the last two countries are not neutral nations but Communists. Representatives of those four countries, with India furnishing umpire and custodian forces, formed a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to handle the disposition of prisoners of war refusing repatriated. (See Appendix VI.)

Operation "Big Switch" -- the last step of the prisoner exchange -- began in August and ended in September 1953. All prisoners wishing to be repatriated had been exchanged during the period.

From the ROK and UNC allied returnees came full details of brutally harsh treatment in enemy prison camps and of an extensive Communist indoctrination program of "brainwashing" techniques, designed to produce prisoner collaboration.

The lengthy non-repatriate prisoners of war settlement extended through January 1954. 21,805 anti-Communist prisoners were set free, most of the Chinese choosing to renew life under the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan. And, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission dissolved itself on 1 February the same year after releasing the last of the non-repatriates as civilians free to decide their own destinations.

Then, based on a provision recommended in the Armistice Agreement, the main scene of the aftermath shifted to Geneva, Switzerland, where the political
conference convened on 26 April 1954. There was a complete impasse from the beginning. The representatives of the UNC member nations wanted to reunify the Korean peninsula through free elections supervised by the United Nations, while the Communist delegation refused to recognize the authority of the world body to deal with the Korean question.

Under such a circumstance, the sixteen UNC member nations who participated in the U.N. collective security action with armed forces in repelling the Communist aggression, made a joint declaration on 15 June 1954, stating in part that “we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as the tool of aggression.” (See Appendix VII.) In other words, the Communists did not accept the genuine proposal for free elections. They had persisted in the same attitude which had frustrated U.N. efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

As a result, the political conference at Geneva ended on 15 June 1954, producing nothing on Korea as the ROK Government had predicted. This fact was reported to the United Nations by the sixteen UNC member nations. Then, on 11 December 1954, the U.N. General Assembly declared that its purpose remained “achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.”

Thus, nothing but the military stalemate and partition of the country still exists nearly a quarter century after the cease-fire, with opposing forces, although guns of the both sides remained silent, still facing each other across the Demilitarized Zone.

Operation Big Switch

The final exchange of prisoners of war, better known as Operation “Big Switch,” took place at Freedom Village in Panmunjom from 5 August to 6 September 1953. More than 70,000 NK Communists and about 6,000 Red Chinese finally agreed to be repatriated. The Communist forces released about 3,600 Americans, some 1,300 other UNC troops, and some 7,800 ROKs. At one time the Communists had claimed they had captured almost 70,000 ROKs. The pitifully few ROKs they actually returned was further evidence of the barbaric treatment of prisoners of war by the entirely inhumane Communists.

Freedom Village was the name of the camp near Panmunjom where the ROK and UN allied troops were received. It was here that such valiant UNC prisoners
of war as Major General William F. Dean, the hero of the Taejon Battle (19–20 July 1950), and so many others returned once again to the Free World they had risked their noble lives to preserve. And it was also here that ugly stories began to be told with once consent by all of the returning prisoners of war about how their comrades of arms had collaborated with the Communists during their infernal captivity. General Dean who had commanded the 24th US Division during the early days of the Korean War, was repatriated on 4 September 1953.

In Operations “Little Switch” and “Big Switch” conducted during the period from 20 April to 6 September 1953, the UN Command received 13,444 POWs in total from the Communist side and repatriated 82,493 POWs also in total to the Communist aggressor side. An additional 21,839 Communist prisoners from among 22,604 who rejected direct repatriation to the Communist side were released by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to the UN

President Syngman Rhee welcomes Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, pinning the Distinguished Service Medal of Taeguk upon the General's breast. Gen. Mark W. Clark is looking on at right.
The Armistice and After

Command's custody, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement, on 20 and 21 January 1954. Earlier on 18 June 1953, some 26,930 "anti-Communist" NK Communist prisoners were released from UNC stockades by ROK forces guarding the stockades on order from President Syngman Rhee as was already mentioned in the previous chapter.

As for the American turncoats refused to be repatriated, only five of them were still in Red China by 1964, more than a decade after the signing of the armistice. One had died there. Another had moved to Czechoslovakia, a third had moved to Poland, and a fourth American defector left Communist China bound for Belgium. Twelve others had returned to the United States.

Section 2. Retrospect and Lessons

The Armistice

It has elapsed 26 years after the outbreak of the Korean War, and, today, the divided Korean peninsula abides under the longest military armistice in modern history. The Communist radicals in the north are now still attempting harassment on the ground, in the air, at sea and in propaganda.

In retrospect, it is no exaggeration to say that the 1953 cease-fire was a mistake, because, among many other reasons, it did not bring real peace in this land. Rather, the Communists had openly been preparing to trigger another war. Many observers still believe that, if the UNC forces had continued the war more months, Red China would have pulled its forces out of Korea, because it could not possibly have continued the fighting. When the UN Command agreed to a truce, Red China avoided a crisis. Over twenty-three years of the post-armistice period, the North Korean Communist clique has not given up its fantastic plot of communizing the south by means of force. Thus, the armistice did not solve the real problems between the divided halves.

At this time, it will be significant to review some terms related with an armistice for a reference purpose. In general, a term of "armistice" defines as a temporary suspension of hostilities as agreed upon by those engaged in the hostilities. For literary reasons, however, the terms "armistice," "truce," and "cease-fire" have been used interchangeably throughout this volume. In the eye of a legal term, someone signifies "truce," as a temporary interruption of
fighting between local forces for some reason such as the collection of the dead
and wounded. The word “armistice” has a similar connotation, but is utilized
to cover a temporary cessation of hostilities on a broad scale. “Cease-fire”
generally applies when all acts of the war are halted, bringing about an informal
end to the war and stabilizing the situation until formal negotiations can be
completed.

Such terms interpret variously, of course, dependent upon individual dis-
crepancy in version. Truce, for instance, defines as a suspension of fighting
especially of considerable duration by agreement of the commanders of opposing
forces, or a temporary cessation of hostilities, while someone interprets armistice
or cease-fire as a respite especially from a disagreeable or painful state or action.

Usually, the term of cease-fire is a military order to cease firing, but in con-
nection with an armistice, it signifies a suspension of active hostilities. In this
sense, the armistice is never more than a imperfect cease-fire.

According to Britannica’s Encyclopedia, a word of armistice is an agreement
for the general cessation of active hostilities between two or more belligerents.
It further described that general armistices are made by commander in chief,
usually pursuant to political decision of the government concerned, and an
armistice does not put an end to the state of war. In other words, unless the
agreement provides otherwise, belligerents may continue to exercise rights of
war such as blockade, visit and search, and seizure of contraband.

An armistice, therefore, whether for a fixed or indefinite term, is considered
temporary, leading to final peace or resumption of hostilities. According to
“the 1907 Hague Convention” respecting the laws and customs of war on land,
any serious violation gave the other party the right to denounce the armistice
or to resume hostilities.

There were some precedents for armistices in modern history; World Wars I
and II. After World War II, the Security Council of the United Nations had
on several occasions called for a cease-fire or truce during hostilities in Indonesia
(1947–1948), Palestine (1948), Kashmir (1948), and now Korea in 1953.
In all cases but one, armistice or truce agreements were signed by the parties.
The exception was Kashmir where, formally, a cease-fire agreement of 17 January
1949, was signed by India and Pakistan. There were many others, of course.

The Korean War was brought to a halt formally by the Panmunjom Armistice
Agreement providing for a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of
armed forces. But the Communist forces soon began to provoke by all possible
means including armed force before the ink signed on the Armistice Agreement
dried up.
Following the end of the shooting war in Korea, the war in Indochina, namely in Vietnam, was terminated by the Geneva Agreement of the cessation of hostilities of 20 July 1954, but was to short live with Communists renewing an all-out war unilaterally.

In their strategy, the Communists had reversed Clausewitz' old adage that war is a continuation of politics by other means. To them, politics, in this case the armistice, is a continuation of war by other means. The outcome of the Geneva Political Conference on the Korean problems, for instance, had depended upon the objectives the Communists had set for themselves, rather than on the persuasion of logic of the free, democratic nations. The Communists did not want to solve the Korean question by peaceful, logical means from the beginning, but had deliberately planned to earn credit from the conference. Communist China and the North Korean Communist puppet regime had designed to conceal their ever changed aggression ambition. Likewise, they attempted to exploit their propaganda advantages during the whole period of the truce negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom.

At any event, the armistice did bring an end to the shooting war that the Communists had started some 37 months before. But the armistice, symbolizing only a temporary suspension of hostilities, was nothing more than a step toward a permanent settlement to which more harder and complicated obstacles lying ahead. The real peace for Korea is still to be negotiated, and particularly, the long-cherished national desire for unification of the peninsula is still long and long way to go. In short, the Panmunjom armistice merely reflected a temporary stalemate.

There were many mistakes can be pointed out that the UN Command made at the truce talks. First of all, the UN Command at the time still was not aware of the real color and nature of the Communists. It assumed at the outset of the truce negotiations that it could deal with the Communists on what it understood as an honorable basis, that a cease-fire settlement would be reached within a short span of time, and that negotiation meant to the Communists what it meant to the UN Command.

The first mistake was made when the UN Command accepted Kaesong as the truce talk site. Since it was then located within the Communists lines, a considerably large area remained in immune from UNC's attack. Had the negotiation talks been held instead on some neutral ship or territory outside of Korea, the armistice would have been agreed upon much sooner with the friendly forces' front lines advancing far more northward, for the UNC forces could have easily demonstrated more effective military power against the Communist
aggressors.

On the other hand, immediately after the cease-fire negotiations had started, the enemy forces began to build up their heavily battered combat strength in men and supplies, while launching disguised propaganda maneuver. The Communists had exploited the Kaesong talks for their propaganda warfare to the fullest.

At times, the UN Command also tried to read too much meaning into Communist statements, as though they were trying to say something without actually saying it. This proved false in all instances.

The Military Armistice Commission was formed by provisions of the Armistice Agreement with the functions of supervising operation of the armistice and of settling violations of the agreement through negotiations. The commission consists of ten representatives, five from each side.

The Secretariat of the United Nations provides administrative support on a day-to-day basis. Some of the agencies of the U.N. Secretariat include the Language Branch, the Joint Observer Teams and the Joint Duty Office.

The Joint Observer Teams are charged with investigating alleged violations of the armistice in the Demilitarized Zone, the North Korean Communists' refusal to allow such investigations north of the Demilitarized Zone has largely emasculated the effectiveness of these teams.

An armistice and truce are not to be confused with a formal peace treaty entered into by governments. Major violations have altered negotiations somewhat. For instance, both sides in the armistice to limit the introduction of men and equipment on a one-for-one, piece-for-piece incoming and outgoing personnel and equipment basis.

The UN Command reported on a daily basis all incoming and outgoing personnel and equipment. The Communists took months for their first report. Meanwhile, the Communists secretly constructed new airfields, brought in many new jet combat aircraft and continued to stockpile supplies.

A four-nation Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was established by the Armistice Agreement to supervise the ban on reinforcements by observation and inspections in the two territories, north and south of the Demilitarized Zone. Among the four nations, Poland and Czechoslovakia were nominated by Communists, while Sweden and Switzerland were nominated by the UN Command. In fact, the first two were not neutral nations but the Communists.

The functions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) were severely handicapped by the Communists in the north. Frustrated at
The Armistice and After

every turn, the neutral nations were not able to conduct real inspections. Moreover, members from Poland and Czechoslovakia were bluntly unfair from the beginning to the end; they were not neutral and worked for the North Korean Communists.

In the Republic of Korea, however, inspection team members moved around freely observing and investigating the rotation of the UN Command personnel and the exchange of equipment on the agreed basis.

This uneven situation was finally resolved in June 1956 when the UN Command announced the end of further inspection in the Republic of Korea at the 70th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). Thus all inspection teams were quickly withdrawn. With this action, the UN Command showed it would no longer tolerate this flagrant abuse of the spirit and intent of the armistice. But the secret Communist build-up continued.

In June 1957, the UN Command publicly announced it would not be bound by the armistice prohibiting the introduction of new weapons. This was done only after the North Korean Communists build-up, in secret and behind a smoke-screen of denials, had reached dangerous levels. And the situation remained to continue up to date. The Communists continue to illegally build-up their forces, the UN Command takes necessary steps to keep the balance of power that prevailed at the signing of the armistice.

Today, the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 still regulates the truce in Korea. While its administrative and supervisory organs have been ignored and abused by the North Korean Communists, the Military Armistice Commission provides a forum for exposing the Communists violations and remains a valuable alternative to a shooting war.

A Collective Security Effort

(1) U.N. Effort: The Korean War was most significantly featured by the participation of the United Nations in a decisive collective action by force of arms against an armed aggression.

Teamed with a common cause of mankind, a number of freedom-loving nations from all over the world immediately came to help repel the Communist aggressors, when they learned that the free Republic of Korea was completely caught by the surprise Communist aggression in force on 25 June 1950.

For the first time in the history of the world-wide organization, branded the Russian sponsored-NK Communist armed invasion as aggression against
international peace and security and decided in a series of its Security Council
to punish and fight back the Communist aggressors by a collective security action.
Thus, the blue and white flag of the United Nations was carried into battle
for the first time in Korea.

The 53 nations endorsed the historical U.N. action against the aggressors in
Korea and, with the United States of America as principal participant, 16 U.N.
member nations provided ground, air or sea combat forces.

Regardless of force in size, each contribution from each country strengthened
the evidence of the Free World solidarity against the Communist aggressors.
It must be praised very highly for valiant fighting men of these U.N. allies.
Particularly, faced with the terrible manpower disadvantage of the war at the
outset, the Free Allied combined forces had fought with exceptionally gallant,
courageous acts and they made great, noble sacrifices to contribute just enough
to exhibit their adherence to the free world ideal. France, for instance, could
ill afford to maintain an infantry battalion in Korea. Her young manhood was
then in the midst of the frightful war in Indochina against another arm of the same Communist aggressors. Yet France did maintain her battalion in Korea and that the battalion became legendary for its valor in such bloody, gallant battles as Chipyong-ni to stem a decisive Communist offensive in February 1951 and in the fighting for Heartbreak Ridge in the autumn the same year.

Thus, all the men of the UNC forces fought with valor and great combat effectiveness. There were many advantages accrued, high among which was the understanding, admiration and friendly rivalry that developed between the comrades in arms of the many other nations. Healthy competition was common. The Belgian Battalion, as an example, was attached to the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Infantry Division, which proudly called itself the "Can Do" unit, the nickname of the regiment.

At all events, it is a great historical fact to be remained in history forever that a political alliance of nations had applied force of arms to punish an act of aggression for the first time in history, viewing the defense of the Republic of Korea as part of the defense of freedom and peace for their own and elsewhere.

(2) U.S. Effort: For the United States, the Communist military aggression in Korea in June 1950 marked the beginning of a new military policy. In the years after the end of World War II the United States had come to recognize a state of cold war with communism, but the Communist aggression by force in Korea was positive proof that Communist Russia and her satellites were prepared and willing to risk not only local war but even a general war by "brush-fire" aggression all over the world.

The limited military strength of the United States had not been a cause for peace but had tempted the Communists to exploit war as an instrument of national policy. The final realization of this fact by the American people made it possible to begin the rebuilding of the armed forces not only for the security of the United States herself but also for resistance to the global threat of communism. In fact, the Korean War had made the United States more aware of the threat of world communism and had resulted in the strengthening of its defense commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe.

In retrospect, the Korean War was one more tragic example of the failure of the existing patterns of international organization to maintain harmonious relationships in a world where predatory nations were eager to plunder their weaker neighbors. Like any other resort to armed force, the Korean War was not only Korea’s tragedy but also a world tragedy. But some good resulted from the tragic experience. The staunch United Nations' support for the Republic of Korea must have given pause to the Communist aggressors.
For the United States, the sudden shock of naked Communist aggression in Korea may have been providential. The American people could now clearly see that world peace would come through strength and not through weakness. Weakness does mean self-defeat or might cause to encourage Communist aggressors to risk for their territorial expansion schemes.

To all the free nations and peoples the Korean War of 1950–1953 emphasized the age-old lesson that the price of peace is eternal vigilance and preparedness to detect, halt and repel aggression wherever it appears. Again, exploiting immeasurable experiences we gained during the tragedy of the Korean War, the United States Armed Forces will be better able to contribute to the maintenance of the world peace through iron-clad defense preparedness always.

Though the Korean War was neither that marvelous victory nor defeat to which a half century of total war had accustomed the world, it was, nonetheless, a triumph for the United Nations Command. The Communist armed aggression was repulsed, and in such manner as to warn the Communists that the free nations will never stand still if they commit such aggressive acts again elsewhere.

The Korean War did halt Communist armed aggression and it had led the Free World to awake that freedom and peace can only be preserved through preparedness. In fact, the end of the Korean War may have brought about that shift to economic warfare and build-up of national strength.

The Communist aggression in Korea also saved the United Nations from the fate of the League of Nations, while encouraging small nations to resist the Communists and keeping Japan outside the orbit of Asiatic communism. Another important result of the Korean War was that collective security action. To the aid of the tottering Republic of Korea came the men of sixteen free nations, putting aside their nation forming, despite their disparate races, religions, customs and culture, a single force under the single-unified command furnished by the United States.

Perhaps, one of most significant lessons taught to the free world was that the war in Korea showed so clearly that the difference between the Communists and the democracies is the difference of means.

The Communists never hesitate to use any means available to them for their plot and ambition. By the "germ warfare" hoax and the torture of those who confessed to it; by the Koje-do reign of terror; by the murder of prisoners, or the impressment or kidnapping of them, or by the brutal war against the minds of the prisoners; by the windy stall at Panmunjom, or by systematic violations of the Armistice Agreement premeditated before it was signed -- by all this, and by the invasion of Korea itself, the Communists showed that they will
use any means to attain their ends. Thus, the Communists, without doubt, will continue to move and go on diametrically the other way round against the free world direction.

No Substitude for Victory

It will be worthwhile to recall what remarks General of the Army Douglas MacArthur made in his speech at Boston after his home coming. He stated that “you can not control war; you can only abolish it. The men who shrug this off as idealistic are the real enemies of peace -- the real warmongers.” The dramatic peroration of General MacArthur’s speech to U.S. Congress is probably the best known of his many attacks on limited war: “…But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War’s very objective is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory …”

Another point on which General MacArthur made argument was that the United States had the capacity and need to defend every place from communism. As in the Second World War when he had refused to subordinate his own theater for the sake of a concentrated offensive elsewhere -- a habitual malady of theater commanders, termed by General George C. Marshall “localities” -- so in 1951 General MacArthur rejected the principle of any order of defensive priorities for one area over another. This is not startling, since in both World War II and, thereafter, President Truman’s Administration had placed the Far East well below the priority of its preferred European stamping grounds. For example, between 1948 and 1950 General Bradley, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chief Staff, had put the Republic of Korea seventh on his priority list, a list on which Europe came first.

General MacArthur attempted to justify his argument against defensive priorities by claiming that his enemy was communism everywhere, including communism within the democratic countries of the West.

Ultimately, of course, General MacArthur’s case for extending the range and intensity of the war in the Far East rested no more on his concessions to public opinion than did that of the President Truman’s Administration against such an extension. Instead, in essence, General MacArthur’s case was based upon a reality so painful and so fundamental that the General had wisely forborne from openly employing it at the time of his recall.

To a large extent the disagreement between General MacArthur and the
President Truman Administration in conducting the Korean War revolved about the question of timing rather than the means of handling Communist China. To General MacArthur and his supporters time was playing in favor of the Soviet Union; hence a decisive, immediate action by the United States was essential because otherwise the Soviet increase in strength in the future, especially in atomic weapons, would expose the United States too dangerously to Russian counteraction.

In short, the tragic intensity of the whole issue of General MacArthur’s relief was brought about by the apparent surmise of the General, and certainly of his supporters, that 1951 was almost the last chance for the United States to face a showdown with the Soviet Russia.

The Question on Remaining Prisoners

According to the information furnished by the Military Armistice Commission of the United Nations Command in Korea, after recapitulating available data, the UN Command determined that there still remained as unaccounted for 3,404 UNC and ROK prisoners of war and United Nations displaced civilians who the UN Command had reason to believe had been under the Communist control at one time or another during the period between the outbreak of the Korean War and the conclusion of the prisoners repatriation in September 1953.

The UN Command, therefore, repeatedly protested against such Communists’ coward acts. The brazen-faced Communists, however, denied this fact saying that “among the 3,404 persons, 519 were directly repatriated to the UNC custody; 380 were released at the front during the war, and the remainder, part of them were not for direct repatriation and most of them have never been captured at all.” The Communists radicals, worse than brutes, maintained the same positions consistently.

In February 1956, the UN Command brought the matter again at the Military Armistice Commission meeting at Panmunjom, since the following incidents caused it to persist in urging the Communists to settle the issue: On 5 December 1954, a Royal Canadian Air Force pilot was released from the Communists; on 31 May 1955, four American airmen were released; and again on 3 August 1955, eleven additional airmen were released. All these events took place after the Communists claimed that “there are no captured personnel of your side for whom our side has to account for . . .” These events caused the UN Command
to doubt more strongly that the Communists had rendered a fair and accurate accounting of the UNC prisoners of war. This doubt continued to exist.

The UN Command efforts to obtain a final accounting had been made at meetings of the Military Armistice Commission and through correspondents between both sides. The UN Command passed the last revised-lists to the Communist side at Panmunjom on 11 August 1964. The list included 2,233 prisoners (1,647 ROKs, 389 Americans, 167 Turks, 16 Britishes, 8 South Africans, 3 Belgians and Luxemburgians, 2 Colombians, and 1 Greek and also 21 civilians of UN foreign nationals. The most audacious, impudent Communists, however, refused adamantly to enter into any meaningful discussion on the subject.

Quite contrary to such Communist attitude, the UN Command made no attempt to deceive the world at all, did not torture or brainwash or remain indifferent to human suffering. The free allies of the United Nations did not betray themselves they gained a victory. Most magnificent of all, these sixteen UNC member nations fought on for years, exposing their soldiers to that much more misery and suffering, to uphold a man’s right to refuse to be a slave.

Refugees from the North

In a large sense, in fact, majority of the people in the Communist-controlled north are not Communists, and just they are groaning under the tyranny of minor numbers of militant, dictatorial Communist radicals. It was particularly true before and during the Korean War.

The freedom-loving people in the northern territory were in full hope and deepest emotion when their ardent desire of national unification seemed to have been realized at last. Their dream of unification proved to be premature, however, as hundreds of thousands of Chinese Communist forces committed aggression in surprise into Korea, thus launching a major offensive against ROK and UN allied forces out of the territory north of the 38th Parallel. Facing with such an extremely overwhelming new enemy in manpower, UN forces had no alternative but to withdraw southward. This unexpected change in the tide of war caused many of the northern people to find themselves they were driven to the fall or were contained in the pocket. Some groups found themselves trapped within the confines of a besieged area like familiar incident around the port of Hungnam.

All they decided that they would rather die than live in under such a hellish rule of barbarous Communists and then they fought their way southward desperately through repeated hardships.
Many of them, however, missed chances to take refuge toward the Free South, while some 2,000,000 in total could escape from the hell of the Communists' yoke by the skin of their teeth. The CCF aggression and the withdrawal of the UN forces had not been anticipated by the northern people, anti-Communist people in particular. Some of them had made hurried excuses to their aged parents, saying that they would certainly be returning in a matter of weeks or months. They had then taken whatever food and possessions they could carry and headed for the south. When it became apparent that egress to the south had been cut off, they made their way to the seas or rugged mountains in an attempt to find boats or to hide, seeking to seize every possible chance and means for refuge.

Adding to the misery in their hardship was the bitter cold weather. The tragic stories of all sorts of hardships and privations they encountered were too wretched beyond all description. They had been sick, hungry, exposed to the elements and saddened over the separation from their families. They were, however, alive. Today, these valiant men and women, together with their younger generations, are fully enjoying with their free and happy life in the Republic of Korea, looking forward to seeing this divided homeland will soon be reunited and they in turn will be reunited with best loved ones.

The Communists' Atrocities

Throughout the fighting period, the Republic of Korea Government as well as the UN Command had been seriously concerned about how friendly prisoners of war were treated by the Communists. All Communist prisoners then held under the UN Command were, of course, handled strictly in accordance with provisions prescribed in the Geneva Convention. But the Communists once again proved themselves that they are worse than the brutes, especially in treating prisoners of war.

During and after Operation "Big Switch," the UN Command learned the full details of Communist prison camp villainy. In the first place, like the Soviet Russia after the end of World War II, the Chinese Communists and NK Communist odds refused to return all the prisoners they captured. Why the Reds refused to return all prisoners of war we could only guess. In our conjecture, one reason was that the Communists intended to mislead the world that some Americans and other Western men are sympathetic toward the Communist cause. Another and more possible reason was that they wanted to hold the prisoners as longest for future bargaining with free world, particularly with the United
States, possibly for some concession such as a seat for Red China replacing Nationalist China in the United Nations.

The UN Command had solid evidence after all the returnees were in from Big Switch that the Communists still held 3,404 prisoners, including ROKs and 944 Americans, as already mentioned earlier. As long as the Communists are concerned, there is no way to get these people back without pointing the muzzle of a gun at the Red radicals, because they are little better than brutes.

The full, tragic story of cruel conditions in the Communist prison camps was brought to light through the testimonies of repatriates. This shocking story of atrocious acts which the civilized world had once thought were things of the ancient past.

The atrocities committed by the Communist aggressors in Korea were really unprecedented in the history of Korea and also an unheard-of outrageously cruel by the world people. There were the 10,032 individuals whose murdered bodies stood as mute witness to the savagery of the Communist aggression. There was a clear evidence that not just 10,032 but 29,815 murders were actually committed by the Communists, of which 11,622 were Americans, according to an autobiographical work of General Mark W. Clark who signed the Armistice Agreement in the capacity of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

This total of 29,815 murders is by no mean all inclusive; it does not include hidden atrocities as yet uncovered. And, it does not include those thousands of reported murders which lack sufficient evidence to establish a probable total of victims, General Clark added.

Communist atrocities in the Korean War had been under investigation by the UN Command since 1950 and were substantiated by the voluntary statements of survivors and witnesses. The investigation is an endless task. It is, however improbable that the whole story of Communist brutality will ever be known.

All cases clearly revealed that the atrocities were premeditated. The cold-blooded design manifested throughout the war revealed that the contemporary Red Chinese and NK Communists received able tutelage from their Eurasian compatriots. These calculated killing targeted upon UNC military personnel were often committed while the individual prisoner's hands were bound behind his back. True to Red design, however, many variations were introduced which would have paled tortures and inquisitors of past centuries. In some instances, gasoline was poured over the wounded and ignited by bamboo spears until God granted merciful death to terminate such continuing agony. In the pattern, it was a Russian made bullet in the back of the head that ended the victim's dedication to the Free World cause. Many witnesses or survivors of these
atrocities recounted the stark terror engendered by a Communist scheme of brutality which recognized no limit. The followings are typical instances of such beastly conducts.

On 15 August 1950, the enemy captured some men of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment on Hill 303. The captives were herded to a nearby orchard and their hands were tied behind their back with wire or their own boot-laces. For two days, they were kept hidden in ravins during the day and forced to march at night. Suddenly, on the afternoon of 17 August 1950, Communist guards opened fire upon these bound victims.

34 American soldiers were slaughtered in this massacre and only four men survived. Later the same day, these men were rescued by a UNC patrol.

When the fall of Pyongyang to the UN forces seemed imminent, the Communists entrained all prisoners of war for northward movement. Men were herded into open gondolas and forced to ride unprotected in the raw October weather. Pneumonia and exposure exacted its daily toll among the weakened survivors. Their comrades of arms conducted burial parties whenever and adequate halt was made. After such inhumane treatment over nine days, the train arrived at a railroad tunnel northwest of Sunchon, where it remained inside the mountain all day.

On the afternoon of 20 October 1950, the starving men were promised their first meal in several days. Communist tormentors took an American major, together with a group of selected prisoners, purportedly as a detail to go to a nearby village to prepare food. None of these prisoners were seen or heard from again. Hours later, the men remaining in the tunnel were informed that food had been prepared for them, and they were ordered to go in small groups to a house to eat.

Accordingly, the first group of 30 men was removed from the tunnel, escorted down the tracks and told to hide in an erosion ditch until food was brought. As soon as they had relaxed on the ground, their guards opened point-blank fire upon them with burp guns and rifles. Those who survived the initial burst of fire were then either shot or bludgeoned individually. Fortunately and very fortunately, at least some survived by feigning death, though seriously wounded.

Remaining groups were then brought out and handled in a like manner. When the UN forces overran the Sunchon area on the following day, the bodies of 68 murdered soldiers were recovered. In addition, seven more bodies were discovered inside the tunnel; the corpses of men who had apparently died of malnutrition.

On 23 April 1951, British combat patrol was attacked and captured by the
enemy in the Imjin River sector. They were assembled with three or four previously captured Belgians, near the junction of the Hantan and Imjin Rivers, a point where they were slated to be murdered. Three British and one Belgian soldiers escaped. On 31 May 1951, Belgian units discovered the bodies of three British soldiers and five Belgian soldiers. In a death pattern, so symbolic of Communist brutality, all of the bodies were so grouped as to reveal the grim truth -- all had suddenly been shot down without warning. Two of the British had been shot in the back of the head, while one Belgian had been shot or bayonetted in the back.

No respecters of either the Red Cross or any symbol of belief in the Almighty, the Communists overran a group of 18 to 20 wounded UNC soldiers being ministered to by a regimental surgeon, prominently identifiable through display of his Red Cross brassard, and an Army chaplain. None of these individuals was armed. The infernal Communists immediately opened fire wantonly executing the group with rifles and burp guns. The surgeon, although wounded, managed to escape.

On the other hand, within the annals of barbarism, the city of Taejon will long be recorded as a monstrous mass extermination site. Countless civilians -- some estimates reach as high as the 5,000 mark -- as well as 42 American and 17 ROK Army prisoners, were slaughtered at Taejon in deference to the Communist watchword -- political expediency.

There were countless cases of Communists' mistreatment of UNC prisoners. Many prisoners who participated in the same death marches to interment and were detained at the same prison compounds pointed out, in eyewitness accounts, identical incident patterns. On the other hand, isolated incidents reported by ex-prisoners, separated insofar as time and place of incarceration are concerned, showed considerable similarity in mode of treatment. A brief summary of the pattern of Communist mal-practices is as follows.

Upon capture by Communist forces, the unwounded and walking wounded were herded into marching groups. The seriously wounded were left on the field and often killed either by concentrated small arms fire, bayonetting or a combination of both. In many cases, UNC personnel carried their wounded comrades. Many marches were made under severe climatic conditions. Communist guards took shoes and other articles of prisoners. The freezing of feet and hands was commonplace. No medical treatment was provided to the wounded. Marches were long, grueling and set at a place that could not be maintained by the majority of the wounded. Savage, the guards kept prisoners moving. Stragglers were clubbed or kicked when they fell. Many who could not continue were left
along the way to die. In countless instances, Communist guards dropped out to shoot prisoners who lagged behind. Out of 700 men beginning one such three-week march, approximately 250 arrived alive at the first camp. A large percentage disappeared on the line of march.

Along another march route, called “Death Valley,” prisoners were herded into squalid huts. The daily death rate soared. Causes of deaths included lack of medical attention, malnutrition, dysentery, pneumonia. What little food the Communists provided was substandard; all too often there was no food at all.

Once the men arrived at permanent prison installations, conditions were too miserable. Throughout the winter of 1950, there were no medical facilities, no heat, no blankets. Some of prisoners were on burial squads and 1,600 men died in a ninety-day period at one camp alone. Similar conditions and a comparable death rate characterized hellish life within other camps.

Another cold-blood act on prisoners by the Communists was brainwashing. The brainwashing techniques the Communists used to distort facts in the minds of the prisoners are identical with those the Communists use in their mass psychology campaigns to mold the thoughts of men and women everywhere behind the “Iron Curtain.” The Communists strived to make their victims believe slogans through repetition. They strive to make their victims feel that any doubt about the Communist line means the victims, not the line, are weak and unable to comprehend the true meaning of the life around them.

More than anything else, the Communists try to cut off each individual from the rest of mankind with mental wall so that in his isolation the individual will believe that any doubts he has about communism are his alone, unshared by any other living human being.

Propaganda Warfare

During the Korean War, psychological warfare took many forms, ranging from the virulent and completely false Communist charges that the UN Command used germ warfare to the unplanned, spontaneous generosity of American and other UN contingent soldiers who contributed their spare time and money to help orphanages, schools and hospitals.

In essence, psychological warfare means winning friends or influencing people. The UN Command won friends through the great generous heart of its troops, while the Communists exploited the psychological warfare primarily for instigating
people and prisoners of war to make troubles.

Most spectacular psychological warfare the UN Command exploited was its successful offer of an one hundred thousand dollars reward for the first MIG pilot to fly a combat MIG to it undamaged. The reward offer was issued the day after armistice talks resumed in April 1953, toward the end of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. Two months later after the armistice was signed, a NK Communist pilot zoomed his MIG out of nowhere, landed at Kimpo Airfield and asked asylum. He claimed he never had heard of the 100,000 dollars reward offer but was more than happy to accept the money. The NK pilot gave the UN Command invaluable information, including corroboration that the Communists were violating the armistice terms by moving MIGs from Manchuria into the so-called non-military airfields in the northern territory.

The enemy’s propaganda warfare in the Korean War was characterized by the use of the big lie technique. Most dastardly of all, the Communists mounted their campaign to charge the UN Command with waging germ warfare. Needless to say, this was their big lie in its classic form. It was fabricated of whole cloth without the slightest substance.

The Communists were capable of uttering any falsehood, any fantasy, for their purpose was not to prove anything but to sow seeds of doubt and fear that would deter their won people from thinking of freedom and would even create uneasiness in the minds of some liberals in the free world.

On the other hand, as was already mentioned earlier, in Korea between two and three million people fled the Communist North to seek refuge in the Free South, running away from communism even when the Chinese Communist forces were on the march and appeared likely to be victorious. Wherever and wherever people in Korea had a chance to make choice, they chose freedom. The most sensational example of this, of course, was the choice made by the Red Chinese and NK Communist captives who vowed they would struggle to the death against anyone who tried to force them to return to their original homes in Communist territory.

An important center for the Communist propaganda activity was within the neutralized zone at Panmunjom where the armistice negotiations held. Taking a typically familiar example, there Red agents who called themselves news correspondents mingled freely with the newsmen of the free world and daily spread their poison. The Red agents used every trick of the trade to influence or try to influence UNC writers. They used flattery and ridicule, thereat and promise. It is impossible to cite here all sorts of Communists’ propaganda warfare.
Battle Lessons

(1) CCF Tactics: Time after time, as UN forces defending troops learned, the Red Chinese characteristic pattern of attack was repetitive and almost predictable. After dark, for instance, heavy preparation fires deluged an isolated advance outpost. Improvised demolitions often reduced combat outpost fortifications so that the enemy could assail the position. Waves of attacking Red Chinese forces then overwhelmed the greatly outnumbered defenders.

Almost invariably the initial attack made on the front of the position was a feint; the real attack would be made by troops that had enveloped the position and moved to the rear. Enemy ambush forces were also located to the area of the outpost, between the combat outpost and main line of resistance, at normal reinforcement routes to prevent both a withdrawal by the defenders to the main line of resistance and to contain reinforcements from reaching the outpost.

Experience with CCF combat techniques forced the friendly forces to re-evaluate our own night fighting tactics. The Red Chinese were very skillful in night operations. Most major attack during the last two years of the war was made at night when they were not directly assaulting, the Red Chinese advanced their own ground positions by digging and their well known creeping tactics. This enabled them to establish an outpost line within small arms and mortar range of friendly outposts.

Defensively the enemy used the cover of darkness equally well. Mountain roads were aswarm with trucks and supply movements, which friendly night-fighters and bombers slowed with only moderate success.

Skilled, rapid construction of field fortifications and excellent camouflage discipline by the enemy were also object lessons. Entrances to tunnels and caves, as well as the bunkers themselves were so carefully disguised by fresh branches, weeds, logs and other natural foliage that they were rarely visible either by air observer or aerial photographs. Active weapons positions were also effectively camouflaged. Often 60-mm. and 80-mm. mortars were housed in bunkers and fired through a narrow opening at the top.

Destruction of the enemy’s bunkers, trenches, and cave network by medium and heavy artillery was only partially successful. Napalm was generally ineffective due to the lack of combustible materials in Red Chinese ground defenses. The well-prepared, deeply dug fortifications were virtually impervious to anything less than air assaults with heavy ordnance - - 1,000-pound bombs and over - -
which were required to destroy Red Chinese reverse slope positions.

A well dug-in secondary line was located six to 13 kilometers to the rear of the CCF main line of resistance. This meant that an attack to infiltrate CCF defenses would require the penetration of a fortified area to a minimum depth of 16 kilometers.

Friendly night raids, patrolling, and ambushes were conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him off balance, and obtain intelligence. For these purposes, more basic training in night combat operations at the squad and platoon level was needed.

Regarding the employment of friendly tanks, they usually remained in firing position on the main line of resistance only long enough to complete their fire mission, since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire.

Outpost battle, which was predominantly night fighting, was characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery duelling, and sharp battles for disputed terrain that would offer improved observation.

Lessons also involved an evaluation of enemy capabilities and certain strategic considerations which had so distinctly affected the course of the war. UN forces faced an adversary who had vast resources of manpower and, accordingly, was wholly indifferent to the cost of winning in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances, Red Chinese forces did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly units.

Chinese Communists' weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign manufacture. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and had proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.

During the Korean War, superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical surprise. Since the CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often there was no preliminary warning until the Red Chinese were virtually within grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed their presence from UNC air reconnaissance.
Further more, important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce talking front. Cease-fire negotiations dragged on interminably over a period of two years and 17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years of the truce talks, from July 1951 – July 1953, an additional 56,000 Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. killed and wounded in action to more than 136,000.

A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the truce was the attainment of long-range political objectives. Accordingly, they fully utilized the negotiation period and respite to gain advantage by aggravating American tendency to impatience through the imposition of endless delays.

The Korean War illustrated another important lesson. The Republic of Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant violation of the Cairo Declaration and the United Nations Charter.

This fact itself proved that if any free nation, if not supported by strong military preparedness, would never restrain aggression.

(2) Human See Tactics: Should the ultimate struggle between communism and freedom flare out in open shooting war tomorrow the Communists would outman the free world numerically everywhere the free-loving peoples fought. At the time the armistice of the Korean War was signed, the militant Soviet Russia controlled the minds and bodies of 750 million people, by far the greatest population any aggressive force in history has had at its command.

In other words, the harsh police rule and the tight control of the Communists, at least in the beginning of any war between two worlds of freedom and communism, weld the 750 million into a cohesive fighting force. That is the evidence of Korea, where the Communists were able to keep an army of 1,200,000 Red Chinese fighting hard for almost three years despite evidence that many of the Chinese hated communism. The evidence of this was the fact that of twenty thousand Red Chinese soldiers captured, fifteen thousands declared they would rather die than return to the Communists.

At the beginning of a war between the two blocs of the world the long years of Communist conspiracy, intrigue and propaganda could be expected to pay dividends through internal troubles in the nations of the free world, troubles that would tend to dissipate the power of the free world by creating friction among allies.

The free world alliance is made up of nations politically equal. Each nation has the right to walk out of the alliance at any time. Not so the Communist
world. The masters of this aggressive bloc are in the Kremlin in Moscow in the main and exercise tight control of each of the satellites, welding the whole group of Communist-controlled nations into a single force, sensitive to the direction of a single high command, politically as well as militarily.

With such control over so many millions, the Communist masters were able to be prodigal with the expenditure of their manpower in Korea, where sometime Chinese Communists kept moving forward in a human sea over the bodies of their fallen comrades, stacked high like cordwood.

Throughout the Korean War, with the exception of a brief period, the Communist forces were able to throw into battle several times the number of men the UN command had in a given sector. Always the Communists were willing to lose relatively large numbers of Red Chinese or NK Communists in order to hit relatively few of friendly troops.

(3) A Basic Fighting Unit: The backbone of both the ROK Army and US Army during the Korean War was the nine-man infantry squad. That was the basic fighting unit of friendly ground forces. It was the accumulated successes of a lot of these little teams that brought victory to an army. It is still true today.

The importance of good team spirit on the squad in that an infantryman will go forward valorously, take the extra chance necessary for an heroic deed, only if he can be certain that one on his right and another on his left will do their part. During the Korean War it was not quite so, although there were countless, distinguished actions demonstrated by exceptionally outstanding team work in squad-size, platoon or company, because men of so many nationalities were teamed together in friendly units.

When a rifleman creeps forward alone toward the enemy he must be confident that his comrades of arms on the squad will stand their ground and cover him if he runs into trouble.

There is much talk these days about push-button warfare and the fact that the technical experts have developed such weapons of mass destruction that the role of the infantryman is secondary. Technical research and development in weapons will continue endlessly. But, without any way disparaging the vital roles of the Air Force and Navy, the infantryman remains an indispensable element in any future war. The infantryman, of course, must be supported by the air and naval forces and every kind of technical weapons, but he never will be relegated to an less important role. He is the brave who, with his rifle and bayonet, is willing to advance another foot, fire another shot and die if need be in defense of his nation.

This, of course, does not mean to disregard the great role of airpower. Par-
Epilogue

While the free world nations were learning the character of the enemy, the militant Communists got a long head start in organizing the military power of their people in Asia. After the Pacific War, while the United States limited the Republic of Korea to a small-sized constabulary force with anti-riot weapons, the Russians supported a gigantic military build-up of the Chinese Communists and North Korean Communist puppet clique, as well as their own military power.

After the Soviet Russia installed a Communist puppet regime in the territory north of the 38th Parallel in September 1948, the puppet clique attempted to raid into the south across the Parallel while prompting and supporting an insurgency in the Republic of Korea in an attempt to disorder and overthrow the ROK Government. After the insurgency showed signs of failing, the North Korean Communist puppet clique suddenly launched an all-out, surprise attack on 25 June 1950 with fully prepared armed forces.

All nations of the Free World, especially the United States, was completely caught by the NK Communist armed aggression. The Communist aggressors seemed to have taken encouragement from the American policy which left Korea outside the United States defense perimeter in the Far East. They evidently accepted this as reason to discount American reaction, or the Soviet Russia may have calculated it. Russia also appeared to have been certain the United Nations would not participate.

Against the Communists' anticipation, however, response by the Free World was immediate. In accordance with a series of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, combat forces from sixteen U.N. member nations came to Korea to rescue the Republic of Korea from the Communist aggression. Five other nations also furnished medical assistance. These forces and units were placed under the United Nations Command.

The ROK and UN allied forces advanced to the northern boundary on the Yalu River, and when the unification of the Korean peninsula was at hand,
Chinese Communist forces made aggression into Korea en mass. Henceforth, the phases of the war, pushing and pulling up and down the peninsula, alternated tides of fortune until late June 1951, when Jacob Malik, the USSR delegate to the United Nations, proposed a cease-fire talk through the U.N. radio broadcast. The outcome was more than two years of limited positional warfare, although there raged countless bloody battles, along the line what is now known as the Demilitarized Zone.

In the three years of war, the NK Communist puppet clique had gained 850 square miles of territory south-west of the 38th Parallel, while the Republic of Korea acquired 2,350 square miles north of the Parallel.

In brief, the armed aggression of the north Korean puppet Communists, supported by the Soviet Union, to unify the Korean peninsula by force was blocked and repelled by the ROK forces with the great support of the UN allied forces. Then, the effort of the United Nations to unify the country by a collective action in force was disrupted by the unexpected armed aggression from Red China, and the Chinese Communist attempt by force to push the UN forces out of the peninsula was thwarted by the ROK-UNC combined effort.

Thereafter, stalemate settled down to two years of the outpost battles while the both opponents struggled for an uneasy armistice at the talking battle front until July 1953.

As a result, despite the failure of complete, decisive military victory at last, the United Nations did achieve its immediate objective which was to stop the Communist aggression in Korea. But the larger objective of the United Nations was to deter future aggressors by demonstrating that the free world nations finally were ready to stand shoulder to shoulder and fight in defense of freedom and peace. In this connection, whether the larger, more permanent objective of detering aggression was achieved is a question which only the future events of history can answer.

Of significant war lessons, the UNC member nations learned that the Communist adversary would use every means at his command to gain an advantage, both political and military; that he was willing, as in his use of human-sea tactics, to expend his soldiers’ lives prodigally in order to offset superior firepower. It is nothing new that the Communist leaders handled their fellow lives as flies or consumable articles for their ambition and designs. And most important, the UNC allies learned that the enemy was not invulnerable.

Furthermore, the countries that fought under the banner of the United Nations to repel the Communist aggression had fully demonstrated their ability to put aside all sorts of differences and act in concert against a common foe.
Many people said that the Korean War was the first conflict that the United States had failed to win. Of course, the war ended indecisively. In a major sense however, the Korean War was apparently victory, a victory over Communist aggression.

For the United States, for the first time in history, it joined with the other free nations and fought the Communists to a standstill. The United States could be proud of as principal role in the first U.N. war, as it can be proud today of the great role it plays in defending the Republic of Korea facing a similar war threat from the same Communists that started the Korean War twenty-six years ago.

The ROK—U.S. combined forces are now maintaining defense posture ever stronger along the Demilitarized Zone which the Eighth US Army aptly calls "Freedom Frontier."

As for the American men who fought in Korea, no brave war was ever fought, under more trying conditions, than that which was fought in Korea. In the U.S. Army, for example, 41,835 awards for valor, and 117,315 Purple Hearts attest this.

Medals of Honor were awarded to 131 members of US Army forces for their heroic exploits during the Korean War. This was a greater number of Medal of Honor winners than there were in World War I, which many Americans have long thought of as a more heroic war than that in Korea. Some 123 men, for reference, won the United States highest award for valor in World War I, and 430 heroes earned it in World War II.

US Army men were awarded 78 Medals of Honor for the Korean War, members of the US Marine Corps earned 42, US Navy men seven, and US Air Force flyers four. Only 39 of these 131 men lived to receive their awards. Several officers and men were promoted in addition to being awarded the Medal of Honor.

At this time, it will be worthwhile to make a remark that during the Korean War there were in service a total of 142 American men whose fathers were generals. Of these 35 were casualties in action which exhibited a high casualty ratio. The only son of General James A. Van Fleet was included among the 35 casualties. The general's son was a pilot and was killed in action when his body failed to return from a mission in a B-26 night bomber.

There was also Captain Bill Clark, son of General Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, UN Command, who suffered his third and most serious battle wound at Heartbreak Ridge when he commanded Company G of the 9th Regiment, 2nd US Infantry Division. Major John Eisenhower, the only son of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, had served with the 3rd US Infantry Division.
The Armistice and After

The Korean War was the fourth largest in America’s history and it was the first effort of collective security by the Free World against Communist aggression. Fighting side by side with ROK forces as well as other UNC contingents, American forces first repelled the North Korean Communist aggressors and then defeated the Chinese Communist aggressors.

Throughout the three years and one month of bitter ground, sea and air battles, American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines distinguished themselves with brave acts of valor thus achieving unprecedented, outstanding meritorious deeds.

In such famous landmark as Heartbreak Ridge, Bloody Ridge, Iron Triangle, Arrowhead, T-Bone Ridge, Porkchop, Old Baldy and Bunker Hill, the distinguished battle account and the memory of bitter fighting of the men who sacrificed their noble lives in the Korean War will live on the history of the Republic of Korea keeping alive the glorious tradition of the United States Armed Forces.

All units of U.S. forces had fought bravely and courageously, thus accomplishing their respective missions with professional skill and confidence, regardless of various tactical problems. They had seen battles throughout the Korean peninsula from the Naktong River to the Yalu River, demonstrating the versatility, aggressiveness, and readiness which has always been a tradition of the American forces. American troops had made dashing attacks on the enemy, fought gallantly, and died bravely for the cause of mankind — defense of freedom and peace. This battle history is a vivid record of which all Americans, the people of the Republic of Korea as well as all other peoples in the Free World can be proud.

We all trust that American servicemen will continue to place duty above life and they will reap more glory and add more brilliance to the tradition to which they have, by their exceptional gallantry, already given so much, particularly in the Korean War.

Since the signing of the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953, U.S. military forces under the United Nations Command have remained in Korea to protect the Republic of Korea and her 35,000,000 people from further Communist aggression and also to contribute to the preservation of peace and security in this part of the world.

The Eighth U.S. Army is the bulwark of the United Nations Command. Its units fought with valor in the bitter fighting of the Korean War and, today, it stands ready to meet any eventualities against the Republic of Korea, remaining a lean fighting force on constant vigil.
Section 3. Korea Today

Communists’ Aggression Threat Still Persists

For more than a quarter century, the eyes of the world have been focussed on this Korean peninsula. It was a prime Communist target in 1950 when the North Korean Communist puppet regime undertook the armed invasion against the Republic of Korea, thus triggering the unprecedented tragedy of internecine war.

But the Republic of Korea was not alone. The righteous fury of the freedom-loving nations swiftly came to our aid by moral, material and even military support for which we all in this Republic are eternally grateful.

Under the banner of the U.N. Command, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of 16 contributing countries fought gallantly, shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea’s stout-hearted troopers. They persevered through three years of bitter fighting and at length repelled the Communist aggression and restored the integrity of the Republic of Korea and established an armistice that silenced the guns.

Thus, the Korean War was stopped with an uneasy armistice on 27 July 1953 but ended. Though 23 years have elapsed since the shooting was stopped, yet, a state of great strain still imposes itself on the Korean peninsula, because the menace of a new armed aggression by the Communists has continued to remain.

The armistice has endured for 23 years largely because the United Nations Command has stood guard to prevent any renewal of Communist aggression. During the period we have overcome many crucial moments as the Communists had attempted serious provocations, sometimes to such a trying point as just before the war. There were the Communists’ knavish war provocations beyond a limit to our patience in enduring. But we bore and forbore, thus enduring beyond our strength at the eleventh hour, just because we truely wanted no war on our peninsula at all costs.

The war-ready Communists, however, backing down on a promise that was agreed upon in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, have been attempting to provoke another war. They have been violating the armistice
terms just like a mere child’s play as indicated in the following figures.

**ARMISTICE VIOLATIONS BY THE COMMUNIST FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>493</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>708</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1967</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>777</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>505</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5,407</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>608</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>985</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,220</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 106 86 38,495 38,687

Today, the irresponsible North Korean Communists are as hostile and intransigent as ever, and the Communist puppet regime in Pyongyang has never shown the slightest sign of modifying its long-avowed design of subjugating the Republic of Korea by means of armed aggression.

In fact, the North Korean Communists have all along concentrated their major efforts on building up military muscle to underpin their adventurist design, and they now find themselves in the deepening mire of economic collapse. The Communist regime has long been turned into a huge military fortification, with its heavy industries mostly geared to arms and munitions industries. Moreover, it has continued to import formidable weapons of largely offensive nature including missiles.

The Communists, particularly since the Indochina debacle, had openly prepared to attack the Republic of Korea by deploying more strength and heavy armament along the Demilitarized Zone. It is a well-known fact now that they dug secret infiltration tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone that divides the South and North in an attempt to penetrate into the south in surprise with groups of forces.

The North Korean Communist regime now has enemies on all four sides. Its diplomats have been expelled from north European countries for involvement
in smuggling and narcotics trafficking. It has also been repeatedly reminded by European countries and elsewhere to pay its tremendous debts.

Such troubles in the Communist North are all interrelated. The troubles occur in a chain reaction. Its economy has long been stagnant and now is completely bankrupt. The Communists to the north used up everything just for war preparations and propaganda purpose. The unpardonable international crimes were committed by their overseas missions in order to make money for use in the Kim Il-sung’s personal cult and his propaganda expenses overseas.
Thus, standing on the verge of difficulties for all directions, the North Korean Communists eventually began to mount more provocative acts against the south, seeking to camouflage such circumstances and to divert the attention of their enslaved people to outside. Very recently, for instance, two American officers were brutally murdered by axe-wielding North Korean Communist guards at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom.

**Barbarous Acts**

On the afternoon of 18 August 1976, North Korean Communist guards attacked in surprise in several groups with axes and metal picks upon UN Command guards who were escorting a work detail trimming a poplar tree in the Joint Security Area within the neutral zone, near the armistice village of Panmunjom. By this Communists’ inhumane and barbaric act of violence, American Major Arthur G. Bonifas and 1st Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett were hacked to death and nine other UNC personnel were injured.

This unimaginably barbarous murder by the Communists in a broad daylight in the Joint Security Area designated to be used for peace-making came as great shock to all peace-loving people the world over. It was a premeditated, inhumane murder that proved to the world what cruel and unreasonable hooligans the North Korean Communists are.

It was an act of openly aggressive provocation. There is a limit to our patience in withstanding Communist provocations. There is no reason why we should always endure the North Korean Communists’ provocations. It is obvious that the Communists had intentionally picked a fight with the U.S. military forces at Panmunjom to commit brutal murders.

This Communist provocation is aimed at concealing temporarily the serious internal problems, particularly in the wake of the economic collapse. At the same time, it is aimed at imputing to the Republic of Korea the responsibility for war provocations schemed by the Communists themselves.

Thus, our efforts to prevent another war with dictatorial, militant North Korean Communist regime, who is ever ready to communize the whole peninsula by means of force, is actually far harder for us to endure than to engage in the battle and win it.

The Republic of Korea will take immediate steps to retaliate against the North Korean Communists if they commit any illegal provocation again, small or large in scale, in the future.
An UNC officer, hacked to death by North Korean Communist soldiers, is seen beside the front wheel of the UNC truck. Another UNC members are being attacked by axe-wielding North Korean Communist mad-dogs during the melee.

The sacrifices of the two American dead officers will not be in vain. They died not only for the defense of the Republic of Korea but also for their own country and for their honor.

Angered by the brutal Communists' behavior at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom, all people of this Republic, old and young, and men and women, called for immediate and strict retaliatory measures by all means against the
North Korean Communists for their savage crime so as to keep the Communists from repeating such cruelties and brutalities.

And, there was a stepup of apparently deliberate North Korean Communist attacks on American personnel. On 30 June 1975, Major William D. Henderson, for instance, was a target of unprovoked attack, and he suffered a fractured larynx after he was attacked by the North Korean Communists as he sat quietly on a bench in same area where the two American officers were killed by axes.

It is also obvious that the Panmunjom murder incident was deliberate, as part of selffulfilling North Korean Communists' campaign to prove that the danger of war is high in Korea and there is direct relationship between this and the presence of U.S. troops.

Warmonger Kim Il-sung and his clique went so far as to resort to such inhumane provocations to conceal their political, social, economic and other internal instability. It is Kim's serious miscalculation and misjudgment if the Communists' chieftain really dreams he can communize the Republic of Korea by force of arms. The freedom-loving people of the Republic have never forgotten the Communist aggression of 1950 and are fully prepared to crush any aggression by the Communists. The only result the Communists can achieve in new aggression of their making will be, very surely, nothing but their total self-destruction.

Peace-Oriented Moves

In the sharp contrast, however, the Republic of Korea has been making all possible efforts to create an atmosphere for easing tension on the Korean peninsula and restoring mutual trust between the two divided halves of the country through the South-North dialogue.

However, the Communists to the north unilaterally ruptured the dialogue without consultations or warning on 28 August 1973. We repeatedly urged them to come to the dialogue table, because we firmly believe the South-North dialogue, including the South-North Coordinating Committee meetings and Red Cross talks, is the best way to pave the road toward long-cherished national unification by peaceful means.

Thus, the Republic of Korea favored a step-by-step approach to eventual unification of the divided two zones of Korea, with humanitarian issues, such as reunion of divided families and establishment of postal contact, to be settled first.

The Republic of Korea also urged continuously the Communists to conclude
non-aggression accord between the South and North but they rejected this real peace-oriented offer. But the Communists, instead, have been demanding the withdrawal of American forces and the United Nations Command from the Republic of Korea because these constitute a deterrent and an obstacle to the Communists' aggression intentions.

Now, in the wake of the August 18 Panmunjom incident, the North Korean Communist clique must have found itself in an extremely unfavorable situation in the international community.

The axe-wielding murders alone are enough to prove the fact that the Communists have made no change at all in their basic strategy to unify the entire Korean peninsula under Communist rule by force of arms.

Kim Il-sung is very highly unpredictable warmonger and is now extensively attempting to mislead the world eyes and ears. In an attempt to break through severe complex and difficulties confronted all four directions at home and abroad, the Communists are now busily engaging in a tricky maneuver, thus launching a camouflaged propaganda warfare. Strict vigilance should be kept up against such a concealed, disguised tactic.

The Communists are rather expected to intensify their scheme to instigate a so-called revolutionary climate in the Republic of Korea and they will certainly attempt to provoke more often and heavily so as to disrupt our rapid growth of national strength.

In conclusion, the basic aim of the North Korean Communists have been unchanged since 1950. The Communist regime is the most paranoia and closed societies in the world and, therefore, everything about the Communist clique is deeply hidden behind the Iron Curtain and much is unknown. But the murder-attack by axes, without doubt, is a part of a pattern to put international pressure on the United States military forces to leave Korea.

Furthermore, the world situation is now changing day after day, and stability and peace in this part of the world will be ensured only if a military balance is maintained between the free nations and Communists, in terms of thermonuclear weapons and conventional warfare, because a most powerful means for preserving peace is military preparedness.

In this essence the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea is absolutely essential to help maintain the relative military balance of the Korean peninsula as the Republic of Korea progresses toward self-sufficiency.

Thanks to the great, perspicacious leadership of President Park Chung Hee, the Republic of Korea is now rapidly advancing in all fields toward the great
national prosperity which unexampled in the history of Korea. Especially, executing a series of the economical development programs yearly, the Republic is making a gigantic, rapid stride in the economical area as well as in the rural development, known as “Saemaul” or New Village Movement, thus becoming a marvel model of many countries.

But the North Korean Communists are just the opposite. They have enemies on every side diplomatically and economically in particular. That makes it more probable the Communists would start something if there were no American troops here in the Republic.

Taking into consideration these circumstances, the war-deterring role of the U.S. forces in Korea, committed under the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty signed at Washington on 1 October 1953, continues to serve as a most potent and effective restraint on the Communists’ inclination to essay another aggressive venture.

We must prevent recurrence of war on the peninsula at all costs. The potential war deterrent entails many-folded; material preparations and spiritual resolve on the basis of stability and strength in order not to give vulnerability to the enemy. This effort makes it necessary for a country to bolster its national power as peace can only be secured through strength. And, a country can expect friendly nations support only when it first prepares to defend itself.

In short, the two sides maintain entirely different basic policies toward unification. The Republic of Korea seeks the national unification through peaceful means on a gradual step-by-step basis, whereas the North Korean Communist regime clings to a strategy of unifying the Korean peninsula by force or violence.

Preparedness is the only means to prevent the tragedy of renewed Communist aggression, and we must build up and maintain self-reliant defense posture always as long as the North Korean Communists dwell on their hostile, trigger-happy strategy toward the Republic of Korea.

If the Communists, however, should attempt to cause another armed aggression against the Republic by misjudging the situation in the country, it would only mean the North Korean Communist puppet regime’s destruction of itself.
PART TWO

THE NAVAL OPERATIONS

JULY 1951 to JULY 1953
CONTENTS

CHAPTER I THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN OUTLINE
Section 1. Introduction ................................................. 517
Section 2. The Naval Air Operations ................................. 520
Section 3. The Surface and Amphibious Operations .............. 527

CHAPTER II THE INITIAL PHASE OF STEalemate
Section 1. The Interdiction Efforts of TF 77 ....................... 535
Section 2. East Coast Operations ..................................... 543
Section 3. West Coast Operations ................................. 551

CHAPTER III THE MIDDLE PHASE OF STEalemate
Section 1. Changes in Far East and Naval Forces Far East ...... 558
Section 2. The Defense of UNC-held Islands Continues .......... 559
Section 3. The Second Year of the Wonsan Siege .................. 561
Section 4. The Naval Air Operations .............................. 565

CHAPTER IV THE FINAL PHASE OF STEalemate
Section 1. Introduction .................................................. 588
Section 2. Naval Air Operations in Final Months ................. 590
Section 3. Naval Surface Operations in Final Months .......... 595
Section 4. Conclusion .................................................. 602
CHAPTER I  THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN OUTLINE

Section 1. Introduction

By mid-June 1951, the United Nations ground forces had reached in their northward movement a line which ran generally northeast from the vicinity of Kaeuegos towards the northern edge of the now-famous “Iron Triangle” and reached the east coast in the vicinity of Nam River, about a little over 60 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. The line was relatively short, and was firmly anchored by the United Nations Navy at each end.

It was late June that, unable to check the UN Command’s northward drive, the Communist enemy asked for a truce, and the UN forces were ordered not to advance any further. This big event, not directly connected with the UN naval operations of the Korean War, must be briefly described, for it was to have great effect upon the remaining two years of the UN naval operations.

The first definite evidence that the Communists were ready to discuss a cease fire in Korea came on 23 June when the Soviet delegate to the UN, in a broadcast talk on the UN radio series called “The Price of Peace,” suggested that “discussion should be started between the belligerents for a cease fire and an armistice.” An overwhelming majority in the UN was as eager to end the Korean War as it had been in December 1950, and on 29 June Washington ordered General Ridgway to get in touch with the Communist commanders to discuss the Soviet proposal. This General Ridgway did on the following day in a radio broadcast to the Communist high command in Korea. The Communist answer came in less than 24 hours; the proposal to negotiate was accepted, but the suggestion that the conference site be the Danish Hospital Ship Jutlandia anchored in Wonsan harbor was rejected and Kaeuegos near the 38th Parallel was suggested as an alternative. After a further exchange of messages and a preliminary meeting between representatives of both sides, talks formally opened at Kaeuegos on 10 July. The chief of the UN delegation was Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, ComNavFE. It was to be two years before these truce talks had any decisive result, a full 24 months of almost incessant bickering and nattering which ceased only when one side or another temporarily broke off the talks.
During these months the fighting went on, and the UN forces suffered well over 100,000 casualties while the negotiators wrangled. On land both sides dug in deeply and prepared positions of great strength, the Communists utilizing every lull resulting from the truce talks to build up the power, particularly their fire power. Offensive activity took the form of patrolling or of limited attacks which, though often of considerable strength, usually had very limited objectives of little apparent strategic value. Both sides continued to strengthen their positions, and soon the capturing of a single prisoner for interrogation became a major military operation.

Thus, the ground operations gradually got into a stalemate and, as the truce talks continued to be frustrated, the burden of offensive action was to lie principally upon the Navy and the Air Force.

Now, it seems necessary to scan the UN naval strength and organizations in the Korean waters.

As of 30 June 1951, Task Force 77, under Rear Admiral George R. Henderson, contained three carriers, the USS Princeton, the USS Bon Homme Richard, and the USS Boxer, the battleship New Jersey, two heavy cruisers, the USS Los Angeles and the USS Helena, and eighteen destroyers. Planes from the carriers not only flew close support missions for the ground forces but also carried out reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrols and interdicted the North Korean railroad net.

In the meantime, Task Force 95, forming the UN Blockading and Escort Force under Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, consisted of 85 ships, many provided by other members of the United Nations and by the Republic of Korea. These ships were led by the carriers USS Sicily and HMS Glory. These ships supplied gunfire support along the coast line, patrolled the offshore waters, and controlled the approaches to northern Korea.

A third naval force, Amphibious Task Force 90, under Rear Admiral Ingolf N. Kiland, stood by in Korean and Japanese waters to render support to any amphibious undertakings. In addition, the units of TF 95 worked with the blockading UNC naval units.

Neither the Chinese nor NK Communists offered more than nuisance opposition to the UNC naval forces. Although the powerful Russian submarine fleet lurked in the background as a potential menace in case of a spreading of the war, the chief danger to the UNC ships lay in the numerous mines sown by the Communists along the coasts of Korea.

Unless there was a radical change in the global situation, the UNC air and naval strength seemed more than adequate to cope with the Communists.
THE COMMAND ORGANIZATION, U.N. NAVAL FORCES (30 June 1951)

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UN COMMAND
(General M.B. Ridgway)

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST
(Vice Admiral C.T. Joy)

CTF 90
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
(Rear Admiral I.N. Kiland)

CTF 92
Logistic Support Force
(Capt. J.M.P. Wright)

COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET
(Vice Admiral H.M. Martin)

CTF 95
UN Blockade and Escort Force
(Rear Admiral G.C. Dyer)

CTF 77
Fast Carrier Force and Heavy Units
(Rear Admiral G.R. Henderson)

CTG 95.1
(Radm A.K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN)

CTG 95.2
(DD or DE Squadron Commander)

CTG 95.5
(Frigate Escorts)

CTG 95.6
(Minesweepers)

CTG 95.7
(ROKN ships)

CTE 95.10
(Representative of CTG 95.1)

CTE 95.11
(West Coast Carrier)

CTE 95.12
(Patrol and Blockade)

CTE 95.13
(Escort Frigates, Admin Purposes Only)

CTE 95.14
Gunfire Support Element as required

CTE 95.15
Small Ops. Element as required

CTE 95.21
(Wonsin Element)

CTE 95.22
(Songjin Element)

CTE 95.24
(Hungnam Element)

CTE 95.28
(Bombline Element)
Exercising complete control of the Korean air and seaways, the UN Command’s greatest vulnerability was on the ground.

Section 2. The Naval Air Operations

The air war was affected hardly at all by the truce talks, and for the naval and air force pilots it was business as usual. From time to time special air operations were ordered with a view to influencing the truce talks, and there were occasional shifts in emphasis in the aerial operation, such as the shift in mid-1952 from interdiction objectives to industrial and military objectives, but on the whole the UN naval aircraft continued to interdict to isolate the battlefield. “Operation Strangle”, that started from 5 June 1951, went on, with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines working as an integrated team in closest harmony.

From time to time in the interdiction effort, the carrier airmen had an opportunity to perform other missions.

On 25 August 11 F9Fs from VF-51 and 12 Banshee F2H2s from VF-172 led by Commander M.U. Beebe, CVG-5, joined in the raid on Najin along with the B-29s from the Air Force. The photo aircraft which followed the strike took pictures which revealed that 97 percent of the bombs had fallen on the Najin marshalling yards. A turntable, a roundhouse, a railroad bridge, and approximately 75 of the 136 freight cars present were destroyed. For both the B-29s and the Navy fighters, the attack on Najin had gone without a hitch. It was the first instance in the Korean War when Navy carrier fighters have escorted Air Force bombers.

On 29 October an enemy compound slightly east of the city of Kapsan, where the Chinese Communist Party members were holding a meeting, was successfully raided by the aircraft of Task Force 77. This Kapsan strike was one of the most successful raid based on information supplied by friendly guerrillas. Information on potential Communist targets in North Korea occasionally came from bizarre sources. Escapees often volunteered information; fishermen captured or defecting from North Korea added to the total information picture; ROK civilians who penetrated into enemy territory were still another source.

In the meantime, task of interdiction continued. In November, 922 track cuts were claimed and 44 rail bridges reported destroyed, despite increasing difficult flying weather. Jet aircraft of Task Force 77 proved to be ideal vehicles for
The track-busting task. Their speed, silent approach, and bombing steadiness made them ideal for such precision work.

In first nine days of December, 937 track cuts were made. Between 29 December and 9 January 1952, Task Force 77 averaged 116 track cuts per day. And in the 24 operating days between 28 December and 1 February 1952, the fast carrier pilots claimed 2,782 cuts in the track. In this same period, 141 bridges or bridges by passes were also destroyed.

The action report submitted by Commander TF 77, Rear Admiral John Perry, for this period concluded: “An almost complete interruption of eastern rail line movement was accomplished.”

In March 1952, there was another break in the monotony of the rail and bridge strikes which did much to boost pilot morale. An enemy attempt to
retook the UN-held island of Yangdo, off Songjin, on 20 February met retaliation in the form of carrier aircraft attacks on small boat concentrations all along the nearby coast. Carrier sweeps from Wonsan to Songjin destroyed 300 small boats and damaged another sampans and junks which might be used in another invasion attempt. The tedium of interdiction was further relieved on 13 April when the first of many combined air strikes and surface bombardment hit Chongjin.

Everywhere the rail-bursting campaign continued with unabated fury. During April, May, and June 1952, over 7,000 sorties were flown, achieving in the first month-and-half another 3,000 rail cuts and the destruction of 80 bridges and 100 bypasses.

While interdiction missions were continuously flown for the remainder of the war, the month of June 1952 saw the interdiction campaign deemphasized. Hereafter interdiction would take the form of massed attacks on rail and transportation centers, manufacturing areas, and supply centers, with the hope that the Communist would thereby be forced to make concessions at the truce table.

On 23 June some 500 United Nations aircraft battered the vast Supung Dam hydroelectric complex on the North Korean side of the Yalu River. Supung Dam, which supplied power to all of North Korea’s industry and much of Manchuria’s, had heretofore been untouchable. The Supung Dam complex was struck again on the 24th by 200 more US bombers.

The highly satisfactory results achieved by the carrier strike not only inflicted severe damage to the hydroelectric system of North Korea, but the attacks were also visible demonstration to the Communists that a new corner in the Korean War had been turned. The psychological effect was pronounced, both at the Panmunjom armistice table and in the North Korean capital. This was the first time that naval aircraft had operated in “MIG Alley” just above Supung Dam since the attacks on the Yalu bridge in the fall of 1950. Although this strike on Supung was a joint operation by the Navy, Marines, and Fifth Air Force in Korea, the navy pilots had the place of honor.

Even more impressive attack was launched on 11 July. This was the strike on Pyongyang, the NK Communist capital city. Its 40-odd military targets -- warehouses, bridges, troop barracks, factories, and Army headquarters -- had been spared for months for the sake of the armistice talks. But not there was even less reason to withhold attacks, upon the capital city’s military targets than there had been for withholding attacks on the Supung Dam complex. On the morning of 11 July, 45 naval aircraft from USS *Bon Homme Richard* and 46
from USS *Princeton* were launched, to make the initial attacks and to strike several targets in Pyongyang on the southeast side of the city. Other target area had been assigned to aircraft of the Fifth US Air Force, the US Marines, the Australian Air Force, and aircraft from HMS *Ocean*, the British carrier operating under Commander Task Force 95. The strikes lasted a full day. A total of 1,400 tons of bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm were delivered upon Pyongyang's targets during an 11-hour period by 1,254 aircraft. The Pyongyang radio a few days later stated that 1,500 buildings had been destroyed and 900 damaged. One bomb had made a direct hit on a large air raid shelter, causing large casualties among high Communist party members.

The success of the raids on Supung Dam and Pyongyang, which had cost the enemy so much and the UN air forces relatively little, was accepted as good evidence of the wisdom of de-emphasizing the interdiction program. Encouraged by the result, from June until the end of 1952, naval air conducted a series of attacks which took the formidable title “coordinated maximum effort air strikes”.

For twelve days of July 1952, Task Force 77 struck a variety of industrial targets, ending with an attack on the Sindok lead and zinc mill with the aircraft from the *Bon Homme Richard* and the Kilchu magnesite plant with the aircraft from the *Princeton* on 27 and 28 July. All planes but one returned safely from the strikes.

On 28 August 1952, the US Navy began a series of guided missile operations by Guided Missile Unit 90 aboard the USS *Boxer*. Pilotless radio-controlled World War II “Hellicats” (F6F-5) converted to guided missile, equipped with a television guidance system, and loaded with high explosives were conducted to the targets by control planes.

Between 28 August and 2 September, six guided missile attacks were launched against selected bridges. This marked the first use of the guided missile in combat from carriers. Several missiles found their targets, and only one was abortive due to faulty control.

On 1 September 1952 three carriers -- *Essex*, *Princeton*, and *Boxer* -- furnished two large coordinated strikes to smash the Aoji refinery, a synthetic oil producing center in the far northeast corner of Korea. *Essex* launched 29 planes from ATG-2, *Princeton* launched 63 planes from CVG-19, and *Boxer* launched 52 planes from CVG-2.

The strike on the Aoji refinery was routine and almost leisurely. No antiaircraft fire or MIG opposition was encountered, permitting repeated runs on the target. The destruction of the refinery was complete.
The total absence of antiaircraft fire from Aoji proved conclusively that the Communists had taken advantage of this "restricted" area's nearness to Manchuria and Russia. By building industrial plants in this northeast corner, the Communists had believed them to be inviolate.

On 8 October the second instance of the Navy's escorting B-29s during the Korean War occurred (the first had been the raid on Najin in August 1951). On this day a combined Air Force-Navy strike walloped Kowon, a rail center in northeast Korea. Twelve F2H2 Banshees from the USS Kearsarge escorted ten B-29's over Kowon. The raid was highly successful and all aircraft returned safely.

As the interdiction efforts dwindled, and the carrier strikes such as those just described blasted the few industrial targets in Korea, it was appreciated that a more fruitful employment for naval air power ought to be found. As a result the Seventh Fleet worked out a new way of destroying enemy supplies at the front, which came to be known as the "Cherokee Strikes." Commander Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Clark, felt that they could do more harm in a stalemated war by destroying the enemy's logistics at the battleline, not somewhere in North Korea. Thus, the new target system was started and continued to the end of the war. The Cherokee strikes were specially effective in knocking out enemy artillery pieces. The use of the strikes at the battleline reached its peak in November and December 1952, with the Air Force joining the Cherokee campaign.

The new strike program steadily grew in proportion until more than half the naval air effort --- approximately 2,500 sorties per month --- was being applied along the frontlines either as close air support missions (nicknamed "Call Shot") or as prebriefed strikes (nicknamed "Cherokee"). The period from 2 November to 25 November was typical: 522 Cherokee missions and 212 Call Shot sorties.

While the results of Cherokee strikes were not always visible or measurable, the program was undoubtedly hurting the enemy and reducing his attack potential. In fact, several of the Cherokee missions had blunted and even prevented enemy attacks.

January 1953 at Panmunjom saw occasional meetings between liaison officers, at which the Communists made false charges about overflights and bombardments of the neutral zone. The fighting along the front consisted only of harassing probes and limited objective attacks. And late in February there was a pickup in close air support by the Seventh Fleet aircraft. Typical of this work was a mission on 21 February 1953. Six Valley Forge VF-54 ADs, led by their
Carrier *Valley Forge*, first in the fray, brings striking power.

skipper, Commander Henry J. Suerstedt, Jr., were put to work on a hill in the IX US Corps area where the corps troops were attempting to regain control of the crest. The carrier ADs made runs parallel to the front of the UN troops, dropping 500 to 1,000 pound bombs on the enemy side of the ridge very close to the UN troops. Following these runs, three of the ADs strafed. The ridge was reported as taken. The “Mosquito” reported 100 per cent accuracy and ordnance effectiveness: sixteen bunkers destroyed or severely damaged, and two caves destroyed, along with many Communist troops. It was an example that the naval aircraft were employed to support the ground troops so closely on the front.

On 6 April the truce talks were resumed at Panmunjom which led to agreement on exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners on the 11th. “Operation Little Switch” commenced on 20 April. These developments, however, did not affect the naval air operations.

On 13 April, the beleaguered city of Chongjin was battered in a fierce maximum air-gun strike. One hundred and nineteen sorties from *Philippine Sea’s* Carrier Air Group Nine and *Oriskany’s* Carrier Air Group Twelve hit the city’s transportation network and its mining and ordnance areas. On 21 April the pilots of *Princeton* and *Oriskany* struck targets of their own preference. Two
hundred and twenty-three sorties were flown. Even so, the targets were much
the same -- the supply and industrial areas of northeast Korea, the Hodo Pando
guns of Wonsan, a jet sweep past Pulchong, and naval gun fire support and
Cherokee missions. The best result, perhaps, was the fact that no pilots were
lost.

Entering May and June the Communist enemy intensified the pattern of their
offensive activity. They seemed determined to seize enough ground for propa-
ganda purposes so that they could say that the UN forces were signing an
armistice to avoid a military defeat. On the eastern sector, after a bitter struggle,
Anchor Hill and Hill 812 passed into enemy hands in late May and early June.
This was followed by heavy action in the central sector, where the Communists
attacked the IX US Corps and II ROK Corps in division strength. Heavy concen-
trations of enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded all attacks. In the II ROK
Corps sector, Communist forces succeeded in pushing back the friendly main line
of resistance.

Noting this enemy heavy attacks, Admiral Clark ordered Task Force 77 and
Task Group 95.11 to exert maximum carrier air effort again in support of the
UN troops at the battleline.

During this final period of the war, Task Force 77 saw a new burst of activity.
Four carriers operated on the line almost continuously, despite poor weather.
Many operating records were smashed: total sorties flown, tonnages of armament
delivered, total days at sea. Underway replenishment at night -- of a magnitude
never before known (27 times in 49 days) -- became routine.

On 14 and 15 June, Task Force 77 had delivered 300 and 403 frontline
missions respectively to support the 1 ROK Corps troops. The carrier planes,
assisted by the New Jersey and the St. Paul, began an intense bombardment and
bombing of the area on the 14th which continued throughout the morning of
the 15th. The battleship New Jersey laid down one of the heaviest
bombardments of the war to assist in the capture of Anchor Hill. This was the
first use of a battleship at the bombline since Iowa had been so employed in
October 1952. The ship reported 44 bunkers destroyed, 20 heavily damaged, 2
caves closed, 610 yards of trench torn up, 13 gun positions destroyed, and 13
others damaged.

On 14 July the carriers of Task Force 77 were now directed to support the
II ROK Corps front where the Communist mass attack was launched to penetrate
again the friendly main defense line. The support produced excellent results.

By the 19th of July, the full weight of the enemy onslaught had subsided
and friendly counterattacks gradually reduced the extent of his frontal pene-
For the remaining weeks of the war the four carriers pounded the Communist forces, setting new records for sorties flown on three successive days — 24 July, 598; 25 July, 608; 26 July, 649. Seven thousand five hundred and seventy-one offensive sorties, half of them at the bombline, were delivered in an all-out effort to stabilize the front.

Section 3. The Surface and Amphibious Operations

The opening of truce negotiations also had no immediate effect on the naval surface ships' operations in the Far East. Despite of the commencement of truce talks, the UN Navy's work must go on for 25 more months. As Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, who relieved Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith as CTF 95 on 20 June 1951, pointed out, "The Navy work not only must go on but that it must be intensified. The more the Navy could do from the sea to hurt and embarrass the enemy on land, the better would be our chances in the negotiations at the truce table." This meant that along both coasts, as truce talks began, the naval surface ships were to perform specific tasks more aggressively: the blockade was to be maintained, fishing suppressed, enemy coastal traffic interdicted, mines swept, rescue performed, and the captured islands supported.

In the east, along the 300 miles of enemy coast, the ships of Task Force 95 continued to provide fire support, to patrol and bombard, and to besiege the cities of Wonsan and Songjin. The siege of Wonsan was accelerated as the Communists worked to expand their truck traffic and to develop his coastal defenses. One of the biggest bombardments in July began on the 18th of July.

On 18 July the heavy cruiser Helena and the battleship New Jersey came to Wonsan to initiate an intensified bombardment plan known as "Operation Kick-Off." For days and weeks, along with other smaller ships, fired at known and suspected positions of enemy harbor defense guns in Wonsan with both delayed-burst and air-burst shells. The most enemy batteries on Hodo Pando, Umi Do, and the tip of Kalma Pando had been knocked out or silenced.

On the western shore, in the meantime, British Commonwealth, ROK, and US units also continued to carry out a number of small bombardments and raids. One of the lengthy and significant operations on the west coast was begun in late July. The operation was called "Han River Demonstration" along the Han River estuary.
This demonstration was begun as two-carrier operations from 26 to 29 July; from the 27th to the 29th the heavy cruiser *Los Angeles* shot up targets on the western shore of Haeju Man; in the Han River estuary as close as possible to Kaesong, CTF 95, Admiral Dyer, committed all but one of his west coast frigates to bombard the northern bank. Even the HMS carrier *Glory* had been ordered from Sasebo to join the US carrier *Sicily* already in the west coast, and a check sweep of the entrance to Haeju Man had been undertaken to permit the entry of heavy bombardment ships. The so-called Han River Demonstration was carried out solely for the purpose of forcing the Communist negotiators to admit the obvious fact that the UN forces controlled the territory of Yonan and Ongjin peninsulas, south of the 38th Parallel and west of the Imjin River. The effect of the demonstration upon the truce talks was quite considerable when the truce delegates in late July took up the question of the military demarcation line. This Han River Demonstration lasted until 27 November 1951, at which time the negotiators agreed upon a provisional cease fire line. The disputed territory was recognized as in UN hands.

From time to time the UN surface ships had to support the UN ground forces. In November 1951, for instance, the 1st US Marine Division in the X US Corps sector requested that naval ships be made available to support them. During this period on the eastern front, the US Marines were facing a deeply entrenched enemy whose main fortifications had been erected on the reverse sides of the steep mountains, away from the Marines. These positions had proved invulnerable to all but the heaviest ordnance, namely, the naval gunfire of cruisers and battleships.

The assigned task for Task Force 77's and 95's cruisers and battleships to support the Marines was not easy one. The average range to target would be ten miles for the cruisers, and 16 miles for the battleships. Nevertheless, reports of the excellent results of the naval gunfire came not only from spotters observing the ships fire but from captured enemy prisoners as well. General Seldon, commanding the 1st US Marine Division, summarized the naval gunfire support: "In view of the unusual circumstances confronting the 1st US Marine Division, it is felt that the fire support ships have played a valuable and unique role in applying pressure against enemy military positions and morale."

In January 1952 the east coast blockade ships of TF 95 introduced two interesting programs known as "Package" and "Derail." These two programs were designed to increase the effectiveness of naval gunfire and to coordinate it with the airstrikes of Task Force 77.

"Package" was a shoreline target suitable both for ships and airplanes.
points along the main Songjin–Hungnam railroad were carefully chosen, and
given the code name "Package," plus a number. The "derail" targets, meanwhile,
were ones to be kept destroyed solely by naval gunfire. At each "derail",
patrolling ships would fire a limited number of shells into the targets during each
24-hour period. (See Sketch Map 1.)

By thus concentrating and coordinating both naval air strikes and naval gun
strikes upon the "package" and "derail" targets, it was hoped that the Commu-
nist logistic efforts along the route could be reduced to a trickle—perhaps even
brought to a standstill. In fact, these programs worked very well.

Entering the latter months of 1951, the naval and air forces in Korea began to
step up their activities. This increased activities were more in the nature of a
counter-offensive than self-initiated program of attack: the air force was counter-
ing a sudden increase in enemy air activity; the navy was resisting a determined
Communist attempt to seize some of the more important UN-held islands. It was
chiefly the western islands in the waters patrolled by TE 95.12 that the Reds
wished to get their hands on. Those important islands included Sok To and Cho
Do, off the Chinnampo approaches, and the island of Taehwa Do in the Yalu
Gulf. The Eighth Army wanted to hold Taehwa Do as well as the other two
islands.

On 30 November, as CincFE warned that those islands had become critical to
the negotiations and adjured his island commanders to make preparation for
defense, Fifth Air Force fighters intercepted a formation of 12 twin-engine
bombers heading for Taehwa Do with an escort of 16 propeller fighters and 50
MIGs, and destroyed the great part of the bomber force. Nevertheless the island
was lost that night to a well-planned Communist amphibious assault supported
by artillery from Ka Do, and of some 1,200 friendly guerrillas and inhabitants
only about a quarter got out. This affair was followed almost immediately by
further enemy shore-to-shore attacks which seized six small coastal islets in
Haeju Man.

The loss of Taehwa Do had brought increased patrolling by west coast ships
and a request for reinforcement of the Cho Do, Sok To, and Paengyong-do
garrisons. By 20 December the ships on anti-invasion duty near Cho Do included
the American cruiser Manchester and the British cruiser Ceylon, and two
destroyers. In mid-January 1952, in an effort to suppress the enemy artillery
effort against Cho Do and Sok To, CTF 95 went north in the flagship Rochester
to bombard the Amgak peninsula in coordination with a Marine air strike from
Badoeng Strait. By early February the enemy had retired from a number of the
captured islets in Haeju Man and off the Ongjin peninsula, in part apprently
owing to bombardment by rocket ships, in part to inability to support his forces. By March 1952, these important islets were being reoccupied by anti-Communist partisans and a number of enemy effort to attack across the mud flats had been thrown back by naval gunfire. Thereafter, although reports of enemy offensive plans continued to come in, and although enemy artillery was persistently directed against Cho Do, Sok To, and their supporting ships, as well as against the islands at Wonsan in the east, the enemy island offensive was limited in its success to the elimination of the foothold in the Yalu Gulf. At Cho Do improved defensive arrangements were followed by the installation of radar and antiaircraft weapons in February, and in March by a helicopter detachment; these facilities, together with naval patrol of the surrounding waters and a rescue B-29 which

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**TARGETS OF "PACKAGE" AND "DERAIL"**

**NOTE**

P: Package Targets
D: Derail Targets
P-1 and P-2: Assigned to TE 95.22
P-3 and P-4: Assigned to Ships Making "Windshield Patrol"
P-5: Assigned to TE 95.24

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**Sketch Map 1**
orbited overhead, made the Cho Do area a useful bail-out and rescue zone for pilots from the Western Sea carrier and from the Fifth Air Force.

In April a series of coordinated air-gun strikes on coastal cities was begun. On 4 April Admiral Joy gave Task Force 77 an additional mission: to coordinate its air strikes with simultaneous gun strikes by the blockade forces. Such a system would increase the damage inflicted, and it would enhance training. Fire from the surface ships would help reduce the enemy antiaircraft fire upon the naval aircraft. In return, the naval aircraft could spot the surface fire of the ships. These combined efforts of air-gun strikes were to continue until the end of the war.

At Chongjin on 13 April, for instance, 246 sorties from Boxer and Philippine Sea deposited 200 tons of bombs while Saint Paul, escorted by three destroyers and with spot from the carrier planes, kept up a daylong bombardment. In May a three-day effort, equally divided between Chongjin and Wonsan and supported by Iowa, was conducted in two installments when the original plans were frustrated by sea fog. But deserving targets were limited, and in June the work of the carrier air group was shifted inland beyond gun range.

The coming of May and June 1952 brought changes to the Naval Forces Far East. In May Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark became Commander Seventh Fleet relieving Vice Admiral Martin and on the 31st Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich relieved Rear Admiral Dyer as Commander Task Force 95. Also, in May, after ten months of truce negotiation, Vice Admiral Joy was succeeded as head of the truce team by Major General William K. Harrison, Jr., USA; in June after nearly three years as Commander Naval Forces Far East, he turned over his Tokyo command to Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe.

At the time of these changes of command, the bombardment and blockade forces of Task Force 95 had been ranging the Korean coasts unchallenged except for coastal gunfire. Added to the hundreds of air strikes conducted on the coastal communications by the carriers of Task Force 77 were the hundreds of gunstrikes by the surface ships of Task Forces 95 and 77. By now, every worthwhile target within reach of naval gunfire along the enemy-held coast had been under siege, and had been hit repeatedly, time and again.

Nevertheless, the Communist continued to increase his strength behind his fortified front, his stubbornness in negotiation, and his vigor in propaganda. By June the greatest troop and supply accumulations of the war were in evidence behind Communist lines, and intelligence indicated the imminence of a general offensive. But June passed without difficulty and the anticipated offensive never came.
The third year of war, which began 25 June 1952, found the blockade and bombardment operations more standard and routine than ever, but nonetheless arduous and dangerous. Enemy shore battery fire increased in accuracy as well as amount. The Communist’s ability to score hits on the UN ships at slow speeds and at close range showed steady improvement.

The increasing enemy coastal fire, which doubled from July 1952 to January 1953, had two immediate results: First, ships increased their patrolling speeds, changed their courses more frequently, and opened their patrolling range to the beach; secondly, ships tried to make sure that every shell fired was a winner. The enemy seemed to have very few radar-controlled coastal guns, which meant that in nighttime, blockading ships could move closer ashore for their intercepting and gunnery efforts, with far less danger from enemy counterbatteries.

The oft-tried tactic of manning a whaleboat with a reconnaissance party, and dispatching it close aboard the designated beach for target observation, still paid dividends from time to time. The whaleboat crews would lie to, waiting, watching, and listening for trains, maintaining communications to the parent ship by walkie-talkie radio. In many instances they were successful. The effort on 14–15 August 1952 by destroyers Jarvis (DD-799) and Porter (DD-800) was typical. In this case in addition to whaleboat parties, the two destroyers were assisted by a ROK Navy torpedo boat. Lying approximately 3,000 yards offshore south of the Songjin area, Porter succeeded in damaging two enemy trains while Jarvis was getting one.

In the meantime, the endless siege of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin went on and on. Ships patrolled the designated courses “Taillight,” “Engineblock,” and “Windshield” day after day. Mine sweepers in Wonsan made another circuit of “Muffler,” and the minesweepers at Songjin went round the harbor once again. The air-gun “Cobra” strikes increased.

During the fall of 1952, the biggest naval operation, however, was the amphibious demonstration at Kojo on the east coast. The original idea was stemmed from the suggestion by CTF 90, Rear Admiral Francis X. McNerney, that routine troop movements between Japan and Korea might be employed for training and deception. Under Admiral Clark, the Seven Fleet Commander, Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven was set up and 15 October established as the target date. For the purposes of deception, only the highest echelon of command knew that the maneuver was to be only a demonstration. On the 15th, more than a hundred ships were off the Kojo beaches. The Iowa, the cruisers, and destroyers continued shelling the beaches all night until H-hour the next morning in support of the demonstration. Having no indication whatsoever that the
The Naval Operations in Outline

projected landing was not genuine, the Bon Homme Richard and Air Group Seven spared no effort to make the Kojo operation a success. But the result was not so successful as anticipated.

On 12 February 1953 Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen relieved Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich as Commander Task Force 95. A change was also made in the Task Force 95 organization. Hereafter, the cruiser division commander serving with Task Force 77 as CTG 77.1 would also have additional duty as CTG 95.2 relieving the destroyers squadron commander who had performed this duty.

For the Amphibious Force, TF 90, the early months of 1953 were occupied by routine training exercises, minor troop lifts, and logistic support work. For the gunnery ships of TF 95, however, as for the soldiers in the line, March and April brought increased action. The number of mines encountered rose radically, from 14 in March to 31 in April, and as usual most were floaters. Increased enemy artillery fire directed against the minesweepers required special attention to the employment and positioning of gunfire support ships. Interdiction of train traffic along the eastern shore continued. Off the bombline, the UN destroyers and heavy ships continued to keep the enemy down and, through their ability to fire upon him from the rear, forced him to keep his targets deflated both from artillery and from the sea. But the principal problem of the spring months was the need to keep the duty heavy cruiser or battleship on notice at all times for immediate movement to Wonsan.

As March passed, and the muddy and slippery roads of Korea dried out, the patrolling ships reported increasing numbers of truck enemy convoys along the coastal roads. Approximately 500 vehicles were seen on the night of 15–16 March. They were taken under fire, but no estimate of damage could be made.

April saw a sharp upturn in the enemy's counterbattery fire, especially in the vicinity of Wonsan. Four US ships were hit during this month: Los Angeles, Manchester, Madox, and Kyes. As the enemy's coastal fire increased, the UN patrolling ships were equally aggressive in matching this enemy fire.

During the last two months of the war the battleship New Jersey supported by heavy cruisers Saint Paul and Bremerton and light cruiser Manchester, plus twelve destroyers, stood guard at the east coast bombline. It was the first appearance of a battleship for naval gunfire support at the bombline since USS Iowa in October 1952.

The sixteen ships rotated in three groups (CTU 95.28, 77.7.8, and 77.1.9) at the bombline to give constant support to the eastern anchor of the battleline. Thirteen thousand rounds of 5-inch, 2,800 rounds of 8-inch, 700 rounds of 6-inch, and 1,774 rounds of 16-inch were poured into enemy positions during
the last two months of the war.

A large part of the credit for preventing the enemy's frantic efforts to advance along the east coast during the final days of the war was due the naval sharpshooters. When the demarcation line was finally set, there was a definite northward curve on the east coast where the battleline was ahead of the rest of the front.

Thus, the longest blockade and bombardment effort ever imposed by the United States Navy came to an end on 27 July 1953.
CHAPTER II  THE INITIAL PHASE OF STALEMATE
(July 1951 – February 1952)

Since the preceding chapter had given an outline of overall naval operations for the remaining two years of the Korean War, this and the following chapters are now devoted to deal with the noteworthy naval operations by phase of the war development.

This chapter covers the period of July 1951–February 1952 which was characterized by stabilized front and peripheral war.

Section 1.  The Interdiction Efforts of TF 77

The interdiction effort of the carrier task force (TF 77) was now to enter its second phase - - breaking the highways. The first phase - - breaking the Yalu bridges and the bridges of the northeast net - - had achieved success within the northeast rail net. But despite the efforts of Navy, Air Force, and Marines alike, enemy truck traffic had continued to increase, and the daily average of Communist vehicle sighting had risen spectacularly from 236 in January to 1,760 in May. Analysis of these sightings indicated that the enemy possessed some 20,000 trucks, a tenth of which arrived nightly in the combat zone, and suggested the difficulty of interdicting this logistic effort.* The importance of the problem was emphasized in early June by a GHQ announcement of the record vehicle sightings of the preceding month and this led to a try of an ambitious new inter-service interdiction effort. This was the genesis of "Operation Strangle" under which the Navy would operate from 5 June until 20 September 1951.

In the planning for "Strangle" the main north-south road routes behind the enemy lines were identified and parcelled out among the services.

The "belt" interdiction idea had appeal and logic on paper, although there was now great skepticism that any interdiction effort could be made effective within the Korean peninsula. But since the system in use had achieved only limited success, why not try one which was primarily concerned with the highways? The
highways, not the railroads, were now carrying the vast preponderance of supplies. Accordingly, a one-degree strip of latitude across the narrow neck of North Korea (from 38°15'N to 39°15'N) just above the battleline was selected. The traffic networks within this belt were studied and divided into eight routes: the Fifth Air Force in Korea would take the three western-most routes; the carriers of Task Force 77 would take the two central routes; and the First Marine Air Wing would take the three eastern routes. (See Sketch Map 2.)

In each zone, at selected defiles and passes along the important highway routes, certain areas were designated as "strangle areas" or "choke points." In addition any bridge, embankment, tunnel, or other construction within the zone would be considered a target.

Special efforts would be made to impede enemy movement at night. Aircraft would use searchlight and flares. Night-heckling aircraft were to increase their activity. Delayed-action bombs, set to explode in periods from six to seventy-two hours, would be dropped at every important choke point to impede progress and to delay repair work. Task Force 77 aircraft made an air drop of a half-million leaflets on 20 June along the route between Chongjin and Songjin. The illustrated
leaflets warned that unexploded bombs were in the ground. Certainly, it was worth a try.

For the first several weeks, in addition to their work on the northeast rail net, the carrier airmen tackled the highway routes in the mountains of central Korea, plowing creators in roadbeds, knocking out highway bridges and passes, firing rockets into tunnels, sowing delayed action and “butterfly” bombs in every choke area, and searching for the hundreds of trucks which, like ubiquitous kitchen cockroaches, were hiding by day in order to perform at night. The turbulent mountain winds complicated bombing accuracy.

Night-heckling activity also increased, and great number of enemy trains and trucks were frequently caught and destroyed at daybreak. Night reconnaissance effort of “Operation Strangle” also increased, and a close watch was kept of the results. Marine Fighter Squadron 513, operating from Pusan’s airfield, was credited with the nighttime destruction of 420 vehicles in a 30-day period.

At the end of two weeks, however, the total results were disappointing. Reconnaissance B-26s reported that the number of enemy trucks moving at night in each direction was unchanged. Some of the main roads had been blocked with delayed-action bombs, and several bridges had been knocked out; but these achievements had only caused the trucks to detour the main routes and to use other less-important and more difficult-to-hit secondary roads.

Nevertheless, “Strangle” went on, with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines working as an integrated team in closest harmony.

The Communists’ resistance also intensified. At important points along the key roads, enemy flak increased until the risk of making attacks often exceeded the expectation of gain. The cross-Korea highway west of Wonsan became so infested with antiaircraft guns that it was given the title “Death Valley.” Enemy road repair activity also increased, and gave evidence of efficient organization. Communists crews hunted out the butterfly bombs with detectors and destroyed them with rifle fire. On other occasions the buried delayed-action bombs were simply ignored with oriental fatalism.

By late summer it was apparent that “Operation Strangle” had failed. The reasons were simple: a bomb crater on an unpaved road could not stop a truck. The hole could be too quickly filled in or bypassed. Even a damaged highway bridge was no impediment. A simple bypass could be built, or a ford made across the usually summer-dry streams. And in comparison to rail networks, there was greater flexibility and greater area in the highway networks to make air attacks more difficult. At any rate, the conclusions were hardly encouraging, but as no obvious alternative presented itself, “Strangle” continued on into September.
As a result of the second phase of interdiction effort, another new effort would now be undertaken to destroy railroad tracks as well as the bridges themselves. This third phase was track-busting.

On 20 September TF 77 was relieved of all responsibility for frontline close air support missions to give the carriers greater interdiction freedom.

The change of emphasis from highway-breaking to track-busting had occurred for a very simple reason: increasing evidence of reuse by the enemy of the northeast coastal railroads. Moreover, American railroad engineers estimated that it would be harder for the Communists to repair multiple rail cuts than to repair certain key bridges.

While the carriers had been employed during the summer months in either giving close air support to the frontlines or participating in "Operation Strangle," the Reds had taken advantage of the respite - - first, to repair a great part of their fractured rail system; and second, to make ever-increasing use of "shuttle" trains between the broken bridges.

The UN reconnaissance aircraft photographed or reported on several occasions as many as 300 railroad cars in the various marshalling yards. Naval aircraft themselves reported attacking and destroying or damaging 1,900 boxcars and 17 locomotives in a 30-day period between mid-August and mid-September.

Rear Admiral W. G. Tomlinson, ComCarDiv Three and now CTF-77, following a coordinating conference aboard the Bon Homme Richard on 30 September 1951, with Major General Frank F. Everest (Commanding General FAFIK), made the decision to alter once again the pattern of the carriers' attacks. Hereafter, attacks would be conducted over as wide an area as possible, striking isolated rail areas at about one mile intervals in order to force the enemy to disperse his repair crews and to reduce the effectiveness of his constantly-growing antiaircraft defences.

Thus, by mid-October 1951, the three aircraft carriers (Bon Homme Richard, Essex and Antietam) were emphasizing rail cutting. In the first three days of October, 131 truck breaks were made. Between 18 to 31 October, the raillines were cut in a total of 490 places.

Within a month, over 1,000 individual breaks had been made in the rail tracks. The steady attrition of this naval air effort became apparent as new enemy car sightings decreased. Further evidence of the campaign's effectiveness was seen in the enemy's cannibalization of rails. Photographs revealed that a great part of all double-tracking, spurs, and marshalling yard rails had been removed for use at more essential places. Also, the pattern of antiaircraft opposition changed, increasing along the routes and becoming less intense at the bridges.
Essex burning after an F2H jumped the barrier. A second F2H in the landing circle and two ADs in the distance.

In November 1951, 922 track cuts were claimed and 44 rail bridges reported destroyed, despite increasing difficult flying weather.

As 1952 was ushered in, it was nonetheless obvious from pilots’ observations, photographic intelligence, and reports received from ashore, that the enemy’s highly integrated and carefully dispersed repair organization had succeeded in matching the UNC’s interdiction efforts over the whole of North Korea. Individual rail cuts were quickly and simply repairable, and there were ample supplies of lumber, unused rails, and, of course, manpower.

Accordingly, carrier tactics were altered once again. Instead of scattering rail and road cuts over wide areas, a plan to concentrate them at selected points was adopted. Rather than crater a roadbed with one bomb for every mile of track, entire stretches of railbed were torn up. At these points crater overlapped crater, totally destroying the roadbed for distances of one-half to two miles.

In 24 days of air operations in the period of 28 December 1951 to 1 February 1952, some 2,782 cuts were made and 79 railroad bridges and 50 bridge bypasses were destroyed. Temporarily, at least, the new attack plan proved too much for the enemy’s repair organization; in some places damage remained untouched for eight to ten days.
Still closer integration of naval air and surface effort against the northeast coastal routes was commenced in January 1952 in order to achieve semipermanent interdiction, regardless of weather and visibility conditions. Attack points along the northeast coast -- known by the code names of "Package" and "Deraill" -- were selected by photographic reconnaissance. These targets were chosen so that breaks could be made and maintained by either air or surface bombardment. Against the five "Package" targets, aircraft established the initial break and planted radar buoys by which surface forces could locate, identify, and hit the target regardless of visibility conditions. At the eleven "Deraill" points, responsibility for breaking the lines was assigned to the surface forces. These points would be bombarded with the aid of air spot by carrier aircraft.

As time went on, the success of both "Package" and "Deraill" operations was minimized by the lack of sufficient surface bombardment units for continuous surveillance of the chosen points.

The concentration of air attack on selected areas of track continued through February 1952, when 1,037 cuts were made in the first twenty days. The major effort was applied to the north-south and east-west rail lines in and around the junction point at Kowon, 22 miles northwest of Wonsan. So successful were the carriers' effort that the line from Kowon to Wonsan was kept inoperable for the entire period of 1 February to 5 March.

Special Missions

The Raid on Najin: From time to time in the interdiction efforts, the carrier airmen had an opportunity to perform other missions. One of these was the attack on Najin in August 1951.

The port city of Najin having been bombed once by B-29s in August 1950, the wisdom of making other attacks upon it was raised by the US State Department in a letter from the Acting Secretary. Mr. James Webb, to the Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson. Because of its nearness to Chinese and Russian territory, Najin was ordered spared from attack by the JCS on 8 September 1950 at the insistence of the Department of State. The danger of an incident with Russian aircraft or a possible error in navigation which might cause UN aircraft to fly over were the main reasons for the decision to declare Najin out of bounds.

As a result of this ruling, the Communists had taken advantage of Najin's sanctuary status and had increased its use as a rail hub and stock point for the transshipment of supplies. Passing this intelligence to Washington, CincFE made repeated
request to strike the city's warehouses, railroads, and marshalling yards. The Far East Air Force insisted that it could destroy Najin's legitimate targets without violating either the Manchurian border or the Soviet frontier. Finally JCS approved it. However, certain restrictions were tied to the approval. The Superforts must bomb on a southeasterly heading, passing over Najin from northwest to southeast. This stipulation was designed to prevent any violation of Russian territory. Second, the bombing attack should take place only in clear weather, in order to minimize any possible error in navigation or bombing. Third, the bombers should take care to avoid any damage on a known POW camp less than a mile from the Najin railroad station. And, of course, at no time should any plane pass north of the Tumen River.

Then, Far East Air Force planners turned for help to the Navy. Could the jets aboard the carriers of Task Force 77 escort the B-29s on the Najin attack? The request was passed through JOC to Commander Seventh Fleet and thence to Rear Admiral John Perry, Commander Task Force 77. Certainly, replied Admiral Perry by despatch. How many jets, what time, and where?

For the next three days the details of rendezvous, altitude, radio frequencies, and escort pattern were exchanged between Navy and JOC. The Navy jets would meet the B-29s at a point 80 miles south of Najin at 25,000 feet, take them in, over the target, and out again.

On 25 August, the mission was launched from the carrier Essex. Commander M.U. Bee, CVG-5, leading 11 F9Fs from VF-51 (Lt. Cdr. E. Beauchamp) and 12 Banshee F2H2s from VF-172 Cdr. M.E. Barnett), catapulted off. The 23 Navy fighters met 35 B-29s at the designated rendezvous point. It was perfect coordination, for the escort fighters did not even have to make a circle. The fighters took escort stations promptly, the Banshees taking high cover and the Panthers low cover. Base altitude was 25,000 feet on the way in. They weaved back and forth on top of the Superforts in order to keep all sectors covered and to maintain a combat speed. The B-29s bombed in three waves, each plane dropping ten tons of bombs. In the course of the mission the escorters kept rubbernecking for the Communist MIGs, but they never saw a single one.

And there was no antiaircraft fire, either. The B-29s did a beautiful job of bombing, making the final run in at about 19,000 feet. There was not a single bomb off-target. The navy fighters' homeward flight was very routine. They peeled off and left the B-29s after they got close to Essex.

The photo aircraft which followed the Najin strike took pictures which revealed that 97 per cent of the bombs had fallen on the Najin marshalling yards. A turntable, a roundhouse, a railroad bridge, and approximately 75 of the 136 freight
cars present were destroyed.

For both the B-29s and the Navy fighters, the attack on Najin had gone without a hitch. The naval action reports, histories, and war diaries of the period mention this mission in the most routine fashion, with the single elaboration that "it is believed this is the first instance in the Korean War when Navy carrier fighters have escorted Air Force bombers.

The Kapsan Strike: While the aircraft of TF 77 were concentrating on bridges, trains, and the rails, they were ordered to strike any worthwhile target. Information on potential Communist targets in North Korea occasionally came from bizarre sources.

One of the most successful raids based on information supplied by friendly guerrillas was the 29 October raid on a concentration of Communist commissars and party officials in the city of Kapsan which resulted in the death of more than 500 Red personnel.

On 29 October 1951, Admiral Perry, CTF 77, received a request from the Eighth US Army to make a raid on the headquarters of the Chinese Communist party at Kapsan, in North Korea. Guerrillas had reported there was to be a meeting of all high-level party members of the Communist Korean and Chinese forces at Kapsan at 0900. This city was located about 60 miles northwest of Songjin, in very mountainous terrain. The target itself was a compound slightly east of the city of Kapsan. In this compound was a records section which contained all Chinese and NK Communist party records, a security police headquarters, and a barracks.

Eight carrier aircraft led by Comdr Paul N. Gray from VF-54 participated in the raid on 29 October. They requested no fighter escort because they felt the fewer number of planes involved would give them the maximum possibility of surprise. They were launched about 100 miles east of Wonsan, at 0730. After rendezvous, they proceeded to the coast, staying as low as possible all the way to avoid radar detection. Upon approaching close to the target, they made a rapid climb to 8,000 feet, and then commenced their attack. The armament used for the strike was: two 1,000-pound bombs, of which one had a proximity fuze and the other an instantaneous fuze. Each plane carried one napalm bomb and eight 250-pound general purpose bombs. The 20-mm. machinegun ammunition was half incendiary and half high explosive.

When they left the target, there was nothing left but a smoking mass of rubble. Pictures showed every bomb except one inside the compound, and there was only one wall left standing. All of the planes returned safely to the parent ship.

Within two days an Army report was received from one of the friendly guerrillas,
who had been posted on the side of the hill overlooking Kapsan and who had watched the whole attack. He reported 509 high-level Communist party members were killed in the raid, and that all records of the Communist party in North Korea had been reported destroyed.

The remarkable thing which the post-strike pictures showed was that no part of the city had been damaged, except the compound itself.

This raid must have really hurt the Chinese and NK Communists, because the next week the NK Communist radio put a price on the heads of all the members of the strike and called them "The Butchers of Kapsan."

Section 2. East Coast Operations

Along both coasts, as truce talks began, the UN naval action continued as before. In the east, along the 300 miles of enemy coast, the ships of Task Force 95 continued to provide fire support, to patrol and bombard, and to besiege the cities of Wonsan and Songjin on the east coast. At Wonsan, especially, activity increased as the Communists worked to expand his truck traffic and to develop his coastal defense: reports from UN Command's agents within the city made frequent mention of the presence of Soviet advisors, of the massing of troops, of possible shore-based torpedo firing facilities, and of the installation of batteries of impressive size, including a "Stalin gun" said to have been hauled out to Hodo Pando by 12 horses.

The Battle of the Buzz Saw

On 6 July the surface ships off Wonsan carried out a heavy bombardment operation against the selected targets in the Wonsan city, in which Task Force 77 helped out the bombardment group by devoting its entire day and 270 sorties to the city. Following the heavy strikes, the Communists retaliated with an especially heavy bombardment on 17 July; the enemy shore batteries opened on the destroyers O'Brien (DD-725, Cdr. C. W. Nimitz, Jr.), Blue (DD-744, Cdr. R. S. Burdick), and Cunningham (DD-752, Cdr. L. P. Spear) from three sides of the Wonsan swept area. The ships at once went into the War Dance, an evasive maneuver originated in May by Brinkley Bass and Duncan, steaming in an ellipse at 22 knots and firing on batteries in each sector as their guns came to bear. As enemy
fire continued heavy. Task Force 77 was called upon for air support; at 1650 hours, and again an hour later, an LSMR was brought in from the outer channel to deliver a long-range rocket barrage against enemy gun positions. By 1830 the enemy batteries on Hodo Pando, Umi Do, and the tip of Kalma Pando had been silenced or had checked fire, but a new group of emplacements at the base of Kalma Pando presently opened up. By this time Helena and New Jersey had been started in from Task Force 77, and HMS Morecambe Bay, en route to Songjin, had been diverted to Wonsan. At 2000 hours she came in to join the dance, and for another hour, until darkness descended, shooting continued. Despite many very near misses no ship had been hit, and the single casualty was treated by the application of a Band-Aid, but the more than 500 splashes observed in the water around the UN ships. In return, the three destroyers pumped out 2,336 rounds of 5-inch fire, in a four-and-a-half hour exchange. The Communist bombardment was continuous and well coordinated from the three sides. Late that night Helena reached the outer channel, to be followed by New Jersey in the morning, and since something heavier than 5-inch gunfire seemed needed, both ships stayed on for two days of heavy-gun bombardment.

This engagement on the 17th was known as “The Battle of the Buzz Saw” and CTF 95, Admiral Dyer, made it compulsory that at all times in daylight, and for all bombardments, either night or day, ships should be underway after this date.

Prospects nevertheless seemed warm, and future policy deserving of consideration. To the Seventh Fleet staff the value of the Wonsan foothold seemed dependent on the future intentions of CincFE, a view which was communicated to the higher levels for comment. But there, owing to the commencement of armistice talks, planning was largely in abeyance, and answer came there none. In the absence of guidance from above, Admiral Martin, Commander Seventh Fleet, decided, as an interim measure, to hold the Wonsan harbor islands for bargaining purposes. It was to prove a long interim.

In the meantime, in the northeastern Korean waters, the no-fishing rule was enforced more rigidly than ever. The 6th of August saw USS Carnick (DMS-32) destroying four fishing sampans near Changjin and taking there 13 occupants into custody. Eight days later, the USS William Severtling (DE-441) captured nine poachers off Tanchon. The 19th of August found USS Thompson (DMS-38) capturing two fishermen at Tanchon.

**Naval Gunfire Support for Ground Troops**

From time to time the UN naval surface ships provided gunfire support for the
The Initial Phase of Stalemate

ground troops. On 17 August, for instance, a special bombardment group. Task Group 95.9, was formed to assist the ROK troops' advance into the difficult hill country south of Kosong; composed initially of New Jersey, Toledo, and two destroyers, this group continued through various changes of ships and of designation to support the eastern end of the battleline through August and into September.

In supporting the ROK forward movement, also, an amphibious demonstration was called for to assist. On 27 August a minesweeping group composed of three AMS and the LSD Whetstone moved into the objective area at Changjon, to be followed in due course by Helena, three destroyers, and an ISMR, and on the 30th by New Jersey and another destroyer. On the 30th and 31st the beach and adjacent enemy troops and gun positions were bombarded and subjected to air strikes; offshore, where the transport group lay to, the boats were lowered, formed into waves, and headed for shore, before being recalled and hoisted in. But although the demonstration was more elaborate than its predecessors, it remained questionable what diversionary impact had been created, or whether anything over and above the bombardment had been accomplished.

The main effort, however, was inland, and there on the 31st the attack began as the 1st US Marine Division, fresh from a six-week rest, pushed northward up the Soyang Valley, while the 2nd US Division pressed forward on its left. By 18 September the Marines had reached their objectives, as did the 2nd Division in mid-October. West of the Hwachon Reservoir, the IX US Corps was also pressing forward and by 21 October was looking down upon Kumsong. Seventh Fleet planners had by this time produced a follow-up plan, known as "Wrangle," which
involved withdrawing the Marines from the X US Corps, embarking them at Sokcho, and landing them in assault at Kojo to link up with the advance of the IX US Corps. But on 24 October, after a month of haggling by liaison officers, the Communists asked that talks be resumed, and “Wrangler” never came off.

The northward advance of the Marines since their February commitment to the Wonju front had brought them steadily closer to the Eastern Sea. Late September found the division on the upper waters of the Soyang River where its right, though still west of the Korean divide, was less than ten miles from the sea. This proximity to tidewater raised possibilities of naval gunfire and maritime logistics which were quickly embraced.

In this extremely mountainous country the Communists, deeply entrenched on the reverse slopes, was hard to reach. Since artillery could not touch them, and since air support was in short supply and unpredictable in quality, resort was made for the first time in a year to naval gunfire. On 20 September New Jersey was sent in to provide support; on the 23rd, after liaison officers had been sent out by helicopter and radio communication had been established, ranging rounds were fired; on the next two days, and again on 2 and 3 October, 16-inch fire was called down upon the backsides of the enemy with destructive and demoralizing effect. On 17 October New Jersey returned to the task, and for five days late in the month support was provided by the heavy cruiser Toledo. Intermittently throughout the winter this work continued, with the ships firing at ranges of 11 to 16 miles, their shells sailing over 2,000-foot mountains and across the Nam River valley to embed themselves amidst the enemy’s supply concentrations and command posts.

The proximity of the sea also held logistic promise. In contrast to the I ROK Corps on the coast, always largely supported by sea, the US Marines in September were dependent on their railhead at Wonju, 91 bad road miles away, a situation which required greatly increased allowances of motor transport, communications gear, and heavy engineer equipment. Now, however, encouraged by the prospect of “Wrangler,” a road was cut through the mountains to the sea, Sokeho in the ROK zone was pressed into use as a supply port, and an adjacent airstrip was employed as division airhead. The impressive consequence of this shift to seaward supply was the addition to the division’s supply potential of an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 combat man-days.

In November the 1st US Marine Division requested again that naval ships be made available to support them. This request was approved and a schedule of naval ships to support the division was drawn up. In the four months which followed, it became standard practice for a new ship, reporting to the Marine
Division to perform gunfire support for the first time, to send representatives to a liaison conference. At this meeting the Marines would furnish the necessary maps and overlays of the frontline and bombline, would explain the terrain topography and targets, and would furnish information regarding voice calls and frequencies. In return the ships gunnery officers would present information on ammunition availability, times on station, expected periods of replenishment, and other problems. These exchanges always proved invaluable.

The cruiser *Los Angeles* also was credited with saving the I ROK Corps on the night of 21 November when the NK Communists were breaking through the ROK lines near Kojo. The location of the break-through was beyond the range of destroyer fire. The only heavy ship available was the heavy cruiser *Los Angeles*. She arrived off Kojo about 0230 hours and her 8-inch guns turned the tide of battle. Her 91 rounds of 8-inch fire drove the Communists back and gave the I ROK Corps a breathing spell until morning, when they were able to replenish their ammunition supplies.

F2H Banshees over Hungnam on their way back to base, in July 1953. Upper left, the mouth of the Songchon River.
Air-Gun Strikes

At intervals throughout the fall the work of the fast carriers in the Eastern Sea was augmented by the Commonwealth light carriers. On 18 September the first coordinated air-gun strike by Task Force 95 was conducted in Wonsan commanded by Rear Admiral George C. Dyer aboard USS Toledo (Capt. Hunter Wood). Other ships included HMS Glory, USS Parks, USS John R. Craig, USS Orleck, and USS Samuel N. Moore. The same ships repeated the bombardment next day, joined by the three rocket ships, LSMR-409, 412, and 525. The air-gun bombardment was repeated on 10 October. For this strike, a British task force, under the command of Rear Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, participated, led by the Australian light aircraft carrier Sydney (Capt. D. H. Harries, RAN) and supported by cruiser HMS Belfast and destroyer HMS Concord, USS Colahan, HMCS Caugya, HMS Comus, and USS Shields. Late in November Admiral Scott-Moncrieff returned again with Belfast and Sydney, and with a screen still further internationalized by the addition of a Dutch destroyer, to spend two days in banging up Hungnam.

Wonsan Siege and Enemy Defense

By the end of June 1951 UN forces had occupied and used seven of the numerous islands in the Bay of Wonsan. The presence of the UN siege ships and minesweepers inside the harbor was definitely a severe irritant and worry for the Communists. During the first year of the siege of Wonsan, there were several occasions when the Reds believed a landing was imminent. These scares usually followed a maximum air strike by Task Force 77 or a heavy bombardment by a battleship, or a combination of the two. They were kept continually on their toes and never dared to leave the harbor lightly defended. (See Sketch Map 3.)

The American naval siege in Wonsan harbor, which grew to be the longest in modern American naval history, was begun on 16 February 1951. At the time there were few enemy batteries around the bay. As the siege lengthened, however, the number of guns defending the harbor rose steadily.

Likewise, the enemy shore defense system in Wonsan, which in the beginning was limited, was steadily strengthened. As UN minesweepers swept the area ever closer to the shore, the enemy's entrenchments were expanded to include the beaches nearest the swept areas. Shore entrenchments were also positioned at
other places where the Communists thought the UN forces might land -- the beaches near Wonsan city and on the south coast of the bay and, later, in the western portions of the bay.

The Communist's shore batteries were placed so as to cover both the ship operating areas and to sweep the potential landing sites: heavy machine guns and mortars were positioned near the probable landing beaches, and 76-mm. batteries in the nearby hills. The harbor's heavy guns (122-mm. and 155-mm.) were located farther back from the shoreline and positioned to take the ship operating area under fire.

The increase of enemy gunfire resulted in six ships being hit in July: *Everett* (PF-8); *LSMR-409*, *LSMR-525*; *O'Brien* (DD-725); *LSMR-412*, and *Helena* (CA-75). In August, the siege ships were untouched. In September, two were hit: *William Seiverling* (DE-441); and *Heron* (AMS-18).
The limited area available to the ships in Wonsan made it extremely difficult for the siege ships to maintain their positions when subjected to fire from the enemy shore batteries. So, in mid-June the sweeping of additional areas between the islands and the providing of so-called escape routes from the inner harbor were undertaken in order to provide the siege ships with more advantageous positions. Upon completion of the initial sweeping in late August, sweeping was started on September in the new ‘Muffler’ area. The latter area permitted a much closer approach to the city.

While none of the siege ships or the UN ships had yet been lost or even seriously hit, there began to be some doubt as to whether the siege was worthwhile. In the first 180 days of the siege, approximately 50,000 naval shells had been pumped into the Wonsan city’s targets. The doubts were expressed largely because there was no accurate way of determining precisely what the bombardment was doing to the enemy’s over-all capability and to his morale.

Outwardly, a little speculation was in order. It was evident, after six months of the siege, that neither the bombs from aircraft nor the gunfire from surface ships, even in combination, had succeeded in halting the steady flow of war material through Wonsan at night. The daytime flow had been effectively dammed, however, and a great deal of damage had been done in six months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks - Vehicles</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junks - Sampans</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cars</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But at night, as the observers on the friendly islands could plainly see, the enemy trains and trucks rolled steadily southward despite the gunfire and harassment. In view of this heavy nocturnal traffic, was the known and estimated damage sufficient to justify the risk being taken? The risk to the destroyers and minesweepers in the harbor was already great and was still growing. It was easy to imagine the tragedy which might occur if a lucky hit in a steering mechanism should veer a speeding ship into the minefield or aground on one of the numerous islands.

Risk to the siege ships was accepted. Damage to the enemy, however, was only one criterion of the value of the siege. The very fact that enemy resistance was on the increase was evidence that the siege was hurting. Also, it was known that large numbers of enemy troops were bivouacked near Wonsan to defend the area
from an amphibious assault. One intelligence report revealed that 79,200 troops were stationed in the vicinity of Wonsan to counter an invasion. Several US aviators -- Air Force, Navy, and Marine -- had already been rescued from the harbor where they might have been captured or lost. And by what yardstick could the psychological value of this thorn-in-the-side siege be measured?

Thus, the question of the desirability of continuing the Wonsan siege had been raised several times. But many of the best brains in the Army and Navy were all convinced of the necessity of the siege.

The siege was therefore continued and accelerated.

Section 3. West Coast Operations

The Han River Demonstration

The effect of the truce talks on naval warfare, particularly in the west coast, was occasionally quite considerable because of its nearness to the truce talk site.

On 26 July 1951, as the truce delegates at Kaesong began what would be a four-month wrangle over the establishment of a military demarcation line, a special naval demonstration was commenced in the Han River.

The reason for this special demonstration was to counteract the Communist's immediate claim made at the truce table that the 200 square miles south of the 38th Parallel and west of Imjin River (including the Ongjin peninsula) was in their hands.

This territory was actually patrolled by UN guerrilla forces. Furthermore, since the city of Seoul was located at the headwaters of the Han River, it was important to insure that any cease fire agreement would provide that the maritime approaches to Seoul were not under Communist control. It was therefore deemed urgent and prudent to demonstrate visibly to the Communists that this vital area was in the UN hands. (See Sketch Map 4.)

For the demonstration CTF 95, Admiral Dyer, committed all but one of his west coast frigates, HMS Glory was ordered from Sasebo to join HMAS Sydney, and a check sweep of the entrance to Haeju Man was undertaken to permit the entry of heavy bombardment ships.

Two-carrier operations were carried out from 26 to 29 July; from the 27th to the 29th heavy cruiser Los Angeles shot up targets on the western shore of Haeju Man, assisted by plane spot; in the Han the Commonwealth frigates bom-
barded the northern bank. The Communists were caught by surprise; the Reds obviously did not consider that such a large ship could get so far into this shallow and mined sea area and bring guns to bear on his front lines. *Los Angeles* fired forty-four 8-inch rounds and sixty-six 5-inch rounds into frontline positions and received a "well done" for her work.

As Admiral Dyer pointed out, the Han River demonstration was a very difficult naval operation: US and British charts of the area differed widely, and none showed any very reassuring depths; the liquid medium in the Han, brown soup rather than clear water, was lined with rocks; currents reached eight to ten knots, and so poor was the holding ground that on one occasion *HMS Comus* dragged while steaming to both anchors.

Although targets for bombardment, obtained from JOC and from the Leopard organization, were generally unprofitable, and although enemy reaction was for the moment nil, the demonstration was more concerned with capabilities than with accomplishments. By early August, despite intermittent groundings, the bombardment ships had succeeded in penetrating upstream to fire on Yonan.
from the southeast and northward up the Yesong River; on the 17th three of the frigates found 400 enemy troops along the river bank and gave them a thorough shelling. Late in the month, on the urging of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, RN, a survey of the river was began by a UDT detachment in the APD Weiss, and the channel was buoyed by the fleet tug Aftanaki. This survey work in the Han River was done most capably and energetically by the navigators of the frigates of the British Navy.

This Han River operation got intensified as the indications that the Communists at the truce table were about to abandon their insistence on the 38th parallel brought requests from the UN delegation and from EUSAk for more gunfire in late September. The carrier in the Western Sea was directed to bomb the northern banks daily and to provide air spot and combat air patrol for the bombarding frigates. On 3 October Black Swan steamed up the river to draw enemy fire, whereupon 13 F4Us from Rendova attacked the gun positions; and for the balance of the month, as carrier aircraft burned off the cover on the northern bank, the noise of the bombardment was wafted to the negotiators at Kaesong. By October’s end an effort originally scheduled for a few days had lasted a hundred, and like the destroyers at Wonsan the frigates in the Han estuary had become fixed.

On 25 October, as the Communists after transfer of conference site to Panmunjom returned to the truce table, the UN negotiators proposed the establishment of a four-kilometer demilitarized zone based generally on the existing line of contact. On 5 November the proposal was accepted, together with a UN proviso that the line be that existing when final agreement was reached. A week later General Ridgway directed the Eighth US Army to cease offensive operations and commence an active defense of existing positions. By the 27th the front had been mapped and accepted by both sides, and a bait provided for the Communists by a UN undertaking to accept this line should the armistice be concluded within a month. With this agreement, frigate bombardment in the Han River was terminated. Indeed, the Han River demonstration played a great role in showing the UN naval power along the Han River estuary. Thus, the Communist claim that the 200 square miles south of the 38th Parallel and west of the Imjin River were in their hands was denied.

Defense of West Coast Islands

Of far greater importance than the Han River demonstration was the campaign involving the west coast islands when they became valuable bargaining counters
in the truce negotiations. It was the defense of these islands that later became the most important and certainly the most dangerous and exciting of the many duties of the UN ships on the west coast after the truce talks began.

In early October, the Communists began to exert pressure on the west coast islands in an attempt to influence the amistice talks on the establishment of the military demarcation line. On 9 October 600 Communist invaders from the mainland landed on the large Yalu Gulf island of Sinmi Do, and although the garrison held for a time with support from Cossack and Ceylon, the enemy reinforcements arriving across the tidal mud flats forced withdrawal on the 12th. On the 30th Cavyga reported receiving a hundred rounds of artillery fire from the Angak peninsula opposite Sok To off the Chinnampo approaches: in the Yalu Gulf the island of Taehwa Do, where friendly forces had concentrated, was attacked by aircraft on 6 November in the first confirmed enemy employment of light bombers in Korea. That night Ka Do and Tan Do, two of the smaller northern islands, were seized by the Communists in a night amphibious attack.

Since the UN delegation hoped to use the islands as counters to trade off against the Kaesong area, these events served to stimulate some interest. From Commander Seventh Fleet came a request for an inventory of west coast islands, and from EUSAK a hope that Taehwa Do would be held. Thus, the battle for the important islands flared up.

In this situation of tension, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, RN, in charge of west coast, ordered one of his destroyers to patrol the area during the hours of darkness although he felt the northern islands were not worth the effort required to defend them. Shortly Commander Seventh Fleet appeared in the Western Sea on an inspection tour; on 12 November, with air spot from HMAS Sydney, his flagship New Jersey fired her final Korean bombardment and her 3,000th 16-inch round of the war at the enemy troop concentrations reported by Leopard Force in charge of west coast underground activities.

The ships of the west coast blockading force steamed up to Taehwa Do nightly; in the course of the month friendly guerrilla raids supported by naval units were conducted against enemy-held islands in the Yalu Gulf; but the proximity of these positions to enemy airfields prevented daylight surface support or carrier air patrol. On 27 November the subject of the offshore islands came up for discussion at Panmunjom, and the Communist efforts at the islands were further stepped up.

On the night of 28 November the Communists raided successfully against Hwangto Do in Wonsan harbor in the east, but the enemy's principal effort was still in the west. On 30 November, as CincPE warned that the islands had become critical to the negotiations and adjured his island commanders to make prepar-
ations for defense, the Fifth US Air Force fighters intercepted a formation of 12 twin-engine bombers heading for Taewha Do with an escort of 16 propeller fighters and 50 MiGs, and destroyed the greater part of the bomber force. Nevertheless the island was lost that night to a well-planned amphibious assault supported by artillery from Ka Do that had been seized by the enemy on 6 November, and of some 1,200 friendly guerrillas and inhabitants only about a quarter got out. This affair was followed almost immediately by further enemy shore-to-shore attacks which seized six small coastal islets in Haeju Man, and by reports of extensive troop movements in Hwanghae Province. These events brought a review of the island situation.

Responsibility for island defense was at this time somewhat obscure. Tokchok To and Paengyong Do had for almost a year been charged of CTG 95.1; other islands where US intelligence activities or equipment were operative were under the control of CincFE: the Korean-occupied islands were pretty much on their own. The loss of Taewha Do had brought increased patrolling by west coast ships and a request for reinforcement of the Cho Do, Sok To, and Paengyong Do garrisons; on higher levels various proposals for the institution of small boat patrols, reinforcement of the islands by air, and the like, were bandied about: in the south ROK Marine units were alerted for movement to the threatened islands.

Nevertheless the situation on those islands still got deteriorated, and between 16 and 18 December, despite support from UN ships and aircraft, an enemy force of about 600 overran two small islands inboard of Sok To. Hereupon CTF 95, Admiral Dyer, headed west, and on the 18th took over as officer in tactical command on the west coast. By the 20th the ships on anti-invasion duty near Cho Do included Manchester, Ceylon, and two destroyers, and the question of responsibility for island defense was at last beginning to jell.

Despite the fact all islands north of the 38th Parallel were conceded by the UN negotiators on 21 December, failing an armistice agreement the defensive requirement remained. On 6 January 1952 responsibility for the overall defense, local ground defense included, of designated islands on both coast, was assigned the Navy and delegated to CTF 95. So far as east coast islands were concerned only Nam Do, off bombline, had not previously been a naval responsibility; in the west, however, Sok To and Cho Do in the Chinnampo approaches, Taechong Do west of the Ongjin peninsula, and Taeyongpyong Do south of Haeju were added to the list. On the 9th an Army-Navy-Air Force island defense conference was held aboard Wisconsin, following which the West Coast Island Defense Element was organized with a US Marine officer in command, with headquarters on Paengyong Do, and with two battalions of ROK Marines distributed among critical islands.

Already the LSTs of Task Force 90, which had brought the defenders in, had
began to evacuate refugees: by 22 December about 9,000 men had been lifted out and by late January some 20,000 had been transported south to Kunsan. Constant patrolling of the threatened areas was undertaken, and an LST with armed small boats was provided for inshore work. In mid-January, in an effort to suppress the artillery effort against Cho Do and Sok To, CTF 95 went north in \textit{Rochester} to bomb the Angak peninsula in coordination with a Marine air strike from \textit{Badoeng Strait}. By early February the enemy had retired from a number of the captured islets in Haeju Man and off the Ongjin peninsula, in part apparently owing to bombardment by rocket ships, in part to inability to support his forces. By March these islets were being reoccupied by anti-Communist partisans and a number of enemy efforts to attack across the mud flats had been thrown back by naval gunfire.

\textbf{Recovery of a Downed MIG}

One more significant affair that took place during the period under review was a special operation involving the recovery of adowned Russian MIG.

On 9 July word was received from JOC that a MIG was down in shoal water off the mouth of the Chongchon River; \textit{Sicily}, back again in the Far East as relief for \textit{Bataan}, was ordered to search, and the American officers in charge of west coast underground activities, “Leopard” on Paengnyong Do and “Salamander” on Cho Do, were instructed to alert their people. But the reported position was 15 miles in error, the weather was foggy, and the aircraft, awash only at low water, was hard to see; not until the 11th did planes from \textit{HMS Glory} find the MIG a couple of miles offshore and 33 miles north of the Taedong estuary.

This location, less than 10 minutes flying time from the enemy’s Antung airfields, was both risky and navigationally difficult. But photographs indicated that recovery might be practicable, every effort was ordered by ComNavFE, and the commanding officer of \textit{HMS Ceylon} worked out a plan. On 18 July an LSU equipped with a special crane was borrowed from CTF 90 and sent up to Cho Do in the LSD \textit{Whetstone}. The next days’ effort ended with the LSU fast on a sandbar, but on the 20th, with air cover from \textit{Glory}, with \textit{HMS Belfast} stationed to warn of air attack, and with \textit{HMS Cardigan Bay} on hand for fire support, a US Navy helicopter operating from the British carrier buoyed the site and \textit{Glory} aircraft led the LSU through the sandbars. By evening the engine had been recovered and the major portions of the air-frame located; next morning the pieces were loaded on the LSU. In the afternoon \textit{Sicily} pilots sighted 32 MIGs heading for the area, but foggy weather prevented contact, no trouble ensued, and on the
22nd the LSU and its precious cargo were embarked in the LSD *Epping Forest* and the MIG brought back to Inchon.

This special operation successfully carried out assisted by the units of Task Force 90 was of the greatest importance for technical intelligence. For although UN aviators were by this time well acquainted with this high-performance fighter, Communist reluctance to engage in combat far from base had prevented acquisition of a specimen for closer examination, and a previous search by west coast ships for one reported on the sandbars of the Yalu Gulf had proved fruitless.
CHAPTER III  THE MIDDLE PHASE OF STALEMATE
(March 1952 — February 1953)

This chapter deals with the period of March 1952 to February 1953, which was characterized by stalemate. Certainly stalemate existed both at the frontline and the truce negotiations, but the stalemate brought no rest. No matter how the truce talks were progressing or what the situation on the ground front, the United Nations ships in Korean waters never had any idle moment. Readiness had to be maintained; crews had to be trained; the enemy, ensconced in the northern half of the peninsula, had to be harassed, and if possible brought to terms. Day after day the F-86s went up to the Yalu, Air Force fighter bombers and carrier aircraft ranged over North Korea, the gunnery ships continued on patrol, mines were swept. But month after month went by, and increasingly the question of what leverage to employ upon the enemy became more puzzling and more frustrating.

Section 1.  Changes in Far East and Naval Forces Far East

The coming of spring 1952 brought changes to the Far East. In Europe General Eisenhower resigned his command at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and returned home to begin a career in politics. Summoned to succeed him, General Ridgway was in May relieved of his commands by General Mark W. Clark. This change at the top of the UN Command was paralleled throughout the echelons of Naval Forces Far East: The 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing received new commanding generals; with the arrival of Rear Admiral Burton B. Biggs the Logistic Support Force got a flag officer at its head; in April the first of a new generation of carrier division commanders arrived in the person of Rear Admiral Apollo Soucek; in May Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark became Commander Seventh Fleet and Rear Admiral Frederick W. McMahon, Commander Carrier Divisions in Valley Forge, relieved Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstie as Chief of Staff of Naval Forces Far East. Also in
May, after ten months of negotiations, Admiral Joy was succeeded as head of the truce team by Major General William K. Harrison, Jr., USA; in June, after nearly three years as Commander Naval Forces Far East, he turned over his command to Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe.

As the faces changed so did the problems faced. In mid-March the command structure of the Western Pacific was modified by presidential order, and military responsibility for the Philippine-Taiwan-Marianas area transferred from CinC FE to CinCPac; local responsibility, however, remained with Commander Seventh Fleet, in his capacity as Commander, Taiwan Defense Force, and standing orders dating from Admiral Struble’s time, to proceed to Formosa at best speed in the event of a serious invasion threat, continued in effect. In April the Japanese peace treaty became effective and that war, at last, was formally over. For Naval Forces Far East this had a variety of implications. With the peace treaty came also the disestablishment of ScaJap, the Navy-administered Japanese-manned shipping concern which had performed such yeoman service in support of the Korean War, and the transfer of its LSTs to MSTS contract operation.

Section 2. The Defense of UN-Held Islands Continues

The period following naval assumption of responsibility for island defense brought two actions of some importance. On the northeast coast, after a month of careful preparation, the NK Communists mounted a raid on the Yang Do group by some 250 troops boated in sampans. Shortly after midnight on 20 February the New Zealand frigate Taupo, the DMS Endicott, and the destroyer Shelton were patrolling to the northward when an emergency dispatch reported Yang Do under fire from the mainland and invasion apparently imminent. Steaming at flank speed the ships reached the islands to discover bombardment continuing and fighting in progress ashore, but by this time radio contact had been broken. With daylight, however, the island commander came back on the air: all invaders on Yang Do had been either killed or captured, those on East Yang Do were departing for the mainland. There followed a spirited engagement in the two-mile strait in which Taupo and Endicott engaged some 15 sampans, destroying 10 and damaging the rest, and were themselves engaged by artillery from the mainland, while Shelton put up counter-battery fire. This was all very well, but on the west coast the enemy fared better, and in a successful assault on the night of 24 March seized a small island between Cho Do and Sok
To and eliminated its defenders.

Although reports of enemy offensive plans continued to come in, and although artillery fire was persistently directed against Cho Do, Sok To, and their supporting ships, as well as against the islands at Wonsan, the enemy island offensive was limited in its success to the elimination of the foothold in the Yalu Gulf. At Cho Do improved defensive arrangements were followed by the installation of radar and antiaircraft weapons in February, and in March by a helicopter detachment; these facilities, together with naval patrol of the surrounding waters and a rescue B-29 which orbited overhead, made the Cho Do area a useful bail-out and rescue zone for pilots from the Western Sea carrier and from the Fifth Air Force. Elsewhere the offshore positions continued to provide bases for intelligence and guerrilla activity, while at Wonsan possession of the harbor islands paid an unexpected dividend. Some concern had been caused the UN Command by events such as Sok To mutiny, and by reports that guerrillas were surrendering in response to an enemy offer of amnesty. But at Wonsan, on 21 February, reassurance was gained when at 0630 hours in the morning NK Brigadier General Lee Il reached Tae Do in a stolen sampan, with a briefcase full of top secret papers, a head full of top secret plans, and a strong desire to make himself useful.

The UN Command’s firm determination to defend those islands finally brought the assignment of three NK corps and three CCF armies to coast defense. In March and April, enemy raids across the mud flats of Haeju Man against Yongmae Do were repulsed by gunfire from Commonwealth naval units; on the east coast enemy batteries on Mayang Do fired on minesweepers and patrolling ships. UN forces, for their part, continued to exploit the islands for their opportunities in evasion and escape, and as bases for guerrilla operations. Attacks by APD-borne detachments against the east coast rail line were resumed, but with diminishing dividends: in the west, coastal raids and incursions into the Haeju area were supported by the Western Sea carrier and by gunnery ships.

At Cho Do and Sok To, which with their valuable radar, weather, and helicopter detachments had become the Wonsan of the west, a series of intermittent engagements took place between ships, carrier and Fifth Air Force aircraft, and enemy coastal batteries. In July there was a brief flurry in the Western Sea as an island close to the tip of the Ongjin peninsula was invaded by a NK Communist force embarked in junks and outboard motor-boats. As HMS Belfast and Amethyst converged to assist the defenders, and as Marine fighter planes from Bataan answered the call, other west coast ships manned anti-invasion station off Cho Do and Sok To; within two days only five of the 156 invaders were missing and unaccounted for. More troublesome than the Communists were
outbreaks of typhus on Cho Do and Paengnyong Do, but the epidemics were quickly controlled by a naval medical unit.

On the east coast, as well, the growth in enemy capabilities was apparent. There, where the ships of Task Force 95 continued to patrol, bombard, and besiege, Communist gunfire steadily increased. From Kojo north to Chongjin the installation of radar, together with such devices as anchored ranging buoys, led to continued improvement in Communist fire control. March brought the heaviest shooting since the previous July, and April’s fall of shot was double that of March. Reports from captured and defecting personnel, which suggested that an assault against the Wonsan islands was in preparation, gained at least superficial confirmation from the discovery that the boatbuilders of the area had been mobilized, and that the bays west of Hodo Pando contained a large and increasing number of small craft.

By June the greatest troop and supply accumulations of the war were in evidence behind Communist lines, and intelligence indicated the imminence of a general offensive. There was also a rumor circulating, derived from POW interrogation, that the enemy proposed to kidnap the UN armistice delegation on the 25th, the second anniversary of the outbreak of war. No one can feel very safe when dealing with such people. As far back as April the US Marines on the west formed a covering force to protect the truce team should the talks break down, and the new rumors brought further preparations. But June passed without difficulty and the anticipated offensive never came.

Section 3. The Second Year of the Wonsan Siege

The naval siege of Wonsan was now well into its second year. The first anniversary of the siege - - 16 February 1952 - - found the destroyers Rowan (DD-782), Twining (DD-547), and Gregory (DD-802) pounding the Wonsan targets with the usual harassing and interdiction fire.

The mineswept areas of the harbor had been gradually increased to the west and southwest, enabling the ships to get closer and closer to targets ashore. The swept areas were marked with yellow buoys to delineate the edge of the minefields. Near these buoys, and in the close-ashore portion of the swept areas, the siege ships soon learned to be especially alert and mobile, for the Communist gunners had carefully “zeroed-in” the marker buoys, and used them for spot correction of their gunfire.
While sweeping mines in "Ulcet Gulch" on 5 March 1952, USS Pelican (AMS-32) and USS Curlew (AM-8) were taken under fire by the Kalma Gak batteries. Both ships lit off their smoke generators and escaped being hit. The use of smoke to cover the retirement of the sweepers always proved helpful and became standard practice.

The enemy guns continued active in March. Manchester (CL-83), Keys (DD-787), McGinty (DE-365) and Douglas H. Fox (DD-779) were on the receiving end of a heavy and accurate outburst on 13 March, but aided by a Task Force 77 strike, succeeded in silencing the enemy guns. On 20 March Wiltsie (DD-716) and Brinkley Bass (DD-887) came under fire. Osprey (AMS-28) was the next day's target; while on the 22nd of March, Brinkley Bass and Stickell (DD-888) were under fire.

On 24 March, the enemy guns achieved a direct hit on Brinkley Bass amidships, just aft of the torpedo tubes, which seriously wounded one man and caused injuries to four others. On 28 March, the frigate Burlington (PF-51) was straddled.

April 1952 was to see even greater efforts made by the enemy to cripple or sink a ship. On 18 occasions the patrolling minesweepers, destroyers, and ships of the Wonsan element were fired upon. Only three were hit, however --- destroyer Leonard F. Mason on the 2nd of May (no casualties) and Cabildo (LSD-16) on the 25th of May (two personnel casualties).

During April and May, the fire of the bombarding ships took a steady toll of guns, junks, trucks, tanks, bridges, and buildings in Wonsan harbor. On the last day of April Maddox (DD-731) and Laffey (DD-724) damaged ten boxcars of a nocturnal train.

This period saw Maddox and Laffey on the receiving end of one of Wonsan's longest and heaviest bombardments. The two destroyers were supporting two sweepers, one working in "Tin Pan Alley" with Laffey, the other in "Muffler" with Maddox. Shortly afterwards, the Hodo Pando guns opened the duel. Maddox and Laffey increased speed to 25 knots, opened fire, commenced the "war dance" and turned to make a fast changing target in deflection.

The Mayor of Wonsan: To the destroyer-minesweeper teams besieging Wonsan's harbor day after day, the duty was routine but never monotonous. The siege of Wonsan during its second year can be illustrated by the typical experiences of one of those who held the title Mayor of Wonsan. A non-political office, this honorific title was conferred, beginning in May 1952, upon those who held the command of Task Unit 95.2.1 The evidence of the title was a
large, gilded wooden key. This key was passed from one CTU 95.2.1 to another until the end of the war.

Captain R.D. Fusselman, as Commander Escort Destroyer Division Thirteen, aboard the USS Jenkins held the title during the period of 16 September to 6 October 1952.

"Being the Mayor of Wonsan," said Captain Fusselman, "gave me the task of running the activities within the harbor itself; to supervise the minesweepers working in the western end of 'Muffler' and in the southern end of 'Tin Pan Alley'; to furnish covering destroyers and destroyer escorts; to work closely with our naval personnel, Marines, and the ROK Marines on the friendly islands; to coordinate and work with the ships of the outer harbor blockade; and of course, to keep CTF 95 informed.

"By the time I assumed the job, the Communists had added shore defense guns all around Wonsan harbor, so that it was necessary for the patrolling ships to maintain a good speed, about fifteen knots, and never to stay on one course too long. By this time, also, the enemy gunfire had gotten so accurate that we no longer anchored at night.

"The enemy guns, for the most part, were practically invisible. Most of them were dug into caves in the hillsides and could be retracted for protection. Others were on the reverse slopes and could not be seen. Still others were mobile, and the Communists changed their locations so often. The only way you could spot them was by the flashes and smoke of their fire. Sometimes, you couldn't see the flashes because of the sun, and many of their guns did not put out a lot of smoke.

"It was common chuckle among our ships that the Communists had a gunnery school right in Wonsan city, and that one of our primary jobs was to serve as suitable targets for the training of enemy artillerymen.

"At any rate the enemy's gunnery improved constantly and kept us on our toes. Personally, I think my ships were lucky not to be hit. The only reason they weren't was because of our evasive tactics. Whenever the enemy guns opened up on us, our ships cranked on speed, started the 'war dance', and made themselves a rapidly moving target.

"The minesweepers had the toughest job, having to work close to the beach and in constant danger of gunfire. The men on the destroyers realized this and often contributed their ice cream ration to those fellows.

"Over-all, I believe that the siege of Wonsan was very worthwhile. We did a lot of damage on main supply route and to military installations in Wonsan. Also, with the harbor kept free of mines, our Navy posed a constant threat of invasion."
“But more important, perhaps, was the excellent training our ships and people received. Wonsan taught us not to forget basic gunnery doctrines and techniques; it taught us the value of knowing how to use optical control and of having a good director setup, and not to depend entirely on our electronic equipment.

“The 30-day duty in Wonsan gave all hands a boost in morale, pep enthusiasm, and efficiency. There was a noticeable buildup in unit pride, and a visible determination not to have a machinery breakdown that would force a ship off the firing line.

“Most of all, the duty at Wonsan gave all hands a feeling of mutual interest and interdependence. To those who served there, Wonsan pointed up the need for balanced forces within our Navy — forces which intimately know each other’s capabilities and limitations.”

The Emergency Airstrip on Yo Do: Since the Navy, like it or not, appeared to be committed, steps were taken to improve the position at Wonsan. Wonsan island fortifications were strengthened; a clear statement from CTF 95 defined the primary mission of ships at Wonsan as the defense of those positions; construction of an emergency airstrip on Yo Do was undertaken. This enterprise had been suggested the previous autumn, when the increased effectiveness of Communist antiaircraft had forced a number of damaged planes to ditch in Wonsan harbor. In the absence of a regular naval construction unit in the area the proposition had been put up to the Army and Air Force, in whose custody, in view of the continuing hopes of an armistice, it had languished for six months. In May 1952, however, permission was secured for the employment of Task Force 90’s Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB), and ComNavFE obtained the approval of CincFE. On 9 June a detachment of 3 officers and 75 men from ACB 1 was landed by LST, and began work under intermittent bombardment from Hodo Pando and Umi Do. The planned 2,400-foot runway had been estimated to be a 45-day project, but the Seabees did better than the planners, and in 16 days the strip was finished. The commanding officer of the construction battalion had predicted that salvage of one plane would more than offset the expense of the project, and if his cost accounting was correct the dividends were enormous.

The strip was first used on 15 July 1952 when seven Corsairs of VF-193 from Princeton, ran low on fuel after an afternoon’s fruitless search for their downed comrade, who had been shot down 30 miles northwest of Hungnam. Three of the searching Corsairs refueled on Yo Do and return to Princeton. The other four spent the night, and returned safely to their carrier the next day.
Although the Communists tried many times to neutralize the field with gunfire, they never succeeded.

In honor of the officer who had ordered it built, Vice Admiral R. P. Briscoe, now ComNavFE, the airstrip was named Briscoe Field. Briscoe Field was to prove of immense value in the final year of the war, as it became the rescue point for many pilots and aircraft.

Section 4. The Naval Air Operations

Interdiction Efforts Continued

Along the familiar stretch of coast from Hungnam to Songjin the naval air interdiction effort against the east coast rail line continued. The effort had been simplified, as related earlier, by the introduction of new programs known as "Package" and "Derail" of 16 target areas, five of which were to be dealt with initially by carrier air and then kept out by surface gunfire, while the rest were assigned to heavy gun bombardment. As before, the targets were principally bridges, vulnerable tunnel entrances, embankments, and slide areas along the precipitous shore. As previously, the new system was comparatively successful: in the first half of 1952 less traffic passed along this stretch of railroad than along any other line north of Pyongyang—Wonsan. With time, however, and as the employment of Task Force 77 shifted from interdiction to strikes against strategic targets, the responsibility devolved increasingly upon the gunnery ships, while in interest of economy in ammunition expenditure the shooting up of trains replaced the shooting up of track.

By now, indeed, the interdiction effort had become the despair of all concerned, and at Air Force headquarters the publicity given the code name "Strangle" was bitterly regretted. Rails could be broken, trains shot up, bridges knocked down, and truck formations harassed, but the enemy continued, largely through night movement, to accumulate supplies in the forward areas. In this situation the inadequacies of UN night air capabilities rose again for discussion, and new efforts were undertaken to improve night work.

Air Interdiction at Night: In May, Task Force 77 carried out a series of night attacks. The night operation was code-named "Insomnia" and commenced on 13 May. This operation had one feature which some of the earlier night missions
had lacked. On several occasions in the past, pilots flying the first night hops had reported that trains and trucks could not be found during the early hours of their patrols; however, just as they were leaving the area, the trucks and trains began to appear. Obviously, the Communists had noted the time pattern of the night aerial patrols and were withholding train and truck movements until the naval planes were homeward bound. Accordingly, “Insomnia” launching schedules were re-shuffled and planes left the carriers at midnight and 0200 hours.

In the “Insomnia”, six aircraft were launched at midnight and six more at 0200 hours; for a time this tactic permitted unopposed attacks on heavily defended areas; on one occasion 11 locomotives were trapped for later destruction by day strike groups. By July, in an effort to provide all-night operations without overloading ships’ companies, three teams of hecklers were being launched at dusk, of which one worked until midnight while the others landed ashore for later takeoff. But by autumn the lack of personnel to man key posts on a 24-hour basis, and the view of Commander Seventh Fleet that unless a special night carrier could be provided the emphasis should be on daytime operations, had led to diminished effort. Owing to the world situation and the shortage of operating carriers no such ship was ever made available, although an abortive attempt was to be made at war’s end to do this locally, and the lack of night capabilities remained a major UN deficiency.

However, the night heckling by the day carriers, contributing to the over-all damage to the enemy in Korea, went steadily on. By now the airmen had developed the night attack work into an art. The flight over a 40-mile stretch of track or road might consume an hour’s zigzagging back and forth, as each curve and embankment was observed for traffic. Locomotives were hardest to see, as they rarely used headlights or made smoke. But careful, tedious searching paid off:

15 July 1952: “... night heckling aircraft from Princeton stopped a train near Tanchon and 18 propeller planes were launched by the Bon Homme Richard at 0915 to finish it off...”
22 July: “... the night hecklers destroyed three trucks and damaged 13 north of Wonsan...”
23 July: “... the night hecklers, surprising a convoy of trucks, damaged 15, leaving a path of flame and rubble...”
24 July: “... the hecklers as usual had their choice of targets, sighting at least 200 trucks within a 30 mile radius of Wonsan... at least three definitely destroyed and 21 damaged...”
27 July: “... at 0330 dawn hecklers left to attack rails northwest of Tanchon.
VC-4 detachment (LCDR E.S. Ogle) found a moving train, cut the rails in front and behind, and damaged the locomotive before expending all the ammunition and bombs. A destroyer later destroyed the train by shelling..."

28 July: "... again the hecklers trapped a locomotive and three cars. Following the prescribed doctrine, the rails were cut and the trains attacked. Direct attacks on the boiler stopped the engine, leaving it stalled for a later princeton flight to destroy..."

1 August: "... the night hecklers reports the destruction of 11 and damage to 15 trucks in the Wonsan area..."

3 August: "... the hecklers found trucks in convoy formation in the Wonsan area. Bombing and strafing vehicles pinpointed by flames, the night flyers destroyed at least nine and damaged 25 trucks..."

As the daytime interdiction effort was de-emphasized, beginning in June, the enemy made increasingly bold use of his highways. The night flyers of TF 77, in the month of November, were credited with the destruction of 206 trucks and damage to 274.

**Air-Gun Strikes:** Through the spring of 1952 Task Force 77 had drifted slowly away from rail interdiction. Although in March the force was still averaging 133 rail cuts per operating day, increased attention was being given to small boat demolition so as to inhibit attempts to recapture offshore islands. In April a series of coordinated air-gun strikes on coastal cities was begun.

The coordination of the fire power of the surface ships and the lethal power of a carrier task force's airplanes commenced with the 13 April air-gun strikes on Chongjin.

*Philippine Sea* (CVA-47, Capt. Willard K. Goodney) and *Boxer* (CVA-11, Capt. John B. Moss) would furnish the air strikes, while the USS *St. Paul* (CA-73, Capt. Roy A. Gano), *Hanson* (DDR-832, CDR W. J. Henning), *T.E. Chandler* (DD-717, CDR T.H. Wells), and British destroyer HMS *Concord* would furnish the gun strikes.

The Chongjin targets were choice ones, especially for the carrier airmen, whose appetites had long been dulled by the steady menu of interdiction targets. Chongjin's Rayon Company and Iron Works would be primary targets. In addition, the city's numerous warehousos, gun positions, supply buildings, fuel tanks, and barracks would receive attention.

Each carrier launched its entire air group twice during the day; *Boxer's* Air Group Two (CDR A.L. Downing) at 0600 and 1200; *Philippine Sea's* Air Group Eleven (CDR J.W. Onstott) at 0800 and 1600. Each strike numbered from 52 to 58 planes, and 200 tons of heavy ordnance were pinpointed on the Chongjin targets.
The surface ships were equally pleased with the new system. The coordination of the firing with the bombing improved the accuracy of each while reducing the danger of all.

On 25 April, the USS Iowa, accompanied by USS Duncan (DDR-874), USS McCoy Reynolds (DE-440), and HMAS Warramunga (CDR J.H. Ramsay, RAN), was joined by four strikes of 50-odd planes each from Task Force 77 to plaster the industrial targets of Chongjin. It was the second time a battleship had operated so far north.

After this strike, the Iowa proceeded south on 27 May to fire at coastal bridges south of Songjin. But deserving targets were limited, and in June the work of the carrier air groups was shifted inland beyond gun range.

On the Line

Only rarely during the height of the interdiction campaign (on such occasions as the Hwachon Reservoir attack in May 1951 and the raid on Najin in August) was the mission of Task Force 77 varied. Commencing with the air-gun strike on Chongjin on 13 April, however, and definitely after June, the missions given the carrier airmen of Task Force 77 turned more and more toward strikes on industrial, military, and frontline targets, and less and less to interdiction and armed reconnaissance flights. As described earlier, there was plentiful evidence that the interdiction campaign was a failure. From now on the carriers' efforts would strike primarily industrial targets in North Korea. For the last six months of the war, Task Force 77 would give the bulk of its support to frontline troops.

This shift of emphasis and employment was heartening and pleasing to all hands, planners and pilots alike. To the carrier division commanders and their staffs, such attacks were more in keeping with the inherent ability of a carrier task force to employ surprise and concentration. To the pilots, such attacks were happy respite from the dangerous and dreary interdiction and armed reconnaissance missions. As to accomplishments, the sudden onslaught of combined carrier strikes upon an oil refinery, a manufacturing installation, or a supply concentration point meant greater destruction and damage, with less risk of damage or loss to our own forces. (See Sketch Map 5.)

Such employment also kept the enemy off balance. The initial strikes in June 1952, on the enemy's hydroelectric plants, for example, brought on little antiaircraft fire; the same attack a few weeks later provoked AA fire of greater intensity and accuracy. The intervening time had allowed the enemy, anticipat-
ing repeated attacks, to rush guns to that location for its protection. A few months after the Supung attack, for example, photo analysis revealed that the number of heavy and automatic guns surrounding the dam had increased from 71 to 167. Meanwhile, the carriers had shifted their offensive power to other targets.

By thus avoiding a rigid and unchanging routine, the naval aviators were able to inflict heavier damage at lesser cost. Too often in the Korean War, the UN naval flight became rigidly set in fixed pattern: the enemy could be fairly certain that the UN night flyers would appear over the coast a few minutes after sunset or three hours before daylight; he could be certain, if he saw a colored-smoke rocket or our troops laying down their colored frontline panels, that a close air support strike was enroute; from previous attacks he could often anticipate what the direction of dive-bombing approach would be, and thus better emplace his AA defense weapons in preparation. The final year of the Korean War saw a definite trend toward more flexible employment of the carriers. While the interdiction effort continued until the end of the war, it received less emphasis. Bridge and track-bursting strikes were employed only to keep the enemy’s AA dispersed and his repair organization tied down.

In the final twelve months of the war, the carriers attacked a variety of targets, from hydroelectric plants to zinc mills, more than forty times, and developed a new type deep support air mission (termed the “Cherokee” strike).

The Attack on Supung (23–24 June 1952): The ceaseless and unspectacular attacks upon interdiction targets during the months on end had a welcome climax on 23 June 1952, when, as an explosive finale to the first two years of war, the Navy, Marines, and Fifth Air Force in Korea began a two-day series of attacks upon the thirteen major electric power plants in North Korea.

At Supung on the Yalu River the world’s fourth largest hydroelectric plant, with an output of some 300,000 kilowatts, supplied power both to Korea and Manchuria. In the summer of 1950 proposals to attack the power complex had very sensibly been turned down on the ground that the bill for reconstruction would fall upon the American taxpayers; subsequently, in the effort to avoid CCF aggression, the importance of the Supung plant to Manchurian industry had led these targets to be placed off limits. But as the armistice negotiations stretched out into 1952 the question was again raised by FEAF, as on a lower level by CTG 95.2, who was desirous of turning off the lights at Wonsan by shooting up the substation.

The timing was appropriate. In late April, in an effort to compose remaining differences at Panmunjom, Admiral Joy had offered to waive restrictions on
airfield rehabilitation if the Communists would accept voluntary repatriation of prisoners and the exclusion of the USSR from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. But this offer was violently rejected, all progress cease, and the meetings degenerated into propaganda about POW riots and bacteriological warfare. In this situation, comparable to the period in World War II when water barriers separated the principal belligerents, a turn to attritional bombardment, the slowest of all methods of war, was almost inevitable.

Early in June, FEAF put the proposition up to General Clark, and was given permission to plan the destruction of all hydroelectric plants except Supung, which was still off-limits without JCS approval. But with the Chinese carrying the burden of the war for the enemy, the earlier rationale had disappeared, and since damage to Supung offered a method of making trouble in Manchuria without crossing the border, approval from Washington was forthcoming. In Tokyo a date was selected which would permit the maximum carrier contribution and on 18 June FEAF alerted Fifth Air Force for strikes on the 23rd or 24th, weather permitting.

Since late January, four fast carriers had been present in the theater, working in teams of two. For the power plant attacks, arrivals and departures in the operating area were overlapped to provide, for the first time since December 1950, four on station at once. In another way the first time since December one, for not since the strikes on the Sinuiju bridges in November of that year had the carrier planes attempted to hit targets in MIG Alley. Joint planning between Task Force 77 and Fifth Air Force was begun at JOC on 21 June; on the 22nd flight schedules and ordnance plans were made up and navigational details worked out. The Supung strike was to be a joint operation in which the carrier pilots had the place of honor; the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was given the two Changjin Reservoir installations; the Hochon plants were assigned to other task force strike groups; those at Pujon Reservoir were divided between the Navy and Air Force. Since Supung, where heavy MIG opposition was expected, was the critical target, the other attacks were timed to follow it by a few minutes.

Early on the 23rd Boxer and Princeton were joined by Bon Homme Richard and Philippine Sea. Preparation for the launch was halted when the Air Force put off the strike owing to anticipated adverse weather. But in the course of the day the operation was rescheduled, H-Hour was set for 1600 hours, and at 1410 the force began launching 35 AD Skyraid es with 4,000 and 5,000-pound bombl oads for the Supung attack. Forming up at 5,000 feet, the Skyraiders crossed the coastline at Mayang Do and then, keeping low to the mountains to avoid radar detection, headed straight for the target. Fifty miles from Supung
they were overhauled by 35 F9Fs which had taken off 50 minutes later. Eighteen miles from the target the group commenced a climb to 10,000 feet, with one jet squadron going up to 16,000 feet as combat air patrol. Two miles from the target a high-speed approach was begun.

At 1600 hours, precisely on schedule, the first squadron of Panthers dove on the gun position on the Korean bank, closely followed by the AD Skyraders and by the other flak-suppression jets. Release altitude was at 3,000 feet and pull-out at 1,000; within a space of two and one half minutes the attacking aircraft delivered 81 tons of bombs. At the power house which was the main target red flares filled the windows, secondary explosions were reported, and photographs taken by the last ADs to drop showed smoke pouring from the roof. The antiaircraft batteries had opened as the attack began, heavy weapons and automatic fire was moderate and machine gun fire intense, but the defenders
were overwhelmed. No plane was lost, and the only Skyraider to suffer serious damage made a successful wheels up landing at Kimpo. Everyone else was back aboard by dinner time.

As the carrier group departed the attack continued with interservice cooperation of a high order. Beginning at 1610 hours, 79 F-84s and 49 F-80s of Fifth Air Force, which had come up from the south to continue the pummeling, added a further 145 tons of bombs. Downstream, between Supung and Antung, a total of 84 Sabre jets gave top cover against enemy MiGs. But while the Antung field is only 35 miles from Supung, none of these MiGs put in an appearance, and of 250 reported on the ground by Air Force pilots, two-thirds disappeared

The power plants at Supung Dam, under naval heavy and effective air attack.
into interior Manchuria during the attack, a tactic for which, on the UN side at least, no firm explanation was ever devised.

While the attack at Supung were in progress the Changjin Reservoir plants received the attentions of 75 aircraft from the Marine Aircraft Wing, a second group of 90 planes from Task Force 77 hit the Pujon plants along with 52 Air Force F-51s, and 70 carrier aircraft went in on Hochon. These efforts were followed up the next day by carrier, Air Force, and Marine attacks on all three complexes, and on 26 and 27 June the Air Force returned to Changjin and Pujon. Then the picture taking and the photo interpretation began, but in North Korea and Manchuria the lights had already gone out.

The results appear to have been first-class. Something in the neighborhood of 90 percent of North Korean power production had been disabled; for two weeks there was an almost complete blackout in enemy country; even at year's end a power deficit remained. But if liaison between the Air Force, Navy, and Marines was well high perfect, on the upper levels someone had forgotten to pass the word. The British had not been advised of the contemplated attacks, and in Parliament some ructions developed among the opposition.

Admiral Briscoe had requested a detailed breakdown of the strikes, and ten days later his operational intelligence officer provided it. The extent of the naval contribution revealed by this tally was such as to give ComNavFE cause for pride. Total Task Force 77 sorties against the plants on 23 and 24 June exceeded those of Fifth Air Force and Marine together, as did the weight of bombs dropped. On a service basis breakdown, Navy and Marine sorties were of the order of 700, as compared to some 400 by the Air Force, and Navy and Marine bomb tonnage amounted to more than two-thirds the total. These figures, however, are in a sense delusive, for they take no account of the F-86 top cover provided at Supung, nor of the later Air Force attacks at Changjin and Pujon. Since FEAF had performed the preliminary planning, and since final planning had been joint, it seems proper to conclude that all hands had done a good job to excellent purpose.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Fechteler, congratulated the Seventh Fleet Commander and the pilots of Task Force 77:

"It is with great pride that I read the dispatch and news reports of the magnificent accomplishment of your forces in the superb attacks upon the North Korean power installations. The excellent performance of duty and high combat effectiveness demonstrated by your forces and particularly the pilots involved in the actual combat are deserving of the highest praise and inspiration of your own people and a warning to the enemy of his inevitable defeat. Well Done."

The surprise assault certainly caused extensive damage to the electric system
of North Korea and Manchuria. The strikes forced the relocation of enemy AA guns all over Korea. Rear Admiral H.E. Regan, Commander Carrier Division One, only a month later was able to report the successful destruction of several bridges which, prior to the hydroelectric power raids, had been too well defended to attack. Finally, the Communists were left in doubt as to the future targets and locations which might be attacked.

The Strike on Pyongyang (11 July): The highly satisfactory results achieved by the carrier strike on 23–24 June not only inflicted severe damage to the hydroelectric system of North Korea, but the attacks were also visible demonstration to the Communists that a new corner in the Korean War had been turned. The psychological effect was pronounced, both at the Panmunjom armistice table and in the North Korean capital. The Pyongyang radio denounced the missions as "sneak attacks," adding that "anyone with common sense knows that a hydroelectric power station is a project of peaceful construction devoid of all military significance."

But even more impressive strikes were now being scheduled. A plan was developed at FEAF headquarters in Tokyo to attack military targets in the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang. Its 40-odd military targets -- warehouses, bridges, troop barracks, factories, and Army headquarters -- had been spared for months for the sake of the armistice talks. But now there was even less reason to withhold attacks upon the capital city's military targets than there had been for withholding attacks on the hydroelectric plants.

Attacking Pyongyang's military installations, however, would be a difficult and demanding task. Many planes had been lost over Pyongyang, and pilots generally considered the city one of the worst "flak-traps" in North Korea. Photographic interpretation showed 48 heavy antiaircraft guns and more than 100 smaller automatic guns ringing the North Korean capital. The enemy's antiaircraft opposition was certain to be both intense and accurate. Moreover, there were prisoner-of-war camps in the environs of the city, and these had to be avoided in the bombings.

The launch began at 0831 hours on 11 July with a single mishap. Ensign E.B. Conrad, a VF-72 pilot flying on FOF-2, lost power after the catapult shot and ditched. Conrad was unhurt, and was quickly rescued by the Princeton helicopter.

*Bon Homme Richard* launched 45 aircraft; *Princeton*, 46. The combined strike group, led by the Princeton air group commander, Cdr. William Denton, CVG-19, rendezvoused over the island of Yo-do in Wonsan harbor. CDR G.B. Brown, Commander Carrier Air Group Seven, leading the *Bon Homme Richard*
Naval air attack blasts odd targets in Pyongyang city.

aircraft, and flying an AD himself, joined above and behind the Princeton strike group.

The carrier aircraft had been chosen to make the initial attacks and to strike several targets in Pyongyang on the southeast side of the city, the ones nearest the POW camps: an ammunition storage area, a vehicle camp, a headquarters and troop billeting area, a factory, a railroad locomotive repair shop, and a railroad roundhouse. Other target areas had been assigned to aircraft of the US Fifth Air Force, the US Marines, the Australian Air Force, and aircraft from HMS Ocean, the British carrier operating under Commander Task Force 95. These elements of the UN air force were scheduled to relieve each other in an all-day, all-out attack on the city’s military targets.

As the carrier aircraft sped toward the targets, the Sabres of the Fifth Air Force were taking off from their Korean bases to form a barrier patrol in “MIG Alley,” and thereby prevent MIGs from interfering with the attacks on Pyongyang.
The *Bon Homme Richard*’s targets were the railroad roundhouse, the locomotive repair yard, and the ammunition storage area. All the targets received direct hits and looked well battered. The bombing by the *Princeton* strike group was equally effective. The photographs taken after strike showed that the roundhouse was 60 per cent destroyed, including two locomotives there in, while the railroad repair shop was 50 per cent destroyed.

“The mission was one of the most accurate attacks that my air group made,” said Cdr. G.B. Brown. “The antiaircraft fire we encountered from Pyongyang’s radar-controlled heavy guns, and the fire from enemy medium and automatic weapons was the heaviest and most accurate we encountered during our entire tour.”

As the naval aircraft recovered from their attacks and headed homeward, the high-flying jets soon picked up radio reports from the Fleet. The weather in the Eastern Sea and along the east coast had suddenly worsened, fog had formed, and ceilings were down to 200-300 feet, with visibility reduced to less than 500 yards.

The remainder of the carrier strikes against Pyongyang had to be cancelled because of the weather. The strikes on the capital city, less Task Force 77 aircraft, however, continued the rest of the day. A total of 1,400 tons of bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm were delivered upon Pyongyang’s targets during an 11-hour period by 1,254 aircraft.

For two days the Pyongyang radio was off the air. When a weak signal was again emitted, the NK Communists called the day’s strikes “brutal,” adding that they had been ordered as retaliation for the failure of the armistice talks. The Pyongyang radio also stated that 1,500 buildings had been destroyed and 900 damaged. One bomb had made a direct hit on a large air raid shelter, causing large casualties among high Communist party members.

Pyongyang was again heavily attacked by Task Force 77 five weeks later, on 29 August, in an operation named “All United Nations Air Effort.” This second raid was even larger (1,403 sorties) than the one on 11 July. Two hundred and sixteen sorties from *Boxer* (CVG-2) and *Essex* (ATG-2) struck warehouses, gun positions, railroad cars, a rubber factory, and oil tanks. Seven *Boxer* aircraft were hit by the AA fire, but no pilots were lost. All targets were all covered.

**Strikes on Sindok and Kilchu:** The success of the raids on Spung and Pyongyang, which had cost the enemy so much and the UN air forces relatively little, was accepted as good evidence of the wisdom of de-emphasizing the interdiction program. True, there were only a few targets in all of North
Korea like the hydroelectric plants and the military concentrations in Pyongyang worthy of massed air attacks. But this more flexible pattern of air attack meant greater damage inflicted in proportion to loss sustained.

From June until the end of 1952, naval air conducted a series of attacks which took the formidable title “coordinated maximum effort air strikes.” For twelve days of July 1952, Task Force 77 aircraft struck a variety of industrial targets, ending with an attack on the Sindok lead and zinc mill and the Kilchu magnesite plant on 27 and 28 July.

The zinc mill had been processing and shipping 3,000 tons of zinc and lead to Russia via Red China every month. Destroying it would certainly cost the Communists more than another hundred breaks in the rail lines.

In the now well-established pattern, the jets struck the enemy antiaircraft guns first and last, allowing the propellered ADs and F4Us to saturate the area with 500-pound, 1,000-pound and 2,000-pound bombs.

*Bon Homme Richard* 27 July: Sindok: “… Flak suppression was effective, accurate bombing and strafing runs taking its toll in Communist gun positions.
The ADs dropped all their bombs in the target area, destroying or badly damaging the main plant and heavily damaging the transformers and other buildings in the vicinity…”

*Princeton* 28 July: Kilchu: “… A total of thirty-eight aircraft (25 F4Us and 13 ADs) in two strike groups dropped forty tons of bombs and rockets resulting in 60 per cent destruction of the magnesite plant; complete destruction of a thermo-electric plant which furnished power to the magnesite plant; major damage to a barracks area; also three to five cuts in the main railroad bridge leading south from Kilchu.”

**The Raid on the Aoji Oil Refinery (1 September 1952):** The course of the war by this time had brought a northward displacement of remaining North Korean industrial facilities, and a concentration of new development along the Manchurian and Russian borders. In early August Rear Admiral Herbert E. Regan, ComCarDiv 1, had commented on the build-up of new industry near Aoji in the far northeast, and had urged attack upon these targets. One month later, in response to this request, the Joint Chiefs suspended for a single event their rule against air operations within 12 miles of Soviet territory. This tip of northeast Korea was beyond the effective reach of land-based fighters; and it could not be touched by B-29s without their overflying one or both of the borders. But from the mobile air bases of the Navy, the target was only a skip and a jump. This huge petroleum center had been long spared because of its location.

On 1 September three carriers - - *Essex*, *Princeton*, and *Boxer* - - furnished
two large coordinated strikes to smash the Aoji refinery. *Essex* launched 29 planes from ATG-2, *Princeton* launched 63 planes from CVG-19, and *Boxer* launched 52 planes from CVG-2.

Simultaneous naval air strikes were also directed upon an iron works near Musan and the thermo-electric plants, transformers, warehouses, and supply buildings in Chongjin.

The strike on the Aoji refinery was routine and almost leisurely. No antiaircraft fire or MIG opposition was encountered, permitting repeated runs on the targets. The destruction of the refinery was complete, as indicated in these excerpts from the reports of the strike:

*Princeton*: "... Extensive damage to the refinery with smoke and flames visible to a great distance...."

*Essex*: "... Completely successful with 100 per cent coverage and damage on all targets assigned...."

*Boxer*: "... No opposition was offered and *Boxer* planes inflicted heavy damage...."

The total absence of antiaircraft fire from Aoji proved conclusively that the Communists had taken advantage of this "restricted" area's nearness to Manchuria and Russia. By building industrial plants in this northeast corner, the Communists believed them to be inviolate. This largest all-Navy air attack of the Korean War proved them wrong.

The Raid on Kowon (8 October): The second instance of the Navy's escorting B-29s during the Korean War occurred on 8 October 1952 (the first had been the raid on Najin in August 1951).

This attack was planned jointly between the Air Force and the Navy. The Navy's plan was to send an escorted group of B-29s over Kowon, where so far dozens of pilots had been lost or suffered damage from the intense antiaircraft fire which surrounded Kowon. The Superforts would be loaded with 500-pound VF-fuzed bombs. Their bombing targets would be the antiaircraft guns around Kowon. Immediately after their attack, while the Reds were all town up by the effect of this bombing, the Navy would send in a low-level strike right behind the Superforts. The Navy's targets would be the marshalling yard and the supply and storage areas of Kowon. The Navy offered to furnish fighter escort for the B-29s. The plan was accepted. Thus, a combined Air Force--Navy strike walloped Kowon on the 8th.

Twelve F2H2 Banshees, led by Commander Denny P. Phillips, Commanding Officer, VF-11, from the USS *Kearsarge*, rendezvoused with Superforts. The B-29s' base altitude was 21,000 feet, with the three levels of Banshee cover at
25,000, 30,000, and 35,000 feet.

The Superfort attack was without incident, except for one brief moment during the approach to Kowon when a group of fighters was tally-hoed in the distance. Prompt recognition of the planes by LT. Jack O’Donnell as F-86 Sabres, not MIGs, settled the pilots’ nerves.

Four minutes after the B-29 attack, a large strike group from Air Groups 19 and 101, and Air Task Group 2, numbering 89 aircraft in all, bombed and rocketed Kowon. The rail, communication, troop, and supply facilities were successfully bombed and rocketed, with much reduced interference from the Kowon gun. The strike on Kowon, however, proved to be the last instance during the Korean War of the Navy escorting B-29s.

As the interdiction effort dwindled, and the carrier strikes such as those just described blasted the few industrial targets in Korea, and with the approach of autumn the activities of Task Force 77 returned gradually to the bombline. No support of ground forces had been provided by the fast carriers in the first six months of 1952. By August, however, an average of 12 sorties a day was being flown in support of the X US Corps and I ROK Corps on the eastern front, and with increasing ground action this contribution was to grow. Mid-summer had seen some enemy raids, September brought assaults on UN Command’s outposts and increased artillery expenditure, and with October came the hardest fighting in more than a year.

On the 6th the Communist Chinese commenced a week of heavy pressure in the area west of the Iron Triangle, the next day brought 93,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire into UN positions, and the last half of the month saw bitter action in the hills above Kumwha. With these developments what had originally been undertaken as a training exercise gained operational importance, and by October the effort was averaging 22 sorties a day. With the emphasis on support of troops there came again complaints about inadequate control, and the situation was further obfuscated by the development of the so-called “Cherokee Strike.”

The Cherokee Strikes

This operation, the brain child of Commander Seventh Fleet, and so christened in celebration of Admiral Clark’s descent from that civilized tribe, was developed to fill the vacuum left by the abandonment of interdiction and the elimination of industrial targets. Having observed exposed US supply dumps, and reasoning that the enemy must be similarly vulnerable, Admiral Clark, on 5 October, put
his main effort on the destruction of supplies, artillery, and troops behind the enemy lines.

The first Cherokee strikes were flown on 9 October 1952. Three strikes, totalling 91 aircraft, were launched from Kearsarge, Princeton and Essex on troop and supply areas beyond the range of the X US Corps artillery.

To the carrier aviators, the first Cherokee strike was simply "one more hop", and there is little in either ship or squadron records to distinguish the day of 9 October. VF-821's report mentions the day in one brief sentence: "Flak-suppression hop of eight F9Fs led by Cdr. L.W. Cooper." Another Essex squadron history, VF-871 says simply, "eight planes hit troop bunkers." Cdr. L.W. Chick's squadron, VA-55, records the results of two missions that day without embellishment: "Twelve ADs destroyed eight mortars, three 37-mm. gun positions, 400 feet of trench, and eight bunkers;" and "eight ADs destroyed two artillery positions and three bunkers while covering 90 per cent of the target area."

By mid-October Task Force 77 had gradually shifted a large proportion of
its strike effort to the Cherokee program until about 50 per cent of its air attack potential was being devoted to this type mission. General Van Fleet, Eighth US Army Commander, enthusiastically approved the program and authorized the division commanders to move their bomblines temporarily to include worthwhile targets for the duration of the strike.

Especially happy was the foot soldier in the line. To him, the various concepts of close support, its mechanics, and its methods of control, were meaningless. To him, the sight of a large number of planes, from whatever source, demolishing enemy targets with heavy bombs was an exhilarating tonic.

After the first few Cherokee strikes, however, there was confusion at the JOC and concern at Air Force headquarters. The Fifth Air Force in Korea looked on the new missions as regular close air support, while the Far East Air Force headquarters was concerned lest the new system jeopardize Air Force control of air power over the frontlines.

The misunderstanding was due to two things: first, the basic difference between a ‘Cherokee’ type strike and a regular close air support mission; and second, the method of controlling them. The Cherokee strikes were different from close air support strikes in several respects. In the case of close air support, missions were not prebriefed, the planes carried a standard bomb loading, and only eight planes could be handled over any particular target at one time. No flak-suppression planes accompanied the close air support aircraft. Moreover, the close air support aircraft were required to remain on call for considerable periods of time. The flights checked in with the frontline control parties and were often controlled by the light Mosquito aircraft who spotted their targets and directed their attacks. Finally, close air support targets were those limited to the area between the main line of resistance and the bombline. Good visibility was required to identify targets and deliver close air support.

The Cherokee strikes, on the other hand, were heavy air power missions outside of the bombline. They were pre-briefed, pre-arranged strikes, carrying weapons specially selected for the target. The number of planes over the target was unlimited because no individual control was needed. The target was selected from intelligence or photographic interpretation, and at the pre-briefing all pertinent information available was given to the pilot. The Cherokee strike aircraft used jet aircraft loaded with antipersonnel bombs for flak-suppression. The Cherokee strikes proceeded to the target as an organized unit, and the timing of the attack called for delivery immediately upon arrival, with a minimum of time on station.

The misunderstanding of Cherokee were satisfactorily resolved on 17 No-
November at a conference between Eighth Army, Commander Seventh Fleet, and Fifth Air Force. It was agreed that close air support missions would continue as before, that the Cherokee strikes were different, and would not interfere with them. However, the Cherokee strikes henceforth would be coordinated through Fifth Air Force, would check in and out with the Tactical Air Control Party of the Army corps in the area, and would use Mosquito type aircraft to mark the targets. Eighth Army also agreed to move the bombline position closer to the frontlines on specific occasions in order to permit the naval aircraft to strike. In some cases the bombline was moved as close to friendly troops as 300 yards - - a rare tribute to the accuracy of the naval airmen.

The use of the Cherokee strikes at the battleline reached its peak in November and December, with the Air Force joining the Cherokee campaign.

On 22 November, the Essex and Kearsarge teamed up for two coordinated Cherokee missions in the Kumwha sector of the front witnessed by a distinguished group of observers: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; Lieutenant General O.P. Weyland, Commanding General Far East Air Forces; Lieutenant General Glen O. Barcus, Commanding General FAFIK; and General Van Fleet Eighth US Army Commander. This enemy sector had come to have the name “Artillery Valley” because of the intense AA fire which was frequently poured into UN lines. Lieutenant General R.H. Jenkins, the 19 US Corps Commander, moved the bombline south about 5,000 yards to permit the Task Force 77 aircraft to strike.

The first strike on “Artillery Valley” was credited with destroying three artillery pieces and five enemy bunkers, and damaging four artillery pieces and five enemy bunkers. The second strike destroyed twenty-five personnel shelters and damaged ten more. The frontline controllers reported that ninety per cent of the Navy planes’ 1,000-pound bombs were on target.

“It was impressive to see those divebombers and fighters dive so steeply,” said General Van Fleet. “The heavy bombs they carried were really mountain busters, and even from our distance the whole earth shook.”

The new strike program steadily grew in proportion until more than half the naval air effort (approximately 2,500 sorties per month) was being applied along the frontlines - - either as close air support missions (nicknamed “Call Shot”) or pre-briefed strikes (nicknamed “Cherokee”). The period from 2 November to 25 November was typical: 552 Cherokee missions, and 212 Call-Shot sorties.

As the year 1953 commenced, the Cherokee program hit a snag. On many occasions in January, bombs were dropped inside friendly lines. On 17 January,
for instance, two bombs were dropped by early morning night-hecklers which killed three ROK soldiers and wounded eight others. These incidents finally led to institution of a policy that any air group commander whose planes were involved would be relieved, and the pilots involved recommended for court-martial. As a result, Fifth Air Force's participation and interest in the Cherokee strikes dwindled, and to some extent the Navy's did also. This was unfortunate, because it slowed down the use of Cherokee strikes at the battleline for several weeks.

By March 1953, however, control procedures, careful briefings and improving weather permitted a return to heavier emphasis on Cherokee support to the frontlines. Planes with missions at or near the frontlines were controlled by radar until they were definitely north of the bombline. Cherokee targets were selected jointly by the Task Force 77 and Eighth Army in a new attempt at closer liaison and control.

Panthers Tangle with MIGs

Taken in connection with the increasing boldness of enemy fighter pilots, the northward movement of carrier operations raised the prospect of collision. On the west coast, during the summer, aircraft from the British carrier and the American escort aircraft carriers (CVE) had clashed repeatedly with MIGs; during the west coast strike of 20 August Princeton F9Fs had an inconclusive skirmish south of Sinanju; on 10 September a Marine flyer had made history by becoming the first pilot of a piston-engined aircraft to shoot down an enemy jet. On 13 September a two-carrier strike against Hoeryong, though unopposed, produced large numbers of bogeys orbiting 50 miles to the eastward over the Siberian border. On the 26th MIGs were sighted over eastern Korea, and in the first week of October two Corsairs were lost in the course of a series of engagements south of Hungnam.

This situation led to some excitement on 18 November as Kearsarge and Oriskany were again striking Hoeryong. The force was operating in 41°30', about 100 miles south of Vladivostok with the cruiser Helena and a destroyer on search and rescue station halfway in to Najin. During the morning Helena tracked numerous high-speed radar contacts to the northward, which seemed to be flying a barrier patrol under ground control. At 1329 Raid 20, estimated at 16 to 20 aircraft, was approaching from the north, distant 35 miles. This contact or a part of it, estimated at eight aircraft, was also detected by Oriskany, and a
four-plane division of F9Fs, which had descended to 13,000 feet owing to fuel pump failure in the leader’s aircraft, was vectored out with instructions not to engage unless attacked.

Having overshot its mark the patrol was turned back to the southwest while the bogey, in its turn, reversed course to close. At 1336, 45 miles north of the force, Lieutenant E. Royce Williams, leader of the second section, reported seven vapor trails high overhead and identified the aircraft as MIGs. As the jets passed over to the northeast they turned, split, came down below the contrail level, and were lost to sight; ordered upstairs by Oriskany controllers, Williams’ section of F9Fs reversed course to the northeast and began a full-power climb.

Turning again at 26,000 feet, the section leader sighted four aircraft approaching from ahead and to port: as they opened fire he rolled into them in a hard turn, came out to find the trailing MIG in his sights, fired, and saw the adversary smoke and spiral downward.

All seven MIGs had now joined the fray, the two Americans had become separated, and from below a third Panther was climbing to join them. But just as help was arriving Williams’ plane was hit: with a MIG on his tail and able to maneuver only by zooming, diving, and popping his brakes, he headed for an undercast ten miles to the southward while his partner, ammunition exhausted, flew wing on the enemy in the hope of scaring him off. Coming out of a turn the pilot from the section below sighted this extraordinary procession and dove toward it, was engaged by another head-on attacker, and after a brief engagement saw a plane going into the water. Far below a flash of silver indicated another target, and he dove, only to find a parachute which he orbited and reported to base.

Lt. Williams, by this time, had reached could cover. The MIGs had broken off. Return to base was uneventful. But within the force, which was now at general quarters, some tension had apparently developed, for as the section leader brought his cranky plane in over the screen one of the destroyers briefly opened fire on him.

Considering the disparity in aircraft performance and number, and the fact that the Americans allowed themselves to indulge in an uncoordinated melee, the results of the engagement - two MIGs down and one damaged in exchange for damage to one friendly aircraft - were highly gratifying. Control and communications in the force were adjudged good, although with less justification: Helena’s attempts to report the approaching raid had been unsuccessful; the effort to fix the parachuting pilot met with no success; two divisions of airborne combat air patrol were not vectored into the fight. For the next hour the force
had almost constant radar contacts in the northerly quadrant at ranges down to 40 miles, and at 1510 a slow-speed bogey in the general area of the engagement suggested the presence of a rescue plane. Twice again fighters were vectored out as contacts closed; one sighting was made but the MIGs turned away; by 1625 the screen was clear.

The Kojo Feint

For the final two years of the war, although UN Command continuously considered the feasibility of amphibious attack against both east and west coasts of Korea, a plan to land at Kojo was first proposed in Mid-1951 by Rear Admiral T.B. Hill while Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Admiral Hill envisioned an amphibious end-around landing on Korea's eastern coast, in the vicinity of Kojo. Once ashore, the troops would drive southwestward to link up with the Eighth US Army and thereby cut off the NK Communist army from its source of Communist Chinese supply. The plan, known as 'Wrangler' had the approval of both Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet, but was disapproved by General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Bradley stated that "We want no more of the enemy's real estate".

Vice Admiral Briscoe soon after his assumption of duty as ComNavFE, again proposed this time feinting an amphibious demonstration in the Kojo area in an attempt to draw enemy troops from their underground frontline positions. It was never intended to land any troops, but it was hoped that the enemy would react to the demonstration by sending his troops to the defense of Kojo, and that the Navy and Air Force could then destroy the enemy as they moved. General Mark Clark, UNC Comander, approved the idea, and designated Commander Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Clark, as Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven, placing under his command various amphibious forces including units from the Sixteenth Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, and 118th Regimental Combat Team. Major General Anthony Trudeau was in command of the troops, and Rear Admiral Francis X. McNerney CTF 90, commanded the amphibious group.

The Kojo operation, known as "Operation Decoy", had the following concept in the operation plan of Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven:

This force, supported by coordinated joint action, will seize by amphibious assault, occupy and defend a beachhead in the Kojo area with the 8th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team in order to (1) create an enemy psychological reaction favorable to the United Nations; (2) draw enemy reinforcements to defense of
the objective area; and finally exploit the enemy's physical and psychological reaction.

A noteworthy feature of the Kojo plan was that it made no mention that the operation was to be only a demonstration landing. So, the subordinate commands, including the carrier and the minesweeper commanders, were unaware that the operation would be a feint.

October 15th was tentatively chosen for D-day. In accordance with Admiral Clark's orders, Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven prepared and distributed plans on 25 September both for a Corps landing and for a regimental landing. On 4 October, General Clark authorized execution of the regimental landing plan.

Ship movements for the Kojo operation began on 1 October. Troop loading operations commenced 6 October at Muroran, Otaru, and Hokkaido, where the Eighth Regimental Combat Team was located. Troop transports - - Task Group 76.4 (ComTransDiv-14) in the Bayfield (APA-33) - - began departing Hokkaido for the rehearsal area at Kangnung, Korea, on 9 October. Rehearsal operations were conducted on 12 October, under most adverse weather conditions which led to the loss of four LCVPs.

While the rehearsal was going on, the Advance Force, similarly handicapped, appeared off Kojo to sweep and to bombard. One battleship, two heavy cruisers, and a batch of destroyers worked over the landing area; four fast carriers operating in the Eastern Sea provided air strikes, including a remarkable 667 sorties on D minus 3; Sicily and Badoeng Strait were both on hand, the former for air spot while the later, as Hunter-Killer carrier, cruised the area in search of submarines and briefly thought she found one.

By this time the demonstration had become an interservice affair. FEAR and Fifth Air Force stepped up their operations, a mock parachute landing was set up, and on the night of 13-14 October Eighth Army launched a two-battalion attack near Kumhwa. By dawn of D-Day, the 15th, more than a hundred ships were off the Kojo beaches, and control procedures were getting a serious test. The aerologists, however, had already failed theirs, for the weather had continued to degenerate: poor visibility and low clouds delayed the bombardment, while winds freshening to 50 knots kicked up high seas. At 1400 hours, nevertheless, seven waves of landing craft were sent in from the transport area to pass the line of departure and then retire seaward. Owing to the heavy sea no troops were boated: owing to the skill of the coxswains no boats were lost or seriously damaged. But two minesweepers had been hit by shore fire and five carrier planes lost to antiaircraft.

So ended what some proclaimed to have been the largest-scale fraud in military
history. Again a deception ended with a question as to who had been deceived. No troop movements of magnitude had been detected ashore, although in the weeks that followed some shifts were noted in the Kojo–Wonsan area. What was certain, however, was that most of the participants had been fooled, and when the true nature of the operations became known some were very angry. The feeling that at last the war was getting off dead center had produced a tension and degree of effort that made the let-down in morale the greater, and one carrier commanding officer strongly protested the internal secrecy which had led his pilots to take risks of a sort appropriate to a landing but not to an exercise. Of Kojo, as of earlier and smaller demonstrations, it seems proper to conclude that an enemy incapable of quick response cannot be very profitably hoaxed.

As far as damage inflicted on the enemy during the aerial and surface bombardment, Commander Seventh Fleet drew the following conclusions:

**Aircraft Operations.** It is impossible to draw a direct comparison of damage between the two periods, due to the diversified nature of the targets; however, it will be noted that the destruction achieved by aircraft in the 1–5 October period was, in general, slightly greater than that achieved in the 12–16 October period, with slightly less tonnage of bombs and considerably fewer sorties. This is attributed to the fact that the former period was devoted primarily to prebriefed and coordinated heavy strikes, while by contrast the amphibious operation required a much greater percentage of nonattack missions... It is concluded that less damage was done by aircraft, with a greater expenditure of effort, during the Kojo demonstration than during a normal operating period.

**Ship Bombardment.** It appears that considerably more damage was done by naval gunfire during the period of the Kojo demonstration than during the earlier period. This opinion is reinforced by the fact that a greater percentage of unobserved and unevaluated fire occurred during the operation than normal periods of deliberate gunfire. Considering these factors, it is estimated that approximately three times as much damage was done by naval gunfire during the Kojo demonstration as during a normal 5-day period; however, the expenditure of ammunition was about five times the normal.

Another factor to be considered in arriving at a cost analysis of this operation is the interruptions of upkeep schedules of ships which were mobilized for the operation. This is particularly applicable in the case of destroyers, which are in short supply, as always. The operations required 128 destroyer days which would otherwise have gone into much-needed upkeep.

The foregoing is not intended to belittle the value of the demonstration as a training maneuver. Such training is invaluable, and cannot be measured in the light of cost. However, it is considered that the concept of drawing the enemy into the open in order to inflict severe losses on him was not realized and, in retrospect, had very little possibility of succeeding under the existing conditions of stalemate and limited United Nations resources.
CHAPTER IV        THE FINAL PHASE OF STALEMATE
(March – July 1953)

Section 1.    Introduction

This chapter covers the last five-month period of the Korean War (March–July 1953), which was characterized by progress at the truce table, crisis on the political and fighting front, and conclusion of the war.

As year of 1953 began and stalemate still continued, it seemed increasingly possible that this war would outlast that one. On 22 February, however, General Clark moved to break the jam on the prisoner-repatriation question by proposing an immediate exchange of sick and wounded personnel. The Red answer was delayed, doubtless owing to difficulties in Moscow concerning the devolution of power, and the interval between letter and reply was marked by heavier than usual enemy pressure. But on 28 March General Clark received a belated reply to his letter of 22 February. The Reds in their reply stated that not only were they prepared to exchange sick and wounded prisoners but that they were also willing to reopen the truce talks. The liaison teams began on 6 April to make arrangements for the exchange of sick and wounded which led to agreement on 11 April. “Operation Little Switch” commenced on 20 April. On 26 April, following the exchange of sick and wounded, the 199-day recess of the armistice negotiations was ended and the talks opened once again.

Considering the difficulties that the negotiations had in the past, the progress made in the next few weeks at Panmunjom was astonishing — and this in spite of the ROK President Syngman Rhee’s persistent attempts to wreck the talks. The President, understandably enough, dreaded the thought of any armistice that would mean a return to the status quo ante bellum, and he was prepared to go to almost any length to prevent such a settlement. The Communists for their part, although surprisingly conciliatory at the truce table, took steps to make President Rhee see the error of his ways by launching heavy attacks on the ROK-held sectors of the front. Mid-May saw the heaviest fighting since October 1952, and on 13 June even heavier action broke out in the central and west-central sectors held by the ROK divisions. Still, in spite of the fighting and of the sabre rattling by the President, the talks continued to make progress, and by 16 June
it seemed as if all were over but the shouting. On that day General Harrison, UN Command’s senior delegate, reported that he expected an armistice within three or four days.

On 18 June, without warning and despite prior assurances, the ROK President released some 27,000 anti-Communist prisoners who were in the custody of ROK troops. If this action angered the UN Command, it infuriated the Communists, who at once broke off the talks, and for a time it looked as if President Rhee might succeed in his attempt to force the continuation of the war. For once in the long history of the truce negotiation, the Communists had a legitimate excuse for stalling, but strangely enough they did not take advantage of it, and on 10 July the talks began again. The Reds continued their pressure on the front however, chiefly on the ROK-held sectors of the line, and on 13 July launched the heaviest attack made since the hard-fighting days of early 1951. On that day six Communist divisions struck the Capital ROK Division and the 3rd and 6th ROK Divisions holding the central front at the Kumsong Bulge. The ROK’s were pushed back several kilometers, and the Capital and 3rd ROK Divisions in particular were very severely mauled. The penetration was not serious, as the shoulders held firm, and by 19 July the attack had petered out.

No matter what provocation the Communists suffered at President Rhee’s hands they were determined to end the war, and at the plenary session on 19 July the senior Communist delegate announced that his side was prepared to accept the UN assurance that the ROK President would be held in check and that he was willing to begin final preparations for signing the armistice. There were no more troubles, and on 27 July, 1953, at 2200, the truce became effective.

On the final day of the war Task Force 77 carried out strikes on northern airfields; at Wonsan Bremerton and Saint Paul fired the last missions; the Amphibious Force busied itself in preparation for the repatriation of prisoners. At 2200, as the troops came out of their holes across the Korean peninsula, the UN ships in Wonsan harbor turned on their lights. On the harbor islands, on Yang Do and Nan Do in the east, and on Cho Do and Sok To in the west, the garrisons began to demolish their installations and pack their bags. Three years, one month, and two days after the NK Communist forces had burst south across the parallel the fighting war was over. But no peace treaty had been signed yet, only an armistice - - and a very unusual armistice at that, for neither side had been defeated in the field. Indeed it was quite possible that the fighting might break out again at any time should the always-unpredictable Communists decide that such a course would be to their advantage.
Section 2. Naval Air Operations in Final Months

As the enemy increased his ground activity during March, both the Air Force and Navy began to put more stress upon close air support and Cherokee-type missions. There were, of course, diversionary operations; The carrier Oriskany in mid-March put on a big effort against a mining complex up-country from Songjin; on the night of 27 March three volunteer Corsair pilots made a moonlight attack on the Hanhung highway bridge, one of the most heavily defended targets in Korea, and dropped the center span before the enemy could open fire; the Wonsan batteries, the city of Songjin, some residual power plant targets, and a number of militarized villages also received attention. Naval pilot morale was boosted by a strike on a North Korean rest camp, which reportedly accommodated heroes of the Communist forces credited with shooting down UN planes, and by the accomplishment of two night hecklers who chased two trains into opposite ends of a short and single-tracked tunnel, to be rewarded by gratifying amounts of steam from both entrances.

On 13 April, the beleaguered city of Chongjin was battered in another maximum air-gun strike. One hundred and nineteen sorties from Philippine Sea's Carrier Air Group Nine and Oriskany's Carrier Air Group Twelve hit the city's transport network and its mining and ordnance areas. Pilots reported the destruction of a communications center. On 21 April the pilots of Princeton and Oriskany struck targets of their own preference. Two hundred and twenty-three sorties were flown. Even so, the targets were much the same - the supply and industrial areas northeast Korea, the Hodo Pando guns of Wonsan, a jet sweep past Pukchong, and naval gunfire support and Cherokee missions. The best result, perhaps, was the fact that no pilots were lost.

Nevertheless the emphasis was on the bombline. In March almost half the offensive sorties were assigned to Cherokee and troop support, and while this figure dropped in early April it subsequently rose again. Repetition of Cherokee strikes against the same area over a period of days was now the custom, a measure felt both to limit the effectiveness of antiaircraft and to result in greater destruction of targets. As always, damage assessment remained the problem, but enemy prisoners reported results in excess of the pilots' estimates and Eighth Army officers were high in their praise.

The approach of the war's end found the naval aviators back at the job that had once confronted USS Valley Forge and HMS Triumph in the initial stage of the
war. Again the Communists were attacking; again the carriers, now four Essex-class ships plus a light unit in the Western Sea, were supporting the ground armies under the control of JOC. Some differences had indeed come with the passage of time: representation at JOC had been institutionalized and communications improved: movement from coast to coast and retirement for replenishment had long since been given up; the risks of air and submarine attack had been accepted. the advantages of mobility and surprise forgone. and the force, with its replenishment ships, was operating as a permanent air base in 39°N 129°E.

Upon this air base, upon its flying personnel, and upon the Logistic Support Force, the events of the final weeks imposed severe demands. Early in June the Eighth US Army called for 48 close support sorties a day, and for a large additional effort in Cherokee strikes. On the 6th orders were received to put the entire piston-engine effort into the support of ground forces, while dividing the jets between Cherokee strikes, road sweeps, and reconnaissance. Late in the month the lull between Communist attacks brought a limited revival of interdiction, but on 14 July Commander Seventh Fleet put all propeller planes back into support of the armies. In the last five days three very large raids were made against seven enemy airfields in the eastern half of North Korea.

With this final period of emergency there developed the most intense flight operations of the war. On 11 June Princeton joined Philippine Sea and Boxer on the line, and two days later Lake Champlain, fresh from the Atlantic Fleet, reached the operating area. Four carriers operated on the line almost continuously, despite poor weather. Many operating records were smashed: total sorties flown, tonnages of armament delivered, total days at sea. Underway replenishment at night -- of a magnitude never before known (27 times in 49 days) -- became routine. The following are excerpts from reports of the period of 11-15 June:

*Boxer* (Captain M.B. Gurney; Air Task Group One, Commander Whitney)

11 June 1953: 130 sorties. The ADs proved exceptionally effective in a close air support mission on the central front. The Mosquito controller reported 500 yards of trenches destroyed, 15 mortar positions destroyed, and 12 secondary explosions...

14 June 1953: 131 sorties. Jet Cherokee strikes hit supply buildings near the eastern frontline near Anchor Hill. ADs and jets were both used in close air support on eastern and central MLR. 1625 yards of trench, 8 mortar positions, and 9 gun emplacements were destroyed by close air support missions...

15 June 1953: 147 sorties. Today's strikes were part of the maximum effort put out by Task Force 77 in support of a counteroffensive by UN forces to retake ground lost the previous week in the vicinity of "Anchor Hill". In the effort, 650 yards of trench, 3 machine gun positions, 7 mortar positions, and 73 buildings were destroyed. "Well Done's" were received from CG 8th Army, ComSeventhFlt, CTF 77, CinePacFlt, and ComNavFE.
Lake Champlain: (Capt. George T. Mundorff, USN; CVG-4, Comdr John Sweeney)
15 June 1953: Prop's again rendered close air support to United Nations troops, and jet strikes were directed to billeting and supply targets in the Cherokee area. One hundred forty-seven sorties were flown, dropping 103 tons of ordnance. The Lake Champlain (which had commenced combat operations two days earlier) received the following from CTF 77: "You amateurs turned in a veteran performance today X We are proud of you X."

Philippine Sea: (Capt. Paul H. Ramsey; Carrier Air Group Nine, Comdr I.D. Harris) X
15 June 1953: The heaviest naval air blow of the conflict was struck today... Today was an all-Navy show for strikes in support of the ground forces to regain "Anchor Hill." At the end of the day's operation, "Anchor Hill" was referred to by Air Group pilots as "Anchor Valley." The hill was regained by friendly ground forces and the operation was praised by General Lee of the ROKs and General Taylor of the Eighth Army...

Princeton: (Capt. O.C. Gregg; Carrier Air Group Fifteen, Comdr John E. Parks)
15 June 1953: The combat sorties record for aircraft carriers is believed to have been broken when 172 and 184 sorties were launched during 2 single-day operations (14 and 15 June).

On 14 and 15 June, Task Force 77 had delivered 300 and 403 frontline missions respectively. The following remarks by Admiral Clark shows an example of how closely TF 77 supported the ground troops on the eastcoast.

"After conference with Lieutenant General Lee Hyung Keun, who commanded the 1 ROK Corps, I ordered a concentrated surface gunfire and carrier air strike to support the recapture of Anchor Hill and its surrounding terrain. My flagship, the New Jersey, and the cruiser St. Paul would join the shoot.

"Carrier planes, assisted by the New Jersey, and the St. Paul, began an intense bombardment and bombing of the area on the 14th which continued throughout the morning of the 15th.

"Accompanied by Rear Admiral Harry Sanders (Commander Cruiser Division One) and Captain Herschel A. House of my staff, I flew by helicopter to an outpost near the scene of action. There I witnessed the attempt to re-occupy the lost territory.

"Supported beautifully by Seventh Fleet's planes, General Lee's troops had no difficulty in recapturing two of the hills, but on the main peak of Anchor Hill the enemy held out stubbornly until after four o'clock in the afternoon."

The battleship New Jersey, laid down one of the heaviest bombardments of the war to assist in the capture of Anchor Hill. (This was the first use of a battleship at the bombline since Iowa had been so employed in October 1952.) The "Big Jay" reported 44 bunkers destroyed, 20 heavily damaged, 2 caves closed, 610 yards of trench torn up, 13 gun positions destroyed, and 13 other damaged."
The Final Phase of Stalemate

Air Operations of Task Force 77 in the last two months of the war were greatly hindered by the usual weather difficulties of the Korean summer. In the interior mountains the monsoonal air masses condensed into heavy fog and rains; at sea, fog and low overcast prevailed. So, for the task force, this period was marked by a continuous search for clear areas, and by the conduct of full-scale operations with ceilings down to 100 feet and visibility of only a mile and a half.

Despite this remarkable performance a large proportion of scheduled sorties was weathered out; despite these cancellations new marks for carrier operations were repeatedly set. The June record of 554 sorties flown on the 13th went by the board in July, with 592, 600, and 746 on three successive days. Total sorties rose steadily from 4,343 in May to 6,423 in July; close support sorties went up from 256 to 1,690; aircraft ordnance delivery rose from 2,835 tons in May to 4,606 in the final month.

So massive an offensive called for hard work from all hands, and for an heroic effort on the part of the Logistic Support Force. On 9 June fueling days were abolished, and from that date nightly replenishment, carried out in a mixture of fog and darkness that often required the use of towing spars and searchlights, continued to the end of the war. Owing to the coming of the jet airplane and to the increased bomb-carrying capacity of carrier attack planes, the requirements far exceeded anything accomplished or even contemplated in World War II. The increased expenditure of ordnance strained the capabilities of the ammunition ships; the consumption of aviation gasoline, which for a time reached 9,000 barrels a day, forced the recall of an oiler from other scheduled operations. Yet somehow all needs were met.

On men and machinery alike the strain of these final weeks began to tell, until as time went on bad weather came to seem almost a godsend. For the aviators the working day was a long one: good weather or bad, flying or not, they were on the alert and under strain; when the weather was operational the average jet pilot spent some four hours flying and another five in preparation, while propeller-plane pilots were airborne almost seven hours a day. When twilight brought an end to the long flight schedule it was time to go alongside the waiting replenishment ships, pass lines and hoses, and fuel and load far into the night. Here the immediate impact was on the ships’ companies, who after arduous days had to manhandle and stow large quantities of stores and ammunition, but the pilots suffered too, their sleep disturbed by the clanking of handling machinery on the hanger deck.

Under such pressure, maintenance suffered and gear began to fail. Electronic equipment became temperamental, Lake Champlain experienced breakdown of both catapults, Princeton was out for a few days with shaft vibrations, and Philippine
Sea had similar troubles. These casualties to her sister ships made it necessary to hold Boxer on the line long after her scheduled date of departure, with the result that on 23 July she set a new fleet record with her 61,000 landing.

In this situation something had to give, and what gave was a plan for intensified night work which had been developed in May. At long last it had seemed possible to put air operations on a 24-hour basis by transferring all night-configurated aircraft to Princeton and providing her with a small screen for independent night operations. But the May casualty to her shafts forced postponement of the scheme, and the subsequent need for maximum effort prevented the assignment of a carrier to night work only. So heavy, indeed, was the daytime schedule, that ordinary night heckling was first diminished and then discontinued, and the hours of darkness were ceded to the enemy.

Nevertheless night brought one triumph. Beginning in April the Communists had cast further doubt upon the virtues of modern design by the employment of fabric-covered training planes -- Po-2 biplanes, or Yak-18 monoplanes -- in a series of night air raids against the Inchon—Kimpo—Seoul area. Employed either singly or in masses of a half-dozen or so, these ancient 80-knot floaters, too low for anti-aircraft fire and too slow for jet interceptors, for two months flew with impunity through the interstices of the air defense organization, damaging parked aircraft, burning a fuel dump, shaking up the residences of the President of Korea and of the gentlemen of the press, and causing generalized confusion and frustration. But in June a detachment of Corsair night fighters was sent in from the fleet, and within a month Lieutenant Guy P. Bordelon had disposed of five of the intruders, to become not only the first ace in this particular category but the Navy's only ace of the Korean War.

The enemy offensive of June and July gave the close support control system its real test since the beginning of the stalemate. As before, the system of pre-planning strikes proved useless in emergency; as before, requests for help could not be promptly answered. Although communications capacity far exceeded that of 1950, this improvement was more than offset by the vastly increased sortie capability: the close support request not clogged almost at once, and despite resport to extemporized and non-doctrinal direct communications, strikes followed requests by as much as 17 hours. Again as in the summer of 1950, the control system collapsed as JOC duty officers, remote from the situation but wishing to help, rammed aircraft in large numbers into the threatened sectors. Once more the lack of forward air controllers below the regimental level put the main responsibility on the Mosquitos which, in the fluid situation, once more demonstrated their inability to keep track of friendly positions and important targets. Inevitably,
The Final Phase of Stalemate

therefore, rather than hitting troops in the open and on the move, close support and Cherokee Strikes attacked supply and billeting areas, gun positions, and trenches, and much waste ensued through jettisoning of ordnance.

These difficulties, experienced for the first time by the personnel involved, although not for the first time in Korea, were compounded by the adverse weather. Large-scale Cherokee operations, sufficiently problematical in themselves, were forced by reduced visibility to operate under ground radar control. In June 577 sorties, some 30 percent of Task Force 77’s support effort, were so employed bombing in level flight from altitudes between 10,000 and 15,000 feet, and by July this was the rule rather than the exception. In their turn the radar facilities became overloaded, and many flights had to be diverted to secondary targets, or directed to dump their loads somewhere north of the bombline.

Section 3. Naval Surface Operations in Final Months

For the Amphibious Force the early months of 1953 were occupied by routine training exercises, minor troop lifts, and logistic support work. For the gunnery ships, however, as for the soldiers in the line, March and April brought increased action. The number of mines encountered rose radically, from 14 in March to 31 in April, and as usual most were floaters. Increased artillery fire directed against the UN minesweepers required special attention to the employment and positioning of gunfire support ships. Interdiction of train traffic along eastern shore continued. Off the bombline, destroyers and heavy ships continued to keep the enemy down and, through their ability to fire upon him from the rear, forced him to keep his targets defiladed both from artillery and from the sea. But the principal problem of the spring months was the need to keep the duty heavy cruiser or battleship on notice at all times for immediate movement to Wonsan.

Final Year of Wonsan Siege

The start of the final year of the siege saw destroyers De Haven and Samuel N. Moore on guard in Wonsan. For the remaining five months there was little change of pattern, although there was a constant increase in Communist effort to drive the US Navy out of the harbor. In December 1952, a CincPacFleet appreciation had foreseen a Communist attempt to recapture the harbor islands, and this
prospect was emphasized by the events of early spring. The record 523 rounds which fell upon the islands in March doubled in April, while another 553 were aimed at the siege ships. The volume did not compare with the Battle of the Buzz Saw, but accuracy was up: from March through May five destroyers and the cruisers Los Angeles and Bremerton were hit, and casualties were incurred both by their crews and by the island garrisons. April, May, and June witnessed the heaviest volume of enemy fire as the Communists fired approximately 1,600, 1,300, and 1,100 rounds respectively --- more than half of them at the siege ships.

On 5 May the battleship New Jersey, accompanied by cruiser Bremerton, and destroyers Twining and Colahan, fired 115 rounds into Wonsan, her first salvo destroyed a main observation post. Sixteen-inch shells also struck and exploded a concrete ammunition bunker. The “Big Jay” also fired at an enemy battery at Hodo Pando, collapsing the cave mouths and obliterating the firing tracks. For almost three weeks this battery was silent. Again on 11–12 July, the “Big Jay” plastered the Hodo Pando guns. These 164 rounds silenced the battery for the rest of the war.

On 13 May USS Brush had nine casualties: USS Wiltse took a single hit on 11 June as the result of 45 rounds of 105-mm. fire: on 14 June the heavy cruiser Bremerton counted four rounds in the sea around her. On 15 June USS Losberg (DD-759), USS John A. Boile (DD-775) and USS Current (ARS-22) were on the receiving end of more than 100 rounds of large caliber fire, but none of the three was hit. On 17 June, Henderson (DD-785) received superficial damage from 80 rounds from the Wonsan batteries.

On the 18th of June, a bad day for the siege ships, the cruiser Saint Paul was under fire. USS Irwin (DD-794) took a main deck hit which caused five casualties. The hardest hit was Rowan (DD-782). Forty-five rounds of shellfire bracketed her, five striking. One shell, thought to be a 155-mm., punched a two-foot hole on her starboard side at frame 209, a scant eight inches above the waterline. Another shell demolished the Mark 34 radar. Several other holes were visible in her side. Nine men were wounded, two of them seriously.

On 25 June Gurke had three casualties. The daylight patrol movements of the ships were somewhat restricted during June and July, but there was no intention of abandoning the siege, even for an instant.

On 7 July Minesweeper Symbol (AM-123) and destroyer Wiltse (DD-716) drew enemy fire. The same day Losberg (DD-759), John W. Thomason (DD-760) and Hammer (DD-718) received 300 rounds. Thomason being slightly damaged by straddling air bursts. On 11 July, cruiser Saint Paul was hit by one 105-mm. shell at her gun mount, but no personnel were injured. On the 23rd, she was again
under attack, some of the shells falling as close as ten yards.

On the last day of the war, 27 July 1953, amidst preparation to abandon the harbor in accordance with the truce agreement, the siege ended as it had begun, with minesweepers sweeping, the destroyers patrolling, taking the Wonsan targets and guns under fire. Destroyers Wiltse and Porter, and cruiser Bremerton fired salvos at Wonsan targets until a minute before the 2200 deadline.

The smaller harbor islands were abandoned on the day of the truce. Yo-do, with its more extensive installations, took longer to evacuate: equipment had to be removed, storage dumps emptied, fortifications destroyed.

The last two ships to leave the harbor -- the cruiser Bremerton and destroyer Cunningham -- did so on the late afternoon of 1 August, after a day of pleasant swimming in the harbor which had felt the fury and stricture of a full-scale siege.

The siege of Wonsan had demonstrated the courage and tenacity of the American Navy. The important rail and highway center, with its many industries, once a city of 100,000 and now half that size, was a mass of cluttered ruins. So important had this city been as a transportation hub that the Communists had been forced to great effort to repair and rebuild the almost daily damage. Hardly an undamaged building was visible. Many industries had gone underground.

In a land-locked harbor which had been heavily mined and which the enemy had sought constantly to re-mine, where shallow, shoal-filled waters abounded, and despite the most intense enemy opposition, a siege of 861 days had been imposed with skill, determination, and success by a tireless and efficient team of American sailors.

Task Force 95

As the war end approached, the gunnery forces on the eastern shore were back where they had been at the beginning, and the task that fell upon Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen, CTF 95 for the last five months of the war, was the task that had faced Admiral Higgins. The emphasis on interdiction of supply and transportation, strong during the period of stalemate, had given way at the last to the requirement of again supporting ground forces on the coastal road.

On 6 March, the destroyer Laws (DD-558), near Hungnam in the east, joined hands with Task Force 77's airplanes to damage several railroad cars despite heavy enemy counterbattery fire. Five days later, Trathen's (DD-550) guns damaged several rail cars of a train near Chaho. Communist engineer detached his locomotive from the train and fled into the closest tunnel.
As March passed, and the muddy and slippery roads of Korea dried out, patrolling ships reported increasing numbers of truck convoys along the coastal road. Approximately 500 vehicles were seen on the night of 15–16 March. They were taken under fire, but no estimate of damage could be made.

Along with the enemy’s increased truck activity, April saw a sharp upturn in counterbattery fire, especially in the vicinity of Wonsan. Four American ships were hit during this month: Los Angeles, Manchester, Maddox, and Kyes.

For the remainder of the war, destroyer James E. Kyes (DD-787) was to receive more than her share of enemy attention. She first reported being shot at near Songjin on 16 March. Ten days later, in the same area, Kyes was again taken under fire, this time escaping damage from some fifty rounds of fire. Two days later, accompanying sweepers Waxbill near Hungnam, Kyes observed ten splashes in their vicinity.

On 1 April, Kyes loaded her boat with a reconnaissance party and dispatched them to the area of Chaho to watch and listen for trains. Sure enough, one was spotted, but it was in such a position that Kyes’ guns could not bear. Rather than let the train escape, Kyes contacted a night-heckling Fifth Air Force B-26 and vectored him to the area. Kyes’ initiative was rewarded by hearing the Air Force pilot report “several box-cars destroyed.”

April 4 saw Kyes under fire again, this time near the island of Mayang Do. Kyes got even on the 18th, near Chaho, and fired at an enemy train. The enemy’s counterbattery fire was rapid and more accurate than usual, and Kyes was forced to open range.

On 17 May, in company with USS Brush (DD-745), Kyes supported a ROK raiding party above the battleline near Kojo. The ROK troops reported the destruction of two automatic weapons and fourteen sampans.

But Kyes did her best night’s work on the 19th of May while in company with Eversole (DD-787). At Chaho, where enemy guns had fired upon her so often and Kyes herself had fired at trains several times, Kyes and Eversole at last succeeded in hitting and stopping a nocturnal train. Illuminating the area with 128 star shells, the two destroyers pumped 418 rounds of 5-inch shells into the doomed train.

On 3 June the USS Chandler (DD-717), assisted by USS Wilsie (DD-716), did her part by destroying one train near Tanchon.

On 12 June at Hungnam, while Manchester (CL-83) and the USS Carpenter (DDE-825) were bombarding harbor targets, sixteen rounds of enemy fire were observed.

On the 25th of June near Tanchon, the USS Gurke (DD-783) was taken under fire by heavy enemy guns. Two direct hits and several minor ones were received.
Fortunately, no one was killed and only three minor personnel casualties were received.

On the morning of 8 July, ten miles south of Songjin, the USS Irwin (DD-794) took a shrapnel explosion in her main-mast from an estimated 80 rounds, which seriously wounded Captain Jack Maginnis (Commander Destroyer Squadron 24) and four other personnel. All electrical and electronic cables on the mast were cut. Captain Maginnis was the senior US naval officer wounded in the Korean War. He was transferred to the Manchester and thence to Japan for a series of operations. He has since returned to active duty.

During this final period of the war, the battleship New Jersey supported by heavy cruisers Saint Paul and Bremerton and light cruiser Manchester, plus twelve destroyers, stood guard at the east coast bombline. It was the first appearance of a battleship at the bombline since Iowa in October 1952.

The 16 ships rotated in three groups at the bombline to give constant support to the eastern anchor of the line. 13,000 rounds of 5-inch, 2,800 rounds of 8-inch, 700 rounds of 6-inch, and 1,774 rounds of 16-inch were poured into enemy positions during the last two months of the war.

A large part of the credit for preventing the enemy’s frantic efforts to advance along east coast during the final days of the war was due the naval sharpshooters. When the demarcation line was finally set, there was a definite northward curve on the east coast where the battleline was ahead of the rest of the front.

Vice Admiral Briscoe, ComNavFE, congratulated the bombarding fleet on 19 June: “Your straight shooting of the past 12 days will not soon be forgotten by the enemy. You knocked him off Anchor Hill, ripped up his frontlines and supply routes, and added another chapter to the lesson that the way of the aggressor is hard.”

On 27 July at 2159 hours the cruiser Saint Paul (Capt. C. W. Parker) fired the last round of the war at sea. Thus, the longest blockade and bombardment effort ever imposed by the US Navy came to an end.

**UN-held Islands in Final Months**

On the west coast, the enemy pressure against the UN-held islands began to increase. The two rounds fired at Cho Do and Sok To in February by the Wolsa-ri and Amgak batteries, and the 16 rounds of March, increased in April to 440, while ships of the blockading force observed more work in progress on the Wolsa-ri cliff positions. Small-caliber counterbattery fire remained of slight effect; a strike from
HMS *Glory* and a series of Air Force sorties accomplished little more; and a moonlight attempt by the frigate HMS *Cardigan Bay* to eliminate the guns after closing to within 1,000 yards of the shore proved unsuccessful. In late April the British cruiser *Newcastle* and *Birmingham* heavily bombarded chunks of Wolsa-ri cliffs and silenced the guns for a month, but the Amgak batteries overlooking Sok To continued lively. To counter this pressure 90-mm. guns were brought in and emplaced on Sok To and on Cho Do, and in late May *New Jersey* was sailed around from the east coast to bombard.

In the east at Wonsan, Communist artillery also continued to remain active, and with the coming of an enemy ground offensive in June the bombardment ships found themselves extremely busy. Between the bombline and Wonsan harbor ruts were worn in the sea, as the heavy ships steamed back and forth in response to emergency calls. Gun strikes by *New Jersey* and *Bremerton* in May were followed up in June by *Saint Paul* and *Manchester*; and although for a time it seemed that the destroyers might be driven out, the position was maintained. On both coasts, at the end of June, enemy harassment of the island footholds markedly declined.

For the islands, in any event, the days of UNC occupation were numbered by the approaching armistice. The resumption of plenary session at Panmunjom on 26 April, which followed the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and ended a recess of 199 days, ushered in a period of progress which, in comparison with
what preceded, could only be described as extremely rapid. By 8 June the thorny question of repatriation had been settled and prospects again became bright.

Since the armistice would prohibit further removal of the inhabitants of the northern islands, CincFE on 12 June directed the outloading of all civilians and all excess supplies from the Wonsan islands and from Yang Do. On the west coast, following the updating of plans, the evacuation of partisan forces, their dependents, and other refugees from the islands north of the parallel was begun. In the east the dimensions of the problem were small, but in the Eastern Sea this last tragic displacement brought the departure, after their cattle had been slaughtered and their dwellings razed, of 19,425 persons from the islands above the demarcation line.

**Task Force 90**

To the normal commitments of Task Force 90, spring of 1953 had added a variety of tasks. In April the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners had been carried out; in May two landing exercises had been held, beach surveys continued, preparations for island evacuation begun, and lift of vehicle and personnel landing crafts (LCVPs) made to the French in Indochina, where another war was in progress and where, a year later, another demarcation line would be drawn. These responsibilities were increased in June as the result of floods in southern Japan, which imposed requirements for evacuation, relief, and for shipping to replace disrupted land communications. At the same time the apparent imminence of the armistice made it necessary to be ready on short notice to repatriate large numbers of enemy prisoners.

In preparation for the movement of almost 100,000 enemy personnel, a task group of 2 APAs, 6 AKAs, 20 LSTs, and minor units had been assembled, although at the cost of delaying the scheduled return of a number to the United States. On 12 June Task Force 90 was alerted for this operation, all units were placed on 24-hour notice, and ships were ordered to Pusan for installation of wood and wire cribbing which would permit the movement of fractions prisoners in manageable groups. Eleven LSTs and one AKA had been fitted with these cribs when there arose the wholly new requirement of a major emergency troop movement.

On 21 June, three days after the ROK release of anti-Communist prisoners, CincFE ordered the immediate airlift of the 187th Airborne RCT to Korea; two days later 2,100 soldiers and 1,500 tons of gear had been flown in by the Air Force and three LSTs and two LSMs were bringing in the heavy equipment. On the 26th orders were received to lift the equipment of one regimental combat team
of the 24th US Division from Japan to Korea; shortly CineFE alerted the entire division for movement by air and sea; by 2 July some 4,000 troops had been flown across, other units had been added to the planned movement, and the emphasis had shifted from air to surface transport. In anticipation of instructions to redeploy the division, Rear Admiral Walter E. Moore, CTF 90, now ordered the removal of security cribs from his amphibious shipping: on 3 July, following receipt of orders, he dispatched three task units to Japanese embarkation ports.

The movement of the 24th Division, so suddenly called for, required not only the diversion of all available amphibious shipping but the requisitioning of LSTs and cargo ships from MSTS; numerous modifications to CineFE's plan had brought confusion and a communications overload; weather and the lack of adequate harbor facilities forced some extemporization in loading; at one port difficulties with Japanese customs officials bizarrely delayed embarkation. By 9 July, nevertheless, one regiment was in Korea and the others were loading, when suddenly the situation was complicated by a whole new series of directives.

The double requirements of the Korean crisis and of the impending armistice, with its prohibition of further reinforcement, now produced an eruption of orders from Supreme Headquarters. On 13 July CTF 90 was instructed to transport the Army's 2nd Amphibious Support Brigade, an amphibious tank battalion, and elements of Naval Beach Group 1 from Japan to Korea. Two days later, as embarkation of these units was beginning, came orders for the movement of a regiment from Pusan to Koje Do. On 16 July, as this lift was commenced, as the last elements of the 24th Division were sailing for Korea, and as loading of other units was continuing in Japan, transfer of a second regiment from Koje up the coast to Sokcho was ordered. On the 17th there came an emergency call to move a battalion from Cheju Do to Inchon, and on the next day, to complete this planner's nightmare, there arose the possibility of further redeployment of elements of the 24th Division. Thus, Task Force 90 spent the most busy days in the final weeks of the Korean War.

Section 4. Conclusion

US Naval Contribution

This final section covers the United States naval contribution to the Korean War.
effort and a study and analysis of two significant roles assigned to, and carried out, by the US Navy in the Korean War - - interdiction and blockading efforts.

At 2200, on the night of 27 July 1953, an uneasy truce settled along the battle-line in Korea. The 37-month-and-2 days war had ended. It had cost the United States 142,091 casualties (US DD press release 1088-54) and almost twenty billion dollars. What had been gained by this expenditure of blood, time, and treasure? Had the United Nations and the United States won or lost the Korean War? A single, simple answer to that question is very difficult to reply, for there still are two diametrically opposed views, which cause continued and bitter argument. One view, although not wholly accepted in political and diplomatic circles, is that the Korean War represented a victory for the West since the Free World was able to demonstrate the real value of collective security; and furthermore, it was able to accomplish what it set out to do: to localize and punish aggression, to drive the Communist invader back to his lair, and to notify him that future forays would be met with ever greater force. The other view, generally prominent in military circles, is that the Korean War was a loss, militarily as well as psychologically. Even though the means for defeating the enemy were available, they were not used; and UNC’s failure to defeat the aggressor was an invitation to future aggression and truculence.

Leaving the difficult question to future historians to answer, one thing nevertheless remains plain. Without command of the seas between the Free World and Korea, and in the waters adjacent to that beleaguered peninsula, the Korean War, as fought, most certainly would have been lost both militarily and politically. Operations by ground and air forces were completely dependent on a flow of personnel and supplies, the bulk of which came across the vast Pacific Ocean.

This conclusion is substantiated by the following factors:

a. Six of every seven people who went to Korea went by sea.

b. Fifty-four million tons of dry cargo, 22 million tons of petroleum products went to Korea by ship.

c. Every soldier landed in Korea was accompanied by five tons of equipment, and it took 64 pounds every day to keep him there.

d. For every ton of trans-Pacific air freight, there were 270 tons of trans-Pacific sea freight. For every ton of air freight, four tons of gasoline for the airplanes had to be delivered across the Pacific by ship.

Nor war involving the United States exemplified the value of sea power better than the Korean War. The need of a strong, balanced, and adequately US Navy for controlling the oceans and for denying them to an enemy was made elementarily clear.

Without the United States Navy, certainly, the UN Command could never have
gotten its troops and their equipment, its airmen and their aircraft, to the scene of fighting, nor supplied them once there. Nor could the weight of the United States strength have been applied upon the Communists without its Navy.

Despite the fact that but for the United States Navy's contribution the war in Korea would come to a sudden halt in the early stage of the war, the Navy's operations in the war, unlike the ground fighting, have gone unpublicized for the most part. It should be emphasized, especially in the Korean War, that the US Navy's achievements were indeed remarkable. Apart from personnel casualties the Navy had suffered during the war, the following statistics on the US naval operations give some indication of its great contribution to the war effort:

1. Naval Air Combat Operations

(1) Combat sorties flown by Navy/Marine Aircraft: 275,912. (25 June 1950—27 July 1953) (Of this total, 204,995 were offensive sorties; 44,160 defensive and 26,757 reconnaissance. The total figure does not include non-combat flights.)

(2) Ordnance Expenditures by Navy/Marine aircraft:
- Bombs (tons) 178,399
- Rockets (number) 274,189
- Ammunition (thousands of rounds) 71,804

(3) Damage inflicted on enemy (25 June 50–8 June 53)
- Troops killed 86,265
- Buildings destroyed 44,828
- Locomotives destroyed 391
- Railroad cars destroyed 5,896
- Vehicles destroyed 7,437
- Bridges (rail and road destroyed) 2,005
- Tanks destroyed 249
- Bunkers destroyed 20,854
- Power plants destroyed 33
- Supply dumps, shelters, stacks destroyed 1,900
- Enemy vessels destroyed 2,464

(4) Enemy aircraft destroyed by Navy/Marine Corps (25 June—31 May 53)
- Aerial combat 23
- Destroyed on ground 74

(5) Navy/Marine aircraft lost to enemy action (25 June 50—27 July 53)
- Aerial combat 5
- Anti-aircraft fire 559
The Final Phase of Stalemate


(1) Shipboard ammunition fired
(rounds - 16” to small arms) 4,069,626

(2) Damage inflicted on enemy (June 50—June 52)
   (a) Buildings destroyed 3,334
   (b) Vessels and small craft destroyed 824
   (c) Locomotives destroyed 14
   (d) Trucks destroyed 214
   (e) Tanks destroyed 15
   (f) Bridges destroyed 108
   (g) Supply dumps destroyed 93
   (h) Mines destroyed 1,535
   (i) Troops (Casualties) 28,566

(3) U.S. Navy Ship Casualties
   (a) Ships damaged 73
   (b) Ships sunk (4 minesweepers, 1 tug) 5

3. Military Sea Transportation Service (June 50 to June 53)

(1) Cargo (Measurement tons) 52,111,299
(2) Passengers 4,918,919
(3) Petroleum (Long tons) 21,828,879

A Study of the US Navy’s Interdiction and Blockading Efforts

Interdiction Efforts: On 6 April 1955, almost two years after the truce in Korea, the Communist Chinese in a broadcast over the Peking radio, stated that the UN forces “mobilized more than 2,000 military aircraft and still failed to cut off the supply line to tiny North Korea.” Regrettfully, though their arithmetic was wrong, their conclusion was right.

For many months from early 1951 through 1952, almost 100 per cent of the offensive effort of the carriers, 60 per cent of the offensive effort of the shore-based Marines’ aircraft, 70 per cent of the offensive effort of the Fifth Air Force, and 70 per cent of the blockading efforts of the ships along the east coast was devoted to interdiction. These percentages fluctuated from month to month, and in the last year of the war, as has been described early, interdiction had less emphasis. Nevertheless, these percentages generally reflect the weight and scale of effort which was made to isolate the Korean battlefield. In the first eighteen
months of the interdiction campaign, Task Force 77 flew 20,567 armed reconnaissance and interdiction flights; the Marines ashore flew 25,266 reconnaissance and interdiction flights; the FEAF (Far East Air Force) flew 126,702 reconnaissance and interdiction flights; and Task Force 95 fired 230,000 rounds of ammunition on interdiction missions.

Despite this effort, the enemy was never kept from supplying his needed requirements. At no time, except locally and temporarily, did the enemy limit his combat effort because of supply considerations. In fact, the Communists were able to steadily increase their flow of supplies to the frontlines. Total over-all rail sightings held steadily throughout the war. Antiaircraft fire increased. Vehicular sightings increased from month to month.

All these facts are made more significant when it is appreciated that the enemy forces at the front were supported by long supply lines which were confined to a closely blockaded peninsula, and which were under constant, largely unopposed, attacks by considerable air strength. At the same time, the UNC supply pipeline was never under attack.

However, because of the limitations imposed which forced airpower to confine interdiction to only a small part of the weakest element of the enemy's logistical system, it does not follow that, having failed in Korea, interdiction must always fail. The full effects of atomic weapons upon an interdiction campaign cannot now be foretold.

In summary, six major reasons are given as to why airpower failed to interdict the Korean battlefield. If these problems are not encountered in a future war, or if they are solved, then isolation of a battlefield may yet be effected.

First, interdiction failed because of the ability of the Communists to absorb widespread and heavy punishment, and, through use of unlimited manpower, to keep their highways and rail lines operating.

Second, interdiction failed in Korea because UN forces could not attack the sources and fountainheads of the supply lines.

Third, interdiction failed in Korea because of UN forces' inability to find and destroy at night, and in inclement weather, the small individual targets of interdiction which the UN forces were able to destroy in daylight.

Fourth, interdiction failed because of the stalemated war. Had the fighting been fluid, the Communists' rate of usage would have increased greatly. Then they would have been forced to use the rails and roads by day.

Fifth, interdiction failed because of the very primitive nature of the enemy's exposed supply network.

Sixth, interdiction failed owing to the UN forces' inability to use the one
weapon - the atomic bomb - which might have severed Communist supply lines in Korea.

Next, in connection with the UNC’s interdiction failure, it is necessary to examine the target systems of the Communist’s logistic networks.

Broadly speaking, there are three main parts to any logistic system: (1) the sources of raw materials; (2) the points of manufacture; and (3) the distribution system.

During the Korean War, two of these three, and part of the third, could not be attacked and destroyed because of the UNC’s own decision. Thus, one of the chief reasons for the failure of the interdiction campaign in Korea was the fact that the UNC could not attack the most vulnerable parts of a supply system - the sources and the points of manufacture. Only the exposed portions of the supply system in Korea could be attacked.

Having been limited to the supply system in Korea, the UN forces had their choice of four types of interdiction targets. First, there were the supply routes themselves: the bridges, tunnels, tracks, roadbeds. Second, there was the rolling stock: locomotives and boxcars, trucks, wagons and carts. Third, there were the personnel who repaired and operated the supply netowrks. Fourth, the stockpiles of materials and supplies in transit or in dumps. Two of these four target systems were unprofitable for systematic air attack. Obviously, with unlimited manpower available to the Communists, attacking the personnel operating or repairing the supply routes was infeasible. As for attacking the supplies themselves, either in transit or in dumps, this would scarcely have decisive effect for two reasons. First, the origins of the supplies were untouchable. Second, the Communist’s ability to hide, camouflage, and disperse supplies in the hundreds of caves, tunnels, and huts was acknowledged.

Thus, only two target systems in Korea were left for attack: the rolling stock and the routes themselves. Attack upon the rolling stock had the disadvantage, once again, of not being able to touch the sources. There was an almost limitless source of trucks and trains in Manchuria; those vehicles and rolling stock destroyed or damaged in Korea need only be replaced. For an interdiction effort to be effective on this target system, the attacks on rolling stock had to inflict damage at a rate exceeding the enemy’s capacity for replacement, a highly unlikely performance.

The remaining target system was the route itself. Here again, however, with the limited number of airplanes available, not every one of the numerous bridges, tunnels, and tracks, and roadbeds could be destroyed or damaged.

Three patterns of attack could be followed: (1) key bridges could be cut, and
kept cut; (2) a belt across Korea could be selected and every supply route and
target within it destroyed; and (3) widespread damage could be inflicted upon the
roads and rail lines themselves.

This analysis indicates that true isolation of the battlefield, under the UNC's
self-imposed restrictions, was never achievable in Korea. Of this effort, General
Mark Clark wrote: "The Air Force and the Navy carriers may have kept us from
losing the war, but they were denied the opportunity of influencing the outcome
decisively in our favor. They gained complete mastery of the skies, gave magnifi-
cent support to the infantry, destroyed every worthwhile target in North Korea,
and took a costly toll of enemy personnel and supplies. But as in Italy, where we
learned the same bitter lesson in the same kind of rugged country, our airpower
could not keep a steady system of enemy supplies and reinforcements from
reaching the battleline. Air could not isolate the front."

**Blockading Efforts:** Any study of the blockading efforts of the United States
Navy in Korea must conclude that the naval blockade imposed during the Korean
War was both effective and successful. Three of the enemy's five main supply
lines were blocked: (1) his deep-water shipping along the east coast; (2) his
shallow-water coastal shipping on the west coast; (3) his deep-water shipping
routes to the Asiatic seaport cities in Red China, Manchuria, and Communist
North Korea. The enemy was denied the use of the sea for military movements,
for the transportation of supplies, and for fishing. In normal times, thousands of
junks and numerous steamers moved hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies by
sea. The imposed naval blockade of the UNC was almost 100 per cent effective.
Only an exceedingly small trickle of sea traffic succeeded in escaping the tight
barricade thrown around the peninsula.

This blockade was imposed, however, under very special circumstances, and
any conclusions based on the blockading operations in Korea must take into
account the almost total absence of enemy air opposition and active enemy naval
opposition. Had either or both of these elements been introduced, a totally differ-
ent blockading operation would have resulted. The siege of the ports of Wonsan,
Songjin, and Hungnam might not have been continuous. To have imposed a
blockade against vigorous enemy air and submarine opposition would have required
many times the numbers of vessels that Task Force 95 was operating.

However, even against enemy air and naval opposition, a naval blockade
could have been established and made effective, although it doubtlessly would
not have been as air-tight as was the case, and it would have been infinitely more
costly to both Communist and American forces. Certainly the pattern and tempo
of operations, the weapons used, and the area of operation would have been much
different. This blockade had further significance because of the fact that it was
the first blockade applied by the US Navy since the American Civil War. The
British had established a blockade in World War II, and the US Navy had assisted.
But this effort was relatively minor and passive. The blockade of the Korean
peninsula, therefore, gave the UN Navy training and experience for the application
of a blockade in other areas.

The effectiveness of the naval blockade, and the enemy’s failure to oppose it
actively, opened both the Korean coasts for the application of a bombardment
and interdiction effort which had known no similar parallel in American naval
history. Naval gunfire, designed primarily to attack targets at sea and to support
amphibious landings, was given three novel roles: (1) the support of fixed
positions at the battlefront (as contrasted with the fluid targets of an amphibious
assault); (2) the task of securing both flanks of the UN battleline; (3) the interdiction
of rail and road lines along the northeast coast.

The first of these tasks was performed in a highly creditable manner. At every
stage of the war, the accuracy and volume of naval gunfire (even at maximum
ranges) given to support friendly frontline positions elicited the highest praise from
both US Army and the US Marines, and, for the most part, compared most favorably
with artillery fire. The devastating effect of the naval seaborne artillery was
indicated by the fact that near the coast, the UN frontlines were invariably ahead
of the main line of advance.

Generally speaking, the greater the caliber of the naval gun, the greater its
effectiveness upon enemy targets at the frontline. If further proof was needed,
the 16-inch guns of Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, and New Jersey demonstrated that
 pound for pound they were the most efficient rifles in the Korean War. While no
effective liaison or standard doctrine existed between the Army and the Navy for
the use or control of naval gunfire in the first part of the war, these were quickly
established, and proved to be effective for the duration. In the words of Rear
Admiral Allan E. Smith, the first commander of the “United Nations Blockading
and Escort Force,” “There were no ready communications between ships and
troops in the initial phases because of the prewar attitude that amphibious landings
were antiquated and naval gunfire obsolete.”

Had the UN forces on the ground been engaged in an offensive war of movement
rather than a sit-down war of stalemate, the pattern of naval blockade effort might
have been different and the contributions of the blockade forces greater.

Whether or not naval gunfire could have been as effective or as much used in
the face of enemy air and surface opposition must remain a moot question. More
active enemy opposition would undoubtedly have expedited the development
and use of sea-to-shore missiles fired from distant ranges. The excellent gunfire support supplied by the battleships under the existing artificial conditions in Korea was not sufficient to warrant retention of large rifled guns in the UN Navy.

The second task given naval gunfire -- security of the flanks -- was one of the most important contributions made by the naval blockade forces. "Never in history," said Rear Admiral Allan Smith, "has an Army had its flanks so firmly secured as in the Korean War by our Navy. In March 1951, Admiral Struble and I visited General Ridgway in Taegu. His subordinate generals had kept telling him that the enemy could outflank our western front troop line because of the shallow waters and sometimes dry land. He was assured that our Navy would not let this happen; and General Ridgway replied that he would give the matter no more concern."

"This mobile artillery and naval air power on both flanks enabled our Army commander to concentrate his strength where such would put the greatest pressure on the enemy. Imagine an Army commander being relieved of concern about his flanks!"

Regarding the third novel task, the collateral one of interdiction, the Navy did not succeed in denying either the east coast rail or road systems to the enemy despite the most intense, prolonged, and ingenious efforts to do so. As stated earlier in the discussion of interdiction efforts, at no time during the course of the war did either the UNC's surface or air interdiction efforts succeed in stopping the flow of enemy supplies from Manchuria to the front to a decisive degree. The gun strikes of the ships of Task Forces 77 and 95 hampered, hurt, and harassed, it is true; but they had neither direct nor decisive effect upon the course of the ground fighting in Korea.

The significance of this failure is to point up the need for the balanced forces in the UN military establishment. Assuming that the war had to be confined to the peninsula, there was only one way to have stopped the steady and constant movement of enemy trains and trucks within North Korea: The physical occupation of the ground, and physical force applied by armed men attacking and holding the routes themselves. Because of the terrain, paucity of suitable targets, and character of the enemy, it is doubted that even the local use of atomic weapons could have isolated the battlefront of Korea.
PART THREE

THE AIR OPERATIONS

JULY 1951 to JULY 1953
# CONTENTS

## CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION
- Section 1. Confronting New Air Strategy ........................................ 614
- Section 2. The UNC Air Potential .................................................. 620
- Section 3. Growth of Communist Air Capability ................................. 626

## CHAPTER II  AIR-TO-AIR BATTLE
- Section 1. Limitation on the UNC Air Action ................................... 631
- Section 2. The Communist MIG Tactics .......................................... 639
- Section 3. Air Superiority Battles .................................................. 645

## CHAPTER III  AIR INTERDICICTION CAMPAIGN
- Section 1. Seeking New Targets ..................................................... 655
- Section 2. Operation Strangle ....................................................... 660
- Section 3. Operation Saturate ....................................................... 667
- Section 4. Employment of Night Intruder ...................................... 671
- Section 5. Red Countermeasures to Rail Interdiction .......................... 678
- Section 6. Air Interdiction Campaign in Retrospect ........................... 682

## CHAPTER IV  THE SHIFT IN UNC AIR STRATEGY
- Section 1. Toward an Air-Pressure Strategy ................................... 686
- Section 2. Attacks on Red Hydroelectric Complexes ............................ 691
- Section 3. Statement of the US FEAF Operation Policy ........................ 697

## CHAPTER V  AIR PRESSURE CAMPAIGN
- Section 1. UN Command Maintains Air Superiority ............................ 700
- Section 2. Development of the Air-Pressure Stratedy .......................... 708
- Section 3. Selecting Targets for Air-Pressure ................................. 712
Section 4. Massive Air-Pressure for Psychological Purpose ............ 716
Section 5. Intensification of Air-Pressure Operations .................. 722
Section 6. Spring Thaw Interdiction ............................................. 727

CHAPTER VI ENDING STAGE OF AIR CAMPAIGN

Section 1. Destruction of Red Irrigation Dams .......................... 729
Section 2. Defeating Communist Last Ground Offensive ............... 733
Section 3. The Day the Armistice was Signed ............................ 738
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Section 1. Confronting New Air Strategy

Development of New Air Strategy

The first year of the Korean War had been fought according to the established air doctrines. A strategic air assault had largely destroyed the enemy industrial capability to support a war. Tactical air operations had maintained control of the air, had interdicted enemy lines of supply, and had given close support to UNC ground troops. In the circumstances presented, these established doctrines had been sufficient to defeat the Communist ground forces. However, with the beginning of the truce negotiations on 10 July 1951 and the UN Command had abandoned its political and military objective of winning the war, these existing air doctrines lacked applicability. The UNC air forces were given the mission of denying the enemy the capacity to maintain and sustain further decisive ground attack, to maintain and sustain maximum pressure on the enemy in Communist-controlled North Korea, and thus to create a situation conducive to a favorable armistice.

Thus from July 1951 onward the question confronting was the determination of strategy for an air campaign against the Communist regime in Red North Korea. A properly conceived strategic air campaign would have destroyed the Communist industrial potential and will to wage war. But in Korea the Communist armies drew their sustenance from areas beyond the Manchurian and Siberian borders, the areas which because of political reasons could not be attacked by the UN aircraft. Major targets remained in Communist North Korea, but most of these major targets -- such as the Yalu River hydroelectric plants -- were politically sensitive. Existing doctrines for the tactical air employment of air power now held no precise message for the UNC air planners.

Meanwhile, with the beginning of the armistice negotiation, the Communists gained a logistical advantage and were stockpiling daily 800 tons of supplies behind their front lines. According to the Eighth US Army calculations the Communists would reach a degree of preparedness previously unparalleled in the Korean War.
Introduction

On 7 August 1951 General Matthew B. Ridway, the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command, informed the U.S. JCS that the Communists were capable of launching limited attacks to gain local advantages and of expanding such piece-meal efforts rapidly into a general offensive at a time suitting purpose. These estimates by the UN Command that the Communists were not in fact defeated but were instead utilizing the truce negotiations to prepare for a major ground offensive deeply concerned the U.S. JCS, and were more than a little convincing to many US Far East Air Forces officers.

Thus, beginning on 18 August 1951 Lieutenant General Otto B. Weyland, Commander of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), implemented a comprehensive air interdiction campaign, well known as Operation Strangle, against enemy's railways in Communist North Korea designed to interfere with and disrupt the enemy's line of communications to such an extent that the Reds would be unable to mount a sustained major offensive or be unable to contain a friendly offensive. The basic concept of Operation Strangle involved a close appreciation of the enemy supply status and an adaptation of what US FEAF had learned about interdiction in the first year of the Korean War.

Given the desired objective for Operation Strangle, the Fifth US Air Force under Major General Frank E. Everest, carefully investigated the Communist supply system. Except for the output of a few small-arms factories, the enemy had to bring all war material from Manchuria, and for such transport the enemy was completely dependent on its rail and highway system. On the basis of this analysis the Fifth Air Force decided that it would be most profitable for its aircraft to destroy the Communist North Korean rail system. The Fifth US Air Force had to share the program with US Far East Bomber Command and US Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE) because it did not have sufficient strength to complete the rail interdiction plan in a reasonable time. Thus the rail interdiction campaign, in one form or another, would occupy the UNC air forces for some ten months until the end of June 1952.

As Operation Strangle progressed, however, the enemy concentrated flak along his rail lines, moving them to meet the UNC fighter-bomber groups on their route to target area. In October of 1951 the Joint Operation Center (JOC) had to allow the fighter-bomber groups to use up to 20 per cent of their effort against the enemy flak. Under such effective enemy countermeasures, the Fifth US Air Force efficiency declined. From the outset of Operation Strangle, meanwhile, the enemy demonstrated great ability to repair rail cuts and by mid-November 1951 photographic reconnaissance flown 24 hours after an attack would very seldom find a rail cut unrepaired. In December 1951 intelligence sources indicated that
the enemy, beginning work at dusk, could repair a rail cut within eight hours, thus opening the track for traffic from midnight to sunrise.

The Communists also displayed proficiency in bridge repair and in handling badly deteriorated stretches of track. Under the circumstances, during the early month of 1952 the Fifth US Air Force considered means by which its rail interdiction effort might be improved. Although the rail lines were being cut daily at many points, the obstructions were not being maintained at night, in bad weather, or in frequent cases even while UNC airplanes were not in the area during the day. So viewing these deficiencies of Operation Strangle, a Fifth US Air Force targets division study, issued on 25 February 1952, placed a strong emphasis on the requirement for 24-hour interdiction with a sufficient concentration of effort to destroy selected stretches of the road beds of the key rail lines. The fighter-bombers would concentrate their attacks against particular segment of track, hitting the same segment during most of the daylight hours with no more than eight hours' lapse between strikes. At night a roving B-26 flare ship would work with individual B-26's which would periodically expend a bomb load of 10 x 500 pound bombs at the rail cuts and then get about their work of reconnoitering MSR's using their guns and externally hung 100 pounds bombs against road traffic.

Thus, the new air tactics called Operation Saturate had begun on 25 March 1952.

Having been shown to be practical, the concept of Operation Saturate was continued and bridge at Pyongyang, Sinanju, and Sinhung-dong were knocked out by the end of March 1952. During the April the effort successfully kept the rail line from Sinanju to Sinuiju out of operation continuously by means of an attack and a re-attack just as the enemy was completing his repairs. Cuts on other major and vital lines in Red North Korea, however, were repaired rapidly and the lines did not remain unserviceable for any length of time. Furthermore, by the end of April it was no longer possible for the Fifth US Air Force to outguess the enemy and to attack flak-free targets. During the first half of May the Operation Saturate continued and provided a partial rail blockade to through rail traffic. (The Sinuiju—Sinanju line for 10 days, the Kunu-ri to Huichon line for seven days, the Sunchon—Samdong-ni line for nine days, and the Sinanju to Pyongyang line)

By mid-April 1952, however, after eight months of sustained air effort against the Communist North Korean railway system, it was evident that the Fifth Air Force lacked sufficient aircraft strength to maintain over a 24-hour period the intensive rail cuts which would interdict the Communist North Korean rail system. Evaluation of the new tactics indicated that available UNC air effort was sufficient
only to maintain at best an average of six continuous intensive cuts on the enemy’s rail lines which were approximately 600 miles of rail line in the US FEAF sector north and east of Pyongyang. Meanwhile, although the operation was initially attractive because of its virtually flak-free targets, no thought was apparently taken that the enemy might be able to reinforce his antiaircraft fire. The Communist flak arsenal ultimately included Soviet-made 12.7-mm. machine guns, 20-mm., 27-mm., 40-mm., and 45-mm. light automatic weapons; 76.2-mm. medium guns; and 85-mm. heavy guns. The Reds increased their antiaircraft artillery in Korea steadily, reaching to estimated 275 heavy and 600 automatic weapons on 1 July 1951 and 409 heavy and 1,318 automatic weapons on 30 June 1952. The planners could have benefited from an estimate of the enemy’s capability to repair bridges by improvisation or use of prefabricated spans, to establish networks of bypass bridges, to build new bypass railway lines, to amass labors to maintain his logistical position.

Thus, the sustained UNC air attack against the enemy railway system had not succeeded in placing upon the Communists the intolerable pressure which had been hoped for by the aerial interdiction campaign. Many miles of rail track had been literally destroyed and the enemy had been forced to pull up tracks elsewhere to replace it; yet, while important to the enemy, rail track was not particularly expensive or critical. Rail-beds had also been severely damaged by friendly air attack but the complete destruction of these beds was beyond the capability of UNC air forces. Given the fact that the enemy had maintained their current logistical expenditures, and by the accumulation of as much as 500 tons a day more than they expended they had built up their front line stockpiles. They could sustain another major offensive for as long as two weeks or an all-out defensive of three weeks’ duration. That the Communists were not being subjected to intolerable pressure by the rail attacks was best indicated by their willingness to continue obstructionist maneuvers at the armistice negotiations when the UNC delegation presented a package-proposal to the Communists, on 28 April 1952, which represented the ultimate in the UN concessions. When the Communists refused to accept it there was no choice but to intensify air operations against the enemy targets in the Communist North Korea in the manner best calculated to bring them to terms.

Then, after eight months of sustained air effort against the enemy railway system, it was evident that some new application of the US FEAF effort would be more productive and late in April 1952 US FEAF began a shift in air attack policy toward the direction recommended in a paper submitted to Brigadier General Jacob E. Smart, the FEAF Deputy for Operations, on 12 April 1952 by
Colonel R. L. Randolph, Director of the FEAF Combat Operations Division, and Lieutenant Colonel B. I. Mayo. They offered a penetrating summary of the indecisiveness of the rail interdiction program and offered answers to the question. Their concept was that the US FEAF could best contribute to a termination of the Korean stalemate by inflicting maximum pressure on the enemy by causing him permanent loss. Under the destruction concept the US FEAF should seek to destroy such supplies, equipment, facilities, and personnel as would represent a permanent loss and accumulative drain to the enemy's strength. They attached overriding priority to counter-air targets, including aircraft on the ground and in the air and enemy airfields in the Communist North Korea comprised highly lucrative targets which were currently forbidden to air attack by the U.S. JCS and the UN Command directives. Thus by the end of April 1952, the FEAF turned its emphasis from tactical or quasi-tactical operations against the enemy and a significant change in combat operations policy took place in May 1952. Interdiction operations were expanded to include destruction of important targets, target complexes, and target systems.

As for the UNC air attacks against the Communist hydroelectric installations in the Red North Korea, on 6 June, with the sole exception of Supung, General Weyland had secured approval of General Mark W. Clark who succeeded General Ridgway as Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command on 12 May 1952. Getting General Clark's approval, General Weyland immediately ordered his operations staff to prepare plans which were forwarded to General Clark on 11 June 1952. After study of these plans, General Clark on 17 June directed commanders of US FEAF and US NAVFE to attack as soon as possible all major power complexes and separate power installations in Red North Korea, with the exception of Supung. Receiving an information copy of this directive in Washington, the U.S. JCS determined on 19 June 1952 that the facilities at Supung should also be attacked in order effectively to neutralize the entire hydroelectric system. After the U.S. President gave his consent, the U.S. JCS authorized UNC Commander-in-Chief that same day to attack Supung, maintaining reasonable precautions against inadvertent bombing of Manchurian territory. Thus, on 23 June 1952, as Supung was added to the target list, the air assault on Communist installations at Supung had begun.

Having marked the initiation of air pressure operations, General Weyland ordered representatives of the US FEAF intelligence and operations deputies to prepare a new policy directive and, on 10 July 1952, issued the US FEAF Operational Policy Directive to the Fifth US Air Force and US FEAF Bomber Command. The new FEAF operation policy reflected a change from the old emphasis
upon delay and disruption and ordered the selected destruction of enemy supplies, equipment, facilities, and military personnel.

While the US FEAF operational policy directive of 10 July 1952 remained in effect during the remainder of Korean War, it actually provided no more than the bare bones of the air pressure strategy. In some measure the directive was even unrealistic. In the state of hostilities prevailing in Korea, UN Command would get desirable results from an intensification of its air effort against targets which were actually of little importance. Attacks against sensitive targets in the vicinity of the Yalu were found to have a degree of profit which was quite apart from the value of the target. The US FEAF Formal Target Committee therefore ignored the target listing when necessary and built an air strategy upon the philosophy of the policy directive, which required the US FEAF to accomplish the maximum selected destruction in order that the Korean War was made as costly as possible to the enemy. The Air strategy which was to develop would display a sound recognition of the Communist political situation.

Communist North Korea was in utter political subordination to, and militarily dependent upon, Red China and Soviet Russia. Any final decision regarding armistice terms would be made by Red China and Russia, and the effects of the air pressure attacks within Red North Korea had to be made to be felt by the senior partner in the Soviet conspiracy. The Communist North Korean armies constituted a huge outlay of Red capital. Therefore, the US FEAF intended that the direct effect of its air pressure in Red North Korea would be felt as far as Moscow, and the US FEAF air pressure, moreover, could cause the Red Chinese to make demands upon the Russians for additional military equipment, which the Russians might not be able to supply, promising to strain Red China-Soviet unity. Furthermore, from their outset, the air pressure operation had one serious limitation; only targets directly related to the enemy military structure and its immediate support could be attacked. The JCS emphasized on 8 August 1952 that air pressure attacks should be directed against military targets and that all justifications of air actions would have to be based solely on military grounds.

General Clark subsequently issued a general rule that every air effort would be made to attack military targets only, and to avoid needless civilian casualties. The determination of what was a military target and what comprised needless civilian casualties would give the US FEAF much trouble in the spring of 1953 when a target study identified Red North Korean irrigation dams as an exceptionally profitable air pressure target system. At this time General Weyland felt himself morally compelled to rule that these dams could not be attacked for the purpose of destroying the Communist North Korean rice crops, and he permitted air strikes against only those dams whose released flood waters would wash away
rails and military supplies.

After the month of October 1952, however, when it was evident that the Communist would not accept the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, the U.S. JCS had directed the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command to apply and maintain against the Communist the maximum military pressure within the capability of its means and which could be justified by results. During the months of December 1952 through April 1953 the FEAF emphasis was on interdiction, but this interdiction was of a far different type from the comprehensive railway interdiction campaigns which had been conducted between August 1951 and May 1952 (Operation Strangle).

The 1952–1953 interdiction effort was primarily aimed at the development of targets for air destruction. Rail and road bridges were attacked for the purpose of creating profitable concentrations of vehicles, supplies, and material for subsequent attacks. Interdiction therefore became a secondary mission incidental to the general program of destruction. Thus, after less than a year of such pressure, the Communists who had arrogantly boasted that they would fight to the very end rather than to accept voluntary repatriation signed the terms of reference on 8 June 1953. This complete capitulation on the part of the Communists resolved the last and bitterest issue of the truce negotiations, and on 27 July 1953 the Korean War was signed off as it had begun three years before with the focus on the frustrations of a divided Korea. However, much the Republic of Korea had been devastated by the war and most Koreans still passionately demanded the unification promised at Cairo ten years before.

Section 2. The UNC Air Potential

Disposition of UNC Air Forces

Following the disastrous defeat of the Communist major ground offensives by UNC air-ground action in the spring of 1951, the Fifth US Air Force under the Major General Frank F. Everest, who took over the command from Major General Edward J. Timberlake on 1 June 1951, moved its units into the Korean fields as fast as minimum facilities permitted advance echelon operations.

Avoiding to lay a burden to forward facilities and to hazard its entire command function, the Fifth US Air Force effected an advance and rear echelon functional
division in its own headquarters, beginning on 14 June 1951 when the command post closed at Taegu and opened again in Seoul.

Even before the end of the Communist spring offensive of 1951, two Sabre squadrons of the 4th US Air Wing already were basing at Suwon (K-13), and in May 1951 the 51st US Air Wing began moving to the same airdrome. Late in June 1951 the 8th US Wing moved to Kimpo (K-14), where in July it had attached to it the Royal Australian AF Squadron 77 which had just been reequipped with Meteor-8's. Two months of operations from the Kimpo runways, however, demonstrated the impracticability of employing aged and heavily loaded F-80 C's from that base. Consequently, between 20 and 25 August 1951 the 8th and 4th Wings traded bases, and the Royal Australian Squadron 77 now being attached to the 4th US Wing. As armistice negotiations got under way on 10 July 1951 and the role of the air power grew heavier, beginning on 16 August and throughout the month, elements of the 67th US Tactical Reconnaissance Wing assembled at Kimpo, and the tactical squadrons came up from Taegu (K-2), while the supporting elements moved in from Japan to bring the wing together for the first time in its existence. The 36th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, having replaced the 27th US Wing in August 1951, moved its fighter group and essential support elements from Japan to join the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Wing at Taegu (K-2) in September.

The completion of minimum facilities at Kusan (K-8) permitted the 3rd US Bombardment Wing to establish itself there on 22 August 1951, and the 452nd US Bombardment Wing had already moved to Pusan (K-9) effective 23 May 1951. The 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing, with its two F-51 squadrons and the Squadron No. 2, continued to base at Chinhae (K-10), but during the last days of September it moved its staging detachment from the Seoul airstrip (K-16) to the forward airfield at Hoengsong (K-16).

During 1951 the 1st US Marine Air Wing was based at Pohang (K-3) and at Kangnung (K-18), but the receipt of new F3D jet fighter interceptors by Marine Squadron VMF (N) - 513 demanded that this squadron be given longer runways. In April 1952, VMF (N) - 513 was accordingly moved to Kusan (K-8), where it found better operating facilities and at the same time provided protection for this light bomber base, which was somewhat vulnerable to possible Communist air attacks from across the Western Sea. On that same month, the 6147th US Tactical Control Group moved to Chunchon (K-47) from its station at Pyongtack (K-6), while US Marine Air Group 12 and its subordinate units moved from Kangnung (K-18) to Pyongtack (K-6) officially effective 15 April 1952.

These movements located Fifth US Air Force tactical units in Korea at the bases which they would occupy during the remainder of the Korean War.
Besides, the US Far East Air Forces Bomber Command (Provisional) under Brigadier General Robert H. Terill continued to remain at Yokoda Air Base near Tokyo, and the 315th US Air Division (Combat Cargo) under Brigadier General John P. Henebry at Higashi Fuchu, near Tokyo, while the US Far East Air Material Command commanded by Brigadier General John P. Doyle at Tachikawa Air Base, and the 314th US Air Division, to conduct the air defense of the Japanese Island, commanded by Major General Delmar T. Spivey was kept remaining at Nagoya until it was replaced by the Japan Air Defense Force on 11 March 1952 and deployed its assigned or attached units at seven different air bases in Japan.

The UN Command’s Relative Air Strength

Continuation of the Korean War beyond expectations, the ominous build-up of Communist jet-equipped air forces in Manchuria, and increased Red antiaircraft and interception firepower compelled a reexamination of the US Far East Air Force fighter complement in the spring of 1951. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) had provided F-51’s at the outset of the Korean War in the expectation that they would be capable of meeting enemy opposition, could best operate from rough Korean airfields. However, the Communist spring offensive of 1951, Red small-arms fire and light and heavy flak increased tremendously along the main enemy supply routes, at key bridges, and around enemy supply areas and air dromes. During the month of April through to 4 May 1951, for example, the Fifth US Air Force lost to enemy ground fire 25 F-51’s, 13 F-80’s, and 2 F-84’s. With its vulnerable engine and coolant system, the F-51 loss rate per sortie to enemy ground fire was just under 100 per cent greater than the F-80 loss rate and almost 6 times greater than the F-84 loss rate. General Stratemeyer, the US FEAF Commander, was so bothered by his F-51 losses that he asked the USAF as to practicability of getting more rugged World War II F-47 type fighters as replacements for the Mustangs. USAF was unwilling to complicate logistics by the introduction of a second obsolescent conventional aircraft into Korea, and General Vandenberg suggested that the only possible solution lay in replacing the F-51’s with jet types, a solution which was going to be forced by declining USAF stocks of Mustangs. An immediate fix might be to move the F-51’s back to the defense of Japan where their attrition areas would be more acceptable.

Effective in July 1951 the Royal Australian Squadron 77 was converted from Mustang’s to Meteor-8 jets. Declining stocks of F-51’s forced the USAF to lower theater reserves of this type aircraft of ten per cent, but General Weyland, for the time being, was unwilling to take his remaining Mustang out of action, explaining
that Korean airfield construction was lagging and that he could not permit the removal of such a substantial proportion of his combat potential as was represented by the Mustangs.

Replacement support for US FEAF F-80 groups encountered some of the same difficulties as were met by the Mustang units, for this earliest of USAF jet fighters was no longer being produced. In April 1951 the Fifth US Air Force figured its F-80 attrition rate at 18.3 planes each month and reckoned that its F-80 groups would be reduced to unit equipment strength by 1 July 1951. If F-80 operations were going to continue on the usual scale, one group of these planes would soon have to be converted to F-84's, the plane which USAF had designated as the F-80 replacement. At just this time the Fifth US Air Force was about to lose the 27th US Fighter-Escort Wing, which had demonstrated that its F-84's were an excellent fighter-bomber replacement. However, USAF decided that the 27th US Fighter-Escort Wing would leave its planes and equipment in the theater, and would be replaced by the 136th US Fighter-Bomber Wing. Late in May, 1951 the Fifth US Air Force also charged the 27th-Wing, with giving transition training to personnel of the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, which began shortly afterward to trade its F-80C aircraft for F-84E's. At the end of August 1951 all three squadrons of the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group had completed conversion to the Thunderjet fighters.

As the truce talks dragged on and the Red air forces waxed in strength, General Weyland, the US FEAF commander became increasingly apprehensive about air superiority in Korea. If the war continued, he reasoned on 12 July 1951, the success of the war would be determined by a struggle between the Red Chinese air forces and the UNC air forces. So far the Korean War had demonstrated that air superiority was the key to military victory regardless of the numerical strength of opposing ground forces, and the UNC air forces had to retain a capability to absorb initial Communist air attacks and to launch immediately effective counterattacks. "Unless our relative air strength is maintained equal or better than the Communist air forces," General Weyland informed USAF, "I feel that our expenditures of men and money in the Korean War may well have been in vain." To retain air superiority, the US FEAF requested additional fighters, of which the F-86 was the best existing type for the purpose. However, General Vandenberg's initial reaction was that additional F-86 wing could not be sent to FEAF.

In mid-September 1951, although General Weyland again urgently requested F-86's, USAF continued to assert that its "capability of supporting one F-86 unit in FEAF is questionable and the ability to support two does not exist."
While USAF was finding itself unable to provide US FEAF with Sabre reinforcements, the Red Chinese air forces were faring better from its Soviet source of supplies. The US FEAF estimates of Chinese Communists air strength rose from 1,050 planes on 10 June 1951 to 1,255 on 1 September 1951, the additional aircraft being MIG-15’s and bringing the total of these jets up to 525. On 26 September, General Weyland cabled USAF: “I consider the present F-86 force inadequate for the future and recommend serious consideration be given to the immediate dispatch of another F-86 Wing to this theater.” Medium bomber attacks into northwest Korea had become impracticable, fighter-bombers were having to jettison their bombs to fight off MIG interceptors, and, unless checked, there was very real danger that the enemy would establish air bases in the Red North Korea and threaten UNC air superiority over the battle lines. If USAF could not furnish another Sabre wing, General Weyland suggested that one of the US FEAF’s F-80 wings could be converted to F-86’s.

The threat was now so grave that USAF could no longer countenance it. At the moment the US Air Defense Command had only F-86’s, but on 22 October 1951 General Vandenberg ordered 75 of them, together with 75 pilots and 75 crew chiefs, flown to Alameda for expedited movement to Yokosuka, Japan. For its part, the US FEAF agreed to return an equivalent number of F-80 pilots and crew chiefs, but it was permitted to retain the released F-80C’s as theater reserve and as attrition replacement for its remaining F-80C group.

Informed that the Sabres were en route to Japan, the US FEAF made plans to convert three of its F-80 squadrons, Lieutenant General Everest, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, however, wanted to equip the two-squadron 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing with the Sabres, reason that the wing was already scheduled to convert to F-86D’s in 1953, whereas the three-squadron 8th Wing was slated to receive F-84’s. Late in October 1951, General Vandenberg approved the conversion of the two squadrons of the 51st Wing. The 75 Sabres left Alameda aboard two escort carriers early in November 1951, greater precautions having been taken to weather-proof them for the pacific crossing than in earlier shipments. In November 1951 the 51st Wing began conversion and flew its first F-86 combat mission on 1 December 1951. To compensate for the reduction in the fighter-bomber capability, the US FEAF committed the 116th Fighter-Bomber Group to combat, but because Korean airfields were congested, only one squadron at a time was rotated to Taegu (K-2), the first of them arriving at the Korean airfield on 30 November 1951.

Arrival of these Sabre reinforcements did not allay the UNC apprehension regarding the growing Communist air forces. In December 1951, General Ridgway
urged the U.S. JCS to consider enemy's serious challenge to UNC air superiority, and to achieve bare numerical parity with the enemy MiG forces, General Weyland requested eight F-86 groups. In February 1952, the U.S. JCS advised that the USAF had purchased 60 F-86's from Canada, which with other Sabres to become available from U.S. production should enable the US FEA to achieve two war-strength F-86 wings, together with 50 per cent theater reserve, by June 1952. To provide the 51st Wing with a third squadron, the US FEA therefore effected the transfer of the 39th US Fighter-Interceptor Squadron from attachment to the 18th Wing on 1 June 1952, and during that month the squadron began to receive new F-86F aircraft, the first of this model Sabre to reach the Far East.

In mid-1952, the number of combat aircraft available to the US FEA, measured in terms of the Communist air order of battle in the Far East, was quite limited. Counting every airplane, including those in storage and in salvage and of all types, the US FEA had in May 1952 a grand total of 1,954 aircraft. Only aircraft in units, however, possessed immediate operational significance. Of such planes, the Fifth US Air Force possessed 111 B-26’s, 45 F-51’s, 83 F-80’s, 97 F-84’s, 138 F-86’s, and 24 F-94’s, for a total of 111 light bombers and 387 fighters. Supplementing the Fifth US Air Force strength were approximately 25 Meteor MK-8 aircraft of the 77th Royal Australian Air Force (77th RAAF Squadron), and approximately 135 fighters and fighter-bombers possessed by the 1st US Marine Air Wing.

The US FEA Bomber Command had 99 B-29 medium bombers. The Thirteenth US Air Force had 27 F-80’s. The Twentieth US Air Force had 28 F-80’s and 24 F-94’s. The US Japan Air Defense Force possessed 23 F-51’s, 28 F-80’s, 60 F-84’s, and 49 F-94’s for a total of 159 fighters. The 835 aircraft possessed by the US FEA tactical units represented a potential US FEA striking force, but only a part of this force was available for duty in Korea. Active in this combat area were the 498 aircraft of the Fifth US Air Force, the 99 US FEA Bomber Command medium bombers, and approximately 186 planes of the South Africa, Australia, and 1st US Marine Air Wing, or a total of 783 aircraft. Counting all aircraft in committed units, which included reconnaissance, transport, rescue, and liaison aircraft as well as fighters and bombers, the US FEA possessed at the end of May 1952 1,031 planes actively engaged in the Korean War, a total which, when UN allied and US Marine fighters and transports were added, rose to a figure of approximately 1,261 aircraft.

Considering the Communist air order of battle in the Far East the number of US FEA aircraft was dwarfed by the mammoth-sized Soviet Air Forces in the Far East and was nearly equalled by the size of the Chinese Communist Air
Force (CCAF). During the first half of 1952 the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force remained virtually stable at an over-all estimated strength of 5,360 aircraft, but the Russians were believed to have made substantial progress in converting their fighter units from piston to jet aircraft. These Soviet air units were not expected openly to be committed into the Korean War, but from time to time Soviets units appeared for combat at the Yalu. By mid-1952 the Chinese Communist air force had gotten its 22 air divisions nearly to authorized strength, and, out of a total of 1,830 aircraft, the Chinese Communists had concentrated in Manchuria and estimated 1,115 planes, including 640 jet aircraft.

Therefore, during the spring of 1952, the shortage of combat planes had gravely affected the success of the comprehensive railway interdiction programs, and the continued shortage of combat aircraft at mid-1952 was a factor of considerable importance to the air planners who were working out the details of a new air pressure strategy.

Section 3. Growth of Communist Air Capability

The Red Air Force's Order of Battle

By November 1950, when the Red Chinese ground forces invaded the Manchurian border, the Chinese Communists had begun to get substantial deliveries of aircraft and was growing. Because of the UNC politico-military restrictions which confined war to Korea, the Communists were free to rebuild their air order of battle behind the Yalu River and brought it up to a magnitude which threatened the UNC forces in Korea.

By June 1951 the US FEAF estimated there were 1,050 combat aircraft in Red China, including 445 jet fighters. Some 690 of these combat planes were based in the Communist China's northeast military district adjacent to Korea. The US FEAF estimated that the Red Chinese air strength rose to 1,225 planes as of 1 September 1951. By June 1952, Red Chinese had build up 22 air divisions to a strength of 1,830 aircraft, including 1,000 jet fighters. Sixty percent, or 1,115 of the total aircraft, was massed within Manchuria. In the meantime the Russians had also been strengthening their own air units in the Far East, and during the first half of 1952 the Soviet air units had reached and stabilized at a strength of approximately 5,360 aircraft.
Introduction

After June 1952 the combined Communist air order of battle in the Far East remained approximately stable at 7,000 aircraft, roughly 5,000 of them belonging to the Soviet Union, a little less than 2,000 of them to the Red Chinese air forces, and some 270 of them to the rehabilitated Communist North Korean air forces. In the last year of Korean War, the Communists continued a vigorous modernization program and replaced conventional aircraft in units with modern jet types. In November 1952, for example, the US FEAF learned that the Chinese Communist air forces had acquired modern IL-28 light jet bombers and had stationed them in Manchuria. Two of these new IL-28's were first sighted along the Yalu on 17 December 1952, and the US FEAF estimated that the Red Chinese air forces possessed 100 of these aircraft by January 1953. Shortly before the end of the Korean War, enemy military aircraft in Manchuria were estimated to total 1,485 planes, including 950 jet fighters, 165 conventional fighters, 100 IL-28 jet bombers, 65 conventional light bombers, 115 ground-attack planes, and 90 transports.

The growing Red air order of battle in Communist China and Manchuria was most alarming and never to be overlooked. Month and month Communist China's air force grew from the 650 combat aircraft it had possessed in December 1950 to the 1,050 combat aircraft it would have on hand, as above-mentioned, in June 1951. Each month Red China took delivery of more MIG-15 fighters, so that she would have 445 of these first-line aircraft by June 1951. A number of other intelligence reports strengthened the conclusion that the Reds were building a powerful air force in Manchuria which they intended to employ against United Nations forces in Korea.

On the other hand, the United States had become fat and complacent and had dropped its guard against the Communist quantity production of swept-wing air-superiority fighters. The contrast in numbers of the fighting air forces in the Far East was little short of shameful. In June 1951 the US FEAF possessed 89 F-86's in theater inventory, including 44 assigned to the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing's two committed squadrons in Korea, while Communist China possessed some 445 modern MIG-15 fighters. Apparently the Reds recognized that they had a numerical superiority in swept-wing fighters, for Communist agents captured as early as April 1951 had shown a predominant interest in air order of battle intelligence.

By June 1951, moreover, the Red pilots were displaying a growing familiarity with the planes they flew. Using wing tanks, the MIG pilots penetrated as far southward as Pyongyang. The Red pilots had also learned that at altitudes above 35,000 feet their MIG's possessed flight-performance advantages over the heavier
Sabres. When flown by experienced pilots, the MIG's were excellent aircraft. Evaluation of the patterns of Communist air activities clearly indicated that the Reds began to implement a new air campaign designed to establish air superiority over MIG Alley in the latter part of July 1951. At first the Reds were evidently testing new tactics. Exploiting their numerical and altitude superiority, the Red airmen evaded Sabre patrols at the Yalu and then continued southward at altitudes above 35,000 feet as far as Pyongyang, where they turned back and let down to attack the fighter-bombers they sighted while en route homeward to Antung. Effective on 1 June, the US FEAR had already placed MIG Alley off limits for all Bomber Command aircraft not accompanied by fighter escort. Now the new Red tactics hazarded unescorted jet-reconnaissance planes and fighter-bombers. On 29 July and 9 August 1951, for example, the MIG's evaded Sabre patrols and attacked lower-performance jets. In both instances the fighter-bombers evaded and escaped damage, but on the latter date four MIG's intercepted and badly damaged an RF-80. In other battles fought on 18, 19 and 24 August 1951, the Sabre patrols held firm and, despite unfavorable odds of two to one, destroyed four MIG's.

As the armistice negotiation had broken down at Kaesong on 23 August 1951,' and the US FEAR had commenced Operation Strangle on 18 August 1951 in which the US FEAR fighter-bombers had been hammering Red North Korea's railway lines of communications, the Communist air forces launched into a bitter and all-out air campaign on 1 September 1951. Employing what they had learned in the past two months and an order of battle which had grown to 525 MIG's as many as 90 MIG's now entered Red North Korea at one time, and with so many aircraft in the skies the Reds employed practically any formation they desired.

The MIG pilots began to show tactics never before seen in Korea. Some MIG's attacked in trail formation, others used the lufbery circle, while in one instance four flights of MIG's flew line abreast head-on passes in which all 16 planes blazed at a single Sabre. Colonel Gabreski, an expert on Luftwaffe tactics, recognized that the Reds were employing a technique which the Germans had used against B-17 formation in World War II. All enemy air formations were tighter and better organized. The MIG's were seriously impeding the progress of the UNC rail interdiction campaign.

**Augmentation of Red Air Facilities**

Besides, the Chinese Communists constructed or expanded their air facilities on the Kwantung peninsula and on the coastal areas of northern part of Red China
which ran along the left flank of the Korean peninsula. Of chief interest to US FEAF was the Antung base complex since it directly supported MIG-15 operations over northwestern Korea. Here, within sight of UNC aircraft patrolling south of the Yalu, Red interceptor forces were initially based on the main airfield at Antung and on bases at Tatungkou and Takushan. Eventually the Reds built other airfields at Kuantien, Fengcheng, Tapao, and Kachiapa. Antung was the logistical center and main base, but MIG's were based at five of these fields, each of which was capable of supporting continued operations of up to 300 fighter aircraft. Six major airbases in the Mukden area defended the significant industrial complex, while providing back-up and dispersal facilities for the Antung complex. In addition to these facilities which were forbidden to UNC air attack, everywhere in Red North Korea the Communists rejuvenated airfield repairs which had quailed under United Nations air attacks a few months before.
In the course of a routine surveillance of enemy air facilities on 25 September 1951, a 67th Wing reconnaissance pilot noted that the Reds were building an entirely new major airfield just north of the Chongchon River, near the town of Saamcham. Apparently the Reds had been working here unnoticed for nearly a month, and they were already preparing the 7,000-foot strip for hard surfacing. Intensive air searches flown in the area on 14 October showed that the Reds were building not one but three jet fighter fields all within the radius of a 20-miles circle. The other two fields were a mile south of the town of Taechon and three miles northeast of the town of Namji. More than a thousand laborers were working at each location, and construction was proceeding rapidly, not only on runways but on aircraft revetments and other installations. Each airfield was already defended by antiaircraft guns and automatic weapons. (See Sketch Map 1.)

The significance of the three MIG Alley airfields to the UNC cause in Korea was obvious and ominous. The Reds evidently intended to fight strongly to protect their investment, for the fields were located close enough together so that one force of airborne MIG's could easily defend any one of them. If the Reds managed to complete the airfields and deploy MIG's to them, they could extend the no-man's air of MIG Alley all the way south to Pyongyang. And if MIG's were dispersed within the revetments being built at the airfields in the Saamcham-Taechon-Namji triangle, rooting them out would be a bloody, costly business. The Communists had some 35 airfields in Red North Korea, nearly all of which were unserviceable and kept that way by UNC bombings. Only the airfields at Uiju and Sinuiju, both being immediately across the Yalu River from Antung, were customarily kept operational, and these two airfields were virtually a part of the Antung complex and did not appreciably extend the southward range of Red aircraft. These 35 NK Communist airfields would have to be completely neutralized by the UNC air action prior to an armistice.

This and other references to the Chinese Communist air force were euphemistic. for the US FEAF intelligence held well-substantiated evidence that powers other than Red China had begun to crew many of the MIG-15 fighters and probably to direct the Red side of air war in Korea. In Mukden a Communist Supreme combined Headquarters of Chinese Communist and Communist North Korea forces apparently served policy-making and administrative functions for the Red air forces, but a Communist jointly headquarters at Antung exercised day-by-day control of Red air activities over Communist North Korea. The Antung center appeared to be managed by the Chinese Communist officers, but an intelligence informant reported that it was actually run by Russian advisors who were present in the control room at all times.
CHAPTER II AIR-TO-AIR BATTLE
(July 1951 -- June 1952)

Section 1. Limitation on the UNC Air Action

Air Foul Line

The foremost task for an air force in any war -- whether the war be limited or
global in nature -- is to safeguard friendly forces, installations and itself from
enemy air attacks. Korea was no exception to this basic principle upon which all
air doctrine is based. In its simplest form, this air doctrine principle has been
described by the words "air superiority."

Air superiority can be attained by any one or a combination of three methods.
The first -- and most difficult -- is to create such an air defense blanket around
friendly areas that enemy aircraft cannot penetrate it and any degree of effective-
ness. A second method consists of fighting in the enemy's own "backyard." Here,
the friendly air force conducts its operations over enemy-held territory,
destroying his aircraft in the air and on the ground, and neutralizing air bases and
air supporting facilities. The third and most final technique is the elimination
of the sources of the enemy's airpower capabilities -- its factories, air supply
depots, pilot training centers, and the like, which often are located deep in
its heartland.

In Korea, because the war was limited to small geographical area and the source
of supply for the air weapons came from without, the air forces were prevented
from accomplishing more than the first and a part of the second methods. The
first was accomplished quickly, but the second was to continue for the next
three years.

Since 1 November 1950, the Russian-built jet fighters of the Chinese Com-
munist Air Force (CCAФ) made their initial appearance in Korean skies when
six MiГ-15's attacked four F-51's over Namsidong. A new force, the CCAF,
and new equipment, the MiГ fighter, entered the Korean War.

The MiГ's were based just north of the Yalu River -- safe in Communist
China. The friendly Sabrejets each day would fly into the northern-most extreme
of Korea, throwing down a challenging gauntlet to them. When the MiG's accepted
the challenge and crossed the river, the Sabrejets destroyed them in the oldest
traditional form of air warfare -- only now at sonic speeds.

While the Korean air war was marked by many unusual aspects, the counterair
phase was even more heavily influenced by considerations rendering it unique.
For political reasons and in accord with U.S. JCS instructions, the United Nations
Command maintained a line three miles south of and parallel to the Yalu River
as an artificial foul line, beyond which UN aircraft were not authorized to fly
without especial order. Under no circumstances were UNC aircraft permitted
to violate the sanctity of the Manchurian or Siberian borders of Korea. This line
of restriction constituted a barrier behind which enemy aircraft could take off,
form, climb, and maneuver for penetration southward into the battle area
completely unmolested. Moreover, the enemy was able to withdraw from the
battle area and recover for landing under the same conditions.

With a few exceptions the northwestern quarter of Communist North Korea
was the scene of counter-air operations. The sea in which the enemy was
normally contacted was even more restricted, lying between the Chongchon and
Yalu Rivers, bounded on the west by the Korean Bay and on the east by a line running roughly between the Supung Reservoir and the town of Huichon. This area was popularly called "MIG Alley." The reason why the enemy liked to fight in this locality was easy to understand, for he had the maximum of geographic advantages. Based at the Antung, Tatungkou, Takushan, and Fenchen airfields, his short-range MIG interceptors could be quickly alerted and take off, form up climb to superior altitude, and maneuver for a speedy penetration southward, all the while remaining within the Manchurian sanctuary. After making speedy passes against UNC aircraft in "MIG Alley," the Reds could break off pursuit merely by crossing the Yalu barrier. Thus north of the Chongchon River the light, specialized MIG interceptors held most of the advantages over heavier all-purpose UNC fighters, who had not only to fly some distance to reach their targets and patrol stations but also had to retain sufficient fuel for their return to base.

At one time in December 1950 the U.S. JCS had been willing to permit UNC interceptors a few minutes of "hot pursuit," in which they could chase the Communist aircraft across the Yalu, but several of the allied nations had objected and the proposition was dropped. In March 1953, when there were newspaper reports that UNC pilots were pursuing Communist aircraft across the Yalu, the U.S. JCS directed the UN Command to take measures to insure that its instructions were fully complied with. General Clark, the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command reported, in turn, that UNC pilots were conscientiously breaking off engagements at the Yalu, even though this practice allowed many MIG's to escape. The UN Command admitted that in the heat of combat it was likely that some border violations had occurred but emphasized that they were not common practice. (See Sketch Map 2.)

Thus during the Korean War, the UNC air forces air superiority activities were virtually limited to such air-to-air fighting as the Red chose to sustain by sending their aircraft across the Yalu. Possessed with the initiative of joining or refusing combat, and remaining callously indifferent to the fate of their ground forces in Korea, the Red air commanders attempted constantly to devise situations which would give maximum advantages to their pilots.

Under the circumstances of a normal war the UNC air forces would have been directed to destroy enemy aircraft wherever found within the operating range of its aircraft, in the air or on the ground, but in Korea the politico-military rule that UNC aircraft could not cross the Yalu precluded attacks against MIG's while they were parked on their Manchurian bases or while they were flying in their vulnerable take-off and landing patterns.
Numerical Inferiority in Swept-Wing Fighters

In the spring of 1951 the men of the UNC air forces had fought the Chinese Communist air force (CCAF) to a standstill, but the Red Chinese air aggregation was nonetheless formidable. In June 1951 the Chinese Communists possessed a total of 1,050 combat planes, of which some 690 fighters, ground-attackers, and light bombers were based in Manchuria. Thwarted in their initial efforts to develop airfields within the Communist North, the Chinese Reds began to construct new airfields just beyond the Yalu River in the Antung complex. The first of these new airfields were at Tatungkou and Takanshan. Antung continued to be the main base, but these three airfields were soon able to support the operations of more than 300 MiG fighters. Already the Red Chinese air force had been lavishly supplied with Soviet-built MiG's and the construction of still more new airfields indicated that the Red China expected to obtain still more of the jet interceptors, with which it could seek a decision in Korea.

General Weyland, apprehensive about the continuing augmentation of Communist air forces in the Far East, looked to the air defense of Japan and requested on 10 June 1951 two additional jet fighter wings to be stationed there. However General Weyland's apprehension was not completely accepted either in Washington or in UN Command. From Washington, General Nathan F. Twining, the USAF Vice Chief of Staff, explained that the USAF believed that the Sino-Soviet air force augmentation was mainly defensive. There were nevertheless indications that the USAF looked at its resources, and General Weyland would receive some reinforcements.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs ordered the 116th US Wing to proceed to the Far East, and arriving in Japan on 24 July 1951, the 116th Wing and two of its squadrons took station at Misawa Air Base, while the third squadron settled at Chitose Air Base. Commitment of the 116th US Fighter-Bomber Wing to the Far East only partially satisfied General Weyland, who, on 12 July 1951, was even more concerned about the Communist air order of battle than he had been only a month before. At this time the US FEAF informed the USAF that it needed another wing for station in Japan and two more jet fighter wings for deployment to Korea. In Washington this request fell on deaf ears of the USAF leaders who had no more air units to spare.

Beginning in July 1951 the USAF had already undertaken to replace the US FEAF’s old F-86A aircraft with more-modern F-86E models on an one-for-one exchange which would continue for many months, but the USAF professed
its utter inability to furnish the US FEAF another wing of air-superiority fighters. The only source of Sabre aircraft was the USAF Air Defense Command, which was not up to the strength and which could not safely be denuded of another of its fighter-interceptor wings.

What was happening in the Far East in the summer of 1951 was one more indication of the observation that the United States had become fat and complacent and dropped its guard against the danger that the U.S. superior technology was not yet able to match the totalitarian economy of Russia in the quantity production of swept-wing air-superiority fighters. The contrast in numbers of the fighting air forces in the Far East was little short of shameful. In June 1951 Communist China possessed some 445 modern MIG-15 fighters, while the US FEAF possessed 89 F-86's in theater inventory, including 44 assigned to the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing's two committed squadrons in Korea. There was little doubt that the Reds recognized that they had a numerical superiority in swept-wing fighters.

As of 31 May 1952 the 4th and 51st US Fighter-Interceptor Wings had 139 Sabres; on 31 December 1952 they had 163; and on 31 July 1953 they had 181 Sabres. Counting F-86 fighter-bomber, which could double as interceptors when needed, the Fifth US Air Force at the end of war had 319 Sabres assigned to units. In addition to the Sabre force, the Fifth US Air Force used the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 77th Squadron's Meteor-8's as day interceptors until January 1953, when these jets, clearly outclassed by the MIG's, were converted to fighter-bomber work. At any time after November 1950 the Communists MIG-15's far outnumbered the Sabres. When the UNC airmen saw fit to give combat, the Red airmen almost always possessed a numerical superiority, and the UNC aircraft faced superior numbers of MIG's ranging anywhere from an occasional 60 to one down to normal three to one.

Furthermore, the Sabres force's operations were additionally limited by the necessity of living within never-plentiful logistical means and by the requirement that 75 percent of all aircraft had to be maintained in combat ready status against the day that they might be needed to meet a sudden Communist onslaught. In their peak month of Korean operations - - May 1952 - - the Sabres flew 5,138 effective sorties, but thereafter F-86 sorties had to be cut back to balance with logistical support, and October 1952, when 4,261 F-86 sorties were flown, was the highest month of Sabre interceptor activity in the last twelve months of the Korean war. Improving logistical support in the autumn of 1952 actually allowed the Fifth US Air Force to increase its planning factor for Sabre operations above that which had been predicted by the US FEAF, and F-86 interceptors were each
permitted to fly a maximum of 29.6 sorties monthly. Unfavorable flying weather in the winter of 1952–1953 caused stand-down or limited operation, with the result that the Sabres flew at a sortie rate of 21.18 missions per month.

**Sabre Logistical Support**

Although the UNC air combat potential was directly related to the number of its possessed aircraft, two other major factors - availability of logistical support and aircrews - dictated the rate at which the possessed planes could be flown. In Korea, however, combat operations had to be closely figured in terms of spare parts and supply, engine availability, aircraft age, expectations of battle damage, and personnel manning and experience, all of which had to be forecast and requisitioned up to six months in advance.

At times of adversity for the UNC cause, the US FEAF planes could be and were flown to exhaustion, as in November and December 1950 when the medium bombers were required to sustain a rate of effort which decimated their in-commission status and hospitalized crews with combat fatigue. In this same effort the US FEAF had knowingly used up a great number of F-51 and F-80 fighter-bombers. Operations in times of emergency could for a short time exceed calculated planning factors, but such expenditures of effort had to be compensated by a subsequent proportionate reduction in the rate of operations. These planning factors thus represented the maximum sortie rate which could be sustained by a given type of aircraft per month, a rate which if long exceeded would result in the collapse of the support and a shortage of replacement crews for that type aircraft.

During 1951–1952 the Fifth US Air Force Sabre strength was not only short in terms of a growing numerical superiority of the Communist MIG-15’s but it was plagued by the problems of logistic support. These logistic problems were due in some degree to several unavoidable factors: (1) the hurried initial movement to the Far East of a plane type which the USAF possessed in essentially short supply; (2) crude operating facilities in Korea and the necessity for the F-86’s to fight at a range which denied them optimum employment; (3) the many changes made in the F-86 aircraft in the effort to give them performance parity with the Soviet-built jet interceptor. Each of these factors interrelated and contributed to the major problem, which was that supply support for the F-86’s had been provisioned according to the best knowledge available for strictly normal operations whereas in Korea the Sabres operated from crude airfields, with excessive combat loading, and in a condition of less than optimum employment.
The hurried movement of the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing from New Castle, Delaware, to the Far East in late November and early December 1950 got it off to a bad logistical start. Due chiefly to an insufficient time for planning and to changing orders during the movement, personnel and aircraft of the 4th US Wing reached Johnson Air Base in Japan, while approximately one-fourth of urgently needed maintenance equipment remained on Pacific coast docks, awaiting water transportation. In Japan most of the 4th US Maintenance and Supply Group set up at Johnson Air Base, where it would retain a rear echelon until February 1952, when rear echelon maintenance for F-86's was established at Tsuiki. Combat echelons, comprising initially detachment, then squadrons, and eventually most of the 4th Wing, operated initially from Kimpo, temporarily from Taegu (K-2), built up strength at Suwon (K-13), and finally by the end of 1951 gained a permanent lodging at Kimpo (K-14).

As its Combat echelons went into action from Korean airfields, the 4th US Wing met logistic and maintenance problems arising from the limited air facilities available in the combat zone, problems which were not unlike those encountered by other Fifth US Air Force units. The only operational runway available at Suwon (K-13) during the first months that the 4th US Wing operated there was of rough concrete, 5,200 feet long, with no overruns and very soft shoulders. Several dips in the runway caused damage to F-86 nose wheels, while the soft shoulders and limited runway clearance caused accidents. Field maintenance shelters were unavailable, and the air-conditioned shop building needed for maintenance of the A-ICM gunsight was somewhat out of the question.

Due largely to an insufficient initial provisioning of F-86 spare parts and supporting equipment, a provisioning based on peacetime instead of combat rates of consumption, supply support for the Sabres went from bad to worse and hit a nadir at the end of 1951. The situation was aggravated by a long pipeline and distribution problems which caused a slow response to increased consumption rates. Supply support was additionally complicated by a wide variety of Sabre models, the old A, the new A, the E-1, the F-5, and the E-10 being in operation in early 1952.

During 1951 the major portion of the 4th US Maintenance and Supply Group remained at Johnson Air Base in Japan, where specialized maintenance crews comprising 15 men from each tactical squadron and every available man of the 4th US Maintenance Squadron performed the necessary 50-hour and 100-hour inspections, along with field maintenance, engine build-up, and engine overhaul. In the spring of 1951 efforts were made to establish at Suwon (K-13) a very limited 30-day level of F-86 spares which was supplemented on an emergency
basis with supplies dispatched from the main body of the 4th US Supply Squadron at Johnson Air Base. In July 1951, acute shortages of between 50 and 100 critical items continued to exist. But during October 1951 the supply situation was somewhat bettered when the 4th US M & S Group obtained permission to remove serviceable parts from the F-86A's being returned to the United States, substituting there for unserviceable parts. The utilization rate of F-86 aircraft nevertheless continued its downward rate, and in January 1952 an average of 45.5 percent of this type aircraft was out of commission for parts and 25.9 percent for maintenance. While there was little that could be done in the theater to better the supply situation, some improvements were made in Sabre maintenance.

At the end of 1951 improved base facilities at Kimpo permitted the 4th US Wing to effect changes in its maintenance organization, and early in 1952 a series of station changes liquidated the rear echelon at Johnson, sending the portion of the 4th US Maintenance and Support Group that was there to rejoin the wing at Kimpo and moving the 4th US Maintenance Squadron to Tsuiki, Japan to establish in February 1952 a REMCO (Rear Echelon Maintenance Combined Operations) in cooperation with the elements of the 51st US Wing. During the course of these changes the second intermediate inspection function was transferred to the forward base at Kimpo, thereby nearly halving the time lost to the necessity of ferrying aircraft to and from rear echelon.

Early in February 1952 a request for information concerning F-86 support in the Far East by the House Committee on Armed Services sent an AMC team, headed by Major General George W. Mundy, to the theater to get first hand information. When General Mundy found some instances of the lack of supply control of F-86 critical items within the theater, Lieutenant General Everest, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, on 13 February 1952 ordered the establishment of a common supply office which could maintain a rigid central control and distribution of critical items to the using units at Kimpo, Suwon, and Tsuiki. Base Supply AFSO-4 at Kimpo was accordingly made the supply point for F-86 spares, functioning there until 1 July 1952 when the function was moved to Tsuiki to decrease its vulnerability to enemy attack. These actions settled a minor problem area in the overall picture. However, the major problem was insufficient provisioning of F-86 spares, and a large part of AOCP/ANFE items had been occurring for the first time and were therefore not previously provisioned, or were provisioned in limited quantities based on peacetime flight consumption data. The AMC team obtained a listing of all critical items, and on 25 March 1952 the AMC established project Peter Rabbit, which had a 30-day objective of purchasing a 360-day level of all critical items of F-86 supply for delivery to the US FEAF.
While the completion date was not met, an augmented flow of supplies was headed to the Far East during the period. Project Jolly Boy was also initiated on 8 April 1952 by AMC with the purpose of improving the support of ground handling equipment needed by F-86 units.

The series of emergency actions resulted in an improving incommission status of F-86 aircraft, and despite heavy operational commitments in May, the percentage of Sabres out of commission during June 1952 had dwindled to 27.8, with an AOCP rate of 3.0 percent being the smallest figure in this category thus far in the Korean operations of the F-86’s.

Section 2. The Communist MIG Tactics

During the spring of 1951 many pilots of the UNC air forces commented that the Communists lacked systematic and organized tactics of aerial warfare, but gradually the enemy was revealed as an astute opponent who was searching for the most profitable means of employing his superiority of MIG numbers.

The MIG-15, which apparently was the backbone of the Communist order of air battle, had been designed to fill the role of a high-speed, high-altitude interceptor against bomber attacks. Although primarily a defensive weapon, the MIG’s heavy-caliber armament system could find ready use in ground attack. A crashed MIG-15 recovered from the coastal waters off Communist North Korea by a combined Fifth US Air Force and Seventh US Fleet expedition in June 1951 had bombs shackles and electrical circuits for bombing.

According to theoretical calculations of the US FEAF intelligence, however, the MIG-15 possessed a limited potential as a fighter-bomber because of existing distances in Korea. From Antung to the battle line was 270 miles and to Seoul was 290 miles. These distances fairly well ruled out use of MIG-15’s for bombing so long as they were based around Antung, because a late-type MIG-15 with internal fuel and two 550-pound bombs was figured to have a combat radius of only 135 miles. The US FEAF intelligence figuring estimated that the best range of a MIG would be with one 550-pound bomb and one 70-gallon external tank and would be 265 miles, or perhaps 295 miles if no fuel reserve was retained for emergencies. A more likely proposition was that MIG’s would escort TU-2 conventional light bombers.

The MIG could go approximately 245 miles without external fuel tanks, or with internal fuel plus two 70-gallon external tanks it could fly some 415 miles.
All of these computations were based on standard USAF flight profiles, but as the US FEAF cautiously pointed out there was little likelihood that the Reds would use the USAF profiles, in which case "the limited-range MIG-15 is not so limited as we once thought."

Who flew the MIG-15's and what they planned to gain, like the great variations in their aggressiveness, remained matters of somewhat intelligent guessing in the UN Command. It was certain that the USSR provided Communist China lavishly with aircraft in compliance with the reported agreement in May 1950 between the two Communist countries. The Russia was alleged to have promised the Red Chinese air force some 1,000 aircraft by mid-1952, together with a large number of training personnel to include pilots and technicians. The US FEAF estimate indicated that this agreement was not only met but was bettered. In December 1950 the Red Chinese air forces was believed to have 650 combat aircraft available in Red China, including 250 fighters and jets, 175 ground-attack planes, 150 bombers, and 75 transport. By June 1951 the Red Chinese air total strength had increased to 1,050 aircraft, the chief gain being in jet fighters, of which an estimate 445 were possessed.

By June 1952 the enemy had an estimated 1,830 aircraft, including 1,000 jet fighters. The Russia had built up the air forces of its Red Chinese satellite, simultaneously replacing the 341 MIG-15 aircraft destroyed by the UNC air forces in the period ending 30 June 1952. Without much doubt, at least a part of the MIG-15's were flown by Russian or European satellite pilots. From time to time enemy pilots who bailed out were observed to be Caucasian types, and US Sabre pilots frequently encountered adversaries of considerable skill who evidently accompanied a MIG formation in the role of instructors.

On the other hand,
encounters with MIG pilots often indicated that the Communists generally lacked "average" pilots. By the US FEAF standards they were either "very good" or "below average." Whatever tactic the enemy employed, it always banked heavily upon surprise, frequently using decoys to set US Sabres up an attempted kill. When the UNC aircraft turned into an attacking enemy flight, contact was generally broken by the enemy.

Gunnery was frequently poor, with notable exceptions against B-29's where it may be supposed that Soviet personnel were interested in seeking tactics of value against possible bomber raids of the future. Towards the end of each cycle the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing noted that the enemy element and flight leaders definitely had improved their skills. "They still made mistakes," summarized the wing, "mistakes which we consider stupid and which account for a large part of the favorable rates of kills to losses which we employ -- but they are trying and learning."

Employment of Communist jet fighters varied from month to month and for unknown reasons there were frequent stand-down periods. At first adverse weather limited MIG operations, but gradually they began to fly when formerly they would have been grounded. There was no positive proof that enemy air efforts were limited by logistical difficulties, although some of the standdowns may have come when the Communists met an excessive loss rate. The US FEAF received continual reports of shipment of aviation supplies into Manchuria via the Trans-Siberian Railway, and in two years of combat only one report specifically indicated that any slackening of MIG operations was due to a shortage of supplies. The enemy twice demonstrably proved that it could sustain operations at an average daily sortie rate of 200 per day for at least 10 days.

The usual MIG tactic was a scramble from Antung airfield (often observed by friendly pilots over Sinuiju) and a rapid climb to superior altitude over Manchuria, whence they would sweep down in closely knit flights, usually of four aircraft. Before reaching the patrolling friendly Sabres from high astern, the enemy flight would often split, sending an element of two in front of the Sabres as a lure while the remaining MIG's would close rapidly from five to seven o'clock high. Only one firing pass would be made, after which all of the MIG's would head for Manchuria. The MIG's usually timed their attacks to take place some 20 to 25 minutes after the Sabres arrived in the area, thus designing to hit the UNC aircraft at a moment when they were running short of fuel. Such hit-and-run tactics were indicative of the small numbers of first-line MIG-15's available to the Communists in this early period.

The hit-and-run tactics continued until the spring of 1951. But MIG's were
frequently engaged in increasing numbers over the Sonchon-Taechon area and were occasionally seen as far south as Sinuiju. Their most common tactic was a high stern attack made from out of the sun by elements of two MIG's which would open fire from an out-of-range position, continue to fire through the target of the friendly aircraft, and then, exploiting superior climbing ability, zoom back into the sun.

Often an enemy flight would repeat this maneuver several times. Bolder ventures were now evidently permitted by augmented numbers of MIG's and by pilots who had accumulated enough combat experience to evaluate and exploit the advantages of their aircraft. During the months of May and June 1951 the MIG-15's were frequently over Sinanju with scattered observations as far south as Pyongyang. In these months the MIG's introduced what Sabre pilots called a "Yo-Yo" tactic, in which 20 or more MIG's orbited at an altitude superior to a UNC air formation. Preferably from up-sun and usually in elements of two the enemy would peel off and attack the Sabres from high astern, come in firing, and zoom back up into another pool or orbiting MIG's.

During the late summer and autumn of 1951 the Communists made their bid to overwhelm the UNC air forces, and MIG's were observed and encountered with great regularity over Pyongyang and were met on numerous occasions in the triangle formed by Sinuiju-Chinnampo-Wonsan. Four unidentified aircraft, believed to have been MIG-15's, passed below Seoul on 3 December 1951. Day after day during October, November, and December 1951, the Communist committed more than 100 MIG's, and on 29 December 1951 some 300 MIG's were out on a single mission. Exploiting his superior numbers against the slender resources of the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing, the enemy turned to a skillful use of pincher and envelopment tactics. Often a force of 60 to 80 MIG's crossed into Korea at the Supung Reservoir on a southeast heading, dropping off hights or small sections to engage UN Sabre patrols north of the Chongchon River. As the main body continued southward, scouting forces for flank patrol went to Wonsan.

At the same time a similar force from Manchuria proceeded down the west coast of Korea, also dropping off pockets of resistance and dispatching scouting flights to Chinnampo and Cho-do island. Altitudes of these southward flights were usually above 35,000 feet. Over Pyongyang the forces converged, dropping to 15,000 to 20,000 feet, and swept back northward over the main supply routes in search of UNC fighter-bombers, homeward-bound F-86's, or stragglers. To cover the mass withdrawal, a fresh section of MIG's usually penetrated Korea at least as far south as Sinanju. The Communists continued these tactics until
the latter part of January 1952, when the "trains" were broken up in favor of 2, 4, or 6, aircraft formations. Unlike the massed formations which had contained large numbers of new and unaggressive pilots, the smaller formations as a rule used very good tactics, appeared to be well led, and seemed to be using a late-model high-trust MIG-15. Their ability to out-turn, out-climb, and out-run the F-86's at altitude was called "out-standing," and their gunnery was improved.

The smaller MIG formations were now flown at both high and low altitudes, a few flights being directed against the augmented Sabre force (the 51st Wing had converted its two squadrons to F-86's in December 1951) while larger numbers of Red aircraft attempted to strike the UNC fighter-bombers.

During February 1952 the MIG's showed little or no desire, except on widely separated occasions, to fly south of the Chongchon, and during the following month few MIG's came south of Sinanju. Although reluctant to fight at altitudes above 40,000 feet, the Communists seemed determined always to maintain initial altitudes superior to the Sabre patrols. When, after December 1951, F-86's entered their patrols at 40,000 feet, the MIG's went higher. On 4 February enemy flights were observed at 53,000 feet. Below the contrail level MIG fighters were aggressive, and in May 1952 the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group lost two F-84's to the enemy jets. This threat to the fighter-bombers was countered by holding the Sabre screen in closer to them.

During May, June, and July 1952 the Communists further reduced the MIG-15 sortie rate but sought to improve the quality of their interception effort. On 18 May a flight of F-86's was attacked by two MIG's which dropped down out of an overcast, indicating that the Reds had begun to employ ground radar to control and vector their aircraft into the most favorable position for an interception. The enemy continued to employ small flights of two to six aircraft, generally flying at lower altitudes in an effort to attack the UNC fighter-bombers. Communist air operations were concentrated over northwest Korea near the Yalu River, infrequent flights being made as far south as Pyongyang but usually when F-86's were elsewhere. Engagements were no longer of a training nature, but displayed the aggressiveness of more proficient Red pilots. Strangely enough, however, the Communists made no air opposition to the UNC fighter-bomber attacks against the Supung hydroelectric plants on 23 June 1952, although 250 swept-wing aircraft were to be seen at Antung and Tatungkou airfields just a few minutes before the attacks. During the course of the bombing some 160 MIG's took off from these airfields, but they withdrew into the interior of Manchuria. The most likely hypothesis was that the enemy was unaware of the UNC target and made an error of judgement in dispatching his aircraft to the
rear before discovering that Supung was to be attacked.

Although the UNC attacks against the Supung hydroelectric plant went unopposed on 23 June 1952, the Red brought their more skilled pilots into action during July 1952. At the same time that the US FEAF was getting seriously down to business with its air pressure campaign, the Communist air arm brought out a new and effective technique. In this endeavor the Reds used scattered MIG formations, a part of the MIG force engaging or luring off the patrolling Sabres, whose location was obviously pinpointed by Communist GCI radar, while other MIG's penetrated or flew around the end of the Sabre screen at moderately high altitudes.

On 4 July 1952, when the UNC aircraft attacked the Red North Korean Military Academy near the Yalu, some 90 MIG's were observed in the area, and at least two strikes got through the Sabre screen to make an unsuccessful attacks against the UNC fighter-bombers. The MIG's positioned themselves well enough but they lost kills because of poor gunnery and eagerness. In the course of engagement, 13 MIG's were claimed destroyed at a loss of two Sabres. As a result of this experience and in view of the need for a change in tactics as the fighter-bombers switched to targets of more importance, the Fifth US Air Force made modification in the old, generally free-lance Yalu barrier patrols which had fixed a screen of Sabres between the UNC fighter-bomber targets and the MIG airfields.

Beginning in July 1952 the Sabres were required to place more stress on visual contact with and flying top cover for the fighter-bombers. More escort missions were now required for the reconnaissance aircraft which sought out and photographed targets deep in enemy territory.

By August 1952 the Communists were giving evidence that they were severely galled by the UNC air pressure campaign. Evidently stung into action by the intensified US FEAF operations and having benefited by a period of reduced activity since April 1952, the Red air forces surged back into action on 1 August as if by signal. Once again the majority of the Reds pilots were getting combat experience and displayed reluctance to tangle, but other MIG's employed end-runs, decoys, and "Yo-Yo" tactics. During the winter of 1952–1953, Communist pilots displayed a wide variation of aggressiveness and ability. The majority of MIG's observed flew high and were evidently engaged in training, but those Red pilots who were willing to fight often displayed good coordination and skillful handling of their aircraft.

Early in 1953, observations of camouflage patterns and aircraft markings indicated that the enemy was probably keeping some selected air units in combat. The 4th US Wing, for example, reported encounters with a unit of "copper-
coloured" MIG's that flew as a unit, maintained excellent flight integrity, and demonstrated aggressiveness, tenacity, and skill. During February, March, and April 1953, the 51st US Wing commented on a noticeable absence of Red Chinese insignias upon the enemy planes it engaged. These anonymous MIG pilots who committed themselves to combat put up terrific struggles, many times hanging onto the attack or prolonging evasive actions when they could have easily crossed the Yalu.

Where MIG's had formerly climbed to evade, these pilots, many of them flying aircraft marked by plain red stars, used almost every maneuver in the book: spins, split “S's,” or combinations of swaying back and forth or up and down which made it extremely difficult for a pursuing Sabre to get in a shot.

As a general rule, however, Communist pilots after September 1952 were reluctant to attack unless the odds were decidedly in their favor, and they usually singled out small Sabre formations upon which they could work coordinated attacks with superior numbers. One favorite Red tactic was to initiate an attack with a 4-MIG flight, and, when the Sabre flight broke defensively, the first MIG flight would break off and a second Red flight would strike from the opposite side. These changes in the tactical employment of the MIG's demanded larger Sabre flights, and the 4th US Wing began to employ sections of eight aircraft to good advantage. The 51st US Air Wing again used 6-aircraft flights, with the fire power concentrated in the flight leader and the two element leaders and with wingmen serving as watchers.

Subsequent to 1 January 1953, both F-86 wings experimented with a "train" type of squadron formation. Each "train" was made up of six flights of four aircraft each. In this refinement of the jet stream, the flights flew the usual "fluid-four" formation, but they remained in a loose trail formation, each flight following another within supporting distance, usually by about one mile. This formation permitted the Sabre wings to get a maximum number of friendly fighters into contact with enemy formations, while it did not hamper the maneuverability, cruising speed, or offensive flexibility of the individual flight. This "train" formation appreciably reduced the susceptibility of individual Sabre flights to enemy attack.

Section 3. Air Superiority Battles
Communists Seek Air Superiority

In the course of 32 months of air-to-air combat over Korea the Communists demonstrated a learning process in the employment of their jet fighters. Beginning on 1 November 1950 and continuing through January 1951 small formations of MIG's appeared intermittently in small sections, seldom venturing more than a few miles south of Yalu, their usual tactics being hit and run passes against UNC aircraft. As the Red air strength increased between February and April 1951, MIG's were frequently engaged over the Sunchon-Taechon area, still well within the relative safety of "MIG Alley." Their common tactic was a high stern attack made out of the sun by elements of two MIG's who would dive down firing and immediately zoom back into the sun. During May and June 1951 the MIG's edged down to the end of "MIG Alley," being frequently encountered over Sinanju and showing themselves to scattered observations as far south as Pongyang.

If the Red pilots now believed that they had sufficient strength to stop hugging the Yalu, they nevertheless still sought security in superior numbers. In the late summer and autumn of 1951 the Communists made their bid for air superiority in tactics employing superior numbers of inferior pilots in maneuvers calculated to encircle and overwhelm the UNC air forces. Day after day the enemy committed more than 100 MIG's in pincer and envelopment tactics. Often a force of 60 to 80 MIG's crossed into Korea in the vicinity of Sunung on a southeastern heading, dropping off flights or small sections to engage UNC Sabre patrols north of the Chongchon.

Evaluation of the patterns of Communist air activities clearly indicated that the Reds began to implement a new air campaign designed to establish air superiority over MIG Alley in the latter part of July 1951. At first the Reds were evidently testing new tactics. Exploiting their numerical and altitude superiority, the Red airmen evaded Sabre patrols at the Yalu and then continued southward at altitude above 35,000 feet as far as Pongyang, where they turned back and let down to attack the fighter-bombers they sighted while en route homeward to Antung.

Effective on 1 June 1951, the US FEAF had already placed MIG Alley off limits for all Bomber Command aircraft not accompanied by fighter escort. Now the Red tactics hazarded unescorted jet-reconnaissance planes and fighter-bombers. On 29 July and 9 August 1951, for example, the MIG's evaded Sabre
partol and attacked low-performance jets. In both instance the fighter-bombers evaded and escaped damage, but on the latter date four MIG's intercepted and badly damaged an RF-80. In other battles fought on 18, 10, and 24 August 1951, the Sabre patrols held firm and, despite unfavorable odds of two to one, destroyed four MIG's.

As the truce talks at Kaesong had broken down on 23 August, and since the "Operation Strangle" had commenced on 18 August 1951 to hammer to Red North Korea's railway lines of communications, the Communist air forces, employing what they had learned in the past two months and an order of battle which had grown to 525 MIG's, launched into a bitter and all-out air campaign on 1 September 1951. As many as 90 MIG's now entered into the Red North Korea at one time, and with so many aircraft in the skies the Reds employed practically any formation they desired.

In aerial fights on 8 and 9 September the MIG pilots showed tactics never before seen in Korea. Some MIG's attacked in trail formation, others used the luffery circle, while in one instance four flights of MIG's flew line-abreast head-on passes in which all 16 planes blazed at a single Sabre. All hostile air formations were tighter and better organized. One formation was particularly hard to fight. Pools of MIG's orbited at superior altitudes waiting to make passes downward at the UNC aircraft which came within range. After diving down and making firing passes, the MIG's zoomed back upstairs.

During September 1951 the pilots of the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing commanded by Colonel Harrison R. Thyng sighted 1,177 MIG sorties over the Red North Korea and engaged 911 of the MIG's in combat. Considering that they commonly fought at odds of three or four to one against them, the Sabre pilots gave good account of themselves. Shortly after noon on 2 September 1951, for example, 22 Sabres tangled with 40 MIG's in a thirty-minutes air battle which raged between Sinanju and Pyongyang and resulted in the destruction of four MIG's. Again, on the afternoon of 9 September 1951, 28 Sabres opposed 70 MIG's, and in this air battle Captains Richard S. Becker and Ralph D. Gibson each destroyed one of the jet fighters, thus becoming the second and third jet aces of the Korean War. In the course of September's all-out air battles the Sabre destroyed 14 Red MIG's. 2nd on 19 September a 49th US Group Thunder jet pilot, Captian Kenneth L. Skeen, jettisoned his bombs and shot down an intercepting MIG.

In air-to-air engagements the Fifth US Air Force lost three F-86's, one F-51, one F-80, and one F-84. While losses to Communist interceptors were moderate, the MIG's were seriously impeding the progress of the UNC's railway interdiction
campaign. On many days the MIG's evaded Sabre patrols and pounced on the fighter-bombers, who had no resource except to jettison their bombs, to scatter, and to run for their lives.

Alarmed by the development in Korea, General Weyland frankly warned General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, on 15 September that the Communist air forces was rapidly getting out of control. The Red MIG's were hampering the UNC's air-to-ground attacks as far southward as Pyongyang. General Weyland stated that the US FEAF had a vital and immediate requirement for another wing of Sabre jets. If USAF could not provide the wing, General Weyland recommended that one of the US FEAF's F-80 wings should be converted to F-86's. "If the present trend continues," the US FEAF Commander warned, "there is a definite possibility that the enemy will be able to establish bases in Korea and threaten our supremacy over the front lines."

In Washington General Vandenberg showed serious concern over the increasing Communist air strength in Manchuria. However his operations officer informed him that the USAF could not provide the US FEAF with any more F-86's without seriously impairing the effectiveness of the US Air Defense Command. "Our present capability of supporting one F-86 unit in the US FEAF is questionable." General Vandenberg was told, "and the ability to support two does not exist." Aside from its inability to provide and support more Sabres in combat, the USAF operations felt that no number of additional fighter units could assure air superiority in Korea unless the source of the enemy's air supplies could be attacked. General Vandenberg, therefore, informed General Weyland on 20 September 1951 that USAF could neither provide nor support additional Sabre squadrons in Korea.

When the Fifth US Air Force received the news that it could expect no additional air-superiority fighters, General Everest, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, had no choice but to pull his fighter-bomber interdiction attacks back out of the MIG Alley. The fighter-bomber now attacked the railway lines in the zone between Pyongyang and the Chongchon River. The change in rail-target areas narrowed the choice of rail targets, but it intensified air attacks against the middle reaches of the enemy's rail network. Evidently sensing that their air forces were about to score a break-through, the Communist began to do what General Weyland had most feared they would do. Everywhere in Red North Korea the Reds rejuvenated airfield repairs which had quailed under the UNC air attacks a few months before.

Understanding the perilous threat to the UNC air superiority which was in the making during the first three weeks of October 1951, the Sabre pilots of the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing intensified their patrols and fought some of the
greatest air battles of history over northwestern Korea. Although the odds against them steadily increased, the Sabres destroyed two MIG's on 1 October, six MIG's on 2 October, one MIG on 5 October, one MIG on 12 October, and nine MIG's on 16 October 1951.

The latter day's combat score was the biggest yet in Korea, and General Weyland messaged US FEAF's admiration for the magnificent performance. Operating mostly against rail targets between Pyongyang and Sinuiju or eastward of MIG Alley on the railroad to Kuru-ri, the Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers were generally but not always free from MIG attack. On 3 October 1951, for example, 12 F-80's of the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, led by Colonel James B. Tipton, responded to a call for help from another fighter-bomber formation received while they were en route homeward from a rail-cutting strike north of Kuru-ri. The old Shooting Stars evidently caught the MIG's by surprise and were able to claim two of the Red interceptors as probably destroyed.

All through the month of October 1951 the Communist air forces were operating at high tide over the Red North Korea. United Nations Command air superiority was in jeopardy. During the month UNC pilots had sighted 2,573 airborne MIG's, and 2,166 of these MIG sorties had been willing to engage in combat with the UNC aircraft. According to evaluated combat claims, 32 MIG's were destroyed -- 24 by Sabres, seven by B-29 gunners, and one by a Thunderjet -- but the US FEAF had lost seven Sabres, five B-29's, two F-85's, and one RF-80 in aerial combat. The old Superforts of the US Bomber Command had taken their worst losses of the Korean war. Up until October the US Bomber Command had lost only six aircraft in combat, yet in one week at the end of this month it lost five planes to flak or fighters and suffered major damages to eight other planes. In the week 55 B-29 crewmen were dead or missing and 12 others had been wounded. Many pessimists were saying that the old Superforts were through in Korea. Made bold by their success, the Communist moved their aircraft across the Yalu to Sinuiju and Uiju airfields.

For the first time some 26 MIG's were dispersed at Uiju, and some 64 conventional aircraft were now parked at Sinuiju. So far, moreover, the US FEAF attacks had not neutralized the new airfields at Saemcham, Namsi, and Tacchon. Thousands of laborers were refilling bomb craters and were building other facilities. After a flying trip to the Far East, General Vandenberg returned to Washington with a gloomy report. "Almost overnight," he told the press, "Communist China has become one of the major airpowers of the world."
Sabre Brings the MIG under Control

With the beginning of winter in 1951 the growing Communist air order of battle based in Manchuria and Communist China forced the United Nations Command to make some reassessment of its emergency plans. Movement of a new Chinese air regiment to Takhushan brought the aircraft complement at the Antung bases to 290 MIG-15 fighters. Other MIG's based at such rearward bases as Anshan, Liaoyang, and Mukden swelled the number of airborne sorties counted over northwestern Korea by staging forward through Antung. In the skies over the Red North Korea US Sabre pilots began to encounter large numbers of new and improved MIG's. These planes would prove to be of a type designated as the MIG-15 BIS (“BIS” meant “enore”) -- aircraft powered by a more-powerful 6,000-pound - - thrust VK-1 engine, designed by Russia's Vladimir Klimov. Employing their superior numbers of aircraft at a respectable operations rate, the Communists sent 2,326 observed sorties over the Communist North Korea in November and 3,997 observed sorties in December 1951. On 3 and 8 December flights of high flying MIG's were sighted south of Seoul.

The growing Communist air capabilities gravely concerned US Air Force leaders in Washington and Tokyo. Up until now the United States policy had assumed that the UNC air forces would be allowed to retaliate against the Communist Chinese Manchurian air bases if the Red air forces attacked the UNC installations in the Republic of Korea. Now, however, General Weyland warned that the US FEAF was certainly not strong enough to attack all major airfields in Manchuria and Red China. In the event of expanded air hostilities the US FEAF would expect to attack only those Red airfield offering direct and positive threats to the UNC forces.

In Washington General Vandenberg's planners advised him that in case of the Communist air attacks from north of the Yalu, the USAF should be cleared to obliterate the Antung bases. This course of action was accepted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs and approved by the U.S. National Security Council in December 1951. While awaiting the open Communist air attacks made against the UNC installations from Antung bases, or a change in UN policies accompanied by a marked augmentation of the US FEAF, General Weyland knew no course of action except to continue to battle the Red jets over the Red North Korea and to give the highest priority to the neutralization of airfields in the Red North Korea which could support Red jet air operations against the UNC installations.

Following the Communist air victories over the US Bomber Command's
Superfortresses in late October 1951, the USAF with more air-superiority Sabres but General Vandenberg ordered the US Air Defense Command on 22 October 1951 to dispatch 75 F-86's with pilots and crew chiefs immediately to Japan, which left for Japan on 1 and 9 November 1951.

As the Fifth US Air Force awaited Sabre reinforcements, the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing under Colonel Harrison R. Thyng, was hard pressed to handle the many Communist MIG's which appeared over the Red North Korea almost every day in November. Because of their superior numbers, the Communist MIG's possessed the initiative everywhere north of Pyongyang during November 1951, and all the UNC pilots could do little more than to counter such actions as the Red airmen initiated. The 4th US Wing Sabre patrols could not prevent MIG's from entering Communist North Korea, but the 4th US Wing made efforts to devise tactical changes which would work against the "trains." Once again the Sabres employed jet-stream patrol formations of fluid-four flights staggered to arrive in the patrol areas either at separate intervals or different altitudes generally ranging downward from 35,000 feet. The 4th US Wing usually employed not more than 32 Sabres on a patrol, and these usually flew in two 16-ship supporting sections. On a few days of profitable combat in November, the 4th US Wing's Sabres downed a total of 14 MIG's.

On 18 November, while on a range sweep to the Yalu, one Sabre flight spotted 12 MIG's parked at the runway at Uiju Airfield. While the two Sabres covered, Captain Kenneth D. Chandler and Lieutenant Dayton W. Ragland made a large circle downward and swept in ten feet high down Uiju's runway. In the strafing pass, Captain Chandler triggered off bursts which destroyed four of the Red planes and damaged several others. Heading southward on the deck, the two Sabres pilots escaped without harm.

In a major air action on 27 November 1951 the 4th US Group
pilots shot down four MIG's. Major Richard D. Greighton scored one of the victories and became the fourth jet ace of the Korean War. But the big day for the Sabres was 30 November 1951. Late on the afternoon of 30 November 1951 31 Sabres led by Colonel Benjamin S. Preston, the 4th US Group's Commander, sighted a force of 12 TU-2 bombers, escorted by 16 LA-9 fighters, and covered by 16 MIG's, heading for Taehwa-do. Fighting in elements of two in a battle which raged all over the sky, the Sabres slaughtered eight of the TU-2 bombers, three LA-9 fighters, and one MIG-15. Major George A. Davis shot down three TU-2's and the single MIG to become the fifth jet ace of the Korean War. Major Winton W. Marshall destroyed one TU-2 and one LA-9 and was recognized as the sixth jet ace.

While the 4th US Wing was holding the line, the 51st US Fighter-Interceptor
Wing had been preparing to convert its two squadrons to Sabres. In preparations for the change, Colonel Gabreski took command of the 51st US Wing at Suwon on 6 November 1951. Lieutenant Colonel George L. Johns, another 4th US Wing veteran, took command of the 51st US Group. On 19 November, 1951 the 51st US Wing transferred its F-80's to the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, and after a short period of transition with its new planes, the 51st US Wing flew its first Sabre combat missions on 1 December 1951. Effective with the receipt of the additional Sabres, the US FEAF possessed 165 F-86 aircraft in December 1951. Since some of the additional planes were assigned to the 4th US Wing, the US FEAF could count a total of 127 Sabres committed to battle in Korea.

On 1 December 1951 more than 40 MIG's launched vicious attacks against 14 Australian Meteor jets. The RAAF pilots destroyed two MIG's but lost three of their number to the enemy. In almost daily attacks during the next several days the MIG's destroyed two F-80's and one F-84. On 2 and 4 December 1951 the Sabres scored five victories on each day, and the neophyte pilots of the 51st US Wing accounted for one of the kills on both days. The big victory came on 13 December 1951. In morning and afternoon sweeps over Sinanju, the 4th US Wing met 145 MIG's and destroyed 13 of them. The indefatigable Major George A. Davis, Commander of the 334th Squadron, had chalked up two additional victories on 5 December, and he claimed four of the Red kills on 13 December 1951. General Vandenberg cabled his congratulations to the 4th US Wing and especially to Major Davis for the fine accomplishments.

After this smashing victory the Communists still appeared over Red North Korea in great numbers, but they flew high and had little inclination to fight. On 14 December the 4th US Wing achieved a single victory, and on 15 and 28 December 1951 the 51st US Wing pilots destroyed two MIG's, which were the last combat results in the latter half of December 1951.

In the latter part of January 1952, after the Sabres had destroyed a record number of 31 MIG's during the month, the Reds broke up their "trains" in favor of more aggressive and smaller formation, which usually remained north of Chongchon and few at both high and low altitudes, a few flights being directed against the Sabre screen and larger numbers of enemy aircraft attempting to strike UNC fighter-bombers.

Enemy attacks against the UNC fighter-bomber numbered eight in January, six in February, ten in March, nine in April, and jumped to 25 during May 1952. With two exceptions, all of these attacks were made while the UNC fighter-bombers were attacking enemy rail targets between the Yalu and the Chongchon. Considering the number of times they tried to attack the UNC fighter-bombers,
the Red airmen were not notably successful. Only eight of this type of UNC aircraft were lost in the air-to-air action between January and June 1952. On the other hand, the UNC Sabres destroyed 44 MIG's in April and 32 MIG's in May 1952. Probably in context with their losses, the enemy severely curtailed their MIG operations in June and July 1952.
CHAPTER III  AIR INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN
(August 1951 – June 1952)

Section 1. Seeking New Targets

Since the initial stage of the Korean War, acting in conjunction with the UNC ground forces, the US FEA F had contributed greatly to the achievement of a series of ground operations. Events since 25 June 1950 had clearly indicated that air operations had been one of the most decisive elements in stopping the enemy’s offensives and reducing its capacity to wage ground warfare. Under the favorable circumstances of air superiority, the UNC air forces had inflicted tremendous destruction upon the Communist forces. But now the question confronting the US FEA F commanders and planners in July 1951 was the determination of strategy for an air campaign against the Red aggressor in the Communist North Korea. A properly conceived strategic air campaign would have destroyed the hostile Communist industrial potential and will to wage war.

Following the disastrous defeat of the Communist ground offensives by the UNC air-ground action in the spring of 1951, Lieutenant General Otto P. Weyland, who had assumed command of the US FEA F on 10 June 1951, informed General Vandenberg that the US FEA F now had “its first real opportunity to prove the efficacy of air power in more than a supporting role.”

At the beginning of the truce negotiations at Kaesong on 10 July 1951, the UNC air forces did indeed possess an opportunity clearly to demonstrate the innumerable advantages of air power as a predominant weapon. Unlike the ground forces, which are always bound to action along a narrow, one-dimensional, surface line of action, and now in July 1951 were limited by directive to an active defense of currently held positions, the air force could range far and wide over the Red North Korea and by selective attack motivate the enemy to accept such UNC terms as were offered at the armistice conference table.

Unfortunately, however, the UNC air forces were not going to be permitted to exercise these decisive attributes of air power for some while. In Korea the Communist forces drew their sustenance from area beyond the Manchurian and Siberian borders, the areas which because of political reasons could not be
attacked by the UNC aircraft. Major targets remained in the Red North Korea, but most of these major targets -- such as the Supung hydroelectric plants -- were politically sensitive. Doctrines for the tactical air employment of air power now held no precise message for the UNC air planners. The UNC ground forces wanted a substantial portion of available air effort in close support, and such support was generously provided when ground units were actively engaged. However General Weyland recognized that it would be “sheer folly” to use expensive air power against enemy dug-in troop positions as a substitute for artillery.

Maintenance of UNC air superiority was necessarily limited to combat over MIG Alley and neutralization of sporadic Communist airfield construction within Red North Korea, neither of which activities could occupy more than a part of the UNC air force. Of the three tasks of tactical air power, only that of interdiction, whereby enemy men and materiel are destroyed and supply routes are severed beyond the battle zones, offered under the existing situation and policies dictated for the conduct of the armistice negotiations any potentially profitable employment for the UNC air power. Not only was interdiction the sole employment permitted to the UNC air forces at the outset of armistice negotiations, but if the UNC estimate of the ground situation was correct, interdiction promised some positive results. During the first two weeks of July 1951 the UN Command calculated that the Communists were stockpiling 800 tons of supplies behind their front lines, and the Eighth US Army feared that the enemy would “reach a degree of preparedness previously unparalleled in the Korean war.”

On 7 August 1951 General Ridgway informed the U.S. JCS that the Communists were capable of launching limited assaults to gain local advantages and of expanding into a general offensive at a time suiting their purpose. These estimates that were generally accepted by the UN Command deeply concerned the U.S. Joint Staffs. Thus on 13 July 1951 the US FEAF directed its subordinates to step up tempo of fighter and light bomber activities, with emphasis on vehicular movements and pre-planned targets of known enemy troops, supplies, or installations. Otherwise, available UNC air power would be frittered away against relatively invulnerable targets along the front lines, while the enemy remained free to build up its resources to launch and sustain a general offensive.

The Eighth US Army and Fifth US Air Force intelligence further noted that the Communists had no major industry in Red North Korea capable of supporting their war effort, and, except for a few arms factories at Pyongyang and Kunu-ri, the Reds were compelled to bring their war supplies from Manchuria or Siberia. According to the UNC intelligence, the Reds had 60 divisions of various
types in the battle zone south of a line drawn through Sariwon. The UN Command conservatively estimated that each enemy division could maintain itself in limited combat with 40 tons of supplies each day. Therefore, the Red logistical system had to transport 2,400 tons of supplies to the battleline each day. Having determined the amount of supplies the Red required, the Fifth US Air Force examined the Red transportation system and found that it comprised motor and rail transport.

In the front lines the Red used human and animal bearers, but they depended upon trucks and trains for long hauls. The Russian built trucks that the Communists possessed each carried approximately two tons, which meant that 1,200 trucks were required to haul a day’s supplies to the Communist armies.

The UN Command estimated that the round-trip time of a truck from Antung to the front lines was ten days, and, to play safe, the Fifth US Air Force figured the round-trip time at five days. According to the Fifth US Air Force figure, the Reds would need 6,000 trucks to transport 2,400 tons of daily supply from Antung to the battle zone south of Sariwon. Each Red North Korean boxcar had a load capacity of 20 tons, and thus only 120 boxcars could transport the Red daily supply requirement. The Reds had always attempted to use their railways to the maximum, and in the period during which the UNC pilots were attacking the roads, the Communists had begun to move supplies by rail into such southern terminals as Sariwon and Pyongyang. Because of its greater load-hauling capacity, the Red North Korean railway network was clearly the primary transportation capability of the Reds.

On the basis of this evaluation of the Communist logistical support system, the Fifth US Air Force determined that the Red North Korean rail-transportation system was of supreme importance to the Communists. From the airman’s viewpoint, moreover, rail lines offered attractive targets. Rail lines could not be hidden, nor could rail traffic be diverted to secondary routes or detours as could motor vehicles.

The Fifth US Air Force saw three methods of rail attack. Air attack could blow out rail bridges, or destroy rail rolling stock, or destroy the tracks and roadbeds of the railways. Fifth US Air Force planners believed that air attack could destroy rail bridges and keep them destroyed, but rail bridges were not the best targets for the new program. On the east coast, in the spring of 1951, US Navy aircraft had done an excellent job of continuous bridge destruction, but the Reds had been willing to move a train 11 or 12 miles and then to reload its supplies on another train waiting beyond a blown-out bridge. If fighter-bombers repeatedly attacked the same bridges, moreover, the Reds would undoubtedly
mount antiaircraft defenses at such objective. Railway rolling stock was in short supply in the Far East, but the Fifth US Air Force planners did not believe that air attack could destroy enough of it to hinder the Communists. The last remaining method of rail attack was to bomb the enemy's railway track and roadbeds.

By early August 1951 the Fifth US Air Force had arrived at the concept of the interdiction plan against the Communist North Korea's railroads, and the Fifth US Air Force operations officers began to compute the aerial capabilities which would be required to do the job. The Fifth US Air Force computed that it would require six to eight months to destroy the enemy's railway system with its own aircraft. In order to shorten the time required to something on the order of 90 days, the Fifth US Air Force requested the Navy to assume responsibility for interdicting the lateral rail line across the Red North Korea between Samdong-ni and Kowon and the east-coast rail line from Kilchu through Hungnam and Wonsan to Pyongyang.

The Fifth US Air Force asked US Bomber Command to assume responsibility for interdicting the key rail bridges at Pyongyang, Sonchon, Sunchon, Sinanju, and Huichon. The Seventh US Fleet accepted its share of the rail routes, and the US Bomber Command agreed to neutralize all the bridges except the one at Huichon, which was too far north and endangered by MiG's. Four bridges were not quite as good as five, but the Fifth US Air Force thought that four would suffice. For its own part, the Fifth US Air Force undertook to interdict the predominantly double-tracked Red North Korean railway lines in northwestern areas.

In order to release the maximum Fifth US Air Force capability for the execution of the interdiction program, General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, agreed to limit the Eighth US Army's requirement for close support to 96 sorties per day, a number which averaged out at approximately eight sorties to each front-line infantry division. All of the arrangements coordinating the employment of the UNC air forces in the comprehensive railway interdiction campaign were apparently worked out by the Fifth US Air Force in Korea, but General Weyland later emphasized that the interdiction program was developed in detail by collaboration between Army, Navy, and Air Force staff officers and was approved by responsible commanders of all services in the theater.

Although the attack plan comprehended intensive attacks against the Red North Korean railway system, the Fifth US Air Force expected to obtain important concomitant results. The official Fifth US Air Force estimate of 14 August 1951 stated: "The Fifth US Air Force and attached units in conjunction
Air Interdiction Campaign

with the US Naval air units and the US FEAF Bomber Command have the capability of destroying the enemy's rail system in the Communist North Korea." Colonel William P. McBride, the Fifth US Air Force's director of combat operations, explained that "We decided to destroy the enemy's rail system to where its rail traffic was as near zero as we could make it." Even if the enemy's railways south of a line between Sinanju and Kimchu were destroyed, the Fifth US Air Force recognized that the Reds could still supply their forces by employing 6,000 motor trucks.

The Fifth US Air Force believed, however, that motor transport would prove too costly for the Reds. The Fifth US Air Force light bombers would hunt trucks as a major endeavor, and natural attrition would take an additional toll of the Red vehicles. From such causes Communist vehicular attrition would range up to 7,500 a month, whereas Communist China and Russia were manufacturing only about 33,000 trucks a month. Thus the UNC air forces were not only capable of destroying the enemy's rail system but "of hindering its highway transportation system to such an extent that it will not be capable of opposing the Eighth US Army effectively." "We are optimistic enough about it," said Colonel McBride, "to believe that with this program we can force the enemy to retire from a line generally from Pyongyang through Kowon, which is a line generally 100 miles from and parallel to the Yalu River."

In September 1951 General Everest, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, reportedly explained to pilots at Taegu that the Fifth US Air Force planners believed that the comprehensive railway-interdiction attacks would so weaken the enemy that he could easily be routed by an Eighth US Army ground offensive or he would be forced voluntarily to withdraw his troops closer to the Manchurian border in order to shorten his supply lines. Enthusiastic concerning the prospects for the new operations plan, the Fifth US Air Force officers used the same name which they had given to the earlier road-interdiction program as "Operation Strangle." At a briefing for General Vandenberg the Fifth US Air Force officers referred to the rail-interdiction campaign as "operation Strangle," and, subsequently in Washington, General Vandenberg used this same code name in a press conference. In a special press release of 18 February 1952, the Fifth US Air Force public-information officer described the results of "Six Months of Operation Strangle."

Within a few weeks both the Fifth US Air Force and the US FEAF began to tone down the earlier exuberant expectations forecast for the railway-interdiction operations. In December 1951 Brigadier General Ferguson, the Fifth US Air Force's Vice Commander, noted that the railway attacks were a "sort of prophylactic measure." "One wants to be sure," General Ferguson said
"that the enemy has not got the means to launch a major offensive." In an effort to clarify the air policy in Korea, the US FEAF intelligence journal explained that "The present objective of the isolation or interdiction program is to cripple the Communist logistic system to the extent that rapid redeployment of their forces and supplies in support of a sustained offensive is impossible." Ultimately, the US FEAF stated the official purpose of the railway-interdiction operations as being: "To interfere with and disrupt the enemy's lines of communications to such an extent that he will be unable to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces or be unable to mount a sustained offensive himself."

By the spring of 1952 the US FEAF would have gladly expunged the code name "Strangle" from the record. General Everest made efforts to eliminate the use of the term "Strangle" when he explained to newsmen on 12 April 1952 that "Operation Strangle" had been the name for the short-lived highway-interdiction program and that the aerial interdiction against the Red North Korea's railroads was properly termed the "Rail Interdiction Program."

Section 2. Operation Strangle

Launched suddenly and without warning, on 18 August 1951, the UNC air campaign against the Red North Korea's railway system soon gave evidences of its apparent success. Day after day, following 18 August 1951, the Fifth US Air Force scheduled its fighter-bomber wings for rail-cutting attacks in northwestern sectors of the Communist North Korea. Recognizing that lateral rail routes on the H-shaped rail network would be useless if the main north-south routes were destroyed, the Fifth US Air Force aimed its heaviest air attacks against the double-tracked rail lines between Sonchon and Sariwon. It also attacked the single-track rail lines which connected Huichon and Kuni-ri and Sunchon. Each day the Fifth US Air Force fragmentary operations orders specified a 15 to 30 mile stretch of rail line for attack by each fighter-bomber wing.

Under cover of the Sabre screen the fighter-bomber wings ordinarily attacked their sections of rail line twice each day. Most wing commanders employed "group gaggles" of 32 to 64 aircraft and varied their tactics according to enemy opposition and the weather. They used glide-and dive-bombing attacks, the former being more accurate and the latter offering the advantages of lower losses and damages from enemy ground fire. Some fighter-bombers carried 1,000-pound
Air Interdiction Campaign

bombs in August 1951, but the standard for use against rail tracks soon became two 500-pound bombs. The track-breaking was not as simple as it appeared. The Communist railway track was only 56 inches wide, and only a direct hit on this narrow-line target was effective. Assemble bombing results for August and September 1951 were improving and some 12.9 per cent of the bombs dropped cut the tracks, or one-fourth of the total sorties flown obtained rail cuts.

Simultaneously with the fighter-bomber strikes, the US FEAF Bomber Command’s B-29’s attacked the key railway bridges at Pyongyang, Sinanju, Sunchon, and Sonchon as a second priority to a continued neutralization of Communist airfields in the Communist North Korea. As a matter of routine, the US FEAF Bomber Command attacked bridges when photographic reconnaissance showed they were serviceable. On a rail-cutting day, the US FEAF Bomber Command ordinarily sent out two flights of four aircraft against two bridges.

RAIL INTERDICTIOIN AREA

Sketch Map 3

LEGEND

- Single Railroads
- Double Railroads
- Key Rail Bridges
- Rail Station

0 80 km
Each flight utilized an axis of attack as close to 90 degrees to the axis of the bridge as possible, thus permitting the bombardiers to use the long axis of the bridge as an aiming point for rate adjustments. Used initially to overcome the obstacle of cloudy summer skies, shoran proved adaptable to bridge busting.

As an illustration, the 19th US Bombardment Group utilized shoran bombing techniques to aim through nine-tenths cloud cover and knock the center span out of the Sunchon railway bypass bridge on 23 September 1951. The bypass bridges at the principal river crossings were easy for the B-29's to chop down, but the Reds also repaired them quickly. In August 1951, however, the Chongchon River floods swept over the rail and road bridges at Sinanju. On the northeastern coast, the Task Force 77's three aircraft carriers -- the *Bon Homme Richard*, *Essex*, and *Antietam* -- altered their pattern of previous interdiction attacks in order to maintain the neutralization of ten rail bridges and 17 highway bridges and to devote the remainder of their effort to attacks against railway lines in isolated areas where the enemy would have difficulty repairing cuts. The UNC Navy airmen performed excellently against the coastal rail routes, but they did not like the lateral rail route between Samdong-ni and Kowon. This route was said to be so well protected by Red ground fire that the UNC Navy airmen called it "Dead Valley." Although the Fifth US Air Force considered the interdiction of this lateral rail route to be critically important, Task Force 77 devoted little effort to this section of track.

The UNC railway-interdiction campaign bested the Communists in August and September 1951. Each night streams of Red vehicles moved southward to make up for the traffic which could not move by rail. Red rail traffic was evidently much reduced, for counts of railway cars in marshaling yards showed little change. Obviously in desperation, the Reds were cannibalizing their double-track railway line, their marshaling yards, and their spur lines to get undamaged rails. By mid-September 1951 the Fifth US Air Force attacks had reduced the main line from Sinuiju to Sinanju to 70 percent single track, from Sinanju to Pyongyang to 90 percent single track, and from Pyongyang to Sariwon to 40 percent single track. In order to keep a single crisscrossed rail line open, the Reds cannibalized 117 miles of track between Antung and Sariwon, and south of Sariwon they took up an additional 13 miles of track which had not been attacked, presumably to make repairs elsewhere.

The Fifth US Air Force was not only meeting good result in efforts to block rail traffic, but it was enjoying a bonus effect of attacks against enemy vehicular traffic. The B-26 night-intruders reported large kills of night moving trucks and trains, and the fighter-bomber wings swept southward after making rail cuts
looking for strafing target and also emphasized dawn and dusk armed-reconnaissance sweeps. Such armed-reconnaissance was often fruitful. Suddenly clearing weather on 24 August 1951 allowed a 16th US Fighter-Interceptor Squadron flight to catch the Reds ferrying a large convoy across a river, and this F-80 flight, plus two others speedily dispatched to the scene, accounted for more than 40 trucks, 20 railway cars, several supply-laden barges, and a large dump of goods on the riverbank. On 30 September 1951 a notable last-light flight of two 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron F-80’s destroyed an estimated 40 trucks out of a large convoy caught moving southward. Early-morning Thunderjet attacks found and destroyed Red locomotives which were tardy taking cover.

The Fifth US Air Force’s fighter-bomber wings destroyed Red North Korea’s railways faster than the Reds could repair them in October and November 1951, but the Communist were beginning to effect countermeasures to the railway attacks. Up north of the Chongchon River MIG’s shot down some fighter-bombers and forced more of them to jettison their bombs harmlessly. Unable to oppose this menace, General Everest was compelled to abandon efforts to destroy enemy’s rail lines between Sonchon and Sinanju. South of the Chongchon River the Reds concentrated automatic weapons along their rail lines and moved them to meet changes in Fifth US Air Force objectives.

In October 1951 group gaggles gave way to five-minutes-spaced squadron takeoffs, permitting lead flights more time to search out and neutralize hostile flak and preventing air jams over targets. To counteract the growing flak, the Fifth US Air Force allowed the fighter-bomber groups to arm up to 20 per cent of their sorties with proximity-fused bombs. Dive-bombing became the rule for all rail attacks, antiflak loadings reduced rail-cut potential, and bombing accuracy fell off. In an effort to increase their hit probabilities by carrying more bombs, the 8th and 49th US Fighter-Bomber Wings worked out devices which permitted their planes to carry additional small bombs on their unused rocket racks. The additional loading so markedly decreased speed and range, however, that the Fifth US Air Force soon gave up efforts to increase the combat loadings of the fighter-bombers.

Although the Reds were striking back with growing vigor, the Fifth US Air Force interdiction efforts were making substantial progress. After 2 October 1951 the Communists were unable to make any rail movements on the line between Sariwon and Pyongyang. After 25 October 1951 the stretch of rail line between Sukchon and Sinanju was completely unserviceable, but the Communists made herculean efforts to keep one rail line open from Sinuiju to Pyongyang and another from Huichon through Kunu-ri and Sunchon to the Yangdok area
For a period of the week late in October 1951 the Fifth US Air Force luckily blocked both of these lines by wrecking three locomotives along the stretch of track between Kuru-ri and Sunchon. At the end of October 1951, however, a few days of bad weather allowed the Reds to clear away the derelict locomotives and reopen this key link in their rail net.

Early in November 1951 the United Nations victory in the air battle against the Communist North Korea’s railroads seemed imminent. The Communists could still move trains over a circuitous route south from Sinuiju to Sinanju, then east to Kuru-ri, then south to Sunchon, and from there to Samdong and Yangdok. The Communists could also move from Kanggye to Kuru-ri, then to Sunchon, and thence into Pyongyang. On the east coast the Reds had no through traffic from Kilchu to Wonsan, but they still were shuttling trans between breaks in the tracks. In order to cut the rail routes in northwestern Red North Korea, the Fifth US Air Force needed only to destroy the short key link of railway between Kuru-ri and Sunchon, a task which appeared possible with a week of intensive attack.

Just when victory for the comprehensive rail attacks seemed to be in sight, however, Communist countermeasures to the UNC rail campaign began to work against the United Nations cause. Communist fighters and flak had already substantially lessened the US FEAF’s interdiction capabilities. After the bloodletting over the MIG Alley airfields late in October 1951, the US Bomber Command was unable simultaneously to neutralize the airfields the Reds were building and the bridges they were repairing.

Early in November 1951, moreover, the US Bomber Command was surprised to learn that the clever Communists had actually been using a bypass bridge at Sunchon which was assumed to be out of service. Day photos showed the bridge with two spans out in its middle, but the Fifth US Air Force was suspicious and sent an RB-26 there to take pictures on the night of 7 November 1951. These night photos showed that the Reds were placing removable spans in the bridge and using it throughout the night. With the US Bomber Command unable to hit the bridges, the Communists redoubled their effort to repair those that had been cut.

On 15 November 1951 the Communists completed reconstruction of the main highway bridge at Sinanju, and by 30 November 1951 they completed a rail bypass bridge at Pyongyang, thus permitting through rail traffic eastward to Samdong for the first time since August 1950. At the end of November 1951 the US Bomber Command’s B-29’s began to direct shoran attacks against the bridges at Sunchon and Sinanju, but the former bridges remained serviceable and the rail crossings at Sinanju were never made unserviceable for more than two
The rail bridge spanning the Chongchon River on the main highway entering Sinanju and Sinuiju is destroyed.

days hand-running.

Communist flak and fighters also reduced the Fifth US Air Force’s interdiction capabilities. Although the Misawa-based 116th US Fighter-Bomber Wing began on 30 November 1951 to stage one squadron to Taegu for limited periods of fighter-bomber work with the 136th US Wing, the conversion of the 51st US Fighter-Interceptor Wing from P-80’s to F-86’s reduced the Fifth US Air Force’s interdiction capabilities.
Enemy ground fire was also taking a substantial toll of the Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers. To such cause the Fifth US Air Force lost 26 fighters and had 24 damaged in August, lost 32 and had 233 damaged in September, lost 33 and had 238 damaged in October, and lost 24 and had 255 damaged in November 1951. The damage rate was especially high and placed burdens upon maintenance crews at the same time a high operational rate was already giving them trouble. In-commission rate for the old Shooting Stars declined appreciably. Flying from the dusty drome at Taegue, the 49th and 136th US Wings experienced an unusually high number of engine failures. Shortages of spare engines and inadequately programmed supply support severely reduced the number of combat-ready Thunderjet at Taegu. The swelling volume of Communist ground fire also lowered the accuracy of the fighter-bombers. According to a Fifth US Air Force operations analysis study made in December 1951, only seven percent of bombs dropped by Thunderjets were cutting the enemy's railway tracks.

As the 8th Air Group's rail target was the critically-important, 25-mile-long stretch of winding, twisting railway between Kumu-ri and Sunchon, the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group Shooting Star pilots returned again and again to hit a piece of terrain in November and December 1951. Despite the almost undivided efforts of this peerless fighter-bomber group, the Communist repair troops filled the bomb craters as fast as the Shooting Star pilots could make them.

From the outset of the "Operation Strangle" attacks the Communists had managed to repair rail cuts very quickly. Doubtlessly assisted by frozen ground which caused some delayed-fuzed bombs to skip off the target and reduced the dimensions of bomb craters of those that hit the target, the Communist seldom left rail cuts unrepaired for more than twenty-four hours in November 1951. When it appeared that the battered Kumu-ri to Sunchon track defied further repair, the Reds redoubled their efforts elsewhere in December 1951. South of Sunchon on the Pyongyang–Sinanju line, Communist laborers laid a rail bypass around a badly mauled section of track. Within a few days the enemy started to work on a similar bypass on the Kumu-ri to Sunchon line. In December 1951 photo interceptors indicated that Communist laborers, beginning work at dusk, could repair a rail cut within eight hours, thus opening a railway track for traffic between midnight and sunrise. Early in December 1951 Communist construction crews began to restore the badly damaged rail line between Pyongyang and Sariwon. Communist repairs progressed so rapidly that the Fifth US Air Force intelligence, on 23 December 1951, acknowledged that Red railway repairmen and bridge builders have broken our railroad blockade of Pyongyang and won the use of all key rail arteries.
Section 3. Operation Saturate

During the early months of 1952 the Fifth US Air Force considered means by which its rail interdiction effort might be improved. Although the rail lines were being cut daily at many points, the obstructions were not being maintained at night, in bad weather, or in frequent cases even while UNC aircraft were not in the area during the day. The enemy had revealed a persistent ability to repair small cuts in a few hours.

Since December 1951 the UNC commanders puzzled over the results of "Strangle." After a thorough study and review of the results of the interdiction program, General Ridgway messaged his conclusions to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 January 1952. General Ridgway noted that the air-interdiction campaign had slowed and seriously affected the enemy's supply operations and had increased the time required to move supplies to the front lines. It had forced the Reds to divert thousands of troops and much materiel in order to maintain and protect their lines of communications. It had destroyed thousands of vehicles and pieces of railway rolling stock and a significant quantity of supplies.

On the opposite side of ledger, however, General Ridgway noted that the air-interdiction program had not prevented the enemy from moving the supplies he needed to support a static defense or from making troop movements into the Red North Korea. Under conditions of static defense, General Ridgway recognized that the Communists could eventually accumulate the supplies they needed to support a major offensive despite the aerial interdiction. If the program should be discontinued or reduced, however, the UNC Commander-in-Chief thought that the enemy could, in a relatively short period of time, accumulate sufficient supplies to permit him to launch and sustain a major offensive. As a result of discussions during the Fifth US Air Force planning conference on 12 December, Brigadier General Ferguson, the US Fifth's Vice Commander announced that the "Strangle" operations ought to be continued for at least thirty more days, pending the development of more lucrative air targets. In the press conference on 26 December 1951 General Weyland stated that the air-interdiction campaign would be continued until the tactical situation or armistice agreements dictate a change. Both commanders nevertheless recognized that the aerial interdiction problem in Korea had become much more difficult.

Since both General Ridgway and General Weyland were in favor of continuing
the Red North Korean railway interdiction campaign, the Fifth US Air Force began to figure how rail attacks could be most effectively accomplished with declining air capabilities. A Fifth US Air Force targets division study issued on 25 February 1952 asserted the requirement for 24-hour interdiction with a sufficient concentration of effort being expended to mutilate and, if possible, to destroy selected stretches of the road beds of the key rail lines. The fighter-bombers would concentrate their attacks against particular segments of track, hitting the same segment during most of the daylight hours with no more than eight hour's lapse between strikes. At night a roving B-26 flare ship would work with individual B-26's which would periodically expend a bomb load of 10 x 500-pound bombs at the rail cuts and then get about their work of reconnoitering MSR's, using their guns and externally-hung 100-pound bombs against road traffic. Four main lines were recommended for such intensive interdiction: Kunu-ri to Huchon, Sunchon to Samdong-ni, Sinanju to Namsi-dong, and Pyongyang to Sariwon to Namchonjom. Because it believed that the B-29's had been given more bridges than they could keep neutralized, the targets division study recommended that they concentrate against the rail bridge complexes at Sinanju and Sunchon.

With General Everest's approval, the Fifth US Air Force put Operation "Saturate" into effect on 3 March 1952. Unlike the earlier operational pattern, the Fifth US Air Force Joint Operations Center now picked exact targets and closely controlled all flights of aircraft, directing routes of approach, initial points, withdrawal procedures, and altitudes to be flown to and from each target, the purpose being to compress the time interval of the attacks and to shift targets when weather or flak dictated. Among other considerations, the Fifth US Air Force attempted to select targets which were as free of flak as possible, but photo reconnaissance planes now not only reconnoitered planned target areas in advance but also slipped in to take pictures between fighter-bomber strikes. Working with wet prints, the 67th US Tactical Reconnaissance Wing photo interceptors flashed mission-results and flak-movement reports to the Joint Operations Center in time to assist fighter-bomber attacks later in the day. The fighter-bomber wings employed massed formations, but intensive study of flak positions prior to missions allowed the formations to neutralize the enemy's automatic weapons. As a planning objective, the Fifth US Air Force sought to expend an average of 300 fighter-bomber sorties and 600 bombs on each rail-track segment each day.

On 15 March 1952 the B-26's of the 3rd US Bombardment Wing began to supplement the day attacks by unloading their internally-carried 500-pound
bombs over the rail cuts at periodic intervals during the hours of darkness. Adverse flying weather handicapped the sustained motive of the "Saturate" attacks, and the results of the new attack plan were inconclusive until 25 March 1952. On this day the "Saturate" target was a segment of railway track between Chongju and Sinanju, especially selected because it included a long roadbed fill through swampy terrain, two bridges across small streams, and a minimum of flak. On 25 March 307 UNC fighter-bombers dropped 530 x 1,000-pound bombs and 84 x 500-pound bombs; on the night of 25–26 March 8 B-26's covered the target with 42 x 500-pound bombs; and on 26 March 161 fighter-bombers expended 322 x 1,000-pound bombs. In the two day attack, only one F-51 sustained minor flak damage. Photographic reconnaissance revealed that the Reds began to bring forward repair materials but attempted no

A perfect strike on the steel railroad bridge across the Taedong River.
repairs until the attacks were finished.

By 30 March 1952, five days after the initial strikes, the Reds had rebuilt their roadbed, and they replaced the tracks on the following day. The two-day maximum interdiction attack had put the rail line out of operation from 25 to 30 March and possible for another day, but the success of the effort was partly attributable to the thawing soil which caused bomb craters to fill with water and forced the Reds to haul in dry fill and ballast. In this same last week of March 1952 the B-29’s were also successful against bridge targets. At Pyongyang, on the 25 March, 41 B-29’s knocked down 225 feet of the bridges; at Sinanju, on the 28th, 47 B-29’s took out 320 feet of bridges; and on the last day of the month 13 B-29’s chopped spans from the Sinhung-ni railway bridge.

Having been shown to be practicable, the “Saturate” concept was continued, albeit with attacks of less magnitude than the initial effort but still concentrated against approximately two-mile-long sections of track on the main enemy rail lines. Day and night attacks were concentrated against the same sector for one or two days and then moved to another sector before the enemy could concentrate his flak. At first, when the Fifth US Air Force was able to outguess the Reds and strike where they had little flak, bombing accuracy was good and damages to aircraft were slight. But by the end of April the Reds had emplaced flak batteries along nearly all of their rail lines and there were virtually no flak-free targets to be found.

During April 1952 “Saturate” attacks kept the enemy’s rail line between Sinuiju and Sinanju continuously out of operation, illustrating the validity of the tactics, but the Fifth US Air Force’s rundown fighter-bomber strength was too small to permit it to effect a simultaneous interdiction of the enemy’s other rail lines. In April the Fifth US Air Force reached a nadir of fighter-bomber strength. Chiefly during railway interdiction strikes it had lost 243 fighter-bombers and had sustained major damages to 290 other tactical airplanes. In compensation for these losses, it had received only 131 replacement aircraft. The 49th and 136th US Fighter-Bomber Wings were woefully deficient in aircraft. Instead of the 75 unit equipment aircraft authorized, the 49th possessed 41 aircraft and the 136th had only 30.

As replacements for the F-84E Thunderjets, USAF was shipping outdated F-84D (Modified) aircraft, planes which General Everest had protested strongly but unsuccessfully against taking. Employing all units, including the 1st US Marine Air Wing, the Fifth US Air Force could possible have made and maintained six intensive cuts on the enemy’s rail lines, but several times this number of continuous cuts would have been required to deny the enemy use of his 600
miles of railways in Red North Korea. Despite a recognition that it lacked requisite strength needed fully to exploit the "Saturate" tactics, the Fifth US Air Force continued to effect a partial blockade of Red North Korea's rail routes in the first half of May 1952. Already, however, air-operations planners were seeking an application of efforts which would be more profitable than interdiction had been.

Section 4. Employment of Night Intruder

With the beginning of the "Strangle" railway-interdiction campaign, the 3rd and 452nd US Wings' mission of night interdiction assumed added importance in August 1951. If the night intruders could make night vehicular movements too expensive for the enemy to continue, the Reds would find themselves in an impossible logistical situation. Looking toward more effective night operations, the Fifth US Air Force divided the Red North Korea between the two B-26 wings. Based at Kunsan Airfield (K-8), the 3rd US Wing was made responsible for covering the main supply routes in western part of the Communist North Korea. Flying from Pusan East Airfield (K-9), the 452nd US Wing drew the duty of covering the main supply routes in eastern part of the Communist North Korea.

US Marine Squadron VMF-513 continued to work with flare aircraft against enemy traffic on supply routes near the rear of the main lines of resistance. The Fifth US Air Force operations assigned colour designations and numbers to each main supply route within enemy territory, and its daily operations orders directed the particular routes over which the night-attack units would maintain surveillance and attack. Ordinarily, the B-26 wings dispatched "lone-wolf" intruder crews at periodic intervals throughout the night, and the four-hour flights were timed to cover assigned supply routes or railways from dusk to dawn. In the winter months the usual interval between take offs was thirty minutes, but on shorter summer nights the interval was reduced to fifteen minutes.

Intruder crews of the 3rd and 452nd US Wings varied their tactics according to the model of planes they flew, the terrain they flew over, and the availability of natural or artificial illumination. Even if an intruder crew had flare support, Korea's rugged terrain hazarded low-level operations. Since aerial charts were frequently inexact, B-26 crews usually pulled up from strafing attacks at altitudes not less than 1,000 feet higher than the highest published height of terrain
features in the vicinity of a target. One pilot further added that the “safe” pull-out altitude was actually 1,000 feet higher than the published altitude of the highest obstacle, plus an additional 500 feet for each maned man on the crew.

When night-intruder crews could secure flare support, they could work closer to the ground. Pointing out that the Marine squadron, which always worked with flare planes, claimed three times as much destruction as the 3rd US Wing in April 1952, General Everest asked that the “Firefly” flight of the 67th US Tactical Reconnaissance Wing be augmented by an additional 20 C-46’s. When this request was made in September 1951, however, the US FEAF had to refuse it because its stocks of flares were already critically short and would remain so during the autumn of 1951. Denoting an increased interest in bombing as the optimum intruder tactic, the US FEAF had requested USAF in May 1951 to send glass-nose B-26C’s to the Far East as replacement aircraft.

With a bombardier’s position forward, the B-26C was much more suitable for bombing attacks than was the hard-nose B-26B strafer. Although it was unable to honor this request, USAF nevertheless undertook to secure British Mark IX fixed-angle bombsights for the Korean B-26 groups. For a trained bombardier the Morden M-9 reflex sight was more satisfactory, but the Mark IX was thought to be easier for lesser-skilled bombardiers to operate.

When the daytime “Strange” attacks successfully interdicted the Red rail lines in Red North Korea in late August 1951, 3rd and 452nd US Wing night intruder-crews reported that they had never before seen so many enemy vehicles traveling the roads of Red North Korea. In view of the emergency, the Reds evidently threw caution to the wind and sent large convoys southward with headlamps blazing. “The traffic reminded me of the crowd leaving the Cotton Bowl football game,” said Captain Clay C. Stephenson of Dallas. “The roads,” he added, “were clogged everywhere.” With so many Red convoys on the roads, the night intruders turned in large claims of vehicles destroyed. On the night of 24–25 August B-26 crews claimed nearly 800 vehicles destroyed or damaged, merit General Weyland’s congratulations.

During the month of August 1951 the intruder crews claimed 1,935 vehicles destroyed and 3,633 damaged. The lighted convoys, moreover, were natural targets for bombing attacks. According to the 452nd US Wing pilot reports, 71 percent of the vehicles destroyed during August 1951 were dispatched by aircraft with bombs. The 3rd US Group reported that “tests” of an undescribed nature demonstrated the effectiveness of synchronous bombing attacks against Red convoys employing 500-pound proximity-fuzed bombs from altitudes up to 8,000 feet.
With all available B-26's working at night interdiction, the 3rd and 452nd US Wings claimed to have destroyed 2,362 enemy vehicles and to have damaged 4,959 others between 23 August and 15 September 1951. Despite a tightened Fifth US Air Force definition issued late in the month, the Fifth US Air Force claimed 5,318 vehicles destroyed in September. In October 1951 the Fifth US Air Force posted claims of 6,761 enemy vehicles destroyed, the highest monthly total for vehicles destroyed during the Korean War.

On 15 September 1951, when the "Strangle" operations were nearly a month old and seemed eminently successful, General Weyland began to mature a relationship between the day fighter-bomber rail-cutting missions and the night-
intruder operation. "As a conservative estimate," General Weyland informed General Twining, USAF vice chief of staff, "we have damaged 5,621 and destroyed 2,559 vehicles during the past twenty-three days." No new techniques or revolutionary tactics of night attack had been devised. The increased results were attributable to the fact that all light bombers were devoting all their efforts to night interdiction.

Although the intruders were claiming many vehicles destroyed, many others were doubtlessly getting through with Red supplies. The only known method of choking off the enemy's supplies, General Weyland said, was to increase the scope of the night-interdiction effort with additional B-26's. If USAF still could not increase the aircraft authorizations of the 3rd and 452nd US Wings, the US FEAF commander recommended that USAF should lend him the 126th US Light Bombardment Wing, which was training for deployment to Europe.

When the Korean War was over, General Weyland promised to deploy to Europe a light bomber wing, fully trained, in combat trim. The increased effort thus available", he said, "should raise our night claims proportionately and might well be deciding factor in our effort to destroy the enemy's resupply capabilities." On 20 September 1951, however, General Vandenberg again reported that USAF could not provide or support additional B-26's in Korea.

According to the mission reports of the night-intruder crews - - purposefully kept conservative by more rigid criteria -- the 3rd and 452nd Wing destroyed an average of 164 enemy vehicles per day during September and 181 per day during October 1951. Within the validity of the crew claims, Fifth US Air Force operations analysis concluded that the principal result of the "Strangle" interdiction campaign was not the throttling of the flow of supplies to Communist front-line troops, but the attrition of at least 15 percent of the Soviet bloc's monthly truck production by less than a hundred old B-26 aircraft. If the crew reports were right, the Reds were facing difficult logistical days.

They could continue to support their front-line troops only by expending 5,000 trucks a month. No doubt influenced by the remarkable reported results of the light bomber wings, USAF continued to study the possibilities of increasing US FEAF's B-26 strength. Early in October 1951 USAF determined that by cannibalizing some old B-26's for spare airframe parts and by sending nonstandard B-26's to Korea it could possibly provide the US FEAF with six squadrons each with 24 B-26's plus 50 percent theater reserves, or a total of 216 B-26's. In order to attain the war strength he had so long requested General Weyland agreed to accept B-26's which would not possess shoran and various other items of equipment suiting them to a night-attack configuration. On 27
Air Interdiction Campaign

October 1951 General Vandenberg ordered that US FEAF’s B-26 unit equipment authorization be increased from 96 to 144 aircraft and specified 1 May 1952 as the target date for the completion of the augmentation.

Both US FEAF and USAF apparently gave credence to the report that less than a hundred old B-26’s were destroying up to 15 percent of the Soviet bloc’s monthly truck production. Especially in the Fifth US Air Force, the report engendered optimistic predictions that aerial interdiction would force the Red ground forces to retire northward. Although the night intruders were undoubtedly more effective than usual against the streams of Communist vehicles which jammed the roads in the autumn months of 1951, it was all too evident later on that the claims of the night-intruder crews were exaggerated. Flying alone at night, unable to secure photographic verification of their claims, the night-intruder crews were understandably unable to determine the exact result of their missions. Apparently several factors determined the extent of claims turned in by the night-intruder crews.

As early as September 1951 some Fifth US Air Force operations analysts noted that night-intruder crews did not indicate that any one type of bomb was better than another for destroying enemy vehicles and suggested that crews were claiming vehicles destroyed in proportion to the number of vehicles sighted and the number of B-26 sorties flown. General Weyland also attributed the increased night-intruder claims of August and September 1951 to the fact that the B-26 wings were flying more night-intruder sorties than ever before. The number of Communist vehicles sighted showing headlamps had some correlation with night-intruder claims, for the B-26 crews to some extent measured the success of their missions in terms of the size of the enemy convoy sighted and attacked.

With the arrival of winter weather in November 1951, the Communists began to break the fighter-bomber blockade of Red North Korea’s rail lines, and the night-intruders accordingly sighted fewer Red vehicles moving with lights on roads. As the convoys became smaller and better dispersed, the Fifth US Air Force claims of vehicles destroyed declined to 4,571 in November and to 4,290 in December 1951. In the latter month, moreover, the Fifth US Air Force also lost a part of its night-intruder capability, for US Marine Squadron VMF-513 ran short of aircraft and crews and was forced to suspend its intruder operations. Accordingly, the 3rd US Wing intruder crews began to cooperate with the Firefly flare ships for attacks along the road route between Pyongyang and Sariwon.

On the cold moonlight nights of these winter months, however, the night-intruders reported some good success against the increasing number of Communist trains that were sighted. Locomotives never showed headlamps and could be sighted and destroyed only by crews who hunted them at low altitudes and
looked for plumes of smoke or stream. It must have been easier said than done, but the 3rd US Group noted that “one very successful method of attack (against trains) stops the locomotive by cutting the rails ahead and behind the initial positions of the train; marks the position of the train with a fire bomb; and then applies low-level bombing attacks using 500-pound parademos.” Apparently because the Fifth US Air Force regulations allowed a locomotive to be claimed as “destroyed” only when such ordnance was used, the night-intruder crews who hunted locomotives almost always employed some type of 500-pound bomb.

As the Communist built up their battleline logistical stocks and grew better able to cope with daytime railway interdiction, the number and density of vehicle sightings continued to decline and the night-intruders reported poorer and poorer results during the early months of 1952.

Other tasks, moreover, diverted B-26’s from intruding. In accordance with the “Saturate” operations, the 3rd US Wing after 11 March 1952 each night scheduled approximately 49 B-26’s to make intensive railway interdiction cuts, each employing six 500-pound general-purpose bombs. These bombs saved their externally carried bombs for route-reconnaissance attacks against enemy vehicles. Since the rail-cutting endeavor greatly shortened the time available for route-reconnaissance and vehicle claims decreased, the 3rd US Wing secured permission late in March to schedule 12 B-26’s each night exclusively for rail-cutting missions in three target areas. Other planes flew standard “lone-wolf” night-intruder sorties. Until the end of May the rail-cutting B-26’s sought to intensify rail blockage by night attacks with 500-pound bombs, but at this time, in deference to an operations analysis suggestion, the rail-attack B-26’s began to employ antipersonnel bombs, the idea being to hinder nocturnal rail repair rather than to inflict more damage to the rail lines.

The 452nd US Wing continued to emphasize night-intruder route reconnaiss ance, but in March 1952 it reported some highly-successful results obtained by bomber stream attacks against accumulations of enemy supplies in Hwangju, Chunchuwa, and Sariwon. On occasion both wings were diverted to shoran targets, though neither wing had much shoran capability. Ground-radar-directed close-support missions also engaged an increasing number of the light bombers.

Lacking any better means of assessing their mission accomplishments, the B-26 wings could judge their success only by aircrew claims of vehicles destroyed which plummeted downward to 2,489 in January, 2,367 in February, 1,750 in March, and 1,723 in April, 1952. The additional support which USAF had undertaken to provide did not help the B-26 wings with the accomplishment of their night-attack mission. The wings reported that the nonstandard B-26’s
sent to them from the United States were "shocking disappointment." Some of the old planes still had "flat-top" canopies, which disqualified them for combat since crewmen who wore winter flying equipment and survival gear could not squeeze out of them in a bail-out emergency. Even with the nonstandard B-26's, moreover, USAF ultimately had to recognize its inability to bring the 3rd and 452nd Wings up to war strength.

In the spring of 1952 a final USAF programming action allocated 24 B-26's to each 3rd US Wing squadron and 16 B-26's to each 452nd US Wing squadron. The US FEAF authorization for light bombers thus included 120 B-26's as unit equipment and 60 B-26's in theater reserve. The supply of B-26 replacement crews was also deficient. Geared to produce 45 crews every five weeks, the combat crew-training school at Langley Air Force Base could not satisfy the US FEAF's attrition and rotation requirements which went from 58 crews a month to 63 a month, and then to 93 a month in the last half of 1951. USAF had to obtain the additional crews by levying on zone of interior commands for casual

The parabomb, armed with a delayed action fuse, is shown heading directly for a sturdy enemy railbridge.
crew personnel who were formed into crews for training in the Far East. The British Mark-IX bomb-sights delivered to the B-26 wings in November 1951 proved no better in the hands of poorly-qualified bombardiers than the Norden sights, and in May 1952 the Fifth US Air Force accordingly retired the British sights from operation. In these same months during which each intruder sortie flown reported fewer enemy vehicles destroyed, Communist ground fire wrought increasing losses on the B-26's. By the summer of 1952 Colonel G. S. Brown, the Fifth US Air Force's director of operations, could only report that "We were trading B-26's for trucks in a most uneconomical manner." It was evident that the Fifth US Air Force's light bombers were no longer scoring positive results against the enemy.

Section 5. Red Countermeasures to Rail Interdiction

A fundamental requirement for executing any successful military campaign is knowledge of the enemy. It is necessary to know his capabilities, probable cause of action, and reactions under given circumstances. At the end of Korean war, the US FEAF intelligence had occasion to comment upon the scarcity of studies undertaken during operational planning regarding potential enemy reactions to the UNC aerial attack. Inasmuch as there had been but infrequent demands for such intelligence estimates relative to expected enemy reactions very few were accomplished, the majority of reaction estimates consisting of speculation among personnel at the working level.

In the case of "Strangle," the Fifth US Air Force planning had little concern with potential enemy countermeasures. Although the operation was initially attractive because of its virtually flak-free targets, no thought was apparently taken that the enemy might be able to reinforce his antiaircraft fire. The planners, as the US FEAF later noted, could have benefited from an estimate of the enemy's capability to repair bridges by improvisation or use of prefabricated spans, to establish networks of bypass bridges, to build new bypass railway lines, to amass coolie labor to maintain his logistical position, and when his supply was hurting to increase his ground action along the main line of resistance in order to divert UN aircraft to close support and away from interdiction missions.

From modest beginnings in June 1950 the Reds increased their antiaircraft artillery in Korea steadily, reaching an estimated 275 heavy and 600 automatic weapons on 1 July 1951 and 409 heavy and 1,318 automatic weapons on 30
June 1952. Viewed in terms of World War II, the Communist antiaircraft artillery establishment was small. Even in June 1952 the Communist flak order in the Red North Korea was provably less than the World War II defenses of many single cities in Germany. The US FEAF loss to enemy flak nevertheless was the major category of loss to enemy action (68 percent), and concentrations of automatic weapons along the MSR’s made friendly interdiction operations more difficult, lessened the effectiveness of rail bombing, and caused increased battle damages.

The Communist flak arsenal ultimately included Soviet-made 12.7-mm. machine guns, 20-, 27-, 40-, and 45-mm. light automatic weapons; 76.2-mm. medium guns; and 85-mm. heavy guns. Most of these weapons permitted use for either antiaircraft or antipersonnel purposes, and during the spring campaigns of 1951 the general movements of these weapons coincided with those of the other ground force arms. Heavier guns, however, were usually in fixed defenses. Pyongyang in January 1951 was defended by 53 heavy guns and 63 automatic weapons. By April and May 1951 the enemy was also defending his airfields in Red North Korea with heavy guns, while some heavy flak batteries had moved up immediately behind the front lines.

Consonant with the need for combating predominantly low-level air operations, the Communists concentrated automatic weapons along the main rail lines after August 1951. Their tendency was to employ such weapons in ground positions, diverting them to alternate positions as dictated by operational requirements, rather than to use any appreciable amount of train- or vehicle-mounted AAA. By June 1952 the enemy was using over half of his flak (132 heavy guns and 708 automatic weapons) to protect his bridges and supply routes.

In the railway interdiction attacks the fighter-bombers had less to fear from the heavier guns than from automatic weapons, small arms, and infantry weapons fire. Communist troops trained for the Korean fighting had been taught the Russian doctrine that “Disruption of rear supplies is the foundation of victory and vigilant preparations against enemy air attacks are especially important tasks.” Air defense thus became the duty of each unit, which was charged to maintain air observation sentries and to employ available fire against aircraft flying at less than 4,500 feet, especially in those vulnerable moments when the plane was diving, releasing, or climbing. Captured enemy documents indicated that in January 1951 the Red Chinese forces also organized especially trained “Hunter Groups,” organically assigned to regiments and divisions for protection against aircraft. Equipped with heavy caliber machine guns, these hunter groups reportedly drew good pay and uniforms, and for the confirmed de-
struction of three UN aircraft in any 90-day period the “hero” was given a
15-day leave. A variation of the special incentive award was reported by an
escaped Fifth US Air Force pilot as “a month’s vacation in Pyongyang or
Peking, all the fine foods he can eat during his vacation, and plenty of good
looking women.”

The concentration also took an increasing toll of UN aircraft: 26 lost and
24 damaged in August 1951, 32 lost and 233 damaged in September 1951, 33
lost and 238 damaged in October 1951, and 24 lost and 255 damaged in No-
vember 1951. Automatic weapons and infantry fire found the F-51 particularly
vulnerable and contributed to the excessive losses of this conventional fighter,
losses which totaled 96 in fiscal year 1951 and 66 in fiscal year 1952. Such a
loss and damage rate was a severe strain on the Fifth US Air Force strength. By
April 1952 the US FEAF had received only 131 replacement aircraft of the
types engaged in rail interdiction against the 243 it had lost and the 290 major
damaged aircraft on interdiction sorties. The Communist air defense thus
contributed to the maintenance of their acceptable logistical position.

The Chinese Communist and Red North Korean ability to keep their supply
lines operative in the face of constant air attacks revealed a tenacity and determi-
nation which had been equalled by few armies. Using organized recovery
programs, Red engineers consistently met the physical destruction inflicted
upon their supply routes. Road repairs were the province of the Red North
Korean department of military highway administration, comprising 12 adminis-
trative regiments, each mustering three or more 500-man battalions. Each
battalion was assigned a sector of a MSR, and platoons of the road-repair
companies were stationed about three kilometers apart along important routes.
Road patrols on foot reported impassable spots to the nearest road-repair
company, which worked at night with hand tools to eliminate the obstruction.

The Red North Korean railroad bureau was responsible for the recovery and
maintenance of rail lines. With headquarters in the outskirts of Pyongyang, this
bureau controlled some three bridges, each of 7,700 men. Units 50 railroad
repair-troops were stationed at major rail stations, while crews of 10 men were
located about every four miles along the routes. Rail walkers spotted cuts
during the day and recruited nearby citizens for the necessary manual labor.
After night-fall experienced military repair undertook the supervision of the
manual tasks and made the actual repair of ties and rails.

The military supply system used by the NK Communists was based upon the
“delivery forward” principles perfected by Soviet armies in World War II. This
logistical system was a two-fold effort in which rear area logistical commands
moved supplies to forward depots and supply points, where the supplies were
picked up by rear service sections of front-line units. Movement of supplies
within logistical commands was done where possible by train with auxiliary
truck support. Below the depot level, movement was generally by truck. From
unit dumps to front-line troops ox-carts, pack animals, and human carriers
moved supplies. Supply depots and points generally remained stationary, being
too well dug-in and dispersed to be easily moved even when the progress of
battle was favorable.

Apparently the major impetus of Communist supply from Manchuria passed
through Sinuiju and Manpojin, whence the cargoes were routed to the major
supply areas at Sopo, Pyongyang, and Yangdok, and thence again southward,
chiefly by vehicle, to the six subordinate branch depots located near Mulgae-ri,
Suan, Koksan, Singosan, Sepo-ri, and Hoeyang. From these points supplies
moved to army and corps dumps. All dumps south of the 39th parallel em-
ployed extensive camouflage, dispersion, revetting, and often were defended by
antiaircraft artillery.

When the rail lines were pressingly interdicted by air attack, the Communists
utilized truck transport to provide their supplies from Manchuria. Trucks were
normally required to handle resupply south of the major trans-shipment points,
thus either for short-haul or long-distance movement the estimated 2,448 tons
of supply which the Communist forces on the front-line required had to be
moved by vehicle during some stage of the journey. Each Red logistical com-
mand in Red North Korea apparently possessed four motor transport companies,
each with 65 trucks; branch depots had one truck company; and Chinese
Communist armies also possessed trucks within their transportation sections,
although animals might be issued when vehicles were not available. Truck crews,
comprising a driver, guard, and helper, generally travelled in convoys of 15 to 20
vehicles at night, using headlights only when meeting other vehicles, travelling
mountain roads, or approaching dangerous spots in the road. The degree of
blackout, however, depended upon the anticipated danger of air attack and the
urgency of the mission. Convoys frequently travelled with lights, relying on
the sentries who were stationed at frequent intervals along the MSR’s for
warning of approaching aircraft. When alerted for air attack, the convoys
reduced speed, blacked out, and continued along at about five miles an hour.
Most trucks ran between 1800 and 0400 hours, and all vehicles were dispersed
and camouflaged before dawn.

Limited to night movements on rough and often tortuous roads, Communist
truck travel was slow, although captured documents indicated that each truck
was expected to cover 62.5 miles each day, or 1,562.5 miles each month, five
days being allocated each month for necessary maintenance. A good estimate
had it that enemy vehicles could average about 60 to 80 miles each night above
the 39th Parallel, and had to show their pace to 50 to 70 miles per night below
the parallel. A round trip from the Manchurian border to the battle front of
eastern Korea (310 miles one way) could require as many as 10 nights’ travel.
Captured documents showed that the Communists waged a constant campaign
to sustain the morale of their truck crews. Allaying their natural fears of air
attacks, awarding the honor of “Transportation Hero” to the meritorious, and
punishing “nightests who are fearful of death.” One propaganda effort empha-
sized that “the loss of one trip due to illness of the driver means that 2,250 men
cannot get food for one day.”

However labourous and crude the Communist supply system might appear by
Western standards, it was able to provide the Red armies with daily resupply
despite intensive attacks by UN air power. Benefitting from the inactivity
in the ground fighting at the front, the Communist supply system was also able
to stockpile reserve stores in advanced depots.

Thus on 21 May 1952 General Ridgway stated: “I think that the hostile
forces now opposing the Eighth US Army -- have a substantially greater offensive
potential than at any time in the past.” As a natural consequence of a much
reduced scale of fighting, the Communists had expended less ammunition and,
despite air interdiction, had gradually built up far greater reserves of artillery
and mortar ammunition than they had ever possessed in the combat zone.

Section 6. Air Interdiction Campaign in Retrospect

The comprehensive railway attacks against the Red North Korea were to
continue until the end of June 1952. Despite the magnitude of the United
Nations air effort in “Strangle” and “Saturate” operations between 18 August
1951 and 30 June 1952 in which the US FEAF aircraft alone flew 87,552
interdiction sorties and claimed for over 19,000 rail cuts plus the destruction of
34,211 vehicles, 276 locomotives, and 3,820 rail cars, the UN Command had not
succeeded in placing upon the Communists the intolerable pressure which had
been hoped for by the interdiction planners.

At the Panmunjom armistice negotiation, the Communist delegates showed no
Air Interdiction Campaign

signs of changing their negotiating attitude as the winter gave way to spring in 1952. Ten months of comprehensive railway interdiction had apparently failed to hurt the Reds enough to compel them to accept United Nations armistice terms. In fact, the Reds were obviously proud that Communist manpower was overcoming western technology. Radio Peking would boast that the United Nations Command "mobilized more than 2,000 military aircraft and still failed to cut off the Communist supply line to tiny Red North Korea." Many high-ranking officers were quick to discount the success of the aerial interdiction campaign.

Back in Washington General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commandant of the US Marine Corps, publicly stated that "Operation Strangle" was "recognized as a fizzle" and that the Reds were steadily building up their land forces in spite of it. "The interdiction program was a failure," said Vice-Admiral J.J. Clark, commander of the Seventh US Fleet. "It did not interdict. The Communists got the supplies through; and for the kind of the war they were fighting, they not only kept their battleline supplied, but they had enough surplus to spare so that by the end of the war they could even launch an offensive."

The critics of the United Nations aerial-interdiction campaign in Korea apparently failed to evaluate the railway interdiction operations in term of the stated purpose, which was: "To interfere with and disrupt the enemy's lines of communication to such an extent that he will be unable to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces or be unable to mount a sustained offensive himself." Viewed in terms of its stated purpose, the railway-interdiction campaign had not failed. "It is believed," stated an Eighth US Army intelligence report on 22 March 1952, "that the air and naval interdiction program - - - has limited the enemy capability of successfully maintaining an all-out, major, sustained offensive." Despite the shift of the UNC air effort away from interdiction beginning in May 1952, the Red North Korean rail network had been so badly battered by ten months of intensive attack that it would not again be able to support a major and sustained Communist ground offensive.

Although the comprehensive railway interdiction campaign attained its limited purpose, the operation nevertheless disclosed certain regrettable failures in command, in planning, and in execution. Involving all theater air forces and far-reaching in scope, the air campaign against Red North Korea's railroads should properly have been ordered and controlled at theater air-force level. The facets of the interdiction program were completely interrelated and the program had to succeed or fail as an entity, yet no one air officer could be
considered responsible for the success or failure of the interdiction campaign because there was no single responsible air commander.

The Fifth US Air Force planned and after a measure supervised the interdiction attacks, but it was powerless to direct the operations of the independent Seventh US Fleet or of the equally-independent US FEAF Bomber Command. Forced to cajole when it could not order, the Fifth US Air Force employed the flambuoyant code name "Strangle," a caption which gave those who did not understand the real objective of the interdiction program a vehicle for proclaiming its failure.

The Fifth US Air Force planning for the comprehensive railway attacks correctly identified the importance of the Red North Korean railway system to the Red war effort, but it displayed two serious defects. The planners did not adequately compute the force capabilities of the United Nations air forces required to effect the desired degree of interdiction of the Red North Korean railway system. At the beginning, the Fifth US Air Force apparently assumed that the United Nations air forces had the capability to destroy the enemy's rail system in the Red North Korea. At the end, the United Nations air forces failed in their efforts absolutely to interdict Red North Korean rail transportation because they lacked sufficient aircraft strength to maintain by day and night the intensive rail cuts required to keep all rail lines out of operation. "Nothing is so bad in air campaigns as not to have enough force to do a job completely," commented General Weyland. "For example," he added, "all but four or five percent of pre-war rail traffic in Red North Korea was stopped, but this was sufficient to form a solid base upon which to add enough truck and A-frame transportation to maintain a static supply line.

Closely related to the failure of the Fifth US Air Force's operational planners to calculate the friendly forces which would be required to interdict the Red North Korea's railways was the failure of intelligence officers to assess the enemy's countermeasures to the planned air attacks. Since the operations officers very seldom asked for enemy reaction studies, air intelligence officers very seldom accomplished such studies. Despite the fact that the success of the railway-interdiction program would depend upon the enemy's countermeasures, the Fifth US Air Force operations officers called for no enemy reaction estimates. This was a great mistake. Modest in their supply requirements and able to give or decline combat, Communist front-line troops were able to gauge their supply expenditures so as to survive periods of disruption in their logistical support. Back of the lines, moreover, the Communist North Korea railroad bureau managed a crude but wonderfully effective rail-recovery effort. By June 1953
the Communist were using over half of their antiaircraft artillery to protect their key bridges and their rail lines. By the standards of World War II, the Red flak order was weak, but it was strong enough to take an unacceptable toll of the US FEA planes in Korea.

Although ten months of sustained air attacks against the Red North Korea’s railroads attained their stated purpose of slowing and disrupting the Communist logistical support system, one may nevertheless wonder whether a more forceful air campaign against more vital target systems might not have been more profitably employed from the beginning of the armistice negotiations. Seen abstractly, the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and preventive rather than offensive and positive.

The United Nations air power sought to disrupt the Communist logistical system because the Eighth US Army feared that the Reds might otherwise easily accumulate the supplies they required to mount a major and sustained ground offensive. Even though the Eighth US Army was stalemated and not intending to attack, the United Nations air power was again supporting the UNC ground forces. Within their limited scope of possible accomplishment, the United Nations air force’s rail-interdiction attacks apparently brought some degree of military pressure to bear upon the Communists in the autumn and early winter of 1951, thus justifying the operation as a worthwhile short-time application of airpower. Given enough time, any astute enemy will devise countermeasures to a given line of military action, and the Reds began to practice effective countermeasures to the UNC interdiction attack by December 1951. As a result, the United Nations railway-interdiction strikes attained progressively diminishing results after January 1952.

Had the United Nations airpower been permitted to attack more decisive target systems as early as August 1951 or certainly in January 1952, the Communists might very probably have been willing to accept reasonable armistice terms much earlier than was the case. However the Korean War was fought in the goldfish bowl of world opinion, and more forceful air operations were prohibited until the United Nations Command had presented its “final” offer of armistice terms in April 1952. If the railway-interdiction campaign lacked the military effect which possibly could have been attained by other operations, it nevertheless conformed with a contemporary climate of world opinion which earnestly desired to end the fighting in Korea even with some sacrifice of principle.
CHAPTER IV THE SHIFT IN UNC AIR STRATEGY

Section 1. Toward an Air-Pressure Strategy

A Staff Study

At the beginning of the armistice negotiations United Nations air forces were unable to secure either the tactical opportunity or the logistical wherewithal that needed for more aggressive air action. In some measure, moreover, General Weyland, the US FEAF commander, was held prisoner by the doctrinal concept for the employment of airpower in land campaigns, even though such a campaign was no longer in progress in Korea.

General Weyland understood that he must preserve United Nation air superiority as a matter of first priority, but aside from this only possible employment for airpower under the existing climate of politico-military decisions was either against interdiction objectives or close-support targets along the stalemated front lines. Viewing this choice, General Weyland reasoned that "in the fall of 1951 it would have been sheer folly not to have concentrated the bulk of our air effort against interdiction targets in the enemy rear areas. Otherwise the available firepower would have been expended inefficiently against relatively invulnerable targets along the front, while the enemy was left free to build up his resources to launch and sustain a general offensive."

Initially meaningful in terms of its impact upon the Communist military situation, the United Nations air campaign against Red North Korea's railroads soon lost any ability that it might have had to influence the course of armistic negotiations at Panmunjom. Still confronting the choice as to whether it would be interdiction or close support, however, General Weyland positively asserted on 26 December 1951 that the United Nations air forces were going to continue rail-interdiction on a top-priority basis. Soon, however, a powerful new voice in the United Nations Command began to question the existing UN strategy and the ability of the railway interdiction program to attain meaningful results in terms of the armistice negotiations. Brigadier General Jacob E. Smart who
The Shift in UNC Air Strategy

replaced Brigadier General Crabb as US FEAP’s deputy for operations on 18 January 1952 had witnessed the declining effectiveness of UN air forces’ efforts to utilize tactical air doctrines in a stalemate truce-talk situation where conventional doctrines for the employment of tactical air forces applied only to the air-superiority portion of the air effort.

Up until this time the US FEAF had explained its air operations in terms of air superiority, interdiction, and ground support, but in February General Smart secured acceptance of a new statement of the US FEAF operations policy which noted that the command sought to maintain effective and positive military pressure upon the Communist military forces in order that the UN Command might obtain the most favorable results in the Korean armistice negotiations.

The US Far East Air Forces accepted the proposition that aerial operations ought to maintain military pressure upon the Reds in order to influence the armistice negotiations, but there was little agreement as to how military pressure could be waged. Early in March 1952 General Smart decided to get some concentrated thinking on the subject of US FEAF’s efforts in Korea. He accordingly relieved Colonel Richard L. Randolph from his regular duties as assistant chief of US FEAF’s combat operations division and briefed him on the job he wanted done. At Colonel Randolph’s request General Smart also assigned to the study Lieutenant Colonel Ben I. Mayo, another young officer who had been a combat commander in Korea from the earliest days of the Korean War. General Smart imposed no time restrictions and asked only that Colonels Randolph and Mayo to dig as completely and fully into the problem as it required and to come up with the best possible answers on how to prosecute more effectively the air war in Korea.

On 12 April 1952, after six weeks’ work, they submitted a staff study covering their findings and recommendations to General Smart. The study was a shrewed analysis of shortcomings in Korea and suggested the concepts of a new strategy which might be of value. Colonels Randolph and Mayo did not consider that the months of comprehensive railway interdiction had been wasted, for the Red North Korean railways had been so badly mauled that they could not be easily rehabilitated. In the future small but periodic air attacks would keep the air lines in marginal operating condition. Tried against the standard of air pressure, however, the railway-interdiction program was no longer practicable. As an economic item, railway track was not expensive to the enemy. As a military effort after December 1951, moreover, United Nations air attacks against the Red North Korean railway system had reached a virtual state of balance wherein the United Nation’s ability to inflict damage was
roughly equalled by the enemy's ability to repair the damage. To continue the rail attacks would be, in effect, to pit skilled pilots, equipped with modern, expensive aircraft, against unskilled Communist coolie laborers armed with picks and shovels. Even if United Nations air action did delay or diminish the flow of enemy supplies to the frontline, such action could not place intolerable military pressure upon the Reds as long as they maintained a static ground front.

After this introduction Colonels Randolph and Mayo examined the alternative employments of US FEAF airpower which seemed possible under the circumstances prevailing in Korea. The US Far East Air Forces could maintain United Nations air superiority through counter-air fighting and airfield bombing attacks, or could destroy and damage enemy supplies, equipment, and personnel, or could delay the movement of enemy supplies, equipment, and personnel. In view of the static ground situation, air action which delayed the movement of enemy supplies or attacked entrenched troops along the front lines promised no more than minimal achievements with the possibility of costly air losses.

Since the enemy based his air force north of the Yalu River, on airfields which could not be attacked, the US FEAF could hardly bring pressure upon the enemy by destroying his air capability, but the US FEAF nevertheless had to maintain air superiority over Red North Korea in order to prevent the Reds from bringing pressure to bear on United Nations Command forces. Airplanes, moreover, were an economic cost to the Communists, and Colonels Randolph and Mayo felt that as many of them as possible should be destroyed in air-to-air fighting. The real opportunity which the US FEAF could exploit in Korea would be to take the Communist armies under attack. From their study of the alternative courses of action, Colonels Randolph and Mayo recommended that the first priority of US FEAF effort should be given to United Nations air-superiority tasks and that such effort as remained should be employed to accomplish "the maximum amount of selected destruction, thus making the Korean conflict as costly as possible to the enemy in terms of equipment, supplies, and personnel."

**Bomning at Hydroelectric Plants**

Having arrived at the broad concept that the US Far East Air Forces should achieve air pressure through the selective destruction of items of value to the Communist nations fighting in Korea, Colonels Randolph and Mayo discussed the sorts of targets which could be attacked. In order to exploit the inherent flexibility of airpower, any air-pressure target list had to be highly flexible and kept under constant review.
The Shift in UNC Air Strategy

Evaluation of specific targets, moreover, would need to consider the importance and value of the target to the enemy, airpower’s ability to destroy the target, and the estimated cost in loss and damage to air units to be expected in the course of attacks against the target. These factors had to be weighed and balanced, for the US FEAF would have to live within its means. Other than Red North Korea’s hydroelectric power facilities -- which should be attacked -- Colonels Randolph and Mayo admitted that “gold targets” were scarce in Red North Korea. They suggested that one solution to the scarcity of targets might be to attack targets which were least unremunerative.

Finding lucrative targets in war-torn Communist North Korea did not promise to be easy, but the problem would not be insurmountable, once available reconnaissance and intelligence effort was directed toward the end. The planning pair stated that once the concept -- destruction -- is clearly stated and made known to all operations and intelligence agencies, targets can be found, developed, and successfully attacked. (See Sketch Map 4.)

Before the US FEAF could expect to secure adoption of the strategy of air pressure through selective destruction, Colonels Randolph and Mayo recognized that they had to offer answers to two questions which would interest the theater commander. Would the Reds be able to stockpile logistical support at an appreciably faster rate if the US FEAF applied its effort in a different way? What risk did the United Nations incur if the Reds did stockpile faster? Colonels Randolph and Mayo assumed that United Nations airmen would, to a great extent, continue to interdict enemy movement as long as they continued to maintain air superiority and to operate over the Red North Korea every day. Under these circumstances the Reds would be unable to move during daylight hours. Moreover, interdiction would not be abandoned but instead focused upon destroying material and killing troops. Under the conditions of the static ground front the Reds could be expected eventually to build their supply level up to any degree which they desired by merely accumulating a little more than they expended. But as long as the United Nations Command maintained air superiority and held the wherewithal of air attack, the Reds could never hope for an ultimate ground victory in Korea, no matter what their jump-off supply level might be.

Just as in 1950 and 1951, a Communist ground offensive would force the enemy to expose his troops and supply lines to a violent air attack as he moved from prepared defenses and dispersed supply dumps. Once again the United Nations air forces could preserve itself by fire and maneuver. Back of the enemy lines, moreover, the cumulative effect of the anti-railway attacks would prevent
the fast and reliable resupply which the enemy would require for an all-out ground campaign. Since the Communists could not expect to win ground victory in Korea, Colonels Randolph and Mayo argued that the United Nations Command incurred very little real risk even if the Reds did build up their front-line supplies at a faster rate.

Following the completion of their study on 12 April 1952, Colonels Randolph and Mayo briefed their conclusions and recommendations to General Smart. General Smart agreed with the findings and presented them to General Weyland, who gave his concurrence to the study. The concept of air pressure through selective destruction was in fact a development of the idea which General Weyland had submitted to USAF in June 1951. The idea of selective destruction appealed to General Weyland for another reason.

Limited to attacks against conventional targets within the territorial confines of Korea, the US Far East Air Forces apparently had little ability to influence the actions of Soviet Russia and Communist China, the powers who were actually calling the tune at Panmunjom. These Communist block nations, however, had economic and military property at risk in Communist North Korea. If, through selective attack, the US Far East Air Forces could destroy targets in Red North Korea which had significance to the Soviet block they could make the direct effect of air campaigns in Red North Korea felt as far away as the seats of power in Moscow and Peking.

Even though he personally endorsed the concept of air pressure through selective destruction, General Weyland must have had his doubts as to whether the United Nations Command would support more forceful air operations. For several months General Weyland had been unsuccessful in his efforts to get approval for air attacks against Red North Korea’s hydroelectric power facilities. As the Panmunjom negotiations moved toward a complete stalemate, Air Force planners in Washington followed U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff orders and sought to decide what actions could be taken if the armistice negotiations foundered. In response to a request for information on 29 April 1952, General Weyland told the USAF planners that Communist North Korea’s hydroelectric power facilities were legitimate and profitable military targets, which, if suddenly destroyed, would deny electrical power to many small war factories and might “impress the Red North Korea with the price they are paying for their continued recalcitrance.”

When USAF assured General Weyland that his views would be submitted to the U.S. Joint Chiefs, General Ridgway stated on 1 May 1952 that he saw no reason for the U.S. Joint Chiefs to direct air attacks against the hydroelectric
plants without following the normal procedure of allowing him to make the first recommendations. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that Washington studies showed that the destruction of the plants was desirable and reminded General Ridgway that except for Supung he had authority to order the attacks, but they assured the theater commander that further action would await his recommendations.

The Far East Air Forces' plans for a more forceful air campaign to begin with all-out air attacks against the Red North Korean hydroelectric facilities seemed stymied. And at this juncture the Panmunjom armistice negotiations were approaching a complete impasse. Acting on instructions from Washington, Admiral Joy offered a package proposal on 28 April which sought to break the deadlock. However, this solution was rejected by the Reds on 2 May 1952.

Section 2. Attacks on Red Hydroelectric Complexes

A significant change in combat-operations policy took place in May 1952. The scope of interdiction operations was expanded to include destruction of important targets, target complexes, and target system. All UNC air commanders recognized that they could now take more forceful actions. The Fifth US Air Force, in view of its concern for railway interdiction, had not followed through with other attacks on this target list, but in May 1952 the Fifth US Air Force began massed fighter-bomber attacks against enemy logistical targets. On 8 May 1952 485 fighter-bomber sorties blasted the Red supply depot at Suan in the biggest single attack since the beginning of the Korean War. On 15 May 256 fighter-bomber sorties completely destroyed a vehicle-repair factory at Tang-dong, a few miles north of Pyongyang. On 22 May 472 fighter-bomber sorties destroyed factories near Kijang-ni where the enemy was making hand grenades and ammunition. On 23 May 275 fighter-bomber sorties returned to this same area to attack a steel-fabricating plant.

During much of May 1952 the prisoner-of-war riots at Koje-do camps prevented General Clark who relieved General Ridgway as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and Far East Command on 12 May 1952 from giving much thoughts as to the course the Korean war to take. On 6 June 1952, however, General Weyland visited General Clark and explained to him the significance of Red North Korea's hydroelectric power complex and emphasized that all of the plants except Supung could be attacked on the theater
commander's order. Given General Clark's approval for developing the target system, General Weyland put his operations staff to work on two briefing plans, one plan to include Supung on the target list and the other excluding it.

In addition to Supung the US FEAF operations staff listed Pujon, Changjin, and Hochon hydroelectric facilities for attack. To get the job done in two day's time, before the enemy could react to the attacks, the US FEAF staff saw that they would need Navy assistance. When the plans were completed on 11 June, General Weyland took them to General Clark and asked him to approve attacks as soon as the Air Force and Navy could draw up coordinated schedules of attack.

On 17 June 1952 General Clark ordered General Weyland and Vice-Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, Commander of the US Naval Forces, Far East, to attack all of the major power installations except Supung. For the coordinated attacks General Clark named as "coordinating agent." After studying an information copy of General Clark's directive in Washington, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 9 June that Supung's generating plant should be added to the attack program. Getting President Truman's approval, the Joint Chiefs

HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS

[Map of hydroelectric plants in Korea and China]

LEGEND
- Major Thermoelectric Plant
- Complete Hydroelectric Plant
- Incomplete Hydroelectric Plant

Sketch Map 4

0 80 Km
A dramatic air view shows the principal components of the great power plant at Supung. The massive concrete dam, 349 feet high and 2950 feet long, backs up 138 square miles of reservoir, which reaches 96 kilometers up the Yalu River.

Authorized General Clark to add Supung to the target list that same day.

General Weyland alerted the Fifth US Air Force and Bomber Command for strikes against the Red North Korean power complexes on 23 or 24 June 1952. These dates being selected in deference to Admiral Briscoe, who wanted to have four fast carriers on the line for the first time since the Hungnam evacuation. Over at Seoul Major General Glenn O. Barcus who succeeded Lieutenant General Everest as Fifth US Air Force on 30 May 1952 had been doing some serious thinking for he was expected to send his fighter-bombers against Supung, only 38 miles up river from the lair of some 250 MIG-15's at Antung. All of the power-plant strikes had to be timed to perfection, or else the MIG airmen could make the attack very costly.

The UN Navy airmen were already slated to bomb the eastern power plants, but Vice-Admiral J. J. Clark, the aggressive new commander of the Seventh US Fleet, flew to Seoul and proposed that Navy airmen should join the attacks
against Supung. Not since the Yalu bridge attacks of 1950 had Navy pilots entered MIG Alley, but when General Barcus accepted the Navy's offer coordinated plans shaped up rapidly. General Weyland would name the day and time of the attack in accordance with target weather at Supung, and no electric power plant would be hit until the Navy dive-bombers and Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers began their runs at Supung. After the Supung strike was in progress, the Fifth US Air Force pilots would hit Changjin No. 3 and No. 4 plants and Pujon No. 3 and No. 4 plants, while Navy pilots would be hitting Pujon No. 1 and No. 2 plants and the four plants at Hochon. Shoran-bombing B-29's would attack Changjin No. 1 and No. 2 on the night of the daylight strike. If weather permitted, the United Nations Command hydroelectric strikes would begin at 0930 hours on 23 June 1952.

At daybreak on 23 June 1952 the Fifth US Air Force weather reconnaissance crews reported heavy clouds along the Yalu, and the planned attacks were off. Toward midmorning, however, the weather was drifting southward and it was clearing at the Yalu. This sort of weather would benefit the friendly attack, since it would cover attacking planes en route to and from the Supung target. In a rapid recasting of plans General Weyland flashed orders of an afternoon strike to begin at 1600 hours. The attack would be followed up on the next day and conducted by a medium-bomber attack on the night of 24-25 June 1952.

Promptly at the appointed time, as 84 Sabres patrolled watchfully overhead, 35 AD Skyraiders from the Boxer, Princeton, and Philippine Sea accompanied by 35 F9F jet fighters from the same ships arrived at Supung. As the F9F's suppressed flak, the Navy dive-bombers attacked Supung's generating plant. In procession between 1610 and 1700 hours, 79 F-84's and 45 F-80's ran the bomb total on Supung up to 145 tons on target. Two hours later 25 F-86's escorted two RF-80's back to Supung to record what had happened. The strikes went off to perfection. Although the area was defended by 44 heavy guns and 37 automatic weapons, Communist ground fire was well neutralized and inflicted only major damage to two aircraft. Strangely enough, the 250 MIG fighters based at Antung and Tatungkou made no attempt to resist the raid. In fact, while the strikes were in progress some 160 of the Red planes took off and fled to the interior of Manchuria. Evidently some rattled Red air commander at Antung feared that his airfields were going to be attacked and pushed the panic button.

A few minutes after the attacks got under way at Supung on the afternoon of 23 June 1952, the Fifth US Air Force Mustangs attacked Pujon No. 3 and
No. 4 while 1st US Marine Air Wing pilots hit Changjin No. 3 and No. 4. Skyraiders, Corsairs, and Panthers from the Boxer, Princeton, and Bon Homme Richard bombed Pujon No. 1 and No. 2 and Hochon complex. On the following day the Fifth US Air Force, Marine, and Navy fliers again attacked these same targets, and in the heat of the moment Fifth US Air Force planes also attacked Changjin No. 1 and No. 2, which were supposed to be saved for US FEAF Bomber Command targets, that night.

Since the Second anniversary of the Korean War needed some celebration, the US FEAF ordered Bomber Command to fly radar-directed close-support sorties at fifteen-minutes intervals during the night of 24—25 June 1952. On 26 and 27 June 1952 the Fifth US Air Force pilots continued to attack the Changjin and Pujon plants. As the four-day assault ended, the Fifth US Air Force had flown 730 fighter-bomber and 238 counterair sorties and had sustained no casualties from the enemy action. In two days of attack the Navy had flown 546 sorties and had lost two planes to ground fire. Both of the Navy pilots had been rescued.

To Air Force and Navy commanders of the United Nations Command and pilots alike the sustained strikes against such a vital target system as the Red North Korean hydroelectric plants were especially pleasing. When the smoke cleared away from the targets, photo reconnaissance showed that something more than 90 percent of Red North Korea’s electric power potential had been knocked out. Of the 13 plants in the four major complexes attacked, 11 were clearly unserviceable and the other two were doubtful. For the first time in Korea Navy and Air Force pilots of the United Nations Command had worked together against a single target, and Admiral Briscoe called General Weyland’s planning “superb.”

Looking back on the Korean War, General Weyland later wrote that the hydroelectric attacks stood out in his mind as one of two particular strikes that were “spectacular on their own merit.” Since the plants would obviously require continuing neutralization, General Weyland and Admiral Briscoe agreed that the Fifth US Air Force and the Seventh US Fleet would keep watch and apply such effort as necessary and as coordinated through the Joint Operation Center in Seoul.

There was no doubt that the attacks against the Red North Korea’s hydroelectric facilities put military pressure upon the Communists, not only in Korea but in Red China and Russia. The rapidity with which the Reds sent scarce Russian and Communist Chinese technicians to try to repair the ruined plants bespoke the importance of the power plants to the Soviet bloc. For more
than two weeks, moreover, the Red North Korea sustained an almost complete power blackout, and after this the production of small thermoelectric plants plus some limited use of the lesser damaged hydroelectric plants restored the Red North Korea's power perhaps to ten percent of its former capacity.

Intelligence agent reports confirmed the US FEAF's prediction that the loss of electric power would curtail war production in many small factories, themselves so dispersed as to be impracticable air targets. Intelligence reports received from Manchuria indicated that the neutralization of Supung's generators represented a loss of 23 percent of the 1952 electric power requirements of Red northeast China. Because of power shortages, 30 out of 51 key industries at Port Arthur, Dairen, Funchun, and Anshan failed to meet the annual production quotas prescribed by Peking. The Red tried a variety of expedients to compensate for the 120,000 kilowatts of power which no longer arrived from Supung, but these expedients provided only a fractional part of the power deficit. Although the Communist North Korean hydroelectric plants were military targets and no violation of Red Chinese or Russian territory could even be alleged, the air attacks brought world-wide repercussions.

In the British Parliament Labourites Clement Attlee and Aneurin Bevan denounced the bombings as provocation which might lead to World War III. Prime Minister Winston Churchill admitted that he had not been consulted prior to the hydroelectric raids but insisted that there was no change in United Nations policy toward the Korean War. Announcements by British Prime Minister Churchill that he was appointing a British deputy in Tokyo did much to clear the controversy on 1 July 1952, and a Labor motion criticizing Churchill failure to "secure effective consultation" on the matters of Korean War failed of adoption in the House of Commons.

In Washington the U.S. Department of Defense received queries from congressmen wanting to know why the Red North Korean power plants had not been bombed earlier. General Clark stated his personal opinion that the power stations had been potentially profitable military targets any time after Chinese Communist aggression of Korea, but in replies to congressmen the U.S. Department of Defense stressed the military characteristics of the targets and explained that military considerations had forestalled attacks until June 1952. The result of the British furor and the U.S. congressional queries were again to inform the enigmatic Reds that the United Nations still intended to wage a limited war in Korea. "Once again," noted the US Far East Air Forces, "the persuasive threat of airpower had been lessened."
Section 3. Statement of the US FEAF Operation Policy

Although the United Nations Command-air attacks against the Communist hydroelectric facilities in Red North Korea must have made the Communists begin to wonder whether their game at Panmunjom was worth the candle, the attacks produced such a furor that the US Far East Air Forces was not at all sure that the United Nations would accept a strategy of air pressure through selective destruction. Obviously embarrassed by high-level statements in Washington and London that United Nations policies were unchanged, the US FEAF combat operations division replied to a request for information on that score from USAF that there had been no basic change in policy but that "there had been a change in the weight of effort expended against various targets."

On 26 June 1952, however, the US FEAF Target Committee proposed that the US FEAF combat-operations policy ought at least to be rewritten sufficiently to direct the Fifth US Air Force and US FEAF Bomber Command to maintain air pressure through destruction operations rather than to continue with the old policies of delay, disruption, and dislocation. General Weyland approved the recommendation, and within the next two weeks the US FEAF intelligence and operations officers matured a new policy directive. Even before this directive was released, however, Brigadier General Smart cautioned the US FEAF Formal Target Committee "to keep in mind that this modification is not a major change in policy, but rather a shift in emphasis from delay and disruption operations to destruction."

Lieutenant General Weyland was promoted to full general on 5 July 1952. And as issued to Fifth US Air Force and US FEAF Bomber Command on 10 July 1952, the new US FEAF operational policy directive recognized three factors. The first was that the Communists had smashed in the Far East considerable air power which could be employed offensively against United Nations Command forces at any time. The second was that the major sources of enemy supply were off-limits UNC air attack and the enemy pipeline from the sanctuary to the front lines was relatively short. The ground front in Korea, moreover, had been so long stable that enemy resupply requirements were low. Thus the obstruction of enemy supply movements in Korea could not prevent the enemy from gradually building up his supply stockpiles. The third factor was that friendly ground
forces in a stabilized ground situation did not require great amounts of close air support.

In order to exert the maximum pressure against the Red forces in Communist North Korea, the US FEAF air effort was to be employed with first priority given to the maintenance of control of the air. Secondly, other combat air effort as available would be employed to accomplish the maximum selected destruction in order that the Korean war should be made as costly as possible to the enemy in terms of equipment, supplies, facilities, and personnel. Third, such air operations as were feasible would be conducted to reduce the immediate threat to the United Nations Command forces posed by the Communist ground forces. Direct air support would be provided to the UNC ground forces as required by the initiation of friendly or enemy offensive ground action. As a general principle, the scope and tactics of air employment would be constantly monitored to assure that all units were kept at a high level of combat readiness. The air attack program would also include provisions to assure crew proficiency in any type of mission which they might be required to fly in a future emergency or a renewed ground action.

As long as there was no significant change in the tactical situation in Korea, the major proportion of air capabilities would be employed in destruction operations. The following priority listing of target categories was specified: (1) Aircraft, (2) serviceable airfields, (3) electric power facilities, (4) radar equipment, (5) manufacturing facilities, (6) communications centers, (7) military headquarters, (8) rail repair facilities, (9) vehicle repair facilities, (10) locomotives, (11) supply, ordnance, and POL, (12) rail cars, (13) vehicles, (14) military personnel, (15) rail bridges and tunnels, (16) marshalling yards as facilities, and (17) road bridges. The selection of specific targets for attack was to be made with a consideration to the relative priority of the target category, the vulnerability of the target to air attack, and the defenses of the targets. Within the target categories all sources of information would be exploited in order to search out and identify the most lucrative objectives. The possibility of developing worth-while objectives was to be exploited, and sufficient attack would be employed against the enemy rail system in order to develop targets such as locomotives and rolling-stock concentrations and to ensure that the system was not rebuilt to such an extent that it would support extensive sustained enemy ground operations.

In order that fleeting targets developed by destruction attacks would be followed up and attacked with the least delay, close coordination between the Fifth US Air Force and US FEAF Bomber Command was essential. Since it had the more flexible capability, the Fifth US Air force was also made responsible for
maintaining air superiority in Korea, but the US FEAF Bomber Command would attack such airfields as the Fifth US Air Force recommended and the US FEAF directed. The US FEAF Bomber Command would normally apply its efforts against enemy communications centers, manufacturing facilities, rail bridges, and concentrations of supplies and railway equipment. Such targets, however, could also be attacked by the Fifth US Air Force.
CHAPTER V AIR PRESSURE CAMPAIGN
(July 1952 – July 1953)

Section 1. UN Command Maintains Air Superiority

The success or failure of the United Nations Command air-pressure campaign depended upon whether or not the United Nations Command could maintain friendly air superiority over the Communist forces. General Weyland’s air-pressure policy directive of 10 July 1952 therefore accorded first priority to operations required to maintain control of the air over the enemy-held territory.

Awareing that the airpower was the key to victory and that the UN Command might extend air attacks to other Far East target area, the Red powers had been hurriedly building major air forces around the periphery of Korea. By June 1952 the Chinese Communist Air Force evidently reached its authorized strength of 22 air divisions and 1,830 aircraft, including 1,000 jet fighters. Some 1,115 of these planes were massed at airfields within Manchuria. During the first half of 1952 Soviet air units in the Far East also reached a probably authorized strength of approximately 5,360 aircraft. After June 1952 the Communist air order of battle in the Far East remained stable at approximately 7,000 aircraft, some 5,000 of them belong to Russia, 2,000 to Communist China, and about 270 to Red North Korea. While the numbers remained stable, the Reds nevertheless conducted a vigorous modernization program, replacing conventional planes with modern jet types. In November 1952, for example, the US FEAF learned that the Red Chinese had obtained 100 latest-model IL-28 light jet bombers and had them stationed in Manchuria. The Communist air order to battle in the Far East not only dwarfed the UNC air forces, but the Reds also possessed more modern planes than did the UNC air forces.

Any time after June 1952 the Communists possessed a vastly overwhelming theoretical air superiority over the United Nations Command. But, for the time being at least, the Communist air commanders gave signs that they intended to use their aerial might for a vigorous defense of Red North Korea and Manchuria and not for offensive air strikes. Sabre pilots who patrolled the Yalu reported
that the Reds were building additional airfields to those at Antung, Tatungkou, and Takushan. The new airfields were at Kuantien, Fengcheng, Tapao, and Kachiapa. Antung continued to be the central command post and the logistical center of the complex, but MIG-15 interceptors were based at five of the airfields, each of which could support continuing operations of up to 300 aircraft.

By American standards these Chinese Communist airfields were poor installations, lacking facilities for maintenance and service of aircraft, but the Reds showed that they could accept lower standards of flying safety and personal comfort and still operate at a fairly high rate.

After June 1952 the Communist air-defense system featured fighter-interceptors, ground-control intercept radar, antiaircraft artillery, and searchlights, but the major threat to United Nations Command air superiority was still the MIG-15 aircraft. These Red interceptors were not only a threat to the success of the air pressure operations, but as planes they represented a not-inconsiderable cost to the economy of Red China. To make the war expensive to the Reds, General Weyland wanted to destroy as many of the Red interceptors as possible in air-to-air combat.

Under the circumstances wherein the Communist MIG pilots possessed sanctuary bases just beyond the Yalu, flew an aircraft with a higher service ceiling than any United Nations Command fighter, and possessed ground-control intercept radar direction, the Communist air forces had almost all of the natural advantages
for aerial combat in the segment of airspace north of the Chongchon River called "MIG Alley." Nearly 90 percent of the MIG's sighted in Red North Korea after June 1952 would be in MIG Alley's 6,500 square miles, or (since the altitude of combat went up to 50,000 feet) 65,000 cubic miles. Charged to protect friendly fighter-bombers against an enemy who was able to choose when he would commit his aircraft and whose MIG's were nearly always able to initiate combat from higher altitudes, the Sabre wings were forced continually to revise their tactics to thwart the tactics of the enemy.

Since the mid-1952 the aggressive pilots of the 4th and 51st US Fighter-Interceptor Wings met the threats of superior numbers of the Communist MIG's. The Communist air forces, in the meantime, began to follow a new concept of operations which involved exploitation of all phases of their developing air defense system. Although the Reds did not oppose the UNC air attacks against their Supung hydroelectric plant, the Red air forces in June 1952 evidently decided to employ quality instead of quantity. Only 298 MIG sorties were sighted in the air over the northwestern Korea in June 1952 but the Red airmen who met the Sabres were aggressive and willing to fight. The Sabres still had the edge in June's combat. At a cost of three friendly lost, the Sabres destroyed 20 MIG's. Only one Sabre pilot became an ace in June 1952, but his was a most exceptional case. Second Lieutenant James F. Low had volunteered for flight training in July 1950 and became a 4th US Wing jet ace on 15 June 1952, only six months after he had graduated from flying school.

While the Communists were conservative in daylight hours, they manifested a growing interest in night activity. Over the not-too-important railway bridge at Kwaksan, on the night of 10 June 1952, Red jets destroyed two Superforts and damaged a third so badly that it barely survived an emergency landing in Republic of Korea. Counting the 12 aircraft which attacked on 10 June, 76 enemy sorties were seen by night-flying US FEAF aircraft during the month of June 1952, marking a new high in Communist night action.

When the UNC airmen began massed attacks against more significant air pressure targets in July 1952, the Communist airmen made good use of their air-defense system. Profiting from radar control and cloudy weather, the MIG pilots made "end runs" around the Sabre screen at the Yalu. Some MIG's decoyed or engaged the Sabres, while other attempted to set up attacks against UNC fighter-bombers. On 4 July 1952, when Fifth US Air Force fighters were bombing the Red North Korean Military Academy near the Yalu at Sakchu, at least 50 MIG's countered the attack. A part of the MIG's got through the Sabre screen to make successful passes against the UNC fighter-bombers. In the
engagement the Sabre claimed 13 MIG’s destroyed but lost two of their own number. There was no longer any doubt that some of the leading pilots were Russians. On 4 July 1952 a Sabre pilot pulled in close to a stricken MIG and observed that the enemy pilot had a ruddy complexion and bushy eyebrows of light red. After 4 July 1952 Sabres continued to fly the Yalu patrols, but they held their screen closer to the area where fighter-bombers and reconnaiss ance planes were working. They also scheduled heavy escort for the unarmed reconnaissance planes which scouted enemy targets deep within MIG Alley.

During July 1952 the Reds flew only 404 observed daytime sorties, but the MIG pilots were more adept than usual. The Sabres destroyed 19 MIG’s, and the Reds shot down four Sabres. During the hours of darkness the UNC radar plotted 63 Communist flights, but the B-26’s and B-29’s saw only 16 enemy planes, probably because the bombers generally avoided the heaviest defended areas.

Evidently rankled by the UNC destruction operations and having profited from three months of reduced activity, the Communist air forces surged back into full action on 1 August 1952, as if by special order. Once again the majority of Red pilots did not have enough combat experience and were reluctant to tangle, but other MIG’s employed end-runs, decoys, and “yo-yo” tactics. In an effort to attack the UNC fighter-bombers, the MIG’s successfully evaded the Sabres four times to come as far south as the Haeju peninsula. This evasion came to naught, however, for the MIG pilots lost all their potential fighter-bomber kills because of poor gunnery, inept maneuvers, and simple overcagerness.

In the major air battle of the month of August 1952, on 6 August, 35 Sabres pilots engaged 52 MIG’s and shot down at least six MIG’s. In other engagement, on 8 August, Captain Clifford D. Jolley scored the victory he needed to become a jet ace. The increased tempo of the air-to-air war, marked by sightings of 1,155 MIG’s, permitted the Sabres to destroy 33 enemy aircraft at a cost of only two friendly interceptors. At night the Reds were not as active as usual, and the UNC crews observed only ten enemy aircraft, four of which came close enough to make unsuccessful firing passes.

As the US FEAF badgered the Reds by attacking targets close to the Yalu during September 1952, the Reds responded with 1,857 observed sorties. Showing an ability to evade the Sabres on 1 September, eight MIG’s got down to Haeju where they bounced and damaged a Mustang. In the first of several major air duels during the month 39 F-86’s fought 17 separate engagements with 73 MIG’s in the north of the Chongchon in a daylong air battle on 4 September. In this unequal fight against enemy pilots who flitted back and forth
across the Yalu, the Sabre airmen destroyed 13 of the enemy planes at a loss of four of their own number. During the day Major Frederick C. Blesse of the 4th US Wing destroyed his fourth MIG and fifth enemy aircraft, making himself the 19th jet ace of the Korean War. By the end of the month Major Blesse would have eight MIG’s and an LA-9 to his credit. In a thirty-minutes air battle on 9 September, stirred up by fighter-bomber attacks against the Red North Korean Military Academy at Sakchu, the Sabres and Thunderjets encountered some 175 MIG’s.

The enemy attack appreciated the situation, for some flights engaged the Sabres while other jumped Thunderjets. In the latter half of September the MIG’s continued to be active, but they attempted only two brief passes against the fighter-bombers, both on 21 September during an attack against a munitions plant south of Sinuiju. In this day’s fighting Captain Robinson Risner destroyed his fifth MIG to become the theater’s 20th jet air ace. In this month of intensive air actions the Fifth US Air Force lost six Sabres and three Thunderjets, but the Sabres racked up a new monthly high of 63 MIG’s destroyed in combat.

With the beginning of October of 1952 the Communist air forces again revised their tactics and employed a pattern of operations similar to the one they had used in the same season of the previous year. Some 1,300 Communist aerial sorties were observed during the month, but most of the Red planes flew at altitudes of 43,000 feet or higher and in large formations. Most of the Red pilots were un-aggressive, but the leading pilots could be lethal when they saw a favorable opportunity. On three days Red airmen penetrated to Wonsan to meet and shoot down three conventional UNC Navy aircraft. When they got the chance, moreover, the Red pilots singled out small Sabre formations and worked coordinated attacks against them with superior numbers of aircraft.

As the Sabre wings attempted to combat the changing Communist tactics, certain developments lent a hand to the swept-wing American jets. After a long delay the 502nd US Tactical Control Group opened a limited-scale air-direction center off Red North Korean western coast on the island of Cho-do in October, and this facility could give the Sabres ground-control intercept vectors of the same kind that the Reds had enjoyed for several months.

In order to combat the high-flying MIG’s and simultaneously to catch other MIG’s who attempted to penetrate at lower altitudes, the Sabre wing’s began to fly high patrols with their F-86E’s at about 40,000 feet and lower patrols with their F-86E’s at about 30,000 feet. When the MIG’s got down to Wonsan, the Fifth US Air Forces established a subsidiary daylight barrier patrol along the Chongchon River which was flown by four Sabres or Meteor-8 aircraft.
Noting that the "fluid-four" flights were vulnerable to attack by superior numbers of MIG planes, the 51st US Wing began to fly missions with flights of six aircraft and the 4th US Wing employed sections of eight aircraft. The changed Sabre tactics evidently mastered the Reds, for the Fifth US Air Force lost a single Thunderjet and four Sabres while the Sabres were destroying 27 MIG's. At night, during October 1952, the UNC bombers reported 128 observations and encounters with enemy planes. These sightings apparently increased as the bombers hit targets close to Yalu. Thus, on 17 October, when eight B-29's attacked a military headquarters at Tosong, 19 Red aircraft attempted unsuccessfully to find and attack the UNC bombers.

At the end of October 1952 two years of jet air warfare were drawing to a close in Korea. In these years the Communist had not yet produced an aircraft-pilot combination of a high enough standard to combat the Sabres. Even though the primary duty of the Sabres had been to defend friendly fighter-bombers, the Sabre pilots had been destroying MIG's with a margin of superiority of eight to one. The Sabre victory must have been persuasive to the Communist aggressors everywhere. "The ability of our pilots to take the MIG," thought Colonel Mitchell, "has undoubtedly slowed the Russian in his headlong rush into another war. It has made him consider the fact that he is not quite ready yet, and it must rankle him to know that we are getting better and stronger all the time." But the story of the air war over the Red North Korea was not as one-sided as it appeared, for the Communist air defense had given the United Nations Command much concern in the latter half of 1952. In no small part the UNC destruction operations were succeeding because good planning was mitigating the effectiveness of the Red defense.

Beginning in November 1952 the high and low-level patrols were augmented by other flights of Sabres which were posted to certain areas where they were readily available for controlled interceptions of such MIG's as might elude the main screens. After February 1953, when the MIG's began to cause scrambles by penetrating south of the Chongchon in the time intervals between regular Sabre patrols, the Fifth US Air Force added a flight of four F-86's which flew airborne alerts north of Cho-do island between the schedules of the main screening patrols.

During the January 1953 pilots of the 4th and 51st US Wings sighted a total of 2,621 MIG-15's over Red North Korea, succeeded in engaging a total of 333 of these sighted aircraft, and destroyed 32 of those engaged. After this month, which represented the peak sighting of MIG's during the last year of the war, the number of MIG's sighted each month was less than the month before, and, since the ratio of MIG's sighted to MIG's engaged remained approximately
constant, combat kills fell off.

The Fifth US Air Force's Sabre potential was increasing at the same time that fewer MIG's were available for destruction. The US wing, however, observed that the rate of MIG kills was not necessarily in any direct relationship to the number of MIG's sighted in a month. What was more important was the degree of aggressiveness of the MIG pilots and their willingness to engage aerial combat. Relatively favorable flying weather allowed the Fifth US Air Force's Sabre wings to fly on most days in April, but the MIG's were not yet willing to fight. Only 1,622 MIG sorties were sighted, and the MIG pilots who were willing to give combat apparently knew their business. In sporadic combat the Sabres destroyed 27 MIG's and lost four of their own number.

On 7 April, moreover, MIG interceptors shot down Captain Harold E. Fischer, the double jet ace of the 51st US Wing. On 12 April the 51st US Wing almost lost another of its leading aces when Captain McConnell bailed out of his crippled plane over the Western Sea. A 3rd US Air Rescue Group helicopter picked up Captain McConnell almost immediately, and on 24 April he downed his tenth MIG to become a double ace. During the month Captian Fernandez of the 4th US Wing destroyed another MIG to stay ahead of the field in the race to become the world's leading jet ace. During the period of 1–15 May, Sabre pilots observed 608 MIG's, of which 138 or 22.7 percent were encountered in combat. In the last half of May, however, 899 MIG's were observed and 399 or 45 percent of them were encountered by the F-86's. In May, 56 MIG's were destroyed, four more were probably destroyed and 27 were damaged. The loss to enemy action was one F-86, and the pilot of this plane was successfully rescued.

In June 1953 the total monthly sighting of MIG aircraft was even less than it had been in May 1953. But during this month the Sabre pilots effected the peak kill of the Korean War. The Sabres observed 637 airborne MIG's but only 184 of them could be engaged in combat. During the last half of June the MIG pilots continued to be neither alert nor aggressive, but a combination of circumstances permitted the Sabres to engage 317 of 613 MIG's observed. Whatever the Communist reasoning may have been, the air combat during the last half of June 1953 was characterized by an unusually high proportion of encounters below 40,000 feet. For once, higher flying Sabres were able to initiate 70 of the 92 engagements with the enemy planes, and during June 1953 the Sabres made their peak monthly kill of the Korean hostilities: 77 MIG's destroyed, 11 probably destroyed, and 41 damaged. On 30 June, the Sabres destroyed 16 MIG's for a new day's record which exceeded the previous highs of 13 kills scored on 4 July and 4 September 1952. During the month there were on 17 MIG sightings south of the Chongchon, of which 16 were noted on 30 June when
### USAF CLAIMS OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT
#### 26 June 1950 – 27 July 1953

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<th>Type claim and type enemy aircraft</th>
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Air Pressure Campaign

707
a formation of MIG's was caught heading northward from Pyongyang, probably intending to ambush Sabres who were returning home low on fuel. During the June combat actions the Sabres wings lost no F-86's to the enemy, and only one F-86 received major damage in combat with Red aircraft.

Although the Communists were reckless with their ground troops in the line and continued useless ground attacks in July 1953, they played it safe with their planes in the "MIG Alley" during this last month of the Korean War. The Sabres got only 32 MIG kills in July, which, while good for the period of hostilities, represented a let down from the remarkable victory of June 1953. On the last day of the war, 27 July 1953, 369 Sabre sorties saw only 12 MIG's, all headed for home in Manchuria. At twilight on this day, however, Captain Ralph S. Parr, 4th US Wing, met and shot down an unwary IL-12 transport which had apparently wandered off course and had crossed south of the Yalu near Monp'ojin. Captain Parr thus achieved the distinction of destroying the last enemy aircraft in the Korean War.

Section 2. Development of the Air-Pressure Strategy

While the US FEAF operational policy directive of 10 July 1952 remained in effect during the remainder of Korean War, it actually provided no more than the bones of the air pressure strategy. In some measure the directive was even unrealistic. The target list, for example, accorded radar equipment the fourth priority for air attack, obviously because such equipment was expensive to the enemy and its destruction would hinder enemy interceptions of UNC aircraft, but the Fifth US Air Force was never able to perfect an adequate technique for locating and attacking these pinpoint targets. Locomotives and vehicles were accorded low attack priorities, yet it would be found practicable to concentrate these elusive targets and to attack them with a large measure of success.

In the state of hostilities prevailing in Korea, moreover, the US FEAF would get desirable results from an intensification of its air effort against targets which were actually of little importance. Attacks against "sensitive" targets in the vicinity of the Yalu were found to have a degree of profit which was quite apart from the value of the target. The US FEAF Formal Target Committee therefore ignored the target listing when necessary and built an air strategy upon the philosophy of the policy directive, which required the US FEAF "to accomplish the maximum selected destruction in order that the Korean
War is made as costly as possible to the enemy."

This air strategy which was to develop would display a sound recognition of the Communist political situation. It recognized that the Red North Korea was in utter political subordination to, and militarily dependent upon, Red China and Soviet Russia. Any final decision regarding armistice terms would be made by Red China and Russia, and the effects of the air pressure attacks within Red North Korea had to be made to be felt by the senior partners in the Soviet conspiracy.

The US FEAF planners reason that the destruction of the Red North Korean hydroelectric facilities would not only impress the Red North Koreans with the price that they were paying for continued recalcitrance but would deprive the Sino-Russian block of the important industrial potential which the system supported. They reasoned correctly that to rehabilitate the destroyed power system in Red North Korea the Russian would have to divert scarce technicians and electrical equipment from their own sources, thus delaying the Soviet Union's own programmed domestic electric power expansion. In this and other destruction operations, the US FEAF intended that the direct effect of its air pressure in Red North Korea would be "felt as far as Moscow." The Communist armies in Red North Korea constituted a huge outlay of Red capital.

The US FEAF reasoned that if these armies were held to an indecisive employment and concurrently destroyed by air action, the Communist would not long continue to argue about truce terms. The US FEAF air pressure, moreover, could cause the Red Chinese to make demands upon the Russians for additional military equipment, which the latter might not be able to supply. Hence, air pressure promised to strain Sino-Soviet unity.

From their outset, however, the air pressure operations had one serious limitation that only targets directly related to the hostile military structure and its immediate support could be attacked. Brigadier General Smart, Deputy for Operations of the US FEAF, nevertheless planned that "whenever possible attacks will be scheduled against targets of military significance so situated that their destruction will have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively engaged in the logistic support of the enemy forces.

During the latter stages of World War II, Twentieth US Air Force B-29's had dropped warning leaflets announcing the names of Japanese cities to be attacked and advising civilians to leave those cities. Morale surveys made soon after the Japanese surrender had shown that these announcements had undermined the people's faith in the ability of their government to defend them, had caused whole populations to flee the proscribed cities, thereby seriously interfering
with war work, and had persuaded many Japanese civilians of the good intentions of the Americans. Psychological warfare planners at the US FEAF on 1 July 1952 recommended a specific warning program which was designed to exploit the psychological effect of the air pressure operations.

The necessary psychological warfare leaflets were prepared by the US Far East Command psychological warfare agency. In support of the massed air strikes directed against military targets in Pyongyang on 11 July 1952, the US FEC psywar plan “Blast” was employed. The day before the bombing, 150,000 leaflets expressing the theme of “Bomb Warning” was dropped over the Pyongyang, the Red North Korean capital, and five days after the attack 150,000 leaflets with the theme of “General Civilian Bomb Warning” were released in the same area. The written text of both of these leaflets urged civilians to stay away from military installations of any kind because all such military targets would be bombed.

Visiting in Seoul on 14 July, General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, told newsmen that the Yalu and Pyongyang raids had seriously crippled the Reds’ ability to start an offensive and added that they “haven’t a ghost of a chance of driving us out of Korea.” In Tokyo on 15 July, General Collins warned that even heavier bombings were in store for the Reds if they “insist on prolong the war.”

Preparatory to the initiation of light bomber attacks against communications and supply centers in Red North Korea, the US FEC psychological warfare agency implemented plan “Strike” on 13 July 1952. Beginning on the night of 13 July 1952 aircraft dropped leaflets entitled “You are next,” containing a map of northwest of the Red North Korea with the main supply routes outlined in red and warning that all military targets along these routes were going to be attacked. These leaflets were carefully directed at 78 towns in Red North Korea known to house Communist military installations and supplies. Designed for dropping in an area after an air attack had taken place was another leaflet, entitled “You were warned,” which was designed to impress civilians with the credibility of UNC leaflets.

While these warnings were both humanitarian and utilitarian - - they enabled civilians to save their lives and disrupted Communist civil order and war-schedules - - the U.S. Department of State on 5 August 1952 stated that it deplored the warnings as “an unfortunate move” which would be intensively exploited by Communist propaganda. In a message to the American Embassy which was passed to Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, the U.S. State Department noted that the subject of massive bombings of military
targets in or near heavily populated areas could not be useful to the UNC purposes. The main targets for UNC air attack selected on a strictly military basis and that air action was not being aimed at the civilian population.

The U.S. JCS did not prohibit the use of warning leaflets, but it emphasized on 8 August 1952 that air pressure attacks should be directed against military targets and that all justifications of air actions would have to be based solely on military ground. The U.S. JCS further stated that it was “considered important to avoid public statements ascribing the high level of air activity as bringing pressure on the Communists to agree to an armistice, so that Communist prestige is not so seriously engaged as to make more difficult ultimate Communist agreement to an acceptable armistice.” The rule that air power could be applied only against military targets had prevailed from the beginning of the Korean war, but these actions in August 1952 greatly circumscribed the US FEAR’s plan to utilize its air power so as to disrupt Red North Korean civil order.

General Clark subsequently issued a general rule that every effort would be made to attack military targets only, and to avoid needless civilian casualties. The directive of 8 August 1952, moreover, deprived psywar of a potent theme that the Communist could resolve the air pressure laid against them by the simple agreement to accept voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, the only armistice issue still outstanding.

The determination what was a “military target” and what comprised “needless civilian casualties” would give the US FEAR much trouble in the spring of 1953 when a target study identified the irrigation dams in Red North Korea as an exceptionally lucrative air pressure target system.

At this time General Weyland felt himself morally compelled to rule that these dams could not be attacked for the purpose of destroying the Red North Korean rice crops, and he permitted air strikes against only those dams whose released flood waters would wash away rails and military supplies. At the end of the war in Korea, however, General Weyland observed that “the policy of attacking only targets directly related to the military structure and its immediate support may be completely invalid for another situation.” If the nation under attack were a flagrant international criminal, or if the friendly ground forces were not committed during the air campaign, or if the air forces were completely investing the enemy by air, General Weyland said that “the system chosen for attack might be, and possibly would be, quite different.”
Section 3. Selecting Targets for Air-Pressure

The USAF doctrines had always been concerned with “strategic” and “tactical” air missions up until the middle of 1952, and the US Far East Air Forces leaders found it difficult to pioneer in new doctrines which visualized airpower as an instrument of national policy. Viewed in relation to existing doctrine, the air-pressure strategy appeared to require “strategic” target systems, which were no longer very numerous in Korea. On 28 August 1952, for example, General Vanflett flatly stated that “Fifth US Air Force and US FEAF Bomber Command’s earlier work, coupled with the recent destruction of the enemy’s power system, has left Red North Korea almost devoid of targets that are suitable in a strategic or economic sense.”

In terms of historical operations and established concepts of target selection very few “lucrative” air targets remained in the Red North Korea, but when intensive target analysis keyed to the destruction operations was put to work it turned up a good many worth-while targets. Some of these targets had been overlooked in the initial strategic attack plans of 1950, some of them had recuperated from earlier bombings, and some new targets were discovered which might have escaped notice had they not been closely scrutinized in the light of the air-pressure strategy. This experience led Brigadier General Don Z. Zimmerman, successor in the duties as the US FEAF’s deputy for intelligence, to point out the lesson that “A dynamic and constant expansion of the target horizon will always reveal that an efficient employment of airpower can be made regardless of the circumstances of the operation, the geographical location, the composition, deployment, and tactics of the enemy forces. It is the mission of the target people to research and reveal the most effective way of employing all our combat air strength.”

When the US FEAF began the work of selecting and nominating air targets under the dictates of the US FEAF operational policy directive of 10 July 1952, the Fifth US Air Force was in relatively good shape. Located with the forward echelon of Fifth US Air Force headquarters in Seoul, the Air Targets Division was already a small assembly plant for the production of targets. Immediately the targets division regearred itself to collate and confirm target intelligence with photography on an assembly-line basis. In this work the Fifth US Air Force
made use of Detachment No. 2, 6004th US Air Intelligence Service Squadron, which, in fact, proved to be its most important single collector of tactical intelligence. Under the command of the same Major Donald Nichols who had been so active in the early days of the Korean War, Detachment No. 2 collected information from agents, prisoner of war, and refugees, submitting between 600 to 900 air-intelligence information reports to Fifth US Air Force intelligence each month.

In order to develop targets from the voluminous quantities of photo cover taken daily by its aircraft, the 67th US Tactical Reconnaissance Wing established a targets section within the 67th US Reconnaissance Technical Squadron. The findings of this photographic interpretation agency were issued in the form of target special reports. As was anticipated, the Fifth US Air Force did not experience any great difficulty in finding destruction targets.

Early in November 1952 the Fifth US Air Force targets representative reported that they had a backlog of 300 targets ready for attack, in addition to some 600 troop concentrations that were noted and targeted. In the mill at that time were about 330 potential objectives, of which approximately one-third would prove suitable for air attack. Most of the Fifth US Air Force’s targets were Communist headquarters, troop concentrations, supply dumps, and communications centers.

The US FEAF policy directive of 10 July 1952 required the US FEAF Bomber Command to direct its B-29’s against communications centers, manufacturing facilities, supply concentrations, and other similar targets. The new strategy posed a requirement for between 60 to 80 diversified shoran targets each month, a requirement which would be difficult for the US FEAF Bomber Command to meet on two accounts. For one thing, US FEAF Bomber Command’s deputy for intelligence lacked sufficient personnel to handle any large day-to-day quantity of targets. The US FEAF Targets Directorate recognized this, but, instead of assigning additional people to the Bomber Command, the directorate decided to “operate” and to assist in the research and preparation of target materials for the B-29’s. This action seemed necessary at the time, but its results were said to be disappointing.

Almost all of the US FEAF Korean Targets Analysis Division’s effort was diverted from its primary duty of maturing over-all target recommendation and priorities while it made a slight contribution to US FEAF Bomber Command in view of the large quantity of targets which that organization required. As the destruction operations progressed, the Fifth US Air Force turned over to US FEAF Bomber Command a good number of targets which were worth attacking but not suited for light bombers or fighter-bombers. The 67th US Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing also furnished a continuous flow of information, either in the form of photo prints or of completed reports and studies accomplished in Korea.

Another source of target photography was the 91st US Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, whose RB-29's flew regular missions over the eastern part of Red North Korea. The 548th US Reconnaissance Technical Squadron also provided medium-bomber targets. Actually, there was no shortage of intelligence information, but real difficulty for the US FEA F Bomber Command lay in its shortage of people available for the intensive study required to locate and develop profitable medium-bombardment targets. Seeing US FEA F Bomber Command's continuing targeting troubles in retrospect, General Zimmerman drew the lesson that "If a command, through some limitation or inadequacy, is unable to fulfill a required function, the higher headquarters, rather than to attempt to assist in the actual production, should instead provide the command with the necessary wherewithal to maintain a capability commensurate with its responsibility."

A second major problem affecting the US FEA F Bomber Command's targets was the fact that all of its shoran targets, because of inaccuracies in existing Korean maps, had to be especially processed for attack by a multiplex stereoplotting process, which, in effect, justified maps against aerial mapping photography.

In July 1952 the US Far East Command's 64th Engineer Base Topographic Battalion could provide US FEA F Bomber Command with only five sets of multiplexed shoran coordinates a week. Early in July the US FEA F air-target were so hard pressed to supply medium-bomber targets that they flatly stated that the Red North Korean transportation system was the "only target system suitable for B-29's in Red North Korea." During July the US FEA F Bomber Command accordingly used aircraft not scheduled for special targets in attacks against marshaling yards along the enemy's rail routes. These July marshaling-yard attacks yielded pitifully small returns. Assessment of the results of nine missions involving 71 B-29 sorties showed only 17 rail cars destroyed or damaged.

On 1 August 1952 the US FEA F accordingly directed that the medium bombers would thenceforth seek enemy material, military personnel, and supplies. But until the US FEA F could expand its multiplexing capability, the US FEA F Bomber Command continued to get reduced bombing accuracy. When supply targets near Pyongyang were attacked in September 1952, for example, the bomb patterns were not uncommonly a thousand feet away from the mapped aiming points. In August 1952, however, the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron had assembled the necessary equipment at Yokota, Japan, and by the end of the year all multiplex coordinates were being determined by the 548th US
Squadron could multiplex a maximum of 90 average-difficulty targets each month and could complete such coordinates on priority targets in three to four days. This capability solved US FEAF Bomber Command's requirement for the exact locations of incorrectly mapped bomber objectives in Red North Korea.

In the coordination of the effort of the US FEAF Bomber Command and the Fifth US Air Force, the US FEAF Formal Target Committee performed a splendid role. The usual agenda for the biweekly meetings in the United Nations Command in Tokyo began with an intelligence briefing on such matters as the status of air targets in Red North Korea. Following this, the US FEAF Bomber Command and Fifth US Air Force representatives presented statements of the general intent of their respective operations planned for the next two weeks. The committeemen gave constant attention to the elimination of competition for air targets. On occasion US FEAF targets representatives outlined target systems or a desired line of air activity which was to be exploited, and the other committee members took steps to implement the desired actions. The meetings of minds at these sessions ensured that the fighter-bombers and the medium bombers both received the targets which they could best handle and that targets developed as a result of a given attack would be followed up by other strikes.

Old concept that certain targets were "tactical" and others were "strategic" were abandoned, and, so far as the US FEAF resources were concerned, air-power was undivided by artificial and unreal attempts to classify targets by types of aircraft.

Although the US FEAF intelligence agencies successfully accomplished a selection of targets for the air-pressure attacks, they never solved one major problem. Air intelligence could target physical objectives for attack and could calculate the physical damage done to the air targets by air strikes, but it was not able to determine what significance a particular physical objective might have to the Communist regime nor could it project the effect of a given amount of destruction upon the hostile regime's primarily political decision to end the fighting.

As General Zimmerman pointed out, army forces had always judged and portrayed their success by a line drawn on a map which showed the current position of the fighting front in relation to the enemy's territory. The Air Force, however, had no way of judging or portraying the effects of its attacks which could range all over the enemy's homeland. The air-pressure attacks thus posed a requirement for new types of social and political intelligence which were unknown to Air Force intelligence. "Briefly stated," said General Zimmerman, "the problem
is to determine the effect of air action in war and then to present this effect in a simple, brief way so that it may be clearly understood and appraised.”

Section 4. Massive Air-Pressure for Psychological Purpose

Study on Another Target System

Since the United Nations Command made its final package proposal on 28 April 1952 which represented the ultimate in the UNC concessions, and the Communists refused to accept it there was no other way for the United Nations Command but to intensify air operations against the enemy targets in the Communist North Korea in the manner best calculated to bring them to armistice terms.

When the air pressure assaults were about to get under way in July 1952, the US FEAR target men had in mind several targets which were worthy of massed strikes. Two months before the US FEAR target experts had made detailed studies of command posts, communication centers, troop billets, and supply warehouses which had sprung up in the city of Pyongyang. The Red North Korean capital had not been subjected to air attack for nearly a year and it was crowded with military targets.

On 13 May 1952 General Weyland had asked General Clark for permission to send a massed attack against military targets in Pyongyang. General Clark was agreeable, but he asked General Weyland to hold up the attacks until the armistice delegation could get the Reds to mark all prisoner-of-war camps, as both sides had agreed to do. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the attacks on 3 July, and on 5 July 1952 General Clark directed US FEAR Commander to attack specific military targets and Pyongyang and to make every effort “to avoid needless civilian casualties.” General Clark also authorized General Weyland to seek naval participation in the attacks and to employ all the UNC air units he thought necessary.

Over in Korea the Fifth US Air Force and Eighth US Army intelligence officers had been working on another target system. From long study these intelligence planners knew that Red supplies entered Red North at Sinuiju, Okkang-dong, Manpojin, and Linchang and traveled southward to major supply-dispersal areas in the vicinity of Singosan and Singye. Supplies imported
through the first three gateway cities came southward through Pyongyang and Kunsan. Supplies entering last gateway city traveled by rail to Hamhung and thence by rail and truck to the major dispersal areas. The supply dumps at Singosan and Singye were well dispersed and difficult for air attack to destroy, but the Reds were using towns and villages along their main supply routes to store supplies, to service vehicles, and to shelter troops.

At about the same time that the intelligence planners noted the importance of the towns and villages along the Red North Korea's main supply routes, General Barcus, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, was concerned with the lack of imagination manifest in the employment of his light-bomber force. Almost immediately the Fifth US Air Force operations officers decided to make use of the light bombers for attacks against the communications centers along the enemy's main supply routes. Guided by a pathfinder crew which would identify the targets for attacks, streams of light bombers would arrive at five-minute intervals to drop incendiary and delay-fuzed bombs on the towns and villages sheltering Red supplies. After dropping their internal bombs at the primary targets, the B-26 crews would proceed to a designated main supply route and perform route reconnaissance with their external ordnance and guns. The program would have twofold results. It would destroy supplies in transit and create effective roadblocks for short period of time. At first the Fifth US Air Force designated 35 towns and villages for light-bomber attack, but it soon increased the list to 78 towns and villages.

The massive assaults against Pyongyang and the attacks against town and village communications centers were aimed at military objectives, but General Smart wanted to exploit psychological as well as destructive attributes of air-power. "Whenever possible," he directed, "attacks will be scheduled against targets of military significance so situated that their destruction will have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively engaged in the logistic support of the enemy forces."

Psychological warfare planners at US FFEAF accordingly recommended a specific prestrike warning program, and the necessary warning leaflets were prepared by the US Far East Command. In support of the assault against Pyongyang, plan "Blast" would be executed. Several days prior to the attack planes would drop leaflets over Pyongyang warning civilians to stay away from military installations of any kind. Several days after the attack planes would drop companion leaflets stressing the fact that civilians had been warned to avoid military targets.

In support of the communications center attacks, plan "Strike" was applicable.
Planes would drop leaflets showing the main supply routes and warning that all military targets along these lines would be attacked. After a communications center had been bombed, other leaflets would be dropped there to inform all concerned that they had been warned of the impending attacks.

While the Fifth US Air Force was awaiting approval for the Pyongyang strikes, it attacked other targets of importance. On 4 July 1952 fighter-bombers attacked *Red North Korea's Military Academy*, near the Yalu and some 50 miles northeast of Antung. The fighter-bombers successfully evaded MIG interceptors who got through the Sabre screen, but they turned in relatively poor bombing results. On 8 July 1952 84 fighter-bombers attacked bridges on the rail line between Kanggye and Kunu-ri, while 41 other fighter-bombers hit the generators, transformer yards, and penstocks at Changjin No. 1 and No. 2, which were still possibly useful to the enemy.

**Attacks Against Pyongyang**
*(11 July 1952)*

Everyone in the United Nations Command air forces was waiting for 11 July 1952, the day which General Weyland had designated as the date for "Operation Pressure Pump." Practically every operational UNC air unit in the Far East was to have a part in the savage assault against 30 targets designated in Pyongyang. The massive strikes carried an element of risk, for they would be in progress nearly all day, giving the MIG's plenty of time to react. Pyongyang was also defended by 48 guns and more than 100 automatic weapons, making it one of the worst "flak traps" in the Red North Korea. But on 11 July 1952 the strikes went off well.

As Sabres and Meteors stood patrols north of the Chongchon without incident, aircraft from the Seventh US Fleet, H.M.S. *Ocean*, the 1st US Marine Air Wing, the Republic of Korea Air Force, and the Fifth US Air Force made strikes at 1000, 1400, and 1800 hours. After the first strike weather on the east coast prevented the Seventh US Fleet's planes from returning to their carriers and so kept them out of action at the Republic of Korea's airfields during the remainder of the day.

Operating on the west coast, Seafuries and Firflies from H.M.S. *Ocean* flew two missions, while most of the Fifth US Air Force's jet fighter-bombers made all three strikes. Timed to hit just before the first strikes were on target, US Marine and Navy flak destroyers worked effectively, but there was still enough
flak in the air to shoot down two Navy planes and a Thunderjet. In addition to these losses, eight Fifth US Air Force planes sustained major damages and 19 others suffered minor damages. That night 54 shoran-directed B-29's attacked eight targets which had been saved for them. This was the biggest air attack so far in the Korean War, for 1,254 aircraft sorties had been committed in "Operation Pressure Pump."

Examination of bombing assessment photographs showed that the aerial blow was quite successful against the command posts, supply aggregations, factories, troop billets, railway facilities, and gun positions marked for destruction in Pyongyang. At least three of the 30 targets were completely destroyed, and all but two of them were heavily damaged.

Accordingly to the agent reports, the NK Communist ministry of industry's underground offices were destroyed and a direct hit on another air-raid shelter was said to have killed 400 to 500 Communist officials. Off the air for two days, Radio Pyongyang finally announced that the "brutal" strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had inflicted 7,000 casualties.

Attacks Against Enemy's Industrial Remnants

Approaching their problem with the view toward making the war expensive to the Communists, the UNC target planners turned up a good number of significant targets. The Red North Korean hydroelectric plants required continued surveillance and repeated strikes to prevent the Reds from repairing them. The destruction strategy, moreover, turned up an entirely new target category -- the Red North Korean metal and mining business. Air attacks could not hurt mine shafts, but they could put the mines out of operation by destroying hoist houses, compressor shacks, or transformer yards. On 15 July 1952 the Fifth US Air Force sent 171 sorties to gut the Sungho-ri cement plant and an adjacent locomotive repair shop. The cement plant had been bombed before, but it had recovered and was again working.

Seventh US Fleet carrier pilots attacked both Changjin power plants on 19 and 20 July 1952, and the No. 2 plant was bombed by 44 B-29's on the nights of 19-20 and 21-22 July 1952. On 27 July 1952, carrier-based aircraft attacked and largely destroyed the Sindok lead and zinc mill, a facility which was reportedly shipping 3,000 tons of processed ore to Russia each month.

On the night of 30-31 July 1952, 63 shoran-bombing B-29's attacked the Oriental light metals plant, near Sinuiju and only four miles from the Yalu. This
was the largest medium-bomber strike against a single target during the Korean War, and the post-strike reconnaissance showed that this military important factory, which had been overlooked in the 1650 strategic strikes, was 90 percent destroyed. Late on the afternoon of 5 August 1952 111 fighter-bomber aircraft attacked a tungsten mine at Kilehu.

On the night of 18 August 1952 the US FEAF Bomber Command employed 14 B-29’s to effect 60 percent destruction of the Nakwon Munition Plant. This factory, a few miles southeast of Sinuiju, was reported to be producing thousands of antitank and hand grenades each day.

The heaviest all-Navy attack of the Korean War was made on 1 September 1952 against the synthetic oil production center at Aoji, a target only four miles from Manchuria and only eight miles from the Siberian border. Morning and afternoon deckload strikes of naval planes devastated the Aoji plant and took out the above-ground buildings of an important iron mine, gas and oil storage facilities, and assorted manufacturing facilities at nearby Musan target complex had been deemed to be of such unusual importance that the U.S. JCS had been willing, on a one-time basis, to suspend its rule prohibiting air operations within 12 miles of Soviet territory.

In August and September 1952, the US FEAF attempted to destroy as many Red North Korean mines, smelters, and ore concentration facilities as was practicable with air action. The Hoechang Ore Processing Plant, reported to be processing gold for shipment to Red China, was 90 percent destroyed by 20 B-29’s on the night of 5 August. Early in September the US FEAF notified the Fifth US Air Force that it would be well to neutralize Red North Korean mines by destroying their hoists, compressor houses, machine shops, and transformer yards.

The US FEAF reasoning was that all of these minerals and ores were being sent to Communist China and Russia in repayment for war costs, and their destruction would post a drain on the whole Soviet economy. During September, Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers hit a number of mines which produced gold, tungsten, and monanite for Soviet industrial and economic uses. One of the largest of these mining enterprises was the gold mine and smelter at Soktal-li. This installation was targeted but could not be attacked because of POW collection joint was somewhere in its immediate vicinity.

On the night of 30 September-1 October, 48 medium bombers almost completely destroyed the Namsan-ni Chemical Plant, an important industrial chemical target located on the banks of the Yalu near Supung. Namsan-ni was later described as the “last of the marginal strategic type targets in Red North Korea.
Attacks Against Red Communications Centers

According to plan, the Fifth US Air Force light-bomber wings commenced their night attacks Communist communications centers on 20 July. Immediately motivated by the fact that the US FEAF operational policy directive accorded a low priority to vehicles and railway rolling stock, General Barcus ordered the execution of a plan which was intended to deny the enemy the villages in which he was storing supplies while enroute southward. Employing M-20 incendiary clusters and M-76 fire bombs, the 3rd and 17th US Wing crews arrived at heights of about 4,000 feet at five-minute intervals to bomb targets marked for them by the incendiary bombs carried by a pathfinder lead crew. Once the fire got going, each bomber added to the conflagration. The usual targets were about one-fourth square mile in size, and B-26 crews put 50 to 60 percent of their bombs into these designated areas without much difficulty. Bomb damage assessment of one of the first targets hit - Namchonjom supply center - showed that it was 95 percent destroyed. A light-bomber strike against Changyon caught a battalion asleep in the village and killed nearly 300 Red North Korean troops. At Pomhwa-dong a company of Red troops assembled for supper was said to have been wiped out.

As the communications center attacks got under way, General Barcus implemented a vigorous warning program, both to save the lives of innocent civilians and to cause maximum disruption of civil order. The Fifth US Air Force operations officers were a little dubious about disclosing targets that the light bombers would attack, but General Barcus favored an even more vigorous warning program than the leaflets would afford. Preparatory to attacks against Sinchon and Yonan, Radio Seoul warned the people to leave these town right up to the time of the B-26 attack. On 5 August 1952, moreover, General Barcus announced to press and radio the names of the 78 Red North Korean centers which were scheduled to be destroyed.

In October a single fire bomb attack against Pyoro-ri resulted in the destruction of 180 buildings. As conducted by the B-26’s, however, the communications center attacks required targets which were not too heavily defended and which were readily identifiable at night.

A peak month of such attacks in October 1952 fairly well exhausted the list of 78 villages, and by December the Fifth US Air Force was having some trouble finding suitable targets for the light bomber streams.
Section 5. Intensification of Air-Pressure Operations

Assaulting Military Targets

In October 1952 General Weyland had asked the US FEAF Bomber Command to attack military targets at Sinuiju and Uiju for the purpose of displaying our air strength in the sector. Aside from their psychological significance, these Yalu River targets represented important military values to the Reds. Sinuiju and Uiju airfields served Red air garrisons and troop headquarters, factories, and vehicle and locomotive repair shops were located in the towns of Uiju and Sinuiju. On the night of 28–29 November, Bomber Command sent 44 B-29’s, in three forces at forty-five-minutes intervals, to attack the long-assigned targets at Sinuiju and Uiju. Once again the bombers met clear weather instead of predicted clouds, but they emphasized other protective measures and escaped injury. A sudden snowball prevented exact determination of the damages inflicted by this attack, but the B-29’s apparently had not destroyed the supply and communications targets in Uiju to the desired degree. Accordingly, on the night of 12–13 December, the 307th US Wing sent 14 B-29’s back to Uiju to effect the 50 percent destruction which was wanted.

On the night in December 1952 the medium bombers bearded the Reds with attacks north of the Chongchon and thrice hit targets near the Yalu. The Communists did not like these Yalu River attacks. Their increasing efforts to shoot down B-29’s indicated as much. On 10 December, moreover, India’s delegate to the United Nations voiced the Communist line and charged that the United States had sabotaged the prospects for an armistice in Korea by bombing along the Yalu.

Although the US FEAF was continuing to mount air attacks into the “sensitive” area along the Yalu, the Communist armies and their men, supplies, and equipment increasingly became the main objective of the UNC air attack. There were two reasons for this. Back of the front line, out of range of the UNC artillery, the Communists had not yet managed to get all of their forces, supplies, and equipment underground. According to the intelligence reports, moreover, the Communists had evacuated most civilians from towns and villages south of the 39th parallel and were using the buildings to shelter supplies and equipment.
From the air planners’ viewpoint trained Communist troops and scarce military equipment were available to the Reds, and these targets were in sufficient quantity to keep the UNC air forces gainfully employed. The second reason for increased United Nations Command air attacks against Communist armies sprang from reports that the Reds were beginning to augment their ground forces in Red North Korea. Beginning in December 1952, increased sightings of Communists vehicles caused General Clark to see the threat of a Red ground offensive as a distinct possibility for early 1953.

When they commenced a new course of sustained air pressure operations in part of October 1952, the UNC air forces had devoted some part of their capabilities to enemy personnel and supply targets close to the front line. The UNC Navy airmen of Task Force 77 emphasized massed fighter-bomber attacks against Red troop and supply positions near the main line of resistance — attacks which well known as “Cherokee” strikes. In these strikes the Navy customarily employed eight F4U’s, eight AD’s, and eight to 12 F9F’s. Such a massed force had good expectations of inflicting maximum damage with minimum losses.

The 5th US Air Force also attempted to find one "special" target worthy of 100 fighter-bomber sorties each day, and it devoted the remainder of its efforts to attacks against enemy supply points and personnel areas in the zone south of the line between Pyongyang and Wonsan. Almost at once the 5th US Air Force and the Navy met the same problem. For the purpose of safety, the 8th US Army designated a bombl ine, within which aircrews could not launch attacks unless under positive control of a tactical air-control party or an airborne coordinator. The 8th US Army’s bombl ine was spread as far as 10,000 meters out in front of friendly ground positions. Air attacks far out in front of friendly troops were thus required to observe close-air-support procedures, even though there was no danger that friendly forces would be inadvertently bombed. If they complied with the close-support formalities, neither Task Force 77 nor the 5th US Air Force could place large air strikes on a target fast enough to profit from the shock effect of the massed strike.

Early in December 1952, at 5th US Air Force's suggestion, the 8th US Army agreed to move its bombl ine to a position approximately 3,000 meters beyond its outposts. At this same time a line was drawn approximately 25 miles beyond the bombl ine separating "general support" from "interdiction." Now, with a greater facility, Task Force 77 and 5th US Air Force units launched forces of 24 of 36 aircraft against enemy personnel and supply areas lying outside the 3,000-meter line but generally within 20,000 meters of the ground.
front.

Almost all of Task Force 77’s planes flew Cherokee strikes, and December 1952 the Fifth US Air Force used 1,891 sorties in general-support strikes. The Fifth US Air Force found that the massed attacks, accomplished in a minimum time with little loss of aircraft, appeared to be highly demoralizing to the enemy. Eighth US Army officers praised the Cherokee effort and called it “airpower’s most potent contribution to the Korean War in its present static-front condition.”

The US FEAF Bomber Command would continue to employ its forces against “special” targets, in October 1952 the Superforts began methodically to attack and destroy several hostile supply and communications targets each night from a list of more than 200 such objectives. Many of the targets seemed to be notting more than villages and towns, but the medium-bomber attacks set off so many secondary fires and explosions that it was soon evident that these villages and towns were Communist arsenals. In making these attacks against small objectives, the shoran-bombing B-29 crews always employed 500-pound general purpose bombs. Relentlessly, hitting 30 to 40 of the targets each month, the US FEAF Bomber Command destroyed Red supply, personnel, and communications centers which were the backbone and support of the Communist armies.

By April 1953 the US FEAF Bomber Command had attacked 168 of these centers and had substantially destroyed 132 of them. At this time General Fisher, the Commander of the US FEAF Bomber Command, reported that he was “firmly convinced that this program has made the support of the Communist armies so difficult and so costly in men, material, and required dispersion, that the Communist Chinese want no more of it.

A New Type of Destructive Interdiction

Early in winter of 1952—53 General Barcus, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, began to give some serious thoughts to air interdiction of Communist supply lines — not the old delay-and-disruption interdiction attacks but a new type of destructive interdiction. At the times when UNC air forces had served the enemy’s rail lines, the Reds had employed trucks recklessly to supply their military forces. General Barcus believed that properly-managed interdiction attacks could set the Reds up for significant destruction. The thing to do was to hit a bottleneck in the enemy’s railway lines and then destroy accumulations
of rail equipment and motor transport. One of the major bottlenecks in the enemy's rail transportation network was evidently in the Chongchon estuary northwest of Sinuiju where the main rail line crossed the Chongchon and Taeryong Rivers.

Proposing to keep the bridges out of action for a month, the Fifth US Air Force Commander sent 114 fighter-bombers to Yongmi-dong on 1 November 1952. On 6 November 1952 100 light-bombers returned to renew the attack only to find that the Reds had already repaired their three operational bridges and had moved in enough antiaircraft artillery to shoot down a plane and negate bombing results of the second attack. The Reds also began to build a fifth by-pass bridge at the Yongmi-dong crossing. On 12 November 1952 six shoran-directed B-29's chopped four spans out of Pyongyang's restored railway bridges. During November and December 1952 the Fifth US Air Force employed moderate numbers of fighter-bombers to keep two more key rail lines out of action.

The US FEA F railway attacks interdicted Communist rail traffic for nothing more than short period of time, but even this small dislocation contributed to the success of concomitant attack against vehicles and trains. In November 1952 the Fifth US Air Force obtained good results from a main supply-route interdiction plan called "choke." At last light fighter-bombers attacked selected road bridges, shortly after dark B-26's hit similar objectives, and during the night other night-intruder B-26's reconnoitered and bombed vehicles stalled behind the blown-out bridges. Even though hampered by unfavorable weather, "Choke" was described as "highly satisfactory," and during November 1952 the Fifth US Air Force claimed to have destroyed 3,139 Red vehicles.

In December 1952 the Fifth US Air Force put into action a "Truck Killer" plan whereby fighter-bombers made road cuts at dusk, light bombers attacked vehicle concentration during the night, and fighter-bombers sweeps at dawn sought out vehicles which had not gotten under cover. Poor flying weather in the early morning hours prevented the fighter sweeps from contributing much, but the Fifth Air Force nevertheless claimed destruction of 2,321 enemy vehicles. In the last week of December 1952 RB-26's and B-26 intruders began to cooperate against enemy rail traffic in a project called "Spotlight." The RB-26 crew located trains, called in a B-26 intruder, and then illuminated the target with flares while the B-26 attacked. This procedure paid off almost at once. On the night of 30 December 1952 an RB-26 located five locomotives in one marshaling yard, and two night intruders destroyed four of them and damaged the other one.
A fighter-bomber, roaring down at jet speeds on elusive targets,
all in a red-hot maze of enemy anti-aircraft fire.

Beginning in December 1952 and continuing into January 1953, the United Nations Command sightings of Red vehicular traffic were higher than at any time in more than a year. Much of the traffic was proceeding south of Pyongyang toward Haeju and Kaesong. “Such unusual enemy activity,” reported the US FEAF intelligence, “might normally be associated with a pending offensive.”

In order to combat the Communist build-up, General Barcus on 2 January 1953 asked General Weyland to approve a short series of intensive rail attacks to be made by the Fifth US Air Force and US FEAF Bomber Command. General Barcus called for the destruction of all rail bridges at Sinanju and Yongmi-dong and the interdiction of other rail bridges on the main north-south rail lines.

General Weyland approved the operation, and the Bomber Command agreed to bomb marshaling yards in the vicinity of Sinanju in order to destroy rail equipment which was backed up as a result of the bridge attacks. According to plan, the Fifth US Air Force began to attack the key bridges in the Chongchon estuary on 10 January 1953. Missing the next day because of weather, the fighter-bombers concluded the bridge assault on 15 January 1953. In the six days the fighter-bombers flew 1,166 sorties, 713 which suppressed flak and 453 which attacked the bridges. On the night of 9 through 14 January 1953 formations
of from four to six B-29's bombed marshaling yards near Sinnaju. In all, the operation consumed approximately 54 percent of the US FEAF's combat effort in the period of its execution.

Section 6. Spring Thaw Interdiction

Although the US Far East Air Forces had not emphasized rail-interdiction attacks during February 1953, the Fifth US Air Force reconnaissance planes had kept a sharp watch behind the Communists lines to make sure that the Reds did not gather their forces for a major attack. As the month passed without any significant Communist ground action, the UNC intelligence stated that the Reds had missed their best opportunity for several months to come. Any Communist ground offensive between mid-March and mid-May would be greatly hampered by spring thaws. For this reason the Reds would probably wait until May before they opened a ground campaign. Learning these intelligence prediction, the US FEAF planners outlined a short but intensive aerial interdiction attack - named "Spring thaw" which was expected to disrupt the enemy's supply lines, destroy some of enemy transportation, and force the enemy to consume supplies which were stored in the forward areas. The combined damages of the aerial attack and the seasonal deterioration of the supply routes would complicate any plans which the Reds might make for a general ground offensive.

All elements of the US FEAF were committed to "Spring thaw," and on the night of 21 March 1953 US FEAF Bomber Command started the attack with 18 Superfortresses, which knocked spans out of two of the three principal bridges at Yongmi-dong and made a third unserviceable. On the next night eight B-29's continued the attack, but they noted that the Reds had already repaired one of the bridges which had been served the night before.

After these two strikes the US FEAF Bomber Command suspended attacks against Yongmi-dong because it feared that "another attack might have been costly in aircraft losses." In order to provide prompt sighting of rolling stock which might be stagnated by the rail bridge attacks, Sabres returning from the first and third Yalu patrols reconnoitered the main rail lines and reported sightings to the Joint Operations Center. Thunderjet strikes, coinciding with the second and fourth Sabre patrols, were supposed to attack fleeting traffic concentrations, but poor flying weather allowed the fighter-bombers to make only one effective follow-up strikes.
The rail attacks were only one part of "Spring thaw," and most of the Fifth US Air Force’s fighter-bombers and light bombers attacked selected road bridges at dusk, the intruders bombed resultant vehicle concentrations during the night, and before dawn the intruders bombed other bridges to stagnate vehicles for fighter-bomber sweeps. The combined attack destroyed 50 road bridges, damaged 56 others, and made 134 road cuts, but the planned cooperation between the fighters and intruders required close timing which was frequently impossible in the marginal weather of late March.

During March 1953 the Fifth US Air Force nevertheless claimed destruction of 2,005 enemy vehicles, and sightings of enemy traffic showed that the Communists were using their boggy secondary roads more frequently than usual. From this evidence the Fifth US Air Force concluded that "Spring Thaw" had caused a slowdown of enemy vehicular traffic.

With better flying weather and more precise timing, the FEAF believed that an operation similar to "Spring thaw" could achieve better results. During the dark of the moon, early in April 1953, US FEAF Bomber Command and the Fifth US Air Force accordingly repeated the operation with a few changes in target areas.

On the nights of 6, 7 and 11 April 1953 forces of 15 B-29’s attacked the three serviceable rail bridges across the Chongchon and Sinanju. On each of these night the B-29’s cut spans from the three bridges, but as the Bomber Command reported, the ability of the enemy to repair bridges was just short of miraculous, and none of the structures were out of operation for more than twenty-four hours at a time. Since the thawing zone was moving northward and the Reds had also augmented their flak along the roads to the south, the Fifth US Air Force moved its fighter-bombers and light bombers beyond a line between Sinanju and womsan to attack the enemy’s main supply routes. During the first half of April, the Fifth US Air Force crews destroyed 18 road bridges, damaged 38, and made 86 road cuts.

During the month the Fifth US Air Force also claimed the destruction of 2,732 enemy vehicles, a larger than normal total which was attributed to an increasing level of skill among B-26 crews.
CHAPTER VI ENDING STAGE OF AIR CAMPAIGN
(April – July 1953)

Section 1. Destruction of Red Irrigation Dams

When the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, well known as operation Little Switch, got under way on 20 April 1953 and the armistice negotiations were resumed at Panmunjom on 26 April 1953, the Communists were as intractable as ever and revealed that they were not prepared to accept the UNC term for ending the war.

As the truce negotiations faltered, General Clark informed the U.S. JCS that the US FEAF would attack the hydroelectric generating facilities at SUPUNG and a target complex at Yangsí – both being legitimate military targets in the “sensitive” area along the Yalu. Because of its flak defenses, the powerhouse at SUPUNG was a difficult target, but on 10 May 1953 Colonel Victor E. Warford, commander of the 58th US Wing, led a formation of eight 474th Group Thunderjets in low at SUPUNG and put at least three delayed-action bombs through the roof of the target. Tailrace activity at SUPUNG dam nevertheless indicated that two generators still continued to work. Without great difficulty on the night of 10-11 May 1953, 39 Superfortresses attacked the Yangsí target complex outside Sinuiju city and effected 63 percent destruction. On the night of 18–19 May 1953, 18 B-29’s returned to complete the destruction of “one of the last large lucrative targets remaining in Red North Korea.”

At Panmunjom on 13 May 1953 the United Nations Command presented suggested terms of reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) which defined the functions of the body in such a way as to ensure that prisoners of war could accept or reject the repatriation. The Communist bitterly rejected these proposals and launched into tirades of propaganda. Having failed to make progress, the United Nations delegates temporarily recessed the truce negotiations on 16 May 1953. Fearing the possibility of another indefinite recess in the armistice negotiations, General Clark pointed out on 14 May to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff the military pressure which he could wage against the
Reds without a change in his current directives. He could continue air attacks against sensitive targets along the Yalu, breach about 20 previously unattacked irrigation dams in Red North Korea, launch all-out air attacks against Kaesong after advising the Reds that they had violated the neutral status of the town by using it as a military concentration point. When he mentioned the Red North Korean irrigation dams on 14 May, General Clark revealed that he had heard about a target system which the US FEAF had been studying for nearly three months.

The Red North Korean agricultural irrigation dams were an excellent target system, but many US FEAF officers were troubled by the implications connected with the destruction of the irrigation dams. On 7 April several members of the US FEAF Formal Target Committee doubted the wisdom of such a drastic operation, and General Weyland was reported to be "Skeptical of the feasibility and desirability of destroying the rice-irrigation system in Red North Korea." The Target Committee consequently refused to accept the operation, but it recommended that the US FEAF intelligence prepare a detailed study of the matter for General Weyland.

The intelligence study developed convincing arguments to prove that air attacks against the Red agricultural reservoir system were suitable, feasible, and acceptable, but neither General Clark nor General Weyland thought that the time was opportune for such a severe operation as the destruction of the enemy's rice crop. Both believed that such an operation would be an ultimate in air pressure, to be used if the Reds broke off armistice negotiations. Even though he was unwilling to authorize attacks against the enemy's rice crop as such, General Weyland was willing to approve irrigation-dam attacks where resultant floodwaters would interdict the enemy's lines of communications.

In order to test the feasibility of the endeavor and develop attack techniques, General Weyland directed the Fifth US Air Force to breach the Toksan Dam, which was about 20 miles north of Pyongyang and backed up the waters of the Potong River. On 13 May 1953 four waves of 59 Thunderjets of 58th US Wing attacked the 2,300-foot earth-and-stone dam. At last light the dam seemed to have withstood the 1,000-pound bombs directed against it. Sometime that night, however, impounded waters broke through the weakened dam, and fighter-bombers found the reservoir empty the next morning. "The damage done by the deluge," reported the Fifth US Air Force, "far exceeded the hopes of everyone." The swirling floodwaters washed out or damaged approximately six miles of embankment and five bridges on the important railway and also destroyed two miles of the main northsouth highway which paralleled the railroad. Down the
river valley the floodwaters destroyed 700 buildings and inundated Suan airfield. The floodwaters also scoured five square miles of prime rice crops. "The breaching of the Toksan dam," General Clark jubilantly informed the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "has been as effective as weeks of rail interdiction."

With one of the two main railway lines into Pyongyang unserviceable, General Weyland immediately scheduled two more dams for destruction in order to interdict one of the important rail lines. He assigned the Chasan dam to the Fifth US Air Force and the Kuwonga dam to the US FEAF Bomber Command. The Fifth US Air Force commenced work promptly. Late on the afternoon of 15 May 1953 Thunderjets of the 58th US Wing dive-bombed Chasan with 1,000-pound ordnance but inflicted no significant damage. On 16 May 90 sorties in three waves of the 58th US Wing Thunderjets continued the dive-bombing attack.

The last wave of the fighter-bombers scored a cluster of five direct hits and the hydraulic pressure of other bombs bursting in the water broke the weakened dam. Impounded waters surged southward to wash away 2,050 feet of embankment.

These photographs record the successful Chasan strike on the afternoon of 16 May 1953.
and three bridges on the rail line. The parallel highway suffered slight damage, but secondary roads were washed out. The onrushing waters surged over field after field of young rice. The US FEAF Bomber Command was tardy in beginning its attacks at Kuwonga and waited too long between strikes. Seven B-29's aimed 56 x 2,000-pound bombs against Kuwonga by shoran on the night of 21-22 May and scored four direct hits on the crest of the dam. The dam did not break, and the Reds had learned an effective countermeasure.

They reduced the reservoir's water level by 12 feet, thus taking strain off the weakened dam and widening the thickness of the earth which the B-29's would have to breach. On the night of 29 May 14 B-29's scored five direct hits with 2,000-pound bombs. Had the water level of the reservoir been at its customary stage, this attack would have destroyed the dam. The Superfort attacks failed because the Reds had rapidly devised effective countermeasure, but the enemy had to drain Kuwonga's reservoir before repairing the dam. The Reds prevented flood damages, but they deprived adjacent rice fields of necessary irrigation water.

At the end of the Korean War General Weyland remarked that two particular fighter-bomber strikes stood out "as spectacular on their own merit." One was the hydroelectric attack of June 1952, and the other -- "perhaps the most spectacular of the war" -- was the destruction on the Toksan and Chasan irrigation dams in May 1953. Although they displayed their usual fantastic rapidity in restoring rail lines, the Communist did not get the two important railways which were destroyed by the floodwaters back into service until 26 May 1953. In an effort to repair the damage, the Reds immediately mobilized 4,000 laborers at Toksan, but by their own admission the rebuilding of this dam required 200,000 man-days of labor. A United Nations covert agent who had been at Toksan said that the local population felt that the destruction of this dam caused more damage than any other United Nations Command air attack.

Faced with extremely damaging air pressure attacks in Communist North Korea and with the possibility that the Korean war might be expanded, the Communist delegates at Panmunjom yielded to the United Nations Command terms for a settlement of the prisoner-of-war question. On 4 June the Communists announced that they basically agreed with the United Nations Command terms of reference proposed on 25 May 1953. Following some changes in wording, the United Nations Command and Communist delegates signed the approved "terms of reference" on 8 June 1953. These terms marked a complete Communist capitulation and achieved the United Nations Command objective of voluntary repatriation of prisoner of war.
Section 2. Defeating Communist Last Ground Offensive

Blunts Communists’ Offensive

Ever since January 1953 the US FEAF’s destructive interdiction operations had been designed to weaken the Communist ground forces before they could launch ground offensive southward. Despite a conscious emphasis on general support strikes, the United Nations Command air forces had not slighted close support in the early months of 1953. In support of generally desultory ground fighting which flared up in battalion-sized battles for “Old Baldy” and “Outpost Vegas” between 23 and 29 March, the US FEAF and its attached units flew 7,665 close-support sorties in the months of January through March 1953.

As spring came to Korea, the UNC air forces gave more attention to the ground situation. In spite of the cloudy skies, which cloaked Communist movements in May, the Fifth US Air Force reconnaissance revealed that the Reds were regrouping their front-line troops and were shifting forces from the northern coast to forward positions. To combat these movements, UNC pilots maintained steady pressure against enemy troop concentrations, supply dumps, and the transportation routes. The B-26’s flew 15 bomber-stream attacks against enemy troop concentration, while intruder B-26’s claimed destruction of 2,239 enemy vehicles. The B-29’s flew 35 strikes against enemy supply areas and troop billets. At the same time that it was checking enemy movements, the US FEAF and its attached units devoted 5,824 sorties - - 25 percent of its combat effort - - to the close support of friendly ground troops.

As early as 27 May 1953 aerial reconnaissance showed that the Communists were ready to mount a ground offensive, and the UNC air forces were ready. Starting on the night of 28 May, the Reds launched a feinting attack against the I US Corps outposts in western Korea, but the main Communist assault was directed against the II ROK Corps on 10 June 1953. This attack centered in central sector, where the II ROK Corps held a bulge in the UNC lines around Kumsong. Beginning on the night of 3 June and for three nights thereafter, the US FEAF Bomber Command devoted its entire effort - - 19 B-29’s each night - - to ground radar-directed support of friendly ground troops. The Fifth US Air Force and Navy pilots also employed ground radar guidance to attack Communist troops by day and night.
When the ground situation worsened on the II ROK Corps front on 12 June, Lieutenant General Samuel E. Anderson, the newly appointed Fifth US Air Force Commander, waived the minimum-altitude restrictions on his fighter-bombers and ordered his wings to give all-out support to the Eighth US Army. Keeping the carriers Princeton, Boxer, Philippine Sea, and Lake Champlain on the line for seven days, Admiral Clark ordered his pilots to team with US Marine and Fifth US Air Force airmen for a close-support effort exceeding anything up to that time.

On 15 June, the day that the II ROK Corps defense cracked, a temporary break in the weather allowed General Anderson and Admiral Clark to hit the Reds with everything they had, the US FEAF planes flew a total of 2,143 sorties of all kinds for the largest single day's effort of the war. Task Force 77 broke all records by flying 532 combat sorties; and US Marine fliers and west-coast carrier pilots topped their records with 478 sorties. On his day 859 of 1,148 Fifth US Air Force combat sorties hit the advancing Red ground troops. In a rare daytime support mission the 17th US Wing sent four six-ship elements for a formation attack against enemy front-line troop concentrations.

"The front-line troops of the Eighth US Army," said General Taylor, "join in praise of the magnificent support they received today from the planes of the Fifth US Air Force."

The Fifth US Air Force and Task Force 77 continued to give all-out support to friendly ground troops until the Eighth US Army got its lines stabilized on 19 June 1953. Directed by day by Mosquito airborne controllers and by tactical air-control parties, or at night or in bad weather by tactical air-direction post radars, the UNC air close-support effort was at a high level all during June and was large enough to swamp all of the control facilities on 15, 16, 26, and 30 June 1953. On these days some pilots could not remain on station long enough for air controllers to direct them to targets and had to make "free drops" against targets of opportunity behind enemy lines.

During June 1953 the tactical air-direction posts of the 502nd US Tactical Control Group controlled 66 percent of the sorties flown by B-26's, and on the three nights following 28 June 1953 they again directed all Superfort attacks. Counting nocturnal bomber and fighter-bomber sorties as well as fighter-bomber strikes in bad weather, the tactical air-direction posts successfully controlled 2,124 bomb runs. In this month of maximum close support the US FEAF aircraft flew 7,023 such sorties, the US Marine air wing flew 1,348 sorties, and the other UNC aircraft provided additional 537 sorties. In all, 49 percent of US FEAF's combat effort provided close support to friendly ground troops.
Ending Stage of Air Campaign

The Communist ground offensive of mid-June 1953 was a face-saving and terrain-grabbing expedition which cost the Reds the lives of many of their foot soldiers. While the Reds were attacking, Communists and the United Nations Command military liaison officers were already drawing a new line of military demarcation for the truce, and a plenary meeting of armistice delegates ratified this line on 17 June 1953. Except for cleaning up the terminology of the draft armistice agreement, the work at Panmunjom was completed and everything pointed to an early signing of the completed agreement, possibly in three or four days. But President Rhee of the Republic of Korea who had opposed strongly to the armistice without unification of Korea, released 27,000 anti-Communist Korean prisoners of war during the early morning hours of 18 June 1953. At the next plenary session at Panmunjom on 20 June Red delegates angrily demanded the United Nations Command to recapture all of the released anti-Communist Korean prisoners. The Communist delegates were careful not to terminate the truce negotiations, however it was all too evident that the Reds were going to launch another ground offensive of powerful proportions.

Defeats Communists’ July Offensive

In order to blunt the force of the expected Communist ground offensive, the Fifth US Air Force and US FEAF Bomber Command agreed to mount cooperative attacks against railway bridges spanning the rivers in the Chongchon estuary. Task Force 77 agreed to launch attacks against rail bridges on the lines supporting the enemy’s eastern front. The Fifth US Air Force had expected to begin these interdiction strikes early in July 1953, and the US FEAF Bomber Command was going to wait until later, when the moon was dark. Marginal flying weather allowed the Fifth US Air Force to get off a few rail bridge attacks on 1 July, but for eight days after this a weather front over the Republic of Korea kept the Fifth US Air Force grounded.

Finally, on 10 July 1953, the Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers began to carry the attack to the rail bridges at Sinanju and Yongmi-dong. On the night of 10 July 16 B-29’s of the 98th US Wing attacked the Sinanju bridges, and on the night of 11 July 16 B-29’s of the 307th US Wing hit the rail bridges at Yongmi-dong. After loosing a day because of weather, Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers cleaned up the Chongchon estuary bridges on 12 July and also attacked road bridges spanning the Chongchon all the way up to Huichon. After more days of bad weather the Fifth US Air Force renewed the attack on the Chongchon’s bridges between 16 and 20 July. Night-flying day-fighters
and night-intruder B-26's harassed bridge repairs, and some fighter-bombers hit bridge-span assembly points in Huichon and Sunchon. Floodwaters on the Chongchon helped the destruction effort and prevented the Reds from repairing bridge damages.

In eastern Korea, on 10 July, Task Force 77 planes commenced rail bridge attacks, but the Navy reported unimpressive results in poor flying weather. With help of floodwaters, however, the US FEAF airmen had placed a zone of interdiction along the Chongchon River which must have hindered any plans which the enemy may have had for an all-out ground offensive.

**SORTIES BY TYPE FLOWN BY U.S. AIR FORCES**
(July 1952 – July 1953)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
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<td>1,797</td>
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<td>2,400</td>
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<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>3,844</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>U ID/AR</td>
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<td>5,490</td>
<td>6,816</td>
<td>5,658</td>
<td>5,937</td>
<td>5,843</td>
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<td>4,229</td>
<td>5,271</td>
<td>4,582</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,964</td>
<td>3,613</td>
<td>4,281</td>
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<td>3,501</td>
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<td>5,195</td>
<td>5,851</td>
<td>5,074</td>
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<td>4,545</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>4,765</td>
<td>4,822</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,184</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>3,208</td>
<td>3,834</td>
<td>3,804</td>
<td>3,401</td>
<td>4,237</td>
<td>5,369</td>
<td>4,917</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>282</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>197</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17,485</td>
<td>19,296</td>
<td>20,036</td>
<td>24,273</td>
<td>19,239</td>
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<td>17,387</td>
<td>18,041</td>
<td>23,094</td>
<td>23,263</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**LEGEND:**

ID/AR = Interdiction/Armed Reconnaissance  
CA/IN/ES = Counter Air/Interception/Escort  
Other = Reconnaissance, Rescue, Strategic, Tactical Control, and Miscellaneous

The same heavy rains and low clouds over the Republic of Korea which prevented the UNC air-interdiction attacks permitted the Communists to prepare for another all-out ground offensive in the central front, where the IX US Corps and II ROK Corps joined flanks. With reconnaissance plane grounded, the United Nations Command was unsure where the Reds would attack, but it received a tip-off when the RF-80's brought home front-line photography on 12 July. The Reds had concentrated nearly all of their front-line flak in the sectors opposite those held by the IX US Corps and II ROK Corps.

On the night of 13–14 July 1953, Red Chinese divisions crashed against the right flank of the IX US Corps and began an assault which forced the Capital ROK Division under IX US Corps and elements of the II ROK Corps to retreat. All UNC air commanders reacted swiftly. From the night of 13 July the full power of US FEAF Bomber Command, the Fifth US Air Force, and Task
Ending Stage of Air Campaign

Force 77 was at the disposition of the Joint Operation Center in Seoul. Weather was still marginal for flying but all air units mustered all their strength when it was needed to oppose the advancing enemy forces. The 6147th US Tactical Control Group kept up to 28 Mosquito aircraft on station over the front lines, and, since had communications were disrupted, the airborne controllers were the best source of current battle information which the Joint Operation Center possessed.

The tactical air-direction posts received more planes than they could handle on 14 and 15 July, but they directed 2,247 successful blind-bombing runs during the month. To lighten the load on the radar direction posts, the Fifth US Air Force targets men scanned aerial photography for objectives which would be bombed by shoran. The B-29's hit 85 of these shoran targets, and the 17th US Wing employed such of its crews who had become qualified for shoran against 35 other supporting targets. In the night-bombing effort many B-29's dropped, 4,000-pound air-bursting bombs, and some B-26's distributed M-83 butterfly anti-disturbance bombs. Red prisoners later stated that they had been highly demoralized by the butterfly bombs, which they stumbled on in the dark.

The curtain of fire laid down by the United Nations Command planes on the Communist aggressors during July 1953 utilized 43 percent of the month's combat effort in close support of ground troops. The Fifth US Air Force's fighter-bombers flew 3,385 close support sorties, while the light bombers contributed additional 1,331 close support sorties. The 1st US Marine Air Wing and the other UNC air forces provided additional 1,462 such sorties, and the B-29's, mostly on the nights of 13 through 19 July, flew 100 ground-support sorties.

Task Force 77 aircraft swelled the volume of close-support still more. Back of the enemy's lines the 3rd and 17th US Wings were able to fly only 453 night-intruder sorties during the month, but these sorties were highly effective and destroyed 1,379 enemy vehicles.

Assisted by tremendous UNC air-support effort, the II ROK Corps fell back to the Kumsong River in fighting order, while the 2nd US Infantry Division, reinforced by the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team, moved to covering positions.

By 20 July the United Nations Command lines were firm and the crisis was over. In order to take a few miles of territory, the Reds had lost more than 72,000 men - the equivalent of nine divisions from the five CCF armies which had made the attack.
Section 3. The Day the Armistice was Signed

With a full day of work ahead of them, the United Nations Command airmen were abroad early on 27 July 1953. Mindful of the importance of “face” to the Communists, General Anderson, the Fifth US Air Force Commander, used all Sabres for counterair patrols and escorts during the day. At mid-morning one Sabre patrol sighted 12 dark green MIG’s near the Yalu, but the Red pilots high-tailed for the river before the Sabre could engage them. This was the only sighting of MIG’s during the day, but the veteran 4th US Wing was not going to be denied one last victory.

Shortly after noon, while flying escort to Chunggangjin, Captain Ralph S. Parr and his wingman sighted an IL-12 transport, marked with red stars, heading east. Captain Parr made two passes to be sure that he was making no mistake and then exploded the unfamiliar Red transport with a long burst of fire. This was the victory Captain Parr needed to become a double ace, and it was the last air-to-air victory of the Korean war.

Covered and escorted by the Sabres, other UNC crews raced against time to accomplish needful tasks before the cease fire. Flying a maximum effort, the 67th US Tactical Reconnaissance Wing secured photographs of all but four of the Red North Korean airfields. The four fields that the wing missed were covered by clouds. The Fifth US Air Force’s Thunderjet fighter-bombers acted swiftly to neutralize the few airfields which the enemy might possibly use to receive aircraft in the last hours after the armistice was signed. Expecting the armistice to be signed at 1300 hours, the Fifth US Air Force had carefully scheduled its attacks to take advantage of the remaining hours of daylight. When the Panmunjom negotiations signed at 1000 hours, it had more time than it had expected.

As soon as the truce was signed, the 58th US Wing roared into action. Colonel Joseph Davis Jr., the 58th US Wing’s Commander, led 23 Thunderjets of the 474th US Group to posthole Chunggangjin Airfield on the banks of the Yalu. At the same time 24 Thunderjets of the 58th US Group attacked the runway at Kanggye. Later that afternoon 24 Thunderjets of the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, augmented by 12 other Thunderjets of the 58th and 474th US Group, bombed Suan Airfield. During these attacks the 2157th US Air Rescue Squadron held its helicopters on alert and orbited SA-16 amphibians
By 2200 hours, 27 July 1953, the USAF had once more converted Sinuiju into a well-ploughed field.

over Cho-do and Yo-do, but the UNC air forces would lose no planes on the last day of the Korean War.

As night fell on 27 July the 4th, 8th, and 51st US Wings executed a "Fast Shuffle" deployment of half of their Sabres to alternate bases. Although the Reds would not attack, General Anderson had wanted to be sure that no last-minute Communist night attacks reduced the effectiveness of his interceptor force. After dark the 319th US Fighter-Interceptor Squadron and Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF-513) dispatched all-weather interceptors for uneventful counterair patrols. The medium bombers of the 19th US Bombardment Wing had been scheduled to make a shoran attack against Sinuiju Airfield, but his mission had to be scratched when the cease-fire hour was set at 2200 hours. The US FEAF Bomber Command would drop no bombs on this last night, but brigadier General Richard H. Carmichael, who succeeded Brigadier General Fisher on 15 June 1953 as the commander of the US FEAF Bomber Command, sent two 98th US Wing B-29's and two 91st US Squadron B-29's over from Japan to deliver a parting volley of psychological warfare leaflets.
One of these RB-29 sorties, flown by Lieutenant Denver S. Cook, was the Bomber Command's last mission over the Communist North Korea. On the last evening of combat 3rd and 17th US Wings launched their night-flying B-26's according to usual schedules. Weather conditions permitted limited visibility, and not many Communist vehicles were stirring, but a 17th US Wing B-26 Crew was credited with the destruction of the last enemy vehicle of the Korean War. A few minutes before the cease-fire -- at 2136 hours -- a B-26 of the 3rd US Wing's 8th Squadron dropped the last bombs of the Korean hostilities in a ground-radar-directed close-support mission. This mission was doubly appropriate. As the end to a war in which airpower had provided ground troops with more support than ever before, it was fitting that the last attack should be a close-support mission. And it was also appropriate that an 8th US Bombardment Squadron crew should have flown the last attack because this same squadron had flown the first combat strike into Red North Korea three years earlier. A few minutes before 2200 hours an RB-26 of the 67th US Tactical Reconnaissance Wing hurried southward from the last combat sortie over Red North Korea.

At 2200 hours, on 27 July 1953, all of the UNC aircraft were either south of the bombline or more than three miles from Red North Korea's coast. The armistice marked the end of the shooting war in Korea, but the US Far East Air Forces' duty was not yet completed. The new USAF Chief of Staff, General Nathan F. Twining, cautioned the men of US Far East Air Forces about their new mission. "Yours is now the role of watchfulness and preparedness," he said, "for you must continue to be the most vigilant and best prepared of all the forces that guard the safety of Americans and the security of the free world."
APPENDIX

CONTENTS

I  KOREAN WAR CHRONOLOGY .......................... 742

II ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE U.N. ALLIES ........ 745

III GLOSSARY OF KOREAN SUFFIXES ...................... 747

IV LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................. 748

V BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 750

VI TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT .................. 752

VII TEXT OF 16-NATIONS DECLARATION ................... 769

VIII TEXT OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY ................. 771

IX SITUATION MAPS ..................................... 773
APPENDIX I

KOREAN WAR CHRONOLOGY

1951

10 July  Truce talks between UN forces and Communists open at Kaesong.

18 July  BB "New Jersey," together with other combat ships, conducts "Operation Kick-Off" at Wonsan harbor.

26 - 29 July  The 2nd US Division attacks on Hill 1179 (Taeu-san) southwest of the Punchbowl.

18 Aug  The X US Corps launches a decisive attack on Hill 1031 in the Punchbowl area.

18 Aug  The US FEAR begins air interdiction of the Communist lines of communication, while the US naval operations complemented the air and ground attacks for the most part.

2 Sep  22 Sabres tangle with 40 MIGs in a 30-minute air battle between Sinuiju and Pyongyang, resulting in the destruction of four MIG’s.

2 - 5 Sep  The 2nd US Division wins fight for Bloody Ridge.

13 Sep - 25 Oct  The battles for Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge by the 2nd US Division (X Corps).

18 Sep  The 1st US Marine Division advances to the Soyang River line, attacking on Yoke Ridge first.

26 Sep  In largest aerial clash of war, 101 FEAR jet fighters engage 155 MIGs, each side losing two aircraft.

3 - 23 Oct  The 1st US Corps conducts "Operation Commando," committing five divisions (the 1st ROK, 1st Commonwealth, 1st US Cavalry, 3rd US, and 25th US) in the offensive, to occupy a new defense line called "Jamestown."

25 Oct  Armistice negotiation talks suspended for two months by Communists, resume at a new site, Panmunjom.

29 Oct  The aircraft of Task Force 77 pours the spectacular air strikes on a meeting spot of all high level party members of the North Korean and
Chinese Communist forces at Kapsan.

5 Dec  The 45th US Infantry and 1st US Cavalry Divisions begin their rotation cycle; the 180th Infantry, 45th US Division arrives in Korea from Hokkaido, Japan.

1952

5 Jan  The 40th US Division begins to arrive in Korea.

10-15 Feb  Operation Clam Up takes place.

25 Mar  307 fighter-bombers drop 260 tons of bombs on the railway track between Chongju and Sinanju.

12 May  General Ridgway leaves to take over NATO Command from General Eisenhower and General Mark W. Clark assumes the Commander in Chief of the UN Command.

6-26 June  The 45th US Division launches Operation Counter to occupy eleven patrol bases, thus establishing a new outpost line of resistance.

23-27 June  Air Force and Navy pilots neutralize major hydroelectric plants at Supung, Pujon, Changjin and Hochon.

10 July  The US FEAF issues statement of a new FEAF operational policy.

17-24 July  The battle of Old Baldy (Hill 275) takes place by the 2nd US Division.

9-16 Aug  Troops of the 1st US Marine Division win the repeated battle at Bunker Hill (Hill 122) in the western sector.

17-24 Sep  The battle for Outpost Kelly takes place in the 3rd US Division sector.

9 Oct  Task Force 77 begins Cherokee Strike against the enemy rear of front.

14 Oct - 24 Nov  The IX US Corps conducts "Operation Showdown" in the Triangle Hill (Hill 598) complex and Sniper Ridge north of Kumhwa with the 7th US Division in the main attack.

15 Oct  Joint Amphibious Task Force 7 carries out the greatest demonstration against Kojo.

3 Nov  The battles of Hills 851 and 930 by the 40th US Division in the X Corps sector.

17-18 Nov  Naval air forces of Task Force 77 heavily bomb at Hoeryong on the Tumen River.

2 Dec  President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour of Korea.

1953

9-14 Jan  B-29's of FEAF and Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers launch severe bombardment attacks on the Sinanju complex and Pyongyang.
25 Jan - 20 Feb  The battle of T-Bone Ridge and Alligator's Jaw (Hill 324), north of Yokkok-chon, by the 7th US Division.

9 - 10 Feb  The Carriers *Kearsarge*, *Philippine Sea* and *Oriskany* mount heavy air attacks on Wonsan again.


18 - 19 Feb  511 Air Forces and Marine fighters and fighter-bombers raid the military targets near Pyongyang with 541 tons of HE, and 24 fighter-bombers hit Supung hydroelectric-power plant on the Yalu River again in a surprise low level attack.

23 - 29 Mar  Heavy battles renew at Old Baldy and Porkchop in the 7th US Division area.

16 - 18 Apr  Troops of the 7th US Division engage again in a heavy battle at Porkchop.

20 Apr  Operation "Little Switch" begins to exchange the sick and wounded prisoners at Panmunjom.

26 Apr  Truce talks reopen after a recess of six and a half months concerning repatriation of war prisoners.

25 - 29 May  A fierce battle takes place at the Nevada complex in the 25th US Division sector.

10 - 18 June  The Communist forces mount their biggest offensive since the spring of 1951, aiming at penetrating the bulge in Kumsong through Kumsong to Mundung-ni.

18 June  President Syngman Rhee releases approximately 27,000 anti-Communist prisoners of war.

3 July  Units of the 24th US Division begin to come in Korea again from Japan.

6 - 11 July  The battle on Hill 281 (Arrowhead), north of Yokkok-chon.

13 July  The enemy begins his final, massive offensive heavily in the IX US and II ROK Corps sectors.

19 July  UN ground forces repulse fierce CCF attacks in the Kumsong and Kumhwa areas, inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy.

19 July  Armistice negotiations reach agreement on all points.

21 July  The combination of the B-29 fragmentation attacks and the Sabre fighter-bomber strikes against Uiju, destroying at least 21 MiGs.

27 July  Armistice is signed, ending three years of the Korean War.

5 Aug  "Operation Big Switch," the repatriation of prisoners of war, begins at Panmunjom.
### APPENDIX II

ASSISTANCES PROVIDED BY THE U.N. ALLIES

#### Military Aids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2 inf bns</td>
<td>1 carrier,</td>
<td>1 fighter &amp;</td>
<td>(A) 28 Sept 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 destroyers</td>
<td>1 air-trans sqdn</td>
<td>(N) 29 June 50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 30 June 50</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1 air-trans sqdn</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 7 May 51</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
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<td>1 FA regt &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 inf brig</td>
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<td>United</td>
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<td>support units</td>
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<td>3 frigates &amp;</td>
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<td>several auxilliary ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Army &amp; Marine</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Arrival</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>7 inf divs, 1 marine div, logistical &amp; support forces</td>
<td>1 naval fleet; carrier task group, blockade &amp; escort forces, various support units</td>
<td>1 tactical air force &amp; 1 air combat cargo command, 2 medium bomber wings</td>
<td>(A) 2 July 50 (N) 27 June 50 (AF) 27 June 50</td>
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**Medical Aids**

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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 hospital ship &amp; medical team</td>
<td>7 Mar 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 field ambulance unit</td>
<td>20 Nov 50</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 Red Cross hospital unit</td>
<td>16 Nov 51</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 mobile army surgical hospital</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 field hospital unit</td>
<td>28 Sept 50</td>
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(Date is based on the arrival of advance party)
APPENDIX III
GLOSSARY OF KOREAN SUFFIXES

bau (pau) ........................................ rock
bong (pong) ........................................ bong, pong or san denotes a mountain
chon .................................................. river; in general small river forming a tributary to a
gang. (e.g. Sami-chon joins Imjin Gang.)
dan (tan) ............................................. point
do (to) ............................................. island, (e.g. Cheju-do, Sok-to)
dong (tong) ......................................... village, settlement
gang (kang) ........................................ river, (e.g. Han Gang, Naktong Gang)
gap (kap) ............................................. point
go (kol) ............................................. village, it also means a ravine or valley
jae (chae) .......................................... mountain pass
li (ni, ri) ........................................... area name; smallest administrative unit consisting of
several villages; township
lyong (nyong, ryong) ......................... mountain or mountain pass
maul ................................................. village, settlement
nae ..................................................... stream, creek, brook
namdo ............................................. south province
pukto (bugdo) .................................... north province
sa ...................................................... temple
san ..................................................... mountain
### APPENDIX IV
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
<td>Cdr (Comdr)</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>AAM</td>
<td>Air-to-Air Missile</td>
<td>ComNavFE</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces, Far East</td>
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<td>Abn</td>
<td>Airborne</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adm</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>CTE</td>
<td>Commander, Task Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commander, Task Force</td>
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<td>ALO</td>
<td>Air Liaison Officer</td>
<td>CTG</td>
<td>Commander, Task Group</td>
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<td>Arty</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>Asg</td>
<td>Assignment; Assign or Assigned</td>
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<td>Den</td>
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<td>ASP</td>
<td>Ammunition Supply Point</td>
<td>Div</td>
<td>Division</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<td>Austr</td>
<td>Australia, Australian</td>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
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<td>Avn</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>Drop Zone</td>
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<td>BAR</td>
<td>Browning Automatic Rifle</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Battalion Combat Team</td>
<td>EUSAK</td>
<td>Eighth United States Army in Korea</td>
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<td>Bdry</td>
<td>Boundary</td>
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<td>Brig</td>
<td>Bridge or Bearing</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
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<td>Brig</td>
<td>Brigade; Brigadier</td>
<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Forces</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fr</td>
<td>France; French</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>FTC</td>
<td>Field Training Command, or Field Training Center</td>
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<td>Can</td>
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<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
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<td>Cav</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>Gr</td>
<td>Greece; Greek</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
<td>GZ</td>
<td>Ground Zero</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operation</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>High Explosive</td>
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<td>Colom</td>
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<td>HMCS</td>
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<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her (His) Majesty's Ship</td>
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<td>His Majesty's Thai Ship</td>
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<td>HNLMS</td>
<td>Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship</td>
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<td>Inf</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operation Center</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>KATC</td>
<td>Korean Army Training Command</td>
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<td>KATUSA</td>
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<td>Killed in Action</td>
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<td>Line of Departure</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Military Armistice Commission</td>
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<td>Ministry of National Defense</td>
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<td>MSR</td>
<td>Main Supply Route</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
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<td>Neth</td>
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<td>NK</td>
<td>North Korea, or North Korean</td>
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<td>Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission</td>
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APPENDIX VI
TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
(July 27, 1953)

Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea.

Preamble

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea:

Article I

Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1. A military demarcation line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces. A demilitarized zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.
2. The military demarcation line is located as indicated on the attached map.

3. This demilitarized zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The military demarcation line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the demilitarized zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the military demarcation line and along the boundaries of the demilitarized zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the demilitarized zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the demilitarized zone which is south of the military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the demilitarized zone which is north of the military demarcation line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the demilitarized zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side.
over any route necessary to move between points within the demilitarized zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

Article II
Concrete Arrangements for Cease-Fire and Armistice

A. General

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this armistice agreement is signed. (See paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this armistice agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

(a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after this armistice agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the demilitarized zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the demilitarized zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the MAC by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the demilitarized zone as directed by and under the supervision of the MAC. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under MAC supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the MAC and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone.

(b) Within ten (10) days after this armistice agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands, which, though occupied by one side at the time when this armistice agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAEO-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island
groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58’ N, 124°40’ E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50’ N, 124°42’ E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46’ N, 124°46’ E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38’ N, 125°40’ E), and U-DO (37°36’N, 125°58’ E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3)

(c) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below: "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

(d) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirements for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the MAC and the NNCS; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. The NNCS, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof.

(e) Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this armistice agreement are adequately punished.
(f) In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this armistice agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

(g) Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (see Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

(h) Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

(i) Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

(j) Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.
17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively co-operate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. Military Armistice Commission

1. Composition

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general of flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. (a) The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

(b) Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.
2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:
   (a) Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57′29″ N, 126°40′00″ E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.
   (b) Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.
   (c) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.
   (d) Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.
   (e) Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.
   (f) Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.
   (g) Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
   (h) Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.
   (i) Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.
   (j) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The Mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.
Text of The Armistice Agreement

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. General

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. Compositions

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely,
POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term “neutral nations” as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. (a) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

(b) Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointed. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. Functions and Authority

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in
Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

(a) Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(b) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

(c) Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs of characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

(d) Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

(e) Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

(f) Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraphs, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

(g) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels used in the performance of this mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command

INCHON ........................................... (37°28’N, 126°38’E)
TAEGU ........................................... (35°52’N, 128°36’E)
PUSAN ........................................... (35°06′N, 129°02′E)
KANGNUNG .................................... (37°45′N, 128°54′E)
KUNSAN ........................................ (35°59′E, 126°43′E)

Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and The Chinese
People's Volunteers
SINUJU .......................................... (40°06′N, 124°24′E)
CHONGJIN ...................................... (41°46′N, 129°49′E)
HUNGNAM ...................................... (39°50′N, 127°37′E)
MANPO .......................................... (41°09′N, 126°18′E)
SINANJU ........................................ (39°36′N, 125°36′E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement
within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).

3. General

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to
exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice
by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as
possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the
results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such
special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.
Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more
individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual
members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded
to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without
delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of
translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such
reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military
Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not
take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received
from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice
Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice
Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the
reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is
authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

Article III
Arrangement Relating to Prisoners of War

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this armistice agreement.

(a) Within sixty (60) days after this armistice agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

(b) Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto, “Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.”

(c) So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called “repatriation” in English, (_song hwan) “Song Hwan” in Korean, and (_chien fan) “Ch’ien Fan” in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this armistice agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and
54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. (a) A committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for co-ordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to co-ordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

(b) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(c) The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. (a) Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice
Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner-of-war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while enroute from prisoners-of-war camps to the place(s) of delivery and receptions of prisoners of war.

(b) The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be co-ordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner-of-war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while enroute from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(c) The Commander of each side shall co-operate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the
personnel of the Joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(d) The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all of the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. (a) The Commanders of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

1. Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

2. Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

(b) If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58 (a) hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

(c) Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. (a) All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement become effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and who on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers to return to the area south Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

(b) All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall,
if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control of contents of the provisions of this sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

(c) Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59 (a) hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59 (b) hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

(d) (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

Article IV

Recommendations to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned
on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

Article V

Miscellaneous

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea at 10:00 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.
APPENDIX VII

TEXT OF 16-NATIONS DECLARATION

Declaration by the Sixteen-Nations Who
Contributed Military Forces to the Korean War
(June 15, 1954)

Pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Berlin communique of February 18, 1954, we, as nations who contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unification, independence, and freedom of Korea; and within the framework of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental.

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.

2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under UN supervision, for representatives in the national assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear. Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as the tool of aggression. Were we to accept this position of the Communists, it would mean the death of the principle of collective security and of the UN itself. Secondly, we desire genuinely free elections. The Communists insist upon procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947.
We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none.

In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of August 28, 1953, the member states parties to this declaration will inform the United Nations concerning the proceeding at this conference.
APPENDIX VIII
TEXT OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, Signed at Washington, (October 1, 1953)

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

Article II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.
Article III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of Korea and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

Article VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of October 1953.

For the Republic of Korea:
Y. T. Pyun

For the United States of America:
John Foster Dulles
THE BATTLE AT THE TRIO-OUTPOSTS (26–28 Mar 1953)

LEGEND
Counterattack
Seizure of ELKO
CCF Main Attack
CCF Diversionary Attack

Situation Map 8
INDEX

A

Acar, Sirri, Brig. Gen. (Tutk): 443
Acheson, Dean (US): 8, 30, 32-33, 395, 450
Adams, James Y., Col. (US Army): 101, 174-180
Air Field:
  K - 2 (Taegu): 621, 624, 666
  K - 3 (Pohang): 621
  K - 6 (P'yongtaek): 621
  K - 8 (Kunsan): 621, 671
  K - 9 (Pusan): 621, 671
  K - 10 (Chinhae): 621
  K - 13 (Suwon): 621, 637-638
  K - 14 (Kimpo): 621, 637-638
  K - 16 (Seoul): 621
  K - 18 (Kwangnung): 621
  K - 46 (Hoengsong): 621
  K - 47 (Chunchon): 621
Alligator's Jaw: See Hill 324
Alston, William P., Lt. Col. (USMC): 186
Amgak Peninsula: 554, 599-600
Anchor Hill: See Hill 351
Aoji: 523-524, 577-579
Armitage, Gerald T., Lt. Col.: 354
Arrowhead: See Hill 281
Attridge, Clement R. (UK): 30, 32, 696
Australia: 9, 15, 43, 434, 475-476
Australian Air Squadron 77: 621-622, 625, 635, 653
Australian Battalion: 234-235
Australian Navy:
  HMAS Sydney: 548, 551, 554
  HMAS Warramunga: 568

B

Baden, Clyde H., Maj. (US Army): 235
Badger Line: 94, 96, 107
Barkely, Alben W. (US): 264
Barrett, Mark T., 1st Lt. (US Army): 509
Becker, Richard S., Capt. (USAF): 647
Beede, M.U., Cdr. (USN): 520
Belgium: 9, 43, 475-476
Biggs, Burton B., RAdm. (USN): 558
Big Nori: 305, 319, 399
Big Switch: 479-481, 492
Bishop, Gaylord M., Lt. Col. (US Army): 145
Bless, Fredrick C., Maj. (USAF): 704
Blood Hill: See Hill 748
Bloody Ridge (See Hills 983, 940, 773): 41, 107, 128-129, 133-152, 159, 171
Boomerang: 446
Bowling Alley: 11
Bradley, Omar N., Gen. (US Army): 489, 585
Briggs, Ellis O. (US): 469
Briscoe, Robert P., VAdm. (USN): 471, 559, 565, 585, 692, 695
British Forces:
28th Brigade: 43-44, 59, 62, 115, 234-235
29th Brigade: 15, 43-44, 59, 62, 115, 234-235, 305, 494
British Navy:
HMS Amethyst: 560
HMS Belfast: 548, 556, 560
HMS Black Swan: 553
HMS Cardigan Bay: 556, 60C
HMS Ceylon: 529
HMS Comus: 548, 552
HMS Concord: 548, 567
HMS Glory: 518, 528, 551, 556, 600
HMS Morecambe Bay: 544
HMS Ocean: 523, 575
HMS Triumph: 590
Brown, C.B., Cdr. (USN): 574
Brown, G. S., Col. (USAF): 618
Buckner, Louis R., Maj. (US Army): 389
Bunker Hill: See Hill 122 or Hill 800
Burdell, Frank E., Lt. Col. (US Army): 263
Burdick, R.S. Cdr. (USN): 543
Burke, Arleigh A., RAdm. (USN): 40
Burton, Jr., Custis, Col. (USMC): 157

C
Cairo Decolation: 32, 620
Camel Back Ridge: 375
Canada: 9, 16, 434, 475-476, 490
Canadian Forces:
Canadian Navy:
HMCS Caugya: 548
Capital Hill: 293, 310, 325, 341, 357, 360, 380-381, 420, 446, 452-458

Index
Cereghine, Alexander L., Lt. Col. (USMC): 430
Champey, Arthur S., Col. (US Army): 46
Chandler, Kenneth D., Capt. (USAF): 651
Chang Chang Kook, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 109
Chang Do Yung, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 88
Changjin: 692, 694, 695, 718
Changjin Reservoir: 570, 573
Cheju-do: 303, 330
Cherokee Strikes: See Operation Cherokee
Chick, L. W., Cdr. (USN): 580
Chinnampa: 57, 529, 554, 642
Chipo-ri: 237, 445
Chiri-san: 108, 259, 269, 300
Cho-do: 529-531, 555-556, 559-561, 589-600, 642, 704, 739
Choi Chang Un, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 462
Choi Duk Shin, Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 450, 471
Choi Suk, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 73
Choi Yun Hee, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 108, 313
Chokkun-san: See Hill 1073
Chondok-san: See Hill 477
Chonggok (Chonggong-ni): 54, 63, 114
Chongjin: 522, 561, 567-568, 578
Chonju: 522, 561, 567-568, 578
Chou En-lai: 298
Christmas Hill: See Hill 1090
Cnu-dong: 118, 162, 239
Chuktong: 193, 242
Chunchon: 78, 87
Chunggusan-ni: 190, 221-223
Chupar-yong: See Hill 645
Clark, Bill, Capt. (US Army): 504
Clark, Joseph J., VAdm. (USN): 471, 524, 526, 531-532, 558, 579, 585-587, 592, 683, 694, 734
Clarke, Bruce C., Lt. Gen. (US Army): 438, 444, 459, 466
Cleland, Joseph P., Maj. Gen. (US Army): 446
Colman, William M., Maj. (US Army): 426
Colombia: 9, 43, 475-476
Colombian Battalion: 43-44, 79, 87, 118, 188, 241-246, 423-425, 434, 491
Connolly, Tom (US): 32
Cooper, L.W. Cdr. (USN): 580
Cordero, Juan C., Col. (US Army): 366-369
Coughline, John C., Col. (US Army): 101
Craigie, Laurence C., Maj. Gen. (USAF): 40
Cromyko, Andrei: 27
Cross, Thomas J., Brig. Gen. (US Army): 47, 252, 305
Culhane Jr., Thomas A., Col. (USMC): 353

D

Daniel, John C., RAdm. (USN): 433
Daniels, Henry F., Lt. Col. (US Army): 174, 177, 211
Dasher, Jr., Charles L., Maj. Gen. (US Army): 460
Daughtry, George W.E., Lt. Col. (USMC): 318, 320, 347
Davies, Albert C., Maj. (US Army): 366
Davis, Ernest H., Maj. (US Army): 120
Davis, George A., Maj. (USAF): 652-653
Davis, John N., Lt. Col. (US Army): 426
Davis, Joseph, Jr., Col. (USAF): 738
Demilitarized Zone: 41, 396, 474, 484, 503-504, 507
Denmark (See Jutlandia): 9, 43, 475
Denton, William, Cdr. (USN): 574
Dodds, William A., Col. (US Army): 323
Downing, A.L., Cdr. (USN): 567
Doyle, John Pl., Brig. Gen. (USAF): 622
Dulles, John Foster (US): 395
Duluth Line: 255-257, 437
Dyer, George C., RAdm. (USN): 518, 527-528, 531, 544, 552

E

Eerie: See Outpost Eerie
Errine Line: 78
Ethiopia: 9, 43, 475-476
Ethiopian Battalion: 43-44, 90-91, 116, 160, 188, 249

F

Fechterler, William, Admiral (USN): 573
Feller, Abraham (UN): 27
Ferguson, James, Brig. Gen. (USAF): 659
Field Eugene J., Col. (US Army): 225
Finch, James H., Lt. Col. (USMC): 428
Finger Ridge: 310, 357, 359-360, 380-381, 446, 457
Fischer, Harold E., Capt. (USAF): 706
Fools Mountain: See Tae-yun-san (Hill 1179)
France: 9, 16, 475-476, 487
French Battalion: 22, 43-44, 99, 103, 156, 179, 188, 205, 207, 249, 264
Fusselman, R.D. Capt. (USN): 563

G

Gano, Roy A., Capt. (USN): 567
Gary Line: 258
Gabreski, Francis S., Col. (USAF): 653
Geneva Convention: 299
Gibson, Ralph D., Capt. (USAF): 647
Gilmer, Dan, Col. (US Army): 225
Ginder, Philip D., Brig. Gen. (US Army): 413, 460
Gingrich, John E., RAdm. (USN): 531, 533
Goodney, William K., Capt. (USN): 567
Gorman, John E., Lt. Col. (USMC): 185
Graven, Virgil E., Lt. Col. (US Army): 174
Graves, Rupert D., Col. (US Army): 139
Gray, Paul N., Cdr. (USN): 542
Greece: 9, 43, 475-476
Greek Battalion: 16, 43-44, 63-65, 168, 188
226, 262, 327, 335-365, 419, 434, 445, 458-459, 491
Gregg, O.C., Capt. (USN): 592
Greighton, Richard D. Maj. (USAF): 653
Griffin, Louis G., Lt. Col. (USMC): 183
Groves, Could P., Col. (USMC): 97
Gulhane, Jr., Thomas A., Col. (USMC): 317
Gurney, Marshall B., Capt. (USN): 591

H

Haegu Man: 528-529, 551-552, 555-556
Haktang-ni: 419
Han Byung Sun, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 80, 117
Han River: 19, 50, 267, 469, 495, 527-528, 551-554
Hantan River: 115, 222, 237
Harries, D. H., Capt. (RAN): 548
Harris, T. D., Cdr. (USN): 592
Hassakkol: 439, 442
Hayward, Richard W., Col. (USMC): 98
Henderson, Frederick P., Col. (USMC): 319
Henderson, George R., RAdm. (USN): 518
Henderson, William D., Maj. (US Army): 511
Henley, John P., Brig. Gen. (USAF): 622
Henning, W.J., Cdr. (USN): 567
Heys Line: 159, 197
Hickey, Doyle O., Lt. Gen. (US Army): 12, 14
Higgins, J. M., RAdm. (USN): 597
Hill, T. B., RAdm. (USN): 585
Hill:
27 (Carson): 438, 444
58A: 351-353
105: 365, 368, 399, 415, 418
122 (Bunker Hill): 41, 341, 350-356, 359, 361
124: 114, 354, 355
148 (Reno): 427-430, 443
155: 370-372
159 (Yoke Hill): 234, 347-349
175 (Vegas): 427-430, 443-444
187: 222, 234
190: 427-428, 431
191 (T-Born Ridge): 41, 222, 308, 321, 401, 415-417
199: 113, 234, 259
200: 258-261, 320, 322
217: 234-235, 257
230: 64, 224, 226, 230-232
250: 222, 224, 230, 232
272: 168, 225-226, 230-231
287: 64, 222, 225, 227-228, 230, 232
313: 75, 193, 224, 226, 229
324 (Alligator's Jaw): 41, 190, 222, 235, 237, 255, 418
346: 201, 222, 224-226, 229-232
347: 193, 222, 228, 320, 466
351 (Anchor Hill): 341, 350, 422, 448, 526, 591-593, 599
355 (Little Gibraltar): 41, 234, 258, 261-263, 305, 418
362 (Soi-san): 72, 77, 236-237
373: 117, 190-191, 222, 356
387: 164-166
388 (Jackson Heights): 360, 373, 378-380,
1062 (Osong-san): 72, 257, 324-325
1073 (Chokkum-san): 78-87, 118-119, 188, 193, 240
1074 (Chae-an-san): 78-79, 88
1090 (Christmas Hill): 278-279, 383-384, 455
1100: 92, 97, 101-103
1118: 83, 118, 152, 161, 239
1142 (Paeknyok-san): 95, 177, 180-181, 210
1145 (Tuok-san): 94-97
1174 (Mosong-san): 78-79
1178: See Hill 1179 (Taew-san)
1179 (Paekam-san): 87-90, 94-97, 118, 301
1220: 181, 208, 210, 215-216, 455, 457-458
1242 (Kachil-bong): 96, 138, 144, 152, 159, 285, 311
1293 (Hyangno-bong): 109
Hinbawi-san: See Paekam-san
Hodes, Henry L., Maj. Gen. (US Army): 40
Hodo, Pando: 544, 561-562, 596
Hoeryong: 583
Hook: 305, 327, 397, 399, 418
Honsowitz, Russell E., Col. (USMC): 318
Horse Shoe Hill: 446
House, Herschel A., Capt. (USN): 592
Stiff, Houston Jr. Lt. Col. (USMC): 185
Hugung-to-ryong: See Hill 851
Huichon: 616, 633, 660, 668, 735-736
Hull, John E., Gen. (US Army): 289-290
Huigam: 491, 529, 532, 547, 565, 598, 658
Hwachon: 82, 238, 250, 287, 307
Hwachon Reservoir: 54, 82, 94, 124, 152, 168, 238, 460
Hyangno-bong: See Hill 1293
Hyosong-san: See Hill 619

\[ \text{Index} \]

Inchon: 12, 278, 594
India: 9, 43, 436, 475-476
Inje: 22, 124
Irvin, Jefferson J., Col. (US Army): 406
Italy: 9, 43, 259, 475-476

J

Jackson Heights: See Hill 388
Jane Russell Hill: 308, 324, 385-391
Johnson, Edwin C. (US): 32
Johnson, Louis A. (US): 540
Jolley, Clifford D., Capt. (USAF): 703
Joy, Charles Turner, Vice Adm. (USN): 37, 40, 315, 517, 531, 559, 569, 691
J-Ridge: 129-133
Jutlandia (Danish Hospital Ship): 9, 28, 35, 517

K

Kachil-bong: See Hill 1242
Kagniew Battalion: See Ethiopian Battalion
Kahyon-ni: 193, 195
Kalma Pando: 527, 544
Kanggye: 664, 718, 738
Kang Moon Bong, Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 46
Kannu-bong: 182-183
Kapsan: 520, 542-543
KATUSA: 43, 291-292
Kapyong: 238, 250, 264, 308
Kelley, B.T., Lt. Col. (USMC): 183
Kendall, Paul W., Lt. Gen. (US Army): 426, 438
Kennedy, Ronald R., Lt. Col. (USMC): 185
Kiland, Ingolf N., RAdm. (USN): 518
Kilchu: 523, 576-577, 658, 664, 720
Kimball, Dan. (US): 289
Kim Chong Kap, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 453
Kim Daeh Shik, Col. (ROKMC): 97, 197
Kim Dong Bin, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 459
Kim Ik Yul, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 382
Kim Joumi Kon, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 462
Kimpo (See Airfield K-14): 572, 594
Kimpo Peninsula: 62, 288
Kim Yong Bae, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 94, 455
Kim Yong Ju, Col. (ROKA): 325
Kirk, Alan G. (US): 27
Koam-san: See Hill 780
Kojo-do: 301-303, 308, 326-339, 488, 602
Kojo: 219, 281, 532-533, 546, 561, 585-587, 598
Korangpo: 279
Korean Communication Zone: 337, 342, 460
Korean Service Corps: 47, 54
Korail: 193, 196, 242
Kosong: 267, 358, 469, 545
Kowang-san: See Hill 355
Kowon: 524, 578-579, 658, 662
Koyangdae: 113, 365, 370, 399, 415
Krzyowski, Edward G., Capt. (US Army): 146, 149
Kumgong-ni (near Kumphwa): 164, 237
Kumphwa: 54, 59, 61, 67, 71-72, 77-78, 80-82, 160, 164-188, 219-221, 237-238, 257, 264, 267, 324, 357, 469, 579, 579, 582, 586
Kumu-ri: 649, 664, 666, 668, 717-718
Kyeho-dong: 221, 225, 364
Kyoam-san: See Hill 770

L
Lahue, Foster C., Lt. Col. (USMC): 183
Layer, Walter F., Col. (USMC): 352
Lee Chu Il, Col. (ROKA): 375
Lee Han Lim, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 458
Lee Hyung Suk, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 313
Lee Hyung Jae, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 454
Lee Sung Ka, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 313
Lee Yong Mun, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 382
Lehrfield, Irving, Col. (US Army): 225
Lie, Trygve (UN): 27, 32-33
Lim Boo Taik, Col. (ROKA): 313
Lim Ben Chuk (ROK): 45
Lim Sun Ha, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 453-456
Little Gibraltar: See Hill 355
Little Nori: 305, 319, 399
Little Switch: 433-434, 480, 525, 588, 729
Luxembourg (included in Belgian Battalion): 9, 43, 225, 475-476, 491
Lynch, John M., Col. (US Army): 174-180

M
Maginnis, Jack, Capt. (USN): 599
Malik, Jakob A.: 25, 27-28, 33, 398, 503
Manpojin: 681, 716
Mao Tse-tung: 27
Marshall, George C. (US): 489
Marshall, Winton W., Maj. (USAF): 652
Martin, H.M., VAdm. (USN): 531, 544
Mayang-do: 560, 570, 598
Mayo, Ben L., Lt. Col. (USAF): 618, 687-591
McBride, William P., Col. (USAF): 659
McCann, Russel J., Lt. (US Army): 406
McClure, Myron, Lt. Col. (US Army): 385-391
McFalls, Carol, Maj. (US Army): 224-225
McInerney, Francis X., RAdm. (USN): 532, 585
McMahon, Fredric W., RAdm. (USN): 558
Messinger, Edwin J., Col. (US Army): 103
Michaelis, J.H., Col. (US Army): 11
Middle Brocks, Richard R., Col. (US Army): 306
Mig Alley: 522, 570, 575, 633, 646, 664, 694, 708
Milburn, Frank W., Lt. Gen. (US Army): 59
Milden, Frank T., Col. (US Army): 145, 205
Military Armistice Commission: 469, 478, 485, 490-491
Min Kee Shuk, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 107
Minnesota Line: 249, 277, 326, 359, 406, 437
Missouri Line: 437
Mitchell, John W., Col. (USAF): 765
Mokyo-dong: 63, 69-191
Moore, Walter E., RAdm. (USN): 602
Moore, William T., Col. (US Army): 305-306
Moses, Lloyd R., Col. (US Army): 385-391
Muccio, John J. (US): 12, 45
Mundorff, George T., Capt. (USN): 592
Mundung-ni: 124-159, 170-181, 201-219, 279
Mundy, George W., Maj. Gen. (USAF): 638
Munsun: 61, 64, 67, 124, 415, 417, 437, 471
Murphy, Preston J.C., Col. (US Army): 243

N

Najin: 520, 524, 540-542, 568, 578, 583
Naktong River: 10-11, 505
Namchonjom: 61, 668
Namdae-chon: 222, 237, 240
Nam River: 129, 267, 411, 423
Netherlands: 9, 16, 43, 475-476
Netherlands Battalion: 22, 43-44, 94, 99, 102, 179, 188, 205, 264, 335, 434
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission: 436-469, 478, 480, 729
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission: 315, 467-469, 478, 484
Neveda Complex: 443-445
Newberry, Robert H., Maj. (US Army): 386-391
New Zealand: 9, 16, 43, 62, 975

New Zealand Artillery Regiment: 16, 43-44
New Zealand Navy:
  HMNZS Endicott: 559
  HMNZS Shelton: 559
  HMNZS Taupo: 559
Nichols, Donald, Maj. (USAF): 713
Nickerson, Jr., Herman, Col. (USMC): 98, 183
Nihart, Franklin B., Lt. Col. (USMC): 183
Nimitz, Jr., C.W., Cdr. (USN): 543
Nomad Line: 201, 240-242, 309
No-Name Line: 21-22
Norway: 9, 475-476
Nung-kol: 169-170

O

Oddy, Robert J., Lt. Col. (USMC): 428
Ofstie, R.A. RAdm (USN): 558
Oh Duk Jun, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 109, 313
Old Baldy Hill: See Hill 275
Olsen, Clarence E., RAdm. (USN): 533, 597
O'Neil, Thomas A., Col. (US Army): 263
Ongjin Peninsula: 51, 528-529, 560
Onstott, J.W., Cdr. (USN): 567
Operation:
  Apache: 170-171
  Big Stick: 281
  Big Switch: 479
  Blackbird: 200
  Buckshot: 347-349
  Cherokee: 524, 569, 579-583, 590-591, 595, 723-724
  Chopstick 6: 281
  Chopstick 16: 281-282
  Clam Up: 278-280
  Cleanup: 160, 189-191, 261
  Cleaver: 160, 193-197
  Colbber: 261
  Commando: 193, 201, 220-238, 281
  Counter: 340, 342-347
  Creeper: 125, 129-133
  Cudgel: 219-220
  Decoy: 585-587
  Deral: 528-530, 540
  Doughhant: 75-76
  Duluth: 255-257
  Home Coming: 281
Kick-off: 527
Little Switch: 433-434
Mongoose: 341
Overwhelming: 50
Package: 528-530, 540
Pressure Pump: 718-719
Ratkiller: 269-270, 282, 287, 300-301
Saturate: 616, 667
Showdown: 360, 384-393
Slam: 113, 115
Smack: 414-416
Strange: 255, 274, 520, 535-540, 615-620, 647, 659-667, 673
Summit: 198-200
Sundial: 255-257
Talons: 170-171
Touchdown: 201-219
Westernminster: 305
Wrangler: 219-220, 545-547, 585
Outpost:
Ares: 401-402, 417
Berlin: 444, 466
Betty: 305, 319, 365, 399, 415, 418
Carson: See Hill 27
Detroit: 417
Dick: 419
East Berlin: 444, 466
Eerie: 285, 344, 401-402, 415, 417
Harry: See Hill 420
Kelly: 319, 359, 364-366, 379-380
Nickie: 365, 370, 399
Queen: 319, 460
Reno: See Hill 148
Vegas: See Hill 175

P

Pacific Fleet: See U.S. Naval Forces
Package Proposal: 282, 315
Paengyong-do: 469, 529
Paeknam-san: See Hill 1179
Pak In Yup, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 309
Pak Nam Kwon, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 110, 310
Pak Byong Kwon, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 307
Park Chung Hee: 512-513
Park Im Hung, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 512-513
Parker, C. W., Capt. (USN): 599
Parks, John E., Cdr. (USN): 592
Parr, Ralph S., Capt. (USN): 708, 738
Pate, Randolph McC., Maj. Gen. (USMC): 461
Pearson, Lester Bowles (Can): 32, 34
Peng Teh-huai: 28, 432
Perry, John, RAdm. (USN): 521, 541
Philippines: 9, 16, 475-476
Philippine Battalion: 44, 59, 72, 188, 190, 235-236, 250, 262, 321, 422
Phillips, Denny P., Cdr. (USN): 578
Pi-ri: 135, 140, 150
Pike’s Peak: 324, 385-391
Platt, Jonas M., Lt. Col. (USMC): 428
Polar Line: 201, 242-246
Porkchop: See Hill 234
Preston, Benjamin S., Col. (USAF): 652
Pujon Reservoir: 570, 573, 692, 694-695
Pukhan River: 78, 92, 94, 188, 267, 452, 455-457
Pupyong-ni: 288, 300, 438
Pusan: 329, 335, 434, 435, 602
Pyongyang: 71-77, 113, 124, 160, 195, 219

R

Ramee, Eric P., Col. (US Army): 263
Radford, Arthur W., Adm. (USN): 395
Ragland, Dayton W., Lt. (USAF): 651
Ramsey Paul H., Capt. (USN): 592
Randolph, R. L., Col. (USAF): 619, 687-691
Regan, Herbert E., RAdm. (USN): 574-577
Republic of Korea Air Forces: 291, 437
Republic of Korea Army: 26, 249, 269, 287-293, 437
III Corps: 22, 446, 461, 474
12th Division: 359, 406, 411, 421, 447, 474
15th Division: 413, 448, 474
20th Division: 413-414, 453, 455, 460, 461, 474
21st Division: 414, 446, 474
22nd Division: 437, 452, 474
25th Division: 437, 452, 474
Republic of Korea Marine Corps:
1st Marine Regiment (later combat group):
44, 95, 97, 99, 143, 156-159, 187, 197, 247-249, 265-266, 305, 362, 370-373, 411, 461, 474
5th Marine Battalion: 62, 188
Republic of Korea Navy: 437
Rhee Syngman: 12, 30-31, 35, 395, 436-437, 449-452, 457, 467-469, 588-589, 735
Ridgway, Matthew B., Gen. (US Army):
459
Risner, Robinson, Capt. (USAF): 704
Ritchie, Ellis B., Lt. Col. (US Army): 343
Robertson, Walter S. (US): 451-452
137, 139, 145, 252
98, 105, 320, 342-343, 413
Ruiz-Novoa, Alberto, Lt. Col. (Colom): 424
Russ, Joseph R., Col. (US Army): 389
Ryu Kun Chang, Col. (ROKA): 392-393

S
Sabanggo-ri: 84, 86, 241
Sa-chon: 305, 361-362, 370-373
Sakchon: 702, 704
Samchon-bong: See Hill 815
Sami-chon: 115, 221, 305, 398
Sanders, Harry, RAdm. (USN): 592
Sanderlin, Joseph C., Lt. Col. (US Army): 345
Sandy Ridge: 324, 385-391, 389
Sariron: 61, 657, 660, 663, 666, 668, 677
Sateri: 172-180, 202-219
Saturate: See Operation Saturate
Scott-Moncrieff, A.K. RAdm. (RN): 548, 553-554
Selden, John T., Maj. Gen. (USMC): 305
Seoul: 7, 12, 19, 22, 36, 59, 267, 395, 437, 451, 551, 594, 693, 695, 737
Shepherd, Lemuel C., Gen. (USMC): 683
Sinanju: 13, 583, 616, 642, 646-647, 658-659, 661-664, 666, 669-670, 728, 735
Sinhyon-ni: 258-259, 320
Sintan-ni: 63, 66
Skeen, Kenneth L., Capt. (USAF): 647
Smart, Jacob E., Brig. Gen. (USAF): 617, 686-687, 690, 709
Smith Alander (US): 33
Smith, Allan E., RAdm. (USN): 527, 609-610
Smythe, George W., Maj. Gen. (US Army): 420
Sniper Ridge: 308, 324, 327, 360, 391-393, 403, 409, 420, 446, 458, 462
Sobang-san: See Hill 717
Soi-san: See Hill 362
Sok-to: 529-530, 554-556, 559-560, 589, 599-600
Sonchon: 642, 646, 658, 660-661
Songin: 522, 529, 532, 543, 598, 599
Song Suk Ha, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 455
Song Yo Chan, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 109, 310, 462

South Africa Air Fighter Squadron: 9, 16, 43, 434, 475, 491, 621, 625
Soucek Apollo, RAdm. (USN): 558
Soyang River: 92, 124, 155-156, 182-187, 246-249, 264
Spear, L.P., Cdr. (USN): 543
Spivey, Delmar T., Maj. Gen. (USAF): 621
Staab, Jr., Edward M. Col. (USMC): 288
Stalin, Joseph V.: 432
Star Hill: 323, 419, 446
Steinback, Richard, Col. (US Army): 418
Stephenson, Clay C., Capt. (USAF): 672
Stilwell, Richard G., Col. (US Army): 395, 419, 420
Strangle: See Operation
Struble, A.D., Vice Adm. (USN): 12, 610
Stuart, Archibald W., Col. (US Army): 402, 418
Suip-chon: 94, 173
Sukchon: 663, 666
Sunchon: 494, 616, 638, 661, 663, 666, 668, 736
Supung: 522, 569-574, 618, 633, 642-644, 646, 691-694, 696, 720, 729
Sweden: 9, 43, 475-476, 478, 484
Sweeney, John Cdr. (USN): 592

T
Tabu-dong: 11, 332
Taechon: 642, 646
Taechong-do: 469, 555
Taegwang-ni: 63, 66, 68, 114, 340
Tae-hwa-do: 529, 554-555, 652
Taejon: 7, 495
Taeu-san: See Hill 1179
Tanchon: 544, 566, 598
Tari-dong: 118, 120, 239
Task Force (Army):
  Hawkins: 71-75
  Hamilton: 72
  Cutthroat: 190-191
  Byorum: 193, 195-196, 238-239
  Lynx: 194-195
  Hamilton: 195
  Sturman: 205, 215
  Mac: 224-226
  Paik: 259, 269-271, 287, 300-301, 307
T-Born Ridge: See Hill 191
Terll, Robert H., Brig. Gen. (USAF): 622
Thailand: 9, 16, 43, 475-476
Thailand Battalion: 43-44, 59, 66, 168, 188, 228, 262, 264, 271, 397
Thomas, George B., Lt. Col. (USMC): 319
Thomas, Gerald C., Maj. Gen. (USMC): 96, 157, 249
Thyng, Harrison R., Col. (USAF): 647, 651
Tolmison, W. G., RAdm. (USN): 538
Tongdachon: 65, 68
Triangle Hill: See Hill 598
Tumen River: 541
Turkey: 9, 475-476
Turkish Brigade: 15, 43-44, 59, 66, 68, 70, 77, 164-167, 237-238, 419, 434, 443, 491
Turyu-bong: See Hill 689
Tuol-san: See Hill 1148
Twining, Nathan F., Gen. (USAF): 634, 674, 740

U

Uijongbu: 66, 220
Umido: 544
Ungok: 417, 427-428
United Kingdom (See British Forces): 9, 32

43, 475-476, 491


UN General Assembly: 7, 13, 27, 31, 436, 479

UN Security Council: 7, 9, 27, 41, 482-502

United States Forces:
  XVI Corps: 42, 43-44, 270
1st Cavalry Division: 8, 44, 49, 61-69, 113-115, 124, 126, 168-170, 188, 191-193, 201, 221-233, 252, 257, 259-261, 270-271, 277, 494, 585


5th Regimental Combat Team: 10, 82-87, 118-120, 314, 326, 413, 445, 458, 461

187th Airborne RCT: 15, 326, 335-336, 460, 463-464, 737

2nd Logistical Command: 308, 327, 342

Naval Force Far East: 42, 275-276, 531, 558-559, 585-587, 615, 618

Pacific Fleet: 585, 595

Seventh Fleet: 42, 524, 566, 573, 582, 585-587, 591-593, 639, 658, 683, 719

Task Force:
7: 352, 554, 585-587
90: 532-533, 555-557, 585-587, 601-602
95: 276, 523, 527-529, 533, 543-544, 548, 551, 556, 564, 597-599, 606, 608

USS Antietam: 538

USS Badoeng Strait: 529, 556, 586

USS Bataan: 560

USS Birmingham: 600

USS Bon Home Richard: 518, 522-523, 533, 538, 570, 574, 576-577, 695

USS Boxer: 518, 523, 531, 567, 576-577, 591, 594, 694-695, 734

USS Bremerton: 589, 596-597, 599-600

USS Brinkley Bass: 543, 562

USS Burlington: 562

USS Brush: 598

USS Cahaldo: 562

USS Carmick: 544

USS Ceylon: 554-555

USS Chandler: 598

USS Colahan: 548, 596

USS Cossack: 554

USS Cunningham: 543, 597

USS Curlew: 562

USS Current: 596

USS De Haven: 595

USS Duncan: 543, 568

USS Epping Forest: 557

USS Essex: 523, 538-539, 541, 576-577, 580, 582, 591

USS Everett: 549

USS Eversole: 598

USS Gregory: 561

USS Gurke: 596, 598

USS Hammer: 596

USS Hanson: 567

USS Helena: 518, 527, 544-545, 549, 583

USS Henderson: 596

USS Iowa: 533, 568, 592, 599, 609

USS Irwin: 596, 599

USS Jarvis: 532

USS Jenkins: 563
| USS John A. Bole: 596 |
| USS John R. Craig: 548 |
| USS John W. Thomason: 596 |
| USS Kearsege: 521, 524, 578, 580, 582-583 |
| USS Kyes: 533, 562, 598 |
| USS Laffey: 562 |
| USS Lake Champlain: 591-593, 734 |
| USS Laws: 597 |
| USS Leonard F. Mason: 562 |
| USS Lofberg: 596 |
| USS Los Angeles: 276, 518, 528, 533, 547, 551, 596, 598 |
| USS McCoy: 568 |
| USS Maddox: 533, 562, 598 |
| USS Manchester: 529, 533, 555, 562, 598, 599-600 |
| USS Missouri: 609 |
| USS Musher: 562 |
| USS Newcastle: 600 |
| USS New Jersey: 276, 518, 526-527, 533, 544-546, 554, 592, 596, 599-600, 609 |
| USS O'Brien: 543, 549 |
| USS Oriskany: 525, 584, 590 |
| USS Orleck: 548 |
| USS Oriskany: 583 |
| USS Osprey: 562 |
| USS Parks: 548 |
| USS Pelican: 562 |
| USS Philippine Sea: 525, 531, 567, 570, 590-593, 694, 734 |
| USS Porter: 532, 597 |
| USS Princeton: 518, 523, 525, 566-567, 570, 575-577, 580, 583, 591-594, 694-695, 734 |
| USS Rendova: 553 |
| USS Rochester: 276, 279 |
| USS Rowan: 561, 596 |
| USS St. Paul: 276, 526-527, 531, 533, 589, 592, 596, 599-600 |
| USS Samuel N. Moore: 548, 595 |
| USS Shields: 548 |
| USS Sicily: 518, 528, 556 |
| USS Stickell: 562 |
| USS Symbole: 596 |
| USS T.E. Chandler: 567 |
| USS Thompson: 596 |
| USS Toledo: 276, 545-546, 548 |
| USS Trathen: 597 |
| USS Twining: 561, 596 |
| USS Valley Forge: 524-525, 558, 590 |
| USS Waxbill: 598 |
| USS Wee: 553 |
| USS Whetstone: 545, 556 |
| USS William Seuerling: 544, 549 |
| USS Wiltsie: 562, 596-598 |
| USS Wisconsin: 276, 555, 609 |
| US Air Forces: |
| **Far East Air Force Bomber Command:** 616, 618, 622, 639, 650, 658-659, 661, 664, 695, 697-699, 712-713, 722, 724, 726, 728, 732, 735 |
| **Far East Air Force Air Material Command:** 622 |
| **Thirteenth Air Force:** 625 |
| **Twentieth Air Force:** 625, 709 |
| **314th Air Division:** 622 |
| **315th Air Division:** 622 |
| **Air Wing:** |
| 3rd Bombardment Wing: 621, 668, 671-672, 675, 677, 740 |
| 4th Wing: 621, 637, 644-645, 651-652, 704-705, 708, 738-739 |
| 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing: 627, 635, 642, 647-648, 651, 702 |
| 8th Fighter Bomber Wing: 621, 649, 653, 663, 739 |
| 17th Wing: 721, 734, 737, 740 |
| 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing: 621, 625 |
| 19th Bombardment Wing: 739 |
| 27th Wing: 623 |
| 49th Fighter-Bomber Wing: 621, 623, 663, 666, 670, 738 |
| 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing: 625, 645,
652-653, 664, 702, 705-706, 739
58th Wing: 729, 731, 738
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing:
621, 672, 713, 738
98th Wing: 735, 739
116th Fighter-Bomber Wing: 634, 664
136th Fighter-Bomber Wing: 621, 666, 670
307th Wing: 722, 735
452nd Wing: 621, 671-672, 674, 676-677

Air Group:
3rd Group: 672, 674, 676, 706
4th Maintenance and Supply Group: 637
8th Fighter-Bomber Group: 667
19th Bombardment Group: 662
49th Fighter-Bomber Group: 623, 643, 647, 738
58th Group: 738
116th Fighter-Bomber Group: 624
126th Light Bomber Group: 675
474th Group: 729, 738
614th Tactical Control Group: 621, 737

US Marine Corps:
1st Marine Air Wing: 189, 558, 570, 573, 621, 625, 670, 717, 737
Marine Air Group 12: 362, 621
11th Marine Artillery Regiment: 428, 431
Kimpo Provisional Regiment: 288
Utah Line: 117, 119

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., Gen. (USAF): 582, 623-624, 648-651, 653, 659, 674-675
Vanway, George L., Col. (US Army): 426
Vittori, Joseph, Cpl. (USMC): 185

Walker, Walton H., Lt. Gen. (US Army): 8, 11-12, 14
Walt, Lewis W., Col. (USMC): 428-429
Warnord, Victor E., Col. (USAF): 729
Webb, James (US): 540
Weede, Richard C., Col. (USMC): 184, 197
Wells, H., Lt. Gen. (UK): 471
Wells, T. H., Cdr. (USN): 567
Westmoreland, William C., Brig. Gen. (US Army): 460
White Horse: See Hill 395
Wichita Line: 99
Williams, John J., Staff Sgt. (USMC): 428
Williams, J., George H., Maj. (US Army): 177-178
Wills, Lloyd E., Lt. Col. (US Army): 367
Willson, Charles E., (US): 394, 437
Wincoff, Joseph L., Col. (USMC): 98
Wonsan Harbor: 28, 276, 548-551, 595-597
Wood, Hunter, Capt. (USN): 548
Worthern, Thomas A., Col. (USMC): 184-197
Worunui: 137, 141, 179
Wyoming Line: 23-24, 38, 41, 48-50, 52-55, 63, 68, 71, 79, 87, 111, 113, 117, 159-
Index

Y

Yalu Gulf: 529-530, 554, 557, 560-561
Yang-do: 522, 559, 589, 601
Yanggu: 94, 96, 98-99, 103, 152, 155, 277, 422
Yawon-san: See Hill 487
Yesong River: 50, 281
Yo-do: 564-565, 597, 739

Yoke Ridge: 128, 144, 155-159, 182-183
Yonan: 51, 57, 60, 528, 552
Yonchon: 63, 66, 192, 221, 261
Yongpyong-do: 469

Z

# JOINT REVIEWING BOARD

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<thead>
<tr>
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**VOLUME V**

<table>
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