THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Minister of National Defense  Suh Jyong Chul
THE HISTORY OF
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IN THE KOREAN WAR

VOLUME IV

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
FOREWORD

On that terrible Sunday in June 1950, when the north Korean communists initiated their wanton, unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea, the United States of America immediately rushed assistance to the Republic. Throughout the 37 months of bitter combat the United States stood as a leading partner among the sixteen United Nations which sent their equipment, supplies, and most importantly, the life-blood of their nations’ youth to uphold the freedom of the Republic.

American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines repeatedly distinguished themselves with acts of courage and sacrifice in bitter ground, sea and air battles up and down the peninsula during more than three years of bloody combat.

In the end these great sacrifices were rewarded with a new, dynamic Republic of Korea born from the ashes of war, a nation whose existence has become viable, whose economy has soared at remarkable rates and whose defense posture is becoming strong and self-reliant. Yet, even two decades since an armistice brought an uneasy peace to our nation, we continue to be faced with the same threat from the same aggressors.

The ultimate goal of north Korea remains the communization of the entire Korean peninsula by force. With the fall of Indochina, the north Korean communists have intensified their bellicose acts toward the Republic of Korea and have continued to increase their shopworn, stereotyped “peace offensive.”

The real danger lies in the possibility of north Korea overestimating its offensive prowess vis-a-vis the Republic’s defensive capability and miscalculating its position within the context of the present international situation in East Asia. While we have supreme confidence in the defense readiness posture of the Republic and the resolve of the United States to stand with us, we pray that the American sacrifices during the war and during the last twenty-two years of continuing military and economic assistance to our small nation will not have been in vain. Any reckless aggression by the communists would disrupt the peace of Asia for which we have all worked so hard these many years, but it would surely invite the self-annihilation of the north Korean communists.
I sincerely hope this work will serve freedom-loving people everywhere of the comradeship between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America which was forged in combat and strengthened through years of joint vigilance to preserve the hard-earned peace.

In closing, this book is reverently dedicated to all the American servicemen who served in the Korean War, with deepest gratitude for their invaluable, gallant battle accomplishments and noble sacrifices, which enabled the Republic of Korea to continue its worthy efforts toward the preservation of freedom and peace.

20 December 1975
Seoul

SUIH JYONG CHUL
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea
PREFACE

This book is the fourth of five volumes dealing with the contribution of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War between June 1950 to July 1953.

Volumes I through III have dealt with the operations of all U.N. contingents who fought and assisted in repelling the Communist aggression from our country, except the United States Forces, which formed the backbone of the U.N. effort in Korea. The last two volumes will describe the role of the U.S. Forces.

This Volume IV presents the contribution of all services of the United States during the first one year of the Korean War extending from the outbreak of the war in June 1950 to the end of June 1951. The U.S. Forces’ operations during the remaining period to July 1953 will be presented in Volume V the next year. As this history is mainly concerned with the account of the U.S. Forces in Korea, battle actions of the other U.N. allies are presented very briefly to place their operations in their proper perspective.

This volume has been written based primarily on the materials furnished by the U.S. military sources and other related publications and records collected and maintained by this Committee. It should be noted, however, a lack of the reference materials for certain periods of the war has inevitably resulted in a lack of in-depth coverage of certain aspects of this volume. This the Committee very deeply regrets. In any case, all efforts have been directed to give adequate coverage to all major units of the U.S. Forces and present an accurate and objective account of their operations. Yet, there still remains much to be desired, and the sole responsibility for any errors, of course, rests with the Committee.

In an effort to complement our works of compiling the history of the U.N. Forces in Korea, this Committee has planned to publish a supplementary edition in the near future. In this connection, it will be greatly appreciated if each nation who participated in the Korean War would continue to furnish the Committee any related materials.

Grateful acknowledgement is especially made for the invaluable assistance and cooperation provided by Mr. Herman M. Katz, the Command Historian for the U.S. Forces in Korea, throughout the course of research and writing.

LEE HYUNG SUK
Chairman
War History Compilation Committee

20 December 1975
Seoul, Korea
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. Contents.
This book, which is compiled into three separate parts of the ground, naval and aerial operations, provides a comprehensive account of the U.S. armed forces during June 1950—June 1951.

2. Equation of Time.
Times and dates used in this volume are those of the place underdiscussion. It must be kept in mind for reference that there is a time difference of fourteen hours between Seoul and New York. And, Korean standard time is that of the 135th meridian, nine hours ahead of Greenwich Mean time.

The Korean names are given according to the Korean custom, that is with the surname first. Korean personal names ordinarily consist of three monosyllables.

The place names are spelled in accordance with the ROK Army Map Service spellings which are coincided with the McCune-Reischauer System of Romanizing the Korean Alphabet. The breve mark, however, has been omitted. In case of nominal changes the new names are indicated along with the old ones. Some place names are followed by a descriptive, hyphenated suffix. See Appendix III for further reference.

5. Maps and Illustrations.
Sketch maps photographs have been used to illustrate the personnel, events, moves, actions, geographical locations and terrain features in the hope that this arrangement will make the narrative easier to follow. In addition, the situation maps are also annexed at the end of Appendixes to illustrate the development of the battle actions more in detail.
6. **Italicization.**

In printing, the Italic typesetting is applied to the some words and phrases that are often italicized in English context or to the specific terms and some quotations in order to distinguish it from normal narrative. The names and designations of the opponent elements and units are also italicized to discern from the friendly ones.

7. **Abbreviations.**

As a general rule, the first time a unit and other terms are mentioned they have been given their full titles, but thereafter generally accepted abbreviations have been used as listed in Appendix IV. Unit designations and place names are further shortened in order to avoid repetitions monotony, such as “the 1st Republic of Korea Army Regiment” and “the Yalu River” may enter as “the 1st ROK Infantry” and “the Yalu” respectively.

8. **Appendixes.**

Chronology, bibliographical references, and glossaries are also included in the Appendixes.

9. **Index.**

The relevant names, places, and incidents are enumerated in the Index in alphabetical order at the volume’s end for cross-reference.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Section 1. The Background

A quarter century has passed since the outbreak of the devastating, bloody internecine Korean War, which was triggered by the North Korean Communists against the Republic of Korea. But, one important aspect remains, unfortunately, unchanged. The cruel Communist puppet regime in the north continues to be occupied by the same trigger-happy, unpredictable Communist clique which touched off the tragic war by mounting an armed aggression into the south.

It was well-prepared but abortive invasion against the completely unprepared and peaceful Republic of Korea. In fact, the militant Communists in Pyongyang have steadfastly and consistently been committed to the armed communization of the whole Korean peninsula by means of force ever since they seized control of the northern half of Korea immediately following the nation's liberation from the Japanese colonial rule in August 1945.

Yet, nightmare of the Korean War, which North Korean Communist clique committed atrocities against totally innocent people in the south on the early morning of that fateful Sunday, 25 June 1950, is especially vivifying today. This heightened concern among the free people about the possibility of Pyongyang's puppet regime reenacting the Korean War against the wishes of the absolute majority of the Korean people was generated by the acceleration of provocative utterances and military maneuver by chieftain of the Communist North Kim Il-sung in the wake of the Indochina debacle, and Kim is the very man who drove all Korean people in the two halves of this "Land of Morning Calm" into the tragic war twenty-five years ago.

Obviously encouraged by the collapse of Indochina at Communist hands in the early months of 1975, the Pyongyang Communist regime now armed to the teeth, has precipitously intensified its belligerence to a point where it largely resembles that which prevailed before the Communist North triggered the war in 1950.
One cogent indication of a sharp rise in the Communist puppet regime's warlike designs is its military build-up close to the Demilitarized Zone underneath which the Communist North has been digging secret infiltration tunnels. This military move closely coincided with a trip of North Korean Communists' ring leader Kim Il-sung to Communist China in April 1975 in an apparent quest of Peking's support for his version on military adventurism. Soon thereafter he continued to make an extensive junket to the East European Communist bloc-nations and the African states in a bid to enlist their diplomatic backing-up for his aggressive schemes against the Republic of Korea.

For Kim Il-sung who has been blaring day and night for the revolutionary takeover of the south by force, is rather natural that he should be encouraged by the Communist successes in Indochina, to pull his trigger to unleash "a war of liberation," which he calls, against the Republic of Korea through an all-out re-invasion, limited-local war or guerrilla warfare. This move is resembling of the fact that the victory of the Communists in China in 1949 had encouraged Kim to launch the tragic war against the south in 1950.

The withdrawal of the United States Forces from Indochina has certainly increased the chances of the Kim's clique discounting the United States' commitment to the defense of the Free Republic, a factor of miscalculation that could induce the North Korean Communists' boss to launch military adventure of one sort or another to test the United States' response in the context of its steadiness in abiding by the commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea. However, it is to be noted that there is a conspicuous difference between now and twenty-five years ago in the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula.

When the North Korean Communists attacked the south in June 1950, the Republic of Korea had no more than constabulary forces with meager, mostly antiquated weapons which were no match for the well-trained, well-organized, and numerically too superior North Korean Communist forces equipped with such heavy arms as tanks, long-range artillery and warplanes, all Russian-built. Further, the Republic of Korea and her people were not only ignorant of the Communists' military capability and preparedness but were completely off guard, and so were the United States military advisors, the only American military personnel remained in Korea at the time.

Today, all the people in the Free Republic are wholly united in the cause of defending their homeland against the Communist forces that are bent upon abridging their freedom; they are on guard and alert against possible armed attack from the Communist North. As long as the Republic of Korea main-
tains a total security posture and the United States of America keeps its
deterrent force here in Korea as the unequivocal manifestation of its living
scrupulously up to the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea,
any reckless invasion of the south from the Communist North would only
invite its own "self-destruction."

All Koreans were fully of joy and hope when Korea was freed from thirty-
five years of the Japanese rule at the end of World War II on 15 August
1945. They looked forward to a prosperous future of Korea. But they were
quickly dismayed to find their homegenerous nation divided entirely against
their will into halves -- the democratic and free south and the Communist con-
trolled-north -- across the 38th Parallel. When the Japanese collapsed and
surrendered in August 1945, the Russians quickly occupied Manchuria and en-
tered into the northern territory of Korea. The necessity for some arrange-
ment for Korea became apparent. In order to expedite the disarming of the
Japanese forces in Korea, the American military authorities agreed that Rus-
sia should occupy the northern half and American forces the southern half,
the boundary between the two zones being fixed as the 38th Parallel. This line was a purely arbitrary one, decided upon as a matter of convenience, as a simple means of defining the areas of responsibility for receiving of the Japanese surrender.

It was never intended that this military partition should form a basis for the future government of Korea; but as happened elsewhere, once Russian influence gained a footing it proved impossible to set up any form of government not controlled by Moscow. Korea is typical country, among many others, and East Germany alike.

Divergent ideologies developed on either side of the 38th Parallel, and the Soviet-dominated puppet band under Kim Il-sung was formed along the Soviet satellite police-lines.

The Soviet Russia, however, intended to control not only the northern half but the whole Korean peninsula within its sphere from the beginning. Russia rejected any united Korea unless the peninsula placed under the Communists' control. The Russians had seized North Korea as they designed but the whole peninsula. Then, barely two years after the Republic of Korea was found in the south through free elections held under the United Nations supervision, the North Korean Communist clique, with full support of the Soviet Russia, invaded on a summer rainy Sunday in 1950, triggering a bitter three-year fratricidal war in which the Communists thrust blades into the hearts of their parents and gunned down their brethren.

The bloody fighting ended in an armistice on 27 July 1953, after the Republic of Korea repelled the Communist aggressors with the helps of its sixteen United Nations allies (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States). Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden had also rendered their medical support to Korea.

Section 2. The U.S. Forces in Korea

Great Contribution

The Korean War of 1950–1953 marked the first real test of the free world solidarity in the face of Communist aggression. In repulsing this deliberately attempted Communist aggression, the United Nations served a
clear notice that it would not hesitate to aid those nations whose freedom and independence were under attack.

When the Republic of Korea was invaded by the North Korean Communist forces in an all-out effort in June 1950, without warning or provocation, the United Nations resolved to halt this violent attempt and punish the aggressors by a collective security action and called upon member nations for assistance. Within a few days, President of the United States of America Harry S. Truman committed U.S. armed forces, the first combat forces from sixteen nations to come to Korea to repel the Communist invaders.

During thirty-seven months of fighting, pushing and pulling up and down the Korean peninsula, experiencing the rigors of the terrible cold winter and the insufferable-heat of summer, American servicemen, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, repeatedly distinguished themselves with acts of courage and sacrifice in bitter ground, sea and air battles. In that period, the U.S. forces suffered 142,091 casualties: 33,629 deaths (27,704 soldiers, 458 sailors, 1,200 airmen, and 4,267 marines), 103,284 wounded (77,596 soldiers,
1,576 sailors, 368 airmen, and 23,744 marines), and 5,178 missing or captured in action (4,658 soldiers, 53 sailors, 273 airmen, and 194 marines). Thus the price for the cause of freedom, justice and peace was so high but Communist designs had been thwarted and the integrity of the Republic of Korea was restored.

But the cause they fought for is still facing the same threat, even two decades after they fought. Indeed, the turns and twist in situation in and outside the Korean peninsula during the period have brought the Republic of Korea to the point where it has to be prepared for the worst that might be imposed at any moment by the same aggressors the Republic of Korea, with the helps of the U.N. allies including the United States, repelled over two decades ago.

There is now standing a monument, erected by the Republic of Korea Government in the vicinity of the “Freedom Bridge” near Panmunjom, to commemorate forever the historical contribution of the U.S. forces in the Korean War as a symbol of “the Crusaders for Justice” and “Defenders of Freedom.”

The Memorial Statue of President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, erected near the “Freedom Bridge,” in gratitude to his historical, great contribution he had rendered to the defense of the Republic of Korea.
Post-Armistice

After the armistice, which was signed on 27 July 1953, American military forces remained as the most strong deterrent force against any eventual Communist reinvasion and to help an ally maintain the peace on the Korean peninsula.

Recently, the role of the American forces here in Korea suddenly became more important in the wake of the Communist successes in Indochina. It is true that the Communist North might once more stage an all-out aggression in force as the one which touched off the Korean War on 25 June 1950. The possibility of a sudden, sharp Communist attack or increased infiltration into the rear areas and along the coasts is always remained, if Kim Il-sung makes misjudgement.

Today is quite different than twenty-five years ago. From President Gerald Ford on down, responsible U.S. leaders had assured and reassured the Republic of Korea and the world of its firm readiness as well as its resolution to fulfill its defense commitment to the Republic of Korea. The American high authorities have taken plains to make it clear to the Communist North’s chieftain Kim Il-sung that the Republic of Korea is unquestionably inside the American defense perimeter today.

In some of the toughest language heard recently in this year, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger revealed that tactical nuclear weapons have been sent to the Republic of Korea and said the United States would consider using them against any Communist attack from the north. He also pointed out that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America signed at Washington on 1 October 1953 made it completely different from America’s bitter experiences in Vietnam. He further went on at a news interview that a North Korean Communist attack would be “a case of outright aggression,” and the reactions in the United States might be considerably different from those of that obtained during the Vietnam War.

On 16 June 1975, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to come to the defense of the Republic of Korea in the event of a Communist attack. He warned that any invasion from the north would be “a wildy rush adventure.”

When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, some critics claimed that the Communists were encouraged to attack by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech on 12 February 1950 which excluded the Republic of Korea from the American defense perimeter in the Far East. Twenty-five years
Ground Operations

later, the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula is entirely different, thus Republic of Korea and the United States are now being more closely tied each other for the preservation of peace in this peninsula.

The U.S. troops are technically in Korea as part of the U.N. Command, but are also covered by a mutual defense treaty signed in 1953. The presence of the U.S. troops in Korea is not only effective means of deterring the Communist invasion from the north but it also plays a decisive role in maintaining the balance among major powers in Asia.

According to a column entitled “Strategy for a Short, Violent War” appeared in the Washington Post on Monday, 15 June 1975, a U.S. general now serving in Korea expressed his strategy to defeat and destroy within nine day a renewed Communist all-out attack from the north. He said that in case of a NK Communist invasion of the south, it would be a nine day war, hitting the Communist attack columns by nearly thousand daily air sorties, including devastating B-52 raids, using the most sophisticated nonnuclear technology.

The newspaper column also mentioned a NK Communist strategy that Kim Il-sung had obviously planned to attack and capture Seoul in a lighting strike, then call for a cease-fire and interminable negotiations that would destroy the Republic of Korea independence. Reminding the NK Communist regime has been massing its troops along the DMZ for three years, the column said that the Communist plan had progressed in the past years with fantastic infiltration tunnels under the DMZ, and Frog missiles that could hit Seoul.

On top of all, on 25 June 1975, U.S. President Gerald Ford made a
statement in his press conference that the United States will not hesitate to use U.S. deterrent power including tactical nuclear weapons in America's national interest as they should be, in the event of an all-out attack by the North Korean Communists.

This statement is the strongest commitment ever accorded by the United States to the defense of the Republic of Korea. This is the sternest warning to the NK Communists that they can start a full-scale military adventure by only taking the surest risk of annihilation and destruction to be wrought by the ROK-U.S. combined-massive retaliation including nuclear weapons.

Section 3. Korea Today

Threat of Communist Reinvansion

A quarter century has elapsed since the fateful Sunday morning of 25 June 1950, but the threat for renewal of a war from the Communist North is not fading with the passage of time.

Today, all material and intelligence evidences are clearly presenting a single sign that the Communist North, led by warlike Kim Il-sung, is never changed its design and strategy of communizing the south by means of force or subversion.

The Communist puppet regime in the north often mouths such words and phrases as peace and peaceful unification. But the fact is indeed that such utterences have a gulf of difference in meaning what they are normally defined to be. The Red hordes in the north use them as an end itself but merely as a means to comouflage their real, aggressive intention.

It ought to be recalled that the NK Communists' premeditated, full-scale arms invasion of the south twenty-five years ago was proceeded by Pyongyang's deliberate peace-offensive under smoke-screen. Well-prepared all along, the Communists' military thrust that followed the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea was halted only after a collective U.N. security action was taken to repel it. The lesson must remain that it was the naivety of failing to perceive the two faces of the militants in the north that largely led to the tragic outbreak of the Korean War.

Entirely contrary to its peace propaganda, the puppet regime in Pyongyang is continuing and even more intensifying war preparations,
The Communists are continuing to dig in secret infiltration tunnels underneath the DMZ for the reinvasion purposes.

provocative acts and subversion against the Republic of Korea.

For some good examples, while they are talking about false peace propaganda, the Communists boycotted even liaison-level meetings between the south and north that had been held intermittently at the Republic of Korea’s earnest request after the Communist North unilaterally suspended the plenary south-north dialogue at both the humanitarian Red Cross and the Political Coordinating Committee levels in August 1973.

Furthermore, the Communist North had pointedly indicated recently that its outward slogan of “peaceful unification” means, in effect, the eventual communization of the south under Pyongyang’s rule by violence. “Pyongyang Radio” broadcasted on 12 June 1975 that “the problem of unifying thefartherland means liberating the southern half of the country by revolution, thus realizing national reunification.” On the following day, 13 June 1975, it was also cited again in a column of the “Rodong Shinmun,” the North Korean Communist party organ, saying that “we can achieve peaceful unification only through militant struggle and there cannot be any
compromise with secessionists." Time and again, "Pyongyang Radio" asserted that the Communist regime and its fellow Communists in the north are "fully prepared with potential (war capabilities) strong enough to render our enemy a decisive defeat."

Meanwhile, the Red Chinese leaders in Peking, unlike a prevailing negative argument, had in fact endorsed Kim Il-sung's design for reinvasion of the south during Kim's visit to Peking in this April. Some sources, on the other hand, noted that during Kim Il-sung's visit to Red China in April 1975, he strongly asked Peking leaders to extend military and economic aid necessary for the intensification of Kim's war preparation, including fighter planes, T-54 and T-55 tanks, warships such as R-class submarines, destroyers and torpedos. Peking's extension of war material to the Communist North, which is doubtlessly encouraged by the fall of Indochina, signifies that Red China supports Kim Il-sung's "people's liberation war strategy," reunification of Korea by force, in principle.

On the other hand, the characteristics in the post-Indochina's debacle era is the intensified competition between Moscow and Peking for influence in Asia. This means that the two leading Communist powers will compete in helping the North Korean Communists for their armed aggression scheme.

In addition, very recently, some foreign newspapers repeatedly reported that they believe that the current designs and schemes of the NK Communists are clearly to achieve "eventual dominance" over the Republic of Korea through a combination of diplomatic and military measures. The diplomatic measure means that the NK Reds are now being heavily engaged in false peace offensive in an attempt to mislead the world attention.

For instance, it was noticed sensible change in Kim Il-sung's utterances made in Romania and Algeria from those made during his previous trip to Peking, Red China. The change is interpreted as a simple shift in tactics to conceal his real plot to renew a war in the Korean peninsula whenever he seizes as a decisive moment to do so. Again, Kim's sudden alternation to his tone of speeches according to the foreign reports, was apparently caused by the fact that his bellicose speeches at Peking led and prompted the United States to repeatedly pledge its defense commitment to the Republic of Korea, thus Kim was forced to camouflage his invasion plot with a disguised peace maneuver.

In brief, the consequences of the debacle of Indochina were so broad and deep as to cause not only the Republic of Korea and the United States but many other nations to start a serious reassessment of rising tension in the
Korean peninsula, despite the prevailing detente move among the world powers.

What could have entailed in the Communist North if the United States had not shown its resolution to go for the heart of Pyongyang in case of its renewal of war in Korea is too apparent. The Communists reinforced their two armed divisions near the Demilitarized Zone, continued construction of infiltration tunnels toward the south of the buffer zone, and concentrated a great number of battle vessels around the western islands close to the seaward extension of the truce line.

Camouflaged Peace Offensive

Recently, the North Korean Communists have intensified their propaganda, particularly disguised peace offensive. This is nothing more than the time-old Communist strategy of “one-step retreat for two-step advance.”

In other words, the Communist North’s chieftain Kim Il-sung, on the heels of the Communist successes in Indochina, is making a desperate effort aimed at creating social confusion and split of national consensus in the south; this is designed ultimately to weaken national solidarity. In addition, on the other hand, the Communist clique is desperately looking for a chance to stage a re-invasion under the smoke-screen of false peace offensive.

Communists’ camouflaged peace offensive continues day and night even along the DMZ using loud-speakers.
Introduction

Kim Il-sung, who pledged himself to the revolutionary takeover of the south during his trip to Peking in April 1975, muted the tone of his unification policy during his trips to Eastern Europe and Algeria less than one month later by uttering that his Communist clique adheres to the policy that "reunification of the country should be realized independently without interference from any outside forces and by peaceful means." This Communist scheme was compelled to resort temporarily to a camouflaged-peace offensive with the double objectives of slackening the moral armament of the free Korean people and soothing the unfavorable international response to its war cry.

The two faces of Kim Il-sung are as old as his Communist hat. When his adversary is weak or he judges it to be vulnerable, he resorts to the inherent means of force to rid of it. But when it is fully prepared to meet his military adventure, he wears sheep's skin and shoots off a smoke-screen of false peace propaganda to fool his enemy. Kim has repeatedly had recourse to one or the other for the past three decades, and will not give up these tricks as long as he is determined to bring the southern part of the Korean peninsula under Communist control by means of force.

After the fall of Indochina to the Communists, he has been employing more "peace" rhetoric than "liberation" (war) rhetoric. While visiting Peking, Kim was certainly so elated by the Communist successes in Khmer and in Vietnam as to shed his veil. He declared that, with the dawn of outbreak of revolution in the Republic of Korea, he would give his full support to the southern people. He went as far as to flague that if war came in Korea, he had only the border of division to lose and national unification to gain. The Indochina debacle indeed led him to believe that Korea would be the next site for success in a similar type of revolution or war.

In short, thus the Communist North is now madly attempting its political propaganda scheme, "a smoke-screen peace offensive," resembling before 25 June 1950, aimed at breaking loose the totally security posture in the Republic of Korea and misleading the world that southward aggression is an internal affair.

Unless the Communist militant regime in Pyongyang proves its intentions by real action and evidence, not a single sensible citizen in Korea and or anyone in the free world will believe in any peace gestures it may make toward the Republic of Korea and the rest of the world. At this very time when the North Korean Communists are desperately engaging in their diplomatic propaganda-maneuvers, their troops are continuing to dig in secret
infiltration tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone, despite strong and repeated protests by the Republic of Korea as well as the United Nations Command.

Communists Designs for Aggression

Greatly encouraged by the fall of Indochina into the Communist hands, the Communist regime in Pyongyang has intensified its aggressive designs, and is now keeping Kim Il-sung busy wrapping his dagger pointed at the Republic of Korea with his old trick "camouflaged peace maneuver." This Kim's disguised tactic is of course, nothing new; he had tried and will continue to do so to create or seize a chance for the use of his polished dagger.

Beginning with the June 1950 armed attack on the south, Kim, the Communist chieftain, has left none in his store untested in his efforts to subvert the Republic of Korea for eventual communization under his rule. He sent personally a specially trained commando force to Seoul on 21 February 1968 in an attempt to raid the Presidential Residence. On 15 August 1974 he infiltrated an assassin into Seoul via Japan, again attempting the life of President Park; his bullets missed the President and killed the First Lady.

On the other hand, as has been widely reported, the national traitor and the most brutal man, Kim Il-sung had ordered his Red forces to construct illegal underground tunnels into the south of the DMZ barely after he had agreed to the Seoul-proposed initiation of dialogue between the south and the north to ease tension and explore a possible path to peaceful unification of Korea.

Kim's subordinates at first said that the tunnel charge by the south has finally admitted to the existence of the tunnels. But his excuse, which he has been fabricated, and Kim has thought out a plan as the last resort, said: "The tunnels were built to provide patrols in the south with escape routes to the north..." He was apparently at the end of his wit after telling so many lies. It was one of the reasons why he called off a meeting of deputies of the south-north dialogue.

Further, on the international diplomatic front, the Communist North is begging for the nonaligned world's support for its armed invasion plan against the Republic of Korea which, in turn, calls for the withdrawal of the United Nations Command and the United States forces from Korea.

Thus, the puppet regime in the north has turned its back on every constructive and most reasonable proposal from Seoul intended to remove the danger of war in Korea and pave the way for eventual unification by peaceful means. The Communists rejected a proposed nonaggression agreement
between the south and the north, dual entry into the United Nations, and even the humanitarian Red Cross proposal for the reunion of displaced families in the two divided halves.

In brief, Kim Il-sung and his Communist clique in the north are only interesting in communizing the whole peninsula by menas of force.

**ROK Efforts Toward Peaceful Unification**

The Republic of Korea has always been pondering how to root firm peace on the peninsula, and it has set forth three principles for achieving peaceful unification: First, to ease tension and secure peace by concluding a south-north nonaggression agreement designed to prevent the recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula, second, to actively carry out the south-north dialogue and expand exchange programs in order to restore mutual trust, and third, to conduct general elections throughout the peninsula under fair management and supervision in proportion to the indigenous population in order to establish a unified government in peacefully unifying the divided country.

On the contrary, the NK Communists came up with the proposal only for the sake of their political propaganda. Because they intended to use the south-north dialogue as their propaganda stage from the beginning.

Actually, the dialogue was started by the initiative taken by the Republic of Korea, and the Communist clique could not find any good pretexts for refusal. Thus they were compelled to come to the dialogue table. On the other hand, in view of their moves up to date ever since the issuance of joint communique on 4 July 1972 for the opening of the “South-North Dialogue,” it is too apparent that the Communist clique responded to the communique in an effort to deceive the Republic of Korea and her peoples and not to achieve peaceful unification.

Giving some examples in clear evidence, it is too clear that the NK Communists, seen from the technical viewpoint, must have started to construct the underground tunnels beneath the DMZ at the time the joint communique was issued. In addition, they continuously dispatched espionage agents. On top of all, Mun Se-kwang, abortively made an attempt on the life of President Park Chung Hee on 15 August 1974, received the order for such a villainous offense against God and man from the NK puppet regime in September 1972, barely two months after the South-North Joint Communique was issued.

When the dialogue was to start the Communists must have believed that
it would be helpful in slackening the vigilance of the peoples in the Republic of Korea. However, things did not go as they had expected in the course of dialogue. While delegates visited Seoul and Pyongyang, the fatally weak spots of the closed society of the Communist North came to be exposed. As a result, the Communists unilaterally suspended the dialogue since 28 August 1973.

Reviewing the Korean situation, as a whole, at the present and in the near future, the possibility of Communist reinvasion southward still stands high. Moreover, the basic policy of the NK Communist clique for the communization of the whole peninsula remains unchanged. The Communists are directing all their efforts to expanding military power and are boasting that all preparations have already been completed. However, there would be no chance for the Communist clique if the Republic of Korea and the U.S. forces deployed in the south are strongly combined together.

Yet, the danger of a war would become greater should Kim Il-sung, the NK Communists' chieftain, underestimate the potential of the Republic of Korea and make an erroneous evaluation of the international situation.

Therefore, it is most important for the Republic of Korea not to have any weak points in herself in order not to allow the Communists to commit such errors or miscalculation.

In conclusion, the surest way for the Republic of Korea and its free world allies to minimize the chance of miscalculation by the Communist clique in the north under the circumstances will be to maintain tight vigilance and the strongest possible defense posture against all means of direct and indirect aggression from the Communist-held North.
CHAPTER II INITIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WAR
(25—30 July 1950)

Section 1. The Armed Aggression from the North
(25—30 June 1950)

The Red Invasion

Early in the morning of 25 June 1950, the North Korean Communist forces invaded the Republic of Korea, making the start of the Korean War. At 0400 hours, high-explosive artillery and mortar shells began to fall on the defense lines of the Free Republic all along the 38th Parallel in increasing numbers. For over an hour the North Korean Reds continued a tremendous barrage.

The Red odds in the north dared to dominate the whole peninsula by force of arms on the patently absurd pretext that the Republic of Korea Army had first attacked northern territory. At 1100 hours, "Communist Pyongyang" announced that the puppet regime in the Communist North declared war against the Republic of Korea. Thus, the free people in the Free South were forced to engage in an internecine feud by wicked designs and barbarism of Kim Il-sung, the bandit boss of the bloodsucker-Communist conspirators in the north.

That morning, all people in the south thought at first that perhaps, this sudden Communists attack might be only a slightly large version of the many other raids that had occurred since the 38th Parallel had been established as an artificial dividing line across the country.

In spite of a year of continuous psychological and political pressure, the all-out invasion came as a complete surprise. It was Sunday in Korea, very favored day for starting modern wars, and that morning was raining. In other words, the North Korean puppet regime planned and launched the armed aggression in an exceptional timing scheme. The summer monsoon season had just begun. More worse, about one third of the fledged ROK Army troops was away on leave and pass, and most of
the officers were spending the week end in Seoul and other cities of towns in the rear localities. Still more worse, no one in the south had ever expected that the Communist clique finally resorted to force of arms in order to commu-

nize the whole of "The Land of Morning Calm."

All the attacks fell unexpectedly on the ROK forces. The unprepared ROK troops south of the 38th Parallel did not realize the NK puppet forces had launched the attack in an all-out scale. Their defensive positions had been subjected to intermittent Communist artillery fire for months. For them it was in the nature of thinking since not only guerrilla infiltration of the ROK territory by the North Korean Red forces had been going on for years, but also border raids across the Parallel had been common for some time. The barrage of this morning was unusually intense, however.

The reports of enemy attacks flashed in from moment to moment to Seoul from all over the frontier one after another; one report from the Kaesong area indicated that the Communist attack was a decisive one, while another report from the Ongjin Peninsula signaled as a serious one. When more reports of the other attacks elsewhere along the Parallel came filtering in during the next few hours, the doubt faded. The number and size of the NK Red offensive quickly ruled out the possibility of mere raids.

The enemy's earliest attack was felt by the ROK defenders in the Ongjin area on the remote west, where the Red forces had been attempted so frequently to raid in for many times in the preceding years, while another blow fell in the Kaesong area northwest of Seoul. Other attacks in force developed at the same time to the west in the vicinity of Tongduchon, Pochon, Chunchon, and along the east coast, serving notice that the North Korean Communists were mounting not minor raids, but a general offensive.

Thus, the enemy invasion signaled a well-coordinated and very deliber-
ately planned attack from coast to coast across the width of the Korean peninsula, directing six major blows on the ROK defense at the outset of the aggression.

The NK Communist puppet forces, at the urging of their Red masters, with seven infantry divisions (6th, 1st, 4th, 3rd, 2nd, 7th, and 5th from their east to west), one armored division (105th), one border constabulary brigade (3rd), one motorcycle regiment (12th), and one separate special regiment (766th) in the line, drove down southward in a brutal invasion. There were three more infantry divisions (10th, 13th, and 15th) as well as two more constabulary brigades (1st and 7th) in reserve being ready for immediate
commitment into action at any time following close behind. A noteworthy was that all the thrusts came all at once taking the major roads leading southward.

**Aggressors -- The Puppet North**

The combat power of the enemy’s initial offensive was formidable one as it were to finish up the Red aggression -- communization of the whole peninsula -- at a single stroke. Equipped with heavy artillery and mortar, T-34 tanks and armored vehicles, and other armament, all Russian-made, the NK puppet army made a display of its mighty from the beginning in its strength, firepower, mobility and battle skills. Furthermore, the aggressors had then more than 200 soviet built warplanes including YAK-9F.

It was an army of veterans that broke the world’s peace in Korea. There were thousands of veterans of those fought together with the Chinese Communists in the Chinese civil war. There were even some who had served with the Soviet Red forces in such World War II operations as the defense of Stalingrad.

Practically, all the commissioned and noncommissioned officers were battle-hardened, and a majority of the rank and file had seen action. The origins of the NK Red army were deeply rooted in Asiatic soil. After Korea had fallen to the Japanese rule by force in 1910, especially during World War II, an endless stream of Koreans escaped from the Japanese bondage and found a refuge in Soviet and Chinese territories. Many of them were absorbed into the Soviet or Red Chinese armies. Originally, they were not all Communists. They dreamed of independent Korea and eventually indoctrinated by the Communists.

It must also be remembered that thousands of Korean veterans of the Chinese civil war returned with their arms and equipment, including American-manufactured weapons surrendered by the Chinese Nationalists. The NK puppet army was second only to the Soviet army itself in the spring of 1950 as the best armed and equipped military force of its size in the Far East.

The Soviet Union did not limit its aid to arms. A large group of Soviet military instructors arrived at Pyongyang in early January 1949 to train the puppet army commanders, staff and line officers for offensive warfare. Thus, the NK Communist clique completed their preparations for the aggression war in numbers, weapons, equipment, unit organization and training by the late spring of 1950. Belligerent Kim Il-sung, the ringleader of
the North Korean Communist clique, and his fellow-conspirators at the time anticipated an effort of only a few days, ending with the destruction of the ROK Army, and then grabbed the whole peninsula of Korea within a matter of weeks. This was not an unreasonable assumption for them to figure out due to immigration, since a swarm of the NK Communist spies had brought back accurate reports of unpreparedness in the Free South. The Red forces had already probed the defense capabilities of the ROK Army through the frequent border raids beyond count.

The question now in the free world was whether this Communist aggression could be confined to this Asiatic peninsula. This was the first time that a Soviet puppet regime had been permitted to go as far as an open war. Nevertheless, it could only be interpreted as a challenge waged by the Communists to the free world.

**Defenders -- The Free Republic**

The fledged and unprepared ROK forces were entirely caught by the Communists' surprise attack. The enemy forces rushed in from every quarter, exploiting the advantage of surprising onslaught to the maximum extent.

In the face of the attacking Red odds, far superior in every aspect, the extraordinarily outnumbered ROK Army units along the frontlines were soon thrown back in confusion by this vigorous surprise attack.

There was no question as to the overemphasis in the midst of observers who knew the composition of the ROK Army. The very name was misleading, for it might more accurately have been described as a large constabulary in process of being converted into an army.

The ROK Army strength, as of 25 June 1950, was nearly 95,000 men as a whole including all the support elements, administrative overhead personnel and trainees equipped merely with small arms and mortars, designed mainly for maintenance of internal security: Social law and order. Their training status was at a rudimentary stage.

They had, of course, neither heavy artillery pieces nor tanks. They had no training or any knowledge at all about defense tactics against tanks.

As for the ROK Navy, it was nothing more than the name itself, equipping simply with small patrol-type boats purely designed for the coastal guard purposes. The ROK Air Force, likewise, had its name only too. It was really a token force at the time, with just 24 liaison planes (L-4 and L-5) and trainers (T-6) in possession in total, all outdated.

The ROK Army had then seven infantry divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th,
6th, 7th and 8th Divisions) and one garrison command (the Capital Security Command) in numbers but all were far understrength consisted mostly with two regiments. Further, each regiment had two battalions except a fews. Actually the Capital Security Command was not a tactical organization and served chiefly as a parade unit, with its dismounted cavalry regiment acting as an honor guard outfit until the outbreak of the war. The security command would be redesignated as the Capital Division on 5 July 1950, reorganizing into an infantry combat status.

Moreover, of the four divisions and one regiment assigned to the their accustomed defensive positions south of the 38th Parallel, only four regiments and one battalion of the separate regiment were at the front merely on the paper. They were, from west to east, the 17th Infantry Regiment on the Ongjin Peninsula, the 1st Division in the Kaesong-Munsan area, the 7th Division in the Tongduchon area, the 6th Division on the Chunchon sector, and the 8th Division in the Kangnung and Samchok area on the east coast.

Even more worse, there were only five infantry regiments across the front lines with the actual manning of only four battalions in strength, resulted from long week-end leaves and passes granted for all ranks. The remaining divisions were dispersed well to the rear, engaging in internal security and the Red guerrilla mop-up operations as well: The Capital Security Command at Seoul and its vicinity, the 2nd at Taejon, the 3rd at Taegu, and the 5th at Kwangju.

The Initial Battles

Taken by surprise, the thinly manned ROK frontier forces were no match for the overwhelming NK Red columns. They had to move backward despite brave fights here and there against the Red aggressors. The enemy continued to roll down spearheaded by T-34 tanks.

Notwithstanding, the brave ROK troops made gallant efforts to knock the enemy tanks out in such a way that they desperately dashed into the tank columns through dead angles. Then they climbed on the top and tried to drop grenades inside the hatches.

Some others approached the tanks with pole charges. The warriors resorted to all sorts of expedients best they could under the seriously adverse circumstances. No one had forced them to do so, but all they did so voluntarily at their own will and determination. Thus, such suicidalsquards had knocked out a number of the enemy tanks. But the ill-equipped ROK troops, without antitank weapons, had been thrown back. On some
occasions the sight of an enemy tank or armored car was enough to scatter the ROK riflemen, and the progress of the invading columns, supported by heavier artillery fire, resembled an occupation rather than an attack.

There were, of course, no foreign troops at all in the Republic of Korea except some American advisors purely with the functions of nonecombat roles. Particularly, it was so regret that none of aid under the military assistance program for the fiscal year 1950 had reached Korea to date -- at the time when the ROK Army needed so badly.

At midmorning, in the mean time, the NK air-planes attacked Kimpo Airfield. A short while later, two enemy Russian-built YAK fighter planes appeared over Seoul and strafed its main street. In the afternoon, enemy planes again appeared over Kimpo and Seoul.

The blows of the enemy’s initial offensives came from six areas simultaneously in a complete surprise out of the blue. The II NK Corps started its attacks on the Ongjin, Kaesong, Tongduchon, and Pochon areas, while the I NK Corps began it major onslaughts from the directions of Hwachon, Inje, and Yangyang.

On the remote west, commencing a heavy artillery and mortar fire at about 0400 hours, the 3rd NK Border Constabulary Brigade plus the 14th Regiment of the 6th NK Division struck against the positions held by the 1st Battalion of the 17th ROK Regiment on the Ongjin Peninsula. The ROK defenders there, of course, knew nothing about the enemy attack was a signal for an all-out offensive, because they had seen the Red attempts to raid in so frequently for years. And, this time they tried to counterattack as they did before against the border raids but failed after the close fighting.

Since the peninsula was cut off by water from the rest of the ROK controlled-territory, the elements of the 17th ROK Regiment prepared before the day ended to evacuate from there to Inchon. The evacuation was completed by three LST's on the following day, 26 June except those completely lost in the early fighting.

Meanwhile in the area of Kaesong, which lay some three kilometers south of the 38th Parallel on the main Seoul — Pyongyang highway and railroad, the 13th and 15th Regiments of the 6th NK Division, with the support of the 203rd Tank Regiment of the 105th NK Armored Division, delivered the heavy attack against the two battalions of the 12th Infantry Regiment, the 1st ROK Division (Colonel Paik Sun Yup in command) just north of the city. The other battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment was at Yonan, 32 kilometers westward. The 13th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division then held Korangpo on the far east from Kaesong, situating above the Imjin River, and the 11th Regi-
ment, in reserve, and the division headquarters were at Susaek nearly five kilometers north of Seoul.

One strong enemy force flanked through behind the ROK troops north of Kaesong just before daybreak while heavy artillery barrage and other Red infantry units attacked frontally from Songaksan (Hill 475), which dominated Kaesong. After a heavy battle Kaesong was fallen in the enemy hands by 0930 hours.

In the meantime, the 11th ROK Regiment moved rapidly from Susaek to Munsan — Korangpo on order and took positions on the left of the 13th Regiment in an effort to protect the approaches to the Imjin bridge. There they engaged in bitter fighting in which the 13th Regiment particularly distinguished itself.

There followed another attack launched by the 1st NK Division under the support of the 203rd Tank Regiment of the 105th NK Armored Division in the Munsan — Korangpo area along the Imjin River. At first the brave troops of the 13th ROK Regiment, facing the formidable T-34 tanks, volunteered themselves to engage in self-sacrificing tactics by striving to be the foremost.
They fought against the tanks, hurling themselves and the high explosive devices under the tanks. Thus, the 1st ROK Division held its positions at Korangpo for nearly three days until it withdraw toward the Han River when the area was outflanked and threatened with being cut off by the enemy divisions in the Uijongbu corridor north of Seoul.

In the north of Seoul, meanwhile, spearheaded by about 40 T-34 tanks of the 107th Tank Regiment, the 105th NK Armored Division and with tremendous artillery and mortar fire in support, the 4th NK Division drove straight south toward Tongduchon from the 38th Parallel near Yonchon about 0530 hours on 25 June, heading for the Uijongbu – Seoul corridor. At the same time the 3rd NK Division struck down the Kumhwa—Pochon—Uijongbu road with another 40 tanks of the 109th Tank Regiment, the 105th NK Armored Division in the lead. These two attacking columns were apparently acting as the enemy’s main effort in a joint operation by blitzkrieg tactics aiming at capturing Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea, timed to coincide with the general offensives elsewhere.

At this crucial moment, the ill-manned and ill-equipped 7th ROK Infantry Division (commanded by Brigadier General Yu Jae Hung) was defending that area. The 1st Infantry Regiment of the division, disposed along the 38th Parallel, received the initial attacks of the 3rd and 4th NK Divisions under cover of the tank columns. With its two subordinate infantry regiments scattered all over the assigned area -- the 1st Regiment in the Tongduchon area and the 9th Regiment at Pochon with no reserve regiment -- the division was too outnumbered to fight back the suppressed onslaught. The 3rd Regiment which was located in Sobinggo, Seoul was transferred to the Capital Security Command effective 1200 hours, 20 June just six days before the Red invasion. Notwithstanding, the division fought well against such Red odds at the first place taking rather heavy casualties but was forced on southward.

At 0830 hours the division sent a radio message to the Army Headquarters that it must have immediate reinforcements to meet the urgent situation. The enemy attacks waited no one and the strong armored columns continued to push down on the two roads: One column through Tongduchon — Uijongbu road while the other one coming through the Pochon — Uijongbu road. People in Uijongbu about 32 kilometers north of Seoul, could hear the artillery fire of the two converging columns before the day ended.

In the Chunchon sector, further to the east, meanwhile, the NK Reds launched a double barreled attack toward Chunchon, the best communication center leading south in the mid-east front where the 6th ROK Division (commanded
by Colonel Kim Jong Oh) was defending, with its 7th regiment north of Chunchon, the 2nd Regiment near Hoengsong and the 19th Regiment in reserve at Wonju together with the division headquarters. The 2nd NK Division rushed in from Hwachon while the 7th NK Division drove down from Inje.

In the early morning on Sunday, the 6th and 4th Regiments of the 2nd NK Division attacked Chunchon defended by the 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division. The ROK regiment fought back so well from the outset despite minor power in strength, and then the enemy thrown his 17th Regiment in the attack from reserve before the day ended. Late in the first day the 19th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division arrived on the scene from Wonju, 64 kilometers south of Chunchon, where it was in reserve. Meeting with the stubborn and continued resistance exhibited by the ROK division, the II NK Corps finally changed its attack plans. The enemy shifted the 7th NK Division, which had started from Inje, 48 kilometers farther east, for Hongchon, to Chunchon the next day.

The subordinate units of the 6th ROK Dividion, however, continued their Herculean efforts to repel the overwhelming Red odds even after the 7th NK Division joined in the enemy attacks for Chunchon until 27 June, the third day, when they were ordered to move back from there to a new defense area on the 28th.

In this Chunchon battle the enemy casualties were tremendous: The 2nd NK Division lost most of its combat effectiveness, and the 7th NK Division likewise suffered considerable casualties. It is noteworthy that the ROK troops could resist the Red attacks for a considerable period of time during which no enemy tanks were appeared there.

On the morning of 28 June, the enemy forces entered Chunchon led by the tanks. And, the 7th NK Division moved down toward Hongchon, while the remnants of the 2nd NK Division turned west toward Seoul.

On the eastmost coast, following artillery and mortar preparation fire for half an hour, the 5th NK Division began to breakthrough the 38th Parallel north of Kangnung defended by the 10th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division at 0430 hours on the 25th. At the time the 8th ROK Division (commanded by Colonel Lee Jung Il, who changed his name from Jung Il to Sung Ga later), had only two regiments: The 10th Regiment on the south side of the Parallel; the 21st Regiment at Samchok, about 40 kilometers south of Kangnung. However, only the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment was at Pukpyong north of Samchok, and the other two battalions were engaged in antiguerrilla action in the rugged mountain areas including
the Taebaek Range. When the 5th NK Division and a group of the 766th NK Independent Special Unit crossed the Parallel, remaining two battalions of the 766th NK Special Unit together with some of the 549 Marine Ranger Unit had landed immediate behind Kangnung by sea-born assault, while another Red special troops, approximately 400 men above and 600 men below Samchok far behind Kangnung, had attempted to land by boats and junks. In consequence of the initial enemy drive in this coastal area, the 8th ROK Division units had to withdraw southwestward down to Pyongchang by way of Taekwan-lyong and Chinbu-ri beginning on 27 June. (See Sketch Map I.)

The Battle at Uijongbu

On the morning of 25 June, the ROK Army Headquarters ordered the divisions in the rear areas to move toward the battle front in an effort to reinforce the embattled units. The 2nd ROK Division at Taejon was the first one. The division headquarters and the 5th Regiment left Taejon by train for Seoul at 1430 hours, 25 June. By the evening the subordinate units of the 5th ROK Division were also on their way northward from Kwangju in far southwest of
Korea. The 22nd Regiment plus the Engineer Battalion of the 3rd ROK Division in Taegu also began to move that late afternoon.

During the first day of enemy invasion, Major General Chae Byung Duk, the ROK Army Chief of Staff, had made two trips from Seoul to the Uijongbu area where the 7th ROK Division was in action. He committed the 3rd Regiment of the Capital Security Command to the Songu-ri area northeast of Uijongbu in an effort to reinforce the 9th Regiment of the 7th ROK Division as Pochon had fallen into the enemy hands. But the 3rd Regiment was also collapsed and, the lst Regiment finally abandoned Tongduchon that evening before the enemy tank columns.

Major General Chae, then, developed a plan to counterattack in the Tongduchon—Uijongbu corridor the next morning with the lst Regiment of the 7th ROK Division attacking on the left along the road toward Tongduchon from Tokchong-ni, and with two battalions of the 5th Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division on the right on the Pochon road from Chukso-lyong northeast of Uijongbu. In addition, the 18th Regiment of the Capital ROK Security Command was to cover the left flank of the lst Regiment.

Brigadier General Lee Hyung Koon, the 2nd ROK Division Commander, however, disagreed with the plan because his division in Taejon, 144 kilometers below Seoul, would begin to arrive in the Uijongbu area during the night and, it would be impracticable to assemble and transport the main body (the 16th and 25th Regiments) of the division by the next morning. He wanted to defer the counterattack until he could get all, or the major part, of his division, instead of attacking piecemeal with small elements (two battalions of the 5th Regiment). Captain James W. Hausman, KMAG Advisor with the Army Chief of Staff also agreed with his view.

Notwithstanding, Major General Chae overruled these objections and ordered to carry out unconditionally the attack plan in the morning of 26 June.

General Chae had confidence in his mind that he could drive the enemy back to the 38th Parallel by taking a strong counter action in this area the following morning, putting the main body of the 2nd ROK Division together with the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division in the attack, if the present units on the frontlines able to contain the advance of the 3rd and 4th NK Divisions pending the arrival of these scheduled reinforcement units. His concept of operation at this crucial moment was absolutely disregarded that the enemy had the overwhelming artillery firepower and the tank units. He was estimating the situation by rule of thumb, taking a leap in the dark. The largest artillery pieces the ROK forces had then were 105-mm. howitzers and they
had neither tanks nor any effective antitank weapons.

During the first day, the 1st Regiment of the 7th ROK Division near Tongduchon on the left sector had fought well against the sharply superior Red forces in numbers, artillery, and armor, inflicting rather heavy casualties on the 16th Regiment of the 4th NK Division. But the enemy had advanced through Tongduchon by the evening. On the right sector, the 9th Regiment of the 7th ROK Division which had stopped the 3rd NK Division at Pochon withdrew from there about midnight.

In the meanwhile, some of the long-awaited reinforcements had arrived at length during the night at Uijongbu: The 2nd Battalion at 2000 hours and the 1st Battalion early in the next morning, both belonging to the 5th Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division.

At dawn 26 June, the 7th ROK Division launched its part of the counterattack against the 4th NK Division north of Uijongbu and, it seemed making progress at first. On the right sector, however, the 2nd ROK Division failed to launch its part of the scheduled counterattack and, the 3rd NK Division, which had withdrawn from the Pochon area during the night, resumed its attack and continued to rolling down toward Uijongbu with the tank columns in the lead, after retaking Pochon unopposed. At 0800 hours, the two battalions of the 2nd ROK Division occupied defensive positions about three kilometers northeast of Uijongbu, and opened artillery and small arms fire on the approaching tank-led enemy forces. This tank column soon entered Uijongbu.

This failure of the 2nd ROK Division caused the 7th ROK Division on the lefthand to abandon its own attack and to fall back below the town. At the time the 2nd ROK Division Commander had still waited for the arrival of the main body of his division from the rear. At any rate, the really fatal error had been Major General Chae's plan of operation assigning the Pochon sector to the 2nd Division when it was so apparent that the division main force could not arrive to take part in the counterattack by the morning of 26 June.

The Fall of Seoul

The seriousness of the battle situation on the north of Seoul became further hot as evening fell on the second day, 26 June. The 1st ROK Division at Korangpo in the Imjin River defense line was flanked by the 1st NK Division immediately to the east and the 4th and 3rd NK Divisions at Uijongbu. The 7th ROK Division and the units of the 2nd and 5th Divisions plus the Capital
Security Command were engaging resistance and delaying actions without coordinated efforts in the vicinity of Uijongbu, the northern gateway of Seoul.

On the morning of the third day, the 27th, the ROK Army Headquarters left Seoul, going to Sihung, about eight kilometers south of Yongdungpo. The ROK Army units held the NK Reds at the edge of Seoul throughout the night of 27–28 June, but the defenses of Seoul had collapsed before midnight of 27 June. The 9th Regiment of the 3rd NK Division with the tank columns in support was the first enemy unit to reach the city. During the morning of the 28th, the enemy attack forced the Seoul defenders to withdraw, whereupon street fighting took place between small ROK units and large Red attackers. But soon the 16th Regiment of the 4th NK Division entered the city about midafternoon, 1130 hours, 28 June. The two NK divisions, the 3rd and 4th, with the support of tank elements, completely took Seoul during the afternoon. Thus, Seoul, the heart of the Republic of Korea fell on the fourth day of the Red invasion.

One of the most decisive factors, among many others, prompting to the sudden defeat of the ROK Army at the outset of the enemy invasion was, perhaps, the shock action of the enemy tanks. The ROK Army had no tanks at all and, its soldier not only lacked experience with tanks, he also lacked weapons that were effective against the T-34 tanks except his own hand-made demolish charge used in close attack. The ROK soldiers utilized all sorts of field experiments best they could on the battle scene to fight against the Red tanks they had ever seen before. On the many occasions, the ROK soldiers sacrificed themselves in knocking the enemy tanks out, in such a way that they threw their bodies under the tanks carrying with explosives.

Meanwhile, there happened an unexpected tragedy over the Han River during the night of 27–28 June. The spans of the Han highway bridge were dropped into the water by the gigantic explosions between 0228–0230 hours, 28 June with a prior-warning neither to the military personnel nor to the civilians crowing the bridges. Major General Chae Byung Duk, the ROK Army Chief of Staff, had given the reckless order to blow up the bridges entirely disregarding the tactical situation. That night there were some of the ROK Army units still holding the enemy advance at the outskirts of Seoul.

Had the Han River bridges (the highway and three railroad bridges) not been blown until the enemy actually approached them there would have been from at least six to eight hours longer in which to evacuate the three ROK divisions and at least a part of their heavy weapons, vehicles, and equipment to the south side of the Han.

The main force of the ROK army (this is no exaggeration to say), still north
of the river, lost nearly all its motor vehicles, most of its supplies, and majority of its heavy weapons. Most of the troops that arrived south of the Han River waded the river or crossed in small boats and rafts in disorganized groups.

This tragic incident, the premature blowing of the Han bridges was a unforgettable military catastrophe for the ROK Army in its history.

Section 2. The United States and the U.N. Reaction

The cold-blood attack upon the Republic of Korea, on 25 June 1950, in spite of the presence of a United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), alarmed the world public. Flashed press news immediately spread all over the world that the Communists had broken the peace in Korea. In fact, the news came like a thunderclap on the free world.

That morning the Republic of Korea Government hastily informed the Red invasion to the United States Government and also to the Secretary of the United Nations in New York, asking for appropriate actions to halt the Red aggression and necessary aids to repel the invasion as well.

In Washington, D.C., the United States of America, half a world away and half a day behind in time, it was the midday of a summer Saturday when the North Korean Red forces started the aggression war, 4:00 a.m., Sunday, 25 June 1950 in Korea was 2:00 p.m., Saturday, 24 June, in Washington time.

The first official word of the NK Red attack across the 38th Parallel into the free Republic was dispatched from Seoul at 0925 hours, 25 June, by the military attache at the American Embassy there to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the U.S. Army in Washington. Soon afterward, Ambassador John J. Muccio sent his first official radio message from Seoul to the Department of State, which received it at 9:26 p.m., 24 June, Washington time, corresponding to 10:26 a.m., 25 June, in Korea. The Ambassador had emphasized this NK Communist attack was not one of the large-scale NK raids into the south which had become an old story during the past two years. He concluded in his report that the Communist armed aggression appeared apparently constitute "an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea." For the Americans the news was a totally unexpected one, resembling that of Pearl Habor, Saturday, 7 December 1941, corresponding to the early Sunday morning of 8 December 1941 in the Far East.
Initial Developments of the War

The State Department promptly relayed this report to the Defense Department, to President Harry S. Truman at Independence, Missouri, and to the United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie at his residence in Forest Hills, Long Island. The news fell upon the free world lighting out of a clear sky. This Red armed invasion was the most flagrant Communist aggression to date that the United Nations had ever been faced.

Two hours after midnight Secretary of State Acheson again telephoned President Truman, when the decision to seek action of the Security Council of the United Nations was made, and at 3:00 a.m., 25 June (Washington time) the request was formally presented to Secretary General Lie.

The report from Korea sounded like a major violation of the U.N. Charter's ban on military aggression to Secretary General Lie, and he informed the U.S. State Department that he was prepared to bring the Security Council together to consider the matter. Before making a formal recommendation to the Security Council, however, the Secretary General preferred to obtain a further report from the U.N. Commission in Korea. The next morning, 25 June (New York time) he received a dispatch from Dr. Liu Yu-wan, Chairman of the UNCOK, which confirmed the Communists' aggression. Dr. Liu mentioned in this report that the four Soviet YAK-type planes had raided Kimpo Airfield and, the railway station in Yongdungpo had also been strafed, suggesting that the matter be brought before the Security Council.

The Decision to Participate

An emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council was hastily summoned by the Secretary General Lie. The implications were disturbing. Every middle-aged free people could recall the failure of the League of Nations to halt militarism-Japanese, fascist Italian, and Nazi German aggressions of 1930's with moral suasion. Even when economic sanctions were invoked, the aggressors went their way defiantly without respect for anything short of armed force. And now history seemed to be repeating itself with dismaying widely as new aggressors challenged the United Nations, the new union of striving to maintain the world peace after World War II.

The reaction of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. At two o'clock in the afternoon on 25 June (New York time), a meeting of the Security Council was called to order at Lake Success.

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea from the Communist North and determining that the Red aggression constituted a breach of the international peace and security, the Security Council
adopted a draft resolution submitted by the United States by a vote of nine to zero, with Russia absent and Yugoslavia abstaining. This historic resolution called for (1) immediate cessation of hostilities; (2) the NK Communist puppet clique to withdraw forth with its armed forces to the north of the 38th Parallel; and (3) all U.N. Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of the resolution.

While these measures were in progress at Lake Success the United States Government was in emergency action. Throughout the morning, 25 June (Washington time), the Secretary of the State (Dean Acheson), the Secretary of the Army (Frank Pace), and the military chiefs were in conference at the Pentagon. At the time the Secretary of Defense (Louis A. Johnson) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Omar N. Bradley) were on their way back to the home country from the Far East tour.

In the early afternoon, President Truman flew back to Washington and, held a meeting in Blair House across the White House that night, with the top officials of the State and Defense Departments present, namely, the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy (Francis Matherws), Secretary of the Air Force (Thomas Finletter), the Chairman of the JCS (General Bradley) and the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Services (General Lawton J. Collins, Army; Admiral Forest P. Sherman, Navy; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force). During this meeting which lasted until 11:00 p.m., the first decisions leading to American commitment in the Korean War were taken.

The situation which confronted the United States that Sunday evening, 25 June (Washington time) was sufficiently obscure. The cold war had become hot, but prospects for the rest of the cold war’s battle was unpredictable. At Blair House the discussions ranged from Korea to Taiwan (Formosa) to the implications of the invasion for Japan and the Philippines, and to the strength of the Russian forces in the Far East. Over and above these questions, there weighed on all the memories of the 1930’s and thereby analized the series of crisis in Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, and Munich which marked the world’s descent into the Second World War. This time, accordingly, the United States, as a leading nation in the world politics who sponsored the birth of the United Nations in 1945 and also have given the Republic of Korea full support for her foundation in 1948, made a firm determination to protect Free Korea from the Communists’ aggression. Thus, the North Korean Communist invasion had produced a reawakening of the United States interest in Korea and a complete reversal of policy.
Initial Developments of the War

Right after the aforementioned top military and diplomatic meeting, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (consisted of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman; General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff) established a teletype conference with General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo at once and relayed to him President Truman’s decisions. Since then the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington and the U.S. Far East Command had engaged in a number of teletype conferences to work out a U.S. course of action. The JCS authorized General MacArthur to do that: (1) Evacuate American civilians and dependents from Korea by sea and air; (2) provide ships and planes to evacuate American civilians and dependents from Korea and to protect the evacuation by air and naval cover, particularly to prevent loss of the Inchon harbor and Kimpo Airfield; (3) send ammunition and equipment to the ROK forces to prevent loss of the Seoul—Kimpo area; and (4) dispatch a survey team to Korea to study the situation and determine how best to assist the Republic of Korea.

President Truman also ordered the US Seventh Fleet (Vice Admiral A.D.
Struble) to start from the Philippines and Okinawa for Sasebo, Japan, and report to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE), for operational control.

Monday, the 26th (Washington time), was another day of action. In the morning President Truman announced the decision to expedite aid to the Republic of Korea under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program by all available means, but no mention was made of the movements of American armed forces.

The President issued his first formal statement on the Korean crisis at 11:45 a.m., 26 June (Washington time) that the nations supporting the U.N. Charter could not tolerate a "willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace." Russia was not mentioned by name in the brief statement but the U.S. officials made it clear that they held the Soviet Union responsible as the motivating power behind the NK puppet clique.

In the evening of the same day President Truman received a report from General MacArthur that the ROK forces could not hold Seoul, that the ROK forces were in danger of collapse, and that evacuation of American nationals was under way.

Soon a second conference of the leading military and civilian advisors took place also at Blair House. As the meeting began, U.S. ships and airplanes were evacuating Americans from Korea and the Seventh Fleet Striking Force was steaming north from its bases in the Philippines. At this second Blair House meeting, Secretary Acheson recommended that air and naval support be given the Republic of Korea under sanction of the U.N. Security Council resolution of the day before, and that Taiwan be neutralized. But, because of the continuing overestimate of the ROK Army or underestimate of the NK Communist forces, in addition to the confidence that neither Soviets nor Red Chinese would take part in aggression, little thoughts seemed to have been given the question of whether to commit ground forces.

The recommendations were accepted by President Truman, and further instructions were sent at once to General MacArthur authorizing him to use air and naval forces in support of the Republic of Korea against the invading forces south of the 38th Parallel, and ordering him to neutralize Taiwan by the use of the US Seventh Fleet. On 27 June, Far Eastern time, therefore, General MacArthur had authorization to participate in Korea with air and naval forces against the Communist aggression.

Following an earlier meeting with the Congressional leaders at the White House, President Truman made public his historic decisions on Korea at noon on Tuesday, 27 June (Washington time) that pursuant to the action of the
U.N. Security Council he had ordered U.S. naval and air support of the
Republic of Korea, and that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent an
attack on Taiwan from the Chinese mainland or invasion of the mainland by
the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

Thus, the Government of the United States took another step forward in
the reversal of the past United States policy, because this new decision ran
counter to all that had gone before. Korea had previously been placed out-
side the American defense perimeter in the Far East.

The reason, aside from America's earlier moral commitment to Korea, was
that the NK Communist attack was a challenge to the whole system of collec-
tive security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in the world. In
Secretary Acheson's words, "this was a test which would decide whether
other nations would be intimidated by this show of force. The decision
to meet force with force in Korea was essential."

On the other hand, there was a vague hope that the NK Communist forces
would, perhaps, heed the first resolution of the U.N. Security Council and
withdraw back to the 38th Parallel. However, it soon became clear that the
Red aggressors had no such intention. Rather the NK Red odds plunged
deeper into the south.

Now, the U.N. Security Council did not intend to rely merely upon moral
suasion or economic sanctions.

Finally, in the evening hours of 27 June (New York Time), the U.N.
Security Council waited no longer, but adopted a second momentous
resolution, by a vote of seven in favor and one (Yugoslavia) opposed, which
recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such as-
sistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed
attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." Once
again the Soviet delegate did not attend the meeting of the Security Council.
Thus, the Security Council of the largest world organization had put the
United Nations into the war against the Communists, the common foe of
the free world. For the first time in the war-racked 20th century, a large
group of nations banded together for peace had not only condemned an
aggression but appeared to armed forces to smite the aggressors. The
answers to the U.N. calls for help began to come in from all corners of the
free world as the days progressed.

On this same historic day, the United States announced that she was
giving immediate military aid to the Republic of Korea. President Truman
ordered American naval and air forces into action. 52 other nations of the
Their pledges of assistance included combat troops, air and naval forces, medical supplies, field ambulances, foodstuffs and strategic materials. Only three of the 56 nations responding to the U.N. Security Council were opposed to the majority decision. They were the Soviet Union and her two satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had been brought into the Communist orbit by force after World War II.

Evacuation of Americans

At the time of the enemy invasion, there were no foreign troops in the Republic of Korea, except the U.S. Military Advisory Group in approximately 500-man strong, which was more known as “K MAG.” On this fateful Sunday, 25 June 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Carl H. Sturies was in temporary command of this peculiar noncombat group, because the Acting Chief, K MAG Colonel W.H.S. Wright who had assumed the post ten days ago was in Japan, seeing his family off for the homeland. Colonel Wright was the Chief of Staff, K MAG and took over the acting post temporarily upon the departure of Brigadier General William I. Roberts from Korea, pending the arrival of the new chief. He was also ordered to attend the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, but returned to Korea early Monday morning on order.

The K MAG personnel remained with their ROK counterparts all day Sunday, while the NK Red forces were rolling down southward. During the morning the NK fighter planes strafed Seoul and Kimpo Airfield. President Syngman Rhee met with Ambassador Muccio during the day and expressed great concern about the need for more arms and ammunition for the ROK forces. Both the Ambassador and K MAG staff sent urgent messages to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, U.S. Far East Command in Tokyo, informing the worse situation in Korea and also requesting for an emergency supply of ammunition in support of the ROK forces.

Of particular concern to Ambassador Muccio, at this juncture, was a course of action what he should take about the safety of American personnel in Korea. He had no specific instructions from Washington what he should follow and what K MAG’s mission would be in the event of war. The K MAG was then under the direct control of the Department of State through Ambassador Muccio as far as the chain of command was concerned.

In the absence of precise guidance from the home government, the Ambassador made preparations for evacuating American women and children to
Japan. Arrangements were completed by midafternoon. At 2200 hours, he authorized the evacuation plan in effect, and an hour later he further ordered all American dependent women and children and others who wish to leave to assemble at Camp Soblingo, the American housing compound in Seoul, from where they would be transported to Inchon.

The exodus of American families from Seoul to Pupyong (better known to Americans as ASCOM City), and then to the Inchon port, proceeded in order, beginning at 0100 hours on Monday 26 June. The last families cleared the Han River bridge about 0900 hours and by 1800 hours 682 women and children were aboard the Norwegian fertilizer ship, the Reinholt under the protection of covering US Air Force planes from bases in Japan. Meanwhile, at Pusan, the southern edge of the peninsula another group of American dependents from Taegon, Taegu, and Pusan had also boarded an American ship, the Pioneer Dale. American fighter planes from Japan flew twenty-seven escort and surveillances sorties during the day covering the evacuation.

As the situation grew seriously worse north of Seoul, on 26 June, Korean time; the U.S. Department of the Army instructed General MacArthur, who was responsible now for KMAG evacuation, to select the course of action that offered the best chance of success. Colonel Wright decided to move KMAG personnel southward, with the idea that they could be evacuated by air or sea some point between Seoul and Pusan if necessary. Late on the 26th Ambassador Muccio ordered nonessential members of the American Mission in Korea (AMIK) to leave and requested military aircraft from the Far East Command for their evacuation. Several hours later Colonel Wright decided to send to Japan all nonessential KMAG personnel.

Far East Air Forces planes began arriving at the Kimpo and Suwon Airfields early on 27 June and the evacuation of AMIK personnel, missionaries, other foreign nationals, and the KMAG members continued during the day at an increase pace. During the morning three NK Communists' planes fired on four American fighters covering the air evacuation and, in the ensuing engagement, the U.S. fighters planes shot down four more YAK-3 planes in the Inchon — Seoul area. During 27 June, F-80 and F-82 planes of the 68th and 339th All-Weather Fighter Squadrons and the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the Fifth US Air Force flew 163 sorties over Korea.

During the period from 26 to 29 June, a total of 2,001 persons were evacuated from Korea to Japan. Of this number, 1,527 were U.S. nationals — 718 by air and 809 by sea.
Evacuation of KMAG Personnel

When the ROK defense lines on the front were continuing to collapse, Colonel W.H.S. Wright, Acting Chief KMAG, returned to Seoul from Japan at 0400 hours, 26 June and, he made decision with Ambassador Muccio's approval, to evacuate all KMAG personnel from Korea except some selected members to be remained with him for a timebeing. Most of KMAG personnel departed Suwon by air on the 27th.

Meanwhile, 22 officers and 34 enlistedmen of KMAG personnel from scattered localities in southern Korea such as Taejon, Taegu, and Pusan gathered at Pusan, putting themselves under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rollins S. Emmerich, KMAG Senior Advisor to the 3rd ROK Infantry Division. Their dependents had already evacuated to Japan by an American ship, the Pioneer Dale, on the 27th and another AMIK personnel were also boarded another American vessel, the Letitia Lykes, on the 28th and sailed for Japan.

While the NK Red forces pushed forward on all fronts, with their heaviest pressure onto Seoul in particular, Ambassador Muccio was ordered to leave Seoul by the U.S. State Department shortly after midnight of 26 June, and accordingly, the Ambassador and his staff left Seoul for Suwon shortly after 0900 hours on 27 June, after notifying General MacArthur's headquarters that the Embassy radio station was about to be destroyed. Later in the day, Colonel Wright together with his selected members of KMAG also followed the ROK Army Headquarters to Sihung, half way between Seoul and Suwon. Colonel Wright had with him the KMAG command radio (SCR-399) mounted on a two and a half-ton truck in the column. Soon after the KMAG convoy crossed the Han River en route to Sihung, Colonel Wright received a radio message from General MacArthur in Tokyo stating that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed him to assume command of all U.S. military personnel and activities in Korea, including KMAG, and that he was sending an advance command and liaison group from his headquarters to Korea. While at Sihung, Colonel Wright received another message from General MacArthur, intercepted by the radio station at Suwon Airfield. The message said in effect: "Personal MacArthur to Wright: Repair to your former locations. Momentous decisions are in the offing. Be of good cheer." Encouraged by these dramatic messages, Colonel Wright persuaded Major General Chae to return the ROK Army Headquarters to Seoul that evening. Thus, the ROK Army and the U.S. Military Advisory Group again
established their headquarters north of the Han River by 1800 hours, 27 June. The former's headquarters, however, left the Capital City again around 0100 hours, 28 June heading for south.

GHQ ADCOM in Korea

On land, meanwhile, the NK Red columns advanced almost at will during the first four days. On 27 June the seat of the Republic of Korea Government was removed to Taejon while the U.S. Far East Air Forces planes were evacuating U.S. citizens. To add to the worse situation the bridges across the Han River were blown around 0230 hours on 28 June and, the fall of Seoul on the 28th ended the first stage of the enemy offensive as the Red invaders halted for reorganizing. Now, the ROK forces were proving weaker than anyone had expected and those of the North Korean Communist forces stronger; the threat of American Air and naval action was clearly ineffective.

At Washington, on the other hand, the third historical American governmental meeting on the Korean crisis was held at the White House. Since the show of force seemed to have accomplished nothing, the discussion turned to the question of whether to commit ground troops. As a result, the final decision was deferred pending the receipt of further information from General MacArthur, who had flown to Korea on 29 June for a first hand inspection of the battle front.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, General MacArthur, the Commander in Chief, the U.S. Far East Command, had no responsibility in Korea except to support KMAG and the American Embassy logistically to the Korean water line. This situation eventually changed when President Truman of the United States authorized him on 26 June, Korean time, to send a survey team to Korea.

General MacArthur formed at once a survey party headed by Brigadier General John H. Church. The party was to assist Ambassador Muccio and KMAG in determining logistical requirements in support of the ROK Army. On 27 June, the party left Haneda Airfield, Tokyo at 0400 hours and arrived at Itazuke Air Base in Kyushu two hours later. While there awaiting further orders Brigadier General Church received telephone instructions from General MacArthur's headquarters about 1425 hours changing his destination from Seoul to Suwon because of the imminent battle situation at the time. General MacArthur had by this time received the JCS directive by which he was ordered to take operational command of all U.S. military activities in Korea, as already mentioned earlier. Accordingly, he

redesignated the survey party as GHQ Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (GHQ ADCOM), assigning it an expanded mission to control KMAG.

The ADCOM group arrived at Suwon Airfield at 1900, 27 June, receiving by Ambassador Muccio. And, it set up temporary headquarters in the Experimental Agriculture Building in Suwon. The Chief of Staff of ROK Army (Major General Chae) and his staff appeared in Suwon early on 28 June and set up headquarters in the same building with the GHQ ADCOM headquarters. Major General Chae and his headquarters had left Seoul again shortly after midnight, around 0100 hours, 28 June, notifying to no one. He had just sought his own safety, thus ordering his Chief Engineer Colonel Choi Chang Sik to blow the Han River Bridges soon after he crossed the bridge, when the bulk of the ROK Army units was still operating on the northern bank of the river. With the major withdrawal route cut off, they and their equipment were marooned.

On the 28th, at 1600 hours, after studying the situation, Brigadier General
Church sent a radio message to General MacArthur, reporting the serious situation that the United States would have to commit ground troops to restore the 38th Parallel, the original boundary line. The American air support could not save Seoul from being taken by the Reds.

General MacArthur Inspects the Battlefront

Shortly before noon of the 28th, June, General of the U.S. Army Douglas MacArthur, having been directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume operational control of all U.S. military activities in Korea on 27 June, began preparations to make a personal reconnaissance trip to Korea. And, he took off from Haneda Air Base at 0610 hours, 29 June, boarding the Batuan, his personal C-54 plane when rain was falling. He was accompanied by seven senior officers including his Chief of Staff, Major General Edward Almond; Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, Commander of the Far East Air
Force; and Vice Admiral C.T. Joy, his naval commander. While still in the air he instructed Lieutenant General Stratemeyer to send an order to the Far East Air Force to bomb the North Korean airfields.

Escorted by four fighter planes, the *Bataan* was landed at Suwon at 1000 hours. That morning the enemy fighter planes had strafed the Suwon Airfield and set fire a C-54. General MacArthur was welcomed there by President Syngman Rhee, Ambassador Muccio, and Brigadier General Church. During the afternoon the enemy planes bombed the Suwon Airfield and a YAK fighter destroyed a recently arrived C-47 plane.

General MacArthur insisted on going up to the north as far as the Han River, opposite Seoul, to make sure of his own impression of the situation. He drove on to the Han River and for an hour surveyed the scene from a hill some one and a half kilometers behind the front line. On the trip to and from the Han River the General saw thousands of refugees, winding southward in an endless stream of humanity. All were on foot. While General MacArthur was in Korea President Truman had sent him a directive authorizing him to use American Army forces to hold a fort and a air base in the Pusan area, to attack military targets in North Korea with air and naval forces, but to keep clear of the Red Chinese and Russian borders, and to defend Taiwan with air and naval forces but at the same time to prevent the Nationalist Chinese from attacking the mainland. Before his return to Tokyo, General MacArthur told Brigadier General Church that in his opinion the situation required the immediate commitment of American ground forces and he intended to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that night for such action. General MacArthur flew back to Tokyo late in the afternoon.

Other than KMAG and ADCOM personnel, the first American troops to come to Korea arrived at the Suwon Airfield on 29 June, the day of General MacArthur's visit. The unit, known as Detachment X, consisted of thirty-three officers and men and four M55 machine guns of the 507th US Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion. At 1615 hours that afternoon they shot down one enemy plane and destroyed another when four enemy planes attacked the airfield, and again at 2055 hours that evening they engaged three enemy planes.

**The Decision to Deploy U.S. Ground Troops**

During the morning of 29 June, Washington time, U.S. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson received the reports from the Far East Command that
the situation in Korea was becoming seriously worse, and he telephoned
President Truman before noon. As a result, the President held a meeting
late that afternoon and approved a new directive to be issued to the Far
East Command.

This new directive, received by the Far East Commander on 30 June,
Tokyo time, authorized General MacArthur to: (1) Employ U.S. Army ser-
vice forces in the Republic of Korea to maintain communications and other
essential services; (2) employ Army combat and service troops to ensure the
retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan-Chonhwa; (3) em-
ploy naval and air forces against military targets in North Korea but to stay
well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union; (4) by naval and
air action defend Taiwan against invasion by the Chinese Communists and,
conversely, prevent Chinese Nationalists from using Taiwan as a base of
operations against the Chinese mainland; (5) send to Korea any supplies and
munitions at his disposal and submit estimates for amounts and types of aid
required outside his control. It also assigned the Seventh Fleet to General
MacArthur’s operational control, and indicated that naval commanders in the
Pacific would support and reinforce him as necessary and practicable. It is
to be noted that this directive of 29 June (Washington time) did not authorize
General MacArthur to use U.S. ground combat troops in the Han River area
but only at the southern tip of the Korean peninsula to assure the retention
of a port.

Several hours after this portentous directive had gone to the Far East
Command, the Pentagon received at approximately 0300 hours, 30 June
(Washington time), a report from General MacArthur on the Korean crisis,
following a perilous personal reconnaissance of the front lines in Korea the
previous day. The General reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the
ROK forces, organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of in-
terior order, were entirely unprepared for attack from the NK Communists,
by armor and air in particular, and that they were too demoralized to stop the
invaders, even with the U.S. air support, suffering the great loss of personnel
and equipment at the outset of the war. He concluded:

“The only assurance for holding the present line, and the ability to re-
gain later the lost ground is through the introduction of the U.S. ground
combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces
of air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.

If authorized it is my intention to immediately move a U.S. regimental
combat team to the reinforcements of the vital area discussed and to
provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops
in Japan for an early counteroffensive.

Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area, our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst, it might even be doomed to failure."

This two division strength in time would prove a notable underestimate of the required force, but the view by the U.S. Army contingents, was shared in Washington. In any event the highest authority on the spot, the man who would be responsible for conducting the war, had spoken. The decision could not be deferred.

In that morning, General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, notified Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., of General MacArthur's report and then established a teletype communication system with General MacArthur in Tokyo. After a teletype conversation with General MacArthur, General Collins immediately gave Secretary Pace through a telephone call a summary of the conversation. The Secretary in turn telephoned President Truman at Blair House at 0457 hours and relayed what General MacArthur had reported. The President promptly authorized without hesitation the use of one U.S. regimental combat team. He had already concluded that the Russians were not going to fight in Korea against the United Nations.

At midmorning President Truman met with his top diplomatic and military advisors and decided General MacArthur should be given full authority to use the ground forces under his command. The approved two orders stated: (1) To send two divisions to Korea from Japan; and (2) to establish a naval blockade of North Korea. Here was the full commitment, although its ultimate magnitude was as yet unforeseen. In subsequent meeting with the cabinet members, congressional and military leaders at the White House at 1100 hours, President Truman reviewed the darkening situation and informed them of the action he had taken.

That afternoon, American delegate Warren Austin made an address at the U.N. Security Council, informing it of what the United States had taken action in conformity with the Council's resolutions of 25 and 27 June (New York time) on the Korean crisis. On the same afternoon President Truman announced his momentous decision to the world in a formal press release. In another words, General MacArthur was authorized to bomb north of the 38th Parallel as governed by military necessity, a naval blockade of a Communist held-North Korea would be proclaimed, and "certain supporting ground units" would be committed to action in Korea. Thus, the United States of
America was now at war against the Communist aggressors not only to protect the Republic of Korea which the United Nations had brought into being two years ago but also for the cause of justice, freedom, democracy and peace of mankind.

One thing noteworthy at this point was that if General MacArthur was overly optimistic in his belief that two U.S. divisions could turn the tide in Korea, there is little doubt his advice was most influential in evoking the final orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 June (Washington time) to enter Korea with the U.S. Army in strength. Some officials in Washington at the time may have hoped the simple commitment of U.S. ground troops would intimidate the enemy into halting, even after his invasion-attack had been launched.

All Americans applauded by the wholehearted approval the resolute stand taken by the United Nations and they were proud of their country for its response, according to contemporary newspapers. However, they did not anticipate that anything more serious than a brief “police action” would be necessary to settle the Korean situation at the time.

Meanwhile, on 29 June, New York time, the Secretary General of the United Nations had sent a communication to all U.N. member nations asking what type of assistance they would give the Republic of Korea in response to the Security Council resolution of 27 June (New York time).

Following the United States’ decisions, the military support and other type of aids to the Republic of Korea began to flow in one after another from many other nations. To wit, the British Government (the United Kingdom) immediately welcomed the resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council. Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee said on 26 June (London time) in his report at the House of Common that the British Government was “deeply concerned that the aggression had started in a country where a U.N. commission is actually functioning.” He added that “it is their earnest hope that all concerned will duly comply with it.” Winston Churchill, then opposition leader, immediately assured Prime Minister Attlee of full support in carrying out Britain’s inescapable duty. The Conservative leader declared on the night of 28 June, London time, the British Government’s action was “correct and wise,” adding “there was no another course.”

The United Kingdom, on 28 June, placed her naval forces in the Japanese waters (the light fleet carrier HMS Triumph, two cruisers, two destroyers, three frigate, and several auxiliaries) at the disposal of the U.S. naval commander. This naval force came under General MacArthur’s control the next
day. On 29 June similar action was taken by the Australian Government. The Prime Minister of Australia R.C. Menzies announced that two Royal Australian naval ships (the destroyer *Bataan* and the frigate *Shoalhaven*) in the Japanese waters had been placed at the disposal of the United Nations through the U.S. authorities in support of the Republic of Korea. The next day, 30 June, Prime Minister Menzies announced in Canberra that Australia had offered Air Squadron 77 (shortrange Mustang fighter planes) also in Japan for service in Korea.

Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands prefiged they were dispatching naval forces in the first steps which would follow by the ground troops later. However, an offer of three divisions totalling 33,000 men, together with twenty transport planes and some naval escort made by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China was eventually turned down on 1 August based on General MacArthur's recommendation.

Section 3. The Initial Deployment of the U.S. Forces (27–30 June 1950)

Despite the prompt and drastic decisions made by the U.S. Government to take part in the military action against the NK aggressors, the readiness of the United States for war in the summer of 1950 was very doubtful. In another words, the United States was neither expecting nor prepared to fight in this remote area when the NK Communists started the armed aggression on 25 June. The Communist puppet regime in North Korea apparently had analyzed United States willingness, readiness, and ability to fight and concluded that the Americans would simply watch and complain, but not fight. The Communists apparently saw an opportunity to seize some additional free world territory with little risk and at little cost.

At the time the U.S. Army had a total of ten combat divisions, all but one understrength. In addition, there were also the European Constabulary and nine separate regimental combat teams. These ground forces were scattered in the continental United States (CONUS), the continent of Europe, and occupation duty in Japan. The U.S. Marines had two combat divisions, both understrength. The U.S. Navy was in the process of being cut down and even the Air Force had been forced to narrow its focus and channel its capability. Noteworthy was that the Navy's larger half was in the Atlantic, and the weight of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and of the other Air Force units
lay at home and in the forward European bases, on the assumption that the first and most important Communist objective was Western Europe.

The Far East Command

In the Far East in June 1950, there was a unified command of the American armed forces under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Far East Command, who was also, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), responsible for the occupation of Japan. General MacArthur was also charged with the defense of Japan, Okinawa, the Marianas, and the Philippines.

As for the Army forces, four divisions -- the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division (dismounted) organized as the Eighth US Army -- were in Japan on occupation duty. Also in the Pacific area were the 5th Regimental Combat Team in the Hawaiian Islands and the 29th Infantry Regiment on Okinawa. The four divisions, under the direct control of the Eighth U.S. Army commanded by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, were widely scattered throughout the islands of Japan, but generally divided into four areas of responsibility, with the exception of an area in the Hiroshima section, which was under the direction of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces: The 7th Division on Hokkaido and in the northern third of Honshu, the 1st Cavalry Division in the Kanto Plain on Honshu with headquarters near Tokyo, the 25th Division in the southern third of Honshu with headquarters at Osaka, and the 24th Division on Kyushu. These divisions, which had been stationed in Japan since the end of the Pacific War, were seriously understrength, having about 70 percent of full war strength in average, with only two instead of the normal three battalions in an infantry regiment, and shortages in equipment were equal serious. The artillery battalions, for instance, had only two of the normal three firing batteries. There was one exception, however, that the 24th Regiment of the 25th Division had a normal complement of three battalions, and the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, its support artillery, had three firing batteries. Most of arms and transport, moreover, consisted of worn World War II equipment. More worse, the divisional armored units had been provided with light M-24 tanks, instead of heavier ones, because of the weak bridges in Japan. Besides, all troops were undertrained. Many of the recruits came to Japan to maintain the small army of occupation. They were mainly young, incompletely trained recruits, with relatively very few veterans among the platoon and squad leaders. There were, of course, no U.S. combat troops in Korea.
It was, in brief, an entirely unprepared and ill-equipped little combat force of occupation which represented the first line of American defense in the Far East.

At the time slightly more than one-third of the whole U.S. naval forces were in the Pacific under the command of Admiral Arthur W. Radford. Only about one-fifth of this was in the Far Eastern waters. The total strength of the U.S. Naval Forces Far East (NavFE), commanded by Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy comprised on cruiser (the Janeu), four destroyers (the Mansfield, Dehaven, Collett, and Lyman K. Swenson) and a number of amphibious and cargo type vessels. Not under General MacArthur’s command, but also in the Far East at the time, was the Seventh Fleet, with Admiral Arthur D. Struble in command. It comprised one aircraft carrier (the Valley Forge), one heavy cruiser (the Rochester), eight destroyers, a naval oiler, and three submarines. Part of the Seventh Fleet was in Okinawa while the remainder was in the Philippines. None of Marines existed in the Far East.

On the other hand, the U.S. Air Forces in the Pacific like the ground and sea forces, literally had grown weak from sharp budgetary limitations and long years of easy garrison duty. At the time the war began, the U.S. Far East Air Forces (FEAF), under the command of Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, on paper, had eight wings (five fighter, two bomber and one transport), comprising an aggregate of some 1,172 aircraft. There were actually about 350 combat ready planes, however. Of the 18 fighter squadrons, only four, those based on Kyushu, were within effective range of the combat zone in Korea. One light bomb wing and a troop carrier wing were in Japan while the only medium bomber wing (B-29’s) in the Far East was on Guam.

The Initial Operations

On the first day of the Communist invasion, President Syngman Rhee as well as American Ambassador in Seoul John J. Muccio notified United States authorities of the need for an immediate flow of military supplies into Korea for the ROK Army. After getting the American civilians out the next step the Far East Command faced to take was to get some ammunition, under the accelerated Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), from stocks available in Japan. General MacArthur with Washington’s approval, ordered the Eighth U.S. Army to ship to Pusan at once 105,000 rounds of 105-mm. howitzer, 265,000 rounds of 81-mm. mortar, 89,000 rounds of 60
mm. mortar and 2,480,000 rounds of 30-caliber ball ammunition.

In accordance with an operation order issued by the ComNavFE in the early hours of the 27th, the MSTS Sergeant Keathley left Yokohama, Japan at midnight of 27 June bound for Pusan, Korea, with 1,636 long tons of ammunition and twelve 105-mm. howitzers on board. Early the next day, 28 June, a second ship, the MSTS Cardinal O’Connel, loaded a cargo from the Ikego Ammunition Depot. Meanwhile, airlift of ammunition began also on the 28th from Tachikawa Air Base near Tokyo. The first C-54 loaded with 105-mm. howitzer shells took off at 0600 hours, 28 June for Suwon, Korea. By 1517 hours in the afternoon, transport planes had departed Japan with a total of 119 tons of ammunition.

Initially, the first order sent to General MacArthur from Washington on 25 June consisted simply of instructions to employ the American sea and air power to evacuate American nationals from the Seoul area. Accordingly, the first two days (25—26 June) of the war the Far East Air Forces’ main effort was directed towards the evacuation of American civilians and their dependents and escort missions. Commander of the U.S. Naval Force, Far East, likewise, instructed Task Group 96.5 (with Rear Admiral J.M. Higgins in command) under the Task Force 96 to send USS Mansfield and De Haven to cover the exodus from the port of Incheon.

On the 26th, as the U.S. naval destroyers were steaming west to cover the departure of ships with the exodus aboard from Incheon, U.S. Air Force fighters orbited over the harbor. Then, on the evening of the 26th, Washington time, President Truman decided to commit the U.S. naval and air forces into the war triggered by the Communists. It was midafternoon on 27 June when General MacArthur received the instructions directing him to use air and naval forces under his command in support of the Republic of Korea.

Now, American naval and air forces in the Far East, under the leadership of General MacArthur, lost no time at getting into action.

Air units moved hurriedly from bases in Japan to those localities nearest the Korean peninsula. Most of the fighter and fighter bomber squadrons moved Itazuke and Ashiya Air Bases in Kyushu. Twenty bombers of B-29’s of the 19th Bombardment Group, Twentieth Air Force, had also moved from Guam to Kadena Airfield on Okinawa by 29 June. Primary missions, prior to all others, assigned to the fighter and bomber squadrons were the elimination of the NK Communist air opposition and the retarding of enemy ground forces by means of interdictory air strikes on bases and supply routes. It would appear that few good roads in the mountainous peninsula would be a favorable
area for strategic bombing since U.S. naval forces were denying the sea lanes to the enemy.

After 26 June the Far East Air Force fighters, therefore, expanded their missions to establish air superiority, to attack all NK Communist targets south of the 38th Parallel, and to protect the movement of the ROK troops. On the 27th, loading of refugees was also commenced at Pusan. FEAF transport aircraft engaged in airlifting personnel out of the Kimpo Airfield, and air fighters destroyed some enemy aircraft obstructing the civilian evacuation in the area of Seoul.

On 28 June one flight of U.S. planes bombed the Communist targets in Seoul. By an early date the Far East Air Forces had destroyed most of the NK air planes, because the attainment of air supremacy was a matter of utmost urgency. Thus, the US FEAF aircraft enjoyed air supremacy from the beginning. On the 29th, the Fifth Air Force, commanded by Major General Earl E. Partridge, flew 172 combat sorties in support of the ROK Army and comparable support continued in ensuing days.

Concurrently with the initiation of air action, the U.S. Naval Forces, Far East (ComNav) under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy began to take their part in fighting against the Communist aggressors. With the ROK forces were engaging in the hard battle facing the overwhelming enemy, control of the sea was a prerequisite in helping their resistance. Admiral Joy, having authorization of operational control over the Seventh Fleet on the afternoon of 27 June, immediately ordered the Task Force 77 (Striking Force) to clamp down a blockade on the Korean coast lines after wiping out the enemy naval opposition. Other warships of the Seventh Fleet were meanwhile blocking Taiwan to guard against the possibility of Chinese Communist invasion. On 28 June the American cruiser Juneau arrived off the east coast of Korea, and the next day shelled the Kangnung - Samchok area where the NK Communists’ amphibious landings had taken place on the first day of the enemy invasion. The American naval forces from this date forward took an active part in supporting the ROK and American forces in coastal areas and in carrying out interdiction and bombardment missions in enemy areas. Naval firepower was particularly effective along the east coast.

The first U.N. carrier-based airstrike of the war came on 3 July by planes from the USS Valley Forge and the British Triumph, of the Seventh Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble), against the enemy airfields in the Pyongyang - Chinnampo areas on the west coast.

The commitment of American naval and air forces raised the morale of the ROK forces very highly. In fact, its psychological effect upon the ROK’s
was beyond the description. The air support, however, could not save Seoul at this juncture, for the overwhelming Red odds, in strength, firepower, arms, and mobility, had already broke into the city with armored spearheads. The ROK forces had no alternative but to abandon the capital city on the 28th.

With the war in its fifth day, it was evident that psychological factors had played a prominent part in the early successes of the NK Reds. They had tanks, the ROKs had not. For the first three days they had airplanes, the ROKs did not. And now they had artillery outranging anything the ROK Army could throw against them. American advisors (KMAC) said before the war that the tank was a military handicap in a country such as Korea. Bare mountains divide the valleys filled with paddyfields, which the summer time of year is simply mud two and three feet deep. Tanks thus must move by roads and should be sitting ducks for determined men with antitank guns, bazookas and demolitions. The NK Reds, however, exploited the formidable effect of mighty tanks from the beginning and, the ROK Army had no antitank weapons to make useful against these Russian-built T-34 tanks.

Military experts now may admit, however, that they failed to give sufficient weight to the psychological effect of tanks and they also may recall what happened in the Low Countries when Hitler’s armors finally broke through in World War II. The principal NK artillery pieces, 120-mm. and 82-mm. mortars, in addition to 122-mm. and 76-mm. howitzers, both easily outranged 105-mm. howitzers and 81-mm. mortars with which the ROK Army was equipped.

The Defense of the Han River
(28 June—4 July)

While some American naval and air forces based in Japan were being committed to the support of the Republic of Korea, the situation in ground action was growing worse during the last days of June. After the fall of Seoul on 28 June, the ROK Army tried to regroup their scattered forces, organizing a defense line along the south bank of the Han River.

On the 29th, when General MacArthur and his party visited the Han River opposite Seoul, the elements of the 1st and 7th ROK Divisions were holding the main defense line, while some troops of the 5th ROK Division were in the Yongdungpo area, and farther west, elements of the Capital Security Command still held Inchon. Their will to fight and the morale was greatly encouraged by appearance of General MacArthur on the scene. They were
looking forward to seeing American ground forces equipped with formidable tanks, heavier artillery, and effective antitank guns. But, General MacArthur witnessed that they were too vulnerable to defend the present lines.

At any rate, the NK aggressors awaited no one. The 6th NK Division units began crossing the Han River in the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield on 28 June the same day that Seoul fell and occupied the airfield the next day.

The 3rd and 4th NK Divisions, after spending a day or two in Seoul, also started to attack to the south side of the Han River. On the morning of 30 June, the 8th Regiment of the 3rd NK Division crossed the river in the vicinity of the Sobinggo ferry.

About that time Brigadier General Chung Il Kwon returned from the United States and replaced Major General Chae as ROK Army Chief of Staff effective on 30 June with the rank of major general.

The enemy’s main crossing came on the following day. At 0400 hours, 1 July, the 5th Regiment of the 4th NK Division, which had been in reserve all the way from the 38th Parallel to Seoul, started crossing aimed at Yongdungpo. The remainder of this enemy division immediately followed and joined in the battle. Yongdungpo fell to the enemy about 0800, 3 July. The ROK units, despite in short of strength and firepower exhibited themselves stubborn defense and a bitter battle there by the 1st and 7th ROK Divisions in particular, inflicting heavy casualties upon the 4th NK Division: 227 killed, 1,822 wounded, and 107 missing in action at Yongdungpo.

The first NK tanks crossed the Han River on 3 July after one of the railroad bridges had been repaired and decked for tank traffic. The remainder of the 3rd NK Division also crossed the Han River on 3 July, while a part of the 6th NK Division reached the edge of Inchon on the same day.

Meanwhile, about 1900 hours, 30 June, Brigadier General Church, GHQ ADCOM, had learned during a telephone conversation with Major General Edward W. Almond, Chief of Staff, Far East Command, that General MacArthur had received authority to use American ground troops, and that if the Suwon airstrip could be held the next day two battalions would be flown in there. But the enemy advance forced ADCOM to move to Taegon on 1 July, in a downpour of rain, while the ROK Army Headquarters remained in Suwon until 4 July, when at 0600 the enemy from the Sihung area resumed the attack on the Suwon road with the 5th Regiment, 4th NK Division in the lead. Just before noon on 4 July, tank-infantry Red forces rushed in Anyang. The 5th Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division tried hard to delay the enemy column between Anyang and Suwon, but failed to contain fourteen T-34 tanks.
CHAPTER III DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES
(1–12 July 1950)

Section 1. The Initial Commitment of Ground Troops

In the early stage of the Korean War, a strategy of delaying action was the only course of action opened to General MacArthur for the time being. Originally, however, as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far East Command, he had no responsibility in Korea when the first official word from the American Embassy in Seoul reached his headquarters on the morning of 25 June. In fact, there had not been the slightest indication that his forces would be involved in the war. General MacArthur belittled its significance when first told of the Communist attack, believing that it was just another large-scale reconnaissance in force or border raid in the 38th Parallel areas by the NK Reds. Thus, at the time neither General MacArthur nor his subordinates had expected to be called upon for a military effort in the Korean peninsula.

This situation suddenly changed when he received authorization from President Truman on 26 June to send a survey group (later known as GHQ ADCOM) to Korea and also received a new directive from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff the next day to take command of all U.S. military activities in Korea.

On 30 June, having the authority to commit the ground forces under his command into battle, General MacArthur immediately instructed Lieutenant General Walker, Commander of the Eighth US Army, to order the 24th US Infantry Division to Korea at once. The principal reason for this selection was its proximity to Korea for immediate commitment. General Walker in turn gave Major General William F. Dean, Commanding General of the 24th Division, preliminary verbal instructions for preparations.

The Eighth Army had already been preparing for any operational demands which might result from the Communist invasion in Korea, ever since it had received the first official message from the General Headquarters, Far East Command by telephone at 1106 hours, 25 June, informing that the NK Communist puppet forces had started the war at 0400 hours.
In conjunction with the Eighth Army action, Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Far East, ordered Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle, Commander of Task Force 90 to sealift the 24th US Division from Fukuoka and Sasebo, Japan to Pusan, Korea. Pursuant to this order Task Force 90 got under way at once.

On 1 July, at 0315 hours, the Eighth Army, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker in command, issued the Operation Order No. 2 instructing the 24th US Division to (1) move a delaying force of two rifle companies, two Platoons of 4.2-inch mortars, one platoon of 75-mm. recoilless rifle and bazooka teams by air to Pusan, under a battalion commander, reporting to the Advance Command, GHQ, upon arrival; (2) move the division headquarters (—) and the infantry battalion to Pusan by air at once; (3) move the remainder of the division by water to Pusan at once; and (4) establish a base for early offensive operations, advance at once upon landing, with delaying forces to the north by all possible means, and conduct and delay the enemy now advancing south from Seoul toward Suwon. The order also stated that Major General Dean would command all U.S. Army forces in Korea (USAFIK) upon his arrival there. The 25th US Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division were to follow up as soon as possible, while the 7th Infantry Division was to remain in Japan until September.

The 24th US Division, with the strength of about two thirds of its wartime fatal, was then scattered near half a dozen parts in Kyushu, southern Japan, with no ships ready: The 19th Regiment based at Beppu, the 21st Infantry at Kumamoto, the 34th Infantry at Sasebo, and the artillery near Fukuoka.

In the next few days the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan transferred a total of 2,108 men to the 24th Division from the other units to bring it up to the full authorized strength, most of them from the other three divisions stationed in Japan. For instance, 15 officers and 732 enlisted men from the 1st Cavalry Division were called upon to transfer to the 24th Division. In such a way, the 24th Division with the headquarters at Kokura, the closest American combat unit to Korea, readied for the movement numbered 15,965 men and had 4,773 vehicles.

The suddenness of the outbreak of war in Korea seriously demanded immediate aid, commitment of ground troops in particular, and, Major General Dean, commanding the 24th Division, planned to move by surface transportation the entire division (except a task force) scattered nearly all over the Kyushu Island in Japan. The time was essential to move to Korea his division as rapidly as possible, and he began a piecemeal commitment without delay.
Task Force Smith

The first combat unit of the U.S. Army to arrive in Korea was Task Force Smith, consisting of two rifle companies and an artillery battery from the 24th US Division stationed in Kyushu, Japan.

During the midnight of 30 June, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, the Commanding Officer, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th US Infantry Division, was ordered by his Regimental Commander Colonel Richard W. Stephens to take his battalion (less A and D Companies) to Itazuke Air Base from where it would fly to Korea at once. Colonel Smith and his group started at about 0300 hours, 1 July from Camp Wood near Kumamoto and reached Itazuke at 0805 hours.

Major General Dean was waiting for Lieutenant Colonel Smith at the airfield. "When you get to Pusan," he said to him, "head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Korean Reds as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Contact General Church. If you cannot locate him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I cannot give you more information. That is all I have got. Good luck to you and God bless you and your men."

Thus, a thirty-four years old infantry officer of West Point Class of 1939, who had a fine World War II record with the 25th US Infantry Division in the South Pacific, would command the first contingent of the American ground troops to meet the enemy in the Korean War.

Assembled at the Itazuke Air Base, the contingent consisted of the following units and weapons of the 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment: Two understrength rifle companies (Band C); one-half of a communication platoon; a composite 75-mm. recoilless rifle platoon of four guns, only two of which were airlifted; and four 4.2-inch mortars, only two airlifted. The organization of two rifle companies included six 2.36-inch bazooka teams and four 60-mm. mortars. Each man had 120 rounds of .30-caliber rifle ammunition and two days of C rations. In all, there were about 440 men, of whom only 406 were destined to be in the group airlanded in Korea that day. One battery of artillery was to follow up by sealift.

At the time there were only six C-54 planes available for the airlift mission. The first plane was airborne at 0845 hours, but failed to land at the small runway near Pusan because the runway was closed in with fog. Finally, the first elements landed outside Pusan at 1100 hours, 1 July, receiving warmest welcome by a crowd of Korean citizens.

The men of Task Force Smith were immediately transported by Korean
trucks and vehicles to the Pusan railway station, some 27 kilometers away from the airstrip. These transportation means were arranged in advance by Lieutenant Colonel Rollinse S. Emmerich, then eventually in charge of KMAG in the Pusan area.

The arrival of the American ground combat troops further encouraged the Korean people for their firm determination to repel and destroy the Communist aggressors at all costs. Cheering crowds lined the streets all the way through, carrying the ROK and U.S. national flags in both hands, extended their heartfelt welcome, waving happily to the American fighters as they passed by. The port city of Pusan, the gateway of the peninsula, was really in gay spirit -- flags, banners, streamers, and posters were everywhere. Korean bands at the railroad station gave a noisy send-off as the loaded train pulled out at 2000 hours that evening.

Task Force Smith boarded train immediately and rushed northward, arriving at Taejon the next morning, 0800 hours, 2 July. There Lieutenant Colonel Leroy Lutes, a member of ADCOM, met Lieutenant Colonel Smith and took him to Brigadier General Church's headquarters. General Church, pointing to a place on the map, explained to Colonel Smith "we have a little ac-

First US troops to arrive in Korea. These crusaders now arrive at Taejon on 2 July by train after flown to Pusan from Japan.
tion up here. All we need is some men up there who would not run when they see tanks. We are going to move you up to support the ROK’s and give them morale support.”

With the permission from General Church, Colonel Smith soon started together with his key officers to make a terrain reconnaissance by jeeps over the 128 kilometers of bumpy roads to Osan, while his men went to their bivouac area. They saw thousands of refugees cluttering the roads and moving south all along the way.

Five kilometers north of Osan, at a point when the road runs through a low saddle, and bends slightly northwest toward Suwon, Colonel Smith found an excellent infantry position which commanded both the main highway and the railroad. An irregular ridges of hills crossed the road at right angles, the highest point rising about 91 meters above the low ground which stretched northward toward Suwon. From this high point both the highway and railroad were in view almost the entire distance to Suwon, about 13 kilometers to the north.

After looking over the ground, Colonel Smith issued verbal order for organizing a position there. The group drove back to the Taejon airstrip well after dark.

That night, Task Force Smith received an order from Brigadier General Church to take his men north by train to Pyongtaek and Ansong. It had the mission of setting up roadblocks to halt and delay the enemy’s southward thrust. The troops entrained and rolled north into the night. Upon the arrival at the destination, one company dug in at Pyongtaek on the main highway, about 18 kilometers south of Osan and the other at Ansong, a village 16 kilometers east of Pyongtaek and also 32 kilometers southwest of Osan. Colonel Smith set up his command post with the group at Pyongtaek.

Theoretically these two points blocked the two roads down which the enemy was most likely to come, but one company per road was not exactly a strong block, especially with the refugees pouring past them by the thousands.

On 4 July, the American national holiday of its independence, divided Task Force Smith was reunited at Pyongtaek, and was joined there by a part of the 53rd Field Artillery Battalion, came from the 24th US Division. This artillery contingent comprised one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries and all of A Battery with six 105-mm. howitzers, 73 vehicles, and 108 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Miller O. Perry. It had crossed from Japan on an LST on 2 July, disembarking at Pusan late that night. Two trains carried the unit to Taejon the next day. There Brigadier
General Church ordered Lieutenant Colonel Perry to join Task Force Smith at Pyongtaek, and about 2100 hours that night the artillery group entrained and departed northward. Because of the destroyed railroad station at Pyongtaek by incidents of mistaken air strike, the artillerymen unloaded at Songhwan-ni and drove on about ten kilometers to Pyongtaek before daylight.

Major General Dean Assumes the Battle Command

Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry Regiment of the 24th US Division loaded at Sasebo, Japan during the night of 1 July, and arrived at Pusan the next night. After Task Force Smith had left Japan the rest of the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th US Division, except A and D Companies which sailed from Moji, departed from Sasebo, arriving at Pusan early the next morning.

Major General Dean, the 24th US Division Commander, also was on his way to Korea. He started for Korea one day after Task Force Smith. But, his original effort in a C-54 transport plane was failed to land at Pusan. Accordingly, General Dean and his party then flew back to Japan, changed to a C-46 and made a second try. Upon successful landing at Pusan, General Dean’s party took off for Taejon. It was now dark when the plane reached over Taejon and there was no lighted airstrip or runway in this part of Korea. Again they had to fly 250 air-miles back to Itazuke, Japan. On the following morning, 3 July, the party took off once more for Korea shortly after dawn, eventually landing at the Taejon airstrip about 1080 hours. General Dean went directly to the ADCOM Headquarters and was briefed by General Church.

His first day in Taejon, 3 July, General Dean tried to get a big picture what was happening, and it was fairly obvious. The enemy’s principal attack was on the main highway and railroad lines, which roughly parallel each other through Suwon, Osan, Pyongtaek, Chonan, Chochiwon, Taejon, Kimchon, Taegu, and Pusan. This was the historic military route through Korea, followed in many cases of forgotten wars, re-emphasized by the Japanese in their invasions, and now being used in reverse by the NK Communist forces. To the east of this route mountains piled up one on another prevented easy troop movement, so there were no great danger routes except central one leading from Chunchon, Wonju, Chungju, Hamchang and Kimchon down to Taegu, or from Wonju, Chechon, Andong and down to Taegu; and one on the extreme eastern coast. These latters were less serious comparing with the Seoul — Pusan highway, however.
The Western Sea protected the friendly ground troops to the west as far south as Pyongtaek; but below the left flank would also have to be guarded. Civilian refugees were still thronging the main highway from Suwon; and the ROK Army units were fighting hard in the mountain areas to the east, according to the reports.

At this juncture the American force obviously was too small to maintain adequate communications over such a large area, so it had to depend on the ROK civil telephones and telegraph for wire communications, and on radio to get its messages through to frontline troops. General Church explained that he had ordered Task Force Smith to take up two positions one at a road crossing at Ansong and another at Pyongtaek. General Dean approved General Church's plan. Then, he flew back to Pusan at where his 34th Regiment had been arriving on ships that day and was entraining for Taejon.

On the afternoon of 4 July Major General Dean flew back to Taejon. Still no American ground forces had been in action against the enemy but there could be no doubt that it was coming soon.

That afternoon he received a message from General MacArthur that the U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) was activated under his command as of 0001, 4 July. General Dean assumed the command of USAFIK during the day and appointed Brigadier General Church, GHQ ADCOM, as Deputy Commander and other 22 officers from ADCOM and KMAG as his USAFIK staff members, establishing headquarters at Taejon. At this time the 34th Infantry Regiment was on the way north from Pusan but other infantry units and all supporting organizations were still at sea or in Japan.

Meanwhile, most of KMAG personnel who had left Korea by air on 27 June returned aboard the ammunition ship Sergeant Keathley on 2 July. By this time the ROK Army had assembled and partly reorganized about 68,000 men.

Section 2. The First American Battle at Osan
(5 July 1950)

On the rainy morning of 5 July, the first American infantry and artillery contingents of Task Force Smith collided with a whole NK Communist regiment supported by 33 Soviet-built T-34 tanks and superior artillery fire in a bloody six-hour battle in the vicinity of Osan, about twelve kilometers south of Suwon. The enemy was more than hundred times superior in terms of
numbers and fire power as well.

The 540 men American Task Force comprised (406 infantry and 134 artillery men) had no reserve, no tanks, no weapons capable of knocking out the thick-armored enemy tanks and nothing to match the enemy artillery. Though hopelessly outnumbered, the American troops acquitted themselves nobly and fought valiantly at their first engagement and, before they withdrawing to the next delaying position, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. They made an immense sacrifice of their lives to win the vitally needed time for the U.N. troops being rushed to the aid of the Republic of Korea. The Task Force including the artillery contingent, suffered 172 casualties in dead, wounded and missing.

It was the first American battle in a series of delaying actions designed to allow the United Nations Command to build up its strength for a counter-offensive against the NK Communist aggressors.

**Battle Organization**

On 4 July, back at Taejon, Major General Dean ordered Brigadier General George B. Barth, Acting Artillery Commander of the 24th Division (temporary duty from the 25th US Division), who now arrived there in the early afternoon, to go forward to represent him. So, at 1500 hours General Barth, with instructions for Task Force Smith, started by jeep for Pyongtaek, where he relayed his orders to Colonel Smith to “take up those good positions near Osan you told General Church about.” General Dean intended to form one solid lump of Americans with the whole task force.

Lieutenant Colonels Smith and Perry and some others went forward in that later afternoon to make a final reconnaissance of the Osan position. At this time Colonel Perry selected the positions for his artillery when the ROK Army engineer groups on the road were preparing demolitions on all bridges.

A little after midnight the infantry and artillery of the task force moved out of Pyongtaek. Colonel Smith had to commandeer local Korean trucks and miscellaneous vehicles to mount his men. It was only 19 kilometers to Osan on road, but it took two and a half hours to get there because they had to push their way through heavily congested road filled by countless refugees moving down southward under blackout conditions.

About 0300 hours on 5 July, Task Force Smith reached the position some three kilometers north of Osan, which Lieutenant Colonel Smith had previously selected. The infantry units started setting up weapons and digging
A road leading to Suwon is visible for 13 kilometers from the position of Task Force Smith north of Osan.

in at the predesignated places. Lieutenant Colonel Miller O. Perry, the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion Commander, moved his guns into the positions behind the infantry that he had selected the previous afternoon. All units were in place, but not completely dug in, before daylight. (See Sketch Map 2.)

On the other hand, the 34th Regiment of the 24th US Division, consisted of only two understrength battalions, had arrived in the combat area late on 4 July. General Dean ordered this regiment to reoccupy the positions Task Force Smith had left, blocking one road at Ansong and the main highway at Pyongtaek, where an arm of the sea comes up almost to the highway, forming a natural defense on the left. About the same time that Task Force Smith had started for Osan the two battalions of the 34th Regiment had passed through Taejon heading for north.

Back at the positions north of Osan where Task Force Smith was now holding, the railroad bent eastward away from the highway until it was about one and a half kilometer distant. There the railroad split into two single-track lines and passed over low ground between hills of the ridge line. On
his left flank Colonel Smith placed one platoon of B Company on the high knob immediately west of the highway. This saddleshaped high ground was better known to the local inhabitants as “Chukmi Ryong” or “Chukmi Pass.”

East of the road were other two platoons of B Company on and around Hill 117 (known as Kum-san to the villagers), overlooking the Suwon valley. Beyond them eastward to the railroad tracks were two platoons of C Company along the forward slope of Hill 92. This B Company’s third platoon occupied a refused right flank along the west side of the railroad track.

Just east of the highway (leftmost flank of Hill 117) B Company emplaced one 75-mm. recoilless rifle; C Company emplaced the other 75-mm. recoilless just west of the railroad. Colonel Smith placed the 4.2-inch mortars on the reverse, or south, slope of Hill 117 about 400 yards behind the center of B Company’s position.

The infantry line formed a one-mile front, not counting the refused right flank along the railroad track. The highway leading from Suwon down to Osan, likely to be the critical axis of enemy advance, tank columns in particular, passed through the shallow saddle (Chukmi Pass) at the infantry position and then zigzagged gently downgrade northward around several knoblike spurs to low ground a little more than a kilometer and a half away. There it crossed to the east side of the railroad track and continued on semilevel ground to Suwon.

Two thousand yards behind the infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Perry pulled four 105-mm. howitzers 150 yards to the left (west) off the highway, in the villages of Changun—Kumbawi. The fifth howitzer was emplaced as an antitank gun on the west side of the road about halfway between the main battery position and the infantry. From there it could place direct fire on the highway where it passed through the saddle (Chukmi Pass) and the infantry positions.

Volunteers from the artillery Headquarters and Service Batteries made up four .50-caliber machine gun and four 2.36-inch bazooka teams and joined the infantry in their position.

There were about 1,200 rounds of artillery ammunition. Nearly all this ammunition was high explosive (HE); only 16 rounds were high explosive anti-tank (HEAT), and all of it was taken to the forward gun.

The Antitank Battle

At this defense position north of Osan as rainy 5 July dawned were 540 Americans comprising of 406 infantry (17 officers and 389 enlisted men) and
134 artillerymen (9 officers and 125 enlisted men). When the first light came, the infantry testfired their weapons and the artillerymen registered their guns. Then they ate their C-ration breakfasts.

In spite of the rain and thick fog Lieutenant Colonel Smith could see from his position on Hill 117 almost to Suwon, 13 kilometers north of the hill. He first saw an enemy movement on the road in the distance near Suwon a little after 0700 hours. In about half an hour a tank column, now easily discernible, approached the waiting Americans. In this first group there were eight tanks. About 0800 hours the men back in the artillery position received a call from the forward observer with the infantry for a fire mission.

At 0816 hours, the first American artillery fire of the Korean War hurtled through the air toward the NK Communist tanks. The artillery took the tanks under fire at a range of approximately 4,000 yards, about 2,000 yards in front of the American infantry. The forward observer quickly adjusted the fire and shells began landing among the tanks. But the enemy tanks continued to come all intact, opening up with their 85-mm. guns.

To conserve ammunition Colonel Smith issued orders that the 75-mm. recoilless rifle covering the highway should withhold fire until the tanks closed to 700 yards. The tanks stayed in column, kept on coming. The commander of the enemy tank column may have thought he had encountered only another minor ROK delaying position.
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Barth, (the Acting Artillery Commander of the 24th Division) had gone back to the artillery just before the enemy came into view and did not know when he arrived there that an enemy force was approaching. After receiving reports from the forward observer that the artillery fire was ineffective against the tanks, he started back to alert the 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment, whose arrival he expected at Pyongtaek during the night, against a probable breakthrough of the enemy tanks.

When the enemy tank column approached within 700 yards of the infantry position, the two recoilless rifles took it under fire. They scored direct hits, but apparently did not damage the tanks which, firing their 85-mm. cannon and 7.62-mm. machine guns, rumbled on up the incline toward the saddle. When they were almost abreast of the infantry position, the lead tanks came under 2.36-inch bazooka fire. Operating a rocket launcher from the ditch along the east side of the road, 2nd Lieutenant Ollie D. Connor, fired 22 rockets at approximately 15 yeards' range against the rear of the tanks where their armor was weakest. Whether they were effective was doubtful. The two lead tanks, however, were stopped just through the pass when they came under direct fire of the single 105-mm. howitzer using HEAP ammunition. Very likely these artillery shells stopped the two tanks, although the barrage of close-range bazooka rockets may have damaged their tracks.

The two damaged tanks pulled off to the side of the road, clearing the way for those following. One of the two caught fire and burned. Two men emerged from its turret with their hands up. A third jumped out with a burp gun in his hands and fired directly into a machine gun position, killing the assistant gunner. This unidentified machine gunner probably was the first American ground soldier killed in action in the Korean War. For reference, survivors of Task Force Smith believe he was Private First Class Kenneth Shadrock, killed in this Osan action at about 0830 hours. The third tank through the pass knocked out the forward gun and wounded one of its crew members.

Following the first group of eight tanks came others at short intervals, usually in groups of four. These, too, went unhesitatingly through the infantry position and on down the road toward the artillery position. In all, there were 23 tanks in the column. The last passed through the infantry position by 0900 hours, about an hour after the lead tanks had reached the saddle. In this hour, tank fire had killed or wounded approximately 20 men in Colonel Smith's position.

Earlier in the morning, someone in the artillery had raised an academic
question as to what would happen if tanks came through the infantry to the artillery position. One of the infantrymen answered, "Don't worry, they will never get back to you." One of the artillerymen later expressed the prevailing opinion by saying, "Everyone thought the enemy would turn around and go back when they found out who was fighting." Now enemy tanks were attacking down the artillery positions.

The first tanks cut up the telephone communication. Now only the jeep radio worked. Communication with the infantry after 0900 hours was spotly at best, and, about 1100 it ceased altogether.

The tanks came on toward the artillery pieces, which kept them under fire but could not stop them. About 500 yards from the battery, the tanks stopped behind a little hill seeking protection from direct fire. Then, one at a time, they came down the road with a rush, hatches closed, making a run to get past the battery position. Some of the tank guns even pointed toward the opposite side of the road. After a moment, the tanks continued on toward Osan. The 105-mm. howitzers fired at ranges of 150—300 yards as the tanks went by, but the shells only jarred the tanks and bounced off.

Three bazooka teams from the artillery had posted themselves near the road before the tanks appeared. When word came that the tanks were through the infantry, two more bazooka teams started to move into position. The first tank caught these two teams in the rice paddy between the howitzers and the highway. A 105-mm. shell hit the tracks of the third tank and stopped it. The other tanks in this group went on through. The four American howitzers remained undamaged.

After these tanks had passed out of sight, Colonel Perry took an interpreter and walked his way up close to the immobilized enemy tank. Through the interpreter, he called on the crew to come out and surrender. There was no response. Colonel Perry then ordered the howitzers to destroy the tank. After three rounds had hit the tank, two NK Reds jumped out of it and took cover in a culvert. The Colonel sent a squad forward and it killed the two Reds.

During this little action, small arms fire hit Colonel Perry in the right leg. Refusing to be evacuated, he sat against the base of a tree giving orders and instructions in preparation for the appearance of more tanks.

In about ten minutes the second wave of tanks followed the last of the first group.

When the second waves of tanks came into view, some of the howitzer crew members started to "take off." The senior noncommissioned officers
(NCO) fired the pieces. The momentary panic soon passed and, with the good example and strong leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Perry and 1st Lieutenant Dwain L. Scott before them, the men returned to their positions. Many of the second group of tanks did not fire on the artillery at all. Again, the 105-mm. howitzers did, however, hit another in its tracks, disabling it in front of the artillery position.

Some of the tanks had one or two infantry men on their decks. Artillery fire blew off or killed most of them. Enemy tank fire caused a dump of about 300 rounds of artillery shells began to explode. The last of the tanks passed the artillery position by 1015 hours. These tanks were from the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th NK Armored Division in support of the 4th NK Division.

After the last tank was out of sight, rumbling on toward Osan, the score stood as follows: The forward 105-mm. howitzers, and 2.36-inch bazooka fired from the infantry position, had knocked out and left burning one tank and damaged another so that it could not move; the artillery had stopped two more in front of the battery position, while three others though damaged had managed to limp out of range toward Osan. This made four tanks destroyed or immobilized and three others slightly damaged but serviceable out of a total of 33.

As for the friendly damages, the enemy tanks had destroyed the forward 105-mm. howitzer and wounded one of its crew members, had killed or wounded an estimated 20 infantrymen, and had destroyed all the parked vehicles behind the infantry position. At the main battery position the enemy tanks had slightly damaged one of the four guns by a near miss. Only Lieutenant Colonel Perry and another man were wounded at the battery position.

Task Force Smith was not able to use any antitank mines -- one of the most effective methods of defense against tanks -- as there were none in Korea at the time. Colonel Perry was of opinion that a few well-placed antitank mines would have stopped the entire armored column in the road.

The Battle against Infantry

After the last of the tank column had passed through the infantry position and artillery and tank fire back toward Osan had subsided, the American position became quiet again. But Colonel Smith knew that he must expect enemy infantry soon. In the steady rain that continued throughout the morning, the men deepened their foxholes and otherwise improved their positions.
Perhaps an hour after the enemy tank had moved through, a long column of enemy trucks and foot troops near started to advance. It took an hour for the head of the column to reach a point 1,000 yards in front of the American infantry. There were three tanks in the lead. This was a major force of the NK Communist army pushing south -- the 16th and 18th Regiments of the 4th NK Division as learned later.

Whether this enemy column knew that American ground troops had arrived in Korea and were present in the battle area remained unknown. Later, Senior Colonel Lee Hak-ku, Chief Operations Officer of the II NK Corps, said he had no idea that the United States would participate in the war, that nothing had been said about possible U.S. participation, and that he believed it came as a surprise to North Korean puppet authorities.

When the convoy of enemy trucks was about 1,000 yards away, Colonel Smith ordered the heavy weapons to commence fire. Mortar shells landed among the trucks and .50-caliber machine gun bullets swept the column. Trucks burst into flames. Men were blown into the air; others sprang from their vehicles and jumped into ditches alongside the road. Behind the burning vehicles an estimated 1,000 enemy infantry detrucked and started to deploy. Behind these infantry other truckloads of infantry stopped and waited. It was now about 1145 hours.

The enemy infantry began moving up the finger ridge along the east side of the road. There, some of them set up a base of fire while others fanned out to either side in a double enveloping movement. The American fire broke up all efforts of the enemy infantry to advance frontally. Then, the enemy was getting around rather than closing on them. Within an hour, about 1230 hours, the enemy appeared in force on the high hill to the west of the highway.
overlooking and dominating the knob on that side held by a platoon of B Company on the saddle of Chukmi Ryong. Colonel Smith, observing this, withdrew the platoon to the east side of the road. Major Floyd Martin, Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, meanwhile, supervised the carrying of available ammunition stocks to a central and protected area back of the battalion command post. The 4.2-inch mortars were moved up closer, and otherwise the men achieved together a defense perimeter on Hill 117 the highest ground east of the road. In the exchange of fire that went on an increasing amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the American position. Wire communications between the artillery and the infantry had already been fired up.

Withdrawal Action

About 1430 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Smith decided that if any of his command was get out, the time to move was at hand. Large numbers of the enemy were now on both flanks and attacking toward his rear; a huge enemy reserve waited in front of him along the road stretching back toward Suwon; and his small arms ammunition was nearly gone. Furthermore, a large enemy tank force was already in his rear. The Smith unit was totally encircled by the enemy troops. He had no communication, not even with Lieutenant Colonel Perry's artillery a kilometer and a half behind him, and he could hope for no reinforcements. The artillery pieces had fired on the enemy infantry as long as the fire direction communication functioned properly, but this too had failed soon after the infantry fight began. The weather prevented friendly air from arriving at the scene.

Colonel Smith planned to withdraw his men by leapfrogging units off the ridge, each jump of the withdrawal covered by protecting fire of the next unit ahead. The selected route of withdrawal was toward Osan down the finger ridge on the right flank, just west of the railroad track. First off the hill was C Company, followed by the medics, then Battalion Headquarters, and finally, B Company, except its 2nd Platoon which never received the withdrawal order. At the time of the withdrawal the men carried only small arms and each averaged two or three clips of ammunition. They abandoned all crew-served weapons -- recoilless rifles, mortars, and machine guns. They had no alternative but to leave behind all the dead and about 25 to 30 wounded litter cases. A medical sergeant, voluntarily remained with the latter. The slightly wounded moved out with the main units, but when enemy fire dispersed some of the groups many of the wounded dropped behind and were seen no more.
Task Force Smith suffered its heaviest casualties in the withdrawal. Some of the enemy machine gun fire was at close quarters. Captain and pitcher of the regimental baseball team, 1st Lieutenant Taymod “Bodie” Adams, used his pitching arm to win the greatest victory of his career when he threw a grenade forty yards into an enemy machine gun positions, destroying the gun and killing the crew. This particular gun had caused heavy casualties.

About the time B Company, the initial covering unit, was ready to withdraw, Colonel Smith left the hill and followed the railroad track south to a point opposite the artillery position. From there he struck off west to find Colonel Perry and tell him the infantry was leaving. While crossing the rice paddies he met the artillery’s fire party and together they hurried to the artillery battery. Colonel Smith had assumed that the enemy tanks had destroyed all the artillery pieces and had made casualties of most of the men. His surprise was complete when he found that all the guns at this battery position were operable and that only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded. Enemy infantry had not yet appeared at the artillery position.

Upon receiving Colonel Smith’s order to withdraw, the artillerymen immediately made ready to go. Colonels Smith and Perry, together with the artillerymen, walked back to the outskirts of Osan where they found the artillery trucks as they had left them, only a few being slightly damaged by tank and machine gun fire.

They planned to take a road at the south edge of Osan to Ansong, assuming that the enemy tanks had gone down the main road toward Pyongtaek.

The American columns soon came upon groups of infantry from Task Force Smith struggling over the hills and through the rice paddies. The trucks stopped and waited while several of these groups came up. About 100 infantrymen joined them in this way. Then the vehicles continued on, arriving at Ansong after dark.

There was no pursuit. The enemy infantry occupied the vacated positions, and busied themselves in gathering trophies.

After the Battle

The next morning, 6 July, Lieutenant Colonel Smith and his group went on to Chonan. Upon arrival there a count revealed that he had 185 men. Subsequently, Captain Richard Dashmer, C Company Commander, came in with
65 men, increasing the total of 250. There were about 150 men killed, wounded or missing from Colonel Smith's infantry force when he took a second count later in the day. The greatest loss was in B Company. Survivors straggled in to American lines at Pyongtaek, Chonan, Taejon, and other places in the southern area during the next several days. 2nd Lieutenant Carl F. Bernard and twelve men of the reserve platoon of B Company reached Chonan two days after the Osan battle. Five times he and his men had encountered the enemy roadblocks. A few men walked all the way from Osan to the Western Sea and the Eastern Sea. One man eventually arrived at Pusan on a Korean sampan from the west coast.

None of the five officers and ten enlisted men of the artillery forward observer, liaison, machine gun, and bazooka group with the infantry ever came back. As of 7 July five officers and 26 men from the artillery were still missing.

On the other hand, the 4th NK Division and attached units apparently lost approximately 42 killed including Senior Colonel Ahn Dong Su, Assistant Commander, 4th NK Division, and 85 wounded at the battle of Osan on 5 July.

In brief, the task force successfully delayed the Communist advance for at least five days, according to a U.S. investigation of findings reported later. It achieved much more than expected.

For their valiant holding action which delayed the enemy advance for six precious hours, representatives of Task Force Smith, including Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, were later honored by President Truman at a special ceremony held in Washington, D.C.

Today, on a tree-covered hilltop at Chukmi-Ryong, some three kilometers north of Osan, stands an obelisk commemorating the heroic battle of Task Force Smith at Osan. The monument was originally erected in 1954 by the 24th US Infantry Division, then stationed in Korea. The bilingual inscription on the plaque commemorates the spot where the first American ground unit -- vanguard of the United Nations-Command -- fought in Korea against the Communist aggressors.

Thereafter, there has been held a memorial ceremony at the monument site every year on 5 July sponsored by the local Korean people in cooperation with the U.S. Army in Korea, paying homage to the fallen American heroes in the first American engagement with the Red odds.

Incidentally, on 2 July 1975, Brigadier General Charles B. Smith, retired, who commanded Task Force Smith, came to Korea under the "Revisit Korea
Program” for the foreign veterans of the Korean War. During his one-week stay, the 59-year-old retired general made an emotional tour of the old battlefield in the vicinity of Osan where he and his task force warriors bravely fought 25 years ago, delaying the enemy advance.

Highlight of his revisit schedule was that the ceremony held on 5 July 1975 at the very site of Chukmi-Ryong, observing the 25th anniversary of the first American ground battle with the invading North Korean Communist forces. During the ceremony, after saluting before his task force’s battle monument, General Smith recalled the war that: “We arrived on this hill about four hours ahead of the Communist and we delayed them the better part of the day. From July 5 for next 40 days the Communists experienced increasing difficulty. I am most proud that Task Force Smith made a small initial contribution to the preservation of world peace and the security of the Republic of Korea from the NK Communist aggressors.” And, “a miracle has been wrought in this nation in these past 25 years. The Republic of Korea has made rapid stride -- with its able, inspired and dedicated leadership, a stable government, a strong military posture and a booming economy,” he said.

General Smith was particularly honored with the Order of Military Service Merit, Taeguk, the highest military medal of the Republic of Korea, personally presented by President Park Chung Hee on 6 July 1975 for his outstanding meritorious service during the Korean War.
Section 3. Delaying Action from Pyongtaek to Chochiwon (6–8 July 1950)

The 24th US Division

During the early weeks of July 1950, the most serious concern and the utmost pressing question for the ROK and U.S. forces on the conduct of war was how far north they could hold and delay the enemy advance southward until they could build up their combat effectiveness in force sufficient enough to launch a decisive counteroffensive against the Communist aggressors. For this end they had to conduct effective delaying action in a series of successive defense lines in an effort to gain time as long as possible.

As the month of July came a sizable strength of American troops began to arrive in Korea to help halt the NK invasion. The main force of the 24th US Infantry Division, consisting of three under-strength infantry regiments (19th, 21st, and 34th) and supporting units, completed its movement to Korea from Japan during the period 2–6 July. The 34th Regiment (with a strength of 1,981 men), comprising of only two under-strength battalions, began arriving at Pusan by ship late in the afternoon of 2 July; the 21st Infantry (minus Task Force Smith -- 1st Battalion) had arrived also at Pusan on the morning of 4 July; and the 19th Infantry arrived in on the 6th.

After Task Force Smith had fought its way out of impending encirclement near Osan on 5 July 1950, the 24th US Division fought successive holding actions at Pyongtaek, Ansong, Chonan, Chonui, Chochiwon, and south across the Kum River to the strategically important city of Taegon until 20 July.

Major General Dean decided to commit his 34th Regiment first into the battle area immediately behind Task Force Smith and the 21st Regiment to follow up it. The 19th Infantry was to remain in reserve for a while. Task Force Smith was to hold the enemy, not to “defeat him,” and to delay his advance as long as it could. The results of its action, therefore, would greatly reflect upon the ensuing actions of the 34th Infantry.

General Dean ordered through Colonel Jay B. Lovless the newly arrived 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 34th Infantry to move north and take up positions around Pyongtaek and Ansong. He was expecting too much, however, with such less-strength and ill-trained units, without artillery, tank, or effective antitank weapon support, against the vastly superior enemy force
that now was to be attacking down on.

When Brigadier General Barth, the 24th US Division Artillery Commander, reached Pyongtaek from Task Force Smith’s position in Osan on the morning of 5 July he found there, as he had expected, the 1st Battalion, the 34th Infantry and its commander Lieutenant Colonel Ayres. He told Colonel Ayres of the situation at Osan and said that probably enemy tanks would break through there and come on down the main highway. They eventually located the enemy tank on the railroad track about one and a half kilometers ahead at the edge of Sojong-ni, some eight kilometers south of Osan. There an exchange of fire took place about 1600 hours.

That evening after dark General Dean and his aide, 1st Lieutenant Arthur M. Clarke, drove up to Pyongtaek, where they met Brigadier General George Barth but no information was available at all about Task Force Smith. He learned there that enemy tanks had been coming down the road when just after General Barth had left Osan. The 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry attempted to contact with the task force by sending out the heavy patrols, but there was no report by 0100 hours in the morning of 6 July when General Dean left to drive back to Taejon.

Four survivors of the Osan battle arrived at the command post of the 1st Battalion at Pyongtaek shortly after General Dean had left it and told an exaggerated story of the destruction of Task Force Smith. A few minutes later, Lieutenant Colonel Perry, the Commanding Officer of the 52nd US Artillery Battalion, arrived from Ansong and made his report of what happened to Task Force Smith. General Barth and Colonel Ayres then decided to keep the 1st Battalion in its blocking position put to destroy the highway bridge just north of the town now that enemy tanks must be expected momentarily. Before starting back south at 0130 hours, 6 July, General Barth instructed Colonel Ayres to hold Pyongtaek as long as he could but to withdraw if his battalion was in danger of being outflanked and cut off. The battalion blew the bridge at 0300 hours.

Brigadier General Barth arrived about 0230 hours at the command post of the 34th Infantry at Songhwan, where he learned that Lieutenant Colonel Smith with the remnant (about 86 men) of his task force had passed through there from Ansong on the way to Chonan, leaving four badly wounded men with the regiment. General Barth ordered Colonel Lovless to consolidate the regiment in the vicinity of Chonan, and he further directed that the 3rd Battalion, less L Company (the regimental reserve) which was near Pyongtaek, should move from Ansong to Chonan. Colonel Lovless thereupon directed L Company to act as a rear guard and to cover the 1st Battalion, but the com-
pany closed directly on Chonan when the withdrawal began. General Barth left the command post of the 34th Infantry for Chonan before daylight. (See Sketch Map 3.)

The 34th Infantry at Pyongtaek and Ansong  
(5—6 July)

Upon the arrival at Pusan, the 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment started north by rail just after daylight of 4 July followed by the last of the regiment by that evening. Major General Dean, the 24th US Division Commander, met with Colonel Jay B. Lovless, the Commanding Officer of the 34th Infantry, at Taegon early on 5 July, and ordered the latter to establish defense positions at Ansong and Pyongtaek, telling that he would prefer the 3rd Battalion to go to Ansong, because the 1st Battalion had already been arrived at Pyongtaek.

It was raining and unseasonably cool during the dark early morning hours of 5 July, when the 1st Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Herold B. Ayres, arrived at Pyongtaek about 0500 hours. The 3rd Battalion, with Lieutenant Colonel David H. Smith in command, went to Ansong, about 19 kilometers east of Pyongtaek, to cover the highway there. Colonel Lovless set up his regimental headquarters that day at Songhwan, nearly ten kilometers south of Pyongtaek.

Now, the 1st Battalion dug in on the south bank of Tongbo-chon, a tributary of Ansong-chon just above Pyongtaek, while the 3rd Battalion went east to take up defenses at Ansong.

Officers and men of the 1st Battalion, the 34th Infantry waited in their positions at the river line in the outskirts of Pyongtaek for daylight, all they sharing the belief that a few US troops would restore order within a few weeks. They thought that “as soon as those NK Reds see an American uniform they will run like hell.” This optimistic attitude completely lost when the enemy forces overran their first defense positions. Early over confidence changed suddenly to surprise. They realized that the NK Communist forces were superior in size, equipment and training.

This was the background and the setting for the raining morning of 6 July in fog when the 1st Battalion of the 34th US Regiment waited in their muddy foxholes with water.

Over three kilometers north of bridge over Tongbo-chon, north side of Pyongtaek, that carried the main highway across the river there were two grass-covered hills separated by a strip of rice paddies one and a half
DELAYING ACTION ALONG PYONGTAEK—CHONAN (5–8 JULY 1950)

Sketch Map 3

LEGEND
- - J S Withdrawal
- - Enemy Attack
0 5 km

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Ground Operations
kilometers wide. The 1st Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ayres arranged B Company on the east side of the road, A Company on the west, leaving C Company in reserve positions in the rear. In the area of A Company with the strength of 140 officers and men the positions consisted of two-man foxholes dug across the north side of the hill, across the rice paddies to the railroad embarkment, and beyond that to the road.

As dawn broke Colonel Ayres climbed the hill west of the highway to the A Company command post. On the hill, he saw in the fog the outline of tanks on the far side of the blown bridge. From the company command post, Colonel Ayres and Captain Leroy Osburn, A Company Commander, saw the tanks about the same time. Beyond the first tanks, a faint outline of troops marching in a column of tanks on the left side of the road and a line of more tanks and trucks on the right side came into view. Elements of the 4th NK Division were now attacking down. Passing the blown bridge on both sides, the enemy tanks continued to roll down.

Colonel Ayres by this time had ordered the 4.2-inch mortars to fire on the bridge area. Their shells destroyed at least one enemy truck. The enemy tanks opened fire with their tank guns on A Company's position. American return fire was scattered and ineffective.

After seeing the enemy infantry began fanning out on either flank, Colonel Ayres told Captain Osburn to withdraw A Company, leaving one platoon behind briefly as a screening force. The Battalion Commander then started back to his command post, and upon reaching it telephoned withdrawal orders to B Company on the east side of the highway. Within half an hour after the enemy column had loomed up out of the fog and rain at the blown bridge, the enemy infantrymen had crossed the stream and approached close to the A Company position.

When he returned to his command post, Lieutenant Colonel Ayres talked with Major John J. Dunn, S-3 of the 34th Infantry, who had arrived there during his absence. About 0300 hours that morning, Major Dunn had awakened at the regimental command post to find everyone in a state of great excitement. News had just arrived that the enemy had overrun Task Force Smith. The regiment had no communication with its 1st Battalion at Pyongtaek. The command radios could not net between Ansong, Pyongtaek, and Songhwan (or Songwan-ni). Land lines were impossible to keep intact. The only communication was liaison officers or messengers. Accordingly, orders and reports often were late and outdated by events when received.

Before Major Dunn started to go forward and determine the situation,
Colonel Lovless gave instructions to be delivered to the 1st Battalion Commander, repeating Brigadier General Barth's instructions to hold as long as possible without endangering the battalion and then to withdraw to a position near Chonan, 22 kilometers south of Pyongtaek. Major Dunn met Lieutenant Colonel Ayres at the 1st Battalion command post and delivered the instructions passed on to him. The decision as to when to withdraw the 1st Battalion was up to Colonel Ayres. The Battalion Commander, soon afterward, started withdrawing his battalion. By midmorning it was on the road back to Chonan, where it began to arrive in the afternoon. Last to arrive there in the early evening was A Company. Most of the units were disorganized. The 3rd Battalion on the other hand would arrive on order at Chonan from Ansong during the afternoon and that night.

The Night Battle at Chonan
(7—8 July)

When Brigadier General Barth arrived at Chonan that morning, 6 July he found there two troop trains carrying A and D Companies and a part of Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment. They were the parts of the battalion not airlifted to Korea on 1 July with Task Force Smith. The General put them in a defensive position three kilometers south of Chonan.

After making disposition of the newly arrived units, General Barth returned to Chonan in the early afternoon and found the advance elements of the 1st Battalion, the 34th US Infantry were already there. He ordered the 1st Battalion to join elements of the 21st Infantry in the defensive position he had just established south of the town. Colonel Lovless, the Commander of the 34th Regiment, had already phoned from Chonan to Major General Dean at Taejon reporting him the Pyongtaek situation. For General Dean it was astonishing report: The 34th US Regiment had pulled its 1st Battalion back south of Chonan -- about 25 kilometers from the river defense line with its flank on the sea. The units that had been at Ansong were now 32 kilometers southward without even waiting until the enemy hit them.

General Dean learned this at Taejon at 1600 hours, 6 July, and rushed up by jeep toward Chonan to find out what was wrong, why they had not held on the river. That evening he met with Colonel Lovless and his battalion commanders in an uncomfortable atmosphere and asked who had authorized the withdrawal from Pyongtaek. Lieutenant Colonel Ayres, the 1st Battalion Commander, finally broke the silence, saying he would accept the respon-
sibility. General Dean considered to say “turn around and get going now,” but the danger of a night ambuscade caused to him to decide against it. Instead, he ordered a company to go north the next morning after daylight. Brigadier General Barth remained at Chonan overnight and then started for Taejon. He remained in command of the 24th Division artillery until 14 July when he assumed command of his regular unit, the 25th U.S. Division artillery.

Meanwhile, as ordered, the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Infantry had arrived at Chonan from Ansong in the afternoon of 6 July and during that night. The Regiment Commander gave its L Company the mission of advancing north of Chonan to meet the NK Communists the morning of the 7th. With the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the regiment in the lead, the little force started out at 0810 hours. It found no one in Chonan except some ROK police. Chonan is a road intersection from which good routes lead to the west, south and north, thus fanning from the old days as “Samgori” a three-way junction.

At this point, Colonel Lovless received a message from General Dean. It read, “Time filled 1025, date 7 July 50. To CO 34th Inf. Move one Bn fwd with minimum transportation. Gain contact and be prepared to fight delaying action back to recent position. PD air reports no enemy armor south of river. CG 24 D.” Pursuant to these instructions, the 3rd Battalion moved up behind L Company.
On the afternoon of 7 July, Colonel Robert R. Martin had now arrived at Chonan from Taejon. General Dean and Colonel Martin had been good friends since they served together in the 44th Division in Europe in World War II. As soon as he was ordered to Korea, General Dean requested the Far East Command to assign Colonel Martin to him. Arriving by air from Japan, Colonel Martin had been at Taejon approximately one day when on the morning of 7 July General Dean sent him northward to the combat area. Colonel Martin took over the command of the 34th US Infantry at 1500 hours on 7 July.

In the meantime, the 34th US Regiment, following the Division Commander's orders, had moved north once more, setting up defense positions in slightly north of Chonan. As the 3rd Battalion moved north out of Chonan men in the point saw enemy troops on high ground at 1300 hours. These enemy troops withdrew several times as the American point advanced cautiously. Finally, about seven to eight kilometers north of Chonan enemy small arms fire and some mortar shells came in on the Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I & R) Platoon. The advance halted. It was past midafternoon. Colonel Lovless emplaced an artillery gun in a gap in the hills about five kilometers north of Chonan; from there he could place direct fire in front of L Company.

A liaison plane now came over and dropped a message for Colonel Lovless which read, "To CO 34th Infantry, 1600 7 July. Proceed with greatest caution. Large number of troops on your east and west flanks. Near Ansong lots of tanks (40-50) and trucks. Myang-myon large concentration of troops. Songhwan-ni large concentration of troops trying to flank your unit. (Sgd) Dean."

Both Colonel Lovless and Martin now drove to the command post of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, to acquaint Lieutenant Colonel Ayres with this intelligence and the situation north of Chonan. When they arrived there they found Brigadier General Pearson Menoher, Assistant Division Commander, the 24th US Division, and Brigadier General Church. General Menoher gave Colonel Lovless an order signed by General Dean relieving him of command of the 34th Infantry and directing that he turn over the command to Colonel Martin. Colonel Martin likewise received an order to assume command. The change of command took place at 1800 hours. Colonel Lovless had been in the command of the regiment only a month or two before the Korean War started.

While the change of command was taking place at the 1st Battalion command post, S-3, Major Dunn had gone forward from the regimental command
Deployment of Ground Forces

post to find the 3rd Battalion moving into a good defensive position north of Chonan with excellent fields of fire. While he talked with Lieutenant Colonel David H. Smith, the 3rd Battalion Commander, the 1 & R Platoon leader drove in a jeep. He reported that an estimated forty enemy soldiers had ambushed his platoon in a small village one and a half kilometers ahead. The platoon had withdrawn, he said, but three of his men were still in the village.

Major Dunn started forward together with the leading rifle company, intending to attack into the village to rescue the men. As he was making preparations for this action, Major Boone Seegars, the 3rd Battalion S—3, came from the direction of the village with several soldiers and reported that he had found the missing men. Major Dunn then cancelled the planned attack and directed the company to take up a blocking position. Major Dunn went back to find the 3rd Battalion Commander, but he could find neither the Battalion Commander nor the Executive Officer at the battalion defensive position.

Major Dunn went to the command post and headed the retreating 3rd Battalion back north. Then with Major Seegars, two company commanders, and a few men in a second jeep, he went on ahead. Nearly a kilometer short of the position that Major Dunn wanted the battalion to reoccupy, the two jeeps were fired on from close range. Majors Dunn and Seegars were badly wounded, others were also hit. An enlisted man pulled Major Seegars to the roadside. Major Dunn estimated there were about thirty or forty enemy advance scouts in the group that ambushed his party. An unharmed officer ran to the rear, saying he was going for help.

From his position on a little knoll, Major Dunn could see the leading rifle company behind him deploy when the firing began, drop to the ground, and return the enemy fire. The men were close enough that he could recognize them as they moved into line. But they did not advance, and their officers apparently made no attempt to have them rescue the wounded men. After a few minutes, Major Dunn heard an officer shout, "Fall back! Fall back!" and he saw the men leave the skirmish line and move to the rear. Major Dunn, who was captured and held thirty-eight months a prisoner in the Communist-held north, said the main enemy body did not arrive for two hours. Major Seegars apparently died that night. (See Sketch Map 3.)

The 3rd Battalion, in withdrawing to Chonan, abandoned some of its mortars. By the time the battalion reached the town its units were mixed up and in considerable disorder. South of the town, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, the Battalion Commander, received an order to return to Chonan and defend
Colonel Martin, the new commander of 34th Infantry, led a Headquarters Company patrol north of Chonan and recovered jeeps and other abandoned 3rd Battalion equipment.

By 1700, 7 July, the 3rd Battalion was in a defensive position along the railroad tracks west of Chonan and along the northern edge of the town. Some of the troops organized the concrete platform of the railroad station as a strongpoint. Other mined a secondary road running from northwest into the town to prevent a surprise tank attack from that direction.

In the early part of the evening some enemy pressure developed from the west. At 2000 hours a battery of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, newly arrived in Korea, emplaced south of Chonan to support the 34th Regiment. Soon thereafter it fired its first fire mission, employing high explosive and white phosphorus shells, against a column of tanks and infantry approaching the town from the east, and reportedly destroyed two tanks. This enemy force made the first infiltration into Chonan shortly before midnight.

After midnight, reports to the regimental command post south of Chonan stated that approximately eighty men and Colonel Martin, who had gone into the town, were cut off by the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Wadlington, the Executive Officer of the 34th Infantry, reported this to General Dean at Taejon, and at the same time, said the regimental ammunition supply was low and asked for instructions. The Division Commander instructed Colonel Wadlington to fight a delaying action and to get word to Colonel Martin in Chonan to bring his force out under cover of darkness. General Dean learned with great relief from a message sent him at 0220 hours, 8 July that Colonel Martin was now back at his command post and that the supply road into Chonan was open.

Sometime before daylight Colonel Martin went back into Chonan. About daylight an enemy tank approached on the dirt road running into Chonan from the northwest. Others were following it. They came right through the mine field laid the day before, but none exploded.

This enemy group of five or six tanks entered Chonan and opened fire on the railroad station, the church, several buildings suspected of harboring Americans soldiers, and all vehicles in sight. In the street fighting that followed, members of the 3rd Battalion reportedly destroyed two tanks with bazookas and grenades. Private Leotis E. Heater threw five grenades onto one tank and set it burning. The enemy infantry penetrated into Chonan about 0600 hours and cut off two rifle companies.

In this street fighting, Colonel Martin, the Commanding Officer of the 34th
Infantry, met his heroic death about 0800 hours, 8 July. Colonel Martin had obtained a 2.36-inch rocket launcher when the enemy tanks entered Chonan and posted himself in a hut on the east side of the main street. He acted as gunner and Sergeant Jerry C. Christenson of the regimental S-3 Section served as his loader. Sergeant Christenson told Major Dunn a month later when both were prisoners at the Communist prison camp at Pyongyang that an enemy tank came up around a corner unexpectedly and pointed its gun at their building. Colonel Martin aimed the rocket launcher but the tank fired its cannon first from less than twenty-five feet, or at the same time that the Colonel fired the rocket launcher. An 85 mm. shell blew Colonel Martin in two. Concussion from the explosion caused one of Sergeant Christenson's eyes to pop from the rocket but he succeeded in getting it back in place. Three days later, on 11 July, the U.S. Far East Command awarded Colonel Martin posthumously the first Distinguished Service Cross of the Korean War. On the other hand Sergeant Christenson died in a North Korean Communist prison camp in December 1950, according to Major Dunn.

Meanwhile, that morning when Colonel Martin was fiercely engaging in the street fighting at Chonan, Lieutenant General Walker flew in from Japan and told Major General Dean at Taejon that the whole Eighth Army, including himself, was coming to Korea. Then, the two generals drove north toward Chonan to see what was going on. They learned at the command post of the 34th Infantry south of Chonan that Colonel Martin and his troops were trouble in the town and they were out of contact with their own front lines.

Generals Walker and Dean pulled on north, to the top of the last hill south of Chonan, wherefrom they watched the remnants of the 3rd Battalion being driven out. There they learned the news of Colonel Martin's death.

After Colonel Martin was killed in action, resistance had disintegrated and the enemy tanks and increasing numbers of infiltrating enemy troops quickly caused confusion in the ranks of the 3rd Battalion. Some of the battalion escaped from Chonan between 0800 and 1000 hours under a continuous white phosphorus screen laid down by the friendly artillery. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, was completely exhausted physically and was evacuated a day or two later. Lieutenant Colonel Wadlington, the Executive Officer of the 34th Infantry, placed Major Newton W. Lantron, the senior officer left in the battalion, in charge of the men at the collecting point. At 1000 hours the artillery began to displace southward. The 1st Battalion still held its blocking position south of the town.

General Dean ordered Colonel Wadlington to assume command of
the 34th Regiment and to withdraw it toward the Kum River. Just south of Chonan the highway splits, but converged on Taejon: The main road follows the rail line south and gently to the southeast leading to Chochiwon, the Kum River and farther to Taejon; the other goes almost straight south also to the Kum River at Kongju then angles eastward to Taejon. Both roads had to be defended. General Dean ordered the newly arrived 21st Infantry Regiment to fight a delaying action on the route to Chochiwon and the 34th Infantry to back down the Kongju road. The 19th Regiment, which had come all the way from Honshu, Japan, was just getting into a reserve position.

In the afternoon of 8 July, a count at the collecting point showed that 175 men had escaped from Chonan -- all that were left of the 3rd Battalion. The 34th Regimental Headquarters also had lost many officers trapped in the town. The Communist radio in the north claimed sixty prisoners at Chonan. The 3rd Battalion lost nearly all its mortars and machine guns and many individual weapons. When the 34th Infantry began its retreat south toward the Kum River line in the late afternoon, enemy troops also continued to move down immediately behind.

The enemy units that fought the battle of Chonan were the 16th and 18th Regiments of the 4th NK Division. The third regiment, called up from Suwon, did not arrive until after Chonan had fallen. Elements of the 3rd NK Division arrived at Chonan near the end of the battle and deployed east of the town.

The 21st US Infantry

The 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th US Division had now crossed from Japan to Korea. Following up its 1st Battalion (Task Force Smith), the remainder of the regiment had arrived at Pusan on the morning of 4 July. Under the command of Colonel Richard Stephens, the regimental troops arrived at Taejon before noon of 7 July. There Colonel Stephens received orders from General Dean within an hour to move northward to take up a delaying position at Chochiwon, support the 34th Infantry, and keep open the supply road to that regiment. At Chochiwon all was confusion. There were no train schedules or train manifests. Supplies for the 24th US Division and the troops of the I ROK Corps, which activated on 5 July at Pyongtaek, eastward at Chochiwon arrived all mixed together.

Colonel Stephens placed his 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carl C. Jensen, in position along the highway ten kilometers north of
Deployment of Ground Forces

Chochiwon. About two kilometers farther north, after they withdrew from their Chonan positions, he placed A and D Companies of the 1st Battalion in an advance blocking position on a ridge just east of Chonui. Chonui is approximately 19 kilometers south of Chonan in roadway distance and a little more than four and a half kilometers below the point where the Kongju road forks off from the main highway at the village of Hyangchon. (See Sketch Map 4.)

Late in the day on 8 July, General Dean issued an operational order confirming and supplementing previous verbal and radio instructions. It indicated that the 24th US Division would withdraw to a main battle position along the south bank of the Kum River, about 16 kilometers south of Chochiwon, fighting delaying actions at successive defensive positions along the way. The order stated, "Hold Kum River line at all costs. Maximum repeat maximum delay will be effected." The 34th Infantry was to delay the enemy along the Kongju road to the river; the 21st Infantry was to block in front of Chochiwon.

General Dean ordered one battery of 155-mm. howitzers of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion to Chochiwon for direct support of the 21st Infantry. Also in support of the regiment were A Company, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion (M24 light tanks), less one platoon of four tanks, replacing the 24th Reconnaissance Company tanks, and B Company of the 3rd US Engineer Combat Battalion. The 3rd Engineer Battalion itself was to prepare roadblock north of Kongju along the withdrawal route of the 34th Infantry and to prepare all bridges over the Kum River for demolition.

Messages from General Dean to Colonel Stephens emphasized that the 21st Infantry must hold at Chochiwon, that the regiment must cover the left flank of the ROK forces eastward in the vicinity of Chongju until the latter could fall back, and that he could expect no help for four days. General Dean wanted the 34th and 21st Infantry Regiments to delay the enemy approach to the Kum River as much as possible, and then from positions on the south side of the river make a final stand. The fate of Taegon would be decided at the Kum River line.

The Battle of Chonui
(9–10 July)

On the morning of 9 July, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st US Infantry completed moving into the positions north of Chochiwon, and the Battalion
Commander Lieutenant Colonel Jensen began registering his 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars. Engineers blew bridges in front of Chonui. By noon the 21st US Regimental Headquarters received a report that enemy tanks were moving south from Chonan.

In midafternoon, Captain Charles R. Alkire in command at the forward blocking position at Chonui, saw eleven tanks and an estimated 200 – 300 enemy infantry move into view to his front. He called for an air strike which came in a few minutes later. Artillery also took the tanks under observed fire. Five of the eleven tanks reportedly were burning at 1650 hours. Enemy infantry in Chonui came under 4.2-inch mortar and artillery fire. Aerial observers later reported that vehicles, including tanks, were burning just north of Chonui. At dusk another air report stated that of about 200 vehicles on the road from Pyongtaek to Chonui approximately 100 were destroyed or burning.

While this heavy bombardment of the enemy column was still in progress, the 21st US Regimental Commander arrived at the forward position about dusk and said he was going to stay overnight.

About 500 men of A and D Companies and fillers for B and C Companies who had arrived at Pusan too late to joint Task Force Smith for the Osan action comprised the composite battalion of the 21st Infantry at Chonui position. They occupied some a kilometer front on a low ridge 500 yards east of Chonui and on a hill 800 yards south of the town. The railroad and highway passed between the ridge and the hill. Still another hill westward dominated the left flank but there were too few troops to occupy it.

As the day of 10 July dawned with a ground fog billowing up from the rice paddies, the enemy began to approach at 0555 hours from the left flank first. At 0700, enemy mortar fire began falling on the ridge.

Lieutenant Ray Bixler with a platoon of A Company held the hill on the left where the enemy apparently centered his main attack, coming from the higher hill beyond it. A concentration of friendly registered mortar fire covered the little valley between the two hills and in the early part of the morning prevented the enemy from closing effectively with Lieutenant Bixler’s platoon. But an enemy group passed to the rear around the right flank of the battalion and now attacked the heavy mortar positions. At the same time, enemy tanks came through Chonui on the highway and passed through the infantry position.

At 0800 hours, the fog lifted. Chonui was still burning. Four tanks came into view from the north and entered the village. Colonel Stephens radioed for an air strike. The enemy tanks that had passed through the line earlier
were joining their flanking infantry group in an attack on the American heavy mortar positions. Colonel Stephens had already lost wire communication with the mortarmen; now he lost radio communication with them. The mortars fell silent. The enemy had overrun them. Although artillery still gave support, loss of the valuable close-in support of the 4.2-inch mortars proved costly.

At 0900, the enemy infantry came from Chonui and began climbing the ridge in a frontal attack against the center of the position. The artillery forward observeres adjusted artillery fire on them and turned them back. The T-34’s in Chonui now moved out of the town and began spraying the American-held ridge with machine gun fire.

Shortly after 1100, intense small arms fire erupted again at Lieutenant Bixler’s position on the left. Lieutenant Bixler radioed to Colonel Stephens at 1125 hours that he needed more men because of many casualties and asked permission to withdraw. The Regimental Commander replied saying: “Relief is on the way.” Five minutes later it came in the form of an air strike. Two American jet planes streaked in, rocketed the enemy tanks, and then strafed the enemy infantry on the left. Soon the enemy infantry resumed the attack as the planes departed. At 1132 hours, friendly artillery fire began falling on the ridge where the forward infantrymen were still fighting. The artillery forward observer’s radio had ceased working. Colonel Stephens ran to his jeep, 100 yards to the rear of the foxholes, and send a message to the regiment to stop the artillery fire; but it kept falling nevertheless.

Colonel Stephens at 1135 hours received another report from Lieutenant Bixler that the enemy surrounded him and that most of his men were casualties. That was his last report. The enemy occupied the position and most of Lieutenant Bixler’s men there died in their foxholes.

At 1205 hours, Colonel Stephens decided to pull back his troops on the ridge to save their lives. The small group leaped from their foxholes and ran across open ground to an orchard and rice paddies behind. While they were crossing the paddies, two American jet planes strafed them, thinking them enemy troops. There were no casualties, however. They safely moved back to the friendly lines. (See Sketch Map 3.)

In this action at Chonui, A Company had 27 wounded and 30 missing for a total of 57 casualties out of 181 men; D Company’s loss was much less; three killed and eight wounded. The Heavy Mortar Company suffered 14 casualties. Of the total troops engaged the loss was about 20 percent.

Upon reaching friendly positions, the 21st US Regimental Commander or-
ordered the 3rd Battalion Commander to counterattack and regain the Chonui positions. As a result, the battalion regained the ridge in front of the town, but was unable to retake Lieutenant Bixler’s hill south of the railroad. The 3rd Battalion rescued about ten men of A and D Companies who had not tried to withdraw under the shell fire.

During the counterattack in the afternoon, they learned the savagery of the NK Communists. They uncovered the first known enemy mass atrocity perpetrated on captured American soldiers. The bodies of six Americans, jeep drivers and mortarmen of the Heavy Mortar Company, were found with hands tied in back and shot through the back of the head.

American tanks on the morning of 10 July near Chonui engaged in their first fight of the Korean War. In the afternoon, tanks participated in the 3rd Battalion counterattack. One of them got in a first shot on an enemy tank and disabled it. Two American light tanks were lost during the day.

Elements of the 4th NK Division had pressed on south after the capture of Chonan and they had fought the battle at Chonui. Leading elements of the 3rd NK Division following the 4th by one day, came up to Chonui late on the 10th.

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of 10 July, the Fifth US Air Force caught a large convoy of the enemy tanks and vehicles at Pyongtaek far north of Chonui and launched a massive airstrike on them, employing every available plane of B-26’s, F-80’s, and F-82’s.
The Battle at Chochiwon
(11–12 July)

Just before midnight of 10 July the 3rd Battalion of the 21st US Infantry began to withdraw from the recaptured ridge east of Chonui, bringing along most of the equipment lost earlier in the day. When the battalion arrived at its former position it received a surprise. Enemy soldiers occupied some of its foxholes. Only after an hour-long battle K Company cleared the NK odds from its old position.

In a message to Colonel Stephens of the 21st Infantry at 2045 hours, 10 July, General Dean suggested withdrawing the 3rd Battalion from this regained position. But he left the decision to the Regimental Commander, saying, "If you consider it necessary, withdraw to your next delaying position prior to dawn. I am reminding you of the importance of the town of Chochiwon. If it is lost, it means that the ROK Army will have lost its MSR." An hour later, General Dean authorized withdrawing back six and a half kilometers to the next delaying position some three kilometers north of Chochiwon, but ordered, "Hold in your new position and fight like hell. I expect you to hold it all day tomorrow."

Meanwhile, Task Force Smith, reequipping at Taejon, had received 205 replacements and on 10 July it received orders to rejoin the parent regiment at Chochiwon. Lieutenant Colonel Smith arrived there with B and C Companies before dawn of 11 July. A and D Companies had reequipped at Chochiwon and they joined with B and C Companies to reunite the 1st Battalion. Colonel Smith now had his battalion together in Korea for the first time. At 0730, 11 July, the 1st Battalion was in position along the highway some three kilometers north of Chochiwon. About six and a half kilometers north of it the 3rd Battalion was already engaged with the enemy in the next battle.

At 0630 that morning, men in the 3rd Battalion position heard tanks to their front on the other side of a mine field under fog. Within a few minutes four enemy tanks crossed the mine field and loomed up in the battalion area. Simultaneously, enemy mortar fire fell on the battalion command post, blowing up the communication center, the ammunition supply point, and causing heavy casualties among headquarters troops. Approximately 1,000 enemy infantry enveloped both flanks of the position. Some forward observers had fine targets but their radios did not function. Consequently these forward observers were unable to call in and direct mortar and artillery fire on the Red odds.
The enemy attack soon disorganized the 3rd Battalion and destroyed its communication before it had a chance to fight back. Enemy road-blocks behind the battalion prevented evacuation of the wounded or resupplying the battalion with ammunition. For several hours units of the battalion fought as best they could and many desperate encounters took place. In one these, when an enemy machine gun placed a band of fire on K Company's command post, Private Paul R. Spear, armed with only a pistol, charged the machine gun emplacement alone, entered it with his pistol empty and, using it as a club, routed the enemy gunners. Enemy fire seriously wounded him.

The enemy forces overran the 3rd Battalion. Before noon, survivors in small groups made their way back toward Chochiwon. Enemy fire killed Lieutenant Colonel Carl C. Jensen, the Battalion Commander, and Lieutenant Leon J. Jacques, Jr., his S-2, when they tried to cross a stream in the rear of their observation post. The Battalion S-1 and S-3, Lieutenants Cashe and Lester, and Captain O'Dean T. Cox, Commanding Officer of L Company, were reported missing in action. The 3rd Battalion of the 21st Infantry lost altogether nearly 60 percent of its strength in this action. A remnant of eight officers and 142 men able for duty was organized into a provisional company of three rifle platoons and a heavy weapons company. By 15 July a total of 322 out of 667 men had returned to the battalion. Four tanks of A Company, 78th US Heavy Tank Battalion, were lost to enemy action north of Chochiwon on 10 and 11 July. The 21st Regiment on 10 and 11 July north of Chochiwon lost material and weapons sufficient to equip two rifle battalions and individual and organic clothing for 975 men. (See Sketch Map 4.)

At Chonui the 3rd NK Division had passed the 4th NK Division on the main highway. It struck the blow against the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Infantry, while the 4th NK Division turned back from Chonui and took the right fork toward Kongju, following the retreating 34th US Regiment.

Toward evening of 11 July, after he had full information of the fate of the 3rd Battalion, 21st US Infantry, General Dean, the 24th US Division Commander, ordered A Company, 3rd US Engineer Combat Battalion, to prepare every possible obstacle for the defense of the Chochiwon area and to cover, if necessary, the withdrawal of the regiment. General Dean also ordered the 19th US Infantry Regiment and the 13th US Field Artillery Battalion to move from Taegu and Pohang to Taejon during the day.

That night the 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry rested uneasily in its positions some three kilometers north of Chochiwon. At dawn, 12 July, an enemy patrol approached C Company's position, and then the enemy units began moving on both flanks. At 0930 hours an estimated enemy battalion,
supported by artillery fire, attacked on the left flank of the 1st Battalion. Very quickly, a general attack developed by an estimated 2,000 enemy in strength. Colonel Stephens, the 21st Regimental Commander, decided that the understrength 1st Battalion, with its larger percentage of untrained troops, would have to withdraw. At noon, he sent a message to General Dean, reporting, "Am surrounded. The 1st Battalion giving way. Situation bad on right. Having nothing left to establish intermediate delaying positions, forced to withdraw to river line. I have issued instructions to withdraw."

Lieutenant Colonel Smith disengaged the 1st Battalion by moving one company at a time. Regimental trucks loaded the troops near Chochiwon. While the Infantry were displacing southward, enemy artillery began shelling in Chochiwon, but there was no close pursuit.

By 1530 hours, 12 July, the 1st Battalion occupied new defensive positions on the south bank of the Kum River where the highway crossed it at Taepyong-ni. The 21st Infantry Regiment completed its withdrawal across the Kum River at 1600 hours, but stragglers were still crossing the river five hours later. A thin line of approximately 325 men held the new blocking position at the river -- 64 men from the 3rd Battalion, the rest from the 1st Battalion.

In the series of battles between Chonui and Chochiwon the understrength two battalions of the 21st US Infantry had delayed two of the best NK Communist divisions for three days.

A Kum River bridge was destructed by US troops before withdrawing to the south bank of the Kum on 12–13 July.
Deployment of Ground Forces

The 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry, meanwhile, had covered the retreat on the Kongju road and fought a series of minor delaying actions against the leading elements of the 4th NK Division. Four light M24 tanks of the 78th US Tank Battalion joined the battalion, and D Company of the 3rd US Engineer Combat Battalion prepared demolitions along the road. In the afternoon of 11 July, enemy action destroyed three of the four tanks, two of them by artillery fire and the third by infantry close attack when the tank tried to rescue personnel from a litter jeep ambushed by enemy infiltrators. Remnants of the 3rd Battalion had led the retreat. After reorganizing as composite company and reequipping at Taejon, it returned to Kongju on the 11th. The next day the 63rd US Field Artillery Battalion and the 34th Infantry crossed the Kum River. The last of the infantry and Lieutenant Colonel Ayres, the 1st Battalion Commander, crossed at dusk. To implement General Dean's orders -- "Leave a small out-post across to river. Blow the main bridge only when enemy starts to cross" -- Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Wadlington, Acting Commander of the 34th Infantry, had L Company hold the bridge and outpost on the north bank for 600 yards.
CHAPTER IV  THE COMMAND SYSTEM AND BUILD-UP

Section 1.  The Activation and Operation of the U.N. Command

On 7 July (New York time) the Security Council of the United Nations took the third of its important actions with respect to the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea. By a vote of seven to zero, with two abstentions and one absence, it passed a resolution to form a unified command in Korea and asked the United States to name the commander. The resolution also requested the United States to provide the Security Council with "appropriate" reports on the action taken under a unified command and authorized the use of the United Nations flag. The next day, 8 July (Washington time), President Truman of the United States issued a statement, saying he had designated General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as the "Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces," under the unified command.

The last important act in establishing the unified command in Korea took place on 14 July when President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea placed the Republic of Korea Armed Forces under the operational control of General MacArthur. Accordingly, General MacArthur received his orders from President Truman and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as executives of the U.N. Security Council. The field executive of the U.N. Command's orders in turn was the Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army, those orders also controlled the ROK Army. The Eighth Army Commander, of course, directed the ROK Army through the ROK Army Chief of Staff to take certain actions regarding the ROK forces, with the exception that those ROK units and or troops attached to the U.S. organizations.

The United Nations was now at war in full swing against the Communist aggressors for the first time in its history, specifically to protecting the Republic of Korea which the very United Nations had brought into being in 1948 two years ago. Eventually sixteen nations from East and West -- Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the
Command System and Build-up

Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, in alphabetical order — rallied under the banner of the blue-and-white flag of the United Nations for the great cause of mankind: Freedom and peace. Furthermore, there were hospital units from Italy, Norway and Sweden, a hospital ship from Denmark and even a field ambulance unit from India.

It is needless to say that the Communist aggressors were seriously embarrassed owing to the prompt and vigorous actions taken by the free nations in giving the Republic of Korea cover and support with their armed forces. The Communist strategy of surprise invasion was to overrun the whole peninsula as quickly as possible by all means -- blitzkrieg tactics -- to establish the fact of a communized Korea before the United States and the United Nations could arrive on the peninsula in force. Now, the Communists were at the end of their hope, they had to fight against the U.N. allies.

Section 2. The Eighth Army in Command

General Walker Assumes Command in Korea

The Eighth U.S. Army, with Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker in command, as already mentioned earlier in the preceding chapter, had been prepared for any eventual involvement in Korea immediately after the NK Communist forces had crossed the 38th Paralle. The 24th US Infantry Division, one of its four subordinate divisions, had already been committed in battle beginning from the early days of July. The 25th US Infantry Division and the 1st US Cavalry Division were being prepared to rush in to Korea, while the 7th US Infantry Division was in stand-by status.

On 6 July, 1950, General Walker was told by General MacArthur that the Eighth Army would control the field operations in Korea. On the morning of 8 July, by order of General Walker, the advance party of the Eighth Army, led by Colonel William A. Collier, flew from Ashiya Air Base in Kyushu, Japan to Pusan and then by light plane to Taegon. There General Dean, General Church and Colonel Collier conferred about the situation. As a result, they arrived at a conclusion to set up the Eighth Army Headquarters at Taegu instead of Taegon. They knew that General Walker wanted the headquarters as close to the front as possible, but Taegon was not a place for it at this juncture, particularly due to the tactical situation. So Colonel Collier drove to Taegu and, after checking around the city together with the local
General Walker (left) is greeted on arrival at Taejon by General Dean.

ROK officials, he decided to establish the Eighth Army Headquarters there. Then, he telephoned without delay Colonel Eugene M. Landrum, General Walker's Chief of Staff, in Yokohama, Japan to start the Eighth Army staff to Korea. The next day, 9 July at 1300 hours, the Eighth Army's advance party opened its command post at Taegu.

The retreat of the 24th US Infantry Division across the Kum River on 12 July coincided with assumption by the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) of command of ground operations. General Walker upon verbal instructions from General MacArthur assumed command of all U.S. Army forces in Korea effective 0001, 13 July. That evening, Brigadier General Church and his small ADCOM staff received orders to return to the Far East Command in Tokyo, except communications and intelligence personnel who were to remain temporarily with EUSAK.

General Walker arrived in Korea on the afternoon of 13 July to assume operational control of the Eighth US Army operations. That same day, the ROK Army Headquarters moved from Taejon to Taegu. General Walker at once established tactical objectives. The Eighth Army was to delay the enemy advance, secure the current defensive line, stabilize the military situation, and to build up for future offensive operations. From then onward all the ROK and American ground forces in Korea, as well as other U.N. troops which would come later, came under the operational control of the Eighth US Army. General Walker, however, did not receive formal notification of his command of the ROK Army operations until 17 July, when General MacArthur sent word that he was to assume operational command of all the Republic of Korea ground forces pursuant to President Syngman Rhee's expressed desire. During the day, General Walker accepted from Colonel Alfred G. Katzin, representing the United Nations, the United Nations flag and displayed it in his Eighth Army Headquarters in Taegu.

Military Build-up

As of 13 July, the day General Walker's arrival in Korea, there was total
force of approximately 76,000 men -- 58,000 ROK’s and 18,000 Americans. It was far powerless to halt the North Korean Communist forces. The ROK and US forces were thus badly in need of more combat forces as well as such armament and supplies as heavy tanks, high-velocity cannon, heavy mortars, antitank mines, antitank shells trucks, trip flares, spare gun barrels, radios, and among the ROK’s ample rations of rice and subsistence.

Almost from the outset of American participation, General MacArthur had formulated in his mind the strategical principles on which he would seek victory. In his early estimate, General MacArthur had asked for Marines which were to spearhead an early counteroffensive with just two divisions. He proposed to use naval and air superiority to support an amphibious operation in the enemy rear. By the end of the first week of July he was realized that the NK Communist army was a formidable force. His first task was to estimate with reasonable accuracy the forces he would need to place in Korea to stop the enemy and fix it in place, and then the strength of the force he would need in reserve to land behind the enemy’s line.

By the time Task Force Smith first engaged the NK Red odds in combat north of Osan, General MacArthur had sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington by a liaison officer his requests for heavy reinforcements, most of them already covered by radio messages and teletype conferences. His requests included the 2nd Infantry Division, a regimental combat team from the Fleet Marine Force, the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, a Marine beach group, a Marine antiaircraft battalion, 700 aircraft, two air squadrons of the Fleet Marine Force, a Marine air group echelon, 18 tanks and crew personnel, trained personnel to operate LST’s, LMS’s, and LCVP’s, and three medium tank battalions, plus authorization to expand existing heavy tank units in the Far East Command to battalion strength.

On 6 July, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff requested General MacArthur to furnish them his estimate of the total requirements he would need to clear the NK Communist forces out of the south. He replied on 7 July that to halt and hurl back the enemy would require four and a half full-strength infantry divisions, an airborne regimental combat team, and an armored group of three medium tank battalions, together with reinforcing artillery and service elements. He said 30,000 reinforcements would enable him to put such a force in Korea without jeopardizing the safety of Japan. He evaluated the situation saying, “Once he (NK Communist forces) is fixed, it will be my purpose fully to exploit our air and sea control, and, by amphibious maneuver, strike him behind his mass of ground forces.”

By this time General MacArthur had received word from Washington that
bomber planes, including two groups of B-29's and twenty-two B-26's, were expected to be ready to fly to the Far East before the middle of July. The carrier *Boxer* would load to capacity with F-51 planes and sail for the Far East. But on 7 July he learned that only forty-four of the 164 F-80 fighter planes were on their way, and that the rest could not be sent because the U.S. Air Force did not have them.

Meanwhile, Major General Dean, the 24th US Infantry Division Commander, had sent to General MacArthur an urgent request for speedy delivery of 105-mm. howitzer high-explosive antitank shells for direct fire against tanks. General Dean, said that his troops who had used the 2.36-inch rocket launcher against enemy tanks had lost confidence in their weapons, and urged immediate air shipment from the United States of the 3.5-inch rocket launcher.

The next day, 9 July, General MacArthur considered the situation sufficiently critical in Korea to justify using part of his B-29 medium bomber force on the battle area targets. He also sent another message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, saying in part: "I strongly urge that in addition to those forces already requisitioned, an army of at least four divisions, with all its component services, be dispatched to this area without delay and by every means of transportation available."

On the other hand, elements of the 25th US Infantry Division had already begun to arrive in Korea as reinforcements. The division, commanded by Major General William B. Kean, was the second U.S. division to be committed in the war and arrived in Korea between 10 and 15 July. On the 8th, General Kean and an advance party flew from Osaka, Japan to Taejon for a conference with General Dean. Two days later, 10 July, the 27th US Regiment landed at Pusan, the 24th US Infantry on the 12th, and the 35th US Infantry between 13 and 15 July. The 1st US Cavalry Division was going to be rushed in also from Japan. Its elements would begin to land at Pohang on the east coast on 18 July.

On 10 July, General MacArthur received word that the 2nd US Infantry Division and certain armor and antiaircraft artillery units were under orders from the continental United States to proceed to the Far East. The first ships carrying the division units steamed from Tacoma and Seattle on 17 July. The first echelon of the division would set foot on the Korean soil on 29 July.

After the battle of Choschiwon by the 24th Division on 11 and 12 July, Lieutenant General Walker decided to request immediate shipment to Korea
of the 29th US Infantry Regiment (two battalions) on Okinawa. Upon receiving the request on 12 July, General MacArthur ordered the Ryukyus Command to prepare the regiment for movement. This independent regiment would disembark at Pusan on 24 July.

The worsening tactical situation in Korea impelled General MacArthur to order the Far East Air Force, on 13 July, to employ B-26 and B-29 bombers to the maximum extent against the enemy divisions thrust down the central mountain areas. Moreover, there would be another independent infantry regiment -- the 5th Regimental Combat Team -- to come in from Hawaii at the end of July.

In the meantime, following the commitment of U.S. Army troops, the 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade was ordered to Korea in early July. This Marine ground-air team was formed at Camp Pendleton, California on 7 July, the same day the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution creating the U.N. Command. The first echelon of the Marines would arrive in Pusan by water on the afternoon of 2 August, while the Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33) started sail for Korea from Sandiago, California on 14 July. Thus, the American combat power in Korea grew gradually as the days passed by. But, the initiative was still in the enemy's hands. Bogus Kim Il-sung, the ringleader of the North Korean Communists, had continuously been urged his fellows through a number of supervisory groups to fight still more vigorously so as to communize the whole peninsula by 15 August, fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese rule.

Logistical Support

During the early stage of the war, the condition of weapons and supplies was equally bad as seriously as the deficiencies of combat troops not only in numerical strength but also in training status, the ROK Army in particular. Accordingly, it was one of the serious problems faced by General MacArthur's headquarters how to fulfill the logistical requirements. On 1 July the U.S. Far East Command directed the Eighth Army to assume responsibility for all logistical support of the ROK, U.S. and Allied forces in Korea. When the Eighth Army became operational in Korea, this logistical function was assumed by the Eighth Army Rear which remained behind in Yokohama, Japan. Thus dual function of the Eighth Army led to the designation of that part of the Army in Korea as the Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK). This situation existed until 25 August 1950. On that date the Far East Command activated the Japan Logistical Command
with Major General Walter L. Weible in command. It assumed the logistical duties previously held by the Eighth Army Rear.

The logistical support of the ROK and American troops in Korea would have to come from the United States or Japan. Under the direction of General MacArthur's headquarters, Japanese manufactures in July began making antitank mines and on 18 July a shipment of 3,000 of them arrived by ship at Pusan. During July and August 1950 an average of 4,000 automotive vehicles a month cleared through the ordnance repair shops in Japan.

Of necessity, an airlift of critically needed items began almost at once from the United States to the Far East. The Military Air Transport Service (MATS), expanded immediately upon the outbreak of the war. The Pacific airlift was further expanded by charter of civil airlines planes. The Canadian Government lent the United Nations a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron of six transports, while Belgian Government added several DC-4's.

Meanwhile, on 30 June a group of American officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis A. Hunt had arrived in Korea to organize the logistical effort in support of the U.S. troops. Then, on 4 July, Brigadier General Crump Garvin and his staff arrived at Pusan and activated the Pusan Base Command by orders of the Far East Command. This command was reorganized on 13 July by the Eighth US Army as the Pusan Logistical Command and further reorganized a week later. The Pusan Logistical Command served as the principal logistical support organization in Korea until 19 September 1950 when it was redesignated the 2nd US Logistical Command.
CHAPTER V  THE DEFENSE OF THE KUM RIVER LINE
(13—17 July 1950)

Section 1. The Defense Plan

The Front Line Situation

On 13 July 1950, the date that Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker assumed the operational command of all U.S. forces in Korea, Eighth US Army, and also the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), the friendly combat units were deployed west to east as follows: Headquarters of the 24th US Division and its 19th Regiment at Taejon; the 34th US Regiment at Kongju; the 21st US Regiment at Tuman-ni with elements at Chochiwon; the 17th Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division along the railroad between Chochiwon and Chongju; Headquarters of the 1 ROK Corps at Chongju; the Capital ROK Division north of Chongju; the 2nd ROK Division (minus) at Maam-ni; the 6th ROK Division at Chungju; the 8th ROK Division at Changnim-ni; the 23rd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division at Yongdok on the east coast. The Eighth US Army Advance Headquarters and the 27th Regiment (minus) of the 25th US Division was at Taegu with elements at Pohang; the Eighth Army Rear CP was at Pusan; and the 25th US Division CP was at Yongchon east of Taegu.

In the meantime, the ROK and American forward lines were crumbling under continuous and steady Communist pressure. The most perilous enemy drive, centering its main effort on the Seoul—Pusan highway, was still on the western front, where the 24th US Division, facing the 4th and 3rd NK Divisions, was holding along the south bank of the Kum River near Kongju and Taepyeong-ni. On the westmost sector the 6th NK Division struck down unexpectedly. On the central front, the 2nd, 5th, and 1st NK Divisions advanced toward the Chungju, Kyesan, and Chungju areas defended by the Capital, 2nd, 1st and 6th ROK Divisions from west to east.

Below Wonju, while the 6th ROK Division tried to defend the Chungju corridor, the 8th ROK Division encountered the 12th NK Division at Tanyang
on 12 July. The 1st NK Division, having entered the central sector from the northwest, turned south at Chungju and on the 12th approached positions of the 6th ROK Division just above Mungyong. On the remote east the 5th NK Division, after seizing Ulchin, advanced down along the coastal road against the 23rd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division. On 7 July, General MacArthur, awaring of the tactical weight of this road, ordered General Dean in turn ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 19th US Infantry Regiment, then assembling at Taegu, to proceed to Pohang, where it arrived on 8 July. By 9 July an antiaircraft company also was at Pohang and heavy engineering equipment was enroute by LST to improve and extend the Yonil airstrip by 3,000 feet.

Thereafter the 25th US Infantry Division arrived in Pusan between 10 and 15 July to strengthen American ground forces. Its 27th Regiment at first went to the Uisong area, about 56 kilometers north of Taegu. The 25th Division Commander Major General William B. Kean opened its command post at Yongchon about 13 kilometers east of Taegu. He was ordered by General Dean on 12 July to dispose less one battalion which was to secure Yonil airstrip near Pohang. One regiment was to be in reserve at Kimchon north of Taegu ready to move either to the Taejon or the Chongju area. The next day, 13 July, the 27th US Regiment moved from Uisong to Andong to take up blocking positions north of Andong behind the ROK troops.

On 13 July, with the 24th US Division in defensive positions along the south bank of the Kum River, the front extended along that river to a point above Taejon, where it bent slightly north of east to pass through Chongju and across the high Taebaek passes south of Chungju and Tanyang, and then curved slightly south to the east coast at Pyonghae, about 32 kilometers above Yongdok and 80 kilometers north of Pohang.

The Strategic Weight of Taejon

The Kum River is the first large stream south of the Han River flowing generally north from its source in the mountains of southwestern Korea. 16 kilometers east of Taejon, the river slants northwest, then bends southwesterly course to the Western Sea. In its semicircle around Taejon, the river constitutes in effect a great moat, much in the same manner as the Naktong River protects Taegu and Pusan farther south. (See Sketch Map 5.)

Protected by this water barrier, Taejon lies at the western base of the Sobaek Mountains. The main Seoul — Pusan railroad and highway passes there. The little village of Taepyong-ni stood there on the south bank of the Kum River northwest of Taejon, while Kongju is located on the northwest of
Taejon. Secondary roads angle off from Taejon into all of southern Korea. Thus, geographical and communication factors gave Taejon unusual military importance.

Therefore, Major General Dean's primary concern at this juncture was Taejon. He wanted hold out there until the 1st US Cavalry Division could come west to reinforce his division.

Defense Setup for the Kum River

On 13 July, the intelligence officer of the 24th US Division estimated that two enemy divisions at 60 to 80 percent strength with approximately fifty tanks were closing on the division front. Enemy prisoners identified them as the 4th NK Division following the 34th US Infantry and the 3rd NK Division following the 21st US Infantry. This indicated a two-pronged attack against Taejon, and perhaps a three-pronged attack if the 2nd NK Division moving south next in line to the east could drive the ROK forces out of its way in time to join in the effort.

Behind the Kum River line, the 24th US Division Commander placed his units in a horseshoe-shaped arc in front of Taejon. The 34th Infantry (with a strength of 2,020 men) was in and around Kongju on the left, the 19th Infantry (2,276 men) in the Taepyong-ni area on the right, and the 21st Infantry (1,100 men) in a reserve position at Okchon southeast of Taejon. On the extreme left, the 24th Reconnaissance Company in platoon-sized groups watched the principal river crossing sites below Kongju. Thus, the division formed a two-regiment front, each regiment having one battalion on the line and the other in reserve.

The 24th US Division was still in poor condition for it had suffered 1,500 men missing in action in the first week of July, of which 1,433 men were from the 21st Regiment. The consolidated division strength on 14 July was 11,440 men including 2,007 men of the division artillery.

Action against the Kum River Line began first on the left (west), in the sector of the 34th US Regiment, with Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Wadlington in acting command.

Section 2. The Battle at Kongju (13–14 July 1950)

On the high ground Kongju, astride the Kongju—Nonsan road, the 3rd
Defense of the Kum River Line

Battalion of the 34th US Regiment was in its defensive positions. On line from left to right were, L, I, and K Companies, with the mortars of M Company behind them. The 63rd US Field Artillery Battalion was about four kilometers south of the Kum River in their support. Its 105-mm. howitzers were placed in position along a secondary road near the village of Samgyo-ri. The battery positions were, from north to south, A, Headquarters, B, and Service. On the 13th, Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Dawson, the Battalion Commander, was evacuated to Taejon because of illness, and Major William E. Dressler assumed command of the battalion.

About five kilometers farther south, the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry was in an assembly area astride the road. The regimental command post was located at Bonggok-ni (Ponggong-ni).

According to an enemy officer captured by an outpost of the 34th Infantry Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon during the night of 11 July, the 16th Regiment of the 4th NK Division had the mission to capture Kongju. The enemy division was now down to 5,000–6,000 men, little more than half strength. T-34 tanks led the division column, which included 40 to 50 pieces of artillery.

At 0400 hours, 13 July, D Company of the 3rd US Combat Engineer Battalion blew the steel truss bridge in front of Kongju. A few hours after daybreak enemy set up machine gun position with tank covering behind it across the river. That afternoon, the enemy began shelling Kongju, but there was little action on the 13th. That night, K Company, a composite group of about forty men of the 3rd Battalion was evacuated to Taejon because of combat fatigue.

There were now only two under-strength rifle companies in front of Kongju  – L company on the left and I Company of the right, with some mortars of the Heavy Weapons Company behind. These troops knew of no friendly units on their left. On their right were elements of the 19th US Regiment, but there was a three kilometer-wide gap between that flank and the 19th US Infantry position eastward on the regimental boundary.

With daylight of 14 July, enemy tanks were firing into I Company’s area. Simultaneously, about 0620 hours, enemy artillery shells exploded in air bursts over L Company’s position. Soon thereafter the enemy troops began to cross by barge on the exposed left below L Company. Estimatedly 500 NK Reds crossed between 0800 and 0930 hours. Then, they attacked toward the position of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion behind Kongju.

Soon after the enemy crossed the river, L Company left its positions
overlooking the Kum about 1100 hours. Lieutenant Archie L. Stith, the Company Commander, after ordering the withdrawal, went in search of the 3rd Battalion Headquarters. He finally found it near Nonsan, about 30 kilometers south of Kongju. Learning what had happened, the Battalion Commander relieved Lieutenant Stith of his command and threatened him with court martial. (See Sketch Map 6.)

Meanwhile, shortly afterward, about 1330 hours, an outpost of the 63rd US Field Artillery Battalion reported enemy troops coming up the hill toward them. It received instructions not to fire unless fired upon as the men might be friendly forces. As a result, the enemy group overran the machine gun outpost and turned the captured gun on Headquarters Battery. Thus, the 16th Regiment under the 4th NK Division surprisingly began the attack on the artillery battalion.

The first enemy mortar shell hit Headquarters Battery switchboard and destroyed telephone communication to the other batteries. In rapid succession mortar shells hit the command post, the radio truck, and an ammunition truck, which caused further confusion.

A second force of about a hundred enemy soldiers started attacking down almost simultaneously from the west and soon brought A Battery under fire at 150 yards' range. Mortar fire began to fall on the battery position, causing most of the artillerymen to leave their gun position. Some of them, however, fought courageously, like Corporal Lawrence A. Ray. Captain Lundel M. Southerland, the A Battery Commander, was killed in this action.

After overrunning A and Headquarters Batteries, the enemy, estimatedly about 400 men, turned on B Battery, commanded by Captain Anthony F. Stahelski. A group of the ROK cavalry rode past the battery and attacked west toward the enemy, but it caused the confusion. Then, the enemy kept B Battery under fire.

An hour and a half after the first enemy appeared at the artillery position the entire 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, with the exception of Service Battery, had been overrun, losing ten 105-mm. howitzers with their ammunition and from 60 to 80 vehicles. The five guns of A Battery fell to the enemy intact. Eleven officers and 125 enlisted men of the artillery battalion were missing in action.

General Dean, the 24th US Division Commander, did not expect to hold Kongju indefinitely, but he did hope for a series of delaying actions that would prevent the enemy from accomplishing an early crossing of the Kum River at Kongju, a quick exploitation of a bridgehead, and an immediate drive on Taejon.
Upon learning the artillery disaster Colonel Wadlington, the Acting Commander of the 34th Infantry at once ordered the 1st Battalion, with Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Ayres in command, to launch a counterattack to rescue the men and equipment in the artillery area and drive the enemy westward.

The 1st Battalion a little after 1700 hours moved out northward in a column of companies in attack formation. When C Company approached within a hundred yards of the overrun artillery position after about five-kilometer movement, enemy small arms fire began to concentrate on the company. Dusk was at hand, and then the battalion started to turn back. Starting at 0100 hours, 15 July, the battalion moved out of its former position by a motor column toward Nonsan.

On the next morning, 15 July, the 24th Division ordered an air strike on equipment lost or abandoned to the enemy in the enemy-held area.

During the day I Company of the 34th US Infantry stayed in its position on the river line, despite being under endless enemy fire. That night at 2130 hours, the company withdrew on order and rejoined the regiment. The 34th Infantry now occupied new positions just east of Nonsan early in the morning of 15 July.

In their first day of attack, the enemy forces had widely breached the Kum River Line. The left flank of the 19th US Regiment was now completely exposed.

By nightfall of 15 July some small groups of the 4th NK Division had pressed south from the Kum River and were in Nonsan.

Section 3. The Battle at Taepyong-ni (13–16 July 1950)

The Defense Formation

The 19th Infantry Regiment of the 24th US Division, commanded by Colonel Guy S. Meloy, Jr., which had begun to arrive in Korea on 4 July, was now in position to relieve the 21st US Infantry Regiment on the south bank of the Kum River before dark of 12 July. But the formal relief for the regimental sector did not take place until 0930 hours that next day.

The 19th Infantry’s zone of responsibility was widely extended from high ground just east of the railroad bridge, 13 kilometers north of Taejon, west-
ward along the river to within five kilometers of Kongju. This was a river distance of almost 50 kilometers because of the stream's numerous deep folds. Necessarily, there were wide gaps between some of the units in disposing a regiment. The main regimental position was astride the Seoul — Pusan highway where it crossed the Kum River at Taepyong-ni, about midway of the regimental sector. Colonel Guy Meloy, the 19th US Regimental Commander placed the 1st Battalion on the front line, keeping the 2nd Battalion in reserve back of the 1st Battalion.

Engineer demolition troops had blown the highway bridge over the Kum at 2100 hours, 12 July and also the next morning. On the 15th, they destroyed the railroad bridge upstream at Sinchon. The Kum River, now swollen by rains, could be waded at many points when its waters fell.

On the regimental right, near Sinchon, the railroad bridge lay just within the 2nd ROK Division zone of responsibility. On high ground west of the railroad and the mouth of Kap-chon, a large tributary, E Company held defensive positions commanding the Kum River railroad crossing site. West of E Company there was an entirely undefended some three-kilometer gap. Beyond this gap C Company occupied three northern fingers of strategically located Hill 200 nearly five kilometers northeast of Taepyong-ni. Downstream from C Company there was a 1,000 yard gap to where A Company's position began behind a big dike along the bank of the Kum. The A Company sector extended westward beyond the Seoul — Pusan highway at Taepyong-ni. One platoon of A Company was on 500-foot high hills south of the Taepyong-ni dike.

West of the highway, the 1st Platoon of B Company joined A Company behind the dike, while the rest of the company was on high ground which came down close to the regimental boundary there was little protection. One platoon of G Company manned an outpost three kilometers away. The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, a platoon of engineers, and a battery of artillery, all under the command of Captain Melicio Montesclaros, covered the last five kilometers of the regimental sector in the direction of Kongju.

The command post of the 1st Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Otho T. Winstead, was at the village of Kadong, about a kilometer and a half south of the Kum River, while that of the 19th Infantry was at the village of Palsan, farther to the rear on the highway.

In the 2nd Battalion area, there were two platoons of G Company behind A Company, while F Company held position behind B Company. The 4.2-inch mortars of the Heavy Weapons Company were east of the highway.

Artillery supporting the 19th US Infantry consisted of A and B Batteries,
52nd US Field Artillery Battalion; A and B Batteries of the 11th US Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers) and two batteries of the 13th US Field Artillery Battalion, coordinated their firing. The 52nd Field Artillery Battalion emplaced its pieces along the main highway at the village of Tuman-ni, while the 11th and 13th Field Artillery Battalions were farther behind it. The large parts of the 26th US Anti-aircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) and of A Company of the 78th US Heavy Tank Battalion (light M24 tanks), were at Taegon. (See Sketch Map 7.)

Friendly aerial strikes on the 14th failed to prevent the build-up of enemy armor on the north side of the Kum River opposite Taepyong-ni. Enemy tank fire started falling in the 19th Infantry's zone at 1300 hours, 14 July. Yet, there were some minor attempted enemy crossings during the day. None succeeded. That afternoon the 34th Infantry was collapsed at Kongju on the left flank of the 19th Infantry.

On the morning of 15 July, enemy troops attempted to cross the river on the extreme left flank of the 19th Infantry. Colonel Meloy ordered the remainder of G Company; one machine gun platoon and a section of 81-mm. mortars, H Company; two light tanks from the 26th Antiaircraft Battalion -- in all, two thirds of his reserve -- to reinforce the small force on the exposed left flank. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. McGrail, the 2nd Battalion Commander, led these troops to the left flank. Colonel Meloy now had only F Company in reserve behind the 1st Battalion in the main battle position. This lack of an adequate reserve would seriously harm him later in fighting against enemy flank movement on the 16th.

That morning, 15 July, on the other hand, Colonel Richard W. Stephens at 0600 hours started his 21st Infantry Regiment from the Taejon airstrip for Okchon, taking one battery of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion with him. Major General Dean had ordered the move so that the regiment would deploy on the high hills astride the highway in that vicinity to protect the rear of the 24th US Division.

As evening of 15 July approached, the 19th US Regimental Commander alerted all units in battle positions for an enemy night crossing. Enemy source indicated that all day the 3rd NK Division had made preparations for an attack on the Kum River line, and repeated friendly air attacks seriously hampered the movement of its heavy equipment.

Just before dusk, enemy tanks began coming down across the river in front of B Company. Soon thereafter the enemy tanks and artillery began firing at the same time. The 1st Battalion had called for an air strike. Two
THE BATTLE OF TAEPYONG-NI (13–16 JULY 1950)

Sketch Map 7
planes arrived over the river and stayed over the area until dark.

Small groups of enemy troops attempted to test the American river defenses. Heavy Weapons Company's fire inflicted heavy casualties on this crossing attempt at and near the bridge, but some of the enemy groups got across under cover of tank fire.

Upstream in front of Hill 200 (Koehwa-san) another enemy crossing attempt was under way in front of C Company. A concentration of the combined fire from all company weapons supported by that from part of the Heavy Weapons Company repelled this attack and two more that followed after short intervals.

With his first river crossing attacks repulsed, the enemy made ready his major effort. At 0800 hours Sunday, 16 July, an enemy plane flew over the Kum River and dropped a flare, signalling for a coordinated attack. As the intensity of the fire from enemy guns grew, the NK Reds used boats and rafts, or waded and swam, and in every possible way tried to cross the river. A heavy barrage of American artillery, mortar, and supporting weapons fire met this attack.

At the most critical time of the enemy crossing, the 1st Battalion through the regiment requested a slight shift of the flare area. But the artillery personnel misunderstood the request and laid the howitzer on an azimuth that required moving the trails of the piece.

At 0400 hours, enemy troops succeeded in crossing the river in front of the gap between C and E Companies on the regimental right and struck the 1st Platoon of the C Company for the fourth time that night. In the midst of this enemy attack, Lieutenant Thomas A. Maher, the 1st Platoon Leader, was killed in action, and the platoon sergeant brought out only about a dozen of men. In the next few hours the enemy extensively infiltrated to the rear of C Company and then struck on the heavy mortar position near the village of Tongchang.

Simultaneously with this crossing at the right of the main regimental position, another was taking place below and the left flank of the main battle position. This one lasted longer and apparently was the largest of all. At daybreak, an enemy force with 300 to 400 men in strength already had crossed southwest of B Company. There followed continuous crossing at a ferry site. Captain Monroe Anderson of B Company called in artillery fire on the enemy crossing force and Colonel Meloy of the 19th Infantry did likewise through his artillery liaison officer.

An hour later or so the enemy was crossing everywhere in front of the regiment. By 0630 hours the command post and the Heavy Weapons Com-
pany of the 1st Battalion were under the enemy attack. Soon the Red odds made deep penetrations and about 0800 hours overrun part of the positions of A Company and the right hand platoon of B Company behind the dike. They then continued on south across the flat paddies and seized the high ground at Kadong-ni.

The Regimental Commander Colonel Meloy and the 1st Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Winstead immediately set about organizing a counterattack force from the 1st Battalion Headquarters and the Regimental Headquarters Companies, consisting of all officers present, cooks, drivers, mechanics, clerks, and the security platoon. Colonel Meloy brought up a tank and a quad-50 antiaircraft artillery half-track to help in the counterattack. The counterattack force drove the enemy from the high ground at Kasong-ni by 0900 hours. Some of the enemy troops crossed back to the north side. In leading this attack, Major John M. Cook, the 1st Battalion Executive Officer, and Captain Alan Hackett, the Battalion S-1, lost their lives. It was understood by General Dean that after dark the 19th Infantry would fall back from the river line to a delaying position closer to Taejon.

Soon thereafter infiltrated Reds behind the main line began to fire on many points of the 1st Battalion position and on the main supply road. Then came a report that an enemy force had established a roadblock about five kilometers to the rear on the main highway. Upon receiving this report, Colonel Meloy immediately ordered the 2nd Battalion Commander to bring up G and H Companies to break the roadblock. Almost at the same time, however, Colonel Meloy received a report from Lieutenant Colonel Stratton, the 13th US Field Artillery Battalion Commander, that he was engaged with the enemy at the artillery positions.

Hours after daylight, six friendly air planes appeared over the front. Now the regiment sent back an urgent call for an air strike on the enemy roadblock force.

Scattered, spasmodic firing continued for the whole morning, and Colonel Meloy gave instructions to Lieutenant Colonel Winstead, the 1st Battalion Commander, concerning withdrawal of the troops after dark.

The enemy troops who set up the roadblock behind the regiment had crossed the Kum River below B Company west of the highway. They bypassed B and F Companies.

About 1000 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Miller O. Perry, the 52nd US Field Artillery Battalion Commander, from his command post near Tuman-ni, saw a long string of enemy troops pass over a mountain ridge. He ordered A Bat-
tery to place fire on this enemy column, and informed the 13th Field Artillery Battalion below him that an enemy force was approaching it. A part of this enemy force turned toward the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion and headed for B Battery. B Battery hastily turned two or three of its howitzers around and delivered direct fire at the enemy. The enemy mortars fired into B Battery position. One of their first rounds killed the Battery Commander and his first sergeant. Lieutenant Colonel Perry hastily assembled a small attack force of wire, medical and fire direction personnel not on duty and some 19th Infantry soldiers who were in the vicinity. He led this group out against the flank of the North Koreans Reds, directing artillery fire by radio as he closed with them. The combined fire from B Battery, Colonel Perry's group, and the direct artillery fire repulsed this enemy attack.

Before noon the enemy force again turned east to the highway about 800 yards south of the 52nd Field Artillery position. Soon the 11th and 13th Field Artillery Battalions came under long-range fire as well as ineffective small arms fire.

As the day wore on, the enemy built up his roadblock force below Tuman-ni where the highway made a sharp bend going south.

When Colonel Meloy, the 19th Infantry, and his S-3, Major Edward O. Logan, arrived at the scene they found small groups of soldiers, entirely disorganized, were returning some fire in the general direction of the unseen enemy. While trying to organize a group to attack the enemy on the high ground overlooking the road Colonel Meloy was wounded. He got hit in calf of leg. He now gave to Lieutenant Colonel Winstead, the 1st Battalion Commander, commander of all troops along the Kum River.

The 19th Infantry's S-3 established communication with Major General Dean about 1300 hours, and he reported him that the Regimental Commander Colonel Meloy had been wounded, that Lieutenant Colonel Winstead was in command, and that the regimental situation was bad. General Dean ordered the regiment to withdraw at once. Soon after this conversation, enemy fire struck and destroyed the regimental radio truck, and there was no further communication with the division. After instructing Major Logan to try to reduce the roadblock, Lieutenant Colonel Winstead started back to his 1st Battalion along the river. Shortly after 1330 hours he ordered it to withdraw. In returning to the Kum River, Colonel Winstead went to his death.

In that early evening, Major General Dean ordered Major Logan, the 19th Infantry's S-3, should continue on south and form a new position just west of Taegon airfield, while saying that Lieutenant Colonel McGrail, the 2nd Bat-
talion Commander, would lead two tanks and the antiaircraft vehicles which had arrived earlier to break the roadblock.

Meanwhile, back near Kongju on the regimental west flank, G Company, commanded by Captain Michael Barszcz, had withdrawn his company to Yusong west of Taejon, where he met Brigadier General Pearson Menoher, Assistant Division Commander, the 24th US Division. Fearing that enemy tanks were approaching, General Menoher ordered him to deploy men along the river bank in the hot spring town.

Captain Barszcz met wounded Colonel Meloy while G Company was withdrawing toward Yusong, and together with Lieutenant J.N. Roush, a tank commander, he tried to evacuate Colonel Meloy. Eventually, an officer brought a commandeered truck and took Colonel Meloy and other wounded men to Yusong.

All afternoon, all night, and into the next day, 17 July, strugglers and those who had escaped through the hills filtered into Yusong and Taejon. Only two rifle companies of the 19th Regiment were relatively intact -- G and E Companies. On the eastern flank near the railroad bridge, E Company was not engaged during the Kum River battle and that night received ordered to withdraw.

When Captain Barszcz encountered Colonel Meloy at the stalled tank the latter had ordered him to dig in across the road at the first good defensive terrain at Yusong. There G Company dug in and occupied the most advanced organized defense position of the 24th US Division beyond Taejon on the morning of 17 July.

The Personnel and Equipment Losses

The battle of the Kum River in 16 July was a black day for the 19th US Infantry Regiment. Of the approximately 900 men in position along the river only 484 reported for duty in the Taejon area the next day. A count disclosed that of the 34 officers in the regimental Headquarters, Service, Medical, and Heavy Mortar Companies, and the 1st Battalion, 17 were killed or missing in action. Of these, 13 later were confirmed as killed in action. All the rifle companies of the 1st Battalion suffered heavy casualties, but the greatest was in C Company, which had total casualties of 122 men out of 171. The regimental headquarters lost 57 out of 191 men. The 1st Battalion lost 338 out of 785 men, or 43 percent, the 2nd Battalion, 86 out of 777 men; the 52nd US Field Artillery Battalion had 55 casualties out of 393 men.
or 14 percent. The total loss of the regiment and all attached and artillery units engaged in the action was 650 out of 3,401, or 19 percent.

Moreover, the 19th US Infantry regimental headquarters and the 1st Battalion lost nearly all their vehicles and heavy equipment north of the roadblock. The 52nd Field Artillery Battalion lost eight 105-mm. howitzers and most of its equipment; it brought out only one howitzer and three vehicles. The 13th and 11th US Field Artillery Battalions, three kilometers south of the 52nd, withdrew in the late afternoon to the Taejon airstrip without loss of either weapons or vehicles.

During 17 July, B Company of the 34th US Infantry Regiment relieved G Company of the 19th Infantry in the latter's position at Yusong, eight kilometers northwest of Taejon. The 19th Infantry that afternoon moved to Yongdong, southeast of Taejon, to re-equip.

The Battle Lessons

In the battle of the Kum River on 16 July one sees the result of defending force lacking an adequate reserve to deal with enemy penetrations and flank movement. Colonel Guy S. Meloy, Jr., the 19th US Regimental Commander, who later became the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command (1 July 1961-31 July 1963), well after the armistice, never faltered in his belief that if had not had to send two-thirds of his reserve to the left flank after the setback of the 34th US Regiment at Kongju, he could have prevented the NK Communist units from establishing their roadblock or could have reduced it by attack from high ground. The regiment did repel, or by counterattack drive out, all frontal attacks and major penetrations of its river positions except that through C Company on Hill 200 (Koehwa-san). But it showed no ability to organize counterattacks with available forces once the roadblock had been established. By noon, demoralization had set in among the troops, many whom were near exhaustion from the blazing sun and the long hours of tension and combat. They simply refused to climb the hills to attack the enemy's automatic weapons positions.

The 3rd NK Division pressed an attack which aimed to pin down the 19th US Regiment by frontal attack while it carried out a double envelopment of the flanks. The envelopment of the American left flank resulted in the fatal roadblock five kilometers below the Kum River on the main supply road. This North Korean puppet forces' method of attack had characterized most of other earlier actions and it seldom varied in later ones.
CHAPTER VI  THE BATTLE OF TAEJON DEFENSE
(18—21 July 1950)

Section 1. The Operation Plans of the Both Sides

The Enemy Attack Plan

After the fall of the Han River defense line, the enemy's next main objective was to capture Taejon, an important communication center. For this end two enemy divisions had crossed the Kum River and were now ready to advance to the attack of Taejon itself. The 3rd NK Division was closer to the city and approaching it along the main highway from the northwest, while the 4th NK Division, in the Kongju—Nonsan road area, was northwest and west of the city and in a position to join the 3rd NK Division in a frontal attack or to move south then east in a flanking maneuver that would bring it to the rear of Taejon.

In addition, in the enemy plan, the 2nd NK Division was supposed to join the 4th and 3rd NK Divisions in the attack on Taejon. This division was advancing on the east of the other two and had been heavily engaged for some days with the Capital Division of the ROK Army in the Chinchon—Chongju area, where it suffered crippling casualties. As events turned out, this enemy division did not arrive in time to join in the attack, nor did the other two need it. Had it come up as planned it would have appeared on the east and southeast of Taejon.

If past practice signified anything for the future, the NK Communist forces would advance against Taejon frontally with a force strong enough to pin down the defenders and attack first with tanks in an effort to demoralize the defenders. Thus far, their tanks had led every advance and nothing had been able to stop them. While this frontal action developed, strong flanking forces would be moving to the rear to cut off the main escape route. The 4th NK Division was in a favored position to execute just such a flanking maneuver against Taejon from the west and southwest. Had the 2nd NK Division arrived on the scene as planned it would have been in a position to do the same thing from the east and southeast. The 3rd NK Division was in
position between these two divisions and was expected to exert the main front-
tal pressure in the forthcoming attack.

The Friendly Situation

In any deployment of his forces against the enemy forces in front of Taejon, 
Major General Dean, the Commanding General of the 24th US Division, faced 
fact that he had only remnants of defeated regiments. In addition to numeri-
cal weakness, all the troops were tired and their morale was not best. General Dean braced himself for the task ahead. The 19th Infantry 
combat-ineffective after the ordeal of the 16th July at Taepyong-ni and at 
Yongdong for re-equipping, the defense of the entire line fell upon the 34th In-
fantry, now commanded by newly arrived Colonel Charles E. Beauchamp 
from the 7th US Division in Japan. Thus, there were neither troops nor weap-
ons enough to halt the advance of the overwhelming Communists.

General Dean had no intention of fighting a last-ditch battle for Tae-
jon. He looked upon it as another in the series of delaying actions to which 
the 24th US Division had been committed by General MacArthur to slow the 
enemy advance, pending the arrival of sufficient reinforcements to halt and 
then turn back the enemy. Expecting that the North Korean Communist 
forces would arrive before the city just as soon as they could get their tanks 
across the Kum River, General Dean on 18 July made plans to evacuate Taejon 
the next day.

But General Dean’s plan was changed by the arrival of General Walker at 
the Taejon airstrip before noon of the 18th. General Walker’s major question 
was that “when and where can I stop the enemy and attack him?” His final 
decision was that the 24th US Division and the ROK Army should 
execute maximum delay on the North Korean Communists in order to assure 
stopping them west and north of a general line connecting the Naktong River— 
Yongdok on the east coast. He hoped to get the 1st US Cavalry Division de-
ployed in the Okchon area and south of Taejon along the Kumsan road, think-
ing this might provide the opportunity to stop the enemy between Taejon and 
Taegu. General Walker felt that if he was forced to fall back behind the Naka-
tong River he could stand there until Eighth Army’s troop and equipment 
built-up would permit him to take the offensive. As a result, General Dean 
informed the 21st Regiment shortly afternoon that the withdrawal from Tae-
jon planned for the 19th would be delayed 24 hours. The regiment passed 
this information to the engineer demolition teams standing by at the tunnels 
east of Taejon.
Battle of Taejon Defense

In 1950 Taejon, with a population of about 130,000 was in size the sixth city of the Republic of Korea, a rapidly growing inland communication center. 160 kilometers south of Seoul and 208 kilometers northwest of Pusan. The railroad ran along its eastern side of the station in the city's northeast quarter. Two arms of the Taejon River, the main one flowing northwest through the center of the city and the other curving around its eastern side, joined at its northern edge. About three kilometers farther north the Yudung River emptied into it and the Taejon River then flowed into the Kap River (Kap-chon), a large tributary of the Kum River.

Defense Setup

The highway net can be visualized readily if one imagines Taejon as being the center of a clock dial. Five main routes of approach came into the city. The main rail line and a secondary road ran almost due south from the Kum River to it. On this approach, a platoon of I Company, 34th US Infantry, established a road and rail block. From the east at 4 o'clock the main Seoul — Pusan highway entered the city, and astride it about ten kilometers eastward the 21st US Regiment held a defensive blocking position in front of Okchon with the regimental command post in that town. There were two rail and two highway tunnels between Taejon and Okchon.

From the south, the Kumsan road entered Taejon at 5 o'clock. The Reconnaissance Company manned there at Kumsan to protect and warn the division of any enemy movement from that direction in its rear. At 8 o'clock the Nonsan road from the southwest slanted into the Seoul — Pusan highway west of the city. Astride this road a platoon of L Company, 34th Infantry, held a roadblock at the bridge over Kap-chon at the southern end of the 34th Infantry defensive position. At the western edge of Taejon where the Nonsan road joined it, the highway turned east to enter the city. The Taejon airstrip lay on a little plateau north of the road three kilometers from the city. In front of the airstrip the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry was in battle position astride the highway at Hill 138 just east of the river, Kap-chon. A kilometer and a half farther west B Company occupied an advanced position.

Behind the 1st Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment held a ridge east of the airfield and between it and the city. The composite battalion of the division artillery, except the 155-mm. howitzers of the 11th US Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the regiment was emplaced at the airfield where it could fire on the expected avenues of enemy approach.

In the evening of 18 July General Dean took steps at his division command
post in Yongdong to bolster the defense of Taejon for an extra day, as desired by General Walker. He ordered the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry to move back to Taejon from Yongdong and B Battery of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion to return to the Taejon airfield from the vicinity of Okchon. At the same time he attached the Reconnaissance Company to the 34th Infantry Regiment, thus ordering the company to move from Kumsan to Taejon the next day. As a result, the 24th US Division became blind to what the enemy was doing on its southern flank. General Dean subsequently considered his releasing the company to the regiment as one of his most serious errors at Taejon.

The units of the 21st Infantry Regiment were astride that road and on the hills between Taejon and Okchon. General Dean also decided that this regiment should stay where it was, fearing an enemy penetration behind his Taejon position from the east through the ROK Army area there. (See Sketch Map 8.)

Major units and their respective commanders those who participated in the battle of Taejon were as follows:

The 24th US Division
   Assistant Div. Commander
   Maj. Gen. William F. Dean
   Brig. Gen. Pearson Menoher

The 34th Infantry Regiment
   Executive Officer
   Col. Charles E. Beauchamp
   Lt. Col. Robert L. Wadlington
   Lt. Col. Harold B. Ayres
   Maj. Newton W. Lantron (MIA)
   Capt. Jack E. Smith (Acting)
   Col. Guy S. Meloy, Jr.
   Lt. Col. Thomas M. McGrail

The 19th Infantry Regiment
   2nd Battalion Commander
   A Battery, 11th FA Battalion
   B Battery, 13th FA Battalion
   B Battery, 683rd FA Battalion
   A Battery, 26th AAA Battalion
   3rd Engineer Combat Battalion (-)

Secton 2. The Battle of Taejon

The First Day -- 19 July

The North Korean Communist attack against Taejon got under way the morning of 19 July. The first blow was an air strike against communication
ENEMY ATTACK AT TAEJON (19–20 JULY 1950)
lines in the rear of the city. At 0720 hours, six YAK's flew over the lines of the 21st Infantry and dropped four bombs on the railroad bridge some three kilometers northwest of Okchon. One bomb damaged the bridge, but by noon B Company of the 3rd US Engineer Combat Battalion had repaired it and restored rail traffic in both directions. The YAK's strafed near the 21st US Infantry command post and dropped propaganda leaflets signed by three American officers and three noncommissioned officers captured at Osan two weeks earlier. Four planes then strafed the Taejon airstrips. Later in the day, the crews of A Battery of the 26th US Antiaircraft Battalion, supporting the 1st Battalion of the 34th US Infantry, shot down two YAK's near Yusong, just west of Taejon.

Meanwhile, the US Air Force also went into action early on the 19th. It bombed and burned known and suspected points of enemy concentration west and southwest of Taejon. Aerial observers at noon reported that enemy tanks and artillery were moving south of the Kum River at Taepyong-ni. The Air Force operated at considerable disadvantage at this time, however, for there were only two strips in Korea suitable for use by F-51 and C-47 types of aircraft -- the K-2 dirt strip at Taegu and the similar K-3 strip at Yonil (Ochon) near Pohang. South of Chinju, the K-4 strip at Sachon was available as an emergency field. Most of the tactical planes flew from Japan.

After completing its crossing at Kongju, the 4th NK Division split its forces for a two-pronged attack on Taejon. The bulk of the division, comprising the 16th and 18th NK Infantry Regiments, an artillery regiment, and most of the tanks, went south to Nonsan and there turned east toward Taejon. Some of the infantry of these regiments may have moved south out of Nonsan in a wheeling movement through Kumsan to the rear of Taejon. Other moved across back country trails to strike the Kumsan road south of and below Taejon. The 5th Infantry Regiment of the 4th NK Division supported by one tank company, left Kongju on the secondary road running to Yusong, and apparently was the first enemy unit to arrive at the outskirts of Taejon.

At 1000 hours, Colonel Beauchamp, the 34th US Regimental Commander, sent the 2nd Platoon of the 24th Reconnaissance Company southwest along the Nonsan road. Half an hour later, the patrol party encountered enemy fire and withdrew to the Kap River and there joined the platoon of L Company on the east bank of the stream. The remainder of L Company arrived and deployed.

General Dean had left Taejon that morning intending to go briefly to Yongdong. On the way he stopped at the 21st US Infantry command post at
Battle of Taejon Defense

Okchon. There he said suddenly about 1000 hours that he was worried about the disposition of the 34th Infantry and was going back to Taejon. When he arrived there, action already had started at the L Company roadblock on the Nonsan road. The battle of Taejon had begun. The General stayed in Taejon, about 45 kilometers forward of his headquarters in Yongdong. He hoped to encourage and stimulate the fighting spirit of the 34th Infantry and attached troops there in the city, and he also hoped to stop the T-34's with 3.5-inch bazooka. This was the weapon which General Dean had urgently requested on 3 July, and by 8 July supplies of the new 3.5-inch rocket launchers and shells took off from California and flew to Korea, arriving in Taejon on 12 July. He later explained in his book his other reasons for staying in Taejon: "These reasons were compounded of poor communication, which had cost me one valuable position up at Pyongtaek, and the old feeling that I could do the job better... if I stayed in close contact with what was happening..."

The 2nd Battalion of the 19th US Infantry arrived at the Taejon railroad station from Yongdong about this time. Just afternoon shortly after 1300, Colonel McGrail received an order saying that the enemy forces were breaking through L Company's blocking position at the Kap River and he was to attack there immediately and restore the position.

The 2nd Battalion attacked immediately with two companies abreast astride the Nonsan road, E on the left (south) and F on the right (north). On the right an enemy force was in the action of enveloping the north flank of L Company of the 34th Infantry. F Company raced this enemy force for possession of critical high ground, taking and holding it in the ensuing fight. On the left, E Company moved up south of the road, and G Company occupied a hill position behind it. Even with the newly arrived 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry deployed covering the Nonsan road, there was still a kilometer and a half-wide gap of high ground between it and the left of the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry to the north.

Coordinated with the enemy advanced along the Nonsan road was an enemy approach on the main Seoul highway. There in the Yusong area, B Company of the 1st Battalion, 34th US Infantry, came under heavy attack. Enemy flanking groups cut off two platoons north of Yusong. In the fighting there both platoon leaders were wounded and several men killed. Now large groups of enemy forces were assembling and artillery going into position in the little valley northwest of Yusong. The 1st Battalion Commander directed artillery fire and called in air strikes on these concentrations. In the afternoon he requested and received authority from his Regimental Commander to withdraw B Company from its exposed position at
Yusong to the main battalion position back of the Kap River.

Meanwhile, just before noon, the enemy forces began shelling the Taejon airstrip with counterbattery fire. This fire built up to great intensity during the afternoon. Frequent artillery concentrations also pounded the main battle positions of the 34th Infantry.

At 1400 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Ayres recommended to his Regimental Commander Colonel Beauchamp that the regiment withdraw that night. Colonel Beauchamp rejected this, thinking they could hold the enemy out of Taejon another day, and he so told Major General Dean, the 24th Division Commander. After dark, however, Colonel Beauchamp moved his 34th Infantry command post from the airstrip into Taejon. At the same time all the supporting artillery displaced from the airfield to positions on the south edge of the city.

As darkness fell, Lieutenant Colonel Ayres ordered his transportation officer to move the 1st Battalion vehicles into Taejon. He did not want to run risk of losing them during a night attack.

On the left of the defense position, F Company of the 19th Infantry had been under attack all afternoon. After dark on its right flank enemy troops were moving into the gap between the company and the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry.

Taejon was ominously quiet during the evening. About 2200 hours Colonel Ayres heard at his command post the rumble of tanks on his right. He sent a patrol out to investigate. It never reported back. Then, he reported to Colonel Beauchamp he thought enemy troops were moving around the city and again recommended withdrawal.

Before midnight a report came in to the 34th Infantry command post that an enemy unit was nine and a half kilometers south of Taejon on the Kumsan road. At 0300 hours, 20 July, a platoon of the Reconnaissance Company drove down the road to check the situation. Enemy fire stopped the platoon at the roadblock. Those platoon members saw the bodies of several men of
the earlier patrol also from the same company. A little earlier, at 0200
hours, word had come to Taejon that a jeep had been ambushed on the Okchon
road.

It would seem clear from these incidents that enemy units were moving
around to the rear of Taejon during the night. General Dean had stated that
he did not know of the enemy roadblock on the Kumsan road and the road sub-
sequently seemed to be clear. (See Situation Map 1, Appendix VI)

The Second Day -- 20 July

In the predawn of 20 July, at 0300, the 5th Regiment of the 4th NK Divi-
sion, together with its attached armored support, struck against the 1st Bat-
talion of the 34th Infantry. When he learned the enemy attack shortly after
0300 hours, the Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ayres could see
flares bursting over the battalion position.

The enemy attack, infantry and armor, came down both sides of the high-
way and rolled up the battalion right flank. Other enemy infantry attacked
from the north against this flank. The NK Reds penetrated to the 81-mm.
and 4.2-inch mortar positions behind the rifle companies and then struck
Headquarters Company. About 0400 small arms fire hit the 1st Battalion
command post. Colonel Ayres tried, and failed, to communicate with his
front line companies. He sent a message to the regimental headquarters
that tanks had penetrated his position and were headed toward the city. In
the growing confusion that followed and spread rapidly, Colonel Ayres
decided to evacuate his command post. Major Leland R. Dunham, the Bat-
talion Executive Officer, led about 200 men from the Heavy Mortar Company,
the Heavy Weapons Company, and the 1st Battalion Headquarters southward
from the Yusong Valley away from the sound of enemy fire. Colonel Ayres
and his S—3 followed behind the others. Day was dawning

In Taejon, after receiving the report that enemy tanks were in the 1st Bat-
talion, Colonel Beauchamp started by jeep down the road toward the 1st Bat-
talion command post to find out for himself just what the situation was. At
the road junction less than a kilometer west of Taejon, an enemy tank sud-
denly loomed up out of the darkness, and the tank fired its machine gun just
as Colonel Beauchamp jumped from his jeep; one bullet grazed him. Colonel
Beauchamp crawled back some hundreds of yards until he found a 3.5-inch
bazooka team. He guided it back to the road junction. This bazooka team
from C Company, 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion, knocked out the enemy
tank and captured the crew members. Later in the morning this rocket launcher team and one from the 24th Reconnaissance Company destroyed two more T-34 tanks approaching from the direction of the airfield.

This action at the crossroad just west of Taejon in the predawn was the first verifiable use of the 3.5-inch rocket launcher against the T-34 tanks.

Disturbed by reports of enemy penetrations of his regimental defense position, Colonel Beauchamp after daylight ordered the 3rd battalion (with Major Newton W. Lantron in command) to attack into the gap between the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry. K Company with part of M Company moved out. But on the road leading into the airfield it had a sharp encounter with a force of the 5th NK Regiment, an estimated infantry battalion with six T-34 tanks in support. In this action, Sergeant First Class Robert E. Dare of K Company courageously covered and directed the withdrawal of the advanced platoon at the cost of his own life.

In its defensive positions on the ridge east of the airfield, the 3rd Battalion remained undisturbed by enemy action throughout the morning except for a small amount of mortar and artillery fire. A peculiar incident had occurred however, which no one in the battalion could explain. The Battalion Commander, Major Lantron, disappeared. The Major got into his jeep about 0930 hours, drove off from his command post, and simply did not return. Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Wadlington, the 34th Regimental Executive Officer, learned of this happening about 1100 hours when he visited the 3rd Battalion. In Major Lantron’s absence, Lieutenant Colonel Wadlington ordered Captain Jack E. Smith to assume command of the battalion. Some weeks later, it was learned that Major Lantron was a prisoner in the Communist north.

At the time, on the other hand, neither the 34th Regimental Commander nor his Executive Officer knew of the fact that the K and M Company attack force was defeated by the enemy. From the vantage point of Taejon everything seemed all right. At this time, however, General Dean instructed Colonel Beauchamp to plan a withdrawal after dark on the Okchon road.

In the positions of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, covering the Nonsan road there, E Company held its position near the bridge, but north of the road F Company under enemy pressure withdrew approximately 200 yards about daylight.

When Major Leland R. Dunham, the Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, led the 1st Battalion and the 34th Regimental headquarters group south, followed at a short interval by Lieutenant Colonel Ayres, the 1st
Battle of Taejon Defense

Battalion Commander, and his small party, it was just after daylight. These men passed the high ground held by F Company of the 19th Infantry. As they neared the Nonsan road they saw F Company on the hill mass to their right was engaging in a heavy fire fight. Soon afterward the company began to leave the hill. Then, the main body of Colonel Ayres’s headquarters group climbed the mountain on the other side of the Nonsan road.

These two parties of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, united on high ground south of Taejon about an hour before noon. Even the rifle companies of the battalion, for the most part, had scattered into these mountains.

Thereupon, just before noon, on the mountain southwest of Taejon, the 1st Battalion Commander Colonel Ayres turnover command of his 150 men to his Executive Officer Major Dunham, with instructions to take them down to the Kumsan road about five kilometers south of Taejon and there establish a blocking position to protect the rear of Taejon. Then he set off with a small party including Major Curtis Cooper, his S—3; Captain Malcolm C. Spaulding of the Heavy Weapons Company; his radio operator; an interpreter; and Wilson Fielder Jr., a Time Magazine correspondent. About 400 yards short of the Kumsan road Colonel Ayres’s party encountered enemy troops, suffering casualties. There also was an estimated enemy battalion approaching toward Taejon along the road. On the way down toward the Kumsan road they engaged fire fight but soon moved into the draw at Kuwan-ni about five kilometers south of Taejon. Enemy troops fired on them from nearby finger ridges, hitting Major Dunham in neck, mortally wounded him. From there Major Dunham’s party fled west to the Yudung valley at Musu-ri. But none of these incidents were known to General Dean, Colonel Beauchamps, and the men in Taejon.

Soon after daylight, the 2nd Battalion Commander of the 19th Infantry, received a report at his command post east of the Yudung bridge that three enemy tanks blocked the road junction outside the city and that three more tanks were approaching the junction from the airfield.

The Battalion Commander ordered the 2nd Platoon, G Company open the road into the city. Upon arriving at the road junction, it found that Lieutenant Little and a reinforced squad armed with two bazookas held the road fork. Some men of H Company, 19th Infantry, passed the road block on their way into Taejon. The 2nd Platoon joined Lieutenant Little’s squad.

About 1100 hours Captain Melicio Montesclaros of the S—3 Section, the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry, volunteered to try to get into Taejon and reach the 34th Regimental Headquarters for instruction. Captain Montesclaros
reached the road junction and met the 2nd Platoon, G Company at the road block, and, much to his surprise, found the road into the city entirely open. At the edge of the city, he encountered General Dean and asked for instructions regarding the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry. General Dean replied, "I am not running this show, Beauchamp (the 34th Regimental Commander) is." He took the Captain to the 34th Infantry command post. Colonel Beauchamp was not present, but from a member of his staff Captain Montesclaros obtained a written order which directed Lieutenant Colonel McGrail to bring his 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry back to the west edge of Taejon.

Captain Montesclaros found all deserted when he drove back to the battalion command post. No one, neither friend nor foe, was in sight. He turned back toward Taejon and overlook E Company on the road. On his way back toward Taejon, Captain Montesclaros saw an estimated enemy battalion marching toward the city in a column of platoons. Accordingly, he decided not to try to get into Taejon but to join E Company instead.

On the other hand, Colonel McGrail, simply believing that the enemy had cut him off from Taejon, decided to move his command post to high ground south of the Nonsan road. He ordered E Company to fall back, and then his radio failed. Thus, he abandoned the command post shortly before noon and climbed the mountain south of Taejon. Already F Company was withdrawing into the hills.

Soon not a single unit of the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry was in its position west of Taejon. G Company was the last to leave its place. Shortly after noon, Captain Kenneth Y. Woods, S-3, 2nd Battalion of the 19th Regiment, arrived at G Company position and gave Captain Barscz instructions to join the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry, group that had passed him in the morning headed south. About 1300 hours Captain Barscz issued his orders for the withdrawal. The G Company 60-mm. mortars were firing at the time. The Weapons Section never got out during the withdrawal — the entire section of one officer and 18 men was lost to enemy action.

Except for the small group all the infantry and supporting weapons units of the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry in the battle positions west of Taejon had left those positions by 1300 hours. All of them could have come into Taejon on the Nonsan road. Instead, nearly all of them crossed this road approximately three kilometers west of the city and went south into the mountains.

Back at Taejon, the first enemy tanks had reached the edge of the city be-
before dawn. They came from the northwest along the Yusong road and from the airfield.

Soon after daylight two enemy tanks entered the city. They were soon followed by others. These tanks drove to the center of Taejon and there unloaded troops who spread quickly into buildings and began sniping that continued throughout the day. Some enemy tanks struck at the large compound of the Service Company of the 34th Infantry where the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry also had its kitchen trucks. Approximately 150 Americans were there at the time. After shooting up the compound, the enemy tanks rolled away and fired at various targets of opportunity.

In the meanwhile, Major General Dean and his aide, 1st Lieutenant Arthur M. Clarke, had awakened at the command post of the 34th US Regiment about 0530 hours to the sound of small arms fire. The General felt by intuition that his forlorn hope that the 34th Infantry could hold the Taejon defensive line long enough for more help to arrive was growing more forlorn by the minute. He knew that the 25th US Infantry Division would come to help him just as soon as the division had secured a vital airfield near Pohang. He also knew that the 1st US Cavalry Division was on the way. But the Taejon situation was as dangerous as sitting on a barrel of gunpowder. It was literally a light before the wind.

General Dean could not do anything at the moment about the fact that the 34th Infantry’s command post had lost contact with two of its leading battalions and did not know where its flanks were, or about battle in general. So he decided to go tank hunting because he thought perhaps he could do something about a couple of enemy tanks. It was about 0630 hours that an enemy tank passed close to the 34th Infantry command post headed west out of the city. General Dean immediately started in pursuit of this tank accompanied by two 2.36-inch rocket launcher teams. The tank went through the roadblock of the 2nd Platoon of G Company, 19th Infantry, without being fired on. It was too late for action when General Dean’s party arrived at the road fork. By 0900 hours, four of the five enemy tanks known to have entered Taejon had been destroyed, perhaps by 3.5-inch rockets and or 155-mm. howitzers. But General Dean lost an opportunity to hunt even one.

At noon another tank entered Taejon. A 3.5-inch bazooka team from the 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion destroyed it. Soon afterward still another penetrated into the city and rumbled past the 34th Infantry command post. General Dean went tank-hunting once more. This time he led a group, joined later by a 3.5-inch bazooka team from the 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion, in pursuit of this tank. But this first opportunity to get close the enemy tank
ended abruptly when enemy snipers began firing at him from the turrets. About 1400 hours, under General Dean's directions a bazooka team destroyed one enemy tank.

General Dean's personal pursuit of enemy tanks in Taejon was calculated to inspire his men to become tank killers.

During the day most of enemy tanks entered the city single or in small groups. It was estimated that American troops had destroyed eight enemy tanks in Taejon or its immediate vicinity by 1100 hours, six of them by 3.5-inch rockets and two by artillery fire. Engineer bazooka team destroyed two more T-34 tanks in the afternoon. This meant that American troops destroyed ten enemy tanks in Taejon on 20 July, eight of them with the new 3.5-inch rocket launcher, first used in combat that day.

As a whole, the enemy tanks did not cause panic in the city, nor did they cause any troops to leave it. They themselves lost heavily, mostly to the new 3.5-inch bazooka which they encountered for the first time. Thus, the Taejon battle demonstrated that for the future there was at hand an infantry weapon that, if used expertly and courageously, could stop the dreaded T-34.

Withdrawal from Taejon

Upon his return from tank-hunting to the 34th Infantry command post, General Dean joined Colonel Beauchamp for a lunch of cooked C-ration. They discussed the situation, which did not seem particularly alarming to them at the time. About 1400 hours, General Dean told the 34th Regimental Commander that instead of waiting for dark as they had planned earlier. He wanted him to initiate a daylight withdrawal because the chances would be better of getting the transportation out safely.

Colonel Beauchamp in turn instructed Major William T. McDaniel, his S-3, to send messages by radio or telephone to all units to prepare to withdraw. He then sent written orders by runners to the three infantry battalions. There was then no telephone or radio communication with the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, or the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry. The runners, of course, never reached these two battalions. But neither General Dean nor Colonel Beauchamp received any report on this. The 3rd Battalion of the 34th Infantry and the other miscellaneous units in and around the city received the withdrawal orders about 1500 hours. The planned march order for the movement out of Taejon gave the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry, the lead, followed by the artillery; the Medical Company; the 34th regimental
command group; the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry; and last, the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry.

About this time, a tank platoon of the 1st US Cavalry Division Tank Company arrived in Taejon for tank escort out of Taejon for administrative vehicles of the 34th Infantry. At about 1530 or 1600 hours, the tank platoon started with the first group for Yongdong.

Meanwhile, in the early afternoon, another large column of enemy troops, approximately in battalion strength, began to close on the city just west of Taejon, in the vicinity of Lieutenant Herbert’s roadblock (2nd Platoon, G Company of the 19th Infantry). Soon the enemy mortars and the howitzers began to shell the roadblock position. Lieutenant Herbert sent a runner into Taejon to report and ask for instructions. At the 34th Infantry command post a group of 50 men was assembled from Headquarters Company and sent back under Lieutenant William Wygal, S-2 of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, with orders to hold where he was until the artillery could be evacuated. With the reinforcements, Lieutenant Herbert’s troops exchanged fire with the NK Red odds and held them to their ridge position.

General Dean mistakenly thought that it was Lieutenant McGrail’s 2nd Battalion troops of the 19th US Infantry that were engaged. About this time, General Dean walked back from the tactical air control party to the 34th US Infantry command post and asked for Colonel Beauchamp. It was about 1700 hours. To his surprise he was told that no one had seen Colonel Beauchamp since about 1500 hours.

What had happened to Colonel Beauchamp? About the time the first of the vehicles started to form into convoy at the 34th Infantry command post and the tanks from Yongdong led the first of them out of Taejon, Colonel Beauchamp got into his jeep and drove to the southeast edge of the city along the withdrawal route. There he came up four light tanks of the 24th Reconnaissance Company and ordered the tankers to defend the Okchon road exit. Then, he came under enemy small arms fire when he starting back to Taejon. He decided to climb a nearby knob and reconnoiter the situation. There he saw numerous groups of enemy troops moving across country south of Taejon toward the Okchon road. Knowing that the first vehicles of the withdrawal convoys already had gone through, Colonel Beauchamp now decided to go on with the tanks he had with him to the pass about six and a half kilometers east of the city and to organize there a defensive force to hold that critical point on the withdrawal road. At the pass, he put the two tanks in position. Some artillery and a company of infantry passed through.
time was about 1630 hours. Still expecting the 21st Infantry to cover the withdrawal route, Colonel Beauchamp drove eastward to the command post of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and from there telephoned the 21st Infantry command post in Okchon. It chanced that Brigadier General Pearson Moenker, the Assistant Commander of the 24th Division, was there. He ordered Colonel Beauchamp to come on in to Okchon and give a detailed report. But again, none of these happenings were known in Taejon.

Meanwhile, General Dean ordered Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Wadlington, the 34th Regimental Executive Officer, to get the withdrawal under way about 1700 hours when he discovered that no one knew where Colonel Beauchamp was.

About this time, in response to the earlier withdrawal order, Captain Jack E. Smith, Acting Commander of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry, had brought his battalion, in trucks to the street corner in front of the regimental command post. There he was told by Major William T. McDaniel, the 34th Infantry S-3, to establish a perimeter defense to protect the initial point and to support an attempt to recover a battery of 155-mm. howitzers as what General Dean wanted.

Captain Smith unloaded L Company for the perimeter defense and sent the rest of the battalion on to join the convoy that was forming.

While the 2nd Platoon of G Company, 19th Infantry held off the enemy force at the west edge of Taejon, the artillerymen had shown no desire to limber up their artillery pieces under fire. When the platoon left its position to join the withdrawal, the North Korean Reds quickly occupied the platoon’s old position and advanced to the battery position. Learning of the impending loss of the 155-mm. howitzers, General Dean ordered Lieutenant Colonel Wadlington to organize a counterattack force from personnel at the command post to rescue the pieces. Major McDaniel, the regimental S-3, volunteered to organize and lead the counterattack. He drove the enemy troops from the battery position and kept down the enemy fire until he could bring up tractor prime movers and pull out the pieces. Lack of tractor drivers prevented taking them all out; those left were rendered inoperative.

By this time the enemy troops blocked the street at the southeast edge of Taejon. General Dean then sent a radio message to the 24th Division Headquarters in Yongdong, saying in effect, “Send armor. Enemy roadblock eastern edge City of Taejon.”

After a while, General Dean ordered Colonel Wadlington to close station
and move out. Enemy fire into and within the city had increased considerably. Now a column of enemy troops was approaching from the airfield toward Captain Smith's perimater defense position. Then the enemy attacked on L Company. General Dean told Captain Smith to cover for 45 minutes and then to withdraw. It was a few minutes after 1800 hours when the large, main convoy started to move.

With Colonel Wadlington at its head the convoy rolled down the street. Soon the convoy encountered heavy enemy fire, sweeping up and down the avenue. After exchanging fire for a short while, the convoy continued to move on. Soon they found themselves in dead-end streets, cut off by enemy fire on the east side of the city. There Colonel Wadlington and his companions started up the nearby mountain.

Meanwhile, the convoy group of about 125 men abandoned about 50 vehicles and started into the hills. During the night the group became separated into several parts. Some of them reached friendly lines the next morning, others on 22 July; some just disappeared and were never heard of again. After the first part of the convoy took the wrong turn, the remainder kept on the street leading to the Okchon road.

Just outside the city on the Okchon highway the convoy encountered enemy mortar fire. Everyone left the vehicles and sought cover in the roadside ditches, started for high ground, and prayed for darkness.

On the other hand, General Dean's vehicle and an escort jeep were scarcely past an intersection when his aide Lieutenant Clarke said him that they had missed the Okchon turn. Enemy fire prevented them from stopping to turn around, so they kept on going south down the Kumsan road. (See Sektkh Map 9.)

Just after dark an effort was made to break the enemy roadblock from the Okchon side. When Colonel Beauchamp, the 34th Regimental Commander, reached the 21st Infantry command post that afternoon he told Brigadier General Menoher of the threatened roadblock. There he was ordered by General Menoher to take the rifle company that had come through the past and a platoon of light tanks at the 21st Infantry command post and go back and hold the pass open. Colonel Beauchamp took the five tanks and on the way picked up approximately 60 men of I Company, 34th Infantry. It was getting dark when the groups passed through the lines of the 21st Infantry.

Short of the pass, they encountered the enemy mortar fire from the both sides of the road. In about two hours the tankers and the men of I Company had expended their ammunition and withdrawn.
Although there were enemy troops scattered all along the withdrawal route out of Taejon, their principal roadblock began about three kilometers east of the city on the Okchon road near the small village of Chojon. Most of the enemy fire came from the west side of the defile, but there were also enemy firing from the east side in the later stages.

All night long the several hundred men caught in the roadblock walked south and east through the mountains. Many finally reached safety at the 24th Division lines 32 kilometers farther east near Yongdong on 22 and 23 July. Lieutenant Colonel Wadlington was among those who reached the friendly lines on the morning of 22 July.

During the night of 20—21 July, at the 21st Infantry command post in Okchon, General Menoher and Colonel Richard W. Stephens discussed the situation and decided to withdraw the regiment in a delaying action rather than to "hold at all cost." The 21st Infantry and 52nd Field Artillery Battalion began leaving their Okchon positions shortly after 1100 hours. Engineer troops destroyed the last bridge across the Kum River east of Okchon. The regiment successfully withdrew 32 kilometers to prepared positions on the east side of the Kum River, some eight kilometers northwest of Yongdong.

Not all the troops withdrawing from Taejon followed the main Okchon highway, although they were supposed to. Many missed the tricky turn at the southeast edge of Taejon and found themselves on the Kumsan road. Once on this road and under fire they kept going. For instance, Captain Smith and his L Company of the 34th Infantry, after passing the Okchon turn inadvertently, kept on down the Kumsan road. His ground fought its way south through small roadblocks, clearing the last one just before dark. In his group Captain Smith had men from practically every unit that had been in Taejon. He led this group south through Kumsan, Anui, and on to Chinju. From there he reached Pusan by train. Leaving the wounded in Pusan, he continued on with the others to Taegu, where they joined other elements of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry that had escaped. At Taegu on 23 July Lieutenant Colonel Wadlington, the 34th Regimental Executive Officer, had assembled approximately 300 men who had withdrawn through the hills from Taejon.

Now it will be as well to mention about the men of the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry, who were driven from or left their positions west of Taejon during the morning of 20 July and climbed into the hills south of the Nonsan road. Most of them retreated
safely, travelling all night. One large party of the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry, which included in G Company of the 19th Infantry, was led by Captain Marks. It passed through Kumsan, where a few small parties turned east toward Yongdong. But the main party continued south, believing the enemy might have cut the road eastward. On the 23rd this group encountered some ROK trucks and shuttled south in them until they broke down. The next day the entire party loaded into a boxcar train it met and rode the last 80 kilometers into the south coast port of Yosu, Cholla Namdo. From there they traveled by boat the next day, 25 July, to Pusan. From there they returned north to rejoin their parent units.

Most of the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Infantry reached Kumsan and there turned eastward to come through friendly lines at Yongdong. Included in these parties were Lieutenant Colonels McGrail (2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry) and Ayres (1st Battalion, 34th Infantry) and Captains Montesclaros and Slack. They arrived at Yongdong on 21 and 22 July.

General Dean’s Missing in Action

Of all of the incidents in the withdrawal, none was more dramatic or attended by such gripping subsequent drama as the adventures of General Dean. After he left the 34th Infantry command post at 1755 hours, 20 July, General Dean and his column, organized with the remaining miscellaneous vehicles at the 34th Infantry command post, moved toward the east, but missed the Okchon turn. They began on the Kumsan road. There had been enemy roadblocks on the Kumsan road since the night before. On the way, less than two kilometers from the city, General Dean discovered several wounded Americans and loaded these into his two jeeps. Riding in one of the jeeps ahead, Lieutenant Clarke, General Dean’s aide, was hit in the shoulder by enemy fire a kilometer and a half farther down the road. Another a kilometer and a half ahead his group encountered an enemy roadblock in force. General Dean’s party tumbled from the jeeps and the half-track into the righthand ditch. Then, they crawled to the bank of the Taenon River where they lay concealed until darkness came. After dark General Dean’s party crossed to the west side of the river and started climbing a high mountain, Hill 598, just north of the little village of Nangwol-li. General Dean and others in the party took turns in helping a badly wounded man up the steep slope. Once, Lieutenant Clarke dissuaded General Dean from going back down the mountain for water. A little after midnight, at a time (0115 hours, according to Lieutenant Clarke’s witness) when he was leading the group, Lieutenant
Clarke suddenly discovered that no one was following him. He turned back and found several men asleep. Someone told him that General Dean had gone for water. He figured the round trip could be made in an hour if the General went down to the bottom. So he decided to wait two hours, but General Dean did not return.

At 0315 hours, 21 July, Lieutenant Clarke and others climbed to the top of the mountain, arriving there just before dawn. There they waited all day, six to eight kilometers south of Taejon, hoping to see General Dean. That night, Lieutenant Clarke led his group back down the mountain, recrossed the Taejon River in a rainstorm near the village of Samhoe, climbed eastward into the mountains, and then turned south. He eventually led his party to safety through the lines of the 1st US Cavalry Division at Yongdong on 23 July.

It was some years before the mystery of what had happened to General Dean that night after Taejon was finally cleared up. In going after water for the wounded men, General Dean fell down a steep slope and was knocked unconscious. When he regained consciousness he found he had a gashed head, a broken shoulder, and many bruises. Particularly, his abdomen where he had had an operation a year before hurt fearfully. According to his book, General Dean saw an eight or ten-man enemy patrol was moving no more than ten yards from him, when he awoke. He had no idea how long he had been knocked out. And, he could not imagine why the enemy missed him.

At any rate, General Dean wandered for 36 days in the mountains trying to reach safety but this was the period when the North Korean Communists were advancing southward as rapidly as he was. On 25 August, two local Koreans who pretended to be guiding him toward safety led him into a pre-arranged ambush of the north Korean Communist soldiers, and they captured the emaciated, nearly starved, and injured general, who now weighed only 180
pounds instead of his normal 190. His capture took place near Chinan, 56 kilometers due south of Taejon. Then began his more than three years of life as a prisoner of the enemy that finally ended on 4 September 1953 when he was repatriated to American officials at Panmunjom. Upon being freed that day he found himself a national hero and the recipient of the Medal of Honor for his courage and exploits at Taejon on 20 July 1950.

General Dean's heroic and fascinating chronicle as told in his book, "General Dean's Story," is one of the great documents to come out of the Korean War. That war was destined to add many illustrious names to the roll of honor in the United States military annals. But posterity probably will accord to none as high a place as to General Dean in the example he set as a soldier and leader in great adversity and as an unbreakable American in Communist captivity.

The first information that General Dean might be alive as a prisoner of war came from a North Korean Communist soldier, Lee Kyu Hyun, who escaped to American lines (his claim) or captured near Pyongyang in the north in late October 1950. He had been assigned to live with General Dean and to serve as an interpreter. During the interrogations the Lee testified to the fact that he had lived with General Dean.

Retrospect

There were many heroic actions by American soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division, despite they faced many handicaps in their early battles with the North Korean Communists. But the battle of Taejon must be considered an unprecedented fierce one under the most unfavorable conditions for them. They were outnumbered too greatly in every aspect; strength, firepower, equipment, ammunition, and communication.

With the support of T-34 tanks, the 3rd and 4th NK Divisions had attacked against only 4,000 men of the 24th US Division in and around the City of Taejon. The 4th NK Division carried out the envelopment of the city from the west and south by strong elements of its 16th and 18th Regiments and imposed the disastrous roadblock on the Okchon highway east of Taejon. These elements had no tanks or artillery with them; theirs was a light infantry maneuver and tactics. Whether they came around by road through Kumsan from Nonsan or marched across country over the mountains south and southwest of Taejon from the Nonsan — Taejon road is not definitely known. There is some evidence that at least part of the enveloping force came through Kumsan.
Battle of Taejon Defense

The 3rd NK Division joined the 5th Regiment of the 4th NK Division in maintaining frontal pressure against Taejon in the afternoon of the 20th and enveloped it on the north and northeast. The 3rd NK Division infiltrated the city heavily in the later part of the afternoon. The enemy tanks that penetrated Taejon in the morning belonged to the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th NK Armored Division, attached to the 4th NK Division ever since the crossing of the 38th Parallel. Some of the tanks that entered the city later in the day were probably from the 203rd Tank Regiment attached to the 3rd NK Division.

The 2nd NK Division, which was supposed to have joined the 3rd and 4th NK Divisions in the attack on Taejon, failed to come up in time. This all but exhausted division did not leave Chongju until or about the 18th July. It then moved through Pugang southwest toward Taejon, apparently intending to cross the Kum River in the vicinity of the railroad bridge. It had yet to cross the Kum when it received word on 21 July that Taejon had fallen. This 2nd NK Division thereupon altered its course and turned southeast through Poun, headed for Kimchon.

It is difficult to estimate enemy losses at Taejon. The North Korean Communist forces' losses in armor and artillery were considerably heavy but infantry. The 4th NK Division, according to prisoner reports later, lost 15 76-mm. guns and six 122-mm. mortars, together with 200 artillerymen. The tank losses were relatively heavy; at least 15 of them were destroyed, and possibly the number may have been 20 or more.

When all of the Americans who retreated from Taejon had rejoined their units, a count showed 1,150 casualties out of 3,933 of the 24th US Division forces engaged there on 19–20 July -- nearly 30 percent. Of these casualties 48 were known dead, 228 wounded, and 874 missing in action. Most of the last were presumed killed, although a surprising number later turned up as enemy prisoners. Among these was General Dean. The equipment loss also was great. Virtually all the organic equipment of the troops in Taejon was lost there. The 24th US Quartermaster Company lost 30 of 34 trucks, while A Battery of the 11th US Field Artillery Battalion lost all five of its 155-mm. howitzers.

In retrospect within five days the enemy, employing numerically superior forces, executed two successful envelopments of American positions at the Kum River and at Taejon. In each case the NK Communists moved around the left flank to impose roadblocks covering the rear routes of retreat. In each case the result was catastrophic for the units cut off.

On the American side, the lack of information of the true state of affairs
caused by the almost complete breakdown in all means of communication was the major factor leading to the disaster. In battle communication is all important. Moreover, in any case, a basic fact is that the occupation forces in Japan were not trained, equipped or ready for battle. Yet, for the these men of the 24th US Infantry Division, the early days of the fighting were bloody and humiliating.

At noon on 22 July the 24th US Division turned its Yongdong positions over to the 1st US Cavalry Division and went into reserve for a while. On the same day, with Major General Dean still missing in action, Eighth US Army ordered Major General John H. Church to assume command of the 24th Division.

After the battle for Taegon the war was to enter a new phase. The ROK Army had been expedited the strengthening of its combat capabilities, thus activating the II ROK Corps with the 6th and 8th Divisions on 15 July in Hamchang, Kyongsang-Pukdo. The 1st US Cavalry Division had arrived in the Yongdong area, and the 25th US Division had already gone in position in the Hamchang area. No longer would the ROK Army and the 24th US Division have to stand alone. There would be soon followed more ground reinforcements in the form of the 29th US Infantry Regiment, the 5th US Infantry Regimental Combat Team, the 2nd US Infantry Division, and the 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade.

By now the NK Red forces had pushed speedily down to the line linking Taejon, Poun, Mungyong, Punggi, and Yongdok. The enemy marched 220 kilometers from the 38th Parallel to Taejon in 27 days, at an average speed of eight kilometers a day.

About this time, the combat strength of the enemy front lines was composed of ten infantry divisions and one tank division, whereas the UN ground forces comprised five ROK divisions (the Capital, 1st, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Divisions) and three US divisions, making the balance between the two opposite forces somewhat narrower.

There is now a battle monument standing in downtown Taejon that dedicated to all the American soldiers, commanded by Major General William F. Dean, who defended Taejon against the North Korean Communist aggressors.
CHAPTER VII  FIGHTING WITHDRAWAL TOWARD THE NAKTONG PERIMETER (21–31 July 1950)

Section 1.  General

The loss of Taejon on 20 July 1950 was of serious consequence to General Walker’s Eighth Army, but the event took place while a large number of US reinforcements were moving up to meet the enemy. The UN Command in Korea was waging two great battles: The battle for ground, and the battle of the build-up. Since their left flank had been exposed by the fall of Taejon, hard-fighting elements of the ROK Army slightly to the east of the 24th US Division pulled back toward the perimeter which was shrinking about Pusan. By this time, however, two additional US divisions had arrived in Korea and were advancing toward North Korean Communists. Some troops of the 25th US Division, commanded by Major General William B. Kean, crossed from Japan as early as 9 July and were sent about 80 kilometers northeast of Taejon to Hamchang, there to block the North Korean Communists advance down in alternate road to Taegu. As other troops of the 25th US Division disembarked they also were dispatched to that area north of Taegu which the strong enemy column was threatening.

The third large American unit to reach Korea was the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Major General Hobart R. Gay. The division began to arrive on 18 July at Pohang, on the east coast behind the 3rd ROK Division defense line.

There followed two battalions of the 29th US Independent Infantry Regiment to arrive in Pusan on 24 July from Okinawa.

By the last week of July, the Eighth Army had been substantially strengthened. A logistical base command, organized in Pusan on 4 July 1950, worked around the clock processing men and equipment for transportation inland. The ROK Army fought along the northern rim of the UN perimeter where it was supported by the 25th US Division. South and east of fallen Taejon, the determined 1st Cavalry Division reinforced the combat-weary 24th Division, now commanded by Major General John H. Church who took
over the command after General Dean had been declared missing. All divisions in the line were still seriously understrength.

Opposing this coalition of ROK and US forces, the enemy high command launched a four-pronged offensive designed to drive the defenders into the sea at Pusan. The NK Communist forces placed nine divisions in the line with an undetermined number in reserve. As the UN defenses tightened into the southeastern corner of Korea, the Communists struck on four fronts. To secure the eastern coastal road, enemy forces effected landings along the shore near Samchok and at Ulchin and Yongdok. Another powerful column raced down through the central Korean towns of Chunchon and Wonju toward Hamchang, Yechon, Sangju, Kimchon, and Taegu. The third and main thrust was in the west. It had hammered through Seoul, Suwon, Chonan, and Taejon. During the last weeks of July, a fourth enemy threat appeared in the southwest, where the west flank of the UN forces had been left exposed by the fall of Taejon. Quickly taking advantage of this situation, the Communists drove straight to the southernmost coast of the peninsula, scattering ROK resistance and capturing all the area between Mokpo and Sunchon on the west coast. They then turned east for the final blow against Chinju, Masan, and Pusan. It was now the objective of the enemy to assault Taegu from the north, northwest, and west, and drive the UN forces back toward Pusan. (See Situation Map 2, Appendix VI.)

Using Soviet-taught tactics, the North Korean Communists sought out soft spots in the UN defensive positions: A mass attack here, an armored thrust there, infiltration always, destructive penetrations occasionally, the determined rush of the enemy against thinly defended flanks, and everywhere the Communist soldier in civilian clothes striking death into the ranks of the defenders. UN troops continued their fighting withdrawal in the direction of Yongdong, Hwanggan, and Kimchon. Some US units were cut to pieces and stragglers wandered about for days in the mosquito and leech infested mountain passes and rice paddies. The NK Red soldiers were not particularly handicapped by the saw-toothed terrain and the weather conditions to which they were long accustomed, but their losses in dead and wounded were very heavy. General MacArthur estimated on 29 July 1950 that enemy casualties exceeded 30,000 men. The Communists, however, forced into the service as replacements every able-bodied man and boy in the area they dominated.

The last part of July, after the fall of Taejon, witnessed a series of hardfought battles all along the UN lines.
Section 2. Yongdong—Hwanggan—Kimchon Area Battles

On 22 July 1950 the 8th US Cavalry Regiment relieved the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th US Division, in its positions at Yongdong and the 1st US Cavalry Division thereby assumed responsibilities for blocking the enemy along the main Taejon—Taegu highway.

The two battalions of the 8th Cavalry went into the two blocking positions, the 1st Battalion on the Taejon road northwest of Yongdong and the 2nd Battalion southwest of Yongdong. General Gay placed the 5th Cavalry on the high ground east of the town in a blocking position. The 7th Cavalry of the division, which arrived four days late at Pohang due to typhoon Helene, moved to the vicinity of Kimchon and disposed its 2nd Battalion near Hwanggan northwest of Kimchon leaving the 1st Battalion at the Pohang—Yonil area for the security of an airstrip there.

Even though the division had received 1,450 replacements before it left Japan, the division was understrength when it landed in Korea and, like the preceding divisions, it had only two battalions in the regiments, two firing batteries in the artillery battalions, and one tank company (light M24 tanks).

The enemy paused but briefly after the capture of Taejon. After a day's rest in that town, which it had helped to capture, the 3rd NK Division departed the city on 22 July, advancing down the main highway toward Taegu. The next morning, 23 July, the 1st Battalion, 8th US Cavalry, in front of Yongdong, reported it had destroyed three enemy T-34 tanks with 3.5-inch rocket launchers. The enemy division was closing with the 1st Cavalry Division for the battle for Yongdong.

During 23 July the 7th and 9th Regiments of the 3rd NK Division began their attack on the Yongdong positions. The enemy made his first penetration southwest of Yongdong, establishing a road block about two and a half kilometers behind the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, at the same time other units heavily engaged the 1st Battalion northwest of Yongdong in frontal attack.

The following day, the 24th, four different attempts by three American light tanks failed to dislodge the enemy behind the 2nd Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Eugene J. Field, the 2nd Battalion Commander, was wounded at the roadblock. Hereupon the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry and the 16th Reconnaissance Company were sent toward the cutoff battalion. By noon, enemy troops were attacking the 99th and 1st Field Artillery Battalions which were supporting the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, indicating that
the infiltration had been extensive.

On the other approach road, northwest of Yongdong, heavy automatic fire from quad-.50's, 37 mm. fire from battery of the 92nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and artillery fire from the 77th Field Artillery Battalion helped the 1st Battalion there to repel enemy attacks.

By the morning of 25 July, however, enemy forces had infiltrated the positions of the 1st Cavalry Division so thoroughly that they forced a withdrawal. Northwest of Yongdong, the 1st Battalion executed an orderly and efficient withdrawal, covered by the fire of the Heavy Mortar Company and the two batteries of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion. The mortar men finally lost their mortars and fought as infantry in the withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the situation worsened on the road southwest of Yongdong. Concentrated artillery support — with the shells falling so close to the 2nd Battalion positions that they wounded four men — together with an attack by the battalion, briefly opened the enemy roadblock at 0430 hours, 25 July, and the bulk of the battalion escaped to Yongdong. But F Company of the 8th Cavalry, the 16th Reconnaissance Company, and the 1st Platoon, A Company, the 71st Tank Battalion, at the rear of the column were cut off. Only four of eleven light tanks broke through the enemy posi-
tions. Crews abandoned the other seven tanks and walked over the hills in a two days' journey as part of a group of 219 men, most of them from F Company. All equipment except individual arms was abandoned by this group. Others escaped in the same manner.

On this same road, but closer to Yongdong, the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry, in trying to help the cutoff units of the 8th Cavalry, ran into trouble. Through some error, its F Company went to the wrong hill and walked into a concentration of enemy soldiers. Only twenty-six men returned. Altogether, the 5th Cavalry Regiment had 275 casualties on 25 July.

Despite of the enemy success in enveloping the American left flank, other elements of the 1st Cavalry Division held their defensive positions east of Yongdong. Faced with the stubborn resistance of the 1st Cavalry Division the 7th Regiment of the 3rd NK Division now started southwest from Yongdong on the Muju road in a sweeping flank movement through Chirye against Kimchon while the enemy's 9th Regiment continued to press on the Yongdong front.

At dawn on the 26th elements of the enemy 7th Regiment in Yongdong attacked the 1st Cavalry troops east of Yongdong. Four enemy tanks and an infantry force started this action by driving several hundred refugees ahead of them through American mine fields. Before day break the 1st Cavalry Division had repulsed the attack.

However, two facts that the enemy movement around the division's left flank in the direction of Chirye and a question whether the 27th Regiment of the 25th US Division could hold Hwanggan northeast of Yongdong caused Major General Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division Commander, to decide that he would have to withdraw or his division would be cut off from Taegu. Accordingly, he ordered a withdrawal to the vicinity of Kimchon where he considered the terrain excellent for defense. This withdrawal began on 29 July after the 27th Regiment had passed east through the division's lines.

The 3rd NK Division used against the 1st US Cavalry Division at Yongdong essentially the same tactics it had employed against the 24th US Division at Taegon — a holding attack frontally, with the bulk of its force enveloping the American left flank and establishing strongly held roadblocks behind the front positions. The enemy division entered Yongdong the night of 25 July; at least one unit was in the town by 2000 hours. The enemy expected a counterattack and immediately took up defensive positions at the eastern edge of the town. Prisoners reported later that the 3rd NK Division suffered about 2,000 casualties, mostly from artillery fire, in the attack on Yongdong on 24–25 July. This brought it down to about 5,000 men, approximately half
Hwanggan Area Battle
(23–28 July)

Closely related to the Yongdong action was the Hwanggan Battle fought between the 27th Regiment, 25th US Division, and the 2nd NK Division. The enemy division, arriving too late on the east of Taejon to help in the attack on that city, turned toward Poun. Unless checked, it would pass through that town and come out on the main Seoul—Pusan highway at Hwanggan, about 16 kilometers east of Yongdong. This would place it in the rear of the 1st Cavalry Division on the latter’s main supply road.

The task of defending this road fell to the 27th US Infantry. Upon first arriving in Korea that regiment went to the Uisong area north of Taegu. On 13 July it moved from there to Andong to support ROK troops, but before it entered action in the heavy battles then taking place in that area it suddenly received orders to move to Sangju. En route to that place it received still other orders to change its destination to Hwanggan, and it closed there in an assembly area the night of 22–23 July. The 27th Infantry’s mission at Hwanggan was to relieve the decimated ROK troops retreating down the Poun road.

In carrying out the Eighth Army’s orders to block the Poun road, the 27th Regimental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel John H. "Mike" Michaelis, assigned his 1st Battalion the task of making contact with the enemy. On the morning of 23 July, the 1st Battalion moved northward toward Poun from the Hwanggan assembly area. The 1st Battalion took up defensive positions in the evening near the village of Sangyong-ni south of Poun. It assumed responsibility for that sector at 1700 hours after ROK troops fell back through its position.

That night the battalion commander sent 1st Lieutenant John A. Buckley of A Company with a 30-man patrol northward to locate the enemy. Near Poun Lieutenant Buckley saw an enemy column approaching. He quickly disposed his patrol party on hills bordering both sides of the road, and, when the column was nearly abreast, opened fire on it with all weapons. This fire apparently caused the enemy advanced unit to believe it had encountered a major position, for it held back until daylight. When the enemy turned back, the patrol party returned to the battalion lines, arriving there at 0400 hours, 24 July. Six men were missing.
Fighting Withdrawal

The 1st Battalion at Sangyong-ni, south of Poun, prepared to receive an attack. It came at 0630 hours, 24 July, shortly after daybreak in a heavy fog that enabled the NK Reds to approach very close to the battalion positions before they were observed. Two rifle companies, one on either side of the road on low ridges, held the forward positions. Enemy mortar and small arms fire fell on the men there, and then tanks appeared at the bend in the road and opened fire with cannon and machine guns as they approached. Enemy infantry followed the tanks. Although the two rifle companies stopped the enemy infantry, the tanks penetrated their positions and fired into the battalion command post which was behind B Company. In this close action, the enemy tank fire destroyed several vehicles and killed the battalion’s medical officer.

On the right (north) of the road the enemy overran the battalion observation post and B Company’s outpost line. This high ground changed hands three times during the day. While the infantry fight was in progress, and shortly after the first tank penetration, five more T-34’s came around the road bend toward the 1st Battalion. When the first tanks appeared the Battalion Commander had called for an air strike. Now, at this propitious moment, three F-80 jet planes arrived and immediately dived on the approaching second group of tanks, destroying three of them with 5-inch rockets. Altogether, bazooka, artillery, and air strikes knocked out six enemy tanks during the morning, either within or on the edge of the 1st Battalion position. In this first engagement with American troops, the 2nd NK Division lost all but two of the eight tanks that had been attached to it a few days earlier at Chongju.

Late in the evening after dark the 1st Battalion disengaged and withdrew through the 2nd Battalion immediately behind it. Both the Battalion Commander and the Regimental Commander expected the enemy to encircle the 1st Battalion position during the night if it stayed where it was.

The enemy apparently were unaware of the 1st Battalion withdrawal, for the next morning, 25 July, two enemy battalions in a double envelopment came in behind its positions of the evening before but in front of the 2nd Battalion. There they were surprised and caught in the open by the combined fire of American tanks, artillery, and mortar, and the 2nd Battalion’s automatic and small arms fire. The NK Communists suffered severely in this action. Surviving remnants of the two enemy battalions withdrew in confusion. The 2nd Battalion took about thirty prisoners.

Despite this costly setback, the enemy division pushed relentlessly forward, and that afternoon elements of it were flanking the regimental
position. Colonel Michaelis issued an order about 2200 for another withdrawal to high ground near Hwanggan. The withdrawal started near midnight with heavy fighting still in progress on the right flank. F Company and A Company, 79th US Tank Battalion, covered the 2nd Battalion withdrawal.

On 26 July the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 35th US Regiment, on the 27th US Regiment's right flank eased the precarious situation. But the following day, 27th July, the regimental left flank came under attack where a large gap existed between C Company, the lefthand unit of the 27th Regiment, and the 7th Cavalry, the nearest unit of the 1st Cavalry Division. C Company lost and regained a peak three times during the day. More than 40 casualties reduced its strength to approximately 60 men. B Company also lost heavily in the action, falling to a strength of about 85 men. By the morning of 28 July the enemy had penetrated the 1st Battalion's line, forcing C Company to withdraw.

At this point the 27th Regimental Commander went to the 1st Cavalry Division command post in Hwanggan and asked General Gay for permission to withdraw his hard-pressed regiment through that division. This request was granted.

Before dawn, 29 July, the 27th Infantry Regiment withdrew through the 1st Cavalry Division lines at Hwanggan to a position about 1,600 meters east of Kimchon. That afternoon the 27th Regiment received orders from the Eighth Army to move to Waegwan on the Naktong River near Taegu, as army reserve, instead of joining the 25th Division in Sangju area.

In its five days of delaying action on the Poun—Hwanggan road, the 27th Regiment of the 25th US Division lost 53 men killed, 221 wounded, and 49 missing, a total of 323 battle casualties. The 2nd NK Division suffered heavily during this time, some estimates placing its loss above 3,000 men.

**Kimchon Area Battle**
(29—30 July)

The 1st US Cavalry Division took up new defensive positions around Kimchon after its withdrawal from Yongdong—Hwanggan area. The 8th Cavalry went into position astride the Sangju road north of the town; the 5th Cavalry blocked the Chirye road southwest of it; the 7th Cavalry remained in its Hwanggan position until the other units had withdrawn, and then it fell back to a position on the Yongdong road about 10 kilometers northwest of Kimchon.
The enemy flanking movement under way to the southwest through the Chiryé area threatened the division's rear and communications with Taegu. The Eighth Army strengthened the 1st Cavalry Division against this threat by attaching to it the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment of the 24th US Division. This battalion had the mission of establishing a roadblock 16 kilometers southwest of Kimchon near Hawon-ni on the Chiryé road. This proved to be a timely and wise move, for, on the 29th, the enemy 7th Regiment of the 3rd NK Division began arriving at Chiryé, a few kilometers farther down the road.

On the morning of 29 July a platoon-force of the 16th Reconnaissance Company drove southwest through Chiryé. Later in the morning, Korcan police informed the party that an enemy battalion was in Chiryé. It radioed this information to the Reconnaissance Company and asked for instructions. Captain Charles V.H. Harvey, the Company Commander, decided to take another platoon to the assistance of the one beyond Chiryé. He set out immediately from Kimchon with the platoon and fourteen Korean police. At the outskirts of Chiryé this force surprised and killed three enemy soldiers. Beyond Chiryé the little column drew scattered rifle fire. The two Platoons joined forces at noon and started back.

On the way back, in the northern part of Chiryé, Captain Harvey's lead vehicles came upon a partially built roadblock from which an estimated enemy platoon opened fire on the column. The troops tried hard to smash through the roadblock, but failed to succeed. Soon several hundred enemy were now in view, moving to surround the patrol; thus the northern

The troops of the 1st Cavalry Division withdrawing to establish defensive position near Kimchon.
exit from Chiryae was closed.

The patrol pulled back to the south edge of town, set up three 81-mm. mortars, and began firing on the enemy machine gun positions. Corporal Harry D. Mitchell, although wounded four times and bleeding profusely, stayed with his mortar and fired it until his ammunition was expended. Captain Harvey early in the fight had received a bullet through one hand, and now machine gun fire struck him again, this time cutting his jugular vein. He did not respond to first aid treatment and died in a few minutes. His last order was for the company to withdraw. The patrol managed to reach the 1st Cavalry Division lines the next morning, suffering two killed, three wounded, and 11 missing.

This Chiryae incident made clear that a strong enemy force was approaching the rear of, or passing behind, the 1st Cavalry Division positions at Kimchon. The following day, 30 July, General Gay ordered the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry; the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment; and the 99th Field Artillery Battalion to Chiryae. This strong force was able to enter the town, but the enemy held the hills around it. The next day the enemy shelled Chiryae, forcing the Americans to withdraw to a position northeast of the town. The enemy 8th Regiment, 3rd NK Division, together with its artillery now joined the other Communists already at Chiryae. This meant that the bulk of the division was engaged in the enveloping move.

On 31 July the 3rd NK Division was closing on Kimchon. About daylight a squad of the enemy infiltrated into the command post of the 8th US Engineer Combat Battalion, about 900 meters from the 1st Cavalry Division command post, and killed four men and wounded six others. The 7th Cavalry also came under attack. But in pressing forward the enemy exposed their tanks. Air and ground firepower reportedly destroyed thirteen of them and set six more on fire.

During its first ten days of action in Korea the 1st US Cavalry Division had 916 battle casualties -- 78 killed, 419 wounded, and 419 missing.

The 3rd NK Division in forcing the 1st Cavalry Division from Yongdong and back on Kimchon apparently suffered nearly 2,000 casualties, which reduced it to a strength of about 5,000. Nevertheless, it had effectively and quickly driven the 1st Cavalry Division toward the Naktong.

Section 3. Sangju Area Battle (21—31 July 1950)

On the next major axis west of the Andong road, where at the end of July
the 12th NK Division was recuperating from its heavy battles, lay the town of Sangju. It was a crossroads center for all the mountain roads in that part of Korea. Situated south of the Mungyong plateau and the dividing watershed between the Han and the Nakdong Rivers, it had a commanding position in the valley of the Nakdong. Sangju was a place of both confusion and activity during the third week of July. Refugees and stragglers poured south into and through the town. Many ROK units were retreating to Sangju and some had passed south through it. Fighting had already been joined between North Korean Communists and ROK forces for control of the Mungyong plateau when the 25th US Division received orders from General Walker to concentrate there to bolster ROK defenses of the central mountain corridors. General Walker looked to the 25th Division to help the ROK forces in central Korea prevent a movement of major enemy forces into the valley of the upper Nakdong.

In order to secure Sangju, the 25th Division had to guard two main approaches to the town. First was the main road that crossed the Mungyong plateau and passed through Hamchang at the base of the plateau about 24 kilometers due north of Sangju. Next, there was the secondary mountain road that crossed the plateau farther west and, once through the mountains, turned east toward Sangju.

On the first and main road, the 2nd Battalion of the 35th US Regiment held a blocking position northwest of Hamchang, supported by a platoon of tanks from A Company, 79th US Tank Battalion, and A Battery, 90th US Field Artillery Battalion. The 35th Regimental Commander, Colonel Henry G. Fisher, was unable to concentrate his two-battalion regiment here for the defense of Sangju because the 1st Battalion had no sooner arrived on 25 July from Pohang than it was sent posthaste the next day to reinforce the 27th US Regiment on the next north-south line of communications westward. Thus, in effect, one battalion of US troops stood behind ROK units on the Hamchang approach. On the second road, that leading into Sangju from the west, the 24th US Regiment assembled two, and later all three, of its battalions.

The 2nd Battalion of the 35th Regiment took up a hill position northwest of Hamchang and south of Mungyong on the south side of a stream that flowed past Sangju to the Nakdong. On the north side of the stream a ROK battalion of the 6th ROK Division held the front line. Directed by Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Vennard Wilson, F Company was inserted in the center of the ROK line on Hill 692 (Pongmyong-san) north of the stream. Behind the ROKs and F Company positions the ground rose in another hill within small arms range. Heavy rains had swollen the stream
behind the ROK's and F Company to a torrent that was rolling large boulders along its channel.

On 22 July the elements of the Ist NK Division attacked the ROK battalion positions where F Company of the 35th US Regiment was defending in the middle of them. The ROK troops withdrew from their positions on either side of F Company without informing that company of their intentions. Soon enemy troops were firing into the back of F Company from the hill behind it. This precipitated an unorganized withdrawal. The swollen stream prevented F Company from crossing to the south side and the sanctuary of the 2nd Battalion positions. The men of the company tried to swim to the opposite bank in vain. The covering fire of a platoon of tanks on the south side held off the enemy and allowed most of the survivors eventually to escape. In this fiasco, F Company lost six men killed, 10 wounded, and 21 missing.

The next morning five enemy tanks crossed the river and moved toward Hamchang. Artillery fire from a battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out four of the tanks. The fifth turned back across the river, and there an air strike later destroyed it.

The 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, was still in its position when it received orders on 23 July to withdraw to a point eight kilometers north of Sangju. On the 29th the battalion fell back about three kilometers more, and the next day it moved to a position south of Sangju. On 31 July the 35th Regiment was ordered to a blocking position on a line of hills about 13 kilometers south of Sangju on the Kimchon road. Thus, it continued to fall back on the Sangju front. In the movements it did little fighting, but executed a series of withdrawals on division orders as the front around it collapsed.

In the meantime, on 22 July, the same day that F Company of the 35th Regiment came to grief north of Hamchang, elements of the 24th Regiment commanded by Colonel Horton V. White had a similar unhappy experience west of Sangju. That day the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, and elements of the 17th ROK Regiment were advancing into the mountains (Kal-ryong) 32 kilometers northwest of Sangju. With E Company leading, the battalion moved along the dirt road into a gorge with precipitous mountain walls. Suddenly, an enemy light mortar and one or two automatic weapons fired on E Company. It stopped and the men dispersed along the sides of the road. Soon enemy rifle fire came in on the dispersed men, and E and F Companies began withdrawing in a disorderly manner. Colonel White found the battalion withdrawing in disorder and most of the men in a state
of panic. He finally got the men under control. The following 23 July, the 17th ROK Regiment enveloped the enemy position on the Kal-ryong Pass, that had caused the trouble, and captured two light machine guns, one mortar, and about 30 enemy who appeared to be guerrillas. The 17th ROK Regiment fought in the hills for the next two days, making some limited gains, and then it moved back to Sangju in the ROK Army reorganization in progress. This left only the 24th Regiment guarding the west approach to Sangju from the Mungyong plateau.

By 26 July the 24th Regiment had all three of its battalions concentrated in battle positions astride the road 16 kilometers west of Sangju. Elements of the 15th NK Division advancing on this road had cleared the mountain passes and were closing with the regiment. From 26 July on to the end of the month the enemy had almost constant contact with the 24th Regiment, which was supported by the 159th and 64th US Field Artillery Battalions and one battery of the 90th US Field Artillery Battalion.

The general pattern of the 24th US Regiment action during the last days of July was to try to hold positions during the day and then withdraw at night. On the evening of 29 July the 1st Battalion got out of hand. During the day the battalion had suffered about sixty casualties from enemy mortar fire. As the men were preparing their perimeter defense for the night, an inexplicable panic seized them and the battalion left its positions. This tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Regiment operations west of Sangju. Men left their positions and straggled to the rear. They abandoned weapons on positions.

By 30 July, the 24th Regiment had withdrawn to the last defensible high ground west of Sangju, about five kilometers from the town. The regiment had deteriorated so badly by this time that General Kean recalled the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, and placed it in blocking positions behind the 24th Regiment. The next day NK Communist units again pressed against the regiment and rushed in force onto the outpost line of resistance. During the night of 31 July the 24th Regiment again had to withdraw through Sangju. The 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, covered the withdrawal. In 11 days of action in the Sangju area the regiment had suffered 323 battle casualties -- 27 killed, 293 wounded, and 3 missing.

In reaching the upper Naktong valley at the end of July, the enemy divisions engaged in this sector of their drive southward had not gone unharmed. The 1st NK Division in battling across the Mungyong plateau against the 6th ROK Division not only suffered great losses in the ground battle but also took serious losses from UN aerial attack. Prisoners reported
that by the time it reached Hamchang at the end of July it was down to 3,000 men. The 15th NK Division, according to prisoners, also lost heavily to artillery and mortar fire in its drive on Sangju against ROK troops and the 24th US Regiment, and was down to about half strength, or approximately 5,000 men, at the end of July. In contrast, the 13th NK Division had bypassed Hamchang on the west and, saved for minor skirmishes with ROK troops and the 2nd Battalion, 35th US Regiment, it had not been engaged and consequently had suffered relatively few casualties.

Section 4. Delaying Actions in the Southwest

During the last weeks of July, a fourth enemy threat appeared in the southwest, where the west flank of the UN lines had been left exposed by the fall of Taejon. The air reconnaissance carried out on 23 July was revealing. It showed that enemy forces had indeed begun a drive south from the estuary of the Kum River and were swelling east behind the left flank of the Eighth Army.

On the basis of the time and space estimate given him on the 23rd and the air reconnaissance of the same date, General Walker realized that a major crisis was developing in a section far behind the lines, and at a time when constant enemy attack was pushing his front back. On 24 July, the Eighth Army made its first move to counter the threatened enemy envelopment in the southwest. General Walker decided to send the 24th US Division posthaste southward to block the enemy enveloping move. General Walker then wanted the 24th Division to defend the Eighth Army's left flank from Chinju up to near Kimchon. The 24th Division had been out of the line and in army reserve just one day before it received the order to defend the Chinju area on 24 July. The division, after a serious defeat at Taejon, reassembled at Yongdong in the next two days. It was then ordered army reserve and went into reorganization at Kimchon, Kunwi and Uisong. It had not had time to re-equip and receive replacements for losses. All three regiments were far understrength.

In addition to the 24th Division the Eighth Army also diverted two battalions of the 29th US Independent Infantry Regiment from Okinawa for the defense of Chinju area. The two battalions (the 1st and 3rd) from the 29th Regiment on Okinawa were the first to arrive in Korea of the eleven infantry
battalions requested by General MacArthur in early July to make up shortages within the infantry divisions of the Far East Command.

When the battalions disembarked at Pusan the morning of 24 July orders from the Eighth Army awaited them to proceed to Chinju. There they would be attached to the 19th Regiment of the 24th Division. The afternoon, on the 25th, the two battalions arrived at Chinju. Instead of the six weeks of training first agreed upon, they found themselves now in a forward position, rifles not zeroed, mortars not test-fired, and new .50-caliber machine guns with cosmoline rubbed off but not cleaned.

By the 25th of July the Eighth Army had reports of ten enemy tanks and 500 infantry in Mokpo at the southwest tip of the peninsula; 26 trucks and 700 soldiers in Namwon; tanks, trucks, and 800 soldiers in Kurye; and 500 enemy troops engaging local ROK police in Hadong. The Eighth Army G-2 estimated at this time that the 6th NK Division was dispersed over about 5,300 square kilometers of southwest Korea. Until the end of July, however, the Eighth Army intelligence mistakenly concluded that the 6th NK Division in the area was the troops of the 4th NK Division.

The potential of the advance of the 6th NK Division to the south and west was altogether uncomfortable, since at the moment, except for air strikers, there was no organized force capable of firm resistance, except local police units.

Advancing on 26 July toward Chinju, commander of the 6th NK Division proclaimed to his troops in that evening, "Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given us is the liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants of the enemy..." The liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to cut off the windpipe of the enemy.

Everywhere refugees fled the terror sweeping over southwest Korea with the advance of the NK Communists and guerrilla units. An entry on 29 July in the diary of a guerrilla tellingly illustrates the reasons for panic: "Apprehended 12 men; National Assembly members, police sergeants and Myon leaders. Killed four of them at the scene, and the remaining eight were shot after investigation by the People’s court."

In the meantime on 25 July, at 1700 hours, the Eighth Army formally ordered the 24th Division, less the 21st Regiment, to defend the Chinju area. Prior to the Eighth Army's formal order, Major General Church, Division Commander, had ordered Colonel Ned D. Moore's 19th Regiment to move to Chinju, and it started from Kimchon shortly before midnight, 24 July.

The 19th Regiment headquarters and the 2nd Battalion reached Chinju at 1500 hours on the 25th. The 1st Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Robert L. Rhea remained behind on the Kimchon road north of the town. At Anui, where a road came in from the west, Colonel Rhea placed A Company in a defensive position. The remainder of the battalion continued south 13 kilometers to a main road junction at Umyong-ni just east of Hamyang.

On 26 July Colonel Charles E. Beauchamp’s 34th Regiment, on orders from General Church, moved from the Kunwi-Uisong area north of Taegu to Kochang. At the same time the 24th Division headquarters and divisional troops moved to Hyopchon, where General Church established his command post. Thus, it was reasonably well centered in the vast area the division had to defend.

On the evening of 25 July, upon arrival of the 29th Regiment’s two battalions at Chinju, Colonel Moore of the 19th Infantry ordered the 29th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Mott to seize Hadong, a road junction point 56 kilometers southwest of Chinju. Colonel Moore said that about 500 North Korean communist troops were moving on Hadong and comprised the nearest enemy organized resistance. Major General Chae Byong Duk, formerly ROK Army Chief of Staff and now in Chinju, urged on Colonel Moore the importance of Hadong in controlling the western approach to Chinju and the desirability of holding it. General Chae accompanied Colonel Mott’s troops; he was merely to serve as a guide and adviser to Colonel Mott.

The Hadong Area Battle
(26–27 July)

At dusk, 25 July, Colonel Mott issued a warning order to his units to be prepared to move at 2230 hours that night, with the mission of seizing Hadong. Colonel Mott and Major Tony J. Raibl, Executive Officer, based their plans on the assumption that the battalion would reach Hadong before daylight. They expected that some enemy troops would already be in the town.

Half an hour after midnight the motorized battalion started for Hadong. General Chae and some other ROK officers guided the column south out of Chinju through Konyang, where it turned north to strike the main Chinju–Hadong road at Wonjon. In taking this route they had detoured from the direct road because of an impassable ford. The column spent the entire night trying to negotiate the narrow road and pulling vehicles out of rice paddies.

A little after daylight, the battalion encountered a truck traveling south
containing 15 to 20 badly shot-up ROK troops. They claimed to be the only survivors of about 400 local militia at Hadong, which the North Koreans had attacked the night before. Pondering this grave information, Colonel Mott led the battalion on Wonjon on the main road. There he halted the battalion for breakfast and set up security positions. Colonel Mott and Major Raibl decided that the regiment commander should know about the happenings at Hadong and, since the battalion did not have radio communication with the 19th Regiment in Chinju, Major Raibl set out by jeep to tell him.

At Chinju, Major Raibl told Colonel Moore and his S-3, the story related by the wounded ROK troops. He requested authority for the 3rd Battalion to dig in on a defensive west of Chinju to cover the Hadong road. After considerable discussion, Colonel Moore told Major Raibl that the battalion should continue on and seize Hadong. Major Raibl returned to Wonjon shortly after noon and informed Colonel Mott of the instructions.

Colonel Mott stopped the battalion at dusk at the village of Hoengchon-ni, situated about five kilometers from Hadong on a bend of the tortuous mountain road.

The battalion moved out from Hoengchon-ni at approximately 1845 hours, 27 July. Captain George F. Sharra and L Company, with a platoon of the Heavy Weapons Company, were in the lead, followed by the command group and K, M, and I Companies, in that order. Captain Sharra was the experienced rifle company commander, having seen action in Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany in World War II.

When he reached about one kilometer close to the top of the Hadong pass, Captain Sharra saw a patrol of 10 to 12 enemy soldiers come through the pass and start down toward him. The heavy weapons platoon fired their two 75-mm. recoilless rifles at the patrol. The enemy patrol turned and ran back over the pass. Captain Sharra ordered L Company to dash to the top of the pass and secure it. His men reached the top and deployed with two platoons on the left of the pass and one platoon on the right. It was now about 0930 hours. Captain Sharra received orders for L Company to dig in and wait for an air strike on Hadong scheduled for 0945 hours.

The command group, including Colonel Mott and most of the battalion staff, now hurried forward to the pass. General Chae and his party accompanied Colonel Mott. Captain Sharra pointed out to Colonel Mott unidentified people moving about on the higher ground some distance to the north. Colonel looked and replied, "Yes, I have K Company moving up there."
He mistook the people for the elements of K Company to which he had issued orders to seize the higher ground. His eager attention was directed down the road toward Hadong. Around a curve came a column of enemy soldiers marching on either side of the road. Captain Sharra also saw it. He directed his machine gunner to withhold fire until the column was closer and he gave the word. The enemy soldiers seemed unaware that American troops were occupying the pass.

Standing beside Major Raibl in the pass, General Chae watched the approaching soldiers, apparently trying to determine their identity. Some appeared to be wearing American green fatigue uniforms and others the mustard brown of the NK Communists. When the approaching men were about 100 meters away, General Chae shouted to them in Korean, apparently asking their identity. At this, they scampered to the ditches without answering. The machine guns of L Company then opened fire. Captain Sharra who had the column in clear view, estimated it comprised a company.

Almost simultaneously with the opening of American fire, enemy machine gun, mortar, and small arms fire swept over the pass from the high ground to
the north. The first burst of enemy machine gun fire struck General Chae in
the head killing him instantly. Colonel Mott, Major Raibl, Battalion S–2,
and the Assistant S–2 were wounded by this initial enemy fire into the
pass. Thus, the 2nd Battalion staff was almost wiped out. The battalion
vehicles including a TACP radio jeep were also destroyed in the first minute
of enemy fire.

Just after the fight opened, two flights of two planes flew each back and
forth over the area, apparently trying vainly to contact the TACP
below. They finally flew off without making any strikes.

In the pass a hard fight flared between L Company and the enemy higher
up the hill. On the righthand (north) side of the road, 2nd Lieutenant J.
Morrissey and his 1st Platoon bore the brunt of this fight. The enemy was
just above them and the machine gun that had all but wiped out the battalion
group in the road was only 200 yards from the pass. Enemy soldiers im-
mediately came in between them and elements of K Company that were
trying to climb the hill higher up. These NK Communists attacked
Lieutenant Morrissey’s men in their foxholes, bayoneting two of them. They
fought bravely and held their positions despite numerous casualties. L Com-
pany held steadfast in its positions on both sides of the pass against enemy
fire and attack from commanding terrain.

About noon Colonel Mott told Captain Sharra, L Company, to take over
command of the battalion and to get it out because of his wounds.

Captain Sharra sent instruction to his three platoons to withdraw to the
road at the foot of the pass. His runner to Lieutenant Morrissey and the 1st
Platoon on the north side of the pass never reached them. As the L Com-
pany men arrived at the trucks they loaded on them, and at midafternoon
started for Chinju.

When he received the withdrawal order Lieutenant Morrissey had twelve
men left; he and one other were wounded. Now his men fell back down the
road to the waiting vehicles and wearily climbed in. When they started
for Chinju they saw enemy troops coming down off the hill, perhaps a bat-
talion or more of them. Mortar and machine gun fire now swept the paddy
area. Many men of I Company caught in the rice paddies had to cross a
deep, 20-foot-wide stream to escape, and many drowned in the attempt.
Most men rid themselves of helmet, shoes, nearly all clothing, and even
their weapons in trying to cross this stream.

At first, Colonel Moore, the Regimental Commander, back at Chinju had
thought that the Hadong fight was going well. Major Raibl arrived at Chinju
with the first wounded in the early afternoon of 27 July, and reported that the 3rd Battalion was fighting well and that he thought it would win the battle. But, when other survivors came in later, the real outcome of the engagement became clear. News of the disaster at Hadong reached higher headquarters with unexpected and startling impact. The report said "No estimate on total number of casualties. Over 100 WIA now in aid station." A count the next day of the assembled 3rd Battalion showed there were 354 officers and men, including some walking wounded, able for duty. When all the stragglers had come in, casualties were listed as 2 killed, 52 wounded, and 349 missing. An enemy soldier captured later said the enemy took approximately 100 American prisoners at Hadong. When American forces rewon the Hadong area in late September a search uncovered 313 American bodies, most of them along the river and in the rice paddies.

The loss of key officers in the battalion were severe. It included the Battalion Executive Officer, the S-1, the S-2, and the Assistant S-3. The commanders of Headquarters, I, K, and M Companies were lost. Approximately 30 vehicles and practically all the crew-served weapons, communication equipment, and even most of the individual weapons were lost.

On 28 July, the day after Hadong, the 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment, was reorganized, all remaining personnel being grouped in K and L Companies. The next day, K Company was attached to the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Regiment at Chinju, and L Company to the 1st Battalion of the regiment, a little over three kilometers to the south of Chinju.

Anui—Kochang Area Battle
(27—29 July)

Meanwhile, in Anui—Kochang area in the last week of July, the elements of the 4th NK Division showed their appearance. It was apparently joining the 6th NK Division in envelopment of the United Nations left flank. While the 6th NK Division moved on an outer arc around the left of the UN position, the 4th NK Division on an inner arc. The two enemy divisions were engaging in a coordinated movement on a theater scale.

In Anui on 27 July, B Company of the 1st Battalion, 29th US Regiment, was under attack from superior numbers closing in from three sides, and by nightfall it had been forced back into the town. The B Company which relieved A Company of the 19th US Regiment a few hours earlier had had a little time on the position. The Company Commander, 1st Lieutenant John C.
Hughes, made plans to withdraw across the upper Nam River to a high hill east of the town. Two officers and 16 men got across before enemy automatic fire cut off the rest. After vainly trying to help the rest of the company to break out eastward, the 18 men went over the hills to the 34th US Regiment position at Kochang. In Anui the cutoff troops engaged in street fighting until midnight. Those who escaped walked out through the hills during the next several days. Approximately half of the 215 men of B and D Companies, 29th Regiment, taking part in the Anui battle, were either killed or listed as missing in action.

The Battalion Commander and the rest of the battalion at Umyong-ni meanwhile knew nothing of the fate of B Company.

The enemy troops that had closed on Anui were advanced units of the 4th NK Division. They were well aware that a mixed force of American and ROK troops was only a few kilometers below them. To deal with this force, elements of the Communist division turned south from Anui early on 28 July.

In defensive positions about Umyong-ni and Hamyang, the men of the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, were on the east side of the Nam River. Colonel Min Kee Shik’s elements of the 7th ROK Division and a small force of ROK Marines were on the west side. American mortar fire turned back the small enemy force that approached Umyong-ni. On the west side of the river near Hamyang a hard fight developed. There, the ROK troops seemed about to lose the battle until their reserve Marines fought through to the enemy’s flank. This caused the enemy to withdraw northward. From prisoners captured in this battle Colonel Wilson commanding the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, learned of the American defeat at Anui the day before.

Learning that evening that the enemy was moving around his battalion on back trails in the direction of Chinju, Colonel Wilson began, after dark, the first of a series of withdrawals. On 30 July the battalion reached the vicinity of Sanchong about 30 kilometers north of Chinju, and went into defensive positions there on order from the Regimental Commander. Colonel Min’s ROK troops also withdrew southward, passed through the 1st Battalion positions, and continued on into Chinju.

Having brushed aside the American and ROK troops at Anui, the 4th NK Division turned northeast toward Kochang. A patrol from the 34th Regiment of the 24th US Division on 27 July had, from a distance, seen and heard the fighting in progress at Anui. Its report alerted Colonel Beauchamp, commanding the 34th Regiment, to the possibility of an early enemy attack.
Colonel Beauchamp had disposed the 34th Regiment in a three-quarter circle around Kochang, which lay in the middle of an oval-shaped basin in a north south mountain valley. The 3rd Battalion was on high ground astride the Anui road about three kilometers west of the town, the 1st Battalion also about the same distance east of its on the Hyopchon road, a reinforced platoon of I Company at a roadblock across the Kimchon road about six kilometers north of the town, while the Heavy Mortar Company was at its northern edge. Artillery support consisted of A Battery, 13th US Field Artillery Battalion, which had five howitzers in position three kilometers southeast of the town.

Before dusk of 28 July, forward observers could see a long line of enemy traffic piled up behind a roadblock that the 34th Regiment had constructed at a defile on the Anui road west of the town. They directed artillery fire on this column until darkness fell. Colonel Beauchamp then brought his two infantry battalions closer to Kochang for a tighter defense.

Colonel Beauchamp was ordered to hold the town when he reported about dark General Church of an anticipated enemy attack and of his plan to withdraw the 3rd Battalion to a previously selected position about five kilometers southeast of Kochang.

About at 0400 hours, 29 July, an enemy attack came from two directions. One force, striking from the north, cut off I Company. Another moved around the town and then struck southward across the road east of Kochang. The 1st Battalion repulsed this attack, but then, without orders, fell back toward the secondary position about five kilometers east of Kochang.

Before daylight the 3rd Battalion, also without orders, fell back through Kochang, leaving I Company isolated to the north. This battalion ran a gauntlet of enemy automatic and small arms fire, but in the protecting darkness suffered few casualties. After daylight the 1st Battalion rescued all but one platoon of I Company. The men of this platoon were either killed or captured.

During the predawn attack the enemy small arms fire also struck in the howitzer position of A Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion and overrun the artillery. Two squads of infantry attached to the artillery to provide security joined the stampede. This debacle had apparently been caused by a small enemy patrol of six or seven men.

During 29 July the 34th Regiment withdrew eastward 24 kilometers to hill positions near Sanje-ri on the road to Hyopchon. From a point about five kilometers southeast of Kochang the road for the next 16 kilometers is virtually a defile. The withdrawing 34th Regiment and its engineer troops blew
all the bridges and at many points set off demolition charges in the cliffs over-
hanging the road.

The 18th Regiment of the 4th NK Division pressed on after the retreating
34th US Regiment. The division left its artillery behind at Kochang because
of the destroyed bridges ahead of it. In advancing to the Naktong River on
the Hyopchon road, it employed only small arms and mortar fire.

It was anticipated that the enemy force which had captured Kochang
would soon approach the Naktong River for a crossing below Taegu. This
prospect created another difficulty for the Eighth Army. To meet it,
General Walker told General Church he would send to him the 17th ROK
Regiment, one of the best ROK units at that time. He also shifted the 1st
Battalion, 21st US Regiment, from the Pohang—Yongdok area on the east
coast to Hyopchon, where it took up defensive position back of the 34th
Regiment west of the town. The 17th ROK Regiment, 2,000 strong, arrived
at the 34th Regiment position in the dead of night at 0200 hours, 30 July. It
went at once into positions on the high ground on either flank.

Chinju Area Battle
(29—31 July)

By the evening of 29 July Colonel Moore had managed to redeploy his 19th
Regiment for the defense of Chinju.

The 1st Battalion, less A Company, proceeded to the vicinity of Kuho-ri,
about three kilometers west of Sachon Airfield after it arrived at Chinju from
Anui on 28 July. There his battalion of only 200 riflemen went into position
to block a secondary road approach to Chinju along the coast from Hadong.

The 2nd Battalion that same morning occupied defensive positions on high
ground astride the Chinju—Hadong road just west of the Nam River. Rem-
nants of the attacked 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment, that had escaped from the
Hadong fight and many of ROK troops were in and around Chinju.

Aerial reconnaissance during that day and the next showed heavy enemy
traffic entering Hadong from all roads and noted movement northeast on the
Chinju road. American intelligence estimated that two enemy regiments
with tanks were in the Hadong area.

Before noon, 29 July, an enemy column with three motorcycles in the lead
approached the 2nd Battalion's advanced blocking position about nine and a
half kilometers southwest of Chinju. Although there was an automatic
weapon available, it did not fire on the column. The few rounds of artillery
that fell were inaccurate and ineffective. The advanced unit, F Company,
then withdrew to join the main battalion position just west of the Nam River about six and a half kilometers from Chinju. An air strike on the enemy column reportedly inflicted considerable damage, halting it temporarily.

Early the next morning, 30 July, an enemy unit moved around the right flank (north) of the 2nd Battalion and cut the road running northwest out of Chinju to the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, that relieved the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, at Anui area in the early afternoon of 27 July.

Although Captain Barszcz, from his G Company position across the Nam River west of Chinju, reported at least 800 enemy troops moving across his front, the enemy was not stopped. Rain and low overcasts during the day hampered efforts of air strikes.

That afternoon, 30 July, E and F Companies of the 19th Regiment fell back across the Nam River to the hills three kilometers west of Chinju. Just before evening, G Company crossed the river from its isolated position. Once on the east side it took up a defensive position in the flat ground near the river bank, with the mission of preventing enemy infiltration into Chinju between the road and the river. The hill positions of the rest of the battalion were beyond the road to its right (north). There was no physical contact between G Company and these troops.

On 30 July, all ROK forces in the Chinju area came under the control of the 19th US Regiment, including the remnants of the 7th ROK Division, now known as Task Force Min, which during the day arrived at Chinju from the Hamyang area with 1,249 men.

After dark the enemy moved in for closequarter attack. Before midnight, G Company killed several North Korean Red soldiers inside its perimeter. Out of communication with battalion headquarters, and with friendly artillery fire falling near, Captain Barszcz tried to join the other rifle companies on his right, but he had found the enemy on the road in strength and had to move around them. About midnight he crossed the road to the north side. There he and his men lay hidden in bushes for two or three hours. During this time several enemy tanks loaded with infantry passed along the road headed in the direction of Chinju.

The enemy supported by their tanks and artillery directed their main attack against E and F Companies in front of Chinju. Forty-five minutes later whistles signaled the infantry attack and enemy soldiers closed in, delivering small arms fire. The main effort was against F Company on the hill overlooking the river. There a crisis developed about 0500 hours.

Back of the F Company hill, members of the Heavy Weapons Company watched the battle as it developed in front of them. Soon, a platoon of F
Company came off the hill, and the enemy pursued. Other members of F Company ran toward E Company's position. At least one platoon of the Heavy Weapons Company opened fire on the intermingled Americans and the Red enemy. Within a few minutes, however, this platoon withdrew toward Chinju. The organized parts of E and F Companies also fell back on Chinju about daylight.

While this battle was in progress, Captain Barszcz, G Company Commander, received radio orders to move to Chinju. He took his company north over high ground and then circled eastward. On the way he picked up stragglers and wounded men from E, F, and H Companies of the 19th Regiment and K Company of the 29th Regiment. By daylight his group was four or five kilometers northeast of Chinju. Around noon, G Company joined elements of the 19th Regiment east of the town. During the night, G Company had suffered about 40 casualties, but of this number it brought approximately 20 wounded through the hills with it. 10 were litter cases.

The 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, also had come under attack during the night. It held a strong defensive position below the Nam River on high ground about six kilometers south of Chinju, overlooking the Sachon—Chinju road near its juncture with the road east to Masan.

The battalion at dusk on 30 July could clearly see enemy troops out in the open going into position, but they were forbidden to fire because a ROK Marine battalion attack was scheduled to sweep across in front of them. But the ROK's never entered the fight there, and the enemy used this three-to-four hour period unmolested for maneuvering against the 1st Battalion.

That night, enemy mortars and self-propelled weapons supported efforts of the 15th NK Regiment to infiltrate the 1st Battalion's position. But it was on terrain hard to attack, and the enemy effort failed. The enemy in front of the 1st Battalion withdrew before dawn, apparently veering off to the northwest.

After daylight, 31 July, the 1st Battalion on orders from Colonel Moore, began moving his battalion 16 kilometers eastward on the Masan road to occupy a defensive position at the Chinju pass. The 1st Battalion withdrew to this position without contact and went into defensive perimeter there astride the road before nightfall.

The 19th regimental command post started to evacuate Chinju at about 0800 hours.

The withdrawal from Chinju was relatively orderly, although slow and laborious, with refugees, animal-drawn wagons, and American and ROK foot
soldiers intermingled in the streets. The 2nd Battalion, in the withdrawal, followed the road north of the Nam River to Uiryong, where it assembled on the evening of 31 July. The regimental command post crossed the Nam about five kilometers northeast of the town, and then went east on the Masan road to Chiryon-ri. The artillery, accompanied by the 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment, withdrew from Chinju to an assembly area at Koman-ri (Saga) shortly after noon, but on orders it returned to the vicinity of Chinju and went into position at the Chinju pass in support of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry.

The 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, started withdrawing at 1700 hours on 31 July. It was unaware until the morning that Chinju had fallen and that the 19th Regiment had withdrawn eastward.

On the last day of July the NK Reds could look back on a spectacular triumph in their enveloping maneuver through the southwest. Chinju had fallen. Their troops were ready to march on Masan and, once past that place, to drive directly on Pusan.

Section 5. Blocking the Road to Masan

By 31 July, after capture of Kochang and Anui, the 4th NK Division was in position to attack beneath Taegu and seal off its escape routes, while also crossing the Naktong River before the Eighth Army had time to fall back behind this natural barrier. And the 6th NK Division was poised to smash at Masan, which masked the plum of Pusan.

General Walker responded by pulling the 25th US Division out of his center and rushing it down to the southwest. The first unit to go south was the 27th Regiment of the 25th US Division, which came out of reserve at Waegwan to join the 24th US Division in blocking the road to Masan. Thereafter, General Walker fed the rest of the 25th into the southwest front, taking the gamble which left his center perilously weak for any enemy thrust there, while strengthening his left for what now seemed to him the enemy's most dangerous maneuver.

It is apparent that the element of the 6th NK Division followed very closely behind the withdrawing 19th US Regiment after the capture of Chinju, sending the bulk of its advance units up the northern road toward Masan.

On 2 August the enemy attacked on the Chungam-ri position held by the 19th Regiment on the northern road to Masan, but he met a strong resist-
ance of the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, and of the 1st Battalion, 29th US Regiment, and had to withdraw by evening. From information gained later concerning the location of the 6th NK Division, it appears that the enemy was at least in battalion strength at the Chindong-ni on 2 August, and he may have had the greater part of a regiment. Friendly casualties in this action numbered about 90.

The next morning, 3 August, two battalions of the 4th Regiment, 6th NK Division, made their attack on Chindong-ni southwest of Masan, where the 27th US Regiment had its command post. The enemy's initial attack came as a complete surprise and the immediate vicinity of Chindong-ni was thrown into confusion. The chaos, however, did not last long. Soon the 1st Battalion attacked on the enemy position on the hill overlooking the command post and had possession of the high ground with the support of artillery. After the action American patrols counted 400 enemy dead, a large number of them in the area where the 8th US Field Artillery Battalion had taken the detruiting enemy soldiers under fire. The defenders of Chindong-ni estimated they had killed and wounded 600 enemy soldiers. American casualties of Chindong-ni on 3 August were 13 killed and nearly 40 wounded in the 1st Battalion, with a total of 60 casualties for all units.

Thus, the 6th NK Division was kept out of Masan, while the 4th NK Division was held off beyond the Nakdong. Pusan and the United Nations foothold in Korea were saved. The flanking dash from the west had been the enemy's outstanding movement of the entire war, but General Walker had blunted it.

In early August, General Walker received what he regarded as conclusive intelligence that the enemy plan had been to supply the Communist enveloping force in southwestern Korea by water from the port of Kunsan and other ports southward to and including Yosu. Walker said that had the enemy force driven straight and hard for Pusan instead of occupying all the ports in southwestern Korea, he would not have had time to interpose the strength to stop it.

Never afterward were conditions as critical for the Eighth Army as in the closing days of July and the first days of August 1950. Never again did the enemy come as close to victory as when his 6th and 4th NK Divisions passed eastward through Chinju and Kochang. Costly, bloody battles still remained, but from a UN strategic point of view, the most critical phase had passed. Heavy UN reinforcements were then arriving, or on the point of arriving in Korea.
Section 6. Withdrawal to the Naktong Perimeter
(1–3 August 1950)

By the end of July 1950, the enemy pressure that forced General Walker to move the 25th US Division from Sangju to the Masan area front forced on him also, partly as a consequence of that move, the decision to withdraw Eighth Army across the Naktong. The Naktong River Line, as many called it, was the vital position where the Eighth Army intended to make its stand. The withdrawal was planned to start the night of 1 August.

The 24th US Division: On 30 July the 34th Regiment of the 24th Division, driven from Koehang, was in a defensive position near Sanje-ri astride the road to Hyopchon and the Naktong River. That day, the 21st Regiment -- except for C Company and a section of 81-mm. mortars, still at Yongdok on the east coast, and the 3rd Battalion, just attached to the 1st Cavalry Division -- crossed the Naktong and took a position behind the 34th Regiment. The 17th ROK Regiment also arrived and occupied the high ground on the right of the 34th Regiment. The next morning the 34th Regiment withdrew behind the 21st Regiment. Colonel Richard W. Stephens then assumed command of both the 21st and the 34th Regiments on oral orders from General Church.

After the 34th Regiment withdrew through the 1st Battalion, the 21st Regiment, Colonel Stephens moved the 17th ROK Regiment back abreast of his troops, with one battalion on either flank and one in reserve. The next day, 1 August, North Korean enemy attacked both flanks. The ROK troops repulsed them. General Church initially had intended that the 17th ROK Regiment could pass through the mountains around the flanks of the enemy and attack from their rear while the 34th and 21st Regiments held them in front. But the army order for withdrawal came before this could be done.

On 1 August the Eighth Army issued an operational directive to all United Nations ground forces in Korea for their planned withdrawal behind the Naktong. It confirmed oral and fragmentary orders already issued to units on their redeployment to the main defensive positions of the Naktong Perimeter known to Americans as Pusan Perimeter.

At 0945 hours, 2 August, Colonel Stephens received the Eighth Army’s order to withdraw. He at once sent the 34th Regiment across the Naktong to the Yongsan area. During the day, while the 21st Regiment and 17th ROK
Regiment held off enemy probing attacks, he made plans to complete the withdrawal that night to the east side of the Naktong.

The withdrawal east across the Naktong by the 21st Regiment proceeded smoothly during the night of 2–3 August. The last of the Regiment crossed the Koryong-Taegu bridge 45 minutes past midnight, followed by the 14th US Engineer Combat Battalion two hours later. The 17th ROK Regiment, covering the withdrawal of the other units, crossed the river 0630 hours, 3 August.

On the evening of 3 August the 19th Regiment was relieved in its position at the Chungam-ni west of Masan by the 35th Regiment of the 25th US Division. It then moved northeast across the Naktong to the command post of the 24th Division at Changnyong, arriving there the next day. From the time of its commitment in Korea on 13 July to 4 August, the 19th Regiment had lost 80 percent of its 1/4-ton trucks, 50 percent of its 3/4-ton trucks, and 33 percent of its 2 1/2-ton trucks.

The 1st US Cavalry Division: Simultaneous with the movement of the 24th US Division to the eastside of the Naktong, the 1st Cavalry Division, next in line above it, began withdrawing on army orders from the Chirye-Kimcheon area to Waegwan on the east side of the river. The division with-

Highway and railway bridges over the Naktong near Waegwan.
drew without difficulty, except for the 5th Cavalry Regiment. This regiment, the last in the march order, was heavily engaged and one battalion nearly lost. By nightfall of 3 August, however, all units of the division were across the Nakto ng except the rear guard of the 1st Battalion, the 8th Cavalry, which had been blocking on the Songju road, southwest of the Waegwan bridges.

The main line railroad bridges and the highway bridge across the Nakto ng at Waegwan were to be blown as soon as all units of the 1st Cavalry Division had crossed. These bridges were the most important on the river. General Gay, commanding of the division, in arranging for their destruction, gave orders that no one but himself could order the bridges blown. At dusk on 3 August, thousands of refugees crowded up to the bridges on the west side of the river, and repeatedly, as the rear guard of the 8th Cavalry would start across the bridge, the mass of refugees would follow. General Gay ordered the rear guard to return to the west side and hold back the refugees. When all was ready the troops were to run across to the east side so that the bridge could be blown. This plan was tried several times, but in each instances the refugees were on the heels of the rear guard. Finally, when it was nearly dark, General Gay, feeling that he had no alternative, gave the order to blow the bridge. It was a hard decision to make, for hundreds of refugees were lost when the bridge was demolished.

The refugee problem was a constant source of trouble and danger to the UN Command during the early part of the war. During the middle two weeks of July it was estimated that about 380,000 refugees had crossed into ROK-held territory, and that this number was increasing at the rate of 25,000 daily. The refugees were most numerous in the area of enemy advance. In July and August 1950, the volume of refugees moving through UN lines was greater than at any other time in the war. With the destruction of the Waegwan bridges, the Eighth Army by the morning of 4 August had destroyed all the bridges across the Nakto ng on its front. Its troops were in defensive positions on the east bank.

The Divisions of the ROK Army: On a line curving north and east from Waegwan, the divisions of the ROK Army also withdrew across the river, coordinating their moves with the Eighth Army on the night of 2–3 August. In this movement, the ROK forces had some severe fighting. The 1st ROK Division was heavily engaged north of the river on 2 August, while the 16th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division was even more heavily engaged by the 12th NK Division at Andong.
It was evident in the last days of July and the first of August that General Walker was concerned about the failure of his troops to carry out orders to maintain contact with the enemy. In preparing for the withdrawal to the Naktong River Line, on 30 July he had ordered all units to maintain such contact. Three days later conditions compelled him to repeat the order with the injunction that division commanders give it their personal attention. Later in the day he thought it necessary to issue still another directive which ordered, "Daily counterattacks will be made by all units... Commanders will take immediate and aggressive action to insure that these and previous instructions to this effect are carried out without delay." "Counterattack," General Walker said, "is a defensive element of the defense."
CHAPTER VIII  THE NAKTONG PERIMETER
(1 - 20 August 1950)

Section 1. Establishing the Naktong Perimeter

The Naktong Perimeter positions taken up by the American and ROK forces on 4 August 1950 enclosed a rectangular area about 160 kilometers from north to south and about 80 kilometers from east to west. The Naktong River formed the western boundary of the Perimeter except for the southernmost 24 kilometers below the point where it turned eastward after its confluence with the Nam River. The Eastern Sea formed the eastern boundary, and the Korea Strait the southern boundary. An irregular curved line through the mountains from above Waegwan to Yongdok formed the northern boundary. Yongdok on the east coast stood at the northeast corner of the Perimeter, Pusan was at the southeast corner, Masan at the southwest corner, and Taegu near the middle from north to south, but only about 16 kilometers from the western and threatened side of the Perimeter. With the exception of the delta of the Naktong and the east-west valley between Taegu and Pohang, the ground is rough and mountainous. The mountains are particularly forbidding in the northeast above Pohang.

In planning for the defense of the Perimeter, the Eighth Army believed it needed at least two reserve forces, one in the vicinity of Kyongsan, 16 kilometers southeast of Taegu, which it could use to bolster any part of the line in the center and in the Pohang area of the east coast, and another in the vicinity of Samnangjin — Miryang, which it could use against any threatened or actual enemy breakthrough along the lower Naktong or the Masan corridor.

General Walker reported to the Far East Command at this time that he thought the 24th US Division would have to be completely rehabilitated before it could be effective. He also doubted that the 25th US Division had offensive capabilities. He intended to use the 30,000 ROK trainees, he said, mostly to bring the existing ROK divisions to full strength.

Thus, to General Walker, the matter of reinforcements was of utmost con-
cern. Even after the arrival of new American troops (the 2nd Division, the 5th Regimental Combat Team, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade) in early August, the odds were still heavily against the defenders. Troops from other member nations of the United Nations were offered in brigade, regiment, and battalion size, but weeks, even months would pass before much of this assistance materialized.

The establishment of the Naktong Perimeter, however, may be considered as a dividing line in viewing and appraising the combat behavior of the American soldiers in the Korean War. The Naktong Perimeter for the first time gave something approaching a continuous line of troops. With known units on their left and right and some reserves in the rear, the men showed a stronger disposition to fight. Before the Perimeter, all through July and into the first days of August, there was seldom a continuous line beyond a battalion or a regimental position. Both flanks were generally wide open, and enemy troops moving through the hills could easily turn a defensive position. Supporting troops were seldom within reach. American soldiers, realizing the isolated nature of their positions, often would not stay to fight a losing battle. Few in July 1950 saw any good reason for dying in Korea; with no inspiring incentive to fight, self-preservation became the dominating factor. (See Situation Map 3, Appendix VI.)

Section 2. The Two Opposing Forces at the Perimeter

Disposition of the troops

The deployment of UN forces on the arc curving from the southwest to the northeast as the battle of the Perimeter opened was as follows: The 25th US Division, the 24th US Division, the 1st US Cavalry Division, and the 1st, 6th, 8th, Capital, and 3rd ROK Divisions, in that order.

In the southwest, the Eighth Army had hoped to anchor the line near the coast on the Chinju pass, but the enemy had forced the line eastward to a point just west of Chindong-ni, whence it ran northward from the coast to the Nam River below Uiryong, a few kilometers west of the confluence of the Nam and the Naktong. The 27th, 24th, and 35th Regiments of the 25th US Division were on line in that order, south to north, with some ROK troops (Task Force Min) interspersed among them, particularly in the 24th Regiment sector. The division command post was at Masan. In addition,
General Kean had at hand the 5th Regimental Combat Team, which arrived from Hawaii on 31 July and was attached to the 25th Division, and the 89th Medium Tank Battalion. Opposite the 25th US Division stood the 6th NK Division and the 83rd Motorized Regiment of the 105th NK Armored Division.

Next on the line was the 24th US Division. Its zone lay north of the Nam River and along the east bank of the Nakton for about 64 kilometers of river front. The 34th and 21st US Regiments and the 17th ROK Regiment were on line in that order, south to north. The 19th US Regiment was in division reserve, re-equipping after arriving from the Masan front on 4 August. The 21st Regiment's front was so long that Colonel Stephens, the Regimental Commander, placed seven .50-caliber machine guns with crews from the 14th US Engineer Combat Battalion in the main line of resistance. The division command post had now moved to Miryang. Opposite the 24th US Division stood the 4th NK Division.

Above the 24th Division, the 1st US Cavalry Division extended the line about 30 air kilometers to a point about 5 kilometers north of Waegwan. The 7th Cavalry (less the 1st Battalion, which was in division reserve), the 8th Cavalry, and the 5th Cavalry Regiments were in position in the division sector, in that order from south to north. The division command post was at Taegu. Taegu, also Eighth Army headquarters, lay about 16 kilometers east of the Nakton River behind the center of the 1st Cavalry Division front. Opposite the 1st US Cavalry Division was the 3rd NK Division.

The three American divisions each had a front to defend from 32 to 64 kilometers long. The Nakton River Line at this time resembled closely the German front before Moscow after the first German withdrawal in 1941, when Guderian's divisions each had a front of 40 to 50 kilometers to defend.

North of Waegwan, the 1st and 6th ROK Divisions of the II ROK Corps extended the line north along the Nakton for 32 more air kilometers, and thence northeast for about 16 kilometers toward Uisong. From there the 8th and Capital Divisions of the I ROK Corps continued the line northeast through Uisong where it turned east toward Yongdok on the coast. On the east coast the 3rd ROK Division held the right anchor of the UN line. The ROK Army headquarters was at Taegu with a forward command post at Sinnyong. The I ROK Corps headquarters was at Uisong; the II ROK Corps headquarters at Kunwi.

North of Waegwan, the 15th and part of the 13th NK Divisions faced the 1st ROK Division; eastward, part of the 12th and the 1st NK Divisions faced the 6th ROK Division; beyond them the 8th NK Division stood in
Front of the 8th ROK Division; next in line, the 12th NK Division confronted the Capital ROK Division below Andong; and, finally, on the east coast the 5th NK Division and the 766th Independent Infantry Regiment faced the 3rd ROK Division.

In summary then, the ROK Army held the east half of the line from a point just above Waegwan; the Eighth US Army held the west or southern part. The ROK sector extended for 128 air kilometers; the Eighth Army's for about 104 air kilometers. The ROK troops held the most mountainous portions of the line and the part with the poorest lines of communications.

The NK Communist Army comprised two corps: I NK Corps controlled operations generally along the western side of the perimeter opposite the American units; II NK Corps controlled operations along the northern or eastern half of the perimeter opposite the ROK units. This enemy corps alignment remained unchanged throughout the Naktong Perimeter period of the war.

The NK Communists had activated its I Corps at Pyongyang about 10 June 1950, its II Corps at the same place about 12 June 1950. In early August 1950, the I NK Corps included the 3rd, 4th and 6th (later also the 2nd, 7th, 9th and 10th) Divisions; the II Corps included the 1st, 5th, 8th, 12th, 13th, and 15th Divisions. Tanks and personnel of the 105th Armored Division were divided between the two corps and supported both of them.

### Strength of the Two Opposing Forces

An official report from General MacArthur to the Department of the US Army in Washington gave UN troops strength in Korea on 4 August 1950 as 141,808 men:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUSAK</td>
<td>2,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMAG</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>10,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Infantry Division</td>
<td>4,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This figure shows only for the 9th Regiment and its supporting artillery which arrived 31 July)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Infantry Division</td>
<td>14,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This includes 5th RCT and 1st and 3rd Bns of the 29th Regiment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>12,073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1st Provisional Marine Brigade............................. 4,713
Pusan Base ........................................... 5,171
FEAF (Korea)............................................. 4,051
Other .................................................. 107
ROK Army (Estimated)..................................... 82,570

Total ................................................. 141,808

This report indicates that American ground combat units, as of 4 August, totaled more than 47,000 men. The principal ROK combat strength at this time was in five infantry divisions recently filled to a strength of approximately 45,000 men.

Thus, on 4 August, the UN combat forces outnumbered the enemy at the front approximately 92,000 to 70,000.

The relative UN strength opposed to the enemy at the front in early August was actually much more favorable than commonly represented.

It is true that the North Korean Communist forces had outnumbered those of the United Nations after the near collapse of the ROK Army at the end of June and until about 20 July, but never by more than two to one as commonly represented. By 22 July the UN forces in Korea equaled those of the NK Red forces, and in closing days of the month the United Nations gained a numerical superiority, which constantly increased until the end of the year.

Now, turning to enemy strength, underestimation of enemy losses in the first five weeks of the war led in turn to an exaggerated notion of the enemy forces facing the UN Command along the Naktong Perimeter. The underestimation of the enemy losses was due apparently to a failure on the part of the UN Command. When the enemy was advancing south so rapidly, there was little opportunity to count his dead. In some engagements, the ROK's alone decimated North Korean regiments and even whole divisions.

The enemy had probably no more than 70,000 men in his committed eleven divisions, one independent mechanized regiment, and one independent infantry regiment, as he began crossing the Naktong River on 4—5 August to assault the UN forces in the Naktong Perimeter. A tabulation of estimated enemy strength by major units as of 5 August as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st NK Division</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd NK Division</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd NK Division</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naktong Perimeter

4th NK Division ........................................... 7,000
5th NK Division ........................................... 6,000
6th NK Division ........................................... 3,600
8th NK Division ........................................... 8,000
12th NK Division ........................................... 6,000
13th NK Division ........................................... 9,500
15th NK Division ........................................... 5,000
105th NK Armored Division (40 tanks) .................. 3,000
83rd Motorized Regiment of 105th NK Armored Division ........................................... 1,000
766th NK Independent Infantry Regiment .............. 1,500

No reliable figures are available for the number of enemy tanks destroyed and for tank troops casualties of the 105th NK Armored Division by 5 August, but certainly they were high. There were only a few tank replacements during July. The first large tank replacement apparently took place about 15 August, when 21 new tanks and 200 tank crew men arrived at the front. Aerial action destroyed many new tanks before they could reach the battle zone. The NK forces probably had no more than 3,000 armored personnel and forty tanks at the front on 5 August.

While no exact information is available as to the number of enemy artillery pieces and heavy mortars still in action by 5 August, it probably was about one third the number with which the enemy started the war. The 4th NK Division artillery, for instance, reportedly had twelve guns on 5 August when the division reached the Naktong.

Section 3. Task Force Kean’s Counterattack (7–14 August 1950)

The NK Communist forces’ drive on Pusan from the west along the Chinju–Masan corridor compelled General Walker to concentrate there all the reinforcements then arriving in Korea. These included the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade—six battalions of infantry with supporting tanks and artillery. The Eighth Army being stronger there than at any other part of the Naktong Perimeter General Walker decided on a counterattack in this southernmost corridor of the Korean battlefront. It was to be the first American counterattack of the war. (See Sketch Map 10.)
The Eighth US Army G-3 Planning Section in the first days of August proposed two offensive actions in the near future. First, Eighth Army would mount an attack in the Masan—Chinju area between 5–10 August. Secondly, about the middle of the month, the Army would strike in a general offensive through the same corridor, drive on west as far as Yosu, and then wheel north along the Sunchon—Chonju—Nonsan axis toward the Kum River—the route of the 6th NK Division in reverse. This general offensive plan was based on the expected arrival of the 2nd US Division and three tank battalions by 15 August. The planning study for the first attack stated that the counterattack force “should experience no difficulty in securing Chinju.”

General Walker and the Eighth Army General Staff studied the proposals and, in a conference on the subject, decided the Army could not support logistically a general offensive and that there would be insufficient troops to carry it out. The conference, however, approved the proposal for a counterattack by Eighth Army reserve toward Chinju. One of the principal purposes of the counterattack was to relieve enemy pressure against the Perimeter in the Taegu area by forcing the division of some Communist units southward.

On 6 August Eighth Army issued the operational directive for the attack, naming Task Force Kean as the attack force and giving the hour of attack as 0630 the next day. The Task Force was named for its commander, Major General William B. Kean, Commanding General of the 25th US Division.

The Order of Battle as well as the names of major commanders who participated in the counterattack were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force Kean</th>
<th>Maj. Gen. William B. Kean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th Regiment</td>
<td>Col. Arthur S. Champney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Regiment</td>
<td>Col. Henry G. Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th RCT (attached)</td>
<td>Col. Godwin L. Ordway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Marine Regiment</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Eighth US Army plan for the counterattack required Task Force Kean to attack west along three roads, seize the Chinju Pass, and secure the line of the Nam River. Three regiments would make the attack: The 35th Regiment along the northernmost and main inland road, the 5th Regimental Combat Team along the secondary inland road to the Muchon-ni road junction, and the 5th Marine Regiment along the southern coastal road. This placed the Marines on the left flank, the 5th Infantry RCT in the middle, and
the 35th Regiment on the right flank. The 5th RCT was to lead the attack in the south, seize the road junction eight kilometers west of Chindong-ni, and continue along the righthand fork. The Marines would then follow the 5th RCT to the road junction, take the lefthand fork, and attack along the coastal road. This plan also called for the 5th RCT to make a link-up with the 35th Regiment at Muchon-ni, whence they would drive on together to the Chinju Pass, while the Marines swung southward along the coast through Kosong and Sachon to Chinju. The 5th RCT and the 5th Marines, on the night of 6-7 August, were to relieve the 27th US Regiment in its front-line defensive positions west of Chindong-ni. The 27th Regiment would then revert to army reserve in an assembly area at Masan.

While Task Force Kean attacked west, the 24th Regiment was to clean out the enemy from the rear area, giving particular attention to the rough, mountainous ground of Sobuk-san between the 35th and the 5th Infantry Regiments. It also was to secure the lateral north-south road running from
Komam-ni through Haman to Chindong-ni. Task Force Min, a regiment-sized ROK force, was attached to the 24th Regiment to assist in this counterattack.

The 35th US Regiment

On the right flank of Task Force Kean, the 2nd Battalion of the 35th US Regiment led the attack west on 7 August. Only the day before, an enemy attack had driven one company of this battalion from its position, but a counterattack had regained the lost ground. Now, as it crossed the line of departure about 5 kilometers west of Chungam-ni, the battalion encountered about 500 enemy troops supported by several self-propelled guns. The two forces joined battle at once, a contest that lasted five hours before the 2nd Battalion, with the help of an air strike, secured the pass and the high ground northward.

After this fight, the 35th Regiment advanced rapidly westward and by evening stood near the Muchon-ni road fork, the regiment's initial objective. In this advance, the 35th Regiment inflicted about 350 casualties on the enemy, destroyed 2 tanks, 1 76-mm. self-propelled gun, 5 antitank guns, and captured 4 truckloads of weapons and ammunition, several brief cases of documents, and 3 prisoners. For the 35th Regiment, the attack had gone according to plan.

The next day, 8 August, the regiment advanced to the high ground just short of the Muchon-ni road fork. There Colonel Fisher received orders from General Kean to dig in and wait until the 5th RCT could come up on his left and join him at Muchon-ni. While waiting, the regiment's troops beat off a few enemy attacks and sent out strong combat patrols that probed enemy positions as far as the Nam River.

The 5th RCT and the Bloody Gulch

The 2nd Battalion of the 5th US Regimental Combat Team commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Throckmorton, had been occupying Yaban-san (Hill 342), about two kilometers and a half west of Chindong-ni since its arrival from the docks of Pusan to Chindong-ni on 2 August to bolster the 27th US Regiment in the area. Fox Hill, as the battalion called it, was merely a high point on along finger ridge that curved down toward Chindong-ni from the Sobuk-san peak. Beyond Fox Hill this finger ridge climbed over higher to
the northwest, culminating about five kilometers away in Sobuk-san (Hill 738).

On 6 August the 27th Regiment was near the road; the 2nd Battalion, the 5th RCT, on higher ground to the north. During the evening the rest of the 5th RCT relieved the 27th Regiment front-line troops, and the 1st Battalion, the 5th Marines, relieved the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, in its reserve position. The next morning the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, was to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, on the high ground north of the road. When thus relieved, the 5th RCT was to begin its attack west.

At 0720 hours, 7 August, the 1st Battalion, the 5th RCT, led off down the road from its line of departure west of Chindong-ni and arrived at the road junction without difficulty. There, instead of continuing on west as it was supposed to do, it turned left, and by noon was on a hill mass about five kilometers south of the road fork and on the road allotted to the Marine line of advance. As a result of this mistake a hill dominating the road junction on the northwest remained unoccupied. The 1st Battalion was supposed to have occupied it and from there to cover the advance of the remainder of the 5th RCT and the 5th Marines.

After the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, had started westward, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, moved out at 1100 hours to relieve Throckmorton’s Battalion on the spur running up to Fox Hill. It ran head-on into the NK force who had come around to the front of the spur during the night. In the
struggle up the slope the Marine battalion had approximately thirty heat prostration cases, six times its number of casualties caused by enemy fire. In the end its attack failed.

While these untoward events were taking place below it, F Company of the 5th RCT on the crest of Fox Hill was cut off.

Failing the first day to accomplish its mission, the 2nd Battalion, the 5th Marines, resumed its attack on Fox Hill the next morning at daybreak after an air strike on the enemy positions. This time, after hard fighting, it succeeded. In capturing and holding the crest, D Company of the Marine battalion lost 8 men killed, including 3 officers, and 28 wounded. The enemy losses on Hill 342 are unknown, but estimates ranged from 150 to 400.

The events of 7 August all across the Masan front showed that Task Force Kean's attack had collided head-on with one being delivered simultaneously by the 6th NK Division.

On 8 August the 2nd Battalion, the 5th RCT, came off Fox Hill after the 2nd Battalion, the 5th Marines, had relieved it there. Colonel Throckmorton was then ordered by General Kean to seize the hill northwest of the road junction that the 1st Battalion was supposed to have taken the day before. Colonel Throckmorton's 2nd Battalion finally seized the hill after his repeated attempts to take it.

For three days the 6th NK Division had pinned down Task Force Kean, after the latter had jumped off at Chindong-ni. Finally, on 9 August, the way was clear for it to start the maneuver along the middle and southern prongs of the planned attack toward Chindu.

Simultaneously with the swing of the Marine brigade around the southern coastal loop toward Chindu, the 5th RCT plunged ahead in the center toward Muchon-ni, its planned junction point with the 35th Regiment. On 10 August, the 1st Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John P. Johnes, attacked down the right side of the road and the 2nd Battalion down the left side. The 1st Battalion on its side encountered the enemy on the hills near Pongam-ni, but was able to enter the town and establish its command post there.

That night, 10–11 August, NK Communist troops attacked the 1st Battalion and the artillery positions at Pongam-ni. The action continued after daylight. At this time the 555th (Triple Nickel) US Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers), less C Battery, and Headquarters and A Batteries, the 90th US Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers)—emplaced at Pongam-ni and Taejong-ni—had near them only the 1st Battalion north of the road. The regimental headquarters and guns of the 159th US Field Artillery
Battalion were emplaced more than one and a half kilometers behind them along the road. During the enemy attack, Lieutenant Colonel John H. Daly, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion Commander and Colonel Johnes were wounded, the latter seriously. Colonel Daly then assumed temporary command of the infantry battalion, and later Lieutenant Colonel T. B. Roelofs, regimental S-2 and formerly the battalion commander, again took the command.

At the same time Pongam-ni came under attack, NK enemy also attacked the 5th RCT headquarters and C Battery, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion who had been left east of Pongam-ni without protecting infantry close at hand. The enemy, however, turned back into the hills on the morning of the 11th when the defenders requested close-in air strikes.

As a result of the considerable enemy action during the night of 10–11 August and during the day of the 11th, Colonel Godwin L. Ordway, the Commander of the 5th RCT, decided that he could not safely move the regimental trains and the artillery through the Pongam-ni Pass during daylight, and accordingly he had made plans to do it that night under cover of darkness.

About 2100 hours, as the 2nd Battalion, C Battery of the 555th, and the trains were forming on the road, Colonel Ordway was ordered to move the 2nd Battalion and one battery of artillery through the pass at once, but to hold the rest of the troops in place until daylight. Colonel Ordway felt that to execute the order would have catastrophic effects.

He tried to reach the division headquarters to protest it, but could not establish communication. Colonel Ordway then started to move west the 2nd Battalion and C and Headquarters Batteries as the advance guard of a regimental advance. The battalion came under light attack on the way but was able to continue on for six kilometers to Kaeam-ni, where it went into an assembly area for the rest of the night.

Sometime after 0100, 12 August, the 1st Battalion Commander received the report that his battalion had lost contact with C Company on the ridge northward and sounds of combat could be heard coming from that area.

Colonel Roelofs then reported Colonel Ordway of this new development, and urged speedy movement of the trains and artillery westward through the pass. But Colonel Ordway reluctantly held firm to division orders not to move until after daylight.

As the situation was becoming critical, however, and unable to contact the division, Colonel Ordway now decided to move the trains and artillery out westward while it was still dark, despite division orders to wait for
daylight. He felt that with the enemy obviously gaining control of the high ground above Pongam-ni, movement after daylight would be impossible or attended by heavy loss. About 0400 hours Colonel Ordway gave the order for the trains to move out. They were to be followed by the artillery, and then the 1st Battalion would bring up the rear. In the meantime, the battalion was to hold open the pass and protect the regimental column.

Movement of the train through the pass should have been accomplished in twenty minutes, but it required hours due to the development of a bad traffic jam. Colonel Ordway tried hard to hurry the column along.

About this time, soon after daybreak, the situation in the Pongam-ni village and at the bridge where supporting artillery tried to clear the area was not quite what it appeared to be to the 1st Battalion Commander. Enemy infantry had closed in so as virtually to surround the artillery. The 13th Regiment of the 6th NK Division, the enemy force at Pongam-ni, now struck furiously from three sides at the 555th and 90th Field Artillery Battalions' positions. The attack came suddenly and with devastating power. Even enemy tanks and self-propelled guns fired into the village and the artillery positions. The Triple Nickel (555) emplacements were in the open and exposed to this fire; those of the 90th were partially protected by terrain feature. The 105-mm. howitzers of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion ineffectually engaged the enemy armor. The 90th could not depress its 155-mm. howitzers low enough to engage the tanks and the self-propelled guns. Some of the Triple Nickel guns received direct hits. Many of the artillerymen of this battalion sought cover in buildings and under the bridge at Taejong-ni. Some of the buildings caught fire. Enemy infantry also closed on the artillery emplacements and fired on the men with small arms and automatic weapons causing heavy casualties.

At daybreak, Corsairs flew in to strafe and rocket the enemy. Despite this close air support, the artillery position was untenable by 0900. Survivors of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion loaded the wounded on the few serviceable trucks. Then, with the uninjured giving covering fire and the US Air Force F-51 fighter planes strafing the enemy, the battalion withdrew on foot.

This artillery disaster was caused by the withdrawal of the section of tanks and the A Company infantry platoon that Colonel Roelofs had left guarding the road entering Pongam-ni from the north. This withdrawal from that position had permitted the enemy armor force to approach undetected and unopposed, almost to point-blank range, and with completely disastrous effects.
General Kean, learning the extent of the disaster in the vicinity of Pongam-ni, at once ordered the 3rd Battalion, the 5th Marine, to proceed to the scene, and he also ordered the 3rd Battalion, the 24th Regiment, to attack through the hills to Pongam-ni. The Marines reached the hill overlooking Pongam-ni, but before they could attempt to attack into Pongam-ni itself the battalion received orders to rejoin the brigade at Masan. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, likewise did not reach the overrun artillery positions.

At Bloody Gulch, the name given by the troops to the scene of the successful enemy attack, the 555th Field Artillery on 12 August lost all eight of its 105-mm. howitzers in the two firing batteries there. The 90th Field Artillery Battalion lost all six 155-mm. howitzers of its A Battery. The loss of the 555th artillerymen has never been accurately computed. The day after the enemy attack only 20 percent of the battalion troops were present for duty. The battalion estimated at the time that from 75 to 100 artillerymen were killed at the gun positions and 80 wounded, with many of the latter unable to get away. Five weeks later, when the 25th Division regained Taejong-ni, it found in a house the bodies of 55 men of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion.

The 90th Field Artillery Battalion lost 10 men killed, 60 wounded, and about 30 missing at Bloody Gulch--more than half the men of Headquarters and A Batteries present. Five weeks later, when this area again came under American control, the bodies of 20 men of the battalion were found; all of them had been shot through the head.

Now, turning to the 2nd Battalion, the 5th RCT, which had been called back from its bivouac area at Kaem-ni six kilometers west of Pongam-ni to cover the rear of the regiment in place of the tired 1st Battalion, it moved back and repulsed an enemy attack at Taejong-ni on the morning of 13 August. That afternoon, the battalion entrucked and moved west again to the Muchon-ni road fork. There it again turned east toward Masan.

The 3rd Battalion of the 5th RCT, rolling westward from Pongam-ni on the morning of 11 August, had joined the 35th Regiment where the latter waited at the Muchon-ni crossroads. From there the two forces moved on to the Chinju Pass. They now looked down on Chinju. But only their patrols went farther. On the afternoon of 13 August and that night, the 5th RCT traveled back eastward to Chindong-ni area.

On the morning of 14 August the 2nd Battalion of the 5th RCT moved around west to Kogan-ni, where it relieved the 3rd Battalion, the 5th Marines. Colonel Throockmorton succeeded Colonel Ordway in command of the regiment on 15 August.
The 5th US Marines

On the afternoon of 9 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, took over from the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, the hill position on the coastal road which the latter had held for three days.

The army battalion then moved to the road fork and turned down the righthand road. At last it was on the right path, prepared to attack west with remainder of its regiment.

The 5th Marines that afternoon moved rapidly down the coastal road, leapfrogging its battalions in the advance. Corsairs of the 1st Marine Air Wing, flying from the USS Sicily and USS Badoeng Strait in the waters off the coast, patrolled the road and adjoining hills ahead of the troops. This close air support delivered strikes within a matter of minutes after a target appeared.

General Kean pushed his unit commanders hard to make up for lost time, now that the attack had at last started. The pace was fast. Casualties from heat exhaustion on 10 August again far exceeded those from enemy action.

Just before noon on the 11th, after a fight on the hills bordering the road, the leading Marine battalion (3rd) neared the town of Kosong. Its supporting artillery, adjusting fire on a crossroads west of the town, chanced to drop shells near camouflaged enemy vehicles. Thinking its position has been discovered, the enemy force quickly entrucked and started down the road toward Sachon and Chinju. This force proved to be a major part of the 83rd Motorized Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, which had arrived in the Chinju area to support the 6th NK Division.

Just as the long column of approximately 200 vehicles, trucks, jeeps, and motorcycles loaded with troops, ammunition, and supplies got on the road, a flight of four Corsairs from the Badoeng Strait came over on a routine reconnaissance mission ahead of the Marines. They swung low over the enemy column, strafing the length of it. Vehicles crashed into each other, others ran into the ditches, some tried to get to the hills off the road. Troops spilled out seeking cover and concealment. The planes turned for another run. The enemy fought back with small arms and automatic weapons and hit two of the planes, forcing one down and causing the other to crash. This air attack left about forty enemy vehicles wrecked and burning. Another flight of Marine Corsairs and Air Force F-21's arrived and continued the work of destruction. When the ground troops reached the scene later in the afternoon, they found 31 trucks, 24 Jeeps, 45 motorcycles, and much ammunition and equipment destroyed or abandoned. The Marine advance stopped that night about six kilometers and a half west of Kosong.
Naktong Perimeter

The next morning, 12 August, the 1st Battalion passed through the 3rd Battalion and led the Marine brigade in what it expected to be the final lap to Sachon, about 13 kilometers below Chinju. Advancing over 17 kilometers unopposed, it came within six kilometers of the town by noon. An hour later, five and a half kilometers east of Sachon, the Marine column entered an enemy ambush at the village of Changchon. Fortunately for the Marines, a part of the 2nd Battalion, 15th NK Regiment, and elements of the 83rd NK Motorized Regiment that lay in wait in the hills cupping the valley disclosed the ambush prematurely. A heavy fight got under way and continued through the afternoon and into the evening. Marine Corsairs struck repeatedly. In late afternoon, the 1st Battalion gained control of Hills 301 and 250 on the right, and Hill 202 on the left, of the road.

Just before noon of the 12th, General Kean had ordered General Craig to send one battalion of Marines back to help clear out enemy troops that had cut the middle road behind the 5th RCT and had its artillery under attack. An hour after noon the 3rd Battalion was on its way back. That evening at Masan, General Craig received the order from General Kean to withdraw all elements of the brigade immediately to the vicinity of Chindong-ni. Events taking place at other points of the Naktong Perimeter caused the sudden withdrawal of the Marine brigade from Task Force Kean’s attack.

Task Force Kean Ended

On 14 August, after a week of fighting, Task Force Kean was back approximately in the positions from it had started its attack. The 35th US Regiment held the northern part of the 25th US Division line west of Masan, the 24th US Regiment the center, and the 5th US RCT the southern part. The US Marine brigade was on its way to another part of the Eighth Army line.

At 1550 hours, 16 August, in a radio message to General Kean, Eighth Army dissolved Task Force Kean. The task force had not accomplished what Eighth Army had believed to be easily possible—the winning and holding of the Chinju pass line. Throughout Task Force Kean’s attack, well organized enemy forces controlled the Sobuk-san area in the 24th Regiment sector and from there struck at its rear and cut its line of communications. The NK high command did not move a single squad from the northern to the southern front during the action. The 6th NK Division took heavy loses in some of the fighting, but so did Task Force Kean. The Eighth Army again had underestimated the 6th NK Division.
Even though Task Force Kean’s attack did not accomplish what the Eighth Army had hoped for and expected, it nevertheless did provide certain beneficial results. It chanced to meet head on the 6th NK Division attack against the Masan position, and first stopped it, then hurled it back. Secondly, it gave the 25th US Division a much needed psychological experience of going on the offensive and nearly reaching an assigned objective. By disorganizing the offensive operations of the 6th NK Division at the middle of August, Task Force Kean also gained the time needed to organize and wire in the defenses that were to hold the enemy out of Masan during the critical period ahead.

During the fighting between Task Force Kean and the 6th NK Division on the Masan front, violent and alarming battles had erupted elsewhere. Sister divisions of the 6th NK Division in the north along the Naktong were matching it in hard blows against the Eighth Army’s defense line. The battles of the Naktong Perimeter had started.

Section 4. The First Battle of the Naktong Bulge
(6–18 August 1950)

The Eighth Army’s defense plan, after its withdrawal to the Naktong Perimeter, centered on holding the road and rail lines running in a large oval east of the Naktong, from Pusan north through Miryang to Taegu, and hence east through Yongchon to Kyongju, where they turned back south to Pusan. Any further withdrawal and loss of these lines of communication would render difficult any later UN attempt at a counteroffensive.

The NK Red forces, in preparing to attack the Naktong Perimeter and its communication system, had available four lines of advance toward Pusan: (1) Through or past Masan south of the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers; (2) through the Naktong Bulge to the rail and road lines at Miryang; (3) through Taegu; and (4) through Kyongju and down the east coast corridor. They tried them all simultaneously in August, apparently believing that if they did not succeed at one place they would at another.

No one doubted that NK Communists intended to force a crossing of the Naktong without delay. Time was against them. Every passing week brought closer the prospect of more American reinforcements—troops, tanks, artillery, and planes. Boss of NK Communists Kim Il-sung had set 15
August as the date for final victory and the liberation of all Korea. This date marked the fifth anniversary of freedom from the Japanese rule.

Northward from the confluence of the Naktong and the Nam, the Naktong forms a wide bow to the west, enclosing a loop of land measuring six kilometers and 400 meters east-west and eight kilometers north-south, with the town of Yongsan at its eastern base. The territory within the river bend was called by its defenders the "Naktong Bulge."

The most dangerous threat developed against this Naktong Bulge although there was hard and bitter fighting along almost all the Perimeter in August, and here the action was typical of the whole bitter, desperate month. (See Sketch Map 11.)

The first enemy crossings of the Naktong River, west of Andong mountain barrier, other than reconnaissance patrols, came on 5 August at three different places. Two were north of Waegwan in the ROK Army sector. The third was in the Naktong Bulge near Changnyong far south of Waegwan opposite Yongsan in the 24th US Division sector. This third crossing of the river was made by the 4th NK Division and was the one to have consequence which first threatened the Perimeter.

By 4 August, the 4th NK Division had concentrated its three regiments in the vicinity of Hyopchon and was studying the American dispositions and defense opposite it on the east side of the Naktong with the intention to make an immediate crossing of the river in coordination with other crossings northward.

On the American side, Major General Church, the 24th US Division Commander, considered the northern part of his 24th Division zone the more difficult to defend and reinforce because of its poor road net. He believed for this reason that the Communist forces were more likely to cross the river in that part of the division zone rather than in the southern part. However, the actual enemy crossing was not where he had anticipated it would be, and it also came sooner than he had expected.

At midnight of 5 August 800 men of the 3rd Battalion, the 16th Regiment, 4th NK Division, began the crossing at the signal of red and yellow flares over the Naktong. Most of the men stripped off their clothing, rolling it and their weapons into bundles to be carried on their heads, and stepped into the shoulder-deep water. Others made rafts to float their clothes and equipment across. This crossing was at the Ohang ferry site, about six kilometers south of Pugong-ni and due west of Yongsan. There was some evidence that the 1st Battalion of the regiment also crossed at this time.
BATTLE IN THE NAKTONG BULGE (5-6 AUG 1950)
None of the units in this initial crossing brought along mortars or heavy weapons. After reaching the east side, the enemy soldiers dressed, and in a column of platoons, marched southeast up the draw leading into the American lines. Their objective was Yongsan.

Simultaneously with this crossing, another enemy force tried to cross the river further north in the zone of the 21st Regiment of the 24th US Division. This force, after running into a mine field and being shelled by artillery, was machine-gunned by infantry and driven back across the river in confusion.

The enemy force that crossed at Ohang penetrated the gap between I and L Companies of the 34th US Regiment, and followed the draw leading southeast to a little valley through which the Yongsan – Naktong River road passed. The battalion command post and the mortar position were approximately five kilometers from the enemy crossing site and directly in the line of enemy advance.

The enemy moved along the draw without making any effort to attack the companies on the hills overlooking the river. They overran the 4.2-inch mortar position, and in doing so, threatened the 3rd Battalion command post nearby. Aware now of the enemy penetration, most of the troops there withdrew to the 1st Battalion command post at Kang-ni.

Colonel Beauchamp, the 34th Regimental Commander, at 0520 hours, reported to General Church of the enemy infiltration in his sector, and of his decision to commit his reserve at daylight to clear up the situation. Colonel Beauchamp ordered the 1st Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Ayres, to counterattack and restore the regimental position. At dawn there was no indication that the rifle companies of the 3rd Battalion on the hills along the river, except L Company, had yet come under attack. Some elements of L Company had been forced out of position and withdrew about one and a half kilometers from the river. The enemy apparently was content to leave the river line troops alone except where they lay across his axis of advance. He was concentrating on penetrating behind the river positions.

After the escape of the 3rd Battalion headquarters troops, the positions of B Battery, 13th US Field Artillery, eastward at the northwestern base of "Ohong-ni Ridge" lay completely exposed to the enemy. At 0830 hours this battery reported small arms fire in its vicinity. The 24th Division now estimated that about 800 enemy were east of the river in its zone.

Upon receiving the order to counterattack straight down the Yongsan – Naktong River road, Colonel Ayres directed his executive officer to mount C
Company in trucks and send it down the road until he stopped it. Behind C Company, A, B, and the Weapons Companies under the executive officer were to follow on foot.

C Company commanded by Captain Clyde M. Akridge attacked the high ground above the former 3rd Battalion command post which was now occupied by enemy, but it failed. In leading the attack, Captain Akridge was wounded three times and was finally evacuated. The enemy on higher ground let loose a heavy volume of small arms and automatic fire against the company, and soon the dry creek bed in which the company men were moving was strewn with dead and dying.

B Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, also came under enemy fire. At 1030 hours the battery commander assembled about 50 men and withdrew along a narrow road with one howitzer, four 2½-ton trucks, and three smaller vehicles. They abandoned four howitzers and nine vehicles. The battery lost two men killed, six wounded, and six missing.

While C Company met the advancing enemy, A and B Companies had started forward on foot. Colonel Beauchamp, upon receiving the report of C Company disaster, went forward at once and joined A and B Companies, the latter cautiously leading the advance. Two antiaircraft vehicles, each mounting four 50-caliber machine guns, were in the forefront of the attack that now got under way with A Company on the left of the road and B Company on the right. Even though enemy resistance at first was light the intense summer heat slowed the pace. Soon B Company on the right encountered strong enemy forces on Cloverleaf Hill (Hill 165). The enemy halted its advance and knocked out one of the quad-50's on the road. On the left, A Company continued its advance with only a few casualties, passing the overrun artillery positions and reaching the area where C Company had been overwhelmed by the enemy. Here at the grist mill A Company rescued several survivors of C Company who had been inside of the mill fighting off the enemy since early morning. Inside, the survivors had stacked their dead against the walls to protect the living from small arms fire.

While A Company pushed on to the river, B Company dug in on part of Cloverleaf Hill. Quiet gradually settled over the area. The day's action made it clear that the enemy troops had penetrated eastward north of the Yongsan—Naktong River road to Cloverleaf Hill, but had not yet crossed south of the road to Obong-ni Ridge. Cloverleaf and Obong-ni together formed a high backbone across the Yongsan road.

By midmorning, General Church had become convinced that the bulk of the enemy east of the river were in the bulge area. He thereupon committed
the 19th US Regiment in an attack west along the northern flank of the 34th US Regiment. In this attack, the 19th Regiment trapped approximately 300 enemy troops in a village east of Obong Hill, near from the river, and killed most of them. By this time the counterattack of the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, had driven back the enemy’s advanced units and regained part of Cloverleaf Hill. This gave time for the 19th Regiment, and later the 9th Regiment, the 2nd US Division, to move up for counterattack.

By the evening of the 6th, however, the enemy had held firmly to his bridgehead in the bulge.

**Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge**

During the night of 6—7 August, the enemy moved an unknown number of reinforcements across to the east side of the river in the bulge area. Then, on the third night, 7—8 August, an estimated two more enemy battalions crossed the river in four different places.

The continuation of the American counterattack in the bulge, on the morning of 7 August, by the 19th Regiment and B Company of the 34th Regiment was a feeble effort. On their part, the NK Red forces pressed forward and occupied the greater part of Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge. In doing this, they established themselves dominating and critical terrain astride the main east-west road in the bulge area.

From the crest of Cloverleaf and Obong-ni Ridge the enemy could see the American main supply road stretching back to Yongsan eight kilometers away and, for a distance, beyond that town toward Miryang. The battle was to rage around them for the next ten days.

As the situation developed unfavorably, the 9th Regiment of the 2nd US Division was ordered to the scene of the battle in the Naktong Bulge on 8 August. The 9th Regiment commanded by Colonel John G. Hill had been placed in army reserve in Kyongsan, about 16 kilometers southeast of Taegu since its arrival in Korea on 31 July.

The 9th Regiment relieved B Company of the 34th Regiment on part of Cloverleaf Hill and members of the Heavy Mortar Company who were fighting as riflemen across the road near Obong-ni Ridge. Colonel Hill placed the 1st Battalion on the left of the Yongsan road, the 2nd Battalion on the right side. His command post was at Kang-ni, about two and a half kilometers eastward toward Yongsan. Two batteries of the 15th US Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers) supported the regiment’s attack, with
twelve 155-mm. howitzers and additional 105-mm. howitzers of the 24th Division on call. The regiment’s immediate objectives were Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge.

The 9th Regiment attacked straight west late in the afternoon of 8 August against Cloverleaf and Obong-ni. On the right, the 2nd Battalion succeeded in capturing part of Cloverleaf by dark, but not control of it or that side of the pass. On the left, the 1st Battalion likewise succeeded in gaining part of Obong-ni Ridge. But that night the NK Communist troops regained the ridge. This situation changed little the next day.

The enemy by now had begun to attack the hill positions along the Naktong still held by American troops. At 2230, on 8 August, A Company started to withdraw with the permission from both the battalion and regimental commanders.

Farther south near the river on the morning of 9 August, K Company received enemy attacks, one enemy group overrunning the company’s forward observation post.

On 10 August, at the critical battle-ground within the bulge, the NK Red force on Cloverleaf Hill launched an attack which met head-on one by the 9th Regiment. Officer losses had been severe in the 2nd Battalion on 8 and 9 August. On the 10th, F was the only rifle company in the battalion with more than one officer. In this fighting the enemy regained all the ground they had lost earlier at Cloverleaf. But north of Cloverleaf, the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, succeeded in capturing several hills along the Naktong, the most important being Ohang Hill. The enemy repulsed all its effort to advance south from Ohang. The fighting on 10 August in the vicinity of Ohang Hill reduced the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, to about 100 effective men in the rifle companies.

General Church, on the evening of the 10th, placed Colonel Hill in command of all troops in the Naktong Bulge. The troops comprised the 9th Regiment (less the 3rd Battalion), 2nd US Division; and the 34th and 19th Regiments, and the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, 24th US Division, together with supporting artillery and other attached units. This command was designated Task Force Hill.

General Church ordered Colonel Hill, commanding Task Force Hill, to attack the next morning, the 11th, and restore the Naktong River line. The attack plan called for the 9th and 19th Regiments to drive southwest through the heart of the bulge. Unfortunately, however, this attack on 11 August failed completely.
During the night of 10–11 August, enemy reinforcements already reached the east side of the river and vastly increased the difficulty of the attack. The 4th NK Division completed an underwater bridge across the Naktong at Paekchon, ferry site in the middle of the bulge, during the night of 10 August, and before daylight had moved trucks, heavy mortars, and approximately twelve artillery pieces to the east side. Some of the equipment crossed on rafts. Additional infantry units of the enemy division also crossed the night. By the morning of 11 August, therefore, five days after the initial crossing, the Communist enemy had heavy weapons and equipment across into their bridgehead.

The 4th NK Division fought the 9th and 19th Regiments to a standstill at their lines of departure and in their positions. Furthermore, the enemy drove the 1st Battalion, 21st US Regiment, from its assembly area before it could start its part of the attack. The situation forced General Church to change his order for the task force from attack to one of dig-in and hold.

**Yongsan Under Attack**

By 11 August there was unmistakable indication that enemy forces in some strength had moved around the main battle positions at Cloverleaf and Obong-ni and were behind Task Force Hill.

On that day enemy artillery fire brought Yongsan under fire for the first time. East of the town, enemy sniper fire harassed traffic on the road to Miryang. South of Yongsan, an enemy force drove back a patrol of the 24th US Reconnaissance Company. And during the morning, NK troops surprised and killed a squad of K Company, 34th Regiment, guarding the bridge over the Naktong at Namji-ri. Enemy control of this bridge cut the Yongsan—Masan road and broke the only direct vehicular communication link between the 24th and 25th US Divisions. In this emergency, General Church dispatched the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion to Yongsan, and General Walker ordered the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, in Army reserve at Masan behind Task Force Kean, to attack north across the Naktong River over the Namji bridge into the southern part of the 24th Division zone. That night, 11–12 August, the enemy also built up their roadblock east of Yongsan to greater strength and extended it to a point about five kilometers east of the town.

In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion, 27th US Regiment, departed Masan on the 11th, and crossed the Naktong against enemy small arms fire. By
midnight the battalion had established a bridgehead on the north side.

The next day the Eighth Army attached the 27th Regiment to the 24th US Division with the mission of attacking north to Yongsan. Army estimates credited two enemy battalions with being east of the Yongsan-Masan road. In the fight northward during 12 August, the 2nd Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gordon E. Murch encountered entrenched enemy who fought with mortars, machine guns, and small arms. An air strike coordinated with the ground attack helped it drive the enemy from his positions. In this attack, the battalion killed about 100 enemy, wounded an unknown number, and captured twelve machine guns and a number of 14.5-caliber antitank rifles.

The attack continued northward the next day with the 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment, assisting the 2nd Battalion. By midafternoon of 13 August both battalions reached their objective, the high ground north and east of Yongsan. The 2nd Battalion effected juncture with Task Force Hill. In this advance, the 27th Regiment's troops overran four pieces of enemy artillery; two of them were captured US 105-mm. howitzers.

Thus, by evening of 13 August, General Walker's prompt action in committing the 27th Regiment, together with the 24th Division's employment of headquarters and engineer troops, had eliminated the dangerous enemy penetration south and east of Yongsan.

Enemy action in the southern part of the 24th Division sector from 10 to 13

US tanks firing at enemy positions near Yongsan.
August convinced Colonel Hill that K and L Companies were doing no good in their isolated hill positions near the Naktong. Accordingly, he issued orders for their companies to abandon their positions and assemble in the rear as regimental reserve. They carried out this movement on the 14th without incident.

**Again at Cloverleaf — Obong-ni Area**

During the enemy infiltration around Yongsan, fighting continued at Cloverleaf, Obong-ni, and northward. There, the 9th US Regiment, the 19th US Regiment, and elements of the 34th US Regiment succeeded in denying gains to the enemy force, and sortied down its main force that the 4th NK Division could not exploit its penetrations southward.

Task Force Hill still had its mission of driving the enemy out of the bulge and back across the Naktong. With the enemy penetration south and east of Yongsan eliminated on 13 August, Colonel Hill planned an attack the next day with his entire force against the Cloverleaf — Obong-ni positions.

The 24th Division artillery delivered a 10-minute preparation. A planned air strike on the enemy positions prior to the artillery preparation was cancelled due to the bad weather. The two battalions of the 9th Regiment, the 1st on the right and the 2nd on the left, started up the slopes of Cloverleaf, while B Company, the 34th Regiment, began a holding attack against Obong-ni south of the road. Although it almost reached the top of Obong-ni early in the morning, B Company was driven back by 0800 hours.

The main battle took place northward across the road on Cloverleaf. There the American and NK Communists locked in a close battle of attack and counterattack. The 1st Battalion of the 9th infantry lost sixty men killed or wounded in one hour of fighting. Both battalions of the 9th Regiment gained parts of the high ground but could not control the hill mass. Northward, the 19th Regiment made no gain.

That night on Cloverleaf was one of continuing combat. The enemy attacked and infiltrated into the 9th Regiment’s dug-in defensive positions. The enemy attack on the night of the 14th was not confined to Cloverleaf. South of Obong-ni enemy troops virtually surrounded the 1st Battalion, the 21st US Regiment, and inflicted numerous casualties on it.

On 15 August, in the morning, Task Force Hill continued the attack. It failed again to dislodge the enemy. On the south end of Obong-ni, A and B Companies, the 34th US Regiment, fought a savage encounter with the enemy.
on the ridge line. Within fifty minutes after launching the attack, the 2nd Platoon of A Company, for example, lost 25 men killed or wounded of the 35 who had dashed across saddle to an enemy-held knob.

Elsewhere, the enemy force fought Task Force Hill to a standstill. Colonel Hill had used all the resources at his command and had just barely held the enemy on his front. Although General Church and Colonel Hill felt that the 4th NK Division was growing weaker from attrition and might have exhausted its offensive power in the costly stalemate fighting at Obong-ni and Cloverleaf, they did not see how they, on their part, could continue the attack. They agreed to discontinue the attack and defend in place.

General Walker always considered the Yongsan—Miryang area just above the confluence of the Nam River with the Naktong as a very dangerous axis of enemy attack. In mid-August he considered the crisis in the Naktong Bulge to be the most serious and important of the several that faced his forces. Accordingly, when the attack of 15 August failed, the Eighth Army Commander knew he must commit more strength into the bulge if he was to drive out the enemy. He chose his strongest reserve, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig’s 1st US Provisional Brigade, for the commitment. The Marine brigade was enroute from the Masan area to Miryang where it was to bivouac in army reserve. Eighth Army attached the Marine brigade to the 24th US Division on 15 August, and ordered an attack as early as possible on 17 August to destroy the enemy in the bulge east of the Naktong.

On 16 August, as the tired men of Task Force Hill waited in their foxholes for the help, the NK enemy again attacked the 9th Regiment on Cloverleaf. The attack were intense and at close quarters. The enemy occupied some of the American foxholes after killing their occupants. On the right, the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, lost ground. There was severe fighting also on Ohang Hill where elements of the 19th and 34th Regiments narrowly escaped being trapped.

In the meantime, General Church planned a co-ordinated attack of Army and Marine troops. The attack plan placed the Marine brigade on the left in front of Obong-ni Ridge. On the extreme left, the 1st Battalion (—), the 21st Regiment, was to protect the Marines’ left flank. The 9th Regiment stayed in front of Cloverleaf where it had been fighting a week. The road between Cloverleaf and Obong-ni was the boundary between it and the Marines. The 34th Regiment was north of the 9th Regiment. Beyond it the 19th Regiment formed the extreme right flank of the attack formations. The plan also called for the 9th Regiment after it took Cloverleaf, to be pinched out by the units on either side of it. They were to drive on to the Nak-
Naktong Perimeter

The 19th Regiment was to attack to the river and seize Ohang Hill, which the enemy had regained. The attack was to begin at 0800 hours, 17 August. Fifty-four 105-mm. howitzers and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers were in place to support the attack.

General Church had planned to co-ordinate the 9th Regiment's attack against Cloverleaf with the Marine attack against Obong-ni Ridge. Colonel Raymond L. Murray, commanding the 5th Marines, however, requested that he be allowed to attack and secure Obong-ni first before the 9th Regiment began its attack. Colonel Murray considered Obong-ni Ridge as his line of departure for the main attack, and thought he could capture it with relative ease. General Church on the other hand, considered Obong-ni and Cloverleaf to be interlocking parts of the enemy position, and thought they should be attacked simultaneously. However, he granted Colonel Murray's request. Information gained later indicated that the 18th NK Regiment, reinforced by a battalion of the 16th NK Regiment, defended Obong-ni Ridge. Other elements of the 16th NK Regiment apparently defended Cloverleaf.

The 2nd Battalion, the 5th Marines, lead the assault on 17th, followed by the 1st and 3rd Battalions in that order. The 2nd Battalion moved to its line of departure on the east side of a narrow valley in front of Obong-ni about one kilometer from the ridge crest.

A 10-minute artillery preparation, falling on areas back of Obong-ni, began at 0735. Intentionally, there was no artillery preparation on Obong-ni itself. Instead, eighteen Corsairs delivered an air strike on the ridge. The strike was impressive.

Two companies, E on the left and D on the right, moved out from the line of departure at 0800, using the red gash in the middle of the ridge as the boundary between their zone of advance. They started up the slope. From the ridge itself they encountered no enemy fire, but from the Tugok village across the road to their right came heavy small arms and machine gun fire. Some fire also came from their left flank near the Obong-ni village. Motor fire fell on the assault group when it reached the slope of Obong-ni. As the assault group managed to reach the crest and scrambled into empty enemy foxholes, grazing enemy machine gun fire from the right swept over the group and the enemy in a second row of foxholes a few meters down the reverse slope jumped up and attacked them with grenades. Corsairs now returned and worked over the Obong-ni Ridge line and reverse slope with a hail of explosives. Tanks moved out into the low ground east of the ridge and supported the group when it made the second attack. Enemy
now moved into their foxholes at the crest as soon as the air strike had ended, and from these points they placed automatic fire on the climbing Marines and rolled grenades down on the group. It fell back down the slope again. Enemy fire, inflicting heavy casualties, pinned the other units to the ground on the side of the ridge.

The heavy enemy fire from Tugok and part of Cloverleaf Hill on the right was an important factor in turning back the Marine attack on Obong-ni. At 1500 hours the 2nd Battalion held positions about halfway up the slope. In seven hours it had lost 23 killed, 119 wounded—a casualty rate of almost 60 percent of the 240 riflemen who had taken part in the attack.

Because of the heavy losses in the 2nd Battalion, General Craig had already decided he would have to pass the 1st Battalion through it if the attack was to continue. At 1245 hours the 1st Battalion was ordered to move in position to resume the attack on Obong-ni. The 1st Battalion completed the relief of the 2nd Battalion on the slopes by 1600 hours.

**Cloverleaf Recaptured:** On the afternoon of the 17th, shortly before 1600, the 24th US Division began to deliver scheduled preparatory fires on Cloverleaf, raking it from top to bottom. In resuming the attack against Obong-ni Ridge, General Churchill made one important change in the plan. The change was for the 9th Regiment on the Marine's right to attack Cloverleaf simultaneously with the Marine's attack against Obong-ni.

At 1600, the 9th Regiment and the Marines began their co-ordinated attack. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, took Cloverleaf without difficulty. The artillery barrage had done its work; enemy soldiers surviving it fled down the hill. From Cloverleaf, the 9th Regiment now supported with its fire the attack of the Marines against Obong-ni.

At Obong-ni, the enemy again stopped the frontal attack of the Marines. But this time, with enemy fire from Tugok and Cloverleaf almost eliminated by the preparatory fires, the righthand elements of the Marines near the boundary with the 9th Regiment was able to move to the right around the northern spur of Obong-ni and reach its crest above the road. The Marines captured this knob, Hill 102, about 1700. Then the next two knobs southward, Hills 109 and 117, fell to a flanking attack from the direction of Hill 102, supported by fire from that hill. Enemy fire from the next knob southward, Hill 143, however, soon forced the A Company men from the crest of Hill 117 back to its eastern slope.

When darkness fell, the Marines dug in on a perimeter defense where they were. From Hill 102, B Company extended its line over Hill 109 to the sad-
dle between it and Hill 117; there it met the defense line of A Company which bent back down the east slope of Hill 117 to the base of the ridge. During the day the Marines had 205 casualties -- 23 killed, 2 dead of wounds, 180 wounded.

While this severe day-long battle had been in progress at Obong-ni, the 34th and 19th Regiments on the 24th Division right started their attacks late in the afternoon after repeated delays. Heavy air attacks and artillery barrages had already hit on Ohang Hill during the afternoon. This attack moved forward, but with heavy casualties in some units, notably in L Company, 34th Regiment, which came under enemy fire from the rear at one point. Ohang Hill, overlooking the Naktong River at the northern end of the bulge, fell to the 19th Regiment by dusk. That night the 24th Division intercepted an enemy radio message stating that NK troops on the bulge area were short of ammunition and requesting permission for them to withdraw across the Naktong.

**Obong-ni Recaptured:** On the evening of 17 August, American mortars and artillery registered on corridors of enemy approach to Obong-ni and Cloverleaf and on probable centers of enemy troop concentrations. Some artillery pieces fired on the river crossing sites to prevent enemy reinforcements arriving in the battle area. On Obong-ni that night, the Marines, sure of an enemy counterattack, set trip flares in front of their positions. One quarter of the men stood guard while the remainder rested.

At 0230, 18 August, a green flare signaled the expected enemy attack. Coming from Hill 117, the NK Red force struck A Company and isolated one platoon. Their attack formation then drove on and penetrated into B Company. The attack forced A Company from its positions and back into the saddle south of Hill 109. In its sector, however, B Company drove the enemy from its perimeter in forty-five minutes of hard fighting. Before daylight the enemy attack ceased. The total enemy losses in this night battle was not known, although 183 enemy dead were counted later around the A and B Company perimeters. The Marine losses were heavy. Digging in that evening with 190 men and 5 officers, B Company the next morning at daylight had 110 effectives; A Company, starting the night with 185 men, had only 90 men at daylight who could take their place in the line.

After daylight, the 1st Battalion of the 5th US Marine Regiment reorganized, and A Company prepared to attack south against Hill 117, to which the enemy attack force had withdrawn.

The company crossed the saddle easily, but machine gun fire stopped it on
the slope. The company commander called for an air strike. After carefully checking the designated target, a Corsair dropped a 500-pound bomb which scored a direct hit on the enemy emplacement. When bomb fragments, rocks, and dirt had settled, the men of A Company leaped to their feet and dashed up the slope. At the enemy emplacement they found the machine gun destroyed and its crew members dead. In five minutes A Company was on top of Hill 117.

The attack now continued on across the saddle toward Hill 143. Air strikes and artillery fire greatly helped to win that point. The process was then repeated with Hills 147 and 153. At nightfall only one small pocket of enemy resistance remained on Obong-ni, and it was eliminated the next morning. The formidable ridge had been captured by an attack beginning on the right flank and moving progressively south and upward along its
series of knobs and saddles.

The Enemy Bridgehead Destroyed: While the 5th Marines' 1st Battalion was driving to the southern tip of Ohong-ni on 18 August, the Marines' 3rd Battalion started an attack from the northern end of the ridge toward Hill 206, the next ridge line westward. The 9th infantry Regiment supported this attack by fire from Cloverleaf. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marines was on its objective within an hour. It met virtually no opposition. (See Sketch Map 12.)

The reason for this easy advance was apparent. At the same time that the 3rd Battalion was climbing Hill 206, aerial observers, forward artillery observers, and front-line infantry units all reported seeing enemy groups attempting to withdraw westward to the Naktong.

After the capture of Hill 206, Colonel Murry ordered the 3rd Battalion to continue the attack toward Hill 311, the last ridge line in front of the Naktong. This attack slanted northwest. At the same time, the 34th and 19th US Regiments on the right flank of the 24th US Division drove south and southwest into the bulge. Only in a few places was resistance moderate and as the afternoon wore on even this diminished. Troops of the 19th Regiment on Ohang Hill could see groups of 10 to 15 enemy in the river, totaling perhaps 75 to 100 at one time, trying to cross to the west side. Fighter planes strafed these groups all afternoon. Before dark the Marines' 3rd Battalion captured most of Hill 311, the 34th Regiment captured Hill 224, and the 19th Regiment captured Hill 223—the high hills fronting the river.

It was clear by evening, 18 August, that the enemy 4th Division was decisively defeated and its survivors were fleeing westward across the Naktong. The next morning, 19 August, Marines and 34th Infantry Regiment troops met at the Naktong. Prisoners captured that morning said most of the NK Communist force survivors had crossed the river during the night. By afternoon, patrols to the river found no enemy troops. The battle of the Naktong Bulge was over.

The destruction, for all practical purposes, of the 4th NK Division in the battle of the Naktong Bulge was the greatest setback suffered thus far by the enemy. The 4th NK Division never recovered from this battle until after the Chinese Communists entered the war and it was reconstituted. Ironically, on 19 August, the day its defeat became final, the NK division received from its higher headquarters the order naming it a "Guard Division" for the accomplishments in the battle of Taegon.

On the afternoon of 19 August, the bulge over, Eighth Army ordered the
1st US Provisional Marine Brigade released from the 24th US Division control. The brigade, reverting to Eighth Army reserve, assembled in the south near Changwon, east of Masan, where it remained until 1 September.

Section 5. General Situation Developed in August

At the same time the Naktong Bulge was threatening the existence of the entire perimeter, serious trouble for the Eighth Army continued to develop elsewhere. The 1st US Cavalry Division holding the Taegu front was in heavy combat; the line sprang leaks in the far south. And on the east, where the ROK troops were fighting, in the Kigye and Pohang areas, the entire front seemed ready to collapse.

Because the east was mountainous, and because he did not have troops and artillery enough to defend everywhere, General Walker gambled in the east. It was assumed that the 12th NK Division marching down the east coast would not be able to cross the mountains in sufficient strength to budge the ROK troops.

But the North Korean Communists came across the rugged terrain, surrounded the 3rd ROK Division, and threatened Yonil airstrip. By 11 August, fighter planes flying out of Yonil in support of ground action were beginning their strafing runs almost before their wheels had retracted.

On 13 August, US Far East Air Force decided to abandon the air field, even though US infantry units and tanks were at Yonil. The Fifth Air Force withdrew, although there was no fire on the airstrip, and actually it was never brought under effective enemy fire. The planes were vitally needed for the seesaw battle the ROK troops and the enemy waged about the area, and when General MacArthur heard the news via United Press, he was much upset. General MacArthur immediately notified FEAF that he intended to hold Yonil and did not want the planes returned to Japan. Nevertheless, the two squadrons of F-51's flew back to base at Tsuiki on Kyushu, Japan.

The embattled 3rd ROK Division fought its way to the seacoast, where on 16–17 August it was evacuated under cover of American air and naval forces. It was landed farther south at Kuryongpo to continue the battle. Pohang fell to the enemy.

But the ROK troops were able to fight the NK enemy advance to a standstill. General Walker's estimate that the 12th NK Division could not cross
the mountain barrier had not been wholly wrong. South of the mountains, the 12th NK Division men were exhausted by the arduous passage; they had left their artillery behind, and their supply difficulties became crucial. For five days after 12 August the division received no food supply and was forced to forage off the countryside. Stretched too far, the enemy at last had to retreat north under heavy ROK pressure.

Defending a front of tremendous width, with its artillery batteries often firing in different directions, the 1st Cavalry Division repulsed enemy crossings over the Naktong again and again. Counter-attacking on Hill 303 near

THE ENEMY ATTACKS ON TAEGU (4–24 AUG 1950)

[Map of the area around Taegu showing military movements and positions on 4–24 August 1950.]

Sketch Map 13
Waegewan, the 5th Cavalry Regiment came across a group of American soldiers, twenty-six mortarmen of the Heavy Weapons Company, who had been captured earlier by the NK army. There men lay packed shoulder to shoulder, their feet, bare and covered by dried blood, thrust out stiffly. They had been shot in the back by Russian-made submachine guns. (See Sketch Map 13.)

As the evidence of battlefield atrocities continued to mount, General MacArthur sent warning message to the NK Communists' boss, threatening them with criminal accountability for these acts.

As the enemy pressure on Taegu increased, and its population rose by more than 400,000 refugees, the Republic of Korea Government moved again south to Pusan.

General MacArthur requested General Stratemeyer of FEAF to divert his heavy bombers to "carpet bombing" of enemy ground troops. Ninety-eight huge B-29's lumbered over the battlefront, unloading almost a thousand tons of general purpose bombs on 16 August. It was a desperate measure, opposed by the Air Force, for bombing tactical troop dispositions from 10,000 feet had to be a hit-or-miss affair. There was never any evidence that the bombing was effective, and it was not repeated.

In the Sangju — Taegu corridor on the Taegu front, the 25th US Division's 27th Infantry Regiment, attached to the 24th US Division, fought desperately night after night to stem enemy advances. The 27th Regiment was able to stop the strong enemy thrust because the 1st ROK Division held the hills surrounding the Taegu — Sangju road north of Tabu-dong, channeling the enemy attack into American guns.

The 27th US Regiment, as a troubleshooter, successfully checked enemy break through in Tabu-dong area.

The month of August ended with the fighting in the mountains on the southern front, west of Masan, a stalemate. Neither side had secured a definite advantage. The 25th US Division had held the central part of its line, at Battle Mountain and Sobuk-san, only with difficulty and with mounting concern for the future.
CHAPTER IX  THE ENEMY'S FINAL OFFENSIVE
(1-15 September 1950)

For most of the men who fought the battles of the Naktong Perimeter in early September 1950, it was a period of confusion. So many actions went on simultaneously along all the Naktong Perimeter fronts and casualties during the first two weeks of September were remarkably heavy.

It is necessary to keep in mind that not one of the battles in this phase of the war was an isolated event, but that everywhere over the extent of the Perimeter other battles of equal, greater, or lesser intensity were being waged. As an example of their impact, on 3 September 1950, General Walker faced at least five distinct and dangerous situations on the Perimeter -- an enemy penetration in the east at Pohang, severance of the lateral corridor at Yongchon between Taegu and Pohang, alarming enemy gains in the mountains north of Taegu, the threat posed by NK Communist units slicing through the defenses of the Naktong Bulge area of the lower Naktong, and enemy penetration behind the greater part of the 25th US Division in the Masan area in the extreme south. In addition, at this time in the east the II ROK Corps was on the point of collapse; above Taegu the 1st US Cavalry Division withdrew closer to that city; and in the south disaster threatened the 2nd and 25th US Divisions.

The NK Communist final decisive Naktong offensive lasted from late August to mid-September. It was commanded by Kim Chaek who was in command of the NK Front Headquarters in Kimchon during August and September. The enemy had 13 infantry divisions, one armored division and two armored brigades, a force fairly even divided between the I NK Corps still operating in west, and the II NK Corps still fighting in the east. In all there were about 98,000 men, an increase of 10 percent over the original invasion force. There were also about 50 new T-34 tanks. But one-third of the enemy forces was formed of raw recruits, and worse, the enemy decision to pursue the tactics of following all the roads to Pusan and fighting was unwisely made in the face of the UN forces now his superior in every way. For by the end of August the UN forces commanded by General Walker had twice as many as the enemy, its tanks outnumbered the enemy's five to one, its
artillery and transport were distinctly superior, and its control of air and sea remained unchallenged.

By 1 September, General Walker’s ground forces stood at 180,000, of which 91,500 were ROK troops and the remainder Americans except for 1,500 newly arrived British soldiers. These men, the first non-Americans to join the United Nations Command, comprised one battalion of the Middlesex Regiment and one of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Thus U.N. ground formation included five ROK divisions, four US infantry divisions approaching full strength, the 27th British Brigade, and the much large 1st US Marine Brigade. To this were added 34,000 men in the Far East Air Force -- including 330 Australians -- and 36,000 men of the US Naval Forces, Far East, now grown from its original complement of 14 ships to more than 150 vessels. Some of these were carriers which launched Navy and Marine planes to support UN ground troops, or mighty dreadnoughts such as the battleship Missouri. The British task force under Admiral Andrews was also in action.

By 20 August, both the I and II NK Corps had issued their attack orders as follows:

1. The 6th NK Division: To penetrate the 25th US Division in the south.

2. The 9th, 2nd, 10th, and 4th NK Divisions: To destroy the 2nd US Division before Miryang, and to break through to the Taegu — Pusan road by way of Yongsan.

3. The 3rd, 1st, and 13th NK Divisions: To break through the 1st US Cavalry and 1st ROK Divisions at Taegu.

4. The 8th and 15th NK Divisions: To smash the 8th and 6th ROK Divisions east of Taegu.

5. The 5th and 12th NK Divisions: To penetrate through the 3rd and Capital ROK Divisions to Pohang, Yonil, and the Kyongju corridor on the east coast.

While the greatest effort was to fall on the Naktong front, in the already corpsestrewn bulge area, the Communist enemy plan was to put pressure on the straining UN wall everywhere. His hope was that somewhere, surely, it must break.

Section 1. Action in the East

Although the II NK Corps’ general attack in the north and east was plan-
ned for 2 September, the 12th NK Division, now numbering about 5,000 men, started earlier to move forward from the mountain fastnesses where it had reorganized after its defeat in the Kigye-Pohang area in the middle of August. On 26 August, American and ROK officers in the Pohang — Kigye area with great optimism congratulated each other on having repulsed what they thought was the last serious threat to the Naktong Perimeter. In their view the NK forces were now on the defensive and the war might end by Korean Thanksgiving (full moon festival on 15 August by lunar calendar).

Nearest to the 12th NK Division was the Capital ROK Division. At 0400, 27 August, an enemy attack overran one company of the 17th ROK Regiment, Capital Division, north of Kigye. This caused the whole regiment to give way. Then the 18th ROK Regiment on the right fell back because of its exposed flank. The 17th ROK Regiment lost the town of Kigye, and the entire Capital Division fell back about 5 kilometers to the south side of Kigye valley. This enemy blow fell with startling impact on the Eighth Army in the predawn of 27 August.

General Walker became so concerned that he formed Task Force Jackson, which he placed, together with the faltering 1 ROK Corps, under the command of Major General John B. Coulter. The task force consisted of the 1 ROK Corps, the 21st US Regiment, the 3rd Battalion, 9th US Regiment, and the 73rd US Medium Tank Battalion, less C Company. General Coulter assumed command of Task Force Jackson at 1200, 27 August.

By this time the 5th NK Division above Pohang had begun to press south again and the 3rd ROK Division in front of it began to show signs of giving way.

The ROK disorganization was so great in the face of continued enemy pressure that Task Force Jackson could not launch its planned co-ordinated attack. The 21st US Regiment moved to an assembly area north of Angangni and ready for an attack the morning of the 28th, but during the night the 17th ROK Regiment lost its position on the high ridge northward at the bend of the Kigye valley, and the attack was cancelled. The ROK’s regained their position in the afternoon but that night lost it again. At the same time, elements of the 5th NK Division penetrated the 3rd ROK Division southwest of Pohang. On the 29th B Company, 21st Regiment, supported by a platoon of tanks of B Company, 73rd US Medium Tank Battalion, counterattacked northwest successfully from the southern edge of Pohang with ROK troops following.

The ROK troops withdrew again to Pohang. The next day an American infantry - tank force repeated the action of the day before.
Also on the 29th, the Capital ROK Division, with American tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against enemy counterattacks, only to lose it finally at dawn. Despite the continuous air and naval support, on the last day of August the battle continued to go against the ROK forces both at Kigye and Pohang.

On 2 September the 21st US Regiment attacked northwest from Pohang in an effort to help the ROK's recapture Hill 99 that was in front of the 23rd ROK Regiment. The attack was very slow, and casualties were heavy. By 1525 that afternoon K Company could account for only thirty-five men. The company was unable to take Hill 99 from the well dug-in enemy who threw showers of hand grenades to repel all efforts to reach the top. Two tanks of the 6th US Tank Battalion were lost in this attack. At dusk an enemy penetration occurred along the boundary between the Capital and 3rd ROK
Divisions about five kilometers east of Kigye.

The next morning, an hour and a half after midnight, the 12th NK Division, executing its part of the co-ordinated its II Corps general attack, struck the Capital ROK Division on the high hill masses south of the Kigye valley. This attack threw back the 18th ROK Regiment on the left in the area of Hills 334 and 438, and the 17th ROK Regiment on the right in the area of Hill 445. By dawn of 3 September the enemy penetration there had reached the vital east-west corridor road five kilometers east of Angang-ni. As the result the Capital ROK Division all but collapsed during the night.

On the night of 3—4 September, the I ROK Corps front collapsed. The enemy, following a mortar preparation, entered Angang-ni at 0220. The troops of the Capital ROK Division had become hopelessly intermingled with enemy forces. At daylight, G Company, 21st US Regiment, discovered that it was alone in Angang, nearly surrounded by the enemy. No ROK troops were around. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Regiment, finally withdrew to the Kyongju area shortly before noon.

By noon, 4 September, enemy units had established roadblocks along the Kyongju—Angang road within five kilometers of Kyongju.

The situation at Kyongju during the evening of 4 September was tense.
The expected enemy attack on Kyongju, however, never came.

North of Pohang the situation worsened by this time. The elements of the 22nd ROK Regiment had given way. Enemy troops entered the town, and the American tanks led by Colonel Emmerich, advisor with the 3rd ROK Division in Pohang were under heavy enemy machine gun fire. Colonel Emmerich then directed air strikes and artillery fire which destroyed four enemy self-propelled guns.

The night, 5–6 September, events reached a climax inside Pohang. At midnight, after ten rounds of enemy mortar or artillery fire struck near it; the 3rd ROK Division command post moved to another location. Enemy fire that followed it to the new location indicated observed and directed fire. The division withdrew from Pohang, and on 6 September this coastal town was again in enemy hands. At this time the 15th NK Division also penetrated the 8th ROK Division lines to enter Yongchon in the Taegu—Pohang cross compartment.

The startling gains of the enemy force in the east on 4 September caused General Walker to shift still more troops to that area. The 24th US Division, that was ordered to move from its reserve position near Taegu to the lower Naktong River to relieve the 5th US Marine Regiment in the Naktong Bulge area of the 2nd US Division front the day before, moved by a new order to Kyongju at 0700, 6 September.

At 1230, 7 September, the Eighth Army redesignated Task Force Jackson as Task Force Church. General Church, now in command on the eastern front, ordered the 21st Regiment concentrated near Kyongju and moved his command post from Kyongju to the vicinity of Choyang-ni, about six kilometers southward.

In the second week of September elements of the 6th NK Division had spread out over the hills west, southwest, and south of Pohang. One NK Red force, estimated to number 1,600 men, reached Hills 482 and 510, about seven kilometers southwest of Yonil Airfield. Facing this enemy force were two regiments of the 3rd ROK Division, which held a defensive position on the hills bordering the west side of the valley south of the airfield. Enemy pressure threatened to penetrate between the two ROK regiments.

On the evening of 9 September, General Church formed Task Force Davidson to eliminate this threat to Yonil. Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, an Engineer officer, commanded the task force, which was composed of the 19th US Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion; the 3rd Battalion, 9th US Regiment; the 13th US Field Artillery Battalion; C Battery, 15th US Field Ar-
Artillery Battalion; A Company, 3rd US Engineer Combat Battalion; the 9th US Infantry Regimental Tank Company; two batteries of antiaircraft automatic weapons; and other miscellaneous units. The combined effort made by the task force and ROK troops finally succeeded in capturing the two hills, hill 131 and Hill 482, which had cut off all other approaches from the Kyongju area. In the midafternoon, 12 September, ROK troops relieved Task Force Davidson on the hill mass, and the task force returned to Kyongju on 13 September.

While the task force action was in progress near Yonil Airfield, the week-long battle for Hill 300 north of Kyongju came to an end. A regiment of the 3rd ROK Division captured the hill on 11 September. In midafternoon the 3rd Battalion, 19th US Regiment, relieved the ROK's there. Scattered over Hill 300 lay 527 counted enemy dead and great quantities of abandoned equipment and weapons. In this fighting for Hill 300, the 3rd Battalion, 19th US Regiment, lost eight lieutenants and twenty-nine enlisted men killed.

The day of 12 September may be considered as the day when the NK Communist offensive in the east ended. By that date, the 12th NK Division had been virtually destroyed and the 5th NK Division was trying to consolidate its survivors near Pohang. The 3rd and Capital ROK Divisions followed the retreating survivors of the two enemy divisions.

With the enemy threat in the east subsiding, Eighth Army dissolved Task Force Church, effective at noon 15 September, and the ROK Army resumed control of the I ROK Corps. The 24th US Division was ordered to Kyongsan, southeast of Taegu. The 21st US Regiment had already moved there on the 14th. The 19th US Regiment was to remain temporarily at Kyongju in Eighth Army reserve.

In the eastern battles during the first two weeks of September, the ROK troops did most of the ground fighting. American tanks, artillery, and ground units supported them. Uncontested aerial supremacy and naval gunfire from offshore also supported the ROK's, and probably were the factors that tipped the scales in their favor. After the initial phase of his September offensive, the enemy labored under what proved to be insurmountable difficulties in supplying their forward units. The enemy system of supply could not resolve the problems of logistics and communication necessary to support and exploit an offensive operation in this sector of the front. (See Sketch Map 14.)

In the high mountains between the Taegu sector on the west and the Kyongju-east coast sector, the 8th and 15th NK Divisions stood ready on 1 September to attack south and sever the Taegu—Pohang road on the vicinity
of Hayang and Yongchon, in coordination with the enemy offensive in the Kigye—Pohang area. The objective of the 8th NK Division was Hayang; that of the 15th NK Division was Yongchon, which the enemy division commander had ordered to take at all costs. Opposing the 8th NK Division was the 6th ROK Division; in front of the 15th NK Division stood the 8th ROK Division. Again the two enemy divisions failed to accomplish their missions although the 15th NK Division succeeded in penetrating in four days to the Yongchon area. General Walker's quick dispatch of the 5th and 11th ROK Regiments from two widely separated sectors of the front to the area of penetration resulted in destroying the enemy force before the 15th NK Division could exploit its breakthrough.

Section 2. Action on the Taegu Front

While four divisions of the II NK Corps attacked south in the Pohang, Kyongju, and Yongchon sectors, the remaining three divisions of the corps—the 3rd, 13th, and 1st NK Divisions—were to execute their converging attack on Taegu from the north and northwest. The 3rd NK Division was to attack in the Waegwan area northwest of Taegu, the 13th NK Division down the mountain ridges north of Taegu along and west of the Sangju—Taegu road, and the 1st NK Division along the high mountain ridges just east of the road.

Greatly concerned at the beginning of September over the NK Red attack and penetration of the southern sector of the Perimeter in the 2nd and 25th US Divisions' zone, General Walker on 1 September ordered the 1st US Cavalry Division to attack north or northwest in an effort to divert to that quarter some of the enemy strength in the south. To carry out General Walker's order General Gay, commanding the 1st US Cavalry Division, and his regimental commanders decided to attack Hill 518 in the 7th Cavalry zone. Only two days before, Hill 518 had been in the 1st ROK Division zone and had been considered an enemy assembly point. The attack by the 7th Cavalry Regiment was to begin on 2 September. After securing Hill 518, the 7th Cavalry attack was to continue onto Hill 346.

On the morning of 2 September the US Air Force delivered a 37-minute strike against Hills 518 and 346. The artillery then laid down its concentrations on the hills, and after that the planes came over again napalming and
leaving the heights ablaze. Just after 1000 hours, and immediately after the final napalm strike, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, attacked up Hill 518. While the 1st Battalion made the attack, the 2nd Battalion was in a blocking position on its left and the newly arrived 3rd Battalion, in its first Korean operation, was to be behind the 2nd Battalion and in an open gap between that battalion and Hill 518.

The attack by the 1st Battalion was doomed to failure from the start. The heavy air strikes and the artillery preparations had failed to dislodge the enemy on Hill 518. From their positions the Reds delivered mortar and machine gun fire on the climbing infantry stopping the weak, advanced force short of the crest. In the afternoon the battalion withdrew
from Hill 518 and attacked northeast against Hill 490, from which other enemy troops had fired in support of the enemy on Hill 518. The next day at noon, the newly arrived 3rd Battalion resumed the attack against Hill 518 from the south, but failed again. Other attacks failed on 4 September.

While these actions were in progress on its right, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, on 4 September attacked and captured Hill 303. By 4 September it had become quite clear that the 3rd NK Division in front of the 5th and 7th US Cavalry Regiments was itself attacking, and despite continued air strikes, artillery preparations, and infantry efforts on Hill 518, the enemy division was infiltrating large numbers of its troops to the rear of the attacking American forces.

Soon, the enemy infiltration reached Hill 464, a high hill mass opposite Hill 518 and by 5 September the enemy had more troops on Hill 464 and on Hill 518. Thus, the enemy cut the Waegwan—Tabudong road so that communications with friendly units now were only to the west.

On the division right, Tabu-dong was in enemy hands, on the left Waegwan was a no-man’s land, and in the center strong enemy forces were infiltrating southward from Hill 518. The 7th Cavalry Regiment in the center could no longer use the Waegwan—Tabu-dong lateral supply road behind it, and was in danger of being surrounded. After discussing a withdrawal plan with General Walker on 5 September, General Gay issued an order for a general withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry Division during the night to shorten the lines and to occupy a better defensive position. This withdrawal caused the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, to give up a hill it had just attacked and captured near the Tabu-dong road on the approaches of Hill 902 (locally called Kasan). The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on Hill 303 north of Waegwan was to cover the withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry and hold open the escape road.

The 7th Cavalry, however, had to fight in the course of the general withdrawal of the division. The 1st Battalion completed its withdrawal without opposition. During its night march west, the 3rd Battalion column was joined several times by groups of NK enemy who apparently thought it was one of their own columns moving south. They were made prisoners and taken along in the withdrawal. Nearing Waegwan at dawn, the battalion column was taken under enemy tank and mortar fire after daybreak and sustained about 18 casualties.

The 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry disengaged from the enemy and began its withdrawal at 0300, 6 September. The enemy quickly discovered that the 2nd Battalion was withdrawing and attacked it. The Battalion Commander, Major Omar T. Hitchner, and his S-3, Captain James T. Milam, were
killed during the enemy attack. In the vicinity of Hills 464 and 380 the battalion discovered at daybreak that it was virtually surrounded by the enemy. Colonel Nist, the Regimental Commander, thought that the entire battalion was lost.

In the meantime moving by itself and completely cut off from all other units, G Company maneuvered around Hill 464 but never gained its crest only suffering heavy casualties. At midafternoon it received radio orders to withdraw that night. The Company left six dead on the hill and started down the slopes.

The next day, 7 September, the situation grew worse for the 1st US Cavalry Division. On its left flank, the 3rd NK Division forced the 1st Battalion, 5th US Cavalry, to withdraw from Hill 345, about five kilometers east of Waegwan. The enemy pressed forward and the 5th Cavalry was immediately locked in hard, seesaw fighting on Hills 203 and 174. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, attached to the 5th Cavalry on 7 September, finally captured the latter hill after four attacks.

Only with the greatest difficulty did the 5th Cavalry Regiment hold Hill 203 on 12 September. Between midnight and 0400, 13 September, the enemy attacked again and took Hill 203 from E Company, Hill 174 from L Company, and Hill 188 from B and F Companies. In an afternoon counterattack the 5th Cavalry regained Hill 188 on the south side of the highway, but failed against Hills 203 and 174 on the north side. On the 14th, I Company again attacked Hill 174, which had by now changed hands seven times. In this action the company suffered 82 casualties. Even so, the company held only one side of the hill, the enemy held the other, and grenade battles between the two continued for another week. (See Sketch Map 15.)

In the meantime, the 13th NK Division attacked south to Tabu-dong area the night of 2 September. It caught the 8th US Cavalry Regiment defending the Sangju road badly deployed in that it lacked an adequate reserve. The enemy struck the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on Hill 448 three kilometers north of Tabu-dong, and overran it. I Company in a blocking position just north of Tabu-dong astride the road was struck at 0200 of 3 September. In this action, I Company suffered many casualties but repelled the enemy attack. E Company also was cut off and had to withdraw by a roundabout way. The overran 2nd Battalion withdrew through the 3rd Battalion which had assembled hastily in a defensive position south of Tabu-dong. During the day, elements of the 1st NK Division forced the 8th Cavalry’s I & R Platoon and a detachment of the ROK police from Ka-san (Hill 902), six and
Hill 303 north of Waegwan fought by the 1st Cavalry Division during 15—16 August 1950.

a half kilometers east of Tabu-dong. On 3 September, therefore, the Eighth Army lost to the enemy both Tabu-dong and Hill 902, the dominant moun-
taintop 16 kilometers north of Taegu.

The Eighth Army now countered the NK Communist advance down the Tabu-dong road by ordering the 1st Cavalry Division to recapture and defend Hill 902.

By 6 September an enemy force had established a roadblock about five kilometers below Tabu-dong and other units occupied Hill 570, about four kilometers south of Hill 902 and overlooking the Taegu road from the east side. The next morning, 7 September, air strikes and artillery kept both Hills 902 and 570 under heavy attack. Even though the 1st Cavalry Division fell back nearly everywhere that day, General Gay ordered it to continue to attack Hill 570. On 8 September, however, a planned continuation of the at-
tack against Hill 570 by the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, was can-
celed when enemy forces threatened Hills 314 and 660, south and east of Hill 570.

The fighting north of Taegu on 11 September in the vicinity of Hills 660 and 314 was heavy and confused. Hill 314 fell to the enemy hands that day. For a time, the 1st Cavalry Division feared a breakthrough to the blocking position of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. The rifle companies of the division were now very low in strength. On 11 September, for instance, E Company, 5th Cavalry, in attacking Hill 203 on the division left toward Waegwan had only 3 officers and 63 men. The day before, C Company, 7th Cavalry, had only 50 men.

Hill 314 was the point nearest Taegu occupied by enemy forces at this time. Some called it the "Key to Taegu." Although this may be an
exaggeration, since other hills, like links in a chain, were possibly equally important, the 13th NK Division valued its possession and had concentrated about 7,000 soldiers on it. The NK Reds meant to use it, no doubt, in making the next advance on Taegu. From it, observation reached to Taegu and it commanded the lesser hills southward rimming the Taegu bowl.

The 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, on 12 September received its attack order through the 8th Cavalry lines against Hill 314. This attack on the 12th was to be part of a larger American and ROK counterattack against the 13th and 1st NK Divisions in an effort to halt them north of Taegu. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, relieved the ROK units on Hill 660, east of Hill 314, and had the mission of securing that hill. Farther east the 1st ROK Division had the mission of attacking from Palgong-san toward Hill 902. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, on the eve of its attack against Hill 314 numbered 535 men, less its near echelons. The battalion attack plan this time differed radically from that employed against Hill 518 and was a direct development of that failure. The key aspect of the Hill 314 attack plan was to mass as many riflemen as possible on top of the narrow ridge line, by attacking with two companies abreast along the ridge, and not to repeat the mistakes of Hill 518 where the fire power of only a platoon, and at times of only a squad, could be brought to bear against the enemy. Because of the ammunition shortage there was no artillery preparation on Hill 314, but there was an air strike before the 3rd Battalion, at 1100, 12 September, started its attack.

Enemy 120-mm. mortar fire was falling on and behind the line of departure as the battalion moved out. For 500 yards it encountered only sporadic small arms and machine gun fire; then enemy rifle fire became intense and preregistered mortar fire came down on the troops, pinning them to the ground. On the left, men in L Company could see approximately 400 enemy preparing to counterattack. They radioed for an air strike but the planes were on the ground refueling. Fortunately, they were able to repulse the counterattack with combined artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. The air strike came in at 1400, blanketing the top and the north slope of the ridge.

By this time enemy mortar fire had caused many casualties, and elements of L and I Companies became intermingled. But, in contrast to the action on Hill 518, the men continued the attack largely of their own volition after many of the officers had become casualties. The example of certain officers, however, pointed the way.

Fifteen minutes after the air strike, the 3rd Battalion resumed its attack toward the crest. As it neared it the enemy force came out of their positions in a violent counterattack and engaged at close quarters. Some men gained
the crest but enemy mortar and machine gun fire drove them off. They reached it a second time but could not hold it. Another air strike hit the enemy. Then, a third time, Captain Robert W. Walker, Commanding Officer of L Company, led a group of men of L and I Companies to the top. When Captain Walker reached the crest he shouted back, "Come on up here where you can see them! There are lots of them and you can kill them." The men scrambled up a 60-degree slope for the last 150 yards to the top, where they closed with the enemy and overran their positions. Captain Walker and the remaining men of the two companies secured the hill at 1530 and then Captain Walker reorganized the two companies jointly under his command. There were fewer than forty effectives left in L Company and about forty in I Company; the latter had lost all its officers.

General Gay caused a special study to be made of this action, so outstanding did he consider it to be. He found that the 3rd Battalion suffered 229 battle casualties in the first two hours, most of them incurred during the second hour of the attack. Of these, 38 Americans were killed and 167 wounded, the remainder were attached ROK troops. The battalion aid station reported treating 130 casualties. Other wounded were treated at the 8th Cavalry aid station. Many men with minor wounds did not ask for medical attention until the battle had ended, and there were only five cases of combat shock in contrast to the eighteen on Hill 518. Enemy mortar fire caused 80 percent of the casualties.

The 3rd Battalion held Hill 314 for the next six days and gathered up a large amount of enemy equipment and ammunition. The enemy soldiers on Hill 314 wore American uniforms, helmets, and combat boots. Many of them had M1 rifles and carbines. Two hundred of their number lay dead on the hill. Of the other 500 estimated to have been there, prisoners said most of them had been wounded or were missing.

After the capture of Hill 314 on 12 September, the situation north of Taegu improved. On 14 September the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, attacked and, supported by fire from Hill 314, gained part of Hill 570 from the 19th Regiment, 13th NK Division.

It appeared that at this time the bulk of the 1st NK Division was gradually withdrawing toward Hill 902 and its vicinity. Indications were that the 13th NK Division also were withdrawing northward.

The fighting continued unabated north of Taegu on the 15th. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, still fought to gain control of Hill 570 on the east side of the Tabu-dong road. On the other side, the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, at-
tacked Hill 401 where an enemy force had penetrated in a gap between the 8th and 5th Cavalry Regiments. The fighting on Hill 401 was particularly severe. Both sides had troops on the mountain when night fell. In this action, SFC Earl R. Baxter, at the sacrifice of his life, covered the forced withdrawal of his platoon (2nd Platoon, L Company), killing at least ten enemy soldiers in close combat before he himself was killed by an enemy grenade.

While the II NK Corps was striving to capture Taegu and penetrate behind Eighth Army toward Pusan by way of the Pohang — Kyongju corridor, the I NK Corps along the lower Naktong and in the south had unleashed simultaneously a violent offensive to bring the entire Perimeter under assault. Of the entire Perimeter, the parts tactically most vulnerable to enemy action lay along the lower Naktong, and accordingly they promised the greatest dividends strategically to successful NK Red attack. There the battle in early September rose to great intensity and for a period the outcome hung in the balance.

Section 3. Action on the Lower Naktong Front

A major breakthrough anywhere on the all fronts might have resulted in disaster, but again, as in August, the deadliest threat to the Perimeter and Pusan developed in the Naktong Bulge on the southwest. While there was a great similarity to the fighting in each locale, it was in the Bulge again that the most crucial battle raged. (See Situation Map 4, Appendix VI.)

Just before the great crossing on the night of 31 August, the enemy commander of the 9th NK Division opposite the front of the 9th Regiment, 2nd US Division, along the Naktong, instructed his division officers as to their mission: To flank and destroy the enemy through capture of the Miryang and Samnangjin areas, thereby cutting off Eighth Army’s withdrawal route between Taegu and Pusan.

The following two major battles are detailed to some extent to reveal the flavor of the whole action in the Naktong Bulge on the southwest.

**Battle of Yongsan**

(1—6 September)

On the morning of 1 September the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the 9th NK
Division (the 3rd Regiment had been left at Inchon), in their first offensive of the war, stood only a few kilometers short of Yongsan after a successful river crossing and penetration of the American line a few hours earlier before daybreak. At that point the chances of the division accomplishing its assigned mission must have looked favorable to the enemy division commander.

As the 9th NK Division approached Yongsan, its 1st Regiment was on the north and its 2nd Regiment on the south. The division's attached support, consisting of one 76-mm. artillery battalion from the 1 NK Corps, a NK antiaircraft battalion of artillery, two tank battalions of the 16th NK Armored Brigade, and a battalion of artillery from the 4th NK Division, gave it unusual weapon support. Crossing the river behind it came the 4th NK Division, a greatly weakened organization, far understrength, short of weapons, and made up mostly of untrained replacements. This grouping of units was the main force of the 1 NK Corps that attacked from the Sinban area into the Naktong Bulge. Elements of the 9th NK Division reached the hills just west of Yongsan during the afternoon of 1 September.

On the morning of 1 September, with only the shattered remnants of E Company at hand, the 9th US Regiment had virtually no troops to defend Yongsan. Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, commanding the 2nd US Division, in this emergency attached the 2nd US Engineer Combat Battalion to the regiment. The 72nd US Tank Battalion and the 2nd US Division Reconnaissance Company also were assigned positions close to Yongsan. Colonel Hill, commanding the 9th Regiment, planned to place the engineers on the chain of low hills that arched around Yongsan on the northwest.

Captain Frank M. Reed, commanding A Company, 2nd US Engineer Combat Battalion, led his company westward on the south side of the Yongsan—Naktong River road; Lieutenant Lee E. Beahler with D Company of the 2nd Engineer Battalion was on the north side of the road. Approximately three kilometers west of Yongsan an estimated 300 enemy troops engaged A Company in a fire fight. This fight lasted several hours with A Company supported by the 82nd US AAA Battalion. A Company finally fell back to the southeast edge of Yongsan on the left flank of D Company. There, A Company went into position along the road; on its left was C Company of the Engineer battalion, and beyond C Company was the 2nd Division Reconnaissance Company. The hill occupied by D Company was in reality the western tip of a large mountain mass that lay southeast of the town. The road to Miryang came south out of this mountain, and then ran eastward along its southern base. In its position, D Company not only commanded the town
but also its exit, the road to Miryang.

NK Communist troops had also approached Yongsan from the south. The 2nd Division Reconnaissance Company and tanks of the 72nd Tank Battalion opposed them in a sharp fight. That night enemy crossed the low ground around Yongsan and entered the town from the south. Four enemy tanks and an estimated battalion of enemy force were in Yongsan.

The enemy now attempted a breakthrough of the Engineers position. After daylight, the enemy were unable to get reinforcements into the fight since D Company commanded the town and its approach. In ensuing fight, which raged until 1100, the Engineers had neither artillery nor mortar support. D Company remedied this by using its nine new 3.5-inch and nine old 2.36-inch rocket launchers against the enemy infantry. The fire of the 18 bazookas plus that from four heavy and four light machine guns and rifles, carbines, and grenades of the company inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy, who desperately tried to clear the way for a push eastward to Miryang. Tanks of A and B Companies, 72nd Tank Battalion, at the southern and eastern edge of Yongsan shared equally with the Engineers in the honors of this battle. Lieutenant Beahler was the only officer of D Company not killed or wounded in this melee, which cost the company twelve men killed and eighteen wounded. The edge of Yongsan and the slopes of the hill south of the town became a shambles of enemy dead and destroyed equipment.

While this battle raged during the morning at Yongsan, Colonel Hill reorganized about 800 men of the 9th Regiment who had arrived in that vicinity from the overrun river line positions.

In midafternoon, 2 September, tanks and the reorganized battalion attacked through A Company, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, into Yongsan, and regained possession of the town at 1500. By evening the enemy force had been driven into the hills westward. For the time being at least, the enemy drive toward Miryang had been halted.

On the morning of 2 September, while the Communist troops were attempting to destroy the Engineer troops at the southern edge of Yongsan and clear the road to Miryang, General Walker received the approval of his use of the 1st US Marine Brigade from General MacArthur to remove the most serious threat. General Walker, at 1315, attached the 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade to the 2nd US Division and ordered a co-ordinated attack by all available elements of the division and the Marines, with the mission of destroying the enemy east of the Naktong River in the 2nd Division sector
and of restoring the river line. The Marines were to be released from 2nd Division control just as soon as this mission was accomplished.

A counterattack plan was made soon after a conference at the 2nd US Division command post that afternoon: The Marines would attack west at 0800, 3 September, astride the Yongsan—Naktong River road; the 9th Regiment, B Company of the 72nd Tank Battalion, and D Battery of the 82nd AAA Battalion would attack northwest above the Marines and attempt to re-establish contact with the 23rd US Regiment; the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, remnants of the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, and elements of the 72nd Tank Battalion would attack on the left flank, or south, of the Marines to re-establish contact with the 25th US Division. The 24th US Division headquarters and the 19th Regiment were also ordered to prepare to enter the battle in either the 2nd or 25th Division zone in case of need.

The attack by the 5th US Marine Regiment started at 0855 across the rice paddy land toward enemy held high ground westward. The 1st Battalion, south of the east-west road, gained its objective when enemy troops broke under air attack and ran to Hill 116 in the 2nd Battalion zone. In the afternoon, the 1st Battalion advanced to Hill 91 south of the road.

North of the road the 2nd Battalion had a hard time, encountering heavy enemy fire when it reached the northern tip of Hill 116, about three kilometers west of Yongsan. The enemy held the hill during the day, and at night D Company of the 5th Marines was isolated there. In the fighting west of Yongsan Marine armor knocked out four T-34 tanks, and enemy crew members abandoned a fifth. The 2nd Battalion had lost 18 killed and 77 wounded during the day, most of them in D Company. Total Marine casualties for 3 September were 34 killed and 157 wounded. Co-ordinating its attack with that of the Marines, the 9th Regiment advanced abreast of them on the north.

The counterattack continued at 0800, 4 September, at first against little opposition. North of the road the 2nd Battalion quickly completed occupation of Hill 116, from which the Red enemy had withdrawn during the night. South of the road the 1st Battalion occupied what appeared to be a command post of the 9th NK Division. Tents were still up and equipment lay scattered about. Two abandoned T-34 tanks in excellent condition stood there. Tanks and ground troops advancing along the road found it littered with enemy dead and destroyed and abandoned equipment. By nightfall the counterattack had gained another five kilometers.

That night was quiet until just before dawn. The Red troops then launched an attack against the 9th Infantry on the right of the Marines, the
heaviest blow striking G Company. It had begun to rain again and the attack came in the midst of a downpour. In hand-to-hand fighting the men of G Company managed to repel the enemy attack. American artillery fire concentrated in front of the 9th US Infantry helped greatly in repelling the enemy in this night and day battle.

That morning, 5 September, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the American troops moved out in their third day of counterattack. It was a day of rain. As the attack progressed, the Marines approached Obong-ni Ridge and the 9th Infantry neared Cloverleaf Hill — their old battleground of August. There, at midmorning, on the high ground ahead, they could see enemy troops digging in. The Marines approached the pass between the two hills and took positions in front of the enemy-held high ground.

At 1430 approximately 300 enemy infantry came from the village of Tugok and concealed positions, striking B Company on Hill 125 just north of the road and east of Tugok. Two enemy T-34 tanks surprised and knocked out the two leading Marine Pershing M26 tanks. Assault teams of B Company and the 1st Battalion with 3.5-inch rocket launchers rushed into action, took the tanks under fire, and destroyed both of them, as well as an armored personnel carrier following behind. The enemy infantry attack was quite savage and inflicted twenty-five casualties on B Company before reinforcements from A Company and supporting Army artillery and the Marine 81-mm. mortars helped repel it.

5 September was a day of heavy casualties everywhere on the Naktong Perimeter. Army units had 102 killed, 430 wounded, and 587 missing in action for a total of 1,119 casualties. Marine units had 35 killed, 91 wounded, and none missing in action, for a total of 126 battle casualties.

At 2000, 4 September, General Walker had ordered the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade released from operational control of the 2nd US Division effective at midnight, 5 September. He had vainly protested against releasing the brigade, believing he needed it and all the troops then in Korea if he were to stop the NK Communist offensive against the Naktong Perimeter. At 0015, 6 September, the Marines began leaving their lines at Obong-ni Ridge and headed for Pusan.

The American counteroffensive of 3–5 September west of Yongsan resulted in one of the bloodiest and most terrifying debacles of the war for an enemy division. Even though remnants of the enemy division still held Obong-ni Ridge, Cloverleaf Hill, and the intervening ground back to the Naktong on 6 September, the division's offensive strength had been spent at
the end of the American counterattack. The 9th and 4th NK Divisions were not able to resume the offensive.

Once again the fatal weakness of the enemy had cost his victory after an impressive initial success — communications and supply were not capable of exploiting a breakthrough and supporting a continuing attack in the face of the UN forces, massive air, armor, and artillery fire that could be concentrated against Red troops at critical points.

**Battle of Changnyong**

*(1—9 September)*

North of the 9th US Regiment and the battles that ebbed and flowed in the big bulge of the Naktong and around Yongsan, the 23rd Regiment, 2nd US Division, after daylight of 1 September found itself in a very precarious position. Its 1st Battalion had been driven from the Naktong River positions and isolated five kilometers westward. Approximately 400 enemy now overran the regimental command post, compelling Colonel Paul L. Freemen, Jr., the Regiment Commander, to withdraw it about 600 yards. There, approximately eight kilometers northwest of Changnyong, the 23rd Regiment Headquarters and Headquarters Company, miscellaneous regimental units, and regimental staff officers checked the enemy in a three-hour fight.

The infallible sign of approaching enemy troops could be seen in Changnyong itself during the afternoon of 2 September. At 1300 the native population began leaving the town. A little later a security force of 300 local police under the command of two American officers withdrew into the hills eastward when two groups of enemy soldiers approached from the northwest and southwest. Enemy troops were in Changnyong that evening.

With his communications broken southward to the 2nd Division headquarters and the 9th Regiment, Brigadier General Loyal M. Haynes, 2nd Division Artillery Commander, then in command of a task force in Changnyong area, decided to send a tank patrol down the Yongsan road in an effort to re-establish communication. Captain Mames R. Dew, commanding officer of C Company, 72nd Tank Battalion, led the tanks southward. The patrol had to fight its way down the road through enemy roadblocks. Of the three tanks that started, only Captain Dew’s tank got through to Yongsan. There, Captain Dew delivered an overlay of Task Force Haynes’ positions to Brigadier General Joseph S. Bradley, 2nd Division Assistant Commander, then in command of another task force in the Yongsan area.
Enemy's Final Offensive

Still farther northward in the zone of the 38th US Regiment the Communist enemy was far from idle. After the enemy breakthrough during the night of 31 August, General Keiser, the 2nd Division Commander, on 1 September had ordered the 2nd Battalion, 38th Regiment, to move south and help the 23rd US Regiment establish a defensive position west of Changnyong. In attempting to do this, the battalion found enemy troops already on the ridge along the road. They had in fact penetrated to Hill 283 overlooking the 38th Regiment command post. This hill and Hill 209 dominated the rear areas of the regiment. At 0600, 3 September, an estimated 300 enemy troops launched an attack from Hill 284 against the 38th Regiment command post. Colonel George B. Peploe, Regimental Commander, organized all officers and enlisted men present, including members of the mortar and tank companies and attached antiaircraft artillery units, to fight in the perimeter defense.

This fight continued until 5 September. On that day F Company captured Hill 284 after the repeated efforts. The company found about 150 enemy dead on the hill.

Meanwhile, during these actions in its rear, the 1st Battalion, 23rd US Regiment, was cut off five kilometers westward from the nearest friendly units. On 1 September the 1st Battalion had received orders from the regiment to withdraw to the Changnyong area. At 1400 Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., sent a tank-infantry patrol to see if his withdrawal road was open. It reported that an estimated enemy battalion held the mountain pass just eastward of the battalion's defense perimeter. Colonel Hutchin, upon receiving this report, decided to remain in his present position and from there try to obstruct the movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. The 1st Battalion then began a 3-day stand as an island in a sea of enemy. During this time C-47 planes supplied the battalion by air drops.

The 2nd US Division, on the morning of 1 September, started the 3rd Battalion, 38th Regiment, in an attack westward from the 23rd Regiment command post near Masan-ni to open the enemy held road to the 1st Battalion. On the second day of the fighting at the enemy-held pass, the relief force, under Major Everett S. Stewart, the Battalion Executive Officer, broke through the enemy roadblock with the help of air strikes and artillery and tank fire. The advanced elements of the battalion joined the 1st Battalion at 1700, 2 September. That evening, enemy troops strongly attacked the 3rd Battalion, 38th Regiment, on Hill 209 north of the road and opposite the 1st
Battalion, driving one company from its position.

On 4 September, General Haynes changed the boundary between the 38th and 23rd US Regiments, giving the northern part of the 23rd’s sector to the 38th Infantry, thus releasing the 1st Battalion for movement southward to help the 2nd Battalion defend the southern approach to Changnyong. The 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment, about 1,100 men strong when the enemy began it’s attack, was now down to a strength of approximately 600 men.

The 23rd Regiment now made plans to concentrate all its troops on the position held by its 2nd Battalion on the Pugong-ni-Changnyong road. The 1st Battalion moved and took a place on the left flank of the 2nd Battalion. At the same time the regimental command post moved to the rear of this position. In this regimental perimeter, the 23rd Infantry fought a series of hard battles. Simultaneously it had to send combat patrols to its rear to clear infiltrating enemy from Changnyong and from its supply road.

The 2nd NK Division made a desperate effort against the 23rd US Infantry’s perimeter in the predawn hours of 8 September, in an attempt to break through eastward. This attack, launched at 0230 hours and heavily supported with artillery, penetrated F Company. It was apparent that unless F Company’s position could be restored the entire regimental front would collapse. When all its officers became casualties, 1st Lieutenant Ralph R. Robinson, adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, assumed command of the company. With the enemy rapidly infiltrating his company’s position and gaining its rear, Lieutenant Robinson in the darkness made his way through them 500 yards to A Company’s position. There he obtained that company’s reserve platoon and brought it back to F Company. He accomplished the dangerous and difficult task of maneuvering it into the gap in F Company’s lines in darkness and heavy rain.

The enemy attack tapered off with the coming of daylight, but that night it resumed. The enemy force struck repeatedly at the defense line. This time they continued the fighting into the daylight hours of 9 September. The UN Air forces gave invaluable aid to the ground troops. Casualties came to the aid stations from the rifle companies in an almost steady stream during the morning. All available men from Headquarters Company and special units were formed into squads and put into the fight at the most critical points. When the enemy attack finally ceased shortly after noon the 23rd Regiment had an estimated combat efficiency of only 38 percent.

This furious night and day battle cost the enemy division most of its remaining offensive strength.
Even though its offensive strength was largely spent by 9 September, the 2nd NK Division continued to harass near areas around Changnyong with infiltrating groups as large as companies. Patrols daily had to open the main supply road and clear the town.

**Battle in the Hyonpung Area**

While the 2nd NK Division was making its great effort near the middle of the 2nd US Division line, the 10th NK Division on its left to the north failed to give the assistance that was expected of it in the coordinated corps attack. And therein lies one of the greatest NK Reds failures of the war to exploit an opportunity. The singular behavior of this enemy force puzzled American commanders at the time, although they were thankful that it took the pattern it did.

A large part of the 10th NK Division occupied Hill 409 in a deep fold of the Naktong River just west of Hyonpung. Elements of this division streamed off Hill 409 the night of 31 August—1 September and struck the 1st Battalion, 38th US Regiment, which formed the extreme right flank of the 2nd US Division. Holding the town of Hyonpung was C Company, which withdrew from it under enemy attack during the night of 2—3 September.

North and east of the Hill 409 and Hyonpung area lay a virtually roadless, high mountain area having no fixed UN defensive position. About six and a half kilometers north of Hyonpung was the Yongpo bridge across the Naktong and the 1st US Cavalry Division boundary. The Yongpo bridge site was defended by the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, attached to the 1st Cavalry Division for that purpose, until 0410, 5 September, when the 27th British Brigade relieved it and went into the line there. This was the British brigade's first commitment in the Korean War.

During the first two weeks of September large numbers of the 10th NK Division came off Hill 409 and roamed the mountain mass northeast of Hyonpung in the gap between the 2nd US Division and the 27th British Brigade. This caused Eighth Army concern for the safety of Taegu. Gradually, ROK police and British combat patrols forced the enemy back to Hill 409. On 6 September, the day after they went into the line, the British had a taste of what the Korean War was like. A combat patrol of the Argylls under Captain Neil A. Buchannan encountered an enemy unit and had to make its escape. The British company nearest Hill 409 was so isolated that air drops of ice to it replaced carrying water cans up the hill.

Had the 10th NK Division thrown its full weight into a drive eastward,
south of Taegu, it might well have precipitated a major crisis for the Eighth Army. It could have moved either northeast toward Taegu or southeast to help the 2nd NK Division next in line below it, but it did neither. Its relative inactivity in the vicinity of Hill 409 when its companion divisions were engaged in desperate combat above and below it is something of a mystery. Captured enemy material and statements of prisoners indicated that its mission may have been to stay on Hill 409 until the II NK Corps could capture Taegu.

Section 4. Action on the South Front

In the southern part, where the 25th US Division held the UN line, the I NK Corps also struck a crushing blow, coordinating it with an attack against the 2nd US Division just to the north. The 6th and 7th NK Divisions were responsible for the breakthrough effort against the 25th US Division. The 6th NK Division, farthest south on the enemy right flank, was to attack, at 2200, 31 August, through Haman, Masan, and Chinhac, and capture Kimhae, on the west side of the Naktong River delta twenty-four kilometers from Pusan, by 3 September. The 7th NK Division, next in line north of the 6th NK Division, was to attack north of the Masan highway, wheel left to the Naktong, and wait for the 6th NK Division on its right and the 9th on its left to join it. The enemy plan pitted the 6th NK Division against the 24th US Regiment and the 7th NK Division against the 35th US Regiment.

The 35th US Regiment along the Nam River

Half an hour before midnight, 31 August, an enemy selfpropelled high-velocity gun from across the Nam River fired shells into the position of G Company, 35th US Regiment, overlooking the river. Within a few minutes, enemy artillery had taken under fire all frontline rifle companies of the 35th Regiment from the Namji-ri bridge west. Under cover of this fire a reinforced regiment of the 7th NK Division crossed the Nam River and attacked F and G Companies, 35th Regiment. Other enemy soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of the paddy ground north of Koman-ni and near the boundary between the 2nd Battalion, holding the river front, and the 1st Battalion, holding the hill line that stretched from Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju — Masan highway.
Enemy’s Final Offensive

During the predawn hours of 1 September, when the 7th NK Division troops had swung left after crossing the Nam River to roll up that flank, widen the gap, drive the American troops from their hill positions overlooking the Nam River, and secure a broad bridgehead for the division, the first American unit they encountered was G Company, 35th Infantry, at the north shoulder of the gap. While some enemy units peeled off to attack G Company, others continued on and engaged E Company, about three kilometers downstream from it, and still others attacked scattered units of F Company all the way to its 1st Platoon, which guarded the Namji-ri bridge. There, at the extreme right flank of the 25th Division, this platoon drove off an enemy force after a sharp fight. By 2 September, E Company in a heavy battle had destroyed most of an enemy battalion.

Of all the 2nd Battalion units, G Company received the hardest blows. So a help was needed. While G Company held its positions on Hill 179 on 2 September, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, started a counterattack northwest toward the hill at 1700 from the Chung-ni area. This attack order was given to the battalion on General Kean’s own authority as the responsible commander on the ground, notwithstanding General Walker’s earlier refusal to use it. The battalion made slow progress against formidable enemy forces. The night was extremely dark and the terrain along the Kuhe-ri ferry road was mountainous. After fighting all that night the battalion, the next day at 1500, reached a position about one kilometer south at the original defensive positions of G Company, 35th Regiment. A coordinated attack by armor, artillery, air, and infantry got under way and by 1800 the battalion had re-established the battle line. In this attack the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, killed 275 enemy and recovered a large part of the equipment G Company had lost earlier.

The next morning, 4 September, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, received orders to attack to the rear and clear the alternate route on the western edge of the battalion zone. At 0800 G Company, 35th Regiment, relieved the battalion on the regained positions and the latter started his attack back up the supply road. While this was in progress, word came that the enemy had again driven G Company from its newly re-established position. The battalion of the 27th Infantry turned around, attacked, and once more restored the G Company positions. The battalion then resumed its attack to the rear along the road in the gap between the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 35th Infantry. The battalion, almost immediately, was in contact with enemy forces. Soon enemy machine guns were firing on the battalion from three directions. The battalion had to withdraw to favorable terrain. By
this time the battalion was running short of ammunition. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon E. Murch, requested air supply since the recaptured supply road was closed again, and the next morning, 5 September, the battalion was resupplied. The battalion resumed its attack to the rear. By evening of 5 September, it had cleared the supply road and adjacent terrain of enemy troops for a distance of 8,000 yards to the rear of G Company’s front-line positions. There the battalion received orders to halt and prepare to attack northeast to link up the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert J. Check. These two battalions of the 27th Regiment were ordered to clean up enemy troops back of the 35th Regiment and below the Nam River.

In the meantime at this time the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, protruded farther westward than any other unit of the UN forces in Korea. Back of its positions on Sibidang-san the main supply route and rear areas were in enemy hands, and only in daylight and under escort could vehicles travel the road. On Sibidang-san the battalion had held its original positions after the heavy fighting of predawn of 1 September, completely surrounded by barbed wire, booby traps, and flares, with all supporting weapons inside its tight

Mountain mass west of Haman.
perimeters. The battalion had the advantage of calling by number for previously zeroed and numbered protective fires covering all approaches, which were quickly delivered. An hour after midnight, 3 September, an unusually heavy enemy assault struck the battalion. The fight there continued until dawn of the day, when the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, counted 143 enemy dead in front of its positions, and on that basis estimated that the total enemy casualties must have been about 500 men.

In this night battle the 64th US Field Artillery Battalion gave invaluable support to the 1st Battalion and became involved itself in the fighting. About fifty enemy soldiers infiltrated before dawn to A Battery’s position and delivered an assault employing submachine guns. The men of the A Battery fought hand-to-hand with the enemy. In defending its guns in this night battle, A Battery lost seven men killed and twelve wounded — about 25 percent of its strength.

It is not possible here to follow in detail the confused ebb and flow of battle behind the 35th Regiment. Battalion, companies, and platoons, cut off and isolated, fought independently of higher control and help except for airdrops which supplied many of them. Air drops also supplied relief forces trying to reach the front-line units. Tanks and armored cars ran the gauntlet to the isolated units with supplies of food and ammunition and carried back critically wounded on the return trips.

In general, the 35th US Regiment fought in its original battle line position, while at first one battalion, and latter two battalions, of the 27th Regiment fought toward it through the estimated 3,000 enemy troops operating in its rear areas.

By morning of 7 September there was clear evidence that survivors of the 7th NK Division were trying to escape across the Nam River. The 25th US Division buried more than 2,000 enemy dead, killed between 1 and 7 September behind its lines. This number did not include those killed in front of its positions. About 9 September Colonel Henry G. Fisher, commanding the 35th Regiment, traveled over these rear areas where fighting had been intense. He was astonished at the number of enemy dead that littered the fields. Speaking of that occasion he has said, “The area of Trun in the Falaise Gap in Europe could not match it. Flies were so thick in some areas it limited vision.”

The 35th Infantry Regiment fought bravely the enemy into the ground in the September battle along the Nam River, winning a distinguished Unit Citation for its performance there.
Counterattack at Haman

Shortly before midnight, 31 August, the enemy forces also struck the 2nd Battalion, 24th US Regiment, first hitting F Company on the north side of the pass on the Chungam-ni - Haman road. This enemy’s surprise scared the men of the 2nd Battalion. Soon, most of the battalion fled its positions. The enemy passed through the line quickly and overran the 2nd Battalion command post, killing many men there and destroying much equipment. Haman was then open to direct attack. As enemy encircled Haman Lieutenant Colonel Paul F. Roberts, commanding the 2nd Battalion, ordered an officer to take remnants of the battalion and establish a roadblock at the south edge of the town. Although the officer directed a large group of men to accompany him, only eight did so. The 2nd Battalion was no longer an effective force.

Colonel Arthur S. Champney, commanding the 24th US Regiment, at 0400, 1 September, moved his regimental command post from Haman about three kilometers northeast to a narrow defile on the newly-built road. A counterattack by the 1st Battalion was ordered. Upon contact with the enemy, the 1st Battalion broke and moved to the rear. Thus, shortly after daylight the scattered and disorganized men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Infantry had moved to the high ground about three kilometers east of Haman. The better part of two regiments of the 6th NK Division poured into and through the about 5-kilometer-wide Haman gap.

General Kean dispatched the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, which arrived at the 24th Infantry command post at 1000, 1 September, to be attached to the 24th Regiment.

The scene there was chaotic. Vehicles of all descriptions, loaded with soldiers, were moving down the road to the rear. Many soldiers on foot were on the road. The road was so clogged with human traffic that Colonel Check had to delay his counterattack.

At 1445, General Kean’s orders for an immediate counterattack to restore the 24th Infantry position arrived at the regimental command post. Lieutenant Colonel Check, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, quickly completed his attack plan. For half an hour the airstrikes came on Haman and adjacent enemy-held ridges. Fifteen minutes of concentrated artillery barrages followed. Haman was a sea of flames. Colonel Check’s troops moved out in attack westward at 1630. Eight tanks, mounting infantry, spearheaded the attack into Haman. Enemy in force held the ridge on the west side of the town, and their machine gun fire swept every approach. Enemy fire destroyed one tank and the attacking troops suffered heavy
casualties. But Colonel Check's battalion pressed the attack and 1825 hours had seized the first long ridge 500 yards west of Haman; by 2000 it had secured half of the old battle position on the higher ridge beyond, its objective, one kilometer and a half west of Haman. Two hundred yards short of the crest on the remainder of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night.

All day air strikes had harassed the enemy and prevented him from consolidating his gains and reorganizing for further coordinated attack. The crisis for the 25th Division however has not lessened by Eighth Army's telephone message at 1045 hours that the 27th Infantry was to be alerted for a possible move north into the 2nd US Division sector.

West of Haman the enemy forces and Colonel Check's men faced each other during the night without further battle, but in the rear areas, enemy mortar fire on the 24th Regiment command post caused Colonel Champney to move it still farther to the rear.

In the morning, under cover of a heavy ground fog, the enemy troops struck Colonel Check's battalion in a counterattack. This action began a hard fight which lasted all morning. Air strikes using napalm burned to death many NK troops and helped the battalion troops in gaining the ridge. At noon, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, at last secured the former positions of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, and took over the same foxholes that unit had abandoned two nights before. Its crew served—weapons were still in place.

Early the next morning, 3 September, the enemy again attacked Colonel Check's troops in an effort to regain the ridge. Artillery, mortar, and tank fire barrages, and a perfectly timed air strike directed from the battalion command post, met this attack. Part of the battalion had to face about and fight toward its rear. After the attack had been repulsed hundreds of enemy dead lay about the battalion position.

Colonel Check's battalion held the ridge until dark on 4 September, then the 1st Battalion and F Company of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, which had reorganized in the rear, relieved it. The 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, thereupon moved back into a secondary defensive position a few kilometers east of Haman. Colonel Champney moved his command post back into Haman.

The splendid fighting ability of the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, brought the enemy threat in the Haman area to nothing.
Battle Mountain and Sobuk-san Area

Although the 6th and 7th NK Divisions had massed their troops for the attempted breakthrough of the 25th US Division positions along the Nam and Naktong Rivers as already stated, the 6th NK Division did not altogether ignore the mountain backbone stretching southward toward the coast. Enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on Battle Mountain, Pil-bong, and Sobuk-san during the period of the enemy offensive and there were strong local attacks and patrol actions. The southern part of the UN line was held by the 24th and 5th US Regiments.

When the enemy attack broke through the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, and streamed for the rear, the instability of the 24th Regiment at this time made it necessary for General Kean to order Colonel John L. Throckmorton, commanding the 5th Regiment, to send his only regimental reserve, E Company, north into the 24th Infantry sector along the Haman road to protect the right flank of the 5th Regiment. In this position, E Company collected stragglers from the 24th Regiment every night and the next morning sent them back to their units. Even the Navy entered the battle in this part of the line, for its destroyers standing off the south coast gave illumination at night by directing their searchlights against low-hanging clouds on Sobuk-san. One destroyer was on station almost continuously, supporting the ground action with the fire of six 5-inch guns. An artillery aerial observer directed this naval gunfire through the fire direction center.

On 7 September, an enemy attack succeeded once again in driving ROK and American troops from Battle Mountain (Hill 665). At the time the 24th Regiment held the high country west of Haman up to and including Battle Mountain and Pil-bong. The 5th Regiment held the southern spur of Sobuk-san to the coastal road at Chindong-ni.

General Kean immediately ordered the 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George H. DeChew, to retake the crest of Battle Mountain. Colonel DeChew, who had just counterattacked through the rear areas of the 24th Regiment to the vicinity of Haman, prepared his battalion for the attempt. Companies K and B of the 24th Regiment were to follow him and secure the crest if he regained it. For three days, 7, 8, and 9 September, the 3rd Battalion counterattacked up Battle Mountain. On the 9th, I Company launched its attack to the top and engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. L Company followed to the crest but the dug-in enemy drove both companies off and back down the slope. An estimated two companies of enemy troops held the crest of Battle Mountain and two more
companies protected their flanks. The 3rd Battalion suffered heavy casualties in these three days of fighting. On the afternoon of the 9th the American counterattack force dropped back to the high ground which it had recaptured on the 7th, 1,000 yards east of Battle Mountain.

With the failure of the 3rd Battalion, 27th US Infantry, to hold the high knob on Battle Mountain after its attack on 8-9 September, Colonel John T. Corley, who had succeeded the command of the 24th Infantry, decided to give up the attempt on the evening of the 9th. He had K Company, 24th US Infantry, and C Company, 65th US Engineer Combat Battalion, dig in on the hill east of and lower than Battle Mountain, surrounded them with barbed wire and mine fields, and placed registered artillery and mortar fires on all enemy approaches to the position. He planned to contain the enemy on Battle Mountain by artillery and mortar fire. The NK Red troops on Battle Mountain attacked the lower American defensive position many times on subsequent nights, but all their attacks were driven off. Thus, finally, after a month of almost constant battle the enemy gained and held possession of the crest of Battle Mountain. The defensive fires of the 24th Regiment and attached artillery, however, contained them there and they were unable to exploit the possession of this battle-torn peak.

With Battle Mountain in their possession, the Communist forces set out to gain control of Pil-bong, a towering peak 250 feet higher than Battle Mountain to the southeast. In the predawn hours of 14 September an enemy force of 400-500 men attacked I and L Companies, 24th Infantry, on Pil-bong. Several attacks were repulsed, but because of men leaving their positions L Company’s strength dwindled from 100 to 40 men. Only the determined leadership of Major Melvin R. Blair, who had just assumed command of the battalion, held these men in the fight. With the remnant of L Company, Major Blair withdrew toward I Company’s position on the crest of Pil-bong, only to find that this company under a relatively minor attack had, unknown to him, left the hill. Major Blair was wounded, and he could not hold Pil-bong with the handful of men remaining with him and it was lost.

Just as soon as the crisis passed for the 25th Division, General Walker ordered it on 7 September to release the 5th Regimental Combat Team within twenty-four hours. The continuing crisis north of Taegu made it mandatory for General Walker to build up his reserve there. That evening the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th US Infantry, moved from the Nam River battlefield to relieve the 5th US Regimental Combat Team on the Masan sector.
CHAPTER X  THE GENERAL COUNTEROFFENSIVE
(15—30 September 1950)

Section 1.  The Landing at Inchon

General MacArthur's Strategic Concept

The single stroke which was to reverse the tide of the Korean War as absolutely as a change in the wind had been conceived by General MacArthur during the first week of the war. It was then that he came to Korea to reconnoiter the battlefront on 29 June, standing on a hill overlooking Seoul while the human debris of defeat whirled around him.

At that moment General MacArthur decided upon the delaying action which would slow the enemy advance and then keep him in place while an amphibious operation struck him in the rear and destroyed him.

Upon his return to Tokyo, General MacArthur instructed his Chief of Staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, to begin planning for an amphibious operation against the west coast of Korea. General MacArthur planned to use his preponderance of air and naval forces, plus the unique ability of the US Marines to go ashore against a hostile beach, to take the enemy in the rear and, by cutting his lines of communications, destroy him.

At the joint Army, Navy, and Air Force levels, under the code name “Bluehearts,” work began immediately for this operation. General Almond initially scheduled Bluehearts for 22 July 1950. But the continuing collapse of the Korean front, requiring that virtually all available troops he committed to save the diminishing Naktong Perimeter, rendered Bluehearts impossible by 10 July.

But, despite postponement after postponement, General MacArthur never wavered in his belief that a sweep by sea around the enemy’s flank and an attack in his deep rear against lines of supply and communications were the most practical way to end the war. It was a concept General MacArthur had used in humbling Japan, and it put United States strength to its best use, while minimizing American weaknesses.
The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), Far East Command, had to discard plan after plan during July and August. The 2nd US Infantry Division arrived from Fort Lewis, Washington; it had to be committed on the Naktong front. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which General MacArthur had requested particularly for the amphibious operation, had to be diverted to the critical points to help save the Eighth Army. Only the 7th US Infantry Division, already cannibalized by the demands of the understrength committed divisions, remained in Japan as nucleus.

Of a number of plans postulated by the JSPOG, General MacArthur favored the one labeled 100-B: an amphibious landing at the port of Inchon, coupled with a breakout from the Naktong Perimeter by the Eighth Army. General MacArthur chose Inchon as a landing site because it was the second port of Korea, intelligence reported it lightly defended, and it was only twenty-eight kilometers from Seoul, the nerve center of Korea.

Seoul in UN hands would leave the Red forces isolated from their bases in the north, and encircled by hostile forces. It was the ancient hammer and anvil concept, and General MacArthur felt that a successful operation would result in the complete disintegration of the Communist invaders.

But Inchon, as a site of landing, posed enormous difficulties. Between Inchon and the open sea were expanses of mud flats, crossed by a tortuous channel. The tides at Inchon were extreme — from 31.2 feet at flood to minus 5 at ebb. Landing craft could approach the harbor only during certain hours of the day. In the middle of September 1950, the Marines would have to land against the sixteen-feet-high seawalls surrounding Inchon with only two hours of remaining daylight.

By 20 July, however, General MacArthur had decided on the Inchon operation, and neither the outright opposition of the Navy and Marine Corps, nor the Joint Chiefs' lack of enthusiasm could sway him.

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, who would command the naval forces, told General MacArthur, "The operation is not impossible, but I do not recommend it." Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. (USMC), called on General MacArthur and tried to argue him into a landing near Asan, below Seoul. All these efforts failed. General MacArthur remained resolute on Inchon. There were better landing sites in other areas, true, but none that could so quickly pinch the vital nerves of the enemy. General MacArthur was willing to take risks, provided the Korean War could be brought to a rapid close.

In Washington, he received solid support from Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, who also wanted the war over as quickly as possible.
He moved ahead with planning for Inchon, and he bombarded the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with messages stating his position in highly eloquent terms. On 6 September he confirmed his verbal orders for the operation in writing; 15 September 1950 was set as D-Day. When the JCS again asked him for reconsideration, he told them in part: "There is no question in my mind as to the feasibility of the operation and I regard its chance of success as excellent."

Finally, in a reply contrasting oddly with General MacArthur's long and literate discourses, the JCS allowed him the green light: "We approve your plan and President had been so informed."

**Landing Forces Assembled**

Meanwhile, the landing forces were being assembled. On 21 August, General MacArthur requested the Department of the Army by radio for authority to activate Headquarters, X Corps, and, upon receiving approval, he issued GHQ FEC General Order 24 on 26 August activating the Corps. All units in Japan or en route there that had been designated GHQ Reserve were assigned to it. The headquarters was to command the landing forces. When General Almond suggested that a corps commander should be found, General MacArthur smiled and said, "It is you."

But General Almond was also to retain his other hat as FECOM Chief of Staff. General MacArthur figured that the war would come to a speedy close once the enemy were taken in the rear.

General Almond took command of X Corps on 26 August. Around him, General Almond gathered a great number of handpicked staff. While many of General Walker's staff had been thrown together in Korea under hasty conditions, General Almond wished to avoid any obvious pitfalls.

For ground troops X Corps would have the 7th US Infantry Division in Japan and the newly assembled and arrived 1st US Marine Division. Both these units had been put together almost from scratch.

Each of the Marine regiments, the 1st and 7th, had been reactivated. Marines had been called from all over the world. Six Fleet in the Mediterranean was stripped of one battalion. Half of the ranks were filled with recalled reservists. While the first arrived 5th Marines fought in the Naktong Bulge, the 1st and 7th Marines continued to debark in FECOM in bits and pieces.

The 7th US Division was in worse shape than even the Marines. As the weakened occupation divisions had been alerted for Korea, they had slowly
cannibalized the 7th Division by drawing on it for fillers. During July, more than 100 officers and 1,500 key NCO's and men had been taken from the 7th Division; at half-strength, it was even weaker in cadre positions.

For a number of days of August and September, despite the Eighth Army's shrieks of dismay, the entire infantry and artillery replacement pipeline was channeled into the 7th Division. And at General MacArthur's order, General Walker shipped 8,000 Koreans over from Pusan as the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) for the division.

While the 7th Division gradually swelled to combat strength, the Marines and Eighth Army were having a jurisdictional squabble over the 5th Marine Regiment. Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division, wanted the 5th Marine Regiment back before the landing operation started.

But General Walker, pressed for the 1st Provisional Brigade's release, snapped, "I will not be responsible for the safety of Eighth Army's front if I lose the 5th Marines."

The Navy and Marine Corps informed General MacArthur that without the return of the regiment they would not participate in the Inchon landing. MacArthur said, "Tell Walker he will have to give up the Marines."

The 1st US Marine Division sailed from Kobe, Japan on the 11th of September. The 7th US Infantry Division embarked at Yokohama the same day, and on the 12th, the 5th Marines departed Pusan to join its brother regiments somewhere at sea. Half an hour past midnight on 13 September, with General MacArthur and party aboard, the command ship MT. McKinley weighed anchor at Sasebo, Japan.

The X US Corps troops, nearly 70,000 men, were at sea. It had been formed from scratch, operating against time, manpower, and every known logistic difficulty, and its very conception embodied the best of American military capability. No other nation in the world had the means and knowledge to put such a force together in a time. No other nation would have attempted what General MacArthur had planned from the first.

Securing the Inchon Beachhead
(15–16 September)

At 0200, 15 September, the Advance Attack Group, including the Gunfire Support Group, the rocket ships (LSMR's) and the Battalion Landing Team, began the approach to Inchon. A special radar-equipped task force,
consisting of three high speed transports (APD's) and one Landing Ship Dock (LSD), carried the Battalion Landing Team (Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett's 3rd Battalion, 5th US Marine Regiment, and a platoon of nine M26 Pershing tanks from A Company, 1st Tank Battalion) toward the transport area off Wolmi-do. Dawn of D-Day came with a high overcast sky and portent of rain.

Because of the extreme tides on 15 September, the assault had to be made in two phases. Wolmi-do connected to the mainland by a causeway, guarded Inchon harbor. There were Communist troops and guns on Wolmi-do, and it had to be eliminated before landing craft could crash against the seawall of Inchon itself. It had been decided to land the Battalion Landing Team on Wolmi-do early in the morning; the battalion would secure the island and hold it while the falling tide forced the naval fleet to retire. Then, in late afternoon, the fleet would surge back into the harbor, throw its landing craft against the sixteen-foot seawalls surrounding the city of Inchon. The amphibious assault could not begin until past 1700 hours in the afternoon, when the tide was high enough to flood landing craft over the slimy mudbanks of the harbor, and this left the attacking Marines only two hours' daylight to land and secure their beachhead.

If the Marines on Wolmi-do ran into serious trouble, there would be no way the fleet could help them, other than gunfire and air support, until the tide turned.

At approximately 0625, the 5th Marine's 3rd Battalion on 17 landing craft moved toward Wolmi-do with G and H Companies in assault and I Company in reserve. Even after the American rocket barrage lifted there was still no enemy fire. The first wave of troops reached the bathing beach on the northern arm of the island unopposed at 0633.
The first troops ashore moved rapidly inland against almost no resistance. Within a few minutes the second wave landed. Then came the landing ships (LSV’s) carrying the tanks, three of which carried dozer blades for breaking up barbed wire, filling trenches, and sealing caves; three other tanks mounted flame throwers. One group of Marines raised the American flag on the high ground of Wolmi-do half an hour after landing. Another force crossed the island and sealed off causeway leading to Inchon. The reduction of the island continued systematically and it was secured at 0750.

A little later in the morning, Colonel Taplett sent a squad of Marines and three tanks over the causeway to Sowolmi-do where they destroyed an estimated platoon of enemy troops; some surrendered, others swam into sea, and still others were killed. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marines assumed defensive positions and prepared to cover the main Inchon landing later in the
day.

In the capture of Wolmi-do and Sowolmi-do the Battalion Landing Team killed 108 enemy soldiers and captured 136. About 100 more in several caves refused to surrender and were sealed by tank dozers into their caves. Marine casualties were light — seventeen wounded.

The preinvasion intelligence on Wolmi-do proved to be essentially correct. Prisoners indicated that about 400 NK troops, elements of the 3rd Battalion, 226th NK Independent Marine Regiment, and some artillery troops of the 918th NK Artillery Regiment had defended Wolmi-do.

Then the tide began to gurgle over the mud flats toward the Western Sea, and the fleet had to retreat down muddy, tortuous, Flying Fish Channel. For long hours Tapelett’s Marines were all alone on Wolmi-do, in the face of a now thoroughly alerted enemy.

But from offshore the big guns of the fleet belched a curtain of fire and steel around the Marines, and Naval and Marine air ranged freely over Inchon and forty kilometers beyond, interdicting any possible enemy move. Then, in the rain that had begun to slash down into the smelly mud bottoms, the fleet steamed in with the resurging tide.

At 1733 the first landing craft of the 5th Marines for Red Beach grated against the seawall just north of Wolmi-do, near the center of Inchon. Marines piled over the wall on scaling ladders or poured through holes blown in the barrier by naval gunfire. Within minutes they were in Inchon streets. After a brief, vicious fire fight along the wall, the enemy broke twenty minutes after touching shore, and a Marine flare ascended into the sky, signaling the capture of Cemetery Hill, an initial objective. Here, Red troops threw down their arms and surrendered to the Marines. By midnight Observatory Hill also fell to the Marines.

In the meantime assault elements of the 1st US Marine Regiment began landing over Blue Beach at 1732, one munite ahead of the 5th US Marines at Red Beach, south of the built-up areas of Inchon. After climbing the high seawall, the 1st Marines moved north around the outskirts of the city to cut the Seoul — Inchon highway. The rapidly falling darkness proved the most serious obstacle in their path.

There had been only 2,000 NK Communist troops in the Inchon area. By 0130 on 16 September, the Marines had taken its final D-Day objectives. The Marine landing force casualties on D-Day were 20 men killed, missing in action, and 174 wounded. Unfortunately, many of these casualties had been inflicted by naval gunners aboard LST’s, who had fired mistakenly into the 2nd
Battalion, 5th Marines.

On the morning of 16 September the two Marine regiments ashore established contact with each other by 0730. Once Inchon had been encircled, the ROK Marines took over mop-up work in Inchon and went at it with such a will that hardly anyone in the port city, friend or foe, was safe.

The two Marine regiments on the 16th advanced rapidly against light resistance and by evening had reached the Beachhead Line, about ten kilometers from the landing area. Their casualties for the day were four killed and twenty-one wounded.

Thus, within twenty-four hours of the main landing, the 1st US Marine Division had secured the high ground east of Inchon, occupied an area sufficient to prevent enemy artillery fire on the landing and unloading area, and obtained a base from which to mount the attack to seize Kimpo Airfield. In the evening of 16 September General Smith established his Marine Division command post east of Inchon and from there at 1800 notified Admiral Doyle, commanding the naval forces, that he was assuming responsibility for operations ashore. (See Sketch Map 16.)
The Advance to the Han River
(17—19 September)

The Marine troops continued to advance following generally the main Inchon—Seoul highway with Colonel Murray's 5th Marines toward Kimpo Airfield, about 11 kilometers away, and the Han River just beyond it and Colonel Lewis B. Puller's 1st Marines, astride the Inchon—Seoul highway, toward Yongdungpo, the industrial suburb of Seoul on the south bank of the Han.

The 5th Marines advanced rapidly on the 17th and by 1800 its 2nd Battalion was at the edge of Kimpo Airfield. In the next two hours the battalion seized the southern part of the airfield. The 400-500 enemy soldiers who ineffectively defended it appeared surprised and had not even mined the runway. During the night several small enemy counterattacks hit the perimeter positions at the airfield between 0200 and dawn, 18 September. The Marines repulsed these company-sized counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy troops, who finally fled to the northwest. E Company and supporting tanks played the leading role in these actions. Kimpo was secured during the morning of 18 September. American air support now could fly from land bases. The airfield now became the base for air operations seeking to disrupt supply of the Communist army.

The 5th US Marines continued to advance toward the Han River beyond the airfield, and the 1st Battalion captured Hill 99 northwest of it and then advanced to the river. The 1st Battalion continued to sweep along the river and on the 19th swung right and captured the last high ground (Hills 118, 80, and 85) about 1,600 meters west of Yongdungpo. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion seized the high ground along the Han River in its sector. At nightfall, 19 September, the 5th Marines held the south bank of the Han River everywhere in its zone and was preparing for a crossing the next morning.

In the meantime the 1st US Marine also continued to advance east toward Yongdungpo astride the Seoul highway. Its armored spearheads destroyed four enemy tanks early on the morning of the 17th. Then, from positions on high ground (Hills 208, 107, 178), about five kilometers short of Sosa, a village halfway between Inchon and Yongdungpo, a regiment of the 18th NK Division checked the advance. At nightfall the 1st Marines dug in for the night west of Sosa. On the morning of the 18th the 1st Marines resumed the attack and passed through and around the town of Sosa at midmorning. By noon the 3rd Battalion had seized Hill 123 east of the town and north of the highway. Enemy artillery fire there caused many casualties in the afternoon, but neither ground nor aerial observers could locate the enemy pieces
firing from the southeast. Beyond Sosa the enemy had heavily mined the highway and on 19 September the tank spearheads stopped after mines damaged two tanks. The advance slowed, but at nightfall advanced elements of the regiment had reached Kal-chon Creek west of Yongdungpo.

Other elements of the X Corps had by now arrived to join in the battle for Seoul. Vessels carrying the 7th US Infantry Division arrived in Inchon harbor on 16 September. The 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment landed during the morning of the 18th; the rest of the regiment landed later in the day. On the morning of 19 September, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment, moved up to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 1st US Marines, in its position on the right flank south of the Seoul highway. The relief was completed by noon. Responsibility for the zone south of the highway passed to the 7th US Division at 1800, 19 September. During the day, the 31st Regiment of the 7th US Division came ashore at Inchon.

Meanwhile, the 2nd US Engineer Special Brigade relieved the ROK Marines of responsibility for the security of Inchon, and the ROK Marines moved up on the 18th and 19th to the Han River near Kimpo. Part of the ROK's Marines extended the left flank of the 5th US Marines, and its 2nd Battalion joined them for the projected crossing of the Han River on the 20th.

Now the battle for Seoul lay ahead. Thus far the UN Navy and Air Force had supported the ground action so effectively.

Section 2. The Capture of Seoul

Outline of the Attacks on Seoul

On 18 September, General Almond, the X US Corps Commander, ordered the 1st US Marine Division to cross the Han River in an effort to occupy and secure the hills north of Seoul. Consequently, Major General Smith, the 1st US Marine Division Commander, ordered the 1st US Marine Regiment to continue the attack toward Yongdungpo along the Inchon—Seoul highway, while the 5th US Marine Regiment was to select and secure a crossing site on the 19th, and then to prepare for a crossing assault.

As a result, the 5th US Marine Regiment, together with the 1st and 2nd ROK Marine Battalions, attempted to cross the Han River during the night of 19—20 September, but resulted in failure due to the enemy counterattack.
The next day, 20 September, the 5th US Marines launched the crossing assault in front of the enemy defenses on the west flank of the city and closed in from Nunggok to the Susaek direction. Thereafter they encountered a stiff resistance, particularly in the Yonhee Hill area. Thus, the attack progressed considerably slow. The Marines finally secured the Yonhee Hill and whereabouts by 24 September.

Meanwhile, the 1st US Marine Regiment also crossed the Han on 24 September and secured a position in Mapo on the right of the 5th US Marines. The 7th US Marine Regiment had taken up position on the left flank of the 5th Marines by this time.

On 25 September, awaring the hard-fighting situation in Seoul, General Almond now ordered the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division and also the 17th ROK Regiment to cross the river in the east of the Marine sector. These two regiments were to seize the Sobinggo area so as to form a pincer-development from the two directions, the Marine units from the northwest and the infantry units from the southeast.

As the main effort of the attack, the Marine units swept the whole area of the west flank by 25 September, thus, some elements had already closed into the city. In another words, the 7th US Marine Regiment with the 3rd ROK Marine Battalion attached, took up positions on the north, the 5th US Marine Regiment with the 1st ROK Marine Battalion attached poised in the center, and the 1st US Marine Regiment with the 2nd ROK Marine Battalion attached now deployed in the south, thus forming an arc in order to compress the encircling attack. Now everything was ready for the general assault.

During the night of 25 – 26 September, the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division and the 17th ROK Regiment occupied Nam-san, a strategic hill situating in the center of Seoul, and about same time, the American and ROK Marines attacked to secure the Sadaemun and Mapo area but failed, encountering enemy counterattacks in considerably large-strength. The 2nd ROK Marine Battalion secured the Yongsan area, however, despite meeting with sporadic enemy opposition.

On the following day, the enemy forces finally began to flee, after they attempted scattered resistances here and there. By the evening, the friendly forces had secured at least one-third of the whole city. In the consequence, the ROK and UN Allied forces hoisted "Taegukki" the national flag of the Republic of Korea on the top of the Capital Building on the morning of 27 September. Thereafter they cleared the whole city mopping up the remnants of the Communist troops.

Although the NK Communist army had been taken by complete surprise,
he had time to react by the time of the Marines' advance to the Han River. Aerial observers and fighter pilots reported large bodies of troops moving toward Seoul from the north. The 18th NK Division, on the point of moving from Seoul to the Naktong front when the landing came at Inchon, was instead ordered to retake Inchon, and its advanced elements had engaged the 1st US Marines in the vicinity of Sosa. On the 17th, enemy engineer units began mining the approach to the Han River near Seoul. About the same time, the 70th NK Regiment moved from Suwon to join in the battle. As they prepared to cross the Han, the Marines estimated that there might be as many as 20,000 enemy troops in Seoul to defend the city. The 20,000-odd soldiery he could throw into the battle for Seoul could stem the tide, but not reverse it.

General MacArthur had told General Almond, the X Corps Commander, "You will be in Seoul in five days." General Almond replied. "I cannot do that but I will have the city in two weeks."

On 20 September, for which the crossing of the Han River was projected, I Company of the 5th US Marines began the assault crossing on LVT's at 0645 after a heavy artillery preparation against Hill 125 near Haengju ferry, crossing site, about four and a half kilometers northeast of Kimpo Airfield. Enemy fire from automatic weapons and small arms on Hill 125 caused rather heavy casualties in I Company but it secured the hill by 0940. Other elements of the 3rd Battalion, still riding LVT's, encountered little or no resistance and proceeded inland to cut the Seoul – Kaesong railroad and a road at the village of Nung-dong by 0830. Still riding in LVT's they now turned right and moved southeast along the railroad track toward Seoul.

The 2nd Battalion followed the 3rd Battalion across the river at 1000, passed through it, and continued the advance. By nightfall the 5th US Marines with twelve tanks, and the 2nd Battalion, ROK Marines, were across the river. Engineers had begun constructing a pontoon ferry at the crossing site.

On the morning of 21 September, the 5th Marines, after repulsing an enemy company-sized counterattack, advanced southeast astride the rail and road lines paralleling the Han River. The 3rd Battalion captured and turned over to the ROK Marines Hill 104, north of the rail line and about eight kilometers from the crossing site, and then turned northeast toward Hill 296 at the northwest edge of Seoul. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion attacked and captured a series of lower hills south of the rail and road lines. That evening the 5th Marines faced a line of hills running generally north-south along the western edge of Seoul. At the southern end of the line, near the
village of Sogang, the 1st Battalion was within less than five kilometers of the Yongsan railroad station in Seoul. Here at the gate to the city that night, the men of the 5th Marines were to be held along the line of hills for four days of bloody battle. There the enemy had chosen to fight their battle for the western approach to the city.

The 1st Marines Enter Yongdungpo

To the 5th US Marines' right, and south, the 1st US Marines gradually approached Yongdungpo. Unfortunately the elements of the 1st Marines on the morning of 20 September had to recapture the hill positions (Hills 80 and 85) which were already captured by the 5th Marines during the daylight of the 19th. This happened because the occupying troops of the 5th Marines on the hills had departed at 2100, before being relieved by the 1st Marines, to meet a deadline set for their departure for Han River crossing site. A Red force counterattacked the hills to find them undefended. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, recaptured Hill 85 only after intense close combat in which there were many Marines casualties.
By 0945 on the 20th, the main body of the 1st Marines reached the high ground overlooking Yongdungpo from the west side of Kal-chon Creek, a stream flowing north past the west edge of the city into the Han River. General Almond arrived there and directed the 1st Marines to shell Yongdungpo. For the rest of the day artillery shelled Yongdungpo and planes bombed it.

At daybreak, 21 September, the artillery resumed its preparation against Yongdungpo. Then, at 0630 the 1st Marine resumed its attack. The 1st Battalion moved off Hills 85 and 80 onto the flat rice paddy ground and across Kal-chon Creek into the edge of Yongdungpo. There enemy fire caused many casualties and slowed its advance. An enemy force held the dikes at the northwest approach to the city.

In its part of the attack, the 2nd Battalion at the southern end of the arc had even harder going. Enemy mortar and artillery fire from high ground on that flank took a heavy toll in Marine casualties. By early afternoon, the 2nd Battalion had suffered 85 casualties in crossing the rice paddies bordering Kal-chon Creek. Here at the edge of Yongdungpo, large part of which were now burning, the enemy fought the battalion to a standstill. The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, passed through the 2nd Battalion late in the afternoon and continued the attack under heavy artillery fire. The enemy had held off the attacks at either end of their line.

While the heavy battles were in progress on either flank, A Company commanded by Captain Robert Barrow left Hill 118 to approach the dike system in the rice fields near the center of the line directly west of the main part of Yongdungpo. The company crossed the high dike and continued to advance, and finally entered the city streets undiscovered. As A Company moved through the heart of the town the men could hear sounds of heavy fighting on their right and left. The company moved on. Shortly before noon, and after passing almost through the city, Captain Barrow stopped at its eastern side. There he placed his men in a defensive perimeter on both sides of a 30-foot-high dike upon whose crest ran a surfaced road which joined at this point with Seoul—Inchon highway.

That afternoon the enemy apparently were too busy in the battle at western edge of the city to give much attention to the unit already in their rear, although small groups did make feeble efforts against it. But at dusk five tanks attacked A Company. In the battle men of A Company fought bravely and knocked out one and damaged two of the tanks with bazooka. Before midnight the company repulsed five separate enemy attacks. Morning disclosed more than 275 enemy dead in the vicinity of the
dike and road intersection and many automatic weapons scattered about on the ground.

The enemy troops, after their failure during the night of 21–22 September to drive A Company from its advanced position at the eastern edge of Yongdungpo, apparently abandoned the city before daybreak. The 1st Marines occupied the city the next morning. On the left near the river they reached the destroyed railroad and highway bridges over Han River about three kilometers east of Yongdungpo.

The 87th Regiment of the 9th NK Divisions and elements of the 18th NK Division had defended Yongdungpo. One battalion of the 87th Regiment reportedly suffered 80 percent casualties in the fighting there.

**Attack Formation**

On the 22, the 1st US Marine Division issued an operations order setting forth its plan for the seizure of Seoul. The 1st US Marine Regiment was to cross the Han in the Yongdungpo area and join the 5th Marine Regiment north of the river, forming the division right, while the 7th US Marine Regiment
which arrived in Inchon on the 21st, was to move up from Inchon and go into the line on the left of the 5th Marines, which then would form the center of a 3-regiment line. The plan contemplated that the 1st Marine Division, without the help of other ground units, would capture Seoul. But that same day, General Almond, who assumed command of the Seoul operation at the X Corps command post in Inchon at 1800 on the 21st, made one change in the plan—he indicated that the ROK Marines and the 17th ROK Regiment were also to be committed in securing the city.

**The 5th US and ROK Marines:** On the evening of the 21st, the 5th US Marines faced a line of enemy defense, a line of hills running generally north-south along the western edge of Seoul. This line was anchored at the north on Hill 296 just south of the Kaesong highway and west of Seoul's Sodaeumun Prison. From the crest Hill 296 the line curved in a gentle half-moon eastward and southeast down spur ridges about four kilometers to the Han River. The greater part of this uneven ridge line was dominated by three hills, each 105 meters high, and accordingly known as Hills 105. Hills 105 North and 105 Center lay north of the rail and highway lines running into Seoul along the northern bank of the Han River; Hill South lay between the rail and road lines and the river.

The men of the 5th Marines were to be held at this line of hills for four days of bloody battle. The largest unit opposing them, the 25th NK Brigade, was newly activated. But its commanding general had studied in Soviet military schools, and the majority of its officers and NCOs had seen battle with the Communist Chinese. The low hills and caves of the area gave them a good area for defense, and they had sufficient artillery and automatic weapons.

On the morning of 22 September the 5th Marines set out to capture these hills. On the north flank the 3rd Battalion's objective was Hill 296. In the center, the objective of the 2nd Battalion, ROK Marines, was hill 105 Center, but the battalion had to take two knobs, Hills 66 and 88, before reaching the main hill behind them. On the south flank across the railroad track the 1st Battalion was to attack Hill 105 South. The attack began at 0700.

On that day all the three battalions fought desperately, only the 1st Battalion taking Hill 105 South late in the day. In the center, enemy fire decimated the ROK Marines in its attack against Hills 66 and 88. The fighting was heavy there all day long. Marine air strikes tried in vain to destroy the enemy position. The next morning, 23 September, the ROK Marines resumed the battle in the center and suffered continuing heavy
casualties, while accomplishing little. Finally the 2nd Battalion, 5th US Marines, at midafternoon took over the attack on orders from Colonel Murray, the Regiment Commander. At noon on 23 September the 7th US Marines under Colonel Homer L. Litzenbery were also ordered to come up behind the 5th Marines.

On 24 September, D Company, the 5th Marines, assaulted Hill 66 which the ROK Marine troops had failed to take. The D Company Commander, 1st Lieutenant H. J. Smith, was killed at the start of the final charge; his men pushed on over him and reached the crest of Hill 66. The enemy fought, then panicked, running from the hill, leaving dead everywhere. Hill 66 cost D Company 36 men killed and 142 wounded out of 206 officers and men, but its capture broke the back of the enemy defense. It was the decisive action in the battle at the western gate to Seoul. The next day, the 25th, the entire enemy's hill line broke. The enemy troops left 1,200 dead behind them in their positions. Marine estimates placed the total number of enemy killed there by all arms at 1,750.

On 25 September after the fall of the enemy defense at the western edge of Seoul, the 5th US Marines started entering the city in the northwest quarter, pointed generally eastward toward Government House about a little over three kilometers away. Its course would take it past big Sodaeum Prison. That evening the 1st and 5th US Marines made plans for a coordinated attack the next morning, 26 September. But the night the enemy troops struck American advance into Seoul at several places in their counterattacks.

About an hour before midnight on the 25th an enemy force of approximately 200 men struck the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. Fighting continued until 0445 when the battalion repulsed the enemy.

After the enemy attack died away with coming of daylight on the 26th it continued to attack into the city, but made only slight gains meeting strong enemy opposition in trying to advance from a spur of Hill 296. On the morning of the 27th the 5th US Marines continued the advancing against relatively light resistance. Overnight the opposition of the previous day had largely vanished. By 1015 hours of the day the 3rd Battalion, 5th US Marines, secured the Seoul Middle School and Hill 79 just to the north of it, and reorganized for the attack toward the Capital Building its major objective. From the Seoul Middle School the battalion advanced due east to Kwang Wha Mun Circle, where the enemy put up their last organized resistance in the heart of the city. A flame-throwing tank clanked across the
large circular plaza and ended this resistance. After tanks had reduced the enemy resistance at Kwang Hwa Mun Circle, G Company, 5th US Marines, advanced without opposition down the boulevard to Government House as fast as they could walk. The company had possession of the building at 1508, and immediately thereafter struck the NK Communists flags flying from the flag poles on either side of the Court of Lions in front of the building and raised in their place the American flag. Then, the battalion cleared the area of snipers and stragglers during the afternoon, and that night the 3rd Battalion established its command post in the building.

During that morning, the 1st Battalion, 5th US Marines, following behind the 3rd Battalion, turned off to the left after reaching the Seoul Middle School and attacked north to Hill 338, a key terrain feature about 1,600 meters north-west of the Capital Building. It secured it at 1900. Now, except for scattered snipers and stragglers, the last defenders of Seoul withdrew from the city that night.

The 1st US Marines: The 1st US Marine Regiment on the morning of 24 September, began crossing the Han River from Yongdungpo in the shadow of Hill 105 South, where the 1st Battalion, 5th US Marines, protected the crossing site. Before dark the regiment had crossed to the north side and the 1st and 2nd Battalions had taken over from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, southern flank of the Marine line at the western edge of Seoul while the 3rd Battalion, 1st US Marines, attacked northward toward the heart of Seoul. Street fighting now began in Seoul, 25 September, in the zone of the 1st US Marines just as the 5th US Marines completed its capture of the enemy defensive hill line at the western edge of the city. When the 1st
Marines turned north on the 25th, ahead of it lay the main Seoul railroad station, the French, American, and Russian consulates, the City Hall, the Dok Soo Palace and Museum of Art, and the main business and hotel area. Nearing heart of Seoul, the 1st and 5th US Marines made plans for a coordinated attack the next morning.

At 2040 hours on the 25th unexpectedly, however, the 1st US Marine Division received orders for the two Marine regiments to continue the attacks the very night.

After receiving the order for the night attack, Colonel Puller ordered the 1st US Marines to prepare attack at 0145 after a 15-minute artillery preparation. At the very moment the artillery preparation was completed, a patrol from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, reported a large enemy force preparing to counterattack. Colonel Puller there upon ordered now another 15-minute artillery barrage to be fired directly in front of the 3rd Battalion.

This second barrage, together with mortar, tank, and automatic fire, caught an estimated force of 700 enemy, supported by twelve tanks, two self-propelled guns, and 120 mm. mortar fire, attacking straight down the main boulevard, and decimated it. Burning buildings illuminated the street scene in front of the 3rd Battalion. The enemy attack continued until daylight on the 26th. After daylight the Marines captured 83 prisoners, counted 250 enemy dead, and saw four tanks and two self-propelled guns knocked out in front of them. Because of the enemy counterattacks against both the 1st and 5th Marine troops during the night, the Marine division did not launch a night attack as ordered by the X US Corps.

After daylight on the 26th the 1st US Marines continued their attack. In a day-long effort down Mapo Boulevard the 2nd Battalion gained less than two kilometers, and very little at all after 1400. Snipers fired from houses along the way and enemy soldiers manned barricades, making of each one a small battlefield.

The battle of the barricades in Seoul continued on 27 September. The 2nd Battalion, 1st US Marines drove into the heart of the city. In the meantime the 1st Battalion, 1st US Marines, captured the Seoul railroad station in the morning in fairly heavy action and then encountered a series of strongly defended barricades along the main street road leading to the center of the city. ROK Marines followed the 1st Battalion, mopping up behind it.

The next day, 28 September, although its 1st Marines swept through the northeast corner of Seoul against only light resistance to complete its occupation. By evening the regiment had taken Hills 132 and 133, at the northeast edge of Seoul, dominating the Seoul – Uijongbu highway.
The 7th Marines: By the afternoon of 24 September Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg's 7th US Marines had moved up on the left flank of the 5th US Marines, and were brought into the fight for Seoul to cut the highway running northeast out of Seoul for Uijongbu at a point about 1,600 meters northeast of the Capital Building. On 26 September D Company of the regiment turned down the Kaesong—Seoul highway toward Seoul, seeking to establish contact with the 5th US Marines on the 7th Marines' right flank, but came under heavy enemy fire at 0830 opposite Prison at the northwest corner of Seoul. The company suffered many casualties there and, unable to advance farther, withdrew to a road out between Hills 296 and 338, and there it established a perimeter defense. That afternoon two planes dropped ammunition and medical supplies to it. Enemy fire hit both planes, and one crash-landed at Kimpo. Friendly tanks succeeded in reaching D Company's perimeter and carried out the wounded. The company was relieved by a tank-led force from the 7th US Marines. On the afternoon of the 27th, the 7th Marines established contact with the 5th Marines.

On 28 September the 7th Marines continued to advance and by evening the regiment had taken its objective, Hill 224, the key terrain feature on the west side of the Kaesong—Seoul highway.

The 7th US Division and the 17th ROK Regiment: At 1800, 19 September, the 7th US Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the zone south of the Seoul highway after the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment, 7th US Division, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 1st US Marines, in position on the right flank south of Seoul highway. Its mission was to secure X Corps' southern flank while the 1st US Marine Division was advancing to capture Seoul.

But on 24 September General Almond, X Corps Commander, brought the 7th US Infantry Division, commanded by Major General David G. Barr, into the battle for the envelopment of the enemy defenses in Seoul, changing division boundaries between the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division. This change was made because the expected capture of Seoul by the Marines was moving behind schedule. The stubborn enemy defense had denied the Marine division any important advance for three days. At this time the 17th ROK Regiment was attached to the 32nd US Infantry Regiment for the attack on Seoul.

The 32nd US Regiment, with the 17th ROK Regiment attached, was to attack across the Han River into Seoul at 0600 on 25 September. The crossing was to be at the Sinsa-ri ferry, about four kilometers east of the main rail and
highway bridges over the Han River. The 32nd US Infantry's mission was first to seize and secure South Mountain (Nam-san or Hill 265) extending from the Han northwest about three kilometers into the heart of Seoul, culminating in a peak 900 feet high and then to secure Hill 120 situated about three kilometers eastward at the southeast edge of Seoul, and finally to seize and secure Hill 348, a large, high hill mass eight kilometers east of Seoul.

At 0600, the 48th US Field Artillery Battalion began firing a 30-minute artillery preparation, and the heavy mortars joined in to pound the cliffs lining the opposite side beyond the river bank. A ground fog obscured the river area. The 2nd Battalion, 32nd US Infantry, reached the north bank without loss of personnel or equipment. The 2nd Battalion hurried across the narrow river beach, scaled the 30- to 60-foot cliffs, and moved rapidly to the slopes of the South Mountain. An hour later the bright morning sun dispersed the ground fog. Air strikes then came in on South Mountain and Hill 120. Apparently this crossing surprised the enemy. Their works on South Mountain were only lightly manned.

The 1st Battalion followed the 2nd across the Han and at 0830 started to move east along the river bank toward Hill 120. Just afternoon the 3rd Battalion crossed the river, followed the 1st Battalion eastward, and passed through it to occupy Hill 120. The 17th ROK Regiment, commanded by Colonel Paik In Yup, crossed the Han immediately behind the 3rd Battalion, 32nd US Infantry, and moved to the extreme right flank of the 32nd Infantry line where, at 2150, it began an all-night attack toward Hill 348.

While the rest of the regiment crossed the Han behind it and moved eastward, the 2nd Battalion climbed the slopes of South Mountain, reaching and clearing the summit against moderate resistance by 1500. Once there, it immediately began digging in on a tight perimeter.

At 0500 on the morning of the 26th a large enemy force, estimated to number approximately 1,000 men supported by tanks, counterattacked the 2nd Battalion perimeters on top of South Mountain. Using all its reserves, the 2nd Battalion finally restored its positions at 0700 after two hours of battle and drove the surviving enemy down the slopes. 110 enemy dead were counted within its perimeter and 284 more outside for a total of 394 enemy killed. The battalion captured 174 prisoners.

Later in the morning, elements of the 1st Battalion also had a sharp engagement in the street immediately north of South Mountain, capturing there some eighty enemy soldiers, apparently remnants of the force that had counterattacked South Mountain.

To the east, the 1st Battalion on the morning of the 26th engaged in a
heavy fire fight while the 3rd Battalion advanced from Hill 120 toward Hill 348. In this advance, L Company saw a large column of enemy troops on the highway leaving Seoul. The company immediately attacked and killed about 500 enemy soldiers, destroyed 5 tanks, destroyed or captured more than 40 vehicles, 3 artillery pieces, 7 machine guns, 2 ammunition dumps, much clothing and POL Products, and overran and captured a large headquarters of corps size.

By midafternoon on the 26th the 17th ROK Regiment had captured Hills 348 and 292 dominating the highway a little over six kilometers east of Seoul. That evening the 32nd US Infantry and the 17th ROK Regiment cleared their zone of the enemy, and established contact with Marines on the regimental left at the western base of South Mountain.

While the great part of X Corps concentrated its strength before Seoul and was preoccupied with its capture, the blocking force of the 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th US Division, almost 50 kilometers south of Seoul, conducted very successful operations. On 23 September, when the 31st Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for Suwon and Suwon Airfield, its mission was
to clear the enemy from Suwon and to seize and hold the high ground south of the airfield. But the regiment troops kept not only the area south of Suwon under close observation, but also advanced as far as Osan to find and destroy the enemy troops of the 105th NK Armored Division which, according to prisoners captured in Suwon, were on their way north to help the Seoul garrison. Near Osan, on 27 September, the regiment's troops encountered the elements of the 105th NK Armored Division, and a heavy fighting ensued. Fighting continued throughout the 27th, with the 31st US Infantry troops making only small gains. While its ground gains were slight, the regiment claimed the destruction or immobilization of 14 tanks, 6 antitank guns, and several mortars, and the infliction of 300 enemy casualties. During the day the regimental S-3, Major Olson, and the 2nd Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Summers, were both seriously wounded.

On 30 September the 1st US Marine Division assumed responsibility for the 32nd US Infantry zone in Seoul and that unit then crossed back to the south side of the Han River.

The Result of the Inchon—Seoul Operation: On 26 September, General MacArthur released United Nations Command Communiqué 9 at 1410 hours announcing the restoration of Seoul. The communiqué said in part, "Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea, is again in friendly hands. United Nations forces, including the 17th Regiment of the ROK Army and elements of the 7th US Infantry and 1st Marine Divisions, have completed the envelopment and seizure of the city."

But sharp engagements continued in the charred and ruined capital for several more days. The enemy defenders had been reinforced by the Communist units, which had been fighting along the Naktong Perimeter. However, Seoul was captured before the other Communist units could reach the area.

On 29 September, at a ceremony in blackened capital building, General MacArthur, who flew from Tokyo in the morning, welcomed President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea back to Seoul and turned over to him and his government the discharge of civil responsibilities.

With the capture of Seoul, the UN forces commanded the railroads and major highway supplying communist troops around the Naktong Perimeter. Caught between the X Corps and the Eighth Army, and swindling sources of supply, the ultimate fate of the NK Communist divisions could be foreseen.

The Seoul operation disclosed that the preinvasion estimate of 5,000
organized troops in the city was low and that, instead, there were approximately 8,000 such troops in Seoul and 5,000 more in the Yongdungpo area. Reinforcements after the landing at Inchon brought the total enemy troops in Seoul to at least 20,000. And there were at least 10,000 enemy soldiers between the Han River and Suwon. Below Suwon in the Osan area there were from 2,000 to 3,000 more. It appears that altogether some what more than 30,000 enemy forces entered battle in the Inchon—Suwon—Seoul area, and that there were perhaps 10,000 more miscellaneous soldiers in the vicinity, uncommitted or who arrived too late to be used. The X US Corps reported 7,000 NK prisoners taken in the fighting and estimated enemy troops killed at 14,000.

The 1st US Marine Division did not lose a single tank to enemy tank action in the Seoul operation but lost several to enemy infantry action. An accurate count of the enemy tank destroyed in the X Corps operation is hard to make,
but it appears that approximately 45 to 50 were destroyed in the Incheon—Yongdungpo—Seoul area and about 10 to 15 more in the Suwon—Osan area, or about 60 altogether. The enemy lost a great amount of other military equipment in the Seoul operation. The 1st Marine Division alone reported that it had destroyed or captured 23 120-mm, mortars, 19 45-mm. antitank guns, 56 heavy machine guns, 337 light and submachine guns, 59 14.5 antitank rifles, and 7,543 rifles.

The Incheon—Seoul victory cost the UN forces approximately 3,500 casualties. The 7th US Division suffered 572 battle casualties, including 106 killed, 409 wounded, and 57 missing in action. Of the total, 166 were ROK soldiers integrated into the division. Within the division, the 32nd Regiment lost 66 killed, 272 wounded, and 47 missing. The heaviest losses in the X Corps occurred in the 1st US Marine Division which suffered total casualties of 2,383 men—364 killed, 53 who died of wounds, 1,061 wounded, and 5 missing. Marine losses were heaviest for the six days from 21 to 27 September. During that time it suffered 1,482 battle casualties, the greatest single day’s loss being 285 on 24 September.

Section 3. The Breakout from the Naktong Perimeter

General MacArthur’s master plan for ending the Korean War envisioned a massive offensive by the Eighth US Army to coincide with the landings at Incheon. The UN troops within the Naktong Perimeter would breakout, drive north, and link up with the X Corps in Seoul, while the enemy forces were smashed between the two friendly armies.

To take advantage of the morale boost word of the successful landing would bring to the UN troops, the breakout offensive was delayed until 0900 on 16 September. It was also hoped by the UN Command that the enemy would be demoralized by the news, but evidence indicates that the NK Communist High Command concealed word of the landing from their men fighting on the Naktong Perimeter.

The Eighth Army Plan

The Eighth Army plan of attack was simple. It sets the hour for attack by UN and ROK forces in the Naktong Perimeter at 0900, 16 September, one
day after the Inchon landing. The Eighth US and the ROK Armies were to attack "from present bridgehead with main effort directed along the Taegu—Kimchon—Taejon—Suwon axis," to destroy the enemy force "on line of advance," and to effect a "junction with X US Corps."

The plan required the I US Corps, which was newly formed on 2 August and became operational on 13 September, to strive for the main breakthrough from the center of the perimeter. The plan called for the 1st US Cavalry Division and the 5th US Regimental Combat Team (RCT) to seize a bridgehead over Naktong River near Waegwan. The 24th US Division would then cross the river and drive Kimchon—Taejon, followed by the 1st US Cavalry Division which would patrol its rear and lines of communications. While this breakthrough attempt was in progress, the 25th and 2nd US Infantry Divisions in the south on the army left and the II and I ROK Corps on the east and right flank were to attack and fix the enemy troops in their zone and to exploit any local breakthrough.

Supplementing the 5th US RCT’s mission of establishing a bridgehead across the Naktong, the 2nd and 24th US Divisions were to strive for crossing of the river below Waegwan and the 1st ROK Division above it.

Situation of the Opposing Forces

The situation at the Naktong Perimeter did not afford General Walker an opportunity to concentrate a large force for the breakout effort in the center. The enemy held the initiative and his attacks pinned down all divisions under Eighth Army command except one, the 24th US Infantry Division, which General Walker was able to move piecemeal from the east to center only on the eve of the projected attack. The problem was to change suddenly from the precarious defensive to the offensive without reinforcement or opportunity to create a striking force. In theater perspective, Eighth Army would make a holding attack while the X Corps made the envelopment. A prompt link-up with the X Corps along the Taejon—Suwon axis was a prerequisite for cutting off a large force of the enemy in the southwestern part of Korea.

Most Eighth Army staff officers were none too hopeful that the army could break out with the forces available. And to increase their concern in September, critical shortages began to appear in Eighth Army’s supplies, including artillery ammunition. But, despite these misgivings, General Walker and his Chief of Staff, Major General Leven C. Allen, believed that
if the Inchon landing succeeded Eighth Army could assume the offensive and break through the enemy forces encircling it. For this reason, General Walker had requested that the Eighth Army attack not begin until the day after the Inchon landing.

The Enemy Strength: Although it is not possible to state precisely the strength of the NK Communist units facing Eighth Army in mid-September and the state of their equipment, an examination of prisoner of war interrogations and captured documents reveals that it was far less than Eighth Army thought it was. The Chief of Staff, 13th NK Division, Col. Lee Hak Ku, gave the strength of that division as 2,300 men (not counting 2,000 untrained and unarmed replacements not considered as a part of the division) instead of the 8,000 carried in the Eighth Army estimate. The 15th NK Division, practically annihilated by this time, numbered no more than a few hundred scattered and disorganized men instead of the 7,000 men in the Eighth Army estimate. Also, the 5th NK Division was down to about 5,000 men instead of the 6,500, and the 7th NK Division was down to about 4,000 men instead of the 7,600 accorded it by the Eighth Army estimate. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd NK Divisions almost certainly did not begin to approach the strength of 7,000—8,000 men each in mid-September accorded to them in the estimate.

Enemy losses were exceedingly heavy in the first half of September. No one can accurately say just what they were. Perhaps the condition of the NK Communist army can best be glimpsed from a captured enemy daily battled report, dated 14 September, and apparently for a battalion of the 7th NK Division. The report shows that the enemy battalion on 14 September had 6 officers, 34 noncommissioned officers, and 111 privates for a total of 151 men. There were 82 individual weapons in the unit: 3 pistols, 9 carbines, 57 rifles, and 13 automatic rifles. There was an average of somewhat more than 1 grenade for every 2 men—a total of 92 grenades. The unit still had 6 light machine guns but less than 300 rounds of ammunition for each.

A fair estimate of enemy strength facing Eighth Army at the Perimeter in mid-September would be about 70,000 men. Enemy equipment, far below the Eighth Army's 75 percent estimate of a few days earlier particularly in heavy weapons and tanks, was probably no more than 50 percent of the original equipment.

Morale in the enemy was at a low point. No more than 30 percent of the original troops of the divisions remained. These veterans tried to impose discipline on the recruits, most of whom were from the Republic of Korea and had no desire to fight for the enemy. It was common practice in the enemy at
General Counteroffensive

this time for the veterans to shoot anyone who showed reluctance to go forward when ordered or who tried to desert. Food was scarce, and undernourishment was the most frequently mentioned cause of low morale by prisoners. Even so, there had been few desertions up to this time because the men were afraid the UN forces would kill them if they surrendered and that their own officers would shoot them if they made the attempt.

The Friendly Strength: Standing opposite approximately 70,000 NK Communist soldiers at the Naktong Perimeter in mid-September were 140,000 men in the combat units of the US Eighth and ROK Armies. These comprised four US divisions with an average of 15,000 men each for a total of more than 60,000 men, to which more than 9,000 attached ROK Army recruits must be added, and six ROK divisions averaging about 10,000 men each with a total of approximately 60,000 men. The three corps headquarters added at least another 10,000 men, and if the two army headquarters were counted the total would be more than 15,000 men. The major UN units had an assigned strength at this time as follows:

The Eighth US Army .................................................. 84,478
  I Corps .......................................................... 7,475
    (plus attached Koreans, 1,110)
  1st Cavalry Division ........................................ 13,904
    (plus attached Koreans, 2,338)
  24th Division ............................................... 16,356
    (plus attached Koreans, 2,786)
  2nd Division .............................................. 15,191
    (plus attached Koreans, 1,821)
  25th Division .......................................... 15,334
    (plus attached Koreans, 2,447)
  Army headquarters and others ....................... 14,525
  27th British Infantry Brigade .................... 1,693

The ROK Army ......................................................... 72,730

Since it marked a turning point in the Korean War, the middle of September 1950 is a good time to sum up the cost in American casualties thus far. From the beginning of the war to 15 September 1950, American battle casualties totaled 19,165 men. Of this number, 4,280 men were killed in action, 12,377 were wounded, of whom 319 died of wounds, 401 were reported captured, and 2,107 were reported missing in action. The first fifteen days of September brought higher casualties than any other 15-day period in the war, before or afterward, indicating the severity of the fighting at that time.

The above cited analysis of the strength of the two opposing forces must
give a considerable numerical superiority to the UN Command.

In the matter of supporting armor, artillery, and heavy weapons and the availability of ammunition for these weapons, the UN Command had an even greater superiority than in troops, despite the rationing of ammunition for most artillery and heavy weapons. Weapon fire power superiority was probably about six to one over the NK Communist forces. In the air the US Far East Air Forces had no rival over the battleground, and on the flanks at sea the UN naval forces held unchallenged control.

The UN Forces Begin the Breakout

The I US Corps, commanded by Major General Frank W. Milburn, was given the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 24th US Infantry Division, the 1st ROK Division, the 5th US Regimental Combat Team, the 27th British Infantry Brigade, plus supporting troops. The 2nd and 25th US Infantry Divisions on the south were to remain under Army control until 23 September, at which date they would come under a newly organized IX Corps headquarters. The ROK Divisions remained under their Corps although they were now fighting under the operational control of the Eighth Army.

In short, as of 15 September, D-1, the line of contact along the Naktong River Perimeter ran generally from Chindong-ni on the south coast, north to Hahoe-dong — southeast to Angang — east to the seacoast to the vicinity of Pohang. That day the friendly Order of Battle from south to north, then east was: The 25th US Division, the 2nd US Division, the 27th British Brigade, the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 1st ROK Division, the 6th ROK Division, the Capital ROK Division, the 3rd ROK Division, with the 7th ROK Division behind the 8th ROK Division, and the 24th US Division in reserve.

At 0900, 16 September, H-Hour for the breakout, there was little change in the battlefront. Under dark skies and heavy rains the two opposing forces were still locked in close combat, and in many places the NK Communist troops were yet attacking. Instead of jumping off in assault, many American units were on the defensive, repelling assaults of the enemy.

The 2nd US Division: The most spectacular success of 16 September, the first day of the attack, occurred in the 2nd US Division zone. There, west of Yongsan and Changnyong, the 2nd US Division launched a 3-regiment attack with the 9th US Infantry on the left, the 23rd US Infantry in the center, and the 38th US Infantry on the right. Its first mission was to drive the 4th, 9th, and 2nd NK Divisions back across the Naktong. The attack on the left failed
as the enemy continued to hold Hill 201 against all attacks of the 9th US Infantry. In the center, a vicious enemy predawn attack penetrated the perimeter of C Company, 23rd US Infantry, and caused twenty-five casualties.

On the 15th, the 3rd Battalion had returned to regimental control from attachment to the 1st US Cavalry Division, and because it had not been involved in the preceding two weeks of heavy fighting, the 23rd US Regimental Commander, Colonel Freemen, assigned it the main attack effort in his regimental zone. After the early morning attack on the 15th was repulsed the 3rd Battalion moved out at 1000 in attack, with C Company of the 72nd Tank Company in support. Enemy resistance was stubborn and effective until about midafternoon when the enemy began to vacate their positions and fled toward the Naktong. To take advantage of such a break in the fighting, a special task force was committed for the purpose of advancing rapidly to cut off the enemy forces. From about 1600 hours until dark, this task force with its heavy volume of automatic fire cut down large numbers of fleeing enemy along the river. (See Situation Map 5, Appendix VI.)

The 38th US Infantry on the right kept pace with the 23rd US Infantry in the center. The Air Force napalmed, rocketed, and strafed just ahead of the

Pontoon treadway bridge across the Naktong, built in thirty-six hours.
38th US Infantry, contributing heavily to the 2nd Battalion’s capture of Hill 208 overlooking the Nakto River. Fighter planes operating in the afternoon caught and strafe large groups of enemy withdrawing toward the west of Changnyong. That night the 2nd NK Division command post withdrew across the river, followed by the 4th, 6th, and 17th NK Regiments and the division artillery regiment. Their crossing continued into the next day.

The fleeing enemy troops abandoned large quantities of equipment and weapons. General Allen, Eighth Army Chief of Staff, in a telephone conversation with Major General Hickey, Chief of Staff, the UN Command, on the evening the 17th said, “Things down here are ripe for something to break. We have not had a single counterattack all day.”

On 18 September, in the morning hours, patrols of the 38th US Regiment crossed the Nakto near Pungong-ni due west of Changnyong, and found the high ground on the west side of the river clear of enemy troops. Colonel Peploe, the Regimental Commander, decided to move one battalion across the river to secure a bridgehead. The 2nd US Division approved the crossing.

Before 1600, the 2nd Battalion, the 38th US Regiment, had crossed the 100-yard-wide and 12-foot-deep current. Two hours later the leading elements secured Hill 308 about one and a half kilometers west of the Nakto, dominating the Chogye road, against only light resistance. This quick crossing clearly had surprised the enemy. From Hill 308 the troops observed an estimated enemy battalion about one kilometer west.

Striking the disorganized enemy by surprise, the advance companies took more than a hundred prisoners, including a major and seven other officers. They also captured more than a hundred tons of ammunition, and many arms.

The 38th US Infantry’s crossing of the Nakto by the 2nd Battalion on 18 September was the first permanent crossing of the river by any unit of Eighth Army in the breakout, and it was the most important event of the day. The crossing was two days ahead of division schedule.

On the 19th the 3rd Battalion, 38th US Regiment, crossed the river, together with some tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars. The 3rd Battalion was to protect the bridgehead while the 2nd Battalion pushed forward against the enemy.

By the end of the 18th, the 2nd US Division had regained control of the ground in its sector east of Nakto River except the Hill 201 area in the south and Hill 409 along its northern boundary. However, on the 19th, the 9th US Infantry Regiment finally managed to drive the enemy from the heights
with help from the 23rd US Regiment. Now, the way was open for the 2nd US Division crossing of the Naktong. And by noon of the 20th the 3rd Battalion, 23rd US Regiment had captured Hill 227, the critical terrain dominating the Sangpo ferry, the crossing site, on the west side. Thus, on 23 September, the 23rd US Regiment gained Sinban-ni across the Naktong, and was ready then to join the 38th US Regiment in a converging movement on Hyopchon.

On the next road northward above the 23rd US Regiment, the 38th US Regiment had hard fighting against strong enemy delaying forces as it attacked toward Chogye and Hyopchon. An air strike with napalm and fragmentation bombs helped its 2nd Battalion on 21 September break enemy resistance on Hill 239, the critical terrain overlooking Chogye. The next day the battalion entered the town in the early afternoon.

The 5th US Regimental Combat Team: The 5th US Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was detached from the 24th US Division and attached to the 1st US Cavalry Division on 14 September. It went into an assembly area west of Taegu along the east bank of the Naktong River about ten kilometers below Waegwan and prepared for action. On 16 September it moved out to begin an operation that was to prove of great importance to the Eighth Army breakout. On the 16th only the 2nd Battalion engaged the enemy as it attacked north along the Naktong River road toward Waegwan. But by the end of the second day the 3rd Battalion had joined in the battle and 1st Battalion was deployed to enter it.

On the 18th, as the 38th Regiment, 2nd US Division, crossed the Naktong, the 5th US Regimental Combat Team began its full regimental attack against Hill 268, southeast of Waegwan.

An estimated 1,200 soldiers of the 3rd NK Division, supported by tanks, defended this southern approach to Waegwan. The hills there constituted the left flank of the II NK Corps. If the enemy lost this ground their advanced positions in the 5th US Cavalry zone eastward along the Taegu highway would become untenable. The tactical importance of Hill 268 and related positions was made the greater by reason of the gap in the enemy line to the south. At the lower side of this gap the 27th British Infantry Brigade held vital blocking positions just above strong forces of the 10th NK Division.

In hard fighting all day the 5th US RCT gained Hill 268, except for its northeast slope. By night the 3rd Battalion was on the hill, the 1st Battalion had turned northwest from it toward another enemy position, and the 2nd Battalion had captured Hill 121, south of Waegwan along the river road. Air
strikes, destructive and demoralizing to the enemy, had paced the regimental advance all the way. In this important action along the east bank of the Naktong, the 5th US Cavalry and part of the 7th US cavalry protected the 5th US RCT’s right flank and fought very heavy battles coordinated with the combat team on the adjoining hills east of Waegwan. At 1800 that evening, 18 September, the 5th US RCT and the 6th US Medium Tank Battalion reverted to 24th US Division control. The 5th US RCT continued to press forward. The 2nd Battalion entered Waegwan at 1415. Fifteen minutes later it joined forces there with the 1st Battalion. After surprising an enemy group laying a mine field in front of it, the 2nd Battalion penetrated deeper into Waegwan and had passed through the town by 1530.

On 19 September the 3rd NK Division defenses around Waegwan broke apart and the division began a panicstricken retreat across the river. At 0900 aerial observers reported an estimated 1,500 enemy troops crossing to the west side of the Naktong just north of Waegwan, and in the afternoon they reported roads north of Waegwan jammed with enemy groups of sizes varying from 10 to 300 men pouring out of the town. By midafternoon observers reported enemy soldiers in every draw and pass north of Waegwan. During the day the 5th US RCT captured 22 45-mm. antitank guns, 10 82-mm. mortars, 6 heavy machine guns, and approximately 250 rifles and burp guns.

On 20 September the 5th US RCT captured the last of its objectives east of the Naktong River when its 2nd Battalion on the afternoon seized important Hill 303 north of Waegwan. In securing its objectives, the 5th US RCT suffered numerous casualties during the day—18 men killed, 111 wounded, and 3 missing in action. At 1945 that evening the 1st Battalion started crossing the river above the Waegwan railroad bridge. By midnight it had completed the crossing and advanced westward. The 2nd Battalion followed the 1st Battalion across the river and dug in on the west side before midnight. During the day the 3rd Battalion captured Hill 300, a little over six kilometer north of Waegwan. The following afternoon, 21 September, after the 2nd Battalion, 5th US Cavalry, relieved it on position, the 3rd Battalion crossed the Naktong. The 5th US RCT found large stores of enemy ammunition and rifles on the west side of the river.

The 5th US RCT in five days had enunched the entire right flank and part of the center of the 3rd NK Division. This rendered untenable the enemy division’s advanced positions on the road to Taegu where it was locked in heavy fighting with the 5th US Cavalry Regiment.
From 18 to 21 September, close air support reached its highest peak in the Korean War. Fighters and bombers returned several times a day from Japanese bases to napalm, bomb, rocket, and strafe enemy strongpoints of resistance and to cut down fleeing enemy troops caught in the open.

The 24th US Division: The unexpected crossing to the Naktong River on 18 September by the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Regiment, 2nd US Division, farther south did not alter the Eighth Army plan which called for the 24th US Division to make the 1st crossing of the Naktong.

On 18 September the 21st Regiment, the 24th US Division, began a crossing in the vicinity of the Hasan-dong ferry due west of Taegu. The 5th US RCT had just cleared the ground northward and secured the crossing site against enemy action from east side of the river. In getting up to the crossing site, however, the 21st US Regiment took all day long because it had to cross one of the Naktong River's tributaries, the Kumho River, that arched around Taegu. On the early morning of the 19th when the first wave landed on the west bank of the Naktong and started inland, almost at once enemy machine gun fire from both flanks caught the troops in a crossfire. And now enemy mortar and artillery fire began falling on both sides of the river. The heaviest fire, as expected, came from Hill 174 dominating the crossing site. The 1st Battalion, continuing its crossing under fire, suffered about 120 casualties in getting across the river. On the west side the 1st Battalion reorganized and, supported by air napalm and strafing strikes, attacked and captured Hill 174 by noon. During the night and the following morning all three battalions crossed the Naktong. The 1st Battalion on 20 September advanced north to Hill 170, the high ground on the west side of the river opposite Waegwan, while the 3rd Battalion occupied the higher hill 1,600 meters northwestward.

Meanwhile, about three kilometers south of the 21st US Infantry crossing site, the 2nd Battalion, 19th US Infantry, began crossing the Naktong at 1600 on the afternoon of the 19th and was on the west side by evening. Once across the river, the battalion encountered only light resistance.

By 20 September the 19th US Infantry had consolidated its hold on the high ground west of the river along the Songju road.

On 20 September I US Corps attached the 27th British Brigade to the 24th US Division and it prepared to cross the Naktong and take part in the division's attack. Relieved in its position by the 2nd Battalion, 7th US Cavalry Regiment, the brigade moved north to the 19th US Infantry crossing site and shortly afternoon started crossing. Thus, on 20 September, all three
regiments of the 24th US Division and the attached 27th British Brigade were across the Naktong River. The 5th US RCT held the high ground north of the Waegwan—Kimchon highway, the 21st US Infantry that to the south of it, the 19th US Regiment was below the 21st US Regiment ready to move up behind and support it, and the 24th US Reconnaissance Company was probing the Songju road west of Naktong with the British brigade preparing to advance west on that axis. By 22 September the division had been ready to attack west along the main Taegu—Kimchon—Taejon—Seoul highway. Its immediate objective was to drive straight northwest to Kimchon, headquarters of the NK Communist forces. The 5-day operation of the division beginning on 18 September left little to be desired.

The 1st US Cavalry Division: Major General Gay’s plan for the 1st US Cavalry Division in the breakout effort was (1) to protect the right flank of the 5th US Regimental Combat Team as it drove on Waegwan by having the 5th US Cavalry attack and hold the enemy troops in its zone of the Waegwan—Taegu highway; (2) to maintain pressure by the 8th US Cavalry on the enemy in the Chilgok area north of Taegu, and be prepared on order to make a maximum effort to drive north to Tabu-dong; and (3) the 7th US Cavalry on order to shift, by successive battalion movement, from the division right flank to the left flank and make a rapid encirclement of the enemy over a trail and secondary road between Waegwan and Tabu-dong. If the plan worked, the 7th and 8th US Cavalry Regiments would meet at Tabu-dong and enclose a large number of enemy troops in Waegwan—Taegu—Tabu-dong triangle. General Gay started shifting forces from right to left on 16 September by moving the 2nd Battalion, 7th US Cavalry, to Hill 188 in the 5th US Cavalry area.

North of Taegu on the Tabu-dong road enemy units of the 13th NK Division fought the 8th US Cavalry to a standstill during the first three days of the offensive. The enemy attacked the 2nd Battalion repeatedly on Hill 570, the dominating height east of the mountain corridor. West of the road, the 3rd Battalion made limited gains in high hills closer to Taegu. The enemy had some formidable defenses on either side of the Tabu-dong road. On the 19th one battalion of the 7th US Cavalry was attached to the 8th US Cavalry to attack Tabu-dong. This attempt was also frustrated by the 13th NK Division. Enemy artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons crossfire from Hill 902 east of the road and high ground of Hill 351 west of it turned back the regiment with heavy casualties. On 20 September the 70th Tank Battalion lost seven tanks in this fight.
Along the Waegwan-Taegu road at the beginning of the UN offensive on 16 September, the 5th US Cavalry attacked enemy positions, centering on Hills 203 and 174 north of the road and Hill 188 opposite and south of it. Approximately 1,000 men of the 8th Regiment, 3rd NK Division, held these key positions. For three days the enemy on Hill 203 repulsed every attempt to storm it. In the fighting, the 70th US Tank Battalion lost nine tanks and one tank dozer to enemy action on 17 and 18 September. Finally, on 18 September, Hill 203 fell to the 5th Cavalry, but the enemy continued to resist from the hills northwest of it, their strongest forces being on Hill 253. The 7th Cavalry, joined in the battle, suffered very heavy casualties. At the close of 18 September the 3rd NK Division still held the hill mass centering on Hills 253 and 371.

The battle on the hills east of Waegwan reached a climax on the 19th when the 1st Battalion, 5th US Cavalry, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th US Cavalry, engaged in very heavy fighting with enemy on Hill 300 and 253. Elements of the 5th US Cavalry finally gained the crest of Hill 300. On that hill the 1st Battalion alone suffered 207 battle casualties. The 5th US Cavalry’s seizure of the 300 and 253 hill mass dominating the Taegu road about five kilometers southeast of Waegwan unquestionably helped the 5th RCT to capture Waegwan on the 19th.

During the 19th General Gay started maneuvering his forces for the encirclement movement, now that the hard fighting east of Waegwan had at last made it possible. The 7th US Cavalry moved out toward Tabu-dong. The progress was so slow.

On the morning of 21 September, however, the 1st Battalion, 7th US Cavalry, managed to arrive at the edge of Tabu-dong at 1255. There it encountered enemy resistance, but in a pincer movement from southwest and northwest cleared the village by 1635. An hour later the battalion moved out of Tabu-dong down the Taegu road in attack southward toward the 8th US Cavalry Regiment.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 7th US Cavalry, also arrived at Tabu-dong and turned north to deploy its troops in defensive positions on both sides of the road.

The 1st ROK Division: The 1st ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, was attached to I US Corps when the newly activated corps became operational at 1200, 13 September.

On 16 September, the first day of the offensive, the 15th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division advanced to the right of the enemy strongpoint on Hill 902
north of Taegu in a penetration of the enemy line. This was the one of the significant gains made on the first day, after the division had been striving to hold off the 13th and 1st NK Divisions in Tabu-dong area for nearly a month.

While the 1st US Cavalry Division was attempting to reach Tabu-dong area, the 1st ROK Division on the right of the 1st Cavalry Division made impressive gains. The 12th Regiment of the ROK division found a gap in the enemy positions in the high mountains and, plunging through it, reached a point on the Tabu-dong — Kunwi road 16 kilometers northeast of Tabu-dong, and approximately over 20 kilometers beyond the most advanced units of the 1st Cavalry Division. There the ROK troops were in the rear of the main body of the 1st and 13th NK Divisions and in a position to cut off one of their main lines of retreat. This deep penetration caused the 1st NK Division on 19 September to withdraw its 2nd and 14th Regiments from the southern slopes of Hill 902 to defend against the new threat.

By 21 September when elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division entered Tabu-dong, elements of the 1st ROK Division had cut the Sangju road above Tabu-dong and were attacking south toward the village. The 12th ROK Regiment, farthest advanced, had a roadblock about 12 kilometers to the northeast below Kunwi. It appeared certain that the operations of the 1st ROK Division and the 1st Cavalry Division had cut off large number of the 3rd, 13th, and 1st NK Divisions in the mountains north of Taegu. On 22 September, the

40-mm. antiaircraft battery attached to the 1st ROK Division fighting north of Tabu-dong.
11th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division and units of the ROK National Police captured Hill 902, and elements of the 15th ROK Regiment reached Tabudong from north to link up with the 1st Cavalry Division.

The Right Flank: In the mountainous area of the II ROK Corps the 8th NK Division was exhausted and the 15th practically destroyed. The ROK divisions were near exhaustion, too, but their strength was greater than enemy’s and the ROK division began to move north on the 16th. The 6th ROK Division attacked against the 8th NK Division and in a 4-day battle destroyed the division as a combat force. The survivors fled north toward Yechon in disorder. By 21 September the 6th ROK Division was advancing north of Uihung with little opposition.

Eastward, the 8th ROK Division, once it had gathered itself together and begun to move northward, found little resistance because the opposing 15th NK Division had been practically annihilated.

In the Kigye—Angang-ni—Kyongju area of the I ROK Corps sector, units of the Capital Division fought their way through the streets of Angang-ni on 16 September. Beyond it, the 3rd ROK Division had moved up to the north bank of the Hyongsan-gang just below Pohang. On the 17th a battalion of the 7th ROK Division, advancing from the west, established contact with elements of the Capital Division and closed the 2-week-old gap between the II ROK Corps and the I US Corps.

On 22 September the Capital ROK Division regained Kigye. The 12th NK Division fled northward fighting delaying actions. The ROK troops then pursued the enemy’s withdrawal toward Andong.

On the morning of 20 September the 3rd ROK Division finally captured Pohang. One regiment drove on through the town to the high ground north of it. And in the succeeding days of 21 and 22 September the 3rd ROK Division continued strong attack northward, supported by naval gunfire and fighter planes, capturing Hunghae, and driving the 5th NK Division back on Yongdok in disorder.

The Left Flank: At the left flank in Masan area, H-hour on 16 September found the 25th US Division still fighting enemy forces behind its lines, and the enemy appeared stronger than ever on the heights of Battle Mountain, Pilbong, and Sobuk-san. The division could advance along the road toward Chinju only when the mountainous center of the division front was clear of the enemy. The 27th US Infantry on the left and the 35th US Infantry on the right, astride the road between Chinju and Masan, could do little more than mark time until the situation in front of the 24th Infantry, which had been
kept under the enemy's daily attack from the heights, improved.

On the 17th and 18th, a composite battalion sized task force from the 35th US Regiment repeatedly attacked the enemy-held heights of Battle Mountain and Pil-bong with the mission of restoring the 24th US Regiment positions. Enemy automatic fire from the heights drove back the attacking troops every time with heavy casualties. Strange enough, however, on 19 September it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned the crest of Battle Mountain, and the 1st Battalion, 24th US Infantry, moved up and occupied it. On the right, the 35th US Infantry began moving forward. On 20 September the 1st Battalion, 35th US Infantry, captured Chungam-ni, and the 2nd Battalion captured the long ridge line running northwest from it to the Nam River.

On 21 September the 35th US Infantry Regiment captured the well-known Notch about five kilometers southwest of Chungam-ni, and then swept westward past the Muchon-ni road fork, to the high ground at the Chinju pass. At the same time, the 24th and 27th US Regiments in the center and on the division left advanced, slowed only by the rugged terrain.

The enemy in front of the 25th US Division in the center and on the right had started his withdrawal the night of 18–19 September. The 7th NK Division withdrew from the south of the Nam River while the 6th NK Division sideslipped elements to cover the entire front. Covered by the 6th NK Division the 7th NK Division had crossed to the north side of the Nam River by the morning of the 19th. Then the 6th NK Division had withdrawn from its positions on Sobuk-san.

The effect of the Inchon landing and the battles around Seoul on enemy action at the Naktong Perimeter from 19 September onward was clearly apparent. By that date the NK Communist forces began to withdraw their main forces committed in the south and start them moving northward. By 23 September this enemy retrograde movement was in full swing everywhere around the Perimeter. This in itself is proof of the theater-wide military effectiveness of the Inchon landing. And on 22 September General Walker issued an order long awaited by the Eighth Army: Pursue and destroy the enemy.

Section 4. Pursuit and Exploitation

The NK Communist army was everywhere in retreat from the Naktong
Perimeter by 23 September. The enemy's general withdrawal clearly indicated that the breakout effort by the Eighth Army was successful in the wake of the success in the Inchon landing.

Quickly taking the advantage of enemy collapse in the Naktong front, General Walker, on 22 September, issued his order for the pursuit.

The order called for a full-scale offensive: I US Corps to continue to make the main effort along the Taegu—Kimchon—Taejon—Suwon axis and to effect a juncture with X Corps; the 2nd US Division to launch an unlimited objective attack along the Hyopchon—Kochang—Anui—Chonju—Kanggyong axis; the 25th US Division on the army's southern flank to seize Chinju and to destroy the enemy in its zone by deep penetrations and enveloping maneuvers. The very fact that General Walker had also told his commanders to advance without regard for their flank security was an indication of how complete he considered the enemy collapse to be.

On 23 September, another newly born corps, IX US Corps, became operational with Major General John B. Coulter as its commander, and attached the 2nd and 25th US Divisions to it. At the same time the Eighth Army Headquarters moved from Pusan back to Taegu.

By this time, fortunately, UN reinforcements had begun arriving in Korea. On 19 September the Philippines 10th Infantry Battalion Combat Team began unloading at Pusan, and on 22 September the 65th US Regiment Combat Team started unloading there. The next day Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital personnel arrived at Pusan.

The pursuit phase of the breakout operation is described by major corridors of advance. It must be remembered, however, that the various movements were going on simultaneously all around the Perimeter.

The 25th US Division: The 25th US Division had to seize Chinju first to carry out the Eighth Army's order. General Kean employed three attacking units to make a convergent attack to Chinju from three separate directions—the 27th US Regiment from the division's north flank; the 35th US Regiment from the center; and a special task force under Captain Torman, commanding officer of the 25th US Reconnaissance Company, from the division's south flank. (See Situation Map 6, Appendix VI.)

On the morning of 24 September Task Force Torman attacked along the coastal road toward Chinju. North of Sachon the task force engaged and dispersed about 200 enemy soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, 104th NK Security Regiment. By evening it had seized the high ground at the road juncture about four and a half kilometers south of Chinju. The next morning the task force
attacked to the Nam River bridge which crossed into Chinju. In the action Captain Torman was wounded and had to be evacuated.

Meanwhile on the main inland road to Chinju the 6th NK Division delayed the 35th US Infantry at the Chinju pass until the evening of 23 September, when enemy covering units withdrew. The next day the 35th US Infantry consolidated its position at the pass. On the 25th in the early morning the 2nd Battalion of the 35th US Infantry crossed the Nam downstream from the Nam River bridge and then attacked and seized Chinju, supported by tank fire from Task Force Torman across the river. About 300 enemy troops, using mortar and artillery fire, served as a delaying force in defending the town. The 3rd and 1st Battalions crossed the river into Chinju in the af-
General Counteroffensive

In the meantime the 27th US Regiment had been delayed in crossing the Nam River. Engineer troops had to work all day on the 25th constructing a sandbag ford across the Nam River. Before dawn of the 26th the 1st Battalion, 27th US Regiment, crossed the Nam. Once on the north bank, elements of the regiment attacked toward Uiryong and secured the town just before noon after overcoming an enemy force that defended it with small arms and mortar fire. The Regiment pressed on the Chinju against negligible resistance on 28 September.

On 24 September, to execute unlimited objective attacks to seize Chonju and Kanggyong, Major General Kean organized two main task forces with armored support centered about the 24th and 35th US Regiments. The leading elements of these two task forces were known respectively as Task Force Matthews and Task Force Dolvin. Both forces were to start their drives from Chinju. Task Force Matthews, the lefthand column, was to proceed west toward Hadong and there turn northwest to Kurye, Namwon, Sunchang, Kimje, Iri, and Kunsan on the Kum River estuary. Taking off at the same time, Task Force Dolvin, the righthand column, was to drive north out of Chonju toward Hamyang, there turn west to Namwon, and proceed northwest to Chonju, Iri, and Kanggyong on the Kum River.

The Task Force Matthews, formerly Task Force Torman, started its attack on 27 September. The 3rd Battalion, 24th US Regiment, followed Task Force Matthews, and the rest of the regiment came behind of it. The task force reached Hadong at 1730. From Hadong the attack turned northwest toward Kurye. About 16 kilometers above Hadong at little village of Komdu the advanced elements of the task force liberated eleven American prisoners. They had belonged to the 3rd Battalion, 29th US Infantry Regiment. On 28 September the task force entered Namwon, and there, found 86 American prisoners. Most of the prisoners were bare-footed and in tatters, and all were obviously half starved. It was apparent the enemy in the town forgot to take them in their hurry to escape.

While Task Force Matthews was in Namwon, Task Force Dolvin arrived there from the east. Task Force Matthews remained overnight in Namwon, but the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry, which followed close behind, continued on toward Chongup, which was secured at noon, 29 September. The battalion also secured Iri that evening. On 30 September the battalion secured Kunsan without opposition.

Task Force Dolvin and the 35th US Regiment, righthand column, moved around the eastern and northern sides of all but impenetrable Chiri-san area,
just as the 24th Infantry had passed around its southern and western sides. Task Force Dolvin moved out of Chinju at 0600, 26 September on the road northwest toward Hamyang, the retreat route taken the main body of the 6th NK Division. The tank-infantry task force had two teams, A and B, each formed of an infantry company and a tank company.

The task force’s advance was slowed because it struck enemy mines along the road to Hamyang. Engineers had to remove them. The enemy ahead of the task force blew all the bridges over which the tanks had to pass.

Continuing its advance at first light on the 28th, Task Force Dolvin an hour before noon met elements of the 23rd Infantry, 2nd US Division, advancing from the east, at the road junction just east of Hamyang. There it halted three hours while engineers and 380 Korean laborers constructed a bypass around another blown bridge. Ever since leaving Chinju, Task Force Dolvin had encountered mine fields and blown bridges, the principal delaying efforts of the retreating 6th NK division.

On the afternoon of the 29th, the task force dashed ahead at a speed of over 30 kilometers an hour toward Namwon chasing the retreating enemy. It caught up with numerous enemy groups, killing some of the soldiers, capturing others, and dispersing the rest. At midafternoon Task Force Dolvin entered Namwon to find that Task Force Matthews and elements of the 24th US Infantry were already there. The next morning Task Force Dolvin reached Chonju, already occupied by elements of the 38th US Infantry Regiment, and continued on through Iri to the Kum River. The next day at 1500, 30 September, its mission accomplished, Task Force Dolvin was dissolved. It had captured or destroyed 16 antitank guns, 19 vehicles, 65 tons of ammunition, 250 mines, captured 750 enemy soldiers, and killed an estimated 350 more. It lost 3 tanks disabled by mines and 1 officer and 45 enlistedmen were wounded in action.

In the wake of Task Force Dolvin the 27th US Regiment moved north from Chinju to Hamyang and Namwon on 27 September and maintained security on the supply road. On 29 September, ROK Marines captured Yosu on the south coast.

**The 2nd US Division:** Opposite the old Naktong Bulge area, the 9th, 4th and 2nd NK Divisions retreated westward. At Sinban-ni the 4th NK Division turned toward Hyopchon. The 9th withdrew on Hyopchon, and the 2nd, after passing through Chogye, continued on to the same place. Apparently the 9th NK Division, in the lead, had passed through Hyopchon before elements of the 2nd US Division closed in on the place.
On 23 September the 38th Regiment of the 2nd US Division had hard fighting in the hills around Chogye before overcoming enemy delaying forces. On the 24th the 23rd US Regiment from the southeast and the 38th US Infantry from the northeast closed on Hyopchon in a double envelopment movement.

During the day the 3rd Battalion, 23rd US Regiment, entered Hyopchon after a rapid advance. As the enemy fled Hyopchon in the afternoon, the 38th US Regiment fire killed an estimated 300 of them at the regiment’s roadblock northeast of the town. The surviving remnant fled in disorder for the hills. That night the 38th US infantry also entered the town from the north.

In retreating ahead of the 38th US Infantry on 25 September the 2nd NK Division abandoned all its remaining vehicles and heavy equipment between Hyopchon and Kochang. The 38th US Infantry, in its advance from Hyopchon to Kochang, captured 17 trucks, 10 motorcycles, 14 antitank guns, 4 artillery pieces, 9 mortars, more than 300 tons of ammunition, and 450 enemy soldiers, and killed an estimated 260 more. The remnant of the enemy was scattered into the mountains. The 38th US Regiment, with the Air Force striking ahead of it, entered Kochang at 0830, 26 September, capturing there an enemy field hospital containing 45 enemy wounded.

The 23rd US Regiment, on the 25th, made a night advance to Kochang, fighting three skirmishes and rebuilding four small bridges on the way. It arrived at Kochang soon after the 38th US Infantry, in daylight on 26 September.

That evening the 23rd US Infantry continued the advance to Anui which it reached at 1930 without enemy opposition. At 0400 the next morning, 27 September, a heavy enemy artillery and mortar barrage struck in the town. This enemy fire killed many officers and men at the 3rd Battalion command post, and wounded the battalion commander severely.

At 0400, 28 September, the 38th US Infantry moved out, with the 2nd Battalion in the lead, from Kochang in motorized advance toward Chonju. Meeting only light and scattered resistance, the 2nd Battalion entered Chonju at 1315. At Chonju the battalion had to overcome about 300 enemy soldiers of the 102nd and 104th NK Security Regiments, killing about 100 of them and taking 170 prisoners.

At 1530 hours on 29 September, after refueling, the 3rd Battalion departed Chonju for Nonsan and continued to Kanggyong on the Kum River, arriving there without incident at 0300 the morning of 30 September.

Thus, at the end of September the 2nd Division was scattered from the Kum River southward, with the 38th US Infantry in Chonju–Kanggyong
area, the 23rd Infantry in the Anui area.

The 9th Infantry, the 2nd US Division, while the two other regiments were pursuing, engaged in mopping up the enemy left behind and its 2nd Battalion occupied Hill 409 near Hyonpung without opposition. On 28 September the 2nd Battalion, 9th US Infantry, crossed the Naktong to join the 2nd US Division after the newly arrived 65th US Regimental Combat Team of the 3rd US Division relieved it on Hill 409.

The 24th US Division; On the right flank of the 2nd US Division, the 27th British Brigade, attached to the 24th US Division for the pursuit, was to move against Songju while the 24th US Division simultaneously attacked parallel to and north of it on the main highway toward Kimchon. After passing through Songju, the British brigade was to strike the main highway halfway between the Naktong River and Kimchon. Its path took it along the main retreat route of the 10th NK Division. The brigade was across the Naktong and ready to attack before daylight on 22 September.

At dawn the 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, seized a small hill, called by the men Plum Pudding Hill, on the right of the road a few kilometers short of Songju. The battalion then attacked the higher ground immediately to the northeast, known to the British as Hill 325. Supported by American tank fire and their own mortar and machine gun fire, the battalion took the hill before dark.

In the meantime, before dawn on 23 September, the Scottish Highlander Argyll Battalion moved up to attack Hill 282 on the left of the road and, after an hour’s climb, captured the crest of it. Then, the battalion continued to attack Hill 388, which was higher and dominated Hill 282 they had just occupied. The British tragedy happened on Hill 282. Enemy troops occupying Hill 388 already were moving to attack the British. The enemy artillery and mortar fire began falling on the British. At this time, unfortunately, the American supporting artillery fire inexplicably withdrawn and the US tanks were unable to bring the enemy under fire because of terrain obstacles, so the Argylls had to call for an air strike on Hill 388.

Just afternoon the requested air support came. Immediately the British displayed their white recognition pannels. The enemy on Hill 388 also displaced white pannels. This confused pilots of three F-51 Mustangs. The Mustangs suddenly attacked the wrong hill; they came in napalming and machine-gunning the Argyll position.

The terrible tragedy was over in few minutes and left the hilltop a sea of orange flame. Except about ten men who were still able to fight, most of
Argylls became casualties on the hill.

The next day a count showed 2 officers and 11 men killed, 4 officers and 70 men wounded, and 2 men missing for a total of 89 casualties; of this number, the mistaken air attack caused about 60.

That night, after the Argyll tragedy, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, attacked south from Pusang-dong on the Waegwan—Kimchon highway and captured Songju at 0200, 24 September. That day and the next the 19th US Infantry and the British brigade mopped up in Songju area. On the afternoon of 25 September the British brigade, released from attachment to the 24th US Division, reverted to I US Corps control.

The 10th NK Division, which had been fighting in Songju area, withdrew with heavy losses on the 24th and 25th. The I NK Corps, about 25 September, ordered all its units south Waegwan to retreat northward.

On 23 September the 24th US Division started its attack northwest along the Taegon—Seoul highway. The 21st US Infantry in the lead headed for Kimchon, the enemy headquarters.

Shortly after midnight, 23-24 September, the 5th US Regimental Combat Team passed through the 21st US Infantry to take the lead. Enemy troops in positions on Hill 140, north of the highway, stopped the regiment about five kilometers east of Kimchon. There the enemy fought a major delaying action to permit large numbers of their retreating units to escape. The enemy command assembled all available units at Kimchon to block the rapid Eighth Army advance.

In the battle that followed in front of Kimchon, the 24th Division lost 6 Patton tanks to enemy mines and antitank fire, while the enemy lost 8 tanks. In this action the 849th NK Regiment was practically destroyed. The 5th US RCT and supporting units lost about 100 men killed or wounded.

As a result of the battle in front of Kimchon on 24 September, the 21st Regiment swung to the north of the highway and joined the 5th US RCT that night in a pincer attack on the town. The next morning the 5th US RCT entered Kimchon and by 1445, the town was cleared of the enemy. With the fall of Kimchon on the 25th, enemy resistance melted away and it was clear that the enemy were intent only on escaping.

On 26 September the 19th US Regiment took the division lead and its 2nd Battalion entered Yongdong without resistance. The regiment continued on and reached Okchon, 16 kilometers east of Taegon, at 0200, 27 September.

At 0530 the 19th US Infantry resumed the advance. Just outside Okchon the led tank hit a mine and enemy antitank fire then destroyed it. The 1st Battalion deployed and attacked astride the road but advanced only a short
distance. The enemy held the heights west of Okchon in force and, as at
Kimchon three days earlier, were intent on a major delaying operation. This
time it was to permit thousands of their retreating soldiers to escape from
Taejon.

This fight in front of Taejon on 27 September disclosed that the city, as ex-
pected, was an assembly point for retreating NK units south and west of
Waegwan. In the fight the ground forces destroyed 13 tanks on the ap-
proaches to the city. The Air Force claimed a total of 20 tanks destroyed
during the day.

On the morning of 28 September the regiment reached the heights unop-
posed. It was apparent that the NK forces had withdrawn north during the
night.

At 1630, 28 September, the elements of the 19th US Infantry and the 3rd
US Engineer Combat Battalion entered the outskirts of Taejon. An hour
later the 19th US Infantry secured the city after engineers had cleared mines
ahead of tanks leading the main column.

On 28 September at Taejon the 19th US Infantry captured so many enemy
stragglers that it was unable to keep an accurate count of them. The capture
of large numbers of prisoners continued during the last two days of the
month; on the 30th the 24th US Division took 447 of them. By this time
other US troops had passed Taejon and Chochiwon to cut the main highway
farther north at Chonan and Osan.

With the capture of Taejon, the 24th US Division accomplished its mission
in the pursuit.

On 29 September the 24th US Division command post moved to
Taejon. From there the division had the task of protecting the army line of
communications back to the Naktong River. Its units were strung out for
nearly 160 kilometers; the 19th US Infantry held the Taejon area up to the
Kum River, the 21st Infantry extended from Taejon southeast to Yongdong,
the 5th US RCT was in the Kimchon area, and the 24th US Reconnaissance
Company secured the Waegwan bridges.

The 1st US Cavalry Division: The Eighth US Army breakout plans
initially required the 1st US Cavalry Division to cross the Naktong River at
Waegwan and follow the 24th US Division toward Kimchon and Taejon. As
the breakout action progressed, however, I Corps changed the plan so that
the 1st US Cavalry Division would cross the river at some point above
Waegwan, pursue a course east of and generally parallel to that of the 24th
US Division, and seize Sangju.
In front of the 1st US Cavalry Division two enemy divisions, the 3rd and 13th, were retreating on Sangju when the 1st Cavalry Division prepared to engage in the pursuit.

On 21 September an important news came to the Eighth US Army. The 13th NK Division’s chief of staff, Senior Colonel Lee Hak Ku, surrendered that morning near the village of Samsan-dong about six kilometers south of Tabu-dong. Lee was the ranking NK prisoner at the time and remained so throughout the war. Before he became chief of staff of the 13th NK Division, Lee had been operations officer (G-3) of the II NK Corps. Later he was to become notorious as the leader of the Communist prisoners of the Compound 76 riots on Koje Island in 1952.

Colonel Lee Hak Ku gave a full report on the deployment of the 13th NK Division troops in the vicinity of Tabu-dong, the location of the division command post and the remaining artillery, the status of supply, and the morale of the troops. The situation described by the prisoner was a great help to the Eighth Army as well as General Gay in planning subsequent operations.
At the time of Colonel Lee's surrender, General Gay had already directed Lieutenant Colonel William A. Harris, Commanding Officer, 7th US Cavalry to lead the pursuit movement for the 1st US Cavalry Division. Colonel Harris organized Task Force 777 for the effort. Each digit of the number represented one of the three principal elements of the force: the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, the 77th US Field Artillery Battalion, and the 70th US Tank Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel James H. Lynch’s 3rd Battalion was assigned as the lead unit under Task Force Lynch. Task Force Lynch was strongly reinforced by several more combat units.

Task Force Lynch started to move at 0800, 22 September, from a point just west of Tabu-dong. Brushing aside small scattered enemy groups, Colonel Lynch put tanks in the lead and the column moved forward. Up ahead flights of planes coursed up and down the road attacking fleeing groups of enemy soldiers.

Task Force Lynch was to cross the Naktong River at the Naktong-ni ferry site far southeast of Sangju. An hour and a half before midnight, 22 September, the led tank halted on the bluff overlooking the Naktong River crossing at Naktong-ni. Peering ahead, men in the lead tank saw an antitank gun and fired on it. The illumination caused by the explosion of the shells revealed a large group of enemy and equipment were in the water trying to escape across the river. The armor and other elements of the task force fired into them killing an estimated 200 in the water. The task force also captured a large amount of enemy equipment at the crossing site.

Colonel Lynch, after learning of no enemy troops on the far bank of the river, ordered the infantry to cross to the north bank. At 0430, 23 September, two companies of the force began wading the river. And at 0530 the two companies secured the far bank.

During the 23rd, the 1st Battalion commanded by Major William O. Witherspoon, Jr., crossed the river and continued on 16 kilometers northwest to Sangju, which the battalion found abandoned by the enemy. Task Force Lynch continued to advance farther up the road to Poun, which they entered before dark. Colonel Harris had authority only to concentrate his regiment at Poun; he was not to go any farther. On 25 September General Walker granted authority for General Gay to go all the way to the link-up with X US Corps if he could do so.

General Gay, 26 September in Sangju, issued orders that at 1200 the division would start moving day and night until it joined the X Corps near Suwon. The 7th US Cavalry Regiment was to lead the advance by way of
Poun, Chongju, Chonan, and Osan. The 8th US Cavalry Regiment was to move on Ansong via Kyesan. At noon at 5th US Cavalry to be relieved by the 1st ROK Division, was to break off its attack toward Hamchang and form the division rear guard; upon reaching Chochiwon and Chonan it was to halt, block enemy movement from the south and west, and await further orders.

Upon receiving General Gay's orders Colonel Harris in turn ordered Colonel Lynch at Poun to lead northwest with his task force as rapidly as possible to effect a juncture with 7th US Division troops of the X Corps somewhere in the vicinity of Suwon.

The leading party of Task Force Lynch, consisting of an I & R platoon and two tank platoons started to move from Poun at 1130, 26 September. 1st Lieutenant Baker, a platoon leader of tanks, led the party and he was ordered to move at maximum tank speed and not to fire unless fired upon. At midafternoon the leading party reached Chongju and found the city deserted.

At 2030, 26 September, the leading party of Task Force Lynch entered the main Seoul highway just south of Chonan. It soon became apparent that the task force was catching up with enemy soldiers. Chonan was full of them. Groups of enemy soldiers just stood around and watched the party column go through. Beyond Chonan, Lieutenant Baker's tanks caught up with an estimated company of enemy soldiers marching north and fired on them with tank machine guns. Frequently then passed enemy vehicles on the road, enemy soldiers on guard at bridges, and other small groups. Soon Lieutenant Baker's lead tanks (three tanks) began to outdistance the rest of the column, and Colonel Lynch was unable to reach them by radio to slow them.

Separated from the rest of Task Force Lynch, and several kilometers in front of it by now, Lieutenant Baker's three tanks rumbled into Osan at full speed. And there continued up again at full speed. Lieutenant Baker's tanks, now approaching the lines of the 31st US Infantry, X Corps, were receiving American small arms and 75-mm. recoilless rifle fire. American tanks on the line held their fire because the excessive speed of the approaching tanks, the sound of their motors, and their headlights caused the tankers to doubt that they were enemy. One tank commander let the first of Lieutenant Baker's tanks go through, intending to fire on the second, when a white phosphorus grenade lit up the white star on one of the tanks and identified them in time to avoid a tragedy. Lieutenant Baker's stopped his tanks inside the 31st Infantry lines. He had established contact with elements of X Corps. The time was 2226 hours, 26 September.

The main party of Task Force Lynch, however, had to fight with enemy
Link-up established, north of Osan, 27 September 1950.

tanks when it approached a small village of Habong-ni about five kilometers south of Osan. In this night battle the task force, in the fight, destroyed 7 enemy tanks out of the 10 tanks in the attacking column, and it lost 2 men killed, 28 wounded, and 2 tanks and 15 other vehicles destroyed. The head of Task Force Lynch reached Osan at 0800 on 27 September.

In this rapid advance to Osan, the 1st US Cavalry Division cut off elements of the 105th NK Armored Division in the Ansong and Pyongtaek area and miscellaneous units in the Taejon area. On the 28th elements of the 70th US Tank Battalion and the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, with the strong assistance of fighter-bombers, destroyed at least seven of ten T-34's in the Pyongtaek area south of Osan.

The ROK Army: Before making mention of the ROK Army troops in the eastern sector during the pursuit phase of the breakout operation, it is deemed necessary to describe briefly on the 1st ROK Division attached to the 1 US Corps in the west.

On the right of the 1st US Cavalry Division the 1st ROK Division, as a part of the I US Corps and the only ROK unit operating as a part of Eighth Army, on
22 September had passed through Tabo-dong from the north and headed for Sosan ferry of the Naktong. It crossed the river there on the 25th, and moved north on the army right flank to relieve elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division, and particularly the 5th US Cavalry Regiment, in the Hamchang-Poun area above Sangju.

Now returning to the other ROK Army divisions in the eastern sector, the ROK Army there made advances from Taegu that kept pace with Eighth Army, and in some cases even outdistanced it. This performance is all the more remarkable because the ROK Army was not motorized and its troops moved on foot.

In the II ROK Corps, the 6th and 8th ROK Divisions on 24 September gained about 25 kilometers. The 6th ROK Division advanced on Hamchang and entered it the night of 25 September. By the 27th it was advancing across the roughest part of the Sobaek Range, past Mungyong in the high passes, on its way to Chongju. On the last day of the month the 6th ROK Division encountered enemy delaying groups as it approached Wonju.

The 8th ROK Division also made rapid advances on the right of the 6th ROK Division. Its patrol elements entered Andong before midnight of the 24th. Remnants of the 12th and 8th NK Divisions were retreating on and through Andong at this time. The 8th NK Division, however, had to detour into the mountains because the 8th ROK Division troops arrived there ahead of it. After two days of fighting, during which it encountered extensive enemy mine fields, the 8th ROK Division secured Andong on 26 September. That evening the division’s advanced elements entered Yechon, northwest of Andong. The next day some of its troops were at Tanyang preparing to cross the upper Han River. On the last day of the month the division met strong enemy resistance at Chechon and bypassed the town in the race northward.

The Capital ROK Division was keeping pace with the others in the pursuit. On the 27th it had entered Churyang, about 50 kilometers east of the 8th ROK Division, and was continuing northward through high mountains.

On the night of 1 – 2 October, shortly after midnight, an organized force of from 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers, which had been bypassed some place in the mountains, struck with savage fury as it broke out in its attempt to escape northward. Directly in its path was Wonju where the II ROK Corps headquarters was then located. This force overran the corps headquarters and killed many of its men, including five American officers who were attached to the corps or who had come to Wonju on liaison missions. The enemy ran amok in
Wonju until morning, killing an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 civilians.

Along the east coast the 3rd ROK Division, with heavy US naval gunfire support, captured Yongdok on 25 September. The fall of the town apparently caught the 5th NK Division by surprise. Some enemy vehicles were found with motors running, and artillery pieces were still in position with ammunition at hand. After the fall of Yongdok it appears that remnant of the 5th NK Division, totaling now to more than a regiment, turned inland for escape into the mountains.

The impressive gains by the ROK troops prompted General Walker to remark on 25 September, “Too little has been said in praise of the ROK Army which has performed so magnificently in helping turn this war from the defensive to the offensive.”

On up the coast road raced the 3rd ROK Division. It secured Samchok on the morning of 29 September, and then continued on toward Kangnung. It moved north as fast as feet and wheels could take it over the coastal road. It led all ROK units, in fact all units of the UN Command, in the dash northward, thus, the vanguards of the 23rd ROK Regiment reaching the 38th Parallel on the last day of September.
CHAPTER XI  ADVANCE TO THE NORTH  
(1—24 October 1950)

Section 1. Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel

The UN forces at the end of September 1950 nearly controlled all territory south of the 38th Parallel. The 1 ROK Corps, with the support of US and British naval gunfire, moved quickly up the 38th Parallel on the east coast, and the II ROK Corps advanced across the peninsula from central sector to east overwhelming rear guard elements of the retreating enemy.

As for the Eighth US Army, the I US Corps, which became operational at 1200 hours, 13 September with the 1st ROK Division, 1st US Cavalry Division, 24th US Division, 5th US Infantry RCT, and the 27th British Brigade attached, had linked up with the 7th US Division of the X US Corps beginning on 26 September in the vicinity of Osan, as already mentioned earlier, and now was preparing for resumption of the advance northward through the main highway (Seoul—Pyongyang) in the western sector. The IX US Corps, which came into being operational at Miryang since 23 September with the 2nd and 25th US Divisions attached, had been engaged in mopping up bypassed enemy groups and the Communist guerrillas in the southern area, restoration and resupply of equipment and training.

Accordingly, the Order of Battle of the UN ground forces across the entire front as of 30 September, from west to east was: (1) In the IX US Corps, the 25th US Division and 2nd US Division with the 65th US RCT in the vicinity north of Yongsan; (2) in the I US Corps, the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 24th US Division, 1st ROK Division, with the 27th British Brigade in the vicinity of Waegwan; (3) in the II ROK Corps the 6th ROK Division, the 8th ROK Division, with the 7th ROK Division en route to Chungju; and (4) in the I ROK Corps the Capital ROK Division and the 3rd ROK Division.

On the other hand the NK Communist army was shattered and fleeing north with little semblance of order, thus losing its will to fight. Some of the enemy divisions simply disappeared. Their men were spread all over the countryside south of the Parallel in disorganized and demoralized small
parties. All of the escape routes were in UN forces' hands. The roads, paddies and ditches became littered with abandoned enemy tanks, guns, and vehicles. Wholesale surrenders became commonplace and haul of prisoners would eventually be counted in tens of thousands. Some isolated remnants of enemy soldiers drifted into the mountains where their harassing activities made it necessary to divert the IX US Corps from its principal mission in order to eliminate the remaining enemy operating in the area of the Parallel.

Meanwhile, poised on the eastern end of the Parallel was the I ROK Corps, waiting for orders to march over the artificial barrier and continue the pursuit up the east coast to capture the ports and industrial centers in that area of north Korea. On the opposite side of the peninsula, the Eighth Army streamed into northwestern area. About this time the Eighth Army was reinforced by a battalion each of Philippine and Australian troops, and early in October the arrival of the 3rd US Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Robert H. Soule, was announced.

Now the question of pursuing the NK Communist forces across the 38th Parallel arose. With the NK forces in full retreat and UN forces rapidly approaching the Parallel, the question arose as to whether the NK enemy should be allowed sanctuary beyond the 38th Parallel, possibly enabling them to reorganize for new aggression.

In order to appraise the situation, it is necessary to take a glance at preceding events. At the outbreak of the war on 25 June 1950, the U.N. Security Council had called for an immediate end to the fighting and the withdrawal of all NK Communist aggressors to the 38 Parallel. This appeal had been ignored, the Council on 27 June recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. By then, however, it was clear that North Korean puppet regime had no intention of obeying the appeal, so another resolution supplemented on 7 July authorized the United States military commitments of forming a unified command and the appointment of a supreme commander in Korea.

These early UN actions constituted adequate guidance in Korea until the Inchon landing and UN counteroffensive turned the tide. However, when it became apparent that the NK Red forces were defeated, the situation demanded re-evaluation, including supplemental instructions to the military commander. The question became a most difficult one as soon as the Inchon landing succeeded and the Eighth Army broke out from the Naktong
Perimeter.

Pursuant to this question, the majority of UN member nations took to position that, if the NK enemy were not completely destroyed, the people of the Republic of Korea would live indefinitely beneath the threat of renewed Communist aggression. They felt that the UN forces had a legal basis for engaging the NK Communist forces north of the Parallel according to the 27th July resolution of the U.N. Security Council, and ground operation should be extended beyond the Parallel to achieve the U.N. goal.

With the collapse of NK enemy resistance, unification of the peninsula, long the aim of the United Nations and even longer the hope of the free Koreans, seemed imminently possible. There were, it was true, certain policy decisions to be made by the United Nations and the United States before the armies could go north, but so far as the United States Government was concerned the decision was not in doubt. Reflecting the desire of the United Nations, the United States Government decided Eighth Army should cross into North Korea. This historic decision, based on recommendations of the U.S. National Security Council to President Truman, reached the U.N. Command, Tokyo, in a message dispatched on 27 September. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General MacArthur a comprehensive directive to govern his future actions. The objectives assigned Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), however, had been more limited in scope. The JCS stated that the destruction of the NK Red forces was to be the primary objective of General MacArthur.

"Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean (Communist) Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea."

The lengthy message abounded in paragraphs of caution, reflecting the desire of both the United Nations and the United States to avoid a general war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff added that in no circumstances any of non-Korean U.N. forces should not be used in the area along the Manchurian border of in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union. None but Korean ground forces were to be employed in the border region. They also instructed General MacArthur to submit his plan for operations north of the Parallel to them for approval.
Upon having been informed from the JCS General MacArthur urged on the JCS removal of the restriction requiring specific approval from the United States Government before his forces crossed the 38th Parallel. Two days later on 29 September, the new U.S. Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall, had authorized him, in his personal message to General MacArthur, to proceed north of the 38th Parallel. The Defense Secretary told him in a message, "...We want you feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th Parallel..."

Meanwhile, a step was taken by the U.S. Government on 27 September in the hope that hostilities might end without much further loss or risk for either side. By dispatch, the JCS authorized General MacArthur to announce, at his discretion, a suggested surrender message to the NK armed forces. Framed by the U.S. States Department, the message broadcast on 1 October. The enemy commander in chief was called upon to surrender unconditionally to avoid further shedding of blood and destruction of property, however, no direct reply was evoked from the Communist bandit. Instead, the reaction of the Communist side came ominously from another quarters.

In a speech in Peking on 1 October, the first anniversary of Communist China, Chou En-lai warned that the Chinese people "will not tolerate foreign aggression and will not stand aside should the imperialists want only invade the territory of their neighbor." Two days after General MacArthur's proclamation, Chou informed K.M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peking, that China would intervene in the event UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. He added, however, that such action would not be forthcoming if only ROK troops entered North Korea.

It will be recalled that the JCS authorization of 27 September permitted operations north of the Parallel "...provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea..." In view of the last two provisions, General MacArthur's plans for crossing the border could conceivably have been cancelled after Chou's announcement. But optimism over the course of the war ran high among the United Nations at this time, and CINCUNC shortly received supplemental authority from both the U.N. and JCS -- the one reestablishing legal grounds for an incursion into North Korea, and the other reaffirming military concurrence at the summit. In a resolution adopted on 7 October, the United Nations directed that "All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea and all constituent actions be taken... for the establishment of a unified, in-
dependent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea..."

Since the enemy had ignored his surrender ultimatum, General MacArthur could attain the U.N. objectives only by occupying entire North Korea militarily. US JCS, therefore, on 9 October amplified its early instructions to the Commander-in-Chief as follows:

_Hereafter, in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgement, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military actions against objectives in Chinese territory._

Section 2. The UNC Plan of Operations in the North (1–20 October 1950)

With the Eighth Army moving northward from the Naktong Perimeter and nearly within the position to approach the X Corps, the future employment of the X Corps came in for considerable speculation. Would the X Corps retain its identity and continue to operate independently or would it be absorbed by Eighth Army? The future relationships of Eighth Army and X Corps were the greatest concerns to the military leaders, especially to General Walker, the Eighth Army Commander. He felt that all UN forces should operate under a unified field command under his control. However, he did not submit his desire to General MacArthur in writing until 26 September when he sent him a message suggesting that he would like to be informed of X Corps' progress and plans so that he could plan better for the approaching juncture of the two forces. In a reply the next day, General MacArthur informed to General Walker that X Corps would remain in GHQ reserve, in occupation of the Seoul area ready to undertake a GHQ-directed operation of which he will be apprised at any early date.

Meanwhile, anticipating his authority for crossing the 38th Parallel, CinC-UNC on 26 September had directed his Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to develop a plan for operations north of the Parallel. He stipulated that Eighth Army should make the main effort in either the west or the east, and that however this was resolved, there should be an amphibious envelopment on the opposite coast -- at Chinnampo, Wonsan, or
elsewhere.

Joint Special Plans and Operations Groups, headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, G—3 of the UN Command, rapidly fitted an earlier staff study into the framework of CinCUNC's directive. It was the following day, 27 September, that proposed operation plan was laid before the commander in chief. This plan evolved from two basic assumptions: First, that the bulk of the NK forces had already been destroyed; and secondly, that neither the Soviet Union nor Red China would intervene, covertly or openly. The advance to the north, according to the plan, would fall to the Eighth Army directing its main effort in the west across the 38th Parallel, along the Kaeson—Sariwon—Pyongyang axis. Further, it recommended that Eighth Army's drive begin in mid-October, to be followed within a week by a X Corps amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. After establishing a beachhead, X Corps would attack westward through the Wonsan—Pyongyang line and link up with Eighth Army, thereby trapping enemy elements falling back from the south. The plan further envisioned that these two commands, after uniting, should advance north to the Chongju—Kunuri—Yongwon—Hamhung—Hungnam line, a line measuring one hundred to two hundreds kilometers south of the Yalu River marking the border between Korea and Red China. Only ROK troops would be allowed to proceed north of this line.

The motivation which General MacArthur decided on two commands in Korea seems to be the problem of logistics arising out of poor road facilities of North Korea.

Above the Seoul—Wonsan route the northern Taebaek Range rises to rugged heights in the east central part of the peninsula, forming an almost trackless mountainous waste in the direction of the Manchurian border. The principal routes of travel follow the deep mountain valleys in a generally north-south direction. The only reasonably good lateral road from east to west in North Korea lay just north of the 38th Parallel, connecting Pyongyang with Wonsan. A rail line also crossed the peninsula here. Any plan for a military campaign north of the Pyongyang—Wonsan line in the interior of North Korea would encounter most difficult logistical and supply problems.

General MacArthur had to note the fact that road and rail communications north from Pusan, attacked throughout the summer by UN aerial action, together with enemy demolitions, were not what they used to be. Repairing these shattered rail and road facilities would require a concentrated work of available Engineer troops for several weeks. Aerial action had also badly shattered the communication and transport system of North Korea. In con-
sidering this state of affairs, General MacArthur felt that it was, consequently, extremely difficult to supply matters on the other side of a steep and almost trackless mountain range.

No one denied the need for a port like Wonsan through which the huge tonnages of food, ammunition, and gasoline could be carried for the combat armies who would be operating to the west and north. The real question was simply, should Wonsan be approached overland or by sea? General MacArthur decided in favor of the assault by sea. He also wanted to get military forces behind the NK enemy retreating from the Naktong Perimeter through the central mountains and up the east coast. The General reasoned that a landing on the northeast coast might accomplish this.

The reasons motivating a seaborne landing at Wonsan were later explained by General MacArthur. “The Eighth Army’s lines of supply were already taxed to their maximum capacity to sustain the day-to-day minimum requirements of its troops in the line,” he said. “Furthermore, the dispatch of X Corps by sea was intended as a flanking movement against enemy remnants still trying to escape from the south to the north, and as an envelopment to bring pressure upon Pyongyang.”

Most Army commanders favored a sea assault on Wonsan, although there were dissenters even among General MacArthur’s staff. Major General Doyle O. Hicky, Chief of Staff, and Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, G-3, felt that X Corps could best be incorporated into Eighth Army at the close of the Inchon-Seoul phase of the operation. Brigadier General George L. Ebberly, G-4, of the UNC, thought the X Corps could be more easily supplied if it was made a part of the Eighth Army.

Army men who favored the sea-borne assault argued that, by landing the X Corps at Wonsan, the heavy supply load on the port of Inchon would be relieved, as an additional harbor would thus be opened for the direct supply of the X Corps. The X Corps would be strategically located to operate as an enveloping force against the enervated NK Communist forces as they opposed the UN forces drive toward Pyongyang.

Most Navy men looked with disfavor on a sea movement to Wonsan, holding the view that the X Corps could march overland to Wonsan in a much shorter time and with much less effort than it would take to get the Corps around to Wonsan by sea.

On 20 October, General MacArthur said, the X Corps would land at Wonsan. The American Marines would be outloaded at Inchon, and, because of Inchon’s limited port facilities, the 7th US Division would be embarked at Pusan. While the X Corps made seaborne run-around-end,
the Eighth Army would push directly toward Pyongyang. After landing at Wonsan, he continued, the X Corps was to move northward between the Eastern Sea and the Taebaek Mountain Range, turning westward through passes in the mountains to link up with the Eighth Army.

**Eighth Army Deploys for the Attack North**

General MacArthur on 2 October formalized in his UN Command Operation Order 2 for United Nations military operations north of the 38th Parallel, and set forth therein the plan of movement. The subsistance of the new strategy of General MacArthur was similar to that employed at Inchon in mid-September. The Eighth US Army would attack in the west with its main effort along the Kaesong—Sariwon—Pyongyang axis, secure Pyongyang, and effect a juncture with the X US Corps, planned to make an amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. Advancing northward, the United Nations Command would establish a defensive line stretching across the neck of the peninsula from Chongju on the west coast to Hungnam on the east coast. Beyond this line the UN forces, except for the ROK forces, would not go without further orders. The fleeing and encircled NK Communist forces would be destroyed, and the United Nations would assist the Republic of Korea Government in establishing control over whole Korea. Based on this order, Eighth Army issued an operation order to implement its part in the plan for the attack into North Korea. This order called for the I US Corps to seize a line west of the Imjin River with not less than a division, and to concentrate the Corps in an assembly area there as rapidly as IX US Corps could relieve it and assume the security mission in that area. The I US Corps was then to conduct operations northward to drive into Pyongyang on army orders, making the main effort with the 1st US Cavalry Division leading the attack. The 24th US Division and the 1st ROK Division were to protect the Corps flanks and form a reserve.

The IX Corps, following behind the I US Corps advance, was to protect the line of communications, Seoul—Suwon—Taejon—Taegu—Pusan and, together with ROK police, to destroy the bypassed enemy forces below the 38th Parallel.

The ROK Army was directed to move its II Corps, consisting of the 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions, to the area between Uijongbu and Chunchon on the mid-west and central front, and the I ROK Corps, with Major General Kim Paik Il in command, composed of the Capital and 3rd Divisions, to the area between Yongpo and Chumunjin on the east coast, all prepared to attack
northward. The ROK Army was also to provide a new division (the 11th) by 5 October to help IX US Corps in the rear areas.

The I US Corps: In the meantime, the I US Corps commanded by Major General Frank W. Milburn, which was to launch a new offensive northward on the western front, had made the attack plans to drive and pursue the enemy across the Imjin River wherefrom to continue the attack toward the Kaesong—Kumchon—Hapo-ri—Namchonjom—Singye—Sariwon—Hwangju—Pyongyang axis. The 1st US Cavalry Division was to spearhead the Corps offensive.

Consequently, the I US Corps ordered the 1st US Cavalry Division with the 27th British Brigade attached, to advance north of Seoul for the purpose of securing the Corps' assembly area near the 38th Parallel. According to the order, the division advanced north with the 5th Cavalry pushing north to the Munsan area to establish a bridgehead across the Imjin River. On 4 October, the other units moved up to the crossing area and with the 7th Cavalry to the east and the 8th Cavalry protecting the rear, the 5th Cavalry proceeded with the crossing against slight enemy resistance. As the 5th Cavalry probed carefully north as far as Kaesong, the 8th Cavalry began its crossing. By 8 October all the division had moved into the Kaesong area and secured the I US Corps assembly area.

The 1st ROK Division, as the right wing, was to attack in the east flank of the Corps advance zone from Korangpo to the Sibyon-ri—Suan—Pyongyang route, while the 24th US Division, after assembling in Seoul behind the 1st Cavalry Division, would be charged with the Corps' left wing, providing cover for the Cavalry division in the main attack. The 27th British Brigade was to remain in reserve for a while with the mission of security guard for the main supply route behind the Corps advance. The I Corps was now in position to face squarely the problem of crossing the Parallel.

At that time, a new military organization appeared in Korea, and it concentrated near Seoul. The 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, arrived in Korea on 28 September, and on 1 October it joined the 27th Brigade, which was then renamed the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade. The arrival of this fine Australian units, up to strength and well equipped, was most welcome and gave the brigade the tactical scope which had been lacking with only two battalions. By the evening of 6 October troops of the brigade arrived by air at Kimpo Airfield as part of the I US Corps concentration near the 38th Parallel.

At the time, the enemy deployed his four newly reorganized divisions in
mass on the western front -- from the west of the Yesong River through north and northeast of Kaesong to the Korangpo sector with the 43rd, 19th and 27th NK Divisions plus the 17th Armored NK Division -- in a rave attempt to resist the UN advance.

The X US Corps: Early October the Eighth Army commenced the relief of X Corps in the Seoul — Inchon area and completed officially at 1200 hours, 7 October. The forward headquarters of both Eighth Army and the Republic of Korea Army moved from Taegu and opened in Seoul on 12 October, with their rear CPs at Taegu. Three days later, on 15 October, the Fifth Air Force headquarters also moved to Seoul. As a result of the September victories, the Japan-based fighters and fighter-bombers of the Fifth Air Force moved to Korean bases.

Preparations for the Wonsan Landing

One day prior to his issuance of the UN Operation Order 2, General MacArthur sent a preliminary instructions to General Almond and Admiral Struble for the projected landing at Wonsan. Joint Task Force 7 was re-established to land the X Corps at Wonsan, and Admiral Struble who had carried out the Inchon landing was named to command it.

On 2 October, when I US Corps commenced the relief of X US Corps, General Almond ordered the 7th US Division, together with the 92nd and 96th US Field Artillery Battalions, to begin displacing to Pusan by motor and rail. He also ordered the 1st US Marine Division to move to an assembly area at Inchon. The withdrawal of the Marine Corps passing the Seoul area to the I US Corps completed the relief of X Corps, and the X US Corps officially reverted to GHQ reserve.

On 30 September when General Almond outlined the Wonsan landing to the division commanders and staff members of X Corps, he set 15 October as D-Day for the landing operation. He based this target date on the assumption that Eighth Army would pass through and relieve the X US Corps on 3 October, the date on which the necessary shipping was to begin arriving at Inchon.

On 7 October, Admiral Doyle, in command of the Attack Force, recommended 20 October as the earliest D-Day which the amphibious assault forces could meet. He foresaw that the projected D-Day of 15 October could not be realized. The relief of X Corps by Eighth Army was completed, not on 3 October as he had anticipated, but on the 7th. Admirals Struble and Joy con-
curred and forwarded this recommendation to General MacArthur. He accepted it was a tentative D-Day but indicated that every effort should be made to achieve an earlier one.

After the arrival of the initial assault shipping at Inchon on 6 October, General Smith ordered the 1st Marine Division to commence embarkation on the 8th. However, loading a reinforced division, more than 28,000 troops, with ROK Marines and Army troops attached, and several thousand tons of supplies and equipments proved to be an aggravating job under the circumstances. Limited facilities and unusual tide conditions held dock activity to a series of feverish bursts. The assigned shipping itself was inadequate and considerable quantities of vehicles had to be left behind. Much of the trucking that could be taken was temporarily diverted to help transport the 7th US Division to Pusan.

For purposes of expediting embarkation and economizing on shipping space, X Corps directed the Marine division to out-load with less than the usual amount of supplies carried by a landing force. The 1st Logistical Command was to schedule to deliver adequate stocks of Classes I, III, and V. But this was not done, and it resulted in the necessity of unloading from ships in the harbor and reloading on others, and also of reloading on X Corps shipping considerable supplies from the dumps shore that otherwise could have been left for Eighth Army.

On 9 October troops began loading at Inchon and within a several days they virtually completed embarkation. General Almond opened his command post in Mount McKinley. Bulk loading of cargo continued until 16 October when all X Corps loading at Inchon was completed.

In the meantime, having been relieved by an element of the Eighth Army of its responsibilities in the Seoul area, the 7th US Infantry Division began to move to the Suwon and Ichon area preparatory move to Pusan. Tanks and other heavy equipment were scheduled to be carried by LST’s at the port of Inchon.

At 0350 hours 5 October the 31st US Regiment initiated a long overland movement to Pusan by way of Chungju, Hamchang, Kimchon, Taegu, and Kyongju, and four hours later the 32nd US Infantry followed the 31st through Ichon. The 17th US Regiment remained behind to secure the position until 8 October. In the course of movement the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Infantry was ambushed by remnants of the enemy force in the vicinity of Mungyong at 0200 hours, 6 October and suffered several casualties. Three days later at 0230 hours on 9 October the division headquarters convoy was also taken under enemy machine gun fire in a pass five kilometers northwest of Mungyong.
and lost three men killed and several vehicles. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment, succeeded in clearing the pass area that afternoon. This battalion thereafter patrolled the pass above Mungyong until it was relieved on 11 October by the 27th Infantry of the 25th US Infantry Division. Both the 31st and 32nd Regiments closed at Pusan on 7 October, and next day the division command post opened at that city. On 12 October the last unit of the artillery and 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment completed their movement to Pusan.

The loading schedule included the quartermaster, chemicals, transportation, and signal units and equipment and supplies of approximately 1,460 tons, and more than 1,400 troops were moved to Pusan by the division vehicles and those of the 52nd US Truck Battalion.

The 2nd Logistical Command furnished all classes of supply for outloading troops at Pusan. The difficult logistical and outloading problem of the 2nd Logistical Command was worked out successfully only by the constant mutual effort and cooperation of the staffs of the logistical command and of the 7th US Infantry Division. The outloading was completed in time and on 16 October the 7th Division advance command post opened aboard the USS *El Dorado*.

The I ROK Corps Captures Wonsan and Hungnam

Along the east coast the 3rd ROK Division under the I ROK Corps, on the afternoon of 29 September, received orders from the ROK Army Headquarters directing it to cross the 38th Parallel and proceed to Wonsan as soon as possible. The division was then approaching Kangnung after it had left Samchok which it secured on the morning of that day. Advanced patrols of the division crossed the parallel the next day, 30 September. On 1 October, the same day General MacArthur demanded the surrender of NK Communist, two companies pushed over the parallel and sped up the east coast. With many of its best troops either dead, captured, or in hiding, the 5th NK Division deployed its remaining units for the defense of the territory north of the 38th Parallel.

On 2 October the 3rd and Capital ROK Divisions established their command posts in Yangyang, 13 kilometers north of the Parallel. The next day General MacArthur made the first official public announcement of forces under UN Command crossing the 38th Parallel.

Now the 3rd ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Lee Chong Chan, spearheaded northward day and night, scattering enemy opposition on the either flank of the coastal road during its rapid drive to Wonsan. The speed of the advance was sometimes slowed by the enemy resistance, but the
rate of advance were averaging 26 kilometers a day over rugged, mountainous terrain. For some time, the advance was stalled by sporadic small arms fire until the division commander gambled on the ineffectiveness of the enemy’s will to fight and ordered the advance to be continued until determined resistance became impossible.

Most of ROK soldiers had only canvas shoes to wear, some of them walked on bloody bare feet, yet they advanced with a near-festive mood. Sometimes they were able to seize natural defensive strongholds in the high ground to their left flank without having to fire a shot. They were welcomed by the cheering crowds with bunches of wild flowers and flag waving greetings. Except for a few hot and hectic hours in the city’s southern suburbs, the capture of Wonsan was a routine operation. As ROK soldiers met some resistance on the morning of 10 October Task Force 77 aircraft fortuitously appeared overhead to begin routine pre-invasion aerial bombing. The ROK soldiers radioed an urgent call for help, and planes from Leyte’s Air Group 3 went work striking gun positions, slit trenches, and tanks as directed by ground controllers. On the same day, the Capital ROK
Division, commanded by Brigadier General Song Yo Chan, made simultaneous entry into Wonsan and joined in the fight for the city. Within a few days the port and its airfield were secured, and by 12 October there were 22 planes of the Far East Combat Cargo Command flying supplies into Wonsan. Thereafter, the victorious ROK soldiers spent their time patrolling the area, marking time for their next lunge to the border. The Capital Division meanwhile moved on north 25 air kilometers up the coast, and, against light resistance, secured both Hamhung and its port, Hungnam, on 17 October.

II ROK Corps

About the same time, the II ROK Corps (6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions), under the command of Major General Yu Jae Hung, began striking up the central front toward the Iron Triangle, a complex of industrial towns which was to become famous later in the war. It was named for the triangular location of its key cities, Chorwon, Kumhwa and Pyonggang. Chorwon, about 30 more kilometers above the Parallel, formed the Iron Triangle's western base; its apex was Pyonggang in the north; and its eastern base was at Kumhwa. For three days starting from the 6th, the 6th ROK Division, fighting off the resistance of the 9th NK Division, captured Hwachon on the late afternoon of 8 October.

The 8th ROK Division with Brigadier General Lee Sung Ga in command, crossed the Parallel on 7 October. On its right, the 8th ROK Division commanded by Colonel Shin Sang Chul, crossed a day or two later. Both divisions headed for the Iron Triangle. On 10 October elements of the 8th Division entered Chorwon and next day the 8th Division and the 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division converged on Pyonggang. On 13 October the 7th Division arrived there by way of Kumhwa. The Iron Triangle was also an important rail and road communications center, linking east and west coasts, and its capture on 13 October, with the fall of Wonsan, argued well for the United Nations counterinvasion. Now all the ROK divisions, except the 1st Division, which was part of the I US Corps and accordingly under direct American command, were across the 38th Parallel before any of the American divisions crossed.

During its great success in advancing northward into north Korea the ROK Army expanded and reorganized. On 8 October it reactivated the 5th Division at Taegu and once again counted eight divisions, the same number that it had when the war began. Simultaneously, the ROK Army activated the 1st Security Group of five battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th). Eight days
later, on 16 October, it activated the III ROK Corps, which actually became operational on the 20th. This new Corps, to which the 5th and 11th Divisions were attached, was to assume responsibility for the ROK Army zone south of the Seoul—Chunchon—Inje—Yangyang line, and destroy remaining enemy troops and guerrillas in that part of Korea.

Section 3. The U.N. Forces Begin the Advance Northward (9—14 October 1950)

The Eighth US Army Operations

Back again in the United Nations, meanwhile, on 29 September, the representatives of Australia, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Norway, Brazil, Cuba, Pakistan and other U.N. member nations presented at the U.N. General Assembly a proposed resolution approving the UN forces in Korea to cross the 38th Parallel.

Since there was nothing to find any reasons to stop the UN forces from achieving the long-cherished goal, embodied originally in the Cairo agreement of November 1943 by the Allied Powers, of a free, independent, and unified Korea, the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly now persuaded the said resolution on 4 October 1950 by a vote of 47 to five with seven abstentions. It was a natural result, because the United Nations Security Council, in its resolutions of 25 and 26 July 1950 (New York time), had branded the North Korean Communists as the aggressors and thereby decided to punish them with force of arms -- the UN Forces. The formality of the U.N. approval, authorizing the UN Command to break through the artificial boundary, the 38th Parallel, and go farther deep into the northern Korea, was followed on 7 October (New York time).

With the full approval of the United Nations, the UN forces now began the general advance in a full-scale in order to clear all the communist aggressors out of the whole peninsula.

To implement the UN Command's decisions, the Eighth US Army issued its operation orders for an all-out attack northward across the 38th Parallel, but the attack did not begin until 9 October, except the ROK Army forces, when the I US Corps on the western front finally launched a new offensive carrying over the Parallel.
The Eighth US Army planned to commence the new offensive with the I US and II ROK Corps on the attack lines, keeping the IX US Corps in reserve for a while.

The I US Corps: The I US Corps, with the 1st US Cavalry Division, 24th US Division, 1st ROK Division and the 27th British Brigade under its operational control, was to attack north generally along the Seoul—Pyongyang highway in the first phase and then it would continue to attack farther northward along the west coast. The 1st US Cavalry Division with the 27th British Brigade attached, as a main effort of the I US Corps, was ordered to attack in a rapid speed along the axis of the Seoul—Pyongyang highway, advancing to Kaesong—Kumchon—Namchonjom—Sariwon—Hwangju—Pyongyang on the center of the Corps attack formation. The 24th US Division would make a flanking movement on the Corps left flank from Kaesong through Paekchon—Haeju—Chaeryong—Sariwon, then to Pyongyang, while the 1st ROK Division was to drive north also with Pyongyang as its main objective in the first phase of the attack. The division advance would take place along the route of Korangpo—Kuhwa-ri—Sibyonn- ni—Suan—Yul-li—Sangwon—Pyongyang on the Corps right flank. The 27th
Advance to the North

British Brigade was to be attached to the 1st US Cavalry Division upon its arrival in the vicinity of Kaesong from the Kimpo area. On 9 October, the 1st Cavalry Division spearheaded in moving up to the Parallel and started fighting its way northward.

The 1st Cavalry Division Attacks on the Kumchon Pocket

Ready for the attack, the 1st US Cavalry Division had already evolved a plan of attack north. The 5th Cavalry Regiment was to swing eastward, then west, in a circular flanking movement designed to envelope enemy forces south of Kumchon, 25 kilometers north of the Parallel. The 7th Cavalry would cross the Yesong River to the west to seize the town of Paekchon and prepare to advance to the northwest to threaten Kumchon from the west. Meanwhile in the center the 8th Cavalry Regiment would attack up the main supply route to seize the town of Kumchon. The 7th Cavalry was to establish a blocking position at Hanpo-ri to trap the large enemy forces that the divisional commander expected the 8th and 5th Cavalry Regiments to be driving northward. Because the prospects of forcing a crossing of the Yesong River did not appear very promising with the support available, the Divisional Commander, Major General Gay and the division staff relied principally on the 8th and 5th Cavalry Regiments for initial success in the attack.

As the 1st US Cavalry Division moved into the Kaeosong area, securing the US Corps assembly area, it sent patrols across the Parallel late on the afternoon of 7 October, and others crossed the next day night. Then at 1000 hours on 9 October General Gay issued an order to continue the attack, and it began move up to the Parallel and started fighting its way northward.

North of the 38th Parallel the UN Command expected to meet newly activated enemy divisions that had been training in North Korea or elements of units that had engaged in the fighting around Seoul. According to intelligence sources the NK Communist Army might have as many as six divisions totalling 60,000 men in North Korean training centers. Actually, only the 19th and 27th NK Divisions, the backbones of the enemy's Pyongyang defense forces, defended the Kumchon—Namchonjom area north of Kaeosong. Both had been brigades activated in the summer and expanded in September to division status. They engaged in combat for the first time when UN forces crossed the Parallel. The 74th Regiment of the 43rd NK Division defended the Yesong River crossing site of Kaeosong. The 43rd NK
Division, organized in mid-September, had the task of defending the coastal area beyond the Yesong River. Some elements of the 17th NK Armored Division engaged in action just north of the Parallel in the zone of the 1st ROK Division, east of the 1st Cavalry Division.

For the following four days the operation plan of the 1st US Cavalry Division was carried out against surprisingly stiff enemy resistance, the stiffest along the entire Korean front.

The 8th US Cavalry Regiment, attempting to move up the main supply
route to Kumchon, ran into trouble from the very start. Both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were held up by heavy mortar and small arms fire as they attempted to move across the Parallel. The 8th Cavalry moved slowly forward. Over a heavily mined road, and against stiff resistance, it could not equal the swiftness of the previous days' leaps. The armored spearhead repeatedly came to a halt, waiting for Engineer troops to remove the mines.

On the division right, in the meantime, the 5th Cavalry Regiment was moving up slowly to the east. In its initial attack the regiment secured the hills dominating the road on both sides just above the 38th Parallel. On the 12th the regiment was delayed by well-built enemy roadblocks and a good defensive position on Hill 174, which dominated the valley to the south and winding road leading up to a small pass. The assault on this hill by the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment gave rise to another example of extraordinary heroism, on the part of 1st Lieutenant Samuel Coursen, a platoon leader of C Company. The action resulted in the award of the Medal of Honor to Lieutenant Coursen. During the night, C Company had worked its way almost into the pass, but as dawn lighted the scene it was discovered that no less than an enemy battalion held the commanding positions, and a foggy morning prevented air strikes against the enemy. Artillery could not be placed on them because of the advanced location of C Company. During the heavy fighting which ensued, Lieutenant Coursen went to the aid of a soldier who had entered an enemy emplacement mistakenly. The soldier escaped with a wound, but Lieutenant Coursen was later found dead. When his body was recovered seven enemy dead were discovered in the emplacement. By his actions, the life of the soldier was saved, a key position of the roadblock was eliminated and the men of his command were greatly inspired by his example.

Meanwhile, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade which had remained in the area of Kimpo Airfield for a few days began its movement northward on 11 October, under the covering fire of Sherman tanks, and advanced to northeast of Kaesong, where it was placed under command of the 1st Cavalry Division. General Gay's plan was for the brigade to move northwest through the mountains for a close-in envelopment of Kumchon. The road taken by the brigade was little more than a cart track, so its advance progress was delayed. Despite arduous effort in the mountains, the troops never got into the fight for Kumchon.

On the division left, on 8 October the 8th Cavalry Regiment was ordered to move up to the Yesong River. The regiment sent the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon for search of crossing sites, and for clearing enemy troops from the area southwest of Kaesong. The platoon found that the
bridge over the river on the Kaesong—Paekchon route was standing, although damaged. It was so weakened, however, that it could support only foot traffic. The platoon also discovered that enemy forces held the west side of the river. The 1st Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Clainos reported this full situation to the division and obtained the authority from it to attempt the crossing the next day. (See Sketch Map 18.)

On the afternoon of the 9th after a three-hour long artillery preparatory fire against the enemy positions on the west bank, a platoon of C Company crossed the bridge under the cover of barrage. During the night the men of B Company, 8th US Engineer Combat Battalion repaired the bridge and roadways under the enemy harrassing fire. The rest of the C Company crossed the river and occupied the hill on the right of the bridge. The artillery and mortar barrage had been unable to silence enemy mortars, and these fired heavy concentrations on the bridge during the 1st Battalion crossing, which took several hours to complete. When the supporting artillery barrage had to be lifted from the immediate environs of the bridge, once the 1st Battalion troops crossed to that side, casualties began to increase rapidly from enemy fire. In this crossing the 1st Battalion had suffered 78 casualties.

After dark the NK enemy launched a counterattack against the 1st Battalion, and the 7th Cavalry Regimental Commander, Colonel Harris, ordered the 2nd Battalion to hasten its crossing. The 2nd Battalion started infiltrating across the bridge under some mortar and small arms fire. On the other side, Lieutenant Colonel Gilmon A. Huff, the 2nd Battalion Commander, assembled his battalion on the south flank of the 1st Battalion. He then attacked west along the Paekchon road in a column of companies with G Company leading. However a heavy enemy counterattack came and continued throughout the night. Eventually the battalion seized the high ground southeast of the bridge and road. In this night battle Colonel Huff was hit in the shoulder, but he remained with his battalion throughout the night battle. By dawn he turned over command of the battalion to the Battalion Executive Officer who led it in a continuation of the attack westward. The battalion seized the Paekchon and the high ground north of the town in the afternoon.

On 11 October the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry crossed the Yesong River and secured the railroad and highway bridges at Hanpo-ri north of Kumchon and the road juncture the next day. That evening the 2nd Battalion joined the 3rd Battalion at Hanpo-ri.

The 1st ROK Division: In the meantime, the 1st ROK Division crossed
the Imjin River at Korangpo at dawn on the 11th, eastward of the 1st Cavalry Division, and attacked northwest on a road that converged with the one taken by the 5th US Cavalry. The 5th Cavalry Regiment in the late afternoon of 12 October was engaged in a fire fight with the enemy at the objective crossroads when advance elements of the 1st ROK Division arrived there from the southeast. The 5th Cavalry Regiment proceeded north until it was almost directly east of Kumchon. The regiment then turned to the west and pushed toward the objective, over a heavily mined road. By the evening of the 13th the regiment was approaching Kumchon.

On the main highway the enemy attempted to oppose the advance of the 8th Cavalry Regiment with his all available forces and weapons -- tanks, artillery, mortars, and small arms fire. In the day's series of attacks and counterattacks the 8th Cavalry and supporting arms destroyed eight enemy tanks; B Company, 70th Tank Battalion, accounted for seven of them without loss to itself. While the enemy force south of Kumchon fought off and prevented the 8th Cavalry from closing in on the town, a large enemy column of trucks and carts with an estimated 1,000 soldiers moved northward out of it on the road toward Namchonjom. At the Hanpo-ri bridge it ran into the 7th Cavalry roadblock. In the ensuing action, the 7th Cavalry, aided by air strikes, killed an estimated 500 and captured 201 of this force. Many enemy troops however, escaped into the hills northeast of the town.

On the division left a column of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry was ambushed by elements of the 43rd NK Division at the northern area of Paekchon on the night of the 12th. Colonel Stephens, the Regimental Commander of the 21st Infantry, the 24th US Division, received the information at Paekchon. Immediately thereupon 1 Company, 21st Infantry Regiment, which was on a blocking mission south of the ambush site was sent to the scene. On arrival it engaged and dispersed the enemy force with mortar and small arms fire, and captured 36 enemy. In this ambush the friendly forces lost 29 American and eight ROK soldiers, and they also destroyed four and damaged 14 vehicles.

Moving out under cover of darkness on 14 October, the 5th US Cavalry Regiment quietly and quickly moved toward the town of Kumchon from the east and south. Its 2nd Battalion drove the enemy units from the east toward the 7th Cavalry operating at Hanpo-ri. At noon it joined the elements of the 7th Cavalry above Hanpo-ri. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry linked up with the 8th Cavalry elements shortly afternoon approximately six kilometers south of Kumchon. The enemy fled northwest from the axis of the advance of the division. But not all could escape and the
enemy suffered many casualties and the division took many prisoners.

On the very day Kumchon fell to the 1st US Cavalry Division, 14 October, Kim Il-sung, the ringleader of the NK Communists, broadcast his harsh measures for future army discipline. He stated, "Do not retreat one step farther. Now we have no space in which to fall back." He farther directed that agitators and deserters be executed on the spot, irrespective of their positions in the army. To carry out this order, he directed that division and unit commanders to organize, by the following day, a special group, which he termed the "Supervising Army." But, sharply contrary to Kim's inveigh measures against the UN offensive, the Communist resistance along the main highway leading to Pyongyang suddenly began to collapse as the 19th and 27th NK Divisions were destroyed in the Kumchon area on 14 October.

Now, the Eighth Army smashed across Kaesong to the north, and the ROK's galloped northward to the east, formal resistance almost dissolved. With this brilliant success of the United Nations forces, there no longer existed an organized enemy front, and only remnants of the NK Communist army fled toward the Yalu.

The II ROK Corps: The II ROK Corps, on the other hand, with the 6th, 7th, and 8th ROK Divisions under its command, began the new attack toward north through the center of the peninsula.

The Corps was to attack north two divisions abreast, the 8th ROK Division on the left and the 6th ROK Division on the right, with the 7th ROK Division in reserve. The 8th ROK Division, after crossing the 38th Parallel, promptly seized Chorwon on 11 October and further advanced up to the Pyonggang-Uichon line by 14 October. It was to continue the attack toward Singye and Pyongyang in conjunction with the advance of the I US Corps right flank. But, on the 14th, the division was ordered not attack toward Pyongyang, and instead, it was to advance through Koksan—Yangdok—Songchon—Kangdong, then thurn southwest to envelop Pyongyang.

In the meantime, the 6th ROK Division, after brokethrough the 38th Parallel in the Hwachon Reservoir area on 6 October, had occupied Kumwha and Pyonggang by 14 October, and thereafter continued the attack, toward Pyongyang from the east after passing through Shinkosan and Wonsan on the east coast. Since then onward these two ROK divisions, the 8th and 6th, had to compete as if in running race, because the II ROK Corps was also called for taking part in enveloping and capturing Pyongyang, the capital of the NK Communists. The units of these two eventually met each other at Yangdok, a communication center in between Pyongyang and Wonsan. From
thereupon they struggled to get through the one-way road leading into Pyongyang in an effort to become the first winner in capturing the enemy’s capital city. However, both division units falling into the confused conditions among themselves, due to the over-crowd congestion of troops on the single route of maneuver, missed the chance to attack into Pyongyang, thus ending their hard-race in a draw. They were ordered to turn their attack directions directly toward the Yalu River through the central northern Korea.

On 15 October, just as the Korean War was turning further favorably to the UN forces, U.S. President Truman met General MacArthur on Wake Island to discuss the final phases of the action. In the conference, there was very little talk about the fighting. It was taken for granted that the war was almost over and that now the main concern was the rehabilitation of Korea, north and south, most of which lay in ruins. But it was not what was talked about. Their primary concern was the future prospect of the Korean War whether or not any feasibility that Red China might come in directly to involve itself in the war, if the UN forces get closer to the northern border. General MacArthur had told President Truman at the meeting that there was “very little” possibility of the Red Chinese entering the Korean War. And while these men talked on the island, the hordes of Red China, marching by night, were streaming across the Yalu into the high land of North Korea.

The X US Corps

It had been known for a nearly month that the waters of the east coast were dangerous for navigation. Evidence began to mount that the NK enemy was mining the coastal waters of North Korea, and first mine was discovered of Chinnampo on the west coast in early September. But it was not until late September that more definite information was acquired the hard way when the US destroyer Brush and the ROK mine sweeper YMS 509 were damaged by east coast mines.

Although the exact date remained unknown, it was a safe assumption that enemy mining activities, beginning in late July or early August, were heavily speeded after the Inchon landing, which aroused the enemy to the peril of further amphibious operations. But the extent and the location of these sea mine fields were little known to the UN forces.

As a result of a series of conferences a Advance Force Joint Task Force (JTF) was formed and simultaneously was ordered proceed to the waters off Wonsan as soon as possible. After careful consideration, the mine sweeping
task got underway commencing on 10 October. The heavy task of the mine sweeping was finally ended on 25 October.

The X Corps began a quiet, administrative landing at 0730 hours on 26 October, with the 1st US Marine Division in the leading. At 1000 hours 27 October the command post of the 1st Marine Division closed aboard the USS Mt. McKinley and opened in Wonsan. By the close of 28 October all combat elements of the division were ashore.

In retrospect, the landing at Wonsan was, thus, ended in a waste of labor, because it was nothing more than a mere administrative one. General MacArthur did not expect that the ROK units under the I ROK Corps could make such a lighting advance deep into the Wonsan—Hamhung area within such a short period of time. The whole units of the X US Corps, perhaps, might be able to move to the Wonsan area more quickly and with less cost of labor, if they had taken inland movement directly from Seoul to Wonsan. In short, the significance of the Wonsan landing was lost than what General MacArthur originally had planned.

Landing craft approaching beach at Wonsan on 26 October.
Advance to the North

In the meantime, the 7th US Infantry Division had remained idly afloat at Pusan for ten days. Finally, it received orders to proceed to Iwon, northeast of Wonsan, and to unload there across the beaches. It is obvious, at that time, that a trans-peninsular drive by X Corps was no longer necessary after mid-October. And General Almond, the X Corps Commander, decided to land the 7th Division as close as possible to its axis of advance inland toward North Korea’s northern border.

On 27 October the elements of the 7th Division left Pusan and two days later, on 29 October, it landed at Iwon administratively after the fast mine-sweepers Doyle and Endicott had found no traces of mines in that harbor. Nor was there any trace of the enemy since the Capital ROK Division had moved through the city several days before.

When the troops of the 7th Division reached Iwon’s shore at 1120 hours on 29 October, they were greeted by the outstretched hands of their commanding officer, Major General Barr. General Barr said at the time that his division would go to the Manchurian border by way of Pukchong—Pungsan—Hyesanjin.

By nightfall of the first day, more than 27,000 of 7th US Division troops had dug in for the night in the frostbitten hills and rice fields around Iwon. Except for most of its tanks, the division completed unloading there on 9 November.

Section 4. The Capture of Pyongyang (15—20 October 1950)

By mid-October 1950 the I US Corps, leading the Eighth US Army’s attack on Pyongyang, had penetrated roughly 32 kilometers into North Korea. With the end of the Kumchon area battle in great success, in its initial offensive north of the 38th Parallel, the I US Corps was now in position to accelerate the attack momentum with increasing speed on to Pyongyang, the first main objective of the Eighth Army advance. However, the speed of the advance was somewhat retarded by the complicated logistical problems related to the readying of the X US Corps for an amphibious landing elsewhere in North Korea.

Nevertheless, the I US Corps, continued the offensive spearheading the EUSAK advance operations. Still maintaining the same attack formation, with the 1st US Cavalry Division as main attack on the center, the 24th US
Division and the 1st ROK Division on the both flanks as the secondary efforts, the Corps attack was immediately resumed on 15 October.

The 1st US Cavalry Division, commanded by Major General Hobert R. Gay, resumed that attack north from Hap-ri on Namchonjom along the main highway, preceded by airstrikes on the objective town at 0700 hours. The division attack was spearheaded by the 7th Cavalry Regiment (Colonel William W. Harris). Even after the airstrikes, the enemy resistance was considerably fierce. After hard fighting the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry seized Namchonjom suffering ten men killed and 30 wounded in action. On the contrary, according to the prisoners the command post of the 19th NK Division was completely destroyed by the friendly artillery killing the enemy division chief of staff. Most of the enemy troops in and around the town were either killed or wounded, and others were flighted scaring out of their wits. The next day the 7th US Cavalry also occupied Sohung. The 27th British Brigade passed through Sohung in the same day to move up on Sariwon, while the 5th US Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Marcel B. Crombez, as well as the 19th Regiment of the 24th US Division advanced westward.

On the other hand, the 24th US Infantry Division, commanded by Major General John J. Church, had also attacked on Sariwon, by flanking through the western flank. The advance of the 21st US Regiment, with Colonel Richard W. Stepens in command, now neared to Haeju after taking Paekchon and Yonan on the 16th. On the following afternoon, the 17th the regiment occupied Haeju despite encountering heavy enemy resistance in 300-strong.

As for the 27th British Brigade, passing the 7th US Cavalry Regiment line, directly maneuvered toward Sariwon in the morning of the 17th. Thus, the UN Allies were now being engaged in a bitter competition to gain the first place of honorable race: The capture of Pyongyang.

In the meantime, the 1st ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, had made a spectacular advance. Despite encountering fierce enemy opposition with tanks and artillery in support, particulary in the vicinity of Miu-dong, it had reached Suan, 65 air kilometers southeast of Pyongyang, by 16 October.

The 27th British Brigade also made a rapid progress in its attack. During the 17th, supported by Sherman tanks, the British units entered Sariwon after the Argylls Battalion experienced a stiff resistance south of Suan. About 1900 hours in the afternoon the Australian Battalion passed through the Argylls in Sariwon and further advanced heading for Hwangju, a bottleneck of Pyongyang.
That day, while the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade attacked on Sariwon along the main highway, the 7th US Cavalry Regiment with the 1st Battalion in the lead hurried along the poor secondary roads through the hills. At 1600 hours when the Cavalry column was about five kilometers from Hwangju and the main highway above Sariwon it received a message from Major General Gay dropped from a light aircraft. The message said that the roads out of Sariwon were crowded with hundreds of the NK Communist troops, and it directed Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Clainos, the 1st Battalion Commander of the 7th US Cavalry, to have one battalion turn to meet the
British troops and help trap the enemy concentration in mass in the Sariwon area, while another battalion turned right and held Hwangju. The 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry turned as directed to meet the British outfit and at the same time the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry (with Lieutenant Colonel Gilmon A. Huff in command) moved on to hold Hwangju. As a result, the 1st Battalion sang in triumph, thus capturing more than 1,700 enemy soldiers in the one spot.

On the other hand, the 19th Regiment of the 24th US Division, which was advancing on the left flank of the I US Corps, had also reached the southern outskirts of Sariwon by 1700 hours, but was ordered not to move into the town because the British troops had already seized it. With the capture of Sariwon by the 27th Commonwealth Brigade under the operational control of the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 1st US Cavalry Division now gained the initiative to attack on to Pyongyang taking a halo from the 1st ROK Division which had been raced to take Pyongyang first.

Thus, as of 17 October, in the I US Corps advance sector the 1st ROK Division, the 1st US Cavalry Division (with the 27th British Brigade attached) and the 24th US Division had cleared the whole southwest and southern areas which formed an enemy’s outer defense line for Pyongyang. In other words, the 1st ROK Division had advanced and secured the Yul-li area and the 1st US Cavalry Division had secured the Hwangju area, thus compressing the encircling net as close as within 40 kilometers to Pyongyang.

From there onward the 1st US Cavalry Division and the 1st ROK Division would fall into a bitter competition in the attack to capture Pyongyang first. In addition, there was another rival engaging in a hurry attack to be the first to capture Pyongyang also. The 7th ROK Division of the II ROK Corps, which had been rushing westward from the vicinity of Wonsan on the east coast in an attempt to take part in a pincer-envelopment for the capture of Pyongyang, now had reached Suan on the right of the 1st ROK Division.

An envelopment formation for Pyongyang was now being readied to attack. The main attack in the 1st US Corps operations for Pyongyang would seemingly be the 1st US Cavalry Division. This division would attack from Hwangju in the center by breaking through considerably a flat and open area, while the 24th US Division would attack northward from Haeju in the westmost sector. The 1st ROK Division would make a flanking attack on the right by maneuvering through southeast, east and northeast of Pyongyang. These two American and two ROK divisions would engage themselves in a cutthroat running race to lead the van so as to be the first arrival at Pyongyang. (See Sketch Map 19.)
Race for Pyongyang

It had become clear by the time the UN forces reached Sariwon that the remaining Communist forces could not attempt a strong defense of Pyongyang without incurring total destruction or capture. The enemy forces by this time not only had to contend with the I US Corps' troops, approaching the enemy's capital city along the main Seoul—Pyongyang axis from the south, but also the enveloping movements of the ROK Army forces from the southeast and east. Some of these forces, if they continued their rapid advance for a few days more, would almost certainly cut on the north to highways and exists from the doomed city. Then Pyongyang would be surrounded and any forces retained in and around the city for its defense would face either destruction or surrender.

The rapid advances of the ROK Army troops from the southeast and east were far more than the Eighth Army expected. The flanking operation originally conceived by General MacArthur for the X US Corps after it landed on the east coast at Wonsan, had, in fact, been carried out by the ROK Army units under Eighth Army's operational control before any elements of the X Corps landed in the east.

By evening of 17 October four ROK divisions were racing each other, as well as the US and British units of the I US Corps, to be first in reaching Pyongyang. The 1st ROK Division commanded by Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, only twenty-four kilometers away to the southeast, was closest of all UN units to the city of Pyongyang. On its right flank, the 7th ROK Division was swing toward Pyongyang from the east. Still farther east the 8th ROK Division had almost reached Yangdok in the central mountains where it would turn west on Pyongyang—Wonsan lateral road. And finally the 6th ROK Division was just short of Yangdok on this road, eighty air kilometers east of Pyongyang, after having turned west on 15 October from Wonsan on the coast, which it had reached by the road from Hwachon. Thus, the I US Corps was nearing Pyongyang the south and southeast, the 7th ROK Division from the southeast, and the 8th and 6th ROK Divisions from the northeast. With about seven UN divisions converging on Pyongyang, obviously the NK Communist Army in its state of depletion, disorganization, and demoralization could not hold the city.

However, on 17 October, an order from the UN Command defined that no UN forces, except for the ROK forces, were authorized to advance north beyond a line connecting Chongju—Kunu-ri—Yongwon—Hamhung—Hungnam. In consequence of the new orders, the 8th and 6th ROK Divisions
were ordered by the II ROK Corps not to attack toward Pyongyang, instead
turn to advance northeastward, because no ROK Army forces other than the
1st ROK Division were authorized to advance on to Pyongyang. The 8th
ROK Division thereupon turned the brunt of its attack toward northeast
of Pyongyang along the Koksan—Yangdok—Songchon line, and by 18
October it reached Kangdong 40 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang.

According to the estimates made by the Eighth Army G-2 on 17 October
the NK Communist forces had less than 8,000 effectiveness of the 32nd and
17th NK Divisions available for defense of Pyongyang. It was apparent that
the enemy would undertake a token defense of the city while the main force
withdrew northward across the Chongchon River for further operations.

The 7th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division was the unit far-
thest north on 17 October, so General Gay ordered it to resume the attack on
Pyongyang at daylight 18 October. The 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry
at Hwangju was chosen to become the assault battalion. The battalion, on
the 18th, crossed the ford in Hwangju and began advance. Resistance was
light until the leading elements of the battalion arrived in front of the high
ground south of Hukkyo-ri, halfway to Pyongyang. There enemy high
velocity gun and heavy 120-mm. mortar fire struck the column. An enemy
force estimated to number about 800 men held the prepared enemy defensive
positions. Even though twenty tanks of C Company, 70th US Tank Battalion
supported the battalion, the men of the battalion had to contend with the fire
from well dug-in enemy tanks and a mined roadway. The fight became in-
tense and the progress of the attack was slow. General Gay, dissatisfied
with the progress, ordered the Regimental Commander, Colonel James K.
Woolnough, who had temporarily replaced Colonel Harris, to start the other
two battalions on flank movements against the enemy held ridge. General
Gay at this time planned to employ the 5th Cavalry to lead north while letting
the 7th Cavalry to make a full regimental attack on the Hukkyo-ri position.

At 0500 on 19 October Lieutenant Colonel Paul Clifford's 2nd Battalion,
5th Cavalry Regiment, moved out of Hwangju. When it arrived at the 7th
Cavalry lines at Hukkyo-ri on the morning of 18 October the troops of the 7th
Cavalry had just repulsed an enemy counterattack.

The 5th Cavalry now passed through the 7th Cavalry and continued to ad-
Vance toward Pyongyang with F Company commanded by 1st Lieutenant
James H. Bell in the lead. Flights of jet planes coursed overhead in advance
F Company, and on at least two occasions, they helped supporting artillery
reduce enemy forces that threatened to delay its advance. The Regimental
Commander Colonel Crombez, and a small command group followed immediately behind F Company most of the morning and pushed it hard.

When the leading company reached the Mujincho River, a tributary of the Taedong at the southern edge of Pyongyang, the column halted. Enemy troops from behind a 20-foot embankment on the north side defended the highway bridge over the river with three antitank guns. F Company was delayed there for about half an hour until their mortar knocked out the antitank guns. F Company then crossed the Mujincho River and entered the southern edge of Pyongyang just after 1100 on 19 October.

Almost simultaneously with the 1st Cavalry Division’s arrival at Pyongyang the 1st ROK Division entered the city on the Sibyon-ni—Pyongyang road at a point northeast of the 1st Cavalry Division. As the two UN divisions were driving hard into Pyongyang the NK enemy made a stronger fight against the 1st ROK Division than against the 1st Cavalry Division, possibly because it was closer to the city and the more immediate threat. Also, the road on which the 1st ROK Division approached Pyongyang was heavily mined with both antipersonnel and antitank mines. These enemy obstacles delayed the advance of the division. Otherwise, the chance was excellent for the 1st ROK Division to be first into Pyongyang.

By dark on 19 October most of the 1st ROK Division was in the main part of the city north of the Taedong River. The 8th Regiment of the 7th ROK Division also swung into north Pyongyang from the east and was in possession of Kim Il-sung University in the northern part of the city by 1700. By 1000 hours, the 20th, the entire city had been secured and Communist troops streamed out of the city to the north. Soviet advisors and diplomats had fled, too, abandoning in their haste quantities of Russian food and wine, as well as a significant accumulation of posters, pictures, and busts of Stalin.

Long before the UN forces entered the city Communist boss Kim Il-sung, having exhorted his troops to defend Pyongyang to the last man, fled from the city and established a temporary capital at Sinuiju on the Yalu River.

Now, with Pyongyang in UN forces’ hands General Gay established his 1st Cavalry Division headquarters in the Communist Military Academy sixteen kilometers southwest of Pyongyang on the Chinnampo road, and disposed his three regiments: The 5th Cavalry in the southern outskirts of Pyongyang; the 8th Cavalry in the northern outskirts; and the 7th Cavalry at Chinnampo.

On 21 October a touching and revealing ceremony occurred on the Pyongyang airfield. General MacArthur had flown in from Tokyo to confer briefly with Generals Walker and Stratemeyer after the fall of the Communist capital. In the course of his brief visit he reviewed F Company, 5th Cavalry
Regiment, which had been the first American unit to enter Pyongyang. He asked all men in the company who had landed with it in Korea ninety-six days earlier, when it numbered nearly 200 men, to step forward. Only five men stepped forward; three of them had been wounded.

Section 5.

The Advance to the Chongchon River
(20—24 October 1950)

The 187th Airborne Regiment’s Attack
(20—22 October 1950)

When the UN ground forces crossed the 38th Parallel and drove on Pyongyang, General MacArthur held the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Colonel Frank S. Bowen, Jr., in his GHQ reserve at Kimpo Airfield near Seoul. Originally, in his strategy to encircle the fleeing enemy forces in a pincer effort, the Eighth Army from south and the X US Corps units from east toward northwest after landing at Wonsan, General MacArthur had planned to trap as many of the NK Communist forces as possible. Now, on 18 October, when the fall of Pyongyang, the NK Communists’ capital, was at hand within a matter of hours, General MacArthur ordered the 187th US RCT to drop about 48 kilometers north of Pyongyang on the 20th, in order to cut off NK Communist officials and troops, and to rescue American and ROK prisoners of war who it was assumed would be hurriedly evacuated northward from Pyongyang ahead of the advancing UN forces.

This vertical assault from air far to the rear of the enemy frontlines was to form a complete envelopment from all directions to seal off the enemy’s escape routes. Along the coast in the Western Sea the UN naval forces were also in action to support the grand operations.

Shortly before noon of 20 October at Kimpo Airfield, the 187th Airborne RCT loaded into 113 planes, C-119’s of the 314th Troop Carrier Group and C-47’s of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron based in Japan. There were to be two airdrops, the principal one near Sukchon and the other near Sunchon. Two drop zones would be about 20 kilometers apart.

The troop carriers for the Sukchon drop approached the drop zone, fighter planes preceding them rocketing and strafing the ground. At about 1400 hours the first troops began dropping from the lead planes over Sukchon. There was only occasional sniper fire came into the drop zone. This first
Advance to the North

drop put Colonel Bowen and 1,470 men of the 1st Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and engineers, medical, and service troops on the ground in the drop zone, southeast of Sukchon. Seventy-four tons of equipment were dropped with the men. After the troop drop came that of the heavy equipment organic to the airborne infantry regiment. Everything was landed in good condition. This was the first time heavy equipment had been dropped in combat, and it was the first time C-119's had been used in a combat parachute operation. (See Sketch Map 20.)

The 1st Battalion, against only light resistance, seized Hill 97 east of Sukchon, where Colonel Bowen established his command post, and Hill 904 north of the town, cleared the town itself, and set up a roadblock north of it.

In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion had jumped in the same zone, turned
south, taken up defensive positions on low hills about three kilometers south of the town, and established roadblocks across the highway and railroad at that point. It seized its objectives by 1700 hours, killing five enemy soldiers and capturing forty-two others without loss to itself.

In the Sunchon drop zone the 2nd Battalion at 1420 began parachuting on to the drop zone, about three kilometers southwest of Sunchon. The battalion secured its objective by night against virtually no resistance. Two companies established roadblocks south and west of Sunchon. A third advanced to the town and established contact there with elements of the 6th ROK Division which had reached Sunchon from the southeast in its push toward the Chongchon River.

During this and succeeding days, a total of about 4,000 troops and more than 600 tons of equipment and supplies were dropped at Sukchon and Sunchon. Included in the equipment were twelve 105-mm. howitzers, 39 jeeps, 38 1/4 ton trailers, four 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, four 3/4 ton trucks, and 584 tons of ammunition, gasoline, water, rations, and other supplies.
General MacArthur, after witnessing the parachute troops land and assemble successfully, commented to reporters that the airborne landing seemed to have been a complete surprise to the enemy. He estimated that 30,000 NK Communist troops, perhaps half of those remaining in north Korea, were caught in the trap between the 187th Airborn Regiment on the north and the 1st US Cavalry and 1st ROK Divisions at Pyongyang on the south, and that they would be destroyed or captured. The next day in Tokyo General MacArthur predicted that "the war is very definitely coming to an end shortly."

This optimism of General MacArthur, however, was not supported by the events of succeeding days. The airborne troops had not cut off any sizable part of the Communist puppet regime officials or military forces as they had already left Pyongyang on 12 October. Most of the American and ROK prisoners had been removed into the remote part of North Korea.

**Yongyu Battle**

*(22 October 1950)*

While the NK Communist resistance was negligible the most important action growing out of the airdrop occurred on 21–22 October in the zone of the 3rd Battalion, 187th Regimental Combat Team, about thirteen kilometers south of Sukchon in the vicinity of Opa-ri. At 0900, 21 October, the 3rd Battalion started south from its roadblock position toward Pyongyang in two combat teams. As I company reached Opa-ri, an estimated enemy battalion, employing 120-mm. mortars and 40-mm. guns, attacked it. After a battle lasting two and a half hours, the Communist troops overran two Platoons and forced I Company, with ninety men missing, to withdraw to Hill 281 west of the railroad. The enemy, however, did not press their advantage but withdrew to their own defensive positions on the high ground around Opa-ri.

In the meantime, K Company, advancing south along the highway, also encountered an estimated enemy battalion about one and a half kilometers north of Yongyu. After sharp fight this enemy force withdrew south and east of the town to defensive positions on high ground, and K Company continued on into Yongyu and to Hill 163, just north of the town. Between Yongyu and Opa-ri is a line of high hills offering the best defensive ground before the Chongchon River is reached. Here the 389th NK Regiment, about 2,500 strong, had taken up defensive position. The enemy regiment had been the last force to leave Pyongyang. Its mission was to fight a delaying action
against UN troops expected to advance north from Pyongyang. Now, suddenly, it found itself attacked by two separate UN forces from the rear.

The 239th NK Regiment, at midnight, attempted to break out to the north. In its first attack the enemy employed a small group and the small group broke into the K Company command post and immediately a close-quarter fight ensued. Eventually, the enemy soldiers were either killed or driven off by the men of K Company. In the fight both K Company commander and executive officers were wounded.

In two other attacks after midnight the enemy finally forced the men of K Company at the roadblock near Hill 163 to withdraw. Aware of this withdrawal, the enemy attacked again at 0400. Then, at 0545, the enemy run blindly into the 3rd Battalion command post. Again the enemy troops were turned back suffering very heavy casualties. In spite of these heavy losses the enemy renewed his attack, about 300 men striking L Company and 450 men assaulting Headquarters Company. At this point the airborne troops sent a radio message describing their situation and requesting help.

At this critical moment it was most heartening to the troops of the 3rd Battalion that the troops of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade were to come from close at hand as a result of a general advance northward of the I US Corps. On the morning of 22 October the Australian Battalion of the Commonwealth Brigade joined the Yongyu battle from the south. The enemy was practically destroyed.

The 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne Regiment, reported that it alone had killed 805 of the enemy and captured 681 prisoners in the Yongyu battle. Caught between the airborne troops and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, the 239th NK Regiment was completely destroyed. That afternoon the 3rd Battalion returned to Sukchon with the British following it. There the 27th British Brigade relieved the 187th Airborne Regiment in its positions.

While the Yongyu battle was in progress, the 2nd Battalion, 187th Airborne Regiment, remained relatively inactive in its drop zone at Sunchon. The 6th ROK Division performed most of the work in clearing the town.

On 23 October the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team returned to Pyongyang, traveling by the secondary road through Sunchon. Altogether, the 187th Airborne Regiment suffered 46 jump casualties and 65 battle casualties in the Sukchon — Sunchon operations. It captured 3,818 Communist prisoners in the entire operation.
I US Corps Continues to Attack

On 20 October, the day Pyongyang was secured, Major General Milburn, I US Corps Commander, had ordered his corps to continue the attack to the MacArthur Line, a line roughly fifty-six kilometers south of the Yalu River. The 24th US Division, with the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade attached, was to lead this attack. On the right of the 24th US Division three ROK Divisions -- the 1st, under I US Corps, and 6th and 8th under II ROK Corps, in that order eastward -- were ready to join in the attack northward.

At noon on 21 October, in this general Eighth Army advance, the British brigade crossed the Taedong River at Pyongyang and headed north on the main highway running toward Sukchon, with the immediate mission of reaching the Chongchon River. On the evening of the 21st, the British brigade approached close to Yongyu, the next morning the 3rd Australian Battalion of the brigade which was in the lead, got heavily involved in the Yongyu battle with elements of the 239th NK Regiment. This action for the Australians was one of rifle, grenade, and bayonet in a apple orchard just north of Yongyu along roadsides. (See Situation Map 7, Appendix VI.)

In this hand-to-hand fight the Communist troops lost about 270 killed and more than 200 captured; incredibly the Australians had only about 7 wounded. Enemy survivors fled westward. The 1st Middlesex Battalion of the British brigade now passed through the Australians and, with the tanks, joined the 187th Airborne force at 1100.

In the meantime on 22 October C Company, 6th US Medium Tank Battalion, designated Task Force Elephant, started from Pyongyang by way of Sunchon for Kujang-dong, halfway on Sunchon—Huichon highway, to block the railroad there. Passing through Sunchon, the task force arrived at its objective at 2200 and then turned west to Kunu-ri, about 32 kilometers downstream in the valley of the Chongchon River. The 1st ROK Division followed the task force.

On 23 October the 1st ROK Division started from Kunu-ri down the valley on the Chongchon. Near Anju, D Company tanks knocked out two T-34 tanks and two self-propelled guns, and captured one tank intact. Just before noon a platoon of tanks seized the damaged wooden bridge over the Chongchon River northeast of Anju. A tank patrol sent to Sinanju found the Sinanju bridges across the Chongchon destroyed.

After the Anju bridge had been repaired the 1st ROK Division crossed the Chongchon River on 23—24 October. The division then continued its attack northward toward Unsan. The 6th US Medium Tank Battalion took the lead.
Meanwhile, advance elements of the 24th US Division arrived an assembly area north of Pyongyang the evening of 22 October, and there the division assumed control of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, the 89th US Medium Tank Battalion, and the 90th US Field Artillery Battalion. Meanwhile, the British brigade had hurried northward from Sukchon. On 23 October it arrived at Sinanju only a few hours after the 1st ROK Division tank patrol entered the town. By this time the 24th US Division completed its move to Sunan, about nineteen kilometers north of Pyongyang.

On the 24th the 1st British Middlesex Battalion started crossing the Chongchon River at Sinanju in assault boats. The rest of the brigade and vehicles crossed that night over the Anju bridge. The 3rd US Engineer Combat Battalion now worked to clear the highway to Sinanju, and to improve it for carrying the main part of Eighth Army's logistical support in the projected drive to the Manchurian border.

II ROK Corps on the Right

While the I US Corps troops advanced to the Chongchon River, two ROK divisions on its right also took up the advance. The 6th ROK Division turned northeast from Kunu-ri up the Chongchon River on the road that led through Huichon to Kanggye. On east the 8th ROK Division reached Tokchon at midnight of 23 October. There it turned north and struck the Chongchon at Kujang-dong two days later. Both the 6th and 8th ROK Divisions under II ROK Corps were now in exceedingly mountainous country. Near Kunu-ri the 6th ROK Division captured two trains, one carrying 8 tanks, and, farther on, near Kujang-dong, it captured 50 boxcars of ammunition. The division had a hard fight with an estimated regiment of NK Communist troops south of Huichon but dispersed them and entered Huichon on the night of 23 October. There it captured 20 T-34 tanks. At Huichon the 6th ROK Division turned west, and later north, its objective being Chosan on the Yalu River. It was now far in front of any UN division.

During the same period the I ROK Corps on the east front had fought its way northward equally far on the east coast to capture Wonsan, Hamhung, Hungnam and Hongwon. And in the closing days of this period the X US Corps had moved amphibiously around the length of Korea to appear off Wonsan for an imminent landing and subsequent operations in that part of Korea. This Eighth Army — ROK Army — X Corps attack which moved the front northward more than 480 kilometers in less than six weeks had virtually destroyed the NK Communist forces.
CHAPTER XII  
THE ADVANCE TO THE YALU  
(25 October—26 November 1950)

It should be mentioned, before entering this chapter, that until 17 October 1950 General MacArthur's orders, based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 27 September 1950, had restrained UN ground forces other than ROK forces from operating north of a line extending from Chongju on the west through Kunu-ri and Yongwon to Hamhung on the east coast. On 17 October General MacArthur, in his UNC Operations Order 4, lifted this restriction and advanced northward the line below which all UN ground forces could operate. This new line, confirmed in a message to all commanders on 19 October, extended generally from Sonchon through Koin-dong—Pyongwon—Pungsan to Songjin on the east coast. It was generally forty-eight to sixty-four kilometers south of the Manchurian border across the greater part of the peninsula, and was within the spirit and meaning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 27 September, which was still in effect. In the policy laid down in this directive only ROK forces were to be used in the provinces of Korea bordering on the Yalu River.

But on 24 October, as the leading UN forces crossed the Chongchon River, General MacArthur issued an order to his ground commanders in Korea which changed all earlier orders drastically. He now removed all restrictions on the use of UN ground forces south of the border, and instructed his commanders to press forward to the northern limits of Korea, utilizing all their forces. Thus, when Eighth Army began what it thought would be the last series of maneuvers to end the war it did so under orders radically different from those that had so far guided its operations in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff demanded to General MacArthur an explanation for violating the directive of 27 September. For the demand General MacArthur said that the ROK forces could not handle the situation by themselves, that he felt he had enough latitude under existing directives to issue the order, and that, furthermore, the whole subject had been covered in the Wake Island Conference.

Although it is clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that General MacArthur had surely violated their basic 27 September directive, they did
not countermand his orders to go to the Yalu River. When the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade crossed the Chongchon River, that unit, the 24th US Division which followed, and all the other UN forces deployed in Korea, were authorized to go to the Yalu River—to the extreme northern limits of Korea.

Section 1. The Eighth US Army Operations (25 October—6 November 1950)

The Eighth Army operation above the Chongchon River began essentially as a continuation of the pursuit that had started with the breakout from the Naktong Perimeter; the I US Corps was on the left, the II ROK Corps on the right. Within the I US Corps, the 24th US Division (the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade attached) was on the left, the 1st ROK Division on the right. The UN Command expected little organized opposition from the enemy and emphasized a speedy advance to the northern border. Several columns were to strike out northward with little or no physical contact between them. The advance was not to be closely coordinated; each column was free to advance as fast and as far as possible without respect to gains made by others.

**I US Corps** (25 October—1 November)

The 24th US Division: Westward in the coastal area above the Chongchon, the pursuit seemed to be going forward with success. On the evening of 25 October the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade leading the 24th US Division crossed the Taeryong River, one of the Chongchon River's tributaries, at and near Pakchon. On the west side it met enemy opposition. On the 27th the 1st Middlesex Battalion led the brigade attack, and about four and a half kilometers west of the river engaged an enemy force in a severe battle. In the course of it, air strikes and artillery preparations helped the troops by knocking out ten NK Communist T-34 tanks and two self-propelled guns. After this battle, the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Basil A. Coad, adopted a brigade formation better suited to heavy combat. On the 28th, after a 24-kilometer advance, the brigade stopped about five kilometers from Chongju.

The next morning, 29 October, the 3rd Australian Battalion attacked
Advance to the Yalu

toward Chongju. Aerial observers reported at least four enemy tanks with infantry troops on the ridge overlooking the road at the pass. In strikes against these positions with napalm and rockets, the US Air Force destroyed four tanks. Then the Australians gained the pass and the adjacent ridge lines. That evening the NK enemy attacked the Australians there in the two hours preceding midnight, employing self-propelled gun and tank support. Australian bazooka teams destroyed three enemy tanks. Supporting American tank fire helped repel the enemy attack. The Australians lost nine killed and thirty wounded in the battle before Chongju. The next morning the British Argylls entered the town of Chongju.

That evening, 30 October, the NK enemy high velocity shells landed in the vicinity of the Australians' command post, one of which exploded outside the tent of Colonel Green and wounded him seriously. Three days later, at the surgical hospital at Anju, the much admired Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Green, the 3rd Australian Battalion Commander died. Lieutenant Colonel I.B. Ferguson succeeded him in command of the battalion.

Brigadier Coad, on 30 October, asked General Church, commanding the 24th US Division, to pass a regiment through his British troops at Chongju because they were very tired. Acceding at once, General Church ordered the 21st Regiment of his division to lead the advance.

At dark that evening, the 2nd Battalion of the 21st US Regiment passed through the British lines and headed north past the burning houses of Chongju. Beyond Chongju the men of the 2nd Battalion could hear the rumble of withdrawing enemy tanks. At 0200 hours on high ground about four kilometers west of the village of Kwaksan seven enemy tanks and about 500 NK Communist infantry troops tried to ambush the battalion column. The nearest enemy tank opened fire with its cannon at 300 yards' range. Other enemy tanks joined the fire, several of the enemy shells hitting American tanks. The American tanks now returned fire at the enemy gun flashes. Colonel Stephens, the Regimental Commander, and Colonel Perez, the Battalion Commander, from their radio jeeps directed the battle that was now joined. By dawn the NK Communists abandoned their position, leaving behind fifty dead, five knocked-out tanks, one self-propelled gun, and seven antitank guns. After daylight an air attack destroyed two more enemy tanks, and the battalion troops captured two on flatcars.

After this night battle, the 21st Regiment encountered only light resistance. The 1st Battalion of the regiment, by noon of 1 November, reached the outskirts of Chonggo-dong, about twenty-seven air kilometers from Sinuiju and the Yalu River.
There, acting on orders from the 24th US Division, Colonel Stephens ordered the 1st Battalion to halt, consolidate its position, and be prepared to defend in depth. The order from the 24th Division for the regiment to halt, which in turn had come from the 1 US Corps, hit the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, "like a bolt out of the blue."

Advancing behind the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, the 5th US Regiment had been the first unit of the 24th Division to cross the Chongchon River. It continued on and crossed Taeryong River above Pakchon on 28 October. From there it marched northward on the right of the British troops toward Taechon. On the 29th in a heavy battle it and supporting air units destroyed nine enemy tanks and four self-propelled guns. The 5th Regiment then entered Taechon. Two of 89 prisoners taken were Chinese, the first captured by American troops in the Korean War. They turned out to be deserters or stragglers from their units. There were no CCF units in contact with the 5th Regiment at Taechon.

From Taechon, the 5th US Regiment turned northwest toward
Kusong. An enemy force estimated to number 5,000 to 6,000 men, supported by tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery, and mortars stubbornly opposed the advance. But the 5th Regiment, strongly supported by tactical air, captured Kusong just after noon of the 31st. The regimental attack the next day secured the road junction a few kilometers north of Kusong. In this action the regiment killed an estimated 300 to 400 Communist soldiers, and destroyed two self-propelled guns, eight 76-mm. howitzers, eight mortars, six antitank guns, and five machine guns. Advanced elements of the 5th Regiment were about sixteen kilometers north of Kusong at midday, 1 November, when a liaison plane came over and dropped a message, as it had to the 21st Regiment at Chonggo-dong along the coastal road. This ordered the 5th Regiment to stop and hold in place.

The uncertainty of the 21st and 5th US Regiments during the afternoon and evening of 1 November over their future courses of action was resolved an hour before midnight when the 24th US Division ordered them to withdraw toward the Chongchon. Mystified and disappointed, the men of the two regiments traveled back toward the Chongchon on the night of 1–2 November. They were to learn later that the explanation for this, to them, puzzling development lay in events that had taken place in the east. The day before, 31 October, General Walker verbally had ordered the I US Corps Commander to limit the 24th Division attack in keeping with the situation in the Unsan area. There lay the controlling events.

The 1st ROK Division: In its part of the I US Corps' general advance, the 1st ROK Division on 25 October was strung out on the road running from the Chongchon River to Unsan. Its 15th Regiment passed through Yongbyon and continued on without opposition toward Unsan, twenty-four air kilometers northward. Elements of D Company, 6th Medium Tank Battalion, led the way and passed through Unsan. About two and a half kilometers northeast of the town, just before 1100, enemy mortar fire suddenly interdicted a bridge as the American tanks were approaching it. ROK troops deployed and engaged the Red force. Half an hour later the ROK troops reported 300 Red Chinese troops in the hills just north of Unsan. A little later they captured the first Red Chinese soldier taken prisoner by UN forces in the Korean War. The Chinese prisoner said there were 10,000 Chinese Communist troops in the hills north and northwest of Unsan and another 10,000 eastward toward Huichon.

During the afternoon the fighting north of town gradually intensified and just after 1400 the ROK troops in contact with the Red Chinese estimated
them to be two reinforced companies. By this time the Eighth Army headquarters had been informed of the capture of a Chinese prisoner and his story. This information then was passed to the I US Corps headquarters. The Chinese prisoner was taken to the Eighth Army advance command post at Pyongyang for interrogation. There could be no doubt that he was Chinese. By midafternoon three more Chinese were brought into Pyongyang. They, too, looked Chinese, spoke Chinese, and understood neither Korean nor Japanese.

The 12th ROK Regiment, second in the division column, turned west when it arrived at Unsan. Just beyond the town it, too, found Red Chinese troops blocking the way. The 11th ROK Regiment, bringing up the division rear, halted for the night a few kilometers below Unsan. The report spread rapidly among the ROK troops during the afternoon that the enemy troops on their front were Chinese.

The ominous events continued to take place. During the night, the 25th, enemy forces had nearly surrounded Unsan. The next morning, the 26th,
brought more information that the forces were Chinese. One report told of thirty-three Chinese dead found north of the town.

Northeast of Unsan, the troops of the 15th ROK Regiment during the morning of the 26th fell back under enemy attack. At 1030 hours Lieutenant Colonel John S. Growden, commanding the 6th US Medium Tank Battalion, thinking that his tanks holding the road northeast of Unsan were in danger of being overrun, ordered D Company to fall back to high ground southeast of the town. West of Unsan the 12th ROK Regiment held fast. The 11th ROK Regiment moved up to join the 12th Regiment in the battle, but almost at once had to move back south of Unsan to beat an enemy force that cut the main supply road there in an envelopment from the west. On the contrary, the enemy force pushed the 11th ROK Regiment north to the edge of Unsan. This seriousness of the situation around Unsan caused the ROK's there to estimate that a full enemy division confronted them.

The reaction of Eighth Army intelligence to this development was that the Chinese troops in the Onjong and Unsan areas indicated "some further reinforcement of NK units with personnel taken from the Chinese Communist Forces, in order to assist in the defense of the border approaches." The estimate stated there were "no indication of open intervention on the part of Chinese Communist Forces in Korea."

On the 27th the situation at Unsan improved. An airdrop shortly after 1100 by ten C-119 planes flying from a Japanese base eased the critical supply situation within the 1st ROK Division, the two supporting tank companies of the 6th US Tank Battalion, and the 10th AAA Group. Encouraged by the fresh supplies the 15th and 12th ROK Regiments attacked and made slight gains north and west of the town. To the south of the town two battalions of the 11th Regiment cleared the road, and in the late afternoon reported the enemy there had withdrawn to the northeast. In this attacks, the ROK troops found the Red Chinese well dug-in, exceptionally well camouflaged, and very hard to locate.

At this time Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup, the division commander, estimated there was a Red Chinese division of 10,000 soldiers -- a solid organization and not just Chinese mixed with Red Koreans -- in front of him. He told General Milburn, the I US Corps Commander, there were "many, many Communist Chinese."

But, as would be natural in such a newly developing situation, the intelligence officials in the Eighth US Army did not accept at face value all the information about the Red Chinese troop organization in Korea. As the extent of reverses north of the Chongchon River mounted quickly within a day or
two, General Walker and his staff, however, were forced to question the correctness of their initial reaction that the Red Chinese troops there represented only reinforcement of Communist Korean units.

General Walker, by the morning of 28 October, had become sufficiently concerned over events to order the 1st US Cavalry Division relieved of its security mission at Pyongyang and to move north, pass through the 1st ROK Division at Unsan, and attack to the Yalu. Now the 1st US Cavalry Division started moving to the north.

The next morning, 29 October, the 8th US Cavalry Regiment departed Pyongyang to begin the division movement. The 8th Cavalry arrived at Yongsan-dong that evening. The next morning, 30 October, the 5th US Cavalry also arrived at Yongsan-dong. The 5th Cavalry's mission was to protect the rear of the 8th Cavalry, which that morning had continued on north to Unsan where it was to relieve part of the 1st ROK Division. (See Sketch Map 21.)

By this time Red Chinese forces had engulfed the II ROK Corps to the east in the Onjong-ni and Huichon areas and the 1st ROK Division now became a northern salient in the UN line. On its left there was a gap of twenty-four kilometers between it and elements of the 24th US Division, the nearest Eighth Army unit on the west.

On 31 October, after its arrival at Unsan, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 8th Cavalry relieved the 12th ROK Regiment. But the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, had to wait until 1600 hours of 1 November because the 2nd Battalion of the 12th ROK Regiment had been pushed back by an enemy attack and the ROK battalion commander wanted his troops to regain the lost ground before they were relieved.

Upon being relieved on 31 October, the 12th ROK Regiment moved to a rest and reserve assembly area at Ipsok and the 11th ROK Regiment shifted southeast to establish contact with the 8th ROK Division on the corps boundary. Still engaged in the battle at Unsan, the 15th ROK Regiment was desperately trying to hold its positions across the Samtan River east of the 8th Cavalry Regiment.

The Disaster to the 8th Cavalry at Unsan

This Red Chinese attack north of Unsan had gained strength in the afternoon of 1 November against the 15th ROK Regiment to the east, and gradually it extended west into the zone of the 8th US Cavalry Regiment. The first probing attacks there, accompanied by mortar barrages,
came at 1700 against the right flank unit, the 1st Battalion. There was also something new in the enemy fire support—rockets fired from trucks. The men of the battalion recovered one of the rocket shells fired and found that it was of the Russian Katushka 82-mm. type fired from four multiple tubes, truck-mounted. The CCF probing on the 1st Battalion position ended at 1930 when the Chinese struck the battalion all along its line. Heavy action ensued. About 2100 the Red Chinese found the weak link on the ridge line and began moving through it down the ridge behind the 2nd Battalion on the left of the 1st Battalion. By this time the 15th ROK Regiment on the right across the Samtan River started disintegrating rapidly, and shortly after midnight ceased to exist as a combat force. Very few of these ROK troops escaped.

With much sounding of bugles and whistles the Red Chinese extended their strong attack westward to the 2nd Battalion, 8th US Cavalry, and in a short time penetrated its right and encircled the left. At the same time the fight with the 1st Battalion went on. By 2300, however, the 1st and 2nd Battalions had been forced back and their positions penetrated. (See Situation Map 8, Appendix VI.)

While this night battle was increasing in intensity, Major General Milburn, the I US Corps Commander, held an important meeting at his headquarters in Anju where he directed the corps to go from the attack to the defensive immediately. This was the first time I US Corps had gone on the defensive since its breakout from the Nakdong Perimeter. General Milburn returned the 8th US Cavalry Regiment to division control, and ordered that it and the 15th ROK Regiment withdraw at once from Unsan to position above the Yongsan-dong—Yongbyon—Unhung east-west road. This would amount to a general withdrawal of approximately about twenty air kilometers.

Colonel Palmer, commanding the 8th Cavalry, received the withdrawal order about 2300 hours and planned to pull back the 2nd Battalion first toward east from the road fork south of Unsan, across the ford of the Kuryong River to Yongbyon while the 1st Battalion would try to hold Unsan. The 3rd Battalion, southwest of Unsan, was to bring up the regimental rear.

In the withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry all the three battalions were trapped by the CCF roadblocks south of Unsan. On 2 November practically all men of the 1st Battalion who were to escape had reached the Ipsok area, and a count showed that the battalion had lost about fifteen officers and 250 enlisted men to all types of casualties. About half the battalion's mortars and heavy weapons had been lost to the enemy. The elements of the 2nd Battalion for the most part scattered into the hills. Many of them reached ROK lines near
Ipsok.

The heaviest blow, however, struck on the 3rd Battalion commanded by Major Robert J. Ormond, who was later wounded in the action ensued. At about 0300, when all the vehicles in the battalion area, except the tanks, were lined up on the road bumper to bumper ready to begin the withdrawal, a company-sized enemy column from the south approached the bridge over the Nammyon River below the battalion command post, and signaled for a deadly surprise assault on the battalion command post from all sides. At the same time, other enemy forces engaged L Company along the stream bank to the southwest, and still others crossed the stream and attacked the tanks there. Hand-to-hand fight took place all the battalion headquarters area. The enemy, as though they came out of a burst of smoke, shadowy figures started shooting and bayoneting everybody they could find.

After half an hour of hand-to-hand fighting in the battalion command post area the Red Chinese were driven out. In the meantime L Company, making its way toward the command post as directed in the earlier withdrawal order, ran into an enemy ambush and lost its command group and one platoon. The remainder reached the battalion area closely followed by the Chinese. There on the valley floor the disorganized men of the 3rd Battalion formed a core of resistance around tanks and held the enemy off until daylight when the US Air Force fighter bomber aircraft came over and began a daylong series of strikes against the Red Chinese. This kept the enemy under cover during the rest of the day and gave the men at the command post a chance to gather in the wounded.

In the meantime, the 5th Cavalry who was to protect the rear of the 8th Cavalry resumed its effort at daylight to break through to the 3rd Battalion of the 8th
Cavalry after having been repulsed at the Red Chinese roadblock south of the Turtle Head Bend of the Kuryong River below the position of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The 5th Cavalry had repeatedly tried to capture the enemy-held ridge in its front in vain. Also, the repeated strikes by air against the enemy ridge positions did little damage because the dense smoke haze hanging over the area obscured the objective. The dug-in Red Chinese did not budge. A prisoner said that five companies of the 8th CCF Route Army were holding the ridge.

In the battle at the Turtle Head Bend, the 5th US Cavalry Regiment suffered about 350 casualties. The 5th Cavalry always thereafter referred to the ridge where it first encountered the CCF as "Bugle Hill." The name was chosen because the Chinese had used bugles, horns, and whistles as signaling devices.

The heavy casualties in the 5th Cavalry and the forces available finally caused General Milburn, the Corps Commander, to order for General Gay to withdraw the 5th Cavalry. Thus, General Gay at dusk, 2 November, made what he has described as the most difficult decision he was ever called on to make -- to order the 5th Cavalry Regiment to withdraw and leave the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, to its fate. Thus, at dark on 2 November the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, had no further hope of rescue.

Just before dusk a division plane flew over the 3rd Battalion perimeter and dropped a message ordering it to withdraw under cover of darkness. But, after talking over the situation, the infantry and tankers in the perimeter decided to stay and try to hold out during the night.

As dusk settled over the beleaguered group, the Red Chinese started bombing again with 120-mm. mortars. Soon the Chinese Communists followed their mortar barrage with an infantry attack. To meet this, the men inside the perimeter fired bazooka rounds into vehicles to start fires and light up the area. Attacking across the open field in successive waves and silhouetted against the burning vehicles, the Chinese were shot down in great numbers. Six times during the night the Red Chinese attacked in a strength of about 400 men, but each time they were beaten back from the perimeter.

The night of 3 November was a repetition of the preceding one, with the Chinese working closer all the time. After each enemy attack had been driven back men of the battalion would crawl out and retrieve weapons and ammunition from the enemy dead. Their own ammunition was almost gone.

Daylight of 4 November disclosed that there were about 200 men left able to fight. There were about 250 wounded. A discussion of the situation brought the decision that those physically able to make the attempt should try
to escape. In the meantime, however, four men of two officers and two men left the perimeter and soon discovered a way out. These men returned to the perimeter and led the remaining able-bodied troops to the east side of the perimeter just as the Chinese let loose a terrific barrage of white phosphorus shells. These bursting shells completely covered the perimeter area and obscured it with smoke. There was no doubt that the Red Chinese were trying to screen an attack.

The next day, when the escaping group crossed the valley near Ipsok, Chinese Communists forces surrounded the battalion group and the group broke up into small parties in the hope that some of them would escape. About 1600 on the afternoon of 6 November the action of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, as an organized force came to an end. Most of these men were either killed or captured that day, apparently in the vicinity of Yongbyon.

The 3rd Battalion Commander, Major Ormond, was among the wounded captured by the Chinese in the perimeter beside the Kuryong. He subsequently died of his wounds. About ten officers and less than 200 men of the 3rd Battalion escaped to rejoin the regiment.

After all the stragglers and those who had walked south through hills had reported in, the losses were found to total about 600 men in the Unsan action. Enemy sources later indicated the Communist Chinese captured between 200 and 300 men at Unsan. In addition to the infantry losses, about one-fourth of the men of B Company, 70th US Tank Battalion, were casualties. The 8th Cavalry Regiment’s loss in weapons and equipment was very heavy indeed. The troop loss in the 15th ROK Regiment was also admittedly very heavy.

The Chinese force that brought disaster to the 8th US Cavalry Regiment at Unsan was the 116th Division of the 39th CCF Army. Elements of the 347th CCF Regiment imposed the roadblock east of the road fork south of Unsan that thereafter halted all vehicular traffic. The 115th CCF Division also fought in the Unsan action. It appears, therefore, that from the first to last -- from 25 October to 2 November -- two CCF divisions, or elements of them, engaged the 1st ROK Division and the 8th and 5th US Cavalry Regiments in the Unsan area.

II ROK Corps

As the I US Corps resumed its general advance toward the North Korean border, the 6th ROK Division of the II ROK Corps appeared to have the greatest success of any front-line UN division.
Advance to the Yalu

Meeting virtually no opposition and traveling fast up the valley of the Chongchon River, it reached Huichon on the night of 23 October. There it left the valley of the Chongchon and turned west, its 7th ROK Regiment leading. The advanced battalion of the regiment marched northwest over a cart trail, but the remainder of the regiment had to turn west from Huichon on a road to Onjong. The night of 24–25 October, the 7th Regiment passed through Onjong then turned north and joined its advanced battalion. Finding the road clear, it headed north for its objective, the town of Chosan, eighty-six air kilometers on the Yalu. Late in the afternoon the regiment stopped at Kojang about twenty-nine air kilometers south of Chosan, and bivouacked there for the night.

The next morning, 26 October, a reconnaissance platoon, reinforced, advanced into Chosan. The remainder of the regiment stayed at its overnight position. In Chosan the reconnaissance platoon attacked and scattered NK Communist troops retreating into Manchuria across a narrow floating foot-bridge that spanned the Yalu River. After a thorough reconnaissance of the town, the main body of the party returned to the regimental position. They left a small party in Chosan because the next morning the main force of the 7th ROK Regiment was to come into the town.

The reconnaissance platoon from the 7th Regiment, 6th ROK Division, was the first UN unit to reach the northern border of North Korea, and, as events turned out, it was the only element operating under Eighth Army command ever to get there during the war.

Following behind the 6th ROK Division, the 8th ROK Division had reached the valley of the Chongchon at Kujang-dong the night of 25–26 October, marching from Sunchon through Tokchon. On 26 October, the day the advanced elements of the 6th ROK Division reached the town of Chosan, the 8th ROK Division turned up the Chongchon valley toward Huichon to join the 6th ROK Division.

In the meantime on 25 October the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, 6th ROK Division, had started northwest from the village of Onjong, sixteen air kilometers northwest of Unsan, headed for Pukchin. There the 2nd Regiment expected to turn north to Pyoktong on the Yalu. About thirteen kilometers west of Onjong the 3rd Battalion came under enemy fire. The troops decided to disperse what they thought was a small force of NK enemy. But the roadblock turned out to be a Communist Chinese trap. In the action that followed the Red Chinese destroyed the ROK battalion as an organized force. About 400 of 750 ROK’s in the battalion escaped, however, and in the afternoon came back to Onjong.
In the meantime, back at Onjong the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd ROK Regiment learned that the 3rd Battalion had become heavily engaged, and moved out to support it. On the way, the 2nd Battalion troops saw enemy troops moving about on the hills to the north. A Chinese prisoner captured by a patrol party stated that Chinese forces had been waiting in the mountains around Pukchin since 17 October. That evening the Red Chinese troops cut off the 2nd Battalion from Onjong, but it escaped southward cross-country and succeeded in rejoining its regiment in the town.

At 0330 that night, the Red Chinese attacked Onjong. The ROK troops there broke in panic, but officers succeeded in stopping them at the southeast edge of the town. When the enemy penetrated this position at 0600, 26 October, the ROK's started withdrawing eastward. The ROK's had gone only about five kilometers when they came to a roadblock -- the Chinese enemy had cut them off. At this time not a single company of the 2nd ROK Regiment was intact. The ROK troops now scattered into the hills. The 2nd ROK Regiment apparently did little determined fighting in its first encounter with the Red Chinese enemy. Eventually about 2,700 men out of approximately 3,100 in the regiment escaped toward the Chongchon River.

The Chinese attack on the 2nd ROK Regiment at Onjong finally caused Major General Yu Jae Hung, commanding the II ROK Corps to employ two regiments at Huichon, the 19th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division and the 10th Regiment of the 8th ROK Division. General Yu ordered these two regiments to attack west in an attempt to recover the abandoned vehicles and artillery pieces of the 2nd Regiment. On 28 October, there two regiments reached a point from which advanced units could look down on Onjong and see some of the abandoned equipment, but they never got any farther. The next day they suffered the same fate that had overtaken the 2nd Regiment. Heavily defeated, they lost their vehicles and three batteries of artillery--all they had.

These critical development in the Onjong area cut off the 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division to the north. At Kojang on the evening of the 26th the 7th Regiment was making plan to occupy Chosan in the morning when it received a radio message from the division which said that the 2nd Regiment had been defeated and scattered, and ordered the 7th Regiment to start south to rejoin the division.

On the morning 29 October, the 7th Regiment started south after being supplied by air. Before noon, when about thirty kilometers south of Kojang, it ran into an enemy roadblock. Soon the entire regiment was committed against an enemy force. The Regiment with the help of strong air support
was able to hold its own during the daylight hours, but night fell and without the support of the fighter planes it could not hold the enemy off.

During the night large numbers of ROK troops scattered into the hills in an effort to make their way south; some, however, stayed in position to the end. By daylight resistance had ended. The regiment was trapped by the enemy. About 875 officers and men of the 3,552 in the regiment escaped to Kunu-ri and rejoined the 6th ROK Division.

The collapse of the II ROK Corps on the right of Eighth Army and the frightening, but confused, reports of Red Chinese troops in the action caused Eighth Army on 29 October to order the II ROK Corps to place the 8th ROK Division in a defensive position north of the Chongchon, extending from Yongbyon eastward to the river at Kujang-dong, and then for the 7th ROK Division to extend the line south toward Tokchon.

By 31 October CCF were pressing against the II ROK Corps defensive line north and east of Kunu-ri. That morning they broke through the part of the 8th ROK Division line, near its boundary with the 1st ROK Division, causing one battalion to scatter.

On the south side of the Chongchon, CCF by 1 November had pushed the 7th ROK Division back to the vicinity of Won-ni. The II ROK Corps of necessity by this time turned to face generally east. This resulted in a gap between its left flank and Eighth Army. The 2nd US Division, attached by Eighth Army to I US Corps, was assembled hurriedly in the vicinity of Sunchon to meet a possible emergency in this gap.

Thus, within a few days after its first action on 25 October, the CCF had driven back the II ROK Corps, crippling it disastrously, and was south of the Chongchon on the open right flank of Eighth Army.

Holding the Chongchon Bridgehead
(3–6 November 1950)

On 2 November the command posts of Eighth Army and its subordinate organizations had hectic and confused activities of taking steps to withdraw the I US Corps below the Chongchon River. Orders and changes to orders came in an almost endless stream. In the final instructions the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade and the 19th Regiment of the 24th US Division were to remain north of the river in a bridgehead that encompassed and protected the bridges and tank fords over the Chongchon and Taeryong Rivers in the Anju–Pakchon areas. General Walker wished to hold these river crossing sites for the purpose of resuming the offensive.
By evening of 3 November the 27th Commonwealth Brigade had moved from Taechon into its assigned defensive positions around Pakchon.

The 19th US Regiment also moved to its defensive positions just north of the Chongchon and northeast of Anju. Once the 19th Regiment was in the new positions, the 1st ROK Division withdrew through it to the south side of Chongchon, completing its crossing before noon of 4 November.

In the II ROK Corps sector the troops of the corps took up a restricted defensive area near Won-ri about six and half kilometers northeast of Kunuri. On 3 November the 5th Regiment of the 24th US Division took a position at Kunuri behind the II ROK Corps. The 19th Regiment of the 24th US Division was in position south of Kunuri protecting the road to Sonchon. Enemy forces during the day advanced within four kilometers of Kunuri.

On 4 November Communist forces drove hard for Kunuri. Hill 622, a large mountain cresting about four and a half kilometer northeast of Kunuri, dominated the town of Kunuri and the rail and highway communication lines
passing along it. The 3rd and 5th Regiments of the 7th ROK Division held this key terrain feature, with 5th Regiment of the 24th US Division in blocking position just behind it. The 5th Regiment of the 7th ROK Division was in reserve along the road east of Kunu-ri. That morning a strong CCF attack broke the 3rd ROK Regiment position on the hill and the ROK troops began streaming back through the 5th US Regiment. The 8th ROK Regiment was now committed to retake the hill. The hill changed hands several times throughout the day, but at dark ROK troops held its vital northwest ridge.

The 5th US Regiment also had heavy fighting for the hill to hold Kunu-ri, and was forced to withdraw about one kilometer. Part of the fighting was at close quarters. By evening, however, the enemy attack in estimated division strength (elements of the 38th CCF Army) had been repulsed. The 7th ROK Division and the 5th US Regiment had saved Kunu-ri and successfully protected the right flank of the Eighth Army.

Simultaneously with the Red Chinese attack against Kunu-ri, the enemy struck the bridgehead force north of the Chongchon. The enemy estimated to number about 1,000 crossed the Kuryong River about three kilometers northwest of the 1st Battalion, 19th US Regiment, and moved south through wooded terrain, evidently intent on getting into the rear of the battalion. The enemy maneuver succeeded. The American troops did not make much of a fight, and, it withdrew eastward and nearly all the men escaped to friendly position across the Kuryong and Chongchon Rivers.

The withdrawal of the 1st Battalion made the 3rd Battalion drive through to the 1st Battalion positions, but strong enemy forces on the road repelled the 3rd Battalion. With these difficulties developing in the bridgehead area, General Church, commanding the 24th US Division, ordered Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, the assistant division commander of the 24th Division, to assume command of all 24th Division troops north of the Chongchon and to co-ordinate the actions of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade and the division troops. General Church also ordered on the evening of the 4th the 21st US Regiment to cross to the north side of the Chongchon River during the night and attack the next day, to clear the enemy from the 19th Regiment area and restore the bridgehead line. (See Sketch Map 22.)

The next morning, 5 November, the two battalions of the 21st US Regiment attacked and succeeded in restoring the lost positions. Once again, as in the days on the Nakdong, the 3rd US Engineer Combat Battalion assumed an infantry role in taking positions to protect the Anju bridges over the Chongchon.
On the west, there was a eight-kilometer gap between the left flank of the 19th Regiment bridgehead position and the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade position. A large mountain mass lay in the gap area and enemy forces could move at will to the flank and rear of either the 27th Brigade or the 19th Regiment. On the 19th Regiment’s extreme left flank at the edge of this gap the 2nd Battalion held Hill 123 which overlooked a valley near the little village of Chonghyon.

On the night of 5—6 November the Communist enemy made a co-ordinated attack all along the bridgehead line. At Hill 123 the enemy attack achieved surprise against the rifle companies of the 2nd Battalion. The Chinese caught many men asleep in their sleeping bags and killed them where they lay. The Chinese Communists virtually overran the entire battalion positions on Hill 123. By 0300, after hand-to-hand fight, the battalion had withdrawn about one kilometer. There it was only barely able to hold its new position. After daylight the enemy withdrew from contact with the 2nd Battalion. The other battalions elsewhere on the 19th Regiment front repulsed the attack on them after hard fighting. Artillery firing from the south side of the Chongchon supported the 19th Regiment during the bridgehead battles.

After daylight the re-equipped 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, which had recrossed to the north side of the Chongchon during the night, counterattacked and closed the gap between the 2nd Battalion and the rest of the regiment on its right. The 19th Regiment then began restoring its original bridgehead line.

In these night battles of predawn 6 November the enemy had lost heavily. Two days later, the 2nd Battalion alone counted 474 enemy dead in the vicinity of Hill 123, and it found evidence that many more dead had been buried. Interrogation of prisoners disclosed that the 355th Regiment, 119th CCF Division, the 358th Regiment, 120th CCF Division, and a NK regiment had attacked the 19th US Regiment on the east side of the bridgehead.

At the same time the enemy struck against the Eighth Army right flank at Kunu-ri and the eastern side of the Chongchon bridgehead, the enemy attacked with equal force against the western side of the bridgehead at Pakchon on the Taeryong River. In this British brigade sector, the 3rd Australian and 1st Argyll Battalions were in defensive positions on the west side of Taeryong River opposite Pakchon, except A Company of the Argylls which was on the east side of the river south of Pakchon. The 1st Middlesex Battalion was also on the east side in and around Pakchon. And the 61st US Field Artillery Battalion of the 1st US Cavalry Division had emplaced to support the British
about four kilometers south of Pakchon.

During the night of 4–5 November an enemy force moved east around Pakchon toward the support artillery where it could cut the road behind the bridge. By daylight these enemy troops were in position to launch their attack.

An estimated battalion of CCF opened fire from the east with mortars and small arms on the 61st US Field Artillery Battalion. The 61st Battalion now formed a tight perimeter with each battery placing all its men around its own battery. A Company of the Argylls started south at once to the aid of the American artillery-men. The British brigade commander then ordered the remainder of the 1st Argyll Battalion to cross the east side of the river.

The most severe enemy attack fell on C Battery. The battery fired 1,400 rounds, some at a range of 50 yards, although the average range was about 300 yards. The fire of another battery was also directed in support of C Battery. A close quarters battle started between enemy infantry troops and American artillerymen and soon A Company of the Argylls joined in the battle. Part of the enemy plan was to blow a critical bridge at the artillery position. If this had succeeded it is unlikely that the bridge would have saved a single tank or vehicle.

Air reports, about noon, indicated that approximately one Red Chinese division had passed east around and below Pakchon, virtually surrounding the brigade. While heavy air strikes went in to impede and disrupt the Chinese maneuver and attack, the British brigade commander, Brigadier Coad, ordered the 3rd Australian Battalion, still on the west side of the Taeryong River, to withdraw to the east side.

Once on the east side, the Australian troops passed through the Argylls and in the early afternoon attacked north toward Pakchon. In a bayonet charge they regained high ground the Argylls had lost about three kilometers below the town. In this action the Australian casualties were heavy. By this time, however, it became apparent that the brigade could not hold the Pakchon bridgehead. Under cover of the Australian attack, and another attack by the 1st Middlesex Battalion which cleared the road southward, the rest of the brigade and the artillery withdrew under fire toward the Chongchon River.

That evening the Australians joined the rest of the brigade in a defense perimeter astride the Pakchon road north of the Chongchon River. Soon after dark the Chinese struck them again in an attack which continued unabated for four hours, forcing two companies to withdraw. By dawn of 6 November,
however, the Red Chinese themselves had withdrawn from contact. The British estimated the Chinese lost 300 men to ground action and 600 to 1,000 to air action during the day and that night.

After daylight of 6 November Australians in their positions could see enemy forces withdrawing northward. The predawn attacks of 6 November against the bridgehead area and Kunu-ri proved to be the last heavy engagements of the CCF in their First Phase Offensive. During the day they withdrew generally out of contact. Aerial observers reported many sightings of large enemy forces moving northward. In limited objective attack by the 24th US Division on 7 November all reached their goals against light opposition, and seemed to indicate that the violent enemy attacks of the past twelve days had ended for the present.


As already stated in the previous chapter, General MacArthur decided, instead of merging the X Corps with the Eighth Army after the success of the Inchon landing, to employ it on the east coast of Korea, and to keep it subordinate not to General Walker but to himself in Tokyo. The decision of General MacArthur was made because he felt he could coordinate the advance of each column, Eighth Army in the west, X Corps in the east, better from Tokyo than could General Walker from Korea. General MacArthur’s reasoning was based, simply enough, on the forbidding terrain and the lack of lateral communication between the western and eastern parts of North Korea.

Whatever the order of battle Eighth Army and X Corps were now to advance and fight as two separate commands in virtual isolation from each other. Thus, the ground operation of the X US Corps under General Almond began in northeast Korea on 20 October.

On 20 October when his own X US Corps troops were still afloat, General Almond flew from the USS Missouri by helicopter to Wonsan Airfield. At noon he assumed command of troops in the X Corps area north of latitude 39°10’ north and east of the Taebaek Range with his headquarters in Wonsan. The major tactical organizations which General Almond could operate in his corps area at the time were the 1st Marine and 7th US Infantry Divisions, and the 3rd and Capital ROK Divisions of I ROK Corps. The only
known organized enemy groups in the X Corps area at this time were north and northeast of Hungnam.

General Almond's general plan of deployment in this mountainous waste of northeast Korea was for the I ROK Corps to advance to the northeast border along the coastal and adjacent roads; the 7th US Infantry Division, southwest of the ROK's, to advance to the northern border over the Iwon—Pukchong—Hyesanjin axis; southwest of the 7th Division, the 1st US Marine Division to advance northward from Hamhung to the Changjin Reservoir, with its specific route beyond that point dependent on tactical developments in its front; and the 3rd US Division, when it arrived, to secure the Wonsan—Hamhung area, keep open the corps lines of communication, and protect the corps rear and left flank from guerrilla interference. Until the 3rd US Division arrived, the 1st Marine Division would have the responsibility of securing the Wonsan—Hungnam area. Accordingly it would not be entirely free to concentrate for the advance northward. As General Almond himself said a little later of X Corps, "We are scattered all over the landscape." But, generally, the deployment was controlled by the road net of the area in which the corps was to operate.

On 26 October, the day the X Corps landed at Wonsan, General Almond issued orders for his plan of operation.

I ROK Corps

On 26 October the Capital ROK Division, already north of Hungnam, continued its attack northward in three regimental combat teams. The Cavalry Regiment of the division was to advance as rapidly as possible toward the border. Two days after the X US Corps landing at Wonsan, the ROK Cavalry Regiment against strong opposition captured Songjin, 168 air kilometers northeast of Hungnam. At the same time, the 1st Regiment of the Capital ROK Division approached Pungsan, inland halfway to border on the Iwon—Sinchang-ni—Hyesanjin road. Two days later the 18th Regiment of the division reached the south end of Pujon Reservoir.

In front of the Cavalry ROK Regiment on the coastal road an estimated NK battalion retreated northward toward Kilchu, a sizable town north of Songjin. Situated beyond the reach of effective naval gunfire, Kilchu was a favorable place for the NK Communists to fight a delaying action. The ROK attack before daylight of 3 November developed into a day-long battle which failed to win the town. The 1st Regiment of the Capital ROK Division joined the Cavalry Regiment in the battle. By daylight of 5 November the two
regiments had encircled Kilchu, and they captured it before noon. On 6 November the ROK's counted 530 NK enemy dead in the Kilchu battle.

After Kilchu battle, aerial reports indicated that fresh enemy troops were moving south along the coastal road from the Chongjin—Nanam area. Supported by tanks, this force, estimated at six to seven battalions, met the Capital ROK Division on 12 November just north of Orang-chon, forty-eight kilometers above Kilchu. In the resulting battle it forced the 18th ROK Regiment to withdraw south of the Orang-chon. Bad weather prevented effective close air support, and, since the scene of action was beyond the range of destroyers' guns, the heavy cruiser Rochester was sent to provide naval gunfire support. Clearing weather enabled Corsairs to join in the battle on the 13th. Despite of the friendly ground, air and sea support, the enemy attack resumed and made further penetration in the positions of the 18th ROK
Regiment on the 14th. The next day the enemy compelled the 18th and 1st
ROK Regiments to withdraw again. By 16 November, however, the four
days of ground battle and three of aerial attack had so weakened the enemy
force that it faltered, and the 18th ROK Regiment once more advanced slowly.

A delayed report covering the three days from the evening of 14 Novem-
ber to that of 17 November listed 1,753 enemy killed, 105 prisoners, and the
capture of 4 rapid-fire guns, 62 light machine guns, 101 burp guns, and 649
rifles. On the 19th, air attacks destroyed 2 more tanks and 2 artillery
pieces. The enemy force that fought the battle of the Orang-chon consisted
of about 6,000 troops of the 507th NK Brigade and a regiment of 41st NK
Division, supported by a battalion of 8 tanks.

In the meantime the 3rd ROK Division, by 17 November, had moved up
behind the Capital ROK Division on the coastal road and had started its 23rd
Regiment inland from Songjin toward Hapsu. The next day its 22nd
Regiment started for the same objective from farther north at Kilchu. The
larger part of the 3rd ROK Division, therefore, was now deployed on the left
of and inland from the Capital ROK Division. Six LST's of the ROK Navy
supplied the I ROK Corps operations. At this time the 26th ROK Regiment
of the 3rd ROK Division was operating in the northern sector of the 3rd US
Division zone, west of Hamhung, under its operational control.

After the battle of Orang-chon, the Capital ROK Division was now able to
resume its advance. On 20 November the division crossed the Orang-chon
and continued its drive toward Chongjin, the big industrial center above
Nanam. The ROK troops, following behind a rolling barrage of naval gun-
fire, enveloped Chongjin on 25 November. That evening the 1st ROK
Regiment moved around the city to a point eight kilometers north of it; the
Cavalry ROK Regiment seized the airfield on its western edge; and the 18th
ROK Regiment was on its southern outskirts. The next day, Chongjin fell to
the Capital ROK Division. The ROK division now planned to turn due north
and inland along the highway and railroad leading to Hoeryong at the Man-
churian border.

The 7th US Division

The 7th US Division, in the zone of operations between the I ROK Corps to
the northeast and the 1st US Marine Division to the southwest, likewise made
important gains in carrying out its part of the X Corps mission in northeast
Korea. On 29 October the 17th US Regiment of the division landed
unopposed at Iwon. This regiment was the first of three regiments to move north. On 29 October the 1st Battalion of the regiment; the 49th US Field Artillery Battalion; and A Company, 18th US Engineer Combat Battalion moved from the beachhead to Cho-ri, a distance of 80 kilometers. From Cho-ri the 7th US Division was to strike north for the Manchurian border at Hyesanjin.

On 30 October the 1st Battalion and regimental headquarters moved on to Pungsan approximately halfway between the coast and its objective, Hyesanjin. The 1st Regiment of the Capital ROK Division had cleared the road of NK enemy troops that far.

On 1 November the 7th US Division had its initial action in the northeast Korea when the 1st Battalion, 17th US Regiment, helped the 1st Regiment of the Capital ROK Division repulse a strong NK Communist attack about three kilometers north of Pungsan. After the enemy had been repulsed the 17th US Regiment relieved the ROK regiment, which turned back to join the Capital ROK Division on the coastal road. By 4 November the 17th Regiment had advanced unopposed to the Unggi River. The temperature stood at two degrees below zero.

On 4 November the 31st Regiment of the 7th US Division came ashore. The regimental mission was to move to the left flank of the 17th Regiment. This would place it in the mountainous country extending to the Pujon Reservoir. ROK troops previously had advanced into that region.

Carrying out its mission, the 31st Regiment advanced on the division left flank toward the reservoir. On 8 November it encountered CCF troops on the eastern slope of Paek-san, a 7,700-foot peak about twenty kilometers east of the southern end of the reservoir. This was the 7th US Division's first contact with the CCF. There, during the afternoon, elements of the regiment engaged in a battle with an estimated battalion of CCF, later identified as part of the 376th Regiment, 126th CCF Division. Before nightfall the 31st Regiment seized that part of Paek-san, and the Chinese force withdrew with at least 50 killed. On this same day a patrol of the regiment met a Marine (1st US Marine Division) patrol about midway between Hamhung and the Pujon Reservoir, thus establishing the first contact between the two divisions in northeast Korea.

On 12 November the 7th Division received orders from X Corps to continue the advance northward. The 17th Regiment was to seize Kapsan, and then go to Hyesanjin on the Yalu; the 31st Regiment was to advance on the left of the 17th, and the 32nd Regiment, which began unloading at Iwon on 4
Advance to the Yalu

November, was to seize the southeast shore of the Pujon Reservoir. The 32nd Regiment, after landing at Iwon, moved southwest along coast through Hamhung and there turned northeast to Tangpung-ni in preparation for its part in the operation. (See Sketch Map 23.)

On 14 November the 17th Regiment prepared to attack across the Unggi River to Kapsan. The 1st Battalion could cross the river over the foot-bridge built in haste. But, the attempt of 3rd Battalion to cross over a shallow ford about three kilometers to the east failed. Because of the cold weather of 7° below zero and enemy's heavy fire casualties became heavy. Eventually the 3rd Battalion had to cross the river over the food-bridge used by the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion crossed the river on the 15th. On the 16th the 17th Regiment advanced about thirteen kilometers. On the 19th the 1st Battalion seized Kapsan at 1030 after a co-ordinated infantry, tank, and artillery attack. That night the 1st Battalion was thirteen kilometers north of Kapsan, only about thirty-six road kilometers from Hyesanjin on the Yalu. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions followed behind the 1st Battalion. The regimental command post set up in Kapsan for the night.

The next day, 20 November, the 17th Regiment in a column of battalions -- the 1st, 3rd, and 2nd, in that order -- advanced on foot more than thirty kilometers over icy roads through and over the mountains to a point only a few kilometers from the Yalu. Small enemy groups opposed the advance with only brief exchanges of fire, and then fled. On the morning of 21 November, without opposition, the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment, led the way into
Hyesanjin, and by 1000 had occupied the town and surrounding ground to the banks of the Yalu River. On the day the men of 17th Regiment first stood on its banks. They had mixed emotions, some apprehensive, as they looked across the ribbon of ice and water into Manchuria. There they saw CCF sentries walk their rounds and their officers come and go.

Upon receiving word that elements of the 7th US Division had reached the Yalu, General MacArthur in Tokyo immediately sent a message to General Almond, X Corps Commander, saying, "Heartiest congratulations, Ned, and tell Dave Barr that the 7th Division hit the jackpot." General Almond added his own congratulations to General Barr, 7th Division Commander, on the 22nd, saying in part, "The fact that only twenty days ago this division landed amphibiously over the beaches at Iwon and advanced 200 miles over tortuous mountain terrain and fought successfully against a determined foe in subzero weather will be recorded in history as an outstanding military achievement."

Meanwhile, to the southwest, the 31st Regiment patrolled extensively and advanced in its zone. On 15 November a patrol from the 31st Regiment reached the eastern shore of Pujon Reservoir. The next day another patrol encountered about 200 CCF soldiers at the northern end of the reservoir and drove them away after a brief fight. On 18 November General Barr began moving the bulk of the 31st and 32nd Regiments to the Pungsan — Kapsan area behind the 17th Regiment, leaving strong detachments to guard the mountain passes from the reservoir eastward into the division's rear along Cho-ri — Pungsan road.

The 32nd Regiment, concentrating now at Kapsan, prepared to strike northwest through Samsu to Singalpajin on the Yalu. This would put it on the Manchurian border to the west of the 17th Regiment at Hyesanjin. The regiment reached the objective through Samsu at midafternoon, 22 November.

The 17th Regiment at Hyesanjin was to cooperate with the 32nd Regiment by attacking west to meet it. On 22 November, the first day that it attempted to attack west to join the 32nd Regiment, one of its combat patrols encountered a force of NK troops about eleven kilometers west of Hyesanjin, and a stubborn fight developed. This stubborn enemy forces all but immobilized the regiment, and kept it from making any sizable gains. At the same time, in front of the 32nd Regiment, enemy forces fought effective delaying actions north of Samsu so that not until 28 November did elements of the 17th Regiment reach Singalpajin.

The intense cold of northeast Korea in late November took its toll in frost-
bite casualties in the 7th US Division. The worst to suffer was the 31st Regiment which operated in the remote mountain regions east of Pujon Reservoir. A total of 142 men in the division were treated for frostbite up to 23 November; 83 of them were from the 31st Regiment.

The 1st US Marine Division

While the I ROK Corps and the 7th US Infantry Division advanced toward the northeast border of Korea against scattered and ineffective NK Communist opposition, the 1st US Marine Division began moving up its assigned axis of advance toward the Changjin Reservoir to the southwest of the two divisions.

The 7th Marines of the 1st US Marine Division started from Wonsan to Hamhung on the morning of 29 October. The next day, 30 October, X Corps ordered the 1st US Marine Division to relieve the ROK troops (26th Regiment, 3rd ROK Division) in the vicinity of Sudong. At the end of month the 7th Marines was in an assembly area north of Hamhung.

From Hamhung to the southern tip of the Changjin Reservoir the road climbs for almost ninety kilometers. At about halfway between Hamhung and the reservoir lies a small village of Chinhung-ni. About nine and a half kilometers below Chinhung-ni is another village of Sudong. There, just below the steep climb leading to Chinhung-ni, the 124th CCF Division held its blocking position.

On 1 November the 7th Marines moved north from Hamhung to the defensive positions behind the 26th ROK Regiment, about four and a half kilometers below Changjin Power Plant 3. The troops of the 26th ROK Regiment had fallen back about eight kilometers since they first met the Red Chinese troops. The next day, 2 November, the 7th US Marines relieved the ROK troops and by noon of the day, the 7th Marines had confirmed that Chinese troops opposed it, and during the day captured three of them -- one from the 370th Regiment and two from the 372nd. The 1st Battalion at 1630 began to prepare defensive positions for the night about one and half kilometers south of Sudong. The 2nd Battalion, nearly one and half kilometers behind the 1st Battalion, meanwhile had engaged in a hard fighting for Hill 698 west of the road. About four and half kilometers behind the 2nd Battalion the regimental headquarters and the 3rd Battalion were at Majon-dong road fork.

Shortly after midnight the CCF launched a co-ordinated attack and cut in between the 1st and 2nd Battalions and almost overran the 4.2-inch mortar
company in position along the road. Fighting was close and at grenade range for both battalions. Friendly casualties gradually mounted. This fight continued into daylight, 3 November. With the coming of daylight, however, the situation improved. The US Marine aircraft went into feverish action, repeatedly attacking the Red soldiers and eventually forcing them from their road blocking positions. During the day combined ground and air action killed about 700 Red soldiers. Nearly all of them were members of the 370th CCF Regiment.

After the heavy battle of 3 November, the Red Chinese apparently withdrew, for the Marines encountered only light opposition on the 4th as they entered and passed through Sudong and continued on to the higher ground around Chinhung-ni.

On 5 November the 3rd Battalion moved through the 1st Battalion toward Koto-ri and its advance was checked near Hill 750, a critical terrain feature about two and half kilometers beyond Chinhung-ni. Marine aircraft repeatedly attacked Hill 750 but failed to force the enemy from his positions.

The Marines had to take the hill before they could advance farther. The next day, after half an hour of air strikes and an artillery preparation, the troops of the 3rd Battalion attacked on the hill. Four times the CCF drove them back. All night artillery and mortars pounded the hill, the 81-mm. mortars firing 1,800 rounds.

The next morning, patrols from the 3rd Battalion found that the enemy on Hill 750 had withdrawn north leaving behind many dead and some wounded. Information gained later from prisoners disclosed that artillery and mortar barrage against the hill during the night had caused crippling casualties in the 372nd Regiment (possibly the 371st) of the 124th CCF Division while it was moving up to reinforce the line. An another prisoner taken on Hill 611 west of the road revealed that two more Chinese organizations, the 125th and 126th CCF Divisions, were in the Changjin reservoir area. On the afternoon of 7 November the 3rd Battalion moved ahead and reached the village of Pohujang and Power Plant 1.

For two days after reaching Power Plant 1, the 7th Marines sent out patrols which failed to contact the enemy. On 10 November the regiment moved up over the Hwangcho-ryong pass without opposition and occupied Koto-ri about eleven kilometers below Hagaru-ri.

In its fight to reach Koto-ri the 7th Marines had captured 58 Chinese prisoners, 54 of them from the 124th CCF Division and 4 from the 126th CCF Division. It had taken its first prisoner from the 126th CCF Division on 7 November.
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The 3rd US Division

During November the 3rd US Infantry Division joined the X US Corps in Korea. The 65th Regiment of the division, which arrived in Korea on 22 September, was the first part of the division to join X Corps in northeast Korea. The other two regiments the 7th and 15th, and the division headquarters arrived in Korea in the middle part of November.

The 3rd Division’s primary mission was to relieve all 1st US Marine Division troops in the Wonsan area and south of Hamhung, to block the main roads in the southern part of the X Corps zone against guerrillas and bypassed NK Communist troops, and to protect the Wonsan—Hungnam coastal strip. The 3rd US Division zone of responsibility was so large as to make centralized division control impracticable. Therefore, General Soule, the division commander, established four regimental combat teams with one artillery or tank battalion in support each and assigned sectors and missions to each. The 26th Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division was attached to the 3rd US Division for operations after being relieved by US Marine troops on 2 November in the vicinity of Sudong and became one of the four regimental combat teams.

The 15th US RCT had the mission of protecting Wonsan and the area south and west of the city, with the Wonsan—Major-ni—Tongyang road the probable axis of major enemy activity. North of the 15th RCT the 65th US RCT was to hold the west central part of the division zone, with the Yonghung—Hadongsan-ni lateral road the principal route into the regimental sector from the coast. The northern sector of the division zone, west of Hamhung, fell to the 26th ROK Regiment; included among its missions was that of patrolling west to the Eighth Army—X Corps boundary. The 7th RCT was in 3rd US Division reserve with the mission of securing the coastal area from Chung-dong, a point about thirteen kilometers north of Wonsan, to Hungnam.

The 3rd US Division did not engage in any major military operation during the early part of November, but beginning on 12 November it did have a number of engagements with NK Communist troops in ambushes and roadblocks along the regimental main supply routes, particularly in the sector of the 15th RCT west of Wonsan between Major-ni and Tongyang. Several of these were serious and resulted in heavy losses of men and equipment. They grew progressively worse toward the end of November; apparently the NK Communist actions were co-ordinated with Chinese invasion in the Changjin Reservoir area of northeast Korea.
CHAPTER XIII  AGGRESSION FROM COMMUNIST CHINA

Section 1.  Triumph and Tragedy

By the end of October 1950, a total United Nations victory over the North Korean Communist aggressors seemed assured and imminent. General MacArthur stated that United States troops might be home by Christmas. The NK Red army was crushed; their divisions were in complete rout. Thousands of enemy troops had surrendered and hundreds more were deserting their arms.

On the west coast of Korea, elements of the Eighth US Army were nearing the Yalu River. On the east coast, likewise, elements of the X US Corps were sweeping to the Manchurian border.

Unlike the Eighth Army, which attacked frontally all along the western part of Korea, General Almond’s X Corps, consisting of five divisions (the 1st US Marine Division, the 7th US Division, the 3rd US Division, and the Capital and 3rd ROK Divisions), attacked northward in four columns with the exception of the 3rd US Division, whose last elements were offlanding in Wonsan on 20 November. The 1st US Marine Division was sent northwest, the 7th US Division went north. The 3rd and Capital ROK Division of the I ROK Corps were advancing far up the eastern shoreline. General Almond’s plan was to dominate all the main arteries of transport and communication in northeast Korea as quickly as possible.

The optimistic horizon in late October was clouded by only one storm, but one which in less than a month was to grow to hurricane proportions. Would the Communist Chinese enter? The Peking Radio had said they would if non-ROK troops crossed the 38th Parallel. On 16 October, in fact, intelligence revealed that Communist Chinese army units had crossed the Yalu River. Were they only, as the Peking Radio had said, “volunteer force?”

On the western front, toward the end of October, the Eighth Army was advancing toward the Manchurian border against spotty resistance, reaching Chongju on 30 October. Elements of the 24th US Division fought their way into Kusong.
In the eastern half of Korea, the 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division, after reaching Chosan on the Yalu River on 26 October, found itself surrounded by enemy forces and its line of communication severed. Relief elements of the II ROK Corps also suffered strong attacks by CCF troops in the vicinity of Onjong and Unsan.

To make the future more ominous, units of the 1st US Cavalry Division was surprised and suffered severe casualties during the night of 1–2 November when a strong contingent of CCF attacked their positions. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, particularly, was almost destroyed as an organized combat unit.

The sudden appearance of CCF units in Korea finally caused General Walker to decide to stop the swift but uncoordinated advance of the Eighth Army. General Walker planned to consolidate its units astride the Chongchon River prior to resuming a more orderly advance supported by an adequate supply system. In the meantime the X US Corps in the east proceeded more cautiously.
At dawn of 6 November UN troops again heard Chinese bugle notes being sounded. They braced for another violent onslaught. But it never came. This time the bugles had sounded a withdrawal rather than an attack. The CCF broke off contact in the entire Eighth Army zone. General Walker was left with an intact Chongchon bridgehead, but also a number of baffling questions.

What did the sudden Red Chinese attack and equally sudden withdrawal mean? Were they in North Korea to stay, or had they simply made a token gesture of resistance and withdrawn permanently after suffering severe losses? Was the CCF attack a diversion to mask the entry of Russian ground forces? Most importantly, in the light of these unexpected development, what should the Eighth Army do next?

General Walker was certain of one thing at least. He no longer had any doubt that the Chinese had invaded in force. On 6 November General Walker cabled the irritated General MacArthur. The United Nations Commander wanted an explanation for the delay in the Eighth Army's advance.

General MacArthur's impatience was satisfied by General Walker's explanation that the plans had been made for resumption of the offensive employing all forces available to the Army to meet the new factor of organized CCF as soon as he completed a regrouping of forces and build-up of supplies.

The UN Commander was still determined to secure all of Korea up to the Manchurian border. In pursuing his overall strategy, he did not appear to be daunted by what had happened to the Eighth Army command or by the parallel developments that occurred in the X Corps zone far to the east of the Eighth Army.

By the time, elements of the 1st US Marine Division were pushing northwestward up a winding dirt road toward the Changjin Reservoir area. From there, it was planned that they would attack northwestward to link up with elements of the Eighth Army.

Section 2. Background of CCF Aggression

By the end of the first week of November it was clear that Chinese Communist Forces had intervened in the Korean War. This intervention, long feared and by some expected, had become a fact. The aggression came in sufficient force to drive Eighth Army back to the Chongchon River and
to delay the advance of X Corps in the east toward the Changjin Reservoir. After accomplishing this, the CCF withdrew from immediate contact with Eighth Army behind a screen of NK Communist soldiers. The UN Command and intelligence agencies now had to ponder and answer what the CCF were intending to do in Korea in determining the future conduct of military operations.

A look at the background of the Chinese aggression in the Korean War seems necessary to an understanding of the problem.

In June 1950 when the Korean War broke out, the Chinese Communist regime, after it gained power defeating the Chinese Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek, had only been in official existence for nine months and had plenty of domestic problems to worry about. The expansionist military ambitions of the Chinese Communists, however, centered on Tibet and Taiwan rather than Korea. They had very little, if anything, to do with instigating the original NK Communist attack upon the Republic of Korea. North Korea was a Soviet satellite, and the Red Chinese displayed scant interest in the affairs of their smaller neighbour.

To most Chinese, the “foreign devils” had been a source of nothing but trouble. Peking was occupied by European troops and Chinese dignity was affronted. Concessions and special privileges were extracted from weak Chinese governments by the Westerners. In 1931, the Japanese invaded and then occupied Manchuria. Now still another foreign army was approaching China borders. Suspicion and hostility toward them were easily aroused as the traditional assumption of the innate superiority of the Middle Kingdom to the culture of the “foreign barbarians” persisted in the Chinese consciousness.

Dean Acheson of the State Department and General MacArthur and his staff appeared to be operating with almost total incomprehension of this Chinese frame of reference. The Chinese Communist leaders, new to power and international politics, did not have any better comprehension of American intentions. But then there had been no logistical consistency to the actions of the United States.

In June, the stated purpose of the United States Government was to repel the NK Communists aggression against the free Korea. By August it was the destruction of the NK Red army. By October it was to unify all of Korea. Now, in November, American planes were bombing bridges along the Manchurian border. This series of developments must have aroused Chinese hostility toward American troops approaching the Manchurian border.
United States President Truman did not want to cross the Manchurian border and extend the war into Red China. But he had not found a way to make the Communist Chinese leaders believe this. They had seen no evidence that he could restrain General MacArthur, an avowed opponent of communism in any form. From the Chinese point of view, Chinese entry might be simply a legitimate response to what they considered an aggressive threat to their borders. Both sides, in the figurative as well as the literal sense of the phrase, were talking different language.

The Far East Command learned in mid-September of an alleged conference in mid-July in Peking where it was decided to support NK Communists short of war. Chou En-lai was quoted, however, as having said that if the Communist Koreans were driven back to the Yalu, the CCF would enter Korea. Far East Command intelligence, in commenting on this report, said that the Chinese Communist authorities apparently were worried over Korea and would regard a UN advance to the Yalu as a "serious threat to their regime." Two weeks later, on the last day of September, the daily intelligence summary reported on an alleged high level conference in Peking on 14 August, at which it had been decided to provide 250,000 CCF troops for use in Korea.

However, it was only when US Troops crossed the 38th Parallel and headed toward the Manchurian border after repeated warnings had gone unheeded that the Chinese Communists definitely decided to intervene in force.

There were many logical reasons why otherwise reasonable men had not taken the Chinese warning seriously. As General MacArthur's intelligence chief, Major General Willoughby, later put it: "Was Communist China prepared to take the stunning gamble of throwing its ground forces into war against a country possessing the atom bomb and complete air control of the campaign area? Could she afford to risk the destruction of her flimsy industrial base and the severance of her tenuous supply lines from the Soviets, which would deny her the resources to support modern war or to sustain large military forces in the field and in turn so weaken the Peking Communist regime's hold in Asia as to threaten the eventuality of a Red debacle?" Of course General Willoughby did not think so, and neither did General MacArthur and his other staff.

However, the Chinese Communists themselves saw the advance of the UN Command to the Manchurian border as a major, immediate threat. And looking at the situation from their own point of view, rather than from the rational way Western observers thought they should be looking at, the
Red Chinese leaders could see at least two good reasons for intervening in Korea.

First, it would be advantageous to keep a friendly Communist regime in existence in North Korea. Passive acceptance of a democratic Korea united under the UN flag might encourage General MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek, and their supporters to attack Communist China itself, where many internal weaknesses could be exploited.

Second, after centuries of isolation and domination by the West, the "sick man of Asia" could now demonstrate that it was not simply a Soviet puppet but a major force to be reckoned with in world affairs. This could be accomplished by a smashing victory over the UN Commander, General MacArthur. The chances for such a victory seemed favorable, as the UN Command continued to be lured ever deeper to where it could be engaged in a classic Maoist war of annihilation.

The enigma of the Red Chinese forces' withdrawal after their initial attacks was, to the Red Chinese, no enigma at all. The Korean situation was far from forgotten within Communist China itself. At this time, the Communist China stepped up its anti-American propaganda campaign. This had already been virulent enough. The Chinese People's Committee in Defense of World Peace and Against American Aggression formed in Peking on 26 October, opened a massive propaganda campaign to mobilize the populace. Its theme was "Resist the U.S., Aid Korea, Protect Our Homes, and Defend Our Country." All communications media hit hard at this theme. Public meetings were held in every major city in China. Thousands vowed to defend China amidst the "spontaneous demands of volunteers anxious to fight the American imperialists in Korea."

On 3 November "Radio Peking" declared that the fighting in Korea posed a direct threat to China's safety and that the Chinese people should aid the North Koreans and resist the United States. Four days later, the official NK Communist communique announced that "volunteer units formed by the Chinese people participated in operations along with the People's Armed Forces, under the unified command of General Headquarters ... and mounted fierce counteroffensives on the west on 25 October."

From these activities on the part of Communist Chinese regime it was quite clear that Red China had intended to intervene in the Korean War and planned to throw the book at the United Nations forces in Korea. The breaking off of the Chinese First Phase Offensive, so puzzling to Western observers, was simply an occasion for the Chinese high command to rest and reorganize its forces and to bring in more from Manchuria where a huge
Chinese army were standing ready for commitment for entry into Korea.

The Chinese First Phase Offensive was primarily a defensive operation to test and assess UN military capabilities. With their own performance, the Red Chinese were satisfied, although their 124th CCF Division was virtually destroyed by the 1st US Marine Division in their engagement along the MSR to the Changjin Reservoir.

Now, then why have the Chinese Communists so far delayed entry into Korea in force, quite aside from any speculation on influences exerted by Moscow, may include:

1) The Chinese Communist had assumed that the NK Communists would win; hence they had not prepared to intervene earlier.

2) Postponing any major effort on their part until the fighting reached the region of the Korean—Manchurian frontier served to shorten their line of communication -- a particularly important point in view of the fact that UN forces control sea and air -- and also gave them the maximum time for preparation. In addition to bring up forces from other parts of China, it was necessary to replenish stocks of equipment and supplies in Manchuria which had been seriously depleted in extending aid to the NK Communists.

3) In the above-mentioned frontier area full advantage can be taken of the degree to which world opinion has been conditioned to acts of aggression and now looks upon a few regiments being identified on the wrong side of the border as indicating rather less than overt action. Meantime the UN forces can be weakened and the exposure to bombing of Chinese Communist line of communications and bases can be postponed. Evidence of an all-out effort, including the expenditure of the Chinese Communist Air Force, probably will be delayed as long as possible for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 2.

4) The support of public opinion in Communist China for major military operations can be whipped up much more easily if it can be represented that an immediate threat to the Manchurian border exists; this notwithstanding the general assumption that Chinese Communist leaders are aware UN forces do not intend to cross the frontier and would not attempt an invasion of Manchuria with a force of only ten divisions in any case.

5) United Nations successes to date can be most effectively countered by a crushing Chinese Communist victory in North Korea, thereby enhancing Asian and Communist prestige in relation of Western imperialism and eliminating as a fighting force an important part of the US Army.

The above points estimated by the Chinese military on Taiwan are necessarily matters of opinion to a considerable degree, but the military experts
on Taiwan have access to more China mainland sources of information and have had more experience in this field of estimating Chinese Communist intentions than others outside the "Bamboo Curtain"; their opinions therefore warrant the most careful attention at this time.

But the evaluation of the intention of Communist China was never taken seriously by the US State Department. The State Department was no longer taking the opinions of the Chiang Kai-shek government with great seriousness.

However, at the joint Chinese—North Korean Army headquarters in Mukden, Manchuria, Peng Teh-huai was indeed preparing to "throw the book" at the UN forces. Kim Il-sung, head of the NK communists was given public credit by the Red Chinese for directing operations. But Peng Teh-huai made all the basic decisions.

Peng was opposed by a UN Command of some 440,000 men. But of these, only about 100,000 were front-line troops. And as their battle dispositions were published in the world press, Peng knew that they were stretched thin and widely dispersed.

By the third week in November, with the front still quiet, Far East Command Intelligence increased its estimates of Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea to a maximum of 70,051 and a minimum of 44,851. The calculation of these figures down to the last digit only added a further touch of unreality to them, for the actual figures might have given even General MacArthur pause.

"The Chinese," as General Matthew Ridgway later wrote, "was a tough and vicious fighter who often attacked without regard for casualties." The capabilities and tactics of the Red Chinese were perfectly suited to the terrain in which they waited. In an age of nuclear and advanced nonnuclear armaments, the Red Chinese infantryman could test a doctrine of Mao Tse-tung and his associates derived from decades of guerrilla warfare against more modern forces with superior arms: that of "man-over-weapons."

Section 3. UNC's Estimate of CCF Aggression

Normally the intelligence evaluation of whether a foreign power has decided to intervene in a war in national force involves political intelligence at the highest level. Field and theater commanders could expect such an evaluation to be made by the government in Washington with the advice of its
Central Intelligence Agency. The intelligence responsibility of Eighth Army and X Corps was tactical; strategic intelligence responsibility rested with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Army, and the theater headquarters, with the ultimate political intelligence responsibility of the President and his immediate advisers. But apparently the Central Intelligence Agency and the administration generally did not evaluate the available intelligence so as to reach a conviction on the question of whether the Red Chinese intended to intervene in the Korean War different from that held by General MacArthur. So, it must be inferred that either Washington was undecided or that its view coincided with that of the UN Commander, since it did not issue directives to him stating a different estimate. The conclusion, then, is that in the developing situation of November the views of the Far East Command were decisive on the military course to be taken in Korea at that time. From the conclusion it must also be inferred that, while Washington had numerous political evidence of Red Chinese intervention, in effect both the Central Intelligence Agency -- weak in Asia -- and the Administration concurred in General MacArthur's views. At least they permitted General MacArthur to proceed as he saw fit.

The Korean War had scarcely started when the Far East Command began to consider the threat of CCF intervention. On 28 June 1950 its daily intelligence summary stated that the possibility existed that NK Communist might receive Chinese Communist reinforcements from Manchuria. In early July General MacArthur informed the JCS in Washington that if Red Chinese combat forces did become involved in the war the assistance of the Strategic Air Command would be required to destroy communications into and through North Korea from Red China. At this time the Far East Command estimated there were 116,000 CCF regular troops in Manchuria. An increase in CCF troops strength there became perceptible during the month and continued steadily thereafter. Much of the information concerning CCF troop movement from south to north China came from Chinese Nationalist sources on Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek's government received a steady stream of intelligence from its agents on the China mainland, and it, in turn, provided General MacArthur's command with numerous reports.

Many of the intelligence reports received by the Far East Command at Tokyo, as is usual in such matters, were inaccurate and unreliable. Such were several reports in August and September that CCF troops had crossed the border into North Korea. On of these reports, on 29 August, alleged that four CCF armies had crossed the Yalu and were deployed in North Korea. These reports in any way had never been taken seriously by the Far
East Command.

On 5 October, however, for the first time Far East Command intelligence listed as number one priority in enemy capabilities "Reinforcement by Soviet Satellite China." But this estimate did not long remain in the first priority; it dropped to second place on 9 October. On 14 October the intelligence estimate again raised the reinforcement of NK Communists to first priority. There it remained during the Wake Island Conference.

On 14 October, from Tokyo, Major General Charles Willoughby, Far East Command Intelligence Director, issued a detailed study of the question of Soviet or Chinese aggression in Korea. It was General Willoughby's view on 14 October that the Soviet Union, in any case, had no military advantage in intervention, and such intervention could be discounted. Then General Willoughby took up what the Red Chinese would do, which was the real problem. He described that recent declarations by CCF leaders, threatening to enter North Korea if American forces were to cross the 38th Parallel, are probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail.

He estimated, however, the Red Chinese had at least 38 divisions in 9 field armies garrisoned in Manchuria north of the Yalu. Of these, 24 divisions were disposed along the border in position to intervene. His estimate of CCF strength was reasonably accurate.

But Far East Command knew that 14 October the UN forces in North Korea stood very close to total victory. The NK Communist troops had deteriorated into remnants. The ROK troops had seized the important port of Wonsan on the east coast, and in FECOM there was a definite feeling that the moment for fruitful Red Chinese invasion had passed. Most of the vital areas of North Korea had been overrun.

General Willoughby's analysis also described the open failure of the NK Communists to rebuild their forces, and suggested that this indicated the CCF and Soviets had decided against further investment in a losing cause. General Willoughby's views unquestionably reflected those of his chief, General MacArthur.

On 15 October, one day after General Willoughby issued the intelligence study, General MacArthur and President Truman met for a conference on Wake Island. Most of the talk there concerned plans for the rehabilitation of Korea after the fighting ceased. General MacArthur said he expected formal resistance to end throughout the whole peninsula by Thanksgiving Day and that he hoped to get the Eighth Army back to Japan by Christmas. In response to President Truman's question, "what are the chances
for Chinese or Soviet interference?” notes of the conference indicate that General MacArthur replied substantially as follows:

“Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand with hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 200,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be greatest slaughter.”

General MacArthur then discussed briefly the chance of Russian intervention, holding the view that it was not feasible and would not take place. There was no question on General MacArthur’s opinion on the subject either by the President or any of the others present, who must be assumed to have had knowledge of the highest level of intelligence bearing on the matter. In fact they seemed to fully agree with his opinion.

On 20 October the Far East Command daily intelligence summary carried a report from a source it regarded as reliable that 400,000 CCF troops were at the border alerted to cross on the 18th or 20th. The Far East Command stated that precautionary measures had been taken of conducting daily air reconnaissance flights over all avenues of approach to the UN forces from the Yalu but that “so far no positive movements except intermittent though large-scale truck convoys have been picked up.” On this same date, the Far East Command issued CINCFE Plan 202, which was to be basis for withdrawal of UN forces from Korea when the fighting ended. This plan assumed there would be no intervention either by Red Chinese or Soviet forces. This is how matters stood by 20 October.

Strangely enough, beginning on 25 October and continuing throughout the month, and at a time when the UN forces were actually fighting the Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea and capturing CCF prisoners, the Far East Command daily intelligence summary placed Red Chinese intervention second in priority to guerrilla operations in enemy capabilities. The intelligence summary for 27 October carried the story of the first CCF prisoners captured two days earlier. The G-2 comment on the prisoners’ account of CCF intervention was that it was “based on PW reports and is unconfirmed and thereby unacceptable.”

The next day, 28 October, after discussing the question of possible CCF intervention, the intelligence estimate said:

From a tactical viewpoint, with victorious US divisions in full deployment,
it would appear that the auspicious time for such Chinese intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed to a time when remnant North Korean Communist forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness.

On 31 October the daily summary discussed the fact that ten CCF prisoners had been taken by Eighth Army and that the II ROK Corps had suffered reverses. It then said that the situation "may signify the commitment of Chinese Communist Forces in the Korean War." The UN Command report to the Security Council covering the period 16–31 October, in mentioning the capture of Chinese prisoners, said there was no positive evidence that Chinese units as such had entered Korea.

Entering November, however, the Far East Command came more and more to the conclusion that there were Chinese Communist troops in North Korea. On 3 November the FECOM accepted the estimate that 16,500 CCF troops were in contact with UN forces in Korea and that possibly the total might be 34,000. This intelligence report listed CCF strength in Manchuria totaling 833,000 men, of whom 415,000 were Chinese Communist regular ground forces. On this same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington dispatched a message to General MacArthur expressing their concern over what appeared to be "overt intervention in Korea by Chinese Communist units," and asked his views on the matter. He replied the next day that while it was a distinct possibility, "there are many fundamental logical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance."

On 5 November the FECOM daily intelligence summary stated that the Chinese Communist Forces had the potential to launch a large-scale counteroffensive at any time and without warning.

On the heels of this estimate came General MacArthur’s well-publicized special communique on 6 November which charged the Communist with having "committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record by moving without any notice of belligerency elements of alien communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea," and of massing a great concentration of possible reinforcements behind the sanctuary of the Manchurian border. Concerning the future, he said, "Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of the gravest international significance."

The FECOM intelligence report the next day, 7 November, raised its accepted number of CCF troops in Korea to 34,500; 27,000 in the Eighth Army
zone and 7,500 in the X Corps zone. On the 9th it carried a rather detailed analysis of the CCF in Korea. It accepted 8 CCF divisions from 4 armies with a strength of 51,600 men as being in contact with UN forces; it accepted 2 more divisions with 12,600 men as probably in contact, and still another 2 divisions with 12,600 men as possibly being in the X US Corps zone but not in contact with UN forces. This analysis gave a total of 76,800 CCF troops as probably being in North Korea.

By this time FECOM came more and more to the conclusion that there were Chinese Communist troops in Korea. Whether "volunteers," as the Chinese Communist government claimed, or otherwise, the big question remained as to what they were doing in Korea. Reports continued to reach Tokyo from the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan, that the Red China intended to throw their main forces against the United Nations in Korea and also to increase the participation in the Indochina fighting.

But as the third week of November passed, the Korean front was relatively quiet, then gradually intelligence officers at FECOM began to reach the conclusion that the Red Chinese action was limited, and confined to a mere fluff to deter the UN final victory. General Willoughby and General MacArthur never wavered from their conviction that the Red Chinese threats were a form of political blackmail.

The Department of the Army estimate of CCF strength in Korea was essentially the same as that of the Far East Command, Eighth Army, and X Corps. In the week preceding the resumption of the UN attack on 24 November it accepted the estimate of 51,600 CCF troops in Korea, and a probable total of 76,800 CCF troops in Korea. It credited these troops to four CCF armies (the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd) with twelve divisions, giving each division a strength of 6,300 men.

The Far East Command intelligence reports themselves during October and November 1950, although filled with intelligence data and estimates of the CCF capabilities, seemed never to reflect the evaluated opinion that the Chinese Communists would intervene in full force.

However, General MacArthur might have been somewhat more apprehensive of massive CCF aggression although his view seemed to have paralleled closely that reflected in the Far East Command intelligence evaluation. On 7 November he sent a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to their request for one, that reflected his views and outlook at the time. In his reply message, he stated for the first time apprehensive aspects of Red Chinese aggression. His message, in part, said:

"... If the enemy build-up continues, it can easily reach a point preventing
our resumption of the offensive and even force a retrograde movement..."

Despite this somber view, General MacArthur two days later, 9 November, expressed himself optimistically in a message to the JCS with respect to future possible military operations against the Chinese Communist Forces. He said:

*I believe that with my air power, now unrestricted so far as Korea is concerned except as to hydroelectric installations, I can deny reinforcements comming across the Yalu in sufficient strength to prevent the destruction of those forces now arrayed against me in North Korea.*

As the General MacArthur’s optimistic message revealed, in formulating his plan of maneuver to the Yalu, he seemed to have strongly believed his air power could destroy the Red Chinese forces if they tried to intervene. This belief may have dominated his thinking; he expressed it many times. Upon this foundation he may have laid his whole campaign. Too late, he would find out what CCF leaders already knew—against a Communist army, in primitive and mountainous terrain, air power could be important, but not decisive.

The Actual Movements of CCF

In June 1950, the *Fourth CCF Field Army*, some 600,000 men, *Lin Piao* commanding, marched to the Korean border to stand ready for any eventuality. During the summer and early autumn, other field armies followed.

Shortly after US troops crossed the 38th Parallel at Kaesong, on 13 or 14 October, elements of the *Fourth CCF Field Army* began to move south across the Yalu.

The 39th and 40th CCF Armies -- the Chinese term “Army” is roughly equivalent to the US Corps; a CCF Army contained three divisions of approximately 10,000 men each -- crossed from Antung, Manchuria, to Sinuiju. The 38th and 42nd CCF Armies crossed from Chi-an to Manpojin. Over these armies *Lin Piao* placed the *XIII CCF Army Group Headquarters*. Artillery and horse cavalry regiments crossed behind them in support.

Three of the Chinese Communist armies deployed in front of the Eighth Army; the fourth took a position in front of the Changjin Reservoir to the east.

Thus, on 15 October, when General MacArthur and President Truman conferred at Wake, 120,000 Chinese Communist veterans were already inside North Korea. Ten days later, two more CCF armies crossed the Yalu, adding six divisions to *Lin Piao*’s forward forces. Five armies were in the Eighth
US Army zone, one to the east in the X US Corps zone.

Night after night, all during October and November, CCF armies continued to stream across the Yalu, moving into the deep Korean valleys south of the river.

By rail from Shantung Province came the IX Army Group, Third CCF Field Army, consisting of nine divisions. It was reinforced with three extra divisions, giving it a strength of 120,000 men. The IX CCF Army Group moved across the mountains to the Changjin Reservoir area.

By the middle of November 1950, approximately 180,000 Chinese Communist troops waited in front of the Eighth US Army, while 120,000 lurked in the mountains surrounding Changjin Reservoir on X US Corps' flank. From Mukden, in Manchuria, Peng Teh-huai, Deputy CCF Commander, assumed direction and control.

While Red China broadcast to the world that Red Chinese "volunteers" would enter the Korean War, under Kim Il-sung, the leaders of the CCF never relinquished control of their forces. And it would have been considerable news to the 300,000 Red Chinese soldiers massed in the cold valleys of Korea to learn that they had volunteered. Many of them did not even know in what part of the world they waited.

Many have found it incredible that American intelligence would never accept the fact that the Red Chinese forces were in Korea in force during October—November 1950. There were reasons. Neither General MacArthur nor his intelligence staff, General Willoughby believed the CCF would intervene in force; both believed the Red Chinese threats were purely diplomatic blackmail. All evidence that they were in Korea broke against this present belief. Nor was it easy for subordinate officers of the Eighth Army and the X Corps commands to go against the ideas of the Far East Command Commander.

More important, no concrete evidence that the Red Chinese were in Korea
could be put forth. Americans believed it incredible that any army of significant size could cross the Yalu and deploy in Korea without observation by their air forces. Daily US Air Force’s aircraft flew over all North Korea; and no armies were ever sighted.

The example of one Red Chinese army, which marched from Antung, Manchuria, to its assembly area in North Korea almost four hundred eighty kilometers away, explains much: after dark, not sooner than nine o’clock, the Communist troops began to march. Singing and chanting in the manner of all Chinese, they plodded south, night after night, for eighteen nights. And each night, between nine and three, they covered almost twenty-nine kilometers.

When light came, every man, every gun, every animal, was hidden from the sight. In the deep valleys, in the thick forests, in the miserable villages huddled on the forlorn plateaus, the Communists rested by day. Only small scouting parties went ahead by day, to reconnoiter the night’s march, and to select the bivouac for the morrow. If aircraft were heard, each man was under orders to halt, freezing in his tracks, until the noise of the engines went away. In bivouac, no man showed himself, for any reason. Discipline was firm, and perfect. Any men who violated instructions in any way was shot.

It was not only cunning and hardihood, but this perfect march and bivouac discipline that caused UN aircraft to fly over the CCF hundreds of times without ever once seeing anything suspicious. Even aerial photography revealed nothing.

Half contemptuously, American military men spoke of “elusive” Lin Piao, and of the “poet” Mao Tse-tung. Mao Tse-tung had already revealed to the world how his Communist armies operated -- how they flowed from place to place, fighting when fighting was profitable, biding their time when it was not.

There was a great deal of confusion about the Chinese Communist POW’s and the way in which they were captured, indicative of a certain confusion among the enemy. United States intelligence began assuming that the NK Communist army had been reinforced with certain small groups of Red Chinese from Manchuria. But in the face of the Far East Command’s steadfast refusal to accept any CCF intervention in the war, neither Eighth US Army nor X US Corps openly suggested there could be any massive CCF units south of Yalu.

The Chinese Communists had slipped into the rugged land like phantoms, now creeping forward, now hiding from the light of day. Deliberately.
Lin Piao was seemingly picking about in confusion, units here, units there, none clearly seen or identified. CCF troops were deliberately misshooled on their own order of battle, so that, captured, they might tell weird tales. There were clashes between Americans and Chinese "volunteers" in odd place -- obviously to draw American attention from where the Chinese planned to strike.

Then, in late October, because the UN forces were pushing forward too fast, before they were ready, Lin Piao struck, with what the Red Chinese called their "First Phase Offensive."

For several days fighting flared savagely--then, as suddenly as they had come, the Chinese Communists broke contact and melted into the shrouding mountain masses ahead of the UN advance. The CCF "First Phase Offensive" had succeeded. The first contact between Americans and Red Chinese had been inconclusive and bewildering. No one knew what the contact foretold.
CHAPTER XIV  WITHDRAWAL ACTION FROM THE YALU
(20 November – 30 December 1950)

Section 1. The End-the-War Offensive

By early days of November 1950, the United Nations Command still observed that all incidents and indications in the battlefield beared that the Chinese Communists were merely attempting an explicit warning gesture that no harm should be done on the Yalu River, particularly for the Supung hydroelectric plant. Because the plant was a strategic electric resource that was vital to Manchuria and northern China. At the time, even back in Washington, the high circles of the State and Defense Departments also considered that the Red Chinese were concerned chiefly with defending the Manchurian frontier and guarding the power complexes along the Yalu River.

In the meanwhile as the UN forces' drive was about to begin, the United States and the United Nations continued to reassure Peking that they had, in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's phrase, "no ulterior designs in Manchuria." The Chinese Communists were invited to send a delgate to the United Nations at Lake Success in New York to discuss a General MacArthur's report documenting Chinese Communist invasion in northern Korea in late October. Chou En-lai turned down the offer, proposing instead that "the discussion should center on the question of armed participation in Korea by the United States Government."

At the United Nations Command in Tokyo, General MacArthur, operating without any clear direction from Washington, was considering what course of action to pursue. There were only three possible courses, he concluded. He could pull his command back to the waist of the Korean peninsula; drive on to the Yalu River; or simply remain where he was.

The latter had the disadvantages of the first two. A withdrawal to the waist he saw a political disaster, since it would leave a large portion of North Korea to the control of the Communists. But to drive on to the Yalu would unify all of Korea and make possible the establishment of a free and democratic government, fulfilling the aim of the United Nations as set forth in
its resolution of 7 October. This is what the General decided must be done.

Nevertheless, the United Nations Command underestimated the CCF aggression, even though the Eighth US Army divisions had received heavy CCF onslaughts during the last week of October, and also even General MacArthur himself announced a special communique on 6 November that the elements of alien Communist forces were concentrating in mass in the "privileged sanctuary" of the adjacent Manchurian border.

On 17 November, General MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington about his plan of a new offensive, optimistically stating that the intensified air attacks of the past ten days had isolated the battle front from increased enemy reinforcements and had greatly reduced the flow of enemy supplies.

The UN Command intelligence estimated at the time that the CCF strength totalled at 76,800 men with two divisions in front of the Eighth Army in the west and two more divisions in the east facing the X US Corps. Actually, however, there were about 180,000 Chinese Reds in Korea forming six CCF armies as of the end of October.

These well-organized and well-trained Red Chinese regular army forces, of course not "volunteers," soon reached at a total of 300,000 men comprising of thirty full divisions by late November. They were 18 CCF divisions (180,000 men) of the XIII CCF Army Group under the Fourth CCF Field Force on the west and central front facing the Eighth US Army and II ROK Corps, while twelve CCF division (120,000 men) of the IX CCF Army Group under Third CCF Field Force were deployed in front of the X US Corps and I ROK Corps in northeast Korea. All the operations orders came from their joint field headquarters in Mukden with Peng Teh-huai in command.

Strangely, in the meantime, the Red Chinese actions and movement had disappeared from the battle scene for almost three weeks since 7 November, while the Eighth US Army was striving to overcome the logistical difficulties that delayed its resumption of an offensive operation in mid-November. Originally, the Eighth Army had planned to begin its attack on 15 November but was postponed, thus ordering on the 14th that an attack day would be announced later date.

During the period, therefore, the UN forces' activities centered mainly around the preparations for an offensive in the later part of the month, while the frontline units had made limited objective attacks in small-scale designed to keep the enemy off balance and to expand the bridgehead over the Chongchon River. On the other hand, the X US Corps as well as the I ROK Corps in northeast Korea continued their headlong advance to the border
against scattered and ineffective resistance except in the 1st US Marine Division sector below the Changjin Reservoir. There the Marine regiments slowed their advance, because Major General Smith, the 1st Marine Division Commander, had worried about his scattered subordinated units on the wide dispersal.

As the Red Chinese forces had pulled back ceasing their offensive at midnight, 5 November, thus resulting in no contact with them both in the west and northeast Korea after 6 November, both the Eighth Army and the X Corps now apparently hoped with confidence that the UN forces could reach the northern border quickly, bring the war to an triumphal end, and then withdraw before winter set in, perhaps, before Christmas Day. It was a great miscalculation as far as the estimate of situation was concerned. The Red Chinese had been faded out not for retreat but to build up their strength and supplies for a decisive blow against the UN forces very shortly, particularly in a complete surprise tactic. Knowing nothing about such enemy intention, and also underestimating the CCF capabilities, General MacArthur suddenly decided to launch his determined and a final large-scale offensive designed to completely destroy the NK Reds and to conclude the war before the enemy could reorganize and build up his forces to resist.

In brief, General MacArthur planned to advance the EUSAK on a broad front northward through west and central areas, while the X US Corps in the east, still remaining under the direct control of the UN Command, should resume an offensive northwest to cut the enemy supply line at the Manpojin—Kanggye—Huichon line. Between the EUSAK and the X US Corps lay the high mountainous spine of the peninsula, thus creating a gap as wide as 50 airmiles, but was to be kept under aerial observation while communication between the two forces was maintained by radio, air and courier.

Section 2. The Eighth US Army Operations (24–30 November 1950)

The Operation Plan

On 14 November 1950, Lieutenant General Walker issued his operation concept to all his Corps commanders. According to the concept the EUSAK was to attack three Corps abreast with the I US Corps on the left, the IX US
Corps on the center, and the II ROK Corps on the right wing. The line of departure would be a line connecting Napchongjong (20 kilometers west of Pakchon) — Taecheon — Unsan — Onjong — Huichon — Incho-ri (5 kilometers west of Sachang-ni), from left to right, extending 100 kilometers in width.

On the center the IX US Corps (the 2nd and 25th US Divisions), commanded by Major General John B. Coulter, was to advance through the Unsan — Onjong axis and then toward Chosan — Pyokyon on the Yalu River side, while the I US Corps, (1st ROK Division, 24th US Division and 27th Commonwealth Brigade), with Major General Frank W. Milburn in command, was ordered to attack through Taecheon — Anju then up to the lower area of the Yalu River in the western sector. The II ROK Corps on the right, consisting of the 6th, 7th, and 8th ROK Divisions, was assigned to advance north through
the Huichon—Yongwon—Tokchon line and thereafter to the Yalu with Manpojin and Kanggye as its major objectives under the command of Major General Yu Jae Hung.

The 1st US Cavalry Division, the 187th US Airborne RCT, the 29th British Brigade, the Turkish Brigade, the Thailand Battalion, the Philippines BCT, the Netherlands Battalion, and the Canadian Battalion were to remain in reserve.

On 17 November, with the logistical situation improved, the EUSAK Headquarters notified to its subordinate commands that the D-Day was 24 November. On the afternoon of 21 November the Eighth Army informed the I and IX US Corps and the II ROK Corps that H-hour for the army attack was 1000 hours, 24 November. (See Sketch Map 24)

By 21 November, the I US Corps and the II ROK Corps had secured the line of departure for the Eighth Army offensive. The IX US Corps had issued its operation directives on 19 November when the 25th US Division arrived in the scene from the rear -- the 2nd US Division was to attack north on the Corps' right sector to occupy Onjong and Chosan, while the 25th US Division was to advance by making maneuver on the left toward Pyokyon.

The major units and their respective commanders who participated in the battle here in northwest Korea under the operational control of Lieutenant General Walker, the commander of the Eighth US Army, during the period from 24 to 30 November were as follows:

I US Corps
- 24th US Division
- 1st ROK Division
IX US Corps
- 2nd US Division
- 25th US Division
- Turkish Brigade
- 27th British Commonwealth Brigade
- British Middlesex Battalion
- British Argyll Battalion
- Australian Battalion
II ROK Corps
- 6th ROK Division

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn
Maj. Gen. John H. Church
Brig. Gen. Paik Sun Yup
Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter
Maj. Gen. Lawrence B. Keiser
Maj. Gen. William B. Kean
Brig. Gen. Tashin Yazici
Brig. Basil A. Coad
Lt. Col. A.M. Man
Lt. Col. G.L. Meilson
Lt. Col. I. B. Ferguson
Maj. Gen. Yu Jae Hung
Brig. Gen. Kim Jong Oh
7th ROK Division
8th ROK Division
1st US Cavalry Division
(Army reserve)

Col. Shin Sang Chul
Brig. Gen. Lee Sung Ga

On the morning of 24 November, the D-Day, General MacArthur, accompanied by the Commanding General of the Far East US Air Forces Lieutenant General Stratemeyer, his Operations Director Brigadier General Wright, Intelligence Director Major General Willoughby, Civil Affairs Director Major General Whitney, and war correspondents came in on the scene by air and visited the EUSAK forward command post near the Chongchon River. During his inspection tour around the headquarters of I and IX US Corps as well as the 24th US Division, escorted by General Walker, General MacArthur expressed his optimistic confidence for success of so-called his "end-the-war offensive." Upon his return at his headquarters in Tokyo, General MacArthur reported to the JCS the commencement of the offensive and released a communique, which reads in part as follows:

"The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our air forces of all types, have for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further reinforcement there from has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer, with noteworthy and effective naval support, has now reached commanding enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy's geographical potential. This morning the western sector of the pincer moves forward in general assault in an effort to complete the compression and close the vise. If successful, this should for all practical purposes and the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is this for which we fight."

At the time the strength of the Red Chinese forces was tremendously formidable one, too sharply contrary to the General MacArthur's estimate of situation. Looking about it in brief, there were six CCF armies (38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 50th, 66th) and one NK Communist corps on the western front, while three CCF armies (20th, 26th, 27th) and three NK Communist corps (III, IX and V) were poising on the eastern front against the X US and I ROK
Withdrew Action from the Yalu

Corps.

Up to the launching of the 24 November offensive the Eighth US Army and the X US Corps had suffered a total of 27,827 battle casualties in the Korean War; 21,519 in the Eighth Army and 6,298 in the X Corps. Of the Eighth Army total 4,157 had been killed in action. 391 more had died of wounds, and 4,884 were missing in action.

Development of the Battle Situation
(24—30 November)

The First Day: At 1000 hours, 24 November, the Eighth Army offensive began three corps abreast (1 and IX US Corps and II ROK Corps from left to right) along 80 kilometers front with little contact with enemy forces. At the outset it made quick gains, and across the Army front, as a whole, advances were made from 9,000 to 16,000 yards the first day.

On the I US Corps front in the west, the 24th US Division passed through Chongju and marked advance as far as 13 kilometers in the first day, with almost no enemy resistance, while the 2nd US Division under the IX US Corps on the central front advanced to the vicinity of Kujang-dong, 16 kilometers north of Kunu-ri. In the right sector of the EUSAK advance, the 8th ROK Division under the II ROK Corps advanced as far as eleven kilometers north of Yongwon in the first attack, while the 7th ROK Division on its immediate left had also reached up to a point ten kilometers north of Tokchon in the same day without encountering noticeable enemy opposition.

The Second Day: On 25 November, attack units continued the advance against increasing enemy resistance to a line Sinodong—Oryongdong—Ansim-dong, Kochang-ni—Chungsan-ni—Yongsan-dong, Sanggu-dong, Sinhung-dong, Tokchon—Hill 1134.

Before dawn of the 25th, the Chinese Communist forces suddenly launched probing attacks. On the I US Corps front in the west, the Chinese Reds struck upon the 1st ROK Division commanded by Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup. On the eastern end of the EUSAK front, meanwhile, the 8th ROK Division, with Brigadier General Lee Sung Ga in command, was already being threatened in its rear. The division was over exposed to the enemy penetration from the beginning because there situated a great gap as wide as 32 kilometers between its right flank and the left flank of the X US Corps in the east. Taking advantage of this open gap the undetected Chinese Reds had already poised for penetration into the rear area. This would cause a
great disaster for the II ROK Corps very shortly. Thus, General MacArthur's decisive offensive to conclude the war seemingly short-lived.

When darkness fell, most of the EUSAK units heard a sudden frightening uproar of noise. Bugles, whistles, and flutes were blown, cymbals clanged, and drums rattled.

This weird cacophony signaled the beginning of the Red Chinese second offensive in a full-scale all along the western front.

At the time, the enemy had reinforced his manpower by committing the newly arrived 42nd CCF Army into the wild maintains north of Yongwon, and the 38th CCF Army into the Myohyang-san area. The 39th and 40th CCF Armies were deployed in front of the IX US Corps, while the 50th and 66th CCF Armies plus the 1 NK Corps were in ambush ahead of the I US Corps' advance route.

The Third Day: On 26 November, the Chinese Communist forces mounted more heavier attack clanging symboles. By the afternoon, 1st ROK Division in the I US Corps area was falling back from Taechon under strong
pressure, and the 2nd US Division in the IX US Corps sector was hard pressed north of Kunu-ri, some 40 kilometers to the northeast. On that night, reinforced by several fresh CCF armies from Manchuria, the enemy counterattacked all along the frontlines, centering his major effort to the Eighth Army right flank in the Tokchon area. The bulk of the Red forces penetrated through the wide gap between the EUSAK right flank and the left flank of the X US Corps. This was the real phase of the CCF aggression against the Republic of Korea and the UN forces.

These Heavy CCF thrusts north of Tokchon eventually forced the UN units back about 40 kilometers. The 7th and 8th ROK Divisions of the II ROK Corps were dispersed in confusion as overwhelming CCF groups infiltrated through and encircled them. Thus, the entire II ROK Corps units had to fall back in various directions toward Songchon northeast of Kangdong, while inflicting heavy casualties upon the Reds as much as they could.

Heavy CCF onslaughts, entirely disregarding their heavy toll of manpower losses, now took place everywhere throughout the EUSAK front. By 27 November, it became evident that the UN offensive of 24 November had merely proceeded a similar full-scale offensive by the Red Chinese by about two days. There were no contending against such heavy odds, and the ROK and UN Allied forces had no alternative but to withdraw back from the north, when the complete victory was at hand, thus missing a golden opportunity for unification of Korea under the banner of "Taegukki," the national flag of the Republic of Korea. Actually, this was the UN forces' first stage of their second retreat, which, eventually, was to be continued areas more than 80 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel.

The tide of war turned and it was another moment of the tragic Korean War. A new war had begun by the Chinese Reds. The fury of the CCF aggression dispelled their hope and long-cherished-desire of the free Korean over night.

The Initiation of the Withdrawal

The CCF attack formation was that the 66th CCF Army together with the 1 NK Corps struck down the Chongju—Pakchon line; the 39th CCF Army toward Taechon—Yongsan-dong; the 40th CCF Army toward Unsan—Yongbyon—Kaechon; the 38th CCF Army on the Huichon—Kujang-dong—Tokchon route; and the 42nd CCF Army toward Yongwon on the EUSAK's right. On the other hand, the IX CCF Army Group the Red Chinese committed simultaneously its three armies (20th, 26th, and 27th) in mass into
the Changjin Reservoir sector against the 1st US Marine Division in the X US Corps area.

Completely caught by surprise the ROK and UN forces had to fight bloody battles literally. For instance, in the Unsan area the 1st ROK Division and the 1st US Cavalry Division fought back the Chinese Reds with desperate efforts, and the 2nd US Division and the Turkish Brigade also fought heroically in the Kaechon — Kunn-ri sector but were forced to into the Anju — Kaechon line. In the face of these setbacks, General Walker ordered all units on the western front to withdraw down to the Chongchon River line on the 28th, especially when the enemy forces advanced as far down as 35 kilometers south of Tokchon after they encountering bitter battles with the II ROK Corps units in the vicinity of Tokchon and Yongwon.

At this juncture, the Turkish Brigade was hastily committed by General Walker from reserve to bolster the frontlines and to cover the 2nd US Division on the IX US Corps’ right flank.

By now, elsewhere in the center and on the right of the Eighth Army front the situation became desperate. General Walker reported to General MacArthur that the Eighth Army was under heavy attack by at least two hundred thousand Red Chines forces. The Chinese Red odds were not engaging in the brief probing attacks of late October, but in a major offensive designed to envelop and destroy the entire Eighth Army. Faced by an enemy of tremendously overwhelming numbers, and supported by an inadequate supply system and a reserve force lacking depth, General Walker had no alternative but one choice; he must take his steps backward. (See Situation Map 9, Appendix VI.)

Meanwhile, on 28 November, General MacArthur, who four days before had confidently proclaimed the beginning of a decisive-general offensive to end the war, now radioed the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "The Chinese military forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever-increasing strength... We face an entirely new war... My strategic plan for the immediate future is to pass from the offensive to the defensive with such local adjustment as may be required by a constantly fluid situation." The General further stated that "This command... is faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength."

General MacArthur was now in a dilemma, but he had to decide a course of action within his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. Confronted with an entirely new war, General MacArthur ordered Generals Walker and Almond to report to him in person by flying from their command posts in northern Korea to Tokyo. In this
unusual conference there were also his principal staff members present, including Major General Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff; Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G—2; and Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, G—3.

As a result of this long emergency meeting which lasted from 2150 hours of 28 November to 0130 hours the next day, General MacArthur arrived at a decision to withdraw the UN forces from northern Korea in an effort to stabilize the fighting front. The General, however, preferred describing the retreat as a "movement in retrograde." And, at first General MacArthur wanted to establish a new UN defense line along Sukchon—Sunchon—Songchon—Yangdok—Wonsan, from west to east, and thereby he ordered the two major field commanders to hastily prepare for the withdrawal movement.

Since the situation had come to this, even General MacArthur, as the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, had no alternative but to change his strategy from the offensive to the defensive, and sent a special report to the United Nations also on the 28th:

"Enemy reactions developed in the course of our assault operations of the past four days disclose that a major segment of the Chinese continental forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in Korea... Consequently, we face an entirely new war."

Thus, not only the Republic of Korea but also the free allied forces under the command of General MacArthur lost the great victorious chance seemed almost within grasps, just because of the Red Chinese aggression.

Almost at the same time that this conference took place in Tokyo, there was an emergency meeting of the U.S. National Security Council in Washington. President Truman called it after first learning of the debacle suffered by the Eighth US Army in a telephone call from Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall at 0615 hours on 28 November.

General Bradley, speaking for the Joint Chiefs, said that General MacArthur would obviously had to turn to the defensive and make do with the troops under his command as new ones were not available. He also recommended against bombing Manchurian airfields, as this would invite retaliation against American planes crowed on Korean airfields. Secretary Marshall further said that the three armed services still agreed that it was essential to keep the war limited to Korea, and not do anything that would entangle the United States, with or without the United Nations, in a general war with Red China.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who felt that the United States was now closer than ever to a wider war, said that some way should be found to end
the war. Meanwhile, the State Department would attempt to unite the pro-
Western delegations in the United Nations against the Chinese Communists
and have their activities labeled as aggression despite the certainty of Soviet
veto in the U.N. Security Council.

All the military men present were disturbed by the exposed and scattered
tactical position of General MacArthur's divided command. The Joint
Chiefs, however, made no specific recommendations to the President for cor-
recting the situation.

Thus, General MacArthur was left to get out of the predicament he was in
as best he could. According to General MacArthur, he had surprised the
Red Chinese and sprung a trap they had laid. This upset the enemy's time-
table, which called for massing his armies in secret for a spring offensive that
would destroy the UN forces in one blow. By acting he had, General
MacArthur felt that he had saved his UN forces from eventual annihilation.

This version of what had happened was echoed by General Whitney, who
later wrote: "...He was not taken by surprise. His troops did not rush blind-
ly into a massive ambush as claimed by some detractors. The big push north
had been carefully designed to be effective either as mopping-up operation
or as a reconnaissance in force and nor it had unhappily became the latter."

This evaluation was probably first chosen by General Walker, com-
manding the Eighth US Army. On 29 November, the General told the
press: "The assault launched by the Eighth Army five days ago probably
saved our forces from a trap which might well have destroyed them... The
time of our attack to develop the situation was, indeed, most fortunate."

In short, President Truman and his Administration came conclusions from
the aforementioned conference shaping the American policy which thereafter
guided the American conduct of the United Nations Cause in Korea. The
U.S. Government recognized that it was no longer possible to unify Korea by
force and that some way to end the war must be found. In other words that
in no case would Manchuria be bombed or anything done to give the Soviet
Union a chance to involve the Korean War. However, it must not be forgotten
that the Soviet Russia waged the Korean War behind Kim Il-sung with its
full support.

Any rate, the Red Chinese forces waited no one. They pressed the pur-
suit south with great speed. Despite the desperate battle efforts of the ROK
and UN Allies, the CCF odds still rushed south. Red China and Kim Il-sung's
puppet clique wanted to unify Korea by force. Actually, Kim Il-sung had
started the war to overrun the whole peninsula by force from the very begin-
ning, and now the Red Chinese gave their hands to the NK Communists to
fulfil their original goal.

On 28 November, General Walker ordered his forces to withdraw to a line along the south of the Chongchon River, conducting the delaying action under cover of the air forces. He had in his mind to hold and secure a line roughly following the road from Pyongyang to Wonsan.

According to the orders, (1) the I US Corps, as the left wing of the Eighth Army, would withdraw to the Sinanju area to establish a defense line there; (2) the IX US Corps on the center was to move back to a line connecting Anju and Kuru-ri, covering the right wing forces; (3) the II ROK Corps on the right wing was to fall back to the Songchon — Yangdok line; (4) the 1st US Cavalry Division, as an EUSAK reserve, would secure the Sunchon — Pukchong line, guard the Eighth Army's east flank, and maintain close contact with the 6th ROK Division of the II ROK Corps; and (5) the III ROK Corps, which was activated on 16 October 1950 in Seoul, was to move northward on order.

On the other hand, on the 28th, a large enemy force, comprising of the 50th and 60th CCF Armies plus the INK Corps, attacked down to the Anju—Taechon line, while on the farther east, the large onslaughts of the 39th, the 49th, and the 42nd CCF Armies rushed south from the Tokchon—Yongwon area through the rugged mountain zone, giving hard pressure on the Eighth Army's right wing in particular.

By the evening of the 29th, the main body of the UN forces generally held a defense line connecting Sukchon — Sunchon — Songchon — Yangdok from left to right. During the two days of 29 and 30 November, the Red Chinese forces, directing their main effort on the north bank of the Chongchon River, occupied Kujiang-dong, Tokchon and Yongwon one after another, and, then their bulky forces threatened to cut the withdrawal routes of the UN forces at one stroke by flanking through toward the directions of Kaechon — Samso-ri — Sinchang-ni.

As of 30 November, the friendly Order of Battle across the Eighth US Army front from west to east was as follows: In the I US Corps, the 5th US Regimental Combat Team (attached to the 24th US Division), the 1st ROK Division, the 25th US Division, with the 29th British Brigade in reserve; in the IX US Corps, the 2nd US Division, the 6th ROK Division, elements of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, with the 1st US Cavalry Division in blocking positions. The 24th US Division (minus) was en route to Kangdong (southwest of Songchon or northeast of Pyongyang), the 2nd ROK Division (minus) was assembling in the Uijongbu—Munsan area; and the 5th ROK Division and the 187th US Airborne RCT were protecting the Seoul—Pyongyang main supply route.
In short, by 30 November, the I US Corps was occupying blocking positions south of the Chongchon River, the IX US Corps was withdrawing from the Kunu-ri sector, and the II ROK Corps was assembling remnants of the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions.

Consequently, on 1 December, the Eighth US Army units began to withdraw from the south bank of the Chongchon River, under the covering actions given by the 5th US Infantry RCT and the British Middlesex Battalion, to the Sukchon—Sunchon line, where they were to form a new defense line north of Pyongyang thereafter.

In other words, the 24th US Division of the I US Corps took up positions in the area between Samsong-ri (northeast of Pyongyang) and Kangdong, while the 1st US Cavalry Division held its defenses along Sinehanging—Songchon. Farther west, the 6th ROK Division of the II ROK Corps had transferred from Sinchang-ri to the Unsan—Sunchon line. On the other hand, the main body of the IX US Corps which had withdrawn through the two routes, one through the Kunu-ri—Sinanju—Sukchon route, and the other through Kunu-ri—Sunchon, now moved back farther south to a line connecting Sunchon—Jasan, while the 25th US Division turned back to Sunchon—Sangga-ri (northeast of Sukchon). These units set up their defensive positions there upon arrival. This meant that the 24th US Division had moved from the I US Corps sector to the IX US Corps area and, instead, the 25th US Division was shifted from the IX Corps area to the I US Corps zone.

During 1—2 December the UN forces on the western front, as a whole, generally held a new line covering Sukchon—Sunchon—Songchon—Yangdok, thus forming the Pyongyang defense line under cover of the UN air supremacy. And yet, all such efforts were in vain.

On 3 December, a countless large-sized Red Chinese force broke through the central mountainous area and the II ROK Corps defenses in the Songchon and Sunchon area fell into the Red hands. Taking advantage of such a momentum, bigger and violent CCF onslaughts took place all along the EUSAK defenses, directing their heaviest effort in massive strength onto Pyongyang in particular. The cold winter had already set in and, unfortunately, the cloudy weather did not allow for the UN air forces to exploit their air mighty in full swing against such Red odds. In these early days of their aggression which they were deficient in armor and artillery, the Red Chinese relied mainly on weight of numbers—human sea tactics.

At this crucial juncture when they were in no match against such Red odds, the outnumbered UN forces had no choice but to abandon Pyongyang
on 4 December, and to withdraw back farther south. The ROK and UN Allied troops thereafter formed a new defense line roughly in the vicinity of the Imjin River and the 38th Parallel, pledging among themselves to surge the Red odds back again with increased strength and in a better prepared posture as early as possible.

I US Corps

Major General Milburn, Commanding General of the I US Corps, planned to take his part in the Eighth US Army offensive, by employing two divisions abreast: The 24th US Infantry Division was to advance on the left, attacking through the main highway leading into the Yalu River along the west coast from the west of the Taeryong River, while the 1st ROK Infantry Division was charged to attack as the Corp's right wing through the rugged mountainous areas, putting two columns in the lead -- one along the Taeryong River–Kewon-chon axis and the other toward Taechon through the Yongsan-dong area. Then it was to continue to attack north to the Kusong–Sakchu–Yalu River line. The 27th British Commonwealth brigade was to remain in reserve in the vicinity of Pakchon. The Commonwealth Brigade under the command of Brigadier Coad was comprising of the Argylls, Middlesex, and Australian Battalions.

On the morning of 24 November the new advance began with no enemy resistance; but it was short-lived. On the second day of the attack, the 25th, the 1st ROK Division encountered heavy enemy opposition and engaged in the fierce battle with an unexpected large force of the Chinese Communist forces south of Taechon. At the time the slow move of the 25th US Division on its right caused the ROK division to fall into more trouble. The 66th and 60th CCF Armies suddenly struck in mass against the advance of the 1st ROK Division before Taechon. The bulk of the Red Chinese forces, supposedly the main body of the CCF in this mountainous sector of Yongsan-dong–Taechon–Kusong, rushed in south, while another CCF masses counterattacked down to the vicinity of Pakchon and Yongsan-dong along the bank of the Taeryong River. By the afternoon of the 26th the 1st ROK Division was falling back from Taechon under strong pressure, but the 24th US Division on the Corps' left wing marked advance as far as 13 kilometers in the first day and continued the attack.

On 27 November when a dangerous situation was likely to arise as the 2nd US Division was hard pressed north of Kunu-ri, on the I US Corps' right
sector, the 27th British commonwealth Brigade, commanded by Brigadier B.A. Coad, was ordered by the Eighth US Army to withdraw to the south of the Chongchon River and moved to Kunuri, where it came under the command of the IX US Corps. The brigade set out for Sunchon the next day on foot as no transport was available. At the time it was the only uncommitted body of troops available to form a reserve for the IX US Corps.

On the 28th, in accordance with General Walker’s orders to withdraw to the south bank of the Chongchon River, the I US Corps withdrew to the vicinity of Sinanju. Thus, the 1st ROK Division and the 24th US Division assembled in and around Sinanju to meet the new situation. That day, putting their main force on the east bank of Taeryong River and Yongsan-dong, the massive Red Chinese bitterly hit the 1st ROK Division, particularly in the Yongsan-dong and Taechon area.

As all the UN forces on the Eighth US Army front began the withdrawal, the 1st ROK Division, on the morning of the 29th, moved to Pakchon, and then withdrew farther south by motor columns, by way of Tongi-dong—Hakaldong, down to Sambong-ni—Haktong-ni—Sankal-dong. On the 30th, its regiments completely gathered at Sukchon and at Yongpo-ri.

On 1 December, in conjunction with the 24th US Division’s new positions, the 1st ROK Division set up new defenses in and around Sukchon, forming a part of the forward lines for the defense of Pyongyang. However, the units of the I US Corps had to abandon Pyongyang on the 4th for the Red Chinese had already deeply penetrated through the II ROK Corps on the EUSA’s right sector.

**IX US Corps**

At 1000 hours, 24 November, the IX US Corps started the attack northward two division abreast, the 25th US Division on the lead and the 2nd US Division on the right. The 25th US Division, commanded by Major General William B. Kean, began the advance, by employing its whole three regiments (24th, 27th, and 35th), taking the Kuryong road heading for Unsan. The 2nd US Division on the Corps’ right wing also struck with the three regiments on the line, the 9th, 23rd, and 38th Regiments, from left to right. It reached nearly Kunjang-dong in the first day attack almost with no enemy resistance.

On the 25th, with the vanguard elements of the adjacent II ROK Corps on the right flank of the IX US Corps came under heavy enemy attack in the Myohyang Mountain area and also some elements fell into the enemy envelopment, the 2nd US Division surprisingly fell into a trap ambushed by a force of
the Chinese Communists near Kunu-ri. The enemy had already flanked through the rear area, thus cutting off the withdrawal route, while another Red Chinese forces struck in mass by frontal attack. By nightfall, the entire Corps sector was a momentary lull in the fighting, but during the night of 25–26 November tremendous number of the Chinese Communists made a determined onslaught against the 2nd US Division, yelling mysterious noises and beating gongs. The Red assault waves rushed in wave after wave under the moon light. This enemy attack signalled the beginning of “the Battle of Kunu-ri” one of the hottest battles in the Korean War.

The Battle of Kunu-ri in late November 1950 became an epic drama where the UN soldiers killed bugle-blowing, drum-beating Chinese Communists by the thousands before giving ground to the superior numbered Red forces. The Turkish Brigade was sent in to help stem the advancing Reds in the Tokchon area but was heavily engaged even before reaching there. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade also moved into the sector to reinforce the fighting strength, but still the Red Chinese came. A brief development of the Kunu-ri battle was as follows:

Out of the darkness in the midnight of 25 November the three full Red Chinese regiments with the support of heavy artillery fire struck against the 2nd US Division. Two of them at the center and right flank of the division, hitting the 38th US Regiment in the Hyonjiye-bong (Hill 1229) area and part of the 23rd US Regiment. The third CCF regiment attacked by flanking movement to the rear against the 9th US Regiment on the left causing heavy casualties.

The enemy attack on the 26th continued against the 38th Infantry and the II ROK Corps on the right of the 38th Infantry. The 23rd Infantry (-) went into positions on the 9th Infantry’s right flank and the 2nd US Combat Engineer Battalion was attached as infantry to the 9th Infantry to bolster the division’s left flank along the west bank of the Chongchon River. Thus, the division line was extended about six and a half kilometers in width north of Kujiang-dong.

By early morning on the 26th, the 7th ROK Division had withdrawn almost to Pukchang-ni, completely exposing the right flank of the 2nd US Division and its 38th Infantry. The 3rd Regiment of the 7th ROK Division closed westward and joined the 38th US Infantry. Tokchon fell during the mid-morning and the 38th US Regiment stood at wall.

Late in the afternoon the enemy resumed his attack against the 9th US Infantry, and at 2200 hours, the Reds overran the regimental defenses, forcing it to withdraw east of the Chongchon River.
Meanwhile, the 23rd US Regiment on the immediate right of the 9th US Regiment was heavily attacked by the Red Chinese at 2115 hours, 26 November. The Americans fought bitterly until their ammunition was gone or their positions completely overrun. At the time, the 38th US Regiment was beating off wave after wave of the Red attackers from the north, east and south. Finally, under intense enemy pressure, the 38th Infantry had to begin limited withdrawal.

The situation of the Eighth Army front, as a while, at this point, gradually became for more serious, even though the 1 US Corps on the EUSAOK's left wing still held the Chongju — Taechon line. The IX US Corps and the II ROK Corps very badly and urgently needed reinforcements to fill up the personnel losses. Consequently, the Turkish Brigade, which had been attached to the 25th US Division, was hastily ordered at 1400 hours by the IX US Corps Commander to move quickly from Kunu-ri to Tokchon where it would take up defensive positions on the right of the 38th Infantry of the 2nd US Division. The Turkish Brigade started off by motor columns Kunu-ri at 1600 hours heading for Tokchon, but it had to halt its movement at Wawon (18 kilometers east of Kunu-ri) as darkness fell and there the brigade prepared for any enemy night attacks.

On the 27th, the 2nd US Division decided to defend in the vicinity of Kujang-dong. At 2300 hours that night, the 38th US Regiment assumed operational control of the 3rd Regiment of the 7th ROK Division.

In the meantime, the 25th US Division, on the left of the 2nd US Division, was also struggling with the heavy CCF attacks, the 39th CCF Army continued its pressure on the entire Corps sector. Taking advantage of darkness, the Red Chinese forces took Ulsan with their main body and chased the 35th US Regiment closely behind and penetrated into Yongsan-dong at a stroke.

To meet this acute situation, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was ordered on the 27th to detach from the 1 US Corps and to move from Jujeong-dong to Kunu-ri, placing under operational control of the IX US Corps upon arrival there. Throughout the day the Red Chinese continued their attacks all along the Corps sector, entirely disregarding their heavy casualties. The 27th Regiment of the 25th US Division was seriously damaged by the CCF onslaughts from all around, rear, flanks, front.

The early minutes of 28 November saw a furious enemy attack against the 9th Regiment of the 2nd US Division, while at 0615 hours that morning the 23rd US Infantry was under heavy enemy attack from the north. By noon of
the 28th it was obvious the 2nd US Division could never carry through with the plan to defend the arc of Kujang-dong. At 1300, the 2nd US Division was ordered to gradually withdraw into an arc around Kunu-ri in an attempt to stop the onrushing hordes of Red Chinese. The withdrawal from north of Kujang-dong was costly success but the new position on the bank of the Chongchon River just north of Kunu-ri presented a new serious situation. It was found the enemy already in possession of its position upon arrival there.

On the other hand, the Turkish Brigade, which had come under the 2nd US Division's control the previous day and had been badly battered in a heroic stand east of the 38th US Regiment position, attempted to tie in on the right of the 38th US Infantry.

Late in the afternoon of the 28th, General Walker, the Eighth US Army Commander, ordered his major commands to withdraw to the south of the Chongchon River, but the situation in the IX US Corps sector was growing serious from moment to moment. The IX Corps was to conduct the withdrawal action, while covering the withdrawal of the II ROK Corps on the other hand.

As for the enemy, the main forces of the 38th and 50th CCF Armies gained the Kaechon – Yongwon line and the Red forces now advanced down as far as three kilometers south of Tokchon by the end of the 28th.

The Turkish Brigade, meanwhile, encountered heavy enemy onslaughts with the support of heavy volume of artillery that struck upon the Turks at 0100 hours, 29 November at the area about nine kilometers east of Wawon-ni. Henceforth, the brigade had to fight its way through repeated bloody battles, suffering heavy losses en route.

On 29 November, the IX Corps ordered its subordinate units. The 2nd US Division was to withdraw through Kunu-ri – Sunchon; the 25th US Division plus headquarters elements of the Turkish Brigade would move back through down to Anju; and the 9th US Regiment and the main body of the Turkish Brigade were to cover the withdrawal of the Corps' main force, then to move down to Sunchon.

They had to break through the enemy roadblocks ahead while they were under heavy attack by numerically superior enemy forces. All efforts to break through the roadblocks met with failure. Particularly, a crisis faced the 2nd US Division for annihilation was certain, if it stayed in Kunu-ri. It requested the IX Corps Commander for permission to take the division out of the enemy trap by way of the Kunu-ri – Anju – Sinanju road. Major General Keiser, finally decided to withdraw to Sunchon. During this move
more bitter and bloody fighting took place; but all units got through. These American units, however, were ambushed many places and suffered very heavily.

At early dawn, 30 November, the enemy forces resumed the attack everywhere across the Eighth US Army front. They penetrated the Tokchon—Pukhang-ri—Anju defense line and rushed down the northern bank of the Chongchon River around Kaechon. On the other hand, also on the 30th, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was ordered to secure a pass on the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road and help past of the 2nd US Division which was withdrawing from Kunu-ri. There it involved in heavy close-quarter fighting. The American columns were ambushed by the Red odds in the pass suffering a heavy toll of casualties. They were heading for Jasan.

After it found and got through the precious way out from enemy traps, the 2nd US Division assembled its troop south of Sunchon. The Turkish Brigade suffered its heaviest casualties in the vicinity of Yongwon-ri where it was ambushed by the overwhelming Red odds, and the survivors reached Jasan. The 25th US Division moved back to Sukchon by way of Anju after it crossed the Chongchon River.

In short, no account of the withdrawal could ever tell of the suffering endured by the heroic men of the 2nd US Division in and around Kunu-ri. More than 5,000 casualties were suffered by the 2nd US Division in November 1950 with 95 percent of that total inflicted in the last five days of the month.

In the early days of December 1950 the 2nd US Division and the Turkish Brigade further withdrew from Jasan to the Pyonyang line, thereafter the 2nd US Division assembled in Yongdungpo, while the Turkish Brigade took up its new positions in and around Sosa, coming under the operational control of the 25th US Division. Meanwhile, after it withdrew from Sangpal-li to the south of Sunchon, the 25th US Division moved back to Pyonyang where it acted as a covering force for the withdrawal of the friendly units. Later it took up defenses in the Kimpo peninsula with the Turks, and then moved to the Ansong area.

The fluid situation which existed during the later part of November and the first part of December 1950 resulted in additional changes in the IX US Corps lineup. The 25th US Division was relieved from the Corps on 27 November and the 6th ROK Division was added the following day. The 2nd US Division left the IX US Corps on 2 December. This followed the next day by the addition of the 24th US Division.
II ROK Corps

The operation plan of the II ROK Corps was to attack north two divisions abreast, with the 7th ROK Division on the left and the 8th ROK Division on the right. The 6th ROK Division was to remain in reserve. The Corps was assigned to attack from the present positions situating in between Yongwon and Tokcon toward Yuwonjin—Huichon then up to the Yalu River, advancing through Tokin-bong—Sinki-bong—Samwolkangjo-ri—Paiknyong-chon. This indicated that the Corps had to attack through wild, high and rugged mountain area with a very wide gap existing on its right flank to the left flank of the X US Corps.

After jumping off at 1000 hours, 24 November the two attacking divisions moved forward as planned through rugged mountainous terrain during the first two days of the advance. As darkness began to fall on the 25th the Red odds started making noise.

Immediately following the most fantastic noise, the subordinate divisions of the 42nd CCF Army struck against the II ROK Corps divisions. The attacks followed a pattern known as the "one point-two sides method," developed by the Communists during the Chinese civil war. The ROK units were allowed to enter a V formation, at whose base and both sides simultaneous assaults were directed.

Meanwhile, other Red Chinese forces used draws and feeder valleys leading into the valley of the Chongchon River to seal off the rear and set up roadblocks.

Earlier that morning, troops of the 2nd US Division on the left neighbor of the II ROK Corps had met CCF resistance on the east bank of the Chongchon River and the fighting there continued throughout the day and into the night. But the CCF main thrust was reserved for the II ROK Corps which was responsible for the most vulnerable sector in the Eighth Army advance.

Throughout the night of 25–26 November a fierce and confused fighting ensued between the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions and the Red odds, and the next day the enemy forces with more reinforcements raged more heavier onslaughts, thus taking Yongwon (held by the 8th ROK Division) and Tokchon (held by the 7th ROK Division) into their hands.

On the 27th, the Red Chinese forces farther invaded as far as into Yochon, Pukchang and Maengsan. The ROK units soon found that their telephone lines had been cut by guerrillas and that radio communication was hindered by the mountainous terrain, which resulted in more confusion among the
units. The enemy forces now turned their direction of attacks westward with the intention of cutting off the rear route of the IX US Corps in the west of the II ROK Corps. Quickly reading such an enemy's scheme of maneuver, the II ROK Corps Commander committed the 6th ROK Division from reserve into the Pukchang area, while the 8th ROK Division was engaging in the delaying action.

By nightfall of the 27th, the entire II ROK Corps had been virtually collapsed, exposing the right flank of the Eighth Army front.

The 8th ROK Division, after encountering bloody battles in the Yongwon and Maengsan area, was relieved by the 6th ROK Division and went into reserve. Yet, the enemy had already penetrated into Pukchang, thus threatening to rush down to Pyongyang at a stroke. Consequently, the 6th ROK Division had to fall back while carrying out a delaying action toward Kaechon—Sunchon—Pyongyang. In an effort to take part in the Pyongyang—Wonsan defense line, the 6th ROK Division moved thereafter to Kangdong on 30 November. Afterward the division farther moved southward through Samdung—Yul-li—Sosan—Singye—Sibyon-ni, thus reaching Tosan on the 5th of December.

Meanwhile, the 7th ROK Division after leaving Kujang-dong behind on the 28th November, also withdrew successfully southward through Pukchang—Sunchon down to Pyongyang and Sungho-ri where it joined in the Pyongyang defense positions.

Section 3. The X US Corps Operations (24—30 November 1950)

Late in November 1950, the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps on the eastern front had advanced deep into northeast Korea, carrying everything before them. The Capital ROK Division under the I ROK Corps had already reached far up the east coast beyond Chongjin, thus nearing to the mouth of the Tumen River (Tuman-gang) bordering with the Soviet Union, while the 3rd ROK Division on the left of the Capital Division had also reached the northern border on the Yalu River.

On the other hand, the vanguards of the 7th US Infantry Division stood on the south bank of the Yalu River (Amnok-gang) at Hyesanjin on 21 November, and the 1st US Marine Division, together with a battalion each of the 31st and 32nd Infantry Regiments, the 7th US Division, had advanced to the Changjin
Withdrawal Action from the Yalu

Reservoir area. The 3rd US Infantry Division had been withheld in reserve with the garrison missions in and around Wonsan.

the X Corps Operations

On 24 November 1950, the D-Day of the Eighth US Army offensive in the east, the forward lines were quiet everywhere along the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps front in the east except for small-scale patrol contacts. On the evening the X Corps issued a warning order for an operation to be executed in conjunction with the Eighth Army offensive. The next day, the 25th, Major General Almond issued the X Corps operation order. He had then the I ROK Corps under his operational control. Thus, there were about 105,000 ROK and American troops. H-hour was to be at 0800 on the 27th November and the major units under the X US Corps operational control were assigned the following tasks:

(1) The 1st US Marine Division—to seize Mupyong-ni and advance to the Yalu River; (2) The 7th US Infantry Division—(a) to attack from east side of the Changjin Reservoir and advance to the Yalu, and (b) secure the Pungsan area, coordinating with the I ROK Corps; (3) The I ROK Corps—to advance from Hapsu and Chongjin areas destroying enemy in zone to north boundary of Korea; and (4) The 3rd US Infantry Division—(a) to gain and maintain contact with the right flank of the Eighth US Army in zone, (b) to protect the left flank of the X Corps, (c) to support the 1st US Marine Division on the X Corps order, (d) to protect the harbor and airfield at Wonsan, and (e) to destroy enemy guerrillas in zone.

On the morning of the 26th, the warning order was supplantended by a briefing at 1000 hours at the X Corps Headquarters. The 1st US Marine Division was to be the northern arm of the pinces in the "massive compression envelopment" while some elements of the 7th US Infantry Division took over the previous Marine mission of advancing east of Changjin Reservoir to the Yalu River; the 1st Marine Division’s objective was about halfway between Huichon in the south and Kanggye in the north.

The main body of the 7th US Division was ordered to proceed northeast to the Yalu River. The 3rd US Infantry Division, remaining in reserve, had the responsibility for the area south of Hagaru-ri to maintain garrisons at Koto-ri and Chinhing-ni. It was also responsible for the protection of the MSR from Sudong southward to Hungnam.
There was also the 41st British Independent Marine Commando, consisted with 14 officers and 221 enlistedmen, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, attached to the 1st US Marine Division. This British unit had arrived at Hungnam on 20 November and was ordered by the 1st Marine Division on the 23rd to locate and destroy enemy forces on the left flank of the Marine advance as far as 20 kilometers west of Koto-ri. Then, in this new offensive the Commandos were assigned the mission to move to Yudam-ni and prepare for operations to the southeast to protect the left flank of the American Marines. But, on the 28th, due to the transportation problem, it was changed to move together with the Headquarters Battalion of the Marine division when the division command post displaced from Hungnam to Hagaru-ri.

In short, the X Corps, with its headquarters at Hamhung, had planned to launch the attack employing four divisions on the lines—the 1st US Marine Division, 7th US Infantry Division, 3rd ROK Division and Capital ROK Division, from left to right, specifically for a wide envelopment to be spearheaded by the 1st US Marine Division on 27 November. The major commands and their commanders at the time were as follows:

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<td>I ROK Corps</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Kim Paik II</td>
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On the evening of the 25th, however, unexpectedly came the disturbing news that the Eighth Army’s right wing, namely the II ROK Corps, had been hurled back by a surprise CCF counterattack in the vicinity of Tokchon, about 70 air miles southwest of Yudam-ni near the Changjin Reservoir. This news was completely beyond to General Almond’s expectation.

On the following day, an intelligence report specifically indicated that the 7th US Marine Regiment had captured three CCF soldiers from the 60th CCF Division. They asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th CCF Division of the 20th CCF Army had reached the Yudam-ni area on the 20th of November.

The X US Corps had also received similar reports of the Chinese Communist forces’ movement in the vicinity of Yudam-ni as well as north and northeast of the Changjin Reservoir. At least six CCF divisions had now been
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infiltrated in northeast Korea but the X Corps intelligence estimates of probable enemy action continued to be optimistic. But, actually there were twelve CCF divisions hiding in the rugged mountains.

1st US Marine Division

On 26 November 1950, the 1st US Marine Division issued its Operation Order 24-50 at 0800 hours in order to implement the X Corps orders. The jump off was to be at 0800 hours on 27 November, with the first objective the road junction at Yongnim-dong, 43 road kilometers west of Yudam-ni, in preparation for further advance on order to the high ground about 46 kilometers west of Yudam-ni. Other provisions of the division order were as follows:

(1) the 7th Marine RCT—to seize and secure Yudam-ni without delay, and when passed through by the 5th Marine RCT, to protect the division MSR from Sinhung-ni (some eleven kilometers west of Hagaru-ri) to Yudam-ni;
(2) the 5th Marine RCT—to pass through the 7th Marine RCT west of Yudam-ni by 0800, 27 November, advance to the west and seize the first objective, prepared for further advance; (3) the 1st Marine RCT — in division reserve, to occupy positions in the vicinity of Chinhung-ni, Kotori, and Hagaru-ri for the protection of the MSR; (4) the 11th Marine Regiment (less detachments) —to provide general support from position in the vicinity of Yudam-ni; (5) the 41st British Marine Commando (reinforced)—to move to Yudam-ni prepared for operations to the southwest to protect the division left flank; and (6) the Reconnaissance Company — to move to Yudam-ni and reconnoiter to the north in coordination with operations of the 7th Marine RCT.

Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General of the 1st US Marine Division flew by helicopter from Hungnam to Yudam-ni on the morning of 26 November to physically inspect the attack posture there. General Smith did not share the optimism of the General MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo or other field commanders. He had been worried about the too wide and exposed gap situated in between the right flank of the EUSAOK front and his own left flank.

As for the disposition of the Marine division, only two of its three regiment were in forward positions. The 7th Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, took up a blocking position at Yudam-ni on the west bank of the Changjin Reservoir. 24 kilometers away from it at Hagaru-ri was the 5th Marine Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L.
Murray, the 1st Marine Regiment, with Colonel Lewis B. Puller in command, still remained well behind, guarding the MSR back to Hamhung.

Thus, his seriously exposed left flank had caused Major General Smith serious concern since the advance north began.

On 27 November, the D-Day for the resumption of the division attack, the American Marines were scheduled to move westward over a single road surrounded by rugged mountains and trackless wastes to close the wide gap between themselves and the Eighth US Army, which now fall into the crucial situation. The movement of the Eighth Army and the Marines to the Yalu was seen by General MacArthur as a "giant U.N. pincer." But, contrary to General MacArthur's estimation, in the rugged and high mountains of northern Korea, the UN forces were faced with a formidable foe who was highly mobile, marched fast at night and hid during the daylight, and required few supplies. Furthermore, the foe was a tremendously large and strong force in numbers, comprising of well-trained, well-battle experienced, particularly for cross country maneuver and tactics. The U.N. airpower could have little effect against such elusive enemy.

The Battle of the Changjin Reservoir
(27—30 November)

The Marines: While the situation was from bad to worse on the western front, the 7th and 5th US Marine Regiment jumped off in the attack at 0815 hours on 27 November toward north of Yudam-ni which lies in the center of a broad valley surrounded by high and rugged hill mass. The attack continued for more than half an hour without meeting mentionable opposition but was short-lived.

Elements of the 7th US Marines came under enemy fire from 500 yards away around 0900 hours. The 5th US Marines which had marched out of Yudam-ni and launched the main attack along the road, were also hit by long range small-arms fire shortly after 0900 hours. There soon flared up bitter battle beating and beating back. While fighting raged in an arc form south to west around Yudam-ni during the afternoon, another danger areas was discovered to the north and northeast, completing a vast semicircle of known CCF concentrations in proximity to Yudam-ni.

By the nightfall, the disposition of the 5th and 7th US Marines was that a total of ten understrength rifle companies of both regiments on the high ground around Yudam-ni; two battalions of the 5th Marines in the valley near
the village; and two rifle companies of the 7th Marines in isolated positions along the 22-kilometers route to Hagaru-ri. (See Sketch Map 25.)

The command posts of both the 5th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murry, and the 7th Marines with Colonel Homer L. Litzelberg in command, were located at Yudam-ni along with the usual headquarters elements.

As for the enemy situation, the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions struck upon the northwest area of the Yudam-ni perimeter during the night of 27–28 November, while the 59th CCF Division completed envelopment to the southeast to cut the road leading into Hagaru-ri, the very lifeline to most of the 1st US Marine Division strength.

As the darkness fell on the battlefield, the temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero. American Marines had no amount of clothing to keep themselves warm enough. Even more worse that their weapons froze to
such a degree that, in some cases, they became completely unserviceable.

When the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division in the southeastern shore of the Changjin Reservoir was attacked by the Red Chinese forces on the night of 27 November, the two American Marine regiments under Colonel Litzenberg and Colonel Murray on the southwestern shore at Yudam-ni were also checked. In the pitch-black night, the silent hills around the Marines suddenly came alive with thousands of Red Chinese in green or yellow padded-cotton uniforms. The endless columns of Red waves rushed toward the American positions. These were the assaults forces of the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions. With seven other divisions they comprised the IX CCF Army Group under the Third CCF Field Force. They threw a massive frontal assault, among at the northwest arc of the Yudam-ni perimeter, while the 59th CCF Division had completed a wide envelopment to the south, driving in toward Toktong Pass to cut the MSR between Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni.

This was the CCF main effort in northeast Korea; three divisions against two regiments of the American Marines. To cope with these overwhelming Red odds, the outnumbered American Marines would have to rely on superior firepower, command of the air, and another weapons called espirit. There was a task force of 2,500 men from the 7th US Division in support of the Marines.

The Red Chinese pattern of attack was designed to offset the enemy’s advantage in arms and equipment by employing surprise, superior numbers, and a mobility derived from being unburdened with transport and heavy weapons. Some small groups of CCF foot troops peeled off from their larger columns, one at a time, and closed in on the entrenched Marines with grenades, rifles, and submachine guns. While a CCF group struck the American positions frontally another group or groups flanked around or maneuvered behind the Marines in infiltration attempts.

Thus, when the full fury of the CCF counterattack struck on the western front, the 1st US Marine Division, commanded by Major General Oliver P. Smith, operating as the left flank of the X US Corps, launched a daring assault westward from Yudam-ni in an effort to cut the road and rail communications of enemy forces now concentrating heavier onslaughts on the Eighth Army in the west, but encountered the enough serious situation which its own from the beginning. Nevertheless, the Marine division sustained the heavy CCF blow and, at the same time, continued its mission of protecting a vital main supply route consisting of a tortuous mountain road running southward to Chinghung-ni, approximately 56 kilometers distant.
In the face of tremendous pressure, particularly in the Changjin Reservoir area, the division began an epic battle against the bulk of the Red Chinese forces, while another intermediate garrisons at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri held firmly against repeated and determined enemy attacks.

At a dawn on the 28th, the commanders of two American Marine regiments met at Colonel Litzenberg’s command post, while the 5th Marines were counterattacking on the Red Chinese. They agreed to launch a coordinated attack to the south and reopen the route to Hagaru-ri.

Since then onward the American Marines heroically struggled to fight their way southward, striking the repeated enemy roadblocks in massive force all the way through from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri then to Chinhung-ni north of Hamhung.

During the period, the first step to regain the initiative was taken by the 1st Marine Division as early as 29 November. Taking serious consideration into the crucial situation around Yudam-ni, Major General Smith concluded it was a task for a regiment to open the MSR, and issued the following orders
that afternoon: (1) The 5th Marine Regimental Combat Team—to assume responsibility protection of the Yudam-ni area adjusting present disposition accordingly; and (2) the 7th Marine Regimental Combat Team—to conduct operation to clear MSR to Hagaru-ri without delay employing the entire regiment.

At 0600 hours on the 30th November, the two RCTs issued their joint operation orders which called for the regroupment of the Yudam-ni forces in a new position south of the village as a first step toward a breakout. The new operation was began on the morning of 1 December which eventually led to a turning point in getting out from the CCF traps, known as the valley of death. Thus, the American Marines not only saved themselves in the Changjin Reservoir battles, they also helped the Eighth US army from being assailed by reinforcements from northeast Korea in the forthcoming CCF offensive. Furthermore, as a direct result of their gallant and successful battle account there, the X US Corps would enable later to evacuate Hungnam without enemy interference.

The following estimates of CCF casualties, for the period of 28 November to 5 December, were nearer to accuracy, according to POW interrogations: (1) the 58th CCF Division had suffered 3,300 casualties for the 172nd CCF Regiment; 1,750 each for the 173rd and 174th CCF Regiments; and (2) the 59th CCF Division had suffered 1,750 casualties for the 176th CCF Regiment. No other units identified. The known Red Chinese dead in the two night battles at Hagaru-ri alone amounted to at least 1,500; and if it may be assumed that three or four times that number were wounded, the total casualties would have crippled an enemy infantry division of 7,500 to 10,000 men, plus an additional regiment. Enemy prisoners indicated that the Reds had used up not only the personnel of a division but most of the limited supplies of ammunition available.

The Infantry: There were also infantry elements of the 7th US Division in the Changjin Reservoir area when the American Marines were engaging in heavy battles with the Red Chinese hordes in the Yudam-ni area.

Prior to the D-Day for the new offensive of the X US Corps the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., took over from the 5th US Marine Regiment a new position in the east of the Changjin Reservoir by 1200 hours, 25 November. The X Corps called for the infantry battalion to remain under the operational control of the 1st US Marine Division until assumption of command in the area by Colonel Allan D. MacLean, the 31st Infantry Regimental
Withdrawal Action from the Yalu

Commander.

Following redeployment of his subordinate units, Colonel MacLean, the 31st Infantry, had set up a defense perimeter near Sinhung-ni with his 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 57th Field Artillery. Along the shore farther to the north, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry held a separate perimeter. Both positions were hard hit by the Red Chinese on the night of 27—28 November and isolated from each other.

During the next 24 hours they gallantly beat off CCF attacks with the support of brother-Marines and FEAF planes, and Colonel Faith fought his way through to a junction with the troops in Sinhung-ni. The overwhelming Red odds in numbers continued to attack wave after wave upon the Americans. Immobilized by nearly 500 casualties, Colonel Faith remained in the Sinhung-ni, where he was supplied by air drop.

It was evident the continued retreat of the friendly forces on the Eighth Army front in west Korea must ultimately affect the destinies of the X US and I ROK Corps in northeast Korea. Of more immediate concern was the deteriorating situation of the three battalions of the 7th US Division—two infantry and one artillery in the east of the Changjin Reservoir.

At noon, 29 November, Brigadier General Henry L. Hodes, the Assistant Commander of the 7th US Division, informed Major General Smith, the 1st Marine Division Commander, that the 7th Division troops had suffered approximately 400 casualties while falling back toward Hagaru-ri (or Hagalu-ri in Korean pronunciation), and were unable to get fight their way out to safety. At 2027 hours that night, all troops in the Changjin Reservoir area, including the three battalions of the 7th US Division, were placed under the operational control of the Marine commander by the X Corps. These 7th Division elements were to gain contact with one Marine regimental combat team redeploying from the Yudam-ni area to the Hagaru-ri area. Thus, they were to open and secure the Hagaru-ri—Koto-ri route by a coordinated effort from both sides.

Also on the 29th, Brigadier General Hodes sent a relief force in company strength from the units of the 31st Infantry. But, these troops, supported by several tanks, were soon hurled back by superior CCF numbers with the loss of two tanks and heavy personnel casualties.

On the afternoon of the 30th, Brigadier General Hodes met with Major General Almond and Major General Smith, at the General Smith's forward command post where they discussed and analyzed the critical situation they faced. As a result, General Almond issued his orders that same afternoon, defining the Corps mission as "maintain contact with the enemy to the
maximum capability consistent with cohesive action, oriented to the Hamhung—Hungnam base of operation.”

The decision to concentrate the X US Corps units in the area meant that the higher levels were preparing for an evacuation of northeast Korea if the situation became worst.

On 1 December, fearing that he would be overwhelmed in the Sinhung-ni perimeter, Lieutenant Colonel Faith attempted to break through to Hagaru-ri. After destroying howitzers and all but the most essential equipment, the convoy with its hundreds of wounded moved out under the constant cover of American Marine close air support. A large proportion of the troops were the ROK soldiers attached to the 7th US Division. Progress was so slow with frequent stops for fire fights with the Red Chinese odds. There were many instances of individual bravery in the face of adversity.

At dusk it was only some seven kilometers away from Hagaru-ri when Colonel Faith fell mortally wounded and the units shattered into leaderless groups. At 2200 hours on the night of 1 December, the first survivors, most of them walking wounded, reached their brother-Marine lines north of Hagaru-ri with tales of frightful losses suffered in the five days of continual

US Marines breakout from Hagaru-ri, 6 December 1950.
fighting since the first CCF attack on the night of 27–28 November. That night alone the three battalion suffered as high as 75 percent.

At any rate, a total of about 670 survivors of Task Force Faith were brought into the warming tents of Hagaru-ri. 319 soldiers of nearly all wounded or frostbitten were rescued by the 1st Marine Transportation Battalion on 2 December. Known as Task Force Anderson after Lieutenant Colonel Berry K. Anderson, senior Army officer at Hagaru-ri, moved out forward to bring in any organized units of three battalions which might have been left behind. Encountering heavy CCF opposition, the task force kept up their rescue action until the last of an estimated 1,050 survivors of the original 2,500 troops had been saved. An American Marine patrol counted more than 300 dead in the abandoned trucks of the Task Force Faith convoy. There were apparently hundreds of missing in action. In short, the battle of the Changjin Reservoir which fought by the units of the 7th US Division was literally an unseen, unheard bloody and brave one to such a degree that beyond description.

In brief, battling desperately night and day in the face of almost insurmountable Red odds throughout the period of intense and sustained combat, the 1st US Marine Division, under the outstanding leadership of Major General Smith, decisively defeated seven enemy divisions, thus inflicting major losses which seriously impaired the military effectiveness of the Red Chinese force for a considerable period of time.

The 1st US Marine Division was later honored with the Presidential Unit Citation from the United States Government for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against the Red aggressor forces in the Changjin Reservoir area and the subsequent battle actions in November and December 1950.

7th US Infantry Division

The 7th US Infantry Division, commanded by Major General David G. Barr, had attacked north with a rush despite experiencing winding mountain roads enroute. The division units had first encountered with the Red Chinese forces on 8 November. That day elements of the 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division had engaged in a fierce battle with the Red Chinese in battalion strength in the rugged mountainous area south of the Pujon Reservoir. It was identified later that the enemy was a part of the 126th CCF Division. At all events, the division units had seized the
Hyesanjin area, thus recording themselves the first American troops to reach the Yalu River.

Now, the 7th US Division, consisting of the 17th, 31st, and 32nd Infantry Regiments, were preparing for the resumption of attack on November. The 17th Infantry Regiment was already in Kapsan and Hyesanjin, the 31st Regiment was to advance north in the center of the division attack zone, and the elements of the 32nd Regiment were to attack through the area between the east shore of the Changjin Reservoir and the southeast of the Pujon Reservoir.

Reaching the Yalu: In the middle morning of 21 November, the three battalions of the 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division entered the town of Hyesanjin on the Yalu River's south bank, without encountering any enemy opposition. There they found that earlier air bombing had left about 85 percent of the town in ruins. The American looked there across the Yalu into the snowy wastes of Manchuria. Beyond the sentries was an untouched Chinese village. To reach this snowy town on the border, the 17th US Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Colonel Herber Powell, had moved some 320 kilometers in twenty days up a winding mountain road from Iwon on the east coast. It had experienced extremely cold temperatures, often 32 degrees below zero.

Major General Almond of the X US Corps and Major General Barr of the 7th US Division appeared on the scene with great satisfaction for the task well done by the 17th US RCT. Then, with the reinforcements from its brother units, the 17th Infantry occupied the Singalpajin—Hyesanjin area by 30 November.

Another American unit also reached the Yalu River. This was Task Force Kingston, commanded by a twenty-one year old Second Lieutenant Robert Kingston, who was an infantry platoon leader in the 7th US Division. On the evening of 21 November, Lieutenant Kingston was ordered to spearhead an advance from Wondokchang to Singalpajin on the Yalu, a distance of 51 kilometers. Once at Singalpajin, Lieutenant Kingston was to establish contact with the 17th US Regiment, 24 kilometers to the west at Hyesanjin.

On the morning of 22 November Task Force Kingston, consisted with 33 infantrymen of Lieutenant Kingston's platoon, began to move out. It was supported by seven tracked vehicles with machine guns and rapid-fire guns. The infantrymen drove forward slowly over icy roads surrounded by a snow-covered barren landscape. Thirty to forty degrees below zero were more normal temperatures at the time. As it fought off the NK Reds, the
task force kept picking up more American troops. By the time it was 16 kilometers from the Yalu it had added two tanks, howitzers, mortars and jeep-mounted machine guns and grown to a force of about 300 men, including three captains, several junior officers, and a major. But Lieutenant Kingston remained in command of his assignment.

On the morning of the 28th, the task force reached within about 13 kilometers from Singalpajin. After encountering the NK Communist and clearing through enemy roadblocks, it finally reached the Yalu River at Singalpajin, where light resistance was offered by the remnants of the NK Reds, who then fled across the Yalu into Manchuria.

**Withdrawal from the Yalu:** When the X US Corps learned what had happened on the EUSA front in the west, its first order was to the 17th US Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division to withdraw from its exposed position in the far northeast at Hyesanjin on the Yalu River. The first American unit to reach the Yalu had been congratulated by General MacArthur for its victory. Now, after a brief rest, the soldiers of the 17th US Regiment found themselves fighting their way back from the Manchurian border.

On the morning, 29 November, Lieutenant Kingston received a message from the Battalion Headquarters to withdraw south immediately. Now the 17th RCT and Task Force Kingston were retreating in haste from the border, not realizing that the Eighth US Army in the west had come under heavy attack by the Red Chinese forces and the units of the 1st US Marine Division and the 7th US Infantry Division were undergoing a harrowing experience around the Changjin Reservoir.

In the I ROK Corps sector, in the meantime, the 26th Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division was ordered to withdraw to Hungnam by way of Kapsan, Pungsan and Pukhang before being cut off by the Communist forces. The Capital ROK Division and other units of the 3rd ROK Division were also withdrawn likewise from the Chongjin and Hyesanjin areas respectively, then to Kilchu — Songjin or through Paikam and down to Hungnam, from where they would be redeployed southward by seaborne.

**Task Force Faith:** On 25 November, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division started to move by trucks from Hungnam and drove 128 kilometers over the main supply route to the southern tip of the Changjin Reservoir. Despite annoyance and the stinging cold, the morale of troops was high, because they all thought that the war would soon be over, thus the whole Korean peninsula becoming a unified
country under the flag of "Taegukki," the symbol of the Republic of Korea.

However, when they reached the frozen Changjin Reservoir on 26 November, the new comers were given some less cheerful information by American Marine units they relieved. On 26 November, the Marines captured three CCF prisoners who agreed that the 58th, 59th, and 60th CCF Divisions of the 20th CCF Army were in the arc with orders to cut off the main supply route leading into Hamhung. The 1st Battalion of the 32nd US Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith, therefore took up a perimeter defense position, but nothing happened that night.

This unit, composed of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment and also the elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment of the 7th US Division, was to be commanded by Colonel Allan D. MacLean, the 31st Regimental Commander. But Colonel MacLean was reported missing in action during the first CCF onslaughts and Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith, the 1st Battalion Commander of the 32nd Infantry, assumed the command. The formation then became known as "Task Force Faith."

The next day, 27 November, the attack day of the X US Corps, was also uneventful. The X Corps orders were for the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment to secure a road that curve along the eastern shore of the reservoir and then joined the Marines who had grouped on its western shore, in a pincer movement toward the Yalu River 80 kilometers to the north. On the 27th, as darkness fell, the outpost positions were attacked by the Red Chinese and they faded away after fire exchange. It was an enemy tactic to pinpoint the American positions.

As suspected, the Chinese Communists launched a full-scale attack shortly after midnight. A group of Red Chinese were charging at the American position up a steep ridge. There soon followed a bloody night battle. Captain Edward Scully, A Company Commander, was killed in action by an enemy grenade. Colonel Faith sent Captain Robert Haynes to replace Captain Scully, but Red Chinese infiltrators killed Captain Haynes before he reached the company position.

When light broke, the Red Chinese withdrew, Colonel Faith saw that despite heavy manpower losses, his battalion had held most of its position. Realizing there was now question of advancing toward the Yalu, Colonel Faith, instead of attacking during the morning of 29 November, tried to regain the ground lost during the night fighting.

In the afternoon, Major General Almond, the X Corps Commander, landed in by a helicopter near the battalion command post, and then the General awarded the medal of Silver Star to Lieutenant Colonel Faith,
Withdrawal Action from the Yalu

commending successful operations of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry.

By now, the battalion aid station was so crowded that more than a dozen wounded men huddled outside of it awaiting medical treatment.

About four hours after darkness fell the Red Chinese launched another massive assault during which D Company was suffered most heavier casualties. While the night fighting was going on, General Almond was conferring with General MacArthur in Tokyo. The United Nations Commander-in-Chief decided that the X Corps must withdraw to the south. The order reached the Task Force Faith at about 0300 hours of 29 November. About an hour before dawn, the task force began to march south down a road skirting the Changjin Reservoir, heading for Hagaru-ri, about 24 kilometers south. Here the American Marines had established a solid defense perimeter. On the way they soon found themselves that they ran into a CCF trap. They were completely surround. Notwithstanding, they fought off the Red odds with death defying courage, sustained by the hope that a force would break through from the south and rescue them.

At this critical moment, only two developments saved these Americans from being destroyed on the afternoon of 30 November. One was the tactical air support provided by the carrier-based black Corsairs of the American Marine Corps. The other was the airdrop of rations and munition which were running too low.

Yet, no a relief column had appeared by daybreak of 1 December. Consequently, instead of taking the risk of being overrun by another night of CCF attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Faith decided to try to reach Hagaru-ri in a breakout by his own effort alone. As the lead elements moved out, four American Marine planes gave the close support.

Just before dark, the Americans encountered another CCF roadblock, but they knocked it out, but Colonel Faith was seriously hit by grenade fragments in this action. Despite heavy casualties they escaped narrowly from the death valley in the long run. The first strugglers began arriving in Hagaru-ri during the night of 1 December. By 4 December, when most of its survivors had reached Hagaru-ri, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment numbered 181 officers, men, and attached ROK troops out of original 1,053 who had started out for the Yalu River on 25 November. Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith, the Battalion Commander, was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Section 4. Withdrawal to the 38th Parallel
(1–31 December 1950)

Retrograde Movement

As the month of December opened, the general withdrawal action of the UN forces from the northern territory now stepped up into a full-scale. The Eighth US Army withdrew behind the Chongchon River and then farther southward without interruption and in good order. The X US Corps and the I ROK Corps in northeast Korea were being busily engaged in assembling their troops from the forward areas into the Hungnam port and were preparing for their evacuation by sea without panic or confusion.

The withdrawal from the north by the Eighth US Army, although serious, was not catastrophic, because the United Nations Command still enjoyed in maintaining the air and naval superiority. In the X US Corps zone, however, the retirement action of the 1st US Marine Division and some infantry units was more of an attack than a retreat, for it was necessary for each unit to battle its way back against the overwhelming Chinese Communist forces to joining the friendly main force, particularly from the Changjin Reservoir area.

Fortunately, the Red Chinese forces could not continue for pursuit, perhaps because they habitually supplied their troops for only a few days of combat at a time, but still kept coming at about ten kilometers a day. Those with experience in Chinese Communists ways of fighting believed that the Communists would commit most of their strength in a desperate endeavor to demoralize and surround the UN force; then would come a lull caused largely by logistical difficulties. The tendency of the Chinese Reds in Korea had been to overextend and then stop for resupply and reinforcements. During the waiting period, fresh units moved up to replace those decimated in combat. Since most supplies were carried by human or animal transport, this pause was also utilized to move essential reserves of food and ammunition to the front. Taking advantage of the Communists’ inability to exploit their gains, the Eighth US Army preserved the greater part of its personnel while inflicting costly casualties upon the enemy during the withdrawal.

Thus, on 3 December, under the cover of the friendly air forces, the UN forces hurried to withdraw farther southward through Pyongyang, while the
1st ROK and 25th US Divisions providing the ground cover. Interdiction air attacks against the enemy concentrations effected considerably to contain the enemy advance, but Anju and Sinanju fell into the enemy hands the next day. In addition, there were other Red Chinese forces in mass compressing an encircling arc on to Pyongyang from the Songchon—Kangdong road. Consequently, the earlier plans to hold the enemy offensive along a line north of Pyongyang from coast to coast became in vain.

That day, on the 4th, the Eighth US Army forces decided to abandon the Pyongyang defense line. B-29’s and B-26’s of the UN air forces mounted massive air attacks against the enemy onslaughts, while the ground forces began to evacuate from Pyongyang. All the warehouses, supply dumps, barracks, and other military installations were demolished before the covering force, composed of the 25th US Division, 1st ROK Division and the 29th British Brigade, fell back to the south of the Taedong River. Thus, the ROK and UN forces had cleared the Pyongyang area by the 5th.

Owing to the superiority of mobility, the UN forces able to materialize comparatively quick and orderly withdrawal, even under the enemy’s hard-pressure, necessary for refilling troops and for setting up next defenses as planned. Accompanying the friendly forces’ withdrawal, there was a mass flow of countless refugees trying to free from the Communists’ hell-sphere.

Since the Red Chinese were relied mainly on foot, their advance lagged as they experienced difficulty in keeping up with the withdrawing UN forces. Again, their communication and supplies were inadequate and casualties were high. The Eighth Army now sought to preserve its troops and equipment, and concentrate on a front across the 38th Parallel, tightening its defense lines. Contact with the Red Chinese diminished somewhat, because the enemy broke contact and showed no immediate attempt for pursuit, but

Korean civilians crossing the icy waters of the Taedong River heading southward. Everybody wanted to leave rather than remain behind under control of the Communists.
there were many skirmishes as the UN forces attempted to detect the enemy’s scheme of maneuver.

On the other hand, the enemy’s supply lines were lengthening and were of course receiving savage attention of friendly air power.

Afterward, on 8 December, the 25th US Division held a defensive position in the vicinity of Chungwa about halfway between Pyongyang and Hwangju; the 1st ROK Division moved from Sariwon to Namchon on the 7th; the 8th ROK Division arrived at Tosan also on the 7th; and the 2nd US Division, whose losses along the Chongchon River had been so heavy, was already withdrawn far south to refill its ranks and reequip. Other units had moved southward in orderly sequence in an effort to secure a new defense line along the 38th Parallel.

In short, by mid-December the I US Corps had established a defense line on the western front along the Imjin River with the newly attached 25th US Division on the left and the 1st ROK Division on the right, keeping the Turkish Brigade on the Kimpo Peninsula. The 24th US Division was released from the I US Corps and placed under the IX US Corps. The IX US Corps, now with the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 24th US Division, 6th ROK Division, and 27th Commonwealth Brigade attached, deployed its units on the mid-western front, while the III ROK Corps would defend on the central front. The I ROK Corps, after withdrawing from northeast Korea, would redeploy on the remote east front. The 2nd US Division and the 187th Airborne RCT were kept in Army reserve.

The interservice of the UN Command was demonstrated during the retreat from Pyongyang. As the Chinese Communists streamed toward Pyongyang, nearly 8,700 passengers, including civilians and wounded soldiers, boarded transports in Chinnampo harbor. The estuary of the Taedong River down which the ships had to pass in order to reach the Western Sea was mined.

The night of 5 December, under cover of darkness and a heavy snowstorm, one American, two Australian and three Canadian destroyers from the British fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral W.G. Andrewes, picked their way up the estuary, shelled the port installations and brought the transports back down in safety.

**Enemy Movement**

As for the enemy situation, the second week of December found the enemy
shifting the mass of his strength from the west to the center of the peninsula. Among other means of transports, donkeys were used by the Communists to move food and ammunition forward. It seemed evident that the offensive against the UN forces would soon be resumed. Pressed between the Chinese Reds from the north and the thousands of guerrillas to the southeast, the Eighth US Army might find itself falling into a great disaster. To prevent such a disaster, the guns of the Eighth US Army, UN navy and Air Force, pounded enemy concentration points relentlessly. The Fifth US Air Force, together with the other friendly air units, flew hundreds of sorties in a massed attempt to smash enemy reinforcements and supply.

After the Eighth US Army had formed a new defensive line north and east of Seoul, generally along the 38th Parallel, there had been virtually no large scale battles with the Communists, but an uneasy lull was hanging over the entire sector. During the period Red Chinese had centered their effort to bring reinforcements and supplies forward.

On the other hand it was known at the time that the North Korean Communist army had been reconstituted, retrained, and reequipped. Some of the NK troops received training in Manchuria where they were safe from UN air power. General MacArthur’s headquarters tentatively identified fifteen NK divisions, a force roughly estimated at 150,000 in addition to the twenty-eight CCF divisions known to be in North Korea. The bulk of North Korean Communist organized strength, located in western and central Korea, participated in probing actions varying intensity above and below the 38th Parallel the week before Christmas.

At this juncture, it was reported that six CCF armies with the strength of about 160,000 men were now concentrating in the areas of Pyonggang—Yonchon—Ichon and the 1 NK Corps was poised to attack toward Kaesong—Munsan with its main objective at the capture of Seoul.

Section 5. The Hungnam Redeployment (11—24 December 1950)

Success of Breakout

On 6 December 1950, General MacArthur’s G—3 Brigadier General Wright gave General MacArthur a detailed study of the problem as to the Korean situation, recommending in part that  (1) the X US Corps be sealifted at the
earliest practicable date and relanded at Pusan or Pohang and (2) X Corps be absorbed by the Eighth Army.

General MacArthur was most reluctant to place the X Corps under General Walker's command, but he approved General Wright's recommendations on 7 December and notified General Almond to step into immediate action for the withdrawal. The next day, he converted his withdrawal plans into orders on the 8th and on the 11th flew into Yonpo Airfield near Hungnam to hear in person General Almond's plan for taking the X Corps out of northeastern Korea.

General Almond told General MacArthur that his Corps could clear Hungnam by 25 December and close in Pusan by 27 December.

As it had already described in the earlier sections, the most serious and difficult task to retire his forces upon Hungnam had been to extricate the Marine and infantry units cut off by the Red Chinese around the Changjin Reservoir. Fighting as withdrew and supported by concentrated close air cover, these units, with the exception of the tanks, had reached the Hamhung—Hungnam area by 2100 hours on 11 December. The armored column ar-

US Marines march back from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni, 8 December 1950.
arrived at the LST staging area of Hungnam half an hour before midnight, thus bringing to an end the breakout of the 1st US Marine Division.

The first gleam of hope was inspired by the news that the US Marines had seized initiative at Yudam-ni and opened the Toktong Pass through Chinese Reds blocking the route to Hagaru-ri.

Then came the thrilling reports of the air drops of supplies at Hagaru-ri and the mass evacuation of casualties by air. The resupply by air drop to the encircled Marines was a dramatic climax to the realization that what had been a hope was now a fact — the Changjin Reservoir troops had saved themselves and inflicted a major defeat on the Chinese Communists in the fighting.

Testimony of POWs had left no doubt that the mission of the three CCF armies (20th, 27th, and 26th) under the IX CCF Army Group was the annihilation of the surrounded United States forces, but the result had been enemy losses which did not fall far short of annihilation of the CCF units themselves.

American Marine losses in northeast Korea, as reported to the Secretary of the Navy, included a total of 4,418 battle casualties from 26 October to 15 December 1950 — 604 KIA, 114 DOW, 192 MIA, and 3,508 WIA. The 7,313 nonbattle casualties consisted largely of minor frostbite and indigestion cases who were soon restored to active duty. Eight Marine pilots were killed in action or died of wounds, four were missing in action and three were wounded. Major General Smith, the 1st US Marine Division Commander, estimated that a third of the non-battle casualties were returned to duty during the operation.

Enemy losses for the same period were estimated at a total of 37,500 men — 15,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by the Marine ground forces, plus 10,000 killed and 5,000 wounded by Marine air. Not much reliance can be placed in such figures as a rule, but the enemy himself admitted in his own testimony as to heavy losses sustained by the Chinese Communists. Consequently, the IX CCF Army Group required a considerably long period of time for replacements, reequipment and reorganization before it could appear in the battle lines.

The Hamhung — Hungnam Perimeter

The X US Corps issued its operation order on 5 December for the defense of the Hungnam area by setting up a perimeter with a final line about 12 kilometers in radius. Pie-shaped sectors of fairly equal area, converging on the
harbor, were assigned to the following major units from east to west — the I ROK Corps (less one division at Songjin), 7th US Division, 3rd US Division with the 1st KMC Regiment (—), and the 1st US Marine Division. The Marine sector included Yonpo Airfield.

While the break-through from the Changjin and Pujon Reservoirs southeast to the coast was in the process of completion, the X US Corps Commander had ordered his forces to concentrate in the coastal sector around the war-ravaged port of Hungnam.

On the eastern flank the I ROK Corps had the 3rd ROK Division at Hapsu and the Capital ROK Division on the coast, near the outskirts of Chongjin, in early month of December. The I ROK Corps was ordered to retire on Songjin, and to prepare for further movement by land or sea. No serious pressure was to be exerted against the I ROK Corps. At Songjin the situation was complicated. The I ROK Corps, mostly 3rd ROK Division, had departed by sea for the south on the afternoon of the 9th December, and six hours after
the transports had got underway, a message was received changing the
destination to Hungnam. On arrival at Hungnam the Capital ROK Division's
artillery units were offloaded to strengthen the defense of the perimeter, and
the naval task elements then continuing sailing for Pusan on the 10th of
December.

On the other hand, main body of the Capital ROK Division, commanded by
Brigadier General Song Yo Chan, had moved to the Hungnam area by land to
strengthen the defense of the perimeter. (See Situation Map 10, in Appendix
VI.)

Three battalions of the 7th US Infantry Division were with the American
Marines at the Changjin Reservoir, while the rest of the division stretched
out along the road to Hyesanjin. The main force of the 7th US Division was
directed into the coastal perimeter by Major General Barr, and joined for the
defense of the Hamhung—Hungnam perimeter. The 3rd US Division which
had moved by land and sea from Wonsan to Hungnam was also in defensive
positions along the perimeter.

Thus the perimeter of the Hungnam bridgehead was defended by the 3rd
and 7th US Infantry Divisions and elements of the Capital ROK Division.

Seaborne Evacuation

It was a great and most dangerous operation to evacuate such large forces
and equipment as well as materials by seaborne under the imminent threat of
the overwhelming Red Chinese forces.

There were no military manuals to rely on in the planning and carrying out
of the evacuation of such great numbers of troops and such great quantities of
equipment from an area under constant enemy pressure. There was no time,
either, for research or experimentation. Unlike Dunkerque, the evacuation
plan called for the removal of all equipment and supplies.

Fortunately, however, the Red Chinese forces made no concerted effort to
overrun the beachhead, although light scattered thrusts suggesting recon-
naissance in preparation for large operations were made by them throughout
the evacuation plan.

As the X US Corps perimeter contracted, naval gun fire, artillery, and air
support were intensified against the possibility of enemy attempts to build up
forces for major assaults.

Commander Task Force 90 assumed control of all naval functions on 10
December after approving loading plans made at a conference of Navy officers and representatives of X US Corps. Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff, X US Corps, was appointed Corps evacuation control officer. Colonel Forney, with his staff, selected the units to be loaded on the basis of available tactical and administrative information, and assigned shipping, and for the evacuation of refugees and the removal of all material.

US Marines started to load aboard waiting transports as soon as they arrived in the Hungnam area on 10 December. In planning for the evacuation Commanding General of the X US Corps made his decision to onload both the I ROK Corps and the battle-worn condition of the US Marines as earliest possible. As promulgated, therefore, the plan called for the immediate evacuation of the US Marines, followed in order by the Capital ROK Division. A smaller perimeter than the original concept was to be defended meanwhile by the 7th and 3rd US Infantry Divisions, with the latter having the final responsibility. Major units were to withdraw gradually by side-slipping until only reinforced platoons remained as covering forces holding strong points. Plans called for naval gunfire and air support to step up as the perimeter contracted.

General MacArthur flew into the Hungnam beachhead on 11 December for a brief conference with General Almond and approved the X US Corps plan. A date of 27 December was set for the Corps units to pass under the control of the Eighth US Army.

Men of an artillery battery get ready into action against the enemy north of Hambung during the perimeter defense.
Withdrawal Action from the Yalu

To defend the port area, protect the embarking troops, and permit the Navy to carry out its formidable task, General Almond directed an active defensive. The front line followed an arc of about 35 kilometers radius entering on Hungnam harbor. The Chinese Reds already had suffered extremely high casualties but with a strong mass attack, supported by artillery, they might have broken through to the beach. The enemy, however, lacked artillery in appreciable quantities and refrained from using his reserves to concentrate a major attack in any one sector. (See Situation Map 10, Appendix VI.)

On the 14th, the enemy in considerable-sized strength renewed his persistent attempts to penetrate the Hungnam defense perimeter. The volume of heavy mortar and small arms fire indicated the presence of strong enemy force just beyond perimeter. There was considerable danger that an all-out Communist offensive would be mounted before the evacuation was completed, but close air support and naval and artillery fire continued to break up enemy concentrations in the surrounding areas. The result had been great enemy losses, however, the following day launched continuous attack against the perimeter north of Hamhung, but his attempts had failed. The air attacks were being flown against enemy troops along the outskirts of Hamhung. Naval gunfire also demonstrated on the enemy line.

The task of loading the US Marines was completed by the evening of 14 December, and on the morning of the 15th last ships with elements of the 1st US Marine Division sailed for Pusan.

On 16 December, the JV and V NK Corps attempted a joint attack against northeast of the Hungnam perimeter, but were less successful than the Red Chinese, and the evacuation operation progressed within the arc of a daily shrinking perimeter. While US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel worked day and night in freezing temperatures to load cargo and troops aboard the waiting ships, every artillery unit in the perimeter fired concentrations upon the enemy.

The 3rd US Division pulled back from Hamhung to Hungnam on 16 December, and the same day Capital ROK Division withdrew from his northeastern blocking position to Hungnam. The perimeter was thus narrowed to the vicinity of Hungnam proper, about 10 kilometers to the southeast. (See Situation Map)

The Capital ROK Division evacuated from Hungnam heading for Samchok on 17 December. The 7th US Division was in the midst of its outloading on 18 December.

By now the perimeter had diminished to a radius of about 5 kilometers
from the center of town, outposted another thousand meters, and the evacuation was entering its final stage. Early in the afternoon of the 19th, Major General Robert H. Soule, Commander of the 3rd US Division, took charge of the ground defenses; General Almond and his staff moved aboard Mount McKinley; and responsibility for the defense of Hungnam passed to Rear Admiral Doyle, Commander Task Force 90. Next day the 7th US Division completed embarkation, and left the port at first light on the 21st.

As the date of final evacuation approached and with a perimeter which covered only the city of Hungnam, the situation became very different. Although lacking in armor and artillery, enemy troops had reached the suburbs in sizable numbers; and while perhaps one-third of airstrike were still employed upcountry, the greater part was used within the 56 kilometers circle. Troop movements on the roads approaching the town were hit; fuel drums and a rocket dump were attacked and destroyed; an enemy command post in Hamhung and buildings on the western edge of Hungnam were bombed and by this time the guns of the fire support ships had come into play.

Two cruisers, seven destroyers, and three rocket-firing craft covered the entire front from their assigned positions in mine-swept lanes. A total of nearly 34,000 shells and 12,800 rockets was fired by these support ships, with the battleship Missouri contributing 162 rounds of her 16-inch guns at the finish of the bombardment. About 800 more 8-inch shells and 12,800 more 5-inch shells were expended at Hungnam than during the naval gunfire preparation for the Inchon landing.

Closing Day at Hungnam

Seven embarkation sites were employed for the 3rd US Division. From left to right they were designated as Pink Beach; Blue Beach; Green One and Two Beaches, and Yellow One, Two and Three Beaches. The 7th US Infantry Regiment, holding the left sector, was to embark from Pink Beach. Blue and Green One Beaches were assigned to the 65th US Infantry Regiment in the center, while the 15th US Infantry had Green Two and the Three Yellow Beaches. (See Sketch Map 26.)

H-hour had been set at 1100 hours on 24 December, and seven LSTs were beached at 0811 to receive 3rd US Infantry Division troops. Strongly supported by naval gunfire and carrier based Marine and naval aircraft, soon the three regiments were reduced to as many battalions which acted as covering forces while the other troops fell back to assigned beaches. All
withdrawals were conducted methodically along specified routes by units using marking panels. Then the battalion themselves pulled out, leaving only seven reinforced Platoons manning strong points. The Hungnam redeployment came to an end when these Platoons boarded an LST after a search for stragglers. Air and naval gunfire support had made it an uneventful finish except for the accidental explosion of an ammunition dump on Pink Beach, resulting in two men killed and 21 wounded.

All beaches were cleared by 1436 hours on the 24th, with A and B Companies of the Amphibian Tractor Battalion sticking it out to the end. Marines of these units provided fires to cover the flanks of the last withdrawals and manned 37 LVTs evacuating Army troops from Pink Beach. With the exception of three LVTs lost in the ammunition dump explosion on that beach, all LVTs and LVT(A)s were safely reembarked on LSDs at the end of the operation.

Remarkable few supplies had to be left behind for lack of shipping space. Among them were 400 tons of frozen dynamite and 500 thousand-pound bombs. They added to the tumult of an awe-inspiring demolitions scene. The entire Hungnam waterfront seemed to be blown sky-high in one volcanic eruption of flame, smoke, and rubble which left a huge black mushroom cloud hovering over the ruins.

The chill, misty dawn of Christmas Day found the Mount McKinley about to sail for Ulsan with Commander Task Force 90 and General Almond after an eminently successful operation. The withdrawal divisions were transported to ports south of the 38th Parallel where they went into Eighth US Army reserve.

During the operation, which required the utilization of 193 vessels, all went smoothly. All equipment and supplies of value were loaded aboard ship from the half-destroyed port. About 350,000 tons of cargo were salvaged, including 17,500 vehicles. Even a number of Russian-made self-propelled 76mm. guns with which the NK Communists had been equipped were hoisted aboard the waiting craft. About 105,000 troops were evacuated from Hungnam, Songjin and Wonsan, and space was also found for over 91,000 Korean refugees.

The homeless Koreans were willing to put up with any hardships to escape from Communist domination, and were loaded in incredible numbers: 12,000 in one APA and 8,400 in one LST were the records.

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander of the US Naval Forces, Far East, later commented on the Hungnam redeployment saying that "With
naval, air and surface units effectively isolating the beachhead we were able to take our time and get everything out.”

Section 6. Facing the New Brink

Facing an entirely new war that a total Red Chinese force of about 300,000 had invaded into Korea against the UN forces, General MacArthur called an emergency council of war at the Headquarters of the United Nations Command in Tokyo, Japan on the night of 28 November 1950. In the meeting, General MacArthur finally ordered, as was mentioned in Section 2 under the sub-title of the “Initiation of the Withdrawal,” General Walker to make withdrawal of the Eighth US Army from the Yalu and Chongchon River lines and also directed General Almond to contract the X US Corps into the Hamhung—Hungnam beachhead.

In Washington, meanwhile, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General MacArthur’s plans for passing from the offensive to the defensive. And, on 29 November, the JCS suggested that General MacArthur should close the gap between the Eighth Army and the X Corps, and to form a continuous defense line across the peninsula. But General MacArthur objected strongly, pointing out the reasons that the UN forces were too weak to cover such a too extensive front; it was impossible to supply both commands from one port; the Taebaek Range, cutting the peninsula in two sections, was well-nigh impassable.

Joining the two forces of the Eighth Army and the X Corps, he explained, to the JCS would produce no significant added strength; it would, on the other hand, endanger the freedom of maneuver deriving from their separate lines of supply by sea.

On 3 December, before the UN forces under General Walker’s command would withdraw from the Pyongyang area, General MacArthur informed the JCS that: “This small command, actually under present conditions, is facing the entire Red Chinese nation in an undeclared war, and, unless some positive and immediate actions are taken, hope for success cannot be justified. And steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be contemplated.” In fact, in those days of late November and early December 1950, General MacArthur was in a dilemma within his latitude of authority and with his forces to battle against the greater Red Chinese in force.

Faced with General MacArthur’s strong objection to a defensive line across
the peninsula, the JCS with the approval of President Truman, told General MacArthur on 4 December that they now regarded the preservation of the UN forces as the primary consideration and agreed to consolidation of forces into beaches.

Shortly before his 6 December meeting with General Collins, General MacArthur in an interview with the editors of "U.S. News and World Report" had severely criticized the restrictions placed upon his command. He called "the continuing prohibition against hot pursuit and bombing Red Chinese bases in Manchuria" an enormous handicap, without precedent in military history.

Disturbed by this, President Truman on 5 December ordered the JCS to inform all unified commanders that any public statement concerning foreign policy should be cleared with the Department of Defense before issuance.

Then, the JCS sent General J. Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff, to the UN Command to find out from General MacArthur what chance he had to defend successfully, what general line or area he could hold, and for how long. Secondary, General Collins was to obtain General MacArthur's opinion of a "cease-fire."

**General Collins Comes Korea**

General Collins arrived at the UN Command in Tokyo, Japan on the morning of 4 December, conferred briefly with General MacArthur, then flew to Korea for talks with General Walker and to inspect the Eighth Army front lines. On the 6th, he flew to Hamhung where he met with General Almond at the X Corps command post.

After winding up his tour in Korea for a first-hand view of the war situation there, General Collins met again with General MacArthur. The latter expressed his opinions to General Collins that reinforcements from Nationalist China should be materialized; coastal blockade of Red China should be setup; and the military targets in Manchuria must be bombed if the UN Command wanted to win the military victory in the Korean War.

After General Collins returned to Washington, President Truman held a series of meetings with his top advisors and with Congressional leaders, but made no decisions on courses of action. On the other hand, the Western allies including the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth Nations and France, had showed their serious attention on what courses of action would be taken by the American Government, even when General Collins was still in Korea.
They also particularly concerned with the use of atomic weapons. As early as on 27 July 1950, President Truman had told the press that he was not even considered the use of atomic bombs in Korea. The President, however, declared in a press conference on 20 November that although the use of all weapons at the United States' disposal, including the atomic bomb, had been considered, he did not want to see the bomb employed on innocent people who had nothing to do with military aggression. On the other hand, the American's principal allies, Great Britain and France were strongly objected the use of atomic weapons because such an action would cause a possible broadening of the war.

High Level Conference in Washington

Disturbed by General MacArthur's strategic judgement, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations feared that his stature and influence might enable to him to appeal so forcibly to the American people for more drastic military action. In other words, if the United States became involved in a war with Communist China, American commitments to NATO would go by the board. This meant that if Russia came to move into western Europe, she could take all of Europe at little cost.

Consequently, Clement Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, proposed conferences between himself and President Truman, scheduling to begin on 4 December 1950.

During this high level conferences, with particular regard to Korea, one suggestion was that the United States should press the United Nations for a resolution calling for a cease-fire on the condition that the UN forces pull back across the 38th Parallel. Another point discussed was whether the UN Forces, in the absence of a cease-fire, should evacuate as soon as they had withdrawn into beachheads or wait until the enemy forced them out.

Following their meeting on 7 December, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee agreed that there would be no general voluntary evacuation of Korea at that time. General Collins, having returned from Korea, on 9 December briefed the two heads of government of the military situation in Korea. After the briefing he told pressmen that the UN forces would be able to take care of themselves without further serious losses.

Among the agreements they reached between two Allied leaders included that both governments would not object to any appeal by Asiatic nation to the Chinese Communists for a cease-fire. In short, they agreed that the objective of both nations was to achieve a free and united Korea, and a cease-fire
and peaceful solution of the Korean War was desirable in the immediate future if it could be secured on honorable terms. But if no peaceful solution could be contained, not granting the Chinese Communists any payment, such as Taiwan or Indochina, American and British troops would fight in Korea until they were forced out. The final communiqué of their conference declared: "For our part, we are ready, as we have always been to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation ... We are confident that the great majority of the United Nations take the same view. If the Chinese Communists on their sides display any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld."

The Communists, however, dreamed the other way, demanding an out-of-the-way price. On 14 December (New York time), when the United Nations General Assembly voted to seek a cease-fire in Korea and set up a three-man "Cease-Fire Committee" to approach Peking and the NK puppet regime, the Soviet Union voted against the proposal. This United Nations resolution, adopted by a vote of 52 to five with one abstention, stated in part that "Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations..."

Then the "Peking Radio" announced Red China's terms for agreement to talk peace: United Nations Forces withdrawal from the peninsula, American withdrawal from Taiwan, and end to all Western rearmament. Meanwhile, boss of the NK Communist clique Kim Il-sung again had broadcasted pledges to "annihilate" the United Nations forces. Thus, obviously, the Communists had no intentions of negotiating unless they gained all they wanted and more was handed to them on a platter. The United Nations allies, therefore, now judged that their hopes for an eventual cease-fire were placed in the UN force's ability to deflate Peking's military pride on the fighting front.

Section 7. The Change of Command

General Walker was Killed

By mid-December 1950, the Eighth US Army occupied a vague line
extending along the south bank of the Imjin River, through Yongpyong (north of Tongduchon), Hwachon, and Inje, to Yangyang on the east coast.

Now, as of 20 December, the friendly Order of Battle from west to east across the entire front was as follows: In the I US Corps, the 25th US Division with the Turkish Brigade attached, 1st ROK Division, with the 29th British Brigade in reserve; in the IX US Corps, the 6th ROK Division, 24th US Division with the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade attached, with the 1st US Cavalry Division in reserve; in the III ROK Corps, the 2nd ROK Division, 5th ROK Division, and the 8th ROK Division; in the II ROK Corps, the 3rd ROK Division, with the 7th ROK Division in reserve; and in the I ROK Corps, the 9th ROK Division. Capital ROK Division. The 2nd US Division, the 187th US Airborne RCT, 1st US Marine Division, and the 7th US Division were in Eighth Army reserve.

The Red Chinese forces did not follow up the Eighth Army's withdrawal as closely as had been expected. But in mid-December, the ROK units in east central Korea had been attacked by the NK troops. Throughout the next
several days more and more NK Reds appeared in front of the Eighth US Army, apparently probing the line on behalf of the Red Chinese. There was undoubtedly something in the offing.

In order to find out just what was going on, General MacArthur directed General Walker to conduct aggressive ground reconnaissance to a considerable depth through the NK Communist screen with particular attention to finding probable routes of enemy advance, location, strength, and to capture CCF prisoners for interrogation.

At this most critical juncture, most unfortunately, General Walker was killed in a vehicle accident near Uijongbu, on the morning of 23 December 1950, when he was on enroute to the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade for presentation of a unit citation. General Walton H. Walker, a native of Belton, Texas, already had achieved so many distinguished battle records before the Korean War, particulary during World War II when he commanded the XX US Corps under General Patton’s Third Army. During the Korean War he had been famed with his “stand or die” order to defending the Naktoconv River Perimeter which led to the decisive factors in defeating off the Communist aggressors in the summer battles.

**General Ridgway Takes Over**

Major General Frank M. Milburn, the I US Corps Commander, became Acting Commander of the Eighth US Army temporarily. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, Department of Army was appointed by President Truman as the new Eighth US Army Commander. At the time, General Ridgway was actually in keeping with a stand-by selection made long before without his knowledge by General MacArthur to succeed General Walker for any eventuality. He arrived at Haneda Airport in Tokyo at midnight of Christmas Day. At 0930 hours the next morning General Ridgway met with General MacArthur at the latter’s headquarters. General Ridgway had already learned some weeks before his arrival that General MacArthur had planned for “a withdrawal in successive positions to the Pusan area.” But now he received immediate instructions to hold as far as possible in the most advanced positions in which he could maintain himself. He was to hold on to Seoul, largely for psychological and political reasons, as long as possible but not if it became a citable position. The possibility of holding Seoul against a full-scale attack had already cease to exist, however.

General MacArthur discouraged by the swing of events in Korea, made his
mind to turn over to General Ridgway a great deal of authority and latitude in directing combat operations. He told General Ridgway that the best he could hope for a tactical success, possibly holding and defending the southern territory of Korea. He remarked, "We are now operating in a mission vacuum while diplomacy attempts to fall its way..." he added that "a military success will strengthen our diplomacy."

The Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command further remarked that the Red Chinese were dangerous opponents and that the Chinese mainland was
wide open in the south for attack by forces on Taiwan. He had already recommended that such an attack be made since it would greatly relieve pressure on the UN forces in Korea, he told General Ridgway, but Washington had not approved. Yet, he did not forget to express him no criticism whatever of Washington, nor was any implied. It was simply a decision by high authority that he had accepted as a soldier.

The new Eighth Army Commander was further told by General MacArthur that the X Corps would pass to his control as soon as it arrived in the southern area from northeast Korea, and that General Ridgway was to act as he thought best. “You will make mistake in Korea, we all do. But I will take full responsibility ... Use your own judgement, I will support you. You have my complete confidence.”

Thus, General Ridgway was granted from the beginning to employ the UN ground forces in Korea as he found best and without reference to General MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo for instructions. He could attack, defend or withdraw; the decision was left to him. But he reported always to General MacArthur in detail of his intentions. Whereas General Walker had been kept under close supervision and control, General Ridgway was not.

Fear that the Eighth US Army and other UN allies might evacuate from Korea obsessed the Republic of Korea and her people. The final decision awaited the outcome on the battlefield but the prospects were not bright at the moment. One of General Ridgway’s first acts on coming Korea was to call on President Syngman Rhee in Seoul and to assure him: “I am glad to be here and I aim to stay.”

Christmas found the Eighth US Army halted its general withdrawal uneasily near the 38th Parallel, awaiting its new commander and the new enemy. Signs were increasing that the Chinese Communist forces were closing the gap and were advancing down the peninsula in a coordinated effort to feel out the Eighth Army’s defenses before launching another major attack. A tense calm hung over the battlefield as prelude to storm. There must be something in the offing. (See Sketch Map 27.)
CHAPTER XV  FACING THE NEW ENEMY OFFENSIVE
(31 December 1950—24 January 1951)

Section 1. The U.N. Command on Defensive (1—25 January 1951)

General Ridgway’s Plans

Upon arrival in Korea on 26 December 1950, General Ridgway reviewed
the situation and ordered his staff to make plans at once for offensive in order
to regain lost ground. Thus, General Ridgway began forcing the Eighth US
Army to turn its eyes to the front, not to the backward. Step by step, in
deliberate and carefully conceived actions and orders, he bore down on his
command.

According to General Ridgway’s strategic concept, he planned a series of
defensive lines to which the UN forces would withdraw if forced to do by
the enemy offensives, while also preparing and waiting for the oncoming
Communist storm on the other hand. The first defense line was drawn
from the south bank of the Imjin River in the west through Yangyang on
the east coast generally along the 38th Parallel, to defend with two US
divisions (24th and 25th) and eight ROK divisions (Capital, 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
5th, 6th, 8th and 9th). The 7th ROK Division and five US divisions
1st Cavalry, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 1st Marine) were to defend the Pyongtaek—
Samchok line in reserve positions. The second defense line would be ran,
from west to east, along Suwon — Yangpyong — Hongchon — Chumunjin,
while the third defense line was to be a line connecting from Pyongtaek
through Ansong — Wonju — Samchok.

The fourth line was to run from the Kum River line to Sobaek Range, the
fifth line would be the Sobaek Range line, and the sixth one was to be the old
Naktong Perimeter.

By the end of 1950, in the meantime, the UN forces became a truly inter-
national character. Twelve nations, namely, Australia, Canada, France,
Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa,
Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States in alphabetical
order, now had their combat troops in Korea for fighting against the Communist aggressors. In addition, there were medical support elements from India and Sweden.

The enemy forces, meanwhile, had completed their concentrations and other preparations for a new decisive offensive. At the time at least twenty-one CCF divisions with a total of 276,000 in numbers as well as twelve NK divisions plus guerrilla units, some 167,000 men in strength, were deployed on the lines. Besides, there were tremendous strength awaiting in Manchuria in order to reinforce the frontline forces at any time they needed.

On 27 December, the enemy suddenly began a determined attack on the eastern and mid-eastern sectors. The Red forces first hit the 9th ROK Division in Hyon-ni, then further struck at the 8th and 3rd ROK Divisions, resulting in a wide gap in the central sector. As a result, the 2nd US Division was ordered from Army reserve on 29 December to move to the Hongchon area, north of Wonju, in order to fill the gap. There 2nd US Division units found themselves engaging in a heavy battle with the NK Reds. As the II ROK Corps units, which had been bitterly engaged in the fighting, commenced a withdrawal, the 2nd US Division had to pull back just south of Wonju where it held firmly.

All these enemy attacks were a forced-probing attack to detect the friendly defense and also to conceal their real scheme of maneuver; their main objective in the imminent offensive would be someplace else, because these actions were taken chiefly by the north Korean Communists against the ROK divisions.

**CCF's New Year Eve Offensive**

The expected new CCF attack finally came on the night of 31 December 1950. That night, the Red Chinese forces began a general offensive on a 75 kilometers front stretching from Kaesong on the Eighth US Army's left flank to a point northwest of Chunchon on the central front. Gathering their assault momentum on the first day of 1951, the Red Chinese and NK Reds attempted to make deep penetration in both the I and IX US Corps, while another blows directing on to the I and III ROK Corps fronts. The main CCF effort came down the Yonchon — Tongduchon — Uijongbu — Seoul corridor, obviously aimed at the seizure of Seoul.

General Ridgway immediately reported the heavy enemy attack to General MacArthur, predicting that the Red Chinese aggression of Korea was a prelude to an attempt by the Chinese Communists to drive the UN forces
from the Korean peninsula by sheer manpower. He told General MacArthur, "The Eighth US Army will continue its present mission, inflicting the maximum punishment and delaying in successive positions while maintaining its major forces intact."

Looking into the enemy attack formation further in detail, the enemy directed his main attack upon the two sectors; one against the 1st ROK Division at the Korangpo area on the I US Corps front, and the other in the Uijongbu area on the IX US Corps front. The CCF secondary attack came at the Chunchon sector on the central front. This renewed CCF attack, so-called their "third phase operation," resembled that of the NK Communist invasion on 25 June six months ago.

At this time, concentrating their main effort to capture Seoul, the Red Chinese forces committed fifteen divisions comprising of five armies, of which one army attacked at and broke through the Korangpo sector, rushing toward Seoul, while another army penetrated through the 24th US and 6th ROK Divisions, also heading for Seoul through the Yonchon — Tongduchon — Uijongbu road and the Chorwon — Pochon — Uijongbu road. Another two CCF armies, hitting the 2nd ROK Division first, also flanking down to the area where the Han River joins the Pukhan River, in an effort to envelop Seoul from the rear.

Meanwhile, about ten NK Red divisions under the III and V NK Corps, together with some units under the II NK Corps, attacked down the Chunchon—Wonju axis, in conjunction with some enemy elements that had already infiltrated into the rear area during the closing days of December.

On the morning of the New Year Day, the I US Corps under the command of Major General Frank W. Milburn, receiving heavy blow on the western flank, stubbornly defended Seoul by holding a line north of the Han River with the 25th US Division and the 1st ROK Division, while it keeping the 29th British Brigade in reserve. The British brigade was soon ordered to prepare for a move to the Corps' right flank. On the IX US Corps front, under the leadership of Major General John B. Coulter, the 1st US Cavalry Division (Commanded by Major General Hobart R. Gay) was forced move back to the south of Uijongbu under heavy enemy pressure. The 6th ROK Division in Tongduchon and the 2nd ROK Division in Kapyong also fell back, while the hard-pressed 24th US Division in Pochon, commanded by Major General John H. Church, which stood directly in the path of the main Communist effort, slowed down the enemy by counterattacking, but it was nothing more than a delaying action. The X US Corps divisions were still regrouping in the southern areas, and the 7th US Division was en routing to Chechon from the
rear, while the 2nd US Division was still en route to Hongchon. The 1st US Marine Division was remained in Masan. On the other hand, the I, II, and III ROK Corps were under enemy attacks.

Now, the battle situation seemed falling into a crucial moment hourly. The great strength of the Red Chinese attack in the west and imminent danger of a breakthrough and envelopment down the east central corridor, defended largely by the ROK forces, forced General Ridgway to order certain withdrawals to the better defensive positions. (See Situation Map 11, Appendix VI.)

On 1 January 1951, General Ridgway, the Eighth US Army Commander, reluctantly ordered the I and IX US Corps to withdraw to a line slightly north of the Han River that formed a deep bridgehead around Seoul. The ROK Corps divisions were also ordered at the same time to withdraw to a new line where they would establish strong defensive positions. The present I and IX US Corps boundary was extended from a point of intersection with Han River southeast to Kimnyangjang, then to Chinchon, while the IX US Corps—ROK Army boundary was extended from intersection with the Han River, southeast and south along the west bank of the Han to new Corps rear boundary.

In the first day of his new offensive, the enemy made a considerable gain despite heavy manpowers losses. Putting three CCF armies in the attack astride the northern approaches to Seoul, the enemy forces attempted to overrun Seoul at a stroke. Thus, the power of the Red attacks left little doubt that Seoul was doomed to fail.

With the situation falling into a critical moment, the X US Corps, comprising of the 2nd and 7th US Divisions, was ordered to move up to the fighting line on 2 January; it assumed the operational control of three additional ROK divisions (2nd, 5th, and 8th) the next day on the central front.

At the time, the 2nd US Division, under Major General Robert B. McClure who had assumed the command on 7 December 1950, was engaging in the heavy fighting in the central sector along the Hoengsong — Hongchon road, while the 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division was hurriedly moving up toward Chechon. The remainder of the 7th US Division was preparing to follow up from Yongchon east of Taegu. The X US Corps opened its command post at Chungju effective at 1800 hours, 2 January.

Meanwhile, the I and IX US Corps and the ROK Corps were ordered to defend the Seoul bridgehead line and elsewhere for maximum time possible, short of entailing such an envelopment that would prevent withdrawal to the south. The heavy fighting continued all day long all along front in continued-
bitter cold weather with the temperature in the minus twenties.

On 3 January, when the enemy swiftly followed up the friendly withdrawal action, General Ridgway finally decided to move his forces south of the Han River and to abandon Seoul. He determined this rearward move would be fought as a delaying action and so ordered all major commanders in the battlefield. Thus, shortly afterward, the evacuation of the Seoul–Inchon area was ordered.

That day, the Turkish Brigade was relieved from the 25th US Division and placed under control of the I US Corps, while the 29th British Brigade was attached for operational control of the 25th US Division. The 187th US Airborne RCT was also ordered to move from Suwon without delay to the vicinity of Ichon and then be prepared for further movement on order to Kyongan ni or Yoji, where it would prepare blocking positions.

In the I US Corps area, the 1st ROK Division was to relieve the 29th British Brigade of closing in security of the Han River bridge. In the IX US Corps area, the 6th ROK Division was ordered to pull back to a new defense position where it would be regrouped. The 24th US Division, now with the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, 7th US Cavalry Regiment, and the Greek Battalion attached, prepared to fall back from Seoul.

In the X US Corps area, on the other hand, the 2nd US Division, with the Netherlands and French Battalion attached, still held blocking positions north of Hoengsong preparing for a Communist attack expected at any moment. The 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division was already closed in Chechon by 1800 hours on the 2nd and now poised for battle. The 1st Battalion of the 17th US Infantry engaged heavily with estimated, 1,000 guerrillas in the vicinity of Tanyang beginning at 1800 hours that day.

On the dawn of 4 January the UN forces abandoned Seoul, blowing up the floating bridge over the Han River. Under the cover of fire the 24th US Division together with its attaching 7th US Cavalry Regiment had completed its crossing of the Han River early in the morning.

That day, the 3rd US Division was relieved from Eighth Army reserve and attached to the I US Corps with its advance command post at Songhwan south of Pyongtaek, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was also attached to the IX US Corps, and the 1st US Marine Division still remained in Masan for retraining and resupply.

In the I US Corps, the 1st ROK Division occupied defensive positions on the south side of the Han River with the 11th Regiment on the left, the 12th Regiment on the right and the 15th Regiment in reserve. The 3rd US
Division was kept in Corps reserve. The 25th US Division maintained defensive positions south of the Han River with the 29th British Brigade and the Thai Battalion in Suwon.

In the IX US Corps, the 1st US Cavalry Division (with the 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team attached) had also taken up defenses along the south bank of the Han, while the 27th Commonwealth Brigade moved to Changhowon. The 2nd US Division in the X US Corps sector still established defensive positions north of Wonju.

As Seoul fell, the enemy increased his pressure further east down the central mountains toward Wonju. The ROK units in this sector soon fell into a serious moment developing a great threat from the flank. Consequently, the I and IX US Corps delayed the enemy attack only momentarily on the south side of the Han River, and then moved on. Thus, on 4 January, the UN forces started back to a line extending from Pyongtaek on the west coast eastward to the coastal town of Samchok. General Ridgway strongly ordered all the Corps to exploit fully every opportunity to damage the enemy on slaughters. The I and IX US Corps thereafter evacuated Suwon and Osan.

By 1200 hours, 5 January, in the I US Corps, the 1st ROK Division established temporary defenses in and around Anyang with the 15th Regiment in reserve in the vicinity of Suwon; the 3rd US Division moved its subordinated regiments to the Ansong and Pyongtaek area; the 25th US Division covered the withdrawal of the Corps units. The 29th British Brigade remained in an assembly area near Suwon.

The 1st US Cavalry Division in the IX US Corps, meanwhile, moved to the vicinity of Taeso-ri, west of Chungju, while the 187th US Airborne RCT still remained in Ichon, preparing to cover the withdrawal of the IX US Corps units. In the X US Corps zone, the 2nd US Division units established strong defensive position in and around Hoengsong. The 38th US Infantry soon came under heavy enemy attack. With the enemy threat to Wonju mounting hourly, all heavy equipment was dispatched to the rear and the division headquarters began displacing to Chungju farther south.

At 0900 hours that morning, the division received a Corps order instructing a withdrawal. Thus, the division pulled back to Wonju. It was to move south on the Wonju — Chechon road and be prepared to attack with the 7th US Division which was east of the 2nd US Division.

On the other hand, 7th US Division, commanded by Major General David G. Barr, was assembling in Chechon, while the 5th ROK Division was also assembling at Yoju. The 3rd ROK Division of the II ROK Corps moved to Pyongchang on 5 January, and the 7th ROK Division under the II ROK Corps
took up defensive positions in the vicinity of Wonju.

During those first days of the new year, after the fall of Seoul, the Red Chinese forces did not push across the frozen Han River in force that the UN forces had expected. And with the enemy failing to exploit his advantage of the initiative and continue his advance, the pressure was temporarily off. This was, perhaps, largely caused by the lack of supplies resulted from a greater expansion of the enemy's communication line, in addition to the UN forces' air superiority.

By the 4th of January, the X US Corps, with the 2nd and 7th US Divisions and the 2nd and 5th ROK Divisions attached, had assumed responsibility for the sector between the IX US Corps and the III ROK Corps.

The next day, the I US Corps had moved its command post from Suwon to Chonan, the IX US Corps had closed its command post in Yongin and opened the new command post at Chungju.

For the next several days, the enemy advance seemed becoming slower on the western front, and then the Red forces attempted to mount heavy weight of their attack on to the central front with their main effort directing toward Wonju. Wonju is a typical communication center for this particular mountainous sector. There five important roads pass through this city. The Wonju—Hoengsong road and the Wonju—Saemal road run north and northeast respectively, thus forming the avenues of approach from the north. To the southeast
runs the road to Chechon. To the west lay the Wonju—Yoju—Ichon road with its accompanying roads.

The heavy battle engagement that followed around there was primarily for the control of this important road nets, both strategically and tactically for the two opponents.

After an enemy force of more than 10,000 troops surged toward the line between Wonju and Chechon on the 6th of January, the 6th, 10th and 27th NK Communist Divisions began hitting at Wonju from the southeast on 7 January, while 12th NK Division simultaneously drove down the main supply route from Hongchon north of Hoengsong. Furthermore, unidentified Red Chinese forces launched their attacks from the west on the stout defenses of the 23rd and 38th Regiments of the 2nd US Division. Thereupon intense fighting raged all day of the 7th and by midnight an enemy force had succeeded in infiltrating the lines of the 23rd US Regiment and entering Wonju in strength. The two regiments made slight withdrawals on division order, but halted on the high ground south and east of Wonju and prepared to stand. There soon ensued the heavy and see-sawed battle back and forth all night long. With the enemy pressure mounting heavier, a new defense line was outlined in an arc to the south encompassing Mokke-dong on the west and Chechon on the east, to be withdrawn to only on orders. However, neither of the two American regiments gave-up their positions immediately south of Wonju. (See Sketch Map 28.)

At 0300 hours on 8 January, orders came from the X US Corps that Wonju must be retaken. Four battalions were ordered to hold the defensive positions on the high ground south of the city while a minimum of one battalion was to attack and clear Wonju and secure the airstrip on the south edge. The 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry jumped off against fierce resistance, fighting from inch to inch and making some progress in the initial attacks. However, enemy reinforcements poured against both flanks of the attacking battalion and it was forced to withdraw to its former positions.

To the southeast, on the other hand, the 9th US Regiment was defending the Chechon—Wonju road from bases at Chupo-ri and at 1500 hours, 8 January was engaged with an enemy regiment attempting to cut the vital route. The battle lasted throughout the day and at night the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry secured the threatened area and buttoned up until daylight.

The following day, 9 January, with elements of the 23rd and 38th US Regiments, the French and Netherlands Battalions occupying the high ground south of Wonju, another attempt by the 23rd Regiment to clear Wonju met
failure as the enemy fought fiercely to hold his advantage. The 10th of January opened with air observers reporting thousands of enemy troops moving south from Wonju to attack the defenses of the 23rd and 38th Regiments. Friendly forward troops poured a rain of fire on the enemy. Friendly artillery and air pounded the masses of advancing Communists inflicting staggering casualties while the bitter weather exacted an increasingly heavy toll on attackers and defenders alike. Finally after savage fighting during which the French Battalion repulsed four successive attacks attempted by the enemy to envelop its positions, the enemy was turned back, his attack broken, friendly lines remaining intact. All the next day the two force poured heavy barrages of fire at one another. In the end, Hill 247, an enemy-infested hill mass, was taken by the French Battalion only after the French troops fixed bayonets and cut their way to the top.

By the 12th January the 2nd US Division with its attached units had formed one defensive ring. During the night of the 12th, the Netherlands Battalion and the French Battalion blunted several enemy attacks. On the 13th the 23rd US Infantry repulsed another attempts by two enemy battalions. The UN air and artillery took a heavy toll of the enemy attackers who finally withdrew in confusion after friendly firepower poured down upon them.

On 14 January, Major General Clark L. Ruffner, former Chief of Staff for the X US Corps, assumed command of the 2nd US Division.

Meanwhile, on 10 January, the 1st US Marine Division was ordered to move from Masan to the central sector in an effort to block the Red penetration between the right flank of the 2nd US Division and the left flank of the III ROK Corps. On the 13th, two divisions of the II NK Corps attacked and occupied Yongwol, forcing the 3rd ROK Division to withdraw. But on 17 January, the III ROK Corps divisions petered out the II NK Corps attacks.

Although fighting still flamed over the entire front, the back of the enemy attack had been broken. Staggering casualties had been inflicted on the Communists in their last attempts to destroy the UN forces.

At any rate, the enemy offensives were beaten off, and at the beginning of the third weeks of January, the enemy pressure had dropped sharply. The enemy finally began to slowly retreat large units to the north. On the 15th January, the ROK and UN forces' patrols pushed off through the snow to occupy, without opposition, the ruins of Osan in the west, and two days later they were in Suwon.

Some intelligence reports indicated that the Reds were retreating for
regrouping, partly as a result of the blows delivered against their manpower and supply lines by the UN air might.

Section 2. The Tide of a New Situation

Evacuation Plans

Even before the January offensive of the Chinese Communist forces, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that the CCF had enough strength to drive the UN forces out of Korea. But they wanted General MacArthur to stay if he could.

A quick, massive build-up of the UN forces was a pressing need of the hour than everything else but was hopeless, because of shortage of combat divisions in the United States and the worsening world situation. The CCF success in their aggression into Korea had increased the threat of a general war, encouraging further Communist military moves against other sensitive areas and heightening the tensions between Soviet bloc and those nations allied with the United States. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out to General MacArthur and told him, "We believe that Korea is not the place to fight a major war." This meant that if more American divisions were sent to Korea American commitments throughout the world, would be seriously jeopardized.

The JCS told General MacArthur: "It seems to us that if you are forced back to positions in the vicinity of the Kum River and a line generally eastward therefrom, and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing us out of Korea, it then would be necessary, under these conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan."

General MacArthur, however, assured the JCS that there was no need to make a decision for evacuation until his forces were actually forced back to what he called the "beachhead line."

The JCS directive came as no surprise to General MacArthur. General Collins had told him substantially the same thing three weeks earlier when he had pressed for an increase of other UN contingents to a total of 75,000 men. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff now told him that this could not be done either.
In the minds of the JCS the best way for General MacArthur to keep from being pushed off Korea was to fight and to fight hard. The JCS expected no miracles. But if the Eighth US Army could, without losing too many men and too much equipment, stop and hold the Red Chinese, not necessarily north of the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur would have done a great service.

The rumor of a UN forces withdrawal from Korea spread quickly among ranks and files of the ROK forces. General Ridgway pointed out to General MacArthur on 8 January 1951 that the apprehension among the ROK soldiers as to their future was dangerous and could seriously affect the Eighth US Army.

General MacArthur, in turn, passed this suggestion to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with the comment that “A reassuring statement by me such as General Ridgway suggests is impossible unless the basis for such a statement is established by policy determination at governmental level.”

General MacArthur had already directed his staff to continue planning the evacuation procedures. His staff estimated that if the evacuation was forced to take place from Pusan, there was a strong likelihood it would be done under enemy pressure. Both in scale and difficulty, the Pusan operation would surpass that at Hungnam.

There would be needed at least two full divisions to hold the final perimeter at Pusan. But no divisions were ever designated for employment of such duties, since by the middle of January the military situation gave to believe that a forced withdrawal might not materialize. The United Nations Command thought that unless political considerations required withdrawals as the best course of action, it would be possible for the UN forces to remain in Korea as long as higher authority dictated.

As a further step in evacuation planning, General Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff, while on another visit to the theater, informed General MacArthur on 15 January that if a UN forces evacuation became necessary, President Truman wanted all members of the ROK Government and their dependents, the ROK military and police forces taken out. General MacArthur expressed satisfaction with this directive. And, when General Collins returned from Korea on 19 January the new situation was laid before him. There were great numbers of dependents of the ROK military and police forces should also be evacuated. On the end, Generals MacArthur and Collins agreed that as many ROK soldiers as possible would be placed on the offshore island Jeju-do in order to maintain, after evacuation, a legal status for continuing to fight in Korea.
Encouraging Signs

The first real chance for a coordinated, though limited, attack since the abortive advance of 24 November 1950, developed in mid-January 1951 and General Ridgway quickly took advantage of it. An enemy build-up was discovered north of the Eighth US Army’s defensive line between Osan and Suwon, and on 14 January General Ridgway ordered an armor-supported coordinated attack against this enemy concentration.

Initially, General Ridgway’s intention was to kill as many enemy soldiers as possible and then to withdraw to main positions, leaving a covering force in the area.

The attack, known as “Operation Wolfhound,” jumped off on the western front on 15 January and inflicted some enemy casualties. The attack was most notable, however, as a sign that the Eighth US Army and the ROK forces were no longer entirely on the defensive and as a harbinger of the offensive spirit that General Ridgway was bent on developing in his new command.

In the meantime, General Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff, and General Vandenberg, the US Air Force Chief of Staff, arrived in Korea while “Operation Wolfhound” was in progress. General Collins spent two days with General Ridgway, touring the front lines and talking with major field commanders. Both Generals Collins and Ridgway made statements of great significance at a press briefing held on 16 January in Taegu. General Collins told the newsmen, “As of now, we are going to stay and fight,” while General Ridgway seconded this by saying, “There is no shadow of doubt in my mind
that the Eighth Army can take care of itself in the current situation."

When General Collins returned to the UN Command in Tokyo on 17 January, he sent a most encouraging report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, telling them that the Eighth US Army was in good shape and improving daily under General Ridgway's leadership.

What he had seen of the enemy made General Collins optimistic. The CCF had made no major move to push south from the Han River than he had expected, and when counterattacked had usually fled. He had detected signs also of enemy supply difficulties and indications of a lowered morale among the Chinese Reds. "On the whole, the Eighth Army is now in position and prepared to punish severely any mass attack," he said.

Meanwhile, General Vandenberg had also inspected Air Force installations in Korea, and two members of the JCS met with General MacArthur in Tokyo once more before leaving for the United States. General MacArthur agreed that things did indeed look brighter and, after reviewing the military situation as he now saw it, the UN forces could hold a beachhead in Korea indefinitely. He felt that with continued domination of the sea and air by the United Nations force, and with the enemy's lengthening line of communication, the Red Chinese forces would never be able to bring up enough supplies to enable them to drive the UN forces from Korea. But he reiterated strongly his belief that the decision to evacuate Korea was a purely political matter and should not be decided on military grounds.

At any rate, as a result, back in Washington, the American authorities saw for the first time since late November 1950 reasonable hope that catastrophe might be forestalled in Korea and that all was not as black as had been painted or as dark as had been feared.
Probing Reconnaissance in Force
(15—22 January)

While the central and eastern fronts were still seriously threatened by the continued enemy pressure, the western front became comparatively quiet by the middle of January. General Ridgway, who had began to wonder what happened to the CCF offensive, ordered the I and IX US Corps to probe the enemy situation in the hope of erasing some of this uncertainty.

In an attempt to find out the enemy strength, dispositions and intention in the zone, the I US Corps executed “Operation Wolfhound” beginning on 15 January. The operation, actually, nothing more than a reconnaissance in force, was carried out by the 25th US Division.

Reinforced by artillery, tanks, and engineers, the 27th US Regiment moved out in the early morning of the 15th. A battalion from the 3rd US Division covered the attacking force’s right flank, while other units on the left also provided the local covering attacks. The main probing body struck north along the main highway toward Osan without meeting any enemy opposition until it reached a point just south of Osan, where a fire exchange took

The 25th US Division troops moving up to Osan, 23 January 1951.
place for a short while. The enemy troops soon fled northward disengaging the fire fight.

The task force continued the probing attack in two columns, converging on Suwon the next day, 16 January, and encountered the enemy machine gun fire just south of Suwon. But by now the high command was satisfied, and ordered the task force to withdraw to its original position.

On the other hand, in the IX US Corps sector, the 1st US Cavalry Division also conducted limited reconnaissance in force to the general area north of the Kimnyangjang—Ichon road, to detect the enemy situation in the area, disrupt the enemy initiative and the attack preparations, and also to destroy maximum enemy manpower and materiel. Here also a task force was organized by the 8th US Cavalry Regiment with tanks in support. Consisted of the 70th US Tank Battalion, a battalion of the 8th US Cavalry, a field artillery battery, and an engineer platoon, the task force jumped off on 22 January in the morning through the 6th ROK Division’s position, and advanced up the village of Yangji-ri, between Kimnyangjang and Ichon, on the Suwon—Yoju road. From there elements of the task force fanned out in all directions, but met no notable enemy troops in size, except for sporadic enemy machine gun fire. Before dark the task force was ordered to withdraw, but it had been successful, despite it encountered only small numbers of Red troops.

With these probing reconnaissance actions in force, it was revealed that the Red Chinese forces were now seriously limited their offensive potentialities, in manpower, equipment and supplies, even though the enemy pressures were still continuing on the central and eastern fronts, where the rugged mountains, perhaps, favored for the Communists’ tactics.

Thus, the battle situation along the entire front soon fell into one of continual and ever-bolder patrol and reconnaissance action in the I and IX US Corps, and the slow liquidation of the enemy penetration in the X US Corps sector.

In view of the absence of heavy resistance to the preliminary probing, the Eighth US Army began planning an even larger operation.
CHAPTER XVI  THE SECOND ADVANCE NORTHWARD  
(25 January—31 March 1951)

Section 1.  The Beginning of Counteroffensive  
(25 January—12 February 1951)

Awareing that the Eighth US Army would not be reinforced, and conscious of the extreme difficulty of defending at this time a position north of the Han River, General Ridgway made his immediate plans for a coordinated phases advance by both U.S. Corps -- the I and the IX -- for the purpose of developing the enemy situation on their front. The X US Corps had not yet come into the forward zone. These two corps were to be ready to take offensive action to the Han River if so ordered, and there to hold.

At this juncture, there was supposed to be 174,000 Red Chinese in front of the UN line, but where they were placed, in what state of mind, and even that they were there at all was something the UN forces could not determine. All friendly vigorous patrolling, and constant air reconnaissance had failed to locate any trace of this enormous force. General Ridgway, therefore, felt that he must make a determined effort to detect the presence of large concentrations of enemy forces, if they existed, before he orders the UN ground forces into their first offensive operation since their setback by the aggression of the Chinese Communist forces into Korea. After he had attempted several probing patrols and reconnaissance actions against the enemy lines, General Ridgway finally started rolling forward more aggressively on 25 January 1951 and the Eighth US Army as well as the ROK forces soon proved themselves to be what General Ridgway felt he could hold the enemy advance and the situation could be turned in favor of the UN forces to step up offensive operations.

The Political Front

By late January 1951, local successes by the UN forces and renewed offensive spirit within the friendly ground forces had altered the battle scene
and had improved the outlook. No longer was the threat of forced withdrawal of the UN forces so real. But the United States and its Western allies, seemingly, had fixed their objective to confine the war to a limited arena in Korea. In other words, the United States had decided to settle the Korean War through the United Nations by arranging a cease-fire. Consequently, a 14 December 1950 resolution by the U.N. General Assembly had established a "Cease-fire Committee," but otherwise had led to nothing. The Chinese Communists rejected every overture to negotiate except on their own terms.

As a result, on 1 February 1951, New York time, after much hesitancy on the some member nations and complete opposition by the USSR and its satellite nations, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution branding Red China an aggressor and calling for the achievement of the United Nations objective in Korea by peaceful means.

The Fighting Front

Regardless of political efforts to find some common ground for negotiation by the United Nations, specially by the United States and its Western allies, the issue between the Communists and the United Nations in Korea continued to be decided at this stage of the war on the battle field. Of course, such a political maneuver outside the Republic of Korea had been dealt without consent of the ROK Government. All the people of the Republic had never thought of such a cease-fire unless the Red aggressors gave themselves up surrendering under terms and conditions that the Republic wanted. Otherwise, there would be no negotiations for a truce whatsoever until such a time that the Communist aggressors were completely defeated and cleared out from the whole peninsula, as far as the Republic of Korea was concerned. Now, in any event, the success or failure of the United Nations political efforts largely depend on the success or failure of the U.N. military measures against the Communist aggressors.

During late January and early February 1951, the Eighth US Army concentrated on measures of exploiting its capabilities to the very limit. Conferring with his I and IX US corps commanders on 21 January, Lieutenant General Ridgway, the Eighth US Army Commander, ordered them to mount a strong combat reconnaissance into the area bounded by the Suwon—Ichon—Yuju road and the Han River to develop enemy dispositions, disrupt enemy attack preparations, and destroy maximum enemy personnel and materiel in the assigned areas. This preliminary probing reconnaissance
in force was carried out by the 1st US Cavalry Division in the IX US Corps zone on 22 January, as already mentioned in the last section of the preceding chapter.

There soon followed a larger one in scale, namely, "Operation Thunderbolt" on 25 January and made consistent progress against generally light opposition. This operation eventually became the beginning of the first counteroffensive by the UN forces ever since the Red Chinese had invaded into Korea, and the commencement of the second advance toward the 38th Parallel after the NK Communists had started the war.

**Operation Thunderbolt**  
(25 January—4 February)

A long awaited UN forces' offensive, although it was called a reconnaissance in force with the limited objectives, finally began on 25 January all across the front lines. The I and IX US Corps in the western and mid-western sectors took the leading parts in the attack.

The Eighth Army ordered these two corps to conduct within zone of action strong combat reconnaissance into area bounded by the Suwon—Ichon—Yoju road and the Han River beginning at 0730 hours, 25 January, for the purpose of developing the enemy situation in that area, disrupting enemy concentrations and inflicting the maximum possible destruction of enemy personnel and materiel in all the area lying south of the Han River. The orders were also provided for each corps to employ not to exceed one US division reinforced with available armor, and one ROK regiment may be used in addition at discretion of the corps commanders. The advance was to effect under protection of covering forces and, upon establishing base of operations the advance would be carried out northward in multiple columns over a succession of east-west phase lines, designated by letters A through E.

Phase line A ran generally north of the Suwon—Kimnyangjang—Ichon—Yoju road; phase line E was nearly as far north as immediate south of Seoul. Each line would cross only upon corps order. It was hoped that this painstaking and cautious advance would prevent the attacking units from bypassing any large enemy forces, which might be left behind in a position to jeopardize the safety of the advancing units. Consequently, both the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions were ordered by the respective corps commanders to assume the leading roles in this new and coordinated operation.

General Ridgway requested the UN naval forces to step up offshore
patrolling, particularly on the west coast as flank protection. In addition, he placed an emphasis on aerial reconnaissance as well as close air support directed by the Mosquitoes.

Afterward, due to the absence of notable-scale enemy resistance, this reconnaissance in force soon developed into a limited offensive, which carried out methodically northward, across a series of phase lines until mid-February. (See Sketch Map 29.)

In the I US Corps sector, at 0730 hours, 25 January, the 25th US Division (Commanded by Major General W.B. Kean), with the Turkish Brigade attached, began the attack with the 24th and 35th US Regiments in the lead under the support of the 89th Tank Battalion. The 27th US Regiment was to follow in support of the attack while the Turkish Brigade also began the attack north at 0730 hours. Elements of the 1st ROK and 3rd US Divisions provided covering efforts when the 29th British Brigade still remained in corps reserve. The attacking units of the 25th US Division met no notable
enemy resistance except that the 1st Battalion of the 35th Infantry had
engaged with an estimated 200 enemy in the vicinity of Suwon at 1500 hours.

The 3rd US Division (Major General Robert H. Soule in command) had
responsibility to move up through the eastern sector of the division boundary
running along the Suwon—Kwachon—Isugyo axis. The 65th Regiment of
the division occupied the Kimnyangjang—Singal area and the 7th Regiment
seized the Chang-ni area.

The Turkish Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Tashin Yazıcı, en-
countered a considerably stiff resistance in the east of Osan. The 1st ROK
Division and the 29th British Brigade (with Brigadier T. Brodie in command),
both in corps reserve, had been charged with the rear security in the vicinity
of Ansong and Osan respectively.

In the IX US Corps sector, meanwhile, the 1st US Cavalry Division (with
Greek and Thai Battalions attached) had received a corps order to execute the
probing in force in conjunction with the 25th US Division’s attack on its
left. The division attack began at 0730 hours, 25 January with two regi-
ments abreast, the 7th Cavalry on the right and the 8th Cavalry on the left.
The 5th Cavalry remained in reserve. A heavy ground haze hampered
operations, but in any event the attacking units made a good progress, thus,
the 7th Cavalry Regiment entering Ichon unopposed on the first day.

The 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division occupied high ground in the
vicinity of Kimnyangjang, while the 24th US Division (with 27th Common-
wealth Brigade attached) also sent out aggressive patrols forward in the sec-
tor. All the attacking units met only scattered opposition and made quick
gains than had been expected.

In the X US Corps sector, that day, spearheads of the 2nd US Division
(with the Netherlands and French Battalions and the 1st Battalion of the 21st
ROK Regiment attached) entered Hoengsong after meeting sporadic op-
position, while other elements of the division closed in positions north of Won-
ju for the night. The 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division advanced to the
Yongwol area, maintaining contact with the 3rd ROK Division on the left flank
of the III ROK Corps.

About this time, the X US Corps made a new operation plan in order to
restore the Bull Line (Osan—Changhowon—Yongwol—Samchok) on its part
and to cut off the enemy retreat route by attacking the 2nd and 9th NK
Divisions under the II NK Corps which had infiltrated deeply into the X US
and III ROK Corps sectors during the enemy’s January offensive. In other
words, it was to encircle and annihilate the enemy concentrations in the
Hongchon area. For this end the 5th ROK Division, as the corps’ right wing,
advanced to the vicinity of Hoengsong by passing through the 7th US Division positions, preparing for further attack toward northeast of Hoengsong.

As the Thunderbolt operation continued, it eventually developed from a reconnaissance in force to a full-scale attack although within the limited objectives, since the main body of the enemy forces had already withdrawn far north. In fact, by 29 January, it had become evident that the enemy would not or could not meet in strength the attack which the I and IX US Corps were launching. Therefore, the UN ground forces were now not only seeking out and destroying the enemy but were regaining the ground and holding it.

By 31 January, the X US Corps units, on the other hand, had withdrawn momentarily to the Wonju–Chuchon-ni line in an attempt to liquidate the infiltrated enemy (I1 NK Corps) in large numbers and were patrolling as far north as Hoengsong again.

At the end of the month, the friendly Order of Battle west to east across the entire front was as follows: In the I US Corps the 25th US Division with the Turkish Brigade and the 15th ROK Regiment attached, the 3rd US Division, with the 1st ROK Division in position behind the 3rd US Division and the 29th British Brigade in position behind the 25th US Division; in the IX US Corps the 1st US Cavalry Division with the Greek Battalion attached, the 24th US Division, with the 6th ROK Division in position behind the 1st US Cavalry Division and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade in position behind the 24th US Division; in the X US Corps the 2nd US Division, the 8th ROK Division, the 7th US Division, with the 2nd ROK Division, the 5th ROK Division and the 187th US Airborne RCT in reserve; in the III ROK Corps the 7th ROK Division, the 9th ROK Division, with the 3rd ROK Division in reserve; in the I

Second Advance Northward

ROK Corps the Capital ROK Division; and the 1st US Marine Division in Army reserve in the vicinity of Andong northeast of Taegu.

By the end of January, the enemy's main line of resistance still had not been developed; but the ROK and UN forces had reached a line six to ten kilometers north of the Suwon-Kimnyangjang-Ichon line and were continuing their advance.

During the period, the I US Corps units had reached and seized the area covering a Panwoljang (nine kilometers west of Suwon)—Suwon—Kimnyangjang-ni line. On 31 January, at 0730 hours, the I US Corps resumed the attack with the 25th US Division on the left and the 3rd US Division on the right to advance farther north through Pankyo-ri—Anyang and then to the south bank of the Han River. The 1st ROK Division and the 29th British Brigade remained in reserve. The regiments of the 25th US Division and the Turkish Brigade encountered stubborn enemy resistance by the 150th Division of the 50th CCF Army in and around Hill 277, Hill 205, and Suri-san (Hill 474), while the 3rd US Division units also engaged with the 113rd Division of the 38th CCF Army, particularly at Hill 457. All they defeated off the Red Chinese forces in the end.

At any rate, by the 4th of February, the I US Corps had advanced up to the Anyang—Pankyo-ri line, thus poising for Seoul.

In the IX US Corps sector, the end of January saw a considerably desperate hill battle in the 1st US Cavalry Division's sector where some 11,000 enemy troops were deployed in the vicinity of Ichon. There the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the Greek Battalion engaged in fiercest fighting at this particular juncture. The Greek Battalion, then holding Hill 381 northwest of Ichon, had to fight alone against 3,000 Red Chinese attackers. Three times the enemy reached the crest of hill but only to be thrown back during 29—30 January.

Operation Thunderbolt was still in progress as February began and the units of the I and IX US Corps continued a slow but steady advance toward the Han River line. What had been planned a strong combat reconnaissance, employing one division from each corps, was turning to a limited offensive. In the IX Corps, on 30 January, the 24th US Division joined the 1st US Cavalry Division in the attack. The enemy was offering scattered resistance, and it was clear that the Reds were not prepared to make a desperate fight.

The lack of enemy resistance in a large-scale on the western front was baffling, but there were some indications as to the enemy's strategy. With the spring thaw coming, the Reds were hesitant to commit large troops south of
the Han River, which would constitute something of natural barrier to the rear as ice melted. Without bridges over the river, and in the face of a mounting UN offensive, the Red forces, probably, considered it strategically wiser to keep the bulk of their forces north of the river.

It was learned later that at the time there were a part of the 50th CCF Army (148th, 149th and 150th CCF Divisions), a small part of the 38th CCF Army, and also some elements of the 8th NK Division in the path of the I US Corps advance.

Operation Round-up
(5–14 February)

Encouraged by the January advance, General Ridgway in early February outlined plans for the immediate future and his ideas on long-range moves. He reported to General MacArthur that the UN ground forces were inflicting maximum losses upon the Communist forces and disrupting the enemy attempts to push farther southward. This was being done, he reported, at the same time that complete coordination within and between the corps was insuring the integrity of all major units. He further reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command that if it proved tactically sound and militarily possible, he would send forces under his command as far as the Han River where they would hold. General Ridgway also planned a coordinated attack on the central front in the very near future to reach and hold the general line running Yangpyong—Hoengsong. After then, he told General MacArthur, he would carefully watch the enemy moves before he take any farther advance northward.

At this juncture, on the contrary to the rapid advance of the I and IX US Corps on the western front, the friendly advances on the central front as well as on the mid-eastern front had been delayed relatively, mostly owing to the fact that many units had been engaged severely in destroying the II NK Corps units which had deeply infiltrated into the rear during their January offensive. Those friendly units in the area had consolidated their line-up and strengthened their combat capacity by the end of January. Now, they were ready to resume an attack in a large-scale.

In early February, in accordance with General Ridgway's orders, the X US Corps ordered his divisions to prepare for continuation of advance: (1) The 2nd US Division was to continue advance in coordination with the movement of the 8th ROK Division, and to support the attack of the 8th ROK Division; (2) 7th US Division would also continue the advance; (3) the 187th
US Airborne RCT would initiate without delay to relieve the 8th ROK Division by 1200 hours, 3 February; (4) the 2nd ROK Division would relieve the 5th ROK Division and conduct aggressive patrolling in the assigned zone; and (5) the 8th ROK Division was to prepare for further advance to the north, after assembling in the immediate rear of the forward elements of the 2nd US Division.

The I and III ROK Corps were also ordered to prepare for attack on D-Day at H-hour through the designated phase lines.

In the meantime, in conjunction with the X Corps operation plans, the I US Corps was ordered by the Eighth US Army on 3 February to organize in order strong task force to exploit any breakthrough which may occur in corps zone, with a special emphasis on the zone of the 25th US Division, and the task force would be organized with the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, one infantry battalion from the 3rd US Division.

On 4 February, General Ridgway ordered the X US Corps, with Major General Edward M. Almond in command, to attack in the central sector in an effort to disrupt the enemy attack preparations, destroy the enemy build-up in the Hongchon area, and also to annihilate those enemy units now attempting to escape from the friendly trap, particularly from the III ROK Corps sector. These enemy groups of the II NK Corps, which had infiltrated during the CCF’s January offensive into the X US and III ROK Corps sectors, had been liquidated or rendered impotent, but some remnants were now trying to escape from being annihilated.

This new attack which would converge from the east and west on Hongchon, an important enemy communication center as well as troop concentration area, was known as “Operation Round-up.” The D-Day and H-hour for this coordinated attack of the X US Corps, the I ROK Corps, and the III ROK Corps was to be 0800, 5 January, and the X US Corps would spearhead the attack employing the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions.

General Almond’s operational concept was that: (1) The 5th ROK Division, as the X Corps’ right wing, would attack on the enemy northeast of Hoengsong, flank through from the east to envelop and attack on Hongchon, and then secure the Hongchon—Pungam-ni line; (2) the 8th ROK Division as the left wing of the corps attack would secure the Yongdu-ri—Hongchon line after destroying the enemy north of Hoengsong; (3) the 7th US Division would advance up the Pyongchang—Hoengsong road, and would protect the rear of the 5th ROK Division, becoming corps reserve thereupon; (4) the 2nd US Division would support and cover the 8th ROK Division’s attack, remaining in corps reserve along the Chipyong-ni—Wonju line; (5) the 187th
US Airborne RCT would support the attack of the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions with its tank elements; and (6) two American field artillery battalions would be placed for the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions in direct support each. In consequence, the attack formation of the X US Corps was comprising of the 2nd US Division, the 187th US Airborne RCT, the 8th ROK Division, and the 5th ROK Division, from left to right. The corps was first to secure the Wonju—Chuchon-ni—Pyongchang line. It was found later that there were the 39th, 40th and 66th CCF Armies facing the corps attack.

For Operation Round-up the Eighth US Army operation order provided specifically that this three corps coordinated-attack would be conducted to destroy elements of the II and V NK Corps in the assigned zones. General Almond, the X US Corps Commander, would coordinate development of the attacks launched by the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps. The UN air forces were to render effective support to the ground action.

On 5 February, the D-Day, 8th ROK Division (commanded by Brigadier General Choi Yung Hee) started the attack at 0800 hours in conjunction with the 5th ROK Division on its right. With two regiments abreast, the 16th Regiment on the left and the 21st Regiment on the right, the division moved up toward the Oum-san (Hill 930)—Pyokhak-san—Taebong-san—Songji-san (Hill 791)—Kalgi-san axis. The 10th ROK Regiment was to follow the advance deploying in the center.

The 5th ROK Division (with Brigadier General Min Kee Shik in command) also began the attack at 0800 hours, 5 February, aimed at a double envelopment of enemy forces in the Hongchon area north of Hoengsong in conjunction with the attack of the 8th ROK Division. The division attack began with the 36th Regiment and the 27th Regiment abreast on the line, keeping the 35th Regiment in reserve.

On the left flank of the X Corps advance, the 2nd US Division (commanded by Major General Clark L. Ruffner), with the Netherlands and French Battalion attached, also jumped off at 0800 hours, 5 February, to strike north as secondary effort for the corps attack. The X Corps at the time had its left boundary at Chipyong-ni and its right boundary running east through Anhung-ni southeast of Hoengsong. This placed the 24th US Division on the 2nd US Division's left flank and the 187th US Airborne RCT on the right, this latter unit having relieved the 8th ROK Division.

Within the 2nd US Division sector, the 19th US Regiment was on the right while the 23rd Regiment, together with the French Battalion was then in and around Chipyong-ni, key to an important road network on the division's left flank. The 2nd US Division was to give artillery and armor support to the
8th ROK Division. The 38th US Regiment, therefore, was concentrating in the Hoengsong area in support of the 8th ROK Division.

The new offensive, as a whole, met with stiff resistance in the IX and X US Corps sectors while the I US Corps advanced encountering sporadic opposition. It maintained an unsteady movement on the second day although poor weather somewhat hindered the air cover. The following days were repeat performances of the initial days with slight gains made in the face of extremely poor weather and rugged terrain and moderate resistance. At any rate, enemy resistance increased steadily as the X US Corps approached the main enemy positions. The 3rd ROK Division (commanded by Brigadier General Choi Suk) was attached to the I US Corps from the III ROK Corps effective 2000 hours, 8 February, and began assembling the next morning northwest of Hoengsong to bolster the battle strength on the central front.

The presence of the Red Chinese forces in the X Corps sector was confirmed on the 10th when, with clearing weather, air observers reported large numbers of enemy forces moving south into the corps sector from not great a distance. Particularly, forward of the 23rd US Regiment and the French Battalion in Chipyong-ni, the Chinese Reds appeared to be massing in strength. Intelligence agents brought from the enemy lines that pre-assault concentrations of thousands of enemy troops. Every new reports served to reaffirm the rapidly accepted opinion that another major CCF offensive was in the making.

In order to meet any CCF offensive in force at any moment, all units prepared for eventuality, thus piling up ammunition stock and other supplies. But there was little enemy activity for next few days. However, in view of the threatened CCF offensive, Operation Round-up was halted and the 8th ROK Division was ordered to hold its present positions. All the 2nd US Division units were instructed to concentrate on short-range, combat patrols and prepare for a new Red attack.

In the west, meanwhile, the units of the I US Corps (commanded by Major General Frank W. Milburn) continued their advance, meeting relatively light enemy resistance. The enemy forces which had invaded into the western sector were the 38th and 50th CCF Armies plus the 17th NK Division, and they now fled in confusion to the area of Chonggye-san and Kwanak-san (Hill 629) as the UN forces had mounted their combat reconnaissance in force. Then, these enemy units, after gathering their scattered units there and here, attempted to dislodge the friendly advance, but they were not in position to resist in force due to their manpower losses. By 8
February the resistance had begun to evaporate.

The I US Corps units now had seized the Sihung—Kumdun-san line by the 10th of February, thus nearing the south bank of the Han River.

Since then onward, the 3rd US Division further advanced to the Chonhodong and Chongggye-san area, while in the 25th US Division sector, its 24th Regiment had attacked to the Inchon area, the Turkish Brigade had moved up to Sosa, the 35th Regiment advanced to Sihung—Yongdungpo, and the 15th ROK Regiment took the Kwachon (near Kwanak-san)—Dongjak-dong area. The 27th US Regiment remained in the vicinity of Anyang.

As for the IX US Corps, its units occupying the key areas in the midwestern sector, also had stepped up further attack, employing the 1st US Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions to spearhead the drives. On 25 January when Operation Thunderbolt began the corps started the aggressive reconnaissance operations, putting the 1st US Cavalry Division (Major General Charles D. Palmer in command) on the left wing and the 24th US Division (Major General Blacksheas M. Brayn in command) on the right. By the early days of February, the corps units had advanced up the Namhan-san (Hill 606)—Yangpyong line against resistance offered by the 42nd CCF Army and a part of the 39th CCF Army. Thereafter further advance was eventually jeopardized momentarily as the 2nd US Division encountered a great threat, particularly in the Chipyeong-ni sector on the immediate right flank of the IX US Corps, when the enemy launched a fierce offensive beginning at midnight of 11—12 February against the X US Corps sector.

In short, I and IX US Corps drove ahead, piercing the enemy's defenses south of Seoul and forcing the Red Chinese back across the Han River. As of the 11th of February, the disposition of friendly forces across the front line, as a whole, from west to east, was that the I US Corps seized the south bank of the Han River, the IX US Corps occupied the Yangpyong sector, the X US Corps secured the Wonju sector, the III ROK Corps deployed in the Pyongchang area, and the I ROK Corps secured the area north of Kangnung.

The UN Command reported to the Pentagon on 10 February that the enemy was not voluntarily withdrawing but was being forced to do so because of the UN forces' attacks.

In consequence of this report, Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, new successor as the Department of Army G-3, asked General MacArthur to explain his future plans. General MacArthur told in his reply that "It is my purpose to continue the ground advance until I develop the enemy's main line of resistance or the fact that there is no such line south of the 38th
Parallel.” General MacArthur pointed out a constant advance would keep the Red Chinese and the NK Communists off-balance. This would allow the UN forces to take full advantage of their superior artillery firepower and armor and “to flush the enemy from concealment where he may have escaped air attack.”

General MacArthur concluded that it was evident to him that the enemy had lost his chance of a decisive military decision in Korea. But he still considered that the Chinese Communists retained the potential, so long as their base of operations in Manchuria was immune from the UN forces’ air attacks, of resuming the offensive and forcing a withdrawal upon the UN Command.

Section 2. The Battle of Chipyong-ni
(12–18 February 1951)

CCF February Offensive

While the successes were being remarkably achieved by the I and IX US Corps in the west, Operation Round-up was beating itself against strong resistance and enemy counterattacks in the central sector north of Hoengsong.

The X US Corps and the III ROK Corps met increasingly heavy enemy concentrations in their efforts to advance.

Intelligence reports had already warned that the enemy was shifting most of his forces from the west to the central zone. Unable to hold in the west, the Red forces were apparently massing their strength against the relatively weak center of the UN line. Air observers also reported the presence of large enemy concentrations north of the boundary between the IX and X US Corps and of other groups moving south and east above Hoengsong. Thus, the threat of an enemy counteroffensive in a considerable large-scale there became more likely within a matter of hours as the I and IX US Corps closed up to the Han River while the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps carried Operation Round-up northward.

The opening moves of massive CCF February offensive against the UN line suddenly came during the night of 11–12 February 1951; first to feel the enemy attack was the X US Corps. That night, 66th CCF Army (196th, 197th, and 198th Divisions) and the 40th CCF Army (118th, 119th, and 120th Divisions) and the V NK Corps (6th, 7th, and 12th Divisions) struck violently in subzero weather the central front, shattered three ROK divisions (3rd,
5th and 8th Divisions), and forced the units in this sector to abandon Hoengsong and withdraw southward toward Wonju.

As he did in January, exploiting his peculiar “human-sea” tactics, the enemy was obviously aiming his attack at the communication center of Wonju, near the center, and Chipyong-ni, near the west flank of the X US Corps sector, whose seizure would help further advance to the south and west. General Ridgway, therefore, resolved that Wonju and Chipyong-ni would be held.

Taking a look at the enemy moves, the Communists, after suffering great losses in men and materiel in January, had been busily engaged in getting reinforcements and supplies from their Manchurian bases now lengthened 420 kilometers in distance.

The 66th, 40th, and 39th CCF Armies under the XIII CCF Army Group had moved into the central sector in early January, and the 66th CCF Army was deployed in Samhyon-ni area (3 kilometers west of Yongdu-ri), while the 40th CCF Army was deployed in the Yangdokwon-ni area, all they were preparing for a new determined offensive.

In the X US Corps sector, meanwhile, the first blow of the enemy’s February offensive was encountered by the 8th ROK Division on the right flank of the corps. Supported by the bulk of artillery and mortar fire, the enemy forces assaulted down from two directions simultaneously, one by frontal attack and the other by flanking maneuver in the late afternoon of the 11th February. By the evening the enemy had gathered additional strength and the whole area of the 8th ROK Division, commanded by Brigadier General Choi Yung Hee, was under heavy pressure. The division soon fell into a complete envelopment.

As darkness fell on the snow-covered mountains, valleys, and rice paddies, the enemy offensive became more heavier moment after moment all across the X Corps front. At the moment, the 38th CCF Army also mounted its new attack on the western front, attempting to take Suwon in particular, but the enemy, as a whole, directed his heaviest blow against the central front along the Chipyong-ni–Hoengsong line with his main objective at the capture of Wonju, most important communication center in central Korea. Facing this critical situation at the time, the main force of the IX US Corps was holding the Namhan-san–Yangpyong line, while that of the X US Corps generally held the Wonju sector. Between these two corps the 23rd US Regiment and its attached French Battalion was the only force defending Chipyong-ni, thus creating a power vacuum around there against the overwhelming enemy onslaughts.
The full swing of the enemy offensive really came at the midnight of 11–12 February, hitting most severely upon the 3rd and 8th ROK Divisions along the Hongchon—Hoengsong axis in an envelopment effort. As usual, the Reds attacked at first upon the ROK units equipped relatively with less artillery and other firepower.

At the time the 8th ROK Division saw a strong enemy assault along the Hongchon—Hoengsong axis when it was advancing north along the Hongchon—Yongdu-ri line. During the night at last the 10th and 16th Regiments of the 8th ROK Division reluctantly withdrew south in an attempt to consolidate a new position and to eliminate the enemy penetration coming through the gap between two regiments.

The 3rd ROK Division, on the other hand, had also received one of the heaviest enemy assaults beginning at 1700 hours, 11 February, and during the night its 22nd and 23rd Regiments were forced to withdraw to the rear positions approximately five kilometers north of Hoengsong.

After having seized Hoengsong, the 66th and 40th CCF Armies rushed down to Wonju—Munmak and to Chipyong-ni respectively, thus encircling the 2nd US Division, while the V NK Corps had broken through the Pyong-chang—Hoengsong line, threatening Chechon.

On 12 February, the 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division, which had been sent out earlier on a limited attack mission, was trapped by the Communist forces and had to fight its way back to Wonju.

That day, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was attached for operational control to the 2nd US Division to build-up the division defenses.

Encountering the most heavy enemy attack, the 2nd US Division ordered its 9th Regiment to move from Sogu up to Yoji, when the 38th US Regiment was under general attack by 0300 hours, 12 February. Meanwhile, the Netherlands Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Den Ouden, was still holding the blocking position at Hoengsong. Soon the 38th US Regiment and the Netherlands Battalion were surrounded by the Red Chinese in the north of Hoengsong beginning at 0500 hours 12 February. Nevertheless, they fought gallantly inflicting a tremendous toll of casualties upon the Reds. Unfortunately, however, Lieutenant Colonel Den Ouden was heroically killed in action there. The 38th US Regiment and the Netherlands Battalion thereafter conducted the fighting withdrawal, while continuing hand to hand fighting and yet maintaining a good order.

At this juncture, General Ridgway decided to secure the Chipyong-ni—Wonju line — shoulder of the enemy penetration — and to hold the
Chechon—Yongwol line. As a result, he committed hastily the 5th US Infantry RCT into the Chipyong-ni area in an effort to reinforce the 2nd US Division (minus the 9th Regiment) now being completely enveloped by the 39th CCF Army also under the XIII CCF Army Group. Furthermore, General Ridgway also shifted the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade from the IX US Corps and placed it under the command of the 2nd US Division on the 14th February, and the brigade was ordered to cross the Han River at Yoji 19 kilometers south of Chipyong-ni at once and advance north to relieve the 23rd US Regiment and the French Battalion, who had been cut off in the Chipyong-ni area. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade was then consisting of the Middlesex Battalion, Argylls Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, the 16th Field Regiment of the Royal New Zealand Artillery and the newly arrived 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Further the 6th ROK Division was also transferred from the IX US Corps to fill up the gap created in the Munmak area after the 38th US Regiment of the 2nd US Division had moved out there to reinforce the Chipyong-ni sector.

In addition, General Ridgway ordered Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond (promoted to the new rank on 12 February), the X US Corps Commander, to block the salient of enemy penetration in the Chechon sector, employing the 7th US Division, with Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh in new command effective on 12 February, as well as the 3rd and 5th ROK Divisions. On 14 February, Operation Round-up was officially terminated.

The ROK Army, on the other hand, ordered the I ROK Corps (commanded by Major General Kim Paik II) to move its command post from Samchok to Chechon without delay, and then to support the X US Corps operations with the 3rd, 5th and 8th ROK Divisions. Thereafter the I ROK Corps occupied Hwangton-ni (11 kilometers north of Chechon)—Songnam-ni in Wonsong and secured the Wonju—Chechon line.

Afterward, the 7th US Division also secured the Chechon—Yongwol line while the 7th ROK Division of the III ROK Corps completely seized forward of Yongwol. Toward the closing hours of 15 February the Red Chinese seemingly began to take themselves to flight northward meeting with gallant actions of the UN forces, proving themselves their inability to sustain an offensive more than a few days. By the 18th February, the 66th and 40th CCF Armies had run away from the scene suffering more than 30,000 men killed and carrying the heavy casualties with them.

Seizing this opportunity, the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps prepared to counterattack in a decisive-scale on 21 February. It was about this time the
Second Advance Northward

1st US Marine Division camp up there to take part in the new attack operation.

In the meantime in the IX US Corps sector on the left-neighboring flank of the X US Corps, the 1st US Cavalry Division was still continuing the advance encountering sporadic fighting. But on 14 February, when the 23rd US Regiment and the French Battalion were completely surrounded by the Communist forces in and around Chipyong-ni, plans were drawn up for the Cavalry division to protect the right flank of the IX US Corps in conjunction with the X US Corps operations, with a particular attention on the Chipyong-ni situation.

Triumph at Chipyong-ni
(13—15 February)

Among the many tough engagements fought with the Communist aggressors in those early months of 1951, none was conducted with greater skill, courage, gallantry, and tenacity than that fought by the 23rd US Regiment, with the intrepid French Battalion attached, particularly in the Chipyong-ni area.

Chipyong-ni was defended because General Ridgway decided to make a stand there against the Chinese Communists. Chipyong-ni lies some 30 kilometers northwest of Wonju, and was a small crossroads town situated on a single track railroad. Encircling the town were eight prominent hills that rose from 100 to 400 meters in height. These hills provided excellent defensive positions, with good fields of fire, but to have occupied them would have stretched the ridgelines and formed a perimeter with five to some six kilometers diameter.

Supported by the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, Battery B, the 82nd Anti-aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, and Battery B, the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion (a 155-mm. howitzer unit), the 23rd US Regimental Combat Team under the command of Colonel Paul L. Freeman and the French Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Raloh Monclar commanding, made the decisive and Hercluean defense of this particular town on 13 and 14 February 1951. (See Sketch Map 30.)

Colonel Freeman stationed his infantrymen on lower ground and low hills immediately around a tight perimeter about one and a half kilometer in diameter, instead of manning on the ridgelines.

While the 23rd US RCT and its attached units built up their defenses, an Eighth Army offensive got underway on 5 February with the X US Corps
A view of Chipyong-ni, where the 23rd US Regiment and the French Battalion gallantly fought on 13–14 February 1951.

spearheading, in the center of the UN line, attacking to make a double envelopment of Hongchon, an important enemy build-up area. The attack moved slowly until the night of 11 February, when the Red Chinese launched a full-scale counteroffensive with two columns driving south aimed at Hoengsong and Wonju in the X US Corps sector. The determined enemy attack drove through the 8th and 3rd ROK Divisions at first and turned the UN forces' "Round-up" attack into a fighting withdrawal that rolled the front lines southward. Before the Communist attack, the front lines of the X Corps were well ahead of Chipyong-ni but as the units went south, sometimes fighting through the enemy roadblocks, Chipyong-ni became a conspicuous bulge on the left flank of the corps line. Plans for an attack by the 23rd RCT on Hill 583 (Chuup-san) southwest of Chipyong-ni, scheduled for 12 February, were cancelled in view of the threat posed by the newest CCF move. The 9th US Regiment, commanded by Colonel Edwin J. Messinger, which had just secured an important hill in the vicinity of Sogu, was alerted to be ready to move to Yoju on three hours notice. The 38th US Regiment and its attached Netherlands Battalion were then fighting their way through an enemy en-
velopment around Hoengsong. Orders to abandon Hoengsong were received early night of the 12th and the Netherlands Battalion with elements of the 7th US Division fought a delaying action to the south while inflicting heavy casualties upon the Reds.

Back at Chipyong-ni, the 23rd US RCT and the French Battalion girded themselves for the enemy assault which might be expected at any moment. The 12th of February was quiet, however, except for a highly successful raid west of Chipyong-ni from the French Battalion, which entered a village where it found and blew up several large ammunition dumps. Air observers confirmed the southward movement toward Chipyong-ni of large masses of enemy troops. Unusually heavy flare activity was observed north of the Chipyong-ni perimeter during the night of 12–13 February.

Throughout the daylight hours of the 13th the Wonju area was quiet as the defenders feverishly prepared their defenses. But at the Chipyong-ni perimeter, the usual patrols reported increased enemy activity crowding close to the town on three sides—north, east, and west. Air observers reported enemy group moving toward the perimeter from the north and east. Observers called for artillery fire against those enemy columns within reach, while the tactical air control party directed 40 flights of aircraft against other enemy groups beyond artillery range.

A strong patrol composed of L Company of the 9th US Regiment and the 2nd Division's Reconnaissance Company also reported itself engaged with 1,000 Red Chinese on the MSR leading to Chipyong-ni.

Faced with this growing threat of encirclement, Colonel Freeman wanted to pull back to Yoju about 24 kilometers south in road distance to prevent encirclement. Lieutenant General Almond, the X US Corps Commander, flew into Chipyong-ni by helicopter at noon on the 13th February and conferred with Colonel Freeman and agreed to withdraw. However, within an hour and a half after General Almond returned to his command post to report the plan to General Ridgway, Colonel Freeman changed his mind not to withdraw, when he heard a report from the 2nd US Division's Reconnaissance Company describing enemy opposition to movement on the main supply road south. In the meantime, however, General Almond had submitted the original recommendation and request -- to leave Chipyong-ni on the following morning -- to General Ridgway. General Ridgway adamantly refused permission to abandon Chipyong-ni. The General judged that if it fell the entire Eighth Army front might seriously be endangered.

Colonel Freeman immediately started to strengthen his position, telling
his subordinate commanders, "We are going to stay here and fight it out." He asked for air strikes and airdrops for the next day, set up a secondary perimeter to be manned at night by engineers, positioned his tanks near the outer perimeter, and ordered all gaps mined or blocked by lanes of machine gun fire.

Increased flare activity marked the late evening around the Chipyong-ni perimeter on 13 February. It was about 2200 hours when the first firing broke out. Small arms and mortar fire began to fall into the area from the northwest, north and southwest.

Soon after an intense mortar and artillery barrage lifted, there was skirmishing, and a few violent close-in assaults followed on the south of the perimeter, where the 2nd Battalion, the French Battalion and a 155-mm. howitzer battery defended. Shortly before midnight, following heavy weight of artillery barrage, a more heavier attack crashed into the northern sector of the perimeter held by the 1st Battalion. Bugles, whistles, and yells sounded out over the cold, night air. By midnight, the frenzied attacks had spread with only the 3rd Battalion on the southwest not engaged. Mortar and artillery rained in upon the regimental command post, the artillery positions and the sector where the heavy mortars were set-up. The command post of the 1st Battalion was set on fire by the flying tracers.

Shortly after midnight, the fighting eased but a fresh attack was launched from out of the north and northwest at 0100 hours, 14 February. The rushing, yelling enemy was repulsed but as the firing died down, troops on the perimeter could hear the click of shovels as the Red hordes dug in to stay.

In the 2nd Battalion area, meanwhile, the enemy in small groups attacked the center of G Company, hitting the 3rd Platoon (Lieutenant Paul J. McGee). Another Red group crawled along the spur of ground that led to the center of the 3rd Platoon, throwing grenades at a machine gun manned by Corporal Eugen L. Ottesen, then with rifles. Lieutenant McGee telephoned his company commander 1st Lieutenant Heath reporting the situation, and he ordered his men to fire only when they could see the enemy in order to conserve ammunition. Apparently making only a probing attack, the enemy withdrew after a few minutes.

Now, the force of the enemy attack was shifted at 0215 hours when the Red Chinese launched a bloody frontal assault from the southwest and east, particularly against K Company of the 3rd Battalion. The perimeter held so strongly with continued pressure in the south while the masses of the Red hordes hurled themselves at the French Battalion in the north yet another
effort to pierce the circle of defenders.

Blowing bugles and whistles, and beating drums, the CCF hordes dashed forward toward the lines of the French Battalion. As the first assault wave rushed upon the Frenchmen, a Frenchman cranked a hand siren, setting up an ungodly screech. A single squad fixed bayonets, grabbed up hand grenades, and when the enemy was about 20 kilometers away, came out of their foxholes and charged on the Reds. Four times their number of CCF stopped, turned, and fled into the night. Meanwhile, G Company of the 2nd Battalion was also hit four times, but the company held down.

As the waves of the attackers struck the French Battalion, intense pressure on C Company of the 1st Battalion forced a slight withdrawal but an immediate counterattack regained the lost ground. The entire perimeter

THE BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI (3–16 FEB 1951)
balzed with fire as the artillery poured round after round into the determined, frenzed attacking troops and the defenders delivered all the firepower they could muster into the hordes.

With light, the Red hordes withdrew to the circling hills. By 0530 hours, the pressure had ceased once again except in front of the French Battalion and K Company of the 3rd Battalion, both of whom were repulsing attack after attack.

C Company of the 1st Battalion was hit at 0540 hours but again the attack was beaten off. An attempt by the attackers to infiltrate in the south was unsuccessful.

At first light of 14 February, L Company of the 9th US Regiment and the Reconnaissance Company of the 2nd US Division in the southeast were under a three-sided attack with elements of the same force attacking Chipyong-ni. But still the ring of steel held. Elsewhere, the battered assault troops of more than three full CCF divisions, estimatedly five divisions in strength, surrounding Chipyong-ni made stabs at the perimeter then fell back under withering mortar, artillery and small arms fire.

In the morning, the friendly air forces came over to search the enemy held hills with rockets and napalms, and cargo planes made two dozen ammunition drops. Other than this, nothing occurred during the daylight hours.

On the other hand, as the 23rd US RCT was engaged in repulsing the swarms of the Red Chinese around Chipyong-ni, the defenders of Wonju were also coming under heavy attack by the eastward spear of the Red Chinese two-pronged drive.

The 2nd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry came under severe, frontal assault at 0345 hours on 14 February in positions on the high ground north of Wonju. Throwing a powerful spearhead into the ranks, some of the attacking echelons pushed into the positions of L and K Companies. Artillery was called in on the break-through on the flanks between the 38th Infantry and the 187th US Airborne RCT.

The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry had been put in on the west flank of the northern line. At 0655 hours, the 2nd Battalion was shifted to relieve the 3rd Battalion which went into reserve. The spot vacated by the 2nd Battalion was filled by the 1st Battalion.

As daylight broke air observers caught two CCF divisions moving in column south along the Som River with obvious intention of encircling the Wonju defenders. Hour after hour the unbelievable slaughter mounted as exhausted artillerymen slammed an endless stream of shells into the exposed
masses of the Red hordes who continued to press forward. Air strikes took up the enemy where artillery could not reach. The enemy attack was broken, the threat to Wonju no longer critical. The battle for Wonju had cost the enemy more than 5,000 men. Although bitter fighting was waged that night and throughout the following day, the enemy had shifted his main effort to Chipyong-ni.

While thousands of the Red Chinese were being bloodily repulsed along the Som River west of Wonju, the 23rd US Regiment and the French Battalion were busy repairing the damage wrought by the frenzied attacks of the previous night. Twenty-four air drops helped restock the supply dumps. Helicopters shuttled in and out of the tight perimeter throughout the day, evacuating the most seriously wounded.

At 1200 hours, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was attached to the 2nd US Division with the sole mission of clearing the enemy from the MSR from Iho-ri to Chipyong-ni. This drive by the brigade was to be made in conjunction with a similar relief effort by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment along a parallel road from the south.

The 6th ROK Division (minus 19th Regiment) was also attached temporarily to the 2nd US Division on the 14th and placed on line. Thus the 2nd US Division front extended from the cut off area of the 23rd US Regiment at Chipyong-ni on the left, through the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, the 6th ROK Division, the 9th US Regiment and the 38th US Regiment holding down the right flank at Wonju.

Back at Chipyong-ni, after nightfall, 14 February, flares soared high all around the southern rim of the town, and the noise of bugles beat on the defender’s ears. Then at 2030 hours, the CCF unleashed a mortar barrage into the 3rd Battalion area and an hour later the 1st Battalion was receiving a heavy volume of fire and could hear the enemy digging-in in its positions.

After darkness, the first enemy onslaught of the night fell on the 2nd Battalion sector. Simultaneously the regimental command post came under a blasting barrage of mortar, artillery and small arms fire which, in an hour, had spread to cover the positions of the mortar company and the trains of the French Battalion. The fighting on the perimeter mounted in intensity with both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions engaged in fierce, close combat as the enemy sought to drive a wedge into the perimeter which he could expand and thus enable him to divide the defending forces. Bugles signaled new and stronger attacks as 120-mm. mortars showered on the command post area.
A slight let-up occurred about midnight as the enemy regrouped for another attempt. The artillery continued to pour round after round onto the outlying area.

K Company of the 3rd Battalion was struck at 0130 hours, 15 February but repulsed two assaults as the pressure again mounted in the south and southwest. Ammunition shortages threatened to become critical. Now, while the entire perimeter of Chipyong-ni was under heavy pressure, the main CCF blow fell against the weakened 2nd Battalion, particularly upon G Company. The company was piling up the red dead by the hundreds, but too many of the enemy were getting in close with explosives and hand grenades. The artillery fired star shells and high explosives alternately, but still the Reds kept coming. The enemy washed up on the low ridge again, fighting a determined battle for each foxhole.

The first penetration of the Chipyong-ni perimeter met at 0230 hours when savage blows by the Red Chinese hordes drove in to the position of I Company in the 2nd Battalion sector. An immediate counterattack by the battalion slashed forward and cut the enemy penetration out, restoring the positions in bitter hand-to-hand battle. It seemed impossible that the perimeter could continue to withstand the mounting pressure by the vastly numerically superior foe.

At 0315 hours, another penetration was made into the G Company position. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles who had flown into the perimeter to replace the badly wounded Colonel Freeman, ordered a composite force assembled to counterattack.

At this juncture, less than 140 rounds of 4.2 mortar and less than 90 rounds of 81-mm. mortars now remained. Orders went out to the embattled lines to conserve ammunition as much as possible. No targets was to be fired upon unless definitely seen and in a position to be hit.

The composite counterattack force struck at the enemy penetration at 0615 hours. Hand-to-hand fighting raged fiercely as the Red hordes attempted to hold their gains. The Chinese Communists threw men by prodigally against fire. Joined by all available reserve, the American counterattackers struck against the penetration more fiercely at 0800 hours despite suffering casualties.

To the south, meanwhile, the 5th US Cavalry Regiment spearheaded by heavy tanks was fighting forward against fanatical resistance in an attempt to reach the seriously threatened Chipyong-ni perimeter in time.

The counterattack effort of B Company was failed and the friendly elements were pinned down under murderous fire. The situation was desper-
ate. But the either side of the flanks were holding firm, and the artillery
was firing a continuous crescendo of flame, while both the Americans and
the Red Chinese massed on the crest of hills, desperately trying to throw
the other off.

At 1230 hours, the relief column was slow against the fire from every
side. At 1400, the tactical air control party called air strikes onto the enemy
entrenched in the gap. Napalm splashed and seared over the grimly holding
enemy troops. At last, the enemy began to run away. Americans stepped
up fierce counterattacks losing no time. Having enough ammunition by air
drops, they delivered a shower of fire chasing the retreating Reds.

By 1630 hours, the perimeter defenders could see the head of the friendly
tank column pushing forward to the relief of the perimeter. The enemy was
fleeing in face of the steel barrage from clanking armor column. The ar-
tillery of the perimeter continued to pour out its lethal rain on the exposed
and fleeing enemy, inflicting tremendous casualties.

Twenty heavy tanks and a handful infantrymen from the 5th US Cavalry
Regiment rolled into the perimeter at 1715 hours. The victorious but
exhausted defenders realized the immediate crisis had passed. The UN air
units continued to chase the enemy who could find no cover. More than 131
sorties had been flown in the Chipyong-ni area throughout the siege. After
the battle, American troops saw thousands of the Red Chinese corpses lying
in a ring about Chipyong-ni.

It can be said that this period—and this action in particular—marked a
change in the tactical methods of the UN forces. Previously, units cut off
had tended to attempt to break out and withdraw; but in this battle the
Americans and Frenchmen were told to remain where they were and dig
in. They would be supplied by air pending their relief by other troops.
This policy had a very excellent effect on the morale of the UN forces as a
whole.

On 17 February, at 1200 hours, the 23rd US Regiment and the French Batt-
talion were attached to the IX US Corps until full relief could be effected by
the elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division. Coincided with the attach-
ment, both the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade and the 6th ROK Division
were relived from the 2nd US Division.

In conclusion, the gallant stand by the 23rd US Regiment and the French
Battalion at Chipyong-ni against the numerically superior Red Chinese forces
was one of the greatest battle triumphs won by the UN forces during the
Korean War, which proved to be the turning point in the enemy advance. In
February 1966, a monument was erected by the Republic of Korea
Section 3. Resuming the General Advance  
(21 February—31 March 1951)

Operation Killer  
(21—28 February)

Once the enemy’s determined efforts to push the UN forces south and further to force them out of the Korean peninsula in his January and February offensives had been contained. Lieutenant General Ridgway, the Commanding General of the Eighth US Army, made his decision to launch a powerful, limited objective attack with two divisions forcing a crossing of the Han River east of Seoul, with the aim of cutting enemy supply lines and enveloping enemy forces massed to the west.

Meanwhile, although the Red Chinese were stopped and repulsed inflicting mortal damages upon them in the Chipyong-ni sector, enemy forces farther east bypassed Wonju and attacked down south almost to Chechon before the ROK and Eighth US Army forces could halt them. But, weakened by great losses in men and equipment due to the strong counter actions taken by the UN forces, the Communist forces called off their attacks and retreated back. Fighting about 420 kilometers or 260 miles south of Manchurian border, the Chinese Communists found the situation quite different from that in November 1950 when they had had their bases to their immediate rear, particularly being immune from the UN air forces’ attacks.

For the ROK and UN forces, there was no resting on laurels. Even before the front stabilized, General Ridgway opened “Operation Killer,” which completed the cycle from concept to plan and execution in just three days, to destroy the enemy east of the Han River line and south of a general line connecting Yangpyong—Hyonchon-ni—Haanmi-ri.

Originally, General Ridgway had seen no military advantage in the recapture of Seoul, as he did not feel the Eighth US Army could operate effectively with an unfordable river at its backs. But General MacArthur had pointed out to him the value of recovering; the use of the Kimpo Airfield and the port facilities of Inchon strengthen the UN air support and ease supply
problems. General MacArthur emphasized the great psychological and
diplomatic victory that would be won by the UN forces if they could retake
Seoul, while he agreed that the military value of Seoul was practically none.

At 0745 hours on 18 February, Major General Bryant E. Moore, who had
assumed temporary command of the IX US Corps on 31 January and full com-
mand on 18 February when Lieutenant General Coulter became Deputy
Eighth US Army Commander, reported to General Ridgway that one of the
regiments in the 24th US Division sector had found no opposition before it.
General Ridgway passed this information to the I and X US Corps, or-
dering to send out combat patrols to gain contact. Findings of the patrols
confirmed the fact that enemy forces along the entire central front were
beginning a general retreat. General Ridgway immediately ordered the X
US Corps to attack eastward to destroy the NK Communist units on its
eastern flank, near Chechon. He directed at the same time the IX US Corps
to seize positions north of Yangpyong, and thence northwest to the intersec-
tion of the IX US Corps boundary with the Han River. These attacks met
very light, scattered resistance and disclosed evidence of enemy's hasty
retreat. Thus, by 19 February the initiative all along the front had passed
from the enemy into the UN forces hands.

Based on plans for the imminent offensive operation, on 20 February, the
Eighth US Army placed the 1st US Marine Division under the operational
control of the IX US Corps effective 1910 hours, while the Turkish Brigade
was ordered to prepare to move to rejoin the 25th US Division by 1200 hours,
22 February. The 29th British Brigade after assembling at Kimnyangjang,
was to revert from the 25th US Division to the I US Corps for the operational
control. In order to include the 1st US Marine Division in "Killer" the boun-
dary between the IX and X US Corps was shifted eastward so that Wonju and
Hoengsong fell within the IX US Corps zone.

On 20 February, General MacArthur flew in Wonju and conferred with
General Ridgway about the general situation and the purpose of forthcoming
operations, particularly on the recrossing of the Han River by two divi-
sions. As to the enemy situation, the strength, equipment status, morale
and intentions of the four CCF armies reported to be in the Pyongyang area
remained undetermined. But reinforcements from this area might easily
have been flowing south for some weeks to strengthen the forces with which
the UN ground forces were now in contact, and could appear on the battleline
almost any day. As for the UN forces' purpose, it remained the infliction of
maximum damage on the enemy with minimum to own. The UN forces were
to pursue only to the point when they were still able to provide powerful
support or at least manage a timely disengagement and local withdrawal.

Based on this thinking General Ridgway had planned Operation Killer on 18 February, two days before the visit of General MacArthur, and had outlined it to the Commanding Generals of the IX and X US Corps and of the 1st US Marine Division.

General Ridgway was embarrassed by an announcement made by General MacArthur on 20 February, the eve of the target date, standing before some ten or more correspondents at the X US Corps tactical command post. "I have just ordered a resumption of the offensive," General MacArthur said. Normally such visits by higher commanders are made with little or no chance of their coming known to the enemy until well after they have taken place. But in this instance, the pattern of General MacArthur's flight from Tokyo and appearance at the fighting front every time a major operation was to be initiated had been well established. Whether his visit and or announcement could reach the enemy in time for him to react became a major concern of General Ridgway when the UN forces were about to jump off on the second general offensive. Operation Ripper, in March, which, if successful, would take them back to the 38th Parallel and beyond.

Operation Killer began at 1000 hours on 21 February. The objective line ran generally east from Yangpyong on the Han River, north of Chipyong-ni and Hoengsong, then east to secure the west-east portion of the Wonju--Kangnung road between Wonju and Pangnim-ni.

In the western sector, the I US Corps, now composing of the 1st ROK Divi-
Second Advance Northward

sion, 3rd US Division, 25th US Division, 29th British Brigade, and the Turkish Brigade, was to protect the Eighth Army's west flank while continuing contact with the enemy: the IX US Corps, consisting of the 1st US Cavalry (with the Greek Battalion attached), 1st US Marine Division, 6th ROK Division, 24th US Division, 27th Commonwealth Brigade, would attack in zone to destroy the enemy south of the Arizona line with main effort along the Wonju—Hoengsong axis; the X US Corps, with the 2nd US Division (the Netherlands and French Battalions attached), 7th US Division (with the 31st ROK Regiment attached), the 187th US Airborne RCT, and the I ROK Corps (the 3rd, 5th, and 8th ROK Divisions) under its operational control, would attack in zone in coordination with the IX US Corps also to destroy the enemy south of Arizona line along the Yongwol—Pyongchang axis; and the III ROK Corps (the Capital, 7th, and 9th ROK Divisions and the 1st ROK Marine Regiment) would advance north commensurating with the advance of the X US Corps to protect the X Corps' east flank, while the 2nd and 11th ROK Divisions were to continue their guerrilla hunting and security missions behind the frontline.

All the UN ground forces were to be tightly buttoned up and to keep in close physical contact while maintaining integrity of units. Patrol and reconnaissance were stressed by General Ridgway, and even lack of opposition would not justify a unit in advancing ahead of schedule. Again, as in previous operations, real objective was to inflict maximum personnel and materiel damage upon the Red foe.

In brief, the main objective of Operation Killer was directed along the Wonju—Hoengsong and Yongwol—Pyongchang axis. General Ridgway specially demanded close lateral coordination within and between the IX and X US Corps, and emphasized that his purpose was to kill enemy troops as much as possible.

The IX US Corps started its part of attack at 1000 hours with the 1st US Cavalry Division on the left and the 1st US Marine Division on the right flank, pushing east toward Hoengsong to effect a junction with the X Corps, while the X US Corps also attacked at the same time spearheaded by the 7th US Division advancing north along the Yongwol—Pyongchang road, pressing west toward Hoengsong in a double envelopment effort. Simultaneous advances were also executed by the I US Corps to the west where patrols had found evidence that Seoul was lightly held.

The objective areas of the IX and X US Corps advance were believed to be defended by the 66th, 39th and 40 CCF Armies, and ahead of the attacking units lay some rugged terrain with rocky heights and narrow valleys.

Holding the left flank of the IX US Corps, the 1st US Cavalry Division
(Major General C.D. Palmer in command) moved out at 1000 hours, progress from the beginning was slow due to the scattered enemy resistance and cloudy weather which hampered air support. Until 1200 hours, some air observation and support was possible, but the rain then started to fall, and all planes were grounded. As a result, by the end of the first day it had not accomplished as much as had been hoped. The rain continued all night.

Next day the Han River rose steadily, and the ford west of Koksu-ri could no longer allow the passage of small vehicles. Furthermore, a pontoon bridge at Yoju broke loose and swung downstream. Not until 0400 hours, 23 February did the rain stop. At any rate, the division seized Hill 469 one of its primary objective, and no attack was authorized any farther.

On the other hand, the 1st US Marine Division (Major General O.P. Smith in command) encountered only scattered small arms fire and sporadic resistance until late afternoon of the first day's attack. The division continued the attack the next day with the 1st Marine Regiment in the lead. Again, the Marines did not run into notable opposition until the next day. That afternoon, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Marines (under Colonel Francis M. McAlister) reached the first phase objective after meeting some opposition.

7th US Division troops trudging up a hill after crossing the snow-covered valley near Chuncheon, 20 February 1951.
On the 24th, the 5th US Marine Regiment (Colonel Raymond L. Murry in command) met a remarkable enemy resistance in taking two hills designated as the main phase objective, while the 1st US Marines on the left sent a tank and infantry patrol unit into Hoengsong. At last the first phase of Operation Killer on the part of the 1st US Marine Division came to an end at dusk on 24 February with all preliminary objectives seized.

The 7th US Division (Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh in command) in the X US Corps sector, meanwhile, had encountered strong resistance when its 17th Regiment assaulted onto Taemi-san (Hill 1232) far north of Pyongchang defended by the 1st NK Division. After a vicious and bloody struggle, the mountain was taken. It was in this attack that Captain Raymond Harvey won the Medal of Honor.

In general, in the X Corps zone thaws coupled with extremely mountainous terrain made each day's advance a test of endurance for both men and equipment.

On 24 February, the IX US Corps lost its commander, Major General Bryant E. Moore, following the crash of a helicopter in which he was riding over the Han River for aerial reconnaissance. Immediately after the aircraft accident, he was rescued unhurt only to die of a heart attack half an hour afterwards. Major General O.P. Smith, the Commanding General of the 1st US Marine Division, took temporary command of the corps pending the arrival of Major General William M. Hoge who would take the command on 5 March.

That day Major General Lewis B. Puller took over the command of the 1st US Marine Division and General Smith flew to Yoju to begin his new duties.

One worthwhile thing to make a special remark at this time is that artillery firepower demonstrated in Operation Killer. By February 1951, field artillery battalions that had been undergoing intensive training in the United States and had long been earmarked for use in Korea began to join the I and IX US Corps, enabling those forces to return to normal old fashioned tactics of coordinated action.

The really terrifying strength of artillery firepower, when employed in concentrated fashion, was strikingly exemplified by the success of the IX US Corps (Major General John B. Coulter in command) in clearing enemy forces from the Hoengsong-Wonju area, as a part of Operation Killer. These two centers, about halfway across the peninsula, and northeast of the Han River, sit astride major highways and rail lines that provide important north-south links. Within seven days estimatedly more than 5,000 Red Chinese had been killed in the IX US Corps area.
On 25 February, General Ridgway called off the attack until enough ammunition, fuel, and other supplies could be brought up for a resumption of the offensive toward the final objective of Operation Killer.

Thus, despite the fading resistance for a while, the UN forces ground move northward had not been easy for heavy rains and thawing in the combat area had severely hampered the movement of vehicles and transport of supplies. As a result, General Ridgway called upon General Stratemeyer for greater effort to support the advance units by air. There was another problem that the forward airfields or airstripes were too small and dangerous to risk landing planes, even C-47 cargo transports.

At the end, by a prodigious effort, enough progress in logistics was made so that General Ridgway could issue on 25 February for the second phase of “Killer” to start on 1 March.

During the first week of Operation Killer, as the UN forces began moving into the areas lately occupied by the enemy, they found evidence of the effectiveness of their attacks. The hills around Wonju and Chechon were littered with enemy dead. Apparently the Red Chinese and NK Communists had been even more severely mauled than had been imagined.

In eight days, the ROK and UN forces had advanced to their assigned objectives in the central and central-east zones. Operation Killer was nearly completed. Its success had been due in large measure not only to continuous pressure against an enemy who appeared unable to launch a major counterattack unless granted time to reorganize, but also to the strict observance of the basic tactical doctrine of co-ordinated maneuver.

On 28 February, after weeks of ceaseless blows by the UN forces, the Communist foothold south of the Han River collapsed.

To keep the enemy off balance and to destroy as many of his forces as possible, it was planned to continue the advance of the IX and X US Corps to the 38th Parallel. By 1 March the entire UN front was relatively stable. For the first time, the UN line had no gaping holes, no soft spots, and no enemy salients threatening to split it into two.

**Operation Ripper**

*(7 – 31 March)*

The United Nations Forces surge up the peninsula had slackened somewhat in late February 1951, thus the advance of the IX and X US Corps had not yet fulfilled all of their objectives of Operation Killer, mostly due to the wretched weather and thawing ground that disrupted movement of troops and
equipment. But the geographical objectives of the "Killer" were largely attained by 1 March, when the U.N. line, situated about halfway between the 37th and 38th Parallels, swung in an arc from south of the Han River in the west through north of Yangpyong and Hoengsong, then curved gently northeast of Kangnung on the east coast.

By 2 March, the Eighth US Army completed plans for a new offensive, Operation Ripper, in which all corps would move northward through successive phase lines (Albany, Banker, Buffalo, White, Cairo, Benton and Idaho) to seize Hongchon and Chunchon in the central sector and occupy a line designated "Idaho," just south of the 38th Parallel and to destroy all enemy forces, materiel, and supplies in the path of the advance. Between the 3rd and the 6th of March, supplies were built-up, and all corps made every preparation for the new attacks.

The First Phase: The purpose of this Operation Ripper, as a whole, was to seize and secure, from west to east, a line running from the Han River line to Hongchon—Hachinbu-ri—Kangnung, then, in conjunction with the capture of Seoul by the I US Corps, to launch a decisive offensive up to the 38th Parallel.

The immediate intent of the operation, of course, was to the continuation of Operation Killer: the basic plan of "Ripper" contemplated the advance of the IX US and X US Corps to the 38th Parallel, with the I US Corps maintaining defensive positions south and east of Seoul, and the ROK Army protecting the right flank on the eastern front by a partial advance to the Parallel. In other words, the IX and X US Corps were to advance in the center on Chunchon, about 48 kilometers north of the existing positions in the Arizona line, while the eastern flank was guarded by the III and I ROK Corps, and the I US Corps remained in place west and south of Seoul. The drive by the IX and X US Corps would create a bulge east of Seoul from which the UN forces could envelop it.

Thus, the Eighth US Army and the attached Allied units had lined-up on the south bank of the Han River in the west, then eastward through Yangpyong—Hongchon in the east-central sector, while the ROK Army, except for those units attached to the U.S. Army units, were deploying along the Yangcheng—Kangnung line on the eastern front.

Operation Ripper opened on 7 March. Ripper was so successful from the beginning; the Eighth US Army claimed the enemy casualties in the first day attack a toll of 11,400 men, exclusive of the results of aerial attacks. On the I US Corps front in the west, following one of the most heavy artillery preparations of the war, the 25th US Division with the 89th Tank Battalion in support
jumped off and crossed the Han River near its confluence with the Pukhan River and soon established a bridghead on the north bank of the river, simultaneously, the 1st ROK Division delivered a diversionary thrust northwest of the Kimpo Airfield, and the 3rd US Division demonstrated along the Han River south of Seoul in an attempt to draw attention from the 25th US Division mounting the corps' main attack. At first the enemy vigorously contested the bridgehead, but after three days of fighting fled north in disorder.

In the central and eastern sectors, the enemy stubbornly delaying actions permitted only short gains in the first days. The enemy opposition to the attack there took form of a series of delaying actions, by exploiting advantage of the rugged terrain feature. The enemy held most stubbornly wherever the land was least favorable to the attackers, roads were lacking, slopes precipitous, and natural approaches few.

The IX US Corps, being assigned to attack toward the Usu-ri—Hongchon—Nochon-ni line, started from the present Arizona line the new operation with two divisions abreast to take Albany line first, employing the 1st US Cavalry Division on the left, the 1st US Marine Division on the right. The corps initial mission was to destroy all Red hordes south of a phase line called "Albany," running slightly south of Hongchon, and to prepare to continue northward, over lines "Baffalo," "Cairo," and "Idaho," the latter forming an arc north of the enemy's strong hold north of Chunchon, not far from the 38th Parallel. At the time both Hongchon and Chunchon were important enemy bases of operations.

The 1st US Cavalry Division drove northeast to the Hongchon area on 7 March, then turned and continued through the designated phase lines. During the early days of this operation, the cavalry division moved carefully north and northeast with the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments on line, but met only scattered enemy opposition en route. At first it seemed that there would be some opposition south of the Hongchon River, but little developed.

On the other hand, the 1st US Marine Division on the right flank of the IX US Corps, had continued the attack in early days of March to completely seize the objectives set forth in Operation Killer, thus reaching line Arizona by 4 March when it seized Hoengsong.

On 7 March, the 1st US Marine Division renewed the attack at 0800 hours with the 7th Marine Regiment on the left and the 1st Marine Regiment on the right. They jumped off to attack in line abreast, employing all three battalions when the broken terrain permitted, while the 5th Marine Regiment remained in division reserve.
The two attacking regiments met with light opposition on the first day. The second day's attack gave added proof that the enemy was attempting a limited defense while his main body was falling back before the Marines could destroy. One hardest resistance was encountered by the 7th Marines on 8 March when they attacked on a hill mass to the left of Oum-san (Hill 930) about halfway between Hoengsong and Hongchon. Nevertheless, the Marines cleared the enemy from the hill and the 7th US Marines seized all assigned objectives for the day. (See Sketch Map 31.)
The momentum of the Marine attack came to a halt on 9 March to wait for the 2nd US Division to catch up on the right.

The Marine advance was resumed on 9 March, and by 14 March the Marine division secured the Albany line, after meeting light enemy resistance all the way through.

In the X US Corps operation for “Ripper,” meanwhile, prior to the D-Day, the 2nd US Division was ordered to assume responsibility for the 3rd ROK Division sector effective 1200 hours, 5 March, while the positions vacated by the 2nd US Division was to be filled by the 5th ROK Division.

With the mission of capturing the Chigu-ri—Sindae-ri—Banguidong—Hungjong-ni line, the X US Corps began Operation Ripper, employing the 2nd US Division on the left, the 5th ROK Division on the center, and the 7th US Division on the right flank. At 0800 hours, 7 March, the X US Corps units jumped off from the Arizona line all at once to the north against widely varying resistance. Generally, they encountered some of the worst terrain proved to be more of an obstacle than the enemy. The mountainous country consisted of high peaks and narrow valleys, sharp slopes or steep heights seemed more stronger than enemy opposition. Consequently, each enemy position was, in effect, a strong point which had to be approached, enveloped, and carried by assault. Moreover, the early spring thaw was turning the battlefields into quagmires, hindering troop maneuver and transport of supplies, and rooms for field maneuver were so limited in particular.

Employing the 23rd and 9th Regiments abreast, the 2nd US Division started the attack on 7 March, and met the initial enemy resistance varied from light to heavy. The 38th US Regiment remained in corps reserve. The 23rd US Infantry attacked an important hill about one and a half kilometers west of Sanggun-ni. Stress was placed on lateral liaison with defense in depth. The narrow division front made possible the massing of artillery fires and this advantage was called upon time and again to pound delaying groups of enemy.

On 10 March the 38th US Regiment returned to the division and soon began sending patrols forward of the 23rd US Infantry. A slight break in resistance occurred on the 11th when the enemy fell back more rapidly than previously, heading for Yudong-ni. Both assaulting regiments pursued closely, taking advantage of every opportunity while the 23rd Regiment made plans to send an armor-infantry patrol into Yudong-ni itself.

The 23rd Regiment was relieved by the 38th Regiment in place on 13 March as the Albany line was secured. The drive to the Reno line was completed
against only moderate resistance by 14 March and plans for moving to the Idaho line were made.

In the eastern sector, the III and I ROK Corps, from left to right, had secured a line connecting from Soksa-ri—Hoenggye-ri—Kangnung by this time as scheduled. Thus, by the 13th March, enemy resistance had begun to diminish, and by the 16th, the enemy was attempting to disengage and withdraw across the entire front.

The Second Phase: Now, the second phase of Operation Ripper was ready to take place. The IX and X US Corps were eagerly awaiting for the situation developing in the west, particularly for attack on Seoul. (See Sketch Map 32.)

By 10 March, enemy opposition to the Han River bridghead had collapsed, and it became apparent that the Reds were falling back all along the west front. On the night of 14 March, patrols of the 1st ROK Division probed into the southern outskirts of Seoul and found the city deserted. After the 25th
US Division had crossed the Han River, the 1st ROK Division was assigned to attack into Seoul from the west and south, while the 3rd US Division would attack toward northeast of Seoul.

On 15 March, the 1st ROK Division units crossed the Han at 0530 hours and had entered the Capital Building by 1125 hours, thus hauling the flag of the Republic of Korea up the mast above the building. For the fourth time Seoul had changed hands; but this time was last. The enemy fled to the Imjin River line losing will to fight.

Once Seoul was restored, General Ridgway then enlarged “Ripper” to include an attack by the I US Corps westward to the Imjin River, while the 3rd and 25th US Divisions were ordered to continue the advance from their positions in and around Tegyewon, Chongpyong, and Ssangmun-dong. The 1st ROK Division had reached the Kupapal-li, Haejon-ri, and Tokun-ri areas.

The I US Corps began its attack on 22 March toward the Imjin River line with the 1st ROK Division in the lead.

Meanwhile, the 187th US Airborne RCT was alerted on 22 March to make

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Sketch Map 32
a drop at Munsan. By the 19th of March, when friendly patrols entered the Chunchon basin in the central sector, it became apparent the progress of Operation Ripper and the retreat of the enemy had been so rapid that an air drop planned to effect at the north of Chunchon would not be profitable. Consequently, the air drop project at Chunchon was canceled.

Thus, an air drop plan was shifted to the western sector. At the time it was reported that the Reds were establishing defense positions in depth near Munsan deploying the 19th NK Division in the vicinity of the crossing site. At 0900 hours, 23 March, the 187th US Airborne RCT (Commanded by Brigadier Frank S. Bowen, Jr.) and two ranger companies parachuted from “Flying Boxcars” onto drop zones at Munsan, the Imjin River crossing town, about 32 kilometers northwest of Seoul. This vertical assault operation named “Tomahawk” was designed to cut the enemy’s escape routes along the Seoul—Munsan highway. Task Force Crowden, composed of the 6th US Tank Battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Regiment (3rd US Division), the 58th US Field Artillery Battalion, one battery of the 999th US Field Artillery Battalion and one company of combat engineers, attacked north to effect a link-up with the airborne RCT.

As a result, the operation failed to achieve its primary purpose; the enemy main force in this sector had already moved back across the Imjin River, leaving some elements to delay the UN advance. At any rate, the jump was much more difficult one, initially, than that one at Sukchon and Sunchon in October 1950. The paratroopers jumped into an area occupied by strong enemy units, thus suffering 782 casualties in the first day of combat. Link-up with Task Force Crowden was made at approximately 1830 hours that same day at Munsan.

In the end, the enemy’s rapid retreat in this sector made the advance to the Imjin River line rapid and very nearly bloodless.

In the IX US Corps sector, by the 14th March, the 1st US Cavalry Division was in a position to cross the river, just west of Hongchon; that day the 5th Cavalry Regiment did effect one crossing, but
against considerable resistance. After the fall of Hongchon to the 1st US Marine Division on its right, the enemy did not remain long in the 1st US Cavalry Division's sector. On 18 March, the division began sending much patrols to the north after the retreatting enemy, and continued its advance.

The I US Corps, seizing the opportunity, quickly ordered the 187th Airborne RCT to move and attack eastward and north of Uijongbu in an effort to capture the commanding ground behind the enemy forcing the 3rd US Division, and then to squeeze the Reds there into a tight pocket for annihilation. By the time the objective was secured, the enemy had already withdrawn.

On 23 March, when the vertical attack was launching in the west, the 3rd US Division reached its objective near Uijongbu. (See Situation Map 12, Appendix VI.)

The advance to line "Buffalo" was accomplished with no enemy contact except very minor rear guard skirmishes. At this time the Reds were pulling back all along the front. Swiftly the division pushed forward, and on the 21st March, secured line "Cairo," and sent a task force into Chunchon, which was not defended by the Reds. Only a few scattered Reds were observed north of the city.

After organizing positions on the Cairo line, the 1st US Cavalry Division sent patrols aggressively after still fleeing enemy. But the Red forces took up temporary positions in the mountain to the north after withdrawal from the Chunchon basin.

The 24th US Division, on the other hand, had advanced to the northwest of Chongpyong by the 23rd March.

Meanwhile, the 1st US Marine Division renewed the attack under the strong support of the 1st US Marine Air Wing (commanded by Brigadier General Partridge), 40 sorties a day in average.

Following the capture of Hongchon on the afternoon of 15 March, the Marine units ran into considerable enemy opposition during the next two days. The 7th US Marine Regiment was pinned down by intense CCF artillery and mortar fire when attacking Hill 356 southeast of Hongchon, but the Marines had barely won a foothold on the hill in the end.

The 1st US Marine Regiment also met opposition on the high ground east and north of Hongchon. Another hard action awaited the 7th US Marines on the 16th, when they moved up to the Baker line north of Hongchon. The CCF resisted so hard on Hill 399 that the Marines had to attack bunker after bunker with grenades.

On the following morning, General MacArthur, accompanied by Generals
Ridgway and O.P. Smith, drove in a jeep from Wonju over the mountain pass to Hongchon when Marine engineers were still clearing mines.

On 17 March, the IX US Corps ordered the 1st Marine Division to continue the attack from Line Baker to the Buffao line. Now, the 5th US Marines were to pass through and relieve the 7th Marines while the 1st US Marines continued to advance on the right flank of the division zone of action. Again, the enemy had withdrawn, and the attackers seized the Buffalo line on 20 March after encountering a few scattered mortar rounds.

As the Eighth US Army jumped off on 20 March from Line Buffalo toward Line Cairo, the 1st ROK Marine Regiment was attached again to the 1st US Marine Division. When the attack was resumed, the ROK Marines attacked between the 1st US Marines on the right and the 7th US Marines on the left.

The zone of the ROK Marines was a roadless wilderness, making it necessary to air drop ammunition and supplies for the attack on Hill 975 immediate south of Line Cairo. This attack was the hardest fight of the Marine division advance to "Cairo." On 24 March, after continuing their way forward in three days of heavy and bitter battle, the ROK Marines took their objective, Hill 975.

The 1st and 5th US Marines were already on Line Cairo, having met comparatively light resistance for the NK Reds who had relieved the 66th and 39th CCF Armies were already withdrawn.

Although the objective of Ripper had been reached, the Eighth US Army planned to continue the UN offensive in an effort to keep the enemy off balance.

The 1st US Marine Division was ordered by the IX US Corps to attack on 26 March to a new Line Cairo,
which was simply a northeast extension of the old Cairo line to the boundary between the IX and US Corps. The 1st US Marine Regiment and the ROK Marines moved up to the new line on schedule without opposition.

On 29 March, the Eighth Army issued a plan for Operation Rugged, which was to be a continuation of the offensive, with Line Kansas as the new objective. In this new offensive the 1st US Marine Division was to continue forward with three regiments including the 1st ROK Marine Regiment. Its mission called for a relief of the 1st US Cavalry Division (with the 7th Marines attached) north of Chunchon. This new order gave the Marine division to cover near 48 kilometers of a wide front.

In the US Corps sector, on 14 March, after taking the Albany line, the 2nd US Division units moved out and seized the next objective, the Reno line. The next was to reach the Idaho line which would involved travelling a rugged, well defended pass on the Yudong-ni—Pungam-ni road.

In fact, the enemy in the path of the US Corps advance fought vigorously from bunkers set up on the wild and rugged mountains and hills which were little affected by air and artillery attacks. In many instances the Reds had to be dislodged by grenades and bayonets.

Supported by the 72nd Tank Battalion, the attack of the 38th US Regiment to the Idaho line jumped off at 0730 hours, 15 March with the 3rd Battalion in the lead, followed by the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion faced a storm of fire from the well-trenched enemy who seemed determined to hold a pass in the vicinity of Hill 570, about halfway between Yudong-ni and Pungam-ni. Hill 570 was laced with concealed bunkers for which the enemy had unrestricted obstacles and fields of fire. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion laid down volley after volley of all types of shells onto the hills.

On the next morning, at 0730, the attack was resumed with the 2nd Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right and by mid-morning the pass was secured.

Then, the 38th US Infantry continued to roll forward and captured Pungam-ni, after receiving a few scattered long-range rounds, thus securing the Idaho line on 16 March.

On 17 March, the 38th Regiment recovered 16 Americans, who had been CCF prisoners. Now, the 9th US Regiment was to spearhead the division attack toward the Texas line and jumped off on 20 March, and it had secured the objective line by the evening. Intelligence reports indicated the continuing withdrawal of the Red Chinese forces and the NK Reds to the defense line north of the 38th Parallel.

The remainder of the month saw the 2nd US Division increased patrol ac-
tivity to the maximum extent, moving forward to occupy the Maine line, and finally the Cairo line paralleling a lateral road which intersected the Hongchon—Yanggu road at its midpoint.

The 38th US Regiment, on the Cairo line, continued to send patrols out while other regiments trained, patrolled and repaired roads. Operation Ripper came to a close on 28 March with the 2nd US Division 48 kilometers north of the initial jump-off line.

In the meantime, Operation Ripper was pressed forward on all fronts, to the east, four regiments of the 3rd and 8th ROK Divisions under the I ROK Corps had been busily engaged in wiping the Red guerrillas out in the rear area. And by 17—18 March the two ROK divisions had polished off remnants of the 10th NK Division in the rugged Chungbong Mountains 40 kilometers behind the UN lines.

Throughout mid-March, groups from this enemy division would enter friendly positions from the rear, fight their way through, and flee to the north. Now, the I ROK Corps in the eastmost sector was free to strike north. The ROK units were thereafter able to advance to Line Idaho by 17 March. By the closing days of March, the III and I ROK Corps had pushed patrols more than 32 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. (See Sketch Map 33.)
Thus, during Operation Ripper, apparently the enemy was using the NK Reds as expendable delaying elements while massing in the rear for an offensive that could be expected at any time when the enemy completed his build-up in manpower and supplies.

The ROK and Eighth Army forces had made average gains of about 46 kilometers during the last three weeks of March while driving to the 38th Parallel.

By the end of March, both the IX and X US Corps had moved north about 30 kilometers well over the 38th Parallel. The UN land forces, as a whole, had advanced about 50 kilometers, had pushed the enemy back across the 38th Parallel, and were in position to counter the enemy thrust, if came.

In conclusion, in the three successive counteroffensive operations, the first launched on 25 January (Thunderbolt), the second on 21 February (Killer) and the third on 7 March (Ripper), 1951, the UN ground forces, after against stubborn resistance, pushed the Communist aggressors back, forcing them out of Seoul and back across the 38th Parallel.

Standing on the Crossroads

Although the war had again shifted in favor of the UN forces, the successes through the end of February 1951 could not be considered an indication of eventual victory.

In General MacArthur's viewpoint, a war offers its participants only the alternatives of victory or defeat, the current situation was intolerable. He suggested strong and decisive counteraction to the Red Chinese aggression. He maintained that the rejection of his proposals would lead to disaster, their acceptance to victory.

President Truman, on the other hand, recognized other alternatives. Consequently, by the close of February, he had not yet granted any of General MacArthur's calls for increased action against Communist China.

The original purpose of the U.N. military operations in Korea—to repel the aggression and to secure peace and security in the area—of course remained unchanged. So did the longer range and long standing objective of the United Nations, and particularly of the United States since "Cairo pledge" in November 1943, "to bring about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea." The achievement of these goals by military means, however, had become less likely after the impact of the Chinese Communists' aggression and the American decision in December 1950 not to commit additional forces to Korea.
In the viewpoint of the U.S. political strategy, the alternatives consequently narrowed to some sort of accommodation that would provide a halt or at least a lull in the fighting during which diplomatic negotiation might salvage the prestige of the United States and the United Nations and at the same time bring some result not too far short of the basic objectives.

Through March 1951, the United States, as the Unified Command of the United Nations, continued to fight without having elected any new political or military courses of action.

On 23 February 1951, the U.S. Secretary of Staff Dean Acheson took the position that the 7 October 1950 resolution of the U.N. General Assembly was permissive but not mandatory to unify Korea by military means.

In February and March as the UN forces again drove northward and it appeared that the UN ground forces, after pushing forward slowly, would soon be able to cross over the 38th Parallel, the eyes of some U.N. member nations began thinking the Parallel as an ominous significance.

General MacArthur, in the meantime, told newsmen that for the time being any talk of crossing the 38th Parallel except by patrol actions was surely academic.

General MacArthur still possessed the authority to cross the Parallel granted him on 27 September 1950 by the United States and tacitly confirmed on 7 October by the U.N. General Assembly. But the U.S. Department of State was keenly aware of the concern felt by some of the members of the United Nations over the ability of re-entering northern Korea. Secretary Dean Acheson judged that virtually all members of the United Nations, including most of those actively participating in Korea, strongly opposed any general advance across the 38th Parallel.

This opposition was based on the belief that once the enemy had been driven out of the south the primary objective of repelling the aggression had been accomplished; that an advance in North Korea would make an early negotiated-settlement of the Korean fighting impossible; and that a crossing would greatly increase the risk of Soviet involvement and a general war. Secretary Acheson further claimed that a major advance across the Parallel would require full consultation with major Allies and their agreement, which under current circumstances would be extremely difficult to obtain.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, took hardly exception to the Department of State views. They pointed out that so long as the political objectives of the U.N. remained unchanged, its military forces should not be forbidden, for political reasons, to advance north of the 38th Parallel.
They believed, along with Generals MacArthur and Ridgway, that any directive halting the UN forces at the 38th Parallel would permit the enemy to build-up in the north such a concentration of military forces that the UN forces would be jeopardized.

In the end Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall agreed with the JCS that there was a risk in disclosing to the enemy a U.S. military decision, and in any event, too early from a military point of view to reach a final determination on crossing the 38th Parallel.

Encouraged by the results of the Operation Ripper, which proved that the military initiative in Korea no longer lay with the enemy's hands, a political course of action began to emerge in mid-March. The U.S. policy planners decided that efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement should be renewed.

On the other hand, in spite of the intransigence thus far shown by the Communists toward every U.N. suggestion of settling the Korean problem by talking instead of fighting, the British Government remained hopeful that the Communists would eventually agree to negotiate.

Lacking specific instructions to the contrary, General MacArthur meanwhile approved plans developed by General Ridgway for advancing above the 38th Parallel, on 22 March. General Ridgway had prepared plans to advance, if General MacArthur approved, to a line that, except for a short stretch in the west, lay just above the Parallel, generally between the confluence of the Han and Yesong Rivers on the west coast and Yangyang on the east coast. General Ridgway explained that operations to reach this line would have as their objective not the seizure of terrain but the maximum destruction of enemy troops and materiel and to keep own casualties to a minimum. General MacArthur approved the plan without hesitation, and without referring it to Washington.

The first phase of this advance, "Operation Courageous," was on 22 March. The advance made steadily forward all along the front and seized positions generally along the 38th Parallel by the 30th. Except for a small area in the west, the whole territory below the Parallel thus was cleared of organized enemy forces. The enemy suffered enormous casualties.

General Ridgway, on 29 March, completed the details of instructions for the next forward step, which named "Operation Rugged," to commence on 5 April. The new objective, Line Kansas, differed slightly from the concept of Operation Courageous by starting at the junction of the Han and Imjin Rivers, not the Han and Yesong, then running northeastward and eastward to Yangyang.
General MacArthur flew in Kangnung on the east coast on 3 April to discuss this next step advance with General Ridgway and to look at the ground situation. General MacArthur wanted General Ridgway to make a very strong fight for Line Kansas, with any advance beyond it carefully limited and controlled.

On 31 March, in his report to the Pentagon, General MacArthur indicated that an enemy offensive of great strength might be expected at any time after 1 April. He estimated that the CCF had 274,000 troops in Korea and 478,000 regular troops in Manchuria. The NK Communist forces were believed to have approximately 198,000 men, including guerrillas, available for an attack.
CHAPTER XVII  CROSsing THE 38TH PARALLEL AGAIN
(1 April—30 June 1951)

By the last days of March 1950, as Operation Ripper came to a close, the UN forces under General Ridgway had fought their way through rain and mud generally to the 38th Parallel. In the east the I and III ROK Corps had pushed patrols far north of the Parallel, and by 31 March ROK troops were in control of the roads leading west and south from Yangyang on the east coast. In the west, an American armored column probed over the line north of Uijongbu above Seoul. The enemy had already pulled back and broken contact in many areas across the front. The enemy retreat, however, allowed a near-bloodless advance to the Imjin River. Supported by United Nations air and the increased bombardment of both coasts by the United Nations navy—notably the US Navy’s protracted siege of Wonsan—Operation Ripper had placed the UN ground forces on a phase line, designated Idaho, just south of the 38th Parallel. For the second time the Korean War was back where it had started. For the second time, the UN forces prepared to cross the 38th Parallel, not to “unify Korea” or in pursuit of “complete victory,” but only, following the President Truman’s new policy of fighting to force the Communist Chinese to negotiate, to inflict maximum damage on the enemy as well as to prevent him from organizing a new offensive unmolested.

Section 1. Occupation of Line Kansas

Having brought the UN forces close to the 38th Parallel, General Ridgway was now faced once more with the decision as to whether that mystic line—which was neither defensible nor strategically important—should be crossed again. Sending UN troops in force across the 38th Parallel was not an undertaking to be entered into lightly.

General Ridgway had to consider seriously both the advantageous and disadvantageous points in making his decision to cross the 38th Parallel. If
his forces were to cross it, the northward advance would lengthen their communication lines while correspondingly shortening the enemy's and eventually a point would be reached where UN air superiority would be nullified; and in the United States and among the other participating United Nations, it was all too easy to remember the debacle of late 1950 after the first UN forces' crossing of the Parallel. On the other hand, however, the enemy armies could not be allowed to regroup and reorganize for a counterattack against UN forces which UN intelligence sources considered inevitable. To complicate matters, the forthcoming rainy season would limit the mobility of armored and mechanized UN forces. The decision whether to cross the Parallel or stand pat was a vital and difficult one. The choice was made by General Ridgway himself as the responsible field commander. With General MacArthur's approval, he elected to continue the advance with the hope of achieving maximum destruction. He felt, under the circumstances, it was better to keep enemy off balance than sit and wait for him to move.

Thus on 5 April General Ridgway followed Operation Ripper with Operation Rugged, a general advance toward a new objective--Line Kansas, which would run generally parallel and to the north of the 38th Parallel, except on the left, where it would follow the twist and turns of the Imjin River to the sea.

This new line was to include the sixteen-kilometer water barrier of the Hwachon Reservoir, formerly a source of water and power for the city of Seoul and a serious threat, because of the possibility of blowing the dam and overflowing the banks of the Pukhan River, to friendly positions downstream.

The Operation Rugged was put into effect on 5 April and general advance northward was resumed. The enemy resistance was uneven as the UN forces advanced toward Line Kansas. Where the terrain favored the enemy, he dug in and fought. Where UN troops could move rapidly, the enemy faded quickly away. The ground on the right was especially difficult, with few roads and many rocky cliffs. But UN troops advanced steadily in every sector.

By 9 April, all units of the I and IX US Corps and the I ROK Corps on the east coast had battled their way against fluctuating enemy resistance to positions on Line Kansas. In the central and central-east sector the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps, however, struggling to overcome the difficulties of terrain and the lack of supply routes, were still moving toward the objective. On the same day, 9 April, the enemy opened several sluice gates of the dam that controlled the water passing from the Hwachon Reservoir into the lower Pukhan River. The Pukhan, originating in the mountainous country to
the north, flowed south to the reservoir and thence southwest to its confluence with the Han River east of Seoul. Within an hour the water level had risen several feet; one engineer bridge was broken, and the IX Corps Engineers were forced to swing a second one back to the banks. To prevent the enemy from opening all eighteen sluice gates and flooding the Pukhan, a task force from the 7th US Cavalry Regiment and the 4th US Ranger Company was hastily organized and sent to seize the dam, close the gates, and immobilize the gate-opening machinery. But poor visibility, rugged terrain, tenacious enemy resistance and a lack of landing craft spelled failure for this attempt. However, the enemy's opening of the Hwachon gates, while dramatic, had less effect on UN operations than originally feared and the task force was recalled after two days. But it was not until 16 April that the dam fell to the UN troops.

While the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps drew up to the Kansas line, the I US Corps and left-flank units of the IX US Corps in the west continued the advance by attacking toward Chorwon, the southwest corner of the Iron Triangle, with the intention of seizing a phase line designated as "Utah" which was in effect an outward bulge of Line Kansas. As Utah's northernmost point lay just south of Chorwon, this move would place the UN forces in position to strike at the Triangle, which was the center of enemy strength, marked out by Pyonggang in the north at the apex, Kumhwa in the southeast and Chorwon in the southwest.

As the UN forces moved forward, the enemy fought more stubbornly. He set fire to brush and forests all along his front to screen his movements and to interfere with air support of the UN ground troops. But after the Hwachon Dam was seized, and the I ROK Corps had taken the town of Tae-po-ri on the east coast, enemy resistance seemed to melt and the UN forces reached Line Utah virtually without opposition.

By 17 April the front-line units of UN forces could not make contact with the enemy. And by 19 April, all the I and IX US Corps units were in position along Line Utah and preparing to continue the advance to Line Wyoming, an eastward extension of the Utah bulge. After consolidating their gains for two days the troops of the two corps started northward again. If this attack proved to be successful, UN forces would be on the high ground overlooking Chorwon at the base of the Iron Triangle. While this Operation Rugged was being carried out there took place a dramatic change in UN command. On 11 April, after a series of public utterances revealed sharp differences over national policy and military strategy, the United States President Truman relieved General MacArthur of all his commands and
replaced him with General Ridgway. Lieutenant General James A. Van fleet was dispatched posthaste from Washington to take command of the Eighth US Army and its attached forces. He arrived and assumed command on 14 April.

Section 2. Release of General MacArthur

The collision course on which General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry Truman had been running since August of 1950 had produced the inevitable crash. On 11 April, President Truman relieved General MacArthur of all his commands and replaced him with General Ridgway. It was a shocking news to the world, particularly to the UN troops fighting in Korea. Because the dismissal of General MacArthur was extremely important in that it clearly and definitely established the policies which the United States government was embarked upon in Korea, it deems necessary to mention the background of it briefly.

The brilliant military commander had, for a number of years, been something more than an army officer. Because of his high rank, he found himself often entering political fields, especially in his position as supreme commander over occupation forces in Japan, where he proclaimed and expounded on great civil issues affecting Japan’s “democratization.” General MacArthur was sought after by his many admirers to give his views on various aspects of the Korean War. So it was no surprise when, in response to a Veterans of Foreign War request, he entered into the discussion of Taiwan in August 1950.

Later, after the Chinese Communist invasion, General MacArthur repeatedly, in his communiques to Washington, called for new political decision to meet the crisis. His views continued to be solicited by newspapermen and American press media, stirring such controversy that, on 6 December 1950, he was requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to exercise “extreme caution in public statements” and to refrain “from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States.”

In March 1951, after the Eighth Army had demonstrated the weaknesses of the Chinese Communist armies, the Truman Administration felt the time was appropriate to seek a new discussion for a settlement in Korea. General MacArthur was informed of State Department planning, which involved
consultations with U.N. members who had contributed forces to the Korean War. Under the American plan, the President was to issue a declaration that, since the aggressors had been driven back into North Korea and the original aggression repelled, the United Nations was prepared to enter into arrangements to conclude the fighting and obtain a prompt settlement by negotiations.

On 24 March, despite of the government policy, General MacArthur issued a statement in Tokyo in which he pointed out the general weakness that had been uncovered by CCF losses in recent battle. He stated that Red China lacked the industrial capacity to conduct modern war; that her numerical superiority was overcome by existing methods of mass destruction; and that it had been shown that Red China could not by force of arms conquer Korea. "The enemy, therefore," the general said, "must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse." General MacArthur thereupon offered to meet with the enemy commander in the field to realize the political objectives of the U.N. in Korea.

When the statement of General MacArthur reached Washington, there was consternation. His statement clearly was at cross purposes with the American diplomatic efforts in the U.N. to end the fighting; his threat seemed to imply a new United States plan of action against Red China. Inquiries from America's allies soon began arriving at the State Department. Deeply shocked, President Truman ordered a message sent to General MacArthur that same day, 24 March, referring him to the JCS message of 6 December about making public statements on military foreign policy.

This message, however, reached General MacArthur after he had responded to a letter to Joseph W. Martin, Republican leader in Congress. In this letter, dated 20 March, General MacArthur called for meeting "force with maximum counterforce as we have never failed to do in the past." He also reiterated his views concerning use of Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan. Congressman Mr. Martin, well aware of the divergence of opinion that had developed between Washington and Tokyo, released the General MacArthur's letter to the press on 6 April.

The General MacArthur's letter finally caused President Truman to relieve General MacArthur of his command. President Truman has written of his reaction to the letter:

"The time had come to draw the line. General MacArthur's letter showed
that the general was not only in disagreement with the policy of the Government but was challenging this policy in open insubordination to his commander in Chief.” Five days later President Truman relieved the general of all his commands.

Thus, a great military career of General MacArthur was brought to its close. However, a great public furor, encouraged by Republic opponents of the administration, followed the general’s firing. In a dramatic return to the United States and appearance before a joint meeting of Congress on 19 April 1951, General MacArthur recalled the four recommendations he had made in December, 1950, calling for drastic action against China. He said:

“For entertaining these views all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Here MacArthur referred to the JCS study of January, 1951, on possible courses of action in event of all-out war with China.)

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa; if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without; and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory. We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign, with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution...”

Several weeks after General MacArthur’s address to Congress, there began the strange spectacle of a congressional inquiry into General MacArthur’s recall and the conduct of the war while it still raged. The senators first heard General MacArthur defend and explain his position, and then heard and crossexamined members of the administration, including Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg, Admiral Sherman, and former Secretary of Defense Johnson.
The Administration’s position was defended unanimously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Secretary Marshall summed up the government’s stand in his opening remark before the Senate committee:

Our position in Korea (he said), continues to be the defeat of the aggression and the restoration of peace. We have persistently sought to confine the conflict to Korea and to prevent its spreading into a third World War. In this effort, we stand allied with the great majority of our fellow members of the United Nations. Our efforts have succeeded in thwarting the aggressors in Korea, and in stemming the tide of aggression in Southwest Asia and elsewhere throughout the world. Our efforts in Korea have given us some sorely needed time and impetus to accelerate the building of our defenses and those of our allies against the threatened onslaught of Soviet imperialism.

General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of China, both from the sea and from the air. He would have us accept the risk of involvement not only in an extension of the war with Red China, but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effort of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe.

This fundamental divergence...arises from the inherent difference between the position of the field commander, whose mission is limited to a particular area... and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States....

While the General MacArthur furor held the world’s attention, the Red Chinese armies in Korea began their so called spring offensive in April 1951.

Section 3. The First CCF Spring Offensive (22–24 April 1951)

General Van Fleet who took over the command of the Eighth US Army and the ROK Army from General Ridgway on 14 April, needed no briefing on the war situation. Like General Ridgway, he had been chosen as next-in-line for the Eighth Army command and had been keeping abreast of the war
developments. From the very moment of assuming the command of the Eighth Army General Van Fleet expected the Communist Chinese to soon launch a big offensive. He felt that the only elements that remained in doubt were the time and the place of the attack. To meet the expected enemy attack General Van Fleet decided to continue the doctrines developed by his predecessor--those of "maximum punishment, maximum delay..." The UN forces would, if compelled, buy time with space, and conduct a co-ordinated withdrawal to defensive positions well south of the 38th Parallel, maintain contact with the enemy at all times, and inflict maximum losses on him by utilizing superior UN fire power from the ground and the air. When the offense had run its course the Eighth Army would counterattack, cut the enemy's supply lines, and endeavor to destroy all hostile troops in the forward areas.

On 21 April General Van Fleet, after his UN forces had reached Line Kansas, ordered the I and IX US Corps on the west to advance to Line Wyoming and the X US Corps and the ROK Army troops on the right to Line Alabama. The UN troops again started northward on schedule. It was to be the first general advance under the command of General Van Fleet.

But during the daylight hours of 22 April enemy activity across the whole front sharply increased, and the UN forces' advance halted abruptly. Their lines alive with movement, the Chinese and NK Communist troops abandoned cover and concealment and moved boldly into the open. The expected enemy spring offensive was at hand.

On 22, in the early evening hours, three Chinese Communist armies launched their co-ordinated attacks against the UN forces following four hours of artillery bombardment. The initial attack, a secondary one, was delivered through the Kwandok Mountains in the Yonchon—Hwachon area of central Korea. By daybreak, 22 April, the enemy was in motion across the whole UN front.

Delivering his main effort against the I and IX US Corps, the enemy attempted a double envelopment against the west sector to isolate Seoul, coupled with the secondary thrust in the Yonchon—Hwachon area and a push against the eastern part of the line near Inje. The NK Communist Radio Pyonyang announced that the ultimate objective—destruction of the UN command—would be readily accomplished. Of an estimated total of 700,000 available troops in Korea, the enemy commanders employed about half in the offensive, but they used little artillery, few tanks, and no close air support. The UN command had expected extensive use of enemy tanks this time, especially in the west where armor could be used advantageously, for
air observers had reported the presence of the equivalent of one armored division and possibly two armored regiments in enemy rear areas. Their tactics -- assaults by a "human sea" of massed infantry -- were the same as before, and again bugle calls and flares co-ordinated night attacks in which small units infiltrated the UN lines.

The IX US Corps Sector in the Center

By dawn of 23 April the enemy broke contact and sought cover and concealment against UN artillery fire. The UN lines held firm against the first assaults everywhere except in the central sector, where the 6th ROK Division occupied the center with the 24th US Division on the left and the 1st US Marine Division on the right. Here the enemy struck the ROK division hard in the Namdae River valley south of Kumhwa and drove it back. As the division withdrew in confusion south of the Utah line, the enemy attempted to exploit his advantage by moving into the gap between the 24th US Division and 1st US Marine Division, which refused their exposed flanks and held on.

In the face of this danger, General Van Fleet immediately ordered the I and IX US Corps to pull back step by step to the Kansas line while the infantry, supported by artillery and aircraft, slowed the enemy. Thus was lost the ground gained in the recent UN offensives. Task forces built around the 5th US Cavalry Regiment and the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade darted into the gap left by the retreating 6th ROK Division, struck the advancing Red Chinese south of the 38th Parallel, and kept the enemy from exploiting his sudden advantage.

By 2200 hours of the first day, there were CCF almost one kilometer behind the IX US Corps positions and firing on artillery units that had been moved forward that very afternoon. But well-manned perimeter defenses charged the enemy a heavy price. As an instance, the fighting around the position of the 92nd US Armored Field Artillery Battalion was especially bitter, with CCF troops swarming all over the position in the hours before dawn. But Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. Lavoie, commanding the artillery battalion, had seen to his defenses and they could not be panicked. Before the enemy was beaten off, the Chinese had lost 179 killed, as against fifteen lost by the battalion. The IX US Corps alone, in three days of fighting, fired 15,000 artillery rounds.

On the right of the IX US Corps the 1st US Marine Division retired southward from the Hwachon area to take up new positions before Chuncheon. When the enemy thrust cut the Seoul—Chuncheon—Kansong highway near Kapyong on 26 April, General Van Fleet immediately pulled the troops of
the IX US Corps back to the Hongchon River.

The I US Corps Sector in the West

Meanwhile, although the enemy did not throw his full weight against Seoul until after the Seoul—Kansong road was cut, the troops of the I US Corps were heavily engaged in the west. The CCF troops had already waded the shallow Imjin River about midnight of 22 April and established small bridgeheads on the south bank between Korangpo-ri and Majon-ni. Other enemy troops cut south along the Chorwon—Seoul highway, but the I Corps withdrew in good order, inflicting severe casualties, as far as the Kansas line, where it meant to hold. The withdrawal was completed on 23 April. However, on this day, the enemy drove the 1st ROK Division south of the Kansas line in a sudden surge, leaving exposed the left flank of the 29th British Brigade. The 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment was cut off and overrun by the enemy in spite of repeated I Corps efforts to relieve it. Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Carnes, commanding the 1st Battalion, and his men courageously and grimly held on to their position for several days, until their ammunition was exhausted. Only a few of the battalion's soldiers made their way back to UN lines.

The 25th US Division men are defending on a hill south of Chorwon against an enemy attack, 23 April 1951.
Once the enemy had cut the Seoul—Kansong highway on 26 April, the Chinese Reds gathered their strength for a full-scale assault against Seoul, the capital city, which they had boasted would soon be back in their hands. Uijongbu, just north of the city, had to be abandoned when the Reds threatened to envelop it. General Van Fleet undertook then to establish a new defense line to hang on to Seoul and halt the enemy north of the Han River. The 3rd US Division held fast just six and half kilometers from the city limits.

The most dangerous CCF thrust toward Seoul, however, came on 29 April when 6,000 CCF troops attempted to cross the Han River in small boats, west of Seoul, where they could move down the Kimpo peninsula and outflank the Seoul’s defenses. It was here that UN command of the air worked most tellingly. The US Air Force pilots swooped down upon the attackers while they were still waterborne and decimated them. The shattered remnants that succeeded in reaching the south bank were no match at all for the 5th ROK Marine Battalion, then defending the Kimpo peninsula. Another effort to outflank the Seoul city by slugging a way across the Han, at the junction of the Han and the Pukhan Rivers was checked by the 24th and 25th US Divisions.

**The East-Central Front**

In the meantime on the east-central front NK Communist troops attacked against the ROK troops in the Yanggu—Inje area, made several gains, and on 24 April captured Inje but by 29 April their drive had been halted.

Thus, by 29 April the highly heralded CCF offensive had been stopped cold. Once again the poorly supported Communist Chinese Army had demonstrated its inability to sustain an offensive for more than a few days.

General Van Fleet, however, not yet aware of his enemy’s immobility, decided to hold at a new line, rather than to gather his reserves and strike. This new defense line was designated No Name Line, beginning at a point north of Seoul, gently rising northeast to Sabangu in the center, north of Hongchon, then slanting sharply northeast to Taepo-ri, still above the 38th Parallel. Because the major weight of the enemy’s attack had struck in the west, General Van Fleet now reshuffled his units to put more American divisions there. Assigned to the I US Corps, on the left, were the 1st ROK Division, and the 1st US Cavalry and 25th US Divisions, with the 3rd US Division in reserve. Holding the Kimpo peninsula was the 29th British Brigade. The IX US Corps, on the I US Corps right, had the 28th Commonwealth Brigade (this was the redesignated 27th Commonwealth Brigade), the
24th US Division, the 6th and 2nd ROK Divisions, and the 7th US Division in line, with the 187th US Airborne RCT in reserve. In the center the X US Corps, consisting of the 1st US Marine and 2nd US Infantry Divisions and the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions, held the line, and the III and I ROK Corps defended the eastern sector. Now all UN front-line troops were on a strong, continuous defense line. The intelligence officers, reasoning on the basis of information gained by air reconnaissance, concluded that the Chinese Reds would start another offensive soon.

**Offensive and Defensive**

As it became clear that the enemy had halted to regroup and bring new forces forward, General Van Fleet decided to take a limited initiative designed to recover the old Line Kansas about thirteen to sixteen kilometers above the 38th Parallel, and to allow no time for the enemy to regroup and rearm. During the first week of May regimental patrol bases were established almost thirteen kilometers in front of No Name Line, and armored patrols ranged sixteen to twenty kilometers into enemy territory to harass the enemy troops that were withdrawing from No Name Line. UN forces cleared the Kimpo peninsula. The 1st ROK Division fought its way up the Munsan-ni road. The 1st US Cavalry Division took Uijongbu back again on 6 May, and a 25th US Division task force drove northeastward up the Seoul—Sinpal-li highway. In the west-central sector an armored patrol regained control of the Seoul—Kapyong road for the UN, and on 7 May the troops of the 1st US Marine Division dug NK Communist troops out of camouflaged bunkers on the Wonju road and captured Chunchon. A task force consisting of the French Infantry Battalion, the 1st US Ranger Company, one company of the 9th US Regiment, and the 72nd US Tank Battalion probed northeast of Chaun-ni. On the extreme right the I and III ROK Corps also advanced northward.

However, in the second week of May the enemy resistance, heretofore sporadic, began to stiffen everywhere. UN patrols began falling back on No Name Line. All the signs pointed to renewal of the CCP offensive. General Van Fleet decided then to postpone the attack and to strengthen his defenses to meet this fresh assault.

The signs were unmistakable. After 10 May enemy resistance to local attacks stiffened. Airbase construction was still increasing. UN intelligence placed enemy air strength at 1,000 planes, with fifty new airbases being

pushed to completion. Supply columns moving southward were reported daily, and air patrols noted heavy troop movements north of the IX US Corps.

To cripple enemy air strength before the new offensive, the Fifth US Air Force and the 1st US Marine Aircraft Wing stepped up their attacks. A good example of their efforts came on 9 May when a total of 312 planes -- F-80 Shooting Stars, F-84 Thunderjets, F-86 Sabres, F9F Panthers, F4U Corsairs, and F-51 Mustangs -- struck at Sinuiju airbase on the south bank of the Yalu and reported demolishing fifteen enemy jets and over 100 buildings.

During the first ten days of May, when it looked as if the enemy would concentrate his attack west of the Pukhan River against Seoul, General Van Fleet had strengthened the western portion of his line. But between 10 and 15 May, according to intelligence reports, the Communist Chinese had moved five armies eastward and deployed them in front of the Chunchon-Inje area held by the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps. Because time was short, General Van Fleet decided not to shift his forces from the west, but he alerted the 3rd US Division, in I US Corps reserve, to move out on his order. The
rough and mountainous Chunchon—Inje area generally favored the defender, but it would provide the attacker with some security from air and armor.

The daylight hours of 15 May saw all the usual signs of impending enemy attack, including an increased number of enemy agents trying to slip through the lines. Air patrols reported more bridge construction, and enemy probing attacks grew more numerous. The Eighth Army command, however, made ready to stand firm.

By 14 May No Name Line had been considerably strengthened. The UN forces had laid mines, registered artillery, established bands of interlocking machine gun fire, and strung over 800 kilometers of barbed wire. Interspersed among the mine fields and barbed-wire networks were 55-gallon drums of gasoline and napalm, ready to be detonated electrically. General Van Fleet resolved not to yield ground, but to hold his line with all the weapons and power at his disposal. As he phrased it, "We must expend steel and fire, not men... I want so many artillery holes that a man can step from one to the other." General Van Fleet had called for an unprecedented volume of artillery, which, in the proportion of five times the normal output, would become famous as "the Van Fleet Load."

Section 4. The Second CCF Spring Offensive (15–18 May 1951)

At last came the expected CCF second offensive for which the UN forces made ready to stand firm. After darkness fell on the night of 15–16 May, an estimated twenty-one Communist Chinese divisions of the 12th, 15th, 60th, 20th, and 27th CCF Armies under the III and IX CCF Army Groups flanked by three Communist NK divisions in the west and six in the east, struck down the center of the peninsula against the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps in the Naepyeong-ni—No-dong area. The X US Corps held about a sixty-kilometer sector of No Name Line from the high ground west of Hongchon northeastward to Inje. The 1st US Marine Division held the left part of the corps line on the jagged terrain overlooking Chunchon plain. To the right was the 2nd US Division, with the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions on its right, and the III ROK Corps to their right. CCF units crossed the Pukhan River west of Chunchon, and on 16 May other CCF units struck hard against the 5th and
7th ROK Divisions. The patrol base regiments fell back to No Name Line, and by 1930 hours of 16 May the two ROK divisions were heavily engaged along a thirty-three kilometers front in the vicinity of Hangye-ri, a village sixteen kilometers northeast of Inje. The two divisions held their ground for a time, then fell back, disorganized and broken. (See Situation Map 13, Appendix VI.)

On the left shoulder of the enemy salient, the 2nd US Division, including the French and Netherlands Battalions, withstood resolute enemy attacks until 18 May, and then, together with the 1st US Marine Division, moved right to fill the gap left by the two ROK divisions. The IX US Corps then extended its front to the right to cover the area left by the 2nd US Division and the 1st US Marine Division. General Van Fleet then sent the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division from Seoul to bolster the west face of the salient, while rushing its 7th and 65th Regiments to blocking positions at the southernmost part of the penetration. The swarming columns of Chinese and NK Communist troops soon almost surrounded the 2nd US Division, pushing against its front, right, and rear. The CCF even blocked the 2nd's main supply route, but a co-ordinated attack by the 9th US Regiment driving northward, and the 23rd and 38th US Regiments attacking southward along with their French and Netherlands Battalions, regained the control of the route. The 2nd US Division stood fast and punished the enemy heavily. One of the mightiest artillery bombardments in the war took place, with the 38th US Field Artillery Battalion firing more than twelve thousand 105-mm. rounds in twenty-four hours on 18 May when the CCF threw a division against the 38th US Regiment's positions. The elements of the 38th Regiment of the 2nd US Division, successfully defended Hill 800 (Bunker Hill), which the CCF repeatedly attempted to take, strongly supported by artillery fire.

It was this kind of monumental artillery support which helped to create the so-called ammunition shortage that later was the subject of public debate and a congressional investigation in the United States. All UN artillery units were firing the "Van Fleet Load," which was five times larger than the ammunition allowance previously in use. The Van Fleet Load, together with a shortage of motor transport and the difficulties of supply inherent in mountain warfare, was largely responsible for the much-publicized shortage.

On 18 May, the third day of the Red Chinese attack, General Almond, commanding the X US Corps, ordered the 2nd US Division back to a new line south of Hangye-ri some eight kilometers to the south. General Clark L. Ruffner, the division commander, successfully executed this withdrawal,
counting 900 men killed, wounded, and missing in the three-day battle, while Red Chinese and NK troops’ losses were estimated at 35,000.

Heavy pressure against other ROK divisions in the east-central sector and along the coast drove them far back of No Name Line. The divisions of the III ROK Corps, on the X US Corps right, were heavily engaged, broke, and pulled back to the Pyongchang—Kangnung road. The I ROK Corps, on the coast, withdrew from Taepo-ri to Kangnung.

While the battle raged on the central and eastern fronts, the enemy struck in the western sector held by troops of the I and IX US Corps. On the night of 17 May, an enemy force estimated at 25,000 men struck down the Pukhan River toward the Han River, but the 25th US and 6th ROK Divisions stopped this drive just south of Masogu-ri in three days of hard fighting. A feeble attack directed against Seoul by some four NK Communist battalions were quickly repulsed.

By 20 May the UN troops had brought the second CCF offensive to a standstill. The X US Corps stabilized its front. The 1st US Marine Division still held its portion of No Name Line, and the 2nd US Division, with the 15th US Regiment attached, prepared to wrest the initiative from the Chinese Reds and retake its positions on No Name Line.

Section 5. Again on Counteroffensive (20 May—24 June 1951)

Having once more stopped the CCF offensive, General Van Fleet now felt that it was time to take up his offensive again. Two new UN battalions were about to finish their final pre-combat training and join the Eighth Army, and the temporary “shortage” of ammunition, caused by General Van Fleet’s artillery-saturation tactics, was no longer a factor. General Van Fleet, however, also had to consider the logistical situation — both his and the enemy’s, because offensive operations carried to far would mean lengthening his supply lines unduly and shortening the enemy’s, as well as incurring heavy casualties.

Nevertheless, General Van Fleet felt it was good sense to threaten and even to seize, if possible, the Iron Triangle, terminus of the formerly one good railroad from Manchuria and center for many good roads that kept the enemy front fed and supplied. It may be recalled that the Wyoming line, a bulge of the Kansas line, had been aimed at the base of the Iron Triangle. It was also vital to UN forces to control the Hwachon Reservoir, previously the source of
water and electricity for Seoul and the heart of the enemy supply route. Consequently the new offensive was meant to roll on over the 38th Parallel again, and to destroy as much as UN forces could of the enemy's potential. (See Sitation Map 14, Appendix VI.)

Line Kansas Regained

On 18 May General Van Fleet started his new offensive with a series of local attacks designed to relieve enemy pressure on the X US Corps. This day he ordered the I and IX US Corps, and the 1st US Marine Division, the left flank element of the X US Corps, to send out strong patrols and prepare to attack a phase line "Topeka" about halfway between No Name Line and Kansas. The next day, 19 May, after bolstering the 3rd US Division by attaching to it the newly arrived 25th Canadian Brigade, he enlarged the goals of his offensive by directing the I, IX and X US Corps to advance to enemy supply and communication areas near Mansedari, Hwachon, and Inje. The I

UN COUNTEROFFENSIVE (20 MAY—24 JUNE 1951)

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Sketch Map 34
ROK Corps, on the east, was to advance and conform to the movements of the X US Corps right flank. The III ROK Corps, which had recently broken under enemy attack, was deactivated. Together with part of the old I ROK Corps front, the 9th ROK Division was given to the X US Corps, and the 3rd ROK Division and its front were given to the I ROK Corps. (See Sketch Map 34.)

The new offensive, General Van Fleet hoped, would deny the enemy any chance to gather himself for another counterstroke, threaten the enemy supply route in the Hwachon Reservoir area, and eventually result in the capture of the Iron Triangle. He shifted boundaries to place the western third of the Hwachon Reservoir in the IX US Corps zone, leaving the remaining two thirds the responsibility of the X US Corps. Once the X US Corps had taken its objectives, he hoped to send it in an enveloping move northeastward to the coast to block the enemy while the I ROK Corps attacked northwestward to crush the enemy between itself and the X US Corps. As he put it, "The 38th Parallel has no significance in the present tactical situation... The Eighth Army will go where the situation dictates in hot pursuit of the enemy." (See Situation Map 15, Appendix VI.)

Once more, as the enemy pulled back, the UN forces rolled forward against generally light resistance. On 19 May units of the 1st ROK Division reconnoitered the Seoul highway toward Munsan-ni. Within the next few days I US Corps troops reached the Imjin River north of Munsan-ni and entered Uijongbu and Sinpal-li. Elements of the IX US Corps pushed toward Kapyong, drove the enemy across the Hongchon River, and moved toward the Hwachon Reservoir.

In the X US Corps zone, while aircraft executed a continuous series of close support missions, the US divisions made ready to trap or destroy the enemy soldiers that had burst through the lines in the offensive just halted. Using tank-infantry task force as well as regular formations, General Almond planned to employ the 1st US Marine Division, on the left, in Yanggu area to push the enemy back against the Hwachon Reservoir while to the southeast the 3rd US Division struck at the farthest point of enemy penetration. At the same time, the 187th US Airborne RCT was to drive northeast along the Hongchon—Kansong highway to cut the enemy supply route at Inje, east of Yanggu, while a task force composed of US and ROK infantry troops covered the right flank. The 8th and 9th ROK Divisions were in reserve; the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions were reorganizing.

At 0800 hours on 24 May, the 1st US Marine Division attacked toward
Yanggu, while the 187th US Airborne RCT started out for Inje. One battalion of the RCT broke loose and crossed the Soyang River the next day to hold a bridgehead pending the arrival of the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 2nd US Division two days later, when the 7th Marines of the 1st US Marine Division also reached the Soyang River. General Almond formed a task force of the 187th RCT, the 72nd US Tank Battalion, and other elements to drive to the coastal town of Kansong on east coast in accordance with General Van Fleet's order.

In the last week of May, the weather came to the enemy's rescue, slowing UN forces' armor, almost wiping out many of the roads, and grounding UN aircraft. As a result, the enemy was again able to trade space for time and make off with much of his force and supplies intact. Nevertheless, the 187th RCT had taken Inje by 27 May, the 1st US Marine Division were making a final push toward the Hwachon Reservoir and Yanggu, and the 17th Regiment of the 7th US Division in the IX US Corps had taken Hwachon. At the end of the month the X US Corps was deployed along the Soyang River. Its flanking drive to Kansong proved unnecessary, for that town fell to the Capital ROK Division of the I ROK Corps.

The Eighth Army now had scored a significant advance which had brought it just about back to the Kansas line. The front now ran from Munsan-ni through Yonchon, Hwachon, and Yanggu, dipped southward sharply, and then swung north and east to Kansong. Except in the west where it slanted southward to take tactical advantage of the Imjin River, the line lay north of
the 38th Parallel. The Republic of Korea was once more practically free of hostile forces.

Enemy casualties for the last half of May, Eighth Army headquarters reported, included 17,000 counted dead and an equal number of prisoners. Its own casualties for the entire month numbered 33,770. The ROK troops had lost the most; US troops losses totaled 745 dead, 4,218 wounded, 572 missing, and 6,758 nonbattle casualties, most of which were caused by disease.

**UN Local Advances Continue**

With UN forces again back on the Kansas line what should be done next? General Van Fleet’s statement about the hot pursuit of the enemy did not mean that he intended another advance to the Yalu, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prescribed that the Eighth Army was not to go beyond the general vicinity of Line Kansas. General Ridgway, however, had authorized local advances to gain better ground. In any event, it was clear that the UN forces were not numerous enough to encircle and destroy the enemy in large-scale maneuvers, but would have to stabilize along a strong defensive line. In addition to Kansas, there were other transpeninsula lines (the Yesong River—Wonsan line, and the Sukchon—Wonsan line north of the 39th Parallel) that were relatively short; but they possessed less defensible terrain than Kansas, their road systems were poorer, and to seize them would lengthen the UN communication lines while shortening the enemy’s. Clearly, then, the best policy appeared to be to defend Line Kansas, while
M4 tanks of 1st Cavalry Division fording the Imjin River in early June 1951.

taking advantage of General Ridgway's authorization to conduct local advance to more favorable ground.

On 1 June, therefore, General Van Fleet directed reserve elements of his forces to clear out all civilians and to strengthen Kansas by stringing barbed wire, clearing fields of fire, laying mines, constructing shelters with overhead cover, establishing trail and road blocks, and plotting artillery concentrations. He hoped thus to make the line virtually impregnable. Meanwhile offensive operations continued forward. He ordered the I and IX US Corps to continue their advance toward Line Wyoming, the bulge north of Kansas that run from the Imjin River to just south of Chorwon and Kumhwa, thence southeast. With this order General Van Fleet lowered his sights slightly, for his earlier plans had aimed at capturing the Iron Triangle rather than stopping short on Wyoming.

The advance to the Wyoming line was carried out with comparative ease except along the approaches to the Iron Triangle where the enemy resisted strongly. Except for a range of hills, the Triangle was a low-lying area surrounded by saw-toothed mountains. It was the terminus of a main highway from Manchuria and was interlaced with dirt roads and two single-track railroads. It served the enemy as supply and communications area. Elements of both the I and IX US Corps fought their way toward the Wyoming line near the Chorwon-Kumhwa base of the Triangle, and the enemy
fought back hard from defenses arranged in depth. As happened so often, heavy rains in the first few days of June limited direct air support and turned the roads into veritable quagmires.

Despite the bad weather and strong enemy resistance the UN forces edged forward. The 1st US Cavalry Division pushed from Uijongbu toward Chorwon against hard-fighting Chinese, as sweat-soaked engineer parties moved ahead of armored tanks to probe for wooden box-mines. The troops of the 3rd and 25th US Divisions plugged ahead, using flame throwers to drive the Chinese Reds from their loglined bunkers. By 10 June, aided by drier weather that made possible round-the-clock air support, the 3rd US Division, with the 9th ROK Division and the 10th Philippine Battalion, attacked and gained the high ground south of Chorwon, the western foot of the triangle, while the 25th US Division and the Turkish Brigade fought their way toward Kumhwa, the eastern foot of the triangle. The next day, 11 June, at 1330 Chorwon fell abandoned by the enemy; two hours later the Turkish Brigade entered Kumhwa, from which the enemy had also departed.

Now firmly in control of its portion of Line Wyoming, the I US Corps sent out task forces to pursue the enemy. On 13 June two tank-infantry task forces, from Chorwon and Kumhwa, reached Pyonggang, which they found deserted. When they discovered that the enemy held the dominating ground north of the city, however, the two task forces withdrew. In the meantime the units of the IX US Corps pushed northeast toward Kumsong and found the enemy present in strength and obviously establishing a defense line there. As the Triangle was dominated by the surrounding heights, neither side attempted to hold it in strength thereafter, although Chinese Reds struck back at the I and IX US Corps and retook Pyonggang on 17 June. But the gains all the way up to Chorwon—Kumhwa had extended the center of the UN line to a point over thirty kilometers north of the 38th Parallel.

In the meantime, on the east-central front, the troops of X US Corps had pushed through mountains toward its sector of Line Kansas, which extended over a series of ridges from the Hwachon Reservoir northeastward to the lower lip of the “Punchbowl,” an aptly named ancient volcanic crater about four kilometers north of Inje. The enemy defending this area were identified as elements of the NK Communist II and V Corps. The X US Corps ordered its three divisions, the 7th ROK, the 1st US Marine, and the 5th ROK (which had relieved the 2nd US Division), to attack against the enemy. The enemy, well dug in on the ridge top and amply supplied with machine guns, mortars and artillery, fought back hard. US Marines and ROK troops assaulted successive bunker-studded ridges to push the enemy out, and on 16
June elements of the 1st US Marine Division reached Kansas, while on the right of the X US Corps the I ROK Corps advanced from Kansong toward Kosong.

Thus by mid-June the Eighth Army had largely attained the principal terrain objectives, although the enemy had again managed to get away. Action for the rest of the month, except in the "Punchbowl" area where the 1st US Marine Division fought a violent battle, was confined to developing the Kansas and Wyoming lines, and to patrolling and local fights which, although fierce and bloody, did not materially affect the dispositions of either side.

Without doubt, the Communists were ready for destruction by mid-June 1951. In one year of warfare, the NK Communist forces had suffered an estimated 600,000 casualties (including 100,000 men who had surrendered) and was virtually destroyed.

In the eight months, the Chinese Communists had lost an estimated half million men. The CCF's April and May offensives had subjected the Red forces to a frightful pounding and the May offensive had clearly revealed its inability to support large bodies of men moving against modern firepower. The NK Communist regime was a shambles, its railroads ruined, its communications crippled, its industry close to nonexistent. At Wonsan and the adjacent Hungnam—Songjin steel complex, the US Navy was continuing the siege which had began on 16 February and which, maintained until war's end, would be the longest in American naval history. All Communist supply now came from the Soviet Union, and Russia had already shown, in the disastrous May offensive, how she could fail to deliver the goods. Moreover it would be some time before the Chinese Reds received the Russian artillery

Troops of the 1st US Marine Division are pushing forward north of Yanggu, early June 1951.
which would give them a fighting chance against firepower. Truly enough, the Communists were reeling and a next bold move by UN forces, if attempted, might have dealt them a knockout blow. (See Situation Map 16, Appendix VI.)

Section 6. Signs of Armistice Negotiations

The United States Government, as we have seen, had made it exceedingly clear that it had no intention of pushing to the Yalu River, that it would accept an honorable truce.

The example of the General MacArthur's relief from his commands was enough to testify the American position. The United States had come full cycle, back from its position of October 1950, to its position of the previous June of 1950. The goal was containment, not victory. But the decision as to whether there would be a cease-fire was not to be made in Washington. Peking and Moscow would decide, as they had decided the initial aggression.

Even until their May offensive the Communist leaders had still hoped for a favorable decision on the battlefield. When they would hint of terms at all, these included withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, leaving Communist North and Free South to settle their own affairs, withdrawal of U.S. protection to Taiwan, and admission of Red China to the U.N., all of which were strategically and politically impossible for the United States.

Here the matter rested during March, April, and early May, while a violent war of maneuver flowed around the middle part of the Korean peninsula. Encouraged by their initial success in the north, the CCF engaged in open battle with the UN forces, in one massive assault after another, in February, April, and again in May. Each time they tasted only defeat.

At the end of May 1951, the CCF had proved they could not prevail in open warfare in the more maneuverable ground of southern and middle Korea. It was very clear to the Red Chinese themselves as well as to Soviet observers that the CCF could not win a decision in Korea; they could not now even halt the slow, steady UN advance northward.

When Communists can not win by force, they are always prepared to negotiate. If, in 1951, they could stop the UN advance by talking, they would firm an increasingly fluid and dangerous situation and in effect achieve a tactical victory. Thus the Communist thinking was altered in favor of
negotiation.

In the meantime, after the CCF offensive in May had been turned back, many U.N. observers were optimistic that the Red Chinese might now find the cost of carrying on the war too high in casualties and equipment and be more receptive to negotiations. The UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie expressed that the time to talk peace had come and that the Security Council's resolutions on Korea would be fulfilled with a cease-fire somewhere along the 38th Parallel followed by "restoration of peace and security" by peaceful means. Secretary-General Lie appealed to the Russians to "say the one word the world is waiting for."

The word came on 23 June. Soviet Delegate to the United Nations Jacob Malik proposed cease-fire discussions between the participants in the Korean War. It was the first official sign of a change in the Communist position. Two days later, the Peking Radio endorsed the Malik's proposal. President Truman then authorized General Ridgway to conduct negotiations with the enemy generals. The UN Commander at once sent radio messages to his opposite numbers in the enemy camp, and after some argument both sides agreed to meet in Kaesong. After liaison officers had made preliminary arrangements, the negotiations opened on 10 July with Vice Adm. C Turner Joy, the Far East Naval Commander, acting as chief delegate for the United Nations. Nam Il led the Communist delegation.

Significantly, it should be noted, it was only after the Chinese Communist armies had completely failed to conquer Republic of Korea, after the casualties to Mao's best troops climbed ever higher, that the desire for a cease-fire was indicated by the Communist rulers. Thus in June 1951 -- with the Russians' colossal error in starting the Korean War having been erased through the efforts of the Chinese Communist -- the Soviet Union made a formal bid to end the fighting.

As soon as the truce talks started, the Communist negotiators began to stall. The first session was followed by hundreds more between the two military commands, meetings which were to be dragged out for two years. They were full of acrimony, bitterness, and hatred. The Communists appeared to be in no hurry to come to an agreement and while they procrastinated, the two opposing armies fought bloody duels in the hills and mountains of central Korea.
PART TWO

THE NAVAL OPERATIONS

JUNE 1950 to JUNE 1951
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CHAPTER I INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
(25–30 June 1950)

Section 1. The First days of Naval Activity

Between Seoul—Washington

Immediately after the outbreak of Korean War which started at 0400 of 25 June 1950 by the surprise attack of North Korean Communist forces all along the 38th Parallel, the Security Council of the United Nations, as proposed by the United States, adopted a resolution on this breach of the peace and called upon the North Korean Communist puppet regime to desist from the aggression.

In Washington, as a result of a Blair House meeting of President Harry S. Truman with representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the US Far East Command in Tokyo: “Assist in evacuating the United States dependents and noncombatants from Seoul. General MacArthur is authorized to take action by Air and Navy to prevent the Inchon–Kimpo–Seoul area from falling into unfriendly hands.” The last part of this phrase defined the American air and naval actions to protect and cover the evacuation from being interfered by any hostile action. General MacArthur was also told to furnish the Republic of Korea Government additional military supplies under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and to dispatch a military survey group to Korea to obtain first-hand information on the assistance required by the Republic of Korea to meet the Communist attack.

By 26 June it was apparent that the North Korean Communist forces had the capability of taking Seoul within a question of hours and that their advance might interfere with the completion of the evacuation task.

Another conference of the top levels of the American diplomatic and military authorities was held at the Blair House with President Truman presiding on the evening of the 26th, corresponding midday of the 27th in the Far East. Following this conference the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General MacArthur: “... At the direction of the President, the Commander
in Chief, Far East is authorized to utilize Navy and Air Force elements of the Far East Command to attack all north Korean military targets such as troop columns, guns and tanks south of the 38th Parallel in order to clear south Korea of North Korean military forces... He is authorized to use naval forces of the Far East Command in the coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea without restriction."

Thus, all necessary actions were taken to evacuate American civilians and dependents from Korea by sea and air; to cover this evacuation the air and naval actions in defense of the capital Seoul, of the harbor of Inchon, and of Kimpo airfield were authorized. The Seventh Fleet was to be started north from the Philippines so as to be more readily available should things get worse. Shipment to Korea of ammunition and of military supplies would be expedited by all available means. Particularly, the decisions taken at the second Blair House meeting were far-reaching. A directive was at once sent to General MacArthur authorizing him to use his air and naval forces against the invading army south of the 38th Parallel. But while the Communist invaders were rushing at full gallop almost unopposed, Seoul eventually fell by 28 June.

On 30 June, meanwhile, after meeting with the Secretaries of State and of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leaders, President Truman made public the new decisions. General MacArthur was further authorized to bomb north of 38th Parallel as governed by military necessity, a naval blockade of north Korea would be proclaimed, and certain supporting ground units would be committed to action.

**The Far East Naval Component**

The United States military forces in the Far East in June 1950 before the outbreak of the Korean War were organized into the unified command of General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Far East and also Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The naval component under Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy the Commander of the Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), was originally small in its scale. But although Naval Forces Far East was largely a housekeeping command, ComNavFE did control, with Task Force 96, a considerable amount of fighting strength, and with Task Force 90 the nucleus of an amphibious force. The combat units of Task Force 96 based in Japan, were fast and able ships, but none mounted anything larger than a 5-inch gun. *Juneau*, Captain J.C. Sowell, flagship of Rear Admiral J.M. Higgings' Support Group, was a younger sister and namesake of the light antiaircraft
cruiser sunk by a Japanese submarine in 1942 while retiring after the Battle of Guadalcanal. With a designed displacement of 6,000 tons, she had a speed of better than 33 knots and mounted a main battery of 16 5-inch dual purpose guns. The four ships of Captain H.C. Allan’s Destroyer Division 91 -- Mansfield, De Haven, Collett and Swenson -- were 2,200-ton, 35-knot ships, completed in 1944 and mounting six 5-inch guns each.

In addition to this small fighting force, the ComNavFE controlled a variety of auxiliary ships. The most important of these were those of Amphibious Group One, Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle; the command ship Mount McKinley, the attack transport Cavalier and the attack cargo ship Union. LST 611, and the fleet tug Arihara. This group, which held the tactical designation of Task Force 90 in the Naval Forces Far East organization, had recently arrived in Japan to conduct a program of amphibious training jointly with units of the Eighth US Army, also in Japan on occupation duty.

A third category of force at Admiral Joy’s disposal consisted of the units of Mine Squadron (Minron) Three, which were engaged in check-sweeping World War II minefields. The Minron Three contained six 136-foot, wooden-hulled, dieselengined craft and four 184-foot, twin-screw “Admirable” class AMS mine-sweepers.

Finally, ComNavFE controlled a number of Japanese-manned ships belonging to the Shipping Control Administration, Japan -- which were employed in logistical support of the occupation and in repatriation of former Japanese prisoners of war from the continent of Asia.

The activities of Admiral Joy’s headquarters had been limited to the peaceful routine of an occupation force. The staff totaled only 28 officers and 160 enlisted men. There were four officers in the operations section, five in plans, four in communications. Since the activities of naval aviation in the Western Pacific were centralized at Guam, the NavFE staff had no air or aerology departments. Although two officers qualified in mine warfare authorized, none was aboard. The one cruiser, four destroyers and six minesweepers assigned to the Support Force had a variety of peacetime tasks: They were patrolling to prevent smuggling; periodic patrols around the offshore islands; and various training operations.

In outline, there were the following United States Navy ships in the waters around Japan under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy’s Naval Forces Far East on 25 June 1950 when the Korean War broke out.

Amphibious Force -- Task Force 90: Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle
USS Mt. McKinley AGC-7 Captain C.A. Printup
### Initial Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Officer</th>
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<tr>
<td>USS Cavalier APA-37</td>
<td>Captain S.S. Bowling</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS Union AKA-106</td>
<td>Captain G.D. Zurmuhlen</td>
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<td>USS LST 611</td>
<td>Lieutenant J.C. Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Arikara AYF-98</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander K.A. Mundy</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Support Force—Task Force 96:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One light cruiser, USS Juneau</td>
<td>Rear Admiral J.M. Higgins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Division 91</td>
<td>Captain J.C. Sowell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansfield</td>
<td>Captain H.C. Allan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Haven</td>
<td>Commander E.H. Headland</td>
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<td>Collett</td>
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<td>Swenson</td>
<td>Commander R.H. Close</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mine Squadron Three</strong></td>
<td>Commander R.A. Schilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redhead</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade T.R. Howard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mocking Bird</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade S.P. Gary</td>
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<td>Osprey</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade P. Levin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partridge</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade R.C. Fuller, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kite</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chatterer</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade J.P. McMahon</td>
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### Section 2. Combat Readiness

#### The Seventh Fleet

On the other hand, the U.S. Seventh Fleet Striking Force, Task Force 77, with Vice Admiral Arthur B. Struble in command, was made up of a carrier group containing one carrier, a support group containing one cruiser, and a screening group of eight destroyers. On the day of the Communist invasion in Korean, Vice Admiral Struble, the Seventh Fleet Commander, was in Washington, and Rear Admiral J.M. Hoskins, Commander Carrier Division Three, was acting. The principal U.S. navy ships under the command were as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Seventh Fleet Commander</th>
<th>Vice Admiral A.D. Struble</th>
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<tr>
<td>Commander Carrier Division Three</td>
<td>Rear Admiral J.M. Hoskins</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 aircraft carrier .......... Valley Forge</td>
<td>Captain L.K. Rice</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 heavy cruiser ........... Rochester</td>
<td>Captain E.L. Woodyard</td>
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<td>8 destroyers .............. Shelton</td>
<td>Commander C.B. Jackson, Jr.</td>
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<td>Eversole</td>
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<td>Fletcher</td>
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<td>Radford</td>
<td>Commander E.C. Ogle</td>
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The Fleet's peacetime mission had largely been that of showing the flag around the orient; in fact, the planes of Air Group Five had flown in parade over Inchon and Seoul on 5 April from the decks of the Valley Forge. A few days later they had appeared over Hong Kong.

The duty carrier in the summer of 1950 was Valley Forge completed in 1949 with a standard displacement of 27,100 tons, a length of 876 feet, and a speed of 33 knots. Flagship of Rear Admiral J.M. Hoskins, Commander Carrier Division Three, Valley Forge had reported in to the Western Pacific in May, 1950 at which time her predecessor, Boxer, had been returned to the west coast for navy yard availability. On 25 June found Valley Forge, with the destroyers Fletcher and Radford, in the South China Sea, one day out of Hong Kong en route to the Philippines.

The air group of Valley Forge, Carrier Air Group Five, Commander H.P. Lanham, was the first in the Navy to attempt the sustained shipboard operation of jet aircraft. Its complement of 86 planes was made up of two jet fighter squadrons with 30 Grumman F9F-2 Panthers; two piston-engined fighter squadrons equipped with the World War II Vought F4U-4B; and a piston-engined attack squadron of 14 Douglas Skyraider AD-4s. Over and above these five squadrons the group contained 14 aircraft, principally the destroyer tenders, which were specially equipped and modified for photographic, night and radar missions. The group as a whole had conducted extensive training in close support of troops with the Marines at Camp Pendleton, California.

State of Readiness

The free world would consider itself fortunate that the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Naval Forces Far East ships were within fast cruising distance of Korea, and that they were well prepared and in a high state of combat readiness. Task Forces 90 and 96 were not the only naval units in Asiatic waters. Based in the Philippines, 1,700 miles to the southward there lay the Seventh Fleet, the principal embodiment of American naval power in the Western Pacific. The Valley Forge with Air Group Five aboard was the best carrier and jet-trained air group of the Pacific Fleet. Cruiser Rochester and Juneau were likewise well trained.
Two other circumstances proved fortunate as the Korean War intensified. First, Amphibious Group One (Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle, aboard the *Mount McKinley*) was in the area conducting the amphibious training exercises in Japanese waters. It was the most seasoned group of amphibious experts in the Pacific Fleet. Second, the Mobile Training Team able of the Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Force Pacific, with the officer in charge Colonel E.H. Forney, USMC was engaged in indoctrinating the Eighth US Army personnel in Japan. Thus, the presence of these naval ships, the amphibious group and the marine training team were of critical importance to the maintenance of a toehold in Korea. The first eighty-two days of the Korean War -- from 25 June until the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950 -- were a withdrawal to a defensible perimeter and a desperate holding action by the U.N. forces before their active counteroffensive. All military efforts in these critical days were devoted to a determined objective to maintain a Korean bridgehead around the port of Pusan, known as the Naktong River Perimeter.

In this respect, the naval history of the early days of the Korean War can be divided into four principal efforts: (1) The flights of the carrier aircraft of Task Forces 96 and 77 on close air support, armed reconnaissance, and interdiction mission; (2) the naval gunfire support and bombardment efforts of the cruisers and destroyers along the east coast; (3) the timely and superb amphibious landing operations at Pohang and Inchon; and (4) the timely arrival and transportation of the U.S. Marines and other U.N. forces participating in the Korean theater of operation. These several naval events powerfully contributed to holding the Naktong Perimeter to the last and to leading the battle momentum to the successful Inchon landing operation on 15 September 1950.
CHAPTER II  FIRST ACTIONS
(25 June—17 July 1950)

Section 1.  War Begins (25—30 June 1950)

Evacuation Task

In Tokyo, Japan the 25th of June 1950 found the headquarters of Naval Forces Far East settled down for a normal peacetime weekend. When the telephone rang, the staff duty officer received the emergency message and found himself talking to the military attache with the American Embassy in Seoul. Within minutes the naval headquarters had shifted to a state of readiness throughout all the command.

Soon after the Korean War started General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE) was ordered to take such action by air and navy to insure safe evacuation of U.S. dependents and noncombatants. At the same time the Seventh Fleet also was ordered to be evacuated out of Seoul area by U.S. Ambassador John F. Muccio in Seoul, the ComNavFE instructed Admiral Higgins to send Mansfield and De Haven to cover the exodus from the port of Inchon. The evacuation was thus carried out as an early action of the NavFE at the outbreak of Korean War.

On the 26th, as the destroyers were steaming west to cover the departure from Inchon, American Air Force fighters orbited over the harbor. On the 27th, loading of exodus was also commenced at Pusan, and the U.S. Far East Air Forces aircraft began to fly for the transport of personnel out of the capital's airfield at Kimpo.

On the other hand, at 0800 hours of 27 June, the Acting Commander of the Seventh Fleet Rear Admiral J.M. Hoskins set sail the fleet from Subic Bay and Hong Kong, and headed for Sasebo, Japan. En route north in the vicinity of Taiwan, Valley Forge planes flew through the Straits of Formosa and over the city of Taipei on 29 June. For the first few days of the Korean War, the sole task of the Seventh Fleet was the neutralization of Taiwan (Formosa) in accordance with President Truman's instructions.
Meanwhile, also on 27 June, Vice Admiral Joy ordered Rear Admiral Higgins to take his flagship Juneau and the destroyer De Haven, and patrol the coastal waters south of the 38th Parallel and oppose any hostile landing. De Haven and Mansfield had just completed the Navy’s first task, the evacuation of American nationals from Inchon and Pusan. Juneau and De Haven had also escorted the ammunition ship Sergeant Keathley from Tokyo to Pusan, while Collett and Mansfield were escorting the Cardinal O’Connell. Both the Keathley and the O’Connell were carrying badly needed ammunition and military supplies to Korea. The naval preliminaries were thus completed. American nationals and noncombatants had been evacuated from Korea.

Further, urgently needed military supplies requested by the Republic of Korea had been delivered.

As the war situation became more serious, the battle ships had assembled. The ships were needed more largely, and the blockade force had incorporated those British and Australian ships then also based in the Japanese waters. The Seventh Fleet in Okinawa’s Buckner Bay was joined by the British cruiser Belfast (flagship of Rear Admiral W.C. Andrewes, RN), Carrier Triumph, and destroyers Cossack and Consort.

Initial Actions

The decision to give air and naval assistance to the Republic of Korea was made at the Blair House meeting in the evening of Monday the 26th, Washington time, midday of the 27th June in the Far East. At 2015 hours that evening Admiral Joy’s Operation Order 5-50, the basic order of the Korean naval operations, was issued. In this dispatch of the order, the ComNavFE informed his forces that President Truman had ordered the fullest possible support of the ROK units south of the 38th Parallel to permit these forces to reform, and had instructed the Seventh Fleet to take station to prevent either an invasion on Taiwan (Formosa) from Red China or the use of that island for operations against the mainland.

The Task Group 96.5 composed of Juneau and the four destroyers of the Destroyer Division 91, was eventually designated the Korean Support Group and was initially ordered to carry out: to base at Sasebo, Japan, patrol Korean coastal waters, oppose hostile landings and destroy vessels engaged in aggression, provide fire support to friendly forces, and to cover shipping engaged in evacuation or in carrying supplies to the Republic of Korea.

The order was then amplified hours later to designate some critical
targets for the action of the task group along the coast and off-lying islands from Tongyoung, west of Pusan, to Ulsan on the east, and the east coast sector between Samchok and Kangnung.

On the evening of 27 June, when ComNavFE’s operation order was promulgated, Admiral Higgins’ Support Group was widely dispersed. The flagship Juneau with the task group commander embarked, was leaving Sasebo to investigate a reported NK Communist landing on the island of Kojedo, southwest of Pusan; in the Western Sea De Haven was escorting a Norwegian freighter with the first evacuees from Inchon, while Mansfield awaited the sailing of a second load in a Panamanian ship.

Early on 28 June, Juneau anchored off the southeastern shore of Koje-do, a party was sent ashore by whaleboat, difficulties in communication with the inhabitants were somehow surmounted, and the fact found out that the island remained peaceful and undisturbed. Following this check on his southern area of responsibility, Admiral Higgins headed north, and in the afternoon put the landing party ashore at Ulsan with a similar result. In the evening Juneau again got underway, and continued up the coast to patrol the area between Samchok and Kangnung, which was reported to have been occupied by the communists. Nonetheless, owing to the uncertainty of informations obtained, false reports had eventually caused the investigation of Koje-do and Ulsan.

On 29 June as Juneau continued her patrol, Admiral Higgins ordered Swenson, which had now reached Sasebo, to meet Mansfield in the Western Sea. During the day De Haven joined the flagship, and at 2300 hours Juneau commenced firing the first bombardment of the war. At Mukho on the east coast half an hour’s deliberate shooting, conducted with searchlight illumination and with target advice from a ROK Navy officer, brought the expenditure against enemy personnel of 16 rounds of influence-fused 5-inch and more than 400 rounds of 5-inch antiaircraft gun, with excellent results.
Strength Expansion

On this day, following the vote of the U.N. Security Council for the military assistance to the Republic of Korea, the British Admiralty placed Royal Navy units in Japanese waters at the disposition of ComNavFE; on the next day similar action was taken by the Australian Government; in Canada three destroyers were ordered to prepare to sail; from New Zealand came promise of the early dispatch of two frigates.

With already the transfer of Seventh Fleet forces to his operational control in addition to the incorporation of Commonwealth naval strength, Admiral Joy acquired all the forces into immediately available NavFE strength and his command was gradually expanding in size.

On the evening of the 29th, the ComNavFE requested Rear Admiral William G. Andrews of the Royal British Navy to send Jamaica and the frigates to join Admiral Higgins' Support Group, and to proceed with his flagship Belfast, the carrier Triumph and the two British destroyers to Okinawa and report to Commander Seventh Fleet. Early in the morning of the 30th Admiral Joy, the Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces, Far East assumed operational control of Admiral Andrews' forces, and in the evening modified Operation Order 5-50 to include the British Commonwealth naval units for Korean operations only, thus exempting them from the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores, which remained a purely American affair.

With these augmentations and expansion of strength Admiral Joy confronted with the considerable increase of his tasks: He was required to evacuate American citizens, support the Republic of Korea, blockade the north Korean coastline, and at the same time to remain prepared for the unpredictable in connection with Formosa, the protection of his flanks, and a possible expansion of the conflict. And as his responsibilities and his forces grew, further difficulty was presented by the inadequacy of his staff and of those of subordinate commands.

The total strength of the NavFE staff at the end of June was 188, but by November it would have reached 1,227. To Naval Forces Far East had now been added the Seventh Fleet and British Commonwealth units. This strength was organized in three principal groups: Naval Forces Japan, the Seventh Fleet and the Amphibious Force.

Of these, the U.S. Amphibious Force Far East, Task Force 90 had been moved forward from Yokosuka to Sasebo in Japan which is more than 500
miles closer to Pusan, Korea and it was awaiting orders.

Under the direct control of ComNavFE, Task Force 96, Naval Forces Japan was also engaged in various tasks.

The long range aircraft of VP 47 had been organized as the Search and Reconnaissance Group, Task Group 96.2 under Captain John C. Alderman.

In the Korean waters the Support Group, Task Group 96.5 originally consisting of Juneau and Destroyer Division 91 had been reinforced by British Commonwealth ships. But, Admiral Andrewes' ships had received the designation of Task Group 96.8. Joined by Triumph, Belfast, Cossack and Consort, the Task Force 77 remained for the moment poised between Korea and Formosa.

The organizational problems which faced Admiral Joy were the provision of some sort of escort for the shipping en route to Pusan and the establishment of the blockade of north Korea, recommended by the American Chief of Naval Operations on 30 June and ordered by President Truman the next day. These matters were dealt with by ComNavFE in Operation Order 8-50, promulgated on 3 July and effective on the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization of Task Force 96.

Blockade and inshore work south of latitude 37° was assigned to the ROK Navy, shortly to become Task Group 96.7, with such assistance as might become available from the U.S. Far East Air Forces and from any NavFE units that happened by. For the coastline north of 37° separate East and West Coast Support Groups were established: In the east the task was entrusted to Admiral Higgins' Task Group 96.5, in the west to the Commonwealth units of Task Group 96.8. The northern limits of the blockade were set at 41 on the east coast and at 39° 30' in the west respectively.

On 30 June, at midmorning (in Washington), and late on the 30th in the Far East, in the meantime, President Truman approved the commitment of American ground troops. Upon this, US Naval Forces, Far East issued its Operation Order 7-50 assigning 16 SCAJAP (Shipping Control Administration Japan) LSTs to Task Force 90, and instructing him to lift the 24th US Infantry Division (Major General William F. Dean in command) from Fukuoka and Sasebo, Japan to Pusan, Korea.

By the afternoon of 3 July the 24th Division had already begun its move. Two infantry companies with supporting artillery had already been flown to Pusan on 1 July, and the rest of the division was hastily loading in locally available shipping to follow by sea. Since the situation seemed under control, the ships of Task Force 90 were retained at Sasebo for other employment.
Section 2. Coastal Bombardment (1–26 July 1950)

The Task Force 77 in Action

On the evening of 1 July Task Force 77, now enlarged to two carriers, two cruisers, and ten destroyers sailed from Buckner Bay at Okinawa and headed northwest and north toward the launching area in the Western Sea. There, in the middle of the Western Sea, the force was some 150 miles from the target area but only 100 miles from Chinese Communist airfield on the Shantung Peninsula.

At 0500 on 3 July Valley Forge launched combat and antisubmarine patrols; beginning at 0545 Triumph flew off 12 Fireflies and 9 Seafires for an attack on the airfield at Haeju, and minutes later Valley Forge commenced launching her strike group. Sixteen Corsairs loaded with eight 5-inch rockets each and 12 Skyraiders carrying 1,600-pound bombloads were launched against the Pyongyang airfield. No serious opposition was encountered by the American jets as they swept in over the North Korean capital. Two Yaks were destroyed in the air, another was damaged and nine aircraft were reported destroyed on the ground. For the enemy, this sudden appearance of jet fighters more than 400 miles from the nearest American airfield was both startling and salutary. Quite possibly, as one American commander observed, it may have deterred a sizable commitment of aircraft to North Korean bases.

Following the Panthers in, the Corsairs and Skyraiders bombed and rocketed hangars and fuel storage at the airfield. Both at Pyongyang and at Haeju enemy aircraft opposition was negligible, and no plane suffered serious damage.

In the afternoon aircraft from Triumph flew a second strike, and a second attack was launched by Valley Forge against the marshalling yards at Pyongyang and the bridges across the Taedong River. A considerable damage was reported
inflicted on locomotives and rolling stock, but the bridges survived this effort.

Targets for the second day, selected by CincFE, were designated by dispatch on the night of the 2nd July, with first priority given the railroad facilities and bridges in the neighborhood of Kumhon, just north of the 38th Parallel on the main line from Pyongyang to Seoul, second priority to similar installations at Sariwon, halfway between the two cities, and third priority to those near Sinanju, where the main road and rail lines from Manchuria cross the Chongchon River.

With a fine disregard of these instructions Task Force 77 celebrated the Glorious Fourth with further attacks on Pyongyang. This time a break was made in one of the Taedong River bridges, some locomotives were destroyed, and some small ships in the river were attacked. Antiaircraft opposition had increased somewhat over that of the previous day, four skyraiders were damaged, and one, unable to lower its flaps, landed fast and bounced over the barrier, destroying three planes and damaging six more.

With completion of flight operations the Striking Force retired southward. As of 5 July Admiral Andrewes the Royal British Navy, with Belfast Cossack and Consort was detached to join the blockading forces in compliance with orders from ComNavFE, and Task force 77 continued on Buckner Bay. There it arrived on 6 July, and it was retained there until the 16th.

On the East Coast

On the other hand, at the east coast, on 4 July Juneau from Task Force 96 of the NavFE worked up and down the shore between Samchok and Chumunjin, firing on bridges and on the coastal road. On the 5th, however, Juneau retired to replenish fuel and ammunition, and for the next few days the bomberdment duty was left in the hands of the British ships.

Thereupon, the 5th of July, which saw Task Force 77 retiring southward while the Juneau of Task Force 96 was completing her second tour of firing at coastal targets, saw also the beginning of the ordeal of the American foot soldier.

On the 5th, at the inland Task Force Smith which came from the 24th US Infantry Division made contact with the enemy at Osan, south of Suwon, where it ran into an entire North Korean Communist infantry division with armored support. After the hours of gallant stand the Americans were forced back on Chonan, where they would hold the enemy to 8 July.

The war was now ten days old. American civilians had been evacuated; a carrier air strike had been made against the enemy capital and the enemy air
force; the east coast invasion route was under fire from naval guns.

By the end of the second week of war the American 24th Infantry Division had been driven out of Chonan and was retiring onto Taejon.

Off the Korean eastern shore, on 5 July, HMS Jamaica relieved Juneau of her bombardment duties, and therefore the Admiral Higgins’ flagship Juneau headed for Sasebo to replenish. On the same day the British cruiser Jamaica, accompanied by HMS Black Swan fired on the road and bridge in 37°16'N, where the coastal route runs close to the sea, and on the 6th shot up oil tanks, bridges and shipping, and silenced a shore battery at Chumunjin. On the 7th, as Black Swan was relieved by Hart, the British cruiser destroyed an oil tank north of Ulchin, cruised northward firing at the cliff roads, and ended the day with an effective bombardment of Yangyang, the end of the coastal rail line from the north, where more oil tanks were destroyed.

While Jamaica was at operation on the eastern shore, the reinforcements and reorganization of the Korean Support Group which comprised Juneau and the four destroyers of the DesDiv 91 was underway in accordance with ComNavFE’s Operation Order 8-50. These instructions had been promulgated while the carriers were striking Pyongyang on the western coast, and as Task Force 77 retired southward Admiral Andrewes was detached to join the Support Group. With Belfast, Cossack and Consort, he proceeded to Sasebo where Juneau was replenishing.

On the east coast on 8 July, Jamaica and Hart joined by Swenson were operating in the vicinity of 37°. There, the enemy shore batteries were engaged and the British cruiser received a hit from a 75-millimeter shell which killed four and injured eight.

Meanwhile, Jamaica was relieved and ordered to Sasebo, the destroyers were left to provide fire support, and Juneau proceeded to Pusan. There Admiral Higgins spent the day in conference with the ROK and U.S. Army authorities, in the evening the cruiser proceeded north again, and at 0200 to 0330 of 10 July bombarded the port of Samchok, following which she headed south to check once more on the situation at Pohang. But another more northerly mission was expected on the eastern coast of Korea.

On 10 July a dispatch from ComNavFE instructed Admiral Higgins to extend his blockade task as far north as practicable, and reemphasized the importance of the coastal tunnels on the Chongju-Wonsan railroad. With these targets in mind equipment had already been procured and plans worked out to land a demolition party, and following another night on coastal patrol and a dawn bombardment of Yangyang and Sokcho, Juneau and Mansfield
headed north for the region between Tanchon and Songjin.

At 2000 on 11 July the ships slowed and the demolition party, a lieutenant and four enlisted Marines and four gunner's mates, led by Commander Willaim B. Porter, Juneau's executive officer, transferred from the cruiser to Mansfield. Moving onward through the darkness the two ships reached the target area, 16 kilometers south of Songjin on the east coast of north east Korea, at midnight. Mansfield closed to within 1,000 meters of the beach, hove to and lowered her whaleboat, and the demolition party went on in. The landing was without incident, no opposition was encountered, and after considerable scrambling around the precipitous terrain the party managed to locate the tunnel and set two 60-pound charges for detonation by the next train.

Although the results of the enterprise were unobserved, later reports of broadcasts by the North Korean radio seemed to indicate that the scheme had worked. By 0330 Commander Porter's party was back aboard, safe and sound, and with the distinction of having been the first members of the United States armed forces to raid upon the enemy locality north of the 38th Parallel. As their mission was accomplished Juneau and Mansfield headed south again and by noon of 12 July had rejoined Swenson on patrol between 37° and 38°.

The enemy ground forces had by this time reached south of the 37th Parallel and on 12 July the Eighth US Army called for naval bombardment of the cliff road in 36° 50'.

On 13 July De Haven came up from Pusan with an artillery major for Admiral Higgins' staff and, though air and ground observers were still unavailable, communications were established with the 25th US Division artillery detachment which was supporting the eastern front.

Coastal fog on the 13th made targets hard to distinguish, but Juneau and De Haven nevertheless spent a busy day shooting at the cliff road in response to the Army request from troops at Ulchin, at Mukho and the neighborhood, at a railroad yard on the local line which leads back into the mountains, and at POL storage in the harbor of Samchok. The shooting was fair, but the distressing ineffectiveness of 5-inch shells against roads and bridges made the arrival of 8-inch gunned cruisers from the United States appear increasingly urgent.

On 14 July no bombardment request from ashore was received and the visibility was poor, but in the evening Juneau let off a few rounds against truck headlights on the road south of Ulchin.

On 15 July, however, the cruiser and De Haven had a big day on the 20-
mile stretch between 36° 4′ and 36° 52′ where the road runs generally close to the sea. For the first time an Army liaison plane was available to provide air spot, and a total of 645 rounds of 5-inch ammunition, expended against hostile troops, shore batteries and other targets, included a little night work against road traffic with the aid of star shell illumination.

Joined by Mansfield on the next day, Admiral Higgins covered the coast between 36° 15′, and these three ships fired 173 rounds against targets of opportunity along the highway.

On 17 July Juneau was at Pusan for fueling while Admiral Higgins conferred with representatives of the ROK Navy. In the absence of the flagship, Mansfield and De Haven fired more than 400 rounds at miscellaneous targets in the same coastal area, and the British ships returned to the duty of coastal bombardment with the cruiser Belfast and the destroyer Cossack.

All these operations were accomplished successfully, but the next day brought wholly unprecedented activity along the east coast in the form of an amphibious landing and a strike by the Seventh Fleet carrier force.
CHAPTER III  ACTIVE NAVAL ACTION  
(18 July—31 August 1950)

Section 1.  The Pohang Landing (18—22 July 1950)

During the first week of July 1950 a carrier strike had been flown against Pyongyang the enemy's capital in the north, and the gunnery ships of Naval Forces Japan, augmented by British ships, had continued their bombardment of the enemy's east coast invasion route. This week saw also the commencement of planning for the first amphibious operation of the Korean War.

On 4 July Rear. Admiral Doyle, the Commander of Amphibious Force Far East, suddenly on orders from Vice Admiral Joy, the ComNavFE, flew to Tokyo with members of his staff to work on a plan for the landing the 1st US Cavalry Division.

For the operation ComFE's preferred objective was Inchon, seizure of which would give access to the Seoul transportation complex and would cut the enemy's main supply route. Alternatively, it was proposed to land the Cavalrymen at Kunsan on the mouth of Kum River, where they could strike inland toward Taegon and the enemy's right flank. Subsequently for four days Admiral Doyle's staff struggled with the Inchon and Kunsan problems. But these objectives were discarded on the 8th. Eventually, thus the situation called for a landing on the southern or eastern coast in an effort to reinforce at once the faltering 24th US Divisions, and on 10 July Admiral Doyle's suggestion of Pohang was accepted. The planning proceeded at an accelerated rate, and then the activity was legalized on the 12th when Commander Naval Forces Far East issued Operation Order 9-50 with the code name of "Bluehearts."

Fortunately Pohang was still in friendly hands. As the Pohang operation was a comparatively small one in its scale and the plans and operations were made in record time, the organization of an Attack Force followed standard amphibious practice. The landing force, commanded by Major General Hobart R. Gay, Commanding General of the 1st US Cavalry Division, consisted of the 5th, 7th and 8th Regiments, an artillery group of three battalions and minor attached units. These were transported to the objective area in
the large vessels of the transport group, in the 16 LSTs of the tractor group and in follow-up shipping. The Attack Force also included a minesweeping group of seven minesweepers; a gunfire support group made up of *Juneau* the American destroyers *Kyes*, *Higbee* and *Collett* and the Australian *Bataan*; and units assigned for reconnaissance, control purposes at the objective, administration of the beaches, and the like. The air support was the responsibility of the Air Force, which by this time had a fighter squadron on the Pohang airstrip; close air support at the objective, if needed, would be provided by the Seventh Fleet, which was moving up from Okinawa for the occasion.

Early in the morning of 18 July, the ships of tractor and transport groups moved into Yongil Man. The current fighting front at this time was reported a few kilometers north of Pohang, but the gallant 3rd ROK Division was still holding the road, and at 0559 hours Admiral Doyle, the commander of Pohang Attack Force and also the Task Force 90, made the signal to “Land the Landing Force” in accordance with the plan for an unopposed operation. Task

Landing craft shuttling from ship to shore with reinforcements and supplies off the east coast near Pohang on 18 July.
Force 77 and Juneau were released from their support commitments, and only a small combat air patrol from Valley Forge was retained overhead to protect the shipping of the Attack Force.

From the ships of the transport group at anchor in Yongil Man, the troops and vehicles were shuttled ashore. Nine of the LSTs disgorged their cargo along the beaches of Yongil Man, along with the smaller landing craft; seven were ordered out to Kuryongpo around the point to unload the vehicles. The landing was begun at 0715 hours and the general unloading commenced at 0930; except for Cavaliers, all major ships had been emptied by midnight, while the LSTs had discharged all personnel, vehicles and more than half their bulk cargo. In this operation more than 10,000 troops, 2,000 vehicles and almost 3,000 tons of cargo had been put ashore.

As the landing was unopposed one and since the ROK troops were still holding out to the northward, the US cavalry division was welcomed by none of enemy but by General Walker the Commander of Eighth US Army as well as the ROK troops and also by trains ready formed to carry them to the frontline.

On 19 July Major General Gay assumed command ashore, but for a variety of reasons unloading of the follow-up shipping was somewhat slow. A week later it was all over, and CTF 90 was able to report the completion of operations at Pohang and the withdrawal of all shipping from Yongil Man. On 22 July the 1st US Cavalry Division took over the frontline positions at Yongdong southeast of Taegon from the battered 24th US Division.

Section 2. Carrier Operations by Valley Forge

On 9 July Major General Dean, then commanding all army units in Korea, had inquired hopefully about the possibility of carrier air support. In response, Admiral Struble, the Seventh Fleet Commander, on next day advised Admiral Joy of his willingness to help out either with close support or with further strikes on the Korean coast targets.

On 16 July, as the Seventh Fleet started north to cover the Pohang landing, Admiral Joy issued Operation Order 10-50 governing the conduct of carrier attacks against the North Korean Communist forces. Morning of the 18th found the carrier Valley Forge, Triumph and their screening ships in the
Eastern Sea, some 60 miles northeast of Pohang. At dawn local antiship and combat air patrols were launched by Triumph, and Valley Forge sent off a target combat air patrol and a support group of attack planes to assist the landing. The Valley Forge air group was now available for attacks on the Communist targets in the north. On the 18th and 19th, therefore, strikes were flown against railroad facilities, industrial plants, and airfields from Pyonggang and Wonsan north through Hungnam and Hamhung. In the two days of attacks two aircraft were lost, but both pilots were recovered. Results were enormous, instead. Some 50 grounded aircraft were sighted, of which more than half were destroyed and the remainder damaged, while flights north along the railroad on the 19th exploded four locomotives. Particularly the explosion of Wonsan and the oil refinery was the biggest one. This seaport city, located at the head of the Korean Gulf and at the east coast focus of Korean rail communications, was the site of a number of manufacturing plants, and the center of a considerable complex of petroleum installations, developed to the largest refinery in Korea.

On the afternoon of the 18th July Valley Forge jets reported that the refinery appeared in full operation, and at 1700 hours a strike group of eleven skyraiders and ten Corsairs was launched, the former armed with 1,000 and 500-pound bombs and the latter with high velocity aircraft rockets. As the group came in over the city the Corsairs went down first, firing their rockets and 20-millimeter guns, and were followed by the skyraiders with their bombs. After actions the large fires and so much smoke on the burning refinery were visible to the force at sea.

Two days of east coast strikes were over now and the plans of the moment called for the force to fuel at sea on the 20th in preparation for two more days of operations. Admiral Struble had advised ComNavFE on the afternoon of the 20th that he hoped to conduct a one-day strike on western Korea on the 22nd, spend a day in refueling and rearming his force, and return on the 24th and 25th for further attacks against the west coast targets.

At dawn on the 22nd July, from a location in the Western Sea of Korea northwest of Kunsan, the Valley Forge launched her air group. On the 23rd, while Valley Forge was refueling, an emergency dispatch from Eighth US Army informed all major commanders of an urgent requirement existed for the employment of naval air in the west coast area beginning that day, and requested information as to naval capabilities in close and general support.

At Sasebo in Japan rearming of Valley Forge began on the morning of the
24th. But the replenishment was to be cut short by the rapid worsening of the ground situation in the west. Early in the afternoon an order was received from ComNavFE, cancelling existing plans and assigning Task Force 77 the area south of the Kum River and west of the line Kunsan—Chonju—Namwon—Kwangju, the region of which was believed to contain a major concentration of North Korean Communist forces. Accordingly, the Commander Task Force 77 was ordered to search carefully and to destroy all armor, bridges, traffic, troops concentrations and barges up to the limit of his capabilities. Thus, at midnight on the 24th Task Force 77 was again underway from Sasebo and headed north. The carriers launched at 0800 hours on the 25th from a position south of Korean peninsula, and for the remainder of the day maintained planes in the air over the frontline. Early in the afternoon Admiral Struble reported that owing to lack of targets the morning sweeps were of very minor effect. Although he announced that he would continue with afternoon attacks, the effort seemed unfruitful to the Commander of the Seventh Fleet, and once again he emphasized the need of proper communications with commanders in the field.

In view of the unproductive nature of the day's work the Valley Forge air group had flown pilots to Taegu to arrange for targets and communications for the 26th.

The carrier operations during July, though they were encountered limits by difficulties in control and by logistic problems, had been reasonably successful. But they had not been free from cost; in addition to the aircraft destroyed in the deck crash of 4 July, two F9Fs, three F4Us, and a helicopter had gone into the water, and on the 22nd a skyraiders had crashed and burned, taking its pilot down with it.

Section 3. Reorganization of Task Force 96

The growing strength of US Naval Forces in the Far East had already brought changes in the organization of Task Force 96. The ComNavFE’s operation order of early July was modified by the addition of Task Group 96.7, the ROK Navy, and of Task Group 96.9, the submarines acquired from the Seventh Fleet. With the arrival of Rear Admiral Richard W. Ruble all aviation activities had been consolidated into Naval Air Japan, Task Group 96.2. Logistic support at Sasebo, Japan was improved by the establishment
of Service Division 31, Task Group 96.4.

On 23 July Rear Admiral Hartman, Commander Cruiser Division Three arrived at Yokoska with Helena and Destroyer Division III, while Toledo, which had been ordered ahead, entered Sasebo. On reporting to ComNavFE, Admiral Hartman was instructed to take over command of all naval forces engaged in escort, support, and blockade, with the exception of the ROK Navy. Pursuant to these orders Helena and the destroyers sailed at once for Sasebo, where they arrived on the 25th and where not only Toledo but Belfast with Admiral Andrewes and Juneau with Admiral Higgins were awaiting them. On 25 July at Sasebo the support groups and the Escort Group, were reorganized and consolidated into Task Group 96.5, the Korea — Japan Support Group, under command of Commander Cruiser Division Three. At the same time, on the basis of Admiral Higgins’ reports of the ineffectiveness of 5 and 6-inch gunfire against reinforced concrete bridges it was decided to use the 8-inch cruisers for bombardment and fire support; Juneau was scheduled for transfer to the Seventh Fleet, and Admiral Higgins shifted his flag to new Toledo. The new organization of Task Group 96.5 involved the creation of four subordinate units: two rotating East Coast Support Elements were set up, one under Admiral Hartman with Helena and Destroyer Division Three, the other under Admiral Higgins with Toledo and Desdiv 91; Captain Joy was to command the Escort Element to which four frigates were assigned; command of the West Coast Support Element remained with Admiral Andrewes who was responsible for the Western Sea and all the west coast operations.

Operational control of Korean affairs was turned over to Admiral Higgins on Toledo, who was ordered to join the fire support ships off Yongdok, on the east coast. As one heavy cruiser reached Yongdok, the arrival of 8-inch guns with their greater hitting power was helpful.

In brief, the subordinate units of the Task Force 96 which were involved in the reorganization under the ComNavFE, are summarized as follows:

| TG 96.1 | Fleet Activities Korea—Japan |
| TG 96.2 | Naval Air Japan |
| TG 96.3 | Shipping Control Administration Japan (Seajap) |
| TG 96.4 | Service Group |
| TG 96.5 | Korea—Japan Support Group |
| TE 96.50 | Escort Element |
| TE 96.51 | East Korea Support Element 1 |
| TE 96.52 | East Korea Support Element 2 |
| TE 96.53 | West Korea Support Element |
| TG 96.6 | Minesweeping Group |
Section 4. Support of the Naktong Perimeter  
(18 July—30 August 1950)

During the weeks of July as the U.N. Command struggled to stop the enemy advance, the naval operations were carried out more actively in all places. To support the war in the peninsula a steady stream of shipping was flowing into Pusan, while the Pohang landing conducted by Task Force 90. At the same time Task Force 77, the United Nations' long-range weapon, worked over North Korean air strength and communications, attacked targets of opportunity like the Wonsan refinery, and attempted to provide maximum volume of fire support from the naval guns or by the carrier-based planes against the pressure of the numerically superior enemy on both sides of the peninsula. While patrol planes covered the maritime flanks, the gunnery units escorted shipping, bombarded enemy positions, and gave fire support to the ROK and UN forces holding the front. Particularly on the east coast, day after day, the bombardment of the enemy invasion route continued. Coordination with the troops ashore was improving steadily, and as suggested problems an artillery liaison officer was assigned to Admiral Higgins' staff and spotting planes were at least intermittently available.

On 18 July, as the 1st US Cavalry Division was landing at Pohang, Mansfield and De Haven from the destroyer Division 91 were working the coastal road in the vicinity of Samchok, while the British cruiser Belfast and destroyer Cossack were patrolling at the 38th Parallel. In the morning as Juneau was released from her support commitments, the others came south to join the flagship off Yongdok, where the day was spent firing on targets of opportunity and where a reported full-scale enemy offensive was broken up. For the next two days Juneau and Belfast together with destroyers operated off Yongdok, between 36°17' and 36°30', and although the spotting planes were grounded by the passage of Typhoon Grace, the gunners' efforts met with great success. Two days of shooting up the valley at troop concentrations in Yongdok cost the ships some 1,300 rounds and got the results of more than 400 enemy troops were destroyed out.

But at Yongdok, as all around the perimeter, pressure continued to be
severe, and the ROK forces ashore were planning the recapture of the town. In the long run, through the active cooperation of the naval forces the operation was successful. At 0600 on the 21st, after a 15-minute bombardment of the town, two star shells from Juneau gave the signal for the attack, and by 0717 hours the ROK troops had overrun Yongdok. Firing in support of the advance continued throughout the day, and Juneau and Belfast with the destroyers expended more than 800 rounds.

As July ended Task Force 77 retired to Okinawa for logistics, and naval responsibility for air support of the perimeter devolved upon the escort carriers. Of these Sicily was first in action. On 2 August she picked up her screening ships south of Kyushu, and on the next day the aircraft of Marine fighter squadron arrived on board. That afternoon a first strike was flown off against North Korean communist troop concentrations near Chinju in the west and also on the central Naktong front.

On 4 August further strikes were flown against the enemy in the Chinju area, and with evening the Sicily group steamed into the Western Sea and headed northward.

On the other hand, on east coast the last echelon of Pohang shipping was completing its unloading when Admiral Higgins arrived with Toledo on 26 July. And on the next day 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as Toledo fired on troop concentrations, supplies and fortifications by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell. By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for all days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, coordinated by troops ashore of fire control and by air spot. Cruising was carried out generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation.

The 7th of August was spent for a move of 70 miles to the northward in the vicinity of Samchok, where the task element ranged along a 25-mile stretch of coast, firing on targets selected from aerial photographs. A bridge across a small river was destroyed, road junctions were plowed up, embankments were knocked down across the highway, and two tunnels sealed by bombardment.

Admiral Hartman's Helena group, in the meantime, was cruising Formosa Strait, where it was joined by Juneau on 30 July. On 1 August, however, the task group was dissolved, Admiral Hartman headed his ships back northward, and after three days at Sasebo for logistics sailed once again for the northeastern coast of Korea, where air sighting reported a thousand railroad cars
in the region between 40° and 42° N.

The bombardment of the town of Tanchon in 40° 28′, carried out by Helena and Destroyer Division III on 7 August, marked the furthest north for U.N. surface forces since Juneau's early raid. Tanchon offered tempting rail and highway bridge targets, a marshalling yard, and some minor industrial facilities. With a VP 6 spotting plane overhead, the force shot up boxcars in the yard and the town power plants, and inflicted a satisfactory 75 percent damage on the railroad bridge. Having applied this pressure to the northeastern artery, the Helena group came southward during the night, and on the next day dropped a highway and a rail bridge near Sokcho, just above the 38th Parallel. This work completed, Admiral Hartman relieved Admiral Higgins of his fire support responsibilities off Yongdok, and the Toledo group headed for Sasebo to replenish.

On the west coast of Korea Royal British naval elements, now divided into three rotating sections of a cruiser and two or more destroyers each, was carrying out its duties of bombardment and blockade. On the west coast there also the ROK navy was already fully occupied with its active operations. On 3 August the ROK minesweeper YMS 502 sank seven sailboats which were loading off Kunsan; four days later and 30 miles to the northward she sank two motorboats, while other Korean units destroyed four small junks in the Haeju Man approaches above Inchon. On the 9th an important step was taken in support of west coast operations as an LST was sailed for Ochong-do, an island 40 miles off Kunsan, to establish an advanced ROKN supply base which would eliminate the 300-mile round trip to Pusan.

In the south, on 2 and 3 August the destroyer Higbee patroled the Namhae area but encountered no enemy movement. On the night of 4–5 August underwater demolition personnel from the fast transport Diachenko attempted to blow bridges north of the railroad town of Yosu. But the landing force was repelled by a North Korean Communist patrol and the naval attempt was frustrated. Instead, on the 12th the destroyer Collett from Admiral Higgins' task element, steamed into Yosu Gulf to bombard the town.

So far the first few days of August, while these coastal activities were in progress, the Seventh Fleet Striking Force lay at anchor in Buckner Bay, Okinawa. During this interval Admiral Struble visited Taiwan, in company with General MacArthur, to perfect planning and liaison against the chance of a Communist invasion; the carrier Philippine Sea arrived from the United States, and Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen, Commander Carrier Division
One, flew in from Pearl Harbor and reported aboard. The pilots from Philippine Sea entering action for the first time on 5 August, were assigned specific targets in southwestern Korea, with the emphasis on the rail and highway bridges at Iri, east of Kunsan, where cuts would hamper movement of supplies to the enemy’s southern flank. Valley Forge planes were sent off on close support missions, and while the weight of effort was concentrated on troops, supplies and bridges in the dangerous northern sector, two Corsairs attacked enemy personnel west of Taegu and five Skyraid ers inflicted heavy casualties on troops behind the central front. But these Skyraid ers reported poor control, and an eight-plane jet sweep never did succeed in reaching its assigned controller. Dissatisfied with the operation of control procedures, Admiral Hoskins now sent four Valley Forge pilots to Taegu for liaison purposes and to help in the direction of support aircraft.

The 6th of August saw the task force still south of Korea, attacking objectives assigned by air controllers and bridge and highway targets from Yosu north to Hwanggan. Once again Philippine Sea concentrated her efforts on transportation facilities, while Valley Forge flew 24 Corsair and 22 Skyraider sorties under JOG control. The emphasis was on the Chinju assembly area and on enemy line of communication behind it; but attacks were also made on troop and transportation targets behind the central Naktong front, in the Waegwan area, and in the important neighboring junction town of Kimchon. Claims for the day included destruction of a large supply dump, five trucks, two jeeps and a tank, damage to a number of bridges and many troop casualties; the distribution of effort represented a useful attempt at close interdiction, if not at close support of troops in combat.
During the night the force moved into the Western Sea, and on the 7th, from a position west of Mokpo, swept airfields and flew strikes against bridges, warehouses, rail yards and vehicles in the region south of the 38th Parallel. At midday, in response to the JOC request, an effort at support of the perimeter was made by eight Corsairs and nine Skyraiders flown in from Philippine Sea.

As to the support of perimeter, an afternoon message from Admiral Joy suggested that subject to especially urgent need for close support, the carriers strike coastal targets in Area F, between Chongjin and Hungnam, where many trains and much rolling stock had been recently reported, and where Helena was currently shooting up Tanchon. This message crossed one from Admiral Struble in which he reported that after fuelling on August he hoped to strike northward in Area E, northwestern part of peninsula, on the 9th, and returning to Area B, between Taegon and Seoul, the next day; should however the Army require support at the perimeter, the force would fly mission in Area B on the 9th and in A of the southwestern sector on the 10th.

These hopes, however, were to be deferred by a dispatch from ComNavFE, received on the afternoon of the 8th as the force was fuelling from Passumpsic and Cacapon on the south of Cheju-do. Concern for the safety of Eighth US Army had led CincFE to order the entire carrier air effort placed on close support and close interdiction from 8 to 17 August. Admiral Struble's plan to hit targets in Area E was now perforce abandoned, and the 9th of August again found the carriers west of Mokpo, flying strikes against the Inchon—Seoul area. There, for the first time antiaircraft fire of moderate intensity was encountered; there, at Air Force request, the three-span bridge over the Han at Seoul was attacked and hit with 1,000-pound bombs. West of Taegu a four plane flight, sent in to the perimeter from Valley Forge, discovered adequate control and destroyed a tank.

On 10 August, operations continued in the same pattern, with continued emphasis on interdiction of the Inchon—Seoul complex. This was Philippine Sea's day in close support, and 4 six-plane flights were sent in at three-hour intervals. But all were forced to attack targets of opportunity, none was used in support of troops, and two failed entirely to contact a controller owing to overloaded radio channels.

Admiral Struble requested information on interdiction targets from all hands, his revised intention for the future called for strikes in Area B on the 12th, followed by a move north to attack the region between Sinanju and Pyongyang.

On 13th, aircraft from both carriers ranged north of the parallel, attacking
transportation targets at Pyongyang, Chinnampo, Haeju and way stations with good results, especially in the destruction of locomotives.

In the meantime the 1st US Marine Brigade launched its first offensive. To contain the enemy's south coast advance Lieutenant General Walker, the Eighth US Army Commander, had decided to attack westward from Masan toward Chinju. Army forces were to move west along the main highway, while the American Marines were assigned the task of cleaning out the left flank along the coastal road through Kosong and Sachon. On 5 August, as aircraft from the fast carriers struck enemy forces near Chinju, orders were issued for an attack to begin on the 7th. On that day, the eighth anniversary of the landing on Guadalcanal, the 1st US Marine Brigade attacked westward. In this peninsula, as on that island, the weather was hot, humid and exhausting. Three days of heavy and confused fighting followed while the hills controlling the road junction at Chindong-ni were cleared. But coordinated employment of brigade artillery and of Marine aircraft flown from the escort carriers broke up the enemy formations and chased them back into the hills. Tanks, vehicles, and guns were destroyed by the aviators from Admiral Ruble's task group, and napalm and strafing helped to clear the heights.

On the 10th the Marine Brigade Commander Brigadier General Craig pushed his brigade down the road to the southwest. At this time Sicily retired to Sasebo for two days, but Badoeng Strait did the work of two with 44 sorties.

During the fighting at Chindong-ni as of the 8th, the North Korean Communist forces built up their Naktong bridgehead to regimental strength and by 10 August the enemy 4th NK Division was across the river.

At 0800 on the morning of the 11th the advance on Kosong was resumed. Overhead a division of Corsairs from Badoeng Strait observed trucks retreating so fast. Making the most of this agreeable opportunity with rockets and 20-millimeter fire, the aviators piled up rolling stock in wholesale quantity.

**East Coast Interdiction**

(6—20 August)

As the second week of August was ending the critical sectors of the UN forces' defense perimeter were on the Naktong front west of Yongsan, in the northwest beyond Taegu, and on the east coast in the vicinity of Pohang.

Admiral Joy had been directed to carry out demolition raids on the
Korean coast, and as the 1st US Marine Brigade moved northward to the Naktong bulge the weight of naval effort shifted to the northeast and to the enemy’s coastal line of communications.

North of the 40th Parallel the Korean coastline is precipitous, with mountains rising steeply from the sea. Constricted by the geography, the railroad for more than 60 kilometers runs close to the shore, and is thus accessible to naval gunfire and to landing parties. Execution of this operation was facilitated by the arrival of the fast transport Horace A. Bass, led by Lieutenant Commander Alan Ray, a destroyer escort conversion carrying four LCVPs (Vehicles and personnel Landing Crafts) and with a capacity of 162 troops.

On 6 August a group of underwater demolition and Marine reconnaissance personnel was assigned to Horace A. Bass, and to this planned schedule of raiding activity Admiral Joy now added carrier strikes. On 7 August he had noted that reports of enemy rail traffic promised useful employment for Task Force 77 in Area F, the northeastern sector of Korean Peninsula. The Task Force 77 was to strike from the East Sea on 16–17 August, refuel on the 18th, and strike again for two days. In order further to reduce the pressure on the northern front, the Far East US Air Forces was instructed to put its maximum bomber effort on the Waegwan area north of Taegu on the 16th, while the carrier planes were striking Area C, the middle eastern portion of the peninsula containing the Uchun and Samchok area. On the 17th, as purposed by Fifth US Air Force, Task Force 77 would move northward to operate against Area F, between Wonsan and Chongjin.

In the meantime, Admiral Joy’s surface forces had begun to converge on north Korean eastern shore. On 7 August the Helena group, en route to relieve off Yongdok, had bombarded Tanchon. On the 13th, in response to the reports of enemy shipping at Wonsan, Admiral Hartman established blockading stations in 39°50’ and 40°50’. Enemy movement on shore was also receiving attention: Between 13 and 16 August, while the ship employed the daylight hours in bombardment of rail targets, the raiders from Horace A. Bass carried out three night landings between 41°28’ and 38°35’ which resulted in the destruction of three tunnels and two bridges. The ComNavFE had by this time established a joint zone for surface and submarine operations, Area 7, between 40° and 41° on the Korean east coast.

Meanwhile, the Task Force 77, which got underway once more from Sasebo on the afternoon of the 15th August and during the night steamed north to the East Sea for its scheduled operations against Areas C and F.

The first strikes on the morning of the 16th were sent off, as planned,
against bridges and supply dumps in Area C. But increasing pressure on the big perimeter around Taegu and on the little one at Chongha, just north of Pohang led to a switch to close support. A morning strike of eight destroyer tender planes and seven F4Us from Philippine Sea was diverted in the air.

By the 17th, when the 3rd ROK Division was taken out of Chongha, Horace A. Bass had completed her three raids and had departed the area. But Pickerel now arrived to begin her photographic work; the Toledo group, on its way to relieve off Pohang, stopped by to bombard; for the first time in a month Task Force 77 had a chance to strike northeastern Korea.

With Mansfield, Collett and Swenson as screen with patrol plane spot and with a combat air patrol from Task Force 77, Toledo cruised the 60-kilometer stretch of coast from Songjin south to Iwon, where the railroad runs close to the sea. The targets were plentiful, and the 297 rounds of 8-inch high capacity guns expended against three railroad bridges and several hundred freight-cars were considered to have been destroyed. At the same time the two carriers of Task Force 77 were flying strikes against rail facilities and such minor coastal shipping as could be discovered between the 38th and 42nd Parallel.

Although the close support efforts of Task Force 77 on the 16th had been concentrated in the east, a considerable number of sorties had been sent to the Waegwan front northwest of Taegu.

By this time the activities of ROK naval forces were no longer limited to inshore blockade. Evacuation of refugees from the south coast, and by raft and barge from the Nakdong valley, was calling forth a major effort, and on 17 August, 600 ROK Marines were landed on the Tongyong peninsula south of Kosong. There, by seizing and holding the isthmus north of Tongyong city, the ROK Marines effectively bottled enemy troops in and on the landward side, and prevented their movement across the narrow water to the island of Kojé, below Chinhae. And concurrently at ROKN Headquarters, plans were being made to carry the war back north.

At sea, meanwhile, the Seventh Fleet carriers had moved north on 17 August to strike Area F. On the next day, prior to giving similar treatment to the west coast, Task Force 77 fuelled from Passumpsic and Casapón, and re-armed from Mount Katmai, the first ammunition ship to reach the Far East. The 19th saw the Admiral Stuble's force again in the Western Sea, giving support to the perimeter and striking targets in Area A and B, while Philippine Sea's interdiction strikes this day were concentrated on the vital railroad bridge in Seoul. Nine destroyer tenders with two 1,000-pound bombs each and nine F-4Us with 500-pounders were sent against this target;
the job was done, but at the cost of the loss of Commander Vogel, the air group commander.

Close support duty on the 19th also fell upon Philippine Sea, and the morning launch of 18 planes brought satisfactory results. Although radio channels continued crowded, tactical air controllers were contacted as planned, and effective attacks ensued. In five separate areas between Hyopchon and the front lines large fires were started with gratifying effect.

On the next day the force had another chance at the type of operation favored by Admirals Joy and Struble. From a launching point west of the Tokchok Islands strikes were flown against transport facilities and warehouses along the line Sinanju—Pyongyang—Kaesong in Area E. On the evening of the 20th the carriers turned southward and headed for Sasebo, where they arrived at 1400 on 21 August.

Coastal Operation and Carrier Strikes
(21-31 August)

In the last ten days of August 1950 a lull descended upon the Naktong River Perimeter, the current fighting front of the war. Nonetheless, for the UN forces the problem was to hold its own perimeter until the counteroffensive could be prepared.

Throughout this period of the lull the operations of the blockading forces continued unabated. Off the front line at Pohang fire support continued, with a heavy cruiser and a destroyer division always on duty and with the nightly northward dispatch of a destroyer to shoot up enemy supply dumps in the rear. Yet while this work went on the coastal supply line was not forgotten, two destroyers were maintained on northern blockading stations, and the attack from the sea against enemy communication centers was again extended northward by a bombardment of the iron and steel center of Chongjin. On the 19th Chongjin was bombed by FEAF B-29s, and on the 20th the destroyer Swenson, from the northern barrier patrol post, arrived offshore and put 102 rounds into iron works, harbor installations, railroad yards, and radio stations, starting flames that were visible for 28 kilometers to seaward.

Two days later the destroyer Mansfield shot up Songjin, just south of 41°, and in a night bombardment inflicted apparently severe damage on the docks, railroad facilities, and bridges of this mineral and lumber export center of the north Korea. The 23rd saw Mansfield off Chongjin, compounding with 180 rounds of 5-inch the damage previously inflicted by Swenson. On the 24th
Admiral C. C. Hartman, with *Helena* and four destroyers, arrived off Tanchon undisturbed since the *Toledo* group's bombardment of the 7th. Railroad cars and warehouses were worked over with the aid of helicopter spotting, after which the group proceeded northward to Songjin, where on the next day heavy damage was inflicted on marshalling yards and railroad cars.

Back of the line at Pohang a period of comparatively quiet was followed, but on the 22nd, there saw an increased enemy pressure. On the next day a conference with army representatives on board *Toledo* led to improved procedures in air spotting. These paid off on the 24th, as the cruisers' gunners had the gratifying experience of putting an 8-inch shell in one end of a tunnel reported to contain a supply dump, and of observing smoke come out of the other. The 25th was a day of variety as enemy tanks and guns were taken under fire, and as the North Korean Communists in their turn attempted an amphibious movement against the town by the use of motorboats and sailboats. But this efforts was beaten off by small units of the ROKN, and when Admiral Hartman and the *Helena* group arrived to relieve next day Pohang was still in UN forces' hands. Aircraft from Task Force 77 took off some pressure on the 26th, reinforcements were again moved in by the Eighth US Army, and from the 28th to the 31st August close support was provided by the US Marine airmen from *Sicily*.

But while the enemy had abandoned his endeavors to bring supplies down from the north by sea, in the south or southwest he was vigorously attempting the forward movement of materiel and troops by small boat. This effort to improve the logistics of his southern flank led to a strengthening in
the inshore operations of the ROK Navy.

Together with increasing enemy activity on the southern front, and with ComNavFE's previously expressed concern about inshore traffic near Namhae Island, these south coast actions led to the inauguration of a new fire support station in Chinhae Man, a bay which, reaching into Chindong-ni and Masan, gave water access to the southern end of the perimeter. On 26 August the destroyer Wiltsie was assigned to duty there in support of the 25th US Infantry Division, and this service was continued by various ships in rotation until later September 1950.

From 21 to 25 August, while the perimeter continued generally quiet and the coast busy, Task Force 77 was replenishing at Sasebo. On the 22nd Admiral Forest P. Sherman, the Chief of US Naval Operations, and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, arrived by air, following a brief trip to Pusan, to visit the force and to apprise Commander Seventh Fleet of his appointment to command the Inchon operation.

On the 22nd, in the meantime, the ComNavFE had in a dispatch to CincFE
argued that the best results would come from the strikes north of the 38th Parallel, where many extremely lucrative and profitable targets existed, even though the effect at the front would be felt with some delay. This recommendation was accepted by General MacArthur, and a new schedule was promulgated; two days on the east coast commencing on the 26th, a day in fuelling, and two days of attacks in the west. On each coast the effort of the first day would be divided between close support and interdiction; throughout the operation first priority in interdiction would be given to railroad and other transportation targets. This dispatch was followed by another in which the CincFE, in view of current planning expressed concern about a possible enemy air buildup. FEAF and Task Force 77 were strictly ordered to emphasize interdiction of air facilities, and while avoiding damage to runways, to refuse the enemy the use of airfields south of 39°. Finally, a request from FEAF for cooperation in the destruction of specified north Korean bridges was approved by the ComNavFE.

On 26 August enemy lines of communications were swept, attacks on targets of opportunity were carried out, and another attempt was made to provide support for the ground forces. At sea, activity was of a routine nature: the fire support ships at Pohang and Chinhae remained busy, the ROK Navy was fully engaged, but bombardment of the northeastern supply line had temporarily ceased. Air strength available for the support of the perimeter had also declined, as a result both of decreased enemy pressure and of the requirements of the planned landing operation of Inchon. The Fifth US Air Force was still operating from Japanese bases, and its daily total of support sorties had dropped well below that of early August; Sicily, after four days in support at Pohang was en route to Sasebo, Japan.
CHAPTER IV  THE INCHON LANDING OPERATION
(1—30 September 1950)

Section 1.  The Enemy's Last Insanity in Attack
(1—14 September 1950)

Along the Naktong Bulge

Late on the night of 31 August 1950 the enemy launched his greatest effort. Around the entire perimeter from Pohang to Haman heavy attacks began, very great forces were committed to the Naktong River front, and almost at once it was obvious that a major emergency was at hand. All troops were ordered out of reserve, all air support was urgently called for, and at 0810 in the morning of 1 September the Marine brigade was alerted. Shortly after 1000 hours the Joint Operations Center sent off an emergency message to Task Force 77. Two hundred and seventy-five miles to the northwest, in the center of the Western Sea of Korea, the carriers had launched that morning at 0800 against transportation facilities in Seoul area and to the northward. Valley Forge aircraft had dropped a span of the rail bridge below Sariwon and has attacked transportation targets near Hwangju and on the Ongjin peninsula; Philippine Sea's bombers had struck the Pyongyang railroad bridge and marshalling yards, and card and equipment along the tracks to the northward; the sighting in the course of this activity of flatcars loaded with steel girders gave evidence of the effectiveness of previous bridge attacks. At 0935 hours jet sweeps from both carriers had been sent against airfields in the Seoul—Suwon area and against the harbor of Chinnampo. The fighters returned aboard at 1120 hours, just after a second propeller strike group was flown off against north Korean bridges and marshalling yards.

Shortly after the fighters had been landed aboard, the JOC's request for help was received. The response was immediate. Rear Admiral E.D. Ewen, Commander of the Carrier Division one at once turned his force to the southeast and built up speed to 27 knots. Strike missions in the air north of
Seoul were recalled at 1155, and the combat air patrol was vectored out to help them find the fleet in its position. At 1233 hours Commander Task Force 77 advised the JOC by flash message that his first strike would be on station at 1430, and at 1315 the planes began to lumber off the decks: 12 Skyraiders Carrying three 1,000-pound bombs apiece, and 16 Corsairs, each with one 1,000-pounder and four rockets. Ten minutes later the aircraft that has been recalled from the north were landed on. At 1344 a second flash message to JOC described the composition of the first strike group, and advised that it would be followed an hour later by a second of identical composition and armament.

As the task force drove southeastward, and as the strike group flew toward the perimeter the Marine brigade was moving north to Miryang and to the Nakton Bulge. Higher levels were also bestirring themselves: at 1231 hours 1 September CincFE had ordered all-out support for the Eighth US Army, and as the carriers were completing their preparations for the second launch dispatch of message relaying this information was received from ComNavFE. In Tokyo, in the course of the afternoon, FEAF informed Admiral Joy's Headquarters that as of 1245 hours the critical situation was in the 2nd US Division sector at the Nakton Bulge, asked emergency action to put both the aircraft of Task Force 77 and Radoeng Strait's squadron, then shore-based at Ashiya, Kyushu, Japan, on close support, and suggested sending any required liaison officers to the JOC at Pusan and the operation of Navy control aircraft from Taegu.

At 1630 ComNavFE passed these suggestions on to Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen Commander of East Carrier Forces; then minutes later the Marines were ordered to deploy Sicly's squadron to Ashiya next day to reinforce the effort in Korea. At 1800 FEAF was advised by courier that the fast carrier aircraft were already in action.

In the meantime another emergency call from JOC had requested all available effort on the 2nd against continuing enemy pressure on the Nakton front, and shortly after 1900 hours Admiral Joy instructed Admiral Ewen to comply.

Within the perimeter, meanwhile, the 14 planes strike group from Philippine Sea was instructed to attack a tank concentration east of the bombline; the flight leader made a preliminary low pass, observed white stars on the vehicles and attacked troop concentrations and a bridge on the Nakton River. Valley Forge's aircraft, instructed to orbit because the controller had no targets, spent 45 minutes circling while the flight of F-51s was called
in on an enemy troop concentration. Deprived of this target, suitable to their 1,000-pound instantaneous and VT-fused bombs, the group was finally directed to attack villages along the Naktong front.

Both carriers had launched again at 1430 hours. This time the planes from Valley Forge did useful work on the 25th US Division front, destroying much of the town of Haman, burning trucks on the road nearby, and flattening an enemy-occupied ridge west of the town. But Philippine Sea's group again failed to find a controller and was obliged to seek its own targets along the river. Both ships launched jet sweeps at 1615 and again at 1745 with similar results: Valley Forge fighters, failing to find controllers, attacked small boats in the river and trucks along the roads; those from Philippine Sea, equally uncontrolled, returned without firing a shot.

The response to the all-out emergency, of a task force total of 85 sorties, 43 had attacked without positive control, but the total of about 280 air force and navy sorties flown on the 1st September in support of the emergency along the Naktong was more than could be handled. Intentions had been good, the effort commendable and at 1800 hours ComNavFE sent a message admiring for a job, "well done" and for its support of the 25th US Division.

The last event of the day within the force was the launch of a night aircraft, with Commander Weymouth, Philippine Sea's air group commander.

On the next day, despite deteriorating weather, the carriers sent in 127 close support sorties, to which Fifth Air Force and the Ashiya-based Marines added 201 sorties. Ninety-nine of the carrier sorties received positive direction, and the troubles of most of the other 28 were attributable to a morning ground fog over the target area. Once the fog lifted things went well. Valley Forge aircraft destroyed three tanks, 12 trucks and three barges, and successfully attacked seven troop concentrations, while Philippine Sea strike groups claimed two trucks and a tank, and many casualties in attacks on 11 troop concentrations.

The last strike of the day was directed against enemy troops retreating across the Nam River south of the bulge.

At 2205 hours of 3 September, in the meantime, a dispatch of message from the Fifth US Air Force in Korea informed Admiral Struble that the Marines desired his air effort on the 3rd and inquired as to his availability; the message was forwarded with emergency precedence to Ashiya Air Base where both the 214th and 323rd Marine Fighter Squadrons were now located. But "Typhoon Jane" was nearing Japan, and at Ashiya the weather was very bad.
At Yongsan near the Naktong Bulge the enemy struck first on the morning of the 3rd, and a heavy attack launched at first light penetrated the Marines’ intended line of departure. But there was no Marine air overhead for close support; Typhoon Jane was centered over southern Honshu, Japan and the fighter squadrons at Ashiya were weathered in. At 1230 hours Brigadier General Craig, 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade Commander sent an urgent message to ComNavFE, requesting naval air close support. Eighth US Army, too, was in trouble, and at 0935 had called directly upon CincFE for the earliest possible return of the fast carriers. At 1340, in response to this plea, ComNavFE instructed Task Force 77, then refuelling and rearming southwest of Mokpo, to give all practicable support to the Army since the Marine planes had been grounded by weather; at 1405 General Craig’s message was relayed to the force. Once again all hands on the carriers doubled to flight stations, and at 1547 Admiral Ewen reported that his strike would be off in an hour, with arrival over the lines at about 1745. Twenty-two planes from Philippine Sea worked over the troops in the Masan area in close proximity to American positions. Valley Forge sent in 24 aircraft in four flights, some of which attacked Kwangju and Samchonpo, and some of which, despite bad weather, had considerable success under Marine control near Masan, where six Corsairs destroyed two tanks and 15 fieldpieces, damaged two other tanks and strafed troops.

At Yongsan front, despite the absence of air support, the Marines had continued their advance westward on the afternoon of the 3rd. By nightfall the originally scheduled line of departure had been gained or surpassed and the enemy, disorganized by the shock of this unexpected engagement, was retiring.

On the other hand, meanwhile, in preparation for the proposed landing at Inchon Admiral Struble, Commander Seventh Fleet had established and ComNavFE had promulgated a new series of carrier aircraft operating areas.

But while fighting was still heavy as the first week of September ended, the naval forces of the Far Eastern theater had done the job. Only in the region farthest from Pusan, the enemy’s all-out offensive was attempted stubbornly. However, although there were still North Korean Communist forces east of the Naktong and south of Pohang, pressure was again diminishing. By the second week of September it was clear that CincFE’s first essential had been accomplished. Despite all difficulties the ROK and Eighth Army units had succeeded in holding the perimeter. All now rested upon the landing at Inchon.
Section 2. Preparations for Counteroffensive

MacArthur's Selection of Inchon

For eighty-two days from the beginning of war until the amphibious assault at Inchon, the UN ground forces had been continuously on the defensive and often at the hardship of disaster. Ridge by ridge, and kilometer by kilometer, the UN forces had to withdraw from the 38th Parallel to a tiny perimeter around the port of Pusan. However, on the D-Day, 15 September 1950, with the shattering suddenness of a bursting shell, the course of the Korean War was reversed by the Inchon landing. In ten swift days the North Korean Communist forces, which had been hammering at the threshold of victory, were broken and beaten. The landing at Inchon and the restoration of the capital city of Seoul had won the war.

General MacArthur's selection of Inchon as the point of assault was a blend of his strategic, psychological, political and military reasoning. As the Reds drove the UN forces southward, he made frequent reference to their over-extended supply lines, most of which passed through Seoul. If Inchon, which take only ran hours by motor transportation from Seoul, could be seized by sea assault, the enemy's supply lines would be quickly severed. "The history of war." General MacArthur said, "proves that nine times out of ten, an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been severed." A successful landing at Inchon would shorten the war, save unnumbered casualties, and possibly obviate a winter campaign.

The other recommended points, near Pyongyang, or Kunsan, were too far or too close to the battlefront. The beaches opposite Pyongyang, the North Korean Communists, capital were well above the 38th Parallel and therefore too distant, while those near Kunsan were too close to the Pusan perimeter. A landing at Kunsan, General MacArthur thought, would not succeed in trapping the North Korean Communist forces. The Reds would merely retreat a few kilometers to negate and contain the landing.

Also motivating MacArthur's selection of Inchon was his confidence that it would not be strongly defended. Estimate by the General MacArthur was that the North Korean Communist forces would consider a landing at Inchon
impossible and would be taken by surprise. By now some intellectual order had been made out of the Korean chaos, at least on the high levels of command, by imposition of a three-phase concept upon the operations in the peninsula. The first of these phases involved the halting of the North Korean Communist forces’ advance, the second the reinforcement of UN forces in the perimeter to permit offensive action, and the third the amphibious counterstroke. Yet these phases were not wholly separable: Planning for phase three had to begin before the success of phase one was assured; the requirements of the first two phases had serious implications regarding the availability of forces for the Inchon landing.

Again, MacArthur’s estimate was right, for enemy opposition to the landing was only nominal. On the first two days of the Inchon landing (15 – 16 September) the First US Marine Division had the battle casualties of 22 killed in action, two died of wounds, two missing in action and 196 wounded in action, with the total casualties of 222.

Planning

After the final briefing of General Collins and Admiral Sherman, both US Army and Navy Chiefs, at the General Headquarters, the UN Command, in Tokyo on 23 August 1950, the decision to land at Inchon was firm, except for the formal approval of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, which arrived a few days after the two JCS members had returned to Washington. The three officers who would be responsible for formulating the plans for the operation and executing them were Commander US Seventh Fleet, Admiral Struble; Commander Amphibious Group One, Admiral Doyle; and Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, Commanding General, First US Marine Division. Admiral Struble would determine the broad plans; Admiral Doyle would handle the amphibious planning; General Smith the landing force plans. For the Inchon assault Admiral Struble would have an additional title as Commander Joint Task Force Seven. The presence of Admirals Struble and Doyle and General Smith in the Far East for the forthcoming Inchon operation was fortuitous. Admiral Struble had participated in or had supervised twenty-two amphibious operations, including Normandy, Leyte, Ormoc Bay, Mindoro, and Corregidor, during World War II. Moreover, he had worked closely with General MacArthur in the latter’s south Pacific campaign, and Admiral Struble’s experience and reputation were well known to the General. Admiral Doyle had had experience in amphibious warfare
during World War II as staff of the Amphibious Force South Pacific, seeing action at Guadalcanal and Tulagi during the Solomon Islands campaign and later as commanding officer of the cruiser *Pasadena*. He had been commander Amphibious Group One since January 1950. General Smith, one of the Marines' top amphibious experts, had commanded a regiment at Cape Cluicester, and had participated in the Peleliu and Okinawa operations.

A series of conferences were held in the Far East military authorities and continued by 7 September, and these conferences served to rapidly coordinate the final planning of the various forces and greatly facilitated the coordination of the landing operation at Inchon. Thus the plan of operations was soon pro-
mulgated and contained the following concept:

(1) An initial landing will be made on Wolmi-do to secure the island prior to the major landing. This step is essential because of the commanding position of the island in relation to the Inchon shoreline. On D-day at L-Hour, one battalion of Marines will land in assault on Wolmi-do to seize the island prior to additional landings. L-hour will be on the early morning tide about 0630.

(2) After the Wolmi-do landings, the principal landings will be made on Red, Yellow and Blue Beaches at Inchon by the 1st Marine Division (less one RCT) landing in amphibious assault. H-hour for these landings will be on the afternoon high tide about 1700. This division will then seize a beachhead in the Inchon area.

(3) The beachhead will be expanded rapidly to seize Kimpo airfield and the Han River line west of Seoul. The advance will be continued to seize and secure the City of Seoul, the terrain commanding Seoul, and an area to the south. The 7th US Infantry Division reinforced plus X US Corps troops will land administratively from second and third echelon convoys in the city of Inchon at a time to be designated after D-day and then carry on combat operations as directed by the Commanding General of the X Corps.

(4) Bombardment and fire support in connection with all these operations will be provided by cruisers and destroyers. Air cover, strikes, and close support will be provided by fast carrier and escort carrier aircraft within the objective area.

Major General Smith’s command group and advance planning staff (23 officers and 12 enlisted men) had arrived in Tokyo from Camp Pendleton, California on 22 August and had established an advance command post aboard Mt. McKinley. The remainder of the Marines moved into General MacArthur’s Headquarters in the Dai Ichi building in downtown Tokyo.

Thus, the planning of this vast and complex operation was completed in only 23 days -- a record which seems likely to stand in military history. This speed was a tribute to the ability and skill of the planners and to the soundness and solidity of the amphibious doctrine.

In carrying out the Inchon landing, General MacArthur organized the Joint Task Force, naming Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet to command it, and the principal subordinate forces and their respective commanders placed under this peculiar joint force were as follows:

Attack Force (TF 90)  Rear Adm. James H. Doyle, USN
Landing Force (X Corps) (TF 92)  Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, USA
Patrol & Reconnaissance Force (TF 99) Rear Adm. G.R. Henderson, USN
Fast Carrier Force (TF 77) Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen
Logistic Support Force (TF 79) Captain B.L. Austin
Advance Group Rear Admiral J.M. Higgins
Flagship Group Captain E.L. Woodyard

The principal missions and functions of these forces were as follows: (1) The Attack Force would make the assault landing and control the close air support and the naval gunfire support for the assault troops. The attack force would continue to provide support of the landing force after they had accomplished their landing; (2) the Landing Force (X US Corps) would land on the designated beaches in the Inchon area and carry out the ground operations. The 1st US Marine Division would carry the assault and seize the beachhead. The 7th US Infantry Division, inexperienced in amphibious warfare, would follow Marine ashore administratively; (3) the Patrol and Reconnaissance Force would provide long range reconnaissance and other aircraft patrols covering the whole area of operation; (4) the Blockade and Covering Force under Rear Admiral Andrews, Royal Navy, would conduct special reconnaissance missions and provide for covering of units of Attack Force en route to the objective area. Admiral Andrewes was also assigned specific interdiction missions and was to maintain a naval blockade of the west coast of Korea; (5) the Fast Carrier Force would conduct air operations to maintain air supremacy in the objective area and for the isolation of the objective area. The carriers would also provide air cover and support for the actual attack landing operations; (6) the Logistic Support Force would provide refueling and reammunitioning facilities in the objective area; and (7) and Finally, the Advance Group, including the Flagship of Seventh Fleet, would conduct a reconnaissance in force of the Inchon area on 13 September. The primary purpose would be to locate and silence gun positions on both Wolmi-do and the adjacent Inchon area which might threaten the success of the landing.

Six destroyers would be sent up the channel to anchor in a fan-shaped ring around Wolmi Islands to draw its fire and to silence its gun positions. At the same time, two American and two British cruisers would conduct a long range bombardment of the Inchon area with air spot, to reduce strong points and positions. Coordinated with the cruiser-destroyer fire would be heavy air attacks from the carriers. This neutralization operation by the advance group would be repeated on 14 September.

As stated precedingly, the mission of Commander Joint Task Force seven
was to land the X Corps on D-Day at H-Hour on the west coast of Korea in order to seize and secure Inchon, Kimpo airfield and Seoul, and sever the North Korean Communist forces' lines of communication. This accomplished, the harvest would follow as X Corps in conjunction with a planned offensive by Eighth Army and with the help of theater air and naval forces, would destroy the North Korean Communist Army south of the line Inchon—Seoul—Ulcin.

Backing the preparations of the operation, in the search for a better objective the fast transport *Horace A Bass* had been sent into the Western Sea of Korea and provided with fighter cover by *Badoeng Strait*; there between 20 and 25 August, and despite the presence of a full moon, her raider and UDT group had conducted night reconnaissance of possible beaches north and south of Kunsan, and of one in Asan Man, 60 kilometers below Inchon.

In the meantime, and on the basis of such intelligence as was available, the work of the planners continued. On his arrival in Tokyo Admiral Struble was briefed by Admiral Doyle's staff on the problems of Inchon, issued orders for concurrent planning, and undertook to give oral decisions as needed as the work went on. The flagship *Rochester*, on her arrival, was berthed alongside *Mount McKinley* to keep the staff in close proximity. On the 30th Admirals Andrewes, Ruble, Higgins and Captain Austin flew up from Sasebo for a conference of prospective task force commanders. And while the planning proceeded the preliminary operations were begun: New operating areas and operating schedules, intended to ensure adequate preparation of the objective without an overconcentration which would alert the enemy, were made up by Admiral Struble's staff for broadcast by ComNavFE to the carrier forces at sea.

In early September, and again in the days preceding the landing, the three carrier units of Joint Task Force Seven -- Admiral Ewen's fast carriers, Admiral Ruble's escort carriers, and the British light carrier *Triumph* -- would work over the west coast with their efforts gradually converging toward Inchon. Prior to D-Day a destroyer and cruiser bombardment of Wolmi-do would be carried out. On the early morning tide of 15 September a battalion landing team of the 5th US Marines would assault Wolmi-do in order to secure that commanding position. On the afternoon tide, at about 1700 hours, the main attack into the city would be carried out by the 5th US Marines remaining two battalions and by the 1st US Marines. While the two Marine regiments moved rapidly to expand their holding to Kimpo airfield and the Han River line, the 7th US Infantry Division and corps troops would be landed administratively and would then operate as ordered by the corps
commander. Throughout the operation bombardment and fire support would be provided by cruisers and destroyers, and air cover, air strikes, and close support by carrier aviation. So far as the air support was concerned the Joint Task Force Seven was self-sufficient: complication of coordination or control during the landing phase were fended off by the proviso that except at the request of Admiral Struble, no FEAF aircraft would operate in the objective area subsequent to D-3, while for the later stages of the battle the X Corps was provided with its own Tactical Air Command, composed of Marine aircraft. Such was the plan for the operation as worked out by the staff of Seventh Fleet, Amphibious Group and the Marine division.

By 2 September, when the joint Task Force operation plan and the Amphibious Group’s operation order were issued, Marine planning was nearing completion, and on the next day Admiral Doyle and General Smith sailed in Mount McKinley for Kobe, Japan, where the bulk of the 1st Marine Division units had just arrived from the United States.

This speed in planning, essential as it was, also brought its problems. There was no time for joint training nor possibility of rehearsal. Division and Attack Force staff had to plan for lower echelons without benefit of comment or opinion from the subordinates, and completed plans made their appearance as hand-outs to the regimental and task unit commanders involved.

The total strength of Joint Task Force 7 amounted to some 230 ships of all shapes and sizes. Except for a few gunnery ships held back to support the flanks of the perimeter, it included all combatant units available in the Far East. Fifty-two ships were assigned to the Fast Carrier, Patrol and Reconnaissance, and Logistic Task Forces; the remainder went to make up the Attack Force, Task Force 90 under Admiral Doyle. Of these, more than 120 were required to lift X Corps troops, while the rest were involved in gunfire and air support, screening, minesweeping and miscellaneous other duties.

The naval components of the Joint Task Force Seven for the Inchon landing were as follow:

**Task Force 90:***

1.2 Amphibious force flagship, 1 hospital ship, 1 fleet minesweeper, 6 motor minesweepers, 3 fast transports, 1 landing craft repair ship, 1 salvage vessel, 1 fleet tug, 2 escort aircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers (1 US Navy, 2 Royal Navy), 1 destroyer escort, 12 destroyers, 5 dock landing ships, 3 rocket ships, 4 ROKN submarine chasers, 1 amphibious control vessel, 8 frigates (3 USN, 2 RN, 2 RNZN, 1 French), 7 ROKN motor minesweepers, and 47 LSTs (30 Shipping
Control Administration, Japan), plus transports, cargo ships, etc., to a total of approximately 180.

**Task Force 91:**
1 light aircraft carrier, 1 light cruiser, and 8 destroyers.

**Task Force 99:**
2 seaplane tenders, 1 small seaplane tender, and 3 USN and 2 Royal Air Force patrol squadrons.

**Task Force 77:**
2-3 aircraft carriers, 1 light cruiser, and 14 destroyers.

**Task Force 79:**
2 destroyer tenders, 1 ammunition ship, 2 refrigerated stores ships, 1 cargo ship, 3 attack cargo ships, 3 light cargo ships, 4 oilers, 1 gasoline tanker, 1 internal combustion engine repair ship, 1 heavy hull repair ship, 1 salvage vessel, and 1 fleet tug.

Section 3. The Operation Chromite

**The Natural Difficulties**

The tides of Inchon, which marked 33 feet at their maximum and 23 feet at average spring tide, were among the greatest in the world, and certainly the worst in the Far East. Moreover, these extreme tides reached their peaks in approximately six hours, producing a five-knot current. The tidal approach to Inchon channel was generally eastward. Over the centuries, the tides had deposited vast mudbanks near Inchon which at low water extended some 6,000 meters to seaward. The approach channel to Inchon, called Flying Fish Channel, was narrow, tortuous, and difficult even for a daylight passage. With the absence of navigation lights and the possibility of enemy gunfire and mines, the navigation of an invasion fleet through such a channel was made extremely dangerous. So narrow was the channel that, if a ship foundered in the final approach to Inchon, the vessels ahead of it would be trapped, particularly at low tide. To make a large scale amphibious assault at Inchon demanded at least 29 feet of water to insure that the LSTs would have sufficient water beneath their keels to reach the selected landing beaches. On only four days a month were such high tides available, and the date for any landing in the fall of 1950, therefore, had to be 15 September, 11
October, or 3 November, give or take a day or two. Moreover, the tides not only dictated the day but even the hour—the time of high water. Thus, there was little leeway in the selection of an assault date. The tides predetermined both day and hour to the detriment of those elements so essential to the success of an amphibious assault—surprise and flexibility.

The next hazard was the strategic location of the city, with its protecting seawalls, and the related island of Wolmi-do. Never before had US Marine made an amphibious assault into the nearest of a large city, or across a so-called beach protected by stone seawalls. Moreover, there was only limited space for beaching the vital LSTs which had to accompany the troops, bringing in the necessary supplies, food, and ammunition. Its pier space was restricted and cargo-handling facilities were inadequate.

The island of Wolmi-do was yet another geographic handicap. This oyster-shaped, pyramidal island lay in the channel off Inchon and only 800 meters distant, and was connected to it by a narrow causeway. The island's topography and location gave it excellent command over the sea approaches in every direction.

The potentially impregnable location of Wolmi-do demanded that it be neutralized before any attempt to capture Inchon was made; otherwise, it would stand in a flanking position to thwart the marine assault upon the Inchon beaches. This necessity for neutralization meant that some of the element of surprise had to be sacrificed. For when the two-day bombardment effort necessary to neutralize Wolmi was made, the enemy might logically conclude that UN forces planned to land at Inchon.

Aerial view of Wolmi Island in the Inchon harbor showing the causeway to the mainland.
Wolmi-do Attack

As stated previously, a successful landing at Inchon demanded that the island of Wolmi-do be captured first.

Although the fast carriers had withdrawn to Sasebo on 5 September, following the strikes against the Pyongyang area, naval activity continued along Korean western shore. Between Kunsan and the 38th Parallel, aircraft from Triumph and Badoeng Strait scoured the land, concentrating on railroad bridges, rolling stock, and electrical transformer stations. While continuing to interdict coastal traffic, Admiral Andrewes’ surface ships found opportunity to bombard Inchon on the 5th and Kunsan the next day.

“In all the planning, it was my intention to so balance the air operation on the west coast that the finger of suspicion would not be heavily pointed at Inchon,” said Admiral Struble. “To accomplish this, I had the carriers not only strike Wolmi and the Inchon area, but also the Kunsan area to the south and the Pyongyang area to the north. I also ordered an amphibious feint in the Kunsan area on 7 September.” The diversionary landing at Kunsan was carried out by the British frigate Whitesand Bay supporting both American army and Royal marine commandoes along Korean coastal areas.

A series of balanced operations were planned for the neutralization of Wolmi-do commencing 10 September. On the 10th, Admiral Ruble’s Marine squadrons were ordered to burn off the western half of Wolmi-do. Double loads of napalm, to a total of 95,000 pounds, were ferried in during the course of the day by the marine aircraft of VMF-212 and 323 which dropped 95 tanks of napalm in a systematic pattern all over the island, with resultant destruction of 90 percent of the top cover in the designated area. Photo reconnaissance the next day showed 39 out of 44 buildings in the warehouse area destroyed. Periodically, over the next two days, a pattern of air strikes to soften the island’s defenses was delivered.

The pre-attack bombardment of Wolmi-do actually commenced at 0700 on 13 September.

The Gunfire Support Group Six (cruisers Toledo, Rochester, HMS Kenya, HMS Jamaica, and destroyers Mansfield, De Haven, Swenson, Collett, Gurke, and Henderson) started up Flying Channel. The weather was clear and the sea calm.

A few miles south of Inchon, as the channel narrowed, the cruisers dropped out of the column and anchored in their bombardment stations. But the destroyers continued northward.

Shortly before 1145 hours, Mansfield, the leading destroyer, reported
what appeared to be a string of mines. *De Haven*’s skipper, Commander Lundgren, confirmed the sighting. The order for open fire was given and both cruisers and destroyers opened fire on the enemy mines. The first mines was hit by *Gurke* at 1146.

Destroyer Squadron 91’s Commander, Captain H.C. Allan, detached *Henderson* to remain behind temporarily to destroy as many of the mines as possible, and then the rising incoming tide hid them from view, to rejoin at high speed. Except for a few mines, most of this minefield was destroyed by the cruiser-destroyer fire.

The destroyers boldly sailed past the doomed island, then under heavy air attack from Task Force 77 carrier aircraft. *Gurke* anchored first at 1242, only 800 meters from Wolmi-do. Behind her, the other destroyers halted in their assigned positions.

*De Haven* opened fire first, shortly before 1300, followed by *Collett*. Not until 1303 was there any fire returned from Wolmi-do, and it was a sudden that enemy fire concentrated on the three destroyers nearest the island: *Gurke*, *Swenson* and *Collett*. The first enemy shots were over, then short; at 1306 *Collett* took her first hit. She was struck again at 1310 hours, 1320, and again at 1329. The last shell was a 75-mm. armor-piercing shell which broke into two pieces, one going into the engineroom and fracturing a low-pressure steam line, the larger half plowing into the plot room, where it broke the firing selector switch and wounded five men. *Collett* shifted to individual control and shifted her anchorage on which at least one enemy gun had found the range. *Gurke* was hit next in two places, neither seriously. The *Swenson* took a near miss which instantly killed Lieutenant Junior Grade David H. Swenson and wounded Ensign John N. Noonan.

Nevertheless, the bombardment proceeded without further casualty, the *Mansfield* being narrowly missed during the retirement. The destroyers steamed out the anchorage at 1400, having blasted the island for more than an hour, supported by shellfire from the cruisers in the lower bay. As the destroyers steamed clear, the planes from Task Force 77 resumed the air attacks.

The reduction of Wolmi-do was resumed in similar fashion the following day. Prior to standing up “Flying Channel,” the advance force have to, half-masted flags, and conducted burial at sea ceremonies aboard the *Toledo* for the late Lieutenant Junior Grade David H. Swenson.

Only five destroyers (*Collett* having been detached) entered the channel. As *Henderson*, *Mansfield*, *De Haven*, *Swenson*, and *Gurke* steamed

northward, the remaining five destroyers resumed their positions around Wolmi-do and commenced firing. The Wolmi-do’s batteries were slow to answer, and for the first forty minutes not a shot from the island splashed around the destroyers. For 75 minutes the bombardment group earthquaked the tiny island.

In retrospect, the bombardment of the Wolmi Island in such a manner and under such circumstances was extremely bold one. That it was so successful is a tribute to the aggressive spirit of the US Navy, which has always accepted great risks where there is great promise. History must record this bombardment as a heroic and daring action.

Task Element 90.62 of those destroyers Mansfield (DD 728), De Haven (DD 727), Henderson (DD 785), Gurke (DD 783), Swenson (DD 729) and Collett (DD 730) received the Navy Unit Citation for the Wolmi-do attack.

**Hitting Beaches**

Silenced and shrouded in smoke, the Wolmi-Island was completely neutralized and now ready for capture by the Marines.
On the early morning of 15 September, the advance attack force led by Captain N.W. Sears, consisting of three high speed transports (Horace A. Bass, Diachenko, and Wantuck) and one LSD (Port Marine with 3 LSUs embarked) steamed up "Flying Fish Channel" in the darkness, guided by the flames of still-burning Wolmido and the light from Palseo. Ahead of these ships were the destroyers Mansfield, De Haven, Swenson; and following them, the LSMR (Landing Ship, Medium Rocket) division of three rocket ships of 401,403 and 404, plus the Southerland, Gurke, Henderson, Toledo, Rochester, Kenya, Jamaica, Collett and Mataco.

At 0545 hours, the bombarding ship opened fire on Wolmido, and again the F4U Corsairs from Carrier Division 15, sprayed the landing beaches.

At 0633, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Marines, led by Lieutenant Colonel R.D. Taplett landed from 17 LCVPs and three LSUs on the shattered island. There were two waves of LCVPs of eight boats, each carrying troops, and one wave of three LSUs carrying a total of nine tanks. The first wave of LCVPs was re-employed as Wave four. The resistance was generally light, for many of over 500-man enemy troops defending the island had been destroyed to inaction by the three days of air and surface bombardment. The US Marines stormed up the hilly slopes, and in 42 minutes the American flag was flying in Wolmido. The enemy suffered 120 dead and 190 captured, to the 20 wounded of the US Marines.

The rest of the day was spent by these Marines getting emplacements ready for two battalions of light artillery which would be landed on Wolmido with the main attack, to support the Inchon landing. The tanks were also made ready to cross the causeway to join the attack upon Inchon.

The actual landing at Inchon commenced at 1730 hours on the evening of 15th. There were three unusual features of the assault at Inchon. First of all, the US Marine Corps had never before made an assault into the heart of a large city, nor had they ever landed on seawalls being constructed in Inchon harbor. The second undesirable feature was the fact that the landing had to take place just prior to darkness, and a third undesirable feature of the landing across the Inchon seawalls was the necessity of having LSTs right behind the assaulting marines: Because of the tides and the late hour of the landing, sufficient supplies as much as 3,000 tons had to be beached simultaneously with the assaulting marines in order to guarantee logistic support during the night and until the next high tide would permit replenishment in the Inchon seashore.

The final afternoon bombardment of the Inchon beaches lasted for 45 minutes, with rocket ships, destroyers, cruisers and airplanes all joining in
the large and tremendously powerful bombardment. Admiral Struble’s orders to the bombardment forces clearly specified that there should be no promiscuous firing at the city itself or at civilian installations. Further, bombing and gunfire would be confined to targets whose destruction would contribute to the conduct of operations. Also, along the stone seawalled Inchon’s harbor area, four lengths were selected as the landing beaches. The Red Beach was to the north, 1,000 feet long, with a 15-foot seawall. The other main beach, Blue, lay to the south of the city, relatively clear of the urban area, and in such a position that the marines could sever the city’s communications from the rear. “Green Beach” and “Yellow Beach” (not used until D + 1 were on Wolmi-do and the tidal basin of the inner harbor, respectively. The latter two were logistic beaches only, Red and Blue being the assault beaches.

The assault on Red and Blue Beaches were simultaneous, roughly an hour before the sunset and high tide. 23 waves of LVTs made the Red Beach assault with the eight LSTs. In each LVT was a pair of scaling ladders with hooked ends designed to catch the seawalls. The first wave tumbled ashore with relatively little opposition, but the enemy fire picked up as Waves Two and Three approached.

The LSTs, led by 859, started in one by one at five-minute intervals at 1830 hours, one hour after the first Marine wave. These vessels seemed to draw the fire of the defending Reds, enabling the marines ashore to move forward. Despite the smoke, dust, haze and the approach of sunset, the eight LSTs succeeded in making the beach, although not in the order originally planned.

Just as LST 973 (Lieutenant R.I. Trapp) beached, it was hit by a mortar shell, which struck among gasoline drums parked topside. Quick work on the part of the damage control party prevented a fire. LST 914, fourth in line, was struck by enemy gunfire and set afire, but the blaze was soon under control. LSTs 857 and 859 were also hit.

The Marines continued to press forward, and in about one hour and a half had secured the hill near Red Beach.

On Blue Beach, 15 waves of LVTs and six waves of LCVPs took the Marines ashore. The seawall was again a problem, and dynamite was used to blast openings. Fortunately, however, the enemy resistance was light in this area, and the Marines pressed inland in the fast-falling darkness.

On 16 September, the ground forces advanced without undue resistance on an area reaching eight kilometers from Red Beach. The ROK Marines mopped up the area and throughout the town of Inchon. Air interdiction in
Hitting the beaches: Soon to be given his life, for which he won the Medal of Honor, 1st Lt. Baldomero Loperz, 5th US Marine Regiment, leads his platoon to climb seawall at Red Beach.

The north and south of the objective area was successful in preventing enemy reinforcement. The waterfront unloading, which was very slow at first, improved on D plus 1 Day, and henceforth unloading proceeded on schedule. Many enemy tanks, vehicles and mortars were strafed and rocketed on the Seoul — Inchon road. The Commander Amphibious Group Three (Rear Admiral L.A. Thackrey) arrived in Eldorado and was placed in charge of unloading operations ashore. Consolation arrived and commenced embarking casualties.

At 1800 hours, Major General Smith of the 1st US Marine Division, assumed command of the landing force elements ashore. The Gunfire Support Group continued deep and close support missions with good results.

At 0550, 17 September, two enemy aircraft, believed to be YAK-3s, made bombing runs on Rochester. The first plane to make a bombing run strafed also the Jamaica and was shot down by that ship. Jamaica, however,
suffered three casualties.

The 1st US Marine Division continued to advance against light resistance, and Kimpo airfield was secured by 2005 hours. On the other hand, 7th US Infantry Division commenced administrative landing at 1400 hours.

The Inchon assault was thus successful, and immediately after that for the next three days the 1st Marines pressed eastward against stubborn opposition.

Despite all geographic and hydrographic complications, the logistics of the assault phase turned out well. By 2100 hours of the 16th, almost 15,000 personnel, 1,500 vehicles and 1,200 short tons of cargo had been put ashore. And all first echelon shipping had been emptied by D plus 4. Three days later 53,882 persons and 6,629 vehicles were ashore, and the 25,512 tons of cargo unloaded more than doubled the X Corps target figure for that date.

For the fighting front at Sosa north of Inchon where the 1st Marines were pushing at the highway between Inchon and Seoul, on the 18th, there was more heavy fighting, but supported by Corsairs from Sicily, the objective of a commanding hill northeast of the town was gained with the help of the escort carriers’ aircraft and of the cruisers’ guns. Here was the half-way mark between Inchon and Yongdungpo, the industrial suburb of Seoul which lies on the south bank of the Han River. Air strikes from Badoeng Strait and artillery fire were called down upon the town of Yongdungpo. An attempted night surprise crossing of the Han aborted when the first swimmers encountered enemy forces on the far shore, but early on the morning of the 20th the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marines crossed in LVTs starting from the side of Kimpo, against only light resistance. Covered by Marine aircraft from Sicily, the other battalions followed apace. By the 21st September the 5th Marines had reached within two and a half kilometers of the capital of Seoul. Thus, the air support, air strikes against approaching enemy columns, and air cover for shipping were still being provided by the carriers, and the Kimpo based squadrons began operations on the 20th. However, as the artillery in full operation and air support increasing, the naval gunfire had begun to decline. By D + 3 the destroyers had been outranged, and while the cruisers had supported the fighting around Sosa, the crossing of the Han and the advance toward Yongdungpo had taken the Marines beyond the range of 8-inch guns.

As of 1700 hours of D + 6 1st US Marine Regiment was entering Yongdungpo, the 5th US Marine Regiment on the western borders of Seoul, and the units of the 7th US Infantry Division were advancing on the southern
flank. Upon this, Major General Almond, the X Corps Commander, had assumed control of the land campaign and the Joint Task Force Seven was dissolved. At Inchon, then the 7th US Marine Regiment was coming ashore from transports and cargo ships which a month before had been part of the Atlantic Fleet, and were moving forward to the Kimpo area as the rear party. With this arrival the 1st US Marine Division at last acquired its full complement of three regimental combat teams.

The success of the Inchon assault brilliantly enhanced the military reputation of the one man who said it could be done -- General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. It also reflects great credit on the three principal naval and Marine officers -- Admiral Struble, Admiral Doyle, and General Smith -- who planned and carried it off.

General MacArthur saluted the US Navy and Marines on the morning of the 15th, September, in a message to Vice Admiral Struble: "The Navy and the Marines have never shone more brightly than this morning. MacArthur."
Section 4. The Lessons of the Inchon Landing

The Effectiveness of “Chromite”

The success of the Inchon landing, one might say with little exaggeration, had changed the military situation in Korea overnight. Inchon had been secured on the day following the Operation Chromite’s execution; Kimpo airfield fell on 17 September; and by the 19th UN forces had reached the Han River. For a day or two it appeared that perhaps the landing would not have the desired effect, for the Reds held firm before Pusan until the night of 17 September. The resistance began to collapse, and by 25 September, when the Marines were fighting in Seoul, the North Korean Communist forces were in panic flight toward the 38th Parallel.

The next problem facing the UN high command was that of the crossing of the Parallel, a problem that was still being debated in the U.N. General Assembly when the 3rd ROK Division on 1 October surged north across the border. General MacArthur had few doubts about what should be done, and on 26 September, the day after he declared his planners to prepare for operations to seize all of north Korea. General MacArthur’s foresight was justified on the following day when the US JCS authorized him to conduct operations north of the Parallel, provided that before such operations began there had been no entry of major Red Chinese or Soviet forces into north Korea nor any threat of such entry. The threat of entry by Red Chinese forces came on 30 September from Chou En-lai and was repeated by him to the Indian Ambassador in Peking on the 3rd of October, when he stated that if non-Korean troops crossed the Parallel, Chinese Communist forces would not stay idle. This threat, obviously designed to influence the General Assembly, did not have the desired effect, and the Political Committee on 4 October passed a resolution authorizing General MacArthur to take “all appropriate steps ... to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.” On 9 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff modified their previous instructions to General MacArthur about ceasing operations north of the Parallel on the threat of Red Chinese or Soviet entry into the war, by now stating that actual contact with such forces in strength should be the only grounds for halting the northward advance. On that same day, 9 October, the UN forces launched their major attack across the Parallel.
The astounding success of the Inchon adventure had encouraged General MacArthur to include another amphibious landing in his plans for the complete destruction of the North Korean Communist forces and the seizure of the entire peninsula. With the ROK forces attacking on the eastern front and the Eighth US Army and its attached UN troops in the western sector, the North Korean Communist forces were being rapidly driven back. But General MacArthur wished to destroy the Communists, not shoosh them across the Yalu, and he decided to use both an airborne and an amphibious landing to cut off as many as possible. The former called for the dropping of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team near Sunchon, a road and rail center some 48 kilometers north of Pyongyang, and it was carried out on 20 October.

The amphibious operation was a much more amphibious undertaking. Like Inchon, the Wonsan landing was the brainchild of General MacArthur, and the UN naval forces prepared to carry out the landing at the place fixed by General MacArthur.

Thus, General MacArthur had considered that a landing at Inchon followed by seizure of the Seoul area, the hub of the Korean communications network, promised the best hope of a speedy decision, and consequently the results reflected his sound estimates to win the war.

The Value of Amphibious Operation

The immediate lesson is that Inchon demonstrated afresh the incalculable value of amphibious operations. The planning and execution of the Inchon landing in record time, and with a minimum of casualties, despite the considerable hazards, is a tribute to the skill, training, readiness, and courage of the men of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps who made it possible. The results of the Inchon operation were notable in many fields. The immediate military effect upon the Korean War was instantaneous and decisive. On the 17th of September, with the Marines plunging toward Seoul, there was still no evidence that the landing had resulted in any relaxation upon the Naktong River Perimeter. In a few hours, however, a despatch from General Walker of the Eighth Army reported that resistance in his front had weakened, and by that evening it was apparent to all that the great Operation Chromite had paid off. That Inchon was a magnificent gamble grandly taken by General MacArthur, and that it also was brilliantly conducted by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, there can be no doubt.

The Inchon landing can be credited with the North Korean Communist aggression, for in a matter of days the entire half of the peninsula below the 38th
Parallel had been recaptured by the UN forces, and the North Korean Army was a beaten and broken army.

An explanation of the results of Inchon assault was found in Rear Admiral Doyle’s action report:

“The target date which was designated, 15 September 1950, did not give adequate time by normal standards for joint planning between the Commander of the Attack Force and the Commander of the Landing Force. There was no time available for the joint training of the landing forces involved, or for holding rehearsals for the Marines, ships, planes and landing craft which participated in the operation. Many naval and Marine units arrived in Japan with barely sufficient time to combat load in accordance with loading plans.

The successful accomplishment of the assault on Inchon demanded that an incredible number of individual and coordinated tasks be performed precisely as planned in the face of almost insuperable difficulties. The fact that the assault was successful is a matter of history.

Under the circumstances I have briefly mentioned above, it is my conviction that the successful assault on Inchon could have been accomplished only by United States Marines. This conviction, I am certain, is shared by everyone who planned, executed or witnessed the assault. My statement is not to be construed as a comparison of the fighting qualities of various units of our armed forces. It simply means that because of their many years of specialized training in amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, only the United States Marines had the requisite know-how to formulate these plans within the limited time available and to execute these plans flawlessly without additional training or rehearsal. To put it another way, I know that if any other unit of our armed forces had been designated as the landing force for the assault on Inchon, that unit would have required many many months of the specialized training, including joint training with the Navy, which is a regular part of the Marines’ everyday life.

All these facts emphasize the soundness of our national policy in entrusting to the Navy and Marine Corps the specialization in, and the development of, amphibious warfare. Conceivably, in the future, we may be required to execute many amphibious landings on many fronts."

Vice Admiral Struble subsequently made the observation: “General MacArthur’s choice of Inchon for the landing demonstrated his great military sagacity. Inchon—Seoul was a strategic target of the greatest value, and his decision as Commander-in-Chief to face the many amphibious difficulties was indeed courageous. The critical ground situation in the Pusan perimeter, and the necessity for a landing with the higher tides on September 15th, or waiting until the day of next high tide probably on October 13th, made action by the earlier date of vital importance. Hence the time available to prepare
and issue the instructions to seven major forces and arrange for the co-
ordination between them was very limited. Rear Admiral Higgins and the
Sitting Duck Destroyers under Captain Allan for their mighty bombardment
of Wolmi-do and Inchon, Rear Admiral Ewen and Rear Admiral Ruble for
their powerful, accurate air attacks, which stunned the North Korean de-
fenders of Inchon and harassed the supporting forces trying to reinforce the
city, Rear Admiral Doyle and Major General Smith, USMC, who successfully
landed the First Marine Division in the courageous assault that captured
Wolmi-do and Inchon, Major General Almond, U.S. Army, whose X Corps
captured Seoul in short order, Rear Admiral Andrewes, Royal Navy, Rear
Admiral Henderson, and Captain Austin, whose forces strongly supported
the assault, were those commanders of forces concerned. Their aggressive
action and splendid teamwork carried out the operation with a precision and
effectiveness which were wonderful to behold and which are now a matter of
record."

On 27 September the X US Army Corps Commander, Major General
Almond, sent warm praise Vice Admiral Struble: "Air support by your com-
mand for the X Corps attack on Seoul on 25 September was outstandingly ef-
fective, comprehensive, and timely. Please pass to Admiral Ewen and his
men my congratulations and appreciation for this splendid effort which
markedly furthered the capture of Seoul."

Nonetheless, the Inchon landing taught no new lessons about amphibious
techniques. None were used nor needed, and what was demonstrated was
that for traditional warfare the doctrine and command relationships and tac-
tics of World War II were still effective and still decisive.

As General MacArthur had indicated to General Smith, the result of the
Inchon landing was to make certain the permanence of the Marine Corps in
the United States military establishment. The incomparable achievement of
the Marines at Inchon demonstrated in clearest terms the need of an adequate
and ever-ready Corps.
CHAPTER V  THE BATTLE OF THE MINES
(September—October 1950)

Section 1. The Advance into the North

The Mopup and Drive Northward

Within the Naktong perimeter, 224 kilometers to the southeast, the tide had turned. Despite the great naval investment in the Inchon landing some fire support remained available for the flank forces in the perimeter. On the 12 September 1950, pursuant to a suggestion from Admiral Sherman, the Chief of the U.S. Naval Operations, the various task groups operating under ComNavFE had been consolidated, and the Korea Support Group, Task Group 96.5, upgraded into Task Force 95. This overall command of the United Nations Blockading and Escort Force was assigned Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith; the West Coast Support Group, now Task Group 95.1 continued under control of Admiral Andrewes, and east coast operations under Admiral Hartman. In preparation for Eighth US Army’s general counteroffensive and as a diversionary move coordinated with the Inchon landing, Admiral Hartman’s ships bombarded Samchok on 14 and 15 September, where on the latter date Helena and Brush were joined by Maddox and by Missouri, first battleship to reach Korean waters. Five years before, as one of 23 active battleships in the U.S. fleet, Missouri had lain in Tokyo Bay to receive the surrender of an empire, but now in Korean waters she was demonstrating the demolition capabilities of the 16-inch gun, and with the expenditure of 52 high capacity shells destroyed one Samchok railroad bridge and damaged another.

On the 16th, as planned, the ROK Army and the Eighth US Army attacked all along the line. On the east coast, on 17 September, ROK troops crossed the Hyongsan River south of Pohang with the help of 298 16-inch persuaders from Missouri, captured the city, and pressed onward Yongdok. Two days later elements of Joint Task Force Seven began morning and evening air reconnaissance of the roads south of Seoul, and alerted Task Force 77 to the possibility of a big strike against forces retiring northward from the
perimeter. On the 20th, the II NK Corps, which manned the northern sector of the perimeter, began its retreat. By the end of the first week the pursued of July had become now the pursuers of September as the 24th US Division broke through the Naktong River line and rushed up the road to Seoul. On the south coast, by this time, UN forces had advanced halfway to Chinju, and the Chinhoe fire support destroyer had finally been released. On 25 September orders were issued by the enemy for a general withdrawal.

By 22 September the 5th US Marine Regiment had reached the western ridge line and were knocking at the back door to Seoul. Here the enemy had established his main line of resistance, and here heavy opposition was encountered. Despite close support from the escort carriers and the Kimpo-based Marine squadrons, the advance was relatively slow. On the 25th, with the reinforcement of ROK and UN troops, the enemy main line of resistance was broken. During the attack toward Seoul the close air support effort was carried out to a high pitch: Badoeng Strait was loading ammunition in Inchon harbor, but Sicily provided five aircraft on station every two hours, and the US Marine Fighter Squadron 212 at Kimpo set a new record for combat sorties. On 26 September the advance inside the city continued against house-to-house resistance, and on the 28th organized resistance in the capital was finally broken. On the 29th General MacArthur turned the capital back to President Rhee of the Republic of Korea.

Thus by September's end, the shattered North Korean Communist forces

US Marine aircraft, Corsair fighter-bombers on Kimpo Airfield after the Inchon Landing.
were in full retreat. Entire Communist divisions had completely dis-integrated and were spread over the Korean countryside in disorganized units. Enemy lines of communication and supply had been completely severed, and escape routes, except for the mountainous areas, were in United Nations hands.

In the meantime, the 1st US Marine Division supported by the Marine Corsair pilots of Task Group 96.8, pushed northward to take Uijongbu, a vital road hub 19 kilometers north of Seoul, which had briefly served as temporary headquarters for the retreating North Korean communist forces.

Simultaneously, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team commenced a mop-up of the Kimpo peninsula.

As the situations of the war on the Korean peninsula shifted from the defense to the offensive, from the perimeter warfare to pursuit, UN naval forces kept the enemy under constant blockade, surveillance, and bombardment whenever possible. Missouri anchored in Inchon channel south of Wolmi-do and fired missions against enemy troop concentration on the road leading north from Suwon. The cruisers Toledo and Rochester, from a position in the Inchon channel north of Wolmi-do, heavily shelled troop concentrations and strong points in the Seoul—Kimpo area.

Early in the morning of 27 September, a particularly heavy bombardment was commenced by the cruiser Manchester and destroyers Ozbourn, Hollister, McKean and Frank Knox. Five thousand enemy troops had been reported bivouacked on the target area. At eleven minutes past seven, the five-ship armada opened fire and shelled the area continuously for forty-nine minutes with five and six-inch fire. Following this bombardment, thirty-three rocket and bomb-loaded Corsairs and Skyraiders roared in from Boxer's Air Group Two (Commander D.M. White, USN) to attack the Communist defenders.

For four days, the pilots of Task Force 77 continued to the reduction of enemy forces and military targets. The only incident of the entire bombardment happened to Ensign C.E. Dorris of Fighting Squadron 23, who was hit by antiaircraft fire during a bombing run. Ensign Dorris crash-landed 16 kilometers south of Pyongyang. It was a 96-kilometer flight for a Kimpo-based Marine helicopter from the Marine observation type Aircraft Squadron Six. In an adventurous flight by helicopter flown by Captain V.A. Armstrong, USMC, a successful pickup of Ensign Dorris was made in about two hours, but the helicopter ran out of gasoline in the vicinity of the Han River. Fortunately, the emergency landing occurred in friendly held territory.
In the post-Seoul mopup, Task Force 77 lost six aircraft and suffered damage to twenty. One man had been killed in action. The Seventh Fleet carriers struck eight railway bridges, destroying five. 24 highway bridges were attacked and eight destroyed. Also reported destroyed in the free-swinging offensive were three aircraft, 203 trucks and vehicles, 20 warehouses, nine locomotives, ten gun emplacements, 52 railroad cars, four tanks, and 143 oxcarts.

After operating in the Western Sea from 21 September through 3 October, Task Force 77 departed for Sasebo, Japan. Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen stated that the carriers had supported the UN forces with both close and deep-support air strikes and by serving as target air coordinators and by spotting for naval gunfire. Admiral Ewen reported that targets below the 38th Parallel had been reduced so effectively and rapidly after the recapture of Seoul that carrier aircraft were out of targets.

The American Navy was now ready and eager to carry the war back into the territory of the North Korean Communists who had initiated it.

The Decision on the Wonsan Landing

In the meantime, that General MacArthur anticipated authority to cross the 38th Parallel was evident on 26 September. On this day the General directed his Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to develop a plan for operations north of the Parallel. General MacArthur stated his brief then that the Eighth Army should make the main effort either on the west or the east coast. Once this matter was resolved, he felt there should be an amphibious envelopment on the opposite coast—either at Chinnampo or Wonsan, or elsewhere. Although the plan to make an amphibious landing at Wonsan was first proposed to ComNavFE in Tokyo shortly after the Inchon landing, it was not until 29 September that General MacArthur himself outlined the plan to subordinate commanders. This was done on the second floor of Seoul's capital building, following the ceremonies in which he gave Seoul back to the Government of the Republic of Korea. General MacArthur described to those present, including Vice Admiral Joy, Lieutenant Generals Walker and Stratemeyer, and Major General Almond, plus representatives from the X US Corps and the Far East Air Force, how he planned to end the war with another amphibious envelopment.

On 20 October, he said, the X US Corps would land at Wonsan. The US Marines would be outloaded at Inchon, and, because of Inchon's limited port facilities, the 7th US Infantry Division would be embarked at Pusan. While
the X Corps made a seaborne run-around-end, the Eighth Army would push directly toward Pyongyang. After landing at Wonsan, he continued, the X Corps was to move northward between the Eastern Sea of Korea and the Taebek Mountain Range, turning westward through passes in the mountains to link up with the Eighth Army.

The reasons motivating a seaborne landing at Wonsan were later explained by General MacArthur: "The Eighth Army's lines of supply were already taxed to their maximum capacity to sustain the day-to-day minimum requirements of its troops in the line," he said. "Furthermore, the dispatch of X Corps by sea was intended as a flanking movement against enemy remnants still trying to escape from the south to the north, and as an envelopment to bring pressure upon Pyongyang should the attack upon that enemy capital result in a long drawn-out siege."

General Almond started to implement the Wonsan plan immediately following the conference in the Seoul on the 29th. General Almond called his subordinate commanders together that same afternoon for a second conference at Puyyang known as Ascom City, near Inchon. There, General Almond stated that he hoped it would be possible to land at Wonsan by 15 October, advancing by five days the D-Day deadline set by General MacArthur. Also he believed that the Eighth Army should be able to pass through and relieve X Corps by 3 October, on which date the shipping would start arriving in Inchon for loading.

To the naval planners 15 October seemed extremely optimistic. As late as 29 September, the 1st US Marine Division was still fighting north of Seoul; on 2 October, in fact, the Marines had 16 killed and 81 wounded in heavy fighting at the front. Moreover, should the first vessels not arrive at Inchon until 3 October, and if five days were required to load, as had been estimated by Joint Special Plans and Operations Group, plus four more days to steam from Inchon to the objective of Wonsan, then only two of the original six days would be left for unloading the landing force in the objective area. In early October the Marines did not know how many ships or what type would be made available for transporting the division. Moreover, they had no maps of the Wonsan area sufficiently, and there was little intelligence.

As events unfolded, General Almond's desire that the X Corps should be relieved by 3 October was accurate as far as the 7th US Division was concerned. As a matter of fact, elements of the Eighth Army began relieving the 7th US Infantry Division on 2 October, and General Almond ordered this division to begin moving toward Pusan by motor and rail.
Despite his lack of planning information, Major General O.P. Smith, the 1st US Marine Division Commander, established a tentative task organization composed of three regimental combat teams and issued his operation order. In it he earmarked the 1st and 7th US Marine Regiments to launch Wonsan amphibious attack. Each regiment would employ two battalions in assault. All Marine units would combat-load out of Inchon. General Smith did not welcome the probability of splitting his division, once ashore, in mopping-up operations.

Next day, 4 October, General Almond issued the X Corps Operation Order No. 4. This ordered the 7th US Infantry Division to outload at Pusan for the landing at Wonsan and the 1st US Marine Division to report to the Attack Force Commander of the Seventh Fleet as a landing force for the Wonsan amphibious assault. The Marines were to seize the X Corps’ base of operations at Wonsan, to secure the Wonsan airfield, and to furnish logistic support until relieved by the shore party.

On 5 October the 5th Marines were relieved. On the 6th and 7th, the 1st and 7th Marines were relieved. On 7 October, the 1st Marine Division command post at Inchon was transferred aboard Admiral Doyle’s flagships, the Mt. McKinley. Marine outloading at Inchon began 8 October.

For the first several days, an amphibious landing at Wonsan was not questioned by the Navy. Both Admiral Joy and Admiral Struble recognized the military need for an assault, as well as the logistic urgency for capturing an additional logistic port.

The naval planning for an amphibious assault at Wonsan was a near duplication of the preparation for Inchon. Admiral Struble issued his preliminary plan on 5 October and his final plan on 9 October. The tasks given by Admiral Struble to his forces were several: (1) To maintain an effective naval blockade of the east coast; (2) to furnish naval gunfire and air support to any east coast army units in addition to those to be landed at Wonsan; (3) to conduct pre-D-Day bombardments; (4) to load and transport the X Corps to Wonsan; (5) to seize Wonsan by amphibious assault; (6) to occupy and defend a beachhead; and following the successful accomplishment of all this; and (7) to provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistic support to the X Corps.

The major elements of Admiral Struble’s task organization included the following:

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<tr>
<th>CTF 90: Attack Force</th>
<th>Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle</th>
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<td>CTF 92: X Corps</td>
<td>Major General E.M. Almond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF 95: Advance Force</td>
<td>Rear Admiral A.E. Smith</td>
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As the planning and preparation to land Wonsan went forward, a message was received from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorizing General MacArthur to proceed north of the 38th Parallel. From this dispatch it was apparent that although the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to expand the war, they did not discount the possibility that the Soviet and Red China might intervene. Three days later the JCS approved the General MacArthur’s plan.

While the decision to make an amphibious landing at Wonsan was never changed, General MacArthur did consider a plan to invade at Hungnam rather than at Wonsan. On 8 October, he confided to Admiral Joy that if the I ROK Corps took Wonsan prior to D-Day, he was considering landing the 7th US Division administratively at Iwon. In this case the 7th Division could drive west-southwest to join the Eighth Army on the west coast. At the same time, said the General, the 1st US Marine Division could make an assault landing at Hungnam, instead of Wonsan, to cut the enemy’s lines of communications through Hamhung. Vice Admiral Struble told Admiral Joy that a landing on Iwon could probably be made on short notice because of the limited mine problem and the satisfactory landing beaches in that area. He added “Iwon was an open beach. We could have taken chances at Iwon and made an assault there.”

Landing the Marines at Hungnam, however, was a more complicated problem, and Admiral Joy pointed out to General MacArthur that because of mines, early and easy entry might be impossible; that there were insufficient landing craft to land simultaneously at two places; that the timetable for the operation was already critically tight; there was no time to shift ships, rewrite plans, and all the rest. But the most important deterrent, he reminded General MacArthur, was there were far too few minesweepers to clear even one area, let alone two.

On 9 October, Admiral Joy informed Admiral Struble by dispatch that he was trying to prevent a change in plans. Admiral Struble was in full agreement with Admiral Joy’s opinion. Thus, with the support of Admirals Struble and Doyle, and in view of all factors Admiral Joy persuaded General MacArthur to continue the original Wonsan plan.
Section 2. The Operation Tailboard

The Wonsan Landing

The X US Corps, in the meantime, would reembark and sail for Wonsan on eastern shore of Korea, 184 kilometers north of Seoul and 152 kilometers east of Pyongyang. There, following an assault landing, General Almond's units would attack westward across the narrow Korean waist, link up with Eighth Army, and encircle enemy forcesretreating from the south. This operation was named "Tailboard."

For the Operation Tailboard to be carried out in October this time, the responsibility again fell upon Admiral Struble as Commander Joint Task Force Seven.

Once again the Joint Task Force Seven had its own organic air force, both afloat and ashore, and its private theater of air operations. Within a line run inland from Kosong at the southern end of the Korean Gulf, north along the mountain spine, and eastward to enclose Hungnam, the carriers of Joint Task Force Seven and the shore-based aircraft of X Corps Tactical Air Command would operate without disturbance from the Far East Air Force, except for air transport and specially requested missions.

But while the externals were similar, the internal organization of the joint task force was considerably modified. The upgrading of the mine menace, following events at Inchon, made it essential to extend the preparatory period of the operation, and to send the sweepers and their supporting ships in well ahead of the Attack Force. While Admiral Doyle and his staff concentrated on the landing itself, the directives for the Covering and Support Group were written by Admiral Smith, and the minesweeping plan was worked up at the headquarters of ComNavFE in Tokyo under the supervision of Admiral Struble.

The Joint Task Force Seven for the Wonsan landing composed the following subordinate units:

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<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Force Type</th>
<th>Officer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>X Corps</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. E.M. Almond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Advance</td>
<td>Rear Admiral A.E. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>Covering</td>
<td>Rear Admiral C.C. Hartman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Task Group 95.6: Minesweeping Group
Task Group 96.2: Patrol and Reconnaissance Group
Task Group 96.8: Escort Carrier Group
Task Force 77: Fast Carrier Force
Task Force 79: Logistic Support Force

Captain R.T. Spofford
Rear Admiral C.G. Henderson
Rear Admiral R.W. Rubble
Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen
Captain B.L. Austin

While the raiding group was approaching its first objective the minesweepers of JTF 7, Task Group 95.6 departed Sasebo with a scheduled arrival off Wonsan on 10 October. On the 8th the patrol planes which had been hunting mines in the Western Sea shifted their activities to the east coast. On the 9th the carriers Leyte, Captain Thomas U. Sisson, and Philippine Sea, the former a recent arrival from the Mediterranean by way of Norfolk and the Panama Canal, sortied from Sasebo in company with Manchester and 11 destroyers, and headed north to provide air support. On the 10th Admiral Hartman departed with Helena, Worcester, and Ceylon, and on the next day Admiral Struble sailed in Missouri, accompanied by Valley Forge and screening destroyers.

On the 12th Admiral Struble arrived off Wonsan in Missouri, joined up with Admiral Hartman's cruisers, and headed north for a bombardment of Chongjin. With a screen composed of one Canadian, one British, and one

The USS Missouri bombarding Chongjin with her 16-inch guns on 12 October 1950.
Battle of the Mines

Australian destroyer, and with combat air patrol and air spot provided by the fast carriers, *Missouri* and the cruisers conducted a deliberate and sustained bombardment of warehouses, rolling stock, and marshalling yards.

Although the spotting provided by the carrier pilots was less satisfactory because of the lack of common grid charts, an absence of specialized training and some serious communication difficulties, the bombarding ships reported the results as excellent. The offensive naval strength deployed off Korean eastern coast, three carriers, a battleship, some cruisers and numerous destroyers, had by now reached a very respectable level.

Although the Attack Force had not set sail, and although minesweeping had barely begun, the capture of the Kalma Bando airfield by ROK troops had opened a door to the city of Wonsan already on the 10th. At sea as well as on shore the air strength available for east coast operations was increasing: *Valley Forge* had arrived on the 12th, and two days later *Boxer* also reported in. On the 15th Admiral Ewen celebrated by sending forth 392 sorties to press the northern offensive and harry the enemy in the hills.

The LSTs of the Wonsan Attack Force sailed on the 15th. By 0800 of the 17th the last transport was cleared.

In the west, in the meantime, Eighth US Army had begun its advance, and had crossed the parallel north of Kaesong.

On the other hand, Major General Field Harris, Commanding General, 1st US Marine Air Wing, and Tactical Air Controller for the X Corps, flew to Wonsan on the 13th, three days after the ROK soldiers had already captured the city. After inspecting the airfield, he determined that flight operations could be initiated immediately. He ordered the Marine Fighter Squadron 312 to leave Kimpo the next day. To facilitate flight operations, the Far East Air Force Combat Cargo Command started to bring in aviation gasoline in 55-gallon drums. Bombs and rockets were loaded on Corsairs of the Marine Fighter Squadron 513 at Kimpo and air transported to Wonsan. Thus the Marine airmen gave direct support to the I ROK Corps advancing northward to Hamhung.

Admiral Ewen's Task Force 77 aircraft also provided the timely pre-attack aerial bombing support. When the troops radioed an urgent call for help, planes from *Leyte*'s Air Group Three went to work, striking gun positions, slit trenches, and tanks as directed by ground controllers.

With Wonsan in friendly hands, General Almond's problem was no longer one of assaulting on the enemy beach and fighting in the streets. The remaining problem was simply to land his X Corps as quickly as possible and
to join the offensive. In other words, it was nothing more than administrative landing. The main assault of the 1st US Marine Division had landed on the beaches of Wonsan 15 to 17 October. In Admiral Doyle’s troop-crowded flagship, *Mt. McKinley* were the staff officers and men of both Generals Almond and Smith. Upon arrival at Wonsan, 19 October, General Almond and Admiral Doyle immediately proceeded to Admiral Struble’s flagship, the battleship *Missouri* anchored in the outer harbor of Wonsan.

Once ashore, the Marines of 22,000 strong started moving north in strength, and they fanned out with rather formidable patrols to the south. The Marine trucks and tanks started rolling northward toward the twin cities of Hamhung and Hungnam. From this area the Marines would strike northwestward toward the northern border.

On 29 October, meanwhile, the 7th US Infantry Division was landed at Iwon also administratively after the fast minesweepers *Doyle* and *Endicott* had found no trace of mines in that harbor. Their supplies came ashore during the night as jeep and truck lights illuminated the beach area. Carrier planes droned overhead in constant patrol, and the destroyer *Borie* (Commander M.P. Bowman) cruised offshore ready to open fire at moment’s notice.

By the night of 31 October 1950, most of the X US Corps was once again on Korean soil. Some units had been at sea for nearly three weeks.

**Sea Mining Tactics**

Throughout the period of both operations of “Chromite” in September and “Tailboard” in October, the ROK and UN naval forces remained active along the coastline. North of the 38th Parallel the east coast naval units were also busy. On 23 September the submarine *Segundo* carried out a special mission on the northeast coast.

On 26 September the destroyer *Brush*, patrolling in company with *Maddox* off Tanchon, hit a mine; 13 members of the crew were killed, 34 wounded, and the ship was badly damaged. Two days later the ROK minesweeper YMS 509 was mined off Yongdok, with 26 killed or missing and five wounded.

While sweeping near Yongdok on 1 October the AMS *Magpie* recently arrived from Guam, hit a mine, blew up and sank with the loss of 21 of crew of 33. On the 2nd the Korean YMS 504 was mined at Mokpo.

The loss of one ship and heavy damage to four, not to mention the casualties to personnel, made this the most costly week of the war for the UN
naval forces. Thus serious problems were raised regarding future operations, and the East Coast Support Group was instructed not to operate inside the 100-fathom curve.

From an examination of the available records, it is concluded that the North Korean Communist mining campaign commenced no earlier than 10 July. Post-Wonsan assault intelligence analysis indicated that the mining of Wonsan and Chinnampo began around 1 August. The program of such enemy sea mining was intensified particularly after the fall of Inchon. And it is further concluded, based on an examination of recovered shipping labels and an examination of captured mines, that all the mines used in the Korean War originated from Soviet stockpiles. Most of them arrived in Korea during the period of 10 – 20 July by rail and a few were shipped by sea. Interrogation of railroad personnel at Wonsan after its capture verified the fact that about 4,000 mines passed through their hand, mainly for use in Wonsan itself but also for use at points further south. At Chinnampo, it was learned from the interrogation of prisoners that mines were shipped to Haeju by truck, and that other mines were shipped to Inchon and Kunsan by rail.

It was to be later discovered that the Soviet Union had not only provided the North Korean Communist forces with mines, but with torpedoes and depth charges as well. On 16 October, 14 Soviet built 21 inch torpedoes were found in a tunnel near the Wonsan airstrip. In addition 167 contact-type mines were found, and more than 600 sea mines were later discovered ashore in the Wonsan area.

The Minesweep at Wonsan

In early October 1950 before the Wonsan landing, Admiral Struble viewed the possibility of mines in Wonsan as a calculated risk. He thought that the sea approaches to Wonsan were mined; that the minefields might consist of moored mines of Russian type, probably of magnetic and controlled mines; that acoustic and pressure mines might be found in the area; and that, in addition to the mines, opposition could be expected from emplaced artillery in the Wonsan approaches.

Vice Admiral Struble was reasonably certain that if there was to be any future naval threat from the Communists, it must come from their use of sea mines. The North Korean Communist forces still retained the capability to plant mines and to launch drifters from the many junk and sampans.

This fact had been early recognized by Admiral Joy as well as Admiral
Struble long before Inchon landing. First of all, much of the Korean coastal area was shallow—ideal for minefields. Secondly, the muddy waters offered near-perfect concealment. Thirdly, ocean currents in both the Eastern Sea and Western Sea of Korea were of such a nature that floating mines launched at any north Korean port would traverse the entire length of the peninsula within 15 days. Thus, the drifter mine itself presented a constant danger to surface vessels.

Vice Admiral Struble had recently received several reports of mines sighted and mines destroyed. Altogether, more than 300 mines had been sighted around the Korean coastline. Enemy sea mines had been reported by the US destroyer McKean (Commander H.L. Reiter, Jr.) at the entrance to the north Korean harbor of Chinnampo on 4 September, 11 days before the Inchon landing. On 7 September, HMS Jamaica sighted and sank a floating mine 25 miles north of the Chongsangot area, in the sea area off Chinnampo. Another was almost immediately seen and exploded by HMS Charity.

There was some doubt at first whether the mines were moored or drifting, but the Britishers concluded that the mines were drifters, having been set loose in the hope of catching some of the blockade ships. At Inchon, on the
morning of 13 September, destroyers *De Havon* and *Mansfield* of the Destroyer Division 91 and spotted a minefield in the approach channel to Inchon, called the “Flying Fish Channel.”

Altogether, from the period of 4 September to 30 September, UN ships and aircraft sighted mines on 54 separate occasions, most of them in the shallow Western Sea, between Chinnampo and Inchon.

To make matters even worse for the Seventh Fleet Commander, more than 25 floater contact-type mines had been sighted on the surface in the high seas around Korea. It was assumed that these drifter mines were contact-type mines which had become detached from their moorings and were floating on the surface.

Obviously such a mine situation would be a considerable threat to ships engaged in fire-support missions. Support ships would either be confined to operating in swept channels or they would have to remain outside the 100-fathom curve.

*Brush* (Commander F.L. Sheffield, Jr.) was the first U.S. Navy ship to be mined. On 26 September 1950, while steaming 1,000 yards astern of the destroyer *Maddox* (Commander P.B. Haines) as the two ships were patrolling along the northeast coast of Korea in search of enemy shore batteries, *Brush* struck a mine. The destroyer was instantly rendered helpless. 13 men were killed and 34 others were seriously wounded. One of *Brush*’s fire-rooms, the messing compartments, and the Chief’s living quarters were open the sea.

On 30 September the destroyer *Mansfield* (Commander E.H. Headlead) struck a contact mine while searching inside the north Korean harbor area some 100 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel, for a downed Air Force B-26 pilot. *Mansfield* was hit in the bow. Her damage, less severe than that to *Brush* and of 28 casualties aboard none was killed.

A third US warship, the 136-foot, wooded-hulled minesweeper *Magpie* and a sister ship *Merganser* (Lieutenant Junior Grade A.L. Short), both recently arrived from Guam, were sweeping a channel three kilometers off Chuksan, 48 kilometers north of Pohang, her starboard bow nudged the horn of a floating mine. Of her 33-man crew only 12 survived, all of them injured. Among the 21 lost with the *Magpie* was the Captain and Lieutenant Junior grade personnel.

ComNavFE dispatched *CincFE* on 28 September 1950 that this kind of mine, which was sighted and sunk by the destroyers *Maddox* and *Thomas*, on the previous day at sea a few miles directly east of Wonsan, was either of Soviet manufacture or a type that had been built by the Japanese during
World War II and kept in good stowage by the NK Reds. The mine was unblemished, shiny with new paint, and from all appearances had been in the water a very short time.

Mine sighting, although plentiful, had not yet revealed any concentration on the east coast near Wonsan or Hungnam.

Hoping for the best minesweeping operation, the little ships of Mine Squadron Three began departing Sasebo for Wonsan on 6 October 1950. Lieutenant C.E. McMullen's *Pirate* (AM 275) was first to leave.

The informations were provided for the minesweeping group commander Captain Spofford that more than 3,000 mines of magnetic as well as contact type were set up on the Wonsan sea and that this minefield covered some 400 square miles. And his task of sweeping the expansive Wonsan minefield would still have been exceedingly hazardous one.

The biggest handicap was a shortage of minesweepers. During World War II, the amphibious assault against Okinawa had been preceded by more than 100 sweepers; at the invasion of Normandy by 300. At Wonsan, Captain Spofford's Mine Squadron Three commenced its work on 10 October with only six minesweepers.

After careful consideration, with the 20 October landing date in mind, Captain Spofford decided to risk a direct-approach sweep, sending his ships, led by *Pledge* and *Incredible*, on an exploratory run straight from the 100-fathom curve to the landing beaches by the shortest and most direct route.

Shortly after sunrise on the morning of 10 October, the minesweeping task got underway. The officer in tactical command, Lieutenant Commander Bruce Hyatt was riding the *Pledge*, since his flagship *Pirate* had not yet rejoined from conducting exploratory minesweeping chores in behalf of the gunfire support ships south of Wonsan. The *Pledge* began the sweep directly from the westward tongue of the 100-fathom curve in a direct line for the landing beaches where the troops were scheduled to go ashore in only 10 days. Astern of *Pledge* steamed the *Incredible*, *Osprey* and *Mocking Bird*, each ship streaming its sweep gear. Two additional minesweepers followed the formation -- the *Chatterer*, dropping orange-colored conical to mark the edge of swept channel and *Partridge*, to destroy by gunfire any mines brought to the surface by the other minesweepers.

To assist and expedite the sweeping, a helicopter from the *Worcester* hovered to shoreward of the minesweepers, attempting to spot mined beneath the surface of the water. This would be the first instance in naval warfare of an organized and combined effort between surface ships and a helicopter to locate a minefield.
Battle of the Mines

During the morning of 11 October, meanwhile, Captain Spofford augmented the examination of the minefield by the use of so-called frogmen, the UDT from the destroyer transport Diachenko. The frogmen were ordered to skim along the surface of the harbor looking for mines from their shallow-draft LCPRs (Landing Craft Personnel Reconnaissance).

Captain Spofford also requested and received help from Commander Fleet Air Wing One in the form of patrol planes to augment the air search. Patrol Squadron 47 (Commander J.H. Arnold) was directed to assign a PBM (Patrol Bomber Martin) for daytime search.

In the afternoon of 10 October, the minesweeping force had been augmented by the arrival of the Pirate, Redhead, and Chatterer. These three were dispatched to the Russian navigation channel. Here the sweeping went so smoothly.

The frogmen, under the command of Lieutenant Commander W.R. McKinney, were ordered to reconnoiter the two outlying islands of Ung-do
and Yo-do in search of any mine cables which would indicate the presence of electrically controlled mines. The Commander McKinney later reported that there were no control mine cables existed.

During the early morning of 12 October, minefield-strike aircraft from Philippine Sea and the Leyte arrived over Wonsan harbor. The Skyraider planes were scheduled to perform the major portion of the effort. Each plane carried three 1,000-pound general purpose bombs. F4U Corsair fighters each carried one 1,000-pound general purpose bomb. The bombs were all fuzed hydrostatically to detonate at 25 feet.

Section 3. The Chinnampo Sweep Operation

The Significance of Chinnampo

While the American Marines were being landed administratively at Wonsan, the ROK and UN forces were speeding toward the border area. By 24 November 1950, the ROK troops was approaching Songjin on the east coast nearly 160 kilometers north of Wonsan, with being supported by the interdiction fire and gunfire support of Task Group 95.2.

The progress in the west demanded mandatory and urgent requirement for the opening of Pyongyang’s port city of Chinnampo. Particularly, the advancing Eighth US Army was already in short supply of fuel, and both its men and motors needed constant logistic support and required winterization. But Chinnampo, like Wonsan, was known to be heavily mined, and the Army Commander made an urgent request for minesweeping help at Chinnampo. Thus, the urgency of Chinnampo sweeping operations was fully understood and appreciated by the Navy.

The minefield problem at Chinnampo, however, differed from the one at Wonsan largely because of the wholly different hydrographic conditions. The direct seaward approach to the port of Chinnampo, unlike the deep-water channels at Wonsan, was blocked by islands and delta-like areas formed over the years by heavy deposite of silt carried down the swift-currented Taedong River into the estuary.

In further contrast to Wonsan’s clear, almost tideless and currentless harbor, Chinnampo’s muddy tide rose a minimum of twelve feet and the current moved as fast as five knots. Two navigation channels approached the harbor. The southernmost channel was extremely shallow -- only 15 feet at
high tide. The northern channel was almost twice as deep. Both could be mined.

Nevertheless, all the available minesweepers in Korea and most of the minesweeping gear in the western Pacific were already committed to the east coast sweeping operations at Wonsan and Iwon. Commander S.M. Archer was placed in charge of Chinnampo sweep operations. When he received an order to clear the Chinnampo channels, Commander Archer was observing Wonsan sweep operations aboard the U.S. destroyer transport *Diachenko* (APD 123). Recruiting the Chinnampo sweep forces was that informal. Archer’s first recruit was his colleague, the mine warfare expert Lieutenant Commander D.C. DeForest, who was from Atlantic Fleet Mine Headquarters.

Commander Archer stated that Chinnampo would have been a much tougher job for the sweeping operation. By November’s end, 200 miles of channel had been swept at Chinnampo and 80 mines had been destroyed by the efforts of Commander Archer’s minesweeping force.

Still the Commander Archer’s Chinnampo sweep force was not finished. But the United Nations forces had continued to advance northward. They might need fire support or an amphibious lift along the flanks. Accordingly, on Thanksgiving Day, 1950, Commander Archer’s force started sweeping north toward the Chongchon River. A dozen Japanese sweepers had by now arrived, accompanied by two mother ships, and were checksweeping the already opened channels. By 17 November, 14 ships had reached Chinnampo; three days later 40,000 tons had been unloaded and the opening of the deep channel celebrated by the arrival of the hospital ship *Repose*. Consequently, the logistic situation of the Eighth Army had already been greatly improved, and even in the later time of withdrawal the Chinnampo evacuation was a complete success. Thus the entire port had served so that logistic command as well as many civilians were safely evacuated.

At Chinnampo, in contrast to the events at Wonsan, no lives had been lost
and no ships damaged. Of the 80 moored mines swept or destroyed, 36 were credited to patrol planes and 27 to the underwater demolition personnel; 12 had been broken loose by storms; only 5 had been cut by sweepers.

Better and earlier intelligence, different tidal conditions and experience had all been helpful. Again there were non-casualties. This was perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Chinnampo operation. The task was completed without the loss of a single life or a single ship.

**Helpers to the Sweep Operation**

The Chinnampo sweep operation had practically included every weapon in the naval arsenal: surface sweep, aircraft, and helicopters.

First of all, when finally constituted the Commander Archer’s Chinnampo Task Elements 95.69 included, in addition to his flagship *Forrest Royal* (Commander O. O. Liebschner), the following:

- **Task Unit 95.69.1**
  - Minesweeping Unit 1
    - *Thompson, Carmick*

- **Task Unit 95.69.2**
  - Minesweeping Unit 2
    - *Gull, Pelican, Swallow*
    - ROK YMS 502, 306, 513, 503

- **Task Unit 95.69.3**
  - Helicopter Unit

- **Task Unit 95.69.4**
  - Minesweeping Unit 3
    - *Horace A. Bass* and
    - TU 95.69.41 UDT One

- **Task Unit 95.69.5**
  - Minesweeping Unit 4
    - *Catamount, 12 LCVPs, Work Boats, and LST Q007*

- **Task Unit 95.69.7**
  - Buoy Ship Unit
    - *Bolster*
  - Intelligence Unit

Commander D.N. Clay

Secondly, the vital helpers to the Chinnampo operation were those aircraft and helicopters from the naval air component: A component of naval air began the mine clearance task on 28 October when the patrol bomber Martin planes from Fleet Air Wing Six, tendered by the *Gardiners Bay* anchored at Inchon, began daily mine search patrols in the Chinnampo area.
Battle of the Mines

The patrol planes of American Marines from Patrol Squadrons 42 and 47 and Sunderland flying boats from Royal Air Force Squadrons and 209 were continuously engaged in anti-mine operations from 29 September through 15 November. During this period, the aircraft sighted 340 mines in the Western Sea area; 44 were exploded and nine were sunk by machine gun fire.

In late November 1950, patrol planes were utilized to drop depth bombs or magnetic mines off Chinnampo. On the 28th, thirty-two 325-pound depth bombs were dropped. Only one mine was exploded. Operations the next day were slightly more successful. P2V "Neptunes" dropped 16 bombs and destroyed three mines. The patrol planes had one distinct advantage over the small minesweepers: They could operate without regard to rough seas.

Helicopters, flying from the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Theseus, were a vital adjunct to the Chinnampo operation. Theseus provided an early base for Helicopter Utility Squadron Two Detachment. They flew a daily search of the minefield; the remainder of the British carrier aircraft provided a daily combat air patrol to protect the minesweeping force from either enemy air interference or shore batteries. The damage or possible loss of minesweepers to enemy gunfire was thus prevented.

The arrival of the Catamount with her LCVP sweepers strengthened the Commander Archer's minesweeping force. The tiny boats were capable of both moored and magnetic sweeping; they could sweep very shallow areas beyond the reach of larger minesweepers; and in deeper waters, they could open shallow paths for the larger minesweepers to follow.

To insure maximum safety and to prevent the loss of any of the minesweepers the utmost use of all intelligence, knowledge, and experience had to be made. According to Commander Archer, the intelligence mission of Commander Clay, to discover the location of the Chinnampo minefield made the sweeping task much easier and less dangerous.

By the end of November, minesweeping had become a problem of major significance to the United States Navy. It required painstaking coordination and much training; It required a variety of equipment such as tenders, motherships, flagships, buoy ships, small-boat facilities, helicopter bases, mine disposal units and underwater demolition teams. In Korea fire support ships were also needed. In order to improving the naval minesweeping study, various recommendations were submitted to the authorities concerned. And as one of these recommendations which were approved, on 11 November the Minesweeping Force Western Pacific was activated under the command of Admiral Higgins.
CHAPTER VI REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE NORTH
(11-24 December 1950)

Section 1. The Red Chinese Forces Aggression

On to the Border

By the end of October 1950, the entire front had brought a total United Nations victory over the North Korean Communist aggressors. On the west coast of Korea, units of the ROK Army and the Eighth Army were nearing the Yalu River. On the east coast, likewise, elements of the X US Corps and the I ROK Corps were sweeping to the Manchurian border.

For all but the minesweeping crews afloat and those with logistic responsibility ashore, the October had been a happy period. On land, at sea, and in the air it was a harvest time, a period of exploitation of a great victory, in which the steady advance of UN forces brought visions of a speedy end to hostilities.

On 19 October, meanwhile, as the 1st US Marine Division was rounding the Korean peninsula, Eighth Army entered Pyongyang. Shortly the UN forces pushed on across the Chongchon River, and on 26 October ROK troops reached the south bank of the Yalu at Chosan.

While the UN armies advanced almost at will, the navies of the United Nations cruised undisturbed along the Korean coasts. As the minesweeping progressed steadily on every channel throughout the Korean waters, ports were one by one opened and the ends of the seaborne supply line closed up on the advancing front, to lighten the burdens of the logisticians.

In the air too, the war was uncontested, and UN air strength was moving forward. At Wonsan, 112 kilometers above the 38th Parallel, Marine squadrons were ashore; at Yonpo near Hungnam, a second modern airfield was available; in the west Fifth US Air Force had advanced its JO to Seoul and was preparing to activate northern airfields; in the Western Sea and in the Eastern Sea the carriers still sent forth their planes. But increasingly the airmen of all services found themselves hard up for targets, and as the
time went on the sortie rate was decreased.

Already the cheerful prospect of an imminent end to the fighting had been reflected in the activities of Naval Forces Far East.

Some of the fire support ships were returned to port, while the functions of the remainder were reduced to patrolling and covering operations. From the west coast the British carrier _Theseus_, as no more targets in hand, was sailed for Sasebo, Japan for onward routing to Hong Kong. On eastern offshore of Korea, a major redeployment of naval strength was begun. Thus, the problem of a reduction and modification of theater naval strength seemed desirable.

On 22 October _Philippine Sea_ and _Boxer_ left the operating area for Yokosuka; one week later _Valley Forge_ and _Leyte_ retired to Sasebo. On her arrival in Japan the _Boxer_ was routed onward to the continental United States for navy yard overhaul; _Valley Forge_ was scheduled to return to the west coast in late November; plans were made to withdraw the escort carriers from the Korean waters, and to send _Sicily_ to Guam to reembark her antisubmarine squadron.

On 28 October Admiral Struble forwarded his appreciation to ComNavFE: The recent experience showed that the Seventh Fleet should not revert to the status of a one-carrier force, but should remain a balanced fleet with amphibious and minesweeping capabilities; to emphasize the mobility of naval forces and to strengthen the impact on the doubtful of the United Nations' success in Korea, he proposed at the earliest moment to take his command to southeast Asian waters to show the flag and to conduct training exercises.

Three days later the Joint Task Force Seven was dissolved, and the flagship group retired to Sasebo. Only Admiral Higgins' minesweeping groups and the Military Sea Transportation Service continued to grow in strength. Reinforcements for the former were still arriving as November came, while the latter had not yet reached its peak. The requirements of the advance to the north brought a further slight increase, and the week of 8 November saw 263 ships under MSTS West Pacific control.

The diminishing activity of Naval Forces Far East was quickly reflected in reduced expenditure of important commodities. Naval consumption of aviation gasoline which had reached a peak of 187,000 barrels in August, was down in October to 130,000. Ammunition expenditure, more than 2,100 short tons in the week of 19 September, had also declined by October's end to less than a sixth of that amount. Navy cargo lifted from the west coast, POL
excepted, had fallen radically from the 107,000 measurement tons of the week of 21 August; in October it dropped steadily from 29,000 tons per week to a mere 11,000. What the naval effort had amounted to in terms of transfer of force may be seen from the extraordinary expansion of NavFE-supported personnel, U.S. and U.N., which from a mere 11,000 in June had reached 40,000 by early August, 69,000 in late September, and 79,000 by mid-October. But there it stopped, homeward deployment was begun, and the coming of November saw the total naval population down to 75,000.

Such was the general situation when in the last week of October there came sudden sign of increased enemy activity. Large concentrations of Com-

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**NORTHWEST COAST**

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Sketch Map 4
munist fighter planes were reported on the airfield at Antung on the Manchurian side of the lower Yalu, and Air Force pilots flying down the valley reported antiaircraft fire from the far shore.

In the eastern half of Korea, the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 6th ROK Division, after reaching Chusan on the Yalu River on 26 October, found itself surrounded by unexpected large enemy forces and its line of communication severed.

From captured prisoners, four Red Chinese armies could be identified. The sudden appearance of Chinese Communist forces in Korea momentarily halted the advance in the west, while the X Corps in the east proceeded more cautiously.

On 5 November 1950, General MacArthur informed the United Nations of the presence of organized Red Chinese units in Korea.

It was at this point that the carriers of Task Force 77 were asked to destroy the Korean side of the Yalu River bridges across which Chinese troops, supplies and equipment were seen. As the Task Force 77 commenced its work on the Yalu bridges and as General MacArthur’s announcement was recorded at UN Headquarters at Lake Success, the entire battlefront in north Korea became extraordinarily tense. On the east coast, however, US Marines pushed northwestward up a winding dirt road toward the Changjin Reservoir area, from which it was planned that they would attack northwestward to link up with elements of the Eighth US Army.

**Battle against Red Chinese Aggression**

While these precautions were being taken on the ground, General MacArthur called upon FEAF and NavFE for their best efforts in the air. On the afternoon of 4 November 1950 the UN Command in Tokyo instructed Admiral Joy to apply the “immediate maximum air effort of your forces...in close support of ground units and interdiction of enemy communications, assembly areas and troop columns.”

Although the escort carriers were still at sea, supporting the 7th US Division’s northward advance, this unexpected order found the fast carriers in port in Japan. Action was immediate: The Carriers Division 15 was transferred from Admiral Doyle’s control to that of Admiral Struble; the prospective return of Valley Forge to the United States was cancelled; task force personnel were rounded up from the pleasure spots of Japan, and on the morning of the 5th, with Commander Seventh Fleet in Missouri in company,
Admiral Hoskins sortied the Valley Forge and Leyte from Sasebo, Japan. Although winds to 50 knots were met en route, the next day found them back at work in the Eastern Sea of Korea, where they were joined on the 9th by Admiral Ewen in Philippine Sea proceeded from Yokosuka, Japan.

A similar maximum efforts were directed to be made from FEAF to destroy every means of communication and every installation, factory, city and other targets below the Yalu River.

Winter had now reached the Eastern Sea. Upon arrival back on location, Task Force 77 was maneuvering to avoid snow storms sweeping and drying the carrier decks with the blast of jet engines, and putting forth its best efforts in interdiction of the area east of 126°41'E and south of a line eight kilometers below the Manchurian border. At mid-day on the 8th November a new priority target was added, as a flash message from ComNavFE informed Admiral Struble that CincFE had determined to destroy the first overwater span on the Korean side of all bridges leading to Manchuria. Since the FEAF's Bomber Command was fully committed to the attacks on the downstream bridges at Sinuiju, those at Chongsongjin at the lower end of the Supung Reservoir, where Air Force pilots had reported heavy vehicular traffic, had been assigned the Navy.

Consistent with instructions from Washington, these strikes were to be carried out under restrictive ground rules: The target was the first overwater span, and that only Manchurian air space was not to be violated; the hydroelectric plants and associated facilities were to remain untouched. Two days later the assignment was generalized by instructions to Task Force 77 to destroy the seven major bridges from Sinuiju eastward, through Chongsongjin, Namsan-ni, and Manp'o-jin, to Hyesanjin at the headwaters of the Yalu.

The USS Leyte is being refueled at sea by the USS Cimarron as the USS Henderson(top) stands fire watch off the Korean coast.
Nine B-29s attacked the Sinuiju bridges on 8 November, while 70 more destroyed 60 percent of the town; next day the carriers flew strikes against the bridges there and at Chongsongjin. Three more days of carrier plane attacks were followed by a day of rest; on the 13th and 14th both B-29s and Task Force 77 returned to the fray. The week of the 15th brought four more carrier strikes, and in the last ten days of the month seven B-29 raids were mounted against the bridges.

The bridge attacks by carrier planes were made by groups of upwards of eight Skyraiders planes, armed with one 2,000-pound bomb or two 1,000-pound bombs a piece, accompanied by Corsairs with VT-fused bombs and rockets to discourage antiaircraft fire from at least the Korean side of the river. For top cover, necessitated by the newly invigorated Communist air opposition, eight or more Panthers accompanied the attack planes. From

Photographic evidence of the pin-point accuracy of naval air attacks at the two bridges over the Yalu River at Sinuiju. The picture was taken just after planes from the USS Leyte had attacked, on 14 November 1950.
their launching point in the Korean Gulf the piston-engined aircraft crossed the mountains at 10,000 feet with the Corsairs on top, climbed to 13,000 feet for a high-speed approach, and then overhauled and joined by the jets some 60 miles short of the target, started their run in. At the objective the Corsairs went down first, to strike the defending gun emplacements, and were followed by the heavyweight Skyraiders, while the F9Fs stepped down to protect against attacks from the rear. This protection was needed. The enemy jet planes were real. On the 8th, in the first all-jet air battle of history, an Air Force F-80 fighter pilot had destroyed a Russian made MIG; on the 9th during the attack at Sinuiju, a Navy pilot duplicated the feat, as Lieutenant Commander W.T. Amen of Philippine Sea chased one from 4,000 to 15,000 feet and down again before the enemy spun in. No more than the Air Force F-80s could the Navy fighters match the agile MIG in speed, maneuverability or rate of climb, but training and gunnery worked to outweigh these adverse factors. On the 18th, two more MIGs were shot down by pilots from Valley Forge and Leyte.

So far as it went the result of these engagements was encouraging, but the purpose of the strikes was to destroy the bridges, and here the bombing was spotty and the results were disappointing. The carrier pilots succeeded in dropping the highway bridge at Sinuiju and in taking out spans at Hyesanjin; the B-29s broke one or two more.

By the 10th, in the meantime, the US Marines were over the pass and had reached the headwaters of the Changjin River at Koto-ri. And five days later they had gained the reservoir at Hagaru. To the eastward the ROK forces were moving up the coast approaching Chongjin. The 7th US Division had captured Kapsan on the 12th and was moving toward Hyesanjin on the Yalu.

At 2200 hours on the night of 27 November, the Chinese Communist forces struck, with their human wave tactics against the 1st US Marine Division in the vicinity of Yudam-ni in defense perimeter. Marine aircraft immediately began to blanket the area with rockets, bombs, and napalm. Of the 500 enemy who initiated the attack, Marine Corsairs were credited with killing approximately three hundreds. Elsewhere on the Marine defense perimeter, planes from Task Force 77 appeared and rendered similar support. Skyraider and Corsair pilots from the Philippine Sea were told by the Marine Tactical Air Controller that their attacks for that day had been fine and that the enemy has been stopped. On the 29th, at the same time, carrier pilots from the Leyte reported their inability to contact air controllers in the Eighth Army area because of the heavy traffic. However, they reported ex-
cellent results from the flights that had been flown in support of X US Corps. *Philippine Sea*'s pilots had similar experiences. Of ten flights flown in support of Eighth Army, only three were able to contact tactical air controllers and these pilots had been instructed to jettison their napalm alongside the road. The same troubles which had been so evident during the battle for the Naktong Perimeter had reappeared. On the other hand, all three flights in support of the X Corps had been directed upon lucrative targets, mostly enemy troop concentrations.

On 3 December, in view of the cut-off position of the 1st US Marine Division and their urgent need for air assistance, Major General Field Harris, Commanding General 1st US Marine Air Wing, had again sent a message to Admiral Joy urgently recommending that the main fast carrier effort be made in support of the Marine division. This recommendation was immediately concurred in, and once again, as during the Inchon assault, Marine and naval airmen would perform close air support for the 1st US Marine Division, using Navy-Marine doctrine.

**Defeat in the West**

With evening of the 28th November 1950 Generals Walker and Almond were summoned to Tokyo for a conference with General MacArthur who authorized Eighth US Army and X US Corps to withdraw.

At the same time ComNavFE alerted Admiral Doyle for a possible general emergency which would require redeployment of the ground forces. On this day, in response to a Fifth US Air Force request, Task Force 77 had expanded its area of armed reconnaissance southward, and throughout the day *Philippine Sea* and *Leyte* had kept eight Corsairs and six Skyraider planes over the newly enlarged border strip.

For the moment Task Force 77 contained only two carriers. That earlier reinforcement would prove possible was due to the existence of the mothball fleet, and to the reactivation program previously begun. The US Chief of Naval Operations had ordered the activation of the fast carrier *Princeton* on 25 July, then in reserve at Bremerton. Recommissioned on 28 August, under command of Captain W.O. Gallery and with a crew largely composed of recalled reservists, *Princeton* had completed her period of shakedown training, had embarked Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, Commander Carrier Division Five, and had sailed from the continental west coast in early November.

On 29 and 30 November 1950 Eighth Army continued its retreat across the Chongchon River. On the left disengagement proceeded without great
difficulty, but there was trouble in the center, and on the right the situation was very bad. The 2nd US Division, after a difficult crossing of the Chongchon, became entangled in a eight-kilometer road block north of Sunchon.

On the morning of the 29th, Admiral Ewen sent seven Corsairs and five Skyraiders to offer their services in close support. On the 30th the situation led CTF 77 to route all armed reconnaissance flights through a point in 39°30'N 126°E, near the big bend in the Taedong River and just east of the pass in which the 2nd US Division was engaged in dubious combat, to offer their loads for close support to any controller they could reach. But by the time these instructions were issued new claims on the fast carriers had developed.

The Chinese Communist forces controlled the roads and American Marine and Army units were separated into a series of isolated perimeters. In this situation General Harris, the Marine air commander, had strongly recommended to ComNavFE a sustained effort by the fast carriers in the X Corps zone, and had stated that Fifth Air Force concurred in this proposal. But an evening dispatch from the Fifth Air Force in Korea on the 29th indicated that such concurrence applied only to that day’s operations, and asked in view of the critical condition in the EUSAk area, a divided effort for the next few days. And a message from ComNavFE, confirming that close support had priority over all other commitments, prescribed such distribution of carrier air effort.

The sorties of the 30th were consequently so divided, and the schedule of operations stepped up by the addition of five jet flights of four planes each. 39 sorties were sent up to the reservoir while 74, including 23 jet sorties, were dispatched on armed reconnaissance with instructions to report en route to any available Air Force control agency.

In the X US Corps zone, communications were overcrowded and the radio discipline was poor, but the coherence of Marine units had not broken and most flights found effective control.

In the west, by contrast, the state of affair was chaotic. The Fifth US Air Force had already been forced out of its forward staging fields at Sinanju on the Chongchon, some advanced control sorties had been overrun, irreplaceable control equipment had been lost, and evacuation of the small Mosquito type aircraft from the Pyongyang airfields was in progress.

The effect of this situation were apparent in difficulties of aircraft control. Of four jet flights to the EUSAk zone three made no contact. Of the heavily-armed strike groups of Corsairs and Skyraiders that were dispatched to the west, one was weathered out, one failed to find a controller, and one...
found good control. There were delays, and when one flight came across to the west, after failing to make contact in the X Corps area, the Skyraiders were incomprehensively detached from attack to road reconnaissance. But the control once gained was fair to excellent; the two propeller strikes which did make contact put 14 Corsairs and five Skyraiders with more than 14 tons of napalm and five of bombs onto troop concentrations in the crucial 2nd US Division area; the jet flight, after being directed against entrenched troops south of Tokchon, ran the roads north to Manp'oijn.

At 2230 on the 30th Admiral Ewen informed Commander Seventh Fleet that while all missions sent to the X Corps had been successful, but about two-thirds of the effort in the EUSAK area had been wasted, and asked him to pass the word to Fifth Air Force. This the Admiral Strube did in a midnight emergency dispatch, stated that in view of unsatisfactory control in the west he would adjust his distribution of effort, and asked to be advised when the situation improved.

In the two fronts of action, Eighth Army and X Corps, very different types of operations were developing. In the west, as December opened, the remnants of the 2nd US Division had at last reached Sunchon, and Eighth Army was disengaging and moving south toward Pyongyang. But in the X Corps zone, where the lst US Marine Division had been fragmented and cut off.

These conditions governed the distribution of Task Force 90. On 30 November, with the ground situation steadily deteriorating, Admiral Doyle put all ships in port on two-hour notice and began to deploy his shipping to Korea. Transports were divided on a 50 to 50 basis, with four APAs (Attack Transport ships) and two AKAs (Attack Cargo ships) being ordered to Inchon and a like number to Wonsan.

But the apparently more critical situation of the Eighth Army, together with the problems of handling large ships in west coast ports, led to the assignment of two-thirds of other amphibious types to Admiral Thackrey's Task Group 90.1. Admiral Thackrey himself had flown to Inchon with General Walker on the 29th to inspect and advise on port operations. On the next day two members of his staff went up to Chinnampo to look things over, and the APA Boxer, the LSD Catamount

The Douglas AD "Skyraider" takes off from the Carrier Boxer carrying 4,300 pounds of bombs and rockets.
and two LSTs were added to his command.

On 1 December 1950, as Admiral Thackrey reported aboard Mount McKinley at Hungnam to confer with Admiral Doyle and to plan for the future, his flagship Eldorado, two more LSDs, and the fast transport Horace A. Bass were ordered west, along with ten SCAJA/P LSTs.

In eastern north Korea, where the ground battle was still developing the X US Corps on 1 December ordered a retirement upon Hungnam. But while no requirement for emergency evacuation as yet existed, the situation of the 1st US Marine Division and of the army battalions at the reservoir was such as to cause the greatest concern. The division which had been moved forward to aid the advance of an army was now surrounded. With the MSR cut off, with supplies running short and casualties accumulating, air supply, air evacuation, and the maximum possible air support became urgent.

Although retirement rather than advance was now the order of the day, the Red Chinese attack had put X Corps back in the kind of beachhead situation that had existed at Inchon and had been planned for at Wonsan.

The collapse in the west had forced the Fifth US Air Force back to fields at Seoul and beyond, and local air support depended upon the two east coast air strips and upon embarked aviation. Recognizing this situation, the Fifth Air Force in Korea on 1 December cut existing red tape, gave General Harris autonomy in the conduct of air operations in support of X Corps, and instructed him to proceed without reference to Fifth Air Force except when reinforcements were needed. And the first day of December saw a steady shift of the fast carrier effort toward complete concentration in the X Corps sector.

In part for the technical reasons and in partly because of the complex structure of the U.N. Command, communications between the Fifth Air Force and the naval fast carriers had long presented a problem.

On 1 December the weather over the eastern Korea was very bad. Morning flights from the carriers were diverted to the EUSA/K area, where three missions totalling 23 aircraft found satisfactory control, successfully attacked large concentrations of enemy troops and abandoned friendly equipment, and blew an ammunition dump at Sinanju. But the weather which had altered their employment also prevented their return to base, for the task force had been obliged to cease flight operations late in the morning. Unable to get home, the aircraft landed at Wonsan, were kicked out again to rumors of deteriorating ground situation in the neighborhood, and finally spent the night at Kimpo.
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Next day the fast carriers again split their efforts sending 28 sorties to EUSAK and half again as many to the Changjin area. In the west two flights with 10 aircraft had a good success, while three totalling 18 found no controllers. But these were the last sorties sent to the western front, where EUSAK had been now disengaged, and where fears of being outflanked and forced back upon Chinnampo had ended all thoughts of holding a line at the waist along the Pyongyang—Wonsan line.

On 3 December, as the Fifth Air Force was completing the first stage of its redeployment to south Korea and to Japan, General Walker's command post displaced from Pyongyang to Seoul, and service units began packing up for the move south. Two days later the North Korean capital was abandoned to the enemy.

The rapid southward movement of Eighth Army, which threatened momentarily to leave Chinnampo uncovered called urgently for the evacuation of that port.

In the course of the movement of amphibious shipping to Korea, Transport Squadron One, Captain Kelly in Bayfield, had been assigned to Task Group 90.1 and ordered to Inchon. On 30 November and 1 December these ships—the APAs Bayfield, Boxer, and Okanogan, and the AKAs Algol and Montague -- had sailed independently from Japanese ports. On the afternoon of the 3rd, while heading northward into the Western Sea, Captain Kelly intercepted a message from ComNavFE to CTG 90.1 which reported an urgent EUSAK request for the dispatch of these ships to Chinnampo, but which expressed doubts as to the possibility of loading and protecting so many large units there. But Admiral Thackrey was still on his Korean travels, his flagship was at sea, and his staff was slow to act. For five hours, as Bayfield steamed northward, Captain Kelly puzzled over the tone of ComNavFE's message and the lack of implementing instructions. At 2200 he decided to wait no more but to sail to the sound of the guns, and ordered his dispersed units to join him off the Chinnampo swept channel in the morning. Others were swinging into action too. At 0330 on the 4th Bayfield intercepted a message from Admiral Smith, Commander of the Task Force 95, to Thackrey which reported that the six west coast destroyers of TE 95.12, Captain J.V. Brock, RCN in Cayuga, were available to protect the transports, and that Ceylon was being started from Sasebo for the west coast. Unknown to Captain Kelly, still more help was on the way, for Admiral Andrewes, after a hasty return from Hong Kong to Sasebo, was preparing to sail with Theseus and four destroyers for the Western Sea of Korea.
Section 2. The Hungnam Redeployment (1–24 December 1950)

Carrier-based Air Action

The Changjin Reservoir lies on some 80 kilometers north of Hungnam. Between the Hungnam port and Hagaru a single road, narrow twisting, inadequate to heavy traffic, and with bridges of only light construction was providing the main supply routes. Moreover, as early as mid-November canteens were freezing and bursting, while by December night temperatures would at times reach 25 degrees below zero. Climatically, at least the American Marines did face there a new war.

By late November the entire 1st US Marine Division was strung out northward along the 120 kilometers of road from Hungnam to Yudam-ni, immediate west of the reservoir. By night the Marines concentrated and dug in tight perimeters, and presented heavily-armed strong points on which the Red Chinese implaced themselves in the attack. And by day, with close support aircraft on station and with flanking forces clearing the heights along the road, they formed moving fortresses which brushed the Communist aside, while over the hill, beyond artillery range, the extension of fire power by Marine and Navy aircraft kept the enemy down.

The coming of the Chinese Communist onslaught had found the fast carriers still committed to armed reconnaissance. On 28 November 1950 the forces available to General Harris consisted of Marine Aircraft Group 12 with two fighter and one night fighter squadrons at Wonsan, Marine Aircraft Group 33 with one fighter and one night fighter squadron at Yonpo and a fighter squadron in Badoeng Strait, and the Air Force's 35th Fighter-Bomber Group at Yonpo. There were plenty of calls on the services of these units. At Chinhung-ni, in the southern sector of the MSR, Red Chinese probing attacks had begun on the 26th; west of Koto-ri, next day, Marine patrols had encountered the new enemy; on the night of the 27th heavy fighting had broken out in Yudam-ni and east of the reservoir.

On the 29th, with Hagaru still holding out, the second phase of the campaign began. Control of the army forces at the reservoir was passed to Major General Smith, who was directed to concentrate all units at Hagaru in anticipation of a further move to the southward. Pursuant to these instructions the forces at Yudam-ni were ordered to fight their way back, and on the
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afternoon of 1 December 1950, after a day of preparation, the 5th and 7th US Marine Regiments disengaged and started south for Hagaru-ri.

The air strength available for the support of X Corps had by this time been considerably increased, as a result of the eastward shift of the fast carrier effort. On the 30th, following General Harris' first request for carrier air, Task Force 77 had sent 39 sorties to the reservoir, of which 14 struck at Red Chinese troops surrounding the isolated army units while 25 attacked the enemy in the hills about Hagaru. By bad luck, however, the next day brought bad weather both at the reservoir and in the Eastern Sea. Although aircraft from Badoeng Strait and Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Red Chinese enemy, the early flights from Task Force 77 were weathered out of the reservoir, and in late morning the force was obliged to cancel operations.

Likewise, on 3 December, the observation planes circled over the column while in the breakout operation, warning of enemy positions ahead; a total of 117 sorties flown by the five Marine squadrons at Yonpo and the sixth in Badoeng Strait were devoted to support of the pull-out movement; Task Force 77 put an additional 80 sorties into the reservoir area. Of the carrier aircraft involved 32 attacked the enemy near Yudam-ni and in the rear of the column, 23 struck targets along the flanks from Toktong Pass to Hagaru, and 25 worked over Chinese forces east of the reservoir and south of Hagaru.

On 4 December, a morning flight from Leyte sighted and attacked an estimated thousand troops at the northern end of the reservoir; in the same area, later in the day, another Leyte flight reported troops moving south on all trails.

By this time the concentration of fast carrier effort in the X Corps sector had been made officially. And as the ComNavFE confirmed that close support remained the primary responsibility of the Task Force 77, General Harris made another try on the 3rd, and urgently recommended the assignment of the main carrier effort to the support of the 1st US Marine Division. On the 4th the Far East Air Force concurred in this recommendation.

The presence of the fast carriers provided types of force not otherwise available. Only the carrier air groups operated the heavily armed Skyraider Douglas Divebomber whose load, greater than that of the World War II Flying Fortress, made it the outstanding attack plane in the Korean War. Defensively too, the Seventh Fleet's contribution was unique; with no Marine jet yet in Korea, and with the nearest Air Force squadrons 320 kilometers away at Kimpo, only the fast carriers could attempt to provide a jet combat air patrol over the area of operations.
The combat air patrol, a precaution measure of some importance in view of the MIG concentration across the Yalu, had been earlier discontinued in the interest of fuel economy and sustained flight operations, but with the arrival of Princeton it was reconstituted.

On 6 December, morning air operations were prevented by a ground fog, but this in time lifted, and the hundred offensive sorties sent up by Princeton, Leyte, and the Marine squadrons provided strikes against troops in ridges along the road as well as a jet combat air patrol.

On the 7th the three fast carriers continued operations, and Badoeng Strait was just joined by Sicily. In the course of the day, and despite bad weather in the afternoon, Philippine Sea, Princeton, and Leyte put 125 offensive sorties into the Koto-ri area, more than half the day's total of 216.

Thus the Marines had reached Koto-ri on the 7th, and their move south
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from Koto-ri began on the following day.

The bad weather which had limited carrier operations on the afternoon before had now really arrived. The attacks were begun in swirling snowstorm, throughout the day zero visibility prevailed, the carrier were unable to operate, and of 5 flights of 15 aircraft which got off the ground at Yonpo only one reached the zone of march. But on the 9th, with the fast carriers back at work, the X Corps sorties mounted to a record 479, half of which were assigned to the airborne control center.

On 10 December, two weeks to the day after the Chinese Communist forces on fall at Yudam-ni, the leading elements of the Marines reached Chinhung-ni and the command post was flown down to Hungnam.

The Pull-Out from the Hungnam Port

On 9 December 1950, General MacArthur issued orders specifying General Almond’s mission for withdrawal: General Almond, the X Corps Commander, was to be lifted from north Korea as he had come, by sea. After his arrival in the south he was to assemble his units in the Pusan—Masan area and report to the Commanding General of Eighth US Army.

The selection of Hungnam as the port of their pull-out was logical for several reasons. It was only six and a half kilometers away from General Almond’s X Corps headquarters at Hamhung; it was approximately the same distance from Yonpo airfield which could serve as the air control center. Hungnam was tactically feasible as an assembly and loading point for the X Corps units which had fanned northward out of Wonsan and Iwon. And lastly, Hungnam was ideal because of its port facilities. Although small, the port was excellent and well protected. The tidal range was less than a foot and berthing space was available alongside the docks for seven ships. By doublebanking ships, four additional ships could be simultaneously loaded. Other beach areas of the port were suitable for LST operations.

ComNavFE now assigned complete responsibility for the east coast redeployment operation to Commander Task Force 90, Admiral Doyle. He was given control of all air and naval gunfire support. He was made responsible for the protection of shipping en route to the debarkation point and for coordinating all withdrawal movements with the Commanding General of X Corps, General Almond. In contrast to the command arrangement for Inchon and Wonsan, Hungnam had no joint task for commander assigned.
As Admiral Doyle completed plans to redeploy the X Corps and the I ROK Corps from Wonsan and Hungnam of the east coast, Rear Admiral L.A. Thackray, Commander Amphibious Group Three, began to redeploy elements of the Eighth Army at Chinnampo and Inchon. Redeployment of 1,800 Army and Navy port personnel and 5,900 ROK troops was completed at Chinnampo on 5 December. The Chinnampo evacuation was carried out by five British Commonwealth destroyers and one U.S. destroyer when, in darkness and through the swept channel of a minefield, they navigated 30 miles of the shallow water of the Taedong River estuary to cover the withdrawal of civilians, noncombatant military personnel, and wounded from the Pyongyang area. That day the transports were loaded with wounded ROK civilian refugees, and military personnel. They were evacuated from Chinnampo without interference by the enemy.

On 7 December, the outloading of all Army stores at Inchon began. By 31 December, 32,000 personnel, 1,000 vehicles and 54,000 tons of cargo had been outloaded.

Finally at Wonsan on the east coast, outloading of UN personnel and material at the port area began on 3 December 1950. Covering fire was furnished by the cruiser St. Paul (Captain C.C. Smith) and the destroyers Charles S. Sperry (Commander R.M. Brownlie) and Zellars (Commander F.E. Michael). Shells from these three ships effectively isolated the city from enemy attack during the day, and at night they fired star shells to illuminate suspicious areas. In addition to the 7,000 Korean civilian refugees, the outloading at Wonsan included 3,800 military personnel, 1,100 vehicles and some 10,000 bulk tons of cargo.

At Wonsan, naval gunfire had held the North Korean Communist forces at such a respectable distance from the UN perimeter that UN troops were never seriously threatened. The entire operation was completed without either the loss of a single life or the necessity to sacrifice any of UN's valuable equipment.

In the Hungnam operation Rear Admiral Doyle exercised control through various control stations: An operation unit aboard his flagship, Mount McKinley; a control vessel, a beachmaster, a port director, an embarkation control liaison officer, and an MSTS control board. The flagship's operations officer coordinated all shipments, assigned anchorages, issued docking instructions, prepared and issued sailing orders for all Navy and SCAJAP vessels, and supervised the operations of all the other control stations. The beachmaster controller LST operations, the port director berthed the ship, and the embarkation control liaison officer linked the staffs of Admiral Doyle
and General Almond, MSTS office handled MSTS shipping. It was a well-coordinated team of experts who knew their amphibious doctrine backward as well as forward. All ships arriving in Hungnam were directed to be ready for immediate movement on sudden notice and to maintain a 24-hour visual watch for sailing signals. Each commanding officer of master was supplied the latest hydrographic information.

The control officer in charge of redeployment operations ashore, representing General Almond, was Marine Colonel E.H. Forney, whose headquarters was a shed near the dock area. Forney was responsible for continuous operation of the Hungnam port; for the withdrawal to staging areas of the X Corps elements; for the loading of troops on assigned shipping; and for the evacuation of refugees and the removal of all material.

Practically all cargo, with the exception of ammunition, was loaded alongside the dock on the LST beaches. Personnel were loaded into APAs and AKAs at anchorages as close to the beach as possible. To assist the loading operation, the Foss (DE 59) was placed alongside the dock to supply electrical power. The Shimano Maru served as mothership for 1,200 Japanese stevedores, who helped with the outloading of supplies and equipment.

General Almond's operation order called for the 1st US Marine Division and the ROK divisions to embark first. They would be followed by the 7th and 3rd US Infantry Divisions in that order. Thus, the 3rd US Division would have final responsibility for the Hungnam defense perimeter. Marines started to load aboard waiting transports as soon as they arrived in the Hungnam area on 10 December. The drivers were embarked with their vehicles; troops were billeted in the cargo spaces of commercial ships. Between 4,500 and 5,500 Leathernecks were embarked on each of the three APAs. Seven commercial cargo vessels, thirteen LSTs, three LSDs, an APA, and AKA were also assigned as lift for the 1st US Marine Division.

The task of loading the Marines was completed by the evening of 14 December.

Troops embarking at Hungnam.
and on the morning of 15th the last ships with elements of the First Marine Division sailed for Pusan. The ROK units departed Hungnam on 17 December, the 7th US Division on 21 December, and the 3rd US Division on 24 December.

On 11 December, the Navy made final plans to lay down an aerial canopy and a curtain of steel around the Hungnam perimeter — a canopy of naval aircraft from seven carriers, plus a steel curtain of shellfire from thirteen ships.

Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen's Task Force 77 had grown from two to four fast carriers by early December: Philippine Sea and Leyte (both of which had been supporting the troops ashore from the Eastern Sea since early November); and now Valley Forge (hastily recalled from the United States with Air Group Two embarked) and Princeton (with Air Group 19, Commander R.C. Merrick, aboard).

In accordance with Commander Seventh Fleet's operation plan of 12 December, the fast carriers were given the task during the daylight hours of flying close air support and air cover for forces inside the embarkation areas. Outside the embarkation area, Task Force 77 aircraft were ordered to interdict enemy supply lines, support friendly ground operations, and provide air cover for the escort carriers and the shipping to and from the embarkation area. In company with aircraft from Fifth US Air Force, they were also to provide heckling missions at night.

Rear Admiral R.W. Ruble's escort carrier group (TG 96.8), originally composed of Sicily and Badoeng Strait, was now augmented by the light carrier Bataan. This force added additional air cover for the ground forces and the armada of ships in the Hungnam port area.

In charge of providing gunfire support was Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, USN. Before the evacuation task was finished on 24 December, 1950. Admiral Hillenkoetter's force included the battleship Missouri, the heavy cruisers St. Paul and Rochester; the destroyers Forrest Royal, Norris, Borie, English, Lind, Hank and Massey; and the rocket ships, LSMRs 401, 403, and 404. The ships of this Hungnam gunfire support group were stationed where they could deliver emergency support to the X Corps, and at the same time provide protection in the event of enemy air attack.

No naval gunfire was requested until 15 December. On that date Admiral Hillenkoetter's gunfire support group commenced deep support fire at ranges up to ten miles delivering both 8-inch interdiction and harassing gunfire as well as 5-inch illumination at night. For this gunfire the ships were deployed to preselected stations at sea and in the swept channel. The recently swept fishing areas allowed the bombarding ships to maneuver
in an area ten miles to the north and ten miles to the south of Hungnam.

As the operation progressed and the perimeter contracted, fire support ships were moved closer ashore to obtain better firing positions. LSMRs blasted the reverse slopes near Hungnam. On two occasions, the three rocket ships were used to fire barrages of the right flank, onto the high ground overlooking Hungnam where enemy troops were reportedly concentrating.

*Missouri* began main battery fire on 23 December at road targets between Ori-ri and Hungnam. In addition to her main battery fire, *Missouri's* 5-inch batteries contributed harassing and illumination fire in covering the withdrawal of the last ground elements.

As the Corps artillery was loaded aboard ships and withdrawn between 22 and 24 December, naval gunfire took over observed firing and close support. The shore fire control parties reported the naval gunfire as "very effective" and credited it with "destroying large numbers of enemy troops." In at least one instance, naval gunfire was reported to have broken up an enemy attack of larger than company size.

For the final day of withdrawal, 24 December, a concentrated naval gunfire barrage was maintained in a strip approximately 2,500 meters wide and 3,000 meters from the beaches and harbor. The only enemy troop movement to be observed on the final day was seen by Admiral Doyle and General Almond from the flagship *Mount McKinley* at the final withdrawal. In the long run, at no time did the enemy attempt to interfere with the Hungnam evacuation either from the air or from the sea.

On 15 December, Admiral Doyle assumed control of all air support operations within a 35-mile radius of Hungnam. This included both the close and deep support efforts of the carriers of Task Force 77 and Task Group 96.8, the night hecklers from both Fifth Air Force in Korea and Task Force 77, and all reconnaissance and transient aircraft flying over the area. In conjunction with the naval gunfire, the mission of the aircraft was to prevent interference with the evacuation.

The contribution rendered by air is typified by such reports as that of Commander W.F. Madden on 10 December; his flight of seven Corsairs had strafed, rocketed, and napalmed enemy troops; by Commander Epes whose four Corsairs strafed and bombed one hundred horses and unnumbered enemy troops; by Lieutenant Commander H.H. Osborne's three Skyraiders and four Corsairs, who reported destruction of stacks of fuel drums and a supply dump.

*Philippine Sea*'s Commander E.T. Deacon reported that on the early
The final demolitions scene at Hungnam, with the USS *Begor* shown in the foreground.

morning of 15 December his flight of six Corsairs attacked troop concentrations. Lieutenant Krause’s six Corsairs had attacked troops concentrated in a small valley near Hungnam. *Princeton’s* pilots reported the destruction of oxcarts, trucks, gasoline drums, warehouses, and railroad tunnels.

From 15 to 24 December, a total of 1,700 sorties of carrier-based planes were flown inside the Hungnam perimeter. Many additional missions were flown outside the area.

The last pilot to fly over Hungnam was *Princeton’s* Lieutenant R.B. Mack, who described the night as “... cloudless, cold, and unfriendly. Haze was everywhere,” said Mack. “I was flying the last launch of the day as one of two F4U-5Ns, Detachment Fox of VC-8 from *Princeton.*”

Section 3. The Lessons of the Hungnam Redeployment Operation

First of all, the Hungnam operation was carried out successfully with simplified command responsibility under the complete responsibility for the east coast redeployment, by Commander Task Force 90, Admiral Doyle. In con-
Redeployment from the North

In contrast to the command arrangement for Inchon and Wonsan, Hungnam operation had no joint task force commander assigned. During the operation the Commander of the Seventh Fleet was in a supporting role, who would provide Commander Task Force 90 with aircraft support and gunfire support ships. For the successful conduct of the Hungnam redeployment operations the following major naval forces and commanders contributed to the accomplishment of their respective tasks:

**Task Force 90:**
- **Flagship Element:** Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle
- **Tactical Air Control Element:** Captain C.A. Printup
- **Repair and Salvage Element:** Commander R.W. Arndt
- **Control Element:** Commander L.C. Conwell
- **Transport Group:** Lieutenant Commander C.E. Allmon
- **Gunfire Support Group:** Captain S.G. Kelly
- **Blockade, Escort and Minesweeping Group:** Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter

**Task Force 77 Fast Carrier Force:**
- **Support Group:** Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen
- **Screening Group:** Captain L.T. Duke
- **Carrier Group:** Captain J.R. Clark
- **Escort Carrier Group:** Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen
- **Logistic Support Group:** Rear Admiral R.W. Ruble
- **Captain B.L. Austin**

The Hungnam operation was a brilliantly executed maneuver for the redeployment to the rear. The time was short, and putting all the parts together and making them work was extremely complicated. However, the Hungnam evacuation was not opposed either by enemy air or by submarine or armor forces. Had such opposition occurred, the operation would not have been so successful and there would have been losses.

Secondly, the significance of the Hungnam operation was that it was an amphibious operation in the reverse. No corresponding operation in military history exists. Particularly, the value of UN firepower from the aircraft carriers and surface ships contributed to the high morale of troops ashore.

The value of rail transport was dramatically demonstrated at Hungnam. The rail line between Wonsan and Hungnam was kept open with the help of Korean laborers; and on some 500 freight cars assembled by the X Corps control organization, almost 8,900 tons of Class V ammunition were among the supplies moved to Hungnam by rail to be loaded aboard ships.
Air transport also played a vital role. 112 Air Force planes and ten Marine planes airlifted 3,600 men, 196 vehicles, 1,300 tons of cargo, and hundreds of Korean refugees from the Yonpo airfield. In spite of bad weather, the Flying Boxcars sometimes took off at three-minute intervals. The field was used as long as it could be defended within the receding perimeter.

The importance of sea transport was never more self-evident as the statistics will verify. When the operation was finally concluded, 105,000 US and ROK military personnel and 91,000 civilian refugees—nearly 200,000 in all—had been embarked. The civilian refugees were loaded in incredible numbers: 12,000 in one APA and 8,400 in one LST were the records. It was Admiral Doyle’s opinion and policy that if UN forces had had the shipping, every person in the Hungnam area of north Korea could have been evacuated.

In conclusion, a powerful force itself of the United Nations with modernized equipment and materiel which displayed in the Hungnam withdrawal movement had brought eventually a triumph for the UN forces in the Korean War.

Further, the unity of Navy and Marine kept on their unchangeable glory. The major lesson of the Hungnam operation was that all the basic principles of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine were sound, and that they worked in reverse as well as they worked forward.

Admiral Joy, the Commander of the US Naval Forces Far East, summarized the redeployment from Hungnam: “The Hungnam evacuation showed that a well-trained and well-led amphibious force can carry out an amphibious operation in reverse as effectively as the conventional type. It again emphasized the importance of having adequate amphibious forces in being and in a state of full combat readiness.”
CHAPTER VII  THE SECOND SIX MONTHS
(January—June 1951)

Section 1. Before and After the Hungnam Operation
(January—February 1951)

The Evacuation of Inchon

In contrast to the fighting at the Changjin Reservoir and the Hungnam evacuation, in the west the contact with the Red Chinese forces was broken in the first days of December as the Eighth Army retired rapidly on Seoul.

On Christmas Day the command of Task Force 77 changed as Admiral Ewen, after four months of strenuous operations, was relieved by Admiral Oistie.

On 26 December, 1950, as Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway the new EUSAK Commander, arrived in Korea, X US Corps was integrated into Eighth Army. At Pusan the last of the Hungnam forces were coming ashore. On the east coast the minesweepers were hard at work clearing an inshore lane for the destroyers.

A new fierce and decisive CCF offensive came with the New Year. On the left three Red Chinese armies pushed down the northern approaches to Seoul; in the center another heavy thrust was delivered north of Wonju. Further retirement seemed necessary, and on 4 January 1951 Seoul was abandoned, the Han bridges were blown, and the army started south again.

At Inchon all ships were put on one-hour notice, and on orders from Com-NavFE the destruction of the port was begun. There, as the enemy offensive broke, Rear Admiral L.A. Thackrey in charge of port operation at Inchon had at his disposal with his flagship Eldorado, one AKA, two APAs, two LSDs, one APD (fast transport), and two U.S. Navy and nine SCAJAP LSTs for rather than redeploy by sea, the staff of Task Group 90.1 had worked up plans for all contingencies, including an emergency outloading of up to 135,000 troops by shuttle service to the off-shore islands. But these precautions proved unnecessary, and the principal withdrawal from the Seoul area was carried out by road.
The sea lift from Inchon was nevertheless a sizable one. The original estimates from EUSAK, which had called for the sailing of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel, had been surpassed by 18 December, and the total lifted out during the month amounted to 32,000 troops, more than 1,000 vehicles, and 55,000 tons of cargo. On 5 January 1951, the Inchon port facilities were blown, and as the Reds entered the town Thackrey sorted his shipping. In these last five days a few hundred more vehicles, a few thousand more tons of supplies, and another 37,000 military personnel had been taken out. But in vehicles and cargo the Inchon evacuation was far smaller than that at Hungnam.

Throughout the period of retirement the naval forces of the UN did what they could to help stem the tide of the Red Chinese forces. On the east coast the destroyers worked to help the ROK defenders, while Admiral Oftie's carriers flew strikes against enemy concentrations in the central mountains and westward to the area of Seoul. At Inchon Rochester, Kenya, and Ceylon supported the withdrawal across the Han and the evacuation of the port, and bombarded Kimpo airfield. From the Western Sea the American Marine fighter pilots embarked in Sicily and Badoeng Strait flew in to provide protective patrols, strike the advancing enemy, and burn quantities of abandoned
supplies and equipment at Kimpo. On 1 January EUSA K's wish for more support brought a request for increased carrier strength, and two days later Bataan arrived to join the west coast group.

For a brief period, from 30 December 1950 to 3 January 1951, the possibility of a diversionary landing at Haeju on the west coast was under active consideration.

In the Eastern Sea, on 7 January Philippine Sea and Leyte returned to action; but while Princeton retired to Sasebo for upkeep, such was the magnitude of the Communist offensive that Valley Forge was held on station. For the next two weeks three carriers were kept on the line, working in the triangular pattern which permitted daily operations by two while the third replenished.

From 6 to 10 January low clouds and heavy snow prevented carrier operations; on the 10th things were so bad that all land-based aircraft were grounded; and from the 11th to 13th Task Force 77 was forced to operate south of the peninsula where the visibility was somewhat better.

The coming of the bad weather coincided with a shift of enemy pressure to the central front. In the west on 7 January UN patrols had moved north without opposition to the neighborhood of Inchon, but in the center very heavy fighting continued, infiltrating Chinese Communist forces reached south to the 37th parallel, and reviving North Korean guerrillas raided supply lines inside the Naktong basin.

On 9 January the 1st US Marine Division was ordered out of army reserve and moved up to prevent enemy penetration south of the Andong — Yongdok road. On the 11th, with clearing weather, aircraft from Task Force 77 attacked large troop concentration southeast of Wonju, at Kangnung on the east coast, and as far south as the headwaters of the Naktong River.

**Back to the Han**

By late January 1951 the UN forces started north again, but they had no longer any plan for great amphibious operations for coming future, X Corps had been integrated into Eighth Army, and as the focus of action had always been on land, the fighting in Korea in the first half of 1951 was more than ever a ground war.

On 15 January the job of transporting refugees and prisoners to Koje-do and Cheju-do was assigned Commander Task Force 90, and five days later an AKA lifted the first load of refugees from Pusan. This was the last task imposed upon Admiral Doyle. At Pusan, on the 24th, he was relieved by Rear

Admiral I.N. Kiland, in ceremony which numbered the Far East naval high ranking commanding officers among those present.

Along the coastline in both the Western and Eastern Seas the Blockading and Escort Force continued to perform its duties. In the east, where the enemy had been checked at Mukho, the front was still susceptible of support by naval gunfire. But the fighting was less intense than in the previous summer, and as both sides increasingly concentrated their weight of effort in the central mountains the pace of action on the coastal road diminished.

For the minesweepers, however, nothing had altered. Their work continued as before, and their task remained arduous, uncomfortable, and dangerous. The short winter daylight hampered operations; the winter weather with high winds and freezing spray made small ship work particularly uncomfortable. Despite the intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was preparing a new mining campaign, minesweeping capabilities
nevertheless had been increased. On 2 February the minesweeper Partridge hit a mine about a mile off Sokcho, just north of the parallel, and sank in ten minute with a loss of ten killed or missing and six severely wounded.

With the completion of this sweep, fire support activities were stepped up. Along the eastern coast four of the eight destroyers of Task Group 95.2 were continuously on station, with one pair patrolling the 100-fathom curve north to the limit of the blockade, while the second provided fire support to the ROK troops.

For the carriers of Naval Forces, Far East the deployment of January 1951 was little changed. With stabilization of the front and the passing of the emergency a reduction of the US Seventh Fleet strength from four carriers to three seemed feasible, and arrangements for regular maintenance desirable. Leyte, present in the Far East on loan from the US Atlantic Fleet, was consequently headed homeward late in January. And the departure of Leyte left the US Pacific Fleet with four fast carriers, Valley Forge, Philippine Sea, and Princeton in Korean waters, and Boxer under overhaul at San Francisco.

Something new had by now been added in the field of embarked aviation with the activation of an antisubmarine warfare task group, established by ComNavFE in view of the possibility that the intervention of new armies might be followed by an intervention of new weapons.

By this time the Red Chinese had broken contact and, following the reconnaissance to Suwon, General Ridgway had ordered a two-divisional advance toward the Han River. To assist this operation known as "Thunderbolt", the Western Sea forces were strengthened by the dispatch of "Saint Paul", escorted by two destroyers, to provide 8-inch gunfire at Inchon. On both coast, as the armies moved forward, the carrier air groups continued to contribute to the support of troops in the line.

At Inchon, where Saint Paul had arrived on 25 January 1951, a second deceptive operation was scheduled to follow. There Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, Gunfire Support Group Commander had been greeted by some port salvos from Wolmi-do, but with the assistance of an air strike from Theseus and gunfire from Ceylon and some destroyers, the Wolmi batteries were neutralized and the Kimpo area subsequently kept under intermittent bombardment. On 6 February Admiral Andrewes sailed from Sasebo in Belfast to administer the pretended landing, and two days, after some shooting in support of ROK troops at Kangnung, Missouri was started west.

Captain S.C. Kelly, Transport Group Commander reached Inchon on the
8th with two AKAs and LSD, to simulate pre-landing operations; on the next day Missouri arrived and began to bombard enemy positions; a demonstration involving two transport divisions was planned for the afternoon tide of the 10th. But the affair was cancelled as a result of successes ashore; enemy resistance in the west, which had stiffened at the start of the month, gave way suddenly on the 9th, and the Red Chinese retired from the area; on the afternoon of the 10th Inchon was occupied by a party of ROK Marines from Tokchok-do, and by nightfall American troops had reached the banks of the Han River.

With these February operations the tempo of naval gunfire began a rapid rise. Where ammunition expenditures in December at Hungnam had set a new record, those of January were dropped down. But with the clearance of the coast fire support lane and with seizure of the Wonsan islands there came a radical increase, and by March 1950 the expenditure of 5-inch ammunition had become phenomenal.

**Ammunition Expended in Bombardment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-inch</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-inch</td>
<td>3,357</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>2,395</td>
<td>1,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-inch</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td>6,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-inch</td>
<td>15,357</td>
<td>3,468</td>
<td>13,385</td>
<td>43,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 2. On to the 38th Parallel (March—April 1951)

On 2 March 1951 the 1st US Marine Division, spearheading up on the center had captured Hoengsong. With the aims of Operation Killer accomplished EUSAK now planned a further advance by Operation Ripper, which was to push onward through Hongchon to Chunchon. And this would outflank Seoul, and gain a line in the neighborhood of the 38th Parallel.

To assist the planned advance EUSAK had again asked for an amphibious demonstration in the Western Sea. On 7 March the Operation Ripper was launched and began a steady progress up the center of the peninsula. Seoul was recaptured without a fight on the 14 March.

On the east coast, as the Operation Ripper began, the destroyers continued to provide for support; at Inchon the heavy cruiser Saint Paul remained on station, her 8-inch guns closely tied in with 1 US Corps artillery. But with the flanks holding and the center advancing, and with Task
Force 95 concentrating on the disruption of enemy transport and supply, gunfire support was for the moment of secondary importance and the trend of naval activity continued northerly. Task Force 77 was working over east coast transportation targets; east coast bombardment efforts were centered at Wonsan and Songjin; in the northwest Belfast, Kenya and associated light units shot up enemy positions at the mouth of the Taedong estuary.

Since 16 February 1951 Wonsan had been under siege, and as April opened, all important harbor islands had been occupied by the U.N., and enemy response to these operations involved a build-up of artillery and garrison forces and remining the harbor. Of the 28 mines swept in March, some of them new and shiny, 20 were swept at Wonsan. Despite frequent and increasing artillery opposition, the sweepers worked persistently to enlarge the bombardment lanes, while the gunnery ships supported them by counterbattery fire and bombardment. On 1 March Korean agents reported that the enemy was unloading Soviet mines at the Kalma railroad siding, and on the 7th a bombardment of this target by the light cruiser Manchester brought a gratifying high order detonation of a boxcar full.

At Songjin, a similar if less intensive siege had meanwhile been commenced. Mine reconnaissance of Songjin, carried out in the first days of March, was followed by daily bombardment of the port and of rail bridges neighboring the town, and in the first week of April, a major minesweeping effort was undertaken to provide increased maneuvering room for the firing ships.

Carlson’s Bridge Strikes

The rail route northeast coast between Wonsan and Chongjin was of continuing value to enemy as a major route over which supplies, equipment, and
troops were being transported to immediate battle areas. The enemy's known capability for quickly effecting temporary repairs to the damaged portions of this route could be seriously impaired by deliberate, methodical, total destruction of all piers, spans, approaches and embankments of each vital bridge in each critical area.

The vigor, tenacity, and ingenuity displayed by Task Force 77 against the coastal rail lines of northeast Korea during the period from January to June 1951 can be described in an account of the destruction of a single bridge over "Carlson's Canyon," near Kilchu, and the subsequent efforts of Task Force 77 to maintain cuts along this coastal railroad.

After the decision had been reached that the primary mission of the carriers was to be interdiction, Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, Commander Task Force 77, ordered his reconnaissance aircraft in February to make a complete photographic survey of the east coast rail system in order to find the most profitable targets along it.

On the morning of 2 March 1951, a perfect target was discovered by the Commanding Officer of Fighting Squadron 193, Lieutenant Commander C.M. Craig. Commander Craig was returning from a strike on the Kilchu bridges when he spotted the bridge. He also noted tunnels at each end of the bridge -- two tunnels, in fact, to eventually allow through traffic in both directions. Best of all, the target was south of Kilchu, at which point three rail lines from Manchuria joined. Thus, if this bridge could be interdicted, and kept interdicted, the flow of southward traffic over the eastern net from Com-
munist China could be seriously impeded. On the afternoon of 2 March the bridge was taken under attack, but only minor damage to the bridge approaches resulted. The following morning, however, the bridge was demolished by Princeton's aircraft. Leading eight Skyraiders from his squadron, VA-195, Lieutenant Commander H.Q. Carlson's pilots dropped one span of the bridge, damaged a second, and twisted two others out of horizontal alignment. The bridge was attacked again on 7 March, and this time another span was dropped. Promptly, the Communists commenced their repair campaign, working mostly at night. The results of the savage attacks of the Task Force 77 aircraft on the northeastern Korean rail systems began to visible in early April. From 24 February to 13 June, the naval airmen, in 1,223 sorties, had made 150 initial breaks and rebreaks in the rail line, and 109 initial breaks and rebreaks in the highways.

On 4 April 1951, after 38 days of concentrated effort in interdiction, Admiral Ofstie turned over tactical command of the force, and Princeton sailed for Yokosuka, Japan for an overdue period of rehabilitation and maintenance. The Task Force 77's rail interdiction from February to April 1951 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Rail Bridges Inoperable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoeryong south to Chongjin</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongjin south to Pukchong</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland from Tanchon, Songjin and Kitchu</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukchong south to Wonsan and inland to the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changjin and Pujon Reservoirs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonsan west to Yongdol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonsan south to Chorwon and Kumbwa</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Command Changes**

By this time the ships, the commanders, and the crews who had carried the burden during the early months of war were being rotated homeward. Admirals Hoskins, Hartman, Higgins, and Doyle had already moved on to new commands, and as spring came more new faces blossomed in Korea. Navy reservists, who had earlier come forward in drafts and as individuals, now began to arrive in organized units; the first weekend-warrior aviation unit, a PBM patrol squadron, had reached Japan in mid-December 1950; in late March the first reserve air group arrived when Boxer, her long-delayed overhaul at last completed, returned to relieve Valley Forge. Also embarked in Boxer was Rear Admiral W.C. Tomlinson, Commander Carrier
Division Three, whose impending arrival at last permitted Admiral Ewen to go home. But *Philippine Sea*, his long-time flagship, remained, and her flag quarters were taken over on 25 March 1951 by Vice Admiral H.M. Martin, who three days later relieved Admiral Struble as Commander Seventh Fleet.

This shift in the principal naval operating command was followed, in early April, by changes in subordinate echelons and by a major structural revision on the US Naval Forces Far East. Admiral Andrewes, who following promotion to vice admiral earlier in the year had for six weeks commanded Task Force 95, was relieved by Rear Admiral A.K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN, and command of the Blockading and Escort Force reverted to Admiral Smith. Service Force units, previously organized in separate Seventh Fleet and NavFE groups, were consolidated into Task Force 92; with the departure of Captain Austinn who had run the logistic for Inchon, Wonsan and Hungnam, command of the force devolved upon Captain Wright, formerly ComSerDiv 31. And with these changes Admiral Martin got something that Admiral Struble had repeatedly sought without success, when on 3 April Task Force 92, Task Force 95, and all U.S. Navy destroyers in the Far East were assigned to his operational control.

With this consolidations only the patrol planes, the submarines, the Hunter-killer Group, and the Amphibious Force remained directly under Commander Naval Forces Far East, and these would be assigned to Seventh Fleet as need arose. One result was a considerable simplication of command relations and of associated communications problem as between Eighth Army, Fifth Air Force, and theater naval forces; another was an improved coordination of carrier and gunnery units in the east coast interdiction campaign. Admiral Ooftie had earlier commented on the economy of effort to be derived from such coordination, then requiring action at the NavFE level, and while exchange of information had been improved the results were not yet wholly satisfactory.

Following the reorganization of 3 April, however, Commander Seventh Fleet assumed responsibility for the interdiction campaign. All heavy ships were absorbed into Task Force 77, while Task Force 95, composed of two US destroyer divisions, the ROK Navy, and units of other UN member nations, became in fact as in name Blockading and Escort Force. Shortly Admiral Martin would delegate responsibility for east coast interdiction, gunfire as well as air, to CTF 77, and by instructing him to make recommendations for supplementary commando raids ensure that there would be no more the amphibious raid at Sorye-dong below Songin.

Moreover, on 11 April 1951, President Truman relieved General
MacArthur of his commands, and the manifold responsibilities of General MacArthur’s were now devolved upon General Matthew B. Ridgway, who was in turn relieved at Eighth Army by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet.

At sea as on land, nevertheless, the operations continued in routine manner. On the east coast the sieges of Wonsan and Songjin were on, with daily bombardment and daily minesweeping.

In the northeast, where the interdiction was now the sole responsibility of Task Force 77, the fast carriers had resumed their effort, and while the rotating emphasis on different sections of the transportation net continued, the focus, with Carlson’s Canyon bypassed, was on the bridges south of Songjin.

In the Western Sea the carrier element worked over western Hwanghae Province, the surface ships continued their missions of bombardment and patrol, and guerrilla raiding forces were put ashore.

Under its new commander Eighth US Army continued its northward advance, while preparing, in anticipation of a CCF offensive, for a fighting retirement which would inflict maximum punishment on the enemy. By the third week of April the Hwachon Reservoir had been reached, and from the Imjin River to the Eastern Sea the front line ran some 16 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel.

Section 3. The CCF Spring Offensive (April–May 1951)

The first phase of the Chinese Communist forces’ spring offensive started at 2000 on the night of 22 April 1951. The frontlines suddenly became alive with activity and action as the 6th ROK Division was routed. The 1st US Marine Division stemmed, then smashed the Chinese attack, which was attempting to turn the left flank. By early May, however, UN forces had counterattacked to stabilize the battlefield. A second enemy attack was obviously being readied. Air reconnaissance and other intelligence reported intense enemy activity and preparation. Thousands of vehicles were reported moving south as fresh Communist divisions were apparently relieving those which had been decimated in the first phase attack.

The result of the first CCF offensive was to divert the striking power of Task Force 77 from interdiction to close support effort in behalf of the endangered Eighth Army. The carrier planes returned to the interdiction
campaign on 1 May, and for the next thirteen days the bridges again received full attention. Thirty one bridges and all bypasses were knocked out by the Boxer, Princeton and Philippine Sea aircraft. Eleven highway bridges and bypasses were also demolished.

During this period Rear Admiral G.B. Henderson, who had relieved Rear Admiral Ofstie on 6 May 1951, received a request from Commander A.L. Downing, the senior naval representative on duty at the JOC at Taegu. Downing said that the Fifth Air Force had asked informally if the carrier aircraft could help them interdict the west coast rail lines from Pyongyang northward. Only three carriers were available to Admiral Henderson and in effect, with replenishment every third or fourth day, only two operating carriers. And two carriers, with only 150 aircraft, were not even sufficient to interdict adequately the eastern rail net, much less interdict the west lines. Anxious to lend a hand, however, Rear Admiral Henderson’s staff selected four rail bridges in the western net; and on 11 May, 32 Skyraiders (each carrying two 2,000-pound bombs) and 32 Corsairs (each carrying eight 100-pound or 250-pound flak-supression bombs), plus 16 Panther jets, struck the selected four bridges. Three of the four were knocked out, and the fourth damaged.

The expected second-phase CCF attack began on 16 May under a blanket of fog and rain which hampered United Nations defensive action. Task Force 77 assistance was again needed for close air support strikes at the battleline.

After four days of bitter fighting all along the front, pressure by the attacking Red Chinese slackened. Despite fog and rain which turned streams into torrents and which kept most airplanes grounded, a UN counteroffensive was started in the west on 19 May and in the central sector on 21 May. This counterattack slowly ground northward until 2 June. In this fighting the Red Chinese losses were estimated to 40,000 men. Fifty five artillery pieces, 900 automatic weapons, and 22,400 artillery shells were captured.

On 2 June, the carriers were able once again to concentrate on their interdiction targets. In the following nine days, 24 rail bridges and bypasses and 6 highway bridges and bypasses were completely destroyed.

By June 1951, however, it was apparent that in spite of the destructive and widespread attacks of the carrier aircraft in the Navy’s northeastern area, the battlefield was not being interdicted. If the enemy had been able to mount two large-scale offensive within a month, it was obvious that supplies, troops, and equipment were getting through from Communist China to the frontline in north Korea in abundance.
The Attack on the Hwachon Dam

In late April, the enemy again seemed ready to use the waters of the Hwachon Reservoir to his advantage. If another advance of his own was planned, he could close the sluice gates of the dam and thereby lower the water level in the Pukhan and Han Rivers to fording depth. In the event of a UN attack, on the other hand, he could open the sluice gates and impede the UN advance across the Pukhan and Han Rivers.

The EUSAK message was received aboard Task Force 77 at 1440 hours. The dam-busting task was given by Admiral Henderson to Princeton -- specifically to VA-195, Lieutenant Commander H.G. Carlson, USN. Torpedoes were obviously called for, but it would take a few hours to get them ready. In the meantime the Skyraiders started to the dam-busting by a dive-bombing attack.

Attack Squadron 195's first attack was launched in less than three hours from the receipt of the EUSAK message. At 1600, 30 April 1951, six Skyraiders, each carrying two 2,000-pound bombs and accompanied by five Corsairs from VF-193 led by Lieutenant Commander E.A. Parker for flak-

US Navy bombers used aerial torpedoes for the first time in the Korean War to destroy Hwachon dam in mid-spring 1951.
suppression, struck the dam. Although one hole was punched in the dam, the sluice gates were unscathed.

The next day, the torpedo attack was delivered. The terrain made a torpedo attack difficult and hazardous. The reservoir was surrounded by high hills limiting the attack to a two-plane section run-in, while the remainder of the strike orbit overhead. The straightaway was very short, and the problem of controlling the airspeed for the torpedo drop was acute, requiring extremely precise flying. The run-in was made over the high hills into the water area, where the point of torpedo drop had to be accurate. Moreover, the point of drop had to be precise to insure a sufficient arming run. Added to these difficulties were the enemy aircraft batteries surrounding the dam.

Eight Skyraiders led by Commander R.C. Merrick, CVG-19 and Lieutenant Commander Carlson, each carrying a torpedo set to run at surface level, and accompanied by twelve Princeton fighters from VF-192 and VF-193 carrying 100-pound and 500-pound VT-fuzed bombs for flak-suppression, struck the dam shortly after 1130 on 1 May. Commander Merrick weaved his attack group through the antiaircraft fire to pushover point, and the Skyraiders dived in for the torpedo run.

The desired results were achieved, one flood gate in the center was locked completely out, and a ten-foot hole punched in the second flood gate. The impounded waters of the reservoir were released.

The Coastal Demonstrations

The Communist spring offensive had brought about a sudden spate of simulated pre-landing operations by units of Task Force 90 and Task Force 95. The first of these, carried out on short notice on 24 April 1951, consisted of a two-hour bombardment of Kosong by St.Paul, Helena, Manchester, and four destroyers. Five days later, on the 29th and 30th, Helena, Manchester, four destroyers, two attack transports and an attack cargo ship made a demonstration in the Kojo area, in the hope of taking pressure off Eighth Army. On the evening of 4 May General Van Fleet asked for another such affair on the 6th and 7th at Kansong; on the 13th Eighth Army called for another demonstration at Kosong on the 18th and 19th; this request was cancelled two days later, but a west coast event already underway continued to its conclusion.

The popularity of these small demonstrations with army commanders, and the frequency with which they were requested, led to some study of their actual effectiveness and measures which might make for greater realism.
During the last days of May, General Ridgway's headquarters proposed a scheme by which the battlefield might be interdicted. This was the genesis of "Operation Strangle" under which the Navy would operate from 5 June until 20 September 1951. The plans were as these; a one-degree strip of latitude across the narrow neck of north Korea -- from 38°15'N to 39°15'N -- just above the battleline was selected. The traffic networks within this belt were studied and divided into eight routes; the Fifth US Air Force in Korea would take the three westernmost routes; the carriers of Task Force 77 would take the two central routes; and the 1st US Marine Air Wing would take the three eastern routes. In addition any bridge, embankment, tunnel, or other construction within the zone would be considered a target.

Task Force 77 aircraft made an air drop of a half-million leaflets on 20 June along the route between Chongjin and Songjin. The illustrated leaflets warned that unexploded bombs were in the ground.

For the first several weeks, in addition to their work on the northeast rail net, the carrier airmen tackled the highway routes in the mountains of central Korea, plowing craters in roadbeds, knocking out highway bridges and passes, firing rockets into tunnels, sowing delayed action and butterfly bombs in every choke area, and searching for the hundreds of trucks which like ubiquitous kitchen cockroaches, were hiding by day in order to perform at night. The turbulent mountain winds complicated bombing accuracy.

Night-heckling activity also increased, and a greater number of enemy trains and trucks were frequently caught and destroyed at daybreak. Night reconnaissance efforts of "Operation Strangle" also increased, and a close watch was kept of the result. Marine Fighter Squadron 513, operating from Pusan's airfields, was credited with the nighttime destruction of 420 vehicles in a 30-day period.

Operation Strangle went on with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines working as an integrated team in closest harmony.

Section 4. Epilogue (June 1950—June 1951)

During the first year period of war from 25 June 1950 to 30 June 1951, the U.S. naval forces in the theater as the leading force of the U.N., had immediately participated in the war, kept the busy days continuously to carry out various operations, and the expansion of strength and fighting ships had rapidly been progressed, which were soon incorporated with the organization
of many task force.

The maritime aspect of the war first showed itself in the concentration of forces to meet the unexpected emergency, a concentration so rapid as to surprise friend and foe alike. To Military Sea Transportation Service lifts of Army units from Japan, Okinawa, and the continental United States to the Amphibious Force’s management of the Pohang landing and the trans-Pacific movement of the 1st Marine Division, to the high-speed delivery of fighter-bombers by aircraft carrier, and to logistic support of the entire U.N. effort, there was added a rapid and extensive reinforcement of naval fighting strength.

Also, the U.S. Naval ships contributed to the victory of the U.N. ground forces by exercise of a willingness and a determination to fight aggression for the sake of the freedom of the world.

The first year combat results achieved by the U.S. and U.N. navies in the Korean waters for the period from 25 June 1950 to 30 June 1951, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammunition dumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery positions</td>
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<td>Bridges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junks and Sampans</td>
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<td>(plus 9 captured)</td>
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<td>MG and mortar positions</td>
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<td>Pillboxes</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT boats</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land mines</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Railroad cars</td>
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<td>Supply dumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop concentrations</td>
<td>2,150 attacked</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop casualties</td>
<td>12,476</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Trucks and other vehicles</td>
<td>134</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The naval war along the Korean coastline was a fertile field for the exercise of initiative and the display of command, and what Rear Admiral G.C. Dyer, CTF 95, referred to as “the combative spirit.” Especially after the
truce talks began, a blockade assignment could either be a monotonous patrol or an action-packed opportunity, depending on the initiative and aggressiveness of the individual commanding officer.

Better liaison, better coordination, and better spotting -- these were the improved techniques which would increase the effectiveness of naval gunfire upon the enemy.

Of the three, perhaps the most important was spotting, whether air spot (airplane or helicopter) or the actual observation and control of gunfire by spotters on the ground. However it was done, all hands agreed that the effectiveness of the naval gunnery would be in direct proportion to the amount and quality to the spotting.

Helicopter spotting was a new gunnery technique, first used in combat by the *Helena* in August of 1950. Opinion was unanimous that a ship using its own helicopter and carrying its own spotting officer possessed one of the best assists to accurate marksmanship that a ship could have.

As one of remarkable naval achievements during the period, the American siege in Wonsan harbor, which was begun on 16 February 1951, must be described. Of the numerous islands in the Bay of Wonsan, UN forces eventually occupied and used seven islands: Yo-do, Mo-do, Sin-do, Tae-do, Ung-do, and Hwangto-do. To prepare for capturing the islands, two destroyers and two frigates, under the command of Commander Destroyer Division 112 (Captain B.F. Roeder), commenced a two-hour bombardment at 0700 on the morning of 24 February, with spotting furnished by *Manchester’s* helicopter.

At the completion of the first 100 days of the Wonsan siege, 27 May 1951 Admiral Smith reported that it had cost the enemy: (1) 107 trucks destroyed and 238 damaged, (2) 8,195 troop casualties, (3) 149 buildings destroyed and 466 damaged, (4) 34 bridges destroyed and 83 damaged, (5) 63 railroad cars destroyed, (6) 3 tunnels damaged, (7) 11 locomotives damaged, and (8) 54 small boats destroyed and 238 damaged.
PART THREE

THE AIR OPERATIONS

JUNE 1950 to JUNE 1951
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CHAPTER I  INITIAL PARTICIPATION
(25–30 June 1950)

Section 1. Outbreak of the Korean War

The Red North Koreans Aggression

Taking advantage of the cover of bad weather, the Red Koreans had drawn up their army along the 38th Parallel, and on Sunday, 25 June 1950, at 0400 hours, they launched a sudden and all-out attack against the Republic of Korea. The invaders numbered about 100,000 men, with many thousands in reserve. They were well-trained and well-equipped with Russian tanks and aircraft.

Defending against these invading forces along the Parallel were four ROK divisions made up of about 40,000 men. They had no tanks, no heavy artillery, no anti-tank weapons, and no combat aircraft. The ROK defense was, in short, no match at all for the Communists.

Just before noon, however, weather began to clear over Seoul, and the North Korean Communist air force entered combat. At 1315 hours two Yak fighters buzzed Youi-do and Kimpo Airfields in Seoul and winged off northward without attacking. The Red fighters began their attacks the afternoon. Four Yaks strafed around Seoul Railroad Station. And at 1700 hours two Yaks strafed Kimpo, hitting the control tower, a gasoline dump, and an American Military Air Transport Service (MATS) C-54 which was grounded with a damaged wing. Four other Yaks strafed the Youi-do Airfield and damaged one T-6 plane of the ROK Air Force. At approximately 1900 hours six other Red fighters again strafed Kimpo, destroying completely the MATS transport.

Founded on 1 October 1949 under the command of Colonel Kim Chung Yul, the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) was a token force at the outbreak of the war. In June 1950 the ROK Air Force mustered 242 officers, 1,570 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 85 civilians. It had 102 pilots,
but only 30 of them were counted as trained. Its 22 planes (eight L-4's, four L-5's and ten T-6's) were located at Kimpo and Youi-do Airfields, and it had detachments at Suwon, Taegu, Kwangju, Kunsan, and Cheju-do.

On the contrary the North Korean Communist puppet air force was equipped with Soviet-built aircraft. With headquarters at Pyongyang, the Red Korean air force apparently possessed 62 IL-10 aircraft, 70 Yak-3 and Yak 78 fighters, 22 Yak-18 transports (similar to C-45), and eight PO-2 trainer planes. Most of 132 combat aircraft were based at the two airfields near Pyongyang, and at the airfield at Yonpo, on the eastern coast of Korea below Hungnam. The Communists also made some use of the airfield at Wonsan, and they were building advanced strips near the 38th Parallel at Sinmak, Pyonggang, Kumsong, and Kansong.

The ROK Air Force was too meager to fight the Communist air force. Notwithstanding, ROKAF's T-6's were sent to the battle zone from the evening on the 25th. There they dropped 15-kilogram bombs against the advance column of enemy. Though poorly-equipped, the Korean Air Force had tried its best in an effort to stop the onrushing enemy troops.

**U.S. Air Force in the Far East**

Before proceeding further to the Korean War, a presentation of the status of American Air Force in the Far East in June 1950 would be necessary.

The United States Air Force had its component under the US Far East Command called the US Far East Air Forces (FEAF).

The US Far East Air Forces was activated during World War II and it remained after the end of the Pacific War under the operational control of the US Far East Command. In June 1950 the US FEAF, with Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer in command, comprised three combat and one support units. Largest of the US FEAF subordinate commands was the Fifth US Air Force, commanded by Major General Earle E. Partridge. Established its headquarters in Nagoya on Honshu, Japan, its tactical air units were deployed in defense of the Japanese home islands.

Southward from Japan down off the coast of Asia on the island of Okinawa the Twentieth US Air Force, Major General A.C. Kineaid commanding, made its headquarters at Kadena Air Base. It was responsible for the air defense of Okinawa and the Marianas.

The other combat unit was the Thirteenth US Air Force, whose headquarters and principal operating site was at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Commanded by Major General Howard M. Turner, it was responsible
for the defense of the Philippine Islands. Disposition of these under the US Far East Air Forces in June 1950 was as follow:

Fifth US Air Force

The 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing (F-80C; 35th, 36th and 80th Squadrons) and 68th US Fighter All-Weather Squadron (F-80) in Itazuke AB on Kyushu, Japan

The 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing (F-80C; 39th, 40th, and 41st Squadrons), 339th US Fighter All-Weather Squadron (F-82) and 8th US Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (RF-80A) in Yokota AB on Honshu, Japan

The 374th US Troop Carrier Wing (C-54; 6th and 22nd Squadrons) in Tachikawa AB on Honshu, Japan

The 3rd US Bombardment Wing (B-26; 8th and 13th Squadrons) in Johnson AB on Honshu, Japan

The 49th US Fighter-Bomber Wing (F-80C; 7th, 8th and 9th Squadrons) in Misawa AB on Honshu, Japan

Twentieth US Air Force

The 51st US Fighter-Interceptor Wing (F-80C; 16th, 25th, and 26th Squadrons) and 4th US Fighter All-Weather Squadron (F-82) in Naha AB on Okinawa

The 31st US Photo Reconnaissance Squadron (RB-29) in Kadena AB on Okinawa

The 19th US Bombardment Wing (B-29; 28th, 30th and 93rd Squadrons) in Andersen AB on Guam

Thirteenth US Air Force

The 18th US Fighter-Bomber Wing (F-80C), 21st US Troop Carrier Squadron (C-54), and 6204th US Photo Mapping Flight (RB-17) in Clark AB on Luzon, Philippines

Besides, the US Far East Air Forces had the fourth major command, the US Far East Air Material Command (FEAMCom), in Tachikawa, Japan. Commanded by Brigadier General John P. Doyle, this command furnished logistical support for all USAF units in the Far East.

A few other attached air units rounded out US FEAF's organizational structure. Flights of the 2nd and 3rd US Air Rescue Squadrons, attached for duty from the USAF Air Rescue Service, were located at the various bases where they could best perform their emergency search and rescue services.
with SB-29 and SB-17 aircraft. The 512th and 514th US Weather Reconnaissance Squadrons of the 2143rd US Air Weather Wing were in Yokota and Andersen. The British Commonwealth air component in Japan was the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 77 Squadron, which flew F-51 and occupied Iwakuni Air Base on Honshu, Japan. This squadron was available to General MacArthur as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, and it maintained liaison with US FEAF, but it was neither attached nor assigned to the American Air command.

On 31 May 1950 US FEAF possessed a grand total of 1,172 aircraft of all descriptions, including some in storage and a few in salvage. Less than half of this total, or 533 aircraft, were possessed by operational units: 365 F-80's, 32 F-82's, 26 B-26's, 22 B-29's, 25 RF-80's, 6 RB-29's, 24 WB-29's, 26 C-54's, 23 SB-17's, and 4 SB-29's. The US Far East Air Forces' most numerous operational aircraft were F-80C jet interceptors which were received during 1949 and 1950. The US FEAF, with an authorized personnel strength of 39,975 officers and men, had 33,625 assigned to it as of 30 June 1950.

Section 2. Air Cover and Evacuation

First report of the Communists' aggression reached the US Far East Air Forces at 0945 hours on 25 June. At this time Major General Earle E. Partridge was Acting Commander of US FEAF. As part of the US Far East Command (FEC) under General MacArthur, US FEAF was charged with defense of American bases in Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and the Marianas. Since Korea was excluded from the American defense umbrella in the Far East, in case of war in Korea, the US Far East Command had only one minor mission of evacuating American nationals from there. For the accomplishment of the evacuation US FEAF was charged to furnish such air-transport aircraft and to ready to attack enemy ground and surface targets in support of the evacuation. According to the Fifth US Air Force's operations plan issued on 1 March 1950, in the event of any emergency situation, the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing was designated to provide fighter cover for air and water evacuations, and the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing was charged to furnish transport aircraft if the evacuation of American nationals from Korea was required.

Shortly after 1130 hours on 25 June General Partridge ordered all Fifth US Air Force wing commanders to alert for implementation required for the air
evacuation plan. Colonel John M. Price, Commander of the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, began preparations and by the evening he marshaled his own F-80 and F-82 fighters, 10 B-26's of the 3rd US Bombardment Group, and 12 C-54's and three C-47's of the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing. Fortunately, the 8th Squadron of the 3rd US Bombardment Group was at Ashiya Air Base on Kyushu, Japan, for a FEAF air-defense readiness test on 24 June, and its B-26's were in place when the alert sounded. At 2100 hours Colonel Price informed Fifth US Air Force operation center that preparations were completed.

While back in Seoul, at a few minutes before midnight of 25 June U.S. Ambassador to Korea John J. Muccio informed General MacArthur that he had decided to evacuate dependent women and children from the vicinity of Seoul and Inchon as the situation became serious. He proposed to load the evacuees into several merchant freighters in the harbor at Inchon and get them started for Fukuoka port in Japan, beginning as early as possible on the morning of 26 June.

At 0045 hours on 26 June General MacArthur ordered US FEAF to provide fighter cover while the freighters being loaded and withdrawn from Inchon. The fighters were to remain offshore at all times, but they were to shoot in defense of the freighters.

General Partridge handed this order to Colonel Price. Within a few minutes Colonel Price informed that he anticipated some difficulties. This patrol work was a job for long-range conventional aircraft, not for speedy but fuel-hungry jets. Colonel Price's 68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron only had twelve operational F-82's, but he needed more aircraft. The Fifth US Air Force first reached the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 77 Squadron's Mustangs to meet the problem, but it was failed as Australia had not yet taken a stand in the Korean War. Therefore the Fifth US Air Force ordered the 339th US Fighter All-Weather Squadron to move its combat-ready F-82's from Yokota to Itazuke in Japan. Eight more F-82's of the 4th US Fighter All-Weather Squadron, Twentieth US Air Force, were ordered to move to Itazuke Air Base. To clear his ramps to receive these additional fighters, Colonel Price moved the contingent of C-54's to nearby Ashiya Air Base.

Evacuation operations got under way in Seoul early on the morning of 26 June under fighter cover. In a change of plans the F-82's were allowed to come inland to cover truck convoys moving from Seoul to Inchon, but the most part the flights of four F-82's remained over Inchon harbor. With some
crowding. 682 persons were loaded aboard the Norwegian merchant ship \textit{Reinholte}, and at 1630 hours the vessel left Inchon. The F-82's continued to escort the \textit{Reinholte} sailing toward Japan until the vessel met escorting destroyers on the early morning of 27 June. At this time the B-26's took the air cover mission during the remainder of the \textit{Reinholte}'s voyage to the port of Fukuoka, Kyushu, Japan.

Ambassador Muccio had planned to have another evacuation by ship. But on the night of 26 June, with the Red North Koreans storming at the gates of Seoul, he asked for emergency aerial evacuation of the remaining Americans, and General MacArthur ordered US FEAF to provide it, beginning at dawn on 27 June.

Foreseeing that the transport operations would require active fighter support, General Partridge dispatched a fighting order to the Fifth US Air Force: No Interference with your mission would be permitted. The air evacuation order threw Colonel Price into some confusion as the F-82 planes and pilots were fatigued and the C-54 transport contingent had been released and has scattered to routine duties. But, in short order, he got two C-54's from the 374th US Troops Carrier Wing and 11 C-47's from the US FEAF base flight and from the US Far East Air Material Command (FEAMCom). At the same time the Fifth US Air Force Operations ordered the 9th US Fighter-Bomber Squadron (49th Wing) to move from its maneuver station at Komaki Air Base, near Nagoya on Honshu, to Itazuke Air Base on the morning of 27 June.

Before dawn of the 27th the first transports left Itazuke Air Base in Japan with F-82 route escort for Seoul, Korea. With high cover over Seoul by F-80's and lower levels by F-82's the transports began to load the evacuees, but they met some trouble.

At first US FEAF was reported that only 375 persons required transportation nearly all from Kimpo Airfield. But both the American Embassy and the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMACG) decided to evacuate all nonessential people, and, to expedite the airlift, they decided the evacuees between Kimpo and Suwon, about 32 kilometers south of Seoul. Despite many difficulties concerned, US FEAF accomplished its evacuation mission by carrying a total of 851 individuals to safety in Japan on 27 and 28 June.

Not a single refugee was injured during this mass air evacuation. This record of safety was due to the tight air cover by fighters of the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing. Throughout 27 June the NK Communist air force tried to attack the transports. At about noon on 27 a flight of F-82's spotted
five Yak fighters headed for Kimpo Airfield, where the transports were loading passengers. Within a few minutes, the F-82 pilots shot down three of the Communist fighters, with the first victory of the first air battle in Korea going to Lieutenant William G. Hudson of the 68th Fighter Squadron.

Early afternoon on the same day Communist airmen made a second attempt to attack the evacuation transports at Kimpo Airfield. This time four F-80C jet fighters engaged with eight IL-10 fighters. Very quickly, with a minimum of maneuver, the American pilots blasted down four of the Red planes, and the other IL-10's turned tail and ran. These were the first aerial victories for American jet fighters. They clearly demonstrated that even these oldest jets were superior to one of the best conventional planes of World War II.

Section 3. Commitment of U.S. Air Force

Back in America, U.S. and U.N. officials watched the Korean situation with growing alarm. On the afternoon of June 25 (26 June in the Far East), the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling on the North Korean Communists to cease their aggression and withdraw to the 38th Parallel. But the Communists intensified their attack. On the evening of 26
June (on 27 June in the Far East), U.S. President Truman sent new instructions to the US Far East Command in Tokyo, Japan. He directed General MacArthur to employ American air and naval forces in support of the Republic of Korea. As soon as the orders were received General MacArthur published his instructions detailing the new mission relative to Korea and Taiwan. The US Far East Air Forces was charged to attack and destroy all North Korea Communist troop concentrations, tanks, guns, supply elements, and other military targets south of the 38th Parallel, and to continue evacuation and supply missions to and from Korea. But it was cautioned not to attempt air attacks north of the 38th Parallel, except under emergency conditions.

The US Far East Air Forces ordered Fifth US Air Force to dispatch visual and photo reconnaissance sorties to Korea and to attack the enemy with two squadrons of B-26's, four squadrons of F-80's, and two squadrons of F-82's all night long on 27 and 28 June. To the Twentieth US Air Force went instructions to move all combat-ready B-29's from Guam to Kadena and to dispatch them against such targets of opportunity as concentrations of tank, artillery, and military columns.

During the evening of 27 June US FEAF received another directions of airlifting 150 tons of ammunition from Tachikawa in Japan to Suwon in Korea on 28 June and 200 tons per day thereafter until about 1 July. Receiving this mission, the Fifth US Air Force made the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing responsible for all air-lift to Korea.

Before nightfall on 27 June the Fifth US Air Force made the deployments required for the missions. Four RF-80's of the 8th US Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Photo Jet) moved from Yokota Air Base to Itazuke Air Base in Japan. The flight echelon of the 3rd US Bombardment Group and the 13th US Bombardment Squadron moved from Johnson Air Base in Japan to join the 8th US Bombardment Squadron at Ashiya Air Base in Japan. So the 3rd US Bombardment Wing was located in Ashiya Air Base at this time. That night, a few B-26's of the 3rd US Bombardment Group went to Korea with instructions to find and attack a Communist tank column reported to be somewhat north of Seoul, but the weather was so bad that they accomplished little.

On the morning of 28 June the weather was still bad at Itazuke and Ashiya on Kyushu, but the Fifth US Air Force had to fly regardless of weather conditions. Into the smoggy dawn from Itazuke a RF-80A took off to reconnoiter the vanguard of the Communists. It was the first reconnaissance sorties of
the Korean War and the first USAF combat jet reconnaissance sortie. The reconnaissance brought back the information that the target weather in Korea was clear, while Kyushu had bad weather. So if pilots could take off from Ashiya in spite of the bad weather, they can strike against the Communist forces.

Off from Ashiya at 0730 hour on 28 June 3rd US Bombardment Group’s 12 B-26’s bombed the busy railway yards at Munsan, 25 kilometers north of Seoul, and strafed targets of opportunity. This deck-level attack was costly to the Reds, but hostile ground fire riddled many of the B-26’s. Later in the day nine B-26’s attacked road and rail traffic north of Seoul.

The F-80’s also took a part. In the middle of the morning and the middle of the afternoon on 28 June six flights of F-80’s, each of four planes, were dispatched to Korea. Having found the road nets which were crammed with the enemy tanks, trucks, troops, and artillery, the F-80 pilots left fires visible for 80 kilometers. During the day the F-82 squadrons flew eleven sorties to Korea. Most of them flew top cover for the transports which were landing at Suwon Airfield.

On the late afternoon of 28 June four 19th US Bombardment Group B-29’s, which had just moved from Guam to Kadena, bombed targets on the two main roads leading into Seoul. Each bomber crew toggled out bombs against anything that looked to be worth a bomb because General MacArthur had called for a maximum show of force. But while US FEAF was flying “morale” attacks, the Communist pilots launched attacks. At about 1330 hours four

F-80 Shooting Star, based in Japan, leaves on a mission against the Communists.
Yaks strafed Suwon Airfield, disabling a F-82 and a B-26 which had been forced to land there by mechanical trouble. At 1830 hours six other Yaks damaged two transports on the ground.

At about this time Lieutenant Colonel John McGinn of the US Advanced Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM) played an active part at Suwon Airfield for aerial operations. Early in the morning of 28 June he began to organize the Suwon airhead by rounding up some trucks and Korean laborers. During the morning he received a battery of quadruple-mounted 50-caliber machine guns, served by a detachment of men from the 507th US Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and a tactical air control party, with two very high-frequency (VHF) radio jeeps. With these VHF radios Colonel McGinn controlled air traffic and communicated targets to fighters which circled over Suwon.

At about 0300 hours on 29 June the US ADCOM group requested a B-29 strike against the Han River railway bridge and Communist troops massing on the north bank of the river, if possible before dawn. But at approximately the same hour the B-29’s were flying off from Kadena Air Base in Japan, under instructions to bomb Kimpo Airfield and the main railway station in Seoul. At 0800 hours nine B-29’s attacked Kimpo Airfield with 500-pound bombs and shot down two enemy aircraft which had attempted surprise attacks. At the same time the other two bombers attacked the main railway station at Seoul.

ADCOM’s request, however, did not reach US FEAF until 1255 hours on 29 June. On receiving the request, the Fifth US Air Force dispatched the B-26’s to the objective. These light bombers tore up the flooring which the Reds were laying on the center bridge of the three parallel Han railway bridges. During the day the Fifth US Air Force flew 22 other sorties in direct support of ROK ground troops.

During the day Red pilots attempted to make six strafing and bombing attacks against Suwon Airfield, one of which was mounted by six Yaks. But the jet fighter patrols frustrated the enemy’s attempts, and during the morning two enemy planes were shot down. At another hour no friendly fighters were overhead, an enemy bombing strike hit and completely destroyed a C-54 transport.

As an experienced air commander Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, US FEAF Commander, knew quite well that the first task of tactical airpower is to destroy the enemy air force and attain friendly air superiority. But the order from Washington to stay below the 38th Parallel hampered him dealing effectively with the air force. The constant aerial
cover was exhausting air effort which might otherwise have served combat purposes.

On the morning of 29 June General MacArthur flew to Suwon to get a first-hand view of the ground fighting. Recognizing the risk involved, US FEAF provided a heavy screen of F-80's for General MacArthur's C-54, the Bataan, and pressed into escorting service a flight of F-51. During General MacArthur and his staff were in conference four Yaks approached and attempted to attack Suwon Airfield, but the Mustangs destroyed all of them. On the ground all the conferees watched the air fight.

Realizing the importance of establishing a general air superiority over Korea, General MacArthur verbally authorized air attacks only against enemy airfields north of the 38th Parallel. As soon as the news flashed US FEAF, the 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron began to fly photo cover of all known North Korean Communist airfields. And at 1615 hours on 29 June, the 3rd US Bombardment Group sent its 18 B-26's against enemy's main airfield at Pyongyang. This bombing, the first against a target in North Korea, marked the beginning of a rapid demise of the North Korean Communist air force.

On 30 June US FEAF's air effort centered again on the targets around the Han River. At intervals during the morning 15 B-29's dropped frag bombs on enemy troops along the river. The 3rd US Bombardment Group sent 18 B-26 sorties against enemy traffic and troops in and around Seoul. One flight of the B-26's discovered Communist tanks, trucks, and other vehicles jammed up bumper to bumper on the railway bridge. The B-26 flight swept in, wing to wing, using all of their offensive weapons in one murderous pass.

Back in Washington, on 29 June, President Truman decided to extend air and naval operations into north Korea against military targets. General MacArthur in Tokyo received this new order after daylight on 30 June. Almost at the same time the US Far East Air Forces was ordered to attack military targets north of the 38th Parallel.

Section 4. Initial Deployment and Augmentation

In the two or three days following the North Korean Communist attack, air units moved hurriedly from scattered bases in Japan distant from Korea to the nearest bases. Most of the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons moved to Itazuke and Ashiya Airfields on Kyushu, Japan, which had the most
favorable positions with respect to the Korean battle area. On 27 June the Fifth US Air Force established an advance echelon at Itazuke Air Base. The 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group (less its 7th Squadron) moved from Misawa Air Base to join the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing at Itazuke Air Base. Went to Ashiya was the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Group (less its 41st Squadron, which went to Johnson Air Base for air defense) from the Yokota Air Base on Honshu, Japan. And the 3rd US Bombardment Group’s B-26’s in Ashiya moved to Iwakuni Air Base on Honshu, Japan.

The all-weather fighter squadrons were shifted according to plan. The 339th US Squadron moved from Yokota to Misawa and Johnson, the 68th US Squadron remained at Itazuke, and on 8 July the 4th US Squadron returned to Naha Air Base on Okinawa. This deployment was planned to use every F-80C jet fighter which could be spared from defensive purposes.

Having made the plans to employ the forces he had available, General Stratemeyer sent in first requirements’ message to USAF in Washington on 30 June. Wanted were: 164 F-80C’s, 21 F-82’s, 22 B-26’s, 23 B-29’s, 21 C-54’s, 64 F-51’s, and 15 C-47’s. Most of these 330 planes were needed to round out squadrons up to their war time strength and provide a 10 per cent reserve for combat attrition. The C-47’s would haul cargo into smaller Korean airfields. And the Mustangs, added to those US FEAF already had, would be used to equip a provisional Mustang group.

On 1 July he reported another requirements to Washington, requesting one B-29 wing, two Mustang wings, two F-82 all-weather squadrons, one troop carrier wing, three F-80C squadrons, a B-26 wing, two B-26 squadrons to fill up the 3rd US Bombardment Wing, an RF-51 reconnaissance squadron, an RB-26 night photographic squadron, and a tactical air-control squadron.

In reply to this request General Vandenberg, the USAF Chief of Staff, secured approval from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to move the 22nd and 92nd US Bombardment Groups (B-29) from the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) to the Far East. At the same time he dispatched a team of officers, headed by Lieutenant General K.B. Wolfe, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Material, because there were some divergencies between FEAF’s requirements and USAF’s capabilities. The party arrived in Tokyo on 4 July and began work the next day. Major General Frank F. Everest, one of this party’s members, informed that USAF did not have enough F-80C’s and F-82’s to meet FEAF’s requirements. But it had a considerable backlog of F-51 Mustangs — 764 assigned to the US Air National Guard units and 794 in storage. Therefore it was available to recall 145 F-51’s from the US Air National Guard for the Far East.
After having several meetings, the US Far East Air Forces agreed to convert six of its F-80 squadrons to F-51 aircraft. Viewed in terms of tactical capabilities, the conversion held some benefit to US FEAF. The Mustang had range enough to go anywhere in Korea, used less fuel than the F-80, and it could be based on crude airstrips in the battle zone. And the F-51 was a better ground-support fighter than the F-80. On 23 July the aircraft carrier Boxer reached Japan and unloaded 145 F-51's.

The B-29 requirements were fully met by the two US Strategic Air Command groups. And later the US Joint Chiefs of Staff was aware the fact that the three B-29 groups already in the theater had been allowed too little time for strategic bombing deep in north Korea. Therefore, on 29 July US JCS proposed to send two additional B-29 groups for 30-day temporary duty in the Far East. On 1 August the 98th and 307th US Bombardment Groups (SAC's) got their movement orders to the Far East.

Enough RF-80's would be provided to keep the 8th US Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at war strength, and US FEAF therefore withdrew its request for an RF-51 squadron. Concerning air-transport requirements, US FEAF would re-form the 374th US Troop Carrier Group with the two squadrons of C-54 and one squadron of C-47. If Army airborne units were sent to the Far East, US FEAF would be further augmented with temporary-duty troop carrier units from the United States. Therefore when the US Army's 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was determined to move to Korea, USAF alerted the 314th US Troop Carrier Group for a stint of temporary duty in the Far East.

As the B-26 requirements could not be satisfied from active resources, it would have to be called into active service from the Air Reserve. The request for a tactical air-control squadron would be difficult to meet as USAF had only one tactical control group. On 10 August the 452nd US Bombardment Wing (Light) was recalled to active duty, and it began to move to Itazuke Air Base on 15 October.
CHAPTER II  TACTICAL AIR OPERATION
(1 July—14 September 1950)

Section 1.  Beginnings of Tactical Air Control System

With President Truman's approval on 30 June 1950, General MacArthur ordered the US Far East Air Forces to airlift the 24th US Division from Japan to Korea without delay. These troops were delayed by weather, but on 1 July a full-scale C-54 airlift into Suyong Airfield in Pusan, Korea, began. Since the runway was so poor for the heavy transports, the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing was instructed to continue the airlift with lighter C-46's and C-47's. These troops, named Task Force Smith, was racing northward by rail and truck to make contact with the enemy as far forward as possible and, by fighting a delaying action, to buy time to bring more troops across. Soon the other units of the 24th US Division were to follow up by surface transportation. And on 4 July Major General William F. Dean, the 24th US Division Commander, assumed the command of the US Army Forces in Korea at Taejon.

As the American ground troops committed into the battle, General Partridge eagerly wanted to move the advanced echelon of Fifth US Air Force Headquarters to Korea. But the poor airfields and communications of Korea delayed this movement.

Mindful of the effective close support for the ground troops, the Fifth US Air Force, on 3 July, organized a combat operations section, drawing officers from the advanced echelon and airmen from the 8th US Communications Squadron, in all, 10 officers and 35 airmen. Headed by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Murphy, this section moved to Taejon on 5 July and set up a Joint Operations Center (JOC) at the 24th US Division's headquarters. But since the Army did not man its side of the establishment, Colonel Murphy's party was something less than a joint operations center.

Lacking Army representatives, Air Force personnel of the center had much trouble to pick up such targets as seemed profitable for air attack. And at about this time the state of the war was so confused that even army operations officer was frequently unable to post an accurate location of
friendly troops. Thus made difficult to select targets for air strikes. Even when Colonel Murphy's party obtained worthwhile targets, communicating them back to the advanced echelon of the Fifth US Air Force in Itazuke, Japan, proved to be a difficult or impossible matter. The section had a VHF radio and a land line telephone and teletype to Itazuke, but the wire circuit was so poor, approximately 75 per cent out of order.

Understanding this lack of communications, the Fifth US Air Force scheduled F-80 flights from Itazuke and Ashiya Air Bases in Japan at 20-minute intervals during the daylight hours, and these flights checked in over Taegon with Colonel Murphy's "Angelo" control station. When "Angelo" had targets, it gave them to the pilots; when it had no targets, the fighters proceeded up the roads between Osan and Seoul and searched for targets of opportunity.

The most forward element of the tactical control system was the tactical air control party (TACP), consisting of a forward air controller (usually an experienced pilot officer), a radio operator, and a radio repair man who also served as jeep driver. On 28 June, while ADCOM was still at Suwon, two tactical air-control parties were dispatched there to control air strikes in support of ROK troops. Both parties retreated back to Taegon with ADCOM, and they were ready for action when General Dean's troops arrived in that city several days later. And Colonel Murphy brought four TACP's with him from Itazuke Air Base in Japan. These six TACP's in total were from Detachment 1 of the 620th US Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron. Each of the parties was equipped with an AN/ARC-1 radio jeep and another jeep which served as a personnel carrier. All this equipment was old.

The former two parties went into action on 5 July for the forward elements of the 24th US Division. Here they met bad weather. And a radio broke down. During 8--10 July, when working with the 21st US Infantry Regiment at Chonui, about 19 kilometers south of Chonan, they had accomplished their mission by controlling F-80's onto a target. The air control parties gave a great improvement in the effectiveness of UN air support and fewer mistaken strikes by friendly planes. In this action at Chonui the personnel of TACP found it difficult to control the air strikes as the control jeep had no remoting equipment, which would allow the forward air controller to leave the vehicle in a sheltered spot and advance on foot to a position from which he could see the target.

The rough road of Korea was quickly battering the old AN/ARC-1 jeeps out of commission. At about this time the 24th Division was retreating by the massive force of the Communists. So the American ground troops badly
needed close air support of jet fighters. But without having immediate targets the jet fighters could not give effective ground support.

To solve these problems, the employment of airborne tactical air coordinators was prepared. The Fifth US Air Force, on 9 July, dispatched two pilots with their L-5G liaison planes, modified with four-channel radio equipment to work in the field. But these two pilots borrowed rides in two 24th US Division L-17’s during their first day in Taejon. During the day the two airborne controllers managed about ten flights of F-80’s. This was the first airborne control in the Korean War, and the results of the missions was good.

On 10 July a T-6 trainer aircraft was dispatched to Taejon, and in flights during the day the plane demonstrated its ability to perform airborne controls. The T-6 was fast enough to survive enemy air attacks whereas liaison aircraft was not. Since then onward the airborne controllers performed their missions well, thus providing up to date enemy targets correctly.

In a Fifth US Air Force fragmentary operations order issued on 15 July the airborne controllers were given radio call signs as “Mosquito Able,” “Mosquito Baker,” and “Mosquito How.” The call sign was catching and appropriate, and thereafter the unit was commonly called the “Mosquito” squadron and the airborne controllers and their planes were called “Mosquitoes.”

Section 2. Establishment of Air Superiority

In the early days of its participation, the immediate objective of American Air Force, the main contributor to the United Nations air effort for the ROK forces, was to gain and maintain air supremacy over the NK Communist airpower. As it already mentioned in the previous chapter, the Communist air
force had enough capability to destroy the fledged ROK Air Force at the outset. And the North Korean Communists and their Russian advisers apparently anticipated no resistance from the United States or from other free nations. Furthermore, the Reds probably felt that involvement by others could not be effective before they accomplished their military objectives. They were wrong on both counts. The American air force was in action over Korea less than eight hours after the United Nations voted to support the Republic of Korea by force against the Communist aggression.

Recognizing the threat posed to the defense of the Republic of Korea by the Red air force, US Far East Air Forces issued instructions to its subordinate commands to attain air superiority over the Reds as soon as possible. At dusk of 29 June the 3rd US Bombardment Group's 18 B-26 light bombers bombed the Pyongyang Airfield and destroyed 25 enemy aircraft on the ground and one Yak fighter in the air. This was the first attack against enemy airfield in the north of 38th Parallel. On receiving a report that a concentration of 65 aircraft was based at Yonpo Airfield, southwest of Hungnam on the east coast of Korea, US FEAF sent ten B-29's of the 19th US Group there on 2 July. But when the medium-bomber crews reached Yonpo, they found only 16 planes, which were destroyed by the frag bombs. On 3 and 4 July Task Force 77 of the US Naval Forces Far East marked its first strikes of the Korean War. On these days it attacked two airfields of Pyongyang and one of Onjong-ni and shot down two Yaks out of the air and damaged ten other planes on the ground.

Seemingly hurt by the American air attacks, the Communists made few aggressions at the first time. But the Reds did renew their air offensive with guileful tactics. On 6 July four Yak-9's, bearing ROKAF mark, strafed Osan and knocked out a telephone relay station. During the second week of July the Communists based some seven camouflaged and dispersed Yaks at the Kimpo Airfield which was just restored its runway. This was to have short-range sneak attacks against United Nations ground troops.

Awareing the length of time that the Fifth US Air Force's jets were able to remain in the battle area, the Yaks bombed and strafed the 19th US Regiment at Chongju on 10 July during the time that no friendly planes were in the vicinity. Next day, in the same area, three Yaks surprised a flight of F-80's, which were low on fuel and could not counterattack. But the F-80's successfully evaded.

On 12 July the Reds pilots were extremely active. In the morning enemy fighters shot down a single 19th US Group B-29 over Seoul, and in midafternoon two Yaks jumped a flight of F-80's while the latter were strafing in the
frontlines near Chochiwon. Once again the jet pilots evaded but they could not pursue their attackers. Later in the afternoon two other Yaks shot down an L-4 liaison plane. On 15 July two Yaks attacked a formation of four B-26's while the bombers were attacking a target. One of the B-26's was damaged so badly that its crew had to make an emergency landing at Taejon.

Bothered by the reappearance of the Communists' aircraft, the US Far East Air Forces made a decision to devote a part of its air power to counter-air purposes. On 15 July the Fifth US Air Force's strafers destroyed two or three of the widely dispersed planes at Kimpo Airfield and three B-29's cratered its runway. In two strikes against Pyongyang airfields on 18 July the carrier pilots destroyed more 14 enemy aircraft and damaged 13 other planes which were dispersed and camouflaged in the vicinity of these airfields. And on 19 July they destroyed 15 enemy planes at the airfield of Yonpo.

Heavy pressure upon the Red air force was continued. On 19 July seven F-80's of the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group, making pass after pass over the airfield at Pyonggang near the 38th Parallel, destroyed 14 enemy fighters and one twin-engine bomber which were camouflaged under tree branches along the west edge of this field. And on 20 July 14 B-29's were sent to crater the runways and dispersal areas at airfields of Pyongyang and Onjong-ni.

Fifth US Air Force, also having excellent coordination by air-ground radio control, broke up the Communist scheme of operations, timing their attacks against American planes when the latter were low on fuel. In this way jet pilots of the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group shot down one Yak on 17 July, three on 19 July, and two more on 20 July along the battleline. B-29's gunners also revealed their proficiency.

With a few unimportant exceptions the enemy made no further air offensive efforts after 20 July, and the United Nations air forces possessed a virtual air supremacy over all of Korea. The Reds, however, were not inactive in the air through their own choice. The US FEAF intelligence estimated on 22 July that the Communist still possessed 65 of their original aircraft, of which 30 might be in operational condition. Early in August, the Reds repaired runways and built protective revetments at Kimpo and Suwon to use these airfields for staging attacks against United Nations ground forces. But American airmen were too alert to permit this. Fifth US Air Force fighters strafed and bombed Kimpo Airfield on 5 July and Pyongyang on 6 July. And the results were very good.

Small to begin with, the Red air strength dwindled rapidly. By August 10, US FEAF estimated that it had destroyed 110 enemy planes, leaving the
Communists with perhaps 22 aircraft. But the Reds still had a slight capability for making sneak attacks against UN forces. On 15 August an LA-5 attacked a 307th US Bombardment Group B-29, and on 23 August two Yaks attacked and damaged a British destroyer off the west coast of Korea.

The US Far East Air Forces saw this incident as an evidence of an increased enemy air potential. Promptly the full and regular coverage of the enemy's airfields by the reconnaissance planes was prepared. And the reported targets were knocked out by fighters. As a result the US Far East Air Forces gained air superiority over the whole peninsual. Because of this, UN naval forces could operate close inshore, Air Force planes remained virtually unchallenged in the air, and UN ground troops under the Eighth US Army had nothing to fear from enemy air assault. The aerial supremacy so readily attained in Korea would probably be dearly purchased in terms of pilots, planes, and air effort.

Section 3. Airpower Blunts the Communist Attack

The second major task of American air efforts was to interdict the movement and flow of enemy troops and supplies to the southern battlefront where the Communists already outnumbered the UN ground forces.

By the end of June, in spite of the gallant action of the ROK forces the Communist army was in possession of all territory north of the Han River and cleared most of the ROK troops there. Early in July, as the ROK forces were falling south from Suwon to the Pyongtaek line, the US combat troops were coming up. But the Communist attacks, spearheaded by heavy tanks, drove the outnumbered and lightly-armed American troops back to the road junction at Chonan on 6 July. The enemy continued to press down southward across the entire front.

In the meantime, American air effort was being directed against the advancing NK Communist troops and in close support of the United Nations ground forces. At about this time, flushed with success and lacking understanding of the power of the air opposition, the Reds were out on the roads and were wide open to assault from the air. On 6 July six 3rd US Bombardment Group B-26's bombed, rocketed, and strafed a Communist tank and vehicle concentration north of Pyongtaek. Later, three other B-26's destroyed six tanks, a number of trucks and horse-drawn vehicles, and
knocked out a defending machine-gun position on the same place. In the three days, 7 through 9 July, Fifth US Air Force crews claimed 197 trucks and 44 tanks destroyed on the roads between Pyongtaek and Seoul.

But Fifth US Air Force pilots found it difficult to distinguish ROK troops from the NK Communist troops. At the time the ROK troops had marked themselves with white panels and carried ROK flags, but that the Red Koreans would probably do the same. In view of the confusion, some mishaps were almost inevitable.

Although the aircrews of the Fifth US Air Force were delaying and disrupting the Communists blitz, it had some problems in operating the delaying action. The most numerous and active plane was F-80 jet interceptor. By 15 July the F-80's had flown 70 per cent of all combat sorties over Korea and had accounted for 85 per cent of the enemy's losses to air attack. But the Shooting Star pilots were seeking to solve a number of operating problems. The chief problem was the limited range of the F-80C. Carrying standard wing tanks, the interceptor could not remain over the target area in Korea for more than 15 minutes as it was based about 240 kilometers too far distant from its target. To meet and overcome this problem the 265-gallon tip tanks were installed, thus providing an extra hour of fight.

Concurrently, the “Mosquito” tactical air-control operations greatly assisted in alleviating the range problem confronting the F-80's. The airborne controllers located enemy targets and had them pinpointed for attack when the faster-flying F-80's arrived at the scene.

Another problem which the jet pilots met during July had to do with the selection of weapons, for as yet the jet interceptors had no wing racks that could carry bombs. However it carried six .50-caliber machine gun and four 5-inch highvelocity aircraft rocket (HVAR). But since few pilots had ever fired a 5-inch HVAR, they would have to get their rocketry training in the heat of battle. HVAR was the only anti-tank weapon the F-80's carried. Early in the war, rocket attacks against enemy tanks did not work. Soon, however, the pilots learned how best to use the HVAR's. They found it best to approach a tank from a four o'clock position and to fire from a 30-degree angle from a range of about 457 meters.

At the time, the Fifth US Air Force strongly needed to operate conventional F-51 fighters from Korean bases as could be supported over there. In Korea, the only useful airfield was Taegu Airfield (K-2). Early in July this airfield had a sod and gravel runway which was full of pot holes, two concrete buildings, and a wooden mess hall.
Perhaps a word should be said about the “K-site” number of Korean airfields. In the early stage of operations American airmen troubled with similarity in Korean place names. What was worse, even a place had various kinds of name. To meet this problem, US FEAF early in July assigned a “K-site” number to each airfield in Korea. For example, Suwon, K-13; Kimpo, K-14; Suyoung, K-9; Pohang, K-3; Youi-do, K-16; Pyongyang, K-23; and Mirim, K-24.

In the meantime, equipped with only liaison and trainer aircraft, ROK Air Force strongly needed fighter planes. As the ROK’s request sending F-51’s was approved by the US Far East Air Forces, ROK Air Force selected ten from among one hundred available pilots and on 27 June sent them to Itazuke Air Base in Japan for training and to ferry the aircraft. On the same day the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing organized a composite unit of U.S. and ROK airmen. This unit, called “Bout-One,” was planned to move to Taegu Airfield as soon as possible.

Ten Korean Pilots were trained for a short period in flying the Mustangs, but, however, they eagerly wanted to fly back to Korea. Bad weather prevented them from flying till 2 July. When they arrived Taegu with 20 USAF personnel, under the leadership of Major Dean E. Hess, the Reds on the ground already crossed the Han River and pressed the ROK Army southward. Awareing this emergency the Korean Mustang pilots, without training in combat, flew on missions on the day following their arrival. On 3 July the Mustangs burned up a fuel tank, destroyed some enemy’s trucks and killed about 30 enemy near the Seoul area.

On 4 July a flight of F-51, commanded by Colonel Lee Keun Sok, located and strafed a concentration of enemy tanks, trucks and troops in the Anyang area, south of Seoul. But misfortune fell on to this flight. The Mustang of Colonel Lee, the best air ace Korea ever had, was hit by the enemy fire. He understood that his plane was badly damaged and nevertheless he crashed his plane against an enemy tank and was killed.

In early July the ROK Air Force Mustangs inflicted over 270 enemy personnel casualties and destroyed or left in flames six oil dumps, five tanks, 16 vehicles, and six ammunition dumps in operations around Seoul, Suwon, Kimpo, Munsan, Pyongtaek, Osan and Chochiwon in the central region of the peninsula and in Mukho and Samchok areas on the east coast.

Even though the Mustangs which “Bout-One” brought to Korea had been towing targets for several years in Japan and were in sad mechanical condition, they caused much damage to enemy vehicles and troop movements. Located near the front, the detachment could get its planes immedi-
ately into action when the ground troops reported targets. It could also operate its Mustangs for two or three hours over the enemy's lines, searching out targets when none were reported by the ground forces.

While on the ground, the Reds captured Chonan on 8 July notwithstanding the gallant air strikes of the Fifth US Air Force. After taking Chonan, the Communists regrouped and pressed hard upon the front of 24th US Division.

In this emergency, Fifth US Air Force employed its full strength in support of the division. On the late afternoon the Fifth US Air Force had one of its best moments in the Korean War. A Shooting Star flight discovered a large convoy of tanks and vehicles lined up north of a bombed-out bridge near Pyongtaek. All available B-26's, F-82's, and F-80's rushed to the scene, and the ensuing air attack cost the enemy 117 trucks, 38 tanks, seven half-tracks, and a large number of soldiers. On the same day ten B-29's also bombed against bridges, tanks, trucks, and troops on the road between Chonan and Suwon. During the day the US Far East Air Forces had 280 combat air strikes. Again, on 11 July, Fifth US Air Force continued to give all-out air support to the 24th US Division.

Bomber Command's first bombing against the marshalling yards at Wonsan on 13 July 1950.
In the meantime, on 8 July, General Stratemeyer, FEAF Commander, organized the US FEAF Bomber Command (Provisional) under the command of Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr. to control the medium bombers. This command would excersise operational control over the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) medium bomber groups -- the 22nd and the 92nd -- and US FEAF's own 19th Bombardment Group.

On 12 July the 19th US Bombardment Group attacked bridges and communications target six to seven kilometers behind the enemy's lines, and on the next day the 22nd and 92nd US Bombardment Groups had a radardirected attack against the marshaling yards and oil refinery at Wonsan. This was the first combat mission flown by the US FEAF Bomber Command.

While the air-ground combined staunch resistance temporarily stalled the enemy's thrust down the Seoul-Taegu axis, other Communist columns were on the marching through the central and the eastern coastal of Korea. To make matters even worse, on 13 July, the Communists forced the 24th US Division to withdraw to defensive positions south of the Kum River. As a result American air units began to put their primary effort on the ground battle lines for the time being.

To meet this ground emergency, ten B-29's of the 92nd US Bombardment Group contacted "Angelo" control at Taejon and bombed targets in the vicinity of Chongju on 14 July. On the next day the 92nd Group continued the ground support effort. Three B-29's were sent to attack Kimpo Airfield (K-14) and the other seven aircraft attacked a rail tunnel entrance, destroyed two railway bridges near Chongju, and bombed the marshaling yard at Wonju. Close support by medium bombers was increased. On the 16th 47 B-29's destroyed rolling stock, cut the main rail lines, and destroyed the large repair and assembly shops in Seoul. Guided by "Angelo" control, eight other B-29's bombed a concentration of troops and six tanks at a road junction near Kongju and a marshaling yard and oil dump at Chochiwon. On the central front, however, three aircraft mistook their location and bombed the town of Andong, killing 22 friendly civilians. On the 17th, six medium bombers destroyed two bridges and bombed the railway marshaling yards at Chechon, Ansong, and Wonju.

But the employment of medium bombers in close support was a novel and wasteful usage of airpower. On 18 July, General Stratemeyer firmly protested the continued employment of B-29's in this wasteful operations. As a result the UN Command sent written orders to employ most of the medium-bomber effort in the area between the bombline and the 38th
Mustangs await take-off at K-2 armed with two napalm tanks and four of the deadly 5-inch rockets.

Parallel in order to isolate the battlefield. By 24 July the American bombers had destroyed 38 bridges and had damaged 31 others.

In the meantime, the Thirteenth US Air Force formed a F-51 squadron of its personnel. The squadron, named "Dallas," moved to Johnson Air Base in Japan on 10 July and hurriedly checked out in Mustangs there. On the same day, the Fifth US Air Force organized at Taegu the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional), which was authorized to take over the American personnel from "Bout-One" and the "Dallas." The "Dallas" pilots, after ferrying their planes to Taegu, flew their first combat missions on 15 July.

Efforts to move more F-51's to Korea were continued. Fifth US Air Force decided to develop Pohang Airfield (K-3) on the east coast of Korea. After having constructed a new pierced steel plank runway, the 40th Squadron of the 35th US Fighter-interceptor Group moved its newly-acquired Mustangs to this advanced airfield on 16 July.

These Mustangs based at Taegu and Pohang displayed great effort during the critical days of mid-July. At Taegu the 51st US Fighter Squadron had wire communications with the air-control center in Taegon, and its planes were available for scrambles when the ground situation demanded immediate air-support missions. Using 500-pound bombs filled with thermite and
napalm, the F-51 pilots enjoyed their success against enemy tanks and troops. At Pohang the 40th US Fighter-Interceptor Squadron began close air support for the 23rd ROK Regiment, which was fighting against the overwhelming enemy. Communist Korean prisoners taken by the ROK regiment reported that air attack had knocked out nearly all of their transportation.

The United Nations air attack and ground defense had delayed the Communist drive along the Chonan—Taejon axis, but the three enemy divisions which opposed the surviving troops of the 24th US Division were too strong to stopped. Now, the Communists continued to pursue the friendly forces, and succeeded to envelop Taejon on 19 July. And at midnight on 20 July, the 24th US Division abandoned the city in an effort to regroup at Yongdong southeast of Taejon. The loss of Taejon was bitter blow to the United Nations' cause in Korea, but the enemy had been forced to slow the tempo of their ground attack. "Without question," said General Dean shortly before he became missing in action, "the Air Force definitely blunted the initial Communists thrust to the southward. Without this continuing air effort, it is doubtful if the courageous combat soldiers, spread thinly along the line, could have withstood the onslaught of the vastly numerically superior enemy." Three weeks of air action and the holding battle fought by the 24th US Division gave the UN forces time to get other ground troops to Korea.

Section 4. Establishing Fifth US Air Force in Korea

The critical ground situation and the F-80's short of range urgently required the movements of fighter planes to Korea. Preparatory to the arrival of these fighters, the Fifth US Air Force had lengthened and improved airfields of Taegu and Pohang. At last, two squadrons of F-51 Mustangs moved to these airfield in mid-July and showed their efficiency in attacking the enemy forces.

At Taegu, on 13 July, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker assumed command of the Eighth US Army in Korea, with a short title of "EUSAJK." As soon as he learned where General Walker's headquarters were to be located, Major General Partridge, Fifth US Air Force Commander, went all out to establish his own command post in Taegu. Because he remained responsible for the air defense of Japan and for the logistical support of Air Force units in Japan, General Partridge had no choice but to divide his headquarters into
two echelons. On 14 July he activated Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fifth US Air Force (Advance) at Itazuke on Kyushu, Japan. At this time Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fifth US Air Force (Rear), soon to be commanded by Brigadier General Delmar T. Spivey, continued to supervise the air defense of Japan and attend to air logistical and administrative matters in Japan at the old station in Nagoya on Honshu, Japan. The Fifth US Air Force (Advance) began to move to Taegu, and at 0001 hours on 24 July it became operational there.

When EUSA K was established in Taegu, the Fifth US Air Force-Eighth US Army Joint Operations Center began to function effective on 14 July.

Most of tactical air control parties began to move from Taejon to Taegu sometime after 12 July, completing by 19 July. Back in America, US Air Force had alerted the 502nd US Tactical Control Group for movement to Korea, but the situation needed the immediate service. So, on 14 July, Fifth US Air Force organized the 6132nd US Tactical Air Control Group (Provisional) under the command of Colonel Joseph D. Lee, in an effort to serve control and warning needs in Korea. The group immediately began to move from Itazuke Air Base in Japan to Taegu, and on 23 July it established a tactical air control center (TACC) adjacent to the US JOC, and took over the operation of control station "Mellow." With the help of the US Far East Air Material Command, the 6132nd US Tactical Air Control Group allocated one TACP to each US infantry regiment and higher unit headquarters engaged in active combat operations and to each ROK division and corps.

While improving the tactical control system, the Fifth US Air Force in Korea, recognizing that effective air-ground operations against the Communist enemy depended upon mutual close coordination between the tactical aid force and the field army, made conscientious efforts to cultivate close relations with the Eighth US Army.

Now, it would be necessary to show a brief presentation of the current relations with the carrier-based aircraft, which had greatly contributed its air power to the UN forces' effort from the beginning. Even before Taejon fell on 20 July the Reds had turned the Eighth US Army's left flank. Unopposed except for a few ROK policemen, two Red divisions rushed southward, reaching Chonju and Iri on 20 July, and Kwangju on 23 July. To meet this enemy thrust, the Eighth US Army sent some elements of the 24th US Division southward and requested the US Far East Command to dispatch the US Naval Task Force 77 to the scene. On that day and continuing on 24 July the carrier task force was resupplying at sea, and it showed its intention to
employ naval air in close support of ground forces, if the emergency were
great enough. Concerned about the Eighth US Army's left flank and as-
suming that Fifth US Air Force was pretty much all out with the forces it
had available, US FEAF was also in favor of the naval close support proposal.

General MacArthur issued instructions that Task Force 77, beginning on
25 July, would seek out and attack military targets in southwestern Korea
within an area bounded by Kunsan, Chonju, Namwon, and Kwangju. As
they were scheduled to do, Navy pilots sought targets in southwestern Korea
on 25 July. But since the carrier task force had not established any com-
munications with the US JOC, nor provided liaison with that responsible
body, its carrier pilots had met little success in their efforts to locate enemy
targets in this unfamiliar area.

On the same day's evening two fleet air officers appeared at the US JOC to
secure some relations with the center. From the next day, Navy and Air
Force pilots, on the basis of the informal understandings undertaken at Taegu
the night before, worked together in support of the UN ground forces.
During the next three days Task Force 77 continued to support the
ground troops, and it effected a workable solution to the front-line control
problem which helped the Mosquitoes. Navy controllers, flying AD
divebombers, joined the Mosquitoes and remained on station with them for
three to four hours. As Navy attack planes came in, they were controlled by
either the Air Force or the Navy controller, whichever was available and not
already working other aircraft. When they finished their tasks, the Navy
pilots checked out with "Mellow" control and made an oral report of their mis-

don accomplished.

On 3 August a conference of US FEAF and US NavFE representatives
agreed that Navy pilots would give first priority to ground support under the
tactical guidance of the US Joint Operations Center, second priority to in-
terdict strikes south of the 38th Parallel in coordination with the Fifth US
Air Force, and third priority to interdiction strikes north of the 38th Parallel
in coordination with the US FEAF Bomber Command. Early in August it
seemed that adequate arrangements had been made whereby US FEAF and
UA NavFE planes would work in harmony in Korea.

At the same time the US Marine aircraft was also participated in the air
operations in coordination with the Fifth US Air Force. For example, one of
the US Marine squadrons -- VMF(N)-513 -- was a night-fighter unit, equipped
with F4U-5N all weather Corsairs. This squadron joined the 8th US Fighter-
Bomber Wing at Itazuke Air Base in Japan and began to fly its mission. And
two day-fighter Corsair squadrons -- VMF-214 and VMF-323 -- not only supported the 1st US Marine Brigade but furnished their Corsair capabilities to the US JOC for the support of the entire UN ground forces battleline when the brigade was not in action.

During the fortnight at the beginning of August as its forces withdrew to the Naktong River Line and began to make counterattack, the UN forces enjoyed the support of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft. This combined air power enabled friendly ground troops to hold the last defense line and to counterattack against the Reds. During the period from 1 to 10 August, the Fifth US Air Force flew an average of 340 fighter-bomber sorties per day for the UN ground forces. On 11 August, General Walker expressed his appreciation for the all-out support that Fifth US Air Force units had given to the Eighth Army: "They have destroyed enemy tanks that had penetrated our lines... Their effort has been of tremendous value to our forces and has saved many, many lives of our infantry troops."

Section 5. Comprehensive Interdiction Action

Sporadic air-interdiction efforts carried out by the US Far East Air Forces during July had undoubtedly delayed the Communists, but during the time in which its aircraft had to center their attacks in the immediate battle area the flow of Communist reinforcements and supplies had benefited from virtually unimpeded movement north of Seoul. Visual air-reconnaissance reports revealed that the enemy was running supply trains from Chongjin southward to Hungnam. And the reports also showed that the Reds had repaired the rail routes between Sinuiju and Seoul and between Seoul and Wonsan.

Reconnaissance photography taken on 22 July at Seoul revealed that the Reds had floored half of the double-track west railway bridge across the Han River and were using it to serve both vehicle and rail traffic. The enemy had also thrown a pontoon bridge across the Han River, and used it only at night; during daylight hours it was broken up and concealed somewhere. It was also found out that the enemy appeared to be trucking most of their supplies southward from Seoul, but they were running one train at night between Seoul and Chonui.

Putting these various reports together, it was evident that the enemy was supplying its logistical resources to the battle front under the careful
plans. And as long as the Reds continued to enjoy virtually uninterrupted routes back to their sources of supply, the friendly forces would continue to be in trouble.

On 26 July, US FEAF finally got authority to begin a comprehensive interdiction campaign based on a careful selection of rail and highway bridges, key communications center, and supply depots north of a line connecting the two towns of Suwon and Kangnung. The UN Allied air forces, then comprising ROK, US and Australian forces, established their primary cut points at Pyongyang, Hamhung, Wonsan, and Seoul in an effort to disrupt the enemy's use of communication line. Under the direction of US Far East Command (FEC) Target Selection Committe, US FEAF on 28 July issued an initial list of strategic interdiction targets. But, after more study this initial list was expanded. And finally on 2 August the US FEAT Bomber Command was provided with a list of 44 rail and highway bridge targets, further esignated as primary, secondary, and tertiary in importance. All but 13 of these targets lay north of the 38th Parallel.

Having made his Bomber Command responsible for these interdiction targets, Lieutenant General Stratemeyer, Commander of the US Far East Air Forces, on 3 August ordered the Fifth US Air Force to destroy the key transportation facilities in the zone between the 37th and 38th Parallels. The Fifth US Air Force and the US Bomber Command were to coordinate their operations for the Seoul area. The B-29's would destroy the marshaling yards and the west railway bridge, while tactical aircraft would knock out the pontoon bridge.

At the same time General Statemeyer was anxious to share the task with the Navy, and on 2 August he asked Admiral Struble to destroy the entire bridge complex at Seoul. To discuss this proposal, US NavFE and FEAF representatives were met on 3 August. At the meeting the Navy representatives readily agreed to take on interdiction strike when they were free from close support. They further agreed to coordinate such strikes south of the 38th Parallel with the Fifth US Air Force, and north of the Parallel with the US Bomber Command.

On 3 August the US Far East Command received a message from the Eighth US Army reporting that three trains had been sighted moving toward Seoul and that several enemy convoys were en route south of that city headed toward the battleline. Alarmed by this message General MacArthur and his key staff were met on the evening. In the meeting General MacArthur in-
terdiction plan which US FEAF instituted on 2 August, the US Bomber Command and the Fifth US Air Force began to attack against the enemy's transportation system. The carrier aircraft also took a part in this operation.

Interdiction Action by the US Bomber Command

The rolling stock and supplies which had accumulated in the Seoul's marshaling yards were bombed at first by the 19th US Bombardment Group on 4 August and followed up this smashing attack with another mission flown by the 22nd and 98th Groups struck the oil refinery and marshaling yards at Wonsan. By this time the US FEAF Bomber Command possessed five groups of B-29's, which were the 19th, 22nd, 92nd, 98th, and 307th US Bombardment Groups.

As these strikes cleaned up the fat accumulation of supplies, US Bomber Command promptly turned to attack against key bridges named for destruction. The bombing against bridges had been carried between 12 and 20 August. When assigned bridges were obscured by cloud cover, the bombers attacked enemy's marshaling yards as secondary targets. During August such secondary target attacks destroyed rolling stock and supplies in the yards at Chinnampo, Kilehu, Kowon, Najin, Chongjin, Sinanju, and Sariwon.

Though the bridge targets were not easy to destroy, the bomber crews carried their assigned missions efficiently with a little practice. The most successful bombing tactic and the one generally used was a bomber stream of individual aircraft which approached the bridge at an altitude of about three kilometers from an angle of 40 degrees. In its bridge attacks the US Bomber Command generally employed 500-pound bombs against flat concrete spans, and 1,000-pound bombs against many steel bridges. On 4 September, when the final results of Interdiction Campaign No. 1 was calculated, the US Bomber Command reported that it had destroyed all but seven of the 44 bridges designated for destruction. And the seven bridges were so badly damaged as to be impassable to enemy traffic. (See Sketch Map 1.)

Of all the bridge targets assigned to the US FEAF Bomber Command, the steel cantilever west railway bridge across the Han River, called by air crews the "elastic bridge" because of its stubborn refusal to fall, was the most difficult one. For almost four weeks the 19th Group bombed this bridge daily with 1,000-pound, 2,000-pound, and 4,000-pound general purpose bombs with fuze settings, intended to damage both the superstructure and the abutments. But the steel spans of the bridge still stood. Much efforts began to
center the destruction of it. Shortly after the noon hour on 19 August nine B-29's of the 19th US Bombardment Group placed 54 tons of 1,000-pound bombs on the bridge with the result of numerous hits. On this midafternoon 37 US Navy carrier-based planes attacked the bridge, scoring eight direct hits. On 20 August the 19th US Group returned to the bridge, but the crews found that two spans of the weakened structure were in the water. The crews bombed it as directed, and this attack chopped down a third span of the structure.

**Interdiction Action by the Fifth US Air Force**

Fifth US Air Force was charged to curtail enemy movement south of the 38th Parallel, and for the most part south of Seoul. Taking into con-
sideration its close-support role for the UN ground forces, the Fifth US Air Force sought to commit approximately one-third of its aircraft capability to interdiction operations. Whenever possible it attempted to concentrate its interdiction operation to the destruction of major road and rail bridges on the transportation routes leading to the battle area.

During August light bombers and fighter-bombers continued to hammer the railways south of Seoul and resulted in 47 rail cuts. By the end of August, counting work that had been done earlier by the medium bombers and naval aircraft, the Fifth US Air Force could report that 140 bridges between Seoul and the front were unserviceable and that 93 highway bridges, generally around the Naktong River perimeter, had been destroyed.

At the time, the most interest target was the pontoon bridge over the Han River, which the enemy had built one north and one south of the rail and highway bridges. Since the pontoons were concealed during the day, only night-flying B-26's could attack this objective. Supposing that the pontoons might be flammable, the 3rd US Bombardment Group, which was charged this attack, at first employed napalm against them but failed. Photo interpreters then revealed that the bridge was composed of sectional steel ramp extensions. In the early morning of 30 August eight B-26's, under the illumination by a B-29, bored in to attack the pontoon bridge — only to find that the bridge was not in place. When this attack had gotten any results, the US Bomber Command was ordered to lay and renew strings of delayed-action bombs set to explode at night along the path of the pontoon bridge. This tactic doubtless harassed the Reds, but it did not prevent movement across the Han River.

Aerial destruction of rail and road bridges south of Seoul hampered Communist efforts to resupply their losses of heavy equipment, such as tanks and artillery. But the bridge-cut was only a partial interdiction. The Red Koreans usually had forced neighbors to prop up demolished bridges with sandbags and timbers during the night hours.

Surprisingly enough the enemy was shuttling trains back and forth over very short distances of open track. At destroyed bridges or rail-track cuts, they portered the supplies across the breach, and reloaded them on another train. As trains and cars hid by day in the numerous tunnels and operated only at night, it was very difficult to destroy them.

Cognizant that the enemy continued to use their supply routes in spite of the destruction of bridges, Fifth US Air Force emphasized armed reconnaissance sweeps. Beginning in August the Fifth US Air Force laid on a
systematic coverage of road routes leading southward to the battle area. The ground forces helped this reconnaissance by recommending profitable area for interdiction sweeps. Generally, Mustangs were used for close support and the Shooting Stars for road sweeps. The F-80 jets, however, proved to be the best aircraft for armed reconnaissance ventures, because they were less vulnerable to enemy fires, and their speed enabled them to reach and attack the enemy before they could disperse.

The armed reconnaissance sweeps had located and quickly destroyed the partly concealed enemy targets. On 5 August Major Louis J. Sebille, Commander of the 67th US Fighter-Bomber Squadron (18th Group), led a flight of Mustangs against enemy artillery and troops hidden along the banks of a river near Hamchang. Unfortunately, during this mission Major Sebille's plane was hit by ground fire, but Major Sebille, disregarding advice to head south to safety at Taegu, again turned into the target and fired his six .50-caliber machine guns at point-blank range. On this pass, he must have sustained additional damage, for he flew right into the enemy concentration and there met death. For his selfless devotion to duty, Major Louis J. Sebille was posthumously awarded the US Congressional Medal of Honor.

As August progressed, Fifth US Air Force armed reconnaissance pilots found very little enemy traffic moving during daylight, but tightened procedures for reporting such enemy sightings as were made permitted some effective attack. On 25 August at the east of Pyongyang, for example, a fighter flight which was returning from airfield attack noticed a train about to take shelter in a tunnel. One of the fighters still had a napalm bomb left in his racks and used it to block the entrance, while the others hurriedly summoned armed reconnaissance planes which destroyed the double-header locomotive, 12 tank cars, and 13 boxcars of the train.

On another occasion, probably early in September, a flight of fighters at a few miles north of Andong dropped a tank of napalm on a truck seen entering a tunnel and then placed another tank at the other end of the tunnel. Though the flight reported one truck destroyed, but a ground reconnaissance party later reported that ten 76-mm. field guns, eight 120-mm. mortars, five trucks, and four jeeps had been destroyed in the tunnel.

The heavy armed reconnaissance attacks forced the enemy to move his supplies only at night over damaged roads. To destroy this enemy traffic, it was needed a night-intruder unit, but the US Air Force possessed no such organization. The Fifth US Air Force would have to devise its own means of combating Communist night travel.

Though the all-weather Corsairs of the US Marine Squadron VMF(N)-513
provided eight to ten sorties per night, more effort was needed. Both of F-80 and F-51 were employed in this mission, but they proved their unfitness for night-intruder missions. Late in July a few 3rd US Bombardment Group crews who had been assigned to the 47th US Bombardment Group began to fly night-intruder sorties. But 3rd US Group B-26's were quite different from the planes they had flown in the 47th US Group, for they had no radar altimeters, short-range navigation radar (shoran), or AN/APQ-13 blind-bombing radar, but in their initial employment over Korea the group crews met apparent success.

Disturbed by reports that night movements were allowing supplies to reach the Reds, the US Far East Air Forces directed the Fifth US Air Force on 8 August to increase the night sorties to fifty. Without delay the 3rd US Bombardment Group (B-26) was ordered to place half its effort on night operations. So its 8th and 13th Squadrons accordingly alternated in the night-intruder role, one squadron flying night missions one week and day missions the following week. By using these squadrons plus the all-weather squadrons, the Fifth US Air Force managed to fly an average of 35 night-intruder sorties each night during August.

As August wore on 3rd US Bombardment Group night intruders, who had begun to supplement their strafing attacks with 160-pound fragmentation bombs, reported that they were sighting fewer and fewer lighted convoys. Night-intruder forced enemy convoys to move without their lights, thus increasing the enemy's problem of resupplying his combat forces. Late in August the UN air forces began flare missions over north Korea. B-29's would release parachute flares at 10,000 feet that ignited at 6,000 feet, whereupon cooperating B-26 bombers attacked any enemy movement.
discovered in the illuminated area.

Although the improved night-intruder effort slowed the flow of Communist logistical support, it was manifestly unable to interdict Communist night movements with the same degree of certainty with which daytime fighter-bombers interdicted enemy's movements. As a result, the 3rd US Group was converted completely to night attack and the 452nd US Bombardment Wing was ordered to make up for the lost daytime effort.

Section 6. All-Out Close Air Support

As the ROK and Eighth US Army withdrew behind the Naktong River line from 1 to 2 August and occupied the new defensive positions in the south, the Communist forces further closed in on the northern bank of the river and hurriedly prepared to cross the river. Although the challenge of the enemy's superior numbers was grave, the friendly forces had some important advantages. Fifth US Air Force air strikes made the enemy armored forces in shambles. During August US FEAF airmen flew 7,397 close-support sorties for an average of 238 sorties each day.

The UN air and ground forces cooperated brilliantly to halt the enemy. If there was a sudden enemy attack against a weak defensive position, General Partridge ordered his planes to fill the breach. If there was a temporary break-through, Lieutenant General Walker, Eighth US Army Commander, requested air support from General Partridge to bomb and machine-gun the advancing enemy until infantry reserves could be hurried into action.

Just as the ROK and US forces were settling behind their defensive lines, Communist troops appeared to be gathering across the Naktong River for a thrust at Taegu. The enemy's activity seemed to be centering in the vicinity of the town of Waegwan, where the main highway and railroad crossed the Naktong. In this vicinity the Reds built bridges, established small bridgeheads, and sought to bring tanks into action. But the Fifth US Air Force kept the enemy's bridgeheads under constant air attack. Night-flying B-26's attacked enemy troops attempting to bring heavy equipment across the river. Shortly after dawn on 15 August rocket-firing fighters knocked out two tanks spearheading a Communist probing attack near Waegwan, and later in the day strafers killed an estimated 300 enemy troops in this same area.
Back in Tokyo on 14 August US FEAF Headquarters discussed the "carpet-bombing" mission proposed by General MacArthur. Here they agreed to bomb the area near Waegwan on 15 August. As thick cloud hampered the medium-bomber operation on the 15th, it was rescheduled for the next day. To the US Bomber Command's dismay the target area which the Eighth US Army designated for attack was a strip of terrain 5.6 kilometers wide and 12 kilometers long running along the Naktong River northwest of Waegwan. In this area some 40,000 Communist troops were said to be preparing for an assault against the 1st US Cavalry Division.

On 16 August the US Bomber Command sent 98 B-29's to the 67 square kilometers of the target area, and within thirty minutes these planes had bombed their assigned aiming points. From the altitudes ranging between 5,000 and 10,000 feet the Superfortress crews released 3,084 x 500-pound and 150 x 1,000-pound general purpose bombs. It was the biggest employment of airpower in direct support of ground forces since the Normandy Invasion. The bombs dropped had a blast effect equivalent to that of 30,000 rounds of heavy artillery.

No concrete evaluation of this spectacular bombing was possible at the time, other than the significant fact that the enemy offensive was not launched. Information obtained later from prisoners made clear that the enemy divisions, the Eighth US Army thought to be still west of the Naktong River, had in fact, already crossed to the east side and were not in the bombed area.

As the fightings raged only 18 kilometers north of Taegu, the US Joint Operation Center moved southward to Pusan on 20 August. And the Fifth US Air Force continued its effort to support the friendly ground troops. Benefiting from the strong air support the UN ground forces could retain their position.

By the end of August the UN aerial interdiction campaign had reduced the NK Communist army to desperate straits. The Red generals evidently decided they had to win quickly or lose everything. Shortly before midnight on 31 August, the Communists launched on the
entire Naktong Perimeter almost simultaneously, employing all their forces of thirteen combat divisions, one tank division and two tank brigades. This time they made all-out and human-wave attacks.

During the day on 1 September, the Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers had provided 167 close-support sorties along the 64 kilometers of front held by the 2nd and 25th US Divisions. The 25th US Division, fighting on the southwestern front around Masan, received 108 close-support sorties and used them to withstand a heavy enemy assault. At a press conference on 2 September Major General William B. Kean, the 25th US Division Commander, said that "the close air support strikes rendered by the Fifth US Air Force again saved this division, as they have many times before."

During the morning and early afternoon of 1 September the Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers flew 59 sorties to the support of the 2nd US Division, which was fighting to hold its positions behind the bend of the Naktong River. Task Force 77 of US Naval Far East also participated in by sending its carrier aircraft.

On 2 September, the Reds continued their offensive all along the front. During the day the Fifth US Air Force plus US Marine aircraft flew a total of 201 close-supports sorties. And the 307th US Bombardment Group sent 25 B-29's to blanket Communist supplies in Kimchon, Kochang, and Chinju with 863 x 500-pound bombs.

On the fine day of 3 September, The Fifth US Air Force planes flew 249 close-support and 89 interdiction sorties, while 35 B-29's bombed enemy troop and equipment concentrations in nine towns lying close behind the battleline. On this day, however, the Reds unleashed new attacks along the northern rim of the perimeter southeast of Hajang and centered about the town of Kigye.

Though the southwestern front got some stalemate by the gallant action of the UN air and ground forces, the 1st US Cavalry and 1st ROK Divisions on Waegwan—Tabudong front were forced backward to within eight kilometers of Taegu. On east coast front the enemy occupied Pohang and pushed toward Kyongju and Yongchon. On the 5th the Headquarters of Eighth US Army withdrew to Pusan, and on the next day the last air units remaining at Taegu -- the 6149th US Air Base Unit and the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron -- also moved to Pusan.

At this critical juncture, the Fifth US Air Force went all out. Beginning on 4 September, the ROK divisions to the east of Taegu received the lion's share of Fifth US Air Force capabilities: 160 sorties on the 4th, 51 sorties on the 5th (when weather seriously hampered flying), 183 sorties on the 6th.
Heartened by this air support, the ROK divisions rallied and attacked.

The UN air forces had continued to give their effort on the entire front around the Naktong River line. Taking advantage of good weather on 11 September, US FEAF planes turned in their peak sortie record so far in the war -- 683 sorties flown against the enemy. In this record the Fifth US Air Force offered 307 sorties in support of ground troops and 130 interdiction sorties against retreating enemy forces. Through their all-or-nothing offensive, the enemy gained nearly ten more kilometers of the ground further southward, but they consumed offensive capabilities in the end.

Looking backward at the successful accomplishment of the Eighth US Army's magnificent defensive effort, General Walker had nothing but praise for the air support which the Fifth US Air Force had provided to the Eighth US Army. "I am willing to state," said General Walker, "that no commander ever had better air support than has been furnished the Eighth Army by the Fifth Air Force... I will gladly lay my cards right on the table and state if it had not been for the air support that we received from the Fifth Air Force we would not have been able to stay in Korea."
CHAPTER III  GENERAL COUNTEROFFENSIVE
(15—31 September 1950)

Section 1.  Air Support for the Incheon Landing

Mindful of eventual commitments for mounting an airborne operation and for providing additional air transport between Japan and Korea, General Stratemeyer had secured additional carrier units and set up the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command (Provisional) on 10 September under Major General William H. Tunner. This command assumed operational control over the 1st US Troop Carrier Group (Medium) (Provisional), the 314th US Troop Carrier Group (Medium), and the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing (Heavy). Up until this time air transport and troop-carrier functions had always been considered to be separate, but it could accomplish both missions from this time.

Located at the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command headquarters in Ashiya on Kyushu, Japan, were liaison officers of the two principal airlift users, the Eighth US Army and the Fifth US Air Force, who comprised the US Joint Airlift Control (JALCO). These officers received specific requests for air transportation from their services and decided what was to be moved and in what priority, keeping their consolidated requirements within the tonnages specified for their service.

As the scheduled date for the Incheon operation approached, US FEAF began to do its assigned missions. Reconnaissance planes plotted enemy movement, and when the United Nations Command discovered a few days before the landing that no one knew the height of a seawall that would have to be sealed at Incheon, two RF-80's of the 8th US Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron went in at low level to photograph the landing area.

Seeking to cut off possible enemy reinforcements, the US Bomber Command began to hammer the enemy's rail lines and marshaling yards from Seoul to Wonsan and to Pyongyang. Exclusive of numerous hits on bridges and tunnels, the B-29's effected 46 rail-line cuts by 13 September. In a crescendo of effort on 13 September four groups with 60 B-29's attacked marshaling yards and rail tracks on all lines southward from Anju and Hungnam.
Also the Fifth US Air Force worked its mission. It attacked the Communist airfields which might endanger the Inchon beachhead. On 11 September a fighter patrol destroyed a Yak and another unidentified plane at Sinmak Airfield, about 70 kilometers northwest of Kaesong. And on the next day a fighter formation destroyed three Yaks and damaged one at Pyongyang Airfield (K-23).

During the week of 10–16 September a typhoon called “Kezia” centered over southern Japan. Alerted in time, the 18th and 8th US Fighter-Bomber Groups moved their F-51 Mustang fighters to barely serviceable airstrips of Suyong (K-9) and Taegu (K-2) respectively. These arrangements permitted an increase in the sortie rate, and aircraft under US FEAF control flew 3,257 sorties of all types during the week.

While the UN ground forces were retreating southward in the summer of 1950, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had been planning an amphibious encirclement of the Communist forces. On 30 August he issued an operations order. On D-day the X US Corps, commanded by Major General Edward M. Almond, would land at Inchon on the west coast and, in conjunction with the landing, the Eighth US Army would begin to drive northward along the Taegu–Taejon–Suwon axis.

As its contribution to the Inchon Landing operation, Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, US FEAF Commander, directed the US Bomber Command to emphasize interdiction operations designed to isolate the amphibious objective area, to continue to attack strategic targets in north Korea, and to conduct special missions including tactical air support, photo and visual reconnaissance, and the distribution of psychological warfare leaflets. For the landing operation, the major B-29 effort would be flown against the marshaling yards on the main rail lines leading into Seoul from the north between D minus 10 and D minus 3.

With the US Far East Air Forces performing its assigned duties outside the amphibious objective area, the X US Corps assault elements went ashore at Inchon as scheduled at dawn on 15 September. Soon the main landing troops followed and cleared Inchon in that afternoon without difficulty. The next day, the X US Corps units fanned out in advancing arcs and began pursuit forth toward Seoul. By the afternoon of 17 September the US Marines had retaken Kimpo Airfield (K-14) and were deploying along the west bank of the Han River.

Air cover during the establishment of the beachhead was provided by the US Navy fighters from three fast carriers, while two US Marine squadrons
based on the escort carriers Badoeng Strait and Sicily were available for close support. Even with this formidable array of naval aircraft present two Yaks were able to attack the heavy cruiser Rochester on 17 September. After scoring four near misses with light bombs, one Yak escaped; the other was shot down by the HMS Jamaica while it was strafing the British vessel. In the light of this surprising sneak attack, General Stratemeyer's insistence that the Fifth US Air Force be allowed to sweep all Communist airfields preparatory to the Inchon landing appeared to be doubly wise.

Following the capture of Kimpo Airfield the US Marine air wing garrison (two land-based F4U squadrons and a land-based F7F night fighter squadron) moved in on 18 September to cover the assault across the Han River at closer range. Since X US Corps controlled its own tactical air, it had little need for the US Far East Air Forces support; but it did request flare missions over Seoul all night on 25 September to enable US Marine night fighters to attack enemy troops fleeing north out of the city.

At about this time the X US Corps did have great need for the air-transported supplies and reinforcements. The US FEAF Combat Cargo Command's air transports were called upon for herculean efforts. At 1426 hours on 19 September the first C-54 of this command landed at Kimpo Airfield, and during the afternoon eight other C-54's and 23 C-119's set down at the airfield with supplies for the ground troops, nightlighting equipment, and 280 men of the 1st US Combat Support Unit (Provisional). This combat support unit, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George E. Stover, would speed the unloading of cargo aircraft and allow the planes to turn around in the shortest possible time.

On 20 September a full-scale lift was begun, with the US Combat Cargo Command immediately bettering its required allocation of 226 tons to K-14 each day. On their return trips the C-54's evacuated the wounded to hospitals in Japan. On 21 September nine C-119's made emergency drops of ammunition and rations directly to the front line troops, and eight C-54's landed 65 tons of ammunition and C-rations at the newly-captured Suwon Airfield (K-13) on 24 September.

By the request of Major General Edward M. Almond, the X US Corps Commander, this US Combat Cargo Command airlifted the entire 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team from Japan to K-14 between 25 and 27 September.

"The airlift provided by the US Combat Cargo Command for the Marines of Kimpo has been the subject of much praise from those who know," radioed Vice Admiral Turner C. Joy, US NavFE Commander.
"The success of our arms was aided greatly by the tremendous amounts of freight and combat replacement personnel airlifted during the most critical period of operations," stated General Almond late on 8 October.

Section 2. Air Support for the Eighth US Army

At 0900 hours on 16 September 1950, acting in unison with the Inchon landing, the ROK and Eighth US Army forces began general counteroffensive from the Naktong River Perimeter. Support for this counterattack was the special business of the UN firepower.

After hitting key interdiction targets in a concentrated-effort between 13 and 15 September, an armada of 82 B-29’s was scheduled to bomb a sector of the enemy line east of Waegwan at dawn on 16 September, but the cloud cover forced them to attack secondary targets in Pyongyang and Wonsan. In the morning of the same day F-80 jets and F-51 Mustangs let down through holes in the clouds to attack enemy positions across the coast to coast, but shortly after midafternoon weather worsened and forced nearly all air units to cease operating.

The weather began to improve in the afternoon on 17 September. On this day fighter-bombers, ably guided by Mosquito controllers, dumped scores of tanks of napalm in the Tabu dong area, where enemy troops were holding up the attack of the 1st US Cavalry Division. Large groups of enemy troops were bombed and strafed in the vicinity of Pohang. On the same day air attacks took a heavy toll of enemy soldiers trying to escape across the Naktong River in front of the 2nd US Division. American fighter-bombers defied the adverse weather to blast them with 260 x 100-gallon tanks of napalm and to strafe many enemy groups west of Changnyong. The massive napalm assault killed at least 1,200 Red soldiers while they were attempting to retreat across the Naktong River.

At first light on 18 September 42 B-29’s of the 92nd and 98th US Bombardment Groups dropped 1,600 x 500-pound bombs on the two bombing areas of Waegwan across the Naktong River. Despite the hurry with which the mission was planned and carried out, the Eighth US Army G-3 Air Officer later described the attacks as highly satisfactory, with timing and accuracy excellent.

As the weather cleared over Korea, the Fifth US Air Force stepped up the
tempo of its air attack. Fifth US Air Force pilots flew 286 close-support sorties on 18 September, and 361 sorties on the next day. Under strong ground pressure and withering air attack, the Communists began to crumble. To the 1st US Cavalry Division, attacking along the Tabu-dong road toward Sangju, Mustangs provided napalm and strafing attacks against entrenched enemy positions within 50 meters of friendly frontline elements.

In August Mosquito controllers had begun to carry SCR-300 radios in their cockpits which allowed them to talk directly with tank columns and forward ground patrols. This radio showed its efficiency. On 21 September an American Mosquito noted a scratch force of 30 Red tanks moving up to attack the advancing 24th US Division. American Mustang fighters and Shooting Star jets responded to the call for air support, and a joint air-ground attack knocked out 14 of them. Continuous aerial support was provided for the division while it drove toward Kimchon, then headquarters of the NK Communist field forces.

On the northern and western fronts the Communists virtually collapsed on 22 September. The 1st US Cavalry Division drove forward rapidly on the Tabu-dong--Sangju axis and then followed secondary roads in a rapid drive to Chongju. While on the eastern front the I and II ROK Corps drove forward with strong air support. On 22 September the American fighters killed 160 Red troops in front of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

And on the same day the Fifth US Air Force fighters flew 125 close support sorties in the ROK sector, killing an estimated 625 enemy troops. Rocketing and strafing American F-80's pinned down and destroyed more than 430 Communist forces in the same area on the following day. As on 23 September the Fifth US Air Force fighter pilots estimated that they had killed 6,500 enemy soldiers, and 1,400 more fell before the fighters' guns, bombs, and

Enemy T-34 tanks knocked out by air attack.
rockets on the following day.

As the Eighth US Army broke out of the Naktong River Perimeter, American medium and light bombers continued their interdiction attacks but with a new slant on the mission. Previously these attacks sought to prevent resupply and reinforcement of the Communist armies in the field. Now the interdiction attacks sought both to hamper the enemy’s movement toward Seoul and to prevent his escape from the noose which was being drawn in the southern part of Korea.

Early on 11 September General Stratemeyer had directed his Fifth Air Forces and Bomber Command to conduct further joint experimental missions in cooperative night attacks against enemy moving targets. On the night of 22 September while a B-29 lighted the highway and railway from Suwon south to Kimchon with M-26 parachute flares, low-flying B-26’s located and bombed a train near Taejon which must have been loaded with ammunition for its cars continued to explode in firecracker fashion for nearly thirty minutes. The same team of medium and light bombers heavily damaged another train east of Yongdong and bombed and strafed hostile troops in the same area.

Since there were not enough B-26’s to cover the main traffic arteries north of the 38th Parallel, three or four B-29’s were employed each night against the enemy’s supply routes. But the M-26 flare bombs functioned poorly, 65 per cent of them were proving to be duds. Fortunately, an air shipment of British-1950 flares had arrived in the theater from the United Kingdom, which would permit the B-29’s and B-26’s to continue their buddy attacks, but, lacking enough of these heavier and more reliable flares for use in both employments, the B-29 reconnaissance attacks in north Korea was canceled on the early October. At this time it was found that the B-29 armed reconnaissance attacks amounted to nothing more than a harassment to enemy.

Not all the B-29’s flew at night. On 24 September twelve B-29’s of the US Bomber Command flew armed surveillance of the roads leading northward toward Seoul, the US Far East Air Forces preferring to employ these tactics instead of attacking towns directly in advance of ground elements as the Eighth US Army requested. On all fronts the American B-29’s sought to pin down the retreating enemy. Roads to the northeast of Seoul were mined by B-29’s with delayed action bombs set to explode at night.

In the ten days following the Inchon landing, 13 other American B-29’s had bombarded the defeated Communists with psychological warfare leaflets inviting them to surrender. This leaflet missions later proved highly profitable. Near Seoul on 27 September, for example, 104 Red Koreans surrendered in a group to the X US Corps and each man carried one of the “safe-
conduct passed” dropped by the Superforts.

Before the onslaught of the UN air and ground attack, the enemy rapidly broke into fragments. By 25 September fighters were returning to their bases with bombs still in their shackles. Victory in the southern part of Korea came quickly, once the Red Korean army was dislodged from its positions around the Naktong Perimeter. At 2315 hours on 26 September, Eighth US Army troops made contact with elements of X US Corps near Osan. At the same time, on the eastern front, ROK troops were approaching the 38th Parallel. The Government of Republic of Korea returned to Seoul on 29 September.

In view of the favorable progress of UN ground forces, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 September canceled all strategic air attacks against north Korean objectives. And on 1 October UN Command prohibited the destruction of railway facilities south of the 38th Parallel. Looking even further ahead, on 4 October the US Far East Air Forces prohibited attacks against enemy airfields south of the 40th parallel unless such attack was necessary to destroy enemy aircraft.

During the defensive period between 25 June and September the US Far East Air Forces had greatly assisted the UN ground forces which were fighting gallantly against the outnumbered Communist troops by giving close air support, interdiction, strategic bombing, and other air support to them. Throughout the period the US Far East Air Forces aircraft had flown the following types and number of sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Close Support</th>
<th>Interdiction</th>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>25-30 June</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31 July</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31 August</td>
<td>7,397</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>4,582</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-30 September</td>
<td>5,969</td>
<td>3,918</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>5,382</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Now, it would be valuable to seek an answer to the following question: What had happened to the numerically-superior and combat-capable NK Communist army, which had been so invincible on the field of battle in July and August? How had this powerful battle force been defeated? In the final analysis it is always the enemy who is best able to judge the effectiveness of the various elements of military strength which contributed to his defeat.

The testimony of Communist prisoners of war, as reported and evaluated by the US Far East Command Translator and Interpreter Service, revealed that North Korean Communist offensive power, so invincible at the start of the war, had been decimated by United Nations air and ground action well prior to the landing at Inchon. Cut off from his sources of supplies, his
equipment being destroyed and his personnel slaughtered by air and ground action on the battlefield, the Red aggressor had been sustaining his offensive around the Naktong Perimeter only by sheer desperation.

According to these reports the NK Communist puppet army was defeated by relentless air-ground action in the southern part of Korea -- not by the op-portune amphibious assault at Incheon. Anyhow, it was evident that American Air Forces' continuous interdiction, strafing and bombing of supply routes, and strategic bombing was decisive in winning victory against enemy in the southern part of Korea.

Section 3. Air Deployment to Korea

As the ROK and US forces pushed northward, ending the threat of the Communist forces in the southern part of Korea, the Fifth US Air Force returned to those stations from which it had retreated in August.

On 17 September 1950 the 822nd US Engineer Aviation Battalion retraced its way from Suyong Airfield, 14 kilometers east from Pusan, and resumed work at Taegu Airfield, where it renovated and surfaced strip "B" with pierced-steel plank (PSP) to a length of 1740 meters.

In the meantime, ROK Air Force Mustangs moved from Chinhae Airfield (K-10) to Taegu Airfield on 20 September. But awareing the Fifth US Air Force was scheduled to move there, the ROK Air Force Mustangs vacated Taegu Airfield and moved to Youi-do Airfield in Seoul on 23 September.

Traveling by motor convoy and aircraft, the Headquarters of Fifth US Air Force returned to Taegu from K-9 between 23 and 25 September, the former being listed as the official movement date. The 6149th US Tactical Support Wing regathered the men and equipment which it had dispersed to Suyong Airfield and Itazuke Air Base in Kyushu, Japan, and began to operate Taegu Airfield.

Alerted at Itazuke Air Base in Kyushu, Japan, for movement to Taegu Airfield, the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group (F-80C) sent its 7th Squadron to Taegu Airfield on 28 September, and the 9th Squadron joined Taegu Airfield on 28 September. Group personnel and the 8th Squadron arrived on 29 September, and the 9th Squadron joined on 30 September. For the first time an American jet fighter group was based on a Korean airfield.

This airfield was also designated as the station for the 543rd US Tactical Support Group, a new provisional unit which had been organized on 26
Spetember to serve as the parent of the 8th US Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Photo Jet), the 162nd US Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Night Photo), and the 363rd US Reconnaissance Technical Squadron. As scheduled, these squadrons arrived at K-2 between 2 and 8 October. Like the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group, the 543rd US Tactical Support Group was attached to the 6149th US Tactical Support Wing.

Despite the fact that the airfield at Pohang had been in the battle zone for five weeks, Company A, 802nd US Engineer Aviation Battalion, found it in fair state of repair on 27 September: Only the north taxiway required extensive repair, including removal of the steel planing and regrading. The American aviation engineers promptly commenced this and other necessary work at the airfield.

Following the movement of the 6150th US Tactical Support Wing, advance elements of the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Group (F-51) left Tsuiki Airfield in Kyushu, Japan, for Pohang Airfield (K-3) on 3 October, and within four days the group, with its 39th and 40th Squadrons, settled in the same habitat it had left in August. On 12 October the Royal Australian Air Force 77 Squadron joined the 35th US Group at this airfield.

At the same time, the Fifth US Air Force had been making efforts to rehabilitate Kimpo and Suwon Airfields. On 25 September the 811th US Engineer Aviation Battalion arrived at Kimpo Airfield and began to fill a large bomb crater on the main runway and to cover it with PSP. On 1 October Company A of the battalion went to Suwon Airfield and patched the runway and laid down a PSP taxiway along its length.

The Fifth US Air Force rushed tactical air units to Kimpo and Suwon Airfields. The 6131st US Tactical Support Wing, loaded abord ships, reached Inchon on 8 October, and the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group and its 35th Squadron arrived by air and surface transport at Suwon Airfield on 7 October. The battered airfield was barely adequate for one Mustang squadron, and the 36th Squadron had to remain behind at Tsuiki Air Base in Kyushu, Japan. On 6 October the Commander of the 51st US Fighter-Interceptor Wing (F-80) took command of the base at Kimpo. On 25 October the last fighter squadron -- the 80th US Fighter-Bomber Squadron (8th Wing) which was now attached to the 51st US Wing -- reached K-14. And on 30 October the 8th US Group with its 36th Squadron moved there too.

In total three US F-51 fighter groups -- the 8th, 18th, and 35th -- based on the airfields at Kimpo, Suyong and Pohang. And two American F-80 jet fighter groups -- the 49th and 51st -- settled at Taegu and Kimpo Airfields. These movements were made with difficulty, for the "UN ground
forces enjoyed overriding claims on all available land and sea transportation. General Walker, moreover, frankly admitted that he wanted air transportation much more than he wanted air support.

In a movement which coincided with that of the main Eighth US Army command post, Headquarters, Fifth US Air force in Korea, moved to Seoul on 13 October. The US Joint Operations Center made these same changes of station. At this time the 502nd US Tactical Control Group arrived from the United States, replacing the improvised tactical control system. One squadron of the 502nd US Group manned the tactical air-control center at Youi-do Airfield (K-16) in Seoul, and the other three aircraft-control and warning squadrons opened tactical air direction centers (TADC's) at Kimpo, Taegu, and Taejon. These TADC's provided radar early-warning and direction-finding facilities but they were given no responsibility for the management of offensive fighter effort.

At about this same time the 20th US Signal Company arrived and began to furnish the tactical air-request communications net which the UN ground forces had so long required between divisions, corps, and the US Joint Operations Center. Thus, the air-ground and tactical air operations system in Korea was greatly improved. And in order to get the T-6 controllers closer to the frontlines, the 6147th US Tactical Control Squadron moved northward from Taegu Airfield, first to Kimpo Airfield on 5 September and then to Youi-do Airfield in Seoul on 18 October.

Many problems were occured due to the deployment of the Fifth US Air Force’s combat strength to Korea. Problems common to all of the Korean
airfields included difficult living conditions and a large amount of physical labor required in keeping operational, but the most serious common problem was the lack of equipment for handling bulk fuel. Lack of reliable communications with the US Joint Operations Center was another common problem of the tactical wings as the center moved to Seoul.

Most of these common problems had been foreseen and would be corrected in time. The greatest imponderable to the Fifth US Air Force, however, was how the F-80's were going to stand up under rugged field conditions. Many studies and efforts were given to meet this problem.

Although the movement of the tactical air wings to Korea necessitated hard work, Fifth US Air Force pilots were elated because of reduced flight time and no more over-water flights.
CHAPTER IV  THE STRATEGIC BOMBING OPERATION  
(13 July—26 September 1950)

Section 1. Selection of Strategic Targets

"While I do not presume to discuss specific targets," General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of U.S. Air Force, informed Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, US FEAF Commander, on 3 July 1950, "it is axiomatic that tactical operations on the battlefield cannot be fully effective unless there is a simultaneous interdiction and destruction of sources behind the battlefield."

Throughout the war, Communist forces drew most of their support from sources in Red China and Russia, which were prohibited from the UN Allied air attacks. In the early months of the war, however, the Communist army drew substantial support from industries within north Korea. As General Vandenberg once said, the proper way to use airpower was initially to stop the flow of supplies at their sources.

Precision bombardment by medium bombers in Korea required precise selection of targets to avoid waste of flying effort. As soon as the 22nd and 92nd US Bombardment Groups were ordered to move to the Far East, the Directorate of Intelligence of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) instituted a crash project looking toward the recommendation of strategic targets and target system in north Korea. This US SAC intelligence research soon showed north Korea to have five major industrial centers: Wonsan, Pyongyang, Hungnam, Chongjin, and Najin. With the exception of Pyongyang, all of these industrial centers were on the northeastern coast of Korea.

Wonsan was a major seaport and railway center and the site of petroleum refining. Pyongyang, the capital of the North Korean Communist regime, was also the army arsenal center which produced rifles, automatic weapons, ammunition, artillery shells, grenades, bombs and mines, and vehicles. It had large freight yards and a major railway shop which produced
and repaired rolling stock. On the northeastern coast of Korea the
Hungnam area constituted the most extensive basic-chemical and light metal
production complex in the Far East. The port city of Chongjin possessed
two major harbors, important railway yards and workshops, and iron
works. Far to the northeast and only 96 kilometers from Vladivostok in
USSR was the important port and naval base of Najin, whose naval oil-storage
facilities and railway yards were of significance both to the North Korean
Communists and the Russians.

In addition to these major industrial complexes, north Korea held a few
other more scattered strategic objectives. On the west coast, at the mouth
of the Taedong River, Chinnampo harbor had anchorage for ships of any
draft. And it produced aluminum, magnecium, and copper. On the east
coast of Songjin other metals plants produced high-grade steels.

And there were many hydroelectric generating plants in the northern part
of Korea: Supung, Pujon, Hochon, Changjin, and Kumgang-san. Ever
since May 1948, when the Red Koreans had cut off power transmissions
south of the 38th Parallel, the NK Communists had possessed a surplus
of electric power of export to the Communist nations of the Far East. Nearly
half of Supung's output of 300,000 kilowatts powered Chinese Communist
factories in Manchuria.

As soon as intelligence officers established the magnitude of north Korea's
industrial development, the US Strategic Air Command gave thought to
target priorities and force requirements. At first the director of intelligence
of SAC recommended the employment of incendiary bombs against the areas
rather than the target systems. But the US Strategic Air command had
some doubt as to whether fire raids would be acceptable in Korea, and it ac-
cordingly devised twin plans: One involving the employment of incendiaries
against the target areas, the other foreseeing the employment of demolition
bombs in precision attacks against the industrial plants. This plan was
presented to Major General Emmett O'Donnell, who carried it to Japan and
submitted it for General Stratemeyer's approval.

Heralding its arrival in the Far East, the 22nd and 92nd US Bombardment
Groups' B-29's flew a strategic strike against the marshalling yards of Wonsan
on 13 July. But the strategic bombing against North Korean Communist
targets was suspended as General MacArthur did not like this mission
because of the perilous situation of the UN ground forces at about this
period. So during the remainder of July these American B-29's had given
direct air support to the ground troops.
Back in the United States during July the US Joint Chiefs of Staff became increasingly impatient with the delayed strategic bombing attack. So long as the Communists drew support from virtually bomb-free industries in north Korea, United Nations forces would find it difficult to defeat them on the battlefields south of the 38th Parallel. On 31 July the US Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that mass strategic bombing against industrial targets in north Korea were highly desirable. And the US JCS offered to send two additional B-29 groups to the Far East, provided they were used to destroy the two munitions plants, railway yards and shops at Pyongyang, the three chemical plants at Hungnam, the oil refinery and railway yards and ships at Wonsan, and the naval oil-storage tank farm at Najin. This US JCS-designated strategic target plan was similar to that which General O'Donnell had brought from the US Strategic Air Command. General MacArthur accepted the proposal, and the US Strategic Air Command dispatched the 98th and 307th US Bombardment Groups to the Far East in early August.

To simplify the bombing problem and to achieve psychological gains, the US Far East Air Forces recommended using area bombing tactic and incendiary munitions. Based upon purely military considerations, the incendiary attacks would be most economical, efficient, and expeditious. But the UN Command anxious to avoid civilian casualties, hesitated to authorize any air attacks that Communist propaganda might exploit. Consequently the US Bomber Command was directed not to employ incendiaries without specific approval. A little later the UN Command forwarded further instructions that Bomber Command must drop warning leaflets notifying civilians to leave the industrial areas before the factories were attacked.

When the 98th and 307th US Groups arrived in the theater General Stratemeyer on 8 August ordered General O'Donnell to put the strategic offensive into effect, using the maximum effort of two B-29 groups against industrial targets every third day. Just as the strategic attacks were getting underway, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned additional targets on 15 August. On 20 August Major General Otto P. Weyland, US FEAF Vice-Commander, arguing the fact that several of the newly-designated US JOC strategic objectives were actually interdiction targets, persuaded the US FEC Target Selection Committee to commit three groups to strategic bombing. On the basis of this decision, General Stratemeyer directed the US Bomber Command to employ the maximum effort to three groups against strategic targets, with two days, stand-down between strikes.
Section 2. Strikes against Hungnam Chemical Complex

Based upon the special information from the United Nations Command regarding the peculiar importance of the target, General Stratemeyer on 21 July 1950 instructed the US FEAF Bomber Command to prepare plans for strikes against the Communist chemical combine at Hungnam. This mission would be accomplished with a total strength of two groups of B-29's and with high explosive bombs. This American bomber command had already made one large-scale attack against the marshaling yards at Wonsan, but the Hungnam attacks were to be bigger -- both in the number of planes required to do the task and in the size and importance of the target.

Hungnam possessed three important strategic targets -- the Hungnam Nitrogen Fertilizer Company, the Choson Nitrogen Explosives Company, and the Bongung Chemical Plant. At first General Stratemeyer specified that these targets were to be attacked under visual conditions, each in two-group strength in three days as rapidly hand-running as possible in order to prevent the enemy from devising any protection for the plants. But the planners of this strategic bombing mission knew that they had to count on the eventuality of radar attacks, for heavy cloud cover was usual along Korea's eastern coast. As the 19th US Bombardment Group had no AN/APQ-13 bombing radar, the 22nd and 92nd US Bombardment Groups had to fly the mission.

As a result of the careful planning and the superior skills of the US Bomber Command crews, mission "Nannie Able" against the Choson Nitrogen Explosives Factory went off smoothly on the morning of 30 July. Within four minutes, beginning at 0954 hours, 47 B-29's dropped all bombs against the center of the factory, completely destroying 30 per cent and heavily damaging 40 per cent of it. The radar bombing was superior and attested the value of intensive radar-training programs of the US Strategic Air Command.

On 1 August 46 American B-29's bombed against the Hungnam Nitrogen Fertilizer Factory. The weather permitted visual bombing. In this operation, called "Nannie Baker," the American Superforts' 500-pound bombs set off explosions large enough to rock the aircraft at 16,000 feet.

Again on 3 August 39 American Superforts were sent on mission "Nannie Charlie" against the Bongung Chemical Plant. All squadrons bombed
through the clouds from base altitudes of 16,000 feet. Bombing results were good to excellent.

After this third attack against the Hungnam chemical complex in five days General Stratemeyer announced that the biggest explosives and chemical center in the Far East could "no longer be considered a major factor in the Korean War."

Section 3. Sustained Strategic Bombing

Strategic Air Attack

Following the Hungnam strategic strikes the US FEAF Bomber Command began its sustained strategic attacks with an all-out mission against enemy's strategic targets.

It was necessary to improve sortie rate in order to destroy the strategic targets in short period. So General O'Donnell privately planned to improve on the seven missions per B-29 per month. With 80 assigned B-29's on 26 July 1950, he had already informed US FEAF that the Bomber Command meant to drop over 5,500 tons of bombs a month in an average of 1,785 flying hours. As good as the commanding general's promise, the US FEAF Bomber Command's B-29's averaged 8.9 sorties per month between 13 July and 31 October. During the period the command dropped 30,136 tons of bombs.

Good target research and analysis were required for the good strategic bombing attacks. Working in close coordination with the 31st US Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron and the 548th US Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, the US Bomber Command intelligence division accumulated the minimum target materials needed by the American B-29 crews. In the course of 46 strategic target attacks, only one group failed to receive adequate photography and radar-scope target materials. In this instance the courier to Okinawa was delayed, but the group concerned fortunately found visual conditions and bombed its targets with excellent results.

Weather was the important factor in the bombing. But the UN Allied air forces were in no position to select or wait for favorable weather at about this time. Therefore, an airborne commander in a weather aircraft was dispatched ahead of the striking force. This senior officer directed the method of attack, or guided the mission to an alternate target. All formation-bombing attacks were planned along the best axis for a radar bombing run, and squadron formations usually dropped on the lead bombardier,
whether the bombing was visual or by radar.

On 7 August the American B-29's attacked the arsenal marshaling yards in Pyongyang. And between 8 and 10 August the three American B-29's groups struck the Choson Oil Refinery and marshaling yards at Wonsan. Owing to the friendly air superiority and the lack of enemy antiaircraft artillery, the UN Allied air forces' B-29's had not been in difficulty bombing strategic targets in the northern part of Korea.

On 12 August the medium bombers bombed Najin by radar. But the B-29 bomb patterns were strangely off in azimuth, and the center of the bomb pattern fell into the unoccupied countryside near the port city, doing no damage to the target and little damage to the city. No violation of the Soviet border was alleged, but U.S. Air Force strongly reminded General Stratemeyer that Najin attacks were to be visual bombing efforts. On 22 August 64 B-29's retraced their way to Najin, but bad weather forced the bombers to attack secondary targets at Chongjin. At this juncture the U.S. State Department strongly objected to the continuance of Najin as an air target, and on 1 September the US Joint Chiefs of Staff put the city off limits for UN air attack. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently reasoned that Najin was an important center of Communist supplies but that the movement of these supplies could be effectively interdicted somewhere along the long coastal route.

Ruins of the oil refinery at Wonsan by strategic bombing.
StrategicBombingOperation

leading southward from the border city of Nakin.

On 28 August a radar-bombing attack on an iron mill at Songjin, on the east coast between Chongjin and Hungnam, achieved 95 per cent target destruction from a strike force of 47 American Superforts.

The US FEAF Bomber Command destroyed its assigned targets except at Nakin. By 15 September, General Stratemeyer could state that “practically all of the major military industrial targets important to the enemy forces and to their war potential have now been neutralized.”

Even earlier than this the US FEAF target planners had been perplexed by the growing shortage of strategic targets in north Korea. On 23 August US FEAF intelligence had asked the U.S. Air Force to give some guidance on whether the UN forces were going to occupy north Korea. If north Korea was to be occupied, the US Far East Air Forces wanted to neutralize the industrial targets; if not, it wanted to destroy them, particularly the hydroelectric power complexes.

Having secured no guidance from Washington, US FEAF intelligence on 21 September strongly recommended that the hydroelectric generating facilities in north Korea should be attacked. And on 26 September General MacArthur approved this recommendation. On receiving the approval, eight B-29’s of the 92nd US Bombardment Group went to the Pujon-ho Hydroelectric Plant in pairs and chopped out its transformer yards and penstocks with 1,000-pound bombs.

But this bombing on the 26th marked the end of the strategic bombing operation against north Korea. The United Nations Command decided to cross the 38th Parallel. On 26 September (Washington time) the US Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly informed General MacArthur that air attacks against targets of relatively long-term military significance should be suspended. Henceforward, the US JCS directed that the United Nations air forces would be employed only against objectives which had a bearing on the tactical situation in north Korea.

Evaluation of the Bombing

In a little more than a month the US FEAF Bomber Command had neutralized all but one strategic bombing objective in the communist-held north. The sole target which was not effectively attacked -- the naval oil-storage tanks at Nakin -- had been prescribed for air attack because of political considerations. Had the American B-29’s been permitted to make radar-directed attacks against Nakin, they could successfully have destroyed
the strategic target there, without compromise to the Russian border.

Damage assessment reports revealed that the B-29's had achieved marked success against the strategic targets. Although only 2.5 per cent of the B-29 effort had been employed in strategic attacks, the American medium bombers had effected an average of 55 per cent destruction on the industrial targets of the strategic bombing list. This successful accomplishment of mission was due to the professional crews of B-29's and the friendly air superiority.

Because the North Korean Communist forces drew most of their logistical support from sources beyond Korea's borders, the strategic bombing lacked decisiveness. But on the ground surveys of the strategic bombing effort revealed that the medium bombers had made an appreciable contribution to the successful effort of United Nations Command.

The US FEAF Bomber Command had tried its best to avoid civilian casualties. The strategic air attacks destroyed none but legitimate military targets in north Korea, and the bombing was so accurate as to do little damage to civilian installations near the industrial plants. Warning leaflets dropped prior to the attacks gave civilian workers ample warning that the bombers were coming.

Despite effort of the US Bomber Command to make the bombing raids as humane as possible, Communist propaganda exploited the attacks to the utmost. The Communists charged that the United Nations Allied air forces were conducting barbarous and indiscriminate bombing attacks against peaceful towns and civilians. But in true, the North Korean Communists massacred prisoners of war and drove helpless citizens to slaughter in order to shield their troops.
CHAPTER V ADVANCE INTO THE NORTH
(1 October—25 November 1950)

Section 1. Support for Ground Pursuit

UN Ground Forces Cross the 38th Parallel

By the end of September 1950 the United Nations Command had broken the back of North Korean Communist forces south of the 38th Parallel. Having broadcast a message to the NK Communist forces on 1 October, calling upon them to accept unconditional surrender, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, on 2 October issued orders for a ground operation into north Korea.

The air mission was also to be similar to that at Inchon landing. The US Far East Air Forces was to continue its current missions, support the advance of the ROK and Eighth US Army, and support the landing and subsequent advance of X US Corps as directed. It was to be prepared on four days' notice to drop the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team where and when it was needed.

Having had no reply from his ultimatum and being now specifically authorized to cross the 38th Parallel by a U.N. Assembly resolution of 7 October, General MacArthur ordered the UN ground forces to advance northward on 7 October.

Early on 1 October in the eastern front, where the I ROK Corps was operating, the 3rd ROK Division crossed the 38th Parallel and drove rapidly toward Wonsan. The other ROK units began to push northward. On the western front, the I US Corps attack began on 9 October. With the Fifth US Air Force guarding and breaking up enemy resistance on the flanks, the UN ground troops had been driving rapidly toward Pyongyang. On 12 October, 146 sorties went out, 81 to the I US Corps and 65 to the ROKs; heavy artillery fire against friendly forces in the Kaesong area ceased after American F-80 attacks put eleven enemy artillery pieces out of action.
Airborne Operation at Sukchon and Sunchon

Covered by the Fifth US Air Force, the 1st US Cavalry Division drove into Pyongyang on 19 October. In an effort to block the enemy’s withdrawal, the 1st ROK Division attacked the city from the southeast, east, and northeast, capturing two airfields at Pyongyang (K-23 and K-24). On the same day the Fifth US Air Force fighters destroyed 34 trucks, five ox carts, two artillery pieces, a tank, and other enemy equipment on the area east of Pyongyang. After the fall of the North Korean Communist capital, the UN Command decided to trap as many of the enemy as possible.

On 16 October General MacArthur issued orders for an airborne operation north of Pyongyang. At the time the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team was standing by at Kimpo Airfield to aid in such an envelopment. The drop zones were to be near the towns of Sukchon and Sunchon, both about 48 kilometers from Pyongyang up the arms of the “V” formed by the main road and rail routes which converge at Pyongyang. The US Combat Cargo Command immediately canceled all transport commitments of the 314th US Troop Carrier Group’s C-119’s and of the 21st US Troop Carrier Squadron’s C-47’s to make certain that the aircraft would be fully ready for the operation.

On the morning of the 20th the paratroops, supplies, and equipment were loaded on 76 C-119’s and 40 C-47’s at Kimpo Airfield. The planes were crowded. A typical C-119 carried 46 men in “sticks” of 23 men each, 15 monorail bundles, and 4 door bundles.

The first aircraft was aloft by noon. After all the planes assembled over the Han River estuary, they turned north along the west coast, escorted by Fifth US Air Force fighters. General Tunner served as airborne commander. At about 1400 hours on 20 October the first troops began to drop from lead planes. There was no antiaircraft fire and only occasional sniper fire. A total of 1,470 men dropped at Sukchon.

At 1420 hours paratroopers began landing in the drop zone near Sunchon. Casualties were light for both jumps -- only one man killed, and 46 injured. The jumps were completed within an hour, 111 planes had delivered 2,860 paratroopers and 301.2 tons of equipment to the drop zones by 1500 hours. The success of the jump was matched by the air attacks. Prior to the drop, 75 F-51’s, 62 F-80’s, and five B-26’s had worked over the drop zones. These pilots claimed the destruction of 53 vehicles, five fuel and ammunition dumps, 23 ox carts, four tanks, and a field artillery gun.
On the ground the paratroopers quickly occupied the high ground overlooking both drop zones, meeting little resistance. This "softening-up" attack, together with the sudden airdrop, so startled the Red troops that they abandoned strong defensive positions, leaving loaded guns with ammunition alongside.

In the following three days additional men, supplies, and equipment were airdropped, reaching a total of 3,955 men and 592 tons for the four-day period. Relatively few items dropped were damaged or lost: two of twelve 105-milimeter howitzers, four of 39 jeeps, and two of four three-quarter-ton trucks.

Late on 20 October elements of the 6th ROK Division bypassed Pyongyang to link up with the paratroopers, and on 22 October troops of the 1st US Cavalry Division broke through from Pyongyang.

**Lack of Targets for Medium Bombers**

Cancellation of strategic strikes by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 September and the progress on UN ground forces forward the Yalu
(Amnok) River left the US FEAF Bomber Command without full employment. During the late September and early October, a part of the American medium bomber efforts was employed against enemy training areas. According to intelligence reports, the NK Communists were attempting to mobilize six divisions of trainees for a last-ditch defense.

On 20 September the American B-29's destroyed three separate barracks areas comprising the enemy's military academy at Pyongyang. And on 23 September the bombers knocked out 90 per cent of the buildings at a troop training center at Hamhung. On 2 October the B-29's destroyed 75 per cent of the training center at Nanam. And on 12 October ten B-29's bombed a training center at Hungnam with excellent results. At this juncture, when only half of the known training installations had been attacked, the US FEAF cancelled further attacks because it feared that United Nations prisoners were being held in the cantonments.

The other mission of the US Bomber Command at this time was to destroy bridges. On 6 October the US Far East Air Forces sent its Bomber Command a list of 33 bridges, all north of Pyongyang and Wonsan and selected to isolate these two areas. As the ROK troops advanced so rapidly up the east coast, US FEAF had to delete ten of them within a week. In context with the Eighth US Army's advance on the western front, medium bombers were forbidden to operate south of Sinanju after 18 October, and US FEAF again revised its list of bridges needing destruction.

Targets were so scarce indeed that a medium bomber chased an enemy motorcycle rider down a road, dropping bombs until one hit him. On 10 October the US Bomber Command was ordered to reduce its sorties per day to 25, and again to 15 on 22 October. General MacArthur on 22 October authorized the return of the 22nd and 92nd US Bombardment Groups to the United States.

Support for Wonsan Landing

According to General MacArthur's order on 2 October, the X US Corps would land at Wonsan and attack westward in time to effect a junction with the Eighth US Army, compressing an envelopment. The UN air forces would support this landing operation. Once again as had been the case at Inchon Landing operations, the UN Command ordered a command arrangement which divided its air capabilities.

Beginning on D minus 5, and continuing until the amphibious phase of the
operation was terminated, Vice Admiral Turner C. Joy, US Navy Commander, would possess "coordination control" authority of air operations within 80-kilometer circle around Wonsan and continuing until the amphibious phase of the operation was terminated. US Navy Task Force 77's fast carriers would provide air support and air defense for the initial phase of the Wonsan landing, but Major General Field Harris was designated X US Corps tactical air commander and his 1st US Marine Air Wing would provide close support to the X US Corps at first from escort carriers and then from Wonsan Airfield.

Except for air-transport and courier missions, the US Far East Air Forces planes would not enter the amphibious objective area unless on the request of the X US Corps tactical air commander.

At a conference concerning the preparation of an air annex to the Wonsan operation order, Major General Otto P. Weyland, US FEAF Vice Commander, secured agreement that General Stratemeyer would regain "coordination control" over all air operations over Korea at the disestablishment of the Wonsan amphibious objective area. And General MacArthur agreed that General Stratemeyer would be responsible for coordinating all air operations over Korea outside the Wonsan objective area. Although airpower would be divided during the amphibious landing, General Stratemeyer had at least secured some semblance of unity of air action in Korea.

In the meantime on 7 October, when the X US Corps began to stage aboard ship for Wonsan, the I ROK Corps was only 16 kilometers south of Wonsan. During their advance into north Korea the I ROK Corps received quite many air support from the Fifth US Air Force and US Marine fighters. On 7 October, for example, an American Mosquito plane located enemy antitank positions forward of the 3rd ROK Division, and called in flights of American F-51's and F-80's to blast out the gun emplacements. ROK troops continued without delay. By 10 October ROK forces were fighting in the city of Wonsan, under the air support by US Marine and Air Force fighters. As a result of the day's fighting, the Capital ROK Division was able to capture Wonsan Airfield (K-25) on 11 October. And by 14 October the I ROK Corps occupied positions 35 kilometers north and 19 kilometers west of Wonsan.

At the time ROK forces were rapidly advancing up the east coast and needed all the air support they could obtain. So on 11 October General Partridge sent Colonel Joseph D. Lee to look over the airfield at Wonsan,
and Colonel Lee reported that the runways and facilities were in good condition. Next day the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command flew 22 sorties with 131 tons of ROK supplies to Wonsan Airfield. And on the 13th the transports lifted the 6151st US Air Base Unit, commanded by Colonel Lee, to there. On the same day Major General Partridge and Major General Harris, 1st US Marine Air Wing Commander, got together at Taegu Airfield and worked out agreements relative to Wonsan Airfield. The 1st US Marine Air Wing began to move from Kimpo Airfield to Wonsan Airfield on 14 October.

Continuing efforts to integrate all the UN air capabilities under one command control got some success. On 16 October General MacArthur made the decision that the US Far East Air Forces would exercise coordination control over landbased Marine air units and over carrier-based aviation operating over Korea effective as soon as X US Corps troops advanced beyond the Wonsan objective area. General Stratemeyer promptly directed General Partridge to prepare for assumption of coordination control over US Marine air units at Wonsan Airfield, but he instructed General Partridge to commit these units in support of the X US Corps.

On 20 October Major General Edward M. Almond, the X US Corps Commander, came ashore by helicopter to assume command at Wonsan. On 21 October the I ROK Corps, now under operational control of X US Corps, forged beyond the Wonsan objective area and the new coordination control arrangements took effect. General Almond stated that due to the limited communication facilities the X US Corps would direct the US Marine Air Wing to furnish close-support missions, but General MacArthur promptly rejoined that the X US Corps must coordinate all requests for close support with the Fifth US Air Force.

Although General MacArthur had properly vested the coordination control of the US Marine air units at Wonsan Airfield in the US FEAF and US FEAF had passed this control to the Fifth US Air Force, but the existence of two separate and independent ground commanders in Korea, namely the Eighth Army and the X Corps, precluded orderly control of air operations.

To meet this problem General Stratemeyer had taken action; (1) to place the 1st US Marine Air Wing under the coordination control of the Fifth US Air Force, (2) to establish the primary mission of the 1st US Marine Air Wing as the support of X US Corps, (3) to make the Fifth US Air Force’s vastly superior strength available either to X US Corps or Eighth US Army as needed, and (4) to retain US Navy and Bomber Command aircraft in a general
support role, to be ordered to either front as required.

After waiting six days while US naval minesweepers cleared the Wonsan channel, the X US Corps made an administrative landing at Wonsan on 26 October. Three days later, in a landing designed to lighten port requirements at Wonsan and to speed the occupation of northeast Korea, the 7th US Division landed at Iwon, about 90 nautical miles northeast of Wonsan. In the days that followed, the IROK Corps followed coastal routes toward Chongjin; the 1st US Marine Division marched toward Hamhung and the Changjin Reservoir; and the 7th US Division pushed inland toward the Pujon Reservoir area.

Section 2. Appearance of CCF Aircraft

Until mid-October 1950, the UN Allied air forces had restricted their air attacks against targets lying within 80 kilometers of Korea's northern borders. But on 17 October General MacArthur instructed that all the UN ground forces could extend their operations up to the line which ran approximately 64 kilometers from Korea's border, but ROK troops would progress north of the line. Now the air forces had to change their restriction. So on the same day the US Far East Air Forces authorized to extend air attack up to the "chop line," 32 kilometers from Korea's border.

But on 24 October General MacArthur ordered to abolish all restraining lines for the employment of UN ground troops. Pursuant to this order, General Stratemeyer on 25 October gave order: "Effective immediately," he stated, "close-support missions when under direct control of tactical air-control parties or airborne controllers, may so close to the border as may be necessary for proper performance of mission." But he cautioned not to violate the Manchurian border.

Although General Stratemeyer had issued orders which allowed the Fifth US Air Force to provide close support for the UN ground forces approaching the northern border of Korea, but at about this time the UN ground troops were more interested in air transport than in air close support.

While the UN ground forces were advancing northward, the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command laid down material as close as possible behind the groundmen. On 16 October an airstrip at Sinmak, 70 kilometers northwest from Kaesong, was captured, and the US Combat Cargo Command on the next
day landed 235 tons of supplies there. Beginning on 20 October two airfields of Pyongyang replaced Sinnak as the designation of Eighth US Army. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Eighth US Army Commander, was highly complimentary concerning this combat support: "If it were not for airlift," he stated, "the Eighth US Army would be flat on its back and at a standstill, awaiting the opening of ports and rail facilities."

To advance north of Pyongyang, the Eighth US Army had to have a minimum of 1,000 tons of supplies each day into northwestern Korea. While the Fifth US Air Force had been planning to move two Mustang wings to the Pyongyang Airfield, that would need 450 tons of supplies daily to support these wings. Since the US Combat Cargo Command could lift only about 1,000 tons of supplies each day into the northwestern Korea, it obviously could not meet both Army and Air Force requirements.

After having some talks with the delegate of Eighth US Army, the US FEAF decided to give the entire Combat Cargo Command airlift to the Eighth US Army for a while. So the Fifth US Air Force established its 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing at Kimpo Airfield and reduced its airlift requirements to approximately 60 tons a day. It was the best possible solution to the present logistical problem and more nearly fitted Army requirements at this stage of the war.

At a same time, to help the airlift mission, the Fifth US Air Force moved small base service units to Pyongyang (K-23), Mirim (K-24) and Yonpo (K-27) Airfields -- the 6148th, 6146th, and 6151st US Air Base Units, respectively. By late October the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command was delivering about 1,200 tons daily to Pyongyang Airfield. On successive two days, 24 and 25 October, the Command broke its tonnage records by carrying 1,687 tons on the first day and 1,767 tons on the second. Almost 90 per cent of this total tonnage was delivered to north Korea, the great bulk of it being rations and motor gasoline for the UN ground troops. In establishing these records, however, the US Combat Cargo Command shuttled a good quantity of supplies to Kimpo Airfield, whence they were transshipped to Pyongyang Airfield.

As the UN ground forces moved northward up to the Yalu River, the Chinese Communists indicated that they intended to make some form of aggression into Korea. General Stratmeyer had predicted that Red Chinese aggression in Korea would first be manifest in the air, and he was right.

At 0400 and again 2110 hours on 14 October two hostile aircraft sneaked in at K-14 and dropped several bombs. This attack did no damage but four
Advance into the North

F-51's, which were sent to search for the origin of the enemy air attacks at Sinuiju Airfield (K-30), drew heavy antiaircraft fire from across the Yalu River and one of them was shot down. On 17 October an RB-29 crew located about 75 fighters parked in neat rows at Antung Airfield in Manchuria, but at early next morning the Red planes were disappeared. On 24 October Red Chinese antiaircraft guns fired on two US Marine F4U's while they were from five to eight kilometers south of the border.

On the morning of 1 November, however, three Russian-built Yak fighters attacked a T-6 Mosquito and a B-26 near Sinuiju; the B-26 destroyed one Yak, and F-51's were called in to deal destruction of the other two enemy aircraft. At noon on the same day an RF-80 pilot flashed the word that 15 Yaks were parked in revetments on K-30, and the Fifth US Air Force dispatched three flights of F-80's to the scene, destroying one and damaging six Yaks. But the revetments opened toward the Yalu River, and from across the river the F-80's drew Red Chinese flak, which shot down a F-80. Later that afternoon a second F-80 strike returned to clean up the remainder of the enemy planes, but all of them that could be flown had departed. On the same day the Communist revealed their new jet aircraft. At 1345 hours six enemy aircraft, at once identified as MIG-15's, crossed the Yalu River and unsuccessfully jumped a flight of Mustangs over Sinuiju. Now the Chinese Communist air force really invaded in Korea.

While on the ground in the last week of October the UN ground forces were pursuing the remnants of the NK Communists. The I US Corps crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju and pushed toward Sinuiju, and II ROK Corps was advancing northward on the eastern front. The 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu River at Chosan on 26 October. But the Communists resistance began to increase. On 28 October
Communist ground troops launched strong attacks against the II ROK Corps. And on the night of 1 November elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division were savagely attacked by forces which included Red Chinese troops.

As the Red Chinese aggression had become well clear with more forces in number in front of the UN ground forces, the UN Command on 3 November ordered the Eighth US Army to withdraw to the line of the Chongchon River in an effort to erect the new defense lines and to prepare for counteroffensive. For the next three days the Communists attempted to pursue Eighth US Army, but Fifth US Air Force crews helped to relieve the pressure. In one notable air action on 4 November flights of B-26's kept enemy troop concentration near Chongjin under attack for more than 30 minutes and killed an estimated 500 Reds. By 7 November Eighth US Army troops safely back at the Chongchon bridgehead, where they turned and countered Communist attacks with savage artillery barrages. As a result the Communists broke off their attack.

Section 3. Air Battle at the Yalu River

Destruction of Enemy Supply Centers

In hopes of discouraging Communist Chinese invasion, General MacArthur directed the UN Allied air forces on 5 November 1950 to make a maximum air effort for two weeks: From the Yalu River southward to the battle line, the UN air forces "to destroy every means of communication and every installation, factory, and built-up areas excepting only Najin, the Supung dam, and other electric power plants." General MacArthur especially cautioned, however, that "there must be no violation of the border. On the day he issued these drastic orders the US FEAF Bomber Command flew its first purposeful incendiary attack. The reduced number of B-29's now in the Far East forced them to use the incendiary bombs.

The US Far East Air Forces target planners during October had given careful attention to the city of Sinuiju, a principal enemy communication and supply center near the mouth of the Yalu River and only eight kilometers from the Manchurian city of Antung. Two 1,207-meter-long bridges connected the two city: One was a combination rail and highway bridge, the other was a double track railway bridge.

In October US FEAF intelligence had recommended against bombing at-
Attack on Sinuiju, lest that the Communists claim the UN air power was being used against civilian populations. But now in November, with the danger of the Communist Chinese forces aggression at hand, the US Far East Air Forces had to discount the sentimental for the practical, it directed its Bomber Command to conduct on 7 November a maximum effort of B-29 strike designed to destroy the key enemy communications and supply center at Sinuiju.

As a warm-up on 5 November, the US Bomber Command sent 22 B-29's to drop 170 tons of incendiaries on barracks and warehouses at Kanggye, a north central Korean town at the apex of transportation routes leading southward to Sinanju and Hamhung; the attack destroyed more than 65 per cent of Kanggye's built-up area. After this preliminary attack the American medium bombers stood down for maintenance on 6–7 November (adverse weather and the delayed US Joint Chiefs of Staff approval having caused the postponement of the Sinuiju attack on the latter date), and on 8 November 79 American B-29's were scheduled to bomb the city.

Before the bombing, on 8 November, American F-80's and F-51's raked enemy antiaircraft artillery positions with machine guns, rockets, and napalm. The first all-jet air battle in history occurred at this moment. Russian-built MIG-15's came up from Antung Air Base in Manchuria to engage the Shooting Stars. The old F-80C's were no match for the swept-wing MIG's, but Lieutenant Russell J. Brown managed to shoot down a MIG-15, the first enemy jet aircraft destroyed in the Korean War.

Shortly before noon on 8 November 70 American B-29's came over Sinuiju to drop 384.5 tons of 500-pound incendiaries. At the same time nine other medium bombers attacked the two Yalu River bridges in Sinuiju. Comparison of photographs taken before and after the holocaust revealed that the incendiary bombs burned out 60 per cent of the three square-kilometer built-up area of Sinuiju. (See Sketch Map 2.)

This US Bomber Command strike against Sinuiju virtually eliminated the first of ten priority communications and supply centers designated by General Stratemeyer. Bomber Command subsequently prosecuted incendiary attacks against most of these towns with a part of its effort, generally hitting two or three on the same mission and striking Chongjin either visually or by radar when weathered out of the primary targets for the day. Other key communications and supply centers were added to the list and were attacked by the American medium bombers. The Fifth US Air Force fighters and light bombers added to the destruction in many of these same cities, generally taking out such buildings and warehouses as the medium bomber
conflagration had missed.

As of 28 November the US FEAF Bomber Command had effected heavy damages on the priority communications and supply centers: Manpojin, 95 per cent; Kanggye, 75 per cent; Hoeryong, 90 per cent; Namsi, 90 percent; Chusan, 85 per cent; Sakehu, 75 per cent; Huichon, 75 per cent; Koin dong, 90 per cent; Sinuiju, 60 per cent; and Uiju, 20 per cent.

While enemy opposition was sporadic, it was nonetheless costly: the 307th US Bombardment Group lost a B-29 to MIG-15's on 10 November. Two days later over Manpojin, heavy antiaircraft artillery fire from across the Yalu River in the Manchurian side damaged a 98th US Bombardment Group B-29 so badly that it was forced to land at a Korean airfield. A combination of enemy flak and weather conditions forced the medium bombers to higher altitudes, causing a serious rise in the incidence of engine failures and increased gasoline consumption.

These attacks against supply and communications centers, which promised shelter and were doubtless already concealing Red Chinese troops, would deprive the Communists of badly-needed protection against the frigid weather and space for storing supplies, as well as such material as they had already accumulated forward for their planned offensive.

AIR STRIKES AT THE YALU (8–24 NOV 1950)
Air Strikes against Yalu Bridge

The UN air interdiction effort ordered the destruction of the first span out from the Korean bank of the Yalu River (Amnok-gang) bridges and marked every major bridge structure between the Yalu River and the battle line for destruction. Concurrently, the Fifth US Air Force was laying an all-out armed reconnaissance, by night and day, against everything moving on north Korean road and rail routes.

In all, there were 12 international bridges crossing the Yalu River, the most important of them to the tactical situation being those which lay in northwestern Korea: The combination rail and highway bridge and the double-track railway bridge at Sinuiju, a highway bridge at Chongsongjin, a railway bridge at Namsan-ni, and a highway and a railway bridge at Manpojin. Across the Sinuiju, Chongsongjin, and Namsan-ni bridges the Chinese Communists could rush forces to oppose the Eighth US Army, and the Manpojin bridges would permit the Red Chinese to march down the center of north Korea and split the Eighth US Army from X US Corps. And there were other bridges of lesser importance to the tactical situation.

Bombing against these Yalu bridges was very difficult. All of them were strong enough to withstand great natural adversities. Antiaircraft fire and MIG interceptors hazarded bombing runs, and the orders which forbade violations to Manchurian airspace limited possible axes of attack. The railway bridge of Namsan-ni, for example, was so located in a bend of the river that bombers could not attack it without flying over Manchurian territory. The horizontal-bombing B-29's operated under severe disadvantages. To escape flak, they had to bomb from altitudes above 20,000 feet, and at such heights they were inherently unsuitable for pinpoint work. To avoid border violations, the medium bombers had to bomb through cross wind, and high level winds in excess of 120 knots were encountered.

Notwithstanding, the US FEAF Bomber Command attacks against the Yalu River bridges began on 8 November, when nine 19th US Bombardment Group B-29's utilized the cover of the massive attack against Sinuiju to drop 1,000-pound bombs on the abutments and approaches to the Sinuiju bridges. But the spans were still standing. In the meantime, the American naval dive-bombers also participated in this mission. In a threeday effort beginning on 9 November the naval bombers from the Valley Forge, Philippine Sea, and Leyte attacked and dropped the highway bridge at Sinuiju and two lighter and less important bridges up the river at Hyesanjin.

As the carriers withdrew for replenishment, the 98th US Bombardment
Group sent nine B-29's to walk 1,000-pound bombs across the Sinuiju bridges on 14 September. With three flights in close trail, the American medium bombers passed over the target within ten seconds, thus minimizing the time of exposure to flak. On the following day 21 American B-29's teamed up against the bridges. After fighting off MIG fighters, which badly damaged two B-29's, the remainder of the bombers attacked the target but did little damage, probably because of the flak and 110-kilometer-per-hour cross wind.

During the next week heavy clouds hung over the Yalu River permitted no bombing action against the bridges. On 24 November clearing weather returned all three US B-29 groups to bridge attacks. Most of the attacks made in the next few days failed to accomplish their purpose, but on 25 November the 19th US Bombardment Group's eight B-29's dropped one span of the Manpojin railway bridge, and on the next day eight 307th US Bombardment Group B-29's reported two spans of the Chongsongjin highway bridge destroyed.

By the end of November the UN air effort had succeeded in cutting at least four of the international bridges and had damaged most of the other bridges, but it was becoming increasingly evident that the returns were not commensurate with the effort expended. During the last week of November aerial reconnaissance showed that the Red Chinese had managed to construct three new pontoon bridges and one wooden-pier bridge across the Yalu River at critical junctions in northwest and northcentral Korea. And to make matters worse, the season was also approaching when the Yalu River would be completely frozen over and bridges might be bypassed by routes across the river ice.

Recognizing that the Yalu River was now frozen over and that close support for the UN ground troops was urgently needed, the UN Command directed suspension of the medium bomber action against the Yalu River bridges on 5 December. South of the Yalu River the American medium bombers and the whole Fifth US Air Force attacked enemy road and rail communications. When the B-29's could not hit their bridge targets because of weather, they were briefed to undertake multiple railway cuts whenever this was at all possible. Fifth US Air Force fighter-bombers attacked bridges, tunnels, and such road or rail traffic as could be found. Night-intruder B-26's and US Marine night-flying F-7F's harassed road and rail traffic during night hours.

After ten days' all-out interdiction and armed reconnaissance, General MacArthur on 18 November announced that he believed that the air effort had been largely successful in isolating the battle area from added enemy reinforcements and had greatly diminished the enemy flow of supply.
Section 4. UN Attack and CCF Counterattack

Early in November 1950 it was starkly evident that an over-dependence on essentially-scarce air transportation had put the UN ground forces in a difficult logistical position. And now, because of increased enemy resistance on the entire front, the UN ground forces wanted more air-lift supplies than before. In the meantime, Fifth US Air Force planned to move its tactical air units northward to the airfields at Pyongyang and Yonpo in an effort to break the Communist resistance effectively. The US Combat Cargo Command had to assist the forward movement of Fifth US Air Force units and to supply them about 450 tons a day. So the requirements for airlift supply had increased.

The US Combat Cargo Command found the X US Corps had opened ports at Wonsan and Iwon, so it canceled the Corps’ requirement for the airlift of motor gasoline. At the same time Major General William H. Tunner, US Combat Cargo Commander, also made efforts, so far as he was able, to increase the airlift capabilities. Less than 36 hours after its C-46’s reached Brady Airfield in Kyushu, Japan, on 8 November the 437th US Troop Carrier Wing began to shuttle cargo into Korea. And in the latter part of November 1950 a new C-54 squadron and additional aircrews and maintenance technicians had arrived from the United States to Japan, thus improving the airlift capabilities. Early in November the Eighth US Army continued to take most of the available airlift, but the port of Chinnampo opened on 9 November and rail transportation into Pyongyang began at about this same time. As these means of surface transportation became available, the ground forces reduced their requirements for air transportation, and the Fifth US Air Force began to deploy the main bodies of its Mustang wings to the airfields in the northern part of Korea.

By air and road the 606th US Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron went to a site near Sinanju Airfield (K-29) and began operating its radars on 21 November. Between 10 and 19 November the 6150th Tactical Support Wing moved from Pohang Airfield to Yonpo Airfield near wonsan. The tactical elements -- the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Group and 77th RAAF Squadron -- stayed at Pohang Airfield until the wing was in place, and then, between 17 and 19 November, the Mustang pilots took off from Pohang Airfield, flew tactical air strikes, and landed at Yonpo. By 22 November the
6002nd US Tactical Support Wing, the 18th US Fighter-Bomber Group, and the newly-arrived 2nd South African Air Force (SAAF) Squadron were based at Mirim Airfield. The main body of the 6131st US Tactical Support Wing began to move to Pyongyang Airfield on 25 November, the same day on which the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group completed movement of its Mustang squadrons to the forward airfield.

Flying from these forward airfields the fighters could easily identify the targets and have enough time to attack. Though the operating facilities in these airfields were primitive, the deployment of tactical air units greatly helped the UN Allied air forces' efforts in Korea.

In the meanwhile on the ground, the Eighth US Army logistical situation was showing substantial improvement at the same time that ten days' intensive air action had been hammering the Communist communications and supplies. And General MacArthur, after noting both factors, fixed 24 November 1950 as the UN forces attack. As was scheduled, the UN offensive which was designed to carry to the Yalu River began in the Eighth US Army zone at 1000 hours on 24 November. The 24th US Division on the west rolled into Chongju, a key transportation junction on the west coast only 85 kilometers from the border. On the eastern front the 8th ROK Division advanced as far north as 11 more kilometers north of Yongwon in the first attack. The 7th ROK Division had also reached up to a point ten kilometers north of Tokchon in the first attack. During this offensive the Fifth US Air Force flew 345 close-support sorties and reported good results against enemy troops found in the open a few kilometers beyond the line of the friendly troops advance. The victory all over the Korea seemed just around corner.

At this juncture, the Chinese Communist forces started full-scale counter-attacks on 26 November, and the UN ground forces offensive was thus interrupted and the withdrawal became inevitable. At any rate, the UN forces in the central and western fronts were forced to withdraw to the northern bank of the Chongchon River. A main body of Red Chinese troops poured down the central mountain ranges to drive the II ROK Corps from its anchor position at Tokchon. While ROK and Eighth US Army were withdrawing backwards from the western front, on the X US Corps front, an enemy force cut the supply routes behind two regiments of the 1st US Marine Division northward of the Changjin Reservoir. Confronted with an entirely new war, all UN ground troops sought safety in retreat. As the situation of war developed as worse as to face an entirely new war, General MacArthur on 28 November shifted his plans from the offensive to the defensive.
CHAPTER VI RED CHINESE OFFENSIVE
(26 November 1950—25 January 1951)

Section 1. Sabres Come into Action

As the United Nations ground troops began to fall back by the massive attacks of the Chinese Communist forces, General Stratemeyer announced that the UN Allied air forces would continue to maintain air superiority, to furnish close support to ground units, and to provide air-transport operations as required. It would seek to interdict Communist lines of communications, to destroy supply centers and transportation facilities, and to attack enemy ground forces and other military targets which had an immediate effect on the current tactical situation.

In broad outline, this was the same mission which the UN air forces had carried before, but now a new uncertainty nagged at the minds of many American airmen. From the moment that the Red Chinese unveiled their MIG-15 fighters, the success of UN ground and air operations depended on the maintenance of air superiority.

During November and December 1950 the battle for the control of the air over north Korea continued with the struggle gaining intensity over the northwest corner of Korea, an area lying between the Chongchon and Yalu Rivers and popularly called "MIG Alley." At Antung Air Base in Manchuria the enemy had resurfaced the gravel runways with concrete and had constructed hard surface taxiways leading to reveted parking stands. While it was evident that the main MIG strength was based around Antung Air Base in Manchuria, appearance of jet fighters over northeast Korea on 28 November indicated other enemy bases in Manchuria.

On occasion the Communist MIG's were seen as far south as Sonchon and Taechon, keeping themselves well within the 144 kilometers which appeared to be their usual radius of action with internal fuel, but they generally preferred to remain in the area immediately adjacent to the Yalu River, diving out of their sanctuary in flights of four or small sections of six to eight aircraft when they had an opportunity against inferior numbers of UN aircraft.
Russian-built MIG-15 fighters were superior in most aspects to American aircraft in the Far East. In level flight the MIG was fully 160 kilometers an hour faster than the F-80C and it could climb away from the old Shooting Star as if it were anchored in the sky. According to US FEAF estimates, the Red Chinese had possessed 650 combat aircraft, including 250 conventional and jet fighters, 175 ground-attack planes, 150 conventional twin-engine bombers, and 75 transports in December 1950.

Fortunately the enemy pilots were generally unaggressive at a time when the UN air forces did not possess an aircraft capable of dealing with the MIG. Although three separate flights of 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group F-80's were bounced during December, always with the enemy possessing superior numbers and in one case 24 to 4, the MIG pilots failed to press the advantages of their swept-wing fighters over the slower F-80's.

Back in the United States, the U.S. Air Force was bending every effort to get more modern jet fighters to Korea. On 8 November General Vandenberg, USAF Chief of Staff, offered to deploy a F-84E Thunder jet and a F-86A Sabre wings to Korea, provided the Fifth US Air Force could prepare airfields for them in the battle area.

The two wings, the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing (F-86A) and the 27th US Fighter-Escort Wing (F-84E), were planned to base at Pyongyang and Kimpo Airfields respectively, but when they assembled and were ready for service, such a deployment was no longer possible. Instead, the 27th US Wing established a rear echelon at Itazuke Air Base in Japan and took its F-84 to Taegu Airfield, and it flew the first mission on 6 December. They were immediately employed in an armed reconnaissance and close-support mission.

The only Korean airfield which could accommodate the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing was K-14, but because of the crowd conditions there only a part of the F-86's could go to the Kimpo Airfield. Seven F-86A's of the 4th US Wing reached K-14 on 15 December and flew an orientation flight over north Korea which marked its entry into battle. Within the following ten days this strength was increased to 25 aircraft. The F-86A’s were assigned a purely air-superiority mission. They had to fly combat air patrol over northwestern Korea, called MIG Alley, and to meet, turn back, and, if possible, destroy MIG-15 fighters.

In the midafternoon of 17 December the Sabre pilots flew their first combat mission. A flight of F-86’s sighted a battle formation of four MIG’s. At the time the Sabres flew slowly, fuel-conserving speed of 0.62 mach. The
Red pilots evidently thought that the Sabres were the old and slow F-80's, which had never given them any especial trouble. Getting speed, the Sabre flight was on the startled MIG pilots before they knew what hit them. In this engagement four MIGs were shot down, and Lieutenant Colonel Bruce H. Hinton became the first Sabre pilot to destroy a MIG-15 in air-to-air combat.

Now, the MIG pilots were learning that the Sabres were no ordinary adversaries; they now timed their attacks to catch the Sabres at the end of their periods of patrol, when the Sabres were short of fuel and could not stay to fight for any length of time.

One of the Sabre's chief limitations was its shortness of range. Carrying two 120-gallon wing tanks in addition to its internal fuel supply, the Sabre's combat range was 490 nautical miles, a distance which had to include the flight to the combat area and the return to the home base. The conditions of combat in northwestern Korea were unfavorable to the Sabres. Deriving advantage from the nearness to their home base at Antung in Manchuria, the MIG pilots could select the time and position for their attacks.

On 22 December two American Sabre flights met more than 15 MIG's. In a dogfight which lasted twenty minutes and ranged from 30,000 feet to treetop levels, the Sabre pilots destroyed six MIG's. Unfortunately one F-86A and its pilot were lost in this action. On 30 December 16 F-86's engaged with 36 MIG's, but the Sabres only claimed to have damaged two of the enemy planes.

By the end of December, the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing had flown 234 sorties in counterair operations, during which 76 Sabres had engaged
MIG's and had destroyed eight, probably destroyed two, and damaged seven of the MIG fighters.

After these engagement with MIG's, the 4th US Wing pilots could compare the relative performance of the two swept-wing jets. In speed, the F-86A and the MIG-15 were fairly evenly matched. At higher altitudes the MIG had better climb and zoom characteristics, but in level flights at lower altitudes the F-86 seemed to enjoy a slight advantage. Other flight characteristics of the Sabre appeared to be slightly better than those of the MIG, but not enough better to make any appreciable difference. For air-to-air battle the armament of the F-86 was superior to the mixed-caliber, low-cyclic rate of fire armament (two 23-milimeter and one 37-millimeter forward-firing automatic weapons) carried by the MIG's.

During the last week of December, 168 MIG sorties were sighted, including climactic engagement on 30 December between 36 MIG's and 16 F-86's during which two MIG's were damaged. Thereafter until 10 January 1951 the MIG's stood down; whether the Chinese Communist air force licking its wounds or awaiting the outcome of the ground offensive then under way was a matter of conjecture.

Section 2. Support for the Ground Withdrawal

Close Support for Eighth US Army

Despite the stubborn efforts of the UN forces, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) pressed their offensive south with great speed. During this critical period the UN air forces gave their great assistance to the retreating ground forces by offering air transportation and blunting the advancing Communist forces. During December 1950 the American aircraft flew 3,569 close-support sorties, chiefly in support of the Eighth US Army. Such close-support activity was heaviest at the beginning of December when the UN ground forces were breaking contact with the Red Chinese and again at the end of the month when the Red Chinese were finally struggling into position to assault the UN frontline.

As the UN ground forces met and then broke away from the initial Red Chinese assaults, air support played an important role, both blunting the force of the enemy attack and clearing out the roadblocks which the enemy in-
filtrators erected behind the UN ground forces. At 0130 hours on 28 November, for example, the 25th US Division at the center of the Eighth US Army, was so hard pressed by Red Chinese assault that it requested for air support. Within thirty minutes the B-26's arrived and poured round after round of machine-gun fire, and thus enabled the division to withdraw from there safely. The American light bombers could not use their 500-pound bombs in this action as the enemies were so close to friendly positions.

The heaviest ground fighting, however, was developed on the Eighth US Army's right flank where the 2nd US Division bore the brunt of an enemy attack, which had it succeeded would have encircled the whole Eighth US Army. Because of air action the Red Chinese units who assaulted the friendly troops never reached effective positions for an attack. In one day the 38th US Regiment received 72 supporting air sorties. One of these support strikes sealed a mine shaft which sheltered enemy troops, and the 38th US Regiment estimated that this strike probably killed 600 Reds. Another air strike caught 50 Red Chinese troops crossing an open field and burned them to a crisp with napalm.

Still more valiant close air support was given to the 2nd US Division. On 2 December this division began to retreat from Kunu-ri toward Sunchon. Unknown to the American troops, a Chinese Communist division had established a massive eight-kilometer-long roadblock on the retreat route. As the 2nd US Division's motor columns got within the ambush they met a withering fire from many machinegun emplacements. They had no choice but to try to run the gauntlet of fire. The division's only salvation was close air support. Promptly, the American fighter-bombers appeared and bored into the enemy gun emplacements with rockets, napalm, and bullets. The air support was not only close but it was effective. The Commander of the 2nd US Division later tendered high praise for the effective air support, without which, he said, the division might never have weathered the Red Chinese fire.

After the withdrawal of the 2nd US Division on 2 December, the Eighth US Army stepped into a general withdrawal from the defense line north of Pyongyang, abandoning the city on 5 December. By mid-December the UN ground forces had come back near the Imjin River north of Seoul.

After it had broken off from the enemy the Eighth US Army required little close support, but in the last week of December 1950 the Red Chinese again attacked and supporting air action was once again in order. On 23 December General MacArthur requested that approximately two-thirds of
the B-29 effort of US FEA F be normally expended against towns and villages suspected of the enemy assembly areas in front of Eighth US Army. At about same time Fifth US Air Force night intruders undertook more intimate support of the Eighth US Army’s main line of resistance.

Evacuation of X US Corps

In the meantime on the east coast, the X US Corps was beginning to feel the Red Chinese assault in a large-scale. With enough close air support by the 1st US Marine Air Wing and Task Force 77 of US Naval Far East, most of the X US Corps had withdrawn to Hungnam without serious incident in the several days following the initial Communist Chinese assault. At the time the entire US FEA F stood ready to support the ground troops on eastern front.

But in the vicinity of the Changjin Reservoir, the 1st US Marine Division’s 5th and 7th Regiments and elements of the 31st Regiment, 7th US Infantry Division, were cut off their retreat routes to Hungnam. To the besieged ground troops battling in sub-zero temperatures the air supply support was badly required. Operating from Wonsan Airfield, a C-47 detachment of the

Air-dropped supplies relieve the encircled Marines near the Changjin Reservoir.
21st US Troop Carrier Squadron, which had been dropping supplies to the advanced columns of the X US Corps during November, airdropped ten tons of ammunition to the Marines at Yudam-ni, and 16 tons to the Army at Sinhung-ni.

But the besieged ground units required for over 400 tons of airdropped materiel. Action had to be taken immediately to step up the airdrop system: US Combat Cargo Command dispatched three C-119's and supply packers to Yonpo Airfield and on 4 December US FEAF instructed the Combat Cargo Command to utilize its C-119's, C-46's, and C-47's in support of X US Corps, leaving only the C-54's to serve Eighth US Army and Fifth US Air Force.

During the two days in which the airdrop system was geared up to a 250-ton-per-day capacity, the drop operations continued into Yudam-ni and Sinhung-ni, but on 4 December the airdrop machine was in full operation and on that day, already benefited by some accumulation of aerial supplies, the US Marine and Army units began fighting their way back to a concentration point, and on 3 November they joined at Hagaru-ri, south of the Changjin Reservoir.

Meanwhile, in an effort to open a retreat route, the 1st US Marine Regiment moved from Hungnam to Koto-ri, 11 kilometers down the valley from Hagaru-ri, but the Red Chinese forces cut this rescue regiment off to the front and rear. The US Combat Cargo Command now had to drop supplies to both Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.

Although the airdrops were providing the bulk of the food, ammunition, and supplies for the encircled ground troops, other lighter transports added to the airlift support. An airstrip, barely wide enough to accommodate a C-47, was hewn out at Hagaru-ri on 30 November, and at Koto-ri on 7 December. By 10 December, 240 sorties, most of them flown by the 21st US Troop Carrier Squadron, brought into the crude airstrips 273.9 tons of supplies, and flew out 4,689 sick and wounded troops. Planes of the 1st US Marine Air Wing shared 56 sorties of the total, while the C-47's of the Greek Air Force detachment, new to the theater and attached to the 21st US Squadron, flew 30 sorties carrying cargo but no evacuees.

On the morning of 5 December, Major General William H. Tunner, US FEAF Combat Cargo Commander, flew into Hagaru-ri with the proposition that he would evacuate all of the encircled troops by air, but the friendly troops were determined to fight their way to safety. Two days later the Marines were able to break out of Hagaru-ri to join the 1st US Marine Regiment pushing from Koto-ri for rescue, but just north of the latter village
infiltrating Red Chinese had blown out an apron bridge directly above the facing of a 450-meter-deep gorge. Unless this bridge could be replaced, the Marines would have to abandon their vehicles, tanks, and artillery, and make it out on foot.

Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commander of the 1st US Marine Division, requested to airdrop eight spans of an M-2 treadway bridge, assembled with plywood planking. Each Span was 1.5 x 4.8 x 0.6 meters in dimension and weighed 1,300 kilograms; when packaged for drop each span weighed about two tons. On the morning of 7 December eight spans were each loaded into a C-119, and two huge G-5 parachutes were hitched to the ends of each span. Beginning at 0900 hours the planes departed Yonpo Airfield at five-minute intervals and over Koto-ri they dropped the bridge. The bridge was assembled and laid in place under enemy fire, and the troops of the 1st US Marine Division got together just north of Koto-ri on the night of 7 December. Late on the afternoon of 8 December the 1st US Marine Division successfully withdrew back to the Hamhung–Hungnam area.

In 13 days that the US Marines were cut off, a total of 1,580.3 tons of supplies and equipment had been dropped by 313 C-119's and 37 C-47's, and for the first time in history an entire bridge had been dropped by parachute. For the part they played in the successful withdrawal of the ground troops from the Changjin Reservoir area, the 314th US Troop Carrier Group, the 21st US Troop Carrier Squadron, and the 801st US Medical Air Evacuation Squadron were simultaneously awarded the Unit Citations, the first such awards to Air Force units in the Korean War.

When the 1st US Marine Division was back within the Hamhung–Hungnam defense perimeter on 11 December, the X US Corps began wholesale evacuation. Even though water-lift could move the bulk of X US Corps, Major General Edward M. Almond, X US Corps Commander, desired to use air evacuation to the maximum. Yonpo Airfield was available for transport traffic, but an emergency airstrip was graded on the beach at Hungnam.

Fortunately, the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command had been recently reinforced by two troop carrier groups. With all transport groups working, the air evacuation from Yonpo Airfield got under way on 14 December and ended at 0900 hours on 17 December. During these four days, the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command kept up a 24-hour day operation, with planes taking off at five-minute intervals. Using nearly all its strength, the command flew 393 sorties from Yonpo, lifting 228 patients, 3,981 passengers, and 2,088.6 tons
of cargo, including 772.2 tons of ammunition and 439 vehicles. The UN naval transports took off the bulk of X US Corps, completing the evacuation on the afternoon of 24 December.

Section 3. Air Action Delayes the Enemy Advance

With the UN ground troops in full retreat and generally out of contact with the Red Chinese forces, UN air forces were carrying the concentrated fight against advancing enemy. During the first week of December 1950 the UN air forces aircraft had struck at the front and rear of the Red Chinese troops, and thus lightened the enemy pressure on the UN ground forces.

Fifth US Air Force armed reconnaissance sorties reaped heavy casualties among the masses of the Red Chinese jamming the roads in bold daylight movements. Eager to score a victory which would overrun the whole peninsula, the Communists continued to march forward, apparently ignoring the casualties inflicted upon them by attacking planes. When the enemy crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju, the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group F-80 pilots made the water run red with enemy blood.

When the heavy concentrations of enemy troops were founded the American medium bombers flew to the scene and dropped bombs against enemy concentration. These B-29's bombed Tokchon, Anju, and Pukchang-ni on 4 December, and Sunchon, Songchon, and Sukchon on 5 December. Virtually every armed reconnaissance mission claimed the destruction of Red Chinese personnel and equipment. On the basis of accumulative combat claims, the US Far East Air Forces estimated that as of 16 December about 33,000 enemy troops, the equivalent of four full-strength CCF divisions, had been killed or wounded by the UN air attacks.

After sustaining two weeks of aerial punishment the Chinese Communists began to realize that they could not afford to travel by day, and they became more cautious. They practiced camouflage and marched their troops at night. Under such circumstances armed reconnaissance missions achieved slignter results, but they were still worthwhile. In the latter half of December 1950 the UN air forces estimated that they had killed another 6,694 enemy troops, and destroyed 17 tanks, 60 field guns, 26 locomotives, 542 vehicles, and 4,168 buildings capable of sheltering enemy personnel or stores.
During the first three weeks of December, the US Bomber Command B-29's attacked marshalling yards, rail facilities, and supply areas at Manpojin, Kunu-ri, Huichon, Sinanju, Tokchon, Anju, Pukchhang-ni, Sunchon, Songchon, Sukchon, Kanggye, Yangdok, Sariwon, Pyongyang, Chongju, and Pakchon. On 10 December, K-23 and K-24 airfields at Pyongyang were postholed with 500-pound bombs to prevent the Communists from using these recently abandoned airfields. On 14 December the marshalling yard and associated storage in Pyongyang were also bombed by the 19th US Bombardment Group B-29's.

In an effort to interdict the enemy supply lines, the US Far East Air Forces effective on 15 December formally instituted Interdiction Campaign No. 4, a well-conceived plan of operations which divided Korea north of the 37th parallel into eleven zones which followed the main transportation routes. The plan named for destruction of 172 distinct targets - 45 railway bridges, 12 highway bridges, 13 tunnels, 39 marshaling yards, and 63 supply centers. By mutual consent the US Naval Far East assumed responsibility for destroying targets in the three interdiction zones on the eastern coast of Korea.

But it was nevertheless apparent that the interruption of north Korean lines of communication would be difficult. Due to the enemy fighter intercepts, interdiction targets in MIG Alley had to be attacked by bomber formations large enough to enable mutual protection, or else they had to have fighter escort. Notwithstanding, on 21 and 22 December the US Bomber Command employed its entire force in four-plane formation attacks against north Korean bridges. On 23 December, however, General MacArthur asked that approximately two-thirds of the B-29 effort be normally expended against towns and villages suspected to be sheltering enemy troops. As a result, only one-third of the US FEAF Bomber Command's effort could be used for interdiction. Due to this change, the US FEAF made little progress in implementing Interdiction Campaign No. 4 during December 1950.

In December the US FEAF aircraft flew 7,654 armed reconnaissance and interdiction sorties, thus killed or wounded enemies equivalent in number to the aggregate strength of five Chinese Communist divisions. And during the period many Red Chinese soldiers surrendered in fear of the powerful UN air forces.

In addition to the direct hitting on the enemy, the air attacks which destroyed potential or actual billeting areas contributed indirectly to extensive Red Chinese personnel losses due to frostbite and freezing. A US Far East Command intelligence source reported large bodies of casualties.
being moved northward during the last week of December. Fully half of these men had frozen hands and feet; they "seemed to have been cut off from their command headquarters, and apparently had no regular supply lines, largely due to the UN air action."

Section 4. Fifth US Air Force Reorganizes

Reorganization

Although the action had been previously planned, it was perhaps appropriate that the reorganization of the Fifth US Air Force came on 1 December 1950 at a time when Chinese Communist aggression indicated a prolonged continuation of war. Early in July 1950 when it had been hard to think that the Korean War would be long duration, General Partridge had divided the Fifth US Air Force's headquarters into two parts to meet immediate needs. Fifth US Air Force in Korea fought the tactical air while the Fifth US Air Force Rear maintained occupation, rear-area, and air-defense responsibility in Japan, but lines of control and responsibility under this arrangement were subject to the confusion of two headquarters and divided staff offices.

The divided Fifth US Air Force span of control had been necessary since it lacked any available headquarters between Air Force and Wing level, and on 1 December, when approval from USAF was forthcoming for the new organization, General Partridge activated the 314th US Air Division at Nagoya in Japan effective 1 December 1950. Under the command of Brigadier General Delmar T. Spivey, the 314th US Air Division assumed three main duties: air defense of Japan, logistical support for Fifth US Air Force, and control of the Japanese airfield-construction programs.

Simultaneously, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fifth US Air Force, was transferred without equipment or personnel to Seoul, where it absorbed the personnel and equipment of the discontinued Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fifth US Air Force in Korea. Now the Fifth US Air Force would be able to give its full attention to Korea.

Concurrently with this revision of command structure, the Fifth US Air Force ordered a series of paper transactions designed to give the supporting wings in Korea regular Air Force status. Effective on 1 December, the 18th
US Fighter-Bomber Wing replaced the 6002nd US Tactical Support Wing, the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing replaced the 6131st US Tactical Support Wing, the 49th US Fighter-bomber Wing replaced the 6149th US Tactical Support Wing, the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing replaced the 6150th US Tactical Support Wing, and the 3rd US Bombardment Wing (Light) replaced the 6133rd US Tactical Support Wing. New table of distribution air-base wings were organized to operate Itazuke, Yokota and Misawa Air Bases in Japan and Clark Air Base in the Philippines.

These changes in designation gave the combat wings regular status and also opened the way for dealing with manning problems. At the beginning of Korean War most US FEAF units, instead of being immediately organized at war strength, had been augmented with additional combat crews and limited numbers of maintenance and supporting personnel. As a temporary measure, such action was acceptable, but under sustained operations it would result in reduced effectiveness.

While the wings and supporting squadrons assumed their new designations according to plan, the reorganization, for the moment at least, received far less attention than did the Fifth US Air Force's crash plans to withdraw its units from the northern part of Korea.

Withdrawal

Massive Red Chinese aggression into north Korea forced the Fifth US Air Force units to remove southward. The most serious losses to the Fifth US Air Force in the evacuation befell the 605th US Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Sinanju; in November 1950 this squadron was farthest forward of air units. On 29 November this squadron received orders to evacuate southward within three hours. Due to the shortage of time and trucks the squadron therefore had little alternative but to destroy its radar and camp equipment, which was worth a million and a half dollars. The other aircraft control and warning squadron in north Korea -- the 6132nd at Pyongyang -- was able to evacuate to Taegu without loss of equipment. Had these air warning units possessed their proper ground transports, or even more important, had the radars been air transportable, the Fifth US Air Force might have saved this valuable signal equipment.

Elsewhere in north Korea the tactical wings pulled out as quickly as air and surface movement permitted. As the enemy forces poured down upon Pyongyang, the UN air units in Pyongyang began to withdraw south-
ward. Evacuation of the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing from Pyongyang Airfield was complicated by the enemy air retaliation: A Communist light plane dropped three fragmentation bombs near the flight line on the night of 27 November, killing an airman and damaging 11 Mustang fighters. Engineering personnel nevertheless worked around the clock to repair the damage, and only two of the planes had to be destroyed. Advance echelons left K-23 for the Youi-do Airfield in Seoul on 29–30 November, and on 3 December the wing's evacuation to K-16 was completed.

The 18th US Fighter-Bomber Group began to evacuate Mirim Airfield (K-24) in Pyongyang early on the morning of 1 December when the first C-119 took off with personnel and equipment, and it completed its move to Suwon Airfield on 4 December. The 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing at Yonpo Airfield (K-27) was ordered to move the bulk of its troops and property by LST to Suyong Airfield (K-9) in Pusan on 3 December.

Simultaneously with these movements, other Fifth US Air Force units found new stations in the southern part of Korea. The 6147th US Tactical Control Squadron moved from K-24 to K-16. The 6151st US Air Base Unit, which had been providing services for the 1st US Marine Air Wing at K-27 evacuated to Pohang Airfield (K-3) where US Marine air units were locating. The 6146th US Air Base Unit, charged with training and servicing the ROK Air Force, departed K-24 on 6 December for Taejon (K-5) with ROK Air Force Mustangs.

Not only was the Fifth US Air Force compelled to evacuate north Korea, but as the Communists pushed south of the 38th Parallel early in December, it had to depart the Seoul–Kimpo area. On 10 December the 51st US Fighter-Interceptor Wing was moved from Kimpo Airfield to Itazuke Air Base in Kyushu, Japan, leaving its fighter group and certain rear elements of the support groups at K-14. Also on 10 December the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, which already slated to convert to F-80C's, began to move from K-16 to Itazuke Air Base in Kyushu, Japan. At Itazuke Air Base on 24 December, the 8th US Wing was rejoined by its 80th Squadron, already equipped with F-80's and previously attached to the 51st US Fighter-Interceptor Wing, and as of 31 December all three 8th US Group squadrons were operational, although the 35th and 36th Squadrons had not received all of their authorized jet fighters.

At mid-December the 18th US Fighter-Bomber Wing at Suwon Airfield moved Chinhae Airfield (K-10) on the south coast, leaving a servicing detachment at K-13 to stage Mustang missions. The South African Air Force Squadron No. 2 accompanied the 18th US Group in its movements.
The 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing also continued to stage from K-14, moving additional F-86's there on 20 December when the 80th Fighter-Bomber squadron returned to Japan to join its parent 8th Fighter-Bomber Group.

On the first few days of January 1951 all of these units had to leave K-14, the 51st Wing concentrating at Itazuke Air Base in Kyushu, Japan, and the 4th Wing at Johnson Air Base in Honshu, Japan. Headquarters installations of the Fifth US Air Force at Seoul, including the JOC and TACC, were broken up and evacuated to Taegu on 20 December. Eighth US Army also established its command post in Taegu on 22 December.

While the Fifth US Air Force managed its evacuation, its fighters, in fact, never missed a single day's operations. Except for the air lift made available by the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command, the Fifth US Air Force would doubtless have sustained grave losses of equipment. In the first half of December, the US Combat Cargo Command lifted 5,069.3 tons for Fifth US Air Force, or 35 per cent of the total tonnage carried; in the latter half of the month it lifted 2,885.0 tons, or 35.8 per cent of its total tonnage. In the midst of the grim war of survival the US Combat Cargo Command lifted a total of 989 orphans to safety at Cheju Island.

Section 5. Air Action against the CCF New Year Eve Offensive

By intensified interdiction and armed reconnaissance the UN air forces had held the forward progress of the Red Chinese down to approximately 13 kilometers per day. In the period of respite permitted by UN air action, the UN ground forces during December 1950 occupied positions immediately south of the 38th Parallel covering Seoul. While directing these defensive preparations, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Eighth US Army Commander, was killed in a jeep accident on 23 December. His successor was Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, who assumed his new duties on 26 December 1950.

At this juncture, the CCF launched its massive offensive. Over in central front, on 29 December, the Communists commenced an envelopment along the Chunchon—Hongchon—Wonju axis, and at the Imjin River, on the night of 31 December, the Fourth CCF Field Army launched its troops into action. UN ground forces fell back to a Seoul bridgehead line, and on the night
of 3 January 1951 the I and IX US Corps were ordered to move to south of Seoul. Meanwhile, in the right and center the ROKs also fell back and entire UN ground forces took up the new defensive line from Pyongtaek on the west, Wonju in the center, and Samchok on the east coast.

During this massive Red offensive, the Fifth US Air Force with all wings flying at or near their maximum effort, scored with 564 sorties on 1 January, 531 on 2 January, 556 on 3 January, 498 on 4 January, and 447 on 5 January. By the close of 5 January Fifth US Air Force airmen estimated that they had killed nearly 8,000 Red soldiers and had destroyed 6,400 enemy-occupied buildings.

In the initial stages of the Red attack the US FEAFO Bomber Command found little opportunity to employ its planes along the front lines, but, instead, gave its maximum efforts to attacks against enemy supplies and personnel at Pyongyang. Sixty-three B-29’s on 3 January, and 60 B-29’s on 5 January dropped incendiary bombs over Pyongyang. Although weather hindered these missions and snow-covered roofs on the buildings reduced the effects of the incendiaries employed, at least 35 per cent of the city’s built-up area was destroyed.

Night-flying B-26’s of the 3rd US Bombardment Wing continued close-in attacks against the enemy, and on 2 January 1951 the wing instituted use of
C-47's for dropping Mark VIII flares over the front line, an improvisation which enabled the B-26's to give their full attention to low-level work, assisted friendly artillery to fire on otherwise obscure targets, and generally held down enemy night movement.

Though the UN Allied air forces damaged greatly on the advancing Communists, they inched their way to the south. On 6 January the UN ground forces abandoned Suwon and its airfield. The heaviest fighting occurred at Wonju on the central front, and it was finally abandoned on 10 January. Due to the bad weather between 6 and 10 January, the UN air forces could not give its full support to the ground forces at these critical days. But when the weather began to clear on 11 January, the Fifth US Air Force and the US FEAF Bomber Command came to the assistance of the Eighth US Army. Fighters slaughtered quite many enemies in Wonju and on the road Hongchon—Hoengsong. On 12 January 10 B-29's of the 98th US Bombardment Group flew a saturation strike against Wonju with proximity-fuzed bombs.

Fortunately, the Chinese Communist air force stood down during the first week of January. To prevent the air field from enemy using, the American B-29's cratered K-14 on 8 January. But on 10 January the Chinese Communist air force returned to action when 15 MIG's ventured to Sinanju to make a half-hearted attack against a lone-flying B-29 without results. In the next several nights Red pilots heckled UN ground troops on nine occasions, again without inflicting much damage.

On 21 January 12 MIG's engaged four F-80's south of Sinuiju and a F-80 was shot down. And on the same day 16 other MIG's launched a surprise attack against two flights of F-84's which were dive-bombing a bridge across the Chongchon River. In the aerial fight Lieutenant Colonel William E. Bertram scored the first Thunderjet victory by shooting down a MIG. But a F-84 was lost at this fighting.

On the ground in January 1951 the Reds began to repair the air facilities at Sinuiju and Pyongyang. To make certain that the Red air forces at bay, General Partridge on 20 January asked Brigadier General James E. Briggs, who had assumed command of the US FEAF Bomber Command on 10 January when General O'Donnell had rotated to the United States, to make a B-29 attack against Pyongyang Airfield. At the same time the 27th US Fighter-Escort Wing was planned to attack Sinuiju Airfield.

Early in the morning of 23 January 33 F-84's of the 27th US Fighter-Escort Wing took off Taegu Airfield and arrived over Sinuiju. Eight strafers made
a pass across the airdrome at Sinuiju before the MIG's were taking off from Manchurian air base at Antung. Soon the largest all-jet air battle to that time was occurred when the Thunderjets engaged 30 MIG's. But in thirty minutes air battle the Thunderjet pilots scored four MIG's destroyed, three probably destroyed, and four damaged without the loss of F-84's. Later on the same morning the 49th US Fighter Bomber Wing sent 46 F-80's to suppress Pyongyang's flak, and when this work done 21 B-29's arrived from Okinawa and bombed the airfields of Pyongyang.

At the same time that the CCF offensive overran the UN airfields at Seoul and Suwon, the UN forces found even greater need for the airborne supplies which previously had been laid down at these airfields. The only airfields could accommodate heavier transports were K-2 and K-9. Since the capacity of the air transport fleet now exceeded the capacity of Korean airfields at a time of great need for air supply, a number of temporary airstrips were readied wherever terrain permitted. In the period of 1 through 24 January the US FEAF Combat Cargo Command utilized 406 C-119 sorties to airdrop to X US Corps some 2,007 tons of supplies. In addition to the airdropped supplies, US Combat Cargo Command moved 5,041 tons to Fifth US Air Force and 7,445 tons to the Eighth US Army during the same period, and upon their return trips from Korea the transports evacuated 10,489 combat casualties.

In the meantime on mid-January 1951, there was little evidence of continued enemy offensive along the entire front. The west was almost no action at all, though the center and east felt still the enemy pressure. During the fighting the UN air forces not only cut off the enemy's line of supply but inflicted many casualties. The UN air and ground forces forced the Communists to retreat back to the 38th Parallel. On 24 January the UN ground forces established a defense line on Suwon—Yuju—Hoengsong—Kangnung.

In the short but intensive fighting between 1—25 January, the US Far East Air Forces airmen claimed destruction of 8 tanks, 26 field guns, 484 vehicles, 11 locomotives, and 187 railway cars, and estimated that they killed 18,820 enemy troops. The United Nations air forces once again saved the ground troops from destruction.
CHAPTER VII  DEFEAT OF RED CHINESE
(26 January—30 June 1951)

Section 1. Efforts to Maintain Air Superiority

Air Battles in MIG Alley

The Chinese Communist offensive early in January 1951 forced the Fifth US Air Force backward to the same bases which it had used during the high tide of NK Communist aggression in the summer of 1950. Having lost the advanced airfields at Kimpo and Suwon, the UN Allied air forces had trouble maintaining air superiority, especially over northwest Korea during January and February 1951. When the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing Sabre jets had to be withdrawn to Japan, the MIG-15’s, gaining in numbers and aggressiveness, enjoyed a wider freedom of action in the area between the Yalu and Chongchon Rivers, called MIG Alley.

MIG’s now harried the UN air forces’ interdiction efforts and attacked the RF-80 photo planes as they dashed to the Yalu River to secure pictures of Communist activity. During February MIG formations swarmed over the reconnaissance planes on at least four harrowing occasions. Each time the intrepid reconnaissance pilots narrowly escaped destruction. With its limited counter-air capability, the Fifth US Air Force claimed only one enemy aircraft destroyed in February, this lone victory being scored against a YAK-9 fighter by a F-51 near Pyongyang on 5 February.

In the air the Communists did not make the most of their opportunities for aerial battle, but they were nonetheless busy with airfield rehabilitation. At Sinuiju, Sinanju, Sunan, Pyongyang, Yonpo, Wonsan, Ongjin, Anak, Sinmak, and Kangdong, the Reds were repairing the runways and building protective revetments for aircraft. Now the Red air force, in fact, possessed air superiority over the northwestern Korea, because the Red Chinese could easily come out from Manchuria within a matter of minutes. In order to renew the air battle over this area, the Fifth US Air Force had to return its jet fighters to Korea, preferably to the old bases at Suwon and Kimpo.
Defeat of Red Chinese

Fortunately, however, the UN ground forces' limited offensive progressed rapidly from its beginning on 26 January. Suwon Airfield was recaptured in a few days, and on 30 January transports of the 61st US Troop Carrier Group began to carry supplies there. And on 10 February the I US Corps recaptured the bomb-pocked runways at Kimpo. Fifth US Air Force lost no time rehabilitating these airfields, but there were many problems followed.

In the expectation that K-13 could be used as a staging base, the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing (F-86) sent a refueling and rearming detachment there on 22 February and simultaneously brought its 334th Squadron to Taegu Airfield.

On bringing the Sabres into Korea, the Fifth US Air Force on 26 February informed US FEAF that it was again prepared to escort B-29's into northwestern Korea, and US FEAF directed its Bomber Command to begin interdiction attacks against the targets in northwestern Korea beginning on 1 March. Although the Sabres had begun to fly combat air patrols from K-2 on 22 February, they could not as yet reach any farther northward than Pyongyang.

On 1 March, 18 B-29's with F-80 escort were scheduled for attacks against rail bridges in the MIG-defended area; running late for rendezvous, however, the medium bombers could be covered for only a short time, and just after bombs were dropped on the bridge target at Kogunyon-dong near Chongju, the formation was attacked by 9 MIG's. In a 23-minute fight, one MIG was shot down and two were damaged, but the MIG's damaged ten of the B-29's, three so badly that their crews had to make emergency landings. On watching the crippled B-29's staggering to land at K-2, Fifth US Air Force officers felt strongly the necessity to restore air superiority over northwestern Korea.

On 10 March the 334th US Fighter-Interceptor Squadron moved from K-2 to K-13. At the same time the 336th US Fighter-Interceptor Squadron came from Japan to K-2. Although the Sabres were again flying patrols along the Yalu River, the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing was forced to enter combat on terms which generally favored the enemy. At the time the Red Chinese had at least 75 MIG's based at Antung in Manchuria, while the 4th US Wing had only two squadrons in Korea, and, flying from separate airfields.

Under such circumstances the Sabres could not fully accomplish their assigned mission to turn back the MIG's in the northwestern Korea. On the afternoon of 12 March, while the Sabres watched a formation of MIG's gyrate across the Yalu River, 12 other MIG's bounced four F-80's near Namsi. In the ensuing air battle two MIG's collied and fell to earth. On 17 March, near
Sonchon, three MIĜ's again engaged a flight of F-80's in a battle which ended when a MIĜ and a F-80 collided head-on, destroying both aircraft. But the F-86's screen was improving by day. On 23 March, while 45 F-86's fought MIĜ's over the Yalu River, 22 B-29's returned to MIĜ Alley to destroy the rail bridges at Kogungyong-dong and Chongju. On this day the B-29's met no air opposition of any kind.

Late in March the big air battles were shaping up in MIĜ Alley. As the end of March 1951 brought the break-up of Yalu River ice, the US FEAF Bomber Command began to bomb against Yalu bridge targets. On 30 March the bomber formations of the 19th, 98th, and 307th US Bombardment Groups, each with 12 B-29's, bombed the bridges at Chongsongjin, Manpojin, and Namsan-ni. The Sabres provided top cover while the F-80's attempted escort. Although the MIĜ's were not especially aggressive, preferring to make away, the F-80's were clearly unsuited to their mission.

Cloudy weather along the Yalu River diverted B-29's attacks away from the international bridges for more than a week, but the Sabre patrols were continued. On 3 and 4 April the F-86's shot down four MIĜ's. On 7 April 35 B-29's flew to the Yalu River to bomb the railway bridge at Sinuiju and a newly-built highway bridge at Uiju with the 49 F-84's escort. Of the 30 to 40 MIĜ's which attempted interception, only one managed to break through the 73 F-86's and F-83's which were covering and escorting the bombers, and a B-29 was destroyed by the MIĜ. But the F-84's destroyed one MIĜ and damaged two others.

Despite the massive bombing the railway bridge at Sinuiju was still standing, so the medium bombers again returned the target on 12 April. The Sabres screened and flew high cover and the Thunderjets flew from Japan to escort the bombers. When they arrived near the Yalu River the enemy attacked aggressively and swamped the friendly fighters with superior numbers, hitting the bomber force twice with MIĜ's estimated to numbers as high as 100 aircraft. They seemed to disregard the escorting fighters and to concentrate on attacking the bombers at all costs. The MIĜ's destroyed three B-29's and damaged five others. But the friendly fighters and bombers destroyed 17 MIĜ's and damaged six others.

Neutralization of Communist Airfields

In the air battle at the Yalu River on 12 April 1950 the MIĜ's demonstrated their growing proficiency. They displayed good unit discipline and an increasing mastery of the four-ship flight in formations of up to 16 aircraft. In
the meantime the reconnaissance pilots reported that the enemy was rehabilitating airfields all over north Korea. To keep the Red air forces at bay the UN Allied air forces decided to neutralize these Communist airfields.

As was the case with most other air actions against north Korea, the success or failure of the UN air forces' airfield neutralization effort would depend upon the success with which the Sabres maintained control of the air over the Yalu River. Now the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing had to increase the size of its Yalu River patrols. With the improvement of the facilities at K-13, however, the 336th Squadron began to move northward on 6 April, and by 22 April both squadrons were together at K-13. Since the Sabres continued to manifest their mastery of the air at the Yalu River, the Red airfield neutralization program progressed without much hindrance.

Scheduling an average 12 aircraft daily for the work between 17 and 23 April, the American B-29's cratered the runways and strewed delayed-action bombs at Pyongyang, Mirim, Anak, Sariwon, Kangdong, Yonpo, Hamhung, Sinmak, and Sunan Airfields. The B-29's made repeat raids against several of these airfields in the period. Fifth US Air Force's fighters and light
bombers also attacked these airfields by day and night. Especially two airfields in Pyongyang (K-23 and K-24) received about 250 tons of bombs on 16 and 19 April.

The degree of UN air superiority which had been won over north Korea was measured best by the fact that the Communist offensive begun on the night of 22 April received no support from their air forces.

Early in May the reconnaissance noted that the Reds were keeping 38 Yak-9's, IL-10's, and LA-5's in revetments at Sinuiju Airfield. Rather than to permit this hazard to endure, General Partridge at 1400 hours on 9 May sent 312 Fifth US Air Force and 1st US Marine Air Wing fighters against K-30. Under the cover of F-80's, F-84's and Marine Pantherjets, the F-80's suppressed flak with proximity-fuzed bombs and rockets, while the Marine Corsairs and Mustangs launched attacks against the targets. The smashing air attack knocked out all the Red aircraft on the field, destroyed 106 buildings, and inflicted heavy casualties.

The UN air forces' efforts to neutralize the Red airfields worked well. On the afternoon of 20 May 36 Sabres engaged some 50 MIG's in the MIG Alley. In the ensuing air battle the Sabres destroyed five MIG's and damaged five others. In this air-to-air battle Captain James Jabara shot down two MIG's, and he became the first jet air ace in aviation history. He already had destroyed four MIG's.

Following the bloodletting on 20 May, the Red pilots were inactive until 31 May, when 12 MIG's surprised two B-29's while the bombers were waiting for the Sabre escorts 130 kilometers southeast of Sinuiju. But three MIG's were destroyed in a short period. On the next day four B-29's attempted a second run over the railway bridge at Sinanju. Short of fuel the escorting F-86's had to go home base, and a few minutes later 25 MIG's made a sneak attack against the bombers. The enemy pilots shot the wing off one bomber and damaged two others. But the B-29 gunners destroyed a MIG, and a flight of F-86's, which was back to the scene by the urgent call for help, downed two more MIG's.

The Communist airfield strikes became routine. On 6 June the reconnaissance noted that the NK Communist airfields were unserviceable, but bad weather during the next several days held up the mission and gave the Reds enough time to repair at least one of their airfields. Having seized an opportunity the Red air forces planned to make night heckling attacks against the UN ground forces.

At about 0315 hours on 14 June one Red raider dropped two bombs on Suwon Airfield, and the other one cruised over Inchon and launched its bombs at
a motor park. Both planes escaped northward, and they were identified as PO-2 biplanes, little canvas-covered and open-cockpit trainers. On the night of 15–16 June an equally strange plane, identified as a MBE-2 pusher-type seaplane, strafed Kimpo Airfield with no results. Two PO-2’s reappeared over Suwon Airfield on the night of 16–17. But this time the Red raiders destroyed one F-86 and damaged eight others, four of them seriously.

Concurrently the Communists first displayed their “big-team” MIG’s on the morning of 17 June, for the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing F-86’s patrolling the Yalu met a formation of 25 unusually aggressive adversaries. In the battle the Sabres downed one MIG and damaged six others without sustaining loss or damage. Far from discouraged, more than 40 MIG’s swarmed out to meet 32 F-86’s on the morning of 18 June. In the ensuing fierce fight the Sabre pilots claimed the destruction of five MIG’s, but one Sabre was probably destroyed. On the next day’s fight the Sabres damaged four MIG’s, but again a Sabre pilot did not return to K-13.

The Communist air forces began to employ the IL-10’s against the UN ground troops. On 20 June eight IL-10’s attempted to air support for their ground troops which had been trying to dislodge ROK troops from the small island of Sinmi-do, 130 kilometers southeast of Sinuiju off the coast. But a flight of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group Mustangs discovered and launched into the Ilyushin aircraft, destroying two and damaging three of the IL-10’s. Both adversaries evidently called for reinforcements, and another flight of F-51’s soon met and worsted six Yak-9 fighters, shooting one of them down. A third Mustang flight, with F-86’s cover, arrived at the scene at about the same time as MIG’s, but one MIG slipped through and shot the wing off of one of the Mustangs.

While the major air battles raging over MIG Alley the little Red North Korean PO-2 hecklers were appearing in the Seoul area so regularly after midnight that UN troops referred to them as “Bedcheck Charley.” Though the PO-2’s accomplished little except for the destruction at K-13 on 17 June, they were really a thorn in the side of the UN forces. UN aircraft tried to shoot down the night raiders, but it was hard to find out them. But the UN aircraft shot down a PO-2 on 23 and 30 June respectively.

But the primary and most effective UN air forces response to the Red night air attacks was an intensive neutralization of all possible operational Communist airfields. Fifth US Air Force and US Bomber Command had returned to their routine airfield strikes. Day-flying fighters, light-bombers, and medium-bombers postholed the airfields, while night-flying B-26’s made attacks each night.
For more than a week the US FEAF crews engaged in the airfield destruction strikes met no enemy air resistance, but, effective on 22 June, the MIG's appeared. On the day, as F-80's swept Sinuiju Airfield unscathed, Sabres and MIG's tangled overhead, and at a cost of one F-86 the 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing pilots destroyed two MIG's. But at this time the Red pilots were venturing as far as Pyongyang. And their proficiency and aggressiveness had improved. The MIG airmen introduced a new maneuver called "Yo-Yo"; 20 or more MIG's established orbits over UN air formations; then, preferably from up-sun and usually in elements of two, the MIG's dived downward and attacked UN aircraft from high astern; and, finally, the elements zoomed back up into the pool of orbiting MIG's overhead.

But the Red airmen were nevertheless unable to have much effect upon UN pilots. On 24 June a MIG formation jumped F-80's who were strafing Sinanju Airfield. In a running fight at low level, where the F-80's had advantages, the F-80 pilots damaged four MIG fighters and escaped unharmed. On 26 June 12 MIG's penetrated the Sabre screen and attempted to attack four B-29's over Yongyu Airfield, 40 kilometers northeast Pyongyang, but the escorting F-84's of the 136th US Fighter-Bomber Wing shot down a MIG and turned back the others.

From the month of March to June the UN air force had tried its best to maintain friendly air superiority over Korea, especially over the MIG Alley. Though a number of MIG's took off from Antung Air Base in Manchuria and opposed the patrolling F-80's, the UN aircraft successfully turned back or destroyed the enemy planes. And after 12 July the Communist air offensive in Korea came to halt, and no more Bedcheck Charlies tried to come to the Seoul area. At the NK Communist airfields the Reds no longer attempted to rehabilitate the runways.
Section 2. Air Action against Communist Logistics

Interdiction Action

As the UN ground forces inched their way northward against light resistance along the entire front in late January, the US Far East Air Forces began to reinforce its interdiction attacks against the Communist supply routes in an effort to hasten the destruction of the Communist forces. Early on 15 December 1950 US FEAF had instituted interdiction Campaign No. 4 designed to cut off all the enemy supply lines and centers. This plan divided Korea north of the 37th Parallel into 11 zones, including 172 distinct targets -- 45 railway bridges, 12 highway bridges, 13 tunnels, 39 marshaling yards, and 63 supply centers.

The most important targets lay north of the Chongchon River in an area called MIG Alley, and if the vulnerable B-29's were to attack in this zone they would have to have substantial fighter escort. Rather than to attempt to provide such escort, the Fifth US Air Force suggested on 5 February 1950 that its fighter-bombers could interdict targets in that area. In the weeks that followed the Fifth US Air Force made a few attacks against the major bridges in northwest Korea. But the fighter-bombers in the existing situation lacked the ordnance carrying capability to knock out major bridges, and on 26 February 1951 the Fifth US Air Force requested to be relieved of the interdiction mission in northwest Korea, a proposition agreeable to US FEAF, which returned the task to the B-29's effective on 1 March.

At first they intended to destroy all interdiction targets in each zone in turn according to the importance of the zone, but the Reds, at the end of January, showed that they were quite willing to use less efficient east-coast routes when the higher-priority northwest Korea routes were interdicted. In order to maintain an effective blockade, UN air forces would have to attack all the targets simultaneously. Since the US Far East Air Forces did not have strength enough for such a task, the US naval carrier-based aircraft took the interdiction attacks against three zones which ran north from Wonsan to the Siberian border.

Other than MIG Alley, interdiction missions were fairly managed. Since most north Korean streams were in the low-water season and many of them were frozen solidly enough to permit troops and vehicles to cross them, most
B-29's sorties were sent against the railway bridges, marshaling yards, and supply centers. Ordinarily, the 98th US Bombardment Wing furnished 24 B-29's one day, and the 19th and 307th US Bombardment Groups furnished 12 B-29's in the two succeeding days.

Most bridge attacks were made by four-aircraft flights, approaching their targets at an inside angle of from degrees of 28 to 37 in order to concentrate more bombs against long narrow objectives. Marshaling yards and supply centers were commonly mined with delayed-action demolition bombs, variable fuzing ranging from one to 144 hours.

The interdiction attacks against the MIG-defended area began on 1 March by 18 B-29's. But on the day two B-29's were damaged by enemy fighters. So the medium bomber's entry into MIG Alley was suspended. On 23 March the Sabres had the MIG's under better control, and three formation of the 19th and 307th US Groups B-29's bombed the key rail bridges at Kogunyong-dong, Kwaksan, and Chongju, thus severing the Sinuiju–Sinanju railway in three places. Next day the B-29's hit two rail bridges immediately south of Manpojin and single bridges at Huichon, Kunu-ri and Sukhon, thus again immobilizing through rail traffic on the Manpojin to Sinanju line.

Far away to the north, the ice-covered Yalu River began to thaw late in March. On 27 March the US FEAF Bomber Command was ordered to attack on the Yalu bridges. Lest there be a violation to Manchurian border, the bridges could be attacked only under visual bombing. On 29 March the 19th and 307th US Bombardment Groups B-29's were sent to the Yalu River bridge targets, but due to the coluds over targets the bombers diverted to attack Pyongyang Airfield. On 30 March the three US medium bomber groups all went to the Yalu River, and they dropped two spas of the Chongsongjin highway bridge, covered the pontoon bridge at Chongsongjin with 1,000-pound bombs, and knocked spas out of the Manpojin railway bridge. Again, on 31 March, the 98th US Bombardment Group sent bombers to attack the highway bridge at Chunngangjin, but it attributed disappointing results to newly arrived replacement crews, who were just beginning to develop their skills.

During the first week of April cloud cover along the Yalu River prevented B-29 attacks against the border bridges. On 7 April Brigadier General James E. Briggs, Commander of US FEAF Bomber Command, dispatched the three B-29 groups against the highway bridges at Chunggangjin and Uiju and the railway bridge at Sinuiju. Finding Chungangjin obscured by haze, the 19th Group diverted to Korea's east coast and hit the rail bypass bridge at Cho-ri. The 307th US Bombardment Group reported that its bomb pattern rendered the Uiju bridge unserviceable, and the 98th Group's bombs strad-
dled the rail bridge at Sinuiju, but the massive structure remained standing.

In one final burst of effort, flown on 12 April, the three groups were sent to destroy the Sinuiju bridge with 2,000-pound bombs. Although the patterns were good, and numerous direct hits were noted, the bridge remained standing.

With notable exception of the Sinuiju railway bridge which stubbornly refused to fall, the American B-29 massive bombings on 30 March, 7 April, and 12 April had severed most of the key bridges connecting the Communist armies with their logistics base in Manchuria. But in terms of damage inflicted upon the bomber force by enemy action, the Yalu bridge attacks were costly. As of 14 April it had lost eight bombers and their crews from combat and operational causes. But the Superfortress gunners claimed tens of MIG destruction. Counting planes out of commission from combat damage, US Bomber Command on 14 April had only 75 aircraft for operations, while its authorized strength was 90 aircraft.

As the medium bombers diverted their efforts against the Communist airfields destruction and the UN ground forces also needed B-29 close support as the Communists began their offensive on 22 April, the US FEAF Bomber Command had reduced capabilities for interdiction in April and May. After mid-May the Communist spring attacks had failed, and the Reds were retreating northward before the UN ground forces' attack. According to intelligence reports, the Communists were no longer trying to bring supplies southward, but were, instead, attempting to save those stockpiled in their forward areas. In the light of these circumstances General Stratemeyer ordered the Fifth US Air

Marshaling yard near Wonsan undergoing a fiery napalm bomb attack by B-26's.
Force to interdict the enemy's highways and railways and directed the Bomber Command to destroy marshaling yards and supply and communications centers.

On receiving the primary responsibility for interdicting the enemy's lines of supply, Major General Edward J. Timberlake, Jr., who became the Acting Commander of Fifth US Air Force on 21 May as Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge had assumed the Acting Commander of US FEAF, instituted an operation plan which called "Strangle." This plan was designed to paralyze the enemy transportation in the zone between the railheads at the 39th parallel and the frontlines. This program divided the key north-south traffic arteries into three sections for intensive attack by units of the Fifth US Air Force, the 1st US Marine Air Wing, and US NavFE Task Force 77.

Beginning on 31 May, the Strangle attacks went much the same in the Air Force, Marine, and Navy sectors. In the west 18th US Fighter-Bomber Wing Mustangs scouted out sections of roads and railway where repairs or bypasses would be difficult and postholed them with 500-pound bombs, some contact-fuzed and some fuzed for delayed explosions.

In an effort to establish roadblocks, 3rd US Bombardment Wing B-26's strewn M-83 butterfly bombs at prebriefed choke points on the enemy's main supply routes. As the Mustangs worked to the southward, F-80 jet fighters of the 49th and 51st US Wings attacked rail bridges in northwestern Korea. Early in June the B-29's gave the jet fighters some assistance with rail bridge attacks, but a few days the medium bombers devoted their efforts to attacks against airfields, marshaling yards, and supply centers.

**Armed Reconnaissance**

During February and March 1951 the ground fighting kept the Communist sufficiently stirred up so that they moved reinforcements and supplies toward the battle line with less than their usual caution. Accordingly, the Fifth US Air Force was afforded excellent targets for armed reconnaissance. Noting heavy troop movements in northwestern Korea, the US FEAF directed a concentration of air attacks against the coastal routes for several days following 7 February, and on 13 February the Fifth US Air Force destroyed or damaged a record one-day total of 318 enemy vehicles.

But the Red Chinese forces camouflaged their vehicles so well that the fighter-bombers could not find much to attack. In an effort to come to grips with the elusive Red truckers, the Fifth US Air Force on 14 February imple-
mented a new procedure for armed reconnaissance: specific sorties and areas for continuous surveillance were assigned each fighter wing, the idea being that the pilots would become familiar with a single zone and readily identify camouflaged objectives.

That the new system of intensive armed reconnaissance held substantial profits was indicated by a mounting total of enemy vehicles reported by Fifth US Air Force as destroyed: with fewer interdiction sorties (the interdiction sorties totals were 9,101 for January, 7,184 for February, and 7,637 for March), Fifth US Air Force pilots claimed 599 enemy vehicles destroyed and 812 damaged in January, 1,366 destroyed and 812 damaged in February, and 2,261 destroyed and 1,326 damaged in March. Most of these vehicles were destroyed by night intruder B-26's and F-51 conventional fighters, which possessed the staying power to let them remain over communications routes for extended periods, but the 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group F-80's also inflicted considerable damage to the enemy vehicles.

Initially the Communists depended upon camouflage, parking their vehicles beside, between, or sometimes inside of houses in small villages, covering them with straw or a white tarpaulin if the ground was snow covered; but at the end of March few vehicles were still attempting to escape destruction through camouflage. Instead, the Reds were increasing the antiaircraft fire, constructing difficult-to-attack log bunkers in almost inaccessible ravines where vehicles could be sheltered during daylight hours, and cramming all available tunnels with vehicles and supplies. The Communists now appeared to be conveying their vehicles from heavily flak-protected areas to the bunkers in one night, to the frontlines and return to the bunker zone the next night, and back to safety on the third night.

In an effort to penetrate the enemy's new-defense, F-51's made predawn and late afternoon take-offs, thus attacking when the enemy vehicles were taking or emerging from their cover; other fighters attempted to seal tunnels by skip bombing 500-pound bombs into the entrances; still other Mustangs experimented in search of the best ordnance to be used against the enemy log bunkers.

Despite the added defenses, the Communists had so many vehicles forward that they could not effectively protect them against friendly armed reconnaissance and night-intruder strikes. On 22 April the Communists launched the massive offensive and they exposed their supply lines and road transport to UN daylight air attack. As a result of its night and day air attacks, the Fifth US Air Force claimed 2,336 enemy vehicles destroyed and 1,496 damaged during April.
Communist vehicle sightings during the first week of May 1951 strongly indicated that the enemy was making extreme efforts to alleviate the logistical limitations which had long plagued him. Moreover, the Reds were increasing their flak batteries both in the forward area and back along the main supply lines. In May, for example, the UN intelligence plotted the locations of 252 flak guns and 673 automatic weapons.

The flak guns were mostly deployed in fixed defenses, but truck-towed Soviet 37-mm. M-1939 automatic weapons, which were effective against planes at altitudes up to 1,370 meters, were now encountered along the main supply lines. On the first sixteen days of May, as the Reds attempted to resupply and regroup for the second impulse of their offensive, the enemy again bared his supply routes and the UN air forces aircraft flew an average of 287 interdiction sorties per day. But during May Fifth US Air Force claimed only 1,245 vehicles destroyed and 1,624 damaged due to the increased enemy antiaircraft defenses. Most of these results were scored by the night-flying 3rd US Bombardment Wing light bombers.

When the Communist Chinese last offensive was routed, the fighter-bombers struck telling blows on the Reds retreating northward. On 25 May, for example, a flight of 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group F-80's destroyed nine trucks and killed many enemies in Hwachon, north of Chunchon. Again, on 26 May, the 27th US Fighter-Escort Wing sent four flights of F-84's to the roads around Inje, in the mountains of eastern front. Defied the bad weather the Thunderjets inflicted more than 700 casualties to the Communists and destroyed some 50 enemy vehicles. Next day General Timberlake, Acting Commander of Fifth US Air Force, presented Distinguished Flying Crosses to the four flight leaders -- Captains Eugene H. MacMurray, John P. Torland, and Edwin R. Dischinger, and Lieutenant Guy B. Razzeto -- and Air Medals to each of the twelve wingmen who had flown this smashing attack.

Though the Fifth US Air Force armed reconnaissance had inflicted some heavy damages upon the Communists supply system, but it had also taken some telling losses. Enemy ground fire shot down 59 aircraft (8 B-26's, 2 B-29's, 23 F-51's, 22 F-80's, 2 F-84's, and 2 T-6's) in April and May. And June losses, which were running heavy at the beginning of the month, would be 22 planes (12 of them were F-51's) to enemy antiaircraft fire. During June the Fifth US Air Force claimed destruction of only 827 enemy vehicles, and most of these victories were scored by the night intruders of the 3rd and 452nd US Bombardment Wings.
Section 3. Air-Ground Actions Defeat Communist Offensive

Counter-air operations neutralized the enemy threat from the air and interdiction and armed reconnaissance actions weakened the enemy situation on the surface by disrupting the Reds supply routes, while the UN Allied air forces worked in close coordination with the UN ground forces. The US Far East Air Forces aircraft flew 3,255 close-support sorties in February and 5,901 in March, the latter total being therefore exceeded only in August and September 1950. At the same time that air action paralyzed the mobility of the Communist troops, air-delivered and airdropped supplies permitted the UN ground forces great freedom of maneuver.

On achieving victory against the Red Chinese New Year Eve offensive, General Ridgway, Eighth US Army Commander, ordered the I and IX US Corps to initiate "Operation Thunderbolt" beginning on 25 January 1950. This operation was designed as a reconnaissance in force which, if enemy resistance proved weak, would also clear the area south of the Han River. Now the Fifth US Air Force's close-support effort was centered behind these two corps.

![Image](image_url)

Giving close support to the 1st US Cavalry Division on 26 January.
On 25 January the UN ground forces began a cautious and proving advance toward the Han River with strong air support. On 27 January the 3rd US Division was joined to reinforce the attack force. Since this expanding ground attack needed increased supplies, the 315th US Air Division (Combat Cargo), which had been activated as the successor to the old US FEAF Combat Cargo Command on 25 January, came to the assistance of the UN ground forces. On 28 January, while fighting continued just beyond the snow-covered airstrip, the 315th US Air Division began to deliver cargo to Suwon Airfield, and on 30 January it unloaded 270 tons of supplies at the newly-captured airfield.

While on the central front, the X US and III ROK Corps began to advance northward on 31 January, and they captured Hoengsong on 2 February. To destroy the resistance by the II and V NK Corps and to advance toward Hongchon, the X US Corps initiated “Operation Roundup” on 3 February. On the west, the advance of the 25th US Division approached Inchon city and Kimpo Airfield. On 9 February, enemy resistance collapsed, and by dusk on 10 February Kimpo Airfield and Inchon city were taken without appreciable enemy opposition. Now the UN forces once again looked over Seoul across the Han.

Awareing the pressure upon Seoul and central front, the Red Chinese forces launched their offensive on the night of 11 February. The 40th and 56th CCF Armies and V NK Corps nevertheless unleashed a violent attack against X US Corps along the Hoengsong—Wonju axis. To meet the attack, the UN Command assigned X US Corps the highest priorities for close air support. On 12 February, when the 8th ROK Division met the massive enemy attack at Hoengsong, five flights of F-4U's, F-80's, and F-51's came to the scene and attacked the onrushing Reds with napalm and rockets.

But the Reds drove into Hoengsong on 13 February, and their attack centered against Chipyong-ni area near Wonju, which held by elements of the 2nd US Division. For three days the UN forces fought fiercely, and the Fifth US Air Force fighters gave numbers of close-support sorties for the friendly ground forces in trouble. Besides, the 314th US Troop Carrier Group C-119's dropped the surrounding friendly troops 87 loads of ammunition, gasoline, and rations.

Heavy fighting also took place north of Chechon, east of Wonju, and south of Chongson, but by 24 February the X US Corps was driving the Communist forces northward. During the fighting in the Wonju area the UN ground and air forces coordinated their actions excellently well, and the combined
Army-Air Force operations got the success against the Communist massive offensive.

As the initiative passed to the UN forces, the UN Command on 21 February effected "Operation Killer," an attack designed to destroy enemy east of the Han River, especially along the Wonju—Hoengsong and Yongwol—Pyongchang lines. The UN Allied air forces began to give their full air-support to this ground operations. On 22 February, for example, 11 flights of fighters flew close-support sorties for the 25th US Infantry Division and destroyed some 1,000 Red troops.

On 25 February an American Mosquito controller located large bodies of enemy troops dug in around Hoengsong and it called for and received seven flights of fighter-bombers at 45-minute intervals. This air raid approximately killed 200 and wounded 300 Reds. Between 24 and 26 February 5 Mosquito missions worked with the 7th US Infantry Division as it advanced to Pyongchang. Not only these close-support missions, but the UN air forces supported the ground troops by dropping 256 C-119's loads or 1,368 tons of supplies between 23 and 26 February.

While it had provided the air support which enabled the UN ground forces to destroy the Communist offensive in central front and to advance back to the Han River, the Fifth US Air Force had been laboring under exceptionally difficult operational conditions. Its jet fighter-bomber wings were based in Japan, and all of these planes were too far distant from the target area to be able to spend much time over the targets. Flying from Itazuke Air Base in Kyushu, Japan, for example, the 27th US Fighter-Escort Wing's F-84's were able to spend only 30 minutes at the frontlines. In view of this fact the Thunderjets preferred to use napalm and rockets.

Flying from Japan, the F-80 groups encountered more serious range problem than F-84's. Over 85 per cent of the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group's flying was being done between the frontlines and the operating bases in Japan. Seeking to overcome this short-of-range problem, the 8th and 51st US Groups staged their Shooting stars through Taegu Airfield. The F-80's usually took off their first missions directly from Japanese bases, returned to K-2 for rearming and refueling, and then flew a second mission from K-2 before returning to Japan. By using Taegu Airfield for a staging base, the Fifth US Air Force had overcome many of its operational problems.

Airborne Attack at Munsan

Instead of trying costly frontal attack against Seoul, the UN ground forces on 7 March initiated "Operation Ripper," which designed to occupy the
Air Operations

eastern flank of Seoul. On the first day the 25th US Division advanced up to the area 25 kilometers east of Seoul. Defied the bad weather, the Fifth US Air Force in the week following 7 March flew an average of 182 close support sorties a day. On 7 March 575 sorties were given to the 25th US Division. Of these sorties, about 200 supported the advancing ground troops and the others attacked enemy personnel and equipment in the immediate rear. On 8 March Fifth US Air Force and Marine fighter-bombers again assisted the division, while 22 B-29's bombed the major Red supply center near Chunchon on the central front. Mustang groups displayed their activities during the bad-weather days. On 9 March a single flight of 35th Group pilots claimed 100 Reds killed and wounded outside of Seoul, while the 18th Group pilots destroyed 22 enemy trucks near Chorwon.

By 10 March, the enemy resistance on the Han River collapsed, and Communists began retreating out of Seoul on 12 March. Seoul was recaptured finally on 14 March. And on the next day the UN ground troops seized the central front communications center of Hongchon.

As the Reds broke cover and began to retreat, the US Far East Air Forces launched more than 1,000 sorties to destroy them. On 16 March, for example, two Mosquito controllers directed six flights of fighters against 1,200 enemies fleeing northward along a road east of Hongchon. This air raid approximately killed 600 Reds and wounded 300. The advancing friendly forces captured Chunchon on 21 March.

Hoping to exploit the Communists retreat, the UN Command had been planning an airborne employment of the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team. At that time, in preparation for an earlier parachute drop at Chunchon which was canceled, the 315th US Air Division (Combat Cargo) had concentrated 80 C-119's of the 314th US Troop Carrier Wing and 55 C-46's of the 437th US Troops Carrier Wing at K-2 on 21 March. Also the 187th US RCT was located there.

At approximately 1200 hours on 21 March, Brigadier General John P. Henebry, who had assumed the command of the 315th US Air Division effective on 8 February, received planning information that the 187th US RCT would be airdropped at Munsan, northwest of Seoul, on the morning of 23 March. General Henebry and his two wing commanders, accompanied by Brigadier General Frank S. Bowen, the 187th US RCT Commander, made a late afternoon visual reconnaissance of the objective area, and at 1730 hours they met with Generals Partridge and Ridgway to confirm D-day as 23 March and to set H-hour at 0900 hours. At about this time some 12,000 NK Communist troops were believed to be in the vicinity of Munsan area.
Weather on the morning of D day was perfect for the operation, and for 30 minutes before the jump time the Fifth US Air Force used 56 B-26's of its 3rd and 452nd Bombardment Wings to soften up the objective area with 500-pound airburst bombs. At Taegu Airfield dust made transport take-offs hazardous, but pilots maintained ten-second intervals and no one got into trouble. These transports were escorted by 16 F-51's. Promptly as scheduled, at 0900 hours, the first serial of C-119's began dropping paratroopers in the north drop zone, and five other serials launched paratroopers and dropped equipment during the day.

Only one mistake marred the drop. When a serial of C-46's took off carrying the 1st Battalion of 187th US RCT, however, the lead plane aborted almost immediately, losing an engine on takeoff and making a successful emergency landing at a nearby airstrip of Tongmyong (K-37). This C-46 carried the command section of the 1st Battalion. The deputy leader took over, but when his heavily loaded C-46's were unable to keep up with the proper timing, he elected to skip the initial point and head directly to the south drop zone. Due to the error in low-level navigation, however, the deputy leader missed his assigned zone and dropped a battalion of paratroopers into the north drop zone. In the meantime, the regular serial commander at K-37 secured a spare C-46 and flew to the south drop zone, where the planeload of the battalion commander and staff jumped and they were the only men to drop at this point. Learning what had happened, General Henebry informed the 187th US RCT command post by radio, and a company was sent to retrieve the 30 men from the south drop zone.

Except for this incident, the airborne operation went satisfactorily: 72 C-119's dropped 2,011 paratroopers and 204 tons of supplies and equipment, while 48 C-46's unloaded 1,436 paratroopers and 13.5 tons of ammunition, food, and signal equipment. During the operation five C-119's incurred minor damage from enemy small-arms fire, and one C-119, evidently because of enemy fire, broke into flames and crashed en route home, killing the pilot and copilot.

To support the 187th US RCT and the UN ground forces driving northward from Seoul, the Fifth US Air Force flew 31 F-51, 50 F-80, 31 F-84, and 56 B-26 sorties during the daylight hours of 23 March. Several airborne relay aircraft (C-47's) provided tactical coordination and reconnaissance over the drop zones. In direct support of the jumping troops, relay aircraft directed 31 flights of 108 fighter aircraft. These fighters attacked 12 dug-in and seven open troop concentrations, four villages containing troops and supplies, two supply dumps, and five weapons positions. At the close of the day's
operations General Ridgway, who had landed from a liaison plane in the drop zone, stated that the fighter support was the best he had ever seen in an airborne operation.

Although the airborne operation at Munsan enabled the I US Corps to close up to the Imjin River very rapidly, its results in terms of Red soldiers captured and killed were negligible: only 200 enemy killed and 84 captured.

Additional aerial resupply aided the advancing ground troops. On 24 March 36 C-119’s dropped 40 men and 187.7 tons of supplies. Four C-46’s dropped 10 tons of supplies on 26 March, and on the next day 12 C-119’s dropped an additional 65.8 tons of supplies.

**CCF Spring Offensives**

Early in April, the UN coordinated air-ground actions had driven Communist forces back to the 38th Parallel. But many reports revealed that the all-out Communist offensive was impending. Inclement weather, together with fog and haze, would hamper UN air operations and also present the on-foot Reds with advantages of maneuver over motorized UN ground troops. At this juncture, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was relieved of all his commands on 11 April and was replaced by General Matthew B. Ridgway. On 14 April Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet took over command of the Eighth US Army.
Defeat of Red Chinese

The UN forces operations plan at about this stage was as follows: Utilizing superior air and ground firepower to effect casualties on the enemy, UN ground forces would roll backward as necessary through a series of phased defense lines. When the Communist offensive had run its course, the UN ground troops would counter-attack.

In bright moonlight, on the night of 22 April, as foreseen by the UN forces, the Chinese Communist forces started off their full scale offensive. The main attack came to the west to isolate Seoul by enveloping the I and IX US Corps. During the night when the attack began ground-radar-directed medium bombers attacked enemy troops concentrations south of Chorwon and north of Munsan. And as Red Chinese forces crossed the Imjin River, the I US Corps used MPQ-2 radar control to direct B-26 strikes against the enemy forces reaadying themselves for a break-through. The night-flying B-26's of the 3rd US Bombardment Wing gave excellent close-support sorties at night.

Beginning at daybreak on 23 April and continuing throughout the day, the US Far East Air Forces flew more than 1,100 sorties, some 340 of them in close support of the UN ground forces. Though the bad weather hampered air action, the Fifth US Air Force fighters and light bombers flew all-out schedules to slaughter the enemy. On the same day two F-80's attacked some 200 Reds and claimed at least 175 enemy troops were casualties. This was only one example of close support in action, and across the whole frontlines, on the day. Fifth US Air Force pilots estimated that they inflicted about 2,000 casualties on the enemy.

Although UN ground troops fought valiantly, the Red tide was too strong. So the UN Command ordered I and IX US Corps to fall back to rear. For more three days after 23 April the UN air forces pilots flew more than 1,000 sorties a day in spite of the bad weather. The fast carriers of Task Force 77, US Naval Far East, which

F-80 bombing enemy positions south of Chorwon.
returned to Korean waters on 16 April, were ready to give aerial close support for the UN ground forces.

The UN air forces sent its daylight fighter-bomber and night MPQ-directed medium-bomber attacks into the breach near Kumhwa, thus alleviated the enemy pressure upon the IX US Corps. On the I US Corps front fighter-bombers and night-flying B-26's and B-29's assisted a withdrawal to defense positions five kilometers north of Seoul. And when the Reds attempted to ferry troops across the Han River to the Kimpo Peninsula and outflank Seoul, United Nations airmen strafed an estimated 6,000 enemy troops trying to cross the Han River, and such as got ashore were easily handled by ROK Marines. By 29 April, after all, the Communist offensive had halted.

All UN forces worked together to inflict terrible casualties on the Communist aggressors. For the first time in Korea the UN air forces gave a tremendous close-support effort at night as well as by day. "Enemy frontline troops have now learned," announced General Stratemeyer, "that darkness no longer provides a protective cloak against our pinpoint air attacks on their positions." During April, despite many moves, the MPQ-2 radar detachments directed 450 bomb drops on 425 targets nominated by the ground forces. The night-flying B-29's usually carried 500-pound proximity-fuzed bombs, which burst into about 15,000 fragments.

The full extent of the casualties inflicted by the night-attacking bombers could not be exactly assessed, but the ground-force reports mentioned excellent results. On the night of 26 April, for example, a B-29 bombed an enemy concentration forming for an attack against the IX US Corps, and the attack never came. On the same night two B-26's attacked enemy forces with 260-pound fragmentation bombs through MPQ-2 radar control. At daybreak ground patrols counted more than 400 Red bodies. Near Kapyong, after a single B-29 strike, ground patrols counted 600 dead next morning. On the eastern front, near Inje, ROK troops driven from a hill called for a supporting B-29. Next morning the ROK troops recaptured the hill and counted 800 Reds killed by the night air attack.

The IX US Corps reported that a strike against a large concentration assembling in front of friendly positions "completely stopped preparation for attack and friendly units received no further attack that night at all." After night strikes on 26 April, X US Corps reported: "Prisoner of war...are really complaining about night bombing. We think the night effort we have been receiving has done a great deal to discourage the enemy."
Defeat of Red Chinese

As the enemy had halted its offensive, the UN ground forces decided to take a limited offensive. Now the UN air forces centered their efforts on the armed reconnaissance. During the first fifteen days of May United Nations coordinated air-ground actions had inflicted heavy casualties upon the Communists across the whole fronts.

Assisted by a blanket of fog and rain which hampered air operations, the Communists launched the "second impulse" of their spring offensive on the night of 15 May. The main Red effort, made with 21 CCF divisions, fell upon the III ROK Corps front in the central east and the X US Corps on its left.

On the initial day of the attack the bad weather helped the Reds, and variable weather conditions continued to hamper UN air actions on the days that followed. But defied the bad weather the UN Allied air forces contributed to the UN efforts in Korea by attacking the onrushing Communist troops by day and night. At the time the Communist forces seemed to decide to carry their objectives at any price, and they even made little effort to take cover from air attacks. Under such circumstances air-support pilots of the UN air forces rained heavy destruction on the Communist troops. On 17 May, for example, the 2nd US Division reported that supporting air strikes killed at least 5,000 enemy troops on its front. On 18 May the carrier-based fighters of US NavFE joined the close air-support missions, and thus strengthened the UN airpower.

During second phase of the Chinese Communist spring offensive, MPQ-directed night bombing had inflicted heavy casualties on the Reds. At about 1800 hours on 19 May, for example, the X US Corps found enemy troops preparing for an attack and requested the B-29's attacks, eight Superforts flew to the scene and saturated the area with 80 tons of proximity-fuzed 500-pound bombs under the control of MPQ-2 radar. This bombing made no enemy attack materialized. About 2100 hours on 20 May, 15 B-29's attacked enemy troops reported to be assembling against the 2nd US Division, and thus forced the enemy to retreat northward in disorder. Next day the ground patrols found an estimated 300 fully-armed and dead Red Chinese. On the night of 21 May the X US Corps received reports that enemies were massing on the roads near Hangye and Chunchon. Eight B-29's hit the former area and five worked the latter.

On the night 23 May the greatest single night close-support effort of the Korean War was carried out. To cut the enemy's main supply routes and destroy the Red troops, 22 B-29's of the 19th and 307th US Bombardment Groups, and 11 B-26's of the 3rd US Bombardment Group, employed MPQ-aiming techniques to lash enemy personnel across the entire front. This
attack worked well and inflicted heavy damages on the Communists.

Though the UN forces had been forced to move backward slightly, the CCF offensive had failed within three days. Now, the UN ground forces lost no time in launching counteroffensive on 23 May. Supported by the strong UN Allied air forces, the UN ground forces made rapid progress against the demoralized Reds. The I US Corps easily advanced north of Seoul to Munsan and Uijongbu, while the IX and X US Corps converged toward Hwachon to cut off Reds south of the Hwachon Reservoir. In this area air strikes also damaged the enemy gravely. By the end of May the UN ground forces had again advanced to the 38th Parallel. During the Communist spring offensive a total of 11,526 Red Korean and Chinese troops surrendered.

During early June the “Iron Triangle” in the west-center was brought under concerted attack by the UN ground forces. Low-hanging clouds and pelting rainstorms now greatly hampered air support. Moreover, the Communists in this area kept in entrenched positions during the day. Notwithstanding, as the UN ground troops inched their way toward the area, the US FEAFAF unleashed a crescendo of radar-directed attacks against the enemy positions in the Pyonggang—Chorwon—Kumhwa triangle. At dusk on 7 June and at 30-minute intervals throughout the night, 23 B-26’s and B-29’s showered air-bursting 500-pound bombs there. This MPQ-directed attacks were continued on the nights of 8 and 9 June. The enemy finally collapsed, allowing the I US Corps to enter Chorwon and Kumhwa virtually without opposition on 10 June. And Pyonggang was captured on 13 June.

As had been the case in earlier enemy offensive, the CCF Spring Offensive brought demands for increased air transportation. During the period the 315th US Air Division (Combat Cargo) played a splendid role, which in some measure dwarfed anything they had done up to this time. In April, during the six days the Communists attacked in the western front, the 315th US Air Division airlifted more than 4,500 tons of battle supplies to Korea. The cargo planes landed some 1,700 tons of these supplies on the Kimpo Airfield.

Beginning on 16 May, and for ten days thereafter, the transports hauled more than a thousand tons of cargo each day. On 23 May, for example, with 222 aircraft on hand, the 315th US Air Division flew 409 sorties to lift 1,534 tons of cargo, so exceeding its stated maximum capacity of 1,291 tons. The great bulk was ammunition and petroleum products, nearly all of it being laid down at Kimpo and Hoengsong Airfields.

At one time during the second phase of the CCF spring offensive, Hoengsong was only ten kilometers behind the X US Corps command post, and during the several days of furious fighting, trucks stacked up 50 to 100 at
a time waiting to take the ammunition off the transport planes and carry it to firing batteries. In spite of the fact that the C-119's were grounded during several weeks in the period, the 315th US Air Division delivered to Korea, by airlift and airdrop, 15,900 tons of cargo in April and 21,300 tons in May 1951.

As the June cloudbursts turned the UN forces supply lines into quagmires, advancing ground troops depended heavily upon air-transported supplies. In central and eastern front the I ROK and X US Corps were especially dependent upon airlanded and airdropped supplies. Herculean effort of the 315th US Air Division was continued. On 2 June an airfield at Chunchon was opened, and C-54's began to land Army supplies there beginning on 10 June. This airfield was very useful as it located near the front line. Counting both the tonnage parachuted to frontline troops and that landed at airfields, the 315th US Air Division hauled 22,472 tons of cargo to Korea during June 1951.

Section 4. Defeated Reds Request a Cease-Fire

By mid-June 1951 all Communist efforts to drive UN forces from Korea had met failure, and, after the debacle of their spring offensive by the UN forces' air-ground actions, the Communists stood on the brink of a major military disaster. Now the UN forces seemed to be growing stronger by day, while the Communists grew weaker. At this juncture, on 28 June, Soviet Russia's delegate to the United Nations, Jacob A. Malik, suggested in a radio talk in New York to begin negotiations for a cease fire in Korea. Having no hope for victory, nor prospect except to continue enormous losses in men and material, the Communists proposed cease-fire discussions. In view of Russia's suggestion, General Ridgway, UN Commander, on 29 June offered to have cease-fire meetings on board a hospital ship in Wonsan harbor. The following night came a reply from Communists, agreeing to the offer but suggesting Kaesong to be the meeting site.

As United Nations and Communist leaders moved toward cease-fire talks, the Korean War was entering a new phase, but UN Allied air operations were going to progress unabated. "Combat operation," enjoined Lieutenant General Otto P. Weyland, who had assumed the command of US FEAF on 10 June 1951, "will continue at the normal rate until otherwise directed."

In the year of fight following the Communist aggression on 25 June 1950, the United Nations Command had defeated numerically-superior North
Korean and Chinese Communist forces. During the period the UN Allied air forces, most of them was the US Far East Air Forces, had contributed greatly to the UN success in the war. The US Far East Air Forces airmen had flown 223,000 sorties to drop 97,000 tons of bombs and 7,800,000 gallons of napalm, to fire 264,000 rockets and 98,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and to transport 176,000 tons of cargo and 427,000 passengers and air evacuees.

According to the Statistical Summary of USAF Combat Operations in Korea (25 June 1950—27 July 1953), the US Far East Air Forces (excluded the US Marine and friendly other UN air powers) combat sorties had inflicted 130,495 casualties upon the enemy’s personnel (while all the UN Allied air forces including US Marine aircraft inflicted 156,524 enemy casualties) and had destroyed and damaged 393 aircraft, 2,406 tanks, 1,001 locomotives, 15,571 railroad cars, 652 tunnels, 1,519 rail and road bridges, 33,122 vehicles, 3,629 gun positions, and 147,278 buildings which sheltered enemy troops or supplies. At the same time the US Far East Air Forces strategic bombers had also neutralized the 18 major strategic targets in the northern part of Korea.

In the year of operation the US Far East Air Forces had lost 857 officers and airmen—187 killed, 255 wounded, 412 missing, and three known to be prisoners of war. Due to the Communist air action, the American air force had sustained the loss of 246 aircraft, including 18 fighters, 33 bombers, nine transports, and 17 other planes.

The true role of airpower as the decisive force in the UN victory in Korea, however, could not be told solely in terms of damages wrought on the enemy. In the maintenance of airsuperiority over Korea the UN air forces destroyed or damaged a number of enemy aircraft, but the fact of the maintenance of the air superiority was far more important than the physical damage inflicted on the Reds. The friendly air superiority had allowed the UN ground forces great mobility and simultaneously forced the Communists to move and fight only at night. Air interdiction missions had destroyed or impeded the movement of enemy troops, equipment, and supplies before they reached the battle zone. In each offensive, however, the Communists took heavy losses, and each offensive dwindled for want of logistical support before it could bring decisive manpower to bear for a lasting ground decision. “Although close air support contributed,” observed General Weyland, “the major effect upon the enemy was produced by air power applied in the rear of his front line battle zone.”

The Communists, even as they requested a cease-fire talks, shrewd enough to turn an advantage against the UN air power which had decimated their
ground offensives: By demanding that the talks take place at Kaesong, a village lying just behind the battleline and on the main supply route southward from Pyongyang, they established new restrictions upon the UN air action. The neutral territory encircling Kaesong was free from UN air attacks; this restricted area greatly complicated Fifth US Air Force operations thereafter.
APPENDIX

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APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGICAL WAR HISTORY

1950

25 June North Korean Communist puppet regime starts the aggression war.

25 June At 3 a.m., 25 June (Washington time), the U.S. Government requests a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to seek an action against the Communist aggression in Korea.

26 June U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of NK Communist forces to the north of the 38th Parallel on 25 June, New York time.

27 June U.S. President Harry S. Truman authorizes use of U.S. air and naval power to support the Republic of Korea forces.

27 June The Far East Air Forces enter combat over Korea.

28 June U.N. Security Council, in the night of 27 June (New York time), adopts a second resolution calling upon the U.N. member nations to furnish assistance to the ROK to repel the NK armed attack.

28 June Seoul falls into the enemy hands.

29 June General MacArthur, US Far East Commander, flies to Korea, and makes a personal reconnaissance trip along the southern bank of the Han River near Seoul.

29 June The Fifth Air Force flies 172 combat sorties in support of the ROK Army.

29 June USS Juneau, the flagship of Task Group 96.5 commences firing the first bombardment of the war.

30 June President Truman approves and orders the commitment of American ground forces into Korea.
1 July  The first contingent of the U.S. ground forces (Task Force Smith from the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th US Division in Kyushu, Japan) arrives at Pusan by air.

1 July  President Truman orders ComNavFE to establish the blockade of North Korea.

2 July  Task Force Smith hurriedly rolls north into the night and then takes up positions at Pyongtaek and Ansong.

2 July  The 34th Regiment, 24th US Division, arrives at Pusan in the night.

3 July  The American Valley Forge flies off fighters and dives bombers in a strike against the military targets around Pyongyang and Chinnampo.

3 July  Major General William F. Dean, CG, 24th US Division, lands at Taejon.

4 July  USS Juneau and HMS Black Swan work up and down the shore between Samchok and Chumunjin.

5 July  American ground troops (TF Smith) enter battle at Osan for the first time in Korea, engaging in a bloody six-hour battle from 0800 hours.

5 July  The first American artillery fire of the Korean War hurtles through the air toward the NK tanks at 0816 hours.

6 July  The 24th US Division completes its movement to Korea from Japan.

7-9 July  Fifth Air Force squadrons destroy 197 enemy trucks and 44 tanks on the road between Pyongtaek and Seoul.

8 July  U.N. Security Council, on 7 July (New York time), adopts a resolution to set up a unified command to control all the U.N. forces fighting in Korea.

8 July  The advance party of the 25th US Infantry Division arrives in Taejon by air.

8-9 July  Eighth US Army advance party arrives in Korea on 8 July and opens its command post at Taegu at 1300 hours, 9 July.

8-12 July  Battles of Chonui—Chochiwon (by the 21st Regiment, 24th US Division).

9 July  President Truman, on 6 July (Washington time), names General MacArthur to the new post of the unified command to exercise the command authority over the U.N. forces.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>General MacArthur receives new assignment -- Commander in Chief, UNC -- in addition to his current three command assignments.</td>
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<td>13 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth US Army Commander (EUSAK), assumes command of all U.S. Army forces in Korea effective 0001, 13 July.</td>
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<td>14 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>President Rhee places the ROK forces under operational control of General MacArthur, the Commander in Chief, UN Command.</td>
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<td>18 July</td>
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<td>The 1st US Cavalry Division begins to land at Pohang and, on 19 July, the 5th Cavalry Regiment starts toward Taejon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-20 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taejon defense by the 24th US Division, during which Maj. Gen. Dean becomes missing in action in the midst of the fighting.</td>
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<td>24 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 29th US Independent Infantry Regiment(-) from Okinawa disembarks at Pusan.</td>
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<td>26 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The advance party of the 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade arrives at Taegu at 1400 hours by air.</td>
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<td>30 July-19 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Forces drop 1,761 tons of bombs over the Chemical complex in Hungnam.</td>
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<td>31 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>FEAF fly 4,635 sorties during the month of July in close support of ground troops.</td>
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<td>31 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 9th Regiment of the 2nd US Division lands at Pusan, becoming the first combat unit to arrive directly from the United States.</td>
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<td>31 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 5th US Regimental Combat Team arrives in Korea from Hawaii.</td>
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<td>1-4 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>EUSAK establishes the Naktong River Perimeter with eight divisions on the line.</td>
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<td>2 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade begins to arrive in Korea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-24 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>The battles of the Naktong River line.</td>
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<td>5-6 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>The first battle of the Naktong Bulge west of Changyong and Yongsan.</td>
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<td>6-9 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 5th US Marine Regiment engages with the enemy first time at Hill 342 in the vicinity of Chindong-ni.</td>
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7 Aug  The 39th Fighter Squadron, the 35th US Air Group, moves in Yonil Airfield.

7-10 Aug  FEAF B-29’s bomb the Pyongyang Arsenal and railroad yard and the petroleum refinery at Wonsan.

7-12 Aug  Counteroffensive operation by the Task Force Kean toward Chinju and the Nam River line.

8-14 Aug  The battle of Ohong-ni by the 9th, 34th and 27th US Regiments in the Naktong River defensive operations.

9 Aug  Corsairs of the 1st US Marine Air Wing, flying from USS Sicily and USS Badoeng Strait, launch airstrikes in close support of Task Force Kean.

10 Aug  Task Force Bradley (from the 2nd US Division) moves in Pohang and Yonil on the east coast in support of the ROK forces.

15 Aug  FEAF light bombers and fighter-bombers join in the interdiction attacks far behind the enemy lines.

16 Aug  98 B-29’s carry out a carpet-bombing mission against a strip of terrain near Waegwan.

28 Aug  The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorizes activation of X US Corps.

28-31 Aug  AF bombers strike the metal industry at Songjin with 326 tons of bombs and the industrial plants at Chinnampo with 284 tons.

31 Aug  The naval air units from USS Sicily launch 38 sorties.

31 Aug-1 Sept  The battles of the Naktong Bulge and Yongsan area.

1-5 Sept  The battle of Yongsan by the 9th Infantry of the 2nd US Division and the 72nd Tank Battalion.

1-6 Sept  The Counterattack at Haman and the battle of Pil-bong and Sobuk-san area by the 25th US Division with the 5th RCT attached.

4 Sept  U.N. air attacks against the Incheon area begin lasting until the landing.

5-6 Sept  The naval ships bombard Incheon and Kunsan.

5-15 Sept  The UN naval action continues along the western coast to interdict the enemy’s coastal traffic.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>Task Force 77 strikes Wolmi-do.</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
<td>The I US Corps becomes operational, with the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 5th US RCT (-), and the 1st ROK Division attached.</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
<td>Inchon landing outflanks the enemy forces.</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
<td>The EUSAk and the ROK forces move out for general counteroffensive from the Naktong River Perimeter.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>The 7th US Division aboard on US vessels arrives in Inchon harbor to join the battle for Seoul.</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
<td>The 5th US Marine Regiment reaches the edge of Kimpo Airfield, completely securing Kimpo the next morning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-28 Sept</td>
<td>The capture of Seoul: The X Corps, with the 1st US Marine Division, 7th US Infantry Division, 17th ROK Infantry Regiment, and the ROK Marines attached, restores Seoul.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>The IX US Corps, with its hqs at Miryang, becomes operational at 1400 hours.</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
<td>TF 777 links up at 0826 at Osan with the 31st Regiment, the 7th US Division under the X Corps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>The 24th US Division units retake Taejon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>General MacArthur issues his demand that the NK Reds' surrender.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>The 3rd ROK Division under the I ROK Corps crosses the 38th Parallel on the east coast.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>The 1st US Cavalry Division advances as far as Munsan and the Imjin River northwest of Seoul.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>The UN Command issues operation Order 2, ordering the EUSAk to attack into North Korea to accomplish the enemy's complete defeat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>The U.N. General Assembly resolves to set up the UNCURK; and authorizes the UN Command to pursue the routing enemy to the northern horder on 7 October (New York time).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>General MacArthur issues an ultimatum to the North Korean puppet clique, calling for unconditional surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>B-29's of the Far East Air Forces blast the railroad between Kanggye and Sinanju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-14 Oct</td>
<td>The I US Corps (with the 1st US Cavalry and 1st ROK Divisions in the lead) advances to Kaesong, Kumchon, Hanpo-ri.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sibyon-ni, and Namchonjom.

10 Oct  The 3rd ROK Division, I ROK Corps enters Wonsan.


15-19 Oct  The Capture of Pyongyang by the I US Corps with the 1st ROK Division, 1st US Cavalry Div., and the 27th British Brigade in the lead.

16 Oct  Chinese Communist forces secretly invade into the Korean territory from Manchuria.

20 Oct  The 187th US Airborne RCT launches airborne attack on Sukchon and Sunchon.

25 Oct-1 Nov  The Chinese Communist forces (CCF) launch attacks in a large-scale against the U.N. forces, particularly on Unsan, Onjong-ni, Won-ni, Huichon, Kujang-dong.

26 Oct  The 26th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division occupys Chosan, thus reaching the Yalu River.

26-28 Oct  The 1st US Marine Division (X Corps) makes administrative landing at Wonsan.

29 Oct  The 7th US Division (X Corps) lands at Iwon on the east coast.

30 Oct  The 24th US Division reaches within 70 km. of the Yalu River on the western front.

1 Nov  The 1st US Cavalry Division engages with the CCF in the vicinity of Unsan during the night of 1-2 Nov.

1 Nov  First enemy MIGs appear along the Yalu River to counter UN air forces.

1-9 Nov  The X Corps advances up to Sudong—Changjin Reservoir.

3-6 Nov  The battle of the Chongchon River line by the Eighth Army units against the CCF units.

5-17 Nov  The 3rd US Division lands at Wonsan.

8 Nov  The first all-jet air battle in history occurs near the Yalu River when F-80's met MIG-15s.

8 Nov  B-29's make the first bomber strikes against the Yalu River bridges at Sinuiju.

21 Nov  The 17th Regiment, 7th US Division, reaches Hyesanjin on the Yalu River on the morning.

24 Nov  The Eighth US Army launches a full-scale offensive, known as General MacArthur's "win-the-war" offensive.
25-26 Nov  The 2nd US Division encounter with the overwhelming Red Chinese forces at the Chongchon River line in the vicinity of Taechon—Kunu-ri.

26-27 Nov  CCF launches heavy attacks on both fronts: Eighth Army's right flank and the 1st US Marine Division sector in the east.

27 Nov  Eighth Army and X Corps begin to withdraw from the northern zone.

7-10 Dec  AF Combat Cargo Command airdrops 1,580 tons of supplies evacuates 4,887 casualties from Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri areas.

10-11 Dec  Withdrawal action from the Changjin Reservoir to Hungnam by the 1st US Marine Division.

15 Dec  The UN forces begin establishing a defensive line more or less along the 38th Parallel.

15-24 Dec  The Hungnam redeployment of the X US Corps with the support of the Naval Task Force 90 and the Task Force 77.

23 Dec  Lt. General Walton H. Walker, Commander of the Eighth Army, was killed in a vehicle accident.

26 Dec  Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway succeeds the command of the EUSAK.

1951

1-15 Jan  The Red Chinese forces launch a determined offensive commencing at the midnight on New Year's Eve throughout the front.

4-7 Jan  The UN forces abandon Seoul and set up a new defense line along Pyongtaek—Wonju—Samchok.

21 Jan  General Ridgway issues orders for probing counteroffensive.

23 Jan  33 F-84's engage with 30 MIG's in a furious jet battle over Sinuiju, gaining a great success.

25 Jan  Operation Thunderbolt begins to advance toward the Han River line by the I and IX Corps.

2 Feb  The U.N. General Assembly on 1 Feb. (New York time), brands the Communist Chinese as aggressors, calling them to withdraw from Korea.
3-16 Feb The battle of Chipyong-ni by the 2nd US Division with the French and Netherlands Battalions attached.

5 Feb Operation Roundup designed for general offensive by the X US Corps, begins on the eastern front.

16 Feb The Wonsan siege begins by the American naval forces.

21 Feb The EUSAK launches Operation Killer with the IX and X Corps in the main effort in counterattack northward.

7 Mar Operation Ripper begins in the central and eastern zones by the IX and X Corps.

14 Mar The UN forces restore Seoul.

23 Mar The 187th US ARCT launches vertical assault at Munsan to cut off the retreating Communist forces.

31 Mar The advance of the UN forces reaches again the 38th Parallel.

5 Apr The EUSAK begins Operation Rugged in order to seize the Kansas Line, drawing along the 38th Parallel.

11 Apr President Truman relieve General MacArthur from the post of the Commander in Chief, UN Command and replaces him with General Ridgway.

14 Apr General James A. Van Fleet succeeds the command of the Eighth US Army: All U.N. forces take positions on Kansas Line.

19 Apr The I and IX US Corps seize the Utah Line.

22-28 Apr Chinese Communist forces launch heaviest offensive all across the front. (First Spring Offensive).

26 Apr The port of Hungnam is placed under a naval siege.

30 Apr UN forces, after withdrawing to a new defense line, halt CCF offensive.

9 May 312 Air Force, Marine, and Navy planes hit Sinuiju Airfield and knock out 38 hostile aircraft there.

16-17 May Fighter-bombers kill at least 5,000 Reds on the roads from Chunchon and Inje.

16-23 May Second phase of CCF spring offensive.

21 May The UN Command launches a counteroffensive which succeeds in driving the enemy north of the 38th Parallel.

30 May The UN forces return back on the Kansas Line.

1 June Operation Piledriver begins, with the I and IX US Corps
advancing toward and occupying the Wyoming Line.

13 June  The UN forces capture Chorwon and Kumhwa in the Iron Triangle and establish hardened defense lines 16 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel.

15 June  Arrival of Colombian contingent completes 17 member UN fighting team including the ROK forces.

24 June  


30 June  General Ridgway announces the UNC’s readiness to discuss possibility of arranging a cease-fire.
### APPENDIX II

ASSISTANCES PROVIDED BY THE U.N. ALLIES

#### Military Aids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2 inf bn</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 destroyers</td>
<td>1 fighter &amp; 1 air-trans sqdn</td>
<td>(A) 28 Sept 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 29 June 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 30 June 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1 inf brig, 1 FA regt, 1 armed regt &amp; support units</td>
<td>3 destroyers</td>
<td>1 air-trans sqdn</td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 31 July 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 21 July 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 15 June 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 22 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 7 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 gunboat</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 29 Nov 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 29 July 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 air-trans flight</td>
<td>(A) 9 Dec 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 26 Nov 50</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1 inf pltn</td>
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<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 destroyer</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 23 Nov 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 16 July 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1 FA regt &amp; support units</td>
<td>2 frigates</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Dec 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 1 Aug 50</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
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<td>(A) 19 Sept 50</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 fighter-bomber sqdn</td>
<td>(AF) 5 Nov 50</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>2 corvettes, 1 transport ship</td>
<td>1 air transport flight</td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(N) 7 Nov 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 23 June 51</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Kinds of Aid</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 hospital ship &amp; medical team</td>
<td>7 Mar 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 field ambulance unit</td>
<td>20 Nov 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 Red Cross hospital unit</td>
<td>16 Nov 51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 mobile army surgical hospital</td>
<td>22 June 51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 field hospital unit</td>
<td>28 Sept 50</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Date is based on the arrival of advance party)
APPENDIX III
GLOSSARY OF KOREAN SUFFIXES

baui (pau'i) ................. rock
bong (pong) ................. bong, pong or san denotes a mountain
chon ....................... river: in general small river forming a tribu-
tary to a Gang. (e.g. Sami-chon joins Imjin
Gang.)
dan (tan) .................... point
do (to) ....................... island, (e.g. Cheju-do, Sok-to)
dong (tong) ................... village, settlement
gang (kang) .................. river, (e.g. Han Gang, Nakdong Gang)
gap (kap) .................... point
gol (kol) ..................... village, it also means a ravine or valley
jae (chae) ................... mountain pass
li (ni, ri) ..................... area name; smallest administrative unit
consisting of several villages; township
lyong (nyong, ryong) ........ mountain or mountain pass
maul ........................ village, settlement
nae ............................ stream, creek, brook
namdo ....................... south province
pukto (bugdo) ............... north province
sa .............................. temple
san ............................ mountain
## APPENDIX IV

### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abn</td>
<td>Airborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austr</td>
<td>Australia; Australian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>Browning Automatic Rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Battalion Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bdry</td>
<td>Boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belg</td>
<td>Belgium; Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General (or Brig-Gen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMCT</td>
<td>Beginning of Morning Civil Twilight (See EECT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMNT</td>
<td>Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight (See EENT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brg</td>
<td>Bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig</td>
<td>Brigade; Brigadier</td>
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<tr>
<td>Btry</td>
<td>Battery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Can</td>
<td>Canada; Canadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cav</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (Sometimes CinCUNC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co</td>
<td>Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colom</td>
<td>Colombia; Colombian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comd</td>
<td>Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comdr</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComNavFE</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces, Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Command Post</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
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<td>Div</td>
<td>Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>EECT</td>
<td>End of Evening Civil Twilight (See BMCT)</td>
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<td>EENT</td>
<td>End of Evening Nautical Twilight (See BMNT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eth</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSAK</td>
<td>Eighth United States Army in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAFIK</td>
<td>Fifth Air Force in Korea</td>
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<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr</td>
<td>France; French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fwd</td>
<td>Forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>OB</td>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLR</td>
<td>Outpost Line of Resistance</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gr</td>
<td>Greece; Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>High Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Periodic Intelligence Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POR</td>
<td>Periodic Operation Report</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
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<td>Inf</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
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<td>Regt</td>
<td>Regiment</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Air Force</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>KATUSA</td>
<td>Korean Augmentation to the United States Army</td>
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<td>LD</td>
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<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
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<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Luxem</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>ROKN</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Task Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force or Training Film</td>
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<td>TG</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
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<td>Major</td>
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<td>Main Supply Route</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations (or U.N.)</td>
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<td>NK</td>
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<td>WIA</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vadm</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX V

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ADVANCE TO THE NORTH (29–24 OCT 1950)

LEGEND
- - - LNC Front Line extending 20 Oct
- - - - LNC Front lines reached by Enemy, 24 Oct
- - - - - Lines of INPA Counterattack Area

CHINA

KOREA

 Situation Map 7
THE BATTLE OF UNSAN (NIGHT OF 1–2 NOV 1950)

LEGEND
8th US Cav and 15th ROK
Regiments, Evening 1 Nov
CCF Blocking Positions, 1 Nov
CCF Attack, Night, 1–2 Nov
Principal CCF Blocking Positions:
Night, 1–2 Nov

Situation Map 8
IX US CORPS RESUMES ADVANCE* (7—13 JUNE 1951)

LEGEND
- UN Advance 7 June
- UN Advance 13 June

Situation Map 16
INDEX

Acheson, Dean G. (US): 11, 35–36, 38, 395, 379, 389, 495, 503

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