THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
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VOLUME III

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Minister of National Defense  Suh Jyong Chul
FOREWORD

Twenty years have passed since the shooting war in Korea was brought to an uneasy termination with the Armistice Agreement in 1953. In this divided land of Korea, flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement by north Korean communists still persist. Time and again, they have infiltrated well-trained, armed agents and saboteurs into the south, by land, sea and even by way of third countries. On innumerous occasions, they opened unprovoked fire against men peacefully engaged in their normal activities, such as patrol along the Demilitarized Zone, fishing at sea, etc. During the ceremony commemorating the 29th anniversary of national liberation and independence, 15 August 1974, the life of the First Lady of the Republic of Korea was taken by the bullets of a north Korean communist-directed assassin, which had meant for the life of the President.

In addition to their own continuing military build-up in north Korea, they unlawfully introduced and deployed offensive weapons, emplacements, and troops into the northern half of the Demilitarized Zone. Furthermore, they have constructed a formidable underground approach tunnel in the southern section of the Demilitarized Zone, as discovered in November 1974. It is capable of being used for easily infiltrating a large-scale attacking force into the Republic of Korea. Despite the world-wide trend of detente and the deceptive peace propaganda of north Korea, all these instances clearly evidence their consistent intention of unifying Korea by force under communist rule.

In this context of the situation, the United Nations Command in Korea continues to be a potent deterrent to the possible resumption of hostilities on the peninsula. The peace-keeping role of the Command can not be overstated in view of the cherished goal of the Republic of Korea: Unification by peaceful means.

This book delineates how gallantly hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines from free nations fought shoulder to shoulder with our stout-hearted troops under the banner of the United Nations against aggression. Their noble sacrifice in Korea for the common cause of freedom shall perpetually remain in the hearts of the people of the Republic of Korea.

In closing, this book is reverently dedicated to all the comrades-in-arms from the United Nations, particularly to those who gave their lives on this soil that freedom and peace might be restored to this Land of Morning Calm -- Korea.

10 December 1974
Seoul

SUH JYONG CHUL
Minister of National Defense
PREFACE

This is the third in a five volume series, the first two volumes of which have been very well received. Volume III deals primarily with combat unit operations from six U.N. members -- Belgium, Colombia, France, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In addition, it covers the activities of the medical support teams from Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden. Volume IV, to be published the next year, will present the United States contribution to the Korean War effort.

This volume has been written based primarily on the materials furnished by the participated nations and from records maintained by this Committee. However, incomplete reference materials, particularly concerning the medical support teams, has limited the detailed coverage of certain aspects of this volume. In this light, it is important to mention that the amount of space afforded each nation herein is by no means meant to reflect upon the contribution made by that nation, but has resulted only from the amount of historical data available and the length of time each nation served in Korea. The sole responsibility for any errors, of course, rests with the Committee.

Before the Committee referred the completed manuscripts of this volume to its Joint Review Board for final review, a draft manuscript, by Part, had been sent to the relevant agencies of the respective nations for their review. Unfortunately, however, this Committee, pressed by publication time requirements, was unable to reflect all those comments or additional materials which arrived too late. However, it will be appreciated if each nation who participated in the Korean War would continue to furnish the Committee any Korean War related material. These materials will be valuable for a supplementary edition which the Committee has planned for publication in the near future.

I wish to extend my particular gratitude to each nation, as well as to the respective embassies and the liaison missions to the U.N. Command in Korea and also to the Historical Section of the Eighth U.S. Army, for their continuous cooperation throughout the course of research and writing.

LEE HYUNG SUK
Chairman
War History Compilation Committee

10 December 1974
Seoul, Korea
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. Contents.
Except Part One and Eight each Part of this volume is independent as a separate chronicle of a nation which has participated in the Korean War.

2. Equation of Time.
Times and dates used in this volume are those of the place under discussion. It must be kept in mind for reference that there is a time difference of fourteen hours between Seoul and New York.

The Korean names are given according to the Korean custom, that is with the surname first.

The place names are spelled in accordance with the ROK Army Map Service spellings which are coincided with the McCune-Reischauer System of Romanizing the Korean Alphabet. The breve mark, however, has been omitted. In case of nominal changes the new names are indicated along with the old ones. Some place names are followed by a descriptive, hyphenated suffix. See Appendix V for further reference.

5. Maps and Illustrations.
Sketch maps and photographs have been used to illustrate the moves, actions and events in the hope that this arrangement will make the narrative easier to follow. In addition, the situation maps are also annexed at the end of Appendixes to illustrate the development of the battle actions more in detail.
6. **Italicization.**

In printing, the Italic typesetting is applied to the some words and phrases that are often italicized in English context or to the specific terms and some quotations in order to distinguish it from normal narrative. The names and designations of the opponent elements and units are also italicized to discern from the friendly ones.

7. **Abbreviations.**

As a general rule, the first time a unit and other terms are mentioned they have been given their full titles, but thereafter generally accepted abbreviations have been used as listed in Appendix VI.

8. **Appendixes.**

Chronology, bibliographical references, military symbols, code names, and glossaries are also included in the Appendixes.

9. **Index.**

The relevant names, places, and incidents are enumerated in the Index in alphabetical order at the volume's end for cross-reference.
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CHAPTER I    AGGRESSION FROM COMMUNIST NORTH

Section 1. Preliminary Remarks

General Remarks

When the North Korean Communists launched their all-out offensive in surprise across the 38th Parallel against the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950, the attention of the whole world was suddenly focused upon this peninsula-country, which was not well-known yet to the Occidental peoples.

Communism dropped its mask of hypocrisy and flung down its challenge to the free world in an open act of aggression that left no doubt as to the danger the free nations were facing. The tune was familiar, only the place, time and people had changed. Czechoslovakia, China and Eastern Germany had danced with the Reds and lost the freedom which they had won out of World War II. Korea was to be the next victim. In other words, the free world won the war but lost the peace. The Communist world hoarded its war-won strength and built upon it, while the free world spent its strength in a prodigal and profligate holiday from war or anything resembling.

In Korea, the Communists found a perfectly patterned scapegoat to test, not only newly acquired North Korea, but also to challenge the very foundation of the United Nations which had acted as a go-between in the founding of the Republic of Korea. It goes without saying that the Communists wanted to use the Korean peninsula as a steppingstone for the communism expansion.

Korea as a trouble spot had been brought about by the Communist refusal to unite the country under one government. Every effort of the United Nations to clear the way for a peaceful settlement of the divided country met with rebuffs from the Soviet bloc. It was clear for all to see that the "Iron Curtain" treatment had sealed North Korea from the rest of the world, but few believed that the Communists would attempt to communize the peninsula by force of arms.
The Background

The news of the North Korean Communist Forces (NKCF) invasion of the newly born Republic of Korea shocked the world, particularly the United Nations, because the world organization assisted in her birth a few years ago. Why did the United Nations concern itself with an attack in distant Korea, and for what reasons did the Communist invaders desire to conquer the Republic of Korea by means of arms? The answers lie variously in Korea's geographic positions, traditional relations with its neighbouring countries, and the aftermath of World War II.

In understanding the Korean War and the direct participation of the United Nations Forces, some historical background is essential. Korea is separated from its northern neighbours, Manchuria and the Soviet Union, by the Yalu (Amnok) and Tumen (Tuman) Rivers. Bounded south by the Korea Strait, west by the Western Sea or Yellow Sea, and east by the Eastern Sea, Korea was found in 2,333 B.C., four thousand three hundred and seven years ago.

The name by which Korea is best known to its own people in the old days is Choson, which may be translated as "Land of Morning Calm." The Republic of Korea uses for its official name, within the country, Dae Han Min Guk. The Occidental name, Korea was derived from the Koryo dynasty (A.D. 918 to 1392). Koryo may be literally translated as "high and beautiful."

Although Korea was so little known to Westerners that it was long called the Hermit Kingdom, its strategically important position on the gateway of the Asiatic land mass has been thoroughly appreciated by the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians.

A long rivalry between China and Japan for influence in Korea resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 which crumbled China's prestige and established the Japanese control over the Korean Kingdom. In 1905 the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) removed Russia from the strategic peninsula and for the next forty years the Japanese were supreme in Korea. From 1910 to 1945, as a segment of the Japanese Empire, Korea lost all semblance of sovereignty.

The Korean national desire for independence had gained the sympathy of the Allied Powers during World War II. In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people by
Japan, pledged that "in due course" Korea would become free and independent. On 26 July 1945, President Harry S. Truman, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang, through the Potsdam Declaration, to which the Soviet Union subscribed when it declared war against Japan on 8 August 1945, reaffirmed that the terms of the Cairo agreement should be carried out.

After Japan's first offer of surrender on 10 August 1945, when the US forces were in Okinawa and the Soviet Red forces were already in Korea, the United States proposed that Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel should surrender to the Soviet commander, while those south of that line should surrender to the American commander. This arrangement was accepted by the Soviet Russia and the Government of the United Kingdom and was incorporated in the General Order No. 1 issued on 2 September 1945, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

It should be clearly understood that there was never any formal wartime agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to divide Korea into two zones of occupation. Korea was divided at the 38th Parallel north latitude purely on a temporary basis to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese troops in Korea.

Again it was established as the line of demarcation between the two zones solely for the purpose of administering the Japanese surrender. It was a purely artificial line, corresponding to no geographical or ethnical division, and was not intended to be in any way permanent.

Meanwhile, north of the Parallel, the Russians made feverish efforts to Sovietize the Korean people. The Soviet troops had crossed into Korea on 12 August 1945, before the 38th Parallel had been agreed upon by the Allied Powers. And the 38th Parallel, chosen arbitrarily only as a military expedient to facilitate the capitulation of the Japanese troops, was completely sealed off and traffic to and from north Korea was choked up, thus suddenly became a political frontier. Thereafter, like the European countries occupied by the Russian troops, North Korea was turned into an armed camp. The Communist trained Koreans poured back from USSR and China, a heavily armed military establishment was created and trained by ideologically pure instructors, objectors were ruthlessly eliminated, and North Korea was prepared in every way for its ultimate role as a satellite-territory of Soviet Union.

Korea - U.N. Relationship

In the south, on the other hand, the Korean people made every possible
effort towards unity and independence of nation. The U.S. Military Government
had also concentrated its efforts on the reconstruction of the shattered economy
and on preparing for the Koreans in its zone for self-government, while the
Russians in the north set up a Communist puppet band.

Finally convinced that further attempts to solve the problem of Korean
unification and independence by bilateral negotiation were futile, the U.S.
Government laid the issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 17 September 1947.

In spite of the uncooperative attitude of the Soviet Union the U.N. General
Assembly adopted a resolution on 14 November 1947 calling for elections in
Korea, and establishing a U.N. Temporary Commission to observe nation-wide
free elections for a Korean National Assembly, which would set up a National
Government.

When the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) arrived in
Korea early in 1948, it was refused access to the Soviet occupied zone, but on
10 May the same year it observed Korea's first democratic election in the south.
The Republic of Korea Government was accordingly brought into being on 15
August 1948.

On 12 December 1948, the Republic of Korea was acknowledged by the
General Assembly of the United Nations as the only lawful and valid government
in Korea. In the spirit of the Assembly resolution, the many nations formally
recognized the new Republic early in 1949, but on 8 April 1949 the U.N.
membership was denied by a Soviet veto. The R.O.K. Government did, however,
become a member of many important international organizations including the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), WHO, UNESCO and
Food and Agriculture Organization.

Prelude to Storm

From its inception, the Republic of Korea was subjected to the most
extreme provocations by the NK puppet regime which, between 1948 and 1950,
in combination with communism's world-wide propaganda campaigns to harass
the growth of the young Republic.

With enthusiastic Soviet and Red China's aid, the warmongers in North
Korea rigorously trained an aggressive army. They were warlike and determined
to gain preinvasion combat experience. By striking time and again across the
38th Parallel, NK Communists forced the south to fall in a precarious position.
These aggressive maneuvers were countered with the great difficulty by the ROK
Army, which was a lightly equipped force designed solely for defense and internal security. Every American combat unit in Korea had left the country by the end of June 1949 and the ill-trained ROK troops were harassed by frequent border raids.

It is a Communists' physiology that they set their eyes always upon any weak spot and then they attempt to probe or attack on it when the balance of power broke or lost.

Thus, when international communism was camouflaging its preparation for aggressive war by protesting its affection for peace, the NK puppet regime pursued an identical tactic and launched an undeclared war and then a full-scale war in the next against the south.

It short, when all else had failed -- border raids, guerrilla warfare, bribery, strikes, sabotage, character assassination, economic strangulation, and intensive propaganda -- the puppet regime in North Korea, led by a Soviet-trained ringleader, who (real name is Kim Sung-ju) changed his given name to Kim Il-sung in order to benefit from the fame of an oldtime hero (against the Japanese rule) of the same name, decided upon a full-scale war to bring the Republic of Korea into the Communist sphere.

Section 2. The Sudden Invasion

Outbreak of the War

At 0400 hours (Korean time) on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, the NK Communists forces began the invasion of the Republic of Korea.

In Seoul, the capital of the free Republic, the full extent of the military situation then in progress along the 38th Parallel was not immediately apparent. When the first reports of the Communist attack reached the capital, everybody thought with one accord it was just another border raid. It was natural at the time that the Red odds in the north had frequently been attempted to raid into the ROK defense positions everywhere along the 38th Parallel.

Less than 80 kilometers from the villages, rice fields, hills, and mud roads over which the northern legions swarmed, knowledge of the situation grew but gradually, and worse reports from the frontier rushed in from moment to moment, indicating that the enemy onslaught was something unusual and much bigger than a border raid-scale. A well-organized NK Red forces, supported by
the Russian-built T-34 tanks and planes, were rolling irresistibly southward.

Everywhere the ROK units, without tanks or aircraft, were falling back in confusion. The element of tactical surprise and the NK Communist forces, overwhelming superiority in numbers, weapons, firepower of artillery, mobility and everything in other aspects, crushed the ROK forces resistance in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel from the outset. Worse, the ROK defenders had antitank weapons neither.

The peace-loving people in the south was completely caught by the enemy’s surprise attack.

None but the Pyongyang puppet regime and its intimate advisors knew the exact battle plans and strength of the well-drilled forces which charged across the Parallel into the ROK defenses. Only they knew that the seven full infantry divisions on the front and with three divisions in reserve, over 1,400 artillery pieces, thousands of mortars, and 240 tanks were directly committed to the southward stab. Only they knew that the 1st and 6th NK Divisions and the 3rd NK Constabulary Brigade would keep the ROK defense units pinned down on the Ongjin Peninsula and in the Kaesong–Koryangpo area, while the main attacking forces, consisting of the 3rd and 4th NK Divisions plus the 105th Tank Division, would strike in the Tongduchon–Uijongbu area — intend upon a blitzkrieg-type advance down the corridor to Seoul. Only they knew that while the 2nd and 7th NK Divisions attacked in the central front in the neighbourhood of Chorwon and Chunchon, other units such as the 5th NK Division and the 1st NK Constabulary Brigade would be advancing down the east coast aided by amphibious landings from sailboats and motor launches.

Blitzkrieg Tactics

Equipped with the bulk of modern weapons, the NK Reds waited no one and rushed down southward. Thousands of battle veterans with years of service in the other Communist armies either in Russia or Red China provided the hard core of the invading Red forces.

Moreover, there can be no doubt that the Soviet advisors played an overwhelming part in planning the invasion operation. Directing their plans, training, and all other activities in readying the NK Communists for invasion was Colonel General Terenti F. Shtykov, the head of the Soviet mission in Pyongyang.

In drawing up their timetable, the Communists apparently assumed that the initial advantage of a strong surprise attack in great force against the fledged
Aggression from Communist North

ROK Army equipped with no tanks, no airplanes and no heavy guns would be followed by a quick and decisive victory for the forces of communism.

Members of the high command in the NK puppet regime, and their colleagues in Russia and Red China, of course, did not fully anticipate the indignation which their aggression would arouse in the United Nations, and that the United States and other free nations would promptly come to the aid of the Republic of Korea under the authority of the U.N. Security Council of the United Nations.

The next day, that was on 26 June, Korean time and Sunday on 25 June in western time, the Communist invasion splashed over the front pages in all the morning papers throughout the world. Thus, around the world, outside the Iron Curtain, the news of the invasion of the Republic of Korea had greatly shocked the governments and peoples alike. The questions everyone asked were: “Does this mean the beginning of World War III? or will the Americans and any other free nations go to the aid of the Republic of Korea?”

Since the North Korean puppet regime was completely closed-door, reliable information about the NK Communist aggression was slow in reaching the outside world. So unexpected was the attack and such was its force that the ROK defenders were throw into disorder. The well-organized NK Communist forces in mass, supported by the Russian-built T-34 tanks and planes, were pushing steadily southward. The NK Reds moved for a speedy and decisive victory over the ROK forces, which without powerful and hurried assistance, would be submerged.
CHAPTER II PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES

Section 1. Collective Security Action

In the Korean War one of the most significant aspects was the participation of so many United Nations members. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, its members had teamed together to aid another free nation in a grave crisis. The world body quickly denounced the Communist invasion as aggression and, with the United States as principal participant, the member nations immediately came to the aid of the Republic of Korea for the common cause of freedom.

It will be as well at this point to trace the motives of the historical decisions made by the United Nations to participate in the Korean War against the Red aggressors.

While the fledged ROK forces resisted the Red invaders as best they could, the anxious world eyes and ears centered on the reactions of the United Nations, because the Republic of Korea was freely born two years ago under the aegis of this biggest international organization in the human history. What would the United Nations do about the NK Communists' attack? The failure of the world to take action when, in 1931, Japan seized upon Manchuria by force had contributed to a general lack of confidence in the League of Nations. Because the world organization was then unwilling to act in concert against the aggressors, the Japanese could occupy whole Manchuria freely. It further led the Japanese to wage more bigger aggressive war in July 1937 and then the Pacific War in December 1941. Moreover, Hitler and Mussolini and other dictators of the past score of years were in free to commit one excess after another, because the world did not taken any counteractions against the aggressors. These aggressors, in consequences, went on and on until the entire world was plunged into war -- World War II.

There were so much questions arose among the free peoples by the Korean crisis. Was a test case being made of Korea by international communism? Was it to become an invitation for unchallenged aggression in Europe, Southeast
Participation of the United Nations Forces

Asia, and the Middle East? The free world wondered. Initially, some peoples in the world felt that Japan was the real Communist objective. The invasion of Korea, coming so soon after the "loss" of the mainland of China in the hands of the Chinese Communists, was to be part of an international psychological campaign to push Japan into neutralism, and then into communism, almost without firing a shot.

Nevertheless, the Communists threw off their mask once again at last aiming their ultimate goal at the world conquest by means of force.

U. N. Move

The news of the Communist aggression in Korea reached the United Nations Secretariat at New York before Saturday midnight, 24 June 1950 in New York time. That Sunday was the anniversary eve of the signing of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco on 26 June 1945. Now, five years later, a group of obscure Asian Communists had challenged the world organization which was established to maintain international peace and security and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace in the world. Under the wing of communism, the self-constituted puppet regime in North Korea sought to settle a bitter political dispute by force. The Communists betrayed themselves the Bolshevik terrorism in politics.

The Republic of Korea Government promptly informed the fact to the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea in Seoul. Pointing out that the Communist invasion was mortal detrimental to the peace and security of the entire world, the Government requested the Commission to order the Communists to stop the aggression and, in the meantime, to call the attention of the U.N. Security Council to the Korean situation. The Government also made an official request to the United States for arms aid.

The U.N. Commission in Korea immediately reported to the Secretary General of the United Nations that the NK Communist forces had attacked all along the 38th Parallel. It drew the Secretary General's attention to the seriousness of the situation, which was assuming the character of full-scale war and endangering the maintenance of international peace and security.

Meanwhile, the United States Government, at 2126 hours, Eastern Daylight Time on 24 June, received from U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio in Seoul the official report of the invasion. Under the leadership of President Harry S. Truman, it called for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council. No one in the
U.S. Government, however, believed that the NK Communist clique would obey a "cease and desist" order from the world organization but it was the proper way to set things in motion. At 3 a.m. in New York time on 24 June, Ernest A. Gross, deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations, rang the U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie, saying that the NK Communist attack was a breach of the peace and an act of aggression within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. The Secretary General already knew of the Communist invasion and he had cabled to the U.N. Commission on Korea in Seoul for full particulars.

The U.N. Security Council acted swiftly. Twenty-four hours after the NK invasion it met at the request of the United States, at 2 p.m. on 25 June, New York time. The U.S. representative told the Council that the NK Communist aggression constituted a breach of peace as specified in Article 39, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and demanded that the Council bring about an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of the NK forces to the north of the 38th Parallel.

The Security Council, observing that the ROK Government was lawfully established, adopted a resolution by a vote of nine to zero with the Soviet Union absent and Yugoslavia casting alone negative vote. China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States voted for the resolution. Yugoslavia, although supporting the call for a cessation of hostilities, abstained from voting for the full resolution. The Yugoslavia delegate thought the North Korean puppet regime should be heard before further action was taken by the world body. The U.N. Commission on Korea was requested without delay to observe the withdrawal of the NK Communist forces, and all the U.N. members were asked to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this first resolution and to refrain from assisting the NK Communists.

The next day the Commission on Korea reported more fully. It observed that all the evidence at its disposal, far from justifying the NK puppet regime's allegations that the attack was begun by the south, pointed to a calculated and coordinated NK attack, prepared and launched with secrecy. In another message, it expressed the view that, judging from the actual progress of operations, the NK Communist attack was a well-planned, full-scale invasion, which took the ROK forces, deployed on a wholly defensive basis, completely by surprise.

Meanwhile, heedless to this overture for a peaceful settlement, the NK Communists continued their savage attack and pressed southward against the numerically inferior Republic of Korea forces.
Collective Police Action

At noon on 27 June, Washington time, the President of the United States issued a statement pointing out that the NK Red forces, in defiance of the U.N. Security Council, were pressing their onslaught rather more hard. President Truman announced that he had ordered the U.S. air and naval forces to give the Republic of Korea Government forces cover and support.

Three hours later, the U.N. Security Council met again and, nothing from the report of the UNTCOK that the NK forces had neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn to the 38th Parallel, it adopted a second resolution, in the continued absence of the Soviet Union delegation, by seven votes to one (Yugoslavia), with two abstentions. China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States voted for this resolution. The representatives of India and Egypt did not vote because they had no instructions from their home governments. India, however, later notified its support for the resolution. This resolution recommended that the U.N. member states furnish all assistance to the Republic of Korea necessary for repulsing the armed aggression and to restore peace and security in the area. The next day the U.N. Secretary General transmitted the resolution to all member states and asked what aid, if any, they would give the Republic of Korea.

An overwhelming majority of the U.N. members endorsed the action of the Security Council which was opposed only by the Soviet bloc (USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland). Russia, which had been absent from the Security Council, was too late to stop the United Nations from acting. The 27 June resolution stood. In retrospect, absence of the Soviet delegate (Jacob Malik) permitted quick action by the U.N. Security Council, but it deprived the United States of an expected opportunity to take the Korean issue, the Communist invasion, to the General Assembly, where it hoped to limit the Soviet veto power. In another words, the United States had planned to introduce in the General Assembly, and see passed a "Uniting for peace" resolution, which would have taken the matter of the Security Council's hands. But, the 27 June resolution (New York time) was adopted so smoothly. Immediate assistance was stepped up by the United States, which informed the U.N. Secretary General on 30 June and on 6 July (all New York time) that, in addition to the naval and air support already provided, President Truman had offered certain supporting ground units. Moreover, he had authorized the US air forces to carry out the missions on the military targets in North Korea and a naval blockade of the whole Korean coast
had been ordered.

The United Kingdom and other member nations of the British Commonwealth were also swift to respond with military aid. For instance, the British and Australian naval units in the nearby waters were immediately placed at the disposal of the United States naval forces in Far East, whose forces were bearing the brunt of the action in support of the Republic of Korea.

Other U.N. allies offered the military support in a steady stream, while many were prepared to assist with hospital units, medical supplies, transport, and foodstuffs.

In retrospect, there were plenty of good political reasons for the United Nations members to physically participate in the Korean War. Above all things, the United Nations, as already mentioned earlier, had recognized the Republic of Korea Government as the only legitimate government in Korea. Whereas, the self-appointed, self-perpetuated puppet regime in Communist North had now resorted to dominate the whole peninsula by force of arms.

If the member nations merely lifted their hands in pious protest and let the NK Communist aggression succeed, the United Nations Charter would become just another scrap of paper and the world organization would be morally meaningless. Let the aggression succeed in Korea and there would be no end to similar appeals to force in a world which balanced precariously along the ideological razor edge which divided east from west. The cold war would flare up in recurring blazes and freedom and peace would be anywhere safe.

Fortunately, in deed, the free world had not forgotten that, in the past, by compromising with aggressions in China in 1931 by Japan and in Ethiopia in 1935 by Italy's Mussolini the old League of Nations had slid down the steep pathway to World War II.

Thus, with the overwhelming feeling the aggression once unchecked, might sweep all before it, the overwhelming member states of the United Nations had solemnly declared their determination to unite their strength under the U.N. Charter to maintain peace and security. In essence, this meant a united front against aggression, the common foe.

United Nations Command

On 7 July (in New York time) a third resolution was adopted by the Security Council by seven votes in favor, none against and three abstentions (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia), to organize the first police force in the history ever to be
formed by an international organization. The resolution called for establishing a unified command under the U.N. flag with an American as commander. In accordance with this resolution, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea. Sixteen countries responded to the resolution to fight against the Communist aggression, 53 others rendered other assistance to the Republic of Korea.

On the other hand, many free nations in the world were being so concerned about the move of the Communists. Since no one knew whether Korea was merely a sideshow to divert attention from a larger Communist thrust elsewhere, it was deemed in many aspects, difficult to send large troops to Korea by the free allies for their own security, particularly those neighbouring countries with the Communist bloc.

Yet, they felt strongly that if the free world let Korea down, the
Communists, led by the Soviet Russia, will keep on going and swallow up one region of Asia after another. If Asia went, the Near East would soon begin to crumble. There was no telling what would happen in Europe. Accordingly, the UN forces all corners of the world poured into Korea one after another to fight against the Red odds.

The United Nations had welcomed contributions, large and small, in its desire to elicit the military help and moral substance against the Communist Aggression in Korea. The one exception had been the 33,000 troops offered by Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalist China. Because of the possibility of political complications with Red China, Generalissimo Chiang's offer was declined.

These Allied forces, except the United States and the British Commonwealth Nations, were comparatively small units in terms of strength under the United Nations Command. For the ground troops, the United Kingdom, then known as Great Britain, Canada, and Turkey dispatched a brigade or more. The others were a battalion-sized strength except for Luxembourg.

However, it was not the number of troops sent by each nation that was important. What truly important was that the fact that this was the first United Nations war, the first time in history that the free Allies from the world had banded together under the U.N. flag to repel the Communist aggression. Above all things, as this book will show, the accounts on their operations should not be interpreted as an over-valuation of their part.

In addition to the armed forces of the Republic of Korea, the United Nations Command consisted of military formations, in alphabetical order, from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Besides, Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden sent the medical units. From the beginning, however, the United States forces were the effective core of the U.N. forces and throughout the fighting the United States made by far the biggest and most effective contribution of any single nation.

A Global War

At all events, for the first time a political alliance of nations had applied force of arms to punish and restrain an act of aggression. The act, the cause and the effect of it, was beset by problems without precedent.

It was great good fortune for the free Koreans that the free nations of
the world had viewed the defense for the Republic of Korea as part of the defense of freedom elsewhere.

To the sharp contrary, on the other hand, the Soviet Union, a guardian for the imitated Kim Il-sung's puppet clique, was plainly hurt by the promptness with which both the United Nations and the free world reacted to the heavy-handed Communist schemes in Korea. The Soviet delegate on the U.N. Security Council, having avoided the meetings (on 25 June, 27 June and 7 July, all New York time) which denounced the aggression in Korea, attempted to label the Council resolutions illegal because of his absences. However, since the Security Council had determined that mere absence did not constitute a veto, the NK puppet regime and its Communist accomplices stood accused before the bar of world opinion as aggressors.

Section 2. The War Situation

Down to the Naktong

Once the U.N. decision was made, the combat troops began to rush to Korea from every corner of the free world and the naval ships soon converged on Korea from every one of the seven seas.

On 2 July 1950, B-29's of the US Air Force, with the Australian Air Squadron in escort, struck at the military targets in North Korea, while the American and British naval forces were already operating in the Korean waters. On the ground, meanwhile, the first contingent of the US Army troops began arriving in Korea from 1 July. Yet, the UN forces in action were still in token only in nature, strength and effectiveness, except for morale that raised highly upon the Republic of Korea forces. As a result, the ROK and UN ground forces had no alternative but to conduct a series of the delaying actions in order to gain time at a cost of ground, pending for build-up of force for future counteroffensive operations. Thus, during the first weeks of the fighting the enemy forces exploited to the full the military advantage they had gained by their sudden onslaught and, despite the gallant resistance of the ROK units with the support of the US Army units drove steadily southward.

At this juncture, on 14 July, New York time, the Secretary General of the United Nations brought to the attention of member governments the urgent need
for additional effective assistance and requested them to provide an increased volume to the combat forces, particularly the ground forces. In consequence, the Allied nations accelerated their actions in sending the fighting troops.

Nevertheless, the ROK forces and their comrades in arms came from the U.N. allies were forced to back as far south down to the Naktong River line. By mid-September, thereafter, despite the continuing NK Communist pressure, the ROK and UN forces firmly held the Naktong Perimeter.

Up to the Yalu

The NK puppet regime, which had counted a quick and overwhelming victory before 15 August, was given a stunning shock during the last two weeks of September 1950. On 16 September the UN allied forces broke out of the Naktong Perimeter with a brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon on the 15th behind the enemy lines. The tide of war was now turned completely upside down and, the U.N. advance was as fast as the lightning, thus reaching the 38th Parallel within a matter of weeks almost at will.

Meanwhile, the question of pursuing the NK Red forces across the 38th Parallel arose at the United Nations. However, the majority member nations took the position that, if the NK Red odds were not completely destroyed and their war potential eliminated, they would live indefinitely beneath the threat of renewed Communist aggression. Furthermore, the free nations members felt that General MacArthur had sufficient authority under "the 27 July resolution" of the Security Council calling for restoration of international peace and security to continue the advance northward up to the northern border line.

Before ordering the advance beyond the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur called upon the enemy to surrender unconditionally to avoid further shedding of blood and destruction of property.

On the other hand, on 7 October, New York time, the U.N. General Assembly approved the eight-power proposals by forty-seven to five, with seven abstentions and one absence. This resolution was sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Britain, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan and the Philippines to set up "a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign state of Korea" under a seven-nation U.N. Commission, consisting of Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

Since the NK Reds had made no reply to General MacArthur's demand for
surrender the UN forces began their advance across the 38th Parallel. The ROK forces were already moving northward beginning from 1 October.

From that time onward, the Allied forces advanced to the north with irresistible force, like the surging waves in the high sea, gaining victory after victory. Pyongyang was about to be the first satellite base of the Communist bloc liberated by the UN forces. There followed the hot pursuit. All the enemy forces had been frightened out of their senses. Consequently, the occupation and control of the entire north Korean territory was within a matter of days or weeks.
CHAPTER III AGGRESSION FROM COMMUNIST CHINA

Section 1. A New Phase of War

Illegal and Barbarous Aggression

By now, when the vanguards of the advancing ROK units had reached the Yalu River (Amnok-gang), the Korea-Manchuria border, on 26 October 1950, the U.N. Army forces included the ground troops from Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. A South African AF Squadron arrived in Korea during this period. Some free nations hesitated to dispatch the additional reinforcements because the war was seemingly nearly over in a decisive victory by the UN forces.

Yet, the full extent of the danger and potential disaster of the forces between the free world and the Communists, which was precipitated with ruthless cynicism in Korea, did not become fully apparent until November 1950, when the tremendous forces of the organized Chinese Communist forces (CCF) were rushed across the Yalu River to stem the victorious advance of the ROK and UN forces.

When a reunited Korea was in sight and the order of the United Nations to restore peace and security throughout Korea was on the verge of fulfillment, again suddenly, resembling a bolt from the blue, the Red Chinese forces without provocation, without justification, wantonly invaded the soil of Korea.

Using human-sea tactics, the massive Chinese Communists, supplied with weapons of every description, chiefly from the arsenals in the international-Communist heartland, swarmed over the forward units of the ROK and UN forces.

Facing this new enemy, the outnumbered UN forces had to fall back southward. Thus, a historical golden opportunity for unifying the country -- the long-cherished hope of the Korean people -- came to naught. All the free Koreans were hotly indignant upon hearing this tragic news.

Under the severely cold weather, endless streams of refugees from North Korea, hundred thousands of men and women both young and old, flooded all
the roads leading southward, when the ROK and UN forces were withdrawing back to the south. All they tried their best, with do-or-die spirit, to escape from the hellish Communist control. All they made frantic efforts to free themselves from the fetters of communism, thus looking forward to possess a life worth living in the free Republic of Korea. Henceforth, the Korean War entered an entirely new war.

The UN forces, together with the ROK forces, now planned to resist the Red Chinese-NK aggressors through a series of defense lines as far as the old Naktong River perimeter, if forced. It was determined to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible and to maintain the Allied units intact. General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, the UN Command, felt and warned the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 December 1950 that the Red Chinese forces could, if they desired to make the effort, drive the UN forces out of Korea, unless the sanctuary of Manchuria was eliminated. In short, he felt firmly in his estimate of the new situation that he should be authorized to bomb all the war resources in Manchuria, if the United Nations forces wished to win the war in Korea. However, contrary to his hope and expectation, General MacArthur was authorized to withdraw his UN troops to Japan if that drastic measure proved necessary to avoid severe losses.

By the end of December 1950, twelve of the United Nations members, in alphabetical order, Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and the United States of America had their armed forces in Korea. In addition, there were a field ambulance unit and a Red Cross hospital came from India and Sweden respectively.

Thus, the strength of the UN ground forces in Korea now reached at a total of about 365,000 men. The largest single contingent was the Republic of Korea Army. As for the enemy, on the contrary, about 486,000 troops, or twenty-one CCF and twelve NK Communist divisions, were physically committed to the battle front and that reserves totalling over one million men were stationed near the Yalu River, in Manchuria, or on the way to Manchuria.

**U. N. Reaction against CCF Aggression**

Meanwhile, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a series of the resolutions with regard to the Korean problems: Following the resolution passed on 1 December 1950 to establish the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), it adopted a resolution on 14 December by a vote of 52 to five,
with one abstention, viewing with grave concern on the Red Chinese invasion in Korea. The latter resolution stated in part that “immediate steps should be taken to put an end to the fighting in Korea . . . then for peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”

Then, after failing to achieve a cease-fire and the peaceful settlement of the dispute in Korea, on 1 February 1951, New York time, the General Assembly adopted a resolution at its 327th Plenary Session, branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors in Korea. Noting that the Red regime in Peking had not accepted the United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities with a view to peaceful settlement, and that the Red armed forces continued their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon the United Nations forces there, the resolution, which was passed by a vote of 44 to seven with nine abstentions, once again called upon Red China to cease the fighting against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea. It prescribed that “Communist China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against the United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea . . .”

The General Assembly also established an additional measures committee to consider the application of sanctions against Red China. On 18 May 1951, the Assembly recommended that member nations apply an embargo on the shipment of munitions to the areas controlled by the Communists. Many states had already applied such measures.

Counteroffensive

From the fall of 1950 onward the enemy offensives continued down the south as far as below Seoul but his pressure relaxed along the front by 19 February 1951, when the UN forces saw a remarkable improvement in the battle situation, and the ROK and UN forces again advanced by a series of the counteroffensives. By the end of March the battlelines were again drawn around the 38th Parallel, and in the early days of April the UN forces were further advancing north of the Parallel virtually unopposed.

At this junction, General MacArthur, who had been contended that the artificial and political sanctuary of Manchuria should be bombed to win the war, still wanted to use the CCF aggression as justification for an all-out effort to neutralize the Red Chinese war capability and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it. President Truman, however, did not agreed the General's
Aggression from Communist China

concept and removed him from the post of the United Nations Command on 11 April 1951.

Section 2. The Armistice

Cease-fire Proposal by the Communists

After their most decisive offensives in April and May 1951 had ended in their vital failures, the Red Chinese fled to the north of the 38th Parallel. Though the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had limited the EUSAK advance to the general vicinity of a line known as “Kansas,” local advance to gain more favorable ground were permissible.

Meanwhile, gradually more combat, support, and medical units from the twenty U.N. countries joined the Republic of Korea by the end of June 1951. Of the 53 nations endorsed the U.N. resolution to repel the Communist invaders, 15 nations had dispatched the ground combat force: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The naval forces were contributed by Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The air forces were came from Australia, Canada, Greece, Thailand, the Union of South Africa and the United States. From India, Norway, and Sweden had come the medical and hospital units and Denmark had sent a hospital ship. In August 1951, the strength of all the ground forces under the command of General James A. Van Fleet numbered 586,769 men at their peak. A Red Cross hospital from Italy arrived in Korea in November of the same year. Thus, the Allied combat forces from the sixteen nations and the medical units from the five nations allied in support of the Republic of Korea for the common cause as the crusaders of justice and freedom.

The forces of the free nations in Korea reaffirmed to continue the fight for freedom even though some talks were heard in the United Nations corridors and were reflected in the public commentaries after the invasion of the Red Chinese forces heralded “an entirely new war.”

As the first year of the Korean War drew to a close, Jakob Malik, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, proposed on Sunday evening, 23 June, New York time, cease-fire negotiations between the opponents in the war. The
Peking radio followed his lead and indicated that Communist China favored a truce. The United Nations Command decided to meet the enemy delegation and the truce talk meeting began on 10 July 1951.

Although the truce meetings held originally at Kaesong just below the 38th Parallel and subsequently at Panmunjom were devised to attempt to settle the Korean War, the Republic of Korea had been represented only by an observer, and had had not part in determining directly the policies adopted by the UN Command’s truce delegation.

Why the cease-fire proposal was made by the Red forces? When the proposal for a truce was first presented by the enemy, the Communist aggressors were truly reeling from a series of successive defeats which had undermined their power as a fighting force. In another words, the talks saved the Red odds from immediate defeat and gave them the golden opportunity they had used so well to build new strength up.

Obviously one purpose of the Communist phony cease-fire offer was to undermine the morale and the fighting effectiveness of the ROK and UN forces which stood in their path of aggression. At the time the UN forces were well above the 38th Parallel and ensconced on the favorable terrain. Moreover, they poised to attack further north on orders with greatly increased combat power, in strength, armament and mobility in the ground, sea and air.

On the contrary, the enemy forces were vitally exhausted in their troops and supplies. The truce proposal itself clearly revealed the extent to which the Red forces had been hurt by the punishing offensive of the Allied forces. As a result, the Communists had thought out a plan as the last resort, a cease-fire. They wanted by procrastination to obtain the results they had been unable to achieve on the battlefields. And, they used the truce talks as a medium for violent propaganda attacks against the Allies. Since Kaesong was inside their lines, the Reds tried the various ways to humiliate the UN negotiations and to make it appear that they were suing for peace. It was the same old trick of theirs.

The enemy purpose in falsely proposing a truce was more diplomatic than military. The Communists hoped by delay and vacillation to undermine the courage and the union of the world alliance of freedom which was formed to stem their forward march of communism.

The Ending of Shooting

On the other hand, the reaction of the people and the Government of the
Republic of Korea had been grown cold toward the truce negotiations from the beginning. They were who most seriously concerned with the cease-fire matter than anybody else in the world. Under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee, the whole nation voiced its stern opposition to the armistice talks, for it had been a long cherished hope of the Korean people to unify the divided country. The Government and people firmly felt that the negotiations would decide the future destiny of the nation. There followed soon the severe parades and demonstrations throughout the south to protest against the truce talks. In brief, the free Korean people wanted no armistice because it would leave the country still divided.

Contrary to the hope of all the free Koreans and with an uncornered air for their long cherished desires for national unification, the truce negotiations continued to settle the war. This unusual situation had resulted in Korea occupying a curious position in relation not only to its Communist foe but also to its free and democratic Allies.

All in all, in retrospect, the two years of cease-fire negotiations had given the Communists a rare opportunity to build up and consolidate their position on land and strengthen their airpower. During the same time, the UN allies had not moved a single step closer toward re-unifying Korea, punishing the aggressors, or ensuring the principle of collective security.

After having through the talking battles ups and downs, the Armistice Agreement was finally signed on 27 July 1953; it contained the provisions against the future aggression, provided for a new line of demarcation, and included a recommendation that within three months a political conference be held to arrive at a peaceful settlement. A conference for this purpose met at Geneva, Switzerland, in 1954, but ended in failure, again by the Communists' obstruction. Thereafter, the Korean question was considered by the United Nations General Assembly at its sessions, but the deadlock remained unbroken. However, the Assembly reaffirmed after the armistice that the United Nations troops should be continued their presence in Korea under the U.N. flag.

Section 3. Retrospect

The U.N. Goal

To the serious disappointment of all the free Koreans, the armistice
agreement came into effect 2200 hours, 27 July 1953, leaving the nation remained divided. Apart from many reasons, the tragic Korean War was a frustrating experience to the non-Communist world. Not only the free Koreans but many other free peoples, particularly those facing the Communist threat, could not understand why the United Nations forces, particularly the United States, the most powerful nations in the world community, should accept an unsatisfactory conclusion of a war. Because they strongly felt that the war could have been won easily and conclusively without a serious risk which might cause to a bigger war with the Communist bloc.

The signing of the armistice, of course, brought an end to the shooting which had lasted three years, one month, and two days. Yet it did not bring an end to the ideological war.

All the free peoples as well as the UN troops in Korea were asked themselves at that time that: "Have we accomplished our objectives? What are the objectives?"

The United Nations goal in Korea has always been the establishment of a unified, independent, free and democratic Korea, by the peaceful means - the free elections throughout the country under the U.N. supervision as the world body had resolved on 14 November 1947 and on 7 October 1950, New York time, respectively. The U.N. Forces came to Korea to take the first armed collective security action to repel the aggression and restore the peace. Again, there were arose many questions among the free peoples that "did they completely repel the aggressions?"

In retrospect, within the framework of the U.N. goal, the immediate objective of the U.N. forces was to destroy and defeat the enemy forces and drive the Red Chinese aggressors out of Korea; the next one was to establish a unified, free democratic Korea under the United Nations supervision, and the ultimate one was to punish the Communist aggressors to such an extent that they would be forced to abandon their ambition of world communization. That was, perhaps, the most logical means of avoiding another world war, as far as the free Koreans were concerned.

On the other hand, did why the Communists want the armistice? Among many other reasons, obviously, the Communist aggressors had inclined toward the truce for the following reasons: (1) Tremendous losses both in manpower and materials without any hope for winning the battle, (2) isolation from the international community, and (3) strengthening of military armament in the Western allies stimulated by the illegal CCF aggression in Korea.
The Lesson of Collective Security

At all events, despite the failure to unify Korea, the free nations in the fighting against the aggression learned the real character and territorial design of the Communists. Of course they paid too high a price to learn about communism. The nations that fought under the flag of the United Nations to defend the Republic of Korea had demonstrated their ability to put aside differences and act in concert against a common foe.

When the U.N. Security Council did invoke the concept of collective security in June 1950, the peoples of the free world rejoiced; the prestige of the United Nations enhanced a hundred times; the world looked to it and cheered.

The UN forces brought victory within their grasp when they rushed up to the Korea–Manchuria border in the closing months of 1950. Thus, the initial aggressors, the NK Communists, had beaten off.

Then followed one of the grossest acts of international immorality by hundreds of thousands of trained and armed Chinese Communists. The Republic of Korea thus missed a golden opportunity to unify the nation.

It must not also be forgotten about the fate of more than ten million human beings who live in the north they had risked their lives under the hellish Communists’ yoke. They had lived by the hope the UN forces would in the end defeat the Communists and drive the aggressors out of Korea. In the absence of complete military victory for which they lived and suffered, they had two fateful choice -- either to die or to accept communism.

The Spirit of the U.N. Forces

Nevertheless, in conclusion, the Korean War was most significant in that the U.N. Security Council called on the member nations to repel the Communist aggression and the U.N. flag waved over the 16-nation Korean War allied forces, the first in history. That Nations of highly diverse cultural, religious, and racial background were willing to place their forces under a single command, the United Nations Command, was evidence that free men could rise above national pride in their never-ending fight to remain free.

Thus, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians from the nations all over the face of the globe had participated in the battle against the Red
aggression. Many had died who a short time before had known Korea only as an exotic place name on the world map.

All the peoples in the participated nations well knew their sons, brothers and husbands sacrificed their lives for the cause of all freemen. They felt that Korea should be kept free and in so doing that the world should be kept free. To them Korea was strange and far away from their respective homes. But they fought bravely and they died heroically as freemen. They gave their lives not only for the Republic of Korea and their own countries, but for all countries, which were and are threatened by the Communist conspiracy for world communication. Their noble sacrifices in Korea for the common cause shall perpetually be remained in the hearts of the Republic of Korea and her people together with the brilliant history of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War.

In brief, the lesson of collective security action -- of all for one, and one for all, against the aggressors -- was written in Korea, in letters of blood, the blood of heroic men of many free Allied nations and the blood of the free Koreans. All they sacrificed their lives for the cause of justice, freedom and peace.
CHAPTER IV POST-ARMISTICE

Section 1. National Reconstruction and Development

War's Havoc and Confusion

Twenty-one years already came and out after the Korean War, which ended in an armistice signed in July 1953.

During this period the Republic of Korea has been trying to ease tension on the Korean peninsula while she is forging ahead to join the community of industrially advanced countries, even in the face of ever-present North Korean Communist provocations.

In summarizing the recent history of Korea, if the 1950's was the age of war, confusion and agitation, the 1960's was the decade of stability and economic development. What is most remarkable in the period the 1960's and 1970's is the economic development.

The Republic of Korea, which has come a very long way in a short span of time to achieve spectacular economic progress, is confidently looking forward to joining the rank of fully industrialized nations in the 1980's.

Korea's only major asset, however, has been a hard-working, comparatively well-educated and determined people, coupled with a dedicated and able leadership.

The Republic of Korea, though hamstrung by artificial territorial division and its economy once shattered by the armed invasion from Communist North, has been undergoing change so fast and vast since the early 1960's that the contrast between what it was only a few decades ago and what it is today is literally incredible.

The fratricidal war of 1950--1953 devastated what little production facilities the fledgling Republic had.

With substantial U.S. assistance as well as friendly cooperation from many other free nations, the Republic began to rebuild the nation all over again from the ruins of the war and confusion. Yet, the recovery and rehabilitation was
slow. The economy became stagnant and political instability continued to mount. Aggravating political and social unrest brought a student revolution in April 1960. The ensuing government failed to put the nation in order as political wranglings kept on seething. A chaotic situation followed and soon was getting out of hand.

A Historical Turning Point

The crisis in the Republic was narrowly averted when President Park Chung Hee, then an army major general, assumed power through a military revolution in May 1961, in order to save the nation which was in imminent peril. In a determined series of actions, he effected sweeping political and social reforms. In 1963, the new Republic was born with a civilian government restored through elections that gave General Park a popular mandate as President.

The stage was now set for the beginning of a new era that has led to the nation's unprecedented development and modernization. Thus, the nation began the formidable task of modern-day-nation-building.

Beginning in 1962 when the nation's first five-year economic development plan was launched, the national economy has grown at an annual average of ten per cent, among the highest rates in the world during the period that coincided with the U.N.-designated "Development Decade." With the successful completion of the first plan in 1966 to lay the foundation for implementation of further development programs, the successive five-year plans that immediately followed one after another proved more fruitful, for which all the foreigners visited Korea referred to as "The Miracle on the Han River."

The country's gross national product (GNP) rose by an average of 9.1 per cent a year during the two successful five-year economic development plans.

Even more impressive are the nation's exports, which zoomed from a meager 40 million Dollars (US) a year in the early 1960's to a whopping $3.266 million in 1973, which far exceeded the year's ambitious target of $2.500 million. This meant that the merchandise exports grew by an average of 45.9 per cent annually during 1962 and 1973. This year, 1974, despite the harsh impact of the global oil price spiral, the export target of $4,500 million is already being reached by the end of October and is expecting to exceed several hundreds million Dollars as long as the current momentum is kept up.

The Republic of Korea has now set up a long-range development plan aimed at boosting the per capita income to more than 1,000 Dollars (US) and her
exports to more than $10,000 million by the early 1980's at least by 1981, through the massive build-up of heavy and chemical industries as the backbone of the nation's economy. Already the programs are bearing abundant fruits, typical of them is the spectacular growth of the steel and shipbuilding industries.

Besides, development emphasis is placed on the machinery, nonferrous metals and electronics industries.

On the other hand, as the Republic continues to move forward into the upper ranks of the world's developing nations, a particular emphasis has now also been given to the development of rural countries to increase agricultural productivity and boost farmer's incomes.

The major driving force behind the nation-wide rural community development is the "Saemaul Undong" or New Village Movement.

Now, Seoul, the bustling capital of more than 6,500,000 population and other principal cities show all the modern aspects of fast-growing urban centers while the rural communities have taken a new, completely renovated look full of vigor and vitality.

The extensive, elaborate network of multilane expressways all built by the domestic engineers, runs all over the country in all directions, linking all cities and towns together.

To make a long story short, the giant strides toward new nation-building which owe much to political stability coupled with the competent and effective leadership of President Park Chung Hee, gave the nation not only pride but more importantly self-confidence in its ability to grow further. Thus, the Republic of Korea will certainly make a historical turning point in the national economy by 1981, bringing to reality one of the long cherished dreams of the people -- self-sufficiency.

Section 2. Peace Efforts by the South

South-North Dialogue

As the nation's lot was vastly enhanced along the line with the spectacular growth of the national strength, aspiration for peace and peaceful unification grew all the greater in the Republic of Korea.

President Park Chung Hee, taking a series of the dramatic initiatives, has been repeatedly called on the puppet regime in Communist North Korea to
create peaceful environment within the Korean peninsula, hoping to fix firm
peace and then to attain the national unification by peaceful means.

On 15 August 1970, President Park called on the NK Communist regime to
renounce its aggressive designs and join in peaceful competition. Subsequently
it opened the way for south-north talks; first through the Red Cross dialogue
proposed by the Republic of Korea Red Cross to help reunite millions of sepa-
rated families in the south and north; and then by a political dialogue, at the
suggestion of the Republic, to ease tension and explore peaceful ways toward
unification.

On 4 July, 1972, Seoul and Pyongyang (capital of Communist North) an-
nounced a joint statement vowing to bury the hatchet and work together for
peaceful reunification. This statement led to the creation of the South-North
Coordinating Committee to handle the political dialogue. Yet, barely a year
later, the North Korean Communist clique unilaterally broke off the south-north
talks which it had been hampering with one impossible demand after another.

The dialogue, if any, only proved the unchanged intransigence and militancy
of the NK Communists. It was no doubt that the Communists had merely ac-
cepted to the call of the Republic, because they could find no pretext to reject.
It has become apparent that the Pyongyang puppet regime was using the south-
north dialogue as a facade behind which it kept on promoting its aggressive
designs while attempting to expand its diplomatic foothold.

In no time, Communist North reverted openly to its familiar slandering
subversive and provocative campaigns against the south. Again, the Communist
unmasked their true colors.

On the other hand, the south-north Red Cross meetings, which were in-
itiated by the proposal of the National Korean Red Cross, the Republic of Korea
on 12 August 1971, have always begun and ended without fruits caused
by the Communist’s old tricks with slanders and excuses for the boycotting of
the humanitarian talks. The Communist North just attempted to play merely a
game of engagement in a humanitarian task while plotting another national
tragedy. The Communists rejected even the mail exchange proposal between the
separated families south and north.

Very recently, the ROK Red Cross presented a five-point proposal to the
NK Communist Red Cross on 29 November 1974. The proposal included that
(1) the bothside Red Cross societies should provide a facility for free meeting
with old parents above 60 years of age at the reunion house at Panmunjom and
free visits to south and north Korea during the national festivals such as Chusok
(Autumn Moon) and the New Year’s day; (2) both sides should implement a
program for searching and informing of the whereabouts and fate of aged parents; (3) exchanging letters or request for search for missing persons which the ROK Red Cross already laid down at the third meeting held on 24 October 1972 two years ago. But, the NK Communist Red Cross side rejected all the proposals without any further discussions by repeating its political harangue.

The reason why the Communist side disagreed on such a most logical and realistic Red Cross business is that the NK regime is so afraid of a critical situation that the waves of freedom from the south would eventually flow into the north in the events of busy comings and goings, both the people and letters, between the two divided zones.

The people in the north, except the ringleader and his frantic key followers, never know about the true picture of the Republic of Korea, because imitated Kim Il-sung clique indoctrinated them all by means of false propaganda and deception.

Therefore, the puppet regime will certainly be driven to the wall, if the North Koreans became to learn and see the real state of affairs in the south; free life in full flourish and the surprising economical development in particular. "Seeing is believing." The Communists will be able to find no pretext to explain away their false propaganda about the Free Republic. Again, in short, it is living philosophy that "a thousand hearings are not worth one seeing."

An Open-Door Policy

From long, severe experiences as regards Communist North, the Republic of Korea has been well aware of the difficulty of any productive dialogue with the puppet regime in Pyongyang, which remains the world’s most antiquated, intractable clique. Accordingly, the Republic of Korea has been so awaring that any such dialogue requires great patience as well as strong national backing.

In a major move to back up her position in conducting the south-north dialogue, Revitalizing Reforms were undertaken in the Republic in October 1972 under the new constitution approved by a national referendum with the landslide support. The reforms are aimed at strengthening national solidarity and maximizing the nation's productive efficiency.

The sweeping reforms enabled President Park Chung Hee to announce a new open-door foreign policy for peace and peaceful unification on 23 June 1973. The policy expressed to improve relation with all nations, and suggested entry of the south and north into the United Nations as an interim measures pending peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula.
In a further peaceful move, President Park called on the Communist puppet regime in Pyongyang to make a no-war accord with the south.

On the contrary, the NK Communist regime has rejected every one of these peaceful proposals of the Republic of Korea and, instead, is now intensifying its militant stance.

This real, ever-present threat from across the DMZ lies only 50 kilometers north of Seoul continues to pose a most formidable problem the Republic of Korea must cope with.

As the Republic looks ahead to the challenging yet promising future, she feels ever more confident of making further progress step by step toward the ultimate fulfillment of her national goals and aspirations to play an even greater role in the community of the world.

President Park Chung Hee said in his address on the occasion marking the 4,306th anniversary of the national foundation on 3 October 1974 that: “Peace can be maintained in this land and provocative acts by the North Korean Communists can be blocked on when the Republic keeps its national strength always superior to that of Communist North.” The President further went on that the foreign policy emphasis will continuously be placed on realizing the peaceful unification of Korea based on “the June 23rd declaration” in 1973 of a new foreign policy.

Section 3. Threat to Peace by the North

Outright Acts of Aggression

There were too numerous to count that the North Korean Communists had violated the armistice terms without hesitation ever since the Armistice Agreement came into effect late in July 1953. They kidnapped two ROK civilian passenger airplanes, seized the U.S. naval patrol ship USS Pueblo, and downed a U.S. reconnaissance airplane. It is almost impossible to cite all about that the Communists have perpetrated so many provocative acts even more during the recent years in particular.

These acts included an abortive attempt to raid the presidential residence on 21 January 1968 by dispatching a 31-man commando group specially trained under the direct directives of Kim Il-sung, the ringleader of the puppet regime
in Pyongyang: the intrusion of the ranger troops into the east coast area of Samchok and Ulchin and subsequent murder of innocent civilians, including very old aged-men and children, on 11 November 1968; and the planting of an explosive device on the gate of the National Cemetery in the southeastern outskirts of Seoul in a cruel attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee who was to attend the Memorial Day Ceremony at the cemetery in June 1970.

After the south-north dialogue began, the Communists seemed for a while to refrain from provocative acts, apparently in response to the aspiration of the whole 50 million Korean people who were eager to see the unification of their divided land.

But the NK Communists, on 28 August 1973, suspended the dialogue unilaterally without reason by making the so-called "August 28 statement," to block the progress in easing the tension on the peninsula and in establishing a peace structure.

Moreover, the war-loving radicals have fortified their war strategies crying out that the situation has been aggravated similar, rather more in many aspects, to the days before the south-north communique of 4 July 1972 was issued. Their aim is to shatter the south-north dialogue.

In early February 1974, this year, the NK naval frigates harassed the passage of the ROK ferryboats plying to the five ROK islands off the west coast. Ridiculous, the outrageous fellows in the north, again showed up their clown hoof. The Pyongyang radio broadcast made the abrupt territorial claim over the waters adjacent to the five islands of Paengnyong-do, Taechong-do, Sochong-do, Yongpyong-do and U-do are theirs.

It goes without saying that the Communists are openly challenged to the terms of the Armistice Agreement and attempted to break up the terms intentionally. Referring to the Communists' illegal claim, the Armistice Agreement has clearly described under its paragraph 12 (b), Article II that these islands are belonging to the control of the Republic of Korea: "... the island groups of Paengnyong-do (37°58'N., 124°40'E.), Taechong-do (37°50'N., 127°42'E.), Sochon-do (37°46'N., 124°46'E.), Yongpyong-do (37°38'N., 125°40'E.), and U-do (37°38'N., 125°58'E.) shall remain under the military control of the Command-in-Chief, United Nations Command."

On 15 February 1974, the North Korean Communist gunboats attacked upon the two ROK fishing boats, Suwon-ho No. 32 and 33 sinking one and kidnaping the other, on the high seas off the west coast, in a barbaric act and have not yet clarified the fate of the fishermen aboard the vessels. These boats, of course, just ordinary fishing boats devotedly engaging in routine fishery works.
In an even bolder act of piracy on 28 June 1974, less than four months later, heavily armed NK naval gunboats attacked and sunk a ROK Maritime Police patrol boat which was escorting the ROK fishing boats south of the demarcation line off the east coast.

At the same time, the NK puppet clique has stepped up the infiltration of its specially-trained agents as witnessed by the recent successive interception of an armed NK espionage boat off Pusan and another off the west coast.

Barbaric Acts

On top of all the barbaric and vicious acts, the NK Communist odds committed a capital crime against the God and man. The ringleader of Communist
North issued an order to assassinate the President of the Republic of Korea at the Liberation Day ceremony on 15 August 1974, killing instead, the wife of the President.

The barbarous murder, a heinous offense, committed on order from the lunatic NK puppet regime has been the object of anger and wrath of not only the Koreans but all of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The astonished and evil incident was committed by a Communist-dispatched assassin during the very moment when President Park was delivering his address in commemoration of the National Liberation Day, particularly calling on the puppet regime in Pyongyang to return to the tables of the south-north dialogue for seeking of national unification by peaceful means.

Sudden outburst of anger by the nation-wide demonstrations were ensued day after day. Thus, the national anger was eloquently expressed in the month-long anti-Communist as well as anti-Japanese demonstrations which raged across the country since the tragic 15 August incident.

In connection with this terrible incident, it will be worthy to take a particular note that the incident itself explained how intensively the NK puppet clique is stepping up its subversive activities to overthrow the Republic of Korea Government using Japan as its forward operation base. In other words, the villain of this felon deed infiltrated into Seoul in disguise as a Japanese having a passport in possession issued by the Japanese government. He was a pro-Pyongyang Korean resident in Japan and came into the country under the directions from the NK Communist boss.

One of the surprising characteristics sending by the NK Communists was an attempt to use Chochohgyon, the pro-Pyongyang and leftist organization of the Korean residents in Japan, as their forward base to make their espionage operations easier against the Republic of Korea.

De Facto Aggression

Very recently, the Military Armistice Commission of the United Nations Command in Korea discovered a tunnel dug in underground some 1.2 kilometers inside the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in clear violation of the Armistice Agreement, of which only one has been uncovered so far. There should be more tunnels hidden underground, without doubt. The tunnel is big enough for a full regiment to pass through less than an hour.

The discovery of the tunnel was made preceding the firing incident on the morning of 15 November 1974, when a ROK Army squad on routine patrol duty
in the southern sector of the DMZ north of Koryangpo was fired upon by the NK Communist soldiers. The tunnel, which is already 1,200 meters inside the southern portion of the DMZ, is reinforced with prefabricated concrete and equipped with electric power lines for lighting.

Moreover, it must take the fact seriously that the Communist North even built the tunnel after repeating acts of violating the Armistice Agreement following the refusal of an offer made by the U.N. Command at the 317th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on 12 June 1971 to use the DMZ for peaceful purposes as well as its demand to remove troops, equipment, fortifications and military facilities illegally introduced and constructed by the Communist side in the DMZ.

The NK Communists have been building the underground tunnel systems in other areas of the no-man’s-land along the demarcation line. Noteworthy is the fact that the huge tunnel system is not primarily designed for the infiltration of small numbers of espionages or guerrillas to the south but to move large forces clandestinely along the tunnel for a surprise onslaught on the Republic of Korea. That is the “mole tactics” now employed by the Communists.

The U.N. Command made soon a stringent protest to the Communist side on this armistice violation through the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom and also proposed to make a joint close fact-finding examination on the matter. However, the Communists denied habitually this stark fact, saying that the tunnel is a pure invention on the ROK Army part. If so, did why not accept even the joint investigation proposal? Once again, the Communists exposed themselves their true colors. To them it is usual and a matter of daily occurrence that the Communists make false charges always. Thus, the North Korean Communist regime attempted time and again to violate the Armistice Agreement. The agreement is now almost scrap of paper by the repeating violations by the Communists.

On 3 December 1974, the Seoul representative of the South-North Coordinating Committee also offered to the Pyongyang side to make a joint fact-finding investigation on the tunnel incident, proposing to destroy the tunnel at the same time. But, again the Communist rejected all even re-opening of the dialogue meeting which has been postponed unilaterally by the Communist schemes.

Such a ruthless provocation of the Communists is more than a simple violation of the armistice terms and virtually an attempt to re-invoke the Republic of Korea by means of force. Though they are talking about peace outwardly, the Communists are ever tightening their pressure on the people of Communist North, not abandoning their aggressive designs.
The underground tunnel constructed by the Communists in the DMZ proves itself an undeniable fact the puppet regime in the north is watching for a decisive moment to reinvade into the south in an all-out effort.

As of 4 October 1974, the total violations committed by the Communists since the Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953 reached 123,495 different occasions and incidents (air violations 831, sea 783, ground 121,881), according to the statistics furnished by the Military Armistice Commission of the U.N. Command. Of the total numbers, in 1974 alone marked 16,976 cases as of date indicated. This figure showed an increase of 10,701 incidents as compared with 6,275 incidents in 1973.

All along, the NK puppet regime had kept up its warlike preparations even while the south-north talks were under way. As lately as last year, 1973, Communist North added a new substantial stock of sophisticated offensive weapons, including tanks, artillery pieces and guided missile-firing vessels, to its already massive military buildup. More recently, the Communist forces moved their
advanced naval and air bases more forward close to the DMZ, posing far more armed troops.

Today, the NK warmongers, as cited above, are making every effort to defame the Republic; envying the national unity and consensus in the south to disturb the national consensus and mislead domestic and overseas opinions.

After all, the NK Communists are now burring preparations for another treacherous invasion of the south, as exposed recently by Kong Tak-ho, formerly a member of the NK Political Security Agency who defected to the Republic of Korea.

Section 4. Threat of Re-invasion

Military Buildup -- Communist North

The North Korean puppet regime has now armed its ground forces with many sophisticated artillery pieces and weapons including Frog-5 guided missiles in attempts to build up its combat capabilities. It has also attempted psychological warfare in recent months by scattering slanderous leaflets and other printed matter such as falsified South Korean newspapers.

The NK broadcasts and propaganda against the Republic of Korea have become more slanderous than the days before the announcement of the “July 4th Joint Communiqué” in 1972.

The Communist North has now also introduced some 130 naval vessels including missile-carrying speedboats in order to strengthen its naval forces, thus enabling it to stage naval provocation like the recent one in the Western Sea.

As for the NK air force, it is now armed with about 850 aircraft including MIG-21, SU-7S and AN-2 with the underground aviation shed and evacuation facilities. It is particularly equipped with all types of warplanes for airborne infiltration.

“A violence-for-violence principle” may best describe the NK Communists, who teach even children in kindergarten, putting the military clothes on, how to aim rifles at their own brother -- making these children play war games and teaching them to call the brother in the south “the enemy.”

In addition to a regular force of 550,000, the Communist North has secured a 2,200,000-man reserve force including a well-armed cadre corps of 23 divisions, the Worker-Farmer Red Guard force and the Red Youth Guards.
Thus, the NK Communists are capable of waging a short-team blitz war without support from the outside in view of their drafting system and that most of their military facilities were installed underground.

All their aim is to re-invade into the south and unify the nation under communism by force of arms when a decisive moment comes. The decisive chance which forged Kim Il-sung's puppet regime refers to is aimed at, among many others, such as time when the balance of military power between the south and north is upset, especially for an instance, the withdrawal of the U.N. Command or the U.S. troops in Korea.

According to Kong Tak-ho, a senior "guidance agent" at the Kaesong office of the so-called North Korean Communist State Political Security Agency, who defected to the Republic on 14 June 1974, the puppet regime in the north had completed war preparations "waiting for the order to invade the south again." Kong said why he had defected: "I was shocked to learn that I had been deceived all along by the NK Communist propaganda and became skeptical about the Communist system which is dominated by the dictatorial family of Kim Il-sung and is so busy preparing for war."

All these ominous developments attest to charlatan Kim Il-sung's openly pronounced scheme of taking over the Republic of Korea by force, a fact that makes the Korean peninsula as volatile as ever despite the global mood of détente.

It is well known that the NK puppet regime is prepared for all-out war, adopting so-called "four major military guidelines" -- "arming of the whole people, fortification of the whole land, training of the whole of the armed forces as cadres, and modernization of the whole armament."

U.N. Command

With Communist North continuing its manifested warlike stance against the Republic of Korea, the peace-keeping role of the United Nations Command in Korea remains more essential to the maintenance of peace and security in the Korean peninsula. This vital U.N. role, definitely abiding the obligation of the world organization dedicated to the cause of peace and freedom, is represented by the U.N. Command in Korea, which constitutes a principle signarity to the Armistice Agreement signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953, twenty-one years ago.

The NK Communist regime, on the other hand, whose armed invasion against the Republic of Korea in June 1950 was aborted by the United Nations'
collective security action, sees the presence of the U.N. Command in Korea as a chief obstacle to the pathway of its openly professed aggressive and subversive schemes and designs against the Republic.

Needless to say that the U.N. Command was created under a U.N. Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950 (8 July in Seoul time) adopted to repel the NK armed aggression against the Free Republic. Now the sole purpose of the continued presence of the Command is to prevent renewal of war in the peninsula, thus further contributing to the peace of Asia and the world as well.

Furthermore, never is an armistice an end of war in itself, but only an agreed respite to allow a more definitive settlement for peace. It is particularly true in the Korean peninsula, where the warmongers in Communist North openly violated the armistice terms as a matter of daily occurrence. Nowhere in the world has such a precarious status of neither war nor peace been continuing for so long on the Korean peninsula. Even twenty-one years after the shooting was ended, the uneasy status quo still remains in Korea as tenuous as it has ever been.

In other words, the passage of more than two decades has not altered the substance of the militant aggressive designs of Communist North whose all-out aggression by force against the Republic of Korea failed owing to the U.N. collective security action.

Under these circumstances, it takes only common sense to see that no alternative short of veritable peace guarantees, such as the North Korean Communist regime’s acceptance of the no-war agreement proposed by the Republic of Korea, should replace the UN forces which has been and will continue to be the mainstay of the precarious armistice.

At all events, it should be recalled that the hasty withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Korea, which apparently stemmed from a misconception of the situation preceding the Korean War, invited the NK Communists’ all-out armed aggression in June 1950. The current situation in the peninsula is no less volatile.

Conclusion

Today, the Republic of Korea is not what it was twenty-five years ago. Thanks to the clear-sighted leadership of President Park Chung Hee, the Republic now has grown to the rank in the foremost group of the world countries in terms of population, economy, society, culture and all other progress.

If the radicals in Communist North hear and see the anti-Communist posture of the people as well as the marvelous economical development in the Free Republic, they will not misunderstand and miscalculate the determination
of the peace-loving people.

Above all, the nation must build-up its strength because the North Korean Communists tend to tramp down the weaker while seeking compromise with the stronger. It is for the reason that the people of the Republic of Korea are striving to make themselves stronger, hoping to pursue steadily the path toward peaceful unification.

In effect, twenty-four years after it started the internecine Korean War, the North Korean Communist regime is still clinging to its basic intention to topple the Republic of Korea through violent revolution. The Communists have ever changed their basic ambitious designs "to unify the nation by means of force," even though a mood of detente and peaceful coexistence is prevailing on the international political and diplomatic scene.

Such a fundamental position of the puppet regime is well and manifestly evidenced by the fact that it has been beefed up its capabilities for war. It boasted a few years ago that it has completed its preparations for war against the south. After unilaterally suspending the two-tiered dialogue between the south and north since 28 August 1973, the NK Communists, having no national conscience even a bit, continued to commit the provocative acts more actively against the south. Top of such barbaric acts was "the August 15th incident" in 1974.

Further, they dared to construct the formidable underground tunnel, surprisingly even down to the southern edge of the DMZ, designed for infiltration not only of their espionage agents or guerrilla elements clandestinely into the south but also for massive movement of the Red combat forces in a large-scale southward at a decisive time they choose. The tunnel incident is far more than an undeniable fact which seriously violated the armistice terms. This is a grave "de facto aggression."

History shows that such fanatics have to find their tombs in the tunnel of their own tricks. The boss of the NK Communist warmongers and his followers should know that their misled judgement is doomed to bring about their own destruction and tragedy in the long run.
PART TWO

THE BELGIAN BATTALION
IN THE KOREAN WAR
His Majesty King Baudouin of the Belgians
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1.  Introduction to Belgium

The Kingdom of Belgium, a constitutional monarchy on the North Sea coast
of Europe, is bordered by the Netherlands, West Germany, Luxembourg and
France. It occupies an area of 30,514 square kilometers (11,781 sq. mi.), which
is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe. There was a total
population of 9,650,944 as of 31 December 1971. Brussels (Bruxells), the capital
city possessed estimatedly 1,057,000 habitants in 1964.

Part of the area formerly known as the Low Countries, Belgium derives its
name from Gallia Belgica, the Roman designation of the southern part of that
region, which was chiefly settled by Belgic tribes of celtic origin. These tribes
were later infused with Germanic elements, chiefly Salian Franks, whose migratory
movement was largely broken by the forests of Flanders and Brabant or by the
defensive frontier of the Roman empire. These Franks settled more especially
in the northern part of the Low Countries and are now roughly represented in
Belgium itself by the Flemish element, while the Walloons of the southern area
are in general more Celtic than Flemish.

The Low Countries were incorporated in the empire of Charlemagne, but
after his death (814) possession of the area became debatable. Belgium’s medieval
history is related largely to that of feudal duchies such as Brabant, Luxembourg,
Flabers, Hainaut, Limburg and Liege. Its political division into Holland and
Belgium was accomplished when northern provinces of the Low Countries won,
under Maurice of Nassau, their independence from Spain in 1609; this division
has continued ever since except for an interim between 1815 and 1831. The line
of division was dictated rather by geographical, strategical and political reasons
than by racial, religious or linguistic ones.

Languages by reason of its situation on the confines of the Roman and
Germanic worlds, three linguistic groups are found in Belgium: Dutch and the
Flemish dialects are spoken north of a line running more or less regularly from
Mouscron (Moeskroen) to Aubel, approximately along the parallel on which
Waterloo stands; French and Walloon dialects south of this line; German and its dialects in the frontier communes of the east. In the Flemish towns there are French-speaking minorities of varying importance. The Brussels agglomeration has been gradually transformed into an enclave of French speech, and to encroach outward more and more. A fairly large proportion was bilingual.

According to the constitution the King commands the armed forces, declares war and makes peace. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into operations way out was found from a complex situation Baudouin, who then was prince royal, signed in January 1951 a decree placing the Belgium armed forces at the disposal of NATO.

In March 1951 compulsory military service was extended from one to two years; in August 1952 it was reduced to 21 months, in May 1954 to 18 months and later to 12 months.

Section 2. Activation of the Volunteer Corps

Recruitment of Volunteers

Shortly after the United Nations Security Council made its historical decision to take the collective action by force of arms against the North Korean Communist aggressors, the Government of Belgium offered its pledge on 22 July 1950 to the United Nations to dispatch the combat troops to Korea in support of U.N. decision.

Following the necessary procedures went through due formalities, the Ministry of National Defense of Belgium decided to activate the Volunteer Corps, a pool of troops to be deployed to Korea. First of all, the Ministry started on 18 September 1950 the recruitment of volunteers. Soon the officers and non-commissioned officers poured in from all quarters to apply for enrollment striving to be foremost one after another.

All the volunteers were reported themselves in the training center at Marcheles-Dames where the processing of selection for eligible personnel took place. Of 40 officers volunteered for the military service in Korea, twelve were then in active service and others were all from the reserve corps including World War II veterans.

Among them, senior officer in rank was Major B.E.M. Vivario who was later assigned to the post of second in command of the Korea-bound Belgian Battalion. Noteworthy was that Major Moreau de Melen of the reserve corps, the
General Background

ex-senator and then an active cabinet member as the Minister of National Defense, set an example to the others volunteering earliest of all. He did not hesitate to give up his social standing and easy circumstances for the defense of cause of freedom that now being seriously threatened in Korea by the Communist aggression. Following the example of Major Melen, so many volunteers rushed in for combat service in Korea.

On the other hand, beginning from 2 October 1950, corporals and privates came to gather at the camp in Bourg-Leopold for selection.

Through the rigorous processes of physical examination, about seven hundred volunteers were carefully selected at last to enroll the Volunteer Corps. More than half of the Corps personnel were reservists.

Organization and Training

With the close of the selection procedures, it was now able to organize an infantry battalion to be dispatched to the Korean battlefield before long after a certain course of training was over.

Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Crahay, the Battalion was formed with three rifle companies of A, B and C and a heavy weapons company. The latter consisted of a 3-inch mortar platoon, a 3.5-inch bazooka platoon, a machinegun platoon and an engineer platoon.

A Luxembourgian rifle platoon led by Lieutenant Wagner joined the Battalion and was incorporated into A Company.

As soon as the companies were organized, violent training was taken place under a hard and fast rule. A particular emphasis was placed on the physical fitness and the combat drill resembling a real fighting. For instance, in the field training, the trainees maneuvered under ball firing delivered by the imaginary enemy, particularly in the infiltration training course. They lived in the noise of the bullets and the explosions. They had to learn how to handle all infantry weapons, they had to go through all shapes of rugged terrain, and they had to fight under all the weather conditions. They had to be fitted for climbing on the mountainous terrain like in Korea.

One of the serious problems concerned by the higher authorities was a esprit de corps. Since those volunteers were gathered from all the corners of the country, as already mentioned earlier, and also either from the civil life or active military duty, they had to be trained to become a member of a team. Of course they volunteered willingly to join in the fighting against the communism
but there still required them to learn how to fight as a team. Fortunately, many of them were the well-trained veterans who served with the French Army in all branches of service during 1944–1945. Yet, all they had to receive the stern training under the strict military discipline all the way through from the beginning to the end.

To cultivate and enhance the esprit de corps among the trainees, the training center adopted a special training system. Each one would be entitled to wear the brown cap with a mark called the Flemish golden day which showed a cross symbolizing the anti-Communist crusade, if he passed through a specially fixed training course.

To merit the brown beret, each one had to make a forced-march of 16 kilometers within two hours carrying individual weapon and equipment in full. To get used to the bivouac life, they were to encamp at Camp de ’Eisenborn during the next eight days. The Battalion made motor movement by its organic vehicles. Thanks to the transportation officer Lieutenant Angeir de Lajalays, all the drivers made good 150 kilometers of motor march per day in the perfect condition.

Training at the bivouac camp noticeably contributed to the improvement of combat capability. They had engaged there in firing practices of all infantry arms such as rifle marksmanship of small arms and ball firing of heavy weapons. The most interest one was that the target practice with live shells of 3-inch mortar. Moreover, all the trainees were obliged to creep in such a way that they walked on their hands and knees under machinegun fire with the live cartridges.

The return trip from the bivouac camp was executed at night under the blackout condition for the purpose of the driver training. None of mishap occurred, however.

On 8 November, S.A.R. Royal Prince visited the training center and delivered to the Korea-bound Battalion the colours in a very impressive ceremony. The Prince spent the day with the troops and assisted the combat exercises under the ball firing.

On 11 November, the Battalion troops marched down the street in Brussels in fine array when the crowd of citizens waved their hands praying their successes in battle.

The final phase of training was conducted at the Artillery School in Brusselchant, where the troops were trained for artillery tactics during the closing days of November.
Voyage to Korea

The Belgian Battalion was prepared everything ready for deployment by the early days of December 1950, while the naval transport vessel *Kamina*, which would take the troops to Korea, was still being busily engaged in preparation.

The *Kamina* was a transport ship of 45,000 tons constructed at Anvers in 1940. Formally the Germans had transformed it into a supply vessel for submarines and the British rebuilt it into a transient floating hotel.

On 18 December 1950, when she still remained much desired to be prepared, the *Kamina* finally sailed from Anvers for Korea with the first contingent of the Belgian Battalion troops on board. She had to hurry her voyage because the Belgian troops were anxious lest they should be too late to reach Korea comparing with other UN allies. The French and Dutch troops had already been fighting in Korea against the Communist aggressors.

Meanwhile, when they left Belgium and during their voyage, there arose a certain anxiety among the Belgian troops because they learned the unexpected news. The Chinese Communist forces had invaded into Korea challenging the UN forces.

The voyage continued without any mishap on the way. For the most of the Belgian troops, it was the first voyage in high sea. The Chief of Staff of the Belgian Naval Forces, Captain of Frigate Robines accompanied them personally to Port-Said, where he turned the command over to Captain of Frigate Ceulmans.

The *Kamina* touched Gibraltar on 22 December and then anchored at Port-Said on the 29th for resupply and refueling. It took eleven days from Port-Said to Colombo. After a brief stop off Manila, the Philippines on 25 January 1951, it arrived on 30 January at the Sasebo bay, Kyushu, Japan.

The Battalion troops met there at Sasebo with Major Moreau de Melen and Captain Poswick who had been dispatched in advance to the United Nations Command and the Eighth US Army for prior-coordination. There were also General Daufresne, Chief of the Belgian Liaison Mission to the UN Command and Major Daelemans, his assistant.
CHAPTER II  THE BELGIAN BATTALION

Section 1.  The Arrival of the First Contingent  
(31 January – 6 March 1951)

The Belgian naval transport ship Kamina arrived in Pusan, Korea at 0800 hours on 31 January 1951 carrying the first Army contingent on board after 44 days at sea.

The Belgian troops soon stepped their foot on this remote soil receiving heartfelt warm welcome by the representatives of the Republic of Korea Government, the ROK Army and Eighth US Army and the crowd of the Pusan citizens, when the Belgian National Anthem was played by the ROK and UN forces bands. Upon the welcome ceremony was over, they were transported by the motor columns to the Reception Center at Tongnae, about ten kilometers northeast of Pusan, where they stayed until 9 February.

The Tongnae Camp was well organized and the tents were warm enough for them to manage themselves the cold weather that reached down twenty degrees below zero. While there the Belgians received a series of training courses including orientation as to the custom, courtesy, comradeship with the other UN troops the nature of war, weather, terrain and so on. There also took place field exercises for them to fit into the Korean battle before they placed on the actual fighting. During the period, Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Crahay, the Battalion Commander, visited the United Nations Command in Tokyo with General Daufresne. They paid a courtesy call on General MacArthur at his Headquarters.

On 9 February, the Belgian Battalion received orders to move to Waegwan about 20 kilometers north of Taegu.

However, the Battalion was still in short of own transportation, because the transport ship Kamina brought the Belgian troops without heavy equipment, which would be transported to Korea by freight ship later. Yet, it was not expected to receive such equipment including vehicles until the later part of February 1951. At this junction the Eighth US Army supplied the Battalion with ten quarter ton trucks (Jeeps) and another ten two and a half ton trucks.

On the following day, the Battalion began a long movement with these
transportation means, reaching Waegwan on 11 February. The Belgians built there big field tents in the vicinity of the town and assumed their first mission in the Korean War to protect the main supply route and the railway from the Communist guerrilla actions, particularly along Taegu–Waegwan–Kimchon. At the time there were a number of the North Korean Communist remnants left behind because the ROK and UN forces had bypassed them when they launched the general counteroffensive in September 1950 from the Nakdong River line and advanced to the Yalu River line thereafter.

First of all the Battalion troops started to build the defensive position around the bivouac area for own security. Then they posted the security guard on the bridge site, while sending out patrol day and night. They also carried out the combat training whenever they seized an opportunity.

The order of battle as well as the names of commanders and key staff personnel of the first contingent of the Belgian Battalion were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion Commander</th>
<th>Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Crahay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Major B.E.M. Vivario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Officer to EUSAK</td>
<td>Major Moreau de Melen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>Captain Poswick</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel Officer (S-1) 1</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Van Wynendael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Officer (S-2)</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Dourlet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations Officer (S-3)</td>
<td>Captain A.E.M. Delperdange</td>
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<td>Supply Officer (S-4)</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Guillaume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain A.E.M. Williot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second in Command</td>
<td>2nd Lieutenant Rocants du Vivier</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Company Commander</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Mititis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second in Command</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Thiry</td>
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<tr>
<td>C Company Commander</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Beaufrez</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second in Command</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Jansens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy Weapons Company</td>
<td>Captain Dargent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second in Command</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant de Brouchoven de Bergeyck</td>
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On 15 February, the Battalion received information that about one hundred Red guerrillas were appeared at Taeyul-dong, about 20 kilometers northeast of Waegwan. But no Reds were found in consequence of patrolling there.

On 17 February, another report was reached the Battalion with regard to the guerrilla situation. The Battalion Commander decided to take his main force in this guerrilla hunting operation, leaving only one company behind. He aimed this time not only to mop-up the Reds but also to train his troops in an
attempt to gain the combat experiences before further going into more hot battle in the front line.

The battalion troops departed in the motor columns along the narrow mountain roads. They entered the valley of Hasan-dong surrounded by the rugged hills on both sides. Upon dismounted, they climbed on the mountain where they discovered on the hill an organized position with the telephone communication system installed. It seemed to be used by the local national police outfit. But it must be utilized now by the guerrillas. The Belgian units prepared an attack on that area but the cross-country movement in this hilly locality was so slower than they thought. The Red guerrilla bands had been coming down the area for getting food and they had already moved to somewhere else according to the latest information. Lieutenant Colonel Crahay, therefore, ordered his troops to return to the bivouac area.

On 21 February, a unit of the National Police Force informed the Battalion that approximately 300 Red guerrillas in group appeared in the vicinity of Taeyul-dong again. The Battalion Commander sent there his Executive Officer Major Vivario together with the Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Dourlet and C Company. A ROK National Police Unit in two company strength was already there when they arrived at the village. Major Vivario made a plan to carry out a coordinate effort with the local police force.

Then, a group of the Belgians led by Lieutenant Dourlet and a section of the ROK police force started out for searching the guerrillas. At the time these Red guerrillas were trying to avoid the frontal clashes with the friendly forces and they were looking to find the safer places to hide, while attempting to raid the innocent villagers in an effort to gain food.

Accordingly, it was not easy task to locate the Red guerrillas since they were hiding in the rugged high mountain areas. It was therefore uninteresting action as far as the Belgians were concerned. They came to Korea for fight back the Communist aggressors and all the Belgians eagerly wanted to go into the frontline. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Crahay, the Battalion Commander, visited the Eighth US Army (EUSA)K Headquarters several times and requested to be sent to the front, rather than fighting against the guerrillas behind the line.

Section 2. Advance North to the Imjin River
(7 March – 21 April 1951)

Entering the month of March, the Belgian Battalion was ordered to move
from Waegwan to Suwon south of Seoul. An advance party of the Belgain Battalion moved to the new area by motor transportation on the 5th, while its main body was transported by train joining the advance party two days later on the 7th. On the 7th the Belgian Battalion was attached to the 3rd US Infantry Division and further attached to the 15th Regiment of the division at the same time for its operational control.

At the time the 3rd US Division consisting of the 7th, 15th and 65th Regiments was demonstrating along the Han River south of Seoul in an attempt to draw enemy attention from the 25th US Infantry Division which was establishing a bridgehead on the north bank of the Han River near its junction with the Pukhan River. Initially the Chinese Communist forces vigorously tried to disrupt the buildup of the bridgehead, but after a few days of strong resistance they started fleeing northward in disorder.

On the 9th, two days after its arrival in Suwon, the Belgian Battalion relieved on orders the 1st Battalion of the 15th Regiment of the 3rd Division then defending a three-kilometer front along the southern bank of the Han River in the vicinity of Tuksom (Tukto). The 2nd Battalion of the regiment was deployed on its left flank and on its right deployed the Philippine Battalion which had then been attached to the 65th Regiment of the 3rd Division.

The Belgian Battalion soon established four outposts on its assigned front along the southern bank and started its hectic patrol activities with special vigilance on the enemy activities along the northern side of the river.

Although the enemy activities had constantly been reported across the river, the Belgian patrols in many cases made no enemy contact; many returned with
negative report, for they had found no one to capture or even to shoot at.

The following accounts will be worthy of mention to illustrate the pattern of the Belgian patrols at the time of the Han River defense:

On 13 March a Belgian patrol team led by the Battalion Executive Officer, Major B.E.M. Vivario, who volunteered to take the team himself, departed the outpost #3 at 2330 hours and rowed across the river in a rubber boat. Soon the team succeeded in penetrating into the enemy defense line established along the northern bank of the river without enemy resistance. After the thorough reconnaissance of the whole area, the team rowed back to the south at 0430 hours and Major Vivario reported to the Battalion Commander that all the enemy positions and trenches built along the bank had been unoccupied leaving some signs of previous occupation by the Chinese Reds. (See Sketch Map 1.)

Two days later, on the night of 14-15 March, another patrol led by 2nd Lieutenant Burlet crossed the river again and advanced this time close to Tukson village, and from the village, the team further advanced approximately 1,200 meters north, but no enemy contact was made either.

These repeated negative reports of enemy activity aroused the curiosity of the Battalion Commander and his staff and made them think the Chinese
The Belgian Battalion

Reds had pulled back from the positions along the northern bank. These findings in turn were reported to the 15th Regiment CP and the regiment commander finally made his decision to form a special team to investigate the circumstances in the enemy area. On the 18th a group consisting of American officers and men departed for the enemy zone in a boat accompanied by two Belgian Lieutenants, Verhaegen and Beauprez who were familiar with the terrain along the north side of the river.

While the party was moving along the enemy positions approximately half an hour after its landing on the northern bank, all of sudden an enormous explosion shook the whole area. An enemy mine exploded! Many of the Americans were killed or wounded; Of the two Belgian officers, Lt. Verhaegen was wounded and Lt. Beauprez killed. This was the Belgians' first casualties suffered on the Korean soil. It was apparent that the enemy had planted anti-personnel mines before his withdrawal to the north.

On 21 March the Belgian Battalion was ordered to move north together with the 15th Regiment. This ended up a tiresome period of the Belgians' defense along the Han River, which lasted over two weeks.

The Belgian Battalion crossed the Han River in the afternoon by use of pontoon bridge and soon reached a small village called Nung-dong a few kilometers north in the evening. Here at Nung-dong the Belgian fighters hastily built their defense positions for the night, and prepared themselves against any enemy attack.

The following morning on the 22nd the Battalion received another order from the regiment CP. It was a general attack order to advance whole elements of the 3rd Division as far as southern bank of the Imjin River in line with other UN forces.

At 0630 hours the Belgian Battalion, reinforced with one tank platoon and one heavy mortar platoon from the regiment, moved out with B Company in the lead. The Belgian Battalion was making good progress for the first few hours until it reached Kanchon where it received enemy sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire from a nearby mountain. The enemy fire from the hill, however, was silenced by friendly artillery in few minutes. The advance continued without further incident. Before darkness set in, the Belgian fighters finally reached the first day objective line in the vicinity of Tongnunng-ni, around which the Battalion formed a perimeter defense for the night.

On 23 March the Battalion's advance was resumed with A Company in the lead this time. Due to the rugged terrain, however, the progress slowed down. At 0530 hours when the Battalion column reached a small village named Huksok-ni
about seven kilometers north of Tongnung-ni four enemy snipers suddenly fired against the advance column. Two of the snipers were killed and the rest two taken prisoners.

From Hukuk-ni the Battalion was again ordered to further advance to Chu-dong two kilometers east of Uijongbu which had already been occupied by the other UN troops by the time. In few hours the Belgians were able to close in the Chu-dong village. Upon arrival at the village the Battalion organized a perimeter defense on Hill 155 a kilometer in the north with C Company on the left, A Company on the right, and B Company as reserve in the back.

Approximately at 2330 hours unknown number of enemy raided the Belgian Battalion on the hill and a few succeeded in breaking through the defense line. Soon hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Belgians bravely fought back. This was a good opportunity for the Belgian fighters to display their skillful use of bayonets. After a few minutes of brief but bloody fight the enemy escaped northward leaving eight dead bodies behind. The Belgians also suffered casualties of one killed and four wounded.

In the afternoon, the 24th, the Belgian Battalion received the visit of General MacArthur accompanied by General Ridgway and General Soule. This was General MacArthur’s last visit to Korea since President Truman relieved the general of all his commands and replaced him with General Ridgway. By the 24th, in the meantime, all the UN troops had been pressing north on all fronts. To

Colonel Crahay welcomes the visit of General MacArthur and General Ridgway to his battalion on 24 March 1951.
The Belgian Battalion

the east, four ROK regiments had at last polished off the north Korean guerrillas who had been a problem since the breakout from the Naktong Perimeter in September 1950, and the two ROK corps in that sector were free to strike north. In the center, the IX and X US Corps advanced steadily, entering Chunchon on 19 March. To the west, an attempt was made to trap an estimated 20,000 North Korean soldiers between Seoul and Kaesong. On 23 March the 187th Airborne Regiment and two ranger companies were dropped over Munsan while an armored column drove up from Seoul 32 kilometers to the southeast. While the UN troops' advance was in progress the enemy showed little resistance retreating north so skillfully. The enemy retreat, however, allowed a near-bloodless advance to the Imjin River where the Belgians were to advance to.

On 27 March the Belgian Battalion resumed its advance from Uijongbu area and arrived before dark in Tokchong on cross-road between Uijongbu and Tongduchon. The following day the Belgian Battalion participated in an operation aimed to capture Hill 507 (Chilbong-san) about three kilometers northeast of Tokchong. The enemy on the hill was a great menace to friendly use of the MSR. The Belgian Battalion bravely fought its way up on the hill and dispersed the enemy.

On the 30th the Belgian Battalion continued its advance three kilometers further north to Kwangam-ni without enemy resistance and then moved westward arriving in Sanggori about one kilometer east of Tongduchon on 2 April.

On 3 April the Belgian Battalion was detached from the 3rd US Division and newly attached to the 29th British Brigade for its operational control. The following day the Battalion relieved the Philippine Battalion on positions in the vicinity of Kwangsuwon about seven kilometers east of Tongduchon at 1400 hours. The Philippine Battalion which had been under the operational control of the 29th British Brigade, upon its relief with the Belgian Battalion, moved to Songna-ri and came under the 65th Regiment of the 3rd US Division.

Brief mention seems necessary here about the 29th British Brigade under which the Belgian Battalion would operate. This brigade, consisting of the Gloucesters Battalion, the Northumberlands Fusiliers Battalion and the Royal Ulster Rifles Battalion, withdrew from Pabalmak area to Suwon on 23 February 1951 and it came into the 1 US Corps reserve. The Belgian Battalion would have been attached to the brigade earlier if the brigade had not been in reserve when the Battalion came to Suwon since the British and Belgian troops were using the same types of weapons and equipment.

In Suwon the brigade devised a deception plan to cover the crossing of the Han River by the 25th US Division. Then, the brigade moved to Inje on 7 March and to Yongdungpo on the 21st.
On the 30th it came under the command of the 3rd US Division and on the following day took over the line of the Imjin River.

This position, extending from Choksong on the left to the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right, was held with three battalions forward.

On 3 April, upon its attachment to the brigade, the Belgian Battalion became the brigade's reserve in Kwangsuwon and started preparing for counter-attacks against enemy penetration to the brigade sector, while carrying out strenuous patrols across the Imjin River.

On the 9th Captain Poswick, Assistant to Battalion Commander, led a carefully planned patrol consisting of Second Lieutenant Fichefet and four men of B Company across the Imjin onto northern bank in the vicinity of Yossi-dong. The patrol could not make enemy contact and returned without incident, reporting that all the Chinese Communists had withdrawn north with their defense positions vacated.

On the 10th the Belgian Battalion moved from Kwangsuwon area to new assembly area in the vicinity of Kuryongmal village closing at 1100 hours. In this area the Belgian Battalion remained until the 19th continuously conducting aggressive patrols across the river. A few patrol activities during this period were worthy to note.

On the 14th the Belgian Battalion carried out a relatively large-scale patrol deep into as far as Hakkyo-mal about seven kilometers north of the Glosters Crossing, an improvised bridge built by the Glosters Battalion, using two rifle companies supported by a tank platoon, and made light enemy contacts in the general area around the Hakkyo-mal village. The patrol consisting of B and C Companies had been out over seven hours before its return to the base at 1430 hours. In this action the patrol killed three Chinese Reds and captured two prisoners.

A few days later, a similar patrol was carried out by the Northumberlands Fusiliers Battalion in the same direction and the Belgian fighters played a supporting role for the patrol. The patrol found no enemy anywhere. It was apparent the enemy withdrew to north again.

On 20 April at 1200 hours the Belgian Battalion on orders relieved the Ulster Rifles Battalion on positions then defending Kungul-san—Tongni-ri area along the north bank of the Imjin in the vicinity of the river junction with Hantan-gang. The Ulsters Battalion in turn became reserve in the vicinity of Mapo-ri south side of the river.

The new defense sector, however, was considered difficult for the Belgian Battalion with only three rifle companies as the sector had been defended with four companies of the Ulsters.
The Belgian Battalion

As of 22 April the front of the 29th British Brigade was held with the Gloucesters (left), the Fusiliers (center) and the Belgians (right) and the Ulster Rifles being in reserve.

The Chinese Reds were about to deliver a blow designed not only to halt the Eighth Army’s advance, but to break the front and lead to big results.

Section 3. Battle of Imjin River
(22 April – 27 May 1951)

It had been known for some time that the Chinese Communists were preparing another large-scale offensive designed to check the United Nations advance. In order to interrupt the enemy preparation for attack, the I and IX US Corps during early April launched an offensive south of a triangle formed by three towns -- Pyonggang on the northern apex, Kumhwa to the east and Chorwon to the west. Resistance was stiff and progress slow but by 21 April American troops had secured an intermediate line, and arrangements were made to push forward along practically the whole United Nations front. These offensive moves may have hindered the enemy preparations, and possibly delayed him; but they did not prevent the launching of his attack, which began on 22 April two days after the Belgian Battalion received the most difficult assignment of the brigade’s right flank defense.

On the day the Chinese attack came, the 29th British Brigade to which the Belgian Battalion was attached was holding the line of the Imjin River from inclusive Choksong on the left to the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right, a frontage of over 10 kilometers. On the left was the 1st ROK Division and on the right the 3rd US Division.

The Belgian Battalion and “B” Troop, the 170th British Mortar Battery, were only units positioning on the north side of the river on the right flank. The defenses of the other units lay along the south bank. Contact was not close; indeed, patrols were able to penetrate several thousand meters to the north without meeting the enemy.

On the 22nd the Brigade sent its usual patrols across the river, and those patrols made contact with the enemy much farther south than usual. By 0600 hours a patrol of the Gloucesters was withdrawing in face of the enemy. At 1000 hours the Northumberlands Fusiliers patrol had made contact, and later in the evening, at about 1500 hours, one of the Belgian Battalion patrols belonging to A Company also had made contact.
It was clear that considerable parties of Chinese were on the move and reports from prisoners indicated that an attack was imminent. Air reconnaissance in the late afternoon reported that the roads leading south from Pyonggang to Chorwon were crowded with marching troops and vehicles. By about 2100 hours the front line battalions (Gloucesters on the left, Fusiliers in the middle, and the Belgians on right) were all in contact with the enemy.

But the enemy attack in strength came before midnight unexpectedly. There was a full moon on that night.

The enemy attack first came on the left flank held by the Gloucesters and before long the fighting had spread to the whole front battalions' companies.

At about 0200 hours unknown number of enemy attacked on the Belgian Battalion and soon succeeded in placing a machinegun at the foot of southern edge of C Company position and began pouring its effective fire against the C Company's fighters. The Belgians made desperate attempts to silence the enemy machinegun, which was finally silenced by the Belgian's bazooka. The enemy attack, however, continued on assisted by his artillery and mortar fire. The Belgians held their fire until the enemy reached the first wire barrier. When the enemy finally reached the wire, the Belgians opened fire with rifles and machine

**ENEMY ATTACK ON BELGIAN BATTALION**  22–23 APR 1951

![Sketch Map 2](image-url)
The Belgian Battalion

guns, and tossed grenades down the hill. The enemy attempts to break through the wire were completely frustrated by the Belgian’s gallant stand.

At about 0300 hours a strong enemy attack signalled all along the B Company’s front. For the first few minutes the enemy attack stalled under friendly mortar fire, but its attack in strength finally succeeded in penetrating into the gap between the Battalion Headquarters and forward companies. Soon, hand-to-hand fight ensued. (See Sketch Map 2.)

In the meantime, at about 0400 hours, C Company, which had been initially attacked from southwest direction, started now receiving another attack from the north direction. This situation drove the company into a great confusion. Thus, by early morning on the 23rd, despite the Belgian fighters’ gallant resistance, the enemy had penetrated into C and A Companies’ positions; one party into C Company and the other party into A Company while another fresh party attacking B Company.

Under the critical situation one thing that greatly worried Col. Crahay about was the safety of the bridge that was vitally important in case of the Battalion’s withdrawal. So, Col. Crahay formed a combat patrol consisting of Lt. Hosdain’s platoon of A Company and machinegun platoon of D Company under the command of his assistant, Capt. Poswick. Unfortunately, the patrol was ambushed by the Chinese as it reached near the bridge. Six Belgians were taken prisoners in the ambush. It was apparent that by that time the enemy had already penetrated to the south of the river and established themselves south of the Belgian troops.

At about 1000 hours Col. Crahay, through Major Moreau de Melen, Liaison Officer to EUSA K, requested the brigade headquarters to send an immediate reinforcement which was finally granted. An American tank platoon of the 7th US Regiment soon came to the rescue. The tank platoon under the command of Major Moreau de Melen proceeded to the open area beyond the south bank of the Han tank River and succeeded in clearing the enemy off the bridge area assisted by the gallant Belgian fighters. C Company was successfully able to withdraw to the east across the Imjin from its isolated position north of the river. Sometime later C Company under 1st Lieutenant Jansens made a furious counterattack to recover its lost position, and to repulse the enemy on the hill. The Belgian counterattack was desperate and the battle became again bloody hand-to-hand fight. Soon the enemy began to collapse before the fierce onslaught and terrifying bayonets of the Belgians.

Despite of the successful counterattack, however, the Belgian fighters were completely exhausted from all day fight suffering heavy casualties; even their ammunition run low; and the communication lines to the brigade were cut off.
At about 1300 hours the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Brodie, decided to pull out the Belgian Battalion to fill a gap created between the Gloucesters and the 5th Fusiliers Battalions. Soon the Belgian Battalion's withdrawal was carried out in face of enemy mortar fire around the bridge site supported by a battalion from the 7th US Regiment without loss of the vehicles and heavy equipment.

Upon withdrawal to Sinsan-ni just north of Kwansuwon, the Battalion established blocking positions on Hill 320 placing A and B Companies on the top and C Company in the back.

By the early hours of the following morning, all the brigade units were in withdrawal very closely pressed by the enemy and the Gloucesters Battalion was completely surrounded and under constant attack. Many attempts in vain was made to rescue the Gloucesters.

During the night of the 24-25th at last orders for the all brigade units to withdraw to a position just north of Seoul were issued, and at 0500 hours on the 25th the leading troops began to disengage. The withdrawal was very closely pressed by the enemy and proved a most difficult, confused and costly operation.

In order to open the withdrawal route and to cover the Ulsters and Northumberlands Battalions, the Belgian Battalion, at about 1000 hours on the 25th, moved to the road junction in the vicinity of Hansan-ni (also called Sinam-ni) about two kilometers northeast of Sinsan-ni, where A and C Companies established blocking positions.

In the meantime B Company of the Belgian Battalion came under the command of the brigade for its use.

In the general withdrawal to follow the Belgian Battalion and the Ulster Rifles had a more difficult task and parties of both units had to fight desperately on the way. Some took to the hills and others became casualties.

It was during this withdrawal that Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Crahay was wounded and Executive Officer Major Vivario was an inspiration to the Battalion, moving from place to place to check the enemy pursue and on occasions he mounted on the friendly tanks and fired machinegun against the enemy approaching so closely. Thus, the Belgians' delaying actions greatly helped the brigade's withdrawal.

On the 25th the 29th British Brigade and the Belgian Battalion upon withdrawal to Tokchong, were released from the operational control of the 3rd US Division and passed to the operational control of the I US Corps.

The 29th British Brigade and the Belgian Battalion continued their withdrawal down to the Han River and by the 27th they had reached the Yongdungpo area, where they came into the I Corps reserve with the operational task of defending the Kimpo Peninsula west of Seoul. (See Situation Map 1.)
Section 4. Defense on Kansas Line
(28 May – 9 October 1951)

By the end of April the highly heralded Communist offensive had been stopped cold. Once again the poorly supported Communist Chinese Army had demonstrated its inability to sustain an offensive for more than a few days.

As it became clear that the enemy had halted to regroup and bring new forces forward, General Van Fleet, the Eighth Army Commander, decided to take a limited initiative designed to recover Kansas Line 12 to 16 kilometers above the 38th Parallel. The enemy attempts to outflank Seoul were thus completely beaten back.

This change of tide was certainly welcome to the Belgian Battalion and the 29th Brigade which had a gruelling time during the three days (23rd to 25th April) of the Chinese spring offensive. It enabled the Belgian Battalion to reorganize, carry out some training and settle down in Kimpo Peninsula after its arrival at Changgi-ri west of Seoul across the Han River on 28 April.

The defense mission assigned to the Belgian Battalion of the Kimpo Peninsula, however, was extremely arduous one. It had to defend too broad front along the southern bank of the Han River with insufficient strength. The Battalion established three outposts along the bank and prepared various counter-attack plans against enemy penetration.

The defense positions were specially designed for daytime as well as nighttime use. Strenuous patrol activities were continuously carried out day and night and the depth of the river water was thoroughly sounded.

As far as battle-fighting was concerned, however, the one month period in Kimpo Peninsula was comparatively quiet.

On the 27th of May the 29th Brigade together with the Belgian Battalion was ordered to move to the left sector of its old positions on the Imjin River.

On 28 May at 1800 hours, the 29th British Brigade and the Belgian Battalion returned to the old place in the vicinity of Kwangsuwon, and the brigade opened its command post there.

Upon arrival in the battle area the brigade passed to the operational control of the 1st US Cavalry Division then defending the Imjin River and the units of the brigade relieved the elements of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the Greek Battalion on the left sector of its old positions: The brigade’s battalions deployed along the Kansas Line (a defense line in the vicinity of 38th Parallel established
by General Van Fleet) with the Ulsters Battalion on the left, the Belgian Battalion in the center, and the Northumberlands Battalion on the right. The Glouceters Battalion that had been reorganized and reinforced with fresh troops from the United Kingdom was placed in reserve.

The Belgian Battalion was assigned a three-kilometer front on a highland region in the vicinity of Solma-ri about three kilometers west of Kamak-san. A Company manned on Hill 357 on the left and B Company on Hill 235 with C Company together with headquarters back in the Solma-ri village. (See Sketch Map 3.)

Upon occupation of the positions, each company set about the task of digging, wiring and mining the defenses. While the defense work was in progress, the Battalion also started its painstaking patrol activities in surrounding highland as well as to the north. The patrol activities, however, were comparatively uneventful for several days. No enemy contact had been reported.

One of the Belgian patrols worthy of special mention, however, was the action of a combat patrol conducted on 1 June.

The Battalion Commander and his staff carefully planned the patrol and assigned the patrol mission to A and B Companies. The mission was to make
enemy contact to determine the enemy disposition in the area as far as Yook-kol about two kilometers to the north from the Glosters Crossing.

At 0815 hours A Company, to which the Luxembourg Platoon was attached, crossed first the Glosters Crossing in the boats built up by the British Engineers and by 1000 hours the company succeeded in building up a bridgehead in the 200 meters proximity of the north side of the Glosters Crossing to support B Company to follow. Soon B Company was able to bypass the bridgehead and continue to advance in two directions: The Petrz Platoon moving to Nogong-ni and the Frere Platoon to the Yook-kol area. As the Petrz Platoon reached close to Nogong-ni it received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the enemy well dug in the highlands around Chosan one kilometer north of Nogong-ni. The Belgian fighters, in face of the intense enemy fire, deployed by squad and continued to attack supported by friendly tanks positioned at the fire base along the southern bank of the Imjin River. In the meantime the Frere Platoon also met with enemy’s strong resistance as it closed near Sauce-kol (Chinmokchong). The platoon was taken under the enemy fire in the open area receiving the concentration of the enemy automatic weapons fire which injured several Belgian fighters. At this critical moment the enemy even counterattacked and soon penetrated into the gap between the two platoons, and the Frere Platoon became surrounded.

The 3rd Platoon of B Company supported by the artillery rushed to the scene and after a brief fight the 3rd Platoon was able to rescue the endangered platoon. Both platoons withdrew to the A Company’s bridgehead. The enemy also began to withdraw to the hill behind Nogong-ni completely frustrated by the friendly artillery concentration.

In this patrol action B Company suffered one killed and one wounded heavily. The effective use of friendly artillery and tank fire on the pin-pointed enemy prevented further casualties. Patrol members gave full credit to the artillery and tank support for their successful withdrawal.

On 5 June the Ulsters Battalion also conducted a patrol similar to the Belgian patrol of 1 June and experienced almost the same difficulty.

Except for those occasions the further contacts with the enemy had rarely been made during the month of June despite of the Belgians’ aggressive and continuous patrol activities.

On 23 June, while the Belgian Battalion was still defending along the Kansas Line with the Battalion CP in Solma-ri village, the Soviet representative to the United Nations hinted a Communist disposition to negotiate the Korean problem. Thus the first session of military armistice conference was held on 10 July at Kaesong between the delegations of the UN Command and the Communist forces.
As the UN’s objective in the Korean War now shifted from military victory to political settlement, this policy also carried with restriction on military operations. In view of these restricting elements and the reluctance of the majority of the nations composing the UN Command to advance again to the Yalu, it was hardly surprising that late in June General Van Fleet, the Commanding General of the Eighth Army, concluded: “Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the UN troops, therefore, was to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain north of Parallel 38, and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the UN forces.” The decision to strengthen the defensive lines of the UN forces and to confine offensive action at the front to limited advances marked the end of the fluid phase of the Korean War and the start of the new war.

Now turning back to the Belgian Battalion, the activities of the Belgians in July were even more arduous. The Belgians had to fight now against nature as the Korean rainy season started. They had to maintain and reconstruct the field fortification including bunkers and barbed wire along the defense line that collapsed in many places. This work had to be done without weakening their patrol activities.

On 10 July Lieutenant Colonel Crahay returned to Solma-ri from hospitalization in Japan for two months and retook the command of the Battalion.

On the 28th a short ceremony was held near Tokchong south of Tongdunchon to mark the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division, with Major General A.J.H. Cassels as its commander. Three brigade groups were integrated into the division including the 29th British Brigade to which the Belgian Battalion had been attached. The Belgian Battalion in turn was automatically attached to the division and continued to remain directly under the command of the 29th British Brigade.

As the Korean War had now entered its second year it seems worthwhile for better understanding of the Belgians’ activities to review the general situation of the war theater at the time of the beginning of the second year in which the Belgian Battalion would operate.

At the end of July 1951, the United Nations line ran, in general terms, from a point on the west coast about 32 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel roughly northeast to the east coast approximately 32 kilometers north of the Parallel. On the most part of the front contact with the enemy was not close.

The I US Corps sector consisted of defensive positions some 48 kilometers
The Belgian Battalion

north of Seoul.

The portion of 1 Corps line held by the 1st Commonwealth Division was about 10,000 meters long, protected by the Imjin River.

The enemy frontline was, on an average, some 6,370 meters north of the Imjin. Contact was only possible by crossing the river by improvised ferry or raft, as no bridges existed and the river was at this season unfordable, being in flood after heavy monsoon rain.

The principal enemy of the 1st Commonwealth Division at this time, and during the ensuing operations, was the 64th Chinese Communist Army, consisting of the 190th, 191st and 192nd Divisions. When the 1st Commonwealth Division was formed on the 28th July, it was actually faced on its front by the 192nd Chinese Division with two regiments in front line -- each regiment consisting of about 2,000 men. At that time the enemy held a very light outpost screen some 2,000 to 3,000 meters north of the Imjin River, with well-prepared defensive positions from 6,000 to 8,000 meters in depth. The enemy did not patrol extensively and generally avoided battle in front of his main position. Until the division advanced to a line north of the river enemy artillery fire was almost unknown.

The first task of the 1st Commonwealth Division was participation in operation "Slam," one of demonstrations to surprise enemy. The Belgian Battalion took part in the operation under the 29th British Brigade. The task of the Belgian Battalion was to advance with, and protect the left flank of, the Cavalry Division in a combined crossing of the Imjin River and an advance north of some seven kilometers on 4 August.

Immediately before the operation started, however, the Belgian Battalion relieved the Gloucesters Battalion on 1 August upon movement to the vicinity of Hancha-ni. Here at Hancha-ni the Battalion became the divisional reserve and this enabled the tired Belgians to spend a few days peacefully.

On 3 August at noon D Company of the Belgian Battalion that had arrived in Korea early in July as a replacement unit under the command of Captain Dargent first crossed the Glosters Crossing and built a bridgehead around north side of the crossing. This was to facilitate the crossing of the rest of the Battalion the early morning on the 4th.

The Belgian Battalion attack on the 4th was speedy and by 1500 hours it had already reached its objective Nopun-gol (also called Kochon) highland, without enemy contact. Upon arrival there the Battalion deployed on the hill top with A Company on the right, B Company on the left and C Company in the rear of B Company with the Battalion CP. In the meantime D Company that based southwest of Nopun-gol was assigned the task of patrolling along the road
on the left flank of the Battalion.

As previously mentioned the object of the operation "Slam" was the demonstration to display the enormous fire power of UN forces. And it had been planned that all participants would withdraw on the following day; but torrential rain, which caused the Imjin River to rise to a depth of 20 feet, dislocated the arrangements. Consequently the troops remained cut off north of the river until the 6th August, and were supplied by air.

At 1500 hours on the 6th the Belgian Battalion and the other participants withdrew approximately two kilometers to the south and the Belgians occupied the well-defensive positions on Hill 112 for the night. At 0030 hours the Battalion received sporadic enemy small arms fire, but the enemy resistance was relatively light. The enemy was soon dispersed.

On the 7th the Belgian Battalion, after four days of its participation in the operation, returned to its camp without casualties suffered.

On the 20th the first party of 454 Belgian rottees consisting of 21 officers, 67 noncommissioned officers, and 336 enlisted men left the Battalion to return home after one year service in Korea departing port of Inchon on the 25th aboard US Army transport.

Now the Belgian Battalion strength was reduced only to 500. This presented in effect a matter of grave concern to Colonel Crahay and staff of higher UN headquarters as the combat effectiveness of the Belgian Battalion was greatly lost. But there was no immediate action taken. A plan to highly mobilize the Battalion to cover the weakness of manpower strength was recommended to the Eighth Army which ignored the idea.

Despite of the weak battalion strength, however, Colonel Crahay and his staff wanted to fight on the front, but soon they learned that the Battalion would be placed for a period in rear area for retraining and reorganization under the control of the 3rd US Division.

On the 21st the Belgian Battalion was detached from the 1st Commonwealth Division. This was a matter of deep regret to the officers and men of the division as well as to those of the Battalion. They were specially on very friendly terms each other. The Belgian Battalion on the day left its base near Hansan-ni and moved to Changgo-ri some 16 kilometers to the east in the vicinity of Pochon. Upon arrival at Changgo-ri in the afternoon, the Belgian Battalion came again under the 3rd US Division for its operational control. A strenuous training course for the Battalion started with newly issued American weapons and equipment. The Belgians soon became adapted to new weapons and American methods. The intensive training lasted until 7 October when the Belgian Battalion moved on
orders further to the north to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Yulchi-ri about three kilometers northwest of Chorwon. Upon arrival in Yulchi-ri, the Belgian Battalion was further attached to the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division.

Section 5. Advance to Jamestown (10 October – 31 December 1951)

By this time all units of the 3rd US Division had been advancing north to secure a new objective assigned under the code-named operation "Commando" which began on 3 October. The operation was conducted by the I US Corps, and the mission given to the 3rd Division on the corps' right flank was to advance and capture Hill 281, nine kilometers northwest of Chorwon, and Hills 373 and 324 some 11 kilometers west by north of the city. The 3rd Division would also link up at Chungsan with the IX Corp's 25th US Division.

Elements of four Chinese armies -- the 65th, 64th, 47th and 42nd -- would have to be pushed back before the objective line (Jamestown) could be reached, but the primary mission of the Eighth Army was to seek out and destroy the enemy.

On 10 October the Belgian Battalion advanced on orders northeast along the road leading to Pyonggang as far as Haktang-ni near Hill 388 10 kilometers to the northeast from Yulchi-ri. The advance was relatively easy as the route was taken in the open area. The Battalion, upon establishing its defense positions on the Hill 388 with C Company on the crest, started sending out its patrols aggressively to the surrounding hills with special caution directed to Hill 488 (Pallibong). No enemy contact was made on that day.

At 0500 hours on the 11th, however, unknown number of enemy attacked the Belgian Battalion's positions. Soon a brief fire exchange was ensued in darkness. The Belgian fighters' gallant stand in a few minutes was able to disperse the enemy to the north to the Pallibong area. This was the first enemy probe. As the evening came the enemy started concentrating artillery and mortars fire on the Belgian positions again. This was the signal of the enemy's attack at midnight.

As expected at 0150 hours the following morning an estimated enemy company strength attacked the Belgians. The Belgian fighters which had been reduced to only two rifle and one heavy weapons companies had to experience the bitterest fight with the assaulting enemy well supported by their artillery.
and mortars fire. The courageous Belgians, however, strongly resisted with all available weapons inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. At the same time friendly artillery pounded on the pin-pointed enemy. This fight lasted until 0300 hours when the enemy broke off the fight and withdrew to the north.

At 2345 hours on the 12th came another strong attack of enemy's reinforced company strength. The Battalion's outposts and C Company position were soon taken under the enemy effective fire. But the Belgian fighters refused to give way. Every Belgian fighter bravely resisted with small arms, automatic weapons, and grenade fire to halt the attack. The Chinese again had to fall back to the north suffering heavy casualties.

On the 14th, despite of the Belgian’s gallant stand against the enemy's repeated attacks, the Battalion had to withdraw from the Haktang-ni village to the old position in the vicinity of Yulchi-ri. This was to reinforce the elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

The following day on the 15th, the Belgian Battalion was detached from the 3rd US Division, and passed to the operational control of the 1st US Cavalry Division upon arrival in the new assembly area in the vicinity of Norumok two kilometers northwest of Yonchon. On the same day the Battalion further moved six kilometers to the northwest and occupied positions in the vicinity of Hill 230 in the 5th Cavalry area. Upon occupation of the positions, the Battalion was further attached to the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division for the operational control.

At this time the 5th Cavalry was given the mission of taking Hill 346 (Chokko-ri) and then pushing on to Line Jamestown, objective of operation “Commando.” The objective Hill 346 was finally taken by the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on the 18th against virtually no opposition. Thus, by 19 October the 1st Cavalry Division had seized the last of its objectives on the Jamestown line as the enemy retreated north of the Yokkok-chon to his next line of defense.

The all units of the 1st Cavalry Division, upon seizure of the Jamestown line, started fortification work along the line assigned. The Belgian Battalion continued to maintain its defense position of a three-kilometer front beginning from Hill 230 on the left close to Hill 290 on the right while carrying out aggressive patrol activities forward. The patrols, however, made no enemy contacts in many cases.

On the 25th the Belgian Battalion occupied its blocking positions in the vicinity of Tokhyon-kol about three kilometers northeast of Hill 230. The Battalion remained in the Tokhyon-kol area until it was ordered again to move east to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Hyonchon in the area of the 8th Cavalry's responsibility on the 30th.
The Belgian Battalion

Upon arrival in the Hyonchon area at 1600 hours on the 30th, the Belgian Battalion came under command of the 8th Cavalry, and on 7 November became reserve unit for the 1st Cavalry Division along with the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry in the area. The reserve period of the Battalion lasted only a few days.

On 12 November the operational control of the Belgian Battalion was shifted from the Cavalry Division again to the 3rd US Division upon its arrival in the vicinity of Pisokkori in the 3rd Division area.

It should be noted that during about a month period with the 1st Cavalry Division the Belgian Battalion played a great part in assisting the division when it needed reinforcement so badly in the course of operation “Commando.” The Cavalry Division met the most strong resistance of the enemy in the “Commando” operation.

On 21 November the Belgian Battalion joined the 15th US Regiment of the 3rd Division who had just relieved the 7th Cavalry Regiment on MLR positions in the vicinity of Hill 230 where the Belgian Battalion had once operated along with the elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment.

Again on the MLR position the Belgian Battalion deployed in the center at the southwestern base of Hill 242 one kilometer west of the hill 230 with the 1st Battalion of the 15th Regiment on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right.

The Belgian Battalion held this defense position over one month until the relief with the elements of the 65th Regiment in the closing days of 1951 when the Battalion moved five kilometers to the south in the vicinity of Samgwan-ni.

During the period on the front, the Belgian Battalion carried out continuous patrol actions including small-scale raids during the daylight hours rarely making enemy contacts. Enemy was seldom seen during the daylight hours. Enemy action mostly took place at night under cover of darkness and unhindered by air surveillance, and even at night the enemy confined themselves primarily to small-scale patrols and limited probes of the friendly outpost positions.

The Korean winter in December was bitingly cold, the temperature dropping 20°C below zero. The Belgians had never been accustomed to such a cold weather. The Belgian fighters, although suffering intensely from the cold, remained unmoved in the bulwark of the struggle, fighting heroically not only against the enemy but against nature.
Section 6. Alongside Imjin-gang—Yokkok-chon
(1 January – 30 September 1952)

In Kojak-kol–Sa-dong Area

The Belgian Battalion, in the meantime, had some changes of its comrade-
ship with the American infantry units in operational attachments, after a series
of moves for its new fighting scene to be settled on the western front alongside
the loop-line of the Imjin River some ten kilometers northwest of Yonchon.

As of 27 December 1951 the battalion was detached from the 15th US
Infantry and attached to the Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment, 3rd US
Division at the same time.

Subsequently, on 4 January 1952 the Belgian Battalion was readjusted from
the line for a move onto the reserve role in the new assembly area in the vicinity
of Sangmae-dong six kilometers northwest of Yonchon, while the neighbouring
Greek Battalion held the position on the left nearby Kojak-kol–Sa-dong area,
both battalions being placed under the operational control of the 65th Infantry,
the 3rd US Division concurrently.

In the Belgian Battalion Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Vivario,
the Battalion Commander, was being assisted by Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy
who arrived in Korea in December 1951 and who was assigned as the Battalion
Executive Officer.

The war situation around the time seemed to be turning to a new phase
of comparatively more static war, passing the entire UN forces’ hard fighting
period of 1951. Nevertheless, in the new year period of 1952 generally the UN
front was characterized with its starting in active hill battles accompanied
by artillery and mortar bombardments on the enemy positions, rather than the
nature of the semi-positional warfare carried out frequently throughout the
preceding year. The new year was welcomed in by the whole division artillery
firing a series of heavy concentration on the enemy held outpost areas. Thus
the trench warfare had started in the late 1951 through the winter of 1951–
1952. The enemy on the opposite side dug deep into the underground
while the UN forces responded to it preparing the defensive line, with digging
in, wiring and mining together with the fortification for the various types of
trenches such as individual slit trenches in addition to the newly developed
A reconnoitering on actual terrain features takes place by Belgian unit commanders.

emplacements of all heavy weapons, command post bunkers and communication trenches. The orders from higher headquarters were received by also the Belgian Battalion that the future operations would be confined to those necessary to maintain the existing positions.

The battalion carried out the intensive daily patrolling and developed the activity sometimes as far the locality as the eastern bank of Imjin-gang.

Meanwhile, the orders were received by the battalion to move up on the line from the current assembly area at Sangmae-dong, and at 0510 hours on 19 January it began to relieve the Greek Battalion.

On the night of 21-22 January, thus the Belgian Battalion completed to take over the Kajak-kol-Sa-dong positions on the line, which were held by the Greek Battalion, while the Greek Battalion retired to secure another position on the southern bank of the looped Imjin-gang area and was detached from the 65th US Infantry at the same time. The Greek Battalion, however, left its one rifle company remained to hold on an outpost position at Nurum-kogae in the immediate north of Kojak-kol-Sa-dong area.

On 28 January 1952, all the 65th US Infantry Regimental units had completed their dispositions in the front alongside the conjunction area with the Imjin
River and Yokkok-chon some 12 kilometers northwest from Yonchon.

The attached Belgian Battalion held the positions on some high grounds in Suo-dong – Kojak-kol – Sa-dong area immediate right of the Imjin River, the 65th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion took up Sa-dong – Sangek-tong area in the center, and the 3rd Battalion at San-kol with the 1st Battalion at Tokhyon-kol to the right, both battalions closed to Yokkok-chon in the front-most area. (See Situation Map 2.)

Comparatively quiet period had passed during the month of January in the front of the Belgian Battalion, except that on 29 January at 1930 hours the battalion patrols encountered with the enemy of approximately one platoon strength at Nurum-kogae one of the Greek company’s old positions some 1,000 meters north of the Belgian Battalion’s current positions, and bravely the Belgian patrols rushed into the enemy line and fought in hand to hand combat for 40 minutes immediately after they opened a fierce fire fight with their small arms and automatic weapons. The patrol withdrew to the line after it smashed the enemy troops counting five enemies killed and a number of enemies wounded. The patrol called for the friendly mortar and artillery fire to break up the enemy troops, and soon the retreating Reds were torn to shreds bringing more their casualties.

In the following month, on 16 February the Belgian Battalion was again attacked by some two-squad enemy force at 2145 hours, but this time the brunt of the enemy attack was directed onward the Belgian Battalion’s left flank across Imjin-gang at Suo-dong two kilometers south from the main battle positions, and such enemy tactics as to strike the flanks of friendly positions or attack on the relatively rear locality would be very frequently occurred as the Communist’s common way of making a surprise attack on the UN positions.

The Belgian Battalion employed small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and artillery which proved the maximum firepower and fought tenaciously against the odds, forcing the enemy eventually to retreat after the hours of actions.

On the following day, thereupon, the battalion reviewed and decided to augment its patrol system in order to carry out more intensive and active patrolling, into 16 teams of each one to three-squad strength from the companies to be carried out throughout the battalion sector, particularly on the gauntlet area of the Imjin River complex, taking more precautions against the enemy infiltrations with the Communist’s guerrilla tactics.

From 0600 hours on 18 February all 16 newly organized patrol teams from the respective companies of the Belgian Battalion departed their defensive
line alternately for the destination of their respective patrol bases along their patrol routes with the mission of collecting informations as to enemy locations and capturing enemy troops or agents if practicable.

Still Northwest of Yonchon

The routine patrolling activity was conducted continuously and was gradually developed to the system of carrying out the small-scale night raid when necessary or the ambushes to be set up along the enemy route of approach.

On 26 February, meanwhile, the Belgian Battalion began to relieve the 20th Philippine Battalion Combat Team at 0820 hours, and for this relief a slight move to the right to close in the assembly area at Sa-dong took place.

On 27 February the battalion which assembled at Sa-dong in relief of the 20th BCT was detached from the 65th US Infantry and placed directly under the divisional control.

While in the assembly area the Belgian Battalion carried out the intensive patrolling chiefly for probing purpose, and on 15 March its patrol engaged four enemies armed with the Russian made burp guns at the riverside of Imjin-gang three kilometers northwest of Sa-dong and the patrol withdrew suffering no casualty.

The months of February and March were thus spent uneventfully, but on 27 March the battalion was happened to move back to Taebongchon on the 20th Philippine BCT's old position three kilometers east of Sa-dong, and it was attached again to the 65th US Infantry Regiment at the same time effective 1400 hours on 28 February.

During the Belgian Battalion's stay in the assembly area at Taebongchon, extending over April and May, no particular event had occurred other than the battalion happened to retire from the assembly area on 11 May to move some 30 kilometers southeast near Pochon, where the battalion assembled and had the intensive field training. The training started with schedules set up by the regiment for the units in the reserve area in the vicinity of Pochon, which included squad, platoon and company tactics, live firing, bunker fortification, map reading, engineer demolition and patrol and reconnaissance in force. The daily training was conducted regularly on a eight-hour basis a day and the officers and men of the Belgian Battalion had undergone the training with enthusiasm to obtain a considerable good result in familiarization with the tactical operations on actual
terrain feature and under the specific Korean weather conditions. Such hard training had continued until the battalion was ordered to be relieved in the place by the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Regiment at 0200 hours of 5 July. Subsequently, on the same date the Beligh Battalion was attached for the operational control to the 7th Infantry, 3rd US Division effective the same time.

On 6 July the Belgian Battalion under the operational control of the 7th US Infantry took up its frontal positions at Chong-dong, near the old Kojak-kol – Sa-dong area some ten kilometers northwest of Yonchon, with its outpost position to occupy Hill 199.

The following day was spent for digging-in and patrolling, as orders had been issued to dig, wire and mine the position.

During the initial occupation of the position, routine patrols also had been established well forward of it, but no contact had been made with the enemy. Patrolling was, therefore, started to locate the enemy positions and strength. From these it was ascertained that the enemy had a fairly strong covering screen in the hill across the Imjin-gang – Yokkok-chon river line. The enemy force in this frontal area seemed to be making no offensive patrol, but he resisted strongly any attempt by the friendly patrols to dislodge him or penetrate his screen.

Up to date the men of Belgian Battalion, however, experienced frequent movement and such hardship as the climbing of steep high grounds in heavy rain and humidity, as well as digging-in generally after dark. In addition to their hard training they underwent in the reserve area, these precious combat experiences could be trained for themselves to be a good test of the unit's endurance and enhancement of the battalion's ability to fight and operate with very limited resources. Particularly, the Belgian patrols proved to fight well independently, as they were so well known for their ability in so quickly becoming familiarized of the terrain features along their patrol routes and in making a relatively correct estimate for the probable course of action by enemy scouts or patrol in the forward locality.

On 24 July a surprise attack by a platoon from the 7th US Regimental units was carried out onto Hill 267 at Nurum-kogae in the front of the friendly main line of resistance, where the attack echelon engaged a platoon strength of enemy force for 35 minutes starting from 2250 hours. The attack was however unsuccessful and the friendly attackers disengaged and withdrew to the line. At 0050 hours on 25 July in order to capture the objective hill the renewal of attack was attempted by the 7th US Infantry with the attack echelon this time reinforced by a platoon from the Belgian Battalion. The attack was successful this time through the help of Belgian Battalion for the American regiment's
effort, and the objective Hill 267 eventually fell to the friendly by the gallantry and endurance of the men of Belgian Battalion who could occupy the crest of the hill finally, while the enemy troops fled to the north. Here again the Belgian Battalion proved its reputation and tradition, earning a credit of its solidarity in combat operation.

By 28 July, meanwhile, the Belgian Battalion was relieved of the positions around Chong-dong by the Greek Battalion as of 2400 hours on 26 July. And by 0200 hours on 27 July the Belgian Battalion arrived in the assembly area at Mudung-ni some five kilometers southwest of Yonchon.

On 31 August the Belgian Battalion was found on the line again eight kilometers northwest of Yonchon, in the vicinity of San-kol, farther northern area closed to Yokkok-chon.

On 8 September the Belgian Battalion patrol engaged with some Reds at the salient of Yokkok-chon at 0130 hours, and dispersed them after the friendly artillery fire was called in.

On 12 September a raid by a small force from the Belgian Battalion was launched on Hill 168, a thousand meters farther north from San-kol at 0130 hours. The night raiders advanced slowly to approach on the objective hill within 50 meters to the enemy positions.

Despite the Belgian raiders attempted their maximum effort to attain surprise, the enemy force noticed already of his being attacked by a unit of the UN forces began to open his maximum volume of fire and barrage particularly with his peculiar mortars proving considerably powerful fire weapons to the positional warfare during the Korean War. At 0210 hours upon halted by the fierce enemy fire, the raiders were completely forced to withdraw.

The raiders withdrew on orders, suffering eight men wounded in action. Nevertheless, the attack was renewed to capture the objective Hill 168 which fell finally to the Belgian attackers at 0245 hours on 12 September, killing several enemies before the attackers withdrew to the friendly main line of resistance.

At 2215 hours on 15 September the Belgian patrols who were patrolling in the Imjin-gang – Yokkok-chon junction area, had encountered two-platoon sized Chinese Communist force at Paped-kol across Yokkok-chon and fought for 20 minutes. Friendly artillery shells were poured against the Red Chinese and then the patrols withdrew.

On 20 September the Belgian Battalion sent out an active patrolling strengthened by the listening posts set up farther north across Yokkok-chon. At 2130 hours the listening post, however, was surprised by the enemy probing
attack. The enemy group was dispersed, but two Belgians were wounded in action.

On 26 September the battalion patrols were reconnoitering at 2130 hours alongside the eastern bank of Imjin-gang for the purpose of probing some high grounds of 171 and 160 meters in elevation near the Kojak-kol area. However, the Belgian patrols in a platoon size were ordered to consolidate and advance to help on Hill 199 in the right of the two features, one of the 7th US Regiment's observation post locations, which was being threatened by approximately two-company strength of enemy troops. In such urgent moment as a precarious situation encountered on the friendly neighbouring unit the Belgian Battalion afforded to the American friends a considerable assistance in providing a strength of reinforcement for the defense of Hill 199, repelling the enemy force which already reached the spur in attempt of smashing the vital friendly position. Upon succeeded in defense of the so important command feature of Hill 199, the Belgian platoon returned in triumph to the main line of resistance.

Section 7. In the Front North of Chorwon
(1 October – 31 December 1952)

Around the White Horse Hill

By 30 September, the Belgian Battalion had been continuously on the western front alongside the Imjin-gang-Yokkok-chon area, under the operational control of the 7th Infantry, 3rd US Division of the 1 US Corps.

As of 2100 hours on 30 September, however, the 7th US Infantry with the Belgian Battalion attached was relieved by the 12th Infantry Regiment of the 1st ROK Division, and arrived at an assembly area just one thousand meters southeast of Haktang-ni in the north of Chorwon at 0745 hours on 1 October. The 3rd US Division units became under the operational control of the IX US Corps effective the same time.

The combat activity throughout the spring, summer and early fall of 1952 was generally confined to patrolling and raids, but in October the activity by the UN forces was focused on the defense of Hill 395 (White Horse). At the same time the UN forces successfully launched limited objective attacks in the Triangle Hill—Sniper Ridge area in order to gain more advantageous defensive positions.
On the other hand, the Chinese Communist forces which faced to the UN forces in the front from the Imjin River to the east of Sami-chon in the latter part of 1952, were identified as the elements of 115th, 116th and 117th Divisions of 39th CCF Army and the 118th, 119th and 120th Divisions under the 40th CCF Army.

In late summer and autumn of 1952 the enemy artillery and mortars had developed considerably both in quantity and quality, and they would employ their specially trained gunners with a warning system that ensured the prompt opening of fire under any adverse terrain and weather conditions in the field.

At this stage of operation, however, it seemed that neither side on the front had the will to fight in an all-out effort to defeat decisively the other, and a long period of so called trench warfare ensued, while the negotiations for a cease-fire or the political settlement of the Korean War were being discussed at Panmunjom.

As soon as all the 3rd US Division units including the Belgian Battalion and other 7th US Regimental units arrived at the new assembly area around the Haktang-ni some ten kilometers due east of the White Horse Hill, their respective unit maintenance and training had started under the supervision of the division command post located at near the Mansedari some four kilometers south of the 38th Parallel.

On 24 October, meanwhile, the 7th US Infantry and the attached Belgian Battalion relieved the 30th ROK Regiment, taking over the positions at 0115 hours.

By 27 October thus the division sector was occupied by the 7th US Regiment on the left, the Belgian Battalion in the center and the 65th US Regiment on the right respectively along the forward area. Particularly the 7th US Regiment and the Belgian Battalion took up the positions around the Hill 395 (White Horse).

The defensive area which the units held up was very wild and consisted of a mass of hill and valleys.

The Belgian Battalion, however, held up the relatively low high ground in the first at Umi-dong approximately two and a half kilometers south of the White Horse Hill and partly on the small salient at Po-ri some five kilometers east of the hill.

On 25 November, meanwhile, the Belgian Battalion took up the important positions on and around Hill 395 (White Horse), relieving the 7th Regiment's 1st Battalion at 2045 hours. (See Sketch Map 4.)

The White Horse Hill was eventually held by a company from the Belgian
Battalion, and the thorough-going patrolling activity was carried out to the considerably remote forward area and no man's land, passing through their preplanned patrol routes. All necessary security measures to defend the White Horse Hill were actually taken by the Belgian Battalion.

On 2 December the Belgian Battalion patrols advanced to and searched the locality of Sanmyong-ni three kilometers north of the White Horse Hill. The patrol there met the enemy squad at 2225 hours, engaged in small arms fire fight for seven minutes and then withdrew.

On 6 December a listening post being set up in a sufficient forward on a spur as a security measure from the Belgian held White Horse Hill, encountered six Red Chinese probers in approach at 0100 hours and broke contact after killing all of them with opening the firing for five minutes.

As a countermeasure against the possibility of the enemy penetration into the White Horse Hill, the Belgian Battalion established also the alternate blocking position to be occupied when necessary by a company size troops, on a command feature some three kilometers apart to the rear from the main line of resistance.

On 9 December the Belgian Battalion maintained its position and at 0800
hours it was ordered to take over the 7th Regiment's 2nd Battalion positions in relief on the MLR as well as the OPLR, assuming the responsibility for the whole area covering the White Horse Hill at the same time.

During the operation in this area the divisional artillery units, the 213th, 955th and 12th FA Battalions were deployed in some rear locality around Hwajon and took up their firing positions, from which they could sufficiently provide their supporting fire in less 10,000 meters firing range for the Belgian held White Horse Hill. They were adequately employed in the general or direct support according to the friendly and enemy tactical situations and the decision made by the unit commander.

One platoon of the 64th Tank Battalion was placed in direct support for the Belgian Battalion, at Sintan-ni nine kilometers due south of Hill 395.

On the other hand, the Regimental Reconnaissance Company was very actively conducting the patrolling activity in the area, providing an additional cooperation in reconnoitering enemy situation for the Belgian defenders around the White Horse Hill.

The Lull in Battlefront

Unlike the occasion of the late-September and early-October when the bloody combats were fought by the heroic gallantry of the 9th ROK Division on the White Horse Hill, the succeeding Belgian Battalion spent the relatively quiet period.

During the latter part of 1952, however, the Communist activity along the front much increased and the enemy began to improve his defensive positions before the onset of winter season. Thus, the hill battle reached its climax, and the intensity of such battles proved by some tens of thousand rounds of artillery shells fallen daily on both opponent positions in this area.

The usual patrolling, probes and small-scale attacks were ever conducted by the Belgian Battalion and other United Nations forces.

From the onset of winter in November – December 1952 to the arrival of the spring in the following year the battlefront was characterized by artillery exchanges, sporadic small-scale fighting, constant patrolling and a propaganda warfare carried on through loudspeakers set up at the front by both sides.

The conduct of the intensive enemy psychological war seemed that the enemy had attempted to attract any of the friendly soldiers in the front-most
locality to make feel extreme homesick and to become exhausted both in mentally and physically and eventually to surrender to him in carrying their rifles upside down. The enemy voice broadcast would sometimes approach to the friendly MLR or OPLR within 50 meters or the less distance, spreading out all over the area the Communism propaganda speech, against which the friendly 60-mm and 81-mm mortars were directed simultaneously.

The means of enemy propaganda varied in such as spreading out the leaflets, broadcasting the Communist instigating speech or singing the civilian popular songs by female in actual voice in attempt of getting any defector from the Allied forces, rather than his effort to capture the prisoner of war.

On the battleground, meanwhile the pattern held steadily through January 1953 as the Red Chinese sent frequent probes of up to a company in force against the key outposts with no success. The enemy intended to occupy better ground along the main line of resistance of the UN forces before the truce settled down.

On 16 December a small-scale patrol action was reported that the Belgian Battalion patrols reinforced by the elements of the division reconnaissance company which was then attached to the 7th US Infantry, engaged some ten enemies in the front of the White Horse Hill at 2110 hours, inflicting upon the enemy group estimated two killed and three wounded instead of one Belgian wounded in action.

In the meantime, at 0125 hours on 28 December the Belgian Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division, and at 0630 hours on 29 December it retired to Unsan-ni some 18 kilometers due south from Chorwon, preparing for its unit maintenance upon arrival at the new assembly area. Thus, the whole 3rd US Division sector was relieved by the 32nd, 17th and 31st Infantry Regiments of the 2nd ROK Division by 0230 hours on 29 December, while the 3rd US Division units including the Belgian Battalion were alerted to soon move up and be disposed on the central front, farther east of the northern Chorwon area.

Section 8. In the Front Northwest of Kumhwa
(1 January – 25 February 1953)

Move on the Central Front

Finally, as of 5 January 1953 the Belgian Battalion with the remainder of
the division units were located at Yami-ri in the southern outskirts of Unchon, and settled there receiving the field training before they were actually redeployed to the front area.

On 15 January, on the other hand, a memorial service at the UN Cemetery in Pusan was held solemnly for all those comrades in arms of the Belgian Battalion who had fallen in battleground of the Korean War. All the ROK and UN representatives as well as the high ranking military officers who were present in the ceremony expressed their deepest condolence and sorrow to the battle fallen.

The bitterly cold weather of the Korean winter came to the battleground. Nevertheless, the officers and men of the Belgian Battalion continued their hard training at Yami-ri, earning the great admiration by members of other UN forces for the Belgian Battalion's active attitude on undergoing the field training.

In their training particularly such lessons as the conduct of a thorough-going camouflage warfare which was peculiar to the Red Chinese tactics in the winter operation, the winterization doctrine, the care and cleaning of weapons in the cold weather area and the security countermeasures including patrol and reconnaissance, were emphasized to the trainees.

In the meantime, on 28 January the orders were received that the 3rd US Division was to take over the whole 25th US Division sector as wide as 16 kilometers in frontage northwest of Kumhwa and that such relief was to be completed by 0600 hours of 30 January.

While in the reserve area at Yami-ri, during which the Belgian Battalion had undergone an intensive field training, the Battalion was alerted on 26 January for the move to the right portion of the famous Iron Triangle area. The area is consisted of a chain of over 200-meter high hill mass and valleys on the central Korea, being embraced by both connecting rivers of Hantan-chon and Namdae-chon which were fordable by the infantrymen at any time throughout the year except when the monsoon season. The rise of rivers in the monsoon, would show a flood frequently five to ten meters boost in water-level for an overnight, and even a small stream would then not permit fording without the bridge on it.

As the time went on in the early stage of operation in 1953 the Belgian Battalion learnt more about the trench warfare which it had experienced on both fronts in the northwest of Yonchon and in north of Chorwon during the preceding year and which it was to experience more amply on the front of Chat-kol area this time for the remaining period of the war in 1953.
The members of the battalion really could learn various important factors to improve more their means of defending their tactical area of responsibility, as a part of the UN front.

In trench warfare the Chinese Communist forces could still use a considerable amount of artillery and mortars efficiently. Therefore, the barbed wire and telephone lines were easily cut off at an early stage of a battle and were of little use unless these were set up in considerable depth or were positioned in bunkers with thick overhead cover. Thus the bunkers, dug-outs and communication trenches had to be very strongly constructed. And the more elaborate works on the trenches, bunkers and dug-outs were necessitated as the troops remained in the same defensive area for a considerable time. The infantry in forward areas lived in slit trenches, bunkers and dug-outs, with overhead cover thickly constructed of timber and sandbags. In the early stages most men preferred a slit trench, using the tent fabric as part of the overhead cover, but later the tendency was to get below ground rather than remain at ground level.

As a general rule the United Nations troops had considerable experience in warfare in tropical and temperate weather but very little in intense cold in the field without permanent shelter in the form of building or huts.

In most of the battles of the two World Wars the fighting was fierce, but the troops could usually look forward to reasonably good conditions, in accommodation when not actually engaged in active combat operations. But in the Korean War they could not expect these conditions except for the infrequent short periods of R and R (rest and recuperation) in Japan or when one’s time came to go home.

Upon this, at dusk on 28 January the Belgian Battalion moved to Ugu-dong seven kilometers west of Kumhwa and arrived there at 2210 hours on the same day.

As of 1200 hours on 28 January the battalion was detached from the 7th US Infantry Regiment and attached to the 65th US Infantry Regiment at the same time.

However, the Belgian Battalion continued to be in the reserve area roughly for a month at Ugu-dong, until it was ordered to be relieved on the position by the 3rd Battalion of the 65th Regiment at 2340 hours on 26 February, and for the operational control the battalion’s change of attachment was made from the 65th US Infantry Regiment back to the 7th US Infantry Regiment effective 0600 hours on 26 February.

Thus, on 3 March the Belgian Battalion took up and secured the positions at Sangdong-ni—Chat-kol—Paektong-ni some five kilometers northwest of
Kumhwa, where the Belgian Battalion fought gallantly with endurance almost for two months from 26 February to 21 April with the battle of Chat-kol in particular. The Belgian Battalion's brilliant fighting record which attained through the Chat-kol battle remains in the battle history of the Korean War and as a glory of the United Nations forces in the Korean War.

Generally figuring the Iron Triangle area connecting three towns of Pyonggang on the top north, Chorwon on the west and Kumhwa on the east with some 20-kilometer distance between the towns, the Belgian Battalion involved in the eastern portion of the triangle in the north or northwest of Kumhwa rather than the western area covering the north of Chorwon.

Particularly the oblique line of Kumhwa—Pyonggang of the triangle on east side not only passes the Belgian Battalion held Chat-kol positions where the line cut roughly one third, but also divides the ground into two tactically important localities, one on the west with the command feature of Hill 717 (Sobang-san) and another on the east with the dominant feature of Hill 1062 (Osong-san). The two dominant features were either being held by the Chinese Communist forces in better places for observing and overlooking all surrounded terrain features as well as the entire friendly areas.

In a five-kilometer distance to southward from Osong-san, the Hill 598 (Triangle Hill) which was one of the important outpost positions of the United Nations forces, withstood at just two and a half kilometers north of Kumhwa facing Osong-san and glaring at each other.

On the other hand, in the spring of 1953 the battalion's tactical movements and activity took place as frequently as ever, with the patrolling activity was carried out as before.

In this period any troops going out for the patrolling on the no man's land, once upon left their home trenches on the main line of resistance, had to manage themselves for precautioning their being surprised by enemy ambush or patrol, and had to resist against the hostile attack when the patrols were provoked by.

There occurred many instances such that a number of patrols fought but resulted in a bloody failure in their patrolling action, encountering with the Red Chinese surprise tactics.

The Belgian Battalion patrols, despite they were often hit by surprise, carried out their routine patrol activity in patiently and steadily. Sometimes the patrols carried out a reconnaissance patrol in force to reach the Red Chinese outpost hill, and tried to make a surprise raid but mostly in vain.

On the contrary, the enemy forces were everynight employing two squads
to one platoon strength for a piecemeal attack on the friendly outpost positions and along the main line of resistance, forecasting the capability of his committing onslaught throughout the front at any time.

The enemy capability in artillery shelling much increased during the Chat-kol battle, with the record of pouring over the Belgian held positions on the line some 35,000 rounds in five hours of hill battle or over two rounds per second. On the Outpost Harry in less ten kilometers westward, the fighting took place likewise fiercely with the artillery shelling throughout the same night.

Against such enemy provoked shelling action, the friendly supporting artillery replied with more than 40,000 rounds of shells delivered in the same whole night on the enemy occupied hill positions, by the considerable number of 155-mm guns and 105-mm howitzers which proved comparatively much better quality than the Communist's inferior 122-mm heavy mortars.

Particularly the friendly supporting artillery used the powerful proximity fuse, and such ground operation was further supported by the air-supremacy which had absolutely been held by the UN forces from the beginning to the end.

For the conduct of the trench warfare the Belgian troops prepared with their best effort their slit trenches, bunkers and communication trenches on their defensive positions at Chat-kol area.

Nevertheless, the Red Chinese shelling action inflicted upon the Belgian defenders considerable number of casualties which the Reds side had the relatively much higher numeral in receiving the casualties.

The casualties which the Belgian Battalion sustained at Chat-kol area during the five months period from 13 February to 12 July 1953 for which the battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy, had been figured with 35 killed including three ROKs and two Americans, 135 wounded including 18 ROKs and six Americans, and three missing in action including one American.

In remembrance of the precious sacrifices as well as the gallantry displayed by the officers and men of the Belgian Battalion in those times on Chat-kol battle, Colonel Gathy then the Battalion Commander witnessed in part:

"In numerically a large number of the battle casualties proves the intensity of the war. So many the precious battle casualties, on the other hand, contributed so much for our unit's glory on the Korean War history – the blood which we shed one by one drop had not been wasted at all, and the fallen comrades gave their lives for the cause of peace. The Belgian Battalion in 1953 had taken over and carried out superbly the occasions of the glory which had been exercised before by my superiors in arms in Korean soil, The Belgian Battalion in
1953 also proved continuously to display to all countries in the world a resolution of the battalion to fight for the righteousness by all the gallant warriors from the villages and cities of our home country. I bless sincerely for those resting in the UN cemetery in Pusan and I dedicate this tale to our fallen heroes solemnly . . . .”

Belgians held Chat-kol

During the period from 26 February to 21 April 1953 the Belgian Battalion held firmly the positions of Sangdong-ni – Chat-kol – Paektong-ni in five kilometers northwest of Kumbwa. The battalion took up the extreme right in the 3rd US Division sector alongside the east boundary between the 9th ROK and the 3rd US Divisions which was set up through the Hill 773 to the north and Tap-kol on south four kilometers northwest of Kumbwa with its coordinating point on Tap-kol.

In the Battalion Headquarters Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy the Battalion Commander and his assistant, the Battalion Executive Officer Major Bodart established their operational concept for the dispositions of three rifle and one weapons companies under the command of his battalion to be settled down in sequence of A, B, C and Weapons Companies from left to right astride the Chat-kol valley.

The Belgian Battalion established also the outpost positions, as a counter-measure of providing security in the front of the main line of resistance with the missions, such as the early warning of the enemy approach, deceiving the enemy force as to the exact location of the friendly MLR and calling for the friendly supporting artillery fire as well as the concentration fire on the enemy attackers immediately before the withdrawal of the outpost personnel on an order; those outpost positions from left to right were detailed and composed of basically one platoon reinforced from the respective company positions on the main line of resistance, with the Outpost Alice from A Company, Barbara from B Company and Carol from C Company. The A Company Outpost Alice was set up on a high ground in the vicinity of Paem-kol in some 1,000 meters forward locality of Sangdong-ni, the B Company Outpost Barbara on and around the Hill 419 in less 2,000 meters front of Chat-kol and C Company Outpost Carol was set up on Hill 400 in the immediate north of Paektong-ni respectively. Thus the battalion employed three main outpost positions while it had four company dispositions along the main line of resistance for accomplishment of
its assigned missions defending the important Chat-kol area.

The battalion heavy weapons including the 81-mm mortars and attached 4.2-inch heavy mortars were well selected with their firing positions set up adequately around the battalion command post area to provide a security for it and in such places as their emplacements were well dug in and camouflaged.

Colonel R. Gathy emphasized as the Battalion Commander for the defensive operation to all the company commanders under his command to employ their utmost effort and the resources for deepening all sorts of trenches and strengthening barbed wire and the mining. Particularly, the battalion commander insisted and asked for the preparation of the battalion's blocking positions as an alternate position to be occupied by the battalion when the enemy troops penetrated into the line. As a result of recommendation made by the battalion commander to the higher headquarters to obtain the necessary engineer support for the construction, the battalion blocking positions were eventually prepared in cooperation with the engineer troops in some four kilometers rear area from Chat-kol and the battalion blocking positions were finally assigned to each company positions alongside a chain of hill features between Ugu-dong and Tap-kol. Thus the defensive line in Chat-kol area was held by the Belgian

The Belgian Battalion's well-prepared 81-mm mortar emplacements prove their accurate firing technique.
The Beligan Battalion

Battalion which applied a precise planning on the digging-in, wiring, mining and also repairing its defensive positions throughout its main battle positions, outpost positions and the alternate blocking positions.

On the other hand, in this stage of operation the Chinese Communist forces facing the Beligan Battalion held Chat-kol positions northwest of Kumhwa were identified by the intelligence summary as the elements of 43rd, 44th and 45th Divisions under the 15th CCF Army. The intelligence report further indicated that the Red Chinese troops of some 700 men had been eyewitnessed by a member of headquarters of the friendly intelligence detachment upon the north of Ponggang on 12 January 1953 and that the enemy forces were under moves to the south. It was apparently clear that the Reds reinforcements were gathering in their assembly area around Ponggang, and building up considerably against the friendly defensive positions.

Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Vivario who had been the Beligan Battalion Commander until he was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy on 12 February 1953, had established tactical scheme in three ways for carrying out the battalion’s counterattack mission in case where any part of his unit within its assigned sector should be penetrated by the enemy force. Those three ways of counterattack were established on the basis of the battalion commander’s precise estimates and studies on the defensive mission which his battalion was to accomplish, on the terrain features, avenues of enemy approach and both friendly and enemy situations particularly under thorough consideration of the friendly capability in supporting arms and the coordinated fire support plan.

Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy who took over the command of the Beligan Battalion from 13 February 1953 remarkably improved the way of fighting together with the means of defending the Chat-kol positions as well as to carry out the counterattacks when necessary for reconstruction of the main line of resistance.

For the accomplishment of defensive mission on Chat-kol area the Beligan Battalion’s company commanders were constantly alerted by the battalion commander for the Communist forces’ specific guerrilla tactics, such as the night raids, attack by human waves, and the ability in Red Chinese infiltration into the friendly OP/LR and MLR in surprise. Particularly, sending out the probing reconnaissance patrol was of all Belgian commanders’ primary concern and an active study for the terrain features both frontal and rear of the main line of resistance in Chat-kol area became one of their important routine tasks.

During the Beligan Battalion’s stay in its defensive positions at Chat-kol, the training maneuver as the rehearsal of counterattack in the nearly selected
area took place by the designated reserve unit in the battalion, as frequently as it had three times in a month, on the assumption that the Chat-kol positions were attacked and penetrated by the Chinese Communist waves.

The tactically important defensive positions around Chat-kol had thus been held by the gallantry and precise planning of the Belgian Battalion.

On 13 February 1953 the command change ceremony of the Belgian Battalion was held solemnly under the presence of ROK and UN representatives particularly the Belgian Ambassador in Tokyo, de Schoutheete de Tervaerten.

On 18 February, five days after the Lieutenant Colonel Gathy took over the command of the Belgian Battalion, the major unit commanders including the Lieutenant Colonel Gathy participated in the 7th US Infantry Regiment’s operation conference to discuss the current tactical situation faced on the regiment and a certain matter of reserve unit tasks.

The Belgian Battalion was then given one of the regiment’s reserve role as well, in addition to the regular combat mission on the main line of resistance to hold the part of the 7th US Regiment’s sector in the 3rd US Division front.

The Regimental operation conference quoted that should the Hill 598 (Triangle Hill), the critical command feature which was currently held by the adjacent 9th ROK Division unit on the right of a five-kilometer distance from the Belgian’s Chat-kol positions be threatened and at the worst captured by the enemy forces who would descend upon from the direction of Hill 1062 (Osong-san), the Belgian Battalion or a certain strong infantry battalion from the 7th US Regiment might be employed and ordered to be committed as a counter-attack unit for regaining the Triangle Hill.

The operational concept in the counterattack plan comprised three phases; the first two phases were to be applied for the American attack echelons to advance on and secure the right portion of the Triangle Hill, while the Belgians were for the worst third phase to attack from southeast of Chat-kol across the division boundary toward the Triangle Hill into the 9th ROK Division sector and finally capture the objective crest of the Hill 598.

Shortly after the conference was held all the Belgian unit commanders above the level of platoon leaders began to study the terrain features around the Triangle Hill and to conduct their detailed reconnaissance on the actual terrains.

As for the supporting arms, the Belgian Battalion was to be provided with the general or direct supports from the air sorties, division tank and artillery battalions, in directing concentration and neutralization fires with their maximum firepower on the objective hill during the counterattack.
The Belgian Battalion

The counterattack plan itself to recapture the Triangle Hill in case it should fail on the Communist side, was of course not the responsibility of the Belgian Battalion nor of the 7th US Regiment, but the responsibility should be rested on the 9th ROK Division units absolutely because the Triangle Hill was situated within the 9th ROK Division sector. Nevertheless, the Belgians understood and convinced that the critical terrain feature of the Triangle Hill proved to be an important part of the entire UN defensive line, particularly in only a five-kilometer distance on the due east from the Belgians held Chat-kol area the hold of the Hill by the friendly forces might not only protect vitally the neighbouring allied force's positions but also promote the cooperations in combat operations between the adjacent units of the UN and allied forces.

A Coordination with Adjacent Unit

The 15th and later relieved 24th CCF Army troops which had been estimated as deployed alongside from Pyonggang through Osong-san, however, seemed to be only building up the positions on their own main line of resistance and the outpost area.

The enemy attack on the adjoining Hill 598 (Triangle Hill) materialized eventually, and therefore the Belgian Battalion could devote for strengthening the defense of its own Chat-kol positions improving them more superbly with more enthusiasm and steadiness.

A crescent shaped Chat-kol area was often called as Boomerang, forming the crescent with one end created at Hadong-ni stretching to the other end at Tap-kol. A coordinating point on the divisional boundary between the 9th ROK and 3rd US Divisions was set up at Tap-kol. Reaching Tap-kol the Belgian Battalion's routine patrols frequently would make a liaison contact and a detailed coordination with the elements of the 9th ROK Division as to the passage of patrol route along the ROK division sector. Thus, the Belgian Battalion as well as the 3rd US Division units had to make a close coordination with the adjacent 9th ROK Division units constantly, as both divisional units were operating in same localities astride the boundary located at Tap-kol; the Belgians held Chat-kol positions on the left of the boundary while the 9th ROK Division units occupied the Hill 598 (Triangle Hill) on the right of the boundary respectively, both areas being overlooked by the enemy held Hill 1062 (Osong-san).

A routine liaison and contacts were maintained at the coordinating point of Tap-kol between the adjacent units by means of exchange of liaison officer
each other and using the signal communication means of either telephone or radio. The telephone wire was widely used as the most convenient means of communications in which a little confusion however occurred sometimes with their conversation by different language.

The spirit of the mutual support was thus prevailing throughout the Belgian Battalion not only for their adjacent units but also it was encouraged highly among their units in the battalion, such as in their companies, platoons or squads.

The timeliness, accuracy and the quick wits in familiarization and judgment of the surrounded terrain conditions in the front of its operational area were of the Belgian Battalion’s particularly known techniques.

In utilizing the terrain conditions on both the enemy and friendly areas the Belgian Battalion successfully accomplished its complementing tasks for the gaps which arose between the adjacent ROK and American infantry units, with preplanned firepower or manning strength of men and actually mining the fields of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines on the gap valley between the ROK outpost positions and the Belgian Battalion’s isolate Dupont platoon in the C and Weapons Companies localities.

Section 9. The Battle in Chat-kol Area
(26 February – 21 April 1953)

Encountering by Listening Post

As a security and precautionary measure the Belgian Battalion set up the several listening posts in the front of its main line of resistance around Chat-kol.

The missions of such a listening post were to chiefly conduct the early warning of an enemy approach as promptly as possible to the friendly defensive line, as similarly as the elements of the outposts line of resistance performed, and to collect informations and report to the friendly OP or CP on the MLR as to the enemy moves in the hostile positions or in the farther area by listening and other means of senses.

On 13 March 1953, meanwhile, the Belgian Battalion’s listening post encountered with five enemies at 0018 hours on 13 March and fought with them for 15 minutes in small arms fire fight and hand to hand combat at the outpost
The Belgian Battalion

area some 800 meters forward from the main line of resistance at Chat-kol. The Belgian listening post inflicted upon the enemy infiltrators in this action one enemy killed and three enemies wounded.

At 2020 hours on the same day, the unknown number of the Red Chinese attacked again on the Belgian Battalion's listening post at the same place. The five Belgians of the listening post engaged with the Red infiltrators for ten minutes and then repulsed the enemy force.

At 2100 hours on 17 March the Red Chinese probes appeared once again on the Belgian listening post at the same place, and this time the Red Chinese strength was much increased into some 30 men, but retreated after being engaged for ten minutes.

In the Belgian Battalion Command Post at Chat-kol, Major Dourlet the Battalion S-3 Staff Officer kept busy in acting the command procedure and controlling all companies chiefly on the aspects of operations, troop affairs and employment of outposts detailed from each company.

Particularly, all means of the signal communications including the telephone and radio proved well operated within the command of the Belgian Battalion and maintained in good conditions constantly between the Battalion Command Post, all three rifle companies and Weapons Company and throughout the Outposts Alice, Barbara and Carol.

In consideration of the necessity of a close troops disposition in defensive operation to be employed against the occasion of massive enemy onslaught as the Belgian Battalion experienced in April 1951 with the hard-hit British Gloucestershires in Imjin-gang battle, the Belgian Battalion had to be manning the strength of 400 to 500 men on a critical portion in the actual battalion sector of over 3,500 meters frontage to be assigned to only three rifle companies.

Each rifle company of the Belgian Battalion proved particularly the infantrymen's browning machine guns to be the most tremendous, effective and powerful weapons, with which the Belgian Battalion's fighting men could smash quickly the Chinese Communist forces' massive onslaught.

During the period the repair of the main battle positions as well as the outpost and blocking positions, together with the reinforcement of the barbed wire and the mine fields along the defensive area, were continuously carried out as routine operations by the Belgians in Chat-kol area.

On the other hand the Red Chinese building up his bunkers and hill positions seemed to be increasingly strengthened day by day. In order to shatter and destroy out those enemy fortifications, the powerful 90-mm gun-shells from the
US tanks, 105-mm and 155-mm artillery shells were directed with a volley on the sighted targets in the hostile area, together with the air strikes by the UN aircraft dropping the napalm shells and 500-pound bombs.

Nevertheless, the Communist bunkers even his weapon emplacements would be easily recovered in a single day to the original state from their state being destroyed out; a Belgian subaltern who eyewitnessed only three enemy-dug artillery loop holes on the Red Chinese hill slope on 1 March, later found to count some 15 loop holes in the same area on 15 April. The Red Chinese further dug out the number of tunnels in which the various sorts of guns and weapons even 122-mm mortars were hidden and from which they could pour their maximum volume of fire at any practicable time and hit the desired targets on the friendly outposts on or onto the friendly main line of resistance. They were well trained and well camouflaged inside the tunnels. And still yet they could be operated efficiently.

The friendly intelligence source, in the meantime, disclosed the fact that the Red Chinese Army relief in Pyonggang area was made by the 24th CCF Army units which took the place of 15th CCF Army between late-February and early-March 1953.

The medical support for the Belgian Battalion during the operations was provided adequately. All wounded soldiers and patients were promptly evacuated to the mobile army surgical hospital (MASH) located at some 25 kilometers distance in the rear area by helicopter. However, each individual soldier had been trained so as to have an emergency medical care and treatment and to have a morphine shot as soon as he was wounded for himself or by help of his comrades in arms in the battle area.

On 8 April the Belgian Battalion's forward company localities had obtained a big battle result, the Belgians captured one Red Chinese prisoner of war but the captive was badly wounded before he was captured by the Belgians. When he was sent to the Battalion Command Post, he still remained in an unconscious condition and therefore he was eventually urgently evacuated to the MASH by helicopter together with some other Belgians wounded.

55 Days Battle at Chat-kol

During the 55 days battle at Chat-kol from 26 February to 21 April, the Belgian Battalion involved mostly in the fierce fighting against the frequent enemy surprise attacks of a strength from two to three men probers to the
extent of massive one battalion.

From early March, as the enemy situation became more precarious, Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy the Battalion Commander issued the battalion's order of day to emphasize all officers and men of his battalion to enforce the newly established time schedule for the daily livelihood of all personnel while living on Chat-kol positions. In accordance with the new schedule the men had to keep on their combat positions during the night and fight when alerted. From dawn only some guards from the respective units were to post on duty as security guards, and all the rest of company and command post personnel had to sleep until 1200 hours, subsequently followed by the daytime works, such as strengthening and deepening the slit trenches or communication trenches.

A fierce fighting overnight becomes quiet with first light in the Belgian forward company positions.

Generally speaking the Belgian main battle positions in forward company localities were protected by their outpost positions designated from left to right as Alice, Barbara and Carol. Each outpost personnel were detailed from respective company localities and comprised some ambush and listening posts. The ambush post was consisted of two to three men for the daytime but it composed of seven to eight men including two radio operators for the nighttime
post. (See Situation Map 3.)

The listening post, however, would be employed mostly in nighttime with usually two-man strength. Neither of these actually had the active defensive mission but they performed the mission as the means of early warning but they performed the mission as primarily the means of early warning for the main battle positions as to the enemy approach and moves in the area. Upon completion of their assigned missions, the elements of the posts would withdraw to the main line of resistance on orders of the company commander. And even when the liaisons with the company commander were cut out the outpost commander might order his men to withdraw back to the line, as he estimated that his post should be withdrawn.

The withdrawal of outposts, however, were usually accompanied by the available supporting fire of 105-mm Batteries, 4.2-inch, 81-mm and 60-mm mortars, such firing being continued for three minutes shelling 270 rounds or more poured into the withdrawn outpost area.

During the Chat-kol actions the Belgian Battalion was visited by some distinguished visitors; on 6 March General Mark W. Clark, the UNC Commander, and General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Commander of the Eighth US Army, visited the Belgian Battalion Command Post at Chat-kol. The generals praised highly the combat achievements of the Belgian Battalion and encouraged its continuous contributions in fighting as a part of the United Nations forces in the Korean War.

On 8 March, on the other hand, Colonel Lothaire, the Commander of the Belgian-Luxembourg Allied Forces also visited from Tokyo to the Belgian Battalion at Chat-kol.

Colonel Lothaire had bidden the farewell to all officers and men of the Belgian Battalion in Korea, and Lieutenant Colonel Soynaeeve was introduced as the Colonel Lothaire's successor at the same time. Such headquarters in Tokyo contributed in many ways for the Belgian Battalion, providing the convenience of transient stay in Japan for those Belgian soldiers who were to proceed on or to be leaving the battlefield of Korea, making comfort visits onto the hospital in Tokyo for those Belgian wounded soldiers, and providing guidances and services for all those Belgian soldiers who came from the battle area of Korea to the five days R and R (rest and recuperation) in Japan.

On the night of 8-9 March the Belgian Outpost Carol was operational on a small hilltop a 200-meter forward of the line, on such critical entrance as the Red Chinese probers might approach immediately into the Belgian held main line of resistance.
The night duty party of the post was consisted of a sergeant, six corporals and men and two men of radio operators with two listening posts, one of which was located at the inbetween of the Carol and the other one was located at 40-meter forward from the line of resistance. Each listening post equipped with a radio was to keep free from the enemy surprise and to provide the cover for the withdrawing Carol.

In a hillfoot of the enemy held Hill 400, some 350 meters north of the Belgian Outpost Carol, there was apparently the Red Chinese first outpost being operative with their guards whose strength was estimated approximately one platoon.

The enemy held hill slopes in the front of the Belgian positions at Chat-kol, however, would almost everynight be watched out constantly by the searchlights placed in direct support or general support for the UN forces during the encountering of hill battle by both opponents in the central front in 1953.

During the period the Belgian Battalion received the Red Chinese artillery shelling and mortaring or over 50 rounds a day in average, and such enemy firing would be directed particularly on the Belgian working parties.

On the night of 8 March, the superb patrols from the Belgian B Company were able to detect and disclose two Red Chinese bunkers on Hill 419 immediate forward of the Outpost Barbara. The patrols returned to their base without causing the enemy fire at 2330 hours.

At 0100 hours of 9 March the attack by the Reds on the Belgian positions was launched simultaneously; the Belgian B Company signaled for the early warning of the enemy approach of the Chinese Communist columns initially in a small scale comparatively, nearing toward the Belgian line very slowly under their covering fire of light machine guns, and such enemy move was immediately followed by the sporadic enemy mortar shelling landed on Outpost Barbara and Carol as well as on B and C Companies localities.

At 0230 hours the Chinese Communist launching attack on the Belgian held Chat-kol positions was intensified and more strengthened with his attack force considerably increased.

Colonel R. Gathy, the Belgian Battalion Commander ordered all his officers and men to start immediately on the hundred per cent alerts and to take all possible security measures against the enemy launched attacks.

The battalion commander also warned the possibility of being surprised by the odds on the positions of B Company in particular. And the enemy surprise could be materialized through the blunt which should be arisen between the Outpost Alice and Carol.
The small arms fire fight by both opponents ensued throughout whole two hours, starting at shortly before 0400 hours, and reached the utmost fierceness by the daybreak.

Shortly after the fire fight ensued at 0420 hours both the telephone and radio signal communications were cut off between the C Company and its outpost positions.

However, the substitute means of signal communications by such as flares, tracer ammunitions and flashlights were on hand and a considerable number of stock was available on supply capability.

Nearly at 0500 hours at the direction of the Outpost Carol several tracer ammunition shots were fired and seen over the C Company positions, indicating that the situations on the forward outpost position which was overrun by the enemy force, became considerably serious. And it was already the time for all outposts to withdraw.

Nevertheless, the fact later became known that the Outpost Carol did not withdraw despite it was overrun by the odds suffering considerable casualties and eventually the outpost commander was killed in action. (See Sketch Map 5.)

**ACTION OF OUTPOST CAROL  8–9 MAR 1953**

![Sketch Map 5](Image)
The Belgian Battalion

At 0520 hours one of the Outpost Carol's men who was lightly wounded but only the survival of Carol barely reached his parent C Company positions, stated that the Outpost Carol was badly smashed by two platoons of the Chinese Communist force deployed at 0430 hours alongside C Company front through Hill 400.

The Outpost Carol seemed likely to be overrun by the Reds completely and it lost the opportunity of its timely withdrawal because the outpost commander was convinced in overestimate that his outpost was enough strong as to overcome any enemy surprise.

Shortly after the Carol's survival returned to the C Company on the line, the battalion commander decided to make a counterattack onto the front of C Company positions to reconstruct the lost Carol positions with two platoons strength from the Belgian Companies. The counterattack was preceded by a volley of the supporting fire for 20 minutes with a 105-mm battery and other fire weapons as set in the preplanned coordinated fire.

At 0610 hours the gallant counterattack platoons departed again their line of departure, but as the first light already began to rise and the enemy automatic rifle fire from the direction of Carol, Hills 400 and 419 was hindering considerably the advance of the Belgian counterattack platoons. However, the Belgian supporting weapons immediately replied with countermortar fire and smoke shells firing against the enemy attempt.

The Belgian Battalion's counterattack on Carol was eventually resulted in successful recapture and at 0645 hours on 9 March the outpost Carol was regained to the Belgian hand by the heroic achievement of counterattack mission with solidarity, esprit-de-corps and the active desire to fight for the fine tradition of the Belgian Battalion.

The repeated Belgian counterattack actions, however, caused to sustain five killed, 11 wounded and one missing in action. The casualties on the Red Chinese were estimatedly 25 killed and 40 wounded at minimum.

Throughout the battle in Chat-kol area the Belgian Battalion was poured with 1,150 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar shells in various types, while the friendly supporting units replied with 2,900 rounds of 105-mm, 400 rounds of 155-mm and 1,200 rounds of various mortar shells.

The size of enemy force in attack on the Belgian held Chat-kol positions was proved to be at least one whole company strength, employing four channels of his radio nets. Further, some four Belgians later witnessed that the number of enemy infiltrators onto Carol positions in the actions were 100 Red Chinese.

In Chat-kol actions the men of the Belgian Battalion displayed highly their
ability to fight with such characteristics as the steadiness, superb esprit-de-corps and their excellent marksmanship in small arms firing.

On 13 March the Outpost Alice was twice attacked by the Chinese Communist forces at 0100 hours on 13 March and at 0020 hours on the following day respectively.

Particularly when the enemy launched slowly the probing raid on the Outpost Alice at 0015 on 14 March, the outpost defenders of Alice and Barbara well tied up to repulse the probers by calling for the artillery supporting fire.

But the enemy probing was soon followed by the main attack who reached and broke through the Alice’s western wire entanglement. A fierce hand to hand combat ensued, and the Belgian defenders hurled a whole day’s quantity of grenades, killing the infiltrators.

The last stand made by the gallantry of the Belgian warriors who blocked and defended the Alice positions eventually led the enemy to retreat and the enemy attempt to attack the Alice was frustrated.

Throughout the action the maximum volume of supporting fires for the defense of Outpost Alice with 60-mm and 81-mm mortars were poured on the Alice. In this fighting Private Ostijn was missing in action at first, and almost fell to the captive in the enemy positions. However, Ostijn’s wits and bravery were able to successfully break out the enemy surrounding and returned safely to the Belgian positions.

On 25 March, raining and foggy day, the listening post set up between C Company and Outpost Carol, was attacked by 20 Red Chinese. The listening post leader Private First Class De Grieck, though he was a small but a man of bravery who experienced with the previous fighting on 9 March for the same post, constantly transmitted the vital enemy informations to both the Carol in the front and his platoon commander in behind of his listening post. De Grieck’s gallantry and excellent technique of fire and maneuver displayed an example. He was promoted to the rank of corporal for his meritorious achievements in this area.

On 30 March Colonel R. Gathy, the Battalion Commander was appeared in the Regimental Command Post for attending on a briefing in the morning. The battalion commander was informed by the higher headquarters of the enemy’s much increased threatening on the Belgian positions.

The Belgian Battalion Commander in the regimental headquarters again asked for the airstrikes essentially required onto the Hills 400 and 419 in which the enemy force seemed to be strengthened day by day and built up considerably.

As for the supporting of an engineer unit for the Belgian Battalion the
American Regimental Commander accepted this immediately and the action was taken to have one engineer platoon attached to the Belgian Battalion until the fighting continued lastly in Chat-kol area and the armistice was signed on 27 July.

As for the requirement of airstrike, on the other hand, was hardly accepted by the higher headquarters with the reason that the desired targets of the enemy held hills were located at too close to the friendly positions so that the airstrike would cause some friendly casualty rather than aiming the casualty on the enemy side.

However, on 12 April both Hills 400 and 419 were heavily airstriked on their targets by the UN aircraft through twice the missions. Besides, during the Belgian Battalion's stand in the fighting at Chat-kol, all 150 sorties of airstrike supports were actually materialized on some enemy held commanding features, such as Hills 558 and 773.

The threatening by Chinese Communist force on the Belgian positions, however, slowly increased until 19 April, when the Belgians could destroy an enemy battalion reinforced.

A relatively quiet period followed since then for some six weeks, and thus 55 days and nights of Chat-kol battle had past in maintaining with the triumph and glory always vested on the Belgian Battalion.

On the night of 7-8 April, meantime, the Belgian Battalion unfortunately sustained a heavy casualties owing to the enemy artillery and mortar fires, with 11 killed and 14 wounded in the action. The Red Chinese artillery and mortar fires proved more the accuracy with the following number of shelling and the number of men killed on the Belgian positions.

On the night of 24-25 March 50 rounds of enemy shells landed, with three killed, on 7-8 April 700 rounds with 11 killed, on 17-18 April 700 rounds with none killed, and on 18-19 April 3,100 rounds with one killed.

Those enemy shelling were accompanied usually by 10-30 Red Chinese strength of surprise attack almost every night onto the Belgian Battalion positions in Chat-kol area, with their main objective seemed likely to be the center of B Company rather than the outposts Alice or Carol.

During the period from 8 to 17 April 1953, a relief in the company area within the Belgian Battalion took place.

Colonel R. Gathy, the Battalion Commander, insisted to have the hard-hit C Company with its outpost Carol to be relieved by an American rifle company for the first, and therefore Colonel R. Gathy noticed this plan to Captain De Greef, the C Company Commander to take a necessary arrangements for the unit
Nonetheless, the company relief was actually materialized for the Weapons Company instead of C Company.

Eventually, in the night the Belgian Weapons Company sector was relieved by the American E Company of the 2nd Battalion, the 7th US Infantry, which contributed considerably for the adjacent Belgian companies in providing covers from flank or in aspect of patrolling activity until the last time the Belgian Battalion fought in Chat-kol area.

On 9 April Brigadier General Dunkelbergh, the Assistant Division Commander, 3rd US Division visited the Chat-kol positions and toured along the Belgian forward company localities under guidance by the Battalion Commander Colonel R. Gathy and the C Company Commander Captain De Greef. The Belgian commanders explained to the general about the plan of repair work in the A Company defensive positions, for which he agreed with.

On the night of 17 April Colonel R. Gathy left his Battalion Command Post for an informal command visit to A Company Command Post in the forward locality, while the Major Decoste, the Belgian Battalion S-3 Staff Officer remained in the Battalion Command Post. Colonel R. Gathy desired to spend that night with the rifle company men in the forward area.

Between 0200 and 0255 hours the Red Chinese launched an attack onto the Outpost Alice’s right flank, subsequently on the left platoon of B Company locality.

During the night enemy shelling was counted 700 rounds landed on the Belgian Battalion sector.

Colonel R. Gathy felt that he was happy to see in that night the fine cooperation rendered between his forward company units and particularly of mutual supports within his battalion.

Through his tour on the forward company localities the Battalion Commander was proud of his officers and men having ability enough to fight independently under adverse terrain and weather conditions. Indeed, the men of Belgian Battalion were well trained and particularly their knowledge in and familiarization with the terrains were perfect.

On the night of 18-19 April, meantime, American E Company (1st Company of the 2nd Battalion) which took over the old Belgian Weapons Company sector on the extreme right, sent out a routine patrol to the eastern flank at 2130 hours and withdrew at 2330 hours without undue enemy contact. But, sooner the American patrols returned, two signal shots were fired at 2330 hours and a little later another shots were fired at 2335 hours respectively on
The Belgian Battalion

A view of Chat-kol area, remembering 55-day’s gallant stand by the Belgian Battalion.

the Hill 419 beyond the Belgian Outpost Barbara. Apparently, the Outpost Barbara gave the signal on enemy approach warning for the friendly troops. On the other hand, the Red Chinese artillery shelling had considerably increased from the morning.

Aside the radio signal communication, the telephone wires were remained cut out by the noon of 19 April as they were partly cut already owing to the enemy shelling.

At 2400 of 19 April to 0130 hours on 20 April, the Belgian security posts gave early warning of a Red Chinese battalion size in approach, with 25 Reds in the right front of C Company, 75 Reds in the front of B Company and 25 in the forward area of A Company initially. Soon the friendly 105-mm and 155-mm artillery opened a volley and began to fire on their preplanned barrage.

Particularly, the neighbouring 9th ROK Division artillery fired 500 rounds of 105-mm and 100 rounds of other sorts as a neutralization fire directed on the enemy area in support of the troubled Belgian Battalion sector on the left.

The enemy assault party rushed almost into the Belgian positions, but he was halted at the wire entanglement set up in the 25-meter distance ahead of the Belgian slit trenches.
The Belgian Battalion inflicted upon the CCF attackers the casualties of some 100 killed and wounded in this final action at Chat-kol.

The Chat-kol positions were thus defended and secured by the epic stand of the Belgian soldiers, who shortly after the action in which the Red Chinese attempt to breakthrough the area was completely frustrated, received a congratulatory message from Lieutenant General Jenkins, the IX US Corps Commander for the Belgian Battalion's gallantry displayed during the Chat-kol actions.

On 21 April the Belgian Battalion in Chat-kol area was finally relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Infantry. The relief was completed uneventfully, and the battalion assembled in a new assembly area some three-kilometer south of Chat-kol.

**Section 10. Before the Armistice**

(22 April – 27 July 1953)

**Last Actions**

The new assembly area where the Belgian Battalion occupied after it retired from the line in Chat-kol area was located at around Ugu-dong, and the battalion remained in the assembly area until it was ordered to take over the 7th US Infantry's 3rd Battalion positions between Hadong-ni and Naechon in the immediate southwest of Chat-kol. The relief began from 1250 hours on 15 May and a quiet period passed for some ten days since then.

However, on 24 May at 2320 the Belgian Battalion's a nine-man listening post encountered with the 20 Red Chinese nearby Sangdong-ni, and the post withdrew after calling for the artillery supporting fire.

On 27 May, at 0035 hours, two-platoon strength of Red Chinese again attacked the Belgian six-man listening post at the farther location near the river side of Hantan-chon.

The men of listening post engaged with the enemy for five minutes and then withdrew to the main line of resistance, where their company men opened their final resistance fire for 65 minutes and repulsed the enemy force, counting eight Reds killed with 15 others estimatedly wounded. The Belgians suffered, however, one killed, one wounded and one missing in this action.

On 22 June at 2320 hours, on the other hand, the Belgian reconnaissance
The Belgian Battalion

patrols encountered and engaged with some 20 Red Chinese for eight minutes at Chigam-ni on eastern bank of Hantan-chen in two kilometers northwest from Hadong-ni.

On 26 June at 0300 hours, in the meantime, the Belgian Battalion was relieved on the positions at Hadong-ni – Naechon by the 65th US Infantry’s 3rd Battalion, and by 0400 hours it moved to the new assembly area at Changnim-ni, four kilometers farther south of Ugu-dong.

On 1 July at 0140 hours the Belgian Battalion, however, once again moved to the scene of its old fighting, the Chat-kol – Tap-kol area, relieving the 2nd Battalion on the main line of resistance. The Belgian soldiers felt that the Korean War was declining gradually to the final phase for ceasefire as the work on signing the armistice was seemed to be developing into the climax to reach the possible conclusion in the near future at Panmunjom.

Nevertheless, the Belgian Battalion gallantly fought until the last time before the armistice.

On 12 July at 2240 hours the Belgian patrols engaged with ten enemies at Paektong-ni in immediate east of Chat-kol, but the Belgians suffered unfortunately one killed and one wounded in action.

On 15 July at 1600 hours, meantime, the Belgian Battalion moved down to the new assembly area at Changnim-ni seven kilometers due south from Hadong-ni, and on the following day it took up the readjusted assembly area at Mangyong-dong a kilometer southeast of Changnim-ni.

Thus, the Belgian Battalion was in the reserve area when the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 and all front line units of the ROK and UN forces retired to withdraw two kilometers from the current line to the south to occupy their Post Armistice Main Battle Positions according to the armistice provisions.

On 30 July the Belgian Battalion, however, was finally ordered to move to some seven to ten kilometers due east of Kumphwa at Chaegung-dong – Samchon-bong (Hill 815) where the battalion took up its dispositions and remained there spending its post-armistice period.

The Crowning Glory

On the end of April 1953, the battalion had to dispatch three Belgian officers to Panmunjom as the committee on works for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war with the Little Switch Operation.

Through this operations it became clear that all the Belgians who had been
reported as missing in action by then were all died and they were proved as killed in action. Further, the Belgian officers were convinced that none of those missing was confirmed as the actual captive in the Communist custodian prisoner of war camp.

The Belgian Battalion sector around Hadong-ni, which the battalion retook in sequence to the last Chat-kol actions, was proved to be the most quiet area in the division sector.

During the 40 days stay in the line at Hadong-ni from 15 May to 25 June the battalion received 100 rounds of the enemy shelling a day, of which a half landed in the nearby command post area.

In Hadong-ni area, the battalion had its troops dispositions for its three rifle companies from left to right with C, A and B Companies respectively. As the positions where the respective Belgian companies took up were relatively quiet localities, the units were able to devote the most of their time in strengthening their defensive positions, in addition to their routine patrolling. The plan with a considerable volume of works for the construction of various trenches, were placed in particular on the two platoons of A Company and on the left platoon of C Company.

In the front of Belgian positions there stood a low Hill 250 where the Red Chinese outposts were located in some 1,500 meters north of the friendly main line of resistance. The wide fields in this area were providing an ample observation and a sufficient field of fire.

In order to provide a maximum ability to fight and operate independently for the reconnaissance patrol, the Battalion Commander stressed on the organization of a patrol team to be at least a 20-man base.

Prior to the raid on Hill 250 which took place twice by the Belgian Battalion before the armistice for the purpose of capturing the prisoner of war, the three-man volunteers from the battalion went out for their ambushing in the locality closed to Hill 250, proceeded to the point some 900 meters north-west of Hill 250 where they spent on for 24 hours, and they brought back a considerable valuable informations about the enemy held many other hills as well as Hill 250. The Battalion Commander felt that the raid on Hill 250 should be committed on the night of 14-15 May, and for execution of this plan B Company with some 80 volunteers from it was selected and a special assault party was organized, preparing for the immediate action.

Captain J. Holvoet, the newly assigned B Company Commander screened only 35 men as elite and put them on the disposition in rear alongside the terrain feature as similar as the objective.
All commanders concerned made their own reconnaissance tour and then checked the terrains and their respective plan of maneuver, referring the actual lands with the aerial photographs. After that, the Belgian Battalion Commander established the plan of raids and submitted to the American regimental commander for approval. On the other hand, the Battalion Operations Officer (Major Decoster) and the artillery liaison officer (US Army First Lieutenant Mike Besso) prepared for the requirement of fire support including the direct support units, such as 105-mm artillery, 4.2-inch mortars, tanks and the rocket launchers. Ten sorties of air support with one hundred aerial photos were promised to be provided for the raiders.

Finally the raid on Hill 250 was decided to be carried out on the night of 20-21 May. On the other hand, Captain Ledant, the assault party commander, had to make a detailed reconnaissance on the actual terrains particularly for the surrounding area north and west of Hill 250. However, the six men under the command of Captain Ledant scarcely departed from the line for Hill 250 before they were halted by a Red Chinese force advancing through the Belgian B Company’s right boundary. The party was eventually ordered to withdraw by the Battalion Commander. (See Sketch Map 6.)
The raid on Hill 250 which was designated as Leopold Raid with the objective Hill 250, nicknamed as Jeff, was originally attempted by the Belgian Battalion for the purpose of capturing a Red Chinese prisoner of war being required urgently for the higher headquarters before the armistice. The Jeff was a low and small isolated hill of some 50-meter long enemy held trench complex, laid on approximately 1,200 meters distant location from the Belgian main position at Naechon.

A support platoon reinforced with two light machine guns with the Platoon Commander Second Lieutenant Paques was to remain in the point Hubert as the forward fire base, some 300 meters south of the objective Jeff.

The assault platoons composed a assault party led by the Second Lieutenant Dekeyser and a search party led by the Second Lieutenant Heusers who was to actually search for and capture the enemy prisoner upon reached the objective, both parties being commanded by the combat experienced officer Captain Ledant, the previous B Company Commander.

Colonel R. Gathy was to command the Leopold Raid at his Forward Observation Post set up in a long slit trench provided by the adjacent 1st US Battalion, accompanying his S-3 Staff (Operations Officer) Major Decoster and the artillery liaison officer US Army First Lieutenant Besso.

The Second Lieutenant Himner, the medical officer was to work in the battalion forward aid post set up in the main line of resistance on such locality as the assault platoons might withdraw immediately after the accomplishment of their mission.

In the night of 20 May the battalion forward command post and the aid post took up their prearranged positions, followed by the deployment of parties which began at 2045 hours in the dark. The assault platoons departed the main line of resistance, deployed at Paul at 2120 hours, and settled on Hubert at 2210 hours without an enemy opposition.

Nevertheless, at 2305 hours the raiders failed in their surprise action, as the flares were flown from the friendly supporting artillery and mortars directly over the maneuvering elements and illuminated the area excessively.

Particularly, the lack of coordination with the adjacent ROK and American units caused to bring a considerable confusions and hindering on the successful achievement of the raid.

Nonetheless, the assault parties proceeded on Andre at 0130 hours and then on Philippe at 0145 hours continuously. It was 0210 hours when the raiders finally reached the northern Andre, and all the accomplishment of mission had to be done by 0415 hours the time of daybreak or before the first light.
Colonel Gathy poses with Generals Clark and Taylor in the Belgian Battalion CP on 6 March 1953.

At 0300 hours all the Leopold raiders were ordered to withdraw, and at 0359 hours Captain Ledant the raid commander finally radioed to report his withdrawal to the Battalion Commander.

During the Captain Ledant’s raiders were withdrawing 36 rounds of 105-mm and 100 rounds of 81-mm mortars were fired on the behind of enemy held Jeff and on the enemy mortar positions in the farther north. The withdrawal of Belgian raiders was thus completed successfully before the first light, with the last man returning to the line of main battle positions at 0450 hours. Subsequently, the raid on Hill 250 was repeated by the Belgian Battalion with a long range patrol system dispatched deeply into the Red Chinese positions on the night of 20-21 June, as a final attempt to capture the prisoner of war. Again the fire base Hubert played an important role for the successful achievement of maneuvering in surprise.

When the parties reached a hillfoot of the objective Hill 250, an encountering was made in hurling grenades and the Belgians had killed two Red Chinese
in the place. Sergeant Glorieux suffered heavily wounded in this raid action, and yet Glorieux and his men displayed a superb gallantry and the highest glory for themselves and the Belgian Battalion in the Korean War.

On 12 July 1953, the Belgian Battalion had its command change with the newly assigned Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Bodart who succeeded Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy, the leaving Battalion Commander. And the relatively quiet period passed on the front of the Belgian Battalion until the armistice was signed on 27 July. However, while the Belgian Battalion continuously remained in the theater for the rest of post-armistice period for two years, the several times of command change took place; Major Brichant took the command of the battalion on 23 August; Lieutenant Colonel Bodart took it again on 20 September; Major Brichant took over the command once again on 19 December 1953, and the last commander was Major Pirlot who took over the command from 27 February 1954.

In the meantime, the Belgian Battalion was understrengthened and its strength was reduced to a 200-man base by the end of 1954. The Belgian Battalion thus finally left Korea and triumphantly returned home on 15 June 1955, leaving its everlasting glory and the brilliant battle history in the Korean War.

The Belgian Battalion, otherwise called the Kamina, since its arrival in Pusan on 31 January 1951 and initial deployment in Korea from 9 February had participated in various important operations, including its major battles, such as the Imjin River battle fought together with the 29th British Infantry Brigade from 22 to 25 April 1951, the Haktang-ni battle on the north of Chorwon from 11-13 October 1951 and the Chat-kol battle which was carried out superbly to defend the United Nations outpost positions around Chat-kol area in the northwest of Kumhwa from 26 February to 21 April 1953. Particularly, the Belgian Battalion received the Republic of Korea Presidential Citation, and also for meritorious combat achievements in the Imjin River battle the battalion was awarded the War Medal of the Republic of Korea and the Order of the Belgian Army and received the United States Presidential Unit Citation.

During the period of war all 3,498 personnel of the Belgian Battalion participated in the Korean War, and suffered 101 KIAs, 349 WIs, five MIAs who were proved as killed in action, and none of prisoner of war.
CHRONOLOGY

1950

22 July The Government of Belgium offers to dispatch the combat troops to Korea in support of the U.N. decision.
18 Sept The Ministry of National Defense of Belgium starts recruitment of volunteers for the troops to be deployed to Korea.

1951

31 Jan The Belgian Battalion arrives in Pusan and moves to Tongnae for training.
9 Feb Moves to Waegwan where it commences anti-guerilla operations to protect the MSR.
7 Mar Comes under the command of the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division for its operational control.
3 Apr Attached to the 29th British Brigade and becomes the Brigade reserve.
20 Apr Relieves the Ulster Rifles Battalion in the vicinity of Kungul-san – Tongni-ri area along the north bank of the Imjin River.
22-25 Apr The Imjin Battle takes place.
28 May The Battalion returns to the Imjin River line and comes under the command of the 1st US Cavalry Division.
28 July The Belgians attached to the newly formed 1st Commonwealth Division.
4 Aug The Battalion participates in the operation “Slam.”
25 Aug The first party of the Belgian rottees (454 officers and men) leaves Korea for home.
11 Oct The Battalion repels the Chinese attacks in the vicinity of Haktang-ri.
27 Dec The Battalion is attached to the 65th Regiment of the 3rd US Division.

1952

4 Jan Both the Belgian and Greek Battalions are placed under the operational control of the 65th Infantry, 3rd US Division, concurrently.
19 Jan The Battalion relieves the Greek Battalion positions in Kojak-kol – Sado-dong area northwest of Yonchon.
29 Jan The Belgian Battalion patrols encounter with and smash an enemy platoon at Nurum-kogae.
18 Feb All 16 patrol teams move out to the looped Imjin-gang area to collect informations as to enemy location.

26 Feb The Battalion begins to relieve the 20th Philippine BCT at Sa-dong.

11 May - 5 July The battalion takes training at near Pochon.

6 July The battalion under the operational control of 7th Infantry, 3rd US Division takes up its frontal positions at Chong-dong, near the old Kojak-kol – Sa-dong area.

30 Sept The 7th US Infantry with the Belgian Battalion attached is relieved by the 12th Infantry Regiment of the 1st ROK Division.

24 Oct The Belgian Battalion relieves the 30th ROK Regimental unit in the north of Chorwon.

25 Nov The Battalion takes up positions on and around Hill 395 (White Horse Hill.)

28 Dec The Battalion is relieved by the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry of the 2nd ROK Division and retires to Unsan-ni.

1953

5 Jan The Belgian Battalion takes field training at Yami-ri near Unchon.

12 Feb Lieutenant Colonel B.E.M. Vivario, the Battalion Commander is succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy.

6 Mar General Mark W. Clark, the UNC Commander, and General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Commander of the Eighth US Army, visit the Belgian Battalion Command Post at Chat-kol and encourage its fighting.

8 Mar Colonel Lothaire, the Commander of the Belgian-Luxembourg Allied Forces visits the Battalion from Tokyo.

9 Mar The Belgian C Company outpost Carol is attacked by Red Chinese force but regained after a counterattack by Belgians.

7-8 Apr The Belgian Battalion sustains casualties of 11 killed and 14 wounded in action owing to the enemy shelling.

19-20 Apr The battalion engages with the Red Chinese battalion strength and inflicts upon the enemy the casualties of 100 killed and wounded in the final action at Chat-kol.

21 Apr The Belgian Battalion in Chat-kol area is relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Infantry.

30 Apr The battalion dispatches three Belgian officers to Pannunjom and participates in the Little Switch Operation.

15 May The battalion takes over the 7th US Infantry’s 3rd Battalion position at Hadong-ni–Naecheon.

20 May The attack on Hill 250 by the Belgian Battalion takes place.
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<tr>
<th>Chronology</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The new Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Bodart takes the command, succeeding Lieutenant Colonel R. Gathy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The armistice is finally signed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Battalion moves to Cheegung-dong – Samchon-bong (Hill 815) on east of Kumhwa to take up its post-armistice positions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major Brichant takes the Command of the Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Bodart again takes the Command.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major Brichant takes over the Command.</td>
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1954

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<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>27 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major Pirlot takes over the command of the Belgian Battalion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Belgian Battalion strength is reduced to a 200-man base.</td>
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1955

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<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>15 June</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Belgian Battalion finally leaves Korea for its triumphal returning home.</td>
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PART THREE

THE COLOMBIAN FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1.  Introduction to Colombia

General

Colombia is a republic occupying the northwestern angle of South America. It is bounded on the north by the Caribbean Sea and Venezuela; on the east by Venezuela and Brazil; on the south by Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador; and on the west by Ecuador, the Pacific Ocean, Panama, and the Caribbean Sea. The republic has an extreme length from north to south of 1,690 kilometers and an extreme width of 1,385 kilometers. It has an area of 1,138,914 square kilometers and a population of 22,490,500 in 1972.

The majority of Colombia’s population lives in the western one-third of the country and is concentrated on the slopes and in the valley of the central and eastern ranges of the Andes, which run from north to south throughout the western portion of the country, and along the Caribbean coastal plain. The hot, humid areas along the Pacific coastal plain and the vast areas of plains and jungle east of the Andes are sparsely populated.

Persons of the white race, or intermixtures of the white and Indian or white and Negro in which white features predominate, constitute the majority of Colombia’s population.

Their traditional cultural ties of the upper classes have been with Europe, but during and after World War II, the United States came to be of primary importance in this regard. Throughout the country, Spanish language has been adopted, together with European dress and the Roman Catholic religion. Bogota, the capital of the republic, has always prided itself on being a center of learning, with special emphasis on literature, poetry, and music. Regional literature has been developed to an extraordinary degree and reflects a keen appreciation of local history and geography.

About 45% of the population lives by farming and cattle herding. Coffee production is the principal source of wealth. Besides the famous coffee production, the leading exports are petroleum and petroleum products, bananas,
sugar, cotton, tobacco, platinum, cement and coal products; the principal destination is the United States, which takes about 50% of the total exports.

Government

The executive branch of the Republic of Colombia is formed by the president and 13 cabinet ministers and the governors of the departments, who are appointed by the president, as well as other administrative authorities directly or indirectly controlled by him under the constitution of 5 August 1886, which was revised and codified in 1945. The president is elected by the people for a term of four years, and he may not succeed himself. Attached to the president is a seven-member consulting body known as the Council of State. An amendment to the constitution in 1957 provided that the presidency should be alternated between the Liberal and Conservative parties for a 12-year period of 1970.

The legislative power, according to the constitution, is vested in Congress, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. All Colombians over 21 years of age are citizens; women were expressly barred from voting and holding elective office under the constitution until an act passed 25 August 1954 by the national constituent assembly gave them the right to vote.

The country has been divided for many years into departments, intendancies, and subdelegations. The departments have popularly elected assemblies; the intendancies and subdelegations are administered directly by officials appointed by the central government.

Defense

Military service for one year is compulsory between the ages of 21 and 30. Peacetime strength of the Army varies between 12,000 and 15,000. The Navy consists of destroyers, frigates, river gunboats, and various smaller vessels. The Air Force has a considerable number of aircraft of various types.

The Republic of Colombia was the only South American country to participate in the Korean War, contributing an infantry battalion. Also, its frigates participated in the war on the Korean waters along with other UN naval forces.
Section 2. Preparation for Korea

When the Republic of Korea was invaded by the North Korean Communist forces at dawn, 25 (local time) June 1950, the United Nations promptly warned the Communist invaders to stop the invasion. But the invaders ignored the U.N. warning and pressed on with their attack. On 27 (New York time) June, the U.N. Security Council went even further, recommending that member nations "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

In response to this resolution the government of Republic of Colombia immediately started working out a form of possible contribution to Korea. After thorough coordination with the United States the Colombian government finally decided to dispatch a naval frigate first, and then ground troops of a battalion strength at a later date.

Immediately following the government's decision, on 1 November 1950, the first selected frigate "Almirante Padilla" led by Captain Julio Cesar Reyes Canal with 12 officers and 177 crewmen aboard the ship departed the port of Cartagena for San Diego, United States, for refitting and training. On the other hand, on 26 December, the 1st Colombian Infantry Battalion bound for Korea was activated in accordance with the Presidential Decree No. 3927. The Battalion consisted of volunteer officers and enlisted men whom a special U.S. military advisory team had carefully selected and trained for 12 weeks in Canton Norte near Bogota, the capital city of Colombia. On 21 May 1951, the Colombian Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania Puyo departed the port of Beunaventura for the entry port of Korea aboard the United States transport "Aiken Victory."
CHAPTER II  THE INFANTRY BATTALION

Section 1.  The Arrival, Training and Initial Deployment
(15 June – 1 August 1951)

On 15 (local time) June 1951, the 1st Colombian Infantry Battalion landed in the port of Pusan, Korea’s southern terminus as well as a major port of entry, where the Colombian soldiers were heartily welcomed by President of the Republic of Korea Syngman Rhee, who presented a bouquet to the Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania Puyo, the US Ambassador John J. Muccio, the Commanding General of the 2nd Logistical Command and other high-ranking officials of Korea and UN Command, and crowds of Korean people. The brief ceremony was a significant and historical event since the 1st Colombian Infantry Battalion was the first contiguous Latin America had ever sent abroad to war theater.

The 1st Colombian Infantry Battalion will henceforth be referred to simply as the Colombian Battalion for the sake of convenience since the Government of Republic of Colombia continuously maintained the integrity of the 1st Colombian Infantry Battalion until the end of the Korean War.

Upon completion of the welcome ceremony at the port, the Colombians were transported to the UN forces reception center at Tongnae about eight kilometers northeast of Pusan for further training.

Although the Colombian fighters consisting of 1,080 officers and enlisted men were mostly war-veterans and already received hard training for 12 weeks at home prior to the departure for Korea, they still needed more training to attain their maximum effectiveness in the mountainous Korean terrain as a combat unit. Upon arrival at the reception center, the Colombians were put into a hectic training days and nights. The six-week training course was designed for them to develop actual combat ability and skill.

The Korean summer was not so unbearable to the Colombian trainees even though they were to suffer sub-zero winter weather of this foreign land. Moreover, there existed practically no language barrier between US instructors and the Battalion troops because all the Colombian officers spoke fluent English.
While the Colombian Battalion was jostling halfway in the strenuous training, the Ethiopian Infantry Battalion left the center on 9 July completing same training course. This hard training for the Colombians continued until 29 July.

On 30 July at 0800 hours by the order of the 2nd Logistical Command, the Battalion commenced its movement north through Chunchon-Hwachon route to the designated assembly area in the vicinity of Sabanggori some 10 kilometers northwest of Hwachon. Upon arrival in the area at 0045 hours at 1 August, the Colombian Battalion was attached to the 24th US Infantry Division and further attached to the 21st Regiment of the division at same time. From this time to closing days of January 1952 the Colombians fought side by side with the elements of the 24th US Infantry Division.

At the time, the 24th Division consisting of the 5th, 19th and 21st Regiments was deployed over the Wyoming loop flanked to the west by the 2nd ROK Division and to the east by the 6th ROK Division with the 7th US Division
as the IX US Corps reserve at Kapyong.

Now having occupied rough terrain of Sabanggori, every face of the Colombians showed a look of grim resolution and courage for fighting. (See Sketch Map 1.)

General Situation of the War Theater

As the Colombian Battalion was now committed for actual fighting, it seems worthwhile for better understanding to review the general situation of the second year of the Korean War in which the Colombians would fight.

After the United Nations Command had halted the Communist Chinese offensives in the spring of 1951, there had been no effort by the Eighth US Army under which all UN ground forces were to operate to launch a counter-attack. As the fighting became stabilized close to the 38th Parallel and specially after the relief of General MacArthur in April 1951, reliance on military victory in Korea had waned. The costs had become too high and risks too great. Still the war continued and had to be prosecuted until a settlement was secured. This had turned thoughts of the military leaders to the negotiation of an armistice.

On 23 June 1951, while the Colombian Battalion was still under training at the UN reception center near Pusan, the Soviet representative to the United Nations hinted a Communist disposition to negotiate the Korean problem. Thus the first session of military armistice conference was held on 10 July, at Kaesong between the delegations of the UN Command and the Communist forces.

As the UN’s objective in the Korean War shifted from military victory to political settlement, this policy also carried with restriction on military operations. In view of these restricting elements and the reluctance of the majority of the nations composing the UN Command to advance again to the Yalu, it was hardly surprising that late in June General Van Fleet, the Commanding General of the Eighth Army, concluded: “Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the UN troops, therefore, was to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain north of Parallel 38, and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the UN forces.” The decision to strengthen the defensive lines of the UN forces and to confine offensive action at the front to limited advances marked the end of the fluid phase of the Korean War and the start of the new war.
With this principle in his mind, General Van Fleet selected the Kansas—Wyoming defense lines as a main line of UN resistance. As of 1 August when the Colombian Battalion was committed on the front line, the UN forces were deployed generally along the Kansas Line. The Line Kansas began near the mouth of the Imjin River 32 kilometers north of Seoul and snaked its way to the northeast on the south side of the river through low barren elevation which gradually gave way to higher, moderately wooded hills. Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, Kansas veered eastward and upward toward the Hwachon Reservoir and then angled northeastward again across the steep, forested South Taebaek Mountains until it reached the east coast some 40 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. The terrain from the Hwachon Reservoir to the east coast was particularly rugged. The mountain slopes rose sharply, especially on the west and south faces, and good roads were almost non-existent. The defense strength of Kansas was increased by full use of the dominating terrain and the numerous water barriers along the route.

Guarding the approaches to Kansas on the western front, Line Wyoming looped northeastward from the mouth of the Imjin toward Chunchon, swung east to Kumhwa, and then fell off to the southeast until it rejoined Kansas near the Hwachon Reservoir.

In the spring of 1951, it served as an outpost line screening Kansas. Although Line Kansas permitted the enemy to retain control of the Communication complex of the area called the Iron Triangle (Chorwon–Kumhwa–Pyongyang), the line afforded the UN forces the advantages of a defensible terrain, a satisfactory road and railroad net, and logistical support.

In the meantime General Van Fleet instructed his subordinate units to fortify Kansas Line in depth and to build hasty field fortifications along the advance Wyoming Line to delay and blunt the forces of enemy assault before they reached Kansas.

Since the terrain became more mountainous in the east and was served by a poor communications network, Van Fleet had deployed his four corps accordingly, with the I ROK Corps forming the eastern anchor, flanked by the X US Corps, in the east central sector, the IX US Corps in the west central area, and the I US Corps defending the broadest sector on the west. Thus, the Eighth Army was fully prepared either to conduct local offensive operations or to punish any attempt by the enemy to penetrate the Kansas-Wyoming lines.

Now turning our look towards the opponent forces operating in the Korean theater, the Communist forces in Korea, according to the Eighth US Army intelligence estimates as of 1 July totalled 459,200 men. Of these 248,100 were
Chinese and the remainder North Koreans.

Among the seven enemy army groups assigned to the front (each of which controlled two or more armies with three approximately 3,000-man divisions), the elements of the 20th CCF Army Group manned the enemy line of resistance facing the IX US Corps front. The Chinese Communist forces were usually armed with a miscellaneous collection of Russian, Japanese, American, and domestically manufactured copies of foreign weapons.

Despite the steady build-up of the Communist forces during June and July, the expected offensive was not launched. Instead the enemy continued to bring up supplies by rail and road and to strengthen his defensive positions. Since casualties were light on both sides during the early summer slowdown in the fighting and the Communists maintained a high flow of replacements, their offensive capability mounted.

Section 2. Sabanggori to Taeri-ri
(2 August – 5 October 1951)

The Colombian Battalion now established a strong patrol base in the vicinity of Sabanggori which was a small village located about halfway on the highway connecting Hwachon and one point of Triangle, Kumhwa, and five kilometers rear of MLR positions defended by the elements of the 21st US Regiment. Some nine kilometers northwest and six kilometers northeast of Sabanggori were deployed the elements of the 24th US Division forming the division’s MLR with the 21st Regiment to the right and the 5th Regiment to the left and the 19th Regiment in reserve.

On 3 August the 24th Division was ordered by the corps to conduct limited objective attacks to establish strong outpost line of resistance along Wyoming Line. While the attacks were in progress, the Colombian Battalion in turn was carrying out painstaking patrol missions into surrounding highlands. The patrolling activities were comparatively uneventful for several days. However, 6 August was a bad day for the Colombian Battalion.

A combat patrol commanded by Captain Alvaro Valencia Tovar infiltrated courageously deep into the enemy zone. At 0755 hours when the patrol reached close to Hukunto-ryong (Hill 851) five kilometers north of friendly MLR positions, unknown number of enemy from the hill suddenly started pouring small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire upon the patrol. The Colombian
patrol immediately deployed in tactical positions and returned fire. Soon, intense firefight ensued. But the enemy fire grew accurate and stronger as the fighting progressed. At 0855 hours after an hour of fighting Captain Valencia and his men finally broke off and withdrew judging continued engagement would result in more casualties by the numerically superior enemy. In this action the Colombians suffered casualties of 14 wounded. This was the Colombians’ first combat and first casualties suffered on the Korean soil.

The following day, 7 August, the 24th US Division was ordered by corps to relieve with the 7th US Division which had been in corps reserve at Kapyong. The 21st Regiment who was relieved by the 17th Regiment of the 7th Division and the Colombian Battalion were ordered by the division to move down to the designated assembly area along the Kansas line near Hwachon. The 24th Division CP moved from Hwachon to Simpo-ri below the Kansas. Thus, the first frontline duty for the Colombian Battalion ended up with only seven days.

Upon arrival at Taeri-ri, the assembly area three kilometers southeast of Hwachon, the Colombian Battalion immediately went into another hard training together with the elements of the 21st Regiment that took up positions in the same area. Although the Colombians boasted their combat ability and everyone was considered as an outstanding recipient of effective trainings both at home and in Pusan, they never felt disgusted with the retraining. This training lasted until the 5th of October when they were called for frontline duty again. During the relatively long training period, the Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania Puyo, devoted himself to the training. The training covered the combat subjects such as patrolling and probing tactics, assault maneuver and blocking exercises, and supplementary orientation in Korean terrain features.

The 24th Division’s reserve period for the IX Corps along the Kansas line ended on 5 October when the division was ordered to relieve again the 7th Division that was to be placed under the direct control of the Eighth Army with its CP at Kapyong. The 21st Regiment and the Colombian Battalion saw one day attachment to the 7th Division during the relief.
Section 3. Advance North to Kumsong

(13 – 23 October 1951)

On 6 October at 1200 hours the 24th Division opened its CP at Papo-ri six kilometers northeast of Hwachon and assumed its responsibility of the zone previously held by the 7th Division. By close of 7 October the 24th Division had deployed all its four regiments along a line connecting Paekun-san to the right and Chokkun-san to the left with the 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment in the middle in the vicinity of Chu-dong. The Colombian Battalion, after its relief with the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division, occupied the western base of Hukunto-ryong (Hill 851). The Battalion was flanked on the right by the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment and on the left by the 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment. To the far left the 5th Regiment deployed in depth with the 3rd Battalion in the middle occupying Chokkun-san and the 2nd Battalion to the north and the 1st Battalion to the south. And to the rear two battalions of the 19th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment were positioned as division reserve. Upon completing occupation of assigned positions each unit started sending out aggressive patrols to the enemy area.

On 12 October at 1600 hours a patrol from the Colombian Battalion encountered with unknown number of enemy in the vicinity of Pamsong-gol some 1,500 meters north of the Colombian MLR positions, and after ten minutes of small arms firefight, the patrol repelled the enemy with the result of four enemy killed. The Colombians suffered no casualties.

From 13 October to the end of the year the Colombian Battalion was now to engage strenuously in a series of the limited objective attacks toward Kumsong area which resulted in not only the Colombians' brave attacks to drive the enemy north, but also in determined defense of their positions from the furious enemy counterattacks.

On the 13th, the 24th US Division and two ROK divisions under the IX US Corps order, initiated to make advance to a line about seven kilometers south of Kumsong. The American division was flanked on the right by the 6th ROK Division and on the left by the 2nd ROK Division. The objectives of the attack were to make local advances to "No Mad Line" set by the corps and to
improve the defense positions of the division in the line and maintain pressure upon the enemy.

The Colombian Battalion and two battalions (the 1st and 3rd) of the 21st Regiment were assigned right flank in the first stage of the attack. The Colombian Battalion attacked at 0530 hours, and the 1st and 3rd at 0500 and 0530 hours respectively. The Colombian Battalion soon encountered unknown number of enemy near the northern base of Hukunto-ryong, but after five minutes of small arms fire exchange, the enemy withdrew to the north. Then the Colombians continued the attack on to Hill 570 about two kilometers further north and secured that hill at 1615 hours against moderate resistance. On the hill the Battalion established its defense position at 2030 hours for the night. In the meantime the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 21st Regiment also advanced about three kilometers the first day.

On the 16th the Colombian Battalion was pulled from the 21st Regiment sector and ordered to proceed south to an assembly area in the vicinity of Tongmak-kol, 1,500 meters southeast of Chu-dong, and from there again to move seven kilometers north to Chuk-tong, a small village in the 19th US Regiment zone. Upon arrival at Chuk-tong, the Colombian Battalion was placed under the operational control of the 19th Regiment effective 0735 hours on the 17th. Here the battalion established a blocking position on a highland to the west and awaited further order.

By the time the Colombian Battalion closed to Chuk-tong village, all units of the 24th Division reached the objective line “No Mad” despite of stubborn enemy resistance and intense concentrations of mortar and artillery fire.

This favorable outcome led the IX Corps Headquarters to direct another advance about three kilometers close to Kumsong itself. Here the attackers would establish a strong outpost line and patrol aggressively to maintain contact with the enemy. The second objective line named “Polar” was established by the Corps and on the 18th, the elements of the 24th Division were ordered by the division to advance to reach the “Polar Line.” The Colombian Battalion was also ordered to advance to its first objective Kung-gol, a small village one kilometer northwest of Chuk-tong on the 18th. The Colombians secured the village with no enemy contact and continued to screen and patrol to a high hill behind the village. While the Colombians were screening the hill they encountered an estimated enemy platoon and received the small arms fire but the enemy was successfully repelled.

On the 19th at 0600 hours the Colombian Battalion was further ordered to move from Kung-gol to new assembly area in the vicinity of Wolbong-ni in the zone of the 21st Regiment. Upon arrival at Wolbong-ni the Battalion reverted
Positions on the MLR occupied by the Colombian Battalion overlooking the Kumsong Valley.
to the operational control of the 21st Regiment. From the Wolbong-ni village
the Battalion conducted a screening operation toward northwest direction until
it reached and secured Hill 552 two kilometers northwest of the Wolbong-ni
village at 1740 hours on the 20th against relatively strong enemy resistance.
The Colombian Battalion's objective on "Polar Line" was thus successfully seized.

By the evening of the 20th, all units of the 24th Division had reached
their second objective line "Polar" and began to organize the defense.

The Colombian Battalion maintained its main defense position on Hill 552
and newly established an outpost position on a hill named Hoegogae. In the
meantime the elements of the 21st Regiment also maintained their positions
to the right along the "Polar" objective line. (See Situation Map 4.)

During the following few days the division sent out several tanks forays,
one of which penetrated deep into Kumsong itself and blew up several buildings
and a tunnel. On the 22nd, at 1500 hours, the Colombian combat patrol also
penetrated close to Kumsong itself supported by two companies of the 6th US
Tank Battalion. At 1540 hours when the courageous fighters reached the near
bank of the Kumsong River at a point some 800 meters southeast of Kumsong
town they encountered an enemy patrol of platoon size. Intense firefight ensued
and lasted until 1630 hours when the enemy withdrew leaving six killed in the
action. During the firefight the tank companies were taken under the enemy
fire and received about 125 rounds of artillery and mortars, but the tanks were
not damaged. 78 enemy buildings were destroyed by the tanks.

The sensitivity of the Communist enemy to the friendly troops' probes
and advances in the Kumsong area was demonstrated by the severe losses that
they sustained in the 13-23 October period while trying to delay the UN troops'
advance. On many occasions Chinese counterattacks varied from platoon to
battalion size and most frequently were launched during the night or just before
dawn. Heavy artillery and mortar fire accompanied the enemy drives and hand
grenades were used plentifully.

During the period the enemy losses inflicted by the Colombian Battalion
alone amounted to 84 killed and 6 POWs as against the Battalion's losses of
six KIAs and 23 WIA's. Of the 23 wounded Colombians was included the Bat-
talion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania Puyo.

The bravery and brilliant battle achievements shown by the fighters of the
Colombian Battalion during the Kumsong attack period (13-23 October 1951)
resulted in winning the US Presidential Unit Citation on 9 December 1952, the
highest award that the US could bestow on the United Nations units.
Section 4. In the Proximity of Kumsong
(November 1951 – January 1952)

The limited offensives on the IX Corps front petered out in late October as the truce negotiations resumed at Panmunjom and another lull set in on the battlefield. Despite the constant reports that the Communist logistical build-up continued, intelligence estimate at the end of October indicated that the enemy offensive capabilities had probably been reduced and that there were no definite signs that the foe intended to launch an attack in the immediate future. It was evident that the UN forces had seized the battlefield initiative and forced the enemy to go on the defense. By keeping the Communists off balance by raids, probing attacks, and small offensives, the UN forces had neutralized the enemy’s ability to mount a large scale drive and in the process had destroyed the thousands of the Communist soldiers. The UN forces had erected a stout defense line and then set the pattern of the fighting for the new war – the battle for dominating terrain.

The Colombian outpost position on Hoegogae held by one company was one of important positions in the central section of the front defended by the 24th US Division. From the Hoegogae enemy movements toward the friendly main defense line could effectively be checked and friendly patrols could easily advance toward Kumsong area. And the wide open valley in front of the hill was suited for employment of tanks. For this reason the Colombian fighters had the tank support from the 6th US Tank Battalion whenever they felt the need of tank support. The Colombian main force on Hill 552 could also use the outpost position as a patrol base when its members went out on patrol missions.

On 29 October at 2345 hours, under cover of darkness unknown number of enemy probed the outpost. Fierce night firefight took place. Although the courageous Colombians repelled the enemy after five minutes of fight, one Colombian was killed in the action.

On 3 November at 2100 hours the Colombian Battalion received intense artillery and mortar fire on the left flank position on the Hoegogae which finally knocked out the battalion’s telephone communication lines at 2300 hours. And an hour later a Colombian ambush patrol was reported by radio to be surrounded by an estimated enemy platoon in the vicinity one kilometer northwest of the Hoegogae outpost. The ambush patrol maintained its valiant
stand fighting with great courage and skill until at 0300 hours the friendly artillery and mortar fire pounded the pin-pointed enemy. The enemy withdrew leaving two killed and three wounded behind. And the Colombians returned to friendly line with no casualties.

On 15 November at 0900 hours as a result of readjustment of the divisional boundary the Colombian Battalion handed over its defense positions to the 3rd Battalion, the 32nd ROK Regiment, and assembled in the vicinity of Hu-dong about four kilometers to the southeast, where the battalion became regiment reserve. From 15 November through 22 December, while in reserve, the Colombian Battalion successfully carried out combat and reconnaissance patrol missions toward the enemy zone in front of the whole sector of the 21st Regiment with its A Company attached to the 1st Battalion on 22 November.

On the 23rd the Colombian Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of the 21st US Regiment on positions, and the 1st Battalion in turn took up the regimental reserve role leaving one company on the outpost position on Hill 424.

Being placed on MLR positions again, the Colombian Battalion immediately started sending out its patrols and small-scale raids during the daylight hours rarely making enemy contacts. Enemy was seldom seen during the daylight hours. Enemy action mostly took place at night, under cover of darkness and unhindered by air surveillance, and even at night the enemy confined themselves primarily to small-scale patrols and limited probes of the friendly outpost positions.

Despite this apparent lull and bitter cold on the front, the Colombians continued to keep constant alert and sent out various types of patrols; some patrols exchanged shots with the enemy and inflicted casualties, but made no close contact; many returned with negative reports, for they had found no one to capture or even to shoot at. This was the pattern of the Colombian patrol activities during December.

One of the Colombian patrols worthy of special mention, however, was the action of a combat patrol conducted on 31 December, the last day of 1951.

At 0900 hours of the 31st, a Colombian combat patrol team consisting of two squads’ strength under the command of Second Lieutenant Camilo Torres moved out from friendly patrol base in single column deep into the enemy-occupied village of Choso-ri, two kilometers north of friendly outpost on Hill 424. The mission was to reconnoiter the area and determine the disposition of the enemy troops around Choso-ri and nearby Kumsong area, and to fight if any enemy was encountered.

As the patrol managed to close almost within 200 meters from the enemy
bunkers out-guarding the Choso-ri village, the unknown number of white-clad enemy troops all of sudden started firing their rifles and machine guns from their positions. The Colombians immediately responded with automatic weapons as well as small arms fire taking advantageous terrain in the open valley. Soon friendly artillery also joined in the firing. However, despite of the heavy bombardment of friendly artillery, the enemy fire kept increasing in its intensity, which finally forced the Colombians to withdraw.

When Lieutenant Torres counted his men after his men had withdrawn to a safer and advantageous position, he discovered that four of his men were missing. He promptly reported it by radio to the Battalion CP, and the battalion in turn ordered him to withdraw immediately to the patrol base. But Lieutenant Torres could not obey the order and leave the four men in the enemy hands. He, after wavering for a while, made his own decision to rather disobey the Battalion’s order and to return to the place where they were initially taken under the enemy’s intense fire to recover his men who might have been

KUMSONG–CHOSO-RI AREA • NOV–DEC 1951.

Sketch Map 2
wounded or killed. Then, he swiftly formed a rescue team of eight men who volunteered for the special task. The team advanced back to the place through the enemy’s fire and succeeded in finding them all and taking them out of the danger by killing all the enemy attempting to pursue the team.

Lieutenant Torres certainly disobeyed the Battalion’s order to withdraw, but his courageous action saved the lives of four Colombians.

This patrol action fully attested to how much the Colombian officers loved their men in combat. (See Sketch Map 2.)

The following day, 1 January 1952, the Colombian Battalion stepped into their second year of the Korean War. The Battalion received the New Year’s message, addressed to its commander, from General Ridgway, the United Nations Command, which read as follows:

“I wish you all members of the Colombian Battalion the best of luck in the new year, and I pray that the Colombian troops may make another example of indomitable will power and valor for the honor of their fatherland.”

On the 18th the long-awaited first Colombian replacement unit arrived in Korea, which enabled a group of rotatess consisting of seven officers and 143 men to depart for Colombia on 12 February. The newly arrived Colombians were assigned to each company of the battalion according to the strength status with no loss of combat effectiveness.

Section 5. Transilient Period
(28 January – 9 May 1952)

Entering new year, the Colombian Battalion on the line continued to confine its activity to routine patrol and the fortification of bunkers along the forward slope of the frontline positions. The Korean winter in January was bitingly cold, the temperature dropping 30°C below zero. The Colombians had never been accustomed to such a cold weather. The men of the battalion, although suffering intensely from the cold, remained unmoved in the bulwark of the struggle, fighting heroically not only against the enemy but against nature.

On 17 January 1951, at 0115 hours a Colombian patrol team consisting of 10 men was surprised by an estimated enemy platoon in the vicinity less than one kilometer south of Kumsong town and an intense fire exchange soon ensued. Under the darkness, the Colombian casualties gradually mounted. The Colombians however bravely resisted doing their best over 10 minutes until they
were forced to withdraw. In this action the patrol suffered a casualty of four killed, three wounded, and one missing. Although a fresh team was immediately dispatched to the scene to recover the missing comrade, the team returned without success.

On the 19th the Colombian Battalion was relieved again by the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment on positions and closed in the designated assembly area in the vicinity of Kung-gol some six kilometers south and eastward to become the regimental reserve at 1800 hours on the day. This reserve period for the Battalion, however, did not last for long.

By this time, two US divisions, the 24th Division and the 40th Division, had begun to rotate. The 24th Division to which the Colombian Battalion had been attached was to leave for Japan leaving behind the 5th Regiment which had also been attached to it.

After about five months of service with the 24th US Division the Colombian Battalion parted with the division and was newly attached to the 31st Regiment, the 7th US Division, then in the X US Corps sector on the 28th and moved to Wondang-ni some 10 kilometers north-northeast of Yanggu at 1845 hours on the day.

At the time the Colombian Battalion arrived in Wondang-ni, the 31st Regiment to which the Battalion further attached deployed on the main line of resistance occupying the left flank of the 7th Division with the 32nd Regiment and the Ethiopian Battalion on its right. The 17th Regiment of the division remained near Wondang-ni with the Colombian Battalion. On 5 February, the 31st Regiment came to Wondang-ni to become regimental reserve with the Colombian Battalion upon completion of its relief with the 17th Regiment on the MLR positions.

Here at Wondang-ni, the Colombian Battalion along with the units of the 31st Regiment underwent training and further sharpened the combat effectiveness through the strenuous training.

On 23 February at 0800 hours the 25th US Infantry Division shifted from the IX Corps and assumed the responsibility of the 7th Division sector, and the 7th Division was ordered for the IX Corps reserve. During the relief the 31st Regiment and the Colombian Battalion were placed under the operational control of the 25th Division. On the 26th the 31st Regiment and the Colombian Battalion moved from Wondang-ni to Kapyong where they reverted to the 7th Division's control.

By this time the 7th Division after its relief with the 2nd US Division had opened its CP at Kapyong as the IX Corps reserve.
After the Colombian Battalion left the battle zone in Kumsong area on 28 January, the Battalion did not stay for long at one place. The Colombians were busy moving from one place to another; from the IX Corps to the X Corps sector on various missions as assigned. The Battalion was badly needed in rear zone until the 7th Division was put on the front line positions again in late April.

At Kapyong reserve camp, however, the Colombian fighters were able to enjoy recuperational activities for about 10 days until 17 March when the battalion together with the 31st Regiment were ordered to move to Inje area in the X Corps sector where they were placed under the operational control of the corps. At Inje, for the period of over one month, they carried out the mission of rear security in the corps zone while conducting training.

While the Colombians were in the Inje area, the second party of rotatees departed for Colombia on 16 April, and the second replacement unit consisting of seven officers, 62 non-commissioned officers, and 192 enlisted men arrived at the Battalion Headquarters on 24 April. Although the newly arrived replacement troops were already well trained back home the battalion conducted an extensive training program for them.

The Colombian Government's rotation procedures, it should be noted, was excellent in that it had never pulled out the whole battalion from the line at one time, and maintained constantly integrity of an ever-strong battalion in Korea.

On 25 April upon completion of the rear security mission in the X Corps zone the Colombian Battalion and the 31st Regiment moved to the vicinity of Wasu-ri about five kilometers southwest of Kumhwa again in the IX Corps sector where they reverted to the 7th Division.

On 28 April the 7th Division opened its CP at Chipo-ri and took over the responsibility of the MLR positions then defended by the 2nd US Division along Missouri line near Kumhwa area. During the relief with the 2nd Division, the 31st Regiment and the Colombian Battalion saw a two-day attachment to the 2nd Division.

Even after the 7th Division was placed on the line, the Colombian Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment continued to remain in reserve in Wasu-ri area sharpening their combat effectiveness further through hard training. This short period in Wasu-ri which lasted until 9 May was a good opportunity for the newly arrived replacement personnel to become familiar with the front line situation and Korean terrain.
Section 6. On Line Missouri  
(10 May – 29 December 1952)

On 10 May 1952 the Colombian Battalion was ordered to move up to relieve the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment on MLR positions at midnight. The assignment of the battalion was the defense line forming a front of four kilometers on line Missouri about three kilometers northwest of Kumhwa. The area to be defended by the battalion was regarded as one of the most important strategic portion in central section of the front held by UN forces. The area covers the most needed supply road connecting Kumhwa and Pyonggang -- two points of Iron Triangle.

The Colombian Battalion was flanked on the left by the elements of the 17th Regiment and the 32nd Regiment, and on the right was the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Regiment.

Line Missouri constituted the central MLR of the UN defense line. It crossed about the heart of Iron Triangle that connected Pyonggang on the apex and Chorwon and Kumhwa on its left and right bases. Since its movement in late April, the 7th Division was bordered by the 40th US Division on the right and on the left by the 9th ROK Division.

The Colombian Battalion was then commanded by Major Alfonso Novoa Morales who took over the command after Lieutenant Colonel Polania was wounded during the Kumsong attack last autumn.

From 11 May to 10 June during which time the Colombian Battalion occupied the MLR positions, the Colombians took part in strenuous patrol and ambush operations continuously. The Communist enemy during this period was very active in sending out its patrols mostly at night. It was apparent that the enemy in this sector was determined not to give away even an inch of its ground.

It was during this period that Second Lieutenant Vladimir Valek Moure was killed while on a patrol mission. The enemy artillery and mortar rounds directed on the Colombian outpost positions increased day by day in numbers, and the enemy fire became more and more accurate. Most of the Colombian casualties suffered during this period were by the artillery and mortars instead of small arms fire.

On 10 June, after one month on the MLR, the Colombians went into regimental reserve relieved again by the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment.
While manning a blocking position near Wasu-ri, the battalion continued retraining and took part in occasional combat patrols to raid or probe the enemy positions. Worthy of particular mention was an action of a company size combat patrol conducted by A Company of the battalion on 21 June.

The battalion commander and his staff carefully planned the combat patrol and assigned the patrol mission to A Company under the command of 1st Lieutenant Luis Galindo. The mission was to raid enemy-held Hill 400 to kill or capture any enemy encountered.

The Hill 400 was a strongly fortified outpost position only 1,500 meters apart from friendly outpost position then defended by the elements of the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment. The enemy strength on the hill was estimated at one platoon reinforced.

The Colombian special patrol consisting of two platoons (support and assault) moved toward the hill at 0400 hours under the support of seven American tanks positioned both on the outpost line and MLR. The patrol advanced swiftly under the cover of darkness until it reached unnoticed within about 80 meters from the enemy bunkers on the hill. At this point the support platoon led by Lt. Galindo himself took up its advantageous terrain.

In spite of the difficulty of moving on the steep slope, the men of the assault platoon, under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Mario Bernal, managed to work their way up the crest of the hill and immediately started concentrating their fire into the enemy bunkers as they were found. The enemy was completely surprised by the assault platoon. By that time the enemy soldiers from their bunkers had started appearing in the communication trench and opened fire aimlessly. But the Colombians either killed them or drove them back into their bunkers in the close quarters fight. Apparently the Colombian fighters held the initiative maintaining a heavy rate of fire, and soon the enemy bunkers were exploded one by one. It was during this time that Corporal Mario Delgado put up the Colombian colors on the crest of the hill as a sign of the Colombian occupation of it. Having judged that the mission was accomplished, Lieutenant Galindo decided to withdraw and called for tank and artillery concentrations on the hill to prevent enemy from probable counterattack. Then the special patrol quickly withdrew covered by artillery support to the friendly outpost position at 0530 hours.

The Colombian patrol most successfully raided the enemy positions with the brilliant result of 20 enemy counted dead, eight presumed killed, two prisoners captured and 11 bunkers destroyed as against two friendly killed and 15 wounded (See Sketch Map 3.)

The effective use of friendly artillery and tank fire on the hill and on the
enemy troops following the Colombian patrol back toward its base prevented further casualties. Patrol members gave full credit to the artillery and tank support for their successful return.

For the courageous actions in the raid, Lieutenant Bernal and all members of his platoon were honored with special medals from the 7th US Division.

The reserve period for the Colombian Battalion in Wasu-ri lasted over one month. While in reserve, the Colombian Battalion was refreshed by the arrival of new commander and replacement personnel that followed consecutively after him.

On 23 June the third replacement unit consisting of 25 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers and 179 enlisted men arrived at the battalion headquarters and on 1 July the third party of rotates consisting of eight officers, 55 non-commissioned officers, and 172 men departed for home led by Major Alfonso Novoa Morales who had commanded the battalion since last autumn when Jaime Polania Puyo, former battalion commander, sustained a heavy injury.
On 2 July the former commander arrived from Tokyo accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruiz Novoa. The latter formally assumed the command of the Colombian Battalion on 4 July.

On 13 July the Colombian Battalion was ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment on positions. At 0155 hours of the following day the Colombians completed their occupation of assigned positions and immediately started patrol activities to the enemy area. The old pattern of strenuous patrol repeated itself since they were so familiar with surrounding terrain.

On the morning of the 17th, the new Battalion Commander Colonel Ruiz sent out two combat patrols simultaneously. The mission of those patrols was to determine the enemy reaction to the patrols. The one patrol led by 1st Lieutenant Luis Galindo encountered an enemy force estimated at about 30 at the base of Hill 324 one kilometer northwest of a friendly outpost position.

The well blackened Colombian fighters are ready to go out for a daylight patrol.
About 20 minutes of fire fight with the enemy resulted in six enemy killed and the enemy withdrawal. The other patrol led by 2nd Lieutenant Jaime Lizarazo at 0635 hours also encountered unknown number of enemy at the western base of Hill 400 that had been overrun by the Colombians on 21 June. About 30 minutes of fire fight ensued and resulted in three enemy killed. The both patrols withdrew safely by the order of the battalion commander.

By middle of July the Korean rainy season had started. The onset of the rainy season made operations exceedingly difficult to carry out during the month of July. Particularly, the last six consecutive days of July was a period of continuous heavy rain. In the main positions as well as outpost positions many trenches collapsed, and for a period the Colombian Battalion was completely cut off from its supply due to flood water in the river valleys.

The first thing to occupy the Colombian fighters' mind in preparation for the rainy season was to reconstruct the field fortifications including bunkers and barbed wire along the vulnerable ridges and possible avenues of an enemy attack. In the ensuing days the diligent hands of the Colombians worked painstakingly through every portion of the battalion defense sector. Despite of the strenuous fighting against nature, the Colombian fighters never neglected their combat duties. Since its occupation of MLR positions on 13 July, the battalion sent out at least one patrol and set up several ambushes for the enemy every night. The patrols were mainly directed toward the two hills 324 and 400 that were the strong enemy OPL facing friendly OPL with less than one kilometer distance apart. The patrol actions conducted by the Colombian Battalion was matched by the similar actions by the Communists on the opposite front. One thing different from the Colombian pattern was that the enemy rarely sent out their night patrols.

While the battalion was on MLR positions, the Colombian fighters observed their independence anniversary day on 20 July. On this day the battalion received the following congratulatory message from General Lee Jong Chan, Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Army:

"On behalf of the ROK Armed Forces, I would like to extend my deep appreciation to the Colombian troops for their brilliant combat achievements in the Korean War. I sincerely wish to join the Colombian comrades in celebrating the independence anniversary of the Republic of Colombia."

On 20 August the Colombian Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment on positions and became regimental reserve. In the reserve camp in the vicinity of Hasong-dong below Wasu-ri the battalion mainly carried
out road blocks and patrol activities while conducting extensive training.

Entering the month of August, combat activities along the front line generally became eased. In front of the outpost positions occupied by the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment, however, there were relatively frequent patrol clashes in August and early September. This situation finally called upon the Colombian fighters in reserve to reinforce the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment on the OPL. Thus, three companies of the Colombian Battalion rushed to the rescue; A Company moved in on the 1st of September; B Company on the 2nd; and C Company on the 5th. The rest of the battalion was also placed on the alert remaining in the reserve camp at Hasong-dong.

On 13 September at 2345 hours the whole Colombian Battalion finally deployed again on the line with the three subordinate companies reverted to the parent control at the same time.

During the first few days that the Colombian Battalion was on the line, the enemy probed on several occasions in company and platoon strength and failed each time. The contacts with the Colombian fighters on the outpost positions in the period convinced the enemy to drop all his intentions of attack and to concentrate on defense.

On the 24th, after 10 days on the line, the Colombian Battalion was ordered to hand over the defense positions to the Ethiopian Battalion and to move to the rear to organize a blocking position and consolidate defense of Wyoming Line in the vicinity of Sindae-dong some seven kilometers northeast of Chorwon. The Colombians for the first time relieved with an UN force other than American troops. The Ethiopian Battalion had been assigned to the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division since its arrival in Korea on 7 May 1951. In the meantime; the 31st Regiment had completed its relief on the line with the 32nd Regiment by the 25th, and moved to the vicinity of Sindae-dong along Wyoming Line with its 2nd Battalion left with the 17th Regiment.

On 2 October the Colombian Battalion completed its defense work assignments on the Wyoming and was ordered regimental reserve. But the frontline situation at the time was not good enough to permit the Colombians to stay long in reserve. Less than a week in reserve, on 7 October the Colombian Battalion moved to the vicinity of Igil-li four kilometers north of Sindae-dong, and there was placed under the operational control of the 17th Regiment at 0930 hours on the day. In the late afternoon of that day the Colombian Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Regiment on MLR positions. The 2nd Battalion in turn became regimental reserve.

The new area the Colombian Battalion was now to defend was three-kilometer wide front surrounded by thickly wooded hills with the highest Hill 438
in its right sector. On the both flanks of the battalion the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 17th Regiment deployed and the 17th Regiment was bordered by the 29th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division on the left and by the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division on the right.

During the following 35-day period in which the Colombian Battalion manned the area the Colombian fighters had to double their defense effort and vigilance by conducting aggressive reconnaissance activities to the enemy zone that resulted in relatively high casualties of Colombians being suffered mostly due to the enemy’s intense mortars and artillery fire.

In connection with the Colombian Battalion’s unusual defense effort, it should be noted that a big operation called Operation Showdown took place during this period getting whole three regiments of the 7th US Division involved in the operation leaving the Colombians on arduous missions of MLR defense.

The operation started on 14 October. Less than five kilometers from Kumhwa the 7th Division and enemy troops manned positions that were but 200 meters apart. On Hill 598, better known as Triangle Hill, and Sniper Ridge, which ran northwest to southeast to a little over two kilometers northeast of Hill 598, the opposing forces looked down each others throat and casualties were correspondingly high. The Showdown was designed to mend this situation and to seize the initiative on the ground action by improving the IX Corps defense lines.

The operation was initially a planned five-day operation starting 14 October which eventually became a bloody nightmare that extended to 14 days and nights and spasmodically thereafter for another month with a random estimated casualty of 20,000 friends and foes.

Unfortunately this operation had an ironic ending. The 2nd ROK Division, which had taken over the 7th US Division’s positions on 25 October, had engaged in a bitter and frustrating fight for Sniper Ridge. Attack and counterattack had followed as the Chinese and friendly troops had struggled for possession of the hill, but neither could win complete control of the ridge. Thus, after six weeks of hard fighting, the UN forces controlled a portion of Sniper Ridge and none of Triangle Hill.

While the three regiments of the 7th Division were struggling for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, the Colombian Battalion firmly held fast to the MLR positions.

On 12 November the 7th Division, after over six months of frontline duty on line Missouri, was relieved by the 25th US Division on the positions and came off the line. Then the division headquarters moved to Kapyong where it went under the direct control of the Eighth US Army. The Colombian Battalion
and its comrades in arms, the 31st Regiment, moved to Hwachon reserve camp, and the 32nd Regiment moved further down to Kapyong to be with the division. In the meantime the 17th Regiment began one of its most unusual assignments as it moved to the island of Koje-do on a POW security mission.

While the Colombian Battalion was under training at Hwachon, the eighth replacement unit consisting of seven officers and 50 non-commissioned officers and 144 enlisted men arrived at the battalion under the command of Captain Jorge Robledo Pulido on 19 November, and on the 22nd the fifth party of rottees departed for Colombia.

On the 23rd the Colombian troops participated in the tactical maneuvering exercise conducted by the 31st Regiment and won the top performance citation from commander of the 31st Regiment. This simple fact alone attested to the outstanding combat readiness of the Colombian fighters.

On 9 December the Colombian Battalion held a colorful ceremony in commemoration of the Ayacucho war of their country. Among the programs scheduled for the day, it should be noted, the highlight event was the presentation of the US Presidential Unit Citation to the battalion by General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, won by the Colombian Battalion for its
glorious battle achievements during the Kumsong attack period.

Section 7. Togun-ni–Sonbyok Sector
(30 December 1952 – 27 July 1953)

After the bitter fighting of last October and early November, the approach of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the scale of operations at the front. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves to hibernate, and action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols, and small unit skirmishes. Waiting patiently for a break in the recessed armistice negotiations, both sides seemed to content to watch each other warily along the battle lines and to conserve their energy. The slackening of operations permitted the enemy to replenish his supplies and to bring up replacements, despite of the effort of UNC air force to destroy Communist depots and communication lines. But the build-up appeared to be perfunctory and not directed toward the resumption of large-scale fighting. As the cold weather set in, its influence dominated its front.

In the closing days of 1952, upon successful completion of training at Hwachon reserve camp, the Colombian Battalion together with the 31st Regiment followed its parent unit, the 7th Division, to the western front in the I US Corps sector. Here, the 7th Division relieved the 2nd US Division then occupying the Porkchop–Old Baldy area, and opened its CP in the vicinity of Changgo-ri about seven kilometers north of Yonchon on 29 December.

Three battalions of the 31st Regiment were assigned a seven-kilometer wide front to defend the main line of resistance along Jamestown Line with the 32nd Regiment defending to the left. In the meantime the Colombian Battalion occupied a number of blocking positions in the vicinity of Komsong-gol about three kilometers rear of the 31st Regiments defense line and prepared the counterattack plans against probable enemy break-through of the line.

On 11 January 1953 the Colombian Battalion on order relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Regiment on MLR positions at 0355 hours and the 2nd Battalion in turn took up the Colombian blocking position at 0600 hours. The new area to be defended by the Colombian fighters was a three-kilometer front facing to the north the shank of T-Bone Hill (Hill 290). On the southern tip of the T-Bone, there lay two outposts, Eerie and Arsenal, manned by the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment. On the T-Bone Hill to the north, two battalions of the 338th Regiment, the 113th Division, 38th CCF Army, held the enemy lines.
On many occasions, the enemy tried hard to gain possession of the Arsenal–Eerie outposts, unsuccessfully.

In mid-January the 7th Division launched one of the infrequent UN raids against the enemy, with the primary purpose of taking prisoners. Moving a company from the 31st Regiment over frozen ground toward the icy CCF fortifications on the T-Bone, in open daylight, the 7th Division took a severe black eye from what it had code-named Operation Smack. During the period 12-20 January, the 57th US Field Artillery Battalion, alone in direct support of the 31st Regiment, poured close to 10,000 rounds of 105-mm fire into the T-Bone complex, seeking to destroy enemy bunkers, mortars, and automatic weapons in preparation for the raids.

During the Operation Smack the Colombian Battalion also held fast to its defense positions constantly sending out combat patrols in a coordinated effort for the operation. It was presumed that the enemy kept silence in the fortified bunkers and refrained from its patrol activities during daylight hours. But after dark the enemy placed a blocking force between outpost Eerie and main line of resistance and concentrated artillery and mortar fire against friendly outpost positions, which wounded a number of the Colombian troops on patrol missions during the period. The enemy casualties inflicted by the Colombian fighters during the period mounted also high.

On 26 January, the Colombian Battalion was dislocated from the line relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 17th US Regiment and moved this time to Wyoming and Hold-Back Lines to hold the blocking positions there. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 31st Regiment followed the Colombians and also occupied prepared blocking positions respectively.

A few days earlier the 17th Regiment reverted to the parent 7th US Division upon completion of the POW security mission in the Communication Zone in Korea and took up the defense positions vacated by the 31st Regiment.

On the 30th the 31st Regiment and the Colombian Battalion moved further south to the Yonchon area and there became division reserve. Here at Yonchon the Colombians went into training. For a 10 day-period beginning from 8 February, the Battalion participated in maneuvering exercises of various types which were concentrated on tactical aspects of occupation of the Hold-Back Line. Upon completion of the exercises, the Battalion continued to engage in a number of operations in the division rear area to check the enemy movements until 26 February when the Colombian Battalion and the 31st Regiment were ordered to relieve the elements of the 32nd Regiment then defending the left flank of the 7th Division sector.

By the 27th the 31st Regiment had completed its relief with the 32nd
Regiment and assumed the responsibility for the sector with its CP at Mago-ri. And the Colombian Battalion in turn relieved the Ethiopian Battalion then occupying one of the important blocking positions near Chuam-dong about five kilometers rear of the 31st Regiment defense line. The three battalions of the 31st Regiment occupied MLR positions with the 1st Battalion in the middle and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions on the left and right respectively to cover a seven-kilometer front. The both flanks of the 7th Division were bounded on the left by the 1st ROK Division and on the right by the 2nd ROK Division in the IX US Corps sector.

Defense on Old Baldy—Porkchop

The two outpost positions, Old Baldy (Hill 275) and Porkchop (Hill 234), now defended by the elements of the 31st Regiment, were the long-contested hills. Especially the fight for Old Baldy so far had been typical of the battles waged during the summer and fall of 1952, a savagely contested, seemingly endless struggle for control of another hill. And there seemed to be little hope that would be any significant change in the pattern. The hill was the high point of an eastwest ridge and dominated the terrain to the north, west, and south. Almost 300 meters west of the crest the Communist Chinese had established positions that posed a constant threat to the friendly outposts in the area.

Elements of two Communist Chinese armies faced the 7th Division front. The 141st Division, 47th CCF Army, manned the enemy positions opposite Old Baldy and to the west and the 67th Division, 23rd CCF Army, defended the terrain from the Porkchop Hill area to the east.

On the evening of 6 March, a combat patrol from the 31st Regiment intercepted an estimated enemy battalion apparently on the way to attack Porkchop Hill and the surprise contact disrupted the Chinese plans. The Communist gunner dropped 8,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on Porkchop during the night, but the enemy infantry made no serious attempts to push on toward the 31st Regiment’s outpost positions.

During the period the Colombian Battalion as the reserve unit was placed on constant alert prepared fully for a counterattack, and continuously sent out its combat patrols or raid teams mainly to the front of the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment. One of the raids, worthy of particular mention, was the action of a company size surprise attack conducted on the morning of 10 March.
Barbula Operation

The operation was code-named “Barbula Operation” and designed to raid and destroy two enemy strong points on Hill 180, about 500 meters from the front of the MLR positions of the 1st Battalion, the 31st Regiment. As this operation was so important, the Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Ruiz briefed it to General Clark, UNC Commander, and General Taylor, who took over General Van Fleet's post as Eighth Army Commander on 6 March, when they visited the Colombian Battalion accompanied by General Kendall, I Corps Commander.

The followings are the detailed account of the “Barbula Operation” conducted on 10 March by C Company of the Battalion:

Captain Hernando Acevedo, C Company Commander assigned this difficult mission to his 1st and 2nd Platoons. The 1st Platoon led by 2nd Lt. Luis A.

Generals Clark, Taylor, Kendall, Smith and Col. Kern are briefed on “Barbular Operation” by Capt Robledo.
Andrade was given the job of attacking strong point A while strong point B was given to the 2nd Platoon then led by 2nd Lt. Miguel Pineros Grimaldi.

The objective Hill 180, only 500 meters across the narrow valley to the north from the 1st Battalion position, was strongly fortified as outpost screening the enemy main resistance position on Hill 222 about 500 meters further north. On Hill 180 the enemy established two strong points on two peaks of same height manned with an estimated one platoon each.

At 0530 hours, the two lieutenants moved out under cover of darkness, moving their platoons toward the hill 180 across the narrow valley. Their advance progressed, and by 0700 hours succeeded in reaching unnoticed within about 50 meters from the enemy strong points. From that point they led their platoons simultaneously in a daring charge up their assigned objectives. The two platoons soon swept up the hill where formidable enemy bunkers and emplacements were dotted. Some courageous Colombians jumped into the enemy trenches with hand grenades in their hands. Soon a bloody hand-to-hand fight ensued. The fight became intensified as more and more Chinese rushed out of their well covered positions. The Colombian litter bearers were few and did not know what to do first as their comrades' casualties mounted. The Korean Service Corps personnel who were to help the litter bearers run for cover. About after an hour of the bloody fight all of sudden the battlefield became quiet. It was apparent that most of the enemy engaged with the Colombians were killed and those still left alive escaped leaving their dead behind. The quiet moment, however, did not last long. Captain Acevedo then saw a new enemy force of estimated two platoons' strength rushing toward the Colombian fighters. Having expected the enemy reinforcement to come, he immediately ordered his artillery forward observer to strike the northern edge of the hill to prevent the enemy from further approaching. Soon friendly artillery started pounding. It was so accurate and destructive that the enemy could hardly close to the Colombians and resorted to their small arms and automatic weapons fire. The fire exchange was prolonged. At 0950 hours, judging continued action would only result in more casualties by the intense enemy fire the Battalion Commander, Col. Ruiz ordered immediate withdrawal. 2nd Lt. Pineros was able to pull out his platoon upon receipt of the order, but the 1st Platoon under 2nd Lt. Andrade failed to receive the order due to radio trouble. It was during this peak of the fight that Andrade was wounded. When the 1st Platoon finally began to withdraw after receiving the order through signal, the enemy started concentrating its fire on the withdrawing Colombians in an attempt not to let the Colombians go safely. Casualties and stragglers again became high. The litter bearers were crawling to and fro picking up the friendly wounded and dead...
bodies. (See Sketch Map 4.)

Under this extremely difficult situation, however, Capt. Acevedo remained so calm and fully displayed his strong leadership in directing every movement of his troops. He requested the battalion commander to send his 3rd Platoon as quickly as possible to take care of the Colombian wounded and dead. In short time, the 3rd Platoon led by 2nd Lt. Luis A. Bernal arrived in the scene through the enemy mortar fire and started its courageous rescue work to search for the Colombian casualties scattered all over the battleground in the face of the enemy fire. The members of the rescue platoon crawled and crawled here and there not to miss even single friendly dead. They completely disregarded safety of their own lives. By close to 1100 hours, thanks to the platoon's courageous effort, the most of the casualties were safely transported back to the aid station set up on MLR position.

The Colombian fighters had been out more than four hours. Although it had no prisoner, the C Company had most successfully raided and destroyed the
enemy strong points on the Hill 180. In this “Barbula Operation,” the enemy personnel losses alone were estimated at more than 150 casualties, while friendly suffered a casualty of 19 killed, 44 wounded, and eight missing.

The Old Baldy Battle

On the 13th of March, at 0455 hours the Colombian Battalion relieved its sister, the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment, on MLR positions. Now the Colombians was to defend the Togun-kol area with its outpost on Old Baldy manned with one company strength. The 2nd Battalion deployed on its left and the 3rd Battalion on the right in the Porkchop Hill sector. One company from the relieved 1st Battalion manned the blocking positions prepared behind the three frontline battalions.

On 20 March the 7th Division had indications that the enemy contemplated an attack in the Old Baldy—Porkchop area. The increase in artillery and mortar rounds on the division’s positions on these long-contested hills usually signified a Communist offensive move, and the capture of two deserters in the sector strengthened the belief that the enemy action would soon be forthcoming.

At 2105 hours of 23 March the Communist Chinese started a double-barreled attacking on both Old Baldy and Porkchop. A mixed battalion from the 423rd Regiment, 141st CCF Division, directed its main attack to the Old Baldy outpost which had been manned by Company B under Capt. Irmer Perea. At the time of enemy attack, the B Company was in the middle of relieving with C Company commanded by Capt. Acevedo who had commanded the raid of the enemy strong points on Hill 180 on the 10th. Taking advantage of the Colombian relief, the Chinese closely followed an intense artillery and mortar concentration upon the Colombian troops and fought their way into the Colombian trenches. By this time all communication lines to the battalion CP had been cut off except the line between A and C Companies. Soon the Old Baldy became a shambles with many of the bunkers aflame and many dead and wounded. The Colombian casualties rapidly mounted. Despite the Colombians’ courageous resistance against the overwhelming enemy the two Colombian companies on the outpost lost 60% of their strength. In addition the Colombians’ ammunition began to run low. At last the Colombians were forced to withdraw to the southeastern slope of the outpost. A few minutes earlier Battalion Commander Colonel Alberto Ruiz Novoa, however, was authorized to put under his operational control a reinforcing American company from the 31st Regiment to mend the situation. The reinforcing company led by 1st Lieutenant Jack M.
Patteson moved toward Old Baldy at 2130 hours. As the company drew near the outpost, the Chinese first called in intense artillery and mortar fire along the approach routes then took Patteson's men under fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. The American company slowly made its way into the first bunkers on Old Baldy at 0200 hours the following morning and began to clear them out one by one. As the company came up against the main strength of the Chinese on Old Baldy, however, progress lessened and then ground to a halt. Throughout the rest of the night there was only intermittent fire exchange between the opposing forces.

This situation led to the employment of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment on the 24th to counterattack for the Old Baldy. Unfortunately, however, the 1st Battalion still failed in improving the situation despite of the repeated counterattacks over two days. Finally the American battalion was ordered to withdraw from Old Baldy during night of 25-26 March. (See Sketch Map 5.)
The over two days of fighting for Old Baldy had been costly both for the Colombian and American troops. The Colombian casualties alone had amounted to 95 dead, 97 wounded, and 30 captured. Of the 30 Colombians captured, 28 were repatriated during the prisoners of war exchange period. This was a great loss equivalent to one rifle company. Although the Chinese casualties inflicted by the Colombian fighters were estimated at over 500, the enemy had committed his troops freely to maintain possession of Old Baldy.

There were many interesting episodes of the Old Baldy battle. For an example, when the Colombian combatants entered into one of the numerous bunkers on the outpost to avoid enemy artillery and mortar shellings, they received very kind greetings and even cigarettes from some soldiers already in the bunker who looked like ROK Army troops. When the artillery fire was lifted those strange soldiers all of sudden started moving out of the bunker. After they had left, the Colombians wondered and wondered about what their identity might be. It was several days later that they learned those strange soldiers were not friendly, but Communist Chinese. The Colombians found out that the friendly ROK Army or the Communist North Korean troops had not fought in the Old Baldy battle.

According to reports made later by Colombians who had hidden in bunkers during the Chinese domination of the heights, it appeared that the Chinese troops left the Old Baldy when the friendly air strikes came, and this, incidentally, had enabled the Colombians to make their way back to the friendly lines. It is uncertain, however, that the safely returned Colombians were the same soldiers who were kindly greeted by the Chinese soldiers in the same bunker.

On 25 March the Colombian Battalion that had suffered heavy casualties in the Old Baldy battle was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment on MLR positions and moved back to the old blocking positions where it reorganized the battalion into two rifle companies, one heavy weapons platoon, and one command platoon, leaving one rifle company short. Completing the reorganization of the battalion in two days the Colombian Battalion returned to the MLR positions again on the 27th relieving the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment.

On the afternoon of the 27th the 7th Division Commander Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, who took over the command of the division on 21 March, visited the Colombian Battalion CP and honored Lt. Col. Ruiz with medal of Bronze Star with V on for his outstanding leadership during the Old Baldy battle.

On 3 April the MLR positions defended by the 31st Regiment was read-
justed. The Colombian Battalion handed the Old Baldy sector over to the 1st battalion, and took over the position on its left then defended by the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion continued to occupy the Porkchop Hill sector, and the 2nd Battalion became the regimental reserve.

The Colombian Battalion continued to remain on the line until 26 April when it was relieved by the 2nd Battalion and moved to the vicinity of Chongwanggok area where the Colombian fighters were able to take a few days of rest and recuperation. During the period of the MLR defense, the Battalion successfully expelled repeated enemy probes inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy each time. The Colombian patrols as well suffered heavy casualties during the period mostly due to enemy artillery and mortar shellings. In the meantime the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment received frequent enemy attacks aimed for the possession of Porkchop Hill, but the enemy attack on 16 April was the heaviest one which lasted three days and was finally expelled by the 17th Regiment’s counterattack.

On 18 April when the 17th Regiment was counterattacking after the enemy attack on Porkchop Hill the Colombian Battalion was attached to the 17th Regiment for the operational control and became an integral part of the regiment thereafter.

On 2 May the Colombian Battalion moved far rear to as far as Yonchon area and there participated in field exercises together with the elements of the 17th Regiment. The exercises lasted until 19 May.

Now, so much for the fighting war, and let us turn our look to the negotiation effort to bring the shooting to an end. At Panmunjom, the disputed agenda on the exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners proceeded to make some progress, following the two announcements made by Red China’s Chou En-lai and Soviet’s V.M. Molotov on 30 April and 10 April respectively. The two Red foreign ministers showed clear signs in their statements that they followed the principles along the line of the United Nations Command’s proposal -- no prisoners should be forced to be repatriated if they did not wish to return to their homes. Thus, on 11 April, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war was agreed upon. This exchange became known as “Operation Little Switch” and was realized between the 20th and 26th of the month. During the “Little Switch” six Colombians were repatriated.

The Last Defense in Sonbyok Area

During the months of May through July 1953, one of the most remarkable
aspects of the Korean War by this stage was that the Chinese Communist forces had launched determined and heavy attacks in large forces chiefly on the front held by the ROK forces. July also saw that the chief targets of the enemy attacks were all the fronts defended by the Republic of Korea divisions. Nevertheless, all the ROK units withstood tenaciously their positions and beat off the enemy offensives, inflicting tremendous casualties upon the Reds.

On 20 May, the Colombian Battalion passed from the reserve status to its last action on the front line, relieving the 1st Battalion of the 17th US Regiment, then defending Sonbyok area, central portion of the 7th Division sector.

As of 20 May the 7th US Division continued to deploy its six battalions along the Jamestown defense line to maintain a 12-kilometer front. In front of the Colombian positions stood Hill 327 with its main ridge extending due north down to a wide valley, and there the Colombians established a listening post at the northern base of the hill. On the Colombians’ left was the 3rd Battalion of the 17th US Regiment who continued to maintain its outpost position on Porkchop Hill. On the right was the Ethiopian Battalion defending the outpost hillocks against enemy from T-Bone Hill (Hill 290). With the friendly troops deployed as stated the Colombian Battalion had fought courageously until 2 July.

While the Colombians were on the line in Sonbyok area, they continuously carried out day and night patrols and ambushes and also repulsed successfully repeated strong enemy’s probing attacks. The movements of enemy night patrols were detected without failure far in advance by the Colombians manned on the listening post set up at the northern foot base of Hill 327. Normally the listening post was manned with four men at night only. Once enemy was detected by the Colombians, it was doomed to be decimated by the pin-pointed friendly artillery and mortar fire. On the other hand the Colombian patrols were also doomed to pay high price insofar as they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Worthy of particular mention was the action of an ambush patrol on 13 June.

As usual the Colombian patrol of a squad size ambushed around the Colombian listening post under cover of darkness and waited for enemy to approach it. At 0020 hours an estimated enemy platoon surely approached closer and closer to the listening post, but this time the enemy was not foolish enough to be caught by the Colombians. The enemy suddenly attempted to encircle the Colombians already knowing where the Colombians were. The situation inevitably developed to exchange to intense fire fight. Although the courageous Colombians managed to repel the enemy after about 12 minutes of the fight
supported by friendly artillery, they had to pay high price. In this action Sergeant Jose Molano Pedro was killed and PFC's German Franco, Jose Durango, Pedro A. Alvarez, Ceferino Torres Ariza and Julio G. Conejo were wounded.

During the period from 20 May to 2 July while defending Sonbyok area a number of congratulatory events took place in the Battalion Headquarters. A few of them are worthy to note.

On 22 May the Colombian Battalion received a message from the La Asamblea de Delegados de la Cooperative Militar which said: "We, the La Asamblea de Delegados Cooperative Militar, wish to express our highest admiration for all the members of the Colombian Battalion who are fighting bravely in Korea for the noblest ideal of democracy in cooperation with other United Nations forces. We also would like to extend the most sincere congratulations on the outstanding achievements of the Colombian troops in the Korean War . . . ."

On 19 June, General Paik Sun Yup, the Korean Army Chief of Staff conferred the "Ulchi Order of Merit" on Lt. Col. Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Commander of the Colombian Battalion, at the Headquarters of the 7th US Infantry Division with the division commander, Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, and other high ranking ROK and US officers attending.
On 25 June, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ortiz Torres formally took over the command of the Colombian Battalion, and made an inspection tour of the Colombian MLR positions and bunkers with the outgoing commander, Lt. Col. Novoa.

On 3 July at 0405 hours the Colombian Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, the 17th Regiment after one and a half months on the MLR positions and moved again to the Yonchon area where the battalion became regiment reserve. While the battalion was in Yonchon the ninth Colombian rotatee group consisting of 10 officers, 68 non-commissioned officers and 151 enlisted men departed for Colombia.

On 27 July the armistice agreement was finally signed at Panmunjom. Briefly, the Armistice Agreement, among many other terms, provided for a military demarcation line along the existing front with a demilitarized buffer zone between the opposing forces. The zone was four kilometers wide and included most of the outposts fought over during the period of stalemated and static war but not the main defense lines. The new artillery boundary line, nearly 250 kilometers (155 miles), ran still above the Kansas Line, the controlling ground north of the 38th Parallel.

At 2200 hours on the 27th, the guns and mortars which had so long pulverized the Korean soil along the Jamestown line fell silent. This armistice found the Colombian Battalion near Hyonchon where it arrived at 0415 hours on the 28th.

During “Operation Big Switch” which took place at the Freedom Village from 5 August to 6 September 1953, twenty-two Colombians were repatriated from Communist hands through Panmunjom, after their prolonged dead-life in the hell of the Communist prison camps. This made a total of twenty-eight returnees including the previous six from the “Operation Little Switch.”

Although the Korean War ended by the armistice, the Colombian Battalion continued to participate in a UN “presence” in Korea in gradually diminishing strength until the last unit embarked for Colombia on 29 October 1954.

Section 8. Retrospect

The Republic of Colombia was the only country in Latin America that contributed to the Korean War efforts, and faithfully fulfilled her obligations of maintaining international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.
The Infantry Battalion

During two years and 42 days, from the time the 1st Colombian Infantry Battalion set its first foot on Korean soil until the armistice was signed, the Battalion had played a great part in the Korean War despite it was relatively late in its arrival in Korea. The Colombian fighters had fought many of the fiercest battles across whole Korea from east to west and established its brilliant battle records which were second to none. But the cost the Colombians paid was so high. (See Situation Map 5.)

The Colombian troops suffered a high proportion of casualties. In all they sustained 639 battle casualties in the war. Of those, 163 were killed in action, died of wounds or officially presumed dead, 448 were wounded in action, 28 were repatriated as prisoners of war. In the Old Baldy battle alone, the Colombian Battalion suffered more than 220 casualties and the rest occurred mostly on patrols.

General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, President of the Republic of Colombia, visiting the Colombian Battalion at the battle front in 1951.
As a general rule in describing patrol activities, only those patrols which were clearly describable on the basis of official records have been mentioned. Therefore, it would be quite wrong to deduce that those patrols which were not mentioned were less active or insignificant.

The bravery of the Colombian fighters and their astonishing combat achievements both in attacks and defenses were widely known to all of the allied comrades-in-arms. The Colombians' bravery were believed to be rooted in the excellent officer-man relationships. The gallant action of 2nd Lieutenant Camilio Torres shown in Choso-ri patrol on 31 December 1951 was enough to illustrate eloquently what the Colombian officer-man relationship was.

The Colombians well adapted to a new environment and to new weapons, by which they achieved near perfect unity of action. These all accounted for their high morale, and this high morale was also believed to be generated by their strong sense of responsibility for their country and for safeguarding of freedom and world peace coupled with their philosophy of life. Every act was engaged with the sense of glory for their beloved always in heart.

In the meantime, when in reserve status, the Colombian troops usually organized a nine-man band which would visit tent to tent to entertain troops with Latin American music in augmentation to the American movies for entertainment. And the Colombians made rules that five-dollar fine would be imposed on those who do not shave every day, and also on those who do not write home once a week.

Apart from many other chivalrous and brilliant accounts of the Colombians, the most significant fact was the Colombian participation itself in the United Nations operations in Korea. The mere fact alone was more than encouraging, since it indicated the firm determination of the Colombian people not to tolerate any act of breaking international peace. The Republic of Colombia, as a UN member nation, fully demonstrated the real value of collective security in the Korean War.
CHAPTER III  THE NAVAL FORCE

The Republic of Colombia, prior to the dispatch of its ground troops, sent the naval frigate, Almirante Padilla, to Korea, and thereafter maintained one frigate continuously in the area for the United Nations naval operations, an effort which involved all three of the Colombian Navy’s ships and five tours of duty. The Colombian naval assistance was, by no means inconsiderable when the Republic of Korea had been anxious to secure the support of as many U.N. members as possible in its desire to elicit military help and moral sustenance against the Communist aggression in Korea.

The Colombian frigates that operated in Korean waters during the war were ARC. Almirante Padilla (Captain Julio Cesar Reyes Canal), ARC. Capitan Tono (Captain Hernando Beron Victoria), and ARC. Almirante Brion (Captain Carlos Prieto Silva). Of the three ships, ARC. Almirante Padilla and ARC. Capitan Tono served two tours of duty respectively; the second tour of duty of the Almirante Padilla was commanded by Captain Dario Forero Gonzalez and the second tour of Capitan Tono by Captain Jorge Tava Suarez.

ARC Almirante Padilla

On 1 November 1950 Almirante Padilla (Captain Julio Cesar Reyes Canal) sailed from Cartagena for the port of San Diego, the United States, with its crews of 12 officers and 177 men aboard. From San Diego, upon being re-conditioned, the Padilla sailed for Pearl Harbour and there joined in a Colombian—American naval exercise designed for the Colombian crews to become familiar with the United States naval methods and procedures.

On 8 May, 1951, the Padilla arrived in Sasebo, Japan, and was incorporated into Task Force 95 then commanded by Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN. On 20 May the Padilla was further assigned to the Korea West Coast Support Group then commanded by Rear Admiral A.K. Scott-Moncriff, British Navy, and immediately started operating in Korea waters. The first mission assigned was to carry out inshore patrols along Cigarette route on the west coast.

The availability of the Padilla was of particular importance at the time in
The Colombian flag being hoisted in "Almirante Padilla" prior to its departure for Korea.
view of the hydrography of the Korean west coast, which restricted the movement of heavy ships. Destroyers and cruisers could bombard, and could check traffic passing around the headlands, but the important inshore patrol had thus far been largely left to the smaller ships of ROK Navy.

On the west coast the Padilla continued to carry out the various missions of patrolling, escorting, and bombarding as assigned except a few days at Sasebo port for minor repair.

On 14 June, upon successful completion of the west coast missions, the Padilla shifted its operational area to the east coast where it was placed under the operational control of the Korea East Coast Support Group. In the east as in the west, the long Korean coastline invited efforts to make trouble in the enemy rear.

It is of interest to note here about Wonsan Siege. The Wonsan Siege was originally conceived and planned by the Commander of TF-95. Admiral Smith had had his eyes on the strategic islands north of the 38th Parallel, and had estimated that the occupation of the islands would be “of great value,” both for control of enemy junk traffic and minelaying, and to provide potentially valuable staging areas. Thus, the siege started from 16 February 1951. However, no one expected the siege would last until the end of the Korean War. Truely the Wonsan Siege had demoralizing effect upon the Communists, and was of great psychological value to the UN forces.

At the time the Colombian Padilla arrived off Wonsan, the communications centers of Wonsan and Songjin remained daily on the receiving end of friendly gunfire from everything from rocket ships up to battle-ships. Far in the north the blockade of Chongjin was maintained, and the road and rail bridges leading south from that city subjected to frequent bombardment.

During the period 14 June to 9 September the Colombian frigate operated mostly off Wonsan and Songjin on bombardment and patrol missions under coordinated effort with other UN ships. For some time the Padilla was assigned a special mission to transport a group of Korean special agents who were to land behind the enemy lines from Yodo island to Songjin. This mission was repeated several times.

The bombardment effort by the Padilla, however, was concentrated mainly on “Package” and “Deraill” programs. The “Package” and “Deraill” programs were introduced in January 1952 to increase the effectiveness of naval gunfire and to coordinate it with the air strikes of Task Force 77. “Package” was a shoreline target suitable both for ships and airplanes. Five points along the main Songjin-Hungnam railroad were carefully chosen and given the code name “Package” plus a number. At three of the five “Packages,” the targets included
bridges. Radar reflector buoys were planted off each one to assist navigation and gunfire accuracy. At night, ships could get as close to the five targets as 1,500 to 2,000 yards, in most cases. (See Situation Map 6.)

The "Package" targets were also ones which would be difficult for the enemy to repair. And all of them were along the main east coast supply route. If these "Package" could be interdicted, the flow of enemy supplies from the Manchurian sanctuary would be seriously impeded.

The initial plan called for the cutting of the "Package" by air strikes. Thereafter, air reconnaissance would reveal the enemy's progress in repairing the damage and reopening the rail-line. When the Communist repair effort was about complete, other air strikes would destroy the target again. However, when the carriers were replenishing, or when bad weather prevented air strikes, the surface forces of Task Force 95 were to take over and keep the "Package" destroyed by gunfire. In addition, patrolling ships were to fire a specified number of rounds every day and every night to hamper and destroy the enemy's repair efforts.

The second program was code-named "Derail." The "Derail" targets were ones to be kept destroyed solely by naval gunfire. A study of the northeast coast was made, and eleven rail targets chosen.

Like the "Packages," the "Derail" targets were along the coast, accessible to naval gunfire, and on the main Chongjin to Hungnam railroad. At each "Derail," patrolling ships would fire a limited number of shells into them during each 24-hour period.

By thus concentrating and coordinating both naval air strikes and naval gun strikes upon the "Package" and "Derail" targets, it was hoped that the Reds' logistic efforts along the route could be reduced to a trickle -- perhaps even brought to a standstill.

On 19 January 1952 the Padilla, upon completion of her first tour of duty on Korean waters, left for Yokosuka, Japan, to return to Colombia.

ARC Capitan Tono

ARC Almirante Padilla was relieved on 12 February 1952 at Yokosuka by ARC Capitan Tono making her first tour of duty. Commanded by Captain Hernando Beron Victoria she received an extensive training until 19 April when she was ordered to proceed to Pusan.

Early in May the Tono was off the east coast, where the major responsibility accepted by the American naval forces. The Colombian frigate's mission was to
escort supply convoys for the UN blockading forces. Bombardment and patrol missions were also carried out by Tono.

During the early part of May, the Colombian Tono operated so strenuously and had little opportunity to complete her routine maintenance or to give adequate leave to her crews. But the Korean sea operations were uneventful. At the time ground fighting still remained stalemated and the armistice negotiation also showed no progress deadlocked over the question of POW repatriation. On the sea small ships of the UN forces carried out rather monotonous duties of patrolling and escorting convoys without noticeable events. Stalemate existed, but the stalemate brought no rest. Readiness had to be maintained; crews had to be trained; the enemy, ensconced in the northern half of the peninsula, had to be harassed.

On 19 May, the Tono proceeded north to Wonsan area to participate in Wonsan bombardment operation planned for 23 May. The Tono's operations were mainly in the Wonsan and Songjin areas, and her time was spent in keeping up a running bombardment of road and rail communications both day and night. The land round Wonsan was enemy held and duels with shore batteries were frequent. This east coast assignment lasted until closing days of August. During the period the ship's crews were able to take a 10-day leave at Sasebo. Upon being recuperated at Sasebo the Tono was again given escorting missions for the American heavier ships. On 12 November the frigate steamed to Yokosuka completing her first tour of duty on Korean waters. On 27 January 1953 the Tono left Japan and made her way back to Colombia.

**ARC Almirante Brion**

The Almirante Brion commanded by Captain Carlos Prieto Silva was the third Colombian frigate to appear on Korean waters. She was already in Yokosuka for major repair when Capitan Tono left for Colombia. The repair period lasted until 26 June 1953, when the Colombian government formally took over from Japanese side. On 29 June the frigate was committed to the Korean War theater for the first time. But the frigate was only a few days on the war before the armistice was signed.

On the morning of 27 July 1953, the armistice was finally signed to take effect that evening. Three years, one month, and two days after the North Korean Communist forces had burst south across the 38th Parallel the war was over. The Communist aggression had been repelled, but Korea still remained divided.
The Colombian sailors paying tribute to the dead comrades at the U.N. Cemetery in Pusan.

In all ships patrolling in Korean waters some relaxation was allowed immediately after the cease-fire. They were no longer darkened at night, scuttles and black-out screen doors were open, providing great relief in the hot and humid conditions prevailing; watchkeeping duties were reduced as instant readiness of full armament was no longer necessary.

However, an aircraft carrier, cruiser, and ships of smaller types were kept, in or within easy reach of, Korean coastal waters. The Colombian frigate, Brion, was also retained in the area and carried out various missions as assigned.

On 22 April 1954 the Almirante Brion left the war theater for Colombia relieved by ARC. Capitan Tono, this time commanded by Captain Jorge Taua Suarez, which arrived at Yokosuka on 26 March 1954 for her second tour of duty and was soon put under repair.

The Tono operated chiefly along the west coast on the Yellow Sea during her second tour which lasted until 11 March 1955 when she was relieved by ARC. Almirante Padilla which was to make also her second tour commanded by Captain Dario Ferero Gonzalez.

On 11 October the last Colombian frigate left Korean waters for Colombia
for good completing all the missions assigned to the Colombian ship as a member of UN naval forces who participated in the Korean War.

Retrospect

In retrospect, the Colombia’s naval frigates played a full part in the special operations of war carrying out the various specific tasks: The blockade was to be maintained, convoy escorted, fishing suppressed, enemy coastal traffic interdicted, mines swept, rescue performed, and the captured islands supported.

For the officers and men who fought on Korean waters, the sea war along the Korean coastlines was a fertile field for their new experiences in joint operations with the United States, British, and other UN naval forces in Korean waters. It was a positive blessing for them from the standpoint of professional efficiency, because there is no substitute for battlefield experience.

The most significant feature again was the mere fact that the Republic of Colombia’s naval ships participated in the United Nations naval operations on Korean waters. This fact alone showed the Colombian determination to involve the country in other United Nations peacekeeping operations whenever possible through the United Nations.
CHRONOLOGY

1951

8 May  Almirante Padilla joins Task Force 95 to operate in Korean waters upon her arrival in Sasebo, Japan.

15 June  The 1st Colombian Infantry Battalion arrives in Korea led by Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polanka Puyo.

16 June  Commences a six-week training course at the UN forces Reception Center at Tongnae.

30 July  Completes the training and moves to Sabanggori in the vicinity of Sanyang-ni.

1 Aug  Attached to the 21st Regiment, the 24th US Infantry Division.

7 Aug  Moves from Sabanggori to Taeri-ri along Kansas Line near Hwachon.

13 Oct  Joins in the attack of Kumsong under the 24th US Division order.

1952

19 Jan  Almirante Padilla leaves Korean waters completing her first tour duty.

28 Jan  Attached to the 31st Regiment, the 7th US Infantry Division, upon the transfer of the 24th Division to Japan, and moves to the vicinity of Yanggu.

26 Feb  Moves from Yanggu to Kapyong.

7 Mar  Moves from Kapyong to Inje area on rear security mission in the X US Corps zone.

19 Apr  Capitan Tono steams to Pusan completing her training period in Japanese waters.

10 May  The Colombian Battalion occupies a part of MLR in the vicinity of Kunhwa.

19 May  Capitan Tono proceeds north to Wonsan area to participate in Wonsan bombardment.

21 June  The Colombian Battalion conducts a raid on Hill 400 and captures 2 POWs.

4 July  Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruiiz Novoa assumes the command of the Colombian Battalion.

20 July  Observes the Colombia's independence anniversary day and receives a congratulatory message from Chief of Staff, ROK Army.
**Chronology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td>Occupies a part of Missouri Line in the vicinity of Igil-li to begin 35-day frontline duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Nov</td>
<td>Captain Tono leaves Korean waters completing her first tour of duty. The Colombian Battalion comes off the MLR and moves to Hwachon reserve camp for training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov</td>
<td>The Colombian Battalion participates in the tactical exercise conducted by the 31st Regiment and wins top performance citation from the regiment’s commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Dec</td>
<td>Follows its attached unit, the 7th US Division, to the western front in the I US Corps sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Dec</td>
<td>Occupies a number of blocking positions in the vicinity of Komsong-gol and prepares the counterattack plans against probable enemy break-through.</td>
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**1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Jan</td>
<td>Occupies a part of MLR on Jamestown facing to the north the Shank of T-Bone Hill (Hill 290).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan</td>
<td>Moves to Yonchon to become reserve unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb</td>
<td>Moves to the left flank of the 7th Division sector and relieves the Ethiopian Battalion positioned near Chuam-dong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar</td>
<td>Conducts “Barbula Operation” designed to raid and destroy enemy strong points on Hill 180.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Mar</td>
<td>Occupies MLR positions in Togun-kol area and mans one company strength on outpost “Old Baldy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar</td>
<td>The Communist Chinese starts a double-barreled attack both on Old Baldy and Porkchop Hills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>Pulls back to the rear area where it completes reorganization in two days and returns to Togun-kol again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>Detached from the 31st Regiment and attached to the 17th Regiment for operational control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>Occupies MLR positions in Sonbyok area relieving the 1st Battalion of the 17th Regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June</td>
<td>General Paik Sun Yup, the Korean Army Chief of Staff, confers the “Ulchi Order of Merit” on Lt. Col. Alberto Ruiz Novoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ortiz Torres takes over the command of the battalion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Almirante Brion starts to operate on the Korean waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 July</td>
<td>Comes off the MLR and moves to Yonchon to become regimental reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27</td>
<td>The Armistice Agreement is signed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug.-Sept 22</td>
<td>22 Colombian captives in north Korea are repatriated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 22</td>
<td>Almirante Brion leaves Korean waters relieved by Capitan Tono which is to make her second tour of duty.</td>
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### 1955

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar 11</td>
<td>Capitan Tono leaves Korean waters relieved by Almirante Padilla which is also to make her second tour of duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 11</td>
<td>Almirante Padilla leaves Korean waters completing her second tour of duty.</td>
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THE FRENCH FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1.  Introduction to France

France, a country occupying part of the Atlantic margin of Europe, comprises an area of 551,601 square kilometers (including Corsica) and is thus the largest country in Europe excluding U.S.S.R. Situated in middle latitude on the western margin of the contingent of Europe, France is liable almost everywhere and at any season to experience the penetration of depressions bringing maritime air-masses and frontal rain.

The population of France in 1969 was about 50,500,000 with a density of around 240 per square mile, having risen annually by slightly less than 1.1 per cent from 1962.

No region of France can be characterized by the presence of any single racial type. There is a frequent mixture of kinds. Nonetheless certain provinces owe their ethnical features to the marked predominence of one or other of great racial groups of western Europe. The languages spoken before the Celtic invasion vanished save for Iberian and Ligurian place names. To the Latin base, which itself evolved and gave birth to dialects of analytical character, were added words of Germanic origin (Frankish). Modern French is Neo-Latin or one of the Romance languages.

France with a dominant Catholic tradition, lived for a little more than a century, from the Consulate (1799) to 1905, under the regime of the concordat; that is to say of a compromise between that statue and the religious sects recognized by it: Roman Catholicism, the reformed churches and judaism. After 1830 Islam was added to this list. There was religious administration and budget. The protestant community, which was diminished by the persecutions of the 17th century, is chiefly attached to the Lutheran church and to Calvinism. By the early 1960 a considerable number of North African Muslims were resident in metropolitan France.

A strong republican tradition of France, built up during about 70 years, was in theory substantially, and in practice drastically, modified 1958. During the years 1958 to 1969 of the Fifth Republic transform the traditional passive
president into an effective political leader, exercising far more executive power than the new constitution in itself granted.

The president of the republic was chosen for a spell of seven years; on the first occasion by an electoral college of Parliament, departmental councilors and overseas assemblies, and the delegates of municipal councils. By a referendum of 28 October 1962, the method was altered to election by popular mandate.

The development of the French economy has owed much to geographical endowment of a favourable world situation, easy internal communications, a temperate maritime climate and extensive tracts of fertile soil, although its mineral resources, with the notable exception of iron ore, were not large. Although the strength of its agriculture, the existence of small-scale industry and its lesser reliance upon international trade helped France to resist the severe economic depression that hit the western world in the late 1920s, its economy was severely shaken, and it was neither politically nor economically in condition to face the German onslaught of 1940. After 1945 France began planned reorganization of agriculture and industry. Considerable progress was made in the development of water resources by multipurpose projects, and communications were improved, while the heavy industry of the northeastern districts was closely integrated with that of the neighbouring countries and the whole economy geared to a wider area of Western Europe within the Common Market organization of the European Economic Community.

After World War II the reconstruction of the armed services was undertaken, and major changes took place in particular under the Fifth Republic. Military service, compulsory between the ages of 18 and 50, lasted for 17 years. This included 16 months active duty and five years "Availability," followed by the rest on active reserve.

France began basically to reorganize the structure of forces after 1962. Three operational bodies were created: a strategic nuclear force, a mobile one, and a group for the defense of the territory. Emphasis was placed on the use of nuclear weapons, and by 1968 a quarter of the defense allotment was being devoted to their development.

Section 2. Commitment

The Communist North Koreans, taking advantage of the bad weather, had drawn up their army along the 38th Parallel, and at 0400 hours 25 June 1950
they launched a sudden and all-out attack against the Republic of Korea. Around the world, outside the Iron Curtain, the news of the Communist aggression shocked the governments and people alike.

Since the Republic of Korea was born by virtue of the U.N. efforts, the U.S. Government immediately brought the aggression to the attention of the U.N. Security Council. The State Department of U.S. promptly relayed this information to the U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie and asked for a meeting of the Security Council.

After noting a report from the U.N. Commission on Korea (UNCOK) and an appeal for assistance from the Republic of Korea, the Council adopted a draft resolution on the afternoon of June 25 (Local Time). The Security Council Resolution noted with grave concern the armed attack by the forces from North Korea and stated that the action constituted a breach of the peace. The North Korean authorities were called upon to withdraw their armed forces to the north of the 38th Parallel. The resolution ended by calling upon all members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Koreans.

By then it was clear that North Korea had no intention of obeying the United Nations' appeal for a cessation of the hostilities. Two days later the Security Council met again. At this meeting the United States representative reported that his government had decided, as the logical next step after the Security Council resolution of 25 June, to order United States air and sea forces to give the Republic of Korea troops cover and support. He moved a recommendation that member nations actively help the Republic of Korea to repel aggression and restore international peace and security. Seven nations of the permanent members including France voted for this resolution.

At that time as a permanent member nation of the United Nations, France had been deeply interested in establishing peace, freedom and stability in Korea well before the out-break of the Korean War. She extended her unanimous support when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on 12 December 1948 approving the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in the Korean Peninsula. In view of this relationship, it was no surprising matters that news of Korea being unduly attacked by the North caused a grave shock to the French Government and people alike. It was to determine to do whatever lay within its power to restore peace in the area.

In fact France was at that time in desperate engagement in Indo-China. Her resources were being pipe-lined to the Indo-China in time parallel to the initial stage of the Korean War. In spite of difficulty, the French Government immediately began to debate as to what part she could and should take in
order to fight the common enemy.

Within a month, on 22 July 1950, the French Government at last decided to participate in the Korean War and immediately placed the frigate "La Grandiere," the Naval Force of the Far East, at the disposal of the United Nations Command through the U.S. authorities in support of the Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, in carrying out the commitment made to the United Nations, she undertook prompt actions necessitated for deployment of the armed forces to Korea.

Now the Korean issue became a fervent object of debates among the French. For the Government it meant hectic discussions in the cabinet and service chiefs, and maintaining further consultations with other member nations and U.S. authorities in the theater.

On 25 August 1950, the nation at last came to a decision. The Government announced that, in view of the gravity of the situation created by North Korean aggression and of the further appeal by the U.N. for additional effective ground force, she had decided to make an immediate offer to the United Nations Command a special combat unit, a battalion composed solely of volunteers for service with other United Nations ground forces.

Immediately after recruiting opened volunteers began calling at army office in Auvours near Mans throughout the country in substantial numbers. On 18 September 1950, the French Army activated the Korea-bound battalion, the "Forces Terrestres Francaises de l'O.N.U." This battalion had a full complement of 39 officers, 172 non-commissioned officers and 806 enlisted men in addition to a replacement unit of 10 officers, 40 non-commissioned officers and 350 men, which would add to the first contingent of the battalion. A small unit of 20 officers and 130 other men was assigned to remain in France for the support of the battalion.

The volunteers came from the active as well as from the reserve. The proportion of active and reserve forces was set up as follows: Officers, half and half; non-commissioned officers, 70 per cent in active, 30 per cent in reserve; enlisted men, ten per cent in active and 90 per cent in reserve.

The battalion was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar, a veteran of the Foreign Legion who had willingly given up his three-star rank of "General de Corps d'Armee" to command this particular troops in Korea. He was as gallant and distinguished a combat soldier as France had ever produced, with every decoration his country could confer and seventeen times wounded in battle. Yet, he would be mainly concerned with its overall administration and would not have any operational command.

The activation of the battalion was assisted by direction of the chief of
the battalion, Commandant Lemire. Commandant Le Merle de Beaufond and Commandant Barthelemy were appointed as the Second-in-Commands, and Medicine-Commandant Jean-Luis as State-Major of the battalion.

The Order of Battle was as follows:

- Battalion Commander: Commandant Lemire
- 1st Company Commander: Captain Castries
- 2nd Company Commander: Captain Huschard
- 3rd Company Commander: Captain Serre
- HQ Company Commander: Captain Le Maitre
- Support Company (C.B.) Commander: Captain Decamp

Gradually as the battalion organized itself it took its unique physiognomy; the 1st Company was composed mainly of old Marine troopers, the 2nd Company received the majority of its members from the metropolitan infantrymen and the 3rd Company was filled with paratroopers and legionaries. The Headquarters Company was consisted of the specialists and artillery men, and the C.B. Company was made up with confirmed specialists considered adequate to operate their jobs independently.

Its designation as the B.F.O.N.U. came on the 1st of October 1950 and it was thrown into an intense training at a specially designed camp around Auvours. It paid particular attention to the training in the combat patrol and ambush actions in the field. After a several-week of training, it stood in full battle gear and on 25 October it embarked in Marseilles on the steam ship "Athos II" for Pusan, Korea.

Section 3. The Arrival

The French Battalion disembarked at the port of Pusan on 29 November 1950 and was heartily welcomed by the high ranking officials of the Republic of Korea and United Nations Command, Captain Green, the Chief of Troop Movement Control, and crowds of Korean people, all waiting to throw flowers and their "welcome" around the necks of the arriving soldiers. The tribute was the first one ever paid to the French soldiers on the Korean soil. After the welcome ceremony, they were ordered to aboard a long chain of train headed northward and reached at the United Nations Reception Center in Taegu.
At that time the arrival of United Nations forces in Korea made necessary arrangements to equip and train them so that they could become effective parts of the United Nations Command. In an attempt to accomplish this, Commanding General of the Eighth US Army, General Walton H. Walker established the United Nations Reception Center (UNRC) at Taegu. Its mission was to clothe, equip and provide familiarization training with United States Army weapons and equipment to United Nations troops as determined essential for operations in Korea by the Reception Center Commander.

A monument which had been erected in Suwon in memory of the French Battalion in the Korean War.
Meanwhile, insofar as the United Nations were concerned, the Korean crisis had reached the end of a phase. In mid-September it seemed that enough had been done to secure a victory. While Eighth US Army stabilized the perimeter of the bridgehead around Naktong River, General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC, had launched a daring amphibious assault at Inchon to sever the North Korean lines of communication. The maneuver was brilliantly successful. With the landings at Inchon, the UNC took the initiative and was soon pursuing the disorganized North Korean army towards 38th Parallel. By the 3rd of the first week of October, the capital of North Korea had fallen and mobile columns of the ROK and US troops were heading north for the Yalu River, the boundary between Korea and China.

When the French Battalion left Marseilles on 25 October, the war in Korea seemed to be near its end. However the Chinese Communist forces had invaded into North Korea, completely surprising the United Nations Command. In the face of these setbacks, a general retreat was ordered.

Now at Reception Center the French soldiers were put to hectic days in unpacking and sorting the stores and equipments which they had brought with them. There were inexplicable shortages in some items. The battalion was underequipped, with only 18 trucks and 44 jeeps. However the young soldiers were quite confident; at this point none of them felt fear. They all realized that the real function of an army is to fight, and if need be, to die for the freedom.

Training emphasized small unit tactics at company level in the hills were taught, stressing all-round defense by night, with isolated companies on high ground. The training was to include hardening of the men for hill-climbing and cross-country movement, and familiarization with American modern weapons.
CHAPTER II  THE DEPLOYMENT INTO ACTIONS

Section 1. The First Encounter with NKCF
(10 December 1950 – 26 January 1951)

On the 10th December 1950, after a brief spell of time in Taegu, the battalion received an order from the 2nd Logistic Command which instructed the battalion to move to Suwon. Officially attached to the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division on 11 December 1950, the French Battalion, in accordance with the order, travelled by truck convoys across the ice-covered rough terrain of Korea, making at Suwon at 1000 hours on the 13th of December. Now the bitter Korean winter was at its height; for troops not fully clothed or equipped for winter conditions it was a time of difficulty and hardship. There, the French Battalion found that the 2nd US Infantry Division was reorganizing itself. The battalion also joined reconstruction work, but the process took time.

In late November 1950 when the Chinese Communist forces (CCF) fell upon the United Nations forces with full power and ferocity, the 2nd US Division was hard hit by the enemy at Kunu-ri area and in subsequent action this gallant division lost over 4,000 men and much of its artillery, signal, and engineer equipment. The division was shattered, its equipment had gone. Only Colonel Paul Freeman’s 23rd Regiment, withdrawing with his division commander’s permission westward toward the sea, evacuated intact. After coming through the CCF gauntlet on the Kunu-ri–Sunchon road, the movement south was nothing but a truck ride for the 2nd Division.

In the meantime, after seven more days stay in Suwon, the French Battalion headed north on order for a new position near Chungiu at 1600 hours of the 21st of December. Huddled together in the back of the trucks, the men of the French Battalion stamped their feet on the truck beds in futile attempts to keep their limbs from becoming stiff and numb. To keep their ears from freezing they tied wool scarves around their heads underneath their helmets. Still the cold seeped through. At 1445 hours, 21 December the battalion completed its move to the assembly area of Kyohyon-dong, Chungiu City.
Three days later, 24 December, the battalion took up the positions near Mukso-tong, and from there sent feeler patrols northward to locate the enemy and establish contact. Late on 25 December, the Commanding General of the 2nd US Division directed the 23rd Regiment with the French Battalion to occupy the positions along the road leading to Wonju and block the enemy advance. On the 27th the French Battalion pushed northward and set up a fairly tight perimeter defense at north of Tanyang area. It was imminent then that the CCF would take an all-out offensive to the Wonju area. Coping with this growing expectation of the CCF mass-attack, the French Battalion was assigned to cover the withdrawal route of the friendly forces in and around Wonju area. With the role of covering Wonju, the battalion moved to northern part of Wonju city on 29 December.

Meanwhile, general retreat of the UN forces continued. However, by mid-January 1951, the United Nations retreat had reached its limit, and the line ran from the coast near Pyongtaek about the 37th parallel to near Wonju in central Korea, and thence to the east coast at Kangnung, some 30 more kilometers south of the 38th Parallel. In the west there was no contact with enemy. In Wonju area, however, the Chinese Communist continued to attack the United States forces. (See Situation Map 7.)

Then, in early January 1951, the French Battalion attached to the 2nd US Division was ordered to attack north. But there were many problems. Thousands of Korean refugees in January 1951 were pouring southward, streaming through UN lines, and with them came disguised North Korean Communist troops. The bandits sought every means to block the main supply route and disturb the rear area of the UN forces. In addition to this, it was cold enough to keep a man’s teeth chattering. Especially the night grew colder. In the bitter weather, the men were having trouble staying alert. Shivering but alert, the French soldiers continued to attack northward. They had been given an order of covering the withdrawal route of the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces in Chunchon area. However the central front of the Wonju—Chunchon axis was hard pressed by Chinese Communists. Neither air nor artillery and infantrymen could completely stop them from scrabbling over the ridges, dropping down into the valleys.

The French Battalion could not hold the Chumakkori area, north of Wonju. When they withdrew, on 5 January 1951, they went back 30 more kilometers to the northern area of Wonju. During the withdrawal the French Battalion broke contact and got away without undue difficulty and occupied defensive positions northwest of Hakson-dong, northern portion of Wonju. There the battalion maintained blocking positions until the 7th of January.
To the east of Wonju the 38th US Regiment deployed its organic battalions and the Netherlands Battalion. On the west were the French Battalion with the battalions of the 23rd Regiment. In the course of several days no one had slept. The men of the French Battalion, shivering in sub-zero weather, were reaching the point of exhaustion.

Meanwhile, three North Korean divisions, the 6th, 10th, and 27th, began hitting at Wonju from the southeast on 7 January while the 12th NK Division simultaneously drove down the MSR from Hongchon to the north. Unidentified Chinese Communists forces launched their assaults from the west on the stout defenses of the 23rd and 38th. Beginning about 2200 hours of the 7th, the Chinese Communists made their dishearteningly regular attack. From the beginning it did not appear to be well concentrated in any one area. Under heavy pressure, the friendly artillery from the 37th US Field Artillery Battalion threw up a hail of fire to keep the enemy off their backs. Intense fighting raged all day of the 7th, however, it was untenable to block the streaming of the hordes and by midnight an enemy force had succeeded in infiltrating the lines of the 23rd and entering Wonju in strength.

At dawn, next day Division Headquarters ordered the subordinate units to break off the fighting, wanting to pull back a slight distance. Both the 23rd and 38th Regiments with French Battalion and the Netherlands Battalion attached withdrew to defensive positions on the high ground approximately five kilometers south of Wonju. However, Wonju was still under control of friendly artillery and patrols. Before leaving, the ammunition train which had of necessity been left in Wonju was blown. Orders to blow the railroad bridge went amiss, however, when the charge failed to explode. Realizing the extreme importance of demolishing the bridge, the platoon leader of the attached engineer platoon braved a wall of enemy small arms fire, advanced to the bridge, doused the ties with gasoline and set fire to the structure, denying its further use to the enemy.

At 0300 hours on 8 January, orders came from X Corps that Wonju must be retaken. Four battalions were ordered to hold the defensive positions on the high ground south of the town while a minimum of one battalion was to attack and clear Wonju and secure the airstrip on the south edge. The 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment was designated as the attacking force and it jumped off against fierce resistance, fighting from house to house and making some progress in the initial stages. However, enemy reinforcements poured against both flanks of the attacking force and it was forced to withdraw to its former positions. The enemy attempted a double envelopment which was repulsed with air and artillery support.

The following day, 9 January, the French Battalion prepared to commence
an attack north in the early hours. The French Battalion would take immediate vigorous action to contain enemy penetration and prevent further enemy movement which might threaten security of the area.

The French Battalion advanced in line with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 23rd Regiment across the Main Supply Route of Wonju—Chechon axis westward toward Urop-tong area. Contact with the enemy was not close, and although constant vigilance was necessary, the main activities were short-range patrols, mostly to Tomechon and Naenamsong. The 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment maintained blocking positions across main supply route near Chupo-ri, approximately 10 kilometers west of Chechon.

Next day, on 10 January the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 38th Regiment secured defensive positions on the high ground of Hungom-ni, and the attacking echelon of the French Battalion, the 2nd Battalions of the 23rd and 38th Regiments continued attack toward Unhaengjong—Naongjong line. There units sustained enemy coordinated attack on each flank of the position at 1630 hours. The French Battalion began to receive increasingly heavy small arms, mortar, artillery fire from the enemy. From the high ground, friendly troops poured a rain of fire on the enemy who threatened the flanks and the front. Friendly artillery and air pounded the masses of advancing communists inflicting staggering casualties while the bitter weather exacted an increasingly heavy toll on attackers and defenders alike. Finally, after savage fighting during which the 1st and 2nd French Companies repulsed four successive attempts by the enemy was turned back, his attack broken, friendly lines remaining intact. Especially, the frustrating role done by Lieutenant Lainel and Sergeant Le Loire ensured the Frenchmen to repulsed the enemy. The action at this area was the battalion’s first serious engagement since it had been committed to action. During the engagement the 3rd Company lost its liaison officer, Lieutenant Delmotte. He was the first French officer killed in action in Korea. The fire fight continued throughout the day and decreased as of 2400 hours with no loss of ground.

All the next day the companies of the French Battalion poured murderous barrages of fire at each other while friendly units were shuffled through knee deep snow to locate maximum strength at the most critical points. The 3rd Company of the French Battalion attached to the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment moved forward from the defense line and struggled to wrest important positions from the enemy on the southern outskirts of Wonju from which he had been laying down bases of fire on the friendly positions. Hill 247, a low lying enemy infested hill mass, was taken by the Frenchmen only after they fixed bayonets and cut their way to the top where, they held in spite of savage
counterattacks and sub-zero winds which cut through winter clothing. The remaining hours of the day passed swiftly with not much actual contact. The situation was quiet in front of the regiment, but there was evidence of an enemy build-up. However, at dawn next day, a strong enemy column from the north burst at first into the 23rd’s perimeter. The Chinese Communist attack, perfectly planned, coordinated, and executed, burst against regiment’s hill. The hill slopes flamed and roared with the sounds of firing. The Red Chinese, with a mighty rush forward, burst over the lower parts of the hill crawling over the small ridges like ants in the gun flashes. Every man could hear screams and shouts, punctuated by the occasional blast of grenades and rifles. The big waves of the enemy boiled up out of the dark, now hammering at French Battalion with rifles and submachine guns, hurling dozens of grenades. The hunch of the enemy coming over the ridges was chopped down. But others tumbled into the holes of the French men. The Frenchmen needed bayonets, but some of the fighters did not have time to do this. A wild melee ensued. When the Red Chinese fell back northward the battalion counted many dead soldiers of the enemy. For the next two days the battalion maintained and improved defensive positions with light enemy contact. On the 15th of January, the battalion again withdrew to defensive positions and occupied the Wongimi area.

By the end of the 23rd, after a stiff battle the division retook the city of Wonju and dispatched a series of motorized patrols to seek out and destroy the enemy. In the meantime after ten more days of anxious waiting in the foxholes, the French Battalion was released from the 23rd Infantry Regiment on 24 January and assigned to the 38th when the 23rd was ordered to assemble as division reserve at Chupori. Two days later, on 26 January, a reinforced French company went out from the Munmang-ni Valley to engage an enemy force of 50 reported by a previous patrol. Selecting a difficult route through the hills, the Frenchmen surprised 450 enemy troops, inflicted 32 counted KIA’s and came back in spite of several enemy ambushes. Said General Ruffner, the 2nd Division Commander, “This may be the information we have been seeking for the last 10 days . . .”

It should be mentioned that after a series of failure in the Wonju area, the enemy had abandoned his stubborn offensive in the central front. At the crucial moment of the Chinese hordes burst only the 2nd US Division had been in contact with the Red Chinese in the center. Had the UN Command been able to employ the main body of the X US Corps against enemy, there is good reason to suppose the Red Chinese might have failed a little earlier. But the terrain made it a series of wild melee. In the central area the soldiers morale
was high, but the men were puzzled by the poor military situation. They felt that Western troops, with their wealth of military experience in World War II, and equipped with modern weapons, should have been able to stand their ground in face of the Chinese, however great their numbers. Meanwhile the new Army Commander, General Ridgway, was not satisfied with positions taken up by the Eighth Army at the end of its withdrawal, and soon after the assumed command planned a limited advance to the 38th Parallel. By the end of January, by a series of methodical attacks, the line in the west had advanced to Suwon, Inchon and near Yoji, and was moving slowly towards Seoul and the Han River. During this advance very fierce fighting continued on the X Corps front.

Section 2. The Battle of Twin Tunnels
(26 January – 3 February 1951)

The 2nd Division, at that time, occupied adjoining positions with the 24th US Infantry Division near the center of Eighth Army’s front. The Commanding General of the X US Corps directed the 2nd Division to send a reconnaissance patrol northward to the vicinity of two railroad tunnels, a few kilometers south of Chipyong-ni. First orders concerning to patrol reached the 23rd Regiment and plans for the patrol were being made while the members assembled. On 28 January, a patrol from the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry returned from the Twin Tunnels area east of Chipyong-ni with a report of enemy sightings but no ground contact. Plans were made to send a larger force out to the same area the following day to clear the enemy.

The planned patrol from the 23rd Infantry to the Twin Tunnels area moved out on the 29th from the 2nd Battalion. Upon nearing the area where the enemy had been sighted the previous day it was attacked and surrounded by two North Korean battalions which appeared from out of the wooded hills along the road. A call for aid was sent back and next day on 30th orders went out to the French and 3rd Battalions to move up to an assembly point six kilometers south of the Tunnels area to counter the developing enemy threat.

In the meantime, the columns of the French Battalion struck north, moving warily, relying heavily on aerial support, methodically destroying enemy pockets while maintaining an unbroken front across the hills and thereby avoiding the error of road bound fighting which left the enemy free to infiltrate down the
ridgelines at night. The French Battalion in line with the 3rd Battalion once again took the lead toward northward to Tunnels area. Its objective was to clear out the enemy in the area.

The drive northward was not easy. The Frenchmen had to work their way up on the hill to join the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment which was advancing along the left side of the road. To establish this peculiar job they had to capture high ground which dominated this road from the both flanks. The French Battalion then took neighbouring hills against comparatively light opposition. In the course of action every possible care was taken not to bypass even a small enemy pocket. The troops made sure of one position before advancing to the next and spread out into the hills away from the road. The French Battalion, beating off the light resistance, continued to advance and finally, at late hours of the 31st, reached the rim of Hill 543 (Korae-san).

The French Battalion then took up the defensive positions on Hills 279 and 459 near Kudun, and also threw up a tight perimeter astride of the road leading to Chipyong-ni. The battalion commander placed the 3rd Company in a perimeter that lay across the railroad facing northwest on Hill 279, with the right flank bent northeastward to face Chipyong-ni and the 2nd Company in the Muwang-ni Valley ranging from the southern rim of Hill 279 to the valley itself. The 1st Company was placed on the positions of Hill 453, one and a half kilometers northeast of Hill 543. To the north and east side of the French Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment put its companies around hills to Kudun from Chowang-kol. (See Situation Map 8.)

Upon taking over the position the companies dug in their machine guns, registered their mortars, and operated patrols to the encompassing high ground.

Early in the morning at 0450 hours of the 1st, the French Battalion came under surprising attack of the enemy from both the Chinese Communists north and south positions. The defensive perimeter began to blaze with fire. In addition to directing steady mortar and small-arms fire against the French Battalion, the Red Chinese kept maneuvering small groups around the perimeter to break the line. Enemy guns, mortars and small-arms broke the silence of the frosty night. Under the baptism of fire, however, the Frenchmen held the high ground belonging to the companies on the west side of the road. Loss of the ground would seriously threat the defense of the battalion and also would permit the enemy to engulf the friendly units. Soon increasing number of reinforcements the enemy approached on the French Battalion positions. The battalion immediately launched counterattack and succeeded in halting the wave of the enemy. The counterattack was greatly aided by mortar fire. After confused and intense fighting during the hours of darkness, the
enemy withdrew at first light. However not long after a silence, a strong enemy column from three sides burst into the French Battalion. Now all the companies were heavily engaged in their own area. Not clearly seen in the dark, enemy skirmishers had crawled balzing rifle fire up at the battalion. The hill slopes flamed and roared with the sounds of firing. In this wild mêlée Lieutenant Nicolai of the 3rd Company was killed in the action. A 57-mm mortar crew of the 2nd Company knocked down twenty-three of enemy, a nearly half of platoon sized, with five bursts of fire. The machine gunners of C.A. Company held the position wiping out the enemy column with the loss of Captain Maitre. The battalion commander moved his Pioneer Section from the rear to the front to reinforce his 3rd Company.

And while the most desperate hours of the French Battalion within the perimeter were passing, another battle had been raging in the area of the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment. The artillery which positioned three kilometers behind the line had been throwing up a continuous curtain of fire in support of both the beleaguered French and American Battalions. Now the tubes nearly ran out of ammunition. The rightmost company of the 3rd Battalion was suffering with the shortage of supply stocks, and even drivers, medics, stretcher bearers, signalmen of the French and Americans had to convey the supplies to the US company. A Frenchman, Hugues, amalgamated into the Americans was killed in this action. Meanwhile the injured men, including Captain Serre and Commandant Barthelemy of the 3rd Company remained in their position fighting. However ammunition was getting scarce and the officers kept cautioning their men to use it sparingly. The 3rd Company was in bad need of supplies. The Assistant Commander of the 2nd US Division, Brigadier General Steward, immediately reported to Major General Ruffner and requested an air strike and a drop of supplies to the encircled companies.

The first help for the surrounded members of the French Battalion came in an hour led by Commandant Beaufond with the support section of the Republic of Korea Army. Soon a plane appeared above the companies. The men watched as it circled above them and they screamed with delight when the first fighter plane appeared. The first plane fired machine-guns and threw rockets down. The second plane carried napalm bombs that burst into orange blossoms of flame among the enemy positions. It was excellent close support. Immediately following the air strike six cargo planes dropped bandoleers of rifle ammunition, cases of machine gun ammunition and other supplies. Except for some of supplies, all of those fell on the perimeter and, now that air strike was over, in the area that was under enemy fire on that night. The situation was grim again. The fire fight had flared up in the vicinity, and the enemy crawled
close to the perimeter and filched some air-dropped supplies. Every weapon in the battalion was firing on the Chinese Communists in two regiment strength. This fire finally drove off the enemy attack. The area was quiet, and the battalion was able to turn the situation. It had maintained its positions intact, and these positions covered the ground vital to the defense of the regiment of area. In addition, its relatively light casualties of 27 killed, 97 wounded and three missing, contrary to those of enemy, approximately 1,300 killed and estimated 3,600 wounded, testified to the skill with which the positions had been organized and defended.

Lieutenant Colonel Monclar's outstanding leadership during this action led the battalion to the awards of the Presidential Unit Citation of the United States of America and the Unit Citations of the French Army for the first time.
The Deployment into Actions

The Presidential Unit Citation of the United States of America reads as follow:

". . . . . , 1,300 dead Chinese soldiers were actually counted in front of the French Battalion's position. Also, of a total of 225 casualties suffered by the task force, 125 were among the companies of the French Battalion. As a result of the gallant actions of this splendid fighting unit of French volunteers, representing fifty percent of the infantry in the force, the position was held and the 373rd Chinese Infantry Regiment was routed. These actions, coupled with the equally heroic stand of the Third Battalion, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, on the other half of the perimeter where the Chinese 374th Infantry Regiment was destroyed, cost the enemy an estimated 3,600 casualties and put the 125th Chinese Division out of action as an effective unit, thus enabling the 23rd Regimental Combat Team to continue its advance. The extraordinary heroism, aggressiveness and esprit de corps displayed by the French Battalion during this period reflect great credit upon the arms of the Republic of France and the United Nations."

The following day, 2 February 1951, all companies of the French Battalion were closed in the Tunnels area and were consolidating their positions following an enemy withdrawal. Patrols fanned out on all sides to maintain enemy contact and flush him from hiding places. The tanks forced a large group from a village and as the enemy broke for cover, air artillery and tank fire rained down upon him, inflicting heavy casualties. Throughout the night artillery laid down a curtain of fire around the position.

Section 3. The Battle of Chipyong-ni
(3 February – 21 April)

After the Twin Tunnels Battle, the French Battalion, together with the 23rd US Regiment proceeded on the afternoon of the 3rd February to the town of Chipyong-ni and set up a all-round defense. Chipyong-ni was a small cross-roads town a kilometer long and several blocks wide, situated on a single-track railroad. Besides the railway station there were several other brick or frame buildings in the center of the town. Already half of the buildings were
reduced to rubble by the air strikes and artillery fire as the result of previous fighting in the town.

Encircling Chipyong-ni were several prominent hills that rose to an average height of 250 meters above the rice paddies and buildings in the valley. These hills provided excellent defensive positions along 20 kilometers of ridgelines and formed a perimeter with a five to seven kilometers diameter. Instead, the regimental commander stationed his infantry men on lower ground around a tight perimeter about two kilometers diameter. On three sides of the town the line followed small hills; on the northwest section the infantrymen dug their holes across two kilometers strip of the rice paddies.

During the ten days after going into position at Chipyong-ni, the French Battalion dug in across a section of frozen rice paddies, and on the other sides of the valley the line lay across a series of low hills. Here the 23rd US Regiment, including the French Battalion, supported by the 37th Artillery Battalion, a battery of 155-mm from the 503rd, a ranger company, and engineers, were still positioned when the CCF released the flood.

The Commander of the French Battalion placed all three of his rifle companies on the front line to cover the assigned sector of the two kilometers long from the southern rim of Hill 106 to the northern area of Yongmal. This was the western plane of Chipyong-ni. The infantry companies dug in their machine guns, registered their mortars, sowed antipersonnel mines, and operated daily patrols to the encompassing high ground. The artillery were registered on all probable avenues of enemy approach, and all units established good communication lines. There was time to coordinate the infantry, artillery, and air support into an effective combat team.

In the meantime, while the French Battalion built up its defenses, UN forces general offensive got under way on 5 February with X Corps, in the center of the line, attacking to make a double envelopment of the town of Hongchon. The attack moved slowly until the night of 11 February, when the enemy launched a counteroffensive. The vigorous enemy attack drove the UN advance into a withdrawal that rolled the front lines south between eight and 35 kilometers. Before the enemy attack, the front lines of X Corps were well ahead of 23rd Regiment’s perimeter, but as the units went south, sometimes fighting through enemy roadblocks, Chipyong-ni became a conspicuous bulge on the left of the corp’s front.

At the battalion’s perimeter, the usual patrols for the daylight hours of 13 February reported increased enemy activity crowding close to Chipyong-ni. Observation plane reported enemy groups moving toward the perimeter and also
Crossroad at Chipyong-ni, in the central front.
2nd Division’s Reconnaissance Company disclosed enemy in strength on the road leading to Iho-ri.

The 2nd Company of the battalion succeeded in infiltrating into the enemy held area and demolished the supply point. It was upon this position that the last group of trucks of the reinforcement of the French Battalion had passed before the total encirclement by the enemy. The early part of the evening was quiet. However the men had to stay awake in their foxholes. The battalion was required to be on a fifty percent alert at all times, which meant that one man in each foxhole had to be awake while the other slept.

It was about 2200 hours when the first firing broke out all along the Seoul-Wonju axis simultaneously. The enemy crawled along the spur of ground that led to the French Battalion and opened with small arms and mortar fire taking advantage of the terrain. Enemy mortar shells smashed the P.C. However in order to conserve ammunition, the infantry men had to fire only when they could see the enemy. The machine guns fired steadily for several hours, although no close action developed until about 0200 hours on 14 February when a platoon sized group of Red Chinese made an attack against the French Battalion just to the right of the machine gun outpost. The enemy soldiers formed thirty or sixty meters in front of the small hill which the French occupied, then launched their attack, blowing whistles and bugles, and running with bayonets fixed. When this noise started, the French soldiers began cranking a hand siren they had, and one squad started running toward the enemy, yelling and throwing grenades far to the front and to the side. When the two forces were within ten meters of each other the Red Chinese suddenly turned and ran in the opposite direction. It was all over within a minute. After this fighting it was relatively quiet in the area.

The machine gunners of the pioneers opened fire and raked the thirty-three of enemy killing twenty-two of them with only one blast. The firing battery, meanwhile, kept up a normal volume of harassing and interdiction fire, and also fired an illuminating round every five minutes for the sector on the opposite side of the perimeter. During the night the battalion mortars fired more than 300 rounds, however, the enemy signalling with whistles and horns, launched several attacks against the French Battalion. By the time it was completely light, all enemy activity had halted and there was a lull for day long.

During the day of 14 February, the infantry and artillerymen reorganized their defenses in preparation for another attack. Others set out to examine the area around the battery’s position, eight hundred meters west of the machine guns in the road cut, there was a house that the men decided should be destroyed before the enemy could occupy if they attacked that night. Using white
phosphorus shells the men of the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Regiment took it under direct fire. After the third round the house began burning, and about fifteen enemy soldiers ran from it across the flat ground. The two machine gunners and men from the French Battalion killed eight of them; the other Red Chinese escaped.

During the day the helicopter shuttled to evacuate the wounded and the battalion received airdrops of ammunition and other supplies. There were also several air strikes. The French Battalion had a relatively quiet day. However, soon after dark flares appeared in the sky following the sound of bugles, and a group of the enemy was trying to reach the battalion's positions. Enemy machine guns fired overhead cover for the group. Enemy mortar shells fell on the French Battalion positions, across the road. The CCF had punched through the battalion, on the west, but that in itself availed them nothing. And the tenacious effort of the enemy to chop the French Battalion had left the enemy spent, too.

While the entire perimeter of Chipyong-ni was under pressure, the main CCF blow fell against weakened G Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry. The Regimental Commander, Colonel Freeman, sent one platoon of the rangers and one tank to support the G Company. In a brief savage action, the Americans were knocked off the hill. The CCF tried to come through, to reach the soft belly of the regiment, fighting stubbornly all day during 15 February against the attack under support of air and tanks. However at 1800 hours Task Force Crombez of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment entered into Chipyong-ni and blunted the Chinese offensive. On this date the CCF suffered its first tactical defeat at friendly forces.

The gallant stand of the French Battalion at Chipyong-ni was later recognized by the Governments of the Republic of Korea and United States with the awards of the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea, US Presidential Citation for the second time, and also Citation Francaise a l'ordre de L'armee.

Upon relieved by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment in the Chipyong-ni positions, the French Battalion, together with the 23rd US Regiment, moved to the southern portion of Wonju on 18 February 1951. Four days later, on 22 February, the French Battalion reached an assembly area and went into the division's reserve at Chechon for reorganization.

Meanwhile, by mid-February, the Red Chinese and North Korean Communists were in full retreat. United Nations Command, hot to pursue, began another advance called Operation Killer. Most of the fighting was done in the
western zone, extended somewhat farther east to allow the 1st US Marine Division to enter the line opposite Hoengsong. On 24 February, the Marines took Hoengsong and the last enemy footholds south of the Han River began to crumble along the line. General Ridgway extended his January-February offensives with a new attack called Operation Ripper. The IX and X US Corps were to advance in the center on Chunchon, about 50 kilometers north of the existing positions, while the right flank was guarded by ROK units and the left remained in place west and south of Seoul.

At this junction, the French Battalion was alerted to move to join the parent unit of the 23rd US Regiment and on 2 March it relieved of security mission at Chechon by the elements of the 38th US Regiment. Effective at 2210 hours on the same day the battalion reached at the assembly area of Ungyo-ri, some 35 air kilometers north of Chechon. There the Frenchmen advanced north up the valley, with the objective of helping the Americans on Hill 1126. On this first day of the advance the men made contact with the enemy, but the battalion made progress and occupied the hill with little opposition. Next day, on the 3rd, the battalion continued up the valley, clearing the heights on either side.

At 0900 hours on 5 March, the French Battalion commenced attacks pressing forward against a stubborn enemy. The hills were precipitous without roads and hard to climb them. Strong resistance was encountered and no troops succeeded in reaching the Chinese Communist fortifications. Under intense enemy artillery fire the battalion made a successful counterattack, and at 1600 hours under the support of the United States Air Force the battalion managed to occupy the objective. Here the battalion came under intense enemy fire along its ridge line and was forced to dig in. All day the Frenchmen fought off the Red enemy. In the evening a ROK unit was ordered toward the Frenchmen hill under heavy pressure. The ROKs met serious resistance as they scrambled forward over the rocky slopes and plunged through the snow covered slopes. They did, however, succeed in getting on the Frenchmen hill. As a result of this success the Frenchmen were able to withdraw, finding and sending back in the process the bodies who had been killed and wounded in this action. The day's casualties had been 143 killed and wounded including six officers.

On 7 March the French Battalion was relieved of defensive positions by elements of the 35th ROK Regiment and moved to Hadaemyon area, approximately 10 more kilometers southeast of Hoengsong to join the 23rd Regiment. And the advance continued until the last day of the month. Several small engagements took place and a number of casualties were suffered in minor actions.

All along the front the Chinese enemy, surprisingly, had broken contact
and disappeared. It became clear that the enemy had abandoned his stubborn delaying action everywhere. Seoul was recaptured by the 1st ROK Division on 15 March. On 19 March, Hongchon was captured, the 1st US Cavalry Division closing on it from the west and the 1st US Marine Division from the east. Two days later Chunchon fell. During the last week in March, the 187th US Airborne Regiment was dropped near Munsan, over 40 kilometers northwest of Seoul, in an attempt to trap the retreating enemy.

Meanwhile, the French Battalion, which assembled in the vicinity of Hongchon on 1 April 1951, began its advance to the northeast area of Chunchon making at the objective on the 3rd. Next day, the French Battalion along with the battalions of the 23rd Regiment relieved the elements of the 5th US Marine Regiment at Sugu-dong area and began to advance along the road of Chunchon-Yanggu on the direction to Hill 1198 (Samyong-san), which dominated southern portion of the Hwachon Reservoir. The French Battalion with the elements of the 1st Cavalry Division advanced up the eastern route of the Sugu-dong-Oumi, and crossed the 38th Parallel for the first time on the next day. On 8 April the French Battalion and an element of the 1st Cavalry secured Oumi. There the French Battalion reinforced with the Ranger Company and the Reconnaissance Company of the 2nd US Division occupied hills between Yuchon and Hill 1198, approximately 8 more kilometers southwest of Yanggu, and isolated the 3rd Company took the eastern area of Suri-bong without enemy resistance. Here the battalion remained for the next ten more days sending patrols in conjunction with the 23rd US Regiment. This was a quiet period for the French troops. (See Situation Map 9.)

Plans for a final mop-up operation south of the reservoir were submitted to division by the Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. John H. Chiles, on 10 April. Labeled Operation Swing, the plan called for a double envelopment of Hill 796, just south of the reservoir, with the French Battalion wheeling around north of the hill and going east between it and the reservoir while the 1st and 2nd Battalions drove onto the hill from the south. The plan was approved and immediately put into operation. It worked to perfection and the driving infantry units, moving forward under the fire of the artillery and tanks, cleaned the pocket of enemy and firmly entrenched the regiment south of the reservoir. North Korean troops who tried to escape across the waters in boats were taken under fire by the 503rd FA Battalion which had moved forward into positions from which it could cover the entire reservoir. Swing was completed by 15 April and the regiment turned its attention to the city of Yanggu, enemy anchor on the eastern tip of the natural water barrier.
CHAPTER III THE SOYANG RIVER BATTLE

Section 1. CCF Spring Offensive
(22 April – 22 May 1951)

It had been known for some time during the early days of April 1951 that the Chinese Communists were preparing another large-scale offensive, designed to check the United Nations advance. Toward the end of April, the Communists forces launched an offensive against the peninsula-wide United Nations line. Except near Kaesong, at the west end, Eighth US Army troops were fifteen more kilometers north of the 38th Parallel when the enemy attack began on the 22nd day of the month. Although the attack was general in both plan and scale, North Korean Communists fighting on the east end of the front made only scant efforts and small advances. Chinese Communist forces concentrated on the west half of the line, aiming the heavy punch at the city of Seoul.

This enemy offensive interrupted the Eighth Army’s limited offensive that contemplated seizing the Chorwon–Kumhwa–Pyonggang area, an important communication and supply area commonly called “the Iron Triangle.”

The Chinese began their offensive, as they so often did, by moonlight, after light-to-heavy artillery and mortar fire. The offensive opened in the mountains of central Korea and, spread, by daybreak, across the whole peninsula. Moving in almost at arm’s length behind the artillery barrage and hurling grenades without regard to losses, the great numbers of enemy foot soldiers infiltrated friendly positions, under orders, units of Eighth US Army began falling back. The 2nd US Infantry Division was occupying the area of north and south of Yanggu. The 23rd Regiment was on the ridges overlooking the important Yanggu–Chunchon road. The French Battalion was on the important Wolmyong-bong area since it guarded the crossing site of the Hwachon Reservoir, west of Yanggu. It was the east end of the regimental sector. Meanwhile the 3rd Company of the battalion manned the bunkers and foxholes on Suri-bong and those along the ridge line that slanted down toward the reservoir. In the meantime, to cover the western flank of the division, the Task Force Zebra
The Soyang River Battle

was created on 24 April. It was composed of the French Battalion, elements of the 72nd US Tank Battalion, one reconnaissance company of the division, and one company of rangers. The two companies of the battalion continued to hold the south bank of the reservoir and patrolled the area. The 3rd Company was relieved by the elements of the Netherlands Battalion on the Suri-bong positions. The 2nd Company, with the Reconnaissance and Ranger Companies maintained positions southwest of the reservoir facing to Yuchon-ni. Enemy contact was made in this area, however, they did not make direct attack to the company. Next day, on 25 April the 3rd Company upon being relieved by the Netherlands Battalion arrived at Yuchon-ni area and reinforced the 2nd Company. The 3rd Company was ordered to cover the critical area of southern flank with the two companies of the ROK Marines. On 26 the 23rd Regiment and the Task Force Zebra were ordered to protect the axis of Yanggu–Chunchon. At the night of the same day, the Task Force Zebra positioned on the saddle of Hill 663, one kilometer north of Chuchon-ni. Next day enemy made a small probing attack against the task force but escaped to the south.

The Task Force Zebra began to conduct a withdrawal on an axis parallel to the other friendly forces and at 1500 hours on the 1st of May, it relieved the 31st US Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division in positions on the Chunnii area, some 30 more kilometers south of Yanggu. Here the battalion with task force ordered to block possible enemy penetrations down the Yanggu–Hongchon axis. However, on completion of the withdrawal, comparative quiet settled over the front.

In the meantime, by 1 May the enemy offensive had ended and the withdrawal of Eighth US Army had stopped. This Chinese Communists offensive had been anticipated and as a result the UN superiority in material was used to decisive advantage. By the end of April the attacks in the center and west had petered out as the Red Chinese were to recoil along their prolonged supply lines. United Nations Command at once planned for a return to the old Kansas line, while the French Battalion mined and wired its positions against a possible resumption of the enemy offensive and during this interval, sent tank-infantry patrols to probe north and northeast without making serious contact. On 10 May, during one of these patrols, the French Battalion lost its Medicine Commandant Jean-Louis. He was killed on his way to rescue two wounded ROK soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, 36th ROK Regiment, which at that time was under the operational control of the Task Force Zebra.

Effective at 1800 hours, 12 May, the battalion was relieved in positions by the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment and moved south, to an area north
of the village of Hangye as division reserve. Here the battalion awaited its next assignment with confidence.

On the night of 16 May 1951 Red Chinese and North Korean Communists launched another major attack against United Nations forces. From the beginning of May United Nations Command had reason to expect another attack, but it was several days before movement of enemy troops and supplies, reported by aerial observers, indicated the attack would be aimed at X Corps' center. Intelligence officers accumulated other substantiating evidence, including information from a captured Red Chinese officer who stated the next offensive would strike the 2nd US Division and the ROK divisions to the east.

The 2nd Division occupied the center position of X Corps along the crest of a great rugged hill mass separating two rivers — Hongchon and Soyang. The 2nd US Division Commander assigned the right half of his sector to a tank-infantry task force; the southwest end to the 9th and 38th Regiments. The 38th and 9th Regiments took up the positions on Hill 1051 and southwestern area of the hill. The 23rd Regiment reinforced with the task force was committed to a sector to the southeastern area of the 38th Regiment and extended to the portion of Koridwi-kol — west of Kama-bong. One ROK company anchored its defense at a point of intersection between the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry and 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment.

Meanwhile, the first fifteen days of May had passed without an enemy offensive. On the 16th there was a low, heavy overcast that prevented the use of observation or fighter aircraft. Next day the enemy offensive commenced that afternoon when probing patrols opened fire on United Nations positions. Strong enemy attacks struck the front of the 5th ROK Division on the right of the 23rd Regiment and also penetrated into the lines of the task force lines of the 23rd Regiment. In the central sector the hordes seized the 1st Battalion positions of the 38th Regiment on the top of Hill 1051 (Kari-san) that night.

In the meantime, while increasing pressure was placed on both the 23rd and 38th Regiments, the French Battalion was ordered to attack north towards enemy penetration area to plug the gap between Task Force Zebra and the 38th Regiment caused by the loss of the C Company of the regiment, and effective at 2200 hours of the same day it made at Chaun-ni, some ten kilometers north of Hangye. The French Battalion reinforced by the task force, took a mission to clear the penetrated enemy in the Sonpyong Valley, approximately three kilometers southwest of Chaun-ni, under the support of a tank squad. While the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment were fighting off the enemy on Hill 833, the 1st Company of the French Battalion with the tank squad progressed
into the valley, and one section which had advanced towards Hill 528, approximately two kilometers southeast of Sonpyong, protected the eastwest flank of the advancing unit. In the course of advancing, fifteen men and one officer of the 38th Regiment who had been separated from the regiment in the night battle were met and advanced in line with the company to rejoin with the parent unit. A large number of enemy were come upon in the village of Sonpyong. By way of preparation against enemy encirclement, one section of the 1st Company were dispatched towards Hill 360. The northwest section of the company reported a considerable enemy force supported by the tanks in the forest, and was ordered to strengthen its defensive position, while the tanks in the valley and the northern section were advancing along the valley. The tank-infantry column advanced one hundred more meters without opposition, however, the quagmire halted the column. At the moment all of this was taking place, a well concentrated enemy mortar fire struck the column and smashed the Heavy Weapons Platoon of the company. Up to this point, unit had maintained organizational structure, it disintegrated into leaderless group of men. Many of the platoon personnel were dead and wounded. At the point of this contact, the Frenchmen opened fire with rifles and machine guns. All members were actively engaged.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Company which had been in defensive position with the Battalion Commander on Hill 300, a ridge southeast of Hill 883 in the Moru-kol Valley (the valley situated parallel to the valley of Sonpyong to north and was connected with the southern portion of Hill 883), was relieved by a ROK company in the positions and attacked northward towards Hill 883. There the company changed its direction to the south to take in rear of enemy facing the 1st Company. However, the advance was stopped by enemy resistance. The section on Hill 360 pushed forward towards enemy positions on a little knoll in front of the hill without success. To make matters worse at this critical juncture, tanks in the valley retreated southward without any advance notice at approximately 2000 hours, enemy strengthened with a considerable reinforcement had flowed around Hill 528 and forced the section on the hill beat a retreat. At the same time, the hordes took in rear of the pioneers in the valley, and struck the ROK unit in front of the 1st Company. In a thunderous small arms fire fight, Chinese and friendly forces wandering about all over Sonpyong Valley in the dark.

In the meantime, the 1st Company had been hard pressed from the right and rear flanks by the enemy holding the key terrain and were forced to retreat. The situation of the pioneers became progressively worse. It was most critical when they were ordered to pull out to join the rest of the 1st Company. The
3rd Company also received an order to withdraw from the position to rejoin the battalion which had been set up in the Moru-kol Valley. Flank protection of the withdrawing units were provided by the section of the 1st Company on Hill 528, elements of C.A., one pioneer section, one supply section, and tanks. These units were also supported by an engineer section from south of the former emplacement of the 1st Company and by the 2nd Company which was placed lately to the disposition of the battalion from southwest.

At approximately midnight, the 1st and 3rd Companies were regrouped after a pains-taking withdrawal in the black conditions and set up their positions respectively to southwest and northeast of the valley.

When dawn came on 18 May, it was learned that the front of the 5th ROK Division, on which another increasing pressure had been placed, was overrun by the enemy force. The defense of the French Battalion’s right flank became vulnerable. As expected, the Chinese hordes broke through in line the weakly held gap between the French Battalion and the elements of the 5th ROK Division, and threatened to swarm over the right flank of the battalion. At dawn enemy commenced his well coordinated attack against the 3rd Company of the French Battalion. Counterattacking force of the Frenchmen immediately spread out on a nearby hill to seal off the penetrators. All that night, the 3rd Company beat off swarming infantry attacks, holding its precious high ground. In this desperate battle, the company took 14 prisoners of war and rescued two pioneers who had been captured by the enemy in the Sonpyong Valley.

At approximately 1500 hours the French Battalion was ordered to pull back, and final preparations for the breakout attempt were made. The men mounted on the vehicles and commenced to pull back to a prearranged area, south of Hangye in the loop of Hongchon River. While these events were taking place, tanks and mortars made prompt and accurate supporting fire on the enemy held area causing a drop in enemy fire from that area. At 1800 hours the battalion completed its movement and remained there in reserve. To the north tanks guarded the Hangye area and the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment protected the western flank of the Frenchmen on Hills 397 and 328.

However, effective at 2400 hours at night next day, the French Battalion was alerted to move immediately to southwest of Hill 643, five kilometers southeast of Hangye. All vehicles must have made movement to the rear area before 0100 hours. At 0900 hours the column of the battalion reached at Hill 643 after a laborious foot march in the dark condition. While the men were at hard working in digging their holes around the hill, they were again ordered to push forward toward north, and to take line between Hills 643 and 533.
The Soyang River Battle

The 1st Battalion of the regiment started to get to the top of Hill 643, but the battalion was forced to abandon its plan by the enemy which had already set up the positions along the pass between Hills 533 and 536. However, it was an unexpected blessing that a ROK unit was still holding the important two Hills 592 and 683 at the right side of the enemy positions, and the 2nd Battalions of the 23rd US Regiment and 27th Regiment of the 5th ROK Division occupied the Hill 495, two kilometers south of Hill 533. On that day columns of the Red Chinese hordes from the south Hill 533 attempted to penetrate into the rear of the French Battalion, but they were beaten off by the French soldiers.

During the next day, 20 May, the artillery positioned at the left side of the French Battalion probed the enemy hill and held off enemy attempts to attack. The 1st Battalion of the regiment commenced an attack north toward an area between Hill 643 and Hongchon River, while the 2nd Battalion was sent forward to plug the gap between the French Battalion and the ROK unit. It could not complete its mission but they held the Chinese Communist at bay. Contrary to the other units, the French Battalion enjoyed comparatively quiet period on that day.

On the 21st of May, the situation was changed completely favorable to the friendly forces. Aircraft of B-29’s and B-26’s strafed, bombed and napalmed as close as several hundreds meters from the front line of the friendly units. Air, flying so low as to touch the mountains, knocked enemy position after position, as fast as the Red Chinese concealed them. The 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment renewed its attack simultaneously on Hills 533 and 536. F Company of the 2nd Battalion supported by the fire arms of the Frenchmen started their attack from the positions. It now became evident with the laps of time that the occupation of the hills was an easy job.

When daylight of the 22nd came, the enemy abruptly broke off their attack and disappeared. The 2nd Company of the French Battalion relieved the elements of the 1st Battalion of the regiment in the positions on Hill 643. Now emerging from their bunkers, men of the friendly unit were in full possession of the hills. In the meantime, on 22 May, being relieved by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, the 23rd Regiment and French Battalion moved to assembly area, approximately three kilometers east of Hongchon.
Section 2. The Yanggu Area Battle
(23 May – 7 June 1951)

Understanding that the CCF had been stopped and was faltering, the United Nations Command ordered to X Corps to counterattack. For the efficient conduct of the mission, the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team was attached to the 2nd US Division on the evening of 22 May. The first attack proved that the UN now held the initiative. Lieutenant General Almond, the X US Corps Commander, ordered the 187th RCT, with the 72nd US Tank Battalion, to form Task Force Gerhardt to advance to the Soyang River, seizing the bridges there and killing as many Chinese Communists as possible on the way.

While the enemy still defended from roadblocks, and their men wandered armed through the hills, the main body of the hordes were in full retreat. As task force pursued them, the Red Chinese displacement became a rout. US tanks roared past abandoned supply, pack animals, ammunition. They went by burning villages and dead enemy lying beside the roads, killed by tank or air strafing.

Meanwhile the 23rd Regiment and French Battalion was resting at the Hongchon area as a corps reserve when the 2nd US Division Commander alerted them for possible action. He warned the regimental commander to advance to Hangye and planned for an attack along the road running from Hongchon to Inje, an air distance of 50 more kilometers. Immediately relaying the order to subordinate units the regimental commander divided the fighting units into two columns: One column was made up with the 3rd Battalion, one tank company, one heavy mortar company, one artillery battery, and one company of the French Battalion under the control of the 3rd Battalion Commander. Its mission was to seize the river bridge of Soyang and to establish a bridge head over there. Another column was composed of the 2nd Battalion including the men of the Regimental Headquarters, the French Battalion, one tank company, and one heavy mortar company under the control of the regimental commander. It was given the mission to proceed to Inje passing over Soyang River bridge and take up defensive positions there.

Effective at 0500 hours of the 25th, elements of the 23rd Regiment launched an attack. A fast moving, hard-punching column of men and tanks smashed
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pockets and columns of Red Chinese enroute. The slashing, smashing advance continued right through the fleeing enemy, over running resistance and running down stragglers on the road. The French Battalion moved up to Namduk-kol, approximately five kilometers north of Chaun-ni in the afternoon of the 25th. During the day some fifty enemy soldiers, most of whom were wounded, came out of the culvert and surrendered.

Next day, on the 26th, the columns continued advance through the pass unmolested seriously until they made at Soyang River, north of Umyang-ni. The engineers which had came along with the airborne troopers constructed pontoon bridge over the swollen Soyang River. While the airborne soldiers were advancing forward toward Kwandae-ri, the French Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the regiment occupied Hills 396, 521 and 322.

On the morning of the next day, the French Battalion sent a feeler patrol into the valley to make a physical contact with enemy. Good progress was made

French troops using pack animals to carry supplies.
until enemy machine guns opened fire. Immediately, it was heavily engaged with the enemy who was repulsed after an hour long fighting. The soldiers continued to exert heavy pressure on the enemy north along the road leading to Inje. Before midday of the 28th, the French Battalion moved into Inje and relieved the elements of the 187th RCT. Enemy was still on the surrounding hills dominating the town itself and continued his mortar shell bombardment. However, fully aware of enemy morale and capability, the 187th RCT assumed the initiative to split the mass of the Red forces now withdrawing to the northwest. However the columns were stopped by the enemy on Hills 645 and 491 to the west, 549, 489 and 366 to the east. Accepting heavy losses at steep northeastern slope of Hill 549, the 2nd Battalion of the regiment eliminated enemy fortifications and occupied the hill. The French Battalion had been given the order to take Hill 366. It took the initiative to direct attack against overwhelming enemy resistance on Hill 645 from the west, while one company of the French Battalion, crossing the river, cleared the Hachon plane. The other company progressed forward toward Hill 366. A large number of prisoners were taken in the plain and vehicles loaded with supplies were discovered in the village of Yangichon, two kilometers northeast of Inje. On the night, after repulsing the elements of enemy, the battalion set up all-round defense on Hill 366. Enemy activity slackened and the rest of night was spent in comparative quiet. Next day the North Korean hordes attempted swiftly to escape from encirclement and they retreated, splitted into small groups, through the eastern hill slope from the west under darkness. At dawn, enemy brought his steep offensive, as it used to be, on the friendly positions around Inje. To the north of Inje, the hordes blocked the advance of friendly units position-by-position with covering fire always.

The French Battalion with other friendly units continued its methodical advance to the north and, on the 4th, it finally arrived at Wontong-ni, ten more kilometers north of Inje. Here the French Battalion was ordered to prepare to move to a newly assigned area of Inje for rehabilitation. Effective at 1000 hours on 5 June, the 23rd Regiment and French Battalion were relieved by the 5th US Marine Regiment in the position, and at 0730 hours of the 7th the regiment found its departure to Hongchon.

Now, the Chinese Communist forces disappeared along the front line. While the remnants of the Red Chinese and North Korean Communist forces still resisted, and their men still wandered armed through the hills, the main body of the Red Chinese armies was in full retreat beyond reach of the friendly units. By launching a powerful counterattack almost before the end of what
was to be the most spectacular defensive stand of the war, the X Corps had suddenly, sharply, changed the course of war. The Red hordes had now completely lost the initiative; worse, they had been hurt almost beyond recovery. Against the 2nd US Division had been committed at one time or another ten CCF divisions, and during the month of May, especially from the 16th of May to the 4th of June, an estimated 6,500 Red Chinese and North Korean hordes had died under its gun. Now, the French Battalion's part was completed. It had not been achieved without cost; the casualties of the French Battalion totalled 112 killed and wounded.

Thus, the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces offensives stopped. When their decisive offensives ended in failure suffering great manpower losses, the Red forces now shifted their tactics to the negotiation table. It would mean the beginning of a new war—the talking war.
CHAPTER IV OPERATIONS IN THE CHORWON AREA

The Battle around Hill 931
(26 June — 6 December 1951)

When the Spring Offensive of the Chinese Communists spent itself at an enormous cost in Red lives, United Nations Command began a counteroffensive. The goal in this drive was "to find and kill the enemy." This the UNC did in great numbers. The United Nations forces also captured the base of an area known as the "Iron Triangle." The Iron Triangle was a vital enemy communication center that controlled the railway and road nets in central Korea.

The United Nations forces in Korea now seemed to be growing stronger by the day, while the Chinese Communists grew weaker. On Sunday, 23 June, at the very moment when the Reds were once again faced with military defeat, Russia's delegate to the United Nations, Jacob Malik, suggested in a radio talk in New York that discussions should begin for a cease-fire in Korea. The Reds had balked at earlier attempts at peace talks, but now they seemed eager to have them begin.

Whatever the motive, it soon became apparent that Malik had reflected the official policy of the Soviet. On 29 June 1951 it was announced in Washington that the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command had been authorized to attempt to open negotiations for a cease-fire, and on 10 July the official representatives of the opposing supreme commanders met at Kaesong, a town along the 38th Parallel about 56 kilometers northwest of Seoul, for the first session of the military armistice conference. Admiral C. Turner Joy, Far East US Naval Commander, was the chief delegate for the United Nations Command. Nam Il was in charge of the enemy delegation. But the real power on the Red side was clearly Hsieh Fang, Commander of the CCF in Korea.

As soon as the truce talk started, the Communist negotiators began to stall. The UNC had to wear down an opponent through endless and pointless argument, for two and a half years. Henceforth, United Nations Command decided that it would conduct no major offensives but would seek to retain
the initiative through the use of strong patrols and local attacks designed to seize key terrain which would extend its observation and curtail the enemy's. When the first anniversary of the opening of war arrived, fighting soldiers thought peace might be just around the next corner. Yet there were still two years and many lives and much blood.

When the Kansas line was restored in June 1951, it had not been along any carefully preplanned battle line. There were bulges, salients, and vague areas of no-man's-land along the whole front. Corrections were needed. In many places the friendly units held disadvantageous ground.

As the talks droned on at Kaesong, the United Nations Command became more convinced the enemy was stalling. And UN Commanders agreed that a little pressure, judiciously applied.

Meanwhile, in view of this situation, the French Battalion was ordered to move to north. During the reserve period, the French Battalion conducted the field training designed to harden the troops and practice them in the tactics and procedures to be followed. The soldiers were transported by trucks in two parties, the main body of the regiment leaving on 26 June, and the remainder of the regiment and French Battalion on the 27th. Now, on 27 June the French Battalion moved to the new area by motor movement. At 1500 hours it made at Inje and remained there until the 14th of July as a corps' reserve.

Effective at 0715 hours of the 15th of July, the French Battalion departed Inje for the Hudong-ni area, some 25 kilometers north of Inje, and it took over the new positions from the elements of the 5th US Marine Regiment from their positions.

Conditions in the new position were very different from the previous ones. During the period from 15 July to 9 August, the troops were close to the enemy outposts and patrol clashes were frequent, casualties being inflicted on the enemy by the Frenchmen and artillery. There were frequent enemy shelling and few minor incidents; but activities were mainly confined to strengthening the defenses, improving communications. Patrols into enemy territory were the orders of the period.

At 1750 hours of the 9th August, the French Battalion was relieved on line by the 1st Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry and took up the positions at the Naesimjok area, three kilometers south of Hudong. During the period from the 9th until the 27th August, the role of the battalion was to maintain its defensive positions, and to harass the enemy by vigorous patrolling raids.

In late August the truce talks were broken off by the Communists. United Nations Command’s plan had been to keep the military pressure on the Reds but
not to engage in any full-scale action that might endanger the peace negotiations. As soon as they were called off, however, Eighth Army launched a series of limited drives aimed at forcing the Reds back to the peace table.

In the center-east sector held by the X Corps, the 5th ROK Division was first ordered to assault toward Taeu-san (Hill 1178) and Hill 983, later called Bloody Ridge, on 17 August, and seized the hills after a four-day battle with enemy. However, on the night of 27-28 August, enemy counterattacked the ROK’s. To help the ROK’s the 9th US Infantry were sent to the area. The Regiment tried hard, but it was shattered against Bloody Ridge. Now the 23rd US Regiment was sent around the flank, to envelop the ridge from the side and rear. However, surprisingly enough, the North Koreans, weakened by heavy losses, had finally evacuated their positions and left substantial stores of supplies. Acting swiftly, the EUSA ordered X Corps to take the ridge just north of Bloody Ridge, considering the fact that immediate thrusts would keep the enemy off balance and would gain the new ridge lines before the Communists had a chance to recover. Thus the task of taking the peaks north of Bloody Ridge was fell on to the 2nd US Division.

On 13 September the elements of the 2nd US Division were in position and ready to attack. The French Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar, had taken over the positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment on Hill 868, south of Saemogi — a little over three kilometers east of Hill 931, and the 38th Infantry had become the division reserve. While, one of the French company remained as a reserve on Hill 754. Direct support for the 23rd Regiment would come from the 37th US Field Artillery Battalion and a battery of 155-mm which had been emplaced on the southern slope of Hill 530, about four more kilometers south of the Hill mass 931, later called Heartbreak Ridge.

On the 14th, the French Battalion received an order to reconnoiter on Hill 841 for the preparatory step to attack on Hill 1052, one more kilometer northeast of Hill 841. The order arrived at 1600 hours, and the 1st Company departed at 1645 hours. The 3rd Company mounted up on Hill 868, just southeast of Hill 841 to join the 1st Company. As the night wore on, the 1st Company went into perimeter defense at southern hill slope of Hill 841. However, after midnight, the expected order to attack on Hill 1052 arrived at each company. At 0700 hours the 1st Company advanced forward from the southwest, with a section in the lead. It struck for the knobs rising stiff along the spine, and on this gloomy ridge the company brushed a hornets’ nest. Enemy suddenly commenced throwing grenades from 300 meters below from the top of Hill 841. The company and foe left their blood along every step of the way up the ridge. The fighting was close-in, brutal, dangerous, while mortars and artillery punished
each side without respite. Again and again the company fought its painful way up the slopes, killing enemy, but it was knocked off by hurling grenades of North Korean bandits. The company losses were heavy; fifteen men were killed including one officer in this action. The 3rd Company immediately fought its way up to the scene for the support of the 1st Company. After an artillery preparation fire approximately for 30 minutes the 1st Company again attacked toward the knob of the ridge under blazing automatic fire, continually slammed by enemy artillery. The men went up the hill painfully, leaving wounded behind all the way. They found themselves sprawled stiffly all along the ridge, 15 meters from the summit. The North Korean enemy opened fire with rifles and machine guns, and tossed grenades down the hill. The 1st Company Commander ordered his men to move back and establish a line beyond grenades range. It was now late in the afternoon. At 1700, the battalion commander ordered the companies to pull back and establish a perimeter for the night on southern slope of Hill 841. On that day the battalion suffered 30 wounded including three officers and three NCO’s. However, it was decided next day that the action of the French Battalion against Hill 841 would be suspended until the 5th ROK Division would
secure Hill 1211. (See Sketch Map 1.)

In the meantime, on 16 September the 23rd Regimental Commander ordered his 2nd and 3rd Battalions to shift toward Hills 931 and 851 from the column formation they had been using to attack abreast. Thus, while the 3rd Battalion renewed its drive due west, the 2nd Battalion swung to the southwest and approached Hill 931 along another spur. But for several days the attack made little headway against the heavy curtain of fire laid down by the enemy. Every time the assault forces were lifted and then returned to their firing positions. Since the enemy controlled the Mundung-ni Valley which offered defilade and less steep access routes to Heartbreak Ridge, the problem of reinforcements and resupply was not difficult to resolve. For the 2nd US Division, the outlook was rather grim. The narrow Pia-ri Valley, southwest of Heartbreak Ridge, was jammed with vehicles and exposed to enemy artillery and mortar fire. To keep the front line units supplied with food, water, ammunition, and equipment and to evacuate the casualties often required that infantrymen double as carriers and litter bearers. The rugged terrain and the close enemy surveillance of the approaches to the Heartbreak Ridge made their jobs very hazardous and time consuming, for it could take up to ten hours to bring down a litter case from the forward positions held by the 23rd Regiment.

On 17 the C.A. of the French Battalion received an order to destroy the enemy positions on Hill 841 to protect the advancing route of the 1st and 3rd Battalions. Next day one company of the battalion which had flanked Hill 868 relieved the B Company of the 1st Battalion on Hill 702. From the 16th to the 25th the battalion maintained the positions without serious contact with enemy.

Meanwhile, the attack by the 23rd Infantry against Hills 931 and 851 had continued with little success. The 1st Battalion had tried again and again to take Hill 931 from the south, while the 2nd Battalion came in from the north. However each time they could not withstand the enemy’s fresh counterattack. Across the Mundung-ni Valley the diversionary attacks against Hills 1024 and 1142 by the 9th US Infantry and the 7th ROK Division made good progress. On 25 September the 9th Infantry cleared the crest of Hill 1024 and the ROK’s won Hill 1142 the following day. Recognizing the threat to neighboring Hill 867, a key terrain feature dominating the valley to the north, the North Korean Communists quickly shifted the 3rd Regiment, 6th NK Division, from Heartbreak Ridge to defend the hill.

On the other hand, on the 25th the French Battalion which had successfully conducted its mission to secure the advancing route of the 23rd Regiment was relieved by the elements of the 38th US Infantry on positions and departed
enroute to the 23rd Regiment position, about one more kilometer north of Hill 931. The Pioneer Section remained for the protection of 23rd Regiment's tanks. There the French Battalion replaced the 2nd Battalion. This was conducted in a bad condition that the elements of the 2nd Company could not make at their new positions till next morning. Contrary to this, the 3rd Company entrenched completely before darkness sets in. However it was pounded by intense enemy mortar shells, and twenty soldiers inclusive of one officer and two NCO's were seriously wounded.

Effective at 1200 hours next day, the 3rd Company tried to advance south along the ridge line while the 1st Battalion sought to press north toward the crest of Hill 931. The 2nd Company remained alert to support the attacking echelon of the 3rd Company, and if necessary it would advance far ahead of the 3rd Company outdoing the front line of the attacking force. After an artillery
3rd Company outdoing the front line of the attacking force. After an artillery preparation for 20 minutes, the company advanced along the ridge line toward Hill 931. It was supported by 50-caliber machine guns, 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles, and 71-mm machine guns of the 2nd Company. 81-mm and 4.2-inch mortars were anchored around the corner of the road, just north of Samdae-dong. The supporting tanks were able to move far enough north in the Satae-ri Valley to deliver direct fire against some of the enemy’s bunkers covering eastern approaches to Heartbreak Ridge. The North Korean Communists constantly shelled on the men of the French and 3rd Battalions and spotted the main supply route of friendly units seat of Hill 801. Enemy shells also landed around Hills 851 and 931. In the battalion sector, the telephone line connecting with the trenches was out by heavy enemy fire and the explosion damaged the radio. Thus the 3rd Company had lost communication with its platoons, artillery observer, and the battalion commander.

H-hour, 1300 hours was postponed to 1400 hours. The accurate caliber rake from the air added to steady bombardment of 105-mm artillery against enemy south and west of Hill 931, but could not destroy the heavy mortars and machine guns that cause casualties of the French Battalion. Now the 2nd Company Commander and one artillery observer were killed and the radio was badly damaged. One of the artillery observer was also wounded seriously by enemy fire.

The order of attack was finally effected. A little after 1430 hours, the 3rd Company led the assault. From the beginning the enemy drew fire, not from one direction, but from the several directions. In such a storm of fire, one of the section crawled forward toward eastern slope of the objective under the supporting fire of 75-mm RR, another one toward western slope. The section progressed through east slopes advanced to the last stronghold behind Hill 931, but it was forced to dig in by the enemy grenades and automatic fire from the crest of the hill. The section of the west, meanwhile, lost 50 per cent of its effective strength by the enemy mortar. In this critical juncture, the battalion commander sent a section of the 2nd Company to the scene to ease the situation. The action on this end of the line developed fast. The supporting section rushed to the area, 30 meters to the stronghold west of Hill 931 and overtook the badly crushed section of the 3rd Company and hurried into position. The firing swelled into a noisy roar and even the sound of the clips coming out of the rifles made considerable noise. The fire fight flared up, however, the section was clogged with the enemy hurling grenades and storming its automatic fire from his trench on the top of the hill. The section desparately attempted three times to dislodge the enemy without success. Endeavors only
added to the numbers of casualties. At 1700 hours the 3rd Company had sustained 100 more casualties. Having found the exhausted men from their arduous activity, the company commander exhorted them to make every effort to maintain the line. However unable to secure the hill, the company commenced its withdrawal by order. On the other hand, at 2300 hours a liaison column of the other company was trapped into an enemy ambush in the Satae-ri Valley, one more kilometer south of the town of Satae-ri itself. The 2nd Company Sergeant-Major and the driver of the C. B. were killed and the 2nd Company Adjutant was wounded.

For two weeks the men of the French Battalion assaulted the ridge. They took knobs, and lost them. They took stretches of the hill mass, but they could not secure the ridge.

After almost two weeks of futile pounding at the enemy's defenses on Heartbreak Ridge it was clear to the 2nd US Division that the ridge would have to be flanked, and a new pattern was being set. In the new plan, the earlier mistakes were to be avoided. All three regiments of the division would launch concentrated and coordinated attacks, supported by all the division's artillery, a full-scale armored drive by the 72nd Tank Battalion up the Mundung-ni Valley, and tank-infantry task force action in the Satae-ri Valley.

The division issued the operation order on 2 October, and the three regiments moved into their attack positions. The 9th Infantry was on the left flank, ready to advance upon Hill 867 while the 38th Infantry was going up the Mundung-ni Valley. On the Heartbreak Ridge the 23rd Infantry maintained two of its three battalions on the lines between Hills 894, 931, and 851. To protect the division's right flank in the Satae-ri Valley area and to distract the enemy, a task force under Major Kenneth R. Sturman of the 23rd Regiment was organized on 3 October. It was composed of the 23rd Tank Company, a French pioneer platoon, the 2nd Reconnaissance Company, and an infantry company from the divisional security forces. The task force had the secondary mission of destroying enemy bunkers on the east side of the Heartbreak Ridge and of acting as a decoy to draw enemy fire away from the foot troops on the ridge.

On 3 October, the French Battalion maintained two companies at the northern foot of Hill 931 and one company in the Satae-ri Valley under task force for the protection of the division's right flank, while the relief took place in position within the 23rd Infantry.

On 4 October forty-nine fighter-bombers worked over the division sector and the task force raided the Satae-ri Valley. In the late afternoon of 5
October, the artillery preparation opened up as the division’s artillery battalions began to pummel the defending enemy units facing the 9th and 38th Infantries in the Mundung-ni Valley. The 23rd Regiment began to advance toward Heartbreak Ridge in conjunction with the left flank units of the division. The 2nd Battalion hit Hill 931 from the south with the 3rd Battalion as reserve behind the 2nd Battalion. While the 1st Battalion exerted diversionary pressure north against Hill 851, the French Battalion feinted south toward Hill 931.
When the French Battalion moved out, enemy fire came in quickly upon the battalion, but North Korean bandits could not concentrate all their attention upon this assault. But the enemy desperately engaged with considerable fire power on the ridge again and again. Little by little, the French soldiers fought a determined battle against violent resistance chipping the ground away from the enemy defenders. The effectiveness of the mortar fire helped the Frenchmen as they closed with the enemy with only light casualties. In the meantime the 2nd Battalion rooted the enemy with flame throwers, grenades, and small arms, from the formidable bunkers that had blocked the advance. The French Battalion occupied the northern hill slope in the black conditions and took three enemy prisoners. With the coming of daylight, the advance was renewed. The French Battalion pressed on from the north and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions moved in to meet it. Before noon Hill 931 finally belonged to the friendly forces.

The 1st Battalion tried to seize Hill 851 from the south, however, enemy artillery, mortar and automatic fire forced the battalion fixed in the earth. At this juncture, the 3rd Company of the French Battalion was alerted to move for the support of the battalion, but it was cancelled.

On Heartbreak Ridge the 23rd Regiment, 13th NK Division, defended Hill 851, backed by its sister regiments, the 21st and 19th. The 21st Regiment was to the immediate rear and the 19th Regiment defended the Satae-ri Valley. On 10 October, the 2nd Battalion had swung down from Heartbreak Ridge and taken possession of Hill 520, a little over two kilometers south of the town of Mundung-ni. Hill 520 was the end of an east-west ridge spur leading to Hill 851. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion which had mounted again an attack on Hill 851 at 1600 hours was checked by a stubborn enemy resistance from the beginning. The 1st Company of the French Battalion was alerted to ease the pressure on the 1st Battalion at 1800 hours and was ready to commence an attack to the eastern flank of the 1st Battalion. One section of the 3rd Company could occupy a ridge, just south of Hill 851 while the 1st Battalion was inching toward the crest of objective. Next day the 1st Battalion, after a sufficient preparation fire of the artillery and mortar, began to mount an attack on Hill 851, however it could not jump over three steep ridges south of Hill 851. To break through this critical situation, the French Battalion was ordered to thrust northward leaping over the 1st Battalion's positions. Now the 2nd Company which had relieved its mission on a ridge northwest of Hill 931 took the position of the 1st Company on the salient southeast of Hill 851. The C.A. had established its fire base of two-75 RR, two-50 caliber machine gun, four-30 caliber machine gun near Hill 851, a little over one kilometer southeast of Hill 851 from the 7th
of October. The 81-mm mortars were emplaced approximately 700 meters west of fire base.

At 2000 hours the 1st Company of the French Battalion struck fire with flame throwers, grenades, and small arms fire such as they had never faced before. Machine gunners and riflemen fired until they were exhausted from loading ammunition, and tubes were closed to burning out. Infantrymen held to their ground and could take the first ridge of the Hill 851. However, in a thunderous fire fight, the battalion sustained casualties of approximately one section. (See Sketch Map 2.)

At about 0200, after a preparation of artillery and mortar, the men began to crawl up the ridge, sending some men forward about twenty meters or so. One section took off the line of departure and shifted suddenly over three small ridges and dashed to the knoll of Hill 851, leaving another section to clean the terrain. The 3rd Company could make at the neck of Hill 851 at 0230 hours. Foot troops set up their weapons and opened the fire on the objective. After deploying his section around the base of the knoll, the section leader instructed the men to intensify their perimeter defense, especially on
the south side of the objective. North Korean Communists in bunkers on the objective suddenly opened fire and threw grenades. The men halted, pinned down by the enemy fire. Unable to dislodge the enemy, the section leader moved the members back to a covered position. At 2100 hours another attempt was made by the 3rd Company of the French Battalion reinforced by A Company of the 1st Battalion, but it was also failed.

Effective at 0530 hours of the 13th, deciding to make a final attempt -- this time a co-ordinated envelopment of the objective -- a head column of the 2nd Company descended from the west to the gully, beneath of the enemy, where it could move without being seen or fired upon by the enemy. The men then climbed the hill, moving northwest to the shoulder of Hill 851. Under cover of fire, the men crawled into positions where they could knock out the foremost enemy bunkers. As soon as these bunkers were destroyed, the angry Frenchmen inched north toward the objective, bunker by bunker, taking few prisoners in the bitter fighting. By then 3rd Battalion was pinned down by the enemy fire at the southwest of Hill 851, and one section of the 2nd French Company desperately counterattacked the enemy with rifles and 57-mm RR.

The North Korean Communists and their Red Chinese allies who had succeeded in joining then had to be killed or wounded before they would cease resistance. Finally at daybreak on 13 October, French troops made an assault on the top of the hill. They stormed the peak and Heartbreak Ridge was in the possession of the French Battalion to stay.

The costs of the long battle were high for both sides. The French Battalion had suffered over 260 casualties during the period, 200 men wounded and 60 killed including Captain Goupil, a legendary hero of the French Battalion. However, the health and spirits of the French troops remained good. Undoubtedly a contributing influence was that there was a general feeling that everything possible was being done to mitigate hardship and that whatever perils and discomforts existed were unavoidable. In this large United Nations Army the men of the French Battalion felt that they were the selected representatives which had a high reputation to maintain. This, too, was an important factor in maintaining morale and a grim cheerfulness. On the enemy side the North Korean hordes and Red Chinese suffered heavy. Estimates by the 2nd US Division of the enemy losses totaled close to 25,000 men. Approximately half of these casualties had come during the Heartbreak Ridge battle.

The French men who had taken Heartbreak Ridge came down off the hill, replaced by the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division on 22 October, three days prior to the reopening of the truce talks at a new site, Panmunjom. Then the
French soldiers and the elements of the 2nd US Division spent fifty more days at reserve camp north of Kapyong. It was a period of real relaxation which the French soldiers ever had experienced in the battle field. They spent hectic days in dressing the wounded, rewarding the battle heroes, and sending regards to all who supported the Frenchmen. First of all, Ambassador of French to the Republic of Korea who then resided in Tokyo, M. Maurice Dejean, heartedly cheered up the members of the French Battalion especially for the hospitalized men in the United States military hospital in Tokyo. It was in this hospital that two French nurses, Miss Dalloz and Taddei paid their attentions to taking care of the wounded.

However, during this whole period the battalion had not been idle. The period was spent in tying up the many loose ends that existed, and in working hard at training and administration emphasizing with sub-unit training of battery firing, fire and maneuver, and night deployment.

In the meantime, on 6 December 1951, Lieutenant Colonel Monclar departed the battle field for France after passing over his command to Lieutenant Colonel Borrel. He was presented with American Legion of Merit by the Eighth Army Commander, General Van Fleet, in recognition of his outstanding leadership in the battle field.
CHAPTER V THE ACTIVE DEFENSE

Section 1. Actions on the Iron Triangle
(18 December 1951 – 28 April 1952)

In the third week of December 1951, the French Battalion received orders to move to a strategically vital point in the Kumhwa area of the Iron Triangle, formed by three towns of Chorwon, Kumhwa, and Pyonggang. The front line assigned to the 2nd Division, was ranged approximately 22,000 meters from the Hill 376 on the left to Hill 424 inclusive of the west bank of the Namdae-chon on the right. The division then had the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Division, French, Netherlands, and Thai Battalions under its operational control with its three assigned regiments. Its command post was at the vicinity of Samgo-ri, about four kilometers north of Chipo-ri.

The French Battalion under the new commander moved north by motor transportation and relieved the 1st Battalion of the 27th US Infantry on the Wasu-ri positions, approximately ten more kilometers northeast of Chipo-ri at 0630 hours of the 18th December 1951. While, the 23rd Regimental Commander placed his two battalions on the defensible positions of the Ugu-dong–Paekje line, about ten kilometers north of the French Battalion position.

The following statement indicates the Battle of Order of the French Battalion.

Battalion Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Borreil
1st Company Commander: Lieutenant Pagniez
2nd Company Commander: Captain Mallon
3rd Company Commander: Captain Le Tac
Support Company (C.B.) Commander: Lieutenant Reynaud
Support Company (C.B.) Commander: l’Heritier
Pioneer Section Leader: Lieutenant Roger

Upon arrival at Wasu-ri, the reserve area of the 2nd US Division, the French Battalion spent the days conducting its defensive assignments and sending routine
patrols to the forward defended localities of enemy at various distances. Its main purpose was to bring back live enemy soldiers.

Effective at 0205 hours of 26 January 1952, some two-squad sized enemy force fired upon the battalion positions near Paejae with small arms. The men acted promptly and beaten him off with artillery and other small arms.

At 1100 hours, 24 January, a reconnaissance team of the battalion patrolled to the vicinity of Saemal, about one kilometer north of the defensive position, where it encountered a squad-sized enemy on the way and dispersed them with small arms fire. Artillery fire brought down and the patrol turned back, arriving at its starting point at about 1130 hours.

On 29 January the French Battalion was relieved on the present positions of Tapkol by the Thai Battalion and moved to the rear assembly area of Sunbawi, eight kilometers north of Chipo-ri.

The period at the reserve area was short lived. In mid-February 1952, the French Battalion moved again forward and took up the positions on an established 2nd US Division fortified defense line. The battalion was placed on ridges over-looking the important Chorwon-Kumhwa railroad that crossed the plain in front of the positions. The battalion occupied bunkers and foxholes.
north and northeast of Ugu-dong covering the frontage of approximately two kilometers. Two patrol bases were established at Naechon and Paektong-ni area, three kilometers north of the main positions to probe north into the unknown territory, with the observation post at Chat-kol. As the defensive positions were drawn tighter, enemy groups of from ten to five were often met, but only light opposition developed. The Frenchmen continued to try to make contact with the enemy through patrols and raids. However it often proved to be futile and this kind of activities kept the front line troops of the French Battalion alert and gave them valuable experience and training under combat conditions. The battalion continued this patrol mission until it was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment in the positions on 18 March 1952. During the period the battalion usually sent out at least one patrol and set up several ambushes for the enemy every night. The patrol mission was to bring back prisoners, however the choice of objectives was extremely limited. (See Sketch Map 3.)

In the meantime, for several weeks of February 1952 all United Nations forces had been trying to reduce the Red Chinese defenses by artillery and aerial bombardment, but the enemy was to be neither driven nor blasted out of position. United Nations forces efforts to that end merely forced him to step up the program of improving his defenses, including tunnels and camouflage. No more successful were various attempts to lure him out of position. Now all artillery, mortars and tanks were silent; patrolling was suspended; and movement in forward areas was kept to a minimum. The objective was to arouse the enemy's curiosity to the point where he might attempt a reconnaissance in force, which United Nations troops were well prepared to deal with. However it could not induce the Red Chinese to come forward in large numbers. They nevertheless mounted probes on the front of the friendly forces.

In the early hours of the 7th March a reconnaissance team of the French Battalion set out to the northern salient of Paemkol to probe enemy positions, and where it met enemy small arms fire from the north at 0900 hours. The fire base group immediately got into position and counterattacked with the hail of small arms fire. The leader dispatched four-man flank guard team northward, since the best approach for the enemy was at that end. The elements did a terrific job with small arms fire until the enemy withdrew at 1115 hours. Meanwhile the fire base group continued to counterfire with all weapons for approximately forty minutes and successfully silenced the enemy on the northern ridge. Having failed to yield any prisoners but three civilians, the team leader ordered his men back. In the face of enemy artillery fire from the northern slope, the members conducted their withdrawal and returned to the starting
point unscathed at 1230 hours.

For approximately ten days there was little activity except for the steady exchange of artillery and mortar fire and patrolling into the northern territory. At 0030 hours of the 18th March the French Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion and went back to the Sunbawi area.

In the first week of April, the French Battalion was warned, that it would be returned back into the line, and at 0100 hours of the 8th the battalion relieved the elements of the 3rd Battalion and the Netherlands Battalion on the line of Hajin-ri-Moksil-ri, with the observation post on Hill 432, two kilometers north of the main position. The 3rd Battalion of the regiment was on the right of the French Battalion.

During the period the battalion patrolled vigorously in conformity with orders laid by the regiment. In the battalion sector the patrols passed through their own wire and minefields at fixed points where gaps existed, and advanced to the objective. Patrol bases were established as close to the objective as possible, in localities that lent themselves to all-round defense, and the actual raiding parties moved on to the objective from these positions. On the night of 17-18 April one of these patrols carried out a raid on the objective near Tangwon-ni, one kilometer northwest of observation post. The patrol moved toward enemy territory, with the aim of sweeping the objective, and there met two squad sized enemy soldiers. The men immediately raked the enemy with small arms fire and killed three enemy soldiers.

On the night of 21-22 the battalion sent a reconnaissance team to raid around Hill 528, Tangwon-ni area. The patrol commenced an attack with all weapons firing. The enemy retaliated immediately with small arms and artillery fire and in the ensuing fire fight one of the patrol was killed and four wounded. In spite of the sharp brush with the enemy, patrol activity continued. On the night of 23-24 April an unknown number of enemy attacked the patrol from the north. The patrol was surrounded but succeeded in extricating itself at a cost of three wounded. The battalion sent out patrols in successive days to contact and engage the enemy if possible. These patrols were intended to range about no-man’s-land, seeking numerous engagements until the battalion was ordered to move to Kapyong, a reserve area.

Effective at 0900 hours of the 28th April the French Battalion was relieved by the elements of the 7th US Division and began to move to Kapyong. So ended approximately four and a half months in the line.

The reserve positions now taken over by the French Battalion were on the Chukdun-ni area on the right side of the Kapyong-chon, some seven kilometers
ne of Kapyong, Division Headquarters being in the town of Kapyong.

Training and inspection schedules were immediately set up. However it was soon learned that the whole French Battalion would not be presented for training. One company was needed to furnish guard details in a very high frequency radio station near Kapyong, while still another company was furnishing security for the IX Corps command post.

Strenuous programs, interspersed with recreation and organized athletics, occupied the time of the remaining elements of the battalion through May, June and early July. As the summer days grew hotter, units put the finishing touches on training and prepared to take over the left sector of the 45th US Infantry Division zone, west of Chorwon.

Section 2. The Battle of T-Bone Hill
(29 April — 19 August 1952)

The French Battalion’s tour of duty in reserve lasted about eleven weeks. The relief of the elements of the 179th US Infantry began on the evening of the 17th July and completed by next day on the Jamestown line. The French Battalion was on the right of the regimental sector at Sonbyok area, about 15 air kilometers northwest of Chorwon. On the center was the 1st Battalion and, on the left, the 2nd Battalion. To the right of the French Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry manned the positions.

When the French Battalion returned to the front line, it saw an important change in the general tactical situation. During the battalion’s previous experiences in the forward positions, the enemy had not followed a very active raiding tactic. However, during the summer of 1952, he had gradually become more aggressive. He moved into no-man’s-land in some strength, attacking patrols, raiding the outpost positions and generally making his presence felt in areas where he had previously moved very quietly, if at all. At the same time, he increased the volume of his harassing fire on the forward positions, and supported his raids by powerful concentrations of mortar and artillery fire. (See Sketch Map 4.)

The 18th of July was marked by company-sized enemy attacks against the outpost positions of the French Battalion on Hill 191, approximately one more kilometer north of main line of resistance. The Red Chinese taking the advantage of the relief of the French Battalion, mounted a strong probing attack at 2335
hours. Through quick reinforcement of the outpost, the French Battalion repelled the enemy assault at 0030 hours next day.

In the meantime during the night of 17-18 July, the Red Chinese commenced attacks in strength exceeding a reinforced battalion against Hill 275 (Old Baldy) of the 2nd Battalion. The Red Chinese overran the outpost and a seesaw battle raged for the blasted, denuded hill for several days. The battle for Old Baldy, which the Chinese Communists eventually lost proved that the enemy had many field guns as the United Nations forces. It was not until 31 July that a full battalion attack of the regiment retook the hill -- a position that could accommodate comfortably only a single rifle company.

While the violent war of maneuver that surged up and down the hill was ensuing on Old Baldy, another two desperate fire fights were developed in the French Battalion's sector. The battalion then established an outpost line on Eerie Hill, approximately 500 meters southeast of Hill 191 and on Yoke, one kilometer northeast of outpost Eerie.

Outpost Eerie consisted of defensive installations encircling the point peak of ridge top, which rose about 50 meters above the rice paddies. A rocky hill

**T-BONE HILL POSITIONS** 20 JULY 1952

![T-BONE HILL POSITIONS](image)

Sketch Map 1
dug up by shell bursts, it had a few scrub trees and bushes and patches of thin grass. There were several bunkers around top. Constructed to accommodate two or three men each, they were made with a double layer of sandbags and logs on the sides and a triple layer of logs and sandbags on top. All were a few meters below the peak of the hill, and were for shelter only.

At the very southern tip of a T-shaped, three-kilometer-long ridge, outpost Eerie was on ground that was lower than several other high points along the same ridgeline. The crossbar of the T, upon which the enemy had established his outpost line of resistance, was higher than the shank, and dominated the entire ridgeline. Using Eerie as a base, the Frenchmen maintained night patrols on each side of the shank of the T, covering the most likely routes by which the enemy could approach the outpost.

After darkness came on the night of 24-25 July, the infantrymen sat quietly, waiting until almost 2330 before anything unusual happened. At about that time the Red Chinese, from the north side of the long ridge, appeared moving south. As the enemy column approached to the friendly ambush point, the Frenchmen opened fire and, informed the battalion commander of contact with a large group of Chinese Communists on their front. Enemy machine guns opened fire and began sweeping the outpost positions, and the artillery emplaced on the highest ground north of the Outpost Eerie placed mass fire across the positions of the French Battalion. The Frenchmen immediately signalled for prearranged supporting fire of machine guns and mortar concentration. Machine gunners fired directly over the heads of the defenders and forced the enemy to halt his infiltration. The defenders held off of the enemy attacks, however assault groups steadily pressed their attempts to blow gaps in the northern part of the protective line. Friendly artillery burst on the enemy approaches along the reverse slopes of the ridge itself. Throughout the night a hail of machine guns and small arms fire whipped at the enemy infiltrators. Infantrymen grabbed rifles and fired into the crawling up enemy. Hand grenades soared through the air down to the advancing Chinese Communists.

After a nearly three and a half hours long wild melee, the Frenchmen could hold off the swarming over enemy soldiers below them on the slope. At dawn the Red Chinese began to withdraw. Artillery fire had been placed along the probable enemy's route of withdrawal, and it is possible this fire caused additional casualties and also influenced the Red Chinese to abandon bodies which they had been attempting to carry away.

The Frenchmen searched the outpost area after daylight, going as far north as possible in the danger of facing enemy soldiers. They found 15
dead enemy, and believed they had killed 50 more and wounded approximately 120. The French Battalion also captured two enemy prisoners.

In the meantime, the enemy employed another reinforced company, supported by artillery and mortar fire, in a desperate effort to gain control of Outpost Yoke, two kilometers north of main positions of the French Battalion. The first break in the Yoke area occurred during the early hours of the 25th when infiltrating groups crossed the rice paddies and penetrated into the line of the Frenchmen. With the enemy force scattered throughout a large area, the Frenchmen could concentrate their fire neither to the front nor to the flanks. Enemy soldiers began to jump over the front positions, and a hand-to-hand fight broke out. In addition to the close-in fighting, the enemy machine guns were firing at the exposed rear of the friendly positions. The Frenchmen fixed their bayonets and worked well together. A long period of noisy, confused, and furious fighting followed. When the friendly covering fire was heavy, the enemy
The Active Defense

was quiet; but it resumed firing as soon, and as often, as the Frenchmen quiet. Finally, at about 0500 hours, enemy attack was slackened and the men could get stock of the situation.

In the stubborn resistances at the night of the 25th on Outpost Eerie and Yoke the French Battalion lost one man killed and eight wounded.

Three days later, the French men on Outpost Eerie received an estimated reinforced company sized enemy assault. The enemy crawled up the slopes of the friendly positions after artillery and mortar preparation. Through pains-taking endeavors and heavy close defensive fire, the men managed to repel the enemy assault at 0230 hours of the 29th.

During the last week of July, heavy rain falls made operations exceedingly difficult to carry out. Six consecutive days of heavy rain flooded the streams and rivers and swept away bridges. As the water seeped into the ground, landslides began and roads were blocked or washed away. The task of supply became a distinct challenge to surmount nature's obstacles. As the torrential downpours converted the battleground into a morass, tactical operations were strictly limited. When the rain eased off at the end of July, the French Battalion again tried to secure complete control of the assigned area.

For the first three weeks of August 1952, the French Battalion kept its elements on the defensive position sending numerous patrols into no-man's-land without big troubles. The battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry at 0505 hours of the 19th and moved to a reserve area, Musu-dong, approximately four kilometers southeast of Yonchon.

Section 3. The Battle of Arrowhead Ridge
(20 September – 31 December 1952)

In the middle of September 1952, orders were received for redeployment of the 23rd Regiment and its attached French Battalion on the front line. The 23rd Regiment with the French Battalion was due to return early in the third week of September to the right sector of the front which it had previously held, and preparations were afoot to relieve the 9th Regiment. On 20 September 1952, the French Battalion completed its movement to a regimental reserve area in the vicinity of Sonchangmal, approximately five kilometers south of the front line, while the relief of the elements of the 9th Infantry by the 23rd Regiment took place.
The rest of the month was one of routine static warfare, with no very outstanding incidents for the members of the 23rd Regiment in the front and the French Battalion in the reserve, although about this time the enemy became more aggressive along the whole front line. Attacks at battalion strength were made in several sectors and resulted in heavy fighting.

On 3 October the French Battalion was ordered to take over the positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment on the extreme right sector of the 2nd US Infantry Division. This area included the vital Hill 281, which was to be the scene of much bitter fighting by the French Battalion some days later. Hill 281, which was known as Arrowhead Ridge to the UN troops, was a knob on the end of a long finger pointing down hill from the Red Chinese main line of resistance into the French Battalion lines, and it bore a striking resemblance to its namesake.

Lieutenant Liron, Commander of the 1st Company and his Executive Officer, Lieutenant Poupard, were in the bunker making final arrangements for the relief that night. Lieutenant Francois Perron, Pioneer Platoon Leader, in preparation for taking over the highly vulnerable forward outpost positions, was coordinating with Lieutenant Storck, a young US engineer officer. Lieutenant Storck was in command of the US engineer platoon which supported the position. Another US officer, Lieutenant Luke LeFevere, the artillery forward observer, came in occasionally from his nearby observation post.

When the relief was completed the companies of the French Battalion were deployed with the 1st Company to the right around Hill 281, the 2nd Company to the extreme left portion of the battalion on Hill 289 and northward, and the 3rd Company in the center on the rice paddies and on the right slope of Hill 281 respectively. The pioneers were deployed on the small features some 300 to 500 meters north of the 1st Company's position. The ridge was ideally suited for a conventional outpost with the mission of detecting and delaying the enemy before dropping back. The position could be protected by enfilade fire from the battalion on the left. It was dominated and covered by the main Arrowhead positions. It was this ridge that the Pioneer Platoon occupied. Specific orders from higher headquarters prescribed that this position be held at "all cost." The pioneers were an overstrength platoon of 47 men. Specialists in demolitions and field fortification, they were also experts at long-range patrolling and close-in fighting. They were the elite platoon of an elite battalion. (See Sketch Map 5.)

In the meantime, just before the 1st Company started up onto Arrowhead Ridge the night of 3 October, the 9th ROK Division on the right picked up an officer deserter who said that a big attack would probably take place the
A bird's eye view of the Arrowhead Ridge. On this ridge the French Battalion repels two regimental strength of the Communist Chinese forces attack. Two officers and 13 men of CCF captured, minimum 600 enemy killed with an own losses of 178.
next night against Arrowhead and Hill 395 (White Horse Hill), which was three
and half kilometers northeast of Hill 281, on the 9th ROK Division front. This
fitted in with information G-2 had received from other sources. Two
specially trained regiments would go for the two hills initially. Other fresh
regiments were standing by for exploitation. One rocket battalion and 120
pieces of artillery, according to the deserter, would support the attack on
Arrowhead. In this critical juncture, the companies of the French Battalion
were well prepared and remained at the alert especially after dark, one of the
occupants of each weapons pit watching while the other rested on the bottom
of the pit.

Just before the Chinese Communists began their attack on the friendly
positions on 6 October, they opened the floodgates of the Pongnac-ho Reservoir,
which was located about 12 more kilometers north of the friendly positions,
evidently in the hope that the Yokkok-chon which ran between the 9th ROK
Division and the French Battalion would rise sufficiently to block reinforce-
ments during the critical period. Although the water level rose, at no time did it
present a tactical obstacle. But they did not rely upon nature alone.
The days preceding the attack had produced no clear evidence that the
day of the 6th October was going to be any different from previous days.
The plan for patrol activities for the night of 5-6 October followed the pattern
which had become normal. But the amount of incoming artillery fire continued
to increase: 200 rounds on 3 October; 600 rounds on 5 October. This relentless
pounding was taking its toll on Arrowhead. Most of the key bunkers had re-
ceived direct hits.

On 6 October the day had come at last. The enemy began to fire his arti-
lery on the French Battalion’s positions. During the late day powerful con-
centrations of enemy artillery fire did not show no let-up. At 1410 hours Lieutenant
LeFevre, the US forward observer, had been killed and Lieutenant Liron, the
French company commander, was gravely wounded. Several French and
American troops were killed or wounded.

Especially for the small detachment of pioneers in the outpost bunkers
life had become difficult. First, 25-man Sergeant Chief, Gavriloff’s outpost
which was astride the main ridge leading into Arrowhead from the north was
being heavily shelled at 1540 hours. Lieutenant Perron was set up with 21 men
about 300 meters to the left. At 1620 hours he requested a platoon-size rein-
forcement with machine guns, ammunition, and grenades. He had learned
during the afternoon that his additional barbed wire was on hand; he was hot
to string it right after dark. Approximately at 1720 hours 15 enemy tanks ap-
peared at a spot about two kilometers north of Arrowhead.

Effective at 1845 hours, the Red Chinese began to move in on the pioneer
positions. It was a clear indication that this was no mere raid but an all-out
attack.

They were giving themselves every possible minute of darkness for getting
on their objective and consolidating before dawn. Lieutenant DuRouchet, sent
as liaison officer to the ROK’s reported that White Horse Hill was now receiving
a devastating artillery preparation. The flare plane, in the air and waiting to be
sent to the division sector which needed it most, was requested and started
winging to the Frenchmen. It would keep the entire sector illuminated all night.
In the meantime the artillery and mortars were lighting the area. The field
defenses were very badly damaged and the great part of the reserve ammunition
stored in the weapons pits had been exhausted. The men liked lots of illumina-
tion. There were more calls for artillery. All defensive fires were being dropped
in front of the French -- maximum rate. Lieutenant Poupard was adjusting them
in closer and closer to his own lines.

Bursting shells, tracers, and illuminating rounds lit up the night and threw
grotesque shadows across the nightmare scene. At 1917 the 2nd Company
reported its outposts in contact with a strong enemy force. These outposts, which had given authority to withdraw, cut loose with everything they had and called in accurate mortar fire. Only when they were in danger of being overrun did they drop back, contesting every foot of the way.

From the main forward trench on Arrowhead the officers and men of Pouypad’s company could hear and see small arms fire in the pioneer positions and in the light of the flares could see large group of Red Chinese milling around behind the pioneers. The main Arrowhead position had now been reinforced by the support platoon under Lieutenant Guillou from the 3rd Company. Lieutenant Roger, formerly the Pioneer Platoon leader, had also arrived to replace Liron.

At 1940, Colonel Borreill saw that his right company under Lieutenant Barres, although in contact and hard pressed, had things under control. So he ordered his heavy weapons company to shift all its fires to support the pioneers. The regiment’s center battalion was delivering a withering fire in front of and behind the outpost.

The pioneers had been hit by four CCF companies. As Lieutenant Roger pointed out later the enemy apparently had no idea that this ridge was occupied by a strong platoon with orders to hold at all costs. They expected to find an ordinary outpost that would give the alarm, fire, and fall back. For this reason the outpost did not get anything like the three-day artillery preparation that was delivered on Hill 281. On the day of the attack, Hill 281 had been pounded heavily from 0700 hours until noon. During this time the pioneers were not shelled. At 1300 hours the enemy shifted his fires onto the pioneers and pounded them unmercifully with everything from 155-mm to direct recoilless rifle and tank fire. Until 1700 hours it was impossible to move around on the position. Men had to shout to be heard inside the bunkers. Strangely, there were no casualties until the defenders had to come up out of their holes to meet the advancing enemy riflemen.

The pioneers had fought like tigers, first as a team and then as individuals. Not a man is known to have surrendered, even when wounded. Several were wounded, captured, and escaped. When Lieutenant Perron’s position was overrun, he joined Sergeant Gavrilloff by making his way up a trench the Red Chinese had not found. Enroute he killed large numbers of the enemy at close range with grenades when he spotted their close packed formations by the light of shells and flares. Several times he lay while they passed close enough to touch. He was hit in the side just before he reached his platoon sergeant’s position, and then in the arm.

The fiercest hand-to-hand fighting was now taking place. Lieutenant Perron
saw Sergeant Gavrilloff roll down the hill with an enemy and stagger back up a few minutes later with a bloody trench knife in his hand. Both sides were running out of ammunition and Lieutenant Perron reported later that at one time he was being pelted with rocks! Amid the sounds of fire came the crack of rifle stocks against helmets and cries of the wounded. At about 1930 hours Lieutenant Perron was hit a third time -- on the head and jaw. A few minutes later, another head wound. He began to vomit blood and lost consciousness. Revived by the pain of a fifth wound in the left thigh, he took another hit in the right biceps. Unable to keep his eyes open more than five seconds at a time, he was having trouble breathing. Finally he passed out again. During the night a survivor staggered into the lines and reported Lieutenant Perron had been killed.

Guerassinoff was famous in the battalion for his skill at Judo. Two Red Chinese made the unfortunate mistake of trying to take him alive. One had an “illegal” strangle hold on him and the other was clinging to his legs. Calmly deciding to deal first with the one at his throat, Guerassinoff very deliberately detached him and snapped his neck. The big Chinese picked him up, kicking, clawing and screaming, threw him across his shoulders, and started carrying him through the raging battle toward Hill 281. Soon realizing that he would have to be content with getting himself back alive, he reluctantly killed the second Chinese with his bare hands.

Another Frenchman was captured and two wounded Chinese Communists assigned as guards. The prisoner tried unsuccessfully for an hour to get a grenade out of his pocket without being detected. Finally, one of the guards was in so much pain from a wounded arm that he asked the prisoner to help him get into a more comfortable position. While the other Red Chinese kept him closely covered with a gun, the Frenchman pretended to help. By some fancy sleight of hand he got his grenade free, pulled the pin, and worked it under the Chinese’s arm in such a way as to keep the safety lever down. Then with a sudden shout he knocked the muzzle of the gun into the air, made a short dash, and dove for cover. The wounded guard left up. The grenade fell free. The two Red Chinese were taken out of action.

Lieutenant Storck, an US engineer officer, hurried to the pioneer position with his platoon sergeant just before the attack started. He was wounded, captured, and escaped. Fighting his way back to his own lines early the next morning he was killed -- reportedly by a mine. Several engineer soldiers, their platoon disorganized, moved along the main trench on Arrowhead, and were put to work breaking open cases of grenades in the bottom of a trench and tossing them up to two bearded Frenchmen who sat on the top of the parapet
rolling them down the forward slope, alternately cursing the Red Chinese and yelling for faster service.

Many feats of gallantry would never be known; for the witnesses were dead. However there were another story to recount bravery. Liron, for example, evacuated: his Korean comrade led him off Arrowhead during the worst of the shelling. Max Olivier, a French correspondent on his way up the hill, took over and got Liron back to the aid station. This place was being shelled so heavily that only three people could brave it to treat his wounds: Colonel Borreill, the padre and Mademoiselle Montboisses. She was a veteran of eighteen months in Korea. Although a trained nurse, her assigned position was that of social worker. The only woman in Korea authorized to be in the front lines, she should have been back with the battalion trains during the battle. It was her who sat upright in the bitter jeep administering plasma to the unconscious Liron while he was sped over the heavily shelled roads to the nearest helicopter pad.

However, four artillery battalions were supporting the French Battalion at a rate of 6,000 rounds an hour. The platoon from the regimental tank company in the French sector fired almost 1,200 rounds of 76-mm that night. Before the attack they had been limited to six rounds per tube per day. A company of tanks from the 7th US Division had moved into the 2nd US Division sector to support the ROK’s on White Horse; they had lost communications with their own headquarters, so the French put them to work. Lieutenant Reynaud’s Heavy Weapons Company of the French Battalion fired 800 rounds of 81-mm mortar and 150 rounds of 75-mm recoilless. The 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry to the left of Arrowhead was supporting with everything within range. The Heavy Mortar Company’s tubes were white hot. Anti-aircraft machine gun positions, about 12 of them, were ringed with growing piles of expended brass, ammunition boxes, and burned-out barrels.

However in spite of this tremendous fire support it was not until 2100 hours that the first enemy attack was stopped.

It should be pointed out that it was tough work to climb up the steep northern slopes of Arrowhead even if the enemy were not carrying equipment and were not getting shot at. The Chinese had made a long, circuitous approach march across rugged terrain and under heavy fire. They must have been pretty tired when the time came to assault that last 100 meters in the face of point-black fire from the Frenchmen in the trenches.

But plenty of them got to the very edge of the position - - close enough to be brought down with grenades, aimed rifle shots, and guns. When the initial
assaults were repulsed, the Red Chinese survivors and reinforcements could
be heard digging in all along the front. In front of the 1st Company’s positions a
few days after the attack huge foxholes the enemy had dug within grenade
range of the main positions of the Frenchmen were seen. The closest hole was
one more meter deep and one meter wide.

The Red Chinese hit Arrowhead twice more during the first night -- at 0140
and 0330 hours. They made a major effort at infiltrating along the river gorge
which was the boundary between the left and center companies. They probed
the Arrowhead Ridge position from flank to flank looking for a soft spot.

Before midnight, the 1st Company, on Arrowhead Ridge was reinforced
by the bulk of a company, a provisional platoon from the French Battalion
trains, and the support platoon of the Lieutenant Guillou’s 2nd Company.

Its attachments before the attack included a provisional platoon from
Battalion Headquarters Company in addition to the pioneers. So the combined
command now numbered approximately 500 men and included two tanks,
a section of 4.2 mortars, and a platoon from the French Battalion’s Heavy
Weapons Company. At about midnight Major Bertrand de Seze, the battalion
executive officer, moved up to take command of the sector. The Frenchmen,
together with the Republic of Korea soldiers attached to the French Battalion
and the Americans, fought off the streaming enemy into the friendly position.
The artillery supported continuously the hard-pressed infantry against enemy
avenues of approach and against his rear areas. These measures no doubt relieved
the pressure; but still the Chinese Communist infantry continued to press
forward. Now it became clear that the counterattack could only ease the enemy
pressure. The Korean soldiers promptly made a counterattack with a hand-to-
hand fighting, and retook the lost ground. Enemy resistance seemed to be weaken-
ing and it was clear that the heavy artillery to which he had been subjected was
beginning to tell. Artillery fire brought down on the withdrawing enemy and it
no doubt inflicted casualties on the enemy.

The record of the French soldiers during their fight in this area had been
a fine one, and will rank high in the history of this famous French Battalion.
No figures were available on the casualties on the enemy, but the enemy deads
counted in front of the battalion amounted to 600 more killed. At dawn the
French were out between the lines policing up the battle field. Patrols picked
up two prisoners in front of right company and eight in front of Arrowhead
including two officers. They also brought back 80 Red Chinese-made rifles; 25
US-M1’s, 60 Russian guns, seven 60-mm mortars, the base plate of an 81-mm
mortar, a heavy machine gun, six bazookas, and innumerable gas masks,
bangalore torpedoes, and engineer tools. A trumpet and two huge red flags on
ten foot staffs completed the collection of booty.

However it was not achieved without losses. The battle cost the French soldiers rather heavy casualties; 48 killed and 130 wounded of which 97 men were evacuated.

The Chinese Communists did not come back the night of the 7th, though the ROK company just to the right of the French got into a real slug fest at about 2130 hours with an enemy company that tried to find a weak spot along the corps boundary. The ROKs drove the enemy back only after the most violent hand-to-hand fighting. The French Battalion received about 3,000 rounds of incoming mortar and artillery during the day.

By the next day, 8 October, it was apparent that the enemy was shifting his main effort to White Horse after having been so viciously repulsed on Arrowhead. An enemy company was spotted in front of the 3rd Company at 0800 hours heading for White Horse. During the day he kept up his attacks on the ROKs, and the hill changed hands several times. The French soldiers took advantage of good observation and their "borrowed tanks" to bring devastating fire against the exposed enemy flank. At nightfall the enemy brought heavy fire to bear on the French positions all along the line. The center company had three killed and eight wounded at 1845 hours and at 1900 hours their outposts reported two enemy battalions out in front of them. At 2035 hours a hundred Chinese were reported on the former pioneer outpost positions and the 3rd Company again came under heavy fire. The enemy hit again along the corps boundary; by 2200 hours they had penetrated the ROK flank company and were heading for the ROK battalion command post.
The 2nd Company of the French Battalion assembled about 40 ROKs survivors and reorganized them as local security around their mortars. Twenty minutes after midnight the 2nd Company was in contact with an enemy company and ten minutes later an enemy company hit Arrowhead. Two hours later the 3rd Company also reported contact. The enemy maintained contact across the entire French front that night but had no success in penetrating the lines.

On the 9th Lieutenant Roger took out a patrol and brought back ten bodies from the former pioneer positions.

The situation on White Horse remained critical until the hill was finally reoccupied by the ROK’s on 13 October. The next day Colonel Borreil got this message from Major General J.C. Fry, the division commander:

"I want to take this opportunity to officially commend your battalion for its epic defense from 6 to 10 October.... the artillery and mortar preparation prior to the assault of this hill was beyond anything I have known in my previous military experience. This preparation which appeared to be almost beyond human endurance, was closely followed by an assault of four enemy companies in the early evening hours of 6 October, followed by four additional companies during the remainder of the night. The fierceness of this fighting can best be judged by the fact that 600 Chinese bodies were found in front of and on your positions. I estimate that as the result of your intrepid action, the enemy suffered in excess of 2,000 casualties. This at a cost to yourself of 126 casualties from all causes.... I particularly want to compliment you, your staff and subordinate unit commanders for their planning and astute preparation of fire plans which slaughtered these Chinese."

From Tokyo came the following tribute from General Mark W. Clark:

"This splendid defense, particularly the heroic action of the Pioneer Platoon, ranks with the most distinguished actions of modern times."

While the French Battalion enjoyed a quiet period after the bitter fight around Hill 281, the 9th ROK Division to its right was heavily attacked. The Chinese Communist forces came in on the outposts covering Hill 395, and ever on the hill itself. The situation was not completely restored until 15 October.

This attack was of more than passing interest since the French Battalion was also destined to spend some busy and trying days defending the Arrowhead Ridge area. By 0020 hours, on the 9th, enemy probed the defenses of the French Battalion on the 1st Company’s front of Hill 281. Two hours or so after midnight the French valours drove off the bandit hordes conducting the all-out
assaults with massed firepower of every weapon. The battalion recaptured the two outposts of Hill 281 coordinated with the elements of the 9th ROK Division. Three days later a similar assault by an unknown number of enemy was met, however, it added to his losses.

Throughout the fight, the timely support from the air, armour, and artillery sparked the Frenchmen's effort in both defense and offense. The battalion had withstood the determined drive of the Chinese infantry, and it provided an excellent testimonial to the leadership, skill, and valour of the French soldiers. Exceptional services of the Pioneer Platoon during this battle was recognized by the French Government with the award of "une deuxieme citation a l'ordre de l'armee."

For the French Battalion the rest of the month, after the bitter fighting of October 1952, was fairly quiet. The approach of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the operations at the front. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves to hibernate in November, and action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols, and small unit skirmishes. Having been alerted patiently, the French Battalion watched the enemy warily along the front line and conserved its energy. The slackening of operations permitted the battalion to secure its supplies.

In the night of 20 November, the French Battalion was relieved on the positions by the 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry, and moved to a new assembly area, Sintan-ni approximately eight kilometers south of the front line. The reserve positions now taken over by the battalion were on road side of eastern Sintan-ni. The battalion's primary role for the next several weeks was to maintain the morale of the soldiers. The main problem that facing the high ranking officers of the battalion was rotation. The decision to limit the length of time a soldier served in Korea brought with it a series of administrative and training problems. Naturally enough, it was good for morale for the soldier to know that his overseas tour would end at a definite time, but to carry out annual rotations of a battalion group while keeping it up to strength with replacements meant that France had to have at least another battalion available at the country.

On 28 November, the second rotation batch of the French Battalion led by Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Germany, and Second-in-Chief, Commandant Alexandre, arrived at the reserve area and took over from the outgoing companies. While the newly arrived officers spent much of their time in analyzing various situations, the men underwent a special course in weapons and a program of offsetting the long sea voyage.
On 1 December 1952 Lieutenant Colonel Germiny relieved Lieutenant Colonel Borreil in command of the battalion. In general terms the Order of Battle of the French Battalion was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion Commander</th>
<th>Lieutenant Colonel Germiny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain Orsat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain Lefeuvre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Company Commander</td>
<td>Lieutenant Jozan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Company (C.A.) Commander</td>
<td>Captain Jaupart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Company (C.B.) Commander</td>
<td>Captain Costerg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, the outgoing members paraded at the Battalion Headquarters Komun-ni, approximately eight kilometers northeast of Chongong-ni, in new battle dress, and in the presence of staff officers of the battalion, General Pack In Yup presented a Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea to the French Battalion in recognition of the outstanding accomplishment in the Arrowhead Ridge battle.

The first week of December opened with the visit of General Eisenhower, then President-Elect of the United States. On 4 December he was received by an honor guard of the French Battalion, later was delivered an insignia of the battalion.

The period 5th to 27th December was uneventful except for preparation of Christmas celebration. As far as circumstances permitted, the French soldiers spent the Christmas day in the traditional manner with the best of fare. The men were especially delighted with a large amount of present which was sent by the daily newspaper "Le Figaro."

During the last week of December the battalion once again moved to another reserve area, Umhyon-ni approximately 16 kilometers east of Uijongbu while the elements of the 23rd US Infantry were underway to Tongduchon. The days of the New Year which followed was also quiet and were unusually fine and warm for the time of year. The battalion remained there until it was ordered to be relieved in the front line at the end of the month by the British Black Watch Battalion.
CHAPTER VI  THE LAST YEAR

Section 1.  Actions on the Songgok Ridge
(1 January - 9 April 1953)

As the year of 1953 came in across the frozen hills of Korea, the French Battalion was in reserve at Umhyon-ni, while the battalions of the 23rd Regiment were sent to guard the prisoner of war camps in Koje-do, an island off the south coast of the peninsula. The operational control of the French Battalion was accordingly fell on to the 38th Infantry of the 2nd US Division.

The days at Umhyon-ni were occupied with the training program that was to refresh the troops with military subjects, such as map reading, small units
tactics, use of compass, foot marches, and soon included attack and defense problems on the snowy hills, made more realistic by the rattle of machine guns and mortars. In the last week of January 1953 the training was discontinued and the battalion was alerted to relieve the elements of the 1st British Commonwealth Division.

On 31 January the French Battalion went back on line, and it relieved the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch Regiment, the 1st British Commonwealth Division. In the regimental sector, the French Battalion occupied the Songgok area of the western part of the Imjin River, and the Netherlands Battalion was on the left, the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment which was relieved by the Thailand Battalion two weeks later on 13 February was in Nabu-ri area. The French Battalion’s positions were in the area of Songgok, 20 more kilometers north-westward from Chonggok. Within the battalion sector, the 3rd Company was on the left, and the 1st Company on the right. The 2nd Company and the C.A. reinforced by one tank company were in rear area around the command post. (See Sketch Map 6.)

When the battalion took over its new area on the last day of January, the Frenchmen found no-man’s-land dominated by the enemy. The battalion was new to action, and the disadvantages arising from its lack of experience were aggravated by the Korean countryside and Chinese tactics. It was evident that any attempt to wrest control of no-man’s-land from the enemy would require careful preparation. Accordingly dispatches of numerous reconnaissance patrols were needed to accustom officers and men alike to the ground in front of them.

For the first ten days of February there was little activity except for the exchange of artillery and mortar fire and patrolling in no-man’s-land.

On 9 February a patrol entered an enemy held area crossing a small river, and engaged one Red Chinese squad at 2115 hours, killing three, without own casualties. Two days later a patrol team brushed a sharp fire fight with a party of six enemy at Chongjon-ri, approximately two kilometers west of the main position.

On the night of 14 February the French Battalion carried out a similar type of reconnaissance patrol at the Songgok area. Previous experience was repeated and the Frenchmen were forced to withdraw suffering three casualties -- one killed, one wounded and one missing. Two days later approximately 10 minutes after midnight of 13 the outpost line members in front of the 1st Company made contact with some six of the enemy, and next day at 0330 hours the battalion suffered one man wounded. On 22 February the French Army General Junin accompanied by General Clark flew to the fighting front of the French Battalion and learned the first hand situation there.
The first few weeks of the month was one of routine static warfare, with no very outstanding incidents. There was much patrolling, a few casualties and several probing attacks in a small scale by the enemy. However, at 2205 hours a patrol team in the same area at which the Frenchmen had a brush on 14 February, was heavily shelled. The position was damaged by the shelling and the Frenchmen were attacked by an estimated two platoon sized enemy force. While the patrol team was engaging stubborn enemy force, three near-by patrols were immediately ordered to stage a counterattack. After a 30-minute fierce fire fight, the enemy had been driven off. The Red Chinese attack had been at two platoon strength and it was estimated that some 160 mortar shells had fallen on the Frenchmen within 25 minutes. Enemy casualties were believed to have been heavy; 11 killed and estimated six killed. The Frenchmen had five killed, 11 wounded and one missing. It was the hottest single engagement which had taken place on the battalion front for the month.
There was to be one more day of fighting before there was a break in the assault on the French Battalion. During the night of 1 March 1953 a strong attack developed against the main line of resistance of the battalion which lasted for one and a half hours. This attack was made by an enemy force estimated at company strength, supported by artillery. A counterattack started shortly afterward and further fierce fighting continued. At about 2130 hours, however, enemy pressure slackened and the French valours drove off the infiltrators. Finally on 2 March battalion was enable to conduct deep-infiltration reconnaissance into the enemy territory. All this duration, the artillery support was given by the 1st Commonwealth Division. Enemy casualties were difficult to assess accurately, as the Red Chinese always made most strenuous efforts to remove their dead and wounded under cover of darkness. In this operation, however, they must have suffered very heavily. This operation was greatly supported by the Republic of Korea Army attached to the French Battalion.

Now it should be mentioned that the French Battalion had small unit of Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, who had been with them for a long time.
United Nations Command had undertaken the training of Korean nationals as infantry reinforcements in large numbers with the expectation that as far as possible Korean troops would ultimately take over in contact with enemy. One-hundred more men were provided to be absorbed by the French Battalion. They paid by the Republic of Korea Government, but equipped, uniformed and armed by the French Battalion. This unit, which was in the nature of an experiment, proved very successful. The French soldiers liked the ROK soldiers and they, in turn, contented in their new surroundings.

From these constant crushes with the Chinese Communists in the Songgok area, the French Battalion paid a dear price. As an example the following casualty figures, for the period 1 February to 25 March 1953 are given: 17 killed and 59 wounded. This was a price to pay by dominating no-man’s-land.

Meanwhile, as the 23rd US Regiment which had been dispatched to Koje-do for the security mission of the prisoner of war camps returned to the divisional area in the vicinity of Hakyomal, approximately five kilometers southwest of Songgok, the French Battalion was again placed under the operational control of the 23rd Regiment effective at 1600 hours of the 25th March.

On 1 April the relief of the French Battalion by the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment began when the 2nd Battalion came up Songgok, and it was completed early in the morning. After one more week rest in the assembly area of Parak-dong, some six kilometers south of the front line, the battalion again moved, on 9 April, to Tongduchon and there joined the regiment. The few days in this reserve area were devoted to resting and re-equipping.

Section 2. The Last Months
(10 April – 27 July 1953)

On 7 April the 2nd US Division was relieved by the Commonwealth Division and the 23rd Regiment with the French Battalion moved into I US Corps reserve at Camp Casey in Tongduchon, approximately ten kilometers north of Uijongbu. During the following two months the French Battalion was to participated in two blocking operations, the first on the Wyoming line and the second the Kansas line.

With the division changing from I US Corps to IX US Corps on 27 April 1953, the French Battalion along with the battalions of the regiment assumed the mission of IX Corps reserve at Chipo-ri, where it was to remain in active
training until it relieved the elements of the 15th Regiment in the Chorwon sector in the middle of June.

The organization of the blocking positions was undertaken on the central front along the Wyoming line, was in anticipation of a possible Communists attack on "May Day." The men traveled from Camp Casey to the Wyoming line via boxcar. From the commanding terrain of the area, the men could look down upon Hill 281 (Arrowhead Ridge), on which the Frenchmen had beaten off the enemy hordes, a short distance to their front, or on Hill 395 (White Horse Hill) farther to the east. From behind Hill 281 the artillery was bombing out its cannonades. Beyond Hill 281 the jets could be seen passing the enemy hill masses with rockets, five-hundred pound bombs, and the much-feared napalm. Communication trenches were dug in and the individual fighting positions built.

Operation on the Kansas line was similar to that on the Wyoming line. Defensive positions were improved. New communication trenches were cut through sand-stone. Sand bags by the thousands were filled. Completing its mission on the Kansas line, the French Battalion moved on to Chipo-ri where it began again an intensive seven weeks training program. This exercise, largely aimed on the problems of individual training on the basic military subjects and unit training in various phases of tactics both in offense and defense, occupied most of the time.

A particular emphasis was placed on the position battle and night patrolling. Words such as dispersion, all round security, cover and concealment, and fire and maneuver became familiar everyday expressions. Squad, platoon, company, and battalion sized tactics in all phases of the attack, the defenses, the withdrawal, and raid were stressed. Hills were assaulted, defensive positions dug. The men put in long hours and was often weary from their exertions. Then there were the air raid alerts at night, which interrupted their sleep. A short distance to the north the French soldiers could watch the nightly fireworks along the 3rd US Division sector, the flares lighting up its front.

In the meantime, during the period the distinguished visitors visited the battalion. Among them were M. Paul Reynaud, Admiral Auboyneau, Commander of the French Marines in Indochina, Ambassador Dejean and Captain Maincent, Military Attache to the French Embassy in Tokyo, and liaison chief to the United Nations Command.

Now full spring brought another lull in the fighting, with roads impassable by mud, and streams swollen to deep and swift for crossing. However, near the end of May 1953, the Chinese Communists began a series of attack that constituted their final offensive and continued almost to the signing of the armistice. They first struck in the area of the Iron Triangle and again tried an attack
against outposts in the Munsan area. However the enemy paid a forbidding price. Finally on 10 June, just six weeks before the war was destined to end, the major Red Chinese effort to shove back the battle lines began. It was the mightiest blow to fall upon friendly forces since the spring offensive in 1951 and it fell on the ROK's area of Kumphwa.

In this critical juncture, the French Battalion was alerted for tactical commitment on 19 June, with instructions to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Regiment of the 3rd Division in the Chungga-san area. The battalion moved out from the reserve area, Chipo-ri and arrived at its new positions on the next night. The French Battalion occupied the regiment's right sector position and the 3rd Battalion of the regiment the left. The right flank of the French Battalion was held by the Greek Battalion which was then attached to the 15th US Regiment. During the following three weeks the 23rd US Infantry relieved the units to the right of the French Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, which had been in blocking positions behind the 3rd Battalion, relieved the 3rd on 4 July. The 1st Battalion, which had been improving positions on the Wyoming line behind the main line of resistance, moved forward to relieve the Greek forces in and around Outpost Harry.

THE CHUNGGA-SAN POSITIONS 18 JULY 1953
Within the French Battalion sector, the 1st Company took up the positions to the right, the 2nd Company center positions on the Chungga-san, and the 3rd Company the left rear of the 2nd Company. (See Sketch Map 7.)

The front was generally in a static condition with sporadic enemy probes striking the outposts. Barbed wire entanglements, trip flares, mine fields acted as a buffer between the enemy and French positions. Safe lanes through the mine fields permitted passage of friendly patrols out of and into friendly positions. An aggressive daylight and night patrolling program enabled the French Battalion to dominate the ground forward of its positions. This provided the security necessary to maintain the battalion front intact. Many patrols were run. Some of the patrols were of the ambush type, others consisted of three or four-man daylight reconnaissances. However contacts with the enemy were infrequent.

For the first half of mid-July considerable enemy patrol activities were noticed close to the battalion's forward positions. About the same time the Battalion Headquarters issued a warning that the Red Chinese were liable to become very bold and carry out their desperate actions. Suddenly at 0020 hours of July 18 enemy attack against outpost line of resistance of the battalion manned by Lieutenant Dureau's team was preceded by a heavy mortar bombardment. After a heavy concentration of mortar fire on the objective, the enemy assault groups rushed in. They came in through the wire entanglement that they had tried to get rid of it. They appeared in the rear of the Frenchmen. There was, however, no withdrawal and for a time the French valours were surrounded. Now close-in fighting erupted across the Chungga-san area.

While this was going on, Sergeant Thuret's 2nd Company patrol team which was in the listening post on the north-most finger knob of Hill 376, some one kilometer north of the main positions, managed to fight back through the enemy blockade in spite of its loss. The 3rd Company team of Lieutenant Monod which had been in the observation post on Hill 478, approximately three kilometers northeast of the main positions, could make a timely withdrawal to the rear. However the 1st Company team of Sergeant Warion had been caught in its position on a ridge, some one kilometer southwest of Hill 478. To ease the situation Dufour's section was ordered to rush to the scene. At the same time whole divisional fire power of the medium and heavy was directed to the approaches and likely forming up places of the enemy. The rescue team could not complete its mission until the first light when the enemy began to retreat to the north.

It was thought that friendly forces inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in addition to five counted enemy dead. However the fighting cost the Frenchmen rather heavy casualties: five killed and 44 wounded.
In the following days much of the time on the line was spent improving fighting positions and cleaning equipment. Old bunkers had to be reinforced with vertical supports and waterproofed, and new ones had to be constructed. Communication wire was continuously being broken, keeping wiremen busy splicing the two broken ends together. Due to the obstructing hill masses, radio reception was not always the best and demanded the constant attention of the radio repairmen.

At that time a large enemy build-up was noted to the front of the French Battalion positions. However, the anticipated large scale enemy attack was never materialized for at 1000 hours on the morning of 27 July 1953 a truce was signed at Panmunjom. At 2200 hours that night more than three years of continuous warfare came to a close.

Section 3. The Armistice and Afterward
(28 July – 6 November 1953)

The withdrawal from the Demilitarized Zone to post-armistice positions began on 28 July, under the provisions of the truce, within seventy-two hours following the cease-fire. During this seventy-two hour period, the French Battalion along with the 23rd US infantry executed a vast dismantling, salvaging, and pulling back operation. Bunkers were torn down and sand bags emptied. The battalion, who treated this as a tactical operation, withdrew some three kilometers to location of Yangji-ri, north of the Hantai River. Ammunition and weapons of all descriptions were removed from forward positions and relocated in new defensive positions. Armored personnel carriers and two and one-half ton trucks were kept busy around the clock hauling the material to the rear area. All available manpower and transportation was utilized for this operation.

A short distance to the north Red Chinese, hitherto strictly nocturnal animals, poured out of their bunkers and caves by the hundreds and clustered in small groups along the skyline. A short distance from the positions the Communist chinese could be seen eating rations and waving across to the friendly forces.

By the close of the seventy-two hour period, the old front was deserted. The rain of friendly forces fire on enemy positions had come to a halt, but the period of constant vigilance was at hand. Particular caution was urged because of the many booby trap devices attached to the defenses.
July passed into August and the building up of Frenchmen fighting machine continued. Barbed wire barricades were set up in addition to road blocks to add security to the new defense perimeter. The steel pot could now be exchanged at least at times for the characteristic soft cap. And physical training was to be applied to men in sedentary occupations, rather than to those performing the normal active duties of a soldier. The security aspect was important and strict measures were taken to prevent unauthorized people entering the battalion area. The recreational program the battalion was also revised to coincide with the new atmosphere that now colaked Korea.

As the leaves began to fall heralding the coming of autumn, the mounting conflict between the free world and the Communists in Indo-China was indeed producing a second sore spot on the surface of the world. Now the rumbling of the war clouds in Indo-China grew louder. It was a time for the French
valours, which had fought courageously during the war and earned themselves the respect and admiration of all who served beside them, to go to the another battle scene.

On 8 October a ceremony to send off the ROK soldiers, who had been attached to the French Battalion, took place. The Commander of the French Battalion presented military medals to the returning ROK soldiers who showed extraordinary faith to the battalion. The ceremony closed with them marching in review before the battalion, and when all was over, the ROK soldiers returned to the ROK unit.

Next day on 9 October, the French men paraded in front of Commanding General of the IX US Corps, General Hickey, who presented Legion of Merit to the battalion in recognition of the gallant actions which the French Battalion had shown during the war. The Commanding General of the Eighth US Army, General Taylor attended the ceremony.

The 13th was the day for the French soldiers to farewell to the dignitaries of the Republic of Korea Government. The Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea presented the battalion Presidential Unit Citation on behalf of the president. He also gave Lieutenant Colonel Gernimy, Battalion Commander Ulchi Distinguished Military Medal, and Commandants Alexandre and Deturbet Distinguished Military Service Medal With Gold Star.

Finally on 23 October 1953, the elements of the French Battalion departed the port of Inchon for the new war zone--Indo-China. On 6 November 1953, the last batch of the French soldiers left the Korean soil leaving behind a token force of approximately 50 members under the command of Lieutenant Caldairou. This unit, which had later reduced to 15 men, served in Korea under the banner of the United Nations until it left Korea in June 1965.

Section 4. Epilogue

When the Korean War caused the United Nations to call to assistance, the French Government immediately sent the frigate "La Grandiere" on 22 July 1950 and approximately one month later on 25 August one infantry battalion was offered to the United Nations Command. By the end of November 1950 the battalion was in Korean soil and operational.

The Battalion was attached to the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Infantry Division, and participated in various battles such as Wonju–Chipyoing-ni battle,
Heartbreak Ridge Battle, T-Bone Hill Battle, Arrowhead Ridge Battle, and Chungga-san Battle. From the beginning the French Battalion was flung into action to stem the hordes swarming from the north, and was also frequently called upon to lead mass attacks by the 23rd Regiment and by the 2nd US Division.

All in all, the French Battalion put 3,763 men into the battle scene during the three years of the Korean War. The peak French Army strength in the Korea was 1,185 all ranks, reached in June 1952. At the time of the armistice there were 1,120 French serving in the theater. In all the French Army suffered 1,291 battle casualties in Korea. Of these 264 all ranks were killed in action and 1,008 men were wounded or injured in action, and 19 men were missing, of whom 12 men survived as prisoners of war.

The exact number of French soldiers captured by the Communists was not known, and never would be known as not of those reported missing were prisoners. Some were killed, but their fate was unknown.

As for the French soldiers, the battles in Korea were a positive blessing from the standpoint of professional efficiency. This was a new development for the French. The leaders at all level who returned to the home camp and Indo-China were experienced fighting men.

The most significant feature of the French forces in the United Nations operation in the Korean War was the establishment of the principal of collective resistance to the aggression. When the aggression of the North Korean and Chinese Communists had been thrown back from the Republic of Korea, the goal had been achieved. In the process, the Frenchmen displayed a spirit of adventure and daring that was to act as a gallant example to those who were to follow.

This kind of new attitude of the French Government confirmed the determination to involve the country in other United Nations peace keeping actions whenever possible through the United Nations and would in time rush to the scene around the world as truce team or peace commission.

During the three-year period, the French Battalion earned two Presidential Unit Citations of the Republic of Korea, three of the United States of America, and four Citations of the French Army.
CHRONOLOGY

1950

22 July The French Government decides to participate in the Korean War and places the frigate "La Grandiere" at the disposal of the U.N.

26 Aug The Government decides to send ground force.

18 Sept The Korea-bound battalion (Forces Terrestres Francaises de l'O.N.U.) is activated.

29 Nov B.F./O.N.U., consisting of 1,054 men and officers debarks at Pusan.

11 Dec The battalion is attached to the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Infantry Division.

21 Dec 1950-23 Jun 1951 Wonju area battle.

1951

24 Jan - 3 Feb Twin Tunnels battle.

4-17 Feb Chipyong-ni battle.

16-22 May Sonpyong battle.

May - June Battle of Soyang-gang in the sector of Hongchon-Inje.

July - Aug Battle of Punchbowl.

14 Sept - 22 Oct Battle of Heartbreak Ridge (Hill 931), in which the battalion sees its top battle cry and pays a dear price for a victory.

1 Dec Lieutenant Colonel Borreil takes over the command of the battalion.

17 (8) Dec Begins participating in the battle of Iron Triangle, a series of defense, reconnaissance and raids.

1952

21 Jan - 18 Mar Kunhwa area battle.

8-28 Apr Battles of Sumbawi, Tangwon-ri areas.

29 Apr - 16 July Reserve in Kapyong.

17 July - 19 Aug Mans a part of Jamestown abreast with the 23rd US Infantry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Repels enemy night assault on Eerie Outpost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Repels enemy night assault on Yoke Outpost through hand-to-hand fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Repels enemy attack on Eerie Outpost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Ordered reserve at Musu-dong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Repels two regimental strength of CCF attack on Arrowhead Ridge (Hill 281). Two officers and 13 men of CCF captured, minimum 600 enemy killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Germiny replaces Lieutenant Colonel Borreil.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Ordered defense of the Songgok area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>A decisive lasting-till-night battle is won on the main role by the combined ROK-French company, whence the battalion is enabled to conduct deep infiltration reconnaissance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Apr -</td>
<td>The battalion is placed for the defense of a part of the Wyoming and Kansas lines in Chorwon district where the battalion organizes a closed position in cooperation with the 23rd Regiment. It later moves to Chipon-ri and participates in the joint maneuver conducted in Kunhwa area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Ordered to move and relieve an element of the 15th Regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>The enemy last attack falls on the battalion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Armistice agreement is signed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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PART FIVE

THE GREEK FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1.  Introduction to Greece

General

Greece, used to be a constitutional monarchy, is now a republic of southern Europe, occupying an area of 131,944 square kilometers (50,944 sq.mi) with a population of approximately 8,769,000 in 1971. It comprises the southern peninsula of the Balkans, the northern foreshore of the Aegean as far east as the Maritsa River, and except for Imbros Island and Tenedos, all the main islands of the Aegean, including Crete and the Dodecanese.

The capital and largest city is Athens, the political, economical and cultural center of Greece, lying toward the southern end of the central and principal plain of Attica. The population of the city proper in 1971 was 867,000.

The name Greece (Latin Graecia) derives from Graeci, originally the Latin name of a Boeotian tribe (Graioi) with whom the Romans came in contact in Italy at Cumae in the 8th century B.C. and later applied there to the Hellenic people as a whole.

The people who in the historical times called themselves Hellenes (Greeks) came to Greece from an unknown district, perhaps by way of Asia Minor. They brought with them only one deity whose name and native origin are certain, namely Zeus.

The Greek language is one of the Indo-European family of languages that has been used by Greeks in its various stages of development from the prehistoric times to the present. The modern language, which the Greeks now spoke as their mother tongue, is the latest development of an ancient Greek, of which the Attic dialect, out of many, became predominant.

The Old Ages

Taking a glance at her history, Greece has a wide scope which is the keystone
of the arch that united east and west, it cast a bridge over two dark ages and has given continuity to man's development in Europe from the Bronze Age to the modern times. It is essentially universal and not parochial in interest.

The finer and crafts of civilized man, invented in Mesopotamia and in Egypt, were adopted and developed first in Europe by the Minoans of Crete and by the Mycenaeans of Greece during the Bronze Age. The civilizations of these peoples attained a high level before each in turn was overwhelmed. A dark age ensued in Europe. But memories of the Bronze Age civilization survived in the rich saga and in the epic poems of which some were finally attached to the names Homer and Hesiod. These memories played an important part in the Greek renaissance of the 9th century B.C. And a new political, intellectual and social spirit came to birth with the city-state. This spirit was carried out to the European shores of the Mediterranean Sea and of the Black Sea by the Greek colonists from the 8th century B.C. onward to Asia as far as the Indus valley by the Greeks and Macedonians in the 4th century B.C. Even when Rome replaced Macedonia as the leading imperial power, the Greek civilization which had been a unifying factor in the Greco-Macedonian and the Greco-Roman world lived on for 1,000 years in the empire of the Byzantines while again there was a dark age in western Europe. It was enlightened by that rediscovery of the Greek outlook vital to the Renaissance that heralded the end of the middle ages and laid the foundation of modern western civilization.

In brief, the modern knowledge of the Bronze Age is derived from archaeological excavation (Aegean civilization) and from the poems attributed to Homer. For the period of the Greek renaissance from the 9th century onward the world today relies upon archaeology and on the remains of epic, lyric and elegiac poetry. The political and military history also begins with the works of Herodotus and Thucydides, who painted some of the background of the great wars which they described so brilliantly.

One of the earliest Sumerian sculptures from Babylonia, probably dating from about 3000 B.C., shows soldiers fighting in close order, wearing helmets and carrying spears and shields.

Incidentally, the modern Olympic games is a modified revival of the Olympian games originating in Athens, Greece in 1896, held once every four year, and consisting of international athletic contests. Having decided that at least one of the reasons for the glory of the Golden Age of Greece was that the emphasis placed on physical culture and frequent athletic festivals could result if the athletes of all countries of the world were brought together on the friendly fields of amateur sport, regardless of politics, race, religion and social status.
General Background

World War II and After

When the Nazi Germany was making efforts to draw the states of southeastern Europe, including Greece, into the so-called Three-Power, or Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, and Japan; 27 September 1940), Fascists Italy forced Greece into the war by invading the country on 28 October 1940 from Albania. The seven Italian Army divisions (155,000 men) that launched the attack, penetrated a few kilometers into the Greek territory, but the very stiffer resistance of the Greek Army brought the invasion to a halt on 8 November. All the Greek peoples had rallied in the national cause, thus they drove back the aggressors and had occupied about a quarter of Albania, then controlled by Mussorini's Army, before the Hitler's Nazi Army also attacked Greece on 6 April 1941 with 24 divisions. The occupation of Greece by the Axis lasted to October 1944, when the Nazi Germany had already come to the worst to collapse.

The destiny of Greece after the withdrawal of the German forces was essentially affected by the agreements of three powers (Great Britain, USA and USSR) of the anti-Hitler coalition for the partition of southeastern Europe into spheres of interest.

Toward the close of World War II and thereafter, a bitter civil war broke out in Greece due to the Communist rebellion. Since the disarming of the Italian occupation forces in September 1943, the large parts of Greece had been controlled by the Greek resistance group -- anti-Communist EDES (Greek Democratic National Army) and the Communist-dominated EAM (so-called National Popular Liberation Army).

The Guerrilla War by the Communist Rebellion

In October 1944, as the Germans withdrew from Greece, the Communist members of the coalition refused to disband their guerrilla force. After a series of conflicts, the Communists, who had overrun virtually all Greece except Athens and Salonika, finally accepted defeat and the disbandment of their forces at the conference of Varkiza in February 1945. Consequently, a period of political reconstruction followed, but a full-scale guerrilla war was reopened by the Communists, who had gone underground.

The Soviet Union, with a treacherous ambition, directed its expansion
thrust upon eastern Europe and the Balkan peninsula where abounded in economical resources. Expanding its influence on Turkey by way of Iran, Soviet now ready to mount a threat to Greece, a key member of the western European bloc. Supplied with huge quantities of weapons from Soviet, the Greek Communists under Soviet manipulation, launched the guerrilla warfare on the government forces, dragging parts of Greece into a state of civil war. The western countries now awoke that the free world should take a stiff measure protest against the Communist expansion. Thus, the United States decided to assist the free nations as manifested in the Marshall Plan announced in 1947. Nevertheless, the Soviet Communists never ceased to push their expansionist strategy. In consequence, the Communist rebellion in Greece did not end until 1949, after the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc had closed a stretch of Greece's northern frontier to the rebels. On 16 October that year, the Greek Communists announced the end of open hostilities.

The Greeks could now assume a more considerable role in the world affairs. Thus, Greece became an original member of the United Nations which began with 51 members on 24 October 1945, and entered the Council of Europe in 1949 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1951. On 9 August 1954, at Bled, Yugoslavia, Greece signed a treaty of alliance with its ancient enemy Turkey and with Communist Yugoslavia.

**Relationship with U.N.**

Greece, one of the original members of the United Nations, has played an active role for the maintenance of international peace and security in support of the principles and objectives of the world organization ever since its foundation in 1945.

After World War II, a large number of disputes and situations came before the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, reflecting the unsettled conditions in the world, mostly created by Soviet and its satellites bloc for Communist expansion.

In 1946, Greece brought a serious problem before the U.N. Security Council, charging that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were aiding the Communist guerrillas in northern Greece. A U.N. Commission of Investigation supported the Greek accusations by a majority vote. When the Security Council proved unable to agree on a resolution by Soviet's veto to deal with the problem, the issue was brought before the General Assembly; in October 1947 the Assembly adopted a resolution requesting all parties concerned to negotiate
their differences; it also established a special committee to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the disputes. Again, the Soviet Union and its satellites refused to cooperate in these U.N. efforts, repeating their favorite trick, and aggressive interventionist activities continued. However, after 1948 when Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Russia, the situation in Greece immediately began to improve.

**Relationship with Korea**

Greece formally recognized the Republic of Korea on 7 August 1949, and the friendly relations have been developed more closer thereafter between the two nations, having a thread of connection with the common struggle against communism in particular. Thus it has always been in support of Free Korea to help achieve the U.N. objectives in Korea, particularly in the Korean War (1950-1953).

In June 1950, when freedom and democracy were endangered in Korea where the precalculated aggressive war was launched by the North Korean Communist forces under the manipulation of Soviet Russia, the Republic of Korea Government asked for help from the Free World. The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution asking the Member Nations to give every assistance whatever possible including military aid to the fledged Republic in order to repel the Communist invaders and restore peace in this area. Offers of military and economic aid from the U.N. Member Nations trickled in.

It was unthinkable for Greece to deny such U.N. request. Faithful to its history and tradition, Greece rushed to the assistance of Free Korea with an armed force consisting of one infantry battalion and one flight of transport aircraft and participated in the defense of freedom and democracy against the Communist totalitarianism.

Thus, the Greek forces, having left their homeland just after, not even a year, hard but victorious war against the same foe, the Communists, were among the first units to come to help the Republic of Korea. Throughout the war in Korea, their exceptional devotion to their duties and their determination to win the battle, the Greek troops demonstrated themselves exceptional heroism, contributed immensely to the Republic of Korea and to all the freedom-loving world.

The 196 men of the Hellenic forces (Army 184 and Air Force 12) had sacrificed their lives in Korea, for the cause of freedom and democracy and of international solidarity proved to the world, together with the thousands of men of the United Nations killed, that Freedom has taken deep roots in the
hearts of the free peoples and that the peoples believe in it as the highest of ideals and have decided to protect it at any cost.

Moreover, Greece had extended the economic helps to Korea during and after the Korean War amounting to 171,282 US Dollars and the bulk of medical supplies and miscellaneous items.

Section 2. Brief War Account in Korea

Pericles, the great statesman of antiquity and creator of the Golden Age of Athens (490 - 429 B.C.), had said that “all the earth may serve as a grave for distinguished men.”

These words of Pericles, said for the men who gave their lives for the cause of democracy that had just emerged in Greece, are also valid for the dead that are lying here in Korea at the United Nations Cemetery who sacrificed themselves for the same world wide ideals.

Greece, after nine years of struggle during World War II, Nazis occupation and the subsequent foreign instigated-Communist guerrilla aggressions, emerged in the summer of 1949 victorious. She had hardly counted her casualties, when it learned that the North Korean Communist forces under the Soviet’s manipulation started the aggressive war in a surprise attack on 25 June 1950, and the United Nations requested her to join in the U.N. collective sanction against the Communist aggressors.

Although not even a year had passed since the Greek Guerrilla War, instigated by the Communists, was over, Greece, as a Member of the United Nations and also an anti-Communist nation, hastened to contribute to the U.N. efforts in Korea and undertook to send to Korea its armed forces which would be placed under the United Nations Command.

During the Korean War, the Greek forces, namely one Army infantry battalion organized with approximately 1,000 men and an Air Force transport flight, consisting of seven C-47 aircraft to which two more were added later, had participated in the common struggle punishing the aggressors.

Since the arrival of its first contingent at Pusan, Korea on 9 December 1950, the Greek Infantry Battalion had participated in the battles continuously until the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, engaging in all kinds of operations; offensive, defensive as well as in patrols. The last contingent of the Greek troops, then in company strength, left Korea on 11 December 1955. The
In remembrance of the Greek Forces' participation in the Korean War. Located in Kanam, southeast of Ichon.

total participants reached 4,441 men.

Among so many battles fought heroically by the Hellenic Army Battalion, the battles on Hills 381 (29-30 January), 462 (1-10 February), 325 and 326 (7-17 March), and also on the Scotch Hill (3-5 October) in 1951; the battles at Kelly-Nori Outposts (2-16 March) and Big Nori (26-30 September) in 1962; and the battles at the Outpost Harry (13 June) and Kumsong area (14-26 July) in 1953 are included.

Throughout the war in Korea, the Greek troops were the first that gave the true picture of the battle, thus attacking upon the enemy at the head of the UN
allied forces whenever they committed into action. The ascertained enemy losses caused by the Hellenic Army Battalion were 1,218 killed and 208 prisoners, besides a tremendous toll of wounded.

Meanwhile, the first contingent of the 13th Hellenic Air Transport Flight, which was among the firsts to come in the Korean theater from the Allies, arrived at Itazuke airbase in Kyushu, Japan on 26 November 1950. It soon undertook the operational missions in Korea and continued the airlift missions undiminishingly from the various airbases in Korea; K-27 (Hungnam), K-9 (Pusan), K-2 (Taegu), K-14 (Kimpo), K-16 (Seoul).

After the truce, the Hellenic Flight remained in Korea until the end of March 1955, and it departed for Greece the next day. During the period from 4 December 1950 to 26 March 1955, the Flight carried out 2,983 missions in all representing 13,777 flight-hours in which it lost four of its nine aircraft and twelve lives including one of its commanders.

The total losses of the Greek Forces in Korea were 184 dead in the Army personnel, of which three were dead in accident (DIA) during the post-armistice service, and 12 dead in the Air Force personnel among the participants of 67 officers and 27 crew-members in total. The casualty breakdown is given as follows.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
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CHAPTER II  THE GREEK ARMY BATTALION

Section 1. Deployment of the First Contingent
(9 December 1950 – 23 January 1951)

Organization

The news of the Communist aggression on the Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, aiming at the communization of the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms, called forth the immediate and direct reaction of the United Nations.

Immediately following the U.N. Security Council adopted a series of the resolutions to enter the war in Korea in a collective security effort to repel the aggressors, Greece promptly decided to send to Korea her armed forces; one infantry brigade and an air transport flight of Dacota-type aircraft.

With the assignment of Brigadier General Solon Gikas, later promoted to Lieutenant General and became the Chief of the Hellenic Army General Staff, to assume the command of a new brigade, the organization works proceeded at a rapid rate in September 1950 in the area of Lamia. Taking into consideration the nature of war in Korea far remote from Greece, its organization was completed within a month. The troops for Korea-bound were formed of specially selected personnel among the many volunteers from the battalions subordinate to the 1st, 8th and 9th Greek Divisions.

During the first fortnight of November, however, the Government of Greece, renewed its decision on the strength of the ground troops to be deployed to Korea. Because, at that time, the Korean War was seemed nearly over, the complement was cut down to about 1,000 men in an ordinary infantry battalion size. They were well-trained soldiers and rugged anti-Communist fighters inured to mountain warfare by the post-World War II Communist troubles in their own homeland.

On 10 November, this newly organized battalion was brought to Athens by train and at approximately 1000 hours, it came to the Monument of the Unknown Soldier, where the ceremony of the delivery of the war flag by King Paul took place. The next day, the Greek Battalion moved to the port of Piraeus and
embarked on the American transport, "General Han," in the afternoon. The vessel sailed out from there at 1900 hours on 16 November 1950 heading for Korea.

Arrival in Korea

At 0800 hours on 9 December 1950, after twenty-four days at sea, the troop transport with the Greek Battalion personnel on board arrived in good order in the harbor of Pusan, Korea, the southern edge of the peninsula. The next morning the Greek troops disembarked receiving hearty welcome and amid deafening cheers by the representatives of the Republic of Korea Government and the Eighth US Army (EUSAK) as well as the citizens of Pusan.

The Greeks were taken to a temporary reception center, 27 kilometers north of Pusan, where they stayed until 14 December, in order to complete their supplies in armament and other equipment, and also to improve their training, thus preparing themselves to their advent into combat action.

During the period, on 10 December, a warning order from the EUSAK was reached the Greek Battalion, instructing it to prepare for a move to Suwon, south of Seoul, upon the completion of equipment supply. Then, it was further directed on the 13th that the Battalion was attached to the 1st US Cavalry Division for operational control.

On the morning of 15 December, the main body of the Greek Battalion departed the reception center on order and entrained for Suwon, where it arrived at 1530 hours in the afternoon, while the remaining troops were still enroute by motor vehicles.

At Suwon, some 27 kilometers south of Seoul, the Greeks met with the UN comrades in arms who came from France, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand and United Kingdom all in reserve, and they remained there until 30 December preparing for combat readiness.

While in Suwon, the Hellenic Battalion was tactically reattached by the 1st US Cavalry Division, to which it was originally attached, to the 7th US Cavalry Regiment on the 18th. Two days later, on the 20th, the follow-up Greeks arrived at Suwon by motor columns, the day the 1st US Cavalry Division was placed by the EUSAK under the operational control of the IX US Corps effective 1000 hours, remaining its present mission unchanged.

The Cavalry Division at the time was securing the defensive positions on the high ground along the Seoul–Kapyong road, in order to contain the enemy advance from the directions of north and northeast, with its three regiment (the 5th, 7th, and 8th Cavalry) manning the area inbetween Sindaechon, eastern
The Greek Army Battalion

outskirts of Seoul, and Chook-tong, some six kilometers southwest of Kapyong.

The War Situation

Before going any further on the main track of this section, it will now be convenient to describe, in short, the development of the military situation in Korea at the time the Greek troops just came into the battle action.

After they initiated the aggressive war against the Republic of Korea in June, 1950 the North Korean Communist forces rushed southward, with the blitzkrieg tactics, in an all-out offensive to establish a fact of Communized Korea. The consequence was that the enemy with the tanks in the lead seized Seoul within three days and poured out southward to communize the whole peninsula before the UN forces, which were being shipped to Korea, had time to build up strong enough to repel him.

Finally, the ROK and UN forces were compressed in a small area southeast edge of the peninsula, known as “the Naktong River Perimeter” in front of which the advance of the North Korean Communist forces was definitely impeded.

The general counteroffensive of the ROK and UN forces began on 15 September, with the Inchon landing operation in a grand scheme. This was followed by the exit of the main UN ground forces from the Naktong River front on 16 September. At last the tide of war turned diametrically. They advanced to the north with an irresistible force, thus reaching the 38th Parallel within 15 days. The enemy suffered heavy losses. Ten thousands were captured and tremendous quantities of all types of war equipment fell into the friendly forces.

After a U.N. decision, the advance of the ROK and UN forces continued beyond the 38th Parallel and pursued the Reds up to the northern border, the Yalu River, making a long drive taking advantage of victory. The close of war was at hand within a matter of hours or days. At this juncture, the resistance by the Red Koreans, in a scale of the guerrilla actions, was overshadowed by the invasion of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). Late in October the CCF units suddenly began to trespass into North Korea through Manchuria, thus Red China openly challenging the U.N. effort in Korea.

Under these circumstances, the ROK and UN forces had no alternative but to withdraw, as long as Manchuria remained as a war sanctuary. Toward the end of 1950, the Red Chinese forces, including more than thirty-two divisions, attacked down southward in haste, and invaded into a few kilometers north of
Seoul. It was at this point that the Greek Battalion came in combat.

The Seoul Defense Line
(30 December – 14 January)

On 30 December 1950, the Greek Battalion was ordered by the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, to which it was attached, to move from Suwon into the Kumgyo area about four kilometers northeast of Seoul and north of the Han River in order to participate in a defense mission assigned to the regiment for the protection of Seoul. The Greeks arrived there at 1515 hours, thus joining the cavalry regiment commanded by Colonel William A. Harris.

In the meantime, the EUSA directed the frontline units to defend a general line along the Imjin River and the 38th Parallel as longer as possible to gain time pending its readiness for re-lineup, placing a particular emphasis on the Seoul defense line.

Funeral ceremony for Private Drankopoulos, the first killed in action among the Greek troops in Korea.
At the midnight of the New Year's Eve, the Chinese Communist forces launched a decisive offensive throughout the frontline, putting their main efforts on the west and midwest front which resembled the same tactics the North Korean Communists had employed at the beginning in June. To cope with the situation, the ROK and UN allies had no alternative but to make retrograde movement, inflicting the maximum damages on the foe.

On 2 January 1951, by order of the IX US Corps, the Greek Battalion was attached for operational control to the 24th US Infantry Division. This shift was to build up for the Seoul defenses. During the time the 24th US Division continued to occupy and organize the defensive positions on the Seoul bridgehead along the Uijongbu–Seoul Corridor.

Upon the arrival in the Kumgyo area, the Greek Battalion was occupied with the task of organizing the blocking positions for first three days of January, thus suffering its first loss; Private Drankopoulos Stayos was killed in action on 5 January, due to the extreme cold weather with the temperature being twenty degrees below zero. He was awarded later the Golden Medal of Galancy in action for his sacrifice. During his inspection of the Greek positions, Major General John H. Church, the 24th US Division Commander, praised with great enthusiasm the task well done in organizing the ground.

Nevertheless, with the Red Chinese entering Uijongbu on 3 January all the friendly forces were preparing to withdraw to the new defensive positions south of the Han River on one hand, while continuing a delaying action on the other hand.

After all, all the ROK and UN forces moved out once again from the Seoul defense line on 4 January, allowing the Reds to take Seoul. In that morning, the Greek Battalion assembled in the vicinity of Kumgyo and cleared the Han River crossing at 0800 hours heading for a new area. Then, the Greek Battalion was detached from the 24th US Division and reverted to control of the 1st US Cavalry Division effective at 0750 hours also on the 4th.

That afternoon, the Greek Battalion, together with the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, was ordered by the IX US Corps to move to the vicinity of Taesowon just south side of Yode-chon, some 10 kilometers due west of Chungju.

On the following morning, the Greek Battalion enroute to the assembly area in Taesowon (Taeso-ri in other name) west of Chungju, arriving by 1800 hours, and remained there onward as a part of corps reserve, preparing to occupy positions on the defense line, behind what had become the main delaying line, until 14 January 1951. It was tactically attached to the 5th Cavalry Regiment on 15 January and assigned a guerrilla mopping-up operation in the rugged mountainous areas southeast of Chungju along the main supply route.
The Guerrilla Mopping-up  
(15 – 23 January)

At 1415 hours, 14 January, the patrolling elements of the 5th US Cavalry engaged with estimatedly 1,000 enemy guerrillas dug in on Hill 553 and the high ground whereabouts north of Munmak–Sajon, about 18 kilometers southeast of Chungju. The 5th Cavalry Regimental Commander decided to clean up the guerrillas with three battalions. The 1st and 2nd Battalions prepared to make a coordinated attack at the first light of the following day against this foe, while the Greek Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Arbouzis Dionyssios, also prepared on order to attack upon the same 1,000 Reds from southeast simultaneously.

On the morning of the 15th, the Greek Battalion en route to the assigned area to sweep north and northeast through the reported enemy location, while the two cavalry battalions moved into the positions in preparation of sweeping operations. In the afternoon, the 1st and 2nd Battalions occupied the blocking positions in and around Hill 485 near Hwangjong and Hill 604 near Chommal respectively. The Greek Battalion was formally detached from the 7th Cavalry and passed to the operational control of the 5th Cavalry effective at 1700 hours, particularly for the mopping-up action.

The Greek troops now began to prepare for the attack from the vicinity of Tokkori along the axis from Pyongchon-ni through Hill 624 - Hill 553 to the high ground north of Munmak. During the night of the 15th - 16th, the air strikes were called on for the close support. On the other hand, the 35th Infantry Regiment of the 5th ROK Division under the X US Corps, which was preparing to assist the attack of the 5th US Cavalry from the north, now moved into the blocking positions near Tallongsil, nine kilometers north of the guerrilla positions on Hill 553.

In another words, the operation plan was to make a complete envelopment to annihilate the guerrillas: The 2nd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry from the west, the 1st Battalion from the east, and the Greek Battalion from the south, while the 35th ROK Regiment was to provide a secondary effort from the north.

At 0700 hours, 16 January, the Greek Battalion attacked first toward the north from Tokkori to sweep the enemy around the high ground north of Sajon–Susae-kol, when the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Cavalry still remained in the blocking positions. The two cavalry battalions also jumped off before long, and the guerrilla area was completely cleared in the afternoon. There was no
more contact with the guerrillas thereafter. The Greek Battalion now maintained the blocking positions around Tokkori and continued patrolling there with a particular emphasis on aggressive patrol during the night. Temperatures during the early morning hours dropped as low as 22 degrees below zero.

The next day, 17 January, the Greek Battalion was ordered to revert to the 7th Cavalry for its operational control effective at 1400 hours, and began to return to the regimental assembly area in Taesowon near Chungju closing in on the 18th. Continuing the patrol action around the area afterward, it remained there in reserve until 23 January.

Section 2. The Battle in the Ichon Area
(24 January – 1 March 1951)

As for the battle situation as a whole, meanwhile, the retrograde movement of the UN forces reached its limit by mid-January, and the frontline ran from the west coast near Pyongtaek, to near Wonju in the center, and thence to the east coast at Samchok.

On 20 January 1951, General Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Command, declared that “no one is going to drive us . . . This command intends to maintain a military position in Korea just as long as the United Nations decide we should do so.” General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Eighth US Army Commander ordered all the Allied units to punch in force northward, finding the enemy vanished or retreating. He further emphasized his major commands to use everything they had to disrupt the enemy buildup.

On 22 January, the 1st US Cavalry Division began to conduct a series of the probing offensives to the general area north of the Kimnyangiang–Ichon road to develop the enemy situation, disrupt the enemy attack preparations, and destroy the maximum enemy personnel and materials. Thus, by 25 January the ROK and UN forces were poised once again for a counteroffensive.

In the first offensive phase, the friendly forces undertook a reconnaissance in force. Then, in view of the absence of heavy enemy resistance to the preliminary probing, the Cavalry Division soon stepped into a series of limited offensives, across a series of phase lines (A - E), until it was relieved in mid-February.
The Battle on Hill 381
(29 – 30 January)

On 25 January 1951, when the Allied forces began a limited offensive towards the Han River line, the Greek Battalion, starting from the 24th, was in the lead together with the 1st US Cavalry Division on the mid-western front.

The objective of this offensive was to locate and destroy the enemy south and west of the Han River by advancing northward over a succession of the phase lines designated by the letters A through E. Phase line A ran generally north of the Suwon–Kimnyangiang–Ichon–Yoji road.

The advance was cautiously and methodically proceeded in such a manner that ridge by ridge and phase line by phase line to clear out every enemy soldier, so as to prevent the units from bypassing any large enemy force, which might be left behind in a position to jeopardize the safety of the advancing units.

Generally speaking the advance was made against only light opposition. With the spring thaw, the Red Chinese were apparently vulnerable to the UN forces airpower. Here and there, however, the CCF resisted determinedly and the Greek Battalion had a particularly stiff battle at Hill 381, northwest of Ichon.

On the morning of 24 January, the Greek Battalion moved as a spearhead of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, carrying out offensive reconnaissance along the axis fo Chungju–Ichon, trying to contact with the enemy. It could not meet the enemy during the first two days.

It had seized without a cost the area near Ichon with its elements in the vicinity of Saum-ni just a kilometer northwest of Ichon, Hill 273 northwest of Solbong-san, and also in Ichon. At the time, the 2nd Battalion of the 5th US Infantry Regiment, which had also been attached to the 1st US Cavalry Division since 25 January, maintained the positions around Hill 185 near Ichon, adjacent to the Greeks.

On 26-27 January, the Greek Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Arbouzis Dionyssios sent out the reconnaissance patrols from the high ground, northwest of Ichon, towards Sugwang-ni and Sojong-ni. The patrols overran the advanced light enemy elements, and observed the fortified positions occupied by the enemy in mass. All patrols were fired on by automatic weapons and mortars resembling a downpour of rain. Four men (Privates Kontos Georgios, Margelos Georgios, Nikolaou Evagelos and Saxtoyris Xarak) were killed and two wounded in this action.

On 28 January, after being relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 5th US
Infantry in place around Sojong-ni and Sugwang-ni, the Greek Battalion moved farther west by motor columns, and established itself for defense on the high ground north of Kwan-ni, about seven and a half kilometers west of Ichon, with the mission to defend the key terrain feature whereabouts. On the immediately left flank of the Greeks was the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, taking positions in the area of Hill 367, Panda-ri and Chugong-ni.

On the night of 28-29 January, at 2230 hours, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry sustained a heavy attack by an estimated CCF battalion in and around Hill 642 (Taehwa-san) north of Chugong-ni. The battalion positions were penetrated at 0300 hours on the 29th and the enemy worked in as far as the 2nd Battalion positions in Ochon-ni. By half an hour later, however, the 1st Battalion had restored the positions by counterattack.

The elements of the Greek Battalion were moved to the vicinity of Hill 642 to support the 1st Battalion but was not employed, because the Cavalry elements were continuing the attack further north after repulsing the enemy penetration. At the close of the day, the Greeks occupied the positions on and around Hill 307, while the 1st Battalion secured the high ground immediately left of the Greeks. The 2nd Battalion was now in the positions north of Hill 367. In the meantime, the patrols from the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry on the right flank proceeded to Hill 471, about six kilometers northwest of Ichon, and the high ground, a kilometer northeast of Hill 471, respectively. The patrols engaged there with the Reds and called for artillery and air support which followed soon with the noticeable results.

During the night of 29-30 January, the Greek Battalion sustained and repelled a series of severe enemy attacks by an estimated CCF regiment with 3,000 men in strength, accompanied by much noise and bugle-blowing. On the 7th US Cavalry sector at the time, the forward line was formed of four battalions, namely the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, the Greek Battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, from left to right.

At 0200 hours, 30 January, supported by mortars of all calibers, the 334th Regiment of the 112th Division under the 38th CCF Army, with strength up to 1,000 men at first, launched a determined night attack in surprise against the Greeks who were dug in on the slopes of Hill 381, north of the Yanggak-san (mountain) and about seven kilometers northwest of Ichon.

In their first attack, forming two assault echelons, one from the direction of northwest along the axis of Norumok–Konok-kol and another from Nogong-ni, southwest, the Reds rushed in human wave tactics toward Hill 381. They used trumpets, cymbals and other noisy means to confuse the defenders.
Although they received supporting fire from artillery and mortars, and from the 7th Cavalry machine guns, the Greek troops on the hill were so located that no reinforcements could get to them and they had to fight alone.

The 3rd Company on the hill faced the enemy onslaught with coolness, and took up a gallant reaction to fight the enemy back. After neutralizing the crew-served weapons, a Red group succeeded in climbing up the crest of the hill, whereupon the bloody hand-to-hand battle was raging between the Greeks and the Reds. But the enemy was driven out by stubborn counteraction.

Yet, the numerically overwhelming CCF soon resumed the attack and reached the crest two more times which fell in mass, estimated 3,000 men, against the Greek defenders, but again the brave Greeks drove them off repeatedly with bayonets, knives, rifle butts and fists, and even bare knuckles, when their ammunition was gone. The fighting continued until 0430 hours, ending with complete failure of the Red Chinese in their attempt to seize Hill 381 situated on the center of the 7th Cavalry’s sector.

Unable to dislodge the stubborn Greek defenders, the Reds finally withdrew. The friendly observers, noticing a flare, realized that this was the signal for a retreat, and they called in artillery on the route of enemy retreat, inflicting still more casualties on the fleeing Reds in disorder.

The battle was a close and tough one. At dawn the snowy slopes were streakened with blood where the Reds had dragged off their many dead. On the other hand, 2nd Lieutenant Stathias Apostolos was killed fighting bravely during the action. The Company Commander and two platoon leaders were wounded.

Parallel to the attack against Hill 381, meanwhile, the enemy attempted to assault Hill 307, defended by the 1st Company, north of the 3rd Company, but failed, having fallen into a platoon ambush. At 0210 hours, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry near Sonim-am (Temple), northwest of Hill 381, was also attacked by an estimated enemy platoon. These two enemy attempts were nothing more than feint to deceive its main effort directed on Hill 381. At 0530 hours all was quiet and the Red Chinese had withdrawn northward. (See Sketch Map 1.)

During the battle, the Greeks suffered, besides Lieutenant Stathias, ten men killed (Corporal Panselinas Pan, Privates Vourvalis Georgios, Doulos Vasiliou, Katsaros Antonios, Katsipis Averkios, Bouslos Basiliou, Mitsinigos Dimitris, Santorinos Antonios, Stasinosopoulos Sot, Tazonidis Athanasio), and three officers and ten men wounded, but many of the wounded did not want to leave the battle area, and refused to be evacuated for hospitalization. As for the enemy losses, Lieutenant Colonel Arbouzis Dionysios, the Greek Battalion Commander, estimated that 800 of the enemy were killed or seriously wounded. Besides countless wounded, 28 CCF dead were counted on the scene of Hill 381 alone. In addition,
the Greek troops captured numerous enemy equipment including automatic weapons, hand grenades, mines and a large quantity of ammunition.

In conclusion it was an important victory, and the Greek soldiers gained the outspoken admiration of the American troops. According to the story of a captured Red soldier later, this enemy attack was intended to lure the friendly troops forward into a trap where some 11,000 enemy troops were deployed. This confirmed suspicions that the enemy was building up his forces in front of the 1st Cavalry Division area.

The defense of Hill 381 was the first big action encountered by the Greek Battalion in Korea, in which the Greeks proved themselves that they were well experienced and vigorous troops in fighting against the Communists, particularly in mountain campaigning, thus contributing a great deal to the future operations of the friendly forces. It had seen no especially heavy fighting since its arrival in Korea on 9 December 1950, but its initiation on Hill 381 was a really spectacular one.

Hill 381 was a most vital terrain feature in the sector both for the friendly and enemy sides, and its loss would have exposed the flanking American cavalry units to the danger of encirclement. (See Situation Map 10, Appendix VIII.)

The Greek Battalion remained in the same general positions thereafter until 1 February when it received further order for a new attack northward.
Attacks North of Konjiam-ni
(2 February – 1 March)

By the beginning of February, the Greek troops were well on their way to becoming accustomed to the frigid temperatures and heavy snows of Korea and increasingly proficient in adapting themselves to the rugged Korean terrain.

On 1 February 1951, the Greek Battalion was ordered to take the place of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment which was continuing the attack towards the highground on the left flank of the regimental sector, along the axis of the Taehwa-san (Hill 642) – Hill 475 – Chonggwang-san – Hill 579. On the following morning, the Greeks moved from Utchommal and Twik-kol to the new area by motor transportation. Upon the completion of the relief in place around Hill 579, north of Chonggwang-san, approximately 14 kilometers northwest from Ichon in distance, the Greek Battalion advanced against heavy enemy resistance to Paribong, while the relieved American battalion was closing in the vicinity of Konjiam-ni (or Konjae).

On the morning of the 4th, the Greeks were relieved in position by the 2nd Battalion, and moved to the assembly area in the afternoon by way of Chugong-ni, closing at Twinmal at 1730 hours, where they remained for two days.

On the 6th, the Greek Battalion now assembled at Konjiam-ni where the command post of the 7th Cavalry being located since 1640 hours, 4 February.

Now on 7 February, the Greek Battalion was ordered to pass through the 3rd Battalion, the 7th Cavalry, attacking north to seize Hills 402 and 227, and the high ground further north, on which the enemy occupied the fortified positions. The entire position was defended by the 334th and 355th Regiments of the 112th Division, the 38th CCF Army.

The operation plan of the 7th Cavalry was to attack toward the Phase Line “D” with the two battalions abreast; the Greek on the right and the 2nd Battalion on the left, while the 3rd Battalion was to join the 1st Battalion remaining in regimental reserve. A heavy ground haze that day hampered the advance, but in any event the Greek troops had orders to make certain that no enemy pockets were bypassed, and rapid gains were out of the question.

At 0730 hours, the 1st Company jumped off the line of departure and attacked along the narrow nose lying down from Hill 402. The 2nd and 3rd Companies were to follow up behind. Despite the strong enemy resistance dug in on the fortified positions, the 1st Company succeeded in taking Hill 402, the first intermediate objective. Taking advantage of attacking momentum, it further
advanced against the heavy enemy small arms fire, thus seizing the next objective at 1335 hours, the high ground north of Yolmi-ri, nearly one and a half kilometers from Hill 402 in distance. The Company established the defensive positions around there for the night.

On the following morning, the 1st Company continued the attack but encountered the heavy enemy opposition at 0800 hours at the southern slope of Hill 400 in Sonjiang-dong. It became clear that the enemy would be difficult to dislodge. The hill was dotted with caves and bunkers, some of them very deep. In consequence, due to the unfavorable weather conditions and the strong Red fortifications under the cover of intensive fire barrage, it was forced to withdraw back to the northern ridge of Hill 402.

On 9 February, the 1st Company renewed the attack and succeeded in setting foot on the top of the first unnamed hill north of Yolmi-ri, receiving small arms fire and grenades at 0740 hours, but the enemy emerged from his deep entrenchments on the reverse slope. Lieutenant Manasis Loannis was killed in the head of the Greeks in this bloody fighting. Two platoons were outrivaled and the Company was forced to withdraw from the hill under the heavy enemy pressure. Whereupon it drew into a perimeter for the night.

Meanwhile, the elements of the 2nd Battalion on the left flank were heavily attacked by two enemy companies shortly after the midnight at the high ground north of Sondong-ni.

The next day, 10 February, after an air and artillery presaturation, the attack was continued by the 3rd Company commencing at 0950 hours toward its objective, a long and high ridgeline situated on the northwest of Sangdongmak.

At 1100 hours, however, the Company met with the heavy enemy opposition in which the Reds concentrated all firepower available and hand grenades upon the attackers from an estimated reinforced company well dug in on Hill 227, a kilometer northwest of Hill 271. After a while, the Greeks disengaged inflicting unknown number of enemy casualties and established a perimeter at Hill 271 for the night.

The reserve elements of the 7th Cavalry passed through the right flank units at 0800 hours on the 10th toward north, while the left flank units attacked at the same time toward objective in Sondong-ni.

On the following morning, after a series of friendly airstrikes on the objective, the 3rd Company attacked again and by the sundown it advanced to the high ridgeline south of Sangdongmak against no noticeable resistance.

At 1200 hours, 12 February, the Company renewed the attack aiming at the same objective, near Sangdongmak and reached the half way by 1740 hours
against moderate opposition. It maintained the positions around there for next two days preparing for the continued attacks.

On the morning of 14 February, the Greek Battalion was ordered to continue the advance on the high ground northeast of Sangdongmak when the 19th Infantry Regiment of the 6th ROK Division, then being attached to the 24th US Division had secured its objective, a hill mass area northeast of Sangyolmi adjacent to the Greeks on the right flank.

The Battalion sent out the strong patrols followed by the main body and advanced to a no-named height east of Sangdongmak where they met again the strong resistance under cover of automatic weapons fire. The Greeks disengaged at 1215 hours and immediately placed mortar fire on the enemy. The next morning, after continuous efforts, the Greeks occupied the high ground near

Colonel Ioannis Daskalopoulos, the Greek Battalion Commander (right), at Chipyong-ni, 23 February 1951. With him are, from left, Lieutenant General Ridgway, EUSAK Commander; Major General Palmer, the 1st Cavalry Division Commander; and Colonel Harris, the Commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment.
Sangdongmak and completed the seizure of its objective.

During the operation in this area, the Greek Battalion suffered the casualties: Besides Lieutenant Manasis Loannis, killed six men - - Private Trellogiamis Kon/Nos on the 3rd, Private Nktas Georgios on the 9th, Sergeant Mitrus Dimitrios, Privates Dalenias or Mones D., Tolis Sterglos and Stiranakis Kyriak on the 10th February respectively -- and one officer and 26 men wounded in action.

On the other hand, there were counted 150 Red dead on the seized high-ground in addition to two prisoners. Furthermore, the Greeks captured four enemy machine guns, four mortars, four M3 automatics, 13 BARs, 45 rifles of several types, and lots of ammunition.

Now the 1st US Cavalry Division was relieved of the responsibility for the present operation area by the 25th US Infantry Division effective at 1700 hours, 15 February. The relief of the Greeks was completed in place at 1630 hours by the elements of the 27th US Regiment. But the 7th Cavalry seized its objective, the Mugap-san (Hill 578), east of Kyongan-ni, before being relieved. Upon assembling by 1815 hours in the vicinity of Hill 175, one and a half kilometers due east of Konjiam-ni (Konjae), the Greek Battalion began to prepare for a troop movement.

On the early morning of 16 February, it started out there by motor transportation and arrived at Changhowon, some 17 kilometers southeast of Ichon, at 1200 hours. Whereupon it became IX US Corps reserve effective at 2400 hours.

Then, starting in the afternoon, 17 February, it continued enroute to Koksu-ri nearly six kilometers south of Chipyong-ni, by way of Yoju about 20 kilometers north of Changhowon on the 18th and Muchon-ni on the 20th respectively. During the period the Greek Battalion was returned to control of the 1st US Cavalry Division effective at 2300 hours, 19 February. Upon the arrival at Koksu-ri by 1800 hours on the 22nd, the Greeks remained there with the 7th Cavalry as division reserve until 1 March preparing itself for the forthcoming operations.

Section 3. Offensive Towards Hongchon—Chunchon—Hwachon
(2 March – 12 April 1951)

By the end of February 1951, the Red Chinese and the North Korean Communist forces were falling back all along the frontlines suffering formidable losses caused by the continued ROK and UN offensive. On the western front,
the recapture of Seoul was now at hand within a matter of days, while the UN operations were continuing pressed northward on the center and east.

The coming of March brought the renewed UN operations as the weather ceased to hamper mobility and supply as seriously as it had in prior weeks. Thus, all along the front, preparations were made to resume the push northward.

To give further, from early days of March through the first half of April 1951, the Greek Battalion, with the Cavalry units, drove northward to the Hongchon area, then turned north and continued through Chunchon to Line Kansas, north of the 38th Parallel. On 11 April, it pushed on to the Hwachon Reservoir until it received order to pull back and shifted to the Uijongbu sector.

On 2 March, the Greek Battalion departed Koksu-ri at 0630 hours on order to relieve the 5th US Cavalry Regiment in the frontline. The Greeks and the 7th Cavalry relieved the 5th cavalry on position by 1500 hours, and they immediately began to organize the defense positions north of Chipyong-ni along the line covering from Hill 329 in Mangnun-ri through Hill 283–Hill 178–Hill 227 to Hill 318, generally astride Route 44 leading to Hongchon. For a few days, there was no particular incident as far as the Greeks were concerned with the exception of patrolling actions.

For instance, a patrol party from the Greeks encountered intense small arms and automatic weapons fire at a place inbetween Hill 138 and Hill 282 at 1400 hours, 4 February, but it returned to the base safely three hours later. A platoon of trucks was with this patrol and one truck hit an enemy mine but was recovered. Thereafter the Greek elements continued patrolling the forward area with minor enemy contact.

Effective at 1345 hours on 5 February, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry was relieved of the defense positions by the 1st Battalion of the 19th ROK Regiment operating under the 24th US Division. There were now the 1st Battalion and the Greeks on the line in the 7th Cavalry sector. The remainder of the 7th Cavalry had assembled in the vicinity of Samga-ri waiting for further orders.

On 7 March, the day the ROK and UN forces resumed the aggressive offensive throughout the front, the 1st US Cavalry Division, now with the 27th Commonwealth Brigade attached in addition to the Greek Battalion, launched a decisive attack.

The primary objective of the EUSA at this time as a whole was to repel the enemy beyond the Imjin River line on the west and drive the Reds back as far as the 38th Parallel, thus, firmly securing a triangle area of Kumhwa–Yonchon–Chunchon on the central front. Facing the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division were the 125th and 126th Divisions, the 42nd CCF Army. After his
unsuccesful mid-February attack, the enemy was in no position to mount an offensive of his own, and probably would take only defensive measures against the advancing Allied units. Such was the case during the early days of this new operation.

The Attack at Hills 326 and 443
(7 – 9 March)

The Greek Battalion had been prepared for the new operation since 5 March when it received a warning order. Besides direct artillery support, it had a tank platoon attached for its operational control from the division.

Charged with the seizure of Hill 443 (Hwachae-bong) about two kilometers north from the present positions on and around Hill 297 (Hill 286 on the new map), Hill 318 and Hill 321 situated south of Yongdu-ri, the Battalion Commander decided to penetrate through the enemy defenses on Hill 326 (Hill 323 on the new map) first as his intermediate objective with two companies; the 2nd Company would make a frontal attack by bypassing the 1st Company on Hill 318, while the 3rd Company on Hill 321 would maneuver from the right flank at the same time. The 1st Company was to remain in reserve preparing for any eventuality, and it would take the lead of advance upon the seizure of Hill 443 by the two attacking brother companies.

At 0800 hours, 7 March, the two companies moved out rapidly all at once and reached the bottom of Hill 326 by 1500 hours against moderate resistance. The Canadian and Australian Battalions on the immediate right flank of the Greeks also advanced to the vicinity of Hill 314 and Hill 424 respectively by that time against moderate to heavy enemy opposition.

The Greeks resumed the attack at 0800 hours the next morning to take Hill 326. The tank platoon had also approached the hill and beat the trenches on the slopes by direct fire. After a short while, the 2nd Company reached the saddle between the first salient and the hill, and it assaulted toward the summit with fixed bayonets, completing the seizure by 1015 hours. The enemy attempted the fruitless counterattacks two times. A platoon of the 1st Company had supported this action.

On 9 March, immediately following artillery fire on Hill 443, more than a kilometer northwest of Hill 326, the 2nd and 3rd Companies started out the attack rushing on to Hill 443 at 0730 hours. Surrounded by the rugged hill mass, Hill 443 was one of the most strong holds the enemy held in the main axis of the division attack. Nonetheless the main force of the Greeks occupied the
hill at a stroke. (See Sketch Map 2.)

The Greek Battalion continued the advance the next day and reached Hill 302 near Kil-kol, five and a half kilometers further north of Hill 443, without meeting the enemy reaction. Now the Chinese Communist forces were in full retreat, evidently suffering great losses both in manpower and materials. An infantry-tank patrol from the Greeks encountered with enemy fire at 1500 hours in the vicinity of Hill 281 north of Yangdogwon-ni. The patrol killed an unknown number of Reds and continued on mission to the northeast.

On 11 March, one company advanced farther north to Hwajon-ni meeting with light enemy resistance while other elements advanced to Hill 325 northeast of Hwajon-ni by 1150 hours without meeting the enemy at all. The next day,
Greek Battalion was relieved on line by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry and occupied the new positions in and around Yangdogwon-ni. From there onward, only light resistance was encountered elsewhere in the division sector during the advance, with the enemy breaking contact and withdrawing north prior to darkness.

During the period 7-10 March Sergeant Daroglou Theodors, and four privates, namely Dimou Hristos, Rallis Fotios, Katsokis Spiridon, and Rokkas Georgios were heroically fallen in action.

The Greek troops continued to attack to the north beginning at 0730 hours, 12 March and advanced to Hill 393. An infantry-tank patrol advanced to the vicinity of Hill 321 where it met a volley of enemy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. After forcing the enemy firing positions to vanish by placing the friendly tank and artillery fire on, the patrol returned at 1600 hours. On the other hand, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Cavalry on the left had engaged heavily at 0930 hours with an estimated CCF battalion in the Odochii and Sukkol pass areas. The enemy had withdrawn north at 1830 hours.

The Attack at Hills 325 and 655
(14 – 18 March)

In continuation of Operation Ripper, the 1st Cavalry Division was now ready to make a coordinated attack with the 1st US Marine Division by double envelopment to trap the enemy in the area enclosed by Hongchon—Wolchon-ni—Changbong-ni. Hongchon possessed a critical weight as a strategical and tactical nerve center in the central front with the road communication nets running in all directions. Furthermore, it would be too hard to take Chuncheon and the Hwachon Reservoir, the utmost critical area for the UN offensive at the time, without taking Hongchon first.

Therefore, the enemy attempted to defend the town with three divisions of the 40th CCF Army. In addition, he had the 39th CCF Army in an effort to protect the town from the right flank.

The Cavalry Division, according to the IX Corps operation plan, would attack and seize the Hongchon area in zone with main efforts on the left.

The 7th Cavalry started the new attack at 0800 hours, 14 March with three battalions abreast on the line; the Greek, 1st and 2nd Battalions in order from left to right, and the 3rd Battalion in reserve.

The Greek Battalion quickly moved as far as four kilometers within two hours, and advanced further up to the high ground in the neighbourhood of
Hill 303 by 1300 hours against no enemy reaction. At 1330 hours the next day, its patrol was under heavy enemy fire, including artillery and mortars, delivered from the vicinity of Hill 154 across the Hwangyang-gang, better known as the Hongchon River. The patrol immediately requested for artillery fire on the suspected enemy gun positions.

Two days later, on the 17th, the Greek elements resumed the attack at 0740 hours and encountered the heavy enemy barrage, mostly from Hill 250 north of the river at 0900 hours. In the afternoon, however, they pushed north across the river, in an enveloping attack in concert with the 1st Battalion, the 7th Cavalry on the right, against the stubborn enemy resistance supported by heavy fire barrage.

The Greek Battalion ran through a salient situated by the river flow and seized Hill 325 (Hill 327 on the new map) after repulsing three fanatical enemy counterattacks, during which time the 1st Battalion on the right also pushed northeast, then toward west across the river breaking through a hail of enemy fire. Incidentally, the Thailand Battalion, which had been attached to the 1st US Cavalry since at 1800 hours on 7 March 1951, was remained in division reserve with the 8th Cavalry in the vicinity of
Koksu-ri with its elements securing the bridges on the Namhan River near Yoji, well rear from the present frontline. (See Sketch Map 3.)

On 18 March, the Greek elements attacked north in zone at 0800 hours and reached the half way up Hill 655 (Kumhak-san), the highest mountain in the division front, by 1015 hours, meeting moderate resistance on the way. They completed the seizure of the hill before darkness, thus accomplishing the assigned missions with the exceptionally outstanding success.

On the following day, the Battalion was relieved in place by the elements of the 8th US Cavalry and assembled in Sadan-ni, about two and a half kilometers west of Hongchon, where it remained in reserve until 22 March.

During the period, 2-18 March, the Greek Battalion suffered ten men killed: Sergeants Stiffis Theofilos and Daroglos Theodoros, and Privates Ganassv Basilios, Zotos Kon/Nos, Mihos Sorkatis, Dimou Hristos, Rallis Fotios, Katsikis Spiridon, Rokkas Geolros and Monopoulou Ioannis. In addition, two officers and 21 men were wounded in action.

On the contrary, the enemy losses were sharply different. The Greek troops killed 190 CCF among which they identified 140 dead on the battleground and captured 18 prisoners. Moreover, three 81-mm mortars, three heavy machineguns, four medium machineguns, three light machineguns, many rifles including four puppie guns and large quantities of ammunition were included on the list of the captured materials.

This particular operation for Hills 325 and 655 was reported in a special feature of the EUSAK’s paper, whose gist was as follows: “The Hellenic force, as the spearhead of the Allied forces operating in the central front, led the friendly offensive into a decisive victory, opening the way along the Hongchon–Chunchon road a very critical junction for the whole.”

General Van Fleet, the EUSAK Commander, said in his message of 25 March to the Battalion after the capture of Hill 325: “My confidence to you is beyond limits.”

The war in Korea now took a new turn as the Chinese Communists were pushed back north. Apparently, the recent UN operations had given the enemy a crushing blow. The Reds were now routing northward losing his will to fight. The ROK units restored Seoul bloodlessly on 13 March and the UN allies followed up the victory reaching the Imjin River within the days. The friendly pursuit was carrying with an irresistible force on the western front to trap the NK Communist forces between Munsan and Kaesong without delay. And all the ROK and UN forces were doing likewise everywhere all along the frontline.
Attacks Toward Hwachon
(23 March – 12 April)

On 23 March the Greek Battalion departed the assembly area in Sadan-ni at 1000 hours and taking the Hongchon–Chunchon road it closed in Kuam-dong nine kilometers south of Chunchon at 1815 hours and remained there until 27 March in order to reorganize. The Battalion celebrated on 25 March the anniversary of its national independence day. The celebration was attended by the Commander of the Eighth US Army (General Matthew B. Ridgway), the IX US Corps Commander (Major General William M. Hoge), the Commander of the 1st US Cavalry Division (Major General Charles D. Palmer), and many other guests and correspondents. General Ridgway spoke during the ceremony:

"I express my sincere congratulations and wishes on the occasion of the one hundred thirtieth anniversary of Greek Independence. The selected Greek troops that freed their country from the Communist tyranny, have played an important and honorable role in fighting against the Communism at this part of the world. The principles which still are the foundation of all democratic countries were first expressed and developed in Ancient Greece. By defending freedom here in Korea, you have proved that you are worthy heirs of the traditions of Marathon and Thermopola, and that the Sacred Flame of Freedom still burns deep in the hearts of modern Greeks. Good luck and my confidence in you is unlimited."

The celebration ended up with the decoration by General Ridgway of the Greek Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Arbozis Dionyssios and the officers and men those who distinguished themselves with outstanding battle services.

On 28 March 1951, the Greek Battalion moved from Kuam-dong to catch up the Cavalry units and established the positions in the eastern outskirts of Chunchon with its subordinate elements around the village of Notmak. Remaining around there for a few days, the Greeks sent out patrols in force deep into the enemy held area across Soyang-gang. On 30 March, a Greek patrol engaged with a platoon-sized enemy by fire fight at Hill 145 near the village of Podulgae. The next day, another patrol encountered heavy enemy fire at the bottom of Hill 365 in Changbon at 1400 hours.

As the spring thaw began to swing in earnest, the 1st US Cavalry Division
was ordered to continue the offensive more aggressively toward the Hwachon Reservoir, in an effort to seize the named Kansas Line, the immediate objective line defined by the EUSAK. Charged with the seizure of a general line along the southern bank of the reservoir, defended by the 40th and 66th CCF Armies, the 1st US Cavalry Division planned to attack with the 7th US Marine Regiment, the Thailand Battalion, the 8th US Cavalry Regiment, the Greek Battalion and the 7th Cavalry Regiment on the line, from left to right. They would renew their methodical advance, securing each day’s objective and pulling into a tight perimeter for the night.

The terrain grew there more and more difficult as the Greek Battalion moved north, and the enemy defense became correspondingly stiffer, but the spearhead of the American Cavalrymen were successful in crossing the 38th Parallel again, on 3 April, and moving to Line Kansas, by the 8th.

As left wing of the 7th Cavalry, the Greek Battalion initiated a new attack at 0730 hours, 3 April for a line ready in zone and moved up to a nose situating from Hill 148 across the Soyang River by 1450 hours. It soon lined up the attack formation rechecking everything ready for jump-off because the full offensive was to commence the next morning.

Putting the two companies abreast on the line of departure, the Greek Battalion stepped up the attack at 0730 hours, 3 April under cover of close air and artillery support. It was assigned to advance against a series of hills along the axis of Hills 365–363–655 (Suri-bong)–522–652–599–858–876 (Yonghwa-san). It reached Hill 148 by 0900 hours meeting with no enemy at all. Then, the Greeks prepared for any possible enemy counterattack on the one hand, while sending out the strong patrols the next day as far as three to four kilometers into the north on the other, in an attempt to explore and probe the enemy disposition and movement before going into any further advance.

On 5 April, the Greeks resumed the advance and reached Hill 652 north of Palsan-ni still meeting no noticeable obstruction enroute. This, without fail, indicated that the main force of the Red Chinese in this sector had already withdrawn to the north of the Hwachon Reservoir where the enemy might concentrate its efforts to fortify, because the area was surrounded with the rugged and high mountain mass overlooking the southern part of the reservoir. In addition, the enemy had in mind to defend there at all costs taking a full advantage of the natural obstacle, the reservoir.

Nevertheless, the friendly offensive continued with the same objective all the way. On 6 April, the Greeks and the 7th Cavalry advanced to the general line covering the hill mass area north of Yuchon-ni–Hill 778 by 1715 hours, inflicting approximately 300 Red casualties enroute. Passing through the Greek
troops, the 7th Cavalry continued the attack and seized the Yonghwa-san (Hill 876) and the high ground north of the Subulmu-san (Hill 639) within the day, while the Greek Battalion remained in position on the west of Hill 778 until 10 April as regimental reserve.

During a series of the hill battles from 3 April to 6 April the Greek Battalion lost 2nd Lieutenant Arvanitis Georgios and the two privates (Karathanasis Olias and Kondilis Solon) in action and 2nd Lieutenant Nikolaidis Athanasios in accident. There were also one officer and eight wounded. Private Zaharis Alehandros was killed on 8 April during a patrolling action.

Meanwhile, all the ROK and UN forces were once more able to occupy a line passing along the 38th Parallel during the early days of April. With the complete seizure of the Kansas Line, thus securing the most dominant and strategic areas, Chunchon and Hwachon, the Cavalry Division was now ordered by the EUSAK to shift to the western front near Seoul.

When the relief was effected on 10 April, the Greek Battalion was relieved in place by the 1st ROK Marine Regiment then operating under the operational control of the 1st US Marine Division. The next day, when General Douglas MacArthur was relieved of the UN Command, it prepared for a long movement to the new assembly area in the vicinity of Kumgok (Kumgang-ri) some nine kilometers northeast of Seoul.

On 12 April, the Greek Battalion departed Chunchon at 0930 hours en-routing to Changnae two kilometers northeast of Kumgok, where it arrived at 0545 hours the next day when the 1st US Cavalry Division was passed from the IX US Corps for operational control to the EUSAK Headquarters effective at 1230 hours.

Section 4. In the Uijongbu—Tongduchon—Yonchon Sectors
(13 April – 15 July 1951)

The CCF Spring Offensive
(22 April – 19 May)

Remaining in EUSAK reserve in the Kumgok area, the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered to prepare for eventual employment against any possible enemy penetration to the south through the corridors of Yonchon—Uijongbu, Chail-hi—Uijongbu, Munsan—Seoul, and Chunchon—Pukhan River, all for the
defense of Seoul against the approaching enemy spring offensive since the friendly intelligence sources had frequently been foreshadowed the Red Chinese forces were building up their combat power for another decisive offensive in a full-scale to push the UN allies southward.

The Greek Battalion, having remained in a bivouac area at Changnæ until 25 April 1951, had been kept busy with field training and reconditioning ready for future commitment into battle. During the period, on 15 April, Major General Chrales D. Palmer, the 1st US Cavalry Division Commander, inspected the Greek Battalion and decorated the Greek officers and men who distinguished themselves in battle, and further expressed his full satisfaction to have the Greek Battalion in his division.

In the meanwhile, on the night of 22-23 April, a new Red Chinese offensive came up to the UN forces expectation. It was the hardest onslaught the Chinese Communists forces ever had launched before in 1951. Particularly, the heaviest blow of the CCF human waves deluged on the western front from the two directions, the west and midwest, to envelop Seoul.

Facing the overwhelming enemy in numbers, the UN ground forces, now under the new command of General James A. Van Fleet who took over the EUSAK from General Ridgway on 14 April, had no alternative but to execute a series of the coordinated withdrawals while inflicting the maximum losses on the Reds until such a time that they would be ready for a decisive counter-offensive again.

At this juncture, the 1st Cavalry Division was released from EUSAK reserve and attached to the I US Corps on 25 April in an effort to reinforce the Seoul defenses.

On the following day, the 26th, the Greek Battalion moved on order to Nuwon, three and a half kilometers south of Uijongbu. Upon closing in an assembly area at Nuwon, it was attached to the 3rd US Division defending the Uijongbu front, against which heavy enemy attacks had been initiated. Together with the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, the Battalion took up the blocking positions without delay in Hajik-tong, west of Uijongbu, with the mission of covering the withdrawal of the friendly forces moving down along the Uijongbu–Seoul corridor. From there onward it was committed in the defensive actions through a series of the successive positions in depth down to Seoul until 3 May as a reserve unit.

With the enemy pressure continued, the Battalion moved four kilometers back down to a hill pass known as Sogwikogae northwest of Seoul on 27 April and again moved further back to Hyonjo-dong south of Inwang-san or Hill 338
near Seoul the next day when its attachment was reverted to the 1st US Cavalry Division. Being remained there for another five days in division reserve, the Greeks organized the blocking positions along the road leading from Seoul to Munsan while sending out the tank-infantry patrols.

After all, meanwhile, the so-called enemy's April offensive had halted by 29 April. The Reds had everything to lose and nothing to gain except some ground in their initial attacks at the costs of enormous losses of their forces and materials as well. Of course, the enemy failed to take Seoul. Frustrated by the Allied actions, the enemy, being depressed in spirits, had begun to retreat at last. Now the UN forces' turn came around.

With the opening of May a decided decrease in enemy activity was noted, and the vitality of the enemy's attack strength was steadily decreasing, tremendous losses of men and materials as well as taxing their supply lines to the maximum, the Reds were forced to limit their attacks and to attempt an extensive reorganization.

The Greek Battalion was ordered to return to the forward line on 4 May when the friendly forces were counterattacking toward the Uijongbu-Tongduchon axis. Taking over a sector operating by the elements of the 8th US Cavalry Regiment around Songhwang-dong in the northern outskirts of Seoul, it prepared for a new attack along the main supply route leading to Uijongbu. Upon stepping up the attack, the Greek elements continued the advance without a pause along the Route 3. The defenders were the elements of the 34th Division, the 12th CCF Army and the 187th Division of the 63rd CCF Army.

Now that the spring season in Korea was in full swing, the UN air operations became more active, thus providing the ground forces with the maximum effectiveness of close support everywhere all the more. The Allied offensive proceeded as planned and Uijongbu, the communication nerve center in the western front, was restored by the 1st US Cavalry Division with its attached Allies on 9 May. Yet, anticipating the enemy intention to renew a general offensive as soon as he completed reorganization in personnel and supplies, the advance of the UN forces was more like a probing offensive within the framework of a limited objective to restore the old Kansas Line.

As for the Greek Battalion, meanwhile, it advanced to the north of Uijongbu by 10 May and established there the strong bases from which to conduct reconnaissance in force deep into the enemy area in zone. There followed almost a week of a hull except for patrolling. On 14 May, a patrol from the Greeks infiltrated as far north into Chohoe-dong, twelve and a half kilometers north of Uijongbu, without the enemy contact. The general tendency of the enemy opposition was now characterized by the ambush actions during the night with
the strength varying from a squad to platoon and also a company size very seldom. And there had been seen no noticeable enemy reactions during the daylight hours. This meant that something was in the offing resembling a calm before the storm.

On 15 May, a Greek patrol base on Hill 202 in Chail-tong was hit by fierce fire of the enemy’s small arms and automatic weapons at 1300 hours and, the Battalion elements after placing artillery fire on the enemy positions, pursued the Reds for a some distance.

Shortly after the midnight of 15 May, the enemy poured artillery and mortar fire like a torrential storm on the Greek positions in the vicinity of Soe-kol, about three and a half kilometers northeast of Uijongbu. The friendly forces expected the enemy would come soon in another full-scale effort and sure enough here he was. In another words, it was a signal that the Red Chinese forces began once again their most decisive offensive, better known as the second spring offensive or May offensive in 1951.

This time, the enemy mounted his largest drive in the center-east and mid-east where the X US Corps and the III ROK Corps were in action. After his first spring offensive in April was ended up with his great defeat, the enemy had changed mind giving up his initial objective to take Seoul. Consequently, there felt no decisive enemy actions in the Uijongbu sector. The friendly units in the western front therefore continued the aggressive patrolling as before.

On 16 May, supported by the tanks, the Greek Battalion attempted a powerful offensive reconnaissance northward in conjunction with the 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment. Then, by means of successful infiltrations to the rear of the enemy frontline, the Greek troops succeeded in encircling and cutting-off considerably a large group of the enemy forces which was completely destroyed. There were 13 enemy dead on the spot, and three Red officers and 36 enlistedmen taken prisoner.

With the ROK and UN allies on the central front and the mid-east in the neighbourhood of Wonju and Hyong-ni were being penetrated and forced to retire back by the severe enemy blows, the units in the western areas were obliged to move back, although there was no enemy breakthrough, so as to maintain the balance of the battleline as a whole. As a result, the Greek Battalion departed the present patrol bases at 1200, 17 May and assembled in the vicinity of Hill 135 in Sowonanmal, about five kilometers south of Uijongbu, at 1630 hours. Then, it further moved down to the northern end of Seoul by 1630 hours the next day where it established the new defensive positions around Suyu-dong and Chang-dong as division reserve.
By 19 May the renewed CCF offensive had petered out, thus revealing once again their vital vulnerability against the Allied firepower that the Reds could not sustain an offensive more than a few days. The heavy toll of enemy casualties and material losses now reached astronomical figures. After rearranging the lines, the ROK and the UN forces immediately began striking north again. Toward the end of the month the old Kansas Line had been restored, crossing the 38th Parallel for the third time.

**Pursuit Towards Tongduchon—Imjin River**

*(20 May – 1 June)*

Frustrated by the gallant actions of the ROKs and their UN allied forces in April and May 1951, the Communist forces had now completely lost their will to fight. The Communist felt, without fail, they can never dislodge the UN forces out of Korea. Their second spring offensive, in which they relied on the number and hardiness of their soldiers was the last decisive try the Communist forces launched in an all-out effort throughout the Korean War.

Seizing a golden opportunity, the UN forces stepped up hot pursuit once again on the morning of 20 May all along the frontline. The tide of situation was entirely turned in great favor of the friendly side. The repeated vital defeats had quite exhausted the Red Chinese and the NK Communist forces and they were already in full retreat.

In the meantime, the 1st US Cavalry Division, to which the Greek Battalion was attached, attacked on 20 May towards Uijongbu–Tongduchon–Imjin River with its 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments and the Thai Battalion abreast in order from left to right.

The weather at this time was generally clear with northwesterly to north-easterly winds with the warm temperature up to 20-23°C, thus allowing the UN air actions increasingly more active.

The enemy forces facing at this time and during the ensuing operations were the 65th CCF Army consisting of the 193rd, 194th and 195th Divisions.

The Greek Battalion, on the other hand, continued the aggressive patrolling actions in the next few days while maintaining the reserve positions in the neighbourhood of Susu-dong, Seoul. On the 20th May when the attacking units were advancing as far as five to six kilometers forward against moderate resistance, a tank-infantry patrol from the Greek Battalion infiltrated into the Uijongbu area by 0830 hours. At 0900 hours the patrol engaged fire fight with the Reds in a platoon size resulting ten enemy killed. The 8th Cavalry reached
Uijongbu by 2100 hours, 21 May and cleared the city the following morning.

On 23 May, the Greek Battalion moved from Suyu-dong to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Kumo-dong (Kumo-ri) north of Uijongbu by 1240 hours. It further moved the next day to the neighbourhood of the Chommi-san in Tokto-ri twelve kilometers northwest of Uijongbu by 1700 hours without mishap enroute.

Upon relieving of the 5th Cavalry elements on position by 1500 hours, 24 May, the Greek Battalion attacked northward from there. Charged with the center sector of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, it advanced to the village of Uro-ri (Ulo-ri) across the Route 316 by 0815 hours in the next morning. That day, the Greeks attacked farther five kilometers north thus occupying the high ground near Chumakkori by 1600 hours. In the right sector, meanwhile, the 8th Cavalry, with the Thai Battalion attached, had already entered Tongduchon.

On 26 May, attacking through a series of the rugged hills and having overrun light enemy resistances enroute, the Battalion occupied Kamak-san (Hill 675) the most important objective and the highest mountain on the division attacking zone. By the following morning, it finally reached the Imjin River, thus accomplishing its assigned mission well ahead of time. Now it occupied the combat outposts on the both flanks of Yulpo-ri along the south bank of the river taking no a moment's respite, and it kept sending the forward security and reconnaissance patrols. There were no enemy reactions except sporadic mortar shelling.

On 27 May, an American pilot and a British enlisted man were freed, and five enemy soldiers were taken prisoner by those patrols.

The Battalion remained in this area until 29 May, when the 7th Cavalry Regiment was relieved in place by the 29th British Brigade. That day, upon completing the relief by 1200 hours, it was concentrated in the afternoon at Kwangsuwon in Nam-myon, some nine kilometers south of Yulpo-ri, remaining there until 1 June.

From 22 April until 29 May, the Greek Battalion had suffered one officer (Lieutenant Platis Dimitrios on 24 May) and three privates (Anastasopoulos Nik on 9 May, Averopoulos Pantelis on 16 May and Pagres Kon/Nos on 24 May respectively) killed; and six enlistedmen wounded. On the contrary, it had captured six Red officers and 48 men, and identified 143 enemy dead including 13 officers on the battle spots. In addition, among the captured enemy arms and equipment were two 61 mortars, one anti-tank gun, three light machineguns, seven submachineguns, 27 rifles, and a large amount of ammunition, especially mortar shells.
Offensive Actions in the Yonchon Area
(2 June – 15 July)

After a three-day rest at Kwangsuwon in Nam-myong, the Greek Battalion moved by motor transportation to a predesignated new assembly area in Saetongjae at 0930 hours on 2 June 1951 by way of Tongduchon and Chongok. The new area was located some three kilometers north of Chongok (Chongong-ni) where the Kansas Line was running through and, Chongok was one of the critical communication centers at the time, with the strategic road nets stretching in all directions; the one leading to Yonchon—Chorwon—Pyonggang to the north and to Tongduchon—Uijongbu—Seoul down to the south in particular. The Communist forces had taken this route as the attacking axis of their main effort in the outset of war in June 1950, and the Chinese Communist forces had also mounted their heaviest onslaught through the same route in April 1951.

Now the primary task of the UN troops was to organize and defend the Kansas Line in zone utilizing the best terrain available while conducting the strong combat patrol actions northward.

On 3 June, the 1st US Cavalry Division, then with the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, Belgian, Greek and Thailand Battalions attached, began a probing offensive in the morning. The new objective was Line Wyoming, extending from ten to 18 kilometers north of Line Kansas. Primarily this new line would serve as a screen while development was continued on Line Kansas.

Charged with the right sector of the division attack, the leading elements of the 7th Cavalry had already seized Yonchon by 0800 hours after they jumped off at 0545 hours. The Greek Battalion, however, still remained in the assembly area, outfitting itself for a new attack until 4 June when it poised in the north of Yonchon.

On 5 June, after crossing the line of departure, the Greek Battalion elements swiftly advanced to the Sinmang-ni area, three kilometers north of Yonchon, along the axis of the MSR 3 by 0800 hours. Whereupon it further attacked in the face of stormy enemy fire and occupied Hill 165 and Chigyingdae on which the Greeks repelled two vigorous CCF counterattacks in a company size each in the same night; one just about midnight and two hours later, that was 0200 hours of 6 June, another one. The enemy casualties were heavy, even though no confirmation was made owing to the darkness.

During the daylight hours on the 6th when the main force of the Battalion was consolidating the occupied positions, a Greek group made a probing attack
and moved up to Seryu-dong where it clashed with an overwhelming enemy force in numbers at 1305 hours. The Greek troops were ambushed by a CCF group with the reinforcements immediately behind in full battalion size in addition to the bulky covering fire of artillery and mortars. Notwithstanding, the valiant Greek troops exhibited once again their chivalrous disposition thus defeating the Red odds and secured the area. Private Sfouros Kyriakos was bravely killed in this action.

At 0800 hours in the following morning, the Battalion continued the attack and by 1100 hours occupied the high ground in the neighbourhood of Seryu-dong and Pongmang-ni encountering heavy resistance attempted by a Red Chinese regiment well dug in all along the steep slopes on the ridge. It was the 567th Regiment of the 189th Division under the 63rd CCF Army. While all this was taking place on the left flank of the 7th Cavalry sector, the 1st and 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment on the right had been in continuous advance attacking through a typical mountain area of Korea. On the immediate left of the Greeks was the 8th Cavalry with the Thailand Battalion attached.

The next day, on 8 June, the Greek further attacked and occupied the rugged hill mass area with steep-sided north of Chungsa-ri by 1000 hours with light enemy contact but returned to the positions in Todangchon and Seryu-dong for the night. In conjunction with the 7th Cavalry on the right, the attack was resumed on the morning of 9 June. By the noontime, the Greek Battalion had secured the no-named heights north of Chungsa-ri and Hoceok-tong against moderate enemy resistance in the form of artillery, mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire. The Greek elements made farther advance in expanding the outpost line, and at 1700 hours they repulsed the enemy counterattack in a company-scale and occupied Hill 218.

From 10 June to 17 June the Greek troops organized the occupied positions more stronger and continued the patrolling actions. Like other units the role of the Battalion was now to maintain its defensive positions, and to harass the enemy by vigorous patrolling and probing raids. For instance, on 11 June, the Greek adjusted their positions along the north of Route 326 taking the better terrain feature while sending out the patrols on the other hand. A patrol discovered an enemy strong hold where the Reds were digging in the emplacements with the aid of civilians across a tributary to the Imjin River, and the patrol directed artillery fire on and dispersed the Reds with estimatedly excellent results. Two days later another patrol operating from the Greek patrol base infiltrated deep into the enemy held area to detect the enemy location and was pinned down but was extricated by the two other friendly patrols and returned to the parent base safely.
Facing the 1st US Cavalry Division at this stage was the 63rd CCF Army, consisting of the 187th, 188th and 189th Divisions, with the 65th CCF Army on their right and the 12th and 15th CCF Armies on the left. By mid-month of June, the enemy reaction against the division front continued to fall off and elsewhere as well. This did mean, according to all the indications, that the Chinese Communist forces had given up their drive for any farther and the bulk of their forces was being withdrawn to the better dominant areas for the defensive operations thereafter.

Surely the Communist forces were ready for destruction. The CCF had lost a half million troops in a eight-month period while the NK Communist forces had suffered more than six hundred thousands.

On 18 June, the whole disposition of the 1st Cavalry Division adjusted relocating on more favorable terrain farther north. Consequently, after being relieved by the 8th Cavalry elements, the Greek Battalion now took up the positions vacated by the 7th Cavalry, in and around Hill 266, the village of Pangadari and Taegwang-ni, eight to nine kilometers north of Yonchon. The 7th Cavalry, in turn, adjusted its positions to the further northeast, relieving of the 29th Regiment of the 9th ROK Division in place during the day.

On the morning of 21 June, the Greek Battalion readjusted its positions to the west a little bit remaining its patrolling mission unchanged.

There followed a period of lull except for more intensive artillery shelling and patrolling by both sides. On 24 June, at 0800 hours, the Greek Battalion relieved the elements of the 7th Cavalry at the patrol base on Hill 339 situated in the north of the Kalgok village, about four kilometers northwest from its main line of resistance, handing its old positions on Hill 266 over to the 7th Cavalry at the same time. The new patrol base was then closer to the enemy outpost line of resistance locating in the area surrounded with very rugged hill masses.

At this stage the patrolling actions were the primary task of the unit, and on 26 June, a Greek patrol went out to Hill 327 in Karhyon-ni across Yokkok-chon where it engaged with an enemy platoon inflicting two Reds killed at least besides numerous wounded.

On 26 June, the 1st US Cavalry Division Commander, Major General Palmer, visited the Battalion and congratulated its troops on their outstanding successes during the recent operations.

The Greeks expanded their patrol base more wider on 27 June and sent out two patrol parties in a squad size each. One party patrolled to the southwest where the patrol placed artillery fire on an estimated enemy platoon at a defile north of Onnamu-kol, some two and a half kilometers from the base in distance.
The other party went out to a hill ridge northwest of Mok-tong, around a kilometer from the west end of the patrol base and it also directed there artillery fire on the enemy position held by a reinforced company, inflicting estimatedly high rate of casualties.

On 28 June, the Battalion carried out successfully a probing offensive. A composite task force, organized with the Greek Battalion, two companies of the 7th Cavalry, two batteries of 105 millimeter howitzer, two batteries of 155 millimeter field artillery, one tank company from the 70th Tank Battalion, a platoon of engineers, psychological warfare team and a bomb disposal squad, departed the line of departure at 0600 hours. With the tanks in the lead, the Greek Battalion advanced more than eight kilometers within two hours without meeting any enemy reaction, thus reaching Yokkok-chon situated on the northern end of the so-called T-Bone Ridge by 0800 hours. It continued the aggressive attack and by 1245 hours advanced four more kilometers up to the
area of Chamui-dong and the high ground south of Un-dong, where it received enemy fire in torrents from an estimated CCF company. After fire fight the Greeks disengaged on order and withdrew at 1400 hours when the tank elements further advanced up to the south bank of the Chuktae Lake without further enemy contact and started to return to the friendly units. The task force was dissolved at 1900 hours with the elements returning to their respective parent units.

Thereafter the patrolling actions in force were a routine activity for every unit to capture and probe the enemy situation whenever the opportunity occurred. On 29 June, a Greek platoon patrol reinforced with a weapons squad moved out to Hill 234, later better known as the Porkchop Hill for its particular shape, across the river and engaged with an estimated enemy platoon at 1540 hours. The patrol broke contact and returned to the base by 1800 hours.

On 1 July, the Greek Battalion, upon handing the present patrol base on Hill 339 and its vicinity over to the 7th Cavalry elements, took up the main defensive positions with a frontage of approximately two kilometers wide covering from Taetong-ni to the northeasterly ridge of Hill 267 on the middle portion of the 7th Cavalry sector, with its combat outpost on Hill 292 some five kilometers north from the MLR in distance.

Continuing the patrolling actions, the Battalion remained in this forward sector until 15 July when the 1st US Cavalry Division went into Corps reserve. During the period the Greek officers who distinguished themselves in the recent battles were decorated by the Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division on 12 July at the Command Post of the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

During the serialized offensive patrolling, the Battalion demonstrated itself the high standard of combat spirit killing 48 Red Chinese and capturing 20 together with two 61-mm mortars, six light machine guns, five automatics and 20 rifles at the noble cost of four men killed and one officer and 20 men wounded in action.

Section 5. Patrolling Actions in Force
(15 July – 30 September 1951)

Talking Front

From mid-June 1951, the battlefront became a stalemate except for shelling
of artillery and mortars and relatively minor incidents. In short, the trend of the enemy activities was confined to patrolling or ambush while strengthening the defenses well beyond the old 38th Parallel, which was no longer being in existence because the Communists had broken it on 25 June 1950.

No doubt, the Communist forces were now being in a serious fix themselves for they had completely lost confidence in their ability to continue the war. In the outset, the Reds had suffered repeatedly the fatal defeats thanks to the brave Free Koreans together with the UN forces in support fighting for a rightful cause against the aggressors. Right always prevails in the end. Thus, the combat power of the ROK and UN forces were being greatly increased day after day, while the Red Chinese and NK Communists were becoming weaker by day on the sharp contrary. The enemy was driven to the wall.

Consequently, the Communist aggressors had thought a stratagem as a desperate shift -- a cease-fire. On 23 June, 1951, Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations in New York, proposed a cease-fire negotiation on the U.N. radio broadcast. Two days later the Peking regime in Red China seconded the Soviet proposal. Then, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko repeated that the proposed armistice negotiations would be strictly military and would not involve the political matters.

On 29 June, General Ridgway, the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command, upon receiving the introductions from Washington, sent the message by radio to the Communist side proposing that a meeting for the cessation of hostilities could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship "Jutlandia" in the Wonsan Harbor. A reply from the Communist forces came in the following night, suggesting Kaesong as the meeting place. As a result, the cease-fire talks began at Kaesong from 10 July 1951.

Eventually, General Ridgway's acceptance of Kaesong as a meeting ground was one of the serious mistakes the UN Command had committed itself during the war. Frankly speaking, the UN Command fell into an enemy trap, thus acting advantageous to the Communist aggressors. In other words, the area became a sanctuary for the UN attack afterward allowing the enemy to get more closer freely to Seoul. Driven by too impatient for the armistice talks, this was resulted from miscalculations about the Communist's real character and purpose.

In retrospect, the friendly forces could have easily advanced to the Kaesong area without cost if the UN forces continued the offensive following up the victorious momentum in June 1951. This was the big picture when the Greek Battalion was operating in the Yonchon area.
Aggressive Patrolling
(3 August – 30 September)

On the morning of 15 July 1951, the Greek Battalion was relieved in place in the neighbourhood of Taptong-ni by the element of the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Division and assembled in Chosong-ni about three kilometers southeast of Chongok. It remained thereafter in this bivouac area for twenty days until 2 August dealing with the organization tasks on the Kansas defensive line.
From early August to the end of September 1951, the Greek Battalion remained in the defensive positions in the area north of Yonchon where it exhibited a remarkable patrolling action, thus wearing out the enemy.

On the morning of 3 August, the Battalion returned to the frontline northwest of Taegwang-ni, taking over the forward positions from the elements of the 24th Infantry Regiment, the 25th US Division. The Battalion sector covered a width of four kilometers from the high ground south of Kumgong-ni to a hill ridge area in Taptong-ni. It put two companies on the main defense line with its outpost in company size on Hill 338, four kilometers north from the main line of resistance in distance. (See Sketch Map 4.)

As for its adjacent units, on the left flank was the 2nd Battalion, the 8th Cavalry and on the right the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry. The enemy formation opposing the friendly units here in the Yonchon front at this time was the 65th CCF Army, consisting of the 139th, 194th and 195th Divisions, with the 47th CCF Army on its left and the 64th CCF Army on the right.

There followed a series of the patrolling activities in force aimed at probing the enemy defenses and detecting his movement with a particular emphasis on capturing the prisoners. A pattern of this type operations characterized the tactical concept of the UN forces since the truce negotiations had started. The enemy had a very light outpost screen and there took place only light contact with the enemy during the ensuing operations. Accordingly, the months of August and September saw relatively the static warfare, as far as the Battalion was concerned, with the exception of aggressive patrolling and a few minor incidents.

In any case, the Greek troops exerted all possible efforts to accomplish their assigned missions. Taking an instance, on 6 August, a reconnaissance party patrolled to a hill mass complex north of its patrol base on Hill 338 at 1540 hours and directed mass artillery fire on the enemy group there inflicting estimatedly a serious damage. In another incident, the patrol base on Hill 338, eventually the regimental observation post in the 7th Cavalry sector, was heavily attacked by a reinforced enemy company with the full weight of artillery support at 1900 hours on 8 August. As a result, the Greek company was forced to withdraw for the night. Supported by the 105-mm howitzers, the Greek troops counterattacked at the first light the next morning and restored the outpost when the Reds fled to the north carrying a toll of casualties with them.

Three days later, that was on 11 August, the Hellenic Battalion was cited for its exceptional combat merits by General James A. Van Fleet, the EUSAK Commander, who visited the Battalion accompanied by Lieutenant General J.W. O'Daniel, the I US Corps Commander, Major General Thomas L. Harrold, the
Commander of the 1st US Cavalry Division, and Colonel Dan Gilmer, the 7th US Cavalry Regimental Commander. All they praised the Greek troops in highest terms with one accord for their continued successes in battle. That day, incidentally, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry was returned to the parent regiment from the security mission in Munsan-ni.

At that time, the Greek Battalion had one more important outpost on Hill 339, in addition to the one on Hill 338. Around 0400 hours on 19 August, the enemy attempted a probing attack which seemed like a feint in nature, employing a reinforced platoon, against the patrol base established on Hill 339 north of Kalgok, approximately four kilometers northwest of the main line of resistance. But again the Reds failed their attempt only gaining their own additional casualties.

On the following day, the Battalion was relieved in place by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry by 1155 hours and assembled in the area nearby Wacho-ri at 1400 hours. It remained there twenty days until 9 September, when the Greek troops took up the reserve positions in the neighbourhood of Oksan-ni, Pulgye-dong and Kwangdaek-kol, thus providing the successive positions in depth for the friendly operations north of Yonchon. Then, the Battalion was kept busy there for another two weeks with field training and reconditioning for the future operations.

On 23 September, the Battalion squeezed the reserve positions into an area with a width of two kilometers behind the main line of resistance, covering from Korim-dong to Chomchon. Shortly before the noontime the next day, it took over a forward sector from the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry, establishing its combat outpost with the 1st Company in Chura-dong. Thereupon the Battalion ceaselessly sent out the aggressive combat patrols in order to keep the enemy off balance, while strengthening the defensive positions during the rest of the month. These were preliminary activities pending for a big move in October.

Section 6. The Battle of the Scotch Hill
(1 – 30 October 1951)

Prelude

As the month of October 1951 opened, during which the fine weather was
followed for air operations in full support, the UN forces, taking the initiative, launched a number of attacks along the front. Specifically, the offensive was to possess the better positions before an agreement on the line of demarcation, the first disputed item at the truce negotiation table, would be reached, and this concept eventually led to a pattern of the bloody battles to take the hill and hold the hill everywhere.

In the west central front where the Greek Battalion was operating at the time, the UN forces planned to launch a full-scale offensive, the named Operation Commando, one of the largest operations after the commencement of the truce talks, to seize a new forward defense line called the Jamestown. In another words, this operation, showing the enemy that the UN forces were still eager to take the decisive offensives, was to capture and secure the key terrain features from the west bank of the Imjin River to the northeast of Chorwon (Cholwon). The seizure of this objective line would screen the Yonchon—Chorwon valley lines of communication from the enemy observation and long range artillery fire, thus permitting the development and freedom of the friendly railroad line between Seoul, Chorwon and Kumhwa.

In the case of the 1st US Cavalry Division to which the Greek Battalion was attached, it would attack to the northwest on a 13 kilometer front between Kycho-dong on the east bank of the Imjin River and the area of Karhwa-kol.

On D-Day, 3 October, the 1st Cavalry Division units moved out with the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments abreast, while the 8th Cavalry Regiment remained in reserve. In the 7th Cavalry sector, on the center of the division formation, the attack was commenced, immediately following an hour long artillery preparation fire, with the 3rd, Greek, and 2nd Battalions abreast. The objective was “Craig” including Hill 347 situated on the south of a branch stream of Yokkok-chon, Hill 327 in Karhyon-ni, Hill 313 near the village of Sonbyok, and Hill 418 northwest of Unhaeng. The area was flanked with the steep and rolling hills and ridges, particularly in the axis of attack all the way through. It was clear at once that the coming operation would be no easy one.

The 139th and 141st Divisions of the 47th CCF Army were defending the enemy’s main line of resistance with the 140th Division in reserve facing the division attack. They had constructed the defenses with the strong bunkers and trenches supporting each other by fire cover, and with heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar barrage interdicting the avenues of approach to the hills and ridges. In addition, there were scrupulous barriers fortified in the form of doubled mine fields combined with barbed wire aprons guarding the trenches and bunkers. (See Situation Map 11, Appendix VIII.)

On 1 October, the Greek Battalion received an attack order from the 7th
The Greek Army Battalion

Cavalry Regiment to attack at H-Hours, D-day in the direction of Hill 313 (Scotch) — Hill 334 (Nebb) or Hill 327 on the map, which were firmly held by the CCF units. This meant that the Battalion would have no option but to breakthrough the rugged heights and ridges enroute.

The Battalion Commander, after estimating the situation, decided that the attack should be carried out in two phases. In the first phase, Hill 313, more famed to the UN troops as the Scotch Hill, was to seize by the 1st Company, and in the second the Nebb Hill by the 3rd Company.

D-Day

Charged with the center portion of the 7th Cavalry sector, the 1st Greek Company began to move toward the Scotch at 0600 hours, 3 October. Yet, the enemy response was immediate and violent. The enemy centered his determined resistance in this zone of action. Despite the use of every available weapons, the attackers could make only inch-by-inch progress for the next advance. The Greek troops therefore had to fight for every foot of ground from the beginning. Nevertheless, after jumped off the line of departure, north of Chura-dong, the Greek skirmishers dashed at 0845 hours against the first enemy entrenchments. The 1st Company attempted to storm Hill 313 along with the ridge and high ground extending from these points. The battle was carried out fiercely by both sides and with extensive use of fixed bayonets, hand grenades and flame throwers. Within a short while, the entire 1st Company was engaged in bloody battle. The Greeks tried hard to capture the Scotch Hill, but the enemy also resisted persistently from his fortified entrenchments on the crest. The attackers soon ran into a wall of steel. The extremely heavy casualties finally forced them to pull back.

The Reds were obviously well dug-in in depth as well as along a main line. Rugged hills and ridges were protected by an extensive system of bunkers and trenches. Their bunkers were apparently deep and carefully made. Furthermore, the enemy troops holding these excellent positions were well supplied and equipped. The summer lull, while the truce talks appeared to be progressing, had given the Reds an opportunity to prepare themselves well, and their weapons, ammunition and supplies -- as well as their morale -- seemed to be in the best condition.

Shortly before the mid-day, the 1st Company resumed the attack but failed again only to suffer heavy casualties from the Red Chinese counterattack that followed: With the bulk of automatic weapons fire support, including more than
ten machine guns, in addition to bolder employment of the artillery pieces in
direct support, the Red assault wave flowed over the Greek attackers in disregard
of their tremendous casualties, thus showing their brutality. The bitter and close
fighting lasted for two hours. The tough resistance of enemy appeared to be
determined to hold the debating hill at any cost. In the long run, the the Company
withdrew to the area north of Hill 215 by 1430 hours for the night, owing
to an inevitable circumstance.

There followed before long a series of the friendly airstrikes upon the
Scotch Hill, as requested by the Greek Battalion Headquarters. The air attack
continued from 1430 hours to 1700 hours completely neutralizing the contro-
versial hill and whereabouts.

The coming darkness found that the Greek fighters were near their objective
which was still in the hands of the enemy. During this heroic effort of the 1st
Company in the first day attacks, two officers, one non-commissioned officer
and eleven enlistedmen of the Battalion lost their lives.

In the evening of the same day, the I US Corps Commander sent to the
Battalion the following message: “Let everybody know that the Greeks were the
first to give the real picture of the battle. I send you congratulations for ex-
ceptionally gallant action.”

In the first hours of that night, the Battalion Commander ordered his troops
to withdraw to the previous line of departure for the night. At 1900 hours, the
Battalion was notified by the 7th Cavalry Regimental Commander that, on the
next day, the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry would reinforce the 7th Cavalry
on the right and attack to seize Hill 418 and continue its maneuver toward west.
At the same time the Greek Battalion was ordered to take advantage of that
movement and attack again to capture the Scotch Hill.

On the other hand, the situation in the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry
on the immediate right flank of the Greeks was quite similar. It attempted to
assault Hill 418 and reached the hill despite the intensive enemy resistance but
could not hold on. Then there continued the close fighting during which the
positions changed hands several times. The 3rd Battalion on the left flank also
encountered severe opposition during the course of attack and could reach not
far than the area southwest of Homang-ni.

D Plus One

In the morning of 4 October, the disposition of the Greek companies were
as follows: The 3rd Company positioned 700 meters south of the top of Hill 313,
and the 1st and 2nd Companies on the line of departure. It was understood that success of the Greek operation depended upon the seizure of Hill 418 on the right, but the situation did not develop as foreseen. Despite the heavy fighting with the close air support, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry together with the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry in reinforcement could not step much forward as planned.

At this juncture, when the Greek Battalion had just begun to step up, it was ordered by the 7th Cavalry Regiment to try again to seize the Scotch Hill using its own means. Thus, at 1400 hours, the 2nd Company started for the Scotch supported only by a base of fire effected by the 3rd Company. The Company soon encountered heavy mine concentrations coupled with strong artillery and mortar fire. It still continued the move and now was fired upon from Hill 347 and Hill 334. Its first attempt to climb the highground was halted by tenacious enemy opposition hurling a shower of hand grenades plus the bulky fire barrage.
At 1500 hours, the Company attacked for the second time. The battle fell into a bitter hand-to-hand fighting and the Greeks made a great effort and finally succeeded to ascend to the enemy bunkers, but were again forced back to the line of assault due to the heavy fire barrage of the enemy who was being continuously reinforced. The Red Chinese had committed the elements of their 2nd Artillery Division in the front. Moreover, the enemy now brought down his 140th Division on the line from reserve.

The development of the battle made it clear that, in spite of the braveness and determination of the attackers, the objective was too strong that almost impossible to seize unless superiority of fire power over the enemy was secured. The Battalion Commander, seeing that the attempts were in vain and the only results were casualties, ordered the 2nd Company to withdraw back to the line of departure under the cover of smoke screen.

D Plus Two

On the following morning, the Scotch Hill was bombarded fiercely by the UN air forces and artillery. 105-mm, 155-mm and 8-inch shells, and bombs of all types and weights fell rapidly on the height and its vicinity. The result of this tremendous bombardment became obvious at 1430 hours when the 2nd Company ascended on the Scotch without meeting any resistance. Almost all the enemy defenders were dead. Some, who were hiding in the underground shelters to protect themselves from the bombs, were taken prisoners adding twelve more on the POW list, and much war equipment was captured. It was really a grim scene beyond description, exposing 150 Red dead, and the countless shell fragments were scattered all over the ground.

As for the defense positions organized on the hill, it was the formidable one the Greek troops had ever seen before and the enemy had defended this particular hill with four companies. (See Sketch Map 5.)

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry also occupied Hill 418 without opposition on the right, while the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry advanced to the ridge southwest of Hill 418 at will. This indicated that the Red Chinese had begun to flight to their next defenses across the Yakkok River during the night of 5-6 October before suffering more fatal blow. According to the prisoners of war taken on the 5th, the Reds were falling back to six to seven kilometers to the north.
Battle Lessons

Owing to the bloody experience on Hill 313, the Greek troops now had a much clearer idea of how well the Red Chinese had fortified themselves. Indeed, that was quite new to them. The CCF defensive positions were elaborate. They had built huge, deep bunkers, covered at times with as much as 15 feet or more of logs, rocks and earth, between these strong points, along the reverse slopes of the hills, ran an intricate network of trenches.

The system of heavy bunkers, interconnecting trenches and escape routes offered such security that bitter hand-to-hand fighting often was necessary to seize the ground. During an artillery barrage, the Reds could withdraw by means of these trenches and re-enter when the artillery lifted. When the friendly troops neared the emplacements, therefore, they were met with a shower of grenades and a wall of fire through which it was necessary to charge in order to overrun the trench and destroy the enemy. Thus, the Greek troops gained very valuable lessons beyond estimation at a cost of 28 killed in action at the battle of the Scotch Hill.

Postlude

The Battle of Hill 313 (the Scotch Hill) was one of the utmost bloody battles fought by the Greeks in the Korean War. The hill had then a heavy tactical weight acting as a defiladed gateway to the open Yokkok-chon valley, providing the UN forces with much better defensible ground and key terrain overlooking the enemy’s forward territory.

The Battalion was honoured later date with the Presidential Unit Citations both from the Republic of Korea and United States Governments in recognition of its unsurpassed battle account on the Scotch Hill and whereabouts.

The total casualties of the Greek Battalion during the Scotch Hill Battle of 3 – 6 October were three officers, three noncommissioned officers and 22 men killed; and two officers and 85 enlistedmen wounded. The personnel who gave their lives in this action for the cause of freedom were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Mbumumis Patroklos</td>
<td>3 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>Tanis Athanasis</td>
<td>3 October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sergeant Madesis Xristos 3 October
Private Vlagospiros Evagelos 3 October
Private Illopolous Koninos 3 October
Private Karlagiannis Georgios 3 October
Private Martinis Georgios 3 October
Private Pantelis Minas 3 October
Private Papana Stasiou Cristos 3 October
Private Tsikrikis Cristos 3 October
Private Fasoulakis Emmann 3 October
Private Ellipopoulos Nikolaos 3 October
Private Xatsigeorgios Dimi 3 October
Private Haviaris Vasilios 3 October
Lieutenant Mauromatakis Stefanos 4 October
Corporal Illopolous Eleuther 4 October
Corporal Kosmaras Athanas 4 October
Private Panagiotis Styli 4 October
Private Giannopoulos Simiinius 4 October
Private Stayrou Eleutherios 4 October
Private Koukouras Kuriakos 4 October
Private Miaulis Stefanos 4 October
Private Lagios Panagiotis 4 October
Private Mastorakis Ilias 4 October
Private Mallinis Loannis 4 October
Private Rousos Nikolaos 4 October
Private Panagopoulos Stayros 4 October
Private Salavadas Emmann 4 October

During the next few days, the Greek Battalion carried out a series of minor operations in the same area and exhibited excellent patrolling activities, mostly offensive.

On 7 October, the Battalion elements, after being relieved of Hill 313 in place by the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry, moved and attacked to the farther west in the vicinity of Sidamak, where they met strong enemy resistance. From 0935 hours to 1215 hours, the Red Chinese counterattacked three times as it labored up a finger ridge northeast of Hill 287 but were beaten back carrying the heavy casualties with them each time. The enemy attempted another counterattack two hours later only to suffer his own casualties. To the left flank of the Greeks, meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry finally seized Hill 287 on 7 October after a series of the close battles back and forth since 5 October.
The Greek Army Battalion

The 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry on the right flank had also cleared Hill 347, about six hundred meters northwest of Hill 334, by the end of the same day.

On 8 October, the Greek Battalion continued the attack northwest and advanced to the vicinity of Hill 275 by 1100 hours, encountering the bulky volume of enemy artillery and mortar fire. It completed the seizure of Hill 275 at 1645 hours. This particular hill was to become better known as the Old Baldy Hill in the later part of war when artillery and mortar fire destroyed the trees on its crest.

Taking the defense positions around there the Battalion conducted the patrolling actions in zone, under the operational control of the 8th Cavalry effective on 10 October for the time being.

Now the patrolling became a routine task to seek out the enemy situation, aiming at capturing the prisoners in particular. On 13 October a patrol from the Battalion moved up to a finger ridge running down to the Yokkok River, nearly a kilometer northwest of Hill 275, where it received enemy’s long range fire from the area across the river. The Battalion was returned to the 7th Cavalry for operational control effective at 1500 hours the next day.

Sketch Map 6
There followed a static period during which the Greeks chiefly, engaged in strengthening the present positions. Effective at 1500 hours, 21 October, the Battalion was attached again to the 8th Cavalry, when the 7th Cavalry assembled in Yonchon becoming division reserve.

On 24 October, the Battalion sent out a patrol in platoon strength to a ridge north of Ut-kkaemugi, where the patrol engaged with a CCF company, killing 35 Reds and destroying the six machinegun positions. Two days later, another patrol party went out as far up to the vicinity of Hill 233, later known as the Chink Baldy Hill, northwest of Ut-kkaemugi and directed artillery fire on the enemy positions. (See Sketch Map 6.)

After being relieved of the positions in and around Hill 275 by the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry by 0930 hours, 27 October, the Greek Battalion closed in an assembly area at Sinchon a little over five kilometers north of Yonchon at 1215 hours.

During the period from 6 October to 26 October, after the Scotch Battle, the Battalion inflicted remarkable casualties upon the elements of the 139th and 141st Division under the 47th CCF Army; 25 dead were counted in addition to ten prisoners of war. Among the captured enemy war equipment, one 75-mm gun and large quantities of ammunition were included.

And yet, it should not forget there involved the sacrifice of brave lives. Two officers and seven enlistedmen were killed -- Privates Daniil Georgios, Themistoleous Odis and Xatziagiannis Athanastios on the 6th of October; 2nd Lieutenant Matsukas Georgios on the 7th; 2nd Lieutenant Stassos Ioannis on the 9th; Private Agelidis Ioannis on the 17th; Private Kliatis Anastastios on the 20th; Private Metazas Dimitrz on the 21st; and Private Kiriazopoulos Spil on the 23rd, respectively -- totalling at 37 lives lost in action during the month of October alone. Besides, one officer and 27 men were wounded in this last series of operations.

The esteem of the Allies for the Greek Battalion and their confidence in it were greatly increased after the battle of the Scotch Hill and the subsequent operations, in which the Battalion was very active. A proof of these feelings was the message sent by the Commander of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment, who directly exercised the operational control over the Greek Battalion, to the Chief of the Greek Liaison Team to the United Nations Command in Tokyo, Japan. The message said that “the Greek Battalion had become more dear to the men of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment with the incomparable braveness that distinguished it during the recent attack. I consider it a great honor to have the privilege of commanding this brave Unit.”

On 28 October, Sunday, the Battalion commemorated at Sinchon the
anniversary of the Italian attack against Greece in 1940. General Van Fleet, the Commander of the Eighth US Army, delivered the message in which he stated that "I wish to pay to you and to all admirable Greeks my highest respects on this occasion of OXI anniversary. Eleven years ago, the Greeks answered "NO" to the inexorable invasion of Mussolini. Since that day, the Greeks continued to resist arrogantly every form of tyranny and violence as they have always done through centuries. It is very pleasing that the Greeks are represented in this fight for Freedom in Korea. Your Battalion, as part of the UN ground forces, have succeeded to attain a prominent combat records."

Lieutenant General O'Daniel, the I US Corps Commander, who was present at the event, pinned the decorations upon the breast of four officers and two enlisted men for their glorious battle accounts during the recent operations.

Two days later, that was on 30 October, the Battalion returned in the first line at 1330 hours, when it took up the defense positions, in a two kilometer front between the high ground north of Tokhyon-ni and Hill 287 on the right flank of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment.

Section 7. The Stalemated Battleline
(1 November 1951 – 27 February 1952)

The Active Defense
(1 November – 25 December)

Averting the eyes from the battle ground to another fighting front of the talking warfare at this time for a moment, the truce negotiations had been fallen into a deadlock from the very beginning caused by the Communist trick. The Communist side had been devoted all their efforts to utilize the truce tent as a main stage of its propaganda show. In brief, the Communists went out of their mind to gain at the talking war the ground for which they lost in the field. In the long run, the cease-fire talk resumed at Panmunjom on 25 October 1951 after much complications. First of all, this was another big mistake the United Nations Command had committed itself during the course of the negotiations. It made a concession too much to the enemy's demand. Panmunjom, locating at about 35 kilometers northwest of Seoul, situated too close to the friendly front-line. In the other words the enemy expanded a sanctuary area more wider to protect himself from any further attacks by the UN forces.
From then onward, a stalemate ensued in the battle field for a considerable period except for minor incidents all along the front.

At 1130 hours, 1 November 1952, the Greek Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment on position south of Yangijamal, less than a kilometer from the main stream of the Yokkok River in distance. That very date, the Battalion was returned to the 7th Cavalry Regiment for operational control. On the following morning, it adjusted the positions expanding up to the high ground in the neighbourhood of Chongjamal. On its right flank, the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry was manning on the key terrain features inclusive of Hill 275, while the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry held the positions on the left.

The continued patrolling actions were a customary task of every unit at this stage of war. The Greek troops carried out the patrolling in force as a routine mission without exception. On 2 October, a patrol went out to a ridge near Hill 222 where it engaged with an unknown number of enemy in fire fight between 1115-1430 hours, and returned to the patrol base after placing artillery fire on the enemy positions. The next day, a patrol group moved into the enemy area near Hill 168 where it received a shower of automatic weapons fire from the enemy at 0930 hours. The another group infiltrated farther north into Hill 222 without mishap.

Effective at 1650 hours, 6 November, the Greek Battalion was passed to the 5th Cavalry Regiment for its attachment, when the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry on the immediate left flank was relieved in place by the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry. There followed a lull with the exception of patrolling and minor adjustment of the positions until 14 October when the Battalion was relieved by the elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry. Shortly after the midday on the 14th, the Greek Battalion moved on order back to the vicinity of Hill 290 and the village of Kalgok, where it occupied the blocking positions until 19 November when it was ordered to assemble in Chinjon-ni two and a half kilometers northwest of Yonchon.

At that time, the 1st US Cavalry Division was to be relieved in zone by the 3rd US Infantry Division beginning from 19 November, as the former would be transferred to Japan very shortly when the 45th US Infantry Division arrived in Korea.

The Greek Battalion was reverted to the operational command of the 7th Cavalry Regiment from the 5th Cavalry upon the arrival at Chinjon-ni at 1530 hours, 19 November, and remained in this reserve area until 25 December. During this period, the Battalion underwent general training devoting most of its time and effort to the troop reconditioning. The one thing noteworthy was
Review of the Greek troops in the advanced post.

that the Greek Battalion was formally relieved from the attached 1st US Cavalry Division and was attached to the 3rd US Infantry Division effective on 28 November 1951, thus marking an end of considerably long and very friendly comradeship in arms, more deeper and closer than the blood relations, between the two Allies in the Korean battlefield ever since the Greeks came into action in December 1950.

On his departure, Major General Thomas L. Harrold, the Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, sent the following "Good Bye" message to the Greek Battalion Commander:

"All of us serving in the 1st US Cavalry Division feel a deep regret for leaving our Greek brothers in arms. Since it arrived in Korea, the Greek Expeditionary Force became an unseparable part of our fighting units and during all this time were linked together with true friendship and comradeship. The fact that we had the brave Greek fighters on our Free Allies makes us happy and we wish the best of luck in your future operations against the our common foe."
On the East of the Imjin  
(26 December – 27 February)

The Greek Battalion was attached to the 65th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd US Division effective at 1200 hours, 26 December 1951, and moved to a new assembly area in Sinmang-ni, a half kilometers northeast of Chinjon-ni.

On 28 December, when the adjustment of the disposition took place within the division zone, the Battalion was sent to the front in the sector of the 65th US Infantry Regiment. The Battalion sector was situated in the high ground, inclusive of Hill 202, along the east bank of the Imjin River south of Kyehodong. Charged with the left flank of the 65th Infantry, it was to hold the area at all costs and prepare for the eventual attacks in order to seize the critical terrains on order.

On its left neighbour was the 20th Philippine Battalion Combat Team under the 7th US Infantry Regiment, while the 2nd Battalion of the 65th Infantry was on the right flank.

The enemy now facing the front was the 139th CCF Division, consisting of the 415th, 416th and 417th Regiments, and the strength of each division was about 5,000 to 6,000 men in average at the time. The winter in Korea had already fell on the battlefield covered with thick snow, and the Greek troops had to cope with the severe cold weather being twenty degrees below zero. However, the advent of such weather seemed to favor for the UN forces slightly because the UN units possessed for the most of part the south slopes of the hills and mountains which were frequently free of snow and warmed by the sun. Still the enemy forces were well experienced odds in North Korea and Manchuria to manage such cold.

Under these circumstance, the 3rd US Division, to which the Greek Battalion was attached, lined up the forward positions by manning with the 7th Regiment, the 20th Philippine BCT, the Greek Battalion, and the 65th Regiment, from left to right. The 15th Regiment and the Belgian Battalion were kept in reserve.

On the talking war front, in the meantime, on 27 November an agreement was reached on the first big dispute, the line of demarcation, after a series of repeated stormy meetings. The Communist delegation accepted the UNC proposal at length that the military demarcation line would be the line of contact at the time of signing the armistice agreement.

From then onward the battle on the ground became comparatively inactive
and neither side attempted any further offensive in a big-scale. Such a lull on
the battlefield permitted the both sides to build up the defenses more stronger
day and night, even though the hard problems arose there for digging as the
ground became completely frozen. The Communist forces commenced during
this period a concerted effort to construct an impregnable defense line all across
the front, thus precluding further military pressure on the ground by the UN
forces. It was what the Communists had sought from the outset of negotia-
tions.

From 28 December 1951 to 18 January 1952, the Greek Battalion main-
tained the positions in the Suo-dong area along the east bank of the Imjin River
having no noticeable incidents except for patrolling activities. Then, on 19 Janu-
ary, when the relief took place among the 3rd US Division units, the Battabon
was relieved in place by the Belgian Battalion, and occupied the blocking po-
sitions in the area between Pogwang-dong and Korung, with the 1st Company
in the vicinity of road junction north of Nung-kol.

Under the new operational command of the 15th US Regiment effective at
0855 hours, 19 January, it remained there for forty days until 27 February with
no enemy contact. There was, however, a remarkable event. On 2 February,
General Van Fleet, the EUSAK Commander, offered to the Greek Battalion the
Presidential Unit Citation in a brief formal ceremony, in the name of the Presi-
dent of the United States, in honor of the distinguished combat services the
Greek troops had achieved in the Scotch Hill and its vicinity during the period
from the 3rd to the 10th October 1951.

Section 8. The Battle of Kelly—Nori
(28 February – 18 March 1952)

Prelude

During the night of 27-28 February, 1952, a change-over of position took
place between the Greek Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Regi-
ment. The Greek troops now took over the frontline positions along the both
banks of the Imjin River by 0310 hours on the 28th. The role of the Greek Bat-
talion was to maintain its defenses, and to harass the enemy by the vigorous
patrolling and raids in the assigned area.

In this area of the Jamestown Line, which was seized by the 5th Cavalry
Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division during the Operation Commando in
October 1951, the terrain was made up of small hills mostly around 100 to 200 meters above the valley floor.

There were a series of the enemy outposts manned by the small forces varying from a squad up to a reinforced platoon in strength on the low hills in front of the Greek positions. One of these was the highground on the west of Koyangdae, to be famed later to the UN troops as Outpost Kelly, situated one and a half kilometers west of the double horseshoe bent of the Imjin River. To the northeast nearly two kilometers from the Kelly in distance, where the first horseshoe began to turn, lay a low hill complex known as Nori; Big Nori formed the north-western half of the ridge and Little Nori the south-eastern half. The enemy was well dug in on these hills and ridges and had ample artillery protection.

There was an open rice paddies field in between the Kelly and Nori area forming a long cross compartment like a bowling alley. The weather was becoming warmer gradually signalling the onset of spring thaw. Facing the Greek troops were the elements of the 116th Division of 39th CCF Army. They controlled the Kelly, Hill 105, the Betty northeast of Hill 105, Nori and Hill 117, with their outposts on them.

Under these circumstances, the Greek Battalion occupied its positions in a considerable wide frontage ranging four kilometers putting three companies in the front line; the 1st and 2nd Companies on the west of the Imjin River and the 3rd Company on the east. There situated eventually a wide gap between the 2nd Company and the 3rd Company with no troops manning, besides several listening posts, for the river itself acted as a natural barrier. In addition, the enemy outpost line facing the gap area was completely dominated by the friendly ground observation, particularly from Hill 264, the highest height in the Battalion sector.

The Raid on the Kelly
(2 — 16 March)

Since the patrolling mission was to bring back prisoners, the plans were carefully detailed in advance, and the choice of objective was extremely limited because the mission was the extremely difficult one to accomplish at this stage of war. Nevertheless, the fierceful patrolling actions continued day and night.

At 0645 hours, 2 March 1952, a patrol of one squad strength from the 1st Greek Company was encountered with an estimatedly enemy platoon in the highground Kelly. The clash was flared up as the patrol began to climb there. The enemy poured on by automatic weapons and handgrenades from a very short
distance. The first engagement lasted but half an hour resulting in two enemy killed. Then, the patrol withdrew and reported to the Company Headquarters the enemy situation in detail. Soon the friendly artillery and mortars began to fire upon the Kelly and, the 15th US Regimental Headquarters issued an attack order to seize the highground.

A new attempt of the same patrol to take it failed, however. Following another artillery concentration fire, a determined attack resumed at 0950 hours. This time, with a reinforcement of another squad, the Greek attackers charged in upon the enemy positions, smashing through a blanket of enemy barrage. The few men of the attackers became electrified on the sound of the order “assault” pronounced by their superior in charge leading at the head of the troops, and dashed into the enemy bunkers with such an impetus and determination that the enemy, who never expected such an action by a handful of men, was surprised, overthrown, and forced to abandon the Kelly positions at 1040 hours, leaving their dead fellows behind.

Not before long, however, the Red Chinese became insane to commit their reinforcements under cover of automatic weapons and small arms fire. Then, the enemy again attempted to send another reinforcements forward in a platoon size from the west, which was also ended with failure thanks to the indomitable fighting spirit of the Greeks and the friendly 4.2-inch mortar fire in support as well. The enemy fled to the west and northwest at 1100 hours. In this first battle at the Kelly, the Greek troops had inflicted two enemy killed and 36 wounded at the cost of three men wounded.

The battle of this Greek raid was watched opportunely by the American artillery observers who were with the Greek Companies and also the nearby troops of the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Regiment. They all thought the achievement of the Greeks was a real feat since only ten days ago, an attempt of a whole American company to seize the Kelly had failed.

On the following morning, a Greek reconnaissance patrol moved out towards the Nori, Hill 117 and Hill 134 along the west bank of Imjin-gang and cleared the Nori area without opposition but was fired upon by the enemy automatic weapons from the direction of Hill 134 northeast of Araehu-dong. The patrol returned safely to the base in the afternoon. The Battalion now posted the small troops, mostly in a squad size, at the key points along the forward edge of the outpost line of resistance (OPLR), thus setting up a series of the listening posts and the guard posts. Thereafter the first half of March saw the Battalion with no noticeable actions other than routine patrolling for which instance as follows.

At 2230 hours, 10 March, a patrol encountered fire fight for half an hour with an enemy platoon at the western slopes of Kelly Hill. Another patrol was
ambushed by the two enemy squads at 2130 hours on 16 March in the vicinity of Hoesan-dong, nearly a kilometer north of the Kelly, but no damage was suffered, returning to the patrol base by 2430 hours without mishap enroute.

The Defense on the Kelly and Nori

(17 - 18 March)

By this time, there had been an increase in the number and aggressiveness of enemy patrols and also an increase in the frequency of enemy artillery and mortar fire in the Greek Battalion sector. These indications usually heralded an impending enemy attack to probe the friendly defenses.

Beginning at 1000 hours, 17 March 1952, the whole position of the Battalion was fired upon fiercely by the enemy artillery and mortars. There followed immediately the severe fire duels as the friendly artillery units mounted counterfire.

Kelly Hill as well as both Big Nori and Litte Nori, on which the small troops were manned as the outposts, were obscured by the smoke and dust of the explosion. The Greek Battalion Commander ordered all the company commanders to alert their men and to beef up the battle setup preparing for action so as to meet an eventual enemy attack.

The artillery duels continued for hours and the enemy shells began to land more severe in density toward the end of evening nautical twilight, and the enemy concentration and harassing fire reached its height at 1800 hours. The outpost troops in the Nori area reported at 1830 hours that a large number of the Communist Chinese were maneuvering towards their positions obviously attempting to encircle them. The similar reports were being received from the other guard and listening posts from moment to moment. To wit, an enemy company was trampling down the Nori where a Greek squad was manned, while another two enemy companies were heading for the highground north of Koyangdae and the Kelly. These small troops in number had only been ordered to observe and watch the enemy movement and also to provide early warning of the enemy approach, and they were called back without delay.

At 1850 hours the enemy had climbed the abandoned highground, Kelly and Nori, which were now being bombarded by the friendly artillery.

The enemy, taking advantage of the darkness, came close to the main positions of the Battalion. The enemy concentrated his main attack on the 1st and 2nd Company positions while the secondary attack was directing toward the 3rd Company, seemingly in a feinting effort. Above all, the heaviest blow fell
onto the 1st Company defended on Hill 199.

A wave of the Red Chinese in two company strength began approaching from the direction of Kelly Hill aiming at the 1st Company, while another Red wave, in a reinforced company size, made a dash from the area of Koyangdae, Hill 105 and Betty Hill at the 2nd Company positions all at once. On the other hand, a Red company-sized force moved out from the Nori area at the same time, attempting to cross the Imjin River in front of the 3rd Company.

With the first shooting exchanged, the fire plan of the Battalion was put into effect. In addition to all the organic weapons available, all artillery and mortars in direct support began to fire a volley at the attacking enemy forces. The battle area was completely wrapped in the mellite of darkness under the watery sky. The battle was so difficult as it was being waged under the light of illuminating shells. Disregarding their heavy toll of casualties being mounted every moment owing to the friendly fire power in mass, the Red Chinese attempted reckless assault which resulted in failure at the outset. Yet, they tried again and again obstinately to rush into the 1st and 2nd Company positions.

The repeated assaults by the Red Chinese caused them to be literally drowned in their own blood. For five continued hours, the fighting was underwent with the same force. The enemy continuously reinforced his attack with the new troops, but the Greek units were determined to cling to their positions at all costs. At midnight, the enemy losing all hope; all their attempts having failed before the matchless warriors of the Greek force, finally gave up the battle and fled to the north and northwest directions, leaving behind 65 dead, and various weapons and equipment. (See Sketch Map 7.)

Supported by the artillery and heavy weapons, the Greek troops cleared the forward area and reoccupied the listening posts on the Kelly, Nori and elsewhere on the following morning. The Greek Battalion suffered five men killed in this heroic action, namely, Privates Karantnis Dimitorios, Karahiannis Evagelos, Mateios Haralimos, Rotzakos Vasilios, and Hiknoulos Georgios. There were also one missing and seven men wounded.

The latest combat in the Kelly and Nori area was one of the bitter battles the Greek troops fought gallantly in Korea. They had beaten off the overwhelming numbers of the foe, thus forcing the Red Chinese to realize keenly that they can never match with the brave Greeks by their favorite human-sea tactics.
Section 9. Behind the Line
(19 March – 25 July 1952)

After the aforementioned battle, the Greek Battalion was relieved in place on the night of 19 - 20 March 1952 by the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Regiment, and concentrated its subordinate elements in the area of Wolgwang-ni about four kilometers south from the frontline in distance, where it remained in reserve until 13 April.

During the period, on 24 March, the Greek Battalion saw a most glorious event to note. That day, in a brief ceremony held at the Battalion Headquarters, it was honored with the Presidential Unit Citation presented by the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, in the name of President Syngman Rhee, for its exceptionally distinguished services in the Battle of Scotch Hill in early October 1951.

On the next day, 25 March 1952, the Battalion celebrated the Greek national holiday for the second time in Korea. Among many ranking guests, Major General Thomas J. Cross, the 3rd US Division Commander, was present.

From that time on until 26 July, the Greek Battalion remained in the second line in the Imjin River sector, and later became a reserve unit, engaged in training and various minor tasks, among which was its participation with one company in beating down the uprising of prisoners held in the camp of Koje-do, an island situated on the southwest of Pusan.

On 13 April, the Battalion moved from the present assembly area to little further north and took up the blocking positions in and around Pogwang-dong behind the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Infantry. The area was a familiar locality for the Greeks as they had stayed there in January with the same mission. A week later, on 19 April, in the circumstance that the 15th Infantry was to hand over its left sector to the elements of the 29th British Brigade under the 1st Commonwealth Division, the Battalion moved to Samgo-ri in the neighbourhood of the east bank of the Imjin River.

Then, the whole relief of the 3rd US Division by the 1st ROK Division began on 24 April, completing by 2400 hours, 26 April. The Greek Battalion now assembled in the vicinity of Hyon-ni about 12 kilometers southeast of Pochon, on 26 April, remaining under the operational control of the 15th US Regiment. Three subordinate battalions of the 15th Infantry were also
concentrated in the nearby areas such as at Suyok and Sopa.

Thereafter, the 3rd US Division was placed under the direct control of the EUSA K Headquarters effective on 29 April until 30 June 1952 as an army reserve.

Remaining in the new area until 4 July 1952, the Greek Battalion had been occupied most of its time with intensive training including rifle marksmanship, platoon and company problems and field exercises throughout the period.

In the meantime, one company of the Battalion was ordered to move to Koje Island where it would take part in the security guard for the prisoners of war. The Company departed the Battalion on 23 May and arrived at Koje-do at 0930 hours, 25 May, by way of Pusan on the 24th. Besides the ROK and US units, there were the Netherlands Battalion, B Company of the KSLI Battalion, and B Company of the Royal Canadian Battalion.

To illustrate a little more about the situation related with the island at this time, exchange of POWs was the most ticklish issue and hot dispute on the armistice negotiation table at Panmunjom. Among many other reasons, the UNC delegation stucked to its stand from a humanitarian point of view, while the Communist persisted in the reverse way. In another words, the Communists demanded exchange of all prisoners whereas the UN Command proposed that freedom of choice by prisoners themselves be respected in deciding whether they should be repatriated.

The foxy and vicious Communists had begun to launch a series of deliberate propaganda campaigns from the very outset of the armistice talks by all means available and, after the Red prisoners riot on 18 February 1951, at the POW camp on Koje-do, the heads of the North Korean Communist clique made all efforts more severe in order to discredit the UN Command. They issued the rigid instructions in secret to the Red delegations at Panmunjom as well the ultra-Communists among the prisoners in the hands of the UN forces to stir the UNC position. For instance, the completely fabricated charge of the Communists at Panmunjom that the UN forces were mistreating the prisoners of war, forming a link in the chain of propaganda warfare in the clever tricks, suddenly led to the incident of kidnapping Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, Commandant of the POW Camp on 7 May 1952. He walked out three days later, however. Thus, the Communists employed every device and technique of the propagandist and mass psychological effect in the effort to mislead the world eyes.

After this incident, the EUSA K Headquarters decided to utilize as many UNC contingents as possible to add to the force on Koje-do. Thus, a Greek rifle company was to provide a U.N. flavor.

The Greek Company remained there under the operational control of the
2nd Logistical Command until 2 July 1952.

Meanwhile, on 1 July, the 3rd US Division was attached back to the I US Corps and, prepared to take the place of the 1st ROK Division in the frontline, the same area where it just had moved out in late April.

The Greek Company on DTY with the Koje-do POW Camp was returned the parent unit on the morning of 3 July, when the main body of the Greek Battalion was being absorbed in preparing for a troop movement. The relief of the divisional units took place beginning from 3 July, completing on the night of 4-5 July.

On 5 July, the Greek Battalion moved to Tongduchon where it remained in reserve together with the elements of the 15th US Regiment until 25 July. Then, it moved on order from Tongduchon on 26 July to the Imjin River area relieved the Belgian Battalion and the Luxembourg troops in place by 2400 hours that night, when its attachment to the 7th US Regiment came into effect.

Section 10. Again along the Imjin River
(26 July – 29 October 1952)

The Patrolling and Outpost Clashes
(26 July – 10 September)

By the summer of 1952 the enemy had grown more active in such a way that he waged the hill battles repeating again and again all across the front, though mostly in the western and central western zones, in order to take the better outposts. Taking the tide at the flood of the prevailing monsoon climate in Korea during which time the UN airplanes had to remain on the ground as an inevitable consequence, the enemy rather preferred to step up more aggressive.

The pattern of the outpost hill clashes was similar one elsewhere. Prior to start off their attacks the Red Chinese forces would plaster with tremendous artillery concentrations on a forward hill or outpost situated in the foremost edge of the friendly outpost line of resistance (OPLR). Then they would assault upon it with larger forces and overrun it.

During these bloody hill battles, the CCF had no regard at all for the lives of their conscript soldiers; the friendly did.

Meanwhile, on 27 July 1952, at 0200 hours, shortly after the Greek Battalion just had taken up the frontline positions again along the east bank of the
Imjin River, west of the Chungsa-ri area, the enemy, estimatedly in a reinforced squad, mounted a probing attack surprisingly at the Greek outpost in front of the Battalion’s right flank. The outpost troops, however, kept perfect composure and repulsed the Red raid after a thirty-minute battle with the mortar support. Private Gatzeudis Georgios was killed in this action.

That day, the heavy rains began all along the front and continued until the 30th, during which the Greek soldiers worked devotedly in repairing the damaged bunkers and trenches, while paying a particular attention to the enemy movement as usual.

The Greeks were well familiarized already with the terrain feature in this locality. The Battalion position offered excellent observation and field of fire into the enemy outposts, especially from Hill 202. Facing there were the elements of the 116th and 117th Divisions of the 39th CCF Army one time or another.

On the night of 28 July, an enemy squad attempted again to probe the same Greek outpost at 2230 hours but again beaten off by the defenders five minutes later. On the other hand, a Greek patrol fell into the enemy mine field in the north of Kyeho-dong at 2240 hours that night causing one man killed and four
men wounded.

The torrential rainfall of late July continued to affect on the ground operations into early August. Although the patrols could range freely some two to three kilometers from the main line of resistance positions, contact between the two opposing forces were few. A notable thing at this juncture was that the enemy was continuing to fortify his defenses. The Red Chinese tactic was to occupy the key terrain at night, dig trenches and construct bunkers during darkness, and then vacate the area before daybreak so as to deceive the friendly observation and to escape from the impact of the UN artillery fire. They repeated this process.

Perhaps more impressive was the steady growth of enemy artillery firepower. As August began, the Red Chinese became more active along the whole frontline to improve their position by overthrowing the outpost system of the Allied forces. More specifically, the enemy attempted to disintegrate the friendly outpost line of resistance of the 3rd US Division in the Imjin River sector which included the Greek Battalion. To dislodge the enemy move, there continued the patrolling actions and minor raiding operations in force, which caused the notable damages to the enemy.

Before every thing, it is worthwhile mentioning the enterprise accomplished on the night of 6-7 August by two platoons which aimed at destructing the enemy and his fortifications on Hill 167 north of Nurum-kogae and about two kilometers north of the Greek position. The enemy had an estimated reinforced platoon on the hill and was reinforcing freely. The weather was intermittently cloudy adapted for the surprise raid.

A ranger force consisted with two rifle platoons plus one weapons squad moved out in a column shortly after midnight and infiltrated into Hill 167 without exciting suspicion. At 0210 hours, 7 August, when the raiders took the enemy by surprise, a close combat flared up lasting for seventy minutes. As a result, the raid was completely successful, and the objective was seized after a man to man fight. After the enemy had been killed, wounded or run away and destroying twelve pill boxes, observation posts and various facilities, the Greek troops returned to their home position by 0400 hours.

The result of this raid was twenty enemy killed and countless wounded. On the contrary, the Greek Battalion lost Private Pirovakis Dimitrios who honored later with the Golden Medal of Galancy by the Government of Greece for his bravery, particularly in this action, and two officers and 32 men were wounded. Further, seven men suffered light wounds, but were not evacuated.

The rest of August saw the comparatively quiet as far as the Battalion was concerned except for routine patrolling and minor adjustment of positions,
remaining the same locality until 10 September.

After the heavy rains of August came to an end and the weather improved, the Communist forces renewed their aggressive attempts to seize the key terrain and better ground all along the friendly outpost lines.

On the night of 1 September, taking the initiative, a Greek patrol group infiltrated into Hill 167, the very same highground where the Greek troops won a triumph of successful raid in early August. The patrol battled with the enemy there for 35 minutes from 2355 hours that night, killing six Red Chinese at a cost of one lost, Private Karatzas Orastis. In the early morning of 6 September, another Greek patrol party collided with an enemy platoon at a finger shaped-ridge just south of Hill 167 at 0145 hours lasting for a ten-minute long. It inflicted estimatedly 40 enemy casualties suffering two own lost -- Privates Demasis Dimitrios and Heltzos Kon/Nos.

On the night of 10-11 September, the Greek Battalion was relieved on position by the 3rd Battalion of the 65th US Infantry and some of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Infantry by 2230 hours, 10 September and, moved down to the further southeast, closing in the vicinity of Mudung-ni about five kilometers northwest of Chongok (Chongong-ni) by 1100 hours the next morning. Upon assembling there, it became a reserve of the 3rd US Division until 24 September. During the period, on the 19th, the Battalion was revisited by General Van Fleet, the Commander of the Eighth US Army, who congratulated the Greeks on their latest successes in battle.

**The Battle of Big Nori**

*(26 - 30 September)*

After spending a two week period of reserve status at Mudung-ni, some eight kilometers south from the frontline in distance, the Greek Battalion vacated the present assembly area for the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Regiment by 2130 hours, 25 September 1952, and returned back on the main line of resistance at a sector nearly two kilometers southeast of the Nori area, close to the east bank of the Imjin River. For the Greek Battalion this area, which took over this time from the 3rd Battalion of the 65th US Regiment, was not a strange ground since it had been there before for a quite while. It occupied its main positions along the high ground situated inbetween Hill 202 and Hill 264 where it had once defended in January and the latest preceding months.

With the rainy season and torrid heat of summer ceased off, the probing and limited attacks of the Red Chinese, in a platoon to battalion-scale, for soft
spots in the friendly lines, became more impressive and continued in mid-September and well into October. Thus, the enemy waged a bitter struggle over a number of the friendly outposts everywhere throughout the battle lines.

In the meantime, in the Imjin River line sector where the Greek Battalion was now operating, the elements of the 65th US Regiment had struggled with the enemy during those days for control of the key terrain features, up and down the hill, specifically for Outpost Kelly, the one the Greek troops had already experienced in March six months ago.

On 26 September, the Greek Battalion received an order from the 65th US Regiment, to which it was then attached for a time being, to prepare for an attack with Big Nori as its objective. The Kelly and Big Nori had been controlled by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 348th Regiment, the 116th Division under the 39th CCF Army. Within the same night, the 2nd Platoon of the 2nd Company moved in on Little Nori relieving the elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 65th US Infantry. Yet, at 0230 hours, 27 September, the Greeks encountered with an enemy probing onto Little Nori, where they were too busy to organize their positions for eventual enemy raids. The enemy disengaged and ran away after a ten-minute fire fight, however. The enemy must have tried to test the defenses.

On the morning of 27 September, the Battalion Headquarters issued an attack order, according to which D-Day was the 28th. The attack was to be carried out by the 2nd Company, which was disposed in depth of three platoons - - the 2nd on Little Nori, the 3rd on Hill 69, and the 1st in the south of Suuksi. (See Sketch Map 8.)

The 2nd Company Commander called the 1st Platoon Leader to his CP bunker and instructed him to lead the attack on Big Nori with his platoon and explained his course of action in detail. At 0450 hours on the 28th, the artillery and mortar units, both in general and direct support, opened up preparations on the Red Chinese positions on and around Big Nori as well as Hill 117 for ten minutes after which they lifted their ranges further deeper into the enemy held area. Meanwhile, the attacking platoon was in its attack position and at the first light, 0500 hours, jumped off toward the objective held by an estimated CCF platoon. The Red Chinese response was immediate. They also opened up with and poured intense fire of artillery, mortars, automatic and small arms resembling a downpour of rain; far more than that. Now and then artillery rumbled, and fire splashed around the Nori area, making the valley echo with the violent bursting sounds.

Despite heavy enemy resistance the 1st Platoon launched assault, plunging through a hail of enemy fire barrage and seized the objective by 0530 hours with
swift and daring action. The Platoon immediately reorganized and consolidated itself on Big Nori without taking breath.

The first enemy counterattack in a reinforced platoon-scale saw only ten minutes after the objective ground had been occupied, but the Red attack was repulsed at 0600 hours, 28 September, when the 1st Lieutenant Bozikis Andrews was wounded at the head of his platoon. The Platoon Sergeant took over the command immediately until a reinforcing rifle squad arrived with a new lieutenant. Just at that moment, the second counterattack was launched which was also put to route by pouring a shower of fire barrage, although the Greek Platoon was now in an unfavorable situation due to the continued heavy enemy concentration of firepower and the growing list of casualties which led to confusion in the Platoon.

At 0610 hours, approaching from several directions, the enemy launched his third counterattack with two Platoons in the lead. The Red wave soon reached the communication trenches and closed in hand-to-hand combat with the defenders. But it was again beaten out by fighting back courageously, in
which Lieutenant Bekiaris Fotios, who now led the Platoon, was wounded. A new reinforcing squad with a new lieutenant climbed there at 0630 hours.

The enemy attempted the fourth counterattack at 0700 hours, more forceful than the previous ones, but was again driven back after the close fighting. At 0745 hours, the UN air forces launched the airstrikes, throwing bombs and napalms onto the enemy positions. Despite their casualties were mounting greater, the Red Chinese launched their fifth counterattack at 0945 hours, which was the worst. This time, employing two companies with the fresh troops, the enemy attempted desperate efforts to seize the disputed ground.

There followed tough and boldy fighting, and the Greeks fought the enemy back to the last man, thus dislodging the Red foe in a triumphal success. Everybody was certain that once more the enemy had failed, when two powerful shells were dropped on the Greek position, due to a tragic mistake of the Allied airplanes that happened accidentally. One junior officer and four men were killed. The enemy, taking advantage of the confusion at the tragic moment, began to renew assault and dashed into the Greek position on Big Nori. The situation took a sudden turn for the worse, and a pack of the Red wolves seized Big Nori forcing the defenders to fall back. An attack to retake the controversial ground was prepared, but was not materialized within the same day because of the enemy artillery and heavy mortar concentration fire of the Greek Battalion positions throughout the day. Still, the 2nd Company Commander carefully drew up an attack plan to take back Big Nori and watched for a chance.

During this severe battle of 28 September, the Greek Battalion inflicted at least 45 Red Chinese killed and 135 wounded. Its own casualties, on the other hand, were two lieutenants, two non-commissioned officers, and 12 enlisted men killed in action; three officers and 18 men wounded. The fallen heroes were as follows.

1st Lieutenant Bozikis Andrews
Sergeant Vourdoulakis Efthiios
Private Vezianos Vazianos
Private Manolouidis Menelaos
Private Papadopoulos Lazaos
Private Simeonidis Germanos
Private Tsitsnakis Georgios
Private Haltoupis Mihail

1st Lieutenant Bekiaris Fotios
Corporal Lazaridis Nikolaos
Private Karagiovanis Theothoros
Private Badanis Athanasios
Private Provatiris Timotheos
Private Soupios Petros
Private Cristoforou Apostolos
Private Psaradelis Nikolaos

A new determined attack was stepped up in the early morning of 29 September with the 3rd Platoons in the lead. Led by a lieutenant, the attack force crossed the line of departure at 0200 hours, and having animosity against the
Red odds, rushed at the enemy positions on Big Nori as quick as lightning in a flash, thus recapturing the high ground within a matter of some ten minutes. The feature was not held for long, however, due to the fact that the position was too close to the enemy firing range, thus being under heavy enemy concentration fire and continuous counterattacks.

The enemy casualties were substantial: Besides a toll of wounded, 22 dead were counted on the scene and 15 wounded abandoned men were taken in. The Battalion suffered six men wounded during this second attack.

Postlude

In connection with the accidental mishap of the friendly air raid on Big Nori on 28 September 1952, when the bitter battle was at its height, it will be as well to annotate here for nothing but reference. That day, the EUSAK Headquarters made an announcement that the UN air forces had misbombed on Big Nori Hill held by the Greek unit. Three days later, on 1 October, however, the Fifth US Air Force Headquarters announced its view in this regard saying that it was groundless and far from the truth as a result of the fact-finding investigation through the aerial photographs, according to the Korean War Diary published by the Troop Information and Education Bureau, the Ministry of National Defense.

But, in any case, to add one more note for further reference, the disputed area eventually became to situate later in the middle of the Demilitarized Zone, as the UN forces withdrew two kilometers along the line of contact to establish the agreed Demilitarized Zone right after the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. Thus, the area of the Kelly and Nori Outposts, one of the most storied highgrounds drenched in human blood in the Korean War, was abandoned. The two features now lay in no man's land still telling, as the living witnesses, the brave and glorious battle account of the Greek troops against the Communist aggressors.

In Reserve

On 30 September 1952, the whole 3rd US Division went into reserve after being relieved in the assigned zone by the 1st ROK Division. That day, the Greek Battalion was relieved in place by the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment, the 1st ROK Division by 2210 hours. On the following day, 1 October, it moved
down to Unsan-ni, 22 kilometers south of Chorwon and about a halfway inbetween Chongok (Chongong-ni) and Unchon, becoming a IX US Corps reserve together with all the other 3rd US Division units upon arriving there. The Battalion remained in this new area under the operational control of the 15th US Regiment until 29 October, engaging in reorganization and training.

During the period, the OXI anniversary was observed on 28 October for the second time in Korea. Lieutenant General Reuben E. Jenkins, the IX US Corps Commander, Major General Wayne C. Smith, the 3rd US Division Commander, and Brigadier General Ospoukn, the IX US Corps Artillery Commander were present at the occasion. General Van Fleet unable to be present, sent the following message: “With respect I mentally participate together with all Greeks in this anniversary of the OXI day. You fighters of the Greek Force, who fight here in Korea for Freedom, have the right to shout out OXI like your glorious ancestors who fought for the freedom of your country against aggressors. I salute your admirable battalion.”

Section 11. The Winter Action North of Chorwon
(29 October 1952 – 28 February 1953)

On the night of 24-25 October 1952, the subordinate units of the 3rd US Division relieved the 9th ROK Division in the frontline north of Chorwon, one of the three bases constituting a communication complex called the Iron Triangle. The outgoing ROK division just had fought recently for control of White Horse Hill (Hill 395), which was nine kilometers northwest of Chorwon, where it had exacted a tremendous toll from the 38th CCF Army. It had beaten off again and again the repeated CCF attacks during the period of 16-24 October, thus leaving its name in the history of the Korean War.

Meanwhile, the Greek Battalion had been undergoing a vigorous training since the successful battle for Big Nori, remaining in Unsan-ni five kilometers southwest of Unchon. On 29 October, the Battalion moved on order to Hwaji-ri, the northern outskirts of Chorwon and, it further moved on 4 November to Hagal-li, about seven kilometers northeast of Chorwon, where it remained as a reserve of the 15th US Regiment for a short while.

During these days, there took place the bloody and endless battles between the elements of the 65th US Regiment and the 29th Division of the 15th CCF Army in order to hold, take and retake the high ground in and around Hill 391
(Hill 388 on the new map), about six kilometers north of Hagal-li, which was known later as Jackson Heights. On the night of 29 October, the 15th US Regiment, to which the Greek Battalion was attached, took over the responsibility for the 65th Infantry's sector and, its outposts set up on Jackson Heights were subjected to frequent and heavy attacks by the enemy, as it used to be, throughout the first half of November.

As cold weather of another winter approached, the front settled back to the old pattern of patrolling, ambushes, probes and small-scale attacks. With raids, patrols and small-unit actions characterizing operations at the front at this stage of war, a unit rotation system in and out of the lines at regular intervals was prevailed in an effort to bolster the troop morale, thus renewing the frustrated conditions created by a deadlock battle situation. The Communist forces, on the other hand, were now apparently digging in to stay conserving their energy, by bringing up replacements, replenishing their supplies, and building up stock level.

On 13 November 1952, the Greek Battalion was again placed on the forward positions, charging with a sector in the neighbourhood of Naepo-ri nine kilometers north of Chorwon. To its left flank was then the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Infantry, while the 3rd Battalion was on the right. As the battle on the ground fell off in mid-November, the enemy showed no inclination to disturb the static situation on this front where the Greek troops were now operating. Facing the area was the 44th Division under the 15th CCF Army controlling the higher terrain than the friendly units. And the Red Chinese did continue to demonstrate their sensibility by a means of patrolling and probing raids.

At this juncture, holding the positions along the northern bank of Yokesok-chon in the large open valley, the Greek troops concentrated all their efforts to strengthen the defense organization on the one hand, while they exhibited excellent patrolling activity and combatability on the other hand until 19 December. The followings are some instances which characterized the Battalion's action at that particular time.

In the evening of 14 November, at 1800 hours, a patrol group consisting of four elements -- each commanded by a junior officer -- was sent out by the 3rd Company. The patrol met an enemy force in group at the enemy area six kilometers north of its exit point and was forced to withdraw. Having completed its patrolling mission, the Greek troops were on their way back when they met an enemy echelon with the strength larger than a company. The enemy was moving towards the positions of the Greek Battalion obviously with intentions to attack. The officer in charge of the patrol, with the superb initiative, and without any hesitation in front of the overwhelming enemy force in numbers,
ordered all his men to attack against the flank of the enemy troops, and forced them to retreat and scatter in confusion.

For another instance, late in the afternoon of 25 November, a squad sized patrol team went out and encountered with an enemy platoon at Yujong-ni, a half way to its objective area. Here again taking the initiative, the Greek patrol drove the enemy back after a ten-minute fighting.

During the night of 12 December, at 2215 hours, a patrol from the 3rd Company, with the strength of one rifle platoon and situated approximately five kilometers ahead of the forward position, used a very clever trick and obliged an enemy company-sized force to unwillingly enter a terrain sector, every part of which was under the fire barrage of the Greek weapons. In another words, adapting itself to the moment when the patrol read the enemy’s motive, the Greek troops gave full play to their genius. The result of this ambush was observed the next morning when 23 Red Chinese dead were counted, and a variety of arms and equipment were collected. There were too numerous to cite the similar actions at the time.

Lieutenant General Jenkins, the IX US Corps Commander, visited the Battalion and praised the Greek troops highly for their successful effort.

During the period the Greek Battalion also saw some other significant events to note. Among them were: On 24 November, Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Koumanakos, the Battalion Commander, was decorated by General Van Fleet with the U.S. Region of Merit. On 2 December, during a parade in front of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the President-Elect of the United States, the small Greek unit which took part in the parade, was distinguished for its excellent outlook. At the time the President-Elect was on his four-day visit to Korea right after the presidential election to see the first hand situation in Korea and thereby to seek out an honorable truce as he pledged to the voters during his election campaign. Three days later, on 5 December, at the EUSAK Headquarters, the President-Elect encouraged and admired the Commander of the Greek Battalion, who was introduced to him, for the glorious battle merits of his unit and expressed his respect for the Greek Army. He did not forget to mention that he had become to know so well about the Greek Army when he was in command of NATO.

Anyhow, the Battalion lost three men, one missing and 14 wounded in action from 1 October to 19 December 1952. The three battle losses were Private Oikonomou Mihail (on 15 October), Corporal Ritas Dimitrios and Private Vagenas Panagiotis. The last two heroes were fallen during the patrol clash at Yujong-ni on the night of 25-26 November.

In the early morning of 19 December, around 0200 hours, the Greek
Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 65th US Regiment and was concentrated at an area immediately north of Chorwon at the disposal of the 15th US Regiment. Then, on 29 December, the 3rd US Division turned its responsible sector over to the 2nd ROK Division by 0600 hours and was ordered to become IX US Corps reserve upon assembling in the staging area in the neighbourhood of Yonpyong and Ut-samgori about seven and a half kilometers southwest of Unchon.

This time, the Greek Battalion was stationed in mass at an area in the vicinity of Changsu-dong, five kilometers northwest of Unchon, where it conducted a field training as well as troop rehabilitation program under the supervision of the 15th US Regiment until 29 January 1953.

With the closing of 1952, the ROK and UN forces had successfully defended a stabilized front and the New Year of 1953 found the Greek Battalion still in reserve. On this holiday occasion, King Paul cabled a message to the Greek troops in Korea: "The Queen and I wish you a Happy New Year and a glorious
return to your home. I am confident that during this New Year you will once more honor your country and distinguish yourselves among our Allies in this fight against tyranny. God bless your arms.”

After a month-long period of training and rehabilitation, the Greek Battalion returned back to the front. This time, it occupied the defensive positions on the Wyoming Line, assuming the responsibility for the outgoing 3rd Battalion of the 24th US Regiment during the night of 29-30 January. The 3rd US Division completed the relief of the 25th US Division effective at 0600 hours, 30 January, with its new command post at Non-kol four kilometers northeast of Chipo-ni.

About ten to twelve kilometers northeast of Chorwon, the 15th US Regiment manned the main line of resistance positions, with the four battalions on the line; the 1st Battalion holding the left flank, the 3rd and 2nd Battalions the middle, and the Greek Battalion the right flank of the regimental front. To the immediate right of the Greek position was the 1st Battalion of the 65th US Infantry defending a hill mass area north of Chongyon-ni situated on the west of the Hantan River. The Battalion held the defensive positions there until 25 April.

Locating in the high, rugged and steep hill mass complex, inclusive Hill 438, the Greek Battalion sector extended over two kilometers north of Hanjin-ni, and about eleven kilometers south of Pyonggang, the peak of the Iron Triangle.

Opposing this new area were the elements of the 15th CCF Army, holding the dominant terrain much higher than the friendly zone. The enemy, without exception had constructed strong bunkers and trenches both on the forward and reverse slopes and, each bunker was mostly underground. The enemy troops were cleverly trained how to camouflage themselves. The both opponents manned their positions as close as 500 meters to one kilometer apart.

Despite the stalemate continued indefinitely, the patrol clashes and small unit skirmishes were customary affairs even during the heavy snow season, mostly in the night. To illustrate some instance, on 31 January at 0300 hours, a Greek night patrol engaged with an enemy patrol party at a hill ridge just in front of the left flank position but lasted for five minutes causing no casualties. On the following night another patrol team met with an unknown number of enemy at the very same place where fire fight took place for less than ten minutes. It was happened almost at the same time that other patrol also clashed with a CCF patrol about 500 meters ahead of the left flank position.

The similar actions remained unchanged throughout the month of February. In other words, as in January, most of fighting was confined to patrol clashes. The largest of these in the Greek Battalion occurred on the night of 9 February when a squad-sized patrol engaged with a CCF patrol in platoon strength at 2240
hours in the vicinity of Hill 412 a kilometer north of the left position. After a ten-minutes clash, the friendly mortar fire was called in thus resulting in estimatedly 37 enemy killed and six wounded at a cost of three wounded.

Meanwhile, 11 February saw a change in the higher command. Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor assumed the command of the EUSAK after General Van Fleet. And, on the morning of 28 February, the 1st Battalion of the 65th US Regiment which had been manned on the immediate right flank of the Greek Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 7th US Regiment.

Section 12. The Spring Action
(1 March – 31 May 1953)

Endless Patrol Clashes

As March began, the enemy sensitivity indicated he shifted his tactics from a long hibernation to the offensive even though a limited scale. This meant that the Red Chinese, undoubtedly, intended to take advantage of the prethaw season regardless of muddy ground. On the contrary, mud restricted mobility of the UN forces. Thus, shortly after the middle of March, the enemy began to resume the attack here and there, mostly against the friendly outposts. To oppose it, the Allied units also continued to conduct the aggressive patrolling operations, rather harassing and raiding actions, yet in a small-scale, in order to capture prisoners or destroy the enemy fortifications.

At any rate, the general disposition of the units across the 3rd US Division front remained unchanged throughout the month except the scheduled routine shift. As for the Greek Battalion, remaining in the same main line of resistance position under the operational control of the 15th US Regiment, sent patrols out day and night to seek out the enemy move and harass the enemy initiative. Some of the remarkable actions were as follows.

On 3 March 1953, at 2205 hours, a Greek patrol in reinforced squad clashed with an enemy platoon at a wooden ridge some one kilometer north from the its main position in distance. After fifteen minutes of fighting, it disengaged and withdrew. As a result, the patrol killed four enemy, suffering two own wounded.

The biggest engagement of the month took place in the rain on the night of 11-12 March. At 0120 hours, 12 March, a reinforced squad sized patrol from the Battalion was completely encircled, and heavily attacked by a CCF company at a
rugged slope in the hill mass area, over nearly one and a half kilometers north of the Greeks main positions. Situating about ten kilometers south of Pyonggang, it was almost same location where the brother patrol had engaged on the night of 3 March. Compressing the envelopment into a narrow trap thereafter, the enemy attack became more severe every moment and the fierce battle; which soon led to hand-to-hand fighting, continued thus for the next two hours, considerably damaging each other. The raining became more heavy and a shower of enemy fire and assault became more heavier, while the Greek casualties increased every second. In the long run, the Greek troops now finally fell into a serious crisis. They could no longer be sustainable as they were outnumbered against such Red odds. At this very moment, 0330 hours, the reinforcements in 15-man strong arrived there to help, and then 20 more men arrived from the home position at 0440 hours. With redoubled courage by these reinforcements, the Greek Troops tenaciously beat off the Red Chinese before the first light. The enemy fled to northward at last carrying heavy casualties with them.

During this bloody and a five-hour and twenty-minutes long battle, the Greek Battalion killed at least 20 Reds besides countless wounded. By contrast, it lost Lieutenant Sideris Spiridon, and five privates, namely Caliatatos Siokas Cristos, Tanos Ioannis, Hartofylakas Vasil, and Hatzopoulos Stayros. In addition, seven men were wounded in this action.

On 25 March, the Greek troops celebrated their national day for the third time in Korea. Lieutenant General Jenkins, the IX US Corps Commander and Major General Symth, the 3rd US Division Commander were among the guests present there.

In April 1953 the UN forces engaged in continuous patrolling and numerous raids with the view to keeping the enemy off balance as well as capturing prisoners. The enemy also attempted their fruitless raids primarily upon the outposts forward of the friendly MLR. But the frequency and intensity of such actions declined noticeably as the month deepened.

The most noteworthy action of the month, in the sector of the 15th US Regiment to which the Greek Battalion was attached, was the battle which flared up on the night of 2-3 April.

Beginning at 0105 hours, 3 April, the Red Chinese units, supported by the bulk of long range fire and all other type weapons, attacked with the strength of approximately one rifle regiment, directing their main effort towards the 2nd Battalion, the 15th US Infantry, and the secondary attempt against the nearby Greek Battalion with Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Koumanakos in command.

The first to feel the enemy attack was a company-strong outpost, about one and a half kilometers north of Hill 358 defended by the elements of the 2nd
Battalion on the immediate left of the Greek Battalion. Disregarding casualties effected by the friendly artillery and mortar fire, the assaulting enemy elements, in a reinforced company strength, continued to come, and an hour later they closed in upon the outpost. But the enemy attackers halted their momentum by 0300 hours whenupon the fighting became the scattered hits.

Shortly after 0300 hours, the American defenders on the outpost were reinforced with two more platoons dispatched from the MLR position and the enemy was forced to retreat, having failed his effort. On the other hand, coming through Hill 412, another CCF elements attempted to probe on the Greek OPLR position, but it was also repelled by the Greek troops.

During a two-hour long battle, 350 rounds of the enemy artillery and mortar shells landed on the Greek MLR area, while 1,500 rounds and 1,850

Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Koumanakos, the Greek Battalion Commander (second from right), at his Headquarters. With him are Lieutenant General Jenkins, Lieutenant General Taylor and General Clark, left to right.
rounds were hit on the embattled outpost and the 2nd Battalion MLR area respectively. The American Battalion inflicted considerably heavy casualties upon the enemy in this night fighting, killing at least 25, 13 wounded, and two prisoners taken. Its own casualties, which seemed also heavy as a localized-scale battle in nature, were 12 killed and 42 wounded in action.

At around 0400 hours, 6 April, estimatedly an enemy squad tried to raid a Greek listening post manned with four men but the enemy took to flight five minutes later before the gallant action of the Greeks. A week later a Greek patrol encountered with an enemy patrol in platoon size at the vicinity of Hill 412 at 2120 hours on the night of the 13th, and it dispersed immediately the Reds by a fire engagement.

By 0235 hours on the night of 24-25 April, the Greek Battalion was relieved in place by the 1st Battalion of the 5th US Regimental Combat Team then operating under the operational control of the 3rd US Division since 20 April. After moved out of the MLR positions north of Hanjin-ni where it had defended for nearly a three-month period from 29 January, the Greek Battalion assembled in Chunggal-li about seven kilometers northeast of Chorwon by 0630 hours on 25 April. It remained there in reserve of the 15th US Regiment until the night of 17-18 May when the Battalion was back to the frontline positions.

From 1 January to 25 April 1953, the Greek Battalion suffered two officers (Second Lieutenant Sideris Spiridon and Lieutenant Maragoudakis Ioannis) and eight enlistedmen dead. In addition, it also suffered 22 enlistedmen wounded during the period from 1 January to 17 May.

Meanwhile, on the talking front at Panmunjom, the sudden death of Joseph Stalin, who had ordered the ringleader of the Communist North Kim Il-sung to wage the aggressive war, prompted the progress of the armistice talks, and the Communist forces gradually came to agree on the most disputed issue, the POW exchange agenda, showing a willingness to exchange the sick and wounded prisoners of war based on the UN Command’s proposal that no individual would be repatriated against his will. The Communists had begun to retreat from their whopping obstinacy before the world opinion. Then, the agreement was signed on 11 April 1953 to begin the exchange within ten days. Thus, beginning on 20 April, the two sides exchanged the sick and wounded POW’s in the Panmunjom area. The exchange, the so-called “Operation Little Switch,” was completed in seven days, during which one Greek soldier who had become missing in action, was repatriated. He had been so poorly treated under the Communist custody, and a tragic story of his wretched life in the Communist North was literally beyond all description by paper and pens.
Vicinity of Hill 388

At 0300 hours on 18 May 1953, the Greek Battalion took over a MLR sector from the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Regiment. The new positions were situated in the area north of Kangchong-ni or on the east of Chunggasu, about four kilometers north of Chunggal-li and some ten kilometers northeast of Chorwon. With the height of 300 meters above the sea level, this particular ground was more like an isolated island in the wide open field lying between Chorwon and Pyonggang.

Acting as a gateway to the Pyonggang area, the enemy’s strongest fortified zone to the north and the best approach route to the Chorwon valley corridor down to the southward, the new area had then a heavy strategic and tactical weight both for the UN forces and the enemy. Accordingly, late in October 1952, the elements of the 65th and 15th US Regiments had struggled with the Red Chinese forces to defend, regain and hold Hill 388 (391), which was soon be called as Jackson Heights, three kilometers north of Hill 376 on which the Greek Battalion now held a company sized-outpost. At any rate the heights were subjected to the continued enemy attacks henceforth and now remained in the possession of the enemy.

As of 18 May 1953, the friendly order of battle across the 15th US Regiment front, from left to right, was the 1st Battalion, the Greek Battalion, and the 2nd Battalion, with the 3rd Battalion in reserve near Yangjimal. The regimental forward command post was still remained in Yongho-dong, while that of the Greek Battalion was located in Chunggal-li.

The battle situation on the ground during the month of May continued to be lively and at the same pace as heretofore.

From mid-May the enemy made the limited objective attacks here and there, directing against the outpost and MLR positions in a small scale. But, in terms of frequency and size, these enemy actions were very impressive, representing an increase in his attempts in comparison with those of April.

As for the Greek Battalion, the whole month, particularly in the first half, was deceptively quiet one with the exception of a few patrolling or outpost clashes in a minor scale. To illustrate some activities, on the night of 24-25 May, a squad-sized enemy patrol raided a six-man listening post established by a Greek outpost company on Hill 378. The Greek troops drove the enemy off after a five-minute encounter, taking two enemy casualties. Private Tsatsakis Ariaroonas was killed in this action, however. At around 0510 hours, 26 May, a Greek patrol
party also clashed for a fifteen-minute long with a reinforced CCF platoon patrol at a ridge, nearly one and a half kilometers northeast from Hill 378 in distance. Despite so outnumbered the Greek patrol well beat off the enemy, suffering three men wounded from the enemy fire. The enemy losses were estimated at over 26 including at least 13 killed.

In another case, at 2245 hours, the next night, a two squad-sized enemy night patrol was ambushed by the Greeks at a ridge-ridge situated in the area, a kilometer northeast of Hill 378 and also a half kilometer north-west of Mirok-tong. As a result, the Red odds were frightened away by the surprising attack after twenty-minute engagement, suffering one killed and four seriously wounded. The two Greeks were wounded.

During the night of the 29th, a three-man listening post encountered with a CCF squad patrol at around 2200 hours for a short while at the exactly same place where a Greek patrol had smashed the enemy raid at 0110 hours on the 25th. Neither side suffered any casualties this time. This listening post was again raided by an enemy patrol in five-man strong shortly before the midnight, 31 May. The Greeks suffered two men wounded during the encounter.

As the early summer had come to feel, the 70th and 74th CCF Divisions had mounted a succession of diversionary attacks elsewhere along the IX US Corps front. Over in the 3rd US Division sector on the left flank of the 9th ROK Division, the enemy made the continuous efforts to seize the friendly outposts. The early days of June, however, sporadic and indecisive battle continued until the Red forces opened a series of obstinate attacks, particularly against the Outpost Harry area.

Section 13. The Patrol and Ambush Clashes
(1 – 15 June 1953)

As of 1 June 1953, the disposition of the Greek Battalion remained unchanged. Namely, with its command post in Chunggal-li, the 1st Company was on the outpost line of resistance defending Hill 376, while the 3rd and 2nd Companies were on the main line of resistance positions situated in and around the isolated heights north of Kangchong-ni and northwest of Hagasan respectively. On its left was the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Infantry while the 2nd Battalion of the 65th US Infantry was defending the Hagasan and Hill 358 area on the right. The right flank was relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry right after
the midnight of 5 June, however.

On the first day of the month, at around 2330 hours, a Greek ambush which had hidden behind a stream dike caught an enemy platoon patrol, and it successfully knocked the enemy out after a twenty-minute fighting, thus inflicting estimated nine enemy casualties including four dead at a cost of one wounded.

The most noteworthy clash during the first week of the month was taken place on the night of 6 June at a finger ridge, a half kilometer northwest of Mirok-tong, the very same place where a Greek ambush had seriously damaged Red Chinese patrol group just ten days ago. That night in the rain an ambush with the strength of one platoon was planned by the 2nd Company Commander. At 2345 hours, an enemy raiding unit in full company strength was completely surprised by the Greek ambush in the fortress on the very boundary between the Greek Battalion and the 15th US Infantry. Being surrounded by the Greeks, the Red odds were entirely flurried moving around hither and thither to find a way out of the trap. With the support of bulky fire of all arms including artillery, the enemy fought his way, in the loud discordant voices and noisy, trying to escape from the envelopment for two hours. Eventually, some Reds narrowly escaped from being killed or captured, leaving their 30 dead behind. Those survived Red Chinese were, undoubtedly, all crippled from head to foot. Had the Greek ambush more troops with more firepower or had its main position closer than that of the enemy, they could annihilate all of the Reds, either killing or capturing.

As for the Greek casualties, four privates, namely, Giannopoulos Stergios, Kaprouzas Filippos, Metaxas Nikolaos, and Niarakis Andreas were heroically dead in this battle. There were six wounded also.

Two other similar enemy efforts in the early morning hours of the 10th and 12th June also failed gaining nothing but casualties. These repeated enemy attempts were, needless to say, entirely aimed at securing the better position for two issues: One for setting up the military demarcation line in terms of his favour when the armistice was signed and also for strengthening his voice at the table if the political conference was held after the armistice.

At any rate, on 10 June, the 74th CCF Division mounted a series of considerably determined attacks against Outpost Harry and its vicinity, nearly four kilometers southeast of Hill 388 or Jackson Heights.

That early morning, the enemy troops, estimatedly more than 40 in number, raided at 0200 hours a listening post manned by the elements of the 1st Company at the forward edge of Hill 376. There followed hand-to-hand fighting for a thirty-minute long, resulting eight enemy killed including at least two confirmed, and 15 enemy wounded. The Greek lost were one killed and two wounded in this
action. At 0455 hours in the same morning, a Greek patrol party encountered with an enemy squad at the southmost ridge lying on Jackson Heights. During this engagement the Greek troops took two enemy wounded, suffering one own wounded.

On that night, a Greek ambush caught approximately 100 enemy at 2130 hours at the very same place where the aforementioned Greek patrol had clashed with the enemy sixteen and a half hours ago. This time, taking the initiative, it inflicted the heavy casualties on the overwhelming enemy in number, suffering three each of own dead and wound in an hour-long fighting.

Shortly after the disengagement of this Greek ambush-clash, the Red Chinese forces opened up the decisive attacks with their main objective at Hill 420, better known to the UN troops as Outpost Harry, then defended by the elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Infantry.

After artillery preparations had placed tons of explosives on his objective area, the enemy attack began at 2230 hours, 6 June employing one rifle company first. Then, bringing two more battalions forward from the direction of Hill 472

Forward command post of the Greek rifle company.
and Hill 478, the enemy penetrated through a northern finger of the outpost position. Hand-to-hand fighting flared up thereafter followed by the repeated attacks and counterattacks by the both sides.

As the American troops well fought back, the enemy now came back with an estimated regiment by 0330 hours the next morning and the bloody battle continued back and forth until 0530 hours when the enemy eventually gave up further fighting. In this night battle, the enemy casualties reached 500 killed and some 1,000 men wounded. In addition, the American troops captured five Reds alive.

On the other hand, the enemy pounded the heavy volume of artillery fire on the outpost line of the Greek Battalion throughout the night as his secondary effort to contain the Greek action or to deceive his main effort. There were also some other patrol clashes, particularly in the finger ridge area northwest of Mirok-tong.

During the period from the early morning of 10 June to the following morning, the Greek Battalion lost seven men including dead of wounded in battle. They were Corporal Tsitsilas Xaral; Privates Asrakis Georgios, Kartsonakis Nikolaos, Kapeles Athanasios, Loufardakis Dimitrios, Brikoris Ioannis, and Triantafylilou Sot.

On the highground Harry area, meanwhile, the elements of the 74th CCF Division repeated their fruitless attacks against the American units on the 12th and 14th.

On the morning of 14 June, the 1st Battalion of the 5th US Regimental Combat Team took over the positions from the 2nd Battalion of the 15th US Infantry on the immediate left of the Greek positions. And the latter US battalion moved into the right sector, taking over the MLR positions from the 3rd Battalion, the 15th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion became reserve.

The Greek Battalion casualties from 17 May to 15 June 1953 were eleven men dead, two officers and 33 men wounded. On the contrary, the enemy had at least 40 dead counted, in addition to a heavy toll of wounded.

Section 14. The Harry Battle
(16 June - 15 July 1953)

Prelude

In the early morning of 16 June 1953, the Greek Battalion was relieved in
place by the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Regiment at 0300 hours and moved to the east a little bit where it took over the MLR positions from the 2nd Battalion of the 15th US Infantry. Thus, the Battalion now positioned in the most important sector within the 3rd US Division front, where the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry had fought the continued enemy attacks during the period from 10 to 14 June. To its right flank, the 3rd Battalion of the 65th US Regiment was defending.

During the first fortnight of the month, the enemy made continuous efforts to seize Hill 420 and its vicinity which was of utmost tactical importance in the area, and tough fighting was encountered with heavy losses on both sides. For its tactical weight and the repeated bloody battles to take and retake it by the two opponents at the time, this particular highground, roughly four kilometers southeast of Hill 388 (Hill 391) or Jackson Heights, was famed to the Allied units as Outpost Harry. Situated in the middle of a rugged hill complex with the precipitous and steep slopes all over the area, its loss to the enemy hands would eventually cause the friendly main line of resistance to be completely dominated by the enemy forces in the Iron Triangle sector as a whole. Thus, success or failure of the friendly operations in this particular sector now greatly depended on the shoulders of the Greek troops. The Harry highground was over one kilometer north of the main line of resistance positions and was well organized with entrenchments, pill boxes and observation posts. In another words, it had enough bunkers to house the three Platoons, company command post, and the forward artillery observer.

The name of Harry Outpost was derived from its peculiar tactical weight at that time, situating between equally unpleasant alternatives, like a devil literally. No source of naming was transmitted down, however.

The disposition of the Battalion units was that one company on the OPLR and two companies on the MLR: The 3rd Company on Hill 420, the 1st Company in the vicinity of Hagasan with one platoon at Mirok-tong and the 2nd Company on and around Hill 361 and Hill 358 north of Pohalm with one outpost platoon on Hill 369.

According to the indications and information available from all the friendly sources at the time, a serious enemy action was expected in the 3rd US Division sector against which the Chinese Communist forces had concentrated four divisions and fifteen artillery battalions totaling about 126 pieces of guns. More specifically, the enemy had deployed four battalions in line and nine in reserve against the 15th US Regiment with which the Greek Battalion was now bearing the most important and heavy burden on the right flank of the regiment. Facing there were the elements of the 24th CCF Army, consisting of the 72nd, 73rd and
74th Divisions. The 221st and 222nd Regiments of the 74th CCF Division were opposing forces against the Greek Battalion one time or another.

Nevertheless, since the higher commands regarded the area of Outpost Harry as critical, the Greek Battalion was ordered to hold it against all enemy attacks. This promised to be a difficult mission if the Red odds were determined to take the outpost, for the highground was at a considerable distance from the MLR and the approach routes from the enemy direction were much easier than those of the Battalion. Moreover, situating in the middle of a hill mass complex, as mentioned earlier, the terrain surrounding this disputed highground was very rough, talling from 400 to 500 meters in height.

Under these circumstances, the Greek troops manning on the hill had great difficulty in maintaining the communication and supply line with their Battalion Headquarters.

Having occupied their positions on the Harry Hill on 16 June, the men of the 3rd Company began at around noontime to work on the defenses, study of defensive plan, and organized the fire plans as well as the barrier setup. They were well dug in, and barbed wire, trip flares, and mines were in place where should be and crew-served weapons sited to core the anticipated avenues of enemy approach. Thus, when the enemy attacked, after only thirty-six hours from the moment they started getting organized, the Company was ready out-to-out to react.

The Development of the Battle
(17 – 18 June)

In the meantime, over in the 9th ROK Division sector on the right flank of the 3rd US Division, the 70th CCF Division made serious efforts to gain more ground. In consequence, the 3rd US Division received its share of attention. It was particularly true in the Greek Battalion.

At 2345 hours, 17 June, the enemy commenced heavy artillery fire against the Greek Battalion positions and taking advantage of heavy raining launched the determined attacks three times until 0415 hours the following morning. The first attack was attempted by two battalions from the 221st CCF Regiment which had converging directions toward Harry, the first objective of the enemy.

The Greek troops acted promptly with composure in meeting the first attacking odds with mortal fire. The barrage fires of the friendly artillery greatly helped to repel the assaults of the enemy and cause the heavy losses. Initially, the enemy attacking battalions closed in from the two directions, one from north-west, presuming from Hill 478, and another from northeast by breaking through
the repeated ridges. With the support of artillery and mortar fire, the Greek defenders on Hill 420 (Harry) tried their best to check and disrupt the enemy approaches pouring all their organic firepower, in combining with the effectiveness of all the obstacles deliberately installed along the most probable avenues of enemy approach. Thus, as the midnight passed, the attacking momentum was slowed down. It was apparent that the Reds had halted the attack temporarily for reorganization, pending the arrival of more reinforcements.

Yet, at 0200 hours on the 18th, a new attack, more forceful than the first, and supported by increased artillery fire, was launched against the Harry. This time as the rain came to a halt temporarily and the night sky once cleared, the enemy fired the white phosphorus bombs upon the Hill 412 area, the immediate
east of the Harry position. Then, the enemy artillery and mortar fire became to flare up impressively heavier every moment, and now the Red Chinese began firing the smoke-screen over the forward slopes of Harry Outpost. Still, the men of the 3rd Company fought with superb determination and vigor, receiving their opponents with mortal fire, thus materializing the pre-arranged fire plans to the maximum effectiveness. But, the attacking enemy masses were too overwhelming even though the Company was reinforced with one rifle platoon at around 0230 hours. The enemy suddenly succeeded to infiltrate into the entrenchments and there followed a furious hand-to-hand fighting, through which the Greeks repelled the Red Chinese with bayonets and hand grenades in a short while. (See Sketch Map 9.)

It was not before long, however, that the assauling Red waves, like raging billows, rushed again onto the Harry position in less than half an hour, blaring the bugles, shrilling the whistles, and clanging the cymbals, all over the high-ground. Soon the bloody battle heated its peak and the defenders of the Harry now fell into a fatal situation after all. At this critical moment, a strong counter-attack was prepared and ventured by the Greek Battalion Headquarters. The Battalion Commander committed his 2nd Company in a column of platoons to cut off the enemy salient by maneuvering through deep into the enemy rear from east, while another elements assaulted to take the apex of the highground, the Harry. On the other hand, a rifle platoon manned on Hill 369 had attacked from the southwest by flanking through the western and southern slopes in a lighting stroke.

The right wing of the counterattack unit, supported by a US tank platoon maneuvered through the valley situating inbetween Hill 420 and Hill 412 with the tanks in the lead. The supporting tank outfit darted off into the enemy area exploiting its mobility and shock action, when the two rifle platoons as well as the weapons platoon hastily began to climb the hill from the eastern outskirts. Meanwhile, the friendly artillery and mortar continued to pound the heavy volume of fire on Hill 440 situated 400 meters behind Hill 420 and further rear area.

Thus, the counterattack fell upon the enemy who was assaulted from the flanks and rear at the same time. In consequence, the Red foe was completely surprised and forced to retreat in disorder in the long run, carrying a toll of casualties with him. (See Sketch Map 9.)

In spite of all the failures and heavy losses, the enemy made a new and more determined effort at 0310 hours and succeeded to infiltrate as deep as into the Greek bunkers again. Meanwhile, the Harry defenders had already been strengthened with the additional reinforcements, and the defenders now fought back the
enemy so desperately in combination with the counterattack launched by the 2nd Company with the support of the tank unit, and succeeded to drive the enemy off from the Harry for the third time by 0415 hours. The routed enemy fled northward fighting his way to survive from being annihilated. The brave Greek troops pursued the foe to a far distance from the highground. This time the enemy did not attempt again to come back and victory remained for good on the side of the Greek defenders of the Harry Hill. (See Situation Map 12, Appendix VIII.)

Results

Tactically, possession of the Harry Hill and whereabouts by the enemy would mean greatly improved observation of the whole 3rd US Division MILR locating in the focal center of the Iron Triangle, the most strategic territory at this stage of the Korean War.

During the night of 17-18 June, the enemy had placed tons of artillery shells not only in the embattled area but also all over the Battalion sector. In this action the Battalion fought so valiantly against a whole CCF regiment with the casualties of six killed and 19 wounded. The fallen heroes were Sergeant Ouzounoglou Prod. T., Corporal Mitilineos Nikol, Corporal Melissaratos Mar., Private Karozis Arist, Private Terzopoulos Cristof, and Private Tilikaos Georgios. To the sharp contrary, the Red Chinese losses were estimatedly 120 killed or more and 480 wounded of which majority were serious ones. It was a gallant and triumphal battle, one of which the Greek valours can be highly proud forever.

After the Harry
(19 June – 14 July)

The battle action tapered off during the next few weeks after the Harry Battle and the Greek Battalion remained in the present area until 14 July, during which period there was relatively quiet. Because the ROK divisions had been the chief targets of the enemy attacks particularly after 18 June when President Syngman Rhee released 27,000 anti-Communist POWs. There remained many events to note, however.

The French Battalion, then being attached to the 23rd Regiment, the 2nd US Division, came on 21 June into the positions adjacent to the Greeks on the left flank, where the 3rd Battalion of the 15th US Infantry had been defended.
On 30 June, the Battalion lost seven valors caused by the enemy mortar concentration fire in a patrolling action. They were Corporal Konstantinou Kon/Nos, and five privates: Destyinis Feransimos, Leonidakis Loukas, Kastoropoulos Andreas, Kastoropoulos Andreas, Parisis Illias and Tsagaralexakis Georg. Further Private Prasianakis Nikolaos was killed in action on 4 July.

Section 15. The Battle of the Kumsong Area
(14 – 27 July 1953)

Commencing on 12 July 1953, the Red Chinese forces attacked in a full-scale upon the friendly forward positions in the Kumsong area northwest of the Hwachon Reservoir. They aimed primarily at the ROK forces again. It was the most extensive action to have taken place since their spring offensive in April and May of 1951. As the enemy increased the weight of his pressure more heavier upon the ROK units, particularly in the Kumsong bulge west of the Pukhan River, by committing six CCF divisions into attack toward the evening of 13 July, a shifting of units took place in the IX US Corps on 14 July. The enemy succeeded in penetrating the MLR and creating a gap, six kilometers wide and five kilometers deep, threatening to isolate the IX US Corps from the II ROK Corps. The 3rd US Division was shifted over into the blocking positions behind the Capital ROK Division, the one received the heaviest of the attacks, to close the gap, stem the enemy advance, and allow the ROK division to disengage and withdraw for reorganization.

On that day, 14 July upon being relieved in place by the French Battalion in the morning, the Greek Battalion moved on order to a new area north of the Potomok village on the left flank of the Kumsong bulge. The troop movement was so difficult because of heavy rains. The Battalion arrived at the destination and occupied its positions without delay in the sector of the 15th US Regiment after a forced night march. Taking advantage of high terrain features, it prepared the blocking positions inbetween the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions of the 15th Infantry, northwest of Hill 785 in the vicinity of Sungam-ni, in order to stop the enemy penetration and also to put the Red odds to the foil by counterattacks on order.

The new area, surrounded by a typical Korean terrain feature, the rugged and high mountains all over with the thick forest, was situated at about 24 kilometers in distance as the crow flies from Harry Outpost to the east.
The First Battle
(16 – 17 July)

Meanwhile, the enemy pressure continued rather more powerfully throughout the night, with huge exchanges of artillery and mortar fire from both sides. Many friendly units had to pull back to avoid being cut off. As the Capital ROK Division fell back, passing through the 3rd US Division blocking positions, the latter took over responsibility for the Capital Division’s sector and assumed the operation control of the ROK division on 15 July effective 1200 hours.

At 0345 hours on the night of 16-17 July, the enemy, estimatedly in two CCF company strength, mounted a fierceful attack against the forward positions of the Greek Battalion. The first to feel the Red attack was the right flank elements. Accompanied by bulky volume of artillery and mortar fire support, the attack penetrated through the outpost line from the direction of Puchonnyong and Hill 364 and drove into the main line positions. The Greek troops sustained bravely in defiance of the enemy’s decisive onslaught followed by another two CCF companies. Yet, the Greeks fought desperately at the disadvantage against great odds in terms of strength. After tough and close fighting within the entrenchments, lasting until 0540 hours, the enemy was foiled in his attempt to overrun the Greek positions. He was defeated and fled to the north with heavy casualties.

In this desparate action, the Battalion lost its six men, Privates Agelis Dimitorios, Vafiadis Styl, Iliakopoulos Dimitorios, Metsakis Kon/Nos, Sfakakis Georgios, and Tsilihas Dimitrios.

During the daylight hours of 17 July, the Red Chinese in 200-strong again struck at the Greek positions at 1505 hours. This time their penetration was aimed primarily at the left shoulder, coming down from Hill 462. The bloody battle ensued for two hours and 25 minutes in which the Greek troops killed 95 enemy and captured twelve prisoners. Further, there were countless enemy wounded as a matter of course.

Thereafter the Battalion positions were extended one kilometer more to the left on the night of 18-19 July, thus taking over the right half of the 2nd Battalion, the 15th US Infantry.

On the night of 19-20 July, the Greek Battalion was relieved the frontline positions by the 1st Battalion of the Cavalry Regiment, the Capital ROK Division. The relief was completed by 0650 hours, 20 July. Then, it assembled once in the vicinity of Hill 784 at 0700 hours and moved east to occupy an area which
was the key to the positions of the 15th US Regiment as a whole. The area the Greek troops newly took up the blocking positions by 1640 hours was located in the neighbourhood of Sungam-ni, astriding the mountain road behind the 1st Battalion, the 15th Infantry. It remained there for three days.

**The Last Battle**

(24 – 26 July)

At 0150 hours, 23 July, the Greek Battalion was placed on the frontline positions by taking over a hill mass area west of Chinhyon-ni from the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Infantry. During the middle of the relief Private Katsoulis Eaharios and also Private Ntoymis Kon/Nos were killed caused by the enemy mortaring. The Battalion took up the hasty action to reorganize the defenses, putting the two companies on the line and one in reserve with the following disposition: The 2nd and 3rd Companies, from left to right, held the positions in and around Hill 532 and Hill 491 respectively, while the 1st Company organized the blocking positions behind the frontline.

On the following day, the 24th, the enemy also moved east his large forces in number in the sector of the 15th US Regiment. Facing there were the 389th and 388th Regiments of the 130th CCF Division. On that evening the 15th US Regimental Commander visited Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Koumanakos, the Greek Battalion Commander, and ordered latter to study and plan a withdrawal of the Battalion southward to another position, as he was afraid that the Greek Battalion would not be able to defend its position occupied at present. The reason why such a question brought at this junction was grounded on the imminent situation that the enemy would step up heavy attacks against the area as the armistice negotiations entered their final phase.

The Battalion Commander, however, assured the 15th Regimental Commander with firm confidence in himself that he was willing to undertake the responsibility to hold its position and he wanted only the sufficient artillery support. His request was granted with pleasure.

During the night of 24 - 25 July, the Red Chinese in company strength, seemingly from the 388th CCF Regiment, attempted a probing attack against the Greek defenses. Supported by a shower of artillery and mortar fire, the Red odds closed in upon the outpost manned by the elements of the 3rd Company. A close fighting was ensued for thirty minutes. The enemy attack was repulsed by stubborn counteraction of the Greek warriors but Corporal Kolgris Valentin and three privates, namely Agelopoulos Ioavvis, Souros Panagiotis, and Kiakos
Dimitrios were heroically fallen in this action.

Beginning at 2250 hours on the night of 25 July, the Red Chinese attacked again upon the Battalion positions employing more than a full battalion strength. The onslaught was directed primarily to penetrate through the center position inbetween the 2nd and 3rd Companies. There soon followed a desperate battle for two and a half hours, during which the concentration fire of artillery and mortars by the both sides vibrated the whole neighbourhood. In the end, thanks to the self-sacrifice of the men of the Greek Battalion and the immense support of the friendly artillery, all positions were held intact. The enemy had routed northward losing will to fight any further. The next morning the enemy attack was repeated, but was much weaker than the first, and was repulsed easily.

After daybreak 105 enemy dead were counted in the battlefield and 15 were taken prisoners. Without saying that the enemy had carried the countless wounded with him. On the contrary, the Greek Battalion suffered seven warriors killed and 24 men wounded in action. The fallen heroes were Private Nikopolos Ilias, Corporal Tanos Stefanos, Privates Vories Ioannis, Karitsiotis Xrysan, Tsouralas Ioannis, Franeskos Nikiforos, and Crisanthakopoulos Efstr. This operation, carried out so successfully, was the last serious task the Greek
Battalion accomplished in Korea. (See Sketch Map 10.)

Shortly after midnight of 26 July, that was at 0040 hours on the 27th, a platoon-sized enemy probed at the Greek outpost manned with a reinforced squad by the 3rd Company, it was defeated off after a thirty-minute engagement resulting in one man wounded.

At 1015 hours on 27 July 1953, the Battalion received from the higher command the following message: “Truce signed 1000 today STOP. Cease fire at 2200 hours today STOP.” At this moment of war, that was 2030 hours, the enemy, being deceitful again, fired against the positions of the Greek Battalion with artillery and mortars. As a result, three officers and five enlistedmen were wounded, and Private Markris Georgios killed; the last victim of the Greek Battalion in the Korean War. And on that day, though the opposing forces remained in place, the war that had ranged up and down the Korean peninsula for 37 months and two days ceased leaving the peninsula still divided south and north.

A few days later, Lieutenant General Reuben E. Jenkins, the IX US Corps Commander, communicated a very complimentary citation to the Greek Battalion.

The total casualties of the Greek Battalion in the Korean War were 174 dead of which 14 were officers, and 543 wounded, including 23 officers, and two men captured. And during Operation Big Switch in August through September 1953, two Greek warriors were repatriated from the POW status in the Communist North.

Section 16. Epilogue

(28 July 1953 – 11 December 1955)

Post-Armistice

After the truce, in accordance with the terms of the military armistice agreement, the ROK and UN allied forces began preparation for withdrawing to the new main battle positions, known as PAMB P two kilometers to the rear of the former front line, thus leaving the Demilitarized Zone inbetween the two opponents.

On 30 July 1953, at 0900 hours, the Greek Battalion moved back to a new assembly area located in the vicinity of Hill 683, about eight kilometers southwest from the old positions in distance. The last positions where the Greeks saw
General Taylor, the EUSAK Commander, decorates in the colours of the Greek Battalion.

the ceasefire were now remained in the military demarcation line.

Thereupon the Battalion was reorganized and trained staying in the south of PAMBP line. In January 1954, it became nearly a regimental sized-unit in strength with two infantry battalions but in May of the next year, it again became a battalion. In July 1955, the Greek Battalion was reduced to a company. This last contingent left Korea on 11 December 1955, leaving just a token force of one officer and nine enlistedmen behind, thus marking an end of the historical contribution of the Greek troops to the Republic of Korea for the period of exactly five years and three days since 9 December 1950, the arrival date of the first contingent.

On that very last day, prior to its departure for home-bound, General Isac D. White, the Commander of the Eighth US Army in Korea, in the name of the President of the United States, awarded a citation to the Greek unit with a particular mention on the interpid stand of the 3rd Company at the Harry Battle and decorated its colours.
Conclusion

In retrospect the Greek troops were disciplined with a high morale. The unit had understood the purpose for which it fought at this distant country, and for this reason, it always accomplished so successfully all the assigned missions to it. Moreover, there were a complete physical contact between the officers and men within the unit, and they exhibited thereby a concrete esprit de corps, thus exemplifying themselves the best team work. Well trained leaders, down to and including the squad leaders, were in charge who knew their job to do and enjoyed the confidence of their inferiors. The initiative exhibited by them had always excellent results, accordingly. The brave Greeks made the particularly gallant stands and actions innumerable against the human-wave tactics of the Chinese Communist forces wherever they encountered and fought with the foe.

Further, it enjoyed the confidence and esteem of the superior commands due to its abilities as a combat unit, and contributed greatly to the common cause of the U.N. Allied efforts.

In conclusion, under the banner of the United Nations Forces, the crusaders for justice and freedom, the Greek Battalion had well demonstrated itself the exceptionally high standard of the military profession, reflecting excellent organization and training, courageous fighting spirit combined with strong anti-communism and outstanding leadership. Its brilliant battle services rendered to the Republic of Korea as well as the United Nations Command in the Korean War will forever remain in the memories of the Korean people.

Such heroic battle accounts and deeds achieved by the Greek troops in Korea had also added immeasurably glory to their home country and credit to the Hellenic people.
CHAPTER III  THE HELLENIC AIR FORCE FLIGHT

Section 1. Major Activity

Introduction

The Greek Air Force, in addition to the Army troops in an infantry battalion strength, had also participated in the Korean War by one flight of transport aircraft, Dacota type C-47's, which was among the firsts to come Korea in support of the Republic of Korea.

Its distinguished operational accounts throughout the participation were beyond expression. Nonetheless, it is a matter for regret that no detailed records for such glorious actions in combat are obtainable from anywhere both at home and abroad. Particularly, the operations of the air transport units as the Greek Flight had been overshadowed by the more furious striking actions in the air and close fightings on the ground, because the transport units had exerted themselves in the background.

At all events, a real brief war history of the Greek Air Flight in Korea is given hereunder in a summary form.

The strength of the flight which was known as the 13th Greek Transport Flight of the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) (Hereafter refers to as the Greek Flight) was initially seven aircraft, to which another two were added later on, and 67 officers and 27 enlistedmen of which were pilots.

On 11 November 1950, the Greek Flight took off from Elefsis (Elevsis) airfield northwest of Athens in Greece and landed at Itazuke airbase in Kyusyu, Japan after a flight of 57 hours and 46 minutes.

Upon its arrival on 26 November 1950, the Greek Flight, also known to the UN allies as the Royal Hellenic Air Force Flight No. 13, had been attached to the 21st Squadron of the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing with Colonel Troy W. Crawford in command, as would be the Royal Thai Air Force Transport Detachment for a time when it arrived on 23 January 1951. The 315th US Air Division (Combat Cargo) assumed the command or control over the 374th Wing at its activation in January 1951.
The Greek Flight had no time to spare from the very beginning of its arrival in the theater of operations despite it just arrived from the remote country. In recognition of its potential capability, it was necessary to participate in operations without a rest, due to the seriousness of the war situation in Korea developed by the surprised and rapid invasion launched by the Chinese Communist forces in a full-scale.

At the time, when the end of war, which provoked and initiated by the puppet regime in Communist North Korea with the full support of the Soviet Russia, was very near at hand, the Red Chinese forces suddenly waged the aggressive war against the UN Forces. In consequence, the ROK and UN forces, facing the overwhelming Red odds in strength, had no alternative but to turn round southward. From that moment onward the Korean War entered into a completely new phase with a new nature that no one ever learned before in the war history of the world.

The First Action in Combat

From 4 December 1950, the Greek C-47's Flight was assigned the war mission over the North Korean area. The tactical situation by this stage of the Korean War had made for periodicity in movements of dropped and airdropped supplies to the battlefield. But now the concept of air transport support became more delicate and more critical owing to the newly developed situation, with the Red Chinese invasion from Manchuria in particular.

Accordingly, the deployment of the air transport unit was aimed at utilizing the varied characteristics of aircraft to the maximum extent. Thus, the higher command attempted to locate the various aircraft types for the most efficient performance of what they could do best.

At that time in the north of Hungnam, a large group of the UN forces, particularly the US Marine forces were fighting for their way toward the port of Hungnam from where they would be withdrawn by seaborne. But they suddenly encountered hardship en route in their effort to open a withdrawal route, because the Red Chinese forces cut them off to their front and rear when they reached the village of Koto-ri, about 11 kilometers down the valley from Hagaruri. Therefore the Air Cargo Command was called for airdrops to provide the bulk of food, ammunition, and supplies. On the icy ground a rocky airstrip, barely wide enough to accommodate a C-47, was prepared for the emergency needs.

The C-47's of the Hellenic Flight, entirely new to the theater, took part in this air transport operation, taking off from an airfield in Hungnam called
The Greek aircraft participated there in an airhead together with the US aircraft to ferry back from Hagaru-ri, 1,000 wounded men of the encircled US Marines. In addition, they flew 30 sorties carrying cargo there.

Under the extremely adverse weather conditions and through snow-storms the aircraft would fly over the enemy territory landing on a very narrow lane covered with ice to lift as many wounded as possible, under the enemy fire, to K-27 site and thence from to the hospital in the rear area.

The contribution of both the American and Greek aircraft to that operation resulted in carrying and rescuing all the battle wounded, the troops being thus given the chance to evacuate the area without considerable casualties. The Hellenic Flight received later a U.S. Presidential Citation for exceptional bravery “in the difficult operations of evacuating the wounded from the areas surrounded by the enemy.” The participating crews were also awarded later the US Air Medal for their outstanding achievements.

Impending now capture of the Hungnam area by the enemy, the aircraft abandoned the airfield and moved to a new airbase in the vicinity of Pusan, the
southern edge of the Korean peninsula.

Until the end of December 1950, the Greek Flight performed a considerable number of missions. These missions were assumed by an operational echelon consisting of three or four aircraft, while the Flight Headquarters stationed at Itazuke Air Base in the northern locality of Kyushu, Japan.

From January 1951 the Greek Flight was stationed at Tachikawa Air Base near Tokyo where it remained until the end of the year. There was the Royal Thai Air Transport Detachment also equipped with C-47’s operating under the same US Squadron, the 21st. Ever since it based at Tachikawa, an operational echelon of the Hellenic Flight, including a half of the C-47’s, was forwarded to K-2 Air Base in Taegu where it continued its operations until 13 May 1951, when it moved again to K-14 Air Base at Kimpo near Seoul. On 26 May 1951, three officers and one corporal were killed in action.

At the end of July, the Flight stationed in Tachikawa, Japan, and the echelon in Kimpo, Korea moved to Ashiya Air Base in Kyushu, Japan, northeast of Itazuke, wherefrom it continued its action until 15 January 1952, when it moved to the Seoul municipal airfield in Youi-do, called K-16, and then to K-14 airfield. There the whole Flight remained till the end of March, 1955, when it was ordered to return to Greece, its mission being terminated.

During the period while in the K-16 and K-14 airfields, the Greek Flight endlessly carried out its assigned missions in transporting the personnel and supplies back and forth from the rear to the front and from the front to the rear.

The Successive Actions

In the meantime, the ancient C-47’s of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron to which the Hellenic Flight was attached for operational control customarily hauled cargo to the small combat airstrips of Korea. Employed where it was needed, the 21st Squadron during 1951 alone was located at Itazuke, Tachikawa, Taegu, Kimpo, and Ashiya. Then, beginning in the spring of 1952, the 374th Wing retained one of the 61st Group’s squadrons and redesignated as the 21st Squadron. The old 21st Squadron, known as “Kyushu Gypsy” replaced by a table of distribution unit which would continue to fly C-47 aircraft. The reorganization took several months to effect lasting until early August 1952.

Since most Globemaster flights terminated at Seoul or Taegu, while the Fifth US Air Force required daily delivery of small-package loads of air freight and air passengers at its tactical K-sites, the Hellenic Air Transport Flight No.
The Flight Commander inspects his crews prior to their take-off.

13 was moved to Kimpo (K-14) on 1 February 1953 by order of the 315th Air Division. At the time the Greek Flight was relocated there along with the 6461st US Troop Carrier Squadron to serve as a feeder airline for the Globemaster route. Because there required balanced capability of small transports which could feed air cargo from Globemaster terminals to the tactical airfields.

Late in December 1952, an unexpected accident happened. On 22 December when the pilot of a Greek Air Flight C-47 accidentally mistook or misunderstood instructions unwillingly and collided with a jet fighter-bomber at Suwon Air Field south of Seoul. In this accident, Group Captain Fragogiannis Panag, the Greek Flight Commander, Master Sergeant Bilias Georgios, and Airman Tsinakos Grigorios sacrificed their lives.

The Greek C-47's continued their transport service to handle routine medical air evacuation as well as the R&R personnel between Korea and Japan. In addition, they were kept busy in transporting cargo throughout the period. Because, there followed a heavy workload ceaselessly, and the larger type aircraft including C-124's could not absorb the extra load, the missions for such an old type of C-47 remained unchanged, thus keeping the Hellenic C-47's in service for a considerable long period of time. Even in the US air transport units at the
time, the conversion programs for the old types into the newly developed aircraft were postponed until the end of the Korean War. Particularly, the Korean terrain features and airstrips available in the field required to maintain the old-typed aircraft in air transport service because of their reliability. Furthermore, when necessary, these old ones such as C-47, C-46 and C-54 aircraft could do almost anything. To cite in the medical air evacuation case in Korea, this airlift had made tremendous strides, because the evacuation of casualties through successive hospitals in order to keep a wounded soldier as close as to the front as possible. That was what the ground forces wanted for the sake of the tactical operations and the UN air support units should devote their efforts to meet the requirements what the ground forces wanted. Thus the UN air transport units continued their missions to move the wounded and to return the recuperated to duty rapidly. The Greek C-47's took part in such a role with the outstanding efforts throughout the period.

Section 2. The Summary Account

Characteristics of the Missions

The missions assigned to the Greek Flight were transports of a variety of war equipment, ammunition, fuel, and medical equipment and supplies to the forward areas in the frontline, as well as transports of personnel, wounded, prisoners of war, and even dead, from the frontline to the rear area. The Flight also carried out droppings of ammunition, supplies and mail to the forward or isolated units.

Those missions and especially the transportation of wounded were carried out under all weather conditions. However, when the weather conditions or ground configuration did not allow the aircraft to reach their objectives, the Greek pilots, making use of their experience obtained during the guerrilla war against the Communist rebels in Greece, accomplished their missions by flying right under the clouds, guided by distinct points on the ground in order to find the airfields, which were usually concealed and surrounded by the high mountains in mass.

Such was the Yoju airstrip southeast of Seoul for instance; a very limited narrow lane on the slope of a mountain wherefrom the heavily wounded soldiers were picked up. It was feasible for the aircraft to land only in one direction
otherwise the aircraft was sure to crash. Since it was not possible to turn the aircraft about on the ground, it was drawn back in order to take off. Both landing and take off were supported by machineguns, which fired at the enemy in advance, being the final defense line.

Besides the aforementioned missions the Flight was assigned some special missions related to the operational information. These missions, being of six hours time duration and in depth within the enemy territory, were carried out by night.

There were also undertaken the missions of resupplying the Allied bases located within the enemy held areas. These missions were carried out mostly without fighter escort. During these missions there were executed landings on the islands located close to and opposite the enemy coast. The aircraft landed on the beach only during the time of tide.

On these missions the airplanes reached the beach flying at a low altitude so that they were acquired by the enemy radars.

Achievements and Honours

From 4 December 1950 up to 26 March 1955 when the Greek Air Transport Flight No. 13 was stationed in Korea, it carried out 2,983 missions in total. This number represents 13,777 flight hours. Moreover it transported 70,568 passengers, 9,243 wounded, 11,104,550 pounds of supplies and executed droppings of ammunition and supplies amounting to 17,000 pounds. During the conduct of the above missions it lost four of its nine aircraft and suffered twelve men killed including seven officers among which one of the Flight Commanders.

For its distinguished services and merits in combat action during the Korean War the Greek Flight was awarded the following honorary distinctions and commendations apart from many others.

First of all, it was honoured with the United States Presidential Unit Citation for its meritorious combat action during the operation of field evacuation by airlift because it contributed to the rescue of hundreds of the friendly wounded personnel late in 1950 in the neighbourhood of Hagaru-ri north of Hungnam.

Its honour was highlighted on 23 October 1953 when the Flight was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation by the Republic of Korea. The citation reads as follows:

"The Greek Flight No. 13 of the Hellenic Air Force was distinguished for its heroic service from December 1st, 1950 up to March 31st, 1953 during its
participation in the war against a common enemy of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations.

It left motherland after a three-year war and defeated the same enemy. It covered thousands of miles and was among the first formations that came to help the Republic. It was attached to the 21st Troop Transport Squadron of the U.S. Air Force whose name was later changed to the 6461st Troop Carrier Squadron. The Greek Flight No. 13 operated day and night without rest and under all weather. The missions were executed landings on the airstrips of the front and hundreds of the wounded men were safely evacuated to the hospitals in the rear areas. There were also landings on the dangerous island coasts while the friendly detachments were far from the near lines of the enemy. The enemy attacks were expected at any moment.

During this period of operations the Greek Flight No. 13 carried out 1,795 combat missions; covered 8,288 combat flight hours; it transported 34,640 men; evacuated 5,958 wounded men; transported 8,823,929 pounds of supplies and made 16,900 drops of foodstuff and ammunition.

During these tasks the Greek Flight No. 13 lost 45 per cent of its active aircraft, 14 per cent of its flying personnel and one of its best administrative officers.

By its gallantry, outstanding loyalty to its duty and its determination to overcome all the handicaps, the Greek Flight showed exceptional heroism, contributed greatly to the Republic of Korea and to all over the world the love of freedom and developed the confidence to the Hellenic Air Force.”

Further, the satisfaction and admiration of its higher Allied commanders, such as Major General Chester E. McArty, the Commander of the 315th US Air Division, who speaking about the Greek airmen said that: “There is a group of pilots with me, one of the best that I have ever cooperated with: All of them are skillful and experienced like air pilots, I am very glad to have them under my operational control.”

The Greek Flight also received the letter of commendation from the 6461st US Troop Carrier Squadron Commander. The Flight contributed to the declaration of the Squadron as “Tactical Monthly Squadron” in February 1953 while it was under the latter’s operational control.

After the return of the Flight to Greece late in March 1955, five Greek aircraft remained in the theater, which left Japan on 8 May 1955 and after many landings at the various airfields they arrived at Elefsis airfield in Greece on 23 May 1955, after a flight of 54 hours and 30 minutes.

In retrospect, the contribution of the Hellenic Air Force Flight in the Korean War to prevail the principles of freedom and justice had been exceptionally
Line-up of C-47's, the Hellenic Air Flight.

outstanding. It contributed to the rescue of hundreds of the wounded comrades of the UN forces, performed the aerial drops of ammunition and supplies in thousands of pounds and generally accomplished successfully its assigned very dangerous missions.

The above citations and commendations awarded to the Flight for its overall action make it outstanding literally among the distinguished UN allied air force elements for its exceptional heroism and gallantry from the beginning up to the end of the operations in Korea.
CHRONOLOGY

1950

11 Nov The 13th Greek Air Force Transport Flight, consisted with seven C-47’s aircraft, takes off from Elefsis Air Field, Greece for Korea.

16 Nov The Greek Infantry Battalion, embarked on the transport ship “General Han,” leaves the port of Piraeus, Greece heading for Korea.

26 Nov The Greek AF Flight arrives at Itazuke air base in Kyushu, Japan, and then arrives at Tachikawa air base on 1 December, where it was placed under operational control of the 21st USAF Squadron.

4 Dec The Greek C-47’s Flight commences its airlift mission in the combat area north of Hungnam, North Korea, particularly engaging in the evacuation operations of 1,000 wounded of the US Marines from Hagaru-ri.

9 Dec The Greek Battalion arrives in the Pusan port and moves to a reception center north of Pusan the next morning.

15 Dec The main body of the Battalion moves by train to Suwon, arriving there at 1530 hours.

18 Dec The Battalion, which had been attached to the 1st US Cavalry Division effective on 13 December, was further attached to the 7th US Cavalry Regiment.

Late-Dec The main body of the Greek Flight moves from Pusan airbase to Tachikawa, while a half of its C-47’s moved to K-2, Taegu from where its continued operations till 13 May 1951.

30 Dec The Greek Battalion moves from Suwon to Kumgyo northeast of Seoul, where it joined the 7th Cavalry.

1951

2-4 Jan The Battalion was attached to the 24th US Division for building up the Seoul defense line.

5-14 Jan The Battalion moves to Taesowon west of Chungju.

15-23 Jan The Greek troops engage in the guerrilla mop-up operations along the main supply route southeast of Chungju.

24 Jan The Greek Battalion begins an offensive reconnaissance, as a spearhead of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, along the Chungju–Ichon axis.

29-30 Jan The Battalion sustains and repels a series of severe enemy attacks on and around Hill 381, northwest of Ichon.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-14 Feb</td>
<td>The Battalion continues to attack northward from Konjiam-ni, taking Hill 402 and Hill 227 one after another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Feb - 1 Mar</td>
<td>The Battalion moves from Konjiam-ni to Koksu-ri, south of Chipyong-ni, where it remains in reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 Mar</td>
<td>The Battalion attacks toward Hills 326, 443 and 281 near Yongdu-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-18 Mar</td>
<td>The Greek troops attack at Hills 325 and 655 along the road leading to Hongsan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar</td>
<td>The Battalion establishes the positions near Chunchon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10 Apr</td>
<td>The Battalion initiates a new attack toward Hwachon along the axis of the rugged mountain areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr</td>
<td>The Battalion after being relieved by the 1st ROK Marine Regiment, moves from the Hwachon area to the vicinity of Kumgok near Seoul, where it remained in reserve until 25 April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr</td>
<td>The Battalion moves to Nuwon, south of Uijongbu, from where it took up the defensive positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>The operation echelon of the Hellenic Transport Flight at K-2 air base in Taegu moves to K-14 at Kimpo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>The Greek Battalion assumed an offensive reconnaissance toward Uijongbu, but it moves back on order down to the northern outskirts of Seoul, when the CCF May offensive was heating up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May - 1 June</td>
<td>The Battalion takes part in a counteroffensive towards Tongduchon–Imjin River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June - 15 July</td>
<td>The Battalion continues the offensive action north of Yonchon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Aug - 30 Sept</td>
<td>The Battalion continues the aggressive patrols in force in the vicinity of Kumgong-ni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Oct</td>
<td>The Greek Battalion engages with the overwhelming force of the Red Chinese at Hill 313 (Scotch Hill). The Battle was one of the utmost bloody ones fought by the Greek troops in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Nov</td>
<td>The Battalion relieves from the attached 1st US Cavalry Division and was attached to the 3rd US Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Dec</td>
<td>The Battalion moves to the Imjin River sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>A detachment of the Greek AF Flight in Itazuke, Kyushu moves to K-16, Youl-do, and then to K-14, Kimpo where it stays until March 1955.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb</td>
<td>The Greek Battalion receives the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb</td>
<td>The Greek Battalion moves into an area of the Jamestown Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar</td>
<td>The 1st Greek Company raids on to the Kelly Hill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17-18 Mar
The Greek troops defend the outposts on the Kelly and Nori, near the west bank of the Imjin River.

24 Mar
The Battalion honours with the ROK Presidential Unit Citation for exceptional battle successes.

23 May
One Company of the Greek Battalion moves to Koje-do where it takes part in the security guard for the prisoners of war until 3 July.

26 July
The Battalion again assumes the defensive missions in the Imjin River sector.

26-30 Oct
The 2nd Greek Company engages in a severe battle with the Red Chinese at Big Nori.

29 Oct
The Battalion moves to north of Chorwon and carries out the patrolling actions during ensuing months.

4 Dec
The Greek Battalion receives the U.S. Presidential Citation again.

22 Dec
Group Captain Fragogiannis Panag, the Greek AF Flight Commander, kills in an aerial accident over Suwon air base.

1953

1 Feb
The Greek Flight moves to K-14, Kimpo.

17-18 June
The Battle of Outpost Harry.

14 July
The Greek Battalion moves from the Harry area to a new area south of Kumsong.

24-26 July
The 3rd Company of the Greek Battalion embattles with the enemy near Kumsong, the last battle in the Korean War, inflicting a toll of the Red casualties.

27 July
The armistice was signed at 1000 hours to cease fire effective at 2200 hours.

23 Oct
The 13th Hellenic AF Flight honours with the ROK Presidential Unit Citation.

1955

July
The Greek Battalion was reduced to a company.

26 Mar
The Greek AF Flight departs from Korea for Greece leaving five aircraft behind.

8 May
Five C-47 aircraft of the Greek Air Force departs from Japan, and arrives at Elefisis Airfield in Greece on 23 May.

11 Dec
The last contingent of the Greek troops in company strength leaves Korea for homeland.
PART SIX

THE LUXEMBOURG INFANTRY DETACHMENT IN THE KOREAN WAR
His Royal Highness Prince Jean of Luxembourg
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CHAPTER I GENERAL BACKGROUND

Introduction to Luxembourg

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a small state, yet it is older than a thousand years. It is situated in the industrial heart of Europe between Belgium, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Its 348,000 inhabitants are living on an area of about 2,600 square kilometers.

Luxembourg forms a national unity which has succeeded in preserving its particular characteristics through the vicissitudes of its eventful history. Today it is a sovereign and independent constitutional monarchy. Luxembourg is a prosperous and highly industrialized country with a powerful and thriving iron industry, a country having close economic and political connections with the nations in Europe as well as overseas.

Its economic structure and geographical position have necessarily led Luxembourg into a close cooperation with other countries. Thus since Luxembourg won back its independence in 1839 its foreign policy has been dominated on one hand by the desire to defend its own security and on the other by the aspiration to secure its integration into a larger economic system.

By its geographical situation, its small territory and the economic and political necessities resulting from its exiguity, Luxembourg is a transit country, a crossroad of manifold influences. It is an ethnic experiment performed by history at the intersection of two great cultures. Two ethnic and political groups live together and merge there: In the west the Romance group with which its civilization and partly also its race connect Luxembourg and in the east the Germanic group to which the country belongs linguistically. This little people, does not owe its existence to the whims of a diplomatic game or an accident of history.

The mother tongue of the Luxembourgers, a national idiom, is an old Mosellan Frankish dialect, blended with a considerable amount of German and French elements. If both the German and French languages are used in the press, in political, cultural and religious life, French is nevertheless the official
language of the Luxembourg administration, jurisdiction, of its parliament, its education system and of some if its literacy circles. The Luxembourg dialect, however, in everyday life is the language used by the whole population.

At the end of the First World War, Luxembourg formed a close economic union with Belgium in 1921. This union still exists today. In 1943 Luxembourg contributed to the creation of the BENELUX, an economic union of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Grand Duchy is a founding member of the three European communities; the European Coal and Steel Community, the EEC (European Economic Community) and the EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community).

In 1948 Luxembourg gave up its neutrality and by joining the different economic, political and military organizations the Grand Duchy resolutely supported a policy of fertile cooperation on the European as well as on the international plane. It has given its approval and active support to the organizations dedicated to furthering the peaceful hopes of humanity. It is a member of the organization of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the European Union, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and of the GATT.
CHAPTER II  THE FIRST DETACHMENT

After announcement of its intention to render the military aid in the form of an infantry platoon for service in Korea, the Luxembourgian Government made a call for volunteers to serve in Korea. Overwhelming numbers from the reservists and even civilians answered in the government's action, and on 1 October 1950 the Luxembourgian Army activated the Korea-bound platoon, naming Lieutenant Wagner as its leader.

This unit was made up of one officer, four non-commissioned officers and 43 enlisted men, totalling 48 troops. The newly activated platoon went into an intensive training to test out the field mobility as a unit. The war preparation kept the detachment occupied during the last months of 1950. As soon as the unit had completed its basic training, the proud soldiers marched in parade on the streets of the capital city. Families and relatives gathered there from all over the country.

On 18 December 1950, the 1st Luxembourgian Platoon with its Belgian Battalion embarked on a transportation ship "Kamina" at Anvers for Korea, in the presence of the congested people sending them off with hearty cheers for success in the war. After a long voyage across the other side of the globe, the Luxembourgian Platoon with the Belgian Battalion disembarked at the port of Pusan on 31 January 1951.

On its arrival at Pusan, the platoon moved to the United Nations Reception Center which was, at that time, located at Tongnac in the northeastern outskirts of Pusan. There the platoon underwent a strenuous training with the emphasis on physical fitness and adaptation to the alien terrain.

When the training was almost at a close in early February 1951, the platoon which had been attached to A Company of the Belgian Battalion was ordered to move to Waegwan, and given the mission of providing security for the Waegwan-Taegu road. Upon arrival at Waegwan on 11 February 1951, the platoon assumed the mission of scouting the Taegu-Waegwan railroad against guerrilla activities. Special emphasis was placed on the security of critical installations along the lines of communications in coordination with the elements of the Republic of Korea (ROK) National Police. The platoon
continued its mission until it was relieved by the elements of the 5th ROK Security Battalion.

On 7 March the platoon, clearing out the present position, moved to the vicinity of Tungjiang-dong, and assumed a defensive mission along the south bank of the Han River in line with the companies of the Belgian Battalion. The Luxembourgers spent hectic days in building defenses and daily patrols. After a ten more days of anxious waiting in this position, they were finally alerted for the projected advance northward crossing the Han River.

On 20 March they participated in the United Nations general offensive under the command of the 3rd US Infantry Division, and approximately ten more days later, on the 2nd of April they reached an assembly area, Tongduchon, about 40 kilometers due north of Seoul. On the following day the Luxembourgian Platoon came under the command of the 29th British Brigade, and advanced to the vicinity of Choksong on the main highway northeast of Munsan. There the Luxembourgers with the Belgians relieved the Philippines Battalion,
which then left the brigade, and remained as a reserve until they were ordered to move into the front line. The role of the platoon in this area was to maintain its position, and detect the enemy by patrolling. However, contact was not close. Friendly feeler patrols were able to penetrate several kilometers to the north without meeting the enemy.

The period 4th to 20th April was comparatively quiet for the Luxembourgeois except for a reconnaissance patrol led by the Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Wagner in which valuable informations of both terrain and enemy were brought back. On the night of 12 April 1951, Lieutenant Wagner, along with five of his men, volunteered to go on a reconnaissance patrol into the enemy held area across the Imjin River to get what information he could obtain on the strength, location, and movements of the enemy. They were forced into a fire fight with the enemy approximately eight kilometers north into the enemy territory and had to withdraw. They made withdrawal over very difficult terrain on a dark night without loss of a single man. They not only succeeded in bringing back valuable informations, but also reflected credit upon themselves, their country and the United Nations forces.

On 20 April the Luxembourgeois with the Belgians moved to the north of the Imjin River on Hill 196, Kungul-san area, where they maintained blocking positions until they were forced to withdraw by a mighty blow of the Chinese Communists forces. To the west of the Luxembourgeois, the C Company of the Belgian Battalion deployed its subordinate platoons. On the west was B Company of the Belgian Battalion. (See Situation Map 13.)

On 22 April, beginning about 2100 hours the platoon was being very heavily attacked by the Red Chinese hordes. From the beginning the Red Chinese attack did not appear to be well concentrated in any one area. It was a full-scale attempt to break through the friendly line. Under heavy pressure, the Luxembourgeois threw up a hail of fire to keep the enemy off. Confused fighting continued throughout the 23rd of April, however, to make matters worse at this critical juncture, Y Company of the British force which had been holding the line on the west of the Luxembourgian Platoon retreated southward without any detailed advance notice. Under this conditions, the situation of the platoon became progressively worse. It was untenable to block the streaming of the hordes. Battalion Headquarters ordered the subordinate units to break off the fighting, wanting to pull back a considerable distance. Assisted by some United States tanks, the platoon with the elements of the Belgian Battalion had successfully withdrawn to the east from its isolated position north of the Imjin River.
The Chinese Communist forces kept pressing on the friendly forces in
great strength, particularly on the left flank of the 29th Brigade. In this criti-
cal juncture, the Luxembourgians along with the Belgians were not standing
aside. They were immediately sent to the eastern portion of Kamak-san,
approximately ten kilometers northeast of Tongduchon, to plug the gap existed
between the British Gloucestershire Battalion and the Fusilier Battalion.

They arrived at assigned area and took up their new positions by the late
afternoon of the 24th. There the platoon again bore the brunt of the enemy
assault apparently intended to cut the road leading to Uijongbu, some 15 kilo-
meters north of Seoul. The platoon received increasingly heavy small arms
and mortar fire from the enemy based on the dominating feature Kamak-san.
The Luxembourgians engaged them with rifles and other small and heavy arms
fire. The fire fight continued throughout the whole day until the situations
were eased by the C Squadron of the British 8th Hussars early on the 25th.
While this most desperate hours of the Luxembourgians within the area had
been occurred, orders to withdraw to a position just north of Seoul were issued.

Early in the morning the platoon was ordered to pull back, and final
preparations for the breakout attempt were made. The men mounted on the
vehicles and commenced to pull back via Uijongbu to a prearranged area,
Changgi-ri, Kimpo peninsula. The platoon completed its movement on 28th
and remained there in reserve until 23 May 1951.

Throughout the fight the Luxembourgians had withstood the determined
drive of the Chinese Communist forces, and it provided an excellent testimonial
to the leadership, skill, and valour of the Luxembourgian soldiers. This gallant
action was recognized by the Luxembourgian Government with the award of
citations. Especially the frustrating role done by Sergeant Chief, Frank Aloyse
and his eight men reinforced to the much pressed C Company of the Belgian
Battalion on 23 April, ensured the Luxembourgians to get fame among the
friendly forces. The action at this Imjin River area was the platoon's first
serious engagement since it had been committed to action.

After a brief spell of stay approximately for three weeks in Kimpo area,
in the meantime, the Luxembourgians astride with the Belgians began to par-
ticipate striking movement northward, methodically destroying enemy pockets
avoiding the error of road bound fighting which left the enemy free to infil-
trate down the ridgeline at night.

On 27 the Luxembourgians with the Belgians received an order to move
to the old Imjin River sector which they previously held in April 1951, and
preparations were afoot to relieve the elements of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment.
Two days later, on 29 May they completed their movement to the assigned area, approximately one kilometer west of Solma-ri. When the relief was completed the companies of the Belgian Battalion were deployed with the Luxembourgiens and A Company to the left around Hill 340, B Company in the center on Hill 235, and C Company to the right around Solma-ri. The men dug in their machine guns, registered their mortars, sowed anti-personnel mines, and operated daily patrols to the encompassing high ground.

On 1 June the Luxembourgiens in conjunction with the Belgians carried out their first operations since they had been committed in the front line on Kansas Line. This was a raid at two companies strength against enemy north of the Imjin River with the objective of the detecting the enemy dug out. British engineers constructed a ferry over the flooded river by the torrential rainfall which continued for several days. The operation began at 0815 hours and within an hour the Luxembourgiens Platoon crossed the Imjin River and established a bridgehead on the northern bank to protect the advance route of A and B Companies. The Luxembourgiens received the enemy automatic fires from the eastern hill tops. This resistance was eased by the maneuvering of the 1st Platoon of B Company, which was supported by artillery and tank fires of the British Centurion tanks, which were unable to cross the swollen ford. While the Luxembourgiens were securing the bridgehead at Kayoul, approximately five more kilometers north of the main positions, the attacking echelons of the Belgians continued to attack northward. In the afternoon B Company began to withdraw. However the enemy kept pressing hard with mighty powers of heavy machine guns killing one man and one wounded. In spite of the protection fire of the 25 pounders, Centurion tanks, mortars and machine guns of the heavy weapons company, the enemy desperately engaged with considerable fire power on the Belgians again and again.

At about that time some men of the Luxembourgiens led by Sergeant Steffen Walter, voluntarily moved to the ambush point, and fired directly over the enemy. The Luxembourgiens threw up a continuous curtain of fire in support of the hard pressed riflemen of the Belgian B Company. However the Red Chinese kept up a steady fire and as the Grand Duchy soldiers moved out steadily, enemy shells began to whistle down on them. The Luxembourgiens, fighting a die-hard action, could knock the onrushing enemy back, which charged in frontally against the retreating Belgian company. The supporting fire of the Luxembourgiens which kept the Red Chinese off their backs, gave the pause to the Belgians to cross the river.

At 1945 hours the Luxembourgiens who had successfully conducted their mission to secure the advancing and retreating routes of the Belgians, withdrew
to their positions. Many factors combined to make this operation a very difficulty one. Especially rain caused the river to rise one more meter, and traffic over the river had to be restricted. In the course of actions the Grand Duchy soldiers provided excellent cover for the Belgians to bring back the wounded, and for this action Sergeant Steffen Walter and Corporal Mainz Theodore were decorated.

Approximately twenty days later on 24 June, the Luxembourgians and Belgians conducted ambitious operation which involved an advance across the Imjin River to make a contact with the enemy. All preparations were completed, and the Grand Duchy soldiers launched their attack at first light on 24 June by taking advantage of a morning ground mist. They reached at Woltonmak, approximately ten kilometers north of the crossing site of Imjin River. However, no contact was made with the enemy.

The period from 25th June to the end of July was quiet one. There was some enemy shelling and a few minor incidents, but activities were mainly confined to strengthening the defenses, improving communications and trainings. The men in forward areas lived in slit trenches and bunkers.

Towards the end of July 1951 orders were received, to advance the battalion to the same area held before the reserve period and on the 1st of August the whole battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment. The Luxembourgians and the Belgians moved to Hansan-ri, approximately six kilometers south east of the front line and remained there as a division reserve. However it was short lived.

The lull in operations during July caused by the armistice negotiations afforded the United Nations Command (UNC) to improve the defenses of the front line. UNC had established its defensive positions and was preparing either to conduct local offensive operations or to punish any attempt by the enemy to penetrate the friendly forces defensive line. As the talks droned on at Kaesong, the UNC decided that a little pressure judiciously applied, might have a wholesome effect.

Now it was not the time for the Grand Duchy soldiers to remain idle. At noon, on the 3rd of August, the Luxembourgians set out the reserve area for southern bank of the ferry site of Kayou (Gloucestershire Crossing). While the whole battalion was passing the night, D Company established a bridgehead at northern bank of the Imjin River and sent patrols northward. At dawn next day aboard on eight rafts, the men crossed the river. (See Situation Map 13.)

At about 0800 hours the men started their unopposed advance to the north with the objective of capturing a hill north of Kochon, approximately
seven kilometers north of Kayoul. The Luxembourgiens could make at the objective at 1500 hours. In taking the new positions, the Luxembourgiens occupied the positions on a ridge just north of Kochon. On the left was B Company and in the rear was C Company.

As soon as the Grand Duchy soldiers arrived at the area, the heavy seasonal rains of the area began to hit full stride at 1600 hours, when 150-mm of rain fell in a few hours and created a precarious position. The run-off water created a new obstacle and caused alarming rises of the streams to depths of three to four meters within a few hours. Such a sudden advance smashed the key main supply route link, across the Imjin River to the companies of the battalion.

The following day the Luxembourgiens set off a limited objective attack without contact. However for the individual soldier, a coming of night signalled the approach of that period most important in the defense of his position, for the Chinese Communists preferred the cover of darkness to launch their attack. First report of enemy on the west was confirmed, and artillery fire of British forces which located in the south of the river were thrown into the enemy. During the night only very slight contact with the enemy at B Company area took place, but there were no incidents for the Luxembourgiens.

Next day on 6 August enemy shelling and mortaring began on the positions held by the battalion. The enemy was showing renewed aggressiveness with patrols and artillery against the battalion. This was interpreted by intelligence to mean that the enemy was preparing his offensive. This alarming prompted the battalion to pull back about two kilometers south to an area of Hakyomal. The Luxembourgiens with the members of A Company took up the positions on a road-side ridge just southwest of Hakyomal. To the left was B Company and to the east was C Company.

At about 0300 hours during the night of the 6th-7th an enemy force attempted an attack on a group of men who were engaged in protecting the command post of the battalion. The men responded quickly to the situation, and in a brisk fire fight of machine guns broke up the enemy attack. To the left some enemy forces were reported and the Luxembourgiens engaged them with small arms fire. In the ensuing fight, the Grand Duchy soldiers beat off the enemy attack, holding their precious high ground. Artillery and mortar bombardments were brought down on the enemy. The men were told to hold their high ground, where they were, and this they did. Enemy resistance seemed to be weakening and it was clear that the artillery fire to which he had been subjected was beginning to tell. At about 0230 hours enemy attack was suspended, and the Luxembourgiens could take the stock of the situation.
During the daytime the men were ordered to withdraw and in the late evening they crossed the river. The Luxembourgians mounted on the trucks at the southern bank of the Imjin River and at about 2100 hours they could make at the former assembly area of Hansan-ni, where the Luxembourgians remained until they were withdrawn from the operational control of the 1st Commonwealth Division to the direct control of the 1st US Corps on 21st August.

Meanwhile, however, the period 8 to 25 August was very busy for the Luxembourgians preparing to return home. The out-going members of the Luxembourgians stood solemnly before the Luxembourgian flag, and on 25th of August they began homeward voyage departing port of Inchon aboard on a US transportation ship.

In its Korean mission, the Luxembourgian Platoon suffered only two men wounded. Its light casualties testified to the skill with which all the positions had been organized and defended. It had earned the Presidential Unit Citations of the Republic of Korea and the United States.
CHAPTER III  THE SECOND DETACHMENT

With the coming of spring and the departure of the 2nd Luxembourgian detachment, the finishing touch of the training in the midst of watchful high ranking officials of the Luxembourgian Army, produced a feeling of unanimity and participation that quickly generated high morale and esprit de corps.

There was much to learn and as the first months of 1952 sped past there were exercises covering every feature of operations, from battle procedures to communications, by night and by day. The men moved out of their barracks and into the countryside of the training areas to harden themselves and accustom them to doing without cover.

Now it was the time for the members of the 2nd detachment to head for the battle scene. The 2nd detachment which consisted of one officer, six non-commissioned officers of whom one man volunteered from the 1st detachment and 45 other men of whom five also volunteered from the 1st detachment left its homeland on board an airplane on 16 March 1952. After a brief stopover at Japan the men continued their trip aboard a ship and came to anchor in the Korean soil on 26 March 1952.

Two days later, on 28 March the Luxembourgian Platoon saw its arrival at Chonggo-ri, north of Pochon and officially attached to the Belgian Battalion which remained, at that time, as a division reserve of the 3rd US Infantry Division. The Luxembourgers were attached to A Company of the Belgian Battalion as 3rd Platoon. At that time when the Grand Duchy soldiers returned to the front line, the action was limited to the patrol clashes and small forays that characterized the defensive, positional war. There was little activity on the battlefield.

Their arrival was welcomed in by the whole members of the Belgian Battalion, and soon they were briefed on current enemy and friendly situations at the division MLR. Of the enemy situation, stress was laid on his numerical capabilities to launch strong attack against friendly positions. The build up of long range weapons and armor by the enemy in front of the division was likewise emphasized.

While attached to the 65th US Infantry Regiment from 27 March 1952 to the time of being detached, the men spent a comparatively quiet period but
Forty-six Luxembourgian volunteers of the 2nd detachment prior to aboard on a Korean-bound airplane at Melsbroeck Air Port in 1952.

busy in extensive training, and receiving new American weapons and equipments. Numerous defense plans were set up by the regiment and the carrying out of these plans kept the Luxembourgian soldiers alert and gave them valuable experience and training under combat conditions. In late June 1952 the Luxembourgians were declared sufficiently trained and supplied to make them combat effective but there was much training to be done and the shortage of some equipment was still acute.

Finally on 30 June, the Belgian-Luxembourgian Battalion received an order to be relieved by the elements of the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Infantry. Four days later, on the 5th, the Luxembourgians along with the Belgians were officially attached for the operational control to the 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd US Division and next day they took up the positions at Chong-dong area approximately ten kilometers northwest of Yonchon.

In taking the new positions, the men were busy in digging in and establishing communications. Their missions were to conduct aggressive patrols to
take prisoners while remainders were consolidating the lines. During the period the battalion planned to continue to send out patrols in force in an effort to locate the enemy positions and strength, at the rate of at least one reconnaissance patrol and an ambush per 24-hour period.

One of these patrols, scheduled for the night of 14 July, fell to the Luxembourgian Platoon, Lieutenant Rodolphe Lutty, the Platoon Leader, received the patrol plans and he selected a patrol team. He took his patrol team to a high point overlooking the planned route and briefed them on the patrol scheduled for that night. He pointed out the objective in the no-man's-land, and explained that he hoped to detect the enemy position. If possible, the patrol would capture one or more enemy soldiers, or killed them if capture were impossible.

At about 2200 hours of 13, when all details of patrol were in order the men who were both careful and thorough worked their way deep into the no-man's-land approximately five kilometers. By the time the patrol team reached the objective, it had been out for about three hours. The patrol members saw and heard movement in the direction of the enemy's main defensive line, however, there was no physical contact with enemy. At dawn the patrol withdraw to the friendly line without accomplishing its mission of capturing a prisoner, but it brought valuable information of enemy positions.

Three days later, on 17 June another Luxembourgian reconnaissance patrol, which was consisted of one officer, two non-commissioned officers and six men, carried out its mission, the purpose of which was to capture prisoners in front of the forward positions. Apart from some enemy shelling, very little opposition was met and the patrol returned its starting point before dawn without any casualty.

At the night of 23 July a patrol became involved into the same area without success. During the period 25th to the 27th July, on direct orders from the battalion, two other patrols were carried out with the objective of capturing prisoners, however none of these patrols had produced any prisoners. The wisdom of such operations which were hardly more successful were curtailed on the 28th when the Battalion was relieved by the Greek Battalion.

By the time operations had become almost completely static. Both friendly and enemy sides had constructed strong and deep defensive works, protected by mines and wire, and had perfected their defensive fire arrangements to such an extent which made patrols and raids very hazardous undertakings. There seemed little prospects of the resumption of a more mobile form of warfare. The truce talks continued their leisurely and quarrelsome trend, but their continuance had some influence on confining operations to minor enterprises.
without much thought by either side of bold plans to produce decisive results. When the Luxembourgians were consolidating their positions after their arrival patrols dominated no-man's-land and raids and other minor enterprises always had good chance of success. However, by July 1952, all this had changed. The Red Chinese now deployed great weight of artillery and mortars and involved a very efficient system of defensive fire by night and by day.

Meanwhile, on 28 July after being relieved by the elements of the Greek Battalion the Luxembourgians along with the Belgians moved to an assembly area at Mudung-ni approximately five kilometers southwest of Yonchon. However, the remaining as a reserve was short lived, and on 19 August the men found that they were again setting out to relieve the elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 65th US Infantry, 3rd US Division. Twelve days later on 31 August the Grand Duchy soldiers took up the defensive positions of San-kol area, some eight kilometers northwest of Yonchon. The period up to the end of the month was a quiet one, but on the 22nd of August enemy mortar fire was directed against Luxembourgians who were busy with an inspection tour of the Belgian Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vivario. Immediately countermeasures to meet this attack were taken. Unfortunately during the course of action Corporal Stutz Roger was killed by an enemy 120-mm mortar shell fragment. He was the first Luxembourgian soldier killed in action in Korea. His period of tenure had been memorable one. His was the responsibility for welding into a fighting machine the fully integrated Luxembourgian Platoon. The best tribute to his ability, and work in Korea, was a decoration given some months later by the Commanding Officer of the Luxembourgian Army.

Now having a defensive mission, the Luxembourgian Platoon Leader gave first priority to clearing fields of fire and constructing bunkers, ordering each man to build covered positions. After laboring to get the men to strengthen their positions with heavy logs and bags of earth, the platoon leader ordered his men to string barbed wire and sow mines across the most probable routes of enemy approaches. As all the situation improved, other improvement such as anti-personnel mine fields, trip flares, and buried telephone wires were stressed.

About this time the enemy became more aggressive along the whole front of the battalion, although there was no noticeable increase in activity in front of the Luxembourgian Platoon, except considerable amount of mortar shells for the first fifteen days.

Meanwhile, another adjustment of the platoon front now took place. On 14 September the platoon set out to take over the King Post of San-kol area
which was to be the scene of the bitterest fighting by Luxembourgiens some ten days later. The adjustment began on the 14th and completed next day. The first five days period in the King Post passed without incident and was relatively quiet with no evidence that the enemy would launch their attack on 25 September. Ordinary operation plans were made to exploit the success of the Grand Duchy soldiers.

The quiet was, however, shattered on the night of 25th as the enemy increased the volume of their harassing fire on the Luxembourgian positions. During the day powerful concentrations of enemy mortar fire fell on the friendly positions without showing any let-up.

In the heavy shelling everyone kept below ground throughout the day, and for the small detachment of Luxembourgiens in the bunkers life had become difficult. A steady trickle of casualties due to the shelling and mortaring began to increase. The whole position was so swept by the enemy shelling that it was impossible to move anywhere without being shot. Further movement in the open was impossible and the great part of the Luxembourgiens stayed in the trenches alerting for the enemy infiltration into the positions of the Luxembourgian Platoon. Now the field defenses were very badly damaged and the telephone lines had been cut.

Now, the Red Chinese appeared in a large strength, and the Luxembourgiens under the command of Lieutenant Lutty engaged them with their machine guns, small arms, and grenades. Provided with the information of overrun Luxembourgiens, friendly artillery and heavy mortar fire had been concentrated on possible enemy approaches and likely forming up places. The Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Lutty, displaying a high degree of gallantry, coolness and superior leadership ordered his men to hold on the positions against enemy well-prepared attack in strength. With complete disregard for his own life after having suffered a serious wound by an enemy shell, Lieutenant Lutty refused to be evacuated and did not show the slightest hesitation to run out of his bunker to rescue one of his wounded soldiers.

The other fighting members, especially Sergeant Mores Robert's team was now locked in desperate fighting. They protected guns, and continued the mission. More than that can not be expected, or said, of his cool and gallant action. Unfortunately, however, he courageously played dead, coming out of his bunkers to rescue one of his men wounded in the action. The gallant stand of Sergeant Mores Robert was later recognized by the Luxembourgian Army with the award of Citation of the Commandant of the Luxembourgian Army.

All night the men fought off the overwhelming numbers of swarming Red Chinese forces, however the situation was not improved until early dawn when
the enemy attack was slackened. Finally the exhausted, shaken but victorious fighting men of Luxembourg could get stock of the situation and cleared the positions from the enemy assault.

The struggle to secure this position had been one of the most vicious defensive actions the Luxembourgian Platoon had ever undertaken in the Korean soil. The deeds which brought it to a close constituted a shining chapter in the history of the Luxembourgian Army. However, it was not achieved without any loss. The action cost the Grand Duchy soldiers rather heavy casualties; one man killed and other six valours including the Platoon Leader wounded.

The days following the end of this desperate action in the King Post were relatively quiet. The men continued its end run into no-man's-land as did all other Belgian fighters but the main purpose of this action was to detect any possible enemy surprise attack.

As has been made clear in the narrative, the outstanding development in the Red Chinese armies in 1952 was the quantity and quality of their artillery. They had many guns, with plenty of ammunition, and their shooting was good. Moreover, they had a very good warning system which ensured the prompt opening of fire, and they were not afraid to bring down fire close to, or even on, their own troops. The enemy did not use wireless or line communication to the same extent as United Nations troops. The control of artillery and mortar fire was normally by signal, in the form of coloured flares, tracer ammunition, and noise signals. This somewhat crude system was, however, very effective.

Meanwhile the Luxembourgians who had manned the front line positions until the end of the month, were relieved by the elements of the 12th Infantry Regiment, 1st ROK Division, and completed their movement along with the Belgians to the assembly area Yami-ri, approximately three kilometers south of Unchon effective at 0800 hours of the 1st October 1952. At the same time the operational control of the 3rd US Division units was reverted to the IX US Corps.

The relief from combat was utilized for the needed training and reorganization accompanied by the division command inspections of all the subordinate units. It was to be the non-combat period enjoyed by the Luxembourgians with the other elements of the division since its fierce engagement with the Red Chinese at the King Post area, and it was the unanimous opinion of all that no Luxembourgian Platoon deserve it more.

Effective at 0115 hours, on 24 October, meanwhile, the Belgian Battalion and the Luxembourgian attached relieved the units of the 30th ROK Regiment,
taking over the defensive positions of Umi-dong area, approximately two and a half kilometers south of Hill 395 (White Horse Hill). Next day the Luxembourgians again took up the positions around Hill 395, relieving the elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th US Infantry. The Luxembourgian Platoon met with less opposition in this area, however, vigorous attempts were made to defend the area. The only enemy activity was heavy shelling of artillery and mortar about fifty to one hundred rounds per day. The remainder of the front was quiet.

On 14 November meanwhile the Belgian-Luxembourgian Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 15th Regiment and it remained as a regimental reserve until it was ordered again to advance to the White Horse Hill positions on 24 November 1952. On 25 November the Luxembourgians returned to the former position.

By this time the winter had set in. It was extremely cold and the first heavy snow was falling. The approach of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the scale of operations at the front. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves to hibernate, and action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols, and small unit skirmishes. As the platoon established its defensive position, the front settled down back to the previous pattern of patrolling and probes.

After a short period in the front line, the Luxembourgians with the Belgians were relieved, effective at 0125 hours of 28 December, by the elements of the 1st Battalion, 32nd ROK Infantry of the 2nd Division, and at early in the morning of the 29th they retired to Unsan-ni about 18 kilometers due south of Chorwon. Finally, however, the Luxembourgians with the whole divisional units settled on an assembly area of Yami-ri, southern outskirts of Unchon. So the fighting of the Luxembourgians in Korea ended – approximately two years from the time the 1st detachment had landed at Pusan.

The period 28 December 1952 to 7 January 1953 was devoted to preparations for departure to Luxembourg. A brief departure ceremony was held, however, it was a big event for the triumphantly returning Luxembourgians. In their best combat uniforms, officers and men of the Luxembourgians assembled on a flat ground attended by the high ranking officers of the United Nations forces, and received a good send-off. It was the 20th of March 1953 when the soldiers set foot on their homeland.

Summarized, the Luxembourgian Platoon, since the arrival of its first contingent at Pusan in Korea on 31 January 1951, had participated in various battle such as the Imjin River Battle, and the King Post Battle on the west
of Chorwon. Particularly for the Imjin River Battle during the period of 20 to 26 April 1951 the platoon was cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy, and for King Post Battle the platoon received an awards of the citation of the Luxembourgian Army.

During the whole period of the Korean War, ninety-four personnel of the Luxembourgians participated in the United Nations operation, and suffered two men killed and ten more men including one officer were wounded. This was a really great contribution on a basis of comparison by population. The most significant feature of the Luxembourgian participation in the United Nations operation in Korea was not the strength of the combat force, but was the establishment a firm resolution, which if subsequent international crises arose, there would be no question of standing aside.

For the limited strength of an infantry platoon, all Luxembourgian losses of the finest men were regrettable, however, considering the casualties wrought upon the enemy side, it became clear that their losses were amazingly light.
CHRONOLOGY

1951

31 Jan  The Luxembourgian Platoon disembarks at Pusan and moves to the United Nations Reception Center at Tongnae for training.
9 Feb  Moves to Waegwan and commences anti-guerrilla operation.
7 Mar  Assumes a defensive mission along the southern bank of the Han River.
3 Apr  Placed under the operation control of the 29th British Infantry Brigade and advances to Choksong.
20 Apr  Takes the defensive mission of Kumgul-san area, north of Imjin River.
22-25 Apr  Imjin River Battle.
28 Apr  Moves to an assembly area of Changgi-ri, Kimpo peninsula.
29 May  Completes its movement to the former Imjin River line under the operational control of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment.
1 June  Carries out an operation across the Imjin River with the objective of detecting the enemy dug-out.
24 June  Conducts another operation across the Imjin to make contact with enemy.
1 Aug  Moves to reserve area of Hansan-ni.
4 Aug  Participates in local offensive operation to punish enemy penetration north of the Imjin River.
25 Aug  The platoon begins its homeward voyage.

1952

26 Mar  The 2nd Contingent of Luxembourgian Detachment anchors in the Korean soil.
28 Mar  Advances to the front line and officially attached to A Company as 3rd Platoon of the Belgian Battalion.
6 July  Takes up the defensive position at Chong-dong area, north of Yonchon under the control of the 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd US Infantry Division.
13-26 July  A combat patrol penetrates deep into no-man's-land to detect enemy position.
28 July Relieved by the elements of the Greek Battalion and moves to Mudung-ri, southwest of Yonchon.

19 Aug Sets out to take up the position of the elements of the 3rd Battalion, 65th US Infantry.

22 Aug Corporal Strutz Roger is killed by an enemy 120-mm mortar shell.

14 Sept Takes over the King Post of San-kol area.

25-26 Sept Violent enemy mortar fire destroys the Luxembourgian trenches. Sergeant Mores Robert is killed and six other men wounded including the Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Lutty.

30 Sept Relieved on the King Post.

24 Oct Takes over the defensive positions of Umi-dong area relieving the units of the 30th ROK Regiment.

14 Nov Relieved by the elements of the 1st Battalion of the 15th US Infantry.

25 Nov Returns to the former defensive positions, Umi-dong area.

28 Dec Relieved by the Units of 32nd ROK Infantry.

1953

1-7 Jan Prepares for departure to Luxembourg.

20 Jan Returns to Luxembourg.
PART SEVEN

THE NETHERLANDS FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
Her Majesty Queen Juliana of the Netherlands
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CHAPTER I GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to the Netherlands

General

The Netherlands is the European part of the Kingdom, the latter also comprising Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, which lie in the Caribbean area. Popularly Holland, a constitutional monarchy of northwestern Europe, bounded on the east by the Federal Republic of Germany, on the south by Belgium and on the west and north by the North Sea. Its maximum length from south to north is over 300 kilometers and its greatest breadth is 256 kilometers. The total area is 36,758 square kilometers, of which approximately eight per cent comprises rivers, canals, lakes and other uninhabitable areas.

The country has a population of over 13 million. Of this number, 4,698,000 people constitute the working population, 53% of them being employed in the services sector, 40% in industry and only 7% in agriculture and fishery.

Until the Second World War, the Netherlands was one of the world's greatest colonial powers. After the war, the colonies gained their independence. Indonesia made a complete break with the Netherlands, while Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles became, with the Netherlands itself, equal partners within the Kingdom. Thus, the Kingdom of the Netherlands assumed its present form in 1954, when the Charter for the Kingdom was approved. The capital of the Netherlands is Amsterdam, though The Hague is the seat of the government. The Head of State is Queen Juliana.

The country is divided into eleven provinces, each with its own provincial administration.

Since World War II, the greatest problem in foreign policy was presented by Indonesia. The Japanese surrender in 1945 left a power vacuum in the Netherlands East Indies which was filled only slowly by the arrival of British and Dutch forces.
In the first postwar years the Netherlands was economically dependent on the U.S., and Marshall Plan aid (1947) made possible the rebuilding of Dutch industry. The Netherlands economy has been characterized by more or less continuous expansion.

Especially, the Netherlands’ trade with its neighbouring countries had brought to a considerable extent in the Belgian-Netherlands-Luxemburg Economic Union (Benelux) as well as in the EEC.

As provided in the Compulsory Service Act (1922), all men of Dutch nationality who have been attained the age of 19 are liable for national services. Regular officers are trained at the military academy at Breda. The greater part of the Netherlands armed forces are integrated into NATO’s defense system; various units are thus permanently stationed in West Germany. The naval forces, including the naval air service and the marine corps, consist of a fleet of postwar-designed cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft patrol boats. Besides their NATO obligations, both the navy and air force are responsible for the defense of overseas territories such as Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.

The protective task in respect of the Netherlands Antilles is mainly the responsibility of the Netherlands Marine Corps.

Relations With Korea

A member of the United Nations from 1945, the Netherlands has always been one of the major defenders of the position of the Republic of Korea. In 1947 when the Korean question was brought to the United Nations, she actively supported the American proposal calling for a general election to be held under supervision by a U.N. Commission on Korea. Particularly, when the North Korean Communist forces launched an all-out invasion war on 25 June 1950, the Netherlands responded without hesitation to the U.N. Security Council’s call for military assistance to the Republic of Korea and contributed to send a contingent to the UN forces in the Korean War.

On 14 July when the U.N. Secretary General urged the member countries to provide the additional combat forces, particularly the ground troops, the Netherlands Government decided to send a detachment of mostly the volunteers to assist in the Korean War. In view of the situation in Korea regular-service personnel and completely trained reserve personnel were preferred to be selected. Eventually the first contingent of the Netherlands Army could only comprise one independent infantry battalion minus one rifle company, with initial strength of 636 men. The troops, with their own title of the Netherlands Detachment of the United
General Background

Nations, departed their homeland on 26 October 1950 and arrived in Korea on 23 November 1950.

Prior to deployment of army troops, the Netherlands navy had sent the destroyer HNLMS *Evertsen* to assist in the Korean War. HNLMS *Evertsen* being ordered to move to the Korean waters from Sourabaya port in Indonesia on 4 July 1950, arrived at Sasebo port in Japan in the first place on 16 July 1950 and then she was incorporated in the United Nations naval forces on 19 July 1950.

The number of naval personnel with such a destroyer was approximately 230, and total three destroyers and three frigates have served in the Korean waters during the war, with an approximate total number of 1,350 men of the Netherlands navy.

Besides the above naval strength, as of 27 July 1953 when the armistice was signed, total 3,183 men of the Netherlands army personnel participated in the Korean War, and by 7 December 1954 a grand total of 3,972 army personnel had served in Korea.

The war casualties as of the armistice, a total of 116 men were killed in action and 6 men as missing in action, and the number of casualties figured by December 1954 all 120 killed, 3 missing, 645 wounded in action and 91 of the 645 remained permanently disabled.

During the Korean War the Netherlands Battalion had fought gallantly in all combat actions against the Communist forces, particularly in the following major battles.

On 12 February 1951 the battalion was holding the town of Hoengsong where it had a stand to the last against enemy forces and covering the withdrawal of the 2nd US Division to Wonju.

Lieutenant Colonel M.P.A. Den Ouden, the Netherlands Battalion Commander was killed in this action.

On 14 February 1951 the battalion had an offensive action recapturing the Hill 325 a commanding feature northwest of Wonju.

On 23 to 31 May 1951 the battalion together with the 38th US Infantry Regiment expelled an enemy force from the main supply route leading to Inje, and on 18 February 1952 a Netherlands company captured the Star Hill at a considerable cost.

Section 2. Commitment of the Netherlands Troops

When the United Nations Secretary General asked the Netherlands
Government to send also army troops to Korea on 14 July 1950, it was difficult for this country to send any troops abroad since at that time the Netherlands troops were demobilized from the Indonesian war of independence (1945-1949) and such troops were rather hoped to be protecting their own motherland.

Nevertheless, the Netherlands Government in judging that the due indispensible duties to protect the world peace from Communist aggression rested with the Netherlands as well, had proposed that she would send one infantry company and one marine corps company at first, but changed the plan on 28 August at the State Council into final decision to send one infantry battalion from army with its command and staff group primarily on the basis of the volunteering system.

Meanwhile, according to the public opinion appeared on newspapers in the Netherlands, in August and September 1950, the nation-wide supports to the dispatch of forces to Korea was announced on a large-scale, indicating that the volunteers to such Netherlands detachment of the United Nations forces in Korea had reached 2,000 men already within four days application comparing with the actual screening target of 636 men.

On 8 September 1950 the Netherlands Government gave notice of such decision to the United Nations Secretary General, and on 15 October the Netherlands Detachment to the United Nations forces in Korea was activated. It comprised the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two rifle companies and one support company. That was a battalion less one rifle company. In the course of the following months, the strength has been enlarged to a complete battalion, whilst the members were periodically replaced.

On 9 September Major Den Ouden was assigned the Commanding Officer of the Battalion and he began to organize the unit at the barracks of New Alexander in The Hague, and its preparatory training followed immediately after the completion of the troops organization.

In order to make the necessary confirmations on the transport of the troops and other supporting arms, training and operations for the first contingent, it was to keep touch with the GHQ of the United Nations Command in Tokyo in advance. Thereupon, two Netherlands liaison officers acting as advance party departed on 7 October.

By 24 October the advance party had arrived in Tokyo. The officers visited the various important agencies such as the Headquarters of the British forces in Tokyo to learn and hear what the British transports had experienced in the earlier days of their arrival in Korea, the army hospital facilities in Pusan, the United Nations Reception Center at Taegue and the Headquarters, EUSAK in Seoul. Thus, they devoted to the study and solution of numerous problems, which
arisen before the departure of the main troops to the theater of war.

Particularly, the liaison officers had visited to the General Headquarters of the United Nations Command in Tokyo, and learnt that the Netherlands Battalion and other United Nations forces, upon commitment to the battle would follow chiefly the American system in organization, training and operations, and be provided with the additional supports of transports, supply of materials and weapons through the U.S. supply channel.

On 23 October, meanwhile, three days before the departure, the national flag of the Netherlands and the flag of the United Nations, to be flown in the Korean battles, were presented solemnly to the battalion in the ceremony of the 5th year commemoration for the foundation of the United Nations, held at the Ridderzaal Hall, by the Netherlands’ National Assembly.

On the following day the battalion had its official sending off ceremony, after it marched the streets of The Hague, and then had a parade and review at the central government hall where the battalion was praised and encouraged highly with a speech given by the prime minister of the Netherlands Government.

After two days, on 26 October, the battle-bound Netherlands Battalion was transported by vehicles to Rotterdam where it was to embark on Zuiderkruis finally.

Here on 26 October the Chief of the Netherlands Military House in his greeting to bless the battalion’s good lucks by name of Her Majesty Queen, had spoken in part:

"You will take care of your job and accomplish it very earnest and sincerely. and prove yourselves worthy of a fine name which the Netherlands soldiers possess. You will behave yourselves so that the name of our country is praised always while even you are in the strange area. The best proud characters of our national people are the diligence, the calmness and the belief. And you will show these even under the any worst of surroundings you move on . . . ."

Thus the total 636 men of the first contingent embarked on the same day. The units and their strengths were as outlined below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The headquarters and the headquarters company</th>
<th>117</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two rifle companies</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One support company</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>636</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of actual strength aboard was however 631 personnel consisted of 34 officers including two nurse officers and 597 enlisted men. Besides this number of personnel two other officers were already in advance party and three
more personnel were those medics who departed by a different transport.

The military transport by Zuiderkruis which departed the Netherlands on 26 October sailed as smoothly as a normal voyage, arriving at Port Said on 3 November, subsequently at Singapore on 16 November without undue incident.

During the voyage, the Netherlands officers and men underwent a routine training and instructions on the ship, and particularly the cadre officers were taught of Korean geography and local customs in paying more attention to the study of English. As the troops ship closed to Pusan port a really happy news was heard that the United Nations forces had advanced almost up to Yalu River. The situation, however, became worsen only some days after their arrival at Pusan that the friendly forces had withdrawn back near to the 38th Parallel.
CHAPTER II INFANTRY BATTALION

Section 1. Initial Deployment
(23 November – 31 December 1950)

Arrival in Korea

The Netherlands Battalion, immediately after its disembarkation at Pusan on 23 November, was due to move to Taegu by train starting at 0500 hours on the following day, which actually took seven hours along the distance of 120 kilometers northward. But on the other way, transport of supply and materials by motor convoy took double the time along the steep mountainous roads, which the Netherlands soldiers first experienced in Korea of such rugged road transport.

The battalion reached Taegu now and entered the United Nations Reception Center on 24 November. This unit would provide all the incoming United Nations troops with a familiarizing training and combat readiness.

The eight-hour training a day started from 26 November to 4 December for nine days at the United Nations Reception Center, with the subject of handling individual weapons for first three days and the subject of company tactics, signal communications and vehicle maintenance for six days. American instructors were much impressed with the Netherlands soldiers’ praiseworthy attitude and their enthusiasm for the training, particularly with their excellent firing scores obtained in their small arms firing exercises which took place on the fourth day of the training period.

On 2 December a staff officer from the Eighth US Army explained roughly the latest war situation to the Netherlands trainees.

Meanwhile, orders were received from EUSAK in a written message through the commanding officer of the United Nations Reception Center at 1800 hours on 2 December to move the Netherlands Battalion immediately to the Suwon area about 25 kilometers south of capital, Seoul.

On 3 December an advance party left for Suwon, subsequently followed by the quartermaster elements in nine vehicles. The main body of the battalion waked early at 0300 hours on the following day. At first light it started to move
out to Suwon, by motor in convoy for 100 men, and for the rest by train from Taegu station. The troops left the camp for the rail road station at 0600 hours on 4 December.

As similarly as the journey from Pusan to Taegu, it was cold in the train with wooden seats and the broken glasses of the windows left unrepai red.

Nevertheless, the Netherlands soldiers were in high morale, singing the song of Santa Claus as they heard gun-firing from battle areas somewhere not too far from them.

At 0800 hours on 5 December they arrived at Suwon and got off the train. At the station the Netherlands soldiers saw some other trains full of refugees moving down southward, and they felt they had come now near to their battle area.

Initial Commitment into Battle

The first mission assigned to the battalion when it reached Suwon on 5 December was to protect by patrolling a series of main supply routes around the town and to prepare itself into immediate combat readiness.

Lieutenant Colonel M.P.A. Den Ouden, the Battalion Commander then insisted that his battalion needed more training for a certain period, but the EUSAK answered in the negative with the reasons that the Netherlands troops had proved excellence and sufficiency in the training at Taegu and required no additional training, particularly noting more imminent reasons of actual worsening situation in the front at the time and of an urgent countermeasure being required to fill a vacancy for the understrength in the nearby American infantry regiment which had only 1,200 men.

The matter that the EUSAK viewed the Netherlands Battalion as a fine troops of really trained men, however, was not overstated, and especially the fact that the Netherlands troops needed not any additional training was due to their high level in the combat knowledge displayed on the previous days training; there were a considerable number of Netherlands soldiers who had real combat experiences in Indonesia.

In carrying out the battalion’s patrolling activity, the patrols encountered with no enemy guerillas. They had covered the areas within 15 kilometers distance for a walking patrol team, and as far as 40 to 50 kilometers away from Suwon for the motor patrolling elements.

In the meantime, the Netherlands Battalion, together with French Battalion which joined the Korean War on 29 November as a United Nations force as well,
Infantry Battalion

were attached for operational control to the 2nd US Division effective 11 December. These battalions were further attached to the 38th Regiment while the latter to 23rd US Infantry respectively effective 1000 hours of 13 December. To the 9th US Infantry Regiment the Thailand Battalion was attached for its operational control.

At the same time another incident occurred for the UN forces in the Korean War; as in the case of KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army), each 100 men of whom were assigned to each US company level, a hundred men of the Republic of Korea combat experienced soldiers commanded by a ROK lieutenant were attached to the Netherlands Battalion for further assignment to each company.

Immediately after the attachment of the Netherlands Battalion to the 38th US Infantry, a basic and tactical training started again, and simultaneously instructions as to the tactics of the Chinese Communist forces were given to the Netherlands trainees by a regimental staff officer on 18 and 19 December.

On 19 December the battalion saw the demonstration on tank infantry cooperation and on the following day had a synthetic firing exercise and tactical training. Further, on 21 and 22 December the battalion was to have the training of probing reconnaissance and offensive operations in the battalion, but these were canceled for awaiting orders on an immediate movement.

Thus the battalion being placed under the command of 38th Infantry as a tactical unit could have an opportunity for the first to be committed into battle and implement an order practically on the real combat actions.

Previously on 14 December an order was already given to the battalion in midst of training at the assembly area. The mission was to reconnoiter an area in the 2nd US Division sector 40 to 45 kilometers south of Seoul. Subsequently on 19 to 21 December similar orders were received from the regiment to carry out the mission of the reconnaissance patrol to cover more extended area to 10 kilometers westward.

In Chungju Area

In the meantime, in the night of 21 December, fresh orders were issued to the 38th US Infantry Regiment with the Netherlands Battalion attached, to move immediately to the area in the vicinity of Chungju about 85 kilometers southeast from Suwon, and there the regiment was to protect the eastern flank of the 2nd US Division upon completion of movement. The regimental quartermaster train left first for the pre-selected assembly area in the vicinity of
Hwaggang-ni 15 kilometers east of Chungju.

The Netherlands Battalion was scheduled to move to the new assembly area on the following day by motor vehicles as the last column unit of the regimental movement.

At 2300 hours on 22 December the battalion left Suwon for Chungju area and arrived at between 0700 and 0800 hours on 23 December without an accident.

By this time the bitterness of the weather in the Korean winter were experienced. It was extremely cold in sub-zero temperature. The convoy vehicles of the troops had passed through a snow-covered mountain road and the slippery winding pass way through a series of high grounds.

As compared with the living condition that the men were provided with a kind of building at Suwon, the Netherlands men after move to Hwanggang-ni had to live in quite different surroundings, and they had to dig in slit trenches; the hardship in their digging in the frozen hill ground under the temperature of 25 degrees below zero in the Korean theater of operation was beyond the expression.

The Netherlands men, however, improvised their shelters dressing up with straw and preparing Christmas trees in their trenches while awaiting happy Christmas Day.

With the missions to safeguard the main supply route along Chungju and also the surroundings of the regimental bivouac area, the Netherlands Battalion was placed initially in the vicinity of Hwanggang-ni occupying its blocking positions on the high ground one or two kilometers north across the Han River.

On 23 to 25 December 1950, however, the battalion carried out mainly the probing reconnaissance for enemy guerilla activity around the stationed area.

Meanwhile, in consequence of reconnaissance by the battalion reconnaissance party on 25 December, Colonel Den Ouden, the Battalion Commander adjusted his employment of troops in accordance with the orders from the regiment, thus deploying his three companies as A Company on a 200-meter high ground at Suanbo about inbetween of Chungju and Mungyong, B Company on a 240-meter hill around Yongpung both of which were backed by the Support Company at Ochon-ni seven kilometers southeast of Mungyong. Thus the whole battalion was covering the main supply route along the area of 54 kilometers in length from Hamchang to Chungju, which had some four places of steep mountainous pass on the route.

On 28 December, when the 38th US Infantry happened to advance north the Netherlands Battalion was placed under the command of 9th Infantry, the reserve unit of the 2nd US Division, and at the same time the division tank battalion took over the Support Company area at Ochon-ni-Mungyong in the Netherlands
Battalion sector. Accordingly on 29 December, in order to furnish all the forward company localities with appropriate supporting weapons, the company headquarters with heavy machine gun platoon, the 81-mm mortar platoon and the 75-mm recoilless rifle platoon of the Support Company of the Netherlands Battalion were moved to Mungyong, to Yongpung and to Suanbo respectively. The close supports to each combat unit now became available in more effectively. The routine patrolling was carried out for probing by each unit with no reported enemy contact.

A reconnaissance platoon from A Company one time left Hwanggang-ni at 1000 hours, advanced along its patrol route in short cut to reach Suanbo at 1900 hours. after walking 16 kilometers distance on the knee-high snowed ground.

Heavy snow fall caused a considerable difficulty for maneuvering in patrol activity and such worse weather slowed any active operations by affording somewhat inaccuracy in the identification of terrain objectives in the field and inefficiency in means of signal communication or due to frequent interruption of telephone or radio in the mountainous area.

Nevertheless, the Netherlands patrol worked hard attaining its goals by patrolling on the ridge line and even to the crests of some commanding features around Mungyong from 29 to 31 December with the results of no enemy contact.

Section 2. Actions in Hoengsong–Wonju Area
(1 January – 18 February 1951)

First Encountering at Chohyon-ni

In late December 1950 the Eighth US Army Headquarters had planned to have the deployment of 2nd US Division in accomplishment of blocking mission for the Wonju–Hongchon area.

On 30 December orders were received by the division to move its troops by 2 January 1951 to the area between Wonju and Hongchon with force of a regiment prepared constantly for blocking an enemy approach through southwest and to counterattack against any enemy infiltration within the area.

On 31 December a part of 9th US Infantry already arrived at Wonju while the 2nd Battalion of 23rd US Infantry moved to destroy approximate 500 enemies on Hill 789 (Odap-san) some 10 kilometers northeast of Hoengsong, and the 38th US Infantry with the Netherlands Battalion attached was en route to
Hoengsong with the mission of securing the town 15 kilometers north of Wonju.

The Netherlands Battalion which was securing the main supply route between Mungyong and Chungju on the previous days, was operating comparatively in the rear area, but now moved to rather forward area close to the enemy location, with more variety of tasks given to it such as opening the way for the withdrawing friendly troops, covering the friendly withdrawal actions, dispatching reconnaissance patrols, and taking part in attacks or defensive operations when necessary.

The Chinese new year offensive, meantime, had launched to break through the right flank of 2nd US Division as deep as some 30 kilometers. The aerial reconnaissance revealed an evidence of enemy build up in the vicinity of Yudong-ni 17 kilometers northeast of Hoengsong. A Netherlands battalion patrol was hit by the enemy ambush near Chohyon-ni 13 kilometers northeast of Hoengsong and eventually forced to withdraw.

Upon this stage of operations, special requirements of informations on enemy forces for the area northeast of Hoengsong were urgently discussed by the higher headquarters.

On 3 January 1951 A Company of the Netherlands Battalion was directed by the 2nd US Division Commander requiring additional informations for his intelligence estimate, to carry out patrols and ambushes in the night near Chohyon-ni for capturing enemy prisoner of war. An aerial support to cover the ground patrols and the other assistances were promised for the Netherlands company.

A Company had detailed for a patrol of 100 rifle men in light uniform with small arms only to accomplish the task, and sent out first to Podong-ni four kilometers south of Chohyon-ni by motor transport at 1000 hours on 3 January, in the bright daylight but the temperature of 15 degrees below zero. The patrol was transported along the road on south bank of Som-gang to Podong-ni, the assembly area from which it started to advance on foot at 1100 hours in the formation of combat column of three platoons, and reached Chohyon-ni. The Netherlands company took up positions on a high ground at Chohyon-ni with no particular incident. When a search party from the platoons was dispatched down the village, however, an encountering occurred between the search party and enemy snipers who were firing from the village on a peculiar terrain feature such a place the enemy was unseen but he could well see the Netherlands search party approaching toward him. A small arms fire fight ensued for an hour. At 1455 hours, a rescue party of five men with a medical sergeant was sent to the village to help the wounded, but this party also engaged with an enemy band who was then disclosed of his location being a foot of the hill
behind the village. The party killed several enemies in this action in cooperation with platoons, and all the wounded were successfully evacuated.

Meanwhile, at 1400 hours orders were received from the division to immediately stop fighting at Chohyon-ni and to withdraw and await further orders. A Company started its withdrawal at 1700 hours.

At this stage of war, overall situation in the UN front was so serious that after the fall of Seoul on 4 January, the CCF offensive shifted from west to the center and east front with his objective being Wonju.

The Netherlands Battalion was located 3,000 meters north and northeast of Wonju on 6 January, and together with the 38th US Regiment maintained defensive positions in that area. The Netherlands Battalion and other UN forces fought a gallant action to repel the Chinese Communist forces onslaught to Wonju. Nevertheless, on 10 January with the collapse of the UN front on the
right of the 2nd US Division, Wonju was fallen to the enemy's hand. Upon this, the regiment with the Netherlands Battalion was maintaining blocking positions on the high ground near Maeji-ri southern outskirt of Wonju. The units sustained light attack on each flank of this position on the following day. On 11 January, in the form of counteroffensive by the friendly forces, the Netherlands Battalion was in blocking position some three kilometers south of Wonju with a dominant feature Hill 420 manned by one rifle company. By 13 January 160 enemies were killed in the engagement by regiment and the Netherlands Battalion.

The 2nd US Division, however, moved from the Wonju line down to Chechon on 16 January. Thus on this date the 38th US Infantry with the Netherlands Battalion attached was located west of Chechon or 23 kilometers south of Wonju, with troop disposition of the 1st Battalion at Anpyongyang-kol, the 2nd Battalion at Sanyak-kol, the 3rd Battalion at Punto-kol and the Netherlands Battalion at Pyongdong-ni respectively.

The Netherlands Battalion, despite it was in reserve at Pyongdong-ni, occupied a chain of high ground of 2,500 meters in width, with a kilometer frontage assigned to A Company on the left in a steep hill slope. With the task of providing security for the area it was ordered to actively search to keep the whole neighbourhood free from penetration by enemy guerillas and agents or civilian suspects from the direction of Wonju by sending out patrol, the result of which was capture of a North Korean lieutenant disguised as a refugee.

In the reserve area the battalion spent in training of tactics and firing exercise, and generally in a good rest under bright winter weather with temperature of 10 degrees below zero.

During the previous days of movements the Netherlands troops experienced the severe cold, humidity and becoming frostbitten, the daily movement and climbing of steep hills, followed by digging-in generally after dark. These hardships, however, made the units trained of endurance and capability to fight and operate in very adverse conditions. The most serious problem of all was that 72 men altogether including the killed and wounded in action and some nurse men for the wounded, the numeral of which corresponded to approximately 12 per cent of the actual battalion strength were to be reduced, and replacements of men became the main problem for the battalion in this stage of operation.

At Mannangpo–Sangjangpo

Meanwhile, relative calm prevailed in the west of the Korean battle front
but the center and east were still violent with the enemy pressure, against which the 2nd US Division on the III ROK Corps’ right pushed up and captured Wonju on 24 January further reaching Hoengsong north of Wonju at the same time.

The movement started again after a fortnight stay in reserve area, when the Netherlands Battalion was ordered by the 38th US Infantry Regiment on 29 January to move to Unnam-ni 11 kilometers west from Pyongdong-ni in order of the headquarters, the support and the rifle companies.

On 31 January, however, the other orders from the regiment were received by the battalion to move up to Mannangpo 15 kilometers west of Wonju by 1 February and immediately patrol around Som-gang.

Scarceley the Netherlands Battalion could implement the orders before the other orders were received on 2 February to patrol from Mannangpo to the extended area to Sangjangpo eight kilometers northwest of Wonju, by reconnaissance party in force of a rifle company from the Netherlands Battalion, reinforced with US tanks, 4.2-inch mortars and artillery liaison group. (See Sketch Map 1)

At 1300 hours on 3 February the B Company Commander being assigned of this task, accompanied by the artillery forward observer with a radio and two
intelligence officers, led the reconnaissance force of two rifle platoons from his company, which departed by motor transport to Kachanam from where they walked along the slippery iced roads in columns with the command group in center. The nearby villagers furnished the party, informations of some 20 north Korean Communists in white uniform who passed by to north four days before.

At 1645 hours a B Company patrol was surprised by an enemy platoon and sustained casualties of two KIAs and one WIA at the north of Sangjangpo. The command group was also attacked and the company commander himself received a severe wound. The patrols engaged with a platoon strength enemy force reinforced from his pre-occupied concealment area of advantageous terrain feature, for one and a half hours.

The B Company Commander, despite he was wounded with a bullet through his left leg, commanded his platoons by hand signal instead of operating the radio which was impracticable, to withdraw at dark to the southern bank of the Som-gang for a further disposition thereupon. The two bodies of the men killed in action were buried in place temporarily before the patrols’ withdrawal for later disposal, which was done by a Netherlands and US patrols three days thereafter.

The Company commander’s cool-headed and gallant action through his skill in combat leadership reflected a high morale for the fighting men facing the bands of Communists. Although he was carried on a litter to Kachanam where all his company men rode on vehicles, he led his company back to Mannangpo at 2345 hours.

At daybreak on 4 February, in the meantime, the Netherlands Battalion was ordered by the regiment to move to Hoengsong immediately.

**Holding Hoengsong**

On 5 February the Operation Roundup, general advance by the X US Corps, took place. This operation was conducted to move northward in central Korea against II and V NK Corps holding the Hoengsong–Hongchon axis.

Upon being ordered to be a blocking force to prevent enemy forces from approaching to Hoengsong, the Netherlands Battalion was en route to the vicinity of Hoengsong at dusk on 4 February, while the remainder of regiment mostly arrived in blocking and patrolling the vicinity of Hoengsong. The friendly patrols hit enemy minefield in the northern outskirt of Hoengsong losing one tank.

On 6 February the 38th US Infantry Regiment less 2nd Battalion which
remained as reserve at Wonju, maintained blocking positions northern outskirt of Hoengsong, with 1st Battalion on left, the Netherlands Battalion in center, 3rd Battalion on right and the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team on the extreme right.

Lieutenant Colonel Den Ouden, the Netherlands Battalion Commander, established the definite company positions within his command and placed one machine-gun and one recoilless rifle teams from the Support Company for attachment to A Company while one machine-gun and a 4-man with machine-gun on Jeep teams to B Company respectively. Furthermore he ordered the B Company to set up a listening post in the valley between the two rifle companies and to maintain a contact-patrol to A Company to keep touch with each other.

Colonel Den Ouden set up his command post in a saddle between the Headquarters Company and Support Company. The 81-mm mortars well spread out in their defensive firing positions. The train bivouac for logistical support and a kitchen-train were established giving tactical consideration on terrain conditions.

Up to date the requirements of replacements for the battalion had been the main problem, for it had sustained the casualties of five KIAs, nine WIA's and 42 sickmen including the frostbitten. Besides, if were to add 20 nurse men to the sickmen 76 men or 12 per cent in total had caused the reduction of the battalion strength. In order to meet the requirements of replacements meanwhile the Battalion Commander requested to the higher headquarters for 80 men of the Republic of Korea Army personnel, who thereupon arrived at the battalion on 10 February for further assignment to each company but they were all recruits this time, unlike the 100 men of well-trained and experienced ROKs who were initially assigned to the battalion on 12 December, the preceding year.

The advance by the friendly forces with the Operation Roundup was made against only light opposition in the beginning, but gradually the CCF began to resist and the UN advance was slowed. On the night of 11-12 February the 40th and 66th CCF Armies and one NKA corps launched a violent offensive, and again their victims were the 8th ROK and 2nd US Divisions on the X US Corps front particularly on the Hoengsong–Wonju axis.

The 38th Infantry received the attack near Saemal five kilometers north of Hoengsong by enemy of unknown strength at 0500 hours on 12 February, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the regiment were in heavy contact with the enemy at vicinity three kilometers northeast of Hoengsong and had broken contact with the enemy to withdraw back to the town in the afternoon on the same date.

At 2110 hours on 12 February in the Netherlands Battalion area, on the
other hand, a sudden alert-shot by the guard in the vehicle park of the Support Company was fired with a series of flares burnt for a short time. It was a pre-planned surprise attack on the Netherlands' train bivouac for the Headquarters and Support Companies area by a platoon strength enemy in same clothes and manners as friendly force's, nearing just as friendly elements, and in the same moment a three quarter ton truck and a recoilless rifle of the Support Company were burnt out by enemy explosives.

The Support Company Commander in judging that his company being completely encircled by the enemy in guerilla tactics, attempted to touch with the Battalion Headquarters either by telephone or radio but in vain; both means of signal communication were out. Nonetheless, in the perimeter defense at such a train bivouac area as had a limited cover and concealment the Support Company fought to the last stand in the stubborn resistance not only by eliminating its heavy loss but also contributing for whole UN front to be bearing the brunt of a well-prepared Chinese Communist attack in strength.

Colonel Den Ouden in the Battalion Headquarters received the spot report made by an eyewitnessed staff officer on the Chinese Communist bands in company strength coming in approach toward the Headquarters Company. A fierce small arms fire fight ensued by the elements of Headquarters Company, and at the same time Colonel Den Ouden, the Battalion Commander in exercising his active leadership for all companies under his command, ordered the companies to withdraw for operational end to the nearby church in an attempt to rescue his men from being encircled and still yet with his sense of responsibility to accomplish the original mission in holding the town of Hoengsong.

Nevertheless, the route of withdrawal being a steep way on the high ground and suited for enemy firing, the several Netherlands men were wounded and killed or surrounded by the Reds underneath the hill. Lieutenant Colonel Den Ouden, the Netherlands Battalion Commander, was killed in action by a grenade thrown on his isolated position where the enemy concentration fires were directed simultaneously. Throughout the entire engagement, Colonel Den Ouden had been checking adequacy for his unit's perimeter defense, moving from place to place regardless his own safety and encouraging his men.

Thus the CCF Fourth-Phase Offensive which began with the main effort onto the 2nd US Division on 11 February, threw a violent attack on the following day to the Netherlands Battalion's blocking positions northern outskirt of Hoengsong near Twinnaemul.

The Netherlands Battalion fought in a gallant stand by hand to hand fighting and yet maintaining a good order throughout the battalion against the mass-infiltrated enemy forces, and finally started on orderly withdrawal on orders by
Infantry Battalion

A Company in company columns at 2145 hours on 12 February and thence by the other companies in sequence to the area southern outskirt of Hoengsong near Amnaemul.

When the Netherlands units passed by Kyohang-ni, the gauntlet of Som-gang (river) before reaching Amnaemul, a chaos due to the retrograde movements by US and other allied forces coming down through the burning town of Hoengsong, was seemed to be the utmost one.

Meanwhile, the further orders were received during the withdrawal that the elements of 38th US Infantry with the Netherlands Battalion attached were to continue the withdrawal farther south to Wonju airfield being their final assembly area upon the completion of movement. (See Situation Map 14.)

The withdrawal of Support Company which started at 2230 hours. following B Company's. was encountered with an attack of the bugling Red Chinese which
was repulsed soon.

The fighting Netherlands men would not leave any of their heavy weapons or equipment such as mortars and machine-guns behind the enemy zone, but sometimes even by carrying them on foot they would live with their weapons in overcoming all sorts of the hardship during the withdrawal; all personnel and equipment of the Support Company were withdrawn successfully without suffering a loss.

Thus, the withdrawal action of the 2nd US Division came to a close by the final withdrawing unit of the Netherlands Support Company which arrived at Wonju between 0300 and 0400 hours on 13 February.

During the battle in Hoengsong the Netherlands Battalion had suffered very heavily. Its casualties accounted nine killed in action including its commander and a chaplain, 37 wounded in action including some staff officers such as S-3 (operations) and S-4 (logistics) and nine missing in action. A considerable number of equipment including some vehicles and signal communication equipment had been lost. The gallant stand made by the battalion, however, contributed greatly to frustrate the Chinese Communist forces' plan to break through the United Nations front, and it blocked all attempts to cut the road to Wonju or the farther south, bringing the CCF Fourth-Phase Offensive to a halt and resulted in their retreat.

On 13 February in the command post at Wonju airfield, Major W.D.H. Eekhout, the Battalion Executive Officer had officially assumed the command responsibility as the Acting Battalion Commander (virtually became the commanding officer with his promotion to the grade of a lieutenant colonel effected at the same time), and the temporary reorganization of the battalion including some assignment change for the vacant officers took place; for the assignment of the S-3 officer who had been evacuated as the wounded in action the S-2 (intelligence) officer was named for the additional duty of S-3; for the acting S-4 officer a platoon leader from the Headquarters Company was assigned and such administrative actions were taken as an emergency measure within the command authority to fill out all the officer vacant resulted from the Hoengsong actions.

**Attack on Hill 325**

On this date, meantime, a verbal order came to the Netherlands Battalion Commander to prepare a position on a commanding ground (Hill 325) north of the Manjong station with the mission of securing the railroad leading to Wonju
under direct support of a 3.2-inch mortars platoon and other supporting elements to include artillery fires.

The command post of the Netherlands Battalion was soon set up at Kulmisil, and from regiment the motor transport was provided for the troop movement with which A Company started at 1130 hours.

The Battalion commander began to reconnoiter the surrounding terrain features almost concurrently with the dispatch of battalion reconnaissance patrol for probing purpose, starting from the patrol base of Manjong-ni four kilometers west of Wonju.

The commander's concept of defense to be applied soon after the arrival of troops was as follows: The disposition of B Company on left, A Company on right and both the Headquarters and Support Companies around the command post to provide security for it, with the heavy machine-guns attached to each rifle company, employing the remainder of supporting weapons from the Support Company as well as the US supporting mortars in general support.

A coordinated fire plan was personally checked by the commander, and firing positions of the recoilless rifles were adjusted to protect the command post.

On the other hand, B Company which left Wonju at 1500, arrived at and took up its designated positions by 1800 hours.

Hill 325 to be occupied by the elements of the Netherlands Battalion, was surrounded by a number of similar hills, and was difficult to point it out among them for the subalterns who presented the different views on the exact location of Hill 325.

Eventually a considerable time was wasted due to the specific confusion in occupying the correct positions on Hill 325 by the elements of B Company.

The 38th Regimental S-2 Officer disseminated urgently an intelligence indicating that a Chinese column was on the move southward in a eight-kilometer distance toward Hill 325 at Chaemyon-ni at dusk on 13 February.

At 0345 on 14 February the Red Chinese launched first attack, however, from the direction of Hill 342, three kilometers northeast from Hill 325, which stood in the 187th US ARCT sector on the right of the 38th US Infantry.

The Chinese Communist forces of apparently a 1,000 to 2,000-man strength were approaching in the dark noiselessly toward the friendly positions in the vicinity of Hill 325 at 0710 on 14 February, while the adjacent US troops were under preparation for a counterattack from Hill 255, in the 3rd Battalion sector of the 38th US Infantry a kilometer northeast of Hill 325. Thus Hill 325 was overrun by a massive enemy force and therefore the friendly was forced to
withdraw to the reverse slope and dug in.

By noon the Netherlands Battalion’s frontage, meantime, was adjusted to be a little shortened by the 38th US Regiment so that the west boundary of the Netherlands sector moved 100 meters east out of Hill 325, resulting that the Netherlands B Company became reserve, and the position east of Hill 325 was eventually turned over to the 2nd Battalion of 38th US Infantry.

Shortly after B Company was relieved at 1245 hours, the Regimental Commander ordered to launch an attack against the enemy occupied positions around Hill 325, with combined strength of 2nd Battalion of the 38th Infantry, the Netherlands Battalion and the Rangers Company of 187th ARCT, under a series of strong aerial supports.

At 1600 hours under the covering fire by friendly machine-guns the Netherlands platoons started their advancing forward up on slippery high ground in the snow fall, maneuvering along the left side of the backbone to Hill 325, whereas the enemy opened his resistance firing simultaneously.

At 1750 hours on 14 February a close aerial support by five UN aircraft began with heavy machine-guns fire directed on the targets north of Hill 325. However, an unexpected event happened by some misreadings of the aircraft to drop the rocket shells and two napalm bombs on the friendly troops advancing toward Hill 325, and made a considerable confusion and several casualties occurred.

Such an air support, however, helped greatly the attack elements in rushing onto the objective area, forcing the enemy to disperse and resulted in his heading north.

Having secured the intermediate objective by 1830 hours before reaching the final objective, the Netherlands Battalion was once consolidated and reorganized, evacuating its casualties to Kulmisil. Then it was ordered to make continuous attack to capture Hill 325 and for the perimeter defense thereon to cooperate with the Ranger Company of the 187th US ARCT.

Notwithstanding that the Netherlands attack elements made a strenuous move under the close support fires from air and artillery during the attack, the bands of enemy remnants still remained on the top of Hill 325 in stubborn resistance and slowed the capture of final objective.

In the meantime, the battalion command post at Kulmisil was proceeding with the formation of a temporary rifle platoon to be augmented for B Company, with the administrative personnel such as clerks, cooks or drivers from both the Headquarters and Support Companies. This was attempted by the Battalion Commander’s idea to reinforce the Netherlands’ attack elements in number of strength in parallel with the neighboring US Ranger Company.
In strengthening the Netherlands attack elements the Battalion Commander planned to have the three rifle platoons from A Company to be added by one improvised platoon from B Company, with the considerable strengthening of support groups including heavy mortars and artillery from the higher headquarters.

At 2130 hours on 14 February the expedient platoon which completed its organization and re-equipment, departed the Battalion Command Post near Kulmisil to join the attack on Hill 325. The light machine-gunnersons as well as two forward observers from the Netherlands' 81-mm and supporting US 4.2-inch heavy mortars followed the platoon.

In the night of 14-15 February the Netherlands A Company (reinforced) on left and the 187th ARCT's Ranger Company on right departed the line advancing through the ridges leading to Hill 325 by creeping and crawling on the snow. The enemy positions were well dug in, keeping a firm stand along the ridges.

Nevertheless, the friendly automatic weapons fire and a constant supporting fire of the 72nd Tank Battalion, 2nd US Division made the Red Chinese slowly retreating. US supporting artillery recorded by later report that in one twenty-minute period a gun fired 80 rounds of high explosives.

On the other hand, in order to secure the top of the objective hill by a wholesale attack in cooperation with the Netherlands' attack elements, the 38th US Infantry ordered its 2nd Battalion to be committed on orders for the attack, and the preparation of the attack was completed by 0300 hours on 15 February at its attack position in the valley underneath the hill.

At 0345 hours when not more than 15 minutes passed following the attack started, the friendly mortars began to fire supporting the new phase of the attack.

The second attack elements of 15 Netherlands men led by a lieutenant advanced forward all at once under the enemy fire the volume of which increased gradually.

At 0350 hours on the 15th, when the Netherlands men reached a point from where 250 more meters to go to reach the crest, the enemy rain of mortar shells poured, and by 0430 the attackers were forced to withdraw eventually back to the starting line.

The Netherlands Battalion Commander, despite his awareness of his men fighting for three consecutive days and nights with no sleep in the attack on Hill 325, commanded for all company commanders by radio solemnly and shouted but in a painful mind, "Absolutely attack again!"

At 0600 hours on 15 February the Netherlands Battalion's third attempt onto Hill 325 started as final efforts for capturing the objective, in which this
this time many non-commissioned officers and men of the supporting American heavy weapons had joined.

The attack column reached a saddle at 0615, then all supporting mortars opened fire and the assaulting infantrymen rushed forward with their bayonets fixed on already.

The command group while in its advance, radioed to all elements: "Still 200 yards, 100 yards, 50 yards..." A couple of enemy machine-guns and still much small arms fire were coming from the direction of the objective hill-top.

At first light the Netherlands attack elements successfully reached a dead space which the enemy could not cover by direct fire or by observation, and from there a fighting throwing grenades on both sides took place.

The lieutenant and his radio operator with four American non-commissioned officers were happened to meet together at the dead space, and they made the final assault by the coordinated fire and maneuver to occupy Hill 325; the lieutenant and his orderly played the maneuvering role while the four non-commissioned officers acted as covering elements who threw a series of grenades up on the crest in support of the maneuvering elements.

Thus the final objective was captured and secured at 0705 hours by gallantry of Netherlands soldiers, after strenuous efforts of three times attacks and joint operation of both Netherlands and American troops.

Such capture of the hill-top by a tiny teamwork of only an officer and a man, had been watched out to the last moment by the other troops underneath the hill.

The remainder of the Netherlands men hearing the Chinese cry of distress on the crest of hill immediately made their assault onto the top charging in like lions, and subsequently the 2nd Battalion, 38th US Infantry followed them.

Upon clearance of the crest, the all-around defense and reorganization took place, together with evacuation of casualties of seven killed and eight wounded in action sustained by four platoons of the participants in the attack on Hill 325.

At 0830 hours on 15 February, the remainder of B Company took over positions for the defense on Hill 325, and twelve hours later an American unit relieved them while the Netherlands Battalion became reserve.

The mission of defending the sectors in the vicinity of the Manjong railroad station was successfully accomplished, with total casualties of 9 KIAs, 17 WIAs and one prisoner of war being reported as missing in action. The Netherlands rifle companies had lost some automatic rifles, on contrary they captured some enemy weapons and Bren guns on Hill 325. (See Sketch Map 2.)

On 16 February the Netherlands Battalion moved by motor transportation
to near Wonju for a rest, but on 18 February, still in reserve, the orders were received to move again to the west of Wonju to hold a whole battalion sector and occupy an adjusted position around Kanhyon-ni eight kilometers west of Wonju.

As of this date battle casualties of the Netherlands Battalion had totalled up to 197 personnel of 31 KIAs, 145 WIsAs and sickmen, one missing as prisoner of war and 20 men on rear service as non-combatants. The remaining battalion strength was only 439 personnel that equals less than 70 per cent of the original strength of 636 personnel; reorganization of the battalion with due replacement of men were as a matter of course inevitable.

Throughout the battle experienced at the Hoengsong–Wonju area the lessons were gained that; the covering with only the firing for the gap between areas due to the short of strength was not always helpful to the solution on the tactical viewpoint, but that the key point on the solution would be the fighting strengths of men themselves rather than fire weapons in any instance, and all gaps should adequately be manned by the troops themselves. The Netherlands Battalion, in order to supplement such personnel, had to substitute them by the
rear service personnel, such as the elements of Headquarters and Support Companies as cited with some examples through the battles of Hoengsong and Hill 325.

Section 3. Continuous Movements North of Hongchon
(19 February – 29 May 1951)

In Reserve at Chupo-ri

Meanwhile, on 19 February a warning order was received by the 38th US Infantry with the Netherlands Battalion attached to leave the Kanhyon-ni and Wonju area for a long distance move to Chechon area some 33 kilometers southeast of Wonju, and on 22 February it was relieved the control of 2nd US Division and attached for operational control to X US Corps. Upon this, the 38th US Regimental Combat Team, X US Corps reserve, was to move to Chupo-ri ten kilometers west of Chechon for a specific mission to provide security guards for the supply trains in the area between Andong and Chechon. 1 ROK Corps had placed one rifle company strength under the operational control of 38th RCT.

On 22 February heavy rain fall continued on all the day, and in humidity with the men’s clothes so wet and cold temperature the regiment with the Netherlands Battalion attached departed after dark in blackout light for long way down to the new assembly area, arriving at Chupo-ri after several times crossing of Som-gang and streams running southeast.

On 23 February, a battalion of the 38th US Infantry was assigned on the mission to the security of Chechon where the X US Corps Headquarters was operative, while the remainder of the regiment and the Netherlands Battalion established their garrison at Chupo-ri. Whereupon they carried out routine patrolling all over the area against Communist guerillas.

The battle in central Korean front, meantime, was already turned for the UN forces by the 1st US Marine Division's recapture of Hoengsong on 24 February, and the CCF and NK Communist units were in full retreat, suffering heavy casualties. Afterwards the UN forces continued their steady advance north, with their objective to secure a line of commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel by early days of April.

By 1 March the 38th US Regiment was considerably strengthened by
arriving its replacement regularly, whereas still no solution was made as for the replacements of Netherlands Battalion.

The location of the battalion was adjusted by the regiment for a slight move to Wonbang-ri near from Chupo-ri.

On 10 March, however, the battalion returned to Chupo-ri, as the regiment was ordered to carry out an additional mission for security of the several bridges on MSR, for which a detail of one platoon from the Support Company was sent. Owing to such expansion of missions, size of a patrol team from the battalion was naturally decreased to a 10-man basis.

Nonetheless, nothing of normal replacement had been materialized nor the sufficient recuperation was afforded for the battalion, but only the much better meals were served for the men in the reserve area.

During a six-week period in reserve, the Netherlands Battalion spent the two whole weeks in a good rest at Chupo-ri, on both mentally and physically in particular with daily services such as regular hot meals, baths and laundry, whereas relatively dry and dusty weather continued at Chechon.

It would be adequate to describe herewith about the rear party of the Netherlands Battalion, which contributed the great deal of enhancement on the military morale for the officers and men while in reserve at Chupo-ri.

This was a similar one as the administrative center of the 2nd US Division being operated since December 1950 in the Chungju area. The Netherlands Battalion established its own facility on 19 February at the northern outskirt of Chungju, by improvement of its store into a rest-camp.

On 23 February the rear party, also called as the rest camp was opened for the Netherlands men in reserve area with various stores, such as the dispensary, the bathing and a clothing exchange service, barber shops, and other PX stores.

The dispensary was served for those patients or wounded men being transient on way to and back from army hospitals in Korea or in Japan.

A considerable number of men came by turns in the camp and spent their own leave here with changing in new clothes and in the best relaxation. Particularly those soldiers who had a meritorious service in the front were granted a special leave at the rear party for a rest. There the stores were operated by some fellow soldiers of their own battalion and were selling chocolates, cigarettes, underwears, cameras, watches, radio etc. without making profit. The English products of the bottled beer and American canned beer, however, were being sold on some profits made to be used for the troops welfare. The most encourageable thing for the men were the mails and parcels of articles from the Netherlands. Particularly the daily newspapers were delivered on and liked. Thus their morale was maintained to a high degree.
In mid-March for the first time the recorded tapes arrived from homeland through the mail. The men sent home their reply tapes together with letters written about true stories of the Communist invasion in the Korean War and the UN efforts with the individual soldier’s good fight, to their parents, wives, friends and their girl friends.

Meantimes, on 15 March when the capital city of Seoul was recaptured by the ROK and UN forces, another encourageable news for the battalion was heard, that it was to participate in R & R system granting the men a five-day leave to Japan. In this connection, the warm-hearted welcome by the Netherlands mission in Tokyo as well as some 50 residents throughout Japan was the sincerest one, and particularly their merciful attitudes for the patients and the battle wounded who hospitalized in Japan were unforgettable and extremely impressed by the individuals of the Netherlands Battalion.

The Holland House in Tokyo provided the Netherlands officers and men with a conspicuous hospitality and entertainment.

The application of the R & R system for the Netherlands Battalion had actually been materialized from 11 April 1951, the day of which nine personnel including an officer and each two enlisted men per company had flown to Tokyo as advance party with checkup mission for their implementation of the R & R leave, followed subsequently by the periodical departures of each one group in every week.

During the period of rest at Chupo-ri, the battalion received the numerous letters of comfort sent from its home government, particularly the heartfelt message of comfort by Queen Juliana for those killed and wounded in action was deeply impressed. Thus the government in homeland began to show its active enthusiasm attitude with the sincerest regards for the Netherlands troops fighting as a part of the United Nations forces in Korea.

Further, there occurred another encourageable event that on 1 March General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command visited for himself to the Netherlands Battalion, and praised in encouragement highly of its distinguished meritorious achievements in Korea.

On 7 March, meantime, the Battalion Commander was informed by EUSAK that all the battle fallen would be under the military honor buried with their graves built in the United Nations Cemetery at Tanggok, the outskirts of Pusan, and actually the burying took place in a ceremony on the following day very solemnly at the hallowed ground of Tanggok.

There the many white crosses stood on the graves, in which the soul of those who gave their lives in resisting the Communist aggression in Korea were in rest silently under the waving national flag of their own loving country.
In homeland, meantime, the Netherlands military authorities concerned were in their study of forming additional detachment to be sent to Korea and set to the organization thereof under the consideration of the necessity of preparedness for the second contingent of troops on the Korean battle, as well as the rapid dispatch of replacements that became urgent since the considerable number of men were sacrificed in the battles of Hoengsong–Wonju areas.

As for the obtaining replacements being currently required for the maintaining battalion strength, it had been requested theretofore seriously by all echelon commanders concerned in the 2nd US Division, especially by the Netherlands Battalion Commander who insisted it very eagerly. The reply from the Netherlands homeland was that such replacements were to become available in Korea by the end of April since they were due to leave homeland not later than the close of March.

Thereupon, first of all, the initial replacements of 19 personnel including three officers one of whom was the battalion chaplain, one color bearer, four sergeants, five corporals and six privates, who departed the Schiphol airport in the outskirt of Amsterdam on 7 March, arrived in Korea via Bangkok on 21 March. The battle-bound officers and men as replacements with particularly newly assigned chaplain, who arrived in the theater of war uneventfully were ardently welcomed by their older comrades in arms. A delightful news was heard, meantime, that 225 men and three medical personnel as the replacements had left their homeland for Korea on 31 March, so that upon their arrival in Korea now the battalion was able to form the third rifle company, as it desired, in addition to the present organization of only two rifle companies with Headquarters and Support Companies under the Battalion Headquarters.

During the whilst in Chupori the battalion kept busy on the other hand in conducting its intensive training and instructions continuously, reviewed its own up-to-date combat actions which it had experienced, and studied in referring with the past tactical operations of ROK and other UN allies through the war historical materials thereof which it had obtained while in the reserve area for its instruction purpose, resulting that all officers and men of the battalion apparently had become clear of “what the individual soldier must do and what must not” in the Korean theater of operation. Such training of the battalion was also accompanied by the conducting refresher training for those ROK soldiers who were attached thereto, which was carried out very actively by instructors of a Netherlands officer and a ROK first sergeant. In general the daily training was conducted regularly from 0800 through 1700 hours, excluding the break times and the holidays, and nevertheless, play of their favourite athletics particularly the football game which is one of the Netherlands'
worldwide sport today, were never missed during the training period in the reserve area.

Furnishing logistical support for the Netherlands Battalion had been properly conducted through the US army supply channel in Korea throughout the war; on the close day of February the 2nd US Division Headquarters established its policy of the supply for both Netherlands and French Battalions being under its operational control that as a rule those supply items of Classes II (clothing, individual and organizational equipment, and vehicles, including the related spare parts) and IV (construction and fortification materials and special machinery and equipment) were to be issued directly from the supply points concerned, while those supplies of Classes I (rations), III (fuels and lubricants for all purposes), and V (ammunition, explosives, and chemical agents) were to be delivered to the units indirectly through the regiment.

On 10 March, reequipment of the Netherlands Battalion which had been recommended to be enforced immediately after the Hoengsong and Hill 325 battles, was being materialized, but chiefly for those items of weapons and signal communication equipment.

There had been a considerable delay for the actions to be taken due to the unsettled situations of war. The Battalion Headquarters had made requisitions for its resupply and reequipment to the American higher headquarters exactly one month before and follow-up actions were taken.

Eventually on 20 March the battalion's reequipment was fully completed, and the battalion became ready to continue its fighting at the same time.

The Netherlands Battalion and the regiment continuously remained as corps reserve in the assembly area at Chupori with the security mission on Chechon area until the units reverted to the control of the 2nd US Division effective 7 April 1951.

Movements North of Hongchon

The Netherlands Battalion having reverted to the control of 2nd US Division carried out a series of very complex moves.

On 9 April it was moved to Sosan-ni eight kilometers northeast of Hongchon, then on 12 April to Sajon-ni 15 kilometers south of Yanggu, and then to Taegong-ni two kilometers north of Sajon-ni on southern bank of Soyang-gang on the same day.

In the afternoon of 15 April, the elements of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd US Division relieved the elements of the Netherlands Battalion across the
Infantry Battalion

Soyang-gang of blocking positions in the vicinity of Oum-ni ten kilometers southeast of Hwachon.

On the following day at 0800 hours the Netherlands Battalion moved through Taegong-ni again and thence back to Songsan-ni, where it was attached to the 38th US Infantry Regiment as of 1145 hours on 16 April, remaining in reserve. In the afternoon of 19 April the 2nd US Infantry Division less the 23rd Infantry Regiment assembled around Songsan-ni as the division reserve area. The reserve area was provided with such recreational facilities set up as the movies, eight-man shower units and laundry shops.

On 22 April 1951 when the Chinese Communist forces' first spring offensive began during the night along the entire front, the 23rd Infantry of the 2nd US Division was taking up positions a few kilometers north of Yanggu, and the French Battalion reinforced with the division reconnaissance company was

The Netherlands troops prepare for the action at nearby Hwachon Reservoir.
defending the southern edge of the Hwachon Reservoir. The Netherlands Battalion under the operational control of the 38th US Infantry was in reserve near Hongchon together with the 9th US Infantry, but the battalion was assigned on this day an important role to strengthen the security efforts for the 2nd US Division sector, in which the Red Chinese forces might penetrate massively in a very short time.

On 23 April, thereupon, the Netherlands Battalion departed the assembly area at Songsan-ni and moved north to the positions near the Hwachon Reservoir, and upon arrival at 1230 hours on the day it came under the operational control of 23rd US Infantry Regiment. The elements of 23rd Infantry received a light probing attack at 2200 hours and light small arms fire continued throughout the night dying down at 0515 hours of 24 April.

Lieutenant Colonel W.D.H. Eekhout, the Battalion Commander, upon reached the southern area of the Hwachon Reservoir immediately established outposts from A Company along southern shore of the reservoir to provide security against probable enemy approach by crossing the reservoir and sent patrols on the nearby dominating features of Hills 796 and 412 or the cape around Hill 392, maneuvering, when necessary, with the army boats provided by the engineer.

Shortly after the Netherlands Battalion’s arrival in the 23rd US Infantry sector near Hwachon Reservoir, the 23rd Infantry organized the Task Force Zebra composed of units from the Netherlands and French Battalions, the Reconnaissance Company of 2nd US Division and tank battalion with mission to be accomplished, such as covering the withdrawals of US artillery and engineer units in case of the enemy breakthrough on the western portion of the Hwachon Reservoir and for the withdrawing French companies to the south from the reservoir area, with the additional mission of maintaining contact with troops of a withdrawing unit of IX US Corps on the left and 23rd US Infantry on the right at Yanggu area.

On 25 April being ordered by the 23rd US Infantry to secure the left flank of the regiment sector west of Yanggu, the Netherlands Battalion moved to the blocking positions and occupied Hill 622 by B Company on the left and a cape ground of Kaembol in the right portion of the Hwachon Reservoir by A Company, in relief of the units of the French Battalion thereon.

On 26 April informations were obtained that the enemy was crowding in northern shore of the reservoir, and friendly tank fires were directed. At 1500 hours the Netherlands Battalion was ordered to provide a flank protection for the units of 23rd US Infantry withdrawing southeast toward Hongchon area through Yanggu–Tochon-ni–Kwandae-ri. The Task Force Zebra was again formed
with the task of covering the withdrawal action across the Soyang River. Thereupon, the Netherlands Battalion was directed to act with the TFZ at Naepyong-ni, manning with the elements of Support Platoon of B Company, and for covering the withdrawal of the French Battalion and the 1st Battalion of 23rd Infantry, which was to start at dawn of 27 April.

Eventually the following morning saw the French Battalion on the left, the Netherlands Battalion on center and the 1st Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry on the right already took up positions respectively, securing widely on the crests and vital terrain features in northern bank of the Soyang River.

The three Battalions were thus to turn their respective covering positions over the 38th US Infantry holding the No Name Line running to the east on Hill 1051 (Kari-san) eight kilometers south of Naepyong-ni from Hill 736 on a seven-kilometer stretch southwest of Kari-san. This was attempted to finally contain the enemy breakthrough at the No Name Line, bringing him to the failure and to be destroyed in north of Hongchon. Nevertheless, no contact with the enemy had been made during the withdrawal or delaying actions.

At 1115 hours, however, a considerable build-up with 100–200 enemy troops were disclosed by a flight observer over Hill 578 three kilometers north of Naepyong-ni. Upon making contact with the ground force, the artillery fires were directed on them intensively.

At 1800 hours on 27 April, meantime, orders were received that the withdrawal was due to start at dawn on 28 April in sequence of American, French and then the Netherlands troops.

On 28 - 29 April the Netherlands Battalion withdrew to Saorang-kogae nine kilometers south of Naepyong-ni, where it joined the 38th US Infantry.

On 29 April the battalion continued its steady withdrawal on foot to Kungwang five kilometers north of Songsan-ni, passing through the deep valley which later became known to the UN forces as the Marathon Valley.

During the withdrawal the Netherlands men fought desperately despite they were being exhausted and extreme hungers, and from Kungwang they arrived by motor transport at Songsan-ni, the division reserve area at 1400 hours.

On 30 April the battalion at division reserve area was again ordered to move out to Sarangmal near Pukpang-ni ten kilometers due west of Hangye, where A Company of the battalion took up positions on Hill 638 on the left and B Company on Hill 736 on the right respectively astride the Cannon Valley which lay south-north across the left half part of the No Name Line. The Netherlands Battalion’s immediate left was the 1st US Marine Division and the right was 3rd Battalion of the 38th US Infantry.

Thus the Netherlands Battalion occupied the positions in the vicinity of
Pukpang-ni on the left of 3rd Battalion’s position on 1 May. The battalion maintained and improved the positions and patrolled 3,000 – 4,000 meters to the front.

The battalion began its digging and wiring, and then the clearing field of fire. Besides, mines, trip flares or booby traps were set up together with a coordinated fire plan.

Afterwards, the American division commander inspected for himself the results and conditions of the fortifications by unit, and with satisfactory remarks he praised highly of the battalion’s excellent conditions in preparation of the defensive positions.

This ended a very strenuous period of operations which lasted for more than a month, characterizing as the period of movement warfare that the Netherlands Battalion continued moves from one place to another ever since 8 April, and seemed now it started rather the semi-positional warfare, occupying a chain of high hills for a certain length of period by either offensive or defensive operation.

During the early days of May the Netherlands Battalion together with other battalions of the 38th Infantry and Task Force Zebra under the command of 2nd US Division, continuously maintained their defensive positions, patrolling north to the Soyang River extensively.

A supporting US tank patrol advanced north to 96 east-west grid line along the MSR 44, where it encountered a friendly mine-field and withdrew.

On 2 May the Netherlands Battalion positions at Sarangmal were strengthened by one tank platoon being attached for the battalion in defense of the area.

On 3 May unknown number of enemy force attacked the Netherlands Battalion but were repulsed after 25 minutes counterattack carried out by a friendly unit under the artillery support.

On 5-6 May the battalion had secured, as the patrolling base, Hill 899 (Taeryong-san) on the Roger Line five kilometers north and in parallel of the No Name Line. (See Sketch Map 3.)

On 6 May, meantime, an information was received that the Netherlands Battalion’s main replacements of 225 men arrived and immediately proceeded to take training in Pusan, and therefore the battalion was now happy to have its third rifle company in coming future.

In the meantime, on 14 May the Netherlands Battalion in the area of Pukpang-ni was relieved by the elements of 9th US Infantry Regiment, and ordered to move to a dominating feature of Hill 710 three kilometers northwest of Hangye with a mission of reconnoitering the forward area and for securing commanding ground thereon.
Shortly after establishment of the defensive positions on Hill 710, the Netherlands Battalion’s patrols were heavily engaged during the reconnaissance in force from Hill 710 to forward Hills of 1051 and 781, the latter of which was the scene of encountering enemy force on 16 May and the patrols eventually withdrew.

**Attack on Hill 1051**

On 17 May, thereupon, the battalion was further ordered to attack toward Hill 1051 (Kari-san) six kilometers north of Hangye, in coordination with the 1st Battalion of 38th US Infantry in this locality and with other UN allies such as the adjacent French Battalion in the right of the 38th Infantry.

In general, around the early days of May the Chinese Communist force in contact with UN forces on the front north of Hongchon was identified as the 349th Regiment of 117th Division under 39th CCF Army, and no report of enemy contact had been received in the 2nd US Division sector during the period
except the minor action.

However, there were signs of much increased enemy activity on the battalion's front and this was accompanied by enemy attacks in each locality with a squad to platoon sized strength.

By 18 May the enemy on the front of 2nd US Division gave his continuous pressures on the right flank of the division frontage, and on the 38th US regimental front some 300 enemy made infiltration in piecemeal attacks onto each battle position of the regiment.

The friendly air reconnaissance disclosed in several places of a large enemy force in a considerable build-up. Approximately 100 enemy horse cavalrymen were observed by UN aircraft at the valley three kilometers northeast of Yanggu on 20 April.

The UN air force disclosed also an enemy assembly area five kilometers north of Yanggu, and the friendly artillery units poured their concentrated fires onto about 700 men of whom 300 were estimated to be killed.

The friendly artillery further fired on some 300 enemies at Sanggol-li, nine kilometers southeast of Chunchon at 0815 hours on 17 May, and the enemy was dispersed leaving 75 of his bodies behind.

At 1000 hours on 17 May Lieutenant Colonel Eckhout, the Battalion Commander appeared with some of his staff on Mul-kol five kilometers south of the objective hill for making his own terrain study in sight of the locality and formulation of his operational plan before his battalion's attack on Hill 1051.

Meanwhile, in the night of 17 May A Company of the 38th US Infantry was already at several blows by the enemy attacks on the eastern edge of Hill 1051, against which the French Battalion was ordered to protect the 23rd US Infantry sector in the right of 38th regiment sector.

The Netherlands Battalion, which was placed under the command of 1st Battalion of the 38th Regiment for this operation, was ordered to act as an attack echelon maneuvering to Hill 1051 with its two rifle companies; A Company of two rifle platoons was to relieve the 38th Infantry's A Company being attacked at the eastern foot of Hill 1051, and the B Company was to maneuver onto Hill 975 the intermediate objective and then continue to attack to the final objective Hill 1051 through the eastern hill-side in support of 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry.

Upon this, the Netherlands A Company departed its attack position at dawn of 18 May, passing through the western valley of Hill 975 in still dark with foggy, cold and humid weather in the rainfall on mountainous pathway, and reached the foot of Hill 1051 from the crest of which a rain of enemy machine gun fires was poured ceaselessly on the Netherlands attack elements.
As it closed in the threshold of Hill 1051, having found out the 38th Infantry’s A Company to be relieved was already withdrawn the Netherlands A Company Commander who made up his mind to attack Hill 1051 on its way radioed for himself calling for a friendly air strike as well as the artillery concentration fires to get his company to rush on and neutralize the enemy held crest of Hill 1051. The combined air-ground and infantry-artillery attacks were launched simultaneously. This was followed immediately by assault of the Netherlands men onto the final objective hill which was still held by the overwhelming Red Chinese defenders.

On the other hand, at 1030 hours B Company which was to attack Hill 1051 from eastern flank, could make contact with its brother Company A attacking from the immediate hill bottom.

Nevertheless, the enemy counterattack in human wave came through a two-kilometer gap between the Netherlands and the friendly companies to their right.

At 1300 hours, meantime, orders were received from 1st Battalion of the 38th US Infantry that the Netherlands companies were to attack Hill 1051, together with French companies under the acting command by the Netherlands A Company Commander.

The line of departure for the attack was determined on the current line of contact in basis of Netherlands A Company’s location, with the French companies were to advance on the right. H hour was set up as 1500 hours on 18 May.

The enemy snipers, automatic weapons fires and mortar shelling threatened constantly the maneuver of the friendly attackers, and on the contrary friendly artillery units concentrated steadily their harassing and neutralization fires on the top of Hill 1051, which eventually became ashes later when the Netherlands climbed up desperately.

Subsequently, after some sharp fighting, in which considerable hurl were made by both sides of hand grenades, the enemy was forced to subdue and after all retreated.

During the night, the Netherlands companies were relieved on Hill 1051 by the elements of 9th US Infantry, and the battalion commander led his battletired companies to withdraw to the assembly area closed to Sosan-ni for reorganization, with the battalion train set up nearby Wonpyong.

The enemy abandoned on Hill 1051 the bodies of 15 killed, numerous weapons and documents, but in this operation of 18 May the Netherlands Battalion suffered one killed, ten wounded of whom only four men were evacuated to the hospital, and considerable number of missing in action the majority of whom were back to their units in a few hours.
From 19 May the Netherlands Battalion seemed likely to be involved in the movement warfare again, which was characterized this time as its momentum of movements was generally directed toward the northeast of Hongchon, roughly applying the Hyon-ni–Inje axis.

During the period of 19-22 May, in anticipation of enemy attempt to launch his next offensive the Netherlands Battalion was constantly alerted and very often ordered for tactical moves, accompanied by frequent changes in its attachment relations to the US regiments, employing the battalion of still yet only two rifle companies chiefly as complements to the gaps between the friendly troops in the 2nd US Division sector; it moved from the assembly area of Songsan-ni to Hangye, then a stretch of six more kilometers eastward to the new assembly area of Changpyong-ni, where it joined again the 38th US Infantry effective 0100 hour of 23 May.

**Advance on Hyon-ni–Inje Axis**

At first light of 23 May the battalion departed its assembly area of Changpyong-ni, passed through steep mountainous roads in heavy rainfall, arrived at Pungam-ni 26 kilometers east of Hongchon, and then entered assembly area nearby Wadunji at 1330 hours.

After a while, an information was received that an enemy band of a Red Chinese force was hidden in the villages between Wadunji and 13 kilometers eastward to Paetchae. Thereupon, the Netherlands A Company reinforced by three US tanks was assigned for the tasks and sent to the locality to destroy him by laying ambushes with some heavy machine-guns from Support Company set up in the inbetween area. The remainder of A Company had dug in by 2200 hours in that locality in order to cut off the avenue of enemy approach through the valleys streaming down from both directions of the north and the east. At 0300 hours on 24 May the A Company elements encountered, engaged with and repulsed some 12 enemy patrols.

In subsequent accomplishment of specific missions, the Netherlands A Company organized a small task force with one reconnaissance platoon, one tank platoon and one combat engineer section attached thereto. The task force was successful in making a probing advance northeast of Hongchon, reaching soon and occupying the several road bridges to Soyang-gang near Kwandae-ri eight kilometers southwest of Inje, and thus, it could open up the way for the main advance by the 38th US Infantry, as well as serving as the complements for a gap in the right of 2nd US Division sector.
Infantry Battalion

On the other hand, the Netherlands Battalion less A Company scarcey moved on order its assembly area from Wadunji to Waya-ri nine kilometers northward by mid-night on 24 May before it received orders for the next day's action.

At daybreak on 25 May the Netherlands Battalion was to continue advance northeast to Hyon-ni in a 40-kilometer distance on foot columns. It was to follow the column of 2nd Battalion of the 38th Infantry, providing thoroughly the flank security on both sides of the road.

At 0200 hours of 25 May, meanwhile, the Netherlands A Company which reverted to parent battalion from its well-achieved task force got to Waya-ri in triumphal animation.

Another inspiring thing that encouraged the officers and men of Netherlands Battalion into their utmost high morale was that the augmentation of rifle company in the Netherlands Battalion to the normal basis of three rifle companies from only two was materialized, and this eventually activated the third rifle company, with its designation as C Company. This new company, which meanwhile underwent training as soon as its arrival in Pusan, was now committed first time into battle from Yudong-ni proper some 20 kilometers northeast of Hoengsong. The company left Yudong-ni at 0500 hours of 25 May by vehicle transport and was to catch up and join its parent battalion which was currently on the way of advance northeast just passing through Waya-ri. The C Company eventually passed through Waya-ri at 1100 hours after some hardship with a mislead in finding the location of the battalion.

The Red Chinese units resisting in the area around Hyon-ni-Inje axis, identified as the subordinate units of the 79th, 80th and 81st Divisions of 27th CCF Army had provoked attacks on several places in an attempt of cutting off or making delay of the UN forces' advance to Inje area at any cost. This was accompanied at the same time by his increasing counter-mortaring efforts against the UN forces' heavy mortars and artillery positions.

At 1800 hours, meantime, the Netherlands Battalion was ordered to prepare immediately one rifle company, for which B Company was detailed this time, to carry out a mopping up operation around and occupy Omsu-dong ten kilometers south of Hyon-ni, in support of L Company of the 38th Infantry and one tank platoon. The mission was accomplished at 2130 hours with the casualty of one wounded in action on B Company while the enemy sustained seven killed with six weapons captured. Both the Netherlands B and the US L Companies stayed up the night at Omdal-kol and Omsu-dong respectively.

On 26 May the primary mission which was given to the Netherlands Battalion for its accomplishment was to advance on the commanding feature of Hill 1091 (Taeam-san) eight kilometers southwest of Hyon-ni, in order that the friendly
units might be able to make more rapid advance toward the objective area, upon clearance of enemy interruption and for opening up the way of movements by UN allies; at 0830 hours the battalion departed from Omdal-kol for the hill in two columns, climbing up through the twin ridges leading to Hill 1091. During the morning the elements of B Company captured five Red Chinese wounded men who were left behind on their retreat.

By 1800 hours the Netherlands Battalion captured Hill 1091 unopposed as it was already after the enemy had retreated from that locality and even the remnants were dispersed.

B Company had passed its night at Sobasu two kilometers southwest of Hyon-ni and the remainder of the battalion at Yongpo, receiving the next day’s schedule from the regiment at 0300 hours.

At 1100 hours on the following day Hyon-ni fell to the regiment, and subsequently the order was received at 1130 hours by the Netherlands Battalion to mopping up the area east of the town; the battalion commander established his command post at the eastern outskirt of Hyon-ni, and several Red Chinese remnants were captured by the battalion headquarters personnel. The elements of B Company contacted with some enemy, killing five with two captured. Friendly artillery fire repulsed some 100 enemy force on the target a 100-meter forward.

The battalion’s mopping up operation for the area took place by means of rather making attacks against a chain of high grounds immediate east of Hyon-ni with the objective of Hill 521 to be captured by C Company on center, Hill 520 by B Company two kilometers apart in the north of Hill 521 and the valley area two kilometers south of Hyon-ni to be secured by A Company.

C Company participated in the attack for the first time since its formation in Korea reaching its objective by 2100 hours after it passed through some steep terrain features.

In this operation, the battalion sustained the casualty of only three wounded in action, but inflicted upon the enemy a heavy casualties of 30 killed and three wounded with the numerous enemy materials captured, such as 45 items of enemy weapons, ammunition and other supplies.

On 28 May the advance by the 38th US Infantry continued through Hyon-ni-Inje axis. During the advance the columns encountered some hidden enemy oppositions by the road. The leading Netherlands C Company with the supporting US tanks being interrupted by enemy automatic weapons and snipers’ small arms fire from the direction of east, at the point just a few kilometers north of Hyon-ni, was unable to advance further and withdrew on order at 0745 hours.

At 1030 hours the regimental commander made a decision through an
interview with the Netherlands Battalion Commander to repulse the enemy oppositions by counterattack, which took place by a platoon strength of the Netherlands B Company, dispersing some 30 enemies at 1200 hours. The battalion sustained none of casualty, but it inflicted the casualties upon the enemy six killed and captured nine North Korean prisoners of war with 14 items of enemy weapons.

Nevertheless, the advancing columns were attacked again from the direction of west this time, two platoons from the Netherlands A Company reinforced with some US tanks were ordered for counterattack task, which they carried out gallantly in rushing into the high ground overlooking the road and securing them to keep the road open. By 1700 hours, a 120-enemy band was dispersed, with the casualty of 21 enemies killed, six captured prisoners of war and 18 items of enemy weapons captured. Two Netherlands men were wounded in this action. Thus, the road was clear of enemies, and now the columns were able to continue their advance to Inje.

The Netherlands B Company on the other hand engaged with a band of North Korean Communist remnants, killing six enemies and one friendly soldier was wounded in action. The ROK troops in columns behind the Netherlands companies as rear security guards, captured some 100 North Korean Communists who surrendered before the ROKs.

In the early morning of 29 May both the 1st and 2nd Battalion of 38th US Infantry continued their advance forward while the Netherlands Battalion followed the columns, providing flanks and rear guards. At 1245 hours on this day the Netherlands officers and men now made their third crossing of the 38th Parallel -- at the point where it cut roughly in half the Hyon-ni–Inje axis -- ever since their participation in the Korean War. The leading column of the 38th US Infantry reached the eastern corner of Inje at 1800 hours, and the Netherlands Battalion upon arrival in the town was detached from the 38th US Infantry and attached to the 23rd US Infantry Regiment.

Section 4. Semi-positional Warfare around Inje
(30 May – 2 October 1951)

Actions in Outskirts of Inje

During the period of UN force's advance on Hyon-ni–Inje axis, an
intelligence summary quoted that the remnants of Chinese Communist force whose parent units were estimated as the 58th, 59th and 60th Divisions of 20th CCF Army in the front of 2nd US Division had attempted to interrupt and block the UN advance to a halt south of Inje about the line of 38th Parallel, and finally to make a mass attack on the UN force east of Inje. The enemy force set up ambushes and road blocks in several places on main supply routes south or southeast of Inje. One of the serious ambush attack by enemy guerillas was made at 0430 hours on 30 May against some friendly vehicles, which were heavily damaged by the surprise.

At 1100 hours, meantime, as a countermeasure for the enemy guerilla activities, the Netherlands Battalion was ordered to establish and occupy the blocking positions from the hill ridges east of Inje to Hill 548 which lay southnorth between the villages of Sungae and Yangjiichon three kilometers east of Inje. The battalion was reinforced in this operation with a 4.2-inch mortar platoon and artillery forward observers group. It was to maintain a close contact with French Battalion on the left.

In order to protect the town of Inje and provide the security for the main supply routes incoming thereto, the battalion commander made up his mind to hold a series of commanding grounds around Hill 548 with two rifle companies in forward and one in reserve. (See Sketch Map 4.)

The machine-guns and recoillless rifles from Support Company were made attachments to each rifle company, while the 81-mm mortars were placed on general support. The attached 4.2-inch heavy mortars, with their emplacements set up near the battalion command post, were protected by the Headquarters Company.

The B Company entered its positions to the crest of Hill 548 unopposed, as the North Korean Communist remnants on the features were smashed heavily by the US heavy mortars fire and retreated immediately before the B Company closed in.

However, on the following day a light probing attack was repulsed by the company defenders on the hill, while the remainder of the battalion was continuously in positions and patrolled around the locality with no significant action happened.

In the morning of 31 May, after a probing activity on the friendly defensive positions the enemy was repulsed. His counter-mortaring shells were landed on the Support Company's 81-mm mortar positions, and inflicted upon them the casualties of seven wounded in action.

By dusk the battalion completed its digging in, and contacts between adjacent units were made among the forward company localities for mutual
supports in actions. The forward companies being assigned with relatively wide frontages on their defensive positions, each company had to establish its layout with three rifle platoons abreast along the front line.

At 0400 hours on 31 May, in the precarious situations, the enemy attack was launched at last on the Netherlands Battalion’s defensive positions on the Hill 548 after the enemy’s light mortar shells were directed heavily on the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of the B Company, and this was accompanied soon by fierce fire fights of artillery and heavy mortars, which ensued on both opponents.

The B Company platoons were eventually forced to withdraw on an area nearby the company command post, where they set machine-guns and fired on rugged area of enemy approach. The 3rd Platoon of C Company was also pushed back a little while during the encountering. The enemy mortar shells were poured on the battalion headquarters area, as well as A Company and the Headquarters Company areas. Particularly, the 1st Platoon of B Company being heavily shelled and under the enemy automatic weapons fire, withdrew a whilst to the left on the positions of 2nd Battalion, 23rd US Infantry, and prepared for a counterattack to restore the lost positions.

**ACTION OF INJE  31 MAY 1951**

Sketch Map 4
The 3rd Platoon of C Company reinforced by the 2nd Platoon, launched the counterattack, and regained its original positions. After a while, the enemy made another attack on the front of 3rd Platoon, but resulted in failure.

At 0500 hours the B Company Commander was called upon and appeared before the Battalion Commander to receive a fresh order for the subsequent action by his company.

The B Company was to launch a counterattack under the timely fire support of friendly heavy mortars, and had to recapture the main feature of Hill 548 the company's old position and now being held by enemy. The both battalion and company commanders believed that the friendly mortars fire power could inflict a heavy blow for the enemy concentration on the Hill 548 and could block further attacks by the enemy penetrating into any gap between friendly companies.

However, the isolated 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon of B Company, fought still on hill foot underneath Hill 548 in spite of being encircled. The platoon commander, judging that the rescue of his men by the friendly supporting fires would be impracticable, ordered the men to withdraw a 200-meter rear on a saddle. Sooner the withdrawal to the new positions began at dawn, the platoon commander with some of his men started combat patrol and probing enemy whereabouts. The lieutenant however, suddenly encountered and faced up to some North Korean Communist soldiers. The Reds jumped out of slit trenches and shot with Russian made pistol at the Netherlands officer. However, the officer instantly killed the Reds with hand grenades. The lieutenant being wounded, returned to his platoon and was evacuated to the hospital. The enemy attacks ensued also on the center and on the left of the battalion.

After being attacked each company carried out a counterattack regaining its own property which was once lost. Particularly, C Company Commander displayed his resourcefulness, and counterattacked with renewed reserve platoon, resulting in complete success.

The casualties that C Company sustained, however, were two killed and six wounded in action.

In the meantime, at 0930 hours the enemy firing ceased throughout the area around Hill 548. The enemy plan to recapture the town of Inje was completely frustrated by the Netherlands Battalion; it made a strenuous efforts in holding Hill 548 the commanding and overlooking feature east of Inje proper. (See Sketch Map 4.)

Both the 23rd and 38th US Regimental Commanders praised highly for the Netherlands Battalion's great contribution and the stand against the repeated enemy attacks on Hill 548.
During the Inje action, the officers and men of the Netherlands Battalion could attain their triumph by overcoming the hardship of their continuous fatigues and lacks of sleepings, and nevertheless the battalion maintained generally a high standards of its morale.

The after-action report revealed that the Netherlands Battalion, particularly the newly activated C Company suffered relatively heavy casualties in its initial six days fighting:
(1) 19 killed in action, including 14 Netherlands, one US artillery observer, three ROKs (KATUSA) and one KSC (Korean Service Corps) porter.
(2) 27 wounded in action, including 26 Netherlands and one ROK.
(3) Three missing in action, including one Netherlands and two ROKs.

Instead of the above casualties, some 300 of enemy force were estimated to be killed, with four enemies captured.

At 1200 hours on 31 May orders were received by the Netherlands Battalion to be relieved of its positions on the right portion of Hill 548, by 2nd Battalion of 38th US Infantry, which was to take over mainly the 2nd Battalion sector of 23rd US Infantry. After the relief the battalion was to advance some three kilometers north to Umjimal, providing a security on both flanks and paying particular attentions on hill side of Yangjichon. A US tank platoon was attached to the battalion under its operational control in this advance. The battalion was to revert to the control of the 38th US Infantry upon arrival at the new positions south of Inje.

In order to accomplish the given task the battalion’s customary reorganization took place by 1800 hours, and the unit disposition was thereupon completed; the C Company was reinforced by machine-guns from Support Company, the attached tank platoon took up positions on the left, and one platoon of B Company held the positions on center while the A Company on the right. Two other platoons of B Company were placed in reserve for the battalion. As the A Company Commander had been seriously wounded in the previous action, B Company Commander was acting as commanding the A Company as well.

As of 1 June some friendly units were located around the Netherlands Battalion. The 38th Infantry Regiment moved from the area three kilometers south of Inje, relieved 23rd Infantry and established positions at Chapyong, Hanyang-dong and Sungae the north and eastern outskirts of Inje. The French Battalion remained in positions at Ipyong three kilometers northeast of Inje while the Netherlands Battalion took up positions at Umjimal two kilometers northeast of the town. The elements of the 38th Regiment established defensive positions securing a bridge site at Kwandae-ri eight kilometers southeast of Inje.
At 0015 on 1 June enemy mortar shells began to land on the Netherlands positions in proportion of a shell in every ten minutes. At 0440 an enemy attack was launched by some 150-man strength through the right flank of A Company but repulsed at 0600 hours after the friendly artillery fire was directed on. The Netherlands Battalion sustained casualties of five killed in action and wounded, one of whom died in an hour.

On 2 June the enemy launched another attack with some 200 men strength on the battalion positions near Umjimal, and this time the enemy perhaps attempted to blunt the several localities simultaneously for a piecemeal attack; at 0130 hours he made attack on C Company with a 80-man strength, while at 0415 some 60-man strength on C and A Companies, and the attacks continued for one and a half hours. The battalion repulsed these enemy attacks with no casualty suffered, but inflicted upon the enemy the casualties of 15 North Korean Communists killed, whose bodies were left behind his retreat.

By 7 June the Netherlands Battalion continued the security mission of Inje maintaining defensive positions and conducting routine patrolling activity around the town.

On 8 June, meantime, the Netherlands Battalion was ordered to move from Inje area to the reserve positions at Sinsae, six kilometers northeast of Hongchon, and remained there until 14 July together with the 9th US Infantry Regiment, conducting the extensive training in individual and small unit tactics, and firing of crew served weapons.

In Reserve at Sinsae

During the continuous fighting in movements as well as the semi-positional warfare the Netherlands Battalion had been displaying its endurances under adverse weather and terrain conditions, despite their mental and physical fatigues, hungers and lacks of sleepings particularly spending nightlong in trench hole or moving from this ridge to that crest.

And, now the battalion had been fighting for six months since its arrival in Korea, attaining those precious battle experiences. While in reserve at Sinsae the battalion was provided again with considerable recreation as much as it had at Chupo-ri, and the physical fatigues were soon recovered. However, so many casualties which the battalion sustained up-to-date reflected a considerable mental withering on its morale aspect.

In the meantime, the battalion received a message from homeland that the second replacements party of 158 men was due to arrive in the battalion prior
to 1 July. These replacements actually had left Rotterdam on 26 May. aboard the U.S. Transport Ship *General Langfitt* together with Belgian troops, arrived at Pusan on 29 June, and soon joined the Netherlands Battalion in the reserve area at Sinmae on 1 July, omitting this time its training at the UNRC in Pusan.

particularly, the arrival of newly assigned two army chaplains were of great helps for the Netherlands soldiers' morale, spiritual and religious livelihood.

At Sinmae the Netherlands replacements immediately entered the training on uses of individual weapons, and subsequently the company training.

As the first contingent which was to complete its services for the determined duration in Korea, the battalion's rotation by the second contingent, was one of significant problem for the Battalion Commander, and such studies exhausted considerably his nerves. The study was made in consideration of the assumption that prior to their triumphal return home of the first contingent some 300 more replacements were to arrive in Korea, and his plan had reached such that the rotation of his battalion was to be materialized not by wholesale but gradually by increment, for which the requirements of replacements should be regularly obtained.

During the operation, the battalion's change of attachments to the different regiments had totalled seven times, so frequent as was counted five times at maximum in a fortnight.

In the reserve area at Sinmae, firstly the unit maintenance particularly for the cleaning of weapons and equipment was thoroughly enforced by the battalion. It had periodically the inspections for the equipment once in every a couple days.

Secondly field training for the battalion was regularly conducted; the Support Company showed demonstration to the officers and men of rifle companies for the employment of weapons, while the US demonstration unit showed the company in attack for the Netherlands Companies. On 1 and 2 July the Netherlands Battalion had a battalion scale field maneuver under support of heavy weapons, and on 8 July it had combined air-artillery-tank-infantry operation in view of its fighting experienced in Hangye area.

The training had been carried out mostly in presence of the regiment commander, who constantly watched, admired and encouraged the Netherlands Battalion for its active and sincere attitudes undergoing the training.

For the firing exercises the battalion selected its own firing ranges in some valley sites closed to Sinmae.

Thirdly, the battalion carried out the daily patrolling activity in the area north of Hongchon from Sinmae, as a routine operation while in reserve, for the
purposes of probing and searching enemy personnel as well as civilian agents, or enemy weapons and documents.

On the other hand, as for the replacements of troops, in early-July a message was received from the Netherlands military mission in Tokyo that the first contingent on return home was to embark on USS General Mac Rae, and 300 more men as the third replacements party were to be arrived in Pusan on or about 29 August by the same ship.

Now newly arrived second contingent, being currently consisted of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Support Company and the C Company, was to become the 38th US Regimental reserve until it could completely be organized into a fully strengthened battalion as soon as the replacements party should be arrived in Korea.

Upon this, the troops of the outgoing first contingent were to finally move to the staging camp at Wonju by 1 August. The general arrangements began to take place for implementing these programs.

Action on Taen-san

In the meantime, the 2nd US Infantry Division, relieved from corps reserve effective 16 July, was to initiate the relief of the 1st US Marine Division on 15 July and assume the responsibility for a new sector near the Hill 1178 (Taeus-an) the immediate southwest of the Punchbowl area, effective 1800 on 16 July. The 300th Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the 1st Marine Division and attached to the 2nd US Division. The 103rd ROK Service Corps Division was attached to the 2nd US Division to provide labor service.

The 2nd US Division's new command post opened at near Kwandae-ri while the marine division became corps reserve at Inje. The 38th US Infantry with the Netherlands Battalion attached, and the 23rd US Infantry had to move up on the front line, accordingly, while the 9th US Infantry remained in reserve. In the morning of 15 July the 38th US Infantry closed in assembly area vicinity of Hugong-ni ten kilometers south of Hill 1178, while the Netherlands Battalion departed Sinae at 0500 and closed in its new assembly area of Pallang-ni six kilometers south of Hill 1178 at 0830 on 15 July. The battalion relieved 2nd Battalion of the 1st ROK Marine Regiment in the 1st US Marine Division, the area of Hills 1148 and Tusol-san four kilometers south of Hill 1178 (Taeus-san), by morning of 16 July. The battalion's relief began at 0600 and completed at 1130 hours on 16 July. One man of the Netherlands A Company suffered heavy wounded by explosion of booby traps.
On the night of 16-17 July the enemy attacks on B Company by 20-30 men strength had repeated five times in an hour, resulting in the friendly unit three wounded in action. At 0230 hours on the following day enemy attacked once again but was repulsed, with no casualty received by friendly unit. Enemy prisoner of war stated that such enemy attacks were intended to probe the new friendly positions.

From 17 to 19 July the battalion maintained positions on Hill 1148, repulsing small enemy attacks on the spur and obtained fighting result of 12 enemies killed.

During the day of 19 July, the division patrols contacted enemy groups of squad to platoon size 1,500 to 2,000 meters forward from friendly positions.

In the afternoon of 19 July, meantime, the Netherlands Battalion's positions were adjusted, extending westward to the point three kilometers west of Hill 1148, and on the following day they were further adjusted to the positions which moved up a kilometer north close to the Hill 1178 (Taeu-san), the primary objective of the 2nd US Division's offensive operation.

On 20 July, generally the friendly line for semi-positional warfare facing Taeu-san, was held by the Netherlands Battalion on center in three kilometers due south of Taeu-san, the 38th US Infantry with 3rd Battalion of the 9th US Infantry attached on left, and the elements of 23rd US Infantry advancing to the Punchbowl area on the right. (See Sketch Map 5.)

The regiment commander ordered a 4.2-inch heavy mortar platoon, an artillery liaison group, a ROK Service Company of 210 porters, and a ROK engineer company from KATUSA (Korean Army to United States Army) for providing fortification support, to be attached to the Netherlands Battalion respectively.

The battalion commander, thereupon, established its initial disposition with A Company on the left, B Company on the right, each one platoon of C Company assigned to A and B Companies and placed the rest of C Company in reserve. At the same time, each one squad of machine-gunners and each one 75-mm recoilless rifle squad from Support Company were attached to A and B Companies respectively. US heavy mortars were employed as general support.

The battalion frontage was so wide as the porters carrying rations, water, ammunitions and other delivery of supplies took two and a half hours to reach one end of its sector from the battalion command post.

The maintenance of positions was particularly emphasized by the battalion commander for constant digging in, repairing, wiring and mining during the period of holding the line.

The forward locality on Hill 1148 the battalion now holding was characterized by steep and wooded area with very slippery pathway. The positions
were generally well-dug, however, with barbed wire and mines set up along the line adequately.

Facing Taeu-san and the vertical line of the Heartbreak Ridge to the north, the Netherlands Battalion held the horizontal line with a series of commanding features of Hills 1148, 872 and 770, connecting on the left with Hills 983, 940 and 773 of the Bloody Ridge, and on the right with Hill 1304 in southern edge of the Punchbowl area.

From the enemy held crest of Hill 1178 (Taeus-an), which dominated all the surrounding hills, enemy was delivering regularly his artillery and mortar shelling on the friendly positions, and maintained his positions thereon by methodically sending out the patrols and carrying out night raids in a relatively small scale strength.

At 1130 on 20 July the friendly attack elements reached Hill 792 two kilometers due east of Taeu-san, encountered an anti-personnel mine field, and received long range small arms and automatic weapons fire from the enemy occupying defensive positions on a ridge of Taeu-san. The friendly units, thereupon, broke contact and returned to the nearby patrol base. A patrol from the
Infantry Battalion

Netherlands Battalion also encountered a mine field at the spur a kilometer southwest of Taeu-san and returned to the line with no further contact.

On 21 July the Netherlands patrol received small arms fire at southern spur of the Taeu-san, and on 22 July observed some 30 enemies at the spur three kilometers southwest of Taeu-san and directed mortar fire on.

The attack on Hill 1178 (Taeu-san), in the meantime, was launched by the regiment on 26 July. In this offensive operation, the Netherlands Battalion's C Company was selected as attacking elements, and was to maneuver on left under the covering fire from the line of friendly positions to capture the regiment secondary objective Hill 1120 some 1,000 meters south of Taeu-san, while the 1st Battalion of 38th US Infantry, as main attack was to maneuver on the right through Hills 1001 and 1100 to capture the final objective Taeu-san. The elements of 23rd US Infantry on the right, was to play a deceiving maneuver to lead the enemy attentions onto the Punchbowl area.

The 1st Battalion of the 38th US Infantry began its attack at 0615 hours, while the Netherlands C Company departed its positions at 0600 hours and reached the valley of Nujong-kol at 0700, after it passed through A Company positions.

At 0650 friendly supporting artillery already opened fire. Simultaneously all ground supporting fires were directed to the enemy area from the line of friendly positions and continued for an hour.

From 0730 hours C Company advanced in two columns, with skirmishers moving forward, in sequence of 1st Platoon, command group and Support Platoon, followed by the 2nd Platoon.

The limited visibility due to fog and clouds hindered the friendly offensive operation. When it reached the 500 meters elevation of the objective Hill 1120, the leading squads were told to have their bayonets fixed on. As the fog was clearing up the increased volume of enemy machine-gun fire was received by the attacking elements.

At 1445 an air strike was directed against an estimated enemy battalion on Hill 1100. The friendly elements broke contact at 2000 and closed back to dig in positions by 2145.

On 27 July the 1st Battalion of the 38th US Infantry renewed attack at 0600 and advanced to vicinity of Taeu-san against enemy resistance and established a perimeter defense in that vicinity for the night.

The Netherlands Battalion attacking on the left was nearing to the crest of Hill 1120. Enemy gave the attackers a considerable hardship, as he was firing to lower area from the high ground. Nevertheless, flame throwers were being moved up and friendly units were preparing to assault onto the enemy positions.
One of the enemy machine-gun nests was interfering the friendly advance constantly, particularly of the leading squad of the 1st platoon on the right. The 1st Platoon Commander ordered another squad to relieve the leading squad, but the enemy machine-gun fire still threatening friendly advance, caused to halt these two squads, forcing the platoon to suffer a browning rifle man badly wounded. An aged Netherlands soldier, rushed on forward immediately and picked up the browning rifle, and then assaulted for himself to the enemy position and silenced the enemy heavy machine-gun. The no named gallant man eventually opened the way for the friendly attacking elements in assaulting. The anonymous man this time asked one of his fellows to cover him with the browning rifle he handed over, while he climbed up alone himself and threw grenades into the enemy positions, killing the snipers on the spot.

Thereupon, by timely supporting of friendly mortar fire on the Hill 1120, the platoon could reach the point within a 100-meter to the crest.

The company commander had his 2nd Platoon to advance on the left abreast with the assaulting 1st Platoon. Here, a soldier who bravely knocked off one enemy machine-gun emplacement, wounded his right hand, but using his rifle with left hand destroyed out another one with grenades.

At this time on a spur ridge west of Hill 1120, it was apparent that the enemy was still occupying there, offering a stiff resistance. Nevertheless, the individual soldiers of the rifle platoon assaulted, with the bayonets fixed on, and almost got into the enemy trenches, engaging a hand to hand fighting and hurling grenades.

The company commander himself was so active in fighting gallantly by providing cover for his assaulting men with a browning automatic rifle.

At 1100 hours the leading Netherlands platoons were finally on the crest of Hill 1120, the Netherlands Battalion’s assigned objective, forcing the enemy retreat through the valley.

On the other hand, the regimental attacking elements occupied Hills 1100 and 1178 (Taek-san) after attacks were made throughout four times from 26 to 29 July, with heavy casualties sustained of some 300 men who were killed and wounded in action.

At 1900 hours of 29 July the regimental commander ordered both the Netherlands and 1st Battalions to return to their original positions by signal of smoke shells at 2100 hours.

On 5 August the 1st Battalion of 38th US Infantry was ordered to take over the Netherlands Battalion’s original positions of Hills 1148, 872 and 770. The relief took place in the morning of following day, and the Netherlands Battalion retired from the front, arriving at the division reserve area after seven hours move
in south of Inje on the 38th Parallel, as the preparatory arrangement to be taken for the triumphal return home of 1st contingent, now the old heroes of the battalion.

During the actions of Taeu-san, in which those prearranged rottees of the 1st contingent participated as the last round action of their participations prior to their return home, the battalion suffered the casualties of 11 killed in action, two of whom were belonged to 1st contingent, 31 wounded and one became prisoner of war.

Return Home of 1st Contingent

On 7 August the Battalion S-3 officer flew to Headquarters, EUSA in Seoul to receive directions as to the farewell to Korea of 1st contingent and organization of new battalion with the 2nd contingent at the same time.

The second contingent, upon completion of organization into new battalion and through a considerable length of training, was to reach combat readiness on about 1 October.

Those replacements who were up-to-date assigned to A and B Companies, were all reassigned to C Company, thus the administrative works for the battalion rotation were being almost through by 11 August.

On 9 August General Van Fleet, the Commander of EUSA awarded the United States Presidential Unit Citation to the Netherlands Battalion, under the presence of all high ranking officers as well as foreign diplomatic officials including the Netherlands representative to the United Nations, who gave the officers and men a congratulatory speech for the meritorious service rendered by the Netherlands Battalion in the Korean War.

In the solemn ceremony, General Van Fleet attached a blue pennant representing Hoengsong and Wonju battles to the Netherlands war colors, and then pinned on the heroes' uniforms their respective medals one by one.

On 18 August the rottees, the 1st contingent, now enroute their triumphal homing moved through their old fighting scenes of Hangye–Hongchon–Hoengsong–Wonju in 21 vehicles. Then they entrained at Wonju by 1500 and arrived at Pusan uneventfully at 0900 hours on the following day. At a staging camp in Pusan, the home-going officers and men turned in their individual weapons, and on 21 August they visited United Nations Cemetery in Pusan to bid farewell to their old comrades in arms. On each grave flowers were laid, and some wreaths were added on by comrades for those silent warriors who were never to return homeland.
On 22 August, USS General Mac Rae, transporting the third Netherlands replacements party, arrived in Pusan, and the leaving contingent now embarked. However, she set sail at 2030 on 23 August, heading to Inchon, where the Belgian troops were landed and embarked there on 25 August. The General Mac Rae called at port of Sasebo, there picked up three Netherlands wounded men, and finally on 29 August she headed to the Netherlands.

On 1 October the ship arrived at the port of Rotterdam uneventfully, and officers and men on triumphal return home were welcomed particularly by His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard, who was for himself appearing on the port. The Prince Bernhard awarded personally the Cross Medals for Right and Liberty to all unit commanders and under-commanders, and subsequently let the commanders to award the same medals to the rest of officers and men.

Section 5. Battle in Mundung-ni Area
(3 – 24 October 1951)

Initial Action of 2nd Contingent

The newly arrived 3rd replacements party, meanwhile, was transported to Chungju on 3 September and joined the new battalion becoming the second, contingent of the Netherlands Battalion in the Korean War. The new battalion was organized, however, eventually same as the first contingent, forming one infantry battalion with only two companies.

On 4 September its training started in reserve area near Chungju, by each company or the whole battalion in attack, defense or retrograde movement. The theory and technical training on the supporting arms were also provided by instructors from the battalion headquarters or the American regiment. Military sanitation and preventing diseases in the field were taught by the medical officers. The training continued until 22 September, on which their last instructions were given as to the care and cleaning of individual and the crew served weapons. Nevertheless, the military morale of the battalion had been fair during the period of training.

On 23 September, in the meantime, the battalion was ordered to move from Chungju to Hugong-ni ten kilometers south of Taeu-san in the 38th US Infantry's assembly area and nearby the 2nd US Division Headquarters. As soon as the battalion arrived at Hugong-ni on this date, it was detached from the direct control
of EUSAK and attached for the operational control of the 2nd US Division, with further attachment to the 38th US Infantry then in the division reserve. Here, in the new assembly area the 38th US Infantry promised an active assistance on the battalion sized training to the Netherlands Battalion. From 24 to 30 September the battalion entered the field exercise with heavy mortars, tanks and the artillery supports. In the actual combat training all Netherlands men participated in with their enthusiasm and saw a remarkable progress in the combat ability, despite the new battalion strength, except the individuals of C Company of old battalion, was composed mostly of non-experienced combatants.

On 1-2 October the battalion was finally in readiness of its participation into frontline combat activity, as the commander’s overall inspection on the personnel and equipment of the battalion was completed and proved perfect.

**Action in Mundung-ni Valley**

On the night of 5 October, Operation Touchdown began with all the regiments of the 2nd US Division arranged on the line.

In this stage of operation, the enemy units facing the Netherlands Battalion and 2nd US Division units in Mundung-ni—Satae-ri front, were deployed irregularly by the 3rd Regiment of 12th NK Division occupied Hill 867, the 1st Regiment of 6th NK Division which spread out from Hill 636 northwest to Hill 974 west of Mundung-ni Valley, and the 15th Regiment of 6th NK Division which was digging in on Hill 931 in the Heartbreak Ridge. The NK 12th and 6th Divisions were both in far understrength by the eve of Touchdown operation, and the advance elements of the 204th Division of 68th CCF Army were in the process of taking over positions already vacated by the NK Communist forces.

On 5 October, as a component unit of 38th Infantry, 2nd US Division in carrying out Operation Touchdown, the Netherlands Battalion, as ordered, had its A Company to relieve the 38th's A Company on Hill 785 in the vicinity of Imokchong while the remainders moved to the new assembly area at Tondoru ten kilometers northwest of Hugong-ni. On 9 October, the Netherlands Battalion departed its assembly area at Tondoru enroute to area near Hill 600 some ten kilometers north of Tondoru. On 10 October, the battalion established positions on Hill 600, and on 14 October it attacked against light resistance and secured Hill 841 (840 on the new map). Thus, the Operation Touchdown was launched at 2100 hours of 5 October. Generally in this operation the 38th US Infantry units advanced toward Mundung-ni valleys with its 1st Battalion moving on the Heartbreak Ridge hills on the right in linking up with 23rd US Infantry units, and
with 2nd Battalion maneuvering on Kim Il Sung Range on the left across Sae-
gonbace valley in maintaining contact with 9th US Infantry units.

Thereupon, on 8 October both Hills 666 and 636 were occupied by 38th's
2nd Battalion, while the Netherlands Battalion was holding Hill 600 the farther
north and was securing already the valley of Mundung-ni. The engineer elements
and other supporting arms helped the infantry units in exploitation of valleys
and contributed to the 38th Infantry's taking outpost Hills of 605 and 905 west
of Mundung-ni Valley. During the hill attacks the Netherlands Battalion command
post was moving immediately behind the rifle companies, nearer to the enemy
positions but within supporting distance of it, so as to command the battalion in
forward company localities with more active attitude causing enhancement of
the morale in all subordinate units.

The enemy mortar shelling hindered the friendly activity, however, giving
some casualties upon the Netherlands B Company and the battalion command
post.

On 11 October, meanwhile, the 38th's 2nd Battalion held the Hill 905
while the 1st Battalion captured Hill 900 the farther west. The Netherlands Bat-
talon was ordered to occupy the all ridges between Hills 605 and 905. It was
difficult for the battalion to occupy such a long line of ridges with only five
rifle platoons, and therefore it had to fill up the gap of 400-500 meters by means
of patrolling.

On 12 October a Netherlands patrol found an American soldier who was
wounded and left behind at the fighting of 10 October on Hill 905, rescued
him to be evacuated, and there found a considerable amount of enemy weapons
with ammunition which had been abandoned by the retreating enemy force.

As the 38th's 1st Battalion succeeded in attack of Hill 974 on 13 October,
the momentum of the hill attack by the regiment developed to northwest on
Hills 905—900—974, and the Netherlands Battalion commander, being ordered to
secure the Hill 905, assigned the tasks of defending Hill 905 to A Company and
Hill 900 to B Company respectively and at the same time set up his command
post inbetween the two hills.

On 14 Ocober the Netherlands Battalion advanced farther north and
occupied Hill 840 in relief of the elements of 9th US Infantry. The battalion
directed harassing fire of friendly artillery and other available supporting weapons
toward Ridges 1090 and 1220 some seven kilometers west of Mundung-ni.

On 15 October the battalion sent out each platoon sized combat patrol from
each rifle company, reinforced by a 57-mm recoilless rifle and with an extra
radio set for the patrol commander who was to maintain a close liaison with the
artillery fire. The A Company's patrol platoon encountered a band of the Red
Chinese at a valley site between Hill 1090 and Nae-ri, chased them and captured two of them in a hand to hand fight, then returned to Hill 840 at 1600 hours with none of casualty sustained. In the night one of two Netherlands ambushes engaged an enemy force, but failed to make a prisoner of war.

On 16 October a B Company patrol proceeding toward Hill 1090 with same tasks as A Company's to instantly inform the friendly artillery by radio of enemy location, discovered a cache of assorted ammunition and destroyed by informing of several other targets of opportunity for the artillery fire.

On the night of 16-17 October the well-trained ambushes from the Netherlands company encountered a Chinese Communist force of larger than a squad at a hill side near Nae-ri and repulsed him, who retreated leaving three bodies behind at the cost of a Dutchman wounded in action.

At 0700 hours on 17 October B Company dispatched a combat patrol to the west of Nae-ri. The patrol engaged with Chinese Communist force of some two Platoons, and inflicted on enemy the heavy casualties by directing artillery fire. The patrol found out and destroyed one enemy bunker, in which the bags of rice but enemy foodstuff had been stored.

On the night of 18 October ambushes from A Company engaged at 2050 hours but unfortunately the platoon commander in those ambushes was wounded in action.

On 23 October orders were received that the battalion was to become reserve as soon as relieved by a battalion of 31st Infantry, 7th US Division, and upon relief on 24 October it withdrew from Hill 840 out of line to Saegonbæe and arrived at 1900 by motor transport near Hwachon in IX US Corps area.

On 29 October, in reserve near Hwachon, the Netherlands Battalion was awarded of the US Presidential Unit Citation for the meritorious service of the Soyang River Battle in May.

On 7 November when the battalion was still in reserve, it saw change of its commander; Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Christan officially took over the command becoming new battalion commander, while the leaving commander Lieutenant Colonel Eekhout returned home on 18th leaving a great deal of merits and achievements performed by his old battalion.

On 20 and 27 November, the 4th replacements party of 66 men and the 5th, of 52 men had arrived and joined the battalion respectively.

During in reserve the Netherlands men had spent relatively the restless days but the continuously tensional period for alerts and maintaining security measures against the enemy guerilla activity, in which the band extended sometimes to the large scale as over 100 armed guerillas, generally appearing to be numerically increased since the close day of October.
On 26-27 October and 3, 12 and 21 November the battalion dispatched strong probing reconnaissance patrols to the area as far as Yuchon-ni 11 kilometers southeast of Hwachon. Nevertheless, its undergoing training and instructions were never stopped on the other hand. Particularly on 29 October, the battalion participated in the after-action conference under instructional aim held by the commanders of all 2nd US Division units for review of combat operations experienced by the division during the period of 25 July to 24 October.

Section 6. In the Northwest of Kumhwa
(25 October 1951 – 19 August 1952)

In this phase of operation the United Nations forces front positions had been characterized with being constructed in the double wire entanglements, along which complements with mine fields laid throughout the line. The sector of responsibility, however, was often widely assigned, and therefore preparation of the adequate emplacements of heavy weapons with their proper fire plans were particularly emphasized for the complements of any gap on the line. No matter how the operational sector should be assigned widely, each battalion would keep its own reserve unit of commonly one squad to platoon size together with the elements of a tank platoon.

The sector of responsibility held by 2nd US Division near Kumhwa in IX US Corps area was 22 kilometers wide in its frontage of generally complex bents of the ground and divided by Hantan-chon into two or more groups of hill mass most of which were dominated by the several commanding features. The 38th US Infantry took up the western portion of the division sector initially, where it was looking up north at the enemy-held critical terrains of Hill 689 (Turyu-bong), Hill 717 (Sobang-san) and the lake Poyang-ho, with the enemy main line of resistance set up apparently in 2.5 – 3 kilometers forward from the friendly positions.

On 13 December the division began to take over the line; on 16th by the 9th US Infantry, on 17th by the 23rd US Infantry, and on 19 December subsequently followed by the division artillery and the 38th US Infantry.

Thus, on 19 December the 38th relieved Turkish Brigade on positions, and the Netherlands relieved the 3rd Battalion of Turkish Brigade at 0300 on 20 December and occupied positions along line near Hajin-ni 12 kilometers west of Kumhwa.
Attacks on Hills North of Hajin-ni

In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Christian, the Netherlands Battalion Commander was planning the launching of a surprise attack against the Red Chinese who was then relatively in calm activity up on the front. Colonel Christian reached the final decision to attack the Manusama Hill, through the approval of division commander, as the objective of initial attack by one platoon from B Company. The Manusama Hill was situated in immediate right of Leuring-schans Hill and on immediate south of Bunker Hill and Silverstar Hill some three kilometers north of Hajin-ni. Two hills of the former were named both by their respective fighting platoon commanders’ names and these four hills, in addition to the mushroom shaped hill 1,000 meters north therefrom, were the scenes of
gallant actions fought by the Netherlands Battalion in late-December 1951 to early-January 1952.

On 21 December the platoon led by the lieutenant of B Company departed for its attack to the Manusama at 0830, advanced in one column with the mine detecting elements moving as leading, and crept within 30 - 40 meters to the objective, hurling innumerable grenades on to the Red Chinese on the crest. At the same time, the supporting machine-guns opened fire simultaneously. The platoon commander radioed calling for the 75-mm recoilless rifle fire, which proved well-hits on the enemy targets particularly in the elimination of enemy hilltop bunkers. The battalion commander was watching carefully at the observation post on Hill 522 and ordered the platoon by radio to slow down its attack while the neutralization fire of supporting artillery and mortars were directed on the enemy hilltop positions. The lieutenant radioed now asking the battalion to shift the supporting 75-mm recoilless rifle fire to 81-mm mortars, the shells of which were soon landed on the targets very accurately.

The bombardment of mortars continued until the firing range was lifted over by signal exploding the red and blue smoke grenades on the line of assaulting platoon, two rifle squads of which rushed up on the objective while the other rifle and support squads provided covering fire. The platoon, thus occupied the crest of Manusama Hill without undue resistance at 1130 hours. The enemy retreated with his numerous bodies left behind. Only one Dutch man was wounded in action by enemy light mortar shell during the search of enemy trenches immediately after capture of the crest.

On 22 December the battalion in attempt of capturing an enemy prisoner of war, made the second attack; the commanding officer at the battalion observation post designated Silverstar Hill as the object hill in subsequent attack by a newly selected platoon from now A Company. The platoon had its attached mortars, 57-mm recoilless rifles and tanks. The maneuver of infantry-tanks teamwork, however, was inadequate in this attack due to the slippery and rugged winter road conditions in this locality. The attacks in each squad were repeated several times, despite the fierce enemy concentration fire was directed on.

At 1045 hours one rifle squad led by the platoon leader made the third attempt to the successful attack on the objective hill and found four enemy bodies and weapons in the underground bunkers. And by throwing grenades in the cave the Netherlands men captured two Red Chinese prisoners of war alive. Although the platoon well-accomplished the mission, it continued the search of enemy positions and subsequently attacked on orders the other hills such as Leuringschans and the Bunker Hill. During the continuous attacks the portable 105 pounds weighed 57-mm recoilless rifle was frequently used in firing the
smoke shells as the means of pointing out targets of opportunity for the other supporting weapons.

At 1300 hours the attack platoon being exhausted and out of the ammunitions asked the battalion for the permission on withdrawal of the platoon. Thereupon, the battalion commander ordered the platoon to withdraw under cover of the smoke-screen. As the actual withdrawal did not match with the smoke-screening on Silverstar Hill, however, the enemy noticed the pulling back of the platoon and poured his mortar shells on the withdrawing unit, inflicting on it several casualties. The platoon passed by the supporting tanks at 1330 and returned to the friendly positions.

There, the division commander was waiting for the Netherlands attackers, whom he awarded on the spot five Silver Stars and four Bronze Star medals, one of which was belonged to a ROK soldier. The Netherlands Battalion's outstanding merits of war achieved in the hill attacks north of Hajin-ni, particularly with two Red Chinese prisoners of war captured alive, was recorded as an outstanding accomplishment of mission among the 2nd US Division units. It contributed to its own honors but also to the everlasting glory of the US Indianhead Division. In this action the Netherlands Battalion had suffered one KIA, one MIA and 11 WIs.

On 23 December the 2nd US Division ordered all units under its command to confine their patrolling activity to only the probing purpose and self-defense activities, and to avoid heavy fighting except when necessary.

The war was now semi-static, and more elaborate protection was possible as the troops remained in the same localities for a considerable time. The infantry battalion in the forward areas lived in slit trenches, bunkers and dug-outs, with overhead cover constructed of timber, sand bags and sometimes tent fabric.

During the Christmas period on 24 December the Netherlands ambushes were laid in white clothes, as it had much snowed, for six hours shift in the bitter cold weather down to 20 degrees below zero, but not encountered with the enemy.

On 29 December the Netherlands platoon attacked also Hill 412 in the immediate south of Leuringschans Hill, and destroyed out seven bunkers. The platoon encountered with 60 rounds enemy shellings of light mortars in the attack without suffering casualty.

As the Netherlands units carried out their continuous patrolling tasks, a considerable number of valuable informations and materials as to probable routes of enemy approach, locations of attack positions or supporting units had been obtained. The Netherlands Battalion through such active manners for the collection of informations became familiarized itself with enemy situations as well
as terrain conditions in the forward area.

With that reason, the battalion was able to respond without hesitation when it received an attack order of the 2nd US Division on 2 January 1952, for the task this time to capture enemy prisoners of war. The battalion commanding officer in order to carry out the task with minimum casualty which it might sustain had planned to attempt a surprise attack by night raid, determining its objective again on the Manusama Hill.

The attack in a platoon size which had started at 0200 on 3 January, however failed as the enemy on the hill had not only defended stubbornly unexpectedly but the Netherlands men encountered the extreme hardship of climbing up the precipitous routes in the dark and bitter cold in temperature of 15 degrees below zero. The attacking platoon eventually withdrew on order to the line.

The battalion commander, who decided a renewal of the attack on the following day, 4 January, reviewed in the morning of 3 January the previous day’s attack and arrived his conclusion to make attack in employment of a 9-man specific attackers comprising one officer as leader and other brave and the most resourceful men selected. The men were to move along the comparatively less steep terrain on western side as avenue of attack, rather than employment of large troops more than two squads to maneuver and occupy the crest, along such narrow and steep paths particularly in the adverse visual conditions of the dark.

A three-man team from the 9-man attack squad was prearranged to make assault chiefly by hurling grenades. The two other squads of the platoon behind were to provide supports with light machine-guns, also the radio operators and with an observer from supporting mortars.

In the afternoon of 3 January, the battalion had a rehearsal of the attack platoon which was performed by preplanned methods of attack on the similar terrain feature nearby the battalion positions with the assumed objective for the actual attack on 4 January. At 0330 on 4 January the attack elements departed, in dark and cold as much as the previous day’s action, and at 0450 hours reached the saddle underneath a cliff, where the covering squads were left behind for taking positions, except the mortar forward observer who desired to follow the main attack. The nine-man attackers in combat formation advanced forward under the command of the lieutenant, but a few minutes later a rain of enemy grenades fell on the attackers, who instantly sheltered under the concealment; this was the indication that the enemy had already disclosed the approach of the attackers. The commanding officer with his S-3 staff at the forward observation post on Hill 522, having quickly noticed this serious situation, directed both 105-mm artillery and 4.2-inch heavy mortars to block the enemy interruption
fire, and on the other hand ordered to deliver neutralization fire on to the Bunker Hill, Mushroom Hill and the Silverstar Hill. At 0505 hours the attackers rushed up, alternating covering and hurling grenades, and finally occupied the hilltop. The result was however unsuccessful in capturing the prisoner of war because of all the enemy retreated leaving some of his bodies.

At 0610 hours the daytime attack subsequent to the night attack, as preplanned, took place. Both attack and support squads arrived at the saddle where the attack was to launch under covering fire of the 57-mm recoilless rifle placed on immediate east of Hill 412. The battalion commander had managed to reopen neutralization fire of artillery and heavy mortars. Thereupon, the attack elements advanced into the enemy line of resistance, followed in the distance of 30 meters by the flame thrower and destruction group. The attackers closed upon the front-most enemy bunker on the Leuringschans Hill, as it was proved evidently none of enemy was inside. Coincidently, however, enemy small arms fire and machine gun fire from the western direction some 40 meters forward had opened and poured on the attackers, ensued by burst of enemy grenades, in which the further advance was impossible. A flame thrower from support group was then immediately ordered to rush, and concentrated the flame-ray to the targets. The attackers assaulted simultaneously and jumped into the bunker and trenches.

Only six bodies of the enemy dead were left there and the rest of the enemy force had again retreated. The hunters proceeded to the next objective on Silverstar Hill, searching all trenches for the Red Chinese, and consequently captured one wounded prisoner of war who was evacuated together with a friendly wounded man.

The wounded prisoner eventually contributed very valuable informations on enemy forces. As the result of the search, besides, various sorts of weapons, some 100 live grenade shells and 21 Red Chinese deads were found. At 1100 hours all attackers returned to the line. During the operation the Netherlands Battalion sustained one killed and eight wounded in action.

On 9 January, meanwhile, the battalion was ordered to retire from the line in Hajin-ni area and became the regimental reserve at Sindae-dong some six kilometers south from Hajin-ni, where it had the Exercise Pelican 2 on 17 January and daily patrolling activity.

While in reserve, some non-commissioned officers underwent a training course in the 2nd US Division, and one officer from each company had to attend a refresher training course.

On 21 January the battalion was alerted to move in a couple days to the line again in the vicinity of Hajin-ni – Sagimak valley. It was cold with temperature
of 20 degrees below zero. In this locality, the firing of recoilless rifles in coordination with artillery and tanks could destroy a number of enemy bunkers. The recoilless rifle crews took up their customary alternate positions on the ridge line while they also made a particular effort to lay down the mine on the other hand.

On the night of 4-5 February the Netherlands Battalion, however, had to retire from the line again arriving at Sindae-dong the reserve area six hours later, because the personnel of its first replacements party would pass a fixed term of service in Korea and therefore arrangements were to be made for their return home.

The Battle of Star Hills

The attack on Star Hills by the Netherlands Battalion had been upheld as the example of all the Eighth US Army's subordinate units in carrying out the small units tactics. The attack had its original purpose to identify the enemy forces defending on Sobang-san the dominating feature in front of 2nd US Division sector and to capture the prisoner of war when practicable.

On 18 February, the Netherlands B Company launched the attack at 0645 hours with two platoons advancing abreast and one in reserve. The advance was made toward northeast through the valley west of Mirok-tong, with the objectives determined as Star Hill for the right platoon and as Star Hill (N) for the left platoon respectively.

The two platoons of the supporting tank company was to direct their concentrated fire on Hill 478 (Henry Hill) from To-dong, while the remainders were supporting near at Mirok-tong and near at Sagimak. The attack platoons were to continue on orders to attack the Star Hill (NN) after they captured the respective objective. The support platoon of B Company departed the line at 0500 hours carrying three 60-mm mortars with them and took up a position where it could cover the attack platoons. The battalion Support Company reinforced with six 60-mm mortars from companies other than the attack company, provided with direct fire supports at Hill 381 for the attack company.

At 0645 - 0655 hours the artillery, mortars and recoilless rifles fired a volley, which was followed by the harassing fire with mortars and tank guns on Bunker Hill. Star Hills, Henry Hill (Hill 478) and Hill 472 from 0654 hours. From 0655 hours a smoke screen was created throughout the slope of the objective hill. The artillery firing had continued upon the known enemy mortar positions. Six artillery observers had performed their fire support missions for their re-
spective areas as divided into six responsible sectors.

On the other hand, on 17 February four UN aircraft at the request of 2nd US Division, bombed the enemy areas with four high explosives, four napalms and 16 rockets, destroying five enemy bunkers. Some Red Chinese thus in retreat came into the hands of American troops and became prisoners of war.

By 0700 hours of 18 February the attack platoon on the right was able to capture the objective without undue difficulty. The assaulting of the attack platoon on left, however, was halted by the enemy's stiff resistance on Star Hill (N) on which recoilless rifle fire as well as the bombardment of heavy mortars on Star Hill (NN) at the same time, were directed as planned by the battalion commander. In order to recover the frustrated attack the commander had attempted the commitment of the reserve unit for the final capture of the left platoon's objective at the one hand, and on the other hand directed the attack of Star Hill (N) to be continued, ordering the company commander to attack with a platoon from south toward north passing through the Star Hill under the cover of right platoon. At 0722 thus the Star Hill (N) also fell to the attack platoons. (See Situation Map 15.)

Throughout the action the enemy losses were estimated over 200 in casualties, with some 60-mm mortars, pistols and lots of communists propaganda materials captured.

The EUSAK had set this battle to be an exemplary action for all army units under its command.

During the action ammunitions were spent as much as the cost of a million dollars. The Netherlands B Company in the attack had suffered five KIAs and 29 WIAs, and this figure included KATUSAs of one KIA and one WIA.

The particular reason that the most of WIAs were lightly wounded was arisen from wearing the bullet-proof vests which were issued to all attackers.

The battalion had continued fighting in the area northwest of Kumhwa until the orders were received on 14 April to retire from the line to the reserve area at Sindae-dong to get ready for moves to Koje-do island, with specific mission for the security of the prisoners of war camp.

On 17-18 April the battalion had embarked on LST arriving at Inchon on 14th and then by train at Yonchon. Thus the battalion was in reserve at Yonchon from 16 July to 19 August.

On 14 August the Netherlands Battalion had participated in Operation Sweep Up and captured some 50 enemy guerrillas.

On 20 August, meantime, the 38th Infantry happened to relieve the 23rd Infantry in the line, and as of the same date the Netherlands Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Christian was officially succeeded by newly
assigned commander Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Schilperoord. Colonel Christian had accomplished his duty in outstanding manner from 7 November 1951 to 20 August 1952.

Section 7. In the North of Yonchon
(20 August 1952 – 12 January 1953)

Between Old Baldy and Arsenal

The positions which the battalion took over from the 2nd Battalion of 23rd Infantry was a series of low hill mass laid between the famous outposts Old Baldy and Arsenal where it fought fiercely during the period from 20 August to 5 September, and this locality seemed to be much bombarded out of the directions of Hasa-kol and Hill 265.

Colonel Schilperoord, after his reconnaissance, had decided to renew the fortification of his battalion positions, and the works started immediately. Nonetheless, heavy monsoon rain hindered the troops from digging-in works considerably; on 24 August a road bridge a kilometer north from the command post was washed out and the transport of fortification materials became the hard problem. Two more days the rain poured and the whole battalion sector had a great confusion by the flood with the several bridges disappeared.

The battalion usually had sent a 20 to 25-man patrol and a ambush patrol once a day at least into deep the enemy area, in an attempt of capturing Red Chinese prisoner of war.

On 5 September, meantime, the battalion was ordered to be relieved by 1st Battalion of the 38th US Infantry. During the period one Netherlands man had been killed in action by mis-stepping anti-personnel mines.

On and East of Arsenal

From 18 September the Netherlands Battalion held the outpost Arsenal manned by two platoons reinforced with each heavy machine gun, and Eerie where two 81-mm mortars were placed in direct support of the area. To defend the Arsenal–Eerie from the launching of enemy infiltration, all the Netherlands’ available weapons fire was preplanned to be opened simultaneously and the
Communicated trenches are well-dug throughout the Outpost Arsenal.

reserve platoon with the powerful 90-mm guns of supporting tanks could repel the enemy attackers.

Of new positions Yoke and Uncle were situated relatively in forward and low locality with some difficulty in the fire support coordinations. Both outposts had frequently been attacked by enemy, and had further difficulty in transport of supplies, rations or in evacuation of battle casualties.

The Netherlands men had sent more ambushes; they had dug in the bunkers newly on Arsenal and Eerie; they had dug in more and deeper their 800-meter long communication trenches prepared between the Arsenal and Eerie. The night patrols were sent out comparatively in more large scale, as far as to Dora and Yokkok-chon.

The Netherlands ambushes were well camouflaged and armed with the automatic rifles and grenades. The probing patrols had included two or three
snipers and they worked out sometimes for 24 hours. The men had to sleep in
daytime to work in the night for the night patrolling, ambushes, fortification
and for any other activity free from their exposure to the enemy.

On the night of 18 September the Netherlands Battalion took over the sector
including Arsenal – Eerie positions. It first experienced on the night, however,
an enemy attack of some 100 strength launched on Old Baldy (Hill 275) and
Porkchop (Hill 234) five and three kilometers southwest from the Arsenal, in
the 38th’s 1st Battalion sector on the left. During the subsequent 48 hours the
Netherlands Battalion had supported the counterattack of the adjacent 1st Bat-
talion by deception fire of all available weapons directed on enemy bunkers
and his weapon emplacements in the T-Bone hills. The result was that the 1st
Battalion successfully recaptured the objective outposts.

Meanwhile, Colonel C. M. Schilperoord who saw that the capturing prisoner
of war by means of patrolling activities was less effective, had reached the decision,
instead of patrolling, to make an attack on Hill 200 in the front of Arsenal.
The attack force was to comprise an attack group of a 10-man patrol team armed
with carbines and browning automatic rifles only, with a radio operator and two
medics under one officer all from C Company, which was to make surprise attack
from west of Hill 200 and a deception group of two 5-man patrol teams led by
one officer with one radio operator all from B Company, which was to make
a diversionary attack from the eastern direction of Hill 200.

At 2030 hours on 29 September the attack was launched and during the
action a thorough fire discipline was enforced to obtain the effect of surprise.
The attack group advanced under covering smoke of white phosphorous shells,
passing through the hill foot and searching all bunkers one by one, and reached
Yoke in the right of the battalion sector at 2125 hours, where it met the deception
group which arrived there ten minutes later. The result was, however, unsuccessful.
Due to an accidental happening of one browning automatic rifleman of the
deception group who was missing in action, a search was carried out for the man
but in vain.

After two days Red Chinese attack was launched again on the right of the
2nd US Division sector on the Arrowhead (Hill 281) this time, but was repulsed
soon by the friendly coordinated fire.

On 19 October after dusk the listening post from C Company set up between
Arsenal and Hill 200 had warned of unusual enemy movement in the front, and
at 2200 hours reported an approach of some 200 Red Chinese coming down
from north. The company commander ordered it to withdraw, warned all
platoons, artillery, heavy mortars and even the searchlights. Thus the timely
orders for opening firing and searchlights on the climbing-up wave of Reds had
led the enemy to a complete surprise and confusion and eventually resulted in his retreat. (See Sketch Map 6.)

On the night of 22-23 October, meantime, the relief of the 38th US Infantry by 9th US Infantry began. The Netherlands Battalion, however, was to remain in the front line two more days, as it was due to be shown in the line for the distinguished visitor from the Netherlands Government, the State Secretary of War F. J. Kranenburg. The Outposts Yoke, Uncle, Arsenal and Eerie had eventually been taken over by the 9th's 1st Battalion between 0600 and 0845 hours on 24 October.

In the meantime, the Netherlands 12th and 13th replacements parties had newly arrived in the Korean front and joined the battalion on 24 November, while the 6th party was leaving the battle theater for its triumphal return home.
on the same day.

At 1800 through 2045 hours on 25 November the Netherlands relieved the 23rd’s 1st Battalion on the right of the Arsenal—Yoke line. The terrain features on the new positions were characterized with those wide valley zone, the right portion of the battalion sector was completely exposed to the enemy on T-Bone, and particularly delivery of the supplies to the isolated A Company positions became a considerable problem. In this locality digging in, wiring and particularly the mining had been checked to be augmented, and the daily routine patrolling actively was controlled and inspected prior to its departure chiefly by the battalion S-3, despite the patrols had had no contact with enemy from 25 November to 7 December except a small-scale enemy infiltration into Rita, which was repulsed by friendly artillery.

On 8 December the 2nd US Division sector was adjusted by moving a little westward. The battalion thereupon transferred the A Company positions of Hill 324 on the right and the Nicky and Dick to 38th’s 2nd Battalion, while it took over its old positions of Yoke, Uncle and Hill 418 from 38th’s 1st Battalion.

On 17 December enemy shelling much increased onward the 38th’s sector, particularly a considerable threatening was made to the Netherlands’ Yoke by the enemy infiltrators. At 1600 hours all of a sudden four enemy tanks, appeared and fired on the positions, one of which was instantly destroyed by fire of a Netherlands’ 75-mm recoilless rifles in 5,400 meters firing range, and the rest of tanks retreated away.

At 2325 hours on 23 December, meantime, the Netherlands observation post near A Company caught up with 20 CCF at first, then over 200 Red Chinese coming down to Arsenal in the 1st Battalion sector on the left, launching the attack preceding nothing of shelling peculiar to their offensive operations. Five minutes later the fighting ensued, and became quiet at 0410 hours after the 1st Battalion repulsed them. The regimental after-action report revealed that the enemy shelling from 2345 hours had been counted with 1,500 rounds on the 38th’s sector, of which 940 rounds on the Netherlands positions, particularly on Yoke and Uncle.

On 26 December, meantime, the Netherlands Battalion began to be relieved in the line around Yoke—Uncle by the 31st’s 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Division, and on 28 December finally C Company was retired. In the afternoon, the battalion thus retired to the reserve area at Kososong-ni seven kilometers due east of Chongong-ni.
Section 8. In the Western Front near Sami-chon  
(13 January – 7 April 1953)

Defense in Nudae Area

By 13 January 1953 the Netherlands Battalion with the 38th US Infantry had remained at Kososong-ni immediately above the 38th Parallel as the 7th US Division reserve, where it had the training of counterattacks for the frontal area to be practicable upon the enemy penetration.

On 13-14 January the battalion moved to Soyo-dong four kilometers north of Tongduchon, where it was reverted to the control of 2nd US Division, and had its training continued.

By first light on 28 January, the battalion moved northwest to the east of Sami-chon and relieved the 1st Battalion of the Canadian Royal 22nd Regiment. The position which the Netherlands Battalion took over had been characterized generally with the low but relatively rugged hill mass on plain ground along the eastern bank of Sami-chon.

On the night of 6-7 February a small scale attack by a patrol from B Company, took place. The attack echelon moved across the river to the enemy area while the support echelon provided the covering fire. Ten minutes later the fierce fire fight by both opponents started and the patrol withdrew at 0210 hours with the casualty of four wounded in action.

The weather conditions became warmer and it began to thaw, and the fog sometimes caused the hardship in the operation particularly for the employment of tanks. Nevertheless, the Red’s artillery fire remarkably increased and his making infiltration efforts on the UN forces positions had become more active.

From 21 February the enemy attacks on the Netherlands positions had seemed to be materialized. Particularly, the Chinese Communist forces identified as the elements of 417th Regiment of 139th CCF Division and 418th Regiment of 140th CCF Division in the front of the Netherlands Battalion sector had attacked the area of Nudae in A Company positions four times during the month of March 1953, which each time repulsed by the gallant stand of the Netherlands Battalion. The first enemy attack on Nudae was made on the night of 15-16 March by some 50 Red Chinese.
A look of Nudae position from the Netherlands A Company OP.

These Reds, however, encountered with the liaison patrol operating between the Netherlands ambush posts of Rita, Bernhard and Amsterdam being set up in the front of A Company sector, and were dispersed by concentrated fire after being surprised at the illumination grenades thrown by a sergeant from the post Rita.

On the night of 16-17 March, when the Red's second attack was launched on the Netherlands right flank, the prompt action by the patrol ambushes who called for the artillery fire as well as flares had been eventually resulted in the dislodge of some tens of enemy attackers.

On the following day the Reds attempted third attack. A Company commander immediately asked for the artillery fire and flares. The battalion commander ordered the reserve platoon to be ready for counterattack, receiving the spot report that the posts Bernhard and Rita were already overrun by some hundreds Chinese Communists. Shortly after the hand to hand fighting ensued
at 0300 hours the enemy had retreated.

The action was successful owing to the timely employment of the reserve unit and particularly to the post Amsterdam's epic stand to the last. (See Situation Map 16.)

Meantime, for the purpose of preventing the further enemy attack the battalion had started overall repairing, wiring and mining in augmentation, strengthening more those ambush posts of Amsterdam, Bernhard and Rita, with each strength increased to 20-40 men.

On 21, 23 and 24 March the enemy in attempt of interrupting such activities of the UN forces had fired the daily 123, 183 and 194 rounds of artillery shells respectively for the three-day's period on the Netherlands position around Nudae. As the enemy regards on the Nudae area thus increased, an enemy attack was impending.

On the night of 27-28 March the fourth enemy attack on the Nudae positions had come true. In seven minutes the enemy shelled 104 rounds both on A and B Companies positions and the telephone lines between companies were cut off. The men of ambush post Bernhard had eyewitnessed some 50 Red Chinese, approaching in three columns each three to five meters apart, as soon as the shelling had paused.

The Netherlands troops waited without shooting until the enemy had approached within the distance of 20-25 meters. They were ordered to open firing simultaneously exactly at 2215 hours and thus firing discipline was strictly obeyed. The friendly artillery fire was directed on the enemy troops steadily in the order from the left to right flank, and soon the infantry had a hand to hand fight in throwing grenades. It saw the results of a dislodge on the most of infiltraters except only one came inside the wire entanglement. Besides, some 300 enemy reserve strength in subsequent wave was estimated to be killed by the artillery fire.

On 29-30 March approximately 200 Red Chinese had invaded again in the forward area through the boundary between A and B Companies, but were repulsed by opening fires of artillery and all supporting weapons in possession of the battalion.

On 3 April 1953 in the meantime, orders were received that the 2nd US Division sector was to be relieved by the 1st Commonwealth Division between 7 and 9 April, and to move to a camp in the reserve area 10 kilometers north of Uijongbu as I US Corps reserve. The relief for the 38th Infantry and the Netherlands took place in the midst of enemy interdiction fire continued for five hours, but caused no casualty.
Section 9. The Last Round Action
(8 April – 27 July 1953)

Again at North of Haji-ni

On 21-23 April the 2nd US Division was happened to move up on the road between Uijongbu and Chorwon to reach about the point where it crossed the 38th Parallel near the Line Kansas. The Netherlands Battalion, becoming regiment reserve, had a field training as similarly as the real fighting until 2 May.

On 3 May the Netherlands Battalion had established the Juliana Camp near Yami-ri a kilometer north of 38th Parallel. Its 18th replacement party which newly arrived, had joined the battalion on this date.

The 5th May was the happiest day for the battalion. It had celebrated the Queen Juliana's happy birth day, which was actually April 30th but the celebration ceremony was postponed because it was under the field training on Line Kansas that day despite it was big holiday.

During the remainder of the month, everywhere the 2nd US Division units had moved, their undergoing hard training in the field had continued.

From 17 to 21 June the division units including the Netherlands Battalion had a field exercise of the counteroffensive actions at the area south of Chorwon-Kumhwa line.

On 6-12 July, meantime, in order to relieve the 3rd US Division units in the front the reconnaissance tour by all unit commanders of the 2nd US Division was carried out. The Netherlands Battalion was placed into regiment reserve by the 38th US Infantry.

The regiment operation order was issued at 2200 of 12 July, and the Netherlands Battalion's relief took place at 0300 of 14 July despite the heavy rainfall, taking over the regiment reserve positions around Haji-ni, its old positions in the northwest of Kumhwa.

The enemy force with his main line of resistance established on the basis of Hill 528, had attempted at considerable cost to stretch down to near the valley area, but after serveral struggles made by both opponents he had failed in dominating the Chungmoksiil–Moksi-lili Valley, and eventually the salient with the dominating Hill 340 was set down to the hands of UN forces.

On 15 July the battalion as the reserve unit received twice the warning
orders to prepare for the commitment of counterattack against enemy penetration in forward locality. However, it had generally performed the tasks of filling in for gaps with either the strength or weapons throughout the regiment sector, besides the counterattack mission.

On 17 July the frontal situation became precarious, as the enemy indications for the attack on 38th’s positions had much increased; at 1900 enemy mortaring began with the shelling of his artillery fire.

Half an hour later a company strength of enemy force had attacked on 38th’s G Company position, accompanied by heavy artillery fire. The attack, however, was smothered with the friendly fires. Two hours later a battalion strength enemy attacked on 38th’s 3rd Battalion sector on the right, seeming likely having set his objective with Hill 340. Two platoons from the Netherlands C Company were ordered for commitment into reinforcement role on Hill 340, but the enemy already retreated when the troops reached the hill. The Netherlands platoons made a pursuit to the frontal area of Hill 340, in search of enemy but saw 19 bodies left behind unlike his custom. In this defensive operation some 100 casualties inflicted upon enemy were confirmed.

On the following day, at 0230 hours the several Red Chinese came again on the probing but were repulsed at once. At dawn a sergeant with ROK soldiers searched the area and captured a slightly wounded Chinese as prisoner of war.

On 20 July the armistice seemed likely to be close, as the news was heard that determination of the existing line on both opponents was initiated. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Battalion had to be engaged with another fighting to the last moment.

On 25 July the battalion patrolling platoon reinforced, comprising 12 patrols led by a lieutenant accompanied by an American artillery observer, was sent out. The patrol had to make the spot reports with radio as to the enemy locations to its headquarters upon arrival at the control points A and B respectively.

At 0035 hours on 26 July the spot report from B Company positions hastily warned the approach of five Red Chinese who ran north by small arms fire. The battalion patrol at the control point C had understood this, in the midst of hard rain and the dark.

The Battalion S-3 in control of the patrol also acknowledged this. All of a sudden in the moment, a shooting was heard from near the point C. The Battalion S-3 having confirmed an enemy surprise, called for artillery fire support and the patrol’s support group awaiting orders by Hill 340 was moved out immediately at the same time.
The patrols were heavily surprised by enemy ambushes at the foot of Hill 528, and suffered heavy casualties, despite one of machine gunners fired his LMG on the Reds for three to four minutes till became quiet. Two Netherlands men were taken prisoners of war by enemy ambushes in this action, and later in August after the armistice was signed on 27 July they were repatriated through the UN forces’ Operation Switch.

After the Armistice

On 28 July 1953 when the ROK and UN forces began to take up the post armistice main battle position (PAMBP), the Netherlands Battalion together with the 38th US Infantry occupied the hill complex by the corridor junction to Chorwon and Chipo-ri led from Kumhwa, and the battalion held the positions a corner of the important strategic keypoint around Hill 331 at Hato-dong some two kilometers southeast of its old positions at Hajin-ri. (See Sketch Map 7.)

On 3 August, meantime, Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Schilperoord, the
Battalion Commander was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel C. Knulst.

For the three days subsequent to its occupation on the PAMB, the mines removal operation in the area took place, with the regretful happening of two Dutch men wounded during the fatigue.

On 12 September the Netherlands sector was widen in its positions on the left, to be occupied by one platoon strength.

Afterwards, frequent adjustments of the battalion sector and reliefs were made within the battalion and the 38th US Regiment units. The battalion established its rest area at Chipo-ri, in 13 kilometers south and the "rear" in Yongdungpo.

On 1 October the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation was awarded to the Netherlands Battalion for its noble and the everlasting meritorious achievements erected during the Korean War participation ever since 23 November 1950 up to date, particularly authorizing all participants to wear the citation ribbon. The awarding ceremony was held very impressively in the presence of all high ranking officers from both ROK and UN forces. Many other specific activities were carried out such as the parade after a brief ceremony in which the Netherlands Queen's letter of encouragement for all officers and men of the battalion was read; on 26 November a special activity commemorating its third year of the battalion's arrival for participation in the Korean War was held.

On 6 October the battalion frontage was further enlarged along Hantan-chon to the left side, where the C Company was thereupon readjusted to hold the additional positions.

During occupation in the post armistice positions the battalion had operated five listening posts outside its positions three alongside the southern bank of Hantan-chon and the other two on bridge sites across the Namdae-chon.

On 8 July 1954, Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel C. Knulst was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel J. Raaymakers who took over the command and served until the battalion's final return home on 15 December 1954.

On or about 23 August the Netherlands Government had a resolution passed at the cabinet council on withdrawal of the battalion from Korea at the earliest practicable time. The battalion's intimate friends in arms, the KATUSA personnel had left the battalion for return to their parent units in August.

On 17 October the battalion had its farewell visit to the UN cemetery at Tanggok in Pusan for blessing all the fallen comrades in arms. There, a Netherlands soldier had put a handful of Korean soil into his empty carbine magazine and carried it with him to his homeland. The soil is still now being politely kept under monument erected at Oirschot in memory of the Netherlands Battalion of the United Nations forces in the Korean War.
On 15 December 1954—when the battalion had returned home in triumph, Colonel J. Raaymakers after being welcomed had presented to the commander of his Van Heutsz Regiment, the banner on which three ribbons were attached as token of the battalion's meritorious services distinguished itself in the Korean War.

Section 10. Postlude

Retrospect

Ever since their arrival in Korea on 23 November 1950, the officers and men of the Netherlands Battalion had fought, as a part of the United Nations forces, under operational attachment primarily to the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd US Division.

The glorious combat deeds which the battalion had achieved during the war had been upheld highly among all the participants of the UN forces in the Korean War. Particularly their intimate comradeship and mutual cooperation with the 38th Infantry “Rock of the Marne” Regiment of the US Indianhead Division had led to establishment of the battalion's brilliant fighting records and the war history, as proved by being awarded of the following battle unit citations and various war medals and decorations:

(1) Unit Citations and Medals:

(a) The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation (for November 1950-8 April 1953, authorized by the Republic of Korea General Order No. 271 dated 2 September 1953.)

(b) The United States Presidential Unit Citation (particularly for Hoengsong-Wonju actions, 12-15 February 1951.)

(c) The United States Presidential Unit Citation (for Soyang River Battle, 16-22 May 1951.)

(d) The Korean War Medal (The Republic of Korea)

(e) The United Nations Service Medal (The United Nations)

(2) The Individual Awards:

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<th>(EM)</th>
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3 3
Infantry Battalion

Chungmu, Gold Star .................. 6
Chungmu, Silver Star ................ 12
Hwarang, Gold Star .................. 7
Hwarang, Silver Star ................ 4  6  5  15
(b) By the United States of America:
   Silver Star .......................... 8  3  3  14
   Legion of Merit, Degree of
   Legionnaire .......................... 4  -  -  4
   Bronze Star .......................... 9  33  20  62

Combat duty in Korea for the Netherlands Battalion began soon after completion of the familiarization training course given at the United Nations Reception Center in Taegu, when it received an order to move out to Suwon on 2 December 1950.

Initially, the battalion was ordered to carry out the missions of such minor actions as routine patrolling activity around the town, and then as it subsequently moved to Chungju area its primary mission was to protect the supply routes in the area against the Communist guerrillas.

Fighting alongside the US regiment the members of the Netherlands Battalion won great respect every time they entered the combat operation.

Individual and unit training were also carried on always in the reserve area and in making use of any available time; schedules set up by the units included squad, platoon and company tactics, bunker construction, map and compass reading, demolitions, live firing and cold weather indoctrination.

The Netherlands Battalion firstly engaged with the enemy at Chohyon-ni on the close day of December 1950. The enemy in this locality apparently had attempted to set up his outpost positions to support the preplanned attack by the massive Red Chinese onward Wonju—Hoengsong route.

In this stage of operation the friendly Operation Roundup, general advance by the X US Corps took place in central front to push up from Wonju—Hoengsong axis, while the CCF offensive was launched through their Hongchon—Hoengsong axis. The Netherlands Battalion was ordered to secure Hoengsong, but heavily engaged along its blocking positions northern outskirts of the town.

The friendly troops fought desperately in this area against a violent offensive by the large forces of the 40th and 66th CCF Armies and one North Korean Communist corps. Particularly, the Netherlands Battalion stood in the front-most blocking mission in holding the town of Hoengsong and made a gallant stand until it fought in hand to hand actions and finally ordered to withdraw to the vicinity of Wonju. Despite the units of the battalion were overrun by the
enemy forces, the battalion consolidated itself to an orderly withdrawal and still yet withstood to the last conducting the delaying actions and carrying out covering efforts for withdrawals of the friendly units.

On 14 February Hill 325 - a key-point of the positions north of Wonju was recaptured by the Netherlands company troops. For the achievements on 12 and 14 February 1951 the battalion received the American Presidential Unit Citation on Hoengsong–Wonju battle deeds.

In April 1951 advance toward and defense of the south bank of the Hwa-chon Reservoir, took place and followed by a withdrawal in the direction of Hongchon while carrying on delaying actions, because of the first Chinese Communist spring offensive. The battalion, which was once reported as missing while in its withdrawal, had a continuous move starving for more than 24 hours and came straight back across the mountainous areas.

On 15-22 May, it participated in repelling the CCF second spring offensive, northeast of Hongchon. The battalion distinguished itself against hordes of enemy by holding its ground near the Soyang River and the battalion kept busy days in the area north of Hongchon moving continuously from a place to another until its leading elements reached finally the outskirts of Inje on 29 May, after they advanced along the Hyon-ni–Inje axis across the 38th Parallel for the third time since they joined such frequent movements.

On 23-31 May the Netherlands Battalion together with the 38th US Infantry Regiment had expelled several times the enemy forces out of the supply route leading to Inje.

On 31 May-3 June the battalion repelled three times Red Chinese attacks attempted in the night on the battalion positions around Inje.

On 23 October the battalion moved into a reserve role in the area of the Hwachon Reservoir. First attention was turned to improving the area as a blocking position for the central front. Bunkers, fields of fire and final protective lines were of primary consideration.

On 29 October for these combat activities the battalion again received the US Presidential Unit Citation for Soyang River Battle in May.

On 20 December, meanwhile, the Netherlands Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion of Turkish Brigade and occupied positions along line near Hajin-ni northwest of Kumhwa. Enemy outposts included the nearby hills known as Star Hills, Manusama Hill and others. His main line of resistance was on the higher ground to the north, around the Hill 717 (Sobang-san) complex.

The outstandingly successful attacks were carried out onto Manusama Hill on 4 January 1952 and Star Hills on 18 February respectively in this area by the Netherlands Battalion. The aggressive attackers pushed the Red Chinese off the
outposts, destroyed the fortifications there and killed or wounded several tens of enemy before returning to the lines, particularly over 200 enemy casualties were reported as the result of attack by the Netherlands B Company onto the Star Hill. The attack on Star Hill was preceded by a day of deadly airstrikes on 17 February and was closely supported by artillery and heavy weapons. The attacking company, moving up the hills at a run, forced off the defenders, destroyed positions and returned to friendly lines. Meanwhile fire fights and supporting fires ensued the Netherlands attackers rushed on enemy-held hills around the Star Hill.

Some more attacks in March were carried out against the hills in the area north of Hajin-ni. These were less spectacles than the Star Hill operation but also caused damage to the enemy outpost line.

On 16 April it came into a change of scene. The entire 38th Infantry units including the Netherlands Battalion were alerted for a move to Koje-do island, to perform prison guard duties at the United Nations prisoner of war camp there.

The long trip, by truck rail and ship, commenced on 17 April. By 22 April the units arrived at its destination and was attached to the 2nd Logistical Command. Duties given to the units in Koje-do island involved guarding compounds, prisoner work details and troop installations. The efficient job done by the Netherlands Battalion and the regiment units will be duly entered in the records alongside the many combat victories of the units.

Notice came in early July 1952 that the 38th Infantry units would shortly join the rest of the 2nd US Division in the move to the new front west of Chorwon. Units were transported to their new assembly areas by three means. LSTs carried the troops and equipment around the Korean coast to the port of Inchon. From there a rail move was made to the railhead at Yonchon, and trucks completed the journey by carrying the units to their areas. The 38th Regiment became reserve units initially while other two regiments occupied the line.

Immediate trouble in the Old Baldy area of the 23rd Regimental sector caused the 38th to be alerted almost as soon as they had arrived. One of the 38th's battalions was moved to a forward assembly area while commanders and their staff looked over the situation and planned a counterattack. Commitment of the 38th was called off, however, at the last minute. The battalion returned to their reserve positions and joined the remainder of the regiment in a training schedule for the rest of July and the first half of August.

On 20 August the regiment relieved the hard-hit 23rd Infantry and the Netherlands Battalion took over positions from the 23rd's 2nd Battalion, on a series of low hill mass laid between the outposts Old Baldy and Arsenal. The
units commenced improving the defensive positions. The heavy rainstorms and
the drenchings of late July hit the entire front, bringing with the slippery landsliding hills and a considerable number of the unit's bunkers became uninhabitable.
To the rear, washouts of bridges and roads created many supply problems. The
reserve battalion stopped training and worked alongside the engineers to re-
construct the supply routes.

Defensive improvements and aggressive patrolling went on for the first half of September. 18 September opened with the Netherlands Battalion's disposition of
units and the Outposts Arsenal and Eerie manned by two platoons reinforced with each heavy machine gun and two 81-mm mortars were placed in direct
support of the area.

Enemy artillery and mortar fire had been falling in the area sporadically, and the rate of incoming fire increased as the day went on. At dusk it seemed as
though every tank, recoilless weapon, artillery piece and mortar that the
Communists owned had opened up. Shells being too numerous to count rattled into the outposts. It was apparent that the enemy was preparing to strike. At
1900 he did strike in two places simultaneously.

One company of Chinese Communist forces hit the Porkchop outpost, which was occupied by a platoon from the 38th's B Company, and on Old Baldy a battalion of enemy swarmed into the K Company positions at the same
time. The Netherlands Battalion on and east of Arsenal–Eerie position pro-
vided an active support for the counterattack of the adjacent American units
by diversionary fire, resulting in successful regaining of the overrun outposts.

On 29 September the Netherlands Battalion made an attack on Hill 200 in the front of the Arsenal, with unsuccessful result in capturing of POW. After
two days on other hand, the Red Chinese attack was launched on the right to Arrowhead this time, but was repulsed soon by the friendly coordinated fire.

On 19 October, meantime, after dusk the listening post from the Nether-
lands C Company, which was set up between Arsenal and Hill 200 had warned of unusual enemy movement in the front, and at 2200 hours reported an approach of some 200 Red Chinese coming from the north. The Company Commander
ordered it to withdraw, warning all platoons and supporting weapons and even the searchlights. The timely orders for opening fire and searchlights on the
climbing-up wave of Reds had led the enemy to a complete surprise and confusion. This eventually resulted in the enemy retreat, and artillery fire called in on the
retreating Red Chinese accounted for many casualties.

On 25 October the 38th relinquished its sector to the relieving 9th Regiment and became reserve within the 2nd US Division sector. The Netherlands Battalion with the regiment remained there for a month, training and preparing to take over
the right sector from the 23rd Infantry. This relief was accomplished late in November as frosty weather began to hit the battlefront. Equipped with the latest in winter gear, the units took over the line. Though most of the men were getting their first taste of winter warfare, it was the third Korean winter for the units.

At 1800 through 2045 hours on 25 November the Netherlands relieved the 23rd's 1st Battalion on the right of Arsenal–Yoke line.

Early December passed quietly, and it appeared that the 38th Infantry might be relieved before any significant action took place. This, however, was forgotten when a large-scale attack was forecasted in the T-Bone area by intelligence. The attack materialized on 23 December, in battalion size, accompanied by a total of 2,600 rounds of incoming artillery and mortar. Just prior to midnight, hordes of Red Chinese charged up the slopes of Arsenal outpost, the old Netherlands property and now manned by American B Company; at 2325 hours the Netherlands observation post near its A Company had caught up in the dark with over 200 Red Chinese coming down to Arsenal in the American 1st Battalion sector on the left. The proximity of Arsenal to Chinese lines aided the enemy to achieve surprise, but the efficient defenders quickly organized and engaged the Chinese in fierce hand to hand fighting under strong flanking fire support from the Netherlands positions on the right of the troubled scene. A number of enemy swarmed into some of the outpost's trenches. Supporting fires were called in and reserve units were alerted for reinforcement.

The defenders soon had the situation in hand and cleared the hill, killing or capturing all of the enemy who had reached the position. Counted Chinese dead on the hill numbered 117, while total enemy casualty figures for the action were listed as 650. Losses for the friendly unit were extremely slight.

On 26 December, meantime, the Netherlands Battalion began to be relieved in the line around Yoke–Uncle by the 31st's 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Division, and retired from the line to Kososong-ni seven kilometers due east of Chongong-ni.

By first light on 28 January 1953 the battalion moved onto western front near Sami-chon to take over the positions along the eastern bank of the river.

In March the elements of the 417th and 418th CCF Regiments in the front of the Netherlands Battalion sector had attacked the area of Nudae in the A Company positions four times, which each time was repulsed by the gallant stand of the Netherlands soldiers.

When the Reds attempted third attack on the night of 17-18 March the Netherlands Outposts Bernhard and Rita were soon forced to withdraw by some hundreds Chinese, but shortly after the hand to hand fighting ensued by 0300
hours on 18th the enemy had retreated. The action was successful for the Netherlands Battalion owing to the timely employment of the reserve unit and in particular to the post Amsterdam's epic stand to the last in holding the defensive positions.

On 21-23 April when the 2nd US Division moved on the road between Uijongbu and Chorwon to reach about the point where it crossed the 38th Parallel near the Line Kansas, the Netherlands Battalion, becoming regimental reserve and had a field training until 2 May. During the remainder of the month, everywhere the 2nd US Division units had moved, their undergoing hard training in the field had continued.

In the month of June, the division units including the Netherlands Battalion continuously had a field exercise of the counteroffensive actions at the localities south of Chorwon—Kumhwa line.

In the meantime, the regiment operation order on 12 July 1953 for the Netherlands Battalion to take over the regiment reserve positions around Hajiin-ni, its old positions in the northwest of Kumhwa, had been issued. In this area the Netherlands Battalion as the regimental reserve unit generally performed the tasks of filling in the gaps with either the strength of manning or firearms throughout the regimental sector, besides the counterattack mission. Two Netherlands men were taken prisoners of war by enemy ambushes during the actions in this area, but in August after the armistice was signed on 27 July they were repatriated through the Operation Switch.

On 28 July the battalion took up the post armistice main battle position a corner of the important strategic keypoint around Hill 331 at Hato-dong some two kilometers southeast of its old Hajiin-ni positions.

As the post-armistice service, the following number of the Netherlands Battalion personnel had been continuously performing their duty under the United Nations flag to protect the peace in the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggression, until they finally returned home on 15 December 1954. The number of strength of the Netherlands Battalion in Korea as of 29 March 1954 were:

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<th>(CPL)</th>
<th>(EM)</th>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo (R &amp; R Center)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>411</td>
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</table>
Infantry Battalion

Of the total of 3,148 who were sent to Korea (including ten nurses), 516 (including two nurses) came for a second term, and 38 even for a third, which brings the total up to 3,972.

120 of them were killed in action or died, including one dead as a prisoner of war. Three returned from the prisoners after the armistice, while three others were missing in action and remained so. 645 were wounded, of which 91 are permanently invalid.

Battle Lessons

(1) Mutual Cooperation

Although in May 1951 the Netherlands Battalion’s third rifle company was activated and it remained organically intact until the armistice the battalion was often considerably understrength during the first two years, in spite of the usual addition of the KATUSA personnel.

Further, the battalion was always committed as a complete infantry battalion, and the burdens laid upon this unit were often too heavy. Nevertheless, the battalion always accomplished its assigned missions.

In accomplishment of its operational missions, the mutual cooperation between the unit and ROK and UN forces had always been essentially materialized and could reflect on every battle for the successful achievement, overcoming all difficulty and hardship such as the battalion’s understrength, supply problem of ammunition, the transport and even labor service, the countermeasure of manning gap to be complemented with personnel or fire, and in such problem as fire support based on the coordinated fire plan.

The cooperation with the Americans was excellent. They did their utmost to meet the demands of their Dutch partners.

On 19 July 1953 when the Netherlands A Company was holding the positions with the dominating Hill 340 near Chungmoksil-Moksil-li valley northeast of Kumhwa, the enemy, in two-company strength, hit the A Company. One platoon from C Company, 2nd US Engineer Battalion, which was working on the A Company’s positions, joined forces with the Dutch to help repel the attackers. A fierce fire-fight followed with the attackers reaching the trenches in some places. After six hours of fighting, most of which was hand to hand combat by both the Dutch and American warriors against the Communist attackers, the enemy withdrew leaving the hill strewn with their dead. Consequently, the enemy casualties numbered over one hundred with approximately
twenty killed.

The after-action report noted the fact that on the day before the action a patrol of a Netherlands sergeant with ROK soldiers searched the area and captured a slightly wounded Red Chinese as prisoner of war. This contributed to provide a very valuable information on enemy movement and eventually to the warning prior to the action of 19 July.

These actions proved to be one of the last phase of engagements for the Netherlands Battalion before the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, and without mutual cooperation no combat achievement was possible for the unit in fighting from the beginning to the last moment during its participation in the Korean War.

(2) Tactical Employment of Men and Weapons

On various actions the Netherlands Battalion displayed its nature of precision on planning and steady performance of duty at all times. Enthusiasm and resourcefulness have always been their primary spiritual weapons, with which they would overcome any hardship and lead each action of the battalion to the successful conclusion during the combat operations in Korea.

The Netherlands Battalion on the right side of Sami-chon Valley, was improving positions and conducting a continuous patrol program in February 1953. The improvement of defensive positions included a tactical fence across the Sami-chon Valley between the Netherlands Battalion and the 38th’s 2nd Battalion. This wire obstacle was six meters wide, about two meters high, and set up to insure that tanks could fire along the fence from both battalion sectors. In addition, the tanks mounting the searchlights were positioned so as to light the area in front of the fence.

In the meantime, an action occurred in the night of 7 February 1953, when an estimated enemy platoon engaged a patrol from the Netherlands Battalion’s B Company. The patrol employed small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and artillery which proved the maximum firepower for the enemy force. After inflicting an estimated 25 casualties, the Netherlands patrol disengaged and returned to the lines suffering only minor casualties.

Due to the peculiarity of the terrain in this sector, it was difficult to establish and maintain an adequate defense system. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Battalion had established its minute countermeasure of defense with the system of nighttime ambush patrol in addition to their routine day patrol requiring a considerable number of men each day and night from the forward company locality, and the high priority on defense construction, it was necessary to
Infantry Battalion

utilize the reserve units or the elements of the division reconnaissance company to support the patrol effort.

On 21 February 1953 at the same locality on eastern bank of Sami-chon a patrol from C Company, Netherlands Battalion engaged an enemy force who fired small arms and automatic weapons in an attempt to destroy the patrol. The patrol called for the friendly mortar and artillery fire to break up the enemy troops, and at the same time the tremendous firepower employed by the patrol tore the Reds to shreds, and the enemy retreated.

Thus each firepower employed by the Netherlands Battalion was always a massive, sharp and tremendous one against the Red force every time in its offensive or defensive operation. Their accuracy of firepower and firing technique, with their individual soldier’s marksmanship were as already proved excellent in firing exercise at the United Nations Reception Center. Especially, the Netherlands Battalion in its frequent movements during early period of war had proved that the 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles were their favorite weapons, in particular with adequate employment of such direct fire weapons they could hit easily the targets on the enemy-held high ground to be neutralized before final assaulting at the attacking operation.

The Netherlands men had improved also the indirect firing method with their recoilless rifles and actually applied it often for the unseen dead space targets such as enemy CP or mortar emplacements during the operation around Hajin-ni northwest of Kumhwa in late-August 1952. However, these weapons proved invaluable in the battlefield of Korea chiefly to the destruction of enemy hilltop bunkers. Heavy casualties administered to the enemy throughout every action left convincing proof that the Netherlands Battalion was capable of capturing its front-most objective at any cost or defending its occupied outposts, keeping tradition with their gallantry and resourcefulness.

(3) Training

Most of the officers and men of the Netherlands Battalion which participated in the Korean War were those who, before coming to Korea, had ample opportunity in Indonesia to be trained through real fighting on ground very similar to that of Korea. After the battalion was embattled it had never stopped its training and continued whenever it was placed in reserve or when it had time spared regardless on combat duty.

Particularly in every reserve areas, their hard training of tactics and firing exercise took place, and they earned excellent results which had been praised highly by other members of the United Nations forces.
In general the daily training was conducted regularly on a eight-hour basis a day, and nevertheless play of their favorite football game which was proud of the Netherlands' worldwide sport today was never missed during the training period in the reserve area.

Thus their hard training and enthusiasm on all combat activities during their participation in the Korean War could have duly produced a remarkable esprit-de-corps among them and eventually could maintain a high standard of the troops morale throughout the war.

(4) Gallantry and Esprit-de-corps

The Netherlands Battalion of the United Nations forces was cited for exceptionally outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in combat against the violent attack of enemy forces in Hoengsong – Wonju area, during the mid-February 1951. On 12 February, the enemy launched an offensive with a large force aimed at splitting the central front. Against this onslaught the Netherlands Battalion had the mission of maintaining blocking positions on the outskirts of the strategically important communication center of Hoengsong.

The purpose of this was to permit two American battalions, supporting artillery and other friendly troops to withdraw from their exposed positions where surrounded. The Netherlands Battalion deployed astride the main axis of hostile advance. Large groups of enemy force approached along the high ground north of the town and penetrated to the positions of the defenders, delivering small arms and mortar fire on the gallant defenders. The Netherlands Battalion supported the withdrawal of the United Nations forces by delivering its accurate and effective firepower. A company of enemy troops succeeded in passing around the open right flank of the battalion positions and reaching the location of the command post. Recognizing the enemy and shouting warning to his troops, Lieutenant Colonel Den Ouden, the Commander of the Netherlands Battalion rallied his headquarters personnel and led his small group against the treacherous foe until he fell mortally wounded. His gallant example and self-sacrifice so inspired the staff personnel that they repelled the enemy and killed many of them in fierce hand to hand combat. The battered and courageous troops withdrew on orders to successive blocking positions until the last of the friendly forces broke through the enemy lines.

The enemy meanwhile had infiltrated to the southwest and established a road block on the main supply route to Wonju. Once more the valiant troops of the Netherlands Battalion were ordered to fight a rearguard action and hold the enemy until the road block could be eliminated. They fought tenaciously
against overwhelming odds, and gained time for friendly forces to open the road.

Utilizing 13 February to establish new defensive positions, the Netherlands Battalion dug in and waited for the next onslaught, which came against B Company on the morning of 14 February. The company was forced back until friendly mortar and artillery fire could be brought to bear on the Red Chinese attackers. The situation became critical by the evening of 14 February. The enemy was in full control of Hill 325, a dominant terrain feature northwest of Wonju overlooking the friendly position. Communications were disrupted, losses heavy and the situation fluid. At this time, the Netherlands A Company, so under-strength that it had to be reinforced by a platoon from both B and Support Companies, was ordered to retake the hill. Launching their first counterattack at 0230 hours on the morning of 15 February, they were beaten back by heavy machine gun fire from the top of the hill. They moved up again at 0345 hours. This time they advanced within 300 meters by 0400 hours, after two set-backs and three sleepless nights of fighting, this noble band of heroic men, short of ammunition and out of communication, snatched victory from defeat by fixing bayonets and storming the hill. Shouting their famous Van Heutz Regiment’s battle cry, they slashed their way to the crest of the hill through the last of the remaining enemy. The inspiring and determined actions of the brave soldiers of the Netherlands Battalion withstood the enemy offensive and enabled the Allied forces to withdraw and regroup.

The Netherlands Battalion displayed such gallantry, determination and esprit-de-corps in accomplishing its mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions. The individual and collective heroism displayed by the soldiers of the Netherlands Battalion in their valiant stand against the Communist forces have gained the highest reputation for themselves, their homelands, and the United Nations forces in the Korean War.

Setting aside from the Netherlands Battalion’s battle monument still existing at Hoengsong city ever since it was erected by the Netherlands warriors on 12 October 1956, a large-scale project on the annual erection of the monuments for each participant country of the United Nations forces, is now underway by the ROK MND, and the construction of such monuments is being steadily propelled in the respective old battle area throughout Korea.
CHAPTER III  NAVAL SHIPS

Section 1. In the early Period of the War  
(4 July 1950 – 31 October 1951)

On 4 July 1950, prior to sending army troops, the Netherlands Government had ordered a destroyer of HNLMS Evertsen to move from Sourabaya port in Indonesia for participation in the Korean War.

The destroyer HNLMS Evertsen had arrived at Sasebo port in Japan on 16 July 1950.

During the service in the Korean waters the Netherlands naval ships had been inapplicable for any independent operation as they were incorporated in the UN allied task units which carried out innumerable duties, such as patrolling, bombardment of coastal area, support of army troops landing behind enemy lines or of advancing troops, protection of minesweepers and minelayers, anti-aircraft duties and many other missions.

During the Korean War the collective efforts by UN allied to repel the communist aggressors had led to the organization of the combined forces on all services particularly in the naval forces. The United States provided the largest part of the UN naval contingents to Korea, and the second contribution had comprised the ships from the navies of the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and many other countries, to be forming the Allied naval forces operated as task forces with various missions.

HNLMS Evertsen was initially incorporated in Task Unit 96.8.2, but shortly after on 19 July 1950 the East and West Coast Support Groups were reorganized and consolidated into Task Group 96.5, the Korean Support Group. The command of the West Coast Support Element, TE 96.53 (Task Force 96) had comprised British Commonwealth ships and the Dutch destroyer Evertsen, remained with Rear Admiral G. Andrews, CB, CBE, DSO.

In addition to his responsibility for the Western Sea and coastal operations, Admiral Andrews was charged with the supervision of all non-American United Nations naval forces, for which purpose he set up an administrative headquarters at Sasebo in Japan.
During the early period of the Korean War, UN naval air service had several unique and unusual missions performed by the navy's patrol squadrons, in addition to the routine anti-submarine patrols, weather and coastal reconnaissance. The first of these was the spotting of naval gunfire.

On 2 August 1950, immediately after the North Korean Communist forces attacked on the Taegu front in the southeast, a VP-6 aircraft conducted a spotting mission for the bombardment of Mokpo the southwestern-most harbor city of Korea by the British naval ships HMS *Cockade* and HMS *Cossack*. So successful was this mission that a second mission was conducted by VP-6 on 6 August when spotting services were furnished to British cruiser *Kenya* and *Belfast*, the two British destroyers *Cossack* and *Charity*, and the Dutch destroyer *Evertsen* (Lieutenant Commander D.J. van Doorninck). The targets were the Communist control of military installations in Inchon. The USS *Sicily* provided four Marine
Corsairs as escort for the spotting aircrafts.

In the meantime, on the days preceding the Inchon landing operation, the
D-Day of which was set as 15 September, the tasks were assigned to Admiral
Andrewes' blockade and covering force, TE 91, to conduct special reconnaissance
mission and provide cover for units of attack force moving to the objective area
of Inchon.

Thus, the most of ships were at sea by 11 September. The Netherlands
Evertsen and seven other destroyers from the allied forces, and four frigates
formed escorts and carried out close and outer screen duties, remaining at sea
until 14 October, operating in and around the port of Inchon.

By mid-February 1951, a night and day siege had begun in Wonsan harbor
on the east coast. Songjin up in farther north also was the objective of a naval
siege, commencing on 8 March, initially set by Manchester, Evans, C.S. Sperry
and the Dutch ship HNLMS Evertsen. Still later, on 26 April 1951, the port
of Hungnam was placed under siege.

July 1951 opened with usual screening by the allied naval ships. At this
time US carrier Sicily relieved USS Bataan in company with the Dutch destroyer
HNLMS Van Galen being commanded by Commander A.M. Valkenburg. This
allied naval operation on the west coast included a concerted attack by both
carriers of TE 95.11 on various targets in north Korea. The carrier force con-
sisted of HMS Glory and USS Sicily, screened by two US destroyers and the
Netherlands Van Galen and two Canadian destroyers, and also one Australian
destroyer. After carrying out a search of the area to ensure that there really was
no submarine around, the destroyers returned to the carriers. The patrol proved
as uneventful as the carrier screening.

On 31 October 1951, in the meantime, the Netherlands destroyer HNLMS
Van Galen had relieved the British ship HMS Concord, operating at East Coast
along between Wonsan, Hamhung and Songjin where she stayed for bombardments
mission.

On 20-21 November another coordinated air, gun, and rocket strike was
made against Hungnam, the north Korean important industrial and communi-
cations center 160 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel.

Appearing again off the east coast, the destroyer Van Galen had the allied
east coast operations together with other UN naval ships of British, Australian
and US, under the command of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff.

Alternating with the air attacks were bombardments from the destroyers
and cruiser, carried out with aircraft spotting the fall of shot and adjusting it
onto selected targets.

Heavy fire was concentrated on the target area with a remarkable effect.
Section 2. Accomplishments of the Missions  
(1 November 1951 – 24 January 1955)

In November 1951 around the time when the allied ships joined the Carrier Task Group 95.8 led by HMS Belfast under the command of Rear Admiral A.K. Scott-Moncrieff, DSO, for a combined two day air-sea strike on Hungnam the industrial center on the east coast of north Korea, the Netherlands ship HNLMS Van Galen had contributed greatly to the Carrier Task Group in carrying out her superb task as a primary member vessel of the Bombardment Group which was then composed of HNLMS Van Galen, HMS Belfast and HMAS Tobruk, and had suppressed anti-aircraft fire ashore which the air element was provided by the Australian carrier Sydney.

At this time the Netherlands destroyer Van Galen had been commanded by the Commander A.M. Valkenburg, who participated in the Korean War ever since 18 April 1951 when she relieved HNLMS Evertsen.

Thus, on 18 November HNLMS Van Galen became a forming part of TG 95.8 for a coordinated strike against Hungnam harbor on the East Sea of Korea. Shortly after dawn on 20 November the guns of the fleet opened fire on known anti-aircraft positions as a preliminary to the first of ten air attacks by Sydney's planes, with barracks, industrial plants, stores and rail communications as the targets. Upon completion of bombardments mission, on 21 November HNLMS Van Galen was detached from the Carrier Task Group and proceeded for the west waters.

In early-December, meanwhile, the allied naval ships at the west coast were carrying out their duties of strengthening of islands defense around Cho-do–Sok-to area, Paengnyong-do, the Han River islands and Yonpyong-do. They also spent a very busy day on 9 December helping the ROK naval vessels evacuate noncombatants from Cho-do.

On 10 December 1951 the Netherlands destroyer Van Galen had taken over such duties from the Canadian destroyer Athabaskan and taken part in the island campaign. The destroyer would lie at anchor at night in the assigned position watching her radar for enemy invasion craft, and firing from her main armament at the various targets on the land.

In July 1952, the UN naval ships had organized a teamwork club which was called the Trainbusters. To become a member of this exclusive organization, a ship had to receive confirmation of a train's destruction. The first member of
the club was the destroyer USS Orleck. The train smasher destroying two enemy trains in 12 days was superb fighting. The success in this respect was quickly followed by similar successes by other destroyers, and led to the establishment of the Trainbusters Club. The trainbusters club of Task Force 95 was thus organized, in which the Netherlands ship also participated, and the members of the trainbusters were comprised in all 18 ships, including the HNLMS Piet Hein, 13 US ships, three Canadians, and one British. The club had achieved its missions and destroyed 28 North Korean Communist trains of enemy personnel and supplies. HNLMS Piet Hein which destroyer had relieved HNLMS Van Galen on 2 March 1952 and each ship whose gunfire had destroyed a train was presented a certificate which read; "For her contribution to the United Nations' cause against Communist aggression destroying a communist train. In recognition of a job well done CTF-95."

On 28 May a combined force of Netherlands and British warships under the
command of Admiral Clifford, and including HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau (a frigate which had relieved HNLMS Piet Hein on 18 January 1953) and two British ships, carried out a bombardment of recently emplaced gun positions on the Amgak Peninsula and on the north shore of the Chinnampo estuary.

The enemy coastal batteries had soon opened to retaliatory action and repeatedly fired on the friendly ships and aircrafts without scoring hits. A motorboat from the British ship laid an effective smoke screen which prevented the enemy from observing the effect of their fire, while the batteries were exposed to the friendly naval force. One enemy battery was silenced by a direct hit, and no casualties were suffered for the combined force.

In the month of June 1953, the Netherlands ship as well as the other allied vessels performed patrols on the west coast islands, and their patrols were uneventful.
The Netherlands frigate HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau (Commander N. W. Sluijter), was in anti-invasion patrol off the islands; she was assisted and screened by HMCS Crusader who provided also gunfire support to a minesweeper operation north of Sok-to. She had served in the Korean waters from 18 January to 5 November 1953 and returned to her country with proud record.

After cease-fire was effected on 27 July 1953, the patrolling by all UN naval ships had continued in the Korean waters, but some relaxation was allowed.

The Netherlands frigate HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau with Commander N. W. Sluijter, thus saw cease-fire and nevertheless had served continuously until 5 December 1953 when she was relieved by the next frigate HNLMS Dubois. Two more frigates had served on the Korean waters after the armistice: HNLMS Dubois (Lieutenant Commander T. Jellemenga), who served during the period from 5 November 1953 to 10 September 1954, and HNLMS Van Zijl (Commander F.G.H. Van Straaten) from 10 September 1954 to 24 January 1955.

During the Korean War the total three destroyers and three frigates from the Netherlands navy served in Korean waters. Each ship was, however relieved by the arrival of another ship, and the number of naval personnel who served with such a ship was 230 in average. An approximate total number of 1,350 of the navy saw service in the Korean War.

The outline of their participation in the Korcan War is shown below, including the ship's name, type, commanding officer's name, duration of service in the Korean waters and the ship's personnel strength participated:

(1) HNLMS Evertsen (destroyer), Lieutenant Commander D.J. van Doorninck; 16 July 1950 - 18 April 1951. 237 men.
(2) HNLMS Van Galen (destroyer), Commander A.M. Valkenburg; 18 April 1951 - 2 March 1952; 247 men.
(4) HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau (frigate), Commander N.W. Sluijter; 10 January 1953 - 5 November 1953; 183 men.
(5) HNLMS Dubois (frigate), Lieutenant Commander T. Jellemenga; 5 November 1953 - 10 September 1954; 209 men.
(7) Other naval personnel, who remained at naval bases in Japan; estimatedly 28 men.
CHRONOLOGY

1950

4 July The Netherlands Navy sends its destroyer HNLMS Evertsen for participation in the Korean War.
19 July Dutch destroyer Evertsen is placed under the command of Task Force 96.
28 Aug The Netherlands Government decides sending army troops of one infantry battalion to the United Nations forces in Korea.
11-15 Sept The destroyer Evertsen takes part in the Inchon landing operation.
26 Oct The army troops of the first contingent embark on Zuiderkruis at Rotterdam, sailing for the theater of Korean War.
23 Nov The first contingent of the Netherlands Battalion arrives in Pusan.
24 Nov The Battalion reaches Taegu and enters the United Nations Reception Center for a familiarizing training and combat readiness.
5 Dec The Battalion reaches Suwon and protects the main supply routes around the town with patrolling.
13 Dec The Netherlands Battalion is attached for the operational control to 38th Infantry, 2nd US Division.
22 Dec The battalion moves to the vicinity of Chungju, carrying out probing reconnaissance for enemy guerilla activity around the area.
31 Dec The Battalion is en route to Hoengsong with the mission of securing the town. A Netherlands Battalion patrol is hit by the enemy ambush near Chohyon-ni northeast of Hoengsong.

1951

5 Feb The Operation Roundup, general advance by the X US Corps takes place, and the battalion maintains blocking positions northern outskirt of Hoengsong.
12-13 Feb The Battalion heavily engages in Hoengsong—Wonju action.
14 Feb The Battalion attacks and recaptures Hill 325 a commanding feature northwest of Wonju.
22 Feb It enters Chupo-ri, and spends a six-week period in reserve.
1 Mar General Ridgway, the Commander in Chief of the UNC visits and encourages the Netherlands Battalion while in reserve at Chupo-ri.
17-18 May The Battalion attacks Hill 1051 (Kari-san) north of Hangye.
23 May The Battalion advances northeast to Hyon-ni—Inje axis.
May 31: Action in outskirts of Inje begins.
June 29: The replacements of 158 men arrive at Pusan by USS General Langfitt.
July 15: The Battalion participates in the action on Taeu-san.
August 9: The United States Presidential Unit Citation is awarded to the Netherlands Battalion by the EUSAK Commander.
August 22: The first contingent of the battalion embarks for return home while the newly arrived second contingent disembarks USS General Mac Rae at Pusan.
October 3-24: The Netherlands Battalion takes part in the Battle of Mundung-ni Valley.
December 20: The Battalion relieves the 3rd Battalion of Turkish Brigade near Hajin-ni west of Kumbwa.

1952
February 18: The Netherlands Battalion launches attacks on the Star Hills.
April 17-12: The Battalion carries out the security mission for the POW camp at Koje-do island.
August 14: The Battalion captures some 50 Communist guerrillas in Operation Sweep Up.
August 20: It begins to fight in the outposts area between the Old Baldy and Arsenal north of Yonchon.
September 18: The Battalion takes up the positions of Arsenal--Eerie and repulses the repeated enemy attacks.

1953
January 28: It moves to Samichon to relieve the 1st Battalion of Canadian 22nd Regiment.
March 27-28: The fourth attack by Red Chinese company strength on the Nudae positions is repulsed by the Netherlands company.
July 19-20: The Battalion fights again north of Hajin-ni near Kumbwa as the last round action.
July 28: The Battalion takes up the Post Armistice Main Battle Position at Hato-dong.
October 1: The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation is awarded to the Netherlands Battalion of the United Nations forces.

1954
December 15: The Netherlands Battalion of the United Nations forces finally returns home.
PART EIGHT

THE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

During the Korean War, besides 16 free nations which dispatched their armed forces to fight against the Communist aggressors, many other countries offered various kinds of aid to Korea. Of these assistances, medical units provided by the following five nations were most important. These were Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden in alphabetical order. As there were many problems such as foreign policy and domestic issues these nations decided to contribute to the United Nations cause in the Korean War by sending their own medical unit rather than military one. Beginning with Sweden and India immediately dispatched their medical teams to Korea, soon to be followed by other nations. The following shows the period of each medical unit’s service in Korea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Unit</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital</td>
<td>28 Sept 1950 – Apr 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Indian Ambulance</td>
<td>20 Nov 1950 – Aug 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Red Cross Hospital Ship</td>
<td>7 Mar 1951 – 16 Aug 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian MASH</td>
<td>22 June 1951 – 18 Oct 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Red Cross Hospital 68</td>
<td>16 Nov 1951 – 2 Jan 1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary mission of these medical units was to treat the military patients at first, but during lull they also gave their humanitarian medical service to the Korean civilians. During the period of their service in Korea, they also provided substantial aid both in the medical and social fields under the close cooperation with the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Especially, the three Scandinavian countries, in close cooperation with the Korean Government and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, established and operated the National Medical Center in Seoul after the Korean War.

Of the five different nations' medical units, this volume covers the outstanding contributions of the four nations, because the 60th Indian Ambulance Unit has already been contained in the Volume II for editorial convenience.
CHAPTER II  THE DANISH RED CROSS HOSPITAL SHIP

Section 1. Introduction to Denmark

The Kingdom of Denmark, the smallest in area of the three Scandinavian nations, whose capital is Copenhagen, comprises the northern part of the low peninsula of Jutland and two groups of islands. The main archipelago of 482 islands lies to the east and the second one, that of the rocky Faeroe Islands, is located 1,127 kilometers away in the Atlantic on the shortest route to Iceland and thence to Greenland, a Danish colony until 1953 and since then an integral part of Denmark. The total area is 43,069 square kilometers excluding Faeroe Islands and Greenland, and the total population in 1972 was 2,994,335.

Lying on the eastern borders of the North sea, Denmark has a moist climate transitional between the oceanic conditions of western Europe and the continental conditions of central and eastern Europe. The mean annual temperature is eight degrees Centigrade, the average for January and February being zero degrees and that for July, the hottest month, 16 degrees.

Denmark has always been famous for high quality agricultural products and one of the most significant facts of its economy is the high ratio of productivity of the land: 90% is productive and 75% actually farmed. Crops include grain, hay, potatoes, fodder beet, sugar beet, seeds, and green fodder. Barley and oats account for 85% of the grain crop, fodder beet for 85% of the root crops. Despite the lack of raw materials industrialization has been growing rapidly, especially since World War II, and industry now occupies more people than agriculture. Denmark has numerous ports, small harbours and quays. It has a large merchant fleet in proportion to its population and was a leader in the modern transition to motor ships; its biggest diesel works are in Copenhagen. Danish vessels carry about two-fifths of the national sea-borne trade and do a large foreign business.

National defence policy is based on collective security attendant on membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After 1964 recruits served 14 months in all three services.
Soon after the end of World War II, the representatives of Denmark attended the San Francisco Conference and became one of the origination member of the United Nations. Whereupon onward, Denmark has participated actively in the U.N. efforts for the maintenance of the world peace.

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 stirred many Danes to seek the military security with non-Communist countries. Negotiations for an alliance with Norway and Sweden broke down in January 1949, and Sweden rejected a Dano-Swedish defensive arrangement. In April 1949 Denmark broke its neutralist tradition and joined the NATO in order to meet the new world situation that the world Communists led by Soviet Russia suddenly unmasked themselves to show their true colors. It goes without saying that they attempted to communize the free nations whenever they found any weak spots. The Korean War of 1950–1953 was one of them.

Denmark voted for the U.N. resolution on the establishment of the Republic of Korea on 12 December 1948. When the Korean War broke out the Danish Government dispatched a hospital ship to give medical treatments to both UN soldiers and Korean civilians. In addition, it contributed approximately three hundred and forty-thousand dollars plus two hundred and thirty-thousand dollars worth of medical supplies to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA).

Today, Denmark has been carried on the diplomatic relation with the Republic of Korea from the time the two nations set up the legations both in Seoul and Copenhagen in February 1959. The legation was elevated to the status of embassy in October 1960.

Section 2. The First Tour
(23 January – 15 September 1951)

Prelude

When the North Korean Communists invaded the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution requesting member states to assist Korea.

Denmark, as a member state of the U.N., had discussions about their available assistances for Korea. In August 1950, the Danish Government offered the U.N. to provide medical assistance in support of the Republic of Korea.
In the autumn of 1950, the Danish Red Cross was requested by the Danish Government to take proper action to dispatch the Hospital Ship *Jutlandia* to Korea. Many doctors, nurses and other personnel volunteered to join this expedition. At the same time all the required medical supplies and equipment were prepared through the Danish Red Cross. Further, each member of the unit was given an orientation course in group about the mission to be carried out and the general situation of the Korean War. The monetary value of this expedition was approximately Danish Krone 35 millions, which was paid from the Danish Government funds.

**Major Activity**

The Red Cross Hospital Ship *Jutlandia* sailed from Denmark on 23 January 1951 heading for Korea, where she served under the auspices of the United Nations Command (UNC) until she returned home on 16 December 1953. On the voyage to Korea, she stopped at the port of Yokosuka in Japan, where fresh water, food, fuel, etc. were replenished. She left Yokosuka and finally arrived at the port of Pusan in Korea on 7 March 1951.

With a total strength of 100 men or so, the Danish Hospital Ship was composed of medical officers, nurses, administrators and other medical personnel. During the first tour the commanding officer was Kai Hammerich; head of hospital, Mogens Winge; captain, Christen Mikkelsen Kondrup; chief engineer, Axel Axelsen; chief officer, Flemming Bech Peterson.

The commanding officer was responsible for coordination on the ship, the captain looked after navigation and security, and the head of hospital was concerned only with medical service.

Commodore Kai Hammerich had to report the hospital ship’s activities to the Danish Government, the Danish Red Cross, the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva and the UN Command in Korea.

At the time the Hospital Ship *Jutlandia* docked at the port of Pusan, the general picture of the war was this:

In the face of a massive Chinese Communists attack the UN forces retreated below the 38th Parallel once again, but the retreat was checked. The UN forces mounted a series of offensive operations beginning in January 1951, and succeeded in retaking Inchon and Kimpo Air Field on 10 February, and Seoul on 15 March. By the end of March, the UN advance reached the 38th Parallel.

In this situation the Danish Red Cross Hospital Ship went to work for the
first time in Korea. Sweden, one of the three Scandinavian countries, had already been operating a hospital in Pusan.

The Jutlandia began functioning upon arrival at the port of Pusan, and there followed a great number of the wounded and patients to come ceaselessly. Even though many casualties, most of whom were grave surgical cases, were transferred from the front to the hospital ship, the excellent medical personnel and the well-equipped medical care facilities of the Jutlandia enabled most of the patients to relieve from pain. Of these patients some critical cases were further evacuated to general hospitals in Japan by the Jutlandia.

The Hospital Ship worked mainly in Pusan Port, but it often sailed to other ports, sometime disregarding possible endanger of the enemy’s bombardment in an effort to provide more closer and swift medical service for the wounded. One difficult question was arisen at the Jutlandia, because she had to work so often under the blackout restrictions. But if all lights were blackened out, the hospital ship would not come under the protection stipulated at the Geneva Convention because the Red Cross flag would not be visible. Yet it was impossible to let it lighted when it was contrary to the military security. After the long negotiations, the UN military authorities agreed that all the hospital ships should turn off all lights as they left port, but when it moored at the most favorable and safer port for transporting the wounded, it was able to turn on all lights and to be again under the protection.

There was a milestone, no relation with its own mission, that the decks of Jutlandia might become one of the most famous spots in the Korean War.

On 30 June 1951, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command proposed the Jutlandia as the site of the truce meetings. Commodore Kai Hammerich, the Danish Commander, was very pleased to offer the ship for this purpose and was anxious to provide the very facilities. The Communists rejected the Jutlandia as meeting place and suggested the town of Kaesong just below the 38th Parallel. The UN Command accepted the Communists’ demand to meet at Kaesong. But this acceptance later proved a considerable disadvantage to the UN forces. Had the meetings been held on board the Jutlandia as the UNC Commander proposed, instead of at Kaesong, the UN forces could have pushed the Reds far more north, thereby making the war situation more favourable for the UN allies.

At any rate, the Danish Hospital Ship made a great contribution to the UN effort in Korea by treating the wounded and patients. Her first tour in Korea lasted about three months. She left Korea for rotation of members and replenishment of medical supplies on 24 July 1951, and arrived at the port of
Rotterdam on 15 September 1951. The Danes were heartily welcomed by a large crowd of people including their families and relatives at the pier.

Danish medical team operating on board "Jutlandia."

Section 3. The Second and Third Tours

Second Tour
(29 September 1951 – 29 March 1952)

During six weeks stay in Denmark, the Jutlandia was filled with abundant of medical supplies and relief goods. At the same time most of the members were replaced by new members, who volunteered to join the service in Korea. The commanding officer, captain, chief engineer and chief officer were remained to continue their services with ship. Dr. Mogens Winge, head of hospi-
The Danish Red Cross Hospital Ship

tal, was succeeded by Dr. Harry Brocks.

The second sailing to Korea started on 29 September 1951. Shortly after she embarked at Pusan on 16 November the Jutlandia commenced its medical service for the wounded. Its activities during the second tour were almost same as the first one. The Hospital Ship often moved to the other ports to treat and transport the critical cases. Although she had sometimes come closer to the battle front, it was never bombarded directly.

Many wounded UN soldiers who could not be expected to return to duty within 30 days were evacuated to the evacuation hospitals in Japan when she went there to have several days of rest and recreation. During their spare times, some of the Danes volunteered to work at wards in the front, and while there they conducted many surgical operations in the US forces' hospitals and the Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (NORMASH).

On 6 December 1951, Dr. Harry Brocks, head of hospital, was replaced by Dr. Hakon H. Zimsen.

After eight months service in Korea, the Jutlandia, with hundreds of evacuees, left Pusan on 29 March 1952, and disembarked at Copenhagen on 20 September. On her way to Denmark, she stopped at several countries to leave the patients to their respective homelands.

Third Tour
(20 September 1952 – 16 October 1953)

While the Jutlandia remained in Denmark for three months from July through September, an ambulance helicopter was attached aboard to help its performance of duties more efficiently. During the previous tours she really needed to have an evacuation helicopter because the helicopter was especially helpful in speeding evacuation of the wounded over the long distance.

At the same time an ophthalmologist was assigned. As a result, the radius of her medical treatments was expanded to include surgery, internal medicine, ophthalmology, neurosurgery and dentistry. The hospital ship had a laboratory, an X-ray room as well as a dispensary.

The Jutlandia now comprised its personnel with one senior officer, 14 medical officers, one pharmacist, 52 nurses and 23 medical and administrative members including a female. Commanding officer, head of hospital, captain and chief engineer continued to remain with hospital, but Flemming Bech Petersen, chief officer, was replaced by Johan Ernst Paulsen.

At Inchon harbour, about 12 to 16 kilometers from the front line, the
Danish Hospital Ship attended many wounded UN soldiers evacuated by ambulance-helicopters, hospital trains, and motor transports from the battle fields.

The presence of an ambulance-helicopter in the Jutlandia was especially helpful in speedy evacuation of the serious casualties. The smooth ride and the rapid arrival at the hospital from the battle fields caused a lower rate of shock fatalities. This evacuation was available only litter jeeps could not reach the patients; a rough ambulance ride would seriously injure them; when it was necessary to get them to the hospital quickly. The helicopter was able to evacuate the most casualties to medical facilities before the serious cases could become worse.

The Danish medical personnel made no distinction about nationality of patients in carrying out their mercy mission. Patients in the Hospital Ship belonged to more than 16 different nations, who took part in the Korean War as a member of the UN forces. Two thirds of them were Americans, and the majority of the rest were Koreans. Among the Koreans were army troops, marine corps as well as many civilians who worked in the line as members of the Korean Service Corps (KSC).

On 1 March 1953, Helge Tramsen succeeded Hakon H. Zomsen as the head of hospital.

From March 1953 when the truce talks had been in progress at Panmunjom many civilians availed of surgical and internal treatments under the close cooperation with the Inchon Christian Hospital. Many Korean medical members were worked together as well, helping to conduct pathological tests, managing X-ray and paying visits to the local civilian patients. Working in close cooperation with the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea (UNCACK) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), she worked as a diagnostic hospital for civilians. These close cooperations with civil organizations enabled the Jutlandia to provide better service for the civilian patients. When the battle fields fell into a long stalemate, the Danish Hospital Ship could able to cure more civilian patients, mostly women and children. From this time she rendered her humanitarian service to both military and civilian patients on board the ship.

The Danish medical team continued its medical service for a while after the armistice. Simultaneously with the medical assistance the Danes participated in the reconstruction and relief program for the Republic of Korea.

On 16 August 1953, a warm send-off ceremony was held in Inchon for the Danish Hospital Ship Jutlandia to compliment its achievements in Korea and pray for its safe return home. On her departure, the Danes handed most of medical stocks such as instruments and drugs over the UNKRA, which
The Danish Red Cross Hospital Ship

in turn distributed all the items to the Korean civilian hospitals.

Throughout the third tour, the Danish Hospital Ship had many patients medicated countless to figure out in number. Most of them were gained the complete recovery and got back to duty in a few days.

Section 4. Epilogue

The number of medical personnel and crew who had served with the Red Cross Hospital Ship Jutlandia during the whole period of her activities in Korea totalled at 630 men.

The total number of patients examined and treated by the Danish Hospital Ship was about 6,000. But according to the Commander Kai Hammerich, more than 15,000 patients were examined and treated on the ship. Although the Jutlandia received a great number of grave surgical cases, there were only 25 death cases due to their fatal suffer in battle. All the outstanding records of such achievements were resulted from the faithful attitude of the whole members of the hospital combined with well advanced surgical skills, excellent facilities and equipment.

Further, during the three times of her voyage to Denmark, the Jutlandia transported about 700 patients including 165 repatriated personnel to Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

After the Korean War the Danish Government rendered another worthwhile contribution to the Republic of Korea to note herewith in particular. That was the construction and operation of the National Medical Center (NMC) in Seoul, one of the biggest general hospitals in Korea. The joint efforts by the Government of Republic of Korea, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the Governments of three Scandinavian Kingdoms resulted in the establishment of the NMC on 22 October 1958. Many Danish medical personnel had worked with this hospital until September 1968 when the whole administration and operation of the NMC was transferred to the hands of the Korean authorities.

During and after the Korean War, the Kingdom of Denmark had contributed greatly to the Republic of Korea by sending the Hospital Ship Jutlandia, granting many medical supplies and relief goods, and establishing and operating the NMC. This was a pure expression of the spirit of Red Cross, which will be engraved in the Korean people forever.
CHAPTER III  THE ITALIAN RED CROSS HOSPITAL

Section 1.  General Introduction

Introduction to Italy

Italy is a republic in southern Europe and the name applied in ancient and modern times to the great peninsula projecting from central Europe southward into the Mediterranean sea, where the island of Sicily continues the continental promontory. On the north Italy is separated from the rest of Europe by the semicircular barrier of the Alps, while to the east it is bounded by the Adriatic sea, on the south by the Ionian sea, and on the west by the Tyrrenian sea. Besides Sicily and Sardeinia, Italy includes numerous smaller islands, mostly near the Tyrrhenian coast. The Sovereign republic of San Marino (62 square kilometers) and the sovereign state of Vatican City (0.44 square kilometers) are in the geographic boundaries of Italy. The area is 301,250 square kilometers and the population in 1971 was estimated at 54,025,211.

Despite its high proportion of mountainous and hilly terrain, it has a higher percentage of arable land than any other European country except Denmark and Poland. This is the result of intensive effort in reclaiming swamp lands, terracing hill slopes, and improving infertile soils.

Until 1931 over half the occupied population was engaged in agriculture (including forestry and fishing), but thereafter the structure of the Italian economy changed rapidly. In terms of gross national product, the share of agriculture decreased from 32% in 1950 to 22% in 1960 and to 11% by 1967. In 1966 two-fifths of the occupied population were engaged in industry including not only manufacturing but mining and quarrying, work of construction and equipment, and the supply of electricity, gas, and water. Italy's major industries are engineering, textiles, chemicals, and metallurgy.

Military position of Italy in the 1960s was defined in the Treaty of Paris in 1947, which imposed on Italy certain limits concerning fortifications on some frontiers, strength of the armed forces, possessions of arms, etc. The development of the international situation, however, has meant that some of
the conditions were not applied. In 1949 Italy joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a founder member. The armed forces are divided into three services: Army, Navy and Air Force. Compulsory military service is 15 months for the Army and the Air Force and 24 months for the Navy.

Italy became a member of the European Defence Community in 1952 and of the Western European Union in 1955. It signed the Treaty of Rome (1957), which created the European Economic Community in 1958. After admission to the United Nations in 1955, Italy participated actively in numerous tasks undertaken by this organization, such as the peace force sent to the Congo in 1961, and took part in the various commissions and agencies, supporting decisions of great importance involving the Congo, the Near East and, more recently, Cyprus and Rhodesia.

During the Korean War, Italy sent a medical team to Korea. In addition, Italy had voluntarily granted more than two million dollars for the reconstruction and relief efforts in Korea to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). The official diplomatic relation with the Republic of Korea has maintained since December 1957 when the two nations mutually set up the legation in Rome and Seoul. In January 1959, the legation was raised to the status of embassy.

**Italy's Decision**

As Italy was not a member of the United Nations until 1955, she was not in a position to send armed forces to Korea at that time. Meanwhile, Italy was troubled with many domestic problems following the end of World War II. In August 1950, the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva sent a circular letter to all the Red Cross organizations saying that medical units were necessary in Korea in order to assist the victims of the war. As a member of the International Red Cross, Italy offered medical assistance to Korea before long.

Pursuant to the instructions received from the Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Italian Red Cross began to organize a hospital unit to be dispatched to Korea. It planned to obtain a lot of medical equipment and supplies, and to select the members who would serve in Korea. These selected members had taken an orientation course to help carrying out their duties in Korea. All sort of these preparations took almost a year.
Section 2. Arrival and Organization

Arrival

On 16 October 1951, an Italian medical unit, known as the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68, was about to depart for Korea. As the ship lifted her anchor up and slowly cut through the calm waters of the Mediterranean, a large crowd gathered there and saw it off waving their hands in good wishes.

On 16 November the ship came to anchor in Pusan, Korea's southern terminus port, after a month-long voyage across the other side of the globe. In total 67 Italians began to disembark in the midst of many flag-waving people with hearty cheers.

When the debarkation was completed, the Commanding Officer of the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68, Captain Luigi Coia, was met by the representatives of the UN Command to discuss the future role of the hospital. In the meeting the Italian medical team was ordered to set up a hospital in the Seoul area.

After a few days in Pusan, the Italian medical personnel moved by train for Seoul. After installing in a school building in the Yongdungpo area, the Italian Hospital started its first medical service in Korea on 6 December 1951.

Organization

The Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 was composed of seven medical officers, two administrators, one pharmacist, one chaplain, six nurses, six noncommissioned officers and 44 enlisted men. These 67 Italians were volunteers who willingly participated in their country's medical assistance for the wounded in the Korean War. The Italian Hospital underwent only one contingent-rotation during the three-year service in Korea. In the first contingent the Commander of Hospital was Captain Luigi Coia, and he was succeeded by Major Fabio Pennacchi on 29 August 1952. In addition to these Italians, there were some American liaison officers and approximately 40 Korean civilians in service with them.

As mentioned above, the Italian Hospital was installed in a school building at Yongdungpo in Seoul. At the beginning this Italian medical unit was a
field hospital with 50 beds, which were divided into the departments of medicine, surgery and pediatrics. Besides, the hospital also had following departments: first-aid, dentistry, X-ray, pharmacy and pathology. The large number of outpatients of surgical, medical, pediatric, ophthalmic and tuberculous cases were examined and treated in the out-door dispensary, which was installed in two large quonset huts near the main building. So the whole departments of the Italian Hospital were surgery, medicine, pediatrics, ophthalmology dentistry, X-ray, autotuberculosis, first-aid, pharmacy and pathology.

The Italian Hospital maintained the structure of field hospital of 50-bed capacity until 30 November 1952, when it was burnt down by a violent fire perhaps caused by the Communist partisans. After the fire the hospital was reconstructed with many barracks and the whole function of the hospital resumed on 23 February 1953.

The new hospital got the structure of field hospital group with 145 beds. But in emergency the bed capacity could be expanded to 200. Of the total beds surgical department got 80, medical department had 50 and pediatric department took 15. This reconstructed hospital was composed of same departments as the previous one had. But by adding more medical equipment, the medical care facilities were improved.

Three freight cars in full of the medical goods and equipment supplied and financed by the Italian Red Cross, enabled the hospital to commence treatment immediately for the wounded soldiers. Most of consumable medical goods were supplied by the Italian Red Cross and the rest of them by the US medical authorities. It received some equipment from the US Army on loan basis to maintain its operational capacity and capability.

How to transport a large amount of medical supplies was chronically in question at that time. However the excellent help of the US transport unit brought it to solution.

Section 3. Major Activity

The Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 received and treated patients in Korea during the period from 6 December 1951 to the end of 1954. At the time the Italian Hospital just started its activity in Seoul, the bitter Korean winter was already at its height. Snow was falling and for the Italians who had been enjoying their warm weather in Italy and not fully accustomed to this kind of cold winter condition, it was a time of difficulty and hardship. It would had
been too cold for the surgeons to operate, but Italian surgeons performed their major operations through day and night without rest.

Even though the tempo of operation on the battle fields became slow with the initiation of peace talks on 10 July 1951, there ensued severe outpost battles endlessly up and down the hills, although in small-scale, all along the frontlines. Thus, the battle casualties were mounted considerably heavy. In consequence, the Italian Hospital was kept busy with treatments of the wounded soldiers from the beginning.

For the duration of fighting, the foremost mission of the hospital was treating the wounded soldiers. But as the number of evacuees from the battle fields became to decrease, the hospital began to give medical cares for the Korean civilians. From this time onward it treated both the military personnel from the UN forces as well as the local civilians.

Departmental statistics relating to patients examined and treated in the Italian Hospital during the period from 14 December 1951 to 21 August 1952 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Inpatients</th>
<th>Outpatients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine and Pediatrics</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>19,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgery</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>10,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ophthalmology</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antituberculosis</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentistry</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathology</td>
<td></td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-ray</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hospital had treated more than 40,000 patients in total during the eight-month period. It was a great accomplishments for a field hospital of only 50-bed capacity.

On 15 August 1952, General Mark W. Clark, the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC, visited the Italian Hospital. After inspecting patients being hospitalized and the hospital's medical care facilities, he applauded its outstanding services in support of the United Nations effort in Korea.

On the morning of 17 September 1952, a train accident happened at Kuro-dong near Yongdungpo Station, and claimed a lot of victims. The Italian Hospital, on receiving the news, dispatched emergency team to give first-aid on the spot. Bandaging wounds, applying tourniquets, putting in splints and giving sedatives, the dedicated Italian healers busily treated the wounded ci-
vilians with other medical teams. It cured about 150 injured, of whom 30 serious cases were brought to the hospital for further hospitalization. In consequence of devotional medical attention for two months, most of the patients gained the complete recovery.

The Minister of Transportation of Korea expressed his gratitude for Italians' prompt medical service in this accident. At the same time Major Fabio Pennachi, Captain Pietro Poloni, Captain Vittorio Rossi and the Chief Nurse Annamaria Rosi were awarded for their faithful accomplishments with the letters of appreciation by the Minister.

On 6 October 1952, the President of Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, visited the Hospital. He awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 citing for its outstanding and excellent performance of duty during the period from 16 December 1951 to the date. This citation carried with it the right to wear the Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the hospital, who served in Korea during the period stated therein. At this ceremony the President of Korea expressed his appreciation for the Italian medical personnel's humanitarian services in taking care of the wounded UN soldiers and Korean civilians.

On 30 November 1952, the Italian Hospital was burnt down by a violent fire. But fortunately enough all the patients were saved by the prompt actions of the whole staff. There were no victims and no wounded but only a small part of the equipment was lost. Prompt preparations to restore the medical facilities were launched by the Italian and the UN authorities. After three months efforts, the new hospital building was constructed and the whole function of the hospital resumed on 23 February 1953.

The routine sick calls were held from 0900 to 1700 hours everyday except Sunday. About 300 patients were consulted on a daily basis, most of whom were local civilians. Of these many outpatients some serious cases were admitted to hospital for further treatment. As the number of civilian patients was increased, heavier-than-normal workloads were placed on the hospital. The Italian doctors and nurses were busy working amid the mourns, screams and delirious ravings of the patients. The hospital displayed superior performance in carrying out its assigned mission.

During the period from 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, the Italian Hospital had treated a total of 1,639 inpatients and 74,600 outpatients. Of the total outpatients, the department of medicine had 35,000; surgery, 15,000; ophthalmology, 6,200; antituberculosis, 18,400. The details of 1,639 inpatients are shown in the following statistics:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Medicine &amp; Pediatrics</th>
<th>Department of Surgery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total patients</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharged patients</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal case</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total days of hospitalization</td>
<td>15,061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the critical inpatients were troubled with intestinal parasites. But the treatment including insecticides, multivitamin pills, invigorants, hypodermic injection and blood transfusion recovered these patients before long.

The tragic war of three years, one month and two days eventually came to an end with signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953. But the Italian Hospital did not cease its medical service as there were still a lot of patients in the hospital. It decided to prolong its mission in Korea about a year.

From the time when all the wounded soldiers in the hospital were evacuated to their respective home countries, the Italian Hospital shifted its major role to provide substantial aid in both medical and social relief fields for Korean civilians. Since the nearly whole Korean peninsula had been ravaged by the war for three years, the relief and rehabilitation program was one of the serious postwar problems the Republic of Korea had faced with. In this juncture the Italian Hospital made utmost effort within its capacity to help the relief program.

On December 1954, the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 received the order from Italy to return home. On 2 January 1955, it left Korea for Italy with warm send-off by the Korean Government and its people.

Section 4. Epilogue

Total Achievements

A total of 128 Italians had served in the hospital during the whole period of its stay in Korea. They were 19 officers, eight voluntary nurses, 12 noncommissioned officers and 89 enlisted men.

During the three-year period of its stay in Korea, the Italian Red Cross Hospital 68, as one of the crusaders for the cause of freedom, had achieved the great works and deeds, for which the whole Koreans are so grateful and will
The Italian Red Cross Hospital

remember always. The followings are given its statistic features the Italian Hospital had achieved during the whole period.

Surgical operations 3,297
In-patients (surgery, medicine and pediatrics) 7,250
Out-patients treated in the departments of medicine, surgery, ophthalmology, anti-
tuberculosis and first-aid 222,885
Dental department 1,155
Pathological tests 8,444
X-ray examinations 17,115
Total days of hospitalization 131,513

Honours and Commendations

The Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 and its members were honoured with a number of the citations and the letters of appreciation for the outstandingly commendable services the hospital had rendered to the Republic of Korea as well as the United Nations Command during the Korean War. For example, among the many others, as previously mentioned, the hospital was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea twice, one on 6 October 1952 and the other on 20 December 1954.

All the Italian personnel who served with the hospital in Korea received the Service Medal in the Korean War. They were also entitled to bear the membership ribbon of the Republic of Korea Red Cross.

Further, Major Fabio Pennacchi, the Commander of the Italian Hospital from 29 August 1952 to the end, was awarded the Order of Military Merit Chungmu with Gold Star on 18 August 1954 by the Republic of Korea for his meritorious leadership. Second Lieutenant Armando Ricchiardì who served as the Adjutant also received the Letters of Appreciation from the Mayor of Seoul and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Seoul. Besides, there were too numerous to note that the hospital itself as well as the personnel received the letters of commendation and appreciation both from the military and civil authorities.
CHAPTER IV  THE NORWEGIAN MOBILE ARMY HOSPITAL

Section 1.  Introduction to Norway

The Kingdom of Norway is a constitutional and hereditary monarchy of northern Europe with the total area of 324,219 square kilometers excluding Svalbard and the Spitsbergen group of arctic islands. The country borders Sweden to the east, except in the extreme north where Norway adjoins Finland and the USSR. On the north it is bounded by the Barents sea, on the northwest and west, the Norwegian sea and the North sea respectively.

Norway is the most thinly populated country in Europe with an estimated population of 3,917,773 in 1972, about 13 per cent of whom lives in Oslo, the capital and largest city of the country. It is not only an important seaport but the nation’s chief industrial, commercial and cultural center.

Due to the warm North Atlantic current and air drift across the Atlantic Ocean onto the shores of Norway, gentle weather continues all the year round. The 80 per cent of the country is mostly highland, where forests are chiefly made of conifers covering about a quarter of the land area. In the Norwegian coast running southwest to northeast, great and spectacular fjords are shaped characteristic of precipitous sides and great but irregular depths.

The above-stated specialties made them mostly engaged in agriculture, fishery and forestry, which rendered great contributions to the postwar economic reconstruction. The agricultural population is decreasing and cereals produced are very restricted as well. Nearly 80 per cent of grain harvested is barley and most of the rest oats, meeting the 70 per cent domestic consumption. Forestry and fishery is also ranked as the main stock of Norwegian export. Besides, various industries including the mining are developed as the result of the development of cheap and plentiful hydroelectric power. Aluminum and other metals, fish, paperboard and pulp, ships, machinery, and fertilizers are exported. Principal imports were ships and other transport equipment, machinery and apparatus, fuels, ores, iron and steel and textiles. The chief trading partners are the United Kingdom, West Germany, Sweden, and Denmark.

The king is supreme commander of the armed forces. Under the Defense
The Norwegian Mobile Army Hospital

Department is a defense staff with combined control of all land, sea and air forces. There is a system of local command areas for the three services. A considerable reconstruction of the armed forces was started in 1954 and accelerated after 1949, when Norway joined NATO. Compulsory military service in peacetime is fixed at 12 months in the Army and 15 months in the Navy and Air Forces.

After World War II Norway faced a mammoth task of reconstruction, especially in the north where the Germans had destroyed many towns in 1944. Much of this had been completed by 1949. The abortive Scandinavian Defense Alliance negotiations in 1948–1949, and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 convinced the Norwegians that they would prefer to belong to a strong defensive alliance. Norway joined NATO in 1949, and in 1952 joined with its Scandinavian neighbours in the Nordic Council. Norway, however, did not wholeheartedly participate in the negotiations (1954–1958) for a Nordic Common Market, its large mercantile marine and dependence on the British market making it seek a wider commercial grouping, such as the European Free Trade Association, which it joined by signing the Stockholm Convention in 1959.

Since Norway became a member state of the U.N., it has contributed greatly for the United Nations cause in many countries as a member nation of the following organizations: United Nations Observer Group in India and Pakistan; United Nations Forces in Korea; United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine; United Nations Emergency Forces in Egypt; United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon; United Nations Yemen Observer Mission; United Nations Control of the British Air Withdrawal from Jordan.

Norway voted for the recognition of the Government of the Republic of Korea as “the only and lawful country in the Korean peninsula” at the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly held in Paris on 12 December 1948. It was the one among the nine nations voted for a strong resolution in support of the Republic of Korea when the U.N. Security Council convened an emergency meeting on 25 June (New York time) to take a collective action against the North Korean Communist aggressors. Moreover, Norway, after the war, made a voluntary contribution in the construction and operation of the National Medical Center in Seoul.

The official diplomatic relation with Korea has continued since February 1959 when the two nations set up the legation concurrently in Seoul and Oslo. Further, the two nations raised the legation to the status of embassy.
Section 2. Motives

When the Republic of Korea was invaded by the North Korean Communists on 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on 27 June, New York time, requesting member states to assist Korea in whatever forms. Norway voted in favor of this resolution.

Accordingly the Norwegian Government began to consider the form of the Norwegian aid to be provided. Several alternatives were proposed such as the provision of transport ships or the establishment of a refugee camp including a hospital in Japan. The Norwegian State Department approached the Norwegian Red Cross, asking a suitable contribution, and to take charge of necessary arrangements. Initially, the Norwegian Red Cross proposed to participate in the civilians help in Korea. But the U.N. rather preferred for Norway to send a military hospital in support of the UN forces in Korea.

At the request by the Norwegian State Department the Norwegian Red Cross worked out plans for such a contribution. On 2 March 1951, the Norwegian Parliament approved a proposal to establish a hospital in Korea. In mid-March 1951, a separate administrative office for the Korean aid, staffed by civilians with occasional assistance from military officers, was established in Oslo to meet many problems related with the activation of a hospital.

The administrative channel for the hospital in Korea was handled by the Norwegian Red Cross on behalf of the Norwegian State Department until 1 November 1951, when the Surgeon General took over the administration on behalf of the Norwegian Defense Department.

On 16 April 1951, two Norwegian officers were dispatched to Japan to make contact with the medical authorities of the U.S. Far East Command. In addition, professor Carl Semb, a representative of the Norwegian Government, went to Japan via Washington to discuss about the establishment of the Norwegian hospital with the UNC officials. It was decided that Norway should participate with a mobile surgical hospital under the UN Command in Korea. And the hospital equipment was to be bought by the Norwegian Government from US stocks in Korea or Japan. It was also agreed that the United States should have the right, but not the duty, to re-purchase the equipment when the hospital was discontinued.
Section 3. Establishment and Organization

Establishment

On 31 May 1951, the first contingent of the Norwegian medical unit came to Japan by air. During its stay in Japan, the unit received the medical equipment sufficient enough to establish a 60-bed mobile surgical hospital from the US medical authorities in Japan. Further, its members were given a short and intensive orientation course about the general situation of the Korean War, equipment handling, military medical service, etc.

After arriving in Korea on 22 June 1951, a total of 83 Norwegians, commanded by Colonel Hermann Ramstad, were welcomed by representatives of the Republic of Korea Government, senior officers of the UN Command and many Korean people. A short welcome ceremony was followed by a meeting held between the Norwegian senior officers and the UN forces' medical authorities to discuss the details of the Norwegian team's medical activity in Korea. It was
concluded at the meeting to set up a mobile surgical hospital in the area of the
1 US Corps under the Eighth US Army's operational control.

In close cooperation with the US medical authorities the Norwegian medical
unit completely established a hospital in many tents at the site some 19 kilo-
meters north of Seoul and 14 kilometers behind the front. After officially
opening on 19 July 1951, the hospital, named the Norwegian Mobile Army
Surgical Hospital (NORMASH), commenced its medical missions for the several
divisions of the 1 US Corps.

Representing an independent Norwegian unit among the UN forces, the
hospital functioned as a part of the Eighth US Army's medical service on equal
footing with equivalent American hospital units both medically and otherwise.
Hereafter the hospital's name is referred to either as the Norwegian Hospital or
NORMASH.

Organization

With respect to the personnel set-up it is to be noted that the standard
for an American MASH at the out-break of the Korean War called for 126
persons. The first contingent of NORMASH was composed of 83 Norwegians.
The additional personnel requirements were planned to be filled with Korean
civilians. Upon the arrival of the first contingent, it appeared, however, that the
American MASH had an increased personnel set-up of 180 including about 70
Koreans. Therefore, the Eighth US Army reinforced NORMASH with 40
American medical personnel, an American liaison officer and 10 to 14 adminis-
trative overhead personnel. Personnel set-up was increased to 106 Norwegians
when the second contingent came in. Consequently the 40 American medical
personnel left the hospital. In addition, there were 18–26 Korean guards and
40–60 Korean civilian labourers. Thus, the total number of personnel in the
hospital became approximately 190 from the second contingent onward.

NORMASH was composed of two major sections, hospital and adminis-
tration. The Hospital Section had 59 persons whereof 14 doctors, one dentist,
one pharmacist, 18 nurses and 25 medical corpsmen, while the Administrative
Section comprised 47 men of whom 16 administrators, six cookers, ten guarders,
ten drivers and four mechanics. The following shows the components of each
section of NORMASH:

Hospital Section : Receiving, X-ray, Laboratory,
Dispensary, Dentistry, Preoperative,
Surgery, Postoperative, Holding, Pharmacy.
The Norwegian Mobile Army Hospital

Administrative Section: Adjutant, Chaplain, Guard, Supply, Transportation.

The tour of duty for each contingent was six months. During the whole period in Korea the Norwegian Hospital underwent seven contingent-rotations. Out of 623 men who served with the hospital, more than 100 have voluntarily extended their service to more than one year. The following shows the roster of the Commanders of NORMASH:

1st contingent Colonel Hermann Ramstad 1 May 1951–31 Dec 1951
2nd contingent Colonel Arne Hvostef 1 Dec 1951–15 May 1952
3rd contingent Colonel Erling Falsen Hjort 3 May 1952–22 Sept 1952
4th contingent Colonel Petter Ingvald Sundt 12 Sept 1952–30 Nov 1952
Colonel Erling Borch-Johnsen 7 Nov 1952–14 May 1953
5th contingent Colonel Egil Moe 10 Apr 1953–21 Oct 1953
Colonel Erl Thoresen 11 Sept 1953–28 Feb 1954

From the beginning an American liaison officer was assigned to the Norwegian Hospital to establish contacts and transmit orders and supplies between the Norwegian Hospital and the Eighth US Army. This liaison service gave many helps to the hospital especially in the contingent-shift and transportation of medical supplies and equipment. As the liaison service became important and necessary, the Norwegian Hospital dispatched a Norwegian liaison officer to the UNC. Usually the adjutant was appointed as the liaison officer. The main responsibility of the liaison officer was to carry out the coordinated efforts between the NORMASH, the UN Command and the Norwegian delegation in Japan. In the first contingent both the Commander (Chief Medical Officer) and the Chief Administrative Officer had to visit the UN Command in Tokyo in order to establish the necessary contacts. But later this activity was performed by the liaison officer.

During the initial fighting in Korea the standard for an American MASH had been considerably increased in terms of capacity and equipment beyond the original plan. From the regular 60-bed hospital, the capacity was often increased up to 200.

The agreement between Norway and the U.S.A. did not contain any provision for a similar increase of the hospital. But after having talks with the US authorities, it became possible to increase the equipment and thereby also the capacity of the hospital. NORMASH had complete and first-class set of
surgical instruments and thus enabled the hospital treated any type of injury. Even if the directives said that a MASH should evacuate its patients speedily, but the equipment was available to take care of patients who could not immediately be transported to the rear medical installations. Additionally, the Norwegian Hospital had given adequate hospitalization to patients who would be discharged within three days.

The security of the hospital was carried out by the guards which was composed of a Norwegian and a Korean platoons. Defense of the compound was arranged for both ground armed attack and air-bombing. NORMASH had, including the guards, only 50 per cent weapons equipment, which meant that only part of the personnel could participate in the armed defense of the hospital. Even though the hospital carried Red Cross marks, it was ordered that ditches should be prepared for both patients and personnel as the Communists often raided into even medical units.
Section 4. Major Activity

Main Tasks

NORMASH had operated during the period 19 July 1951–18 October 1954. For the duration of fightings, the main task was to treat military patients whereas civilians could be treated within the limited extent. After the truce on 27 July 1953 it became easier to treat civilian patients. Another difference was that prior to the armistice all patients needing more than three days stay in hospital had to be evacuated, while after the armistice the patients could be kept in hospital until cured perfectly.

In addition to inpatients, the hospital also had a large number of outpatients both military and civilian. Most of them came to the hospital for ordinary consultations because the Norwegian Hospital was the nearest place where they could see a doctor, but some were referred for specialized consultation by their own doctors to the NORMASH’s X-ray department or specialists.

Number of Patients Treated

The hospital had 14,755 inpatients in total during the whole period. There are no accurate records of all patients examined and treated as outpatients, but available records show 55,970 men. Additionally, some 1,000 were registered as outpatients at the X-ray department or were examined by the various specialists without being registered. A considerable number of patients were also, in rush periods, examined and received first aid without registration. The estimated number of patients treated by the hospital was over 90,000. In addition the Norwegian doctors and nurses also gave medical assistance to some civilian hospitals in Seoul during their off-duty hours.

Inpatients

The hospital had treated a total of 14,755 inpatients whereof 12,201 before and 2,554 after the truce. The break-down by nationality of these inpatients is
as follow: Australia 447, Belgium and Luxembourg 130, Canada 1,241, Colombia 53, Ethiopia 68, France 39, Greece 62, India 3, the Netherlands 28, New Zealand 181, Norway 50, the Philippines 21, Korea 2,082 soldiers and 2,720 civilians, Sweden 1, Thailand 50, Turkey 28, the United Kingdom 2,095, the United States of America 5,259, Communist Korea and China (POW) 172, and unknown 24.

The only participating UN countries not represented among the NORMASH’s inpatients were Denmark and South Africa.

Of the 14,755 inpatients 4,317 were discharged as cured, 10,288 transferred to other hospitals while 150 (1.2%) died in the hospital. In this latter figure is included those that died on arrival and prior to any treatment being carried out. On the other hand, the figure does not include those who died after they had left NORMASH.

**Duration of Stay**

As mentioned above, all the patients had to be evacuated to the rear medical installations as soon as possible in the period up to the armistice. In many cases this entailed that the patient was got out on the same day he arrived at the hospital, even before the patient had recovered from anesthesia. For this reason the average length of stay per patient in the hospital was only 3.4 days. But in the period after the armistice, when patients could be kept more freely in the hospital, the average length of stay increased to 12.3 days. The total number of hospital days recorded was 73,637, whereof 42,020 before and 31,617 after the armistice.

**Surgical Operation**

During the whole period of its medical service in Korea, the Norwegian Hospital had performed more than 9,600 surgical operations, thus approximately eight operations per day. The number of surgeries per day varied between one and 64. In the total figures shown in the above included both minor and major operations. But in case several operations were performed on one patient it was recorded as one.

Most of the operations were done under general anesthesia using intravenous pentothal or citopan plus ether and oxygen. Local anesthetics were used only for very minor wounds and a few delayed primary closures.
Employment of spinal anesthesia was very limited. Curasit was used from 1953 in many cases with good results.

Before, during and after the operation, patients received blood, salt water, sugar water, dextran and aminosol intravenously to the necessary degree. All the wounded were given tetanus shots in addition to antibiotics in dosages of around 0.5-1 gram streptomycin plus 0.5-1 million units penicillin 2-3 times a day.

**X-ray Department**

The X-ray department had the most working pressure within the hospital. During fighting periods on the battle fields the department was fully occupied with the wounded, and during lulls the military units in the area took the
opportunity to have their troopers examined lungs.

During the whole period a total of 36,593 patients were X-ray examined, i.e. an average 31 per day. It is estimated that the department took altogether 183,000 X-ray pictures.

**Dental Service**

As the first and the second contingents did not have any dentist, the US medical authorities dispatched an American dentist to the NORMASH. This American dentist was withdrawn at the end of the second contingent because a Norwegian surgeon had the orthodontic training and could undertake emergency dental treatment. From August 1952 a Norwegian dentist was assigned to the hospital and began dental service. During the rest period, in all five dental officers, with the rank of captain or lieutenant, served with the hospital.

The main responsibility of dentist was to assist in treating all patients with damages to the jaws and to perform regular dental treatment on patients from nearby military units. This dental service was also given to the Korean civilians to the extent of permitted limit. It is estimated more than 8,000 patients were treated by the Norwegian dentist.

---

**Section 5. Epilogue**

**Total Achievements**

During the period from 19 July 1951 to 18 October 1954, the Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital had greatly contributed to the United Nation's cause in the Korean War by rendering its humanitarian medical service to the UN forces and the Korean civilians.

During the period, a total of 623 Norwegians comprising 80 doctors, five dentists, six pharmacists, seven chaplains, 111 nurses, 22 male nurses, 98 administrative officers and noncommissioned officers and 294 enlisted men had served with the hospital. These Norwegians had examined and treated more than 90,000 patients including 14,755 inpatients, and more than 9,600 surgical operations were carried out by the Norwegian surgeons.
Awards and Decorations

NORMASH and its members were awarded many citations and decorations for the exceptionally distinguished service in support of the United Nations cause in the Korean War. The Norwegian Hospital was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea twice, the first in November 1952 and the second in October 1953. It was also given the Award of the Meritorious Commendation by the Secretary of the US Army. Additionally, some individual participants were awarded following decorations:

- Republic of Korea:
  - 3 Order of Military Merit Ulchi with Gold Star
  - 2 Order of Military Merit Ulchi with Silver Star

- United States:
  - 2 Legion of Merit
  - 11 Bronze Star

The Norwegian diplomatic minister in Tokyo visited the hospital several times. On one occasion, following a visit to Korea on 9 September 1952, Minister Reusch wrote a report to the Norwegian State Department on the basis of meetings he had with General Van Fleet, Commander of the Eight US Army; Major General Kendall, Commander of the I US Corps; Major General West, Commander of the Commonwealth Division. The report in part read, "NORMASH and its personnel were highly respected by all units involved. The organization of the hospital is perfect both with the respect to the military as well as the medical aspects, and even a nonprofessional could see how useful and efficient they carried out their missions... I do not believe that Norway could have provided a more valuable contribution to the United Nations cause in the Korean War than what has taken place through the activities of this hospital."

On departure from Korea, the Commander of NORMASH was given a Letter of Appreciation by the Commander of the Eighth US Army. It read: "As the Norwegian Army Surgical Hospital prepares to depart Korea, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for your many contributions to the United Nations cause in Korea. The maintenance of consistently high professional standards and a courageous, unselfish devotion to the care of the sick and the wounded have earned you the respect and gratitude of thousands of former patients, and of the many nations which they represent. On your departure for Norway, the officers and men of Eighth Army join me in wishing you Gods speed."

After their return home, the Norwegian Red Cross bestowed its Honorary Medal to all successive nine Commanders of NORMASH and gave its Distinguished
Triumphal returnees being honored with the Korean War Service Medal on 2 October 1955.

Medal to all personnel in the first contingent. The Norwegian Defense Department subsequently awarded all Norwegians who served more than two months with the NORMASH the Medal of Participation.
CHAPTER V  THE SWEDISH RED CROSS HOSPITAL

Section 1.  General Introduction

Introduction to Sweden

The Kingdom of Sweden, with the capital in Stockholm, is a constitutional monarchy of northern Europe lying on the eastern side of the Scandinavian Peninsula. A long frontier runs along the Scandinavian mountain range in the west, dividing Sweden from Norway, while a shorter line in the northeast separates Sweden from Finland. Both of these boundaries cut, for the most part, through barren land and sparsely populated areas. In the southwest, the Sound separates Sweden from the fourth Nordic country, Denmark.

The length is 1,574 kilometers, the extreme breadth is about 400 kilometers, and the total area, inclusive of inland waters, is 449,793 square kilometers. In land area, Sweden is the fourth largest country in Europe. The population in 1971 was estimated at 8,100,000.

Sweden's relatively mild climate is unique for countries that lie so far north. Prevailing west winds and the Gulf Stream, the huge ocean current that brings warm water from the West Indies to the North Atlantic, make it possible to grow crops even in the northern parts of Sweden and to cultivate forests profitably at latitudes with tundra and glaciers.

Modern war affects the entire population. All sections of society are thus included in the Swedish defense planning. Against total war a total defense system has been organized. Its components are the military, civil, economic and psychological defenses. The aim of the total defense as fixed by the Government is “to be so well prepared for war that it will served to maintain peace. The different sections of the total defense shall cooperate and support each other in order to achieve maximum efficiency.” A supreme commander coordinate activities of the services and directs military planning. Military service is compulsory for all males between ages 18 and 47.

Sweden’s foreign policy can best be described as a policy of neutrality.
Its goal is to contribute to the preservation of peace. Its principle of nonalignment is intended to keep Sweden neutral if war should break out. The principle of neutrality, however, does not imply that Sweden has committed herself to any kind of ideological neutrality. In fact Sweden is strongly rooted in the democratic ideals of the western world.

Sweden’s neutrality has enabled the United Nations to use Swedish supervisors, observers, technicians and military units for assignments in Korea, Kashmir, Lebanon, the Israeli-UAR border, the Congo and Cyprus.

All through World War II Sweden was a shelter for refugees from German oppression, not only for Norwegians, Danes, and Finns but also for Balts and Jews of all nationalities. After the war, relief, largely in the form of credits, amounting to about six hundred million dollars was extended mainly to Norway and Denmark, and medical supplies, food, and clothing were sent wherever needed.

It is in the common interest of the Nordic countries to contribute to peace and stability in Scandinavia, and to avoid friction and conflict in this part of the world. In this, they have succeeded in making Scandinavia one of the most stable areas in the world after the war. The partnership of the North is manifested in the Nordic Council, established in 1952. The member states are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

During the Korean War, Sweden contributed its medical assistance to Korea. It was through members of this hospital team that Sweden established its first contact with Korea.

After the war, Sweden had taken a part in establishing the National Medical Center in Seoul.

Today, the Kingdom of Sweden has maintained its official diplomatic relation with the Republic of Korea ever since February 1959 when the two states established mutually the legation in Seoul and Stockholm. Further, the two nations raised the respective legations to the status of embassy in November 1960.

Sweden’s Decision

Following the United Nations Security Council’s resolution of 7 July 1950, which called upon the U.N. member nations to help the Republic of Korea, the Swedish Government, on 14 July 1950, informed the U.N. that it had come to the conclusion that the most appropriate assistance would be to equip and dispatch a field hospital to Korea at Swedish expense.

As its decision to send a hospital unit to Korea was satisfied by the
Parliament on 10 August 1950, the Swedish Government requested the Swedish Red Cross to work out the various preparations in detail. To cope with the whole workload connected with the selection of personnel, procurement of medical equipment and supplies, the Swedish Red Cross established immediately a separate department headed by Sven Rydman.

Section 2. Arrival and Organization

Arrival

On 24 August 1950, the Swedish Red Cross medical team, comprising about 160 personnel, departed Stockholm for Korea. After a long voyage through the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, it arrived at the port of Pusan, Korea, on 28 September.

Immediately after a brief but warm welcome ceremony at the pier, Colonel Carl Erik Groth, the Commander of the Swedish medical unit, and his staff members were met with the medical representatives of the UN Command, and the Swedish medical unit was ordered during the meeting to set up a hospital in Pusan under the operational control of the Eighth US Army effective on 28 September 1950.

The Swedes wasted no time for establishing the hospital as they found there a scene of hectic activities. With the thoughtful consideration of the Pusan Mayor, the hospital was installed in the two-story buildings of the Pusan Commercial High School. The hospital was named as the Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital (hereunder refers to as the Swedish Hospital).

Organization

The Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital was composed of approximately 160 personnel including 10 doctors, 30 nurses, some technicians and administrative overhead members.

It had originally been intended that the hospital would start to work as a 200-bed field hospital, but the urgent and large requirements of medical service at that time forced it to expand to a 400-bed hospital and 50 more later. This meant that the Swedish Hospital would take part in the invaluable roles of
the medical service from the beginning. This well-equipped Swedish Hospital had following departments: Surgery, medicine, pediatrics, dentistry, ophthalmology and X-ray. In addition to these departments it had a laboratory, a modern-equipped operation room, a pharmacy, living quarters, etc.

In the early May of 1952, an outpatient clinic, separated as an annex to the hospital, was established to examine and treat many Korean civilians.

The Administration and General Service Section of the Swedish Hospital dealt with the duty-shift of the members, the liaison activity with the Republic of Korea agencies and the United Nations Command, the payment of salaries and the maintenance of the equipment. The security of the hospital was taken care by a guard team composing of the Swedes and Koreans. The Swedish Hospital rotated its personnel in small groups instead of rotating the whole contingent. After their arrival in Korea the new members were accustomed themselves to the medical service in Korea through the intensive on-the-job training course.
Section 3. Major Activity

The Swedish Hospital had served, as a medical unit representing Sweden, in Korea during the period from October 1950 to April 1957. All along the period the Swedish Hospital and its members had actively taken in the treatments of the wounded UN soldiers and Korean civilians. However, unfortunately, the lack of data and records on hand makes it impossible to mention the whole activities of the Swedish Hospital in Korea.

The Swedish Hospital, as previously mentioned, initiated its first medical service in Korea in the early October 1950. Before long the hospital was opened, many wounded UN soldiers came to the hospital for medical treatments.

In the meantime, taking a glance at the battle situation at this time, the ROK and UN forces were now advancing northward resembling the high sea almost at will, after they stepped up the general counteroffensive from the Nakdong River Line in mid-September. Consequently, the enemy forces were in general retreat completely losing their will to fight.

This heavy battles along the banks of the Nakdong River made numerous casualties from both sides inevitable. At the time the most wounded soldiers of the ROK and UN troops were operated and treated at hospitals in the Pusan area. Of these UN allied patients many critical cases were evacuated for further treatment to the evacuation hospital in Japan by either ships or planes.

Since the military and civilian medical facilities in Korea still fell greatly short meeting the needs, the Swedish Hospital had to engaged in busy works as soon as it began to function. There rushed so many wounded soldiers day after day from the battle field. Nevertheless, all the members of the hospital concentrated all their efforts to take care of the wounded. They cured and nursed the sick persons and the wounded denying themselves all comforts. Four-hundred beds of the hospital were completely filled all the time with numerous wounded soldiers. Even though these life-saving services kept them from rest, they went on fighting against bruises and diseases without complaints.

By late October 1950 the advance of the UN forces reached the Yalu River, but the aggression of the Chinese Communist forces changed the war situation. Subsequently the friendly forces stepped into a general withdrawal from the north. There were thousands of refugees shuffling along on all the southward
roads. During this winter quite a lot of wounded and frostbite casualties were occurred all along the battle fields.

In the meantime, the Swedish Hospital had been engaging in treating and caring the wounded. Surgeons performed complex operations daily and routinary, nurses cared the mourns with their whole hearts, and the administrative personnel improved its medical management. Consequently the hospital displayed superior performance in carrying out its assigned missions. Besides the original mission of carrying out the medical service for the UN soldiers, the Swedish Hospital had given active assistance to the Korean civilians since June 1951.

This relief works began with helping a refugee camp near a Catholic church in Pusan. The Swedes provided substantial aid in both medical and social fields: Disinfection of the camp, basic medical care including hundreds of vaccinations and relief goods such as food and clothing. Thanks to the relief efforts rendered by the hospital the refugee camp was greatly improved in either environment or facility. At the same time the Swedish nurses also extended their warm helping hands to the camp. They voluntarily gave medical assistance to the refugees during their off-duty hours. Many critical patients of the camp were transferred to the Swedish Hospital for further treatment.

After the beginning of the armistice talks on 10 July 1951, the tide of battle was becoming to lull. The Swedes treated
only the wounded soldiers during the fightings, but during lulls they had plenty of opportunities to observe the living conditions of the civilian population being ravaged by the war disaster caused by the Communist aggressors. In all parts of the country the picture was the same: material destruction, human misery and disorganization. Millions of refugees from the Communist North were scattered all over the country.

To the Swedes these pitiful sights of civilians were a shocking experience, so they really wanted to help the Korean civilians. Since then the hospital had provided medical care of highest quality to the Korean civilians. Many Korean inpatients were permitted to hospitalize, and numerous outpatients were examined and received first-aid by the Swedish Hospital. The X-ray department had the most working pressure. The X-ray technicians busily examined many civilian patients, who were transferred from the civilian hospitals.

Besides, some Swedish nurses were dispatched to both the Railway and the Chokki Hospitals in Pusan to tender their service. At about this time the two hospitals were poorly equipped and their medical supplies were far from adequate. Therefore, the Swedish medical unit supported them with its medical personnel and supplies.

Since early autumn of 1951 the Swedish physicians and surgeons used to visit these hospitals once a week to give Korean doctors their technical assistance. There they performed many medical treatment to the Koreans. Some serious cases of these hospitals were moved to the Swedish Hospital.

During the period from 1 June 1951 to 30 June 1952, the Swedish Hospital had treated approximately 900 civilian inpatients for the running of 23,000 days in total. The X-ray department examined 7,800 civilians during the same period. Probably 10,000 X-rays had been taken by the department.

The Swedish Hospital was provided a large amount of medical goods and up-to-date equipment by the Swedish Red Cross. And many expert surgeons, physicians and other medical personnel came to Korea to join this humanitarian service. The modern equipment and high professional medical technique made the hospital highly successful in treating military and civilian patients. Consequently, the hospital earned an enviable reputation for its medical service.

In spite of the strong opposition of the whole Korean people, the armistice was signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953 by the UNC side and the Communists. That night at 2200 hours the guns along the front fell silent.

Although the guns stopped firing all along the front, the hospital service remained. Awareing of the unchanged situation in Korea, the hospital was pleased to continue its medical service. After having consultations with the Swedish
Red Cross, the hospital decided to keep go on its contribution to Korea until a certain improvement of the rehabilitation and reconstruction programs.

Before long after the war, all the inpatients of the UN allied forces were evacuated to their respective countries. Then the Swedish Hospital was able to congregate its efforts only on civilian patients. Various kinds of patients, great in number, attended at everyday's sick call, and the number increased daily. To meet such a great number of patients, the Korean doctors, nurses and other technicians began to work together with the Swedes.

Thus, in close cooperation with the ROK and U.N. authorities, the Swedish Hospital continued its service in Korea until it returned back to Sweden in April 1957. Throughout its stay in Korea, a large amount of aid goods was given to many civilians by the hospital, in addition to its primary service.

In April 1957, the Swedish Red Cross Hospital went back home, thus putting an end to its five and a half years medical service in Korea.

Section 4. Epilogue

The Swedish Red Cross Hospital enjoyed an enviable reputation and received a deep appreciation for its humanitarian service during its five and a half years stay in Korea. This Red Cross Hospital was the first and foremost contribution to the Republic of Korea rendered by the Kingdom of Sweden.

The postwar contribution rendered by Sweden was highlighted when it had taken part in constructing the National Medical Center (NMC) in Seoul. When rumours of peace negotiations were spread in June 1951, the leaders of the three Scandinavian medical teams in Korea met together to discuss about the way how they would be best contributed to the rehabilitation of Korea. They finally agreed that the establishment of a big hospital after armistice would be the most preferable solution. This idea was discussed with the Korean Government authorities and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). After having many discussions and meetings, the detailed and final planning was laid down. In autumn of 1958, the construction of the NMC was completed by the joint efforts of the Korean Government, UNKRA and the three Scandinavian Governments. Sweden, one of the three Scandinavian countries, made a concerted efforts to build and also to operate the NMC, for which the Republic of Korea and her people should never be forgotten.
# APPENDIX

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APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGICAL WAR HISTORY

1950

25 June North Korean Communist Force (NKCF) illegally invades the Republic of Korea in a total-effort.

25 June UN Security Council, on 26 June (Korean time), adopts the resolution calling for NKC to cease-fire and withdraw to the north of the 38th Parallel, branding NKC attack as a breach of peace and international security.

27 June UN Security Council, on 28 June (Korean time), adopts the second resolution calling upon the UN members to render every assistance including armed forces in support of the Republic of Korea. President Truman orders US air and sea forces to support the Republic.

28 June ROK abandons Seoul.

30 June President Truman orders to commit US ground forces to Korea, on 1 July (Korean time).

1 July The first contingent of the UN ground forces (TF Smith) arrives at Pusan.

4 July Netherlands dispatches its destroyer "HNLMS Evertsen" from the Indonesian waters to Korea.

5 July UN Security Council adopts the third resolution to set up a unified command (UNC) for the UN effort in the Korean War. United States, in compliance with UN resolution, appoints Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, UNC.

14 July President Syngman Rhee assigns command authority of ROK forces, to the UN Command.

22 July The French Government decides to send armed forces to Korea and places the frigate "La Grandiere" at the disposal of the UNC.

22 July The Belgian Government decides to dispatch the combat troops to Korea.
27 July  Colombia renders general economic assistance.
27 July  UN forces establish the Naktong River defense perimeter.
25 Aug  France decides to send a ground force.
28 Aug  The Netherlands Government decides to send army troops of one infantry battalion to the United Nations forces in Korea.
15 Sept  Inchon Landing.
16 Sept  UN forces commence general counteroffensive from Naktong perimeter.
19-25 Sept  Enemy resistance along the Naktong perimeter begins to collapse.
28 Sept  The Swedish Red Cross medical team arrives at Pusan.
28 Sept  UN forces take back Seoul.
1 Oct  ROK forces cross the 38th Parallel.
7 Oct  UN General Assembly establishes UNCURK to bring about a unified and independent Korea and the rehabilitation of a relief of the nation; and authorizes Gen. MacArthur to pursue the retreating enemy to the north, on 8 Oct (Korean time).
16 Oct  CCF secretly invade into Korea from Manchuria.
16 Oct  Colombia dispatches a frigate to the Korean waters.
19 Oct  1st ROK Division takes Pyongyang, the capital of NK puppet regime.
26 Oct  7th Regiment of the 6th Division of the II ROK Corps reaches on the Yalu River. First CCF prisoners were captured by ROK forces.
27-31 Oct  CCF first-phase offensive begins.
1 Nov  First enemy MIGs appear along the Yalu River to counter UN air forces.
6 Nov  MacArthur warns US JCS that movement of CCF across the Yalu River threatens UNC position.
20 Nov  Indian field ambulance unit arrives in Korea.
23 Nov  The first contingent of Netherlands Battalion arrives in Pusan.
25 Nov  CCF second-phase offensive begins.
26 Nov  The Greek AF Flight arrives at Itazuke air base in Kyushu, Japan, and then arrives Tachikawa air base on 1 December.
26-27 Nov  CCF offensive takes place in full swing on both fronts, west and east.
29 Nov  French Battalion arrives at Pusan.
1 Dec  UN General Assembly resolves to set up UNKRA, on 2 Dec (Korean time).
The Greek C-47's flight begins its airlift mission in the Hagaru-ri area north of Hungnam, North Korea.

The Greek Battalion arrives in the Pusan port and moves to reception center north of Pusan the next morning.

Each of the French and the Dutch Battalions is attached to the 23rd and 38th Regiments, the 2nd US Infantry Division.

I ROK and X US Corps evacuate from Hungnam by seaborne. UN forces form a new defensive line along the 38th Parallel.

Lt. General Walton Walker, Commander of the Eighth US Army, is killed in accident and Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway succeeds the command on the 26th.

The Greek Battalion moves from Suwon to Kungyo northeast of Seoul, where it joins the 7th US Cavalry.

1951

3-4 Jan UN forces abandon Seoul again.

25 Jan Operation Thunderbolt begins to advance towards the Han River line with the I and IX US Corps in the lines.

29-30 Jan The Greek Battalion sustains and repells a series of severe enemy attacks on and around Hill 381, northwest of Ichon.

31 Jan Belgian and Luxembourg Forces arrive in Korea.

1 Feb UN General Assembly brands Communist China as aggressor, on 2 Feb (Korean time).

10 Feb UN forces retake Inchon and Kimpo.

12-13 Feb The Dutch Battalion heavily engages in Hoengsong-Wonju action.

21 Feb IX and X US Corps begin Operation Killer.

5 Mar Belgian Battalion is attached to the 3rd US Division upon arrival in Suwon.

7 Mar The Danish Hospital ship "Jutlandia" arrives in Pusan.

7 Mar Operation Ripper begins in central and eastern zones.

14-15 Mar ROK and UN Forces restore Seoul again.

31 Mar UN advance reaches the 38th Parallel.

5 Apr Operation Rugged begins in order to seize the Kansas Line.

11 Apr General MacArthur is relieved of the UN Command and General Ridgway is appointed in his place.
Chronological War History

14 Apr  General James A. Van Fleet succeeds General Ridgway to command the Eighth US Army.

15 Apr  UNC establishes defensive line more or less along the 38th Parallel, or Kansas Line.

19 Apr  The I and IX US Corps seize the Utah Line.

22-28 Apr  First effort of CCF fifth-phase offensive begins (1st Spring Offensive).

30 Apr  UN forces, after withdrawing to a new defense line, halt CCF offensive north of Seoul and the Han River.

8 May  A Colombian frigate joins Task Force 95 to operate in Korea waters upon her arrival in Sasebo, Japan.

13 May  The operation echelon of the Hellenic Transport Flight at K-2 air base in Taegu moves to K-14 at Kimpo.

16-23 May  CCF second spring offensive takes place.

21 May  UNC launches a counteroffensive to drive the enemy back north of 38th Parallel again.

30 May  ROK and UN forces return back on the Kansas line once more.

1 June  Operation Piledriver begins, with elements of the I and IX US Corps advancing toward the Wyoming Line.

13 June  UN forces capture Chorwon and Kumhwa in the Iron Triangle.

15 June  The first Colombian Infantry Battalion arrives in Korea.

22 June  Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital arrives in Korea.

23 June  Jacov Malik, Soviet delegate to the U.N. proposes cease-fire talks, on 24 June (Seoul time).

29 June  The Dutch replacements of 158 men arrive at Pusan by USS General Langfitt.

30 June  General Ridgway announces the UNC's readiness to discuss an armistice.

10 July  The first meeting for cease-fire negotiations between UN Command and Communists opens at Kaesong.

19 July  Norwegian MASH commences its medical missions.

24 July  The Danish Hospital Ship "Jutlandia" leaves Korea for rotation of members and replenishment of medical supplies.

26 July  Negotiators at Kaesong agree on preliminary agenda.

28 July  Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division.

9 Aug  Truce talk delegates meet at Kaesong to resume the negotiations.
The first contingent of the Dutch Battalion embarks for return while the newly arrived second contingent disembarks at Pusan.

The Luxembourgian Platoon departs for its homeland.

Battle of Heartbreak Ridge (Hill 931), in which the French Battalion saw its top battle cry and paid a dear price for a victory.

IX US Corps advances to the Jamestown Line.

Truce talks resume at a new site, Panmunjom.

Cease-fire line agreed upon as present line of contact at the time of an armistice is signed.

UNC orders RUSAK to confine operations to active defense.

The Italian Red Cross Hospital 68 arrives in Pusan and the Danish Hospital Ship "Jutlandia" in her second tour of duty comes to anchor in Pusan.

The exchange of the POW lists takes place between UNC and Communists.

The Dutch Battalion relieves the 3rd Battalion of Turkish Brigade near Hajin-ni west of Kumhwa.

UNC proposes principle of "voluntary repatriation" in POW exchange.

Both the Belgian and Greek Battalions are placed under the operational control of the 65th Infantry of the 3rd US Division concurrently.

The Greek Battalion is honoured with the ROK Presidential Unit Citation for exceptional battle successes.

The 2nd contingent of Luxembourg Detachment arrives in Korea.

The Jutlandia leaves Pusan with hundreds of evacuees after her eight months service in Korea.

French Battalion repels enemy attack on Eerie Outpost.

The Danish Hospital Ship "Jutlandia," attached aboard an ambulance helicopter, sails for Korea, on her third tour.

President Syngman Rhee visits the Italian Red Cross Hospital and awards the Presidential Unit Citation.

The French Battalion repels two regimental strength of CCF attack on Arrowhead Ridge (Hill 281).
Chronological War History

24 Oct  The Belgian Battalion relieves the 30th ROK Regiment in the north of Chorwon.

20 Nov  Danish Hospital Ship “Jutlandia” docks at Inchon.

30 Nov  The Italian Hospital was burnt down by a violent fire caused by the Communist partisans.

1953

20 Jan  The Luxembourgian Platoon leaves Korea for home.

11 Feb  General Maxwell D. Taylor assumes FUSAK Command from General Van Fleet.

22 Feb  UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs, as preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners.

27-28 Mar  A Netherlands company repulses the CCF attack in company strength on the Nudae positions.

11 Apr  Agreement on exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners reaches to begin on 20 April.

19-20 Apr  The Belgian Battalion engages with the Red Chinese battalion on the final action at Chat-kol.

00 Apr  Exchange of sick and wounded prisoners -- “Operation Little Switch” -- begins at Panmunjom.

28-30 May  Savage fighting flares up again along the front.

6 June  ROK National Assembly demands freedom for anti-Communist North Koreans held in ROK POW camps.

8 June  Agreement reaches on POW question: POW nonrepatriates to be turned over to five-member neutral commission to decide disposition of POW cases. President Rhee declares armistice terms unacceptable to ROK.

9 June  ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms.

10-17 June  Communists step up a heaviest offensive in two years against II ROK Corps sector in Kumsong area.

17-18 June  The Battle of Outpost Harry by the Greek troops.

18 June  President Syngman Rhee releases approximately 27,000 anti-Communist NK prisoners of war.

23-25 June  President Rhee reiterates opposition to truce terms.

8 July  Communists agree to resume the talks, accepting the U.N. Command’s proposal to proceed with final arrangement without ROK participation.
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<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>CCF launch offensive against chiefly on the ROK divisions, aiming their pressure at the ROK Government to accept the armistice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Truce talks at Panmunjom reach agreement on all points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>The UN Command and the Communist forces sign the Armistice Agreement, ending three years of war started by the Communist aggressors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Exchange of prisoners of war -- &quot;Operation Big Switch&quot; -- begins at Panmunjom.</td>
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1954

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<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Legal responsibilities for custody of the non-repatriated POWs by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission end. UNC releases some 22,000 non-repatriatees to be free civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>The Berlin Political Conference, seated by the representatives of US, UK, France and USSR in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, issues a communiqué agreeing to participate in a conference at Geneva to discuss the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Delegations from ROK and all the nations participating in the UNC except the Union of South Africa meet with delegations from USSR, Red China, and Communist North Korea in Geneva, Switzerland. It came to a close in mid-June without any conclusion. UN members participated in the Korean War declared and reported to the UN that the Korean Question be returned to the United Nations.</td>
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## APPENDIX II

**ASSISTANCES PROVIDED BY THE U.N. ALLIES**

### Military Aids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2 inf bn</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 destroyers</td>
<td>1 fighter &amp; 1 air-trans sqdn</td>
<td>(A) 28 Sept 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 29 June 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 30 June 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1 inf brig, 1 FA regt, 1 armed regt &amp; support units</td>
<td>3 destroyers</td>
<td>1 air-trans sqdn</td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 30 July 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 21 July 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 15 June 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 22 Apr 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 7 May 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 gunboat</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 29 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 29 July 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 air-trans flight</td>
<td>(A) 9 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 26 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1 inf pltn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 destroyer</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 23 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 16 July 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1 FA regt &amp; support units</td>
<td>2 frigates</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 1 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 19 Sept 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 fighter-bomber sqdn</td>
<td>(AF) 5 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>2 corvettes, 1 transport ship</td>
<td>1 air transport flight</td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 7 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 23 June 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 inf brig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 17 Oct 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2 composite inf brigs with supporting units</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 3 frigates &amp; several auxiliary ships</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 24 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 29 June 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U.S.A. 7 inf divs, 1 marine div, logistical & support forces 1 naval fleet, carrier task group, blockade & escort forces, various support units 1 tactical air force & 1 air combat cargo command; 2 medium bomber wings

(A) 2 July 50
(N) 27 June 50
(AF) 27 June 50

Medical Aids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Kinds of Aid</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 hospital ship &amp; medical team</td>
<td>7 Mar 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 field ambulance unit</td>
<td>20 Nov 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 Red Cross hospital unit</td>
<td>16 Nov 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 mobile army surgical hospital</td>
<td>22 June 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 field hospital unit</td>
<td>28 Sept 50</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(Date is based on the arrival of advance party)
APPENDIX III

CODE NAMES

Operations

Big Stick: An operation plan proposed by General Van Fleet early in February 1952 to destroy the Communist supply complex based on Sibyong-ni and to advance the Eighth Army left flank to the Yesong River, and regain Kaesong.

Big Switch: Operation for repatriation of POW which took place in Aug-Sept 1953. During the period UNC returned 70,159 NK and 5,640 CCF POWs while the Communists sent back 12,757 UN prisoners.

Chopstick 6 and Chopstick 16: Operation plans proposed by General Van Fleet on 1 April 1952. Chopstick 6 envisaged the envelopment of the high ground south of Pyongyang by a reinforced ROK division, and Chopstick 16 laid out a two-division attack to drive the enemy from the area east and south of the Nam River in eastern Korea.

Clam-up: An operation designed to confuse the Communists and lead them into miscues. Operation Clam-up imposed silence along the front lines from 10 to 15 February 1952. Theoretically this change of tactics was supposed to arouse the curiosity of the enemy and make him think the UNC troops had pulled back from their positions.

Claymore: An operation carried out by the Canadian Brigade during 22-24 August 1951. The object of Claymore was to place the 25th Brigade less one battalion, in the rear of the 1st Cavalry Division to support the 5th Cavalry Regiment while it adjusted its positions.

Cleaver: An operation carried out by the Ethiopian Battalion late in September 1951, to take Hills 602 and 700 in Samhyon area.

Commando: An operation carried out by the I US Corps to make a modest 10-kilometer advance to a new defense line Jamestown in the mid-western front during 2-15 October 1951. As a result of the operation the I US Corps greatly improved its defense position and kept the enemy from launching an offensive of his own.

Counter: An operation carried out early in June 1952 by the 45th US Division, the I US Corps, to capture strategic outpost hills in the division front.
Cudgel: An operation plan proposed by General Van Fleet to advance from Wyoming line in the US Army I and IX Corps sectors. Plan Cudgel envisioned a 15-kilometer drive forward from Wyoming to protect the railroad line and to force the enemy to give up his forward positions.

Decoy: An operation carried out by the Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven on 15 October 1952. It was a feint operation in the Kojo area in an attempt to draw enemy troops from their underground frontline positions.

Highboy: An artillery operation experimented by the 1 US Corps in January 1952 to bring direct fire onto enemy positions and bunkers not accessible to other artillery and mortar fire.

Home Comming: An operation plan proposed by General Van Fleet in late February 1952. The objectives of Home Comming were similar to Big Stick, but contemplated using only ROK troops and also the attack toward Sibyon-ni and amphibious feint would be omitted.

Killer: UN operation ordered by General Matthew B. Ridgway to cut off Hoengsong and destroy large numbers of enemy, lasting two weeks from 21 February 1951. By mid-February, the Chinese and their North Korean allies were in full retreat.

Little Switch: Operation for repatriation of sick and wounded POW. The agreement for it was signed on 11 April 1953, and the exchange began on 20 April, lasting until 26 April. During it UNC handed over a total 6,670 sick and wounded Communist prisoners, while the Reds returned 684 UN POWs.

Overwhelming: An operation plan prepared by the Eighth US Army early in July 1951 to advance its troops to the Pyongyang–Wonsan line starting about 1 September, provided that certain conditions were satisfied.

Persuader: An operation carried out by the IX US Corps in November 1951 to erose the enemy opposition from Sniper Ridge in Kumsong area.

Piledriver: An operation to make limited advances by the I ROK and X US Corps while the I US Corps securing the vital Chorwon–Kumhwa area early in June 1951.

Polecharge: An operation carried out by the 1st Cavalry Division in the middle of October 1951, to advance onto the Jamestown defense line. By 19 October the 1st Cavalry Division had seized the last of its objectives on the Jamestown line.

Ratkiller: Anti-guerilla operation carried out by Task Force Paik to wipe out the Communist remnants scattered around the Chiri-san area starting 2 December 1951 and ending 15 March 1952.

Red Cow: An air force operation carried out by the Fifth Air Force between 8 and 25
October 1952. The object of the operation was to destroy the enemy positions and troops close to the main line of resistance and the neutral zone where the enemy had long felt safe from air attack because of its closeness to Kaesong.

**Ripper:** An operation designed by General Ridgway and executed by the IX and X US Corps in order to create a friendly bulge east of Seoul by crossing the Han River from central and eastern peninsula. This operation which began 7 March 1952 was successful from the beginning.

**Round-up:** An operation ordered by General Ridgway and conducted by the X US Corps to move northward in central Korea against the II and V NK Corps occupying Hoengsong and Hongchon. This operation began on 5 February.

**Rugged:** An operation planned by the ELSAK to seize an intermediate objective before reaching the Kansas Line roughly along the 38th Parallel. This operation began on 5 April 1951.

**Saturate:** An air force operation plan for interdiction bombing of North Korean railroads. The operation was initiated in March 1952 to focus the destructive power of the air forces upon a specific stretch of roadbed on an around-the-clock basis.

**Showdown:** An operation plan designed to improve the IX US Corps defense line positions north of Kumhwa. This plan approved by General Clark on 8 October 1952 was carried out by the 7th US Division.

**Smack:** An operation plan for combined air-tank-infantry-artillery test strike. This operation was one of a series of air-ground operation experiments carried out by the 7th US Division in late January that produced loud repercussions in the United States.

**Spring Thaw:** An air force operation carried out by all elements of FEAF between mid-March and mid-May of 1953 during which any Communist ground offensive would be greatly hampered by snowthaws. The objective of the operation was to disrupt the enemy’s supply lines, destroy some of his transportation, and force him to consume supplies which were stored in the forward areas.

**Strangle:** Air operations to disrupt North Korean logistics by interdiction bombing. This plan was first inaugurated by the Fifth US Air Force during August 1951 to slow down the southward movement of enemy troops and equipment by interdicting the Communist lines of communications.

**Sundial:** An operation plan to establish Duluth defensive line. This plan was set up by General Van Fleet on 27 October 1951 for an advance into the Iron Triangle on the west and beyond Kumsoong on the east.

**Thunderbolt:** A large reconnaissance operation in force spearheaded by the I and IX US Corps in January 1951, in order to feel out the CCF screening force prior to UN general advance towards Seoul.
Touchdown: An operation to gain control of Heartbreak Ridge. This operation was carried out by the 2nd US Division and lasted 10 days beginning on October 1951. In this operation the Chinese and North Koreans suffered close to 12,500 men.

Wrangler: A plan to follow up the operation “Cudgel” with an amphibious operation on the east coast. This plan was proposed by General Van Fleet in September 1951 and it aimed at cutting off the North Korean forces opposing the I ROK and X US Corps on the right flank of the Eighth Army.

Phase Lines

Davidson: Davidson line outlined in early August 1950 by General MacArthur was a defense line prepared for occupancy in the event Eighth Army could not stop the North Koreans at the Naktoong. This line began on the east coast at Sodong-ni, approximately eight miles north of Ulsan, and extended generally west along high ground to a point northeast of Miryang, then curved down the ridge east of Muan-ni, turned south across the Naktoong River and anchored on the high ground northeast of Masan.

Duluth: A defense line to be established by Operation Sundial. In late October 1951 General Van Fleet, using the I and IX US Corps, intended to take over the high ground north of the Chorwon-Kumhwa Railroad and establish a firm screen along the defense line, south of Panggung and north of Kumsong.

Idaho: An objective line for Operation Ripper conducted by the IX and X US Corps. Established in mid-March 1951, it ran west to east from Yokchon on the Han River through Osandong to Pigum-ni to Hill 900 3.5 kms west of Pyongban-ni to Mok-kol in Cheryong-ni to Pukpye-san to Sungsae-san to Mullo-ri to Pungam-ni to Hill 1181 in Saenggong-ni to Kyebang-san to Hwangbyoung-san to Haypog-dong.

Jamestown: A new defense line secured by UN forces as a result of Operation Commando conducted by the I US Corps and western elements of the IX US Corps in October 1951. Beginning on the west bank of the Imjin River, it lined Sami-chon, Kyeho-dong, Yokkok-chon, Chutoso and ending 8 kms northeast of Chorwon.

Kansas: A defense line in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, established by UN forces in May 1951. It began near the mouth of the Imjin and snaked to the northeast on the south side of the river. Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, Kansas veered toward the Hwachon Reservoir and then angled to the Taebaek Mts. until it reached the east coast some 40 kms north of the Parallel.

Missouri: A defense line constituting the central MLR of UN forces in April 1952. It lined the heart of Iron Triangle that connected Pyonggang on the apex and Chorwon and Kumhwa on its left and right bases.
Nomad: An objective line established in mid-October 1951 by the IX US Corps. This line was approximately seven kms south of the key highway center of Kumsong and ran west to east from Haso—Kyojon-ri east to Hill 434—Wolbong-san—Nungdong across the Kumsong-chon to Hill 585—the junction of Kumsong-chon and the Pukhan River.

No Name Line: A defense line established by General Van Fleet immediately after the Chinese spring offensive in late April 1951 had been stopped. General Van Fleet, not yet aware of the enemy's immobility, decided to hold at the No Name Line, rather than to gather his reserves and strike. The line began at a point north of Seoul, gently rising northeast to Sabangu in the center, then slanting sharply northeast to Taepo-ri on the east coast, still above the 38th Parallel.

Polar: An objective line established also by the IX US Corps upon the capture of Line Nomad on 17 October 1951. This line was approximately three kms south of Kumsong running west to east from Yangjimal—Ocyadong—Pyongwa-san—Kyoam-san to a point 2.5 kms west of Songsil-li—Hill 529—the IX-X Corps boundary on the Pukhan River at the junction of the Pukhan River and Kumsong-chon.

Utah: An objective line established for the Operation Dauntless by the EUSAK. Line Utah from Taell on Line Kansas north along Imjin River to Tapko-ri—Pongmang-ri—a point 2 kms west of Kodae-san thence generally east to Kumbwak-san—Munhye-ri southeast to Hill 795—Chipo-ri—Kwangdoghyon—Cholkol on Line Kansas.

Wyoming: A defense line north of the 38th Parallel. It looped northeastward from the north of Imjin River towards Chorwon, swung east to Kumbwa, and then fell off to the southeast until it rejoined Kansas Line near the Hwachon Reservoir. In the spring of 1951 it served as an outpost line screening the Kansas Line.
APPENDIX IV

MILITARY SYMBOLS

Branch of Arm and Service

Infantry .................................................................

Airborne ...............................................................  

Airborne-Infantry ...................................................  

Artillery .....................................................................  

Armor (Tank) ..............................................................  

Reconnaissance ..........................................................  

Armored Reconnaissance .............................................  

Armored Infantry ......................................................  

Engineer ...................................................................  

Medical Corps ............................................................  

Signal .......................................................................  

Identification of Command and Unit Size

Squad ...........................................................................

Section .......................................................................
Military Symbols

Platoon ................................................................. • • • •

Company ...................................................................... •

Battalion ..................................................................... • •

Regiment ..................................................................... • • •

Brigade ...................................................................... •

Division ...................................................................... • • •

Corps ......................................................................... • • • •

Field Army ................................................................. • • • • •

Army Group .................................................................. • • • • • •

Examples

Company A, 17th US Infantry Regiment ......................................................... A 17 (US)

2nd Bn, 50th Regt of 55th ROK Division ...................................................... 2 50/56

20th Regt, 19th Div, VII ROK Corps ............................................................ 20 19/VII

Headquarters, VII ROK Corps ................................................................. VII ROK

Headquarters, Republic of Korea Army ..................................................... ROKA

Boundary between 1st and 2nd Battalions ................................................... 1 2

Boundary between 50th Regt of 55th ROK Div and 60th Regt of 56th ROK Div ...................................................... 50/56 60/56

Boundary between 7th and 25th ROK Inf Div .......................................... 7 25
APPENDIX V

GLOSSARY OF KOREAN SUFFIXES

bauì (pauì) .............................................. rock
bong (pong) .............................................. bong, pong or san denotes a mountain
chon ......................................................... river; in general small river; forming a tributary to a Gang. (e.g. Sami-chon joins Imjin Gang.)
dan (tan) ................................................... point
do (to) ...................................................... island, (e.g. Cheju-do, Sok-to)
dong (tong) ............................................... village, settlement
gang (kang) .............................................. river, (e.g. Han Gang, Naktong Gang)
gap (kap) ................................................... point
goì (kol) .................................................... village, it also means a ravine or valley
jae (chae) ................................................... mountain pass
li (ni, ri) .................................................... area name; smallest administrative unit consisting of several villages; township
lyong (nyong, ryong) ................................. mountain or mountain pass
maul ....................................................... village, settlement
nae .......................................................... stream, creek, brook
namdo ..................................................... south province
pukto (bugdo) .......................................... north province
sa .......................................................... temple
san .......................................................... mountain
yon .......................................................... deep water or pool; abyss; swamp
### APPENDIX VI

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>Air-to-Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abn</td>
<td>Airborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acdt</td>
<td>Accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACI</td>
<td>Air Combat Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Air Control Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acty</td>
<td>Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCOM</td>
<td>Advance Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AdSec</td>
<td>Advanced Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adv</td>
<td>Advance or Advancement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afld</td>
<td>Air Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALO</td>
<td>Air Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Ammunition Officer, or Aerial Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armd</td>
<td>Armored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asg</td>
<td>Assignment; Assign or Assigned</td>
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<td>Army Serial Number</td>
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<td>ASP</td>
<td>Ammunition Supply Point</td>
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<td>Asst</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
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<td>Atch</td>
<td>Attach or Attachment</td>
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<td>Attack</td>
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<td>Austr</td>
<td>Australia, Australian</td>
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<td>Avn</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>Browning Automatic Rifle</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Battalion Combat Team</td>
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<td>Bdry</td>
<td>Boundary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belg</td>
<td>Belgium ; Belgian</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General (or Brig-Gen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bldg</td>
<td>Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>Bench Mark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMCT</td>
<td>Beginning of Morning Civil Twilight (See EECT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMNT</td>
<td>Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight (See EENT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bn</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bom Com</td>
<td>Bomber Command</td>
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<td>Brg</td>
<td>Bridge or Bearing</td>
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<td>Brghd</td>
<td>Bridgehead</td>
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<td>Brig</td>
<td>Brigade ; Brigadier</td>
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<td>Brit</td>
<td>British ; Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Btry</td>
<td>Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can</td>
<td>Canada ; Canadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cav</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sometimes CinCUNC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<td>Co</td>
<td>Company</td>
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<td>CoFS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Col</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>Colomb</td>
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<td>Command</td>
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<td>Comndr</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>ComNavFE</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces, Far East</td>
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<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Communications Security (Sometimes ComSec)</td>
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<td>COR</td>
<td>Combat Operation Report</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE</td>
<td>Commander, Task Element</td>
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<td>CTG</td>
<td>Commander, Task Group</td>
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<td>Commonwealth</td>
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<td>Dest</td>
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<td>Det</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Dead in Accident</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<td>DOW</td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
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<td>DS</td>
<td>Direct Support</td>
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<td>Drop Zone</td>
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<td>EECT</td>
<td>End of Evening Civil Twilight (See BMCT)</td>
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<td>EEI</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNLMS</td>
<td>Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFA</td>
<td>Indian Field Ambulance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ind</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isl(s)</td>
<td>Island(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It</td>
<td>Italy (Sometimes Ital)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATC</td>
<td>Korean Army Training Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATUSA</td>
<td>Korean Augmentation to the United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCOMZ</td>
<td>Korean Communication Zone (Sometimes KComZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMC</td>
<td>Korean Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>Korean Service Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCVP</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Vehicle-Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Line of Departure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>LogCom</td>
<td>Logistical Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Limiting Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSU</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Utility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxem</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT</td>
<td>Landing Vehicle, Tracked</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Armistice Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Marine(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASH</td>
<td>Mobile Army Surgical Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATS</td>
<td>Military Air Transport Service</td>
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</table>
Ord  Ordnance  ROKN  Republic of Korea Navy
    RR  Railroad (or R.R.)
PAMB P Post-Armistice Main Battle  RTC  Replacement Training Center
   Position
Penin Peninsula  RW  Railway
Phil Philippines  SAF  South Africa
PIR  Periodic Intelligence Report  Sig  Signal
Pla Platoon  SO  Supply Officer
PlnBrg Panel Bridge  SOP  Standing Operating Procedure
POD Port of Debarkation  Spt  Support
POE Port of Embarkation  Sqd  Squad
POR Periodic Operation Report  Sqn  Squadron
POW Prisoners of War Sr  Senior
Prchst Parachutist  Stgt  Secondary Target
Prcn Parachute  Str  Strength
Psn Position  Svc  Service
PST Pacific Standard Time  Swbd  Switchboard
Psywar Psychological Warfare Swed  Sweden ; Swedish
Pt Point
PUC Presidential Unit Citation  TAC  Tactical Air Command
    TACC  Tactical Air Control Center
    TacCP  Tactical Command Post
    TACP  Tactical Air Control Party
    TADC  Tactical Air Direction Center
    TCI  Terrain Clearance Indicator
    TDY  Temporary Duty
    TE  Task Element
    TF  Task Force or Training Film
    TFC  Traffic
    TG  Task Group
    TGT  Target
    Thai  Thailand
    TkBN  Tank Battalion
    TOC  Tactical Operation Center
    TOD  Time of Delivery
    TOLOPS  Theater of Operations
    TOP  Time on Target ;
    Time over Target
    Tnb  Tributary
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>TU</td>
<td>Task Unit</td>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Vertical Bomb</td>
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<td>Turk</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Vei</td>
<td>Velocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>Vicinity</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Underwater Demolition Team</td>
<td>VO</td>
<td>Verbal Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations (or U.N.)</td>
<td>VT</td>
<td>Variable Time Fuze</td>
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<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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<td>UNCAK</td>
<td>United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea</td>
<td>WD</td>
<td>War Diary</td>
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<td>UNCOK</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Korea</td>
<td>Wea</td>
<td>Weather</td>
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<td>UNCURK</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea</td>
<td>Wg</td>
<td>Wing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKRA</td>
<td>United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>Warrant Officer; Warning Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTCOK</td>
<td>United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>White Phosphorous Shell</td>
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<td>Wpn(s)</td>
<td>Weapon(s)</td>
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<td>United States Army Forces</td>
<td>WSP</td>
<td>Water Supply Point</td>
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<td>United States Armed Forces in Korea</td>
<td>WSup</td>
<td>Water Supply</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>USAFIA</td>
<td>United States Armed Forces in Korea</td>
<td>ZA</td>
<td>Zone of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAdm</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
<td>ZH</td>
<td>Zero Hour</td>
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<td>ZI</td>
<td>Zone of Interior</td>
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APPENDIX VIII  SITUATION MAPS

BATTLE OF IMJIN RIVER  (22–25 APR 1951)

LEGEND

- Disposition 22–23 May
- Belg Bn Withdrawal 24 Apr
- CCF Attack 22–24 Apr

Situation Map 1
BATTLE AT CHAT-KOL (26 FEB-22 APR 1953)

LEGEND
- Alice A Co Outpost
- Barbara B Co Outpost
- Carol C Co Outpost
- Blocking position
- CCF Held Hills

Situation Map 3
MOVEMENT OF COLOMBIAN BATTALION (JUNE 1951—JULY 1953)

LEGEND

- Forward Movement
- Goes to Reserve or
  Security Mission

Sangyang 1 Aug '51
Hwachon 7 Aug '51
Kumgang 20 Oct '51
Yanggu 25 Jan '52
Kapyong 26 Feb '52
Inje 17 Mar '52
Kumhung 10 May '51
Hwachon 18 Nov '52
T-Hone Area 11 Jan '53
Yonchon 30 Jan '53
Old Bolly Hill 13 Mar '51
Chungan 26 Mar '52

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