THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

VOLUME II

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
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The War History Compilation Committee

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Second Edition
(15 December - 1981)
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In today's troubled world there are many nations under constant communist threat. Efforts to bring about a better understanding of the historic events of the Korean War, in which the communist intrusion precipitated the nation into the worst misery of her history of five millennia, are welcomed by freedom-loving nations. By 1977 the Ministry of National Defense's War History Compilation Committee had published its six-volume History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, a work which documented a new era in international cooperation and showed the UN taking a first major step toward achieving the ideal of a concert of nations opposed to wars of aggression particularly through the Korean War waged by North Korean at the USSR's instigation. This edition published by this committee during the period of 1972–1977 drew widespread attention abroad and continues to be sought after 28 years after the truce, bearing testimony to the value of history. Its high demand has necessitated this second edition.

Regretably, Korea remains the most volatile spot vulnerable to communist threat in Asia and a hair-trigger truce is all that prevents the military situation along the DMZ from erupting at any time into a full scale war. In 1980 alone, North Korea was charged with 8,330 violations of the armistice and proved its hostility toward not only the Republic of Korea, but all of the free nations of the world. The unpredictability of North Korea always obliges us to think deeply about the requirements of national security and it forces the examination and reevaluation of the military and non military defensive posture of this country.

What looms large and clear in the present world situation is the urgent need for all freedom-loving nations of the world to stand together against communist aggression. To our greatest regret, however, the 28 years since the armistice have seen the secession of Ethiopia, one of the sixteen participant nations in the Korean War, from the United Nations, the fall of Indochina into Communist hands, and the recent tragic affair of Afghanistan that warrant the death of enthusiasm for the collective security shown by the free nations at the time of the Korean War. No matter where Communist aggression appears, its end is the same—global conquest. Any meaningful response from the free world must therefore come on a global level, with the total weight of the free world staunchly
and completely behind it.

Although to most it appears hopeless, the Republic of Korea will continue its efforts, by peaceful means, to realize its aspiration for a unified country. This reflects the will of all of the Korean people as a single race. In the meantime, the highest priority will be placed on preventing another fratricidal war, not only for the sake of our own survival, but also for the sake of regional stability and world peace.

In dedicating this book to all of the comrades in arms from the United Nations, those countries that came to the aid of Korea and fought Communist aggression in the early 1950’s, the Republic of Korea’s deepest gratitude is extended, especially to those men who gave their lives on Korean soil for the common cause of freedom and peace.

15 December 1981
Seoul, Korea

Park Chung In
Chairman
War History Compilation Committee
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. Contents.

Except Part One and Two, each of this Volume is independent as a separate chronicle of a nation which has participated in the Korean War.

2. Equation of Time.

Time and dates are local, indicating the time of the origin of the event or the action. To give reference, Seoul time is fourteen hours ahead of America's Eastern Standard Time, thus 0400 hours on 25 June in Seoul would be 1400 hours, 24 June in New York.


Korean Names are given according to Korean custom, that is with the surname first.


The McCune-Reischauer System has been adopted and in case of nominal changes, new names are indicated along with the old ones. When proper identification is established, contemporary code names and nick names are used interchangeably with the map designation. Some place-names are followed by a descriptive, hyphenated suffix. See Appendix VI for further details.

5. Maps and Illustrations.

Sketch maps and photographs have been used to illustrate the moves, actions and events in the hope that this arrangement will make the narrative easier to follow. In addition, the situation maps are also annexed at the end of Appendixes to illustrate the troop movements and the battle actions more in detail.
6. **Italic Letters.**

In printing, the Italic type is applied to some quotations in order to distinguish it from normal narrative. The same type is also used to discern the opponent units and elements from the friendly ones.

7. **Abbreviation.**

As a general rule, the first time a unit and other terms are mentioned they have been given their full titles, but thereafter generally accepted abbreviations have been used as listed in Appendix VII.

8. **Appendixes**

Chronology, bibliographical references, military symbols and codes, and glossaries are also included in the Appendixes.

9. **Index.**

The relevant names, places, and incidents are enumerated in the Index in alphabetic order at the Volume's end for cross-reference.
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CHAPTER I THE PAST BACKGROUND

Section 1. Pre-Liberation
(1910 - 1945)

Introduction

It was all of a sudden that the Communist regime in North Korea opened the unprovoked war against the Republic of Korea in the early dawn hours of 25 June 1950, twenty-three years ago. Truly this tragic news of the Communist aggression came like a thunderclap from the blue not only on the people of the free and fledged Republic but also on the whole free world. The Korean War was far more tragic than any war because it was fought by two politically split sides of one and the same people.

No one can easily and fairly understand the Korean War unless he has at least a rudimentary knowledge of the history, geopolitics and the political problem of Korea and its people.

Korea is a single entity in its geographical, economical, and ethnical aspects from the era of her foundation, four thousand three hundred and six years ago. Throughout her long and traditional history, Korea has always existed as an independent nation in the hearts of its inhabitants. Just a geographical misfortune, which meant its strategic importance of the geopolitical position, had made Korea a battleground for many times by the neighboring countries.

Located at the strategic crossroads of East Asia, Korea had been the scene of repeated invasions and encroachments by neighbours -- in modern times, by China and Russia as an overland route to the Pacific and by Japan as a gateway to the Asian continent. Because of that the northern border of the Korean peninsula abuts the Chinese territory of Manchuria and the Russian province of Siberia, while to the east over the sea lies the Japanese archipelago, Korea had been a pawn in the Asian power struggle between these three countries. To Japan and Russia, the peninsula meant access to Manchuria as well as the use of numerous year-round harbors. Particularly, Korea’s ice-free ports fronting its Eastern Sea and the Sea of Japan were coveted by the Russians. On the contrary, to China, control or possession of
Korea meant a barrier against the Russian or Japanese ambition for her homeland.

In its early history Korea, or Chosun was noticeably influenced by China. But it reached a high level of power, wealth and culture. From the beginning of history, the Koreans had their inherent languages, religion, customs and cultural heritage completely different from those of the Chinese people. The name of Korea was originally derived from the name of the old Korean Kingdom Chosun under T'angun, the founder of the nation.

Late in the sixteenth century the Japanese invaded Korea in 1592, but the aggressors were finally and deadly driven out seven years later when the Koreans won a greatest naval victory over Japan by using ironclad battleships like turtles. The Koreans then tried for more than two centuries to keep their borders closed to all foreigners. Henceforth Korea became known as "the Hermit Kingdom."

The Scene of the Powers Rivalry

The remote cause of the Korean War can be traced to the Japanese victories in the Chinese-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the ensuing Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

While Korea, and indeed all of Asia, stagnated, the Europeans with their cannon and modern implements, were sailing in the four corners of the world. Only one Asian nation, Japan, immediately awoke to the importance of Western science and techniques. In the latter decades of the nineteenth century Japan had been steadily consolidating her ground for the invasion of Korea. The Japanese undertook the negotiations with Korea and, on 26 February 1876, they managed to wring a trade treaty from Korea, the first in Korea's history, which fostered Japanese economic penetration. In the years that followed the treaty of 1876, and before the United States appeared on the scene with a treaty obtained in 1882, Japan made significant progress in infiltrating the Korean peninsula.

However, Japan faced strong opposition from the Korean conservatives surrounding the throne, who were in turn supported by the Chinese. Late in 1884, when the reform group arose in revolt, Japan dispatched her troops to the peninsula with avowed aim of protecting her nationals and concession. For this China responded by sending reinforcements. But since neither side was prepared to fight, the called Tientsin Conference was held in April 1885, in which both sides agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea.
Growth of Japanese Power

A decade later, in April of 1894 when the Tonghaks (Eastern Learning Party) rose up in revolt, Ching China dispatched 5,500 troops to the peninsula while Japan also sent 8,000 of its troops. The Tonghak uprising, meanwhile, subsided, leaving the Chinese and Japanese troops facing each other in the field. On 25 July in that year this rivalry resulted in the Sino-Japanese War, which lasted but eight months. The Chinese forces were driven from Korea, and China was forced to recognize the full and complete independence of Korea by the Treaty of Simonoseki on 12 April 1895. Japan, on the contrary, with the removal of China as a rival, continued and strengthened to interfere more aggressively in Korea's government. At last, the Japanese heavy efforts to dominate Korea led to the murder, on 8 October 1895, of the Queen Min.

Now a popular reaction against Japan set in. On 11 February 1896, the King Kojong managed to flee with his crown prince to the Russian legation in Seoul for protection.

Russia, in the meantime, had begun to extend its power into Manchuria and other areas of the Far East, particularly into Korea. Bitter feeling between Russia and Japan developed as a result of Japan's victory over China.

In the summer of 1903 both the Russian and Japanese delegates met at St. Petersburg (Leningrad) in Russia to discuss about the disputed interests but dragged on fruitlessly. Continued disagreement finally led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904—1905, from which Japan emerged as the victor and signaled the rise of a new world power. To end the war, in September 1905, a peace conference was arranged at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, by the United States President Theodore Roosevelt. In the Portsmouth treaty, Japan's rights in Korea were recognized not only by Russia but also by Great Britain and the United States. The latter two nations, however, committed a great mistake because they did not make any serious efforts to halt the Japanese expansion. They just shared a common goal, to prevent the Russian expansion. If Japan had been contained at that juncture, the Pacific War and even the Korean War might never have occurred.

Spirit of Independence

With the elimination of Russia, her most powerful rival, Japan now
strengthened its hold in Korea for every respect without meeting any noticeable obstruction and, in 29 August 1910, after a polite delay, Japan finally annexed Korea by a means of force against the will of the Korean people.

From then onward until Japan's collapse in 1945, Korea was administered by Japan for Japan. No one, except the Korean people themselves, challenged Japan's position until she became an active belligerent with Germany and Italy in World War II.

The thirty-six years (1910-1945) of the Japanese occupation witnessed one of the cruelest and most uncivilized colonial policies in the world history. In short, Japan made every effort to transform Korea into her complete colony.

Thus, the Korean nation was turned into a granary of rise to increase the food supply of the Japanese homelands. Its mines and industries enriched Japan. The Koreans were not allowed to speak even their own language, and worship of the Japanese emperor as “Shinto” was taught in the schools. Any and all signs of independence were ruthlessly suppressed by the Japanese army and police.

Despite such thorough oppression by force, the Koreans ceaselessly resisted, and thousands were killed or imprisoned. Even thus rough-handed treatment did not put an end to their patriotic uprisings. Many patriots continued to meet in and out of Korea in an effort to restore the independence.

Notwithstanding, the Japanese could never destroy the Korean's fierce spirit of independence and their national vigilance by guns and indoctrination.

The opportunity came on 1 March 1919, after President Woodrow T. Wilson of the United States proclaimed the principle of self-determination of peoples in his famous fourteen points statement in January 1918, near the end of World War I. The Korean nationalist leaders were inspired by this principle to take vigorous steps to attain Korea's freedom. They conceived the plan of a nationwide, nonviolent movement to demonstrate to the world, for freedom and independence.

On that fateful day the first demonstration ignited in Seoul, while thousands marched in protest through the streets of the city, the independent movement soon spread to all corners of the country, with the participation of the whole population regardless of their age, sex, and social status. All the demonstrators were completely unarmed and threatened no violence. They cheered long-live for independence of Korea, carrying the forbidden flag of Korea, the Taegukkii. The thirty-three Korean leaders met in Seoul and publicized a Korean Declaration of Independence: "We herewith proclaim the
The Past Background

independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people."

The Japanese immediately reacted by force. They moved to crack down upon the demonstrators with loaded guns, fixed bayonets, and swords. Thousands of the Koreans were killed and thousands of others jailed and tortured. According to records, a total of 1,363,878 individuals physically participated in the anti-Japanese demonstrations. Of these, more than 6,670 were killed, 14,611 wounded and 52,770 arrested by the Japanese military and police forces.

On the other hand, the exiled abroad also acted in concert with this domestic movement appealing to the peoples and the governments of their host countries to help Korea in her efforts to restore her lost sovereignty.

It was a grave and graceful national movement the world history had never seen before. The Koreans had voiced their desires in a nation-wide demonstration by a peaceful means for the restoration of national sovereignty and independence, but the world showed only passing interest and within a short while the Japanese had complete control of the situation.

After the grave movement of March 1919, better known as the "Samil Movement" or "Kimí Mansae," Japan stepped up carrying out the so-called "Japanization" policy. Japan, for example, forced the Koreans to change their names to the Japanese fashion. Nevertheless, patriotic demonstrations for independence recurred in 1926 and again in 1929.

The Pledges for Independence by the Allied Powers

The endless resistance and struggle to free their nation by the Koreans, both at home and abroad, finally began to bear fruit during the Second World War. Meanwhile, Japan plundered Manchuria from China by force of arms in 1931 and, she waged the aggression war against China on 7 July 1937. Subsequently, Japan declared a war against the United States and Great Britain on 8 December 1941, thus initiating the unprovoked "Pacific War."

With the hope of liberation still remote, exiles were suddenly revived. By 1943 as the great war grew in intensity, it became increasingly clear that Japan and her Axis partners would lose the war. The Koreans waited nervously for the defeat of the Japanese and their national liberation.

Toward the end of World War II there had been several important conferences among the Allied Powers on the postwar settlements which, in effect, were destined to bring about the present situation of Korea.

In late November 1943, the Allied leaders of the Republic of China,
Great Britain and the United States met at Cairo, Egypt and discussed primarily the military means to bring about the Japanese downfall and also for the postwar settlements. In the declaration issued on 1 December 1943 after the conference, the Three Heads, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, pledged that Korea would be given its independence "in due course" after the Japanese surrender. The declaration was agreed by Joseph Stalin when he met with the U.S. President Roosevelt at Teheran, Iran.

Two years later, this first pledge was reaffirmed by the three nations at the Potsdam Conference in Germany where they convened on 26 July 1945. Russia also agreed to it.

It might be significant somewhat to mention at this time about a particular phrase "in due course" included in the sentence on Korea, because in fact it evoked misgivings among the Korean exiles. For instance a leader of "the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea" in Chunking, China at that time, denounced the phrase and demanded Korea be given freedom "the moment that the Japanese collapse."

The words, "in due course," were the expression that provoked suspicion among the Koreans. Undoubtedly, the Allies were concerned about the power vacuum in Korea after the removal of the Japanese. That concern also reflected their doubts that it could be filled by the Korean people themselves.

To note one more question in this connection, some talks had it that the phrase and the thinking behind it were Roosevelt's. According to "The Memories of Cordell Hull," (Secretary of State, USA, 1933-1944), President Roosevelt suggested in meeting with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on 27 March 1943: "... that Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States, and one or two other countries participating." Later that year, at one of his first meeting at Teheran in Iran with Joseph Stalin, on 28 November 1943, Roosevelt again referred to this topic, pointing that the peoples of the Far Eastern colonial areas should be trained for certain period in the democratic tradition to prepare themselves for independence.

If the Cairo meeting was to be said as a milestone for the Korean history the meeting of the Anglo-American leaders with Stalin at Teheran was another, for it was there that the Soviet ruler casually announced that once Germany had collapsed, Russia would join in the war against Japan. The Americans were delighted by Stalin's promise because it was fulfillment of a long-sought American goal to get Soviet cooperation in the Pacific War. But the Russians were determined, for their own sake and not for the
The Past Background

Americans, not to stir up the Japanese in Manchuria at a moment when they were meeting the onslaught of Hitler's armies in the Europe.

The reason that the United States wanted the Red Russian entry against Japan was to save casualties and to shorten the war by many months which would have taken eighteen months otherwise after the collapse of Germany to defeat Japan, according to the estimate of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JOC). In retrospect, this was an overestimation of Japanese power. At any rate, there were few voices, at the time, if any, raised against the concept of bringing Soviet Russia into the Pacific War. Korea's destiny might have been entirely different had not Russia allowed to enter that war.

At Yalta in February 1945 it was finally agreed that Russia would enter the war against Japan after the collapse of Germany, and that Russia would take the surrender of Japanese in the northern part of Korea while the United States took it in the south. Later at Potsdam Conference, in July 1945, it was agreed that the 38th Parallel would be the dividing line for the demilitarization of the Japanese. To the United States this was interpreted as meaning that this would only be a military, not a political division. Russia had other plans, however. The Communists hide their real character habitually at any time and every where.

Meanwhile when the three heads of the Allied Powers talked about the postwar settlements, the United States military authorities were preparing for dropping the atomic bomb on Japan. Beforehand, an ultimatum was broadcasted to Japan from Potsdam, calling on her to accept unconditional surrender. The Japanese, however, rejected the ultimatum in a radio response.

On 6 August 1945 the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Two days later, on 8 August, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) announced at last its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration and declared a war against Japan, when the fall of Japan was a moment far. Russia had now attempted to fish in troubled water, turning up its real colours. She knew that the war was nothing but ended and wanted to get a share of the one-week war involvement without paying any cost.

On 15 August, Japan finally laid down its arms -- unconditional surrender. But the Russian troops were already in Korea, while the United States forces did not arrive in Korea until almost a month later.
Section 2. Post-Liberation  
(1945 - 1948)

The 38th Parallel

One of the greatest imprudence that the United States committed in its decisions for the postwar era was the one to divide Korea at the latitude 38 degrees North when the Pacific War ended.

Beyond all, the Japanese surrender to the Allied Powers which ended World War II did not leave the Korean people a single, united nation, due to this decision.

The Korean War might have been prevented if the country had not been divided along the 38th Parallel by the two occupation forces, the Russians in the north and the Americans in the south. Thus, the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, which directly and at once brought the liberation of the Korean nation from the Japanese colonial rule, left the peninsula, divided along the fateful Parallel, into two separate zones.

Korea’s independence and freedom was assured, as already mentioned in the preceding section, at the Cairo Conference in 1943 and reaffirmed at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. But, again, the true tragedy of Korea was determined by the others. Because, in reality the 38th Parallel partition was artificially created by the global conflict between the United States and Soviet Russia.

In fact, when the Koreans learned of their liberation from the prolonged Japanese domination (1910--1945), they were so excited at it and they all thought that their long-cherished aspiration for national independence would be realized within a matter of hours or days. It did not take too long for them, however, to see that their utmost joyful jubilation over the liberation had been premature. They were soon to realize that the fateful 38th Parallel was to remain as the seeds of a new tragedy for them.

The nightmarish division at the 38th Parallel was originally decided by the United States and Russian authorities for nothing other than a military convenience -- to disarm the Japanese forces in Korea. Accordingly, the Parallel is of course not a border in any true sense. And it does not bear any traditional significance. The resentful 38th Parallel partition was neither intended nor thought to be permanent, but the Russians immediately began to organize north Korea as a separate Communist satellite.
In retrospect, it is possible to conjecture that the decision to divide Korea at the 38th Parallel was made at the secret Yalta Conference, opened on 11 February 1945 between the Angro-American and Soviet Powers. The conclusion, however, is not more than an assumption because the source of this decision still remains confidential.

Then, five months later during the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the U.S. military delegates attended there discussed to draw a line for a occupation boundary between the United States and the Russian forces. They decided at least two major ports of Inchon and Pusan should be included in the U.S. forces zone. This led to the decision to draw a line north of Seoul, not exactly on the 38th Parallel but in general neighborhood. The American and Russian delegates, however, did not discuss in the military meetings of the Potsdam Conference, according to the American sources.

The question a demarcation line in Korea to the fore was settled in General Order No. 1 approved by the United States, Great Britain, and Russian governments and issued by General of the U.S. Army Douglas MacAr- thur on 2 September 1945.

In brief, the 38th Parallel was gradually turned into one of the tightest Iron Curtains in the world for years to come. Thus, Korea was again to have her destiny by a quarrel among the foreign powers, as a by-product of conflict between the world’s two contending ideologies. This was to become in turn the seeds of the tragic war in Korea five years later.

**Division of Land**

On 12 August, three days before Japan’s collapse and four days after they entered the Pacific War, the Soviet armies crossed the Siberian border into northern Korea nearly a month ahead of the American troops and took every advantage possible of their early arrival. The move on the part of the Red Army created a chain of new tragic events in the post-liberation history of the Korean people.

Meanwhile, with approval of the Allied nations in August 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), issued on 2 September, a General Order. The order had provided that the Russian troops would receive the surrender of the Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel and the American forces south of it. The Russian troops were as mentioned earlier already in their northern zone of occupation and they reached the 38th Parallel on 26 August just as the subordinate units of the XXIV US Corps were loading at Okinawa some 960 kilometers or 600 miles away for their movement to Korea. The American troops began to land at
Inchon on 8 September and Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV US Corps, the US Occupation Forces in Korea, arrived in Seoul on the 9th to accept the formal surrender of all Japanese south of latitude 38 degrees North.

For a few days at least after the U.S. troops arrived in Korea, the Korean people still lived in a dream world. Needless to say that they thought this was the end of long and too long years of bondage and the beginning of a new era of full peace and real freedom from interference by the foreign people in their lives.

The division of Korea into two separate zones of military occupation planted the seeds that were to bring so much grief to the Korean people. It contained within itself the explosive element which was touched off five years later.

With an unbalanced economic structure on one hand and a nation divided physically by the two powers and further politically by the internal factional groups on the other, the U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), namely the XXIV US Corps, composed of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions, as the occupation forces, began its mission in the south.

As the disarmament and repatriation to Japan of two hundred thousand Japanese troops in south Korea (most of whom had fled from the advance of the Russian armies) for which the US forces had primarily come, had progressed, General Hodge turned his attention to deal the emotions of the Koreans who feverishly desired immediate independence for their country. But he found himself hampered by little or no practical guidance from Washington or General MacArthur on such questions as the eventuality of Korean independence, methods of handling various political factions. He had then only General Order No. 1 which was primarily concerned on the Japanese surrender. There were already a number of political organizations existing before the arrival of the U.S. forces.

Apart from many others, what troubled most the US command was the Korean Communist party -- even though a small group in numbers -- forming an alliance with its fellow leftists, which the US command believed to be controlled by Moscow through the Soviet consulate in Seoul. For some inexplicable reason, the consulate had continued to function even though the Russians had entered the war against Japan; it was still in business when the Americans arrived in Seoul.

In the meantime, many important exiles those who had struggled for independence, including Dr. Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, began to return to the beloved homeland.

On the other hand, the nationalist leaders in the south Korea soon
became aware of the suspicious atmosphere emanating from the north. One of the first unfriendly acts of the Soviets was to cut off electric power service for an area north of Seoul. Soon afterwards all the communications were severed between the south and north.

General Hodge attempted several times to invite the Soviet Commander in the north in an effort to discuss the various problems which were obviously resulting from the division of the peninsula. The Russian command, however, refused to take any action. As the months passed, the economical situation began to prove disastrous.

As the circumstances grew more and more unpromising, the worried Koreans, early in November 1945, organized a meeting in Seoul of all political groups, and issued a joint memorandum demanding they be given the opportunity of organizing Korea as a unified whole. The division of Korea, they declared, was "a most serious blunder that is not of our making." By December 1945, this had apparently become evidence to all but the Russians.

In Washington, meanwhile, as the reports of Soviet immobility began to flow in, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, on 29 October 1945, laid down an American policy on Korea: "The present zonal military occupation of Korea by the US and Russian forces should be superseded at the earliest possible date by a trusteeship for Korea. It had become clear to the US government that the Soviets would try to obtain predominant influence in Korea.

**The Trusteeship Question**

In December 1945, the foreign ministers of the United States, Nationalist China, and Soviet Russia met in Moscow to iron out the many postwar problems which had arisen between the Western Allies. On the 27th an agreement was reached that Korea would be placed under a four-power trusteeship of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union lasting up to five years to prepare her for matured independence.

To the Koreans the agreement was most unwelcome. As soon as news of this trusteeship was flashed into the country on the morning of the 29th, the entire Korean people, including at first the Communists, rose unanimously in protest at once. The word "Trusteeship" resembled too closely their relationship with the Japanese rule from which they had just emerged.

The US occupation command below the 38th Parallel encountered with violent anti-trusteeship campaign which spread all over the provinces. The somewhat shocked American command sought to interpret the meaning
Introduction to the Korean War

of trusteeship in the most favorable light, but the Koreans refused to listen.

The furor was only slightly assuaged when the United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made a broadcast on 30 December. Regarding Korea, he stated that the U. S. – U.S.S.R. Joint Commission “may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the society of nations.”

However, the last hours of 1945 ticked away, the Koreans remained greatly troubled. Particularly, the Communists and the leftist elements, those who initially joined the anti-trusteeship movement, transfigured their attitude and turned suddenly their coats in January 1946 to support the trusteeship. They were of course directed to do so from the north Korean Communists under the leadership of the Soviets.

The Soviet Union already persuaded the people of the north to maintain a reluctant silence on the subject. In the south, however, the whole people, except the Communists and their followers, seethed with unrest to move violently once again on the interrupted promise of independence.

The American-Russian Joint Commission

Meanwhile, under the decisions reached at the Moscow Conference a U.S. - Russian joint Commission met for the first time in Seoul on 16 January 1946 and the first formal session of the Commision was held on 20 March through 8 May the same year to discuss the ways of establishing a provisional Korean government.

It was doomed to failure from the beginning. Dissension arose over the Moscow statement calling for consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. The Russians refused to consult with those groups in the south that had demonstrated against the trusteeship. The US side favored talking with everyone. The Russian side adhered to its assertion that only those organizations and individuals supporting the trusteeship agreement be invited for consultation. On the contrary, the United States delegation opposed this on the ground that it would be against freedom of speech to exclude such organizations and individuals simply because they voiced objection to the Moscow agreement -- trusteeship. The Joint Commission adjourned in May without making any headway.

The second and final session held on 21 May the next year, ending 18 October, but the both sides could not budge from their conflicting positions.

The Russians insisted all the way through from the start that the only
groups eligible for consultation were those that had not demonstrated against the trusteeship. It goes without saying that they were all communists. The Russians refused to even discuss administrative and economical cooperation of the two separate zones.

Long before the break-up of the American—Russian talks, it was clear that the continued occupation of the land by the two opposed forces had reached a stage where unification was far beyond the powers of the Joint Commission.

In fact, by the time, that the United States and the Soviet Union became incompatible rivals in the settlement of post-World War II problems once their common enemies were collapsed, thus creating a new tension, the cold war. In consequence, they completely failed to reach any agreement on the Korean question.

To be brief, the basic obstacle was that each side wanted a Korean Government friendly to itself, the Americans wanted no Communists while the Russians wanted otherwise.

Setting aside the Korean issue, the defect of the Axis powers in 1945 was not to bring peace. The Western Allies were soon to find themselves engaged in a new, more subtle, but equally vital struggle with their formerly, the Soviet Union. In 1945, however, they did not foresee unhappy developments would follow. They were soon to see them in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Trieste, Berlin and many other regions.

Communist Developments in the North

Upon the Axis powers collapsed, the strange alliance between the Communists and the Western Allies turned suddenly to struggle each other everywhere, chiefly provoked by the Communists. Korea, like Germany, Indochina, and other points of contact, became a battleground for the contending ideologies. Thus, as a pawn in power politics, Korea remained unchanged even after her liberation from the Japanese rule.

In north Korea, meanwhile, the Soviet Red Army's swift occupation having gone unviewed and unpublicized, the Russians appeared to have had no difficulty in establishing rigid Communist control over the territory. The Russians ran the northern zone as a police state through their trained puppets.

While the United States approach to the Korean problem had neither real goal nor a definite policy from the beginning, Soviet Russia visualized
from the very beginning on “independence” that would leave the Korean peninsula under the Communist control. In another words, Russia had begun to work towards this end almost from the moment the United States entered World War II and made victory a certainty.

As once cited in the earlier Section, Russia had looked upon Korea with acquisitive eyes for well over half a century, to gain Korea and warm weather ports in particular.

To begin with, Soviet started earlier in the scheme to train selected cadres to establish and maintain a Soviet-style country in which anti-Soviet groups would be voiceless. Thus Russia had her puppet leaders prepared for the time the Japanese surrender. Under the dictatorial control of Soviet Russian armies, the North Korean Communists had started to lay the groundwork for the creation of a Communist-controlled regime as early as February 1946, when a nation-wide opposition to the trusteeship continued to mount in the south.

Consequently, the North Korean Communists headed by Kim Il-sung (real name was Kim Sung-ju), who was trained in Russia, and whose name was taken from that of the well-known Korean patriot who had terrorized the Japanese by his guerilla tactics, could early concentrated their efforts in organizing and consolidating their power all over the Koreans in the north. Of course any dissidents were suppressed or purged immediately and ruthlessly, and only, the lucky ones were able to flee to south Korea.

On 22 February 1946, following the so-called interim people’s committee of North Korea was established two days ago, a provisional regime under Kim Il-sung began to exist.

One year later, the North Korean interim people’s committee of Korea was renamed as the central people’s committee of Korea on 24 February 1947 in an attempt to claim the right of its jurisdiction over the whole peninsula. Then, on 10 July 1948, the North Korean regime adopted a constitution, and set 2 August as the election date for its supreme people’s assembly.

Not like the general elections held on 10 May 1948 in the south, the northern Korean voters were allowed to make only one choice; to approve or disapprove a single slate of candidates named by the Kim Il-sung’s party.

As for the military buildup, on the other hand, the Soviet army command in north Korea made immediate provision of impressive size, including infantry, mechanized divisions, and border constabulary. Originally these forces were supplied with arms taken from the Japanese at the time of surrender. Then, as the North Korean Communist army grew in size and skills, the Russian forces filled them with Russian-made armament. And as
the Russian forces were withdrawn in 1948, all their arms including tanks and artillery were left behind for the newly trained North Korean Communists. On the contrary, in the south at that time, only a small constabulary equipped merely with rifles was in existence for maintenance of social law and order.

In such a way, Kim Il-sung had favourably been prepared step by step towards his ultimate goal -- the communization of whole Korea by force.

Section 3. National Independence and Separation

The United Nations Effort

As the U. S.—U.S.S.R. Joint Commission proved powerless after conferences were deadlocked for the second time on 10 July 1947, the United States turned the Korean problem over to the United Nations. Beforehand, the US State Department proposed on 28 August 1947 in a letter to Russia, that in view of the Joint Commission stalemate a four-power conference be held in Washington to discuss the entire Korean issue. On 4 September the Soviet Union replied rejecting the four-power talks and she continued to pursue its old arguments, blaming on the United States.

On 17 September the U.S. government now took the Korean issue to the U. N. General Assembly, advocating immediate independence without a trusteeship phase. This marked the beginning of the close relation between Korea and the United Nations.

On 26 September the Soviet Union offered to the United Nations a substitute proposal, recommending that all foreign troops leave Korea beginning in 1948 and thus allow the Koreans to erect their own government. This, in retrospect, had wide meaning that the North Korean Communists were already in position to communize the whole nation, particularly by its military power. In addition, from the Russian viewpoint, the American proposal would bring the international body into the scene and perhaps frustrate permanently Soviet efforts to gain control of Korea.

This Russian proposal on troop withdrawal was first made by the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission in Seoul. The U.S. command in Seoul, of course, rejected the Russian maneuver, because the withdrawal of the occupation forces at this stage would leave south Korea at the mercy of the militarized, Sovietized north.
Meanwhile, on 14 November 1947, the U. N. General Assembly passed a resolution on Korea as proposed by the United States by a vote of forty-three to zero, with six abstentions over the objection of Soviet Russia and its satellites. The resolution called for a general election to be held throughout Korea under supervision by a nine-member U. N. Temporary Commission (UNTCOK) to form an all-Korea government. It was the first step taken by the United Nations, the world organization, to respond to the inherent and rightful claim to independence of the Korean people.

On the contrary, the Soviet counter-proposal was voted down seven to thirty-four, with sixteen abstentions and eight absentees among fifty-seven members in total.

Yet, a major obstacle remained to be discovered by the U. N. Commission after it traveled to Seoul. Upon arrival in Korea on 8 January 1948, the Commission, which was consisted of the representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria, (Ukraine's representative did not come due to the Soviet's pressure), began its works on 12 January and, dispatched letters to the military commanders on both occupation zones, asking permission to pay courtesy calls. But the Soviet commander sent no reply. Thereupon the Commission reported back to the United Nations, asking that the Soviet delegation be requested to cooperate. Answer was also negative, however. Again, it was obvious that Soviet wanted no influence on the Korean question by the United Nation at all, thus hindering the Commission's activity by all means available to exploit.

Under such circumstances that there would be no nation-wide elections feasible, as the Soviet Command in the north refused to access to the U.N. Commission which the Soviet Union declared illegal, the Korean question was taken up again by the U.N. on 26 February 1948 though a "Little Assembly" formed to by-pass the Soviet veto in the Security Council and reflect the majority decision of the General Assembly on a workable basis.

This "Little Assembly" adopted a resolution calling for election in the area accessible to the UN Commission in Korea: i.e., south of the 38th Parallel. Several days later the UNTCOK announced it would monitor South Korean elections, to be held not later than 10 May 1948.

The reaction of the Russians and the North Korean Communists to this unexpected development was clamorous. *Kim Il-sung*, already hailed as head of the communized north, promptly called upon the South Korean sympathizers and the leftist elements to launch a movement to disrupt the elections in the south.

In the south, on the other hand, the leftist elements directed by the North Korean Communists attempted to hinder the elections. As the elections
date neared, the Communists stepped up their harassing tactics, instigating the southern people.

Despite the Communist rumblings that violence would occur, under the U.N. resolution the elections took place on schedule -- the 10th of May. Approximately ninety-five per cent of the voluntary registrants, or eighty per cent of all eligible voters voted for 170 representatives. The reports of the U. N. Temporary Commission was that the elections were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constitute approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea; about nine millions in the north and twenty-one millions in the south.

The Foundation of the Republic of Korea

The National Assembly, convened formally on 31 May 1948, adopted a Constitution for the Republic of Korea on 12 July and formally promulgated on 17 July.

The Assembly elected Dr. Syngman Rhee the first President of the Republic of Korea on 20 July. Sovereignty was proclaimed to the world and "DAEHAN MINGUK," (the Republic of Korea) officially born on 15 August 1948, the third anniversary of Korea's liberation from the Japanese. At the inaugural ceremony on this very day, President Rhee stated in part: "The thirty-eight parallel division is not part of our choice and is wholly to our destiny. Nothing must be neglected to keep wide open the door to reunion of the whole nation. The White Head Mountain (Paektusan) is surely our boundary to the north as are the Straits of Korea to the south. No temporary international situation can obscure what has been established through centuries of historic fact." The President also reiterated his appeal to the people of north Korea to "elect and send the missing one-third of our representatives from the north." 100 seats of the National Assembly had been left vacant to allow the North Koreans to send their representatives.

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the Commander of the US Occupation force in Korea, announced the termination of the US Military Government. In September 1948 began the withdrawal of all the U. S. Forces thus exhibiting once more its traditional devotion to the theory of non-involvement.

On 8 December 1948, meanwhile, the U. N. General Assembly passed by a vote of forty-one to six, with two abstentions, a resolution approving the reports submitted by the U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea on activities
in Korea before, during and after the general elections and establishing a new United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to replace the Temporary Commission.

The U.N. General Assembly, who acted the role of mid-wife in the founding of the Republic soon stepped in to recognize officially the Government of the Republic of Korea on 12 December 1948 at its third plenary session (the 187th plenary session) in Paris, as the only legitimate government in Korea, declaring that "There has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the great majority of the people of all Korea reside ..." It further stated that the government was erected "based on elections which were valid expression of the free will of the electorate."

This historic resolution, proposed by Australia, China and the United States, was voted by forty-eight to six, with one abstention and three absentees, and the Russian proposal was rejected by a vote of six to forty-six.

From that day onward the full diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Korea immediately followed from all corners of the free world, including the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and many other nations. The number of foreign countries which extended recognition to the Republic increased to a total of thirty-two by 1 October 1950.
In the North, on the other hand, the Russians turned their attention to the further communization of that zone. On 25 August 1948, the North Korean Communists held elections to set up a Communist regime sponsored by Russia. And the Communist regime was established in the north on 9 September 1948, headed by Kim Il-sung.

The next day, Kim Il-sung declared that his regime would "put forth its fullest effort for the earliest reunification of the country and the formation of a single sovereign state." This intimates evidently the fact that his determination to invade the South had not been made overnight.

Had the free general elections been realized throughout the peninsula under the supervision of the U. N. Commission on Korea in accordance with the U.N. resolution adopted at the first place at Paris on 14 November 1947, the tragic Korean War might never have occurred and Korea might be in a unified nation long time ago.

So it was that, by the end of the American and Russian occupation, a Korean nightmare -- the creation of the two parts which led to the separation of nation -- had come to pass.

Section 4. American Policy and Strategy Toward Korea

Prelude

While the Communist approaches led by Soviet Russia for the world domination had been contained in Western and Central Europe, especially in Austria, Greece, Turkey, West Berlin and elsewhere, by a means of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the continued march of world Communism remained undeterred in Asia. Particularly the greatest postwar victory won by the Communists was that the Chinese Communists defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist armies and drove the Kuomintang forces to the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) in 1949. This Communist expansion was to become in turn the seeds of the new conflict in the Asian continent, Korea and Indochina in particular.

During the period from 1945 to 1950, the American attitude toward the Korean problems was characterized within the framework of a policy that had both positive and negative aspects: On the positive side, the United States sought to fulfil the pledge of the Cairo Declaration of 1943 that Korea would become free and independent; negatively, it sought to avert Commu-
nist domination of Korea. After mid-1947, the positive objective eventually became to realize in such a way that the United States turned the Korean issue over to the world body, the United Nations. But the negative objective of withstanding the spread of communism below the 38th Parallel was the major motive behind the American policy from 1945 until the end of 1948. This meant preventing the Soviet Union from exercising its power throughout the peninsula. And from 1949 it also meant preventing the Soviet-dominated regime in North Korea from absorbing the U. N. sponsored and approved Republic of Korea in the south.

Military Policy

Shortly after the turn of 1945, the maintenance of the U.S. troops in Korea became an increasing burden to the U. S. Army as its reduced postwar force program. By early 1947, U. S. Secretary of War urged that the troops be withdrawn as soon as possible. The U. S. State Department, however, insisted that, politically, the troops should be kept as long as the Russian troops remained in the north.

In September 1947, the United States decided that on purely military grounds the U. S. Army divisions (the 6th and 7th infantry) stationed in south Korea should be withdrawn. General Dwight Eisenhower, U. S. Army Chief of Staff, and General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Far East, had both concurred in the decision of Pentagon. In their thought, the commitment of the ground forces on the Asian continent would have been a disastrous handicap in the event of the outbreak of a major war.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) seems to have reached this decision by reasoning, first, that the United States did not have sufficient military interest strategically in defending South Korea and, second, that in the light of the severe over-all shortage of military strength, the divisions in Korea could be better used elsewhere.

In January 1948, the U. S. JCS advised the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), successor to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, regarding Korea, that the withdrawal of the U. S. occupation forces from the Republic of Korea would most likely lead to Communist domination of the entire nation. But the withdrawal plan remained unchanged.

The definitive write-off of Korea as an important strategic area came when the U.S. JCS asserted that no military security guarantee should be extended to the Republic of Korea because such action would risk a major
war in an area where Russia would have nearly all the natural advantages. As a result, the U. S. President Truman approved a policy on 4 April 1948 that: "The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea ..." From that moment, Korea was of secondary importance to the American planners and policy makers. Russia, on the other hand, maintained its traditional regard for Korea as an important strategic area.

Withdrawal of the U.S. Troops--Power Vacuum

Meanwhile, Soviet announced on 19 September 1948 that its troops in north Korea would begin to withdraw in October and would complete the process by the end of the year. At the same time Soviet did not forget to ask the United States to do the same.

This bears, in retrospect, that the North Korean Communist regime and its armed forces were already strong enough and sufficiently trained to be relied upon to obey and carry out the Soviet stratagem.

Two days later, that was 21 September, the United States Government made an announcement that its troops in Korea were being reduced. As a result, the Government of the Republic of Korea made serious efforts requesting the United States to maintain its troops in Korea until the security forces of the young Republic became strong enough to keep internal order and also counter any foreseeable threat from the north.

In late December 1948, Soviet announced again that its troops had completely been withdrawn from north Korea by 25 December. But the United States neglected to penetrate the Russian's real motives that if the two occupying forces were withdrawn, unification of Korea would indeed be achieved by the Communists in the Soviet way. In another words, the secret motive behind the Soviet strategy was that she would realize her prime object -- the domination of whole Korea -- without the actual presence of Soviet troops after the eventual withdrawal of the American forces. The objective as well as tactics of Soviet was long-range -- the preparation of a satellite to fight, hiding herself behind the scene, to add more land and more people to the Soviet orbit.

At any rate, the debate about the withdrawal of troops filled the remainder of 1948. The Soviet Union took the offensive in this exchange because she stood on the favourable ground -- the North Korean Communist regime had already established a firm hold on the North by creating a one-party
power and a larger, well-equipped modern armed forces.

Meanwhile, on 11 January 1949, the newspaper *Izvestia* in Moscow attacked on the American troops remained in Korea, charging that it was the "principle obstacle" in the ways of unification of Korea. The United States continued to plan for withdrawal although such action would fall in with Soviet's wish. The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time had no long-range plans for Korea and the U. S. Army also wanted to get out.

In February 1949, the United States informed the United Nations that it would defer the withdrawal of its remaining troops at the request of the Republic of Korea. However, the U. S. Government, taking into consideration, besides other reasons, the political and military developments in China where the situation had taken a sudden turn for the worse, finally decided, on 23 March to hasten the withdrawal of the remaining troops from the Republic of Korea, a regiment of the 7th US Infantry Division.

At this juncture, the Republic of Korea Government urgently dispatched a special presidential envoy to the United States to appeal for stepped-up economic and military aid. It produced no particular fruit, however.

Consequently, President Syngman Rhee requested the U. S. authorities in May 1949, to halt the troop withdrawal and, made a statement stressing that: "Whether the American soldiers go or stay does not matter very much. What is important is the policy of the United States toward the security of Korea. What I want is, a statement by President Truman that the United States would consider an attack against the Republic of Korea as an attack against itself. If this is done, we do not need the soldiers."

And the following month the President reiterated to the United States the subject stating that "after the U. S. forces out of Korea what do we do for our defense? Most of the Republic of Korea Army men are, setting aside heavy weapons, without rifles and so is our police and Navy." It was too true that the ROK Army was in name only at the time, equipping with small arms not even enough to arm such a small size in strength.

Nevertheless, at the time when the Red Chinese were forcing the Nationalist Chinese from the mainland, the last contingent of the U. S. tactical forces finally sailed away from Inchon on 29 June 1949, with the exception of the Military Advisory Group (KMAC), 482 strong, which was established on 1 July that year, to assist in the training of the ROK forces within the limit that would just meet to the maintenance of public law and order. Thus, they left behind a fledged ROK Army equipped with small arms and mortars, but without tanks, heavy guns or aircraft.

Several reasons had been given for leaving the ROK Army so ill-equipped. Testifying before a U.S. Joint Armed and Foreign Relation Committee of the Senate in 1951, the Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that the
ROK troops did not know how to use modern heavy equipment and the United States did not have any to give. That view was obviously grounded on a short-sighted policy in a sense.

On the other hand, Soviet also sent a special military mission to north Korea as early as late December 1948 when its troops withdrew from the North, with the clear-cut aim of training and equipping the North Korean Communist armies strong and plenty enough to launch an aggression war by force of arms at their own choice.

Here again, to be brief, the United States failed to read the Communist strategy and stratagem concealed behind the iron curtain.

The Strategic Planning

Despite that the intelligence reports repeatedly pointed out the buildup of a formidable North Korean Communist Army, the United States limited itself to creating little more than a police force in the Republic of Korea.

The American government's low estimate of Korea's strategic importance was reflected in the words of high military and political authorities as well as in the dispositions of forces.

Twice during 1949 in separate press interviews, first with British journalist C. Ward Price on 1 March and later with Walter B. Mathews of the Arizona Daily Star in America, General MacArthur, the U.S. Far East Command, outlined an American "line of defense" in the Far East that excluded the Korean peninsula, as running from the Philippines through the Ryukyu Archipelago, Okinawa, Japan and the Aleutians to Alaska.

General MacArthur's basic plan to meet a general emergency in the Far East was to defend the Japanese islands. In his strategy, operations were to be offensive-defensive, with air and naval forces assuming the tactical offensive to protect the withdrawal of forces from the outlying areas and to deny to the hostile force the control of sea and air approaches to Japan. The U.S. forces located in Korea were to be quickly withdrawn. In fact the U.S. emergency plan for the Far East did not provide for the defense of either Korea or Taiwan (Formosa), thus again proving itself that the traditional U.S. "write-off" policy was apparently still effective.

On the diplomatic level, while the Korean situation began to boil, the U.S. government continued to support the U. N. effort in Korea. Nevertheless, Korea learned its most unfortunate fate in a famous speech delivered by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, which would make comfort for the Communists in prompting their aggression scheme. He defined Korea as little strategic
worth on 12 January 1950 at the National Press Club in Washington, delineating the American "defense perimeter" in the Far East, in similar terms as General MacArthur had mentioned in the preceding year.

Excluding Korea and Taiwan from the U.S. defense obligation, Secretary Acheson stated that the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia was set along the line connecting the Aleutian Islands, Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. He further went on: "so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned ... Should such attack occur ... the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far as not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression."

In the light of his remarks, it appeared that the United States had no intention of fighting for the Republic of Korea. In fact, the unexpected statement greatly brought despair in Seoul, while perhaps delight in Pyongyang and Moscow. In the view of many observers, his statement was an invitation to the North Korean Communist regime, Russia, and Red China that they could invade the Republic with impunity. (See Sketch
Map 1.)

Thus, the U.S. policy and strategy toward Korea continued to fumble until the outbreak of the war, with promises of economic and military aid on the one hand, while belittling the peninsula’s strategic weight, on the other.

For instance, about five months later, in May 1959, Senator Tom Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, went further than Secretary Acheson and publicly announced, that Russia could seize south Korea at her convenience and that the United States would probably not intervene, since Korea was not “very greatly sic important.” This statement would also offer a certain encouragement for the Communists to step into their long-waited action, the invasion.

Economic Development

The American government, taking the place of a power vacuum after the U.S. troops withdrawal, had been prepared to support the ROK Army and assist in the development of a viable economy. This was, however, thwarted by the short-sighted opposition in Congress who delayed passage of the Korean Aid Bill in 1949 and 1950 while the Soviet Union was building up a strong force north of the 38th Parallel.

On 19 January 1950, the military aid bill for Korea for 1950 was rejected surprisingly by a vote of 192 to 191 at the House of Representatives. This must have further encouraged the Communists for their aggressive ambition, although the bill was passed on the 14th of the following month in the long run.

The Republic of Korea and the United States signed a mutual defense assistance agreement on 26 January 1950. The United States, however, underestimated the strategic value of Korea and judged that it would be militarily impossible to retain the Republic of Korea in the free world. Accordingly, the United States was not enthusiastic in giving economic and military aid to Korea. In fact, the assistance was worked out by the United States as the impromptu one to calm down the strong opposition movement for the early withdrawal of the U.S. troops launched by President Rhee and the National Assembly. Taking an instance in evidence, up to June 1950, the time of the invasion from the north, no arms or equipment were forthcoming.

The United States Government supplied the Republic of Korea mostly consumer commodities and expendable items during the period under discussion. In other words, the United States attitude with respect to its
economic or military assistance to Korea did not materialize to effect for the development of basic economy as well as for the national security.

In sharp contrast, the NK Communists had every advantage in speeding their economic buildup, in addition to the military buildup, for they had greater industrial resources and facilities in the north. Before the liberation of Korea the Japanese had developed such industrial field in north Korea as electric power and iron refinery to a considerable degree for the continuation of their war effort, while south Korea had remained primarily to feed the Japanese with agricultural products.

Moreover, North Korea had been received full-scale economic aid from Soviet, particularly to prepare an all-out invasion of the Republic of Korea at a decisive time the Communist regime would choose -- on 25 June 1950.
CHAPTER II  WAR PREPARATIONS
BY THE NORTH

Section 1. The Communist Strategic Movements

The NK Communist regime designed its strategic course of action for an open war against the Republic of Korea as early as in late 1948, as a final means of unification of Korea.

In fact, initially there was a wide difference of opinions on the measure of unifying Korea among the Communist factions in the north: The Soviet-Koreans led by Kim Il-sung; the Communists fled from South Korea, Park Hun-young in command; and pro-Chinese Communists led by Kim Du-bong.

In anticipating the power-struggle after the conquest of south Korea, the South Korean Communist faction tried to minimize Soviet-Korean influence towards unification and emphasized that the role of military invasion was very limited and of secondary importance, whereas the Soviet-Koreans were, as a rule, favoring open blitzkrieg of south Korea. Kim Il-sung and his ring won in the end -- to run a general war.

Behind the Iron Curtains

At the end of 1948 when Soviet closed the withdrawal of its occupation forces from North Korea, Joseph V. Stalin, the head of the Communist bloc, summoned Kim Il-sung to Moscow for a series of secret meetings behind the iron curtain. Kim Il-sung, taking his deputies (Park Hun-young, Hong Myong-hi, Kim Il, Kim Chung-ju) and many other fellows with him, left Pyongyang on 2 February 1949, arriving at Moscow on 4 March. Kim’s party was accompanied by the Russian ambassador in Pyongyang, General T. Shlykov who assumed that post less than a month ago, on the 11th January.

According to a Red paper Pravda report, dated 21 March 1949, during Kim’s stay in Moscow, negotiations and meetings were held with Stalin, and First Deputy Chairmen Molotov and A. I. Mikoyan, during which Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, General Shlykov, also took part in the talks. As a result of personal meetings with Stalin at the Kremlin, time and again, Kim
succeeded in signing a ten-year agreement on economic and cultural cooperation between his regime and Soviet on 17 March. Kim and his party, again accompanied by Soviet ambassador Shlykov, left Moscow on 20 March and returned Pyongyang on 7 April by way of Mongolia and Manchuria.

The Pravda reports of 17 March 1949 on the Soviet-North Korean Communist agreements during Kim's visit aroused suspicion for many observers at home and abroad, because it was over a month-long tour, in particular. In the light of the timing of their visit, which took place immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from North Korea, and the length of their stay in Moscow, Kim's primary aim as well as the secret talks were appeared to have had more military matters than merely a socio-economic agreement. No doubtless Kim went there to accept a new strategic guide from the Kremlin regarding the Korean peninsula. Since this was the first of this kind of personal meeting between the two men, either Stalin personally suggested and urged Kim Il-sung his future strategic planning in Korea, or Kim, by the advice of ambassador Shlykov, urged Stalin to grant permission and support for the implementation of his design for a military action to communize whole Korea, and Joseph Stalin personally concurred as far as formal procedure went, according to "Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin," written by David J. Dalin, New York.

On the other hand, about this time there were numerous reports and rumors with regard to a treaty relationship between Communist China and North Korea. A Chinese Nationalist Government organ, then in Shanghai, reported that "the Chinese Communists had signed on 17 March 1949, a secret military treaty with the Russian sponsored North Korean Communist regime." It further charged that the North Korean—Chinese Communist pact called for: "Common defense against aggression of whatever nature, joint action against an attack on either, supply to North Korea of arms, materials and manpower from Manchuria and North China from the period of 1 July 1949 to 30 August 1950."

Taking account of the situation of those days, that the tide of the civil war in China had been turned in a great favour of the Red Chinese, Mao Tse-tung could urge belligerent Kim Il-sung to accelerate his war preparations, giving a promise in writing. Because they are a family group living behind either the iron curtain or the bamboo curtains.

Meanwhile, on 16 December 1949, Mao Tse-tung, Red China's head arrived in Moscow on the pretext of celebrating Joseph Stalin's 70th birthday, but in reality he was to discuss the whole range of Sino-Soviet relations as well as the Far Eastern situation with Stalin. Because, the great victory of the Chinese Communists over the Chinese Nationalists led by Chang Kai-shek drastically changed the balance of power in the Far East. The Peking regime
from then onward would greatly stimulate the Communist movement in the entire region, particularly upon the adjacent Asian nations.

*Mao Tse-tung's* mission, supplemented on 21 January 1950, by the arrival of *Chou En-lai* in Moscow, finally ended with the signing of a "Thirty-Year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" on 14 February 1950 in the *Kremlin*. This new Sino—Soviet treaty also encouraged the Communists' struggle elsewhere in Asia.

Many observers outside of the Communist world immediately suspected the possibility of a more significant secret agreement between the two powers. Without access to further evident materials, however, there was no way to take a full picture mirrored behind the iron curtains. But, in the light of the long length of Mao's stay in Moscow and also a Communist tendency toward secret diplomacy, the secret pacts between them were by no means improbable. Furthermore, Mao's visit to *Stalin* on 8 January 1950 was the longest of all among his visits to the inner sanctuary of the *Kremlin*, according to a report of the *Pravda*.

At any rate, the Korean problem may have held high priority during the two summit talks in Moscow. Yet, unfortunately, there was no official evidence regarding secret discussions on the Korean affairs, which led to the North Korean Communist aggression in June 1950.

In a view of subsequent developments in relation between Red China and the North Korean regime thereafter, many observers at home and abroad have agreed in common that the Peking regime knew of *Kim Il-sung's* plans for invasion well in advance—*Stalin* conferred on the forthcoming adventures in Korea with *Mao Tse-tung*, who concurred on the Soviet strategy.

Another reliable indication which backed up such observations was that Red China returned to north Korea thousands more Korean veterans among its forces during March—April 1950, soon after the Moscow conference. At the same time, a part of *Lin Piao's Fourth Field Forces*, namely the 38th, 39th and the 40th Armies, had moved during May and early June 1950 from the southern zone to northeast China and to the Korean—Manchurian border, where the 42nd Army had already moved in.

As for the NK Communists, *Choi Yong-kun*, the so-called defense minister in the *Kim Il-sung's* regime, implied in his comment on the Sino-Soviet treaty that it insured a North Korean victory even before the war started in June of 1950. Choi said, according to a report of the *New China News Agency* on 22 February 1950, that "...the Korean people, who are struggling for the independence and unity of their motherland, are encouraged by the gigantic victory of the friendly relations between the USSR and China, and, with added confidence in victory will redouble their struggle to drive the American imperialist's aggressive forces out of Korea and wipe out the treacherous
Syngman Rhee ... "

In short, the decision to invade by force was made, perhaps by a combined effort of Joseph Stalin and Kim Il-sung. At that time Red China did not have yet its diplomatic mission in Pyongyang by June 1950. All the arms provided to the Reds of North Korea -- T-34 tanks, Yak fighter planes, 122-mm howitzers, 76-mm self-propelled guns, and mortars -- were Russian, either brought across the northern border by trains or surfaces from Vladivostok to North Korea.

**Soviet Diplomatic Signs**

There were also a series of some other signs among the Russian diplomatic circles doing about Korea that the affairs had taken on something out of the common in them.

In the first place, Russia boycotted the meeting of the U.N. Security Council, in an attempt to plunge the prestige of the world organization and further to paralyze the functions of the Security Council, under the pretext of refusing the presence of Nationalist China's representatives. Without fail, it was the Soviet's technically pre-calculated scheme to make a escape-route for the Security Council not to intervene in the conflict if the NK Communist forces launched a full-scale war against the Republic of Korea during the summer of 1950.

On 13 January 1950, the Russian delegate Yakov Mal'tik again walked out from the Security Council when the Council voted down the Russian proposal, thus refusing to accept Red China as a member. From the 16th of January on, the Russian and its satellite delegates walked out one after another from the United Nations boycotting to attend the meetings.

Affected by the Russian policy, the whole delegates of the Communist bloc retired one after another from all the organizations under the United Nations, after 16 January, as the Russian delegates withdrew from the Thirteen-Nations Far Eastern Commission in Washington, the Four Power Allied Council in Tokyo, and the U. N. Trusteeship Council on 1 June, respectively.

On the other hand, all of the diplomatic missions residing in North Korea, Japan, and the United States were recalled to Moscow during the spring of 1950 without leaving any particular reasons behind on the surface.

It was another series of deliberate movements the Soviet Union planned in an effort to make sure the mutual coordination in advance so as to cope with the situation to be developed before long -- the invasion of the Republic
of Korea by the NK Communists.

The Russian "Ambassador" in Pyongyang, General T. Skrykov was summoned to Moscow in early April 1950 right after the Government of the Republic of Korea announced the general election for a new National Assembly to be conducted on 30 May. There was no room for doubt that Skrykov returned home with the mission of giving Stalin his final advice on the Communist offensive which was scheduled in the summer, because he had been playing the leading role in modernizing the NK forces since being assigned to the post on 11 January 1949.

In mid-May 1950, the two Russian experts on the Far East resident at Tokyo and Washington returned to Moscow one by one. On 16 May, Alexander S. Panyushkin, the Russian Ambassador in Washington, then holding additional post as the Russian representative to the Thirteen-Nations Far Eastern Commission, told the press on his departure for home leave that he was going back to Moscow for a time at the urging of his physician in charge. Panyushkin was ordered by Moscow, without fail, to leave Washington for a two-month period, taking into consideration the event of North Korean invasion of the south that would put him in an awkward position.

Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyankov, chief representative of the Russian delegation to the Four Power Allied Council in Tokyo, suddenly embarked for Russia from Yokohama on 27 May without notice, pulling out all 50 staff members of the Russian Mission in Japan including his senior assistant Major General Kislenkov. Numerous speculations continued in Tokyo after Derevyankov and his large staff departed. In order to cover up a fact that they were ordered to return home before the NK Communist invasion into the South, Derevyankov's press secretary did not forget to make a plausible excuse so as not to excite any suspicion for their mass removal. At any rate, the Russian government had planned to reassign General Derevyankov to the Russian Far Eastern Command and Major General A. P. Kislenkov was returned to Tokyo, together with 30 new staff members on 30 August 1950, as new chief delegate to Japan.

In short, it was by no means an accident that these Russian diplomatic and military strategists on the Far East affairs had gathered at a place in Moscow before 25 June 1950. Again, it is a Communists' prevailing tactics that they never expose to anyone the facts behind the shadows of their ill intentions. But they were recalled to Moscow, beyond mistake, for consultation in detail in order to insure the closest cooperation in the campaign ahead.
Section 2. The Portents of Invasion

With the complete withdrawal of the U.S. tactical forces from the Korean peninsula by 29 June 1949, the Republic of Korea was laying on the nakedness of the land. At this juncture, the Chinese Communists, about to conquer whole China, seemed to be riding a relentless tide of victory, and Korea as in its long past, would be greatly influenced by the entirely new development on the Chinese mainland.

Meanwhile, in north Korea subterfuge was being mixed with stepped-up military activity. On 6 July 1949, the North Korean radio announced that the Communist regime in Pyongyang would sponsor nation-wide elections on 5 September that year to create a unified legislature for the entire country. This legislature would then create an all-Korean government which the Communists said, would be free from the control of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations.

While thus talking of peaceful elections, which were never held, on the one hand, trouble flared up along the 38th Parallel, not long after the U.S. troops withdrew, on the other hand, as the North Korean Communists simultaneously stepped up harassment attacks and raids, both large and small. The Parallel was soon in a continued state of alarm.

Such repeated border clashes and skirmishes provided the NK Communist armies with invaluable experiences, as well as military intelligence on the capability of the Republic of Korea Army.

In addition, the presence of the American military advisors in the Republic continued to be the target of the Communist propaganda attack. Both the NK Communists and Soviet demanded the ouster of the American advisors, without saying anything about the bulk of the Russians in the north.

More striking development at this stage was that the North Korean Communist regime openly announced its intention, in letters to the U. N. Secretary General Trygve Lie and Carlos P. Romulo, the President of the General Assembly, on 14 October 1949, to reunite Korea by force of arms, stating: "The Korean (North) people will not abandon the struggle and will reserve for itself the right to continue by measures at its disposal the struggle for removal of the United Nations Commission on Korea and for final unification of the country by its own forces into a united state."

This Communist threat, however, failed to deter the U. N. General Assembly from once more considering the problem of Korea. On 21 October
1949, the Assembly voted forty-eight to six, with three abstentions and two absentees among the fifty-nine nations in total, resolving that "the United Nations Commission on Korea shall continue in being with the following membership: Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Turkey and having in mind the objectives set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 12 December 1949." On the other hand, the Russian proposal, asking for immediate dismantlement of the UNOK, was voted down by six to forty-two, with five abstentions.

The reaction of the North Korean Communists followed soon, thus urging the South Koreans to rise in rebellion under the form of the so-called "Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland." With the aim of mobilizing the political masses to the Communist cause, this propaganda machine adopted a resolution on 28 June 1949 appealing to the naïve: "To struggle for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from southern Korea and for the departure of United Nations Commission on Korea; to mobilize all forces of the people to struggle for the speedy build-up of the military forces; and to struggle for the re-establishment of the people's committees in southern Korea ..." In September 1949 the Communists began to activate all their various apparatus aimed at subversion and conquest.

Military Development

President Syngman Rhee's fears of attack from the North were not unreasonable. While the United States government limited the Republic of Korea Army to a constabulary-size force equipped with anti-riot weapons, the Russians supported a gigantic military buildup in Communist North.

In fact, before Soviet Russia entered the Pacific War against Japan, Stalin had already trained beforehand the key Korean Communists, either the Soviet-born Koreans or Korean exiles, who would rule the puppet regime he planned to establish. Kim Il-sung was one of them.

While the American political and military leaders debated the wisdom of building up the Republic of Korea armed forces, the Russian occupation command in North Korea lost no time to make steady progress with all-out effort in organizing, training and equipping the Sovietized-NK Communist forces in a modern pattern designed for the invasion.

The NK Communist forces, having been equipped with the Russian-made tanks, heavy artillery and warplanes, had been grown into a powerful and efficient combat forces under the close control of the Russians, between 1946 and 1950, in conjunction with its political consolidation. With
the arrival of the special military mission in early January 1949 from Russia, the plan to expand and modernize the NK Communists armies in size and equipment developed with increasing speed.

According to the "How Russians Built North Korean Army," written by ex-Russian Artillery Lieutenant Colonel Kyrii Kalinov in a report form, dated 26 September 1950, Soviet Russia dispatched this military mission in late December 1948 with the purpose of organizing and training the Red Korean armies up to the best shape within eighteen months, that was by June 1950. Colonel Kalinov, who had been in North Korea as a working member of the military mission, said that this special military mission, composed of such famed armored experts as Colonel General T. Shlykov, M. Katukov and Lieutenant General Kubanov, and intelligence expert, Admiral M. V. Zakharov, was organized by the Moscow conference held in early December 1948. Among those who attended the meeting were representatives from North Korea, Red China, and Soviet Russia itself, including Defense Minister N. A. Bulganin, Marshal R. Malinovsky, Commander of the Soviet's Far Eastern Forces, Marshal I. S. Konev, Commander in Chief of the USSR Ground Forces, Admiral A. G. Glavko, Marine Chief of Staff, and First Deputy Premier G. M. Malenkov. It could easily be visualized how early the Kremlin and Pyongyang regimes had been deliberately planned and prepared for 25 June 1950,
War Preparations by the North

in the light of these faces directly took part in the shaping of a top-secret strategy -- an aggression war.

Because of the NKC regime's dependence on Soviet Russia for training, supplies, and weapons, the NK forces remained under the control of the Russian advisors even more closer than before.

The NK Communists stepped up their preparations in full-scale for an invasion war as soon as Kim Il-sung returned from Moscow in April 1949. In the spring, total mobilization was declared by Kim Il-sung to conscript, draft and forage the additional manpower and materials required for fulfillment of his adventure. In that year, the addition of 40,000 draftees, 25,000 Korean who had been serving the Chinese Communist army, and several thousand men trained for three years in Soviet Russia as cadres for air and tank corps doubled the size of the military force. At the same time, all combat and supporting service units received additional Soviet equipment and training programs including the field exercises and maneuvers were markedly intensified. The Communist regime also created the youth training centers in all provinces in North, to organize reserve forces.

Early in 1950, the momentum of military expansion increased sharply. The NK Red army further expanded to 135,000 men of the regular infantry with the addition of new conscripts and 10,000 more returnees, seasoned veterans, from the Red Chinese army. Supporting the army forces was an air force amply equipped with approximately 180 Soviet warplanes, in addition, a naval force consisting of coastal craft. In April and May 1950, large shipments of the additional arms coming from Soviet reequipped the NK army and air force.

The Border Raids and Guerrilla Warfare

While the NK Communist regime accelerated its military build-up on the one hand, it also used every conceivable means, including propaganda and armed violence, to instigate the overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Both armed and unarmed espionage agents and terrorists from the north infiltrated deep into the southern zone and carried out subversive actions and guerrilla warfare, thus linking up with their sympathizers who had been hidden in the rugged mountains. Their aims were very explicit: Subvert the lawful government from within, if possible, and if not, create political confusion, economic chaos and public disorder by alienating the populace from the government.

As the year of 1949 began, the NK Communist armed forces stepped
up their border raids along the 38th Parallel, forcing the Republic of Korea to face serious security problems, namely (1) the Communist-inspired revolts from within, (2) frequent border attacks by the NK forces, and (3) the potential danger of an all-out war by north Korea, strengthened to an unpredictable degree by the Soviet or Communist Chinese aid.

The year of 1949 saw 874 border incidents that developed into the armed clashes by provocation of the NK forces, mostly known as the 38th Parallel Constabulary. Just before the last American troops left Korea, the NKC army units launched their first open attack across the 38th Parallel. On 3 May 1949, they struck onto the ROK security line in the Kaesong area just south of the Parallel. The NK Communist forces, more than a 400-man strong, pushed over the line to occupy Songhak-san or Mountain and other strategic hills north of Kaesong. The troops repulsed them after a fierce skirmish the next day. Afterwards, Kaesong became a continued battle ground and two-third of the citizens fled to the south as refugees.

In June 1949, following a series of forays along the 38th Parallel, the North Korean forces invaded the ROK territory in the Ongjin Peninsula, almost at the same time that the last of the US tactical units were being withdrawn. The border was not restored until July. In the same month the Communist units again crossed the Parallel near Kaesong, roughly 57 kilometers north of Seoul, committing a considerable force of infantry and artillery. Again the Red raid was finally driven back after heavy fighting.

On 28 July, the U.N. Commission (UNCOK) in Seoul reported to the General Assembly that embittered propaganda and hostile activities maneuvered by the North Korean Communists indicated the prospect of unification more and more remote.

In this period, the North Korean Communists (NKC) launched another invasion of the Ongjin Peninsula on the remote west with an estimated six thousand armed troops. The fighting flared for several days, and the invaders were repulsed by the ROK forces, although the Communists held two points inside the southern zone. As the summer faded, the situation along the Parallel deteriorated to such an extent that the U.N. Commission warned the General Assembly, on 8 September, of the growing possibility of a full-scale, "barbarous war" by Communist provocation in the peninsula.

Throughout the latter part of 1949 and early 1950 the NK Communists continued to take all possible measures to instigate and create trouble in the south. Hundreds of small-scale assaults occurred in 1950. In one week alone, 3-10 May, there occurred eighteen incidents along the 38th Parallel. In every cases, however, the ROK Army pushed the Red invaders back. While most skirmishes were confined to small-arms fire fights, some involved artillery duels and inflicted heavy casualties on both sides. For instance,
Kaesong once more came under heavy artillery fire from the north in May. On the other hand, a strong guerrilla warfare in the southern areas was also functioning. The Communist agents fostered disorder through propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla action and terrorism. To cite, a series of uprisings on the island of Chejudo spread to the mainland by late 1948, and keeping the guerrillas under control became a major task for the ROK Army just equipped with small arms only, but the ROK Army had virtually stamped them out, in some case after sizable battles. It was claimed by the Government that its forces had killed 5,000 Red guerrillas in the south during the period from September 1949 to April 1950. In March 1950, twenty-nine guerrilla attacks occurred during a week period from the 3rd through the 10th.

But, by the early months of 1950, in the main, no sizable revolts could be waged by either the armed guerrillas or the underground saboteurs because most of them had been destroyed successfully and effectively by the Government forces.

When these efforts of the border clashes and guerrilla warfare failed to cause the downfall of the Republic of Korea, Stalin and Red China’s head, Mao Tse-tung (who visited Moscow in December 1949—January 1950), apparently planned direct action to bring about the unification of Korea under the Communist control.

As for Kim Il-sung, he must have realized that his followers in the south could no longer hope to bring his inordinate ambition materially from within. This in turn must have prompted Kim to launch a horrible attempt to overthrow the Republic of Korea by force of arms before it became too late.

Section 3. Situation Immediately Before the Invasion

The Timing of Invasion

Upon successful conquest of mainland China by the Chinese Communists in the latter part of 1949, the two Communist powers, Soviet and Red China, soon turned their strategic attention to the next targets, the Republic of Korea and Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). It seemed certain that Korea was picked as the first target, setting the date to start an open war during the rainy summer of 1950.

In fact, Kim Il-sung openly expressed his firm determination to conquer the southern half of the Korean peninsula by force of arms as his last resort in terms of “liberation.” In his new year’s message of 1950, Kim announced:
“We could not accomplish our task to unify the fatherland in 1949, because of objection of the Americans and Syngman Rhee ... Under the situation, we were forced to build up a strong groundwork in the north to achieve the unification of the fatherland.

The people’s army, the 38th parallel constabulary, and internal security force ... should prepare for battle and ready themselves to defeat the enemy at any time. The people in the southern part ... must enlarge their struggle for the unification of the fatherland ...”

Kim’s appeal was followed up by the North Korean Worker’s Party, which on 30 May 1950 transmitted its last-minute secret directives to the Communist guerrillas and underground agents in the south: “You must expand your area of activities to make the year of 1950 our victorious year ... Remember that appeal made last March by the Korean Workers Party (actually Communist party) to expand your responsible area of activities as an immediate goal of early summer. This must be done at any cost.”

Both Kim’s personal message and the Communist party’s directives had apparently intimated that the Communist aggression was nearing within a matter of days or months.

**Last-Minute Buildup -- North**

Considering the relative strength and combat readiness of the armed forces that faced each other across the 38th Parallel in June 1950, just before the enemy invasion, it was a marvel that the North Korean Communist armies were delayed at all in their drive to overrun all of South Korea.

The military buildup in North Korea entered its final stage in early 1950. The mass expansion program of the armed forces completed in the preceding year. Then, the Communist regime spent the first half of 1950 in shaping up finally of its attack formation and battle deployment. During the period, the assault units were, of course, given intensive last-minute field training by day and night for a large-scale maneuver under the close direction of the Russian advisors, headed by Lieutenant General Vassilyev.

In March and April 1950, huge shipments of new arms, including hundreds of T-34 tanks, about 180 new warplanes, and heavy artillery, flowed into North Korea from Soviet Russia by rail and sea. It was also about that time that the former 15th Independent Division, the most famed Korean veterans in the Fourth Chinese Communist Field Forces, secretly entered north Korea and was redesignated as the 7th NK Division at Wonsan.
By early part of May all forces were brought to full strength, and an armored brigade was raised to the 105th Tank Division. The North Korean army force included ten regular infantry divisions, including approximately 145,000 men: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 13th, and 15th, of which the three (5th, 6th, and 7th) were from the Fourth Field Forces in Red China. Besides, there were three active brigades of the 38th Parallel constabulary, the 1st, 3rd, and 7th; the 105th Tank Division of 10,000 men with about 250 tanks; one air force division including 2,000 men with 211 planes including Yaks, Stormoviks and some attack-bombers; a 13,700-man naval force equipped with 35 frigates; and also a marine corps numbering 9,000.

According to the intelligence estimates in early June, there were also one each of separate infantry, artillery, motorcycle, and antiaircraft regiments and one engineer brigade in addition to those of divisional units and numerous supporting units. Furthermore, the bulk of reserve divisions and reinforcements were being prepared in the rear areas ready for later commitment.

But there was more to this Communist army than mere numbers and modern equipment. Most notable of all was many of the North Korean Reds in ranks were combat veterans of those who had fought together with the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), plus several thousands who completed a three-year training course in the Soviet Red armies. In addition, the NK spearheads had also gained experiences during frequent armed raids south of the Parallel, some of them full-scale assaults supported by artillery.

Thus, the NK Communist forces had tanks and heavy artillery while the Republic of Korea Army had none. They had heavy weapons that far outnumbered and outranged what the ROK Army had in name only. They had air cover, and the ROK Army lacked even anti-aircraft guns. Nor did the ROK Army had any arms capable of slowing a tank.

Furthermore, in most instance, the ROK Army had neither been trained its crews to operate light artillery, its heaviest weapons on hand, nor guns test-fires. On the sharp contrary, the NK howitzers had been zeroed in on major targets for months and years and had already shelled the city of Kaesong on their border attacks.

**Defensive Buildup – South**

Despite of the facts that the North Korean Communists possessed such formidable armed forces far superior than those of the Republic of Korea, Brigadier General William Roberts, then Chief KMAG, still believed that the Army was strong enough, although he seriously feared that air force
capability of North Korea.

In October 1949, the Ministry of National Defense had requested the tanks but the KMA had held the view that the Korean terrain and the conditions of roads and bridges would not lend themselves to efficient tank operations.

Above all, the United States military assistance to the Republic of Korea was predicted upon the policy that the ROK military establishment was an internal security force; and further that equipment furnished by the United States was to permit the development of an organization that would maintain security within the Republic, with no view to the possibility of the invasion from the north. On top of that, not even light equipment provided under the Military Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) for the fiscal year 1950 had reached Korea before the Communist attack.

Meanwhile, the American Ambassador in Seoul, John J. Muccio, brought the subject of military aid to the attention of the U.S. government when he reported the Committee of Armed Service at the 81st Congress on 6 June 1950, in Washington time, a few weeks before the enemy invasion, that the superiority of the North Korean forces, particularly in heavy infantry support weapons, tanks, and combat aircraft would provide North Korea with the margin of victory in any full-scale invasion. He told the American legislators that it was vital that the ROK Army be maintained on an effective level of equality in relation to those of forces which immediately threatened it.

But, William C. Foster, then deputy administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), testified quite the opposite before the Senate Appropriations Committee one week later. Speaking about the ROK Army, he said: "The rigorous training program had built up ... one that had cleared out the guerrilla bands in South Korea in one area after another."

By early June 1950, the ROK Army reached a strength of approximately 95,000, the bulk of which comprised eight infantry divisions. The strength of each division, however, varied from 6,900 to 9,500, thus only four divisions were near full strength. Moreover, of 95,000 men in total, actually broke down into 65,000 combat troops and 30,000 headquarters and service personnel.

Infantry weapons were those used by the US army in World War II, namely, besides the small-caliber rifles, light and heavy machineguns, 50-mm and 81-mm mortars, 2.35-inch rocket launchers and 57-mm antitank guns. They had no big mortars, no recoiless rifles and mines. The heaviest arms were 27 armored cars and 89 pieces of 105-mm howitzers with an effective range of 7,200 yards and maximum range of 8,200 yards, while the North Korean forces had then 14,000 yard effective range of 122-mm howitzers.
Moreover, fifteen per cent of the ROK weapons were useless and thirty-five per cent of the vehicles unserviceable. Ammunition stock would last only a few days. The six month’s supply for spare parts originally provided by the U.S. government was already exhausted. Most of the ROK Army division had yet to train in sizeable field exercises. A majority of the units had not been completed even small unit training at company level.

The ill-equipped, ill-trained, and less-manned ROK divisions were stationed before the enemy invasion as follows: Four of the eight existing divisions, namely, the 1st, 7th, 6th and 8th, held the positions thinly along the 38th Parallel in the order named, from west to east, with about one third of their strength in defense positions and the remainder in reserve well to the rear ten to thirty miles below the Parallel. At the extreme western end of the line was the 17th Infantry Regiment of the Capital Security Command on the Ongjin Peninsula. The other three, the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Divisions were widely scattered throughout the interior and southern areas and were for the most part engaged in suppressing the Communist guerrillas in the rugged mountain areas, while the Capital Security Command was garrisoned in and around Seoul. Under these circumstances, not a division would be able to concentrate its full combat strength in time to stem any eventual invasion from the north.

As for the ROK Navy, it had, on 24 June 1950, patrol craft (PC-701), recently purchased in the United States from the surplus vessels, three other similar patrol craft enroute to Korea from Hawaii, one LST, fifteen former U.S. mine sweepers, ten former Japanese mine layers, and miscellaneous small craft.

The ROK Air Force, on the other hand, had in June 1950 a single flight group of 14 liaison-type aircraft and ten advance trainers (AT-6), all out of date.

**Smoke-Screen Maneuver**

The North Korean Communist regime had completed its long-ranged preparations by the month of May 1950. In an effort to deceive deliberate invasion scheme, it employed every conceivable means, particularly a series of camouflaged warfares, as the summer of 1950 neared.

From the autumn of 1949, the Pyongyang regime intensified its “hat campaign” against the Republic of Korea, placing the increasing stress on service in the “fatherland liberation” as the highest duty to the Communist domination. Thus, by early months of 1950, the North Korean military machine was ready and the populace was psychologically prepared for war within North Korea.
As part of this build-up, the Communist regime in Pyongyang, geared for war, began a so-called "peaceful unification" campaign. In other words, the Communist propaganda machine was raising the smoke-screen intended to obtain the advantage of surprise, while the NK Communist troops and tanks already began moving south toward the assembly areas and attack positions behind the 38th Parallel.

This "peace offensive" was nothing else but to camouflage their plans of surprise attack -- divert the attention of the Korean people, induce the Republic of Korea to set her alertness at rest, and further to deceive the world eyes.

Among the number of psychological campaigns launched by the NK Communist regime as its last-minute camouflage and smoke screen tactics, the "Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland," one of the propaganda machines, proposed on 7 June 1950 a single national election for all-Korea. The camouflaged proposal noted that the general elections would be held on 5 August and a parliament would meet in Seoul on 15 August, the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese rule. It would appear from this manifesto that the NK Communists expected that all of Korea would be overrun by mid-August.

The Communist proposal also offered a preliminary joint conference by the political and social leaders of both south and north Korea to be held near the 38th Parallel to discuss the ways and means to hold the elections. The proposal, however, excluded participation by the U.N. Commission on Korea, President Syngman Rhee, and other leading political figures of the south. The Communists made such offer because they knew only too well that it would never be accepted by the leaders in the south.

Soon acting in unison with the camouflaged maneuver, the leftist elements in the south, began clamoring for acceptance of this trick attempt under cover of the "unification proposal."

Meanwhile, in the general elections of 30 May 1950, for a new National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 130 seats went to independents, 49 to parties supporting President Rhee, and 44 to other parties. As a result, this led to the un stalled political situation within to some degree.

On 20 June, just five days earlier the Communist invasion, the NK Communist regime itself repeated the camouflaged proposal with slight revision. Then came a dramatic proposal to exchange some political prisoners, namely Cho Man Shik, prominent Christian-nationalist who had been placed under house-arrest by the NK Communists, and Kim Sam-yong and Lee Chu-ha, well-known south Korean Communists who had been arrested by the national police on charges of subversive activities. In fact, this last proposal
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was dramatic enough to seize the national headlines and public curiosity, a crafty stratagem to camouflage the real intention of the Communist invasion.

To be brief, these offers were final steps for invasion taken by the NK Communists as the main body of their attack forces deployed to the line of departure along the 38th Parallel.
CHAPTER III THE INVASION FROM THE NORTH

Section 1. Intelligence Estimate

One of the serious mistakes of Korea by the American military authorities, in their estimate of situation, was that they failed to read the enemy intentions on one hand, and also to give proper weight to what they learned of enemy movement and capability on the other. Putting in other words, the American intelligence failed to predict such enemy scheme of invasion as the time, strength, and actual launching of attack, because of reluctance to accept all the reports furnished by the Koreans, a distrust of oriental agents and sources, and a belief the Koreans were prone to give a false alarm. It seemed that they might feel at that time the Koreans were pretending pain for military aid. Needless to say that such American tendency was absolutely wrong, -- a mere guess work -- and it caused eventually in part to bring about a great disaster in Korea before long.

Many reliable intelligence sources had been brought an imminent threat from the North Korean Communists to their attention. The existence of the powerful striking forces in the north and the massing of troops near the 38th Parallel were not secret to the various intelligence sources. Apart from many others, the increased troop movement and activity during the spring of 1950 followed a pattern established by the Communists in 1947 when they initiated an annual rotation of completely equipped units from the 38th Parallel. Accordingly, the signs which actually marked the prelude of the North Korean attack had become accepted as merely routine Communist activity.

Meanwhile, the Intelligence Division at the U.S. Far East Command in Tokyo received a vast quantity of information regarding Korea, although Korea was not strictly within General MacArthur's orbit of responsibility, since the peninsula was under the jurisdiction of the State Department after the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops in June 1949.

On 10 March 1950, for instance, a ROK source sent to the G-2, the General MacArthur's Headquarters an agent's report that the North Korean invasion schedule had been set back from March or April to June 1950. Late in March, however, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, the G-2, neglected it saying that: "It is believed there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or
summer ... The most probable course of North Korean action is furtherance of attempts to overrun the Republic of Korea Government by creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic through guerillas and psychological warfare."

Headquarters, the U. S. Far East Air Force also received information in mid-April that Russia had directed an attack on the Republic of Korea by the North Korean Communist forces. But in early May the American Embassy in Seoul reported little likelihood of a North Korean invasion in the near future.

In effect, the massive troop movement to deploy from the interior and the remote areas to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel was mostly done during the general election campaign period in the Republic of Korea which ended on 30 May 1950. The intelligence authorities of the ROK Army testified at the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) hearing held on 12 May in Seoul that "the 1st and 7th Brigades of the North Korean 38th Parallel Constabulary are acting as the first-line forces. Immediately behind them are the 6th NK Division at Sariwon, the 1st NK Division at Yonchon, and the 3rd NK Division at Chorwon. And one tank regiment had completed its transfer from the rear and is now stationed at Sariwon."

Afterward, a UNCOK observation team, which had been inspecting the 38th Parallel since 12 June to report the developments likely to be involved a military conflict, returned to Seoul with the view that there was "no reason to believe from the intelligence sources the invasion was imminent. This report was made, even though the North Korean Communist party clearly signalled by the name of people that the war was imminent in a news conference held on 24 June when it declared in part that: "No matter what steps are taken by the reactionary clique, it will not succeed in concealing the North Korean peace proposal from the Korean people." This big talk was, of course, nothing more than continuation of last-minute smoke screen, their conventional propaganda tactics, under cover of "peace offensive."

On the other hand, on 19 June, just six days before the Communist attack, a routine report from an American intelligence agency was reached Washington pointing out the strong evidences of imminent NK Communist offensive: (1) Extensive troop movements along the 38th Parallel; (2) evacuation of all civilians north of the Parallel for two kilometers; (3) suspension of civilian freight service from Wonsan to Chorwon and the transportation of military supplies only; (4) concentration of armored units in the border area; and (5) the arrival of large shipments of weapons and ammunition. But no conclusions were drawn from these indications.

On the same day, the G-2, the US Far East Command in Tokyo concluded in his intelligence report noting that "apparently Soviet advisors believe
that now is the opportune time to attempt to subjugate the Republic of Korea Government by political means, especially since the guerilla campaign in South Korea recently has met with serious reverse.” Nevertheless, in spite of facts that there had been ample warnings, MacArthur’s staff continued to assert that Communist North would confine its activities to subversion and guerilla actions; the reason seems to have been an inability to separate rumor and propaganda from fact. In addition, the American estimate of situation at the time must have largely guided by conviction that the Communist bloc was not ready to risk atomic war by resorting to an armed aggression.

After all, the Pentagon authorities had also failed to interpret and evaluate properly the reports sent in from Korea and the U. S. Far East Command. From their viewpoints, the general tenor of reports dispatched from the Far East indicated that the North Korean Communists would continue to employ the local guerilla actions and psychological warfare as usual together with political pressure rather than resort to the overt employment of military forces.

Section 2. Last-Minute Developments

Battle Readiness

As the month of June 1950 drew near, the North Korean Communists, behind the smoke screen, now took up practical steps to finalize their preparations for an all-out attack on the south.

In mid-March all civilians within five kilometers north of the 38th Parallel were ordered to evacuate the area. In an attempt to conceal their real color of invasion, they told the civilians that “We have no alternative course but to remove to elsewhere more safer because the Syngman Rhee’s army will take a risk of invasion within a matter of days.” But, on the hand, they did not forget to use their most favorite tactics, a camouflage-shrewd, thus excluding those people located on the spot within the border line from the removal order.

It was on 20 March that the additional guerilla elements and special agents infiltrated deep into the south, with the missions of instigating the innocent people to rise in revolt if the invasion was commenced from the north. They were all those carefully selected among the former South Korean Workers Party members who had been fled to the north.
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During the month of May, the busiest month to all the North Korean troops, they were brought to the field to repair bridges and roads leading to the 38th Parallel, and to supervise the evacuation process of civilians, within five kilometers of the Parallel.

While what was called the signature campaign was taking place throughout North Korea in terms of camouflaged “peaceful unification of fatherland,” Kim Il-sung held an unusual meeting in scale on 17 May 1950 at the Moranbong Theatre in Pyongyang. The attendants, besides Kim himself, included all the political and military leading figures in the Communist regime, such as Pak Hun-yung, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, Choi Yong-kun, Defense Minister and North Korean people’s Army Commander, Pak Il-wu, Internal Affairs Minister, key staff members of the Communist army including Kang Kun, Chief of Staff, NKPA, and all division commanders. At the meeting, all they agreed upon unanimously that there was the only way to unify Korea -- by force of arms. And they confirmed and pledged that their military power was strong enough to overrun South Korea within a matter of months, not longer than fifty days if they open a hot war.

From early June the so-called defense ministry of the North Korean regime and the Russian advisors had lost themselves in the final preparations as busy as bee. The head members of the Communist defense ministry, including Choi Yong-kun, the defense minister, and Kang Kun, chief of staff of the North Korean people’s army, held the high level secret meeting every day with the Russian advisors in attendance.

Meanwhile, on 7 June the North Korean regime undertook a last minute, farcical “peace maneuver” as mentioned in the Chapter II, to mask its invasion plans. Kim Il-sung repeated the camouflaged peace proposal being two faced, ins and outs, under the cloak of the “unification of fatherland,” while his armed forces were heavily engaged in the final phase of shaping-up course preparatory to the general attack.

On 8 June the trick was flatly rejected by the Republic of Korea. Instead, the free Republic presented a counterproposal to the effect that “for the unification of Korea, an election should be held in the north under the supervision of the United Nations Commission on Korea in obedience to the U.N. resolutions.”

Two days later, on 10 June, the North Korean defense ministry hastily recalled all of its division and brigade commanders to Pyongyang, at where the operation conference was held in secret. Kim Il-sung at the meeting set the D-Day for 24 June and instructed the commanders to deploy their units for battle readiness between the 15th and the 22nd of June, forcing a strict order for them to keep the plans as top secret. The day was later

The new organization of the I and II NK Corps was announced in that day. According to former North Korean Army Senior Colonel Lee Hak-ku, who had surrendered to the United Nations forces during the war, the II NK Corps started Pyongyang on 12 June, two days after he was appointed as Chief of Operations Section of the Corps, and he had never known about the war was to begin, until his Corps moved to Hwachon, the assembly area.

In this way, under the name of field maneuver training, the North Korean forces had completed their deployment in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel by 23 June. Only one day before the attack, all the Russian advisors attached to the assault units withdrew temporarily to Pyongyang on 24 June.

**The Battle Orders**

As the combat deployment had well been proceeded, Kim Il-sung, the Supreme Commander of the North Korean Communist Forces (NKCF), now issued a series of "the battle orders" which were translated from the original plans presented by the Russian advisors, to his major field commanders in battle formation.

On 18 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army Headquarters issued the so-called "Reconnaissance Order No. 1" to the assault divisions, requiring the information of the ROK Army defense situation be obtained before the attack.

An original copy of the "Reconnaissance Order No.1," of 18 June 1950, written in the Russian language, was captured later by the United Nations Forces on 4 October 1950 in Seoul during the war. The original order must have been drafted by the Russian advisors. This captured document instructed the Chief of Staff of the 4th NK Division to collect and substantiate the information with regard to the location and strength of the ROK Army defense units prior to the attack, specifically the areas guarding the approaching route to the Uijongbu—Seoul corridor. The similar orders bearing the same date, modified only to relate to the situation on their immediate front, were sent by the Intelligence Command of the NK People's Army to all the attack divisions and the 3rd Constabulary Brigade. No doubt such orders also went to other units to take part in the initial attack.

Then on probably the next day or 20 June, the Communist army headquarters must have issued finally its operation orders to the major field commands, which directed them to fully prepare for attack by mid-night of
23 June, in compliance with the assigned objectives.

On the other hand, "the Battle Order No. 1" dated 22 June 1950 was issued in the Korean language by Lee Kun-mu, the Commander of the 4th NK Division, in order to prepare his subordinate unit commanders for the attack by 2400 hours, 23 June. The mimeographed copy of this particular order was later captured on 29 June 1950 by the United Nations Forces in the vicinity of Taegon.

The captured copy of "the Battle Order No. 1" disclosed that the 4th NK Division was to advance down the Uijongbu—Seoul corridor and that the 1st NK Division on its right and the 3rd NK Division on its left would join in the attack leading to Seoul. Tanks and self-propelled artillery with engineer support were to lead it. This battle order included an annex giving a breakdown of regimental attack plans.

Other assault units apparently received their battle orders about the same time. Thus, all the North Korean attack units were poised at their lines of departure for attack by 24 June. Officers told their fellow men that they were on field maneuvers but most of the latter realized by 23-24 June that it was war.

Most noteworthy is that these two battle orders provide too clear and documented confirmation that the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea, launched on 25 June 1950, was carefully prepared and carried out in accordance with a deliberate and premeditated plan for the conquest of the whole peninsula. The full texts of the two orders under discussion, excluding the annex, which were issued to and by the 4th NK Division, one of the main attack divisions, are as follows:

RECONNAISSANCE ORDER NO. I

Supreme Headquarters
Korean People's Army

To: Chief of Staff, the 4th Infantry Division

18 June 1950
Map 1:50,000, issued 1949

1. The 1st Regiment of the enemy's 7th Division with its artillery in support is defending the sector from Imjin-Gang up to Hill 538.5 (0634). The forward edge of the 38th Parallel defensive buildup is along the northern slopes of the heights at the Parallel. The main force on the enemy main line of resistance is manning along the line -- Hill 217.0(0622)—Saekkyo-ri
Reconnaissance Order No. 1 issued in the Russian language, dated 18 June 1950,
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Reconnaissance Order No. 1 – Continued
(0622) on the northern slope of Hill 411.3 (0628)—the northwestern and northern slopes of Hill 630 (0630) and whereabouts (0632). The defiles along the roads from the Parallel to Kasan-ni (9824) and Tongjin are protected with a well-developed defense system. The positions of the regimental reserves are supposedly in the area of Hill 249.7 (0026). To the left, the enemy defenses are held by the 13th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division, to which left flank is the 9th Regiment of the 7th Division.

2. Prior to the beginning of the attack when the Division is set up in an attack position, through observation and reconnaissance, it is necessary to:

   Have a thorough grip of the enemy situation, including the main line of enemy resistance, the presence and arrangement of mine fields, barbed-wire entanglements and other barricades, the pathways between barricades and entrenchments and the location of unbuild-up areas.

   Determine accurately the arrangement of trenches, communication trenches, DOT [tochka, concrete pillbox], DZOT [earth-and-timber pillbox], NP [observation post], and the disposition of weapons for fire barrage and the concentration fire set up.

   Determine the location of the enemy main body and the daily operation plan.

   Determine accurately the firing position of artillery and the small arms. At the same time, determine the arrangement of antitank guns, especially along the routes of approach.

   Toward the end of the second day after jump-off of attack, work out accurate objectives on the map and also indicate the location of the enemy engineer units.

   As the attack commence exert ardent efforts to find the new objectives so as to destroy the enemy forces, direct strong blow on the center of the enemy resistance, and fix your eyes on to where the dislodged enemy retreat.

   When the frontline units reached the Choksong (0416)—Tongjin line, organize a new striking force and move down south in the direction of Choksong—Kanap-ni; and along the road to Uijongbu with the objective of a timely stand, pending the arrival of the reinforcements from the rear.

   After reaching Yangju (8426) and Haga-ri (8614), organize a new force and send it out in the directions of Hayang—Nohok-ni (7414); Kanap-ni—Pugok-ni; and Uijongbu—Sodo-ri (7226), with the objective of determining the enemy opposition areas along these routes leading to Seoul.

   When the advance toward Seoul is in progress, devote your effort by all means to the collection of information about the enemy concentrations
and dispositions defending the city, so as to deliver a decisive blow.

3. A daily intelligence summary, covering a twenty-four hour period, must be reported to the Intelligence Command not later than 1900 hours by radio or telephone. The written reports, captured documents and interrogation reports must also be submitted to the Intelligence Command twice a day by 0800 hours and 2000 hours.

4. Not more than one-third of unit troops are to be placed at and around the observation posts, and two-thirds must be employed to attack on the enemy main body. Each regiment must have one squad of three to five men who would collect the captured enemy documents on the battlefield. (prepared 2 copies; one to division)

Commander, Intelligence Command
Supreme Headquarters, Korean People's Army

BATTLE ORDER NO. 1

Korean People's Army
Headquarters, the 4th Infantry Division
Okke-ri, 1400 hours, 22 June 1950
(Map 1:50,000, issued 1948)

1. The enemy in front of our attack is the 1st Infantry Regiment of the enemy's 7th Infantry Division.

2. The objective of our Division, the one, utmost important on the Corps frontage of attack, is to penetrate through the enemy defenses along the Kwangdong (05.18)—Ajangdong (23.38) line, and after taking Maji-ri (03.19), Hill 536.2 (03.33) Pyongmaul (05.13), and Naehaem, attack down to the Uijongbu—Seoul direction. The attack preparations must be completed by 23 June, 1950.

3. The 1st Infantry Division will poise to attack on our right wing, for which boundary defines along Maktaedong (23.18), Nogong-ni (18.18), Bangjingni (88.11) and Pibong (67.18). The 4th Infantry Division is not responsible for these points apart from Maktaedong. On the left, the 3rd Infantry Division will attack. The boundary between the left wing and our Division is the line running from Puhangdong (20.35) through Hill 583.5
(06.34)—Hill 535.6 (03.33)—Hill 519 (93.32) then to Hill 333.1 (82.29) for all of which the 4th Division is not responsible.

4. The main attack will be directed toward the wide road on the left flank, and the battle formation will be in two echelons.

5. The 18th Infantry Regiment, together with one artillery battalion, one 45-mm anti-tank battery, one self-propelled artillery battalion, one engineer battalion, one tank company, two anti-tank platoons attached, will break through the enemy defense line along Kwangdong (0518) and Sahang-ni (09.30); then, as the initial objective, take the Kuum-ni (14.18)—Tongmyong-chon (06.27) line and lastly, the Maji-ri (03.16)—Hill 262 (24.27) line. Subsequently, the attack will be directed toward Hyangdong (31.24).

The foregoing actions will be executed with the support of one anti-tank battery attached from the anti-tank artillery battalion of the 13th Field Artillery Regiment, the 13th Infantry Division, one battery of 76-mm howitzer and 45-mm guns each; and also another 45-mm battery and the 82-mm mortar battery from the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment.

The left wing battle line of the 16th Infantry Regiment will be defined along Umnae-ri (19.30)—Saejip (12.27)—Sarang-ri (19.30)—Hill 289 (06.27)—Tangnae (00.27)—Chungpae (97.26)—Songgam-ni (94.27), and of which, with the exception of Umnae-ri, will be included in the responsibility of the 18th Infantry Regiment.

6. The 16th Infantry Regiment, acting in concert with one battery of the Division Artillery Regiment, two batteries from the self-propelled artillery battalion, two tank companies, two sections from the 45-mm anti-tank gun battalion and one engineer company, will break through the enemy defenses in the area of Sadang-ni (09.30) and Paegi-ri (10.34), and will capture Yangwon-ni (05.27) and Paeha-ri (05.33) first; Hill 362 (04.27) and Hill 535.6 (03.33) the next; and thereafter attack toward the Uijongbu direction.

The two batteries of the antitank battalion from the 13th Infantry Division; two batteries of the 76-mm howitzer regiment; two 45-mm anti-tank gun batteries; and two 76-mm howitzer batteries, one 120-mm heavy mortar battery, and two 82-mm mortar companies from the 5th Regiment will support the regimental action.

The left wing boundary will be the Division boundary, and the 16th Regimental Commander will be responsible for it.

7. The 5th Regiment (less one battalion), as the second echelon of the Division attack, will follow behind the 16th Infantry Regiment and will prepare to commit into battle on and around Hills 362 and 535.6 (03.33). The
1st Battalion Commander of the 5th Infantry Regiment will form an assault group with one anti-tank gun platoon, two anti-tank squads, two heavy machine gun squads, one engineer platoon in addition to one infantry platoon. The infantry platoon leader will take command of the assault group.

8. The 2nd Battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment, with the anti-tank gun company attached, will follow the 18th Infantry Regiment, and will prepare for tank attack along the line of Maji-ri (03.16) and Tongmyonchon (06.27).

9. The field artillery units will be placed under my command. Artillery preparation fire will be laid down for 30 minutes: 15 minute-bombardment and 15 minute-quick firing.

   The General missions of artillery are:
   Firing ........................................ minutes.
At the time of preparation for assault——
   (1) To concentrate its total effort upon the forward positions of the enemy defense line.
   (2) To weigh down the enemy's artillery positions and, to ruin its earth-wooden made positions (bunkers) as well as permanent-strong points (fortified defenses).
   (3) To open up the passages through the obstacles in front of the enemy defense positions.
   (4) To interdict the enemy approach toward Chombang (06.20), Pujopdong (06.25) and Chochon-ni (06.30)
   (5) To paralyze the enemy observation posts.

When supporting the assault——
   (1) The attack by infantry, tanks, and self-propelled guns will be continued as far as to Maji-ri (03.16), Machasan (02.20) and Hill 535.6(03.32)
   (2) Destroy the enemy bunkers and fortified defenses along the both sides of the main road leading to Seoul
   (3) Carry out counter-fire upon the enemy’s artillery positions.
   (4) Prevent the enemy from a possible counterattack in the direction of the road leading to Kosayong (02.14), Hosa-ri (97.25) and Uijongbu.
   (5) Prevent the enemy from concentrating in the Tongduchon and Hansa-ri (97.21) area.
   (6) Destroy the enemy's command posts.

During the last phase of action——
   (1) Cut off the enemy’s retreat route.
(2) Continue counter-battery fire.

(3) Cut off the enemy’s main route as well as waterways of retreat and destroy the enemy on the flanks of Tongduchon.

(4) As soon as the initial mission of the Division is executed, it will restraints the enemy from assembling at the Taechon (98.15), Yogong-ni (97.25) and Kichon (97.32) areas.

(5) Prevent the enemy’s concentration for counterattack from the Uijongbu area. The preparation for artillery fire must be completed by 2400 hours, 23 June 1950.

10. The missions of the Air Corps are to:

(1) Cover the Division operations and protect troops from possible enemy attacks.

(2) Destroy the enemy’s military installation and railway marshalling yards.

(3) Interdict the enemy movement for concentration and also check the approach of its reserves for reinforcement.

(4) Destroy the enemy’s roads in order to sever its troop concentration.

11. Each unit will take anti-air measures with its organic anti-aircraft weapons, and in case of enemy air attack, will mobilize 30 percent of infantry weapons.

The Division anti-air surveillance liaison post is No,... and those of each regiment are:

18th Inf Regt No,...
16th Inf Regt No,...
5th Inf Regt No,...

The anti-aircraft machine gun company will protect the Division Command Post and the field artillery positions.

12. The anti-tank reserve unit, composed of one company from the 45-mm battalion and one engineer company, will follow the second echelon in attack and thereafter will repel any enemy attempts to penetrate through in column with its mechanized force.

13. The Division Medical Station and the Evacuation Station have been locating at 23.30 and 23.31 as shown on the map, effective 20 June 1950 respectively.

14. The Division Command Post and the Observation Post will be opened at Hyopkok (13.281) and 03.11, respectively, effective 23 June 1950, and the removal axis of the Command Post will be fixed to a direction along the
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roads leading to Uijongbu.

15. Reports will be made:
   (1) When the attack preparations are completed.
   (2) When attack is begun.
   (3) By messenger, radio, and written report when the first
day, the next, and then daily mission had been completed.
   (4) Once every two hours on the matters other than the
   aforegoings.
   (5) Written report will be submitted twice a day to be reach-
ed exactly at 1700 and 1900 hours.

16. Standard Signal Codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Flare</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Radio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commence Attack</td>
<td></td>
<td>Storm</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Begin Assault</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Hot Sky</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Commence Artillery Fire</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Storm</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Begin Supporting Assault</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Snowstorm</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cease Firing</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Stop Firing</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Call for Fire Support</td>
<td>Red &amp; Green</td>
<td>Thunder</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. First Deputy: Chief of Staff
   Second Deputy: Commander, 16th Infantry Regiment.
   (Prepared 9 copies)

Lee Kun-mu
Commander
4th Infantry Division
Ho Bong-hak
Chief of Staff
Battle Order No. 1 issued by the North Korean Communists on 22 June 1950.
Section 3. The Coming of War

Strategic Concept and Scheme of Maneuver

The Communist strategy designed a quick end to the war to establish the fact of a Communist Korea before the other foreign forces, perhaps from the United States, could arrive on the peninsula in support of the Republic of Korea.

Why did the Communists choose Sunday, 25 June 1950 as D-Day? It was to serve a double purpose for them. Originally, *Kim Il-sung* and his fellows conferred and decided to have a nation-wide celebration of conquest at Seoul, the heart of Korea, on 15 August 1950, the fifth anniversary of the Japanese surrender and the consequent liberation of Korea.

On the other hand, their basic strategic objective for invasion was to sweep over the whole of Korea in a lightning stroke war by making a surprise attack. The Communist regime in North Korea, with the firm endorsement from the *Kremlin* as well as by its Russian advisors, was sure of itself to conquer the Free Republic within two to three weeks, and not longer than 50 days even at the worst, taking into consideration the heavy summer rains. The 50-day estimate was drawn from a mathematic calculation that their advance in force would average 10 kilometers a day from the 38th Parallel to Pusan which ranges 480 kilometers. As for the prospects of the invasion, *Kim Il-sung* had never thought he would not get a look-in.

It was Sunday, 25 June, when he counted 50-operational days backward reckoning from 15 August. Of course, he had fixed his eyes upon the maximum effect of surprise, choosing the week-end holiday, resembling to the Pearl Harbor attack in surprise by the Japanese on Sunday, 8 December 1941, or Saturday, 7 December in American time.

In consequence, the enemy scheme of maneuver was worked out within the framework of the aforementioned strategic line, which implied to seize all the major roads south, striking simultaneously at so many different places that the outnumbered ROK Army would be unable to meet every thrust.

Namely, the enemy directed his main effort upon the national highway, leading from Uijongbu to Seoul—Suwon—Taegon—Taegu—Pusan, placing his secondary efforts on the both flanks along the main advance axis down to the final destination, Pusan, the southern edge of the peninsula. The enemy intended to launch the blitzkrieg operations exploiting his overwhelming
artillery weight, striking power, and high mobility and with the T-34 tanks in the lead.

In their first phase of invasion, the NK Communist forces put the 3rd and 4th NK Divisions, under the I NK Corps, on the main attack formation together with the 203rd Tank Regiment of the 105th Tank Division in support, to move down southward along the Tongduchon-Uijongbu-Seoul route, while the 1st and 6th NK Divisions were to attack south along the axis of Kaesong—Munsan—Seoul on its right wing as the western secondary attack force. On the other hand, under the II NK Corps, the 2nd and 7th NK Divisions would concurrently rush headlong toward the Hwachon—Chunchon—Hongchon axis on the left wing of the main effort as the eastern secondary attack force. On the east coast line, the 5th NK Division with the 1st Border Constabulary Brigade in reserve was also to breakthrough the ROK defense buildup north of Kangnung by frontal attack, while the 766th Guerrilla Regiment and the 549th Marine Unit would take the landing action at the same time on the east coast behind the ROK defense lines.

On the remote, isolated western coast, meanwhile, with the support of some tanks, the 3rd Border Constabulary Brigade plus the 14th Regiment of the 6th NK Division were to overrun the Ongjin Peninsula also acting as a secondary attack.

Thus, the main body of the II NK Corps (the 2nd and 7th NK Divisions), upon taking Chunchon, was to assist the I NK Corps effort on the east, by a circuitous maneuver southeastward -- to intercept the path of retreat for the ROK forces those fumbling themselves in the vicinity of Seoul and also to cut the ROK units along the Suwon—Ichon line off the reinforcements from the rear areas -- so that the I NK Corps would destroy the ROK main force in and around the Seoul area. Again, such deliberate, well-planned operational scheme had never prepared overnight.

**Enemy Order of Battle**

As what the NK Communist army high commands had ordered in their battle orders, all the attack divisions and regiments moved into a belt, by 23 June, along their respective planned lines of departure from which civilians had already been cleared.

Some of these units, such as the 5th and 6th NK Divisions, came from the distant north. More than 80,000 men with their newly issued equipment joined those already along the 38th Parallel. They succeeded in taking their positions for attack without being detected. The initial attack units included seven infantry divisions (the 6th, 1st, 4th, 3rd, under the I NK Corps and
2nd, 7th, and 5th under the II NK Corps, from right to left in their formation), with the strength of 11,000 men each; the 105th Tank Division equipped with 242 tanks, 176 pieces of 76-mm self-propelled guns, and 54 armored cars; and the 3rd Constabulary Brigade. There were also the 603rd Motorcycle Regiment, the 766th Separate Regiment composed of the guerilla troops, and the 549th Marine Unit. This force itself numbered more than 100,000 men supported by the T-34 tanks. Besides, more regular divisions and others, including the 16th, 13th and the 15th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 7th Constabulary Brigades, were in position behind the assault formation to reinforce the attackers at any time.

All the thrusts were to follow the major roads. Particularly, the Communist forces planned to concentrate more than half their infantry and artillery and most of their tanks for covering attack on Seoul. Thus, the main effort was to follow the Uijongbu-Seoul corridor, a most sensitive route leading straight south to the capital city.

The Communist air and naval forces, of course, were to take part in the outset.

On the contrary, destined to bear the brunt of this impending invasion was such a nominal force as one-third of four ROK divisions, namely the 1st, 7th, 6th and 8th and a regiment (the 17th Infantry) stationed along the south side of the 38th Parallel in its accustomed defense positions. These ROK troops had no knowledge of the imminent attack although they had made many predictions in the past that there would be one.

The military balance of the two sides along the 38th Parallel as of 24 June 1950 stood as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROK Army</th>
<th>NK Communist Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ongjin Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Infantry regiment</td>
<td>14th Regiment, 6th Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One artillery battalion</td>
<td>3rd Constabulary Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kaesong Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>1st NK Division (3 regiments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve regiment at Susaeck reconditioning,</td>
<td>Artillery units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy weapons and vehicles were evacuated to</td>
<td>6th NK Division (—)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rear area for repair.</td>
<td>Artillery units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops of six battalions were on leave or</td>
<td>Constabulary units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passes</td>
<td>40 tanks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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One artillery battalion

Tongdyoung and Pochon areas  7,500
7th Infantry Division (2 regts)
One artillery battalion
Troops of four infantry battalions were on leave and passes

Chunghung Area  9,388
6th Infantry Division
Reserve regiment was at Wonju but all were on leave or passes as were parts of frontline troops

Kangnung Area  6,500
8th Infantry Division (2 regts)
One regiment was in guerrilla mop-up operations
One artillery battalion

Rear Area
Capital Security Command
2nd Inf Div, Taegon
3rd Inf Div (2 regts), Taegu
5th Inf Div (2 regts), Kwangju

3rd NK Division (3 regts)
One artillery regiment
4th NK Division (3 regts)
One artillery regiment
105th Tank Division (—)
(150 tanks)

2nd NK Division (3 regts)
One artillery regiment
7th NK Division (3 regts)
One artillery regiment
Constabulary units
40 tanks

5th NK Division (3 regts)
One artillery regiment
766th Independent Regiment
One motorcycle regiment
Constabulary units
10 tanks

13th NK Division (Sinuiju)
10th NK Division (Sukchon)
15th NK Division (Hoeryong)
1st Constabulary Brig (Kansson)
7th Constabulary Brig (Sibyon-ni)

Surprise Attack – Sunday Morning

In the predawn darkness of Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean Communist Force (NKCF) began a general offensive by surprise all along the 38th Parallel. In fact, the Communist gained complete tactical surprise as they burst across the artificial demarcation line.

It was about 0400 hours, when scattered but heavy summer rains fell along the Parallel, the North Korean artillery and mortar concentration fire fell on across the width of the peninsula all at once, signalling well-coordinated
attack from the west coast to the east coast. Then, with the columns of Russian-made tanks in the lead, the infantry forces soon followed massed artillery fires and rolled back the unprepared ROK Army units engulfing the defenders as they attacked toward their objectives in a well-conceived and carefully planned military operations.

News of the Communist invasion reached Seoul about 80 kilometers or 50 miles south of the Parallel within an hour, before 0500 hours. Incipient belief that the attack was nothing more than a border raid soon faded away. By 0800 hours, it was obvious that the bulk of the NK Communist Forces was involved at many separate places. It was obviously a full-scale invasion. The flash reports continued to come every moment from the frontlines hither and thither. The invading forces accelerated their assault momentum more greater speed and the assault waves became more and more every moment, thus roaring southward in a blitz -- seemingly aiming their first objective at Seoul. The ROK defenders, on the other hand, meeting with these unexpected enemy forces, had no alternative to tide over the crisis but to retreat. It was now apparent that the Communist ventured a total-war with the aim of communizing the whole peninsula at all costs. The North Korean warplanes, giving tactical support, were eventually unchallenged. Thus the free and peace-loving people of the Republic of Korea suddenly found themselves that they were in the most precarious situation ever seen before.

At this critical hour—the national peril, the Republic of Korea Army was at a loss how to do it, which was natural posture, because the Communist attack was completely a bolt out of the blue sky. The Communists had scheduled the surprise invasion to begin at dawn on Sunday, a most likely time of the week for them to start a military adventure when many commanders, officers, and men of the ROK forces were on week-end leave. What made the surprise invasion even more surprising was the timing which coincided with the heavy rainy season of the year in Korea.

The unprepared ROK Army -- ill-equipped, poor-trained, and inexperienced force with small strength in numbers -- was too hard to deal with the formidable NK tanks and heavy artillery. Moreworse, the decisive enemy blow fell entirely unexpectedly against the vulnerable ROK defense lines manned in name only, because at that time so many of officers and men were in the cities and towns far away from the defense fronts on their long-week end passes. Further more, many others were being enjoyed themselves at their homes in the rural areas on the long-awaited leave, since the ROK Army had granted the leave at long last in many months. The Army had been deferred the leave benefits during and after the general election of 30 May 1950, and the ROK Army Headquarters now left the commanders at all
levels to their discretion of a 15-day home leave for one third of their respective troops.

The main forces of the I and II NK Corps, consisting of seven infantry divisions and one tank division attacked down southward along six ground invasion routes (Ongjin, Kaesong, Tongdunchon—Uijongbu, Pochon—Uijongbu, Chunchon, and Chunmunjin—Kangnung) and one by sea south of Kangnung.

On the remote west, the Ongjin Peninsula, about 0400 hours, enemy’s artillery and mortar shells began to fall on the defense lines manned by the elements of the 17th Infantry ROK Regiment. Soon the 3rd NK Border Constabulary Brigade and the 14th Regiment of the 6th NK Division attacked in force and had forced the remnants of the ROK Regiment to fall back toward the sea.

At Kaesong, where the elements of the 1st ROK Division were defending, the NK army launched a strong two divisions (6th and 1st NK Divisions) thrust behind the tanks. Some of the ROK troops ran at the T-34 tanks with TNT or any other explosive charges. Some others swarmed over the enemy tanks and tried to open the turrets to drop grenades inside. The ROK troops sacrificed themselves heroically, but the Communist troops were unavailing.

At the Uijongbu—Seoul corridor, where a pair of covering roads running
down from the north to meet at Uijongbu, namely, one from Yonchon—Tongdunchon and the other from Chorwon—Unchon—Pochon, the two NK divisions, the 4th on the west road leading from Yonchon—Tongdunchon, the 3rd on the east through the Chorwon—Unchon—Pochon route, rushed down behind the tank columns of the 105th NK Tank Division. There were, again no troops could be able to withstand these impetuous armored columns since the defenders (the 7th ROK Division) had nothing with which to stop them. The 57-mm antitank guns, which the ROK Army then had 140 pieces as a whole, were hardly better than pistols against the T-34s. Thus the enemy tanks rolled southward almost at will.

Meanwhile, the Red air arm had brought Kimpo airfield under attack by noon, and it was not long before Seoul itself was strafed by a pair of propeller-driven Yak fighter planes.

By early afternoon in the western half of the battle-ground, the I NK Corps was carrying out its action with lighting speed. Only on the east at Chunhon defended by the the 6th ROK Division had the invasion fallen behind the enemy schedule. The 2nd and the 7th NK Divisions failed to carry out the II NK Corps objective to take Chunchon the first day. (See Situation Map 1, Appendix IX.)

On the east coast front, the 5th NK Division, under the II NK Corps, struck the 8th ROK Division along the coast line, while the special guerrilla troops, the 766th NK Unit, landed at the beaches above and below Samchok, without meeting noticeable opposition, in an attempt to take up the work of blocking roads to bar the retreating ROK troops from the frontline and also to harass and terrorize the innocent people in the rear areas.

Thus, the unprovoked war came at a real surprise and the ROK forces were thrown back in great confusion.

Section 4. Paradoxical Propaganda

Did Who the War Initiate

At 0830 hours on the fateful Sunday morning, Radio Pyongyang alleged that North Korean Communist forces attacked the Republic of Korea in retaliation for a challenge from the south. It was the same cunning tactic the Japanese imperialists employed when they attacked the Pearl Harbor on the Sunday morning of 8 December 1941.

The Communist broadcast, which was nothing more than paradoxical
propaganda, gabbled through the back of its neck:

"North Korean People's Republic warn the authorities of South Korea that if they do not immediately cease their adventurist military operations in the area of the 38th Parallel, decisive measures will be taken to crush the enemy and South Korean authorities will bear full responsibility for all the serious consequences which these adventurist military operations may involve."

At 0930 hours Kim Il-sung announced that his NK Communist forces were attacking because the Republic of Korea had rejected his "peace proposal" and had attacked the NK army in the Ongjin Peninsula. Kim, however, did not explain how his "defending" army was already 17 to 33 kilometers inside the territory of the south.

In the same broadcast, Kim Il-sung officially proclaimed war against the Republic of Korea, calling on the South Koreans for a mass uprising and sabotage in unison with his invasion operations. The Communist forces were numerous, well-trained and equipped with heavy artillery and tanks when they, without warning, crossed the 38th Parallel in force and marched southward, while the defenders in the south had none of these advantages. From these facts alone, it seems fairly obvious who attacked whom.

A North Korean declaration of war was rumored at 1100 hours over Radio Pyongyang, but no confirmation was available from any sources. An hour later, at 1200 hours, Radio Pyongyang declared that war was effective at 1100 hours.

There are abundant evidences that the North Korean Communists planned from the beginning to invade the south. According to Lieutenant Colonel Kyril Kalinov, a Soviet army officer who had served in North Korea as a member of the Russian special military mission in Pyongyang since January 1949 and later defected to the West, the aim of this military mission was to build up the NK armed forces to a point they would be able to defeat the south, within the 18-month timetable -- with the invasion date sometime in June, 1950. If any farther evidences were needed, the events of the early stage of the war itself supply them. The ROK forces were taken completely by surprise and were forced to retreat. They had no weapons to oppose T-34 tanks, no antiaircraft guns to repel the enemy warplanes.

**Evidences for Ostrich Stratagem**

Not only the Communist regime in North Korea but also the international Communist bloc later charged the Republic of Korea Army had invaded North
Korea, thus triggering a North Korean Communist counterattack. How ridiculous!

An old Korean proverb professes that "the thief raises a stick" imputing one's blame to others. In fact, Kim Il-sung and his fellow Communists had been acting exactly in the same manner and the same tricks even up to date ever since the very beginning of the Korean War.

Abundant evidence is available to prove the Communist aggression prompted the invasion of the free Republic of Korea. In the first place, it is too clear that the Korean War started with an unprovoked invasion of free Korea by Communist-controlled North Korea, considering general nature of the surprise and initial victory of enemy during the war.

Furthermore as mentioned in the preceding Section, two documents captured by the friendly forces following the fall of the NK forces have been authenticated as official attack orders issued by Kim Il-sung and his fellow commanders to their subordinate commanders several days before the attack.

The above facts are also substantiated by Paul Mornat, then a Polish army colonel and military attache serving in North Korea, after his defection to the free world. According to Polish Colonel Mornat's disclosure while he was serving in North Korea, Choi Rin (NK Communist army major general), Chief of Staff of the II NK Corps, told him before the invasion that: "We have drawn own attack plans perfectly in detail. We have practiced the assault plans in a concrete way several times, thus becoming well proficient in the actual attacks."

The most positive proof of the North Korean Communist aggression can be found in the "Memories of Nikita Khrushchev," former Russian premier. In his memories, Khrushchev does not try to deny the responsibility of the North Korean Communist regime for provoking the Korean War. He stressed that the NK Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea was undertaken by the miscalculation of Joseph Stalin, and that the plan for the Korean War was made at the insistance of not Stalin, but warmonger Kim Il-sung.

It is clear by now just what happened on 25 June 1950. The evidence is in and the true history will judge who started the war. Any objective observer can clearly see that it was the North Korean Communists.

Irrefutable Fact

The flash reports of the surprise attack dispatched by the news agencies captured the headlines of the newspapers as well as broadcast agencies of the world, both Eastern and Western.
To quote from some reports, "The Times" in the United Kingdom on 26 June 1950, under the headline of "COMMUNIST TROOPS MOVE INTO SOUTH KOREA," reported that: "... Forces from the Communist territory of North Korea early yesterday crossed into the territory of the Republic of Korea at a number of points and landed detachments on the east coast of South Korea. Shortly after the noon the North Korean wireless station at Pyongyang declared that a state of war had been effective since 11 a.m."

On the other hand, "The Asahi Shimbun" in Tokyo reported on 26 June 1950, under the headline of "NORTH KOREA DECLARES WAR ON SOUTH KOREA," that: "Hostilities broke out around 4 a.m. June 25 ... at points as Chunchon, Ongjin and Kaesong along the 38th Parallel, the demarcation line dividing the country, and at the eastern area. An official announcement by the Government of the Republic of Korea said that an all-out war had been started by North Korea while Radio Pyongyang reported that war had been officially declared on South Korea." "The Mainichi Shimbun" in Japan also reported on the same date under the similar head-title with a subtitle "Aiming at the unification of country by a single stroke." The newspaper went on: "The North Korean forces started on June 25 a series of attacks, against the Republic of Korea."

In Argentina, under the headline "SOUTH KOREA INVADED BY NORTH KOREAN TROOPS," "La Nacion," dated 25 June 1950, reported that: "Armed forces, coming from North Korea crossed the frontier through different points, helped by artillery and tanks and invaded Southern Korea. According to the announcement by the Communists, the invaders met with little resistance in their surprising attack." "The Globe and Mail" in Canada also reported, with a special mention of "U.N. DECLARES REDS GUILTY," that ... At 4 o'clock on Sunday morning there began in Korea what some observers fear may be a third world war and what the United Nations Commission in that country (UNCO) described that as a full-scale conflict that might endanger international peace. The North Korean forces armed with tanks, guns and planes of Russian manufacture attacked all along the border of South Korea simultaneously with amphibious assaults on the east coast."

Meanwhile, on 28 June, "The Philippines Herald" in the Philippines also reported, under the title of "North Korea Challenges U.N." that: "San Francisco, June 27 (UP) -- The outbreak of war in Korea in a challenge to the United Nations and that organization has met the challenge, Carlos P. Romulo, President of the U.N. General Assembly, declared here. Speaking at the fifth anniversary celebration of the United Nations, Romulo said the invasion of South Korea was a breach of peace."

An Austrian newspaper "Die Presse," dated June 27, 1950, also gave prominence to the Korean crisis under the heading "HOT WAR DECLARED BY
NORTH KOREA" that "Sunday night Communist troops of North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel with tanks and artillery, starting heavy battles. The Republic of Korea Government immediately asked the United States for help, which resulted in an instant meeting of the U.N. Security Council ... The cold-blood attack upon South Korea, inspite of the presence of a U.N. Commission (UNCOK), alarmed the world public." "Wiener Zeitung" also in Austria reported on 28 June 1950, covering a special feature of the Communist invasion, that "North Korea branded aggressor."

It is virtually impossible to exhaust all the instances, because there are too numerous to mention. At any rate, all these news reports provide one unanimous confirmation that the war was initiated and officially declared by the North Korean Communists against the Republic of Korea. What is interesting in this connection is the fact that even the Soviet news agency, "TASS", reflected similar opinion and indirectly admitted the North Korean initiation of the war by quoting the Western news agencies. Some examples are given below.

"New York, June 25 (TASS)—The correspondent of Associated Press reports from Seoul that, meeting with little resistance, the North Korean armed forces are advancing along the entire front. The correspondent points out that the South Korean forces, which are already in disorder, are evacuating the Ongjin Peninsula."

(Izvestia, USSR, June 27, 1950)

"Paris, June 25 (TASS)—The Seoul correspondent of Agence France Press reports that a communique had been issued in Seoul, stating that North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel at seven points. Members of the armed forces on leave were ordered via radio to return to their posts.

(Izvestia, USSR), June 27, 1950)

"London, June 25 (TASS)—The Seoul Correspondent of Reuter reports that today in the morning hostilities broke out between the forces of North and South Korea. "The North Koreans, says the report, have occupied the strategically important city of Kaesong, 40 miles to the north of Seoul. North Korean tanks are reported to have reached the city of Pocheon, 45 kilometers northeast of Seoul."

(Izvestia, USSR, June 27, 1950)

With these evidences, among many others, there leaves no room for doubt, being as clear as daylight, that the Korean War was started cleverly by Kim Il-sung and his colleagues.
Section 5. The United Nations Participation

Why did the Communists attack on the free world? Why did the Communist choose a direct invasion of the Republic of Korea? The Communists are always keeping a vigilant eye on an area of great vulnerability and weakness to fulfill their aim for Communist expansion and then the world conquest. It is their fundamental physiology.

There are several key reasons for the Communists to hasten the military invasion of the south: (1) Withdrawal of American troops from the south, (2) victory of Mao Tse-tung in Chinese mainland and the decline of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, (3) Exclusion of the Republic of Korea from U.S. defense security obligation in the Pacific region, and (4) Steady progress in the south through parliamentary politics.

In the first few days the ROK Army units fought back strongly in some sectors, particularly in the Chunchon area. But by the end of the second day, the 26th June, the invaders were nearing Seoul and the 1st and 7th ROK Divisions were in danger of being outflanked. On the 27th refugees began to pour out of Seoul, clogging the roads leading south. By evening the first North Korean troops were already in the outskirts of the city. Three days after the war started, the enemy seized Seoul and the Government was forced to move its organizations first to Suwon, then eventually to Taegon, Taegu and finally to Pusan on 18 August 1950.

U.S. Reaction to the Invasion

There was a time difference of about thirteen hours between Seoul and Washington. It was about 2000 hours, 24 June, Washington time, when the first report reached there of the North Korean attacks that had begun five hours earlier. Soon afterward, the Department of State received the first radio message from its Ambassador in Seoul, John J. Muccio at 2125 hours on that Saturday night, which would correspond to 1025 hours on the morning of 25 June in Korea. Ambassador Muccio said in part: "It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it
constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea."

The American Government, as the consequences of the North Korean aggression sank in, reversed its policy of withdrawal from the Asian mainland. That reversal sent a tremendous tide of change into the future. Despite the fact that President Harry S. Truman and his advisors had ruled out the American defense of the Republic of Korea on the military grounds, as the Communist aggression actually occurred, they unanimously agreed to take prompt action to defend free Korea. The dominant motive among considerations, at the outset and throughout the Korean War in their mind for fighting, was the fear that if this aggression went unchallenged, it would be the first of a chain of aggressions that would destroy the foundations of international security and eventually cause a third world war. If now the Communists should be allowed to launch aggression with impunity, they would be encouraged to think no obstacle lay in their path to the world domination; and eventually the free world be forced to meet the Soviet Union in a total war, just as it had been forced to meet the Nazi and Fascist powers and also the Japanese militarism.

U. N. Reaction

On 26 June (in Seoul time), while the most world peoples turned their eyes on the map to see where Korea was, the United Nations Security Council convened its emergency session at 1400 hours, the Sunday afternoon of 25 June, New York time, at Lake Success. By this time the world organization had received an official report from the U. N. Commission on Korea in Seoul confirming the Communist attack. The Commission reported that the North Korean regime had broadcast a formal declaration of war. The Security Council also had received urgent appeals for aid from the besieged Republic of Korea.

When Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations, received the news of the North Korean invasion he reportedly burst out over the telephone, "This is war against the United Nations." After noting the reports and appeals from Korea and also the proposal submitted by the United States, the Security Council, where the Russian delegate had walked out in January in protest against failure to make a Communist China delegate the representative of China on the Council, adopted a historic resolution with respect to Korea by a vote of nine to zero, with one abstention and one absence. Voting were China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The resolution called for immediate end of hostilities,
the immediate withdrawal of the North Korean Communist forces to the 38th Parallel, and for assistance of all U. N. members in restoring peace.

Meanwhile, U. S. President Harry S. Truman immediately met with his advisors to decide on a course of action. It became soon clear that the North Korean Communists had no intention of halting their invasion forces. Their intention was to overrun the entire Korean peninsula as quickly as possible, before any serious military defense could be mounted against them. This too was typical Communist tactic -- to present the world which an accomplished conquest and then debate about it. Once the peninsula was in their hands they knew debate and resolution on the part of the United Nations would be useless. A vacuum had been created in Korea, and in true Communist fashion the North Korean Communists were filling it by conquest before the free world could decide what to do about it. This time, however, the free world knew what to do about it. The United Nations, moved swiftly and effectively beyond the Communist imagination.

Thus on the day of the first U. N. resolution, President Truman ordered the Seventh US Naval Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to repel any invading attempt from the mainland; and ordered General Douglas MacArthur to evacuate the American dependents from Korea, using air and naval cover. On that evening of 26 June (Washington time), in response to the increasing military urgency, President Truman further instructed General MacArthur "to use air and naval forces to support the Republic of Korea."

The following after noon, on 27 June (New York time), the U. N. Security Council, again with the Soviet Union absent, passed a second resolution, calling that "the members of the U. N. furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore the international peace and security in the region." Thus the world body succeeded in meeting its first challenge, and inconsequence, the free nations came into Korea to fight side by side against the Communist aggressors in the name of the United Nations. Communist North was amaged at the sudden turn of the situation by the prompt reaction of the United Nations.

Offers of military and economic aid from the U. N. member nations trickled in. Material support took the form chiefly of supplies, foodstuffs, or services that were mostly readily available to the particular countries.

Already on the 28th June the United Kingdom had placed the British naval forces in the Japanese waters under the U. S. naval commander, the Far East and in turn came under the General MacArthur's command the next day. On 29 June the Australian Government informed the United States that it would make available for use in Korea its two naval vessels based in Japan and a fighter squadron which was just preparing to go home from Japan.
Two days later this air squadron was escorting the United States bombers and transports over Korea, the first non-American unit, among the U. N. Forces, to come into action in the Korean War.

**U.N. Command**

The willingness of the Security Council to support the Republic of Korea was further emphasized when a third resolution, proposed by the United Kingdom and France, was passed on 7 July, also in New York time, recommending "that all members providing the military forces and other assistance ... make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States." Under the provisions of the resolution, the United States was requested to designate the commander of such forces, which were authorized to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces. No provision other than post factum reporting was made for the United Nations oversight of American direction of the military effort. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the Unified Command was the United States Government acting as an executive agent for the United Nations under the
The Invasion from the North

broad terms of the Security Council resolution. Accordingly, President Truman named General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command (UNC) on 8 July. President Syngman Rhee placed all the ROK forces under this command on 14 July. For the first time in its history, the United Nations was sending a fighting force into the field. In a period of less than two weeks from the day the Communist aggression was initiated, the Russians and North Korean Communists found themselves facing an impressive array of the nations led by the United Nations.

Of the 53 nations that supported the U.N. resolution to repel the enemy invaders, 16 nations eventually sent combat forces to aid the Republic of Korea. These nations were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa and the United States. Furthermore, five nations sent medical units. These were Denmark, India, Intaly, Norway and Sweden.

Why did the UN forces participate? In the first place, the Republic of Korea had been established by free elections held under the U.N. supervision and had been recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in the area. In the second place, the Communists chosen an overt attack on the Republic of Korea, so that the U. N.'s special obligations as well as its charter were directly violated. In the third place, soon after the North Korean Communist attack the Security Council was able to pass a resolution calling for an immediate end to the fighting and the assistance of all members in restoring peace, which would not have been possible without the Soviet delegate's absence during Russia's boycott of the United Nations.

U.N. Forces Buildup

Despite the U. S. air and naval forces went into action to aid the Republic of Korea, Seoul fell to the invaders on 28 June and the ROK Army units had no alternative but to fall back southward.

In the meantime, the U.S. ground forces were hastily arrived in Korea but were not enough to stem the enemy advance. Henceforth, the ROK and U. S. forces kept falling back, in a classic example of the delaying action, to gain time pending the arrival of more reinforcements from the U. N. allies and in turn ready for counteroffensive. Had the delaying action failed, the North Korean Communist forces would have overrun the entire peninsula, perhaps in mid-July or in early August.

By the end of July five reorganized ROK infantry divisions and three
U. S. divisions (the 24th and 25th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry) under the Eighth US Army were boxed into the southeast corner of the peninsula with their backs to the port of Pusan. The bridgehead that resulted had a perimeter -- what became known as the "Naktong River Perimeter" or "Pusan Perimeter" -- from the area north of Pohang on the east coast, thence inland some 80 kilometers to the Naktong River valley and south to the west coast near Masan. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth US Army (EUSAK) Commander, decided to hold the general line along the Naktong River.

According to the UN Command's estimate, the combined U. N. strength, including base units and headquarters personnel, at this stage stood at 160,000 men. Opposing them along some 240 kilometers of the battle front were 200,000 North Koreans organized into 15 infantry divisions and a tank division. It seemed quite possible that the defenders of the Republic of Korea would soon be driven out. (See Situation Map 2, Appendix IX.)

Nevertheless, by 2 August the Americans had three infantry divisions and two regimental combat teams in Korea with a Marine division and the 2nd US Infantry Division on the way from the United States. The United Kingdom had now ordered an infantry brigade from Hongkong to deploy to Korea until a brigade group, including armored regiment, could be mobilized and sent from homeland.

Section 6. From the Naktong to the Yalu

General Counteroffensive

The enemy continued his determined thrusts for six weeks against the both flanks along the Naktong perimeter extended for about 233 kilometers or 145 miles as the crow flies, while probing for vulnerable spots in the center, the Taegu front. The EUSAK divisions and the 27th British Brigade held the left sector and the I and II ROK Corps with five divisions the right sector. There were, of course, neither rest for the weary troops nor the reserve units.

In the middle of September, the UN forces squeezed into the Naktong perimeter, decided to make a basic change in the front by means of carrying out the massive landing operations in the extreme rear of the enemy forces. The concept of the operation was that, having taken Inchon and Seoul, to cut the enemy communications and then destroy the Reds by a combined attack of
the landing forces and of the ROK and EUSAK forces. In short, this was to place the enemy between the hammer and the anvil.

General MacArthur had been planning a decisive counterstrike, which he believed would swiftly end the war, ever since the early days of the war. His grand Inchon landing succeeded on 15 September in achieving operational surprise, thus completely turning the tide of war in a great victory of the ROK and UN allies.

In consequence, the North Korean Communist forces, those in greatest peril of being cut off, had been in general retreat along the Nakdong front. General MacArthur's judgement had been proved right. Acting in unison with the amphibious operations by the X US Corps, the ROK and the EUSAK forces jumped off for an all-out counteroffensive all at once on 16 September from the southern front. They rushed with irresistible force toward the 38th Parallel almost at will. Now the enemy forces began to flee in complete disorder, with tens of thousands of its troops flowing into the prisoner of war camps hastily erected by the friendly forces.

By 27 September, Seoul was cleared, and on the next day General MacArthur in a brief and moving ceremony, officially turned back to President Syngman Rhee the capital of the Republic of Korea.

Advance to the Yalu

Exploitation of the great success after the Inchon landing, however, did not begin to plan until 26 September. Now the question was whether and how far to pursue the defeated enemy forces. As for General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, the plan for crossing the 38th Parallel to destroy all the NK Communist forces had of course required prior approval from Washington, for the implications of such a crossing were manifold.

The basic authority under which the United States directed operations of the unified command in Korea lay in the U. N. Security Council's resolution of 7 July 1950; and within this resolution the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had been called upon to direct the UN forces so as to help the Republic of Korea against the armed attack and thus to restore peace and security in the area. Accordingly this provision was generally considered significant legal basis to enter North Korea.

The main concern, however, was that Red China had been threatening by radio frequently that it would come into action if North Korea were invaded. And there was some feeling that the Soviet Union might also step in. But,
it was very clear enough that if the North Korean Communist forces were not destroyed quickly and if it were allowed to crawl back into a sanctuary, another invasion might soon followed. In addition, it seemed that a golden opportunity had presented itself to bring about the long-sought goal of a unified, independent Korea.

After all, President Truman approved a US Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation that General MacArthur, the UN Command, be authorized to operate in North Korea, with one condition attached to. No non-ROK troops were to get near the Chinese or Russian borders and only the ROK troops were to be used in the frontier area.

As a sequel to the JCS directive of 27 September General MacArthur had fixed a line beyond which non-ROK forces should not advance. On 1 October, he had delivered an ultimatum for surrender to the North Korean Communist boss, Kim Il-sung. That day, on the other hand, Chou En-lai in Peking issued a warning that Red China would not stand aside if "imperialists" invaded the territory of their neighbours.

At length, the ROK forces, which had awaited with impatience at the resentful 38th Parallel, launched the spirited attacks towards the north on 1 October.

On the 2nd of October, the Russian delegate to the U. N. proposed a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. How ridiculous! He could have decisive influence over Kim Il-sung to halt the invasion in the outset, if the Russians really wanted a cease-fire, when the U. N. Security Council had strongly demanded it on 25 June.

On 7 October, the United Nations officially endorsed General MacArthur’s plan, already approved by the US JCS, for operations north of the 38th Parallel. To wit more about, that day the U. N. General Assembly adopted a resolution by a vote of 47 to five, with seven abstentions and one absentee among 60-total members. This resolution, originally proposed by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom, granted the United Nations Command for widening the military action beyond the 38th Parallel with a goal of unification of Korea by force. It reads in part: “Having in mind the U. N. armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950 … Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea … the United Nations forces should not remain any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in sub-paragraph (a) and (b) above …”
The Invasion from the North

The resolution also authorized to establish a Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the U. N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

Meanwhile, by 9 October there had been no reply to the MacArthur’s demand for surrender and he repeated it. Complete victory seemed now in view, he plunged northward in pursuit of a vanishing enemy. On that day, the main body of the UN forces began march into the north, endeavoring to catch up with the units of the ROK forces which had crossed the 38th Parallel on 1 October.

By keeping the X US Corps under his direct control on the right, together with the I ROK Corps along the east coast line, and leaving the left, or western front, to the EUSA, General MacArthur had realized with impassible ridges and roadless ravines that separated one force another.

On 10 October the 3rd ROK Division under the I ROK Corps entered Wonsan on the east, while the 1st ROK Division captured Pyongyang on the 19th on the western front. Thus, as the pursuit of the thoroughly defeated
NK Communist forces proceeded, on 17 October, General MacArthur moved the restrained line for non-ROK troop more close to the Manchurian frontier. On 21 October, MacArthur commented briefly to newsmen that the Korean War “is very definitely coming to an end.” Then on the 24th he lifted all restrictions and ordered the field commanders to advance to the Yalu border, with air support keeping pace with them. This was in disregard of his orders and another step towards his downfall. (See Situation Map 3, Appendix IX.)

On 26 October, the II ROK Corps had pushed the advance elements of its 6th Division all the way to the Yalu River, Chosan, while the 24th US Division and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade on the left flank of the EUSAK formation had crossed the Chongchon River on the 24th and were pushing on toward the Yalu, then only 100 kilometers away.

Elsewhere the ROK and UN forces were now advancing towards the Yalu along many different routes. On the X US Corps front, left adjacent to the I ROK Corps, the 7th US Division proceeded to Haesanjin on the Yalu, while the 1st US Marine Division was to follow a narrow, single-track road up over the central plateau to Kanggye and then onto Manpojin also on the Yalu. On the remote east coast the Capital ROK Division poised for further north after taking Chongjin on 25 November.

In the meantime, in October and November 1950, more UN allied units began to arrive in Korea, namely a Canadian battalion, a France battalion, a Netherlands battalion, a Thailand battalion, a Turkish brigade, and the 29th British Brigade, in addition to those already being in action on the battlefield such as the Australian Battalion, the Philippine Battalion Combat Team, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, and the Eighth US Army. There were also the air and naval forces came from Australia, Canada, France, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
CHAPTER IV THE INVASION FROM RED CHINA

Section 1. A New War

When the war in Korea seemed to be near its end, the situation had completely changed. The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) had invaded in Korea, completely surprising the Republic of Korea as well as the United Nations Command. Subsequent events triggered by the invasion of the Red Chinese forces in late October, destroyed the illusion that a definite line between war and peace could be drawn.

The Chinese Communist regime in Peking may have decided to enter into North Korea early in October 1950 when it was learned that the UN forces had crossed the 38th Parallel. By the end of October six CCF armies, each of three divisions of 10,000 men, had crossed the Yalu River. The 39th and 41st CCF Armies entered North Korean at Sinuiju; the 38th and 42nd Armies passed through Manp'o-jin. These four armies, components of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Forces were the first CCF formation to enter the fighting against the UN forces. Within two weeks two more armies, the 50th and 60th, had entered the battle zone. Together with four artillery divisions, several transport regiments and a cavalry regiment, these forces had an approximate strength of 180,000. They soon increased up to 300,000 troops. Five armies concentrated in front of the ROK and UN forces in the western and central front, while another six armies moved east against the I ROK and the X US Corps.

Neither advancing columns of the ROK and UN forces nor their air reconnaissance units were able to detect these large scale moves, as they were conducted at night. As for the United Nations command, Chou En-lai's statement to the Indian Ambassador in Peking on 3 October that Red China would send troops to help the North Korean Communists if the UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel was considered to be "in a category of diplomatic blackmail."

Meanwhile President Truman met General MacArthur at Wake Island on 15 October. When asked by President Truman about the chances of the Russian or Red Chinese interference of the war, General MacArthur replied, "very little."
MacArthur stated that about 300,000 Red Chinese troops were stationed in Manchuria, of whom from 100,000 to 125,000 had been deployed along the Yalu River boundary with Korea. He estimated that only 50,000 to 60,000 of these troops could get across the river. If they attempted to move on Pyongyang, he said, they would be "slaughtered," owing to the proximity of UN air bases.

He further added that Russia had no troops immediately available for a thrust into the peninsula. It would take six weeks for a Soviet division to assemble at the border, and by that time winter would have set in.

Through the last weeks in October, as the UN forces pursued the remnants of the NK forces towards the Yalu, the burning question of Chinese Communist entry was constantly reviewed at all levels of the UN Command. But toward the end of October the ROK and UN forces began to meet increasing enemy resistance everywhere. By the end of the first week in November it became more obvious that a massive entry of the Red Chinese forces was under way.
CCF Aggression

On 24 November the UN Command opened a big new offensive to conclude the Korean War. A few days after it began, they were attacked by greatly superior forces in strength. The Chinese Communist forces suddenly waged the war against the United Nations, thus turning the U.N. offensive into a retreat. To wit some instance, the CCF offensive caught the II ROK Corps, turned back the advance of the 25th US Division and penetrated deeply into the 2nd US Division, decimating the Turkish Brigade. In the face of these setbacks, a general withdrawal was ordered. (See Situation Map 4, Appendix IX.)

With the close support of the air forces, the ground forces, smashing through the encircling Red forces, fought their way over the ice-bound ridges and along the deep winding valleys that lay below. The UN allies had no

Human waves of CCF overspreading the snow-covered fields.
alternative against such odds but to continue their withdrawal southward. In
the west, the I and IX US Corps and the II ROK Corps moved back to the
positions south of Pyongyang, and by 16 December, held the positions on the
Imjin River north of Seoul. In the east, a defensive perimeter was establish-
ed around Hamhung, from which port the X US Corps and some units of the
I ROK Corps were evacuated by 24 December 1950.

When the Red Chinese started their drive, General MacArthur reported
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff that unless the UN policy of "Limited War"
were changed, the Reds could drive the UN forces out of Korea. To prevent
such disaster, he asked for authorization to use the UN airpower to bomb the
Communist supply bases in Manchuria. But this request was denied. The
only action taken by the UN General Assembly was to adopt a resolution on
1 February 1951, that branded Communist China as an aggressor in Korea.
MacArthur as the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces, was
then told to withdraw if necessary to the former Naktong perimeter or Pusan
perimeter. If, this fall became too great, he was also authorized to withdraw
his forces to Japan.

New Phase of War

The undeclared war of Red China against the United Nations resulted in
some policy changes in the Allies.

In spite of all restrictions the ROK and UN forces were able to drive the
Red Chinese forces back along the 38th Parallel by the end of March 1951,
and were ready once again to plunge into North Korea.

As the UN forces began warily and stubbornly to take up counteroffen-
sive toward Seoul and the 38th Parallel again during the early months of 1951,
the possibility of applying full military force in order to achieve a unified
Korea became increasingly uncertain. Any such action risked opening a
general war in Asia since the flow of troops and supplies from the north of
Yalu River, Manchuria, could only be stopped by a direct attack on their
sources, an act which might provoke Communist China and possibly the Soviet
Union to enter the war openly and in force. (See Situation Map 5, 6, 7,
Appendix IX.)

Thus, the broad implications of this new phase of the Korean War were
not immediately and completely clear. In other words, the extent to which
the Chinese Communists were prepared to commit themselves to battle and the
intention of Russia were both highly problematical. Nevertheless, beyond
these speculative factors, the concept of a limited war had not yet thoroughly
entered into the calculation of the UN strategy.

In the long run, the decision was made that the UN forces would not strike against the enemy bases in the Red Chinese territory. It was believed by many, President Truman in particular, that this was the only way to avoid World War III. From the military standpoint, it also precluded any possibility of winning the Korean War. From that point on, the basic strategy involved inflicting maximum losses on the Red forces, while attempting to minimize the losses of the UN forces. Consequently the battle continued back and forth across the general line, more or less along the 38th Parallel.

**UN COUNTEROFFENSIVE (15 JAN-22 APR 1951)**

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**MacArthur’s Strategy**

Throughout this period General MacArthur was carrying on a running argument with President Truman and the JCS regarding the war strategy in
Korea. The General had been shocked by the message that authorized him to evacuate the peninsula, according to circumstances, and withdraw to Japan. He also flatly disagreed with the restrictions against air strikes north of the Yalu River.

MacArthur insisted that Red China was already in the war as far as it could get, and bombing the Red Chinese "privileged sanctuary" beyond the Yalu could not possibly do anything except strengthen the U. N. cause. MacArthur declared that the course he recommended would quickly bring the war to a victorious close. To the contrary the US JCS maintained that the MacArthur's assertion would expand the war and increase the risk of total war without giving any commensurate assurance of a quicker, less costly military decision.

As a result, on 11 April 1951, President Truman finally relieved General MacArthur of his commands in Korea and Japan.

General MacArthur had said there was "no substitute for victory" in Korea. Thereafter the result for long months to come was to be a bloody stalemate.

In retrospect, it seems extremely doubtful that the Russians -- especially before they had acquired great air-atomic capabilities -- would have taken anything less than a direct attack upon their immediate sphere of control. Total war would have meant the devastation of their homeland.

Therefore, it seems quite improbable that the Kremlin would have deliberately entered in such a way as to cause total war, merely for the sake of upholding Red China's position in Korea, as long as it believed that the UN Command coveted no territorial objectives beyond Korea.

At any rate, General MacArthur's strategy did receive much public support in the United States, while there were also many people who now favored a truce -- an end to the war without complete victory.

Section 2. Armistice

Now it was time for the ROK and UN forces to take the offensive again. As the spring had come Seoul was restored on 14 March 1951 and on 3 April they recrossed the 38th Parallel. During the next three weeks, in a series of limited attacks the UN allies pressured forward and seized a phase line named the Kansas Line which runs parallel and to the north of the 38th Parallel, except on the left, where it follows along the Imjin River to the Western Sea.
The Invasion from Red China

During the months of April and May, 1951, the Chinese Communist forces launched the major offensives with human-sea tactics, their biggest attacks in Korea. Their objectives were to destroy the ROK and UN forces, with no matter what the cost in the Communist casualties. General James B. Van Fleet, the new Eighth US Army Commander, ordered all the field forces to inflict as much punishment as possible on the Red odds. The enemy losses were severe. Thus the Red Chinese had now completely lost the initiative; worse, they had been hurt almost beyond recovery.

The War on the Two Fronts

The UN forces now seemed to be growing stronger by day, while the CCF grew weaker. On Sunday, 23 June 1951, at the very moment when the Reds were once again faced with great military defeat, Russia's delegate to the...
United Nations, Yakov Malik, suggested in a radio talk in New York to begin negotiations for a cease-fire in Korea. The Reds had balked at earlier attempts for peace talks, but now they seemed eager to have them begin. After this broadcast, the US Ambassador in Moscow Alan Kirk was instructed to obtain a clarification of the Malik statement. After Malik made the cease-fire proposal, the Peking Radio followed it and indicated that the rulers of Red China favored a truce.

This resulted eventually in General Matthew Ridgway, the UN Command, being authorized by the United Nations to invite the enemy to discuss in the field the possibility of arranging a cease-fire.

It was very clear to the Soviet regime that the CCF could not of course win a decision in Korea; they could not now even halt the slow, steady U.N. forces advance northward. It was also obvious that the continuing hot war in the Far East was jangling the Western nerves and hastening the slow re-armament of Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- a collective defense and security body as the counterweight to the Russian and its satellite military power in Europe.

After all, on 30 June, General Ridgway, as the UN Commander in Chief, radioed the Communist forces in charge to meet for the cease-fire negotiations.

For the Republic of Korea, however, it saw no honor in the proposed cease-fire, which left its people ravaged and still devided. The Republic of Korea had gone into the war, which provoked by the Communists, to repel the Red aggression. And hundreds of thousands of its people killed or injured. Millions of orphans and homeless wandered its ruins. To end the war after such wholesale sacrifice with nothing but the status quo was more than vital tragedy the Korean people could bear.

From this time on, President Syngman Rhee continued to block an armistice, threatening again and again.

The truce talks began in July 1951 at Kaesong. The tragedy of the talks was that the Communists intended merely to transfer the war from the battlefield, where they were losing, to the conference table, where they might yet win something.

As soon as the talks started, the Communists used all kinds of dirty words and abusive language freely and shamelessly. Thus the Reds began to show themselves in true colors -- ill-natured.

They insisted that the 38th Parallel must be the new line of demarcation, although the UN ground forces in most places stood well above it. They also at once refused demands to permit the International Red Cross to inspect the POW camps in North Korea in the cause of humanity.
Cease-Fire

As the summer deepened, another battle was bound to come. In the green and muddy hills and valleys, the war had not ended. It had begun a new and terrible phase.

Henceforth, there was, however, no intention of striking for the Yalu River or opening up the battlefront for a new type of maneuver. The shattered Red Chinese forces had the intention to launch a large-scale offensive neither. The new attacks of the two opposite sides would be limited in zone, for limited objectives, a hill here, or to erase a bulge there. For instance, the objectives of these limited attacks were the key hills and ground, such as Punchbowl, Heartbreak Ridges, or Bloody Ridge today in the eastern sector, or to deny vital ground and heights to the enemy, such as White Horse Hill.
or Hill 395, or Hill 275 (Old Baldy) next day in the Chorwon area, or to seize and hold the Kowangsan or Hill 355, or to control the key terrain feature, such as Bunker Hill and Outpost Hook another day in the western sector.

While the armistice talks dragged on first at Kaesong and next at Panmunjom without visible progress, the enemy lost no time in building up his considerably weakened might. The one-year period from 1 July 1951 to 30 June of the following year saw only sporadic fighting now and then all along the line. In this period, it became routine for the UN to destroy the enemy's potential military might through large-scale air bombing operations deep inside the enemy territory. The enemy built up his strength to around one million men during this period. Then came the fiercest battles of the Korean War. On 6 September 1952, the enemy tried to take the strategic Capital Hill, northeast of Kumhwa. The enemy's attack on the hill was repelled 30 times.

OLD BALDY—WHITE HORSE HILL AREAS

Sketch Map 8
The Invasion from Red China

by the Capital ROK Division. Twenty thousand rounds of artillery shells fell daily. On 29 September, the enemy gave up his attempt to take the hill and changed his objective to adjoining White Horse Hill. Again bloody combats were fought and again the hill was secured thanks to the bravery of the 9th ROK Division.

There were a number of other occasions when the enemy finally decided to give up his attempts at territorial conquests after formidable losses. The merciless stalemated war continued right up to the armistice signing on 27 July 1953, after vicissitudes of the long talks, ups and downs.

In conclusion, the death of the Russian boss, Joseph Stalin, jolted the Communist world. Its repercussion soon extended to the truce tent at Panmunjom and decisively affected the progress of negotiations there. Thus on 4 June 1953 the Communist delegates effectively agreed to all major UNC counterproposals.

Now, with the United Nations Command and the Communists in agreement, only the Republic of Korea and again President Syngman Rhee stood in the way of armistice. Politically and emotionally, the Government of the Republic of Korea could not accept the armistice terms, because it would leave the Korean nation still divided.

Every American pressure, from cajolery to blunt talks was used to make the Government come around. The pressure was now brought on President Rhee both by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Mark W. Clark, the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. President Rhee told bluntly that unless he did not agree to the terms of the armistice the Republic of Korea would get no further military support from the United States. If he did agree to the terms, he was promised both continued military and economic aid after the war. Thus President Rhee finally bowed to the inevitable.

The armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, marking an end of three years battle in which many men of the United Nations poured out their noble blood on Korea's melancholy soil. Not only the free Koreans but also many peoples in the free world felt a sense of disappointment in seeing the Korean War ended on terms less than total victory.

It was a victorious war, however, because, although there was no complete one, the free world triumphed over communism and dealt it a deadly blow.
CHAPTER V POST-ARMISTICE

Section 1. After Cease-fire

The Triumph and Tragedy

It is true that the United Nations objective -- to repel the aggression, to expel the Communist invaders and to restore peace in the area -- was achieved as the triumph of right over Communist evil. However, when the complete unification and independence of all Korea, the goal that had been the dream of the Korean people ever since 1910, was in sight, the Chinese Communist forces had invaded into Korea which resulted in a new phase of war. Henceforth the U.N. forces had operated in a mission vacuum or without specific political or military objectives. There were no pursuit, even after the ROK and the U.N. allied forces had strength strong enough to push the Reds back again up to the northern border, the Yalu River. The willingness to settle a stalemate was all that brought division of the Korean peninsula again.

There would have been much justification for punishing the Red Chinese forces, when they launched massive offensive in north Korea in November-December 1950, by bombing the war potential in Manchuria. But such action was maturely debated and finally rejected by the United States authorities. Thereafter the U.N. objectives in Korea were confined to the defeat of the aggression, the expulsion of the invaders and the prevention of an expansion of the war into another major war.

The Political Conference

The shooting war had ended, but the struggle in Korea. During the first year of the post-armistice period, the Communists maneuvered in the hopes of gaining what three years of war had not gained them.

The political conference, which was to follow the military truce, in accordance with Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, was held belatedly
at Geneva, Switzerland, and proved abortive. Korea thus remained unnaturally divided as ever -- this time along a strip of land known as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which, set mostly far above the old 38th Parallel frontier, ran a zig-zag course from the west coast to the east coast. On both sides of this zone, the armies postured and dug in.

Meanwhile, at Panmunjom, the United Nations and Communist armistice delegations had continued to meet to make arrangements for the political conference. The Communists reverted to their former delaying tactics, insisting that Soviet Union must be included in the conference as a neutral participant. Again, how ridiculous! Soviet Russia was a guardian of Kim Il-sung who had planned the invasion of the south.

To put an end to such a self-opinionated Communist persistence, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution on 28 August 1953, limiting participation in the political conference to these sixteen nations who fought in Korea against the Communist aggressors and the Republic of Korea on one side, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Communist North Korea on the other. Neutral nations were to be excluded.

During January-February of 1954, the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union met in Berlin, Germany and upheld the U.N. resolution. Consequently, the Geneva Conference was held on 26 April 1954, which soon made clear the impossibility of reconciling the divergent views on how to unite Korea, or who was to do it, as President Syngman Rhee had predicted.

Under such circumstance, the sixteen Allies who contributed the military forces to Korea made public a joint declaration on 15 June 1954 at Geneva, "pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953 of the U.N. General Assembly, and the Berlin communiqué of 17 February 1954." It reads in part:

"The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement. The principal issues between us, there, are clear. Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as the tool of aggression. Secondarily, we desire genuinely free elections. The Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free elections. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that so long as the Communist delegation reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean ques-
tion by the conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea."

On 11 November 1954, they finally submitted the written reports to the United Nations Headquarters. It followed as a logical consequence that the U.N. General Assembly declared on 11 December, that its purpose remained "achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea ..." Thus the General Assembly hoped that some progress to this end would soon be made. But there was no hope and there never was a political conference afterwards.

Section 2. Retrospect

The Armistice Lessons

In retrospect, there were some of the mistakes the United Nations Command made during the armistice negotiations. The first one was demonstrated by the acceptance of Kaesong as the site for the armistice talks. This played the hands of the Communists, for Kaesong's very position forced a halt to advancing UN troops by making a large area immune from attack. The location of Kaesong below the 38th Parallel and within the Communist's lines also proved of immeasurable propaganda value to the Communists, for it meant that the United Nations Command had to go to the Communists to negotiate. Had the talks been held instead on some neutral ship or territory outside of Korea, the armistice would have been agreed upon much more advantageous position, for the United Nations forces could have exercised more effective military power against the aggressors.

Furthermore, during the course of negotiations, the Communists had made every effort to utilize the scene as their privileged stage for propaganda show programs. The imputed Communists lied without hesitation, they presented fabrications as the truth and challenged the UN Command to prove them otherwise. Therefore, it must be remembered that such methods as the Communists employed in the negotiations were to them entirely legitimate. To them the nature of their ultimate end justifies the use of any tactics.

The tragedy of Korea was that the United Nations Command did not accept this fact from the beginning. Extending this concept into the post-armistice period made it clear that the Communists can, with legitimacy by their
standards, violate the armistice agreement. There are too numerous to mention all of such betrayal of the terms.

Another mistake which can be pointed out was that the names “Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission” and “Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission” were misnomers, and also contributed to the Communists’ propaganda campaign. To wit, Poland and Czechoslovakia scarcely measured up to the standards of neutral states. Dulling them such by naming them as members of the two Commissions immediately cloaked them in the halo of neutrality. There were many others, but these examples serve to illustrate the importance of maintaining constant alertness to Communist effort in the future.

**Armistice Violation by the Communists**

Thus, the Communists began to violate the armistice agreement from the beginning. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission created under the terms of the armistice, was responsible for monitoring the cease-fire reporting each side the results of its observation and inspection. The Commission was composed of nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The reason for violation was highlighted by a former Polish military attache in Pyongyang, Colonel Paul Morinat, who extricated himself to the West following an assignment in Communist North Korea. He wrote in part:

> “Whenever an inspection team of Poles, Czechs, Swiss and Swedes went into South Korea, the Poles and Czechs used the opportunity to collect and photograph all the classified information they could on the ROK and U.S. tactics, aircraft, logistics and training.

> When the teams went to North Korea, the Poles and Czechs did their best to keep the Swedes and Swiss from seeing anything of military value. For example at Sinuju and Manpojin on the Yalu where the Swedes and Swiss wanted to check trains from Red China for contraband military supplies, the Poles and Czechs worked directly with the very Communist generals they were supposed to be policing. The Red Chinese and North Koreans informed them whenever a train was coming through loaded with forbidden new weapons. Then the Czechs and Poles would try to lure the Swiss and Swedes away, often by producing a fake train with no freight on it. When the inspectors’ backs were turned, the new guns and tanks went rolling south.”

In the end, owing to the constant pressure of the Republic of Korea, the armistice inspection teams in the south were flown to Panmunjom on 9 June
1956, while the teams in North Korea were also returned to the DMZ during the next two days, and the objectionable activities of the Commission were finally halted.

In the years that followed the North Korean Communists had ceaselessly been violated the armistice agreement without hesitation. They dispatched espionages into the Republic of Korea, attempted the raids in surprise onto the ROK Army outposts near the Demilitarized Zone, attacked the fishing smacks merely engaging in fishery without arms within the territorial waters and marine highways. There had been countless cases to cite such violations committed by the Communists.

According to the information supplied by the Military Armistice Commission, the United Nations Command the statistical figures of Communist violations, as of 19 June 1973, are as follows.

### Armistice Violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNC against Communists</th>
<th>Communists against UNC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admitted</td>
<td>Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>14/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>—</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973(by mid-June)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100,287/16</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: The first figure indicates the number of violations charged. The second figure indicates the number of violations admitted.
The War Lessons

The blue and white flag of the United Nations was carried into battle for the first time in its history. In repulsing the Red aggression, the United Nations served notice that it would not hesitate to aid those nations whose freedom and independence were under attack.

Initially the aggressor was the North Korean Communists; then the aggressor became Communist China. But the ultimate paradox was laid in the fact that Soviet Russia’s aims to communize the whole world waging conflict everywhere whenever it seizes chances by encroaching upon the weakened territories one after another. Its first attempt came into Korea.

The 38th Parallel helped Russia to precipitate war and it also had lent confusion to the military operations. When Red China openly assumed the role of an aggressor in Korea, an additional factor of confusion was added to the military scene. Because of the same anxieties which prompted some nations to urge respect for the 38th Parallel. It was decided that the Red Chinese bases in Manchuria were to be immune from the UN air attacks. This self-denying act cancelled much of the effectiveness of the U.N. strategic air force. It gave the Chinese Communist forces complete freedom to prepare for their aggression in Korea behind the line of the Yalu River. These enemy forces could only be attacked after they had dispersed into actions in Korea.

The war has inspired many lessons. Almost unanimous attitude of the United Nations members on military participation in Korea gives us the main lesson that peace and freedom are the common aim of the international organization. The war has also forcibly demonstrated to the free world that the fact that must be no further power vacuums into which the forces of the Communist aggression can move with impunity. In addition, it taught us that the free peoples are always facing an enemy who would continue to probe our defense looking for weak spots to exploit.

In essence, the Korean War was another phase of the freedom versus communism struggle which started even before the end of World War II. In spite of all the United Nations efforts to settle previous conflicts between the two worlds by peaceful means, the Korean problem broke out suddenly as an overt act of war. In such an abrupt shift toward hot war, the United Nations had no chance of following its usual peaceful procedure and had no choice but to resort to military or police action.

These are but a few of the many lessons which the war has taught us at a cost in blood and treasure.
In short, as events have subsequently proven, holding the line against Communist encroachment is a battle whose end is not yet in sight. Enemy aggression may explode upon the world scene, with an overt act of invasion, as it did in Korea in June 1950, or it may attack the form of a murderous guerrilla war as it had more recently, for over a decade, in Vietnam.

Section 3. Today’s Korea

Now twenty years after the Armistice, the United Nations is still providing the defense shield for the modernizing Republic of Korea. Symbolic of the shield is the United Nations Command which was activated in July 1950 at the request of the U.N. Security Council.

North Korea has been violated the armistice provisions in innumerable cases ever since a unique truce was put into force two decades ago. But the Republic of Korea has been able to manage to avert a war during the precious days because the people in the south have remained patient and peace-loving.

At the same time, it should make due estimate of the peaceful role of the United Nations Command in Korea. As an effective deterrent of any eventuality on the Korean peninsula in confrontation with the other half of the divided nation during these years what the UN Command has done can under no circumstances be underestimated. For without the military presence of the white and blue flag, those in power in the north would have made another blunder of provoking an all-out invasion.

Duplicity -- Communist North

There is a parallel between the false “peace” overtures made by Communist North Korea before its invasion of the south in 1950 and its currently disguised “peace” offensive.

Prior to the Korean War the North Korean Communists clamored for talks between the political representatives of the two sides. Even now twenty years after the three-year war and more than a quarter century after the partition of the peninsula, they are still hammering out the same tactics. But the people in the Free South are not confident in any verbal “peace” as far as North Korea is concerned, no matter how loudly it talks about peace to implant among the world nations a false peace-loving image. It was, again, nothing more than smoke-screen tactic, their most favorite trick, because they are playing a double game, carrying two faces under one food.
The North Korean Communists have never suspended their continuous dispatch of armed agents into the south even following the South-North Dialogue for unification. To give in evidence, a ROK security agency made public on 29 June 1973 the arrest of eleven suspected espionage agents, including four Korean residents in Japan. They reportedly attempted to organize underground cells among the Korean residents in the United States and alienate them from the Republic of Korea. In another case, which was revealed on 30 June 1973, seven espionage agents were arrested by the National Police, which confiscated from them espionage documents, operational funds and other items.

The South-North agreement had called upon the two parts to suspend any such subversive acts against each other on the course of seeking peaceful unification. Then, how could the North Korean Communists override such a peaceful pledge in an overt way, if they really want both sides to succeed in their talks.

On the contrary, in the foreign policy announcement made by President Park Chung Hee on 23 June 1973, the Government of the Republic of Korea has expressed its readiness to meet the north in the United Nations and other international organizations, in a design to help reduce tension on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere in the international community.

Compared with such peaceful efforts on the part of the Republic of Korea, the North Korean regime is bent upon creating a tense atmosphere by continuing dispatch of espionage agents.

Real Peace Move

Today, the world is facing one of the most important junctures in man's history. Under the rapidly changing international developments, a new historic phase is taking place toward the West-East thaw from the extreme confrontation between the free democratic system intend upon pursuing peace and the Communist dictatorial system threatening the cause of peace. Somehow or other, Communist China, who openly acted the role of an aggressor in Korea (1950-1953), is now emerging as one of the big world powers.

Thus, despite the new wave of peace-orientation, there still hangs, unfortunately, the dark cloud of tension over the Korean peninsula, because Communist North is the most vicious and inhumane group in the world Communists society. In this situation, the free people in the south should never be idle in establishing a self-reliant defense posture.

President Park Chung Hee announced a special statement on 23 June 1973 to cope with the changes on the peninsula and in the world community realis-
tically and open-mindedly. Under this policy, the Republic of Korea will no longer oppose Communist North to become a member of the United Nations together with the Republic with the ultimate goal of peaceful unification remaining unchanged.

This change reflects the world-mindedness of the growing Republic of Korea, led by President Park, who took a series of initiatives beginning 15 August 1970, the 25th anniversary of national liberation, to meet the Communists in the north halfway and ease tensions on the peninsula. President Park, however, made it clear that such move does not signify recognition of Communist North as a state, stressing that policies regarding North Korea are interim measures during the transition period until the achievement of national unification.

Secretary General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim immediately made a comment on that very day, welcoming President Park’s special foreign policy statement as progressive action. The action is in the same direction as the U.N. principle of universality, said the Secretary General, adding his hopes the statement will serve as a turning point for facilitating the South-North talks on the Korean peninsula.

On 15 August 1973, addressing a ceremony marking the 28th anniversary of national liberation, President Park reiterated his statement of 23 June: “If the Northern Korean authorities consistently turn away our assertion, this will only prove that they still have not abandoned the illusion of unifying the entire peninsula under communism by violence and force of arms.” Calling again the simultaneous entry into the world organization as “the most realistic means of accelerating our efforts for peaceful unification,” the President said that “it will be no means perpetuate the national division or interfere with efforts for unification.” In fact, it will not only contribute to easing tensions in Korea and restoring trust as one nation, but also serve to promote world peace.

In conclusion, the situation of today’s Korea may best be explained by quoting the gist of a commemorate address delivered by President Park Chung Hee on 3 October 1973, on the occasion of the 4, 305th National Foundation Day. The President particularly urged Communist North to join in the south-north dialogue table again by giving up its scheme of utilizing the talks only as an expediency to reunify the Korean peninsula in a Communist fashion.

He pointed out that the North Korean Communists are attempting to generate “a new form of strain” between the divided halves by unilaterally boycotting the south-north talks. He further stressed that “we have to persuade the North Korean authorities with perserverance and sincerity to return to national consciousness as soon as possible so that the south-north conversation
Post-Armistice

can be continued toward expanding the grand avenue of peaceful unification." He also stated that "we cannot forget overnight the memory of innumerable damages we had to undergo during the aggressive war triggered by a surprise attack of the North Korean Communists."
PART TWO

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMONWEALTH FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I GENERAL INTRODUCTION

As members of the United Nations, the Commonwealth Nations had been deeply interested in establishing peace, freedom and stability in Korea well before the outbreak of the Korean War. They extended their unanimous support when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on 12 December 1948 approving the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in the Korean peninsula. There followed one after another diplomatic recognition of Korea by each Commonwealth country. In view of this relationship, it was no surprising phenomenon that news of Korea being unduly attacked by the North caused grave concern among the Commonwealth of Nations. In fact, they were determined to do whatever lay within their power to restore peace in the area.

On 25 June 1950 the United Nations Commission on Korea reported to the Secretary General that North Korean forces had launched a full-scale invasion across the 38th Parallel. He in turn summoned an emergency meeting of the Security Council the next day.

The Council acted swiftly. Twenty-four hours after the Communist invasion, members of the Council, of whom the United Kingdom was represented permanently, adopted a resolution by a vote of nine to zero, with one each of abstention and absence, branding the aggression as a breach of peace and calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the aggressor forces to the 38th Parallel.

Nevertheless, as the the Communist forces, in defiance of the Security Council, pressed on their attack, the President of the United States announced on 27 June the commitment of the United States air and sea forces in the area to give the Korean troops cover and support.

During the night of 27 June (New York time), the Security Council passed a second momentous resolution which called upon member nations to give military aid to Korea in repelling the attack. Thus, events on the international stage by the early days of the invasion had progressed swiftly to the extent where the United States actually applied air and naval pressure to help repel the aggression and the United Nations had called upon the member nations to provide solid means for the same purpose.

The United Kingdom and other members of the Commonwealth were also swift to respond to the Korean crisis. In backing up the resolutions of the Security Council, the United Kingdom, as permanent member status with four
other nations, did not only express her own mood but also the shared voice of the Commonwealth nations. About the hard-nosed policy of the Commonwealth nations against the Communist aggression, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff indeed struck the keynote when they said the importance of "showing the USSR and its satellites that the NATO and Commonwealth powers are solidly behind the action taken by the United States in Korea."

But as was the case with the United States, the Commonwealth nations were at the time uncertain of the necessity of sending ground forces to Korea. The following summarization gives the same picture of the uncertainty and hesitation prevalent in the Commonwealth circle:

"The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff doubted if the forces from north Korea could be driven back without assistance in the way of land forces but they did not consider it was desirable to recommend at this stage the movement of any land or air forces from Hong Kong. They are however studying the whole Far Eastern situation with a view to determining whether or not land forces could be made available from Hong Kong."

Nevertheless, on 28 June the United Kingdom had no doubt about committing her naval forces—the first military aid by the Commonwealth nations—to Korea. Notification of placing naval forces in the Japanese waters at the disposal of the United States Command in the Far East was made to the Security Council, the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea and all Commonwealth countries.

In fact, British naval power in the Japanese waters was temporarily stronger than US sea force when the North Koreans attacked the Republic of Korea on 25 June. Britain's Far Eastern Station Headquarters at Hong Kong commanded twenty two ships under Admiral Andrewes in port or sea between Malaya and the China coast. In contrast the main body of the Seventh US Fleet was based on Pearl Harbour and Andrewes' US counterpart, Admiral Joy, had a meager force of five ships at hand. Admiral Andrewes assembled one light fleet carrier, two cruisers, two destroyers, three frigates and several auxiliary ships and rushed to the K rean waters.

On the following day, on the 29th of June, Australia announced the dispatch of one destroyer and one frigate; in Canada three destroyers were ordered on 5 July to sail for Korea; from New Zealand came promise of the early dispatch of two frigates on 3 July.

While the Commonwealth sea force in the Korean waters was expanding at this feverish pace, Australia committed its No. 77 Fighter Squadron to Korea on 29 June. Canada announced officially on 21 July that its No. 426 Transport Squadron had been offered for service along with the United Nations allied air forces. Besides the unit participation a score of fighter pilots would join in the UN air force operations.
In the meantime, during the first month of the fighting the North Korean armies exploited to the full the military advantage they had gained by their sudden onslaught and, despite the gallant resistance of the ill-equipped ROK forces, drove steadily southwards. On 14 July the Secretary General of the United Nations brought to the attention of member governments the urgent need for additional effective assistance and requested to provide an increased volume of combat forces, particularly ground forces.

The request for the ground forces and the subsequent discussion for the possibility among the Commonwealth family however brought one crucial factor to public attention. The demobilization that had followed the victories in 1945 had left the western democracies in general very short of active forces. By early August the United States had already committed more than half of her organized field forces in Korea and they were as anxious as the Republic of Korea forces for the Commonwealth ground commitment. The British ground forces were scattered over a wide area including North-West Europe, Austria, the Middle East and the Far East. Few nations in the Commonwealth had land forces in being which could be sent to Korea without weakening their own home defenses.

Nevertheless the United Kingdom again took the lead after a personal appeal by General MacArthur, the United Nations Command, and decided to send a brigade from Hong Kong. Ordering the brigade to proceed to Korea on 19 August, the British Government began exploratory moves to other Commonwealth governments for additional forces.

The reaction to this request to fill out the order of battle with Dominion contingents was immediate; Australia announced one infantry regiment, Canada would send one infantry brigade, from New Zealand would come one artillery regiment and from India, a field ambulance in that order.

In the air, one further fighter squadron was to be available to the United Nations air power from South Africa, which would arrive in Korea on 4 November 1950.

The United Kingdom contemplated the integration of the ground forces into a Commonwealth division in the theater, but which could be able to come into existence late in July 1951.

After all, during the Korean War, six of the Commonwealth of Nations provided assistance and personnel in one form or another. The United Kingdom sent substantial army and navy forces; from Canada and Australia came ground, sea and air units while New Zealand furnished one artillery regiment plus naval ships; an Indian field ambulance unit was in Korean service and South Africa provided one air fighter squadron. But since the story of the South African air squadron has been already contained in the First Volume of this series, which was due to nothing other than editorial convenience, ref-
ference to that squadron's history must be made to the First Volume. Therefore this volume covers the history of the other five nations—Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and United Kingdom in alphabetical order.
CHAPTER II  THE OUTLINE OF THE FIGHTING

Section 1. Early days: Gathering Strength

On 1 July 1950, two ships—a destroyer and a frigate—of the Australian Navy went into action in the Korean waters to be the first Commonwealth unit of any kind at work against the Communist forces. On the next day, British naval ships and Australian Mustang Fighter Squadron arrived in the theater. By the end of July five more ships would come from Canada and New Zealand to join Australian and British ships.

It was when the Naktong Perimeter was ablaze with the heaviest fighting that the first Commonwealth ground troops—the 27th British Infantry Brigade—arrived in Korea on 24 August 1950. Dispatched from Hong Kong with only two infantry battalions, the brigade was to experience a more fluid phase of the war than any other later Commonwealth formations.

After its first baptism of fire in early September on the Naktong River line southwest of Taegu, the unit was on the general attack north.

Off the coast of Korea, a gigantic amphibious blow was under preparation to coincide with the push-up from south when it would strike at Inchon. Commonwealth naval ships would also take part in this amphibious coup de grace.

On 1 October the 3rd Battalion of the Australian Regiment joined the brigade at Taegu, which was then renamed the 27th Commonwealth Brigade. Past Pyongyang on 20 October, the brigade entered Chongju, north of Chongchon River on the last day of the month.

But the brigade’s advance in the northern peninsula ended there and it was now ordered to withdraw south of the river on 3 November. The end of November saw the brigade at Sunchon fighting to secure a pass on the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road and help ROKs, Turks and Americans, who were ambushed by a CCF force in the narrow pass.

On 3 December during further withdrawal south, the 27th Brigade met another British brigade a few miles north of Pyongyang. Arriving mid-November at Pusan, the 29th Brigade which had come directly from the United Kingdom, better equipped and up to the strength.

But on 4 December the 27th Brigade left the 29th Brigade and headed again south about 200 kilometers to Uijongbu about 24 kilometers north of
Seoul. In mid-December the Indian Field Ambulance joined the brigade at Uijongbu after its arrival on 20 November.

The 29th Brigade, positioned around the village of Koyang about 15 kilometers north of Seoul on 3 January, engaged in its first serious battle. When the contact was broken the brigade listed 300 casualties.

It was at Changhowon that the 27th Brigade was reinforced by the 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment on 22 January 1951 and could for the first time in Korea muster its organic artillery.

On 18 February the 27th Brigade became full strength when the Canadian Battalion joined it.

In April the 27th Brigade was engaged in its heaviest fighting in Korea at Kapyong. The brigade was in defensive positions behind the 6th ROK Division in north of Kapyong. The CCF attacked in great strength in efforts to effect a complete breakthrough on this important axis leading to Seoul. From 22-24 April the Kapyong valley raged in “some of the bloodiest and fiercest fighting ever to take place in Anzac history” according to many observers. During 30 hours of incessant heavy fighting, the brunt was taken by the Australian Battalion with the New Zealand gunners in massive and deadly artillery support.

Section 2. Stalemate: The 1st Commonwealth Division

In April 1951, the Australian Fighter Squadron converted the Mustangs into the Meteor jets to cope with the increasing numbers of the enemy jet fighters over north Korea. South African fighters continued to fly combat sorties over the northern peninsula sometimes concentrating on the communication and supply installations. On the sea, the Navy was engaged in less exciting work of convoys, escort missions, and bombardment on shore battery positions if luckier.

On the ground, at midnight 25-26 April the 27th Commonwealth Brigade changed its designation, becoming the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The month of May saw big additions to the Canadian contingent in Korea. Headquarters, 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived with two infantry battalions and one field artillery regiment plus supporting units. Subsequently, these units—together with the first battalion which was withdrawn from the 28th Brigade—made up the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group.

Near Tokchong north of Uijongbu on 28 July 1951 at a brief ceremony the 1st Commonwealth Division’s flag was flown and the formation came into being with Major General A. J. H. Cassels of United Kingdom as the first com-
mander of this historic "community" of twenty thousand men from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and India. The formation of the division meant, among other things, an elevation in prestige and in increased participation in the planning of the major operations.

Since mid-December 1951 the division had adopted the principle of two brigades in the line and one reserve. This scheme had been altered, however, at the end of October 1952 to commit all three brigades to the line, each having one battalion in reserve. Battalions, and their supporting arms, were since then each fifty-six days in the line and twenty-eight days in reserve.

The effectiveness of the Army-Navy-Air Force coordination reached its peak in January 1952, especially in the defense of west coast islands north of gun busting fronts.

The Australian and Canadian Air Force fighter pilots were second to none in gallantry actions in the scramble over air hegemony against the increasing hostile MIGs, while losing their own lives and aircraft due to outnumbering enemies in the North Korean skies. But they never yielded a way for the enemy to the air supremacy. And also their air transport units saved the lives of wounded personnel of the friendly forces with aerial evacuation efforts as well as shuttling the urgent materiel to the grinding front across the Pacific.

The active maneuvering of the Navy aircraft effectively conducted air raids on north Korea beyond their role, in cooperation with other UN allied forces.
CHAPTER III  WAR ACCOUNT

Section 1.  Retrospect

The size and scope of the Commonwealth participation in the Korean War is enormous. On the ground, at its peak strength in July 1953 it constituted a community of 24,085 men, of which 14,198 were British the remainder being one Canadian brigade of 6,146, 2,282 Australians and 1,389 New Zealand gunners and 70 Indian doctors and medics. At sea, British Navy operated with 53 vessels of various ships, Australians with nine vessels, Canadians with eight vessels and two frigates from New Zealand. In the air, each of the fighter squadrons of Australia and South Africa, one transport squadron each from Australia and Canada, together with a score of fighter pilots, contributed in the form of unit or on an individual basis.

Its participation in Korea was an association of men from many countries, and of many races and creeds. However, they all formed a unique cooperative body, supporting each other in battle, delivering each other’s rations, ammunition and stores and tending each other’s wounded, all part of the armed forces of the great family of nations which had been built up over the centuries with so much toil and good will.

Indeed for the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth this war began a new era. In the two world wars troops of different Commonwealth countries had served side by side; but never before so intimately as they did in the 27th and 28th Commonwealth Brigades in the early days, later in the 1st Commonwealth Division and the administrative organization which supported it, on the ground and at sea in the form of naval forces. Covering and supporting friendly ground forces as well as their own brothers, the Commonwealth fighter pilots pinpointed the stubborn targets often for the hard pressed allied ground forces. All jet versus jet fighting began for the first time in the history of air war during the hostilities. Canadian pilots shot down over nine MIGs and left many more damaged even though their mission tours were short and their numbers small.

The high caliber of Australiann pilots must be noted as well as the alacrity with which the air force squadron arrived in Korea. They fought in the propeller driven Mustangs in the early war and converted into Meteor jet fighters. Slower and tail blinded as the fighters were, the Australians
could still score on several MIGs, although at considerable sacrifice by their own members.

The Korean experience demonstrated that soldiers from Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom can be integrated for battle with complete success, under commanders from any part of the Commonwealth. This is an achievement which is unique in history.

When all did their duty so well it would be invidious to select any particular component or unit for special mention. Indian Field Ambulance contributed very noticeable medical service in the spirit of saving lives regardless their nationalities.

It is sufficient to say that all Commonwealth troops in Korea gained a reputation which is a source of pride throughout the Commonwealth, and of satisfaction to all who took part in.

Since the first operation of the Australian naval forces on 1 July 1950 the Commonwealth countries rushed to Korea one after another. Ground forces fought desperate but valiant battles from the bloody Naktong to the desolate Chongchon rivers. Many served beyond the call of the duty.
The total of 7,268 men -- 1,279 Australians, 1,471 Canadians, four Indians, 84 New Zealanders, 4,286 British -- were either killed, wounded or missing in Korea. Among the missing a total of 1,036 were repatriated at the conclusion of the war, leaving 151 unaccounted for.

Section 2. Administration and Logistics

Operationally the Commonwealth units were under the United Nations Command. Administratively it was under the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces, Korea (B.C.F.K.).

But much independence was still exercised in individual unit and relations within the Commonwealth forces, however, always proved to be cordial, and differences which arose from time to time were invariably resolved with common sense and understanding.

Before the Korean War, there existed Headquarters, British Commonwealth Sub-Area, Tokyo, which commanded Commonwealth occupation troops in Japan solely of Australians, under the command of Lieutenant General Horace Robertson. For sometime he subsequently assumed responsibility for supporting ships from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

In December 1950 the actual and impending increase in the size of the Commonwealth forces made it necessary that administration and logistics should be placed on more regular scale. Consequently, General Robertson assumed command of the new organization, British Commonwealth Forces, Korea. He was responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Melbourne, which was the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee strengthened by representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

With this development, Korean Base Organization -- consisting of Headquarters, supply and ordnance depots and a medium workshop -- was built up at Taegu. Further south at Pusan, transit units accommodated troops in movement and at Kure, Japan were a hospital and replacement and personnel administrative units.

In February 1951 after the CCF invaded Korea turning the situation precarious for the UN forces, the base organization at Taegu was removed to Kure, Japan and transit area at Pusan was converted into an Advanced base, to be called the British Commonwealth Sub-Area, Korea.

Minor changes took place from time to time. But by the autumn of 1951 when the Korean War became stalemated, the administrative and logistical organizations also became stabilized as follows.

The Main Headquarters, British Commonwealth Forces Korea (B.C.F.K.)
was at Kure, Japan with such subordinate headquarters as; Headquarters, Sub-Area, Pusan with the function to safeguard and accommodate the troops in casual transition; Forward Headquarters, Seoul to effect liaison with Main Headquarters, 1st Commonwealth Division and the Eighth US Army in Korea; forward maintenance area, Seoul charged to maintain various stocks of supplies to the division. In addition there were two detachments at Taegu and Tokyo for the liaison work with the UN Command.

But here it must be noted that each Commonwealth component maintained its own system of replacement and personal records. Each had a headquarters unit to command its base units, although the system varied slightly. Headquarters, Canadian base units, Far East was formed in Kure, although lately in 1953, and Australia had one at Hiroshima, and New Zealand at Pusan. Only the United Kingdom left these duties within B.C.F.K. itself.

There were also two other units. The British Commonwealth Leave Unit in Tokyo was started in early 1951 and more than 53,000 made use of various facilities there by the end of 1953. The 1st Commonwealth Division Battle School near Kure trained replacements except the New Zealand component and ran courses for other ranks.

Throughout the fighting in Korea, the administrative organization left very little to be desired with modifications taking place from time to time. Most of the credit for the smooth working goes to Australia with its prompt manner in which her occupation forces in Japan assumed responsibility for administration in Korea, and later played the major part in building up a large and complicated organization.
PART THREE

THE AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to Australia

General

The Commonwealth of Australia is an island continent situated in the southern hemisphere. Australia, one of the oldest land masses in the world, is the only continent occupied by a single nation and the last to be developed by Europeans. It is a self-governing member of the Commonwealth of Nations and its capital city is Canberra. With an area of 7,686,420 square kilometers, it is about the size of the United States and more than three-quarters the size of Europe.

The isolation of Australia is one of the most significant factors in its geography. Only in the northwest does it face the outposts of Asian civilization at no great distance; and the northern area is in general difficult country. Hence contacts with the islands to the north, though probably intermittent throughout historic time, did not become significant until the mid-19th century. On all other sides Australia is surrounded by wide expanses of ocean. Nevertheless, it is the largest land mass, with the largest and most technically advanced population, within the Pacific, and indeed it may be said to dominate the whole of the southwest of that ocean.

In its history, the long delay in the discovery and settlement of Australia was caused by many factors -- vastness of the Pacific Ocean, ideas from antiquity of the impassability of the torrid zone, fears of being cast against the east or west of Terra Australia by prevailing winds and lack of any sign that the land possessed anything worth having. In the later stages the main work of discovery of Australia had been done by the British who took possession of it on behalf of the British Crown. Settlement of the Australian continent ensured that almost the only influences determining its character were British.

As the various settlements expanded, the great distances separating them from Britain and from each other caused so many administrative problems that self-government became an early objective.

The first constitutional charter was granted to New South Wales in 1823, when the British government passed an act which authorized the creation of
a council possessing a limited legislative responsibility.

Henceforth, the rapid development of the various colonies following the stimulus of the gold discoveries and the granting of self-government soon brought a realization of the need for intercolonial co-operation.

The Commonwealth of Australia was assented to on 1 January 1901, in a proclamation issued by Queen Victoria on 17 September 1900. Late in the 19th century it came to be realized that some form of union was essential. A series of inter-colonial conferences was held to discuss cooperation in meeting common problems.

Many factors, however, particularly the divergent interests of the colonies, militated against complete unification. A federal system was finally adopted in which the colonies became States, with legislative and executive powers divided between the central Commonwealth and the local State Parliaments and Government.

Australia's population was now estimated to have reached 13,000,000 in 1972. This represented an increase of more than 70 per cent since the end of 1945.

**Relations with Korea and U. N.**

Australia played an active part in drafting the Charter of the United Nations at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and has been a consistent supporter of the principles and objectives of the United Nations since its establishment.

It has also been directly involved in the United Nations peace-keeping activities in Greece, Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir, the Arab States and Israel, Hungary and Cyprus.

Australia recognized the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1949, and friendly relations have since developed rapidly between the two nations. She has had representatives with all the three U.N. Commissions on Korea to help achieve the U.N. objectives in Korea.

In June 1950, when the North Korean Communist forces invaded the Republic of Korea, the Australian Government, in answering the U.N. Security Council's call to help the Republic of Korea to repel the Communist aggression, ordered its ground, naval and air force units based in Japan immediately into action.

Thus, during the Korean War, Australia contributed its share of the armed forces with three services from the very beginning: One infantry battalion in the early stage but two battalions from April 1952 up to the end of the war; a fleet consisted of an aircraft carrier with three fighter squadrons,
four destroyers and four frigates; and one air force fighter squadron.

The Australian forces remained in Korea until August 1957 as a major contingent of the Commonwealth Forces and have continued to be represented as the Military Armistice Commission since that date.

Total strength of personnel who had participated in the Korean War and total casualties in each Service are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strength:</td>
<td>10,657</td>
<td>4,507</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties:</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(including 16 POWs) (including 6 POWs)

In addition, Australia has made a voluntary contribution of more than four million dollars to the reconstruction and relief efforts for Korea of the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and also the U.N. emergency relief program in Korea.

The Commonwealth of Australia has possessed a permanent member seat in the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) ever since its foundation in October 1950.

Section 2. Prelude to the Australian Contribution

Reaction to the Communist Aggression

When the first reports of the North Korean Communist forces spread all over the world, free people were alarmed and the question everyone asked was: "Does this mean the beginning of World War III waged by the Communist world?"

Meanwhile, the U.N. Security Council met in New York on the Sunday afternoon, 26 June 1950, New York time, at the request of the United States. By the time it was obvious that the United Nations was facing its greatest test. If member states merely lifted their hands in pious protest and let North Korean aggression succeed, the U.N. Charter would become just scrap paper and the world organization would be morally bankrupt.

Fortunately, the Council adopted a resolution ordering the North Korean Communists to withdraw immediately its armed forces and asking member nations to assist in upholding the United Nations authority.

Two days later, on 27 June, New York time, the U.N. Security Council met again, as it was clear that the North Korean Communists had no intention of obeying the U.N. appeal for an immediate cease-fire and with-
drawal back to the 38th Parallel. The Council passed another resolution calling
on member nations to contribute their armed forces to repel the North Korean
Communist aggression and restore international peace and security.

Next day the Secretary General transmitted the Council resolution to all
member states, including Australia, and asked what aid, if any would give
the Republic of Korea.

At that time when the North Korean Communist forces launched their
invasion attacks on 25 June, there was an Australian Air Force unit, Number
77 Fighter Squadron, at Iwakuni, Japan as an element of the Commonwealth
Occupation Force in Japan.

On 29 June the Prime Minister of Australia R. G. Menzies announced that
two Australian naval ships in the Japanese waters, namely the destroyer
HMAS Bataan and the frigate HMAS Shoalhaven, had been placed at the dis-
posal of the United Nations through the U.S. authorities in support of the
Republic of Korea. The same day Lieutenant General Horace Robertson, Aus-
tralian Commander of the Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, ordered
Number 77 Australian Fighter Squadron to prepare for combat commitment.
Next day, 30 June, Prime Minister Menzies announced in Canberra that
Australia had offered Number 77 Squadron for service with the United Nations
forces in Korea. Thus, the Australian naval and air forces were committed
in the U.N. action against the Communist aggressors at a very early date.

On the battleground, meanwhile, the outnumbered Republic of Korea
forces did all that was humanly possible to hold the advancing enemy, while
the U.N. ground troops were gradually arriving to build up the defensive
line. At the same time, member states of the United Nations began to re-
spond to appeals for greater assistance.

Commitment to the U.N. Action

In Australia, on 6 June 1950, a specially summoned meeting of both Houses
of the Federal Parliament unanimously approved the Government's action in
placing naval and air units at the disposal of the United Nations Command in
Korea.

Eight days later, on 14 July, the Acting Prime Minister Arthur W. Fadden,
while the Prime Minister was on his official tour to London and Washington,
announced that he received a request from the Secretary General of the Unit-
ed Nations for additional assistance.

The announcement that Australia would be sending ground troops came
suddenly on 26 July 1950. Minister Fadden, who was in Brisbane to address a
Country Party meeting, broke the news without warning over the evening
radio news session. Simultaneously similar announcements came from Britain and New Zealand.

Next day, Acting Prime Minister Fadden gave more details. Australian ground forces, he said, would consist of a brigade of volunteers to be drawn from the Permanent Army, the British Commonwealth Occupation Force and World War II veterans. They were expected to form part of a British Commonwealth Division which would include Australian and New Zealand infantry and artillery units. The Government was waiting for Prime Minister Menzies to return from abroad before pushing ahead with these plans. Meanwhile, HMAS Warramunga, a destroyer, would sail soon to join HMA ships Bataan and Shoalhaven in the Korean War theatre.

On 1 August 1950, Minister Fadden said that Cabinet had considered the nature and extent of ground forces which Australia had already agreed to make available for the Korean War. Decisions had been sent to Prime Minister Menzies in Washington.

In Washington on the same day, Prime Minister Menzies promised that Australian troops would be serving in Korea “within a few weeks.” He hoped that Australian troops would co-operate with New Zealanders in a small but first-class combat group. He said he would eventually like to see all British Commonwealth troops brought together in a Commonwealth Division.

The first recruits for the Korea-bound ground forces were ordered to report for medical examination and attestation on 8 August. The Government had previously announced that it intended to send a battalion of 900 troops, within six weeks if possible. This would consist of volunteers from the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, Japan, built up to establishment by members of the Regular Army serving in Australia. Volunteers would enlist for a maximum of three years’ service in any part of the world. At Ingelburn, New South Wales, the recruits selected for their previous infantry experience were attached to the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, for training. At Puckapunyal, Victoria, recruits were attached to the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. Already, 98 per cent of the officers and men of these Regular Army components had volunteered for service in Korea. Not all could be taken because of national service training demands in Australia. Eventually the recruiting quota for the Korea deployment force was full by 26 August.
CHAPTER II ARMY TROOPS

Section 1. Initial Deployment
(September - October 1950)

The First Contingent – The 3rd Battalion

On 27 September 1950, the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment embarked in Tokyo Bay on the American vessel *Aiken Victory* for Pusan, Korea. The full establishment was 960 all ranks but Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Green and commander of the new battalion, was already in Korea with the AFIKMA (Australian Force in Korea Maintenance Area) personnel who had crossed the Korea Strait in the Japanese freighter, *Tatsukiyo maru*, on 23 September. Actually, the pioneers were the members of a small advance unit who went to Pusan on 17th September in the *Lady Shirley*, an ex-Japanese crash launch. The men of the battalion were all volunteers, either from Australia or from the 67th Australian Infantry Battalion, on occupation duties in Japan, men chosen for their infantry experience and physical fitness to march and fight in a rugged terrain. They were fit and eager for action after a ten weeks' intensive combat training course at Hamamura, 40 kilometers from Kure, where during the Pacific War the Japanese Army had maintained a jungle warfare training school.

This first Australian Army contingent in the Korean War will henceforth be referred to as the 3rd Australian Battalion for the sake of convenience.

Colonel Green met the battalion at Pusan wharf on 28 September, where the ROK officials and crowds welcomed the Australians. The transport drivers and a loading party remained with the ship while the rest of the battalion entrained for Taegu, 117 kilometers to the northwest. At Taegu, Brigadier B. A. Coad, in Command of the 27th British Brigade, met the officers and addressed all ranks on future operation. Then, on 30 September, the battalion joined the British battalions in the Songju—Waegwan area, hilly country 48 kilometers northwest of Taegu, to help in mopping-up operations well behind the front line. By this time the ROK and UN forces were safely
in near the 38th Parallel, after the successful Inchon landing, and poised to pursue the fleeing enemy remnants northward.

The Australian Battalion was responsible for 100 square miles of hilly country and B and C companies made their first operational patrols on 2 October. Each company had a platoon of Sherman medium tanks and maintained communications through portable wireless sets. Forward observers from an American artillery battalion were at company headquarters to direct supporting fire if necessary. Although the area was well far south of the battle line the rapid advance of the ROK and UN forces left pockets of the North Korean guerrilla elements scattered throughout the south. Any innocent-looking peasant might conceal a "burp" gun under his white clothing. The Australians, in two days’ patrolling, contacted no enemy but destroyed a number of dumps of Russian-type box mines and arms ammunition. The battalion’s first casualties occurred when Lieutenant K. Hummerston, the second-in-command of C Company and his driver drove their carrier into an unmarked minefield and were both killed.

On 5 October the battalion moved to Taegu airstrip with the British Argylls and Middlesex Battalions for an airlift to Kimpo, near Seoul, ready to join the other UN forces in the pursuit of the fleeing NK Communist forces. The troops travelled north in DC-4 Skymasters and C-119’s (the already famous “Flying Boxcars”) and the trip took about 35 minutes. The 27th Brigade transport travelled up by road. Four days later the brigade moved to Kaesong, 4.8 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel, to join the 1st US Cavalry Division which was assembled to spearhead a drive on the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.

The immediate objective was Kumchon, about 32 kilometers above the Parallel on the western peninsula.

**Offensive to the North**

On 9 October the main advance began the Parallel up a narrow valley between high mountain ranges through much more rugged terrain than further north. In places, the thickly-wooded mountains reached up to 1,000 and even 1,300 meters shutting in narrow river valleys where thatched stone villages straddled the dangerous winding roads.

Behind a hail of shells, rockets and napalm the 8th US Cavalry moved up the main road from Kaesong to Kumchon without meeting much effective resistance and on through the ruin of Namchonjom headed for Sariwon, near the west coast, about half-way to Pyongyang. Patrols probing out of Namchonjom had found little opposition and the three prongs of the advance were
jockeying to take the lead when heavy rain bogged the roads and slowed down the wild rush. On the right flank of the 1st US Cavalry Division front, meanwhile, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade moved northeast from Kaesong on 12 October towards Yonghung-ni and Yuga-dong, with the Middlesex Battalion in the lead.

There was no room on the narrow roads and the tracks for the Commonwealth Brigade transport so progress was slow.

The Australian Battalion had the support of four Sherman tanks and a battery from the 13th US Field Artillery Battalion. On 13 October, C and D Companies patrolled the minor tracks on the axis of advance and picked up three North Korean stragglers. Two members of the mortar platoon were slightly wounded when a North Korean threw a grenade into the mortar area. The North Korean was shot. Meanwhile, the 7th US Cavalry had taken Kumchon without opposition and 27th Commonwealth Brigade rapidly covered 6.4 kilometers by US Army transport to establish itself 5 kilometers north of Kumchon. There, the British Brigade camouflaged for a more active role.

On 17 October, one company of the Argylls Battalion opened the road into Sariwon. The advance began at 0640 hours, the troops mounted on tanks and lorries with more than 48 kilometers to cover. Despite delaying action by the enemy the Argylls ran into no real opposition until they were 6.4 kilometers out of Sariwon.

B Company of the Argylls established a battalion strongpoint in Sariwon, while C Company fanned out to the northern suburbs. The Australian Battalion had advanced through Sariwon about 13 kilometers before dark and then took up positions on the northern outskirts. As darkness fell, they soon discovered that the North Koreans were not all north of Sariwon. The enemy were still not aware that United Nations forces had occupied the town and all that night they kept arriving from the south and the west, staging in to Pyongyang.

Before long, the Australians found they had to fight at both ends of the battalion positions, with their reserve company facing back the way they had come.

In the town itself there was equal confusion. Pushed on the left flank by the 24th US Division the enemy began to arrive in Sariwon by the lorry load. That night, when a reconnaissance party of Argylls, led by Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Neilson, went out along the road leading southwest from Sariwon, they found themselves driving between two enemy columns, totalling about 2,000 troops, going in the opposite direction on each side of the road. The enemy remnants were falling back on Sariwon. The Argylls quickly step-
ped on and cleared the column without molestation and then took to the bush, spending the night in a ditch. The North Korean Communists attempted to escape along the northern road and there ran into the Australian troops.

At the time, Warrant Officer W. A. M. Ryan and six guides happened to be there, awaiting the arrival of the ration vehicles in an apple orchard, when the enemy column came up the road from their rear. Missing no time, one of the guides opened fire and at the same moment the enemy column dispersed, taking up fire positions. The Warrant Officer requested the Australian Battalion Commander for the immediate support of more troops and, he did this, although he doubted the reported situation, sending Major G. M. Thirlwell and his company to clear them out. Mounted on a tank, Major Thirlwell told the enemy troops through an interpreter they were completely surrounded and gave them two minutes to give themselves up. The North Korean Communists surrendered and the result was 1,982 prisoners plus some anti-tank guns and a host of light and heavy machine and mortars.

In addition, Lieutenant E. O. Larsen of B Company discovered a Russian-made truck trundling along in an Australian convoy. In it he found a Communist officer and twenty-five NK Communist soldiers including two female soldiers.

It was raining heavily as the 27th Commonwealth Brigade moved northward again, with the Australian Battalion leading on the morning of the 18th.

On the 19th October the ROK troops of the 1st and 7th Divisions entered Pyongyang without much opposition and the advance to the north continued without pause. The Australians covered 122 kilometers in two days until rain slowed down progress.

At one point enemy opened fire on A Company from the shelter of a village without causing casualties. Sherman tanks battered the village and A Company cleared the area without any trouble. Enemy casualties were five killed and three prisoners. After the rain began a North Korean-manned Russian T-34 tank, well camouflaged with straw, opened fire on D Company and there was a brief tank battle in which the Australian-controlled Shermans knocked out the enemy. Close to the destroyed T-34 the Australians found another, that was unmanned, and a SU-76 self-propelled gun. Neither of the enemy tanks had any petrol.

Deep into the North

By now, the entire forces of the North Korean Communists were completely demoralized, fleeing towards the northern border of the peninsula in
complete disarray.

After being placed under the operational control of the 24th US Division, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade resumed the offensive further north, and on 21 October it crossed the Taedong River. The immediate objective was to link at Yongyu with the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team which had been operating in the Sukchon-Sunchon area after it had dropped there on 20 October. The Airborne RCT was to seal off the North Korean escape route and to destroy them. The airborne maneuver apparently caught the enemy by surprise but the paratroopers soon ran into trouble. The British Argylls made contact with them at the south of Yongyu, and furious fighting began at about 2230 hours on 21 October between the paratroopers and the NK troops lasting throughout the night.

The Brigade Headquarters informed the Australians that the American paratroops were about one and a half kilometers north of the 3rd Battalion’s positions which were under fire from an apple orchard north of Yongyu. The enemy-held high ground lay between the advancing Australians and the Americans. Under covering fire from the Sherman tanks Captain A. P. Dennis led C Company into the attack. Jumping from their tanks the Australians charged up through the dusty apple orchard, with No. 9 Platoon responsible for protecting the flank. The Australian bayonet charge was too much for the North Koreans who abandoned their fire positions and fled, suffering heavy casualties from C Company fire and the tanks. Meanwhile, D Company had cleared out a number of the enemy from near the tactical headquarters and sent a platoon forward to contact the Americans, who had been under attack since first light on the 22nd and who had suffered casualties. Caught from both directions between the attacking Australians and Americans, the North Koreans attempted to escape by fleeing across open paddy field, where they ran into heavy tank and rifle fire from D Company. The enemy casualties were about 150 killed and 231 captured. The Australians lost seven wounded.

The advance continued and on 23 October the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was set the task of securing a bridgehead across the Chongchon River at Sinanju and capturing Pakchon and Chongju, on the main routes from Pyongyang to the Manchurian border. Just south of Pakchon the Chongchon River divided into two estuaries with an island of solid ground between them. The bridges over both of these estuaries had been blown and a reconnaissance party from the Argyll Battalion crew fire from machine guns and light artillery located on the further bank. The brigade called up an air strike which effectively disposed of this opposition. Meanwhile, the Middlesex were in the lead and crossed the river in assault boats without being troubled by the
enemy, although the strong tidal currents swept the boats from their course so that they arrived one and a half kilometers downstream from the point selected to land. Consequently, the Australians crossed the river at the Anju ford further upstream and dug in 5 kilometers northwest of Anju to wait for the tanks which had to go still further upstream. The American engineers immediately went into action to build a bridge, and had a pontoon crossing ready within forty eight hours. (See Sketch Map 1.)

Meanwhile, B Company of the Australian Battalion had continued the advance and by late afternoon was just south of Pakchon, where the main road to the Manchurian border turns west across the Taenyong River. Here the Australians, faced by stiff opposition, fought the Battle of the Broken Bridge and gained a bridgehead. The B Company troops crossed the river by climbing along the broken span of a partially demolished concrete main road bridge. When the Australians reached the west bank a group of about fifty enemy troops came down from the high ground on the right with their hands raised in surrender.

As they neared No. 4 Platoon, B Company enemy still hidden on the
high ground opened up with heavy but inaccurate fire. A "Mosquito" artillery spotter aircraft reported that there were at least two enemy companies on the high ground overlooking the crossing, so Lieutenant A. L. Morrison, No. 4 Platoon Leader withdrew his men back across the river with ten prisoners.

Behind a barrage from F-80's (Shooting Star jets), artillery and mortar fire, D Company (led by Major W. F. Brown) cleared Pakchon by 1800 hours, returning with 225 prisoners, and leaving a platoon to form a bridgehead guarding the American engineers busy constructing a ford. Away to the left a Communist machine gun chattered fitfully, and there were still strong concentrations of the enemy on the west side of the river crossing with only a platoon from D Company to hold the bridgehead. The Australians had to secure the bridgehead safely for the main crossing.

It was dusk and a rising moon hung like a huge pale lamp low above the horizon. A sub-zero wind blew out of Manchuria, 108 kilometers away, and moaned around the pylons of the broken bridge, bitter reminder that the winter was near and that Australians still wore their temperate-climate
uniform, slouch hats included, plus American-issue winter jackets. But A
and B Companies found it warm enough once they had crossed the river and
spread along the ridges near the power pylons, where they dug in after a
slight withdrawal of forward patrols to avoid encirclement. Things quietened
down then, the enemy apparently under the impression that the Australians
had pulled out, whereas actually they were settling in. When they discoveryed
their mistake, the North Korean Communist kept up harassing fire, which
caused the loss of two killed and three wounded. The two forward
companies, reinforced by a C Company platoon, were dug in on each side of
the road leading down to the river crossing.

At 0400 hours, the next morning, a T-34 tank, followed by two Russian
type jeeps, a motorcycle and about six North Korean infantrymen, came
down the road towards the bridge, apparently with the intention of reoccupy-
ing the ridges overlooking the river crossing. A Company allowed the
enemy convoy to ride well into the trap and then opened up with everything
they had -- mortars. Brens, Owens, rifles and forcing the NK troops to scatter
and abandon their vehicles. Among the enemy dead was a North Korean
senior tank colonel with a number of marked maps and instructions. However,
before morning, another T-34 tank came down the road and reached within
ten meters of B Company command post.

From then on the enemy tank fired at random for the remainder of the
night. But the Australians could not attack as they would have given their
positions away to the supporting infantry. One of the men attempted to
engage the tank with a bazooka but, just as it was about to move off, the
bazooka misfired and the tank was out of range before he could reload.

Chongju and Vicinity

As the weather became clear 27 October saw the US Shooting Stars
arrived and rained a hail of rockets, bullets and napalm on the Communist
positions, while C and D Companies crossed the river, but the battle
was not won until noon. Meanwhile, the Argylls crossed higher up on tanks
and established a second bridgehead against slight opposition. By nightfall
the Australian and Argyll Battalions had linked up, increased their bridgeheads
in depth and made a safe crossing for the rest of the bridge. The battle cost
the Australians eight killed and twenty-two wounded. Next day, on 28 Octo-
ber, the Middlesex Battalion continued the advance and had to fight a sharp
battle in the hill west of the Taenyong, where supporting aircraft destroyed
ten T-34 tanks and three self-propelling guns.
Back at the United Nations Command, in the meantime, the announcements indicated that the war was virtually near to an end. At the spearhead of the west coast drive, however, stiffening opposition indicated that the enemy still had some forces to resist.

Chongju, near the west coast and 64 kilometers from the Manchurian border, was the next objective of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade to take. On 29 October, through a road winding over wild pine-covered mountains, the Australian Battalion with the Argylls spearheaded the west coast advance. The Argylls, on tanks, were in the van, but struck no trouble. Then, about 6 kilometers from Chongju, the Australians passed through the Argylls and took the lead. The axis of advance lay in a mountainpass, where the Australians encountered very heavy opposition. Here a "Mosquito" aircraft spotter reported sighting at least four tanks on a northsouth ridge dominating the road, plus strong concentrations of the enemy infantry.

The "Mosquito" directed eight American air strikes, which blasted the enemy positions with napalm and rockets, while the Australian support tanks hurled high explosive shells into the North Koreans. Lieutenant Colonel Green, the Battalion Commander, then ordered D Company (under Major W. F. Brown), to attack with tank support. The North Koreans were still active and one Sherman tank was hit by an armour-piercing shell through the turret. After two hours fighting D Company had secured the ridge at 1630 hours while A Company under Captain W. J. Chitts, who had succeeded Major R. A. Gordon two days before, by 1730 had secured a stiffly-defended ridge north of the road. At nightfall, D Company was dug in on a paddy field to the left of the road, with A Company on a pine-covered slope to the right. B Company was in the center astride the road and C Company in reserve just forward of battalion command post. The North Koreans had brought up reinforcements and kept up a harassing fire, although they had lost many tanks and several self-propelled guns. At nightfall, from 2000 hours until nearly midnight, the North Korean Communists made desperate attempts to push back the Australians. This determined counterattack had tank support while a selfpropelled gun dropped armour-piercing shells up and down the roadway. The initial push came against a forward D Company platoon led by Lieutenant D. J. Mannett. A two platoon assault cleared the road and paddy fields and saved the situation on the left. However, some North Koreans had infiltrated the front and got behind D Company, cutting it off from the battalion command post, which was already under fire.

Beaten back from their attempt to annihilate D Company, the North Koreans made a storming rush against A Company, dug in among the pine trees on the rising of the road. T-34 tanks hurled shells into the Australian
positions and the enemy were so close that defensive artillery and mortar fire fell only ten meters or so in front of the forward A Company platoons. Again the enemy failed to dislodge the Australians from their positions covering the disputed road. After this attempt the enemy retreated but kept up intermittent fire throughout the rest of the night.

During the hastily organized attack by A Company on the right of the road, Private L. A. Simpson, of No. 3 Platoon, destroyed two T-34 tanks by bazooka rockets, while the bazooka team of the platoon accounted for another. Private Jack Stafford, a D Company Bren gunner, wormed his way within 20 meters of a camouflaged T-34 and set fire to its outside auxiliary patrol tanks with a well-placed burst. The fire ignited ammunition and the tank exploded.

At daylight the Australians were still in their positions, and when they started to enter Chongju it was soon obvious that organized resistance had ceased. During the morning the battalion killed ten North Koreans and took ten prisoners, but these were all stragglers and that afternoon the Argylls cleared the ruined and burning town without further opposition. During the same night, by the sheerest mischance, the Australians lost their Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Green. At dusk, while the battalion was resting after the hard fought battle for Chongju, six high velocity shells landed in the command post area. Headquarters was sited on the sheltered side of a hill and most of the shells exploded harmlessly on the outer slope, but the sixth cleared the crest, hit a tree and exploded outside the CP tent. The Colonel was asleep on his stretcher at the time, but about forty men were moving about the area and Jack Reyman, his batman, was in the tent. A shell fragment badly wounded Colonel Green, although all the others escaped without a scratch. He was still conscious when taken on a stretcher by jeep to a surgical hospital at Anju but he died of his wounds two days later and was succeeded in command by Lieutenant Colonel I. B. Ferguson. In all, the battle and its aftermath cost the Australians nine men killed and thirty wounded.

After the capture of Chongju, General Hobart Gay, Commander of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division, to which the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was attached, signalled Brigadier Coad: "Congratulations on your splendid and sensational drive into enemy territory. I send my sincerest congratulations and commendations to the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, who marched almost 50 kilometers in twelve hours to deal the enemy this disastrous blow."

Chongju, being within 64 kilometers of the border, marked the limit of the advance, so far as the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was concerned, and the nearest Australians ever got to the Yalu River and Manchurian border.
On 30 October 1950, the day the Argylls units entered the town, the 24th US Division took over to lead the advance, and the brigade went into reserve for a time being. It was then ordered to move to the Taechon and Pakchon areas. The men were tired, having been on the move or in action since they crossed the 38th Parallel twenty-two days before.

Section 2. The Red Chinese Invasion
(1 - 28 November 1950)

The First Encounter with CCF

By the end of October 1950 the North Korean Communist forces had already been destroyed to such an extent that it no longer possessed a combat power. Among all the ROK and UN allies, the first unit to reach the northern border was the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 6th ROK Division, which occupied Chosan on the Yalu River on 26 October. Thus, it appeared, the end of the war was almost in sight.

The optimism was, however, short-lived, because of the fact that the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) were concentrating along the Manchurian border in preparation for an attack on Korea.

The United Nations Command, on the other hand, had known for some time that the Red Chinese were south of the Manchurian border. However, the UNC intelligence reported that they were there merely to hold off any threat to the Yalu dams and power installations. The intelligence reports also showed that the 40th CCF Army had crossed the Yalu River as early as mid-October to protect the hydroelectrical plants in North Korea vital to Manchuria.

At Wake Island, meanwhile, on 15 October General MacArthur had reassured U.S. President Truman that he believed there was a little chance that the Russians or the Red Chinese would give their assistance to the North Korean Communists by committing armed forces actively.

In the meantime, among the papers the Australians found on 25 October on the body of the NK Communist Colonel at the Battle of the Broken Bridge, there was a combat diary with the significant entry, dated 25 October: “From yesterday the enemy's air attacks have increased. It seems they are supporting the ground troops who will probably cross the river and advance. We are in a bad position. The time for overall counterplans is here with us now. A new culture propaganda plan was established to
change the tide of battle from defense to attack ..."

At Pakchon, the evening the Commonwealth Brigade arrived, Brigadier Coad learned something of what the Communist "overall counterplan" was. "The Chinese Communist forces are in," said higher command when he reported to. Although many intelligence sources had warned that something was in the offing, indicating extensive troop movement along side of the Yalu River, by late October, the UN forces still believed that this development, as it turned out, was not the beginning of a major Communist Chinese offensive.

On 31 October the Middlesex Battalion moved to Taechon, about 67 kilometers northeast of Chongju while the rest of the Commonwealth Brigade, including the Australians, moved back to Pakchon two days later.

In the meantime, on 26 October, the day the 7th ROK Infantry Regiment seized Chosan, a border town on the Yalu, its brother regiment of the 2nd Infantry ran into a CCF roadblock in the area northeast of Wonsan.

On the night of 1 November, the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments of the 1st US Cavalry Division, to which the Commonwealth Brigade was now attached, were heavily attacked by the Chinese Communist forces. From then on a series of reports identifying the Red Chinese came flowing in from a wide variety of sources.

So far as the Australian and British troops were concerned at this stage, they were spread over an area of 400 square miles around Taechon, southwest of Unsan, where the US Cavalry troops were savagely fighting their way out from the CCF trap. After two days at Taechon, during which the 1st US Cavalry Division completed its withdrawal, the Argylls and Middlesex were ordered on 3 November back to Pakchon under cover of the Australian Battalion. D Company of the Battalion secured the important crossroad at Kasan to cover the British move. The Chinese Communists entered Taechon in force less than an hour after the Argylls withdrew, having successfully protected the flank of the 1st US Cavalry Division's withdrawal further east.

The Commonwealth Brigade was now concentrated at Pakchon and was to cover the north-western corner of a perimeter guarding the Taenyong (Broken Bridge) River crossing and the Chongchon River crossing further south at Sinanju and Anju. Here, the Australian and Middlesex Battalions held the defensive positions in and around the town of Pakchon itself, while two companies of the Argyll Battalion formed a bridgehead around the far side of the "Broken Bridge" over the Taenyong River, with one company in the river side. To the right of the Commonwealth Brigade, the 24th US Infantry Division extended the perimeter to cover the Anju crossing over the Chong-
Pakchon and Vicinity

On 4 November, elements of the 40th CCF Army launched a determined attack against the 19th Infantry of the 24th US Division, on the east of the Commonwealth forces, and forced it to fall back eastward across the Kuryong and Chongchon River to the friendly positions. During the night an enemy force made a further penetration in the 19th US Infantry zone, but the lost position was restored on the following, 5 November, by a counterattack of the 21st US Infantry also under the 24th US Division.

There was an eight-kilometer gap between the 27th Commonwealth Brigade position and the left flank of the 19th US Infantry Regiment, and over and through the large mountain mass there the enemy forces could breakthrough at will to the flank and rear of the Commonwealth forces. Nevertheless, the main threat to the Pakchon-Sinanju road where the Australians were in position, did not come until the morning of 5 November.

A battery of the 161st US Field Artillery took the first impact, about six and a half kilometers south of Pakchon. A Company of the Argylls moved to the relief of the US battery, encountering stiff opposition. The threat was coming from the northeast and not from the Pakchon side of the river, which the Australians had won ten days ago. The river crossing-point was under enemy fire and the Argylls had to scramble across in single file, which took several hours and cost a number of wounded. When the Argylls reached the US battery positions they found the Americans out of shells and saw dead Red Chinese heaped in within thirty meters of the artillery muzzles. Supported by four tanks and heavy weapons, the Argylls attempted to clear the enemy-held hill so as to keep the road open, but a CCF counterattack forced them to withdraw. The Australian troops, who were still in position west of Pakchon, then deployed across the Taenyong River and prepared to regain the Argylls' lost position and break the road block. At the time, the Australian Mustangs from No. 77 Air Squadron prepared the way by "softening up" the ridge before the Australian Battalion launched a full-scale battalion attack with A and B Companies left and right forward respectively. Focal point of the road block was a hill about 150 feet high which had a clear field of fire across about 500 meters of open paddy field. After an hour-long bitter fighting with heavy casualties the two forward companies captured the hill and D Company followed up to reinforce them. Lieutenant E. O. Larsen, a platoon leader of B Company, was killed in this action.
Later the enemy launched heavy counterattacks and began to mortar and machine gun fire upon C Company and the Battalion Command Post. At about 0800 hours the three companies of A, B and D were ordered to withdraw back to the road. A Company had to fight its way down the ridge and suffered casualties. Battalion headquarters elements, C Company and a company of tanks also withdrew south about 1,500 meters. Under Brigade orders D Company immediately reoccupied the hill without opposition and the whole battalion spent a quiet night except for intermittent fire and the sound of Red Chinese bugles and whistles. The day's battle, the Australian's first encounter with the Red Chinese, cost the Australian Battalion 12 killed and 64 wounded.

In comparison, the enemy had suffered very heavily and the enemy dead included both North Korean and Chinese Communists. Finally, the enemy broke contact on the following morning and retreated three to four kilometers.

In this vital battle Australian Air Force Squadron Mustangs gave close support to British and Australian troops for the first time.

On 6 November the Australians were still astride the main southward-running road with D Company in position on the former enemy stronghold. They spent most of the day engaged in digging deep weapon pits in the hard ground. On 6 November, still holding the road, Lieutenant Colonel I.B. Ferguson, the Battalion Commander, sent out a clearing patrol that killed seven of the enemy and followed up with an unopposed C Company advance to a high bare hill overlooking the road 2,500 meters northeast of D Company's position. As C Company reached the top they could see the enemy withdrawing northwards up a valley over paddy fields.

During the next few days the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, including the Australians, extended out patrols well north and east of the main road, capturing many Red Chinese stragglers but making no serious contact with the enemy. By now it was apparent that the British and Australian troops had stopped the Chinese break-through and kept open the vital routes south across the Chongchon River. Some of the enemy, estimated as an attacking total of 10,000 frontline troops got through south towards Sinanju but they failed to cut the road or envelop the river crossing.

Meanwhile, General Walker the Eighth US Army Commander, had rushed up reinforcements to bolster the Chongchon Line, which held, and the Red Chinese faded away into the hills as suddenly and as dramatically as they had appeared. The UN forces were now ready to resume the offensive to push the Reds back to the Yalu.

For three weeks after 5 November the 27th Commonwealth Brigade inched slowly forward from the Chongchon River line. Patrols tested each
A patrol from B Company, 3rd Battalion, returns to its lines on the ridges in the Uijongbu area, December 1950.

yard of the way, companies made certain of one position before moving on to the next; still there was no visible reaction from the Red Chinese. The Australians met no opposition at all until after 18 November when they dispersed scattered groups of North Koreans and small enemy patrols. In each case the enemy casualties were North Koreans.

Meantime the 29th British Brigade, Brigadier Tom Brodie in command, had arrived in Korea. It consisted of the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Gloucesters, the Royal Ulster Rifles (infantry), the 8th Hussars (armoured cavalry), the 45th Field Regiment (artillery) and the 55th Squadron (engineers). The Hussars had the new 52-ton Centurion tanks.

On 14 November bitter cold howled in from Siberia, and the temperature dropped below zero in a deep freeze, foretaste of winter to come. At Pakchon, where the Australians were still in their positions, the great brown Taenyong River began to grip the crumbled columns of "Broken Bridge" in a glittering frosted slab of ice.

By now the knowledge was general all along the line that a UN offen-
sive was imminent. The Australian troops, patrolling in company strength, reached out to a depth of 16 kilometers. There were many sharp skirmishes with Communist Chinese and North Koreans but probing UN infantry and tanks did not come up against anything resembling a connected enemy line. By now, besides 29th British Brigade, Turkish, Belgian, Thailand and Philippine troops had joined the UN forces. For its part, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was still in reserve. The Australians, with fifty-four days continuously in the line, had suffered the heaviest casualties in the Commonwealth Brigade.

End-the-War Offensive

On the morning of 24 November 1950, General MacArthur launched his promised "end-the-war offensive," by employing three corps abreast, left to right the I US Corps, IX US Corps and II ROK Corps under the command of General Walker, the EUSAK Commander, with massive airpower in support to push Reds back into Manchuria.

The 24th US and 1st ROK Divisions, together with the 27th Commonwealth Brigade in corps reserve, were formed Major General F. Milburn's I US Corps, on the left flank of the general offensive. Its way lay up the west coast across the Chongchon and Taenyong Rivers and along the Pakchon—Kasan—Chongju road where the Australian Battalion with the British troops had earned their rest by holding open the routes after the 1st US Cavalry Division disaster at Unsan.

The IX US Corps, consisted of the 25th and the 2nd US Infantry Divisions, with the Turkish Brigade in reserve, took the center, while on the right flank, centered near Tokchon, was the II ROK Corps, consisting of the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions with the 6th ROK Division in corps reserve. In general reserve behind the whole advance were the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 187th Airborne RCT, the 29th Brigade, the Belgian, ThaiLand and Philippine battalions. Further back still, the 5th, 9th and 11th ROK Divisions were mopping up by-passed North Korean forces along the 38th Parallel as well as in the mountain areas far in the south.

As the UN allied forces advanced forward they met little opposition during the first few days, but this situation was very short-lived. On Sunday, 26 November, Brigadier Coad learned that a Red Chinese counteroffensive had developed 64 kilometers east of the Pakchon—Sinanju river crossing, smashed the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions of the II ROK Corps on the right flank and threatened the 25th and 2nd US Infantry Divisions in the center.
The Red Chinese object was soon clear. The main weight of their offensive had broken through in the Tokchon area, and they were now swinging west to cut all roads leading south from the Chongchon River line into Pyongyang. If they succeeded the UN ground forces would be trapped, cut off from the south, jammed in narrow, overcrowded valleys between the central mountains and the Yellow Sea. Immediate objective of the CCF drive was the Kunu-ri-Sunchon-Pyongyang road.

Philosophically, on 27 November the Australian packed up and took the road into action again the next day. Together with the British troops, it crossed the Chongchon at Sinanju, moved by motor transport southeast to Chasan and then east-northeast towards Kunu-ri, where they met the Turkish Brigade troops for the first time.

At Kunu-ri the Australian Battalion came under the IX US Corps, and from there the Australians, the Argylls and the Middlesex, on 30 November, were falling back on Sunchon, which was threatened by the Red Chinese breakthrough. The troops marched in double file, one on each side of their loaded transport vehicles. The Argylls led off and the Australians came next, with a piper to each company lent by the Argylls, followed by the Middlesex.

With the Chinese Communist invaders pressing at their heels and impeded by thousands of refugees in the narrow valleys, the Australians were obeying their orders and moving back from the Chongchon. Inside the perimeter which the Australians, the Turks and the 1st US Cavalry Division guarded, the Allied forces were regrouping to meet the new circumstance.

For the purposes of accuracy and history it should be added that all the Australians did not march on foot all the way. The battalion had to provide its own transport so A echelon stores were off-loaded to provide troop-carrying vehicles. B and C Companies began marching while transport moved Headquarters, Support, A and C Companies to Chasan. Due to the congestion of traffic the 56-kilometer trip took six hours. On arrival, the trucks were turned around and went back to pick up, in relays, B and D Companies and troops of the Argyll and Middlesex Battalions. The whole process took from two o'clock in the afternoon to two o'clock next morning. A echelon stores were last to be lifted from Kunu-ri and a few hours later the area was in enemy hands.

After the Turks, the Australians and the British had moved back on Sunchon and Chasan on 30 November the 2nd US Division raced down from Kunu-ri to join them. The Middlesex were sent back north to help. They found every ridge and peak occupied by the enemy. Their orders were to link up with the 2nd US Division if they could do so without being cut off and to retire when the US Division could take over for themselves. In the
long run, the American columns got through.

By the first week in December 1950, all the ROK and UN forces were in a general withdrawal from North Korea due to the unexpected full-scale invasion mounted by the Chinese Communist forces. The allied air strikes proved insufficient to stem the tide. That was not fault of the air forces. The Red Chinese mostly hid by day, attacked by night, and the main bases for flow of the CCF forces and supplies were from across the Yalu River which were sacrosanct in the Korean War.

Lightly-equipped foe came together in hard fists of human waves under cover of darkness, struck sharply and then drew back to disperse, in the light, from the searching aircraft. The repeated blows hit where it hurt and forced the UN forces back towards the 38th Parallel. An entirely new phase of the war had opened.

Section 3. Southward Action
(December 1950 - January 1951)

The First Winter

At the beginning of December, the Australians and Middlesex were in and around Chasan, eight kilometers south of Sunchon, with the Argylls near by, just south of Unsan. The whole brigade was now under the operational control of the 1st US Cavalry Division and still out on the eastern flank of the United Nations withdrawal.

On 2 December, the Australians moved about 16 kilometers south to defend a bridge American engineers were building across the upper Taedong River at Yopa-ri. Lower down, the Taedong flowed through Pyongyang to the Western Sea. The new bridge was intended as an withdrawal route for elements of the Argylls and the 1st US Cavalry Division who were themselves heavily engaged with the enemy to the north, but, no sooner had the Australians passed down the road from Unsan to Yopa-ri, than the Red Chinese cut in behind them and forced the American Cavalry Division units to move westward from Unsan to the already overcrowded main Sunchon-Chasan-Pyongyang route southward. Initially, only the Australians held this vital river crossing, but they were joined later by the Middlesex and later still by the Argylls.

When the Australians arrived at Yopa-ri the Chinese Communists were already causing casualties among the American bridge-builders. About 1,000
of the enemy were located on and around a hill, about 3,000 meters from the bridge. Aerial reports said that 5,000 more Chinese were coming up to support the threatened attack. Behind a terrific barrage of artillery and mortar fire A Company of the Australian Battalion launched an attack against the hill and soon dispersed the badly-shaken enemy. Heavy snow began to fall as the Australians dug in on the lower slopes of the hills protecting the river crossing. A, B and D Companies and the anti-tank platoon remained east of the partially-frozen river. Probing patrols contacted the enemy but by nightfall there had been no counter-attack. About 2030 hours, the Red Chinese began to assemble for a night assault backed by harassing mortar fire. However, American mortars and heavy artillery put down such terrific counter-fire that the threatened attack did not develop.

During the night there was a heavy snow fall which, towards morning, began to freeze. The Australian withdrawal across the river began between 0300 and 0400 hours. The anti-tank platoon had trouble pulling out their snowed-in guns and were the last elements of the battalion to withdraw from the position. It took two prime movers to evacuate each anti-tank gun.

The withdrawal from Yop-ri to Hayu-ri, a twelve-hour march of 150 kilometers, lives in the memory of many 3rd Australian Battalion men as their worst day in Korea. Next day, 3 December, the Australians withdrew another 32 kilometers to Singye. A, B and D Companies had to march half the way. At Singye the 27th Commonwealth Brigade came under the direct control of the IX US Corps instead of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

In the meantime, the 29th British Brigade which disembarked at Pusan between the 3rd and 18th November 1950, had struggled northwards, under the command of Brigadier T. Brodie, against a rising tide of southward-flowing transport unit, they reached Pyongyang on the 29th the same month. This brigade then was in the outskirts of Pyongyang as a covering force for the withdrawal of the ROK and UN forces. Here, on 3 December, the Australian Battalion, and two British Brigades greeted each other.

Incidentally, about this time, two Australian destroyers, Warramunga and Bataan, helped evacuate 8,000 U.N. wounded at Chinnampo, the port of Pyongyang.

Ground operations at this stage centered around Pyongyang on the west, while other ROK and US forces on the east were moving back towards the Ports of Hungnam and Songjin for seaborne withdrawal.

The UN allies, continued their retrograde movement, thus abandoning Pyongyang on 4 December. The Australian Battalion, together with the 27th Brigade, also continued its withdrawal from Pyongyang for approximately another 150 kilometers to just north of Uijongbu, about 24 kilometers due north of Seoul.
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During the course, the Australians dug in and sent out patrols at every halting place, both up and down the main supply route and out on the flanks, not because that the Red Chinese were pressing. After the initial breakthrough the Red Chinese had paused to reorganize. However, the danger, the further south the Allies withdraw, was more from the active North Korean Communist guerrilla bands than from Chinese forces. They were remnants or by passed forces of the North Korean armies.

Meanwhile, at Uijongbu, the Australian Battalion continued to send out patrols and lost one man killed and one wounded in clashes with the Communist guerrillas. At this stage, the Australian Battalion was in reserve to the IX US Corps with the Commonwealth Brigade.

By mid-December 1950, the United Nations line ran generally along the 38th Parallel, and as the Red Chinese caught up with the UN withdrawal, the Australian Battalion found itself once again in the battle zone. However, no contact with the enemy was made and a quiet period continued until the year’s end.

During the period, as December passed, the 27th Brigade found itself alongside the 29th Brigade and several US units forming a rear security stretched across the northern approaches to Seoul, capital of Korea.

On 23 December, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade paraded for General Walton Walker, the Eighth US Army Commander, to present the Argylls and the Middlesex with a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for their part in the defense of the Naktong River line. Most unfortunately, however, the General was killed in a traffic accident on his way up to Uijongbu. The jeep he was in collided with a vehicle which turned abruptly out of a transport column as he passed on one of the high narrow bunds crossing frozen paddy fields. Similar accidents were fairly common on these inadequate roads, as the litter of wrecked motor vehicles at the foot of the bunds testified. A few days later, Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway took command of the Eighth US Army (EUSAK) to which the X US Corps was also assigned at the same time, ending the peculiar set-up under which the eastern and western sectors were independent commands in the fields under the general direction of the United Nations Command.

Uijongbu and Tokchong Action

Meanwhile, it was expected that the enemy would launch a new offensive on or about the New Year, and preparations had been made for further withdrawal through Seoul. In Seoul, the columns of refugees had already
began to drift southward at the first rumble of the guns along the Imjin River.

The expected enemy attack began on New Year’s Eve. That evening, as the Australians were celebrating with a New Year’s party, the enemy gunfire began increasing all along the front. At 0630 hours on the first day of the New Year came orders from the IX Corps Headquarters for the 27th Commonwealth Brigade to move about ten kilometers north to help cover the main withdrawal routes from the north and also to act as rearguard to the 6th ROK Division.

The Australian Battalion went the furthest forward to Tokchong, 10 kilometers north of Uijongbu, and struck the most trouble. In due course the ROK division passed through and almost immediately the Australians discovered that the road behind them, linking them with the rest of the brigade, had been cut by a party of the enemy who had come in from a flank. The road was soon cleared, however, and they withdrew and passed through the Middlesex and Argylls. The whole brigade was ordered to withdraw to Seoul.

By nightfall as the Australian vehicles moved down the road back towards Seoul they ran into road block enfiladed by the enemy machine gun and rifle fire. They had successfully infiltrated behind the UN line. Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, the Battalion Commander, had been attending a conference with the Brigade Commander and was cut off well south of his now isolated companies. He conducted the breakthrough operation over a field radio telephone five kilometers from the scene of action. The first sign of trouble occurred when the company commanders, moving to rendezvous with the battalion commander, ran into fire from either side of the road. All vehicles got through except one, the support company commander's jeep, which had a tire burst by the enemy machine gun fire and toppled into the roadside ditch. The driver was wounded.

The battalion, coming behind, dismounted from their transports and, under the direction of Lieutenant A. G. Keys, A and C Companies fanned out and cleared the flank, killing seven of the enemy and capturing a light machine gun. C Company lost three wounded and A Company one wounded. The next day, the Commonwealth Brigade reassembled in Seoul. The Argylls took over the close protection of the main river bridges leading out of the city over the Han River while the Australians and the rest of the brigade manned the town perimeter and sent out company strength patrols. The 29th British Brigade Group were dug in further north, between the Imjin and the Han.

On 3 January, the Australians and the Middlesex were assigned defen-
sive positions on the Uijongbu-Seoul road to cover the withdrawal of the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments of the 24th US Division. The Australians had the right forward position astride the road leading to Uijongbu, with the supporting tanks and artillery from the US units. By 2200 hours all retiring elements of the UN troops had passed through safely, and by 2300 hours D Company was engaged with the forward patrols of the advancing enemy. Throughout the night D Company, the American tanks and supporting artillery kept up defensive and harassing fire and, at 0600 hours next morning, the Australians began “thinning out” back towards Seoul. As the last company (C Company) withdrew the enemy followed up and when the last Australian elements had mounted their trucks they could see the Red Chinese occupying the positions they had just evacuated. At 0830 the Commonwealth Brigade withdrew from Seoul. The Australians were the last to cross the railway bridge before US Army engineers demolished it. On the 4th, Seoul was abandoned once again.

Whereupon the UN forces flowed south, outpacing the Chinese Communist forces. The southward retirement was carried out without any incidents to record. The 27th Brigade moved back to Suwon, then to further south about 32 kilometers below Changhown and then north again to Changhown, approximately 72 kilometers southeast of Seoul, arriving on 6 January 1951. Taking new defensive positions about twelve kilometers west of the town and dug in along the frostbite ridge, where the Australian troops spent the next month of that freezing winter.

Section 4. Counteroffensive Again
(15 January - 22 April 1951)

The Probing Offensive

After the fall of Seoul, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) halted their offensive. Their advanced units probed down to Suwon, 27 kilometers south of the Capital City, but the bulk of the enemy forces remained north and east of the Han River which, after passing eastward through Seoul, turns southeast and forms a boundary between the western coastlands and the central and eastern mountains. The most critical situation was remained in the area of Wonju, on the far side of the Han River, a vital railway and land communication center for all directions.

By mid-January, 1951, however, the withdrawal of the UN forces had
reached its limits, and the frontline now ran more or less along the 37th Parallel.

In the meantime, on 22 January, the 16th Field Artillery Regiment of the New Zealand Army, who arrived at Pusan on 31 December the preceding year, joined the 27th Commonwealth Brigade at Changhowon.

By the end of January the strong UN reconnaissance forces had advanced in a limited offensive through a series of consolidated phase lines inside the elbow of the Han River. Early in February probing American tank units were able to shell the outskirts of Seoul without noticeable resistance.

Headquarters of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was now located in the Changhowon area at Haengshim-chon, eleven kilometers west of Changhowon itself. In the frontline the Australians had the left forward position with the Argylls right forward and the 6th ROK Division on the right flank of the brigade. The battalion spent twenty-eight horrible days in this area, covering a front of 3,500 meters with five companies including one company of the Middlesex attached with.

It was the bitterest and most nerve-racking period of the Korean War, so far as the Australian Battalion was concerned. The static role, combined with the large front to be covered and the heavy patrol action to be maintained, brought greater strain on all ranks than at any other time during the mobile warfare. The weather was bitterly cold, with temperatures well below freezing. The Australians, many of whom had never seen snow before, were taking the sub-zero temperatures like veterans.

Under these rugged circumstances, the Australian Battalion laid 34 kilometers of telephone line, with two relay stations for use by patrolling companies clearing Ichon. The Commander of the 6th ROK Division was so impressed by the Australian liaison patrol activities that he called at the Australian Battalion Headquarters and presented the battalion with a bullock — on the hoof. The battalion commander gave the bullock to D Company, whose men bore the brunt of this patrol action.

For the first half of January there was little evidence of enemy activity along the entire front. A and B Companies of the Australian Battalion patrolled to a depth of 6,000 meters without making contact, and without opposition the reconnaissance elements of the 24th US Infantry Division reached Yoji, on the Han River about 19 kilometers northeast of Changhowon. Northwest of Changhowon, Lieutenant J. H. Young took No. 6 Platoon, B Company, within 600 meters of Ichon without incident. The following day, 15 January, a platoon from C Company took up positions west of Ichon.

On 16 January 1951, another Australian patrol party at about 400 meters northwest of Ichon, sighted between forty and fifty of the Red Chinese
approaching in single file along the Seoul-Ichon road. Heavy mist made visibility bad and it waited until several of the enemy had passed before opening fire. Although taken by surprise, the Chinese Communists did not panic but quickly returned the Australians fire before withdrawing behind the crest of a hill. Two of the enemy managed to get behind the patrol base but were noticed in time. Estimated enemy casualties were twenty killed without loss to the Australians, who withdrew to rejoin its platoon.

During the next few days the Australian patrols systematically combed the features surrounding Ichon and Captain J. W. Callander established a C Company base northwest of Ichon in the vicinity of A Company's action area of two night before. Local villagers stated that the Red Chinese were now concentrated 5 to 6 kilometers north and northwest of Ichon. During this period No. 77 Australian Squadron Mustangs and American Shooting Stars napalmed and machine gunned enemy-occupied villages north west of Ichon. Two nights later the enemy attacked A Company’s positions, killed a lance-corporal and forced the company to retire to prepared positions about 5,000 meters south of the town. Here, the Australians ambushed a big party of advancing Red Chinese and forced them to retreat, taking their dead and wounded with them.

When A Company took over the advanced Ichon positions on 20 January, Lieutenant Angus McDonald and four men from the 1st Platoon were detailed for a reconnaissance patrol to discover the enemy strength in the foothills and villages across the wide valley north of the town.

The Australian patrol’s task was to cross the valley, discover as far as possible the enemy’s position and strength and report back by first light.

Snow lay thick on the ground when the patrol moved down the road from Ichon and out on to the valley floor just after 1800 hours on a cold, dark, winter evening. After a cautious beginning, the patrol pushed rapidly across the floor of the valley and climbed into the enemy-held hills. Just after midnight the Australians reconnoitred a village extending across a main road and found the place wired for defense, but apparently unoccupied. Air attacks had badly damaged the road. Looking back across the valley members of the patrol could see tracer above A Company’s positions at Ichon. This was the attack which caused casualties and forced the company back to the prepared positions south of Ichon. On its way back the patrol soon discovered why the northern hills were apparently deserted. The Red Chinese had crossed the valley and attacked the Australian positions.

On 22 January, forward observers from the New Zealand Artillery Regiment commanded in the field by Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Moodie, joined the Australian Battalion.
Back to the 38th Parallel

On 25 January 1951, the UN ground forces began a cautious, probing offensive within the elbow of the Han River. The objective of this limited advance, known as "the Operation Thunderbolt," was to locate and destroy the enemy south and of west of the Han by moving through a succession of phase lines. This operation was followed by a series of successive operations: Round Up on 5 February, Killer on 21 February, and Ripper on 7 March respectively.

The 27th Brigade, however, did not take part in the initial stage of the "Thunderbolt," remaining in its current positions.

On the IX US Corps front, where the Commonwealth Brigade became its operational control effective on 30 January, the 1st US Cavalry Division and the Greek Battalion were in the lead towards the Han River. Generally speaking the advance was made against only light opposition. With the spring thaw melting ice on the Han the Red Chinese were apparently reluctant to commit large numbers of troops south or west of the river. With the thaw they would have to use the fords or bridges, making themselves vulnerable to UN forces' air power. Here and there, however, the Chinese Communist forces resisted determinedly, and the Greek Battalion had a particularly stiff battle at Hill 381, northwest of Ichon.

The enemy's answer, when the comparatively few troops inside the bend of the Han had failed to stop the American advance, was to stage a diversion on the east side of the river. At first they began a southerly move from Wonju, which could have been an attempt to cut communications between the rear bases and the Suwon-Ichon-Yoju base line below Seoul. General Ridgway countered by using elements of his IX Corps, including the British Commonwealth Brigade, to move northeast from Yoju, about 15 kilometers east of Ichon. The Chinese then swung westward in an attempt to cut across this drive.

While the American "limited offensive" was in progress the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was in IX Corps reserve in and around Changhowon. The weather had turned fine and the Australians made themselves comfortable in villages near the township, washing their clothes, maintaining their weapons and vehicles. D Company, under Major R. A. Gordon, was detailed for guard duties at IX US Corps Headquarters, five kilometers behind the lines, a position which earned them the title "Palace Guards."

On 4 February the 27th Brigade moved to Yoju, an important Han River
Army Troops

crossing. The Australians and the Argylls were located in the town itself, with the Middlesex midway between Changhowon with the Brigade Headquarters at Chongan. This move was made because of a threatened Chinese Communist offensive which did not immediately materialize. The brigade dug defensive positions and jeep patrols thoroughly reconnoitered the whole area but made no contact with the enemy. A cold snap brought renewed winter conditions and more snow. The ice roads made travel dangerous and a patrolling A Company jeep skidded and overturned, injuring one occupant.

The Australians maintained regular contact patrols between Yoju and Chipyong-ni, 35 kilometers northeast of Yoju, without making serious contact with the enemy. Patrol reports from north and east of Chipyong-ni, however, proved much enemy activity. Thick ice still made the river an easy highway and attempts to crack this natural bridge with 25-pounder shells failed.

By 14 February, when the 27th Brigade was attached to the 2nd US Division, the Red Chinese concentrations developed into a serious threat to communications between Yoju and Chipyong-ni. To keep this road open and to relieve the 23rd Infantry of the 2nd US Division and the French Battalion, who then had been cut off in Chipyong-ni and whereabouts, the Middlesex took the lead in attack from Yoju to Chipyong-ni.

Meanwhile, when the British Commonwealth Brigade moved out at Yoju, the 1st US Cavalry Division went into reserve. When the news came through of the 23rd US Regiment and French Battalion caught in Chipyong-ni Colonel Crombez, the 5th US Cavalry Regiment organized a task force with the tanks in support to rescue them. With the tank elements in the lead, this force moved rapidly up the Yoju-Koksu-ri-Chipyong-ni road late in the afternoon of 15 February, well to the left of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, busy clearing the right flank. Despite heavy Red Chinese opposition with rocket launchers and mortars the tanks got through and within an hour had made contact with the 23rd US Infantry Regiment and their French allies. The task force arrived just as the Reds were launching a strong attack against the encircled units. Joining in the counterattack the friendly tanks smashed the enemy formations and forced the Red Chinese into a hastily retreat.

Along the right flank, the Australians on 15 February collected all the trouble the task force missed. With B and C Companies on the flanks the battalion soon after daybreak began to push up the eastern road to Chipyong-ni. The flanking companies found the going rough as they slithered down snow slopes and clambered up steep hills. The advance soon came under heavy fire from mortars and machine guns located on high ground west of the road. The Battalion Commander ordered B Company into the attack to
dislodge the enemy. As the company fanned out in the paddy fields leading up to the enemy-held positions machinegun bullets began to kick up the snow and mortar bombs exploded among the widely-spaced Australians, causing casualties and sending the company to cover.

The battalion called up air strikes, artillery and mortar fire support, but when A Company took up the advance from another direction enemy fire from the right, front and center was as concentrated as before. By nightfall A Company had pushed three quarters of the way up the main enemy hill position but heavy fire there pinned down the Australians on the snow-covered slopes. The Company withdrew under cover of darkness, having lost three killed and nine wounded. In the day’s battle, B Company had lost four wounded and D Company lost one wounded. During the night B Company easily dispersed an enemy patrol of about twenty Red Chinese.

Next morning, on the 16th, a rising wind drove heavy snow across the battlefront and Brigade H.Q. cancelled the attack on the high ground because of reported big enemy concentrations on the east of the main supply road. Throughout the day sporadic enemy mortar fire on the battalion area and casualties were one killed and two wounded, including Captain J. W. Callander, in command of C Company, who was on a reconnaissance patrol. Next day the Battalion occupied all the high ground without opposition. They discovered that the enemy had hastily abandoned their positions during the night, leaving food and weapons behind. The Middlesex on the left of the Australians and the Argylls on the right had also advanced and occupied hill features without opposition.

In mid-February, the 2nd PPCLI Battalion, joined the Brigade. This meant that the 27th Commonwealth Brigade could now alternately use two battalions forward and two in reserve. At Sogu-ri, 11 kilometers northeast of Yoju, the Canadians passed through the Australian Battalion, which went into Brigade reserve. Meanwhile, through a heavy snowstorm and over icy roads, the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division had moved up from Yoju to Chipyong-ni to establish a new forward line running from just north of Chipyong-ni westward to the Han, where it linked up with the American advance west of the river.

On 20 February, the IX Corps (consisting of the three US Divisions of the lst Cavalry, the 24th Infantry, the lst Marine and the 6th ROK Division and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade) was assigned the task of trapping a large force of North Koreans reported to be moving southeast of Wonju. The general advance was to be made through mountainous country, away from main roads and without vehicles. This meant the use of Korean porters and 150 were allotted to each battalion. The troops were able to move
forward with only their weapons and immediately essential gear. Once they had secured their objectives the porters brought up bedding, extra rations, ammunition and other necessities. In short, after two disastrous experiences of "barrelling" forward along main highways, the UN forces were now ready to meet the Red Chinese and North Koreans on their own terms.

The original plan was for the X Corps and IX Corps to carry out pincer attack by enveloping the enemy from west and east simultaneously, but heavy rain disrupted schedules and turned the main supply routes into churned-up bog. The Han River rose steadily, swept away crossings and made fords dangerous. At Yoju the pontoon bridge broke loose at the western end and swung downstream. Meanwhile, the Australians and Canadians, out on the right flank of the IX Corps, were meeting stiff opposition at Hill 614, east of Chipyong-ni, which held up the brigade advance four days. This 700-meter hill dominated the surrounding countryside in tortuous and rugged terrain where the snow still lay thick in sheltered hollows and the razor-backed ridges were slippery with rain.

Early on the morning of 24 February, No. 6 Platoon, B Company attempted to capture Hill 614 by a frontal assault. The ridge running up to the enemy position was so steep and narrow that no more than one section could move forward at a time. On the last lap mortar and small arms fire swept the platoon from the ridge, killing one and wounding six. An American helicopter evacuated the seriously wounded. Meanwhile concentrated artillery and mortar fire, following air strikes, failed to dislodge the Red Chinese from Hill 614. A squad from B Company reached within grenade range of the Chinese positions but there was no cover on the steep and narrow approach. Heavy fire compelled the squad to withdraw after losing one man killed and two wounded. The slope was so steep that stretcher bearers had to slide the wounded off the ridge.

The next day, 25th February, two days after the initial assault, the Australian Battalion called up a terrific barrage of napalm, artillery and mortar fire on Hill 614. The approaches to Hill 614 were so narrow that No. 12 Platoon, could step forward only on a one-man front, wriggling like snakes through waist-high scrub. To dislodge them the Red Chinese rolled grenades down the steep slopes. Finally the squad charged in among the Chinese weapon pits and dug-outs. The bloody battle resulted in complete seizure of the key hill.

After this successful assault B Company consolidated the hardly-won Hill 614 while No. 12 Platoon rejoined D Company. During the night of 25—26 February the mortars plastered the slopes without causing any casualties and battalion outposts dispersed an enemy patrol without loss to themselves.
The Australian Battalion's C Company and the Canadian elements then took neighbouring heights against comparatively light opposition. C Company discovered that the Red Chinese had hurriedly vacated their positions, leaving grenades, weapons, ammunition and food in their weapon emplacements. The cautious attack continued until the 25th. On 2 March the Argylls and the Middlesex moved through to the "sharp end" leaving the Australians and Canadians in brigade reserve.

**Chipyong-ni and Vicinity**

On 7 March the Australians and Canadians once again took the lead. Their objective was to cut the main supply route to Chunchon, a CCF held city just below the 38th Parallel. To do so they had to capture high ground which dominated this road from the north. At first light A Company of the Australian Battalion crossed the road, but enemy mortars and machine-guns
pinned them down when they were about a third of the way up a steep spur leading on Hill 410. D Company reached up a parallel ridge under covering fire from B Company, plus New Zealand artillery and American mortars. The approaches to Hill 410 were so exposed and fire swept that D Company took four hours to reach the top of its ridge from where Bren gunners could give effective cover to A Company. (See Sketch Map 2.)

A Company had moved well forward the night before and was to attack Bald Knob, a dominant feature on the opposing line of hills at first light. D Company was to move up parallel with them towards an objective known as Pine Hill. The remaining companies were to wait in reserve until the battle developed. At last all was ready. When the forward platoons reported ready to move and slowly in the gathering light of early dawn, D Company snaked its way from the assembly area to begin the strenuous approach march.

They reached the edge of the first steep drop in the valley. There was a halt in front, then an urgent report from the advance squad leader. It had lost its footing and had vanished rapidly into the darkness of the valley below. The squad did the only thing that was possible in the circumstances, waited for them to land. A flurry was followed by some cursing and then the report came from the depths below that every thing was under control.

It was now daylight when A Company encountered heavier opposition than expected. The Company was pinned on the razor-back ridge leading to the planned objective and under fierce enemy mortar and small arms fire. Casualties were already heavy. For D Company to attack the Pine Ridge with Bald Knob still occupied in strength by the enemy would have been suicide. Two companies would now be necessary to capture Bald Knob.

A wide valley of paddy fields separated the Australians from the enemy on Bald Knob. Two main ridges ran to the summit of this feature. A Company was still pinned down on the right-hand ridge with its air identification panel on the ground to indicate its forward elements.

D Company plan was that, after a brief reconnaissance, to attack with one platoon forward up the left-hand ridge of Bald Knob. This would relieve the pressure of A Company and, at the same time, open the way for a concerted effort by the two companies to capture the objective. The enemy was well aware of these intentions. Enemy mortars and small arms fire increased. To move quickly was the essential need. No. 11 Platoon led the move, followed by Company Headquarters with No. 12 Platoon left and No. 10 Platoon right.

They lost no time. No. 11 Platoon moved out from the small creek across the dangerous open space. D Company had already suffered casualties
but No. 11 Platoon was fortunate and crossed the open space without further losses. Supporting artillery and mortars had all this time been plastering the ridge line up which the attack was to be made. This fire lifted and moved up along the ridge as the leading platoon approached. To move close in behind supporting fire in this manner was the key to successful support and No. 11 Platoon used it to the fullest advantage on this occasion.

Immediately No. 11 Platoon had consolidated on the lower end of the ridge, the rest of the Company moved off, suffering several casualties crossing the open. Meanwhile, No. 11 Platoon was moving cautiously up the ridge and now had moved to a position from which it could strike with supporting from No. 12 and No. 10 Platoons on the left and right. After a brief sharp struggle No. 11 Platoon overcame the demoralized enemy.

During the afternoon the battle was fought in heavy snow which reduced visibility and made the evacuation of the wounded even more difficult than it had been before. The Red Chinese kept the exposed roadway under fire. Consequently the stretcher bearers had to carry wounded men out by a long route over rough terrain. During the day A Company lost seven killed and 14 wounded while D Company lost four killed and ten wounded. Other casualties were one killed and two wounded.

Next day, on 8 March, B Company moved through A and D Companies and reached the crest of the hill without opposition. The enemy had abandoned the position during the night, leaving behind mortars, mortar ammunition and piles of hand grenades, a quantity of Russian-made small arms ammunition and a few enemy dead. Battalion officers estimated that the Australians killed about fifty but, as usual, the Red Chinese removed their dead. The ridge was deeply entrenched with pine branches camouflaging the bunkers and weapon emplacements. The Canadians had also secured their objective. The Argylls and Middlesex then passed through the Canadian troops and made further advances, for a hill or two, without opposition. Local Koreans assured the UN troops that the Chinese Communist forces under the 42nd CCF Army had withdrawn to an area five kilometers north.

It was apparent that the enemy forces had begun to withdraw on elsewhere along all fronts, leaving behind a considerable quantity of equipment and supplies, due to the fact that their manpower losses had been extremely heavy during a series of the UN offensive operations since 25 January 1951.
Along the Pukhan River

On 11 March the whole brigade launched a simultaneous attack on high country south of Yangdogwon-ni, a town on the road to Hongchon. The enemy line, at this stage, extended from the mountainous area south of Hongchon, where the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was engaged, west to the Pukhan River, which joined the Han just east of Seoul, then along the Han westward through Seoul to the sea. The Australians were the only troops who had to fight to gain their objectives. The Argylls, the Middlesex and the Canadians each advanced without having to fire a shot. But, with the right flank of the Australian Battalion exposed, A Company suffered by heavy mortar and rifle fire, which killed two men and wounded seven. The wounded included Major B. S. O'Dowd, the Company Commander, and Lieutenant J. M. Church, who led a platoon attack against the stubbornly defended village of Chisan. C Company also lost seven wounded and the support company one wounded. American and New Zealand artillery and mortar fire eventually silenced the enemy mortars and on 12 March C Company took the defended ridge without further opposition.

On the IX Corps Sector, the 7th Regiment of the 1st US Marine Division then established contact on the 27th Commonwealth Brigade's right flank, making the line secure. On the left the 1st US Cavalry Division and the 24th US Infantry Division formed the UN front. The Commonwealth Brigade went into corps reserve near Chipyong-ni on 13 March, the day before the ROK and UN forces re-entered Seoul without serious opposition. The new reserve area was a dry river bed surrounded by paddy fields. Here the whole brigade, assembled together for the first time in six months, remaining in reserve status until the 24th March. During the period the Australian exchanged their American winter uniforms for Australian issue clothing and welcomed more than 100 replacements. Colonel B. A. Burke replaced Brigadier B. A. Coad as new Brigadier Commander. Brigadier Coad, who was promoted to major-general, left the brigade on 23 March.

On 25 March 1951, the Commonwealth Brigade joined the 24th US Infantry Division in the mountains of Taebu-ri, on near Hyon-ni, north of the Pukhan River about 24 kilometers below the 38th Parallel and about 48 kilometers northeast of Seoul. For the next fortnight the Australians were always near the front in a rather uneventful general United Nations advance in force across the 38th Parallel. The British and Australian troops were still in rough terrain, among mountains which reached 4,000 feet, and they made the
advance on foot, scrambling over slippery grass along the right ridges, mopping up small pockets of the Red Chinese here and there, helping to consolidate a new line which extended from the Imjin River, north of the old Australian positions at Uijongbu, along the parallel to the east coast. (See Sketch Map 3.)

The 3rd Battalion, dispatched from the Royal Australian Infantry Regiment, had now been in Korea for six months. During that time it had advanced as far north as Chongju, within a striking distance of Manchuria, then back more than 320 kilometers well into the middle of south Korea and had now advanced again nearly 160 kilometers to the 38th Parallel. During this backwards and forwards movement the battalion had been in action 165 days and lost more than 300 men killed, wounded and missing in the fighting, including the first commanding officer, Colonel Green. In the six months the personnel of the battalion had almost completely turned over with reinforcements and replacements from Australia and Japan. Battle-experienced non-commissioned officers were at this time being regularly drafted back to Australia as instructors.

On 5 April, B Company crossed the 38th Parallel in rough mountainous
country miles from any big town or main road. During the afternoon the company saw small groups of enemy but artillery and mortar fire soon dispersed these. The brigade was now moving in higher and rougher country than ever before. One company position was 3,000 feet above sea level. The brigade transport vehicles crawled like tiny beetles deep in the sharp-sided valleys, but porters had to manhandle all supplies to the forward troops. What would happen next was anyone's guess.

On the 19th April the Commonwealth Brigade was relieved by the 19th Infantry of the 6th ROK Division and moved back to the Kapyong area, being still in reserve for the IX US Corps.

**Hills of Sardine and Salmon**

The UN forces continued its cautious and limited offensive during the early days of April 1951, in an effort to seize more dominant ground north of the 38th Parallel except the extremely western sector. This time, the UN allies had advanced slowly on a broad front.

On 8 April, meanwhile, the Australian Battalion went into brigade reserve with the Argylls Battalion at Karim, in the upper Kapyong River valley, just south of the 38th Parallel. There were still scattered groups of enemy in the area and a patrol party from A Company of the Australian Battalion ran into mortar and small arms fire from a hill occupied by the Chinese Communist elements upon which the New Zealand artillery poured its mighty firepower clearing the hill.

On 11 April, the day the Australian troops heard at Karim the news of General Douglas MacArthur's dismissal from the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was at the curve of a UN bulge pressing the enemy back into the north, deploying inbetween the 24th US Infantry Division and the 1st US Cavalry Division. At the time, the so-called "Operation Rugged" was in progress. This peculiar name was given as the UN forces advanced from ridge-top to ridge-top.

On that very same day, the 11th, a severe electrical storm caused casualties in A and B Companies and four men were evacuated for hospital treatment after being struck by lightening. That night there was a fall of snow, rarely experienced at this time of the Korean season, bringing back a recurrence of the winter.

At 0730 hours, on 13 April, the 27th Brigade moved forward with the 7th and 8th US Cavalry Regiments for the opening phase of Operation Rugged. Their objective was to establish the Kansas Line just north of the 38th
Parallel. On the first day the Australians moved by motor transport from just north of Kapyong towards the Parallel. The enemy's automatic arms fire troubled the advance but caused no casualties. The enemy were not dug in and appeared to be withdrawing in small disorganized groups. By nightfall the battalion had reached its intermediate objective one and a half kilometers south of the Parallel. During the night enemy infiltration parties penetrated D Company's area on the right flank but were easily repulsed.

Next day, spread across a wide front and on foot, Australians resumed their attack, with the Argylls on their right flank and the 21st US Infantry Regiment on their left. Intermittent small arms fire troubled No. 10 Platoon of D Company led by Lieutenant Mannett, but the company gained its objective, a hill west of Yongso-dong, without suffering any casualties. C Company crossed the 38th Parallel at 1330 hours after silencing small arms fire with 4.2-inch mortar fire and supporting artillery fire. A and B Companies also secured their objectives without opposition. At 1630 a D Company patrol penetrated 300 meters north of the Parallel without making contact with the enemy. The war diary of the battalion states that "the opposition met by the battalion indicated small enemy parties were fighting delaying actions, and then withdrawing north when our troops approached and when artillery or mortar fire was brought down."

On the left and the right the Americans and the Argylls were running up against scattered barbed-wire defences and booby traps, but there was still no stiff enemy resistance. In this operation "artificial moonlight" was used for night attacks but without conspicuous success. The "Moonlight" consisted of training searchlights on the objective and using flares. The leading troops suffered slight casualties when attacking under these conditions. The brigade was now in extremely rugged country. Battalion transport edged along narrow roads in deep valleys while the advancing companies climbed steep ridges among mountains which reached 1,000 meters and more. The fighting troops carried all their immediate needs on their backs while Korean porters brought up supplies and ammunition. B Company, 74th US Engineer Combat Battalion, kept the track in repair for the Australians and other Commonwealth battalions.

On 15 April, the Australians were across the Parallel again beyond the roadhead and fighting to gain Hill 951, more known to the Australians as Sardine and Salmon, heights forming part of a razor-back ridge. The Middlesex made two unsuccessful attacks against Hill 951 (Sardine) and then A Company of the Australian Battalion attacked the objective, a steep hill covered in dry scrub. Following a New Zealand artillery barrage, No. 3 Platoon of the
Army Troops

Company gained the crest after a brisk exchange of grenades with the enemy. Company casualties in this action were eight wounded. By nightfall the Australians were well established all along the ridge with an excellent field of fire towards the final objective, Salmon.

At 0830 hours next morning, C Company took Salmon against light opposition. The company was greatly assisted by an air strike, which cleared a knob about 300 meters in front of the advancing troops and countered any enemy attempt at a counterattack. C Company's casualties were two slightly wounded. The new Commonwealth Brigade Commander, Brigadier B. A. Burke, watched the attack. During the day the Canadians attacked along a parallel ridge and successfully occupied their objective. These advances brought the 27th Commonwealth Brigade to line Utah, just north of the 38th Parallel, and ended Operation Rugged so far as they were concerned. At this line, the 19th Regiment, 6th ROK Division, took over from the British and Australians who went into corps reserve at Kapyong, on the Pukhan River, about 48 kilometers to the southeast. The Middlesex and Argylls were due to leave Korea when the 28th British Brigade consisting of the 1st Battalion King's own Scottish Borderers and the 1st Battalion, the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, arrived at the battle front. The Commander of the 28th Brigade, Brigadier G. Taylor, arrived at Karim during Operation Rugged.

The UN front line, at this stage, was 186 kilometers long from the Imjin River, in the west, along the Iron Triangle, at the center, into the high, easily-held mountains, on the east, where the X US Corps and the I and II ROK Corps were firmly anchored. Indeed, the Red Chinese made no secret of the fact that their Fifth Phase Offensive was planned to drive the UN forces out of Korea. On 19 April, an advance party from the 27th Brigade departed for Hong Kong.

In the meantime, it had been known for some time that the Chinese Communist forces were preparing for a full-scale offensive to drive the UN forces back to the south.

Successive Sundays had brought unexpected misfortunes to the Australians during their campaigns and the standing joke of the Australian Battalion was that the brigade had so many padres the enemy always attacked on Sunday in the belief that everybody was too busy praying to fight.

At Kapyong, on Sunday 22 April, all the 27th Commonwealth Brigade units, then in IX US Corps reserve, attended a united church service, and the day was uneventful until just before midnight.

But, just mid-night, as suspected by the Australians, the Red Chinese forces began their all-out offensive along the whole front, perhaps the most determined blow they had ever launched. That evening the artillery and mortar fire began the heaviest concentration of enemy fire ever experienced,
lasting four hours. Then bugles and whistles sounded as the Red Chinese and North Korean Communists surged forward along the front.

In the west-center front of the IX US Corps under which the Commonwealth Brigade was in reserve, the 20th CCF Army poured to breakthrough the gap the 6th ROK Division had yielded between the 1st US Marine Division and the 24th US Infantry Division. Then the two US divisions turned their fronts and harassed the enemy flanks while the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and the 5th Cavalry of the 1st US Cavalry Division were ordered to move up from reserve to fill the exposed gap. Whereupon the confused battle continued throughout the frontlines, and the Reds met with considerable success in the first few days. Thus, there was no alternative for the UN allies but to retire once again. General James A. Van Fleet, who succeeded the command of the Eighth US Army from General Ridgway who took over the United Nations Command right after General MacArthur’s dismissal, reluctantly ordered a general withdrawal down the south bank of the Pukhan River.

During that time, the Australian Battalion with its Commonwealth units in the mid-center front fought the famous holding actions which in particular brought a US Presidential Unit Citation to the major participation units. The next section covers the detailed account of the gallant Australian part in the Battle of Kapyong.

Section 5. The Battle of Kapyong
(22 - 25 April 1951)

Preformative Situation

When the Chinese Communist forces launched its fullscale offensive, commencing on the night of 22 April, the Australian Battalion troops were making wreaths from azaleas in preparation for Anzac Day, to be observed on 25 April, in commemoration of the landing of the Australian and New Zealand forces at Gallipoli in 1915 during World War I.

The camp was near the village of Charidae, slightly northwest of Kapyong, in a grove of chestnuts. There were still some patches of snow on the hills but the wild azaleas were already in bloom and the trees were coming out in fresh green leaf.

Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, the Australian Battalion Commander, had sent across to the Turkish Brigade, camped about four kilometers away,
inviting a detachment to the Anzac Day Service.

Meanwhile, since the Argyll Battalion was being pulled out to go back to Hong Kong and Middlesex Battalion was due for relief, the Australian Battalion was expected to be attached to a new Commonwealth Brigade, the 28th, under Brigadier G. Taylor. And when waves of Red Chinese attacked on the night of 22 April, the half-dissolved 27th Brigade was still about 50 kilometers behind the front lines.

But the Brigade Headquarters received no detailed information until next morning. At that stage, the enemy had not broken through but, as a precautionary measures, the brigade was ordered to take up the blocking positions across the routes of the enemy flow from the north.

The Australian order of battle of the units which took part in the Battle of Kapyong were:

3rd Australian Battalion Commander
A Company Commander
B Company Commander
C Company Commander
D Company Commander

Lieutenant Colonel I. B. Ferguson
Major B. S. O'Dowd
Captain Darcy Laughlin
Captain R. N. Saunders
W. N. Gravener

The Australians and elements of the 72nd US Tank Battalion were assigned a position on a ridge covering crossroads, and fords over the Kapyong River and one of its small tributaries. Four or five kilometers to the left the Canadian Battalion (Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) held similar high ground covering a ford across the river. On the right there was a big gap, estimated at 22 kilometers, to the nearest American troops. Between the Australians and the Canadinas the Middlesex held a reserve position. At this stage the New Zealand Field Artillery were well forward covering the 6th ROK Division.

Early on the morning of 23 April, Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson met his company commanders at the village of Chuktun-ni about eleven kilometers of the battalion camp area at Charidae. They made a reconnaissance of cross-country and found that the Australian sector covered the junction of two roads and two rivers. The rivers were the Kapyong, coming in from the northwest, and a small tributary flowing from the northeast. Chuktun-ni village straddled a road junction near the river junction. Just below where the roads joined, one from the northwest and the other from the northeast, a ford crossed the Kapyong. About three kilometers down the river there was another ford near the Middlesex Battalion's position. The Canadians, on the left, were primarily responsible for the road from the northwest whereas the Australians' task was to cover the road junction and the first ford. Three Companies, A, C and D, were positioned on high ground east of
Chuktun-ni village, guarding the approach to the ford, and overlooking the road coming in from the northeast, while B Company was assigned a long, scrub-covered island feature between the road and the smaller of the two rivers. In effect, B Company's position was a small natural fortress, flanked on both sides by paddy fields, standing in what was likely to be one of the main streams of the CCF flow from the north.

The battalion was overcommitted because it had to hold a two-battalion front. Consequently, there were gaps, no matter how thinly they spread out the platoons. But there was nothing on the flanks to prevent the Reds, if they came in large enough numbers, from rushing through these gaps and closing round behind the Australian positions. Nevertheless, if they broke through the frontline, their local superiority in numbers would be ample enough to flood around the thinly deployed Commonwealth in the Kapyong valley. The mission of the brigade, therefore, if the frontline broke, was to stem the break through long enough for the Allied reinforcements to organize the rear defenses and then to take up the counterattack.

The Australian Battalion front faced northeast, up the river valley and road. This was the direction from which the Red Chinese were very likely to come, if they penetrated through the first line. B Company, on the left of the road, had a loop of the river on its left flank, the road and paddy fields to the right. With B Company on this island feature were a tank platoon from the 72nd US Tank Battalion, the 1st US Cavalry Division. Another platoon of tanks from the US tank battalion was forward from B Company in flat country watching the road running in from the northeast.

A Company was in the center position dug in along a high rocky spur, while D Company was responsible for important high ground to the right of A Company and, C Company was in mobile reserve along a spur slightly west and to the rear of A Company. The Battalion headquarters, with the pioneer platoon and the Bren-gun section from the machine-gun platoon, was about one and a half kilometers southwest of the company positions against some small hills 100 yards west of the road and south of Chuktun-ni village.

About at 1800 hours on the evening of Monday 23 April, the companies were in position. Darkness fell to the sound of digging as the men prepared their gun emplacements and made themselves comfortable for the night.

Before long, however, the Australians were the first to feel the CCF attack among the Commonwealth Brigade. Already crumbling elements of the 6th ROK Division began to move into the battalion area. That something serious had gone wrong up at the front was becoming rapidly obvious. About nightfall the advance elements of the 6th ROK Division set up a Division Headquarters, near Chuktun-ni.
Army Troops

Over on the isolated left flank B Company had dug in comfortably enough and the forward platoons improved their defensive positions making them as strong as possible.

A Company in the center, had the most difficult ground and worked hard to prepare sangars and trenches before dark. The company's position was a low, long ridge which rose sharply to a commanding bald knob in the east. No. 1 Platoon (Lieutenant F. A. Gardner) was nearest the road. Then came company headquarters with the machinegun section, and alongside them, No. 3 Platoon (Lieutenant H. Muby). No. 2 Platoon (Lieutenant I. R. W. Brumfield) occupied the bald knob overlooking the main position. By nightfall the platoons had dug in. Sentries were posted and the remainder of the company curled up in sleeping bags before their turn came to watch.

D Company, on the right, had the highest ground within the battalion sector. It was a backbreaking task carrying weapons, ammunition and other supplies. They prepared the defense positions themselves around the crest, taking advantage of terrain feature, while keeping eyes open for possible enemy approach.

The Progress of the Battle

By 2200 hours on the 23rd the main forces of the 118th CCF Division had reached the Australian perimeter. The American tank platoon forward of B Company took the first shock. Suffering casualties and confused as to whether they were under fire from the Reds or the retiring ROK troops the tanks began to fall back down the valley roads towards Chuktun-ni between B Company and the other Australian companies. Meanwhile, the Red Chinese had fanned out and were probing A, C and D Company positions.

With the tanks out of position the CCF began to move straight down the road between the B Company positions toward battalion command post. The US tank leader, who had given no orders for his forward platoon to fall back, rushed down into the valley to halt his men moving withdrawing too far.

Meanwhile, following the last column of the 6th ROK Division came through, fighting had flared up right around the battalion perimeter and inside the Headquarters area. At first, the Reds directed their main effort to B and C Companies holding the high ground leading to Hill 504. Then they swept down the valley to the ford and established a road block behind Headquarters. The initial attack killed two Bren gunners and wounded four others. A machinegun platoon leader (Lieutenant C. B. Evans) saved
the situation by asking an American tank leader to turn his cannon on the
road block and nearby houses. This tank fire killed forty Red Chinese in
one house alone.

Throughout the night Headquarters Company and A Company were
under constant pressure. In the absence of rear communications, A Company
Commander directed the forward defence and, beat off repeated enemy
attacks. The company had its first contact on No. 1 Platoon's front near-
est the road leading through to the battalion command post, when a Bren
gunner opened up on an enemy patrol approaching his position. The rest of
his section joined in and, after a sharp action, the enemy withdrew to the
bottom of the hill. In the darkness, the men of A Company could hear the
Red Chinese reorganizing for another attempt to the accompaniment of
shouting, whistle blowing and bugle blurtmg.

The attack poured in again with fresh fury against No. 1 Platoon in
exactly the same sector as before. A shower of grenades was followed by a
mad rush, which was beaten off. Then came another after another, with the
dose repeated with scarcely enough time for No. 1 Platoon to close in gaps
caused by other elements. The Red waves came in one after another until
by weight of numbers the Red Chinese overran No. 1 Platoon.

With this position gone, Major O'Dowd quickly regrouped his center
around No. 3 Platoon. There was no further trouble from that side of A
Company positions for the rest of the night. There was no more massing
for attacks in waves, except two series of attacks in which the enemy ran
into energetic counteraction. Apparently, the bloody stand made earlier
by No. 1 Platoon had depleted the Red Chinese too badly for him to stage
a repeat performance.

By daylight 24 April, however, the Reds had as far as Battalion Head-
quarters, thus occupying the high ground overlooking the area and domi-
minating the west side of the road back to Kapyong. By this time every man
of the light machinegun section had been killed or wounded and the sup-
porting pioneers had suffered heavy casualties.

Meanwhile, about 0300 hours the enemy began to harass B Company
on the left flank island feature and as dawn approached Reds, who had not
got past the ford, fell back to renew their attacks against the forward rifle
companies. The main effort was against A, B and D Companies. C Compa-
ny in reserve, had to deal only with small groups of infiltrators. As casu-
alties began to mount in A and D Companies A Company Commander called
on C Company to send stretcher parties for the evacuation of the wounded.

On the B Company front, on the other hand, the Reds had begun to
harass on that island feature about 0300 hours.
Army Troops

At that time No. 6 Platoon was strung along the ridge, with a tank in the center, and the Company CP was on the side of the hill below. The Chinese moved up the spur behind the command post heading for a knoll occupied by a section from No. 6 Platoon.

During repeated early morning attacks against B Company explosive bullets from the defending tanks set fire to straw thatched houses alongside the road and exposed the enemy movements. B Company riflemen, machine-gunners and tanks caused great slaughter to the Red Chinese who were crowded in the valley between B Company on the north of the road, and the other companies, south of the road. One group crouched in a ditch to shelter from B Company’s machine-gun fire. The 2-inch mortar could not reach them so a tank shelled the bank above the ditch and blew the Chinese out of their position. In the light from the burning house Captain Young saw the explosion lift the bodies into the air. In the growing light the Australians could see the valley below littered with enemy dead.

At about 0400 hours, a Corporal in charge of a light machinegun outpost on a knoll behind B Company’s perimeter, saw large numbers of the enemy forming up for an attack. Fifty or more Chinese tried to clear the knoll, which would have given them a domination overlooking the main company positions, but the corporal and his men smashed three determined attacks. As day broke 23 enemy dead were found on the lower slopes.

As daylight developed snipers in the paddy fields near the road began worry the company command post. Orders had already come through for B Company to withdraw across the other companies. Consequently, Captain Laughlin, the Company Commander, sent out a patrol to clear the ground towards C Company.

Before crossing to C Company’s position on the high ground south of the road Captain Laughlin loaded the company’s only casualty and several wounded POWs on to the company jeeps and sent them down the new battalion headquarters site. Tanks, going back to refuel and rearm, escorted the jeeps. The column ran the gauntlet of small arms and bazooka fire without suffering any damage. As the remainder of the company crossed the valley, under tank cover, they passed many dead and badly wounded Chinese. Throughout the withdrawal B Company exchanged shots with Chinese hiding in the river bed, in broken ground and around the village of Chuktun-ni. B Company was safely in its new positions by 0900 hours, and had brought all its POWs.

At about 0430, 24 April, the battalion commander asked the brigade commander, over the rear link to Brigade headquarters for a company of Middlesex, if they could get through, to reinforce the pioneer platoon position, which was the key to the Battalion Headquarters position.

A company of Middlesex arrived but artillery could not be provided to
support a company attack. The enemy had now so reinforced their position that the Middlesex found any forward movement impossible and they withdrew along the route to the east already used by the 2nd U.S. Chemical Mortars. When the Red Chinese rush threatened to catch the mortarmen in open paddy fields the mortarmen had retreated 16 kilometers east, abandoning their vehicles. Actually, the enemy did not reach the mortar positions in strength and the Australians and a U.S. engineer unit later drove out the packed but untouched vehicles.

In the meanwhile, the Australian Aid Post, in a paddy field across from battalion headquarters, was under fire all night. Throughout, the chaplains gave valuable assistance with the wounded. They managed to evacuate all the casualties from the Battalion H.Q. and the support company during the night. At dawn, when a heavier CCF attack began, the Australian Battalion Commander went to the Aid Post and advised a withdrawal down the road. They made a break for it with Padre A.W.A. Laing, Padre E. B. Phillips and the Salvation Army representative, Major E. C. Robertson, and got away safely.

As there were insufficient stretcher bearers to cope with the mounting casualties among headquarters and support troops Salvation Army Major Edwin Robertson left the job he was doing for the medical officer and went out to help bring in the more seriously wounded. This meant they had to go up the front line and often made their way with the stretcher on their hands and knees.

Meanwhile, between 0500-0600 hours, battalion headquarters, down the valley near the ford, began to withdraw towards the positions occupied by the Middlesex. During the withdrawal a mortar bomb fell between Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson and his Intelligence Officer (Lieutenant A. Argent), blowing a wheel off the Commanders’ jeep, but the headquarters withdrawal was completed without loss. Whenever the enemy opened up the men jumped from their vehicles and returned fire from cover until one of the tanks covering the withdrawal lumbered up and silenced the opposition.

About 0615 hours, Colonel Ferguson reopened his intermittent communication with the rifle companies, which were all intact and in position, although under fierce pre-dawn attack. It was then decided to withdraw B Company from its exposed position to within the perimeter of the other companies on the high ground southeast of the road.

By 0700 hours A Company was in possession of all the ground it had occupied the day before. The action cost the company and attached troops
50 casualties but this nowhere approached the number of enemy dead littered in ugly heaps about the disputed positions.

Meanwhile, D Company had come under heavy attack from repeated waves of Chinese supported by 60-mm mortars. By now the New Zealand artillerymen were able to provide covering fire. There was no observation officer with the company but Captain Gravener established artillery wireless communications and called up support. The attack began at 0700 and continued at half-hour intervals throughout the morning. No. 12 Platoon (Lieutenant Ward) took the weight of these attacks in the forward position. The Red Chinese launched their initial attacks on a four to five man front, assisted by mortars and grenades, and they suffered heavy casualties.

During the morning B Company had been having a lively time trying to clear a passage for a ordered general withdrawal down the valley and across the Kapyong ford. Colonel Ferguson, with his Intelligence Officer, had ridden forward on tanks in a successful attempt to make direct contact with the subordinate companies. Because the tanks had to travel closed-up, Colonel Ferguson replaced a gunner in the leading tank. By this time the enemy occupied the positions originally held by battalion headquarters and B Company. This effectively blocked the roadway to the ford. Subsequently a B Company platoon moved up to clear the approach to the ford, but heavy fire pinned down this patrol and caused casualties. Captain Laughlin, the Company Commander, immediately sent a platoon to attack the Red positions and extract the two sections pinned down. The battle raged for several hours but the platoon finally gained a commanding height, after a bayonet charge and a fierce hand-to-hand fight in which it killed 81 Red Chinese. The battalion was able to get the tanks to fire on the enemy positions in support of the platoon. The Australian casualties were four killed and five wounded. However, the ford remained in the Red hands and the withdrawal eventually took place along the high ground south of the road and river.

Over the right flank of battalion positions the Red Chinese continued to make determined attempts to occupy the commanding high ground held by D Company. Captain Gravener, the Company Commander, had ordered his men to sit tight and hold the present position. In view of the heavy casualties, however, he decided to tighten his perimeter and withdraw No. 12 Platoon. The withdrawal was conducted so skilfully that the Red Chinese continued to mortar the abandoned position. Then, about 1500 hours they launched a full-scale attack against nothing. D Company had a grandstand view as about thirty Chinese, behind a mortar barrage, went through the motions of driving the departed No. 12 Platoon out of position. At the right moment, the Australians and the New Zealand artillery opened
up fire with all available weapons and caused heavy casualties among these Red attackers.

At this stage the D Company Commander called for air support to clear the Chinese off the position formerly occupied by No. 12 Platoon. On arrival the spotter plane dropped a spigot flare on what the pilot thought was the target area. Actually, it was the position occupied by No. 10 Platoon. The Corsairs swept in and dropped napalm which sent flames racing through defense positions and the Company CP area. Captain M. Ryan ran out under fire waving the identification panel which had been placed on the ground to make the position of friendly troops while the company radio operator made frantic efforts to save the radio set which was the only means of communication for the transmission of artillery fire orders. By the time the aircraft had discovered the napalm attack had caused several casualties, two fatal, and destroyed a quantity of weapons and ammunition vital to the defense.

Taking advantage of this unexpected support the Red Chinese launched a frontal attack, coupled with a flanking maneuver on the right. No. 11 Platoon held off the frontal attack and made a minor readjustment to counter the attempted right flank move. Once again the enemy suffered heavy casualties and drew back. At this stage D Company was acting as a rearguard covering the withdrawal of the other companies along the high ground to the reserve area occupied by battalion headquarters and the Middlesex. D Company received its orders to withdraw late in the afternoon but was then beating off one of the heaviest attacks of the day.

Throughout the night of 23 April and all next day, D Company had no direct communication with battalion headquarters. Captain Gravener, therefore, kept contact through Major O'Dowd and A Company signals. After the napalm attack on the afternoon of 24 April even requests for tank support had to go through A Company. This meant Major O'Dowd directed the withdrawal, in which D Company acted as rearguard. By just after 2100 hours on the night of 24 April, the rifle companies were all clear of the forward features which they had defended so successfully for a night and a day.

By about 2245 hours, 24 April, the Australian Battalion had passed through the Middlesex area on orders and had taken up a new position near the brigade headquarters, bringing 32 CCF prisoners with it.

In the late afternoon the next day, very little activity was seen to the northeast on the Australian's old position. The 27th Brigade changed its designation effective at 2400 hours, 25 April as the 28th Commonwealth Brigade with its new commander, Brigadier G. Taylor. But the components of the brigade remained the same.
This ended the Battle of Kapyong for the Australians. That fought during the so named CCF's First Spring Offensive. All night and all day the rifle companies had held their position, exhausting and demoralizing the Red Chinese, and gradually blunting the offensive which tailed off ineffectively at the Middlesex perimeter. The Australian cost was heavy -- thirty-one killed, fifty-eight wounded and three missing, afterwards known to be POWs. But with the support of the Canadian infantry, the American tanks and the New Zealand gunners, the Australian Battalion was a major factor in halting the Chinese Communist advance long enough for the other UN forces to reinforce the Kapyong River front.

"The seriousness of the break-through on the central front had been changed from defeat to victory by the gallant stand of these heroic and courageous soldiers," said the US Presidential Unit Citation. "The 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and A Company, 72nd US Heavy Tank Battalion, displayed such gallantry, determination and esprit de corps in accomplishing their missions as to set them apart and above other units participating in the war, and by their achievements they have brought distinguished credit to themselves, their homelands, and all freedom loving nations."

All members of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, are now

A Company, 3rd Battalion is moving off to attack Hill Sardine, April 1951.
entitled to wear the emblem of the US Presidential Citation, a strip of blue watered silk ribbon inside a frame of gold silk, on both upper sleeves of their uniform. The members of the battalion who fought in the battle are entitled to wear the emblem always in whatever unit they serve. All serving members of the battalion, now or at any future time, are entitled to wear the treasured emblem whilst on the strength of the unit only. Thus, Ka-pyong added a permanent honour to the battle traditions of the Australian Army and put the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, in the distinguished company of famous British regiments whose continuing history is starred with honours won on distant battlefields.

A memorial to members of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment who lost their lives at the Battle of Ka-pyong is sighted near the ford at Chuktun-ni.

Section 6. The Beginning of the Static War (May - September 1951)

The New Front — Negotiations

As the First Spring Offensive that waged by the Chinese Communist forces with their all-out efforts had halted, the ROK and UN forces resumed the offensive during the early weeks of May in order to restore the lost ground and push the Reds back beyond the Kansas Line.

In the meantime, the Chinese Communist forces launched once again an all-out offensive, with its chief targets on the ROK divisions front, starting off on the night of 15-16 May. After all, the renewed enemy attack, referred to as the Second Spring Offensive, had failed by 19 May suffering an unprecedented serious casualties. Thus, the enemy proved again that the Reds can not sustain their offensive more than few days as that of the April drive. Moreover, this enemy offensive was followed almost immediately by the friendly offensive, with heaviest weight on the central front. As a result, the Iron Triangle, the utmost vital area on the strategic and tactical points of view in this stage of the war, came under the friendly hands.

On the political front, on the other hand, on 23 June 1951, Yakov Malik, Soviet representative at the United Nations, put the first Communist sign for the settlement of the Korean War by negotiations. For the repeated all-out offensives of the Red Chinese in April and May had completely failed, and
further the Reds had sustained extremely heavy losses, while the ROK and UN forces were now growing stronger daily, the Communists realized that they could not match the UN build up. Accordingly, they had maneuvered to win the war by negotiation instead of on the battle ground.

Thereafter the negotiation talks began on 10 July at Kaesong at first and, later the meeting site was shifted to Panmunjom. These discussions dragged on for two years during which the battle situation settled down to a state of almost static war. Gone were the days of attack and counter-attack on the key outposts and critical terrain features all along the forward lines.

Changes in Command

Immediately after Kapyong, the Australian 3rd Battalion joined the new 28th British Commonwealth Brigade. On 6 July 1951 Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Hasset took command of the battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson. The 3rd Battalion was still the only Australian Battalion in Korea, but the officers and men had turned over several times. Replacements were fed in rotation from a Reinforcement Holding Unit in Japan.

In May 1951 men who had been more than two years absent from Australia and not less than eight months in Korea were given the option of returning to Japan or to Australia. If the exigencies of the service permitted, officers and men were allowed five days' recreation leave in Japan after each four months in the line and three weeks' leave in Japan after eight months in Korea. The constant rotation of men in the 3rd Battalion caused many administrative problems. It happened sometimes that in the middle of a battle, as during Operation Commando in October 1951, some men were due for repatriation and other were waiting to move in as replacements. Consequently, this system was not adopted for the 1st and 2nd Battalions when they arrived in Korea. These battalions were relieved as a whole, after serving for about twelve months. This change-over was found far preferable to the inconvenient rotation system.

After Kapyong, the Australian Battalion moved with the new British Commonwealth Brigade, the 28th to take over from the 19th Infantry, the 24th US Division at Yangsu-ri on the Pukhan River, near its junction with the Han, about 24 kilometers east of Seoul. Here, the troops were on the alert for the so-called second phase of the Chinese spring offensive but the 5th US Regimental Combat Team then attached to the 24th US Infantry Division, took the brunt of this last enemy attempt to break the UN forces
before Soviet’s Malik made his peace bid. The main thrust developed in the eastern sector. General Van Fleet, the EUSAK Commander, had to decide whether this was a feint or the real thing before weakening his western and eastern front to reinforce the ill-equipped ROK troops in the eastern sector. He took the risk and rushed the 24th Division across in time to save the situation. From then on to the end of war there was never the slightest chance of the Chinese Communist forces ousting the United Nations from Korea.

Meanwhile, the Australian Battalion had been settled down in the reserve area, grouping with other Commonwealth units for the subsequent formation of the Commonwealth Division.

In July 1951, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade to which the Australians were attached had moved to the western sector near the Imjin River. Here, on 26 July, the three Commonwealth Brigades were now positioned together: the 29th on the left, the 28th on the right, and 25th Canadian Brigade in reserve, under the operational control of the I US Corps.

**Formation of the Commonwealth Division**

On 28 July 1951, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, including the Australian Battalion, came under the command of a new-formed 1st Commonwealth Division, Major General A. J. H. Cassels in command. For the first time in history Commonwealth troops from Australia, Britain, Canada, India and New Zealand were part of an inter-Dominion operational division under a unified command. General Van Fleet, Commander of the Eighth US Army, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Forces in Japan and Korea and other high-ranking Commonwealth and other UN officers attended the inauguration ceremony. Brigadier Ian Ross Campbell, Administrative Commander at Kure, was responsible for the hard work of organizing and maintaining the Australian Battalion serving with the Commonwealth Division for the last two years of the Korean War.

Besides three infantry brigades, the division had supporting armour consisting of the 8th King’s Royal Hussars, armed with Centurion tanks, and a squadron of Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Canadian), armed with new model Sherman tanks. Great Britain, Canada and New Zealand each provided a field regiment of artillery, India, Britain and Canada made up a complete medical team while sub-units from Britain, Canada and New Zealand provided the engineer and signal requirement.

The first Commonwealth Division began its operational life under the
command of the 1st US Corps and was given a 11,000 meters sector of the Kansas Line protected the Imjin River. The sector was between the 1st ROK Division on the left and the 1st US Cavalry Division on the right. Opposite was the 192nd Division of the 64th CCF Army. The Red Chinese outposts lay about 2,000 or 3,000 meters north of the river and the division’s mission was to carry out active patrols and raids against these positions. This meant that patrols had to cross the river, which was from 100 to 150 meters wide, subject to flooding in the summer rainy season and without bridges or easy fords.

The Australians lost several men drowned in the hazardous early assault boat crossings before the forward Jamestown Line was established and bridges built. During June and July heavy thunderstorms often caused the river to rise sometimes up to 10 more meters in one night and the current then ran with a speed of eight or nine knots. At this stage patrolling activity was limited to the depth at which division artillery could give cover from behind the river.

At the end of August, the Australian Battalion made full scale raid (Operation Boomerang) across the Imjin River to probe enemy reaction. A few Chinese were captured and killed and the battalion suffered about fifteen casualties. On 6 September, the battalion maneuvered across the Imjin and established a new defensive line without opposition about 6,000 meters north of the river in the Misan-myon area. By the 8th the whole brigade was north of the river.

Section 7. Operation Commando
(2 - 8 October 1951)

The Imjin River Sector

The one big operation during the period of the truce talks -- Operation Commando in October 1951 -- aimed at straightening the Allied line and showing the enemy that the UN forces were still offensive minded and not sitting back taking things easy during the peace negotiations. The new defensive line, known as Jamestown, was the western sector front line until the cease-fire in July 1953, and during all this time the Australian troops were mostly at the front there or in reserve building up the rear areas into an impenetrable reserve line. When not at the front the Australian troops were kept busy on full-scale training operations and with the dull but essential task of digging,
wiring and laying mine-fields. The Lozenge, an important defense feature in the Kansas, became a backbreaking bugbear to many Australian soldiers. 

"It is back to trench warfare," commented the Australian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell, after a visit to Korea in May 1952. He further went on: "In the bad early days we used to fight in the valleys, now we fight on top of the hills and cover the valleys with mines, wire and fire. I am convinced that this doctrine is sound ..."

The order of battle of the Australian Battalion at this juncture was as follows:

3rd Battalion Commander: Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Hassett
A Company Commander: Captain J. J. Shelton
B Company Commander: Captain H. W. Nicholls
C Company Commander: Major Jack Gerke
D Company Commander: Major Basil Hardiman

Operation Commando began in early October and aimed to buckle the enemy's defenses and establish a new forward UN defense line. The 28th British Commonwealth Brigade was assigned the major task on the east
central sector, the assault of Hills 355 or Kowang-san and 315, key heights in the enemy's defenses. The Kowang Mountain, better known to the UN troops as the "Little Gibraltar" in terms of its tactical weight and further for a strategic significance, the seizure of this peculiar feature was one of major objectives of the operations. The King's Own Scottish Borderers were given the task of capturing the area's dominating feature, Hill 355, with the Shropshire Light Infantry and the Australians in support. Once Hill 355 was in UN control the Australians were to assault Hill 315 while Hill 217 to the west of it was assigned to the Northumberland Fusiliers, which was detached from the 29th British Brigade and placed under the 28th Brigade for the operation. (See Sketch Map. 4)

On the 2nd October the 28th Brigade moved to its assembly area behind the Canadian Brigade. In darkness and mist at 0300 hours on the morning of 3rd October the attack against the towering Hill 355 began. The Borderers were in the center, with the Shropshires on the left flank and the Australians on the right. The enemy was well dug in and had ample artillery protection. Supported by Centurion tanks, which climbed almost impossible slopes and raked the enemy position with 20-pounders and heavy machine guns, the Australians made good progress but, after an easy beginning, the Shropshires and Borderers had to inch their way forward against determined opposition. The attackers were still a thousand meters short of their objective by nightfall but held their positions through darkness and consolidated, ready to resume the attack at first light next morning. B Company, under Captain H. W. Nicholls, led the Australian advance on the right flank and gained an elevation covering the Borderers' line of advance. B Company met some enemy resistance and three men were wounded.

Hill 355 (left) and Hill 315 (right).
The Little Gibraltar and Hill 315

Next morning C Company, led by Major Jack Gerke, had the task of shifting the enemy from a strongly-held hill north of Hill 355. From this feature, the previous day, the Red Chinese had been able to bring deadly flanking fire on to the Borderers' attack line. Under cover of a heavy early morning mist the company commander led his men rapidly across dangerous open low-lying ground and made the final assault up the steepest and most unlikely approach. Hurling grenades and covered by chattering automatics the men of C Company took the Chinese by surprise, killing 19 and capturing three for the loss of ten wounded, one of whom later died of wounds. The command of this feature was of great help to the Borderers in the last stages of their capture of Hill 355. By this time D Company had rejoined the battalion from the Misan-myon area, where it had been detached under the control of the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd Canadian Regiment.

All night on 4 October division artillery battered at the enemy positions on and around Hill 315, a key point in the Red Chinese line. This dominating hill was shaped like a pyramid and its eastern face was so steep that it could be climbed only with great difficulty, using hands and knees. All hope of surprise had now gone and a few determined enemy on the heights should have been able to hold off an attacking force indefinitely. The western slope, behind the enemy lines, offered easy access for reinforcements and supply. When finally, the Australian and British troops occupied the positions they found deep, three-level shelters packed with stocks of enemy winter clothing, ready for issue, besides ample supplies of food and ammunition. The hills and ridges protecting these main positions were ringed and stepped with trenches, machine-gun nests and fighting pits. All in all, Hill 315 presented a stiff proposition for any attacker.

Colonel Hassett's plan of attack was for A Company to make a feint up a ridge running in towards Hill 315 from the southeast and to contain the enemy there while B and D Companies moved in from the east, B Company to clear the lower slopes and features and D Company to pass through and capture Hill 315 itself with C Company in reserve. Events did not quite follow plan. Nevertheless, thanks to Colonel Hassett's able planning and direction and a magnificent effort by D Company, the feature was in Australian hands by 1700 hours, although the Commonwealth Brigade's hold on this sector of the enemy line was not consolidated for another two days.

The attack began at 0330 hours on 5 October to capture Hills 217 and 315.
Army Troops

B Company was in the lead this time and moved west in darkness and through a heavy mist over steep, broken and thickly timbered ground. With No. 10 Platoon leading, D Company under Major Basil Hardiman moved out behind B Company. D Company crossed a valley and began to move slowly west along a ridge line towards Hill 315. The mist was still so thick, even after dawn, that frequent halts were necessary to keep direction. Away to the left the company commander could hear distant firing, blanketed by the fog-wrapped ridges. This, he believed, was A Company developing the planned feint against Hill 315 from the southeast. There was no sight or sound of B Company from where he supposed B Company to be. Actually, due to the heavy fog and very broken country B Company had swung slightly north-east and later encountered slight opposition but cleared their intermediate high ground by 0930 for the loss of one man killed and one wounded.

The time was 0915 hours and the fog still wrapped the rugged hills where every shadow looked as large as a Red Chinese army and every twig cracked with the heart-thumping rattle of a Russian-made burp gun. Away on the right B Company was now beginning to meet with similar trouble.

Communications were good and from his company CP Major Hardiman ordered No. 12 Platoon to take up the defensive positions. As they did so they heard the Reds begin to throw the grenades on No. 10 and 11 Platoons deployed on either side of No. 12 Platoon. The enemy continued to hurl grenades through the mist, while small arms fire caused one casualty, a man who had been wounded for the first time in the Middle East during World War II and for the second time in Korea in 1950. A bullet badly wounded him in the head and he died while the stretcher bearers were evacuating him to the Aid Post. The New Zealand artillery officer with the company could not call down covering fire as he was uncertain of B or D Companies positions in the thick fog. Crouched in their damp defensive positions D Company could hear the enemy about 200 meters ahead and called for 3-inch mortar fire but the fog was too thick and the forward platoon had to depend upon 2-inch mortars and small arms fire directed in the general direction of the Red Chinese positions.

About 1030 hours the blanket of fog began to lift and No. 12 Platoon could just see the enemy dug in on a group of knolls ahead of them. A lively fight followed, with No. 10 Platoon trying a flank attack from the left. As the company moved in to the attack, Major Hardiman was badly wounded in the left thigh and Lieutenant Young, as senior platoon commander, took over the direction of the attack. Sergeant Rowlinson took command of No. 12 Platoon. With this platoon at center and the other platoons on the flanks the company broke into the knoll defenses and the enemy quickly evacuated to the next defensive position along the ridge line, leaving 22 dead and ten
POWs. D Company’s casualties at this stage were seven, including No. 11 Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Geoff Leary, who was wounded in the thigh and evacuated.

The fog lifted just after 1100 hours and D Company quickly re-established radio communications with battalion headquarters. During the fight enemy fire had shot away the aerials on D Company radio sets so the battalion commander gave the company its map locations by asking the signallers to wave a fluorescent air panel on the downward slope of the hill away from the enemy. A small patrol moved out to the right to establish contact with B Company and plans were then made to continue the advance westward against Hill 315.

A section of medium machine guns arrived at the captured position and Centurion tanks took up positions on a hill across a valley to the left. The machine-gunners set up to cover the next move and the 8th Irish Hussars took over seemingly impossible country to within 1,600 meters of the next objective, christened Brown Knoll from the amount of brown soil showing.

No.11 Platoon led by Lieutenant L. G. Clark jumped off the next assault. The minutes of intense artillery fire preceded the attack and the platoon then moved forward under cover from tank and machinegun fire. In return a Chinese 3.5 rocket launcher opened up and caused casualties.

Corporal J. T. Black, a veteran soldier from Melbourne led one of the forward sections. An exploding grenade blew him off his feet and a machine gun bullet seriously wounded his left arm. Bleeding and unarmed he continued to lead the attack, shouting encouragement to his section.

By 1415 hours No.11 Platoon had reorganized and consolidated on Brown Knoll and in turn No.12 Platoon moved out to capture the next objective, a green wooded hillock, which the platoon took without difficulty only to meet intense machinegun fire which pinned them down in sight of Baldy, the last hurdle between D Company and Hill 317. No. 10 Platoon (Lieutenant Young) was ordered forward to take over Brown Knoll while No. 11 moved through to assist No. 12. At bayonet point, and under covering fire from No. 12 Platoon and machinegun section, the 11th soon cleared out the enemy machinegun nests holding up the attack and by 1600 hours D Company had mopped up the captured objectives. Counted enemy dead totalled 68 and the company had taken 30 prisoners. D Company losses were two killed and 13 wounded, one of whom died of wounds, and two wounded but remaining on duty. In addition to each man killed or wounded the company strength was down because of the men needed to help carry out the wounded.
At this juncture the battalion commander made one of the decisions which was responsible for the final victory. Since the two assaulting companies - B and D - could not continue immediately on to Hill 315, both having suffered losses, and the men were exhausted from the tremendous effort, Lieutenant Colonel Hassett thereupon ordered C Company, ten men light from its battle on Hill 355, to move through D Company, and take the objective, Hill 315. Knowing that speed was now the essence of the contract, C Company raced up to D Company and through it. Before the Red Chinese knew what had happened Hill 315 was in C Company’s hands.

What prompted Colonel Hassett to change his plans was a B Company report that the enemy were leaving Baldy and Hill 315 in large numbers. Consequently, C Company was able to go in the objective without opposition. Throughout the action, on the other hand, A Company had kept the enemy occupied on the southeastern spur. This diversion course of action kept the Chinese so busy that C Company’s final assault came as a surprise and they were unable to get sufficient force back into position quickly enough to forestall the Australian Battalion’s final move on Hill 315. At the same time heavy artillery fire kept what enemy remained on the reserve slopes away from the actual top of Hill 315. Key to the whole operation, however, was D Company’s early rapid progress through Brown Knoll and other strongpoints obstructing the final approaches to the enemy’s main defense line.

During 6 October, the day after the capture of Hill 315, the battalion commander sent C Company forward to another important feature. No. 8 Platoon moved out as spearhead of this attack. The Red Chinese were surprised when digging in and driven off by the platoon’s grenades and small arms fire. They launched several unsuccessful vigorous counterattacks through thick timber and long tangled grass. After a fierce hand-to-hand engagement the enemy finally retired leaving 19 dead and three prisoners. C Company lost one killed in this action.

The battle was by no means over. A third dominating feature, Hill 217, still remained in enemy hands. During the Australians’ fight for Hill 315 on 5 October, the Northumberland Fusilier Battalion had fought their way up from the south through rugged country against bitter opposition and secured a foothold on Hill 217, a dangerously exposed feature. During the night of 5-6 October heavy volume of artillery fire drove them off again and the Reds re-occupied the hill. All next day the Fusiliers kept up the pressure, suffering a total of 100 killed and wounded for the two-day action, but they had failed to dislodge the enemy for a second time. By late afternoon of 6 October it was apparent that a fresh attempt would have to be made from a different direction, the north, and the Australian Battalion’s B Company was
assigned the mission of capturing high ground in that direction which would make the enemy’s position on Hill 217 untenable. The ground was situated in the vicinity of PaeksoK-tong, a key terrain to Hill 217.

B Company’s objective was the Hinge, behind PaeksoK-tong, about one kilometer north of Hill 217. Once this was secure in UN hands the Red Chinese were beaten.

**Hills 315 and 217**

On the evening of 6 October, B Company moved to the advanced post held by No. 8 Platoon of C Company led by Lieutenant Pembroke) and prepared for the assault. At first light, on 7 October, Colonel Hassett moved his command post to Hill 315, from where he directed to attack against the Hinge. The jump-off was delayed until 0800 hours to allow the mist to rise and permit a heavy artillery preparation, tank and machine-gun barrage. The Red Chinese kept down in the grassy timbered country and allowed B Company’s two forward platoons through before trying to close a pincers on company headquarters and the reserve platoon.

It was a bitter fight and one of the most decisive battles that the Australians had experienced in Korea. The reserve platoon and company headquarters suffered heavy casualties but the enemy suffered far more and finally broke and scattered. Captain Nicholls, the Company Commander, quickly consolidated his position and prepared for a counterattack. Several minor enemy counterattacks occurred that day but after a time it was obvious that the Reds were waiting for nightfall to make their effort. The shellfire that day was remarkably heavy. By this time the Red Chinese had recovered from their initial surprise and had moved additional guns and mortars to deal with, by now, the isolated attack. The battalion casualty rate began to rise rapidly.

For a half hour from 1930, an ominous silence pervaded the battlefield, and at 2000 hours it came -- the heaviest and most concentrated shelling, chiefly on the two forward companies, B and C, that the Chinese had yet produced. For thirty minutes it continued, that nerve-racking thunder of exploding shells. The first volley blasted the telephone cables, and in all, hundreds of rounds fell in what was up to then the Commuists’ biggest artillery effort of the war. At 2030, when the shelling eased the enemy attacked B Company on three sides, front west and east. Instead they found the defenders resolute and confident; in place of disorganized defences they met a blazing perimeter of Australian rifles and machine-guns. Again and again, the Red Chinese attacked but in vain. The friendly artillery was now in full swing and the
enemy was sent reeling back - - his hopes of an easy victory completely shattered.

Three times that night the enemy counterattacked, each time without success. Before day break the enemy gave up at 0500 hours, 8 October and withdrew leaving 120 dead and wounded. At first light the weary and heavy eyed Australians held their rifle fire while the Chinese stretcher bearers removed the enemy casualties.

The Hinge, one of critical terrain features in the west of the Imjin Bulge, now firmly in UN hands and that day the Scottish Borderers took over from the exhausted Australian Battalion. A Company from the Borderers occupied Hill 217 without opposition. The Red Chinese had had it in that sector and withdrew all along the line. The final clearance of the Maryangsan feature, in which Hills 355, 315 and 217 were key defense holds, completed Operation Commando. In six day’s fighting the Australian Battalion attacked deep into the Red Chinese formidable fortified positions, occupying the key hill mass area in the I US Corps front. The Battalion had suffered 20 killed and 104 wounded during the period. Intelligence summaries estimated that the Commonwealth Division’s first major battle had broken up the elements of at least two enemy regiments and inflicted casualties close on 1,000 including more than 100 prisoners.

On 12 October General Van Fleet, Commander of the Eighth US Army, sent his congratulations to the Commonwealth Commanders and the Australian Battalion received particular praise from Major General Cassels and from Brigade Headquarters.

Section 8. The Second Winter Action
(November 1951 - March 1952)

Hills 217 - 315

Until the end of October, after Operation Commando, was a quiet period not only for the Australian Battalion but for whole Commonwealth Division. There was a command change-over, however, that, on 25 October, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) J. F. M. MacDonald, former Scottish Borders Battalion Commander, assumed command of the 28th Brigade from Brigadier G. Taylor.

The new front, the Jamestown Line, was about 19 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. Here, the Commonwealth Division spent the next few weeks reorganizing and consolidating the new positions with wire and mines.
Because of the almost endless heavy artillery fire the new shelters were dug in 3.5-meter deep with a one and a half-meter overhead cover strong enough to sustain the direct hits.

The enemy, meanwhile, centered the continued efforts to build up in terms of manpower strength, supplies, and defense position throughout the period. And there was every indication the Communists would attempt to break the UN line and regain their lost positions before the winter set in.

The night of 2-3 November saw the enemy attack on the Canadian troops but was beaten off. A series of vigorous enemy attacks repeated thereafter but the Reds met repeated defeat with heavy casualties, with the exception that they gained back some of the features captured in Operation Commando. During this enemy offensive, on the night of the 4th, the Red Chinese launched a strenuous attack against the Scottish Borderers Battalion positions on Hill 217 and 315, which were won by the Australians after bitter battle in early October during Operation Commando. Despite a heroic effort the Borderers failed to hold the two hills.

At about 1200 hours on the next day, the Australian troops joined a counterattack towards Hill 315 but halted en route, as the Leicesters failed to reach Hill 217. Several days passed without incidents. On the night of 7-8 November, supported by artillery and a few tanks, the Red Chinese attacked against the Australian Battalion. This enemy attack was in regimental strength, presumably from 190th CCF Division was beaten off only causing Red casualties. Thereafter another quiet period followed.

On 21 November, the 28th Brigade was ordered to be relieved by the 3rd US Division in position. Henceforth, the Australians remained in an inactive status until the end of the year. A feature of battlefield life during the winter of 1951-1952 was the large numbers of distinguished visitors who came to Korea to see the situation at first hand. Among them, the Australian Minister for the Army Jos Francis visited the Australian Battalion on 24 December 1951.

On the talking battlefront, in the meanwhile, after nearly five months of negotiations, the Communists agreed on 27 November to a UNC proposal that the demarcation line between the two opposite forces should be on the battle line when the armistice was finally signed. Consequently, this brought a long lull to the front while the delegates struggled on POW exchanges and other issues on the agenda which deadlocked the negotiations for another eighteen months.

After a spell in reserve the 3rd Australian, with the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, returned back into the frontline on Imjin River sector on 18 January 1952. Here, it took over from the 1st Battalion, the 22nd Canadian Regiment
on the western slopes of the Kowang-san, better known as "Little Gibraltar," captured during "Operation Commando," the Australians remained there for three months.

The 28th Brigade sector of the Jamestown Line was about 48 kilometers north of Seoul (80 kilometers by road) and not far from the truce talk center at Panmunjom. The Australians were dug in along three bare, brown hilltops, about 170 meters high, looking over five double aprons of barbed wire and a minefield to the valley which climbed up to another ridge about 3,000 meters away. The enemy lines were based on Hill 227 (220 on the new map), northeast of Un-kol. The Hill 355 (Kowang-san) was one and a half kilometers due east in distance. (See Sketch Map 5.)

Here were the razor-ridged hills and springy, thorny growth, with trenches following the spine of a mountain terrain and deep shelters let in on slopes dropping away from the enemy. In addition, the winter months of Korea were bitterly cold to such an extent that tea froze in the pot within a few minutes.

Everyday at dawn and dusk the whole battalion stood to for about an hour, ready for anything that might happen during the Red Chinese favourite
times of attack.

At night patrols slipped out through the wire and minefields to probe the position of opposition defenses, to try to capture prisoners or to otherwise harass the enemy. Prisoners were hard, almost impossible to capture, although the higher commands throughout the channel were anxious to get them. At this stage the Chinese Communist patrols in No Man’s Land invariably collected their wounded and carries them back to their own lines. Artillery and mortar duels were a regular feature of the frontline life which characterized the ground battle during the stalemate. The fire battles caused many casualties. During the period, ironically, while the sound of battle waxed and waned in the dark valley between the Australian Battalion and the Red Chinese lines, a finger of light, plainly visible from the Australian positions, marked the site of the neutral village at Panmunjom.

**Patrolling and Raiding**

The general pattern of warfare in this stage was confined to maintain the existing positions, and the battle action had mainly been within such a scale as patrol, ambush, and limited raids on the enemy outposts along the No Man’s Land.

On the night of 26-27 January the Australian Battalion made an attempt on orders to occupy and dig in on the disputed Hill 220, west of the Kowangsan (Hill 355), in No Man’s Land in front of the brigade sector. The two Australian platoons attacked in the evening and captured the objective by 2100 hours in face of light opposition. Following the heavy weight of artillery and mortar concentration fire, the enemy made a counterattack putting two companies in force. Eventually the Australian platoons were forced by the overwhelming odds to withdraw back carrying seven men killed and eight wounded.

During the early months of 1952 the Australian Battalion had been remained static without engaging the enemy in any form of action. It spent most of its time in intensifying the organization of the existing defenses.

On the 18th April when its brother, 1st Battalion was being trained upon assembling, the 3rd Australian Battalion was relieved by the Leicesters under the 29th British Brigade in the area of Hill 220, west of the Hill 355 (Kowang-san). The 28th Brigade went into reserve.

It is worthwhile to note that Anzac Day, 25th April, was celebrated by a parade in the presence of the Australian and New Zealand units. There were also guest personnel from the Turkish Brigade and the Greek Battalion serving in Korea.
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It is also interesting to record at this time that, in Korea, a United Kingdom officer commanded the Commonwealth Division, while an Australian Commander-in-Chief looked after the domestic affairs of all Commonwealth troops in Korea.

During May there were no particular incidents except that General M. B. Ridgway, the United Nations Command, was replaced by General Mark Clark in 1952.

Section 9. The Second Contingent -- 1st Battalion
(April 1952 - March 1953)

The Two Battalions in Action

In the meantime, the second Australian contingent, originally known as the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, marched through Sydney, Australia on 3 March 1952 and moved via Japan to Korea where it became under the operational command of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, before relieving the 1st British Leicester Battalion on the Jamestown Line in the west of the Imjin River in mid-June. Hereafter the battalion is referred to as the 1st Australian Battalion to distinguish between the 3rd Battalion, the first contingent.

By the second week of April 1952, the 1st Australian Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel I. Hutchison in command, had completed its concentration in the Commonwealth Division area. The newly-arrived battalion immediately began a six week course of intensive field training in an effort to be acquainted with the combat conditions peculiar to the Korean terrain.

Then, on 1 June, it was to take its place with its sister battalion, the 3rd, in the 28th Brigade area.

It was on 19 June that a machinegun platoon opened up on a lone Red Chinese soldier and claimed the honour of the battalion's first operational engagement. In fact, the line was particularly quiet and, despite intermittent shelling, the new battalion suffered no casualties until 22 June, when an ambush patrol lost one man.

On 28 June 1952, Brigadier T. J. Daly of the Australian Army took over the command of the 28th Brigade in succession of Brigadier J. F. M. MacDonald who left for Britain. The Brigade was now consisted of two Australian Battalions, the 3rd and the 1st, besides the two British Battalions. This, together with the appointment of a new commander, further proved a good
example of the integrated character of the Commonwealth forces in Korea.

The 28th Brigade relieved the 25th Canadian Brigade in the line on 29-30 June, thus, at the end of the month, the brigade was redeployed on the left sector of the Commonwealth Division, lining up with the 29th Brigade on the right and the 25th Canadian Brigade in reserve.

By this time the Korean War had become more static. Both sides concentrated most of their efforts in making fortified positions stronger, while the probing patrols in force continued in the forward areas. By July, however, the Chinese Communist forces shifted their tactics to pour further great weight of artillery and mortar fire in its quantity and accuracy.

**Operation Blaze**

On 2 July the 1st Australian Battalion took part in its first major operation, code named Operation Blaze, a daylight raid at company strength on the notorious enemy-held Hill 220 to capture prisoners and harass the Red Chinese. Armed with flame throwers and with the assault troops in US Army's issue body armour -- bullet-proof jacket, A Company led by Major S. S. Thomson, and attached flame and demolition platoons, jumped off at 0900 hours and within half an hour gained the crest of the hill without heavy opposition. Two only of the six bunkers on Hill 220 situated in the northeast of Un-kol were occupied but the enemy kept up steady small arms, mortar and machine-gun fire from flanking positions. Although the assault party could not eject the fiercely-resisting enemy from the occupied bunkers and did not take a prisoner they destroyed one bunker and used flame throwers with telling effect on the other.

No. 1 Platoon was in the forefront of the attack against the two defended bunkers. Attempts to silence them with grenades and flame throwers failed, so the platoon leader tried to dig through the overhead cover of the first bunker while the 3rd section leader and one man jumped into the trench and tried to force their way down the mouth of the bunker. Both were wounded and mortar fire caused further casualties when members of the platoon went to their support. Suddenly, there was an explosion inside the bunker, probably caused by a percussion grenade, and the roof collapsed taking the platoon leader with it but he escaped without serious wound.

The second bunker ran in at right angles from a covered trench one more meter deep through a two-foot-square entrance tunnel which slopes down at an angle of about 30 degrees. Under the Australian attack the
overhead cover of the trench collapsed exposing the entrance to the bunker. Closing in the platoon blasted the bunker with flame and all activity ceased by 1100 hours. The platoon suffered five casualties in the attacks on the defended bunkers and A Company’s casualties for the whole operation totalled three Killed and 34 wounded. One of the wounded died next day.

The areas where the Australian fought during these days were the steep and irregular hills lining the valley. These hills on the west of the Imjin River were accentuated by the low-lying flat country at its base. From the fighting front the mountains loomed massively, the irregular outline of its slopes leading to the peaks.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Australian Battalion carried out a similar type of raid also at company strength on the night of 13-14 July. Similar resistance was experienced and the order to withdraw was given, suffering one killed, fourteen wounded and one missing.

The remaining days of the month had gone with no particular incidents, except that many trenches collapsed in the 28th Brigade zone due to heavy rain during the last four days. In the following month, on the night of 13-14 August the 3rd Battalion again carried out a company size raid but ran into heavy fire and suffered one killed, 23 wounded and one missing totalling 25 casualties.

On the night of the 23rd-24th August, a patrol of the 1st Australian Battalion was badly ambushed, suffering one man killed, nine wounded and two missing in this action.

The period of the 24th through the 26th saw very heavy rain which caused the Imjin River to rise forty-one feet. The bad weather caused many other difficulties, and on the 26th a patrol party went out from the 3rd Battalion ran into difficulties in the Sami-chon, one of the major branches of the Imjin River and the troops were nearly drowned.

As September came, the weather improved. The new month opened with a brush by the 3rd Australian Battalion with an enemy party about 30 strong, 21 of whom were estimated to have been killed, against one Australian killed and nine wounded. It was on the night of 13-14 that the whole area of the Commonwealth Division was heavily shelled, particularly in the left forward sector held by the 28th Brigade. Later that night a combat patrol of C Company, the 1st Australian Battalion ran into a strong enemy ambush patrol dug in along a ridge overlooking a stream. Nevertheless, the Australian patrol section made a strenuous effort in a determined charge. The Red Chinese fled, leaving two dead and two badly wounded men in their ambush position. The Australians pursued the fleeing enemy back to the Red main lines, hurling their remaining grenades and emptying the magazines.
of the rifles into their midst. The Australians then returned the patrol base safely with prisoners.

Except for a couple of days in reserve thereafter the 1st Battalion remained in the front line until the end of the month, actively engaged in fighting patrols, ambush patrols and minefields protection.

A patrol party of the 3rd Battalion made contact with some forty or fifty, of the Reds on the 29th. Enemy casualties were estimatedly very heavy while the Australians suffered two killed and three wounded.

As October approached, the Reds became more active along the front, which resulted in the heavy and bloody battles in sectors, mostly on the key outposts. There were, however, no serious actions on the Australian sector.

On 20 October, when the 1st Battalion was in reserve, Lieutenant Colonel M. Austin took the command and a few days later the battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment in the frontline on Little Gibraltar (Hill 355) and resumed its monotonous, but dangerous and nerve-racking
Army Troops

stand-to and patrol routine.

On the 27th the 3rd Battalion was ordered from the reserve status to relieve the 1st British Welch Battalion under the 29th Brigade in the line. Toward the end of October there were already signs of approaching winter with the troops feeling the cold at night.

On 3 August 1952, Vice Admiral John Collins, Chief of Staff of the Australian Navy visited the Australian Battalions on his official tour to Korea. The President of the Australian Returned Soldiers League also came to Korea to see the Australian troops in the field.

Operation Fauna

On 2 November, the 1st Australian Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment in the Hook area west of Sami-chon which marked the completion of the relief of the Canadian Brigade by the 28th Brigade.

The Hook, one of the disputed positions as both sides struggled to gain control and was to play a prominent part in the fighting until the end of war.

On the night of 25-26 November a raid "Beatup" was mounted by the troops of the 1st Battalion. The raid, ran into an enemy ambush and suffered four wounded. 29th November saw the redeployment of the Commonwealth Division and the 28th Brigade including the Australian Battalions took up positions on the right sector of the Division front.

During the winter months of 1952-1953, many distinguished personnel had visited the frontline units. Apart from many other Allied nationals, the Minister for the Navy and Air Force, W. McMahon toured the Korean battlefield at the end of November.

In December 1952, the 3rd Australian Battalion, now Lieutenant Colonel R.L. Hughes in command, cooperated with the 1st Battalion in vigorous patrolling action to clear No Man's Land of the forward enemy positions. One of the most successful of these was "Operation Fauna" on the night of 10-11 December. On a freezing winter night B Company maneuvered deep in to the enemy positions and successfully prepared to assault in. When the assault began B Company led by Major A. S. Mann found the enemy much stronger than expected. Exploding grenades twice blew Major Mann off his feet and caused casualties in company headquarters but he threw in his reserves and the Company swept over the enemy killing most of the enemy and destroying several enemy trenches.

But this action was costly one, B Company suffering one officer and one other rank killed, 18 wounded and two missing. Christmas and New
Year period was passed without notable incidents, although there was continued shelling.

The month of January 1953 was a relatively quiet period for the 28th Brigade except for the Australians.

On the night of 6 January a group of about thirty Red Chinese ambushed a B Company patrol of the 3rd Australian Battalion. Although wounded twice during the encounter Lieutenant D. F. Lloyds skillfully extricated his men.

During the early morning of the 14th a patrol of the 3rd Battalion had a sharp brush with an unknown number of the Red Chinese on the northern slope of Hill 220 again on the west of Kowang-san (Little Gibraltar). Later another patrol went out, under cover of artillery fire and smoke curtain, to recover some wounded Australians. The Reds reacted strongly to this and fired some 700 mortar shells on to the Little Gibraltar. Australian casualties in this action were one killed, five wounded and two missing.

Two days later, on the 16th, the Commonwealth Division was ordered to be relieved in the line by the 2nd US Infantry Division at the end of the month and then moved into the reserve positions some 16 to 20 kilometers to the south, where it would be remained for a while as the I US Corps reserve.

On the 23rd a patrol group of the 3rd Australian Battalion engaged in heavy battle with an enemy patrol team, when it moved forward northwest from the Little Gibraltar, inflicting casualties upon the Reds. The Australians killed two or perhaps three Reds without cost.

Snatch Raid

It was on the night of 24—25 January that A Company of the 3rd Australian Battalion carried out operations to the northwest of Hill 355 (Kowang-san). The objective was to capture prisoners by a hazardous “snatch” raid into the enemy lines. The raiders were split up into three parties for this purpose. Lieutenant Geoff Smith was in charge of a raiding patrol party of thirty men strong. Sergeant John Morrison, a veteran of 100 patrols, took four men into the enemy trench lines while Lieutenant Smith and Corporal Frank Mackay, respectively, commanded the two cover parties of twelve men each.

Crawling into the shelter of an embankment before the enemy lines the “snatch” groups went to ground while the Sergeant Morrison jumped into a trench. Two Red Chinese piquets immediately opened fire and Sergeant was forced to kill them both or he might otherwise have been captured. This drew a fusillade of enemy fire from the surrounding areas, forcing the
“snatch” party to withdraw about 30 meters back along the withdrawal route and to call for artillery cover.

Meanwhile, a fierce fire fight had developed on the feature occupied by Lieutenant Smith and his men. Following a pre-arranged plan, Sergeant Morrison linked up with Corporal Mackay and the combined party, consisting of eighteen men, began to move to Lieutenant Smith’s support. After covering 200 meters Sergeant Morrison saw a party of about twenty troops moving in to reinforce the Red Chinese attacking Lieutenant Smith’s position.

Realizing that in the poor light the Chinese would either not see him or mistake his party for their own men, Sergeant Morrison quickly organized an ambush. The Australians held their fire until the attacking Chinese were almost tumbling over them. The opening volleys killed all of the twenty-ambushed men before they had time to defend themselves. In several instances, the Chinese were so close when Sergeant Morrison gave his fire orders that the dead bodies fell across the Australian positions.

By this time, however, enemy troops were in full possession of the feature previously occupied by Lieutenant Smith and his men. There were also large enemy forces moving into the area, searching for Sergeant Morrison’s party. This forced the Australians to begin their withdrawal to escape encirclement. They were too late. Approaching high ground leading to A Company’s main positions the withdrawing patrol found itself cut off by a group of the Red Chinese drawn across the ridge.

There was only one thing to do — fight a way out. Sergeant Morrison and Corporal Mackay made a frontal attack on the Chinese blocking their way and killed six in a hand-to-hand fight. As the Australians made their way back along the ridge towards their own lines the Chinese launched repeated attacks in platoon size against them. The patrol Owen gunners fought off these attacks but the original party of eighteen was by then reduced to fifteen, including three stretcher cases and five walking wounded. When the still-fighting patrol was 500 meters from their own lines the enemy disengaged and the Australians reached safely without further casualties, mainly owing to the aggressive spirit of the Australians. It was estimated that at least 90 to 100 of the Reds were killed.

At 1330 hours, 25 January, three members of Lieutenant Smith’s group reported back to the company command post. They said that a full company attack, launched from three directions, had swept over the Australian position. Lieutenant Smith ordered a withdrawal but a concussion grenade almost immediately exploded near him. Four men only withdrew from this position and one of these was missing by the time the other three reached safety, after lying up in enemy territory all night.
Section 10. The Third Contingent -- The 2nd Battalion (April - July 1953)

The whole month of February was a quiet one for the Australians, while they spent most of their time in developing camps and positions in addition to the necessary field training. There were, however, some noticeable events at the higher command levels during the month. General James A. Van Fleet, the EUSAK Commander was succeeded by Lieutenant General Maxwell Taylor on 11 February 1953. Moreover on the 12th, Lieutenant General H. Wells, of the Australian Army, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Forces in Korea, visited the Commonwealth units in the field, together with his British predecessor, Lieutenant General W. Bridgeford.

As February progressed and March arrived, there was a marked increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire all along the frontline. The Australians were kept busy in intensive field training.

On the 21st March 1953, the 1st Australian Battalion was replaced by the third Australian contingent -- the 2nd Battalion from the same Royal Australian Regiment. This meant that Australia would still maintain the two infantry battalions, the 2nd and the 3rd, upon the departure of the 1st Battalion for home in March. The newly arrived contingent, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel G. F. Larkin, is hereafter referred to as the 2nd Australian Battalion.

On that same day, 21 March, at Camp Casey located on the area west of Tongduchon in the I US Corps reserve area, the detachments from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Australian Battalions, paraded together for the first time. This was possible because the advance elements of the 2nd Battalion arrived at Camp Casey before the 1st Battalion had pulled out.

On the 26th Brigadier J. G. N. Wilton of the Australian Army assumed the command of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade from Brigadier T. J. Daly, also from Australia.

March also saw Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Macdonald take over from Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Hughes, command of the 3rd Battalion which continued an active action of patrolling in the Little Gibraltar sector.
Little Switch

As the spring began, the Chinese Communist forces shifted their tactics to the offensive again although on a limited scale. Their previous tactics were relied chiefly on a bulk weight of artillery and mortar fire. But now they had attempted to regain the initiative, by sending out considerable size forces, from a company to battalion-scale, sometime in a regimental strength, mostly by night. It was apparent that the Reds attempted to take advantage of the thaw season so as to bring the Panmunjom talks under their favourable terms.

In the meantime, the early days of April was a relieving period for the Commonwealth Division. By the 9th of April, the 28th Brigade to which two Australian Battalions were attached had completed the relief, thus returning back, again in the position around Hill 355 on the right sector of the division.

At Panmunjom, the disputed agenda on the exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners proceeded to make some progress, following the two announcements made by Red China's Chou En-lai and Soviet's V. M. Molotov on 30 April and 10 April respectively. The two Red foreign ministers showed clear signs in their statements that they followed the principles along the line of the UNC's proposal--no prisoners should be forced to be repatriated if they did not wish to return to their homes. Thus, on 11 April, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war was agreed upon. This exchange became known as “Little Switch” and was realized between the 20th and the 26th of the month. During it five Australians were repatriated.

The 2nd Battalion

Returning back to the Australian activity, April had passed with no particular incidents of note. On 4 May, the 2nd Australian Battalion, the new comer, was in the forward line, where it took over an operational sector from the 1st British Fusiliers Battalion on the right of the Commonwealth Division front. The next day, the enemy artillery shelling caused the first casualty on the Battalion. The Red Chinese put on a special loudspeaker propaganda broadcast to attract the Australians. It was, of course, their favorite trick for psychological effect upon the UN allies.

The new Australian Battalion was disposed in the Jamestown Line on
the west of the Imjin River where it remained until 16 June 1953. At first heavy rain turned the front into a sodden morass and restricted operations.

The new Australian Battalion went into the line on the night of the 4th-5th May for the first time in relief of the British Northumberland Fusiliers Battalion in the area of Hill 159 near Chomal.

As for the old-timer, the 3rd Australian Battalion, meanwhile, Lieutenant C.P. Yacopetti and Lieutenant A.C. Weaver led a 17-man combat patrol from A Company on the night of 25 May into No Man's Land. When attacked by twice their number the Australians began a fighting withdrawal, carrying their wounded. Although wounded twice, Lieutenant Yacopetti continued to direct the withdrawal. Finally, he refused evacuation until the other ten or twelve wounded were safely on their way. Because of this all but two of the wounded, of whom Lieutenant Yacopetti was one, were evacuated before the enemy again attacked and swept over the area. Lieutenant Yacopetti was reported missing in action but he was taken prisoner and repatriated in the first exchange later. Private A.M. White also distinguished himself in this action.

The following day, the 2nd Australian Battalion also engaged a fierce battle with the enemy around Hill 159. The Reds fired over 500 rounds of mortar shells into the left company position. In this action, the Australians suffered four killed, 15 wounded and two missing.

During the months of May through July 1953, one of the most remarkable aspects of the Korean War by this stage was that the Chinese Communist forces had launched determined and heavy attacks in large forces chiefly on the front held by the ROK forces. July also saw that the chief targets of the enemy attacks were all the fronts defended by the Republic of Korea divisions. Nevertheless, all the ROK units withstood tenaciously their positions and beat off the enemy offensives, inflicting tremendous casualties upon the Reds.

Meanwhile, on 6 June Sergeant W.J. Bruce was responsible for leading a patrol from the 2nd Australian Battalion out of an ambush on an enemy-held terrain feature known as the Mound. The Australians were moving up the feature when an enemy patrol of about twenty-one ambushed them. The Chinese Communists were waiting in deep V-shaped position covered by machineguns. They waited for the leading Australians to move into the apex of the V-shaped position before opening fire with its automatic weapons, burp guns and percussion grenades, causing six casualties. A percussion grenade hit the patrol leader and Sergeant Bruce, of C Company, took charge and by a quick reorganization of his ground extricated the patrol, complete with the wounded, from the ambush position. He moved the patrol about thirty
meters along the ridge and organized a defensive position around the wounded. The Reds, thinking the Australians had withdrawn, moved down the ridge and were themselves ambushed, losing six killed and several wounded.

A week later, Lieutenant A. W. Gargate, leading a 15-man patrol party from B Company, the 3rd Australian Battalion, battled on 24 June with a strong group of the Red Chinese on top of the Mound, in the enemy-held area of Hill 220 northeast of Un-kol village. Corporal R. K. Cashman took in charge when a burst of rifle and machinegun fire badly wounded Lieutenant Gargate and several men. After leading a fierce assault against the strongly-positioned enemy the Corporal ordered a withdrawal but remained behind with a companion to search for wounded. Finally, he evacuated a badly-wounded Tasmanian under fire from within 30 meters of the Communists positions.

The Last Battle on the Hook Sector

Early in July, the 2nd Australian Battalion was again in the forward line, this time on the Hook, a notoriously lively sector on the Sami-chon (River), where the Australian Battalion took over from the 1st Battalion, British Kings Regiment. In spite of its vulnerability, the Hook, situated in the vicinity of Changmok-tong, west of the Sami-chon, could not be abandoned at any cost. The reason why there was no other terrain feature nearby held by the friendly units that could control the critical Sami-chon valley, one of the most critical avenues of enemy approach from the northeast to the east coast sector. The Hook salient also dominated the entire nearby area of the Imjin River to the south.

Therefore, continued air strikes were carried out behind the enemy facing the Hook during the early days of July. Aware of its tactical weight, the Red Chinese had made repeated attempts to take this area but without success. Towards the end of the month, just before the cease-fire, the enemy renewed determined flareup in fighting. At late evening on the 24th, the main objective was Hill 119 or more known informally as Boulder City, a feature in the 7th Marine Regiment sector under the 1st US Marine Division adjacent to the Australians in the west. Hill 119 was situated directly south of the Berlin Complex held by the 7th US Marines. The enemy had put two CCF battalions onto the hill. At this moment the Australians also came under a sharp attack. The first Red wave petered out under intense artillery fire before the enemy reached the defensive wire barriers. A heavy fire fight developed at another Australian strongpoint but the situation was restored there in about
an hour and a half. During this abortive action the Red Chinese fired approximately 2,000 artillery rounds into the Australian positions.

On the following morning, 25 July, the Red Chinese resumed the attack in battalion strength and D Company of the 3rd Australian Battalion moved up from reserve to reinforce B Company of the 2nd Battalion, where the greatest pressure occurred. In the long run the Australians repulsed the enemy attack.

During the two enemy attacks more than 6,000 enemy shells had fallen in the 2nd Australian Battalion area, causing casualties. At one period the rate of enemy shell fire was thirty rounds a minute. The 2nd Battalion lost five killed and 24 wounded, including a number of Korean infantrymen attached to it, known as KATCOMS.

During the battle on the night of 24 July, Sergeant B. C. Cooper, 19-year Australian, was in charge of a machinegun section when the fierce enemy attacks were in progress against the 7th US Marines. This section was largely responsible for beating off the repeated enemy assaults against the US Marine position on Hill 111, northeast of Hill 119 and southwest of the Hook.

The next night, Corporal R. H. Crockford, in charge of a forward rifle squad, successfully defended a key position in the 2nd Australian Battalion line. The Corporal’s promptness in passing back essential reports to the company and battalion command posts was a decisive factor in defeating this last minute Red Chinese attempt to gain ground before the cease-fire.

With dawn on the 26th the battlefield became seemingly quiet. But that night the Communists, knowing the armistice was near and that time was running out for gaining some key features, attempted to make final assaults on Hill 119 (Boulder City) and Hill 111 held by the US Marines, right at the left door of the Australian positions. Throughout the night of 26-27 July the 2nd Australian Battalion had provided substantial support in this action, which eventually marked the final activity of the battalion in the Korean War.

Armistice

After a recess of six and a half months, armistice negotiations had resumed at Panmunjom on 26 April 1953, and during June and July the war was visibly drawing to a close. For about two years the two opposite forces had faced each other across a narrow disputed No Man’s Land along more
or less static defense lines north of the 38th Parallel, except in the nearby area of the talking battle site, on remote west front.

For most of this time the main dispute had been about the exchange of POWs. The chief Communist contention was that, both sides should release and repatriate all the prisoners of war by force, regardless of their will whether or not they wanted to be repatriated, after the armistice was finally signed. On the other hand, the United Nations Command insisted that there should be no forced repatriation of prisoners who did not wish to return to the Communist-dominated areas. The UNC’s contention was based on not only for the sake of humanitarian cause but also on the principles of free will.

On 8 June 1953, the Communist suddenly agreed upon the UNC’s persistence for repatriation of the prisoners, the both sides signed the completed “Terms of Reference” which cleared the way for an armistice, finally signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953.

Briefly, the Armistice Agreement, among many other terms, provided for a military demarcation line along the existing front with a demilitarized buffer zone between the opposite forces. The zone was 4 kilometers wide and included most of the outposts fought over during the period of stalemated and static war but not the main defense lines. The new artificial boundary line, nearly 250 kilometers (155 miles), ran still above the Kansas line, the controlling ground north of the 38th Parallel.

Back in the frontline, in the meantime, in the Hook sector, west of the Imjin River line, the Reds began more intensive propaganda warfare, while the Australians used most of their time preparing for removal of the foward positions and with keeping the flood of unauthorized personnel off the Hook area.

The 2nd Australian Battalion moved out at 1000 hours on 30 July and withdrew to the Kansas Line before moving to a permanent truce area, where the 1st Australian Battalion took over for another term of duty in March 1954, the following year, while the 2nd Australian Battalion returned to Sydney, Australia in April 1954. The 3rd Australian Battalion, which had been in reserve during the last months of the war, remained in Korea for several more months after the arrival of the 1st Battalion for its second tour of service in Korea.

During “Operation Big Switch” while took place at the Freedom Village from 5 August to 6 September 1953, twenty-one Australians were repatriated from Communist hands through Panmunjom, after their prolonged dead-life in the hell of the Communist prison camps. This made a total of twenty-six returnees including the previous five from the “Little Switch.”

In retrospect, the three Australian Battalions, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd, had
played an important part in the Korean war, alongside the Republic of Korea and other United Nations forces. Apart from many other chivalrous and brilliant battle accounts throughout the war, the Australians sacrificed 289 lives for freedom in Korea against the Communist aggression and to further the cause for international peace and security.
CHAPTER III THE NAVAL FORCE

Section 1. Initial Deployment
(June - December 1950)

Introduction

At the outbreak of the Korean War, two Australian ships, as a unit of British Commonwealth Forces, had been already serving on the Far Eastern Station. They were destroyer HMAS Bataan (Commander William B.M. Marks) and frigate HMAS Shoalhaven (Commander Ian H. McDonald). The Australian ships had arrived at Hong Kong, on 21 June just before the outbreak of the war, from Australia.

At this time, the British Commonwealth Naval Forces were commanded by Rear Admiral William G. Andrewes Royal Navy, Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far Eastern Station. Emergency plans had to be quickly made, following the vote of the United Nations Security Council for military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 29 June the British Admiralty placed British Naval Forces in Far Eastern Waters at the disposal of the Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. On the following day similar action was taken by the Australian Government; in Canada three destroyers were ordered to prepare to sail, from New Zealand came promise of the early dispatch of two frigates.

The two Australian ships, together with other Commonwealth units, were placed under the orders of the Commander of US Naval Forces, Far East. HMA ships Bataan and Shoalhaven, sailed from Hong Kong harbor and arrived at Okinawa on 1st July, 1950. On their arrival, the Australian ships reported for duty to the Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far Eastern Station, Rear Admiral W. G. Andrewes, flying his flag in the cruiser HMS Belfast, and were immediately assigned to Task Force 96 under the Commander, US Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE).

First Missions by HMAS Bataan and Shoalhaven

The Australian Naval operations were begun on 1 July 1950, with the
escort of a USS transport by the frigate Shoalhaven, in company with the fleet-tug Arikara, from Sasebo, Japan, to Pusan, Korea. At this time the fate of the bridge-head around Pusan depended mainly upon how rapidly the navy could pour troops and supplies into the battle area. Shoalhaven and her consort certainly wasted no time in idle preparations. Within twenty-four hours of their arrival at Sasebo, one of the Australian ships, Shoalhaven had carried out her first operational mission with the United Nations escort forces. Having completed this mission by 6 July, the Australian frigate sailed for West Coast to join the blockade group. On 7 July, HMAS Shoalhaven relieved the destroyer USS De Haven, and also operated with the destroyer USS Collett for three days before returning to Sasebo. This was her only patrol in Korean waters and on 6 September, 1950, she left Kure, Japan, en route to Australia. The remainder of Shoalhaven's service in Korean waters was spent escorting Sasebo—Pusan convoys.

The first participation by the Australian destroyer HMAS Bataan commenced on 6 July, 1950. At this time Bataan was assigned to Task Group 96.1, US Escort Group, for convoy escort duties in the Korean Strait until 13 July, when the destroyer was deployed to Task Force 90, US Amphibious Group under Rear-Admiral J. H. Doyle. It was planned that an amphibious landing operation take place at Pohang harbor, located about 98 kilometers north of Pusan, for the purpose of harassing the NKCF's left flank. During this period until 20 July, the Australian destroyer, operating under difficult navigational conditions, had faithfully carried out her missions as gunfire support group with other US destroyers, Kyes, Highbee and Collett. The amphibious operation ended in a failure, but it was her first hostile operational patrol. HMAS Bataan was detached from the TF 90 on 21 July and sailed for Haeju-man area to join the West Coast Blockading Group.

The blockading duty had been the main task of the British Commonwealth ships since the 5 July and prevented supplies reaching the enemy by sea either from outside Korea or along the coast. The Australian frigate Shoalhaven had been already operated in the area since 7 July, after escorting the USS transports from Sasebo to Pusan. It was routine patrolling except for a brief exchange fire with an enemy coastal battery at Haeju-man area on 1 August. However, the arrival of additional US aircraft carriers enabled the Australian ships to be relieved to join British Commonwealth units blockading the West Coast, where their aircraft were employed in seeking out and destroying the North Korean Communist Forces (NKCF) vessels in the creeks and harbors.
The Destroyer HMAS Warramunga

August, 1950 proved a quiet month for the Australian destroyer *Bataan* with three weeks in port and ten days on the West Coast patrol, ending when the ship entered Pusan late in the month. At this time the military position of the UN forces within the Naktong River perimeter was still precarious. Though the main impetus of NKCF attack had been slowed, the enemy was still pushing upon the perimeter.

At this time another Australian destroyer *Warramunga* (Captain Otto H. Becher) left Hong Kong for the Korean waters on 25th August, escorting the cruiser HMS *Ceylon* and aircraft transport HMS *Unicorn* taking aboard 1,500 troops of two British Battalions. They arrived at Pusan on 28th August. Disembarkation was completed and all stores totalling 8,000 tons were landed the following day, a considerable feat in view of the cranes available. The ships' companies worked throughout the night to complete this task. After completing her task, HMAS *Warramunga* had time to acclimatize to herself to new circumstances. After that she joined the other HMA ships in the West Coast Blockade, and the three HMA ships continued to operate as individual units within British formations rather than as a division. Their duties were various and often interesting, and each ship normally took her turn performing each type of assignment.

The new comer *Warramunga*’s first real operational patrol of the war commenced on 3 September, screening the carrier HMS *Triumph* on operations on the West Coasts. This Task Element 95.11 performed the usual pattern of carrier operations in the western sector; airstrike spotting and reconnaissance, by the carrier and bombardment by the cruiser and destroyer elements. The initial patrol mission ended 9 September.

Meanwhile the destroyer HMAS *Bataan*, after completing her screen mission to Pusan in late August, resumed patrolling on the West Coast on 1st September. For the first three days she had carried out the usual pattern of patrolling in company with UN naval ships by day for mutual support against possible air attack and was detached by night for inshore blockade at the approaches to Incheon and Kunsan. During the second phase covering three days (4-6 September) *Bataan* was employed screening the HMS *Triumph* which was operating spotting aircraft in support of the cruiser HMS *Jamaica*’s bombardments in the Incheon and Kunsan areas. The operation against the two harbor areas were of particular importance for it appeared likely that Incheon harbor would be the scene of a mighty amphibious landing designed to cut off and destroy the NKCF attacking the
Naktong River defense line or Pusan perimeter. Kunsan was at the top of list if the Inchon plan had to be cancelled, and in case it was to be the scene of deceptive operations designed to draw attention away from Inchon.

At the time when this great landing operation was to begin, the Australian frigate Shoalhaven, as above mentioned, left the battle field for home. She steamed 17,600 kilometers during her brief four months' participation in the war. From Shoalhaven's departure only two destroyers—HMAS Warramunga and Bataan—served in the Korean Waters until the arrival of another Australian frigate Murchison, in May, 1951.

Before and After Inchon Landing

After HMAS Shoalhaven's departure for home, one of the remaining destroyer HMAS Bataan began the final phase of her patrol in the Inchon and Kunsan areas on 7 September, again screening HMS Triumph on east coast air attacks against Wonsan. On 11 September, Bataan returned to Sasebo for refueling. The destroyer came back to west coast on the following day and was involved in the operation in support of forces at sea during the course of the landing at Inchon. There the Australian destroyer Bataan joined her sister-ship, HMAS Warramunga which was screening HMS Triumph in company with the British destroyers, Charity, Cockade and Concord, and the two HMA ships, as part of TG 95.1 (West Coast Blockade Group), from the 12th to the 21st September, had operated together in support of the largest scale UN naval forces assembled off the west coast for the amphibious landings ending with the capture of Inchon on 15th September. Though they were at this time in TG 95.1 instead of TF 96, the Australian ships were still under the orders of Admiral Andrewes and still serving on the west coast; only the number and official designation of their task group had changed.

As is generally known, as a result of the success of the Inchon Landing it became evident that many of the islands on the West Coast would fall into friendly hands. Commonwealth destroyers and frigates carried out the majority of these missions. In particular, HMAS Warramunga in September carried out one of the most successful. Not a gun was fired, though the ship was at action stations all the time. Instead, the Warramunga sent ashore rise in place of shells to feed hundreds of ROK islanders and several lighthouse-keepers who were marooned by the war on their islands. There was nothing particular to record the Australian destroyers' activities during
the landing operation except for the rice transportation, but after the success of the Inchon landing, HMAS *Bataan* had an interesting experience off a tiny island at the entrance to Kunsan harbor, Osik-do.

On 27 September HMAS *Bataan* relieved the Canadian destroyer *Sioux* and in company with HMCS *Athabaskan* assumed responsibility for blockading the Kunsan area. In the afternoon the destroyers *Bataan* and *Athabaskan* joined forces to give the island a thorough pounding, as NKCF, alarmed by the ROK assault two days before, had reinforced the Osik-do with several hundred fresh troops. Their bombardments were deadly accurate, and one target after another was systematically destroyed. the Canadian destroyer moved north to watch for enemy coastal traffic, but the Australian destroyer *Bataan* remained in the Kunsan area that night.

In the following morning of 28 September, *Bataan* set to work on mine demolition in company with the Canadian destroyer which returned to the island. What with mines and with the shallow water, it would have been dangerous to take the ships close enough inshore to destroy the mines, but they experienced good fortune and another four mines were destroyed and a new minefield was discovered. The destroyers joined forces in the afternoon for a bombardment of the Beija Bay area between 36°12' North and 126°01' East. After the bombardment, the Canadian destroyer was relieved by HMAS *Warramunga* on the morning of 29 September. On day before, *Warramunga*, after embarking Admiral Andrewes (Commander of Blockade Group West Coast) during her brief visit to Sasebo, arrived at the approaches to Inchon. There also Commander of the 7th Fleet (Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, USN) came on board for a brief conference prior to taking part in the official turnover of Seoul to the ROK civil administration. Upon completion of this duty, *Warramunga* relieved the Canadian destroyer for the Kunsan patrol, and proceeded to that area, joining *Bataan*, they carried out patrols and bombardments until 4 October, enforcing the blockade and harassing the withdrawing NKCF. Having completed seven weeks on their patrols, the Australian destroyer departed for Sasebo on 4 October.

Meanwhile, the UN naval forces prepared to carry out the Wonsan Landing. While this plan was being prepared, the two Australian destroyers spent most of their time in Sasebo cleaning boilers, undergoing minor repairs and generally readying themselves for their next mission.
Operation off Wonsan Harbor

On 8th October Warramunga reported for duty at Sasebo to CTG 95, Rear Admiral A. F. Smith, USN, and was assigned as part of the British forces scheduled to join the main body of the US forces for the amphibious landings at Wonsan. On 10 October HMAS Warramunga sailed from Sasebo in company with HMS Cockade and HMCS Athabaskan to join the Gunfire Support Group (TG 95.2). Rendezvous was made on the following day with main body and the group sailed to carry out its assigned bombardment missions. The first mission was against the industrial city of Chongjin. The bombardment was carried out on 12 October by the battleship USS Missouri and the cruisers, USS Helena, Worcester and HMS Ceylon, with the Commonwealth destroyers screening. The main targets were the road and rail communications system and the purely military objectives, since it was the UN Command's plan to leave all strategic targets, such as oil refineries and factories, to the Air Force. The fact that within the Chongjin Iron Works there was a large rail concentration, enabled Missouri to pound that
particular strategic target to bits; the Air Force could hardly take offense if some of the 16-inch shells happened to miss the railway tracks.

The following day, 13 October, the Gunfire Support Group split up temporarily to range along the coast north of Wonsan looking for profitable targets. HMAS Warramunga, acting as mine detection and screening ship, led the battleship USS Missouri and the cruisers to their targets; warehouses, rolling stock and marshalling yards. Their bombardment was successfully carried out. Until the 20th since then Warramunga's operations went on with TG 95.2. The remainder of the month was spent on courier duties to the carriers at sea and as control ship at Wonsan. At that time, the Wonsan landing had been cancelled, as ROK troops had already captured the city before the planned date.

While Warramunga was serving US Naval Forces on the east coast, the Australian destroyer Bataan continued to be employed with TG 95.1 on the west coast from 14th October. She had mainly operated in the approaches to Inchon throughout the month. It was a routine and uneventful duty for Bataan. (The month closed with the ship seventeen days out from Kure acting as Senior Ship of Screening Destroyers operating with the British Carrier HMS Theseus off Chinnampo. The patrol ended on the 7th of the following month.)

November was a quiet month with nothing more exciting than escort of an American Navy dredger en route for Chinnampo. On the last day of the month Warramunga joined the Canadian ships on patrol off the north west corner of the mainland, the Yalu Gulf, with orders to enforce strict blockade. HMAS Bataan, on the 14th of the month, returned to the west coast and joined CTF 95.12 HMS Ceylon. This patrol which ended on the 22nd November, consisted of a very rough passage to the patrol area, a period as station ship at the entrance to the Chinnampo swept channel and a further period of comparative inactivity anchored in the lee of Taechong-do.

**Chinnampo Evacuation**

While the UN naval ships were sailing with impunity around the coastal waters of the peninsula, the situation on land was entirely different. It became evident in mid-October that the Chinese Communists had invaded Korea. Late November the UN forces had launched their long-awaited offensive, only to be stopped in their tracks by strong Communist Chinese resistance and crushed by an overwhelming counterattack. The Allied forces
on the western front had been thrown into a panicky and precipitate flight. The forces on the eastern front was also forced to retreat. The rapid southward movement of Eighth US Army, which threatened to leave Chinnam- po uncovered, and called urgently for the evacuation of that port.

The Australian destroyers, *Bataan* and *Warramunga*, on 4 December, took part in the evacuation of the UN forces from Chinnampo together with the three Canadian ships and an American destroyer. On that day they assembled north of Cho-do near the entrance to the channel in preparation for the evacuation. After dark they began the hazardous passage through the narrow channel of a mine-field. The narrow channel was also dangerously shallow. The shallow water finally was the cause of the first casualty, *Warramunga* which had gone on ahead reported herself aground shortly before midnight. She soon managed to work herself free but was forced to return to the replenishment area south of Cho-do (designated as Area Shelter) to examine her hull and screws for underwater damage, and she took no further part in the operation. HMCS *Sioux* became the second casualty shortly after midnight, running aground on a bank of sand and mud well within the limits of the channel. She backed off easily, but as she was maneuvering to proceed up-stream, again the starboard fouled the mooring wire of an unlit buoy which had drifted into the channel. It proved impossible to free the screw, so the destroyer was forced to return to Area Shelter.

The four remaining destroyers except for two ships which had stranded continued to navigate the 48 kilometers of the shallow channel in the Tae-dong River estuary to cover the withdrawal of civilians, non-combat military personnel, and wounded from the Pyongyang area. They encountered heavy seas and snowstorms enroute to the mouth of the river, with orders to provide necessary gunfire support and antiaircraft fire during the loading of casualties and port personnel. During the operation, Sea Furies and fireflies from the British lightfleet carrier HMS *Theseus*, wearing the flag of Vice Admiral W. G. Andrewes (who had just been promoted), flew air patrols over the flotilla.

Slowly, the four destroyers began the passage of the twisting swept channel through the minefield which in many places was only some 500 meters wide. Visibly was almost nil, and it was not until 0330 hours on 5 December that HMCS *Cayuga* anchored abreast of the main docks at Chinnampo. The Australian ship *Bataan* and USS *Forrest Royal* in the meantime had anchored near the southern entrance to the harbor, while HMCS *Athabaskan* proceeded further up-stream and anchored north of the city. They were at action stations waiting for dawn and possible enemy air attack, but everything was quiet.

That day the transports were loaded with ROK civilian refugees, and
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military personnel. Altogether about 7,700 personnel were evacuated from Chinnampo without interference by the enemy. When the last transports had left the port, all the oil storage tanks, dock and harbor installations, and supply dumps of the city were bombarded by the naval units but the commercial and civilian parts were untouched.

The Chinnampo operation was successfully completed by evening of the 5th of December.

The remainder of the month HMAS ships continued to spend their time patrolling the west coast. From 7th to 17th December, Batuan and Warramunga were employed screening HMSC Theseus with Task Element 95.12, as the Inchon Support Element. The Task Element operated in direct support of the UN ground forces ashore then holding a line stretching east from Inchon and covering Seoul. The line proved static during the Australian ships' period in the sector, though daily bombardments using air spotters from the 25th US Infantry Division proved valuable experience. The Inchon patrol marked the close of six months arduous service in the Far East for the Australian destroyers. Christmas Day was spent at Inchon with heavy snow falling and extremely low temperatures. It was a busy month with many excursions and alarms in a period of withdrawal for the UN forces.

Section 2. Second Six Months Period
(January - June 1951)

The early months of 1951 were times of danger for the UN forces in Korea. By early January, the situation had become critical. The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) had broken the UN lines north of Seoul in the sector held by the 1 US Corps and once again Seoul was occupied by the enemy. The strategic retreat by UN forces was not an overwhelming defeat as defense positions had been prepared some 25 kilometers south of the Han River enabling the troops to withdraw in an orderly manner. At this position, the UN forces made preparations for its counteroffensive. There were three series of counterattacks, the first series launched on 25 January, the second on 21 February and the third on 7 March. The UN ground forces pushed the enemy back, forcing them out of Seoul and back across the 38th Parallel. By early April, the UN forces had seized the territory more or less along the 38th Parallel.
Two Destroyers’ Activity on Both Coasts

The first few days of January, 1951 found the Australian warships, Warramunga and Bataan, still at Inchon harbor assisting in the evacuation of UN troops. The evacuation was completed on the 4th and by the following day, the gun fire support ships, including USS Rochester and HMS Ceylon, were the only vessels left in the area. These vessels remained, behind maintaining harassment fire until 9 January when the group was disbanded and the Australian ships left for Kure for their half yearly docking. The ships, after undergoing repairs and maintenance in Kure, had spent 45 days off the coast of Sasebo on patrols, screening exercises and gun fire support exercises.

On 3 February, the Australian ship Warramunga returned to operational duty. At this time, she joined the TG 95.2 (American Destroyer Group) led by the USS English on the east coast off Kangnung City. Coastal harassing fire in the area was performed by the destroyers that day, and the Australian ship, for the following two days had carried out the screening of the cruiser USS Manchester and the battleship USS Missouri.

Late on 5 February, HMAS Warramunga and USS Lind proceeded north to 38°05’ on the coast, where USS Lind had previously landed an intelligence party. This party had been captured by the North Koreans who, using their captured equipment, arranged a rendezvous with Lind. Unbeknown to the enemy, their deception was discovered and the two destroyers planned unpleasant surprise. At the time the enemy showed the pre-arranged signal, Warramunga’s Commander commented; “USS Lind asked me if light was bright enough for an aiming mark and I replied it could be brighter. The enemy obliged by turning up to full brilliancy. We then opened up as fast as we could fire. Warramunga expended 59 rounds of 4.7 inch USS Lind about the same amount. The light went out. Subsequent intelligence confirmed that one North Korean company, some North Korean police and a large Intelligence team who were assembled as a reception committee, were mostly killed or wounded. As the range was less than 3,000 meters and the fire was extremely rapid the result was not surprising.”

Proceeding north, the two destroyers bombarded a number of targets on the east coast before finally rejoining USS Missouri for a few hours on 7 February before the battleship left the area. The remaining ships of the bombardment group stood off the coast maintaining harassing fire until 12 February. After the cruiser USS Manchester had completed a shelling of Tanchon, just below Songjin, the task group withdrew to the south enroute for Sasebo.
Two further east coast operations were carried out by the Australian ship Warramunga during February, in company with HMS Belfast and USS Lind. They performed some impressive exhibitions of rapid inshore bombardment, the most remarkable being at Wonsan after navigating some 37 kilometers of channel through minefields. They anchored off an enemy-held island and destroyed key positions with their guns following an effective US air strike. They then settled down to serious business off Wonsan with a variety of bombardments. These efforts, combined with continuous bombardments by US ships for 16 days in succession, forced the enemy to abandon the coastal road for less serviceable roads inland, where their troops and supplies were under constant air strike. After that, HMAS Warramunga was relieved by USS Borie for the gun fire support off Kangnung.

While Warramunga was serving on the east coast, another Australian destroyer Bataan, at Sasebo on 21 February, met her namesake, the light carrier USS Bataan which had been operating in the waters for several weeks. The following day was involved in forming a unit on the screen of the cruiser HMS Belfast to begin west coast patrols, after seven weeks break from operational duty. Her patrol, which continued until 6 March was carried out under Arctic weather conditions, consisting in the main of inshore patrols between Inchon and Chinnampo and a full scale amphibious demonstration (2-6 March) north of Haemji designed to relieve pressure on the central front where CCF were massing to assume the offensive. It included air strikes from USS Bataan; minesweeping operations, pre-assault bombardment and convoy escort work. HMAS Bataan's part consisted of escort and bombardment duties, and was performed in temperatures of 13°F. On 6 March, the ship returned to Sasebo.

Only for five days in February the Australian ships had been spent out of the operational areas, and more than 1,000 rounds of 4.7 inch had been fired in anger. In addition, nearly 5,000 miles had been steamed. Warramunga's patrol on the east coast ended on the 4th of March when she was relieved by the USS Borie.

**Joint Operations with the other UN Naval Forces**

March, 1951, opened with HMAS Bataan's returning to the west coast on the 13th of the month. She began the screen mission with her namesake, USS Bataan. The two Bataans operated as a happy team until the Australian destroyer was relieved by USS Borie. The remainder of the patrol which ended on 25 March, was taken up mainly by Harbor Entrance Control in the approaches to Inchon and finally two days in the harbor and thence to Sasebo.
HMAS *Warramunga* experienced damage due to gales and was forced to be idle in March and early April. It was not until the 11th of April that she returned to the west coast, when she relieved HMS *Black Swan* as CTE 95.12, West Coast Blockade Group.

The first period of her patrol (11-16 April) consisted of reorganizing a patrol of the ROK Navy units on the east coast and gaining intelligence for CTE 95.15 (*HMS Belfast*) during operations in the Yalu Gulf. On 17 April, HMAS *Warramunga* turned over command of TE 95.12 to HMS *Belfast* and proceeded to the Haenju-man area to assume control of ROK naval minesweepers. Supervision of the sweeping operations continued for two days when she joined HMS *Comus* for mine search patrol and bombardment duties. Her patrol finally ended on 21 April with operations off the Inchon approaches.

Screening of one of the west coast carrier element (*HMS Glory*) began on 26 April with *Warramunga* as the screen commander. Her sister ship *Bataan* joined them on 29 April and USS *Richard B. Anderson* and USS *Perkins* on 2 May. *Warramunga*’s patrol ended on the 4th of May after a period of perfect flying conditions.

Up to that time, when the two HMA ships joined on the 29th April, *Bataan* had spent its time screening UN carriers on the east and west coast. The period of counteroffensive from April to June 1951 was a busy one for the UN naval ships. Early April, after a visit to Sasebo in preparation for her lengthy operation on the screen of a carrier force, *Bataan* left the harbor on the 8th in company with US ships *Bataan* (carrier), *Sperry* and *English*, HM ships *Theseus* (carrier) and *Consort*, and HMC ships *Athabaskan* and *Huron*, enroute for the east coast theater of operations. *Bataan* was involved in what was to be a usual operation when the carriers of TG 95.1, HMS *Theseus* and USS *Bataan*, together left their former haunts in the Yellow Sea to join in the attacks on the east coast communications system in the Wonsan area. TE 95.11 on this occasion was a truly United Nations organization. Screening the British and American carriers were two US, one British, one Australian and two Canadian destroyers. The carriers flew strikes against the enemy in and around Wonsan for three days with good effect. The comments of the Commanding Officer, Commander R. P. Welland, RCN, HMCS *Athabaskan*, on the operation are interesting: “This international force, involving ships of four countries, worked together from 8 April to 15 April in near perfect harmony ... There were no inter-service difficulties that affected the efficiency of the operations. Communications were good and maneuvering was rapid and correct. Fuelling and storing was carried out from both British and US logistic ships. Command relationships were excellent.”
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**Bataan Completes First Tour of Mission**

The Australian destroyer *Bataan’s* following series of carrier operations consisted of screening duties on the east and west coast. It was a period of high speed steaming in rough weather; during one 24 hour run *Bataan* steamed more than 550 miles and during the first six days refuelled four times. The last three days of the patrol which ended on 20 April, were spent screening HMS *Theseus* on the west coast. It was the British carrier’s final spell of duty before being relieved by HMS *Glory*.

On 28 April, HMAS *Bataan* left Sasebo for the west coast where she joined the destroyers screening USS *Bataan* and HMS *Glory* then operating in direct support of the I US Corps, Eighth US Army. The screen which comprised two American, two Canadian, two British and the *Bataan* operated as a team under the 10th Destroyer Flotilla. The patrol which proved uneventful for the screening ships, ended the 6th of the following month.

May saw *Bataan’s* last patrol of her first tour began on the 10th, when she left Sasebo with HMCS *Huron* screening HMS *Glory*, enroute for the west coast. Flying operations commenced the following day and HMAS *Bataan* joined by USS ships *Perkins* and *Agerholm* became Screen Commander for the next 48 hours. The patrol, which proved active in good flying conditions, included for *Bataan* a spell of air guard patrol north of the 38th Parallel, and ended for the Australian destroyer on 18 May, when she was detached for Kure.

On 29 May, HMAS *Bataan* left Hong Kong for home after steaming some 55,000 miles and being underway more than 4,000 hours on active operations. At this time she was relieved by the Australian frigate *Murchison* (Lieutenant Commander Alan N. Dollard).

In the meantime, HMAS *Warramunga*, 1 June, had been screening US carrier *Bataan* on the west coast, after a period of exercises with the US submarine *Redfish* at Yokosuka in mid-May. It was USS *Bataan’s* last patrol, ending on 4 June when carrier and screen arrived off Sasebo, where *Warramunga* remained until 12 June when she left to begin operations on the screen of USS *Bataan’s* replacement USS *Sicily*.

In those days there were indications that truce talks would soon begin. The first indication that the Communists were ready to discuss a cease fire in Korea came on 23 June when the Soviet delegate to the UN suggested that “discussion should be started between the belligerents for a cease fire.” On 29 June, Washington ordered General Ridgway to get in touch with the enemy commanders to discuss the Soviet proposal. This he did on the following day through a radio broadcast to the Communist high command in
Korea. The answer came in less than 24 hours; the proposal to negotiate was accepted, but the suggestion that the conference site be the Danish Hospital Ship *Jutlandia* anchored in Wonsan harbor was rejected and Kaesong city near the 38th Parallel was suggested as an alternative. After a further exchange of messages and a preliminary meeting between representatives of both sides, talks formally opened at Kaesong on 10 July. It was to be two years before these talks had decisive results, a full 24 months of almost incessant bickering and fruitless discussion which ceased only when one side or another temporarily broke off the talks. During these months the fighting went on, particularly on land where both sides dug in deeply and prepared positions of great strength, the Reds utilizing every lull resulting from the truce talks to build up their power. Both sides continued to strengthen
their positions, and soon the capturing of even a single prisoner for interrogation by the intelligence staff became a major military operation.

The air war was affected hardly at all by the talks, and for the air force and naval pilots it was business as usual. From time to time special air operations were ordered with a view of influencing the truce talks, and there were occasional shifts in emphasis in the aerial campaign, such as that in mid-1952 from interdiction objectives to industrial and military objectives, but on the whole the air war was not greatly affected by the negotiations.

The effect of the truce talks on naval warfare, particularly on the west coast, was occasionally quite considerable. The so-called “Han River Demonstration” was performed soley for the purpose of forcing the Communist negotiators to admit the obvious fact that the UN forces controlled that portion of the Republic of Korea south of the 38th parallel and west of the Imjin River. Of greater importance than the Han River affair was the campaign involving the west coast islands when they became valuable bargaining counters in the truce negotiations. It was the defense of these islands that later became the most important and certainly the most dangerous and exciting of the many duties of the Australian ships on the west coast after the talks began.

Section 3. Stabilized Front  
(July - December 1951)

Completion of Warramunga’s First Tour

The opening of truce talks had no immediate effect on the Australian Ships. July opened with HMAS Warramunga’s usual screening. At this time she spent 23 days on west coast patrol screening US carrier Sicily who had relieved USS Bataan in company with American, Dutch and Canadian destroyers. Immediately after that Warramunga took part in the operation “Han River Demonstration” already mentioned. This naval offensive on the west coast included a concerted attack by both carriers of TE 95.11 on various targets in North Korea. This air offensive was a part of the “Operation Strangle,” which was a concerted effort to cut the Communist armies off from their northern supply bases by serving communications in the narrow neck of North Korea between 38°15’ and 39°15’ North Latitude.

The carrier force consisted of HMS Glory and USS Sicily, screened by two American destroyers, Samuel N. Moore and Renshaw, the Netherlands
Van Gulen and the two Canadian destroyers, Cayuga and Huron and also the Australian destroyer Warramunga. So far as escorting ships were concerned this carrier mission, which continued from 24 to 29 July, was uneventful. One day there was a little excitement when USS Ronshaw made a sonar contact which was classified as submarine. USS Moore joined her, and the two expended all their anti-submarine ammunition on the contact. Warramunga then took over and attacked with squid, but after examining the contact more closely they classified it as non-sub. After carrying out a search of the area to ensure that there really was no submarine around, the destroyers returned to the carriers. A break in screening duties was also provided by the so-called Bugatti patrol. This was a night patrol undertaken by each of the destroyers in turn and involved proceeding to the vicinity of the 38th parallel to maintain radar watch against a surprise night attack on the carriers. The patrol proved as uneventful as the carrier screening. On 29 July HMAS Warramunga detached and returned to Sasebo screening USS Sicily. During the month, a record milage of 8,625 was logged by her, being the highest monthly total steamed by the ship since commissioning in 1942.

On 1 August after one night at Sasebo, Warramunga began her last patrol. After acting as postman to a number of ships in the Inchon area, she joined the blockading group (TE 95.12) with HMS Ceylon at Haeju-man area and had carried out her bombardment mission from as close inshore as possible. After several days, on the evening of the 4th, Warramunga began shelling enemy positions, and the following day spotting planes from USS Sicily assisted with, according to the US pilots, highly gratifying results.

On 6 August Warramunga temporarily detached from TE 95.12 and proceeded north to carry out surveillance in an attempt to estimate enemy activity. At last on 7 August, back at Haeju, she fired a final bombardment of 110 rounds as a parting gesture, bringing a year’s operational service to a close.

Meanwhile, the new comer, HMAS Murchison’s first mission in the Korean War was short one with two uneventful west coast patrols in June. Her real operation began on the following month. In early July she joined the Task Group 95.12 operating off the mouth of the Yalu River and the approaches to Chinnampo. This phase of the patrol ended on 24 July with a successful bombardment of enemy tanks and vehicles south of Cho-do Island, the approach to the Taedong River estuary.

The end of July saw the start of the Han River Demonstration which last until November. On 25 July, the Australian frigate Murchison, in company with HMS Cardigan Bay and ROK frigate PF 62, initiated operations to probe the Han River to the upper limits of navigation, as a demonstration
of Allied control of the area. This patrol began with an daring attempt to negotiate the uncharted waters of the Han River approaches on 25-26 July, followed by return to the assembly anchorag. Here the group was reinforced by HMS Morecambe Bay and six ROK Naval ships.

On the following evening, 26 July, the group, now designated as Task Unit 95.12.2, proceeded and subsequently anchored without mishap in the chosen position (37°48.7' North, 126°20.6' East) from which gunfire could be directed over a wide arc on the north shore of the Han River. The Australian frigate ship Murchison remained with this force bombarding shore installations, troop concentrations, gun emplacements and supply dumps, until 4 August. Fire was maintained day and night with spotting planes from the west coast carrier element (95.11) assisting by day. In eight successive days to the close of July, the Australian frigate expended some 1,100 rounds of 4-inch ammunition. Meanwhile survey parties from her, operating in ships boats, daily added their quota of sounding.

After that, HMAS Murchison made a brief visit to Sasebo and this was followed by escort duties to Inchon en route to rejoin the Han River bombardment group. On 10 August, she rejoined the Task Element 95.12, now consisting of HMS Cardigan Bay and ROK PF 62. The Australian ship Murchison remained in the Han River area maintaining harassing fire and daily progressing the survey with ships boats to the close of August.

The end of August saw three additional Australian ships enter the Korean theater: The aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney (Captain David H. Harries) arrived upon the scene on 31 August, 1951; the destroyer HMAS Anzac (Commander John Plunkett-Cole) on 24 August; the destroyer HMAS Tobruk (Commander Richard I. Peck) reached Sasebo on 31 August. However, the latter destroyer, a month later, would take part in the war.

**HMAS Anzac – Activities on Both Coasts**

On arrival of HMAS Anzac (A Battle Class Destroyer) relieved the destroyer Warramunga at Sasebo on 24 August. Upon taking over her mission from Warramunga, Anzac departed the harbor as a unit of TE 95.11 screening USS Sicily and participated in the west coast blockade operation until the end of the month.

Early in the following month, September, HMAS Anzac was detached from the group, when USS Sicily was relieved by HMS Glory, to proceed to the vicinity of Haeju Gulf with orders to bombard selected targets. At 1815 on 6 September her gunners opened fire on the enemy on the mainland near the Haeju-man area. Her targets included the suspected headquarters
of the area Communist forces. This operation was completed when Anzac returned to Sasebo on the following day.

During the remainder of the month, Anzac was engaged chiefly on the east coast blockading operation, particularly in the area off Wonsan and Songjin harbors. On 12 September, she departed Sasebo and proceeded to the wonsan area to assume the duties of Task Element 95.22 under CTG 95.2, Rear Admiral C. Hartman, USN. The TE 95.22 comprised US ships Thompson (fast minesweeper) and Naifeh (destroyer escort). Duties of the group were "blockade of east coast from a point some 35 kilometers south of Songjin to the latitude of 41°50' North" being some 55 kilometers south of the Korean-Siberian border. The operations with the TE 95.22 continued until 26 September, when, after firing her one thousandth round of 4.5 inch ammunition against the enemy, Anzac left company for Kure, ending her first brief tour of mission in the war. The Australian destroyer Anzac steamed some 23,000 miles in almost three months. At this time Anzac was relieved by her sister-ship HMAS Tobruk and started on her way to home, acting enroute as escort for HMS Glory, who was about to leave Kure on 30 September for a well earned refit and rest in Sydney. The relief of the HMS Glory was the Australian HMAS carrier Sydney.

The Carrier, HMAS Sydney

The carrier HMAS Sydney's participation in the war was an historic landmark, for it was the first time that any Commonwealth carrier had gone into action. Her squadrons at this time, No 805 (Hawker Sea Furies, Lieutenant Commander W.G. Bowles), No 808 (Hawker Sea Furies, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Appleby) and No 817 (Fairey Fireflies, Lieutenant Commander R.B. Lunberg), were determined to show that they could beat any records existing, and they were not slow to start.

HMAS Sydney's first patrol began on 4 October on the west coast, but on 8 October four days later, she was ordered round to the east coast to take part in a special operation there on the 10th and 11th October. Particularly on the 11th, Sydney broke her first record by flying 89 sorties (a new light fleet carrier "best ever") and making a total of 147 sorties in the two days operation, while operating against troop concentrations and suspected store dumps on the enemy coast. On the last patrol on the second day twelve of her Sea Furies (fighters) caught more than 1,000 NKCF troops engaged in the hills. The high standard of bombardment spotting by HMAS Sydney during this two days' operation gained favorable comment from the US Battleship New Jersey.
HMAS *Sydney* started her second patrol on the west coast (Task Element 95.11) in Tactical Command, on 18 October. She celebrated Trafalgar Day (21st October) with a highly successful strike of her Sea Furies against a gathering of junk believed concentrating in the area south-east of the Yalu estuary, which was posing a threat of invasion to the friendly island in the area, Taehwa-do. For remainder of the patrol, *Sydney* provided close air support for the Commonwealth Division particularly, of the Australian Battalion attacking enemy communications. Her Fireflies concentrated on bridge busting and considerable success.

On 23 October, in addition to the normal day’s flying programme, the Australian carrier provided an air search for ditched American airmen in the northeast of Korea Bay. One Fury pilot detected a survivor and towards dusk a Firefly dropped a dinghy and supplies. Succour eventually reached the man in the shape of a boat from the Australian frigate *Murchison*.

Two days later on the 25th of October, a Sea Fury (Lieutenant C. M. Wheatley, RAN) was hit by flak off Chinnampo and was forced down. He was promptly rescued by helicopter and safely landed at Kimpo. A second Sea Fury (Lieutenant Commander J. L. Appleby, RAN) was hit while operating over the front line but managed to reach Kimpo airfield. A Sea Fury crashed landed on the south bank of the Han River and in this case the pilot (Sub-Lieutenant N. W. Knappstein, RAN) was rescued unharmed by a boat from HMS *Amethyst*.

These operations against the enemy communications continued throughout 26 October. A flight of five her Fireflies made a determined attempt to block a railway tunnel between Haeju port and Chaeryong town on the mainland opposite Haeju-man Bay. The primary objective was unfortunately not achieved, but the line was effectively cut. On the last day of the operation, a Firefly piloted by Sub-Lieutenant N. D. MacMillan was shot down by the enemy’s intense light flak. The pilot made such a good crash landing that neither occupant was hurt. When news of the planes loss reached HMAS *Sydney*, there followed one of the most exciting and courageous rescues of the war, as there was not only the enemy, but darkness also to overcome. At 1620 hours, *Sydney*’s USN helicopter was sent off to the scene. Her Sea Furies gave cover over the position of the crash and were joined by Australian Air Force (AAF) Meteors of No. 77 Squadron. As the air group commander of *Sydney* flew low over the survivors to tell them the helicopter was coming, his aircraft was hit and he had to limp to a friendly airstrip. On the ground the two pilots helped the Sea Furies to keep the encircling enemy at a respectful distance by bursts from their Owen sub-machine gun. At 1715, the Meteors had to leave. The Sea Furies had been ordered to leave at this time, the limit of their endurance, but the pilots decided to hang
on for a few more minutes. At 1725, the helicopter, which had been making a good 20 knots more than the acceptable maximum for the type, arrived. At last the rescue was successfully carried out by the helicopter (piloted by Aviation Pilot Arlene Keith Babbit and crew). Just after the pick up had taken place a NKCF soldier who was menacing the helicopter was shot dead with a burst from the Owen gun. At 1830, the helicopter, still with its escort of Sea Furies, some of them rather short of fuel, landed with the last of the light at Kimpo airfield, to conclude a very fine evening’s work.

On the following day USS *Rendova* relieved HMAS *Syndey* as CTE 95.11 bringing to an end the latter’s second operational period. In company of HMCS *Athabaskan* she arrived at Kure on 28 October. During the two operational periods concluded 474 offensive sorties had been flown for the loss of three aircraft (two Furies, one Firefly) and twenty-eight damaged by flak. Targets for Fireflies had been chiefly against land communications whereas had confined their assault to coastal shipping and troop concentrations carrying out two strikes a day in the Han River area. On the second patrol (18-26 October) a total of 389 sorties were flown for ammunition expenditure of 96,280 rounds 20-mm; 1,472 rockets; 81,000 lb. and 174,500 lb. bombs.

**HMAS Murchison in the Han River**

In the meantime, to return to the activity of the other Australian ship, the period of the Han River Demonstration lasted until November since late July 1951 was a little busy one for the HMAS *Murchison*. As already mentioned, the frigate remained in the area maintaining harassing fire on the enemy to the close of August. Entering into the following month, September, she began her fourth Han River patrol, and during the early days this followed the usual pattern and were uneventful. However, on late in the month, there was some excitement in the area.

It was on 28 September when *Murchison* was carrying CTF 95, Rear Admiral G. Doyer, USN, who was accompanied by the surface blockade commander, under whose immediate orders the Han River Operations were then being conducted. About 1600 hours when the frigate under way along the north bank of the River, she came under heavy fire from a number of 75-mm, 50-mm guns and mortars in concealed positions in the bank, at a range of about 2,000 meters. The Australian frigate immediately replied with her 4-inch guns and with rapid short range fire. At the end of her beat she had to stop, turn on her anchor, and run the gauntlet on the return journey at increased speed. Fire was again opened on her and she replied, scored hits on the 75-mm emplacements, silencing all opposition. Although hit
four times, no damage was done and only one rating was slightly wounded.

Two days later she returned to the scene of the engagement. The enemy, apparently expecting her return, had meanwhile strengthened their artillery. A second gun duel ensured fought at such short range that Murchison’s gunners were firing over open sights at a rate of 20 shells a minute. Bolstered by their increased armament, the Communist forces maintained heavy concentrated fire and as the frigate endeavoured to maneuver in the fast tidal river channel, succeeded in holing the ship at several points above the waterline. However, Murchison’s repeated hits took their toll of enemy guns reducing them to desultory fire, before the frigate withdrew to await reinforcement. Later joined by other ships of the patrol group she returned the combined 4-inch shelling ending all opposition. Ammunition expenditure in this engagement totalled 276 rounds of 4-inch, 40-mm and Bofors guns.

On the 1st October, in company with the frigate HMNZS Rotoiti, a series of bombardments were undertaken of enemy bank positions with day long air strikes from USS Rendova adding their weight of explosive. At 1600, she fired her last shots of the patrol before proceeding for Kure for docking. The Australian frigate Murchison returned again, on 17 October, to duty on the west coast escorting the Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker Wave Chief enroute to replenish the Carrier Task Element (HMAS Sydney). This task was followed by a brief patrol of the Inchon approaches. Four days later (21 October) the frigate joined the frigate HMNZS Hawea for a twenty four hour patrol in the Yalu Gulf, followed by patrols off Chinnampo.

In the following month Murchison returned to her old stamping ground on the Han River. Beginning with her usual task of escort to the Fleet Oiler on 1 November, she then relieved HMS St. Brides Bay as “Sitting Duck” on the coast in the area of Sok-do, a small island covering the Taedong River estuary. During this period until 5 November, she bombarded the enemy batteries on the Amgak Peninsula landing parties on Sok-do to observe the fall of shot. At this time her “Han River patrol operation” was coming to an end, having handed over her bombardment mission on the peninsula to HMCS Athabaskan. The Australian frigate Murchison from 6 to 16 November, operated in the Han River area with TE 95.13, carrying out night harassing fire on suspected enemy gun emplacements, and by day, air spotted bombardments on the targets reported by the special forces’ intelligence. Enemy activity was confined to anti-aircraft fire. Finally on 16 November, after a quiet patrol, Murchison was relieved by HMS Whitesand Bay, and departed for Kure for a well earned refit and rest. Thus, upon her departure for Kure, the Han River demonstration was at an end (27 November 1951), at which time the armistice negotiators agreed upon a provisional cease-fire
line. Accordingly both sides curtailed their operations on land forces, but the naval and air forces began to step up their activities. In particular, the navy had been successful in resisting determined attempts to seize some of the more important UN-held islands.

New Participator — HMAS Tobruk

Meanwhile, the Australian new comer, HMAS Tobruk who relieved her sister-ship Anzac in September, as already-mentioned, began active operational duty in the war on 3 October, 1951 when she reported for duty on the screen of the Carrier Task Element 95.11 (USS Rendova) with HMC ships Athabaskan and Sioux in company. From this time until the destroyer returned to Sasebo on 18 October she remained on the screen of the Carrier Task Element on the west coast except for one day with TE 95.19, a group specially formed for combined air and naval bombardment strikes against the east coast sector.

The screening force usually consisted of three ships with occasionally a fourth. During the patrol period, in addition to HMAS Tobruk it comprised at various times HMC ships Athabaskan, Sioux and Cayuga, HM ships Comus and Concord and US ships Philip, Nicholas, Hanna and Naifeh. The Australian destroyer Tobruk began her second west coast patrol in company of HMS Cockade screening USS Rendova on 26 October and remained there with the carrier during daily flying operations until 4 November when the three ships proceeded to Sasebo.

HMAS Tobruk began her third patrol on 8 November, the venue changing to the east coast, where she spent twelve days as one of TG 95.2, Blockade Group East, attacking enemy targets between Songjin and Chongjin. A highlight of the operation was the complete destruction of a southbound freight train during the middle watch of the 18th November. On several occasions trains after being hit had escaped but on this occasion derailment enabled Tobruk to complete the destruction with 4.5-inch gun fire. One hundred and sixteen targets were engaged during the course of the operations and 1,200 rounds of 4.5-inch ammunition were expended.

Immediately after detaching from the TG 95.2, HMAS Tobruk joined the Carrier Task Group 95.8 (HMS Belfast) for a combined two day air-sea-strike on Hungnam. At this time, the air element was provided by the Australian carrier Sydney after the bombardment group, HMS Belfast, HNMS Van Galen and Tobruk had suppressed anti-aircraft fire ashore. Tobruk fired 321 rounds of 4.5-inch. After that she visited Kure for a week’s rest, and on 28 November resumed her fourth patrol and her third as
one of the screen protecting the US Carrier Rendova. This patrol, which eventually lengthened into 26 days, covered three periods as screen to USS Rendova (1-6 December) and HMAS Sydney (7-17 December) and as a unit of TE 95.12, the west coast bombardment force. The period as screen to USS Rendova ceased on 6 December when HMAS Tobruk proceeded to operate independently off Paengnyong-do. It was Rendova’s last patrol of the war.

Meanwhile the Australian frigate Murchison which had spent ten days in Kure after the Han River operation, arrived at Paengnyong-do from Sasebo, on 27 November, enroute to take up anti-invasion duties protecting the islands of Taehwa-do. Having carried out her duties protecting the islands until the close of the month, she resumed the role of “Sitting Duck” in the Sokdo-Chodo area until the 3rd December when she sailed for Inchon for escort duties to a carrier task group, and thenceforth she sailed for Sasebo to replenish before setting course for Hong Kong and a month and a half of rest and recreation until late the first month of the next year, 1952.

First Casualty

The Australian carrier Sydney resumed her operations, again on the west coast, on 5 November. At this time, Sydney was commander of TE 95.11, and screened by HMC ships Athabaskan, Cayuga and Sioux, and US ships Hanna and Collett. Her aircraft hit the usual targets for the following nine days, but unfortunately the preliminary sorties of the operation brought her first casualty—Lieutenant N. E. Clarkson, was killed when his aircraft failed to pull out of a strafing dive against enemy transport. The following days in spite of bad flying conditions, HMAS Sydney maintained a high sortie level against enemy lines of supply and communication. She provided patrols for UN surface craft. On 12 November the carrier reached her thousandth sortie in eighteen and a half flying days since her arrival in the theater.

On 13 November, the single clear day of the patrol, HMAS Sydney was joined by USS New Jersey wearing the flag of Vice Admiral E. M. Martin, USN commanding 7th Fleet. It was the last day of the patrol, successful in spite of the weather as her Commanding Officer, Captain Harries, commented “I am pleased to be able to say that on 13 November no railway line was serviceable in the area covered by my aircraft.” During the period of this fourth patrol she flew 440 sorties, pouring a total of 186,500 lb. bombs on her selected targets.

On 18 November the Australian carrier sailed again from Sasebo forming
part of TG 95.8 under the command of Rear Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN, in HMS Belfast, for a coordinated strike against the industrial center of Hungnam on the east coast. Shortly after dawn on 20 November the guns of the fleet opened fire on known anti-aircraft positions as a preliminary to the first of ten attacks by Sydney's planes, with barracks, industrial plants, stores and rail communications as the targets. More than 100 sorties were flown during the two days operation. HMAS Sydney detached 21 November and screened by HMS Constance and HMNS Van Galen proceeded for the west waters.

Snow and high winds prevented resumption of flying operations until 24 November, and in succeeding days of the patrol severely limited activity. It was not until 27 November that conditions improved sufficiently to bring the enemy's respite to an end. The following day HMAS Sydney's patrol ended. On this patrol sub-zero temperature were experienced and a total of only 270 sorties were flown on both eastern and western coasts, with four days operations cancelled.

On 7 December when HMAS Sydney returned to the west coast after a week's maintenance at Kure, and again representing the Carrier Element of TE 95.11 and was joined by HMAS Tobruk. The first time the Australian Ships had operated together, they remained in company until 17 December. Upon their arrival off the west coast Sydney's planes began flying shortly after first light and the day according to her commander, "proved rich in results." But unfortunately the success of the days sorties was marred by the loss of the second pilot from her complement. Lieutenant R.R. Sinclair, RAN, operating a Sea Fury, north west of Chinnampo was hit by flak and successful in bailing out, died from injuries inflicted by his falling airplane's tail. Four other aircraft were hit on this day and one Sea Fury was forced to land on Paengnyong-do with its wheels up.

Profiting by a spell of fine weather which continued unbroken until 14 December, Sydney's aircraft maintained a high rate of attack. Troop concentrations in the Changyon-Hanchon areas, the Chinnampo waterfront, coastal small ships and rail communications all received attention. On the morning of the 13th a Sea Fury was shot down off Ongjin. Both pilots were rescued the first by a US helicopter from Paengnyong-do the latter by a friendly junk. The closing day of the patrol were occupied in support of incoming convoys CTE 95.12, in his anti-invasion operations in the Cho-do-Sok-do area, including the provision of a constant daylight patrol over the ships in the vicinity. The patrol ended on 17 December with a total of 383 sorties of her aircrafts. Twenty-five aircraft suffered flak damage including five lost. The majority of hits were sustained in the heavily gunned Amgak peninsula area. And also the destroyer Tobruk, at this time, marked her lengthened stay of 106 days.
The Naval Force

at sea since last October with some 30,000 miles of steaming.

After this operation was completed, the carrier Sydney returned to Kure for ten days’ refit, and the destroyer Tobruk was transferred to TE 92.12, comprising HM ships Ceylon and Constance and US ships Manchester and Eversole, and spent three days, harassing the enemy south of Sok-do. On the 20th she also returned to Kure. Towards the end of the year the Australian carrier Sydney had been on continuous duty on the west coast since 27 December when she returned to relieve USS Badoeng Strait on the area, and the other Australian two ships, Tobruk and Murchison joined company for the closing days of the year at Kure.

Section 4. On Both Waters
(January - June 1952)

At the beginning of 1952 the outlook in the war was dismal. The deadlock at the Panmunjom talks left the UN forces free to resume the offensive it virtually stopped in its tracks some six months before, but the difficulty was that the military position was no longer what it had been in June 1951. During this period of stalemate the Reds had strengthened their defenses enormously and increased their troop strength, but the main emphasis had been on fire power, and despite all that the UN naval and air forces could do the Communists had now a large number of guns and a more than adequate stockpile of ammunition. The UN Command maintained its position to continue stalemated campaign on both fronts, hot battle and talking warfare.

Carrier Sydney’s Brilliant War Result

No matter how the truce talks were progressing or what the situation was on the land front, the UN naval forces including the Australian ships, never had any unemployment problem. They had their missions of blockading the enemy coasts, preventing sea-borne attack on friendly islands, harassing the enemy’s coastal supply lines and providing gun-fire support to the troops holding the seaward end of the UN front line. When these tasks did not fully occupy their time, they engaged in offensive operations against whatever targets came to hand: industrial cities and towns, troop concentrations, field batteries, supply dumps—in fact any target whose destruction would hurt the enemy’s war effort.

During the first months of 1952 the three Australian ships were relatively.
busy while waiting to be relieved by two Australian destroyers. During late January and early February HMA ships, the carrier Sydney, the destroyer Tobruk and the frigate Murchison were to return home, and be relieved by the old timers, Bataan and Warramunga which had returned for their second Korean tour of operations.

On New Year's Day 1952, both Australian ships Sydney and Tobruk continued their missions on the west coast. The carrier's aircraft reassumed her active offensive role, giving assistance to the UN troops on the island of Yongyu-do which had been invaded by the enemy early that morning. Tobruk greeted the New Year by commencing her fifth patrol when she relieved HMS Whitesand Bay in the Haeju area, operating mainly in defense of Yonpyong-do. Two or three bombardments were carried out daily by Tobruk during this phase and on 7 January she attacked heavily Chomi-do to prevent a threatened invasion of Yongmae-do, a small islet north-east in Haeju Bay. Early on the morning of 9 January she was relieved by HMCS Cayuga.

The sixth and last patrol of Tobruk on her first Korean tour of duty began on 16 January when she joined the ships of TE 95.11 screening HMAS Sydney. At that time, the carrier also was screened by other UN naval ships—US ships Hanson and Radford, and HMCS Sioux. Sydney and Tobruk began their last series of sorties in bad weather on 17 January. The operations continued until 25 January, the carrier's last day of participation in the war. During this period 17--25 January Sydney flew a total of 293 sorties including one day on convoy escort and two days when weather conditions prevented flying. For the two days in particular, the Australian destroyer Tobruk spent in the Cho-do—Sok-do area, at anti-invasion stations by night and desultory bombardment of enemy shore batteries by day.

Finally after their last mission marked chiefly by snow storms and gales, Sydney and Tobruk proceeded for Sasebo on 25 January and the following day with Tobruk, in company Sydney sailed for Australian waters.

Throughout a half-year in the war, HMAS Sydney spent 64 days in the operational area (not including passage from Sasebo and Kure) mainly as the British Commonwealth carrier of the west coast patrol. Of these days 9.5 were taken up by replenishment or passage between west and east coasts. Bad weather accounted for 11.7 flying days, leaving a total of 2,366 sorties flown. The average daily sortie rate was 55.2 per full flying day. Ammunition expenditure during the course of Sydney's seven patrols, totalled 269,249 rounds of 20-mm, 6,359 rocket projectiles and 902 bombs of 1,000 lb. and 500 lb. weight. And also three Distinguished Service Crosses and one Bar to a Cross and one DSM were awarded to personnel of Sydney for Korean Service. Lieutenant Commander P. W. George, RAN, also received the
American commendation of Legion of Merit.

On the one hand the Australian destroyer *Tobruk* had steamed some 39,000 miles and fired 2,316 rounds from her 4.5-inch armament, spending 89 days at sea during her four months of first service in the operational area. The comments of the Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far Eastern Station, Rear-Admiral Scott Moncrieff, on HMAS *Tobruk* are interesting: "She had recently made her presence known to the Communist Forces in Korea. Fitted with the very latest gunnery equipment, she had carried out pin-point bombardments on both coasts of Korea and has hit trains, railways, railway bridges and troop concentrations. During the strike against Hungnam in November, she was one of the bombarding element which destroyed large area of military installations."

On 26 January when they left for home, *Sydney* was relieved by HMS *Glory* and *Tobruk* by HMAS *Warramunga* which returned to the war zone for a second tour of duty after a refit at Sydney, Australia.

In the meantime, the Australian frigate *Murchison*, on 22 January a few days before these HMA ships departed for home, had returned to the west coast and resumed the duty of Commander TU 95.12.3 being the Han River Defense Unit. Until now the frigate had remained in Hong Kong and Sasebo for spell of maintenance. On 24 January *Murchison* came back to the familiar anchorage covering the north bank of the river where she remained for the next three days, maintaining day and night bombardment of the enemy positions. Early on 28 January *Murchison* left the Han estuary and proceeded to Taechong-do, below Paengnyong-do, to take over the defense of the island of Yuk-som, north-west of Yonpyong-do, then threatened by invasion. After two uneventful days, the frigate returned to the Han River.

On arrival *Murchison* was handed a list of thirteen targets by local intelligence. In the ensuing bombardment, one hundred and fifty rounds of 4-inch ammunition was expended over the thirteen targets. "X" guns crew achieved a peak of efficiency. The ship's company of HMAS *Murchison* then took their farewell of the Han River. Sasebo was reached on 2 February bringing *Murchison*’s eight months of Korcan service to a close, and two days later at the harbor she was relieved by the old timer, HMAS *Bataan* which arrived at the area for a second tour of duty.
Two Destroyers' Second Korean Tour

The old timers, Warramunga and Bataan began their patrol of their second tour of duties early February on the west coast respectively. HMAS Warramunga had sailed from Fremantle, south-west harbor of Australia, on the 17th ult, under the command of Commander J. M. Ramsay, escorting HMS Glory en route for the theater. Sasebo was reached via Singapore and Hong Kong on 5 February and the following day she started her second Korean tour of patrol mission concurrently with screening HMS Glory on the west coast. On 7 February Warramunga detached and joined the nightly patrol in the Paengnyong-do area. Early the following morning intelligence informed her Commanding Officer, Commander Ramsay, that the island of Mahap-do had been invaded from the mainland and its special forces evacuated. The island is situated about twenty kilometers due east of Paengnyong-do and is less than one and half kilometers from the mainland peninsula of Yung-mahap. As with all the other little islands lying so close to enemy territory, it was virtually impossible for naval vessels to protect it against sneak raids. Joined by the US rocket ship LSM(R) 401 and a ROK patrol craft, Warramunga without delay had rushed off Mahap-do and heavily bombarded the newly taken position. Later the same day the Australian destroyer rejoined the screening forces protecting HMS Glory. One again she detached for the island patrol on 10 February, as her Commanding Officer's comments "to trail my coat along the coast." On the following day refuelling at Taechong-do, HMAS Warramunga met her sister destroyer Bataan also on the first patrol of her second tour of duties, and after a further brief spell with Glory, Warramunga detached for Kure on 16 February.

As previously-mentioned, the Australian destroyer Bataan who relieved the Australian frigate Murchison on 4 February, had already begun her first patrol four days later when she joined Task Unit 95.12.1 with flag in HMS Mounts Bay to relieve HMS Charity for operations in the Sokdo-Chodo area, south of Chinnampo. It was the familiar pattern on the west coast, blockade enforcement, shore bombardment and escort duty. The weather true to the forebodings of old hands in the ship, was bleak and squally with temperatures down to 26°F. On the night of her arrival Bataan was assigned a patrol between Sokdo and Chodo some five kilometers from the enemy held mainland for harassing fire support.

The patrolling was constant and NKCF active. On the 13th the destroyer carried out her first air spot bombardment using spotters from HMS Glory to shell enemy troops encamped outside the village of Pungchon, a town
opposite Chodo. Later the same day as dusk was falling a brief duel began between ship and 75-mm shore batteries, ending with silence from the enemy and a single hit on the Captain’s Day Cabin after 78 rounds of 4.7-inch had started two fires on the battery positions. This patrol ended on 24 February, with a heavy bombardment of enemy positions on the mainland opposite Hodo, inland below Chodo. Five hundred and forty three rounds of 4.7-inch and seventy-five rounds of 4-inch had been expended when the ship finally withdrew en route for Sasebo.

At that time, another destroyer Warramunga, on 25 February after spending some ten days for refit at Kure, crossed the 38th Parallel in the east coast of Korea north bound to report to CTG 95.8 off Wonsan who ordered her to relieve the New Zealand frigate HMNZS Taupo off Songjin. The following two days in extreme cold and heavy snow she bombarded Songjin and Yang-do and east coastal railway communications. This month closed with HMAS Warramunga and USS Doyle maintaining the nightly patrol to 41°50’ North and harassing of Chongjin by day.

During the first days of March HMAS Warramunga continued to operate as one of the units blockading and bombarding the north east coast and defending Yang-do. On 2 March, closing to 5,000 meters north of Chongjin, she was straddled by a salvo from a well-hidden battery of five guns and in the ensuing running engagement successfully silenced three of them before the widening range stopped future gunplay. Joined by USS Doyle the site was again shelled before both ships retired. Finally after a fortnight of strenuous patrol on the east coast, HMAS Warramunga was relieved by HMS Morecambe Bay and Commander Farnel, RN, “took the weight.” On 8 March the Australian destroyer reached Wonsan and there embarked Admiral Doyer for Sasebo. The Commanding Officer commented after the events of past days, that “I was rather surprised,” he let me pass the bombline without a go at the enemy’s front line.

In the meantime, HMAS Bataan had returned to the west coast on 7 March from Sasebo and allocated on the screen of the familiar Element 95.11 (Aircraft Carrier Element Patrol) though the operational carrier USS Bairoko (Captain Hogle, USN) was new to the Australian destroyer. However, there were old friends on the screen in the shape of HMCS Cayuga and HMS Concord. HMAS Bataan was designated Screen Commander. The main task of protecting the carrier was varied for one destroyer each night, when in turn they reinforced the inshore task unit stationed at Taechong-do and Paengnyong-do. Patrol which had operated between nightfall and dawn covered the coast and offshore islands between Changsan-got Point and Sunwi-do with orders for harassing fire. On 13 March, USS Bairoko was
relieved by HMS Glory and the entire group retired to Sasebo. The above patrol was repeated between 23-31 March, the screen for Bairoko being HMAS Bataan, HMCS Cayuga and USS Isbell.

Warramunga’s activities began in March with her third patrol screening HMS Glory on the west coast on the 13th. Particularly on 17 March “in lovely spring weather” with the destroyer in attendance, the carrier set up a light carrier with 105 sorties. The patrol ended in gales and rain on the 22nd March when HMS Glory and her screen called it a day and sailed south for Sasebo. April brought another ten days operations on the screen of HMS Glory interspersed with night coastal patrol, followed by a trip to Hong Kong for gun mounting repairs, and Warramunga did not return to the war area until the first ten days of the ensuing month.

During the rest of April the only mission undertaken by the other destroyer Bataan was with the carrier force on the west coast. She had began the fourth patrol on the 7th, an escort from Sasebo to USS Rochester flying the flag of Commander Task Force 95 (Rear Admiral G. Doyer, USN) en route for the west coast operational area. The patrol began with bombardments of the Yalu River in which the US cruiser took part.

On 10 April, Bataan relieved HMCS Nootka as CTU 95.12.4, Haeju task unit, being a detachment from TE 95.11 with flag in HMS Belfast. The task of this unit was to defend the islands in friendly hands in the Haeju estuary, and for the coordination and deployment of UN vessels working in cooperation with the west coast island special troops and Marine forces. The axis of HMAS Bataan’s responsibility lay in the island of Taeyonpyong-do which it was essential to hold. The UN naval forces including the Australian destroyer were one frigate, a US minesweeper, an LST with four LCVP’s (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) and small armed patrol craft.

There was the usual harassing fire against the enemy ashore on the mainland and on 13 April, a creeping barrage put down across the mudflats separating the island of Yongmae-do, north-east in Haeju Bay, from the mainland, effectively wrote finis to an attempted invasion by NKCF. This patrol ended on 20 April, when HMS Whitesand Bay relieved HMAS Bataan in the Haeju-man approaches.

Two Destroyers’ Activities on Both Coasts

During the months of April, May and June, 1952, while the situation at Panmunjom remained deadlocked, the Australian destroyers carried on operations much as in the preceding months. One of them, Warramunga, served a stint on the east coast where she added to her reputation for efficiency
and aggressiveness. All performed several screening missions and carried out numerous patrols, and all served on island defense, chiefly in the Chodo-Sokdo and Haeju-man areas.

HMAS Warramunga's fifth patrol started on 3 May, operating in the stamping ground, Chodo—Sokdo area as a unit of TU 95.12.1 relieving the Dutch destroyer Hr.Ms.Piet Hein. The remainder of the unit comprised HMS Crane and US ships Brush, Pelican and Current and patrol craft. After a brief uneventful period with the unit Bataan was relieved by HMNZS Rotoiti before replacing HM frigate Whitesand Bay in the Haeju-man estuary group preventing infiltration by the enemy of offshore islands, Bataan's main duty of the patrol.

Overall it was a busy and varied patrol for the destroyer. Bataan worked with four separate Task Units (3 inshore, 1 Carrier Element); acted as Air Control Ship at Chodo; operated as joint Headquarters Ship for daylight guerrilla raid firing 400 rounds of 4.7-inch in close support; assisted in quelling an outbreak of smallbox on the island of Taeyonpyong-do; shepherded and policed the 400 junk fishing fleet in Haeju-man Gulf; bombarded the enemy on eight occasions and finally carried out a series of diving operations for lost US aircraft. As her commander commented "The merry month of May, never a dull moment."

While Bataan continued its routine operations on the west coast during May, her sister destroyer Warramunga returned to operations on the 10th of that month with her second east coast patrol, where according to all reports, conditions remained lively, the day before USS Jameson Owens had suffered 10 hits from an unrepentant Songjin battery. En route to Wonsan, Warramunga bombarded three reported gun positions. Songjin was reached on 11 May and HMS Amethyst relieved US ships Owens, Doyle and Evansville made up the remainder of the Task Element.

This patrol proved as arduous as ever and there was little respite from the continuous harassing of the enemy. On the 17th a change of venue came for Warramunga when she relieved USS Thomas near Chongjin covering the operating sweepers. That day 222 rounds of 4.7-inch were fired by HMAS Warramunga on battery positions located by spotting planes of TF 77. Operating between Chongjin and Songjin and constantly on the move, HMAS Warramunga continued to maintain a high rate of harassing fire, attacking enemy rail communications and covering the minesweepers. On 24 May her Commanding Officer that he had cleaned out Mount Katmai's 1,250 rounds of 4.7-inch.

On the following day HMAS Warramunga joined the US battleship Iowa and her attendant destroyers for a bombardment of Chongjin. From dawn to late afternoon Iowa kept almost continuous 16-inch bombardment on docks
and factory area while the destroyers maintained gun fire suppression shelling on suspected emplacements. Air strikes from the planes of US carriers Boxer and Philippine Sea added their quota of explosive during four brief lulls. It was Warramunga's first participation in major bombardment operations although in November two years' ago, 1950, she had escorted USS Missouri to Chongjin for a similar assault. Her Commanding Officer recorded something of an anticlimax when she returned to the Chongjin waters the following day with US destroyer Endicott "to drop a mere token ration on their doorstep."

On 27 May Warramunga arrived off Chongjin from Songjin for the 11th conservative and final day, marking her last visiting cards P.P.C. (to take leave) and dropping them on inland railway tracks. The following day she handed her patrol over to HMCS Nootka and after farewelling USS Endicott with whom she had operated on her two east coast patrols, she departed for Sasebo. More than 4,000 rounds had been fired from her main armament exceeding 3,000 during the two east coast patrols and the balance over a much longer period on the west coast.

HMAS Warramunga after spending 10–18 June screening US carrier Bataan on the west coast, joined TU 95.12.1 in defense of the islands of Chodo and Sokdo on 29 June. The days that followed were uneventful routine patrol relieved only by a "set piece bombardment on American Independence Day in July." On the 9th of the same month Warramunga was relieved by HMCS Crusader.

Her sister ship HMAS Bataan in June, carried out two patrols, the first on the west coast operating on the screen of the HM carrier Ocean and the second with the Songjin element on the east coast, patrolling and bombarding the industrial area of Chongjin and other areas on the coast. On the 21st, Bataan arrived Kure for refit.

Section 5. Similar Recital Mission Continues
(July - December 1952)

The stalemate at Panmunjom had its effect on military operations. There was however little change in the situation at the front until in September when fighting flared up again and produced a series of vicious hill battles, mostly on the commanding terrain features along the frontlines, until the coming of winter put a damper on military operations. But this fighting was really of little moment except to the men actually engaged;
whether the Reds seized Sniper Ridge today and the UN forces captured Triangle Hill tomorrow chiefly on the troops who were or would be holding those sectors. It made no apparent difference to the negotiations at Panmunjom.

The development at the armistice talks had little effect on UN naval operations, since there had never been any let-up in the war. Accordingly for the Australian ships the second half of 1952 was not different from the first six months.

**Last Operations by Warramunga and Bataan**

The first two months of the second half of 1952 saw a new Australian frigate take part in the war while two Australian destroyers left the theater to return home after completing their second Korean tour of missions. The first ship to return Australia was the destroyer *Warramunga*.

Her last mission of the war began on 12 July, screening USS *Bataan* on the west coast. On 21 July, after farewelling HMAS *Bataan*, also on the screen, she proceeded south with the carrier. Finally on 26 July at Kure, HMAS *Warramunga* cast off and sailed for home. Thus ending six months war operations during which the destroyer *Warramunga* had been some 3,000 hours underway since leaving Australia, steamed 40,000 miles and fired 4,151 rounds from her main armament.

Another HMA destroyer *Bataan* was the second to leave the Korean War theater. In July, there were only two patrols by the destroyer, the first screening HMS *Ocean* from the 2nd to 13th and the second twelve days with TE 95.12 (*HMS Newcastle Flag*) on inshore patrol and bombardment in the Sokdo area on the west coast.

The Australian destroyer’s second last patrol in Korea began with a brief visit to Taeyonpyong-do Island to enable Vice Admiral John Collins, the Australian Chief of the Naval Staff, to inspect the defenses and operational conditions at sea on the west coast. A bombardment of an enemy gun emplacement was carried out north-east of Mu-do, northwest island of Taeyonpyong-do. After visiting Paengnyong-do, far-away west island, the destroyer *Bataan* returned south to Inchon to disembark the Australian Chief of Naval Staff. *Bataan* then proceeded to Kure.

On 17 August she began her final patrol of the Korean War and the third of the Haeju-man area, when she assumed command of TU 95.12.4 from HMS *Concord*. Later the same day the US destroyer *Strong* which detached from USS *Bataan*’s screen joined in support. The patrol proved active and bombardment of the particularly enemy batteries ashore kept HMAS *Bataan*
constantly on the alert. On Saturday, 30 August, 1952, spent her last day on operational patrols before relief by HMCS Iroquois. HMAS Bataan was presented with the Republic of Korean Flag "TAE GUG GI" by the Korean leaders on Taeyonpyong-do and thanked for her part in preserving the island from invasion. Some 35,000 miles had been steamed on operations.

On the 31st of August, the Australian destroyer Bataan finally left the Korean theater, sent on her way south by many signals of congratulations including that from Commander 7th Fleet, Vice Admiral Clark, reading—"Commander Seventh Fleet commends officers and men of HMAS Bataan for outstanding service in the United Nations opposing Red aggressors and spread of Communism. Well done." Bataan would be relieved by the second-comer Anzac in mid-September at Hong Kong en route to home.

New-Comer HMAS Condamine

Early August, a new Australian frigate to participated in the war was Condamine under command of Lieutenant Commander Robert C. Savage. HMAS Condamine began her first operational duty on 4 August as a unit of TU 95.12.4 in the Haeju-man area. On 8 the frigate relieved USS Kimberly as CTU 95.12.4 in defense of the Chodo-Sokdo area at the entrance to the Taedong River. This patrol was not very eventful. By day Condamine usually lay at anchor north-west of Sokdo on flak-suppression duties, keeping the batteries on Angak quiet during the numerous air raids carried out by the carrier planes of TE 95.11 West Coast Carrier Group. At night the frigate was usually stationed between Chodo and the mainland to guard against enemy raids. But the following week was spent on daily bombardment of the mainland largely in cooperation with air elements of the TE 95.11. On 16 August the Australian frigate Condamine was relieved HMS St. Brido's Bay and after a typhoon delayed passage the frigate reached Sasebo three days after.

HMAS Condamine's next assignment area was the east coast theater. It was the first Australian frigate to operate in the area. On the 22nd of August Condamine reported for duty to CTE 95.22, Commander Chandler, USN, in USS McDermut, at Yang-do, an island near Songjin. There she relieved HMS Mounts Bay and with other ships of the element began a period in defense of Yang-do and coastal patrol north to Chongjin and south to Chahor harassing enemy rail communications.

It was, for the main, a quiet period for Condamine with suitable targets scarce. Railway traffic proved elusive and apt to seek the safety of tunnels and cuttings. Even direct hits were no guarantee of ultimate destruction as
HMAS *Condamine* discovered when after hitting a two engine train and forcing it to stop, it divided at the point of damage, half disappearing into a tunnel while the other half made haste for the shelter of a cutting. Some compensation for *Condamine*'s disappointed gunners came on the 10th of the next month (September) when a highly successful bombardment near Tanchon ended with the complete destruction of six buildings previously untouched. On the ensuing day she was relieved by HMS *Charity*. In the nineteen operational days on the east coast the frigate steamed 2,577 miles.

Ten days at Kure, 13–22 September, was followed by a return to the Haeju-man area on 23 September, where she relieved HMS *St. Bride's Bay* as CTU 95.12.4. Other ships of the unit comprised patrol craft of the ROK Navy. A fortnight was spent in defense of the offshore islands of the area. Night stations were normally to the east of Taesuap-do from which position the mud flats between the mainland and Yongmac-do were effectively covered and the movement of enemy junks down the Haeju-man prevented. Day stations were normally in the vicinity of Taeyonpyong-do. On 23 September the Australian frigate gave support to a UN special forces raid on Chomi-do, island opposite Changdong peninsula. Strong opposition eventually forced a withdrawal, *Condamine* evacuating a wounded US major and a Marine sergeant. On the other days, harassing fire served to relieve the monotony of what proved mainly a routine patrol.

Thus, at the time when the new comer *Condamine* had first served on both coasts throughout the first two months since her arrival at the theater early last month, the other Australian old timer, *Anzac* (destroyer) returned for her second Korean tour of operations in last September. HMAS *Anzac* had already departed Sydney, on 1 September for Sasebo to begin her second tour of duty in the Korean waters. Singapore was reached on 10 September, and Hong Kong six days later, where she relieved HMAS *Bataan* on the station, proceeding for Sasebo on the 27th, for duty on the west coast of Korea. The following day *Anzac* joined HMS *Newcastle* and HMNZS *Rotoiti* at Paengnyong-do to begin coastal patrol. In this *Anzac*'s role was six days with the West Coast Bombardment and Blockade Group followed by nine days on the carrier screen. The closing hours of the month found *Anzac* on patrol some 50 miles south-east of the Yalu River, where, in bright moonlight her crew witnessed a full scale UN air raid on Cholsan peninsula. On the 4th the following month, the Australian destroyer completed her period of patrol and proceeded to operate on the screen of HMS *Ocean*, relieving *Hr. Ms. Piet Hein* and joining HMCS *Nootka* and USS *Vammen*. This operation ended on the 13th and the entire group then proceeded for Sasebo and thence to Kure. At that time *Anzac* had temporarily met with *Condamine*, at Sasebo, who had returned after performing the last phase of her third
patrol in the Chodo-Sokdo area during six uneventful days since the 7th of October.

**Anzac's Second Korean Tour**

Late in the month, on 29 October, 1952, the Australian destroyer Anzac came back to the theater. At that time, Anzac (Lieutenant Commander W. O. C. Roberts in temporary command) returned to the west coast patrol as a unit of TU 95.12.1 and on the following morning she relieved HMCS Nootka who had a fairly quiet time with the Chodo unit.

The task unit's main function was defense of the islands of Chodo and Sokdo, the former being the site of a Radar Station and Tactical Air Defense Center a vital point in the operations in South Korea. The task group of mixed Royal Navy and Australian-Canadian-American units comprised HMAS Anzac, HMCS Crusader, HMS Comus and USS LSMR (Median Landing Ships Rocket) including some vessels of ROK Navy. Throughout 19 days until the 17th of November the Fireflies from the west coast carrier and the destroyers thoroughly worked out the area with their variety of guns and rockets. Anzac's period of patrol and bombardment ceased on 17 November when the duties of CTU 95.12.1 were turned over to the 8th Destroyer Squadron in HMS Cossack.

The Australian frigate Condamine's fourth patrol began with four days as CTU 95.12.2 at Paengnyong-do in the middle of October. Bad weather at the time was more of a problem than the enemy; snow storms were frequent and there were often high winds and heavy seas. Gales, snow and fog combined to make the normally hazardous west-coast inshore patrol a most unpleasant task. Due to the bad weather during her patrol her mission was reduced to routine watch over the offshore islands. The following six days at Haeju-man area the ship was engaged in daily bombardment tasks: Ten rounds of her 4-inch gun on the 26th, twelve rounds the next day, eighty rounds north of Mudo on the ensuing two days. Another two days at Sokdo supporting the minesweepers brought a quiet month to a close. The patrol finally ended with the frigate Condamine operating at Haeju-man area on 8 November. A return again to the Haeju-man area on 28 November followed a week at Kure. Ten days on patrol and thence to Sasebo and back to the west coast on 23 December with patrols off Paengnyong-do and Haeju-man extending to the 6th of January of the next year, 1953.

HMAS Anzac resumed her active operational duty on the 27th of November, on the west coast patrol, screening HMS Glory in company with Hr. Ms. Piet Hein and USS Hickox. On 7 December, HMAS Anzac detached,
relieved HMCS Crusader and resumed bombardment and patrol duties in the vicinity of Chodo and Sokdo islands, being relieved in turn on the 12th, by HMS Comus. Wearing the flag of Rear Admiral E.G.A. Clifford, RN, the Flag Officer Second-in-Command Far East Station, the HMAS Anzac entered Sasebo harbor on 13 December. The Admiral had already succeeded Admiral Scott-Moncrieff on 23 September, 1952.

On 19 December, Anzac departed Kure for her last patrol of the year, the venue switching to the Eastern waters, as a unit of TE 95.22 comprising US ships The Sullivans, McNair and Evansville. Next day, on arriving at the east coast, Anzac relieved HMCS Heida. Base of operations was the island of Yang-do, the defense of which was the unit’s chief mission.

Commenting on this phase of Anzac’s Korean services which ended on the 3rd of January the next year commander, Captain Gatacre, stated “This tour of duty on the east coast had introduced the ship to a naval aspect of the Korean War greatly differing from that on the west coast. Enemy batteries were numerous and very hostile; navigational worries are few, tides almost non-existent. Moreover there has been the experience of working in what is almost an entirely American force. The weather alternated between heavy snowfalls and days of bright sunlight.”

The Australian destroyer had greeted the New Year’s Day in the theater and on the 5th of January, 1953, Anzac berthed at Kure.

Section 6. Last Year of the Korean War
(January–July 1953)

On New Year’s Day, 1953, the United Nations forces, and the Communist forces for that matter, had little reason to reach an agreement on the armistice terms. No plenary session of the armistice delegations had been held since a UN representative adjourned the talks indefinitely on last October, and neither side had given any indication that it wished to reopen negotiations. Occasionally the liaison teams met for short, futile meetings which were usually taken up with the presentation of charges about the violation of the truce zone and which accomplished nothing.

At the beginning of the year the whole front still remained static. But the war on the both waters went on day after day along the coasts.

During the last six months of the war, it was business as usual for the Australian ships. Carrier screening and inshore patrols on the west coast took up most of their time, and usually these missions were dull and uneventful.
On Australia Day

The first fifteen days of the New Years, 1953 were an unusual occasion for the Australian ships, for they could spend some days in January together in Kure for the first time since the beginning of hostilities in Korea. Everyone took full advantage of this opportunity and there was much inter-ship visiting during the days the ships remained together. Right after these short visits, they were to again part company for the war area in late January enduring the hazards of enemy shore batteries, the dangers of inshore navigation on the west coast and the vicious unpleasantness of winter weather in the Yellow Sea.

The Australian destroyer *Anzac*’s west coast patrol was resumed on 21 January, with Captain Gatacre assuming the duties of CTU 95.1.2, comprising herself and RFA oiler *Wave Prince*, for protection of Chodo and Sokdo area. On 25 January, *Anzac* was relieved by HMS *Birmingham* and then relieved HMS *Cockade* as CTU 95.1.4, which then comprised the British destroyer and USS *Quapan*. Operations of this group followed the usual pattern with destroyers being assigned daily for gunfire support against the mainland. At that time the *Anzac* experienced heavy snowfalls and a temperature of nine degrees Fahrenheit and so the tempo of her support missions was considerably restricted, however the Commanding Officer of the *Anzac*, Captain G.G.O. Gatacre, commanded a task force consisting of his own and a number of US ships carried out patrols in defense of UN-held islands, bombardment of enemy coast positions and railways, and the maintenance of the blockade of the coast. On the 26th of January, Australia Day was celebrated by her bombardment of battery positions which had shelled *Anzac* on 16 November, 1952. On 29 January, she arrived back at Sasebo.

Beginning on 5 February, when HMAS *Anzac* left the harbor screening HMS *Glory*, she began a period of eleven weeks of almost continuous service on the west coast patrol. It comprised four tours of operational duty with only brief periods in Sasebo and Kure. It ended on 23 April, when the destroyer left Yonpyong-do for Hong Kong where she remained until the 7th of May, 1953.

During this period other attacks were carried out by the frigate HMAS *Condamine* on the Haeju-man and Chodo areas. *Condamine* patrolled in both areas from the 21st of January, through to 15 March, 1953, when she completed her final patrol with more than 22,000 miles steaming in the Korean waters. HMAS *Condamine* was to turn over duty to her sister ship HMAS *Culgoa*, a month later, and on 14 April the latter ship arrived at Sasebo and reported for duty to the Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, Admiral Clifford.
HMAS Culgoa

The months of April and May saw some developments at Panmunjom the agreement to exchange wounded prisoners and the reopening of plenary sessions but these led to no slackening of the UN naval efforts. The destroyer Anzac and the frigate Culgoa confined their attentions to the west coast and found it a little too quiet for their liking.

The first operations by HMA Culgoa commenced on 19 April when she arrived off Paengnyong-do to relieve HMS Whitesand Bay on the west coast patrol. Culgoa remained on patrol anchored off Paengnyong-do by day and under way at night until the 28th of April, when she handed over to HMNZS Kaniere.

On 21 April she gave strong support to friendly partisan troops in trouble ashore on the mainland. While an American Sergeant spotted, HMAS Culgoa fired 102 rounds of 4-inch, dispersing attacking NKCF, and killing many. The enemy’s mortars were silenced the partisan troops enabled to evacuate the mainland to the safety of off shore islands. An attempt to repeat this successful shoot on 26 April, when a patrol landed on the mainland to gather wood and draw the enemy, failed when the NKCF refused to rise to the bait. On the 28th the Australian frigate proceeded to the Chodo-Sokdo area to operate under the orders of CTU 95.1.4 in HMCS Haida on bombardment support until the 3rd of May.

In May, the Anzac rejoined TU 95.2.2 which comprised the UN ships Gurke and Maddox, for her second period of duty on the east coast based at Yangdo. Operations consisted of defense of the island, maintenance of the blockade and shelling of traffic on the northeast coastal railway. The Australian destroyer’s part ended on 26 May, when she proceeded for Tokyo where, with HMS Mounts Bay she represented British and Commonwealth Navies, for the Coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.

Other inshore bombardments during May were carried out by the frigate Culgoa. She began her second patrol on 18 May in the Chodo area, spending the next five days daily bombarding enemy positions on the Amgak Peninsula. One day, 20 May, was spent south of Chodo assisting USS Cocoba to locate and salvage a crashed Sea Fury. On the 23 May HMS St. Brides Bay relieved HMAS Culgoa in TU 95.1.4. On the following day Culgoa arrived at Taeyonpyong-do and there relieved HMS Sparrow in command of TU 95.1.6. The ships attached were six ROK Naval vessels and two mine-sweepers for operations and three patrol crafts for shepherding a fleet of 700 fishing junks. This patrol which ended with her departure for Kure on 7 June proved uneventful.
Last Two Months

Very few incidents occurred during the month of June except for a few inshore patrols and bombardments by the Australian ships which also included HMAS Tobruk.

In June Culgoa spent two uneventful weeks on the west coast patrol in the Haeju-man area, mainly on the routine and unspectacular task of protecting Taeyonpyong-do from the enemy invasion. On 13 June the Australian frigate, after co-operating with aircraft from USS Bairoko in a strike against Chomi-do, fired her last shots of the Korean war with a 37 round bombardment of NKC troops invading the island of Yongmae-do. The patrol ended on the 19th when after handing over to HMS Charity the frigate proceeded to Hong Kong.

On the June the Australian destroyer Anzac entered Sasebo from Tokyo and departed two days later in company of HMS Ocean for her final patrol of the war. At 1845, 13 June 1953, Anzac was relieved by HMAS Tobruk bringing to an end her part in operations after nine months Far Eastern Station service. Anzac, on 3 July 1953, entered Sydney harbor after an absence of 305 days. Of these 228 days were spent at sea, 40 of them on patrol in the combat areas. During the entire period she steamed 57,865 miles.

Anzac’s relief, HMAS Tobruk (Commander I. H. McDonald, RAN), who had returned for her second Korean tour of duties, began her first mission on 26 June when she reported for duty to CTU 95.1.2 (HMS Newcastle) at Taechong-do for west coast operations. On the following day she joined the screening force covering the carrier HMS Ocean. This duty continued until Ocean was relieved by USS Bairoko on 5 July.

During the last month of the war, July, 1953, heavy fighting flared up again on the land front when the Communist launched their last minute attacks against the ROK-held sectors of the line, and many of the UN ships, particularly the carriers and the ships of the bomb-line unit, were called upon to intensify their operations against the enemy. But for the Australian ships the last few weeks of the war were relatively uneventful except for an enemy’s sinking by Tobruk on the east coast.

HMAS Tobruk’s next mission, after completing her first patrol duties on the west coast, was with TG 95.2 as part of the Yangdo Blockade and Patrol Group on the east coast. She reached the island on 14 July where she relieved HMCS Huron. Operations with this group continued until the close of hostilities on the 27th of July. Then, on 16 July she sank a large motor sampan suspected of operating as a minelayer. She fired her last shots of the war on the 24th when she fired a few rounds of 4.5-inch at a radar
post installation on Musudan Point between Chongjin and Yangdo.

By this time of the 'Cease-fire' (27th July) the Australian frigate Culgoa had returned to the west coast area relieving HMNZS Hawea at Paengnyong-do and assuming the duties of CTU 95.1.5 where she began the first of a series of "Armistice patrols."

Section 7. Epilogue

The end of open war in Korea on 27 July, 1953, did not mean that the UN forces could be disbanded. After all, no peace treaty had been signed, only an armistice in the field. Indeed it was quite possible that the fighting might break out again at any time should the always-unpredictable Reds decide that such a course would be to their advantage. Consideration such as this made it imperative that the UN resist any temptation to reduce immediately the strength of their forces in Korea. Well before the signing of the armistice the UN high command had made it quite clear that there would be no sizable reduction of forces in the event of a cease-fire, so it came as no surprise to the Australian Naval Forces in Far East Station when it was announced that the remaining Australian ships -- one destroyer (Tobruk) and one frigate (Culgoa) -- would continue to be serving in the Far East.

When the cease-fire came into effect, the two Australian ships were on active operations around the Korean peninsula; HMAS Tobruk was then serving, forming part of the Task Group 95.2 on the east coast and HMAS Culgoa was performing her duties of CTU 95.1.5 on the west coast.

One of the Australian ships, Tobruk did not leave the Korean theater until February the next year, 1954, and the frigate Culgoa detached from her service in the Korean waters on 2 November, 1953. There was very little acting of note during this period and they were mainly engaged on a routine patrols.

In summary the Australian Naval activities in the Korean War were: The Australian Navy provided a total of eight ships including the Aircraft Carrier Sydney (14,000 tons) in the theater: the destroyers Bataan (19,00 tons), Warramunga (1,870 tons), Anzac (2,440 tons), Tobruk (2,440 tons) and the frigate Shoalhaven (1,550 tons), Murchison (1,550 tons), Culgoa (1,550 tons) Condamine (1,550 tons).

In all these Australian ships 311 officers and 4,196 ratings served, and in operations they expended the following ammunition: 9,515 rounds of 4.7-inch; 5,576 rounds of 4.5-inch; 9,983 of 4-inch; 50,417 of 40-mm; and
9,921 of 2 pdr. The carrier HMAS *Sydney* herself expended, in addition to the above totals, 269,249 rounds of 20-mm cannon and 6,359 rockets projectiles. Her aircraft also dropped 410,000-lbs of bombs in total weight. The *Sydney*'s aircraft flew 2,366 sorties in 42.8 flying days, her daily average sortie rate being 55.2.

The Australian Naval Forces suffered: one officer killed, two officers missing presumed killed, and one officer and five ratings wounded. A total of 57 officers and men received decorations for their meritorious services in the Korean Waters.
CHAPTER IV  THE AIR FORCE SQUADRON

Section 1.  Initial Deployment

Introduction

No. 77 Squadron was formed during the Pacific War in March 1942 at Pearce, Western Australia. The squadron saw its first aerial combat action over Darwin in the Northern Territory, where a squadron member shot down the first Japanese night bomber over Australia. In January 1943, No. 77 Squadron went to Milne Bay, New Guinea. Milne Bay, was one of its historic engagements, the squadron, with the loss of one pilot, destroyed four Japanese bombers, one fighter, and damaged another five bombers. Moving from Milne Bay to Goodenough Island, thence to Nadzab, the squadron, equipped with P-40 Kittyhawks, played an active role in aerial campaigns that rolled the Japanese back out of New Guinea and Borneo.

When the Pacific War ended in August 1945, No. 77 Squadron was operating from Labuan in British North Borneo. Instead of being brought back to Australia with most of the other Australian Air Force squadrons, it was moved to Japan to serve with the occupation forces. In March 1946, re-equipped with Mustangs, the squadron began surveillance patrols and normal training in Japan. In 1949, the Australian Government withdrew the two other occupation squadrons No. 76 and No. 82 so that when the North Koreans invaded South Korea, in June 1950, No. 77 Squadron was the only Royal Australian Air Force unit stationed in Japan.

The Australian Air Force Squadron was stationed at Iwakuni, southwest of Hiroshima, Yamaguchi Prefecture, at the southwestern end of Honshu, Japan. The squadron with its brilliant aerial combat record during World War II, and a record of more than seven years overseas, was due for rotation back to Australia. This squadron, which flew F-51 Mustangs, was available to General MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, and it maintained liaison with the United States Far East Air Forces (FEAF), but it
was neither attached nor assigned to the American air command.

The Prelude

On Sunday morning of 25 June -- when the North Koreans launched their attack -- the duty pilot at base operations got a long distance call from Itazuke base operations at 1100 hours. "I have been trying to get you all morning," said an American voice. "The North Korean Communist forces have crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea. We have been alerted and placed on standby, I will keep you posted."

Squadron Leader Graham Strout broke the news to the C.O., Wing Commander Louis Spence. The commander was just leaving for holiday trip with his family before final rotation to Australia. The squadron was under the operational control of the Far East Air Forces, so far as occupation duties were concerned. If the Americans were alerted then No. 77 Squadron would have to be placed on standby too. Spence cancelled his plans for the weekend and reported to the operations room. At the hangars, ground crews wheeled out the Mustangs, not yet stripped for shipboard passage to Australia. The armorer began to feed fifty-caliber rounds into the ammunition belts, fit the drop tanks in the event of long range missions and awaited the progress of the situation in Korea.

Korea is located 240 kilometers across the Eastern Sea from Japan. The news coming through to the excited air station indicated something far bigger than a border skirmish was taking place in the Republic of Korea.

Meanwhile, the United Nations having ascertained the minimum air-defense forces which would remain in place for the defense of Japan, the Far East Air Forces operational planners sought airfields in Korea that were suitable for deployment of an air striking force. Whatever glimmer of hope there was that jet fighters could be based in Korea was extinguished as heavily loaded transport planes tore up the lightly surfaced runway at Pusan. Now it was clear that all of the jets would have to be based on Kyushu, at Itazuke, and Ashiya. The 49th US Fighter-Bomber Group moved from Misawa to join the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing at Itazuke. But before the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Group could go to Ashiya some disposition had to be made of the 3rd Bombardment Group's B-26's which were already there. The Far East Air Forces planners cast covetous glances at Iwakuni Air Base, but Great Britain had not yet announced whether Commonwealth forces would support the Republic of Korea.

On 29 June, however, the Australian Government made their No. 77 Squadron (with 24 Mustangs) available to the Far East Air Forces, and thus
cleared the way for the desired deployment of the 3rd US Bombardment Group to Iwakuni. The 35th Fighter-Interceptor Group (less its 41st Squadron, which went to Johnson Air Station for air defense) moved from Yokota to Ashiya without delay. The all-weather fighter squadrons were shifted according to plan.

The Prime Minister of Australia announced that two Royal Australian Navy ships patrolling in the Japanese waters (the destroyer Bataan and the frigate Shoalhaven) had been “placed at the disposal of the United Nations through the United States authorities in support of the Republic of Korea.” The same day Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, Australian commander of the Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan, signalled Wing Commander Spence telling him to prepare No. 77 Squadron for combat. General MacArthur had asked the Australian Government for Australians, and No. 77 Squadron was anticipating what that answer would be. The next day, 30 June, Prime Minister Menzies, announced in Canberra that Australia had offered No. 77 Squadron for service with the United Nations forces in Korea.

Initial Commitment into Battle

The first order came through on Saturday night, 1 July. At 0500 hours in the next morning—one week after the North Koreans launched their offensive Australian Mustangs took off from Iwakuni to escort American B-26’s on an unspecified bombing mission and to cover B-29’s for an attack on the North Korean airfield of Yonpo near Hamhung. On 3 July, again in the Korean theater, the Australian Mustangs attacked the North Korean ammunition train headed south and blew it up at Pyongtaek. Other Australian squadron aircraft escorted transports bringing wounded out of Korea.

Australia was officially and actually in the Korean War as the first non-American nation to go into action in response to the United Nations appeal. On 7 July 1950, the first casualty of the squadron occurred. Squadron Leader Graham Strout led a formation of aircraft from Iwakuni, Japan, to strafe and rocket North Korean supplies in the vicinity of Samchok, on the east of Korea. After the raid the squadron leader did not appear at the rendezvous area. Because of a fuel shortage the other aircraft returned to base without attempting to find him. The following morning, a mission led by Wing Commander Spence found no trace of the pilot or his aircraft and he was officially posted as missing in action. It was assumed that Squadron Leader Graham Strout dived on to his target, the Pukpyong railway station, 12 kilometers north of Samchok, on the east coast of Korea and failed to pull out.
By this time, although the allied ground forces were making a strategic withdrawal almost everywhere, some semblance of order and discipline began to appear in the organized all-out aid that Washington had ordered. The Commanding General of the Fifth US Air Force, had established an emergency Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Taegu to co-ordinate air strike communications. In the United States, a huge transport effort provided a sea and air shuttle service of men and supplies across the Pacific. Meanwhile, members of the United Nations began to respond to appeals for additional assistance.

Air power now began to be more effective. Every available plane, even B-29, was thrown into close air support tactics for the allied forces. The North Korean air force proved a squib. Within three weeks American F-80 Shooting Star jets had blasted the Yaks and Stormoviks out of the sky. A new technique of pinpoint rocket attack shook enemy morale.

Meanwhile, on the ground the Eighth United States Army and the Republic of Korea Army were desperately struggling against the North Korean Army at the Naktong Perimeter, a desolate sweep of mountains, rivers and rice paddies in the extreme southeast corner of the almost overrun peninsula. The defense line ran from Masan in the south, through Waegwan in the center to Pohang on the east coast. The United Nations forces had complete command of the sea and the air. Consequently, supplies poured in from America and Japan ready for the big build-up and a counteroffensive. Two British battalions were expected from Hong Kong to help stiffen the perimeter.

Almost every aircraft sortie destroyed some enemy targets on the roads between Pyongtaek and Seoul in early July. The combat preparations of the North Koreans demonstrated one major weakness, in that the North Korean Army was not prepared to withstand hostile air attacks. For the successful accomplishment of blitz tactics, the North Koreans required unimpeded lines of communications. By destroying bridges the UN allied air forces could delay the movement of enemy armor.

During the early stages of the war, the allied air forces were unable to obtain sufficient intelligence information which it needed to insure successful accomplishment of air operations. Because of the fluid ground situation in Korea, the allies had restricted their air attacks along a line south of the Han River bank. North of this line aircrews were permitted to attack targets without restriction, but in the south, pilots had to identify targets positively as hostile before attacking them. How the allied pilots were expected to identify ROK troops was somewhat indefinite. The Fifth Air Force submitted the question to the United Nations Command staff and received the
reply that the ROK troops would mark themselves and carry South Korean flags; consequently, the North Koreans would do the same. In view of the confusion, some mishaps were almost inevitable. Such a mishap occurred on 3 July, when five Australian Mustangs on their second day of combat erroneously attacked ROK troops between Osan and Suwon. What had happened was that the allied air forces advance headquarters had received a report that a Communist convoy was headed southward, but the message had passed through Tokyo and had not reached the operating level until several hours after it was filed. Noting this delay, the allied air forces operations officers estimated where the North Korean convoy would probably be located at the hour of the Mustang attack. Unfortunately, ROK troops were holding the positions where it was thought that the North Koreans would be. Soon after this tragedy, and effective for the first time on 7 July, General MacArthur instructed the Allied air forces to establish a realistic bombline and to report changes in this line at periodic intervals during each day. General MacArthur also instructed the field commanders to see that all the ROK and friendly troops painted white stars on the tops and sides of their vehicles, the same marking that served to identify American ground troops.

Although the aircrews of the UN air forces were delaying and disrupting the North Korean blitz, each of the tactical air units was operating under technical disadvantages. Fortunately the quality of air leadership was high, and the tactical air units had begun to meet and overcome many of their technical problems. The UN air forces had by now switched their emphasis from air to ground support to a planned interdiction program designed to cut the North Korean supply routes. Under the direction of Far East Command (FEC) Target Selection Committee, two thirds of the B-29 effort, half the fighter-bomber strength including Australian Mustangs, plus sorties from the US Seventh Fleet and the 1st US Marine Air Wing, operated against rolling stock, bridges, truck convoys and other lines of communications south of the Yalu River boundary with Manchuria from 26 July.

Operating from Iwakuni, Australian No. 77 Squadron Mustangs struck the enemy repeatedly in the all-out air offensive which helped stop the breakthrough. They supported American B-29's on bombing missions over north Korea and along the southern supply routes in addition to flying close air support missions for the ground troops.

Although the counterattack of the UN ground forces thwarted the Red drive at the southwestern end of the Naktong Perimeter, the Communists took advantage of the UN allies preoccupation with this sector to mount a more successful limited attack at the northeastern end of the defense. Early in August elements of the North Korean 12th Division worked through the mountains, struck the coastal route south of ROK defenses at Yongdok, and
headed southward for Pohang where a UN Mustang fighter-interceptor group stationed.

As North Korean troops entered the port of Pohang, and next day the Mustang group had no choice but to evacuate the embattled airfield, the Australian Mustangs across the Eastern Sea made every effort to halt the North Korean Army advance.

Meanwhile on 27 August, three days after Australian Service Chiefs had reported that the recruiting quota for the Korea force was completed, the Headquarters and two battalions of the 27th British Infantry Brigade (the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex and of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) arrived at Pusan from Hong Kong under the command of Brigadier B.A. Coad.

A few days after the United Nations forces abandoned Pohang Airfield, the UN ground forces rallied in the area and drove the Reds out of the port of Pohang. But air force units would not be able to return to Pohang while fighting raged on the Naktong Perimeter, for the east coast area was too guerrilla ridden to accommodate combat air units.

Under the Fifth Air Force's emergency system, requests for close-support air strikes came from forward areas, through artillery coordination centers to the Joint Operations Center, who then ordered ground-support missions. At the front, Tactical Air Control Parties in jeeps or forward controllers in T-6 Mosquito planes (Texans), directed the air missions to selected targets. Planes were thus able to act as flying machine guns and cannon, getting right down among the elusive enemy.

These tactics succeeded only because the North Koreans had no sort of air force themselves. An experienced Commonwealth air liaison officer with the United Nations Command estimated that within three months the heavy weight of air power thrown against the North Koreans was equal to that of any against any army anywhere in World War II.

Superior air power may have helped the UN forces to keep their toe hold in Korea but it alone could not attain a decisive early victory. There were several reasons for this. Sharp-peaked mountains and razorbacked ridges covered all the eastern and much of the central sectors. They stuck out like teeth in a gigantic tank trap, over 3,000 feet high. In the more undulating western sector roads ran on high embankments across soggy flats of rice paddy. Great brown rivers spread wide bands across the tortuous south-north transport routes. By day, Communist troops now hid in the railroad tunnels that honeycomb the Korean hills. And at night they moved rapidly forward, safe from the roadbound UN ground forces.

On the actual fighting front things were different. Directed from the
Joint Operations Center at Taegu, the allied tactical planes patrolled daily over segments of the perimeter, at 20 minute and 40 minute intervals, for target designation by radio contact jeeps or “Mosquito” control planes. By these means they were able to get right down on their targets and break up threatening enemy concentrations.

This translation of a captured North Korean operations order shows how successful air support was: “Our experience in night combat up to now shows that we can operate only four to five hours in the dark, since we start night attacks between 2300 and 2400 hours. Therefore, if the battle continues after the break of dawn, we are likely to suffer heavy losses. From now on, use daylight hours for full combat preparations and commence attack soon after sunset. Concentrate your battle action mostly at night and thereby capture enemy base positions. From midnight on, engage enemy in close combat by approaching to within 100 to 150 meters of him. Then, even with the break of dawn, the enemy planes will not be able to distinguish friend from foe, which will enable you to prevent great losses.”

The Australian Squadron Mustangs played an active part throughout the Naktong Perimeter period. During August the squadron flew 1,745 hours in combat operations. Forty pilots shared 812 sorties. From the beginning of the war to the end of August, Australian Mustangs had destroyed 35 enemy tanks besides 182 trucks, 44 other vehicles, four locomotives, and many ammunition and fuel dumps. In this month the squadron used napalm for the first time.

Mustangs and napalm, these were the weapons that enabled the hard pressed allies to hold the Naktong Perimeter in the early part of Korean War. Air power was a decisive counteraction to meet the North Korean effort to wipe the allied power into the sea in this period.

The Australian Mustangs, in those early months, went hurtling down spewing rockets and jellied gasoline, the deadly napalm. The long, yellow, banana-shaped napalm containers burst on the hillsides in a lazy rumble under a black cloud of smoke. A knuckle of heat -- 1,000 degrees centigrade within a few seconds of impact -- spread out rapacious fingers, plucked at the entrails of buildings, turned tanks into welded ovens, raced over the blackened skeletons of trucks and left dead men bloated with heat and crusted with burns.

On 3 September, Pilot 3 William Harrop, one of four Australian pilots, was returning from an escort mission, armed with rockets and 50 calibers, looking for a controller to give them a front-line target somewhere along the Naktong River line. But they had come a long way (from covering a bombing
attack force over Pyongyang) and gasoline was running short. Harrop called up on his radiotelephone to say he had only 30 gallons of fuel left and was headed for Taegu. Half an hour from Taegu, where he could have landed, he said he would have to bail out because his aircraft was on fire and losing altitude rapidly.

An American "Mosquito" controller, following the Australian Mustangs, saw Harrop crashland on the banks of the Naktong River and leave his aircraft without injury. The downed pilot was in enemy territory but only a few miles from safety. One of the Mustangs stayed to give Harrop air protection and another returned to base to call a helicopter. The fourth had landed at Taegu because of engine trouble. The watchers from the air saw Harrop lying down in a paddy field, smearing himself with mud, then running to the shelter of a hut in an orchard. The patrolling Mustang had to leave because of gas shortage. Other fighter planes took over the patrol. However, when the rescue helicopter arrived the pilot could not find Harrop although he hovered above for an hour. Months later Australian Air Force searchers located Harrop's body.

On the following day, returning to Iwakuni, Flight Lieutenant Ross Coburn's Mustang developed glycol fumes which filled the cockpit and clouded the canopy. In cloud, over the mountains in Japan Coburn's Mustang began to vibrate and lose altitude rapidly. "The plane was going to crash," wrote Flight Lieutenant George Odgers (No. 77 Squadron Public Relations Officer) in his account of the incident. "Coburn had to get out or die. He jettisoned the cockpit canopy, undid the safety harness and disconnected his headphones and throat mike. Then he stood up in the seat, levering himself up in the cockpit, with his right hand on the armor plate at the rear of the cockpit and his left on the windshield. He then dived towards the starboard roundel, pulling his legs up and crossing his arms over his chest. When he felt he was clear of the aircraft he straightened his legs out again and pulled the parachute rip cord, feeling a sharp jerk as the 'chute opened."

Two hours later a jeep from Iwakuni picked Coburn up from the back of a three-wheeled truck in which local Japanese were giving him a lift home.

Over Angang-ni, on the west of Pohang, on 9 September, Wing Commander Louis Spence, the Australian Squadron Commander reported to "Mosquito Control" with his section of three Mustangs. A fourth Mustang briefed for the mission had landed at Pusan with glycol leaking into his engine. When the Australian Mustangs vectored over Angang-ni the controller told them to napalm and rocket the enemy-held town. Due to heavy clouds, visibility was limited. Attacking from 700 feet Wing Commander Spence went into an unusually steep dive to release his napalm. He failed to pull out of the dive and his Mustang struck the ground in the center of the town and
exploded on impact.

During July and September eight F-51 Mustangs out of 24 in the Australian Air Force Squadron were ready for combat. Flying sorties were totalled up to 1,629. The squadron lost six aircraft, half of them by enemy action; two by ground fire, one known to be lost due to enemy action, but the exact type of enemy action causing the loss was not known. The other three aircraft were lost owing to causes other than those due to enemy action.

Victory over North Korea

Meanwhile on the ground, with the advance of the UN forces northward after the highlight of UN amphibious forces landing operation in the Inchon area on 15 September, the Australian airmen began to move across from Iwakuni to Pohang, in southeast Korea. Prior to this movement, advance elements of the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Group left Tsuiki, Japan for Pohang Airfield (K-3) on 3 October, and within four days the group, with its 39th and 40th Squadron, settled in the same habitat it had left in August. The conditions at the old air base were much the same, as they were poor in July and August 1950.

At the time of North Korean invasion the UN air forces consisted of three wings of American jet fighters and the Mustangs of Australian Air Force No.77 Squadron. The jets were somewhat inadequate for the kind of war that developed in need of close air support. Built for dogfighting three or four miles above the earth the jets couldn’t carry napalm and rockets to bring their fighting power down to ground level, where it was urgently needed.

Hence, since the UN air forces jets, participating in the theater from 28 June, mainly began strategic sorties, the Mustangs of the Australian and the Republic of Korea air forces flew in close of friendly ground forces in their non-stop job of harassing the enemy in the early stages of war.

The requirement for this kind of support resulted in converting some of the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Group from F-80 Shooting Star planes to Mustangs. At Ashiya on 10 July 1950 the 40th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron of the 35th Group was informed that it would be the first Fifth Air Force Squadron to convert to Mustangs. Pilots of the 40th Squadron were told that the F-51 Mustang was a better ground-support fighter than the F-80, in spite of the controversy against the aircraft, insisting that there had been vivid demonstrations of why the F-51 was not a ground-support fighter in the World War II and, they weren’t exactly intrigued by the thought of playing guinea pig to prove the same thing over again. On 16 July 1950 the 40th Squadron had moved its newly acquired Mustang fighters to Pohang Airfield.
Even though the airfield had never been captured by the North Koreans during the fighting, when the wind blew, it was just as dusty, and when it rained, the mud was just as sticky. On 12 October the Australian Air Force No. 77 Squadron now joined the Fifth US Air Force's 35th Fighter-Bomber Group, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Dale who had fought alongside the Australians in New Guinea, fleshing out the base complement to three squadrons of F-51 Mustangs. The aircrews were quartered in tents erected on the airstrip.

To the western eyes a general view prevailed that Chinese Communist aggression in Korea was a "possibility" but "not ... a probability." General MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, apparently held this same view, and at Wake Island on 15 October he explained to President Truman that he did not anticipate great difficulty in ending military operations in Korea, perhaps as early as Thanksgiving Day. "In North Korea, unfortunately," said MacArthur, "they (the North Koreans) are pursuing a forlorn hope. They have about 100,000 men who were trained as replacements. They are poorly trained, led, and equipped, but they are obstinate and it goes against my grain to have to destroy them." President Truman asked a question: "What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?" "Very little," replied MacArthur. "Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no air force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greater slaughter." General MacArthur's remark that the Chinese Communists had "no air force" was at variance with Far East Air Forces estimates that the Chinese possessed at least 300 combat aircraft.

The tactical elements--Australian No. 77 Squadron and the 35th US Fighter-Interceptor Group - stayed at Pohang until their Tactical Support Wing was in place at Yonpo Airfield (K-27), south of Hamhung in North Korea. Then, between 17 and 19 November, the Mustang pilots took off from Pohang, flew tactical air strikes, and landed at Yonpo. Although a more settled base than Pohang, it was extremely cold and desolate. Ice, snow and bitter winds made conditions almost intolerable. Ground crews had to sweep snow from the wings of the Mustangs before the pilots could take off. Servicing aircraft was a constant battle against freezing temperatures and the weather was a major hazard to planes which had to maintain close support effort for
the X US Corps operation. By 22 November on the other hand in the north-
west, the 6002nd US Tactical Support Wing, the 18th US Fighter-Bomber Group,
and the newly-arrived South African Air Force (SAAF) No. 2 Squadron (arrived
on 5 November) were in place at Pyongyang East Airfield (K-24), but for
several days before this the 18th Group’s Mustangs had been staging through
the field. The main body of the 6131st US Tactical Support Wing began to
move to Pyongyang Airfield (K-23) on 25 November, the same day on which
the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group completed movement of its two Mustang
squadrons to the forward airfield.

The three Communist airfields which the Mustang Wings occupied showed
signs that they had once been prosperous air facilities. Most still had
barracks and hangars, but these buildings were badly battered by aerial bom-
bardment and by Red demolition squads. Flight surfaces at each airfield were
lightly constructed and had already suffered damage from heavy transport
traffic. They presented some challenge, even to the hardy Mustangs.

Although living conditions were crude and operating conditions were
worse for the Australians and other UN personnel, the Mustang squadrons
benefited from their closeness to the battle area. From advanced airfields
missions were much shorter, targets more easily identified in the greater time
allowed, and external fuel tanks (in short supply) were no longer needed.
Such favorable operational factors more than offset the primitive operating
facilities at the Communist airfields.

Section 2. Encounter with CCF

Among the papers the Australian ground troops found on the body of
the North Korean colonel at the Battle of the Broken Bridge near Pakchon,
northwest of Anju, however, there was a combat diary with the significant
entry, dated 25 October: “From yesterday the enemy’s air attacks have in-
creased. It seems they are supporting the ground troops who will probably
cross the river and advance. We are in a bad positon. The time for overall
counterplan is here before us now. A new propaganda maneuver was estab-
lished to change the tide of battle from defense to offense…”

At Pakchon, in the evening the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade
arrived, Brigadier Coad learned something of what the Communist “overall
counterplan” was. “The Chinese are in,” the Division Commander greeted
Coad when he reported to headquarters.
On the night of 4 November, the Chinese launched a full-scale attack against the 24th US Division and forced a regiment to fall back two kilometers. Maintaining pressure on the Americans the enemy swung west to get behind the British Brigade and Australian Battalion at Pakchon and to cut the Pakchon-Sinanju road over the Chongchon River. A Middlesex patrol of the 27th Brigade had the first intimation that a new move was afoot early on the afternoon of 4 November, when it clashed with a big enemy patrol about ten kilometers northeast of Pakchon, but the main threat to the Pakchon-Sinanju road did not come until early on the morning of 5 November.

To keep the road open for the ground troops in this battle, the Australian Mustangs from No. 77 Squadron prepared the way by “softening up” the ridge before the Australian Battalion launched a full-scale battalion attack with “A” and “B” Companies left and right forward respectively.

In this vital battle Australian Mustangs gave close support to British and Australian troops along the Pakchon-Sinanju road for the first time.

Reports that Russian MIG jet fighters were over the Yalu were fair warning that this time the Australian and American airmen, joined by the South Africans, would not have things all their own way. Meanwhile, the Australian Mustangs were all out flying close-support missions and interdiction strikes against the flooding Chinese Communist Forces.

Squadron Leader R. C. Cresswell, who took command after the death of Wing Commander Spence, had his Mustangs on call in the Pakchon area on 5 November. At 1500 hours the tactical air controller working with the British Commonwealth Brigade called up support for an Australian attack. Flight Lieutenant Ian Olorenshaw led in the first flight. Then Flying Officer William Horsman and Pilot Thomas Stoney took over.

Olorenshaw’s flight used up their machine gun and rocket ammunition and saw the enemy troops scattering all over the place, reported the Squadron Public Relations Officer, Flight Lieutenant George Odgers. “It was a good feeling to know you were supporting your own boys. Horsman and Stoney stooed around for a while, and then the controller sent them rocketing and machine gunning the trenches on the same hill. They saw dozens of enemy troops dart out of their positions and run down the valley. Tanks were landing shells on them as the Mustangs attacked. The whole place was alive with aircraft. Squadron Leader Cresswell led a four-ship flight against tanks and transport. His flight fired eleven rockets at a tank, which toppled over the road... They then knocked out two trucks and attacked a village which replied with antiaircraft fire but did not score a hit.”

“It was an all-Australian day,” said Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson who during the battle was promoted to take command of the battalion, “and the boost to morale was amazing when we recognized the planes of No. 77 Squad-
ron overhead. The squadron’s close support was the closest I have ever seen and we passed our congratulations to the pilots over our air contact wireless.”

The Australian Mustangs had to continue maximum effort to hold off the flooding Chinese since their aggression. The Australian No.77 Squadron and the 35th Fighter-Interceptor Group were still operating from Yonpo Airfield at Hamhung. There, the fighters were put on “maximum effort” to help the encircled allied forces. The weather was bitter and when the clouds lifted, the Australian pilots could look across the flat coastal plain to the towering snow-covered mountains where the fighting was going on. When the aircraft took off from the runway the slipstream whipped up miniature icy hurricanes in their wake. Out over the mountains under the leaden sky the pilots could see the thin columns of UN ground forces battling for their lives, crashing southwards through road blocks in their mechanized transport under machine gun and small arms fire from the surrounding slopes.

Australian Mustangs, Marine Corsairs, Navy Wildcats did all they could to help. But, with the hunched men hooded and mittened against the bitter cold, this was essentially beyond reach of power.

Over on the eastern coast of Korea, in the X US Corps area of operations, Air Force and Marine air units had adequate time to evacuate and sustained few losses of any kind. On 3 December the Australian Air Force Squadron received orders to move from Yonpo to Pusan East Airfield (K-9) together with the 35th Fighter-Interceptor Group. As usual, the combat echelon of the unit moved by air, and within a few days the Mustangs were reported to be operating from Pusan “as smoothly as ever.” The bulk of the troops and property was uneventfully transported southward aboard LST’s.

During October and December 13 Mustangs out of 19 Australian Squadron aircraft participated in combat. Total sorties were up to 868. The squadron lost one aircraft due to enemy ground fire in a close support sortie.

In mid-January Australian Squadron Mustangs napalmed and machine gunned enemy-occupied villages northwest of Ichon after it had fallen to the Communist Chinese aggression.

Now the Australian Squadron participated in the new Fifth US Air Force “truck-hunting” plan to stifle the troop replacement and supply lines behind the enemy front. The Chinese learned the warfare of night vigilance, ingeniously camouflaging themselves from the UN air finders by day. Mosquito control aircraft had often penetrated as far as 50 miles in advance of friendly lines, seeking targets for fuel-hungry jets from Japan, but the Chinese Communists put up enough ground fire to force the unarmed T-6’s to limit their operations to the immediate vicinity of the friendly front lines. Early in
February 1951, an effort to come to grips with the elusive Red truckers, the Fifth Air Force implemented a new plan of action in the second week of February. Each night reconnaissance and intruder crews spotted streams of Communist vehicles, but the Reds were hiding their automotive equipment so well before dawn that the fighter-bombers could not find much to attack.

According to the concept of the new operation, Mustangs or Marine Corsairs would relay on air patrol over the areas, locating and attacking the targets of opportunity. By assigning certain routes or areas to the same organizations for continuing operations, the Fifth US Air Force hoped that would become intimately familiar with a single zone and would more easily pilots recognize camouflaged objects.

The new “truck-hunting” plan was an outstanding success. On 12 February, just as the new armed reconnaissance zones were being established, the Chinese Communists launched their “Fourth-Phase” offensive along the Hoengsong — Wonju axis, and, desperate to get supplies forward, the Reds moved by daylight.

The standard truck-hunting armament load for the Australian Mustangs was maximum rockets and 50-caliber, the former being useful for suppressing flak and the latter lethal against vehicles.

In this month, fourteen pilots of the Australian Air Force Squadron received the American Air Medal for meritorious service in combat. Two of them — Flight Lieutenant R. Coburn and Flight Lieutenant L. Olorenshaw, at that time acting commander of the squadron, had carried out 98 missions.

Section 3. Recovery of the Lost Pilots

The search for the lost pilots in the rugged mountains of Korea, mountains beyond mountains and still more mountains, was not a snap job for the squadron. The pilots of the Australian Air Force Squadron juggled with these ranges, their vagaries and dangers, the swiftly moving currents of air, the illusion of room to fly that served to conceal great masses of rock hidden behind clouds. Somewhere in these mountains, or on the paddy fields below, two pilots had vanished. There were certain factors involved in their disappearance that puzzled Air Board, and it was decided to send a search team and bring them back alive or dead.

The team selected consisted of Sergeant Tom Henderson, a veteran of
search and rescue in New Guinea, Java and New Britain, and Chaplain Esmond W. New, an ordained minister of the Presbyterian Church who lived in Korea, 1933—1939.

Early in December 1950, they began with investigations in Japan. They tried both the United States Far East Air Forces and the Australian Air Force Intelligence Sections without success. The two pilots, W. M. Garroway and G.I. Stephens, who had been with Stout could not give much assistance. Nor could the Escape and Evasion Division of the Far East Air Forces in Tokyo help much. Consequently, the team crossed over to Korea on 24 December with very little to go on. At this stage the land fighting had moved back from North Korea and men of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment were dug in at Uijongbu, 24 kilometers north of Seoul.

The memoranda concerning Squadron Leader Strout's disappearance, prepared by the Intelligence Section in Japan, read: On 7 July 1950, Squadron Leader Strout led a formation of aircraft from Iwakuni, Japan, to strafe and rocket North Korean supplies on the east coast of Korea, in the vicinity of Samchok. After the raid Squadron Leader Strout did not appear at the rendezvous and the other aircraft returned to base. The following morning a mission led by Wing Commander Spence found no trace of the pilot or his aircraft and he was officially posted as missing.

The team planned to begin their search from Suwon, the most northerly airstrip which had not yet fallen a second time into Communist hands, but its fall seemed so certain that they were forced to return to Pusan, the base from which the Australian Air Force was operating at that time.

They spent Christmas Day with the squadron. The commanding officer, Wing Commander R. C. Cresswell, was pessimistic about the result. The Communists had gained ground by sheer weight of numbers and overwhelmed the thin lines of the United Nations. In such a desperate situation, how could a couple of men work their way north over hundreds of miles of frozen roads? But this was not the only problem for them to solve.

In the northward advance the United Nations forces had moved so rapidly that large numbers of Communist troops had been left in isolated pockets all through the country. These had become guerrillas and with North Korean partisans they had become a menace. Actually no one could be safe unless he was in armed company. Furthermore, the arterial roads from the north were blocked by hundreds of thousands of refugees making their way south. The bridges proved bottlenecks and big rivers like the Han swept away hundreds of men who fell into the frozen waters in the crush to cross the bridges that remained. How could the team hope to make progress against this tidal wave of human suffering and misery? They had no food, no medical supplies, no escort, no transport, and inadequate clothing.
They had money but nowhere to spend it.

Christmas night was as cheerful as it could be under the circumstances. Some of the men went to the church service; others sought forgetfulness in beer.

Early next morning Reverend New visited the local Governor in Pusan, who was a friend of former years; he had a great admiration for Australia and high appreciation for the work of the Australian Presbyterian Mission. The Governor introduced Reverend New to Admiral Son, Republic of Korea Navy.

A few days later, with the help of the Admiral, the team steamed into the comparative safety of Mukho harbor, 24 kilometers north of Samchok, on the east coast. The open sea was dangerous as mines had come adrift and were floating down the Korean coast from the north. Perhaps they commenced their journey at Vladivostok or Wonsan. Mukho was surrounded with high snow-covered mountains and was easier to defend than attack.

Fortunately the Commander of Mukho area had already investigated the crash of Strout’s aircraft and informed them that it had taken place at Pukpyong, 12 kilometers north of Samchok, on the east coast.

It was a grey, heavy overcast day with the snow driving in from the sea, when they began the trek to Pukpyong. They went to the office of the local headmen. Within an hour they had interrogated a number of eyewitnesses of the crash. Strout was dead. The headman showed them a head tablet prepared to be put on his grave when the UN allied forces had finally mopped up in that area. It read, “To the memory of a brave United Nations airman.” The team recovered the body and returned to Mukho.

Meanwhile, the storm had increased in intensity. At Mukho, thousands of Koreans had gathered on the wharf with an eager hope that the team would take them back to freedom. The team crowded over 150 on board and began a nightmare voyage back in heavy seas to Pusan, which they reached without further incident. Many of the men they brought back were wounded. It was an inspiration for both Reverend New and Sergeant Henderson to see across the wharf a ship unloading stalwart New Zealanders. It was on 31 December 1950.

The search for Pilot W. P. Harrop was in some ways more difficult than that of Strout. To quote from the memoranda concerning his case: After a crash landing two Mustangs located the aircraft a few miles northwest of Waegwan on 3 September 1950. One Mustang returned to Taegu in order to organize rescue procedure while the other patrolled above the crash to protect the pilot from enemy attack. The patrolling pilot saw Harrop, who was wearing a white flying suit, lie down in a paddy field and smear himself all over with mud and then run in a westerly direction and enter a hut in an
orchard. After a short interval he reappeared, waved his arms, then re-entered the hut, and was not seen to leave the hut again. When the patrolling Mustang was running short of fuel, United States fighter aircraft took over and remained until a helicopter arrived at 1630 hours. The helicopter searched the area for an hour, descending as low as hut level, enabling the pilot to see a portion of the interior of the hut, but Harrop was not sighted again.

Wing Intelligence had heard a rumor that a Republic of Korea patrol had sighted Harrop in the Waegwan area. The searching team checked this rumor first and made an exhaustive inquiry through the Republic of Korea Army, without success. The Intelligence Section, United States Army, at Pusan, and the P. O. W. camps in Pusan gave no further light. Both of the searchers then contacted the Director of the Republic of Korea National Police, but could find no trace of Harrop. There was still one other way of inquiry. The team visited the Headquarters of the Eighth United States Army. There they inspected hundreds of photographs and identification particulars of a great number of bodies which had been recovered, many murdered and buried in mass graves by the Communists. Harrop was not among these men.

Nothing remained but to search the area. This would mean visiting about one hundred villages. They tramped from village to village, in the northwest area of Waegwan until dusk. On making a routine inquiry of a small boy, he immediately said, “Yes, I will show you where a plane crashed near our village.” No signs of the aircraft were visible with the exception of a radio transmitter half-hidden in the dry stubble. This was not surprising as the Communist often removed all parts of a crashed aircraft for inspection. Sergeant Tom Henderson took a rubbing of the identification plate and was assured that it was one of the Australians.

After a long conversation the villagers mentioned that the dead pilot wore black socks. Reverend New turned to the headman and said, “Where did you find the body?” “In the paddy field of Park Serk.” “Where is Park Serk?” “He has gone to his native place many līs (one lī equals 4,000 meters) from here.” One of the villagers was sent for Park. Towards the close of the short winter day Park Serk appeared and led them up the mountainside to a small rough grave under the pines. The villagers began to dig in the frozen ground. On the lining of the clothing it read the words, “Made in Australia.” Tom checked the dental plate with the card he brought; they had found Harrop. Tom collected the body, which they wrapped in a ground sheet.

Their search was ended. Back in Canberra at the Department of Air, Flight Lieutenant Kibble took down two flags from his map. Two more
problems of the Korean War had been solved.

Meanwhile, the Mustangs were at Pusan hammering away at Chinese troops and supplies and flying direct support missions for the UN ground forces now moving up to the Han River. Alarmèd by these constant air attacks, the enemy increased anti-aircraft defenses and, during March 1951, several Mustangs of the squadron were hit by fire from the ground. Two pilots -- Warrant Officer C. R. A. Howe and Flight Sergeant H.W. Meggs -- were forced to crashland near the front line but were not wounded and rescued by a helicopter. Another pilot, Sergeant Cecil Sly, had a remarkable escape from capture or death when he was forced to bail out from his disabled Mustang after being hit by enemy ground fire, north of Seoul.

Meggs was hit when he was high over the Munsan area but managed to get his aircraft back to Kimpo airfield, near Seoul, where he crashlanded. Things were so chaotic about that time that he was not sure whether the airfield was in UN hands or not, he told afterwards. When two Oriental looking soldiers approached he climbed on the wing of his plane, loosed his pistol in its holster and tried to figure out whether they were Communist Chinese, North Koreans or South Koreans. When they got a little closer they identified themselves as South Koreans and he knew he was all right.

Warrant Officer Howe was on armed reconnaissance north of Seoul on the same day in the same area when his engine packed up. He climbed to 10,000 feet and headed back to base. His Mustang would not maintain altitude so he bellylanded on an island in the Han River. He was unhurt and a helicopter picked him up within twenty minutes.

A few days later Meggs and Sergeant Sly were on an armed reconnaissance patrol north of Seoul when Sly’s cockpit filled with smoke, temporarily blinding him. His No. 2 Sergeant Meggs, called up Sly and said that the aircraft was streaming smoke. The smoke, filtering in from down near the port fuel gauge, had filled the cockpit so that he could not see the instruments. He opened the canopy and headed south, obtaining alterations of course from Meggs until the smoke cleared sufficiently for him to read the compass. All engine instruments appeared normal at this stage but the motor became very rough and soon began running intermittently. Showers of sparks and flames were coming from the exhaust stubs and passing the cockpit. Meggs told Sly that his aircraft was on fire and advised him to abandon it.

The aircraft was then at 1,500 feet and losing altitude. Sly undid his safety harness, switched on the emergency radio, trimmed, and attempted to abandon the aircraft on the right side. As the canopy was already open he forgot to jettison it and, as a result, his parachute pack caught under
the canopy edge. After about three seconds his legs shot free and he felt the drag of the slipstream, which levered him out in a somersaulting motion. He struck the tail plane and bruised his right side. The heavy clothing he wore and a food package on his belt saved him from serious wounds.

Having cleared the aircraft Sly pulled the rip-cord and the 'chute opened with a heavy jolt. As he floated down he heard rifle shots and bullets whistled past him. He landed on the side of a rocky hill and, after releasing the harness, he made for a ditch a few yards away, near enough to the "silk" to be spotted from the air yet far enough away should the enemy open fire at it. He removed all food and medical packs from the Mae West (a life vest) and threw it away as it was too colorful. The enemy were dug in almost all around Sly, both on the hill behind and across the small stream in front. More of the UN aircraft had arrived on the scene and provided constant cover with napalm, rockets and 50-caliber machine guns. The enemy did not fire at him while Sly was on the ground but fired constantly at the aircraft above.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Meggs had alerted the American rescue helicopter and called up flights of Mustangs to keep Sly covered. Four American Mustangs were there within a few minutes, followed by four Australian pilots, and these planes put a curtain of fire around Sly. The first of the rescue helicopters arrived in about half an hour and Sly crawled down the ditch towards a sandy river bed to get as close as possible to an easy landing ground. The enemy fire was so intense and accurate that although the helicopter descended to within 50 feet it was unable to reach Sly. Heavy ground fire riddled the machine and it had to return to base on a groggy motor.

Fresh flights came in with napalm to work over the area across the river and near an orchard, where most of the fire came from. Sly saw two Communist Chinese soldiers dressed in quilted khaki run from the direction of two friendly aircraft about 100 to 120 yards away. They were within easy firing range of his position so Sly moved further down the river and hid behind a rock about 30 yards from where his aircraft had hit the ground. It had long since burned out with a series of explosions and flying bullets. Sly wrongly supposed that he was easily seen from the air but, he learned afterwards, his khaki green clothing blended into the surroundings and the covering aircraft had lost him.

By this time, the Mustangs had called up an American T-6 spotter plane to locate the crashed Australian pilot. This plane made three circuits before it found Sly, who left the shelter of the rock and waved his hat, but ground fire wounded the T-6 observer in the leg and he was forced to leave. A second American helicopter, piloted by Captain Lynden E. Thomasson, had
now arrived.

At 10 o'clock, just two hours after bailing out, the second helicopter approached his position and hovered within a few yards of him. Sly crawled out to meet it, taking advantage of all possible cover and timing his arrival to coincide with the moment the copter touched down. This left both of them vulnerable to enemy fire as short a time as possible. Nobody was sure whether the helicopter actually landed but it only took three seconds for the crew to drag him inside. Over the last few yards Sly had to stand up and force himself against the slipstream of the whirling rotor. Forty minutes later he was in Suwon hospital being X-rayed for the wound he had received when he struck the side of the tail plane on bailing out. Fortunately, no bones were broken though he had difficulty in walking.

Australian Air Force highly praised the work and courage of the Third Air Rescue Unit from the United States Air Rescue Service, a unit with a remarkable record of helicopter rescue work in Korea. The unit saved his life at great risk to its own. Sly received the US Air Medal for his coolness and later he also won the Distinguished Flying Medal.

During January and March 1951, the squadron possessed 19 Mustangs and 15 of them were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 1,212. The Australian Squadron lost eight aircraft. Five of them by enemy action; four by hostile ground fire, one by cause unknown and the other three were not lost by enemy action.

Section 4. MIG's versus Meteors

With no air opposition and comparatively little anti-aircraft fire the early part of the war had been effective and dangerous but non-spectacular for the pilots of the Australian Air Force Squadron. So, while the jets were being modified for close support, the American units changed over to Mustangs and joined with the Australians in their nonstop job of harassing the enemy.

By November 1950, when this phase of the war was over, the Australian Squadron had flown 2,000 sorties. Then, came rumors that Russian-type aircraft had been seen south of the Yalu. Two Yaks had strafed South Korean troops and UN allied air force pilots had seen MIG-15's patrolling in groups of four along the Manchurian border. Nobody worried much about the Yaks but the MIG's were a different proposition. Russia's new single-engined jet fighter was known to be good. How good time would tell. The American
fighter pilots, in their F-86 Sabre jets, were confident. But prop-driven Australian Mustangs, good as they were for close support where the enemy had no air force, were becoming obsolete as combat fighters in a jet age. The Australian Air Force would have liked F-86 Sabres for the eager pilots of its No.77 Squadron to try themselves out on MIG's. But there were no Sabres available and the Australians had to take Meteors, the second-best jet fighter the United Nations had to offer in early 1951.

Squadron Leader Cresswell and Flight Lieutenant Desmond Murphy were the first Australian pilots to fly jets in combat over Korea. As a preparation for rearming the squadron they attended a conversion course on American jet aircraft at Itazuke Air Base in Japan, where the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Group taught them to fly the F-80 Shooting Star and coached them in jet jockey jargon.

An American instructor told Murphy to join the pattern and shoot some landing after he had explained the controls and put the Australian pilot through his ground drill.
Then after some solo flights, the Americans put Murphy on the schedule for a combat mission on 20 February. Assigned to a flight led by another American pilot he flew No. 2 to his instructor.

Murphy’s jet took the whole length of the runway to get off the ground because they were carrying a big load of fuel and ordnance. Once off the ground they formed up and climbed through the clouds to 24,000 feet. Their mission was close support of an American infantry division. The flight contacted the ground controller at the target area and he had a ‘hot’ target waiting. Captain White called up and ordered ‘dive brakes down’ and the flight let down at a very fast rate. They were soon circling at 4,000 feet above the area the flight was going to hit.

The flight had slowed down to a speed of about 400 miles an hour when Flight Lieutenant Murphy attacked and after pulling up away from the target he looked at it again and saw his napalm had hit right on the nose. American ground troops were to make an assault on a hill close by. The controller told them that as soon as the flight had finished with the target the ground force would launch its attack. So the flight screamed down on the hill throwing out napalms and rockets at the target and they could see enemy troops running everywhere. It was one of the best operations the pilots had ever been on.

The pilots could see exactly what they were doing and the commander of the ground force kept talking to them on the radio and said they were putting the stuff right on the vital area. The flight did not stay long over the target because the endurance of the jet is not as great as that of a Mustang. Their No. 4 was getting low on fuel, so the flight made a last pass and returned to base.

Cresswell and Murphy each flew ten combat missions in Shooting Stars before rejoining No. 77 Squadron at the end of February 1951, a few days before the first Meteor aircraft for the use of the squadron arrived in Japan from Great Britain. Later, Squadron Leader Cresswell transferred to a US fighter squadron flying F-86 Sabres for a brief tour. Wing Commander G. Steege, succeeded him as C.O. of No. 77 Squadron.

On 10 April 1951, No. 77 Australian Squadron pilots at Iwakuni, Japan, began training on Gloster Meteor VIII jet fighters, a twin jet with an altitude of 40,000 feet powered by two Rolls Royce Derwent engines and capable of speeds up to 500 miles an hour.

By this time when the squadron ceased combat operations during April, it had completed just over nine months in combat and lost ten pilots in action. The Commander, the Fifth United States Air Force, said that the Australian No. 77 Squadron was the best squadron he had, “the one that set the
pace."

By the end of June, the squadron was ready to return to operations in Korea, eager to test its Meteors against the MIG’s, which had continued to make spasmodic raids from across the Manchurian border. In “MIG Alley,” above the land between the Yalu River and the Chongchon River, the Australians joined with American jets—Sabres and Thunder jets—against the Russian-built planes which were gradually becoming a major factor in the air war in Korea.

Meanwhile, the UN allied airmen had been finding out much that they did not like about the MIG. On combat experience it looked as if the single-engined Russian-built jet was as good and better than anything the UN air forces had to put up against it. The MIG could fight at a higher speed, at a greater height, and carried heavier armament which had a slower rate of fire. Below 25,000 feet the Sabre jet could outfly and outfight the MIG, between 25,000 feet and 50,000 feet the Russian-built plane had the advantage. Nevertheless, over a long period, the United Nations Sabre pilots claimed more kills, about 10 to 1 in favor of the Sabres.

Nobody quite knew why the Russians should have allowed the use of MIG’s in Korea, unless it was to test them out. Certainly, they were never decisive weapon and seldom ventured far south of the Yalu. They did nothing to stop the almost unremitting UN air offensive against enemy ground troops. The enemy undoubtedly regarded Korea as an advanced training school and, at first, the MIG pilots were cautious and inexpert and tended to avoid combat. Later they improved and struck whenever they could. Then there was a dropping off in quality, suggesting that a new bunch of trainees had moved up for combat experience. This fluctuation continued throughout the war. The pilots spoke Chinese on the radio but this proved nothing because any pilot of any nationality could easily learn the limited number of words needed for adequate fighter combat jargon.

“Most important of all,” Wing Commander P. G. Wykeham-Barnes, British Air Force liaison officer with Fifth Air Force, reported early in 1952, “MIG bases are north of the Yalu River. Consider the predicament of the Air Commander of the United Nations air fighters in Korea. He sends his aircraft from about the 38th Parallel and flies them 240 kilometers north towards the border to maintain the air superiority necessary for our armies to operate unmolested from the air and, also, of course, for our bomber offensive to continue unchecked. They arrive with a good deal of their fuel used up.”

“At the time which suits them, when the sun is in the right position, when their morale is at its highest, and when their formation is perfect, from across the Yalu come 50, 60 or 100 MIG-15’s. We cannot even photo-
The Air Force Squadron

graph them on their bases. We cannot molest them on their airfields, nor attack them while they take off nor surprise them when they are forming up. We wait, as we must, until they have reached the height of 40,000 feet or so, until their formation satisfies their leaders and they have the sun behind them, and until we ourselves are rather short of fuel. They then come; then the fight begins."

During the first ten days of the period (April-June) the squadron possessed 27 Mustangs and 24 of them were combat ready. The Australians ceased operations during April because of the transition training (conversion training) for the squadron pilots into Meteor jets in Iwakuni Air Base, Japan. The squadron did not lose any aircraft in this period.

The Meteor VIII had never been tried out in combat although an earlier type had been operated against the VI flying bomb in the closing stages of World War II. The Australian pilots knew its limitations, particularly a blind spot on a 30 degree arc on either side astern, but were confident that they could outmaneuver any aircraft they were likely to meet. But, for more than a week, the Meteors operated in bad weather over "Mig Alley" without hearing or seeing a MIG.

The 4th US Fighter-Interceptor Wing had left a squadron and a detachment behind at Johnson Air Base and had moved to Suwon Airfield (K-13) in June. And in the same month the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing had concentrated at Kimpo Airfield (K-14). While the aviation engineers made good progress rehabilitating Kimpo, this airfield's runways were short and still rough.

In July, the Australian No. 77 Squadron, equipped with British Meteor jets, was attached to the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing at Kimpo airfield. They, one day in mid-August, 1951, when the Meteors were providing top cover for UN F-80 Shooting Star jets attacking enemy supply-lines near the Yalu River, the Australian pilots saw their first MIG's, a tight little bunch of about 20 squat-nosed outlines high in the blue about a mile away. The Meteors immediately broke towards the enemy jets but the MIG's refused combat and left the area. Flying Officer Dick Wittman said he saw two of the MIG's turning in as if they were about to attack but when the Meteors turned to meet them they made off back to Manchuria. After that the Australian Squadron pilot complained of stiff necks, they were so busy swivelling their heads to keep a lookout for the waiting MIG's. Two months of the fighter-bomber wing's operations at Kimpo airfield amply demonstrated that combat-loaded F-80 fighter-bombers could not safely use this cramped airfield. On the other hand, the Sabres did not carry external ordnance when they are out for covering missions and could use the short runways. Consequently, in late August the 4th and 8th Wings traded bases. At Kimpo the Australian Air
Force Squadron was now attached to the 4th Wing.

The first clash between Australian Squadron Meteors and MIG's took place on 29 August 1951. Eight Meteors were on a fighter sweep 35,000 feet above Chongju at about 11 o'clock when they saw six MIG's above them at 40,000 feet. They turned to keep the "bandits" in sight when Squadron Leader R. Wilson saw two more MIG's below them at 30,000 feet. Calling to his No. 2, Sergeant N. Woodroffe, he peeled off into a dive, following by Woodroffe. The two MIG's dived off but Woodroffe's Meteor twisted into a spin, taking him out of the fight. Wilson, stick back and throttles open, pressed the attack, but almost immediately a shudder shook his Meteor. A MIG jumped him out of the sun and scored hits. Wilson wrenched his Meteor around, the blood rushing from his head in a limit-rate turn as he endeavored to shake the MIG off his blind tail. Flight Lieutenant Cedric Thomas and Flying Officer Kenneth Blight, the two other members of Wilson's section, screamed down to the rescue and the MIG's broke off after an ineffective attempt to get on Blight's tail.

Meanwhile, the MIG's had got well on to the other section of four Meteors, led by Pilot Geoffrey Thornton. Thornton saw them coming out of the sun and yelled to his companions to break away. When the section straightened out again one aircraft, piloted by Warrant Officer R. D. Guthrie, was missing. He was taken prisoner and released after the ceasefire.

Warrant Officer Guthrie's flight was over the mouth of the Yalu River when they saw a flight of MIG's running for the border about 5,000 feet below. The Australians immediately turned into attack. Guthrie lagged about 50 yards in making this turn and a flight of MIG's jumped him from above at 6 o'clock. He broke to port but was hit before he could make the move effective.

During the break Guthrie called to the rest of the flight but found that both his radios had been knocked out. While Guthrie was about 40 degrees through the break two MIG's passed his nose and he turned back to starboard to have a shot at them. He was hit again from behind while firing at one of the pair in front of him. This time his controls failed to respond so, after flick rolling four times, he abandoned the aircraft by the ejection seat, at about 38,000 feet.

The seat and oxygen worked perfectly and he floated down uneventfully until he was within about 1,000 feet of the ground, when enemy ground troops began to fire on him intermittently. As soon as the seat had settled down under its own 'chute Guthrie separated himself from it and opened his own 'chute. In all, it was about 23 minutes before he reached the ground. Members of the North Korean Home Guard, immediately surrounded him and
led him off to the nearby village of Kusong, north of Chongju.

The Australian Meteors again tangled with MIG’s on 4 September 1951 and came off second best. Six Meteors were providing fighter cover for two RF-80 Shooting Stars on a photographic reconnaissance mission near the Manchurian border. Flight Lieutenant Victor Cannon, the flight leader, saw the red-nosed swept-wing enemy fighters first at 12 o’clock high, moving to 9 o’clock ready for an attack. Flight Lieutenant Joe Blyth, a British Air Force pilot with the Australian Squadron saw the MIG’s dive down on Dawson and Pilot W. Michelson, in “Baker” section.

“Baker section, break starboard,” Blyth yelled over his radio, “aircraft attacking, 6 o’clock high.” Down they came, right on the Meteors’ blind tails, six of them, two at a time, one pair after the other. Dawson and Michelson broke as the tracer shot above them. Then Michelson felt his kite shudder and it flipped over on to its back and spun down out of control. At 10,000 feet Michelson regained control. “I’m still flying,” he called triumphantly over his radio, “Heading for base.” He just made it. A shell had holed his tail plane and exploded behind the port engine damaging his port flap, port wing, and main fuel tank and putting holes in his fuselage and engine nacelle. Another shell had carried away part of his starboard aileron.

In mid-September, Flight Lieutenant R. L. (Smoky) Dawson, scored the Australian Squadron’s first effective hit against a MIG. Twelve Meteors were on a fighter sweep near Anju, in north Korea, when fifteen MIG’s jumped them. Cannon fire damaged one Meteor of Sergeant E. D. Armit, but not severely. Meanwhile, Dawson and his No. 2, Sergeant Max Colebrook, turned in on two MIG’s and Dawson scored with a long burst from his 20-mm. cannon. Sergeant Colebrook saw Smoky firing and then smoke coming from a MIG in front. Colebrook shot several bursts without success. Liquid streamed from the damaged MIG’s port wing but nobody saw the enemy jet crash.

Flight Lieutenant Cedric Thomas and Sergeant Vic Osborn got on to the tail of one MIG, cut him off from the Yalu and hung there but couldn’t close in enough to fire. On six occasions the MIG pilot tried to turn north but each time he saw Thomas and Osborn in a position to cut him off. The Meteors chased the MIG 50 miles south before he managed to get into the sun and head off for home. In the beginning, this MIG had made an unsuccessful head-on attack against Thomas.

During this period of July and September the Australian Air Force Squadron possessed 24 Meteors and 16 of them were combat ready. The
number of total sorties was 943; 12 for close support, eight for interdiction and armed reconnaissance, 853 for counter-air offensive, 58 for counter air defensive and 12 for close miscellaneous purpose. The squadron lost four aircraft. One by enemy action in an air-to-air battle and the other three aircraft were lost to an exact cause of any type except that due to enemy action.

On 24 October, the following the battles of the Australian Meteors over MIG Alley, the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command sent eight B-29’s of the 98th US Bombardment Wing to attack a bypass railway bridge at Sunchon, a target south of MIG Alley. To screen the B-29 Superfortresses against the enemy air power in this bombing raid, 16 Australian Meteors flew with other ten UN allied air force F-86 Sabres. But despite the escort provided by the Meteors and Sabres, the Superfortress formation was systematically attacked by some 40 to 70 MIG’s, some of whom pursued the bombers almost all the way to Wonsan. Because of this, for two days after 24 October, General Weyland, who had become the US Far East Air Forces Commander after Lieutenant General Partridge, even cancelled all main effort daylight B-29 attacks while operations officers assessed the situation.

On 1 December 1951, in the last Meteor-MIG battle of the year, twelve Meteors were on a fighter sweep north of Pyongyang in clear cold weather at 19,000 feet when between forty and fifty MIG’s swept down on them out of the sun. In a few seconds the whole sky was filled with thundering jets, the Meteors outnumbered four or five to one. It was all over quickly. Once they had lost their initial advantage the MIG’s soon turned their red noses for the Manchurian sanctuary but not before they had torn holes in the Australian squadron. Three of the twelve Meteor pilots were missing, Sergeant B. L. Thomson, Flight Sergeant E. D. Armit and Sergeant V. Drummond.

During the dogfight, Flying Officer Bruce Gogerly, a World War II pilot who flew Kittyhawks in the Pacific, found himself among a group of MIG’s which had attacked Sergeant V. Drummond. Gogerly pulled inside the tight turn the MIG’s made to get at him and fired a five-second burst. He saw his cannon shells exploding on the fuselage and starboard wing root of one MIG. “I saw two MIG’s pass close by us,” said Sergeant John Myers who was flying No. 2 to Gogerly. “Bruce broke into them and I followed about 600 yards from the MIG. I saw Bruce open up on one MIG and splinter the fuselage and wing. I gave it a burst, too, but it was so badly damaged that it did not need any more. It went into a dive leaking fuel.” Other pilots said they saw this MIG explode in mid-air.

Several pilots got in bursts against a MIG but the fight was so furious
that they did not have time to observe results. However, another MIG was seen streaming to earth and several pilots shared credit for this kill. The battle had lasted ten minutes and it was now clear that, despite the Australians' undoubted courage and skill, the Meteor was no match for the MIG. In three encounters the Australians had lost four pilots and two badly damaged aircraft. The Meteors were rugged, and could take terrible punishment, but they were not nearly fast enough and they could not climb high enough to engage the MIG's on even terms and, with their blind spots astern, they were sitting ducks for the swept-wing enemy fighters as they came thundering down from out of the sun. Nobody was surprised, therefore, when No. 77 Squadron was taken off fighter-interception duties.

When Squadron Leader R. T. Susans, took over from Wing Commander Steege on 26 December 1951, the squadron was sitting on Kimpo airfield on call for the air defense of the Seoul area, against aircraft that never appeared. Susans met Lieutenant General Frank F. Everest, Commander, the Fifth US Air Force, and asked for a more active role. "I'm on the side of any man who wants to do a bit of honest killing," said Everest and allocated the Australian Squadron to the dual role of patrolling the Kimpo-Seoul area and ground attack duties. Heartened by their success in this new role, the pilots voluntarily set themselves the target of 1,000 sorties a month, which they maintained despite bad weather.

During October and December of this year the Australian Squadron possessed 20 Meteors of which 13 were combat ready. The period marked over 1,400 sorties in total to be broken down into some 800 for counter air offensive activity, 557 for counter air defensive and 57 for other activities. During this effort the total of five aircraft were lost, three by enemy activity while active air-to-air battles and two by non-hostile cause.

By now, ground fighting in Korea was virtually static along all the frontlines. This meant no lessening of effort for the Australian Air Force Squadron and, as the number of missions rose, so did the grim toll of pilots lost to the increasingly accurate enemy ground fire. From January to April in 1952, six pilots - Flight Lieutenant M. A. Browne-Gaylord, Sergeant B.T. Gillan, Sergeant K. G. Robinson, Flight Lieutenant J. H. Hannan, Sergeant M. E. Colebrook and Flight Lieutenant L. G. S. Purssey - were reported missing in action. During this period, the squadron had kept up an unremitting campaign with cannon and rockets against enemy supply lines and troop concentrations. Although none of the pilots had previously fired rocket projectiles from jets, their record of destruction soon became highly satisfactory as they accustomed themselves to the new techniques required. In
addition to rocket and strafing missions against selected targets, the squadron maintained a constant daylight patrol north of the bombline. These patrols enabled the Meteors to give almost immediate cover to pilots shot down behind the enemy lines.

By this time the Australian pilots were finding Meteor jets a highly efficient aircraft for the hard-hitting role assigned them. Although the jet planes lacked the range of piston-driven aircraft they provided easier maintenance problems and showed a remarkable capacity to take punishment and fly home. Despite the greater speed pilots found that the absence of a forward engine and propeller gave them a much better view of small targets than they had thought possible. “Although some criticism of the Meteor has been made in Australia,” said Air Marshal Donald Hardman, then Chief of the Australian Air Staff, “in Korea the men who fly and maintain it say it is a first-class aircraft, that it gives no maintenance trouble at all. The life of the Derwent engines is being extended. They do not seem to be able to wear them out. The Meteor VIII is particularly good for its rocket attack role because, apart from anything else, it has two jet engines and can get back home even with one of them shot away.”

During January and March the squadron possessed 24 Meteors and 16 of them were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 2,595; 171 sorties for interdiction and armed reconnaissance, 176 for counter air offensive, 1,649 for counter air defensive and 599 for miscellaneous sorties. The Australian Squadron lost seven aircraft in this period. Six by enemy action of hostile ground fire and another was lost to an exact cause of any type except that due to enemy action.

Early in 1952, the MIG’s became bolder, bigger enemy patrols flew over the Yalu and extended further south than hitherto. This gave the Meteors another opportunity to do some fighter sweeps but this time at a lower level. On 4 May, patrolling southwest of Pyongyang, Pilot Officer J. L. Surman attacked and probably destroyed a MIG. “He was a sitting duck,” said Surman describing his success. Surman was flying wingman to Sergeant Ken Murray, when the Australian pilots saw nine MIG’s above them. One cut across in front of Surman and started firing at Sergeant Murray. He presented a perfect target dead ahead of Surman.

He fired a two-second burst into the MIG and saw its starboard stabilizer crumple and fall away. At the same time the starboard side of its jet exhaust blew out with a rush of flame. Surman must have hit the pilot, as the aircraft did not take evasive action. He pulled out about thirty yards from him and broke away to avoid collision. He then lost sight of the MIG as it went down through cloud. Four days later Pilot Officer W. H. Simmonds
shot down another MIG. A month later Pilot Officer Surman, a recent graduate from the Royal Australian Air Force College at Point Cook, was killed when his Meteor crashed over the target during a rocketing mission. Pilot Officer D. Robertson, another Australian Air Force College graduate, was lost in a similar manner on 15 May.

In June, Wing Commander Susans relinquished command to Wing Commander J. R. Kinninmont and the squadron continued its steady routine of interdiction missions, escorts, strikes, patrols and fighter sweeps.

During April and June the Australian No. 77 Squadron possessed 25 Meteors and 23 of them were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 2,510; two for close support, 1,053 for interdiction and armed reconnaissance, four sorties for counter air offensive, 1,254 for counter air defensive and 197 for miscellaneous sorties. The squadron lost five aircraft. Three of them by enemy action; two by ground fire, one by cause unknown and two aircraft were lost to an exact cause of any type except that due to enemy action.

The massed raids against military targets in Pyongyang had the highest priority, and on 29 August an operation called the "All United Nations Air Effort" against Pyongyang marked the initiation of attacks which were designed to cause a noise in Moscow. The list of targets marked for attack read like a guide to public offices in Pyongyang and included such points of interest as the Ministry of Rail Transportation, the Munitions Bureau, Radio Pyongyang, plus many factories, warehouses, and troop billets. The Australian Air Force Meteors with the Allies Sabre jets flew screens along the Chongchon River before and during the thirty minutes that each attack lasted as a protective measure. The other Meteors of the Australian Squadron formed part of a 420 fighter-bomber force which made a devastating attack on Pyongyang, bombing and strafing airfields, power stations, factories and antiaircraft positions. During the day most allied power planes flew all three strikes, and the aircraft carriers Boxer and Essex sent aircraft to join the attacks. In all, United Nations aircraft employed 1,403 sorties in the Pyongyang raid.

In the autumn of 1952 the Australian Air Force Squadron flew approximately 18 Meteor counterair sorties and the Ist US Marine Air Wing averaged approximately 100 sorties of all types each day. In June 1952 FEAF planning factors set maximum monthly sortie rate for tactical aircraft as follows: F-51 -- 25.5 sorties, F-80 -- 28.5 sorties, F-84 -- 25 sorties, F-86 -- 25 sorties, and B-26 26 sorties. Although the number of combat sorties which would be flown would increase with additional possessed aircraft in the autumn of 1952, and
could be juggled by flying shorter combat missions than the planning factors contemplated, the UN allied air force could in mid-1952 sustain each day something on the order of 115 F-86 counterair sorties, 220 fighter-bomber sorties, and 63 light-bomber sorties.

During July and September the Australian Air Force Squadron had 39 Meteors and 18 of them were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 1,665; 1,258 for interdiction and armed reconnaissance, 359 for counter air offensive, 12 for counter for defensive and six for other sorties. The squadron lost three aircraft. One by enemy action, cause unknown and two aircraft were lost to an exact cause of any type except that due to enemy action.

Here, in the latter part of November the squadron was visited by the Minister for Air and the Navy, William McMahon.

At Iwakuni Airfield on the way of his observation tour to the Korean theater he presented to the Republic of Korea Air Force two Mustang planes on behalf of the Australian Government on 26 November.

The British Air Force pilots serving with the Australian Air Force Squadron were among those lost during August, September and October. Flying Officer M.O. Bergh (a South African serving with the British Air Force) parachuted after being hit by enemy fire and was taken prisoner and Flying Officer O.M. Cruikshank was killed while attempting to bail out after being hit by fire from a MIG. On 24 December, ground fire killed Flight Lieutenant F.J. Lawrensen and a third British Air Force pilot -- Flying Officer F.H.G. Booth -- failed to return from an attack on Siamak Airfield, 80 kilometers south of Pyongyang in January 1953. At this time, the Australian Air Force was finding it difficult to keep up the flow of trained pilots to No. 77 Squadron and consequently arrangements had been made for a number of British Air Force pilots to serve with it. Since June 1952 the operational tour of duty for pilots had been reduced from nine months to six months.

During October and December 19 Meteors out of 37 Australian Squadron aircraft were combat ready. The number of the sorties was up to 2,034; 1,341 sorties for interdiction and armed reconnaissance, 612 for counter air offensive, ten for counter air defensive and 71 sorties for other purposes. The squadron lost two Meteors due to enemy action, by air-to-air and ground fire each.

On 20 January 1953, Wing Commander Kinninmont handed over command to Wing Commander J. W. Hubble. The Australian Squadron began the year with a total of 15,000 individual sorties since the war had begun,
two and a half years before, 11,000 of them in Meteor jets. On 17 February, Flight Sergeant K. J. Murray completed his 320th jet mission over North Korea. This was believed to be a world record for missions over Korea. By the time Murray, then promoted to a pilot officer, left for Australia in March 1953, he had 333 missions to his credit. Flight Lieutenant W.B. Rivers had held the previous record with 319 missions over Korea, many of them in Mustangs.

On 16 March, the Australian Squadron carried out a particularly successful attack on an enemy convoy of about 150 trucks. The Meteors destroyed at least 24 vehicles and damaged several buildings. General Otto P. Weyland, Commander, Far East Air Forces, sent the squadron a congratulatory message for this attack. Warrant Officer Bob Turner saw the trucks when he was flying on a road patrol south of Wonsan, along the east coast. In the dawn light he saw a three mile long convoy. He dived to attack the head of the line and blew up the first two lorries, then circled back to hit the last four. This trapped the Communist column in a narrow pass between steep cliffs and sheer drops. Turner flew back to base and returned with other planes to finish off the convoy in what turned out to be one of the biggest lorry-busting forays in the Korean War.

Possibly in an effort to boost the morale of Communist ground forces by making a show of force over the battle lines, MIG airmen carried external fuel tanks for long range missions to tangle with Sabres over Sariwon on 21 March, with Marine fighter-bombers in the Chinnampo area on 26 March, and with two RF-80's and two Australian Air Force Meteors between Sariwon and Sinmak on 27 March 1953. The last engagement was only 61 kilometers north of the ground front. In each case the MIG's were too poor in gunnery to score on the slower United Nations planes. But the Communist pilots showed their willingness to fight at altitudes as low as 17,000 feet, rendering good targets for the UN allied air force pilots.

On 27 March, the Australian Squadron had another successful tangle with MIG's probably destroyed one and damaged another without loss. The action took place over Sinmak, 80 kilometers south of Pyongyang. Sergeant George Hale and his wingman, Sergeant David Irland, were about to start a patrol along an enemy supply route when Hale saw what he thought was a MIG chasing two American Shooting Stars. As he dived on the last plane he realized that all three were MIG's. Hale opened fire and one MIG broke off and headed north. The other two made a pass at the Meteor from the starboard. Hale made an S-turn into the MIG's, jettisoned his large ventral fuel tank and got behind the enemy. He fired two high explosive rockets which flashed between the MIG's causing them to break apart and in different di-
rections. Hale was trying to get on to the tail of one of these when another MIG overshot him in an attempt to attack into his blind spot.

"For a second he was flying parallel with me and about 50 yards ahead," said Hale. "I could see the pilot clearly as I swung behind him and hammered at him with my 20-mm. cannons. Strips of metal began to peel from his fuselage and the aircraft rolled on its back and headed straight down from 10,000 feet. I think black smoke belched from him but I did not have time to watch him crash. Two more MIG's came at me with guns blazing and again I managed to S-turn on to their tails. The Meteor was flying like a bomb. They tried to climb away and as I blasted at one I saw bright flashes near his wing root and the aircraft began to pour out white smoke. My guns stopped and I headed for home."

"I did not see anything," said Sergeant Irlam, "but something hit my port tail, busted my port aileron, blew up my air bottle and put my compass out of action. I got back the 80 to 100 miles to Kimpo by radar direction. When I landed there were 112 holes on my aircraft."

Wing Commander Hubble saw the MIG on Irlam's tail and dived in for a head on attack. The two aircraft screamed towards one another at 900 miles an hour but the MIG pilot broke off and made for home. Flight Lieutenant S. Rees, Hubble's wingman, dived into the swirling dogfight and engaged a MIG. He did not make any official claim but he believed that he hit home with a few cannon bursts.

During January and March 1953, 20 Meteors out of 34 Australian Air Force Squadron aircraft were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 1,834; 1,279 for interdiction and armed reconnaissance, 449 for counter air offensive, four sorties for counter air defensive and 102 for other purposes. The squadron lost five Meteors. One by enemy ground fire and four aircraft were lost to an exact cause of any type except that due to enemy action.

In the spring of 1953 the Fifth Air Force was building up to a strength of four Sabre wings to counteract the active long range missions of the MIG's over the front. The 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing flew its first interceptor sorties on 25 February and the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing joined a Yalu sweep on 7 April. These two wings were fighter-bomber units, but their F-86's were equally versatile as fighter-interceptors. The two new Sabre wings greatly increased the Fifth Air Force's counterair capabilities and permitted the Australian Air Force Squadron to convert to fighter-bomber work. The straight-wing Meteor VIII jet fighters flown by the Australians had powerful engines, but they had never measured up against the swept-wing MIG's as witnessed in the previous battle.
Consequently during April and May the Australian Squadron concentrated on napalm-rocket attacks on enemy troop billets, villages and supply centers. Australian Air Force technicians evolved the napalm rocket, or "Flaming Onion," as a new and deadly weapon suited for Korean conditions. The weapon resulted from a widespread belief among pilots that napalm bombs
had certain limitations. Studying these reports technicians in Australia devised a means of using a rocket motor to propel a napalm head. Tests at Williamstown, New South Wales, were so successful that operational tests were made on Meteors from Japan. The rocket was first used against the enemy in February 1952, when four Meteors attacked a group of supply buildings at Chaeryong, in North Korea. The Commanding Officer of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing, accompanied the Meteors in a photographic reconnaissance machine to record results. He took back ample proof of the effectiveness of the new weapon. Later records over a period showed that 75 per cent of the napalm rockets recorded direct hits.

On 5 June 1953, Wing Commander A. Hodges took over the Australian Squadron from Wing Commander Hubble. June was an eventful month even though the war was nearly over by this time. While taking part in an attack on an enemy cable station, Sergeant W.D. Monaghan had a remarkable escape from death. Ground fire hit his aircraft just after he had released his rockets and he had little hope of reaching base. Instead of making the attempt he turned west and headed seaward on one engine and managed to land with his wheels down on a friendly island.

Two days later, Sergeant D. W. Pinkstone was hit by anti-aircraft fire and forced to bail out. Intense ground fire forced away a rescue helicopter and Pinkstone was captured. Flying Officer J. R. Coleman of the British Air Force was more fortunate a week later when he managed to bring his damaged aircraft back over friendly territory before bailing out at 15,000 feet. A helicopter picked him up and returned him to base unhurt.

During April and June 20 Meteors out of 24 Australian aircraft were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 1,748; 18 for close support, 1,561 for interdiction and armed reconnaissance, six counter air offensive and 163 for other purposes. The squadron lost five Meteors. Four by enemy ground fire and another was lost to an exact cause of any type except that due to enemy action.

And during 1-27 July 21 Meteors out of 22 Australian Squadron aircraft were combat ready. Total sorties were up to 220; four close support, 206 for interdiction and armed reconnaissance and ten sorties for other purposes. The squadron lost an aircraft due to an exact cause of any type except that due to enemy action.
Section 5. Transport Squadron

When the Korean War began the Australian No. 77 Squadron had an attached communications flight consisting of one C-47 Dakota commanded by Flight Lieutenant D.W. Hitchins. This was the nucleus of No. 30 Transport Unit which did most of the aerial supply and medical evacuation for the Commonwealth forces until it grew into No. 36 Transport Squadron in March 1953. Operating over mountainous terrain in an area where low cloud is the rule rather than the exception, and where bad weather is notorious, the Australian Air Force Dakotas had the proud record of having aircraft grounded on only a few days throughout three years of strenuous operations. The crews flew 100 hours a month, and the aircraft averaged 640 hours a month. Flight Sergeant Murphy held the record with 333 trips from Japan to Korea, and Flight Lieutenant R. Daniel did the Korean flight 276 times as captain of an aircraft.

In its first sixteen months’ operations, No. 30’s aircraft flew more than a million and a quarter nautical miles during more than ten thousand hours in the air. To maintain such a high rate of effort there were seven complete crews to man the seven freighter and one VIP aircraft, all Dakotas.

“Once, in the early days, I landed at Pyongyang with a load of winter clothing for the Australian troops,” said Flight Lieutenant Daniel, when describing some of his experiences. “We had unloaded most of the stuff when an American came running up to see what it was all about. ‘Do you see that river,’ he told us. ‘The Chinese are just over that water and heading this way as fast as they can make it. The Aussies are setting up to fight a rear-guard action 30 miles south of here. We are all getting the hell out of here and you had better do the same.’ We did. But not before we had reloaded our cargo of winter clothes. We did not care to see Australian equipment keeping Chinese soldiers warm even if only as a bonfire in burning Pyongyang.”

No. 30 Transport Unit did not lose many cargoes in that or any other way. Once, Squadron Leader Murdoch had to jettison his cargo over the sea. But he had a good excuse. He had lost one engine and had to struggle back with a light load to Iwakuni Air Base before the other petered out. Once, Flight Lieutenant Daniel had a similar experience but, on the whole, the unit was remarkably free from mishaps.

“That was pretty good going flying between Japan and Korea in all sorts of foul weather,” said Squadron Leader Hitchins, in an interview. “Heavy
icing was perhaps the biggest hazard. Crossing the Korea Strait in heavy cloud it was nothing unusual to hear the ice cracking off the wings and thumping against the fuselage. In the early days the runways we used were pretty sloppy with mud but what used to trick us was that had been soft mud one day turned into frozen ridges and hollows the next so we never knew where we were. Many Korean airdromes are ringed with mountains. Taking off from a strange one in the dark was no joke."

The principal task of the Australian Air Force transport unit was the aerial evacuation of wounded from Korea to the station hospitals in Japan, a job which averaged between thirty and thirty-five such flights each month. Australian Dakotas flew more than 12,000 wounded out of Korea. Although a typhoon in October 1951 "grounded" all aircraft in Korea, one No. 30 Transport Unit Dakota kept its schedule to fly out the wounded. In the same month the unit achieved the record total of 711 medical cases evacuated during the month.

Pilots found that flying in Korea weather conditions was valuable experience and they quickly became good instrument fliers. Navigators, too, found that this type of flying greatly improved their navigation, and they
were able to bring their cargoes of mail and wounded right on to destination airports, either in Japan or Korea, in the worst of weather. With so much poor visibility, the Dakota crews made 30 to 100 “ground controlled approach” landings each month. This landing aid, coupled with the experience of the aircrews, enabled the unit to maintain its record of flying, even in the face of a typhoon. During the nine months’ tour of duty for a crew in the area the average crew member logged between 900 and 1,000 hours in the air. Many men applied for extension of their tours, for they realized the value of the experience gained in the area, and also because the work in support of United Nations forces in Korea was most satisfying to them.

For the record, the Australian Dakotas in the Korean War carried 100,000 passengers and 13,500,000 lbs. of freight and mail.

Section 6. Maintenance Effort

The maintenance effort has been made mostly for the transport squadron. However keen the aircrew they would have been helpless without maintenance to keep the aircraft ready to fly. In this regard fitters and mechanics earned well-deserved praise. The possible percentage of serviceability was 87 per cent but the Dakota groundstaff men maintained a record of from 75 to 83 per cent serviceability. They worked long hours often under arduous conditions to insure that commitments were met with all aircraft. One aircraft returned from a mission to Korea due for an engine change. Its motors had hardly stopped on the tarmac before the groundstaff were working on it, and they had the first cowlings off before the passengers were on the tarmac. Within an hour the two engines were out of the airframe and, less than two hours later, the new ones had been installed.

With a supply line of approximately 6,000 miles, the unit had to achieve the utmost economy in the use of parts and equipment. To insure maximum life for all engines, aircraft parts and equipment the maintenance staff found it necessary to change parts from aircraft to aircraft. Consequently, the salvage and repair of material and equipment was a valuable contribution to economy and efficiency and helped to maintain the high safety standards demanded by the Australian Air Force.

To save the expense of major airframe inspections in Australian workshops, the maintenance staff noted engine and airframe hours before the engines were due for inspection and, wherever possible, equalized them by the transfer of engines to aircraft with approximately the same life. This
meant that the duty crew, which started half an hour before the aircrew arrived and did not finish until after the last plane returned each day, had to work long hours to keep the Dakotas at immediate readiness. In addition to servicing Australian aircraft, groundcrews spent many hours on the repair of other Allied planes which landed at the base in need of maintenance.

In the later months of the war the transport unit's groundstaff assumed more and more responsibility for maintenance of the aircraft. Normally the Australian No. 491 Maintenance Squadron of No. 91 Wing did much of the work on the Dakotas. However, with the increasing commitments of the Maintenance Squadron in keeping Meteor jets serviced for the Australian No. 77 Squadron in Korea, the transport aircraft groundstaff voluntarily undertook additional maintenance duties to help other Australian Air Force units achieve maximum output. Thus, by a well co-ordinated and unselfish effort, aircrew and groundstaff members of No. 30 Australian Transport Unit, which expanded into No. 35 Transport Squadron, achieved and maintained a record of efficiency which would be of credit to any civilian airline operating in any area.

Section 7. Epilogue

When the ceasefire began on 27 July 1953, the Australian No. 77 Squadron had been in active operations for just over three years. In that time it had totalled 4,836 missions and had lost thirty-five pilots, thirty-two of them during the two years' operations with jets. In 18,872 individual sorties members of the squadron destroyed 3,700 buildings, 1,500 vehicles and 16 bridges. It shot down three MIG-15's and three other enemy fighters. The squadron had lost fifty-two aircraft, thirty-seven of them were Meteor jets. The Australian Air Force replaced the aircraft losses with new planes and the average number, computed on a 37 month basis, of the aircraft possessed by the squadron was 26.

The President of the Republic of Korea honored the squadron with a Presidential Unit Citation and the United States Government made many awards to Australian airmen. In a glowing tribute to an "unknown record of vigorous and fearless action" by the Australian Squadron, Lieutenant General W. Bridgeford, Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Forces in Korea, mentioned that with the British Navy and the Australian Navy, No. 77 Squadron was the first of the Commonwealth forces to fight for freedom in Korea.

In August and September 1953 seven squadron pilots were released from
Communist POW camps. They were Flight Lieutenant G. Harvey, Flight Lieutenant Hannan, Flying Officer Guthrie, Flying Officer Bergh, Pilot Officer Drummond, Pilot Officer Thomson and Sergeant Pinkstone. Harvey, the first Australian Air Force prisoner released, had crashlanded a Mustang, on his eighty-fourth combat mission, on a sand bar in a river about a mile from Pyongyang in January 1951. He spent thirty-two months in captivity, the first five months of them the worst. With other UN prisoners he spent most of this time in a battered Korean brickyard. They rose at 0530 hours and went to bed at dark. They received two meals a day -- at 0830 and 1630 hours -- consisting of rice or sorghum and a thin vegetable soup.

On 28 April 1951, Flight Lieutenant Harvey escaped together with two American officers from the enemy POW camp. They were free for six days before recapture. "We were punished for the escape," Lieutenant Harvey told Australian Air Force Public Relations Officer, Flight Lieutenant Ross Alexander after his repatriation. The treatment was very rough and one American officer died as a result of it. The punishment lasted forty-five days and ended on 23 June, when they moved to a Chinese-controlled camp near the Yalu River. During those forty-five days Harvey was kept in a hole in the ground seven feet deep and only a few feet square. At the new camp, prisoners attended eight hours of political lectures a day. Attendance was compulsory and every man had to seem attentive. As the peace negotiations got under way the treatment of prisoners improved and, after the lecture courses were ended, they were free to organize games and exercises although work details were still supervised and so-called "crimes" punished after required written confessions.

After his capture, on 29 August 1951 Warrant Officer (promoted F/O) Guthrie spent three months in North Korean hands before seeing any fellow prisoners. His captors took him from village to village exhibiting him to the local peasants and cross-examining him. Finally, he arrived at Pyongyang, capital of North Korea, where he attempted to escape. He was recaptured after five days and marched with a party of about thirty-five POW's north to the Manchurian border.

The UN prisoners were then handed over to the Chinese, after losing about a third of their number on the 14-day march through malnutrition and dysentery. This fact was disclosed by Guthrie on his repatriation. They were allocated to various camps, according to rank, and Guthrie remained in the officers' camp of Pinchin-ni until the end of the war, some two years later. There, he met Gordon Harvey and, at the end of December 1951, Pilot Officers Thomson and Drummond, two more Australian Meteor pilots, arrived at the camp. Flight Lieutenant Hannan and Sergeant Pinkstone were captured later but sent to another camp as the compound was then full.
Both clothing and food were in very short supply until the end of 1952
but from then on conditions steadily improved until the end of the war.
There was no Red Cross aid, because the Communists do not recognize this
organization, and he received no mail until during 1952 when an agreement
had been reached to exchange mail at the site of the ceasefire talks.

However, not all the prisoners received mail -- it was purely up to the
Chinese authorities. The prisoners were allowed to write three letters a
month but few ever got through to their friends at home.

The alacrity with which the Australian Air Force arrived in the Korean
War must be noted. When the first Australian pilot flew over the Korean
theater on 2 July 1950, he found the Republic of Korea at extreme danger
with defense military operations at the lowest ebb; On the ground hope
was nowhere visible, UN ground forces being cornered into a scanty land
around Pusan and the gathering UN naval forces were still short of providing
drastic reversal in Korea. In the air, Australia sent her air force only
second in speed to the United States Air Force which had alone been
responsible to keep the Korean air in UN hands.

The Australian Air Force contingent was great in both size and gallant
actions among the UN allied air force groups. The Australians further saved
the lives of wounded personnel of the friendly forces with their aerial
evacuation planes, while losing many pilots and aircraft of their own fighter
squadron through bloody battles in the Korean Skies.

It should be inscribed in the History of Korean War especially for those
killed in action that at the sacrifice of their lives the Royal Australian Air
Force units greatly contributed to the UN allied air forces in retaining the
balance of air power over North Korea from the outbreak of the war until
the Armistice on 27 July 1953.
CHRONOLOGY

1950

29 June  The Australian Government places two naval ships in Far Eastern waters at the disposal of the United Nations.

30 June  Commits No. 77 Air Fighter Squadron and one C-47 Dakota airplane for service with the UN forces.

1 July  No. 77 Squadron Mustangs began to escort US bombers from Iwakuni over Hamhung area on North Korea.

1 July  HMAS Shoalhaven commences first escort mission.

7 July  The Air Squadron suffers the first casualty at Sunchon.

6 July  Australian Houses of the Parliament unanimously approve the Government's action in placing naval and air units at the disposal of the UN in Korea.

13 July  HMAS Bataan takes part in Pohang attack Operation.

1 Aug  Order is issued to recruit the Korea-bound ground force and the recruiting quota for the Korea deployment force is full by 26 August.

29 Aug  HMAS Warramunga arrives at Pusan escorting two HMS cruisers taking aboard 1,500 troops of two British battalions.

28 Sept  The 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment arrives at Pusan and entrains for Taegu.

30 Sept  Joins the 27th British Brigade in the Songju-Waegwan area.

2 Oct  Makes its first operational patrol.

5 Oct  The battalion is airlifted to Kimpo and joins UN general advance towards the north.

9 Oct  Arrives at Kaesong.

11-30 Oct  HMAS Warramunga joins the amphibious landings at Wonsan.

12 Oct  The Air Squadron moves in from Iwakuni to Pohang, and joins the 35th US Fighter-Bomber Group.

17 Oct  The 3rd Battalion takes up positions on the northern outskirts of Sariwon.

21 Oct  Crosses the Taedong River and taster sharp fighting with NKA north of Yongyu.

23 Oct  Crosses the Chongchon River at Anju and fights battle with NK near Pakchon.

29 Oct  Encounters heavy oppositions near Chongju and loses its Battalion Commander, Colonel Green.

5 Nov  Sees bitter fighting with CCF around the Pakchon area under the cover of the Australian Air Force for the first time.

17-19 Nov  The Air Force Squadron moves from Pohang to Yonpo, south of Hamhung in North Korea.

27 Nov  The 3rd Battalion moves to Kunu-ri and arrives at Singye on 3
December.

3 Dec The Air Force Squadron receives order to move from Yonpo to Pusan.

4-5 Dec HMAS’s Bataan and Warramunga take part in the Chinnampo evacuation operation.

1951

3 Jan The Army battalion withdraws from Seoul and arrives at Suwon on the 6th.

4 Feb Continues to advance towards north in the Yoju area.

15 Feb Sees heavy fire fight with CCF at Yoju area.

7 Apr Crosses the 38th Parallel for the second time.

10 Apr The Air Force Squadron is attached to the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing at Kimpo and begins training on Gloster Meteor jet fighters.

23-25 Apr The 3rd Battalion nips the bud of CCF Spring Offensive north of Kapyong and comes under the control of the 28th Brigade.

29 May HMAS Bataan is relieved by HMA frigate Murchison and leave for home.

26 June The Army battalion moves to the Imjin River area.

28 July Comes under the 1st Commonwealth Division and conducts patrols across the Imjin River.

24 Aug HMA frigate Anzac relieves the destroyer Warramunga at Sasebo.

Late Aug The Air Squadron is attached to the 8th US Fighter-Bomber Wing at Kimpo.

29 Aug Meteors encounter with MIG over Chongju area for the first time.

31 Aug HMA carrier Sydney and destroyer Tobruk arrive upon the theater.

6 Sept The 3rd Battalion crosses the Immuruk and establishes a defensive positions.

30 Sept Sydney relieves HMS Glory.

2 Oct The 3rd Battalion carries out Operation Commando.

8 Nov Tobruk destroys an enemy freight train in coastal area between Songjin and Chongjin.

21 Nov The Army battalion goes into reserve.

26 Dec The Air Squadron is on Kimpo airfield.

1952

18 Jan The battalion returns back into the west slopes of Hill 355 and conducts patrol, ambush and limited raid.

26 Jan Sydney and Tobruk relieved by HMS Glory and HMAS Warramunga respectively.
Chronology

4 Feb  HMAS Murchison is relieved by HMAS Bataan who arrives at the theater for a second tour of duty.
3 Apr  The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment arrives.
19 June The 1st Battalion's operational engagement begins
2 July  Takes part in Operation Blaze.
26 July  Warramunga leaves the battle area for home.
31 Aug  Bataan leaves the theater for Australia.
26 Nov  Australian Government presents two Mustang planes to ROK Air Force.
10-11 Dec  The 3rd Battalion carries out Operation Fauna.

1953

16 Mar  The Air Squadron attacks 150 enemy convoy trucks and destroys or damages 24 vehicles.
21 Mar  The 1st Battalion is replaced by the 2nd Battalion.
27 Mar  The Air Squadron destroys one MiG and damages another one.
14 Apr  HMAS Condamine is relieved by HMAS Culgoa at Sasebo.
  May  The 2nd Battalion goes into front line on the right of the Commonwealth Division sector.
26 May  The 2nd Battalion engages in fierce battle with CCF.
13 June  Anzac is relieved by HMAS Tobruk.
24 July  The 2nd Battalion repulses the last attack of CCF on the Hook.
27 July  The Armistice Agreement is signed.
  Aug  5-6 Sept  21 Australian captives in north Korea are repatriated.
PART FOUR

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CHAPTER 1 GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to Canada

General

Canada, with an area of 9,976,178 square kilometers is the second largest country in the world, yet one of the least densely populated. It is bounded by the Arctic Ocean on the north, the Atlantic Ocean on the east, the United States on the south, and the Pacific Ocean and Alaska on the west. Canada is an independent democracy, and a voluntary member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Like every large country, Canada has a widely varying climate. The mildest climate is in the western portion of the country. Rainfall is heavy on the west coast but very light in the interior valleys.

Most of its people (about 90 per cent) in 1961 live within 320-kilometer of the United States border. About half of the people are of British descent, one third of French, and most of the remainder are from other European countries. There are a few Indians, Japanese, Chinese and Negros. English is spoken everywhere except in the province of Quebec, where most of the people speak French. Many Quebec people speak English and French, and both are official languages.

Canada is a federal union of ten provinces and two territories. Matters concerning the country as a whole -- national defense, external affairs, trade and commerce -- are controlled by the federal Parliament. Among responsibilities of the provincial legislatures are education, health, and local government. As a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada shares the British monarchy. Queen Elizabeth II is Queen of Canada. As a constitutional monarch she reigns, but does not rule. Her personal representative in Canada is the Governor-General. She appoints this official, usually for a term of five years, on the advice of Canada's Prime Minister.

The Parliament of Canada consists of the Queen and two legislative chambers -- the House of Commons and the Senate. Executive power is vested in the Prime Minister and Cabinet, who are all members of the majority party in Parliament. Members of the Supreme Court of Canada and of the
Exchequer Court, as well as most judges of the superior, district, and county courts in each province, are appointed for life by the Governor-General acting under recommendations of the Cabinet.

World War II and Afterward

Demand of World War II caused a great expansion of Canadian industry. New petroleum fields and deposits of metallic ores were opened the way for further industrial growth. The rapidly increasing size of its economy itself and the discovery and development of abundant energy resources have been significant factors in the recent development of the industries of Canada. Between 1940 and 1960 the number of manufacturing establishments increased by almost 50 per cent and the total number of workers by more than 100 per cent. Today Canada is one of the world's several leading nations in income from manufacturing.

Canada's role in world affairs steadily increased after World War II. As a leading middle power, Canada played an important role in the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and was elected to the United Nations Security Council in 1947. In 1949 Canada ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canada also cooperated closely with the United States in the defense of North America through the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

Especially Canada has supported the Republic of Korea in all United Nations discussions of the Korean problem ever since it was first taken up in 1947. She played a positive role in the establishment of the Republic of Korea Government by appointing a representative with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea that supervised the general elections on 10 May 1948.

Upon the Government of the Republic of Korea being formed, the Canadian Government recognized it on 9 April 1949. Furthermore, she also willingly helped the United Nations in its efforts for emergency relief and reconstruction in Korea during and after the Korean War.

Section 2. Commitment

In the first month of hostilities several United Nations members provided or offered ground, sea and air forces. Canada was among those countries which had offered assistance. Canada agreed to support United
Nations in whatever it deemed necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness of collective security and quickly began to debate as to what part she could and should take.

On 30 June the Canadian Prime Minister made a statement that if Canada were to be informed by the United Nations that a police action under a United Nations Commander would achieve the ends of peace, Canada would immediately consider a contribution. In the meantime three destroyers based on Esquimalt, Vancouver Island, which had been preparing for a European cruise, would move into Far Eastern waters, to be available if required to cooperate with other United Nations naval forces. Most Canadians reading the Prime Minister’s statement concluded that Canada would take every action short of war. Meanwhile, the attention of the leaders of the Canadian Government remained focused on Korea.

On 12 July the Canadian Government decided to place the three destroyers under the operational control of the United Nations forces and informed the Secretary General of the United Nations. Two days later the Secretary General forwarded his memorandum to the Canadian Government requesting that Canada examine its capacity to provide an increased volume of combat forces, particularly ground forces, for service in Korea.

Upon receipt of the request for ground troops, the Canadian Government immediately called for a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee to consider this proposal. On 21 July the Canadian Government came to the conclusion to attach No. 426 Transport Air Squadron to the United States Military Air Transport Service operation between the United States and Japan. And, the ground force was under consideration. However some delay was unavoidable; for unlike the United States and Britain, Canada did not already have forces in the Far East, nor were any Canadian troops readily available for foreign service.

At last on 7 August, the Canadian Government acted and announced the decision to recruit an infantry brigade plus certain supporting arms and services, “to be available for use in carrying out Canada’s obligations under the United Nations Charter.” This contingent was named the Canadian Army Special Force.

Section 3. The Outline

Army

Throughout the Korean War, the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade main-
tained an enviable record as a first-class fighting force. From the time the first Canadian soldiers set foot in Korea on 18 December 1950 until the armistice was signed, 21,940 members of the Canadian Army force served in Korea and Japan. The number of the Canadian Brigade reached its peak in January 1952 totaling 8,123 all ranks. There were 7,134 serving in the theater at the time the armistice was signed.

The Canadian Brigade engaged sharp fightings with the Communist Chinese mainly in the areas of Hongchon, Kapyong, Unchon and Imjin River. During the later battles after the line had been generally stabilized, the brigade remained until the armistice in firm hold along the Imjin River. The static nature of the war accounted for a low casualty rate. In all, the Canadian Army suffered 1,543 battle casualties during the hostilities. In spite of frequent and massive attacks by the Communist Chinese, the gallant stand of the Canadians always nipped the momentum of the enemy.

Navy

From the time when the Canadian Navy steamed into the Korean waters from late July 1950 to May 1951, Canadian destroyers were engaged in the monotonous but essential task of screening United Nations aircraft carriers in Korean waters. It then reentered to more exciting duties. Throughout the remaining years of war the Canadian Navy destroyers -- eight vessels -- had carried out the task of protecting islands chiefly in the western Korean waters. Besides, the destroyers performed supporting the numerous friendly task forces in their unremitting harassment of the enemy mainland and islands, bringing aid and comfort to the sick and needy of the isolated villages and performing the countless other tasks that fell to the lot of the United Nations destroyers serving in the waters around Korea.

Nevertheless the Canadian Navy did not suffer its first and only battle casualties of the Korean War until 2 October 1952, when Iroquois received a direct hit from a shore battery on the east coast. Three were killed and ten wounded. For over three years 3,621 officers and men of the Canadian Navy served in Korean waters.

Air Force

No. 426 Transport Squadron, Royal Canadian Air Force, the first Canadian contingent for the Korean War, had been attached from the Canadian Air Force to the United States Military Air Transport Service (MATS) in mid-July 1950 and airlifted personnel and equipment to and from the Korean
theater of war between MacChord Air Base, Washington, United States and Haneda Airfield, Japan for eleven months. Then the squadron returned to its home base, Dorval, and continued its flying duties until 9 June 1954. When its airlift commitments ended, the squadron had flown 599 round trips (34,000 flying hours) over the Pacific Ocean carrying 13,000 personnel and 3,000 metric tons of freight and mail without loss.

Besides the participation of one air transport squadron, 22 Canadian fighter pilots served with the Fifth United States Air Force. With the loss of one fighter pilot on 5 December 1952 (Squadron Leader A.R. Mackenzie repatriated in December 1954), the Canadians destroyed and damaged many enemy aircraft and wrought great damage upon the enemy. Considering such a small group of pilots, their devotion to duty certainly helped the United Nations forces to enjoy complete supremacy in the air.
CHAPTER II ARMY BRIGADE

Section 1. Deployment
(August 1950 - January 1951)

Activation of the Brigade

Enrolment in the Canadian Army Special Force was voluntary, the term of service being 18 months or "such further period as may be required in consequence of any action taken by Canada pursuant to an international agreement or where the term of service expires during an emergency or within one year of the expiration thereof." Recruiting, which began only two days after the Canadian Prime Minister's announcement, proceeded with great dispatch. By 26 August the number of enlistments had reached 8,000. A number of officers, NCOs and specialists were drawn from the Regular Army, and Brigadier J. M. Rockingham was named as the commander of the unit.

On 21 November the Special Force moved to Fort Lewis in the State of Washington for collective training. On completion of the move, the group of units which had concentrated at Fort Lewis formed the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Thereafter, the term "Canadian Army Special Force" was seldom used.

The new units consisted of second battalions of three infantry from the existing regular regiments; the Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Royal 22e Regiment. Other major units included C Squadron of the 2nd Armoured Regiment, the 2nd Field Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, No. 57 Independent Field Squadron Royal Canadian Engineers, the 25th Brigade Signal Squadron Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, No. 54 Transport Company Royal Canadian Army Service Corps and No. 25 Field Ambulance Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps.

Meanwhile in September 1950 Canada had established, in Tokyo, a Military Mission to provide liaison with the United Nations Command. The Mission was headed by Brigadier F. J. Fleury. Its first major task was to prepare for the arrival of Canadian troops. An advance party of some 350 all ranks sailed from Seattle in the latter part of October, with the intention that the main body should go to Okinawa, Japan for further training, and thence to
Korea. By the time the advance party reached Japan, however, certain changes of plan had developed. At this time in Korea, ROK and other UN forces had crossed the 38th Parallel, Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea had fallen and mobile columns of the ROK and US troops were heading north for the Amnok (Yalu) River, the boundary between Korea and China. In view of the prospect of victory and an apparent lessening in the need for further ground forces, the immediate Canadian commitment was cut to one infantry battalion. Nevertheless, as long as there was any uncertainty, the requirement for a trained force remained vital, and no let-up in training was contemplated or permitted.

The Canadian unit selected to serve in the Korean theater was the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Stone. The battalion which had yet to do any serious advanced training spent less than four days in Fort Lewis. The day after arrival the battalion paraded with the other units of the brigade on the parade square and marched past the Canadian Minister of National Defence. Two days later, on 25 November, it left Seattle for Korea.

However, when the PPCLI Battalion was on its journey, the picture of the Korean War which seemed to be near its end abruptly changed; Chinese Communists, which had said earlier that it would not remain inactive if the United Nations forces entered north Korea, had invaded with formidable forces. The Chinese Communist forces launched a massive attack in the west, followed several days later by one in the east. Allied forces were forced to withdraw, and by the middle of December held positions along the 38th Parallel.

Arrival in Korea

On 25 November, the first Canadian contingent, 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry and its administrative increment left Seattle for Korea on the USNS Private Joe P. Martinez and steamed into Pier 2, Pusan at 1545 hours on 18 December. Disembarkation of the 45 officers and 873 other ranks began at 1900 hours. They were greeted by the cabinet members of the Republic of Korea and some municipal representatives. There was also flag-waving and cheering welcome of Korean ladies and school children.

After the welcome ceremony they were transported to the island of Yong-do, where they were to spend the next ten days. The city of Pusan overflows the mainland onto the eastern end of the island. Near these island outskirts, at the foot of a steep hill dominating the harbour, the
advance party had established itself in several school buildings. To accommodate the battalion, tents were erected on the school playground and the battalion was made as comfortable as possible. Here the 2nd PPCLI Battalion, portion of the advance party, consisting of two officers and 41 other ranks, rejoined their unit.

The battalion was busy in unpacking and sorting the masses of stores and equipment which had been sent with them. There were inexplicable shortages in such items as field cooking equipment and tentage, but the battalion found itself, with certain exceptions, well provided with technical stores.

In the meantime, an area some 80 kilometers north of Pusan was now assigned to the Canadian Battalion as a camp and training area, and on 23 December a reconnaissance group headed by Major H. D. P. Tighe, the second-in-command, left to prepare the site. It was to be the best location the battalion was to occupy for its entire stay in Korea. Located in an apple orchard on the banks of the Miryang-chon, a tributary of the Nakdong River. Although there was ice in the river on most mornings and fuel for the heaters in the US squad tents was in short supply, the battalion would suffer worse discomfort in the months ahead.

The move to the Miryang area by truck convoy began on 27 December, completing by 29 December. The newly arrived Canadian Battalion underwent collective training emphasizing mobility in the hills and lessons picked up from the British Brigade, stressing all-round defense by night. There training program aimed at the physical hardening of the soldiers. Hill-climbing, cross-country movement and hard exercise were combined with lessons on the American supporting weapons they now began to use for the first time. The many drills and deployment and reconnaissance that must be learned if real mobility is to be achieved were practiced continuously. A degree of realism was effected by the performance of limited operational tasks, such as anti-guerilla patrols.

Section 2. First Encounter with Enemy
(February - April 1951)

The Canadians’ First Contact

By the end of January 1951, the battalion had reached an advanced stage of training. On 2 February, the battalion began an exercise that lasted until
7 February. Exercise "Maple Leaf," designed to put the finishing touches to the weeks of work, covered all aspects of the advance, attack, defense and withdrawal.

In mid-February the Patricias moved from Miryang to join the 27th Commonwealth Brigade in the line of battle. This brigade consisted of two British battalions -- the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders -- and the 3rd Battalion of the Australian Regiment. Artillery support was provided by the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment, and immediate medical care by the 60th Indian Field Ambulance. The British battalions had been the first Western troops, other than Americans in the theater.

The advance party of the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI, arrived in its assembly area near the IX US Corps Headquarters on 12 February. The new area, near the town of Changhowon, a river and road junction about 80 kilometers southeast of Seoul, provided few amenities. The weather was bitterly cold, with occasional gust of snow. The main body of the battalion arrived at 1300 hours on 17 February, having taken over two days to cover the 240 kilometers of congested roads through guerilla infested mountains and over treacherous passes.

The Chinese Communist winter offensive having been halted, the UN forces were soon to launch another general advance towards the 38th Parallel. In the central sector the IX and X US Corps were already attacking. On 17 February, by which time it had reached a point immediately north of Yojon approximately 20 kilometers north of Changhowon, the Commonwealth Brigade passed from operational control of the 2nd US Infantry Division, X Corps, to that of the IX Corps. On the same date the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI then 15 kilometers to the south, came under command of the brigade.

On 19 February, the 2nd Battalion moved to Chuan-ni approximately 35 kilometers north of Changhowon and at 1100 hours on the same day, the Canadians advanced north up the valley, with the objective of capturing Hill 404. On this first day of the advance the men were given a grim lesson on the danger of underestimating the Chinese enemy. By the roadside were the bodies of many friendly soldiers who had been surprised by the Chinese Communists at night and killed while still in their sleeping bags. Thereafter the Canadian troops used blankets when resting in the front lines. Hill 404, the initial objective, was not defended and the battalion occupied it without opposition.

At 1000 hours on 21 February, the Canadians began to advance up the valley running north from the area of Sangsok, some 4 kilometers to the east of Hill 404. Hill ranging in height from 200 to 500 meters rose on
either side. Rain mixed with snow, turned the roads and tracks into quagmires and soon fog began to fill the valley. In spite of these difficulties, the battalion made progress. D Company made the first contact with the enemy when its leading elements came under fire near Chohyon from high ground to the northeast. This burst of fire was the only opposition encountered, and by 1700 hours Tactical Headquarters was established in the little village of Wol, with the companies deployed in the surrounding hills. The steep hill sides had been treacherous with ice; two officers suffered severe injuries in falls and had to be evacuated.

The hill positions were 400 meters high and had to be dug through several feet of snow. The weather turned bitterly cold. The only precaution that could be taken was to insist that the man walk about every 15 minutes. This night passed slowly.

Next day the battalion continued up the valley, clearing the heights on either side. Major George’s C Company sustained the unit’s first battle casualties in a two platoon attack on Hill 444 when it lost four killed and one wounded. As the advance neared Hill 419 at the head of the valley, opposition increased. This height was one of two which controlled a pass leading into the next valley. B Company came under fire early in the afternoon from Hill 419 and Major Lilley ordered two platoon attacks that overran the Red Chinese outposts. The battalion commander ordered up A Company to strengthen newly gained B Company’s positions and began to prepare for a battalion attack on the hill next morning.

This attack, led by C and D Companies, went in at 0900 hours on 23 February, but an inaccurate napalm attack by the US Air Force on Hill 444 stalled the C Company advance and D Company went forward alone. Strong resistance was encountered and no troops succeeded in reaching the objective. At last, with night coming on, the battalion commander ordered the two companies to dig in below the high ground to the left of Hill 419. The day’s casualties had been six killed and eight wounded. The hills controlling the pass were precipitous and covered with undergrowth; it was hard enough to climb them let alone fight as well and the elusive enemy was difficult to pinpoint and engage. The brigade commander moved up the Australians to Hill 523 on the PPCLI right, and the Australians, under heavy fire from Hill 614, which controlled the pass from the east, also dug in for the night.

Next day D Company (Captain J.G. Turnbull) attempted again to reach the crest near Hill 419, this time by advancing along the high ground from the right. The company went in after preparatory artillery fire from the New Zealanders and air strikes from the US Air Force and succeeded in reaching forward edge of the objective. Here it came under fire from both
flanks as well as from the front, and was forced to retire and dig in on Hill 614, which dominated D Company’s objective. The battalion patrolled from its company positions until 27 February, when the Australians succeeded in capturing Hill 614. As a result of this success, Hill 419 became untenable by the enemy, and the battalion took it on 28 February without serious opposition and dug in, fighting and sending back in the process the bodies of four Canadian soldiers who had been killed in earlier actions. The next day emphasis was placed on opening up the winding road leading to the pass.

By the first of March, the brigade held positions at the apex of a long salient, with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th ROK Division echeloned back from it on its left and right respectively. On the 3rd, the Middlesex and the Argylls moved a long bound north into positions on Hill 484 and 450 respectively, while the Canadians went into reserve for a rest and clean-up.

**Advance is Continued**

The forward positions now lay nearly three kilometers north of the pass, overlooking a valley running east and west, with the village of Hagai on
the floor of the valley almost immediately below them. There the brigade sat, waiting for the line to be straightened and the flanks secured. During the next week the 27th Brigade remained on its hills overlooking the tributary of the Hukchon and Hagal which straggled along its banks. The road over the pass was improved by US engineers to permit passage of light traffic and by 5 March the 6th ROK Division had come up in line on the right of the brigade. During this interval, patrols had probed north and west as far as the valley of the Hukchon without making contact.

On 7 March, at 0700 hours the Canadians launched an attack on Hill 532. The road through the pass was still difficult and the paths leading down to the valley were treacherous and wet; the battalion commander sent two companies against it. A Company moved across the valley and up the ridge lines to the left of the objective while D Company crossed the stream at Hagal and climbed towards Hill 532 frontally. A Company met only light resistance and by 0800 had closed to within 2 kilometers of the objective. D Company had heavier going. Shortly after deploying from Hagal the company came under intense machine gun fire from the forward slopes of Hill 532 and the advance slowed down. Air strikes were added to the steady fire from the New Zealand Field Regiment and the battalion mortars, but the feature was large and the Chinese Communists were well dug in and camouflaged. The attack slowed down to a series of stubbornly fought section battles supported where possible by tanks from the 1st US Cavalry Division.

In the afternoon snow began to fall, making observation difficult. A Company met increasing opposition along its ridge line and was forced to halt and dig in. D Company put in one last attack about 1400 hours and managed to get some men on the top of the ridge above Hagal, only to find that they were in turn under fire from a higher eminence. The commanding officer of the battalion ordered the company to withdraw and sent forward B Company to hold the far side of the valley. The Red Chinese reoccupied the overhanging ridge. D Company reorganized out of small arms range. The company had lost six killed and 28 wounded.

Although D Company attack failed to achieve complete success, it had been pushed home most gallantly. Private L. Barton, batman to the platoon leader of the leading platoon, particularly distinguished himself. After his officer and several members of the platoon were wounded, he rallied the remainder and led their advance. He was himself wounded three times, but carried on until ordered to the rear. A good part of the ultimate success of the attack may be attributed to his bravery, for which he was awarded the Military Medal, and became the first Canadian to be decorated in the
Korean War.

D Company's lack of success had been matched by equal failure on the left and right flanks of the brigade. The Greek troops of the 1st Cavalry Division on the left did not get across the valley, and on the right the 8th ROK Division trailed some 6 kilometers in rear. Within the brigade, the Australian Battalion on the right of the Canadians had failed to capture Hill 410. Next morning, all was changed. The Red Chinese had spent the night lobbing grenades into the B Company positions, but when at 0500 hours, the angry Canadians fixed bayonets and, led by Major Lilley, charged up the hill, they found only two Chinese soldiers in the defenses that had help up D Company the day before. By 0900 hours B Company was firm on Hill 532. They counted 47 Chinese dead. The Chinese Communists, surprisingly, had broken contact. All along the IX Corps front they had disappeared, leaving behind them evidence of hasty departure in the shape of ammunition dumps and equipment. On 10 March, the Canadians occupied Hill 685 (Kalgi-san).

On 13 March, the 27th Brigade was relieved by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment and moved to the rear into Corps reserve. The Canadians area was near the village of Sangwhang, on the banks of the Hukchon about 16 kilometers behind the front line. This ended a very strenuous period of operations which had lasted for 26 days, conducted in bitterly cold weather. The battalion remained at Sangwhang-ni until the 24th of March in reserve -- resting, refitting and making liberal use of the bath unit loaned by the 1st Cavalry Division.

On 23 March Brigadier Coad left the brigade, being relieved by Colonel B.A. Burke, the Deputy Commander of the 29th Brigade. The next day the Canadians' commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stone was evacuated with smallpox. Major H. D. P. Tighe, the second-in-command, took over as acting commanding officer.

Further to the North

On 25 March the 27th Brigade moved 80 kilometers by mechanical transport to Hyon-ni approximately 14 kilometers southwest of Kapyong, where they came under the command of the 24th US Division. Two days later the brigade took over from the 19th US Infantry Regiment in the front line just north of Hyon-ni. The brigade's axis of advance ran up the valley of the Chojong-chon, a tributary of the Pukhan River. The attack began approximately 8 kilometers south of the head of the valley, which at this point in its course ran north and slightly east. The mountains on each side rose to heights of between 700 to 1200 meters. The crest line was continuous,
and roughly paralleled the floor of the valley.

The Canadians were given the task of advancing along the eastern crest line. At 1420 hours on 28 March, the Canadians reached the positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 19th US Infantry Regiment, the unit they were to relieve. These positions lay on the crest line, 3 kilometers northeast of Porum-kol, and gave a view of the ground over which the battalion was to advance. Snow lay one and a half meters deep on the shaded slopes, and the crest was broken by steep rock faces and cut by gullies. There were no roads on which a vehicle could move. Battalion supporting weapons were reduced to one section of 81-mm mortars. The attack started from Hill 929 on 29 March. The battalion met no serious resistance as it scrambled forward over the rocky slopes and plunged through the snow field. On 31 March the advance halted before Hill 1250 (Myonggi-san). The 21st US Infantry Regiment to the right put in an attack on the ridge line dominated by this hill, but failed to take it. They did, however, succeed in getting on Hills 974 and 834.

At the beginning of this attack Brigadier Rockingham, Commander of the 25th Canadian Brigade, visited the Canadians. He had left Fort Lewis for Korea on 23 March, and six days later he was climbing a steep slope in the area of Hill 929 in search of the forward companies of the Canadians. The brigadier gained a clear impression of the difficulties of the Korean landscape on this, his first trip.

By 31 March, the brigade advance had reached its ultimate objective. As a result it was moved east to the valley of the Kapyong River. During the early part of this offensive the Canadians remained in brigade reserve in the area of Sorakkae some 16 air kilometers northwest of Kapyong, while the other units pushed up the Kapyong valley. On 7 April, however, the battalion was given the task of clearing a crest from Panglip-kochi to Hill 719, parallel to a similar line on the left which had already been cleared by the Australians. The Canadian Battalion crossed the 38th Parallel for the first time on the next day, and on the 11th took the assigned line. On 18 April the brigade was relieved by the 19th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division, and returned to the Kapyong area in IX Corps reserve.

The Action at Kapyong

In the night of 22 April, as foreseen by the United Nations forces, following artillery preparations for four-hour long, the Chinese Communist forces started off their full-scale offensive. The greatest weight fell in the west, against the I and IX Corps. In the sector of the IX Corps the heaviest attack fell on the 6th ROK Division. The 6th ROK Division, falling
back through the Kapyong valley, was in grave danger of being cut off. To hold open a withdrawal route for the 6th ROK Division the 27th Brigade, then in IX US Corps reserve, was ordered to establish a defensive position north of Kapyong. (See Sketch Map 1.)

The brigade's reserve location lay in the valley of the Kapyong River, northwest of its junction with the Pukhan and immediately north of the town of Kapyong. At this point the valley was 3 kilometers wide, but to the north the hills on either side converged, and the valley, thus narrowed, turned northeast for 6 kilometers. The river that flowed down this stretch in three sweeping curves, was dominated by Hill 677 on the west and Hill 504 on the east. Opposite Hill 504, the valley turned sharply northwest for 5 kilometers. At this bend, where an unnamed stream entered the Kapyong from the northeast, the valley was dominated by a ridge running northeast from the village of Somok-dong. As the Kapyong valley turned northwest, it ran across the northeast face of the lower slopes of Hill 677, which thus
dominated both arms of the valley. In addition, the northwest arm was dominated by Sudok-san (Hill 794) across the river from Hill 677. Between these two hills, the valley narrowed sharply, and then opened again as it continued to its head, some 15 kilometers to the northwest. Although continuous crest lines ran west from Hill 677 and east from Hill 504, connecting in both cases with north-south crest lines and furnishing an avenue of approach to both hills, the hills, if held, effectively controlled all entrances to and exits from the valley of the Kapyong River.

This was the area in which the 27th Brigade was ordered to hold open a route along which the ROK troops could withdraw. The Middlesex, with three companies, were given the high ground in the vicinity of Hill 794; the Australians, with A Company of the 72nd US Heavy Tank Battalion attached, were to cover the area north and east of the bend in the river, in positions extending to Hill 504. The Canadians were to hold the steep scrub-covered Hill 677, and Lieutenant Colonel Stone, fully recovered from his bout with smallpox arrived back in time to conduct a reconnaissance of the new position with his company commanders.

The Australians were the first to be attacked. A dangerous situation had arisen as some Chinese Communists had penetrated to the vicinity of Australian Battalion Headquarters, but as daylight came the situation eased. As it seemed unlikely that the Australian Battalion would be able to sustain another night of attack they were ordered to withdraw. The Australian Battalion Headquarters moved to a position within the area held by the Middlesex, who had withdrawn from their exposed position on Hill 794 and taken a stand on the high ground within the southern-most of the three curves of the Kapyong river.

Until the withdrawal of the Australians, the Canadians had remained relatively undisturbed. The Canadian Battalion had deployed to cover the north face of Hill 677, with A Company on the right, C Company in front of D Company on the left. B Company occupied a salient in front of D Company. Battalion Tactical Headquarters was set up on the rear slope overlooking the village of Tungmudae.

At 0700 hours a small body of infiltrating enemy was detected immediately in rear of the Headquarters. To meet this threat, B Company was moved farther south, to a hill immediately east of Battalion Headquarters. The American tanks, engaged in supporting the withdrawal of the Australians and evacuating the wounded, opened fire in error on the company as it occupied the hill, wounding one man slightly.

In its new position, B Company was able to observe enemy movement
across the wide valley of the Kapyong to the north and east, in the area of the village of Naechon. This movement increased throughout the day and about 2200 hours enemy mortar shells began to fall on the Canadian positions, two machine guns opened up at long range and a third ranged in on B Company using tracer, evidently as a direction marker. Within fifteen minutes the forward 6th Platoon was under attack by a force estimated by the company commander to number 200. The battalion mortars and the company machine-guns stopped this assault within a few meters of the company perimeter. At 2300 hours the enemy attack was renewed, preceded as before by a few mortar fire. This time the forward platoon of B Company was partially over-run, but most of the men were able to fight their way back to the main company position, where they were organized into a counter-attack force, which succeeded in stopping the enemy thrust.

As the attack was in progress against B Company, about 100 Red Chinese probed at the Battalion Headquarters and the battalion mortars from a gully in the rear of the position. Shortly afterwards a larger body of enemy was caught in a heavy concentration of artillery fire as it forded the Kapyong. The Canadians on the hill saw them clearly in the moonlight as they broke and fled. The Canadians counted 71 Chinese dead on the river banks next morning. Private W. R. Mitchell of B Company was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his gallant stand in this action.

By 0200 hours every weapon in the battalion was firing on the Red Chinese and it became apparent that the attack on B Company and Battalion Headquarters -- savage though it had been -- was only diversionary. D Company, in its exposed position to the northwest, was attacked by large numbers of the enemy from two sides and the waves of Chinese Communists succeeded in infiltrating the area in strength.

At this critical moment Captain Mills, D Company Commander, requested the artillery to lay down defensive fire on top of his position and after two hours succeeded in stemming the enemy’s advance. Undeterred by these reverses, the enemy persisted in his attacks, but was driven off each time by artillery fire. At last, with the approach of daylight, the pressure subsided, and D Company was able to reestablish itself in its previous position. Captain Mills was awarded the Military Cross for his bravery in this action. Private K.F. Barwise of C Company was awarded the Military Medal for the courage he displayed during the reoccupation of the position, in particular for his single-handed recapture of the medium machine-gun.

By contrast with the night, the daylight hours of 25 April were quiet. The Canadians held their lonely hill and although subjected to heavy fire, they remained free from attack. The battalion was however, cut off from
the rest of the brigade -- the supply route to the rear was held by the enemy -- and the ammunition reserves and emergency rations had been depleted. Failing normal supply, the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stone requested an air drop and only six hours after the request was made, four C-119 aircraft dropped the right proportions of British and American ammunition and a supply of rations. At 1400 hours patrols from B Company reported the road clear, and Lieutenant Colonel Stone requested that additional supplies be brought up by vehicle as soon as possible.

By late afternoon of the 25th April, the area was quiet, and the battalion was able to take stock of the situation. It had maintained its positions intact, and these positions covered the ground vital to the defense of the brigade area. In addition, its relatively light casualties of 10 killed and 23 wounded testified to the skill with which the position had been organized and defended. Lieutenant Colonel Stone's outstanding leadership during this action led to the award of a second bar to his Distinguished Service Order.

In reviewing this battle, the intelligence staff at UN Command estimated
that two CCF regiments of about 6,000 men had attacked the 27th Brigade. The Canadians and their supporting artillery had inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy during their share of the fighting: on B Company’s front alone, 51 dead enemy were counted. There is no doubt that the stand at Kapyong stopped the Red Chinese advance in this sector of the front; for the rest of the offensive the enemy sought elsewhere for tactical gains. The gallant stand of the Canadians and Australians at Kapyong was later recognized by the American Government with awards of Distinguished Unit Citations. A Company, the 72nd US Heavy Tank Battalion, was also included, for the support it had given during the operation.

The units of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade had now been in Korea for nearly a year and Commonwealth rotation policy called for annual replacement. On 23 April the Argylls had been relieved by the 1st Battalion, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and on 25 April, at the conclusion of the action at Kapyong, Brigade Headquarters was itself relieved by a new staff from Hong Kong named Headquarters 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The new commander was Brigadier G. Taylor, who, like Brigadier Coad, had served in Hong Kong prior to his appointment.

On 26 April, the Canadian handed over the positions to a battalion of the 1st US Cavalry Division and with the rest of the brigade moved southwest, to Non-kol, an area north of the junction of the Chojong-chon and Pukhan River near Chongpyong. From Non-kol the Chojong-chon valley runs generally north on a course parallel to that of the Kapyong, and 15 kilometers west of it. The 24th US Division, which had been on the left of the 6th ROK Division, had been conducting a withdrawal on an axis parallel to that of the Republic of Korea forces. On 28 April the brigade came once more under direct control of the IX US Corps and moved to a reserve area near Yangpyong where it remained until the end of the month.

Section 3. The 25th Brigade in Action
(May - July 1951)

The Arrival of the 25th Brigade

The decision to dispatch only one Canadian battalion to Korea for the moment in 1950 had left the question of the employment of the rest of the force. While awaiting final orders the force was to undergo collective training. No existing Canadian camp readily lent itself to such a program,
especially during the winter months. Fortunately, at the time when it was assumed that the whole brigade would move to Korea shortly, a suitable site in the United States had been reserved as a staging camp: namely Fort Lewis in the State of Washington. The bulk of the force concentrated in Fort Lewis in November 1950. Supporting arms and services joined the three infantry battalions to form the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier J. M. Rockingham. To fill the gap soon left by the departure of the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI for Korea a third battalion of the same regiment was created. Third battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment and the Royal 22e Regiment were also raised.

On 21 February 1951, the decision emerged that the whole brigade was to go to Korea as originally planned. The preparation of vehicles for shipment overseas made it impossible to continue formation training beyond mid-March. The emphasis now passed to physical training, range work, practice patrols and night exercises. In this period Brigadier Rockingham visited Korea and Japan as previously mentioned in order to observe the battle front and to make various arrangements in connection with the arrival of the Canadians in the theater.

The 25th Canadian Brigade sailed on 19, 20 and 21 April 1951, in three ships, the *Marine Adder*, the *General Edwin P. Patrick* and the *President Jackson*. The *Marine Adder* and the *General Patrick* docked at Pusan on 4 May 1951, and completed unloading on the following day. On the 6th, at Kure in Japan, the *President Jackson* landed No. 2 Canadian Administrative Unit, No. 25 Canadian Reinforcement Group and associated signals, movement control, postal and dental units.

The newly arrived Canadian Brigade was organized as follows:

Headquarters, 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier J. M. Rockingham)

2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Keane)

2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Dextraze)

C Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse Royal Canadian Armoured (Major J. W. Quinn)

2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (Lieutenant Colonel A. J. B. Bailey)

57th Independent Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers (Major D. H. Rochester)

25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Signal Squadron (Major D. H. George)
Army Brigade

No. 25 Canadian Field Ambulance (Lieutenant Colonel B.L.P. Brosseau)
No. 54 Canadian Transport Company (Major R.C.D. Laughton)
No. 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Ordnance Company (Major H.R. Ferris)
No. 191 Canadian Infantry Workshop (Major R.E. Hallam)
No. 25 Canadian Provost Detachment (Major R.I. Luker)

On disembarkation, the units of the brigade were transported to an empty prisoner of war camp some 15 kilometers from Pusan, where they spent the next six days drawing stores and equipment, and removing the ocean voyage preservatives which had protected stores from salt water corrosion.

During this time the front was quiet across the whole of the peninsula; no new operations had been mounted by either side since the collapse of the Chinese Communists spring offensive in April. This brief spell permitted the brigade to take the opportunity to make a major change in the equipment of its troops.

On arrival in Korea, it was learned that while very few enemy tanks were being encountered, tank support for infantry was essential. In addition, it was discovered that enemy tank ambushing parties, for whose grenades the open turret of the M-10 would provide a convenient receptacle, were active at the front, and even along the lines of communication. In view of these facts, the anti-tank squadron was converted into a armoured squadron, equipped with Sherman tanks. Previously the unit's primary role had been the anti-tank defense of the brigade area; the squadron had been equipped with self-propelled M-10 anti-tank guns, and trained in employment for anti-tank defense. At the same time, the cumbersome 17-pounder anti-tank guns of the infantry were replaced by US 75-mm recoilless rifles.

**Advance Towards the 38th Parallel**

On 11 May training exercise “Charly Horse” began. It was designed to harden the troops and practice them in the tactics and procedures to be followed during an attack in mountainous country. The two infantry battalions put their companies in turn through the exercise, which involved climbing the steep hills surrounding Pusan's K-9 Airfield. The last company of the 2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (R 22e R) finished on Tuesday, 15 May and immediately afterwards the brigade began to move north.

The orders for the brigade's move provided that wheeled vehicles, carrying as many troops as possible, would move by road and that the remaining soldiers, with the tracked vehicles and the heavy engineer
equipment, would travel by rail, in parties on the 17th and 18th.

Elements of the brigade going by road also travel in three groups, the first leaving on 15 May and the other two on the 16th and 17th. The road to be followed was the main supply route via Pusan, Taejon, Suwon; the assembly area lay near Kumyangjang-ri, some 16 kilometers east of Suwon. The road move was expected to be completed on 19 May, but no arrival time was given for the parties travelling by rail, for these troops would have to be transported by truck from the railhead at Suwon to the brigade assembly area. On 20 May, the morning after the last units of the brigade reached the assembly area, the brigade found itself taking part in a general advance towards the 38th Parallel.

The brigade had reached an assembly area northeast of Uijongbu, near Sunae-ri and came under command of the 25th US Division on 24 May. The 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team, which had been placed under the command of the brigade, moved with it. The mission of the 25th Division was to advance to the 38th Parallel.

At 0903 hours on 25 May the brigade moved off following Task Force Dolvin of the 25th US Infantry Division to establish strong defensive positions. The Task Force Dolvin, named after its commander, was composed of three companies of a tank battalion, one infantry battalion, a company of engineers, a tactical air control party and a signals detachment. This device of sending a task force in advance of the infantry, presumably to shake up the enemy and hamper his retreat, which was widely employed across the front during the third advance on the Parallel, had also been used during the second advance.

On 27 May the brigade established positions covering Line Kansas, after a further advance which was made without contact. Line Kansas, the defense line selected by General Van Fleet, Commanding General of the Eighth US Army, began near the mouth of Imjin River 30 kilometers north of Seoul and snaked its way to northeast on the south side of the river through low barren elevations which gradually gave way to higher, moderately wooded hills. Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, Kansas veered eastward and upward toward the Hwachon reservoir and then angled northeastward again across the steep, forested south mountains until it reached the east coast some 40 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. Guarding the approaches to the Kansas on the western front, Line Wyoming looped northeastward from the mouth of the Imjin towards Chorwon, swung east to Kumhwa, and then fell off to the southeast until it rejoined the Kansas near the Hwachon reservoir. In the spring of 1951 it served as outpost line screening Kansas.
The Canadians took over from Task Force Dolvin the following day, on high ground overlooking the 38th Parallel in the area west of Samdolbat, some 13 kilometers northeast of Pochon. On the same day, a tank-infantry patrol from C Squadron and the Philippine battalion moved forward 10 kilometers north of the parallel, but made no contact.

On 29 May, Operation Follow-up, an advance by the brigade north of the 38th Parallel, with the Philippine unit left and the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R right. It covered the route already reconnoitered by the patrol of the previous day, and halted near a burnt out valley village that nestled at the foot of a formidable mountain barrier, Kakhul-bong (Hill 466) two kilometers east of Unchon. From this height came the first opposition since crossing the parallel. It would appear that the enemy’s time table of retreat was being disrupted to a certain extent, for tanks of C Squadron, which were moving on the left discovered a large abandoned dump of gasoline and ammunition.

During this offensive, some Red Chinese positions were inadvertently by-passed, with unexpected consequences to the Laundry and Bath Platoon of the Brigade Ordnance Company. That unit had been keeping pace with the advancing troops and on the afternoon of 28 May had set up shop some 24 kilometers north of Uijongbu on a stream near the brigade center line. The Commanding officer returning from a terrain reconnaissance for a new location, found his men standing guard over two Chinese Communists who they had captured from a nearby farmhouse. These were the first prisoners taken by the brigade. Three days later, the platoon captured three more Red Chinese.

Chail-li Battle

The attack was to be resumed on the 30th May with the 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) replacing the 2nd R 22e R on the right. Since Kakhul-bong dominated the 2nd RCR axis of advance, a plan was made to put in a battalion attack on this feature, and the village of Chail that lay beyond it. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Keane ordered A Company to push rapidly up the road to the west of the hill and capture Chail-li; B Company was to cover the left flank by occupying positions on Hill 162, while C Company was given the task of capturing Hill 269, which lay between Chail-li and Hill 467. The main assault, that on the twin peaks of Kakhul-bong, was assigned to D Company commanded by Major H. B. Boates. (See Situation Map 10.)

In a driving rain-storm, A, B and C Companies got on to their objectives with relative ease, but D Company, climbing the steep slopes of its objective, encountered resistance from enemy markedly superior to the be-
dragged specimens encountered earlier in the advance, and by 1130 hours
the Red Chinese began to react very strongly against the penetration
of the RCR. A Company began to receive increasingly heavy small arms,
mortar, artillery, and high-velocity, low-trajectory fire. The 1st Platoon
reported groups of enemy, estimated at company strength, coming down
south along the road towards Chai-li, and dispersing into the fields on
either side of the road when the platoon opened fire. The 2nd platoon,
guarding the left flank, also reported that the enemy was infiltrating
through the paddy fields around its position and opening fire at a range of
25 meters. Five or six enemy field pieces, and what A Company believed
to be tanks, were spotted at this time. Despite the fire of battalion support-
ing weapons and the 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery,
the enemy pressure continued to increase. At 1300 hours the Chinese
Communists began to infiltrate on the right flank, and with superb field
craft worked themselves towards the spur bordering the road on the
southern outskirts of the village. At first, due to the poor visibility, this
movement on the flank of A Company was overlooked.

According to Major Medland, the troops he saw were wearing ponchos
and looked very much like Canadian troops. He took them to be some men
of C Company, but as he could not raise C Company on the wireless, he
could not determine otherwise. It was not until this flank erupted in a
hail of small arms, mortar, and machine gun fire, that he realized the Chi-
nese were circling to his rear. The Canadians were beginning to experience
the tactics that had bedeviled the Americans in earlier encounters.

Mortar, small arms, and machine guns kept a steady fire on the defend-
ers, and the company commander later reported he was positive that the
enemy was using a machine gun. Mortar fire began to fall behind the
company, the pressure increased against the 1st and 2nd Platoons, and it
became obvious that the Red Chinese were making every effort to surround
and cut off the company.

During this period C Company, in and around Hill 269 played the
frustrating role of a virtual bystander. By mid-day visibility was so restricted
by rain and mist that it was very difficult to identify the troops in the
valley. Consequently, although the movement around the flank of A Company
could be seen, it was first believed to be A Company's own platoon. Once
it was realized that these were Red Chinese, the 8th Platoon engaged them
with rifles and Brens, but this had no visible effect owing to the long
range. At the same time a considerable number of Chinese Communists
could be seen coming from a village east of the valley reservoir towards
Kakhul-bong. These were engaged by the 7th and 8th Platoons, but again
the distance was too great to have much effect. The company commander
had been forced by the nature of the ground to place his troops in the immediate vicinity of Hill 269, and he did not have the men available to engage the flanking enemy. This inability to cooperate was to have a decided effect on D Company’s attempt to take Kakhul-bong.

This feature was the backbone of the Chinese Communists defense, and step by step they resisted D Company’s attack. The 11th Platoon, which had swung over to the left flank, found that this had already been cleared by the 10th Platoon in its advance along the main axis. The Red Chinese took every advantage of their extensive trench system which skirted the main ridges and ran back up the hill, using their camouflaged bunkers with great skill. Machine gun and mortar fire increased with every meter, but the attack continued. By 1130 hours the leading platoon had scaled and cleared the precipitous western peak and was dropping down into the draw leading to the main feature itself, some 300 meters distant.

But from the very top of this pinnacle a well placed enemy machine gun completely dominated the approaches. Artillery and mortar fire was brought down, the platoon leader of the 11th ordered his 3.5 rocket launcher to fire against the lone machine gun, but the stubborn defenders could not be dislodged. The leading section worked itself to within seven meters of the crest, but found it impossible to proceed further frontally. The platoon leader ordered a section to work around the right flank, and try to engage the position from the east ridge. The section however, went too far in the dense mist which swirled around the peak, and suddenly came upon a group of enemy having launch in a small valley behind the crest of Kakhul-bong. Enemy mortar fire had become very heavy. The company command post, located behind the west peak, received a direct hit, seriously wounding Major Boates. The leader of the 10th Platoon took over and again attempted to knock out the machine gun, but without success.

The Brigadier decided that it would be unwise to continue the attempt and ordered a withdrawal to an organized defensive position. As a further measure of security, the I US Corps placed the 2nd Battalion of the 65th US Regiment under operational control of the brigade, and the brigade commander ordered the battalion to occupy positions on the feature south of the 2nd Battalion, RCR.

Beginning at 1430 hours the encircled companies of the RCR began to fight their way back. A Company, under cover of artillery and tank fire, withdrew from Chail-li and, B and C Companies began to move back at the same time. D Company, now under Lieutenant J. A. Cowan’s command, began to withdraw from Kakhul-bong, with the enemy pressing closely. The return of the 2nd Battalion, RCR was a long and painful business, but by
1900 hours the last company had pulled clear of the hills. By 2100 the unit had reached its new position and organized into a compact defensive position.

The machine gun section with C Company lost the majority of its vehicles -- two jeeps and three trailers -- and three tanks of C Squadron that had bogged down had to be temporarily abandoned. Fortunately, it was possible, with the assistance of the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R, to recover two of the tanks that evening and the third the following day. The 2nd Battalion, RCR lost six men killed in the day's action and two officers and 23 men wounded.

The action at Chaul-li was the brigade's first serious engagement since it had been committed to action. There is no doubt that the violent enemy reaction in this locality was caused by the threat to his lines of communication across the Chorwon plain.

**Patrols at Chorwon**

On 1 June, after relinquishing its position to the 65th US Regiment, the Canadian Brigade moved into the I US Corps reserve area about 20 more kilometers south of Imjin, northeast of Uijongbu, and remained there until the 18th. While the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R, remained in position on the right of the 65th US Regiment and the 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA) continued in support of the remaining units.

Meanwhile, the 2nd PPCLI, which since its last major action -- the Ka-Pyong battle -- had been under command of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, now located in the area of Imjin—Hautan junction. Its next task was to establish and hold a patrol base north of the junction, from which other Commonwealth troops would probe deeply into the heights beyond. The Patricias set up such a position on 6 June and held it until the 11th, when they were relieved by the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R. The Patricias moved back to the Canadian Brigade reserve area.

On 18 June, Eighth US Army placed the Canadian Brigade under command of the 1st US Cavalry Division, where it was given the task of relieving the elements of the 3rd US Division on the Chorwon end of Wyoming. The brigade left its area south of the Imjin, where it had been in reserve since the first part of June, and was in position on Wyoming by noon on the 19th. The 2nd Battalion, R 22e R joined it here on the same day from its patrol base on the Imjin, and the brigade was complete again.

The brigade was in position by noon on the 19th. The front was 7 kilometers long, with the right flank on the western outskirts of Chorwon, which were included in its sector. To the right, the positions of the 3rd US Division carried the line generally due east. To the left, the 1st Cavalry
Division's positions continued from south west to the general area of Yonchon. Within the brigade's sector, the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI was on the left and the 2nd Battalion, RCR on the right, with the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R in reserve in rear of the 2nd Battalion, RCR.

On 21 June, the 2nd Battalion, RCR provided the two companies for the first of a series of deep patrols into no man's land. The patrol was composed of a troop of tanks, artillery and a tactical air control party. A patrol base was established on the high ground immediately northeast of Chungma-san and the artillery deployed there, following which the tanks, the infantry and the air control party continued on the route. Several small bodies of enemy were encountered on the way and dispersed with tank fire and by 1620 hours the patrol had covered some 13 kilometers and firmed up around the village of Hahoeson. At this point an air observation plane accompanying the force reported the enemy strength on a hill nearby. Artillery fire was brought down and the patrol turned back, arriving at its starting point about 1900 hours.

On 9 July, during one of these patrols, the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R lost their second-in-command. Major J. P. L. Gosselin was acting as commanding officer.
in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel Dextraze and supervising the movement forward when his scout car ran over a mine. His driver and one operator were also killed and two other operators wounded. Major Gosselin was the only Canadian field grade officer killed in action in Korea.

Deep patrols into no man's land were the order of the day. This patrol was the first of a series of deep incursions into enemy territory which was to last until the middle of July.

**Truce Talks begin**

Despite the boastful big talk of the Red Chinese to drive the ROK and UN forces into the waters off Pusan by human wave warfare, the Red combat capabilities reached their limits in the course of their three determined offensives in January, April and May 1951. Their offensives only added to their losses. The CCF engaged in open battle with the UN forces, in one massive assault after another. Each time the CCF were spectacularly unsuccessful. At the end of May 1951, the CCF had proved they could not prevail in open warfare in the more maneuverable ground of southern and middle Korea.

In the meantime the United Nations Command had no burning desire to push and pursue them back into the horrendous terrain girdling the Amnok (Yalu) River. It was very clear to Soviet observers that the CCF could not win a decision in south Korea; they could not now even halt the slow, steady UN advance northward. When the Communists cannot win by force, they are prepared to negotiate. On 23 June 1951, almost one year from the hour that the North Korean army deployed above the 38th Parallel, Soviet delegate Yakov A. Malik made a remarkable speech before the UN. He proposed the armistice negotiations. Two days later, the Peking radio endorsed Malik's proposal. On 29 June General Ridgway made a broadcast to the Communist High Commands that the United Nations Command would be willing to send representatives to discuss an armistice. It took but a few days to make contact and agree upon a meeting place the west coast town of Kaesong, just south of the 38th Parallel. Vice-admiral C. Turner Joy, US Navy, was named to head the United Nations delegation. The Chief Communist negotiator was Lieutenant General *Nam Il*, North Korean Communist Army. As soon as the truce talks begun, it became apparent that the Communist delegation intended not only to discuss the proposed cease-fire but everything up to and including the kitchen drain. They insisted that the 38th Parallel must be the new line of demarcation, although the UN forces
in most places stood well above it -- and the parallel, as had been proved, was hardly a defensible line -- and that, unless the UNC ceased actual hostilities in Korea at once they could not discuss the armistice. They at once refused demands to permit the International Red Cross to inspect the north Korea POW Camps.

Within the initiation of negotiations, the tempo of operations on the battlefield slackened. The prospect of an early end to the fighting made UN commanders and troops eager to prevent any unnecessary loss of life. But some small-scale limited objective attacks were mounted and frequent patrols were sent out to collect information on the enemy activities and to prevent the UN troops from losing their fighting edges.

Section 4. Across the Imjin River
(July - October 1951)

Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division

At the beginning of May 1951 the Canadian Minister of National Defence, announcing the departure of the Canadian Brigade for Korea, had stated that the force would form part of the 1st Commonwealth Division. This formation did not yet exist, though its creation had been under consideration by the British War Office as early as August 1950.

Meanwhile in Korea, the patrol base system and the lull in operations during July 1951 caused by the armistice negotiations gave the Commonwealth forces time to organize the 1st Commonwealth Division. Division Headquarters elements began to assemble in Korea early in June 1951. The Commanding General designate, Major General A. J. H. Cassels, was British, as were most of the original senior officers. The General Staff Officer Grade I, however, was a Canadian, Lieutenant Colonel E.D. Danby.

Along the 38th Parallel, the components of British Commonwealth forces were being drawn closer together. The assembling of the three formations, the 25th, 29th and 28th Brigades which were to become the brigades of the new division had already been recorded. With this went a parallel assembling of command staff elements, and of maintenance units required to make the division operational. On 24 June, the British elements of the staff and services of the headquarters together with the 1st Commonwealth Division Signal Regiment and the 28th Field Engineer Regiment arrived in Pusan, and the headquarters was set up, for the first time, in that city. On 1 July, the first flight of the Canadian Section, British Commonwealth
Hospital arrived. The Canadian element of the headquarters increased by 28 July, it included seven officers.

On 28 July 1951, the 25th Canadian Brigade came under the command of a newly formed lst Commonwealth Division. For the first time in history Commonwealth troops from Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India were part of an inter dominion operational division under a unified command. In addition, the division had supporting armour consisting of a squadron of Lord Stathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadian) and the 8th King’s Royal Hussars (British). Canada, Britain and New Zealand each provided a field regiment of artillery, Canada, Britain and India made up a complete medical team while sub-units from Canada, Britain, and New Zealand provided engineer and signal requirements.

On the lst August, the Canadian element was organized as a unit under the designation Canadian Section, Headquarters lst Commonwealth Division. The formation of the division brought reductions in Brigadier Rockingham’s command. Previously, his force might have been considered, in some respects at least, a division miniature, complete with its own arms and services. The incorporation of the Canadian Brigade into the division brought changes in the organization for command and control. Previously, as the commander of an independent force, the Brigadier exercised direct operational and administrative control over all Canadian units forward of Headquarters Eighth US Army, while the troops along the line of communication, in rear of Army Headquarters, were controlled by appropriate service advisers from the Canadian Brigade Headquarters.

But after incorporation, while Canadian units of the former brigade remained under Brigadier Rockingham’s administrative control for purely Canadian aspects, such as discipline, promotion and transfer, he had operational control of only the three infantry battalions and the armoured squadron. The other units in the brigade came under operational control of Headquarters lst Commonwealth Division, although they were used, for the most part, in support of the 25th Brigade. It stands greatly to the credit of all concerned that the transition was made with the absolute minimum of friction or confusion.

When the new Division Headquarters assumed control, its formations held a front of 11 kilometers, a sector of Line Kansas, on the south bank of the Imjin River, from that river’s junction with the Hantan westward to the boundary of the lst ROK Division. There was always the possibility that the enemy might attack east across the Imjin and sever the north-south supply route to Chorwon, when the Canadian Brigade occupied its positions
on the eastern side of the salient. This threat prompted vigorous and deep patrolling into the salient, in which activity the new division became involved almost immediately.

The 25th Brigade’s first task was participation in Operation Slam. For this purpose the brigade was placed under the operational of the 1st US Cavalry Division on 3 August, with the role of holding defensive positions in order to free the Cavalry Division for mobile operations north of the river. This operation consisted of patrols in strength across the Imjin, with troops of the Commonwealth crossing from the south and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division from the east. On 8 August the 25th Brigade was reverted to parent control and returned to its reserve position. At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Stone returned from Canada and resumed command of the 2nd PPCLI. There followed a period of active patrolling, whenever the opportunity to cross the river occurred.

**Operation Dirk and Claymore**

On 13 August, Operation Dirk took place. This was carried out by the 2nd Battalion, RCR. The aim of the operation was to try to discover just where the enemy was and what he was doing, and capture prisoners, clear the Chinese from the vicinity of the Imjin.

Accompanied by troops of Lord Strathcona tanks, Major C.H. Lithgow, the second-in-command of the 2nd Battalion, RCR, led this patrol. A Company crossed a two-kilometer east of the junction with the Sami-chon, and established patrol base on a ridge northwest of Noruk-gol to meet the possibility of a strong enemy reaction. Next day the remaining companies crossed the river and advanced some seven kilometers into enemy territory without opposition. The day was oppressively hot and humid and the tired troops were glad to settle down at dark in company defensive position. But one further task, and a most unpleasant but necessary one, was the preparation for the night involving digging, wiring and mining. (See Situation Map 11.)

The first enemy reaction came that night when small sized Red patrols probed at the B and C Company positions. The Canadian artillery fired on them from their gun positions south of the Imjin and dispersed them, but C and D Companies suffered thereafter from sporadic mortar and machine gun fire. Next morning one dead Chinese Communist soldier and a Russian carbine were discovered in front of C Company’s hill position. At 0600 hours, 14 August, C Company, with Captain L.W.G. Hayes in command, moved forward towards its final objective, Hill 187, a dominating feature another kilometer to the north. Two hours later, about half way there, the company came under fire from enemy dug-in on a hill that overlooked their
attack from the west.

The company commander attempted to rush the position by ordering his leading platoon forward but the enemy reaction was swifter and the troops were driven to ground by machine gun fire before they had gone 50 meters. Artillery fire was called down on the position but it was not until the battalion mortars came into action that the enemy fire slackened, permitting C Company to assault the position.

The company commander deployed two of his platoons in covering positions and ordered the third to assault the hill position from the rear. Lieutenant A.P. Rankine led his men, undetected, to an assault position and ordered bayonets fixed. The platoon went up the hill with considerable dash and a hand-to-hand encounter followed.

In this assault Private G.G. Rowden particularly distinguished himself. He had been wounded in the head during the initial exchange of fire, but after binding up the wound himself, he refused to be evacuated and joined the assaulting platoon. Reaching the crest of the hill and firing his Bren gun from the hip, he engaged the enemy positions one after another, and his coolness and accuracy undoubtedly contributed to the outcome. For his conduct on this occasion he was awarded the Military Medal.

The attack was successful and by 1,000 hours the enemy had been driven from the hill. Troops of C Company found the bunkers and trenches of what had evidently been a platoon position, seven dead and two dying Red Chinese soldiers, and several automatic weapons. C Company suffered two wounded in the attack. It was C Company's last attempt on this particular operation; heavy and accurate machine gun fire, originating on the company objective, Hill 187, made further progress unwise. The enemy appeared to be dug in at least in company strength.

Throughout this episode, Lieutenant Colonel Keane who was acting Brigade Commander during the absence of Brigadier Rockingham circled overhead in a reconnaissance aircraft, in full communication with the American air control team and the companies of the RCR. As the company commander was consolidating his gains, Colonel Keane told him that the enemy were moving to cut off his rear and ordered him to withdraw his troops.

The next attack was by B Company. It had as its objective a hill (152) north of Sogu-ri and it had been advancing parallel to C Company. The company commander, Captain E. K. Wildfang, could see clearly the C Company attack and was even able to support it by ordering one of his Bren gunners to open fire on an enemy machine gun position that was firing at C Company. Enemy reaction was swift. Almost immediately, B Company was hit heavy mortar and artillery fire and forced to dig in. At 1230 hours the advance was resumed, but as the company moved down the slope of its
hill position the mortar fire increased and several men were wounded, including the company Sergeant Major. The advance was pressed home, however, until the leading platoon reached the lower slopes of the objective. There the weight of fire made it obvious that the hill was held in force and since the purpose of the attack had been to confirm this, the company commander ordered the attack to stop and began to withdraw, reaching the Imjin at 1800 hours.

C Company did not have as easy a withdrawal, for the enemy followed closely, and the platoons covering each other's movements were not able to silence the enemy small arms fire. D Company, which had been in battalion reserve, was ordered to hold a delaying position so that C Company could break contact and move through them. This they were finally able to do by 1645 hours, thanks largely to the cool courage of Private C.O. Bell of D Company, who used his Bren gun so effectively that the enemy were stopped and finally broke off the action. For this he, too, was awarded the Military Medal. By last light on the 15th, the battalion had successfully recrossed the Imjin and returned in its former assembly area.

During the three days, from 22nd to 24th August, the Canadian Brigade carried out a more ambitious attack Operation Claymore. The Battalions, 2nd PPCLI and R 22e R, crossed at Sumuso due six kilometers north of the Imjin and Hantan junction, established firm positions and patrolled as far as Hills 187 and 208. Slight contacts with the enemy were made, but both objectives were reached without difficulty and without casualties. Two air strikes by the Americans were estimated to have killed more than 50 of the enemy. The R 22e R Battalion returned by the ferry at Sumuso and moved to an assembly area at Saetongjae, about six kilometers due west of Sumuso, where it met the RCR. The PPCLI Battalion returned due south, and went back to their former position. (See Situation Map 11.)

The purpose of this move was to place the 25th Brigade, less one battalion, in the rear of the 1st Cavalry Division, to support the 5th Cavalry Regiment while it adjusted its positions. The brigade moved back to the Commonwealth area on the 28th, and on 4 September relieved the 28th Brigade on the right of the division's front.

**Operation Minden**

The 8th September saw the development of the Operation Minden. The 28th Commonwealth Brigade crossed the river and established a bridgehead covering two crossings, one where the road from Choksong crossed the river and the other a few kilometers to the east. Class 50 Bridges (for
tank) were constructed by the 1st US Corps Engineers at these crossings, which were ultimately made into the high level structures named "Teal" and "Pintail." They were the main links to the maintenance areas behind the Imjin and their existence was vital. Much time and treasure were spent keeping them in repair and fighting off the temperamental river they bridged.

On 11 September the division moved north out of the bridgehead with the 29th Brigade left and the 25th Canadian Brigade right, and advanced toward the objective; a line named Wyoming, from Sangkorangpo to Chung-kol. Occupation of this line would remove the salient. By 13 September, the move had been completed, The 12th ROK Regiment "tied in" on the division's left at Sangkorangpo, its line to the west running south of the Imjin. The 5th Cavalry Regiment was on the right at Chung-kol, the Cavalry Division's positions continuing the line northeast towards Chorwon. The inter brigade boundary divided the Commonwealth Division's front roughly in half, and the Sami-chon in turn divided the front of the 29th Brigade. At this time, then, the division lay on Line Wyoming, with Line Kansas in its rear along the south bank of the Imjin.

The part played by Canadians in Minden was not a particularly stirring one and the casualties of 3 killed and 10 wounded were comparatively light. The general area which the brigade was to occupy lay south of Sumuso. Part of the brigade's objective was already held by one of the battalions of the 28th Brigade, and previous patrols had already explored the territory. (See Situation Map 12.)

On 12 September, following an air strike, B Company, 2nd Battalion, R 22e R whose position centered on Hill 172, put in an attack on three hills across the valley to its front to clear the enemy from them so that work on the defenses of the main position could be carried on. This attack was carried out with great spirit and very skillful coordination of supporting fire by Captain Tremblay.

Canadian tanks were in support and under the able direction of the company commander, literally fired the troops down the slope from Hill 172, across the valley, and on to the middle objective. Some of the enemy bunkers engaged in this way were not more than 40 or 50 meters ahead of the Canadians and this accurate supporting fire contributed greatly to B company's success.

The troops themselves lived up to the accurate supporting fire. Lieuten- nant J. P. A. Therrien, commanding the left forward platoon, led his men up the hill with such vigour that the enemy fled their defenses, leaving sixteen dead behind them. Captain Tremblay and Lieutenant Therrien were awarded the Military Cross. Two other soldiers, Corporal J.G. Ostiguy and Private
R. Gagnon earned the Military Medal for the skill and fearlessness they showed as their platoons swept over the objective. Corporal Ostiguy's section was reduced by casualties to three men but with fire and movement he penetrated into a platoon position, hurling grenades into bunkers and putting the enemy to flight. Private Gagnon, a wireless operator, hurled a grenade up-hill with such accuracy that it landed inside an enemy dugout, knocking out the machine-gun and killing the crew. But the captured objective proved to be untenable. The enemy on nearby Hill 222 proved too strong to be dislodged and the company was ordered to returned to Hill 172. Next day D Company took the objectives without opposition and counted 36 enemy dead. The King's Shropshire Light Infantry, a British unit, occupied the area on the 14th, leaving the 2nd R 22e R free to complete work on its position. On 17 and 18 September, the British unit was relieved by companies from 25th Canadian Brigade. Routine patrols and a great deal of mining, wiring and digging occupied the brigade after this relief, until the commencement of Operation Commando early in October.

**Operation Commando**

The 3rd October saw Operation Commando -- a coordinated I US Corps offensive against the most carefully prepared enemy defensive positions and the largest enemy build-up yet experienced. This operation was to form part of a United Nations offensive on the I Corps front. The aim of the offensive was to close with the enemy and disrupt any plans he might be making for an autumn offensive: additionally it was hoped that such action might induce a more conciliatory attitude in the Communist peace delegates, who up to date had been vacillating and intransigent in negotiations for a cease fire agreement.

Advances were to be made to a line Jamestown which, in the case of the Commonwealth Division, was six to eight kilometers northwest of Wyoming. A further advance to Line Fargo, 4 to 5 kilometers beyond Jamestown, was also planned, to be made on orders of Headquarters I US Corps.

The Sami-chon, which flows southeast into the lower Imjin, became the Commonwealth left boundary in Commando; the opposite boundary began at the southward bend of the upper Imjin. To the right of the latter were the 1st US Cavalry Division and 3rd Division, and on the Commonwealth Division's left as before, the 1st ROK Division. About 8 kilometers beyond the Wyoming Line ran an unnamed tributary of the Sami-chon -- the stream and its valley have since acquired the area name, Nabu-ri -- and it was on the high ground overlooking this valley that the 25th Canadian and the
Hill 355 seen from a reserve company position. The tank is positioned to check any attempts to outflank the hill.

28th Commonwealth Brigades were to establish their portions of the James-town Line. For Operation Commando the 29th British Brigade was committed, not as a formation, but rather by individual battalions allotted to the attacking brigades. In order that each might be more heavily supported by artillery the 25th and 28th Brigades launched their attacks on successive days.

On 28 September preliminary moves took place. The 2nd Battalion, R 22e R relieved a battalion of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment in its area on the right flank. One hour after the move of the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R began, the battalion started by companies to new positions roughly 2 kilometers forward, the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI fitting in between.

Completion of these preliminary moves placed the battalions of the RCR and PPCLI in the brigade’s former outpost line, as required in the original planning and retained in the plan for Commando. The move of the R 22e R Battalion was completed on 1 October, when the 15th Regiment, 1st ROK Division took over all territory west of the Sami-chon from the 29th Brigade.

The attack by the 25th Canadian Brigade to secure high ground 3 kilo-
meters forward of Wyoming, began at 1100 hours, 4 October while the British were still fighting for Hill 355. The 2nd Battalion, RCR advanced with A Company left and B Company right, A Company passing through the forward defended localities of the 1st Battalion, Ulster Rifles. Neither company encountered any opposition, and within two hours the Canadian Battalion was on its objectives, the feature above Chommal and the height east of Naeochon. The 2nd Battalion, PPCLI began its advance on the right of the Canadian Brigade's front at the same time as the 2nd Battalion, RCR. It also had two companies up. D Company on the left, advanced on Mangun-ri, passed through it and seized the unnamed hill, 500 meters to the north. A Company, on the right, advanced to the hill east of Kamagol, while B Company cleared the ridge running north from Sogu-ri and relieved D Company which then moved across the next valley to take Hill 187, the battalion's main objective. (See Situation Map 12.)

This high ground was held by the enemy, and it took two hours of fighting to reach the top. Lieutenant C.E.S. Curmi's 10th Platoon, D Company led the final assault. The enemy stayed in his dugouts and fought back and in the resulting melee Lieutenant Curmi and one of his section leaders were wounded. Twenty-eight Chinese were killed in this action and four surrendered. D Company lost one man killed and six wounded. It had been a well fought battle. Meanwhile A Company set out to relieve the Shropshire company on the high ground northwest of Kamagol (Hill 210), and B Company of the PPCLI passed through B Company, 2nd Battalion, RCR east of Naeochon, to capture the height immediately north of the RCR Company. The 25th Brigade again began to make the attack. In the RCR sector, C Company passed through D on Hill 187 and seized the height 500 meters northeast of Hamurhan by late afternoon of the 4th. It did not encounter any enemy troops during its advance. But it was heavily shelled by enemy artillery, presumably controlled from Hill 166, west of the valley. At the same time B Company, which had been relieved on the Naeochon high ground by the B Company, PPCLI, began to advance along the spur toward the hill mass northwest of Ochon. The company came under fire from its objective, and had difficulty in extricating its leading platoon.

The successful withdrawal of this platoon was made possible by the covering artillery fire provided with great gallantry by Lieutenant M.T. O'Brennan, an artillery observation officer with B Company. While pushing forward to a better view of the enemy position, his wireless operator was killed and he himself was wounded, but he continued to direct the artillery fire until evacuated as a stretcher case. His devotion to duty was an important factor in the success of the company's withdrawal and he was awarded the Military Cross. After his officer had been evacuated, Lance
Bombardier Dorman took over, and won the Military Medal by directing fire support under very heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. Private W. D. Pugh, a signaller of B Company, went forward from the company’s patrol base when the radio operator with the company commander was wounded. He reestablished the communications necessary to the direction of fire. For outstanding devotion to duty which he showed, Private Pugh too was awarded the Military Medal. Corporal E. W. Poole was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for the courage which he displayed while evacuating the wounded.

In the meantime the PPCLI Battalion had also been advancing. C Company worked its way along the ridge from the Hill 187 to the heights 800 meters west and A Company set out for Hill 159. At this point the resistance which the RCR had encountered and the lateness of the day caused the advance to be suspended. B Company of the RCR was brought back into line, and A Company of the PPCLI was stopped short of its objective. Thus, at the end of 4 October the forward line of the brigade ran north east from the heights above Hamurhan. To the left of the brigade’s front, the Ulsters had gained all their objectives without difficulty.

On 5 October the attack was resumed. B Company, 2nd Battalion, RCR occupied the feature northwest of Ochon after it had been reported clear by a patrol of scouts and snipers; B Company, PPCLI dug in on Hill 159, and A Company secured the heights 800 meters southwest of Sanjom-ni. When the 2nd Battalion, R 22c R relieved the Ulsters, all three battalions of the brigade were on the forward line. Thus, late in the afternoon of 5 October, the 25th Brigade was on Line Jamestown, with the 12th ROK Regiment on the left and the Shropshires on the right. At last the Commonwealth Division’s part in Operation Commando was completed. It had not been achieved without cost. The Canadians suffered four killed and 28 wounded.

On 8 October, then, the division held a front of approximately 21 kilometers on the Jamestown Line, with seven battalions, in the front line, one battalion in support position on the left flank and one battalion in reserve. General Cassels, the Division Commander, considered that a larger reserve would have been desirable but found it impossible to reduce the number of units in the front line without leaving unacceptable gaps. As it was, the forward battalions were very thin on the ground. In short, the Division Commander believed that the division was not capable of holding a large scale enemy offensive. It provided no depth to the position, and the importance of depth in defense had been one of the main lessons of the campaign. It would have been very difficult to hold the position if the Red Chinese had launched a full-scale offensive. Moreover the country was exceptionally wild
and consisted of a mass of hills and valleys running every direction.

The enemy, of course, heavily outnumbered friendly allies and but for massive firepower, constant close air support, the Chinese Communists might have overwhelmed the division. It was guns -- ability to concentrate untold amounts of hot steel at any point along the front line -- that gave superiority. Of course, lately developed skills at using the terrain advantageously, at getting off the narrow twisting roads up into the wild hill sides and along the rocky ridges, had helped tip the scales in the Canadians favor too.

Section 5. During October - December 1951

The Rotation of the PPCLI

In July 1951 the Canadian authorities arrived at a rotation plan, whereby units and individuals would be rotated after approximately one year in the Far East. The first Canadians to be rotated as a unit were the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI, the relieving battalion being the 1st Battalion, PPCLI.

The two companies of the 1st PPCLI which had sailed in September arrived at Pusan on the morning of the 6th October 1951. After a dockside breakfast, they boarded a train. The trip to the Tokchong railhead, approximately 12 kilometers north of Uijongbu, took almost a full day. The incoming companies were accommodated at a reception center at Sandogi, some three kilometers southwest of the Imjin–Hantan river junction, set up by the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI.

While the newly arrived officers spent the time forward in the positions they were to take over, the men underwent a special course in American weapons and a program of route marching to offset the long sea voyage. Mortar men received training from 2nd Battalion instructors, culminated in a two day route march (12-13 October) combined with a tactical exercise.

On 14 October these companies relieved two companies of the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI on the Commando objectives. Major Cross’ C Company took over from the outgoing 2nd Battalion’s C Company on Hill 187 and Major Williams’ A Company from D, on the right. The relief was carried out in the early daylight hours of the 14th, smoothly and apparently without the enemy’s knowledge.

Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company and a third company (D Company) docked at Inchon on 30 October. B and Support Companies reached Yokohama the following day. On 4 November, at 0700 hours, D Company took over from the 2nd Patricia’s right forward B Company. The third and
final flight, having disembarked at Pusan the day before, arrived at the rotation center on the same day and the main body took over from the 2nd Battalion.

On the following morning, at 1100 hours, the 2nd Patricias paraded before the Eighth US Army Commander, General Van Fleet, who congratulated the unit on its achievements in Korea and presented it with the US Presidential Unit Citation which it had won at Kapyong.

**Operation Pepperpot**

On 23 October, almost two weeks before its parent unit officially entered the line, one company of the 1st Patricias had had a taste of action. Facing the Commonwealth Division were the 64th CCF Army’s 190th and 191st Divisions. In order to inflict damage and casualties on the enemy and at the same time to obtain information regarding his layout, General Cassels ordered the 25th and 28th Brigades to carry out raids on certain known enemy positions. For these operations, which took place on the 23rd, the Canadian Brigade provided one company of each battalion.

The main Canadian objective was Hill 165, secondary objectives being Hill 156 on the right and an unnamed feature in between. Brigadier Rockingham named Hill 165 as the objective of the D Company of the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R supported by the light machine guns and mortars of the 1st Gloucesters and a section of the 57th Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers (RCR), and assigned Hill 155 and another feature north of Hill 156 to the D Company of the 2nd Battalion, RCR with the 1st Battalion Leicesters’ light machine guns and mortars in support and the 1st Patricias, A Company plus a Canadian Engineer demolition party. Each group was further supported by a troop of C Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, firing from advanced positions overlooking the valley. While the raiding groups began moving forward at different times according to the distance to be covered, H-Hour for all three was 0630 hours on 23 October. The three Canadian companies moved off separately between 0530 and 0630 hours in the morning.

The RCR Company, attacking under light opposition, was on its objective by 0730 hours. Against six Red Chinese killed, eleven wounded and one captured, its own casualties were one killed and four wounded. While the attached pioneer section mined and booby trapped around the bunkers and slit trenches, the other two companies continued their advance. By 0830 hours one platoon of the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R was hundred meters from Hill 166 and the Patricias were half way up Hill 159. Two of Major Williams’ platoons now charged up Hill 156 closely supported by the fire of their tanks and the Canadian tank reserve troop, the shells bursting within 20 meters. Only Hill
165 was still in enemy hands by 0920 hours.

While the Patricias cleared all bunkers and strong points on their objective -- evidently a company position -- the accompanying forward observer and mortar fire controller set up an observation post. Shortly after 1000 hours, at Williams' request, Lieutenant Colonel Stone, Patricias Battalion Commander, sent a platoon of the A Company, 2nd PPCLI Battalion to clear Sohaktong, a village about 400 meters to the southeast. The platoon entered unopposed and rounded up two civilians for questioning.

The infantry troops were now on two of their objectives, and the artillery and all the Strathcona tanks could now concentrate their fire on Hill 165. This they did, reducing an estimated five enemy machine guns to one; yet repeated attacks still failed. By noon the brigade commander considered the objective of the operation largely achieved and accordingly ordered the three companies to return. Major Williams received an American Bronze Star for his part in this raid and artillery forward observer, Captain J.E.W. Berthiaume, was awarded the Military Cross.

Artillery, mortars and tanks covered the withdrawal with smoke, though not from the outset. Anticipating that the smoke screen would cause the enemy to bring down his fire, Brigadier Rockingham first ordered high explosive concentrations on hills beyond the objectives. The Red Chinese may well have believed that further attacks were in preparation; in any case the delay enabled the R 22e R and RCR companies to get clear of the enemy fire power before these were fired. The PPCLI company, however, suffered ten casualties during the withdrawal.

Operation Pepperpot had cost the R 22e R Battalion seven casualties, the RCR five and the PPCLI fourteen. Enemy losses included one prisoner, 37 counted dead and as many more believed killed or wounded.

**On the Songgok Spur**

On the night of 2-3 November, the first of the enemy's attack was directed at the Songgok spur, overlooking the valley of the Sami-chon and its eastern tributary. This feature was now held by A Company, and Hill 187 by C Company, of the RCR Battalion. At 2100 hours, 2 November, the Chinese Communists mounted a strong attack to get through the wire between the two companies. Quite large numbers of the enemy were sighted around the Songgok feature, where they sent up flares. But they found themselves in an anti-personnel minefield and leaving screaming and moaning casualties behind, they retired to the floor of the valley.

At 0240 hours next morning the enemy struck again. This blow fell mainly on a platoon of A Company that had already borne the brunt of the
earlier attacks. Although short of ammunition and greatly reduced strength by casualties, the platoon fought an orderly and most effective delaying action under the fire support of the division's artillery. Unable to exploit his initial success, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind 35 dead and at least three wounded. The platoon position which had been overrun was reoccupied.

The enemy's next major attack fell on Hills 217 and 315, in the sector held by the 28th Brigade. The two hills eventually passed into Red Chinese after a bitter struggle.

On the night of 5-6 November, while the fighting on the 28th Brigade's front was still in progress, the enemy launched repeated attacks on C Company of the 1st Battalion, PPCLI. D Company occupied a star-shaped feature on the boundary with the 28th Brigade, the contours of which made it necessary to defend it with one platoon forward and two back. Mortar fire had started to fall on the company area at 1400 hours. By 1630 hours artillery and mortar shells were falling on both D Company of the 1st Patricias and A Company of the PPCLI, though D Company remained the principal target. At 1800 hours enemy flat-trajectory guns and howitzers joined in the firing, and ten minutes later Red Chinese infantry troops were seen forming up across the valley under the cover of machine gun fire from the northern flank. The attack developed at 1815 hours.

This particular attack was largely broken up by artillery and mortar fire, and what remained of it soon melted away under the company's machine guns and rifles. Enemy activity from approximately 1830 hours to 2000 was limited to sporadic mortaring and shelling. Thanks to division's 25-pounders and US medium tanks, a second thrust about 2015 hours was broken up. Further artillery fire, supplemented by the Patricias' mortars and machine guns, was directed with the aid of searchlight. A second attack on the Patricias developed quickly. By 2045 hours one section of D Company's forward platoon had been forced to withdraw, having used up all its ammunition, and the enemy were trying to encircle the entire company. But it was repulsed by the fire both of its organic and supporting arms.

Again the enemy struck the forward platoon at 0140 hours next morning. Coming across the valley, an estimated two companies began to attack, more or less frontally, while a smaller group made a right hook. Despite a great weight of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, some CCF got through the barrier of two platoons -- only to be stopped by grenades and small arms. After an hour the attack had largely petered out, and by 0315 hours all was again quiet. Lieutenant J.G.C. McKinley was awarded the Military Cross for his gallant stand for this action. For Lieutenant McKinley and his platoon it was only the second night in the line after arriving from Canada. Canadians casualties were remarkable light -- three killed, fifteen
wounded — whereas 34 enemy dead were counted.

The next action in which Canadian troops were involved was another company raid by the 2nd R 22e R on Hill 166, on 9 November. A detachment of the Assault Pioneer Platoon (C Company) accompanied the raiding force, and the Scout and Sniper Platoon carried out a secondary action. Support for the raid included Puerto Rican mortars of the 3rd US Division.

H-Hour was 2130. The company left its own area at 1900 hours, two hours before H-Hour, to form up the line of departure in the valley in front of the RCR Battalion. Two platoons reached intermediate objectives with some difficulty. The Scout Platoon eventually made good a secondary objective some 500 meters southwest of Hill 166, though not in time for the third rifle platoon to assault Hill 166 itself as planned. An improvised attack by the right forward platoon got to within a hundred meters of the top, but at the same time the Scouts were being heavily counterattacked on the newly won secondary objective. Accordingly, at approximately 0130 hours, they were ordered to withdraw.

The right forward platoon leader reported the dug-outs on Hill 166 as obviously permanent quarters stocked with food, clothing and ammunition, while Scout Platoon leader noted that the neighbouring position did not seem to have been affected by friendly artillery and mortar fire. The raid cost six casualties, of which two were fatal.

**On Mansok-dong Feature**

On the 22nd November the Commonwealth Division turned over its right hand sector — still the scene of heavy fighting — to the 3rd US Division, which had relieved the Ist Cavalry Division. The 29th British Brigade took over from the Ist ROK Division a portion of the line west of the Samichon, the 28th Brigade became division reserve, and the Canadian Brigade assumed responsibility for a front of almost six kilometers extending northeast from the Samichon. Brigadier Rockingham continued to employ three battalions forward — the RCR Battalion now on the left, the PPCLI Battalion in the center, and the R 22e R Battalion which had been relieved by a composite battalion of the 29th Brigade on the right. The R 22e R Battalion positions formed a right angled triangle whose base ran due east to the height northwest of Kama-kol, the hypotenuse extending northeastward to a saddle between Hills 220 and 355. At the time the ridge northwest of Kama-kol was not occupied, while Hill 355, which dominated the center of the 1st US Corps’ front, was held by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Regiment.
The rifle companies of the R 22e R were in position by 0630 hours, 22 November. B Company was at the end of the ridge that ran westward from Hill 210, C Company, on the northern face of the latter, A Company, on a fingerlike spur pointing at the same from Hill 355, and D Company, in the saddle between 355 and 220. (See Sketch Map 2.) The battalion command post had established at Mansok-dong on the ridge northwest of Kamagol by mid-afternoon. Red Chinese shells and rockets began to fall heavily on Hill 355, the mortar fire spreading to the D Company of the R 22e R Battalion at 1530 hours. D Company held its ground, but by early evening Hill 355 was in enemy hands and in the meantime the Chinese Communists reoccupied Hill 220 as well.

**MANSOK-DONG BATTLE (23-25 NOV 1951)**

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**Legend**

- **American Position**
- **Canadian Position**
- **CCF Attack**

Sketch Map 2
The loss of Hill 355, if permanent, would constitute a serious setback for the 1st US Corps sector. Even the temporary presence of the enemy on this and on Hill 220 placed the R 22e R Battalion in a precarious situation, but the battalion commander calmly and confidently instructed all companies to cling to their positions.

At 1800 hours the commander of D Company, Captain Real Liboiron, reported a second attack coming in. This report of enemy attack drew fire from all artillery regiments of the Commonwealth -- the 2nd Canadian, 14th British and 16th New Zealand. The good communication with supporting arms that were a feature of Commonwealth Division operations proved to be a highly important factor in the defense of the area.

Scarcely had the first evening attack on the R 22e R Battalion died down when, about 2030 hours, another seemed to be in the offing. Mortar flares revealed further movement on Hill 220. Meanwhile, some twenty CCF, probing at the inner flanks of the Patricias and the RCR, were quietened with mortars.

The second attack on D Company of the R 22e R came towards 2130 hours. This was repulsed with the help of artillery and tanks. Throughout the night the company successfully withstood further attacks on either flank. On Brigadier Rockingham's order the Canadian Lord Strathconas, who already had two troops of tanks supporting the R 22e R Battalion, moved up an additional troop after midnight. Early next morning the 7th US Regiment recaptured the greater part of Hill 355, and later in the day the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division secured the remainder.

Intermittently throughout the morning and early afternoon, the Chinese shelled A and D Companies of the R 22e R and C Company of the 1st Battalion, PPCLI with anti-tank weapons.

From 1330 hours onwards there was tremendous amount of enemy movement from the north and northwest and Hill 220. At 1745 hours some three hundred strong Red Chinese attacked, coming down a hill northeast of Hill 220 and over the top the hill itself, from which the A Company patrol had fortunately been withdrawn.

The first three waves were armed with burp guns. The second wave carried heavy matting for getting over the barbed wire, and the third carried bayonets attached to sticks. The left platoon leader Lieutenant R. MacDuff, took the remnants of his forward section and his other two and reorganized them into three groups, one party covering the rear of A Company's right flank while the other two had protection to recoilless rifle detachments. In the meantime, the Company Commander, Major Liboiron lost no time in calling down tank, mortar and artillery fire on the
overrun position; and preparations for its recovery were under way by 1930 hours. Mortar fire came down, catching the enemy in the open and breaking up the attack.

During the night of 24–25 November the situation on the right had taken another turn for the worst; the CCF had recaptured a portion of Hill 355. Thus the 2nd R 22e R again found its flank exposed until the next morning, when elements of the 7th and 15th US Regiments took back the lost ground. Prisoners taken by the Americans identified their belonging to the 192nd CCF Division, and that on Hill 220 as the 568th Regiment, 190th CCF Division.

The daylight hours of the 25th November were relatively quiet for the R 22e R Battalion, but in the evening D Company once more came under attack. Unknown numbers of the Red Chinese, coming in from Hill 227, were beaten off by artillery and 81-mm mortars. This proved to be the last of seven attacks on the position in three days, in which time the battalion had suffered 49 casualties, including 15 killed; about half of these were members of D Company. Major Liboiron, who was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, attributed his company’s successful defense to “the will to fight and good communications.”

Activity elsewhere on the Canadian Brigade’s front between the 22nd and 26th November consisted mainly of patrolling. On the evening of the 27th, Brigade Headquarters received from General Cassels the information that no further combat patrols were to be dispatched, and that the artillery would be restricted to defensive fire.

But the restrictions were very temporary. On the night of 6–7 December 1951, a combat patrol from the 2nd RCR came under very heavy machine gun fire near the village of Pukchang 1,000 meters due north of Hill 166 but returned unscathed. A brigade plan issued on 7 called for a combat patrol from each unit between that date and 10 December, and for night reconnaissance and ambush patrols. One objective of this renewed activity was to get all possible information about enemy positions west of Hill 220 in preparation for a company strength raid there, but the purpose common to all patrols in this new situation was to take prisoners.

The company chosen for the raid behind Hill 220 was D Company, 1st Patricias, to be supported by the 2nd Canadian Horse Artillery Regiment, British 4.2 mortars, R 22e R 81-mm mortars and Strathcona tanks. The raiders set out at 2200 hours, 10 December, their objective being a row of three hills 300 to 850 west of Hill 220. The right platoon passed through the village of Un-kol without incidents until the leading elements gained the ridge between two of the hills. Here the right platoon was first held
artillery fire and subsequently by grenades. The Red Chinese continued to hit the top of the ridge. D Company Commander, Major George, ordered 11th Platoon to halt while the supporting tanks engaged the enemy positions. This fire successfully silenced the enemy on the ridge.

Meanwhile, on the center hill, the left platoon (the 12th Platoon) had come under small arms fire, and within a few minutes suffered a dozen casualties. The platoon leader, himself wounded, ordered his men back. In the meantime, the right platoon had reorganized and started to attack again. After four unsuccessful attempts, it took the hill at the east end of the ridge. Major George was wounded, but refused medical attention until he had withdrawn and counted all his men. The 10th Platoon now joined the attack and although the leader was among several wounded by the tank fire supporting the assault, a corporal led the platoon to its objective in the face of machine gun fire from the reverse slope.

The Chinese Communists escaped to the back of the ridge through tunnels and communication trenches. Nevertheless it was a well conducted operation that succeeded in its main aim of testing and probing the enemy defenses around Hill 227. Canadian casualties numbered one killed, twenty four wounded. Major George was awarded the DSO for his brilliant gallantry.

Meanwhile the latter half of December saw two changes of command within the Canadian brigade. The commanding officers of the R 22e R and RCR Battalions returned to Canada. The one was succeeded by his second-in-command, Major J.A.A.G. Vallee, and the other by Lieutenant Colonel G.C. Corbould.

Section 6. Active Defense
(January - July 1952)

The PPCLI on Hill 132

The 25th Canadian Brigade continued to hold the positions which it had taken over in November until the third week of January 1952. This period was one of what came to be called normal activity. Already the defensive layouts were assuming their final form and units were occupying and reoccupying the same familiar ground. The Canadians were relieved by the 28th Brigade and thereafter spent six weeks in divisional reserve. The reserve positions now taken over by Canadian Brigade were on the Wyoming
Line on either side of the Sami-chon, Brigade Main Headquarters being southeast of its junction with the Imjin.

On 10 March 1952 the 25th Canadian Brigade relieved the 29th Brigade in the left sector of the 1st Commonwealth Division, west of the Sami-chon. The R 22e R Battalion was on the right of the Sami-chon, in the position it had held prior to the Hill 220-355 Battles. Across the river were the PPCLI Battalion and, on their left, the RCR Battalion.

During the night of 26-27 March the enemy mounted a strong, highly coordinated raid on Hill 132, overlooking the junction of the Sami-chon and

25TH BRIGADE FRONT (31 MAR 1952)
an unnamed west—east tributary. (See Sketch Map 3.)

The 7th Platoon, C Company of the 1st PPCLI, in charge of holding Hill 132, reported a small group of Chinese in the valley half an hour after midnight. Other enemy parties crossed the valley. Thus the enemy closed in on the position, surrounded it, and waited for his artillery and mortar preparation. The enemy fire began at 0120 hours, and within five minutes the Canadian platoon found itself under attack, mainly from behind. Knocking out a Browning gunner covering the rear of platoon headquarters, some Red Chinese succeeded in getting through the inner wire. The acting platoon leader, Sergeant R.G. Buxton, thereupon took over the gun and beatened them off. By 0230 hours the platoon was still holding but were running short of ammunition. C Company Commander ordered two sections of a rear platoon to carry ammunition to the 7th Platoon and bring back a seriously wounded man. At 0415 they finally reached the position. By that time the enemy began to withdraw. As usual the entire division artillery gave full support.

The enemy left behind 25 dead and one prisoner. The Patricias' casualties numbered four killed, nine wounded. Sergeant Buxton, who was also wounded, was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

**Rotation of the Troops**

By this time preparations were well under way for the rotation of Canadian units. Advance parties of some of the rotating units had already arrived by air, the main bodies following by sea. The first unit to be rotated was No. 54 Transport Company, which completed handover to No. 23 Company on 11 April.

Between the 14th and 19th the division boundaries were shifted eastward by two battalion frontages. The new right sector was taken over by the 29th Brigade, the 28th Brigade going into reserve. The Canadian Brigade's right flank -- the position east of the Sami-chon, held by the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R -- became the left. The 2nd Battalion, RCR and the 1st Battalion, PPCLI, on being relieved by battalions of the 1st US Marine Division (which now held the I US Corps' left flank), assumed responsibility for what became the center and right, respectively, of the Canadian front.

While these adjustments were in progress the 1st Battalion, RCR (Lieutenant Colonel P. R. Bingham) rotated with the 2nd Battalion, RCR and the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R gave the place to the 1st Battalion, R 22e R (Lieutenant Colonel Trudeau). The 1st Battalion, RCR, which had disembarked at Inchon on 10 April, rotated two companies of the 2nd Battalion, RCR. The
remainder of the 1st Battalion reached Pusan on the 18th and took up a new position on the right of the 2nd Battalion, R 22e R. The RCR handover was completed on 25 April.

Meanwhile, the first two companies of the 1st Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment had reached Pusan on the 11th, and were in the line by the 17th. Two remaining companies of the 2nd Battalion came under the control of the 1st Battalion, R 22e R on 24 April, until relieved on 8 May.

The next unit to leave Korea was No. 25 Canadian Field Ambulance, which gave place to No. 37 Ambulance on 27 April. On the same date command of the brigade passed to Brigadier M. P. Bogert. Brigadier Rockingham's tenure of command had been a notable one. His military skill and cooperative spirit were major contribution to the successes of the brigade and also the Commonwealth Division. He was awarded the CB for his service in Korea. In May the 57th Independent Field Squadron was rotated by the 23rd Field Squadron, and the 2nd Field Regiment RCHA by the 1st RCHA. The last of the first contingent units to depart was C Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (tank), which was rotated by the Strathcona's B Squadron on 8 June. No. 2 Administrative Unit, No. 25 Reinforcement Group and other Canadian units in the Far East continued to function under the same names, though with new personnel.

Rotation and other developments had brought about many changes in the Commonwealth Division's order of battle. Division Headquarters now included 27 Canadians. Lieutenant Colonel N. G. Wilson Smith was now GSO I, command of the 1st Patricias having passed to Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Cameron. The original Assistant Director of Medical Services, a British officer, had been succeeded by Colonel G. L. Morgan Smith, a Canadian. A recapitulation is given below to avoid some confusion which may have arisen.

1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR)  
(Lieutenant Colonel P.R. Bingham)

1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI)  
(Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Cameron)

1st Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (R 22e R)  
(Lieutenant Colonel L.F. Trudeau)

B Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse (tank) (Major J.S. Roxborough)

1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA)  
(Lieutenant Colonel E.M.D. McNaughton)

23rd Field Squadron (Major E.T. Galway)

No. 37 Field Ambulance (Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Caswell)
Patrolling—May and June 1952

In the middle of May 1952 the 1st US Corps began to dispatch strong combat patrols one from every forward battalion each week in order to snatch prisoners. Before describing the Canadian’s share, it is necessary to describe the ground on which they operated.

An unnamed tributary runs into the Sami-chon from the northeast, approximately six kilometers upstream from the river junction with the Imjin River. The valley of Sami-chon, which is quite narrow above the mouth of this tributary, widens to over two kilometers below it. The tributary, on the other hand, flows through a valley which is little more than 500 meters wide. The features which lie to the east of this tributary, and of the wide portion of the Sami-chon valley, consist in the main of long ridges stretching west into the valley like fingers. The features opposite are more compact. In the sense that fewer reentrants run into them from the valley whose western boundary they form. The area held by the 1st Battalion, R 22c R and a good half of that held by the 1st Battalion, RCR fronted on the wide portion of the Sami-chon valley; the remainder of the RCR Battalion and all of the 1st Battalion, PPCLI’s area faced the valley of the tributary. The latter two units were thus much closer to the enemy held high ground opposite them, but nowhere in the Canadian sector was contact with the enemy really close.

In the Canadian sector the patrols passed through their own minefields at fixed points where the safety lane existed, and crossed the floor of the valley to the hills opposite. Patrol bases were established as close to the objective as possible, in localities that lent themselves to all round defense, and the actual raiding parties moved on to the objectives from these positions. On the objective, the raiding groups usually found themselves in a maze of trenches ruined by friendly artillery. Here they came under heavy mortar and small arms fire which inflicted casualties and restricted their freedom of movement. In addition, a high proportion of the enemy trenches were connected to tunnels, through which his troops could retreat from a threatened spot or move to one which had been cleared and passed by the patrols. Although it was possible, under these conditions, for the raiding party to inflict casualties, it proved difficult to take a live prisoner. The results of the many raids staged in May were not particularly encouraging. One prisoner was captured on the night of 6-7 May, and two deserter surrendered early in mornings of the 9th and 16th.

The 1st Patricias sent out a patrol on the night of 20-21 May, with the aim of sweeping the eastern tip of a shoulder running east from Hill 156
known as the Boot. The party consisted of one officer and 32 men, including two snipers, two wireless operators and two pioneers, and was divided into a patrol base group, a covering fire section and an assault section; the last named was made up of a headquarters, two Sten gun groups and two Bren gun groups. Supporting fire was provided by a troop of the 1st Regiment RCHA and the unit mortar and machine gun platoons. The patrol base group established itself on the floor of the Nabu-ri valley at 2300 hours, the main body passing through at midnight. Reaching the base of the hill without interference, the covering fire section took up a position some 50 meters below the enemy’s trenches, while the remainder continued on up the slope. But now, as the party came within 20 meters of his main position, the enemy opened fire with every platoon weapon. Five of the Patricias were wounded, one of whom later died; among the other four was the patrol leader, Lieutenant D.A. Middleton.

His group outnumbered three to one in immediate fighting strength, the patrol leader, Lieutenant Middleton, ordered a withdrawal. Corporal J.G. Dunbar, supervised the recovery of casualties, and it was only at last that he realized that the officer was wounded. Lieutenant Middleton, anxious not to hamper the withdrawal, urged the Corporal to leave him behind; but Corporal Dunbar insisted on carrying him to safety. At one point, exhausted, he laid the officer down and called on another member of the patrol for assistance, whereupon that soldier picked up the Lieutenant and carried him some distance. In due course the party arrived back with all its wounded. Enemy losses inflicted by the patrol were estimated at seven wounded or killed.

Unfortunately, such patrols as this, in very aggressiveness and frequency, failed in their primary purpose; for as the enemy learned to anticipate friendly actions it became more difficult to take him alive. Perhaps the most nearly successful of these patrols was one dispatched by the RCR Battalion on 31 May. This party, consisted of 33 men under Lieutenant A.A.S. Peterson, was sent to Hill 113 on the night of 31 May-1 June. Their weapons included six Bren guns, grenades and a 2-inch mortar in the patrol base. On completion of an air strike on the objective, the patrol reached the base of the hill. Lieutenant Peterson called down prearranged artillery fire on the upper slopes, and then led his men to the first line of trenches, which proved to be unoccupied and in disrepair. He set up his patrol base of six or seven men with a 2-inch mortar under Sergeant H.J.D. Shore and continued the advance of his own section in the lead. At the same time, the artillery concentration was replaced by a timed schedule of tank fire which, being more accurate than the artillery fire, could be maintained.
until the infiltration was very close to its objective.

Under the cover of the supporting fire, the patrol climbed up a draw to the intermediate line of trenches, which was also found to be unmanned. While Corporal Stinson's six-man section began to search the position, Peterson's group pressed on to the crest.

The whole feature proved to be held by a reinforced platoon. The enemy in the uppermost position came out fighting. Meanwhile the enemy in the bunkers halfway down the hill were now giving battle to the Corporal Stinson's section. The enemy began to close in and Stinson's team began to withdraw to the patrol base, with four of his men wounded. One prisoner taken from a bunker tried to escape when the withdrawal began, and was shot as he scrambled away.

In the meantime, Lieutenant Peterson's group attempted to return by way of Corporal Stinson's intermediate former position, but superior numbers of the enemy forced the Lieutenant to take a more dangerous northerly route. The patrol had inflicted a number of casualties on the enemy, at the cost of only four wounded. The low casualty rate was due largely to the excellent timing of the withdrawal, and the firm control maintained throughout.

Other actions of this series were similarly eventful, and all were a severe test of the soldier's courage, skill and resourcefulness. However none of the patrols succeeded in bringing back a live enemy prisoner.

In May the Canadian Brigade carried out more than 480 patrols of all types 419 standing, 43 ambush, 20 fighting and two reconnaissance and during June almost 550. The Canadian casualties for the period totalled 21 killed, 109 wounded and one taken prisoner. Not all these losses occurred in patrol action: a number resulted from the enemy artillery fire, which was becoming heavier and more effective at this time.

The 25th Canadian Brigade turned over its positions to the 28th Commonwealth Brigade at the end of June. During the next six weeks, while in division reserve, the Canadians worked on the Wyoming and Kansas defenses and underwent refresher training. The tanks had a busy time firing on drifting debris and floating mines on the swollen Imjin, in an attempt to protect Teal and Pintail Bridges against damage. Unfortunately the former was washed out; but by mid-September, when the flood had abated, Pintail bridge still stood and Teal was being restored.

**Canadians at Koje-do Prisoner Camps**

In the meantime, there were frequent instances of unrest and occasional outbreaks of resistance in the United Nations Command prisoner camps on
Koje Island. The outbreaks of dissension and open resistance were desultory until the negotiations at Kaesong got underway. But thereafter the prisoners had been staging riots, and had murdered more than 100 of their own number for anti-Communist leanings. Early in May 1952 they seized the American commandant of the camp and held him captive for three days. At the end of the month, when the command had passed to Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, there began an operation to move prisoners to new 500-man compounds where they could be more easily controlled. This turned out to be a difficult and dangerous task, and it soon became evident that the guard would have to be reinforced by other UN troops.

On 22 May, Eighth US Army Headquarters issued an order calling upon the Commonwealth Division to furnish two rifle companies for this purpose—one British and one Canadian. The Canadian detachment was provided by the B Company of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, the British by the 1st King’s Shropshire Light Infantry. B Company with its administrative overhead personnel left the brigade area by vehicles on the morning of the 23rd; it sailed from Pusan on the evening of the 24th, and reached the island the next morning. Meanwhile the R 22e R, reinforced by a company of the British King’s Own Scottish Borderers, had extended itself to fill the gap in the Canadian defenses.

The two Commonwealth detachments, of which the British company commander served as coordinating officer, were placed under the command of the 92nd US Military Police Battalion. General Boatner, greeting the Canadians on their arrival, informed the detachment commander, Major E.L. Cohen, that his troops might have one week to get settled in and to undergo the necessary special training. The special training which the Canadians received consisted mainly of riot drill and instruction on handling of the POWs.

On 4 June the Canadians took over Compound 66, in conjunction with the British company and were employed there for three weeks working in 24-hour shifts. The time passed without any major incidents occurring in this particular compound, though on 12 June, the Commonwealth troops were ordered to move the prisoners to one of the new compounds on the following day. The inmates resisted with spears, clubs, gasoline grenades and barbed wire flails when American soldiers cleared the Compound 76. On 13 June, however the prisoners moved out of Compound 66 in an orderly fashion, leaving the Canadian and the British companies temporarily unemployed.

Towards the end of June these companies assumed security responsibilities for a new enclosure; this was divided into four sub-units, each consisting of 500 to 550 prisoners. The reorganization had produced more than
the desired effect: the captives were now not only docile but even friendly. On 8 July the Canadians handed over to an American unit. Two days later, the Canadian detachment left to rejoin its parent battalion which by that time was in reserve, with the other units of the brigade, on Wyoming Line. General Boatner was on hand at the dock to congratulate the troops on their fine performance.

The relations between Canadian and other UN troops on Koje had been friendly throughout, and the detachment had apparently made a favourable impression on all concerned, not excluding the prisoners.

Section 7. Again Along the Front
(August 1952 - March 1953)

General

After about six weeks in reserve the Canadian Brigade returned to the front in the early hours of 10 August 1952. The Canadian Brigade relieved the 29th Brigade in the Commonwealth Division’s right sector between the villages of Paujol-kol and Kojanhari-sacmal. As in previous reliefs, no major changes were made in the battalion positions. On the left, the R 22e R Battalion took over from the Black Watch, the RCR Battalion replaced the British Welch Battalion on Hill 355 and on the right the Patricia’s Battalion occupied the Norfolks’ positions. To the left of the Canadians the 28th Brigade still held the positions it had occupied since later June.

During the next three months the Canadian Brigade was to experience heavier shelling and mortaring than in any other period in the line. Heavy rains occasionally silenced the enemy’s artillery, but would then further damage the trenches and bunkers; and as the skies cleared and the mud began to dry, the Red Chinese would resume shelling on a still greater scale. Attention was given to the improvement of defenses; and at the end of the month the Canadians began once more to send out combat patrols.

In the meantime, early in September General Cassels turned over command of the Commonwealth Division to Major General M. M. Alston-Roberts-West.

Enemy shelling continued to be heavy, and bitter patrol clashes occurred from time to time. There was however, no clear indication, either in the nature or scale of the enemy activity, of the heavy fighting that was to occur later in the month. On the night of 5-6 September an ambush patrol
from B Company, 1st Battalion, R 22e R detected approximately 60 Chinese Communists filing along a ridge toward its position. The patrol called artillery down on the enemy and withdrew. Subsequently, another patrol was sent out to find the leader of the first patrol, who had not returned to his group. As this second patrol approached the spot where the first patrol had left, it heard the missing man shout a warning that there were still enemy in the area. The patrol then went to ground and exchanged grenades with the enemy while heavy fire from both sides blanketed the slopes. By the time the second patrol had got back inside the wire and front had quietened down, the unit had lost four killed, five wounded and one missing.

On 24 September a five-man patrol from B Company, RCR Battalion was sent to an enemy position one kilometer northwest of Hill 220. The patrol entered enemy held lines across the valley at approximately 0330 hours and had established a patrol base some 200 meters east of its objective by first light. Finding no one on the latter, Lieutenant H. R. Gardner, patrol leader, led his second team to the enemy mess area. Here they cut a telephone wire. As they expected, a Red Chinese signaller came along the path to find the failure of communications. The patrol seized him. The entire patrol managed to get him back alive to its lines. For this daring exploit Lieutenant Gardner was awarded the Military Cross, while Corporal K. E. Fowler also received the Military Medal.

It was about this time that the Chinese Communists began a series of limited attacks in the central and western sectors. Such operations did not for some time directly affect the Commonwealth Division, but an increase in artillery shelling early in October suggested that the enemy was soon to strike in this direction; another warning factor was his sharp reaction to division’s patrols. On the night of 12–13 October B Company of the RCR Battalion was ambushed on the forward slopes of Hill 220. A brisk fire fight ensued and suffered several casualties. Three night later, the Patricias’ 25-man patrol to the slope of a ridge running southeast from the height immediately to the north of Hill 217 had several casualties.

**The 1st Battalion, RCR on Hill 355**

The 1st Battalion, RCR had been securing Hill 355 with five companies -- the four normal companies plus a fifth, specially created from unit resources. The area of E Company lay in the angle formed by the valley to the south of Hill 355 and the draw to the west of the Hill. Area of the B Company, soon to come under attack, lay immediately east of the saddle
between Hills 355 and 220, the mess area being in the southeast corner, accessible to the valley south of Hill 355. The platoon positions of A Company ran due west in a line from the peak of Hill 355. To the north of these positions the ground fell away in gullies. C and D Companies lay behind E and A Companies, respectively.

After the ceaseless artillery firing of the first three days of October, the enemy fire slackened until the 17th, when it began to increase again. On 21 October approximately 1,600 rounds hit the RCR Battalion and although there was a lull on the 22nd, it began again on the 23rd. The greater part of this shelling fell on B Company's area. The three platoon positions of B Company, which were on a north—south line immediately east of the Hill 220 saddle, were occupied from south to north by the 4th, 5th and 6th Platoons. The 14th Platoon of E Company was immediately east of the 4th and 5th on the western crest of Hill 355. (See Sketch Map 4.)

The field defenses were damaged very badly by enemy artillery fire and
most of the telephone line cut. The greater part of the ammunition stocks stored in the weapon pits had been buried. The company remained at the alert after dark, one of the occupants of each weapon pit watching while the other rested on the bottom of the pit, huddled in his poncho. From time to time heavy explosions added to the noise of bursting shells. In view of the likelihood of an enemy attack the company kept watching all night. During the night three Chinese were shot from a weapon pit in the 4th Platoon’s area. At any rate, there were no further contacts that night. But enemy shelling finally succeeded in demolishing all the bunkers in the 6th Platoon area and the survivors were drawn into the 5th Platoon’s area.

Dawn on the 23rd saw no let up in the heavy shelling and except for a small detachment manning the company’s observation post, everyone kept below ground throughout the day. Enemy shelling made impossible any effective work on the defenses or on communication line and wrought further havoc on both, and prevented ammunition and fresh rations from being brought forward. Plans to reorganize, refit and feed the company after dark came to naught; for shortly after 1800 hours the enemy put down a very heavy artillery concentration — a thousand rounds and within ten minutes on B Company alone — and then assaulted with infantry.

Owing to the darkness, the confused nature of the fighting and the lack of communications, the situation unfolded itself only gradually during the next three hours. The 4th Platoon on the left, had been dislodged by the first rush. Major Cohen, B Company Commander, his last link with Battalion Headquarters gone, had removed his Command Post to A Company’s area, while the leader of the 5th Platoon had established a position between his former area and the new company CP. The battalion’s acting commander, Major F. Klenavic, now ordered tank and mortar fire on the ground that had been lost, and called D Company forward for a counterattack.

The counterattack force, having turned over its position to a British company, arrived at about 2100 hours; but the battalion commander decided not to commit it immediately. First he brought down all available supporting fire on B Company’s former area to forestall a threatened attack on E Company, and ordered out a patrol from the latter to investigate. The patrol, returning at about 2330 hours, reported light machine guns firing from B Company’s bunkers. The counterattack went in towards mid night, one platoon of D Company moving up through A Company, another through E Company. The left hand platoon encountered considerable resistance and suffered some casualties, but by the time the two groups reached the objective the enemy was no longer there.

The last troops to leave the position, however, were not the enemy. Lieutenant Gardner and some men of the 5th and 6th Platoons had held out
the positions, and then played dead. Lieutenant Gardner himself, after having shot five of the attackers, had been wounded.

Through shelling during the day, and in the night’s action, B Company had suffered 75 casualties -- 18 killed, 43 wounded and 14 captured. The enemy force, estimated at one battalion, had left nine dead behind and dragged away many others. Three days later one of the patrols discovered six more dead Chinese in or near six large bunkers, which apparently had served as a forming up place for the attack and subsequently as a regimental aid post. The patrol blew up these bunkers.

In the meantime, on the night of 26-27 October the Commonwealth Division’s right boundary was shifted westward, a battalion of the 1st ROK Division relieving the Patricias. The latter moved to a reserve position on the Wyoming Line. The RCR Battalion and the R 22e R Battalion remained forward for five more days, after which the 28th Brigade took over the Canadian sector.

**On Hill 146**

On completion of the relief of the 25th Brigade and change in the boundaries, the Commonwealth Division had two brigades in the line, the 29th on the left and the 28th on the right. The 25th Brigade (except for B Company of the R 22e R which was under command of the Black Watch in the Hook area), was in rear of the forward positions, while sending men off on leave, checking stores and catching up on unit administration.

Meanwhile the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, PPCLI from the line marked the end of that unit’s operation in Korea. The 3rd Battalion, PPCLI, which had put to sea early in October, already encamped at Lieutenant Colonel Cameron’s 1st Battalion area. Its advance party, consisting of the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Wood, and certain of his officers, had flown to the theater in the middle of the month; and each member was now living and working with his 1st Battalion, PPCLI. Other troops, having since landed with the main body, were attached as observers to all three battalion of the brigade. The handover was completed on 3 November and eight days later the 1st Battalion began its homeward journey. The first operational role assigned to the 3rd Battalion was that of counter-attacking the Hook and certain other British Black Watch positions in the event of their loss to the Chinese Communist forces.

On the night of 18-19 November the enemy, attacking in battalion strength, succeeded in gaining a foothold on the Hook. The Black Watch
company on Hill 146 mounted an immediate counterattack, and while fighting was still in progress C Company of the 3rd Patricias came forward to reinforce it if necessary; meanwhile B Company had taken over the defense of Hill 146. By first light the British Highlanders had completely cleared the main position, and the counterattack company of the Patricias occupied the hill without difficulty. British and Canadian soldiers now cooperated in the evacuation of casualties, both on the Hook itself and on an outpost immediately to the north. In attempting to search a second outpost position, however, a Black Watch soldier was killed and a Canadian platoon leader wounded by enemy small arms fire. Sporadic shelling caused a number of Canadian casualties. C Company remained on the Hook until 22 November, when it was relieved by a Black Watch company, and B Company continued to hold Hill 146 until the 24th. The battalion spent the rest of the month in training and in preparation for the 25th Brigade’s return to the line.

Meanwhile, on the 12th November 1952, the 1st Battalion, PPCLI had reached Pusan; here, at the UN Cemetery, it held a service in honour of both its own dead and those of the 2nd Patricias. Next day the battalion set sail for Japan; and on the 22nd it boarded a Seattle-bound ship.

**On the Hook**

On 29 November General West began to redeploy his forces so that, instead of two brigades being forward and one in reserve, all three brigades were in the line, keeping one battalion each in reserve. The new arrangement afforded each brigade commander the advantages of a narrower front to control.

As part of this redeployment, the Canadians moved back into the line on the left of the division front, in the Hook area, with the PPCLI Battalion on the Hook itself. The R 22e R Battalion had taken over the Yongdong area to the east of the Sami-chon, and in the PPCLI former reserve position lay the RCR Battalion except for C Company forward under the command of the PPCLI. To the east of the Canadians was the 29th Brigade, and the 28th Brigade still held the right portion of the division sector. Immediately on the 25th Brigade’s return to the front, a troop of the 23rd Field Squadron carried on with the tunneling project. The defenses prepared for the R 22e R on the Yongdong feature were not extensive, and engineer assistance there was limited to the provision of an artillery observation post on the forward slope and a command post within the hill. The next two months proved to be a relatively quiet period, the chief activity being improvement of the defensive works, particularly on the Hook. During the whole period in the line, the infantry deepened and extended its trenches,
observation posts and bunkers, and installed additional earthworks of all types. (See Sketch Map 5.)

Patrolling, while by no means neglected, was not as strongly emphasized as it had been in the early summer; nor, at least as far as the Canadians were concerned, did any more company raids take place. The enemy's artillery was considerably less active now than it had been in previous months, and his infantry refrained from attacks on any such scale as those against the RCR and the Black Watch Battalions in October and November 1952. As a result of these conditions, Canadians casualties in December 1952 and January 1953 were 57 -- 12 killed and 45 wounded -- compared with 131 in May and June and 232 in September and October 1952.

On 28 December, the PPCLI and the RCR Battalions exchanged positions, one company of the former battalion remaining forward under the operational control of the relieving unit.

The RCR Battalion's month on the Hook was also quiet. Although the unit patrolled actively, few contacts were made, and none of these resulted in heavy casualties. On the night of 12-13 January 1953, a patrol to Seattle outpost had several of its members wounded by a grenade a Chinese
Communist threw at the assault group, just as it was approaching a trench on the northern end of the feature. The explosion wounded the patrol leader and prompted a withdrawal, which the enemy followed with mortar and small arms fire. Except for a few similar incidents, the month's patrolling was uneventful, nor did the enemy bestir himself actively in the immediate vicinity of the Hook positions. The snipers, to whose training particular attention had been paid in November when the unit was in reserve, ran up an impressive score of kills, and the unit pounded the positions continually with concentrations of mortar and artillery fire. Toward the end of month, preparations for a handover began and on 30 January the RCR Battalion moved off the Hook, on relief by a battalion of the 2nd US Division.

Next day, for the first time in the 18 months since its inception, the Canadian Brigade was withdrawn into reserve; its new location was about 11 kilometers southwest of the Imjin-Hantan junction. Only the artillery remained forward, its role being the support of the relieving force, the 2nd US Infantry Division. The Canadian Brigade remained in reserve from 30 January until 8 April. During this time the division carried out training exercises on battalion and brigade levels. In addition to training in mobile operations, which included one exercise at corps level, two developments of some importance occurred during this period. The first was a scheme to augment the infantry units of the division by the addition of the Republic of Korea Army soldiers, the other was the beginning of the second major rotation of Canadian units.

The Second General Rotation

The last week of March 1953 saw the beginning of the second major rotation of Canadian units. On 25 March the 3rd Battalion, RCR (Lieutenant Colonel K. L. Campbell) rotated the 1st Battalion, RCR. Two days later No. 56 Transport Company (Major E. G. Hession) rotated No. 23 Company; next day the 59th Independent Field Squadron (Major L. E. C. Shmidlin) took over from the 23rd Squadron. No. 191 Infantry Workshop was rotated with No. 23 Workshop (Major V. W. Bethel) on 16 April. The 1st Battalion of the Royal 22e Regiment gave place to its 3rd Battalion on 21 April 1953. Also on that date, Canadian Brigade Commanding Officer, Brigadier Bogert turned over his command to Brigadier J. V. Allard. The 81st Field Regiment RCA replaced the 1st Regiment on 22 April, and nine days later No. 38 Field Ambulance took over from No. 37 Ambulance. The rotation was completed on 24 May when A Squadron of Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Major W. H. Ellis) took B Squadron’s place. A new commanding officer for the 3rd Battalion, PPCLI,
Lieutenant Colonel M. F. MacLachlan, arrived on 16 May to replace Lieutenant Colonel Wood who had taken sick and been evacuated to hospital in Japan on 27 March.

The 6th April saw Operation Cotswold, the Commonwealth Division's return to the line. Two days later the division took back its old lines from the 2nd US Infantry Division. On completion of the relief operation, the 25th Canadian Brigade was in the central sector. Within the Canadian sector, the R 22e R Battalion was on the left, the PPCLI Battalion on the right, and the RCR Battalion in reserve near the junction of the Sami-chon and the Imjin River. The 3rd Battalion, PPCLI occupied an area much the same as had the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI early in October 1951.

The month of April was relatively quiet and the brigade settled back into its front line routine without serious interruption from the enemy. On 20 April, the RCR Battalion and R 22e R Battalion exchanged positions, preparatory to the latter's rotation by the 3rd Battalion, R 22e R. As had been the case with the 3rd Battalion, PPCLI, completion of the move into the front line placed the 3rd Battalion, RCR in substantially the same area as had been occupied by the 2nd Battalion, RCR during Operation Commando.

Section 8. The Last Fighting
(April - July 1953)

Hamurhan and Vicinity

The period of front line duty which the Canadian Brigade began in April 1953 was its last of the Korean War. Although the closing months of the war were far from quiet, only one strong attack came against the 3rd Battalion, RCR.

The ground the 3rd Battalion, RCR occupied was typical of that along the greater part of the Jamestown Line. The area fronted on the Sami-chon; the highest ground, Hill 187, lay in the northeast corner. Three irregular fingers of high ground radiated out from this feature to the northwest, to the west and to the southwest. Hill 159 rose from the last named of these ridges, and three additional fingers ran west from it, roughly paralleling each other and the ridge which ran west from Hill 187. At least the northern two of these four ridges running west exposed to observation from Hill 166, on the enemy's side of the valley.

The 3rd Battalion, RCR was laid out in the following pattern: A Company
was on the high ground about Hill 187; D Company was on the ridge to the south west; C Company held the western half of the ridge running west from Hill 187, while the platoons of B Company were distributed between the two ridges to the south. Within C company, the 7th Platoon was on the western tip of the finger, about Hill 97. The 8th was to three hundred meters in rear and the 9th Platoon, with company headquarters, held Hill 123 approximately 400 meters to the east. A jeep road ran along the northern side of the ridge which lay to the south of the Hill 97-123 ridge. This road turned north across the valley between the two ridges, and this stretch had a camouflaged wall along its west side, to screen it from enemy observation.

One of the significant features of this layout was dispersion. The distances separating even the platoons of C Company were not small, but the two platoons of B Company on the ridge immediately to the south of C Company were at least 700 meters away, and the nearest troops of the PPCLI lay 1,000 meters to the northeast. At the same time, the forward platoon of A Company was approximately 800 meters behind the rear platoon of C Company on Hill 123. These distances precluded effective mutual fire support.

When it took over its new area on 20 April, the 3rd Battalion, RCR found no-man’s-land dominated by the enemy. The unit was new to action, and the disadvantages arising from its lack of experience were aggravated by the Korean countryside and Red Chinese tactics. It was evident that any attempt to wrest control of no-man’s-land from the enemy would require careful preparation. Accordingly, the battalion commander (Lieutenant Colonel Campbell) at first sent out large numbers of reconnaissance patrols to accustom his troops to the ground and the enemy in front of them. After a week of this, he began sending stronger combat patrols out into the valley. He was just into this phase of his plan when the enemy struck.

At the RCR Battalion positions, the plan for patrol activities for the night of 2-3 May followed the pattern which had become normal. Reconnaissance and standing patrols were to be sent out in front of the forward companies, and in the valleys between them. In addition, a combat patrol of Lieutenant G.B. Maynell and 15 men from A Company was to destroy the enemy who had been working on the barbed wire covering the northern flank of C Company. The C Company patrol for the night consisted of a section of the 8th Platoon under the platoon leader, Lieutenant D.W. Banton.

The attack on C Company was preceded by a patrol encounter. According to the plan, A Company’s patrol was to have left the C Company area at 2030 hours via the path through a gap in the minefield. From this point the group was to have gone to a point in the valley where it could ambush the enemy who had been penetrating into the valley between the RCR and the PPCLI troops. It was not, however, strictly an ambush patrol, since
it was free to move about in search of the enemy.

The patrol went to its assigned position 110 meters west of the minefield gap and between one and three hundred meters north of it. Here it lay down in ambush. Presently, however, an enemy group was spotted in rear and the patrol turned to face it, at the same time moving to the shelter of a paddy wall. The patrol leader then called for a flare, which was supplied by the 60-mm mortars of C Company. When the flare went up, a heavy fire fight developed between the two patrols at grenade throwing range. Lieutenant Maynell received a head wound in the encounter, from which he is presumed to have died. (See Sketch Map 6.)

Corporal J. C. McNeil then assumed to lead the patrol, which by this time was running short of ammunition and involved with not one but two and perhaps three enemy parties. The corporal therefore requested permission to return to the unit lines, and began to lead the patrol in along the path to the minefield gap. Just short of the gap, however, the survivors again
came under heavy fire from a group of Chinese Communists positioned near the path. A general melee ensued, during which the Canadians separated, some of them making their way through the minefield into the 7th Platoon’s position.

Meanwhile, the stand-by patrol had been sent to the aid of the A Company patrol. Lieutenant Banton and his section met some of the survivors as they came in through the minefield, and these men warned him of the Red Chinese near the gap. In spite of this warning, the patrol team carried on down towards the valley, but it had not gone more than 120 meters from the C Company position when it, too, fell into an enemy ambush. Lieutenant Banton was killed in the encounter and the survivors of his patrol were scattered. At this time, then the remnants of two patrols were on the slopes and in the valley north of C Company, together with a formidable number of enemy. The enemy, it soon developed, were busily preparing for their own part in the night’s work.

The Red Chinese had planned their raid carefully. The force devoted to it was divided into five groups, the first of which was a counter patrol force of three patrols, given the task of engaging friendly patrols and dominating the periphery of the area to be attacked. Next came section groups charged with gapping wire. Three bunker and trench destruction groups, of approximately 15 men each, were to pass through the gaps, followed by two snatch groups, each of platoon size. Finally, a force of company strength was held in reserve to reinforce the effort or to exploit success.

At midnight, hours before the last remnants of these two parties had made their way back, the Chinese artillery put down a heavy concentration on Hill 97. Then the enemy infantry assaulted. The 7th Platoon’s leader, 2nd Lieutenant E. H. Hollyer, called for artillery fire right on his own position, catching not only the first wave of the attacks but a follow-up force as well. Throughout the action he received the closest cooperation from Lieutenant L.G. Cote (attached to the battalion from the RC Signals), who maintained communications under these extremely difficult and dangerous conditions. The other platoon on Hill 97 came under attack as well, but held its ground with its own weapons. Threatened attacks on A and B Companies on the Patricias’ Battalion were broken up by friendly supporting arms. To some 2,000 shells which the enemy had fired, the division artillery replied fourfold; the 81st Canadian Field Artillery Regiment alone fired 4,300 rounds. The 3rd Battalion, RCR was also assisted by the PPCLI mortars and machine guns, and by part of the 1st US Corps artillery.

Shortly after 0130 hours the Red Chinese began to retire from Hill 97; and the Commonwealth artillery, shifted its fire so as to harass the enemy retreat. A few hours afterwards Colonel Campbell took C Company out of
the battalion area for a period of rest and refitting. Its relief was D Company, whose former position was now occupied by a company of the recently arrived 3rd Battalion, R 22e R. The night’s action, a raid in battalion strength, had cost the enemy more than 80 fatal casualties. The RCR Battalion’s losses were 26 killed, 27 wounded and seven taken prisoner. Chinese artillery fire also killed two Patricias and two Canadian gunners, and wounded seven Patricias.

The Final Weeks and Armistice

The remaining weeks were relatively uneventful. Early in July the division commander shifted his brigades and on the 12th, the Canadians found themselves once again responsible for Hill 355. This time the 3rd Battalion, PPCLI occupied the hill, with the 3rd Battalion, RCR left and 3rd Battalion, R 22e R in reserve. The moves were completed by the 12th. Except for a few minor patrol contacts, there was little else to record of Canadian activity. All this time, the normal routine of life in the line continued, while the reported developments at Panmunjom caused expectations of an armistice to rise and fall. The battalions of the 25th Brigade continued in their attempts to dominate no man’s land and the 3rd Battalion, R 22e R in particular showed considerable imagination in their efforts to entice the enemy into traps and ambushes.

Hitherto in this part little mention had been made of the cease-fire talks which had been going on since July 1951, and resulted in the signing of the Armistice on 27 July 1953. It is now proposed to summarize the story of the talks and the Armistice Agreement, and to give a brief sketch of events for the few months following the cessation of hostilities.

On 23 June, 1951 Yakov A. Malik, the Soviet Representative to the UN, had suggested in a broadcast that cease-fire talks might profitably be held in Korea, and the talks began on 10 July, 1951. On the UN side the Commission consisted of Republic of Korea and US officers. Disagreement was at once evident on the question of a demarcation line, the Communists insisting the 38th Parallel while the UN representatives a line approximating to the existing front line. The period from November 1951 to March 1952 was spent on the questions of the composition of the supervisory organization and on the increase in the size of forces during an armistice period. By March 1952 these differences had been resolved and the matter was left in abeyance. In April 1952, discussions began on the question of exchanging prisoners. Interrogation of prisoners held by the UN had shown that many did not wish to return to Communist China or north Korea. In view of this, the UNC proposed that those who did not want to be repatriated would
not be exchanged, but it was wholly rejected by the North Korean and Chinese Communists. The Communists insisted that all captives be returned whether they wished to be repatriated or not.

In March and April 1953, the situation was abruptly changed when, on 28 March, the Communists at last agreed to negotiate an immediate exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners. The exchange was carried out during the next three weeks. Operation Little Switch, as the exchange was called, resulted in two Canadians returning from captivity. And eventually the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953.

On 27 July at 2200 hours the guns which had so long pulverized the Korean soil fell silent. The armistice had become effective.

The demarcation line had been located along the actual line of contact. In the 1st Commonwealth Division's sector, it followed the valley of the Sami-chon tributary, swinging almost due south at its southwestern end to bisect the broad stretch of the Sami-chon valley. On its north eastern end, the line passed to the east of Hill 220 and then continued north and slightly east to the point where it cut the divisional boundary. Two kilometers to the southeast, the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone paralleled this demarcation line. The 25th Canadian Brigade, in common with the other UN formations, had to complete a withdrawal to positions south of the demilitarized zone. The brigade planned to make this withdrawal in two phases. The first, for a few of the units at least, was to interim positions immediately south of the demilitarized zone; the second, to permanent post-armistice positions. On leaving the scene of its protracted defense, the brigade planned to take with it all stores and equipment, all ammunition, and all the material that could be salvaged from existing field defenses.

This plan was executed as ordered, some of the units moving directly to their permanent positions. The infantry of the 25th Brigade, however, occupied temporary positions along a no-pass line immediately south of the boundary of the Demilitarized Zone. Here their duties were to erect signs and man road blocks to prevent movement into the Demilitarized Zone. Shortly afterward, the move to permanent areas was completed and work began on their development.

**Canadian Prisoners of War**

It is only possible to generalize on this matter and give a picture of how the average man fared in Communist prison camp. The exact number of Canadian officers and men captured by the Communists is not known, and
never will be known, as not all of those reported missing were prisoners. Some were killed, but their fate was unknown. It is probable that the number of prisoners was about 40 or slightly less. Thirty-two Canadian soldiers captured while serving in Korea were repatriated after the signing of the Amistice in August 1953.

The Chinese Communists methods of punishment were usually primitive. They attempted to convert the prisoners to Communism. Promises were made of “lenient” treatment, if prisoners would sign peace petitions, broadcast propaganda or help in converting fellow captives. Refusal to do so usually resulted in solitary confinement, extra work details, prolonged interrogation, a reduced diet or beatings.

Many of them had signed peace petitions against their own will in the hope that this would disclose their presence in the camps, and all of them had been forced to listen to indoctrination lectures and to read Communist propaganda book and newspapers. But no Canadians were converted to Communism. Summarized, it can be said that all Canadian prisoners maintained their loyalty and morale in captivity, and showed proper pride in defying Communist indoctrination and attempts at conversion.

Section 9. Behind the Line

Administration

The Canadian administrative organization in the Far East served three special purposes: it equipped and supplied Canadian troops mainly from Canadian and American sources; it enabled all elements to keep their Canadian identity; and it represented an appropriate contribution by Canada to the Commonwealth administrative effort.

The 2nd Battalion PPCLI Administrative Increment, whose role was to continue while that battalion was the only Canadian administrative unit in Korea, consisted of some 80 all ranks, including Army Service Corps, Ordnance Corps, pay and records. Its headquarters was set up in Pusan, with the Commonwealth advanced base. Detachments were located in the main base, Kure in Japan, the forward maintenance area (later permanently located in Seoul) and the Commonwealth Brigade’s area. When, early in June 1951, the Patricias rejoined their recently arrived parent formation, the Administrative Increment ceased to exist and its personnel were further absorbed into the Commonwealth organization.

During its first three months in the theater, the 25th Canadian Brigade
was maintained as well as employed as a brigade. Brigadier Rockingham exercised command over the administrative units through his staff, which then included deputy assistant directors of the various services. The two major Canadian units in Japan -- No. 2 Administrative Unit and No. 25 Reinforcement Group -- were equally responsible to Brigade Headquarters. But on the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division at the end of July 1951, almost all other Canadian administrative units either were reallocated to the division service or to the Commonwealth line of communication and base organization. At the same time the establishment of Brigade Headquarters was modified so as to resemble more closely that of a standard brigade.

To give the story of the administration of an army on a day to day or week to week basis would make tedious reading. Let us now consider very briefly the work of the administrative service.

(1) Supply and Transport

In the very early days the Commonwealth troops were supplied by the US Army, but by the time the Commonwealth Division was formed there were three independent transport companies including No. 54 Canadian Company. The division railhead for most items of ammunition, petroleum was at Tokchong, some 35 kilometers south of the Imjin River. Certain supplies came from the forward maintenance area at Seoul, and some types of American ammunition and equipment -- used mostly by Canadians -- had to be drawn from US Army supply points in the Corps area. The Canadian transport company normally handled ammunition for the division, and the British gasoline and lubricants.

The food problem was complicated by the fact that the ration for the division was not standardized. Canadian troops subsisted on US rations and other troops on a mixture of British and American. American rations for Canadians were delivered by the Canadian transport company; and courses in preparing them were later run at the 25th Brigade Cooking School (next to the Brigade NCOs School near Uijongbu).

(2) Medical and Dental Services

No. 25 Canadian Field Ambulance worked normally with the Canadian Brigade before the formation of the Commonwealth Division. Since May 1952 the office of Assistant Director of Medical Services had been a Canadian appointment. In addition there was No. 25 Canadian Field Dressing Station, located near Tokchong, with a capacity of 200 beds with Canadian nursing sisters on its staff. This hospital close at hand catered for all
Commonwealth personnel and was an invaluable medical unit. Later an advanced Commonwealth Military Hospital was established at Seoul; here the Canadians earned a high reputation. Surgery was carried out by American and Norwegian mobile units and by the 25th Canadian Field Surgical Team. Serious cases were evacuated to the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces General Hospital in Japan. Those whose recovery was likely to take place within fourteen days were usually retained at the Canadian Field Dressing Station in Seoul.

As in past wars, the chief means of casualty evacuation were hand carry and road transport; though whenever possible helicopters of the I US Corps would pick up urgent cases. No. 37 and 38 Canadian Motor Ambulance Companies provided transport between field ambulances and more rearward medical installations.

No. 25 Canadian Field Dental Unit was not of course the only dental element in the division, but it was the largest; and detachments of it were located both at major Canadian units in the field and in Japan. These detachments provided comprehensive dental treatment for all Canadian personnel and also took care of emergency cases of other nationalities.

(3) Ordnance

Soon after the formation of the division, No. 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Ordnance Company, the 28th Infantry Brigade Ordnance Field Park and the 29th Independent Infantry Brigade Group Ordnance Field Park were amalgamated, under the Commander, Army Ordnance Corps and formed into the 1st Commonwealth Division Ordnance Field Park and the 1st Commonwealth Division Stores Distribution Detachment. The Ordnance Field Park, as we have seen, was an integrated unit under a Canadian commander, and consisted of an integrated headquarters, an integrated general stores platoon, a British platoon and a Canadian platoon. Other ordnance elements included two British shower sections, two Canadian shower sections, a British laundry and a Canadian laundry. Despite difficulties arising from the cosmopolitan nature of the force, the ordnance services maintained a laudable standard of efficiency.

(4) Repair Organization

Both before and after the Commonwealth Division was formed, the maintenance and repair of weapons and vehicles was carried out largely on a brigade basis. No. 191 Canadian Infantry Workshop including two other British workshops was responsible for the maintenance, repair and recovery
of vehicles, and certain other equipments. During its tour, which lasted 23 months, No. 191 Canadian Infantry Workshop piled an impressive record of 21,983 field repairs on everything from radio equipment to armoured vehicles. As the situation stabilized, and static war became the rule, this unit settled down to an almost permanent situation, some kilometers south of the Imjin. When it was finally relieved by No. 23 Infantry Workshop on 15 April 1953, it was estimated that 429 combat vehicles, 3,504 trucks and engineer equipments, 159 guns, 3,235 small arms, 2,893 instruments, 7,587 radio equipments and 4,176 miscellaneous equipments had been repaired during its stay in the theater.

(5) Miscellaneous

The lst Commonwealth Division Provost Company was made up of sections from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, and was commanded by a Canadian officer. Its heaviest responsibility was traffic control -- speeding alone accounted for over half the charges laid by the division police. Directly under the authority of the commander of the 25th Brigade, although located well behind the division area, was a Canadian detention barracks. Australia, Britain and New Zealand also were represented at this institution, both on the staff and among the guests.

Meanwhile, Commonwealth welfare officers, located at the various headquarters in Korea and Japan, cooperated with one another and with their American counterparts to bring films, concerts, canteen supplies and reading material to the troops, and to provide sporting goods. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, the success of the welfare program depended on the energy with which the units themselves set up recreational facilities and used them. There were many others such as pay, postal and chaplain services. The burden of all was greatly increased by the very wide dispersion of units, the absence of paved roads and the scarcity of roads of any kinds, and by frequent rain and extremes in temperature. Yet every administrative problem was met and overcome with determination and resourcefulness, and, where necessary, through cooperation among the forces of a number of nations.

After the Armistice

The three days immediately following the cease-fire saw the forward troops busily engaged in salvaging or destroying defense material in what became the Demilitarized Zone. The 25th Canadian Brigade maintained a new defense screen north of the river. This arrangement lasted approximately fifteen months. The Canadian Brigade was to hold its ground to report enemy
activities and prevent unauthorized entry, by agents or troops of either side, into the Demilitarized Zone. While infringements with respect to the Demilitarized Zone were not uncommon, no serious incidents occurred.

October 1953 saw the 3rd Battalion of the PPCLI preparing to go home, the relieving battalion being the 2nd Battalion, the Black Watch of Canada. The main body arrived at Inchon on the USNS *Marine Lynx*, and the Patricias boarded the same ship that afternoon.

Meanwhile, from March 1954 the Canadians had a recreation center north of the Imjin. "Maple Leaf Park," as it was called, was officially opened by Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent on the 8th, with the unveiling of a stone monument bearing a bronze plaque. It was also during the same period that the third general rotation took place. Brigadier Allard was succeeded in mid-June by Brigadier F.A. Clift.

The continued build up of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces to a point where these could, if necessary, wage a successful defensive war, enabled the UN Command to reduce its own strength. Accordingly, early in November 1954 the Commonwealth Division's right sector and the Canadian Brigade's covering position north of the Imjin became the responsibility of the 28th ROK Division. The Canadians' operational role ended on the 8th November. Already the 2nd Black Watch Battalion had sailed for Canada, and all but two of the remaining Canadian units in Korea -- the 2nd Battalion, Queen's Own Rifles and No. 3 Field Ambulance -- followed close behind. Brigadier Clift, whose headquarters "closed down" on 2 December, was succeeded as Senior Canadian Officer in the Far East by the Commander of the Military Mission in Tokyo, Japan.

The second stage of the withdrawal of Canadian troops took place in April 1955. The 2nd Battalion Queen's Own Rifles returned to Canada and were not replaced. Other elements were rotated on an individual basis rather than as a body. Thus No. 3 Field Ambulance became the only Canadian field unit in the theater.

A third stage was announced on 16 February 1956. The Commonwealth force in Korea was now to be reduced to a battalion group. On 13 March the Field Ambulance gave place to the Canadian Medical Detachment and this unit officially ceased to exist in Korea on 25 June 1957, the main body of the force sailing from Inchon on 28 June.

Postscript

In 1950 Canada was called upon to honour her obligations of maintaining international peace and security under the UN Charter, and the soldiers
who came into the Republic of Korea were the means by which she honoured
them. The international force in which they served inflicted a check upon
aggression which had world wide consequences. As for the Canadian Army
the actions in Korea was a positive blessing from the standpoint of profes-
sional efficiency. There is no substitute for battlefield experience.

For the last two years of the operations in Korea, the Canadian Brigade
had consisted of professional soldiers. This was a new development for
Canada. The leaders at all levels who returned to the home camps and bar-
racks in 1953 were experienced fighting men. During the three years of
war, 146 officers were decorated or mentioned despatches and 151 other
ranks were similarly honoured.

It was in the infantry that by far the most casualties occurred in Korea.
Only 15 deaths were suffered by other service branches and in fact non-infan-
try units accounted for less than seven per cent of all battle casualties.
This was undoubtedly due to the static nature of the warfare, and the com-
plete UN air superiority.

From the time the first Canadian soldier set foot in Korea until the arm-
istice was signed 21,940 members of the Canadian Army served in Korea
and Japan. The peak Canadian Army strength in the Far East was 8,123
all ranks, reached in January 1952. At the time of the armistice there were
7,134 Canadians serving in the theater. This was no small contributions on
a basis of comparison by population, but the Canadian brigade was nonethe-
less a small portion of the total UN effort.

The static war which took place for the greater part of the time the
Canadian were in Korea accounted for a very low casualty rate. In all the
Canadian army suffered 1,543 battle casualties in Korea. Of these 11 officers
and 298 other ranks were killed in action, died of wounds or were officially
presumed dead, 59 officers and 1,143 other ranks were wounded or injured
in action, and 2 officers and 30 other ranks survived as prisoners of war.

The most significant feature of the Canadian participation in the United
Nations operations in Korea was the establishment of a precedent. This
new attitude confirmed the Canadian determination to involve the country
in other United Nations peace keeping operations whenever possible through
the United Nations and would in time spread troops across the world in
truce teams, peace commissions and emergency forces.
CHAPTER III THE NAVAL FORCE

Section 1. Introduction

When the invasion began in Korea at dawn of 25 June 1950, in Canada it was mid-afternoon, Saturday, 24 June. The Canadian Parliament at this time was in session. On 27 June, the Korean crisis was weighed carefully, as the House was discussing the estimates of the Defence Department. Preparedness was the theme of much of the discussion, and the Canadian Navy was singled out for praise on that score. The leader of the opposition party expressed agreement with a statement of the Minister of National Defence that the Navy was "nearer to being on an active service basis than any of our other forces." The Minister of National Defence Brook Claxton did not state that the Navy might be involved in the Korean War, but he hinted at the possibility when he remarked that "... if the situation continues to look serious, we certainly could not continue with plans for the voyage of the ships of the Pacific Destroyer Division to European Waters ..."

The overall picture was much clearer when the House met the following day, 28 June. There was no longer doubt about the intention of the NK to continue their aggression. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, L.B. Pearson, at the meeting, indicated that the United Nations Security Council resolution of the 27th had not yet been formally delivered to the Government; but he continued, "I can assure ...... that we shall be conferring, through the United Nations, with other members of the United Nations as to what part we in Canada can and should take in any future action that may be necessary." Before the debate ended both the ruling and opposition parties expressed their approval of what had so far been done to meet the Korean crisis. There were no dissenting voices. Nearly every party in Canada whole-heartedly supported the Government in taking whatever steps might be necessary to preserve the peace. Upon this, when the members assembled on the morning of 30 June the Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent made a last statement on the Korean crisis. He emphasized strongly that, should the United Nations Security Council request military aid, Canada
would consider making a contribution; he said "It might take the form of destroyers to operate with other naval units of the United Nations ..." That it would almost certainly take the form of destroyers was revealed by the statement that the Pacific Coast destroyers would definitely not go to Europe as planned, but, instead, would be moved into Western Pacific waters to be closer to the area where they might be of assistance to the United Nations and Korea. The Canadian Navy thus began to take steps to put its fighting ships in the Pacific on a war footing.

At this time the three destroyers of the Pacific Division were in the early stages of preparing for a European cruise. HMCS Sioux was in dry dock, where she was expected to remain until 30 June; Athabaskan was in the midst of her annual leave period and many of her key men were away until July; only Cayuga, the senior ship of the division, was prepared to make a departure. Although the ships on the West Coast had been aware that at least some of its destroyers might be ordered to the Far East, it was not until the morning of 30 June that a message arrived from the Canadian Naval Headquarters, Ottawa, officially cancelling the European cruise. The Flag Officer Pacific Coast, Rear Admiral H. G. DeWolf received the message as follows; "You are to sail Cayuga, Sioux and Athabaskan from Esquimalt at 16 knots to Pearl Harbor on Wednesday, 5 July, 1950..."

Immediately after receiving this message, the Canadian destroyers got ready to sail for the Far East in 24 hours if necessary.

Then important changes of command took place within the Pacific Destroyer Division. Captain J. V. Brock, became Commander Canadian Destroyers Pacific and Commanding Officer of HMCS Cayuga in place of Captain Medland who had served in her since 1949, and Commander P.D. Taylor, became HMCS Sioux's Commanding Officer, relieving Commander Gross, and Commander R. P. Welland, who had taken command of his ship some three months before, remained with HMCS Athabaskan.

Finally the time came to sail, and at 1500 hours, local time, 5 July 1950, the three Canadian destroyers formed up astern of HMCS Ontario (Captain H.F. Pullen) and sailed out from Esquimalt bound for Pearl Harbor some 2,000 miles away. It was the morning of 12 July that they entered the harbor. After two days at Pearl Harbor taking on fuel and supplies and effecting minor repairs, the three ships sailed for Kwajamalein, the next port-of-call and arrived there on 20 July. The next destination was Guam, where the Canadian ships received orders to proceed directly to Sasebo in Japan. Difficulties in fuelling and storing delayed the destroyers until the 27th. The Canadian Destroyer Division Pacific, at last, entered Sasebo harbor at 1530 on 30 July, 1950, ready to join in the Korean War.
Section 2. Initial Deployment
(30 July 1950 - 30 November 1950)

First Actions

When the Canadian destroyers arrived at Sasebo harbor on 30 July, the Korean War was going badly for the United Nations forces. Taegu had fallen; Taegu was endangered; the Naktong River perimeter was threatened by NKCF's advance. They found there that the fate of the bridge-head around the river depended mainly upon how rapidly the navy could pour troops and supplies into the battle area. The Canadian ships wasted no time in preparing for action. At this time the three Canadian naval ships ceased to exist as a single unit for operational purposes; HMCS Cayuga was assigned to the West Coast Support Group and HMCS ships Athabaskan and Sioux to the Task Element 96.50, the fast escort element convoying ships between Pusan and Japan. They operated respectively under orders of the Commander Task Group 96.5, Rear-Admiral Charles C. Hartman, USN, under the Commander Task Group 96, Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, the United States Commander Naval Forces Far East.

Within 24 hours of their arrival, one of the Canadian destroyers, Athabaskan went to work almost immediately and by 1430 on 31 July had cleared Sasebo harbor en route to escort the US troop ship General Morton to Pusan. This was the first of four routine convoy missions to Pusan undertaken by HMCS Athabaskan before she was transferred to the west coast group on 11 August. HMCS Sioux was retained at the harbor for rescue duties, and on the 12th August she transferred to join Athabaskan in CTE 96.53, Rear-Admiral W. G. Andrewes, for service on the westcoast. During this period HMCS Cayuga had carried out more operational assignments than the other two destroyers. On 3 August she sailed from the harbor as escort to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Brown Ranger who was going out to refuel the ships of TU 96.53.3 on the west coast. After transferring on the 9th to the fast escort element, TE 96.50, she carried out five convoy missions to Pusan during the period ending on the 24th. Completing this duty, she joined the blockading forces on the west coast.

It was mid-August that one of the three Canadian destroyers engaged in active bombardment against the enemy for the first time in the war. After returning from an escort assignment to Pusan on 15 August, HMCS
Cayuga joined HMS frigate Mounts Bay south of Yosu to prepare for the bombardment of the area, the enemy stronghold in control of the southwestern portion of the peninsula. At about 1800 on 15 August the Canadian destroyer Cayuga went into bombardment. For almost two hours Cayuga bombarded the harbor installations. But the target was too far to be completely destroyed. Perhaps her action did not have any direct effect upon the battle for the perimeter, but the importance of the Yosu bombardment is that it marked the first time since the end of the Second World War that the Canadian Navy had engaged the enemy. It was only the first of many such actions during the next three years of the Korean War.

When Cayuga left the escort element to join with the west coast blockade on 24 August, the other Canadian ships Athabaskan and Sioux had been in hectic employment in the west coast islands, bombarding enemy batteries, observation posts, troop concentrations and other targets and supporting landings of ROK troops on NKCF dominated islands. This was the first time that the Canadian destroyer Athabaskan had cooperated with the Republic of Korean Naval Forces.

Joint Operation with ROK Naval Forces

On 15 August, Athabaskan set sail for Ochong-do, some 60 kilometers northwest of Kunsan where ROK naval ships were anchored waiting for her. At the destination, Athabaskan’s Commanding Officer, Commander Welland, was led to a conference with the four ROK Naval Commanders and briefed from them on the intelligence of enemy activities. After the conference, the Canadian destroyer approached the mainland to check on reported enemy activity in the island. Athabaskan arrived at her night anchorage south of the Kokunsan-kundo islands and two armed ships boats were sent inshore to patrol the coast line and prevent illicit traffic by junks and sampans. After recovering her boats, the Athabaskan, steamed towards Kunsan and on the way bombarded a battery of four 120-mm guns located near the city with 58 rounds of 4-inch. There was no response. The ship sailed northward along the coast towards the Taechon, where a military observation post had been reported. Twenty-five 4-inch shells were hurled at the building housing the suspected observation post, whereupon the ship withdrew to seaward to patrol among the off-shore islands.

In mid-afternoon, 16 August, she met the ROK Naval ships, PC 704 and YMS 502, and a conference was held with their commanders aboard her. The ROK’s commanders provided a good deal of information. In the following morning Athabaskan sailed south along the coast and anchored off the town of Popsongpo which, the ROK’s had reported, was the site of a NKCF mili-
tary headquarters. Fortyfive shells from her main armament were fired into
the town. For the next four days, from 17 to 21, HMCS Athabaskan operated
under the orders of HMS cruiser Kenya in the Inchon area. When the
ships arrived at their night anchorage on the evening of the 17th, Command-
er Welland went aboard the cruiser for a conference with the latter and with
the ROK Navy on future operations. The commander of the ROK Navy in the
area was Commander Lee Hee Jong, Commanding Officer of FC 702 (Kum
Gang San), who had under his command a small force of seamen with which
he was systematically mopping up the Reds on the islands in Inchon area. At
the conference it was decided that the island of Tokchok, 37°14' North, 126°08'
East, would be next on Commander Lee's list.

Lee's operation was to begin on the following morning, 18th August.
Accompanied by two ROK YMS, Commander Lee put a 110-man force on
Tokchok-do. HMCS Athabaskan supported the operation and the island was
secured. On the 19th the ROK Naval force landed on Yonghung-do, in the
Inchon approach channel, and in the days that followed expanded its control
of other islands in the west coast bight. On the 20th a landing party from
HMCS Athabaskan destroyed the radio gear in light on Palmi-do at the mouth
of Inchon harbor. By 1 September, considerable information to the defense of
Inchon had been collected by the ROK intelligence teams. And reports from
the information indicated that the seizure of Yonghung-do had caused the
NKCF to shift forces southward to guard against a possible mainland landing.

Thus while one of the Canadian destroyers, Athabaskan, had been co-
operating with ROK Naval ships, the work done by the other Canadian ships
on the west coast blockade was similar, but it was less spectacular. During
this period only two bombardments were carried out by these two ships,
one in which both Cayuga and Sioux participated in shelling the small island
of Taebu-do, 37°15' North and 126°35' East on 31 August, and one carried out
on 20 by Sioux in the Popsong-po area. During the rest of the time the
Canadian destroyers were engaged in screening the carrier HMS Triumph
and in carrying out routine patrols in the Kusan and Inchon areas.

Before and After the Inchon Landing Operation

The three Canadian destroyers were assembled in Sasebo by 3 September,
but only temporarily, as Athabaskan left next morning on an escort mission
to the west coast. Preparation for the Inchon landings were at this time
nearing completion. The Canadian destroyers were not given a spectacular
role to play in the operation. Admiral W. G. Andrewes had been appointed
to command Task Force 91, which was labelled the Blockade and Covering
Force and consisted of one carrier (HMS Triumph), one cruiser (HMS Cey-
lons), eight destroyers and 15 ROK Naval ships. Admiral Andrewes split his forces into a Northern Group (TG 91.1) and a Southern Group (TG 91.2) to simplify the conduct of his blockade and escort assignments. To the Canadian ships, now for the first time in the Korean war to operate as a unit under their own commander, fell the prosaic duties of TG 91.2, the Southern Group. As CTG 91.2, Captain Brock, Commanding Officer *Cayuga*, was responsible for: (1) providing escort for the logistic support group supplying the attacking force; (2) enforcing a blockade of the coast between 35°45' and 36°45' North; and (3) maintaining a hunter-killer group to deal with enemy submarines in the unlikely event that they made their appearance in the area. To carry out these duties, a few ROK Naval ships involved in the TG 91.2.

Although the group was thus small size, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) destroyers had carried out their duties with their customary devotion and despatch in Inchon operation. But there was no opposition from the enemy to the passage of the logistic support ships and no hostile submarines to pursue. Therefore the HMC ships' stories during this period does not make very exciting reading, however there was always at least one of the RCN ships on the inshore blockade patrol and sometimes the interesting adventures. For a week before the new TG organization came into effect, HMCS *Sioux* had been working on the west coast blockade with HMS *Ceylon*. She took part in the interception of suspected blockade runners, investigated suspicious junks and sampans, destroyed four enemy mines and joined *Ceylon* in a bombardment on the mainland at Ongjin Pando (peninsula). *Sioux* detached from *Ceylon* on D-Day, 14 September and proceeded to the Kunsan area as CTE 91.22. The RCN ships were responsible for the blockade of this part of the coast with ROK vessels. After patrolling off Kunsan until 17 September, *Sioux* was relieved by *Cayuga* and sailed to join *Athabaskan* for escort duties. *Cayuga* spent three uneventful days on blockade patrol, cruising up and down the coastal area.

On 20 September HMCS *Athabaskan* arrived to take over from *Cayuga* and begin a patrol of nine days. The major operation, during this period, performed by her with ROK PC 704 was against Piung-do and Osik-do, two small islands at the entrance to Kunsan harbor. The islands were believed to be held only by weak Communist police forces. On the morning of 25 September *Athabaskan* assaulted the Piung-do, sending in her two motor cutters with a party of 30 specially trained volunteers. There was no opposition to the landing. No signs of any installations were founded, so the Canadians withdrew.

In the afternoon ROK PC 704 and YMS 306 went to assault Osikdo under covering fire from *Athabaskan*. But they were met by machine-gun fire.
In spite of the enemy fire, the ROK vessels pressed their attack, and the NKCF withdrew inland. Satisfied that the island was occupied by Communist troops, not being prepared to take and hold the island against strong opposition, the ROK’s withdrew.

When the ROK Naval ships went inshore to support their landing parties, PC 704 sighted a mine off the island. Next morning Athabaskan sent in her motor cutters with a 14-foot dinghy to investigate this sighting. One mine was found at once and marked with dan buoys for later examination, the second was sunk and another two were sighted and their locations plotted before the rising tide hid the field. On 27 September low tide was at 0900, and Athabaskan’s motor cutters and dinghy again set to work on the mine problem. It would have been dangerous to take the ship close inshore to sink the mines with the 40-mm guns and since it proved very difficult to sink them with rifle fire the problem was not an easy one to solve. The cutter went in towing the dinghy. When a mine was sighted the dinghy, carrying David W. Hurl, Commissioned Gunner, the Athabaskan’s demolition expert, would be rowed to the spot. Carefully avoiding a collision the man at the oars would bring the dinghy close alongside the mine and hold it there while Commissioned Officer D. W. Hurl and his assistants fastened time-fused demolition charges to the mine’s rings. When the fuses had been lit, the dinghy would “take off” with all despatch and remain at a respectful distance until the charges exploded. Then “back to the mines” to blow up some more before the tide came in and covered them. Sometimes the charges would merely blow holes in the casing and the mine would sink, but occasionally the charge within the mine would be set off and there would be a tremendous explosion. The display was almost enough to compensate for the ticklish business of setting the charges. Working in this fashion, they were able to destroy four mines before the tide came in.

At noon on 27 September the Australian destroyer Bataan joined Athabaskan. As it had been reported that the Reds, alarmed by the ROK landing two days before, had strengthened Osik-do, the two destroyers joined forces to give the island a thorough pounding. Their bombardment was accurate, and one target after another was systematically destroyed.

In the following morning they destroyed four more mines and discovered a new minefield. The two destroyers joined forces in the afternoon for a bombardment of the Beijaa Bay area, 36°12’ North and 126°01’ East, that Cayuga and Athabaskan had shelled on the 22nd. After the bombardment HMCS Athabaskan sailed north again to the night patrol area. On way to the area several hundred civilians were seen on Oejanggo-do, in 36°24’ North and 126°21’ East, digging trenches and preparing military installations, so
Athabaskan closed the range and disrupted their activity with her 4-inch guns. After another uneventful night searching for enemy junks, Athabaskan left on the morning of the 29th for Inchon. Here she handed over her patrol duty to HMAS Warramunga. Athabaskan, after taking on fuel, then embarked the commander of the blockade forces on the west coast, Admiral Andrewes, for passage to Japan. On the following morning she was back in Sasebo, where Athabaskan joined Cayuga and Sioux.

After the Inchon landing operation had been successfully carried out by the UN naval forces, when HMCS Cayuga returned to Sasebo, a plan for the rehabilitation of the west coast islands was prepared by the Canadian Navy. The plan envisaged the removal of the remaining Communist elements from the islands. HMC Ships Cayuga and Sioux and a number of ROK Naval vessels were ordered to carry out the mission. But the progress of events in Korea had resulted in the cancellation of the rehabilitation plan. The landslide defeat of the NKCF had rendered the presence of destroyers with the operation unnecessary, and the operation was turned over to the ROK Navy.

**Athabaskan on East Coast**

At this time on the east coast, preparations were being made for the Wonsan landing. HMCS Athabaskan was to take part in this operation.

The Canadian destroyer Athabaskan, on 10 October, put out from Sasebo with HMS Cockade and HMAS Warramunga to join the TG 95.2 (Gunfire Support Group) of Joint Task Force 7, which was conducting the landing. On the following day the group sailed to carry out its assigned bombardment missions. The first target was the industrial port, Chongjin. The bombardment was carried out on 12 October by the US battleship Missouri and the cruisers, Helena, Worcester and HMS Ceylon, with other UN destroyers including Athabaskan screening. On the following day the TG 95.2 split up temporarily to range along the coast north of Wonsan looking for profitable targets. HMCS Athabaskan, acting as mine detection and screening ship, led Worcester and Ceylon, to their target area off Tanchon near Songjin. At this time she encountered one mine and promptly sank it by gun-fire.

At this time on land, as the Wonsan city had been already captured by the I ROK Corps on 10 October, the landing operation by UN naval forces was one anticlimax after another. In spite of this situation, the various tasks of patrolling, blockading and minesweeping operations off Wonsan had been continued by the UN naval vessels until the 26th, when the first assault troop began landing.
The Canadian destroyer *Athabaskan* led a humdrum life during the remainder of the operation carrying out the task of postman and courier to the Seventh Fleet until 1 November, when *Athabaskan* and four other destroyers left Wonsan to escort the battleship *Missouri* to Sasebo.

On the other hand, HMC ships *Cayuga* and *Sioux* on the west coast continued to be employed with TG 95.1. They had carried out the duties of blockade patrol along the north coast of Inchon, escorting of supply ships and screening of the carrier HMS *Theseus*. *Cayuga*, on 19 October, were thrown into a fix. When she was patrolling north of Inchon with HMS *Kenya*, the two ships were steaming north towards the approaches to Chinnampo, when *Cayuga*’s sonar operator suddenly reported mines ahead at a range of 400 meters. There being a known mine-field to port, *Cayuga* turned sharply to starboard, at the same time flashing an emergency-turn signal to *Kenya*. There were tense moments as the destroyer’s stern swung clear of the mine-field, but the danger had been detected in time and both ships escaped.

**In the Chinnampo Evacuation**

The land situation, at this time, went far to bear out UN’s optimistic picture. On 19 October the ROK units entered Pyongyang and continued to press northward, pushing on across the Chongchon River, and on 26 October the 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu River. But late November all of a sudden saw a signs of increased enemy activity. Large concentrations of fighter planes were reported on the airfield on the Manchurian side of the lower Yalu River, and the UN Air Force planes flying down the valley reported anti-aircraft fire from the far shore. The ROK Division which had reached the Yalu River were roughly handled and driven back. The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) had invaded Korea. As had been the case five months before, rapid enemy advances resulted rapid retirement by the ground forces of the UN. At sea, the UN naval forces were responsible for any necessary evacuation of the UN ground forces, a responsibility now greatly enlarged. Consequently, the Canadian ships which continued their routine patrols on the west coast until the early December, took part in the Chinnampo withdrawal operation, concurrently beginning with the Hungnam’s on the east coast. The RCN ships’ mission was to defend the UN transports diverted Chinnampo to withdraw some UN troops.

Overall responsibility for this redeployment lay with CTG 90.1, Rear Admiral L. A. Thackrey, USN, and for this operation the six ships of TE 95.12 were placed at his disposal. Commander Task Element 95.12 was, of
course, Captain J.V. Brock, Commanding Officer of Cayuga and it was the strongest force available to support the evacuation. At midnight on 3 December the element was maintaining its normal patrols with Cayuga and HMAS Bataan operating near the mouth of the Yalu and Athabaskan HMAS Warramunga patrolling to the south of them. The Canadian destroyer Sioux was absent escorting HM oiler Wave Laird from Inchon to the element’s replenishment area south of Chodo, island approach to the Taedong River estuary. Early on the 4th the destroyer USS Forrest Royal was assigned to reinforce TE 95.12.

Athabaskan, Sioux, Bataan, and Warramunga were ordered to assemble near the swept channel into Chinnampo, ready to proceed up-river in the morning. Cayuga intended to remain at the replenishment area south of Chodo—designated as Area Shelter—with Forrest Royal to await the arrival of HMS Ceylon who was to be joined later, but Cayuga had to make the passage to Chinnampo before the cruiser arrived. Cayuga slipped from the tanker in Area Shelter at 2230 and made for the swept channel. One by one they formed up astern in order Athabaskan, Bataan, Forrest Royal and Sioux. But low water was the cause of the first casualty, HMAS Warramunga who had gone on ahead reported herself aground. She managed to work herself free, but was forced to return to the Area Shelter to examine the damage, and also HMCS Sioux followed her example, going aground on a bank of sand and mud. So they took no further part in the main operation.

Meanwhile the four remaining ships continued to creep up the channel. Due to the low and narrow water they were forced to steam slowly and cautiously up the channel, and it was not until 0330 on the 5th that Cayuga dropped anchor at the main docks of Chinnampo. Bataan and Forrest Royal in the meantime had anchored near the southern entrance to the harbor, while Athabaskan proceeded further up-stream and anchored north of the city. During the early morning the transport group also continued to arrive at the area. These transport ships consisted of the US Attack Transports(APA)—Bayfield, Bexar and Okanogan -- and Attack Cargo ships (AKA) -- Algol and Montague --, and they were commanded by the CTG 90.2, Captain S.G. Kelly, USN. At last, the anchors went down, the boats were launched and the evacuation began. At 1400 the first two transports left, the forerunners of an exodus that continued until after dark. The last troops were embarked shortly after 1700, and the bombardment by the TE 95.12 began at 1735.

Their targets had been assigned earlier in the day after consultation with the Army Commander at the harbor. The Canadian destroyer Cayuga with her 4-inch guns and HMAS Bataan with her 4.7’s concentrated their fire
on oil storage tanks, supply dumps, freight cars, railway lines and dock installation. *Forrest Royal* with her heavier guns had destroyed some of the targets, such as a massive brick chimney in the harbor area. Marshalling yards, rolling stock and such smaller targets proved more vulnerable, and on them her accurate fire was very effective. Their bombardment ceased at 1845, and the three destroyers withdrew to join HMCS *Athabaskan* at the defended anchorage. After a night disturbed only by the glare of the explosions from the harbor, the destroyers left the anchorage at first light on 6 December. The long procession of destroyers and LST's, led by *Athabaskan*, set off down river. *Cayuga* brought up the rear, encouraging the LST's to greater efforts by shouting well chosen words and phrases over the loud-hailer. All the ships were clear of the channel by 0945, and Captain Brock could report “Mission successfully completed.”

During this period from mid-December 1950 through early January 1951, the Canadian destroyers remained in the operational area on the west coast almost continuously. All ships took their turns on the carrier screen of HMS *Theseus*, whose aircraft were flying armed reconnaissance in support of the UN ground forces, conducting anti-shipping patrols and acting as spotters for naval bombardments. Towards the end of the year, the Canadian
destroyers who had been on continuous duty on the west coast since 20 November, were beginning to feel the need for a few days in harbour to effect necessary repairs if nothing else and to catch up on routine maintenance tasks. *Athabaskan* was the first one relieved; she arrived at Sasebo on 22 December and was immediately taken in hand by the Japanese dockyard crews. *Sioux* returned to Sasebo on 2 January 1951 and spent the next two weeks preparing for her voyage home to Canada. *Cayuga*, after setting a record for the Commonwealth destroyers by completing 50 days on patrol, joined her consorts in Sasebo on 8 January for a well earned docking.

Section 3. Counter-Offensive Ashore
(January–June 1951)

Several Changes

The early months of 1951 were times of danger for the UN forces. By the evening of 2 January the CCF had broken the UN lines directly north of Seoul in the sector held by the I and IX US Corps, and there was nothing for it but to retreat back across the Han River and leave Seoul once again to the enemy on 4 January. Defensive positions had been prepared some 25 kilometers south of the Han River. This was the limit of the UN withdrawal.

During these momentous events the Canadian destroyers did not play a particularly important role, but it was not that there were no interesting moments. It was in Inchon harbor that the RCN ships for the first time in the war came under enemy fire.

On 25 January, the Canadian old timer *Cayuga* and new comer *Nootka* (Commander A. B. F. Fraser-Harris) -- she had relieved HMCS *Sioux* on 15 January -- were leaving Inchon, when the enemy guns on Wolmi-do opened fire upon them. The Reds' gunnery was inaccurate, but the first enemy resistance was welcomed in *Cayuga* after so many months of waiting, and both ships turned, reversed course and closed to engage. Their guns silenced the shore batteries, but the ships, for good measure, steamed into Bofors range to spray the area with the short range weapons before leaving to continue their patrols.

HMCS *Cayuga* returned to Inchon two days later, this time to join the
UN bombardment force in the harbor. The UN’s offensive was at this time making good progress, and the two Canadian ships were under orders to harass the enemy, to provide direct gun-fire support for the UN troops advancing up the peninsula. Before Cayuga left the harbor again, she came under enemy fire for the second time on the afternoon of 30 January. This time the gunners were more efficient and several rounds landed within 200 yards of the ship, but the combined fire of two cruisers and two destroyers was more than the enemy artillerymen were able to stomach, and although HMCS Cayuga remained at Inchon until 3 February she was not molested again. Except for these minor clashes, the RCN destroyers had a relatively quiet time during the early months of the year. For instance, Athabaskan spent 19 days at sea in January, 20 in February and 24 in March, and Nootka carried out a five-day patrol off Inchon in February.

Things began to change in April; not only did the Canadians draw more free lance missions on the inshore patrol, but the patrols became more eventful.

In the meantime, the Canadian Destroyer Division had been affected by several changes by this time. Cayuga left for home on 16 March, after being relieved by HMCS Huron (Commander F. T. G. Madgwick) and the departure of Captain Brock necessitated a change in command for the RCN Special Force. At that time Fraser-Harris of Nootka took over as Senior Officer and he did so as Commander Canadian Destroyers Far East (COM-CANDESFE).

There were also several changes of command at higher levels during the early months of 1951. Admiral Andrews (CTG 95.1), promoted to Vice-Admiral on 1 December, 1950, was placed in command of the Task Force 95 in place of Rear-Admiral A.F. Smith, USN, who was his immediate superior in the UN organization. But the change did not last for long. Vice-Admiral Andrews was relieved on 10 April by Rear-Admiral A.K. Scott-Moncrieff, and Admiral Smith returned to his post as CTF 95 and concurrently the TF was placed under the Commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice-Admiral H. M. Martin, USN.

At this time far more important than the change of commands in the UN naval forces, was the relief of the Commander-in-Chief, the UN Command, General of the Army, Douglas MacArther, on 11 April, 1951. In place of him, General Ridgway was appointed and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet took over the command of the Eighth Army. Under their new commander the UN forces prepared for their counter-offensive operations and began their northward advance. By the third week of April the Hwachon
Reservoir had been reached, and from the Imjin River to Eastern Sea the line ran north parallel.

On the other hand, the changes in the high commands had little effect on the RCN destroyers but the placing of TF 95 under the Seventh Fleet was of importance. This resulted in to the much more frequent employment of the Canadian destroyers on the east coast. Henceforth the Canadian ships increased their naval activities on both coasts.

**Continual Pressure on Both Coasts**

In the meantime, at sea as on land, naval operations continued in routine fashion. On the east coast the sieges of Wonsan and Songjin went on, with daily bombardment and minesweeping. In particular, this period of offensive and counteroffensive from April to June 1951 was a busy one for the Canadian Navy.

Early in April the two Canadian destroyers, *Athabaskan* and *Huron* were involved in what was to them an usual operation when the carriers of TG 95.1, *HMS Theseus* and USS *Bataan*, together left the Yellow Sea to join in the attacks on the east coast communication system in the Wonsan area. TE 95.11 on this occasion was a truly UN force, for screening the British and American carriers were two US, one British, one Australian and two Canadian destroyers. The carriers flew strikes against the enemy in and around Wonsan for three days with good effect. At this time another Canadian ship *Noatka* on the west coast, went on blockade patrol with TE 95.12 under the orders of HMS carrier *Kenya*, the remainder of the month was uneventful on both coasts.

After the carrier screening mission, HMC ships split up again, *Huron* remaining on carrier duty and the other two returning chiefly to blockade duties. *Sioux* had returned for her second Korean tour (relieving *Athabaskan* who sailed homeward on 3 May) and was in the thick of things on the inshore patrol. They spent much more time on the blockade patrol during May. At this time, it had been the policy of the UN naval forces on the west coast to retain control of certain strategically-placed islands for continual pressure on the enemy by the threat of amphibious operations in the area between Chinnampo and Inchon. The islands selected were Chodo, Paengnyong-do and Tokchok-do which covered the approaches to the two harbors and the only usable deep-water channel along the Hwanghae Promontory. Later, other islands were taken by the ROK forces and special troops, and for a time the UN controlled islands deep in the Yalu Gulf. From early 1951 through to the signing of the armistice the task of pro-
tecting these islands became an important part of the duties of TG 95.1.

In mid-May, there was an amphibious operation. British Marines from HMS Geylon and Kenya were to land on the mainland opposite Chodo. On 20 May the Canadian ship Sioux took part in this operation. With the ships of TE 95.12 she bombarded the beaches to destroy any mines that might have been planted, shifting fire inland to the nearby villages as the Marines went in. The landing force penetrated more than 1.5 kilometers inland and created a great disturbance before returning. The raid caused no serious loss to the enemy, but it had an even greater effect than had been expected in causing the movement of reinforcements to the area, as the Reds hastened to man the coastal defences and to move troops across the Taedong River into the peninsula. The movement of reinforcements provided many targets for the aircraft of TE 95.11, and the manning of the coastal defenses temporarily brought more enemy troops within range of the guns of the blockading force.

On the other hand, at this time, HMCS Nootka who had been patrolling in Yalu Gulf area, was transferred to the east coast later in May. On the 21st she arrived in the Songjin area, taking over from HMS Black Swan as a unit of TE 95.22, the element responsible for patrol and blockade of the coastline from Chahoe below Tanchon to 41°51’ North and for the interdiction of roads and railways in that area. Upon joining Nootka was immediately put to work bombarding a line of boxcars in the Songjin area. She remained in the area until the following day, carrying out interdiction and harassing fire, and also sometimes landing her assault party to attack on the coastal railway bridge near Songjin, at the same time seizing the opportunity to save ammunition by blowing up some of the tracks with demolition charges.

On the night of 23–24 May, 1951 HMCS Nootka made the northern patrol, bombarding Chongjin for half an hour before returning to her daylight station off Songjin. The remainder of the day the destroyer spent in bombarding interdiction targets and targets of opportunity along the coast. In the evening Nootka again set course northward to give Chongjin its nightly shelling. Nootka followed this routine in the Songjin—Chongjin area for the next five days.

On 31 May, the Canadian destroyer Nootka was given a new assignment, this time with TE 95.28, the bombline element supporting the ground troops in the frontline. The senior ship in TE 95.28 was USS cruiser Manchester (later USS Los Angeles). One of the services performed by the Canadian destroyer was that of keeping in close touch with the troops of the I ROK Corps holding the extreme eastern flank of the UN line. On several occasions Nootka contacted the troops ashore to collect intelligence
information and to ferry liaison and intelligence officers between the cruiser and army headquarters ashore. Only once did she carry out a bombardment, this one against troop billets whose locations had been reported by army intelligence. On 4 June another HMCS *Sioux* arrived to relieve *Nootka* who then returned for a much-needed docking in kure. She had spent a most active two weeks on the east coast. During this period she fired over 1,500 rounds of 4-inch as well as 312 rounds of 40mm, ten star-shells, twenty-six 5-inch rockets and 850 rounds of small-arms ammunition.

**Wonsan Siege**

HMCS *Sioux*, who joined TE 95.28 as a relief for *Nootka*, operated mainly in the swept channel, providing harassing and interdictory fire on targets throughout June. These bombardments were frequently controlled by aerial spotters.

Twice during her patrol *Sioux* sent north to join TE 95.21 in the siege of Wonsan. The Wonsan siege was dangerous duty because of the numerous enemy batteries. Furthermore, the harbor is covered by two long, narrow peninsulas, like horn, called Hodo and Kalma pando. The harbor was filled with mines, except for the area which had been cleared by UN minesweepers.

*Sioux*’s first bombardment to the harbour began at 0920 on 14 June. She bombarded several targets, including batteries on the northern peninsula of Hodo and sailed south again TE 95.28 at 2036 that same day. A battery on the peninsula opened fire on *Sioux*’s companion, the US destroyer *Frank E. Evans*, but as it ceased fire when *Evans* replied with her own guns no further action was taken. On *Sioux*’s return to Wonsan on 17 June the same battery again opened fire on the UN ships and was soon joined by the batteries on Kalma Pando and Umido. This time there were three destroyers in the outer harbour, *Brinkley Bass*, *Evans* (USS destroyers) and *Sioux*, and they went immediately into their “war dance.” This was a manœuvre that had been involved to suit the peculiar conditions of Wonsan harbour. The action continued for half an hour, but none of the ships was hit. The naval bombardments appeared to be accurate, and one of *Sioux*’s salvos set off a considerable explosion on Umi-do. It was exceedingly difficult to put any of the Wonsan batteries out of action, for most of the guns were sited in caves. After this short bombardment *Sioux* and the other ships returned to their night bombardment stations. *Sioux* had rather a quite time during that night and the following morning, for she was running short of 4.7-inch ammunition, and there was no more available on the east.
coast. In the afternoon on 18 June, the harbour batteries decided to begin another duel with the UN ships. There were another ship, USS frigate *Gloucester* in the harbour. The action raged hot and heavy for over an hour and all of the ships were straddled at least once. *Sioux* had four near misses, and numerous small shell fragments hit the ship, but caused neither casualties nor damage. An hour after the enemy guns opened fire, carrier-based aircraft from TF 77 arrived and joined in the fight. Their rocket and cannon fire added to the shells from the ships soon convinced the enemy that it was time to call a halt. *Sioux*, during the action, used up all of her 4.7-inch HEDA (High Explosive, Direct Action) ammunition except one round which was overlooked, and she had to resort to firing her scarce and expensive proximity-fused shells. A few minutes after the gun action ended, USS *Arnold J. Isbell* arrived to relieve *Sioux*, who returned to TE 95.28 in the Kosong area. HMS *Whitesand Bay* arrived next day to relieve *Sioux* which then sailed for Sasebo.

After spending a day at Sasebo following her patrol, *Sioux* set out for Hong Kong. While she was at the dockyard there her superheater tubes were inspected and found to be in such poor condition that they had to be replaced immediately. *Sioux* was forced to remain until 24 August.

On the other hand *Nootka* and *Huron* had been patrolling the west coast during June. At this time *Nootka* was soon to return home, but on the 24th August *Huron* had sailed for the east coast to begin her first mission there. The Canadian ship *Huron* served with TE 95.22 in the Songjin and Chongjin areas until 7 July carrying out their usual routine of bombardments. During this routine mission, she was under fire by an enemy gun sited near the southern end of the Songjin swept channel, but her 4-inch gun immediately silenced this gun. In particular, her gunnery in the Chongjin area was accurate and greatly damaged the enemy shore installations.

HMCS *Huron* was relieved on 7 July by HMS frigate *Morecambe Bay* and arrived back at Sasebo after two days. But early in the following morning *Huron* left again to join the carrier screen of HMS *Glory* on the west coast. At that time *Nootka* had been on carrier duty since 1 July with US carrier *Sicily* on the west coast. Upon the arrival of HMS *Glory*, *Nootka* joined her screen for a few hours just long enough to exchange farewells with *Huron* before leaving for Sasebo to make preparation for her homeward passage. *Cayuga* was met at Yokosuka and, after a three-day turn-over period *Cayuga’s* Commanding Officer, Commander J. Plomer, took over from Commander Fraser-Harris as Commander Canadian Destroyers Far East, the *Nootka* sailed on 20 July for home.

In the meantime the cease-fire talks had been opened in Kaesong on 10
July, 1951, but it was broken by the Communists’ common trick. After that this suspension lasted for over two months until the reopening of truce negotiations in late November. United Nations naval forces, at this time, decided to show the Reds that, although the land campaign might be virtually stalemated, they would not escape the attention of the navy and air force by stalling the talks. On the west coast this naval and air offensive included the “Han River Demonstration” (for the purposes of forcing the Communist negotiators to admit the fact that the UN forces controlled South Korean portion of the 38th Parallel and west of the Imjin River) and a concerted attack by both carriers of TE 95.11 on various targets in North Korea. The carrier force consisted of HMS Glory and USS Sicily, screened by two American, one Australian, one Netherland and the two Canadian ships. Cayuga’s second tour opened with these carriers screening mission. This mission which continued from 24 to 29 July, was uneventful.

The dullness in screening duties was broken by the so-called “Bugatti patrol.” This was a nightly patrol undertaken by each of the destroyers in turn and involved proceeding to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel to maintain radar watch against surprise night attack on the carriers. However, the patrol also turned out as uneventful as the carrier screening, but at least it was a change. USS Sicily was detached and returned to Sasebo on 29 July, but Glory, screened by USS frigates Renshaw and Moore, and HMC ships, Huron and Cayuga, remained on the west coast carrying out serial strikes until 4 August before returning to Sasebo.

Through the remainder of August, Cayuga was the only Canadian destroyer in action in the Far East. Huron left for home on 14 August; her relief, Athabaskan did not arrive until 31 August; and Sioux did not complete repairs in Hong Kong until 24 August.

During August HMCS Cayuga operated chiefly in the Chodo-Sokdo area. These Islands cover the approaches to the Taedong River estuary and guard the northern end of the only deep water channel along the north-west coast of the Hwanghae Promontary, the so-called “Cigarette route.” This area was to be one of the chief centers of activity for the Canadian destroyers on the west coast throughout the remainder of the war. Chodo and Sokdo, in particular Chodo, were of great value to the UN forces. They provided bases from which special forces were raiding the mainland to attack the enemy and to gather intelligence. The US Air Force also maintained radar, radio and SHORAN (Short range aid to navigation) installations on Chodo. On the west coast area the cruisers, destroyers, frigates and ROKN craft of TE 95.12 and the aircraft of the carrier element TE 95.11 used their fire power to discourage the enemy from concentrating in great strength on the
mainland near such islands as Chodo and their very presence was a strong
deterrent to any enemy attempt to make large-scale landings.

_Cayuga_ proceeded to her main operational area near Cho-do and Sok-do
in the morning of 8 August. Four targets were engaged during the morn-
ing; one a target of some troops on the beach, the others pill-boxes and
observation posts. After the bombardments _Cayuga_ held a conference at
noon with the ROK minesweeper YMS 512 and her companion YMS 511.
Beside promising co-operation, the ROK's provided _Cayuga_ with much valu-
able intelligence. And the Canadian ship supplied the ROK vessels with
five tons of fresh water and gave medical treatment to a ROK crew. At
the conclusion of the conference _Cayuga_ made for Sok-do and came to an-
chor just to the south of the island. Almost immediately the ship was closed
by two junks from Sokdo, one of them bearing a letter from the leader of
most of the special forces on the island. The letter contained useful infor-
mation. Commander Plomer sent in a boat to find the agent and, if possi-
bile, bring him out to the ship for a conference. The agent arrived in due
course; he was familiar with the local situation, and his information was of
the greatest value.

_Cayuga_ began to reap the fruits of this co-operation immediately. With-
out shifting her berth, she was able to pour over 200 rounds of high explo-
sive on several important targets pointed out by the agent. After the
bombardment _Cayuga_ returned the agent to his island and set course for
Cho-do. But the Donkey (another secret organization) on Cho-do was able to
give little information of any value. The ship passed a quiet night at an-
chor off Cho-do. About 0700 of 10 August explosions were heard and smoke
was seen rising from the mainland. Shortly thereafter a small mortar fishing
vessel arrived from Cho-do with the news that the guerillas that _Cayuga_
had assisted the night before had been trapped on the beach by the enemy
as there was no wind to propel their junks. _Cayuga_ immediately weighed
and moved inshore. The enemy, reluctant to draw the attention of the
destroyer's 4-inch guns, at once ceased fire, and one by one the junks were
able to clear the beach and reach the motor vessel to be towed to safety.
One of the escaping junks was towing a live cow which was vociferously
protesting its liberation from Communism. When the junks were clear of
the beach, _Cayuga_ opened fire on the nearby town of Pungchon, on the
opposite shore of Cho-do and other targets on the vicinity, including a group
of soldiers crossing a mudflat and then retired from the area to clear her
condensers of the great masses of seaweed that had collected in them during
the night. _Cayuga_ headed north again for Sokdo area early in the after-
noon, where she met the two ROK minesweepers. The ROK's had carried out
their promise to _Cayuga_ with devotion, and YMS 512 preceded the destroyer
north-east of Sok-do from which she could engage the enemy at close range. Owing to the ROK's, Cayuga was able to engage at closer range and her fire with 338 rounds of high explosive was much more effective than on the day before.

After the bombardment she withdrew to seaward of Sok-do and anchored during the night. On the following morning she handed over her patrol missions to HMS Consort and proceeded to Inchon. After refuelling from HMS Wave Chief at Inchon Cayuga escorted the ship out to the carrier screen of TE 95.11 before leaving for Sasebo. Her activities for the remainder of August were principally with the west coast carriers.

On the other hand, Huron had sailed from Sasebo en route to her homeland on 14 August and her relief did not arrive until the end of the month. Sioux came also from Hong Kong on 25 August after completing her repairs, but she did not start active operations on the west coast until the 31st. Thus August was a quiet month for the Canadian ships.

**Cigarette Channel**

At the beginning of September all three Canadian destroyers, Cayuga, Athabaskan and Sioux, began to put in a good deal of time on carrier screening, and Cayuga spent ten eventful days on the inshore patrol with TE 95.12. Among the carrier screening missions undertaken during this period by the Canadian ships was one involving the first attack made by TF 95 on the city of Wonsan in which the air-strike and gun bombardment were coordinated. This striking force pounded Wonsan with bombs and shells for two days (18-19 September).

But the most interesting mission during the month was the inshore patrol carried out by Cayuga from the 2nd to the 13th September. She arrived in Chodo area on the night of the 2nd and, after an early morning conference with the New Zealand frigate Rotoiti, took over from her the responsibilities of the Chodo-Sokdo patrol. Later in the morning, after being provided with the targets for bombardment from the Leopard agents on Chodo, Cayuga proceeded north to the channel between Sokdo and the mainland and bombarded mainland villages and roads near the bay opposite Sokdo. The Leopard agent on Sokdo was then embarked, and the Canadian ship retired to the southward, anchoring for the night in the channel between Chodo and the mainland.

Early on the following morning the Chodo Leopard also came aboard and the ROK minesweeper YMS 510 came alongside to request minesweeping assignments. At 0930 the HMS cruiser Belfast, who was the CTE 95.12 at this time, was sent steaming up the Cigarette channel, firing her 6-inch
guns landward as she came. *Belfast* dropped anchor nearby and the two Leopards were sent aboard her for a conference. *Belfast* left af 1300, and a few minutes later *Cayuga* weighed and proceeded southward down the Cigarette channel. The afternoon was spent in bombarding various targets on the mainland Chodo and Changsan-got, Hwanghae Province Promontary.

The Canadian ship fired a total of 44 rounds of high explosive and 148 rounds of 40-mm before returning to a night anchorage off Chodo. Friendly agents reported that the NKCF troops on the mainland in the Chodo-Sokdo area were taking to the hills in the daytime to escape the gunfire of the UN ships and were occupying their barracks only at night. To frustrate the enemy's design, *Cayuga* kept up intermittent fire of high explosive and star-shell during most of the night. Late in the afternoon of 6 September, *Cayuga* set course north-westward for the Manchurian coast to carry out a special patrol. It had been reported that the Red Chinese were running supplies from Dairen to Antung at the mouth of the Yalu, and *Cayuga*'s mission was to investigate these reports. Throughout the night and the following day, the destroyer cruised the waters of northern Yalu Gulf without encountering enemy shipping, although a fleet of 22 junkas was sighted near the estuary of the Yalu. But they were on the western shore and therefore immune from attack. Towards the evening on the 7th *Cayuga* set course back to Chodo, arriving at her night anchorage east of island at 2035. That evening there was a conference on Chodo to discuss the part to be played by *Cayuga* in supporting a strong raid on the mainland planned for the following morning. Arrangements were quickly made and at night the Salamander agent (counter-intelligence organization who had his headquarters on Paengnyong-do) came aboard *Cayuga* to help co-ordinate the ship's support activities during the raid. The landing force consisting of some 200 men of a guerilla organization, embarked in junkas towed by two motor fishing vessels, crossed the strait from Chodo and went in on the beaches south of the mouth of the Namhon. There was no opposition, and the guerillas penetrated inland in groups of 30 to 40 men after establishing a command post from which *Cayuga*'s gunfire support could be directed.

All requests for support came from the command post ashore to the Salamander group in the ship which relayed the information to the gunnery department. The system worked well and at the height of action, when the enemy were pressing the retiring guerillas closely, the ship's guns were firing as rapidly as shells could be rammed into the breeches. *Cayuga* fired 335 rounds of 4-inch throughout the action, and it was ammunition well spent. The enterprise was very successful. A good deal of valuable information was obtained and a certain amount of food was seized, but it was in the destruction of enemy troops that the guerillas secured the best results.
A few days later, when *Cayuga* visited Chodo, it was reported that conservative estimates set the enemy losses in the raid at 150 killed and 100 wounded. The friendly casualties were light; seven wounded and only three of these seriously hurt. The three seriously wounded were treated by *Cayuga*’s Medical Officer, Surgeon Lieutenant J. C. Cyr, before being transferred to *Belfast*. *Cayuga* remained on the island patrol for another four days, but there were no more guerilla landings and the usual routine prevailed. At night *Cayuga* remained at anchor near Chodo or Sokdo in position to cover with her Sperry radar the routes an enemy invading force would have to use, if it tried to attack the islands. During the day the ship usually carried out bombardments on targets recommended by the Leopard and Salamander agents in the area. Occasionally the ship was ordered north on a special anti-shipping patrol in the Yalu Gulf, but such patrols were usually without incident. *Cayuga* carried out one of these northern patrols on 12 September and did not sight a single vessel, friendly or enemy. She returned to the Cho-do area for the night and was relieved by *Sioux* at 0600 on the morning of 13 September.

During the remainder of the month the Canadian ships took part in few other operations of particular interest, except the two-day strike on Wonsan previously described.

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**Section 4. Island Recapturing Operations**

(October - December 1951)

**HMCS Cayuga’s Activity on West Coast**

The truce negotiations, which had been suspended on 23 August by the Communists for over two months, finally began to make some progress. In late October the negotiators sat down at a new conference site in Panmunjom. At last the agreement had been reached on a provisional demarcation line by 26 November. It was agreed that, should an armistice be signed within 30 days, the existing battle line would be taken as the basis for the final truce line. But the UN naval and air forces, from this time on, had increased their activities, in particular in the Western Sea; the navy was resisting a determined attempt to seize some of the more important UN-held islands. It was chiefly the western islands patrolled by TE 95.12 that the Reds wished to get their hands on, and, consequently, the Canadian destroyers were to become closely involved in the naval campaign to frustrate the Communist design.
Cayuga was the only Canadian ship to see action with the inshore patrol in October. The other ship, Sioux, had a long lay-off in Sasebo during the month and Athabaskan had spent twenty-one days at sea, but she, too, had suffered slight damage by a typhoon. Cayuga, besides serving nine days on the inshore patrol, also performed two carrier screening missions. From the 7th to the 11th she was with a special task element consisting of the cruiser HMS Belfast, HMAS carrier Sydney and five destroyers carrying out another combined aerial and gun bombardment of Wonsan. Upon returning from the east coast she sailed immediately to join the west coast mission.

On 22 October she arrived at the vicinity of Taechong-do. At that time she found that one of a flight of B-29's dived sharply to disintegrate in a burst of flame and smoke in the island. Cayuga and HMAS frigate Murchison, who was also in the vicinity, immediately made for the scene of the crash. The parachutes were seen to land on the island, so Cayuga lowered a boat and sent her medical officer to render assistance. All the airmen had safely landed and, after treating two of them for shock, the medical officer returned to the ship.

After carrying out a routine patrol for a few days, Cayuga, in the evening on the 24th October, left to carry out a patrol in the vicinity of Taehwa-do, south of Sinmi-do. There are many islands in the chain form northeastward of the island. Earlier, those islands had been held by friendly guerillas, but most of them were falling to the enemy, and now Taehwa-do was the only one of any importance still on UN hands. The island was in a very vulnerable position, lying as it did only a few kilometers from Red-controlled island and within easy reach of the enemy's Manchurian air-fields. These circumstances made it much more difficult for the ships of TE 95.12 to defend the island.

Cayuga, on the morning of 25th, was ordered to proceed to the anchorage off Taehwa-do to investigate reports of an enemy bombing attack on the island. On arriving at Taehwa-do the cutter was sent in. The island had been attacked: two bombers had dropped ten bombs which inflicted eleven casualties on the defenders. Cayuga's Medical Assistant, Petty Officer Robert Hotchin, went ashore to treat the wounded. The special troops on the island was disturbed over the enemy build-up which had been taking place on the islands to the north, so Commander Plomer decided to carry out a surprise bombardment to encourage the "friendlies." Threading her way through the sand banks, Cayuga steamed northward and came to anchor off Sogaza-do, east of the Cholsan Peninsula opposite the Taehwa-do. The enemy evidently had not expected a UN ship to appear in that area and was totally unprepared; hence Cayuga's 150-round bombardment caused numerous casual-
ties and did considerable damage.

She returned to Taehwa-do at 1650 and embarked her Medical Assistant, seven of the bombing casualties and a Korean doctor with his two assistants. Before leaving there, it was decided bombard Sun-do, 27 kilometers to the north west, which reported 500 enemy troops and number of junks. Closing the island, Cayuga opened fire at 6,000 meters and continued to fire until only 2,500 meters from the beach. Enemy guns also opened fire, but were immediately silenced by direct hits.

After bombardng Sun-do, Cayuga carried out an anti-shipping patrol during the night, making contact with Ceylon next day at noon off Cho-do. A doctor and Korean passengers were transferred to Ceylon, and Cayuga received five tons of stores and four passengers for Taehwa-do. There was a US Army officer going out to relieve the Leopard representative among them. Cayuga arrived off Taehwa-do at dusk on 26 October, transferred her stores and passengers into guerilla junks and sailed westward to patrol during the night. On the morning of the 27th Cayuga proceeded on a search and rescue mission to a position north-west of the estuary of Taedong River, but found nothing. She again set out for Paengnyong-do and lay at anchor off the island the night of 27-28 October. The following day, 28th of October, Cayuga spent in bombarding targets. Cayuga on this day, had a very successful afternoon. By keeping the ship close inshore and suddenly appearing out from behind the cliff, complete surprise was achieved. The enemy troops could be seen rushing to wheel out a mortar or field gun before direct hits from the 4-inch and the Bofors blotted out the view. Fire was held for a time until the smoke and dust blew away, and then the remains of the target were systematically destroyed. Cayuga then carried on along the coast to engage other enemy positions.

The night of 28-29 October she spent in the Yalu Gulf. At that time, Cayuga received a message to be at a position in the Taedong Gulf to assist in the evacuation of special forces. When she reached the shallow water, her motor cutter was sent to take soundings, and then the ship crept in as close to shore as was prudent. The second cutter was then sent in charge of Lieutenant D.R. Saxon, RCN, Cayuga's guerilla expert, to get in touch with the troops that were to be evacuated. Except for a burning village was no sign of any activity; but as the cutter began to approach the shore a heavy machine-gun opened up. The fire was accurate; some of the rounds hit so near the boat that its occupants were splashed with water. The cutter's crew tried to retaliate with the Brens, but the range was too great. And, also, as there was no friendly troop to be evacuated, Cayuga, after the cutter had returned, withdrew to seaward.
About noon a radio message from Leopard on Paengnyong-do reported two targets worthy of Cayuga’s attentions. These targets were in the area bombarded on the precious day, so the ship arrived off Paengnyong-do towards evening, where she conferred with Ceylon before leaving for her night anchorage in the channel between Cho-do and the mainland. Early in the morning on the 30th Lieutenant Saxon went ashore to confer with the local Leopard agent and to donate to the islanders a quantity of clothing. According to the Donkey the Communists were still building up their forces on the mainland, probably in preparation for an attack on the islands of Cho-do and Sokdo.

While the cutter was ashore, a message arrived from the Donkey on Sok-do, saying that his junks were being fired on by the mainland batteries. Cayuga weighed and made for the channel between Sok-do and mainland. When she arrived off the island there were no signs of enemy gunfire. The ship anchored off Sok-do and the other cutter went in to pick up Lieutenant Beaudette, US Army, who had replaced Master Sergeant Frost, as the Sok-do Donkey. He came aboard the ship and gave the latest intelligence: the enemy was planning for invasion; new guns were being sited; the civilians the NKCF troops had been removed from Amgak and some 2,000 Chinese Communist regulars moved in; new offensive and dive and defensive works were being rapidly constructed.

Commander Plomer decided to try to knock out a new battery of 76-mm guns which had recently been mounted near the tip of Amgak. She shifted to a position nearer Amgak and prepared to fire. Before Cayuga had time to fire there was a whistling noise and three shells, landing in a tight pattern, threw up columns of water 200 meters astern. Cayuga replied with two quick broadsides before the next enemy salvo arrived. Again the shells fell astern, but this time only 100 meters away. This was getting too close altogether, and orders were given to slip the cable and retire with all despatch. Cayuga, because of her position, to steam stern-fist out of sight around the southern tip of Sok-do. As she got under way another enemy salvo straddled her, two rounds and one over. While all this was going on, heavier shells were also falling around the ship. Not until Cayuga had disappeared around the southern tip did those heavier guns cease fire. This action lasted nineteen minutes. The ship observed several hits in the target area, but none of the enemy guns were knocked out.

Cayuga, after this skirmish, returned Lieutenant Beaudette to his island and picked up Lieutenant Sazon and the cutter at Cho-do. Shortly after she was relieved by HMS St. Brides Bay who took over the inshore patrol. After spending a quiet night patrolling, Cayuga set out for Sasebo where she arrived late on 1 November.
On Taehwa-do

The next Canadian Destroyer to take part in the island campaign was *Athabaskan*. She took over from HMAS *Murchison* in the Cho-do area on the afternoon of 5 November 1951. *Athabaskan* plunged into the thick of things by carrying out a 40-round bombardment of the Amgak batteries. After the bombardment, she brought Lieutenant Beaudette of Sok-do in her motor cutter to brief the ship's officers on the local situation. An operation was planned for the morning of 6 November. *Athabaskan* was to run in towards Amgak. She would then open fire on an inland village some distance from the enemy guns. In the meanwhile *Belfast* (HMS cruiser), with a Shore Fire Control Party on Sok-do, would be lying in wait out of sight behind the island, and a flight of planes from *Sydney* (HMAS carrier) would be orbiting, also out of sight, to seaward.

As soon as the enemy guns opened up on *Athabaskan* she was to retire, at the same time reporting the exact location of the battery to *Belfast*. The planes from *Sydney* and the 6-inch guns of *Belfast* would then the enemy position. *Athabaskan* went in at dawn, anchored under the muzzles of the 76-mm gun on Amgak, and began pounding the village of Kumbong-ni, but the Red gunners stayed underground and made no move that would betray their position.

On completion of the bombardment of the village shifted fire to a beached junk near the tip of Amgak. Still there was no response from the enemy. After the operation, *Athabaskan* rejoined *Belfast* to seaward of Sok-do and embarked from her a quantity of arms and other necessities destined for the garrison at Taehwa-do.

The destroyer set out to deliver these supplies in the evening and was only some 25 kilometers from her destination when *Belfast* radioed that Taehwa-do was being attacked by air and sea. As she closed, *Athabaskan* could see the island outlined by fires burning on the northern slopes and here the crackle of smallarmes fire up in the hills. *Athabaskan* anchored less than three kilometers off Taehwa-do Lighthouse, and the local Leopard agent, Lieutenant A.N. Allan, US Army, came aboard. He reported that the island had been bombed just after dark by nine to eleven four-engined bombers escorted by five or six jet fighter. The bombers had practically wiped out the only village on the island, destroyed an ammunition dump and set afire the islands main food dump. The raid had come as a complete surprise and it was the first enemy air raid since the beginning of the war. But there had been no attempt at invasion. Thereafter *Athabaskan* moved northward to cover the northern approaches to the island in case the enemy
should attempt invasion. A list of targets on enemy-held Ka-do had been provided by Lieutenant Allan, and these were worked over by Athabaskan’s 4-inch guns during the night.

Meanwhile the HMS cruiser Belfast had been steaming northward at full speed, and she came to anchor some 11 kilometers southwest of the island. But the enemy took no further action, and Athabaskan weighed at 0415 to clear the area before daylight. At that time Lieutenant Allan radioed that Athabaskan return to evacuate casualties and pick up him and his party for passage to Paengnyong-do, and so she reversed course to Taehwado. After some delay Lieutenant Allan, his sergeant and a ROK Army interpreter were embarked. The casualties had been moved inland, and it proved impossible to collect them in time. It was growing light when Athabaskan headed southward at 32 knots to deliver her passengers to Leopard headquarters at Paengnyong-do. When Athabaskan arrived at the island, Commander King sent in his Executive Officer and Navigator to confer with Leopard in the hope that he might have information of value for the planning of future operations. A plan was drawn up after the conference, and it worked as smoothly as could be expected. Athabaskan arrived off Taehwado Lighthouse at 2139, but heavy weather to the southward prevented Cayuga, detached from her carrier group to cover Athabaskan, from taking up her covering position until just after midnight. But the wind dropped about 0100 8 November, and Commander King was able to satisfy the guerrillas that it was safe to bring the junk alongside. Loading at last began at 0220, and it took only a little more than an hour to embark the 47 wounded and a ROK nurse who accompanied them. Shortly before 0400 Athabaskan and Cayuga weighed and set course for Paengnyong-do. After escorting Athabaskan, Cayuga returned to the carrier.

Athabaskan arrived at Paengnyong-do at 0850 and, after conferring with Belfast, carried on to land the casualties at Inchon. Shortly after midnight on the 9th she returned to Paengnyong-do, but her hopes for the quiet night at anchor that the CTE had planned for her were rudely quashed by a USAF bomber which crashed and burned on the northern slopes of the island just after the ship arrived. Her cutter was at once lowered to search for survivors, but, fortunately, all but one of the bomber’s crew landed on the island. Athabaskan’s Medical Officer, Lieutenant C. A. West, was put ashore to treat the survivors. CTF 95.12 had decided that each night at least one ship should be assigned to the defense of Taehwado and, in Athabaskan’s absence, Cayuga was again ordered from her carrier screening to carry out this duty during the night of 8-9 November. So after three hours with the carrier Cayuga steamed northward again, conferred at Paengnyong-do with Belfast from whom she picked up an intelligence officer from the British Army, a
ROK communications officer and an interpreter and headed for Taehwa-do. Cayuga came to anchor off the island at 2155 and sent in a party in the motor cutter to consult with the guerillas. When the cutter approached the beach someone opened fire on it. The cutter retaliated with a Bren gun, but was ordered to cease fire by Cayuga. The cutter at last was allowed to go in unmolested. The intelligence brought back by the cutter party was that Taehwa-do's situation was desperate. The garrison consisted of some 750 special troops, with very little ammunition, and food enough for only ten days. The enemy was pressing very hard; the guerilla detachments there were being mopped up or had fled. Even the small islets near the island were said to be in enemy hands.

Cayuga, creeping up to within 1,200 meters of Tan-do and Ka-do, two of the island to the north, lay quietly for several hours to lull the enemy into a false sense of security. Then she opened up at 0345, plastering the troop concentrations with 268 rounds of 4-inch. The enemy response was slow in coming, but at last searchlights began to sweep and flak to burst in the area well to the north of the ship's targets. Shortly thereafter their heavy flak began to burst low over the water some five kilometers astern of Cayuga. Cayuga was never in any danger as she turned and retired, still firing from her stern mounting, to make for Paengnyong-do, and she returned to the command of CTE 95.11 on 9 November.

On 9 November shortly before Cayuga arrived at Paengnyong-do, Commander King of Athabaskan had gone on board Belfast to discuss future operations. It was the consensus that Taehwa-do was indefensible in the present situation. But since the higher command had not decided what should be done about Taehwa-do, all CTE 95.12 could do was to arrange to keep one or two ships near the island during the hours of darkness in the hope that any enemy invasion force would be caught. If the well-trained CCF should get ashore, it seemed likely that they would soon dispose of their guerilla opponents. In the hope of disrupting enemy invasion plans, CTE 95.12 decided to send Athabaskan and bring his own ship, Belfast, north to bombard the islands near Taehwa-do during the night of 9-10 November.

Everything went as planned. Athabaskan arrived off Taehwa-do and Belfast joined with her. The two ships proceeded to bombard Tan-do and Ka-do with high explosive. As had happened during Cayuga's bombardment the night before, the enemy reacted with a display of flak and searchlights over the mainland. Both ships set course back to Paengnyong-do before daylight. Shortly after arrival of the ships at the headquarters island was another conference. A new Leopard, who had just taken over at Paengnyong-do, decided to make an attempt to hold Taehwa-do and Athabaskan was assigned the task of transporting the party. She set out at 0945 along the
Cigarette channel, firing at target of opportunity along the mainland coast. Following the bombardment, Athabaskan returned to Paengnyong-do late in the afternoon to embark passengers and supplies for Taehwa-do.

During the night she carried out her mission of shelling Tan and Ka-do islands and the following day returned to Paengnyong-do. At this time it had been decided to relieve Athabaskan for one night from her usual Taehwa-do patrol mission, so on arrival at the headquarters island the Commanding Officer and Navigator went aboard the relieving ship, the HMS frigate Whitesand Bay, to brief her on the situation. Most of the afternoon was spent in refuelling from Belfast and the remainder of the day in carrying out the routine missions connected with the Chodo-Sokdo patrol. That night of 11–12 November was spent at anchor off Cho-do.

Now that the frigate had taken over the duties of the Cho-do patrol, Athabaskan had a easy time of it for the next two days. However she spent the eights of 12–13 and 13–14 November in Yalu Gulf. On completion of the area patrol on the morning of 14 November, Athabaskan was transferred to TE 95.11. She remained with the carrier force for eight uneventful days before putting into Sasebo on the 23rd to replenish. While the Athabaskan was absent from TE 95.12, Cayuga represented the RCN on the blockade patrol. Cayuga joined the element on the morning of 19 November, when she made contact off Inchon with HMS cruiser Ceylon, who had replaced Belfast as CTE.

Cayuga's assignment for the first few days with TE 95.12 was to make the nightly Taehwa-do patrol. The first night of 19–20 November was uneventful, but on the second night there was a special bombardment. The target was Uri-do, a tiny island north-east of Taehwa-do. The Leopard agents on Taehwa-do, Lieutenant Allan, and his new assistant, Lieutenant Kassering, US Army, set sail in their old motor junk and crept close inshore of Uri-do to direct Cayuga's fire. The Leopard's radio set was not working well that night, and after Cayuga had dropped six rounds on a reported junk concentration communications broke down completely, and the bombardment had to be cancelled. The following afternoon, while en route to Taehwa-do, Cayuga ran into foul weather in the vicinity of Cho-do. She was steaming ahead at high speed. Suddenly she struck a cold front; the temperature dropped fourteen degrees, and the wind rose to gale strength. Steadily the gale worsened, until it became that it would be very risky to attempt to navigate the confined waters off Taehwa-do in such a blow. Fortunately any gale that made the waters around Taehaw-do dangerous for Cayuga would make them completely impassable for an invasion fleet of enemy junks, so the destroyer had no qualms about cancelling the night's
patrol.

The next two days Cayuga spent quietly in the Cho-do area. The night of 23–24 November was spent on patrol north of the 39th again and in the morning she returned to Cho-do. On arrival off Cho-do, Cayuga found the New Zealand frigates Hawea and Taupo at anchor near the northern tip of the island. She closed and discovered from them that the Donkey on Sok-do Lieutenant Beaudette, was planning to make a guerilla landing on the mainland and would welcome naval assistance. Therefore the ship sailed to Sok-do and offered her services. The target of the raid was a battery on the Wolsa-ri Peninsula. The guerillas landed without opposition and pushed rapidly inland. The first call for fire came at 1410 as the raiders encountered the forward enemy defences. The destroyer’s guns helped break this defensive position and the guerillas forged on. Seven calls for supporting fire were answered by Cayuga until 1630 hours, when she had to leave the area for her night mission at Taehwa-do. In the meantime, the guerillas had penetrated almost to the enemy battery, but the resistance was stiffening. And since the New Zealand frigate Hawea, who took over the fire support duties, had only one 4-inch gun, the guerillas were compelled to retire before the opposition became too heavy.

On the other hand, Cayuga, upon leaving Sok-do, took under her command the US destroyer escort Edmonds, who had recently arrived in the area, and the two ships set out through a snow storm for Taehwa-do. There, another operation was being prepared against the enemy on Ka-do, and the two destroyers took over the task of providing gunfire support. Fire support was called for only when the guerillas were landing, when star-shell was required, and again for the withdrawing, when the two ships fired a 70-round covering barrage. Edmonds was detached at 0400 to proceed south, but Cayuga remained until the guerillas were safely on their way back to Taehwa-do. This operation had been a success and one prisoner had been taken. Cayuga joined again Edmonds that morning off Cho-do, and after spending an hour briefing her on the local situation (for Edmonds was to relieve her) she continued southward to Paengnyong-do. There she reported to the CTE 95.13 in Ceylon and then set course for Sasebo where she arrived late on 26 November.

At this time, on 25 November, Athabaskan was just sailing from Sasebo to take her place. (Athabaskan reported to Ceylon at Paengnyong-do on the morning of 27 November.) She was ordered to assume responsibility for the Chodo-Sokdo area from HMNZS Hawea. USS Edmonds was to remain that area.

While her companions on the west coast had been harassing the enemy, Sioux had been also performing a lot of carrier screening work. In early
November she had served only three uneventful days with TE 95.12. But the Canadian destroyer, during the last two weeks had taken part in a combined aerial and gun bombardment against the east coast ports of Hungnam, Wonsan and Chongjin and she had bombarded almost 400 rounds of 4.7-inch at the roads and rail targets in the coastal areas. *Sioux*, on the 28th, was relieved and arrived back at Kure on 30 November.

Returning to the west coast, when *Athabaskan* reached to Cho-do area, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was preparing for an early attack on the islands. So Commander King planned to dispose his ships to cover the possible invasion routes, with USS *Edmonds* near the south-eastern end of Cho-do and *Athabaskan* to the north-east of Sok-do. As *Athabaskan* headed north, she faced a strong wind was blowing from the north-west, whipping up a sea that would make an enemy invasion attempt impossible. There she reversed course to get to lee of Cho-do again and anchored. On the following day, the 28th, *Athabaskan* and *Edmonds* bombarded two targets at the request of Lieutenant Beaudette of Sok-do. *Athabaskan* dropped 64 rounds of 4-inch on an observation post and troop position on Wolsari Peninsula, and the other USS *Edmonds* plastered a gun emplacement in the same area with 48 rounds. The remainder of the day was spent in preparing for the turn-over from *Athabaskan* to *Edmonds* scheduled for the morning.

On the morning of 29 November *Athabaskan* left Cho-do to join the carrier element with which she served for the next two days. On the evening of 30 November, *Athabaskan* was on route from fuelling at Inchon and proceeding to the Bugatti patrol area near the 39th parallel and set course straight for Taehwa-do. At that time there was HM destroyer *Cochade* who had been on the regular Taehwa-do patrol. On passage to the island, *Athabaskan* sighted many junks their way south to safety. Some were stopped for questioning, but the ship had no interpreter aboard and was unable to learn from them what had happened to the UN personnel on the island. When approaching the island, *Athabaskan* saw that Taehwa-do had been a scene of confusion and disaster; fires burned everywhere; the crackle of small-armes’ fire proved grim evidence that the last survivors of the garrison had not been wiped out; small bands of troops could be seen roaming around apparently combing the island. One of these roving bands had the temerity to engage *Athabaskan* with a machine gun and received four rounds of high explosive for pains. A motor junk was sighted to the north of Taehwa-do and was engaged with 4-inch guns and Bofors; several hits were scored and the junk set on fire.

In the afternoon of 1 December 1951 *Athabaskan* returned to Paeng-nyong-do, conferred with the CTE in *Ceylon* and received permission from him
to return to Taehwa-do that night to search for survivors. So after fuelling from Cayuga the destroyer set course northward again. Just after midnight on 2 December, Athabaskan came to anchor 1.5 kilometers south-east of Sojongjok-do, a small islet east of Taehwa-do. All had been prepared and the cutter, carrying an armed party of six led by Lieutenant Commander C.A. Hamer, RCN, was sent in. The cutter cruised for two hours along the shore line, its occupants shouting loudly at intervals to attract attention. But there was no response, and as she had other duties to attend to, the boat was recalled at 0200. She weighed and set course to rejoin the carrier element. The fall of Taehwa-do caused a furor in the UNC and Sasebo. The UN-held islands north of the 38th Parallel were one of the important items on the agenda at Panmunjom. The result was that the high command became very “island conscious” and ordered that every precaution be taken against a repetition of the Taehwa-do affair.

Strengthening of Islands Defense

All steps began to be taken to strengthen the land defenses of the threatened islands. The CTE 95.12 also revised its organization to deal more effectively with the Communist threat to the islands. Its CTU was usually the commanding officer of one of the Canadian destroyers or Bay Class frigates. Task Units were subsequently organized to defend the other major islands; TU 95.12.1 for Cho-do—Sok-do area; TU 95.12.2 for Paengnyong-do; TU 95.12.3 for the Han River islands; and TU 95.12.4 for Yonpyong-do. The Canadian Ships were to see service with most of these units in the ensuing months.

Cayuga was the first Canadian ship to operate in the Cho-do area under the new dispensation, and the ship spent a hectic week after her arrival on 1 December 1951 performing a great variety of duties connected with the new defensive measures. When Cayuga left TE 95.12, her place with the Cho-do defense force was taken by Athabaskan. At that time of Athabaskan's arrival off Cho-do on the morning of 7 December there were HM Ships, Mounts Bay, Witesand Bay and Constance, and US destroyer escort Edmonds, as well as numerous ROKN craft. Athabaskan would lie at anchor at night in her assigned position watching her radar for enemy invasion craft, and throwing the odd round of 4-inch to harass the enemy on the land. During the day she fired about 250 rounds from her main armament at the various targets on the land. Athabaskan spent a very busy day on 9 December helping the ROK Naval vessels evacuate non-combatants from Cho-do. Athabaskan turned over her duties to the Netherlands destroyer Van Galen on the following day and made for Paengnyong-do to report to Ceylon
before leaving for Sasebo.

*Sious* was the second Canadian ship to operate in the Cho-do area, which she reached on 11 December 1951. She took over responsibility for the position in the south-eastern approaches to Sok-do (from which her radar could cover the most likely invasion routes between the island and the closest points on the mainland).

The first few nights of *Sioux*'s patrol were uneventful, and when she took up her usual station on the evening of 15 December there was no indication that the coming night would be any different. However, the enemy chose the night of 15-16 December, when *Sioux* was on duty guarding Sok-do, to make his major attack on the small islands. *Sioux* was informed at about 0315 that enemy mortars were firing on Chongyang-do, and Ung-do, the tiny islands less than five kilometers south-east of Sok-do, and a few moments later the Reds were sloshing over the mudflats to attack. The destroyer at once opened fire, using star-shell to illuminate the flats and HEDA to try to break up their attacking formations. The starshell was of great value to the island defenders, but as communications were disorganized and *Sioux* was firing blindly, the main bombardment was not so effective as it would have been had there been a spotter to control the fire. No information was reaching the ship from the islands, and when dawn came there were no signs of activity on either one. However *Sioux* could not know whether this inactivity meant that the attacks had been repulsed or it meant that all the defenders had been wiped out. So *Sioux*, after returning to what was her usual night anchorage, put an armed party of five under Sub-Lieutenant A. A. T. Henley, RCN, aboard ROK Naval vessel 301 and sent her in to reconnoiter. The ROK vessel found that Ung-do was still in friendly hands, but that Chongyang-do had fallen during the night. During the morning and early afternoon she made two trips to the Ung-do, bringing off refugees and wounded special troops who were taken aboard *Sioux*.

The ROK vessel-AMC 301 came alongside *Sioux* at 1630 hours, again with more wounded. During the afternoon the ROK ship had been operating off Ung-do, whose garrison troops had launched an independent assault on Chongyang-do during the bombardment. The ROK minesweeper AMS 512 arrived at 1730 and took off the noncombatant refugees and some of the wounded from *Sioux* for transfer to Cho-do, but the seriously wounded were retained on board the destroyer for treatment in the sick bay.

Fire was opened again on Chongyang-do at 1800 to prepare for the assault, now scheduled for 1830. At this time the landing was successful, and the attackers secured a foothold on the island. After 1830, when fire
was lifted to allow the assault party to go in, *Sioux* turned her guns on the mainland mortar batteries on Wolsa-ri. The ship was so engaged when at 2207 an urgent call came from the Sok-do garrison saying that the enemy was assaulting the northern end of the island. *Sioux* followed by HMS destroyer *Constance*, at once set off northward, firing star shell and rockets to illuminate the channel between Sok-do and Amgak promontory. It soon became apparent that these waters were completely clear of traffic, and eventually Sok-do, where there was obviously quite a bit of confusion, reported that the invasion warning had been a false alarm.

This invasion alarm served as a diversion for another attack on Ung-do. This attack came as rather a surprise, which had been made at low water across the mudflats, this one was made at high water by troops ferried over in junk. Fortunately, ROK ship (301) was on hand, and thanks to the illumination provided by *Sioux* and *Constance*, was able to sink one junk, thereby making a substantial contribution to the defeat of the invaders. Fortunately, too, the Ung-do garrison troops had intelligent and aggressive leadership, and no sooner had the invaders been beaten back when junks and small boats were launched to carry out a counterattack on Chongyang-do. That island was once again in friendly hands by midnight. AMC 301 provided close support for the counterattack, and *Sioux* assisted by putting down fire on two enemy mortar batteries firing the friendly forces.

The ebbing tide forced the ROK ship 301 to leave the vicinity of Ung-do, and she returned to the destroyer at 0230 on 17 December bringing more wounded for treatment. The ROK ship’s and *Sioux*’s armed party were very tired as they had been fighting hard, and the little vessel’s ammunition was almost exhausted. Therefore the ROK ship remained alongside *Sioux* for the night taking on ammunition and resting her personnel.

The enemy attack came at 0300, as expected, and *Sioux* went into action again, illuminating the danger area and pounding the mudflats and the mortar batteries with high explosive until 0645 when the rising tide had covered the flats. Although *Sioux* did not know it when she left the area that morning at 0815, the enemy attack had been too strong for the defenders, and Ung-do and Chongyang-do were now in Red hands. All the *Sioux*’s passengers, most of them wounded special forces from Ung-do, were removed to HMS cruiser *Ceylon* by boat. After this operation was completed ROK AMC 301 was detached and *Sioux* weighed to join TF 95.11. For the remainder of the month her operational missions were confined to carrier screening.

Three days after *Sioux*’s departure, 20 December, the Canadian destroyer *Cayuga* took over *Sioux*’s old post in the channel between southern Sok-do and Pipa-got (promontory), a channel which became known as “The Slot,” from where she provided star-shell illumination over the invasion routes
and bombarded the enemy on the mainland and on Ung-do and Chongyang-do. The Slot was now becoming a rather dangerous area because of the deadly accuracy of the enemy battery fire from Amgak. Consequently, the ship stationed there had to withdraw a little southward or westward.

The following night after her arrival, 21-22 December 1951, *Cayuga* was stationed in the Slot when a small target, presumably a junk, showed up on the Sperry. The target was making for Chongyang-do, and the range was 5,000 meters from her gun. The splashes of the exploding 4-inch shells showed up clearly on the scan, and the echo made by the second salvo merged with that of the target. Four more two-gun salvoes were fired just to make certain, and when fire was lifted the target echo had disappeared. *Cayuga* gave the enemy a repeat performance on Christmas Eve. This time the target did not disappear, but as it showed up on the scan as an echo one-fifth its original size drifting slowly seaward with the tide, *Cayuga*'s gunners had good reason to believe that their fire had been effective. No illumination was employed on either occasion, and the effect on the enemy, particularly if and survivors got safely to shore, must have been most demoralizing.

But these gun-fire displays were two isolated incidents in a busy patrol. Besides carrying out her normal duties of maintaining a nightly anti-invasion routes, bombarding enemy positions and providing armed boarding parties for ROKN vessels, *Cayuga* engaged in many extra-curricular activities. For more than two days she served as CTU 95.12.1, and twice she acted as Headquarters Ship for the Officer in Tactical Command in the area. On one of these occasions the Commanding Officer of HMS *Mounts Bay*, Captain J.B. Frewen, RN, was acting as CTE 95.12 in the absence of the cruiser and on the other he was the CTU 95.12.1; and as his frigate did not possess the specialists and equipment carried by *Cayuga*, he took advantage of Commander Plomer's suggestion to transfer to the destroyer for the nights of 22-23 and 27-28 December. The arrangement was of great benefit to both the tactical command and *Cayuga*, the former obtaining the use of better command facilities than his own ship possessed and *Cayuga* gaining experience of great value to her specialist staff and indeed to her entire company.

**Operation Cheerful**

During the patrol, *Cayuga*'s most interesting special assignment was the operation on Ung-do and Chongyang-do. Preparation for this operation, known as "Operation Cheerful", began on 24 December 1951. The objective was to retake the two small islands that had fallen to the enemy on the night of 17-18 December during *Sioux*'s last patrol in the Cho-do area. The Cheerful Operation was planned for the evening of 27 December. As soon
as darkness fell, the operation began. ROK AMC 302 took on an armed party from Cayuga, headed for the Sok-do at 1800 and anchored close to the south beach. The control party headed by the leader of the special forces came aboard, bringing radio equipment with which to maintain contact between its elements operating ashore and the command post on Sok-do. The four junks that were to make the assault were taken in tow by the AMC at 1855 and set course for the western tip of Chongyang-do where the first two junks were to go in. The assault junks appeared to be standing up well to the tow, but when the landing force had almost reached its objective area a word was passed to the AMC that one of the junks had sprung a leak and became unseaworthy. This was most unwelcome news as the plan had called for two junks to attack Chongyang-do and Ung-do; now the latter force would have to go in at little better than half strength. There was a short delay while most of the guerillas in the leaking junks were transferred to the remaining three.

At 1930 when AMC 302 was 200 meters from the objective beach at Chongyang-do, the first two junks were slipped to make their way in. Cayuga at this time was saturating the beaches, but there was no sign of enemy opposition. After slipping the junks the ROK vessel edged into within a hundred meters of the shore. But hardly had the first junk reached the sand when the Reds poured fire. The first mortar shell scored a direct hit on the leading junk, killing five men and holing the craft badly. Some of the survivors scrambled ashore; others swam over to the remaining junk. The ROK ship immediately called for fire support from Cayuga, and the surviving junk was able to make the beach without suffering serious casualties.

While the Chongyang raiders were trying to consolidate a beachhead, AMC 302 made for Ung-do to slip the third junk. En route, however, it was decided that in view of the enemy strength on Chongyang-do it would be suicidal for a single load of the special forces to try to take an even larger and better defended island, so course was reversed to return to the original landing beach. The special forces at landing beach had managed to establish a small beachhead. The junk with AMC 302 possessed radio equipment and its occupants were fully informed about the situation and not at all anxious to share the difficulties of their colleagues ashore. Hence when she was slipped and told to go in under covering fire from the AMC, the junk, instead of closing the beach, crept along the shore-line. The AMC closed to try to herd the junk in towards the beach, but she was not to be persuaded and crept in between the beach and the offshore rocks, ignoring the pleas of the special forces commander in the AMC. The AMC soon found herself beyond the western tip of the island and within sight of the mainland, and immediately some enemy guns opened fire on her. Cayuga was informed at once,
and before any damage had been done the guns were silenced. Under this situation there was nothing for it but to allow the reluctant junk to withdraw.

This Operation Cheerful was the last event of any importance during Cayuga’s patrol. During the afternoon of 28 December Cayuga, acting as an Air Control Ship, directed air strikes on Ung-do, and toward the evening she sent her Medical Officer to accompany wounded survivors of the operation who were being taken for further treatment to Paengnyong-do by the hard working AMC 302.

For the next two days little of interest occurred, and Cayuga continued to carry out routine duties in TU 95.12.1. On the morning of 31 December 1951 the Canadian ship was given a special assignment to take Lieutenant Beaudette to Paengnyong-do. After embarking the lieutenant, Cayuga spent New Year’s Eve in the Slot. On New Year’s Day Cayuga proceeded to Taechong-do for fuel, and late in the evening she turned over her duties to the Netherland destroyer Van Galen. Whereupon Cayuga set course for Taehwa-do which she bombarded for ten minutes before turning southward towards Japan. The return of Cayuga to Kure on 4 January, 1952, marked the end of a long period during which the Canadian ships had been engaged chiefly on island defense missions in the Taehwa-do and Chodo-Sokdo area in the western waters. The island defense campaign, however, was by no means over and for the next six months of 1952, the Canadian destroyers were again to be involved in repelling enemy raids and supporting guerilla landings.

Section 5. Mainly in the Haeju-man
(January 1952 - June 1952)

As the war continued among the islands and along the coasts, so did the truce talks at Panmunjom. In January 1952, with agreement on the demarcation line, discussion had turned to arrangements for a ceasefire and to the question of prisoners of war. Last December and January brought abandonment by the UNC of the northern islands, of the right to air reconnaissance over North Korea, and of a previously proposed limitation on Communist rehabilitation of airfields. But with the New Years the sticking point appeared on the question of forced repatriation of prisoners. Despite further U.N. concessions, all progress ceased, while continued enemy pressure against the islands was indicative of no speedy peace.

Through the winter cold and winds and snow, U.N. naval and air operations went on. The Canadian destroyers had also performed their duties of
blockading the enemy coast, harassing the enemy's coastal supply lines and providing gunfire support to the troops holding the seaward ends of the UN front line. During the first half of 1952 the Canadian ships were engaged chiefly in island defense work, usually in the area south of the Hwanghae Promontory below the 38th Parallel, but occasionally in the Cho-do-Sok-do area and also in the east coast, Wonsan and Chongjin.

**Haeju-man Patrol Begins**

During January 1952 the ships of CANDESFE were relatively busy, with *SiouxF* carrying out two carrier screening missions, *Athabaskan* one carrier mission and one east-coast patrol and *Cayuga* one important west coast, inshore patrol. As *Cayuga*’s was the first island-defense patrol carried out by a Canadian ship in the Haeju-man area, and as she was responsible for the initial organization of the Haeju-man naval defense unit, TU 95.12.4, it is necessary to be dilate upon this patrol.

*Cayuga*’s Haeju-man patrol started on 8 January, 1952, when she was
ordered by CTE 95.12 to meet the ROK PC 702 off Ohwa-do, one of the group of islands over the Bay. Contact was made at 1940, and at a long conference the ROK ship’s Commanding Officer informed the Canadians that the Reds in the area were maintaining a vigorous and persistent campaign against the islands all over Haeju-man. The naval forces faced the following problems in these waters; that of defending the remaining friendly islands, helping the guerillas dislodge the invaders from the recently-captured islands and dealing with many refugees. When Cayuga arrived all of Sunwi-do, east of Ohwa-do, was in Communist hands; the civilians from Ohwa-do and tiny Piap-do, south-westward of the island had all been evacuated and only a mere handful of special forces remained to defend the islands.

After a joint conference, Cayuga set out for Yonpyong-do to take over from HMS Tobruk. Having taken over at the island early in the morning of 9 January, she at once took steps to co-ordinate the naval and land defenses of the area. Her first night as CTU 95.12.4 was uneventful, but early on the morning of the 10th, she was ordered to go to the assistance of PC-702 toward the Changnin-do, northwest of Ohwa-do. Cayuga arrived off Changnin-do shortly after 0900 and, in company with PC-702, began to bombard targets on the island. Great care had to be taken not to hit any of the several thousand refugees who had been left behind. The destroyer’s fire was very accurate. Three junks and several boats were demolished; enemy troops suffered many casualties; and a large rice dump was completely destroyed.

For the rest of the day and during the night of 10-11 January Cayuga was busy patrolling the waters between Yonpyong-do, lying at the mouth of the Haeju-man, and the mainland. During the night the ship fired 34 rounds of 4-inch harassing fire on the mainland’s targets. Next day, 11 January, Cayuga left for Taechong-do to refuel from the tanker. Heavy seas prevented the ship from taking on fuel, and towards evening she was ordered inshore to look for a drowned airmen near Changnin-do. She failed to find the airman, but, since she had to remain in the area during the night, she took the opportunity to pay a return call on the enemy battery, sited near Upchori village, which had fired some 50 rounds at her in the previous day. Closing to 8,000 meters, Cayuga plastered the gun position with 64 rounds of 4-inch.

Early next morning Cayuga dashed back to Taechong-do to refuel and then returned to Yonpyong-do. On the 12th at noon, she arrived there and spent the remainder of the day in conferring with the island’s defenders on problems relating to the land defenses. That night Cayuga carried out her usual anti-junk patrol and bombarded more targets on the mainland. The following day was uneventful, as was the ensuing night. At noon on 14
January HMS cruiser *Ceylon* arrived off Yonpyong-do. Having conferred with *Cayuga*'s Commanding Officer, *Ceylon* left to carry out a bombardment of mainland targets suggested by *Cayuga*. *Cayuga*'s motor cutter was used to transport hand grenades brought by *Ceylon* for the island's defenders. On that evening the CTE 95, Rear Admiral G. C. Dyer, USN, flying his flag on USS *Rochester*, had arrived in the area, and a conference for island defense in the Haeju-man area was held in his flagship. The conference had many beneficial results. *Rochester* and her destroyer, USS *Collett*, took part in the nocturnal activities of TU 95.12.4 and joined *Cayuga* in bombarding the mainland. USS LST-516 arrived during the night as a replacement for USS LST-602 and was assigned to anti-junk patrol.

Next morning 15 January, USS LST-742 arrived to evacuate refugees and was at once put to work. Later, three US minesweepers arrived to begin preparing new swept channels for the task unit, and these ships were briefed by *Cayuga*. On the following morning, as *Cayuga* was to be relieved, it was decided to give the enemy a farewell present that night in the form of close range bombardment. When darkness fell, she moved inshore and opened up with 4-inch and Bofors. According to the friendly agents' report, it was said that the enemy troops thought the good-by bombardment by *Cayuga* was an invasion and retreated inland and did not return to their positions until the following night. HMS *Cockade* arrived on the morning of the 16th, to relieve *Cayuga* who then set course for Sasebo, en route to Hong Kong for two weeks of rest and recreation.

**Worthington Patrol**

On the other hand, the Canadian destroyer *Athabaskan* on the east coast contacted the CTG 95.2 and was assigned to Task Element 95.22 which was responsible for the area Chaho to Chongjin. Interdiction of road and rail traffic, at this time, along the coast was the most important task. *Athabaskan*, as a unit of TE 95.33, took an active part in the interdiction against the Songjin-Hungnam railway and bombarded a great variety of targets with 1,292 rounds of 4-inch and 5,830 rounds of Bofors without any opposition. Except for the shore bombardments, the patrol was uneventful.

After spending four days replenishing at Sasebo from 21 to 24 January, *Athabaskan* set out on a carrier screening mission to the west coast with USS carrier *Badoeng Strait*. The carrier accompanying US ships *Radford* and *Fletcher* (destroyers escort), with HMCS *Athabaskan* on the screen, began flying operations in the Yellow Sea on the morning of 26 January. That evening, after a day of uneventful screening, *Athabaskan* was detached to carry
out a Worthington in the waters north of Paengnyong-do in support the USS LSMR-401. During this period, the threatened points in the area were two islands of Yuk-do, north of Changsan-got Peninsula, and Wollae-do, west of the island. Athabaskan was assigned to protect them from enemy invasion, and occupied herself with bombarding targets on the mainland, sailing at dawn to refuel at Taechong-do before returning to the carrier.

On the night of 29-30 January it was again Athabaskan's turn to do a Worthington. Nothing had happened during the two nights that Radford and Fletcher had patrolled with TU 95.12.2, but the evidence was piling up that the enemy intended to attack the two islands sooner or later. Athabaskan spent the night illuminating the waters inshore of the islands and in bombarding mainland targets to disrupt invasion preparations. She fired fifty-one rounds of star-shell and 110 rounds of high explosive. Athabaskan was directed to remain until the morning of the 3rd, since the Task Element 95.11 was under orders to sail far to the southward to support a convoy. She occupied herself in illuminating the waters between Yuk-do and the mainland with 59 rounds of star-shell and in bombarding invasion targets. At dawn she cruised the south shore of the peninsula, firing at targets of opportunity near the coast.

After taking on fuel at Taechong-do on the 2nd February, Athabaskan had faithfully performed the duty to harass targets on the mainland along the south shore of Changsan-got Peninsula. At dusk she took up her night position south-west of the southern tip of Yuk-do while her companion, US LSMR-401, stationed herself to the south-west. After dark the both ships began to illuminate the danger area with star-shell and to bombard nearby targets. The enemy battery that had engaged Athabaskan during the afternoon was returned by an additional 60 rounds of 4-inch.

Athabaskan spent the next few days quietly, screening the carrier while the US destroyers took their turns ranging the waters around Yuk-do and Wollae-do. Both the US destroyers escort (Radford & Fletcher) spent very busy Worthington patrols, bombarding the mainland and the recently-captured Yuk-do and supporting rangers, attempts to retake the island.

When Athabaskan's turn came around again on the evening of 5 February, the status of Yuk-do was still in doubt, but she was unable to get any reliable information about the military situation on Yuk-do. At last Athabaskan was ordered to leave for a new night station off Mahap-do. The island is situated about 30 kilometers due east of Paengnyong-do and less than one and a half kilometers from the mainland. As with all other little islands lying so close to enemy territory, it was impossible for naval vessels to protect it against raids carried out in darkness, but the attempt had to be made.
Shortly after dark on 5 February, *Athabaskan* arrived off the island and remained all night illuminating the channel between the island and the mainland with star-shell. The night passed without incident, and in the morning the destroyer refuelled at Taechong-do and returned to the carrier. This was the final Worthington of the mission. It had been by far the most eventful carrier assignment *Athabaskan* had ever carried out.

**Sioux's Last Mission**

*Sioux* completed her second tour on 12 February when she turned over to *Nootka* at Sasebo before sailing for home on the 14th. Her last mission had been an inshore patrol from 29 January to 11 February in CANDESFE's old stamping ground, around Cho-do and Sok-do.

During this period, *Sioux*, day after day when conditions were suitable, bombarded the mainland, concentrating on troops billets and gun and mortar positions. The US destroyer *Proterfield*, one of *Sioux*'s colleagues, was hit on 3 February by the enemy coastal battery on the mainland opposite Cho-do, and also ROK AMC-304, serving under her orders, was taken under fire by the Red's guns, but the destroyers and ROK vessel silenced them before any damage was done.

*Sioux*, earlier in this patrol, had carried out an usual operation. On the afternoon of 8 February one of the USAF Rescue Detachment members on Cho-do was taken sick and required immediate medical care. *Sioux* was unable to send a boat in with her Medical Officer due to the ice conditions, so it was decided to bring the patient out to the ship by helicopter. But the man was too ill to be lowered from the airplane in the usual manner and it was necessary to improvise sort of flight deck on *Sioux*. Such an operation had never before been attempted, but it was quickly done; the deck head of the squid-handling room was propped up with timbers, the top cleared of all obstructions, and there was an adequate landing platform. After two test landings, the helicopter carrying the patient came in and landed safely. Her Medical Officer diagnosed the patient's illness as appendicitis and so the ship steamed south despatch and transferred him to *Ceylon* (HMS cruiser) who possessed better facilities than herself. Eventually, the man was out of danger.

*Sioux* before completing the last patrol of her second Korean tour on the morning of 11 February, opened her final bombardment of some enemy bunkers on the mainland opposite Cho-do. The Parthian shot marked *Sioux*'s 3570th shell. Just after the good-bye bombardment, *Sioux* set course southward arrived, at Sasebo on the following day.
Chiefly in Cho-do and Sek-do Area

After **Sioux**’s leaving for home, throughout the period to March 1952, there was a relatively uneventful period for the ships of CANDESFE, except for **Athabaskan**’s tour of duty as CTU in the Haeju-man during the first eight days of the month and a similar tour by new-comer **Nootka** during the last five. **Athabaskan** took over as CTU for the period 25 February to 8 March, and her patrol was uneventful. **Athabaskan** was relieved on 8 March by **HMS Cossack**, and she set course for Hong Kong for a two weeks’ visit by way of Kure. The ship’s companies had not enjoyed overnight leave since the ship’s call at Pearl Harbor in August 1951.

The latest member of CANDESFE, **Nootka** (Commander R. M. Steele), returning for her second tour in Korean waters, was sent straight out on island defense missions on 15 February. After a night patrolling the Worthington area off Paengnyong-do, **Nootka** joined the Chodo-Sokdo task unit. At this time her duty with the task unit was relatively uneventful. But she had more trouble with the pack ice in the straits between the islands and the mainland than with the enemy. **Nootka** had served with the TE 95.11 from 23 February to 4 March. During the time she took more than her share of the Worthington patrols. The whole of the month of March 1952 was uneventful for the Canadian ships. Except for **Athabaskan**’s tour of duty as CTU in the Haeju-man during the first eight days of the month and a similar tour by **Nootka** during the last five, the Canadian destroyers spent the rest of their operational time on carrier screening.

Through the next three months of April, May and June 1952, while the situation at Panmunjom was in still deadlock, the Canadian destroyers carried on operations much as in the preceding months. But they found that there was now considerably more activity on the west coast both by the friendly special forces and by the enemy. **Nootka**’s tour as CTU in the Haeju-man area during the last five days of March, which ended on 10 April, has already been touched on, and it was the only Haeju-man patrol carried out by a Canadian destroyer during the month. The other Canadian ship, **Cayuga**, served with the Cho-do unit from the 6th to the 16th, April. Throughout the rest of April the only missions undertaken by the Canadian ships were with the carrier force of TE 75.11 on the west coast, but, though these missions involved the ships in a great many Worthington patrols among the inshore islands, no incident of any particular interest occurred.

During the next month, May, the Canadian ships were active enough, but none of them was involved in any notable operation. **Cayuga**, from 10 to 18 May, carried out a patrol with the Cho-do unit, the last one of her second
The Naval Force

Korean tour. During this period she conducted the usual nightly anti-invasion patrols and shelled enemy positions on the mainland. At that time Cayuga operated close inshore to try to entice enemy batteries to reveal their positions, but there was only one enemy gun which fired three ineffective rounds at her. Cayuga fired the last shell of her second Korean tour on the morning of 18 May and set out for Japan. During her second tour, as during the first, she had earned a well-deserved reputation for aggressiveness and all-round efficiency, and many and complimentary were the messages she received when she left the theater.

Then, before she left for home, the Commodore J. C. Hibbard, RCN, visited the Canadian destroyers in the Far East, and he spent several days in Cayuga during her Cho-do patrol. At this time he not only accompanied the ship when she went about her regular duties of patrolling and bombarding, but he also paid an official visit to Cayuga's old friend, the ROK AMC-302, who had served with Cayuga often during the destroyer's patrols in the Cho-do area. His courtesy call on the ROK vessel must be credited with promoting the already very friendly relations existing between the ships of CANDESFE and those of the ROK Navy.

On the other hand, while Athabaskan carried out a full patrol mission in the Eastern Sea as CTU of the Paengnyong unit, TU 95.12.2, Nootka performed the most noteworthy patrol duty of the period, from 28 May to 9 June. Nootka arrived off Yang-do, north-east of Songjin, on 28 May to relieve HMAS Warramunga with TE 95.22, which consisted of the Australian destroyer and the four US Ships including Endicott and Thomason (Destroyers). At this time, the interdiction campaign against the coastal railway was still the most important of the task element's duties. But then the enemy coastal batteries were becoming increasingly aggressive. In March two US ships had been hit; in April the damage figure augmented to six; in May to seven ships.

Nootka's first encounter with these enemy shore batteries came on the morning of 30 May. She had been shelling gun positions in the Kyongsong area below Chongjin for about half an hour and had just shifted fire to a large junk full up on the beach when the enemy guns sited along the coast opened fire simultaneously. The fire was fast and accurate. The salvos were even closer to her. The Canadian ship went full speed ahead, turning and twisting to avoid the fall of shot while she made smoke to cover the withdrawal of Thomason who was also under heavy fire. Fortunately, neither was hit.

Nootka again, on 1 June, came under enemy fire from batteries south of Chongjin, but this was a trivial affair. During the daylight hours of her patrol, she cruised up and down along the coast from Hungnam to Chongjin, pounding away at the coastal railroad, shore battery positions,
beached junks and sampans and other targets. At night she operated even closer to shore, watching for fishing craft and delivering her nightly quota of harassing fire on the land. During this patrol period, Nootka fired well over 2,000 rounds from the main armament alone.

The remainder of Nootka's mission was routine, and on 9 June she was relieved by HMS Constance. Upon relief, Nootka set course for Hong Kong for two weeks of rest by way of Sasebo. On 12 June HMCS Iroquois (Commander W.M. Landymore, RCN) arrived in Sasebo to take the place of Cayuga who had left on the first for home. She remained in Sasebo until 23 June and for the remainder of the month served on an uneventful patrol with carrier on the west coast, USS Bataan.

**Final Operation by Athabaskan**

On the other hand, Athabaskan, while she was CTU 95.12.4 from 8 to 16 June, had carried out the most interesting and eventful patrol mission during the month. At that time the Athabaskan was almost continually in action; repelling an enemy raid, breaking up an invasion, supporting a landing by friendly special forces and, in general, dashing about firing her guns in all directions.

On first night of 8 June, she rode lying at anchor off Taesuap-do, in the upper estuary in Haeju-man when tracer fire was observed in the vicinity of Mu-do. It was a indication that Mu-do was being attacked by sea. So HMCS Athabaskan immediately sailed to the island to rescue. However, the enemy raiding force already was repulsed by the 40 or so garrison troops on the island. And so the destroyer, before withdrawing, bombarded the mainland opposite Mu-do with 667 rounds of 40-mm to chill the enemy raider's morale.

But the raiding force tried again on the night of the 10th. At this time Athabaskan was at night station east of Mu-do. However, a few seconds later tracer fire was seen in the direction of Yongmae-do, a tiny island near Mu-do. She was faced with a choice of whether it was the real or feint attack. Yongmae-do was strongly held, but it could be reached at low tide. The fact that Yongmae-do was a much more important island than Mu-do tipped the scales in its favour, and she set course eastward, firing starshell over the channel separating Mu-do from the mainland as she withdrew in order to mislead the enemy into thinking that a UN ship was standing by.

When Athabaskan reached the island, she was informed that there was a strong body of enemy troops on Kobuk-som, an island near Yongmae-do. Her forty rounds of 4-inch dispersed these troops. However, she could get no closer to Yongmae-do because of the low water and had to content herself
The Naval Force

with illuminating the mudflats for the benefit of the islander’s defenders. At 0023 on the 11th a flareship (a bomber carrying flares for illumination) arrived and remained throughout the night, taking over illumination duties from Athabaskan. The attack had been repulsed by 0330. The shelling of Mu-do turned out to be a feint and no attack on the island developed.

On the next night of 11-12 June the enemy tried to attack Yongmae-do, but HMC Ceylon, who was in the area, provided all the naval gun-fire necessary to hold the defenders. The Red’s last attack in the area came on the night of 12-13. This time Athabaskan was again involved and was able to put down some very effective fire because of the efficient communications link between friendly troops on Yongmae-do and the ship. A flareship again arrived and took over illumination duties from Athabaskan. By about 0230 of the 13th, this last raid was completely repulsed.

The Athabaskan moved to a new station north-west of Sosuap-do, deep into the estuary on the night of the 13th. At this time HMS Cosmos was patrolling Yongmae-do, the ROK PC-701 was guarding Mu-do and another ROK AMC-301 was watching Yonpyong-do. The reason for Athabaskan’s forward position was that some friendly 300 guerillas were to raid on the peninsula north of Sosuap-do. Athabaskan was to provide fire support during the hours of darkness, with ROK AMC-301 joining in to render close support. The landing was not made until 0600 due to the tide, wind and the guerillas, temperament. Meantime, she had been softening up the landing area while planes from the carrier wheeled overhead ready to crush any attempt to oppose the landing force. ROK AMC-301 had also arrived and assumed a posture of standing by at the nearest distance from the beach. The friendly force landed without difficulty and the special troops dashed. The carrier planes quickly destroyed the enemy mortars.

Athabaskan was in radio contact with the assaulting force. This assault had been successfully carried out, despite the late arrival and early withdrawal. The Canadian ship and the carrier planes had inflicted 60 casualties on the enemy and the friendly troops had killed another seven. In addition, they had rescued 20 civilians and two junks, 35 bags of rice and other supplies. The friendly force’s cost was only wounded. After this operation the Reds made no further attacks on the friendly islands during the remainder of her patrol.

The next two days, 15th-16th June, the Canadian destroyer were spent in comparative peace. Athabaskan, during the period from the 8th to 16th, had fired a total of 1,607 rounds of 4-inch and 2,231 rounds of 40-mm. On the morning of 16 June, after this operation, Athabaskan was relieved by HMS Amethyst and went back to Sasebo harbor en route for home. On the 21st after the arrival of her relief, HMCS Crusader, Athabaskan had already
started on her way to Canada.

Immediately before her departure, on the 20th, Commander King turned over the command of CANCOMDESFE to Iroquois’s Commander Landymore.

Section 6. Stalemate on Western Waters
(July - December 1952)

The Canadian destroyers continued to operate mainly on the west coast defending the friendly islands and screening the carriers. Taking a birdseye view of the last six months of 1952, the Western waters front showed the tendency to become more stable as the friendly special troops strengthened their hold on the islands and the Reds consolidated their defenses along the coast. Such stabilization resulted in less work for the naval forces on the area. Accordingly, it brought an increase the number of enemy shore batteries and made inshore patrolling more dangerous than before.

Assault Operation

The new-comer HMCS Crusader, immediately after her arrival at the Korean battle front, was assigned to TU 95.12.1 and carried out her first inshore patrolling for two weeks in the Cho-do area. This patrol was uneventful. Sometimes she received assignments that broke the regular routine; Crusader provided gun fire support for the USN minesweepers Redhead and Swallow in the Cigarette Channel route from Chodo to Changsan-got Point and in the Taedong Estuary. Twice during this patrol period she was also assigned to the recently-instituted Jaguar patrol (night patrolling for guarding the little islet of Nap-do, the most southern island in the Yalu Gulf—it was at this time the only west-coast island north of the 39th Parallel still in friendly hands). At this time the Canadian destroyer Crusader bombarded several of the nearby Communist-held islands without opposition.

Having been relieved on the morning of 22 July, Crusader sailed for Kure, where she spent the remainder of the month. During the whole month the ships of CANDESFE carried out only two inshore patrols. The rest of the time they occupied in carrier screening. During these screening missions very incidents worth recording occurred.

HMCS Iroquois got closer to coming to grips with the enemy than any other Canadian ship. On the evening of the 28th Iroquois was detached from the carrier group and joined TU 95.12.2 for Worthington patrols. On the
night of that day the CTU HMNZS Taupo detected a group of enemy junks making for Paengnyong-do and managed to sink them before they scattered. HMCS Iroquois without delay hurried to the scene, but she was unable to find even a single one of them throughout the night. However, Taupo had apparently struck a blow on the Communists, for they never again attempted an invasion of Paengnyong-do.

Another inshore patrol during July was performed by Nootka. She had served as CTU 95.12.4 in the Haeju-man area from 19th of July to 6th of August. At this time the enemy artillery assumed the offensive against the friendly islands and the UN naval ships. The Canadian Naval destroyer Nootka came under fire more than seven times, but, fortunately she sustained no hits.

The UN forces, meantime, sent intelligence parties ashore every night and also made an occasional large-scale raid. Nootka was also involved in one such raid and moved into her supporting position deep in the Haeju-man area. This raid was aimed at the peninsula opposite the Haeju port with a view to capturing prisoners and destroying military installations. This operation was to have begun at 2130 on 24 July, but the two motor junks that were to tow the sail craft of the assault force had decided to leave earlier that evening to pick up some stores at Kanghwa-do. Fortunately, the ROK Naval vessel, AMC-302 was serving with TU 95.12.4 at the time, and so the AMC was involved in the operation. The raid was two and a half hours behind schedule when the ROK AMC-302 set out from Yonpyong-do towing a long column of eleven sailing junks loaded with guerilla raiders.

Meantime HMCS Nootka's radar, at that time, picked up a junk lying near the path the assault force would have to take. Nootka's motor cutter manned by an armed party from her was launched and closed the junk at a distance, whereupon her liaison officer politely informed the enemy that they were in an untenable position and had better surrender. The junk was arrested without resistance. The five members of the crew, armed with rifles, automatic weapons and grenades, were captured.

At this time the assault force approached her position and kept well to the north of the channel, away from the landing beaches. But suddenly a strong tide was flowing, and the junks drifted towards the Haeju jetties to the northward. An enemy gun on the mainland opened fire, but, fortunately, all the rounds fell far short. The field gun soon ceased fire. Working frantically the ROK AMC-302 managed to round up her junks and again set course for the break-off position. Three times in succession this happened and each time the wind and tide set the force a little closer to the Haeju jetties. At last at 0315 the landing was cancelled. Eventually, the whole assault force was brought out safely and returned to Yonpyong-do.
After the abortive raid HMCS *Nootka* occasionally carried out bombardments to silence enemy batteries firing on the friendly islands. On the 5th August the Canadian destroyer *Nootka* turned over her missions on the Haeju to HMS *Concord* and returned to Kure, where she whiled away the three-week recess.

August was uneventful for the ships of CANDESFE. All three destroyers had spent most of the time screening carriers and with exercises. In particular, they spent some five days during the month exercising with USN and British Navy ships on the east coast.

**Operation Siciro**

After the beginning of September all of the Canadian ships were employed on inshore patrolling. These inshore patrols were more exciting than in the previous months. Occasionally one of them involved in one tour with west-coast carrier and in east-coast patrol. HMCS *Iroquois*, as CTU 95.12.4, carried out the first inshore patrol in the Haeju-man area during the first two weeks of the month. Her patrol was off the mainland opposite Mu-do, but the major event was a large-scale raid performed by the special forces from Yongmae-do supported by *Iroquois*, HM Cruiser *Belfast* and the USS Sicily's planes.

Since the failure of the raid in August the spirits of the special forces had been low, and the so-called "Operation Siciro"—designated in the combination names of Sicily and Iroquois—was undertaken for the purpose of restoring their morale. The initial bombardment was opened by *Iroquois* and HMS *Belfast* (CTE 95.12) at 0230 on 10 September. Their guns rained shells upon the enemy positions in the assault area. The fire was directed by the shore fire-control team and was very effective. The friendly troops left the junks at 0400 and went slowly inland. Throughout the period of the assault and withdrawal the Canadian destroyer *Iroquois* and HMS *Belfast* had always prompt and accurate fire support. At 0620 USS carrier Sicily's airplane appeared in the area and strafed the disorganized enemy forces. The assaulting force got on board its junks by 0830 and headed for Yongmae-do. The "Operation Siciro" was a huge success compared to most other raids. During this assault the friendly force had only four men slightly wounded, while the enemy's casualties amounted to about 400. In addition, three friendly agents captured earlier were rescued and brought back from enemy hands. After the Operation Siciro, *Iroquois* was relieved by HMS *Bride's Bay* on 14 September sailed to screen HMS *Ocean*. 
Crusader and Nootka in Cho-do area

On the other hand, the other Canadian destroyers, Crusader and Nootka, had served in the beaten path, Cho-do area, from 9 to 20 and from 20 to 30 September, respectively. Crusader's inshore patrol was uneventful, but Nootka, who relieved her on the 20th had a little excitement. On the 26th Nootka detected a foreign craft with her radar. The stranger might have been laying mines out in the Cigarette Channel.

It called for a minesweeper to check sweep the area. USS Defense arrived on the evening and performed a through check. But nothing was found. Nevertheless, the Canadian ship Nootka picked up a radar contact near the place where the junk had driven ashore on the previous night. And she quietly moved into position to check the craft, if it should again move out into Cigarette Channel. Then she put on speed and rapidly closed what turned out to be a large junk with unusually low free-board. The terrible threats of the ROK interpreter that the junk would be blown out of the water if it did not reverse course proved effective, and the craft altered around. As it did so, small dark objects began to drop from the junk's stern and float towards Nootka, who reversed engines and set up a wash that kept them clear of the ship. When it was found that these strange objects showed up well on the radar, she drew off to some 1,800 meters, illuminated the junk, and put several rounds of Bofors into it.

An armed party was set off on a motor cutter to investigate the floating blobs, and as the party approached the nearest one its members saw that it contained what appeared to be a human body with its feet sticking up in the air. A flash-light was turned on, revealing a NKCF officer sitting in a large, inflated tube and about to open fire with a submachine-gun. But the NKCF had been blinded by the light in his eyes. The Communists opened fire, but to no avail. The junk was towed to sea for examination later. After daybreak Nootka returned to pick up survivors and managed to retrieve all five, two lieutenants and three petty officers of NKCF. They had discarded their weapons. They were given warm baths, clean clothing, hot rum toddies and cigarettes. This service moved the prisoners profoundly and one of them became very co-operative and divulged much valuable information. After this event the Canadian destroyer Nootka remained with the Cho-do unit for two days and she stood by to prevent the enemy artillery from interfering with the minesweeping. On the morning of 1 October Nootka left to join the carrier element.
Iroquois Had a Great Misfortune

In the meanwhile, the Canadian ship Iroquois assigned to the east-coast patrol took over from HMS Charity as Commander Task Element 95.22 on 28 September and performed routine patrols for the first few days to become familiar with the waters. At this time Nootka carried out several bombardments but was not engaged with the enemy. And HMS Charity, before handing over to Iroquois, had already destroyed the train and railway line near Songjin; since then the carrier planes of TF 77 and the ships of TE 95.22 had succeeded in blocking the rail line by shelling and bombing. But on 2 October, TF 77 was replenishing and could not send planes, and so the blocking duty on the railway line fell upon the destroyers. At that time the TE 95.22 consisted, besides Iroquois, of the USS destroyers -- Walker, Marsh Naifch -- and two ROK torpedo vessels, etc. One of the three USS destroyers, Marsh, spent the morning preventing the enemy repairs crews from working on the cut, but came under fire several times from nearby shore batteries. Iroquois, in the afternoon of the 2nd October, went to assist her. Twice she steamed in to bombard the cut, with Marsh in company to provide fire support, should the shore batteries again intervene. Iroquois had completed her second run-in and altered the course of the ship to withdraw when the enemy came in to action. At this moment Iroquois was hit by the third shot of the Red gunners. The enemy shells struck on the starboard side and exploded abreast of “B” gun. Unfortunately, Lieutenant-Commander John L. Quinn, RCN, and Able Seaman Elburne A. Baikie were killed instantly; Able Seamen Wallis M. Burden, Edwin, M. Jodoin and Joseph A. Gaudet were severely wounded; eight other men were slightly injured. They were Petty Officers Emilien Fortin, Edward Moslin, and Gerald Jamieson, and Able Seamen Gilbert Dynna, Eugene Riley, Walter Wrigley, Waldo Bergghen and Aime Adams. At full speed she zigzagged to get out of range and suffered no more hits.

Nootka’s medical officer, Surgeon Lieutenant D. W. Brooks and his assistant, Petty Officer Fortin, in spite of his wound, went into action at once to treat the wounded. But one of the seriously wounded, Able Seaman Burden, died from his critical wound. October 1952 was the most tragic month for the Canadian destroyers in Korea. The three dead and the two seriously wounded able seamen were transhipped to the oiler USS Chomung leaving for Japan.

The war dead were buried on 8 October, in the Commonwealth Cemetery at Yokohama, Japan, with full naval honors. Iroquois' ship companies,
officers and men from Crusader bore the dead to their last resting place and fired the farewell salute over the graves. Besides the Crusader Party, among these attending were many representatives of the armed forces and governments of Canada and Britain. Even after the event, Iroquois remained with TE 95.22 for another eleven days, and on 14 October she was relieved by USS Carmick. On the same day HMCS Crusader arrived and Iroquois sailed for Sasebo.

The Canadian destroyer Crusader, following the Iroquois, had been chiefly patrolling on Package area (East-coast line from Songjin to Chaho above Hungnam) during the remainder of October. Of course, she had not been occupied entirely with train hunting during her east-coast patrol. Indeed, this activity had taken up only a small portion of her time with TE 95.22. Crusader, during daylight, had carried out a good many bombardments of interdiction targets, gun positions, villages occupied by enemy troops and many other objectives. During night time she had been assigned to escort minesweepers, who now did much of their work at night; sometimes her task had been to protect the Yang-do Group, islands above Songjin, from the Communist raiders. All of Crusader's patrol was highly successful; she had efficiently carried out every her allotted task, and her gunnery had been exceptional.

Alternations

In the meantime, the Canadian destroyer Nookta on the west coast had served the first two weeks of October with the carrier element and the last week with the Chodo unit. In particular, she provided gun-fire support for the USS Condor and Competent (minesweepers) at the Cigarette Channel south of Cho-do on 26 October. Nookta's supporting fire went on for three days, and this time except for a few minor bombardments, she had a fairly quiet time with the Cho-do unit. On the morning of 30 October Nookta was relieved by HMAS Condamine and left for Yonpyong-do to take over command of the Haeju-man unit.

Nookta's mission in Korea was drawing to a close. Her last tour of mission had been performed as CTU with Haeju-man unit from 30 October to 5 November. Particularly on the morning of 2 November, some 200 friendly special troops from Sunwi-do made a raid on the mainland peninsula opposite the north-east of the island, cleared it of enemy troops and withdrew again after six hours. Throughout this operation, Nookta, besides providing her gun-fire support, had on several occasions silenced enemy batteries which were firing on the friendly-held islands and on ROK vessels attached to the unit.
November 1952 saw two of the Canadian destroyers leave Korea for home. The first one was HMCS Nootka, who returned to Sasebo on 6 November and sailed three days later for Hong Kong on the first leg of her passage home. The other ship was Iroquois. She, after spending the first two weeks of November at Hong Kong, had joined the screening carrier on the west coast, chiefly off Haeju-man area and at Cho-do, from 17 to 21 November. And on the following day the destroyer sailed for Sasebo for the voyage home. The new comer, HMCS Haida (Commander Dunn Lantier, RCN) relieved Nootka in Sasebo on the 12th, and the old timer, HMCS Athabaskan, back for her third tour in the theater, was now commanded by Commander J.C. Reed, RCN, who took over as Commander, Canadian Destroyers, Far East from Commander Landymore of Iroquois.

The new HMCS Haida, after a week in Sasebo storing and carrying out maintenance, was assigned to a west-coast carrier screening mission. The carrier work was, as usual, uneventful, though the destroyer was twice detached to the Paengnyong-do and the Cho-do unit. Haida returned to her naval base, Sasebo, on 29 November without engaging with the enemy. Her regular patrol began on the east coast on 3 December. Although this was the first time Haida had served on the east coast, she performed the duties of inshore interdiction and blockade most efficiently. During this period HMCS Haida took her turn at all the routine patrols: the Windshield patrol from Yang-do to Chahoe, the Northern patrol from Yang-do to the north of Chongjin and the Sweet Adeline patrol guarding the Yang-do Group from night raiders.

The most interesting of Haida's duties was train-busting. The first opportunity came on the night of 17-18 December, when HMCS Haida was lying in wait off south of Chahoe (Package Four area). At this time her gunners got off 53 rounds of 4-inch and 31 rounds of 3"/50 caliber, but the train continued on its way. One more chance knocked on the night of the following day. This time Haida was at Package Two, the coast area below Songjin. At 0259 a north-bound train came into sight and the ship's gunners were right on the target, and the star-shell showed the train had been stopped. HMCS Haida had poured high explosive into the target for some fifteen minutes. When the smoke had lifted a little, eight to ten box cars littering the track came into sight, but there was no sign of the locomotive, and it was assumed that it had escaped. Her intermittent bombardment continued until 0516 hours when she left the area. Haida spent her last night with TE 95.22 on the Sweet Adeline patrol. Next day, 20 December, Haida set sail for Japan upon the arrival of her relief, HMAS Anzac.

In the meantime, on the west coast during December, only one of the Canadian destroyers performed an inshore patrol. It was HMCS Crusader.
CANADIAN NAVY IN EASTERN SEA

MANCHURIA

KOREA

Coastal railway
Northern Patrol Area

TE 95·22

Package 1
Package 2
Package 3

Yang-do

Songjin

Tanchon

Iwon

Chabo

Package 4

Mayang-do

Hamhung

Package 5

Hungnam

Ho-do Pen

Kalma Pen

Wonsan

EASTERN SEA

Sketch Map 8

1 : 2,000,000

0  20  40  60km
She had served with the Cho-do unit, TU 95.12.1, from 30 November to 8 December, but the vicious weather made their work troublesome. During her patrol the enemy was abnormally quiet. However, one incident occurred on the night of 5-6 December, when four enemy aircraft bombed Cho-do and Sok-do. Her radar detected them approaching the ship. Crusader opened fire with her 4.5's and they altered away. The planes dropped their bombs on the islands, but they caused neither casualties nor damage. At last, they retired northward. HMCS Crusader was the only ship in the task unit to open fire. On the morning of the 8th she detached from the unit to screen USS Carrier Badoeng Strait for ten days. At this time intelligence reports indicated the enemy was massing troops on the mainland opposite the islands, but nothing happened. On 18 December Crusader sailed to Kure for the next ten days.

The old timer, Athabaskan, remained with Badoeng Strait from 7 to 17 December, except for three Whitbread patrols -- Haeju-man area -- undertaken on the nights of the 8th, 11th and 15th. These three patrols were in the Cho-do area and all were uneventful. When the USS carrier was relieved, Athabaskan sailed to Kure on 8 December to observe Christmas with her companies, Haida and Crusader.

For the first time since the beginning of the Korean War, the ships of CANDESFE could spend Christmas 1952 together in the naval base. But two of three destroyers were once more on patrol before the end of the year.

Section 7. Train-Busting on the East Coast
(January - July 1953)

The New Year found the land situation still static. But the stalemate continued; the crews had to be trained; the Reds, ensconced in the northern half of the peninsula, had to be harassed. Day after day the US F-86s went up to the Yalu, UN Air Force fighter-bombers and carrier aircraft swept over the whole of North Korea, the UN vessels continued on patrol, mines were swept.

While all these events were taking place during the last six months of the war, the Canadian destroyers continued carrier screening and inshore patrols on the west coast. These missions, as usual, were relatively uneventful. However, occasionally east coast patrols were more active. During the last period, they had acted to the best of their gunnery skill, particulary in the exciting game of train-busting.
Train-hunting Operation

At the beginning of 1953, HMCS Athabaskan and Crusader had operated on the west coast. This time, on 1 January, the system of numbering the task units on the west coast was changed, and the Cho-do unit became TU 95.1.4, the Paengnyongdo unit TU 95.1.5 and the Haeju-man unit TU 95.1.6. On New Year's day, Athabaskan joined TU 95.1.4 and Crusader the carrier. Athabaskan's life with the Cho-do unit was quiet until the 7th, but when she returned for another Cho-do assignment on 16 January, Athabaskan went through the difficulty encountered with the floating pack-ice. On the morning of the 18th Athabaskan were lying at anchor north of Cho-do when the ice suddenly moved in on her. Owing to the incident, she lost her starboard anchor and four shackles of cable, and extricated herself with great difficulty. This trouble restricted the destroyer in her patrol activities. But Athabaskan did her best to recover the lost anchor and cable. She finally, with the USS fleet tug, Quapaw, managed to recover her lost gear on the afternoon of 22 January. On that afternoon she was ordered to sail to join screen of HMS Glory. On the other hand, HMCS Crusader carried out only one operational mission from the 1st to the 11th, and Haida, two 10-day patrols during January.

The following month, February, saw slightly more remarkable events than January. It was because two of the destroyers, Crusader and Athabaskan, were involved in the train-busting on the east coast. Crusader, from 28 January to 9 February, took part in a train-hunting operation, but she did not even see a train. However, she was lucky on her last day. On 9th February Crusader happened to spot an enemy truck hurtling down a road near the coast opposite Yang-do and, using her 4.5-inch gun, she stopped it and dispersed its passengers with a few rounds of air-burst. On 9 February she was relieved by HMS Cockade and returned to Sasebo next day.

Athabaskan took the second one, from 14 to 27 February, carrying out an east coast patrol. At this time she took the Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral E. R. Mainguy, on board. Admiral Mainguy was making his first visit to the Korean theater. The Canadian destroyer ranged the east coast on interdiction missions for two days, waiting for a train to appear. Nothing was seen, but on the 18th Athabaskan, on route to TF 77 to escort Admiral Mainguy to its fast carrier, saw a Panther jet crash into the sea some three kilometers ahead of her position. Steaming at full speed, HMCS Athabaskan soon had the pilot safely aboard, and on her arrival at the TF the Admiral and the pilot were left with Valley Forge.
When *Athabaskan* hurried back to her task unit on the morning of the 19th, she took over the duties of CTU 95.2.2, the Sweet Adeline patrol protecting Yangdo, from USS *Thompson*. On several occasions the Canadian ship was able to bombard suspected gun positions and interdiction targets along the east-coast. On the 24th she sank a mine. She was relieved by HMS *Charity* on the 27th. Operations on the west coast during February followed the usual pattern, with only one of the Canadian ships, *Haida*, carrying out an inshore patrol. She fired on the enemy gun positions and troop concentrations opposite Mu-do in the Haeju-man area.

Very few incidents worth recording occurred during the following month, March 1953. The one noteworthy event happened on 30-31 March, when HMCS *Athabaskan* had been serving as CTU 95.1.4 in the Chodo area from 26 February to 1 April. In the night, a unit of ROK special troops, from Cho-do sneaked ashore, beat up the enemy in the area, and then retired to a small island connected to the mainland. At this moment the enemy troops were pressing them with their heavy mortar fire when HMCS *Athabaskan* was called in to help. The destroyer without delay closed the range and began to fire on the enemy positions, calling at the same for support from the carrier planes. The aircraft based in USS carrier *Bataan* came in haste and poured their bombs, rockets, napalm and machinegun fire into the area. Owing to this support, the ROK special troops were able to withdraw in their junks.

The next month saw few incidents worth recording. Only an east coast patrol with the Task Unit 95.2.2 from the 18th to the 27th, *Haida* spent sometime train watching, but in vain. At this time her gunners fired 27 rounds of 4-inch and twelve of 3"/50 caliber, but the locomotive disappeared from her sight. On the other occasion the moon was bright and the carrier-based planes too active for the trains to run. In April *Haida's* assignment was mainly restricted to carrier screening.

**Last Highlight by Crusader**

The leading role of the following narrative was played by *Crusader*. Her brilliant work on the east coast during April must be acknowledged as one of the most successful patrols performed by the ships of CANDESFE in the Korean War.

On the 9th of April HMCS *Crusader* left Yokosuka for East Coast to join TU 95.2.2. En route to close the Eastern Waters, she found and sank a mine. It was a good omen. On arriving in Yang-do on the afternoon of 11 April, *Crusader* assumed the duties of CTU 95.2.2 and spent next four days in daylight patrols to Chongjin and her nights in defending the island.
Its main objective was to capture prisoners for intelligence purposes. *Crusader* vectored inshore two dripters which carried the raiders; the troops made their way to the beach in small rubber boats. The raids were all successful.

On the evening of 14 April HMCS *Crusader* set out to do some train busting. Her destination was Package Three area south of Tanchon. Having taken up station there at 1900, she waited patiently for almost six hours, and then at 0040 of the 15th a north-bound train suddenly appeared. At that moment all four of her 4.5's belched smoke and the train stopped. Her gunners continued to pour on the high explosive, but the train crew managed to uncouple the locomotive and escaped with it into the tunnel at the south end of the package. But still, 15 cars remained and became a prey to *Crusader*'s gunners. She spent the night bombarding them. At daybreak the carrier planes of TF 77 arrived at the area and she left them to continue the destruction while she dashed southward to fuel from the replenishment tanker.

After returning at noon, 16 April, *Crusader* took over from the planes the interdiction task. Then at 1300 the NKCF tried to rescue the remaining cars. HMCS *Crusader*, calling for support, closed the package and fire with all her guns. *Crusader* foiled the Reds and withdrew again to a distance and continued interdiction fire. Towards the evening a train was sighted on an inland rail line to the north near Tanchon. So she closed at full speed and opened fire on the train. The target was hit and came to a halt. No sooner had it been stopped than another train appeared on the railway line. Her guns swung to cover the new target, and the train lay stopped. At the time her Bofors also sank an enemy mine which had drifted into sight. It was getting dark. *Crusader* kept up fire on the victims until the darkness made spotting impossible and then turned her attention back to the train in the package area. Having demolished another four cars in the package, *Crusader* then set out to join the screen of the fast carriers of TF 77. When *Crusader* reached the TF at 0430 on the morning of the 16th CTF, Rear Admiral R.F. Hickey, USN, greeted her personally by voice radio. Her reputation had already preceded her.

On the evening of the 20th April *Crusader* returned again to TU 95.2.2. The first night she saw nothing. She spent the next day in the Yang-do area. Late in the evening she received a message ordering her to steam south and relieve the cruiser USS *St. Paul* on the bombline. She sailed at midnight and arrived at the line at first light on 22 April. Its assignment was to support the troops of I ROK Corps holding the coastal sector of the front, and during the day she spent with TU 95.2.8. She carried out two bombardments. *St. Paul* returned that night, and *Crusader* set course
northward again.

_Crusader_ was once again on a train-busting mission on the last evening of the 24th. When she had just arrived at Package Four, near Chaho below Songjin, a train suddenly dashed out of the tunnel marking the southern end of the Package and rushed towards Hungnam. Since the rails curved sharply inland at this point, the ship failed to score a hit in the moment before the train disappeared from sight. _Crusader_ quickly steamed to Package Five in the hope that her target would continue its journey southwards, but her quarry did not appear. However, at midnight a tiny train consisting of one locomotive and two cars heading northward was seen. Her guns stopped it, and one of the hits caused a large secondary explosion in one of the cars, but when the smoke cleared the train had disappeared. She spent another two days with the task unit, but she did not see another train. Having been relieved by HMS _Cockade_ on the afternoon of 27 April, the Canadian ship sailed for Japan.

**Haida’s Last Mission on the East Coast**

As _Crusader_’s operations on the east coast had been the highlight in April, in May it was _Haida_’s turn to shine. _Haida_ carried out a mission as CTU 95.1.4 from 28 April to 9 May. Some enemy activity was expected on May Day, but it did not materialize. The remarkable incidents occurred after that, when _Haida_ arrived in the Yang-do area on the afternoon of the 26th, spent a having spell of rest at Hong Kong. On arriving in the area, she took over the duties of CTU 95.2.2. from HMAS _Anzac_. She set out to do some train busting southward towards evening. Her target for the night was Package Two, just south of Songjin, and there she took up station at 2215. In less than an hour a train was sighted. Her gunners without delay went into action and the train disappeared in a welter of smoke and dust. It was found that the train had stopped dead on the tracks when a US aircraft dropped flares over the area on night-interdiction missions. At 2320 hours a north-bound train appeared. But the moment her guns went into action, the train escaped unscathed. And _Haida_, until 0300, kept up unobserved interdictory and harassing fire on the area to prevent the enemy from making emergency repairs and perhaps escaping into a tunnel. Having been relieved by USS _Eversole_, _Haida_ returned to Yang-do, where she joined USS _Bradford_ for a patrol northward to the limits of the station.

The ship was once more train-busting on 29 May. This time her target was Package Three area, north of Iwon. At 2200 a north-bound train came into sight. All the guns of the main armament opened fire simultaneously and
when the star-shell lit up the tracks there stood a train, stopped just short of the tunnel it had been trying to reach. Her firing was kept up to prevent the enemy from clearing the tracks, but the Reds worked fast, and when the area was illuminated again it was revealed that the engine had been uncoupled and secreted in the tunnel. *Haidə* maintained an intermittent fire on the box cars for the next six hours. En route to the Yang-do area having been relieved by *USS Bradford* on the morning of 30 May, *Haidə* rounded off a most satisfying patrol by sighting and sinking a mine.

During the remainder of her last east coast patrol, *Haidə* performed a variety of tasks: gunfire support for USN minesweepers engaged in sweeping the bombardment channels along the coast, anti-invasion patrol off the island, routine bombardment patrols north to Songjin and Chongjin and also train busting. This was her last duty in Korean Waters. At last, having turned over to *HMS Cossack* on 8 June 1953, *Haidə* headed for Sasebo and home.

**Last Train-Bustings**

The most eventful patrol of the following month, June, was the east coast train busting by a ship of CANDESFE, *Athabaskan*. On and after 21 June, when she took over as CTU 95.2.2, *Athabaskan* had her first chance of the patrol to get a train on the night of 24-25. The quarry came in sight when she was lying off Package Two area. Her two salvos from the 4-inch guns sufficed to stop it but there was cloud over the area which made it impossible to illuminate with star-shell. So she gave up her attempt to completely destroy the wrecked train and left to search for other targets. Her next opportunity knocked on the night of 29–30 June; on that night she sighted a train near Package Three above Iwon and another near Package Two below Songjin. But she could hit the later one only. The next night proved more successful, and *Athabaskan* was able to celebrate "Dominion Day" by completing the destruction of a 24-car train that she had stopped with two well-aimed salvos. Her second victim brought the number of trains destroyed the ships of Canada to its final total of eight.

In the month another of the ships of CANDESFE performed patrols as usual before returning home. *Crusader* had screened the west coast carriers, *USS Bairoko* and *HMS Ocean*, from 4 to 12 June. Twice during this period she was detached to patrol the Cho-do area. During the first patrol from the morning of the 6th to the morning of the 7th, the destroyer passed a busy day in providing gunfire support to a minesweeper operating north of Sok-do and in assisting the Netherlands Frigate *Johan Maurits* the Sok-do shore batteries and *Bairoko*’s Corsairs in saturating Wolsa-ri Peninsula. *Crusader*’s second patrol was uneventful. On the 12th she handed over her mission on
the screen to Athabaskan and set course for Sasebo. Having remained in the harbour until 18 June, when two other Canadian destroyers Iroquois and Huron arrived there, Crusader left for home at 1300 on the same day. She had served in the Korean theater three days short of a full year and was returning to her country with proud record.

The new arrivals, Iroquois and Huron, were "old timers." These ships had returned for their second Korean tours. Iroquois, from 22 to 27 June, remained in the Cho-do area directing the activities of TU 95.1.4. At that time the Reds remained inactive, except for firing on one of the ships of the unit. Huron, by the 23rd, was serving on the screen of USS Bairoko.

Athabaskan on the east coast, in July, had some opportunities to add to her train busting score, but a heavy and persistent fog again prevented her from destroying any enemy trains. On 7 July Athabaskan was relieved by HMCS Huron and sailed for Kure. The last few weeks of the war were relatively uneventful for the Canadian destroyers, but on the night of 13 July Huron ran aground in heavy fog on Yang-do. The ship managed to extricate herself and returned to Sasebo for repairs on 13 July, where she remained until 25 October 1953.

Athabaskan, after coming back from Sasebo, joined TU 95.1.6 in the Haeju-man area on 18 July and carried out her last mission; on the 20th, particularly, she had satisfaction of scoring several hits on the enemy troop billets on the mainland opposite Mu-do. On three days before the truce she joined the screen of USS Bairoko, and so the destroyer was the only one of the Canadian ships on active operations in the Yellow Sea when the cease-fire came on 27 July. At that time Iroquois, after spending from the 15th to the 19th in the Haeju-man area, was in Sasebo making preparations to rejoin the west coast task unit, while Huron lay in dry dock at Sasebo repairing the damage caused by her groundings.

Epilogue

The cease-fire did not mean the cessation of all the activities by the UN naval forces. The islands were beyond the demarcation line and were to be evacuated by the UN naval forces. Iroquois was the only Canadian destroyer to be involved in the task. She remained north of the 38th Parallel until 6 August 1953 assisting in the evacuation. Having completed her last mission with other UN naval forces during the ten days allowed by the armistice for the evacuation, she withdrew south of the parallel. The Canadian destroyer, Iroquois, was relieved on 14 August by HMS Crane and sailed for Sasebo, thus completing the post armistice patrol by one Canadian destroyer.
However, as is generally known, the last Canadian ship remained in the Korean theater until September 1955, more than two years after the cease-fire. Since the Canadian destroyers' duties mainly of a routine nature during this period, there is little need to describe their activities. Athabaskan left Sasebo for home on 18 November, 1953, and Huron and Iroquois, on 26 December 1954. Sioux, the last Canadian destroyer which relieved them, steamed out from Yokosuka on passage home on 7 September, 1955.

Thus, during the three years and more the Royal Canadian Navy maintained a total of the eight destroyers, and the Canadian ships had fired approximately 50,000 rounds of main armament ammunition and 70,000 rounds of close range ammunition in the Korean War. The personnel statistics amounted to some 3,621 officers and men from July 1950 to July 1953. If one takes into account the fact that many of these officers and men served more than one tour, it may be stated that the RCN provided personnel for 4,269 tours of duty in Korea. If the RCN contribution from the armistice to September 1955 were taken into consideration, the figure would be substantially higher. A total of 62 officers and men received decorations and awards for services in Korean Waters. The following casualties were sustained by Canadian Naval Forces; one officer and one rating killed, one died of wounds, and three were wounded in action: seven had minor and six, fatal injuries in accident.

Considering the scale of the United Nations naval forces, Canada made a large contribution to the repelling of Communist aggression and the restoration of peace in Korea.
CHAPTER IV  THE AIR FORCE

Section 1. Deployment of No. 426 Transport Squadron

Introduction

Shortly after the North Korean communist armies invaded the Republic of Korea across the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950, it was assumed that the Canadian Government would provide military support to the Republic of Korea in accordance with the request of the United Nations to halt the North Korean aggression. It was rumoured that Royal Canadian Air Force would send a contingent to Korea. Then, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced officially on 21 July that No. 426 Transport Squadron had been offered for service with the United Nations allied forces.

The Air Force contribution was directly from the Canadian Government to the United Nations, but the squadron was to serve under the operational control of the United States Military Air Transport Service (MATS), a unified air transport organization of the United States armed forces. The squadron’s job would be the airlifting of personnel and equipment to and from the Korean theater of war. For the airlift, the Royal Canadian Air Force chose the name “Operation Hawk.”

No. 426 (Thunderbird) Squadron was ready for the task. Formerly, it had carried out many flights to the United Kingdom and Europe and was just completing a series of special training flights in Canadian-built North Stars—one of the best airlift planes at the time—to the Azores, North Africa and South America. In preparation for the new task, Wing Commander C. H. Mussels, and other Air Transport Command officials attended conferences at Washington and Ottawa during the first half of July. The base of operations for the airlift was to be McChord Air Force Base, near Tacoma, in the State of Washington, USA.

Participation

On 25 July, six North Stars took off from Dorval Airport, Canada. At the capital city, Ottawa, they passed in formation over the Parliament Buildings, dipped their wings in salute to the late Right Honorable William
Lyon Mackenzie King, three times Prime Minister, who had died on 22 July 1950, and whose body was lying in state in the Peace Tower. The North Stars set course for the west and the beginning of Operation "Hawk." The next day they landed at McChord Air Force Base and began to set up their servicing and administrative organization. Within 36 hours, the first three aircraft were headed for Tokyo. They completed the round trip in an average elapsed time of 81 hours.

At the time of the opening of the Korean War, McChord Air Force Base had been the base for a single fighter squadron. Now, almost overnight, it had become the stepping-off point for what was to be the greatest long-range air transport operation of all time.

When the North Stars arrived, the Military Air Transport Service had already brought in two transport groups, one from Texas and one from Germany. McChord's servicing facilities were completely overtaxed, and the Americans could offer only limited aid to the Canadians. Thus, the Canadians depended almost entirely on the equipment they had brought with them from Dorval. There was hangar space for only one aircraft, so that much of the work had to be done outside. However, it was summer and there was little bad weather to interfere with the airmen's round-the-clock work. Nose-docks—special docks used generally for a large airplane—were constructed later and eased the servicing problem.

Almost immediately, the squadron was operating on a schedule several times heavier than that which had been expected. By mid-August, the six aircraft and twelve crews were flying one round trip per day over a route of 10,000 miles. This meant that aircrew began a new trip every eleven or twelve days, sometimes logging 150 hours or more per month, while each North Star was flying more than 300 hours per month. But the cargoes were as vital as the schedule was heavy. Often the entire load consisted of fully-armed infantry or bazooka rockets. Speed was the essential factor to be considered.

The route flown was the great-circle track through Elmendorf Air Force Base, at Anchorage, Alaska, to Shemya, far out in the Aleutian chain, and terminating at Haneda Air Base, in Tokyo. Drawing on their trans-Atlantic experience the Canadian navigators were key men in setting up procedures for all Military Air Transport Service aircrew. During the early months of the airlift, it was No. 426 Squadron crews who conducted the route briefings at McChord Air Force Base. The Shemya-Tokyo leg skirted close by the Russian-held Kurile Islands, far beyond range of radio and radar navigational aids. The navigators depended on astro, pressure drift, and dead reckoning -- an estimation of aircraft’s position in the air at any time by calculating earlier known position, elapsed time, speed, heading steered, and effect of
wind -- navigations. Often they had to do without astro because of overcast cloud layers.

It was Shemya that early made the greatest impression on the aircrew, and, as the years went by, its reputation grew until it became famous throughout the Royal Canadian Air Force. It had a reputation for thick fog -- largely, no doubt, because the airlift began in mid-summer, when pea-soupers (a heavy dull yellow fog) are common. Ground-Controlled Approach landings were the rule rather than the exception. However, the United States Air Force always supplied its best Ground-Controlled Approach operators; during the early airlift days they were mostly veterans of the Berlin Blockade. Their skill was welcome when, as often happened, conditions of minimum or below-minimum ceiling and visibility were complicated by the gale-force winds that blow for days across the barren island.

The northern route was used most of the time, but, for six months after December 1950, the return from Tokyo was routed through the South Pacific. From Tokyo, flights steered a course for Wake Island, and from there they flew via Honolulu to Travis Air Force Base, sixty miles from San Francisco, and thence back to McChord Air Force Base.
Along the routes the squadron placed servicing detachments of fifteen or twenty airmen. They were at first commanded by senior NCO's, later by officers. Handling as many as two aircraft arrivals per day, the detachments contributed much to the Canadian technicians' remarkable servicing record.

After the first busiest months, Operation "Hawk" settled down to a routine of fifteen trips per month. By June 1951, Wing Commander Mussels had handed over command of the squadron to Wing Commander J.K.F. Macdonald, and the squadron returned to Dorval soon afterwards. From Dorval it continued to carry out its airlift commitments as well as its other flying duties. One year later the schedule was reduced to eight trips per month, and it remained at that rate until the end of the operation. In July 1952, Wing Commander H. W. Lupton, took over command of the squadron.

Afterwords

Statistics of the work done during the four years of the airlift are great. In 599 round trips, No. 426 Squadron carried 13,000 personnel and 7,000,000 lbs. of freight and mail. This added up to 34,000 flying hours, during which not a pound of cargo or a single life was lost.

After the return of the squadron to Dorval in 1951, the airlift, as had been already implied, was only part of its commitments. The flights between Dorval and McChord were utilized for trans-Canada schedules. Arctic and other special flights were resumed, and the North Stars flew on an increasingly heavy schedule to European support of the Canadian NATO forces located there.

Operation "Hawk" was concluded on 9 June 1954, when trip No. 599 was greeted at Dorval by a modest concluding ceremony. The operation had been ended by the removal of the weather facilities at Shemya. Without Shemya as a staging-point, it would have been very difficult to operate the North Stars over long flight to Japan.

In announcing the decision to end the operation, Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton said: "To all those who have taken part in the Canadian Air Force's operations on the airlift, I pass my personal congratulations for a demanding task done in proper Air Force fashion. I can give no higher praise than this."

Canadians were participants at the first and at the last, and at all times played their part with gallantry, courage and devotion to duty.
Section 2. Canadian Pilots in the Korean Skies

Prelude

Besides the unit participation of No. 426 Transport Squadron more than a score of Canadian pilots joined in the F-86 Sabre sweeps and screens over North Korea as a UN allied air force member. The participation was not as a unit, but on an individual basis. The Canadian airmen contributed their share, shooting down at least nine MIGs and damaging many more during the Korean War.

On 1 November 1950 the Communists revealed that they had something far more menacing than the old Yak planes in the air. At 1345 hours six swept-wing jet aircraft crossed the Yalu River and opened fire on a T-6 Mosquito control plane and a flight of F-51 Mustang fighters of the UN allies. The jet plane was a Russian-built MIG-15. The swept-wing plane was the most advanced Russian fighter of the day, superior to every UN plane in Korea at that time, and was being supplied in growing numbers to both the Red Chinese and North Koreans in the winter of 1950. Although the United States Air Force F-80 Shooting Stars and Navy F-9F Panther jets then were able to shoot down a few MIGs, it was clear that the newer aircraft threatened UN air superiority, especially in the air war of jet versus jet dogfights. The only comparable airplane in service in the UN hand was the F-86 Sabre.

In this situation, the United States Air Force wanted to deploy the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing (Sabre) in the Republic of Korea airfields. The most suitable airfield was in Kimpo near the capital city of Seoul, but because of the crowded conditions there only a part of the Sabre wing could go to Korea. Accordingly, the wing left a large rear echelon at Johnson Air Base, and took “Detachment A”—pilots and airmen from group headquarters and the three squadrons, the 334th, 335th and 336th—to Korea in December. One of the pilots of the wing was Royal Canadian Air Force officer on exchange duties, Flight Lieutenant J. A. O. Levesque, who became the first Canadian to participate in all-jet air battles.

On 15 December the 4th Wing flew an orientation flight over North Korea and took off for combat at the Yalu River on the seventeenth. Levesque was among these pilots sent to Korea.

The men who piloted the Sabres took confidence from the fact that they
were flying the best fighter in the United Nations arsenal—the only plane on the friendly side of the free world that would consistently slug it out with the MIG-15.

But deriving advantage from their propinquity to their home base at Antung, the MIG pilots could select the time and position for their attacks. After their first few engagements with the MIG’s, the 4th Wing pilots could make some tentative comparisons of the relative performance of the two swept-wing jets. In speed, the F-86A and the basic model MIG-15 were fairly evenly matched. At higher altitudes the MIG had better climb and zoom characteristics, but in level flights at lower altitudes the F-86 seemed to enjoy a slight advantage. Other flight characteristics of the Sabre appeared to be slightly better than those of the MIG, but not enough better to make any appreciable difference. For air-to-air combat the armament of the F-86 (six 50-caliber machine guns) was superior to the mixed-caliber, low-cyclic rate of fire armament (two 23-millimeter and one 37-millimeter forward firing automatic weapons) carried by the MIG’s. For the Sabres, carrying two 120-gallon wing tanks in addition to its internal fuel supply, the Sabre’s combat range was 490 nautical miles, a distance which had to include the flight to the combat area and the return to the home base. Initially, flying at about Mach .62 in order to save fuel for the long range missions over North Korea, the Sabre pilots were at a disadvantage, as they first had to accelerate before countering the high-flying MIGs.

Early in January 1951, advancing Communist armies forced the Sabres to abandon Kimpo airfield and return to the bases in Japan. However, on the 26th of the same month the UN allied forces opened a counter-offensive, retaking Suwon airfield on 28 January and Kimpo on 10 February. The airfields were badly damaged, and when the Sabres returned to Korea they had to be based temporarily at Taegu, using Suwon for staging. On 22 February, however, the 334th Squadron moved to Suwon, while the 336th, moved from Japan and based at Taegu, staged its Sabres through the more advanced field and Sabres and MIGs resumed their duel.

When the Sabres of the 4th Wing began to operate from Suwon, the 334th Squadron was permitted to devise its own tactics. Fragmentary field orders simply charged the Sabres to fly combat air patrols over northwestern Korea at those hours of the day when other aircraft were attacking targets in MIG-hazarded areas. The Sabre screen was intended to turn back Communist aircraft, and it was not primarily designed to destroy Red aircraft, though of course no one objected to the latter activity if opportunities presented themselves. As they had learned to do in December, the Sabre leaders dispatched flights of four Sabres at periodic intervals, and the flights took stations over various landmarks in MIG Alley, the area between the Yalu
and Chongchon rivers. The lead flight generally went to Sinuiju to stir up the MIG’s, and if swirling dust at Manchurian airfields revealed MIG’s taking off, the lead flight called out: “Dust on the runway at target area.” Then the other Sabre flights closed in to join the fight. If a Sabre flight met more MIG’s than it could handle, it called out “Hey Rube” and headed toward Sinanju, where all flights assembled to fight the MIG’s. With some reduction of reserve fuel, the length of the Sabre patrol in MIG Alley was about the same twenty-five minutes that it had been when the Sabres were flying from Kimpo airfield. The Sabre tactics varied some from day to day, but the 4th Wing continued to exploit high-speed cruising in the target area, the “jet-stream” patrols of flights staggered in time and space, and, at the moment, the “fluid-four” flight in fingertip formation.

Although the swept-wing Sabres were again flying patrols along the Yalu, the 4th Wing was forced to enter combat on terms which generally favored the enemy. At a time when the 4th Wing was not operating at anything near maximum effectiveness, the Chinese had at least an air division with 75 MIG’s based at Antung. The 4th Wing had only two squadrons in Korea, and, flying from separate airfields, the 334th and 336th Squadrons found it hard to unite their efforts over MIG Alley. On 30 March 1951 a force of B-29s was sent to bomb the bridges over the Yalu River at Sinuiju, under the very noses of the MIGs based in Manchuria. The 334th Squadron was included in the escort, and Levesque was flying as wingman to an American major, one of the flight leaders.

The MIG response that day was feeble, and only a few brushed with the Sabres. The leader and Levesque attacked two, which split up, each with a Sabre in hot pursuit. Levesque’s MIG made a few evasive maneuvers and then levelled off, as if the pilot thought he had shaken the Sabre. At more than 600 yards Levesque opened fire and the sleek enemy fighter went spinning down, crashing on the Manchurian side of the Yalu. It was Levesque’s first triumph over MIG jet fighter. He was awarded the American Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC).

He returned to Canada in May 1951, when his exchange tour expired. He went back home wearing the ribbons of the American Air Medal (for having flown twenty missions in December) and the American DFC (for his combat on 30 March 1951).

This ended the participation of the RCAF in the air war for some time, except the airlifting of No. 426 Transport Squadron, flying Canadian-built North Stars across the Pacific.

At that time the RCAF was only beginning to equip its fighter squadron with Sabres, and had neither enough planes nor trained pilots to send to Korea.
Going back to January of 1951, the commander of the Far East Air Forces had expressed his willingness to rotate Commonwealth jet pilots through United States Air Force formations in order to give them combat experience. The then-Chief of the Air Staff of the RCAF, Air Marshal W. A. Curtis, noted that Canada was in no position to accept the offer at that time. However, he instructed the Canadian Air Member in Washington, Air Commodore W.W. Hendrick, to open discussions with the United States Air Force to lay the basis for future exchanges. The result was the exchange program of 1952 - 1953.

The plan agreed upon was that RCAF pilots with at least fifty flying hours on Sabres should be attached to the United States Air Force fighter-interceptor wings for a tour of fifty missions or six months, whichever came first. Two pilots would be sent initially, and one a month thereafter.

**Participation**

On 10 March 1952, Flying Officers S.B. Fleming and G.W. Nixon were assigned to Korea. They came at a time when all the details had not yet been worked out, such as the length of the tour and the criteria for acceptance of foreign decorations. Fleming was attached to the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, now based at Kimpo airfield, where he joined the 334th Squadron, while Nixon came to the 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing at Suwon airfield, where he flew in both the 16th and 25th Squadrons. They were given verbal instructions to complete fifty missions and return home. This was not immediately confirmed in writing, so Fleming went on to fly eighty missions on sweeps, escort duties, reconnaissance, and interceptions.

On 13 May, in the course of escorting an RF-80, Fleming spotted 16 MIGs preparing to attack. He led his element into the first four MIGs, scattering the enemy and sending a few running for Manchuria. He then attacked two MIGs which were firing on the RF-80 and its close escort of two Sabres. One MIG went down and later assessed as “probably destroyed.” Fleming kept up the fight until the RF-80 had withdrawn safely, and then returned to base, low on fuel and out of ammunition.

He also damaged two MIGs during his tour, one on 1 April and the other on 21 May. In addition, he scored hits on several ground targets while strafing, an unusual job for the Sabres, whose prime duty was running interceptions for the bombers and fighter-bombers. Subsequently, Flying Officer Fleming was awarded the American Distinguished Flying Cross.

Flying Officer Nixon flew the prescribed fifty missions, but although he participated in many combats, often against heavy odds, he made no claims. He completed his tour in July, and was later decorated with the American
Air Medal.

The pattern was now established, and these two pilots were followed by Flying Officer J. D. Donald and Flight Lieutenant L. E. Spurr in April 1952. Donald was reassigned before he was combat ready, but Spurr went on to do the full fifty mission tours with the 25th Squadron of the 51st Wing. On 14 July, while leading a flight of Sabres which were screening for fighter-bombers, he became separated from his No. 3 and 4 men. Spotting ten MIGs above, he saw two aircraft which he took to be his comrades. Suddenly he realized they were also MIGs and closed in to attack. The lead MIG was shot down, burning and out of control. His wingman then called that the top MIGs were coming down, so the Sabres beat for home. Spurr’s victory was the second MIG-15 shot down by a Canadian. Spurr was eventually awarded the American DFC.

The highest ranking Royal Canadian Air Force officer to fly in Korea was Group Captain E. B. Hale. As the commanding officer of the RCAF’s No. 1 Fighter Wing at North Luffenham, he was sent to study tactics and to report on how the rotation programme was working in the field. Hale came with orders written especially for him by Air Marshal Curtis. He reported to the 51st Wing on 29 April 1952 and flew his first mission on 1 May.

Group Captain Hale was involved in four scraps with MIG-15s. He was awarded the American DFC for an action on 25 May which was especially dangerous. He was leading two flights of Sabres which were to escort some F-84 Thunderjets. The F-84 fighter-bombers were late arriving, and part of the escort force had to turn back. Group Captain Hale and his wingman decided to do “one more sweep” and picked up the Thunderjets just as four MIGs closed in. Although low on fuel, the two Sabres attacked, drove off the MIGs, and escorted the F-84s home.

By this time word of the exchange scheme had spread through the RCAF and scores of pilots were clamouring for Korean duty. At No. 1 Operational Training Unit, Chatham, Flying Officer J. C. A. Lafrance found himself far down the pilot exchange list. Preference was being given to instructors. Lafrance approached the Commanding Officer, pointing out that he was the only instructor without operational experience, while the others having seen action during World War II. As a result, he was placed at the top of the list and in May he joined the 39th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron of the 51st Wing. He flew his first mission on 28 May.

On 5 August, as a newly-promoted Flight Lieutenant, he was flying his twenty-second mission as No. 3 man in a flight of four Sabres. Near Sariwon Flight Lieutenant Lafrance spotted two MIGs and broke into them, closing on the leader. He opened fire, scoring strikes on the enemy plane, and the
pilot ejected. He then turned on the second MIG and chased it to the Yalu River before heading for home with his fuel running low. It was the third MIG credited to a RCAF pilot, and the exploit brought Lafrance an American DFC.

At this point it might be appropriate to explain the circumstances under which the pilots were fighting. As early as November 1950 the UN Command had been warned of the dangers of spreading the war to Red China, which would possibly bring in wider aggression. Consequently, the enemy bases in Manchuria had been declared “off limits” to all UN pilots. The MIGs had only to fly across the Yalu River for the sanctuary to escape the Sabres. They could be seen taking off or parked in neat rows at their fields at Antung, Tapao, Tatungkou and Takashan in Manchuria.

The RCAF pilots had a minimum of fifty hours on Sabres before going to Korea. Once assigned to their squadrons they, together with all other new pilots, gained additional hours ferrying aircraft and in practice flights south of the lines. Finally, before going into action all pilots attended “Globber College,” a one-day course on proper methods of bailing out if hit, plus a briefing on escape and evasion techniques.

Both the MIGs and Sabres used a variety of tactics. The MIGs, flying in large formations, resorted to hit-and-run methods. While one formation acted as decoys, another group would fly behind and either above or below, ready to dive or climb into the Sabres which took the bait. In other cases, the MIGs, flying high above the Sabres, would be vectored over them by the efficient enemy controllers and then pounce, sometimes through clouds. At times the enemy pilots experimented, resorting to varying types of formations and even trying head-on attacks.

The basic Sabre formation was the “Finger Four”—two elements of two aircraft each. These flights were usually spaced in time and altitude. When one flight spotted MIGs it called in the others and attacked. It was not unlike a controlled street fight, where everyone rushed up to take part.

The heart of the system was the two-plane element, with the leader and wingman. The element leader did most of the shooting while the wingman guarded his tail. Wingmen had fewer chances to fire, and they did not attack MIGs on their own, leaving the leader uncovered. The selection of element and flight leaders was made on the basis of experience. Normally, a pilot flew about twenty missions as a wingman before being made an element leader, and twenty more as an element leader before being upgraded to flight leader. The number of missions varied according to the individual pilots themselves. Flight Lieutenant J.C.A. Lafrance, for example, shot down his MIG on his first mission as an element leader. Having shown that he could handle himself in dogfight, he was quickly made a flight leader.
The number of victories credited to RCAF personnel was necessarily small because of their short tour -- fifty missions as against the standard American tour of one hundred. It was not until near the end of their tours that the Canadians became element and flight leaders, and as noted, these were the positions that gave the best opportunities for firing. Members of the RCAF were in Korea to gain enough combat experience to make them useful to the service in passing on their knowledge. No broader aims were planned. Nonetheless, the abbreviated tour was slightly disruptive for the squadrons in which Canadians flew, for it meant that a few RCAF pilots were promoted to lead positions to the detriment of USAF fliers, and then these element and flight leaders were transferred just as they were becoming experienced in jet combat.

RCAF personnel in the Korean theatre came under the operational control of the United States Air Force wings, and while attached to these wings they were recommended for a number of American decorations. American fliers were normally awarded the Air Medal after twenty missions, with an Oak Leaf Cluster after sixty. In addition, there were awards of the American Distinguished Flying Cross for particularly outstanding achievements in combat.

In view of the shorter tour which the Canadians served, plus the fact that would generally qualify for the Korean War Medal and the United Nations Service Medal, the Air Council moved to restrict the number of awards made to members of the RCAF. The policy, as laid down in December 1952, set criteria for the award of the Commonwealth DFC, and for the acceptance of the American DFC and Air Medal. No pilot would be eligible to accept more than one United States decoration. The exception was Squadron Leader J. A. O. Levesque, who had been given two awards by the Americans before the rotation programme to Korea came into effect.

The only RCAF pilot to win a Commonwealth award for gallantry was Flight Lieutenant E. A. Glover. He joined the 334th Squadron at Kimpo in June 1952. Up until 26 August he did not even see a MIG, but from then on he saw them almost every day until the end of September.

He opened his scoring on 30 August by damaging two MIGs. On 8 September he was flying No. 4 position in a flight which got into a scrap with two MIGs. The enemy turned sharply to starboard, putting Glover in the best firing position. He opened up on the pair, scoring hits all over the wingman. The two MIGs went into a screaming dive, but Glover stuck with them from 40,000 to 15,000 feet. The trailing MIG tried to pull up, started to spin, and crashed. Glover went after the second, saw strikes, but had to break off as the damaged enemy plane streaked into Manchuria.

On 9 September a force of Thunderjets with Sabre escort attacked the
North Korean Military Academy at Sakchu. The strike stirred up a hornet's nest, and the Sabres and Thunderjets encountered some 175 MIG's. Some flights engaged the Sabres while others jumped the Thunderjets. Six MIGs were shot down, one of them by Flight Lieutenant Glover. The enemy fighter was closing on some Thunderjets when Glover sneaked in behind and set it on fire.

On the 16th of the month he was leading a flight of three Sabres which piled into 20 MIGs. Glover set one on fire and it dived away spinning. The MIG became Glover's third confirmed victory.

Flight Lieutenant Glover completed his tour in October 1952. He was subsequently decorated with both the American and Commonwealth DFCs, the only member of the RCAF to win the latter when Canada was technically at peace.

Two pilots were posted to Korea in July, Flight Lieutenant R.E. Lowry and Squadron Leader J. D. Lindsay. This was the former's first experience in combat. He was assigned to the 25th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, flew twenty missions before completing his tour in November 1952 and returned to Canada.

Squadron Leader Lindsay was another example of the Old School of Fighter Pilots of World War II. He was the most experienced RCAF fighter pilot so far in Korea and showed that he had lost none of this touch. After only four missions he was made an element leader.

Lindsay attracted the name of "MIG Magnet." By the time he had completed twenty missions he had had five engagements with MIGs, and had damaged two on 5 September. After his twentieth sortie he was presented with a bottle of "Mission Whiskey" and made a flight leader, a promotion which opened up new opportunities.

On 11 October he was leading a flight of four Sabres when he spotted twelve MIGs above him. He started to climb while the MIGs swept in trying to cut the Sabres off from base. Lindsay singled out the last four MIGs and led the Sabres into the enemy formation, shooting down one MIG. His victory brought to three the number of MIGs downed by the 39th Squadron and six downed by all Sabres that day. It had been his twenty-ninth mission.

On 25 October he damaged his third MIG. As his tour drew to a close it appeared that he would have to settle for that. November was a slack month. The enemy used the Manchurian sanctuary more than they did in September and October.

He was flying his forty-ninth mission on 26 November and at 46,000 feet his element attacked a force of 21 MIGs. The enemy aircraft broke right in a climbing turn. Lindsay shot one down -- his second. Lindsay was
awarded the American DFC.

Going back to August, another Canadian pilot, Squadron Leader E.G Smith was selected as the exchange pilot for the month of August. Smith was awarded the American Air Medal and completed his tour with the 334th Squadron in December 1952. Although he made no claims, the experience of Squadron Leader Smith does point up the importance of the wingman. He frequently flew with an American leader as No. 2, when the American shot down his third and fourth MIGs on 14 and 16 September.

Another colourful Canadian pilot in Korea was Wing Commander R.T.P. Davidson, who arrived in September 1952. Flying with the 335th Squadron out of Kimpo airfield he had ten brushes with MIGs and, in his own words, “made a couple of them smoke.” He returned to Canada in December.

Next up was Flying Officer A. Lambros. He was fortunate enough to tangle with MIGs when the enemy trainees gained more confidence and became increasingly aggressive. During his tour he damaged two MIG-15s, one on 22 January and the other on 31 January 1953.

So far the Canadians had been fortunate, having lost none of their numbers. In mid-November 1952 Squadron Leader A.R. Mackenzie was assigned to Korea, where he joined the 39th Squadron at Suwon airfield. On 5 December 1952 he was flying an F-86F as wingman. At 40,000 feet the flight ran into 20 MIGs. The enemy fighters closed in all directions, and in a few seconds Mackenzie became separated from the leader. Suddenly, a burst of cannon fire tore off his canopy and knocked out the controls. At 40,000 feet, Mackenzie bailed out into the bitter cold of the North Korean sky.

He landed in a North Korean field, where he was almost immediately captured. He was not to be freed until December 1954, two years after his capture and 17 months after the Korean Armistice. He was to endure countless interrogations, poor food and enemy attempts at brainwashing.

Meanwhile, the Korean War went on. Flight Lieutenant F.W. Evans joined the 334th Squadron in December 1952, and Flight Lieutenant G.H. Nichols joined the 16th Squadron in January 1953. Evans flew with American aces. On 2 March he was wingman to a major, who destroyed the first of four and a half MIGs which he was to shoot down. He also did a bit of strafing and destroyed one locomotive and four boxcars.

Nichols had a little more luck in the air. On 7 April he damaged a MIG-15 during a bitter fight. That day saw three MIGs shot down and seven damaged.

A Sabre that did go down -- but not through anything done by a MIG pilot -- was flown by Flying Officer R.D. Carew. He was the RCAF’s 16th
pilot to rotate to Korea, flying his first mission on 5 April. At 43,000 feet, his engine flamed out and he was unable to get an air start. At that point Carew was a sitting duck, but the other Sabres covered him while he began a long, wallowing glide southwards. At 7,000 feet he was still a long way behind the enemy lines. The UN forces also controlled the sea, so Carew
bailed out over water. On his way down he saw two helicopters, a Catalina flying rescue boat and a friendly launch cruising around waiting for him. As it turned out, he did not even get his feet wet. He landed on a small island held by UN forces and was quickly flown back to Kimpo airfield.

The last MIG shot down by a Canadian pilot fell to Squadron Leader John MacKay. He arrived in Korea in March 1953 and was attached to the 39th Squadron. He flew his first mission on 1 April and had flown the twentieth by 9 May. As his tour drew to a close, it began to appear that luck was not with him, for, although he took part in several engagements, he was not able to claim anything.

On 30 June the air war exploded into a series of engagements. In the early afternoon MacKay was leading a flight when he saw a lone MIG on the tail of four friendly aircraft. He closed the range and opened fire, scoring hits around the tail section, and the enemy pilot ejected. Ten days later MacKay completed his tour and left for home.

Two other pilots were posted to Korea before the shooting ended, Squadron Leader W.H.F. Bliss and Squadron Leader W. W. Fox, sent in April and May 1953. Both pilots were able to see action before the Armistice became effective at 2200 hours on 27 July.

**Mission Roundup**

In June Flying Officer J. B. Mullin was posted to Korea, followed in July by Squadron Leader D. Warren. Neither arrived in time to see action. They spent the remainder of their tours ferrying aircraft or in flying patrols south of the frontlines.

During the early months of 1953 most MIG’s engaged by Sabres had borne the plain red stars of Soviet Russia, but after 8 May most MIGs sighted bore Chinese Communist and North Korean insignia.

The Canadians joined the air war of the new era when jet versus jet combats began. Considering the small number of pilots and the scheme of twenty missions in exchange duties, their contribution was great. Even at the time when Sabre pilots thought that the MIG was a better plane than it actually was, Canadians were always ready to meet the MIG pilots. These pilots outmaneuvered the Reds in spite of heavy odds in every mission. Their contribution certainly helped the United Nations air forces restore air supremacy over North Korea.
**CHRONOLOGY**

**1950**

12 July  
Canadian government decides to send three destroyers to Korea.

21 July  
Places an air transport squadron of six North Star aircraft to support the UNC and No. 426 Air Squadron begins its operation.

31 July  
HMCS Athabaskan begins to escort the US troops ship General Merton from Sasebo to Pusan.

15 Aug  
HMCS Cayuga fires the first bombardment on the Yosu harbor installations.

12-30 Aug  
HMCS Athabaskan participates in the Wonsan landing operation.

7 Nov  
An advance party of the ground force disembarks at Pusan.

4-6 Dec  
All three Canadian destroyers take part in Chinnampo evacuation.

18 Dec  
The 2nd Battalion, PPCLI steams into Korea.

27 Dec  
Moves to Miryang for training.

**1951**

15 Jan  
HMCS Nootka relieves Sioux.

17 Feb  
The 2nd Battalion joins the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade at Changhowon.

21 Feb  
Begins to advance up to the north.

23 Feb  
First casualty ensues.

16 Mar  
HMCS Huron relieves Cayuga.

30 Mar  
A Canadian pilot shoots down one MIG.

7 Apr  
The battalion crosses the 38th Parallel for the first time.

24-25 Apr  
Halts the CCP offensive north of Kapyong.

3 May  
HMCS Athabaskan is relieved by Sioux, who returns for her second Korean tour.

4 May  
The main body of the 25th Brigade arrives at Pusan.

20 May  
HMCS participates in the first amphibious operation on the mainland opposite Cho-do.

24 May  
The brigade reaches Sunae-ri north of Uijongbu and comes under the 25th US Infantry Division.

27 May  
Establishes positions covering Kansas Line.

30 May  
Attacks against Hill 467 (Kakhul-bong).

14-19 June  
HMCS Sioux takes part in the Wonsan Siege.

18 June  
The brigade comes under the 1st US Cavalry Division and patrols
Chorwon area.

10 July HMCS Cayuga relieves Nootka.
28 July The brigade comes under the 1st Commonwealth Division.
3 Aug Participates Operation Slam.
13 Aug Initiates reconnaissance probes across the Imjin River.
14 Aug HMCS Huron leaves for home.
22-24 Aug The brigade carries out Operation Claymore.
3 Oct Takes the offensive Operation Commando.
14 Oct The 1st Battalion, PPCLI relieves the 2nd Battalion, PPCLI.
23 Oct The brigade carries out Operation Pepperpot.
2 Nov The 2nd Battalion, RCR contacts with CCF at Songgok Spur.
22 Nov The 2nd Battalion, R 22e R tastes sharp fighting on a ridge west of Hill 385.
1-31 Dec HMCS ships engages on islands defense missions in the Cho-do—Sok-do area in the western waters.
6-7 Dec The 1st Battalion, PPCLI probes to a ridge west of Hill 220.

1952

14 Feb HMCS Sioux sails for home, and her mission is turned over to Nootka.
26-27 Mar The 2nd Battalion, R 22e R knocks out CCF attack on Hill 132.
11 Apr No. 23 Company relieves No. 54 Transport Company.
25 Apr The 1st Battalion, R 22e R relieves the 2nd Battalion.
27 Apr No. 25 Field Ambulance gives place to No. 37 Ambulance.
27 Apr Brigadier M.P. Bogert is appointed to succeed Brigadier Rockingham.
3 May The 37th Field Engineer Squadron is relieved by the 23rd Squadron.
6 May The 1st Field Artillery Regiment relieves the 2nd Regiment.
20 May The 1st Battalion, PPCLI sends out a patrol to Hill 155.
23 May B Company, Ist RCR Battalion leaves for Koje-do prisoners of war camp.
12 June HMCS Iroquois arrives at Sasebo to take place of Cayuga.
14 July Canadian pilot shoots down one MiG.
5-31 Aug Three MiG's are shot down by Canadian pilots.
8-9 Sep Three MiG's are shot down by Canadian pilots.
2 Oct HMCS Iroquois is attacked and loses its three officers.
11 Oct One more MiG is shot down by a Canadian Pilot.
23 Oct B Company, Ist RCR Battalion is smashed by the CCF on a ridge west of Hill 385.
3 Nov The 3rd Battalion, PPCLI relieves the 1st Battalion.
6 Nov HMCS Nootka performs its last mission and sails for home.
12 Nov HMCS Haida relieves Nootka.
3-20 Dec HMCS Haida performs the inshore interdiction and blockade on the east coast.
1953

25 Mar  The 3rd Battalion, RCR replaces the 1st Battalion.
27 Mar  No. 56 Transport Company relieves No. 23 Company.
28 Mar  The 59th Field Squadron takes over from the 23rd Squadron.
16 Apr  No. 23 Workshop relieves No. 191 Workshop.
21 Mar  The 1st Battalion, R 22e R gives place to the 3rd Battalion.
21 Apr  Brigadier Bogert turns over to Brigadier J.V. Allard.
22 Apr  The 81st Field Artillery Regiment replaces the 1st Regiment.
27 Apr  HMCS Crusader carries out the train-busting operation on the east coast.

2 May  The 3rd Battalion, RCR is heavily engaged.
7 May  No. 38 Field Ambulance takes over from No. 38 Ambulance.
24 May  A Squadron of Lord Strathcona's Horse takes the B Squadron's place.
18 June  HMCS Iroquois and Huron return for their second tour.
27 July  The Armistice Agreement is signed.
PART FIVE

THE 60TH INDIAN FIELD AMBULANCE IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER 1 GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to India

India is a republic in southern Asia, whose capital is New Delhi. Nearly 550,000,000 inhabitants of various racial and ethnic types populated in the Country, of which 83.5 per cent adhears to the Hinduism. The Republic of India occupies 3,288,100 square kilometers comprising 17 states and 11 territories in the late 1960s. The official language of the country is Hindi but English continued to be used in addition to Hindi.

The main crest line of the Himalayas draws the northern border of the Indian territory, and contacts with the independent state of Nepal occupying the central part of the great Himalayan area. To the west Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh stretch to the crest line of the Great Himalayas and beyond to a frontier with Communist China in the late 1960s.

In the east India has a long frontier through mountainous country with Burma, with the state of Nagaland and the territory of Manipur on the borders. East Pakistan, coinciding closely with the Ganges Brahmaputra Delta, forms a large enclave in the Indian territory and renders communications between the main mass of Indian territory and the isolated state of Assam, particularly difficult.

In the west the boundary with West Pakistan passes through the featureless plains of Punjab and through the almost uninhabited heart of the Thar of Indian Desert to the head of that marsh or desert waste the Rann of Cutch. Otherwise that southern boundaries of India are clearly defined by sea on the southwest, the Bay of Bengal on the southeast. And the Island of Ceylon lies at the foot of India.

Climatically the whole enjoys a tropical monsoon climate, but with extreme ranges of rainfall from under 5 inches in the desert to the wettest stations in the whole subcontinent -- indeed in the world.

India's relations with the Commonwealth of Nations were defined at the London Conference of Prime Ministers on 27 April 1949, and India became a sovereign democratic republic on 26 January 1950.

In foreign affairs, although India remained a member of the Common-
wealth, the Former Prime Minister Nehru attempted to follow a policy of "neutralism" and "Non-alignment" between the Western and Communist blocks.

India also played an important part in the deliberations of the United Nations. Its representatives frequently urged the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and attempted to mediate between the great powers, while expressing the hostility of Afro-Asian states toward colonialism.

Before the outbreak of the Korean War, India had joined the earlier UN effort to attain prompt unification of Korea, as a member of the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) which was then composed of 6 other nations; Australia, China, El Salvador, France, Philippines and Syria.

When the North Korean Communist Forces illegally invaded the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950, India sent a medical unit to assist free Korea. Also later the war was over, Indian Government provided a custodian force to oversee the post-war problems, and greatly contributed to restore the peace in the Korean Peninsula.

Section 2. India's Decision

"Where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression took place, India cannot be and shall not remain neutral." This is a part of Nehru's statement before the U.S. Congress in November 1949.

When the Korean War broke out, India was a member of the non-permanent nations in the UN Security Council. The issue facing India's basic policy of neutrality had already been settled by her support for the earlier U.N. resolution on 25 June 1950 (New York Time), that branded North Korea the aggressor and urged it to withdraw its forces to the 38th Parallel.

Before approving the Security Council resolution on 27 June (New York Time) calling for military aid to the Republic of Korea, the Indian Government awaited a report from the Indian member of the U.N. Commission on Korea. On the evening of 29 June Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru announced his decision. While accepting the resolution on aid, the Government of India stuck to a foreign policy based "on the promotion of world peace and friendly relations with all countries." At any rate on the Korean problem, India had lined up with the democratic nations assisting military help on the invaded country.

Early in November 1950, the Government of India decided to send a field ambulance and surgical unit to Korea to tend the sick and wounded... The
General Background

60th Indian Field Ambulance, which had already won fame in many battles was chosen for this assignment.

Raised in Secunderabad in August 1942, the 60th Indian Field Ambulance received intensive training in parachute jumping and formed part of an Indian Airborne Division in Central India.

The men of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance were drawn from all parts of India. There were Lushais from the Assam hills, Sikhs from the Punjab, south Indians, Bengalis etc. But to all these men active service was nothing new. Most of them had served in World War II and the unit as a whole was in Kashmir for 18 months.
CHAPTER II  THE 60TH INDIAN AMBULANCE

Section 1. Arrival in Korea

When the end of the voyage was announced Indian officers and men alike rushed to the upper-deck to see the land. The approaches into the port of Pusan, the country's major entry and southern terminus in Korea, was much crowded since most of the UN troops and material were supplied through this port. The local citizens thronged at the dock to show their welcome looked a bit puzzled to find that these stout men with turbans on instead of helmets came to look after the wounded soldiers.

Finally the 60th Indian (Para.) Field Ambulance Unit touched the land of Korea on 20 November 1950, with a total strength of 346 men, including 17 officers. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Rangaraj, the Indian medical unit was composed of 4 surgeons, 2 anaesthetists, 8 GDMOs, 1 dental surgeon, 1 motor-transport and 1 quartermaster officers, and 329 other enlisted ranks, carrying its own equipment with them.

When Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj was given a bouquet around his neck by a traditionally-clad young lady, he and other men were once oblivious of their struggle ahead.

Immediately after the short welcome ceremony, Colonel Rangaraj was met by other senior commanders of the UN forces to discuss the future role of the Indian unit. In the conference, taking into consideration the related problems, it was decided as the best modus operandi of the 60th Ambulance under the circumstances, that the unit had better be divided into two elements; one would provide service for the 27th British Brigade in the front while another would remain in the general area of Taegu to work with the friendly hospitals thereabout. Even though this division threatened the unity of command Colonel Rangaraj saw it inevitable since no medical service was available to the 27th Brigade and the situation in Taegu area was worse than that. He relinquished the command of the Taegu Detachment to Major N. B. Banerjee. Far into the night, the both sat down discussing the arrangements of the train schedule to Pyongyang dropping the Taegu Detachment on the way.
Section 2. With the Commonwealth Forces

Leaving the Taegu Detachment behind, Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj led his field ambulance unit to Pyongyang in order to join the 27th Commonwealth Brigade under which it was instructed to operate.

At this time the war situation was hardly encouraging. The battle front was shifting from day to day and the UN allied forces under the United Nations flag in Korea were being driven back from the border provinces in North Korea by the "uncertain strong manpower." It was no doubt that the Chinese Communist Forces had invaded Korea against the United Nations forces. As the phase of war turned as worse as to face an entirely new war, General MacArthur, on 28 November, shifted his plans from the offensive to the defensive. Subsequently the friendly forces began a general withdrawal from the defense line north of Pyongyang.

It was this sudden about-face of the situation and resultant uncertainty that would threaten the Indian ambulance with premature commitment, more often within effective gun range of the enemy than otherwise.

After a two-week journey and securing medical stocks for six months, the Indian ambulance finally arrived at Pyongyang on 4 December. But it had hardly began to unload equipment when it received orders to pull out from the city; Pyongyang was being abandoned by the UN forces and in a great confusion. The haste of the withdrawal made it inevitable to destroy immense quantities of stores and equipment which had been brought forward in the wake of the advance. They were told that, as there was neither transport available nor time sufficient enough to evacuate, they must burn all their stores and equipment. The bug-out fever at Pyongyang was at its height: The other UN allies had set fire to their vast supplies of petroleum, clothing and ammunition -- on all sides flames crackled, and choking pall of smoke obscured the scene of expensive wreckage.

For them it was a grievous matter to lose, or abandon, their precious equipment, which might not be replaced for months. Therefore, Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj accustomed to a more frugal system of accounting, determined to prevent such a disaster if it was possible to do so, and it was here that the extraordinary devotion and versatility of this ambulance unit came into full play.

Standing beleaguered and apparently unwanted in a small siding was a dilapidated railway engine and a few trucks. It is unlikely that any
medical unit of any army carries engine drivers on its strength, but the 60th Indian Field Ambulance did; soon the men had formed a chain, and the precious stores were being loaded: a softly spoken Bengali, who had once been a fireman on the Deccan Mail (despairing of promotion to driver, he had enlisted in army instead) looked the engine over with a professional
eye, and reported to the Colonel that given fuel and considerable assistance from God it could coaxed into motion. There was no coal, but wood in plenty. A chain of Indian passes up "jerry-cans" of water and the stores were loaded on to the trucks.

Then there was a violent hissing of steam, a triumphant shriek from the engine’s whistle; the train with its precious cargo, manned by men dedicated to the task of alleviating human suffering, gathered speed and rolled through and out up the line, southward on the early hours of 5 December. American engineers, detailed to demolish the last bridge on the Taedong River, stared incredulously and then cheered. It would be difficult to imagine finer initiative and devotion to duty that lavished on the last train out of Pyongyang.

Now there was a double tide rolling south; the withdrawing army and wailing, frozen refugees. The bitter Korean winter was now at its height; snow was falling and for troops not fully clothed or equipped for winter conditions it was a time of difficulty and hardship. The enemy advance was also hampered by the weather conditions, delay imposed by the inadequate roads, demolitions and bombing carried out by United Nations forces.

Operations at this time centered round Pyongyang, where the Allied forces were converging on the town. Here the 29th British Brigade was holding a bridgehead north of the Taedong River, covering the withdrawal. After passing through the 29th Brigade north of Pyongyang on 4 December 1950, the 27th Brigade continued its withdrawal for another 200 kilometers, about 24 kilometers north of Seoul. Here, for the time being, conditions were peaceful; but the cold weather was bitter and there was little comfort. The 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit joined the brigade at Uijongbu on 14 December.

Here the Indian Field Ambulance was put to employment first time in Korea. The fluid phase of the war and bitter cold made the number of patients skyrocket. The men wounded on the battle lines were evacuated increasingly day by day, and the critical short of doctors was a serious problem.

Many of the casualties were also delivered to the Indian Ambulance Unit by litters and jeeps. Bandaging the wounds, applying a tourniquet and giving sedatives, the dedicated Indian healers busily did emergency, life-saving surgery, and further transported the seriously cases to the rear. Their high-skilled performance to the treatment was tonic to all and soon had a higher reputation for efficiency, and devotion to duty, than any other field ambulance in Korea.

In the meantime, the actual and impending increase in the size of the Commonwealth Forces made it evident that administration should be placed
on a more regular basis. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade had already been in action for some months, the 29th British Brigade and the 60th Indian Field Ambulance had arrived in November, the 16th Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery, was due in mid-January and a Canadian Brigade was expected in early spring. The formation of a Commonwealth Division was already more than a suggestion.

A Chinese decisive attack began on New Year's Eve, and by the morning of the 1st January the situation was precarious.

On the morning of the 1st January 1951, the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit moved to an area about 10 kilometers north of Uijongbu alongside the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade which was then ordered to act as rear-guard to the friendly forces. Having completed its covering mission successfully, the whole brigade then withdrew to Seoul. Here the Indian Ambulance remained quietly until the evening of the 3rd. During the night of the 3rd-4th January the combat troops of the brigade occupied defensive positions in and around the city to cover the retirement of friendly divisions, while in the center of the formation the Indian healers promptly attended the wounded from the forward areas.

Soon after midnight on the night of the 3rd-4th January the most brigade troops crossed the Han River after the covering mission. But even after the evacuation of the city the brave commander of the Indian Ambulance Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj refused to cross the river with his Advance Dressing Station, as he was still treating some casualties. The Indian Field Ambulance Unit only crossed the Han just before the last battalion of the brigade. When they reached the opposite side of the river, they could see the last covering force closely behind them, soon the bridge was also blown with immense roaring at 1000 hours.

The Indian Field Ambulance moved back to Suwon along with the 27th Brigade then to an area some 30 kilometers south of Changhowon and then north again to Changhowon itself (about 70 Kilometers southeast of Seoul), where they arrived on 6th January 1951.

By mid of the month the United Nations withdrawal had reached its limit and the 27th Brigade and the Indian Field Ambulance Unit remained still at Changhowon. At there the Indians, as working normally with the brigade, attended numerous wounded UN soldiers evacuated from the fronts. But the extreme cold weather did not permit the Indian healers to work more freely.

As there was no buildings to use, the Indians had to set up their galley in one storage tent, used another as their "indoor" serving line, put water taylor and mess washing equipment in another, hoping that the heat from the
small generators would keep the water from freezing. It worked fine during
the day, but everything froze at night, including the galley range. The original
blood supply froze and hemolized; zepherin chloride solutions froze, plasma
units froze. They placed all out liquids together in the warmest spot they
could find trying to save them, but to no avail. Plasma could be thawed suc-
cessfully but when cold water was added, the solution gelatinized and refused
to flow into a Man’s blood stream. Finally they tied a hot-water bottle around
the solution flask to administer plasma. They kept stoves going twenty-four
hours everyday, but water froze within eight feet of a stove.

The difficulties of removing a wounded man’s clothing frozen in snow
and blood are obvious. They could not turn off the stoves even during
major operations utilizing gaseous anaesthetics. It would have been too
cold for the surgeons to work. But Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj and his
medical assistants performed their major surgery through day and night
without rest. Soon the British, American and Australian sick and wounded
were openly declaring that they wanted the Indians to minister to them, and
many a British soldier surfeited with canned hash, sampled a curry of Veer-
awamy potency and proportions. There were no “ladies with lamp” in
Korea, but the 60th Indian Field Ambulance were the next best thing.

Particularly in January 1951 three US Army helicopter detachments ar-
rived in Korea with the mission of evacuating seriously wounded from the
frontlines. Each detachment consisted of 4 helicopters, 4 pilots, and 4 me-
chanics. In the past, the tendency has been to move surgery as close to the
patient as possible. In Korea this was undesirable because of the fluid tacti-
cal situation, the limited highway net, the rough roads, and the mountainous
terrain. By the helicopter evacuation, the field hospitals in Korea could stay
longer in each location and allow four or five days of post-operative care for
a patient before further evacuation.

On arriving in Korea, two detachments were placed under the control
of the IX US Corps surgeon. Since the IX US Corps was in the center of
Korea, the helicopters were also able to serve the other corps. During the
period of following two years the intimate cooperation between the Indian
Field Ambulance and the evacuation helicopter was carried out smoothly at
an advanced clearing station or hospital, and caused a lower death rate of
the UN casualties than in any other war.

The presence of helicopters in Korea helped morale. Although much
experimentation in the use of helicopters for evacuation remained to be done,
the “ambulance of the air” has proved its usefulness in the Korean War.

On the 25th January the U.N. offensive began. In the initial stage
the 27th Brigade did not participate, still remaining in the Changhowon
area. In February, however, precautionary movement to Yoju was made successfully by the Brigade’s advance party, and the Brigade Headquarters and Indian Field Ambulance advanced to Chongan-ni, northeast of Changhownon.

After ten-day’s staying there, the Indian Field Ambulance crossed the Han River east of Yoju on orders and continued to move forward on the 19th, together with the 27th Brigade. On this day General Mark. W. Clark, the American General of World War II fame, visited the Brigade Headquarters and encouraged them. He also admired especially on the devoted activities of the Indian Field Ambulance.

Led by the Australians and Canadians, the offensive continued day by day until 27 February. At first enemy opposition was slight, but it increased considerably as the leading troops approached closer to Chipyong-ni, 20 kilometers north of Yoju.

During this advance the prompt activities of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance were excellent one. The terrain of the hills was so rough that it was impossible to bring the aid-station equipment forward, so the casualties had to be carried on stretchers for four hours to get them back to the rear aid station. Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj and his medical teams had themselves at various battalion aid stations organizing the evacuation and advising and helping the other battalions’ medical members. The Indian litter teams picked up the seriously wounded and carried down the mountain. In this operation, however, the litter teams passed the aid station and came up the road to a point only fifty meters from the base of the mountain on which the Australian battalion was fighting. Between the road and mountain were rice paddies and channels. The channels gave the Indian litter bearers a great deal of trouble because the stream was fast-flowing, waist-deep, and had large boulders in the stream bed.

On arriving the jeep evacuation point, the Indian healers checked and readjusted the bandages of wounds and observed general condition. Here the wounded were loaded to motor vehicles and sent to the advanced clearing station for further evacuation by helicopter. Although the courses of action were difficult and tired one, the efficient Indian healers worked well.

The 27th Brigade’s casualties during the last 26 days mounted to 21 killed and 70 wounded. Most of them were attended by the Indian dedicated healers, and only abdominal and other serious cases were removed promptly to the rear area by heli-lift. Besides these combat casualties, one of the most difficult problems was the triage of the frostbite cases.

They had to determine who would be a hindrance. All frostbite cases were screened by the Indian surgeons, and finally by a team consisting of the brigade surgeons and senior line officers from each battalion. As a working criteria those with large blisters or large discolored areas were subjected for
The 60th Indian Ambulance

air evacuation. It later developed that many Commonwealth troops with toes absolutely black never turned in, but made the march somehow with frozen toes.

The methodical advance continued until the 8th March. The enemy now withdrew on all front, and the 27th Brigade was relieved by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment and concentrated in a river-bed near Nolbunyo-ri, about 25 kilometers north of Yoju. At there the Brigade forces remained until 24 March in IX Corps reserve -- reorganizing and refitting. But to the Indians fighting against bruise and disease there was no time to rest a while.

At about this time, the United Nations Command was preparing another jumping plan over Munsan area, aimed to destroy the enemy at the restricted withdrawal route of Imjin River crossing and to smash elements of fleeing North Korean forces. The 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team was chosen for this assignment, and the 60th Indian Field Ambulance and some other support units were also ordered to join the operations.

A detachment of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance under Lieutenant

First aid in the battle field.
Colonel Rangaraj departed the 27th Brigade for the K-2 Airstrip near Taegu where they joined the airborne regiment being under hard parachute jump training. Early in the morning of 23 March 1951, four-thousand thirty-three US paratroopers and a detachment of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit aboarded C-119 aircraft, and flew for Munsan. The drop would be made concurrently with the departure of a column of US tanks which would effect link-up within forty-eight hours. At 0305 the qualified Indian paratroopers jumped into territory held by the enemy forces. As the engine noises subsided they could hear a considerable amount of small arms fire below. The advancing armor was then clearing the drop zone, and crushing the retreating enemy like rats at the waters edge.

Landing in soft ground the dedicated Indian healers cleared their parachute harness and headed for the regimental assembly area. At there one hundred and two men injured in the jumping were waiting for the skillful hands of the Indian healers. Promptly the Indian surgical teams bandaged the wounds and arranged emergency treatments on the pains. Ten serious injuries were carried immediately by the Indian medics to the helicopter ambulance. Throughout the whole period the Indian Field Ambulance performed very efficiently and quickly in tending casualties from the operation. On 24 March, the Indian surgical detachment relieved its mission and headed for their parent unit still remained at north of Yoji.

On 25 March the 27th Brigade moved 80 kilometers by mechanical transport to Hyon-ni, north of Chongpyong, the advance continued until 16 April. The 60th Indian Field Ambulance and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade were in reserve on the 22nd April 1951 at Chungchon-ni, just north of Kapyong.

At midnight of 25 April 1951, the 27th Brigade changed its commander and its designation. It became the 28th Brigade. Five-months’ cooperation with the 27th Commonwealth Brigade came to an end, and now the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit was attached to the 28th Commonwealth Brigade.

Early May 1951, the Indian Field Ambulance Unit moved to the area east of Seoul together with the rest of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, and on the 21st again to north some 48 kilometers from that position, behind the Imjin River line.

During the month of June, the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit was on and to dispense bandages to the wounded, medicine to the sick and potent curry to the hungry. Now the exhausted 29th British Brigade was up to strength again. And those prime architects of destruction of the Chinese, the 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment, the 45th British
Field Artillery Regiment and the 170th British Independent Mortar Battery stood to their guns, ready to give the enemy many more salutary hammerings.

But this was considerably more than just a big build-up of Commonwealth strength. In earlier days the British, Australian and Canadian troops had been in Korea to be used at the whim of an American corps commander—large enough to be shelved during a major offensive: an unsatisfactory situation, as the commanders of Commonwealth Forces had discovered on more than one occasion.

This was to be something quite new for the first time in history all ground troops from Australia, Britain, Canada, India and New Zealand more to be part of a Commonwealth operation division under a unified command.

28th July, 1951, was a memorable day for the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit. At mid of the day all the senior officers from the Commonwealth forces assembled near Tokchong, and held a short ceremony to mark the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division.

Now the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit was also integrated into the divisional troops under the command of British Major General James Cassels. However, it continued to work with the 28th Commonwealth Brigade as before. And the other divisional medical units were the 25th Canadian and 26th British Field Ambulances.

At the end of July 1951, the United Nations lines ran, in general terms, from a point on the west coast about 30 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel roughly northeast to the east coast approximately 30 kilometers north of the Parallel. The frontage held by the 1st Commonwealth Division was about 10 kilometers along the Imjin River.

From the time of the formation of the division until the 3rd October, the 60th Indian Field Ambulance performed its medical services in the rear area of the Imjin line comparatively quietly, but included a practical movement of the division defense zone to the north of the Imjin River.

On the 7th September, the Australian Battalion which had already crossed the Imjin on the 6th received an order to maintain their base north of the river as a screen force to cover the crossing of the remainder of the Division. On the day of 8th, the 60th Indian Field Ambulance crossed the river without enemy interference. Soon the rest of the division followed, and by the evening of the 12th September a new line, some 4.5 kilometers north of the river, was established with the 29th British Infantry Brigade on the left and the 25th Canadian Infantry on the right, and the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade in reserve securing the original bridgehead.

In the reserve area the 60th Indian Field Ambulance busily treated and
attended the casualties continuously evacuated from the frontline. The forward troops were so close to the enemy outposts that they were always subjected to enemy artillery and mortar fire. In a week period the Indians had to meet about seventy casualties, of which twelve were evacuated to the rear.

On 28 September, the whole division moved approximately 2,700 meters to the right, as a preliminary step of Operation "Commando" whose objective was to seize the area further north some 10 kilometers in distance from the present line. As a result of that preliminary move, a new line -- which was to be the scene of the Commonwealth Division's activities for the next 22 months -- was established along Sami-chon and the Imjin River, from left to right.

On 2 October the 60th Indian Field Ambulance moved to right sector of the new division line with the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade which was to carry out the first phase of the attack. D-Day was fixed for 3 October, 1951. The attack of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade was commenced at first light on the day. In spite of strong enemy opposition, all battalions of the Brigade made good progress.

Meanwhile, the Indian medical teams were fighting against enemy with scalpel instead of bayonet. Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj and his medical assistance followed close behind the assault troops. They busily collected the woundeds moaning here and there, and gave them first-aid and preliminary care. Total 51 friendly casualties including 10 killed took place during the first day attack. In a hurry the Indians organized litter teams and carried the casualties down the mountain. Passing through the difficult mountainous country, they reached on the regimental aid stations, where the Indian doctors gave them another active treatments and made room for these casualties by jettisoning supply and borrowing vehicles from other units. The wounded had to be stacked several deep in the litter jeeps and trailers because their number soon overflowed the transport capacity. They drove the ambulances to the division clearing station. But two men of them died on the ride out, both from stomach wounds. Only twice did the ambulances came under enemy fire, and luck was with it each time. One of the ambulances had its radiator shot away by a machine-gun burst. One wounded man lying in the bed of a truck was hit by a second bullet; he managed to survive. On arriving the clearing station the Indian medics loaded the abdominal wounds and head injuries on helicopter-ambulance for further evacuation back to the military hospitals in Seoul.

The last phase of Operation "Commando" did not finish so easily or so quickly on the front of the 28th Brigade. After several times advance and
retreat the battalions of the brigade succeeded in capturing their objectives. For the lst Commonwealth Division the operation “Commando” was practically completed on the evening of 8th October. Then, the division lay on the “Jamestown” line between the Sami-chon and the Imjin River. It had not been achieved without cost; throughout the operation the casualties totalled 58 killed and 262 wounded. About 150 of them were treated or evacuated by Indian Ambulance, and only three of them died during the evacuation and two died later in the rear hospital.

Bringing dead and seriously wounded down from the top was an arduous task. Medical aid was needed to administer medical care during the trip if the man was critically wounded, and riflemen often accompanied the litter team to protect it from enemy snipers along the trail. A critically wounded man might, and sometimes did, die before, he reached the bottom where surgical and further medical care could be given. This possibility was one of the factors that lowered morale in the U.N. soldiers fighting on mountainous area. Many men were afraid that if they were wounded there they would die before reaching adequate medical care.

But the Indian’s bold activities just behind the battle line helped the morale of troops. Regardless to enemy bullet, they concentrated their attention only to relieve humane life and suffering.

In carrying out their mercy mission the Indians made no distinction. Americans, Australians, Koreans, as well as the Prisoners-of-war, all received the same humane treatment, and if one person was treated before another, it was not because he belonged to a particular race or country, but because he needed medical aid so badly earlier than the rest. In that spirit of “merciful impartiality” the Ambulance Unit continued to work and the maroon beret became a symbol of friendliness all round. Even the enemy prisoners of war expressed amazement at the kindness and courtesy shown to them by the Indians.

The lst Commonwealth Division had now been in existence for nearly three months. It had experienced a period of very active defence, had carried out a virtually unopposed advance, followed by a major offensive against stiff opposition. These operations had all been very successful.

Until the 15th October 1951 the 60th Indian Field Ambulance and other division medical units had treated about three hundred casualties. The health of the troops had been good. During the same period 3,864 officers and other ranks were admitted sick to medical establishments of Indian or other medical services, of whom 1,358 were evacuated from Korea for further hospitalization.

With contingents from so many Commonwealth countries the rear support
organization of the Division was a somewhat complicated one. But the sensitive Indian healers had carried out their mission efficiently without friction and major difficulties. The integrated Commonwealth Division and its supporting elements in rear, had already achieved remarkable success.

On the conclusion of Operation "Commando" the Commonwealth Division continued to hold and consolidate the position which it had captured, the period from 16 to 31 October was a comparatively quiet one, although there was some shelling of the enemy artillery and mortars.

No major operational incidents occurred during the following two months, except the forward areas of the division were under sporadic enemy fire. Also there were some redeployments among the division units, and almost completely static.

In the early stage of 1952 the front was comparatively quiet, but sporadic enemy shelling and a few minor incidents. And there were some relieves in disposition of troops between the Commonwealth Brigades. At about this time the state of affairs is so familiar to the present generation of officers that the smooth working of the division in Korea was taken as a matter of course; but to many, not so well acquainted with intimate relations which have existed for so long, it may have come as a surprise.

In addition, there was remarkable Brigade Groups spirit of friendly rivalry, which was as noticeable in the 27th Commonwealth Brigade before the division was formed and in the 28th Commonwealth Brigade after its formation, as in the other two Brigades, which were not so integrated. In these two Commonwealth Brigades, Australian and United Kingdom infantrymen, New Zealand gunners and Indian medical personnel fought and worked together with the greatest accord and with enthusiastic regard for each other's professional qualities.

In April 1952, information was received that a Canadian officer was to be appointed soon as Assistant Director of Medical Services (ADMS) of the division. This would provide a suitable opportunity to assess the working of the integrated command and staff system which was such a feature of the Commonwealth Division.

On the 29th and 30th of June the 28th Commonwealth Brigade relieved the 25th Canadian Brigade in the front line, thus deploying: 28th Brigade in the left sector, 29th Brigade in the right, and the 25th Canadian Brigade in reserve.

By this time (1st July to 31st October, 1952) the battle field had become almost completely static. Both sides had constructed strong and deep defensive works, protected by mines and wire, and had perfected their defensive
fire arrangements to an extent which made patrols and raids very hazardous undertakings.

On the 25th July, the officers of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance were all invited to a farewell party, hosted by the 1st Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers. The battalion was bound to home on rotation basis after its sixteen-month's service in Korea. On this occasion, the officers of the battalion entertained and offered their deep appreciation to the Indians, and presented them with a cigarette box and salver, as a memento of their close association and outstanding and unfailing support to the battalion. On 4 August 1952, the battalion left for the United Kingdom, upon the relief by the 1st Battalion of British Fusiliers.

The Communist Chinese now deployed a greater weight of artillery and mortars and had evolved a very efficient system of defensive fire by night and day. The day of easy success was over. During the night of 13th-14th September the Commonwealth Division area was heavily shelled, mainly in the left forward sector held by the 28th Brigade and in the rear areas. Regimental Aid Station of the Norfolks in reserve was hit, and a number of shells fell near the 60th Indian Field Ambulance and in one gun position area. One man was killed in the night shelling and seven others were wounded seriously. Receiving wounds at the time were two Indians working in one storage tent. Though wounded in the face and ankle, the brave Indians wanted not to be evacuated but to join the responsibility for caring of the wounded coming into the station.

Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj and his surgeons received and cared for the casualties occurred during the day. In the case of one British soldier's wound the medical officers of the Indian Field Ambulance came to decision that it was one of those miracle wounds which happened very seldom in war. A mortar blast had entered one side of his neck and passing directly through came out on the opposite side. From front to back the blast passed midway between the esophagus and spinal column. After being hit he walked nearly 300 meters to the Indian Ambulance. One Indian doctor told him, "if I practiced for ten years I could not pierce your neck where that blast did without killing you. Son, you are just plain lucky."

It must also be recorded that during the year from 1st October 1951 to 30th September 1952, 302 serious medical cases (of which 173 were battle casualties) were evacuated from the division forward area by helicopter. For the Commonwealth Division the month of October was fairly quiet, but irregular enemy shelling.

Summarized, it may be said that the summer and late autumn of 1952 had been quiet period for the Commonwealth Division, while there occurred comparative high proportion of casualties on patrol. During that period the
Commonwealth Division had suffered 191 KIAs, 803 WIA's and 39 MIA's.

By late of 1952 the division medical units were of the 26th British, 37th Canadian and the 60th Indian Field Ambulances. The 25th Canadian Field Dressing Station had also joined the medical service. Although operating under the Assistant Director of Medical Services, these medical units had continued to work normally with the respective assigned brigades in direct support as they had served before the formation of the Commonwealth Division was also supported by the Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital -- another unit which earned a high reputation.

In addition, the 25th Canadian Field Dressing Station was an invaluable medical unit for the Commonwealth personnel. The helicopter evacuation service of the Dressing Station greatly contributed to decrease the death rate of Commonwealth troops, which was only one per cent for abdominal wounds.

Serious cases were evacuated to the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces General Hospital at Kure in Japan, and those likely to be recovered within fourteen days were usually retained at the Canadian Field Dressing

Indian medics emplane a Commonwealth wounded soldier in a helicopter ambulance.
The 60th Indian Ambulance

Station in Seoul, as an intermediate evacuation hospital with a capacity of 300 beds.

On the 16th December orders were received that the Commonwealth Division would be relieved in the line at the end of the month by the 2nd US Division and go into I US Corps reserve some 15 to 20 kilometers to the south.

The relief itself began on the 29th December and was completed by the 31st. And so the Commonwealth Division withdrew out of contact with the enemy for the first time since its formation almost eighteen months before.

In earlier year of 1952, the Commanding Officer of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance, Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj returned to home after twenty-five month's service since his arrival in Korea on 20th November 1950. His organizing ability, professional skill and high sense of duty had been the admiration of all; qualities which were matched by his successor -- Lieutenant Colonel M. B. K. Nair -- who took over command of the unit in February 1953.

The Commonwealth Division was due to return early in April to the same sector of the front which it had previously held, and by the end of March preparations were afoot to relieve the 2nd US Division.

The preliminary move began on the 6th April in fine weather. At 0800 hours on the 8th, the Commonwealth Division assumed control of the sector, and by the night of 8-9 the relief had been completed. Henceforth the Commonwealth Division occupied there until the armistice agreement was signed.

By this time the "Cease-fire" talks had got to a stage where its seemed likely that an early armistice would result. In the ground, on the other hand, the operations of each side were concentrated to occupy more important outposts as possible, before the truce being signed. Thus, local but bitter fightings took place throughout the frontline. At one time 90 to 120 rounds of the enemy shells fell per minute in the division zone, and patrol engagement in the forward area resulted heavy personnel losses on both sides. This was the last phase of the war, also one of the most desperate.

Finally the armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom at 1000 hours on the 27th July 1953, and hostilities ceased at 2200 hours. The casualties attended by the Indian Field Ambulance Unit since the Commonwealth Division returned to the line early in April 1953 were amounted to 230 wounded. Though the war was over, it could not touch the Indian's merciful heart until the wounds recovered completely.

In accordance with the armistice terms, the Commonwealth Division had to withdraw the Demilitarized Zone to post-armistice positions, the same
areas the Commonwealth units had been held when the division was formed exactly two years ago. The movement began on the 28th and was completed by 31 July. The Indian healers remained there until their separation from the Division.

On 27th August, the Commonwealth Division Commander visited the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit who was scheduled to leave the Division on the 29th to join the Armistice Custodian Force from India. The Indian Ambulance had been in Korea since November, 1950 and served with the 27th and 28th Commonwealth Brigade before the division was formed. Upon the formation of the division it became its operational subordinate unit; but owing to their early independent roles, the brigade group spirit remained very pronounced in the Commonwealth Division, and the 60th Indian Field Ambulance was always in support of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The brigade's comradeship to the Indian Medical Unit was remarkable. As a senior officer put it, "Australians, British or New Zealanders, they would have nothing to do with any other Field Ambulance." The 28th Brigade and indeed the whole division, viewed the separation of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance with the deepest regret.
CHAPTER III ACTIVITIES OF TAEGU DETACHMENT

When the Indian Field Ambulance Unit first arrived in Korea from India in November 1950, half of it was ordered to remain in Taegu under the command of Major N. B. Banerjee. His hard working men wanted work to do and Major Banerjee started looking around to see if there was anything the unit could do to help relieve the suffering and disease that was so apparent in Taegu area at that time. The United Nations medical authorities asked for assistance in the ROK Army Hospital and later at the West City Hospital. There they found a badly disrupted organization, shortage of medical supplies, doctors, nurses, food and other necessaries. Originally built as a 1,000-bed hospital, it was badly over-crowed with patients of all kinds put together. After weeks of really hard back-breaking work they brought back cleanliness and order in the hospital, organized regular supplies of food and medicine and in addition, trained thirty men and four women doctors to act as anaesthetists and surgeons, so that the wounded and injured Korean soldiers received immediate treatment of the best kind available.

In the civilian hospital conditions were found to be even worse. When the Indians first arrived they found patients lying on bare floors in the wards and corridors, dead and dying mixed together. Typhus and T. B. cases were lying side by side with surgical patients. Whole families were eating and sleeping in these premises. Babies were being born into a world full of disease and filth. An improvised operating theater was immediately set up, and for two whole weeks the surgeons and medical officers worked day and night to produce order out of the chaos and to complete all the necessary life-saving operations. The buildings were thoroughly cleaned, food was applied for from the Korean and U.N. sources. Medical supplies, particularly drugs, were obtained with great difficulty from various authorities.

In this civilian hospital alone, up to February 1953, about 1,400 serious operations had been performed. In June preceding year, an out-door dispensary was opened, to cope with the very large number of out-patients, who could not possibly be admitted to the hospital. Fifty thousand patients had been treated by February 1952, and by this time there was an average of three hundred patients a day coming for treatment. Some of these people
walked as much as ten miles for medicine, bringing with them their families, the women carrying their young on their backs. They sit outside in a great crowd waiting for the clinic to open.

A disease which was responding very well to treatment was trachoma, an eye disease which was very prevalent those days among the young children caused mainly by dust and malnutrition. At a children's orphanage a total of 130 cases was discovered, all of whom were now recovering under the regular treatment they getting. Factured limbs were also found to be taking a long time to knit together, but it was found that as soon as the diet was improved, the bones mended much quicker. The military hospital was then running by the Korean personnel, but surgeons were still called in for serious operations.

A prominent citizen of Taegu praised the work of the Indian Field Ambulance with the words, “it is now a number one hospital.” Proud possessors of a Meritorious Unit Citation awarded to them by the ROK Army in greatful recognition of their deeds, and also a US Army Citation, these medical soldiers felt that when they eventually had to pull out of Taegu, they could be confident that they were to leaving behind a Korean staff who carry out the good work.

During the period, some Indians from the main body of the 60th Ambulance Unit working with the Commonwealth Division came down to the Taegu Detachment occasionally for a shortwhile rest as circumstances permitted.
CHAPTER IV POST-WAR ACTIVITY

Section 1. Epilogue

The Indian Field Ambulance Unit was awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation by the United Nations Commander. It cited, "the 60th Indian Field Ambulance displayed such outstanding devotion and superior performance of exceptionally difficult tasks as to set it apart and above other units with similar missions. The individual and collective professional standards and conscientious achievements of members of this particular organization reflect the highest credit on themselves, their homeland, and the United Nations forces."

The 60th Indian Field Ambulance returned to India after three years and three months in Korea. The President of India gave immediate recognition to the excellent work done by it by granting many awards for gallantry to the personnel of the unit. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj, won the Mahar Vir Chakra along with Major N. B. Banerjee. General Cariappa on behalf of himself and all ranks of the Indian Army, felicitated Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj on the splendid account he and his men had been putting up in Korea.

Altogether the unit won two Mahar Vir Chakras, four Vir Chakras and 24 Mentions-in-Despatches — a splendid record for a small unit just over 300 officers and men.

A tribute came from Eric Linklater, the well-known novelist, who was writing the official history of the Commonwealth Forces in the Korean campaign. He said: "Of the political relationship of India to the Commonwealth very few soldiers, I imagine, could tell you much; but of the Indian Field Ambulance they will say: "It is the smartest unit in Korea."

Section 2. Indian Custodian Force

Still another important factor was the persistent activity of the Government of India in attempting to bring about the longed-for armistice. The
Indians initiated certain actions which later helped the combatants. One of these was a resolution introduced into the U.N. General Assembly on December 3, 1952, calling for a ceasefire on the basis that “force shall not be used” against the POWs but that there be organized a repatriation commission composed of neutral nations, to take charge of the prisoners for 120 days. During that period, the Indians proposed, the prisoners would have their rights explained to them and then would choose freely where they would go. The Indian plan was accepted by fifty-four nations, but was initially rejected by Moscow and Peking regimes.

A few days later, another Indian resolution, presented to the League of Red Cross Societies at Geneva, Switzerland, eventually became the vehicle which led to the ceasefire. In this second resolution, the Indians recommended that sick and wounded prisoners be exchanged in advance of a ceasefire. The resolution was approved by the League.

In March and April 1953, the situation was abruptly changed when on 28 March, the Communists at last agreed to negotiate an immediate exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners. The agreement was signed on 11 April and completed the general arrangements. Within ten days the exchange at Panmunjom would begin, with the enemy delivering 100 and the UNC 500 a day in groups of 25 at a time.

The final tally of deliveries disclosed on the 3rd May that the UNC had relieved itself of 6,670 Communist sick and wounded POWs. In return the enemy had brought 684 assorted sick and wounded to Panmunjom.

Eventually the tragic war of three years came to an end with the signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953, and all prisoners who wished to be repatriated were to be handed over within sixty days. This was to be arranged by a Committee for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War, consisting of three officers from each side, and supervised by a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, consisting of officers from India, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Poland.

To the Government and Army of India had fallen the main task in connection with the repatriation of prisoners of war. Lieutenant General Thimayya, Indian Army, was appointed chairman of the Neutral Nations Commission for Repatriation, and a Custodian Force, some 5,000 strong, was organized in India under the command of Major General S. S. P. Thorat. The first contingent sailed from Madras on 18th August 1953. As each contingent arrived in Korea, and disembarked at Inchon, it was flown by United States aircraft to the Demilitarized Zone.

As was to be expected, the somewhat complicated arrangements for the exchange of prisoners did not always work smoothly, and at times there
Indian Custodian troops lead the repatriation of ROK POWs through the Freedom Bridge. There was much argument and accusations of breaches of the agreement. By 6 September, 1953, the Communists had returned some 12,750 prisoners. The U.N. Command turned over to the Communists 75,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners.

Prisoners who did not want to go home were to remain the responsibility of the Repatriation Commission for the next four months; the Commission entrusted their care to the Indian Custodian Force. Some 22,600 Communist prisoners refused repatriation were screened by a neutral commission at Freedom Village, Panmunjom, and his own people allowed to persuade him, while the Indian Army stood guard. This resulted in the exchange of some 620 more Chinese and North Koreans out of 22,600 Communist prisoners and for nine out of 360 U.N. prisoners. It must be true that, "watching the Communist tactics, the Indian Army became a decidedly anti-Communist whatever the notions of its government."

In early January 1954, as the 120-day deadline for release of the prisoners approached, nerves grew taut. The Indians, caught between the U.N. and Communist crossfires, decided they could not make a decision. They therefore declared that their legal responsibilities for the prisoners would
end after 120 days (on January 23) and that they would return them to the original detaining sides. This was done and the U.N. Command, at one minute after midnight of the 23rd January 1954, promptly declared the prisoners to be "civilians." The nonrepatriates marched out of their compounds and were turned over to the Chinese Nationalist government, in the case of Red Chinese prisoners and to the Republic of Korea, in the case of the North Koreans. In this way, after their tortuous adventures, come 22,000 prisoners won their freedom.

Near Munsan on 7 February 1954, Major General Murry and senior officers of the Commonwealth Division entertained Marjor General S. S. P. Thorat, Brigadier R. S. Paintal (Commander, 190th Indian Infantry Brigade) and more than twenty other officers of the Indian Custodian Force. After a programme of pipe music by the Pipe Band of the Royal Scots, General Murray presented Brigadier Paintal with a silver plaque as a token of the Commonwealth Division's admiration for the manner in which the Custodian Force had carried out its exacting duties. The plaque consisted of an engraved map of Korea above the Commonwealth Division shield, followed by this inscription:

"Presented to 190th Indian Infantry Brigade by 1st Commonwealth Division as a token of their admiration for steering so fine a course between the rock of Scylla and the Whirlpool of Charybdis—Korea 1953-1954."

On 22 February 1954, its mission ended, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was liquidated. President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea was much pleased with the outcome, and the friendly democratic nations thanked Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for the delicate operation by the Indian force.

The last of the Indian Custodian Force embarked at Inchon for India on 23 February 1954. On the same day Lieutenant General Thimayya left Kimpo Airport to fly to Japan. He had a great send-off, as it was generally recognized that he had performed a most unpleasant and irksome duty with skill and judgement.
# CHRONOLOGY

## 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 20</td>
<td>The 60th Indian Field Ambulance Unit arrives at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 4</td>
<td>The Indian Unit arrives at Pyongyang, the north Korean capital, dropping its Detachment in Taegu on the way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 5</td>
<td>Pulls out from Pyongyang by CCF aggression, and continues its withdrawal for southward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 14</td>
<td>Joins the 27th Commonwealth Brigade at Uijongbu.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1</td>
<td>Withdraws to Seoul with the 27th Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 6</td>
<td>Moves back to Changhowon, remains there until 4th February in reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>The advance to north continues until 27th February with the 27th Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 13-14</td>
<td>Indian Ambulance remains with the 27th Brigade in IX Corps reserve in the vicinity of Nobunyo-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 23</td>
<td>A detachment of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance joins the airlift operation over Munsan area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 22</td>
<td>Remains in reserve at Chongchon-ni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 25</td>
<td>The unit is placed under the 28th Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21</td>
<td>Moves to the Imjin River line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td>Integrated into the 1st Commonwealth Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-Aug</td>
<td>Continues its medical services in the Imjin River line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 3-8</td>
<td>Operation Commando commenced. The first-day attack launched by the 28th Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 16-31</td>
<td>Maintains position in the vicinity of north of the Imjin River.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Nov</td>
<td>Remains in the vicinity of the Imjin River area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 28-31</td>
<td>Comes under I US Corps reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rangaraj returned to home, and Lieutenant Colonel M. B. K. Nair succeeds him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr</td>
<td>The unit returns with the Commonwealth units back to the Imjin River line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>Armistice Agreement signed at Panmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-31 July</td>
<td>Withdraws to the south of the Imjin River area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug</td>
<td>Leaves the Commonwealth Division to join the Indian Custodian Force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART SIX

THE NEW ZEALAND FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to New Zealand

New Zealand is an independent monarchical state and a constituent member of the Commonwealth of Nations, consisting of a series of islands in the southwest Pacific.

Two major islands, North (114,687 square kilometers) and South (150, 460 square kilometers) Islands, harbor most of the country's estimated total population of 2,680,000 in 1966.

The economy of New Zealand is extremely dependent on specialized production, especially of primary products, on their disposal overseas, and on the large volume of maritime commerce entailed. Swiftly converting from a pro-European forested land into a land of productive pasture, the country has the highest proportion of livestock to its human population. Thus almost 70% of the occupied land (45% of the total area) is devoted directly to the support of sheep and cattle. But of particular importance is despite the country's dependence on pastoral agriculture, it has a highly urbanized society, and only 13% of the total labour force is engaged in primary industries.

In World War I and II, New Zealand supported Great Britain by sending men overseas and producing food and wool. In World War II the Japanese brought danger close to New Zealand's shores; in the earlier conflict the peace of the Pacific was seldom disturbed.

In her postwar external relations the ANZUS Pact (1951) is of particular importance. This defensive alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States reflects what US efforts in the Pacific campaign meant in her defense, a new situation in view of her historical loyalty to Great Britain. This development, however, did not change New Zealand's close affinity with Great Britain, nor its loyalty to the Commonwealth of Nations. Independence and close identity were found to be compatible.

New Zealand entered the United Nations as a charter member in 1945 and set in the Trusteeship Council. She also became deeply involved in Southeast Asia. From 1951, through the Colombo Plan, it provided
assistance to many Southeast Asian countries. More militantly, apart from
Korean actions, New Zealanders fought in Malaya, and Vietnam further,
and became an enthusiastic member of the SEATO.

In fulfillment of its obligation under the United Nations charter New
Zealand sent troops and warships to join the United Nations forces in Korea.
New Zealand also supplied some officers for the Fiji military forces. Following
the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty of January 1955, there was a redirection
of New Zealand's defense effort, when the country's commitments
in the Middle East were transferred to the Southeast Asia area.

In 1958 compulsory military training was abolished but in 1961 a form
of selective national service for the army was reintroduced. A small force
served in Malaysia from mid-1960s and later New Zealand accepted obligations
under SEATO to assist the Republic of Vietnam. By 1969, 540 servicemen,
including artillery, medical services and logistics personnel, served in
that area, symbolically shouldering with the Republic of Korea troops.

Section 2. Summary of New Zealand Participation

Upon the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the New Zealand
Government decided without delay to contribute both ships and troops to the
United Nations effort in support of the Republic of Korea.

Two Royal New Zealand Navy frigates, HMNZS Pukaki and HMNZS
Tutira, were despatched to Korea on 3 July 1950. Throughout the war two
New Zealand vessels were maintained in the operational zone, the original
frigates being followed, at intervals, by HMNZ ships Rotoiti (two tours),
Hawea (two tours), Taupo and Kaniere. The duties of the frigates consisted
mainly of interminable, but essential, patrolling as part of the successful
Allied effort to command the seas in the region. Islands held by ROK forces
were defended from enemy attack, raiding parties were supported, supply
operations protected, and enemy shore positions and communications bom-
barded. In all, some 1,350 men of the RNZN—half of its complement—
saw service during the Korean campaign.

The Army's contribution took rather longer to arrive in the theater as
a force had to be specially recruited and trained. It left New Zealand on 11
December 1950 and became operational on 22 January 1951. The main com-
ponent of New Zealand Army's contribution was the 16th Field Regiment,
New Zealand Artillery, which was equipped with 25 pounder guns. They
provided artillery support for the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and later for
the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and other units of the 1st Commonwealth
Division. New Zealand also contributed minor units to this division,
including a transport company, part of the Divisional Signals Regiment,
a transport platoon, and staff officers at Division Headquarters.

The New Zealand land force arrived in Korea some months after the Red
Chinese had attacked in strength and flung the United Nations armies far
back from the Yalu River. It took part in the sometimes desperate battles
to stem the Chinese advance, the 16th Field Regiment particularly distin-
guishing itself during the Chinese spring offensive in 1951. From 22-25 April
1951, at the Battle of Kapyong the gunners gave almost continuous support
to units of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and the 6th ROK Division as
they dealt with a very dangerous situation that had emerged. For their
efforts in this action, the regiment was awarded the Republic of Korea Pres-
idential Unit Citation. During the later battles after the line had been
generally stabilized, it often gave artillery support to American units. By
the time of the Armistice on 27 July 1953 it had fired over three quarters
of a million shells, the highest total of any field regiment in the war. Most
of the New Zealand soldiers were withdrawn from Korea late in 1954.

Two sailors and 37 soldiers of the New Zealand Armed Forces lost their
lives during the war. (See Sketch Map 1.)

Section 3. Decision to Commitment

Both as a member of the United Nations and a Pacific country, New
Zealand had been deeply interested even before the outbreak of the war in
establishing peace, freedom, and stability in Korea.

The New Zealand representative at the General Assembly accordingly
supported the three Assembly resolutions of November 1947, December 1948
and October 1949, the principal objective of which was the creation of a free,
unified and independent state in Korea. On 29 June 1949, New Zealand
gave formal recognition to the Republic of Korea as an independent sov-
ereign state whose territory was that part of the Korean peninsula in which
free elections were held under the observation of the United Nations Tempo-
rary Commission, and to the Government led by President Syngman Rhee
as the lawful Government of that country.

The New Zealand Government were therefore gravely concerned at the
all-out invasion by the North Korean forces against the duly constituted
Republic of Korea. Thirty hours after the UN Security Council passed the resolution of 27 June calling for assistance from member states in repelling the armed attack by the forces of North Korea and restoring peace and security, Prime Minister S. G. Holland addressed in the House of Representatives that the New Zealand Government fully welcomed the measures taken by the Security Council and that they would do whatever lay within their power to fulfil the obligations New Zealand had incurred under the United Nations Charter. After informing the legislature of his close consultation with British and US Governments, he went on with finality that New Zealand was prepared to make available units of the Royal New Zealand Navy should this form of assistance be required.

But in the theater of the Korean War, the situation deteriorated day by day. By the evening of 1 July, the Prime Minister found himself announcing the nation the formal commitment of Royal New Zealand Navy to Korea. Following contacts with British and US Service authorities in Far Eastern waters and mindful of the single-handed burden the US Navy bore out in the Korean waters, the two New Zealand frigates HMNZ Pukaki and Tutira were given orders to sail for Hong Kong en route to the Korean area. Two days later on Monday, these two vessels slipped off to Korea leaving behind flag-waving crowds of Auckland.

On 14 July, when the United Nations forces were wounded fatally and forced back towards the last minute bridgehead of the Naktong River, the Secretary General of the United Nations asked the New Zealand and other governments for further assistance, particularly by way of ground forces. The Korean issue now became a fervent object of debates among the New Zealanders. For the government it meant hectic discussions in the Defense Committee with the Service Chiefs present and in Cabinet, and maintaining further consultations with other Commonwealth nations and the US authorities in the theater.

On 26 July the nation at last came to a decision: Prime Minister S. G. Holland stated in the House of Representatives that in view of the gravity of the situation created by North Korean aggression and of the further appeal by the United Nations for additional effective forces, the Government had decided to make an immediate offer to the Secretary-General of a special combat unit for service with other UN ground forces. It was also stated that, subject to the outcome of consultations then proceeding with other Governments, it would probably take the form of an artillery force. And finally he ordered Army offices to start to receive volunteers for this combat unit from 8 a.m. the following morning.

There were, however, some constitutional problems involved because
there was no statutory provision for the raising of a force for Korea. The special legislation, the Emergency Forces Act 1950, was therefore, enacted to provide for the raising of volunteer forces to fulfil the obligations undertaken by New Zealand in the Charter of the United Nations, and to provide, also for the making of emergency regulations to safeguard the interests of the servicemen and their dependents.

So New Zealand was now firmly resolved to go to war in Korea carrying high the traditions of Commonwealth soldiery. Around the globe in the Commonwealth of Nations, July were on in a flurry of similar decisions. Since 24 August 1950 the British had been the lone representation of the Commonwealth ground forces in Korea, to be added soon by Australia's infantry battalion in September. At close heels of New Zealand, Canada would announce one brigade for Korea which was to arrive seven weeks earlier than New Zealanders.

Section 4. Preparation for Korea

At 0800, 27 July 1950 immediately after recruiting opened volunteers began calling at Army offices throughout the country in substantial numbers. The response to the appeal for volunteers was excellent and when recruiting closed on 5 August, 9 days after it had opened, 5,982 men had offered their services. The Maori population was well represented; as was almost every trade and profession in the country. The difficulty occurred, however, as insufficient artillery officers volunteered to fill all the vacancies in the commissioned ranks of the force. It was solved eventually by holding two intensive training courses—one for officers of other arms to be converted to artillery, and the other for first appointment to commissions—and by seconding 10 regular officers.

Meanwhile, after consultations with the United Kingdom and Australian governments as to the eventual composition of the Commonwealth forces required for service in Korea, the following order of battle for the New Zealand component was decided upon:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NZ Base HQ</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th NZ Field Regiment</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th NZ Field Regiment Light Aid Detachment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th NZ Field Regiment Signal Troops</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Transport Platoon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Base Reinforcement Units</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>915</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacements to accompany K force Total (Approx.)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,017</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brigadier R. S. Park, former Military Adviser to Paris Peace Conference in 1946 and occupant of important military posts in World War II, was recalled from the Retired List to fill the appointment of commander of the force. He would be mainly concerned with its overall administration and would deal with such questions as pay, welfare, promotions and discipline etc. He would not have any operational command. Major J. W. Moodie, RNZA, formerly second in command of the 3rd Field Regiment RNZA was appointed commanding officer of the Korea-bound 16th Field Artillery Regiment with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

On 6 August the eyes of the volunteers ran excitedly over the final calling-up notices -- the selected were overjoyed and others, turned down, held to last chance of being called in future teams. On 29 August the force, with a modest sprinkling of regulars, of 1,000 all ranks, entered one of the three District Training Camps (Papakura, Linton or Burnham) to commence their initial training.

During the first week in camp, selected volunteers were outfitted, and processed; training commenced on 6 September. Throughout the month, the officers and men of the regiment were hard at work doing their basic training, getting fit and becoming efficient gunners. In the meantime, officer candidates, selected to fill the shortage, attended three weeks basic officers' course at the Army School at Trentham.

By 4 October all "Kayforce," as the force was known, with the exception of signals and ordnance, were gathered at Waiouru for a concentrated spell of artillery training. The first half of November passed with soldiers sweating out for troop and battery training. In the latter half, there took place a final feature of the training-- a three day regimental exercise in the field. The exercise was carried out as closely as possible under battlefield conditions and restrictions. The RNZAF cooperated in providing additional realism in the form of mock convoy attacks, photo reconnaissance, flare dropping over bivouac areas and close air support.

By 29 November the training was pronounced complete. Observers were in accord that the standard of training aimed at was achieved to a remarkable degree by the average recruit, and the curricula had proved to leave nothing to be desired. However, although no case of physical or mental breakdown was reported in instructor staffs or trainees, the tempo of training
was judged to have been at rather too high a pitch throughout. This only finds justifications that only 1 in 10 of the recruits had artillery experience and one-third previous service experience of any kind and the consequent Government anxiety to mold the best with minimum delay. To the recruits nevertheless this tension constituted neither a cause to be less responsive to training nor any complaints. Throughout they maintained high standard of discipline and excellent enthusiasm -- an apparent resolution that what they lacked in experience they would more than make up in enthusiasm.

In late November the freighter *Ganges* left New Zealand carrying the guns and other heavy equipment for the regiment. The freighter was unloaded at Pusan by a small advance party which had flown to Korea under the command of Lieutenant (later promoted Major) P. King.

As December opened, Wellington was full of usuall crop of gossips and headlines about the latest developments of the Kayforce. Following a well-earned few days' leave, the soldiers were in fact, alerted making a final check on personal kits and field instructions. On 10 December the city was at full attention; the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment was going to Korea. Along the street routes and docksides waving flags, the crowds stormed in. Between the dignitaries present, in uniforms or otherwise, and Colonel Moodie, solemn words were exchanged. With modest pomp and pageantry, the Kayforce filed up the gangways onto the blue cruiser *HMS Ormonde* and some, having stowed their kit, thronged the decks. Some men sang and whistled and other yelled good byes to their kins as gang ways were closed and disconnected.

Then *HMS Ormonde* slowly slipped down the Wellington waterways towards the Cook Straits and the open sea towards Korea.
CHAPTER II  THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT

Section 1.  The Arrival and the General Situation

On New Year's Eve of 1950, Pusan -- Korea's southern terminus as well as a major port of entry -- was in a mood of celebration: When the ship's PA system announced the destination was in sight, cheer roared as sea-weary Kiwi soldiers surged up towards forepart decks.

For the soldiers twenty one days had not been a pleasant cruise, and each day afloat had been devoted to training: on charts and maps men worked hard to master perfect gunnery; there continued strenuous physical training. In a deep cabin, Lieutenant Colonel Moodie, closely followed the developments in the Korean theater and daily staff meetings were sometimes carried far into the nights.

On the quayside there were flags everywhere and Korean girls, in neat traditional attire, threw darts of flowers around the neck of disembarking New Zealanders. Local citizens, first grim in critical appraisal of the newcomers, seemed relieved when they apparently read confidence and invincibility in fighters' eyes.

When the debarkation was completed, the Regiment was ordered to move to the first bivouac area, some a half hour's foot march past the Pusanjin Station. The orders allowed two weeks in Pusan before the move to Miryang. Later it would tell it to join the 27th British Brigade at Changhowon by 22 January 1951 as its supporting artillery regiment.

The stay in Pusan was rather eventless; artillery and other equipments were sorted out and classified and soldiers were always on usual portion of trainings. The regiment was first attached a week after the arrival to the 24th US Division and became a frequent spot of visits by Major General John H. Church, the latter's commander and other senior officers.

Men most from the land free of frost, full rigors of the Korean winter presented to New Zealanders another enemy to overcome although Pusan enjoys the mildest temperature in the peninsula.

In the evening of 12 January the transport platoon of the regiment was
alerted for the movement. But it was not until the next morning that it learned that it was going to Miryang, about 65 kilometers north of Pusan, to calibrate the guns. By 1900 all the motor convoys arrived safely at that scenic village except one mishap.

The incident represented an increase in guerrilla activity which seemed to have been planned to coincide with the drive down the East Coast by the Communist forces and taught something of ubiquitous presence of dangers. As had been discovered by a later searching party, guerrillas ambushed during the movement a jeep carrying Warrant Officer R. G. Long and his driver, Gunner R. MacDonald, which must have mistakenly turned off the main supply route. These guerrillas first tied their captives’ hands behind their backs, clubbed them on the chest, bayoneted them in the stomach and shot them in the throat. The murderers then stripped the officer and dragged him to a hilltop where one of them cut off his hand to remove his wrist watch. A trail of bloodstain showed late searchers where the dying man had crawled into a nearby hamlet and knocked vainly on door after door in search of shelter. His friends finally found him dead in a haystack.

At Miryang, surrounded by orchards and a stretch of the Naktong River a week’s training passed rather peacefully. The regiment was busy calibrating the guns and getting ready for action. On 18 January the orders arrived: "New Zealand FA move by organic motor transportation commencing 20 Jan 1951 from present location to the vicinity of Pyongam-ni, CR 7797 by night of 21 January. Upon arrival at destination FA is attached to 27th British Brigade." Thus on the 20th the long convoy started out and moved into position in support of the 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade.

Since the 27th British Infantry Brigade came from Hong Kong on 24 August 1950, it had been in Korean actions without benefits of neither artillery nor any other supporting arms until the arrival of the 29th British Infantry Brigade in November and the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment in December. When the United Nations forces achieved a breakthrough from the Pusan perimeter with amphibious actions around Inchon, the brigade advanced to Taegu on 4 October where it redesignated itself "the 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade" being added by the first Commonwealth troops — a battalion from Australia.

With the ROK and US forces in pursuit of the aggressors well across the 38th Parallel, it proceeded to Kaesong for operations in North Korea under the 1st US Cavalry Division. In October, the Chinese invasion still in strong probability, some ROK and UN units reached as far north as the Yalu River line.

For the United Nations Command, November passed in complete
disillusionment and surprise; The Communist Chinese forces were now evidently in Korea and on 26 November their crucial blow fell on the II ROK Corps and US units at Tokchon.

From mid-November, the 27th Brigade, with the rest of UN forces, was in general retreat, which was to be continued to the areas south of Seoul. On 14 December the brigade met the newly arrived 60th Indian Field Ambulance (Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Rangaraj), at Uijongbu on the retreat. In December two other additions would be made to the strength of the Commonwealth ground forces in Korea—the 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, a harbinger of Canada's 25th Brigade, would arrive on 18 December and another, the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment.

By January 1951 the United Nations retreat had reached its limit, and the line ran from the coast near Pyongtaek about the 37th Parallel to near Wonju in central Korea, and thence to the east coast at Kangnung, some 30 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel.

The 29th British Brigade, another brigade which arrived in mid-November was on the extreme left of the line around Pyongtaek, with the 3rd US Division on its right. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was at Changhowon with the 60th Indian Field Ambulance. Soon New Zealanders would arrive there.

Section 2. With the 27th Brigade

On 22 January 1951 in a full fury of Syberian winter the 16th New Zealand Regiment arrived at the snow-crusted command post of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, at Tohwadong 12 kilometers due south of Changhowon. The 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade now consisted of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel I. B. Ferguson), the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel A.M. Man), the 1st Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Lieutenant Colonel Neilson) and the 60th Indian Field Ambulance (Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Rangaraj) and was commanded by an Englishman, Brigadier Coad, and now came New Zealanders with powerful 25-pounders to a brigade which had never enjoyed its organic artillery support. The brigade, as was told before, left Hong Kong with virtually nothing except the 1st Battalion, Argylls and the 1st Battalion, Middlesex; it had no tanks or engineers; no medical unit, and only a bare minimum of vehicles. Long dependence on
US battery, though performed in remarkable cooperation, had been proved rather discouraging in a war of insurmountably heavy artillery demands.

In a briefing at the brigade's command post following the tidying up of accouterments and artillery pieces Colonel Moodie obtained first-hand information on the situation and assessed the Regiment's future. While fierce fighting continued on the X US Corps front in the Wonju area, the I US Corps (attached to was the 27th Brigade) stopped withdrawal and began early January to make a cautious and slow advance. By 7 January the brigade established its position around Haejungni 11 kilometers west of Changhowon and some 65 kilometers southeast of Seoul, where it would until the month's end perform rather static role, deep patrolling and manning monotonously frozen slit trenches. Now the Australians had the left forward front position around Haengsim-chon with the Argylls right forward and the 6th ROK Division on the right flank of it. The English battalion, 1st Battalion, Middlesex, was in the brigade far left adjoining to the 24th US Infantry.

The regiment was given a week's time to ready for the take-over from a US battery. Observation post officers were sent to each battalion. The regiment's 163rd battery was decided to support the Australian battalion which was the most forward unit, with Major B. W. Hunt being New Zealand artillery liaison officer and Captains H. Honnor and J. G. T. MacLanachan as company observation post officers to the latter's headquarters. From 0600 on 28 January the regiment officially took over support of the brigade from a US artillery battalion which had been equipped with 105-mm howitzers.

The regiment's first action in Korea which came at the midday of the next day was for the Australians. About noon as the 163rd Battery stood by behind the Australian position at Haengsim-chon, stomping their feet and slapping their arms to keep warm, the radio cracked into life: "Battery target suspected enemy movement in village." When given firing data, from the 163rd Battery command post fire orders echoed out and the gunners leapt into action. "Take Post...Battery target." The ranging gun barked into life and the first Kiwi shell screamed on its way toward the CCF enemy. Down came corrections from the forward observation officer, Captain H. Honnor and the whole battery opened up again. The Australian commanders peering out the performance were instantly astounded; those New Zealanders worked a miracle in three month's training out of amateurs of artillery in every sense.

On 25 January the expected United Nations offensive began. But the 16th Artillery Regiment did not participate in the initial stages, but remained deployed in its positions with the rest of the 27th Brigade. A US regiment
The Artillery Regiment

from the IX US Corps entered Ichon unopposed on this day. On the 30th the brigade came directly under the IX US Corps (Major General Moore) and to concentrate in and around Changhowon.

The enemy counterattacked Ichon on 2 February threatening to grow into a large scale offensive. As a precautionary measure the Argylls were moved forward that morning to Yoju (23 kilometers east of Ichon) and the 27th Brigade Headquarters opened at Changan halfway between Yoju and Changhowon with Middlesex Battalion. In the meantime, the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment was preparing at Changhowon for the move to Yoju. The weather fortunately had turned fine and warm and occasionally New Zealanders mingled in washing their clothes and resting with Australians, who had remained to guard the Corps Headquarters south of the village.

On 5 February the New Zealand artillery joined the brigade at Changan- ni. By then, however, the situation on the Ichon front had greatly improved, allowing the regiment a period of rest.

On 14 February the brigade came under the command of the 2nd US Division and received orders to cross the Han river at Yoju at once and advance north to relieve the latter’s element and the French battalion which had been cut off in the Chipyong area, some 16 kilometers north of Yoju. Earlier in the second week of last November when patrol reports warned of much enemy activities on Yoju-Chipyong route, the 16th NZ Artillery Regiment had been ordered to destroy ice-covered highway on the Han River. Ice was, however, so thick that attempts to crack this natural bridge with 25-pounder shells had failed. Later American engineers had constructed a pontoon bridge alongside the existing ford on which now the brigade was to cross.

For a month the brigade would be highly mobile and on the move continuously pressing forward 24 kilometers until March 13. The extent of burden and chores entailing the movement of artillery in mobile warfare does not seem likely to be understood by men of other services. Gunners go through multiple processes in which gun pieces are packed, strapped and toed, and ammunitions sorted out and also tightly packed. When the trek comprises of the rugged and inhospitable country, just as the Yoju-Chipyong route, without roads or any of the normal amenities of life, the trouble reaches near insurmountable degree breaking the back of artillerymen. Generally, March brought New Zealand gunners more than usual share of hard work involved in movements other than normal artillery support missions.

Now Peter Battery was in direct support of Middlesex battalion which was to lead the advance, Queen Battery supported the Argylls and Roger Battery was in support of the Australian battalion. On 14 February the
Movement on deeply rutted tracks.

Middlesex battalion captured Hill 112 (about 10 kilometers north of the river) and the Australians moved up to another feature on their left and the Argylls on the right.

At about 0530 on the 15th the Middlesex battalion was under full counterattack of the CCF. The attack swept in relentlessly as assaulting waves of Chinese broke screaming over A Company area, where Captain A. A. Roxburgh (later promoted Major) was forward observation officer and Lance Bombardier H. K. McGubbin, his radio operator. While the former directed the withering rain of artillery fire, the both had to defend their post with small arms. Soon after first light the attack let up. The two protected their position tenaciously to the last bringing in the fire of Peter Battery and killed many of the attackers. Captain Roxburgh was later awarded the Military Cross and Lance Bombardier McGubbin the Military Medal for their part in this action.

Until 13 March when the brigade was relieved by a US regiment, the 16th Field Regiment could advance about 24 kilometers north of Yoju and was concentrated near Nolbunyo-ri. This ended a very strenuous period of operations which had lasted for 26 days and now men were ordered into US
IX Corps reserve. Since the operations had been a part of general advance towards the 38th Parallel against Communist Chinese and North Korean rear guard action very few of artillery missions deserve detailed account.

On 19 February the brigade was made "Four Square" by the arrival of a Canadian battalion, the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and participated in the Eighth Army's Operation Killer, an attempt to trap the enemy in a pincers movement. Although the major aim of the attack was not achieved, the week-long advance continued over 32 kilometers.

During that time, the Regiment fired its first creeping barrage in support of the Canadian and Australian Battalions on 23 February. As the infantry would move in close to the protective line of artillery fire, the range of the guns would be lifted another two or three hundred yards to establish a farther barrage.

The Regiment remained at Nolbunyo-ri until 24th March in IX US Corps reserve -- resting and refitting. Here for the first time in Korea New Zealanders could enjoy hot showers, films, and well-earned rest. During this period Brigadier Coad was relieved by Brigadier Burke. The regiment's rest was, however, cut short when it supported the 1st US Marine Division for two days a few miles east of Hongchon.

On 25 March the brigade with New Zealanders moved 80 kilometers by mechanical transport to Hyon-ni, where they came under the command of the 24th US Division.

The advance, to the line Benton, some 8 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel, continued until 16 April. The last week -- up the Kapyong road -- was a very strenuous period for the whole brigade. Several small engagements took place and a number of casualties were suffered in minor actions. In the meantime, on 8 April in a Middlesex attempt to gain a hill, it was so effectively pounded by the 16th RNZA the feature was taken on the next day without opposition. And on the 15th the Regiment was in support of the Australians attacking Hill 951 (Sardine). The advance was terminated on 19 April when the brigade was relieved by the 19th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division. However, the Regiment was ordered to remain with the ROK division and the rest of the brigade moved south to an area immediately north of the village of Kapyong in the IX Corps reserve area.
Section 3. Battle of Kapyong
(22-25 April 1951)

The Regiment's first major test came during 22-25 April 1951 when the CCF Spring Offensive struck in great strength and sought to achieve a complete breakthrough. Pitched against unusually precarious set-up, muzzles of the 25 pounders never eased glowing on the night of the 22th and New Zealanders, stripped to the waist, made yet another heroic stand, which was materially substantiated in the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.

Before returning to the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment which was as of 19 April in support of the 6th ROK Division on Line Benton while the rest of the brigade in IX US Corps reserve, an explanation of general situation in which the enemy offensive was launched seems necessary.

In fact the previous advance of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade on the line Benton was a portion of the UN forces' wider picture of methodical advance towards the Iron Triangle. This area was located in central Korea, the center of the triangle being 32 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel and about 100 kilometers northeast of Seoul. It had been known for some time that the Chinese were preparing another large scale offensive. In order to nip off the enemy ambition, the I and IX US Corps on 9 April launched an offensive south of the triangle. Resistance was stiff and progress slow, but by 21 April the friendly troops had secured an intermediate line, and arrangements were made to push forward along practically the whole UN front. These offensive moves may have hindered the enemy preparations, and possibly delayed him; but they did not prevent the launching of his attack, which began on 22 April.

Releasing the thunderbolt of 35,000 troops supported by the tank units in three directions, the major blow would fall upon the west to isolate Seoul by enveloping the I and IX US Corps, simultaneously from the west and mid-west. In the IX US Corps sector, the 6th ROK Division, which was supported by New Zealand artillery, was to be hit badly by two CCF divisions south of Kumhwa on the Benton Line exposing a gap between the 24th Infantry and 1st US Marine divisions. By 26 April the road communications linking Seoul-Kapyong-Chunchon would be in the enemy hands resulting in the corps' withdrawal to the south bank of the Pukhan River.
In New Zealand gun pits around Sachang-ni the imminence of the CCF attack which came repeatedly through information reports was hard to realize: Azaleas all around on this once gelid ground and few actions since they had moved up on 19 April made them dispel, if momentarily, the warning that they would be directly in the path of CCF heavy offensive.

They thought of the rest of the brigade which was some 25 kilometers south well behind the line at Kapyong and the Australians who must be in full preparation for Anzac Day on 25 April.

For them there seemed to be no cause to worry; the weather could not be better in rest camps. Between them and the enemy were the 6th ROK Division, flanked by battle-tried US divisions.

But intelligence reports warned of the attack and a formidable build-up in the area north of the line Chorwon-Hwachon became obviously clear when these were attested unanimously by CCF and North Korean prisoners. It was learned later that opposite the front of the 6th ROK Division and the 24th US Infantry and 1st US Marine Division on its left and right respectively, the CCF had mustered the 118th Division of its celebrated Third Field Army for the offensive.

Under the brightest moon the attack began on the night of 22 April with the CCF artillery bombardment reaching unprecedented degree. The 6th ROK Division which bore the brunt of the offensive in this area was from the onset outgunned and outnumbered with only the New Zealand artillery support and soon in complete retreat, opening up wide gap in the front.

About midnight exploiting the gap and the collapse of the ROK position the Chinese troops poured south in mass and it was immediately apparent that they threatened to split the friendly position in two. Through their gun positions at Sachang-ni where the enemy had not yet reached the Korean troops started to filter back. No immediate report of the enemy offensive reached the brigade CP at Chariade until later the midnight when New Zealand gunners were also attacked by the CCF infantry. The brigade radioed that the Middlesex battalion was on the way for local support and ordered that the unit disengage at once to withdraw while giving fire cover to the ROK retreat.

In what one newspaper correspondent described as “some of the bloodiest and fiercest fighting ever to take place in Anzac history,” the gunners remained by their guns and as dusk was falling they stuck to their targets -- valleys along which the enemy were advancing. When the orders to retreat were given the main task of the guns in the valley was to cover the Middlesex while they came down from their protective perimeter in the surrounding hills. (See Sketch Map 2.)
Firing at almost point-blank range, the cannoneers put down a heavy curtain of fire as the ROK troops withdrew from the high ground positions. As each company reached the valley floor, one troop was taken out of action, the infantry scrambled up on the guns and vehicles and the dash back to new positions started. One gun tractor, towing a trailer and a gun, moved out with more than twenty British soldiers clinging to every conceivable handhold.

The orderly withdrawal continued until only the four guns of B Battery troops remained in action. They continued firing at increasingly shorter range until the last of the infantry was ready to pull out. Then battery troops, bringing the last few infanteers with them, joined the race out of the valley.

It was a nightmare journey along a narrow and winding road for artillery move. No lights were allowed and the road was clogged with the southbound troops. Just a few minutes after the last vehicle roared out of the valley and on the main road, another shock of the enemy blow fell on the ROK positions.

In the meantime, the rest of the 27th British Infantry Brigade, which had been rushed up from reserve to stem the gap, hastily prepared positions to form a second line of defense. The disposition was astride the bend in the River Kapyong, north of Chongchon-ni and north of a big east-to-west loop in the Pukhan River. The forward battalions were the Canadian battalion, left, on Hill 677, and on the right the Australian battalion on Hill 504. This was the area in which the 27th Brigade was ordered to hold open a route along which the troops of the 6th ROK Division could withdraw.

When by the nightfall of 23 April the New Zealand Regiment and the Middlesex battalion came into the brigade’s area by crossing the steel bridge north of Naechon, the gunners were ordered to move directly well rear of the brigade as soon as possible and immediately open up support for the brigade. Later the Middlesex took up positions north of Chongchon-ni. The New Zealand artillery sped back a mile behind into position at Yopkwang-ni.

The relocation of the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment, which was in fact beyond the effective range of the 25-pounders for the Australians, was to prove rather embarrassing when the latter was under full attack at 2000 hours of the night. Towards midnight the battalion was heavily fired by artillery, mortars and small arms and the CCF succeeded in dislodging one frontmost company and began to probe other companies. Although the Australians clung tenaciously onto Hill 504 supported by the 72nd US Tank Battalion, at dawn they found themselves attacked from all sides. In the meantime, upon immediate report of the developments the New Zealanders
moved up the valley to support Australians.
At 0430 of the 24th, the Australian Battalion asked for a company of the Middlesex and reported its headquarters was already in danger. But reports of the progress of the Middlesex battalion indicated that the enemy already established a strong roadblock in the Australians rear area and that unless provided by artillery cover it seemed it would bring more casualties. The New Zealand artillery regiment struggled its way up and could arrive at the back of Hill 504 in the early morning. By the time the Australian battalion was virtually cut off and in almost every company there was bitter hand-to-hand fight.

The guns of the New Zealand artillery roared, a round after a round ceaselessly pounding a terrific volume of fire against the masses of the Red Chinese infantry advancing in waves in the open. With light the enemy pressure eased somehow, which was but to resume at 0700 and the heaviest struck Australian D Company supported by 60-mm mortars. The gunners continued to pound the enemy relentlessly, but in spite of heavy losses, the Reds repeatedly threw wave after wave of reinforcements in suicidal attempts to overrun the Australian position. "Without those Kiwi gunners," grinned
The Artillery Regiment

proudly one observer of the battle later "we must have been right in the middle of a flaming cart." The scene was unique. Anzac day was a day far, a big celebration for those gunners sweating over their smoking and paintblistered guns. Captain Gravenor, Commander of D Company, took no chances establishing himself artillery wireless communications and called up support.

By the time the Australian battalion headquarters was retreating under orders via the valley route through the site of the Middlesex battalion. The New Zealand battery provided smoke screen and fire support to ease the withdrawal.

When the Australian withdrawal was under way, the Canadians, who were away to the Australians' left and strangely intact until then, were now undergoing similar treatment and resisting with the same tenacity. Towards the sundown of the 24th of April when Australians pulled out, they nevertheless stayed put to hold the ground. Their gallant struggle was attributed in no less degree to the batteries of the New Zealand artillery which was in continuous support for the Canadians.

Now in the afternoon of the 24th, the main force of the New Zealand artillery was laid to cover the Australian withdrawal. The regiment was giving cover to heavily battered D Company which was in rearguard actions and support to other companies along high ground to the reserve area occupied by the Middlesex. New Zealanders were given mandatory orders to slow down the enemy follow-up during this thinning out process. Corrections to bring this artillery fire as close as possible were very effective.

As the Australian battalion finally cleared Hill 504, which was at the south end of the main ridge, shells were falling no more than 150 meters forward of the infantry. At this stage, artillery direction was so effectively relayed that volume of fire completely frustrated enemy attempts to follow up further. The withdrawal ended without incident.

Fighting continued in the brigade's area throughout the night of the 24th and the New Zealand Artillery Regiment ably supported the Canadians and the Middlesex battalion. By contrast to the night, the light of the 25th brought no more of the enemy actions. It seemed the CCF offensive stopped cold and the enemy had withdrawn as quickly as it had moved down.

During the thirty hours preceding the dawn of Anzac Day, the regiment fired about 10,000 rounds at the targets ranging in distance from 3,000 meters to 10,000 meters. The amount of artillery available permitted the 27th Commonwealth Brigade to stem the savage Chinese attack during 22-25 April. On the Australian position alone, the artillery, together with the infantry actions, accounted for an estimated 1,000 Chinese killed and 3,000 wounded.
Through the battle of Kapyong the 16th Royal New Zealand Artillery Regiment stood the first major test in Korea with the fame which would last in the annals of Anzac traditions. Among many who would volunteer to attest to this, New Zealanders take a great pride in what the President of the Republic of Korea said about their action. In a Presidential Unit Citation which was presented in February 1952, President Rhee said from his heart, "throughout the battle, during nights of the 23rd and 24th of April and all day on 24 April, it operated its guns ceaselessly and efficiently and played an important role in holding the position." It was read out by the Minister of National Defense in an impressive ceremony which would be forgotten by few. Many view with wonders how during initial action Lieutenant Colonel Moodie extricated the Regiment without losing a single gun or a vehicle and at the same time was able to provide fire whenever and wherever it was required. As a result, he was made a companion of the Distinguished Service Order for "intrepid leadership."

During the battle of Kapyong one significant event took place in the brigade which the narrative failed to describe. Effective midnight of 25-26 April, the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade changed its commander and its designation. It became the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and Brigadier G. Taylor, took over from Brigadier B. A. Burke.

Section 4. CCF Second Spring Offensive

On 26 April 1951 the 28th Commonwealth Brigade was relieved by the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division and ordered to withdraw and occupy a position on the Pukhan River line, about 11 kilometers southwest of Kapyong. The road down which the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment withdrew was the only one for the supply and withdrawal of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade, as no other roads or tracks ran into Kapyong from the south or west. To avoid possible contacts with the enemy remnants, intensive patrolling were conducted during the move, which were also instructed how to tell the enemy from the many ROK troops to prevent from incidents due to misidentification. The rain, which had begun at the time the regiment moved, continued almost continuously for the next two days.

At the new position at Chongpyong, the regiment was allowed but a short rest. The regiment received the orders to withdraw farther south down to Yangpyong, a rest area, which is 30 kilometers south in air distance
but the route deviated along the Pukhan River bank making it double the
distance. Now the weather gave way to a misty fog, and troops lorries and
artillery vehicles slowly headed south in the reduced visibility.

Contacts with the enemy rarely arose except that in the afternoon of
the 28th, a British battalion encountered some pockets of the enemy pressure
but it did not last long. In general, the heavy rain, humidity, daily movement
and climbing of steep hills, followed by digging-in and gun-caring after
dark, had made the previous four days a good test of endurance for the
regiment.

New Zealanders spent what remained of their rest period in various
activities healing battle fatigue and getting fully operational. Most atten-
tions were given, however, to the hygiene of an individual which had long
been forgotten during Kapyong battle. Gun pieces also demanded a good
deal of repairs and work due to ceaseless support on previous battles. But
the expectation of a recuperative period was short-lived, as the regiment
was ordered the following morning to move to the Wolmun-ni area, some 40
kilometers east of Seoul, at the junction of the Han and Pukhan Rivers.

The Red Chinese in their recent offensive, in spite of having made
considerable advances all along the front, had suffered very heavy casualties
and it is assumed that it was for this reason, as well as questions of supply,
that they decided to halt their advance along a general line running west to
northeast across the country. In the west and central sectors of the front
this line ran about 11 kilometers north of Seoul. Taking advantage of this
situation, the United Nations Command issued orders to its forces to advance
and occupy defensive positions immediately south of the enemy line, with a
view to launching an offensive at an early date. This was the situation
that accounted for this sudden “turn round” of the regiment, on 30 April.

In the early morning hours of 30 April, the regiment and the remainder
of the brigade moved by motor transport from Yangpyong to their new
positions. Upon arrival the brigade relieved the 19th Regiment of the 24th
US Infantry Division and the New Zealand Artillery Regiment went into
position near the brigade’s CP at Wolmun-ni.

The brigade deployed the Canadian battalion on the left at Naedong,
the newly arrived Scottish battalion in the center around Hill 524, and the
Middlesex battalion on the right near the village of Chungchon. The Austra-
lians, who were most exposed to the CCF attack at Kapyong, went in to the
brigade’s reserve at Chodong.

The defensive area held by the brigade was naturally surrounded by high
mountain features and thus provided many stronghold positions for defense.
Mountains of over 500 meters high are not uncommon and defense layout
accordingly took the advantage of the terrain. Orders had been issued to
dig, wire and mine the positions, as it formed a part of the IX US Corps defense line, on which the enemy was to be held, if he should attempt to resume his offensive and from which, in due time, it was intended to launch a friendly offensive to take back the ground lost in the previous CCF offensive. While busy with the preparation with gun emplacements, New Zealanders hurriedly established earthworks along their zone. All defense stores—sandbags, pickets, wire and mines—had to be carried from an off loading point on the road up to usually high ridgelines on foot, a slow and most arduous task.

During the initial occupation of the position, regular patrols had been established by the Brigade's infantry with customary range of 5,000-6000 yards deep into the enemy land, but no contact had been made with the CCF. Patrol reports indicated that the enemy had a fairly strong covering screen in the hills south of the Kungong-ni-Masogu-ri road which was generally some 6 kilometers north of the brigade's area.

In the meantime, after the failure of the CCF First Step, Fifth Phase Offensive, the front, which now almost evenly divided the Korean peninsula, seemed to enjoy two weeks of uneasy inactivity. But the night of 15-16 May the battleground trembled with an unprecedented volume of artillery fire signalling the launch of the CCF second spring offensive. The main weight of the offensive fell this time on the III ROK Corps front in the central east and the X US Corps on its left. In the brigade area patrols of the day encountered no enemy opposition while the 5th US Regimental Combat Team in the brigade's neighbourhood underwent sharp actions. The 6th ROK Division, licking its wounds from the Kapyong battle, this time was anxious to regain its honor. By 19 May the ROKs knew they really made it as the CCF offensive had failed with three days destroyed as utterly as the April drive. With the two spring offensives stopped cold, the latter being the final CCF attempt to thrust the UN lines as events were to prove later, it was now the UN's turn to push up and gain the ground.

In the New Zealand regimental area the patrolling and construction of field fortifications continued to keep the gunners busy. In the second week of May the brigade moved the Australian battalion into the Middlesex battalion's area. The latter, upon relief by the 1st Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry, was due home following the embakation from Inchon.

On the 20th of May, orders were received indicating that the United Nations forces were to attack on the following morning. The New Zealand Regiment was to advance with other units of the brigade until 23 May some 15 kilometers north due 12 kilometers west of Chongpyong.

The following morning saw the brigade start out for the attack; the
Australians on the rightmost, the British and Canadian battalions to the westward each infantry unit sent out patrols into respective route of advance.

The regiment allowed its batteries on rather flexible basis since the terrain, being irregular devoid of even moderate road for artillery, denied the normality of strict one battery per one battalion formula. Through this advance this non-existence of suitable road for the artillery was to present a problem which sometimes called for dedicated and backbreaking efforts of engineering crews to plough up the path. To another dismay of New Zealanders, it had been pouring with rain all night on the 21st and thus what could be called earth and gravel path with bare minimum requirement for artillery passage was all waterlogged and muddy. Everyone and everything was soaking wet and caked with mud and even maps were rain soaked to wreck the advance temporarily.

During the first day of attack the opposition was very light and patrols contacted meager enemy forces. By 23-24 May the Regiment and the rest of the brigade were astride the Kumgong-ni—Masogu-ri road and prepared to advance up to Oebang-ni, an insignificant village about 8 kilometers north of Masogu-ri.

As far as the Regiment was concerned the advance in the ensuing days from Masogu-ri to Oebang saw as little enemy activity as it had during the last period. The difference lay only in the weather, which cleared up from the night of the 23th and thenceforth dried rain-soaked New Zealanders. By 26 May the regiment could make Oebang and was about to advance nine kilometers northeast to Taebo-ri, to be the IX US Corps reserve. The move was again a difficult one for the transport, due to lack of any suitable track and the flooded rivers and streams. In practice, since leaving Masogu-ri, all ranks had to carry a considerable amount of equipment and ammunition, as well as their greatcoat and a blanket, all of which would normally have been carried in the regiment’s transport.

The village and Hyon-ri in its proximity provided the rest area of the US IX Corps with convenience of traffic converging on Seoul and proper accommodations, though on wartime standard, built along Chochong-chon. But when the regiment arrived at Taebo-ri reserve area on the 28th it was to learn that the gunners were allowed to rest less than 24 hours and that they were to move out early next day for some 160 kilometers transport movement to the Imjin River area on the east central front. The announcement of impending long movement, immediately after their arrival at the reserve area, however, did nothing to mar the feelings of the gunners. A good sound day’s rest was enough for them and they more or less took
another move for granted.

In fact, the regiment move to the Imjin River area represented the
general shift of the frontline units and the effort of the UN forces to conso-
lidate the defense lines after the CCF last offensives.

In April General MacArthur was relieved of his command and in subse-
quently days two steps of the CCF Spring Offensive were stopped by his suc-
cessor General Ridgway. But on the battlefields after a year of bitter combat,
the war in Korea seemed to have lost momentum. The new commander of
the Eighth US Army General Van Fleet gave us some idea of the general
feeling thereabout: "Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither practical
nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the Eighth Army there-
fore, was to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain
north of the 38th Parallel, and from there to push forward in a limited ad-
vance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with
minimum danger..." It seemed clear that the active offensive had now come
to an end and a new, more static phase began.

To stabilize the front and to take up the slow business of confined offen-
sive action, the United Nations forces established two defense lines in the
general neighborhood of the 38th Parallel. Lines Kansas and Wyoming, the
latter guarding the approaches to the former on the western front and serving
as an outpost line to screen it, began near the mouth of the Imjin river and
ran approximately on the parallel past Hwachon Reservoir and South Tae-
baek Mountains. Until mid-year the UN forces were to fortify in depth and
build fixed fortifications along the two lines.

By the end of May the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade was ordered
to release the operational control of the IX US Corps and to receive that of
the 1st Cavalry Division of the I US Corps defending the broadest sector on
the west.

When the regiment arrived at its new position on 30 May the Imjin
River was well up and an obstacle to major movement from north and
south. With width varying from 75-100 meters it was connected by no per-
manent bridges except two local ferry sites. But dikes and streams swollen
by recent heavy rainfall made artillery movement in the valleys extremely
difficult except on foot. In retrospect, when on 22 April the 29th Brigade
blunted the heaviest blow of the CCF Spring Offensive, it was pontoon
bridges hastily laid by US troops that the badly mauled Gloucester battalion
was barely extricated.

The area was rugged and mountainous as was most Korean country
although the hills were not so high. The hills, on the lower slopes were
covered with dense scrub and on the middle and higher slopes by fir and
other tree. The local villages were destroyed during CCF attacks and there was no evidence of any local inhabitants when the regiment arrived. The Imjin River in this area runs in serpentine shape and allows vehicular traffic on Pintail ferry site on the north and Teal on the south.

The regiment established its CP at Chonang-nae amidst paddy fields and allotted one battery each to the Australian and the Scottish battalion. The Australian battalion was forward of the regiment on the brigade's right and the 1st Battalion, KOSB occupied right of it. The brigade's another battalion, the 1st Battalion, KSLI, was reserved near the brigade's CP at the village of Kampari. On the left across Kamak-san (Hill 675), being the highest, the brigade was bounded by the 28th Brigade and by a unit of the 1st US Cavalry Division on the right.

In the regimental area the emplacement of the 25 pounders and construction of defense works around gun pits first encountered little difficulty. Being flat paddy field, Chonang-nae was a bit muddy due to recent rain but that eased the shovelling of New Zealanders. But when the construction was finished, the rain really proved to be the worst enemy as it was so heavy that it washed all but the strongest emplacements away, and played havoc with the tracks. The rainstorms were spectacular in this area sometimes as much as 6-12 inches to fall in 12 hours and the Imjin River rose in one occasion to 6 meters in 24 hours. Within a few weeks, the preparation was completed: the area was mined and wired carefully, the latter enabling the communications even with remote observation posts with infantry.

Unlike the regimental area, the other batteries found themselves completely baffled by the terrain. The ground was more or less hard rock, which made the preparation of defensive positions a long, tedious and difficult business. In the case of New Zealand artillery observation troops who were then with the Australians and Canadian infantry on various outposts on Hills 152 and 217, the trial was even worse. They had to bring all defense stores up to the hills on foot paths and trails which were invariably muddy and inhospitable.

In June when still the both sides stuck to local probing tactics, the Communists stepped up their artillery fire. There was evidence that the enemy brought in new artillery pieces and was determined to do whatever the infantry failed to do. The scene of artillery duel, which were not unlike summer thunderstorm in its whim, was frequent and although not quiet accurate, heavier artillery than ever resulted in considerable victims.

But until 28 July when all the troops of British Commonwealth were incorporated into one division, the area remained rather quiet. The infantry
usually conducted long patrols across the river to discover the enemy dispositions. Upon request for the artillery cover, artillery batteries were moved forward from time to time in order to support these deep patrols. But except for minor patrol clashes, the results always remained local and limited.

In early July the attentions of New Zealanders and as well as other troops were suddenly directed to some event which was eventually, after two years' of bitter wrangling, to provide a cease-fire in Korea.

After a year of bitter combat, now the time seemed ripe for armistice negotiations in Korea on the contention that neither side would gain as much ground as the little but continuing casualties could be justified. The stage was set at Kaesong, a little village 35 kilometers west of New Zealanders, and the first meeting was held on 10 July amidst wishful thinking among weary combatants.

Until mid-1953, the talks were to drag on without achieving much. But the optimism was hard to evaporate. It is hard to assess to what extent the morale of gunners in the field were affected by the fact that the end of the shooting might be near. But it was obvious that the future UN operations would take on the defensive outlook and that military endeavors were more influenced by the progress of armistice negotiations than strict military necessity.

Section 5. The Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division

To all comrades-in-arms under the Commonwealth banner, 28 July 1951 was a red-letter day, which marked an event of special significant -- the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division in Korea.

The idea of composing a division with all Commonwealth elements in Korea was given a spur when the United Kingdom came to a decision to retain two brigades' strength in Korea. In March 1951, the War Office in London called for a meeting to discuss each nation's share in such an enterprise, which was attended by officers from the liaison staffs of New Zealand, Australia, Canada, South Africa and India. During the meeting New Zealand publicly pledged to provide some staff and liaison personnel for the division staff. More important than that was it agreed to increase its force by approximately 500 men.
The Artillery Regiment

The increase, as announced later by the New Zealand Government, would include a divisional transport company, a light aid detachment, and various troops for the divisional signal regiment. In retrospect, a call for volunteers was made to furnish the 17 officers and 564 other ranks required for these units, and also for a third replacement of 8 officers and 128 other ranks. Recruiting was carried out between 2 and 19 May, in which time 16 officers and 1,603 other ranks offered their services. These reinforcements left the country in early August for Korea.

On 28 July near Tokchong about 13 kilometers north of Uijongbu, a short ceremony was held to mark this event. Among present were General Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander and Lieutenant General Horace Robertson, the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces in Japan. With the force of three infantry brigades and a full complement of supporting arms, the division was composed of units from the five Commonwealth countries operating in Korea and commanded by the British Major General A. J. H. Cassels.

In addition to the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment which became the divisional artillery, New Zealand furnished some personnel in the division. Besides the personnel of the "New Zealand Section Headquarters, 1st Commonwealth Division," Captain H. B. Honnor would serve as a division G.S.O. 3, Major D. S. Gibb, as an artillery S.O. and Lieutenant V. Brooke would be a liaison officer to the division.

In the course of the next two years many changes would be made among units and personnel; but the division's truly Commonwealth character was not altered, and the Commonwealth spirit was maintained throughout. Men from many countries, and of many races and creeds, were to support each other in battle, deliver each other's rations, ammunition and stores and tend each other's wounded -- all part of the armed forces of the great association of nations which had been built up over the centuries with so much toil and good will.

Being integrated into the division artillery, however, it should be noted that the Regiment, to a larger extent, lost no independent status or its role. It would continue to support the 28th Brigade and save the logistical and administrative problems the operational control would generally remain in the regiment.

Now let us return to the regiment which was then in position along the Imjin River with the rest of the Commonwealth units in the I US Corps.

During July the regiment remained in defense position along south of the Imjin River. The 1st Commonwealth Division held about 11,000 meters of the I US Corps line which stretched some 48 kilometers north of Seoul. In
the division area, the 29th British Brigade occupied in the left and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right and the Canadian Brigade was in reserve position. On the left flank was the 1st ROK Division and on the right the 1st US Cavalry Division.

The enemy front line, was on an average, some 7,000 meters north of the Imjin. Contact was only possible by crossing the river, which infantry patrols often did, by improvised ferry or raft, as no bridges existed and the river was at this season unfordable, being in flood after heavy monsoon rain.

The principal enemy of the division at this time and during ensuing operations, was the 192nd CCF Division of the 64th Army, with two regiments in front line -- each regiment consisting of about 2,000 men. At that time the enemy held a very light outpost screen some 2,000 to 3,000 meters north of the Imjin river, with well-prepared defensive positions from 6,000 to 8,000 meters in rear. The enemy did not patrol extensively and generally avoided battle in front of his main position. Until the division advanced to a line north of the river, as described later, the line remained comparatively quiet.

Indeed the period from the formation of the division until 3 October 1951 was a quiet one, but included a practically unopposed advance of the division line to the north of the Imjin River and a number of minor enterprises.

During this period the chief activity of the artillery was to cover and give support to the infantry patrols which crossed the river to feel the enemy situation. New Zealanders, given exact data as to the routes and time of the patrol, poured in extensive bombardment. As a rule, the patrolling was limited to the depth at which the artillery could give cover from behind the river.

In early August the Canadians first crossed the river advanced some 6,500 meters. During this advance the regiment also gave some artillery covering.

Until the major offensive Operation Commando began on 3 October, about half a dozen small operations followed this Canadian crossing of the river. During each of these efforts New Zealand gunners were called upon to cover and protect by artillery barrage for infantry endeavors. Sometimes the artillery positions had to move ahead in case of the deeper penetrations.

Towards the end of August, the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment expansion draft of some 550 officers and men began to arrive in Japan by air from Darwin, Australia. They had in fact, started out on a troopship "Wshine" at Wellington on 2 August. At approximately 0540 on 15 August, however, the vessel ran a ground on Marsela Island, in the Arafura Sea, 510 kilometers northwest of Darwin. All troops were transhipped to a tanker,
the "Stanvac Karachi" and returned to Darwin. Onward movement was then arranged and troops were moved in twelve air-lifts beginning on 17 August and ending on 8 September.

By early September the Canadian Brigade which so far carried out most of the raids across the river and relieved the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, the latter coming into reserve. On 6 September Operation Boomerang, the amphibious raid plan with the lead of Australians and later developed into Operation Minden on the 8th, began. New Zealanders were ordered to pound the area in the vicinity of Hakkoyo-mal and provide artillery support anywhere when requested. Australians’ crossing met little enemy opposition due both to the effective New Zealand bombardment and a few air strikes. Now that the 28th Brigade was north of the river, the division was ordered to establish a new line some 5,000 meters north of the river, which would be an extension of the I US Corps forward line. By the evening of 12 September this line had been established with the 29th British Infantry Brigade on the left and the Canadian Brigade on the right. The 28th Brigade, which had been spearheading the advance was reserved to guard the bridgehead.

By the end of September the division advanced to the position very closer to the enemy positions. Now patrol clashes were frequent, casualties being inflicted on the enemy by ground troops and artillery and air strikes. On 21 September 1951 the division was ordered to take part in a full-scale Corps offensive with the object of advancing some 6,000 to 10,000 meters along the whole Corps front line. D-Day, Operation Commando was set on 3 October and division staff began to lay out preliminary moves and operation plans.

In the first week of September the New Zealand Artillery Regiment was ordered to cross the Imjin River following the advance and clearing of the bridgehead. Although the river itself was well swollen, the swift actions of the Corps engineers in bridging it with sturdy pontoon made the crossing of the 25 pounders an easy one. When the 28th Brigade was ordered into the reserve status, the responsibility of New Zealanders was to continue to cover infantry actions of the other brigades. Throughout Operation Commando and until the end of the fighting, the 2nd Regiment of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery operated shoulder to shoulder with the New Zealand gunners.

Section 6. Operation Commando

Operation Commando was conducted from October 2 to 8 by the whole
units of the I US Corps, and designed to advance on the entire Corps front to secure a new line. The 1st Commonwealth Division was ordered to advance from 6,000 to 8,000 meters along the division front. Throughout this operation, the volume of artillery fire was heavier than any other operations in the past. The expenditure of ammunition for the month marked the highest for any month since the regiment had been in action in Korea -- 72,000 rounds. It is obvious that Operation Commando and ensuing October undertakings would be recorded in historic annals as the first occasion on which a British Commonwealth Division, comprised of New Zealanders, English, Canadians, Australians and Indians, had gone into action as one fighting force and achieved so great a success.

On 2 October, D minus one, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, which was to carry out the first phase of the operation on the right, moved to its assembly area behind the 25th Canadian Brigade. By the evening of the day the stage was all set for the division attack.

The objective for the 28th Brigade was to seize Hill 355, which was known as Little Gibraltar and was the highest point in the division objective area.

The attack was launched at first light on 3 October -- Initially all battalions made good progress under effective Kiwi cover and support, especially the Australians whose objective was to secure highlands on the brigade's right. New Zealand artillery's mission on the day was to neutralize the enemy opposition in coordination with Centurion tanks which spearheaded infantry columns. But the enemy was unusually well dug in and had ample artillery protection. After this easy beginning, however, the infantry progress was bogged down due to severe mine fields and determined opposition. The attackers were still a thousand meters short of Hill 355 by nightfall but held their position through darkness and consolidated, ready to resume the attack at early next dawn.

Throughout the night of 3-4 October, the New Zealand 25-pounders continued to blaze and strike the enemy hill. Kowang-san, brightly illuminated by Kiwi shells, was a target of saturation that night and towards the dawn the ammunition stock began to run low. The enemy artillery bombardment which went on steadily since the evening now reached to the same magnitude as the friendly fire. It was obvious that the 192nd CCF Division had brought up more artillery pieces to reinforce the defense. (See Sketch Map 3.)

By the afternoon of the 4th, the 28th Brigade could secure Hill 355 (Kowang-san) and friendly forces were seen on the hill preparing for defense for possible enemy raids. As the day was drawing to a close the advance
was suspended and the front was adjusted for night defense. Enemy resistance seemed to be weakening and it was clear that the heavy artillery fire to which he had been subjected was beginning to tell. In the 28th Brigade's objective area, two hills still defied capture by the end of the day. Hills 217 and 315 stood several kilometers north of Kowang-san, and the former was to be the scene of bitter, and almost continuous fighting for four days before it was finally taken.

Now on the third day, the 28th Brigade was reinforced by one battalion from the 29th Brigade and set out to attack two hills. New Zealand Artillery Regiment assigned its batteries to each hill and poured in some preparation fire. At 1500 hours the infantry took Hill 217 under maximum Kiwi artillery
cover but soon found it heavily counterattacked by enemy infantry and artillery barrage. One of the mystery of the counterattack was sudden increase of artillery fire whose positions were nowhere detected. Consequently the New Zealand Artillery Regiment was ordered to cover the infantry pullout and at the same time to pound the suspected area north of the hill to neutralize the enemy artillery.

At Hill 315, in the meantime, the situation was a little better. This dominating hill, a key point in the Red Chinese winter line, was shaped like a pyramid and its eastern slope was so steep that it could be climbed only with great difficulty, using hands and knees. The later observation revealed that the positions were defended deep, three-level shelters packed with stocks of winter clothing, ready for issue, besides ample supplies of food and ammunition. In addition to defense build-up, the enemy secured good support of seemingly ever growing artillery. When the Australians, who were ordered to this objective, launched a first assault on this hill, they found it ringed and stepped with trenches, machine gun nests and fighting pits. Artillery positions were well concealed so that repeated air reconnaissance could not effectively place air strikes.

During the morning artillery supporting mission, the trouble was that the fog and thick mist was so dense in the area that the New Zealand artillery liaison officers were uncertain of exact friendly and enemy positions. Well aware of dire consequence resulting from the misidentification, New Zealand gunners had to make sure every fire request. The fog and the low visibility was also a trouble to Australians. In the morning the attacking columns made frequent halts to keep direction straight. Under that blanket of mist it seemed that the two protagonists groped awkwardly for each other without much effect.

The fog began to lift just after 1030 and Australians quickly reestablished contacts with the enemy. At the time Australian D Company was in severe engagement, which was commanded now by a senior platoon commander as the commander fell wounded. The situation became worse as all communications were shot to put out isolating the company. At the battalion headquarters near Hill 355 Colonel Hassett, Australian Commander and Colonel Webb, new Commander of the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment who was on the call to the headquarters to discuss the situation, waited anxiously to know what was going on in the D Company area. At 1100 when the radio communications was reestablished, the first message out of that embattled troops were “Give us fifteen minutes of artillery and we will be ready to move.” Right after the Australian senior platoon commander himself radioed the exact firing data, the New Zealand 25-pounders roared
into fire. As the artillery fire scored direct hits, a burst of exclamation also roared from the gun pits and among the Aussies. Artillery fire continued until the hill finally fell into friendly hands in the afternoon.

On 6 October the Australians and one battalion from the 29th Brigade were attacking Hill 217, which now was the only part of the division objective yet to be taken. Although heavy shelling by New Zealanders had never let up since the initial failure, the infantry was still encountering stubborn resistance and so the progress was very slow. By nightfall the attackers found themselves bogged down with determined opposition. Despite that the hill itself was ugly deformed with New Zealand artillery pounding and all surface defense works had been badly destroyed, the enemy somehow managed hold onto it.

During the night the enemy counterattacked several times each with strong artillery support. The brigade at last called for air strike, which in coordination with Kiwi bombardment, dropped four 500 lb. bombs in the area.

Until the evening of the 8th, artillery and air strikes continued. Following this, an element of the brigade easily took the hill. The Red Chinese had
already given up the hill and withdrawn leaving behind 120 dead and wounded.

The final clearance of the Maryang-san (Hill 315) area, in which Hills 355 (Kowang-san), 315 and 217 were defense points, completed Operation Commando. In six days' fight the 1st Commonwealth Division had suffered 58 killed and 262 wounded and advanced 6,000 meters against the main Chinese defense line in central Korea. Intelligence summaries estimated that the division had virtually wiped out two enemy regiments and inflicted casualties close to 1,000 including more than 100 prisoners.

On the regiment casualties list were both Gunners Cooper and Dickson killed in action during Operation Commando. But their service was attested by the infantrymen with whom they fought as artillery outpost personnel, as sufficiently gallant to polish the finest traditions of the New Zealand arms. During the last ten months the regiment, in fact, had suffered three killed in action and a dozen wounded. Some of them occurred among the gunners in their regimental areas for the Chinese were using more and heavier artillery in counter bombardment. However, the majority of casualties were among the forward observers with the infantry teams.

General Van Fleet, Commander of the 8th US Army, sent his congratulations to the division commander and the New Zealand regiment received particular praise from Major General Cassels and from the 28th Brigade headquarters for the unflinching fire support during the operation.

On 9 October the dispositions of the 28th Brigade were adjusted. The 25-pounders of the 16th New Zealand Artillery Regiment remained in Segol position and ordered to consolidate the area in depth. Special emphasis was laid to build the fortifications and gun pits on semi-permanent basis since the war was to take on even more static nature. Around this time two other gun positions were contemplated among the regimental staffs which resulted in the build-up of a triangular regiment area on which until the armistice the regiment would move freely as the situation demanded. The Mangun position, three kilometers west of the present Segol position and the Five Months position, the same distance south of it, were worked out in the same manner with strong barbed wires and mines.

In the brigade area, the Australians were on the right around Hill 199 and the Scottish battalion was on the left on Hill 315 (Maryang-san) and the KSLI battalion was on Kowang-san.

On Kowang-san, known among the friendly troops as Little Gibraltar, the regiment established two observation posts on top of it which were continually under enemy fire during late October. The hill itself was about 300 meters high and had very steep sides. Infantry and New Zealand
artillery observation teams were supplied by a flying fox on a cable running to the rear of the hill. On the whole brigade front, this particular hill was the nearest to the Communist Chinese positions. It was also the highest point on the brigade front, overlooking the area.

In this area, the 118th CCF Division was disposed on the chain of four hills across the no man's land opposite Hill 355. Called the Apostles which were comprised from left to right, Mathew, Mark, Luke, and John, they were very heavily defended and many of the regiment's biggest fire were directed against these hills. In addition frequent air strikes were called in to bolster what artillery failed to do. The patrols from the infantry units usually approached the Apostles through the Bowling Alley at night which was a flat buffer zone. There were a large number of patrol clashes in the general area.

To light up the Bowling Alley at night, on a hill at the village of Wolong-mak, itself being called as Searchlight Hill, were high-voltage searchlights which could cover practically the whole of the brigade front.

The Regiment's another outpost was set up on Hill 159 which was about 2 kilometers southwest of Hill 355. Being about half of the height of Kowang-san, from a tactical point of view it was extremely important. By holding this feature, the brigade was able to maintain a spearhead bulge in the Chinese front. Fighting patrols frequently set out into no man's land from this hill and the enemy made frequent efforts to take it. The regiment maintained just one observation post on the hill top but it commanded an admirable view of the near slopes of the Apostles group. It was subject at times to heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. In addition to this artillery observation team, there was an Centurion tank manned by New Zealand gunners.

But until early November 1951 the position was quiet except usual activity of probings and patrolling in the no man's land. During the night of the 3rd November and morning of the 4th November, however, there were signs of much increased enemy activity on the brigade's front and this was accompanied by intensified shelling and mortaring on the brigade left on Hills 315 and 217. Although strong New Zealand counter-artillery and three air strikes were placed on the enemy gun positions, the enemy persisted with their shelling and mortaring. The enemy guns were particularly difficult to locate and destroy, as they were cleverly concealed in tunnels in the hills opposite the friendly line. These hills had been bored through the previous months under concealment.

By 1600 hours on 4 November, the enemy shelling had developed into
an intense bombardment, with shells of all natures falling at the rate of 6,000
an hour. By this time the ridgeline held by the 1st Battalion, KOSB had
become an inferno of smoke, dust, flame and explosions. Shells of 155
millimeter artillery fell among the friendly hill positions for the first time since
the regiment was committed and the volume of fire reached yet unprecedented
degree in the war.

By 1615 the enemy infantry began to attack in great number on Hill
315 which was defended by C Company of the KOSB battalion. On Maryang-
san (Hill 315) with C Company was Major P. F. King, as New Zealand artillery
observation officer who was to win the Distinguished Service Medal for his
gallantry in this battle.

An hour later the enemy massed and attacked again in even greater
strength. Major King continued to call down heavy and accurate defensive
fire until his radio set was destroyed and his wire communications cut by
enemy artillery fire. With him was Gunner Rixon as wireless operator who
calmly and efficiently worked his radio set, passing back fire data to the
New Zealand guns in Segol position. The enemy continued to approach
and soon penetrated the company positions resulting in heavy hand-to-hand
fighting on Hill 315. Completely ignoring the heavy and small arms fire,
Major King and Gunner Rixon moved in to the penetrated area and there,
armed with grenades and supported by light machine-gun sections, they
endeavored to restore the situation. For one and a half hours they continued
hurling grenades and making numerous trip back to company headquarters
to carry up grenades and urgently needed ammunition.

During the action Major King wounded three times and Gunner Rixon
wounded in the head, he nevertheless assisted to carry his wounded officer to
safety and was himself wounded a second time while he was doing it.

At this time the regiment itself came under very heavy enemy artillery
fire. Vehicles were badly holed by shrapnel and the regiment suffered one
died of wounded and another was wounded. However, the New Zealand
gunners stood by their guns all day, pounding all types of targets disclosed
among the Red Chinese attackers.

Towards 2000 hours the whole area of the KOSB battalion was swamped
by hordes of estimatedly one division and casualties were heavy. Am-
munition ran low in most of front troops and many radio sets were knocked
unserviceably by fire. Towards 2100 and 2200, in consideration of mounting
casualties and seemingly countless CCF reserve ready to be put in, the
battalion was ordered to abandon Hills 217 and 315.

The investigation of the casualty showed that out of the attacking force
of a CCF division some 6,000 strong, about 1,000 were killed chiefly due
to New Zealand artillery action. In return although the New Zealand
Regiment suffered very little in this battle, the KOSB lost very heavily, their effective strength being reduced to the equivalent of about two companies.

Soon after midnight increased shelling and other activities indicated that the second phase of the attack would begin soon, but it did not materialize. It was thought that the concentration of troops was broken up by severe artillery action by New Zealand guns and several air strikes. By dawn all was quiet.

During the thirty-six-hour period ending at 1800 hours on 5 November the division artillery altogether fired 30,829 rounds and among them the Regiment accounted for as many as 10,387 rounds in 24 hours from early 4 November.

There followed days of comparative quiet until the end of the year. On 7 November the regiment's two hundred thousandth round was fired without no tactical significance. The quarter million round was fired without ceremony on 24 November.

On 22 November there was some change of the division's sector, which was designd to relieve the 28th Brigade on the division's right. Now the
change gave the division a slightly shorter front with the 29th Brigade on
the left adjoining across the Sami-chon, the 1st ROK Division and the 25th
Brigade on the right neighboring with the 3rd US Division leaving Kowang-
san in American responsibility. This change also enabled the division to
adopt the principle of two brigades in the line and one in reserve. The New
Zealand Regiment was placed with the 28th Brigade in reserve. The rest
of the brigade moved south towards Paekhak Reservoir on the 23rd. But
in the evening of the day saw a big action on Hill 355 which called for
New Zealand support again.

After the busy day of various moves on 23 November, the enemy made
a very strong attack on Hill 355, which the Commonwealth Division had
gained in Operation Commando. The New Zealand artillery regiment was
ordered to support the 7th US Regiment with other artillery units. Despite
heavy artillery and air bombardments and strong infantry effort, the hill
was captured. On 24 November, the New Zealand guns gave the full
weight of its artillery support while the US regiment struggled to recapture
the hill. Eventually the Americans were successful in reoccupying the
position. Due probably to the heavy snow, which had just started, the
front then became very quiet and was to remain so for some time.

In the remaining days of 1951 and early 1952 the front was quiet. The
gun positions were shelled again from time to time in the following month
but there were no casualties. Other busy days followed at intervals, but the
winter of 1951-1952 was, on the whole, a comparatively quiet one for the
Regiment. The Regiment's first Christmas in Korea was quite a joyous
affair as a result.

It would have been happier, however, had it not been for an unpleasant
incident just a few days before. A high explosive round exploded premature-
yly when the driving band was still two inches inside the muzzle on one of the
25 pounders. One gunner died a few minutes after being hit by shrapnel
and another was evacuated to a hospital with severe wounds.

But in rest the New Zealand gunners always made sure that fire could
be delivered in contingency when and where it was wanted. In comparison
with the winter before, officers and men, occupying well-built tents and
dug-outs and wearing specially improved winter clothes, were living in good
condition.

The latter half of the year brought two dignitaries from New Zealand.
During August and September the Director General of Medical Services
undertook a tour of medical establishments and formations in Japan and
Korea to study the medical set-up, chain of evacuation, medical supplies and
all matters generally affecting the health of New Zealand troops in the
The Artillery Regiment

Theater. He also made such recommendations as might be desirable for the improvement of the medical services. The conclusions reached as a result of this tour were, that New Zealand personnel were being well cared for and that the treatment of casualties and sick left nothing to be desired, in spite of their having to pass through a chain of evacuation that consisted of units from many nations.

During November-December, the Adjutant General visited Kayforce units in Japan and Korea to discuss details of the replacement scheme and to explain the scheme to Kayforce personnel. During the visit he also studied the conditions under which the force was serving.

New Year was welcomed in by the whole division artillery firing a series of heavy concentrations on the enemy. On the whole front actions were very little and moves very few. In conclusion the period was devoted to the necessary business of recuperation of New Zealand gunners and improving living standards of front line troops.

Section 7. Summary of the Artillery Battles-1952

On 21 January 1952 the New Zealand Artillery Regiment returned to the line after four weeks of rest. Previously on the 19th the 28th Brigade relieved the 25th Canadian Brigade in the right sector of the division front. But before going back to the regiment, it seems appropriate to relate briefly to the general situation of the war.

In late August the negotiations for a ceasefire and an armistice were broken off by the Communists. Operation Commando in which New Zealand artillery regiment took part in and other UN offensive operations in October had the effects to deplete the offensive capabilities of the Communists and had influenced them to return to the conference table. On 25 October the negotiators renewed the talks, this time at Panmunjom approximately ten kilometers southeast of Kaesong. The enemy made some concessions and on 23 November an agreement was reached in principle to regard the present line of contact as the demarcation line. By 27 November the disputed points were settled and a thirty day demarcation line was agreed upon. In fact, the New Zealand reserve period coincided with the little armistice which brought a month of lull on the battlefield. But on 27 December it was obvious that the Red Chinese had used the October—November delays at Panmunjom and the thirty days of the little armistice to rebuild their battered army. By the spring of 1952, the CCF main line of resistance would
be found dug with more elaborate and formidable fortifications than any other time in the war.

In the meantime, on the ground from mid-1951, warfare took on more static nature as neither side attempted to bring the war to an end by military measures. Every military endeavor had an overriding consideration of gaining favorable grounds for the peace negotiations rather than seeking large-scale victory.

With such a slow pace in the ground fighting, artillery assumed a new importance. Static warfare required more artillery missions to harass and interdict the enemy. Whatever may have been the impression of Korean operations to date, artillery had been and remained the great killer of the enemy. It would remain the great sayer of the friendly infantry. There was a direct relation between the piles of shells in the ammunition supply points and piles of corpses in the graves registration collecting points. The bigger the former, the smaller the latter and vice versa.

The increase in volume and missions of the artillery support meant that the day of supply had to be raised. But the ammunition supply was not unlimited, and the reality which resulted in was stockpiling in every front artillery unit to guard against sudden emergencies and to provide a cushion in case supplies were temporarily cut off.

Complicated problems arose during Operation Commando in UN artillery units. When the Communists massed their artillery against this offensive, UNC guns depleted the stocks at the ammunition supply points and I US Corps had to place restrictions on its artillery units. As it pointed out later, the I US Corps did this not only to replenish the supply points, but also to suggest units to use the ammunition they were stockpiling in excess of what they were normally allowed to have on hand.

At any rate it is all too obvious that as the reluctance to jeopardize lives grew, the effort to substitute firepower for manpower also increased on both sides.

Now let us return to the New Zealand Artillery Regiment at Mangun position. The activity of the regiment and of the 1st Commonwealth Division in large sense remained to be static until April. During this period, even now customary artillery exchange, which broke out at intervals all of a sudden, was limited to small scale. Infantry operations also were confined to local patrol clashes of usually a platoon size with passive objectives.

Commencing from February, the regiment began to launch somewhat an interesting and unwarlike mission of shooting "propaganda shells" on to selected points along the enemy line. Into these shells were stuffed all sorts
of propaganda material and they were timed to burst above the ground over the CCF positions.

On 24 March, Lieutenant Colonel R. McK. Paterson, relieved Lieutenant Colonel R. J. H. Webb who had commanded the Regiment from September 1951 as a new commander. It was also agreed around this time the regiment would operate alternate periods of twelve weeks in the line in direct support of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and six weeks with no forward observers dispatched in general support.

During 13-15 April, Operation Westminster, designed to redeploy the whole Commonwealth Division, began during which the New Zealand Regiment was relieved and moved back into reserve position near Paekhak Reservoir. By now the division was bounded by the 1st US Marine Division on left and the 45th US Infantry Division on right. During the relief, it was one of terrible weather, rain and sleet with high winds.

The remaining days of April were quiet and the weather clement befitting Anzac Day on 25 April. New Zealanders attended the ceremony held at the Headquarters of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment. The feature of the occasion was a Gallipoli Day Commonwealth Parade in which not only New Zealanders and Australians but the Turks who fought at Gallipoli, and Greeks, who happened to be with the 1st Commonwealth Division, also took part.

In the closing days of June, the regiment, after six weeks reserve status, returned to the line, when the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade relieved the 25th Canadian Brigade. But by this time operations had become almost completely static. New Zealand gun pits at Mangun village were dug in with strong and deep permanent defensive works, protected by mines and wire. This pattern of permanent fortifications was also the case with the enemy with its guns embrasured in strongholds on ridgelines. In the infantry warfare, the perfection of defense made patrols and raids very hazardous undertakings which meant the resumption of a more mobile form of combat less likely.

Perhaps the most significant in this period was the steady growth of enemy artillery firepower during the spring of 1952. From a total of 710 active pieces in April the enemy by June increased the number along the front to 884 according to one intelligence report. The chief mission of the enemy artillery was to provide close support for the infantry on offense and defense and gradually enemy fire became more accurate. Using eight to ten pieces, enemy massed fire techniques also improved. The Communist employed deceptive measures such as the firing of alternate, widely spaced guns, numerous firing positions, and a number of moving guns to make the task
of a accurate location of pieces more difficult of friendly guns. By moving
his artillery frequently and not concentrating the guns for long in any one
sector, the enemy hindered effective counterbattery fire by the UN artillery.
From a daily average of 2,388 rounds in April, the enemy almost tripled his
fire in June, to 6,843 rounds a day. The increase in ammunition fired
demonstrated that the enemy had over a period of months gradually increased
his forward supply levels.

That the enemy increased his artillery power which was only responsive
by the friendly counterbattery attested to the fact that in the late stalemate
period of the Korean War as long as the both sides avoided human loss, the
war became more and more like an artillery battle.

In July the Korean rainy season started with the Imjin River swollen
from time to time. The line continued to remain static although occasion-
ally there were fierce actions in which the New Zealand Regiment
distinguished itself, adding further luster to its reputation. The regiment
continued day and night to harass the Chinese with observed and predicted
fire, helping the infantry deny the enemy freedom of movement in no man’s
land.

On 13 September, the regiment received the severe attention of the enemy
artillery. In fact, all during that month, the enemy artillery spasmodically
bombarded the regiment’s gun positions. Roger Battery was particularly
hard hit on the day and a result of the shelling had Gunner T.M. O’Neill
killed, Gunner R.H. Mortimer died of wounds and two other wounded.

On the Commonwealth division front, the first big action of the year
came in October 23 when the Chinese launched a battalion-size attack on
the Royal Canadian Regiment on Kowang-san (Hill 355), which since Opera-
tion Westminster had been in the division responsibility. The enemy com-
pletely overran one position but it was later restored. The regiment, along
with the rest of the division artillery, engaged forming up points and other
targets during the operation. It was estimated that some 4,000 shells had
fallen on the Canadians within twelve hours. The division artillery fired
8,000 shells and 4,000 mortar bombs in support of the battalion. Although
no casualties arose in the New Zealand Regiment, 15 Canadians were killed
and 82 wounded.

After a short time in a reserve position, the regiment continued in direct
support of the 28th Brigade on 2 November. Enemy shelling and mortaring
continued steadily on Hills 355 and 159, where the regiment had its observa-
tion posts. Later in the month, there was a determined enemy company-size
attack on an English battalion and the regiment again swept into action.
The Artillery Regiment

The regiment did not really open up, however, until 25 November when an assault group from another English battalion was ambushed. For the twenty-four hour period during that action, the regiment fired 5,126 rounds, its highest total in twelve months.

Ever since it first went into action in January 1951, the regiment had maintained a steady rate of fire against the enemy and at 1200 hours on 26 November 1952, it fired its 500,000th round. It was a ceremonial occasion attended by senior officers of the division. Major General West (who assumed the command in September 1952) fired the gun, which was directed on a target selected by Brigadier T. J. Daly, the Commander of the 28th Brigade. Seven months later, on 25 June 1953, the regiment was to fire its three-quarter millionth shell, an impressive total which gave the regiment a firing average of 830 rounds a day in the two and a half years it had been in Korea up to that time.

Summarized, it may be said that the late summer and autumn of 1952 had been a quiet period for the regiment. Of minor incidents there were plenty, but the only operation of any size was the attack on 23 October on Hill 355, and for that matter, it was also a small action for an army of a division-size.

As has been made clear, the outstanding development in the Chinese armies in the later part of 1951 and 1952 was the quantity and quality of their artillery. They had many guns, with plenty of ammunition, and their shooting was good. Moreover, they had a very good warning system which ensured the prompt opening of fire, and they were not afraid to bring down fire close to, or even on, their own troops. The friendly dominance of artillery which was hardly challenged by the enemy in quantity and technique was no longer the case from mid-1951 onward.

On 29 November the redeployment of the division on a new layout began which affected the regiment’s future operations. It was now proposed to have all three brigades up, each with two battalions in front line and one (two in the 28th Brigade) in reserve. Battalions, and their supporting batteries from the New Zealand Artillery Regiment, were each fifty-six days in the line and twenty-eight days in reserve. This meant for the regiment a breaking down of the really intimate contact between one battery and one battalion because previously, in May, the 28th Brigade once again became “Four Square” with the arrival of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment.

In December as this plan became effective the regiment reserved one battery behind the line. This month saw the regiment firing in support of the 1st ROK Division on the right of the Commonwealth Division.

On 11 December two regiments of the 420th Regiment of the CCF 140th
Division, 47th Army, the enemy elements also opposed to Commonwealth troops, attacked the ROK outposts in the Kojang-ni area 6 kilometers northeast of Kowang-san. In the first stroke the Chinese gained several outposts. To support the ROK counterattack, the New Zealand Artillery Regiment poured a continuous barrage of shells on the Chinese in addition to B-26's air strikes and the bombardment by other artillery units. The encounter lasted four days during which the regiment fired 3,400 rounds in support of the ROK division.

The last several weeks of the year also saw a few deep aggressive patrols by the 28th Brigade. Each involved large regimental fire plans.

Unsuccessful "Operation Pimlico" by the British and Australian battalions creating a diversion in the right was quite the largest. Another patrol by the Australians in December was more successful, but Captain John Salmon—an Australian artillery officer posted to the regiment—was wounded as the patrol returned. He was forward observation officer with the patrol.

During the Christmas period, the regiment received its first seasonal

The 10th New Zealand Transport Company in convoy through the Gloucester valley, 20 January 1953.
greetings in card form from the enemy. Many of these pamphlets and cards for propaganda purpose were dropped by enemy aircraft. Except this, Christmas was spent eventlessly with the best of the traditional fare as circumstances permitted.

The New Year period which followed was quiet, and in the second week in January 1953 there was a noticeable increase in enemy shelling and mortaring.

On 29 January the Commonwealth Division was relieved in the line by the 2nd US Division. The New Zealand Artillery Regiment remained along with the rest of the division artillery in support of the 2nd US Division whose artillery was then supporting the 1st ROK Division. Although the Commonwealth Division was to be in reserve until April, the regiment was to face heavier action in March.

Section 8. Summary of the Artillery Battles—1953

In early days of the final year of the fighting in Korea the situation on the front remained stalemate. Although the troops in line were not charged with heavy fighting plans, they were, nevertheless, busy in developing camps and winterizing accommodation and equipment.

By now the armistice negotiations reached a stage where one of the main disagreements was the conditions for the repatriation of prisoners. When this difficulty would be removed in April 1953, the sick and wounded prisoners would be exchanged bringing the fighting in Korea nearly close to an end.

The Commonwealth Division did not return to the line again until early in April. In February, Lieutenant Colonel J. Burns, had taken over command of the regiment from Lieutenant Colonel Paterson. In that same month, two members of the regiment left Korea to join the Coronation contingent. They were Captain T. M. Fenton and Gunner T. Crapp. There were three other NCOs from separate Kayforce units in the contingent. Until April, the New Zealand Artillery Regiment remained in support of the 2nd US Division which was subjected to heavy attacks in March. Following vigorous patrols in February, which were not so serious, the Red Chinese went over to the offensive again in March, but on a limited scale.

The Communist troops started March with a two-company attack on the left forward spur of Hill 355 (Kowang-san). They were supported by a heavy artillery and mortar bombardment. The regiment fired counter-artillery tasks in helping to hurl back the attack. Then again on 17 March at
0130 hours, the enemy attacked the left spur of Kowang-san with a battalion. A friendly company was overrun and fighting continued until 1000 hours when the area was restored. In this particular action, the regiment fired 4,600 rounds and was credited with many of 400 enemy casualties.

During this same night of 17 March, Gunner W. L. Clarke was to win an immediate Military Medal for the exhibition of personal valor. He was checking artillery telephone cables which ran up an open valley next to Hill 355 when the 9th Regiment of the 2nd US Division was attacked on the hill. The battle was raging fiercely and the area was being shelled continuously when he approached a partly overrun American platoon. He saw wounded being evacuated to the rear and he helped to take them out with his jeep. From that time on, Gunner Clarke voluntarily drove his jeep from forward to rear of the platoon position no fewer than ten times in spite of the fact that the enemy were in occupation of the center of the position. On these trips he evacuated 31 casualties and on each return trip he brought forward much-needed supplies and ammunition. Each journey was made under heavy shell and mortar fire and, in the early stages, under enemy machine gun fire.

Before the 2nd US Division was relieved in the line by the returning Commonwealth Division in April, the former's commander, Major General James C. Fry presented 25 of his Division Certificates "The Order of the Indian Head"--to the members of the regiment. At a special presentation parade, he described its work in support of his division as "magnificent..."

The Commonwealth Division returned to the line on 9 April 1953, but there was a marked slackening of enemy interest in the 28th Brigade on the right of the division area.

During May, in one of the regular propaganda broadcasts beamed on to the division front line by loudspeaker, a female voice announced: "Welcome Aussies ... Here is some Australian music ..." This was followed by a recording of "12th Street Rag." Although April was a quiet month, the front flared up again during the May, June and July period when the Hook position around the village of Oum-ni was subjected to many heavy attacks.

On 2 May 1953, two Red Chinese companies attacked a Canadian battalion in the Hook position west of Sami-chon at Oum-ni, and overrun a forward platoon. Again the New Zealand Regiment was called into action along with both the division and corps artillery, to support the defending infantry troops.

In mid-May the regiment gave substantial artillery support to the Turkish Brigade when it was attacked west of the Hook position.

But the biggest action of the year took place in the closing days of May on Hook position. Two Chinese battalions attacked the Hook position at 2100 hours on 28 May which was then defended by British battalions. A
bombardment of some 10,000 rounds of mixed artillery and mortars preceded the attack which was made in conjunction with a brigade-size attack on the Turkish Brigade to the left of the Hook.

A forward company of the 1st Battalion of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment was heavily hit and one platoon was completely overrun. A fierce counterattack at 0230 hours was successful in restoring the position.

All available division and corps artillery was employed in support of the defenders and the regiment fired some 4,500 rounds of total 24,000 expended.

With the exception of a number of light patrol clashes, there was little activity on the front during June. Enemy activity in the main was directed against the 1st ROK Division on the right of the division where increased activity resulted in the loss of Little Nori. The regiment fired some 2,300 rounds in support of the ROK troops during the month. However, the regiment's main fire was in support of patrols and counter-bombardment work.

The enemy continued to harass forward companies by day, particularly in the Hill 355 and 159 areas where most of the regiment's casualties arose. In the last few days of the war, the enemy put in some very heavy attacks on the hills to the left of the brigade and the regiment provided some very solid fire support to assist the defenders.

The regiment was still firing up to within five hours of the time the truce became effective -- 1000 hours 27 July. News of the ceasefire agreement came after two nights of heated action on the front. The New Zealand gunners were up for the greater part of both nights, pouring shells into the enemy. Chinese bodies were still being carried out even after hostilities had ceased. The last rounds were fired at 0530 hours on 27 July 1953. After two and a half years almost continuously in the line, the guns became silent. The regiment's tally of shells fired came to almost 800,000 rounds -- the highest for any field artillery regiment in Korea. It was a record the regiment could always remember with pride.

In fact, the signing of the Truce Agreement meant more work for everyone in the regiment. New positions had to be prepared, training was intensified, exercises were frequent; and in addition to all this, the normal routine tasks of an artillery regiment in the field had to be carried out. The first big task was to clear the gun positions and observation posts in the Demilitarized Zone. This had to be completed by 13 September 1953. Every piece of equipment that could be salvaged was brought back to be used in a new defensive line. At the same time the Regiment had to move back to a new truce position.

This was an area that had never been occupied before and roads, drains,
living sites and gun parks had to be constructed. It meant long hours of
arduous labor for all ranks, but before the regiment left Korea the result of
their efforts was very plain to see. The regimental truce position ranked
among the best in the division area. Quonset huts were erected for messing,
a regimental area was built, also a special wet canteen for the men.

But the emphasis was on training. Many men had arrived in the field
since the end of the war and they had to be prepared for whatever the
future might have held. At the same time, the veterans were not allowed
to forget what they had learnt by hard experience.

Early in 1954, the regiment found itself slipping severely under strength.
For some months, recruiting in New Zealand had been slackening off and
replacements were just not coming forward to take over from the men whose
period of service in Korea was completed. The position became serious and
it was decided to augment the New Zealand personnel in the regiment with
British National servicemen who were already posted to the scene. A num-
ber of British artillery officers were already fed to the ranks of the regiment.

At first a trial group of ten British gunners were augmented to the
regiment to see if the suggested scheme was practicable. They were all
volunteers and at the end of that trial period, it was quiet apparent that the
scheme could be a success.

About 70 volunteers were called for among the British units but more
than 200 put their names forward. There was no problem in obtaining British
officers to serve with the regiment and for the remainder of the time it
stayed in Korea, there were always about seven or eight on trial status.

The British gunners who were fed to the regiment stayed until early
October 1954, when the running down process was started. They served
the regiment well and they certainly seemed to enjoy their period of tour. It
was something of a novelty for them to serve with the “Kiwis.” Towards the
end of March, Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Pountney arrived to take over com-
mand of the regiment from Lieutenant Colonel Burns. On his shoulders fell
the task of finally moving the regiment out of Korea in November 1954.

At last it was announced that the 1st British Commonwealth Division
was to be reduced in strength by about two-thirds. A few weeks later the
regiment knew it would soon be on the way home. Then on 7 October 1954,
it officially became non-operational. A special parade was held early in
October and it was attended by the Commander of the Division Artillery,
Brigadier M. A. W. Rowlandson.

Addressing the New Zealand Artillery Regiment after the inspection he
said: “You are going away, certainly well-liked and respected.”

Not all the members of the regiment returned to New Zealand. Some, who
had recently arrived, were transferred to the 10th Company, Royal New Zealand
was staying behind as the New Zealand component of the Commonwealth Brigade which remained. Others were transferred to Japan to complete the one hundred and one “clean up” jobs which remained to be done.

But for the majority, it was “farewell Korea.” The 16th Field Artillery Regiment, RNZA, which had acquitted itself with honor both in war and peace, ceased to exist.

Section 9. War Account

General

Since the first New Zealanders set their foot in Korea on 31 December 1950, the 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment maintained traditions of the highest order in the Korean artillery scene. When the 1st Commonwealth Division was formed in July 1951, the force was substantially augmented by a transport company, signal and divisional headquarters troops. The New Zealand gunners, once men in offices, factories and shops, who until Korea had never seen a 25 pounder, had seen they had a great tradition to live up to have been built in many battles in two world wars. Five years after their first action one of the commanders of the 1st Commonwealth Division, Major General West, told a press conference in Wellington: “If there is a better unit than the New Zealand 16th Artillery Regiment, I’d like to see it.”

The gunners, backed by support units, worked to the gunners’ watchword “ Ubique” — they were everywhere. New Zealanders supported in turn ROK units, and such US units as the 24th Infantry, the 1st Marine, the 1st Cavalry and the 2nd divisions. The commander of the 2nd US Division Major General James C. Fry, presented the Regiment with 25 Divisional Certificates “The Order of the Indian Head” for the splendid supporting action. But the highest praise came from the host country when the unit received the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for “exceptionally meritorious service and heroism” against the Chinese Communist forces at Kapyong.

The regiment’s fine records can possibly be matched by the actions of the New Zealand frigates which arrived in Korea five months before the Army. From 1 August 1950, the Royal New Zealand Navy kept two frigates continuously in the area, an effort which involved all six of the Navy’s frigates and eight tours of duty. In also involved approximately one half of the Navy’s average manpower strength. The total personnel involved was approximately 1,350 and casualties sustained were one rating killed in action during the Rotoiti’s first tour.
Although always charged with such minor roles as patrolling, escorting convoys or defending friendly islands, they were nevertheless noted many times for superb seamanship and devotion beyond the call of duty. Some of them are shown in seven D.S.C.’s and two D.S.M.'s.

The 16th New Zealand Regiment lost 38 lives during the War which includes 22 killed in action and 79 were wounded in action. Among many official recognition which the regiment won in addition to the ROK Presidential Citation were 1 C. B., 9 M.B.E's, 3 B.E.M's, 4 D.S.O.’s, 1 D.C.M., 7 M.M.'s, 45 M.I.D.'s and 4 foreign decorations.

After the armistice when the regiment was badly under strength, some officers and British gunners joined the regiment. All served well under the regiment’s tradition until October 1954 when the regiment became “non-operational.” It was Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Poutney’s unhappy duty to disband a unit which the Commander of the Commonwealth Division Artillery, Brigadier M.A.W. Rowlandson, in a farewell letter to the regiment on 6 October, the day before it ceased to exist, said: “I lose a fine regiment from my command” and then paid the men the highest tribute from one artilleryman to others when he said they were “good gunners.”

Supporting arms

The reputation of Kayforce rested on teamwork which extended miles behind the front gunners—doing a thousand-and-one jobs with equal distinction—the drivers, the signallers, the engineers, the men at base headquarters unit, those of the reinforcement men who served in Commonwealth divisional units independent of the regiment.

Every modern formation depends on organization of great complexity to keep fighting fit. Every move involves orders, instructions and messages sent over complicated systems of communications manned by highly technical men using elaborate and expensive equipment. Doing exactly this there were the Regiment Signal Troops, known as George Signal Troops, from the regiment’s early days with the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade.

Communications are just as important to an artillery regiment as nerves are to the human body. All the signal troop personnel, with the exception of three radio mechanics who lived one at each battery to maintain wireless sets and charge wireless batteries, were attached to the regimental headquarters. Set down in cold words and figures, the job of the signallers seemed like simple, routine work; but it was often done in the dark, in freezing temperatures and on lonely stretches of aroad when the enemy’s position was not clearly known. It called time and time again for high degree of devotion to duty. Reporting on the difficulties experienced by signallers in Korea,
Lieutenant J.R. Clarke, the first officer commanding the troop, said in February 1951, "At time the batteries operating the telephone system freeze overnight in the sub-zero temperatures rendering the exchanges useless, and the damp cold corroded contact points on the wireless sets used as secondary lines of communications.

Warmth was the only effective remedy against technical faults caused by Korea's cold weather. Even though they made sure that the equipment was kept as warm as possible, there was nothing they could do about the lines laid around the areas each time the regiment moved.

At the time, seventeen of the troops were responsible for operating the signal office, the regimental office, the regimental exchange, and the regiment's wireless and radio telephone links. The signal office containing the exchange had been set up in a special three-ton lorry, which the signalman had made comfortable by lining it with matting and installing a heater. Nine men made up three line detachments. Their job was to lay and maintain about eight to ten miles of telephone line between the three batteries, the regiment's Bren-gun outposts, and superior headquarters. They were on call twenty four hours a day to repair lines put out by vehicles or enemy action. Four signalmen worked as despatch riders; but they used jeeps instead of the motorcycles with which they were originally issued. Apart from the state of the roads, ice-covered or a foot deep in slush, the cold alone sometimes made it physically impossible for man to ride a motorcycle. These despatch riders rushed messages up to thirty or forty miles, traveling one to a vehicle by day, but two to a vehicle by night for protection.

There was also the Light Aid Detachment, Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the 16th Field Regiment. In fact, much of the smooth-working efficiency of the regiment during those early days was directly due to the work carried out by the Light Aid Detachment, commanded at first by Captain J.W. Wilson MBE. Guns were almost always on the move along rugged roads and often, vehicles which were not particularly new, were kept working like clockwork only because of the tenacity of themechanics under varying conditions.

The engineers worked in extremes of climate, in a country not always with the first-class roads and many rivers which from a trickle in autumn froze thick in winter and became raging torrents in summers. The Imjin River, for example, from a fordable three feet, would rise to forty feet in about a day. The engineers saw to it that the bridges were there when needed. At times, the "Sappers" fought with the infantry as they did at "the Hook" in 1953.

The maintenance crews and drivers of the transport company kept fit to whip the regiment and its guns in and out of battle and from battle to
battle often at night without lights over unknown tracks. They also carried up food, ammunition, equipment and the mail sorted out beforehand at base unit.

**Administration and Logistics**

The conditions in which Commonwealth formations operated in Korea were unique. Operationally the Commonwealth units were under the UN Command but administratively they were under the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces, Korea (B.C.F.K.). Most of supplies also came from Commonwealth logistics sources except for petrol, rations of some contingents and special articles of equipment. But this command was no absolute, as none of the Commonwealth countries concerned completely surrendered sovereignty over their forces.

When this command was first established in December 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, Australian Army was chosen to lead it. He was responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Melbourne, which was the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee augmented by representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

Despite this unified command, independence of each component of Commonwealth countries was always preserved in every endeavor. Each Commonwealth countries maintained its own system of reinforcements and personnel records. Headquarters, New Zealand Base Units, Korea, was at Pusan with a detachment in Kur. At Pusan a resident senior officer looked after the administrative problems with direct responsibility to New Zealand.

When the fighting settled down to a slow pace, the British Commonwealth Leave Unit was established in Tokyo to cater for valuable rest for combatants. Started in early 1951 it could provide by the middle of the year good accommodation and rest facilities appreciated by all ranks. Until December 1953, 90 officers and 2,777 other ranks of New Zealanders passed through this establishment.

The replacement system of the New Zealand force in Korea differed more than any other points from that of other nations. The original personnel of the force were enlisted "the period of the emergency and six months thereafter." Other Commonwealth troops in the United Nations forces, however, had a fixed time limit for service in their contingents, as also had the UK and Canadian armies. During the latter part of 1951, New Zealand examined the position, and as a result decided to proceed with a replacement scheme which would provide for personnel to be relieved after serving from eighteen to twenty one months in the theater of operations.

Prior to this decision, with the formation of the 1st Commonwealth
Division, the biggest expansion of troops was made to the original force. On 1 May 1951, the New Zealand made a broadcast statement to the effect that additional New Zealand land units would be required for that formation. When recruiting closed on 19 May, 1,619 had offered their services for a required total of 771 all ranks. This expansion troops went through an eight weeks training; five weeks basic training in Distinct Training Camps and the remaining three weeks in different areas according to each speciality.

During the active fighting, teams of replacement troops followed one after another in about every three months to fill up the loss and service-expired personnel. Each of these teams underwent six weeks of basic and another six in specialist training before being shipped to Korea via Japan.

**Casualties**

Until mid-1951, when the regiment had campaigned in Korea for more than nine months, it had just lost three killed in action and a dozen wounded. But from then on, the casualties increased. Some of them occurred among the gunners in their regimental areas for the enemy used more and heavier artillery in counterfire. However, the majority of casualties were among the observation post parties up with the infantry. Throughout its presence in Korea, the force suffered the total of 118 casualties to be broken down to 22 killed in action, 79 wounded in action, 16 died and one missing.

One missing was Gunner N.G. Garland, the only New Zealand POW in Korea. He returned on 6 August 1953 with other UN captives and how he fared during captivity is briefly described below.

He was captured on the night of 17 November 1951 when he was with an observation party from the regiment in support of the 1st Battalion, Kings Shropshire Light Infantry. The company position the party was in came under a heavy fire from Communist self-propelled guns and shortly after was attacked by the enemy. When the fighting quietened down Gunner Garland went outside the dug-out and met two sole survivors of an infantry section which had been dug in near the observation post.

The three started to go over the top of the hill to company headquarters but were seen by a small party of Chinese armed with automatic weapons who forced them to surrender at gunpoint. They were marched to the Chinese command post two or three miles away where they were interrogated for half an hour. They were then marched 25 miles to the rear where they were imprisoned with other Commonwealth captives.

Two days later he started on a 125-mile march to a mining camp with other captives. He was on the road for about ten days, and found it very
cold as he was still in light clothing and there was much snow around. At the mining camp, the captor issued him with their quilted winter clothing and took him part of the journey in trucks to the 5th North Korean Prison Camp. There, he was put in a United Kingdom company and lived with these men all the time. For food he generally had two cups of rice a day. In winter this was augmented with a midday snack of a cup of charred barley brew. Monotony was his worst enemy. He remained in enemy hands for twenty months and was repatriated at the Panmunjom prisoner exchange on 7 August 1953. He looked surprisingly well when he was released although he was very thin.

Introducing himself to Major General M. West, the Commander of the Commonwealth Division at the time, who was waiting to welcome returnees, Garland cheerfully said: “My name is Garland, Sir. I’m a Kiwi.” Among others who were there at Panmunjom to welcome him back was Captain H. J. McLean, who had been with him the night he was captured.
CHAPTER III  THE NAVAL FORCE

Section 1.  Pukaki and Tutira in 1950

On the morning of 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea. The United Nations reacted strongly: first an appeal to cease fire and, when it was apparent that this had failed, a request to its member nations to provide forces which could be sent to the assistance of Korea.

New Zealand’s answer was immediate. On 29 June, the Prime Minister, S.G. Holland, told the House of Representatives that the Dominion would do whatever lay within its power to fulfil the obligations it had incurred under the United Nations Charter. “It is prepared,” he added, “to make available New Zealand Naval Units should they be required in the present Korean situation.”

There was no doubt that they were required. The same day the New Zealand contribution was fixed at two frigates initially, with more if they were needed. At the same time the ships to be sent were selected. Of the navy’s six Loch-class frigates, two (Tauru and Hauho) were in the Mediterranean on exchange with two ships of the Royal Navy which were due in New Zealand on 3 July. Rotoiti was in the Pacific Islands, concluding a visit there with the cruiser, Bellona. Kaniere was refitting at Auckland, Pukaki was undergoing a routine docking, although she could be removed from the dock at short notice, and Tutira was on her way back from Fiji and due to arrive at Auckland that day.

Finally, Pukaki (Lieutenant-Commander L.E. Herrick, D.S.C., R.N.) and Tutira (Lieutenant-Commander P.J.H. Hoare, R.N.) were selected and the departure date set on Monday, 3 July 1950. It was a striking example of the flexibility of seapower that it was possible to choose two ships, one in dock and the other not yet returned from an Islands Cruise, and expect them to leave for a war zone at less than for days notice.

Apart from the physical preparation of the ships, men were needed to bring them to war complement. Volunteers were called throughout the navy on Friday, 30 June. Within an hour 80 names had been received in H.M. N.Z.A. Philomel alone and in the succeeding two days long lists of volunteers
came in from other ships and shore establishments.

During the weekend, the two ships were made ready and fully manned. Then, on 3 July, they gathered at dockside of Auckland for a ceremony. "You are about to leave New Zealand in the United Nations first fifteen," said a farewell signal from the New Zealand Naval Board. "We know that you will do justice to this honour. Good luck and good hunting."

The two ships sailed north along a path that was to become familiar to the New Zealand navy in the following years. They sailed to Port Moresby for fuel, then east about New Guinea and the Philippines. They arrived at Hong Kong on 19 July and began making good defects, embarking war stores and doing gunnery exercises. On 27 July 1953, they sailed for Sasebo which had become one of the main bases for the gathering United Nations naval forces.

The alacrity with which the United Nations naval strength grew in the Korean waters is very astonishing. Two days after the invasion, the United States gathered all available naval forces in Far East under the command of Vice Admiral Joy, USN and began to deal with the Communist invader in joint effort with the ROK navy pending the arrival of the UN ground forces. On 29 June, added to this sea force were ships of the Royal British Navy commanded by Rear Admiral Sir William G. Andrewes, Flag Officer Second in Command, Far Eastern Station. By the time New Zealand frigates arrived at Sasebo, additional ships had already come from Australia, Canada, France and Netherlands.

The prospect of operating this combined multinational naval force presented some problems in organization and employment. After some revision, it was decided in late July that Task Group 96.5, be established under Admiral Joy. The new organization would be commanded by Rear Admiral Hartmen, USN and involved the creation of four subordinate units; the Japan-Korea Escort Element (96.50), to which four frigates were assigned including New Zealand frigates; the West Coast Support Element, composed of other Commonwealth ships and a Dutch ship, commanded by Admiral Andrewes; two rotating East Coast Support Elements, consisted chiefly of US ships. Admiral Andrewes, in addition to his responsibility for west coast operations, was charged with the supervision of all non-American United Nations naval forces, for which purpose he set up an administrative headquarters at Sasebo. The principle incorporated in this new command organization of making the British responsible for the west coast of Korea while the United States Navy looked after the east coast was retained throughout the war.

As was indicated in the above explanation. Tutira and Pukaki upon arrival at Sasebo were assigned to Task Element 96.50 commanded by Captain
Jay, RN in HMS *Black Swan*. This element was primarily responsible for escorting convoys from Sasebo and other Japanese ports to Pusan and included two Canadian ships besides New Zealand frigates.

The safe conduct of these convoys was essential. On the ground, the North Koreans were still sweeping down the peninsula, compressing the defenders into the Naktong Perimeter. Troops and equipment were being rushed into this corner to hold the bridgehead and it was essential that the convoys should run without delay or harm.

Yet, it must be noted that the first few weeks in Korea was less hectic for the New Zealand frigates than one might have expected considering the critical state of the land campaign at this time. The period must have been hazardous and exciting one for big carriers taking up directly and decisively the bombardment missions on inland fightings. But in the battle for the Naktong Perimeter the UN naval forces, except for the carriers, were engaged mainly in blockading the enemy coast and in ensuring the safe passage of men, ammunition and supplies to the battle area.

In general, *Tutira* and *Pukaki* found themselves in a fixed routine. They sailed from Sasebo in the early afternoon with a convoy, arrived at Pusan in the early hours of the following morning, patrolled off the harbour entrance until the convoy was safely inside and then returned to Japan at full speed. They spent the night in harbour and sailed again in the following day. This meant days at sea with little rest. In addition, during the few days spent in harbour as a break from this routine, the frigates remained at short notice for steam, ready to escort any shipping which might arrive. It was a strenuous program which was not made easier by the blistering heat of the Korean summer.

Although New Zealand frigates found Sasebo expanding at a feverish pace the port was still incapable of accommodating such large-scale naval activity. It had been heavily bombed and after the war the dockyard installations had been repaired to a limited extent. The base was then placed under care and maintenance while the American occupation fleet used Yokosuka near Tokyo as its main base.

As a result, the outbreak of the Korean War found Sasebo inadequate as a main operational base. The dockyard and base facilities were rapidly expanded and amenities for the ships' companies were provided ashore but it was some time before these were sufficient to meet the demands.

But a change came in September. The United Nations ground forces began their counter offensive and they planned to land ROK and US troops far up the Korean coast to Inchon in the hope that the troops would form a cordon against which the North Koreans, retreating from the friendly
breakthrough from the south, would be trapped.

For this amphibious operation, New Zealand frigates were assigned to Task Group 90.7 (Screening and Protective Group) commanded by Captain Richard T. Spofford, USN. Being one element of Joint Task Force Seven, designed specially for the operation, this force was responsible for screening and sweeping of minefields prior to major amphibious landing. In the meantime, all other Commonwealth ships formed Task Group 91 (Blockade and Covering Force) under Rear Admiral Andrewes.

The active participation of New Zealand frigates with this operation began on 12 September 1950 when they left Pusan with a convoy. They arrived off Inchon in the early hours of 15 September. They were met by a force of cruisers and destroyers which took charge of the convoy and escorted it to the beaches for the assault at dawn. Meanwhile the two ships joined the TG 90.7 which formed a patrol line around the approaches to, and about 64 kilometers from, Inchon.

For the rest of the night and all the following day a stream of ships passed Pukaki and Tutira on their way to the beaches. For a while the patrols were an interesting variation from the usual convoy duties. But monotony set in as they remained on the protective screen for five weeks without encountering enemy activity.

But it must be noted that although the New Zealand frigates were not given a spectacular role to play in the Inchon landing, they nevertheless did their duties with their customary efficiency and in the words of one observer “have done yeoman service” in that amphibious victory.

In the meantime, the triumph at Inchon had changed the entire Korean picture, with recapture of Seoul, the northward sweep of the UN forces, and the collapse of the enemy resistance, unification of the peninsula, long the hope of the Koreans, seemed imminently possible. It was about this time that General MacArthur contemplated another landing at Wonsan.

For Wonsan landing New Zealand frigates were assigned to Task Group 95.6 (Minesweeping and Protective Group) commanded by Captain R.T. Spofford, USN. But before returing to the history of New Zealand ships, we must note that this assignment represents the change of organization, which had already become effective on 12 September. This was upgrading of Task Group 95.5, into Task Force 95 called also officially the “United Nations Blockading and Escort Force” commanded by Rear Admiral Smith, USN. The West Coast Support Group, now Task Group 95.1, continued under control of Admiral Andrewes who under him had New Zealand frigates in addition to Commonwealth ships; east coast operations under another US admiral. This was the command set-up with minor variations from
time to time, was to continue until 3 April 1951.

But on 10 October, before Tutira and Pukaki left Inchon for Wonsan, the 3rd ROK Division, which had already crossed the Parallel on 1 October, took the city that the 250-ship armada was setting out to assault. It was decided, however, to let the operation continue as the quickest method of reinforcing it, and landing equipment.

With the prospect of this administrative landing at Wonsan, Tutira and Pukaki left Inchon on 16 October 1951 and raced after more than 40 craft of the Task Group 95.6. The assignment of New Zealand frigates to this group, or that of HMS Mounts Bay and French ship La Grandicre for that matter, was out of the normality that non-American ships were to operate in west coast under Admiral Andrewes.

The force reached off Wonsan waters on 20 October 1950. But there was, as New Zealand frigates were to find, still no swept channel to the beaches, whereupon there began what the US Marines sarcastically dubbed Operation Yo-Yo ... steam southward twelve hours and then northward twelve hours. It was not until 26 October that the amphibious troops could land at Wonsan.
In the meantime, HMNZS Tutira and Pukaki led a very humdrum life. Two ships steamed long a patrol line about 100 miles south of the port and came back almost always without opposition. Indeed in those five days the only warlike activity befell on Pukaki as she sighted and sank a floating mine. Incidentally it was her operational act of her Korean tour, and also a modest climax to her tour since Rotoiti was already on the way to north to replace her.

Sasebo was the setting for the change-over. After a break at Kure, Pukaki arrived there on 4 November 1950 and found Tutira, which had come directly from Wonsan, already in port. On the same day, Rotoiti (Lieutenant Commander B.E. Turner, RNZN) arrived at the port. The following day Pukaki left, her paying-off pennant streaming, on her returned passage via Hong Kong, British North Borneo, the Molucca Sea, Torres Strait and Cairns to Auckland, where she arrived on 3 December. She had been away from New Zealand for 153 days and steamed 27,871 miles.

Meanwhile Tutira and Rotoiti resumed their duty with the Task Group 95.1 in the west coast under Admiral Andrewes. They were responsible for control traffic entering the ports of Chinnampo and Inchon and escort mission for ships making the passage between them.

The port of Chinnampo was then the main logistical base to supply the United Nations' western flank, the 8th US Army, which was now successfully operating in North Korea. But the opening of the port had not been an easy task since it had been heavily mined. It was true in late October and early November the task was one of top military priority in the navy. Even after mines were cleared, the supply vessels had to take intensified precautions against new or uncleared mines.

The mine problem was one thing Tutira and Rotoiti had to watch out constantly on escort missions. In principle, in view of the enemy's ingenuity in mining by small craft, it was considered that the inshore route between Chongsan-got and Chodo Island should not be used by the larger ships, unless operationally essential, until further check sweeping was done.

Until the closing days of 1950, the two ships remained in operation off west coast with not a single accident occurred during New Zealand escort missions. Periods at sea alternated with spells at Kure, Tokyo or Sasebo; the only drawback to this mission was the fact that the two frigates were working "opposite numbers" and it was months before they spent a day in port together. In December the sea began to freeze in north and snow flurry was sometimes to reduce the visibility, not to mention the difficulties of their crews. But worse than that was the danger the United Nations ground forces in Korea now confronted -- the invasion of the Chinese Communist.
Section 2. Hawea and Rotoiti in 1951

With the New Year the Korean situation changed entirely. Overwhelming Chinese Communist forces crossed the North Korean border and the United Nations troops were forced to withdraw. Both Wonsan and Chinnampo were evacuated, leaving the naval forces without a base in the forward area on the west coast of Korea when Inchon was abandoned, too. In February, the United Nations forces advanced again and Seoul was retaken. During the retreat the frigates had joined the patrols which largely prohibited the enemy from using coastal shipping; with the reoccupation of Seoul they resumed their harbor control duties off Haeju area again under Task Group 95.1.

March brought a welcome change of duty for Tutira. Mines were known to be laid in areas to the northwest, north and southwest of Paengnyong-do and the New Zealand frigate was instructed to cooperate with two ROK minesweepers and clear them. It took three weeks to complete the task which was made more difficult by conflicting and unpredictable currents. Although there always existed language problems, the first joint operation with the ROK navy exhibited uncommon solidarity between two navies. Tutira welcomed the job as the most interesting since her arrival in Korea and as a fitting end to her tour of duty. When it was completed she had a short refit at Kure and left for Auckland. When she returned home on 30 May she had steamed 35,400 miles and had been away from New Zealand a few days short of eleven months.

Tutira was replaced by HMNZS Hawea (Lieutenant Commander F. N. Hohnston,) HMNZS which left Auckland on 8 February 1951 and arrived at Kure on 26 April. At the time Rotoiti was still engaged in patrol and escort mission.

Hawea's arrival coincided with a new pattern in Korean naval warfare and one which was to last with variations, until the ceasefire. The land fighting had become stabilized to the extent that there were no more major offensives. Both opposing armies watched warily over the defense line in the neighborhood of the 38th Parallel and were reluctant to carry out more ambitious plans at the expense of mounting casualties. This atmosphere was to bring about the first armistice negotiation at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. In fact it was not so wide of the mark that one observer noted that for all the practical sense the Korean War ended when Yakov A. Malik on 23 June radioed the Communist willingness to talk peace.
On the sea, it was apparent that there was no immediate prospect of attacks on United Nations shipping by enemy interdiction or raiders. Naval units were, therefore, detached from escort duties and diverted to blockading the enemy coast, harassing troop movements, bombarding shore positions, covering troop raids and supporting and supplying islands which although close to the mainland and far to the north of the battle line were still held by the ROK partisans.

_Hawea_ was the first New Zealand ship to be placed in this new pattern. After almost a year of war she was also the first to fire on the enemy. Since early 1951, it had been the tactics of the UN naval forces on the west coast to keep continual pressure on the enemy by the threat of amphibious operations in the area between Chinnampo and Inchon. Everything possible had also been done to give “aid and comfort” to the large groups of friendly guerrillas operating behind the lines on the Hwanghae Promontory. After an amphibious feint, in mid-May, it was now decided to show the enemy that the UN could do more than threaten, and plans were laid to land the British Marines on the mainland opposite Chodo.

On 18 May _Hawea_ was ordered from Task Element 95.12 (Surface Blockade and Patrol Element) to patrol the area prior to the marine landing. Her specific mission was to patrol the coast around Chodo area to collect necessary intelligence and to fire on the targets of opportunity. That afternoon she was fortunate in finding an installation which was either a lookout or a gun position. Whatever its purpose it was within the range of the frigates’s four-inch gun. She anchored, fired 29 rounds, secured three direct hits and, in the words of Lieutenant Commander Hohnston, left the target “damaged beyond further practical use to the enemy.”

Two days later _Hawea_ was in action again when the British Marines from HMS Ceylon were about to raid on the beach in three personnel landing craft. With other ships of TE 95.12 she bombarded the beaches to destroy and mines that might have been planted, shifting fire inland to the nearby villages as the Marines went in. The raiding force infiltrated more than a mile inland and created a great disturbance before returning to Ceylon.

For a month _Hawea_ enjoyed the honour of being the first New Zealand ship to fly her battle ensign in Korea. Then on 17 July 1951, _Rotoiti_ joined her when she was relieved of her escort and patrol mission in the Chinnampo and Inchon area.

But on the day HMNZS _Rotoiti_ was to engage herself one of the most brilliant raids in Korea. She was steaming past Sogon-ni Point, 15 miles south of Chodo in the outer approaches to Chinnampo Harbour, when leading signal-
man E. G. Collier on the bridge noticed a tree which seemed to have grown suspiciously since the frigate's last visit there. Further examination disclosed figures in uniform moving around its base. Lieutenant Commander Turner decided to raid the position. The conditions seemed favourable since ships had frequently come under machine gun fire from the point and just as frequently had bombarded in return. It seemed probable, therefore that the enemy had developed the habit of moving under cover during a bombardment and could safely be sent there while an assault group landed.

The position was located on a cliff, between 15 and 21 meters high, which jutted out into deep water. The face of the cliff fell away in a landslide to a beach and it appeared from the ship that this slide be scaled.

Organization of the raid did not present a major problem. During a refitting spell in Kure Rotoiti had taken advantage of the presence of a Royal Marine Commando nearby to train members of the ship's company in beach landing tactics. An assault platoon was formed under the command of Lieutenant R. S. Webber, R.N. consisting of a three-man headquarters, two flank teams of two man, a five-man boat's crew and an assault team of two men.

Within minutes the raid was under way. Under cover of a bombardment the assault platoon left the ship. As the boat reached the beach the two flank groups moved out with Bren guns to enfilade the position. Immediately the assault teams, consisting of able seaman N. J. Scoles and able seaman E. J. Button, began scaling the landslide at the double preceded by four-inch and 40-mm gunfire from the ship.

They swept over the top of cliff, reached the position, shot a North Korean soldier who was about to throw a grenade, and took prisoner two more who were hiding in a fox-hole. Shepherding the prisoners back down the cliff, the two seamen came under rifle fire but a covering bombardment protected the party while it embarked and returned to the frigate. The boat was back at the davit's head and the disconsolate prisoners were being examined exactly one hour after the operation began.

The end of July saw the start of operations in the Han River Estuary which was the biggest undertaking for New Zealand frigates in 1951. With the battle lines more or less fixed on land it was found that the Estuary offered an opportunity for smaller ships to sail to a position they could shell the enemy flank.

The Han River Estuary lies just south of the 38th Parallel on the west coast of Korea. The northern bank was occupied by Communist forces while the south was in friendly control. The Estuary is shallow and the many sandbanks were then inaccurately charted. Up to this time the waters had been penetrated only by occasional ROKN patrol craft. The tides were
strong, the waters muddy, and there were no navigational marks. The decision to send some frigates into the Estuary was, therefore, quite an undertaking which required most of the available Commonwealth naval forces.

*Hawea* was the first to join this operation leaving behind *Rotoiti* in Chodo-Sok-do patrol mission. On 26 July she arrived in the Estuary and learned that she would act as a communication guard for two British and a ROK frigate which were to penetrate into it. In the evening the three frigates entered the Estuary by western entrance while *Hawea* stood to keep the communication intact. The next two days *Hawea* provided necessary communication in addition to her normal duty for the Estuary force when the western bank of the Haeju-man was heavily bombarded by other UN ships.

In early August *Rotoiti* relieved one of the pioneers, HMS *Morecambe Bay*. With *Hawea* still guarding the communication, *Rotoiti* operated with other two frigates bombarding, probing, and surveying the winding channels in the Estuary with spells of intermittent rest. For these operations the finest kind of seamanship was necessary: US and British charts of the area differed widely, and none showed any very reassuring depths; the liquid medium in the Han, brown soup rather than clear water, was lined with rocks; currents reached eight to ten knots, and so poor was the holding ground that on one occasion a ship that to drag while steaming to both anchors. Despite intermittent groundings, *Rotoiti* and other ships in early August had succeeded in penetrating upstream to fire on Yonan from the southeast and northward up the Yesong River. On the 17th three of the frigates found 400 enemy troops along the river bank and gave them a thorough shelling.

But all this had to stop from 18–24 August interrupted by typhoon “Marge.” During the peak of this storm with winds of 110 knots at the center, *Rotoiti* and *Hawea* were anchored four days in Inchon riding it out, while this disrupted naval operations on the west coast for almost a week.

When “Marge” died out, the operation was immediately started again. This time again *Hawea* and *Rotoiti* were to be separated; the former going back to the Estuary and the latter to Chodo-Sokdo patrol and raid mission.

As all usual activities were taken up with renewed vigour *Rotoiti* was ordered to participate another night raid on Sogon-ni on 25 August with British Marines. A landing party was composed of seven ratings from *Rotoiti*, and eleven from Royal Marines. Since surprise was considered essential, no preliminary bombardment was made and the assault party, in two boats, picked their way through rock shelves to the selected beaches. Slowly and carefully in the darkness the party moved toward the guns across ground interlaced with trenches and covered with high grass. Ahead they sighted a group of NK Reds, backs toward them, watching *Rotoiti*. They steadied for the attack and at that moment they were challenged. Heavy machine-gun
fire came down on them and one able seaman from the Rotoiti section was killed. A hand grenade silenced the enemy and the assault party obeyed its instructions to retire if heavy opposition was met. They reached the boats, came under fire and finally evacuated the beach with Bren gunners in the bows firing back at the aroused enemy. This raid produced the New Zealand Navy's only operational casualty of the Korean campaign.

Until early September Rotoiti remained in Chodo-Sok-do area with uneventful but essential patrol and raid duty. Although this role might not result in direct loss on the enemy, it certainly increased his transportation problems by denying him the use of the sea and forced him to spend a large part of his strength on coastal defences against the possibility of landings or guerrilla activities. In the early morning of 2 September she was relieved of the mission by Canadian ship, Cayuga to ready for return to New Zealand via Japan.

However, Rotoiti managed to finish her tour of duty with the most unusual experience of her tour. She sailed at night from Kure for Hong Kong on 23 October, 1951, to begin the long voyage home. She passed through the Inland Sea, the Shimonoseki Passage and the Formosa Straits without incident but on the afternoon of 25th October she received a distress signal from the British ship S.S. Hupeh which had been attacked and captured by pirates using a fast motor power junk off the mouth of the Yangtze River.

Rotoiti immediately altered course and worked up to full speed to intercept. At 10 p.m. her radar detected a ship. She was closed and, as she took evasive action to escape the frigate, a starshell revealed that she was the same size as Rotoiti's quarry. The frigate continued to illuminate her by rocket and finally her name was picked out by signal projector. She was the HMS Hupeh.

Finding her was only the first part of Rotoiti's problem. She was in the control of about 49 heavily-armed pirates who promptly threatened to shoot the ship's European officers and the women and children among the passengers if Rotoiti attempted to board her. The ship's master told Lieutenant-Commander Turner of this threat by signal light and appeared to be in little doubt then the pirates would fulfill their threat. However, he added that the pirates appeared willing to consider their position and he asked that Lieutenant Commander Turner delay action for a while. Eventually the pirates made their offer. If they were promised safe custody to a nearby island they would respect the safety of the officers, passengers, and cargo. It was a hard decision for Lieutenant-Commander Turner to make; pirates are rarely captured by warships and they would have made an unusual trophy for Rotoiti's return. On the other hand, the safety of the ship, its passengers and crew
and its cargo was undoubtedly the prime consideration and there seemed no way of taking the pirates into custody without risking it. Had Rotoiti sent away a boarding party, bloodshed on the Hupeh would have been inevitable. So the promise of safe custody was granted and the Hupeh was escorted by the frigate to the selected island where the pirates were put ashore and the Hupeh continued the return voyage to Hong Kong. Rotoiti, too, resumed her passage via Hong Kong North Borneo to Auckland. She arrived at Auckland on 21st November 1951, having fared 51,000 miles since leaving there eleven months before.

Meanwhile Taupo (Lieutenant Commander K.A. Cradock Hartopp, M.B.E., R.N.) had come north to replace Rotoiti. She left Auckland on 29 August 1951 and after calls at Sydney, Singapore and Hong Kong, she arrived at Sasebo on 10 October—the fifth New Zealand frigate to enter the war area.

Taupo slipped smoothly and quickly into the Korean naval pattern. She sailed the same day to join the Han River force on the west coast of Korea where she spent October landing spotting parties for shore bombardment and surveyed the bombardment anchorage. Early November saw the 100th day since the first entry into the Estuary. At this date the scores, in numbers of days spent in the area, 34 days inclusive of three New Zealand frigates. Some other statistics of this operation are that the 14 ships concerned in it have spent a total of 235 days in the Estuary steaming about 2,100 miles and spending 15,370 rounds of ammunition.

In the same month Taupo intermittently left the mission in the Han River for convoy escort duty in Cho-do-Sok-do route sometimes patrolling the Haeju area. The sea patrol was occasionally extended as far north of 39th parallel around Taewha-do in Korean Bay although she encountered little enemy opposition. On 23 November she proceeded to Cho-do to be relieved by Hawea. But just before the relief took place near the northern tip of the island, both ships were ordered to assist a guerrilla landing on the main land. The largest friendly guerrilla organization on the west coast at this time was directed by an American officer stationed on Paengnyong-do whose representatives were scattered on various islands in the west coast. Both ships therefore sailed to Sok-do and offered their services. At the time Canadian ship Cayuga was also available. The objective of the raid was a recently-placed battery on the Wolsa-ri Peninsula which, if allowed to remain undisturbed, could dominate essential sea route and seriously hamper naval operations in the area. In this period the New Zealand ships placed further pressure on junk traffic along the coast until, in the words of Taupo’s Commanding Officer, their grip became “a complete strangle-hold.” This work may not have been colorful but it was essential and it placed
hard and unremitting pressure on the ships and their companies.

In December there was welcome variety in targets. The United Nations navy undertook more ambitious plans to harass the enemy on the mainland. This involved lying at anchor at night in her assigned position watching with her radar for enemy invasion craft, occasionally firing star-shell to illuminate the more important invasion routes, and now and then throwing the odd round of 4-inch to harass the enemy.

On the 1st December Taupo went closer to the inland to illuminate and shell a railway tunnel in an attempt to block an enemy supply line. Hawea joined the attack on transport at the same time with a series of bombardment of lines, bridges and tunnels and, when possible, of trains.

"Although we have not been successful in hitting a train under way we were summoned to the kill of a train stopped by American ships," Lieutenant Commander Hohnston recalled, "We had the satisfaction of doing considerable damage to the engine, ripping open boxcars and starting two fires."

In the meantime Hawea returned to the Han River force on 25 August 1951. With the aid of US Army maps held together with cellulose tape, and by sending her cutter ahead to lead her through the tortuous channels and mudbanks, Hawea made a successful penetration in early September. She was to repeat this at intervals during the rest of 1951 until in the end she would have spent 23 days in the upper reaches and steamed 350 miles in the river's restricted waters.

But the enemy's complete passivity ended on 21 September when a ROK frigate was hit by a 40-mm or field gun while surveying. It seemed apparent now that the enemy was set to retaliate. In the same month, Hawea and one Australian ship were attacked in the Estuary, Hawea had penetrated 16 miles up the lower reaches of the river and engaged troop concentrations. To improve the accuracy of her shoot she landed a party of 13 men to set up an observation post on an island three miles from the frigate and only one mile from the target. Fifty rounds were fired into the target area before the spotting party was noticed by the enemy. It promptly came under intense mortar fire and was forced to withdraw, fortunately without casualties.

Section 3. Taupo and Rotoiti in 1952

At the beginning of 1952 the outlook of the Korean War was dismal. The hopes raised by the earlier agreement at Panmunjom were slowly dying as
the two sides locked horns over the POW issue. The provisional agreement reached in November 1951 that the existing battle line would form the basis of the military demarcation line if an armistice were reached within 30 days had ended on 26 December and no attempt had been made by either side to extend it. This left both sides free to resume offensive, but the reality was that neither side was willing to take decisive offensive. It seemed for the present that both opposing forces were content to watch warily on the line while making no concessions at the negotiation table.

No matter how the truce talks fared or what the situation on the land front, the United Nations ships in Korean waters, including the frigates of New Zealand, never had any unemployment problem. As far as New Zealand seamen were concerned, this year would bring heavy duties of blockading the enemy coast, preventing seaborne attack on friendly islands, harassing the enemy shore supply lines. Duties would also come from such unexpected targets as troop concentrations, shore batteries, illumination of sea routes in fact any target whose destruction would hurt the enemy’s war potential.

During early months of 1951, however, the New Zealand frigates remained in normal duties in Cho-do-Sok-to patrol mission. On 3 February 1952, Hawea left Kure to return home. She visited Hong Kong, British Borneo before arriving at Auckland on 8 March. She had been away from New Zealand 371 days, had spent 272 days at sea, steamed 55,000 miles and fired 21,000 rounds of ammunition.

Hawea was replaced in the Korean theater by Rotoiti making her second tour of duty. Commanded by Lieutenant Commander G.O. Graham, D.S.O., Z.N. she left Auckland on 7 January and reached Kure via Raoul Island and Suva. She sailed on 12 February for exercises after which she proceeded to the Han River. Day and night bombardment of enemy concentrations followed, interspersed with coastal patrols. Then on 22 February 1952, the frigate penetrated far up the Han River to support a projected raid on enemy positions. Fifty minutes after she anchored in the river she came under heavy fire from three enemy batteries and was forced to withdraw. Rotoiti's experience was not without significance. It meant that the Communist forces had finally sited guns heavy enough to dominate the upper reaches of the Han and that they would be, in future, denied to United Nations ships. It was fortunate that the lesson was learned without casualties.

In February Taupo was off the east coast, where the major responsibility was accepted by American naval forces. In retrospect, despite the fact that all islands north of 38th Parallel were conceded by the UN negotiators on 21
December, failing an armistice agreement the defensive requirement remained. On 6 January responsibility for the over all defense, local ground defense included, of designated islands on both coasts, was assigned and delegated to Task Force 95.

The period following naval assumption of responsibility for island defense brought two actions of importance, one of which *Taupo* was to engage. On the northeast coast, after a month of careful preparation, the North Koreans mounted a raid on the Yang-do group northeast of Songjin by some 250 troops boated in sampans. Until the night of 19-20 February she patrolled Songjin area firing at targets of opportunity and attempting generally to disrupt the enemy rail communications. Then, on that night — after spending part of the previous afternoon waiting for a train which had hidden in a tunnel and refused to emerge — the frigate learned from an emergency dispatch that Yang-do was under fire from the mainland and invasion apparently imminent. Steaming at flank speed, she reached the islands to discover bombardment continuing and fighting in progress ashore, but by this time radio contact had been broken. She closed the islands and saw 15 sampans packed with troops on their way from the mainland to the islands. Covered by the United States ships *Endicott* and *Shelton*, she moved inshore and to attack the sampans. She destroyed 10 and was moving even closer inshore to attack the remainder when she came under accurate fire from batteries on the mainland.

There followed a spirited engagement in the two-mile strait in which all invaders on Yang-do were departing for the mainland. During the enemy artillery bombardment which was put up by USS *Shelton*’s counterbattery, a near miss punctured the engine-room of *Taupo* and others fell under her bows and close to port. It was growing light and the batteries were becoming uncomfortably accurate. Reluctantly *Taupo* withdrew.

This eliminated the invasion attempt and early the following morning the frigate landed a medical party to assist treatment of casualties on Yang-do. A number of wounded were embarked and subsequently transferred to the USS *St. Paul*. *Taupo* thereupon resumed her patrol duty which was to continue until 27 February.

She located not many days later two bridges which had been demolished by naval gunfire and re-built by enemy working parties and promptly wrecked them again. After standing by Yang-do island, once again under threat of invasion which did not on this occasion eventuate, she made another patrol of the coast and finally returned to Sasebo on 27 February 1952. At this stage she had been away from New Zealand for six months, five of them in the operational area. She had spent 78 per cent of that time at sea — an unusual and gruelling record for a ship of her type and a credit to her ship’s
Meanwhile *Rotoiti* continued escort duties and blockading patrols in west coast. On 3 May she engaged in a brisk skirmish with a shore battery in the Kirin-do Channel of Ongjin. Light and heavy guns were observed to be firing on a friendly island and on a ROKN frigate close inshore. *Rotoiti* promptly moved in to supply counter battery fire and placed 16 rounds in the area with some success. While still on this patrol a cook became seriously ill with appendicitis. With Commissioned Supply Officer J.H. Crig as anaesthetist, Surgeon Lieutenant J. D. Read operated shortly after midnight. The operation was successful.

*Taupo*, like the other ships in the United Nations forces, had been working very hard for the past eight months and had had little opportunity to complete her routine maintenance or to give adequate leave to her crews during the short periods spent in harbour. When the demand for ships loosened up a bit towards mid-1951, Admiral Andrewes took the opportunity to send *Taupo* on a visit to Hong Kong on Rest and Recreation.

She arrived at Hong Kong on 14 April without incident. The city had long been a favourite leave port for seamen of many nations and the British authorities did all in their power to do to make the stay comfortable. The visit was beneficial not only for the provision of long-forgotten recreation, her company being sometimes tight on beer, but also for the opportunity for a great deal of necessary repair and maintenance work. Spending her Anzac Day in Hong Kong *Taupo* sailed on the morning of 1 May to return to the Korean waters. (See Sketch Map 4.)

But "Uneventful" was a word used often by Lieutenant Commander Craddock Hartopp in his reports for the remainder of *Taupo*'s tour. The ground fighting still remained stalemated and the armistice negotiation also showed no progress deadlocked over the question of POW repatriation. On the sea ships carried out rather monotonous duties of patrolling, escorting convoys without noticeable events. Stalemate existed, but stalemate brought no rest. Readiness had to be maintained; crews had to be trained; the enemy, ensconced in the northern half of the peninsula, had to be harassed, and if possible brought to terms. However, if the patrols were not composed of major events, they were at least crowded with incidents as a detailed report of the frigate's activities on one typical day -- 20 July -- well shows.

The day began in the early morning with Lieutenant Commander Craddock Hartopp, as Commanding Officer of a small task unit under Task Element 95.12 arranging the exchange of ROK detachments which formed the garrison of friendly islands in Cho-do and Sok-to area. But there had been a flurry
in this area as islands close to the tip of the Ongjin peninsula had been invaded
by a North Korean force embarked in junks and outboard motorboats. That morning a small craft was sighted approaching one of these islands. It
was not a scheduled passage but through contact with USS Craig anchored
at the anti-invasion station near Cho-do she learned the latter would be right
on the way. But she had to alert the island of its approach. At mid-morn-
ing there was a conference with ROK troops from the islands and a prisoner
who had been found hiding in a foxhole was taken into custody. After the
conference Taupo moved down her patrol line to deliver mail to HMS Bel-
fast which was in the same duty of protecting islands in west coast. There
took place another short meetings with the island garrison to extract inform-
ation in Belfast's area. These lasted until mid-afternoon when Lieutenant
Commander Cradock Hartopp despatched a small supply ship on a flood tide.
Arrangements were made for a shore bombardment of suspected troop posi-
tions on the mainland two nights later and Taupo was decided to send out on
night patrol. But before the evening set in, Taupo had another run to make.
More troublesome than the enemy were outbreaks of typhus on Cho-do and
Paengyong-do, Taupo's medics were pleased to join Korean helping hands
there.

It was a quiet 24 hours in which Taupo did not fire a shot. Nevertheless
it combined practically all the typical duties of a New Zealand frigate at that
time; defense of friendly islands, support for friendly guerrillas, liaison with
other United Nations ships, and the organization of the maritime supply line
besides occasional medical service to islanders.

Taupo sailed from Sasebo on her final patrol on 9 September 1952. She
took over from Rototiti near Paengyong-do, patrolled and bombarded targets of
opportunity until 17 September when she returned to Sasebo for the last time.

Taupo left Japan soon afterwards and made her way back to New Zea-
land arriving at Auckland on 21 October 1952. She had been away from New
Zealand 421 days and had spent 311 of them at sea. She had fired 16,000
rounds, wearing out the barrel of her four inch gun in the process and had
steamed 58,200 miles - highest total reached by a New Zealand ship during the
Korean War. On a lesser statistical level, her cooks had baked 21,000 pounds of bread.

Taupo was replaced by Hawea, this time commanded by Commander G. R.
Davis Goff, RNZN, which reached Sasebo on 1 October 1952 and after 24
hours in harbour sailed north to join Task Unit 95.12.

Meanwhile Rototiti had also enjoyed a three-week visit to Hong Kong
where maintenance was carried out and returned to her Korean patrols. They
followed the usual pattern; guns on the mainland which were bothering the garrisons of the inshore islands were bombarded, coastal shipping screened and wounded were evacuated from the land fighting. The months went by; July passed and there was nothing more to tell about Rotoiti in the latter part of 1952.

After a routine patrol, Rotoiti returned to Kure on 6 October 1952. Five days later the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderik McGrigor, visited the Kure area. He inspected the New Zealand frigate and addressed the ship's company. Hawea, in the meantime, also received her notable visitor on 26 November when the Minister of Defense, T. L. Macdonald, visited Kure in the course of a Far Eastern tour. He was accompanied by C. F. Skinner, Deputy Leader of the Opposition, and by E. Halstead, M. P. A guard was paraded, the visitors walked around the ship and later Macdonald and Skinner addressed the ship's company.

Both Hawea and Rotoiti were fortunate in that the routine of their patrols brought them in from the west coast operational area to port for Christmas Day, Hawea to Sasebo and Rotoiti to Kure. Dinner was profusely and greetings were heartily exchanged with seamen of other ships of the UN forces. Rotoiti, nevertheless, sailed out on Boxing Day (Christmas fell on Thursday this year so on the 26th) and two days later was in Cho-do area.

Section 3. Hawea and Kaniere in 1953

On New Year's Day 1953 the front still remained static. At Panmunjom, no plenary session of the armistice delegations had been held since the talks were adjourned in October 1952 due to haggling over the POW issue. But from March the end to the war would suddenly come in sight when Malenkov launched his famous "peace offensive." From then on the pace would be quickened to bring the fighting to a final stop on 27 July.

On the Korean sea, watch after watch, day after weary day, the war went on. Although major events were taking place here and there, but patrolling, minesweeping and bombardment continued in arduous but monotonous routine.

On 7 January 1953 Hawea left Sasebo and reached her area off Taedongman. The first night she was within a mile of the friendly island of Wollaedo when it came under fire from 76-mm batteries on the mainland. The frigate immediately began counter battery fire which was repeated at dawn and dusk the following day. "No further 76-mm fire has been
observed in this area since that date.” reported Commander Davis Goof.

Hawea’s next patrol brought excitement but unfortunately no results at all. Although no enemy submarines had been in operation throughout the Korean War a continual watch was kept. On 9 February, Hawea’s Asdic operators off Taedong-man reported suspected submarine. The frigate made an immediate squib and depth charge attack and produced an oil slick on the surface. Further examination, however, disclosed that the contact was the wreck of a 1,300-ton Japanese ship sunk in 1944 whose oil tanks had been opened to produce the slick. Although the alarm was false it was a reassuring indication that the frigates, although engaged on patrol duty, still kept their anti-submarine attack honed to a fine edge.

On 28 February 1953, Rotoiti left Sasebo to return home. She called at Hong Kong and Sydney on the way and arrived at Auckland on 19 March, having steamed 58,000 miles and fired 13,400 rounds in her 14-month tour of duty. She was succeeded by Kaniere (Lieutenant Commander L.G. Carr, R.N.Z.N.) which left Auckland on 2 March and met Rotoiti in Sydney.

Kaniere arrived at Sasebo on 23 April and left the following day for the west coast of Korea. Appropriately enough, she entered the operational area on 25 April -- Anzac Day. It was a relatively brisk patrol. It began with gunfire support for minesweeping operations and an evacuation of guerrilla wounded from the mainland, continued with counter-fire on a mortar position which had fire on the American ship in the Regency Channel and ended with a lively duel between Kaniere’s four-inch gun and a 76-mm battery on the mainland.

By now the Korean War was last three months. Unexpectedly, however, the New Zealand ships were more active than for months previously. Guerrilla activity from the islands to the enemy mainland increased and, understandably, the enemy made more vigorous attempts to capture the islands. That they were prevented was largely due to naval bombardments and air strikes, both of which were available to the island garrisons at short notice.

A typical example of this co-operation came on 4 March 1953 when a report was received that 150 North Korean troops had landed on Yang-do island. The target was out of gun range for Hawea but she controlled aircraft in the strike that was called up during the morning. This strike assisted the garrison so effectively that by 2 p.m. the enemy in the terse language of Hawea’s report, were “dealt with.”

On her next patrol the frigate supported a guerrilla landing on the mainland and noted that the North Koreans were intensifying their defensive preparations. Beaches were being mined and batteries were being placed in
caves that covered possible landing points. One of these batteries caused Hawea a little trouble a few days later. She was bombarding shore positions selected by the guerrilla organization when a battery of 76 m.m. guns were sighted in caves on the coast. They were fired on and at an opportune moment the frigate increased speed and turned away from the shore. With the turn half-completed another battery previously undiscovered, opened fire on the ship. It was joined by the guns on which Hawea had been firing.

The first salvo of eight shells landed about 200 yards astern and as Hawea moved rapidly away a total of 140 shells landed within reasonable distance of her. The closest fell within 15 yards of the port beam. By combining smoke speed, and a "lazy weave," Hawea escaped undamaged.

"The remainder of the patrol," Commander Davis-Goff noted, "was of a routine nature."

After a visit to the Han River, Kaniere took over from Hawea in the same coastal area. She attacked mortar positions, continued night patrols and bombarded troop positions, bunkers and an ammunition dump. In addition she supported a guerrilla landing and demolished a Korean army mess hall which was occupied by the enemy at the time.

Coronation Day -- 2 June 1953 -- found both Hawea and Kaniere in Kure. They landed men to join the Commonwealth Parade which was held in Anzac Park and inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces, Kure, Lieutenant General H. Wells.

Kaniere then carried out anti-submarine exercises, returned to Sasebo and on 10 June was back in the operational area again. Sixteen days later, after covering a large scale evacuation of partisans from Cho-do, Kaniere was fired on by two batteries of 105-mm guns. Kaniere moved out of range but not before 25 rounds had landed within 500 meters of the frigate. Twenty rounds were fired in return.

After a recreational visit to Beppu, a popular Japanese health resort, Hawea came back on patrol in early June. By now the end of the Korean War in sight and a major task was the evacuation of the partisans and their families from islands off the coast far above the proposed cease-fire line. This preparation for peace and the necessity of continuing aggressive action against the enemy on the coast made a curious combination for the New Zealand ships.

On 11 June, for example, Hawea spent the morning at a conference arranging further evacuations. By 1300 hours she was busy bombarding shore positions and mortar sites and by late evening she was supervising the stream of junks which brought civilian refugees away from the disputed islands.
Finally, on 28 July 1953, the cease-fire came into force. It was a matter for national pride that New Zealand ships, which had been so prompt to answer United Nations appeal, were still at their posts when the fighting stopped.

It had been three hard years. There had been none of the headline brilliance of great naval battles. Nor was there the satisfaction of bringing important convoys safely through enemy attacks. It had been merely essential work, not far removed from the Navy’s traditional “watch and ward” role. It had been monotonous then; it was monotonous still. But its importance -- that of denying the sea to the enemy while making full use of it yourself -- was as great as ever.
CHRONOLOGY

1950

1 July NZ decides to send her navy.
26 July NZ decides to send her army, too.
1 Aug NZ ships Tutira and Pukaki arrives in Korea.
29 Aug Kay force recruits enter the training.
5 Nov Pukaki rotated by Rotoiti.
29 Nov Training completes.
10 Dec Departure home.
31 Dec–12 Jan Arrival in Korea and during stay at Pusan attached to the 24th US Division.

1951

13–19 Jan Additional training at Miryang.
20 Jan Departure Miryang for Pyongam-ni.
22 Jan Attached to the 27th Brigade upon arrival at vicinity Changhowon.
28 Jan Official takeover from a US artillery unit.
29 Jan First support for Australians.
30 Jan The Regiment, receives direct command of IX US Corps and assembles near Changhowon.
5 Feb Regiment joins the 27th Brigade at Chongan-ni.
8 Feb Hawea departs NZ to replace Tutira.
14 Feb Under 2nd US Division with the brigade, the Regiment crosses the Han River at Yojiu.
14 Feb–13 Mar The Regiment, with the brigade makes unopposed and eventless advance (24 kilometers north of Yojiu) to Nolbunyo-ri.
25 Mar–16 Apr The Regiment moves 80 kilometers to Hyon-ni. Upon arrival makes uneventful advance up Kapyong until the brigade relieved by element, 6th ROK Division leaving behind the regiment in support of the ROK Division.
22–25 Apr Battle of Kapyong.
25–26 Apr Redesignation of the 27th Brigade to 28th Brigade while the Regiment on movement south.
28 Apr Regiment arrives at harbour area behind Pukhan River through Chongpyong to Yangpyong.
Regiment moves to Wolmun-ni and lies in defense.

CCF offensive begins but no action seen in the Regiment area except artillery weight.

Uneventful advance on Kumgang-ni--Masogu-ri road.

Upon arrival Taebó-ri, the Regiment ordered to be IX US Corps reserve at Hyon-ni impending move to Imjin River area.

The 27th Brigade attached to the 1st Cavalry Division of the I US Corps and the Regiment in defense position at Chongang-nae.

Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division.

Operation Commando.

Rotoiti replaced by Taupo.

1952

Hawea replaced by Rotoiti (2nd tour).

Operation Westminster during which the Regiment goes into area near Pakhak reservoir.

Taupo replaced by Hawea (2nd tour).

Kowang-san attacked and the Regiment provides support.

1953

Rotoiti replaced by Kanire.

Battle on Hook position.

The phase-out from Korea starts.
PART SEVEN

THE UNITED KINGDOM FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II
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CHAPTER I GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom comprises England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands.

The total area is 244,912 square kilometers. The population of the United Kingdom was 52,708,934 at the 1961 census, but later was 55,534,000 estimated by the United Nations in 1969.

The United Kingdom retains certain global defense responsibilities within the Commonwealth of Nations to allies and to friendly nations. In addition, treaties bind the United Kingdom to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

In 1963 the British government decided to carry out a policy of modernizing the three fighting service, and in the following year a unified Ministry of Defence was created under a secretary of state, assisted by three ministers of state. The Defence Council, under the chairmanship of the secretary of state, is the command and administrative body for defense. It deals with general defense policy.

Britain helped Korea regain her independence from the very beginning by signing the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations in November 1943 and August 1945 respectively. After the end of World War II, when the Korean question was brought to the United Nations she spontaneously supported the United States proposal calling for a general election to be held under supervision by a UN Commission on Korea. Since then she has always been one of the major defenders of the position of the Republic of Korea. Her official diplomatic recognition was extended on 18 January 1949.

When the North Korean Communist forces launched an all-out invasion in June 1950, Britain was one of the first nations to respond to the UN Security Council's call for military assistance to the Republic of Korea.

The British Government promptly ordered a nearby naval fleet of one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, eight battle-cruisers and one patrol frigate to go to Korean waters. The Commonwealth air forces and ground troops immediately followed the Royal Navy to participate in the war alongside other UN Allies.
The total strength of the British forces in the Korean War were two infantry brigades with such combat support arms as one cavalry regiment and a field artillery regiment, totalling approximately at 40,000 officers and men who, had served in Korea during the war, and 17,000 naval forces.

Moreover, to the credit of the leadership extended by the British government, there were considerable forces contributed by other Commonwealth nations, namely from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and India.

During the Korean War the British forces suffered 686 killed, 2,498 wounded, 1,102 missing and POWs on land, and 58 killed, 85 wounded and 27 missing at sea. This makes a total of 744 killed in action, 2,583 wounded in action and 1,129 missing in action and POWs.

The last contingent of British Army troops left Korea in September 1956, leaving a group of liaison officers with the United Nations Command, while the Royal Navy retained some ships in or near the Korean waters, even after the armistice was signed.

Section 2. Commitment of British Forces

On the outbreak of war caused by the invasion of the North Korean Communist forces, Great Britain contributed to UN actions, and was studying the whole Far Eastern situation with a view to determining whether or not her land forces could immediately be made available to Korea.

The British naval forces arrived in the Korean waters on 29 June 1950, and took up battle stations on the west coast. The British navy, represented by the light fleet carrier Triumph, the cruisers Belfast and Jamaica, the destroyers Cossack, Consort, Comus and Cockade, and the frigates Black Swan, Alacrity and Hart were ranged alongside the US Seventh Fleet. They were joined soon by naval ships from other Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and already 7,000 officers and men of the naval forces were at action stations.

Meanwhile the British government announced its decision to send troops to Korea on 26 July 1950. Accordingly on 20 August 1950 the British War Office announced that it was dispatching to Korea at once from Hong Kong an infantry force of two battalions. These troops comprised the 27th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, the 1st Battalion, the Middlesex Regiment and the 1st Battalion, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

In June 1949 at the time when Red China was in fact making thr-
General Background

eating the territory of Hong Kong, the British Army had sent there Major General Evans' 40th Infantry Division and Brigadier Coad’s 27th Infantry Brigade under whose control there were well trained infantry battalions such as the 1st Battalion, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 1st Battalion, the Middlesex Regiment, the 1st Battalion, the Leicestershire Regiment, the 1st Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 1st Battalion, the King's Shropshire Light Infantry and the 1st Battalion, the South Staffordshire Regiment.

The 27th Brigade, then consisting of three battalions, the 1st Argylls, 1st Leicesters and the 1st Middlesex, had been designated since 1948 as the United Kingdom Strategic Reserve Force, which was at ten days readiness to move anywhere in the world. For this reason it was nicknamed the Fire Brigade. With the mission to defend the Colony against possible aggression from the Chinese mainland, the 27th Brigade was required to live under real active service conditions and the mountainous terrain in Hong Kong provided ample opportunities for training in mountain warfare and for acquiring a high degree of physical fitness. Thus, the 27th Brigade had been in Hong Kong since the summer of 1949, and its training in the hilly country there was to prove very valuable in Korea.

Both Battalions were understrength when they were ordered to be sent to Korea, and each battalion had to reorganize onto a special establishment suitable to the type of country in which they would operate. In order to make them up to approximately six hundred men each, replacements had to be found from the other battalions which remained in Hong Kong; in all some 250 men had to be found from the other four battalions.

Initially the troops' movement order noted that it was not intended to send any supporting arms as the US forces would provide the Brigade's requirements in Korea, but this was altered the day before sailing, and transport had to be redrawn to follow later. There was some difficulty, however, in sending engineer or artillery units for this new formation, and the War Office had requested the official reaction of Commonwealth countries to strengthen the order of battle with some contingents of their troops.

For the additional commitment of army troops, the 29th British Infantry Brigade sailed from England during the 1st week in October 1950, and disembarked at Pusan between 3 and 18 November with a complete order of battle including combat support arms. They were the Headquarters, the 29th British Infantry Brigade, 1st Battalion, the Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment, 1st Battalion, the Ulster Rifles Regiment, 8th Hussars, Armoured troops, 45th Field Regiment Royal Artillery and the 55th Field Engineer Squadron.
Thus by 18 November 1950 the British Government had sent to Korea five British infantry battalions and some supporting arms.

As the war situation became more serious the British and Commonwealth troops were gradually increased in numbers and size, and on 28 July 1951 the 1st Commonwealth Division was activated in the field near Tokchong with three brigades, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade (later redesignated as the 28th Brigade), 29th British Infantry Brigade and the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

As for the British Marines in Korea, the 41st British Marine Independent Commando of 14 officers and 221 enlisted men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, was attached to the Commander, US Naval Forces Far East, and had been formed in Japan early in September 1950 and underwent intense training for a short period. Before these troops were committed, small raiding parties from this commando had operated in coastal areas in rear of the North Korean Communist force on 12 September 1950, near Inchon on the west coast, and on two other occasions early in October 1950 against railway objectives on the east coast. In early November 1950 Admiral Joy, the commander of the Naval Forces Far East had inquired if the US Marine Division Commander could use the British Marines as a special force which could be employed with the Division Reconnaissance Company in a flank security mission. Major General Smith, the Marine Division Commander replied that he would be glad to have these fine troops, which were highly trained in combat reconnaissance. Thus the British Marines arrived at Hungnam about 48 kilometers north of Wonsan harbour on 20 November 1950 and reported to the 1st US Marine Division. The British Commando was committed in the battle of Koto-ri and Changjin Reservoir areas against Chinese Communist forces' initial aggression on 27 November until 10 December 1950.
CHAPTER II ARMY TROOPS

Section 1. Initial Deployment to Korea
(26 July - 31 October 1950)

Troops Formation

On 26 July 1950, the British Government had announced its intention to provide a Brigade Group from the United Kingdom.

On 19 August 1950 this order was given officially and transmitted to Brigadier B. A. Coad, in his Kowloon flat by Major General Evans, the 40th British Division Commander in Hong Kong. The order stated that the Brigadier Coad was to command a force, initially consisting of two battalions, and be prepared to take his brigade to Korea in five days time.

By midday on 21 August 1950, every man in the New Territories knew that the British troops were going to Korea as some reorganizations and preparations for the movement were under way before the actual embarkation took place.

On 24 August 1950 the historic deployment of the British army troops from the New Territories had started, and for the embarkation the 1st Battalion, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders filed up the gangway of the cruiser H.M.S. Ceylon and the 1st Battalion, the Middlesex Regiment boarded the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Unicorn.

In addition to being cheered, photographed and interviewed by the numerous reporters, the Korea-bound battalions had been addressed by General John Harding, Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces, and Malcolm MacDonald, the High Commissioner for South-East Asia. They emphasized to the departing troops their responsibility to fight communism. MacDonald said:

"This is a historic expedition. You will be fighting as if on the soil of France or on the beaches of Britain. The Korean War is part of the Communists' attempt to conquer the world and make slaves of us all. This aggression is being resisted not only by individual nations, but by the free peoples of the world under one organization, of which you are a part. It is up to you to show the world the valour and unconquer-
able spirit of the British people."

The pipe band of the 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers and the brass band of the 1st Leicestershires were there and played some martial music for their comrades departing for battle. Then the aircraft carrier _Unicorn_ and the cruiser _Ceylon_ slipped down the harbour toward the Lei Mun gap and the open sea.

So on 24 August 1950 the advance party including the Brigade Commander was flown to Korea, and with the bagpipes playing "Auld Lang Syne" and "The Campbells Are Coming" the main body of the brigade left by sea.

**Arrival in Korea**

H.M.S. _Ceylon_ with the 1st Battalion, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had sailed in company with H.M.S. _Unicorn_ carrying the Brigade Headquarters and the 1st Battalion of Middlesex Regiment, and as soon as they arrived at the harbour of Pusan, Korea on 28 August 1950, they joined the United Nations forces in Korea. So the men of the 27th Infantry Brigade became the first British troops engaged under the United Nations' flag against the Communist aggressors.

Among the many dignitaries and ranking officials in the welcoming ceremony, besides the representatives of the ROK Government, the Acting British Minister Sidney Faithful, American Ambassador John Muccio and the members of the UN Commission on Korea were present.

There were flags everywhere. Children waved miniature Union Jacks. Pipe-Major McGlynn and Pipe-Corporal Pitkeathly of the Argylls Battalion, wearing kilts and Tam-O'-Shanters played their pipes, to the astonishment of the Koreans, on the after-gun turret of the H.M.S. _Ceylon_.

Brigadier Coad, the 27th Infantry Brigade Commander, who had flown into Korea ahead of his brigade, accompanied by his Brigade Major, Douglas Reith, Lieutenant Colonels Man and Neilson, both the battalion commanders, and a skeleton staff, had an early meeting with General Walton Walker, the Eighth US Army Commander. As the brigade was to work under, and be maintained by the US forces, it was decided to change temporarily the designations of the staff, in order to conform to American practice. The Brigade Major became S-3, and the Adjutant and Quartermaster General performed the duties of S-1 and S-4.

Soon after they landed, the brigade moved by train on Korean railways, and when the nightmare journey ended, the two British Battalions found themselves in an assembly area near Kyongsan, 12 kilometers south east of Taegu. There the 27th British Infantry Brigade was concentrated, and
remained till 3 September 1950, awaiting the call of action.

**Initial Commitment to Battle**

On 3 September 1950, the 27th Brigade was placed under command of the 1st US Cavalry Division and moved farther west of the area of Taegu.

Then, on 4 September the British units were ordered to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd US Infantry Regiment, and found themselves on the east bank of the broad Naktong River with the enemy on the other bank and also to the south of their own position.

On 5 September, the brigade moved forward and took over a portion of the defense line around Hyonpung on the Naktong River, southwest of Taegu.

The front of the brigade's initial deployment, which included a large bulge of the Naktong River, south west of Taegu, was an immense one; nearly twenty kilometers in width, with a gap of six thousand meters between the extreme left of the brigade front and the next US troops. It was held with the Argylls Battalion in the west and most forward area, and the Middlesex Battalion to the north and to the rear of the bulge.

Initially, General Walker, the Eighth US Army Commander, being anxious to plug the sagging line with the newly arrived British troops, had agreed with Brigadier Coad that the brigade should not be committed to action until their transport arrived. But on 1 September the North Korean Communist forces launched an offensive all along the line, a last all-out attempt to breach the Naktong perimeter. There was no question of waiting for transport now: Every South Korean, American and Briton who could hold a rifle was needed.

US supporting arms included one battery of 105-mm howitzers, one battery of 155-mm guns and some Sherman tanks, these being attached to the British Brigade.

For the next fortnight the two British battalions carried out the normal routine of troops in defense. Intensive round-the-clock patrolling was the order of the day at this stage. There were reconnaissance patrols of half a dozen men with orders to draw enemy fire and report back with information about enemy numbers and dispositions without getting involved in a scrap; fighting patrols of twelve or more or standing patrols more commonly known as ambush parties who lay in wait for the enemy and exterminated him at close range; there patrols tried to capture a prisoner.

On 6 September, a reconnaissance patrol led by Captain C. N. A. Buchanan of the Argylls had the first exchange of fire with the enemy when it encountered and duly drew the fire. Then the volume of enemy fire increased, disclosing the strength and disposition of the enemy. Captain Buchanan
saw that he was outnumbered by something like three to one. It became clear to Buchanan that his little party had accomplished their mission and ought to get back with their information.

At that moment a burst of the enemy machine gun fire hit Captain Buchanan above and below the waist and in the right leg. Captain Buchanan's batman, Private T. Taylor also took a bullet through the shoulder. In these circumstances, although he was mortally wounded, the Captain Buchanan ordered his men to withdraw and leave him behind. The order had to be repeated before it was reluctantly obeyed, and the patrol slowly withdrew, leaving the officer and his batman, Private Taylor, wounded beside him. Lieutenant Colonel Nailson, the Battalion Commander who reported them as missing, found their graves at the spot some months later through an officer whom he had sent to search them.

The patrol action cost the battalion a total of seven casualties in killed and wounded.

Captain Buchanan had been very popular with all ranks, and the death of such an officer always moves any battalion to a cold and fighting fury; this has always applied particularly forcibly to the Scottish Regiments. Patrols continued day and night in this area, sometimes across the Nakdong River, which was about a hundred meters wide. The patrols went down to the river bank by night, and crossed in small assault boats.

The battalion position had three rifle companies on hills overlooking and overlooked by the enemy across the river to the south; The most forward company was about 2,000 meters from the enemy positions in the hills to the south, and 1,000 meters from the strongly defended orchard area across the river. So for a fortnight the battalion sat in its slit trenches, learning by patrolling and observation what sort of enemy they were fighting.

**Advance North**

By 18 September 1950 after the Inchon landing operation by ROK and UN forces had succeeded the 24th US Division was ordered to cross the Nakdong River west of Taegu and was advancing north astride the Taegu-Seoul road. As part of these operations the 27th British Infantry Brigade under command of the 24th US Division left its defensive positions and moved north with the mission of crossing the Nakdong some eight kilometers south of Waegwan and advancing on Songju, a small town about eleven kilometers to the west. The mission which was assigned to the brigade in this operation was to protect the left flank of the US troops in pursuit of the 10th NK Division along the main retreat route.

On 21 September the crossing of the Nakdong River took place. The
Army Troops

Middlesex Battalion led elements of the 24th US Division in this advance. At first the transport crossed by ferry and when this broke down ammunition and heavy equipment was man-handled. The battalion lost a few men from shell fire during the river crossing.

Brigadier Coad commanded the brigade, and received his orders from Major General John Church, Commander of the 24th US Division.

For the movement of the troops, the men of quartermasters and transport as supporting arms, did a really successful job there, not only in getting the vehicles across but in providing the combat battalions the logistical supplies during the critical days in the area.

During this advance, I US Corps drove the enemy north along the Kimchon-Taejon-Suwon route with the 1st ROK, 1st US Cavalry and 24th US Divisions leading. Following the 1st US Cavalry from Songju, the 24th US Division reached Kimchon on the 25th, Yongdong on the 26th, Okchon on 27th and retook Taejon on 28th of the month, thus recovering its honour that had been injured 68 days before.

After the recapture of Taejon, I US Corps reached the Imjin River on 7 October.

Especially, the 1st ROK Division, attached to the 1 US Corps forming the main effort in this general counteroffensive, cut off the enemy escape route in the north of Taegu on 21 September, and it continued to attack the 13th NK Division in pincers from north and south jointly with the 1st US Cavalry Division.

By now, the allied forces took a firm base of breakthrough on the Nakdong front, and kept on their advancing north, while the North Korean Communist forces were extremely demoralized, shattered and now fleeing north with little balance of order. Seoul was recaptured by the ROK and UN forces on 28 September, ninety three days after the North Korean Communist invasion.

The 27th British Infantry Brigade was now on an axis, which was surrounded by hills which were much higher and thickly covered with fir trees, presenting good defensive positions for the enemy. It was plain to Brigadier Coad that the high ground on either side of the road would have to be cleared before the brigade could resume its advance to Songju.

On 22 September 1950, the 27th Brigade, in order to clear the enemy to its front, attacked with the Middlesex Battalion on the right of the road and with the Argylls Battalion to capture the hill on the left of the road and continue onto hill 282 the main objective.

The attack began at dawn, led by the Middlesex Battalion while the Argylls Battalion followed and later deployed to the left of the road. (See
Supported by two US tanks, a platoon of B Company (Major W.P.M. Allen) of the Middlesex soon captured Plum Pudding Hill. This was followed by a successful attack by D Company (Major J.E.F. Willoughby) on Hill 325 which later became known as Middlesex Hill.

This attack was also supported by US tanks and by the battalion's own machine guns and mortars, but not by artillery fire until the very final stage. The whole feature was then occupied by the battalion. heavy losses had been inflicted on the enemy at very small cost.

Meanwhile the Argylls on the left of the brigade had advanced up the road and were preparing to attack Hill 282 preparatory to a further advance toward Songju. The battalion was supported by five US tanks and a battery of US artillery.

The Lieutenant Colonel Neilson, the Argylls' Commanding Officer had ordered to send A Company (Major A.D.G. Wilson) to occupy an intermediate objective from which B Company (Major A.I. Gordon-Ingram) and C Company (Major J.B. Gillies) could be supported in their attack on Hill 282.

The attack by the Argylls started at 1415 hours and they advanced in close
cooperation with the Reconnaissance Company of the 24th US Division. As soon as the enemy was sighted on or near the objective, accurate friendly tank fire started and A Company walked toward unopposed on to the position and dug in, having suffered no casualties. So the opening phase of the attack was quickly and neatly concluded and protection ensured for the start-line of the main attack.

On 23 September 1950, three rifle companies of the Battalion made a dawn attack at 0515 hours for the final objective, Hill 282. B and C Companies had with them the American artillery forward observation officers.

Thus the Argylls captured their objective Hill 282 with a loss of 12 casualties by 0630 hours. Due to the steepness of the hill, the lack of men to act as porters, and enemy mortaring and shelling, the supply of ammunition and the evacuation of wounded was difficult; but Major K. Muir, the Second-in-Command of the Argylls was successful in taking forward a party of ammunition and stretchers. As the situation became worse an air strike on Hill 388 was arranged. There was a large force of North Korean remnants on a ridge of Hill 388, some 1,500 meters away to the left of the Argylls' position. This was carried out soon after noon by three US Mustangs, but unfortunately, their napalm fire-bombs fell on B and C Companies on Hill 282, instead of on Hill 388. Meanwhile, the enemy counterattacked fiercely for two hours in confused circumstances. In spite of heavy casualties, the battalion fought to the last stand with no one withdrawing from its position on Hill 282.

The battalion had to be reorganized on a two-company basis pending the arrival of replacements. The situation was quickly restored, however, and Major Muir, who had taken command of both companies, collected some thirty men and led them back. A fierce close-quarter fighting followed, in which Major Muir showed the greatest courage and resourcefulness. He was mortally wounded, and later posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, the highest British award for valour.

The official citation reads: "Major Muir's actions were beyond all possible praise -- the effect of his splendid leadership on the men was nothing short of amazing and it was entirely due to his magnificent courage and example and the spirit which he imbued in those about him that all wounded were evacuated from the hill, and as was subsequently discovered very heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy in the defense of the crest."

On 24 September, the elements of a patrol from the Argylls made contact with some US troops advancing from the north-east, with the result that the following day the 27th Brigade was directed on Songju about 16 kilometers along the road to the west. This time the supporting artillery had been put under the command of the brigade, but no opposition was encountered, and
Songju was occupied without incident.

The battalion spent four days there engaged in mopping up operations which involved chasing and rounding up straggling North Korean remnants and clearing mines.

Meanwhile, officers and men to replace the Argylls arrived, and so the battalion was able to reform its third rifle company. Some of these new comers included volunteers from other regiments.

On 30 September 1950, the 27th Brigade was augmented by the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment which came under its operational control. The brigade was redesignated as the 27th Commonwealth Brigade. Still the brigade did not as yet have its own supporting arms. The Australians’ arrival was most welcome and served to improve the tactical balance of the brigade.

It would appear from what followed, that the US Commanding General waited for their arrival and then started the brigade on a series of forward moves, which did not cease until the end of October.

On 4 October 1950, a warning order was received for the brigade to move to a concentration area north of Seoul, and preparations were at once started. It was to be rather a complicated move in two echelons by air and by land. The major unit commanders of the brigade were to go on head of the battalion by aircraft to plan future operations under the Brigade Commander and for ground reconnaissance.

The pursuit had begun, and the enemy was to be kept on the run and chased back across the 38th Parallel or even farther.

Thus, by 11 October, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade had advanced to Kaesong, where it came under command of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

On the 15th, instructions were received for an advance to be carried out in conjunction with the 1st US Cavalry and the 24th US Divisions. The task of the 27th Brigade was to advance from Kaesong and lead the divisions on its main axis up to Sariwon about 54 kilometers distant. For two days the advance continued without opposition or incident, each battalion in turn as vanguard.

On 17 October 1950, the Argylls were leading the 27th Commonwealth Brigade advance to Sariwon with A Company on tanks and trucks in front. In spite of delaying action by enemy snipers in some villages, the column maintained a good rate of advance until it was about six kilometers south of Sariwon. The battalion fought there and captured several well-prepared enemy bunkers and ten machine guns, killing more than 50 enemy rifle men. There were few casualties in A Company, and the road into Sariwon was open for the brigade. At 1600 hours B and C Companies were to move through the town which had already been captured by A Company and clear the main
Army Troops

Argylls' A Company is Spearheading for Sariwon, 17 October 1950.

axis of advance, while the 3rd Australian Battalion was to pass through the Argylls and occupy an area north of the town. Some 125 enemy were killed by the Argylls in the town, and some 2,000 prisoners were captured by the 27th Brigade in this operation.

The Battalion was praised by the Commanding General of the 1st US Cavalry Division for its rapid advance and capture of Sariwon.

Early on 19 October, ROK troops entered Pyongyang from the east, to be followed next day by the leading battalion of the 27th Brigade, the Middlesex Battalion, from the west. Then, after a brief halt the brigade was placed under the command of the 24th US Division and ordered to lead an advance on Chongju via Sinanju on the banks of the Chongchon River.

The advance continued, and on the 21st, the brigade crossed the Taedong River at Pyongyang. The Argylls approached Yongyu and made contact with elements of the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team, which was fighting there.

At first light on the 22nd, A and C Companies of the Argylls moved in to clear the town, and the Middlesex Battalion took up defensive positions on the northern outskirts.
The next task of the 27th Brigade was to secure a bridgehead across the Chongchon River at Sinanju and to capture Pakchon and Chongju, two towns on the main supply routes from Pyongyang to the Manchurian border.

The advance continued, Sinanju being entered on 23 October 1950. The Middlesex made an unopposed assault crossing over the formidable Chongchon River. This crossing of the river was a difficult one owing to the tidal nature of the river Chongchon, the craft being carried seaward or inland according to the tide.

The Australian Battalion, faced by stiff opposition, gained a bridgehead across the next river, the Taeryong, where it was reinforced by the Argylls which followed, crossing the Taeryong from Pakchon, after it had provided the support and covering fire for the Australians.

Meanwhile the Middlesex had struck west toward Kasan, a crossroad where they met strong opposition. The battalion attack was, however, successful and reached the outskirts of Kasan. (See Situation Map 13.)

Thus by 26 October, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, without pause and still leading the advance, had sped northward to Pakchon. The direction of its pursuit changed westward to Chongju about 48 kilometers away to the west.

On the following day the brigade encountered enemy remnants in the hills a little farther to the west on the way to Chongju.

On 29 October, the Australian Battalion and Argylls Battalion passed through to the west, and the Australians encountered some oppositions just east of Chongju.

Finally, on 30 October 1950, the Argylls entered Chongju where the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th US Division passed through to lead the advance. Upon the occupation of Chongju, the brigade had come into reserve for the first time for eight weeks. For the past two weeks it had led the advance, to within 64 kilometers of the Manchurian border. Some supplies of equipment and clothing, including battledress, arrived and were issued.

That evening, however, the Brigade Commander was ordered to send a battalion to Taechon 25 kilometers to the north to secure the town. The 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment was detailed for this task and on 31 October moved to Taechon, but owing to a shortage of transport the battalion's move took two days, as the troops had to be sent in relays.

During the operations of the past few days the British Commonwealth units had captured several hundred North Korean prisoners, and accounted for several enemy tanks.

Thus till the end of October 1950, the North Korean Communist forces had not only been defeated, but almost completely destroyed by ROK and UN
forces.

All enemy resistance on that front had been overcome by the British troops. But the Intelligence Summaries indicated that for the first time in the Korean War the presence of Chinese Communist forces on other front was confirmed. Also the reports from patrols as well as from the air and from local inhabitants all indicated that massive Chinese forces were converging on the Taechon area and that the Commonwealth Brigade would be in a precarious position, should the enemy by-pass Taechon and make a drive on Pakchon from the west or northeast.

A withdrawal to Pakchon or even behind the Chongchon River was urgently being discussed at the higher headquarters at that time.

Section 2. First Encounter with CCF
(1 November - 3 December 1950)

At Pakchon — Chongchon River

At 1115 hours on 1 November, a message was received from the 24th US Division to which the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was attached, that the 1st Battalion of the British Middlesex Regiment was to remain at Taechon, the Australian Battalion at Chongju, and that the rest of the brigade was not to move up farther than these areas and eventually to concentrate the troops back in the Pakchon area.

The intention of the higher headquarters at this time was, that the advance should cease until the situation clarified.

By 1415 hours of 2 November the Brigade Headquarters and the Argylls Battalion withdrew to Pakchon and then the Argylls Battalion moved to join up with the Middlesex Battalion at Taechon. The Australian Battalion, however, was still at Chongju.

In this area, for the first time, some dead Chinese were found, and at about 2000 hours on 2 November three Chinese Communists came down the road from the north and surrendered to the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment.

It was estimated that the Chinese Communist forces who appeared on the front of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade at this stage, were the elements of the 39th CCF Army who were to attack toward Taechon and Chongju areas, and the 66th CCF Army toward Chongju and Pakchon areas under the
XIII Army Group of the Fourth CCF Field Army. The British troops were informed that the Chinese were armed with the 1942 model British Bren guns, Thompson submachine guns and many other US types of Automatic weapons and mortars. The standard infantry weapons were, however, the rifle, stick grenade and 7.62-mm light machine guns. Armoured units were equipped with T-34 medium tanks mounting an 85-mm gun.

The object of the Chinese attack had been to blow a bridge on the axis, along the Taeryong River covering Pakchon and the Chongchon River covering Sinanju, which if successful would have prevented any of the brigade's transport or tanks from getting back. One demolition party was killed by the gunners within 15 meters of the bridge and a follow up party by the rifle men of the Argylls Battalion.

Meantime, I US Corps had decided to withdraw south east of the Chongchon River, so that the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade could withdraw through a bridgehead formed by the 24th US Division.

Early on the morning of 3 November fresh orders were received for the brigade to withdraw to the north of the Chongchon River covering Sinanju.

The Australians, who were still in position west of Pakchon, then deployed across the Taeryong River, northwest of Chongchon River, and prepared to regain the old positions the brigade had occupied.

The withdrawal was conducted mostly on foot, although a few were carried on vehicles and tanks. The movement was closely pressed by the Chinese, who on several occasions approached within small arms fire range and fired on the withdrawing troops.

The brigade's task upon arrival was to hold a part of the bridgehead north of the Chongchon in coordination with the 19th US Regiment, until such time as a new offensive could be launched. The US troops held the southeast and the British Commonwealth troops the north-west corner of the bridgehead, but there was a gap of about ten kilometers between the two formations. The Americans were soon in trouble, and by the evening of 4 November one of their battalions was cut off and its transports lost.

By the early morning of the 5 November the UN position had deteriorated further and the Argylls Battalion reported that the enemy were approaching the road behind the Commonwealth Brigade, and that C Battery of the 61st US Field Artillery Battalion, who had come up in support, were under small arms fire at the area about six kilometers south of Pakchon. This happened at about 0730 hours, and some very confused fighting followed.

A Company of the Argylls Battalion went to the help of the American gunners; it had advanced sufficiently to assist the American gunners, who had formed a circle and were shooting down the Chinese over open sights at point-blank range.
Army Troops

On the other hand, supported by the Middlesex Battalion machine guns, B and C Companies of the Argylls began to clear the road steadily, while the Australians restored the situation by carrying out a counterattack.

By the evening of 5 November, the whole Commonwealth Brigade was on the north of Chongchon River, but with a much diminished bridgehead. The elements under Major Wilson, A Company Commander of the Argylls, formed an effective assault force and set out to clear an enemy-held hill which overlooked the north-south road. Supported by four tanks, machine guns and mortars, the elements of A Company cleared the hill but a Chinese counter-attack forced them to withdraw.

In this vital action Australian No. 77 Squadron Mustangs gave close support to the Commonwealth troops. And the British Commonwealth Brigade's first encounter with the Chinese Communist forces had shown that the new enemy's most marked characteristic, was their ability to conceal comparatively large bodies of troops and so avoid the UN forces' air attack.

Although the aggression of the Chinese Communist forces into the Korean War had so greatly altered the situation, the higher headquarters of the UN forces was not abandoning the original goal of their advance to the Yalu; the new enemy had been checked and preparations were now made to resume the offensive; the plan was now to advance slowly about a kilometer a day and reestablish the Pakchon bridgehead; the troops to do this were the 1st US Cavalry Division, the 24th US Infantry Division, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and the 6th ROK Division. But, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was put in I Corps reserve during the operation.

For three weeks after 5 November the British Commonwealth Brigade moved slowly forward from the Chongchon River line. Patrols probed every meter of the way and companies made certain of one position before moving on to the next. Pakchon was reached again without much incident and once again the Brigade Headquarters was established at Pakchon by 24 November.

During the battle bitterly cold weather continued and the temperature dropped below zero.

By then, officers and men of the Commonwealth Brigade were still in jungle green uniform and cellular underwear. However, fortunately their winter equipment now reached the forward lines; heavy sweaters, hooded American wind jackets, long woolen underpants, snow boots, sleeping bags and pile caps with ear-flaps helped to keep out the cold.

By now it was apparent that the British and Australian troops had stopped the Chinese Communist forces' initial attempt to break through and kept open the vital supply route south across the Chongchon River. Some of the enemy attacked south toward Sinanju but they failed to cut the road or envelop the river crossings. (See Sketch Map 2.)
The New Offensive and Defense

During the period of the offensive of the ROK and UN forces, the 1st ROK Division spearheaded toward Supung hydroelectric plant after capturing Pyongyang, while the 24th US Division moved along the west coast line with the objective of Sinuiju. The 1st ROK Division reached Unsan on 26 October, and the 24th US Division took Chonggo-dong on the first day of November, after passing through Pakchon—Taechon—Sonchon leaving only 40 more kilometers to Sinuiju. The 1st US Cavalry Division, then remained in Pyongyang as Army reserve.

The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was up near Pakchon as a Corps reserve.

24 November was D-Day for the renewal of an Offensive by UN forces. The advance was to be controlled on phase lines and was not to be an all out race to the Yalu. The order of battle of I US Corps from left to right was 24th US Infantry Division, the 6th ROK Division, with the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade as Corps reserve. The 1st US Cavalry Division had been detached from I US Corps.
Army Troops

The New Offensive started steadily on 24 November, but on 25 November a warning order was received that the 27th Brigade might be employed in IX US Corps sector on the right.

Meanwhile at 2355 hours a message was received from I US Corps informing the Brigade to prepare for certain combat action.

As far as the brigade could gather all was not going well with the neighbouring 25th US Infantry Division in the IX US Corps sector advancing north, and that the 6th ROK Division had reported 70,000 Red Chinese in Taechon, 25 kilometers north of Pakchon.

At 1930 on 26 November, another message came from the I US Corps ordering a prearranged counter-measure to the obviously worsening situation on another front. The army headquarters ordered the 27th Commonwealth-Brigade to be passed from its operational control to IX US Corps effective 2330 hours.

Finally by 1230 hours on the same day the move of 27th Brigade to Kunu-ri in the IX US Corps area, 27 kilometers due east from Pakchon, was virtually completed.

The IX Corps front on the right of I Corps consisted of the 2nd and 25th US Infantry Divisions and the Turkish Brigade as Corps Reserve.

The situation was serious in the new Corps area and II ROK Corps on the right of IX US Corps had folded up, leaving a 40 kilometer gap, into which the Turkish Brigade had been launched for its first battle. A gap had also appeared between IX US Corps and I US Corps on the left, and so a double envelopment of the 2nd and 25th US Divisions seemed possible.

By 2130 hours, a general withdrawal was being openly discussed at Corps Headquarters. During the night the situation further deteriorated, the 25th and 2nd US Divisions both having withdrawn in face of strong attacks.

Late in the night of 27 November, orders were issued for a move south. On the following day the British and Australian Battalions set out on foot from Kunu-ri for Sunchon about 35 kilometers south, as no transport was available. The Argylls Battalion led off with their pipes skirling through the cold and naked barren hills. The Australians came next, with a piper to each company lent by the Argylls Battalion, followed by the Middlesex Battalion.

At this juncture the brigade was the only uncommitted body of troops available to form a reserve for IX Corps.

On 30 November the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment was ordered to retrace its steps to secure a pass on the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road and help elements of the 2nd US Division, which were withdrawing from Kunu-ri. Attempts to enter the pass were met by strong opposition. Holding a position
south of it, the battalion became involved in heavy close-quarters fighting. The American column was ambushed in the pass and suffered very heavily. Many failed to get through, but the survivors joined up with the Middlesex Battalion, and by the evening of the 30th the whole party, with vehicles loaded with Americans wounded, was withdrawing to Chasan ten kilometers south of Sunchon. During this move more bitter fighting took place; and another column of the 2nd US Division got through by another route. The British Commonwealth casualties in these operations were about thirty men.

Meanwhile, the 1st ROK Division which set up its command post at Yongyu, occupied defensive positions at Sukchon as a delaying action to protect Pyongyang.

Subsequently, the 25th US Division occupied its positions along the road from north east of Sukchon to Sunchon so that the 35th, 27th and 24th Regiments could link up with the 1st ROK Division.

On 1 December the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade came under command of the 1st Cavalry Division and a series of rather aimless operations took place, whose object was to hold a blocking position to the east, where
the threat of a Chinese envelopment movement was expected to develop.

On 2 and 3 December the brigade, moving from Chasan to Pyongyang, covered the withdrawal of US troops.

But on 3 December the UN forces' defensive line for the protection of Pyongyang was shaken and its forward position, Sunchon fell to the enemy. General MacArthur's withdrawal orders to the 38th Parallel were issued to the whole front.

Section 3. Withdrawal Southward
(4 December 1950 - 6 January 1951)

The 29th British Brigade Joined up

On 2 and 3 December 1950 the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, moving from Chasan to Pyongyang, covered the withdrawal of US troops.

The situation was extremely obscure and much confused fighting, moves and counter-moves were carried out, in which the British Battalions were mainly involved at this stage of the war.

By the evening of 3 December the brigade had reached the Taedong River. Here it had expected that it might be given the task of holding a bridgehead to cover the passage of the river by the withdrawing ROK and US ground troops. This duty was however, taken over by the newly arrived 29th British Infantry Brigade and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade continued their withdrawal, passing through the 29th Brigade on the morning of the 4th. The British troops had been among the first to enter Pyongyang during the advance, and now formed the rear-guard up to its northern outskirts during the withdrawal.

The 29th British Infantry Brigade, which had arrived and found itself in the Taedong River bank near the North Korean capital, had sailed from the United Kingdom in the first week of October 1950, and disembarked at Pusan between 3 and 18 November with the following Order of Battle:

Headquarters, 29th British Brigade: Brigadier T. Brodie
1st Battalion, the Northumberland Fusiliers Regiment: Lieutenant Colonel K.O.N. Foster
1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment: Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Carne.
1st Battalion, the Royal Ulster Rifles: Lieutenant Colonel R.J.H. Carson
8th Irish Hussars, Armoured troops: Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Phillips
45th Field Artillery Regiment: Lieutenant Colonel M.T. Young
55th Field Engineer Squadron: Major A.E. Younger

By 19 November the newly arrived Brigade was concentrated at Suwon 28 kilometers south of Seoul, and on that day it moved to Kaesong where initially it came under command of the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team.

There were still a few pockets of enemy resistance and bands of guerrillas operating deep in rear of the main battle front. Sibyon-ni about 45 kilometers north of Kaesong was an area in which such bands of the North Korean remnants were active. The Gloucester Battalion was the first unit in action against the guerrillas in this area where they discovered a number of hidden weapons in a village.

On 30 November at Sibyon-ni the elements of the Northumberland Fusiliers were attacked by a large force of the enemy, but they in cooperation with a troop of 45th Field Artillery Regiment, inflicted heavy losses on them.

Leaving the Northumberland Fusiliers Battalion and a battery at Kaesong, the rest of the Brigade moved south on 29 November, through Pyongyang and thence north again to Sukchon, finally falling back a few kilometers to Yongyu in support of the 1st ROK Division which was in process of withdrawing.

By the evening of 3 December 1950, the 29th Brigade (less the Northumberland Fusiliers who were still in the Kaesong area for a certain mission to clear the enemy to the south) had withdrawn to an area a few kilometers north of Pyongyang with the task of forming a bridgehead to cover the withdrawal of other UN and ROK troops over the River Taedong at Pyongyang.

So on 3 December 1950 the two brigades which had joined the Korean War from the different parts of the world found themselves together in the same area. The 27th Brigade had come from Hong Kong and Australia, and the 29th Brigade from the United Kingdom.

**The 27th Brigade—To Changhowon**

By the first week in December 1950 the Eighth US Army was in full withdrawal, while the Chinese Communist forces were making a steady but not very swift advance. The bitter Korean winter was at its height and snow was falling, but the British troops were still not fully clothed or equipped. The enemy advance was hampered by the bad weather and road
conditions, and demolitions and bombing carried out by the ROK and UN forces.

Operations at this time centered round Pyongyang where ROK and UN forces from I and IX US Corps were converging on the town. Here, the 29th British Brigade held a bridgehead north of the River Taedong, covering the withdrawal of friendly troops.

On 4 December, after passing through the 29th British Brigade north of Pyongyang, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade continued its withdrawal for another 190 kilometers to just north of the town of Uijongbu, about 24 kilometers due north of Seoul. Here for the time being the conditions seemed more settled but the cold weather, in addition to the seriousness of the enemy situation, had hampered the field operations of the British troops and the instability did not last. The 60th Indian Field Ambulance joined the brigade at Uijongbu on 14 December.

By mid-December the United Nations line ran roughly along the 38th Parallel. It was expected that the enemy would launch a new offensive about Christmas Day or the New Year, and arrangements had been made for a withdrawal through Seoul should this become necessary.

On the morning of 23 December General Walker, the Commander of the Eighth US Army was unfortunately killed in a motor accident while on his way to present a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation to the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, subsequently presented by the acting Army Commander Lieutenant General Milburn on the following day. A few days later General Walker’s successor, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed the command.

The expected Chinese attack began on New Year’s Eve. It had been the Army Commander’s intention to hold the existing line if possible, but the situation was precarious. A friendly force had been roughly attacked and was withdrawing, and some US troops had been forced back nearly five kilometers.

On the morning of 1 January 1951 the 27th Brigade was ordered to advance to an area about 10 kilometers north of Uijongbu and then act as rear-guard to the 6th ROK Division. In due course the ROK troops passed through and soon the Commonwealth troops discovered that the road behind them had been cut by a party of the enemy who had closed in from a flank. The road was soon cleared, however, by the Australian Battalion, who passed through the British Middlesex and Argylls Battalions.

The whole of 27th Brigade withdrew to Seoul. Here they remained comparatively inactive until the evening of 3 January 1951, but during the night of 3-4 January they occupied defensive positions in and around the city to cover the retirement of the 1st Cavalry and the 24th US Divisions. In this
task the Australian Battalion had some contact with the enemy. C Company (Major J. B. Gillies) of the Argylls Battalion was sent to protect an important bridge (named Al Jolson Bridge), over which the bulk of the friendly troops were to withdraw. Soon after midnight of 3-4 January the last troops had crossed, the Company then withdrew and the bridge was blown behind them.

After the evacuation of Seoul city the rest of the Brigade crossed the Han River by a bridge farther west. This movement was covered by D Company (Captain G.M.M.M. Howat) of the Argylls, and when they finally crossed at about 1000 hours on 4 January 1951 that bridge was also blown.

The withdrawal was carried out without incident except an ambush near Ichon in which some elements of the Australian Battalion were involved. Thus the Brigade moved down to Suwon then to an area some 32 kilometers south of Changhowon and then north again to Changhowon itself, 72 kilometers south-east from Seoul, which they reached on 6 January 1951.

The 29th Brigade – The Engagement at Koyang

The 29th British Brigade had occupied its positions covering Pyongyang by 3 December 1950, but on the 5th it withdrew under orders to a defensive position at Sinmak, a rail and road junction some 88 kilometers to the south. There it remained until 11 December, when it came into I US Corps reserve at Changdan, about 80 kilometers farther south and 16 kilometers east of Kaesong. Here the Northumberland Fusiliers rejoined 29th Brigade.

On 13 December 29th Brigade moved to a blocking position, north of Seoul, with the role of protecting an important bridge. Here on 23 December Brigadier Brodie issued a special order of the Day which, in addition to his own Christmas greetings to his men, included messages from the Army Council in the United Kingdom, the Commander of the Eighth US Army and the Commander of the US Corps.

By 1 January 1951 the enemy had caught up with the UN forces and had begun the second phase of his offensive.

On the western flank this was directed against I Corps which was covering Seoul by holding a line north of the Han River with the 1st and 6th ROK and 24th and 25th US Divisions.

On 2 January the 29th British Brigade, with the 2nd Battalion of 11th ROK Regiment and the Thailand Battalion attached, was in I US Corps reserve north of Seoul and was heavily involved in the fighting of the next few days. Early on this date the 29th Brigade was ordered into a counter-attack role, but this was later cancelled. Instead they took up some blocking
positions, which were intended to be prepared for occupation by the 1st ROK Division. These positions of the Brigade were around Koyang about 18 kilometers north of Seoul, to the east of the main supply route Number 1 to Pugong-ni, a distance of about nine kilometers.

While the 29th Brigade was maintaining defensive positions along the general line, a US patrol was driven back from Koyang and fighting started at about 0400 hours on 3 January 1951. At first light B Company (Major J.W.H. Mulligan) of the Ulster Rifles was overrun by a surprise attack. Later a platoon of D Company (Major H.M. Gaffikin) was also overrun, but by 1130 hours the situation had been stabilized by a counterattack. By 1235 hours Major C.A.H.B. Blake, the Second-in-Command, who was in temporary command owing to the illness of Lieutenant Colonel R.Z.H. Carson was able to report that the original positions had been regained.

Meanwhile the enemy had also attacked on the front of the Northumberland Fusiliers on the right near Pugong-ni, and by about 0930 hours had penetrated the position to a considerable depth. The Commanding Officer asked for tank support which was given by moving C Squadron, 7th British Tank Regiment (Major A.J.D. Pettingell) forward.

By 1730 hours the situation on this front had been restored by a counterattack delivered by the reserve W Company and by the supporting Centurion tanks.

At 1630 hours orders were issued for the Brigade to withdraw south of the Han and the withdrawal began at 1830 hours. The Gloucester Battalion which had not been seriously engaged and the Northumberland Fusiliers broke contact and got away without undue difficulty. But the Ulster Rifles became involved in heavy fighting and suffered severely.

During the withdrawal, a part of the battalion was surprised by an enemy ambush, which attacked their flank. The situation was restored however, by a gallant bayonet charge of the support elements assisted by a tank detachment under Captain D.L. Astley-Cooper. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place in which some 200 of the enemy were killed.

In the final stages of this action Major Blake, the acting Commanding Officer of the Ulster Rifles, and Captain Astley-Cooper, the tank detachment commander, were both killed in action.

Contact was broken just before midnight, and before dawn on 4 January the 29th Brigade crossed the Han River where the transport was ready to take them to Suwon.

The Brigade had had a bitter combat experience in its first serious engagement in Korea. The losses were heavy with about 230 killed, wounded and missing in the Ulster Rifles, about 50 in the Northumberland Fusiliers and some 20 in the Astley-Cooper’s Force, as well as the loss of some tanks
and 12 trucks lost.

From Suwon the 29th Brigade moved another 32 kilometers south to Pyongtaek. It was 6 January 1951 when the withdrawal ended, with 29th British Brigade on the extreme left of the Eighth Army’s new line, near the western coast, and 27th Commonwealth Brigade some 56 kilometers inland to the east at Changhowon. (See Situation Map 14.)

Section 4. The Second Advance North
(7 January - 22 April 1951)

By mid-January 1951 the UN forces’ withdrawal had reached its limit, and the line ran from the coast near Pyongtaek about the 37th Parallel to near Wonju in central Korea and thence to the east coast at Kangnung some 32 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel. Although there was no contact with the enemy in the west the Chinese Communist forces continued to attack in the Wonju area, but were repulsed.

By the end of January the line in the west had advanced by a series of friendly attacks some 32 kilometers up to Suwon, Ichon and near Yoji, and was moving slowly toward Seoul and the Han River. On the central Korean front in the Wonju area, however, some fierce fighting continued during this advance and the city changed hands several times.

On 7 January 1951 the 29th British Brigade was on the extreme left of the line round Pyongtaek, with the 3rd US Division on its right, while the 27th Commonwealth Brigade took up defensive positions about Changhowon, with its main activity of long-range patrols, mostly to the Ichon area. The 6th ROK Division was on the left and the 5th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th US Division on the right. There was a gap of some 2,000 meters between the Brigade’s left and the ROK troops.

27th Brigade

While the 27th Brigade was at Changhowon on 22 January, the 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment joined the brigade as its supporting unit. Another supporting troop which had been with the brigade since December 1950 and remained with it until April 1951, was the 2nd US Mortar Battalion, organized in three Batteries, of twelve 4.2-inch heavy mortars each. These units gave the Commonwealth troops magnificent support on many
occasions particularly during the brigade's advance north.

On 25 January 1951, meanwhile, the Eighth US Army offensive began. The 27th Brigade did not participate in the offensive in the initial stages, but remained deployed in its positions at Changhowon. Elements of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment entered Ichon unopposed that day. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade came under command the IX US Corps on 30 January 1951.

On 4 February 1951, the enemy counterattacked the 24th US Division, north of Ichon and as a precautionary measure the Argylls were moved forward that morning to Yoju, 19 kilometers east of Ichon.

On 14 February the Brigade came under the command of the 2nd Division of the X US Corps to which the brigade was attached for four days till 17 February and received orders to cross the Han River at Yoju at once and advance north to relieve the 23rd Infantry of the 2nd US Division and the French Battalion, who had been attacked by an estimated two battalions of enemy forces, and who had formed a perimeter position in the Chipyong-ni area some 16 kilometers north of Yoju.

The 27th Brigade continued enroute to positions of the 23rd Infantry and attacked against light resistance until it passed to operational control of IX US Corps at 1200 hours of 17 February.

On 18 February a Canadian Infantry Battalion arrived to join the 27th Brigade. The forward move continued on 19 February 1951 with the Middlesex Battalion left, the Canadian Battalion center and the Argylls Battalion right.

On 20 February the Brigade reached a point four kilometers east of Chipyong-ni with the Argylls nine kilometers east of the village. 27th Brigade command post opened in the vicinity of Saisi! eight kilometers south east of Chipyong-ni as of 1800 hours on 21 February, with the Middlesex a kilometer south. The Brigade prepared to resume the attack on 22 February 1951 from the current positions towards Hills 419 and 469, two critical features commanding ground about nine kilometers north east of Chipyong-ni.

Combat patrols from the Canadian and Argylls Battalions departed at 0800 hours on 26 February to patrol north to 52 East West Grid line in the objective zone. The Brigade captured another objective, a group of hills, and repelled an enemy counterattack on the afternoon of 28 February.

During the period for which the 27th Brigade was directed on Chipyong-ni and during subsequent operations it was continuously on the move for a month pressing forward against stubborn enemy resistance. (See Sketch Map 3.)

The advance north continued until 27 February 1951 with the advance guard formed by the Australian and Canadian Battalions.

On 1 March 1951 some additional ROK labourers were attached to the British and the Commonwealth Brigades, bringing the total up to approximately
100 per battalion. These men greatly helped the UN troops in battle to solve the problem of supply to forward troops, and on many occasions they displayed remarkable loyalty to and affection for the units with which they served.

On 8 March 1951 the enemy forces withdrew on all fronts, leaving a considerable amount of equipment. And on 13 March the 27th Commonwealth Brigade was relieved by the 5th US Cavalry Regiment and concentrated in a river-bed near Nolbunyo-ri, about four kilometers north of Chipyong-ni. The Brigade remained there until 24 March in IX US Corps reserve for rest and refit.

On 23 March 1951, Brigadier Coad, the commander of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade left the Brigade, being relieved by Colonel B.A. Burke, the deputy commander of the 29th British Brigade.

On 25 March the 27th Brigade moved 80 kilometers by motor transport to Hyon-ni, just north west of Chonpyong, where they came under the command of the 24th US Division. A few days later the Brigade took over from the 19th US Infantry Regiment, a position in the front line just north
of Hyon-ni.

The offensive continued until 16 April 1951, and these weeks, advancing up the Kapyong road, proved to be a very strenuous period for the whole brigade. Several small engagements took place and a number of casualties were suffered in minor actions. The Argylls lost two officers killed and some men wounded in the last engagement.

On 19 April 1951, 27th Brigade was relieved by the 19th Regiment of 6th ROK Division, and returned to Kapyong area in IX US Corps reserve. The New Zealand gunners however remained in support of the ROK troops.

Meanwhile, some arrangements were made for the relief of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and subsequently Brigadier G. Taylor, who was to command the newly redesignated 28th Commonwealth Brigade, arrived on 14 April.

29th Brigade

During the period of withdrawal, on 6 January 1951, the 29th British Infantry Brigade had arrived in the Pyongtaek—Songhwan area on the left of the Eighth US Army line near the coast and about 64 kilometers south of Seoul, and here it remained until the end of January, moving on 1 February to Osan about 19 kilometers to the north, on the Seoul road. At the same time the 45th British Field Artillery Regiment and the C Squadron, 7th Tank Regiment were detached from the Brigade in support of the 1st ROK Division and the 25th US Division respectively, until they reverted to their parent brigades on 11 February 1951.

On 11 February a somewhat hurried move north to Pabalmak 33 kilometers north east from Osan was made, where on the following day the 29th British Brigade relieved the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the Ist US Cavalry Division. For the following ten days the Brigade was assigned with minor counterattack actions, antiairborne mission, reinforced patrolling activities including some armoured patrols as farther as the banks of the Han River, and was engaged in hill fighting in cooperation with the 24th Regiment of the 25th US Division. The Gloucesters and Ulster Rifles, with C Squadron of the 8th Hussars, were the units mainly engaged in these operations.

On 23 February 29th Brigade returned to Suwon, in the previously held assembly area, where it became the I US Corps reserve. Here its only task was to cover the pass-through and crossing of the Han River by the 25th US Division. It was a quiet period for the brigade which moved to Ichon on 7 March and then to Yongdungpo on 21 February.

Finally on 30 March 1951 the 29th Brigade came under the command of the 3rd US Infantry Division and on the following day took over the line
of the Imjin River which was the scene of the Brigade's gallant stand during the battle from 22 to 25 April 1951. The position extended from Choksong on the left to the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right, held with three infantry battalions forward: The 1st Battalion, the Northumberland Fusiliers on the left, the 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team which was attached to the Brigade on center and the 1st Battalion of the Ulster Rifles on the right.

For the next three weeks the 29th British Brigade carried out intensive patrolling and prepared to continue the advance on orders. On 4 April the Belgian Battalion relieved the 10th Philippine Battalion which then left the British Brigade. (See Sketch Map 4.)
Section 5. The Chinese Spring Offensive
(22 April - 29 May 1951)

29th Brigade’s Battle of the Imjin River

During the early days of April 1951, the UN forces continued its gradual advance north, with the objective of securing a line of commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel.

However the Chinese Communists were preparing another large-scale offensive designed to check the UN advance. In order to interrupt the enemy preparations for attack the I and IX US Corps launched an offensive south of the Iron Triangle area on 9 April and by 21 April secured an intermediate line for further arrangements to push forward along practically the whole UN front. Eventually the 29th British Brigade and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade were to play a leading part in defeating the enemy’s spring offensive.

On 22 April 1951, the day which the Chinese Communist forces April offensive started, the 29th British Brigade was under I US Corps in the front line, holding the line of the Imjin River about 56 kilometers due north of Seoul, and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade under IX US Corps and in support to the 6th ROK Division which had recently relieved the Brigade, in the area just north of Kapyong on the Kapyong River some 56 kilometers northeast of Seoul.

The 29th Brigade, with the Belgian Battalion under its command, was holding the line of the Imjin River from including Choksong on the left to the junction of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers on the right, a frontage of a little more than 12,000 meters. On the left was the 1st ROK Division and on the right the 3rd US Division. Except on the right flank where the Belgian Battalion was holding the northern part of the river, the brigade’s general line of defenses was south of the river in places as much as 1,000 meters distant from the river.

The river itself flows to the sea from east to west through a wild and fertile valley. The hills around this area are steep, and the highest Kamaksan, a hill of 675 meters, is situated some six kilometers south of the river. The Imjin in this area, however, is not a very formidable river; nowhere more than three hundred meters wide and in few places more than 4 meters deep, and at this season of the year almost everywhere it was fordable to the infantry.
Daily and nightly patrols were carried out by the Brigade in the area setting up some listening posts on the river bank.

On 22 April 1951, the Brigade had its usual patrols across the river, and made contact with some enemy who approached much further south than usual. By 0600 hours a patrol of the Gloucestershire Battalion was ordered to withdraw in face of the enemy. At 1000 hours a patrol of the Northumberland Fusiliers Battalion had made contact, and later in the evening at about 1800 hours the Belgian Battalion reported that one of its patrols was also in contact.

Information obtained, showed that considerable parties of Chinese Communist forces were on the move and the report of a prisoner of war under interrogation indicated that an attack was imminent. Air reconnaissance in the late afternoon further reported that the roads leading south from Pyonggang and Chorwon of the Triangle area were crowded with marching troops and vehicles.

By dusk the enemy patrols had reached the river in the front of the British troops and some howitzers and guns of supporting artillery were engaging targets to the front line battalions, which were all in contact with the enemy.

No. 7 Platoon of C Company, commanded by Lieutenant G. Temple placed an ambush of 16 men on the river bank after darkness fell. At 2130 the men saw four Chinese slip into the water and start to cross under a full moon, then three more. Soon the river seemed to be full of Chinese, all clearly illuminated by the moon. But Lieutenant Temple did not give his men the orders to commence firing, but waited until the enemy was within a range of approximately ten meters. Then the ambush opened up with everying they had, and the resultant slaughter was a triumph for their fire discipline. There was not a man in the ambush party who had not killed at least three Chinese. Private L. Allen, a Bren gunner counted ten corpses in front of his position. Thus Lieutenant Temple’s ambush party beat off four enemy attempts to cross the river. After that the men of No. 7 Platoon withdrew from the river bed and returned to C Company position.

In the steep and rugged hills surrounding the deserted village of Choksong, the men of Gloucestershire Battalion were ready for the attack which they knew must come. On the hill feature known as Castle Hill commanding the long spurs that rose from the southern bank of the river and the road that ran along the right flank, was A Company (Major P. A. Angier) which was very heavily attacked at midnight. A Company, immediately west of Choksong, engaged with the Chinese who in face of heavy artillery fire had crossed the ford which was only the critical obstacle for the defender.
Army Troops

Some penetration into the Company's position was made, nonetheless the fighting British infantrymen opened their final defensive fire with light machine guns, Brownings, rifles and grenades, in addition to a fierce volume of supporting fire.

An hour later the fighting had spread out to other forward companies such as D Company (Captain M. G. Harvey) across the road securing the eastern flank of the road that led from the Imjin, and B Company (Major E. D. Harding) which was located on hill features some 2,000 meters south of the river with its backs to the towering Kamak-san. X Company (Major R. M. Pratt) and Y Company (Major H. G. Winn) of the Fusiliers Battalion in the right center, and A and C Companies of the Belgian Battalion in the extreme right and up in the Brigade sector, were also under attack.

Chinese had established themselves also south of the Belgian Battalion and soon some crossed the river in this area. (See Situation Map 15.)

At dawn on 23 April the enemy estimated at battalion strength rushed into Choksong where A Company of the Glocestershire Battalion were heavily attacked.

During the morning after an epic stand in the position, all the forward companies of the battalion A, D and B withdrew under orders to the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters under cover of artillery fire. A Company was sadly depleted. Major P. A. Angier, the Company Commander had been killed and there was only one officer left in the Company.

The Victoria Cross was awarded posthumously to Lieutenant Philip Curtis of A Company, the 1st Battalion of Glocestershire Regiment for magnificent conduct throughout the battle on Castle Hill. Lieutenant Philip Curtis was ordered by the A Company Commander to counterattack against the critical hill feature known as Castle Hill, which was the highest point in A Company's position, where the Chinese had set up machine gun posts from which they could spray the defenders, dominating the platoon positions of Lieutenants Curtis and Terry Waters. It was obvious to the Company Commander that so long as the Chinese remained on Castle Hill his Company would suffer even more casualties, and unless the hill was retaken quickly the Chinese would make a advance further, which would endanger not only A Company but the whole of the Glocestershire Battalion's position. To accomplish such a mission Lieutenant Curtis needed artillery and air support in addition to strong infantry soldiers to finish the job, but he had only twenty men under him.

At the head of his tiny force, Lieutenant Curtis advanced across open ground. There was not a stick of cover anywhere, and soon they were raked with accurate enemy machine gun fire from the direction of the objective;
three men fell dead after they had advanced twenty meters and four more were wounded sixty seconds later. Lieutenant Curtis himself was hit in the right arm and left side. Corporal Papworth quickly acted to deal with the casualties. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Curtis shook off the restraining hands. He advanced again keeping his orders from the Company Commander to retake Castle Hill.

Then Curtis went forward alone, once he fell down but got to his feet again and continued his lone charge, leaving a thin trail of blood behind him. He advanced to within twenty meters of the enemy machine gun position. Then drawing on some incredible reserve of strength, he staggered forward a few more meters and hurled two grenades, demolishing the gun and killing the crew. The machine gun emptied its last burst into Lieutenant Philip Curtis already sagging body.

A Company of the Gloucestershire Battalion had a heavy lost. Lieutenants John Maycock and Philip Curtis were dead and Lieutenant Terry Waters had been badly wounded. He was taken prisoner, and subsequently awarded a posthumous George Cross for extraordinary heroism in captivity.

On the other hand, on the Fusiliers Battalion's front X Company had withdrawn under orders before first light. At about 0610 hours a platoon of Z Company was attacked in force by Chinese who must have infiltrated through the comparatively thinly held front of the Belgian Battalion and bypassed Y Company.

A counterattack by Z Company supported by tanks put in at 1245 hours reached the position after hand-to-hand fighting but was later driven back by another wave of the Chinese Communist forces. Attempt to retake the position by some US troops also failed.

At this time it was estimated that elements of the 187th and 188th Divisions of the 63rd Army under the 19th CCF Army Group, were operating on the front of the 29th British Brigade. It was apparent that this was not only a local attack with the limited objective, but a full-scale attempt to break through the UN forces front at the point where it turned north, and the 29th Brigade was bearing the brunt of a well-prepared attack in strength. The 29th British Infantry Brigade fought on a front of over 12,000 meters, which was held by five forward companies, an average frontage of about 2,400 meters per company. Under these conditions it was clearly impossible to prevent penetration by the Chinese who attacked at night and without warning.

As a result confused fighting continued throughout the day of 23 April. Each battalion was forced to change in respective defensive positions soon after first light:

The Gloucestershire Battalion on the left was now more closely concen-
trated in an area for perimeter defense with its frontage still nearly 2,000 meters, while Y and Z Companies of the Fusiliers Battalion in the right had been withdrawn and the Battalion occupied a position with Y Company left, X Company center and Z Company right, with W Company in support linking with the Ulster Rifles Battalion, which had moved up from reserve position to take up defensive positions in the front. On the right the Belgian Battalion assisted by some US tanks had successfully withdrawn to the east from its isolated position north of the river, and then to the rear center of the Brigade sector.

The enemy continued his attack in great strength with not less than one regiment on the Gloucestershire Battalion’s front, and one division on the 29th British Brigade front. Later on the following day another enemy division was committed against the Brigade: thus it was estimated that approximately two divisions of Chinese Communist aggressors in total were committed in their offensive against the 29th British Brigade sector.

Even to the experienced eye of Brigadier Brodie, the 29th Brigade Com-

The memorial on Gloucester Hill at Choksong commemorates the Battle of Imjin River.
mander, the gaps between battalions seemed so large that a complete Chinese division could infiltrate easily through the gaps. The stubborn resistance of the Brigade, however, blunted the enemy's attack. There were no reinforcements, but only the three British and one Belgian infantry battalions with rifles, bayonets, Bren guns and artillery support.

The Brigade Commander therefore decided to move the Belgian Battalion which had withdrawn from its isolated position on the preceding day, to fill the gap. They arrived and took up their new positions by the late afternoon of the 24th.

At Battalion Headquarters of the Gloucestershires Captain T. Farrar-Hockley, the Battalion Adjutant, and Lieutenant H. Cabral, the Battalion Intelligence Officer assisted the Commanding Officer throughout the night watching the enemy activity at their observation post.

Through the day of 24 April all the survivors of the Gloucestershire Battalion, together with elements of the anti-tank and mortar platoons of each company and other supporting arms, withdrew from Choksong area to Hill 235 (Glouster Hill) at Solma-ri three kilometers southward which was to be the scene of the Battalion's final stand. The Battalion was then completely surrounded and under constant attack. It became clear by last light that the survivors could not be extricated by successful counterattack.

Early in the afternoon of the 24th a detachment of Filipino tanks advanced up the road in an attempt to relieve the Gloucestershire Battalion, however about three kilometers short of the position the leading tank was disabled. Further progress was impossible and, fired at from both flanks, the column was forced to retire.

Later in the evening British Centurion tanks of C Squadron (Major P. H. Huth), 8th Hussars, with American, Puerto Rican and Belgian infantry, made another attempt to force a way through but were forced to withdraw.

Several attempts were made to drop supplies and ammunition by air, but they were not successful. A US helicopter also attempted to evacuate the seriously wounded men, but coming under fire and finding no suitable place to land it was forced to withdraw without fulfilling its mission.

Throughout the entire engagement, showing a complete disregard for his own safety, Lieutenant Colonel Carne had been an inspiration to his men, moving from place to place wherever the fighting was hottest and encouraging his troops. For this he was later awarded the Victoria Cross.

Thus on the night of 24 April as the beleaguered Gloucestershire Battalion prepared for their historic last stand, a furious attack fell on the adjacent Northumberland Fusiliers Battalion, and more specifically on Z Company (Major John Winn). By dawn of the 25th for the loss of Sergeant Clarke
and two Fusiliers killed and twenty-eight wounded, Z Company had, at a conservative estimate, killed five hundred Chinese and certainly wounded twice as many again.

During the night of 24-25 April orders to withdraw to a position just north of Seoul were issued, and at 0800 hours on the 25th the leading troops began to disengage. But Lieutenant Colonel K.O.N. Foster, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion of Northumberland Fusiliers was killed while the withdrawal was in progress. At 1235 hours the 29th Brigade arrived at Uijongbu 24 kilometers north of Seoul and the Brigade continued its withdrawal toward the Han River. By 27 April they reached the Yongdungpo area, where they came into I US Corps reserve with the operational task of defending the Kimpo peninsula to the west of Seoul.

The 29th British Infantry Brigade had suffered very heavily. More than 25 per cent of its fighting men had become casualties, one battalion of the Gloucestershires having been practically wiped out. Much equipment including some tanks had been lost. The stand made by the Brigade had, however, completely frustrated the Chinese plan to break the United Nations front. For three days it blocked all attempts to cut the road to Seoul and inflicted casualties on the enemy which brought his first spring offensive to a halt and resulted in his retreat. All had fought bravely in the tradition of British infantry.

On 8 May General Van Fleet, the Eighth Army Commander, presented the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment and C Troop, 170th Independent Mortar Battery, British Artillery, with an American Presidential Unit Citation, as a tribute to their exceptional service during the Imjin River Battle.

In the Battle the gunners of Lieutenant Colonel Maris Young's 45th Field Artillery Regiment also did a magnificent job. The 45th Artillery Regiment had own 25-pounder guns and they were firing more rounds per weapon -- the average was a thousand, theretofore considered the biggest show ever put on by British Artillerymen. They dropped shells on Chinese less than thirty meters from the forward companies' positions; they shelled enemy massing on the far river bank and enemy on the way across. The guns traversed full circle; they had a range of twenty-one kilometers, but during this battle they were often firing point-blank, over open sights, at Chinese soldiers a mere fifty meters away.

The price paid by the 29th British Brigade was a grievous one; the total figure of killed, wounded and missing in its three battalions was in excess of one thousand. On the contrary, the Chinese casualties were enormous, and are estimated at 10,000 killed and wounded.
The Relief of a British Battalion, 27th Brigade

Almost at the same time as the 29th Brigade was fighting on the Imjin River, the 27th Commonwealth Brigade on the east in the area of Kapyong River, also came under heavy attack mostly on the front of the Australian and Canadian Battalions.

The 27th Brigade which had been relieved by 19th Infantry, 6th ROK Division, had withdrawn to the Kapyong area where it was IX US Corps reserve on 19 April, with the Brigade headquarters being located in the vicinity of Kapyong.

Meanwhile for the first time since the start of the Korean War the relief of a British Infantry Battalion took place; the 1st Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which had just been relieved by the 1st Battalion of King's Own Scottish Borderers remained in the assembly area and moved to Inchon on the 24th for embarkation to Hong Kong. During the same day the new Battalion moved forward to the positions near Brigade Headquarters.

Shortly after the Battalion's relief the 27th Brigade changed its commander and its designation effective midnight 25-26 April 1951. It became the 28th Commonwealth Brigade with its new commander, Brigadier G. Taylor, who had arrived on 14 April.

The record of the Argylls Battalion during their eight months service in Korea had been a fine one and will rank high in the history of this famous Regiment.

The new comers, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, stationed in Hong Kong, had received orders to relieve the Argylls Battalion in Korea on 9 April 1951, and embarked at Kowloon Wharf on 19 April.

The four days' sea passage to Korea by USS Montrose was comparatively calm, and on 23 April the Battalion arrived at the port of Inchon where it was to disembark without its vehicles and support weapons.

The Battalion, under the command of Major Tadman, the Second-in Command, disembarked and by 1930 hours was moving forward in 3-ton Trucks to its assembly area about 24 kilometers south west of Kapyong, which it reached at 0400 on the 24th.

Meanwhile, after motoring throughout the night, the Battalion Commander arrived at Kapyong in the middle of a battle at 0600 hours on 24 April. At Brigade Headquarters, he was given his task, which was to hold the high ground initially on the left and slightly to the rear of the 27th
Commonwealth Brigade. The Commanding Officer, having completed his brief reconnaissance, returned to the Battalion. (See Sketch Map 5.)

It was the order that the Battalion had to move forward to the Kapyong front from its assembly area by advancing about 24 kilometers north east.

In the early hours of 25 April the Battalion Commander's party set forth for Kapyong, followed at 0500 hours by the Battalion. The main body of the Battalion arrived at 1000 hours and immediately deployed to occupy a series of high hill features to the left of the Commonwealth Brigade. 28th Commonwealth Brigade relieved the 27th Brigade during the day.

The 25th April was spent for digging-in and patrolling. On 26 April, enemy pressure on the 1X US Corps front increased and the Chinese Communist forces had actually broken through the 6th ROK Division, who were holding the front on the left and to the south west of the Battalion's position. In view of this situation, which threatened to cut the 28th Commonwealth Brigade line of contact, the British battalion received the orders at 1600 hours to withdraw and occupy a position astride the line of contact facing north, about 11 kilometers southwest of Kapyong.

Early on 27 April, the other three battalions of the 28th Commonwealth
Brigade, the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the Australian Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the Canadian Infantry, withdrew down the line of contact past the Battalion's position to Chaggon-ni; the Battalion followed shortly afterwards to occupy a reserve position in the same area.

By about 1400 hours, just as the Battalion had got dug-in, orders were received to withdraw to another position farther south down the line of contact. Thus, the K.O.S.B. Battalion had continuous movement south by orders until it reached its rest area at Yangpyong about 35 kilometers south from Kapyong. During the movement the Battalion carried out the rear guard role for the troops of the Brigade.

Heavy rain, humidity, daily movement and the climbing of steep hills, followed by digging-in generally after dark, which the troops experienced for four days, proved to be a good test of 28th Brigade's endurance and ability to fight and operate with very limited resources. 29th April was spent in getting clean and dry, and maintaining equipment and weapons to ensure that they were in good condition and ready for any in future action.

In the meantime, at 0500 hours on 30 April the Battalion and the re-
remainder of the Brigade moved out by motor transport from Yangpyong to their new positions just north of the junction of the Han and Pukhan Rivers. (See Sketch Map 6.)

In the new position, the K.O.S.B. Battalion was disposed on the high ground south east of Wolmum-ni, with B Company on the right occupying a feature Hill 551, A Company on its left on a feature of similar height and still further left C Company on feature Hill 524. D Company was in reserve, some 800 meters back on a high pass. On the right of B Company was the 3rd Battalion of the Australian Regiment and in Brigade reserve was the 1st Battalion of King's Shropshire Light Infantry who had just arrived to join the Brigade.

The Canadian Battalion was on the left of C Company, having come under command of the 25th Canadian Brigade, its parent formation, which had also just been formed in the theater.

The defensive area held by the 28th Brigade was a naturally strong one and the K.O.S.B. Battalion area particularly so. Orders had been issued to dig, wire and mine the position, as it formed part of the UN defensive line, on which the enemy was to be held, if he should attempt to resume his offensive and from which, in due time, it was intended to launch a UN offensive.

During the initial occupation of the position, routine patrols had been established well forward of it, but no contact had been made with the enemy. Patrolling was, therefore, started to locate the enemy positions and strength. From these it was ascertained that the enemy had a fairly strong covering screen in the hills south of the Kumgong-ni—Masogu-ri road. Although the enemy did not patrol offensively, he resisted strongly any attempt by the friendly patrols to dislodge him or penetrate his screen. This state of affairs continued until 20 May 1951.

One particular successful patrol during this period was carried out by a platoon of A Company, commanded by Second Lieutenant Foulis. The patrol worked its way unseen to the top of a high hill ahead of the Battalion’s position. Here it surprised and killed the Red Chinese sentry and flushed a party of some 20 Chinese on the reverse slope; six of them were killed before they could escape to the cover in the valley below. During this action, the platoon came under fire from approximately 50 enemy on a nearby spur on their right. These enemy were immediately engaged and close quarter fighting mainly with grenades, ensued. In this engagement the platoon fought with great skill and gallantry against superior numbers of enemy. Private T. Johnstone particularly distinguished himself. With one grenade he killed two enemy in a trench, then rushed forward and seized their burp gun. His action inspired his comrades and proved demoralizing to the enemy, who broke off the engagement and fled. So far
the action had gone well for the platoon, but it had yet another problem to reckon with. Down in the valley to the right of the hill on which the platoon had been fighting, some 200 enemy had moved out and were proceeding to work round the right rear of the platoon, obviously attempting to cut it off. Fortunately for the platoon, the enemy were moving across the front covered by the machine guns of the 3rd Battalion of the Australian Regiment. The latter seized upon this excellent target and inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Second Lieutenant Foulis also called for fire of the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment on this target and directed the artillery fire himself. When this threat had been successfully neutralized, the platoon, having completed its mission, withdrew back to its base. The platoon had killed 25 enemy and wounded many more while suffering no loss. The assistance given to the platoon by the Australian Battalion had been invaluable to the success of the action.

On 20 May, orders were received indicating that the UN forces were to attack on the following day.

On 21 May the IX US Corps assumed the offensive, in which the 28th Commonwealth Brigade participated.

The British K.O.S.B. Battalion was given a mission to pass through the Canadian Battalion’s position on the left and secure by last light its objective which consisted of a series of low foot hills, some 1,000 meters south of Kumgong-ni. Early on 21 May, prior to the advance of the Brigade, the Battalion sent out a reconnaissance patrol for probing purpose and by 1500 hours the Battalion had reached its objective with no enemy contact.

On 22 May a further task, allotted to the British K.O.S.B. Battalion, was to capture a high feature Hill 432, which lay to the northeast of the village of Kumgong-ni some seven kilometers from the Battalion’s present position. Throughout the advance, the Battalion had to carry out a special task to provide protection for the engineers clearing the mines.

On the following day 23 May, two platoons of D Company (Major A. D. Mackenzie) made a very gallant attempt to capture Hill 432 by assaulting it from the left flank, and one platoon led by Lieutenant McMillan Scott, actually secured a foothold on the feature after scaling the rock face. They were engaged, however, by enemy machine guns and mortars and counter-attacked by a force of some 150 Chinese who had been lying up in a re-entrant at the rear of the feature. Close hand-to-hand fighting ensued; but the platoon outnumbered and running short of ammunition was forced to withdraw. It was clear by now that the enemy was very strongly entrenched on this feature and that another plan and measures were required to dislodge him. During the remainder of this day, very heavy artillery concentrations and air strikes, using napalm bombs, were put down on the feature and A
Company (Major G. A. Duncan) during the late evening, was withdrawn from its position west of Kumgong-ni and moved through the village to a position from which it could assault the feature from the east on the following morning. During the night 23-24 May, however, the enemy withdrew from its feature and both A and D Companies occupied it without meeting any opposition.

In spite of the fact that the enemy position on Hill 432 was a naturally strong one, much of the 48 hours spent in capturing it, might well have been reduced had it been possible to devote some time to reconnoiter before the operation. Nevertheless, the result of the operation was satisfactory, in that the Battalion destroyed two enemy machine guns, two mortars and a number of light automatic weapons. Large quantities of ammunition and equipment were captured and 25 enemy dead were found on the position. These facts were of interest as the enemy seldom left any weapon, ammunition or equipment behind when he withdrew and invariably disposed of his dead.

The Battalion had suffered 14 casualties in the operation and the enemy, apart from the 25 dead found on the position, must have suffered many more from the artillery concentrations and air strikes.

Once on Hill 432, it was with much relief that the Battalion received orders to concentrate and rest for the remainder of the day near Masogu-ri.

The 25 May, the next day, saw the Battalion on the move again at an early hour. On this occasion the task of the Battalion was a simple one, to relieve a US Regiment at Oebang-ni, some 19 kilometers north of Masogu-ri.

In the meantime, on 27 May the Battalion was ordered to move again to Taebo-ri, some 24 kilometers north east of Oebang-ni, where the Battalion was to move into Corps reserve.

The move was again a difficult one for the transport, due to the lack of any suitable track and the flooded rivers and streams. In practice, since leaving Masogu-ri, all ranks had to carry a considerable amount of equipment, and ammunition, as well as their greatcoat and a blanket, all of which would normally have been carried in the Battalion's transport.

On 28 May 1951 the Battalion and the remainder of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade were ordered to move at 0800 hours on 29 May to come under command of 1st US Cavalry Division in I US Corps on the western sector of the front north of Seoul and took up position on the line of the Imjin River. Thus up to this date the 28th Brigade had advanced north some 48 kilometers since 21 May, and the Battalion had been operating as a part of the Brigade under command of IX US Corps in the central sector of the front.

On 30 May the Battalion relieved a battalion of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment on the south bank of the Imjin River. This was the area in which
the 29th British Brigade fought its major battle in late April and it had only just been reoccupied by the Allied forces.

The mission of the K.O.S.B. Battalion at its new position was to prepare a strong defensive position and at the same time, by patrolling, to keep contact with the enemy on the north bank of the river. One further task, and a most unpleasant but important one, was the identification of the British dead, who had been killed during the Imjin River Battle in April.

For the defense of this position, the Company areas were assigned, and their preparation involving digging, wiring and mining commenced immediately after the Battalion and the rest of the Brigade arrived, and as events turned out went on for some three months. During the heaviest rainstorms it was not uncommon for 150 to 300 millimeters to fall in twelve hours and for the river Imjin to rise very quickly.

As the enemy showed no inclination to close up to the river, and only reacted to battalion strength operations carried out to a considerable depth north of the river, patrolling was again limited to company strength patrols and other means were employed to try and discover the enemy's present
whereabouts and future intentions.

The problem of obtaining information regarding the enemy's locations and size of strength had proved difficult. It was for this reason that the Battalion, during the last few weeks in this position, created a platoon, called the patrol platoon for special long range patrol tasks. (See Sketch Map 7.)

Section 6. Commonwealth Integration
(30 May - 24 December 1951)

A Limited Offensive

It was whilst the British Battalion of the 28th Brigade was preparing its defensive positions south of the Imjin River during the month of July 1951 that negotiations began between the UN Command and the Communist Aggressors for a cease-fire agreement. As time passed, however, it became abundantly clear that the Communists were only interested in such an agreement on their own term.

On the battlefront, the 29th British Infantry Brigade with the Belgian Battalion and 5th ROK Marine Battalion attached under its command, after its heavy losses in the Imjin battle, spent the next month on the Kimpo peninsula, west of Seoul, chiefly for patrolling, absorbing replacements, reorganizing and training. Particularly the Gloucestershire Battalion, which had suffered heavy casualties at the Imjin, were brought up to strength, and under their new Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel D. B. Grist became operationally fit in a very short time.

Meanwhile at the end of May 1951 the 29th British Brigade moved to the left sector of its old positions on the Imjin River, where it set about digging, wiring and mining the defenses. The Belgian Battalion remained with the Brigade, but the 5th ROK Marine Battalion was detached from the Brigade and joined the 1st ROK Division.

The mission for the 29th British Brigade at the new position was to organize, occupy and defend the Line Kansas in its zone utilizing the best terrain, conduct strong combat patrols north of the Imjin River, and to establish a minimum outpost line 6,000 meters north and west of the Imjin River. In maintaining these positions the Brigade was to coordinate with the 1st ROK Division on the left and 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right.

At 0600 hours on 17 July the elements of the 29th British Brigade initiated a limited objective attack with the Ulster Rifles on the left and the Belgian Battalion on the right to secure Hill 187 about 15 kilometers north
from the Brigade's main defensive position. By 1045 hours the elements of the Ulster Rifles advanced, reached a point three kilometers south of the objective and had placed artillery fire and an air strike on an estimated two company strength of enemy to their front. At 1045 and 1315 hours respectively the British and Belgian Battalions encountered some enemy. At 1740 hours after some brief engagements the Belgian Battalion started to withdraw and elements of the Ulster Rifles established blocking positions to cover the withdrawal. At 1900 hours the remainder of the attacking echelons were approximately half way back to the friendly positions.

On the other hand, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade area was on the right. On 6 September the 1st Battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers with the remainder of the Brigade received the orders to move forward on 8 September to occupy positions north of the Imjin River in an area which up to date had been known as No Man's Land. The position allotted to the 28th Brigade was just north of the ferry site of the 29th British Brigade's sector. Once the bridgehead was established in this position by the 28th Brigade units, a US engineer unit quickly made a floating bridge.

Apart from some encounters with the enemy by long range patrols, the 28th Brigade had no contact with the enemy in this position and after being in it for two weeks, the 29th British Brigade passed through to occupy positions further north of the bridgehead held by the 28th Brigade across the river. At the same time the 25th Canadian Brigade, from the role of reserve, advanced on the right of the 29th British Brigade to reach its portion of the objective line for Operation Minden by 11 September.

Toward the end of September the reasons for the move of both the 28th and 29th Brigades across the river became clear, when instructions were issued to prepare plans for Operation Commando. This operation was to form part of a UN offensive on the I US Corps front and was to be carried out by the 1st Commonwealth Division which had recently been activated with the three existent Brigades of 28th Commonwealth, 29th British and 25th Canadian Infantry.

The aim of the offensive was to close with the enemy and disrupt any plan he might be taking for an autumn offensive; additionally it was hoped that such action might induce a more sincere attitude on the side of the Communist peace delegates in negotiation for a cease-fire agreement. (See Situation Map 16.)
Activation of the Commonwealth Division

Before describing the initial operation of the 1st Commonwealth Division it will be as well to give a brief description as to the general situation of both enemy and friendly troops around the time and later the outline Order of Battle.

The division commander designate Major General A.J.H. Cassels and the staff officers of division headquarters started to gather and organize early in June, and on 28 July 1951 the 1st Commonwealth Division was activated near Tokchong about 10 kilometers north of Uijongbu.

At this time the enemy front line facing the 1st Commonwealth Division was on average some 7,000 meters north of the Imjin, and during the ensuing operations, the enemy was the 64th CCF Army consisting of the 190th, 191st and 192nd Divisions. When the Commonwealth Division was formed, it was actually faced, on its front, by the 192nd CCF Division, with two regiments in the front line. It was estimated that each regiment consisted of about 2,000 men. At that time the enemy held his outpost line some two to three kilometers north of the Imjin River, with well-prepared main defensive positions from six to eight kilometers in rear.

Around the end of July 1951 the UN line ran generally from a point on the west coast about 32 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel roughly north west to the east coast approximately 32 kilometers north of the Parallel. It cut the Parallel some 64 kilometers north east of Seoul.

The newly activated 1st Commonwealth Division was initially put under the operational control of I US Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General J.W. O'Daniel. The portion of I Corps line initially held by the 1st Commonwealth Division was about 11,000 meters long with 29th British Brigade on the left, 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right and 25th Canadian Brigade and the Belgian Battalion in reserve. On the left flank was the 1st RCK Division and on the right the 1st US Cavalry Division.

The period of over two months from the day of formation of the Division until 3 October was a comparatively quiet period, but included a practically unopposed advance of the divisional line to the north of the Imjin River and a number of minor actions.

The relatively quiet period of semi-positional warfare since the formation of the Division had enabled it to settle down in almost ideal conditions, but the only aggravating factor was the weather which provided the usual heavy monsoon rain customary at this season of the year.

However, each British battalion in making use of the time spared had carried out training, such as the use of search-lights for employment on the division front in some future operation. A demonstration was held by the
1st Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers of a platoon in defense at night, attended by the Corps Commander and representatives from most formations and 1 Corps units.

**Operation Commando**

The 1st Commonwealth Division as a part of I US Corps was to carry out Operation Commando in which D Day was fixed for 3 October 1951.

Operation Commando was a limited offensive which was planned and conducted by the Corps, and involved an advance along the whole corps front to secure and establish a new Line of Jamestown north of the old Kansas Line. Taking the initiative, the UN allies started a series of limited drives. This advance was to be carried out with the 1st ROK Division on the left, 1st Commonwealth Division center and 1st US Cavalry Division on the right.

Before the actual operation started, some preliminary moves took place on 28 September. The 1st Commonwealth Division sidestepped approximately 3,000 meters to the right to establish new boundaries between the Samichon on the left and the Imjin River on the right.

The 1st Battalion of the Ulster Rifles of the 29th British Brigade was due to be relieved by a battalion from the United Kingdom in a few days' time, and therefore it was arranged to employ each battalion of this Brigade separately to support other brigades rather than use the Brigade as a whole.

Thus, the main effort of the division operation was accordingly placed on the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, which was to carry out the first phase of the attack on the right with the primary mission of securing a dominating feature, Hill 355 (Kowang san).

The Order of Battle, 1st Commonwealth Division during Operation Commando from 2 to 10 October 1951 was as follows:

- **Headquarters, 1st Commonwealth Division:** Major General A.J.H. Cassels
- **Headquarters, 28th Commonwealth Brigade:** Brigadier G. Taylor
- **1st Battalion of King's Own Scottish Borderers:** Lieutenant Colonel J.F.M. MacDonald
- **1st Battalion of King's Shropshire Light Infantry:** Lieutenant Colonel V.W. Barlow
- **3rd Battalion of the Australian Regiment:** Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Hassett
- **Headquarters, 29th British Infantry Brigade:** Brigadier T. Brodie
- **1st Battalion of Northumberland:** Lieutenant Colonel M.C. Speer
Army Troops

Fusiliers
1st Battalion of Gloucestershire Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel D.B. Grist
1st Battalion of Ulster Rifles Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel R.J.H. Carson
1st Battalion of Norfolk Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel J.H.R. Orlenar
Headquarters, 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
Brigadier J.M. Rockingham
Armoured Units:
8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars
Lieutenant Colonel W.G. Lowther
C Squadron, 7th Royal Tank Regt
Major A.J.D. Pettingell
C Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Canada)
Major V.W. Jewkes
Artillery Units:
2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
Major J.S. Orton (acting)
16th New Zealand Field Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel R.J.H. Webb
45th Field Regiment, R A
Lieutenant Colonel M.T. Young
Engineer Units:
28th Field Engineer Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel P.N.M. Moore
12th Field Engineer Squadron
Major H.W.B. Stevens
55th Field Engineer Squadron
Major D.G.M. Fletcher
57th Canadian Independent Field Engineer Squadron
Major D.H. Rochester
64th Field Park Squadron
Major J.A. Keer
Signal Units:
1st Commonwealth Division Signal Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Arkinson
Transport Units:
54th Company, Canadian Army Service Corps
Major R.C.D. Laughton
57th Company, Royal Army Service Corps
Major F.H. Potter
78th Company, Royal Army Service Corps
Major G.W. Moncur
Medical Units:
25th Canadian Field Ambulance
Lieutenant Colonel B.L.P. Brosseau
26th Field Ambulance
Lieutenant Colonel A. MacLeenan
60th Indian Field Ambulance
Lieutenant Colonelnel A.G. Langaraj

The principal role in the operation was to be carried out by 28th Com-
monwealth Brigade whose task was to capture the vital features of Hills 210, 355 and 317 (315 on the new map), these objectives being assigned initially to 1st Battalion, the King's Shropshire Light Infantry for Hill 210, 1st Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers for Hill 355 and 3rd Battalion, the Australian Regiment for Hill 315. On the left of the Commonwealth Brigade the Canadian Brigade was to attack Hills 187 and 159, and maintain contact with 29th British Brigade who was already in position.

On 1 October the elements of the 28th Brigade moved in motor transport to the right flank of the division area and thence northward along the east bank of the river Imjin, into an area held by 1st US Cavalry Division. The same evening, the Brigade crossed the river Imjin by ferry and moved into an assembly area. And during the night of 2-3 October the Brigade attack echelons moved forward to forming-up positions for the attack, which was to start at 0715 hours.

**Action of Kowang-san (Hill 355)**

The area over which the 1st Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers had to advance on the Brigade's center in the attack, consisted of steep-sided hills of rock and sandstone, for the most part covered by dense pine forest and rising from muddy fields of paddy to heights of some 250 meters. Dominating the surrounding area for many miles stood the towering mass of Hill 355, known to the UN troops as the Little Gibraltar, the Battalion's final objective.

The Order of Battle of K.O.S.B. Battalion when it carried out the attack on Hill 355 (Kowang-san) was:

- **Battalion Headquarters**
  - **Headquarters Company**
    - **A Company**
    - **B Company**
    - **C Company**
    - **D Company**

- **Leutnant Colonel J.F.M. MacDonald**
- **Major D.B. Haig**
- **Major G.A. Duncan**
- **Major P.F. St. C. Harrison**
- **Major T. Little**
- **Major R.C. Robertson-Macleod**

As dawn broke on 3 October, the Borderers crossed their line of departure with C Company on the left directed on an intermediate objective named Long and B Company on the right working forward to a parallel objective named Finger. The rate of advance of both Companies was slow, due to the steep and densely wooded terrain and the difficulty of keeping direction and control. (See Sketch Map 8.)
By 0845 hours C Company had fought its way to the lower slopes of Long and from then onward became engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy was holding the feature in considerable strength and offered fanatical resistance from well-prepared and ingeniously concealed positions.

By 1200 hours the forward elements of C Company had obtained a footing on Long, but were unable to dislodge the enemy from the whole feature. The Company had become very dispersed in the long struggle that had taken place on the way to the objective and the forward elements on Long were being subjected to intense machine gun and mortar fire from enemy positions on the Kidney ridge. Realizing that the capture of Long was not within the capacity of the depleted and somewhat exhausted C Company, the Battalion Commander ordered the Company Commander Major Little to withdraw his forward elements from Long and reorganize his Company. At the same time, he ordered A Company Commander who had been with him at the Battalion C.P. during this phase of the action, to go forward and make a joint plan for the capture of the objective with C Company.

In the meantime, B Company had captured Finger ridge with little difficulty, despite heavy artillery and mortar fire. They were ordered to
consolidate this position and give maximum fire support to the forthcoming assault on Long by A and C Companies.

At 1415 hours A and C Companies started their attack on Long and after some close and fierce fighting the two Companies had captured the feature by 1530 hours.

A Company was immediately ordered to advance and capture the next feature Kidney. This they did in remarkably quick time, after engaging the enemy once more in some fierce hand-to-hand fighting. Throughout the fighting for Long and Kidney, the Battalion's patrol platoon operating on the left flank, had given the most useful support, as well as the armoured troop of the 8th Hussars operating with the K.S.L.I. Battalion.

By the time Kidney was captured, it was already getting dark and the K.O.S.B. Battalion was ordered to consolidate its positions on Kidney, Long and Finger, evacuate its wounded and prisoners and resupply its forward companies.

Early on 4 October D Company and the patrol platoon successfully scaled and fought the enemy off the final objective Hill 355. B Company, the medium machine gun platoon and the 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment gave the most valuable support throughout this action.

During the 36 hours fighting on 3 and 4 October, the Battalion's casualties were seven killed and 34 wounded. The counted enemy casualties were 26 killed and 14 prisoners, but a considerable number of enemy wounded was confirmed later by enemy prisoners.

On the left of the K.O.S.B., the K.S.L.I. secured their final objective Hill 210 and on the right Australian Battalion captured Hill 315.

The Battle on Hills 217-315

On 9 October the dispositions of 28th Commonwealth Brigade were adjusted: The K.S.L.I. Battalion took over the area of Hills 227(220 on the new map) and 355 while the K.O.S.B. Battalion was ordered to take over the area of Hills to include 217 and 317(315 on the new map) and the Australian Battalion the area about Hill 199 in extreme right.

The front held by the Battalion was some 3,000 meters and faced both west and north, from which directions it was overlooked by the enemy. Being a long and narrow ridge, it was impracticable to get any depth within company localities. Except for the fact that the position provided some depth to the defense of Hill 355 and the river, it had absolutely nothing to commend it as a defensive position.

The three forward Companies of the Battalion, B, C and D, had considerable difficulty in preparing any defense, as any movement or noise immed-
Hill 317 (315 on the map), a commanding feature, was held by K.O.S.B. Battalion.

...immediately brought heavy shell and mortar fire on them. For the same reasons, it was particularly difficult to get ammunition, defense stores, equipment, water and food up to the forward Companies, despite the great efforts made to do so by the gallant band of Korean porters.

The close proximity of the enemy’s defensive positions, in the Hinge area, only some 300 meters away, restricted patrolling and offensive activity was mainly confined to shelling and air strikes using napalm bombs. In this unenviable position, the Battalion remained until 4 November, incurring daily a number of casualties from enemy shelling.

Meanwhile on 25 October the Commanding Officer of K.O.S.B. Battalion was ordered to take over command of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and Major Tadman assumed command of the Battalion.

During the night of the 3rd and morning of the 4th November, there were signs of much increased enemy activity on the Battalion’s front and this was accompanied by intensified shelling and mortaring on friendly positions. Despite three powerful air strikes and strong counter measures by friendly artillery and mortars, the enemy persisted with their shelling and mortaring on friendly positions. The enemy guns were particularly difficult to locate and destroy, as they were cleverly concealed in tunnels in the hills opposite the Battalion’s front.

On 4 November it was estimated that 10,000 shells fell in the division
area and that at one time 90 to 120 rounds per minute were being received by the Brigade.

All available means of defensive fire, aircraft, artillery and mortars were called on for support at this stage, as it was evident that the Battalion was about to be attacked.

About 1615 hours reports were made from the forward companies of human waves of enemy moving forward with his main efforts against the 1st Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers.

C Company, on Hinge was the first to be engaged in hand-to-hand fighting and was soon hard pressed. Nevertheless, it was not until some two hours later, after fighting most gallantly against overwhelming odds and under intense fire, that the Company which by this time had suffered many casualties, was ordered to withdraw to the area held by A Company.

In the meantime B Company on Hills 217 and United had become closely engaged. The enemy using self-propelled guns and rockets had systematically destroyed the forward defenses. Shortly afterward enemy estimated at 1,500 started moving behind the artillery barrage across the paddy fields toward Hills 217 and United.

The friendly defensive fire, both artillery and mortars, took great toll, but despite this the enemy pressed on in vast numbers armed with pole charges and nets to lay over the friendly wire. In fact, little wire remained after the intense enemy shelling and enemy were soon in the forward slopes of the position. After hand-to-hand fighting the survivors from the forward positions joined the remainder of the Company on the reverse slopes and set about keeping the crest of the hill clear of the enemy. This was achieved by the use of light machine guns fired from the hip and high explosive and phosphorus grenades thrown by parties of men who had been allotted various sections of the crest.

By 1730 hours Hill 217 had been overrun and the handful of survivors had crawled back to join the battle patrol in its reserve position on Lock. This resulted in the enemy being able to advance along the ridge to join their comrades assaulting United. B Company continued to put up a magnificent and gallant fight on United and by the skilful use of illuminating flares silhouetted the enemy, as they poured wave after wave over the crest. It was in this action that Private W. Speakman, a member of B Company Headquarters, won the Victoria Cross for his supreme gallantry.

At 2045 hours, by which time their strength had been seriously depleted by heavy casualties and ammunition was running out, B Company was ordered to withdraw onto the battle patrol position at Lock. In the event,
Army Troops

B Company withdrew to Italy just after 2400 hours. As the Company had practically no ammunition left or radio sets serviceable, the 6th Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant R. A. Brooks, was sent back to Battalion Headquarters to get both ammunition and, if possible, radio sets. His journey both ways was made in the dark under heavy artillery fire and through an area covered with the friendly mine fields. That he was able to return to his Company with their requirements was a great tribute to his skill and courage, under very difficult circumstances.

Under similar circumstances to C and B Companies, D Company was putting up a fierce resistance on Hill 315, but they too, with their numbers very depleted, were finally forced to withdraw between 2100 and 2200 hours onto their reserve platoon on Peak.

Since early in the battle there had been no communication with the two platoons on the Knoll. However, at about midnight, it was confirmed that this gallant force was still holding out, although running short of ammunition, that the Second Lieutenant Henderson, Commanding a D Company platoon, had been wounded and the Second Lieutenant Purves had assumed command of the force. The force was surrounded on three sides by enemy in considerable strength. Second Lieutenant Purves was instructed to try and fight his way out and join the remainder of D Company on Peak. This difficult and unpleasant operation he successfully carried out, his exploit being especially remarkable for the fact that, although wounded himself, he managed to evacuate all the wounded and the undamaged equipment of his force, under heavy mortar fire. For his exploits in this battle, Second Lieutenant Purves was awarded the Distinguished Service Order. He was nineteen years old.

Throughout this prolonged battle, the Mortar Platoon under Second Lieutenant Rooke of Headquarters Company, had provided excellent support to the forward Companies. Although under heavy fire for most of the period, the platoon discharged some 5,000 rounds in four hours. Most valuable help was also provided by the Medium Machine gun Platoon drivers, under Second Lieutenant Lyal, who in their jeeps successfully evacuated, under fire, many wounded from the forward companies.

The Battalion Medical Officer, Captain Rutledge and his assistants worked untiringly at the Aid Post dealing with a great many casualties.

At about 0200 hours on 5 November the enemy artillery fire lifted on to A Company and the nearby Battalion Headquarters area, and tracer was fired down the valley east of Italy, indicating the direction of an enemy attack. However, fortunately for the Battalion, which had already heavy losses in personnel, equipment and weapons during the previous ten hours, this attack
never materialized.

As dawn broke on 5 November, the Battalion sadly depleted in numbers, was holding positions firmly in which it could still fight.

B Company with the battle patrol under command was in position on Italy, D Company on Peak, A Company who had not been involved in the battle was in their original position, and C Company was in reserve near Battalion Headquarters just south of A Company.

The after-action report revealed that the division artillery commanded by Brigadier W.G.H. Pike fired 30,830 rounds during the fiercest shelling engagement from 0300 hours 4 November to 1800 hours 5 November.

An immediate check on casualties disclosed that the Battalion had suffered in this action seven killed, 87 wounded and 44 missing, almost all from the three forward Companies.

It subsequently became known that the Battalion had been attacked by a Red Chinese Division, some 6,000 strong and that, in the course of the battle, the enemy had casualties of over 1,000 killed.

Details of the action for which Private W. Speakman, 1st Battalion of King’s Own Scottish Borderers was awarded later the Victoria Cross for his brilliant account during the battle.

On 6 November the 1st Battalion, the Royal Leicestershire Regiment relieved the 1st Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers, who withdrew from the line to an area near Hill 238 about two and a half kilometers east from its old Hill 355, where it became Brigade reserve for reorganization and reequipment till 12 November 1951.

On 7 November 1951 Lieutenant Colonel J.F.M. MacDonald, Commander of 28th Commonwealth Brigade issued a Special Order of the Day to the 1st Battalion, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers for commendation of the Battalion’s outstanding and heroic achievement in the battle. This Special Order of the Day is reproduced in part:

"Sunday, 4th November, 1951 will be remembered and revered for all time in the annals of The King’s Own Scottish Borderers.

On this day, you stood your ground from early dawn in the face of intense and accurate enemy bombardment, and as the afternoon wore on, you met and held a major Chinese Communist attack and dealt the enemy a deadly blow.

The actions fought by you all, both collectively and individually on this day, were beyond praise, and it is true to say that your gallantry and sacrifice saved the divisional front from being penetrated.

Your adversary was clearly confident that his intense bombardment and human mass attack, in which he used one division (6,000 men), would overwhelm the defenders of the now famous Point 217—Point 317 ridge
He had failed completely and utterly, however, to appreciate that he was opposed by men, whose courage, tenacity and fighting skill was second to none—The 1st Battalion The King’s Own Scottish Borderers. Your magnificent exploits on this fateful Sunday have, therefore, given him further proof, if such be needed, that such tactics against you are doomed to disaster...."

In the Brigade reserve area the Battalion had ten unpleasant days and nights when the enemy was making his determined efforts to capture Hill 355 held by the 1st Battalion of King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, and almost every night from one direction or another put in powerful attacks in an endeavour to achieve his aim. At this time, the enemy started to make use of tracer, as a mean of indicating to his own troops the axis of their attack, but it gave the British troops not only warning of their attack but an opportunity to disrupt it at an early stage with defensive fire from artillery, mortars and machine guns. American heavy bombers were also used during this period to bomb the enemy positions in front of the British forward positions. The nightly attacks by these bombers, using 1,000 lb. bombs and incendiaries, were most spectacular, accurate and effective and such was the accuracy of their radar equipment, that they often bombed targets within 400 meters of British forward position. This bombing did much to raise the morale of the British Battalion, who had been fighting almost continuously since the beginning of October.

Section 7. Trench Warfare
(12 November 1951 - 6 August 1952)

Holding the Line

The UN Command in the meantime had clarified its policy about the conduct of war by issuing instructions to subordinate units on 12 November 1951 that all units were to minimize offensive operations and begin active defense of UN front, thus introducing the stalemate which lasted until July 1953. At this stage of the war it seemed that neither side on the front had the will to fight in an all-out effort to defeat decisively the other, and a long period of trench warfare ensued, whilst negotiations for a cease-fire and political settlement of the war were being discussed at Panmunjom.

In the night of 21-22 November the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right of the 1st Commonwealth Division sector was relieved by the 7th US
Cavalry Regiment; practically the whole of the front including Hills 355 and 220 held by the 28th Brigade was taken over. Instead of this on the left flank the 1st Commonwealth Division was to take over a portion of the line held by the 1st ROK Division west of Sami-chon.

The new division area which the Commonwealth troops held, had a slightly shorter front and permitted some defense in depth. The new front could now be held by two brigades leaving a complete brigade in reserve.

On 23 November various moves were in progress all day to complete the re-deployment of the Division. In the evening the enemy made a strong attack against the 7th US Cavalry Regiment on the right and captured the important feature Hill 355 which a British Battalion of the Commonwealth Brigade had captured in Operation Commando. This was a serious matter as the feature dominated most of the division front. Its recapture was a matter of some urgency, and vital to the integrity of the Commonwealth Division.

The 24th November was a day of desperate fighting for the 7th US Cavalry in its efforts to recapture Hill 355. The Commonwealth Division gave the full weight of its artillery support, and eventually the Regimental counterattack was successful in re-occupying the position.

The period from late-November 1951 to the end of the year was a quiet one. There were some enemy shelling and a few minor incidents, but activities were mainly confined to strengthening the defense, improving communications, training, receiving distinguished visitors and preparing for eventualities which rarely occurred.

The 1st K.O.S.B. Battalion in its new position was reasonably well concentrated, and although in reserve it was fully occupied so as to provide all round security. Considering its recent experience in the early-November battle it had to prepare the best defensive position and so first priority was given to the preparation of effective fire positions and dug-outs, wiring and mine-laying. Particularly as a reserve, the Battalion had a series of counterattack roles and these had to be planned and rehearsed.

Also at this stage of the war the British troops were issued with special purpose equipments such as the experimental armoured vests and infra-red telescopic sights for rifles, and consequently when they again went into the line, both equipments were found to be of value.

On 18 January 1952 the 28th Brigade was ordered to move into the line taking over the positions held by the Canadian Brigade.

On 19 January 1952, the Battalion went back into the line, taking over positions some three kilometers north of Yongdong.

For the three forward companies this relief had to be carried out by
night, as the company areas were all in full view of the enemy on the far side of the valley. In these positions, movement was not possible by day time and this applied equally to the enemy in his positions on the hills 1,000 meters or less across the valley. All maintenance and reliefs had to be carried out by night and be completed by first light. In this position the Battalion remained until 15 April.

The British Battalion in the line, however, had a wide frontage which was accentuated by the many re-entrants and so forward companies were of necessity holding somewhat isolated areas. Enemy shelling was a daily occurrence and varied in intensity from light to heavy, the latter generally being confined to a 30 minutes period, on one or other of the forward company areas between last light and mid-night.

On 2 April enemy shelling noticeably increased, particularly on A Company (Captain A.M. Thorburn) who at the time was holding the right forward company area of the battalion frontage, and at 2100 hours the platoons of the company were subjected to an intense half hour’s artillery fire. Harassing fire continued on the following day, but of no similar weight to that of the previous evening.

On 4 April enemy harassing fire continued throughout the day which was more concentrated. It was thought that this was the prelude to an attack and so the whole Company stood to and defensive fire was directed on all likely enemy approaches. No attack however materialized. The 5th April was much the same as previous days, except that the shelling through-out the day was considerably heavier.

Information deduced from interception of the enemy radio net indicated that H-hour for an enemy attack would probably be 2300 hours. Forewarned the elements of A Company were making all preparations to meet an enemy attack, which from the previous days of shelling appeared likely to be directed at their position. At 2100 hours exactly a signal shell was landed and this was followed almost immediately by an intense artillery concentration on A Company’s positions which went on for half an hour. The Company put up parachute flares and all available weapons opened up on their defensive fire tasks. Smokes and dust from the enemy shelling, however, coupled with the darkness made it impossible to see what was happening in and around the platoon and company areas.

It was not long after the heavy shelling started that the enemy made contact with the two forward platoons of A Company.

After some sharp fighting in which considerable use was made by both sides of hand grenades, the enemy eventually withdrew.

During this period, excellent support was received from D Company on the left and A Company of the 1st Battalion, the King’s Shropshire Light
Infantry on the right, who were able to bring enfilade fire to bear, immediately on the front of A Company’s forward platoon areas. By about midnight, it became clear that the enemy, who had failed to overcome the two forward platoons began to withdraw.

The defensive fire on the enemy approaches had disorganized his attack, caused him many casualties, and accounted for the comparatively small number of the enemy who actually reached A Company positions.

All elements of A Company and those individuals working with it had done good work in their respective roles, and thus once again the enemy was repulsed suffering considerable losses.

**The Battalion’s Triumphant Return Home**

Between 13 and 15 April 1952, the 1st Battalion of the British King’s Own Scottish Borderers and the other units of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade were relieved by units of the 25th Canadian Brigade and moved back in a staging area just south of the Imjin River.

It was the first time since arriving in Korea that the whole Battalion had been concentrated in the same area for some rest. However, in reserve area, opportunity was given for the British army combat units to carry out some field training and field firing exercises. In addition, when the weather increasingly became hot as the months passed, every opportunity was taken to bathe in the nearby River Imjin after the day’s work, or to play football, which it had been possible to start up on an improvised playground near the headquarters area.

In the meantime, the British Battalion was to start its journey home from Korea, after 16 months of active service in the war.

On 25 July the Battalion had entertained and offered their appreciation to the 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment and the 60th Indian Field Ambulance for their close association and outstanding and unfailing support to the British Battalion in actions.

Wearing the traditional Minden roses in their hats, the Battalion having handed over its position to a Canadian Battalion (22nd Regiment), was on its way by 1100 hours 1 August to Britannia Staging Camp, some 48 kilometers south of the 1st Commonwealth Division area. During its five days in this camp, the Battalion was visited by Major General A.J.H. Cassels, Commander the 1st Commonwealth Division, who addressed all the officers and men of the leaving Battalion.

The Battalion continued its journey home on 6 August, entraining at Tokchong that day for Pusan, which was the port from which it was to embark for Hong Kong. The journey in a Korean train with hard wooden
seats took sixteen hours.

In the staging camp at Pusan where the British Battalion was to make its farewell to Korea, the Battalion held a Commemoration Service, in the United Nations Cemetery on 10 August 1952, whilst final preparations for embarkation were being made. The service was conducted by the Battalion’s Chaplain, the Rev. R. Liddell, assisted by Mr. Adams, the British Chargé d’Affaires in Pusan, and a number of other officers and friends. Wreaths, which had been made in the form of the Regimental Badge, were laid at the foot of the Union Jack after the Service. The Parade and Service in memory of those members of the Battalion, who had given their lives during the war, was a most impressive ceremony.

On 12 August 1952, the Battalion embarked at Pusan, in H.M.S. Halladale. Shortly before sailing the Minister of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, and his staff arrived to bid farewell to the Battalion. Finally, to the strains of music played by the Republic of Korea Navy Band and a US Army Band the Battalion sailed away to the south and finally bid farewell to Korea.

Looking back over the sixteen months it had spent in Korea, the Battalion could feel justifiably proud of its operational record; General Mark W. Clark, the Commander-in-Chief, the United Nations Command, had sent to Lieutenant Colonel D.H. Tadman, Commanding Officer of the Battalion on the triumphal return, a citation dated 9 August 1952, which was written as follows:

“On the occasion of the departure of the 1st Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers, from this Command, I wish to extend to you my deep appreciation for the outstanding service which you and the Battalion have rendered to the cause of freedom.

During the past sixteen months the superb combat record of your fine unit has been an inspiration to your comrades-in-Arms in Korea. You take with you the respect and affection of all those who have been honoured to fight and serve at your side.”

Subsequently on its triumphal return to the United Kingdom in December, 1952, the Colonel-in-Chief, H.R.H. The Duchess of Gloucester most graciously sent the following message to all ranks of the Battalion:

“I welcome home all who served with the 1st Battalion of the Regiment in Korea. Immediately on arrival there, the Battalion became involved in active operations, which continued intermittently for the next 16 months. Twice attacked by an enemy in greatly superior numbers the Battalion displayed conspicuous gallantry.

Throughout these operations the 1st Battalion has been animated by a fine spirit, and by its conduct in battle has most worthily upheld the traditions of the Regiment and has written another glorious page in its
Changes in the Divisional Line

Up to the summer of 1952 since Operation Commando the Division sector of defense had frequently been changed to organize troop reliefs and because of the decisions of higher headquarters.

As a result of Operation Commando in early October 1951, the Commonwealth Division was holding a position between the Sami-chon on the left and the Imjin River on the right, including such major features as Kowangsan (Hill 355) and Hills 217 and 317 (315 on the new map), which the Division had previously captured. On its left was the 1st ROK Division and on its right the 1st US Cavalry Division.

On 29 November 1952 the redeployment of the Division to new positions began. It was now proposed to have all three Brigades up, each with two battalions in the front line and one in reserve. It was considered that this gave better control to Brigade Commanders, with their own reserve at hand, and each Brigade had a sector in depth instead of only a front line. The redeployment was completed on the night of 1-2 December with the 25th Brigade left, 29th center and the 28th right.

Meantime, on 16 January 1953 orders were received that the 1st Commonwealth Division be relieved in the line at the end of January by the 2nd US Division and go into I Corps reserve some 16 to 20 kilometers to the south. The Division artillery, however, was to remain in support of the 2nd Division whose artillery was supporting the 1st ROK Division.

On 29 January the relief began and was completed by the 31st. And so the Commonwealth Division (less its artillery) withdrew out of contact with the enemy for the first time since its formation exactly 18 months before.

After two months' rest and field training in reserve, the Commonwealth Division was due to return in April 1953 to the same sector of the front which it had previously held, and the period of 1-5 April was devoted to preparations for the relief of the 2nd Division.

Thus, the Commonwealth Division having assumed the defensive sector on its old front by the night of 8-9 April 1953 the disposition of units was the 29th British Brigade left, 25th Canadian Brigade center and 28th Commonwealth Brigade right.

During the first week of May 1953 the adjacent division to the 1st Commonwealth Division, on the left, the 1st US Marine Division was relieved in the line by the 25th US Division which had the Turkish Brigade under its command.
Army Troops

The Turkish Brigade was then placed immediately to the left of the Commonwealth Division and on the night of 15-16 May they were heavily attacked. The Commonwealth Divisional Artillery and the mortars of the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment were able to give the Turks considerable support and the enemy attack was repulsed.

The 29th British Brigade on the left of the Division front was confronted with desperate enemy attacks in attempts to occupy the position of the Hook. In order to defend this critical position the British Brigade had two battalions to the west of the Sami-chon. The Hook position was occupied by the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment on the left of the Brigade sector.

On the afternoon of 29 May 1953, however, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers, 28th Commonwealth Brigade relieved the Duke’s on the Hook position, and as of 12 July 1953 the left front of the division line was held by the 28th Brigade, the center by the 29th Brigade, and the right by the 25th Canadian Brigade.

To the left of the Commonwealth Division was the 1st US Marine Division who had now returned to the front line and on the right of the Commonwealth Division was the 1st ROK Division.

This deployment of the 1st Commonwealth Division continued until the truce was signed on 27 July 1953 with no particular enemy contact occurred except that the enemy attacks on the 1st US Marine Division on the left were repeated twice by 26 July and again the British Commonwealth forces provided considerable armoured and artillery support for their adjacent US troops.

The Lessons of Trench Warfare

Throughout the experience of trench warfare in hill actions of the first three weeks of November 1951 and a prolonged stay in their defensive area during the winter, spring and summer of 1952, the British troops of the Commonwealth Division learnt various important factors to improve more their means of defending their tactical area of responsibility, as a part of the UN front.

Firstly, the British soldiers learnt that the Chinese Communist forces could still use a considerable amount of artillery efficiently. Therefore, the barbed wire and telephone lines were easily destroyed at an early stage of a battle and were of little use unless these were set up in considerable depth or were positioned in bunkers with thick overhead cover. Bunkers, dug-outs and communication trenches had to be very strongly constructed.

Secondly, the defensive area where the British troops held up to that time, was exceptionally wild and consisted of a mass of hills and valleys
running in every direction. The division frontage was originally as wide as some 20,000 meters width. This made it necessary to have seven battalions in the front line, with one in support on the flank and one in reserve. So there was no depth to the positions.

The war was now semi-static, and more elaborate protection was possible as troops remained in the same defensive area for a considerable time. The infantry in forward areas lived in slit trenches, bunkers and dug-outs, with overhead cover constructed of timber, sandbags and sometimes tent fabric.

In the early stages most men preferred a slit trench, using the tent fabric as part of the overhead cover, but later the tendency was to get below ground rather than remain at ground level.

As a general rule the British troops had considerable experience in warfare in tropical and temperate weather but very little in intense cold in the field without permanent shelter in the form of building or huts. In most of the battles of the two World Wars the fighting was fierce, but the troops could usually look forward to reasonably good conditions, in accommodation when not actually engaged in active combat operations. But in the Korean War the British officers and men could not expect these conditions except for the infrequent short periods of leave in Japan or when one’s time came to go home.

There was an administrative system of rest and recuperation (R and R) leave to Japan that the British soldiers could really enjoy, and in 1952 the Commonwealth Division opened its own Rest Center at a small village by the sea near Inchon.

The health and spirit of the troops remained in good condition. Particularly, among the large UN forces in the Korean War the men in the British Commonwealth forces felt that they were the selected representatives of a group of countries which had a high reputation to maintain, and this too was an important factor in maintaining their high morale and a grim cheerfulness in the theater of war.

Section 8. The Battle of the Hook
(October 1952 - May 1953)

29th Brigade held the Hook

In late summer and autumn of 1952 the 1st Commonwealth Division was continuously occupying the positions north of the Imjin River and to the east of Sami-chon, being faced by the 40th CCF Army during the first part
Army Troops

of the period, and later by parts of both the 39th and 40th CCF Armies.

The enemy troops between Sami-chon and Imjin Rivers changed as their reliefs took place, but included at one time or another the 116th, 118th, 119th and 120th CCF Divisions.

In the latter part of 1951 and in 1952, the enemy's artillery had developed considerably in quantity and quality, and they would employ their specially trained gunners with a warning system that ensured the prompt opening of fire under any adverse terrain and weather conditions in their battle area. The enemy would frequently use signals for fire control, rather than use of radio or line communication, which were commonly used among the UN troops.

On 23 October 1952, the 1st Commonwealth Division had received the orders to take over the sector of the right battalion of the 1st US Marine Division west of the Sami-chon, to include the vicinity of Hill 163 the nearby ridge, which was known as the Hook position. This relief began on 27 October 1952.

On 4 November 1952, a patrol from the 1st Battalion, the Black Watch, was attacked by enemy of a platoon strength in front of the Hook position. The patrol lost one officer and five other ranks killed, six other ranks wounded and two missing. Only three men of the patrol escaped. Another patrol sent out later was able to collect the dead and wounded. On 14 November 1952 the 1st Battalion, the Black Watch now took over the Hook position less than one kilometer southeast of Hill 163, which was to play a prominent part in the fighting until the end of the Korean War.

On 16 November 1952 the enemy began to shell the Hook, held by the Black Watch, with increasing tempo, and on the night of 18-19 November he made a determined assault on the position. The enemy action started at 1900 hours when a patrol of the Black Watch, of an officer and 10 men found itself surrounded by the Red Chinese on a spur running north-east from the Hook, and at 2100 hours A Company was attacked from three different directions by the enemy in company strength approaching under his own artillery and mortar fire. From this time onward the divisional artillery and that of the 1st US Marine Division on the left fired almost continuously throughout the night in support of the British troops. The Commonwealth artillery men and some US Corps artillery units worked together in complete harmony. At 2250 hours B Company from the Canadian 3rd Battalion had relieved B Company of the Black Watch, which was preparing to counterattack. At 2320 hours the Hook was reported clear of enemy, but soon after that heavy shelling began again. At 0030 hour on 19 November the enemy attacked again and succeeded in getting a foothold on the position. At 0130 hours a deliberate counterattack of the British troops, supported by heavy artillery fire and one tank, was launched. The
tank was soon put out of action by an enemy rocket launcher. The counterattack made good progress and after a while another counterattack was launched which got farther forward. The hard and confused fighting continued for the rest of the night, but the Black Watch held firm. By 0430 hours they were engaged in mopping up a few enemy parties remaining on the position, and by 0630 hours the enemy had withdrawn. At about 0615 hours C Company of the Canadian Battalion relieved A Company of the British Battalion on the Hook position. By this time all casualties had been evacuated.

It was estimated that the enemy employed one battalion in this action. More than a hundred of enemy dead were actually counted. The casualties in the British Battalion were five officers wounded and one missing, 12 other ranks killed, 67 wounded and four missing.

Only minor clashes occurred during the remainder of the month. The 1st Battalion, the Royal Fusiliers of the 28th Brigade, made a night raid on Hill 133 in the extreme left sector and killed 15 of the enemy, with a loss of 13 wounded and 3 missing.

"Dig or Die" tactics applied on the Hook positions by 29th British Brigade.
Army Troops

On the night of 25-26 November two small raids were put in, the Pimlico Operation by the 1st Battalion, the Royal Fusiliers and Beatup Operation by an Australian Battalion. Neither were very successful. The Fusiliers were ambushed, soon after leaving their own lines and had heavy casualties of 14 killed, 20 wounded and 8 missing.

On the night of 7 May 1953, the enemy in company size probed the Hook position then held by a company of the Black Watch. The enemy were first seen at 0150 hours, and at 0300 hours a party of about 20 Chinese attacked but were driven back. At 0350 hours the Black Watch Battalion sent out a combat reconnaissance patrol of platoon size, which soon encountered the enemy and a sharp fire fight ensued. The patrol captured three wounded prisoners and brought them back when it withdrew. The British casualties were two officers and three other ranks killed and one officer, eight other ranks and one KATCOM (Koreans attached to Commonwealth units) wounded in this patrol action.

On the following day the disposition of British units in the 29th Brigade was adjusted and the Black Watch on the Hook position was relieved by the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment.

In mid-May 1953, a lot of enemy vehicles movement was seen some 6,000 to 7,000 meters north of the Hook position, and engaged by the division artillery, which was then reinforced by the arrival in the area of a US battery of 8-inch howitzers.

During the period of 18 to 29 May 1953 it became apparent that the enemy was building up his strength in front of the 29th Brigade, and a deserter who surrendered on the preceding day stated that an early attack on the Hook was planned.

Meantime, several probing attacks and increased artillery and mortar fire were directed against the feature held by the Dukes. Counter measures to meet an attack in this area were taken and included harassing fire by artillery (including I US Corps artillery which fired 5,000 rounds in one night) and 24 air strikes (102 sorties with 129 tons of bombs). Elements of the Black Watch Battalion were also moved to the Hook area to strengthen the defenses, and the Royal Fusiliers moved to the reserve position vacated by the Black Watch Battalion.

On 25 May 1953 the 1st Battalion, the King’s Liverpool Regiment carried out a raid, which was intended to be a diversion for activities in the Hook area. The raiders had several men killed and wounded by a mine en route, but reached the objective across the line of contact, where they killed some Chinese and blew up several bunkers.

By 27 May 1953 there were signs of so called the fourth battle of the Hook. The enemy was expected to attack the Hook imminently on a larger
scale than before. Further measures were taken to strengthen the position, including an additional battalion in the front line. When these measures were completed the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's Regiment was on the left, holding the Hook itself, and the 1st Battalion, the King's Liverpool Regiment held the right hand sector.

Shelling and mortaring increased in tempo and became intense at 2000 hours on 28 May 1953. Some eyewitnesses considered it to have been the heaviest enemy bombardment in the Korean War.

The first wave of the Red Chinese infantry approached soon to D Company of the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's Regiment on the Hook, after throwing hand grenades and assault charges into the positions. Gradually the defenders were forced to withdraw into their tunnels. By this time the division and corps artillery were bringing down the full weight of their fire on prearranged targets, and this defensive fire continued against the second and third attacking waves.

At 2045 hours, a second big attack was launched against the right platoon of the forward company on the Hook. This attack although badly mauled, succeeded in getting into the position, but the situation was restored when the platoon was reinforced by men from another platoon.

About 2200 hours two enemy companies attempted to assault B Company on the left rear of the Battalion, but they were caught by artillery fire and failed. An hour later enemy shelling increased on Hill 146, held by D Company of the 1st Battalion, the King's Liverpool Regiment in the right sector. In the light of search-lights large numbers of Chinese were seen forming up to attack, and were dispersed by artillery fire. Later it was discovered that this attack was in battalion strength and that the enemy suffered a heavy casualty.

The last attack came in on the Hook at 0030 hours on 29 May 1953, and was beaten off. By 0430 hours the Hook position and all other British defensive positions in the vicinity were reported clear of the enemy.

An engineer reconnaissance was carried out at once and it discovered that all main bunkers had been damaged and many trenches, some eight feet deep, had been destroyed out.

This attack by two enemy reinforced regiments in strength had been prepared over a long period, and ended in failure. Over 100 enemy dead were counted on or near the Hook, and another 70 were seen in enemy-held territory. It was estimated that the enemy had lost 250 men killed and 800 wounded.

Commonwealth casualties were: Officers, 3 killed and 2 wounded. Other ranks, 20 killed, 103 wounded and 20 missing. Of this total of 148, the figure of 126 which is 87 per cent was suffered by the 1st Battalion, the Duke of
Army Troops

Wellington's Regiment, who fought with the greatest tenacity throughout the actions.

Incoming shells and mortar bombs were estimated at 1,000 on 28 May alone and 10,000 on the night of 28-29 May 1953.

The Commonwealth Division artillery fired over 32,000 rounds and 1 Corps artillery nearly 6,000.

Thus ended the battle of the Hook, the last sizeable engagement fought by the 1st Commonwealth Division in the Korean War.

Nevertheless, the next two months saw bitter fighting along the whole United Nations front, which increased in severity as the date for the Armistice approached.

On the afternoon of 29 May 1953 the 1st Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers, 28th Commonwealth Brigade, relieved the 1st Battalion of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment on the Hook position. The enemy mortaring on the following day considerably hindered repair work on the defenses, and made it difficult to establish some of the routine patrols.

On 31 May 1953, 26 air strikes with 115 sorties by UN air supporters dropped 298 tons of bombs behind the front of the enemy facing the 1st Commonwealth Division. This was a record for one day's air operations.

BATTLE OF THE HOOK   (MAY 1953)

Sketch Map 9
During the first week in June 1953 many air strikes were carried out behind the enemy facing the Hook. On 5 June 1953 a raiding party of the 1st Battalion of the King’s Liverpool Regiment blew up some enemy caves, but unfortunately ran into a minefield and had 2 men killed and 15 wounded.

The rest of June 1953 was an exceptionally quiet period, there being no activities other than some light shelling and mortaring and a few minor patrol clashes. (See Sketch Map 9.)

The Battle Lessons

At the conclusion of the battle of the Hook, from autumn of 1952 to the end of May 1953, the following major units had contributed to their fighting in holding that position firm to the end, and had shown much gallantry:

1st Battalion, the Black Watch
1st Battalion the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment
1st Battalion, the Royal Fusiliers
1st Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry
1st Battalion, the Royal Scots

Lieutenant Colonel D. Mcn. C. Rose
Lieutenant Colonel F. P. St. P. Bunbury
Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Stevens
Lieutenant Colonel P. J. Jeffreys
Lieutenant Colonel M. E. Melvill

At first, the defenses on those positions around the Hook, had been terribly battered mostly by enemy shelling and mortaring and were completely uninhabitable when the US Marines left. Even the communication trenches which should have been at least six feet deep, were scarcely knee high.

Ever since the British troops took over on 14 November 1952, Lieutenant Colonel Rose, Commander of the Black Watch Battalion launched his battalion into the toughest tasks of digging and wiring yet experienced by any British battalion in Korea.

The relatively low rate of casualties to the Black Watch on the Hook position was due to the hard work with the policy of “Dig or die” of the British Battalion in repairing its defenses.

Wiring parties erected an elaborate defensive pattern, communication trenches and fighting bays were constructed; British engineers, who regarded the infantry with tolerant condescension, constructed circular tunnels into which the troops could retire under heavy shelling and from which they would emerge to engage with the enemy when the shelling had lifted.

Colonel Rose had first learnt that theory of defense in depth twenty years earlier at Sandhurst, and had been both preaching and practising it ever since that time. All Company Commanders also were taught this and
so the Black Watch, under the strong leadership of Colonel Rose, learned and the position was held.

The battle of the Hook was essentially a subalterns’ battle, and it was held because the British Battalion had subalterns like the Second Lieutenant Roger Doig, who died leading his platoon in a bayonet charge into a veritable hail of enemy machine gun fire; like Second Lieutenant Michael Black, who although repeatedly attacked and surrounded by enemy for the whole of one night, sent back his situation reports to his superior by radio in so cheerful and reassuring that the superior was constrained to ask him on the radio if he was really as happy as he sounded. The scene of this cool-headed subaltern’s attitude in combat action was caught by Lieutenant John Moncreiff, the Black Watch Intelligence Officer who intercepted on the radio at dawn on 19 November 1952, during close quarter fighting with some enemy who were throwing hand grenades down on the Lieutenant Black’s Platoon.

The Hook was held because there were sergeants like Alexander Hutchison, who in spite of a severe wound, led his men into the counterattack on his hands and knees; or corporals like Robert Manning, who refused to be evacuated after being twice wounded and who silenced an enemy machine gun with a hand grenade.

Furthermore, there were privates like George Coley, who bowled the Chinese over like ninepins with his Browning machine gun up to the very moment when he was killed by a grenade; like MacDonald and Alex Graham, who became prisoners of war, but MacDonald, deprived of his rifle by his captors, engaged with his fists and broke the skull of the Chinese guarding him with the brim of his steel helmet.

When the Black Watch handed the Hook position over to the 1st Battalion of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, the Dukes were trained in battle, through conducting the hard patrolling for the first two months after their arrival in Korea from garrison duty in Germany.

Early in their service in Korea the Dukes experienced mortaring and shelling and they soon learnt the truth in the saying “Dig if you want to stay alive.”

On 13 May 1953, a full-scale attack was imminent, and for three days the Chinese propagandist on the loudspeaker predicted the eviction of British soldiers from the Hook.

On the morning of 18 May, a small unarmed Chinaman walked into No. 8 Platoon’s position with his hands held high in the air and wearing a conciliatory smile. He was spotted simultaneously by three privates of the Dukes who all claimed him as their prisoner. The reward was five days’ R and R leave for the apprehension of a live enemy. The information given by the Chinese defector was comparatively accurate and was that an all-out attack
on the Dukes was imminent and this time the Chinese Communist forces were coming to stay. The Chinese assault would be made by five companies of infantry, and further three companies would take over the captured positions and hold them.

Colonel Francis Bunbury, the Commanding Officer, had more or less believed the Chinese defector’s confession, and immediately resolved to make the Hook as nearly impregnable as possible. He set about deploying his battalion to the best possible advantage and strengthening the defenses with all possible speed.

Colonel Bunbury declared in a forceful directive to his Company Commanders that nobody in the Battalion should be caught napping and that the British soldiers should fight to the last man and the last round.

During the night of 20–21 May 1953, some 4,500 shells fell on the Dukes Battalion, and thereafter the enemy artillery averaged 2,000 shells every 24 hours on the Hook.

Brigadier D. A. Kendrew, the Commander of 29th British Brigade described the shelling of the Hook on this date as the worst in his experience.

As a rule, a Chinese bombardment would normally be followed by their infantry’s attack. But during the next three days the shelling and mortaring merely increased.

The enemy attack, so called the fourth battle of the Hook, the last and fiercest engagement fought by the British army troops, eventually was launched at 2000 hours on 28 May 1953 as soon as the bombardment lifted just perceptibly and the Chinese Communist forces were at the Dukes’ throats.

This battle of the Hook resolved itself into a series of desperate close-quarter engagements fought at a range varying from 20 meters to a few feet.

One of the most violent and bloody of these was fought by Major Lewis Kershaw and ten men who were the only remnants in one of the forward positions.

Anticipating the collapse of the command post by a mere sixty seconds, Major Kershaw who was wounded by three direct hits from heavy shells ordered those ten men to take shelter in a nearby tunnel; he was the last to enter the tunnel, and no sooner had he done so than a party of Chinese appeared at the entrance and threw grenades inside; Major Kershaw in spite of being seriously wounded killed two of the Chinese with his sten gun, and threw grenades from a lying position, and prevented the entry of the enemy into the tunnel. As dawn broke on 29 May 1953, he was still there together with the ten wounded men, and the tunnel was still Dukes’ property.

There were many other Dukes of similar gallantry: Corporal George Pickersgill denied the Chinese entrance to another tunnel in the Hook position by pouring bursts of fire into enemy crowding the entrance; Private Denis Husband, blocking yet another tunnel, was invited by the Chinese to surrender
but he replied with a shower of grenades.

Section 9. Retrospect

Specific Missions Accomplished

During the static war after the middle of October 1951, after the Operation Commando, the main activity of the British troops had been patrols and ambushes with the main aim of dominating No Man’s Land, but also with the object of securing prisoners. Periods of inactivity in war are usually accompanied by constant demands on the part of the higher command intelligence staff for prisoners in order to help their attempts to keep pace with changes in the enemy order of battle.

All British infantry units patrolled very actively whenever the circumstances were suitable, and the following minor scale patrolling operations including some raids at the strength of up to a company were planned and carried out:

On 15 December 1951, Operation Skunk Hunt took place with the objective of discovering enemy guerrillas, agents and unauthorized civilians in the division’s area.

On 10-16 February 1952, Operation Snare which was intended to give the UN troops the opportunity to capture prisoners on the orders of the I US Corps. The enemy, however, would continue to work on strong and deep bunkers on the forward slopes with all the communication trenches covered, which connected his bunkers.

On 16 February 1952 the 5th Dragoon Guards carried out two small armoured raids on either flank of the division’s front. The enemy was not encountered on the left flank, but on the right these troops reached their objectives and made contact with the Chinese. One tank was damaged by a mine and a British engineer officer was killed.

On 18 February 1952, Operation Pole Cat, another sweep of the division area to round up guerrillas and suspected persons, took place and a few civilians were apprehended.

On 17 June 1952 the 5th Dragoon Guards carried out Operation Jehu, the purpose of which was to capture an objective some 1,500 meters in front of the forward positions. The force employed was the equivalent of about one squadron and the advance began at first light. Apart from shelling, very little opposition was met, but the going proved very bad and several tanks were bogged down. The leading tanks got to within about 600 meters
of the objective, when they were all ordered to withdraw.

During the period of 21 to 24 June 1952, in accordance with direct orders from higher authority, four raids including the following were carried out with the object of capturing prisoners.

On the night of 22-23 June 1952, following an air strike the raid by a company from the 1st Battalion, the Welch Regiment (29th British Brigade), took place against an enemy in the vicinity of Hill 277 (220 on the new map) about two kilometers west of Hill 355 (Kowang-san). The troops reached the objective without serious opposition, but were then subjected to heavy defensive fire and forced back with casualties of three killed and 19 wounded.

During the night of 2-3 August 1952 1st Battalion, the Norfolk Regiment (29th Brigade) fought a successful action. The enemy were tricked into moving on to a small feature, where they were heavily shelled and then rushed by two platoons of the Norfolks who had been lying up about 400 meters to the east. A third platoon had a sharp engagement elsewhere. Six wounded prisoners were captured, but they all died later, and in addition 14 enemy dead were counted.

On the night of 13-14 October the 1st Battalion, the King's Liverpool Regiment (29th British Brigade) was ordered to send one company across the valley of the Sami-chon against a small feature known as Hill 75. But the troops came under artillery and mortar fire and had three men wounded when they withdrew.

The Headquarters, 1st Commonwealth Division made public the fact that the Division had captured 12 prisoners of war from 1 July to 31 October 1952 and that not a single unwounded prisoner had been captured during the three months since October 1952.

The price of these activities was heavy one. As an example the following casualties suffered by the British forces from 1 June to 12 November 1952 are given: Officers, 13 killed, 46 wounded and three missing. Other ranks, 178 killed, 758 wounded and 36 missing.

A high proportion of these casualties occurred on patrols. In the half-dozen raids, on a company scale, in a month since the middle of June 1952, more than 120 casualties had been suffered by the Commonwealth troops, mostly among Canadian and Australian units. However by dominating No Man's Land the Commonwealth troops avoided being surprised with much effectiveness and in the long run this policy undoubtedly saved lives.

As a general rule in describing patrol activities, only those patrols which made actual contact with the enemy have been mentioned. By the fortunes of war some units made contact more frequently than other. Therefore, it would be quite wrong to deduce that those units who were not engaged and who are not mentioned were less active than other.
Army Troops

In January 1953, Major General M. M. A-R-West, the 1st Commonwealth Division Commander had issued a directive emphasizing more effective conduct of routine patrolling, which was carried out by all subordinate units, and ordered that no patrol should ever be sent out without proper planning and briefing, and with a definite object in view.

Operations of this sort were costing too much, even when the importance of obtaining prisoners for identification purpose was taken into account. Shortly after the armistice, when the Division Commander issued a directive he still laid emphasis on the importance of patrolling.

On 24 January 1953, a party of two officers and 15 other ranks of the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, after very careful planning and rehearsal, carried out a raid against an enemy-held feature. The approach under cover of artillery, mortar and tank fire, and with a deception plan, took the enemy by surprise. Several enemy were killed and one body brought back for identification purposes. An enemy tunnel was also blown up. This was a very successful enterprise and the patrol did not have any casualties.

On the night of 4-5 May 1953, on the right sector of the divisional line, the 1st Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry (28th Brigade) engaged an enemy patrol in front of Hill 355. The troops had seven men wounded but killed at least 12 of the enemy.

Another specific mission given to the British troops in the war was, on 25 May 1952, to send a company for security duty at the prisoners camp on the island of Koje-do off the south coast about 40 kilometers south-west of Pusan port. B Company from the 1st Battalion, the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, 28th Brigade, was designated to be dispatched to the island for a period of one and a half months.

After twelve hours movement the troops reached their destination by means of trucks, planes and LST, and as a reinforcement of the security force accomplished the mission successfully.

Epilogue

For the period of two years and eleven months during which the British Army units participated in the Korean War from 28 August 1950, their first arrival at Pusan, until the truce was signed on 27 July 1953, they had fought various battles, starting from the Naktong River front, advanced north with the other UN troops up to Pakchon-Chongju-Taechon areas through Songju, Kaesong, Sariwon and Sinanju-Chongchon River on 1 November 1950, and then had carried out the other major battles in defense at the
Imjin River in April 1951 and in hill battles in the vicinity of Kowang-san (Hill 355) and the Hook positions the north of Imjin River. Of these the fiercest fighting in which the British Army units engaged during their participation in the war was the battle of Imjin River at Choksong on 22-25 April 1951, where the Gloucestershire Battalion and remainder of the 29th British Brigade were acting an important part for the UN ground forces, made a last stand and consequently frustrated the Chinese Spring Offensive to break through the UN forces front.

During the war the British army troops not only made a distinct contribution to UN efforts but they were always proud of their traditions. The types of infantry weapons the British Battalions used primarily were: caliber 303 Rifles, No. 4 or Snipers rifles with telescopic sights and US carbines fitted with infra-red night firing sights; grenades No. 35 or No. 80 (phosphorus); Each rifleman had about 18 grenades built into the walls of his slit trench; 3-inch mortars could fire US 81-mm shell and 4.2-inch mortars mainly used for parachute flares; light and heavy machine guns, flame throwers and rocket launchers. Supporting weapons were the Gun 25-pounder, which was the normal British field gun, the US 155-mm gun and the 8-inch howitzer. British Sten machine guns and Australian Owen guns when available were also commonly used on patrol.

Below are some of the factors which had a considerable bearing on the morale and efficiency of British troops throughout the period of the Korean War.

Training: Most British Battalions which participated in the Korean War were those who, before coming to Korea, had ample opportunities in Hong Kong to train on ground very similar to that of Korea. Each battalion was a team mentally and physically fit for war, by the time it was committed into active operations.

Espirit-de-corps: The morale of the troops was constantly high throughout the war. The intense but friendly rivalry that existed between units and formations in the 1st Commonwealth Division produced a remarkable esprit-de-corps and standard of efficiency.

Cooperation: The fact that the units operated in Brigade group for the whole period did much to stimulate the high degree of cooperation with the supporting units.

Administration, throughout the war, was always predominant and in a climate which varied between sub-zero and sub-tropical, produced many problem areas. The British troops showed remarkable initiative and flexibility in tackling these problems and it is a great tribute to their efficiency that they never had to adjust their operational plans for administrative reasons and always had their requirements promptly met.
CHAPTER III NAVAL OPERATIONS

Section 1. Arduous Month of July 1950

Quick Deployment

On 29 June 1950, following the vote of the Security Council for military assistance to the Republic of Korea, the British Admiralty placed Royal naval units in Japanese waters at the disposition of the Commander, US Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE).

With so many tasks to perform and so few ships with which to accomplish them, the receipt of the instant offer of the British Navy units, commanded by Rear Admiral William G. Andrewes, Flag Officer Second in Command, Far Eastern Station, was most heartening and helpful to the ComNavFE, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN; on the next day a similar action was taken by the Australian government; in Canada three destroyers were ordered to prepare to sail; from New Zealand came promise of the early dispatch of two frigates.

At this time there were 22 ships of the British Navy in Far Eastern waters, several of them cruising in Japanese waters. Deployment had to be quick and, by reducing other requirements to a minimum, it was possible to put a high percentage of the fleet into action by 30 June. Five days after the war began, the following British ships had already started operating with United States Navy ships in Korean waters:

- **HMS Triumph** (Captain A.D. Torlesse), a 13,000-ton light carrier, completed in 1946 and operating about 40 aircraft;
- **HMS Belfast** (Captain Aubrey St. Clair-Ford), 6-inch gun cruiser, heavily armored and the largest cruiser in the British Navy;
- **HMS Jamaica** (Captain J.S.C. Salter), 6-inch gun cruiser;
- **HMS Cossack** (Captain R.T. White), destroyer;
- **HMS Consort** (Commander J. R. Carr), destroyer;
- **HMS Black Swan** (Captain A.D.H. Jay), frigate;
- **HMS Alacrity** (Commander H. S. Barber), frigate;
- **HMS Hart** (Commander N.H.H. Mulleneux), frigate; and several auxiliaries.

The British naval forces on the spot at that time were numerically about as strong as those of the United States Navy in Japanese waters.
The First Engagement with North Korean Navy

On the early evening of 29 June, Admiral Andrewes, was requested by ComNavFE to send HMS Jamaica and the frigates to join the Support Group then commanded by Rear Admiral Higgins, USN, and proceed with his flagship HMS Belfast, the carrier HMS Triumph and the two destroyers to Okinawa and report to the Commander of the Seventh Fleet. Thus, at an early stage of the British Navy's participation in the war, the fleet was for the moment divided between the Support Group, Task Group 96.5, and the Seventh Fleet, Task Force 77, although the fleet had originally received the designation of Task Group 96.8.

Upon receipt of the ComNavFE's request Admiral Andrewes dispatched Jamaica and Black Swan up the east coast to join the Support Group in harassing the enemy's left flank. Jamaica had reported to Admiral Higgins by radio at 1940 hours, and had requested a rendezvous, and on the next day Black Swan also checked in by dispatch. But radio communications had become clogged, owing to the sudden expansion of high-precedence traffic, and communications with the British were for the moment worst of all; the instructions for a rendezvous never reached the British ships, and they had to seek out Admiral Higgins by intuitive means. Jamaica joined at 2200, and Black Swan and Alacrity arrived on the 1st July. The day was spent in patrolling the coast and reorganizing the Support Group. Alacrity was ordered into the Western Sea to relieve USS Mansfield in Area Yoke; Jamaica, Black Swan, and USS Juneau continued on east coast patrol. At 0615 on 2 July these ships discovered four torpedo boats and two motor gunboats heading north from Chumunjin, where they had escorted ten motor trawlers loaded with ammunition. As the cruisers put on speed to intercept the enemy, the torpedo boats, with more bravery than discretion, turned to attack. Fire was opened at 11,000 yards, and by the time the range had closed to 4,000 yards one torpedo boat had been sunk and one stopped, a third was heading for the beach, and the fourth was escaping seaward. The final score of the engagement was three torpedo boats and both gunboats destroyed, and two prisoners taken by Jamaica. Following this first engagement with North Korean Navy, also in effect the last, the cruisers and Black Swan bombarded shore batteries at Kangnung, and late in the day Jamaica sailed for Sasebo to refuel.
The First Enemy Air Attack on HMS Black Swan

On 3 July Black Swan on east coast patrol was subjected to the first enemy air attack of the war. At 2012 two enemy fighters, thought to have been Stormoviks, came in on Black Swan from over the land and out of the haze, inflicted minor structural damage, and escaped without being hit. Black Swan's experience remained for some time unique, and not until 23 August did another UN ship undergo attack from the air.

On 4 July, Black Swan and USS Juneau worked up and down the shore between Samchok and Chumunjin, firing on bridges and on the coastal road. On the 5th Jamaica returned from Sasebo and relieved USS Juneau. For the next few days the bombardment duty was left in the hands of the British. (See Sketch Map 10.)

Initial Air Strikes

On 1 July Triumph, Belfast, Cossack, and Consort joined the Seventh Fleet Striking Force, Task Force 77, that remained for the moment poised between Korea and Taiwan (Formosa). On the same day the Task Force, now reinforced by the British ships, sortied from Buckner Bay and headed northwest and north toward the launching area in the Western Sea, and by early morning of the 3rd the Striking Force had reached the designated point. Thus, the combined force (two carriers HMS Triumph and USS Valley Forge) was in a position to fly off strikes over the enemy territory.

Beginning at 0445 Triumph flew off 12 Fireflies and 9 Seafires, capacity-loaded with rockets, for attack upon hangers and installations at Haeju with railway traffic and bridges as secondary targets. They encountered no enemy planes and saw none on the ground, so they shot up the Communist's hangers causing explosions and fires. The flights returned at 0815 without casualty except minor flack damage. At 0600 USS Valley Forge commenced launching her strike groups. 16 Corsairs loaded with eight 5-inch rockets each, and 12 Skyraiders carrying 1,600-pound bombloads were launched by Valley Forge against the Pyongyang airfield. In the afternoon aircraft from Triumph flew a second strike, and a second attack was launched by Valley Forge against marshalling yards at Pyongyang and the bridges across the Taedong River. The carriers launched their second day strike groups on the 4th against targets selected by ComNavFE. Both at Pyongyang and at Haeju enemy opposition was negligible, and no plane suffered serious damage. In those air strikes, the British-American fleet had worked together with the greatest harmony. The two days of action by
US Navy and British Navy carrier pilots resulted in the destruction of two YAK-9s in the air, eight other enemy planes on Pyongyang airfield, 13 locomotives, three trains, two gunboats, trucks, airplane hangars, bridge approaches, and enemy troops.

Although HMS Triumph was slower than USS Valley Forge, and there were other operating difficulties, those were most successfully overcome. It was fortunate that a large proportion of British commanding officers and communication personnel had previous experience of United States procedures during World War II. Also the British-American combined exercises in March 1950 proved of value. As a result of these exercises, United States methods were adopted, and the Commander of the Seventh Fleet chose to send a signal of congratulations to Admiral Andrewes on 5 July on the excellent manner in which the British had adopted these methods.

Since the air strikes, the Triumph worked with the Valley Forge until the arrival of additional US carriers at the beginning of August enabled her to be released to join British Commonwealth forces blockading the west coast of Korea, where the aircraft were employed in seeking out and destroying enemy craft in the creeks and harbors.

As Task Force 77 retired southward after completion of the Pyongyang air strikes, Admiral Andrewes, with Belfast, Cossack, and Consort, was detached to join the Support Group. By this time, for the coastline north of 37 degrees, separate East and West Coast Support Groups had been established: in the east the job was entrusted to Task Group 96.5, while the west was assigned to the Commonwealth units of Task Group 96.8. The northern limits of the blockade were set at 41° on the east coast and at 39°30′ in the west, well south of the northern frontiers. Admiral Andrewes assumed command of the West Coast Support Group, TG 96.8, on 5 July, but the greater needs and opportunities of the east coast situation were destined to make heavy demands upon his ships.

**HMS Jamaica Suffers Casualties**

On 5 July after relieving USS Juneau, Jamaica, accompanied by Black Swan fired on the road and bridge in the 37°16′ N, where the coastal route runs close to the sea, and on the 6th shot up oil tanks, bridges, and shipping, and silenced a shore battery at Chumunjin. On the 7th the Jamaica destroyed an oil tank north of Ulchin, cruised northward firing at the cliff roads, and ended the day with an effective bombardment of Yangyang, the end of the coastal rail line from the north, where more oil tanks were destroyed. On the same day Black Swan was relieved by HMS Hart which had so far carried out her escorting duties for US ships lifting ground troops from Japan.
to Korea. 8 July saw Jamaica now joined by Hart, operating in the neighborhood of 37°. There, where the highway skirts the water’s edge, road traffic was taken under fire, enemy shore batteries were engaged, and the Jamaica received a hit from a 75-millimeter shell which killed four and injured eight. Late in the day an alarm from Pohang brought Jamaica, Hart, and the American destroyer Swenson south at speed. All these ships joined off Pohang on the evening of the 9th. On the same day Jamaica was relieved and ordered to Sasebo.

On the 17th the British returned to the business of coastal bombardment this time with the cruiser Belfast and the destroyer Cossack. They continued to bombard upon the selected targets, but the next day brought wholly unprecedented activity along the east coast in the form of an amphibious landing and a strike by the Seventh Fleet carrier force.

**Actions in Support of Naktong Perimeter**

On 18 July, as the 1st US Cavalry Division was landing at Pohang then held by ROK troops, the British ships, Belfast and Cossack, were patrolling at the 38th Parallel, while the American destroyers, Mansfield and De Haven, were working near the coastal road in the vicinity of Samchok. On the 19th and 20th, the Belfast and the American cruiser Juneau with the destroyers operated close off Yongdok, between 36°17’ and 36°30’, and although the spotting planes were grounded by the passage of typhoon “Grace”, the gunners’ efforts met with great success. The two days shooting up the valley at troop concentrations in Yongdok cost the ships some 1,300 rounds and got them a radio station, more than 400 enemy troops by actual count, and enthusiastic reports from the shore fire control personnel. On the 21st Belfast, Juneau, and the destroyers continued firing throughout the day in support of the ROK troops’ advance to Yongdok expending more than 800 rounds. In the afternoon Belfast and Mansfield retired to Sasebo, while Juneau, with the two American destroyers, remained close off Yongdok.

The East Coast Support Group Commander, Admiral Higgins, reported that Yongdok was destroyed, that large fires were started, and that smoke was still visible to the ships some 12 hours later. The admiral congratulated Captain St. Clair-Ford’s fast-firing Belfast crew, saying that her guns had spoken “with authority.” Until the 30th, the British ships continued to alternate day’s duty running north along the shoreline to bombard on the targets between Yongdok and the parallel.

Meanwhile, in the Eastern Sea, HMS Triumph, USS Valley Forge and their screening ships were in their designated positions. An dawn, 18 August, local antishubmarine and combat air patrols were launched by Triumph,
and Valley Forge sent off a target combat air patrol and a support group of attack planes to assist the Pohang Landing. No alternative targets seem to have been given to the support group; the location of the front line and the needs of the 3rd ROK Division were apparently unknown; and when the landing proved unopposed and the task force was released from its air commitments the support group jettisoned its load. On the 18th and 19th, strikes from both ships were flown against railroad facilities, industrial plants, and airfields from Pyongyang and Wonsan north through Hungnam and Hamhung. About 50 grounded aircraft were sighted, of which more than half were destroyed and the remainder damaged, while flights north along the railroad on the 19th exploded four locomotives. But the biggest explosion was at Wonsan, seaport city, where the largest refinery in Korea was hit. On the 20th, in winds of up to 40 knots, the force cruised the Eastern sea, and late in the day headed south through the Korea Strait to get clear of typhoon “Grace’s” skirts and gain an operating position off the west coast of Korea. On the 21st, Triumph was detached with Comus for a ten-day period at Sasebo, while USS Valley Forge remained alone and at dawn on the 22nd, from a location in the Western Sea north of Kunsan, launched her air group. Then Valley Forge headed to Sasebo and rearming of her began on the morning of the 24th. But the replenishment was to be cut short by the rapid deterioration of the ground situation in the west. Valley Forge broke off her rearming before completion, and Triumph, whose yard period had barely begun, rejoined the force. At midnight on the 24th Task Force 77 was again underway from Sasebo, heading north.

The carriers launched their aircraft at 0800 on the 25th from a position in the east coast and for the remainder of the day maintained planes in the air over the front line.

Operations of Triumph and Valley Forge during July, limited though they were by logistic problems and frustrated by difficulties in control, had been reasonably successful but they had not been free from cost. During the July operations, one aircraft was destroyed in a deck crash on 4 July and two F9Fs, three F4Us, and a helicopter had gone into the water. Most downed personnel, however, had been fished out of the sea by screening ships; one pilot had been recovered 80 miles from the force by Triumph’s amphibian plane. Perhaps the most remarkable loss of the period had occurred on the 28th when a Triumph fighter pilot on combat air patrol, vectored out to investigate a radar contact which appeared unfriendly, had somewhat absentmindedly closed on a B-29 only to find himself shot down west of Anmado in the Western Sea. But he too was recovered by a destroyer.

Following the operations of the 29th, Triumph and Comus were detached to Japan for further assignment to the west coast blocking force.
Reorganization and Reinforcements

On 21 July the East and West Coast Support Groups were reorganized and consolidated into Task Group 96.5, the Korea Support Group, under command of Rear Admiral Hartman, USN. This Support Group consisted of four subordinate units: two rotating East Coast Support Elements were set up, one under Admiral Hartman (who was also in command of the group), the other under Admiral Higgins; Captain Jay, US Navy was given command of the Escort Element; command of the West Coast Support Element, TE 96.53, which comprised British Commonwealth ships and the Dutch destroyer *Evertsen*, remained with Admiral Andrewes. In addition to his responsibility for the Western Sea and coastal operations, Admiral Andrewes was charged with the supervision of all non-American United Nations naval forces, for which purpose he set up an administrative headquarters in the frigate *Ladybird* at Sasebo.

The arrival of reinforcements and the reorganization of Task Group 96.5 greatly increased the strength available for operations in the Western Sea, where in the early days the British frigate *Alacrity* had patrolled alone. Now, however, the British Commander had under his control the light cruisers *Jamaica*, *Kenya*, and *Belfast*, the destroyers *Cossack*, *Cockade*, and *Charity*, the Australian *Bataan*, and the Netherlands *Evertsen*. On 30 July his command was further enlarged by the arrival of the Canadian Tribal Class destroyers, *Cayuga*, *Athabaskan*, and *Sioux*, and on 8 August the West Coast Element acquired its own air strength when *Triumph*, her yard period completed, reported in with *Conus* to Admiral Andrewes' control. The availability of *Triumph* was of particular importance in view of the hydrography of the west coast, which restricted the movement of heavy ships and so made aircraft the more useful. Destroyers and cruisers could bombard, and could check traffic passing around the headlands, but the important inshore patrol had thus far been largely left to the ROK Navy. Part of the reorganization which concerned the British Commonwealth ships was as follows:

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<th>TASK ELEMENT 96.53</th>
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<td>(RADM W.G. Andrewes)</td>
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<td>HMS Kenya (Capt. P.W. Brock) &amp; escorts</td>
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Naval Operations

It should be noted that HMS Black Swan was designated as Task Element 96.50 (Escort Element of DD's and PF's) directly under Task Group 96.5, and Task Unit 96.53.4 (HMS Ceylon and escorts) was later added to the West Korea Support Element. This command set-up, with minor changes from time to time, remained effective until 11 September 1950.

Section 2. Month of Crisis, August 1950

Bombardment and Blockade on the West Coast

The increased strength of the West Coast Support Element now permitted more ambitious efforts. On 1 August Belfast and HMAS Bataan steamed into the Haeju Man approaches to bombard the shore batteries guarding this potential source of enemy seaborne supply. By this time ComNavFE had ordered a bombardment of the Mokpo area by British war-ships, with patrol plane spot from the Naval Air Force based in Japan.

Such a bombardment is no child’s play, for it involves a 30-mile approach through a constricted and tortuous channel where the currents at ebb and flood exceed ten knots. But on 1 August a promise of big business arrived, with a report from Far East Air Force (FEAF) of large ships and many small craft in Mokpo harbor, and on the next day the destroyers Cossack and Cockade steamed in to the attack. Docks and railroad sidings were bombarded with satisfactory results, but the FEAF dispatch appears to have been in error: after an hour over the target the spotters in the VP 6 Neptune reported that one sunken steamer constituted the only shipping present.

On 5 August an international three-dimensional evolution took place. Screened by Charity and Cossack, the cruisers Belfast and Kenya steamed up the hazardous approach to Inchon, where with spot provided by a Neptune from VP 6 they bombarded oil storage, factories, warehouses, and gun positions. Fighter cover for the spotting plane was given by some of USS Sicily’s Corsairs, while others attacked transport and industrial facilities in the Inchon-Seoul region. The spotter described the results as excellent.

The British Naval force, now divided into three rotating sections of a cruiser and two or more destroyers each, was carrying out its duties of bombardment and blockade. Here on the west coast the land war had swept past and no fire support was required, but the numerous islands and the
shoal waters which fringe the coast made the interdiction of communications a sufficient task. On the 5th, on instructions from ComNavFE, the British commander established three barrier stations off the western headlands, between 38°08' and 36°45', which were kept manned as the availability of ships permitted. Inshore work steadily improved as cooperation with the reviving ROK Navy was developed, and the blockade became increasingly effective.

**Blockade Becomes Effective**

By this time enemy activities in southwest coastal waters had been on the rise: the increasing unpleasantness of highway travel had stimulated diligent efforts by the communists to improve their seaborne logistics. Much of the enemy overwater movement seemed to originate at the port of Kunsan, attacks against which had been earlier prohibited by ComNavFE with a view to the preservation of harbor facilities. But these restrictions had by now been lifted, and on 15 August the cruiser Jamaica,
returning from patrol, bombarded factories and docks with satisfactory results. On the same day a third blow was struck against enemy south coast capabilities when Yosu, previously attacked by two US ships, was bombarded so thoroughly by Mounts Bay and HMCS Cayuga that no worthwhile targets were deemed to remain. Throughout this period Triumph was operating independently sending her aircraft continuously against objectives to the southward to support ground forces on the Nakdong Perimeter. The West Coast Support Element also continued to man the coast barrier stations and to interdict enemy traffic around the headlands. Here the principal excitement was the appearance of two enemy aircraft, the first in more than a month, one of which surprised and damaged the British destroyer Comus on the 22nd and the other a ROK vessel the next day. The attack on Comus produced a call for air cover from the escort carriers, which otherwise spent most of their effort during the latter part of the month in close support of Army forces on the perimeter. Despite the difficult hydrographic conditions in the west, the blockade here, as in the east, appears to have been effective: No traffic was moving south around the headlands patrolled by British units, and on 28 August Admiral Andrewes conducted a photographic reconnaissance of the entire coastline with satisfactorily negative results.

The Arrival of Unicorn and Ceylon

on 25 August Ceylon and Unicorn sailed from Hong Kong with 1,500 troops of the 1st Battalion, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and 1st Battalion, the Middlesex Regiment, and 800 tons of stores, for Pusan. This operation was performed in a most expeditious manner, and on 29 August the ships arrived at Pusan. Disembarkation was completed and all stores unloaded by 9 a.m. on the 30th, a considerable feat in view of the few cranes available. The ships companies worked throughout the night to complete this task.

Meanwhile, the logistic support of the Fleet was being arranged. The Unicorn (Captain H.S. Hopkins) brought replenishment aircraft for the Triumph and later for Theseus. The superior accommodation in this replenishment carrier left room for many tons of bulk stores much needed by the Fleet operating over 1,000 miles from its base.

Besides the Unicorn, the British Admiralty used Ocean and Warrior, the two latter as troopers, to carry out men and material from the United Kingdom.

The Fleet train grew in size, and among the ships employed were the Fort Charlotte, Fort Rosalie, Choysang, Green Ranger, Brown Ranger, Wave Emperor, Wave Laird, Wave Prince, and Wave Sovereign.
Hospital Ship, Maine

The early part of the Korean War can not be left without mention of the British hospital ship Maine (Captain S.V. Kent). This ship is a vessel of 7,515 tons. She was at this early period the only hospital ship in Japanese waters available for the evacuation of casualties from Korea. The Maine's first trip was on 14 July 1950, and from then until 24 August she was employed on the evacuation of wounded from Korea. During this period she steamed 4,654 miles in the process of evacuating 1,316 casualties. Her hospital staff worked unceasingly, and it is of interest to note that on three of her trips the ship managed to depart from port on another trip within four hours of arrival, having evacuated 250 wounded.

HMS Maine, the first UN hospital ship to evacuate wounded from Korea.
Section 3. The Inchon Landing Operation

It should not be supposed that the naval war in Korea had settled down to a routine affair. The blockade was working smoothly, and it seemed about this time that the ships could be rested for short periods in turn. But the Inchon Landing was about to take place and all ships were required for support and escort duties. This remarkable amphibious operation, mounted in such a short space of time, will long be remembered.

Joint Task Force Seven

In early September, and in the days preceding the landing, three carrier units of Joint Task Force Seven were formed consisting of a British light carrier, American fast carriers, and also American escort carriers that would work over the west coast with their efforts gradually covering toward Inchon. The total strength of Joint Task Force Seven amounted to some 230 ships of all shapes and sizes, from APDs of 2,100 tons full load displacement to transports of ten times that size. Except for a few gunnery ships held back to support the flanks of the Naktong perimeter, it included all combatant units available in the Far East. Fifty-two ships were assigned to the Fast Carrier, Patrol and Reconnaissance, and Logistic Task Forces; the remainder went to make up the Attack Force, Task Force 90. Of these, more than 120 were required to lift the X US Corps, while the rest were involved in gunfire and air support, screening, minesweeping, and miscellaneous duties.

The tasks assigned to Admiral Andrewes’ Blockade and Covering Force, TF 91, were to conduct special reconnaissance missions and provide cover for units of Attack Force en route to the objective area. The TF 91 was also assigned specific interdiction missions and was to maintain a naval blockade of the west coast of Korea.

In order to accomplish these tasks, the British cruisers Jamaica, Ceylon, and Kenya, with the Triumph providing air spotting, formed part of the bombarding force. The destroyers and frigates formed escorts and carried out close and outer screen duties at the port of Inchon. Most of the ships were at sea by 11 September. The ships employed for the duties of escorting and screening were: eight destroyers (British, Cockade and Charity. Canada, Cayuga, Sioux, and Athabaskan. Australia, Warramunga and Batuan. Netherlands, Eversten) and four frigates (British Mounts Bay and Whitesand Bay. New Zealand Tutira and Pukaki). These forces remained at sea until 14 October, operating in and around the approaches to Inchon.
Diversionary Operations

The Inchon Landing was preceded by a two-day bombardment effort to neutralize Wolmi-do. Even before this action there were some diversionary operations carried out to delude the Communists.

On 7 September HMS Triumph departed to the east coast for two days of operations off Wonsan area. Triumph's aircraft concentrated on railroad bridges, rolling stock and troop concentrations on the 8th off Wonsan and on the 9th off Ulchin and Samchok. A diversionary landing at Kunsan was also carried out on the 7th by the British frigate Whitesand Bay in which an British-American raid force embarked.

Bombardments in Support of Assault Force

Prior to the pre-bombardment, the neutralization of Wolmi-do was commenced on 10 September by US Marine aircraft. The Marine aircraft of VMF-212 and 323 dropped 95 tanks of napalm in a systematic pattern all over Wolmi, and for the next two days, a pattern of air strikes to soften the island's defenses was delivered.

At 0700 on 13 September six US destroyers started up the channel in column with Mansfield in the lead. Behind the destroyers came the cruisers: HMS Jamaica and Kenya, and two US cruisers Rochester and Henderson. Two Neptunes joined the British bombardment force outside the channel and covered their entrance into the harbor. At 1010 the Support Group entered the approaches to Inchon's outer harbor.

Shortly before 1300 hours the destroyers commenced deliberate fire on the Wolmi-do's batteries and on the Inchon waterfront. Some minutes of undisturbed bombardment followed, and then the enemy batteries opened up. Communist fire was concentrated on the three ships nearest the island. The three ships suffered total casualties of one killed and five wounded. For nearly an hour the engagement continued until at 1347 hours, after the expenditure of about a thousand 5-inch shells, the destroyers weighed and proceeded down channel. Five minutes later the British-American cruisers opened from the lower harbor against the Wolmi batteries, and with one intermission for an air strike continued shooting until 1640, when the task group retired seaward. This bombardment had been a destructive one.

On the 14th again with two US cruisers, the British cruisers continued their bombardments. Enemy fire, this time, was late, sparse, and inaccurate, and no ship was hit. Air spotting had been considerably improved, and the itemized claims of destruction and damage inflicted by the two-day effort
INCHON ASSAULT BEACHES

Mud

Yongjong-do

Chagyak to

Red Beach

Wolmi-do

Green Beach

Sowolmi-do

Tidal Basin Under Constr

Blue Beach

Mud

Shipping Channel

Soundings in Fathoms

Tidal range averages
30 feet Datum of
Soundings is 5 feet
below mean low tide

Mud bank at very low tide

Sketch Map 11

0 1 Miles
were encouraging. Wolmi-do was ready for the landing troops.

On the 15th L-Hour, set for 0630, was again preceded by 45 minutes of bombardment. Kenya fired on the Blue Beach area, while Jamaica took the region behind Blue Beach and on the right flank. When the assault force landed on the island the weight of fire was shifted inland. Kenya and Jamaica were given as their target assignments the region to the south and east of the zones assigned to their sisters. For post-landing gunfire support Jamaica's batteries were placed at the disposal of the 1st US Marine Regiment while the 5th Marine controlled USS Rochester's batteries. (See Sketch map 11.)

During the Inchon Landing Operation the only enemy air reactions had come on D plus 2 in a dawn attack by two Yaks directed against Jamaica and Rochester, anchored in their fire support positions south of Wolmi-do. One 100-pound bomb bounced off Rochester's aircraft crane and failed to explode, and seven others were misses; one man on board Jamaica was killed by strafing, and one of the Yaks was shot down by the Jamaica.

On the 20th, D plus 5, the Communists, which manned along the Naktong River line in the south, began its wholesale retreat. By the end of the month the pursued of July had become the pursuers of September as the ROK and UN ground forces commenced an all-out counteroffensive from the Naktong. On the 21st upon completion of the operation, the Joint Task Force was dissolved.

**Summary of Operations**

Here is the summary of the results of the British Commonwealth naval operations during the 14 days covering the Inchon Landing and the subsequent operations up to 30 September. During this period ships of the Commonwealth Force steamed 56,456 miles, and the aircraft of Triumph flew 112 sorties over an area of 251,000 square miles.

The guns of the force fired 2,690 six-inch shells, 1,274 smaller calibre shells, and 215,000 rounds of Oerlikon and Bofors into the enemy gun emplacements, ammunition dumps, troop concentrations, tanks, island strongpoint, and shipping; one ammunition dump was blown up and two damaged; 11 junks sunk, two damaged; two 50-ton coasters, one 100-ton coaster and one 70-ton coaster sunk; a 500-ton freighter damaged, and twelve mines destroyed. A number of enemy troops were killed and wounded; and an enemy aircraft shot down by Jamaica, the first enemy aircraft to be shot down by gunfire from any United Nations warship.
Task Force 95 Established

Despite the great naval investment in the Inchon Landing Operation some fire support remained available for the flank forces in the Naktong perimeter. On 12 September the various task groups operating under ComNavFE had been consolidated and the Korea Support Group, Task Group 96.5, was upgraded into Task Force 95. Henceforth, the Task Force 95 would carry on until the end of the fighting as the “United Nations Blockading and Escort Force.” Overall command of the Task Force 95 was assigned Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN; the West Coast Support Group, now Task Group 95.1, continued under control of Admiral Andrewes, and east coast operations under CTG 95.2. The West Coast Support Group, TG 95.1, contained three principal elements: the carrier element (TE 95.11), the surface blockade and patrol element (TE 95.12), and the west coast island defense element (TE 95.15). And ROK Navy elements on the west coast, except when special operations were involved, came under the operational command of CTG 95.1

Section 4. October - December 1950

Ceylon and Warramunga Help West Coast Islanders

As a result of the retreat of the North Korean forces following the general offensive of the ROK and UN forces in conjunction with the Inchon Landing Operation, it became evident, at least for the time being, that many of islands on the west and south-west coasts of Korea would need early liberation. During this period the British Commonwealth destroyers and frigates carried out a number of humane missions.

On a small island called Chagyak-to, which lies off the west coast near Inchon, the British cruiser Ceylon’s crews found twenty orphaned children in charge of one woman. Although the temperature was below freezing there were no fires and some of the children were naked and sick. The chaplain on the Ceylon broadcast an appeal and within an hour his cabin was piled with offerings of warm clothings. Ashore a working party cut enough firewood to last the orphanage through the winter. Meanwhile, stores of food were unloaded for the children. Sailors stripped the rags from them and redressed them in thick clothing. A similar exploit was carried out by HMAS Warramunga. On the instruction of Admiral Andrewes, the destroyer rushed two tons of rice in place of shells to feed hundreds of South Korean
islanders and several lighthouse-keepers who were marooned by the war on their islands. Although the ship was at action stations all the time, not a gun was fired.

**Carrier Theseus**

On 8 October *Theseus* arrived in Korean waters and replaced *Triumph*. The main assignment of the *Theseus* at this stage was the harassing of the enemy during their retreat north of the 38th Parallel. The enemy was adept in camouflage and it was during one sweep that her aircraft spotted heavily camouflaged junks. Photographs revealed that they were in fact minelayers. An attack soon prevented any further activities on their part.

The *Theseus* soon proved her worth, and by her achievements during the next two months earned the Boyd Trophy, a silver medal of a Swordfish aircraft. This trophy is awarded annually for the finest feat of naval aviation by an individual or unit in the British Navy. The award was made to the 17th Carrier Air Group (Lieutenant Commander M. P. Gordon Smith) operating from *Theseus*. This was the first time that the trophy had been awarded to a Carrier Group.

During December 1950 and January 1951 the 17th Carrier Air Group operated in close support of the British and other UN ground troops on the west flank. A liaison officer was landed and stationed ashore with the Fifth US Air Force. As many as 50 to 60 sorties were made a day in support of the ground forces. During a period of three weeks in December, 650 sorties were flown, and in a period of eight days in January 301 sorties were flown, and it was during the latter month that the 2,000th sortie during Korean operations was flown. During the above operations the total “bag” of destroyed targets included: 190 buildings occupied by enemy troops, 32 railway bridges, eight tunnels, 30 box cars, 21 trucks and lorries, five locomotives, 12 factories and warehouses, five power stations, 19 oil dumps and trucks, 86 junks and other shipping, and some 2,000 enemy troops killed or wounded. In addition, such targets as gun emplacements, jetties, airfields, railway sheds, etc., were attacked. Throughout these operations the *Theseus* was screened by British and Commonwealth ships.

**Mine Problems and the West Coast Support Group**

The Korean peninsula was almost ideally suited for an experiment in defensive warfare. After the UN’s entry into the Korean War, the Communists could foresee that the UN naval forces would take every advantage of their amphibious warfare specialty to move northward. The landing at Inchon
was eloquent testimony of this special skill. Moreover, the Communists recognized the vulnerability of Korea’s eastern coast to amphibious assault, and also to bombardment from the sea. The waters off the east coast were deep and the coastal plains narrow. The coastline was reasonably straight, and the 100-fathoms curve lay fairly close to shore. Off the good harbors of Wonsan and Hungnam, there was a large shelf of shallow water which made mine planting exceptionally effective.

On the opposite, Korea’s western coastline was a honeycomb of shallows, with the Korean rivers emptying into the Western Sea. Nowhere in the Western Sea was the water more than sixty fathoms deep, mean tidal range was twenty-one feet. Therefore, the mine menace on the west coast was worse than the east and the enemy could plant mines with greater ease in the west.

Enemy sea mines had been reported by the USS _Mceean_ at the entrance to the North Korean harbor of Chinnampo on 4 September, 11 days before the Incheon Landing. On 7 September, _Jamaica_ sighted and sank a floating mine 25 miles north of the Changsan-got area, off Chinnampo. Another was almost immediately seen and exploded by _Charity_. There was some doubt at first whether the mines were moored or drifting, but the British concluded that the mines were drifters, having been set loose in the hope of catching some of the blockading ships.

From the period of 4 September to 30 September, UN ships and aircraft sighted mines on 54 separate occasions, most of them in the shallow Western Sea, between Chinnampo and Incheon. Obviously such a mine situation would be a considerable threat to ships engaged in fire-support missions. To clear the Chinnampo-Incheon channels, the Chinnampo Sweep Force was formed. Among the staff officers manned for the force were two officers from the British Commonwealth units: Lieutenant Commander W. E. H. Rodwell from _Theseus_ and Lieutenant Commander G. H. Gladstone from HMAS _Warramunga_.

To the Chinnampo sweeping operation, the helicopters, flying from the _Theseus_, were a vital adjunct. _Theseus_ provided an early base for Hutron Two Det (Helicopter Utility Squadron Two Detachment). The _Theseus’_ “eggbeater” flew a daily search of the minefield; the remainder of the British carrier aircraft provided a daily combat air patrol to protect the minesweeping force from either enemy air interference or shore batteries. The damage or possible loss of minesweepers to enemy gunfire was thus forestalled. It was apparent that the enemy made every effort to mine the channels leading to major ports on the west coast, specially the southern channel for Chinnampo, but planes from the British carrier _Theseus_, by sinking what they believed to be a mine-carrying barge, had interrupted the enemy efforts. One time a
sunken enemy barge was found in the southern approaches to Chinnampo. Fifteen mines were still aboard it.

By November’s end, 200 miles of channel had been swept at Chinnampo, and 80 mines had been destroyed.

**Chinnampo Evacuation**

The period following the successful assault of Inchon and the landing at Wonsan found the blockade and bombardment forces of Task Force 95 moving farther and farther northward. The enemy coasts were covered as closely as possible while observing the “Stay outside the 100-fathom curve” order. Having denied the Communists the freedom of advancing southward by sea, the task was now turned to prevent them from retreating northward by sea.

Aboard the ships off the Korean coasts, few people knew that original war was ending and that a new war was beginning -- a war with Communist China.

On the peninsula in early November, however, it was apparent that the Chinese Communists had invaded. On 25 November the Communists commenced a full-scale attack which succeeded in breaking through the west-center front, and hordes of the Red Chinese poured through the gap. Disaster seemed probable and imminent. All available UN ships in the Far East and several ships already enroute back to their home bases were hurriedly recalled and rushed to Korea to stand by to support the evacuation of the UN forces, if need be.

An urgent call to hurry back went to the British at Hong Kong, and on 1 December Admiral Andrewes sailed for Sasebo in Theseus, to be shortly followed by Kenya. On 5 December the Chinnampo evacuation, one of the most hazardous naval operations, was carried out by British Commonwealth destroyers, three Canadian and two Australian, and one American when, in darkness and through the swept channel of a minefield, they navigated 30 miles of the shallow water of the Taedong gang estuary to cover the withdrawal of civilians, non-essential military personnel and wounded from the Pyongyang area. The force, led by HMCS Cayuga (Captain J. V. Brock) with two HMCS’s Athabaskan and Sioux, two HMAS’s Warramunga and Bataan, and one USS Forest Royal, ploughed through heavy seas and thick snowstorms to the mouth of the Taedong-gang, which serves the principal west coast port of Chinnampo. Their orders were to provide necessary gunfire support and anti-aircraft fire during the loading of casualties and port personnel in the dock area, which was some 30 miles up the Taedong-gang estuary.
During this operation, Sea Furies and Fireflies from *Theseus* (Captain A.S. Bolt) protected the surface flotilla. These aircraft of the 17th Carrier Air Group flew 650 sorties in support of the Chinnampo evacuation, over a three-week period. The US transports were loaded with wounded, Republic of Korea civilian refugees, and nearly 2,000 troops. Altogether about 7,000 persons were evacuated from Chinnampo without interruption from the Communists. The Chinnampo evacuation was a complete success, and the West Coast Group Commander sent his warm congratulations “to all hands for a job well done.”

On 27 December after the evacuation *Theseus* was relieved by two US carriers *Sicily* and *Badoeng Strait* in the Western Sea. On the 29th USS *Rochester* arrived at Inchon to join HMS *Ceylon* and the Australian destroyers *Warramunga* and *Bataan* in support of ground forces on the west flank. *Ceylon* and *Kenya*, now joined by USS *Rochester*, supported the withdrawal of the UN ground forces across the Han River and the evacuation of Inchon port, and bombarded Kimpo airfield. On 3 January *USS Bataan* arrived to join the west group in response to the ground forces request for more support in the west.

Section 5. January - March 1951

Change of Command

The redeployment of UN forces from North Korea was followed by a period of buildup of personnel, supplies, and equipment in order to resume the offensive.

On 1 December 1950, Rear Admiral Andrewes was knighted and promoted to Vice Admiral, thereby becoming senior to his immediate superior in the UN organization. American Rear Admiral A.E. Smith, the CTF 95, Admiral Andrewes and his British superior, the Commander in chief Far East Station, were both content with this situation, and for six weeks there was no change. On 19 February 1951, however, Admiral Andrewes was appointed to command the United Nations Blockade and Escort Force, known as Task Force 95.

The command organization outlined above, however, did not last long, since, as had been planned, Admiral Andrewes was relieved on 10 April 1951 by Rear Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, and Admiral Smith returned to his post as Commander of TF 95. At this time, also, the operational command of Task Force 95 was shifted from ComNavEF to the Seventh
Fleet.

The division of Korea into two blockade forces under CTF 95 was continued. As for the west coast blockade, Task Group 95.1, the British and American carrier element (95.11) with their aircraft, took station near the 39th parallel in order to render close support ashore to the western end of the battleline, as well as to help maintain the blockade. The surface blockade and patrol element (TE 95.12) maintained a one-ship anti-junk patrol off Chinnampo, and close inshore patrols near the coast from the northern limit of the blockade to the south.

By late January the immediate crisis was over, but as the UN armies started north again it was still a new war.

On 25 January the northward movement of the ROK and UN ground forces began against only slight resistance. Ten days later the Chinese Communists started to retreat beyond the 38th Parallel.

UN Forces Reoccupy Inchon

On 7 January 1951, Theseus again assumed the load of the Western Sea. The American escort carriers Badoeng Strait and Sicily departed the Western Sea following the evacuation of Inchon. The US carrier Bataan which had operated with the escort carriers during the period of the Inchon evacuation, was assigned to Task Group 95.1, West Coast Group, and began to alternate ten-day period of duty with Theseus as the principal unit of Task Element 95.11.

On 25 January the American carrier Saint Paul arrived at Inchon to assist an operation, known as “Thunderbolt”, and the west Coast Group was further strengthened by her appearance.

On this day, at Inchon the USS Saint Paul was greeted by some short salvos from Wolmi-do, but with assistance of an airstrike from Theseus, and gunfire from Ceylon and destroyers, the Wolmi batteries were neutralized and the Kimpo area subsequently kept under intermittent bombardment. On 6 February the West Coast Commander sailed from Sasebo in Belfast to carry out a pretended landing on Inchon. But this deceptive operation was cancelled as a result of successes ashore: enemy resistance in the west, which had stiffened at the start of the month, gave way suddenly on the 9th, and the Chinese Communists retired from the area; on the afternoon of the 10th Inchon was again occupied by a party of the ROK Marines from Tokchok island, and by nightfall American troops had reached the banks of the Han River.

In connection with the restoration of Inchon, the major port of the west coast, it is of interest to note that the UN troops' advance of 1950 had brought
Naval Operations

possession of holdings off Inchon and Haeju, of Cho-do and Sok-to off the Taedong estuary, and of islands in the Yalu Gulf. Most of these islands were controlled by guerrilla groups, and employed as bases for intelligence activites and for raids behind enemy lines. But responsibility for three of them -- Ochong-do off Kunsan, Tokchok-to in the Inchon approach, and Taechong-do off the Ongjin peninsula -- had been assigned to the West Coast Support Group, and these islands had been given ROK Navy garrisons in January. Inshore patrol of the shallow coastal waters was provided by four groups of Korean naval ships, supported as necessary by the West Coast Support Group.

The West Coast Duties Become Routine

Much of the time spent on operations by the British Commonwealth naval forces in the west coast during the early months in 1951 was devoted to carrier screening. The British carrier _Theseus_ alternated with US carrier _Bataan_ to provide the air power for Task Group 95.1. The carrier-based aircraft flew direct support and armed-reconnaissance missions for the ground force, provided spotters for naval bombardments, conducted anti-shipping patrols and, when required, provided air cover for UN ships.

The usual routine for the carrier group was to operate in the vicinity of the Clifford Islands (operation area between 34° 40' N and 36° 38' N) during day-light. The first aircraft would take off at dawn, beginning a hectic day during which the 34 planes in _Theseus_ would fly an average of 55 sorties. At dusk when the last plane landed on, the ship would steam south or south west out into the Western Sea, reversing course during the night in order to make a landfall on the Cliffsords at dawn.

For the carrier herself, the work was strenuous but rewarding; for the other screening ships, it was strenuous and dull. They were there chiefly to guard the carrier against air and submarine attacks, but enemy aircraft and submarines never appeared, nor was there much likelihood that they ever would appear. But each ship had her specific duty to perform, and then there was always the problem of keeping the very precise station required of a screening ship to avoid collisions with her neighbors.

One of the minor annoyances for the commander of the screen was the fuelling problem. Fuelling at sea is not a particularly inspiring operation, but the Canadian destroyers, for instance, made a game of it. The Canadian destroyer _Athabaskan_ and the British Fleet Auxiliary _Wave Knight_ claim a world record for fuelling at sea. Their time from firing a line across to pumping oil was 1 min. 45 secs. A few weeks earlier another Canadian destroyer _Nootka_ broke the then existing record of 2 mins. 10 secs., by four seconds. The dash and enthusiasm of _Athabaskan_ were reported as out-
standing in every way.

Wonsan Siege Begins

The Wonsan siege was originally conceived and planned by the Commander of TF-95. Admiral Smith had had his eyes on the strategic islands north of the 38th Parallel, and he had estimated that the occupation of the islands would be "of great value", both for control of enemy junk traffic and minelaying, and to provide potentially valuable staging areas.

On 12 February the minesweepers first went in to check the Wonsan channel, and four days later, on the 16th, two US destroyers entered to bombard the port. On the 18th, in a return engagement, one of the destroyers was hit by artillery fire, apparently originating from the island of Sin-do, two miles off the tip of Kalma Pando. This enemy impudence brought a bombardment by Belfast on the 19th. Henceforth, the Belfast, with HMAS Warramunga, carried out some impressive exhibitions of rapid inshore bombardment, the most remarkable being at Wonsan after negotiating a 23-mile swept channel through minefields. Belfast anchored off an enemy-held island, whose batteries had caused trouble to the destroyers the previous day, and destroyed them with her 4-in. guns after they had been quietened by an effective air strike.

These efforts, combined with continuous bombardment by UN ships for 16 days in succession, forced the enemy to abandon the coastal road for less serviceable roads inland, where troops and supplies were under constant air attack. The Wonsan Siege begun on 16 February 1951 lasted until the end of the war, 27 July 1953. On the day the operation began, there was no plan to lay an indefinite or constant siege to Wonsan. The Wonsan Siege had demoralizing effect upon the Communists, and was of great psychological value to the UN forces.

West Coast Operations

March opened with bombardment by the British cruisers and destroyers on the west coast. In response to the request to assist the UN ground forces' planned advance, the British naval forces now planned a deliberate feint operation, feeling that the speed of earlier efforts had not given the sluggish enemy sufficient time to react. Beginning on 27 February the air activities of Theseus and USS Balaan were increased and localized: for two days the American DMS Carmick and the British frigate Alacrity, and two Korean ships steamed northward along the coast and into the mush ice of the Taedong estuary; there followed a cruiser and destroyer bombardment with aircraft
from the carriers spotting. On 3 March the amphibious element of three APAs and two AKAs appeared, escorted by two destroyers, to steam northward along the shore. Half way to Cho-do the transports reversed course and retired to Inchon, when they made an ostentatious departure on the 5th to continue to mystify the enemy.

In one bombardment *Belfast* hit her target with the first salvo and dropped three succeeding salvos on the same spot. The *Belfast* steamed through miles of pack ice during these operations and found ice floes 20 feet across and several feet thick. The ice pack was formed by river ice which at that time of year breaks up and drifts down the coast, constituting a potential danger to small shipping. The weather was intensely cold with 23 degrees of frost. While in the northwest *Belfast, Kenya*, and associated light units shot up enemy positions at the mouth of the Taedong estuary, east coast bombardment efforts by ships of TG 95.2 were centered at Wonsan and Songjin with Task Force 77 working over east coast transportation targets.

The patrol and blockade by Task Group 95.1 of Korea's west coast differed from that of the east coast in many respects, principally due to dissimilar hydrographic and geographic conditions. The west coast was a honeycomb of islands; it was an area of high tides, of mud banks, shallow, and difficult channels. Many of the Korean rivers emptied into the Western Sea. Nowhere was the water more than 60 fathoms in depth. And within 10 miles of the shore, the depth was less than 20 fathoms. As a consequence, large vessels could not operate as close inshore on the west coast as was often possible on the east coast. The bombardment effort, therefore, was not as great.

In further contrast to the east coast, the more numerous islands made the guerrilla problem on the west coast much more difficult. In the last 18 months of the war, there was a contest with the enemy for control of key islands north of the 38th Parallel. On some of these captured islands, UN forces had placed radar stations for the control and direction of the UN airforces' aircraft. Some west coast islands served as search and rescue stations for parachuting airmen whose aircraft had suffered damage. Other west coast islands served well as intelligence outposts. Supporting the west coast islands, therefore, was a much greater part of the over-all task than on the east coast.

The mine menace on the west coast was also different—"better" in the sense that the range of the tides often exposed mines at low water; "worse" in the sense that the enemy could plant mines with greater ease.

Finally, the blockade problem on the west coast was more difficult because of the navigation hazards posed by fast currents, mudbanks, and
high tides. Numerous rocks and shallows made a close approach to the mainland hazardous and in many places impossible.

Throughout the blockade of the Korean coasts, the ships of the UN Navy acquitted themself ably and with distinction, and learned many valuable lessons and techniques through their combined efforts that would prove of great value in subsequent years.

Admiral Sir Roderick McGregor, the First Sea Lord, following an inspection trip to Korea, had these words of praise for the UN Navy: “I have been much impressed by the way in which the navies of so many nations are co-operating in the Korean War. In spite of differences in language and customs, warships of different navies are operating as one against the common enemy.”

Section 6. April - June 1951

Theseus Leaves the Korean Theater

Early in April Theseus and USS Bataan, left their former haunts in the Western Sea to join in the attacks on the east-coast communications system, in the Wonsan area, leaving Kenya as head of the British Commonwealth forces in the Western Sea, where conditions on the blockade patrol were much the same as they had been in the months between the Inchon Landing and the Chinese invasion.

These two carriers, upon arrival off Wonsan, flew strikes against the enemy in and around Wonsan for three days with good results. Task Element 95.11 on this occasion was a truly United Nations organization, for screening the British and American carriers were two US, one British, one Australian and two Canadian destroyers. There were no interservice difficulties that affected the efficiency of the operations. Communications were good, maneuvering was rapid and correct. Refuelling and storing was carried out from both British and US supply ships.

On 19 April the Theseus left for home having been relieved by the carrier HMS Glory. Glory together with USS Bataan, who was shifted to the Western Sea from the east coast as result of emeny pressure, began operating in the west on the 3rd May. The Theseus spent a total of 86 days operating in the Korean War since her first arrival on 8 October 1950. In 4,446 sorties her reconnaissance planes had covered an area of more than 23,000,000 square miles, an achievement to be proud of under the bad weather conditions and intense cold experienced during the winter months. She claimed to have
destroyed 93 junks, 152 railway trucks, 17 warehouses, 33 gun positions, 16
road bridges, three railway stations, 19 factories, and five power stations, as
well as railway engines, tanks, command posts, railway sheds, jetties, cars,
buses, road blocks, barrack buildings and steam rollers.

Theseus carried her own helicopter before she left, lent and manned by
the Americans. During the operations of 13 and 14 April, two rescues of pilots
from Theseus, who had been shot down behind the enemy lines, were made
by a helicopter from USS Manchester, while she was bombarding Wonsan
from close inshore, and a plaque was presented to the Manchester commem-
orating these two very gallant rescues in face of intense enemy flak.

In the face of increased flak, the losses of aircraft from Theseus during
the final stage of her tour of duty were high but, thanks to helicopter rescues,
casualties were fortunately confined to one person killed and one wounded.
Of the five British aircrew shot down in or off enemy territory during this
period, four were recovered by helicopter.

Cockade's Rescue Operation

It is realized that much of the Navy's part in the Korean War has
been unspectacular. In many cases, for the crews of many of small British
ships engaged on the west coast, the war has mostly been arduous and in-
tensely boring. The brief stand off in Japan did little to relieve the monotony.
However, the exception proves the rule and the following rescue work lends
colour to what the British ships had been doing.

On 7 April 1951 Cockade was at sea off the west coast fully expecting
to spend another unexciting day on a routine job, when, at 1015, a junk was
sighted to the eastward among the shallows. Upon closing the junk with due
caution, it was seen that the crew were waving white flags and gesticulating.
They then held up a black cloth inscribed in white: "Have American on
board." Once alongside the junk the Cockade was able to haul on board an
unkempt and bearded figure in a tattered uniform bearing the mud-covered
flash of the USAF. As this officer unfolded his story it was clear that
the nondescript occupants of the junk were responsible for having saved his
life, at no small danger to themselves. The word went round the ship's
company and showers of goods were thrown into the junk.

The American lieutenant's first thoughts were for the occupants of the
junk. It was obvious that they could not return to their homes, so they were
taken on board the Cockade. As the lieutenant went below a pall of smoke
was observed, rising above the horizon to the east. At the same time a
signal was received reporting an aircraft ditched about 25 miles due east of
the ship. The occupants of the junk were disembarking their pathetic belong-
ings on to the destroyer's upper deck and the First Lieutenant was pre-
paring to take their vessel in tow. All this had to be stopped and the junk
was hurriedly anchored with the Cockade's kedge. The owners saw with
alarm their only means of livelihood being apparently cast adrift and needed
considerable calming down.

Within a few minutes, the ship was proceeding at 25 knots toward the
aircraft casualty and the Commanding Officer viewed the forthcoming pas-
sage of the shoals with some misgivings. The visibility was moderate and
the only land in sight was Napu Somu Island to the north, looming in the
haze. As the ship approached the fourth shoal at 1220, it was realized that
she would have to cross a charted depth of three and three quarters fathoms.
The necessity for despatch had to be weighed against safety; the former
won. As the ship crossed the shallows, the echosounder gave a sudden, but
expected, decrease. An anxious moment occurred when it registered three
and a half fathoms. The ship was drawing over 16 feet and the "water-drag"
underneath pulled up the ship with alarming suddenness. She reduced by at
least 10 knots -- one observer on board from another ship estimated the
reduction to be 15 knots. However, she rapidly drew into deeper water.

By 1235 it became obvious that it would not be possible to close the actual
position of the men in the water. Several fighters and two bombers re-
ported the position of the crashed aircraft to be four miles farther south-east
than that originally received and that an amphibian was on its way. The
Cockade proceeded as far as was prudent on a falling tide and anchored. The
motor-boat was already lowered to the waterline and contained everything
strictly necessary for the occasion, in readiness for searching the area under
direction from the ship; but it never departed. An amphibian had arrived
on the spot, dropped a lifeboat, and then alighted after having ascertained
the wind force and direction from the Cockade. After much talk between the
various aircraft and the ship, it was decided by 1403 that there was only one
survivor, and he was taken on board the amphibian between the shoals and
thence back to her original position, where the junk was taken in tow at
1640.

Preparedness Against Enemy Air Attack

The Red Chinese offensive broke on the evening of 22 April 1951 with
a thrust down the center by the 20th CCF Army. Four days went by before
the assault was checked, and in this interval, with the enemy out in the
open and moving more than a thousand close support sorties by carrier-
based aircraft and US Fifth Air Force inflicted very heavy casualties on the
enemy. These circumstances called for the immediate shift of fast carrier
operations from interdiction to close support, and for the greatest possible effort.

With the beginning of the Chinese Communist offensive, it was expected that the enemy's long-expected air offensive would also begin. It was, therefore, desirable to reduce any unnecessary hostages to fortune, in the form of valuable targets such as cruisers and replenishment ships in Wonsan. The initial result was a resurgence of activity by the shore batteries on Kalma Pando at Wonsan, which had the effect of driving the destroyers farther out. The destroyer *Comus* arriving for a spell of duty in Wonsan on 23 April, was greeted by the initiation of this activity and was selected as the primary target shortly after arrival. The first two salvos were short, but the *Comus* slipped her cable in accordance with policy and steamed farther out. It was as well that she did so as the third salvo fell just about in the position she had recently occupied. While retiring under the smoke with the target obscured from the director, a spirited engagement was continued by X and Y guns in quarters firing, not without some success, as was subsequently established. For some days the firing line remained well back, but still capable of reaching the more important targets ashore with the 4.5 and 5-inch guns. With the failure of the expected air attack to eventuate, the firing line crept back to its original position.

A general tightening up of vigilance and state of preparedness for enemy air attack and other possible forms of attack was instituted with this new phase of the war. For many months UN ships had seen little of the enemy air effort and, apart from the two appearances by two lots of very inept and obviously frightened Yaks during the operations by *Kenya* and other ships in the Sinmi-do (held by ROK Navy) area between 12 and 17 April, the only other evidence of enemy-air activity was at the entrance to the Taedong-gang estuary on 22 April, when four Yaks tried to jump two US Corsairs from USS *Bataan*, who were covering the rescue from the sea of a pilot whose engine had failed. Three of the four Yaks were shot down out of hand. The fourth was damaged and believed to have ditched later. No damage was done to the Corsairs and the rescue of the downed pilot was safely effected.

On 24 April Rear Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, now commanding the West Coast Support Group, TG 95.1, took passage to the operational area in *Amethyst* to join *Belfast* at Inchon. At Inchon Admiral Scott-Moncrieff witnessed the departure of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders relieved by the King's Own Scottish Borderers.

On 28 April *Kenya* relieved *Belfast* in charge of the blockade patrol and was in turn relieved by *Ceylon* on 8 May in company with *Concord* and two other UN ships. On 20 May *Black Swan* was relieved of her east coast
duty in charge of the Songjin siege. Black Swan had operated in Songjin area since 10 May.

**Demonstration Landings Become Popular and Effective**

By the end of April the Chinese offensive had been contained. However the offensive had brought about a sudden spate of simulated pre-landing operations by units of Task Force 95.

On 20 May 1951 British Marines from HM ships Ceylon and Kenya made brief demonstration landings on the west coast. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff planned the landings with some finesse feeling, as had his predecessor, that previous demonstrations had been too short and too transparent to produce the maximum reaction. Rumors of an impending landing were spread by agents of Leopard Force, a west coast guerrilla organization, so successfully, that aircraft from Glory, flying cover for the minesweepers, reported a large sign near the landing area which read “Welcome, UN Army.” By 20 May the preliminaries had been completed and Ceylon and Kenya and USS Toledo were on hand to provide fire support. In the afternoon a dozen LCVPs, three loaded with British Marines and the others empty, were put up on the beach opposite Cho-do, and the Marines made a brief unopposed excursion inland prior to reembarking.

This diversion is believed to have caused the enemy considerable anxiety and certainly appear to have brought reinforcements to the area. With its satisfactory completion and the stemming of the main offensive, the west coast commander returned to Japan in Ceylon, while the normal blockade patrols and air support were resumed under the direction of Kenya.

**Kenya’s Presence in the Inchon Area**

Kenya’s presence in Inchon was very welcome in that the 29th British Brigade was defending the Kimpo Peninsula, and thus for the first time it was possible for the British troops to see something of the British Navy, of whose activities they normally hear nothing. Visits, in spite of the fighting, were mutually exchanged to the benefit of all, until the Kenya was released from duty in the Inchon area about 25 May, and the 29th Brigade moved up in the wake of the I US Corps advance. The presence of the British ships in the Inchon area was always heartening to the UN ground forces and necessary owing to the their anxiety that their flank might be turned from seaward or across the outer approaches of the Han River Estuary.
HMS Glory and Her Aircraft

The carrier Glory started operations on 3 May. However the months of May and June produced much fog and drizzle in the Western Sea and, indeed, throughout the Korean theater, air operations had been impossible or curtailed on several days from this cause. On the other hand, in good conditions the flying day was 14 hours long and the darkness for Communist movements correspondingly shorter. Compared with the blizzards and Arctic conditions under which Theseus operated, the Glory was more fortunate and summer weather and longer daylight hours acted progressively in her favor.

By 22 June, her aircraft had achieved a fine bag having completed a series of very successful strikes, destroying and battering the enemy’s supply trains, blowing up his ammunition dumps, and inflicting casualties among his troops. They claimed they had destroyed 17 junks and damaged 76, blown up 59 buildings containing troops and war stores and damaged 54. One ferry, three bridges and 14 store dumps were destroyed, including four buildings and a lorry which was seen to blow up on 1 June. They destroyed 109 ox carts (part of an ammunition train) and damaged 59 others, and hit railways and trains. Power supplies were cut off from eight transformer stations and various gun batteries were destroyed or damaged with nearly 300 casualties to troops. Sea Furies and Fireflies expended nearly 60,000 rounds of 40-mm. ammunition in these attacks, loosed off over 1,000 rockets, and dropped 180 bombs.

After operations on 11 June it was found that Glory’s aviation fuel had become contaminated by corrosion inside a pipe in RFA Wave Premier which had not been used recently. The Glory returned to harbor and her tanks were washed through. She was reported ready for service again within four days.

Aircraft of the 14th Carrier Air Group from Glory, on 25 June, marked the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War by attacks along almost the entire front. Fireflies attacked a railway bridge at Hwasan-ni north of Sariown, with 1,000 lb. bombs and cut the line in two places. At the same time Sea Furies gave close air support to the UN forces on the eastern sector. They attacked and destroyed gun emplacements which were harassing the UN troops.

The tendency for enemy flak to increase in both quantity and accuracy continued, with the main increase in small arms fire. More than half of Glory’s 33 aircraft were hit by flak on her last patrol. One Corsair, two Furies, and two Fireflies were lost as a result of enemy action, the crews of all but the former and the pilot of one Firefly being recovered.
Section 7. July – October 1951

On 10 July 1951 armistice discussions started in Kaesong but the United Nations naval operations on both coasts of Korea had been unaffected by the negotiations. However, the commencement of the armistice talks produced a stalemate on the ground. Thereafter, the war on the ground was to become positional, and neither side was to make more than local and limited efforts to change the situation. By mid-June the front had stabilized along the general line covering Munsan and Kosong from west to east. Under this situations the British Commonwealth’s main effort had been applied on the west coast, although the east coast had not been without a quota of British ships.

West Coast

In the latter part of June and the first half of July 1951, surface operations consisted of routine patrols and bombardments required to keep the west coast blockade complete. The following ships formed the blockading force at various times during this period:

British ships ------- Ceylon, Consort, Constance, Black Swan, Cardigan Bay, Morecambe Bay, Whitesand Bay, Mount’s Bay, and Alacrity.

Australian ship ------ Warramunga
Canadian ship ------ Nootka
New Zealand ships --- Hawea and Rotoiti

By 15 July, this force had been left very short of ships for various reasons, but they had the welcome support of the Cruiser Kenya.

(1) Recovery of a Russian MIG

The second half of July produced an interesting task for the west coast force. This was the recovery of a downed Russian MIG. This affair was of the greatest importance for technical intelligence. On 9 July, word was received from the Joint Operations Center that a MIG was down in shoal water off the mouth of the Chongchon River. On the 11th, the wreckage was sighted and not without difficulty, the position fixed a couple of miles
offshore and 33 miles north of the Taedong estuary by Sea Furies of No. 804 Squadron from Glory. The position of the crashed aircraft was well within range of an enemy air base. The surrounding area consisted largely of shoals and mudbanks which, with the treacherous tides, made navigation hazardous, the approach to the crashed aircraft lying up a 40-mile channel bounded by sandbars. It was evident that the recovery must be made by small craft, covered from the nearest deep water channel by a frigate. The commanding officer of Ceylon worked out a plan. Cardigan Bay was allotted this task and cover from seaward was supplied by aircraft from Glory and by Kenya. For the actual recovery a shallow draught landing craft (LUS) was made available by the US Navy.

At first light on 20 July, Cardigan Bay, leading a ROK Navy motor boat and the LSU, set off up the channel. Navigation was assisted by Sea Furies from Glory who flew along the channel to indicate deep water. At the end of the main channel Cardigan Bay lowered her motor boat which led the ROK motor boat and the LSU to the wrecked aircraft. The team from Cardigan Bay, together with the US naval crew of the LSU and army and air force technicians who had been specially embarked, worked with such a will that nearly all parts found had been collected when darkness set in. Early on the 21st the work started again and, the morning tide being lower, more parts found and recovered.

The enemy made no attempt to interfere with the operation, although aircraft from USS Sicily, who had taken over from Glory, drew light and heavy antiaircraft fire when they dived on batteries only a mile from the scene. Upon completion of the operation, the guns of Cardigan Bay and aircraft from USS Sicily combined to score direct hits on an enemy gun position. The whole party withdrew successfully on 21 July.

(2) Operations off Haeju Man

The end of July saw the start of operations in the Han Estuary which are described in the following separate section. This required the concentration of most of the available west coast forces, but a second operation, south of the 38th Parallel in the vicinity of the Haeju Man, was carried out under the direction of HMS Ceylon, who took charge of both operations on 29 July. This operation was planned for a show of strength in the Han River estuary as close as possible to Kaesong where the armistice talks were taking place. For this operations, Glory was ordered from Sasebo to the west coast, and a check sweep of the entrance to Haeju Man was undertaken to permit the entry of heavy bombardment ships. On 5 August, USS Sicily, escorted by Cossack and Charity, took over from Glory, and on 7
August *Kenya* relieved *Ceylon*.

August was a bad month for weather in and around Korea, and the Western Sea, particularly the Han River estuary was no place to be caught in one of the seasonal typhoons. When, therefore, typhoon "Marge" was reported moving west-northwest with winds of 110 knots at the center, operations were rudely interrupted. This must have been a great relief to the enemy as it involved withdrawing all ships to the southward until "Marge" showed her hand. On 25 August the operations were resumed.

While "Marge" had interrupted operations, she had not interfered with normal reliefs, and when proceedings were resumed the forces available were *USS Sicily*, two US destroyers, HMCS *Cayuga*, HMAS *Anzac*, who had recently relieved HMAS *Warramunga* and the Blockading Group consisting of HMAS *Ceylon*, *Charity*, *Mounts Bay*, and *Morecambe Bay*, and HMNZ ships *Rotoiti* and *Haweia*.

A notable absentee was HMAS *Kenya*, who left the war zone on 25 August for refit and reconditioning at Singapore. She had been in the Far East since the outbreak of Korean War. The "*Kenya*" had rescued ten ditched carrier airmen and had fired 3,386 6-inch and nearly 1,000 4-inch shells.

On 31 August *Ceylon* was relieved by *Belfast*, who had recently returned from refit in Singapore, and the *Belfast* was quickly on the job with bombardments. HMCS *Cayuga* took over from HMNZS *Rotoiti* on 2 September and *Concord* later joined the screen.

During the first part of September, bombardment and patrols occupied the west coast forces. On 10 September *Cossack* relieved *Belfast*. On the same day *USS Sicily* returned to the west coast, screened by HMS *Comus*, HMCS *Atabaskan*, and two US destroyers.

(3) **Salvage of Two of HMS Glory’s Aircraft**

Early in September, two aircraft from *Glory* had force-landed on the beach at Paengnyong-do off Changsan-got, where they had been slightly damaged. It was decided to salvage them and an LSU was borrowed from the US Navy and escorted to the island on 21 September by HMS St. Bride's Bay. A maintenance team from *Unicorn* was embarked in the LSU. The two aircraft duly recovered, the LSU transported them to the *Unicorn*, escorted by *Cossack* and *Comus* on 22 September.

The *Glory* carried out her last patrol, which started on 21 September, and left for Australia for a well earned rest and refit on 30 September. The Australia carrier *Sydney* replaced the *Glory* until her return for a 2nd tour of duty in Korean water.

In October *Alert* and HMAS *Tobruk* joined the west coast forces. The latter relieved HMAS *Anzac* who escorted the *Glory* to Australia.
The Han River Operations

The Han River estuary lies just south of the 38th Parallel on the west coast of Korea. The northern banks were occupied by Communist forces. The estuary is shallow and the many sandbanks are inaccurately charted. Up to this time the estuary waters had been penetrated only by occasional ROK Navy patrol ships. The tides are strong, the waters muddy, and there were no navigational marks. The decision to send some of British frigates into the estuary was therefore, quiet an undertaking. For the operations in the estuary the finest kind of sea-manship was necessary: US and British charts of the area differed widely, and none showed any very reassuring depths; the liquid medium in the Han, brown soup rather than clear water, was lined with rocks; currents reached eight to ten knots, and so poor was the holding ground that on one occasion HMS Conus dragged while steaming to both anchors.

On the evening of 26 July 1951 Cardian Bay and the Australian Murchison, with a ROK frigate, entered the estuary by the western entrance. The New Zealand Hawea acted as communication guard. The three frigates penetrated as far as they could that night, then anchored and bombarded the northern bank. The following morning they extricated themselves from the mudbanks, ably guided and advised by aircraft from USS Sicily, and moved around to the eastern channel, where they were joined by Morecambe Bay. Through this channel they eventually penetrated to within the enemy gun range of the northern bank.

There were few good targets at first and little enemy retaliation, but a lot of hydrographic information was collected. The reliefs for the frigates were Mount’s Bay for Cardigan Bay and HMNZS Rotoiti for HMS Morecambe Bay. HMAS Murchison was pulled out for a few days’ rest. Then these ships relieved each other in rotation and the work of bombarding, probing, and surveying the winding channels went on until interrupted by typhoon “Marge.” Operations started again on 25 August and on the 29th St. Bride’s Bay joined the team. On 14 September HMS Amethyst took her first turn in the estuary.

The enemy’s complete passivity ended on 21 September when a ROK Motor Launch, while surveying, was hit by a 40-mm. or field gun. On the same day the Amethyst reported splashes near her in this area. Nothing further was heard from the enemy until 28 September. On this day HMAS Murchison was carrying Rear Admiral Dyer, USN, Commander, Task Force 95, accompanied by the Surface Blockade Commander (Captain G.A.F. Nor-
folk), under whose immediate orders the Han River operations were then being conducted. She came under heavy fire from a number of guns and mortars in concealed positions on the north bank, at a range of about 2,000 yards. HMAS Murchison immediately returned the fire. At the end of her beat she had to stop, turn on her anchor, and run the gauntlet on the return journey at increased speed. Enemy fire was again opened on her and she replied knocking out one gun. Although hit four times, no damage was done and only one rating was slightly wounded. On the following day, while carrying out the same patrol, the Murchison came under much heavier fire and was hit and holed above the waterline in a number of places, but fortunately without serious damage and with only one serious casualty. The enemy on this occasion included about a platoon of riflemen hidden in the paddy fields. Again the ship replied to the fire with considerable success.

On both occasions HMAS Murchison’s fire had temporarily silenced the opposition, but it was virtually impossible to deal with all the guns. This opposition was not unexpected. It was only surprising that it had not occurred before. On 3 October Black Swan made a feint along the northern bank, which was synchronized with air strikes from USS Rendona. The air strikes were followed by heavy bombardments from Black Swan. This treatment was repeated on ensuing days and, although a great deal of damage was done, enemy guns continued to fire from various positions. On each occasion they were engaged by counter-battery fire from the frigates.

Black Swan was relieved by St. Bride’s Bay on 6 October and, on the 7th Amethyst relieved HNZS Rotoiti. On this day the Rotoiti took the Commander in Chief, Far East Station, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff to see the situation.

On 29 October, Comus became the first destroyer to enter the Han River. The first position chosen for her proved unsuitable, due to the strong tides. Even with two anchors down and constantly steaming to them to ease the strain, she dragged periodically at alarming speed across the estuary. An anchorage out of the fierce tide was then found for her, where she fired over a hill with a frigate in the forward anchorage acting as spotter.

By October’s end an effort originally scheduled for a few days had lasted a hundred, and like the destroyers at Wonsan the British frigates in the Han estuary had become fixed. Whitesand Bay joined the force in early November. When this period brought up the 100th day since the first entry into the estuary, the scores, in numbers of days spent in the area, were as follows: HMAS Murchison 44, Cardigan Bay 29, St Bride’s Bay 19, Rotoiti 18, HNZS ships Hawea and Taupo 16, Mount’s Bay 15, Black Swan 14, Comus 3, Morecambe Bay 1. This Han River Operations ended on 27 November 1951, at which time the negotiators at Panmunjom agreed upon a provisional
cease fire line.

Some other statistics of this operation are that the 14 ships concerned in it had spent a total of 235 days in the estuary. They had steamed about 2,100 miles, made 74 passages of the entrance channel, and grounded 14 times. 85,000 sounding had been taken in surveying a 26-mile channel and 33 navigational buoys had been laid. 15,370 rounds of ammunition had been expended on the enemy.

Activities of Glory and Unicorn

Since the armistice talks began, enemy anti-aircraft fire was gradually increased in volume and efficiency.

At the end of June 1951, Glory had been on the station for two months. Her squadrons were No. 804 (Sea Furies) and No. 812 (Fireflies). During a patrol beginning on 22 June, she flew her 1,000th operational sorties and was well on the way to establishing a record with a daily average of 50 sorties when a catapult defect reduced her output for the last two days. Her targets on this patrol varied from junks to railway bridges and troop concentrations, in addition to giving close support to ground troops, and she filled in the intervals by providing spotting aircraft for bombardment from the sea. Among her records on this occasion was a total of 46 rocket- assisted take-offs in one day.

Her next patrol began on 11 July and, apart from the usual targets, included locating and fixing the position of the crashed MIG aircraft a couple of miles off shore and 33 miles north of the Taedong estuary. She also gave cover to the force engaged in the recovery of the wreckage and her Sea Furies provided navigational assistance to the ships by flying along the deep water channels. This patrol was completed on 20 July, but was back again on 26 July to join with USS Sicily in covering the entry into the Han River and in spotting for the frigates' bombardments. Throughout July bad weather hampered air operations, though this was not evident from the tasks undertaken by the carriers. Six hundred sorties were flown in this month and she had completed the 2,000th for her tour by the end of it. More than 250,000 cannon shells, over 600 rockets and 1,010 bombs had been expended. Her "Kills" included 15 bridges and four railway tunnels.

August was Glory's unlucky month, her main patrol period coinciding with typhoon "Marge" which prevented operations. However, she celebrated her return to the west coast by flying 395 sorties between the 2nd and 9th September. The period included a blank day the 6th September, when she refuelled. This considerable achievement, an average of over 56 sorties a
day, was crowned by a record of 84 sorties on 9 September, the last day of the patrol.

On 16 September, the Glory started her last patrol on the east coast, transferring to the west coast on 21 September and leaving the area on 26 September. At Kure, Japan, on 30 September, she found the Commander in Chief, Far East Station, who said good-bye to her and congratulated her on a job well done before her departure for Sydney. Glory was relieved by the Australian carrier Sydney who operated in Korean waters until 26 January 1952, when she was relieved by Glory.

HMS Unicorn’s operation had been unspectacular, but the aircraft carriers could not have operated without her help. Since the start of the war she had ferried about 200 naval aircraft to the forward areas, and taken back for repair about 70 unserviceable ones. This indicated that a large amount of work had been performed on each aircraft in order to prepare it for flight or preserve it for shipment. This ship provided deck landing practice for replacement pilots and, when replacements were required in a hurry, she had flown off aircraft direct to the operating carrier. The Unicorn was able to help the air forces by ferrying to Japan the new Meteors with which the Australian Air Force No. 77 Fighter Squadron was equipped. During her tour she had fulfilled many purposes other than those for which she was intended, including acting as fleet cargo carrier and army troopship.

East Coast Operations

The east coast was normally considered to be the prerogative of the US Navy, in the same way as the west coast was thought of as the Commonwealth sphere. However, there was no hard-and-fast rule about this and there was nearly always at least one Commonwealth ship on the east coast, apart from concentrations for special operations. The 41st British Marine Independent Commando had also been operating on the east coast during this period.

The work on the east coast was similar to that on the west but considerable and increasing enemy opposition during July 1951 caused concentration on counter-battery work rather than on the more fruitful interdiction targets.

Ceylon left the east coast on 25 June, after a special mission during which she joined the bombardment forces at Wonsan and Songjin for short periods. Whitesand Bay was relieved by HMCS Huron on 26 June and had expended considerable ammunition with profitable results until she was relieved in her turn by HMS Morecambe Bay on 7 July. During her 15-days’ patrol
Morecambe Bay fired 1,000 4-inch shells mostly at road and rail communications.

On 22 July, Mount's Bay took over from Morecambe Bay. On the 23rd Kenya visited Wonsan for two days in response to a request for a cruiser to back up the destroyers. Kenya was relieved by Ceylon, but on 27 July both she and Mount's Bay had to be shifted for the Han River operation. This operation required the use of all Commonwealth ships on the west coast until 16 August when Consort joined the Wonsan force. She carried out some satisfactory bombardments and was, in her turn, relieved by Cossack on 25 August. On entering harbor, Cossack was straddled by an enemy battery which was suitably dealt with, and after 48 hours at Wonsan the Cossack was sent north to take command of the force off Songjin, where she had a profitable time until relieved by Charity on 3 September. The Charity continued the good work and on 9 September was fired on, but not hit, by a shore battery. HMAS Anzac took over on 13 September and remained on these duties until 26 September.

On 18 and 19 September, at the suggestion of the Commander of the Seventh Fleet, Task Force 95 put on a special two-day air, gun, and rocket effort against Wonsan, in which the air strikes were provided by Glory. Belfast spent from 26 to 30 September on this coast, sailing off Wonsan, Songjin and Chongjin and carrying out bombardments at each. On the 10th and 11th October a similar operation against the Kojo area (south of Wonsan) was carried out by the Belfast. In addition to HMAS Sydney, HM ships Belfast, Concord, and Conus, and HMCS Cayuga took part in this operation.

HMS Concord appeared again off Wonsan on 21 October and on the same day proceeded to Hungnam where she stayed for bombardments until 24 October. Then she proceeded to Songjin, which proved a much quieter station. She was relieved on 31 October by the Netherlands ship Van Galen.

Section 8. November 1951–June 1952

Battle of the Islands on the West Coast

"Full employment" was to be the rule during the latter months of 1951 as the Communists intensified their efforts to seize the strategic islands on the west coast. The UN naval forces were resisting a determined enemy attempt to seize some of the more important UN-held islands while the UN
air forces were countering a sudden increase in the enemy air activity during this period. It was chiefly the islands in the waters patrolled by the West Coast Task Element 95.12 that the Reds wished to get their hands on. Sinni-do, Ka-do, Tan-do, and Taehwa-do in the Yalu Gulf, and Cho-do and Sok-to off the Taedong estuary were strategically important and the UN delegation in the armistice talks hoped to use these islands as counters to trade off against the Kaesong area since all the islands are located north of the 38th Parallel. (See Sketch Map 12.)

In this situation of tension and uncertainty, the enemy, in early October, began to exert pressure. On the 9th, about 600 Communists infiltrators landed on the large Yalu island of Sinni-do, and although the garrison troops held it for a time with support from Cassack and Ceylon, enemy reinforcements arriving across the tidal mud flats forced them to abandon the island. On the night of the 12th the garrison troops successfully withdrew from it with cover provided from Ceylon. On the 30th the Canadian destroyer Cayuga reported receiving a hundred rounds of artillery fire from the Amgak peninsula opposite Sok-to; in the Yalu Gulf again the island of Taehwa-do,
where friendly forces had concentrated, was attacked by aircraft on 6 November in the first confirmed enemy employment of light bombers in Korea. That night Ka-do and Tan-do, two of the smaller northern islands, were seized by the Communists in a night amphibious attack.

These unfortunate events served to stimulate some interest. From the Commander of the Seventh US Fleet came a request for an inventory of the west coast islands, while the Eighth US Army Headquarters had also hoped that Taehwa-do would be secured. On the 9th Admiral Scott-Moncrieff ordered Task Element 95.12 to assign each night at least one destroyer, and when possible two, to the defense of Taehwa-do.

By this time, in the Yalu Gulf, Taehwa-do was the only one of any importance still in UN hands. Like most of the islands, Taehwa was very inadequately garrisoned by poorly-armed ROK guerrilla troops under the nominal command of a few US Army personnel. Moreover it was in a very vulnerable position, lying within easy reach of enemy’s Manchurian airfields. The proximity of these enemy air-fields made it much more difficult for the ships of TE 95.12 to help defend Taehwa, as it was dangerous for a ship to cruise the waters around 39°30’ north in daylight unless she had air cover.

Under these difficult circumstances the Commanding officer of Mounts Bay organized a system of inshore and covering patrols towards the end of the year to galvanize the islands into some form of effective defensive measures and also to coordinate army and air force activities in the areas. The task of the outer circle of ships was to keep the enemy approaches from Amsgak and the Chinnampo estuary illuminated by star shell during critical periods in the dark hours, and this operation became known as “Smoking Concert” under the command of “Sitting Duck,” the senior officer of the ships present, either Mounts Bay or Whitesand Bay.

On 27 November the subject of offshore islands came up for discussion at Panmunjom (site of armistice talks transferred from Kaesong late October), and at once the Communists stepped up their efforts.

On the night of 30 November, the enemy began his push to invade the islands. About 1,000 of them came in junks and small boats under covering fire from shore artillery on Ka-do, and the lightly held Taehwa-do fell to them. Of some 1,200 friendly guerrillas and inhabitants only about a quarter got out. This affair was followed almost immediately by further enemy shore to shore attacks which seized six small coastal islets in Haeju Man, and by reports of extensive troop movements in Hwanghae province.

When the enemy invasion began Cochade had been on the regular Taehwa-do patrol. Unfortunately she was unable to detect the invasion force of junks and rubber boats until the first waves had reached the beach-
es. The Cockade opened fire, sank one junk, probably sank another, and damaged several, but the enemy batteries on Ka-do now got the range and repeatedly straddled the destroyer, securing one hit. The shell killed one seaman but did only minor damage to the ship. Cockade, however, could not take the risk of being disabled among the sand banks off Taehwa-do where in the morning she would be a sitting target exposed to shore battery fire and the bombs and cannon of the Red Chinese planes stationed only a few miles away. In any case it was now too late for her to take any effective action; the enemy had got ashore and apparently had quickly overrun the defenses, for early in the action the Taehaw-do garrison's radio went off the air. Consequently she withdrew to the south. British personnel left behind in the evacuation were Lieutenant D.A. Lankford, and photographer D. Penman who had been ashore to obtain ciné and news photographs.

The fall of Taehwa-do caused a furor among the commanders of the UN forces. The UN-held islands north of the 38th were at this time one of the important items on the agenda at Panmunjom, and the more of them that fell to the Communists the weaker would be the bargaining position of the UN delegates. The result was that the high command became "island conscious" and ordered that every precaution be taken against a repetition of the Taehwa affair.

Immediate steps were taken to strengthen the land defenses of the threatened islands. Mortars and machine guns, and later Bofors and Oerlikons, were set up to cover the landing beaches. After the navy had ferried in enough arms and ammunition, the chief difficulty in organizing the defense was that of man-power; there were not enough ROK Marines on the islands. This man-power problem, however, was later solved by bringing in more ROK regulars.

Task Element 95.12 also revised its organization to deal more effectively with the Communist threat to the islands.

The following statistical number of days spent at sea by the British ships during the 29 days from 8 February to 8 March 1952 indicated that there was no slackening of the calls made on them. Where a ship left or joined during the period the total number of days on which she was available is shown in brackets: The carrier Glory 20; the cruisers Belfast 14, Ceylon 21; the destroyers Cossack 21 (24), Charity 16, Cockade 11 (19), Concord 21; the frigates Cardigan Bay 23, Mounts Bay 20 (23).

Those ships who were absent during the period but took part in the west coast operations at varied time were: The destroyers Comus and Constance, and the frigate Whitesand Bay and Alacrity.

On the night of 24 March an enemy assault seized a small island situated between Cho-do and Sok-to. At this time Ceylon, with destroyers
Constance and HMCS Sioux, the frigate Alacrity, and USS Comstock, were heavily shelled by Amgak enemy batteries while repelling the enemy raid. The enemy batteries on the Amgak peninsula were bombarded previously by the two British cruisers Belfast and Ceylon.

HMAS Sydney’s aircraft got a direct hit on one of these guns of Amgak and USS Badoeng Strait repeated the attack the next day. Ceylon, USS Manchester, Comstock and Eversole, and the British frigate Alacrity silenced batteries on the islands.

During these inland operations the naval forces had been responsible for the evacuation of refugees. By early March the flow of refugees had been reduced to a trickle and the final lift was made from the island of Sok to.

In April and early May 1952 there was little enemy activity. It was believed that enemy troops were turned over in large numbers to assist farmers — preparing for ploughing and rice planting. At that time, both the fishermen of the Republic of Korea and the North Korea had large numbers of fishing craft at sea. There was a fleet of about 800 friendly fishing junks which presented a considerable problem to the blockading force, which was compelled to organize a system of fishery protection licensing, and control. Up to five police junks, armed with light weapons, patrolled around this friendly fleet inspecting all newcomers to ascertain that there were no Communist intruders and to prevent the junk from getting too close to the enemy controlled coastline.

On the afternoon of 15 June the British Minister of Defense Field-Marshal Lord Alexander of Tunis visited Inchon when HM ships Belfast, Ocean, Amethyst and Consort were there. He spoke to the assemble ships companies in the three larger ships, the officers and men from the smaller ships being sent over to the Belfast and the Ocean. After he left, the fleet sailed to carry out further operations.

**East Coast Operations**

Off the east coast, in the meantime, there was little significant activity.

On 20 and 21 November another coordinated air, gun, and rocket strike was made against Hungnam, the important industrial and communications center, 100 miles north of the 38th Parallel. This time the operation was again under the command of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff. Australia was represented by the carrier Sydney and the destroyer Tobruk; Canada by the destroyer Sioux; British by the cruiser Belfast and the destroyer Constance; US by the destroyer Hyman and three rocket-carrying landing ships; and the Netherlands by the destroyer Van Galen.
Shortly after dawn the guns of the fleet opened fire on known enemy antiaircraft gun positions to silence them before Sea Fury and Firefly aircraft swooped down to carry out the first of ten attacks, with barracks, industrial plants, stores, and rail communications as their targets. Alternating with the air attacks were bombardments from the cruiser and destroyers, carried out with aircraft spotting the fall of shot and adjusting it on to selected targets.

Heavy fire was centered on the target area with a remarkable effect. In the evening, three rocket ships moved slowly into position close inshore, covered by the bombarding force. For 35 minutes these three ships rained their rockets down on the city area, causing much damage to war industries. During the two days, over 200 tons of explosive fell on Hungnam targets; the Sydney's aircraft flew more than 100 sorties.

Hungnam was mined-in by the enemy after the withdrawal in the winter of 1950, and the operation was made possible by the long and patient minesweeping operations carried out under difficult and dangerous conditions by a US minesweeping group. Hungnam shore batteries had previously been aggressive, but on this occasion they surprisingly failed to fire a single round against the inshore bombardment forces.

Early in February 1952 Alacrity came under fire in the Songjin area from what appeared to be an antitank gun firing from 3,000 yards range. Six hits were scored but no serious damage or casualties were suffered. On 9 March Morecambe Bay had her wireless aerial shot away by enemy shore batteries at Chongjin. In the same area Cossack, on a successful three-night patrol, shot up three trains and seven others.

In April and early May the enemy stepped up his coastal defence armament in order to protect his vital supply lines which were harassed at night by UN warships, including the British ships Constance and Cossack and the Australian ships Warramunga and Bataan. UN minesweepers working close inshore, and covering forces, were fired on frequently.

On 23 April Concord came under heavy fire from shore batteries when she was bombarding on the enemy communications center in the Songjin area. The shore batteries hit one of the destroyer's gun positions, killing two ratings and injuring four others. Little structural damage was suffered but the ship returned fire upon the enemy and resumed her patrol. Before this incident Concord had been attacking the enemy batteries at Chongjin for several days. She also captured five enemy junks and set one on fire which attempted to escape.
Naval Air Operations

For sometime the carrier elements in western Korean waters had consisted of one Commonwealth carrier and one US carrier. In November 1951, the missions were shared by the Australian carrier Sydney, who had earlier relieved HMS Glory, and USS Rendova.

The carrier Sydney's tour of duty ended on 26 January 1952 when she left the UN forces upon relief by Glory. Glory escorted by HMAS Warramunga, returned to the Korean theater for a second tour of duty after reconditioning at Sydney. She was joined off the west coast by Concord and USS Marshall.

The Glory's first period of operations was favored by good flying weather and she was able to show that she had lost none of her previous skill, although she had a considerable proportion of new pilots on board. In March 1952, there were some bad flying days, but the aircraft of the 14th Carrier Air Group stepped up the number of sorties flown, and in one day they put up 105 sorties, each of normal duration. This was a record for a light fleet carrier and brought congratulatory signals from both American and British Commanders. In dawn to dusk sorties the aircraft silenced enemy gun positions, strafed invasion boats, and damaged a boat yard. They dropped 70 bombs and fired over 400 rockets at targets which included an enemy troop headquarters and store houses. Enemy troops working on a bridge diversion were killed or scattered. At one time every aircraft in the Glory, except one previously damaged, was airborne. All aircraft and all pilots flew three normal full length sorties during the day, and some even completed four; a triumph of organization in which the whole ships company shared, particularly the deck handlers and technical crews. The Glory was screened at various times during this patrol by destroyers of three nations, including HMAS Warramunga, HMCS Nootka, and USS Monroe.

About this time the Glory's two tours of duty in the war zone had brought the number of sorties flown up to 4,000 and, in 12 patrols she had steamed 77,000 miles.

In a subsequent patrol the Glory's Sea Fury aircraft, though not designed for such work, were armed with bombs instead of rockets. The results showed that the Sea Fury was a successful dive-bomber, and that the type of target available on the west coast could be hit harder by the bomb than by the rocket.

The Glory's second tour of duty was now drawing to a close and during her last patrol, Captain T.A.K. Maunsell flew to the ship in a US Avenger aircraft to take over as Commanding Officer from Captain K.S. Colquoun.
By early May 1952 the ship had completed her task and was relieved by Ocean. Since leaving the United Kingdom in January 1951, she had steamed some 85,000 miles, operated off four continents, made more than 6,400 aircraft landings and had been screened by more than 60 destroyers of five different UN countries.

The 14th Carrier Air Group had set up a conspicuously high standard of operational flying, often against determined flak opposition, in providing support for ground and naval forces on the west coast, harassing the enemy's lines of communications, and attacking his built-up areas.

No. 804 Sea Fury Squadron and No. 812 Firefly Squadron flew some 4,835 operational sorties -- a total of 11,860 flying hours. The cost of this extensive effort was 27 aircraft lost and more than 140 damaged, but the Air Group completed 4,835 deck landings with only 13 accidents; 16 pilots flew more than 130 sorties. A total of 24 aircrews were recovered from aircraft which crashed or were shot down, and the ship suffered nine aircrews killed and one wounded.

The Glory's aircraft hit the enemy with nearly a million rounds of 20-mm. cannon shells, 14,000 rockets, and well over 3,000 bombs, inflicting heavy and widespread damage on enemy road and rail communications, gun positions, barracks, bridges, store dumps, and other targets. They also gave close support to the ground forces, particularly for the Commonwealth forces, spotted the targets for naval bombardments, and assisted the warships in their defense of the strategic islands of the west coast.

After she relieved the Glory, Ocean flew a remarkably high sortie ratio and soon bettered the performances of all her predecessors Glory, Theseus, Triumph, and HMAS Sydney. In one day the pilots of her two squadrons, No. 802 (Sea Furies) and No. 825 (Fireflies), flew a total of 123 sorties against enemy held positions, beating the Glory's record of 105 sorties in a day.

During that one day the Ocean's pilots destroyed three railway bridges, an oil fuel dump, many coastal gun emplacements, 15 vehicles loaded with ammunition, and attacked numerous troop encampments and store dumps. In all these attacks 72 bombs were dropped and 456 rockets fired. The Ocean's record was set up only four days after she returned to the operating area.

**Operations of the British Fleet Auxiliaries**

The work of supplying the fleet continued efficiently but almost unnoticed, yet without the valuable support of British Fleet Auxiliaries in all weathers, warships of the United Nations Fleet could not carry out their
missions.

Some idea of the importance of the work carried out by these ships was made known when one of the tankers, *Wave Chief*, returned to the United Kingdom in March 1952. In the course of 66 oiling operations, at sea she had pumped 37,000 tons of oil and aviation spirit into the ships of the British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, US and Netherlands Navies. But the *Wave Chief* was, of course, only one of the Blue Ensign ships which had fuelled, armed, clothed, and fed the United Nations Fleet in Korean waters.

Of some 70 fleet auxiliaries operated by the Admiralty, about one-third had contributed to the Korean war effort, by carrying fuel and other military supplies to the East and distributing these supplies to ships in the Korean theater of operations. In less than two years some 90,000 tons of fuel were replenished at sea and a further large quantity was supplied to ships in port.

Often these fuelling at sea operations involved the passing of fuel hoses from ship to ship while they steamed at from 12 to 15 knots. The work was carried out in the competitive spirit of sporting events and ships’ companies were trying to beat the record set up by *Wave Knight* and HMCS *Athabaskan* when—105 seconds from shooting the pilot line—the pumping of fuel began.

To the men of the British Commonwealth Fleet, *Fort Rosalie* had probably been the best-known British Fleet Auxiliary. She operated in the area for more than 18 months and returned to the United Kingdom in June 1952. During her service in Korean waters she supplied a large proportion of the
ammunition used by the Commonwealth ships and inspected, repaired, and replaced guns worn out by heavy bombardments. Nearly 9,000 tons of bombs, rockets, and small arms ammunition, together with miscellaneous pyrotechnics and other ammunition, were supplied by her. The Fort Rosalie was relieved by Fort Sandusky, who had been carrying on the good work demonstrated by her predecessors in the area.

Section 9. July – December 1952

With the front remaining relatively quiet and showing no signs of major offensive action by either side, the disposition of the British Commonwealth naval forces in this period remained as before, the major effort being made on the west coast; an occasional incursion to the east coast where the other UN naval forces normally held sway, provided a change of scene to some of the Commonwealth ships.

Early in July 1952, the Commander in Chief, Far East Station, Admiral Sir Guy Russell paid a visit to the operational area, where he was able to inspect a number of the Commonwealth ships taking part in the operations.

Air Raid on Pyongyang

The first major operation of July, in which Commonwealth naval forces were committed, was a heavy air raid on Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, carried out on 11 July. Aircraft from Ocean represented the Commonwealth navies and flew 39 sorties, delivering 180 60-lb. rocket projectiles and 32,000 lb. of bombs on the city’s military targets. All the aircraft returned unscathed and pilots reported that the targets, which were the big railway marshalling yards of the city and large concentrations of logistical supplies around the area, were well covered. Their reports were confirmed by damage assessments which stated that 60 percent of the supplies were destroyed. In addition to the aircraft from Ocean, aircraft of the Fifth US Air Force, the US Marines and the Australian Air Force also participated in the operation.

A Flurry in the Western Sea

At Cho-do and Sok-to, which with their valuable radar, weather, and helicopter detachments had become the Wonsan of the west, a series of
intermittent engagements took place between the UN naval ships and enemy coastal batteries. On 15 July, there was brief flurry in the Western Sea as an island close to the tip of the Ongjin peninsula was invaded by a North Korean force embarked in junks and outboard motorboats. *Belfast* and *Amethyst* were immediately ordered to the scene. Supported by airstrikes from the USS *Bataan*, the two British ships concentrated their gun fire onto the invaded island. Both ships were fired on by enemy shore batteries, but suffered no damage. On the next day the ROK Marines landed on the island under covering fire from the ships. The Marines reported that 151 invaders were killed. At that time more troublesome than the enemy were outbreaks of typhus on Cho-do and Paengnyong-do, but the epidemics were quickly controlled by a naval medical unit.

**Ocean's Aircraft Engaged by MIGs**

On 27 July *Ocean's* aircraft were attacked by MIG-15s, the first time the carrier-based aircraft in the Western Sea had had this experience. Four Fireflies were attacked by two MIGs, two of the Fireflies being damaged. One landed safely on board, and the other on a friendly airstrip. The crews were unwounded. Shortly afterwards four Sea Furies were attacked by four MIGs. The encounter was brief, and no Sea Furies were damaged.

In August, *Ocean's* Sea Furies had four encounters with MIG-15s. On 9 August, four Sea Furies were again attacked by eight MIGs at 5,000 feet. After a brief but spirited action one MIG was destroyed, exploding as it hit the ground, and repeated hits with 20-mm. cannon were obtained on two others which then broke off the action and, screened by the remaining five, retired northward. No damage was sustained by the Sea Furies.

On the same day four Sea Furies were attacked by four MIGs at 6,000 feet. One MIG broke away emitting black smoke and flames, and the remaining three broke off the action. One Sea Fury was hit during this engagement, one of its drop tanks being set on fire. Later the pilot managed to jettison his blazing tank, put out the fire by side slipping, and made a safe desk landing. An hour later a third action occurred between two Sea Furies and two MIGs at 4,000 feet. One Sea Fury was hit and had to make a forced landing on a friendly island. The pilot was unwounded. The next day four Sea Furies were attacked by eight MIGs. One MIG broke away smoking and on fire, but could not be claimed as a 'certain' as no one saw it crash. No Sea Furies were damaged. This was the last engagement of the month, and the total score was one MIG seen to crash, two 'probables' and two damaged against two Sea Furies damaged. During their
aerial patrol between the 9th and 17th August, the Ocean's aircraft achieved an average daily rate of 75 sorties.

**Naval Surface Operations**

The month of August 1952 was distinguished by its unpleasant weather. Typhoon 'Karen' caused a three day's absence from their stations of the west coast forces, but did not give as much trouble as the Typhoon 'Marge' the preceding year. During the month HMS St. Brides Bay and Mounts Bay and the Australian ship Condamine each did a turn of duty on the east coast. Between the 4th and 6th August, St. Brides Bay took part in a joint operation with the US ships Carmick and John R. Pierce. The St. Brides Bay stopped a train consisting of six box cars loaded with timber and sand. She stood watch over the wreck from the morning of the 5th until the next morning and harassed it with 4-inch and close range fire to prevent the track being cleared. The USS John R. Pierce relieved the St. Brides Bay at this duty and during the afternoon was engaged by a Communist field battery which scored hits causing damage and casualties. The US destroyers had no doctor on board, and the St. Brides Bay was glad to be of help by dispatching a surgeon lieutenant and leading sick berth attendant to the John R. Pierce. This assistance was much appreciated by the US ships.

HMS Mounts Bay relieved the St. Brides Bay, and a few days later came under heavy fire from a shore battery during her patrol in the Western Sea. She was hit five times in rapid succession and unfortunately suffered one fatal and several other casualties. In returning the fire she secured a hit on one gun of the battery. The damage sustained did not prevent her from continuing patrol.

The Mounts Bay was the 12th Commonwealth ship to have been hit by enemy shore battery fire in the last nine months. The 11th was Belfast when, operating on the west coast early in August, she received one hit, having one Chinese rating killed and three others injured. Damage to the ship was unimportant, and after silencing the battery the Belfast resumed her patrol.

Other surface operations on the west coast during August included support for raids by friendly land forces given by HMS Newcastle and four other Commonwealth ships.

The Belfast left the Korean theater in September 1952 to return to the United Kingdom. The Belfast was the first British cruiser to serve in the Korean theater. Since her arrival on 29 June 1950, the Belfast had steamed more than 80,000 miles, fired well over 8,000 6-inch shells, and spent 404
days at sea. In the early days on the east coast she was described by the US Naval Command as a “fast firing” ship, and had been much complimented on the effectiveness of her bombardments.


Between the 23rd and 29th September Morecambe Bay carried out a patrol in the Han River to investigate junk traffic and to check the channels which were surveyed with so much effort during the Han River operations in late 1951. After an adventurous passage it was reported that the channel had altered considerably and that the passage was punctuated with frequent alarms and excursions necessitating “casting” the ship for the deep water. It would have been impracticable in the strong tides and strong breeze to have lowered a boat and sounded out the channel by hand lead. Eventually it was accepted as quite reasonable to have only eight feet of water under the ship for 20 minutes at a time.

During October, the Commonwealth naval forces were visited by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor. Although the visit was of short duration, the First Sea Lord was able to visit all but one of the Commonwealth ships and to witness their activities. He watched the shelling of enemy batteries from the bridge of HMS Birmingham and on another occasion he saw aircraft from Ocean taking off for strikes against the enemy and returning from their operations. It was in this month that, during a patrol lasting from the 2nd to the 14th, aircraft of the Ocean flew an average of 85 sorties a day, destroying, among other targets, 47 rail bridges which meant that none could be used anywhere in the area.

Ocean’s Achievements in Her 1st Tour

November saw the end of Ocean’s tour in this theater. Her achievements were indeed remarkable. Apart from the record individual day’s sorties for Commonwealth carriers off Korea (which was 123 sorties) the following figures give some indication of her contribution to the war effort:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sorties</td>
<td>5,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average daily sorties</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest daily sorties</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest number of sorties per patrol</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(nine flying days)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Total flying days.................................................. 79
Ammunition expenditure:
  1,000-lb Bombs .............................................. 420 rounds
  500-lb bombs ................................................ 3,454 rounds
  R/P ............................................................ 16,490 rounds
  20-mm ..................................................... 1,500,000 rounds

Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridges, road ........................................... 115</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges, rail ............................................ 81</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail wagons ................................................ 61</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor transport .......................................... 57</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox carts .................................................... 172</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water craft ................................................. 102</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun positions .............................................. 69</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Installations .................................. 18</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy killed in action (pilots's observations) ........ 1,060</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft (MIG-15) .......................................... 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In early November 1952, the Ocean was relieved by Glory who began her third tour of duty of the Korean War. On account of their distinguished service, the Ocean's squadrons, Nos. 802 (Sea Fury) and 825 (Firefly), were awarded with the Boyd Trophy for 1952 by the British Navy. This trophy is awarded annually for the most outstanding contribution in naval aviation during the year.

Naval operations continued on the same pattern throughout December without diminution of effort, but with no special incidents. Another milestone in carrier history was passed when the Glory achieved her 10,000th deck landing since she left the United Kingdom in January 1951. Nearly 6,000 of these landings had been made following operational flights against the enemy in Korea.

Section 10. January – June 1953

The disposition of the UN naval forces in Korean waters during the period January to June 1953 remained generally routine -- British Commonwealth forces concentrating mainly on the west coast, while the US forces operated on the east coast. Although no major sea operation was launched,
there still continued a series of offensive actions against enemy shore batteries and lines of communications.

Effective, January 1953, the organization of the West coast Support Group was modified for more effective operations against the increased enemy shore batteries that had constitute great menace to the UN-held islands on the west coast. The revised organization was as follows and continued effective until the end of the war:

Inshore Operations

In early January 1953, HMS Birmingham, Glory and USS Missouri bombarded enemy gun positions on the mainland which had constituted a threat to the nearby UN-held islands of Cho-do and Sok-to (this was the third time these ships had worked in cooperation); Sparrow attacked shore batteries near Haeju and sustained superficial damage when the enemy batteries replied to her fire; and in early February, Cockade, operating with the destroyer minesweeper USS Thompson, scored a total of ten direct hits on supply buildings north of Chongjin.

In the early months of the year ice and bad weather hampered inshore operations in some areas and earlier, the pack ice area had been so thick that the usual patrols carried out by destroyers and frigates had to be
temporarily suspended.

HMS *Newcastle*, *Whitesand Bay*, *Opossum*, *Cardigan Bay*, *Cockade* and *Sparrow*, with the other Commonwealth ships, carried out inshore operations against the Amgak batteries overlooking Sok-to island during early April. On 17 April *Whitesand Bay* came under enemy fire from a shore-mounted 76 mm. gun and fired 51 rounds in counterbattery. Three days later she fired 40 rounds at the same gun position. HMS *Consort* and the Canadian ship *Crusader* attacked enemy trains and the latter gained the reputation of being the new champion train stopper. Aircraft from USS *Badoeng Strait* spotted for HMS *Newcastle* when that ship bombarded buildings and troops in the Haeju and other areas.

Inshore operations during April included the silencing by *Charity* and *Cardigan Bay* of an enemy battery which had been threatening a friendly island; and the blasting of a gun cave by *Mounts Bay*.

*Morecambe Bay* was specially active in the early part of June. She attacked enemy gun positions in the Chinnampo area on 2 June and shortly afterwards, working in conjunction with USS *Thomson*, attacked troop concentrations. Fire was opened on the *Morecambe Bay* by shore batteries, but the ship evaded the attack and suffered no damage or casualties.

On 19 June, *Cossack* opened fire on a group of Communists on shore near Tanchon (south of Songjin on the east coast), causing several casualties, and on 20 June, in conjunction with USS *Gurke* she bombarded north and south-bound trains at Tanchon.

**HMS Glory’s Air Operations**

*Glory* operated in the Western Sea almost continuously until relieved by *Ocean* in mid-May 1953 and created or equalled several records in this period. In May, she completed the longest period of naval air operations by any British Commonwealth carrier in the Korean War. Since leaving the United Kingdom in January 1951, she had spent 530 days at sea and steamed 157,000 miles. In this time, she had completed 15 months’ war service and spent 316 days at sea in Korean waters. Of a total of 13,700 flights from the carrier’s deck, more than 9,500 sorties had been over northern Korea. On 5 April the *Glory* equalled the record previously set up by *Ocean* in completing 123 operational sorties in one day.

Increased enemy air activity off the west coast was experienced by the *Glory*’s aircraft. On 7 February, two MIG-15s attacked four Sea Furies operating northwest of Chinnampo and, on 23 April, four Sea Furies were fired upon by four unidentified aircraft with swept-back wings. No losses were incurred in either attack.
Air operations were interrupted by bad weather in the first three months of the year, but the Glory operated her aircraft at high pressure whenever the weather was suitable. On good weather days she achieved an average daily sortie rate of 72 from her 30 aircraft. Four aircraft were lost during the period 6 to 12 February, when two Fireflies and one Sea Fury ditched due to engine failure and one Sea Fury was shot down by enemy flak. The aircrews of the ditched aircraft were rescued but the pilot of the Sea Fury was believed killed.

During March, a combined attack on the enemy targets in the Chinnampo area was made by Glory and the US destroyer McCord. The carrier's pilots accounted for five troop shelters destroyed at Changyon. One gun position was damaged, and heavy casualties were inflicted on troops in the open near Haeju, when attacked by the aircraft.

On several days in April the Glory's aircraft averaged 70-80 sorties. A concentrated attack on troop billeting areas and coastal targets near Haeju was made by Sea Furies and Fireflies. A large training headquarters and a portable radio station were destroyed, numerous casualties on enemy personnel were inflicted and some of her aircraft spotted for St. Brides Bay as she shelled gun positions. Further attacks were made in May by Glory's aircraft on road bridges, a sluice gate, gun positions, and troop buildings.

The pilot of one of Glory's aircraft, which had been forced by flak to land in the sea, was rescued from his dinghy by a US Air Force helicopter which landed him back on the flight deck of his ship.

**Two Combined Operations in May**

In May operations on a larger scale than hitherto in 1953 took place. On 25 May, a combined force of British and American ships, under the command of British Admiral Clifford, Flag Officer Second in Command Far East, and consisting of Newcastle, USS New Jersey, and aircraft from Ocean, which had recently relieved Glory, attacked shore positions on the west coast. The ships steamed into action with UN flags at their foremasts and national ensigns at the main. While the USS New Jersey bombarded the enemy coastal batteries and defensive positions with her 16-inch guns, the Newcastle stood further inshore to neutralize any anti-aircraft batteries which might open fire on the spotting aircraft from Ocean. For three hours, the Newcastle stood within range of shore batteries, but no enemy attempt against her was made. During this time she neutralized two enemy batteries with her 6-inch guns.

Again on 28 May, a combined force of British and Netherlands warships under the command of Admiral Clifford, and including Newcastle, St Brides
Bay, HNMS Gohan Maurits Van Nassau, and supported by aircraft from Ocean, carried out a bombardment of recently emplaced gun positions on the Angak Peninsula and on the north shore of the Chinnampo estuary. The enemy coastal batteries were soon stirred to retaliatory action and repeatedly straddled Newcastle without scoring hits. A motor-boat from St. Brides Bay laid an effective smoke screen which prevented the enemy from observing the effect of their fire, while its batteries were exposed to the friendly ships and Ocean’s aircraft. One battery was silenced by a direct hit from Newcastle. As further enemy batteries became active the Newcastle engaged with both 6-inch and 4-inch guns and withdrew behind the smoke screen, from which position she continued to fire upon the enemy batteries until noon. St. Brides Bay continued to fire over her stern until the range was too great, while aircraft from Ocean continued attacks until nightfall. No casualties were suffered by the combined force.

Among other inshore bombardments during May were those carried out by HMS Modeste, the Australian ship Culgoa and the Canadian ship Haida.

Section 11. The Korean War Ends

On the morning of 27 July 1953, the armistice was signed to take effect that evening. Three years, one month, and two days after the North Korean Communist Army had burst south across the 38th Parallel the war was over. The Communist aggression had been repelled, but Korea still remained divided.

Evacuation of Cho-do Area

In accordance with the terms of the armistice the garrisons of the islands beyond the demarcation line were evacuated by the UN ships, with the exception of west coast islands of Paengnyong-do, Taechong-do, and Sochong-do, off Ongjin peninsula, and of Yonpyong-do and U-do off the mouth of Haeju Man.

The evacuation of the friendly troops and equipment from the islands, north of the cease-fire line, started the day after HMS Birmingham arrived back on the Western Sea to take over control around Cho-do area.

A meeting was held with the island commanders on board Birmingham and later a liaison officer and communication party landed to assist the garrison at Cho-do in the evacuation. Work was started immediately on dismantling the shore radar station.
Naval Operations

For the evacuation two LSTs beached, one on the air force beach to load air force equipment, and second on a small beach known as POL beach, for the anti-aircraft battery equipment. A third LST came to take off the Korean Marine troops. HMS Crane landed a beach party to handle affairs on POL beach, and subsequently on Sosa-ri beach, where the Korean Marines embarked, while Birmingham assisted on the air force beach with a beach party and a working party in the LST.

During the night the anti-aircraft battery continued working with all available trucks and by morning had practically completed loading their own equipment and started preparing the upper deck for drums of diesel oil. Air Force heavy equipment soon started arriving and the Korean Marine Corps, with 650 men available, were working like ants storing food for the winter. The Canadian destroyer Iroquois took over the work from HMS Crane during the forenoon.

A LST from Sok-to, the neighbouring island, was seen heading south for Paengnyong-do. It had Korean Marine Corps personnel to embark and expected to complete loading in twelve hours.

By dark, things seemed to be going well as the air force LST was virtually full, the anti-aircraft battery had made a good start on the diesel oil, the most awkward item on the island, and the Korean Marine troops had completely cleared their beach and were on board for the night with all their own equipment. The weather as usual proved the only worry and during the night it blew up bringing heavy rain squalls which continued the following morning. In spite of this all three LST completed loading to capacity and withdrew from the beaches at about 10 o’clock.

This left only a small amount of air force stores and personnel on the island besides the island commander and part of his camp. During a break in the rain, a fourth LST, prepared to feed and accommodate the remaining 200 troops, beached on the air force beach. The only excitement was watching the final destruction of timber rubbish, and concrete emplacements. Throughout the night fires burned steadily with occasional brilliant bursts of flame and the dull rumble of explosions until finally the LST withdrew, leaving the demolition party to complete the destruction on the beach. Seven old men elected to stay on the island and these were supplied with food and other comforts that would be of use.

Although ten days were allowed for the evacuation, it was completed in five days and five nights without incident. Large numbers of troops and refugees had been evacuated prior to the armistic.
After Cease-Fire

In all ships patrolling in Korean waters some relaxation was allowed immediately after the cease-fire. They were no longer darkened at night, scuttles and black-out screen doors were open, providing great relief in the hot and humid conditions prevailing; watchkeeping duties were reduced as instant readiness of full armament was no longer necessary.

However, an aircraft carrier, cruiser, and ships of destroyer and frigate squadrons of the British Navy were kept, in or within easy reach of, Korean coastal waters. Naval ships of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were also retained in the area.

When the armistice was signed the following ships of the British Navy were in or near Korean waters: the aircraft carrier Ocean; the cruiser Birmingham; the destroyers Cossack, Cockade, Charity; the frigates Whitesand Bay, Crane and the depot ship Tyne. In addition, there were the replenishment aircraft carrier Unicorn, the hospital ship Maine and eight ships of the fleet auxiliary service.

Section 12. British Marine Troops

The United Kingdom, in addition to its ground and naval forces, also had a Marine unit in Korea during the war. This peculiar combat unit, composed of a reinforced company in strength, was formed in August 1950 at its parent unit -- the 41st Marine Independent Commando.

The British Marines of 14 officers and 211 men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, flew from their home station to Japan in early September 1950. Upon arrival in Japan, they received a special course of hard training, under the operational control of ComNavFE, for raiding operations deep into the enemy territory.

Suitable objectives for the Marine Commando raids were few, but it carried out a number of raids, operating from the ships of the United Nations. When the Inchon Landing took place in September 1950, the unit carried out a diversionary landing at Kunsan from the British frigate Whitesand Bay alongside American special troops.

The First Three Raids

During early October 1950, the missions of the Commando was to keep
the retreating North Korean Army off balance on the east coast.

On the night of 1 October, the first raid was carried out from the US submarine transport *Perch* against a section of the railroad line in 40°21', where two tunnels adjoin. The US destroyer *Thomas* bombarded an adjacent target as a diversion, and another USS *Madox* backed up the raid. This raid was considered most difficult, not only because it was the first raid but because it was conducted on a well defended beach area. Enemy coast guards opened fire the moment the black-faced Commandos stepped out of their rubber landing boats to wade ashore. While one group planted explosives beneath the steel rails, two other groups fanned out on the flanks to stave off enemy attacks. Soon there was a blinding explosion followed by instant shock waves reaching far out to sea. In this raid Private P.R. Jones was killed by enemy rifle fire, but a culvert was destroyed by the demolition charge and both tunnels were mined.

Two other raids against the northeastern coastal railway were carried out on nights of 6-7 and 7-8 October with supporting fire from an American destroyer. The first of these attacks was directed against a tunnel in Kyongsong Man, less than 32 kilometers south of Chongjin; the target of the second was a tunnel and bridge 6 kilometers below Songjin. The Commandos knocked the target out completely, suffering no casualties.

**On the Way to Hagaru-ri**

One of the Commandos' toughest fights took place when they fought their way from Koto-ri up the tortuous mountain road to join the American Marine division at Hagaru-ri. (See Sketch map 13.)

In mid-November 1950, as the United Nations forces advanced along both coasts, the Commando commander, Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, received orders to report for duty with the 1st US Marine Division. It was the intention of the US division to use the well trained Commandos as an additional reconnaissance force.

The Marine Commandos arrived at Hungnam on the 20th. After a short period of cold-weather training, the unit joined the American troops at Koto-ri on 28 November. Here at Koto-ri, Colonel Drysdale became the commander of a newly organized composite unit consisting of the British Commandos, and two companies from the 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division. The composite unit was designated as "Task Force Drysdale", and its mission was to break out from the Koto-ri perimeter and fight its way through the enemy road blocks to Hagaru.

On the 29th, at 0945, the task force left Koto-ri for Hagaru. Soon after the unit moved out, it was reinforced by US tank units.
Progress was slow because of the necessity for halts while the forward tanks blasted out pockets of CCF resistance. Enemy mortar as well as small-arms fire was encountered. Further delays resulted while the tanks made their way over road-blocks or around craters. For the three infantry companies, the advance consisted of brief periods of movement alternated with interludes in which the troops scrambled out of the trucks to engage in fire fights. Finally, about 1615, the column ground to a complete halt about 6 kilometers north of Koto-ri.

To make matters worse the tanks and trucks could hardly get through because of road conditions and increasing enemy resistance. The task force commander requested a decision from Division Headquarters as to whether he should resume an advance which threatened to prove costly. The division directed Colonel Drysdale to continue in view of the urgent necessity for reinforcements at Hagaru. Upon resuming the advance, unit integrity was lost and infantry elements mingled with headquarters troops.

Not far south of the halfway point to Hagaru, increased enemy fire caused an abrupt halt in a long valley. The high ground rose sharply on the right of the road, while on the left a frozen creek wound through a plain several hundred yards wide, bordered by the Changjin River and wooded hills. This was "Hell Fire Valley" -- a name applied by the British commander -- and it was to be the scene of an all-night fight by half the men of the convoy.

Such a possibility was far from their thought when they piled out of the trucks once more, as they had done repeatedly all day, to return the enemy fire. It did not even seem significant when an enemy mortar shell set one of the trucks in flames at the far end of the valley, thus creating a roadblock and splitting the column. The enemy took advantage of the opportunity to pour in small-arms and mortar fire which pinned down the troops taking cover behind vehicles or in the roadside ditches and prevented removal of the damaged truck. During this interlude the head of the column, consisting of the US tank and infantry companies, nearly three-fourths of the 41st Commando and a few other US Army infantrymen, continued the advance, in obedience to orders to proceed to Hagaru at all costs. Left behind in the "Hell Fire Valley" were 61 Commandos, most of Company B, 31st US Infantry, and practically all the 7th US Division Headquarters and Service troops.

Fortunately, however, no determined Red Chinese attacks were received up to midnight. So the troops left behind managed to form several perimeters for the night, and some of the British Commandos even managed to slip out of the perimeter in an effort to reach Koto-ri and summon assistance.
The head of the task force column was not aware, at dusk on the 29th October, that the convoy had been cut behind them. There had been previous gaps during the stops and starts caused by enemy fire, and it was supposed at first that the thin-skinned vehicles would catch up with the vanguard.

The progress of the head of the column was fairly good, despite intermittent fire from the high ground on the right of the road, until the tanks reached a point about 2,200 meters from Hagaru. There the column was stopped by concentrated CCF mortar and small-arms fire. One of the tanks was so damaged by a satchel charge that it had to be abandoned, and several vehicles were set afire. It was here that Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale was wounded and the command was passed to the G Company commander, who formed the force into a perimeter until the repulse of the Chinese permitted the march to be resumed.

The 41st Commandos now joined the 7th US Marines at Hagaru at 2300 hours, and when they were mustered, there were no more than 63 present. That night 55 more fought their way through.

In the meantime, there was strong Chinese resistance from the hills all around the Camp at Hagaru and in the early morning hours of the 30th an enemy concentration appeared to be taking place. Only sniping took place that morning, but at about 2300 hours the US Marines on the left flank, on a hill near the camp entrance, were pushed back. One platoon of the Commando, consisting of 32 men was sent up to retake the flank of the hill and did so just before dawn.

During the march from Koto-ri to Hagaru, the Commando’s casualties suffered were unknown, but an estimate of 18 killed and 43 wounded is not far from the mark.

There is no doubt that the British Commandos, a major part of the Task Force Drysdale, made a significant contribution to the holding of Hagaru which was vital to the 1st US Marine Division.

**Raid at Sorye-dong**

After the UN forces withdrew from Hungnam in December 1950, the 41st Independent Commando was attached again to ComNavFE. ComNavFE had conceived the idea of assisting the naval interdiction of the east coast rail line by a commando raid. A special task organization, Task Force 74, was set up under overall command of Admiral Hillenkoetter, USN. On 7 April 1951 at 0800, following rehearsals at Kure, Japan, a raid force of 250 Commandos stormed for Sorye-dong, 13 kilometers south of Songjin and demolished a section of the main line of the enemy coastal
railway.

The Commando, led by Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, and operating as a part of the task force succeeded in blowing up more than 100 meters of the track and left a crater 5 meters deep. The task was accomplished under cover of naval aircraft and a bombardment force, including the US heavy cruiser St. Paul. A fire control party from the St. Paul accompanied the Commandos and directed supporting naval fire while the Commandos maintained a defensive perimeter and planted their demolition charges.

Although a captured civilian reported strong Communist forces to the north of Songjin, the raiding party encountered only token resistance and small-arms fire during the seven hours required to complete the task. So complete was the surprise of the landing, and so effective was the curtain of naval gunfire in denying the enemy access to the area, that no casualties were suffered by the raiding force. By 1600 hours the party had reembarked.

As this raid was in progress, elsewhere up and down 250 miles of the east coast of North Korea, naval air and surface units maintained a relentless disruption of transportation lines. In the meantime, in the west, the West Coast Support Group continued to maintain a tight blockade of sea commu-

The British Marine machine gun crews take up covering fire in a daylight raid.
Amphibious Feints and Deceptions

From the September 1950 landing at Inchon, the enemy was well aware how decisive and how dangerous an amphibious assault could be. For the remainder of the Korean War, the enemy would remain acutely sensitive and apprehensive that another such lightning blow might come at any place and at any moment.

To take advantage of the enemy's sensitivity to amphibious attacks, the British Commandos were employed for the deception operations on numerous occasions.

One of those operations, for instance, took place on the west coast on 20 May 1951. The West Coast Blockading Commander, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff commanded the operation with gunfire support from the British cruisers Ceylon and Kenya. In the afternoon, that day, a dozen LCVPs, three loaded with the Commandos and the others empty, were put up on the beach opposite Cho-do, and the Commandos made a brief unopposed excursion inland prior to reembarking.

Coastal Raids

In July 1951 the Commando, whose varied experiences had taken it under the sea in USS submarine transport Perch into the enemy rear line near the mouth of the Taedong River, had arrived at Yo-do, off Wonsan, for a six month's tour of duty; after some practice raids against the Wonsan mainland the Commandos began a series of autumn operations, landing from an APD to attack objectives along the northeastern coast. During this time, the Commandos used the island of Yo-do as their base for the operations.

On the night of 4-5 December 1951, the Commandos carried out raids against enemy communication lines in Wonsan landing from USS Harace A.Bass. Although they met with some opposition they damaged railway tunnels and inflicted casualties. In these raids four men of the Commando were slightly wounded.

On 23 December 1951 they raided enemy sampans in Wonsan Bay with a great success. This was the last raid before they were ordered to leave the Korean theater. They were replaced by ROK Marines. On Christmas Eve they arrived at a base in Japan after 16 months' active operations in the Korean War.

Below is quoted a message of commendation sent by Vice Admiral Joy,
Commander Naval Forces in Korean waters, to the Commando:

"It is with the greatest pleasure that I command the officers and men of the 41st Independent Royal Marine commando. Your superb achievements have been a source of inspiration to freedom-loving people the world over and will go down in history's brightest pages. You have contributed in no small measure toward arresting the forward momentum of the Communist threat to world peace.

Since the inception of the 41st in August 1950, your courageous combat record against overwhelming odds in the many months of hard fighting has reflected the highest credit upon yourself and your brothers in arms in other branches of the UN forces in the field. On behalf of the naval forces in the Far East I extend most sincere appreciation for a job well done."
## CHRONOLOGY

### 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td></td>
<td>The British Admiralty places its Navy units in Japanese waters at the disposition of ComNavFE for the operations in the Korean War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jamaica and Black Swan engage with North Korean navy off Chumunjin on the east coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>The West Coast Support Element (TE 96.53) organized and CTE entrusted with the supervision of all non-American United Nations naval forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>Three west coast barrier stations established between 38°08' and 36°45'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unicorn and Ceylon arrive at Pusan with 1,500 troops and 800 tons of stores.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>Early Sep</td>
<td>The 27th British Brigade arrives at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>The 41st Marine Commando of 14 officers and 211 men arrives in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Brigade joins the line on the Nakdong River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td>The West Coast Support Element (TE 96.53) upgraded and redesignated as the West Coast Support Group (TG 95.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td>Triumph, Kenya, Jamaica, Ceylon, Cockade, Charity, Whitesand Bay, and Mounts Bay operate in support of the Inchon Landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fighting on Taegu—Seoul road across the Nakdong River and advancing on Songju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Action at Songju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Theseus arrives in Korean waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Advanced to Kaesong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Occupies Sariwon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Brigade departs Pyongyang for advancing on Chongju via Sinanju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Argylla Battalion enters Chongju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Middlesex Battalion moves to Taechon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>The brigade withdraws to positions north of the Chongchon River covering Sinanju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3—18 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 29th British Brigade arrives and disembarks at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 41st Marine Commando arrives in Hungnam for duty with the 1st US Marine Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 27th Brigade withdraws south of Chongchon River and moves to Kang-ri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Task Force Drysdale organized with Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale as its commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td>British troops at Taedong River near Pyongyang where 29th Brigade met the 27th Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 27th Brigade withdraws to Uijongbu from Pyongyang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td>The port of Chinhae evacuated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1951

1 Jan  The 27th Brigade moves Uijongbu to Seoul.
2 Jan  Action at Koyang by the 29th British Brigade.
6 Jan  The 29th Brigade at new line about Pyongtaek—Songhwan and the 27th Brigade east at Changhowan.
14 Feb  The 27th Brigade advances across the Han River from Yoji to move on Chipyong-ni.
16 Feb  Wonsan Siege begins.
19 Feb  Admiral Andrewes takes over the command of Task Force 95, the UN Blockading and Escort Force.
31 Feb  The 29th Brigade takes over the line of the Imjin River.
10 Apr  Rear Admiral A.K. Scott-Moncrieff takes over the command of the West Coast Support Group (TG 95.1).
19 Apr  Theseus leaves Korean waters for home relieved by Glory.
22-25 Apr  Battle of Imjin River by 29th Brigade.
23 Apr  The 27th Brigade defends in the area of Kapyong River.
26 Apr  The 27th Brigade was redesignated as the 28th Brigade.
27 Apr  The 29th Brigade at Yongdungpo area defending Kimpo.
29 May  The 28th Brigade takes up positions the line of Imjin River.
31 May  The 29th Brigade moves on Imjin River.
July  The 41st Marine Commando arrives at island of Yodo off Wonsan, for a series of special operations.
26 July  Three Brigades of 28th Commonwealth, 29th British and 25th Canadian holding the line of Imjin River.
26 July  The Han River operations begin.
28 July  Near Tokchong 1st Commonwealth Division was activated.
30 Sep  Glory leaves for Australia to refit.
3-8 Oct  Operation Commando takes place.
3 Oct  The attack on Hill 355 (Kowang-san) by 1st KOSB Battalion.
29 Oct  Corus enters Han River for the first time and drags the anchor.
4-5 Nov  The defensive operation on hills 217 - 315 by the 1st KOSB Battalion.
24 Dec  The 41st Marine Commando leaves Korea after 16 months active operations in the Korean War.

1952

May  Ocean arrives in the Korean theater and relieves Glory.
25 May  B Company, 1st KSLI of the 28th Brigade dispatched to Koje-do for the security guard duty on the prisoners camp for six weeks.
15 June  The Minister of Defence, Field-Marshal Lord Alexander of Tunis, visits Inchon.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Ocean’s aircraft attacked by MiG 15s for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>Belfast leaves the Korean theater to return to the United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rear Admiral E.G.A. Clifford takes over the command of the West Coast Support Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Admiral Sir Rhoderick, McGrigor, the First Sea Lord, visits the West Coast Support Group and witnesses its operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>Glory returns to Korean waters and relieves Ocean.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>British 1st Black Watch Battalion takes over the Hook positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28-29</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>British troops defends the Hook positions against enemy attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Evacuation of west coast islands begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-31</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Operation Swanlake for withdrawal from DMZ to post-armistice positions takes place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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KOREAN WAR CHRONOLOGY

1945

15 Aug     Japan surrenders, and Korea liberated from the Japanese colony.
24 Aug     Soviet troops complete occupying the northern half of the country.
 8 Sept    US occupation force begins to land in Korea.
13 Nov     USAMGIK creates National Defense Agency comprising Army and Navy Departments.
27 Dec     Moscow Agreement suggesting a four-power trusteeship over Korea signed among the three big powers (US, UK, USSR)

1946

12 Jan     A nation-wide movement opposing trusteeship over Korea breaks out.

1947

23 Sept    UN General Assembly adopts the Korean issue as an agenda.
14 Nov     UN General Assembly establishes UNTCOK, and passes a resolution for general election to be held under the supervision of the commission.

1948

12 Jan     The first meeting of UNTCOK convenes in Seoul.
23 Jan     Soviet occupation command refuses UNTCOK to enter north Korea.
26 Feb     UN Little Assembly directs UNTCOK to observe election in its accessible area of the peninsula.
10 May     General election held under the supervision of UNTCOK.
31 May     Constitutional National Assembly of the Republic of Korea takes form.
20 July Dr. Syngman Rhee elected as the first President of the Republic of Korea.
15 Aug The Government of the Republic of Korea is formed.
12 Dec UN General Assembly recognizes the Republic of Korea as the only and lawful government in the peninsula; also approves the reports of the UNTCK and establishes a permanent UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to replace the Temporary Commission.
26 Dec Soviet troops complete withdrawal from north Korea.

1949

1 Jan US Government officially recognizes the Republic of Korea.
18 Jan England officially recognizes ROK.
9 Apr Canadian Government recognizes ROK.
20 June New Zealand recognizes ROK.
29 June US occupation force completes withdrawal from Korea.
15 Aug Australian Government recognizes ROK.

1950

12 Jan The State Secretary of US, Dean Acheson utters the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia, excluding Korea and Taiwan from that defense line.
25 June North Korean Communist Force (NKCF) illegally invades the Republic of Korea in a total-effort, declaring the war.
25 June UN Security Council adopts, on 26 June (Seoul time), a resolution calling for NK Communists to cease-fire and withdraw to the north of the 38th Parallel, branding NK Communist attack as a breach of peace and international security.
27 June UN Security Council adopts the resolution calling upon the members to render every assistance including armed forces in supporting the Republic of Korea: President Truman orders US air and sea forces to support the Republic of Korea.
28 June ROK abandons Seoul, the Capital City.
29 June British naval fleet and the Australian vessels arrive in the Korean waters.
30 June RAAF aircraft enter the Korean war theater.
30 June President Truman orders to commit US ground forces to Korea, on 1 July (Seoul Time).
1 July UN Security Council decides to set up a unified command (UNC) for the UN effort in the Korean War: United States, in compliance with UN resolution, appoints Gen. MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, UNC.
14 July President Syngman Rhee assigns command authority of ROK forces to General MacArthur.
Korean War Chronology

20 July  Taejon falls to NKCF.
21 July  RCAF Transport Squadron enters the war.
30 July  Naktong River defense perimeter established. Canadian naval vessels begin to participate the war.
1 Aug  New Zealand frigates arrive in the Korean waters.
24 Aug  The advance party of the 27th British Infantry Brigade arrives at Pusan.
15 Sept  Inchon Landing.
16 Sept  UN forces begin general counteroffensive from Naktong Perimeter.
19-25 Sept  Enemy resistance along the Naktong perimeter begins to collapse.
28 Sept  UN forces take back Seoul. Australian infantry battalion arrives in Korea.
1 Oct  ROK forces cross the 38th Parallel north.
2 Oct  Chou En-lai implies that Communist China will intervene in the war in case of UN entry into North Korea.
7 Oct  UN General Assembly establishes UNCURK to bring about a unified and independent Korea and the rehabilitation of a relief of the nation; and authorizes Gen. MacArthur to pursue the retreating enemy to the north.
16 Oct  Chinese communist forces secretly invade Korea from Manchuria.
19 Oct  1st ROK Division takes Pyongyang, the capital of NK Communists.
26 Oct  6th Division of the II ROK Corps reaches on the Yalu River. First CCF prisoners captured by ROK forces. X US Corps lands at Wonsan.
27-31 Oct  CCF First-phase Offensive commenced.
1 Nov  First enemy MiGs appear along the Yalu River to counter UN air force.
6 Nov  MacArthur warns US JCS that movement of CCF across the Yalu threatens UNC position.
7 Nov  The advance party of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade lands at Pusan.
20 Nov  Indian field ambulance unit arrives in Korea.
25 Nov  CCF Second-phase Offensive commenced.
26-27 Nov  CCF offensive in full swing on both fronts; in the west Eighth US Army suffers deep penetration around Tokchon, and in the east 1st Marine Division cut off at Changjin Reservoir.
4 Dec  UN forces begin to withdraw from the northern zone and abandon Pyongyang.
15 Dec  I ROK and X US Corps evacuate from Hungnam, bound to south. Evacuation from Wonsan completed. UN forces form defensive line along the 38th Parallel.
31 Dec  New Zealand field artillery regiment lands at Pusan.

1951

3-4 Jan  UN forces abandon Seoul again and withdraw to general line along Pyongtack–Wonju–San-chok.
25 Jan  Operation Thunderbolt begins to advance toward Han River with the I and 1X US Corps on the line.
1 Feb UN General Assembly brands Communist China as aggressor.
21 Feb EUSAK orders Operation Killer to advance further north by the IX and X US Corps.

7 Mar Operation Ripper begins in central and eastern zones with advance across the Han River by the IX and X US Corps.
14-15 Mar ROK and UN forces restore Seoul again.
31 Mar UN advance reaches the 38th Parallel.
5 Apr Operation Rugged commenced to seize the Kansas Line.
8 Apr Operation Ripper clears enemy troops from South Korea east of Imjin River.
11 Apr General MacArthur relieved from the UN Command and General Ridgway appointed in his place.
14 Apr General Van Fleet succeeds Ridgway to command the Eighth US Army.
15 Apr UNC establishes defensive line more or less along the 38th Parallel, or Kansas Line.
19 Apr The I and IX US Corps seize the Utah Line.
22-28 Apr First effort of CCP Fifth-phase Offensive begins (1st Spring Offensive).
30 Apr UN forces, after withdrawing to new defense line, halt CCP offensive north of Seoul and north of Han River.
16-23 May Second and final effort of CCP Fifth-phase Offensive commenced (2nd Spring Offensive).
21 May UNC launches counteroffensive, pushes enemy north of the 38th Parallel again.
30 May ROK and UN forces back on the Kansas Line once more.
1 June Operation Piledriver begins, with elements of the I and IX US Corps advancing toward the Wyoming Line.
13 June UN forces capture Chorwon and Kumhwa in the Iron Triangle.
23 June Yakov Malik, Deputy Foreign Minister of Soviet Union, proposes cease-fire talks, on 24 June (Seoul Time).
30 June UNC notifies enemy of its readiness to discuss an armistice.
10 July Truce talks begin at Kaesong.
26 July Negotiators at Kaesong agree on preliminary agenda.
28 July Formation of the lst Commonwealth Division.
1 Aug-31 Oct UN forces launch limited attacks to straighten lines at Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge.
5 Aug UNC suspends truce talks because of armed enemy troops in neutral area. Cease-fire talks resumed on 10 Aug.
12 Oct IX US Corps advances to the Jamestown Line.
25 Oct Truce talks resumed at new site, Panmunjom.
28 Oct Cease-fire line agreed upon as present line of contact at the time of an armistice was signed.
12 Nov UNC orders EUSAK to confine operations to active defense.
18 Dec Prisoners of War lists exchanged by UNC and Communists.
1952

2 Jan  UNC proposes principle of "Voluntary repatriation" in POW exchange.

7-11 May  Rioting prisoners at Koje-do camp seize General Dodd and hold him hostage, until order restored.

12 May  General Mark W. Clark arrives in Tokyo to succeed General Ridgway as CinCUNC.

8 Oct  UNC adjourns armistice talks "indefinitely"; complete deadlock on POW question.

17 Nov  India introduces compromise truce plan at UN.

2 Dec  US president-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower begins three-day tour of Korea.

3 Dec  UN General Assembly adopts compromise Indian resolution, upholding the principle of no forced repatriation, while accepting the Communist notion that the fate of those who refused to go home should be decided at the peace conference to be held after an armistice.

1953

11 Feb  General Maxwell D. Taylor assumes EUSAK Command from General Van Fleet.

22 Feb  UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs, as preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners.

30 Mar  Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian proposal at UN.

11 Apr  Agreement on exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners to begin April 20 reached.

20 Apr  Operation "Little Switch" begins at Panmunjom.

7 May  Communists accept UN proposal that prisoners unwilling to be repatriated be kept in neutral custody within Korea, rather than be removed elsewhere to a neutral nation.

28-30 May  Savage fighting flared up again along the front.

6 June  National Assembly demands freedom for anti-Communist North Koreans held in ROK POW camps.

8 June  Agreement reached on POW question; POW nonrepatriates to be turned over to five-member neutral commission to decide disposition of POW cases. President Rhee declares armistice terms unacceptable to ROK.

9 June  ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms.

10-17 June  Communists launched heaviest offensive in two years against II ROK Corps sector in Kumsong area.

18 June  President Syngman Rhee releases approximately 27,000 anti-communist NK prisoners of war.
23-25 June  President Rhee reiterates opposition to truce terms.
8 July  Communist agrees to resume the talks, accepting General Clark’s proposal
to proceed with final arrangement without ROK participation.
13 July  CCF launches offensive against chiefly on the ROK divisions, aiming
their pressure at the ROK Government to accept the armistice.
19 July  Truce talks at Panmunjom reach agreement on all points.
27 July  Armistice signed, ending three years of the war waged by the Communists.
5 Aug-
6 Sept  Final exchange of prisoners, named Operation “Big Switch,” takes place
at Panmunjom.
1 Oct  Mutual Defense Treaty between ROK and USA, signed at Washington.

1954

23 Jan  Legal responsibilities for custody of the non-repatriated POWs by the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission end. UNC releases some
22,000 non-repatriatees to be free civilians.
18 Feb  The Berlin Political Conference, seated by the representatives of US,
UK, France and USSR in accordance with the Armistice Agreement,
issues a communique agreeing to participate in a conference at Geneva
to discuss the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.
23 Feb  Indian Custodian Force departs Korea for homeland after its mission.
26 Apr-
15 June  Delegations from ROK and all the nations participating in the UNC
except the Union of South Africa meet with delegations from USSR,
Red China, and Communist North Korea in Geneva, Switzerland. It
came to a close in mid-June without any conclusion. UN members
participated in the Korean War declared and reported to the UN that
the Korean Question be returned to the United Nations.
APPENDIX II

RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS ON KOREAN PROBLEM

1. The Cairo Declaration (December 1, 1943)

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already raising.

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first world war in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories she taken by violence and agreed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the People of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nation at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Note: Statement by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, and Prime Minister Churchill.

2. The Potsdam Declaration (July 26, 1945)

The Japanese Surrender

(1) We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Contracted.
(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Contracted.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) Contracted.

(11) Contracted.

(12) Contracted.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now that unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Note: Proclamation defining Terms for the Japanese Surrender, Signed at Potsdam and issued by the President of the United States (Truman) and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Attlee) and concurred in by the President of the National Government of China (Chiang), 26 July 1945.

3. Authorizing UNTCOK to Observe Elections in South Korea (583-A) (February 26, 1948)

The Interim Committee,

Bearing in mind the views expressed by the Chairman of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea;

Deeming it necessary that the programme set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 be carried out and as a necessary step therein that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea proceed with the observance of elections in all Korea, and if that is impossible, in as much of Korea as is accessible to it; and

Considering it important the elections be held to choose representatives of the Korean people with whom the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may consult regarding the prompt attainment of freedom and independence of the Korean people, which representatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National Government of Korea;

Resolves:

That in view it is incumbent upon the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, under the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947, and in the light of developments in the situation with respect to Korea since that date, to implement the programme as outlined in resolution II, in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission.
4. Recognition for Lawfulness of May 10 Election (June 25, 1948)

The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea,

Having observed, in accordance with the terms of the resolution of 14 November 1947 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the elections which were held on 10 May 1948 in that part of Korea accessible to the Commission,

Having previously declared that there existed in that part of Korea a reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom, of speech, press and assembly were recognized and respected,

Having taken into account the reports of its observation groups that such a free atmosphere existed during the elections,

Having satisfied itself that the electoral procedures which it recommended had on the whole been correctly applied,

Resolves:

To record its opinion that the results of the ballot of 10 May 1948 are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea.

5. The Administration of the Territories Occupied by the United Nations Forces (October 12, 1950)

The Interim Committee on Korea,

1. Considering the provisions of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October, under which the Interim Committee on Korea is requested to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the Recommendations contained in that resolution;

2. Having regard to the General Assembly recommendation that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea;

3. Recalling that the Government of the Republic of Korea has been recognized by the United Nations as a lawful Government having effective control over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult, and that there is consequently no government that is recognized by the United Nations as having legal and effective control over other parts of Korea;

4. Advises the Unified Command to assume provisionally all responsibility for the Government and civil administration of those parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the United Nations as being under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the outbreak of hostilities, and which may now come under occupation by United Nations forces, pending consideration by the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea of the administration of these territories; and

5. Recommends that the Unified Command take immediate steps to associate with all authorities established for civilian administration in accordance with the present resolution officers from the several forces of members of the United Nations under the Unified Command in Korea;

6. Invites the Unified Command to keep the Interim Committee informed of the steps taken in response to this resolution, pending the arrival of the Commission in Korea.


We, the United Nations Members whose military forces are participating in the Korea action, support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.

Australia: Percy C. Spender
Belgium: Silvercruys
Canada: H.H. Wrong
Colombia: Cipriano Restrepo J
Ethiopia: A. Tesemma
France: H. Bonnet
Greece: A.G. Polites
Luxembourg: Hugues le Gallais
The Netherlands: J.H. van Roijen
New Zealand: L.K. Munro
The Philippines: Melquiades J. Camboa
Thailand: P. Sarasin
Turkey: Feidun C. Erkin
The Union of South Africa: G.P. Jooste
The United Kingdom: Roger Makins
United States of America: John Foster Dulles

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

Article II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

Article III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to
dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of Korea and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

Article VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of October 1953,

For the Republic of Korea:
Y. T. Pyun
For the United States of America:
John Foster Dulles

8. Berlin Communique and Report (February 18, 1954)

Quadripartite Communique on the Berlin Conference

A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union — Mr. John Foster Dulles, Georges M. Bidault, Mr. Anthony Eden, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov — took place in Berlin between 25 and February 18, 1954. They reached the following agreements:

A

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in other parts of Asia,

Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend, shall meet
in Geneva on April 26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

B

The Governments of the United States of America, of France, of the United Kingdom, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Convinced that the solution of international controversies necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace would be considerably aided by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments,

Will subsequently hold an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of this problem as provided for in paragraph 6 of the United Nations resolution November 28, 1953.

The four Ministers have had a full exchange of views on the German question, on the problems of European security, and on the Australian question. They were unable to reach agreement upon these matters.


1. With a view to establishing a united, independent and democratic Korea, free elections shall be held under United Nations supervision in accordance with the previous United Nations resolutions relating thereto.

2. The free elections shall be held in North Korea, where such elections have not hitherto been possible, and in South Korea in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea.

3. The elections shall be held within six months from the adoption of this proposal.

4. Before, during and after the elections, the United Nations personnel connected with supervision of the elections shall enjoy full freedom of movement, speech, etc. to observe conditions and help to create a free atmosphere throughout the entire election area. Local administrative authorities shall give them all possible facilities.

5. Before, during and after the elections, candidates, their campaign helpers and their families shall enjoy full freedom of movement, speech, etc. and other human rights which are recognized and protected in democratic countries.

6. The elections shall be conducted on the basis of the secret ballot and universal adult suffrage.

7. Representation in the all-Korea legislature shall be proportionate to the population of
the whole of Korea.

8. With a view to apportioning the numbers of representatives in exact proportion to population in the election areas, a census shall be taken under United Nations supervision.

9. The all-Korea legislature shall be convened in Seoul immediately after the elections.

10. The following questions, particularly, shall be left to the all-Korea legislature:
   (a) Whether the President of unified Korea should be newly elected or not;
   (b) Amendment of the existing constitution of the Republic of Korea;
   (c) Disbandment of military units.

11. The existing constitution of the Republic of Korea shall remain in force except in so far as it may be amended by the all-Korea legislature.

12. The Chinese communist troops shall complete their withdrawal one month in advance of the election date.

13. Withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Korea may start before the elections, but must not be completed until complete control over the whole Korea has been achieved by the unified government of Korea and certified by the United Nations.

14. The territorial integrity and independence of the unified, independent and democratic Korea shall be guaranteed by the United Nations.

10. Declaration by the Sixteen-Nation Who Contributed Military Forces to the Korean War (June 13, 1954)

Pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Berlin communique of February 18, 1954, we, as nations who contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unification, independence, and freedom of Korea; and within the framework of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental.

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.

2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under UN supervision, for representatives in the national assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear. Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as the tool of aggression. Were we to accept this position of the Communists, it would mean the death of principle of collective security and of the UN itself. Secondly, we desire genuinely free elections. The
Communists insist upon procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none.

In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of August 28, 1953, the member states parties to this declaration will inform the United Nations concerning the proceedings at this conference.


In paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953 the military Commanders of both sides recommended that, in order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, a “political conference of a higher level of both sides” be held. The General Assembly, in its resolution of 28 August 1953, welcome the holding of such a conference and recommended that “the side contributing armed forces under the United Nations Command in Korea shall have as participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to the call of the United Nations which desire to be represented, together with the Republic of Korea.” It also recommended that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participate in the conference, “provided the other side desires it.” The United States Government was requested to make the arrangements for the political conference with the other participants. Finally, the Assembly recommended that Member States participating in the political conference on the United Nations side should inform the United Nations when agreement was reached at the conference and keep the United Nations informed at other appropriate times.

Efforts by the United States to make arrangements for the conference in accordance with these resolutions were for long frustrated. However, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR, meeting in Berlin, proposed on 18 February 1954 that “a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People’s Republic, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on 26 April for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.”
The Conference convened as scheduled on 26 April in accordance with the Berlin communiqué of 18 February 1954 with all eligible countries attending except the Union of South Africa. In our view this conference was in effect the conference referred to in paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the General Assembly's resolution of 28 August 1953. The Korean problem was discussed in fifteen plenary sessions and one special meeting over a period of seven weeks, from 26 April to 15 June.

Pursuant to the Assembly's resolution of 28 August 1953, the Members of the United Nations who participated in the United Nations action in Korea and attended the Geneva Conference believe it appropriate to inform the United Nations of their efforts to bring about, by negotiation, a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. It is requested that their report on the Conference, and this letter, be circulated to the Members of the United Nations. Copies of the records of the conference have been transmitted to the United Nations Secretariat.

(Signed)

For Australia: Percy Spender
For Belgium: F. van Langenhove
For Canada: Paul Martin
For Colombia: Francisco Urrutia
For Ethiopia: Z.G. Heywoot
For France: H. Hoppenot
For Greece: Alexis Kyrou
For Luxembourg: J.P. Kremer
For the Netherlands: D.J. von Balluseck
For New Zealand: L.K. Munro
For the Philippines: Felixberto M. Serrano
For Thailand: Wan Waithayakon
For Turkey: Selim Sarper
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Anthony Nutting
For the United States of America: Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

1. Our Governments, which participated in the United Nations action in Korea, made every effort at the Korean Political Conference in Geneva to obtain agreement that would lead to the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. To this end, our delegations made a number of proposals and suggestions, consistent with the authority and principles of the United Nations, to achieve the unification of Korea by peaceful means on a practical and honorable basis. Agreement was sought on the basis of the following two fundamental principles:

(1) The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully an diligently empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and

(2) In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision for representatives in a National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea.
Relevant Documents and Resolutions

2. The three Communist delegations rejected these principles..........................
3.-13. ........................................(contracted).
14. In our view the proposals submitted by the three Communist delegations at the
final session could have served only to conceal the serious issues of principle which remained
unresolved. We considered that it was better to face the fact of our disagreement and that
it would be wrong to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing
there was agreement when in truth there was none..........................
15. ...............................Our delegations made it clear that the failure of the Geneva
Conference to solve the Korean question does not prejudice the armistice in Korea, which
remains in effect. We expressed our intent to continue to support the objectives of the
United Nations in Korea, in particular that of achieving a unified, independent, and democratic
Korea by peaceful means. It is our hope that, through the acceptance of the fundamental
principles set forth in the first paragraph of this report, it may yet prove possible to
achieve.


A

Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Reha-
bitation of Korea signed at Seoul, Korea, on 7 September 1955,

Recalling that, in resolution 811(IX) of 11 December 1954, in approving the report of
the fifteen Governments participating in the Geneva Korean Political Conference on behalf of
the United Nations, the General Assembly expressed the hope that it would soon prove possible
to make progress towards the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, inde-pendent and
democratic Korea under a representative form of government and of full restoration of inter-
national peace and security in the area,

Noting that paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 provides that the
Agreement "shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable
amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settle-
ment at a political level between both sides,"

1. Reaffirms its intention to continue to seek an early solution of the Korean question
in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations;

2. Urges that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objectives;

3. Requests the Secretary General to place the Korean question on the provisional
agenda of the eleventh session of the General Assembly.

B

Problem of Ex-prisoners of the Korean War

The General Assembly,

Noting that, pending their final disposition, a number of exprisoners of the Korean war
remain temporarily in India,

1. Notes with appreciation that the Governments of Argentina and Brazil have generously offered to resettle as many of the ex-prisoners as opt to settle in those countries and that, in respect of the offer of Brazil, consultations with regard to arrangement are taking place;

2. Requests the Governments of Member States able to do so, to assist in bringing about a full solution of this problem by accepting for resettlement those exprisoners not covered by the present offers;

3. Requests the Government of India to report to the General Assembly at its eleventh session on this problem.

13. Resolution on the Korean Question by the U.N. (1180-XII)
(November 29, 1957)

The General Assembly,

Having received and noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea,

Recalling its resolutions 195(III) of 12 December 1948, 496(V) of 1 February 1951, 811(IX) of 11 December 1954, 910(X) of 29 November 1955 and 1010(X) of 11 January 1957.

Noting that the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains in effect,

1. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations are to bring about by peaceful means the unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Urges that continuing efforts be made to this end;

3. Calls upon the communist authorities concerned to accept the established United Nations objectives in order to achieve a settlement in Korea based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, and reaffirmed by the General Assembly;

4. Requests the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly.
# APPENDIX III

## ASSISTANCES PROVIDED BY THE U.N. ALLIES

### Military Aids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2 inf bns</td>
<td>1 carrier, 1 fighter &amp;</td>
<td>(A) 29 Sep 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 destroyers, 1 air-trans sqds.</td>
<td>(N) 29 June 50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 30 June 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1 inf brig, 1 FA regt, 1 armd regt, 3 destroyers, 1 air-trans sqd</td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 30 July 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 21 July 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
<td>(A) 15 June 51</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) Apr 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 7 May 51</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 gunboat</td>
<td>(A) 29 Nov 50</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) 29 Jul 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 9 Dec 50</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 air-trans sqd</td>
<td>(AF) 13 Nov 50</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1 inf co (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 31 Jan 51</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>1 destroyer</td>
<td>(A) 23 Nov 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N) July 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1 FA regt &amp; support units.</td>
<td>2 frigates</td>
<td>(A) 31 Dec 50</td>
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<td>(N) 1 Aug 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>(A) 19 Sep 50</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AF) 5 Nov 50</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>2 corvettes, 1 troop carrier</td>
<td>(A) 7 Nov 50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 transport ship, flight</td>
<td>(N) 7 Nov 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(AF) 23 June 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 inf brig</td>
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<td>(A) 17 Oct 50</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2 inf brigs, 1 tank regt, 2 FA regts, 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 3 frigates</td>
<td>(A) 24 Aug 50</td>
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<td>1 armd regt, 1 marine co &amp; several auxiliaries</td>
<td>(N) 29 Jun 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; support units.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>7 inf divs, 1 marine div, logistical &amp; 1 naval fleet; carrier task group, blockade &amp; escort forces, 1 tactical air force &amp; 1 air combat cargo command; various support units</td>
<td>(AF) 27 Jun 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 medium bombardment wings.</td>
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## Medical Aids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Kinds of Aid</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 hospital ship &amp; medical team</td>
<td>20 Nov 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 field ambulance unit</td>
<td>20 Nov 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 Red Cross hospital unit</td>
<td>Oct 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 mobile army surgical hospital</td>
<td>July 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 field hospital unit</td>
<td>23 Sept 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX IX
CODE NAMES

Iron Triangle: An area so named on account of its strategical and tactical weight during the war, forming like an equilateral triangle, with Pyonggang at its peak and Chorwon and Kuhmwa on both legs.

Jamestown Line: A new defense line secured by UN forces as a result of Operation Commando in October 1951. Beginning on the west bank of the Imjin River, it lined Samichon, Kyeho-dong, Yokkokchon, Chutoso, and ending 8 kms northeast of Chorwon.

Kansas Line: A defense line in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, established by UN force in April 1951. It began near the mouth of the Imjin and snaked to the northeast on the south side of the River. Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, Kansas veered toward the Hwachon Reservoir and then angled to the Taebaek Mts. until it reached the east coast some 40 kms north of the Parallel.

Missouri Line: A defense line constituting the central MLR of UN forces in April 1952. It lined the heart of Iron Triangle that connected Pyonggang on the apex and Chorwon and Kuhmwa on its left and right basis.

Operation “Big Switch”: Operation for repatriation of POW took place in Aug-Sep 1953. During the period UNC returned 70,159 NK and 5,640 CCF POWs while the communists sent back 12,757 UN prisoners.


Operation “Killer”: UN operation to cut off Hoengsong and trap large numbers of the enemy, lasting two weeks from 21 February 1951.

Operation “Little Switch”: Operation for repatriation of sick and wounded POW. The agreement for it was signed on 11 April 1953, and the exchange began on 20 April, lasting until 26 April. During it UNC handed over a total of 6,670 sick and wounded red prisoners, while the Communists returned 684 UN POWs.

Operation “Piledriver”: Operation to make limited advances toward Wyoming line by UN Forces, after securing Kansas line, early June 1951.

Operation “Ripper”: Operation executed by the IX and X US Corps in order to create a friendly bulge cast of Seoul by crossing the Han River from central and eastern
peninsula in mid-March 1951.

Operation "Roundup": Operation conducted by X US Corps to move northward in central Korea in February 1951 against II and V NK Corps occupying Hoengsong and Hongchon.

Operation "Rugged": UN operation to seize, lasting threedays from 3 April 1951. the Kansas Line roughly along the 38th Parallel.

Operation "Thunderbolt": A large reconnaissance operation in force spearheaded by I and IX US Corps in January 1951, in order to feel out the CCF screening force prior to UN general advance towards Seoul.

Wyoming Line: UN defense line in north of the 38th Parallel. It looped northeastward from the North of the Imjin River towards Chorwon, swung east to Kumhwa, and then fell off to the southeast until it rejoined Kansas Line near the Hwachon Reservoir. In the spring of 1951 it served as an outpost line screening the Kansas.
APPENDIX V
MILITARY SYMBOLS

Branch of Arm and Service

Infantry

Airborne

Airborne-Infantry

Artillery

Airborne-Artillery

Armor (Tank)

Reconnaissance

Armored Reconnaissance

Armored Infantry

Guerrilla

Engineer

Medical Corps

Ordnance

Signal

Transport
## Identification of Command and Unit Size

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Ⅰ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Ⅱ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td>Ⅲ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Army</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Group</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Examples

- **Company A, 17th US Infantry Regiment**
  - [Diagram](#)
  - 17(US)

- **2nd Bn, 50th Regt of 55th ROK Division**
  - [Diagram](#)
  - 50/55

- **Command Post, 8th British Field Artillery Regt**
  - [Diagram](#)
  - 8(Br/i)

- **Headquarters, VII ROK Corps**
  - [Diagram](#)
  - VII

- **Headquarters, Republic of Korea Army**
  - [Diagram](#)
  - ROKA
Military Symbols

Boundary between 1st and 2nd Battalions .................................................. 1 1 2

Boundary between 50th Regt of 55th ROK Div and
60th Regt of 56th ROK Div ................................................................. 50/55 1 1 60/56

Boundary between 7th and 25th Inf Div .................................................... 7 X X 25
APPENDIX VI
GLOSSARY OF KOREAN SUFFIXES

bau(pau) ......................... rock
bong(pong) ....................... bong, pong or san denotes a mountain
chon ............................. river; in general small river forming a tributary to Gang. (e.g. Sami-chon joins the Imjin Gang.)
dan(tan) .......................... point
do(to) .............................. island, (e.g. Chejudo, Tokdo)
dong(tong) ........................ village, settlement
gang(kang) ....................... river, (e.g. Han Gang, Naktong Gang)
gap(kap) .......................... point
gol(kol) ........................... village, it also means a ravine or valley
jae(chae) ......................... mountain pass
li(ni, ri) ........................... area name; smallest administrative unit consisting of several villages; township.
lyong(nyong, ryong) ............. mountain or mountain pass
maul .............................. village, settlement
nae ............................... stream, creek, brook
namdo ............................. south province
pukto(bugdo) ..................... north province
sa ................................. temple
san ............................... mountain
you ............................... deep water or pool; abyss; swamp
# APPENDIX VII
## ABBREVIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abn</td>
<td>Airborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCOM</td>
<td>Advance Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALO</td>
<td>Air Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Minesweeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Ammunition Officer, or Aerial Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armd</td>
<td>Armored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty(Aty)</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aus</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Battalion Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCFK</td>
<td>British Commonwealth Forces in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig(Bde)</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brit</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry(Bty)</td>
<td>Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cav</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cdr</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIB</td>
<td>Canadian Infantry Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CofS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComNavFE</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE</td>
<td>Commander, Task Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG</td>
<td>Commander, Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det</td>
<td>Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
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<td>Div</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>Died of wounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWR</td>
<td>Duke of Wellington’s Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>Drop Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
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<td>EUSAK</td>
<td>Eighth United States Army in Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forward Air Controller</td>
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<td>FAFIK</td>
<td>Fifth Air Force in Korea</td>
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<td>Fld(Fd)</td>
<td>Field</td>
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<td>FDC</td>
<td>Fire Direction Center</td>
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<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Forces</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Forward Observer, or Field Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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</table>
Gen  General
Grade  Gunner
HMAS  Her Majesty's Australian Ship
HMCS  Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
HNZNZS  Her Majesty's New Zealand Ship
HMS  Her Majesty's Ship (Brit)
HQ  Headquarters
IFA  Indian Field Ambulance
Inf  Infantry
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC  Joint Operation Center
KATUSA  Korean Augmentation to the United States Army
KATCom  Korean Augmentation to Commonwealth
KCOMZ  Korean Communication Zone (KComZ)
KMAG  United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KIA  Killed in Action
KOSB  King's Own Scottish Borderers
KSC  Korean Service Corps
KSLI  King's Shropshire Light Infantry
LCVP  Landing Craft, Vehicle-Personnel
LD  Line of Departure
Log  Logistics
LST  Landing Ship, Tank
LSU  Landing Ship, Utility
MASH  Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MATS  Military Air Transport Service
MBP  Main Battle Position
MDL  Military Demarcation Line
MIA  Missing in Action
MIG  Russian Single-Seat Jet Fighter-Interceptor
MLR  Main Line of Resistance
MSR  Main Supply Route

MX  Middlesex (Brit)
NAVFE  Naval Forces Far East
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer
NKCF  North Korean Communist Force
NNRC  Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
NNSC  Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
OBE  Order of the British Empire
O.I.  Operation Instruction
OB  Order of Battle
OP  Observation Post
OPLR  Outpost Line of Resistance
OpnO  Operation Order
OpnPlan  Operation Plan
Ops  Operations
Para  Parachute
PF  Frigate
PIR  Periodic Intelligence Report
POR  Periodic Operation Report
POW  Prisoners of War
PPCLI  Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
Psn  Position
RA  Royal Army, or Royal Artillery (Brit)
RAAF  Royal Australian Air Force
RAN  Royal Australian Navy
RAR  Royal Australian Regiment
RCAF  Royal Canadian Air Force
RC  Royal Canadian Engineer
RCHA  Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
RCN  Royal Canadian Navy
RCR  Royal Canadian Regiment
RCT  Regimental Combat Team
Recon  Reconnaissance
Regt  Regiment
Reinf  Reinforced
RFA  Royal Fleet Auxiliary (Brit)
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<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Republic of Korea Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKMC</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Marine Corps</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
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<td>Royal Navy (Brit)</td>
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<td>RNF</td>
<td>Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Brit)</td>
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<td>RNZA</td>
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<td>Royal New Zealand Navy</td>
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<td>R 22eR</td>
<td>Royal 22e Regiment (Can)</td>
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<td>Supreme Commander, Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SHORAN</td>
<td>Short range aid to navigation</td>
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<td>Supply Officer</td>
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<td>YMS</td>
<td>Motor Minesweeper</td>
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APPENDIX VIII

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M. Yingling Maj. USMC.

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THE BATTLE OF KAPYONG (23-25 APR 1951)

LEGEND

Australian Positions
CCF Attack

0 1 2 km

Sangnamdong

△ 219

△ 241

△ 272

△ 847

Kyegok-ri

△ 434

△ 299

Kyegok-ri

△ 179

△ 258

Situation Map 9
OPERATION AROUND PAKCHON—CHONGJU (23 OCT-2 NOV 1950)

LEGEND
Adv 23-26 Oct
Adv 30 Oct
Spearhead 31 Oct
Withdrawal 1 Nov
Pass-through 30 Oct
CCF Atk 25 Oct

Situation Map 13
ACTION AT KOYANG (2-3 JAN 1951)

Situation Map 14
COMMONWEALTH OFFENSIVE (30 MAY - 5 OCT 1951)

LEGEND
- CW Front 30 May
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