THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR
THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR

VOLUME I

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
1 December 1972

The War History Compilation Committee

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Minister of National Defense  Yu Jae Hung
FOREWORD

At dawn on 25 June 1950, the north Korean armed forces launched an unprovoked invasion of the Republic of Korea, subsequently precipitating the nation into the worst misery in her history. The land, divided unjustly by big powers, was once again torn apart by the unprecedented pandemonium of a family feud in an unfortunate war which was a by-product of the East-West confrontation.

Unprepared and taken by surprise, the Republic of Korea at the onset could render no effective resistance against the far superior invader forces and in no time faced an almost complete collapse of its existence to which the United Nations had given full approval. But the United States and other free nations did not close their eyes to this intrusion; in a firm resolution to repulse the aggressors in keeping with the principles of the collective security, these nations came to the rescue of free Korea in the name of the United Nations. Their support and assistance were various and vital. They preserved the Republic of Korea from being communized, laying a ground for her progress of today.

Currently, the realization of peaceful co-existence, transcending ideological differences, appears to be the trend of international pursuits. Similarly in Korea dialogues are in progress between the South and the North through Red Cross talks and other means. Nevertheless, there still are those peoples who fail to recognize the facts about the Korean War. We hope this book may help to clarify many points that have been in question.

The Korean War ceased in neither defeat nor victory. An armistice put an end to the three years and one month's hostilities, leaving a devastated land. It is two decades after the fighting. A true account of the conflict will be beneficial to the people who dare make their proud choice—freedom and peace.

It is hoped that this publication will serve to recall the comradeship which had so distinctly existed during the days of hardships among the comrades-in-arms of the free nations, and further to enhance mutual relations among our friendly nations.

Our deep gratitude is herewith extended to all the nations that helped Korea during those trying days.

This book is humbly dedicated to the men and officers, known and unknown, who gave their lives on this soil in the cause of freedom and peace and who are now resting here under the banner of the United Nations.

YU JAE HUNG
Minister of National Defense
PREFACE

Until it is suddenly brought home to him by the sight of his own misfortune, say, his house on fire, one never realizes what the old saying "a friend in need is a friend indeed" really means. There would be a neighbor who would come running, without regard to his own stake, to put down the fire and save him. Other would stand idly watching the catastrophe. Still the worse would in such a confusion unmask his falsehood and take to his predatory greed. The last was the case of the Communists in the conduct of warfares in Korea.

Since that uneasy silence fell on the 38th Parallel two decades ago, the Republic of Korea could never forget the lessons of the war as well as the friendship of the free nations. It was much in the sense to return its gratitude to the friendly nations that in 1972 initiated this project to present a comprehensive account of the activities of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War.

Now the First Volume among the five planned in the English series sees its first light, which covers the activities of troops from Ethiopia, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey in particular. The editing of one nation into a certain volume, however, represents nothing other than the editorial convenience in light of the unusual bulk of the themes on combat troops of the sixteen nations and non-combat elements of the five nations.

The second volume, to follow in the coming year, will deal with Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, that fought under a family group of the British Commonwealth; the third will attend to the activities of Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxemborg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden; the fourth will focus on the United States forces which formed the backbone of the United Nations' effort in Korea; the last in the series will cover not only the chronicle of the peace negotiation with the frustrations at the truce table, its politico-military backdrops and the Republic's uncertain status over the armistice, but also go into the post-armistice activities of the United Nations forces, and Armistice Commission, with mention of the consolidation of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

The preparation of this volume has undergone several phases in which the concerned nations also played the cooperative roles. The foundation of each Part was obtained by the books and operations records kindly furnished by the nations who fought the war. With full access to the archives of the Republic of Korea Services and other related sources, the Committee translated many materials written in the original language of friendly nations and rewrote each Part with thorough cross-reference with one another. When the un-
availability of reliable information and data threatened this cross-examination impractical, the Committee whenever possible observed to the objectivity to sort out the clues for conclusions. It is reminded that each nation participated in the war has been treated as an independent entity so that the scene in a Part shifts independently from the country's initial decision to commitment through all the phases of the fighting until the armistice. Nevertheless, each Part varies in size as a result of discrepancy in magnitude of original provision of information.

The manuscript has been further reviewed by leading scholars on the subject and by several foreigners for literary effect. When this completed, the Committee has sent each Part to the concerned nation for final perusal and comments. The final draft was also read by the Joint Reviewing Board composed of retired generals and authorities and historians in and out of services.

In the course of research and writing of this volume the Committee has received help from many agencies and sources, both inside and outside the Committee and here gladly acknowledges its indebtedness. It owes special debts of gratitude to the Minister of National Defense Yu Jae Hung, and the Vice-Minister of National Defense Ryu Kun Chang for their substantial support and encouragement to the project. It is also deeply grateful to the Members of the Advisory Group to the Committee, for their many helpful suggestions and counsellings: General Paik Sun Yup, Admiral Kim Yong Kwan, General Kim Chung Yul(AF), General Shin Hyun Jun(MC), and Dr. Kim Sung Shik of the Korea University. Special gratitude also goes to Professor Yun Ha Joon of the Keon Kook University and Mr. Yun Ha Jong, the Director of the Planning and Management, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for contributing their knowledge to improve the script, and for their tireless reviewing of manuscript.

Acknowledgement is also extended to the editorial staff members who contributed unlimited toil to the making of this Volume and also to Mr. Chung Hae Taek for his steadfast confidence in planning and support to the project.

In conclusion, I wish to add that although the volume remains much to be desired, it is presented to all free nations as a reminder to the collective security, the principle the United Nations once proved its worth so effectively in the Korean War.

LEE HYUNG SUK
Chairman
War History Compilation Committee

Seoul, Korea
1 December 1972
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. Contents.
Except Part One and Two, each Part of this volume is independent as a separate chronicle of a nation participated in the Korean War.

2. Equation of Time.
The problem of time difference has been met by adopting the local time of the origin of the event.

Maps are pooled at the end of each Part, where also the Annex can be found with the chronological history of each national contingent. In the drawing of the maps, the lines and areas indicative of the friendly forces are shown in blue in order to distinguish those of the opponent in red.

4. Romanization of Place Names.
The McAune-Reischauer System has been adopted and in case of nominal changes, new names are indicated along with the old ones. When proper identification is established, contemporary code-names and nick names are used interchangeably with the map designation.

5. Abbreviation.
As a general rule, the first time a unit and other terms are mentioned it has been given its full title, but thereafter have used abbreviation generally accepted. Unit designation and place names are further shortened in order to avoid repetitious monotony, such as “the 1st Republic of Korea Army Regiment” and “the Naktong River” may enter as “the 1st ROK Infantry” and “the Naktong” respectively.

6. Appendix.
Chronology, bibliographical documents, other references, and codes are attached in the Appendixes at the end.

7. Symbols.
Generally prevailing military symbols are also used to identify the units and their sizes as shown in Appendix IX.
8. Italic Letters.

In printing, the Italic type is applied to discern the opponent units from the friendly ones.

9. Index.

Relevant names, places, and incidents are enumerated in the Index in alphabetic order at the volume's end for cross-reference.
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CHAPTER I GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Section 1. Land and People

Located in the heart of the Far East, the peninsula of Korea has been of great strategic importance. Projecting out of the Manchurian land mass, it has, from pre-historic times, constituted a crossroads of Asiatic peoples flowing out of and into the eastern extreme of the Eurasian Continent.

Korea is approximately 970 kilometer-long and from 200 to 320 kilometer-wide. There are about 3,500 islands, mainly along the southern and western portions of the 9,700 kilometer-coastline. With its 220,848 square kilometers, the Korean peninsula, where approximately fifty million population now live in 1972, is hardly diminutive within the present world family of nations. But it is overshadowed by its neighbours. Japan is almost seventy per cent larger, China almost forty three times Korea's size, and the adjoining Russo-Siberian land mass is beyond comparison.

Extending southward from Manchuria and Siberia, however, are firm boundaries; the sea on the three sides and on the other the long northern border formed by great two rivers, the Amnok River(Yalu) and the Tuman River(Tumen).

The Amnok and Tuman originate in the same mountain mass, Korea's highest land, Paek Tu San. Stretching southward from the mountainous northern interior, close to the eastern coast, a major mountain chain throws off spurs to the west and south. Therefore nearly all of Korea is mountainous; only a fifth of the land is suitable for cultivation.

A big mountain barrier along the northern frontier effectively divides Korea from Manchuria, and the great mountain chain protruding southward along the east coast forms the spinal backbone of the country.

The coastal strip to the east of the mountainous backbone is narrow and has few good harbours. To the west, however, the land slopes more gradually down to the deeply indented west and south coasts. Here and there are numerous good harbours despite a phenomenally high tide, rising from 6 to 9 meters.
The broader river basins and wider coastal plains are found along the western and southern coasts, and the bulk of the agricultural yield comes from these areas. Land access thus lies chiefly along the western coast, where coastal lowlands form a corridor into the Manchurian plain.

The climate of Korea is humid and continental. However, Korea has a pronounced rainy season in summer and relatively dry winters. Throughout the Korea summers are hot. The hot, moist summers are suited for growing rice, the desired crop of the Korean farmer. Winters in the north are dry and cold; in the south the winters are relatively mild, two harvests a year being able to be produced. The vital rice crop is grown largely in this south part of the country.

Section 2. Pre-historic Times

It is assumed that in the paleolithic period human beings existed on the Korean peninsula, arriving there from the adjoining land mass. There are paleolithic remains found in the south of the Han River and elsewhere.

In the neolithic period, on the other hand, man's existence in Korea is evidenced by the shell mounds along the sea coasts and in river basins, and by the remains-bearing strata found in these locations and on the hills and mountains.

The long history of Korea goes back into a legendary past. One of the important legends is that of a founder of "heavenly origin" who became the first king of Korea in 2333 B.C. According to the legend, Hwanung, son of the Heavenly Ruler, came down to earth under a great tree, found a beautiful young woman (who had just been transformed from a bear into a human being), and breathed on her; she gave birth to Tangu, who became the first king. The bear and forest motif of the legend has significance in showing the northern Asiatic origin of the Korean people.

Henceforth, movements of peoples into the Korean peninsula were successively repeated: Some from Manchuria, and others from northern China and Mongolia, following the sea coasts and rivers. Some of them seemed to have crossed the sea to Japan, and others to have climbed the mountains and hills of the interior of Korea. Thus various cultural elements were gradually mixed during a long formative period of time.

This sluggish primitive society was finally changed by an outside force. Two influences, metal culture and the concept of authority, penetrated the peninsula from the northwest, which introduced the rise of a power structure
based on tribe, class, and culture differentiations.

While Korea was still in the stone age, two great movements, the activities of Hsiung-nu (Huns) and the Chinese drive to the east, had a profound effect on her population.

The Hsiung-nu were nomadic peoples who lived largely in the Mongolian plateau of the northern Asiatic steppe belt and diffused the Scytho-Siberian culture. Their activities extended from the four or fifth century B.C., and threatened the Chinese to the south and expanded as far as Manchuria to the east. This eastward movement of the Hsiung-nu was rivaled by the Chinese eastward expansion and culminated in the occupation of much of Korea by the Emperor Wu of Han in 108 B.C. The Han were to control Korea as an eastern base and were to have a protected flank in their effort against the Hsiung-nu.

Section 3. The Era of Three Kingdoms

The year 57 B.C. is generally given as the beginning of the Era of three Kingdoms, since that year the Silla was formed.

Koguryo, a branch of the Puyo of Manchuria, originally lived in the basin of the Sungari River. About the second century, faced with the Chinese eastward movement, they were forced to move east. After years of bitter conflict with Chinese, they succeeded in creating in 37 B.C. a great state extending over much of Manchuria and Korea.

In the central and southern part of the Korean peninsula lived the Sam Han tribes. About the time that the Koguryo people were strengthening themselves, the Han tribes were divided into three branches; the Ma Han in the central and western part of the peninsula, the Chin Han in the eastern part, the Pyon Han in the southern part. The third Kingdom was Paekche, in southwestern Korea, which was established in 18 B.C. out of the area of Ma Han.

A small state called Karak also existed from A.D. 42 to 562 in the southeastern fringe of Korea, which today is dominated by the town of Kimhae. In 562 it was finally absorbed by Silla.

Thus fighting for the control of the Korean peninsula among Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla lasted from the fourth century to the seventh century. Koguryo was the mightiest at first. Paekche, resisted powerful Koguryo in the north and Silla from the east. Silla successfully defended her territory against the pressure of Koguryo and Paekche, and, with the aid of Tang expeditionary forces, absorbed Paekche and Koguryo in the latter half of the seventh century.
Finally, driving out the Tang occupation forces from the peninsula, Silla created for the first time in Korean history a unified nation state covering almost all of Korea.

Section 4. Unification of Korea by Silla

In the struggle for the unification of Korea, the backward Silla survived. The period of the Three Kingdoms in Korea was paralleled in China with the turbulent era of the “Five Barbarian Nations and the sixteen States” and the “Northern and Southern Dynasties,” to the time of the Tang unification, or 317 to 618 A.D.. At the end of the sixth century China was unified by Sui, which was menaced by invasion, especially from the Turks in the north, and was necessary to secure its flanks. To this end Sui sent a large army, once more than a million men, to attack Koguryo in 598 and 612-614 A.D.. Yet these efforts to subdue Koguryo failed. The attempt crucially sapped the power of the victors as well.

Chomsongdae, one of the oldest astronomical observatories in the world.
as the repulsed, and caused insurrection in China, which contributed to the overthrow of the Sui Dynasty (618). The Tang Dynasty, who replaced the Sui, continued the Sui Policy of planning the conquest of Korea and Manchuria. After several frontal attacks on Koguryo were failed in 644 and 646, and 655-659, Tang sent a fleet to invade Paekche, Koguryo's rear, and succeeded in subjugating Paekche. Conquering Paekche, Tang China attacked Koguryo and finally occupied the capital Pyongyang in 668. For about seventy years, Koguryo had fought against the huge armies of the Sui and Tang empires, and finally fell. Silla, at the time of the Tang expeditions against Paekche and Koguryo, participated in the fighting as an ally. But Silla, opposed to Chinese occupation of Korea, commenced war against occupation forces. After six years unfavorable fighting, the Tang invaders were finally forced to withdraw from the peninsula. Silla began her unified rule of Korea in 676.

The unification of Korea was an important turning point in Korean history. It brought about a political unity of the country and also achieved an amalgamation of all Korean tribes and various elements of cultures in the country. This provided a basis for the development of the modern Korea. Thus unified Korea, with the rarest and most temporary exceptions, remained until the foreign imposed Cold War division along the 38th Parallel in 1945, and the Demilitarized Zone in 1953. The northern borders were somewhat fluid until the mid-fifteenth century, but, on the whole, Korea has one of the longest traditions of unity within approximately the same borders of any nation of the present world.

Section 5. Koryo and Choson

With the unification of Korea, Silla built a brilliant culture and prosperity. But a period of decline called on it. The latter 150 years of the dynasty was marked by a succession of a quarrels, conflicts and discords among the nobility. The confusion in the government's administrative machinery developed throughout the country. Bandit chieftains with local authority appeared in many parts of land and became influential. Thus regional revolts continued for about a half century, until Wang Kon, the founder of the Koryo dynasty, unified Korea in 936.

Establishment of the new dynasty by Wang Kon was favoured by a continental situation. As mentioned earlier, Korea has been directly affected by vicissitudes in the adjoining part of Asia and her fate has been intertwined with continental affairs. The overthrowing of Silla and the founding of a new dynasty by Wang Kon coincided with the chaotic period on the continent; the
period of Tang's decline and the Five Dynasties (907-960) in China. Wang Kon was able to form the new dynasty without interference from the continent. Sun unified China in 960. Koryo's relations with Sun were peaceful. That situation, however, did not continue for long. The Khitan, the Jurchin, and the Mongols arose in the north to threaten Koryo.

Khitan invasions of 994-1011 penetrated deep, once occupying the capital Kaesong. The Khitan made demands for overlordship after they established the Liao dynasty in China. The Jurchin, who established the Chin dynasty (1115-1234), destroyed Liao in 1125 and drove the Sun south of the Yangtse River (1127), and threatened the northern borders of Koryo in the twelfth century.

The Mongols destroyed the Chin and occupied Manchuria and North China in 1234. Conquering the Southern Sun, they carried out a major invasion of Korea. Since a large Mongol army crossed the Yalu River and attacked Korea, in 1231, Mongols incursions were repeated. Finally they ended in the complete capitulation of the Koryo Dynasty in 1259 and a century of Mongol overlordship. Koryo Kings took Mongol princesses for their wives, and Koryo court life followed the Mongol pattern.

Koryo suffered from another calamity with the advent of Japanese marauders. Their activities continued from the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries to the early period of the Yi Dynasty in Korea. During these years they raided Korea and China, and caused great distress in Korea. The nation was unable to defend itself.

In the government of Koryo, a strong anti-Mongol movement developed. The Koryo court debated fervently in foreign policy whether it continued itself to the Mongols or the Ming regime. At the end of the dispute, the pro-Mongol faction defeated the pro-Ming faction and a pro-Mongol policy was promoted. Koryo decided to attack the Ming in order to assist the Northern Mongol regime. A fifty thousand expeditionary army was ordered to advance into Liao-tung of Manchuria. But General Yi Song Gye, who had won a high military reputation for victories over the Japanese pirates and Jurchen, resolved to stop the war, gathered the army, and led it back to the Koryo capital. Returning to Kaesong, he banished the pro-Mongol faction at one stroke and seized power at the capital. In 1392, Yi Song Gye mounted the throne, and commenced the Yi Dynasty, which remained in power until the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

Under the early Yi dynasty, Korea flourished intellectually and culturally. The Confucian ethical system governed the mores of the court and upper civil service. Buddhism, which had been the state religion of Koryo, persecuted and curbed. During the first 150 years of the Yi Dynasty, scholarship was
widespread in medicine, astronomy, geography, history, and agriculture.

At the end of the sixteenth century, Korea suffered from the first of two invasions that took place within a 50-year period.

When the Ashikaga Military Government in Japan had been established the Japanese pirates activities, which had been plundering the Korean coasts, were checked. Then peaceful relations between Korea and Japan began. Later the Ashikaga Military Government weakened, Japan was reverting to internal strife, and Japanese pirates were again active on the Korean coast. Because of them, official relations were suspended between Korea and Japan. When Toyotomi Hideyoshi appeared and unified the country, Japanese pirate raiders marauding was put to an end but the overseas activity of the Japanese was continued by peaceful merchants and traders. Hideyoshi was not satisfied with peaceful trade alone and was planning to conquer the Asiatic continent as far as India. In 1592 and again in 1596, Hideyoshi sent invasion troops into Korea in an abortive attempt to attack China. During this period, the Koreans, led by Admiral Yi Sun Sin, won sea battles off the southern coast over the Japanese, aided by the “Turtle Boats,” ironclad warships shaped like a tortoise. However, the Korean army in land was crucially defeated by the Japanese in the first few weeks owing to the lack of defenses. The helpless despairing state of Korea was scarcely rescued by the Ming army. This war struck a heavy blow to Choson and Ming China as well as Japan.

In Korea the organization of the government, of the economy, and of the whole society disintegrated. Recestablishment of order was almost impossible. This period marked the beginning of the rapid decline of the Yi Dynasty. On the part of Ming, mobilization of her armies had placed a heavy burden on China financially, and this, combined with the discontent of the people, undermined the strength of the Ming Dynasty. Added to this, the sending of the Manchurian forces to Korea had weakened China's defenses in Manchuria, and provoked the independence drive of the Manchus which lead to the establishment of the Chin Dynasty in 1644. In Japan, the Toyotomis was shortly overthrown by the Tokugawas, and the Tokugawa feudal power was established. Thereafter peace prevailed between Korea and Japan to the end of the Tokugawa period.

With the factional struggles engrossed in Korea, the political situation in Northeast Asia had changed. The Jurchin arose in Manchuria under the leadership of a Manchu chieftain, Nurhachi. In the struggle for power on the China mainland, the Manchus had to secure Korea under their control. The Manchus, before the losses incurred by the Japanese invasions were recovered, attacked Choson twice in 1627 and in 1636, despoiling the peninsula even further. The
Korean government was hardly able to rehabilitate the losses, and, when the Western world began to take interest in the peninsula, the Yi Dynasty was weak and to be absorbed into Japanese imperial territory.
CHAPTER II  A VORTEX OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY

Section 1. The Policy of Isolation and Seclusion

Having experienced repeated catastrophic invasions, the Koreans were made acutely aware of foreign threat and their own weakness. They felt the hopelessness of purely military defense and adopted other means of maintaining essential independence and identity. After the Manchu invasions, they fended off contacts with the outside world for more than 200 years, earning for their country, the sobriquet, "the Hermit Kingdom."

Isolation was probably a function of geography and undeveloped communication. The Mongolian invasion of the mid-thirteenth century brought a more conscious seclusion in the fourteenth century. From 1609 contacts with Japan were officially limited to the small port of Pusan, which was purposely isolated. Resources lay consciously undeveloped lest they should attract foreign avarice; the mining of gold and silver was discouraged lest it lead to increased Chinese exactions, trade never flourished, and visitors or castaways were hustled out or expelled. No significant minorities of foreign origin could root themselves on the Korean soil. Confucian xenophobic political system and philosophy worked deep against "alien" ways.

Unfortunately, the Koreans stopped the clock of history at a time when the industrial revolution was taking place in Europe. The Europeans and Americans forced China to open her ports in 1842 and 1854 broke down the seclusion of Japan. The Far Eastern nations found themselves by the intrusion of England and France from the south, Russia from the north, and the United States across the Pacific Ocean. It was only a matter of time whence the wave of the western influences would reach Korea.

The Korean envoys who went annually to China had been bringing home news of the impacts from the West. By way of China, Western natural science and Christianity had already entered Korea as the "Western Learning (Sohak)." In 1653 a Dutchship was wrecked on Cheju Island and 36 survivors were brought to Seoul. It was one of the first Western contacts the Koreans had experienced.

In the nineteenth century, Western vessels, surveying or in search of shelter, frequently haunted off the Korean coasts. Korea regularly succored the
shipwrecked, before expelling them to China, but she resisted violently all efforts to open trade or even negotiate.

In 1833 and 1845, English ships appeared off the western and southern coasts and in 1865 a Russian warship off the coast in the northern border waters. In 1866 a French squadron, to obtain redress for the decapitation of French priests, occupied Kangwha Island, at the entrance of the Han River southwest of Seoul; in 1868, in search of trade, an American merchant ship, the General Sherman, sailed up the Taedong River only to be burnt and an American squadron occupied Kangwha Island in reprisal for her destruction.

Confronted by these critical impacts, Korea responded with strengthened border defenses and redoubled her persecution of Christians. Accordingly in 1866, about 30,000 believers were persecuted. The French and American landing parties were vigorously attacked and driven out by the regimented Koreans.

This apparent military success confirmed the resolution of the Korean government and the old policy of seclusion was firmly upheld. This stubborn seclusion policy can not be explained only by her strong stand and military defense, but by the attitudes of the western nations toward Korea. The foreign powers, at that time, had more important problems on their hands. England was more concerned with India. Russia was concentrating her efforts towards the development of Siberia and the Maritime Province. France was busy with Annam, and the United States with the opening up of the West after the Civil War. This left them neither time nor interest necessary for overcoming Koreans' determined opposition to foreign trade.

But Korea could not preserve her isolation for long since Japan loomed on the scene. Japan had been forcibly opened by the United States in 1854, and overthrew the Tokugawa military regime and restored emperor's government in 1868. After this Meiji restoration, modernization modeled after the western nations, was fervently aimed at. The foreign policy of the Meiji government was to promote the expansion of the empire in the interest of the newly developing Japanese capitalism. Korea, unfortunately, was chosen first target of the Japanese aggression.

When the Meiji government wooed to renew diplomatic relations, Korea refused the proposal and considered Japan as dangerous as the western powers because Japan had been opened up by them. The reaction to this was a proposal of military expedition against Korea led by disgruntled warriors. In 1873 their plans for invasion were forestalled by cooler heads in the Japanese government, but the idea did not disappear. They were looking for the opportunity out the
project. When in 1875 the Japanese warship Unyo, navigating off Kangwha Island, was fired on by the Koreans, the opportunity had come. Warships and transports were immediately dispatched. With Chinese advice Korea was forced to make a treaty opening up the country in 1876. This is known as the Treaty of Kangwha, an equal treaty modeled on the western treaties with China and Japan. It opened three ports for Japanese trade—Pusan, Inchon, and Wonsan—and declared Korea to be an “independent state.”

In 1882 the United States became the first western nation to conclude a treaty with Korea. This was followed by similar treaties with other western countries, and by 1886 diplomatic relations had been established with all other nations having interests in northeastern Asia.

Section 2. Growth of Japanese Influence

The opening up of Korea marked the beginning of the competition between China and Japan for control of the country, a competition which lasted until the Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895). Korea, from this time on, was thrown into a vortex of great power rivalry. The opening of three ports introduced floods of Japanese and Japanese goods. Their cheap cotton cloth in particular dominated Korean markets. On the other hand, rice and other foodstuffs were exported from Korea to Japan, so that dating from this early period Korea became a supplier of food for Japan, and became tied to the Japanese capitalist industrial market.

After the Treaty of Kangwha the Korean government attempted a Japanese-sponsored military reform. This invoked strong reaction among anti-Japanese populace, especially among the old military men whose livelihood was threatened by this reform. In 1882, an uprising, in essence a protest against the entering of the Japanese into Korea, broke out. Ching China, who had lost to Japan the dominant position in Korea as the suzerain for 200 years, found an opportunity to intervene in and reassert her authority over Korea. She dispatched an army of 5,000 men to help the Korean government and abolished all Japanese-style reforms. Japan, also, sent troops to Korea, but the situation had already been established for China, and Japan did not have the strength to oppose it.

In the turning-over of influence from Japan to China, Korea’s bureaucracy split into two conflicting groups. The Sadae (Serve the Great) party was the conservative force surrounding the throne and dependent on China. Opposing it was the Independent party mainly composed of younger Koreans. They wanted
Japanese support and, learning from Japan's modernization, attempted to carry out reforms. In 1884, the reform group, aided by the Japanese troops in Seoul, carried out a coup d'etat. Contrary to expectations—China was then at war with France over Annam—a Chinese army began a counterattack and the Japanese troops retreated. The coup d'etat was soon overthrown and the Sadae government was reestablished.

Before the revolt had ended, Japan dispatched her troops to Korea with the avowed aim of protecting her nationals and interests. China responded by sending additional reinforcements and a war between the two powers seemed pressing. But since neither party was prepared to fight, a conference was held at Tientsin in 1885, in which both sides agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea and further agreed not to send new troops to the scene without first notifying the other power.

In 1894 the Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Rebellion, a large anti-foreign peasants' uprising comparable to the Taiping Rebellion and Boxer Rebellion in China, broke out in the southern provinces and began a march on Seoul. The Korean government, being unable to suppress them, requested China to help put down the rebellion. China dispatched 5,500 troops and notified the Japanese in accordance with the Tientsin agreement. The Japanese responded by sending 8,000 troops into Korea to balance the Chinese power. The Tonghak uprising, meanwhile, subsided, and war declared between the two powers in July, 1894. Japan's ostensible purpose was to preserve the independence of Korea. After a short period fighting, to the astonishment of the world, China was defeated.

In April, 1895, the Treaty of Simonoseki was concluded between Japan and China. Japan obtained from China the Liatung Peninsula, Taiwan and the Pescadores, and an indemnity. The Chinese influence in Korea was removed, and Japan was recognized as having a dominant position in both Korea and South Manchuria.

In less than a week after signing of the Treaty of Simonoseki, the so-called three power intervention by Russia, France and Germany intimidated Japan. Faced with such a coalition, Japan had no alternative but to accept the three power request and return to China the Liatung Peninsula. Russia, however, obtained the rights to mines and railroads in 1896, and in 1897 leased Lushun (Port Arthur) and Luda (Dairen). This development was obnoxious to the Japanese, who had been forced out of the peninsula by Russia herself.

The three power intervention, in its turn, affected Korean politics, the Progressive party associated with Japan was shaken and the strength of the Russian-oriented party of Qeen Min increased. In an attempt to roll back the situation, Japan ended up with the assassination of Queen Min by political thugs.
in October 1895. The King, in fear of his life, took refuge in the Russian legation, where he stayed for a year. During this period, Korean politics were completely dominated by Russia.

A clash between Russia and Japan over Korea was inevitable. A series of conventions met in St. Petersburg, and it was agreed that neither nation would interfere in Korea's internal affairs, and Russia promised to recognize the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and not to hamper Japanese industrial and commercial activities in that country. Despite this agreement, the intense Russo-Japanese rivalry continued.

In this situation Japan's anti-Russian policy became more pronounced counting on British support against Russia. In 1902 the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been concluded. At that time Britain was clashing with Russia in Afghanistan, and with Russia's ally, France, in China, and was also threatened by the world-wide advance of a newly arisen Germany. Britain chose Japan as her ally in the Far East.

Japan demanded Russia to withdraw her army in Manchuria and recognize Japan's position in Korea. Russia refused to withdraw from Manchuria and proposed to establish in Korea the spheres of influence of the two nations divided along the thirty-nineth Parallel. Finally the Russo-Japanese war broke out in February 1904 and lasted to 1905. Russia, thought to be one of the most powerful nations in the world, was surprisingly defeated by Japan, a newcomer on the world scene. In Russia the revolutionary fervor of 1905, was stirred—the prelude to 1917. In Korea it signaled the death knell of that country.
CHAPTER III UNDER THE JAPANESE RULE

Section 1. The Annexation of Korea

In 1897 the official name of Korea, CHOSON, was changed to Dae Han (Great Han) and the King proclaimed himself Emperor, actions symbolic of his independence from China. The Korean Government, however, was scarcely able to maintain itself in the vortex of international power politics.

In 1905 when President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States offered his “good offices” to end the war, the Russians and the Japanese accepted it and met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to sign a peace treaty. In his dealings with this affair, Roosevelt clearly ignored Korean interests. In hopes of implementing the United States “Open Door” policy in Asia, he had given strong support to Japan in opposing Russia’s expansionist activities and approved Japan’s program for Korea. However, there was another matter for Roosevelt to consider, the Philippine Islands, which had been acquired by the United States in the war with Spain(1899). In July 1905, Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, visited Tokyo and signed a secret agreement with Japan, that, in return for Japan’s disavowals of aggressive design on the Philippines, the United States would agree to the establishment of Japan’s suzerainty over Korea.

Thus, after the Russo—Japanese War Japan established her exclusive domination of the country, the ultimate end of which was annexation of Korea.

In February 1904 Japanese troops entered Seoul, and under the Japanese military pressure, Korea signed the so-called Korean—Japanese Protocol. In February 1906 a regency general was established in Seoul, and Ito Hirobumi was appointed the first Resident General. He was empowered to give direct orders to the Korean Government on matters important to the Japanese. His control was not limited to foreign affairs alone, but extended to Korean internal affairs also. The Japanese firmly set up a protectorate over Korea.

Korea had now become a part of Japan. The take-over of Korea by Japanese force naturally aroused in the Koreans considerable opposition and disquiet. In 1907, the Emperor sent a secret mission to the Second Hague Conference to protest against Japan’s domination. Taking it as a pretext for more pressure on Korea, Japan forced the Emperor to abdicate and disbanded the Korean
army. The disbanded armies rose in rebellion throughout the country. The uprising was nation-wide and vigorous. These “righteous troops” partisans were active until after the annexation. D.W. Stevens, a Japanese-appointed American advisor on foreign affairs attached to the Korean Government was killed by Koreans in San Francisco in 1908; Ito Hirobumi was assassinated by a Korean patriot, An Chung Kun, at Haerbin as the main foe against Korea in 1909; and pro-Japanese Prime Minister, Yi Wan Yong, was stabbed in the same year. All these were expressions of the anti-Japanese feelings of the Koreans.

In such a critical situation, Japan considered even nominal independence might be dangerous, and, to ensure her complete domination over Korea, she annexed Korea under her absolute control in August 1910. Thus, both in name and in fact, Korea became a part of the Japanese empire. From August 1910 until August 1945 Korea did not exist as a nation.

Section 2. Japanese Military Rule

The annexation of Korea by Japan had brought with it a military government and a typical economy. The governor generalship, for which only generals and admirals were eligible, was personally appointed by the Japanese emperor, and had absolute authority to control Korean military and civil affairs. Thus the regime continued uninterruptcd until it aroused the incident of March 1919, and even after that, in changed form in a more oppressive manner, it continued as the basic policy for controlling over Korea. In the economic sphere, Japan was importing agricultural products, especially food-stuffs from Korea, and exporting industrial products to Korea. Thus in Korea, a typical colonial economy had been forcefully developed under the complete control of Korean economy by the Japanese.

In spite of the atrocious military administration, opposition to the Japanese rule flared up in the Korean people. When the First World War ended, the doctrine of racial self-determination, proclaimed by President Wilson of the United States, appealed to the Korean people who had lost their fatherland. This faith underlay the great March First(Samil) Movement of 1919, a nationwide unarmed demonstration in request for the Korean independence.

The first day of March 1919, two days before the funeral of the former ruler of Korea, Yi Taewang(Kojong), was fixed as the day for the public announcement of an independence declaration. Thirty-three Korean national representatives, including land owners, capitalists, cultural and religious leaders, especially
The March First (Samil) Movement of 1919.

Christians, Society of the Heavenly Way (Chondogyo), an offspring of Eastern Learning (Tonghak) and Buddhist leaders, signed the declaration.

It eloquently runs:

"We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea—in witness of the equality of all nations, and we pass it on to our posterity as their inherent right—victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder ruled, we have come after these long thousands of years to experience the agony of ten years of foreign oppression, with—every restriction of the freedom of thought, every damage done to the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the intelligent advance of the age in which we live—The result of annexation, brought about against the will of the Korean people, is that the Japanese are concerned only for their own gain...digging a trench of everlasting resentment deeper and deeper the farther they go..."

The declaration did not call for violent means. It appealed only two methods in its efforts to achieve independence, namely to make petitions to foreign powers and to shout in the street "Dongnip Manse!" (Long live the independence of Korea!). No plans for armed uprisings were scheduled. Throughout the nation people joined the movement and took part in the mass parades. However,
the Japanese military police responded with gunfire against the peaceful demonstrations and called even the army and navy for help. This movement was not limited to Korea, but developed also to Harbin and Tsingtao (Qingdao), Hawaii and any place where Korean residents existed. In Tsingtao (Qingdao) which thereafter became a center of independence movement, Koreans attacked the Japanese consulate. But this large independence movement, finally, was suppressed by force and ended in failure.

The expected foreign support was not materialized. The Great Powers meeting at Versailles found it expedient to ignore the appeals, since Japan was a victor in World War I. As for Wilson, upon whom so much the faith was placed, he was soon foundering in the discord of the United States Senate which rejected his League of Nations. Nevertheless, the drive for independence continued. The exiled leaders assembled in Shanghai and organized the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (Dachan Mingug Imsi Jeongbu) with Syngman Rhee named as first President.

The Independence movement was not entirely in vain. The Japanese adopted a cultural policy and proposed various reforms, in which the integration of Koreans and Japanese was advocated. The military police was replaced by regular police, and government officials and teachers were no longer required to wear uniforms and carry swords. Publication of newspapers in Korean such as the Chosonilbo and the Dongailbo was permitted. On an extremely limited scale, certain influential Koreans were allowed to take part in local and national politics.

The change from a policy of military rule to a cultural one coincided with the post-war period. The rapid development of Japan during the war caused a serious food crisis in Japan. There was need for a positive plan to increase rice production in Korea to meet Japan's food deficit. Thus the program for increasing rice production was forcefully developed. From 1929 on, Japan was caught up in the world depression. It struck a heavy blow to agriculture first. A world-wide agricultural panic occurred. In order to recover its agriculture and its capitalistic economy, Japan placed a limitation on Korean rice imports. It was a decisive blow to Korean economy which had been tied exclusively to Japan in a colonial single crop economy system.

At this point, Japan had to find another breakthrough. The 'Manchurian Incident' of 1931 and the establishment of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo found the breakthrough. In Japan a garrison state was established; in Korea the value of her strategic location and materials were highly appreciated. Thus Korea had become exploited as a military supply base, and led to the continued development of industry and mining. This brought about the
change of industrial structure in Korea, with southern Korea concentrating on rice production and light industry, and northern Korea heavy industry; Korea became divided into two major industrial areas. But this industrialization was only through the investment of monopolistic capitalists as the Koreans were but outsiders.

In 1937 the Japanese imperialism started an aggressive war in China. The reintegration of the Korean economy was pushed a step further. Korea took on a more pronounced military character in every sector of its life. With it began the so-called Unification of Korea and Japan movement, and the Transformation into Imperial Subjects. In October 1937, immediately after the China Incident, the "Oath of imperial Japanese subjects" was drawn up, and students in all educational echelons, as well as non-students were forced to recite aloud the oath at morning meetings, ceremonies and other occasions. The Japanese language itself was popularized vigorously, and, from 1938 on, the use of Korean was forbidden in schools, and the newspapers in Korean were abolished.

In addition, to indoctrinate Koreans in the "Japanese spirit," "love the country" days were introduced when Shinto shrines were visited and flag-raising ceremonies were observed. Koreans were also forced to alter their names to Japanese style with coercion. Korean homes were even forced to provide themselves with "good stands" of the Sun Goddess, the mythical ancestor of the Japanese emperor.

The mobilization was not limited to spiritual lines. The Koreans were involved, after the undeclared war against China by Japan began, in the combats through a system for army volunteers. There was also a labour and service mobilization for increasing production of military supplies.

Korea had now become an integral part of the Japanese empire. In this context, Korean traditions and customs, as well as their ideas and desires, counted for naught. Everything in Korea was subordinated to Japanese strategic military needs. Korean economic growth, the spectacular industrialization of Korea and Japan, the transformation of Koreans into Imperial Subjects, and all similar developments had been brought about simply to fill such needs.

This trend became even more pronounced after Japan entered the Pacific War. In 1942 the old system of volunteers was changed to a system of conscription. The mobilization of students, conscription, military training, and other measures were applied in Korea. Opposition to such measures was strong but they, as a colonized people, had no means of expressing it under a system of absolute military control.
The Korean independence movement, after the failure of the March First Movement, had experienced a temporal setback. But it soon grew up again in three centers: (1) the "Russian" Koreans, located in the Soviet maritime provinces; (2) the "Chinese" Koreans, who made up the Korean Provisional Government and a few army troops supported by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government; and (3) the "American" Koreans, located in Hawaii, Washington, and Los Angeles.

Within Korea itself, due to thorough-going suppression system of the Japanese rule, there was no possibility of organized resistance, but some sporadic and underground activities were practiced. In 1927 the New Foundation Society (Sin Gan Hoe) was formed. This society legally organized and provided a broad united front of nationalists and reformers. Laborers, students, and intellectuals were deeply influenced by it. The large-scale student disturbance of 1929-1930 was the greatest product of its efforts, and it was dissolved in 1931. However, underground agitations and activities continued despite brutal Japanese suppression.
CHAPTER IV LIBERATION AND DIVISION OF KOREA

Section 1. The 38th Parallel

In August 1941 the first international recognition towards the independence of Korea was made indirectly in the Atlantic Charter. Drawn up between United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, it declared in part that: "We respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live, and we wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them."

But it is doubtless that President Roosevelt did not mean an immediate independence of Korea. When in March 1943 British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden visited Washington to discuss plans for the post-war world, President Roosevelt expressed that he wanted a trusteeship for Korea as well as French-Indo China for an interim period, with the United States and a few other countries exercising collective control.

Eight months later at the Cairo Conference, this idea of multi-power trusteeship, as advocated by Roosevelt, was to be formulated when the heads of the three big powers, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek convened on December. Their conclusion was that "...The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

In the meantime like an arctic bear growing wilily, the Soviet Union had been cautiously watching the allied conduct of the Second World War and the Cairo Declaration. In February when the allied victory was apparently in sight, Roosevelt met Churchill and Stalin at Yalta. In the conference the Soviet Union first uttered informally the agreement to the principle of a multi-power trusteeship in Korea which would function on an interim basis. Still Russia sought for more decisive time and carefully evaded clear-cut pledge on the Korean issue.

In late July 1945, the Allies declared at the Potsdam Conference that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. An ultimatum was flared to the Japanese calling on them to surrender unconditionally, which met the Japanese adamant rejection. But the end of the Second World War was at hand when on August 6th an atomic bomb was first dropped on Japan.
To the Russians the waiting proved to be rewarding. Already in the plenary session of the Potsdam Conference they stepped closer to the Allies and advocated outrightly the trusteeship over Korea. On 8 August on the brink of Japanese surrender the Soviet Union broadcasted the official declaration of war against Japan, putting its treachery out of sight that was to gain a strong voice in the matters of post-war settlement in the Far East.

With Russia now entering the war whose end would come at any moment, the Allies were taken off guard with the problem of allocating zones of occupation in Korea to the US and Soviet forces. At Potsdam a planning group of the United States had first conceived that a line near the 38th Parallel would be an appropriate boundary between two forces. The idea, however, had failed to meet further attention of any extent among the Allies.

Well before the proclamation of the war against Japan the Soviet Far Eastern Army had been awaiting the moment within striking distance of the Japanese troops in the northern part of Korea. The nearest American troops were still 960 kilometers away at Okinawa. The night of 8—9 August saw the Russian Air Force fighters launching massive air raids in the Korean inland. Four days later the Soviet ground forces began a well-coordinated drive into Korea and Manchuria.

In the United States, at this time, the Secretary of State and Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to President Truman the 38th Parallel of north as an arbitrary dividing line for disarming the Japanese troops in Korea. There was no intention that the Parallel should serve any purpose other than as a temporary line of convenience. Being finally approved by President Harry S. Truman the text was sent on August 14 to Marshal Stalin, who made certain amendments. However, no reference was made to those provisions regarding the 38th Parallel. Thus the US was assured of conducting the Japanese surrender south of the 38th Parallel while the Soviet troops were moving down toward this line from the north.

Recalling this period, Truman once stated:

"I was told that Secretary (of State James F.) Byrnes had suggested that American forces receive surrender as far north as practicable. The Army authorities, however, were faced with the insurmountable obstacles of both distance and lack of manpower. Even the 38th Parallel was too far for any American troops to reach if the Russians has chosen to disagree... By drawing
it along the 38th Parallel our military assured us of the opportunity to receive the surrender in Korea's ancient capital city, Seoul...”

Certainly some Americans might feel that Korea would be likely to fall completely within the Soviet orbit and that they were relieved by the expediency of the 38th Parallel. But on the part of the Koreans, the 38th Parallel and the decision to occupy the peninsula by the two forces was the prelude to a Korean tragedy.

The Japanese Governor General Abe, who knew surrender was afoot, faced the problem of the security of his people and their property in Korea. He brought this problem on 12 August to the Korean rightist leader, Song Chin U, who was neither allured by the offer of administrative power to him nor interested in his proposal. He turned down Abe on the ground that authority for the transfer of such power would devolve on the US occupation forces. In addition, he firmly believed in the legitimacy of the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking, which had been a chief machinery of Korean independence movement, and thus he considered, it should not be diversified by an interim government.

Failed with Song, Abe contacted on the night of 14 August Lyuh Woon Hyung(Yu Un Hyung) on the leftist line. Both made an appointment in the early morning of the following day.

The eve of V-J Day was slowly getting dark in Korea. Nevertheless it was very few Koreans who could see the pitchy dark cloud overhanging on the peninsula: Neither could they see the rapid, little-opposed progress of the Russian army nor grim look on the Allied leaders over the division of their own land. In the deep chamber of the Japanese Emperor, very important message was under final touch for the release at the following noon.

In the morning of the 15th August 1945, Abe met Lyuh, who had only briefly taken part in the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai as a Communist in the 1920's. The latter accepted the proposal of the anxious Japanese Governor General and demanded the release of all Korean political prisoners and rice stocks for three months to feed the country.

Section 2. Liberation and Internal Politics

At noon on 15 August 1945, V-J Day at last came and a new chapter of Korean history began. The hostilities of the so-called “Great East Asian War” formally ceased and it meant “Liberty Day” in Korea.

In the minds of the Korean people, the defeat of Japan in World War II meant the realization of a dream they had treasured in their hearts for more than a full generation. They would be able to bring out their own flags and
organize their own government and live under their own laws.

However, they soon discovered that the victory by the Allied powers did not at once mean a united and independent Korea. Rumors of an international trusteeship of Korea was much in the air. By August 24 the northern half of the country was occupied by the Soviet troops and a month later the US XXIV Corps was to arrive in Korea from Okinawa to control the other half.

In the country long devoid of national politics under the Japanese rule,
the pent-up emotions desiring for immediate independence of the Koreans erupted into the vacuum which the Japanese left behind on the Korean scene. In conclusion the liberation came not without its dear price in the form of confusion.

The first public action taken in Korea after the liberation was Lyuh’s announcement that his organization would be responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the principle functions of the government. On the night of 15 August, Lyuh and his associates set about drawing up a tentative plan of organization for a ruling committee, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, which would include chiefly the leftist nationalists and Communists alike.

In the ensuing several days the nation was gripped with hectic mood of celebration and with the spray of undivulged rumors that the United States would only occupy the Pusan-Mokpo areas in the extreme south leaving the rest to the Russians. Indeed, crowds assembled at Seoul Station on the 16th of August to welcome Russians. Lyuh and his leftists marched at the head of crowds. In the illusion that the Soviet arrival in Seoul was imminent, Lyuh’s committee moved further left removing Song and other oppositions.

Amidst this liberation fervor, Abe learned of the United States occupation plan of Korea from Okinawa. At the same time Tokyo instructed him that the governor general remain in control, maintain public order and keep the demonstrations at bay until the US occupation authorities would land. Encouraged by the instruction, Abe turned to reduce Lyuh’s authority and restore some control of Japanese reign. Nevertheless it was too late to do anything about it among fervent Koreans in liberation orgies.

In the meantime, People’s Committees took root all over the country. Most of them were formed spontaneously by groups of influential local citizens in order to replace the Japanese with a temporary local administration. Leftists exploited the inevitable indecisiveness and chaos at the time in order to wield disproportionate influences.

All these provincial committees would converge on the political center, Seoul, where the only government pretender, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, regarded them as organs of its interim government.

On 6 September, hastening to legitimate itself before the occupation forces’ landing, the leftists summoned a “Congress of People’s Representatives” in Seoul, a hodgepodge body of a thousand from all over the country. A tight leftist core stage-managed all the procedures; A tentative government organization law was passed and fifty five representatives for a People’s Legislative headed by Lyuh were named all by Lyuh, and were to shape a cabinet. Thus the leftist People’s Republic was born and the Communist group became more clamorous.
When Lyuh got down to the shaping of the power, he was all too aware of public sentiment. In fact, frustrated over the Communist prevalence most Koreans were reluctant to give their credence to any other than the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking who still failed to return. In an attempt to bear the disguise of the Korean Provisional Government he finally chose Syngman Rhee as President and himself as Vice-president. Except two ministers Kim Ku and Kim Kyu Sik, all other posts were taken up by Communists or extreme leftists.

While the leftist power maneuvered to take hold of the country, the Korean rightists also struggled to oppose Communist dominance. After turning down Abe’s proposal, Song Chin U was frustrated by the subsequent Communist prevalence. He finally got around to form a rightist party on 27 August. The party was encouraged by the arrival of the US occupation forces on 8 September and launched inauguration on 16 September. The Korean Democratic Party unanimously voted for Syngman Rhee, So Chae Phil(Philip Jaisohn) and Kim Ku, three respectful expatriates as its leaders.

In the meantime, the Russian occupation forces advanced south into the northern Korea and by August 24 they could reach at Pyongyang. The advance party did not stop at the North Korean capital but spearheaded towards the 38th Parallel. On the day all the rail traffic on the Seoul—Wonsan line was halted by the Communist armed guards. Other traffic was strictly checked and prohibited passage across it except by the express permission of the Soviet military commanders.

On the 8th of September the US occupation forces to Korea, the XXIV US Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, first landed at Incheon. Thus armies from both the United States and Russia came face to face in Korea across the 38th Parallel.

Section 3. US Occupation Policy and Political Turmoil in Korea

When V-J Day came, the United States had to switch its planning from invasion strategy to that of occupation and disarmament of enemy. But the US government was least prepared with any detailed and concrete plan for this change of role. In addition, due to the fact that the focus of their interests was Germany and Japan, Korea was left a sideshow in which they were extremely reluctant to become “mired down.”

This general lack of US policy on Korea is fully responsible for the unpreparedness and subsequent bewildermment of the US occupation forces. General
Hodge, himself, was more a tough, hardworking and successful combat general than qualified for the subtle political nature of his job. In the first crucial days of occupation he was neither equipped with efficient civil-affairs officers nor with practical instructions from his superiors.

In search for immediate guidance he found some in General MacArthur's directive, issued on August 29. This directive declared that the Japanese army headquarters should continue to function to aid in the demobilization of the various armies and that property rights of the Japanese would be scrupulously respected. Following this directive until 12 September by retaining Japanese incumbents during the period of transition proved soon a grievous fiasco. The unwisdom of this decision was immediately apparent as a bitter wave of resentment swept Korea. The Korean reaction was so intense that the US authorities abandoned the idea and began to replace the Japanese as quickly as possible, at first with US personnel and later with Koreans as they became qualified.

At the initial phase of the Military Government the Japanese-initiated, leftist-controlled People's Republic, pretending to act the name of the Korean Provisional Government, had come to claim legitimacy as a ruling power. It had indeed no rivals in the first three weeks of liberation.

On 8 September, when General Hodge was faced with the leftist power, he was startled. He had no instructions to deal with such an organization especially in view of MacArthur's General Order No. 1, that proclaimed to the people of Korea: "All powers of Government over the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority."

General Hodge had to have the prospect of going soon into trusteeship negotiations with the Russians, who had made great strides in communizing North Korea. To secure his political position, General Hodge in some dismay, tried to reassemble the political picture. On September 12, 1945, he declared in his first public address that he would "consult" only with "organized political groups." General Arnold followed this with the statement that "small political parties should group themselves into larger organizations according to their objectives."

The declaration of General Hodge, on 12 September, on the other hand, introduced further political confusion and a free-for-all invitation to the politics of Koreans. "Consult" in the Korean cultural context, implied access to power, hence status. Lacking interest groups, one achieved status by calling on classmates or a friendship circle and organizing a political party.

By 12 September, there were already 33 political parties, many formed that week. By 10 October, representatives of 43 were discussing unification.
By the time Dr. Rhee arrived a week later, Hodge felt it necessary to consult with over 50 political groups and parties. Before 24 October, 54 political parties had registered with Military Government headquarters.

On 16 October 1945, Dr. Syngman Rhee returned. The US State Department had doubts as to Rhee's value in bringing order to the excited political scene in Korea. He had been a steady critic of the Department and United States policies, and furthermore he was in his seventieth year and had been abroad for long years. The Department found him stubborn and intractable.

From the day of Japan's surrender, the old patriot tried to travel to Korea. The United States intended to move toward its initial plans for trusteeship with the Soviets. For that purpose, Rhee's adamant anti-Communism seemed less timely to Washington, and his immediate return was opposed. But General Hodge, caught in political mires, needed a leader to give a stabilizing influence and personally favoured an anti-Communist leader to counter Lyuh. The Korean conservatives around the Military Government also favoured Rhee's return. Finally, his return was accepted by both the Department of State and General Hodge, on his promise that he would return to Korea in the capacity of a private citizen.

Dr. Rhee was the symbol of the long struggle for independence of the Koreans. His return was welcomed with zealous excitement. A welcoming rally was held on 20 October. Now his popularity was so obvious that all the political parties, even the Communist party, sought to gain his support.

Dr. Rhee, however, even at the open rally on 20 October, attacked the Soviets and the fixing of a border at the 38th Parallel. It annoyed Hodge and added to his political problems. But in the leadership vacuum, Dr. Rhee had become a centripetal force of the conservative power of Korea.

Within a week of his return, on October 23, a "unity" meeting took place in the Choson Hotel. It was an important early step in the political amalgamation process. The Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence resulted; fifty seven different political factions and major parties, even the Communists and the leftist groups joined it. But within a month as the anti-Communists and leftists stand of the Council manifested itself, the Communists and the leftist group withdrew.

On November 23, 1945, Kim Ku, head of the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking and fourteen of his comrades were flown to Korea. They returned each as a private citizen "to form an interim government with the patriotic leaders" in Korea until a free election could be held.
Section 4. The Moscow Agreement

For the Americans, the political confusion in Korea was not a serious problem compared with the problem of the suspicious Soviet army. With the swift occupation of North Korea, the Russians carried on the Sovietization policy in the occupied areas without difficulty and established Communist control rigidly throughout the areas. With the arrival of the American troops in September the Russians agreed to establish tactical liaison at the 38th Parallel but, thereafter, the Soviet authorities remained almost entirely unresponsive to General Hodge's overtures. Hodge became aware of the suspicious atmosphere from the north. One of the first symptoms was the cut-off of electric power service for the south.

In an effort to bring the Russians around, Hodge twice invited the Soviet Commander, Colonel General I.M. Chistiakov, to discuss the various pending problems resulting from the division of the peninsula. Chistiakov's response, in a letter on October 9, 1945, was that he could take no such action as General Hodge suggested because matters of unification could only be resolved by the governments concerned.

At the months passed, the situation began to prove disastrous. Repatriates and refugees poured into the south. Prior to 1950, 1,108,047 Koreans returneb from Japan, 120,000 came from China and Manchuria, and 1,800,000 found refuge in the south from the north. Even by the end of 1945 there were 500,000 North Korean refugees in south Korea. The economy declined, the industry, while most of hydroelectric plants and resources were in the north, foundered. Prices in the southern half, with no chemicals, coal, or goods coming down from the north, began to rise in an inflationary spiral. By December 1945, the economic and social deterioration of affairs had important political effects, the rise of violence, and chaos. The matter, however, as the Russians in Korea continued to insist, could be no longer be settled at the local level.

In Washington, as the reports of Soviet uncompromising deportment began to flow in, the State—War—Navy Coordinating Committee, on October 20, 1945, laid down American policy on Korea: "The present zonal military occupation of Korea by United States and Soviet forces should be superseded at the earliest possible date by a trusteeship for Korea." It had become clear to the United States government that the Soviets would try to obtain predominant influence in Korea. Now the American Government felt it had no choice but to proceed with the establishment of a trusteeship.
On November 10, 1945, President Truman of the United States met with Prime Minister Clement Attlee of Britain and Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, in Washington, to discuss mutual problems. About Korea, they agreed that immediate steps should be taken to set up the trusteeship under the direction of the four great powers.

In Korea the American command was strongly opposed to trusteeship. They reported to Washington that the entire trusteeship idea was repugnant to all elements in Korea and that, considering this unanimous opposition, it might be wise to abandon the trusteeship plan.

However, at the Moscow Conference, the trusteeship of Korea was agreed upon. The Moscow Conference began, on December 16, 1945, to discuss the many problems which had arisen between the Allies in Europe and the Far East. A trusteeship under the four governments participation was considered as the only way of preventing ultimate domination of Korea by the Soviets. The wishes of the Koreans, the Americans misjudged, could be ignored for the moment.

The American delegation, Secretary of State Byrnes proposed the establishment of a joint commission to unify the administration of such matters as currency, trade, transportation, telecommunications, electric power distribution, coastal shipping, and so on. He further proposed the creation of a four-power trusteeship in terms of five years, but indicated that the tutelage could be extended by agreement of the four governments. The Russians deliberated on the American proposal for several days. Then Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov submitted a Soviet proposal for a joint Commission on urgent problems of economic unification, the establishment of a provisional government and a four-power trusteeship to last for five years.

There were no serious discrepancies between the two proposals, and the final agreement was determined. The Moscow agreement states as follows:

(1) With view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state... there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government.

(2) In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government... there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations.

(3) It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, to work out measures also for helping and assisting(trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of
the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the pro-
visional Korean government for the joint consideration of the Governments of
the United States, United Kingdom, China and Russia, for the working out of
an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up
to five years.

(4) For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and
northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent
coordination in administrative—economic matters between the United States
command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea a confer-
ence of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in
Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

The news of the Moscow agreement reached Korea on the morning of
December 29, 1945. Since trusteeship seemed to threaten as well as delay
independence, the Koreans, including initially Communists, arose in anger and
demonstrations, organized by the conservative leaders of whom were Dr. Rhee
and Kim Ku, launched to oppose it. But when, at the turn of the year, in-
structions from Moscow arrived in the midst of a Communist anti-trusteeship
demonstration, the Communists changed it to pro-trusteeship. The fragmented
anti-trusteeship camp, in this occurrence, sought unity and coalition. On 4
December nineteen small groups and parties joined the Korean Democratic
party. Provisional Government allegiance brought some forty lesser groups to a
united front. Thus under the banner of the Rhee’s National Association for
the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, the first time began to have
national consolidation and feel under it local roots that had controlled by the
leftists alone.

In the next two years, this strength enabled Dr. Rhee and rightists to
resist the leftist and Communist movement and, in 1946 and 1947, to
organize an ultimately successful campaign against the continuation of American
military occupation and for the establishment of an independent Korean govern-
ment.

At any rate, confronting the furor invoked by the trusteeship issue, Secre-
tary Byrnes broadcasted on 30 December to the American people on the Moscow
conference. Regarding Korea, he stated that the Joint Commission “may
find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the
day when Korea will become an independent member of the society of nation-
als.” By this the Koreans might have found a slender light in the dark.
Section 5. Joint US-Russia Commission

On January 30, 1946, a US State Department report, which explained the United States stand to support trusteeship, was sent to General Hodge who were bewildered by the Moscow agreement. The Department pointed out its goal was to prevent Russian domination of Korea. It was apparent, the report noted, that the Russians had available various apparatus, in the form of émigré Koreans loyal to Moscow, to take over the "democratic" provisional government, which would then move to exclude the other powers from Korea. The Russians accepted the Anglo—American principles of trusteeship but with emphasis on Korean "democratic" parties, social organizations, and provisional government. They attacked Dr. Rhee and Kim Ku as "reactionaries." It would probably foredoom the impending US—USSR discussions.

Being amazed at the Department’s explanation, General Hodge, on February 1, 1946, dispatched a message to MacArthur. Hodge pointed out that the Russians had no thought of unifying Korea while the United States remained there. In his opinion, he said, the country would be reunited until the Russians felt the whole country would be communistic.

In this strained atmosphere, the Americans and Russians sat down in Seoul in mid-January 1946, in the first of a series administrative—economic discusions. General Hodge met the Russian delegation, headed by General Shlykov, on 16 January, and stated the hope that the discussions would result in agreement to eliminate the 38th Parallel barrier and thus "bring to an end to trials and difficulties of the Korean nation..."

However, in the proceeding of the meetings, it became quite manifest that a wide gap existed between the two military commanders’ intentions. The Americans wished to discuss immediate, on-the-spot liquidation of the Parallel and prompt integration of the two zones. The Russians just wanted to discuss non-political matters including the delivery of rice and other products from south to north Korea, evacuation of Japanese refugees, and the delivery of electric power from north to south Korea. The talks dragged on fruitlessly, finally breaking up on February 5, 1946. Little progress was made to break down the 38th Parallel barrier.

On 28 January General Shlykov called upon General Hodge, stating he had received orders from Moscow to make arrangements for the convening of the Joint American-Soviet Commission to discuss the political unification of Korea.

To prepare for the Joint Commission, a Representative Democratic Council of South Korea was created, and General Hodge approved the organization on
February 14, 1946, It was to be a “representative” political body that would support the American view in consultation with the Joint Commission. Hodge sought to obtain a broad political coalition to the council by asking the leftists and Communists to join. The leftists and Communists, however, refused to join with the prominent conservatives and the council rapidly became a rightist organization under Dr. Rhee as Chairman.

On 29 January, General Hodge received a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive in preparation for the political discussion of the meetings of the Commission. Its statement was that only those Korean parties, organizations, and individuals considered to be nondemocratic by both the United States and the Soviet should be excluded from participation. The Korean leaders should be representative of the Korean people as a whole and also such a composition to be acceptable to both the United States and the USSR. No group dominated by totalitarian leftists such as Communists, or by rightist elements, said the JCS, could be representative of the Korean people and therefore these groups were not acceptable. Early in March 1946, prior to the convening of the Joint Commission, the State Department issued instruction that American policy in Korea be shifted away from conservative to progressive leaders. This Department's directive, that tried to back moderates and to form a moderate coalition, arrived too late to change the political picture and added to the splitting between rightists and moderates.

Meanwhile, the American delegation to the Joint Commission, which was headed by Major General A.V. Arnold, held preparatory conferences in Seoul to discuss foreseeable arguments which seemed to be raised at the meetings of the Commission. It was clear to the American delegation that the Russian's long-term strategic aim was to establish complete domination over Korea. The United States policy, therefore, would be to insist on some form of territorial guarantee for Korea, since the country if left alone, could never defend its integrity against Russia. The Russians were expected to push for the early establishment of a leftist-controlled provisional government and subsequent elimination of the other powers from the peninsula.

On March 20, 1946, the first meeting of the Joint Commission was held in the Duk Su Palace in Seoul. Both Hodge and Shtykov delivered opening statements at the initial session.

Entering into closed session meetings, the Commission, as anticipated, confronted the situation; that the Russians insisted that only those Korean parties and organizations which had not opposed the trusteeship principle were eligible for consultation with the Commission in the formation of a government.
Since only the Communists and the far leftists supported trusteeship, the acceptance of this Russian principle would have meant that the Communists would dominate the unified provisional government. The United States rejected this principle at once. In twenty four futile sessions, lasting until May 6, 1946, the issue remained unresolved. The Commission adjourned sine die.

General Hodge reported to MacArthur the day afterward that he had felt no need of any further negotiations. He stated that throughout the discussions there had not been a bit of indication of the Russians' cooperation in the establishment of anything other than a completely Communist controlled government.

The first effort to unify Korea by the two parties, initially responsible for the partition of Korea, had ended in dismal failure. American-Soviet disagreements on whom to consult widened and deepened the fracturing process in internal Korean politics. In the south, the rightists, moderates and leftists still further continued to compete each other. In the north the Soviet military government intensified openly its policy of communizing North Korea and building a strong native government loyal to the USSR.

The United States Military Government, from July 1946 on, had encouraged a coalition of moderates as a first step to the Koreanization of the military government, or the establishment of an interim government. Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, prominent leader of the Provisional Government in Chungking recommended, at the US suggestion of an interim Legislative Assembly, which was approved by General Hodge. Dr. Kim Kyu Sik became chairman of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly on December 12, 1946, among ninety members of which half was elected and half appointed. When the US Military Government embarked on a program of appointing the Koreans as heads of departments in the South Korean Interim Government and giving them increased responsibility, a moderate nationalist, An Jhae Hong, took office as Chief Civil Administrator in February, 1947. Though rightists and extreme leftists refused to appoint delegates to the Assembly and constantly harassed it in statements, the coalition continued to make some progress until the summer of 1947.

In the meantime, General Hodge wrote letters to General Chistiakov in the north, formally proposing that the Joint Commission be reconvened to take up again the problem of unification of Korea. The Soviet commander replied in the negative, reiterating the Russians' opposition to those Korean leaders who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow
agreement. Concerning to the United States stand, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on August 30, 1946, had already announced that the United States Government was ready to carry out the Moscow agreement, including continuation at any time of the work of the Joint Commission. "We believe" Acheson stated, "in the right of Korean people to determine for themselves the kind of economy and democratic political organization they require and are opposed to minority group in power. We stand for freedom of speech, of assembly, and of the press. Honest criticism is not considered a crime."

On December 28, 1946, a year after the Moscow Conference, the State Department once more fostered that the United States was ready "to sit down with the Russians at any time to try again to work out under Moscow Agreement an acceptable formula for turning Korea over to the Koreans."

Though the Korean stalemate still continued during the spring of 1947, the new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall in a letter of May 2, 1947, suggested to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that if the Koreans who had previously opposed trusteeship were ready to cooperate with the Commission, they should not be excluded from discussions. Molotov's response, in a letter dated May 2, 1947, took no exception to this principle.

The US State Department took it as an important concession to the Russians' viewpoint that the only people who could be excluded were those people who both sides agreed should be excluded. As a result, on May 20, 1947, the Joint Commission reconvened in Seoul. At first, discussions were smoothly proceeded. The American delegation hoped an agreement might be at hand.

As the consultation issue broadened, Korean politicians of both right and left felt mounting pressure of competition to produce the largest numbers of consultative bodies. More bodies were formed, many by the splitting of old ones. Such atomization tended further to be encouraged by the distribution of a Joint Commission form asking the views of each body on the problems the future Korean government would confront and the methods to be used in its establishment.

The chief commissioner of the American delegation announced that, by 19 June, 344 political parties and social organizations in South Korea had got copies of the Joint-Commission consultation document. Within twenty four hours of announcement of the terms of consultation, over 80 political bodies and social organizations had sent representatives for the forms. Extreme rightists refused to participate, but even 463 political parties and social organizations submitted applications for consultation; 425 were from the American zone alone.

By early July, however, the Soviet delegation suddenly reverted to its old
position, rejecting all consultations with those who had expressed opposition to the Moscow agreement.

This sudden reversion of the Russians can be explained by the developments of the American foreign policy. The United States launched its containment policy, first proposed by President Truman on March 12, 1947, in his offer of aid to Greece and Turkey. It naturally developed into the Marshall Plan of the European reconstruction, on June 5, 1947.

To this shocking activation of the American foreign policy against Communists, the Soviets responded with the drastic change of tactics; from the "united front" or coalition tactics to the "revolutionary" or militant activity tactics. In Korea, these events brought about a permanent deadlock in the Joint American—Soviet Commission. The problem of Korean independence and unification was sent back again to Washington and Moscow.

In a letter to Molotov on 28, August 1947, the US State Department proposed that, in view of the Joint Commission stalemate, a four power conference be convened in Washington to discuss the entire Korean problem. The Department also suggested early elections in both zones to establish zonal legislatures which could, in turn, elect representatives to a national provisional legislature to meet in Seoul to form a united Korean government.

On 4 September, Molotov replied that Russia could not agree to four power conference "inasmuch as the Joint Commission is still far from exhausting all its possibilities for working out agreed recommendations which is entirely possible." And sticking to their old arguments, the Russians blamed the United States that it had insisted "on extending an invitation to groups which had opposed the Moscow decision."

In order to find out a breakthrough of the stalemate, the State Department had to make some other moves. The Russians were informed that the United States intended to refer the entire Korean problems to the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. On 17 September, 1947, the United States laid the problem before the UN General Assembly.

In Korean internal politics, with the stalemate of the Joint Commission, the American—supported fragile moderate coalition was also overturned. The breakdown of the Second US—USSR Joint Commission ended all hopes for a negotiated settlement of the Korean problems. By the beginning of 1947, as the United States foreign policy for Korea was shifted, the American support turned to Dr. Rhee to back its new policy of separate elections under the UN. From this time on, the age of Dr. Rhee had begun.
Section 6. Economic and Social Situation under the Military Government

South Korea’s population estimated to be just over sixteen million in 1945, grew by 21 per cent during the next year. Prior to 1950, 1,108,047 Koreans returned from Japan, 120,000 came from China and Manchuria, and 1,800,000 poured in from North Korea. Even by the end of 1945 there were 500,000 North Korean refugees in South Korea. Annual increase of births over deaths continued at about 3.1 per cent per annum. Rural areas were crowded, cities overflowed and a third upward flow went to Seoul. At this moment Korea maybe had a more serious population problem than any other country.

With the repatriation of 300,000 Japanese, almost all the country’s technical and managerial skills and its industrial capital resources were removed. Administration were vapoured; the economy declined and the industry dwindled; politics only flowered without direction and policy. Japan and her Yen bloc, which had absorbed 96.9 per cent of Korea’s exports by 1939, while 99 per cent by 1944, now took almost none. The war, which had brought most industrial growth, had overworked and worn out the facilities it created. There was now no economic force to repair or even maintain them. Sources of raw materials outside Korea were cut off. Nearly 90 per cent of industrial property and much of urban real property was suddenly unowned and, as enemy property, it became vested in US Military Government. US troops neither knew anything about economy nor were equipped to operate it. No Korean organizations existed that could even begin to cope with the problem. Though accurate statistics were not available, production by the end of 1948 was probably not more than 10-15 per cent of pre-war potential.

By September 1947, industrial employment had fallen 60 per cent since 1944. It was believed that a population rather fully employed in 1944 had only about half its labor force of ten million engaged in gainful employment by 1947. In July 1947, the Military Government expressed the belief that the disposal of at least small vested industry to private Korean ownership would be more efficient. However, the disposal should be deferred until an independent government had taken over; very little was effected. Industry was thus almost wholly dependent on an inefficient military government.

Inflation added to chaos. The Japanese, in despairing atmosphere of war, had flooded the country with Yen, partly to buy protection. In June 1943, Bank of Choson Yen notes in circulation was under a billion in Korea; on 6 August, 1945, there were four billion in circulation in all Korea. By October,
seven billion or more circulated in the US Occupation Zone alone, and eight billion by the end of September 1946. Although production and proper tax revenues were lacking, currency in circulation continued to rise steadily; to 18.3 billion in January 1947 and 33.4 billion in December 1947. By the end of 1948 it was estimated at 38 billion Yen.

Retail prices rose 10 times between August 1945 and December 1946 wholesale prices 28 times. The average monthly cost of food per person rose from 8 Yen before the war to 800 Yen by September 1946, because of the release of controls over grain prices in October 1945. Wages could not keep up with prices. In 1948 the average government salary was below 3,000 Yen per month, whereas the minimum cost of necessities for an average family was 10,000 Yen per month exclusive of expenditures for clothing, medicine, or entertainment. Strikes, demonstrations, angry demands flourished. But almost all enterprises were in the hands of government, which was incompetent and directionless. Only those who collaborated with the Japanese had the competence to rehabilitate the economy that the Japanese left behind. Even these few individuals were now threatened by both inflation and charges of collaboration. The economy was helpless to restart itself by any means, both through private and governmental efforts.

So long as disorder and resultant violence continued the youth groups would flourish in terror and lawlessness. Most were political, agitational, and, at first, leftist. Several grew out of the Korean Communist Young Men's Association, which had been active in the underground. In the first few weeks after August 15, 1945, when there existed the leftist-controlled Peace Preservation Corps enforced local security and peace in the name of the People's Committees. They grabbed Japanese arms they could find, filled police stations, patrolled, intervened in disputes, and hoped for the path to power. In May 1947, the Military Government disbanded these terrorist activities agitated by Communists. They were the strongest bands of the leftists in South Korea, the principal disseminator of propaganda and instrument of terror. In the North similar groups became prominent channels of political recruitment for the Communist regime. Even in South Korea, relatively many "alumni" of the leftists entered the police and, later, the army. By the summer of 1948, all such leftist youth groups were banned.

Rightist political bosses and political groups, also, had to possess youth groups partly for political propaganda and power, partly for self-defense against leftist bands. Among them most active and tough ones were: the Northwest Youth Association of northwest Korean refugees, which contributed to quell Communist rebellions in South Korea; the Great Korean Democratic Young Men's Association; Dr. Rhee had his Korean Independence Youth Association,
General Yi Chong Chon, a leader of the Provisional Government and former Commander of its Kwangbok Gun (Restoration Army), had his Taedong Youth Corps. Thirty four such young men’s bodies registered before the Joint Commission in June 1947.

About the middle of 1946, US Military Government began secretly to form a national youth association backed by some five million dollars in official, American Army equipment, and an American lieutenant colonel as training advisor. General Lee Bum Suk, former Commander of the Second Branch of the Korean Restoration Army, was selected as head. His selection was probably based on the fact in China, he had collaborated closely with American intelligence. By July 1947, some 70,000 had received training. Its purpose was to train young men who could if agreement with the Russians was not reached, act as an anti-Communist Korean army. Many of its members indeed entered the armed forces. To avoid Russian protests and to secure secrecy it was named as the Racial Youth Corps, and this group lasted until President Rhee broke it up later. However, its loyalties and ties were remained to continue.

Meanwhile internal clash had come to be unavoidable; with it, disruption and revolt came faster. The Communists had been the first powerful manipulator of youth group, agitation, and demonstration. Communists concentrated their energy in powerful industrial and communications unions. US forces began to build up the police and, eventually, rival rightist unions.

On 24 September 1946, the members of the South Korean Railroad Workers Association set on a strike under demands for an increased rice ration and pay allowances, for abolishment of wage payment by the day, for lunches on the job, and for cessation of reductions in the work force. The requests aroused the sympathy of other workers who were suffering from mounting inflation. By 30 September the strike spread to the Printers Union, the Electrical Workers and many other industries; tramcar motormen and conductors struck in sympathy on 2 October.

It spread rapidly outside Seoul. The collection of grains caused great anxieties because the crop fell 40 per cent below normal, and the approaching rice harvest was expected to be 20 per cent fall. The Military Government was determined to perform rice collection and rice price control not to repeat the failure of 1945. In 1945 the disastrous inflationary consequences followed from the free market system of rice dealings. The police quotas showed favours to anti-Communists and thus gave leftists incentives to stir up anti-police sentiment by spreading rumors that the United States was inviting Japan in carrying off rice and dumping cheaper grains in Korea.

In October at Taegu a food demonstration of two to three hundred citizens started, and a policeman was seriously injured and a workman was shot to
death. On the morning of the next day, a huge crowd had gathered. The mob captured the central police station and its weapons and ruled Taegu for hours. Fifty three policemen were mutilated and killed. That afternoon the local American command declared martial law and restored order with American troops.

In the next few days, similar but smaller incidents broke out in dozens of districts, towns, and villages throughout south Korea, mainly in the area of Kyong Sang-pukdo. Though these strikes and revolts were repressed by police forces, rightist youth groups and, in the last dependents, US military forces by the end of October, an enduring pattern of subversion and repression was thus established. From these events, an unbroken chain stretched to the subversive attempts of Communists in later months, the infiltration of Communists into the constabulary, the revolt of Yosu in 1948, and the guerrilla activity thereafter, which was withered only in the spring before the Korean War. Partly through American indirection, mostly through the release of almost uncontrollable forces, south Korean society was dumped in mires.
CHAPTER V FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Section 1. US Policy Revised after the Joint Commission

In the late summer and fall of 1947, the United States reviewed and revised its policies toward Korea. The first Joint US-Soviet Commission adjourned sine die. The collapse of the second Commission in July—August 1947 brought to an end the search for unification or agreement on Korea with the Soviet Union. Hence the US State Department policy toward Korea from 1945 to 1947 might be said to have come to an end.

The US State Department was operating under adverse situation, both internal and international. The Congress clamored for reductions in army expenditures. Military circles feared American forces were too thinly deployed. In China, Chinese Communists were strengthening themselves; in the near future it was believed that the Asiatic mainland would be dominated by Communists. Only the conviction that Korea is vital to the US security would justify further initiatives.

State and Defense Secretaries saw no such vital interests in 1947. Like Theodore Roosevelt in 1904-1905, they decided to put aside, if possible, Korean problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that “in the event of hostilities our present forces in Korea would be a military liability. Authoritative reports from Korea indicate that continued lack of progress toward a free and independent Korea, unless offset... in all probability will result in such condition, including violent disorder, as to make the position of US occupation forces untenable.”

It was therefore determined, as Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson put it, that the United States should disengage itself from Korea.

The policy of the disengagement from Korea resulted in rapid expansion of the Korean constabulary into an army, a three-year aid program, turning-over the problem of Korea unification to the United Nations. Korea was placed outside the US defense zone, as indicated in Secretary Acheson’s famous speech of January 12 in National Press Club. Accordingly South Korean army of approximately 100,000 men with equipment sufficient for only about 65,000
men had to be strengthened. It is a known fact that the US policy of disengagement from Korea was a factor in inducing Communists to invade South Korea.

As for the aid program, a three-year aid program, $500,000,000 was worked out in the winter of 1946—47, for presentation for Congress. However, in March 1947, aid program suffered. Just before the aid program would be presented, Great Britain notified the United States of its inability to shoulder the burdens of defending Greece and Turkey. The long-term program of aid to Korea had to be dropped while the Greek—Turkey aid program was rushed to Congress. This entanglement from Korea took place without taking necessary measures for assistance to Korea. This disastrous error in judgement was made at the time when the Marshall Plan was about to be launched.

Section 2. United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and May-10 Election

After the failure of the second Joint Commission, the US State Department proposed a four-power conference to deal with the Korean problem, which the Soviet counterpart refused, sticking to its old position. Accordingly the State Department informed the Russians of the United States intention of referring the entire problem of Korea to the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.

On September 17, 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall appeared before the General Assembly and, after noting Korean impasse, stated:

"It appears evident that further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the establishment of an independent, united Korea. It is therefore the intention of the United States government to present the problem of Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly. Although we shall be prepared to submit suggestions to how the early attainment of Korean independence might be effected, we believe that this is a matter which requires the impartial judgement of the other members. We do not wish to have the inability of two powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence."

On September 26, nine days after Marshall's presentation, the Russians offered an alternative, recommending that all foreign troops leave Korea beginning in 1948 and allow the Koreans to erect their own government.

In this Soviet proposal, seemingly a popular solution to the entire question
without any foreign intervention, the Americans found an intrigue. The withdrawal of the occupation forces, which was first proposed by the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission in Seoul, would leave South Korea at the mercy of the militarized, Sovietized North. The State Department rejected the Russian plan and Secretary Marshall informed Molotov that troops withdrawal constituted only one aspect of the Korean problem. The United States, in this regard, had considered the withdrawal of her occupation forces. The withdrawal was decided, however, as a wing of series of disengagement policies, e.g. expansion of the constabulary into an army, long term aid program, presenting the Korean Problem to the UN, etc..

Early in November 1947, the United States formally presented this problem before the United Nations. A United Nations committee heard an American delegate recommending the establishment of a United Nations Commission to oversee the general election in Korea, designed to create a representative government, which would then negotiate for the withdrawal of the American and Russian troops.

The Soviet delegation, led by Andrei A. Gromyko, introduced a counterresolution, asking for the withdrawal of American and Soviet troops beginning from the end of the year so as to allow the Koreans to set up a government "without foreign intervention." The Russian proposal was voted down and the American plan was approved.

On 13 November Gromyko, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, fiercely opposed the UN intervention, and warned the Assembly that the USSR would not take part in the resolution.

The next day, the General Assembly voted forty three to zero, with six abstentions, for the American proposal. Thus the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was created to observe free and secret elections, and it was recommended that these elections be held not later than March 31, 1948, with the goal of electing National Assembly members. It was also recommended that, immediately after a national government is established, arrangements be made with the occupying powers for a complete withdrawal of their armed forces from Korea.

The UN Temporary Commission on Korea arrived on January 12, 1948. The Commission upon arrival sent letters to commanders of both occupation zones, asking consideration to pay courtesy calls. The letter to the Soviet commander in Pyongyang brought no answer. Thereupon the Commission’s Acting Chairman sent a message to the United Nations, that requested the Soviet delegation’s help in this matter. The Soviet delegation, reminding of the negative attitude taken by the Soviet government toward the establishment of
the United Nations Commission on Korea, refused any action on the matter. And the subsequent efforts of the Commission to obtain access to Communists-controlled north Korea were unsuccessful. The Commission reported back to the United Nations Interim Committee that it had been unable to carry out its mission because of the attitude of the Soviet authorities in North Korea. The United States government decided to urge the Interim Committee to proceed with election in where as much of Korea as possible. Acting upon this, on February 28, 1948, the UN Committee adopted a resolution directing the Temporary Commission in Seoul to observe election in the area to which it had access. The election was announced to take place on 9 May, 1948 (subsequently changed to 10 May).

The reaction of the Russians and the communized North Korea to this unexpected development was antagonistic. Kim Il Sung, head of the North Korean Communist Regime, called upon his sympathizers in South Korea to launch a maneuvering movement against the election.

Kim made attack on the Temporary Commission, sneering that it had brought "only disaster and unhappiness to Korea." He blamed the United States for deliberately disrupting the Joint American—Soviet Commission, tearing up the Moscow agreement, violating the Potsdam accord, all the while "scheming to colonize Korea."

Thus in South Korea the Communists' last-ditch attempt to ruin election ensued with increasing violence. On 5 February 1948, coordinated violence broke out, which was planned to correspond with the second anniversary of the North Korean Communist regime on 9 February. In one night, 40 locomotives were damaged, within the month over 100 persons including 33 policemen were killed and more than 8,000 were arrested. In Cheju Island, where political atmosphere was predominantly leftist since Liberation, and weapons were easily available because of the concentration there of surrendered Japanese troops, the newly-born constabulary had to be deployed in semi-military formation. Ten days before the election, 323 persons including 32 policemen were killed. The National Police Director said that between 29 March and 19 May, 589 persons including 330 rioters, 63 policemen, 37 government officials were killed and 10,000 persons were "processed" in the police stations.

Against this background, the Military Government had to cope with the problems of the police and agrarian reforms. It took the initiative in turning from its middle-of-the-road policy with a view to obtain Dr. Syngman Rhee's support.

From 16 April, the Military Government created a large police auxiliary known as the Community Protective Association or the Country Guard Corps. To fill its ranks, the police recruited "loyal" youths from eighteen to twenty
five in age without pay. They patrolled the villages, proud of the government "favour" to them and anxious show off their new status by interfering in the lives of ordinary citizens. They tried to turn out as many voters as possible.

Meanwhile, agricultural reform was also conducive to the peasants' cooperation in the election. The Military Government, in its first weeks of occupation, placed a maximum allowable rent at one third of the crop price as compared to previous 50-90 per cent. These regulations were not enforced successfully except on the former Japanese-held lands vested in the Military Government. A decision was at last made in 1947, which was intended to sell these lands to tenants. By September 1947, a total of 487,621 acres had been sold to 502,072 tenants. This occurred just prior to the election. Tenancy was reduced to about 33 per cent from about 75 per cent in 1945. Disposal of these lands reduced rural instability, undermined Communist influence, actual or potential, among peasants, increased their cooperation in the election campaign of the military government, and aroused expectation that Korean landlord-held lands would be disposed of similarly.

All organs of the state, including news media, tried to persuade the people that voting was a patriotic duty; Dr. Rhee was the personification of patriotism; foreign guests were benefactors. After all, election, which the Korean people had never experienced before in their history, was a national festival.

When the nation-wide election was impossible owing to the negative attitude of the Russians, Dr. Rhee urged separate election in South Korea. The United States, too, turned to Dr. Rhee for its new policy of separate election under the UN observation. On 28, February 1948, separate election in South Korea was decided. Upon this decision, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu Sik together with his small middle-of-the-road groups committed themselves to internal method of unification, and opposing separate election, refused to take part. When the Communists in the North called for a "Unity Conference" for united opposition to separate election, the two Kims and some of their followers traveled to Pyongyang. On 19 April, 545 delegates met in a futile unification conference.

Despite disruptive violence and propaganda concentrated by the Communists against the free election in Korea, over 90 per cent of the registered voters went the polls on 10 May, 1948 under the oversee of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

Section 3. Formation of the Government

On 27 May 1948, the elected-representatives met in Seoul, and Dr. Syngman
Rhee was elected as Chairman on 31 May at the first formal session of the Assembly. The Constitutional Assembly, finally on 17 July, established the historical Constitution of the Republic of Korea (DAE HAN MIN GUG) and promulgated it to the world. Incidentally, the Assembly adopted a resolution inviting the North Koreans to elect representatives under the terms of this constitution as well as the United Nations' resolution to fill one hundred seats left vacant in the Assembly for them.

On 20 July, Dr. Rhee was elected President of the Republic of Korea. The formal inauguration took place on 15 August, three years after the liberation from the Japanese rule.

The stage was set for the transfer of authority from the US military government to the elected Government of the Republic of Korea. As the American military command relinquished its control to Dr. Rhee and his associates, a new relationship had to be established between the two to provide for the maintenance of US forces in South Korea and for their role in the defense of the country until final withdrawal could be effected.
The United States government promptly took steps to grant diplomatic recognition to the new government and President Truman named John J. Muccio as special United States envoy to Korea, with the rank of ambassador. This was followed in 1949 by the Republic of China, Great Britain, France, the Philippines and 20 other states. On December 12, 1948, the Government of the Republic of Korea was recognized as “the only and lawful” by the vote of 48 to 6 at the Third Session of the UN General Assembly held in Paris.

Faced with a fait accompli in the South, the Russia created his satellite regime a communized “Democratic People’s Republic” On August 15, 1948—the same day that the Republic of Korea was being officially proclaimed—the election to the Supreme People’s Assembly of Korea was held in the north, and on 3 September its constitution was adopted. Kim Il Sung as Prime Minister and head of the Communist Party, laid the North under his totalitarian control. General Shtykov was named Russian ambassador. Several other Communist East European nations shortly followed Russia’s lead in establishing formal diplomatic relations with the North Korean Communist regime. The three-year nightmare of the occupation had passed but resulted in the formal division of Korea. From this the tragedy of today’s Korea has begun.
CHAPTER VI CREATION OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMED FORCES

Section 1. Military Government and Internal Security Forces

General MacArthur named Lieutenant General John R. Hodge as the Commanding General, US Armed Forces in Korea, and assigned the XXIV US Corps, composed of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions as a occupation force. To handle civil affairs, General Hodge appointed Major General Archibald V. Arnold, Commander of the 7th Division, as the head of the United States Military Government in Korea.

On landing in Inchon, almost three weeks later from the Japanese unconditional surrender, General Arnold and his assistants found in Korea uncontrollable chaos, confusion and clamour they had not experienced before. Thus the US officials, in accordance with MacArthur's Japanese occupation policy, decided to retain the Japanese incumbents during the period of transition until the Koreans attained more political maturity and were able to take over the administrative machinery. But the Koreans, who wanted to erase all the mark of Japanese control totally opposed this decision. Their reaction was so intense that the US authorities had to abandon the idea and began to replace the Japanese with US personnel and later with the Koreans.

In the process of eliminating Japanese influence, one of the first steps taken by the US officials was to seize control of the Bureau of Police. Since the Japanese police were the main objective of hatred and fear of the Korean people because of the harsh repressive measures, the US Military Government leaders felt it necessary to remove them at once and set up a Korean police agency. Brigadier General Lawrance E. Schick, Provost Marshal, XXIV Corps, took over this task. He abolished the Economic, Welfare and Thought Control Sections in the Police Bureau which were not the proper jurisdiction of police force. In personnel matter, he had to proceed prudently since only 30 per cent of the police force at the time of surrender were Koreans and they were almost in minor positions. To hasten the change-over, the military government reopened the old Japanese Police Academy in Seoul on October 15, 1945 and gave a one-month basic training course to new recruits. In November a new National Police organization in South Korea began to take
shape. But the country was beset with post-war instability and confusion in a power vacuum that the fledgling Korean National Police Bureau still could not cope with support from the US troops. However, a basis for internal security was founded.

Despite the emerging police force, the occupation authorities recognized that with only the police force, the needs of Korean national defense would not be met. As early as 31 October 1945 General Schick informed General Arnold that provision "for the National Defense is one of the primary functions of government." If a government being sponsored by the United States was to endure, it would have to have a more effective means for quelling internal disturbances and defending its borders than a civil police organization. And he recommended that the Korean police force be augmented and redesignated a constabulary. Anyhow, a governmental bureau, on the level of finance and justice, for establishing and coordinating Korean national defense forces, was clearly advisable.

Since there was no framework for such an agency within the structure of the old Japanese Governor-General, the Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Korea, appointed a board of US officers on 10 November to make a study of military and political conditions in Korea in order to determine the need for a national defense program. On November 13, the Military Government created an office of the Director of National Defense with jurisdiction over the Bureau of Police and over a new Bureau of Armed Forces comprising Army and Navy Departments. General Schick became the director. Shortly thereafter a staff for the office was organized with US forces officers.

The study produced by this group recommended a modest development of Korean national defense forces to supplement a projected 25,000 men police force. For the Army and Air Force, there would be one corps of three infantry divisions supported by essential service troops and one transport and two fighter squadrons, together with ground components, totaling 45,000 men. The Navy and Coast Guard would be limited to 5,000 men.

Since the strength designed for the police and defense forces would be comparatively low, compared with a population total of over 15,000,000 in South Korea, the plan for recruiting volunteers called for the acceptance of only those that could meet the highest possible physical and mental standards. Quality would compensate in part, it was hoped, for the lack of quantity. The forces would be organized in accordance with modified United States Tables of Organization and Equipment and equipped with United States surplus stocks, with a three year reserve. Recruiting for the Coast Guard would begin without delay; the police would be brought to full strength as soon as
Creation of ROK Armed Forces

possible; the remainder of the plan would be implemented progressively and systematically during the following twelve months.

General Hodge approved the plan on November 20, but General MacArthur thought that the question of armed forces for South Korea lay beyond his authority. In referring the matter to Washington, he recommended that the police, in any case, be equipped with US arms and be developed to the point where they could relieve US tactical forces of civil police functions.

While the policy makers in Washington debated the problems of the South Korean armed forces, General Schick's staff attacked some of the problems that would have to be overcome if approval were granted. One of the other problems occurred was the language barrier. Since few US personnel understood Korean and qualified interpreters were difficult to come by, they decided to open an English language school at the Methodist Theological Seminary in Seoul. The purpose of the school, which began classes on 5 December, was to teach basic military English expressions to potential Korean officers.

Except for the Korean volunteer corps and the Manchurian Communist-guerrilla groups, drawn to Soviet-occupied North Korea, almost all groups converged on Seoul. Thus numerous private armies had sprung up. One called the Preparatory Unit for the National Defense Forces was formed around the Korean officers trained by the second-generation Japanese. The Kwangbok Army, a Naval Defense Corps for former naval personnel (of whom there were few), an Association for the Establishment of a Korean Air Force, a Student Officers Association and more than thirty unofficial quasi-military organizations had been abolished.

Although this atomization was further complicated by the conflict between the rightists and leftists and the US forces were at a loss what to do and no attempt had been made to disband them. These groups could constitute a nucleus for the Korean forces, if and when such forces were authorized. With the establishment of the constabulary in January, 1946, all the private armies were banned.

In any case, the Military Government invited six of the groups to send candidates to the language school. Qualifications were high so that only the best men could apply. Each candidate, besides having to show previous military experiences, had to be at least a graduate of a secondary school and was required to possess some knowledge of the English language. Over sixty applicants attended the first class.

On February 27, 1946 the school moved to Taenung (present Military Academy site), and was closed on May 1, 1946, when the Korean Constabulary
Training Center was established. During the course of instruction 110 students were commissioned in turn. Upon one's wishes, some tens of the school graduates turned officials of the military government.

Section 2. Creation of the Korean Constabulary

The plans for the Korean defense forces proposed by the US military authorities in Korea were looked askant at in Washington because of the Korean unification policy of agreement with the Soviets. When the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) in Washington considered the plan for building up Korean armed forces, it recommended in late December that the decision be postponed until after Joint American-Russian Commission was held. Apparently the United States did not want to arouse the Russians. SWNCC agreed that the Korean National Civil Police should be furnished with US arms and equipment so that eventually the US tactical forces could be relieved of their civil police functions.

When word arrived that SWNCC had postponed the decision on the establishment of a full-fledged defense force, an alternative plan called "BAMBOO" offered another way of providing South Korea with increased internal security forces. This plan was developed by Brigadier General Arthur S. Champeny, who succeeded General Schick on December 20, 1945.

General Champeny recounted an interview with General Hodge: "He told me... that (the) plan for an army was entirely too elaborate and would not be approved. He asked me to develop something more practical and smaller. I came up with a plan of a police reserve consisting of 25,000 to be trained along infantry lines... This plan was submitted and approved by XXIV Corps."

"BAMBOO" planned a constabulary-type police reserve established on fixed post-camp-station basis under the Bureau of Police and was to be used as a supporting force during periods of national emergency. Initially, one company would be formed in each of the eight provinces of South Korea and organized as infantry (US style) less weapons Platoons.

The plan was to send out to each province a United States Army training team of two officers and four enlisted men who would select initial activation and training areas and begin recruiting and organizing. In each area a company would be formed overstrength by approximately 20 per cent. After a short period of training, a second company would be built around the surplus of the first, in another location. The new company would likewise be recruited overstrength to provide a cadre for a third. At this time a battalion headquarters
and a headquarters company would be formed, and thereafter second and third battalions activated in a gradual expansion to one regiment of Constabulary in each province.

A Constabulary recruiting station opened at the English Language School in Seoul on January 14, 1946 under the direction of the military government. Notices welcoming all experienced officers were posted, and candidates flocked to enlist. After a brief interview with an American officer, applicants filled out questionnaires and were examined by Korean doctors from a nearby mission hospital. Selected Koreans were transported to a former Japanese barrack area northeast of Seoul on the Chuncheon road, where a constabulary garrison had been established.

At any rate, the recruiting progress exceeded American expectations. By the end of January nearly three companies had been formed in Seoul area alone. At this time the first battalion of the 1st Regiment, Korean Constabulary, was activated and Colonel John T. Marshall became the first American Chief of Constabulary. Because as yet there was no Korean counterpart to Marshall, the young Korean officers who were to command new companies were selected on the advice of Lee Ung Jun, former Korean Colonel in the Japanese army then serving as “advisor” to the Director of National Defense.

On January 24, 1946, eighteen lieutenants came from the 40th US Division, which was deactivating, to the Bureau of National Defense. After a brief period of orientation, sixteen of these officers set out in pairs for each province. The teams together with the English language school graduates and a few Korean enlisted men picked from the 1st Battalion, were to set up regimental headquarters and organize regiments by local recruiting. They had to arrange, procure, and obtain funds, food, clothing, equipment, shelters and even training areas. And since authority to arm the National Police had not extended to supporting Constabulary, arrangements had to be made with local military government groups to obtain abandoned Japanese weapons and equipment.

Besides the regiment at Seoul seven had been formed by April 1945—at Pusan, Kwangju, Taegu, Iri, Taejon, Chonju, and Chuncheon. In any case, the regiments were very small, for the total strength of the constabulary at the end of April 1946 was slightly over two thousand men.

In 1946, changes occurred in the Korean defense structure and in the procedures of managing the structure. Since early 1946 some Americans had advocated an autonomous Korean police force; in their opinion the police did not properly belong under the jurisdiction of the national defence agency. The military government recognized this in March by establishing the National
Police as a separate organization.

On 20 March 1946 the Joint US-USSR Commission had just been proceeding. Not to arouse the Russians' sensitivity to the term “National Defense” the United States Military Government in Korea redesignated all its major organs as department, including the Office of the Director of National Defense. The Bureau of Armed Forces with its subordinate services was abolished, and instead new Bureau of Constabulary and Coast Guard were set up. The Department of National Defense became the Department of Internal Security.

Still another change occurred in September 1946. Koreans in all branches of the military government had been functioning under the close supervision of Americans. With a year of instruction and observation, General Archer L. Lerch, who had succeeded General Arnold as Military Governor, thought that the Koreans were ready to become less dependent upon Americans. At his direction the Koreans became responsible for administration on September 12, 1946, and Americans in the military government were ordered to assume a strict advisory status.

In the Department of Internal Security, the Director, Colonel Terrill E. Price, stepped down to the role of advisor and the Korean Director, Yu Tong Yul, took over the power. The American officers on duty with the Constabulary or at Coast Guard bases also switched their positions from commanders to advisors. From this time on, official correspondence had to be forwarded through the Korean chiefs.

Despite this change of more independent operation of the Koreans, the American advisors actually had maintained much of their direct control. The Koreans should have more to master staff procedures and organization, and acquire mechanical and technical knowledge before they could assume full control over their internal security.

Officially at this time there was no Korean Chief of Constabulary to advise. The Bureau had no general or special staff sections, and no technical or administrative services. In the provinces there were eight undersized regiments of quasi-infantry, varying in size from one to three companies. The total strength of the Constabulary at the end of November 1946 was 143 officers and 5,130 enlisted men.

Meanwhile, Colonel Russell D. Barros, the chief advisor, started to build up a Constabulary headquarters organization and in general to try to accelerate the whole program. Another Constabulary regiment activated in November 1946 in Cheju Island. With redeployment and demobilization of the US
Army in full-scale, the number of military government advisors to the Korean Constabulary diminished steadily.

Section 3. The Korean Coast Guard

Along with the creation of the Constabulary, the US Military Government established a coast guard. Smuggling and piracy were plaguing the Korean coasts and waters after the World War II and the need for a coast guard was urgent. Since a coast guard organization had existed under the Japanese rule in Korea, the Military Government transferred it, on January 14, 1946, to the jurisdiction of the Director of National Defense as a Korean Coast Guard. The US Army officers set up a training center at Chinhae, and on 8 February began recruiting in Seoul.

The development of the Coast Guard was slower than that of the Constabulary. Lack in equipment and shortages of qualified personnel were critical problems for building up the Coast Guard. Moreover, since the Koreans with experience in modern seamanship were hard to find, leadership was of special concern to the US authorities. Without component officers, the Coast Guard could not be expected to operate effectively. Vessels were also in lack. While there had been fifty two small crafts at Chinhae at the time of Japanese surrender, they had been used by the 40th US Division to repatriate Japanese and were unavailable when the Korean Coast Guard was formed. Vessels "are most necessary in a naval organization," as a Republic of Korea publication later put it.

To the eyes of the US advisory personnel the Coast Guard was not so urgent as the Constabulary. During the eight months following its establishment, the Coast Guard was operated by junior US officers basing at Inchon, Mukho, Mokpo and Chinhae. It was September when fifteen US Coast Guard officer and enlisted advisors arrived from the United States to advise with professional knowledge.

Together with the organization of a more efficient headquarters in Seoul on October 1, 1946, new bases at Kunsan, Pusan, and Pohang were activated. Training program was initiated and the groundwork for a radio communications system was laid. In the fall of 1946, they commissioned eighteen vessels of various types (loaned by the United States), which had arrived from Japan and the Philippines.
Section 4. An Army was Founded

Since the United States decided to present the matter on Korea before the UN General Assembly, on the other hand, the rapid demobilization of US forces and the cutbacks in military expenditures had led to manpower shortages in the armed forces and a close scrutinizing of US commitments overseas. Thus in October 1947, the US Department of the Army asked Generals MacArthur and Hodge for their recommendation on the Korean forces.

General Hodge proposed a South Korean army of six divisions, complete with headquarters and service troops, which could be equipped and trained by US personnel within one year. But General MacArthur thought that the establishment of Korean defense forces should be deferred until the UN General Assembly had the opportunity to express its wishes.

Four months later General MacArthur still considered the formation of a South Korean army premature. Instead, he favored an increase in the Constabulary to 50,000 men and the provision of infantry type weapons though not artillery from US sources in Korea. Other items, if necessary, could come from American stocks in Japan. To augment the Constabulary from its current strength of approximately 20,000 to 50,000 men, it would require 105 days. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the augmentation plan on March 10, 1948 along with the issue of infantry arms.

In the meantime, on 8 February the North Korean Communist bands announced the official birth of their own People's Army. In the South, the strength of the Korean force already approximated 50,000 by the time the US authorized it in March. Organizational expansion kept pace with recruiting. In December, 1947, three brigade headquarters were established at Seoul, Taejon, and Pusan. These were patterned after the headquarters organization of a US infantry division, though greatly reduced in strength and with minor changes to fit local condition. Each brigade controlled three regiments, and the Korean Constabulary began to imitate an army more than a police reserve force. In the spring of 1948, embryonic technical services were also activated.

On April 8, 1948, the US Army Department directed General Hodge to create conditions in Korea so that the US forces could be withdrawn at the end of 1948. General Hodge had in mind to train and equip the forces primarily for defense and internal security. The United States considered, after the withdrawal of the occupation forces, the establishment of a diplomatic
mission, with an advisory group attached, if necessary, to administer economic and military aid to South Korea.

Upon the direction of General Hodge, the training of the Constabulary improved in both scope and skills during the summer of 1948. The Constabulary set up its first standardized training program in July. Weapons school was established on 1 July at Taegu by the 6th US Division, and cannon schools were established on 10 July at Chinhae and Seoul by the 6th and 7th Divisions respectively. In this way the Constabulary received necessary training in the use of the guns, US light and heavy machine guns, 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, 57-mm anti-tank guns, and 105-mm howitzers.

On 20 May Brigadier General William L. Roberts replaced Colonel Price as an advisor to the Director, Department of Internal Security.

Section 5. Withdrawal of the US Occupation Forces

Early in December 1948, the UN General Assembly reconvened in Paris. After considering the reports of the UN Temporary Commission and Interim Committee on the South Korean elections, the UN adopted a new resolution on 12 December. This resolution stated:

(1) Approves the conclusions of the UN Temporary Commission.

(2) Declares that there has been established a lawful government in South Korea, in that part of the peninsula where the Commission was able to observe and consult with the inhabitants; that the elections in South Korea “a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea” and that this government was the only such government in Korea.

(3) Recommends that occupying powers should withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable.

(4) Resolves that a permanent UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) be established to continue the work of the Temporary Commission.

(5) Calls upon the Member States to cooperate with the Commission in bringing about “the complete independence and unity of Korea.”

The United States won a victory, however, the main problem of Soviet non-cooperation was not solved. After traveling to Seoul, the new Commission found that it like its predecessor, was shut out of North Korea. A new plea from the United Nations to Moscow to land its “good offices” in establishing contact with the North Korean government went unanswered.

The withdrawal of the occupation forces from Korea was first proposed
by the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission in Seoul. When the United States placed the Korean question before United Nations, the Russians offered a substitute proposal, recommending that all foreign troops leave Korea beginning in 1948 and thus allow the Koreans to erect their own government. However, the Americans recognized that withdrawal of the occupation forces would leave the South Koreans at the mercy of the militarized Sovietized north. The United States stand was that troop withdrawal constituted only one aspect of the Korean problem.

On September 19, 1948, Moscow announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops by the end of December 1948, "having considered" North Korean appeals of "requesting the immediate and simultaneous withdrawal" of both the United States and the Soviet troops from Korea. This Soviet announcement was issued on the eve of the opening of the UN General Assembly in Paris. The US State Department responded on 20 September, 1948, with a press release in which it agreed with the Russians that the best interests of the Korean people would be served by the withdrawal of all occupying forces in accordance with the United Nations resolution of November 14, 1948. However, the State Department insisted on the stand that "the question of the withdrawal of occupying forces but one fact of the entire question of the unity and independence of Korea."

The Russian announcement shook the fledgling Republic of Korea Government, which feared United States withdrawal. The Government of the Republic charged that the main purpose of the Soviet announcement was "to stimulate the people of South Korea to agitate for the withdrawal of US Forces."

Concerning US troops withdrawal, General Hodge had been instructed to make plans and preparations for the gradual withdrawal of American troops from Korea by the end of 1948. On 15 September, the first phase of the approved plan was put into effect, and the Americans began to leave the peninsula. But the political realities of the Korean situation came into conflict with the United States policy desired. In September 1948 the North Korean regime was formed under the auspices of the Soviet Communists, and the Russians had requested tantalizingly all foreign troops withdrawal. During October a rebellion within the Constabulary occurred led by the Communists. In November, a second revolt broke out at Taegu among other Constabulary troops by leftists also.

Since the Republic of Korea defense forces were not properly prepared to resist invasion, the US State Department came to the conclusion that continued presence of the US forces would have a stabilizing effect upon the over-all situation. President Syngman Rhee sent a plea to President Truman,
urging that the United States maintain an occupation force in Korea until the ROK forces were capable of dealing with any internal or external threat and that the United States establish a military and naval mission to help deter aggression.

When the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on 12 December, calling for the complete withdrawal of the occupation forces from Korea, more than 16,000 American forces still remained in the peninsula. The JCS directed General MacArthur to scale down this figure as quickly as possible to one regimental combat team of 7,500 men. On 15 January 1949 the XXIV US Corps left Korea for deactivation in Japan and General John B. Coulter who succeeded General Hodge, left the same day, and General Roberts assumed of Headquarters, United States Armed Forces in Korea, while retaining his position as Chief, Provisional Military Advisory Group.

In January the US JCS sought General MacArthur’s comment on whether the regimental combat team should remain in Korea. He told them that the United States did not have the capability to train and equip Korean troops to the point where the Koreans would be able to cope with a full-scale invasion accompanied by internal disturbances fomented by the Communists. If a serious threat developed, the United States would have to give up active military support of the ROK forces. Under the circumstances, General MacArthur recommended the remaining US units be withdrawn on May 10, 1949, the anniversary of the Korean elections.

On January 1, 1949 the United States formally recognized the Republic of Korea, and the National Security Council conducted a thorough review of US policy with respect to Korea. The Council reached the conclusion in March that further support and assistance to the ROK should not depend upon the presence of American military forces in the country and complete withdrawal, preferably by 30 June, was politically and militarily desirable. They also advised the President to seek legislative authority for continuing military assistance for the fiscal year 1949-1950 and, if developments warranted, thereafter. To handle the training of the ROK Army, Coast Guard, and National Police and to assure that the US military assistance would be effectively utilized, they recommended that a US military advisory group be established. President Truman approved these recommendations on March 23, 1949.

On June 29, 1949, the last of the American troops departed, leaving behind some five hundred members of the United States Military Advisory Group.
Section 6. The Republic of Korea Army

The United States Army Military Government came to an end when the Republic of Korea Government formally took control on 15 August 1948. General Hodge immediately opened negotiations with President Rhee for a smooth and equitable transfer of authority to the new government. On 24 August, President Rhee and General Hodge signed a military agreement whereby the Republic of Korea Government would gradually assume command of the nation's security defense forces. In the meantime, the United States would continue to train and equip the ROK Army and the Navy and would continue to use the facilities and base areas required for the maintenance of its forces. On 11 September, a financial and property settlement was concluded, which arranged for the transfer of property and funds controlled by the United States under the occupation and for reversion of Korean goods and services requisitioned during the period of occupation.

John J. Muccio was appointed as Special Representative to Korea with the rank of US Ambassador and was given the authority to negotiate of the withdrawal of US forces. He established the US diplomatic mission in Korea on August 26, 1948. On the following day General Hodge left the country and was succeeded by Major General John B. Coulter as Commanding General, United States Armed Forces in Korea and XXIV Corps. After 15 August, the position of the American military advisors to the Korean forces was changed. Official justification for their presence ended with the deactivation of the military government, but their training functions were to continue by the terms of the military agreement. All advisory personnel were organized as a Provisional Military Advisory Group under the command of General Roberts.

As the US troops left Korea during late 1948 and the first half of 1949, they turned over part of their equipment to the ROK forces in accordance with the agreement. By November 1948 between 60 and 80 per cent of the Constabulary's small arms and automatic weapons were American, but there was a dearth of mortars and heavy machine guns. Although only 52 of an allotted 90 105-mm infantry cannon(M3) had been received, a full issue of 37-mm anti-tank gun was on hand. But spare parts and all types of sighting and aiming equipment were in extremely short of supply.

During the spring of 1948, the Republic of Korea had added six more infantry regiments to the original nine formed for the Constabulary, thus activating two more brigades. They wanted to form one more but the United
States warned that it could not furnish equipment for further expansion at that time.

On the other hand, on 19 October 1948, the 14th ROK Regiment at Yosu mutinied, and the uprising spread quickly to the towns of Sunchon, Posong, and Kwangju. Since internal disturbances were common throughout South Korea by the Communist elements, it was a serious test for the fledgling Government and the Army. By the close of the month armed forces loyal to the Republic of Korea Government were able to put down the revolt. A second revolt of the Communist elements among the troops at Taegu in November, 1948 was also suppressed. These were communists-provoked insurrections. The United States called a halt to its unannounced reductions of American forces in Korea. In late November 1948, the ROK Armed Forces Organization Act was passed, and on 15 December a complete ROK national defense establishment, including a Ministry of National Defense, Headquarters of Army and Navy was set up. Forming an initial cabinet, President Rhee had appointed Lee Bum Suk, Prime Minister, to the Minister of National Defense. Brigadier General Lee Ung Jun and Commodore Son Won Il were appointed as the first Chief of Staff of Army and Chief of Naval Operations respectively. At the time the Constabulary brigades emerged as Army Divisions.

The transfer of US arms to Korean armed forces continued during the winter of 1949 and so did the ROK Army recruiting program. Despite the fact that the United States had only authorized the transfer of infantry-type weapons and equipment for 50,000 men, the ROK forces in March 1949 totalled about 65,000 in the Army, 4,000 in the Navy, and 45,000 police. Approximately one-half of the navy and police were equipped with American side arms and carbines; the rest carried the Japanese weapons.
CHAPTER VII WAR PREPARATION FOR INVASION BY THE NORTH

Section 1. Soviet’s Occupation Policy in North Korea

In contrast to an American occupation in the South, lacking policy, preparation and competence, liberation’s vacuum of power and direction was filled in the North by the clear-out programs of Soviet-implanted Communism.

The Soviet Union declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945, and entered Korea by August 10-11, rapidly over-running most of the northern half of the country. Soviet troops accompanied a group of Soviet-Koreans into Korea to help them actively with the establishment of a Communist regime. These Soviet-Koreans were from the beginning highly placed; many of them were vice-ministers in charge of ministries. They were trusted and well-used. But they had neither a prominent position in the Soviet Union before the war except former Vice Premier Huh Ka Uli, nor held a rank higher than captain in the Soviet forces except Kim Il Sung who was awarded the rank of major in the Red Army.

With these troops came in relatively obscure 33 years old partisan leader. His real name was Kim Song Ju, but he adopted for leadership purposes the name of Kim Il Sung a name of a hero associated with a famous legendary guerrilla fighter against Japan in the Manchurian and Korean border. New Kim Il Sung, entered the Soviet Army, during the World War II and on Liberation, the Russians picked Kim to receive a hero’s welcome in Pyongyang on October 10, 1945, then to head the North Korean branch of the Korean Communist party and finally to lead the People’s Interim Committee which from early in 1946, began to function as a Communist regime under the Soviet occupation.

The Russians were able to establish firmly a satellite regime through the control of the Soviet-Koreans, who were faithful apostles of a foreign power in its attempt to impose Communism—most held Soviet citizenship. Parties and a “Democratic Front” were formed; “elections” (with 99.6 per cent voting and 97 per cent endorsing the official slates) were held in 1946 to create a People’s Assembly and to set up a ruling regime. Political activity was dominated by the North Korean Workers Party in June 1949, uniting with the remnants of the South Korean Labour Party. Through it the further communization of
North Korea was to be carried out and the violent unification of Korea by force of arms then to be prepared.

Section 2. The March toward an Invasion-war

During 1949, the Communists were about to conquer the whole China, and Korea, as the case with her past, would be influenced greatly by the tremendous developments on the mainland of China.

On July 6, 1949, the North Korean radio broadcasted that the Pyongyang regime would sponsor nationwide elections on 5 September 1949, to create a unified legislature for the entire country. This legislature would then create an all-Korean government which would be free from the control of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations. While thus talking of peaceful maneuver, the North Korean Communists simultaneously stepped up harassment raids along the 38th Parallel.

Meanwhile, the UN Commission in Seoul reported to the General Assembly on July 28, 1949, that "embittered propaganda and hostile activities which now mark the relations between the two parts of Korea render the prospect of unification more and more remote." The Commission said that, like its predecessor, it was unable to forward the objectives of the General Assembly, in view of the world wide antagonism existing between Russia and the United States, and Russian obstructionism in Korea.

As summer faded, the situation along the Parallel deteriorated, and the UN Commission warned the General Assembly, on 8 September 1949, of the growing possibility of a full-scale invasion by the North Korean Communists.

On October 14, 1949, in letters to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie and Carlos P. Romulo, the President of the General Assembly, the North Korean regime openly and clearly announced its intention to reunite the Korean peninsula by force. The letters stated:

"The government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic deems it necessary to declare that should the United Nations ignore in the future the will and strivings of the Korean people, considering only the selfish interest of a small group of traitors and betrayers of the Korean people will not abandon the struggle and will reserve for itself the right to continue by measures at its disposal the struggle for removal of UNCOK and for final unification of the country by its own forces into a united democratic state."

When the UN General Assembly voted to continue the UNCOK on 21
October, charging the Commission members with the additional responsibility of investigating and reporting developments which might lead to military conflict in the area, the North Korean regime organized a new apparatus called the "United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea" around which the Communists sought to rally all dissident elements in the South. Pyongyang radio, throughout the winter of 1949-1950, continually urged the South Koreans to rise in rebellion. In this impending threat of "civil war" in Korea, the United States pursued a disengagement policy and supported the activities of the United Nations in its guard role in Korea. On a military level, American policy was clearly refuted in a speech on January 12, 1950, delivered by Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the National Press Club in Washington D.C.. According to Acheson, the American defense line in the Pacific ran from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines. As for the security of other areas of the Pacific, Acheson stated: If an attack occurred, the initial reliance "must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations." As for Korea, this meant that Korea was considered to be outside the area in which the United States would automatically react to an aggression.

By early June 1950, the Russian-North Korean plans for invasion had been completed. The North Korean armies, assisted and guided by members of the Soviet Army, were slowly shifted into position for a rapid advance south.

American intelligence agencies in the Far East became aware of this growing aggressive posture of the North. For example, in September 1949 MacArthur's headquarters noted Chinese Communist troops of Korean decent were entering North Korea in great numbers since the end of the Chinese civil war on the Asian mainland had essentially been achieved. In December 1949 and January 1950 MacArthur's headquarters learned that the threat of well-equipped North Korean Army to the Republic of Korea would become more pronounced in the more favorable weather of the spring of 1950. In a notable dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on 10 March 1950, rumors of an impending North Korean attack in June were reported. But two weeks later the intelligence section of the US Far East Command had concluded that there would be no civil war in Korea in that year.

On 10 May, the Republic of Korea Defense Minister warned an imminent invasion of North Korea, who told the press that his intelligence reports indicated the North Koreans were moving in force toward the 38th Parallel. The Pentagon authorities, however, agreed with General MacArthur's estimate and decided an attack was not imminent.
Meanwhile, the American diplomatic and military leaders were visiting the Far East on various missions. John Foster Dulles, discussing in Tokyo a Japanese peace treaty, flew to Korea and toured the 38th Parallel. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, arrived in Tokyo on June 18, 1950 to discuss the Far Eastern military situation with General MacArthur. In the briefings nothing was referred to a possible war in Korea.

By June 1950 notwithstanding, anxiety concerning attack in free Korea, the US authorities in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington were in agreement that while a North Korean offensive was possible it was not imminent.

In the early morning of 25 June 1950, however, all-out invasion of the Republic of Korea by the North Korean Communist forces was launched, to the surprise of all the free world.
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CHAPTER I THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST FORCES INVASION

Section 1. Confrontation at the 38th Parallel and Beginning of the War

38th Parallel

With the end of the Second World War, the Korean Peninsula was divided into two parts along the 38th Parallel. The northern half of the peninsula was occupied by the Russian troops and the southern part by the United States. As fully stressed earlier in Chapter IV of Part One, no free people had ever thought of the Parallel as anything more than a convenience to expedite disarming of the Japanese troops in Korea, as it was strictly an imaginary line that ran straight across mountains and rivers, and was therefore a military nightmare if it was to be actually manned and defended.

On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Union in its speculations of imminent conclusion of the Pacific hostilities declared war against Japan, subscribing to the Potsdam Declaration that reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo’s. The United States, after Japan’s first offer of surrender on 10 August, when the nearest American forces were in Okinawa and the Soviet troops already in Korea, proposed that Japanese forces north of 38th degrees north latitude should surrender to the Soviet Commander, while those south of that line to the American. This US proposal was accepted by the United Kingdom and Marshal Stalin, and was incorporated in the first General Order issued on 2 September by General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers.

Yet, when the United States troops arrived in Korea, they saw that the Parallel had been already sealed off by the Soviet troops with guard posts checking all traffics between the south and north. The ensuing US-Soviet negotiation tables proved futile in removing this artificial boundary and the subsequent United Nations efforts also ineffective. Thus Korea was placed under a status of territorial and national division by external powers. The Koreans had scarcely time to rejoice over their liberation from the Japanese rule before they realized that their liberty was a case of miscarriage from the beginning.

Military Build-up

The Soviet Command in July 1947 began to organize so-called the 38th
Security Force with the youth in North Korea to put them on the guard duties along the 38th Parallel. These security forces were gradually expanded, reaching by May 1949 to three armed brigades in force. The Headquarters of the First Brigade was established at Kansong in Kangwon Province, and Third and Seventh at Chukchon and Sibyon-ni respectively, both located in Hwanghae Province.

During this while, in the areas far behind the 38th Parallel, ten regular army divisions were being prepared for invasion tactics. And guerilla forces composed of former South Korean Labor Party members who had escaped from the South Korean police investigation and been trained with Kangdong Political Institute were being smuggled back into South Korea in some eleven major groupings. They established guerilla bases in such mountains as Odae-san, Taebaek-san, Pohyon-san, and began to harass those remote towns and villages.

Border Clashes

The year of 1949 recorded a total of 874 border violations by the North Korean security forces. And in the meantime, the United States disengagement moved on apace. By June 1949 the United States Occupation Force withdrew its last combat troops from Korea, assertively in deference to a resolution made by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Almost coinciding with the withdrawal of the United States tactical units, the North Korean forces, following a series of minor forays along the 38th Parallel, invaded the Republic of Korea territory in the Ongjin peninsula. The border was not restored until July. In this same month the city of Kaesong, south of the 38th Parallel, was attacked by North Korean infantry and artillery. Again in August the Ongjin peninsula was invaded, the North Koreans being finally driven back after heavy fighting.

The North Koreans on the other hand claimed that the South Koreans committed a total of 1,836 cases of “aggression” north of the 38th Parallel. The irascible, ill-equipped South Koreans were always the “aggressors,” according to the Communist books.

North Korean Deployment

By May 1950, the North Koreans completed war preparation. Ten division strength equipped with tanks and guns were ready to move out. With the D-Day set on that Sunday in the month of June, the North Korean forces went into combat deployment. Their tactical movement began on 12 June and completed on 23 June.

In the western sector, the 1st and 6th NK Divisions were on the move. The 6th Division in Sariwon advanced its two regiments toward Kaesong and one
regiment toward Ongjin. The 1st NK Division massed its strength toward Koryangpo, deploying between Namchonjom and Kuhwa-ri.

In the western central sector, the 4th NK Division moved from Chinnampo down to Yonchon while the 3rd Division from Pyongyang came south to Unchon. And in the mid-center the 2nd NK Division assembled between Chorwon and Kumhwa, and the 7th NK Division marched to Yanggu. On the east coast, the 5th NK Division left Nanam for Yangyang, coordinated with the move of the 766th guerilla unit from Hoeryong to Kansong.

To follow up with the main assault divisions, three more divisions were in reserve: The 10th in Sukchon, 13th in Sinuiju, and 15th in Hoeryong. And three brigades of the 38th Security Force were at alarm: 1st at Kansong, 7th at Sibyon-ni and 3rd at Chukchon (See Table I and III).

Section 2. Unprepared -- Republic of Korea

Creation of ROK Army

In 1948, the US National Security Council gave serious thought to helping create a field army in South Korea. But the plan shortlived, largely because of the “diminished capabilities of US occupation forces.” By 1949, all the planning, all the official statements and all the military decisions in free nations derived essentially from the theory of a global war in an atomic age. The concepts of “limited war” were well compartmented inside the Communist world. In a global war, the Security Council agreed, Korea would be relatively minor importance and, in any event, indefensible. The United State’s mind was already made up to liquidate its embarrassing military commitment.

However, in Korea where the clashing arms not only sounded more distinctively but also actually slashed along the border, the United Nations Temporary Commission and President Syngman Rhee kept warning that Korea was on the verge of a “barbarous civil war.” President Rhee had foreseen the need for an additional defensive strength. Following his visit to the United States in 1948, he immediately made his wish known to his Defense Minister, alluding to the National Guard of the United States. The ROK Conscription Law was enacted on 6 August 1949, to substitute the Volunteer Service Act that had been in force since the establishment of the Constabulary. And on 1 September that year, the Military District Command was erected each in the provinces. But no attrition of strength followed. On 20 January 1950 those enlisted personnel of over three years service were separated from the military ranks, and 2,000 recruits were filled in. Yet there was no way to enroll other draftees; the District Commands were deactivated on 14 March
the same year.

Being consecutively the head of the Korean Youth Corps (activated on 19 December 1949), Minister of Defense saw to it that the Youth Defense Corps be activated on May 1950 with alleged membership of 200,000 young men. With no arms this paper corps proved non-existent before the armoured force of the North Koreans in June 1950, the next month.

President Rhee's fever for the build-up of defensive strength came to the field of armory, and by the end of May 1950 a laboratory succeeded in bringing out the parts of Japanese rifle Model 99, but not the rifle barrel. The laboratory also brought up an imitation of the US caliber 45 pistol, but its hardness, like that of the rifle barrel, did not sustain the shock of explosion.

**ROK Army Deployment**

On the day of the North Korean invasion, the Republic of Korea Army was manning the 38th Parallel with elements of its five regiments. And most of the ROK regiments had given their officers and men long-suspended week-end passes, thus reducing its front-line forces down to only four battalions strength deployed along the entire defence line. Faced with the North Korean attack, the ROK defensive soon proved to be nonexistent. The ROK order of battle as of 24 June 1950 was as follows:

The Ongjin Peninsula was of the responsibility of the Independent 17th ROK Regiment, which deployed its one battalion on the line and two battalions in reserve with its command post located at Ongjin town.

The 1st ROK Division defended Kaesong sector with its 12th Regiment on line, and 11th and 13th Regiments in reserve at Kimpo and Munsan respectively, while its Headquarters was located at Suseok, northwest of Seoul.

The main route of the enemy approach, Tongduchon area, was in the responsibility of the 7th ROK Division that had only two regiments organically. The 9th Regiment was on line with its one battalion posted at Pochon, and the other 1st Regiment was in reserve with the Division Headquarters in Uijongbu.

In the middle sector, the 6th ROK Division had its Headquarters established with its reserve 19th Regiment in Wonju; its 7th Regiment posted at Chunchon to man the front and its another reserve 2nd Regiment in Hongchon to guard against enemy guerilla actions.

On the steep east coast area, the two-regimented 8th Division placed its 10th Regiment at Kangnung and its reserve 21st Regiment at Samchok with the Division Headquarters well advanced in Kangnung with the 10th Regiment. The troops of these two regiments were mainly employed against the enemy guerilla infiltrations in the mountainous areas.

The ROK reserve divisions were placed in four separate districts. In the far
The NKCF Invasion

south, a couple of two-regiment divisions were operating in the Chiri Mountain from east and west to mop up the North Korean guerillas.

The 3rd ROK Division with its Headquarters in Taegu, together with its 22nd Regiment, operated from east toward the guerilla infested areas, and its 23rd Regiment in Pusan checking the southern path to the mountain. The 5th Division placed its 15th Regiment in Chonju and 20th Regiment in Kwangju with which was also located the Division Headquarters. Its battalions operated far inside the mountain where communications produced great difficulties.

In the central district, the 2nd ROK Division, with its 5th Regiment, established its Headquarters in Taegon and deployed its 16th Regiment in Chongju and 25th Infantry in Onyang. The Capital Security Command with all the subordinate units(3rd, 8th, 18th and Cavalry Regiments) located in Seoul was a "show" force that paraded on special events.

### TABLE I COMPARISON OF THE MILITARY STRENGTH
25 JUNE 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES</th>
<th>NORTH KOREAN FORCES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1) Army Strength &amp; Equipment</strong></td>
<td><strong>(1) Army Strength &amp; Equipment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>10 Infantry Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>(22 Regiments)</td>
<td>(40 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Units</td>
<td>Other Units:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>77,500</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tank Brigades</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8,800</td>
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<td></td>
<td>122-mm Arty Regt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1,300</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AAA Regiments</td>
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<td>1,200</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>603rd Motorcycle Regt</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,500</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>208th Mecz-Inf Regt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Engineer Brigade</td>
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<td>2,500</td>
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<td>Signal Regiment</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1st &amp; 2nd Military</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Academy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guerilla &amp; Ranger Forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2,500</td>
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<td>Internal Security Forces</td>
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<td>34,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>15,700</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Strength</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Strength</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>94,974</td>
<td>198,380</td>
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<tr>
<td>REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES</td>
<td>NORTH KOREAN FORCES</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm Howitzer, M3</td>
<td>122-mm Howitzer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-mm Anti-tank Guns</td>
<td>76-mm Howitzer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm Mortar</td>
<td>45-mm Anti-tank Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm Mortar</td>
<td>120-mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
<td>82-mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61-mm Mortar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85-mm &amp; 37-mm AA Guns</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tank, T-34, w/85-mm Guns</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76-mm, SU, Self-propelled Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Navy

**Total Strength** 6,956
Patrol Frigates 28
LST 2
Other Vessels 41

(3) Air Force

**Total Strength** 1,897
Total Air Planes 24
Liaison Planes, L-4 (8)
Liaison Planes, L-5 (6)
Trainees, T-6 (10)

(2) Navy

**Total Strength** 13,700
Patrol Frigates 30

(3) Air Force

**Total Strength** 2,000
Total Air Planes 211
Fighter, Yak-9F
Fighter, IL-10F
Fighter, IL-2F
Trainees
Reconnaissance

(4) Marine Corps

**Total Strength** 1,166

(4) Marine Corps

**Total Strength** 9,000
TABLE II  ORGANIZATION OF ROKA INFANTRY DIVISION
As of 25 June 1950
TABLE III  ORGANIZATION OF NKA INFANTRY DIVISION
As of 25 June 1950
ROK Army Defense Plan of the 38th Parallel

Subsequent to the withdrawal of the last of the United States combat units, the ROK Defense Plan was formulated in the end of January 1950. It dictated initially delaying actions along the 38th Parallel, definitely calling for the withdrawal from Ongjin Peninsula to Inchon and the alternate position, after withdrawal from Kaesong, behind the Imjin River; the four reserve divisions were to be called upon for the counter-offensive. The second phase defense line was drawn along the Han River, and the third along Taegon and Andong. The engineer portion was eventually added, including demolition plans.

Convinced of the North Korean general attack on that Sunday morning, this plan was called upon by officers on duty in various echelons. However, they soon realized that they had no time enough to implement this plan under the existing circumstances; the North Koreans moved down fast, especially where they were led by tanks.

The force below the 38th Parallel was no match for the one above it, either in number, in arms or in training. Their heaviest weapons were twenty-seven armored cars and eighty-nine 105-mm howitzers, still serviceable but with short range effects. Among arms that had been given out to the ROK troops by the departing US Occupation Forces, 15 per cent of the weapons were useless and 35 per cent of the vehicles unserviceable. The ammunition stock would last only a few days, even for the small arms (See Table I, II and III).

North Korean Attack

On 25 June 1950, at 0400 hours in the morning, the North Korean Communists, with seven infantry divisions in the line and with three more infantry divisions in reserve, struck south across the 38th Parallel.

Radio Pyongyang asserted that the South Koreans initiated the attack and did not hesitate to declare war against the Republic of Korea by noon. As the North Koreans surged forward, the Russian Radio announced that the South Koreans had made a surprise attack on the North, but assured that “...all attacks of the South Koreans have been thrown back... the North Korean People’s Army in counter-offensive had pierced the 38th Parallel up to five and ten kilometers.” The irascible, ill-equipped South Korans were again the aggressor, according to the Communist book.

General Ridgway, who had been much dissatisfied with the South Korean performance during his command of the Eighth US Army, wrote many years later in his book about the Korean War: “Considering the relative strength and combat readiness of the forces that faced each other across the 38th Parallel in July 1950, it was a marvel that the North Korean armies were delayed at all in their drive to overrun all of South Korea... It was as if a few troops of Boy Scouts with hand weapons had undertaken to stop a Panzer unit.”
Section 3. First Phase Operations of North Korean Army
(25-30 June 1950)

The North Korean principal objective in their first phase operation was to capture all cities and towns north of the Han River. Taking the initiative, the enemy first intended to close in Seoul by turning and flanking movement from all directions, and cut the ROK frontline units along the 38th Parallel off the reinforcements from the rear areas. Then they planned to envelop and destroy the main ROK forces at a stretch in the Seoul area.

On 25 June, the North Korean Communist Army opened a volley of fire at 0400 hours in the morning. Following the artillery preparation for a twenty minute, the enemy infantry divisions, preceded by the tanks, moved south across the Parallel.

Headed by more than 80 tanks, the irresistible forces of the North Korean Army rushed down to Tongduchon and Pochon sectors the most sensitive routes accessible to the Capital of the Republic of Korea. The enemy’s most powerful attacks were launched by the 3rd and 4th NK Infantry Divisions with units of the 105th NK Armored Brigade attached. Armor-infantry columns stabbed Tongduchon-Uijongbu approach from due north and Unchon-Pochon-Uijongbu high way from the northeast.

The enemy main attack soon caught up the 7th ROK Infantry Division which was in command of Brigadier General Yu Jae Hung. Troops on line fought well, but learned in a very early stage that they could not stop the Russian made T-34 tanks with their 57-mm anti-tank or 2.36-inch rocket shells. Some ROK troops jumped on enemy tanks with handgrenades and TNT’s (trinitrotoluene). But these new attempts were likewise a failure before the enemy tank column. The enemy continued to press on toward Uijongbu-Seoul highway.

Those ROK troops on week-end passes were ordered to return, but they had no posts to report in; their units had been already dispersed by the enemy armored forces.

In the Chunchon sector where the enemy tank was scarce, the 6th ROK Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Kim Jong Oh, successfully fought back for three days on the Soyang River, exacting loss of one regiment of the 2nd NK Division, thereby stumbling the initial plan of the enemy offensive. Nothing but the 7th NK Division came down from the northeast under cover of 30 tanks to occupy Hongchon while the 2nd NK Division moved in from the north to seize Chunchon by the morning of 25 June. Initially, the elements of
the 6th ROK Division were forced to give ground, and the invaders penetrated Chunchon several hours later. Soon stubborn counterattacks by the 6th ROK Division prevented the enemy from capturing the city, however, the North Korean Reds had to call upon additional armor and artillery to bolster their attacks. The enemy 2nd Division, with no tanks attached, attempted to maneuver with the self-propelled guns in offense, but these guns became no longer to appear again since two of them were destroyed by the ROK special assault teams. In addition, the 7th NK Division also suffered loss of ten tanks during the first phase battles. It was a surprise for the enemy that the 6th ROK Division, in spite of having no tanks and no heavy guns, had delayed the offensive, and inflicted the fatal blow. The commanders of the II Corps and 2nd Division of the NKA invasion forces were dismissed from the posts on charge of vital failure in the mid-east operations. The 6th ROK Division was thus able to move back in an orderly fashion with its units and equipment intact when the valiant defenders had to pull back for the next operations.

On the remote east coast, in the meantime, the 8th ROK Infantry Division also came under the enemy attack at daybreak on 25 June. Attacked by the elements of the 5th NK Division on the front and the other forces combined with the 886th Guerilla and Ranger Unit plus the 549th Marine Unit in the rear, the 8th ROK Division, Colonel Lee Sung Ga in command, put up obstinate resistance with its two regiments. These enemy special forces landed along the coast north and south of Samchok. When the ROK elements observed the landing junks and sampans circling offshore below Samchok, apparently preparing to land the second wave there, it brought anti-tank guns to the coast and opened fire. After two boats were sunk, the enemy amphibious forces withdrew. The defending ROK troops did not realize that a full-scale invasion was in progress since the enemy guerilla infiltration of the friendly territory were not unusual for years. The troops that landed on the coast that day were acting like guerillas rather than regular units. But the 5th NK Division and other frontal attacking units were moving southward from the 38th Parallel at this same time. Nevertheless, the 8th ROK Division withdrew on order to the Taekwal-lyong and Pyongchang without noticeable loss.

Meanwhile, in Seoul front, the enemy leading tanks already broke through the Mia-ri defense line, the northern outskirts of the city, at about 0100 hours on 28 June, and rushed into the downtown, seizing soon the whole city.

As for the Kaesong and Munsan sector, northwest of Seoul, the 1st and 6th NK Divisions, struck south early in the morning of 25 June, supported by one tank regiment. This enemy, however, failed at the outset in breaking through the Bonggilchon defense line which was defended by the 1st ROK Division under the command of Colonel Paik Sun Yup. They later barely
entered into Seoul as the ROK defenders withdrew.

On this fateful Sunday of 25 June, the ROK Army Headquarters personnel trickled into their posts from the middle of weekend passes, and the general staff meeting was convened at about midday. In consequence, it was decided that the three regiments under the Capital Security Command to be committed immediately. At the same time, six ROK regiments (three from the 2nd Division, one from the 3rd Division, two from the 5th Division) and the Infantry School troops were ordered to deploy north of the Capital City. Yet, these orders were not carried out due to the lack of transportation. They were thrown in piecemeal when arrived there later, and the main ROK ground forces of six divisions soon lost its combat capabilities.

The North Korean forces took only three days and a half to seize Seoul, 50 kilometers from the 38th Parallel. Thus they gained psychological effects in addition to the political and strategical advantages from the early stage of the war. With the initial success, the enemy became to conclude that they could overrun the whole peninsula in a two week period. In fact, the ROK Army did not then have enough ammunition stock to last even a few days. Moreover, all major weapons and equipment were abandoned north of the Han River because demolition of that bridge took place too earlier the stage. With the major route cut off, disintegration of morale among the troops and civilians alike, in Seoul and elsewhere in the north of the Han River, was rapid and confusion followed. In the morning hours of 28 June, the North Korean Communists forces terminated their first phase operations with complete seizure of Seoul (See Situation Map 1).

Section 4. United Nations Resolution and Participation

The whole world was shocked when the Republic of Korea that had achieved national independence under the aegis of the United Nations only a few years back was falling victim to the illegal aggression. Particularly, at the request of the United States, the United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session on 25 (local time) June, 1950 and adopted a resolution that branded the North Korean Communists attack a breach of the peace and called for the immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel. To extract a portion of the resolutions reads as follows (See Appendix II UN Resolutions):

1. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eight parallel;

2. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:
(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation, with the least possible delay;
(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eight parallel; and
(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

3. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance the North Korea authorities.

When the North Korean Communists ignored the resolution, the Security Council, on 27 June (New York time) finally put the United Nations into the war against the North Korean Communists. In a resolution momentous in the history of the world, the Council declared;

"Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th Parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

Having noted that appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

This was the first instance in the history where a world organization ever decided to take up military sanctions to oppose aggression and keep the peace. And on 7 July (local time), further the Security Council provided a unified United Nations Command for all the forces fighting against the North Korean Communists and asked the United States to appoint the commander. Being absent, the Soviet Union failed to exercise the veto with which any of the five permanent members could nullify the Council's resolution.

While the North Korean forces pushed forward on all fronts, President Harry S. Truman of the United States ordered on 27 July the United States naval and air forces to defend the Republic of Korea, appointing General of Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, US Far East, as the Commander-in-Chief of the US forces to be deployed in the Korean theatre of operations. The next day, on 28 June, Admiral Ladford, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, ordered most of his fleet to move to the Far East waters. Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee of the United Kingdom announced the British decision to place the British Fleet based in the Japanese waterway under the operational control of General MacArthur.

On 30 June, the United States President Truman ordered General MacArthur
to make immediate use of US air and naval forces to give the Republic of Korea cover and support. The air support could not save Seoul at this late juncture, however. The North Koreans wanted a swift conquest of the Republic of Korea to establish a Fact of Communist Korea before the allied forces from the United Nations could arrive on the peninsula.

Acting in unison with United Nations movement, by 30 June, thirty two countries expressed their support of the United Nations resolutions to provide the armed forces, medical and other assistance to repel the Communist aggression in Korea. Eventually sixteen nations from east and west rallied beneath the blue-white flag of the United Nations. All these men did not come at once, but they were bound by the common bond of the historic resolution.

Section 5. Resistance and the Delaying Actions

a. Enemy Second Phase Operations (1-6 July 1950)

After Seoul taken the enemy started its second-phase operations with 1st, 6th, 3rd, and 4th NKA Divisions and 105th Tank Brigade; directing the main attack to the Yongdungpo-Suwon-Chonan highway, and secondary attack on the Yongwol-Chunchon-Chungju-Pyongtaek line. The prospect of the war remained tragic for the ROK forces at the time. But the top ranking ROK military leaders, in the meantime, planned to cope with the situation in the immediate south of the Han River. By mid-night of 28 June, they reorganized ROK stragglers available into a composite force of six battalions. This force of barely 3,000 in total was hurriedly deployed along the south bank of the Han River, from Yongdungpo through Noryangjin-Huksokdong-Donggyakdong. On the following day, 29 June, the remnants of the 1st ROK Division were also disposed on the Oryudong—Kimpo line. By then the enemy had already crossed the river and were in the process of seizing Kimpo airfield. But the ROK troops were reaffirmed that their orders were to stay put. The primary purpose of defending the river line by the ROK forces was to earn time for the US ground forces expected after General MacArthur’s personal inspection of the battle area on 29 June.

By the end of June, the North Korean army was in possession of all territory north of the Han and cleared most of the ROK troops there. The enemy wanted to cross the Han River but the river-crossing equipment was not immediately available. They started to reorganize and at midnight on 29 June, their first attempt to cross the river was observed. They employed company-size units on many points along the wide front. Against the enemy artillery and mortar fire, the troops in the south bank of the river had a few crew-
served weapons. Bloody six-day battle took place and on 3 July, the Han River defense line fell to the enemy hands. The ROK survivors moved back to the Suwon defense line.

In the central sector, meanwhile, the North Korean 2nd and 7th Divisions, having overrun Chunchon on 27th and Hongchon on 30th June respectively, continued to pursue the ROK troops to capture Chechon and Wonju on 6 July.

In those days, the enemy main attack that had taken Yongdungpo also continued along the main national highway capturing Suwon on 4 July. As the ROK forces were falling south from Suwon to the Pyongtaek line, the US combat troops were coming up. They were the first US vanguards Task Force Smith, composed of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry of the 24th US Infantry Division. The evidence of the participation of the US forces greatly boosted the morale of the ROK troops, however, only temporarily. The enemy armour soon proved still excelled over the friendly weapons, and the enemy column broke the Pyongtaek defense line on 6 July. This marked of their second phase operations; the main force on Pyongtaek and the secondary on Chechon-Yongwol line, now had linked up.

As the participation of the US forces into the battle became reality, however, the Kim Il Sung's clique had to readjust their operational concept. To meet the new situation, the North Korean army established a centralized Forward Command, integrating the First and Second NK Armies. General Kim Chaik was placed in charge of the new field command. The NK Corps were renamed the Corps Groups. Security Brigades under the Internal Ministry were also renamed Divisions to strengthen the defense of the coastline in addition to the Coastal Defense Corps that was only recently activated.

On 5 July, the ROK Army de-activated its battered 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions at Pyongtaek to form the 1 ROK Corps, placing the 1st and the Capital Divisions under operational control at the same time. The new corps was given the mission of defending the Chinchon-Chungju line, while the 6th Division was deployed on the line of Umsong-Chungju-Mungyong, the 8th Division on the Chechon-Tanyang-Yongju, and the 3rd Division along the east coast. Then the 2nd Division was placed in corps reserve but it had no combat capability.

The faces of the ROK troops once again brightened when they learned that the main body of the 24th US Infantry Division had now come to the frontline. Charged with the western front, from and inclusive of the main national highway where the enemy directed their main efforts, the division troops immediately took over the defense mission around Pyongtaek and Ansong while the Task Force Smith was engaged in the farther north.
b. Enemy Third Phase Operations and Friendly Kumgang Defense
(7—20 July 1950)

The North Koreans were still pressing steadily southward across the entire front. The fundamental concept of their next step operations was to completely neutralize both the ROK and US forces on the Kum River and Sopaek Range by speedy maneuvers allowing no time for the US forces to substantially organize for effect. This meant to seize the whole line of Chongju-Nonsan-Mungyong-Ulchin from west to east not later than 20 July.

General MacArthur first estimated that, to repel the North Korean invasion forces back to the 38th Parallel, he needed only two US divisions perhaps landing at Incheon with the 1st US Cavalry Division, while the 24th US Division held the enemy advance in the west front. But now General MacArthur began to re-evaluate the North Korean Communist forces, as the elements of the 24th US Division continuously suffered sharp reverses in the successive battles in and around Osan-Pyongtaek-Chonan-Chonui and elsewhere.

He realized that the enemy forces were not only overwhelming in number and armored equipment, but also they were so well trained. Eventually he concluded that he needed at least four full-strength divisions. With the revision of General MacArthur's basic strategy, the 24th US Division organized the defensive line along the Kum River to gain time to bring up more reinforcements, while the 1st US Cavalry Division, which General MacArthur had been hoarding for landing, was rushed to Korea to check the enemy advance. That was the situation on 12 July, the day all ground operations in Korea passed to the command of Lieutenant General Walton Walker.

The North Korean army continued to give pressure on forcing their advance momentum southward. They were now moving down at the rate of nine kilometers per day which seemed to have slowed down a little as compared with eleven kilometers in the first stage of their invasion. This decrease in their offensive momentum was attributable to the US naval forces off the east and west coasts as well as the US air forces striking in the enemy rear and also in close support of the ground operations during the daylight hours.

The North Korean I Corps on the west sector, in the meantime, continued to strike south along the Kyong-Pu Highway (Seoul-Pusan Road), sweeping over Chonan on 8 July, Chonui on 11 July and Chochiwon on the next day. To meet this onrush, the 24th US Division deployed its available two regiments of a new defensive line along the Kum River in the afternoon of the same day. With the daylight of 14 July, however, immediately following artillery pounding upon the American troops on the south bank, the elements of the 3rd and 4th NKA Divisions began to cross in force by barges, and at a draught, broke
through the defense line, while some other enemy troops, which had simultaneously crossed to the southwest, penetrated into the friendly rear to block the path of withdrawing. The entire positions of the Kum River defensive eventually collapsed. The enemy forces continued thereafter to pursue the 24th US Division, and succeeded to envelop Taejon on 19 July. Then they began blocking the major approaches to the city and launched the determined attacks from five directions of Shintanjin, Yusong, Nonsan, Kumsan, and Okchon. Confusion began to spread among the scattered units of the 24th US Division.
as soon as numerous communication's failure and left them without leaders. During the bitter and bloody fighting, the Division Commander Major General Dean himself had to go tank hunting, moving through mid-town with a bazooka team in a deliberate attempt to encourage his troops. By nightfall much of the city was already in the enemy hands. On the afternoon of the following day, that was 20 July, the US Division abandoned Taejon in an effort to regroup at Yongdong southeast of Taejon. Unfortunately, General Dean was missing in action and it was learned later that he had been in captivity since 25 August while he was trying to find a way out from the enemy area (He was repatriated through the Freedom Gate at Panmunjom in Korea on 4 September 1953 after the armistice was signed).

Then, on 22 July, the 24th US Division turned its Yongdong blocking positions over to the 1st US Cavalry Division and went into reserve. The 24th US Division had fought and delayed the North Korean 3rd and 4th Divisions along a 160 kilometers route from Osan to Yongdong.

After Taejon, the North Koreans announced third-phase operations as "an excellent one whose record will be carried forever in the glorious history of the fatherland liberation war." They were so proud of their success against the US troops who defeated the Japanese during the World War II. Without exception to their habitual psychological approach, they inserted again this time a special feature story in their so-called "The History of just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People." It claimed that they inflicted great casualties of 32,000 men on the 24th US Division with actual strength of that had only two regiments 3,933. The casualty list of this particular US division later turned out at 1,150 men, representing 30 per cent of the entire division strength. This one fact proves official records of the North Korean Communists are deplorably falsified.

In the meantime, with appointment of General MacArthur as the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, the Eighth US Army Headquarters, better known to the UN allies as EUSAK, moved from Japan to Taegu on 9 July. Lieutenant General Walker also arrived on 13 July at Taegu to assume command of all the US ground forces in Korea. From that date on, both the ROK Army and the Eighth US Army, as well as the other United Nations troops that arrived later, came under his command.

On 14 July, President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea formally notified to General MacArthur the assignment of command authority over all the Republic of Korea forces to him through a letter which reads in part as follows:

"...In view of the common military effort of the United Nations, on behalf
of the Republic of Korea, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commanders or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas."

General MacArthur was by then, of course, the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Command in Korea, a force that consisted of the Eighth US Army, attached UN units and the ROK Army in substance (See Appendix III Assignment of Command Authority).

As the battle line continued moving down to the south, the ROKA Headquarters moved from Taejon to Taegu on 14 July, and the government then at Taejon moved south to Taegu two days later, on 16 July.

Now at the battle line, the ROK and US forces were fighting desperately to stabilize the situation. On the mid-west, the I ROK Corps fought a series of delaying actions against the 2nd NK Division near the Chinchon-Umsong line but gave Chongju up on 12 July while the ROK 1st and Capital Divisions withdrew to Poun and Hamchang respectively. In the north of Umsong, the ROK defense was successful and one entire regiment of the NK 15th Division was annihilated. For this merit all the ranks, officers and men, of the 7th Infantry Regiment under the 6th ROK Division, were honored with a special promotion in rank. This victory was so complete that the 6th ROK Division moved on 12 July north to Mungyong to organize new defense position covering Chungju. On the further northeast, the 8th ROK Division withdrew to Punggi on 12 July after its short-lived containment of the enemy advance along the Chechon-Tanyang route. On the east coast, the North Korean 5th Division was coming down the narrow coastal road over the 3rd ROK Division finally forcing the division to withdraw to Yonghae on 4 July. But the enemy had to receive much casualties unlike the first contact at Ulchin on 30 June. On 12 July, the 3rd Division further moved south to Yongdok where it held the enemy advance until 20 July.

Thus continuing their delaying actions, the ROK forces had to undertake hard and bitter battles. One gallant action among many others was performed by the 17th ROK Infantry Regiment to result in wholesale destruction of one regiment of the 15th NK Division. During this two-day battle of 18-19 July that was fought on the ROK's counterattack took the enemy column at Hwaryangjang road in between Poun and Sangju. The troops of this victorious regiment too were soon rewarded with special promotion in rank.

With the third phase operation of the enemy completed around 20 July, the
frontline now lay generally along the line of Chonju—Taehyon—Poun—Mungyon—Punggi—Yongdok from west to east. The Communist forces gained up to now some 220 kilometers from the 38th Parallel within 27 days, averaging eight kilometers daily.

c. US Reinforcement and Reorganization of the ROK Army

Based on General MacArthur's new look at the military situation, the 25th US Infantry Division began arriving in Korea on 9 July at Pusan, completing by 18 July, and commenced a series of delaying actions near Hamchang and along the areas of Uisong-Sangju-Kimchon in support of the ROK Army units. The 1st US Cavalry Division, formerly stationed in Japan, followed nine days later landing at Pohang on 18 July. It immediately proceeded to Yongdong on 19 July, deploying in the rear of the 24th US Division.

There were also the 2nd US Infantry Division and the 1st US Provisional Marine Brigade en route to Far East with tanks and supporting air. They were at sea ordered directly to make for Pusan instead of Japan. Moreover, many of UN member nations were preparing troops for Korea.

On the other hand, the ROK Army was still far from completing its reorganization, therefore unable to launch decisive counter-operations. The ROK troops were fighting almost exclusively with small arms. Nevertheless, the ROK Army activated the II Corps at Hamchang on 15 July with the 6th and 8th Infantry Divisions, while the I ROK Corps had the Capital and 1st Infantry Divisions. The 3rd Infantry Division then remained under direct control of the ROKA Headquarters.

Meanwhile, on 20 July General MacArthur sent his new estimate on the size of the UN forces against the aggravating situations in Korea to President Truman. He in turn sent his message to Congress on 19 July (Washington time), asking for removal of restrictions on the size of the US armed forces and legislation on the priorities and allocations of materials necessary for the conduct of the war. The MacArthur report said:

"With the deployment in Korea of major elements of the Eighth US Army now accomplished, the first phase of the campaign had ended and with it the chance for victory of the North Korean forces. The enemy's plan and great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons temporarily shattered South Korea resistance... The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete coordination by air and naval elements, forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics which
so slowed his advance and blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build up a secure base...the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not be without choice...Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He had his great chance and failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force and with God’s help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored.”

d. Enemy Fourth Phase Operations and Naktong River Defense by the UN forces (21 July—20 August 1950)

As the southward momentum of the North Korean Communist forces was gradually slowed down even in the wake of their second phase operations, Kim Il Sung became highly dissatisfied with the war progress. In his calculation, his invasion army was to be greeted everywhere by uprising peasants and underground elements of the South Korean Labour Party. But not a single upheaval of the people in the south took place. To make the situation worse, the North Korean advance was remarkably obstructed by the unexpected deployment of the US forces, and the daylight actions of the tanks, which had played the most essential roles in the series of their preceding attacks, were greatly restricted by air strikings of the UN forces in particular. Their supply line also became longer with passing day. Consequently, the North Korean operational efficiency was becoming a stagnation as the war progressed.

So fretted, Kim Il Sung appeared personally on 20 July at Suanbo (Onchon-ni), South of Chungju, where the enemy forward command headquarters was located, and urged the forward command to do its utmost to seize Pusan by mid-August. The enemy forward command had to try to conclude their invasion war by any means during the fourth phase operation.

They could have very well attained Pusan within ten or fifteen days if the United States had not joined the war as Kim did expect. However, in their concerted endeavours, the UN member countries immediately came to call of collective security against the aggressor, dealing fatal blow to the north Korean invaders. The Kim’s clique and his master in the Kremlin were bewildered. Yet, Kim Il Sung still retained some hope of defeating the US ground forces, particularly at the battle of Taegu. The memory of the initial success greatly encouraged Kim but entertained him with a miscalculation for final victory. He boasted that his forces would drive out the ROK and US forces as well as other UN forces from the whole Korean peninsula.

The Communist forces prepared to renew the attack with a dozen of
divisions on the line; eight were deployed already and four more were moved to the south of the 38th Parallel. The North Koreans still believed that they could take Pusan, and struck down on four routes. One southern thrust that had reached near west of Pusan was directed now east to make a flanking dash toward the port city.

The enemy could be right. The initiative was still in his hands. In its desperate move to push through, the enemy organized a number of so-called the supervising units to drive their troops to fight to death. The supervisors were ordered to shoot down anyone who, if, turned back to retreat.

Throughout the fourth phase operations, the North Korean army kept its main effort on the main highway, along Yongdong-Kimchon-Taegu. The First NK Corps Group pressed down upon the 1st Cavalry, 25th and 24th US Infantry Divisions in that sector, while the Second NK Corps Group continued to press on the I and II ROK Corps along the line from Hamchang north of Kimchon, to the east coast. In the mountainous central and eastern front the enemy wanted to make the blitzkrieg drives and settle the war by waging a final Armageddon upon crossing of the Naktong River.

The enemy plan, however, was not easily implemented due to blocking operations by the ROK and US forces. The enemy lost a half of its strength in action. Worse, two third of their tanks were destroyed by the US air forces. Thus, the morale of their troops lowered greatly.

The North Koreans, nonetheless, kept pressing down. In the indefensible south-western part of the peninsula, the 6th Division, the North Korean First Corps Group, overran Kwangju on the 23rd, Mokpo on the 24th, Namwon and Yosu on the 26th and Chinju on the last day of July.

On the main highway leading to Taegu, the 3rd NK Division, leaving Taejon after one-day's rest, struck the 1st US Cavalry Division in Yongdong. On the night of 25 July, the enemy captured Yongdong, its leading element reached Kimchon on 2 August. In the meantime, the 4th NKA Division attacked down on the Kumsan road and captured Kochang on 30 July.

The 15th, 13th and 1st NK Divisions under the command of the Second NK Corps Group also reached the Sangju-Hamchang line by the end of July, while the 8th and 12th NK Divisions closed in on Andong.

In the east coast, the 5th NK Division was stalled at Yongdok, where a fierce see-saw battle raged for possession of the town.

The 24th US Division, after a serious defeat at Taejon, reassembled at Yongdong in the next two days. It was then ordered Army reserve and went into reorganizing at Kimchon, Kunwi and Uisong. On 24 July, the understrength-
ened division was ordered to return to the line to encounter the 4th and 6th NK Divisions on the west flank of the Naktong River, where the enemy maneuver was most likely to endanger the defense.

In the south-western Honam District (Cholla Provinces), the enemy swept, turning it into uninhabited land. There had been three newly activated regiments, the 15th, 25th and 26th, chiefly composed of local young volunteers. Only one company strength of each regiment carried rifles collected from stragglers. The remnants of the 7th ROK Infantry Division had been there to reorganize with skeleton of merely a battalion strength. There was also one marine battalion on the same process.

To block the enemy advance from this district, the Eighth US Army placed the 24th US Division in the Kochang and Chinju sector, with the latter’s attached 29th US Infantry Regiment committed into the Hadong area, west of Chinju. The regiment, however, was soon greeted by an enemy ambush at Hadong on 27 July. Major General Chae Byong Duk, who had been the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army during the Seoul disaster, happened to be there with an individual mission to guide and encourage the US troops. The very first burst of the enemy ambush fire brought him an instantaneous death. The 29th US Regiment moved on east toward Chinju.

On 29 July, the 34th Infantry Regiment of the 24th US Division, reinforced by the 17th ROK Infantry Regiment, contacted with the 4th NK Division at Kochang and then withdrew to the downstream of the Naktong River. The 19th US Infantry Regiment, with the ROK element attached, set out to defend Chinju, but they were also forced to give up the city and fell back on 21 July to Masan to organize a new defense line. Nevertheless, the enemy divisions were losing the race for Pusan and the 6th NK Division was poised to smash Masan.

On the northwest of Taegu, the 1st US Cavalry Division made its first contact at Yongdong on 23 July. It abandoned the town on 25 July, after inflicting casualties upon the 3rd NK Division, and took up new blocking positions in and around Kimchon northwest of Taegu. It further retrograded to the Naktong River line on 31 July for its both flanks were widely open to the enemy.

The 25th US Infantry Division that deployed on the Sangju line north of the 1st US Cavalry Division was encountered with hard pressures from three directions by the enemy’s 1st, 15th, and 2nd Divisions. It gave up the defensive line on 31 July and withdrew to Waegwan.

The 1st ROK Division also held the 15th NK Division at the south of Koesan-Poun line until 13 July, and moved to the Hwaryongjiang area to renew the delaying actions. Relieved by the 24th US Regiment on 25 July, the division moved to Hamchang, where it fought to contain the 1st NK Division until the end of the month.
The 6th ROK Division, after the Umsong-Chungju line, was engaged with the 1st NK Division at Hwaryongjang from 14 to 17 July. Then it moved through Mungyong, Hamchang and Chomchon to block the enemy advance there. The 17th ROK Regiment was then under operational control of the 24th US Division, and now caught the 4th NK Division at Kochang-Myosan. As for the Capital ROK Division, its three regiments were engaged in a stubborn resistance: The 18th Infantry against the 8th NK Division, the 1st Infantry against the 12th NK Division and the Cavalry Regiment against the 766th NK Special Unit at the Yechon, Andong, and Chongsong areas respectively until the end of July.

The 8th ROK Division, after its pull back on 10 July from Tanyang to Chuknyong, encountered the 12th NK Division in fighting. It moved back to Andong, forcing the heavy losses upon the enemy along the Punggi-Yongju areas. With the 16th Infantry Regiment augmented, it now became a regular infantry division comprising three regiments. But by the end of the month it had to give up Andong as the enemy pressure from the 8th and 12th NKA Divisions increased.

On the east coast, the 23rd Infantry Regiment plus one independent battalion from the 3rd ROK Infantry Division was forced to pull back from Pyonghae to Yongdok on 13 July after a series of desperate attacks by the 5th NK Division. Despite tenacious resistance, Yongdok fell on 17 July, to be recovered the next day under the gun support of the US naval ships operating in the eastern waters. On 19 July, the 5th NK Division retook Yongdok. Two days later, however, the ROK troops took it back. The same night when the US naval gun support decreased, the ROKs were driven out again. With its 22nd Infantry Regiment returned on 24 July, the division strength doubled. And on 27 July, the division counterattacked to secure Yongdok on 2 August.

The 2nd ROK Division that fell back from Chongju, occupied defensive positions at Hwangyum but was relieved by the 27th Infantry of the 25th US Division. The 2nd ROK Division was deactivated later with its name changed to Taegu Defense Command; accordingly reassigning its 16th infantry Regiment and one infantry battalion of the 25th Regiment to the 8th ROK Division, and one battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment to the 1st ROK Division (See Situation Map 2).
Section 6. Decisive Battles of Naktong River Defense Line

Still inferior in strength the effort of the ROK and US forces was only to
delay the enemy advance. During these days, the enemy employed ten infantry
divisions plus one tank division against the five ROK and three US infantry di-
visions. Nowhere else did it seem possible to hold by the ROK as well as the US
ground forces. Withdrawal followed withdrawal. The situation at the end of
July was critical. Particularly the enemy’s northeastern drive toward Taegu
seemed uncontainable. Below Taegu lay a wide-open gap through which the
enemy might race to cut off the Pusan road.

On 27 July General MacArthur flew to Taegu from Tokyo to review and
discuss the situation with General Walker. That day he told the press: “There
will be new heartaches and new setbacks but I was never more confident of
victory... ultimate victory... in my life.”

After meeting with General MacArthur, General Walker visited the Com-
mand Post of the 25th US Division on 29 July and issued the controversial
order which said in effect:

“We are fighting a battle against time. There will be no more retreating
or withdrawal. There will be no line behind us to which we can retreat. Every
unit must counterattack to keep the enemy in a state of confusion and
off balance. There will be no Dunkirk, there will be no Bataan; a
retreat to Pusan would be one of the greatest butcheries in history. We
must fight until the end. Capture by these people is worse than death
itself. We will fight as a team. If some of us must die, we will die
fighting together. Any man who gives ground may be personally respon-
sible for the death of thousands of his comrades.
I want everybody to understand that we are going to hold this line. We
are going to win.”

This was nothing else but General Walker expressed his firm determination—
“Stand or Die”—to defend Korea.

Notwithstanding, General Walker on 31 July ordered the ROK and US
forces to withdraw to the inner line of the Naktong River to form the Naktong
River defense line, as an enemy column was already speeding toward it. Taking
into consideration all the factors what he already had in Korea, together
with what reserves could be mustered in near the next days, General Walker
concluded that the allied forces could hold only a line generally following
the Naktong River from Chindong west of Masan and running north Uleryong-
Namji-Waegwan to Naktong-ni then turning east to Andong-Chongsong-Yongdok on the coast. This line which stretched for more than 310 kilometers, would eventually become famous as the Naktong River Perimeter or Pusan Perimeter. Two thirds of the defense line lay along the inner line of this particular river. The US forces took charge of the 145 kilometers south of Waegwan while the ROK forces held the 165 kilometers on the north of it and then east.

To wit the deployment of the friendly forces, the Eighth US Army put the 25th US Division on the west of Masan and the Namgang area, the 24th US Division on the line from the southern salient of the Naktong to Hyon-pung, and the 1st US Cavalry Division from there onto Waegwan. The 2nd US Division which arrived in Korea in the early part of August was then in reserve. Besides, both the 1st US Marine Brigade and the 5th Cavalry Regiment were attached to the 25th US Division upon arrival in Korea recently.

On the other hand, the ROK Army divisions organized the new defensive positions occupying frontage of 33 kilometers each in average along the Naktong River as follows:

The 1st ROK Division.................Waegwan—Nakjong-ni
The 6th ROK Division ..............Nakjong-ni—Pungchon-myon
The 8th ROK Division ..............Pungchon-myon—South of Andong
The Capital ROK Division..........Southeast of Andong—Chongsong
The 3rd ROK Division ..............Yongdok in the east coast.

a. All-out Offensive of the NKA Forces

As the ROK and US forces withdrew behind the Naktong River line from 1 to 2 August and occupied the new defensive positions in the south, the North Korean forces further closed in on the northern bank of the river and hurriedly prepared to cross the natural barrier.

If the enemy still expected to take Pusan by 15 August as Kim Il Sung was insisting upon his subordinate commanders, there remained only ten more days to go. Therefore, the enemy forward command was making madly effort in spurring its corps groups into prompt river-crossing at earliest date possible. The first stroke finally came around on 5 August and had succeeded in crossing at certain points.

Although the friendly forces had built up the defense line connecting each other behind the natural obstacle of the Naktong, it was a reckless tactical attempt; each division had to defend with only 6,000 men such a wide front extending 30 to 40 kilometers which would normally be assigned to three divisions. Accordingly the defenders were deployed merely on the line without depth. Moreover, the upper streams of the river where the ROK troops defended were
The NKCF Invasion

fordable by the foot troops. Despite that they fought in a frantic effort against the superior enemy in numbers, the initial defense line began to collapse and the ROK forces had to withdraw further backward. To make good Kim Il Sung’s repeated boast that his armies would drive the ROK and US forces into the sea in time for mid-August, the enemy tactics dictated acceptance of great losses. In their assaults three or four waves of troops were used. If the first wave was stopped, then second and third waves renewed the assault, and the next a fourth wave of well-trained attacked. With this desperation tactics, the North Korean Army opened its new offensive, striking on the east, northwest, and southwest, sometime simultaneously but more often with an aimless fury which hoped to find and open the soft spot through which the enemy troops might rush to Taegu and Pusan.

Meeting this enemy challenge, the 1st, 6th, 8th, and Capital ROK Divisions had to move further back in order to keep the balance of line. On the east coast, the 3rd ROK Division withdrew to Changsa following a series of desperate fighting back and forth around Yongdok for a month-long period from 13 July to 13 August. On 11 August, elements of the 12th NK Division penetrated into Pohang, flanking through a gap on the left and overran the rear command post of the 3rd ROK Division as well as many other logistical installations in the city. That day the enemy encircled the 3rd ROK Division of Toksok-ni and Changsa by erecting roadblocks below Yongdok and above Pohang, while other ROK units struck out to the west through Kigye. Led by tanks with sirens screaming to terrorize the defender, the Communist forces plunged into Pohang. Soon fierce fighting ensued to take and retake the port city. On 17 July the landing ships(LST), ran inshore beneath the covering fire of the friendly forces, and in front of the enemy assault brought the 3rd ROK Division troops to safely behind the line at Kuryongpo southeast of Pohang. Pohang was retaken by the Task Force Min thereafter.

In the Masan area where the enemy forces pushed closest to Pusan, the 25th US Division blocked fierce drives of the 6th NK Division at Chindong—Kunpuk line. A friendly counterattack was launched on 7 August by the Task Force Kean, a group which Major General William Kean formed from the 35th Infantry Regiment of his own 25th Division, plus the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the Marine Brigade. This was the first counteraction of the friendly forces since the outbreak of the war and quickly pushed back the 6th NK Division close to Chinju. But the Task Force returned to the original defense line on 12 August.

On the front of the 24th US Division, which Major General Church took over after General Dean was declared missing, the 4th NK Division stuck from
the west bank of the Naktong and crossed the river on 6 August. The enemy attack continued southeastward through a draw in the direction of the Yongsan road. The enemy secured its bridgehead and fought to hold it, while more troops were fed into him. By 11 August the North Koreans had built up considerably and moved trucks, mortars, and artillery pieces over the river and into the enemy position. By 15 August all counterattacks on the Naktong Bulge by the 24th US Division had failed. In consequence, the Eighth US Army commander pulled back the Task Force Kean from the west and placed the 1st Marine Brigade under operational control of Major General Church to strike at the enemy bridgehead. On 18 August the Marines attacked under air support and broke through enemy positions. Routed enemy troops fled across the river racing desperately to survive from the continuing ground and air assault of the Marines.

The 1st US Cavalry Division defending south of Waegwan held off the advance of the 3rd and 10th NK Divisions, destroying one regiment of the 10th NK Division at river crossing.

All three divisions of the Eighth US Army were now able to maintain their defensive lines against the enemy attacks, but the ROK forces were less
The NKCF Invasion

successful. The ROK's defended the upper streams of the Nakdong where water was shallow, allowing the enemy to cross any points at choice. Besides, the ROK forces were still inferior in terms of strength, firepower, and equipment. Especially the Andong area was alive with the Red guerrillas behind the line.

During these days, the 1st ROK Division fought back and forth in the north of Waegwan to secure the Nakdong corridor that ran between Sangju and Taegu. Here the 13th and 15th NK Divisions plus some elements of the 3rd NK Division pushed their way south, taking casualties in thousands. On 12 August, the 1st ROK Division finally readjusted its positions, squeezing the defense line to critical Waegwan and Tabu-dong.

To the right of the 1st ROK Division, the 6th ROK Division also pulled back to the Uihung line (below Uisong) as the pressure of the 1st NK Division increased. The 8th ROK Division on the further east readjusted the defensive position on Pohyon-san, north of Yongchon. The Capital ROK Division now took up new positions in the north of Kigye, when the 3rd ROK Division was defending the Pohang line. It meant, by 29 August, a retreat of 30 to 45 kilometers from the Nakdong River line.

During this period, dozens of large and small actions took place. The ROK and US forces sometimes were forced to give ground but always counterattacked and drove the enemy back to the west bank of the Nakdong. On 16 August, when the situation became so critical, ninety eight of B-29's were called on to carpet-bomb the enemy main forces ... the 3rd, 13th and 15th NK Divisions. The big Superforts did bomb on oblong of twelve-by-five (12 x 5) kilometers west of Waegwan. But the bombing seemed to have little effect because the enemy continued to stream out from that area. The fight for Taegu raged on until 21 August.

At any rate, the North Korean fourth phase operation was met with unexpected difficulties and setbacks, though they had made good headway, particularly in the areas defended by the ROK forces. As for the front defended by the Eighth US Army, the situation came to a deadlock for twenty days, thus resulting in heavy casualties on the part of the enemy forces. Among them, the 12th NK Division that was composed largely of those served in the Chinese Communist forces before, lost most of its troops in the battles, thus had a bare 1,500 men when it came to Kigye. The 766th NK guerrilla unit was incorporated into the 12th NK Division to fill gaps in rank. An average advance rate of the enemy divisions for a month from 21 July to 20 August recorded only 4.2 kilometers per day in speed. During the month of August they suffered a total of 28,570 casualties. To replace this tremendous loss, the enemy drafted forcibly 14,770 men from the South Korean civilian population.
Then average strength of the enemy division ranged at the fifty per cent level, of which these South Korean draftees formed eighty per cent.

Kim Il Sung, furious at the outcome of the battle that the target date of 15 August had passed without accomplishing his objective, decided to scale down offensive efforts for the moment, until he could build up sufficient for the final showdown. But his hastily-drawn fifth phase operation plan was to sound a prelude for his final defeat march.

This last plan, formulated by the North Korean Supreme Commander, intended mainly to: First, strengthen the divisions and technical service units; Second, move more logistical materials to the frontline; Third, commit the operational reserve units into battles; and Fourth, intensify the coastline defenses, particularly at Wonsan and Inchon.

Based on the above concepts, the enemy brought to the line more reinforcements of two combat divisions, two brigades, two security force regiments, and one independent infantry regiment. This made 98,000 men in total strength, adding nearly 30,000 to 70,000 of the fourth phase operation period.

In the meantime, the ROK and UN forces also reorganized and consolidated their defense positions and were planning a large-scale counteroffensive at the same time.

Relieved by the 2nd US Division, at a salient of the Nakdong River, the 24th US Division moved on 24 August to Kyongsan, southeast of Taegu, for reorganization while remaining in reserve. The 1st ROK Division that had been charged with the northern gateway of Taegu, was also relieved by the 1st US Cavalry Division on 30 August, and redeployed to the immediate right. This gave the 1st ROK Division a seventeen kilometers narrower front. When the situation became again critical, the 27th British Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier B.A. Coad, D.S.O., moved forward and took over a section of the defense line on 5 September. This second contingent joined the United Nations forces around Hyonpung on the Nakdong River, south west of Taegu. The British Brigade’s main body had arrived at Pusan shortly on 28 August.

The 7th ROK Infantry Division was reactivated about this time, effective on 20 August. In an effort to expand the ROK Army, the five replacement training centers(RCT) were established and kept busy with the heavy schedules of recruit training, though only of a two-week course. In the meantime, the hard-pressed US divisions in Korea fell understrength. Subsequently many ROK soldiers were fed into the ranks of the US units, under a plan officially labeled the Korean Augmentation to the US Army, more popularly known as “KATUSA.” These KATUSA personnel were recruited by the ROK Army, and paid and administered by the Republic of Korea, although they
received American rations and equipment. The ratio between the KATUSA and American personnel within an US division's combat elements then was of one-to-one basis, though a division had the ceiling of 8,300 KATUSA's. The fundamental idea was to train the ROK's on the battle field, if necessary, by pairing them off with the US soldiers.

b. Organization of X US Corps

General MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo organized the X US Army Corps, in August 1950, with the 7th US Infantry Division then in Japan and the 1st US Marine Division from the United States. This particular Corps was to operate apart from the Eighth US Army. And soon Major General Edward Almond, General MacArthur's Chief of Staff, was appointed to command this Corps as of 26 August.

In the month of August, the ROK and UN forces seemed to have stabilized the war along the Naktong River. And they were now preparing the X Corps for landing operations behind the enemy line. The North Korean Communist forces also completed their preparation for their final offensive. The time now matured for a decisive showdown.

c. The North Korean Forces' Final Offensive

The enemy offensive was launched on the entire Naktong Perimeter almost simultaneously, employing all their forces of thirteen combat divisions, one tank division and two tank brigades. Late on the night of 31 August the 1st NK Corps Group opened up, while the 2nd NK Corps Group at about sunset on 2 September. The following figures show the strength of the two sides as of 1 September (See Situation Map 3):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Artillery Pieces</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Air &amp; Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROK &amp; UN Forces</td>
<td>176,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK Forces</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>6:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The renewed enemy offensive, ever so furious since they had sped south from Seoul, was preluded by five efforts in division group. They struck to achieve frontal penetration all the way to Pusan, exploiting the initial momentum.

It might as well watch closely how the situation developed, beginning from the southern front.

(1) Masan Front: On this southwestern front around Masan, the enemy's first assault group was composed of the 6th and 7th NK Divisions, the 10th
Security Brigade and the 16th Tank Brigade. Overwhelmed, the 25th US Division withdrew behind the Masan and Nam River line, discarding Haman. On 5 September, however, the US Cavalry Division bruntled the enemy attack and retook Haman also blocking the penetration in the Nam River. The fighting in this front was so fierce that the famous chain of mountains changed hands a dozen times before it finally came to permanent possession of the friendly forces. The two sides paid heavy tolls.

(2) Yongsan-Changnyong-Hyonpung Front: In this area the 4th, 9th, 2nd and 10th NK Divisions in the second assault group delivered a blow, probably the strongest, against the 2nd US Division from the west. The enemy 4th and 9th Divisions drove deep into Yongsan as in his August offensive. It was obvious that again a critical emergency was at hand. Once more the rear of Taegu was seriously threatened at the Miryang rail junction. All troops were ordered out of reserve. And General Walker called upon General MacArthur to authorize the use of the 5th Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Brigade which was then in a stand-by status for Incheon landing. On 3 September the Marines counterattacked and restored the lost ground, defeating the enemy forces back to the other side of the Naktong before returning to the parent formation for Incheon landing. The element of the 2nd NK Division also penetrated into the Changnyong area, but was repulsed by the counterattack of the 2nd US Division. The 10th NK Division, though seized the Hill 409 in Hyonpung, failed in exploiting its momentum any further. Thus the Naktong River bulge was saved. If the Communist 10th Division were able to direct its attack toward Chongdo, the results could have been different. At the time there only one US infantry battalion defended Hyonpung area, hoping to have one more battalion arrive from the 27th British Brigade on 5 September.

(3) Waegwan-Tabu-dong Front: Back on the northern gate of Taegu where the 1st US Cavalry Division defended, the enemy's third assault group, composed of the 13th, 3rd, and 1st NK Divisions plus the 105th NK Tank Division, came down on the same mountain pass that they chose in the last mid-August. Since the Cavalry Division was not able to deploy in depth, a considerable enemy troops penetrated the defense line through the gaps under cover of darkness. By 5 September the enemy reached 8 kilometers to Taegu. Thus a chain of friendly strong-holds ... the Hill 303—Suam Mountain—Yuhak Mountain—Kasan, fell to the enemy hands. These strong points on the hill complex had been successfully defended by the 1st ROK Division in the wake of the enemy's August offensive.

Meanwhile, the 1st ROK Division on the immediate right of the 1st US Cavalry Division was attacked by the 1st NK Division. The enemy massive
onslaught succeeded and broke through the southern skirts of Todok Mountain. Despite its detachment of the 11th Infantry Regiment to the Yongchon area, the 1st ROK Division fought back stubbornly against the overwhelming enemy forces, and drove the enemy out of Todok Mountain on 10 September. It continued counterattacks, recapturing the enemy stronghold on the Kasan Hill on 15 September. The 1st NK Division thus lost its foothold on Taegu.

With the enemy advance within twelve kilometers to Taegu, the Eighth US Army finally decided to move on 5 September its headquarters, together with the Ministry of the ROK National Defense and the ROK Army Headquarters. The forward command post, however, still remained in Taegu not only to facilitate its command functions but also to pacify the psychology of the people. On 18 August the Republic of Korea Government moved to Pusan.

(4) Sinnyong-Yongchon Front: To the west of Taegu, the enemy's fourth assault group formed of the 8th and 15th NK Divisions launched one of the fiercest attacks under the support of the 17th NK Tank Brigade. One attacking column rushed toward Sinnyong defended by the 6th ROK Division, Colonel Kim Jong Oh in command, while another column directed at the same time onto Yongchon defended by the 8th ROK Division commanded by Brigadier General Lee Sung Ga.

Under attack, the 6th ROK Division successfully held its defense line along Unsan-dong—Cholim San—Pilsan-dong against the 8th NK Division, except for the Cholim San area on the left where the enemy troops broke through three kilometers. The enemy 8th Division had suffered the tremendous losses in last August. It was marvelous that the 6th ROK Division well withstand with two regiment, as its 19th Infantry Regiment had been detached to the critical Yongchon area.

Meanwhile, the 15th NK Division that had fought back and forth along the Waegwan—Tabu-dong line against the 1st ROK Division in August moved to the Pohyon-san area late in August. This time the enemy division overran Yongchon on 5 September with its leading elements reaching Limpo-dong, still headed for Kyongju, thus penetrating deep into south to mark thirty two kilometers in a single drive. However, this enemy threat was finally subdued by the joint efforts of four ROK infantry regiments. The II ROK Corps, Brigadier General Yu Jae Hung in command, sent forth immediately one regiment each from the 1st and 6th ROK Division to Yongchon, while Colonel Shin Sang Chul sent the 8th Infantry Regiment from his 7th ROK Division to attack the enemy from behind. In addition, the enemy column was flanked by the 5th Infantry Regiment, originally of the 7th ROK Division but attached then to the 8th ROK Division. The ensuing ROK counterattack with seven regiments
finished off the enemy attacking echelons including their supporting artilleries on 10 September. The ROK defense line was restored in a steering victory by 13 September. In that engagement, the 15th NK Division was crushed, save only some hundred troops.

(5) Kigye-Pohang Front: On the east coast, in the meantime, the North Korean forces were once more piercing their way into Kyongju through Pohang, threatening the eastern corridor to Pusan. The 5th and 12th NK Divisions forming the fifth assault group, broke through the Kigye-Pohang line and further penetrated about eighteen kilometers down to the direction of Kyongju. The Capital ROK Division, then commanded by Colonel Song Yo Chan, was forced to withdraw to Munong-san and Kongye-bong below Angang on 4 September, due to the raved attack of the 12th NK Division. But the 1st Infantry Regiment on the right gallantly withstood the enemy pressure. The regiment continued its resistance along the southern bank of the Hyongsan River poising menace to the enemy’s rear. One enemy battalion reached Kumi-san, about eight kilometers northwest of Kyongju, but was eventually repulsed. On 16 September, the Capital Division launched a counterattack that drove the enemy back to Angang.

In the eastern front, meanwhile, the 5th NK Division occupied Pohang on 5 September but its attacking momentum was held down at the northern bank of the Hyongsan River by the 3rd ROK Division, then Colonel Lee Chong Chan in command. Next day, however, when the relief of positions was taking place among the subordinate regiments of the 3rd ROK Division, the elements of the 5th NK Division sneaked into the Wonju Mountain. This caused the 3rd ROK Division to redeploy its elements in a diamond formation, and Kyongju was again menaced from the two directions, left and right. As the situation grew serious, the EUSAK committed the 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry from the 24th US Division. With the US reinforcement, the 3rd ROK Division regained the Hyongsan River bank line on 12 September and held it until its jump-off for the general counteroffensive.

There were five main actions in this phase of the enemy operation. Of course, none was so clearly separated from the other. Through this fierce but abusing efforts, the enemy gained nearly ten more kilometers of the ground further southward. But they consumed offensive capabilities in the end. The arrival of US reinforcements and the North Korean decimation indicated a turn of the tide. The enemy was operating at long supply lines exposed to the UN air attack and had taken considerable casualties in men and equipment in its all-out drive. They were wrong to have conjectured that the United States forces would come too late. Time, which at first appeared to be in their
favor, was now beginning to switch to the advantage of the United Nations forces.

Nevertheless, Kim Il Sung, unforsaking its madcap dream to capture Pusan, ordered his forward supreme command on 12 September to commit his emergency reserve forces into Taegu front, the most critical area for the Pusan Perimeter. They were the 18th NK Division, the only combat unit remained in the Seoul area to defend Seoul—Inchon district if the UN forces turned to counteroffensive; the 87th Regiment of the 9th NK Division, then attached to the coast security unit in Inchon; and the 849th Independent Anti-tank Artillery Regiment. Such extraordinary course of action meant that the North Korean forces were determined to throw everything they could muster to follow through their offensive once for all.

It did not work out, however, for they had to turn back halfway to meet the assault waves that landed at Inchon on 15 September. The North Korean forces fell chaotic in the face of the greatest counteroffensive of the UN forces.
CHAPTER II  GENERAL COUNTEROFFENSIVE
AND CHINESE INTERVENTION

Section 1. Inchon Landing and Pursuit across the
Parallel (September-October 1950)

a. Inchon Landing and Recapture of Seoul

By the end of the first week in September the North Korean advance saw
a deadlock and the UN forces were about to undertake the landing operation
which, was to bring about a drastic change in the Korean War.

The amphibious operation launched at Inchon by the X US Corps on 15
September was a complete success, providing a great turning point to reverse
the tide of war. It was the most masterly and audacious strategic stroke carried
out by General MacArthur.

General MacArthur thought out to strike an amphibious operation in the
enemy's deep rear, when he first flew to Korea to reconnoiter the battlefront
along the Han River line. At that time, it was only a question of time how
long the ROK forces would be able to hold the Han River defensive line against
the invader's relentless attacks, because the ROK forces had already lost the
combat efficiency. The North Koreans had decided that they should push
southward before the Japan-based US forces could be committed into battle.

So, General MacArthur decided, in his broad plan, to undertake delaying
actions which would slow the enemy advance and then keep him tied up until
the decisive counteroffensive could be prepared. Accordingly, he ordered his
staff, in the early stage of war, to get busy on the details of preparation.

The enemy's back was, needless to say, Inchon. Therefore, General Mac-
Arthur concluded that Inchon was the most ideal spot for such a landing
operation in conjunction with the ground encircling effort. He believed the
United Nations forces could give the enemy a fatal blow, both psychologically
and physically, by landing at Inchon, the second-best sea port in Korea only 39
kilometers away from Seoul. In his belief, perhaps the overwhelming consider-
ation among many others, was that he should find a way to end the war quick.
And the restoration of Seoul, which possessed the nation's best airport at
Kimpo, and which sat astride all the supply lines to the North Korean forces in the south, was the very but way to serve the purpose. The history of war also proved that an army can be destroyed in so many cases with its supply lines cut off.

Initially, the landing was set on 22 July as the target date for the "Blue Beach" operation. With the North Korean forces achieving quick progress southward, however, early landings by either the 1st Cavalry Division or 1st US Marine Brigade had to be cancelled since these two units were fed on 10 July into the battle for immediate needs.

The North Korean Army had committed into the Nakdong River line a total of eleven divisions by early August, leaving such a few reserve units in the rear areas as the security regiments under the command of the North Korean Interior Affairs Ministry to guard the supply routes. Therefore, General MacArthur was looking forward to a chance of hitting the enemy supply routes in the back, thus neutralizing the enemy main forces concentrated along the frontlines. This concept would force the enemy to fight in two fronts at once, in other words. At the time an intelligence analysis revealed that the Seoul and Inchon districts were defended by 6,500 NKA troops only. For the UN forces, this fact furthered operational advantages with the absence of the enemy air and sea opposition to be certain as the UN allies had already been enjoying the complete supremacy over air and sea.

The Fifteenth of September was set as final D-Day for the Inchon amphibious operation. This landing operation, however, met with myriad objections as that port did not offer satisfactory pre-requisites for a landing place. It conceived natural and geographic handicap. Chief among these objections were the enormous Inchon tides, the second highest in the world, with an average nine meters fall of the sea level. The mud itself also posed another problem. Inchon's numerous harbor islands not only heaped the tides high but also broke up wave action. The landing troops, after trans-shipped from the depot-ship to the landing ships, had to climb the beach-wall, using the ladders. To clear the vast mudbanks, on the other hand, the landing ships could only approach the shore on days when the tide rose as high as a minimum of nine meters, and there were only two or three days a month when this would come in daylight. Furthermore, the ships would be unable to move if they smashed into the rocks or ran on enemy mines in the narrow waterway of the harbor. Nonetheless, General MacArthur was not hesitant but rather insistant upon his decision.

Subsequently, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves came to Tokyo for the purposes of getting the detailed pictures about the Inchon landing plan. The meeting took place at the United Nations Command on 23 August, when
General J. Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of US Naval Operations, joined the final conference. Admiral Sherman said in his conclusion that "Inchon is not proper place for a landing," while General Collins proposed an alternate plan to land at Kunsan, a port with fewer natural obstacles. Rear Admiral James Doyle, Commander of the US Naval Task Force 90, who also was present there said: "Inchon is not impossible."

Towards the very arguments made against his plan, General MacArthur said as outlined here: "The impossible port is still the only place where we can achieve our purpose of destroying the enemy in a surprising effort. For the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as to make such an attempt. The amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have. To employ it properly, we must strike hard and deep into enemy territory. It will not fail and save a hundred thousand lives. We shall land at Inchon, and I shall crush the enemy." On 28 August the US Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved the operation plan of the Inchon landing. On 30 August he issued the operation orders.

According to the plan, the X Corps was to land at Inchon on 15 September to recapture and secure Inchon, Kimpo airfield and Seoul, and sever the North Korean Army lines of communication, while the ROK and EUSAK forces were to commence a general counteroffensive from the existing lines. With this accomplished, exploitation of success, which was expected to be great harvest, would follow with the support of theater air and naval forces. But there was one last argument. In early September, when the all-out offensive of the North Korean forces seemed about to hurl the United Nations forces into the sea, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff asked General MacArthur on 5 September for his estimate as to the feasibility and chance of success of projected operation on the planned schedule. General MacArthur replied with a cable which assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had no slightest doubt for the loss of the Pusan beachhead, while pointing out that in any case it was too late to call the landing off. Back came the message saying approved. The debate for the arguments had ended and now it was time to throw the blow.

Now for the North Koreans, there was still no evidence that its leaders had perceived imminent amphibious operations at Inchon. However, during the later part of his fourth phase operation, Kim Il Sung hastily put up a west coast defense command with his eyes focussed on Kunsan and Inchon shore lines. He placed his defense minister as the head of the new command. To carry out defense missions in the rear, he disposed the 18th NK Division in Seoul and the 87th Regiment of the 9th NK Division plus the 849th Anti-tank Artillery Regiment in the Inchon area. However, this rear defense formation did not last long, because Kim Il Sung decided to put them in the Taegu front.
for his fifth phase offensive which had proved not as lucrative as expected, even after ten days of their determined attacks. To *Kim Il Sung*, the Naktong Perimeter defended by the ROK and UN forces needed always one more push for all. He also believed that the United Nations forces would be able to spare no force except to patch up the broken lines and infiltrated positions of their last hold—Pusan perimeter. Of course, he did not anticipate that the UN forces would choose a decisive landing at Inchon.

In fact, there were many attempts which would mislead the judgement of *Kim Il Sung*. Heavy bombardment and striking by the UN air and naval forces covered so wide a scope that it appeared as if everywhere the pre-landing warfare was under progress: Samchok, Pohang and Yongdok on the east coast and Kunsan and Inchon on the west. Of noticeable feint in nature, a ROK guerilla force landed at Changsa north of Pohang on 14 September, hoping to relieve enemy pressure on Pohang. On the same day, the battleship Missouri which had just arrived off the east coast, battered the port of Samchok with her giant sixteen-inch guns, in an effort to attract the enemy attention. At any rate, how early the North Korean forces became aware of the impending landing maneuver could not be judged. But they knew at least something critical was in the offing by 13 September when Kunsan was caught under fierce aerial attack and naval gun fire.

The total strength of joint task force of the UN naval forces invested in the Inchon amphibious operation mounted to some 261 ships of all shapes and sizes from the seven nations. Except for a few gunnery ships held back to support the flanks of the Pusan perimeter, it included all combatant vessels available in the Korean theatre, such as 226 ships of the US navy, 15 ROK ships, 12 British ships, three of Canadian ships, two each of Australian and New Zealand ships and a French ship. The landing forces were the 1st US Marine Division and 7th US Infantry Division under the X US Corps plus the 17th ROK Infantry Regiment and the two battalions of the ROK Marine Corps.

The historical landing operations at Inchon started under the command of General MacArthur at the dawn of 15 September. Twenty eight minutes after the first wave began to land shore, the initial objective of Wolmi Island fell. Soon the main landing waves followed and cleared Inchon in that afternoon without difficulty.

The next day, the X US Corps units fanned out in advancing arcs and began pursuit forth toward Seoul. They captured Kimpo airfield on 17 September and entered Yongdungpo on 19 September. It now remained for them to cut the enemy’s supply lines by recapturing the whole Seoul and to move south to block off the enemy escape routes from the Naktong Line.
Inchon Landing

On the early morning of 15 September, only one enemy regiment remained with the west coast defense command in the Seoul and Inchon area. This 22nd Regiment of the 18th NK Division was also bound for Taegu, but was thrown hurriedly toward Inchon and only routed back to Yongdungpo in no time.

Bewildered, Kim Il Sung ordered those units, which had been shifted from the Seoul-Inchon area to the Naktong front just several days ago, to turn around and launch counterattack against the Inchon beachhead. Kim further decided to defend Seoul and immediately ordered the movement of the 105th NK Tank Division from the Naktong, 25th NK Brigade from Chorwon and 78th Regiment from Sariwon.

Kim's plan was that the main body of the 18th NK Division, which was on its way to the Naktong following the 87th Regiment of the 9th NK Division were to reinforce Yongdungpo. The downtown Seoul, north of the Han River, was to be defended by the 25th NK Brigade and the 78th Independent NK Regiment with the total strength of 20,000. But there came a bad news that the main elements of the 105th NK Tank Division had been destroyed by the US air forces in the areas south of Suwon on their way back
to Seoul. That time, the enemy division commander escaped north through
mountain routes.

Now, Kim Il Sung had to be easy with his subordinate commanders on
the Naktong front allowing to turn their arms from the offensive to the defen-
sive. On 23 September, Kim finally ordered his forward command to beat a
full retreat. He saw that the bulk of his forces on the Naktong would be butch-
ered, if the 7th US Division maneuvered from Yongdungpo to Suwon, while
other UN units intercepted at Wonju. But he was frantic to defend Seoul.

As for the United Nations forces, the 1st US Marine Division, Major Gen-
eral Oliver Smith in command, struck Sinchon and Mapo sectors of Seoul,
while one regiment of the 7th US Division and the 17th ROK Regiment pushed
across the Han River. Consequently on the night of 26 September, Kim Il
Sung himself fled north. But his followers did not leave Seoul until after they
have committed many acts of inhumanity. Seoul was restored by the ROK and
US forces on 28 September, ninety three days after the North Korean Commu-
nist invasion.

b. General Counteroffensive from Naktong

At 0900 hours on 16 September, acting in unison with the Inchon landing
by the X US Corps, the ROK and Eighth US Army forces began general
counteroffensive from the Naktong Perimeter.

The mission was to destroy the enemy along the axis of Kimchon-Taegon-
Suwon, and to tie up with the X US Corps in the north. Except for a success
in the Naktong Bulge, however, there were only a few gains. The enemy
seemed determined to hold firm.

The 1st ROK Division, attached to the I US Corps forming the main effort
in this general counteroffensive, cut off the enemy escape routes in the
north of Tabu-dong(north of Taegu) on 21 September, and it continued to
attack the 13th NK Division in pincers from north and south jointly with
the 1st US Cavalry Division. The 13th NK Division took a crushing blow,
and now the allied forces took a firm base of breakthrough for the first time
on the Naktong front. To expedite link-up with the X Corps the 1st US
Cavalry Division was ordered to form a mobile task force “Triple Seven” or
Task Force Lynch. Consisted of two infantry battalions, a tank battalion and a
field artillery battalion, the Task Force jumped off the line on 22 September
and reached Sangju on the next day, Poun on the 24th, and finally made
juncture with the 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division just below
Suwon by the midnight of the 26th. This task force recorded the most spec-
tacular dash of the breakout that sped 192 kilometers of long penetration in
such a short period during which it destroyed thirteen enemy tanks.
Along the east coast front, meanwhile, the 3rd ROK Division retook Pohang on 20 September and was ready to take off a speedy and long drive which would be carried across the 38th Parallel. On the west of Masan at that time, the North Korean 6th Division, the enemy unit farthest south from home base, began retreating north. Then on 21 September it became plain to the United Nations Command that the enemy collapse was at hand. There were definite indications that the enemy was beginning to fall apart throughout the battleline. Now was time for the UN allies to turn into a pursuit; the morale of the enemy forces by this time, off-course, had reached its nadir. Finally, on 22 September, the ROK Army Headquarters issued orders to all the ROK forces to assume an unlimited general offensive from present positions and to direct their all efforts toward the destruction of the enemy by effecting deep penetrations. The orders further stressed them to cut the enemy routes of retreat and destroy him through the conduct of encircling maneuver.

In the eastern front the I ROK Corps moved out with two divisions abreast, the 3rd Division on the right along the coastline and the Capital Division on the left taking inland course at the same time.

Meanwhile the II ROK Corps had also started counteroffensive toward the 38th Parallel with the 6th ROK Division along the axis of Hamchang-Chungju, while the 8th ROK Division began advancing through the Uisong-Andong-Yongju route.

Charged with a main effort of the UN forces advance, the I US Corps drove the enemy to the north along the Kimchon-Taejon-Suwon route with the 1st US Cavalry, 24th US and 1st ROK Division on the line.

On the west, the IX US Corps, consisted of the 2nd and 25th US Divisions, was ordered to maneuver into the Honam district (Cholla Provinces) and to remain with the security mission of the supply lines upon reaching the Kum River line.

By now, the North Korean Communist forces were extremely demoralized. The enemy was shattered and now fleeing north with little balance of order.

As the UN forces rushed at a high speed with the motorized troops in pursuit, some of the enemy troops spread all over South Korea in small parties. Wholesale surrenders became commonplace and the haul of prisoners would eventually be counted in the tens of thousands. Some fleeing enemy troops went into mountains to hide out. But some others took the wild Chiri Mountain to act guerilla bands which would harass the UN forces rear for the months to come.

In the meantime, the 3rd ROK Division put spurs to expedite advance along the east coast route, thus recapturing Hunghae on the 22nd, Yongdok on the 25th, Ulchin on the 28th, Samchok on the 29th, and finally reached the
38th Parallel by taking Kangnung on the 30th of September. The division had advanced over 250 kilometers within nine days.

The Capital ROK Division on the immediate left of the 3rd Division, after breaking through the Kigye line, retook Topyong-dong on 24 September, and the 12th NK Division collapsed. Some of this enemy elements fled into the Taepaik Mountain Range. The division then recaptured Chunyang on the 26th, Yongwol on the 27th, Pyongchang on the 28th and came to Sorim-ni just below the 38th Parallel on the last day of September.

The 8th ROK Division, starting its offensive from the Pohyon-san area, retook Uisong on 24 September and Andong two days later. After restoring Punggi and Tanyang meanwhile and Chungju on 28 September, the 8th Division was ordered to participate in the ceremonial triumphal march into Seoul on 3 October.

The 6th ROK Division pursued the 8th NK Division on retreat from Chorim San area. It recaptured Kunwi on the 22nd, Hamchang on the 25th Mungyang on the 27th and returned on the 30th of September in triumph to Wonju, its home town. Then, the division entered into Chunchon on 2 October.

On the I US Corps front, meanwhile, the 1st ROK Division, now out of corps reserve, broke the fleeing enemy in Sangju and Poun, and the vanguards of the division pursuit force arrived at Koryangpo near the Imjin River by 11 October, all the way through Chochiwon-Chongju-Chungpyong-Ansong-Suwon-Seoul.

Following the 1st US Cavalry Division from Sangju, the 24th US Division reached Kimchon on the 25th, Yongdong on the 26th, Okchon on the 27th and retook Taejon on the 28th of the month, thus recovering its honor that was injured 68 days ago. Subsequent to the recapture of Taejon, the I US Corps reached the Imjin River line on 7 October.

On the IX US Corps front, the 2nd US Division recaptured Hapchon across the Naktong Bulge on 23 September and advanced further to Kochang on the 25th, Chonju on the 28th and the Nonsan-Kanggyong line on the 30th of that month. The 25th US Infantry Division, after recapturing Chinju on 25 September, went through Hadong-Namwon-Iri and restored Kunsan on 30 September. The ROK and UN forces had thus completed their clearing operations over the entire territory south of the 38th Parallel.

By the end of September, the North Korean Communist invaders were defeated and disorganized. The defeated enemy troops scattered all over the South Korea. Those who immediately retreated with their respective original division were sent over the Manchurian border for reorganization. But those, however, particularly who ran away into the Sopaik and Taepaik Mountain Ranges in piecemeal, soon revealed to collect stragglers in an attempt first to
break through north. As they began to assemble in group at Yangyang, Inje, Hwachon, Kumihwa, Chorwon and Pyonggang, estimatedly 25,000 to 30,000 in total, the Communist stragglers were subsequently incorporated into the newly organized 2nd NK Corps soon to form guerilla bands or become the defense forces in Wonsan. Deployed then on the west front, were the 19th, 27th and 43rd NK Divisions as well as the elements of the 17th NK Armored Brigade. The 26th NK Brigade defended Hwachon, and the Kangnung Security Brigade was placed in Yangyang in order to attempt the delaying action against the United Nations forces advance.

As of 30 September, meanwhile, the strength of the United Nations forces stood at 230,000 troops, of which 85,000 men were in air and naval arms. The UN ground forces then were about 145,000, and this number was augmented by the arrival in late November of the 3rd US Infantry Division, another British brigade, a Turkish Brigade and a battalion each from Canada, the Netherlands, the Philippines and Thailand, thus making the UN ground forces about 205,000 men. The figure might even have been higher, had not the rebounding optimism of the United Nations Command Headquarters dissuaded other United Nations members from sending troops to a war that seemed nearly over (See Situation Map 4).
c. Propriety for Crossing the 38th Parallel

On 30 August, while fierce battles were still raged along the Naktong River Perimeter, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressed an important view on the question of crossing the 38th Parallel and also the intervention of the Chinese Communist Forces in the war: "We do not want the fighting in Korea to spread into a general war. It will not spread unless other country comes in force into the fight of the aggressors against the United Nations. A question whether or not to cross the 38th Parallel is under the control of the United Nations." In another word, the tenor of this remark represented that the United States indirectly warned Red China to stay away from the war. By such statement the United States also made it clear that it would not decide all by itself whether or not to cross the 38th Parallel. It may have been a diplomatic strategy when even the turning point of the military situation was not in any way in sight.

In the long run, the Representatives of Australia, Philippines, Netherlands, Norway, Brazil, Cuba, Pakistan and other UN Members presented on 29 September a draft resolution approving the crossing of the 38th Parallel at the UN General Assembly. While the United Nations was still tackling with the decision on break through of the Parallel, most of the pursuing forces had already reached the Parallel in great haste. Meanwhile, after the success of the Inchon landing, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated a new instruction as a result of reappraisal to General MacArthur on 27 October to destroy the North Korean armed forces within Korea, on the condition that specifically prohibited him from employing non-ROK ground forces in the provinces along the northern border and from employing air or naval action against Manchurian and Russian borders under all circumstances. The Joint Chiefs, authorizing military actions north of the 38th Parallel, further asked him to report, as to future courses of action. In reply to the Joint Chief's anxious inquiry, General MacArthur set forth the gist as follows:

(1) The UN Ground forces will break through the 38th Parallel and march to Pyongyang with the present troop organizations. In order to attack on Pyongyang, the X US Corps will land at Wonsan to conduct a pincer operation in coordination with the Eighth US Army and its allies.

(2) The 3rd US Division will remain initially in Japan as a reserve of the United Nations Command.

(3) Operations beyond north of Chongju (northwest of Pyongyang)-Yongwon-Hungnam line will be confined to the ROK forces.

(4) The Eighth US Army will break through the 38th Parallel in due course of time between the 15th and 30th of September.
On 30 September the above plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and subsequently by President Truman. Accordingly, General MacArthur, before the political objective of the war was decided by the United Nations, issued orders to the UN ground forces, within latitude of the authority vested in him, to cross the Parallel. On that day, the 3rd and Capital ROK Divisions, under the I ROK Corps commanded by Brigadier General Kim Palk Il, which had awaited with impatience at the 38th Parallel, became the first vanguards to break through the artificial barrier on 1 October. Thus a dramatic pursuit to the north commenced.

In the meantime, since nothing seemed to stop the UN forces from achieving the long-standing goal, embodied originally in the Cairo agreement of 1943, of a free, independent, and unified Korea the UN General Assembly’s Political and Security Committee on 4 October persuaded to pass the eight-nation resolution backed up by the United States and the United Kingdom, by a vote of 47 to 5 with 7 abstentions, that in effect authorized General MacArthur to employ the forces under his command for this large purpose. The formality of General Assembly approval of the act was followed on 7 October.

**d. Advance to the North of the 38th Parallel**

On 30 September with the Republic of Korea forces eagerly awaiting to push into the north, General MacArthur, in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, broadcasted an ultimatum to Kim Il Sung and his clique demanding unconditional surrender, and stating: “The early and total defeat and complete destruction of the North Korean armed forces and war-making potential is now inevitable.” But it was not responded to. As a consequence, the order was finally given by General MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel on 1 October.

On that day in the east coast, where the I ROK Corps was operating, the 3rd ROK Division pushed into north defeating the enemy resistance south of Yangyang and captured the town on the following day. This ROK Division was the first unit to cross the 38th Parallel. It pursued the enemy day and night in succession with irresistible force bypassing the enemy groups behind. They marched as much far as they wanted, taking one after another; Koesong on the 4th, Tongchon on the 6th and Wonsan on the 10th of the month.

The Capital Division also chased the enemy without stopping, passing Yangyang on 2 October and made simultaneous entry together with the 3rd Division into Wonsan on 10 October, after passing through Inje on the 5th, Hoeyang on the 8th, and Singosan on the 9th of October.

Along the way these ROK troops were met by cheering crowds. Children ran after them to give them bunches of wild flowers, women waved the TAE GEUK
KO, the national flag of the Republic of Korea, and the old men stood with expressions of grave satisfaction on their faces. But there were no young men to be seen, the North Korean Communists had drafted them all.

With the rapid capture of Wonsan by the ROK forces at an unexpected high speed, a planned amphibious operation on Wonsan by the X US Corps lost significance. The X Corps divisions were to be pulled out of Seoul and sent around the peninsula to land at the east coast port of Wonsan. Then the X Corps would attack west toward Pyongyang along the lateral Wonsan-Pyongyang road while the Eighth Army struck at Pyongyang from the south. Eventually the X Corps divisions landed at Wonsan on 26 October more like in an administrative maneuver, after the mines in the waters off Wonsan were well cleared.

Meanwhile, the II ROK Corps with the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions under its command began striking up the center of the peninsula toward north. The 6th ROK Division captured Hwachon on the 6th, Kumhwa and Pyonggang on the 12th, while the 8th Division reached Koksan on the 14th, enroute Yonchon on the 8th, Chorwon on the 10th, Ichon on the 13th of the same month. Thereupon, these two divisions had to compete as if in a running race,
though reluctant, since the II ROK Corps orders were also to "Capture Pyongyang."

On 14 October, the units of the 6th ROK Division which came through Wonsan and those of the 8th ROK Division from Koksan met each other at Yangdok, a communication center in between Pyongyang and Wonsan. Subsequently the one-way road leading to Pyongyang deteriorated to unserviceable conditions with great congestion of friendly troops. Nonetheless, the ROKs accustomed to "die-orders" pushed through their way into the path. But anyhow both divisions were delayed and missed a chance to attack on Pyongyang. Afterward, however, the 6th ROK Division marched into the northern border uninterruptedley, taking the routes of Songchon-Sunchon-Kaechon-Huichon-Koijang. By 26 October its vanguard 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment finally occupied Chosan on the Yalu River. Its troops attacked and scattered the North Korean remnants into Manchuria across the Yalu, marking itself the first unit to reach the border. The promise to "Wash our swords in the waters of the Yalu" were now fulfilled.

About the same time, the 8th ROK Division also was rushing into Huichon through Songchon-Tokchon-Kujang-dong in the western center, meeting only sporadic enemy resistance en route.

On the western flank, the I US Corps attack began on 9 October, two days after the United Nations General Assembly approved the crossing of the 38th Parallel.

The 1st US Cavalry Division struck north fast along the main Seoul-Pyongyang highway, breaking through Kaesong-Kumchon-Namchon-Sariwon-Hwangju-Pyongyang, gaining almost as much ground as it wished, while the flanking 24th US Division moved up from Kaesong on 15 October then to Paekchon-Haeju-Chaeryong-Sariwon. These two divisions were also racing to seize Sariwon first, so as to with the priority in the assignment by the Corps to march toward Pyongyang.

During the course of advance toward Wonsan in the east coast, the Capital and 3rd Division had raced each other to be the conqueror of the city. Likewise, the two US divisions here under the I US Corps were also caught by a similar psychology. The consequence of overheated competition in a forced march day and night was the lack of the tactical consideration.

The 1st ROK Division, under operational control of the I US Corps, began driving north on 11 October from Koryangpo near Kaesong with its objective at Pyongyang. The axis of the division attack was Kuwha-ri-Sibyon-ni-Suan-Yul-li-Sangwon-Pyongyang on the right of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

Meanwhile, the enemy on the western front attempted to resist the UN forces advance with three newly organized divisions, taking advantage of the
old fortified positions along the 38th Parallel. The enemy defenses along the Seoul-Pyongyang highway began to collapse when the 19th and 27th NK Divisions, the backbones of the North Korean capital defense forces, were destroyed in the Kumchon area on 14 October.

With the crumbling of these enemy defense lines, the 1st US Cavalry Division, taking possession of Sariwon at the first move, overran Hwangju on the 17th and Hukkyo-ri on the 18th of October. When the flanking 1st ROK Division's advanced party reached Taedong-ni on that day, a furious running race to take the lead for Pyongyang rose to climax now between the proud 1st US Cavalry and probable dark-horse 1st ROK Divisions. However, the next day, on 19 October, the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 1st ROK Division and the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 7th ROK Division, flanking through Samdung and Sungho-ri from the west of Pyongyang, closed in on Moranbong, Kim Il Sung University, and soon swept into the down-town Pyongyang.

But Pyongyang was all but deserted and Kim Il Sung had fled to Sinuiju on the Yalu. Kim set up his command post at Huichon, with its first defense line along Anju-Kaesong-Tokchon, the second defense line at Huichon, and third one at Kanggye, prepared to resort to Manchuria, if need be. As for

Pyongyang citizens welcome President Syngman Rhee.
the remaining strength of the enemy, a total of 40,000 troops were aligned along these defense lines; 17,000 on the coast lines; and some 10,000 as guerrillas in the Chorwon-Pyongyang-Kumhwa area that was soon to become the famous “Iron Triangle”, as the war prolonged.

After capturing of Pyongyang, the 1st ROK Division headed its spearhead toward Suyong hydroelectric plant, while the 24th US Division moved out along the west coast line with the objective of Sinuiju. The 1st ROK Division already reached Unsan on 26 October, and the 24th US Division took Chonggo-dong on the first day of November, after passing through Pakchon-Taechon-Sonchon leaving only 40 more kilometers to Sinuiju. The 1st US Cavalry Division then remained in Pyongyang to secure the enemy capital.

By then, the 1 ROK Corps, under operational control of the X US Corps, had already departed Wonsan. The Capital ROK Division was poised north to attack first on the coast road to capture Munchon on the 13th, Hamhung on the 17th, Pukchong on the 22nd, Songjin on the 29th of October and Kilchu on 5 November. But it soon met vigorous enemy resistance on the Namdae River line estimated with two regiments in strength. The strongest resistance came on 12 November to last for eight days. The ROK troops succeeded in crossing the Namdae River on 20 November and fought into the port city of Chongjin on 25 November under close support of the UN air forces. The leading spearheads were now dashing into Puryong as of 30 November. The I ROK Corps' final objectives were Hoeryong and Unggi on the Manchurian border line.

The 3rd ROK Division, following the capture of Wonsan, was charged with the security mission in the Corps area, more like a secondary effort in support of the Capital ROK Division. On 9 November its 26th Infantry Regiment was attached to the 1st US Marine Division and was ordered to move toward the Changjin Reservoir. Both its 22nd and 23rd Infantry Regiments remained in Corps reserve yet to follow up the advancing Capital ROK Division that moved into Kilchu on 17 November.

The 3rd ROK Division’s mission was then to capture Hyesanjin and Musan with its two regiments. Subsequently the 22nd and 23rd Infantry Regiments resumed their drives toward Songjin and Kilchu respectively and marched into Hapsu on the 21st and Paikam on the 25th of November without enemy resistance. By the end of the month, the 3rd ROK Division units had scattered its troops in Songjin, Kilchu, Nanam, Paikam, Chaeok, Hapsu and Hyesanjin.

On the X US Corps front, the 7th US Division, upon landing at Iwon below Songjin on 29 October, moved out, headed for Puonho, east of Changjinho. It marched into Pungsan on 1 November and reached Pujon Reservoir on 15
November. The enemy offered only sporadic opposition.

The main force of the 7th US Division maneuvered toward Kapsan on 18 November, while its 17th Infantry Regiment moved into Hyesanjin. The regiment had moved toward the Yalu River border-town chiefly on vehicle, and had not met any determined foe but only an occasional and brief enemy defense.

Meanwhile, the 1st US Marine Division, after its landing at Wonsan on 26 October, was charged with the rear security of the X US Corps in and around Wonsan-Hamhung route. The 7th Marine Regiment relieved the 26th Infantry of the 3rd ROK Division at the vicinity of Sudong on 2 November and moved northward. The Marines seized Koto-ri on the 10th and Yudam-ni on the 24th one after another of the same month, thus reaching the lake-Changjinho.

About that time, the 3rd US Infantry Division, which landed at Wonsan during the period from 5 to 17 November, took over the Corps rear area security mission from the 1st Marine Division(See Situation Map 5).

The above was a summary of the courses taken by the ROK and UN forces in hot pursuit of the enemy covering 30 November. The reason why General MacArthur had employed Non-ROK ground forces to march into the border could be considered as follows:

With the II ROK and I US Corps crossing the Chongchon River on 24 October, General MacArthur ordered the UN forces to proceed to the Korea-Manchuria border with all efforts, and abolished for the UN forces advance the northern limit line of Chongju-Yongwon-Hamhung.

By the end of the third week of October, as the North Korean capital fell into the friendly hands, the North Korean elements had been falling back in disorder along the fronts. But after the major escape route north was sealed off by the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team at Sukchon-Sunchon and the UN forces broken through the Chongchon River, the enemy resistance eventually became stronger. General MacArthur therefore judged that advance of the ROK forces alone would only require more time, thus only to delay the accomplishment of the UN missions in Korea. Moreover, there had been no indication by then that the Chinese Communist forces would intervene the war. At that time, he was not alone to believe that the Korean War practically ended with the closing of the trap on the enemy forces in north Korea.

The mass surrender of the enemy troops began all over the peninsula. The enemy prisoners in the friendly hands reached well over 135,000 men and his casualties mounted to tremendous numbers. It seemed that the enemy forces had all but melted away. The United Nations forces, on the other hand, were greatly augmented by the arrival of the allied forces from the UN
member nations: Ground forces from eleven nations (United States, United Kingdom, Philippines, Australia, Turkey, Canada, Thailand, Netherlands, France, Greece and New Zealand in chronological order of the troops arrival); naval forces from eight Nations (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Netherlands, France, Canada, New Zealand, and Thailand); and air forces from five nations (United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa and Greece). Besides, there were hospital elements from Sweden and India also in 1950.

Also the Republic of Korea Army reactivated the 5th Infantry Division on 8 October, and additionally activated the 9th Infantry Division on 25 October.

Organized earlier on 27 August the 11th Infantry Division had moved into Honam district (Cholla Provinces), after the IX US Corps, to mop up the enemy guerrillas. The 9th ROK Division was assigned the task of sweeping the remnants and bypassed units of the North Koreans in the Taepaik Mountain Range on the east. The 5th ROK Division was then employed to secure the lateral supply line between Seoul—Chunchon—Inje—Yangyang.

The 2nd ROK Division, reactivated on 7 November, moved to Kumhwa—Chorwon—Pyongyang, more known later “Iron Triangle,” a critical and road communication center, linking east and west coast.

When the 1st ROK Division, the 24th US Division together with the 27th British Brigade crossed the Chongchon River for a drive on Sinuiju and the strategic Supung Reservoir, Kim Il Sung fled again to the woods around Kanggye and Manpojin on the border. Kim Il Sung had planned and executed the invasion war himself and the blame for the defeat in war should lie on him. However, he shifted the blame entirely on to his subordinates in the following words:

“I NK Corps Commander Kim Ung, as an anti-revolutionary as well as anti-party element, did not carry out the orders to move a part of his units from the Naktong River line to the Inchon-Seoul area. He also did not observe the orders to occupy the Kum River line. Consequently it made our forces divided into two, our main force falling in the trap of the enemy counteroffensive. We had taken the possible measures, having prepared adequate strength of troops. We only did not have sufficient reserves to maneuver in time to destroy the enemy within a short span of time.

II NK Corps Commander Kim Mu Jung did not obey the operation orders of the Supreme Command to maneuver in the enemy's flanks and rear. He did not make the best use of small paths and defile in the mountains. Thus our forces wasted valuable time and combat strength, losing once for all the opportunity to encircle and annihilate the enemy.
As a result we had only to concentrate our efforts on the frontal attack, rather giving the enemy time and opportunity for reorganization and reinforcement.

Lee Sung Yup, Chairman of the Military Committee for the Kyonggi Provincial Defense Area, did not carry out the instructions of the Supreme Command as regards Inchon-Seoul defense but effected intentionally against it to allow the enemy to flank attack.

Pak Heon Yeong, North Korean Foreign Minister, Lee Sung Yup and the other spy elements so misled the South Korean Labour Party and partisan forces to fall apart and become impotence. Their subversive and clique activities were directed for the benefit of their reactionary elements. As a result, there took place neither partisan fights nor uprisings of the southern people when the North Korean army advanced south. Particularly Pak Heon Yeong, an employed espionage of American imperialist, with his fellow conspirators made a false report that there were two million pro-Communist members in the south, thus caused to invite great discrepancies in the execution of the strategic plan of the Party. Not for the party but for their conspiracy to devide and rule, they endeavored to bring the war to a catastrophic end. They are all attributable to our retreat, though temporarily, in the face of a large-scale offensive of the enemy. "The traitors, therefore, must be weeded out under the name of the party."

The above was the gist of a statement broadcasted by Kim Il Sung over the radio on 11 October 1950. His accusation was soon put through in his report handed out to the third regular convention of the Korean Labour Party Central Committee, held at Byolo-li, near Kanggye, on 4 December 1950. The purge soon took place.

Section 2. Chinese Communist Forces Intervention
(October—December 1950)

When the ROK and United Nations forces were about to advance North Korea, the UN forces had received reports from several sources that the Chinese Communists might send troops to help the North Korean Communists, if the UN forces had advanced north of the 38th Parallel. The Red Chinese regime delivered its direct warnings to this effect on the radio and indirect warnings through the Indian Ambassador in Peking.

On 30 September, while the ROK forces were eagerly awaiting the orders to cross the 38th Parallel, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai
warned from Peking that Communist China would not tolerate the crossing of the 38th Parallel, and "would not stand aside" if North Korea were invaded. This statement was regarded due after the Sino-Russian conference in Peking on 26 August 1950, where they thought of "volunteers" in support of the North Korean aggressors. Consequently, a combined staff headquarters of Red China and North Korea was set up at Changchun in Manchuria on 2 September. Lin Piao, as supreme commander of the Red Chinese Communist Force (CCF), led the Fourth and Third CCF Field Armies to the Korea-Manchuria border to wait for opportune moments.

On 3 October the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou informed the Indian Ambassador at Peking that Red China might intervene in the event that the United Nations forces, as opposed to merely ROK forces, crossed the 38th Parallel. In the meantime, a UN General Assembly resolution of 7 October reaffirmed its objective of unifying the country and holding elections in Korea in order to set up a "united, independent and democratic government." The resolution pledged that the "United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified." Even though the Chinese Communists had already stated that they would intervene the war if foreign troops came near their border, General MacArthur-
maintained a different view. During his meeting with President Truman at Wake Island on 15 October, he expressed doubts that either the Red Chinese or the Russians would enter the fracas. He consoled his troops with the belief that the war would be over by Thanksgiving Day and that they could expect to be home by Christmas.

On 26 October when the 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division entered Chosan on the Yalu River, its 2nd Regiment stumbled into a Red Chinese roadblock at Onjong-ni northeast of Unsan. The exultant 7th ROK Regiment on the Yalu, was yet to learn. Next day alarmed, the 7th ROK Regiment turned to pull back from the Yalu. Its withdrawal column was soon barred by the usual enemy roadblock. On the other hand, on 25 October, the 26th Regiment of the 3rd ROK Division was struck by the enemy in the north of Sangtong-ni near Changjin Reservoir. Interrogation of enemy prisoners revealed that the striking force was Chinese Communist.

Late October, two battalions of the 1st US Cavalry Division were also attacked and badly battered by the Red Chinese. Like General MacArthur, this American division did not know whether the action of these Chinese “volunteers” represented any official policy of the Chinese Communist regime. On 3 November the 24th US Division hurriedly retreated some eighty kilometers to avoid a new Chinese threat on its supply lines. On the east coast, the 1st US Marine Division under the X US Corps anticipated something in offing.

Meanwhile, the United States intelligence agencies were inclined to devaluate Red Chinese assertions and interpreted that the entry of “volunteers” could best be attributable to the Chinese Communist version of an explicit warning that no harm should be done on the Yalu power plants.

By late October there came suddenly increased enemy activity. Large concentrations of fighter planes were reported on the airfield at Antung on the Manchuria side of the lower Yalu. From US Marine night fighters flying out of Kimpo came reports of extensive enemy traffic across the Yalu bridge at Sinuiju. Soon the available prisoners were talking freely, affably describing the units to which they belonged and the story of their movement into Korea. On 3 November, a Nationalist Chinese source also reported that the level of military activity in North China and Manchuria indicated an imminent all-out effort, and expressed fears that the United Nations were in grave danger.

On the night of 1 November, elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division were savagely attacked by forces which included Red Chinese cavalrymen mounted on Mongolian ponies. With the I US Corps’ right flank wide open, following the collapse of the II ROK Corps, now came from every quarter, reports identifying the enemy as Chinese Communist forces. The meaning of the forest fires
which had raged throughout the northern hills in late October was now clear. There was no doubt that Communist China had been in the war against the United Nations forces.

In response to a request from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 4 November, General MacArthur stated that so far the evidence was insufficient for any final conclusion. However, the next day, on 5 November, he sent a special report to the United Nations detailing Communist Chinese acts of war, including the arrival of the MiG's, the anti-aircraft build up on the safe side of the Yalu, and the identification of forces which Peking called the Chinese People's Volunteers. In a special communiqué on 6 November, General MacArthur announced that he had evaded a possible trap which had been surreptitiously laid by the Chinese Communists. The statement went on: "In the face of this victory for United Nations arms, the Communists committed of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record by moving without any notice of belligerence, elements of alien Communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea and massing a great concentration of privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border........ a new and fresh army faces us, backed up by a possibility of large alien reserves and adequate supplies within easy reach of the enemy but beyond the limits of our present sphere of military action...."

Meanwhile, a strange thing had happened on the battlefront. The Communist Chinese had pulled back. For almost three weeks, from 7 November, there was only desultory action in North Korea. Patrols sought the enemy and rarely found him. An eerie wasteland filling with the first snows of winter separated the two antagonists. Unknown to the United Nations forces, the Communist Chinese "First Phase Offensive" was over.

As the Red Chinese intervention had become well clear with more forces in number in front of the Eighth US Army, the II ROK Corps and UN forces pulled back to the Chongchon River line to erect the new defense lines and to prepare for counteroffensive.

To reinforce this new line, General Walker committed the 2nd and 25th US Divisions of the IX US Corps inbetween Kunu-ri and Won-ri along the south bank of the river. The Turkish Brigade, that had recently joined the war, then was attached to the IX Corps.

In the face of the new enemy, the formation of the UN allies, from left to right, was I US Corps, IX US Corps, II ROK Corps, X US Corps and I ROK Corps. Behind the line, there were the 1st US Cavalry Division, 187th US Airborne RCT, 29th British Brigade, Thailand Battalion, the Philippines BCT,
and the Netherlands Battalion with the missions of rear security along the main route from the north of Pyongyang down to Kaesong. The 3rd US Division was deployed in Wonsan area.

Accurate estimates of the CCF strength in Korea at any given time were difficult to make. At the time the intelligence officer of General MacArthur's headquarters estimated at about four CCF divisions opposite Eighth US Army in the west, and two CCF divisions facing the X US Corps in the east, amounting to 76,800 men in total. Actually, however, there were about 180,000 Red Chinese in Korea forming six CCF armies as of the end of October, and this strength had increased with four more divisions by late in November, thus reaching 300,000 men as a whole. They were not volunteers but the organized CCF divisions and armies. The Chinese Communist forces had now succeeded in sending down thirty full divisions in the field: 18 divisions or 180,000 men of XIII Army Group of the Fourth Field Army in the west and center opposing Eighth US Army and II ROK Corps, and 12 divisions or 120,000 men of the IX Army Group of the Third Field Army facing the X US Corps and I ROK Corps in the east. With the entry of these forces, the fiction of combined North Korean and Chinese Communist headquarters was established around Kanggye, but the actual orders came from Peng Teh-huai who had set up his headquarters in Mukden.

Notwithstanding, on 24 November the day after Thanksgiving Day, the ROK and UN forces launched attacks in the west and center. The UN forces advanced three corps abreast along 80 kilometers front north of the Chongchon River. From left to right they were the I and IX US Corps and II ROK Corps. The UN allied massive compression envelopment against the new Red Armies operating in North Korea was now approaching its decisive effort. The 24th US Division passed through Chongju and marked advance as far as 13 kilometers in the first day encountering almost no enemy contact, while the 2nd US Division in the center reached near Kujang-dong, 16 kilometers or so above its departure point at Kunu-ri.

Right flank of the 8th Division of the II ROK Corps on the right wing of the UN offensive, was exposed to the enemy threat very beginning with great gap as wide as 32 kilometers between the division and the X US Corps in the east. But the ROK Division advanced as far north as 11 more kilometers north of Yongwon in the first attack. The 7th ROK Division on the left of the 8th ROK Division had also reached up to a point 10 kilometers north of Tokchon in the same day without much enemy resistance.

On 25 November, the Chinese Communist forces suddenly launched probing counterattacks. On the eastern flank of the 8th ROK Division in the central
sector, taking advantage of wide open gap, the Chinese Communists were already poised for penetration into the rear area. The allied advance was thus interrupted and the withdrawal became inevitable. In the western sector, however, the 24th and 2nd US Divisions were still pushing forward towards Kusong.

On 26 November the CCF started full-scale counterattacks, to the blare of bugles, the shrilling of whistles and clanging of cymbals. The Chinese came swarming over all fronts of the UN allied formation. At any rate, the US divisions in the western and central fronts were forced to withdraw to the northern bank of the Chongchon River. In the II ROK Corps sector, the enemy occupied Tokchon causing the dispersion of the 7th ROK Division while the 8th ROK Division had also its rear cut off with the subordinate regiments being encircled by the enemy. And then the massive Red Chinese stroke fell in full fury on the two ROK divisions.

The Eighth Army grappled with the crisis. Nonetheless, the enemy had penetrated deep into the right flank. The tide of the war could not be turned in the favour of the II ROK Corps. Accordingly, the 6th, 7th, and 8th ROK Divisions under the II ROK Corps had to make a pull-back in various directions toward Songchon northeast of Kangdong.

Meanwhile, the 1st ROK Division attached to the I US Corps moved forward to Pakchon on 24 November, but the advance momentum was halted on the next day. Faced with the new enemy, the ROK division crossed the Chongchon River on 28 November and then assembled its troops at Sinanju. The 24th US Division also pulled back from Chongju to Sinanju.

The IX US Corps on the center of the Eighth US Army had its 2nd US Division falling under the heavy pressure of the Red Chinese at the southern line of Won-ni on the Chongchon River. The Red Chinese forces rushed westward from Tokchon to Kunu-ri following the collapse of the II ROK Corps. To meet the new situation General Walker began committing his reserves, and the first to go was the Turkish Brigade under operational control of the IX US Corps to cover the right flank of the 2nd US Division. However, the Turkish Brigade suffered a fatal defeat under the Red Chinese attack at Wawon-ni just below Won-ni. Gripped with a death-and-life struggle, the 2nd US Division pulled back to the Kunu-ri line, while the 25th US Division was also badly beaten, thus retiring to the south of the Chongchon River. The vanguard of the Red Chinese onslaught caught the route leading to Sunchon south of Kunu-ri establishing the roadblocks. Encircled by the Chinese Communist forces, the 2nd US Division, Turkish Brigade and 27th British Brigade fought their ways through frantic steps and finally moved down to the Sunchon line on 1 December under cover of the UN air forces.
While ROK forces and the Eighth Army were withdrawing backwards from the western front, the 1st US Marine Division which had been advancing toward Changjin Reservoir was subjected to the encircling attacks by the Red Chinese forces. With its only route of retreat cut off, the division continued to strike the enemy's blocking positions along the narrow paths and steep precipices. All the while, air support was the dominant factor in making the withdrawal successful. The division thus was able to move out from the valley of death on 11 December and retired to Hamhung. The division troops had to fight their way over a short distance of 100 meters in fourteen days, grappling with the Red Chinese forces, the severe cold and starvation.

The Capital and 3rd ROK Divisions under the I ROK Corps on the east, on the other hand, were ordered to withdraw from the Chongjin and Hyesanjin areas to Hungnam before cutting the rear off by the Communist forces.

It would be appropriate to analyze the background of the intervention of the Chinese Communist forces in the Korean War.

(1) The advance toward the northern border by the UN forces had threatened the security of their borders. It was their intention, therefore, to secure strategic areas necessary for self-defense along the border line; all of Korea if possible;

(2) The Communist Chinese had to fulfill the terms of the mutual defense pact signed with the North Korean Communists on 18 March 1949;

(3) They wanted to repay a moral debt arising from the participation of Korean volunteers in the Chinese civil war between the Nationalists and Communists following the close of the Second World War;

(4) They intended to allow the North Korean Communist forces, following their defeat, time to reorganize, and also to open an avenue to a peaceful conclusion of the Korean war in terms of their favour;

(5) They wanted to gain a unanimous support of their own populations for their regime by intervening the Korean War, and also to demonstrate to other Communist nations on the force of unity, as far as foreign policies are concerned;

(6) The Communist Chinese intervention would give the Soviet Union greater flexibility in its military strategy in the Far East, which would in turn accelerate the dispersion of the military strength of the allied forces;

(7) They intended their own public opinion to concentrate on the Korean War so as to forsake their invasion of Tibet;

(8) The Communists also attempted to protect their economic interests in the Korean—Manchurian border.
Section 3. Withdrawal Actions  
(December 1950-January 1951)

As the situation of war developed as worse as to face an entirely new war, General MacArthur, on 28 November, shifted his plans from the offensive to the defensive, and sent a report to Washington:

"This command has done everything humanely possible within the capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength."

That report eventually led Washington to the decision to pull the ROK and UN forces back from the entire North Korean territory.

On 3 December, the General further reported to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with these words:

"... Unless ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly supplied, this command will be either corded into successive withdrawals with diminished powers of resistance after each such move.

Although the command up to the present time has exhibited good morale and marked efficiency, it has been in almost unending combat for five months and is mentally fatigued and physically battered....."
The Chinese Communist troops are fresh, completely organized, splendidly trained and equipped and apparently in peak condition for actual operations."

Meanwhile, despite stubborn efforts of the UN forces, the Chinese Communist Forces pressed their pursuit south with great speed. General Walker, the EUSAK Commander, had hoped to hold around Pyongyang along a line roughly following the road from Pyongyang to Wonsan on the east coast. But the situation seemed to warrant the ROK and UN forces to pull further south, to a line in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel.

The friendly forces stepped into a general withdrawal from the defense line north of Pyongyang, abandoning the North Korean capital city on 5 December. The withdrawal was orderly but bitter. Specifically, at the time there were thousands of refugees shuffling along on all the southward roads. By mid-December, the UN allies had come back to the old 38th Parallel, generally from Kaesong on the west to Yangyang on the east coast.

On the other hand some elements of the I ROK Corps on the east coast left Songjin by sea, while its main body assembled at the Hungnam port. The X US Corps also assembled its troops in Hungnam and withdrawals by sea were carried out from the 11th to 24th of December. The ships headed east and then south to Pusan. The I ROK Corps and ten thousand refugees besides 105,000 men of the X US Corps were taken out of Hungnam successfully. The troops of I ROK Corps thereafter formed their defense around Yangyang.

Now the ROK and UN forces lined up its combat formations on the line that ran along the flats of the Han River south of the 38th Parallel toward northeast along the Imjin River before bending eastward through high mountains to the east coast. The I US Corps under Major General Frank Milburn was on the left, then Major General John Coulter's US IX Corps in the center, with the mountainous right held by the II and III ROK Corps. The X US Corps, which had landed its troops and equipment at Pohang and Pusan, begun reorganizing in the south.

The Chinese Communist forces in pursuit moved its Fourth Field Army of the eighteen divisions into the west front and its Third Field Army comprising the twelve divisions into east. In addition, there were 160,000 troops of North Korean Communists in the center, some of them reorganized and rearmed in "Manchuria Sanctuary." The Chinese Communist forces however concentrated the bulk of its forces north of Seoul in an effort to shatter the UN forces into a furious rush. Its next phase offensive was to begin either in the closing days of the year or the first of the new.

Beginning in late December, the 500,000-strong enemy forces took up very active patrolling across the entire front, probing the friendly fragile lines in
strength.

At this critical moment in the war, Lieutenant General Walton Walker of the Eighth US Army was killed on 23 December in a vehicle accident north of Seoul. The General was on his way to present the 27th Commonwealth Brigade with a "Republic of Korea Presidential Citation" for their part in the defense of the Nakdong River line. Three days later, on the 26th, Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway took over the command. This command changeover eventually led to the establishment of a single command for the UN ground forces in Korea under the new commander. With the divisions of the United Nations forces under two separate commands, Eighth US Army and X US Corps could hardly conduct the war that required complete coordination.

The United Nations forces, meanwhile, had taken on a truly international character. Fourteen nations—the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, South Africa, Thailand, Greece and India—now had troops and noncombatant elements in Korea. They were now trained in joint military doctrine throughout from the UN Reception Center up to the battlefields they shared. The allied intelligence estimate toward the end of December revealed signs of the enemy preparations for a new offensive with the main forces deployed in the mid-western front. Peking radio dragged about this time that the Red Chinese objective was to drive the UN forces out of Korea.

On 27 December, the enemy in force attacked first and pushed down the 9th ROK Division some 15 kilometers. This Division, organized with young recruits, was recently put to defend around Hyon-ni in the east sector. The enemy then pushed through the gap between the 9th and Capital Divisions and succeeded in penetrating as far as the Odace-san. This enemy penetration cut off the supply lines of the friendly units north of Pungam-ni and Haengchi, putting the 9th ROK Division in an envelopment. Sustained by air-drop supply its 28th and 29th Regiments however, struggled through Changchon northwest of Kyebang-san, and reached Soksa-ri on 1 January the next year. The division headquarters and its 30th Regiment also moved through Soksa-ri to Chongson on 5 January. By then the enemy had already penetrated as deep as into Kwangha-ri, southwest of Chongson.

With the fall of the 9th ROK Division's defense, the 3rd ROK Division to its right was exposed to the enemy threat. Following the collapse of the 10th Regiment of the 8th Division on the left flank, the 3rd ROK Division had eventually to pull its entire troops back to Hangye on the first day of new year, to Hongchon on the 3rd, and further back to Pyongchang on the 4th. Meanwhile, the elements of the Capital ROK Division on the east coast also
withdrew into the Taekwal-lyong (Taekwan Range) and down to Kangnung.

Defense line again broken, the Eighth US Army had the 2nd US Division moved from reserve up to Wonju to block the open gap. This US division withheld the two enemy divisions on the high ground just south of Wonju, but was forced to withdraw on 10 January as its right flank was collapsed.

A determined enemy offensive came in the west sector at the midnight on New Year’s Eve. Directing his main efforts upon the I and IX US Corps, the enemy struck toward Seoul and Wonju. The 6th ROK Division in Tongduchon, the 24th US Division in Pochon, and 2nd ROK Division in Kapyong were those received the brunt of the enemy’s blows. In the meantime, General MacArthur instructed General Ridgway to defend the positions only to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. Thousands of Red Chinese were killed during this first fierce onslaught only to gain ground. But seven CCF armies and two NK corps that penetrated behind the UN line broke 1st and 7th ROK Divisions. The friendly units safe from the brunt of the enemy attacks included the Turkish Brigade in the far west, and the Capital ROK Division in the far east.

Meantime, General Ridgway committed the X US Corps in the collapsing center and began fighting a covering action to blunt the CCF drive while other UN forces withdrew from Seoul. With the Communist forces offensive intensifying gradually, the withdrawal became inevitable. General Ridgway, therefore, ordered a retrograde movement from the south bank of the Han River to a new line along Yangpyong—Hongchon—Chumunjin. During the early days of January the enemy was undertaking his second phase offensive. On the western flank this was directed against the I US Corps, which was covering Seoul by holding a line north of the Han River with the 25th US, 1st and 6th ROK and 24th US Divisions. The 29th British Brigade was in corps reserve at Yanchol-li and was to become heavily involved in the fighting for the next few days.

On 3 January, with the enemy entering Uijongbu and also crossing the frozen Hantan River toward the west and east of Seoul, the Korean government agencies and refugees moved out of the capital. The enemy offensive at the time was as fierce as at the beginning of the war. This new enemy, however, employed some twenty CCF divisions, directing its main effort on the same Uijongbu-Seoul and Kapyong-Yoji corridors. In view of the enemy strength the I and IX US Corps were ordered to move to south of Seoul. On the dawn of 4 January, the UN allies blew up the floating bridge over the Han, allowing the enemy to take Seoul. The 25th US Division and 29th British Brigade had performed the task of holding the attackers off
while the rest of the Eighth US Army gained the south bank of the Han. Meanwhile, in the right and center, the ROKs also fell back, and entire UN forces took up the preassigned defense positions beginning with Pyongtaek on the west, stretching northeast to Wonju in the center, and from there due east to Samchok on the east coast.

After the fall of Seoul, the CCF offensive in the west thinned out. This was attributable to the lack of stocks of supplies resulting in greater expansion of the enemy supply lines besides UN air superiority. Then, the Communist forces and their North Korean allies shifted their strongest offensives to the center and east. These came against the 2nd US Division and the adjacent ROKs. The enemy objective was Wonju. Here the 2nd US Division, reinforced by French and the Netherlands Battalions, fought a gallant action on the gauntlet of the Chongchon River, which took ample revenge for the beating suffered in last December.

On 10 January, with the collapse of the ROK divisions on the right of the 2nd US Division, Wonju was abandoned. The Red Chinese rushed into the city, but soon offered a lucrative target for saturation bombardment by the UN air forces.

On the same day, General Ridgway ordered the 1st US Marine Division from Masan to block the enemy forces who had poured through the gap on the 2nd US Division’s right and infiltrated behind the 3rd, 7th and 9th Divisions of the III ROK Corps.

On 13 January, the 2nd and 9th NK Divisions under II NK Corps, infiltrated into Yongwol through the gap between the X US Corps and III ROK Corps and also another gap between the 7th ROK and 9th ROK Divisions. The 2nd US Division on the left of the III ROK Corps, meantime, moved from the Wonju line back to Chechon on 16 January. With the fall of Yongwol to the enemy’s hand on 13 January, the II ROK Corps, on the next day, ordered the 3rd ROK Division then in corps reserve at Chunyang and the 7th ROK Division on the left flank to launch a counterattack. Supported by the US navy fighters based in the US carriers, the 3rd ROK Division, on 17 January, annihilated one NK regiment at a vicious battle in the Namdae-ri valley south of Yongwol. By battering the spearheads of the II NK Corps, the III ROK Corps made the enemy offensive petered out. The 5th ROK Division which had assembled its troops at Yongju north of Andong, meanwhile, succeeded in blocking the enemy penetrations and retook Yongwol on 24 January. The 2nd US Division on the III ROK Corps’ right captured Wonju on the same day and further reached Hoengsong. On the 26th, the tanks of the 7th US Division entered Pyongchang encountering no enemy opposition. By
midmonth of January, there was little evidence of the continued enemy offensive along the entire front. The west was almost no action at all, though the center and east felt still the enemy pressure. The fury of the enemy offensive had diminished. The weather was bitterly cold, with temperature well below freezing. Up on the hills, it was cruel.

On the east, the Capital ROK Division under the I ROK Corps was conducting probing reconnaissance in and around Kangnung and Tackwal-lyong. Nevertheless, relative calm prevailed in the west front where the I and IX US Corps were defending. The reconnaissance units of their divisions made infiltrations north without meeting any enemy resistance. Mechanized reconnaissance outfits of the 27th British Brigade under the I US Corps also proceeded north on 15 January with support of tanks and artillery. To them, elements of the 3rd US Division also provided covering fire from the right flank. Following day, these reconnaissance outfits encountered the enemy in small numbers south of Osan. While the I US Corps was continuing limited reconnaissance operations, the IX US Corps also put up its own mechanized patrols into Yongin, Icheon and Kwangju, employing elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division. On 24 January, the right flank troops of the IX US Corps recaptured Yoju, thus stabilizing a UN line on Suwon—Icheon—Yoju—Hoengsong—Pyongyang—Kangnung(See Situation Map 6).

By now, the main enemy forces had moved back to the north save for one NK Division that operated in the mountain areas east of Tanyang and another division in Yongju and Andong in the south. These two NK divisions were to operate with 5,000 communist guerrillas.
CHAPTER III THE SECOND ADVANCE BACK TO THE PARALLEL

Section 1. Back to the 38th Parallel
(February-May 1951)

The UN air reconnaissance over the enemy area reported of the movement of large stocks of supplies and troop replacements. The EUSAK decided to strike the enemy before he could reorganize. The EUSAK Headquarters ordered its commanders to use everything they had - armor, artillery, infantry, close air support - to disrupt the enemy buildup.

The weather of this period remained for the most part cold and clear, with occasional flurries of snow, the temperature being twenty degrees below zero.

On 25 January, the UN forces began a cautious, probing advance toward the Han River. The two US corps in the western front moved warily, relying on aerial support. They did not care to enemy but did care to their front intact. The EUSAK fed more power into the advance, putting the 3rd US Division into the line on the western front on 27 January, sending armored spearheads probing boldly toward Seoul, massing its artillery and striking the enemy with aerial bombs and napalm. Generally speaking the advance was made against only light opposition. With the spring thaw on the Han River, the CCF were apparently reluctant to commit large numbers of troops south and west of the river, unlike their winter drive where the light-armed were able to swarm over the frozen river.

Throughout January, the UN reconnaissance in force was conducted in a series of consolidated phase lines south of the Han River. During this probing advance very fierce fighting raged on the X US Corps front in the Wonju area, and the city changed hand several times. Early in February the probing UN tanks were only able to shell the outskirts of Seoul without resistance.

Gradually, thereupon, the CCF began to resist, and the UN advance slowed. It became obvious that the CCF 50th Army was fighting a delaying action. The last day of January held the UN advance to a mile, but the UN forces continued throughout early February to exploratively slug its way up to the south bank of the Han River. In the center, meanwhile, Wonju was recaptured, and
the X US Corps and III ROK Corps were advancing in the same manner that the I and IX US Corps in the west were doing.

On the west, the advance of the 25th US Division approached Inchon city and Kimpo airfield. On 9 February, enemy resistance collapsed, the next day Inchon and Kimpo were taken without appreciable enemy opposition and the UN troops once again looked over Seoul across the Han.

On 1 February, on the other hand, with the Asian countries still reluctant and some other nations acting only on the United States assurance that the Korean War would not extend, the United Nations General Assembly formally branded Communist China as the aggressor in Korea.

At this point, the Chinese Communist forces were planning their most determined effort to wreck the UN offensive. The UN advance in the central sector was slow because of the terrain. Five UN columns fanned out west, north, and east of Hoengsong, about 24 kilometers north of Wonju.

On the night of 11-12 February, the 40th and 65th CCF Armies and one NKA corps attacked out of the mountains, and again their victims were the 2nd US and 8th ROK Divisions on the X US Corps front. The 38th US Infantry Regiment with the Netherlands Battalion attached were caught in a trap while the 8th ROK Division suffered heavily at Heongsong. The 5th ROK Division was mauled. The Communits threw a violent attack on the Heongsong-Wonju axis and in the Chipyong-ni area. For three days the 23rd US Regiment and French Battalion fought fiercely until relieved by an armored column from the 5th US Cavalry Regiment. The 27th British Brigade came under the command of the 2nd US Division effective on 14 February and received orders to cross immediately the Han River at Yoju and advance north to relieve the 23rd US Infantry Regiment and French Battalion in Chipyong-ni. The next day, on 15 February, the Chinese Communits faded out.

Meanwhile, a defense line was formed with the 7th US, 3rd and 5th ROK Divisions to block the North Korean forces that had penetrated into as far south as some 16 kilometers north of Chechon. Heavy fighting took place north of Chechon, but by 24 February the X Corps was driving the enemy northward. This enemy offensive failed to dislodge the I and IX US Corps from their gains along the Han River. Now the CCF and NKA units were in full retreat, they were evidently suffering from a shortage of logistics.

On 21 February, the EUSA Korean attack "Killer" designed to destroy the enemy forces east of the Han River, with its main efforts placed along the Wonju-Heongsong and Yongwol-Pyongchang axes. Spearheaded by the rejuvenated 1st US Marine Division, the UN central assault registered steady initial gains, but the early spring rain and thaw severed rail and highway communi-
ocations between the IX and X US Corps and jeopardized their further progress.

The I US Corps operating south of Seoul at the time was continuing advance against enemy strongholds across the Han River. An estimated 18,000 of the 50th CCF Army and two NKA infantry plus one tank divisions initially opposed but in the long run the enemy retreated from the south bank of the Han between Seoul and Yangpyong.

On 24 February the 1st US Marine Division took Hoengsong and the enemy's last footholds south of the Han River began to crumble all along the line. On the other hand, about this time there were a number of reports of enemy guerrilla bands operating behind the UN lines. The US Marine elements were whiffling the Communist guerrillas by encircling them in the Jomchon, Andong and Uisong areas. By the end of the month 18,000 guerrillas were destroyed by the elements of the 2nd ROK and 1st US Marine Divisions.

The offensive, resumed on 7 March by the friendly forces, was successful from the beginning. Charged with the seizure of the Imjin River line, the 25th US Division advanced on the first day up to Yangsuri 25 kilometers east of Seoul, though they ran into stubborn resistance. By 10 March, the enemy opposition on the Han collapsed, and the CCF began retreating out of Seoul on the 12th. The other Communists were also falling back all along the west-central front. On 14 March the 1st ROK Division finally restored Seoul without enemy resistance. Of the original population of 1,500,000 only 200,000 remained to welcome the ROK and UN forces.

In the meantime, a new UN operation was pressed forward on all fronts. To the east, the III ROK Corps troops cleared off the remnants of the 10th NKA Division and other enemy guerrillas in force who had been active since the UN breakout from the Naktong Perimeter in September 1950. This ROK Corps was now ready to strike north, and the I ROK Corps reached Yangyang on the east coast by the end of March. In the center the IX and X US Corps advanced steadily, entering Chunchon on 19 March. To the west, the UN pursuit was launched to trap the North Korean forces between Seoul and Kaesong. On 23 March the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was dropped over Munsan about forty kilometers north of Seoul in conjunction with an armored column drive from Seoul to the Imjin River. But the North Korean forces had already withdrawn, thus allowing the UN forces a nearly bloodless advance to the River line.

As the UN forces neared the 38th Parallel, by the end of March 1951 the UN advance ran generally from Munsan through Chunchon to the vicinity of Hyon-ni, the northeast to Yangyang which fell to ROK troops on 27 March. In a few days more than two months, the UN coordinated ground and air action finally drove the Communist forces back to the 38th Parallel. The UNC
intelligence received reports that the enemy intended to defend the 38th Parallel until they were prepared for an all-out spring offensive. In terms of climate and the sign of stiffening enemy resistance along the Parallel, the reports of the impending Communist spring offensive made sense. Korea’s inclement spring weather would favor the “on-foot” communist armies, whereas it would work against the UN mechanized forces.

The ROK and UN forces now secured a line which ran from west to east with the I US Corps along the south bank of the Imjin River, IX US Corps on the Tonduchon line north of Seoul, X US Corps in the Chunchon sector, III ROK Corps along the Soyang River line south of Inje and I ROK Corps in Yangyang (See Situation Map 7).

During the early days of April, the ROK and UN forces continued from the current line to press northward. The objective was to secure a line on the commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel. On 4 April, the I ROK Corps in the far east seized Kansong approximately 42 kilometers north of the Parallel, while the III ROK Corps captured Inje and Hangye-ri to its northeast on the 6th. On the same day, the X US Corps in the central-east entered Yanggu and further secured the Hwachon Reservoir on the 18th of April. In the central-west where the IX US Corps was in action, the 6th ROK Division had taken Sachang-ni west of Hwachon, while the other divisions moved up to Chorwon (Cholwon) and Kumihwa. On 20 April, they were engaged in the bitter battles with the Chinese Communist Forces.

The I US Corps units in the west had established a bridgehead along the Imjin River, and were now carrying out reconnaissance in force over the northern bank. The 1st ROK Division seized Koryangpo near the 38th Parallel.

Moving forward to the enemy assembly and supply area bounded in the “Iron Triangle,” a realistic attitude toward the capabilities of the enemy forces prompted the UN forces to define a series of lines to which they would execute coordinated withdrawals. This meant that, maintaining contact with the enemy at all times, the UN force would inflict maximum losses on him by utilizing superior ground and air firepower and when the enemy offensive was about finish its routine course, the UN forces would counterattack.

The friendly forces in the meantime underwent a big reshuffling in the higher chain of command. Major General Bryant E. Moore, the IX Corps Commander, was killed on 24 February in an aircraft crash into the Han River during his aerial observation. Major General Kim Paik II, the I ROK Corps Commander, was also killed on his way back from a corps commanders meeting on 28 March when his aircraft crashed on the mountain. To the greater shock and disappointment of the Korean people, on 11 April, General of Army Douglas MacArthur was relieved of all his commands. He was
replaced by General Matthew B. Ridgway, and on the 14th April Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet took over command of the Eighth US Army.

The command changeover took place during a critical phase of the war, just before the renewal of the CCF onslaught on 22 April. The Chinese Communist forces were about to deliver a strongest blow designed not only to halt the UN forces advance, but to break through all the way down. By the time, the 19th CCF Army Group had moved near the west front, signaling their imminent offensive. It was then judged that the CCF would direct their main effort to the west front, because one division and two regiments of the CCF armored forces were prepared in reserve immediately behind. The friendly reports further indicated that the bulk of enemy reinforcements concentrated in the central and mid-east fronts. Thus, there were ten CCF armies plus eighteen NKA divisions and six more brigades either disposed along the front or in the rear.

On the other hand, by 21 April, the ROK Army in the east held perhaps one quarter of the entire front, the other three quarters being defended, from west to east, the I, IX and X US Corps and those ROK divisions attached to them.

Section 2. Red Chinese Spring Offensive
(April-May 1951)

First Offensive

In the night of 22 April, as foreseen by the UN forces, following artillery preparations for four hour long, the Chinese Communist forces started off their full-scale offensive. The attack was failed after all, although it met with considerable success at the outset (See Situation Map 7).

The enemy committed 350,000 troops along with his tank units in a three-pronged assault. The heaviest of all three human waves fell upon the west to isolate Seoul by enveloping the two US I and IX Corps, simultaneously from the west and mid-west. Some enemy elements attempted to flank the Suwon line. This concept coincided with that of North Korean attacks delivered at the outbreak of their invasion in June 1950. The enemy secondary attack came to the center, while another big blow was delivered in the east. The IX Corps front was crumbled when the 6th ROK Division was hit hard by the two CCF divisions south of Kumba, thus exposing a gap between the 24th Infantry and 1st US Marine Divisions on the corps line. On 26 April, the CCF cut off the road communication linking Seoul-Kapyong-Chunchon. As a result, the IX
Corps found it necessary to fall back to the south bank of the Pukhan River.

In the west sector, meanwhile, the CCF crossed the Imjin River and subsequently broken through the 29th British Brigade in the valley of Kamak Mountain 55 kilometers north of Seoul, and began to press onto Seoul. The US Corps elements were also ordered to move backward while the friendly air forces hammered the pursuing enemy.

By 29 April, after all, the Communist offensive had halted, thus proving its inability to sustain an offensive more than a few days. Toward the end of the month, General Van Fleet, EUSAK Commander, decided to hold at a new line, beginning at a point north of Seoul gently rising northeast through Kapyong and north of Hongchon to Sobangu-ri below Chunchon in the center, then slanting sharply northeast to Taepo-ri still above the 38th Parallel in the east coast.

As it became clear that the enemy had halted, suffering 45,000 losses, to reorganize and bring new forces forward, the UN forces decided to take a limited offensive designed to recover the old Kansas line thirteen to sixteen kilometers above the 38th Parallel.

In the US Corps front, the 1st ROK Division started out on 5 May driving the enemy from Susack to the Imjin River, annihilating the main force of the I NKA Corps. The death toll reached 8,700. Following up this a favourable tide of situation, the I US Corps advanced back to the Imjin River and Munsan on 10 April. Uijongbu was retaken by the 1st US Cavalry Division with the allied units attached. On 7 May the 1st US Marine Division chased the North Korean Communist units out from Chunchon, and a task force composed of the elements of the 2nd US Division and French Battalion fought northeast of Choa-ni in the center. The III and I ROK Corps in the east also moved further forward.

Second Offensive

In the meantime, all the signs indicated renewal of the enemy offensive. The night of 15-16 May the battle ground trembled with an unprecedented volume of artillery fire as the second CCF spring offensive came. This time, employing the twenty-one CCF divisions, with three NKA divisions on the west and six more on the east, the enemy launched once again an all-out attack, with its main effort on the III ROK Corps front in the central east and the X US Corps on its left, and the Red Chinese quickly drove a deep salient into the ROK lines (See situation Map 8).

The units of the 6th ROK Division made the most successful defense this time. The ROK division fought back the three CCF divisions of the 63rd
CCF Army along the southern bank of Hongchon River on the right of Chongpyong Reservoir, defeating most of them in the positions and pursuing north up to Hwachon. This hard blow to the enemy scored the most glorious victory in the Korean War. An estimated total of 29,156 enemy troops were killed and 3,253 captured. The division could thereby regain their honour and prestige which had been seriously damaged in the previous enemy offensives.

Nevertheless, the CCF dealt a severe blow to the 7th ROK Division on the right flank of the X US Corps and further into the rear of the III ROK Corps, on whom the weight of the enemy attack fell, thus encircling the 3rd and 9th ROK Divisions. The ROK Corps had its main force scattered, and had to hurl back to the Hajinbu-ri line, causing the I ROK Corps on the east coast also to move back to Taekwhal-lyong.

With the withdrawal of the 7th ROK Division, the 5th ROK Division on its right was forced to move backward down to Changpyong-ni east of Hongchon. Though the UN line had been forced back below the 38th Parallel, the renewed CCF offensive had failed within three days by 19 May as utterly as the April drive. Now, to throw the CCF off balance, the ROK and UN forces lost no time in launching the counterattacks all at a time on 23 May, and drove the enemy again north of the 38th Parallel (See Situation Map 9).

After the ROK divisions had been moved backward, the 2nd Infantry and the 1st US Marine Divisions launched counterattack towards the Iron Triangle, in an effort to fill the gap on the right of the X Corps zone, while the IX Corps in the center also shifted east to fill the gapping hole left by the Marines. The 23rd US Regiment was also committed to bolster the left gap and to block the salient.

In the western front, the CCF and NKPA units launched joint operations down to Uijongbu and Bongilchon. But the allied defense north of Seoul was firm. The UN forces had the Red Chinese whipped. Enemy casualties were heavy, and for the first time large numbers of CCF prisoners were taken.

On 27 May the 1st US Marine Division retook Inje and struck Yanggu, while the 6th and 7th ROK Divisions recaptured the Hwachon Reservoir area and moved further north along the Soyang River line on 31 May. The Capital ROK Division regained Kansong in the east coast during the period. Throughout the all fronts, the enemy retreated rapidly before the UN forces advance. During the last week of May the UN allies captured more than 10,000 CCF prisoners. By the end of the month most of the positions on the Kansas Line, 13 to 16 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel, had been reached.

“Kansas Line,” the defense line selected by General Van Fleet, EUSAK Commander, began near the mouth of the Imjin River 32 kilometers north of Seoul and snaked its way to the northeast on the south side of the river
through low barren elevations which gradually gave way to higher, moderately wooded hills. Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, Kansas veered eastward and upward toward the Hwachon Reservoir and then angled northeastward again across the steep, forested Taebaek Mountains until it reached the east coast some 40 kilometers north of the Parallel. The defensive strength of Kansas was increased by full use of the dominating terrain and the numerous water barriers along the route.

During early June the “Iron Triangle” in the west-center was brought under concerted attack by the ROKs, US divisions, the Philippines Battalion and Turkish Brigade, and its Chorwon-Kumhwa bases fell on 10 June. The UN forces captured Pyonggang on 13 June, but abandoned the town on the 17th under pressure from the Red attacks.

With the capture of Punchbowl, which lay a circular valley approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Hwachon Reservoir, by the 7th and 5th ROK Divisions and the 1st US Marine Division on 16 June, repelling the hard resistance of the 2nd and 5th NK Corps, the UN forces had now held a line beginning the west of Munsan-Imjin River line-Yangpyong-Hwachon-Yanggu-Kansong. The enemy toll from 16 May to 10 June during his second spring offensive reached 174,000 losses, according to a statement made by the United Nations Command.

Incidentally, the 1st ROK Marine Regiment attached to the 1st US Marine Division had captured fourteen hills within the Kansas Line since 4 June and thereafter continued the attacks further north gaining seven more key hills including Tusol-san, southeast of Mundung-ni. In one year of fighting, North Korean communists had suffered an estimated 600,000 casualties including 100,000 men who had surrendered and was virtually destroyed. In only eight months, the CCF had lost an estimated half million men.

Section 3 Beginning of the Talking War
(June-December 1951)

Despite the boastful big talk of the Red Chinese to drive the ROK and UN forces into the waters off Pusan by the human wave warfare, the Red combat capabilities reached their limits in the course of their three determined offensives in January, April, and May 1951. Their offensives only added to their losses.

In the meantime after the United Nations forces had halted the enemy offensive in the spring, there had been no effort by the UN ground forces to launch a counteroffensive in large-scale. It was not that the UN forces lacked
the capability to force the enemy to withdraw far north of the 38th Parallel, but the question was how far to push. Once again the question of crossing the Parallel became an issue within the higher levels of command and among the Members of the United Nations. If the UN Forces were to remain in Korea, two courses of action were open.

The first was to try again for complete victory. To accomplish this, reinforcement of the UN forces was needed as well as authorization of operations beyond Korean borders, particularly strategic air strikes against the Red Chinese bases in Manchuria. The second was to accept stalemate or stabilization of military position in the hope that subsequent UN negotiations would end the war.

General MacArthur, in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, established himself as a supporter of the first course, and by so doing quickly revealed that his views commanded no support at all among most of the members of the United Nations. President Truman and his Administration in the United States, on the other hand, desired stabilization, not only because other nations fighting under the UN flag wanted it, but because the alternative seemed to be general war with the Chinese Communists, with its attendant risks of another war. Accustomed as they were to think in terms of total victory, there many voices raised against the stalemate which their allies in the United Nations seemed quite prepared to accept. But these allies felt that by driving the invading forces back behind the 38th Parallel, the aim of the operations had been accomplished. In view of the restricting elements and the reluctance of the majority of the nations composing the United Nations Command to advance toward the Yalu, the UN forces were to establish a defense line in the general vicinity of the 38th Parallel, and from there to push forward, but not to proceed beyond the general vicinity of the Kansas Line, in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the UN ground forces. The concept of a limited war meant entirely a new phase of the situation for the UN allies.

On the other hand, the political front was alive with maneuver. The Neutral diplomats in Peking made the United States position known to the Red Chinese leaders. At the United Nations after the Communist spring offensives had been turned back, many observers were optimistic that Red China might now find the costs of carrying on the war too high in casualties and armament and be more receptive to negotiations. Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie expressed that the time to talk peace had come and that the Security Council's resolutions on Korea would be fulfilled with a cease-fire somewhere
along the 38th Parallel followed by resolution of peace and security by peaceful means.

At the time when the UN forces in Korea now seemed to be growing stronger by the day, while the CCF grew weaker, the first sign of a change in the Communist position came from a radio address by the Soviet delegate to the United Nations Jacob Malik on 23 June 1951. He proposed the armistice negotiations. Two days later, the Peking radio endorsed Malik's proposal.

On 29 June General Ridgway offered to discuss a cease-fire with the Communist top commanders in a radio message:

"As Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following: I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice. Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship (Jutlandia) in Wonsan Harbor."

The following night came a reply from Peng Teh-huai of the CCF and Kim Il Sung of the North Korean Communists, agreeing to the offer but suggesting Kaesong to be the meeting site.

After having patrols brought reports from Kaesong and whereabouts, General Ridgway decided the town would be an acceptable neutral site. And the talks began on 10 July at Kaesong. Admiral C. Turner Joy, Far East US Naval Commander, was the senior delegate for the United Nations Command, while NKA General Nam Il was in charge of the enemy delegation.

As soon as the truce talks started, the Communist negotiators began to stall. They insisted the 38th Parallel should remain the dividing or demarcation line between the two opposing forces after an armistice was signed. Since the UN forces had already driven north of the Parallel in many places, Admiral Joy insisted that the truce line would be the line of contact between the belligerents at the time the armistice was signed.

The Communists, having been beaten on the battlefield, now sought to win back lost ground at the negotiation table. Their proposal of a cease-fire along the 38th Parallel would guarantee them against the UN offensives while the truce talks continued, for any ground gained in such attacks would, of course, have to be given up when the armistice was signed.

With the initiation of negotiations, the tempo of operations on the battlefield slackened. The prospect of an early end to the fighting made UN commanders and troops eager to prevent any unnecessary loss of life. But some small-
scale, limited-objective attacks were mounted and frequent patrols were sent out to collect information on the enemy activities and to prevent the UN troops from losing their fighting edges.

Although an enemy offensive failed to materialize in mid-July, the intelligence sources indicated that the Communists were developing their potential and had the capacity to launch an attack if and when the negotiations broke down.

The UNC directed his air and naval commanders to use their air power to the maximum to interdict road and rail communication lines and to punish the enemy wherever he might be in Korea.

The slowdown on the ground front did not prevent the UN commander from applying pressure on the enemy in other ways. In view of the political implications involved, the UN Commander questioned that a large-scale air bombing over Pyongyang and enemy strategic areas at this time might have repercussions on the negotiations, but was aware of that to permit the enemy to grow stronger that UN Command could mean a heavy cost in the UN force lives. Nevertheless, a successful air strike would naturally reduce the enemy capability to attack and increase the pressure upon him to negotiate.

Because of bad weather, the strike was not mounted until 30 July. Even then weather conditions were not ideal and all attacks planned for light and medium bombers had to be canceled. Nevertheless the UN air forces claimed excellent results by bombing the enemy rear.

During August the armistice talks stalled and the ground battles flared up again. The EUSAK ordered the X US Corps to advance north in order to gain more dominant terrain. The UN forces thereupon decided to renew the offensive to drive the enemy back from the Hwachon Reservoir area, which was the Seoul's source of electricity.

The 2nd US Division seized Daeu-San(Hill 1179) on the left of Punchbowl while the 5th ROK Division advanced north, and on 22 August retook Hills 983, 840 and 773 forming the Bloody Ridge just west of the Punchbowl in the center-east sector held by the X Corps. However, on the night of 27-28 August, the CCF counterattacked the 5th ROK Division at the Bloody Ridge, and broke through the line, and captured the hills on 30 August. On the last day of the month, the 1st US Marine Division and the ROK Marine Regiment began attacking the northern rim of the Punchbowl, and two days later, the 2nd US Division on the left of the Marines also attacked north against the Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges. Thereupon the bitter fighting developed in both sectors. The Marines secured the ridges on 2 September, inflicting 10,500 men of
losses upon the enemy.

Meantime, the 7th ROK Division north of Yanggu occupied the Hill 901 on 20 August, and continued further to push northward. The 6th ROK Division on its left also seized the Hill 819 some 5 kilometers north of Paikam-San, thus overlooking now the Kumsong River. More earlier, on the other hand, the 2nd ROK Division had attacked northward on the left flank of the 6th ROK Division and captured the Hill 734 some 12 kilometers south of Kumsong on 8 August.

The 8th ROK Division had now been shifted from guerrilla mop-up operations in the Chiri Mountain areas to the X Corps front, and on 14 August occupied the Hill 1031 northeast of Sohwa-ri, east of Punchbowl. In the east coast, meanwhile, the Capital and 11th ROK Divisions seized the Hill 924 on the 23rd and the Hill 884 on the 29th of August respectively.

In August 1951, the UN ground forces reached the greater strength in numbers. With the arrival of the Canadian 25th Brigade and Colombian Battalion, the UN Command now included, besides the Republic of Korea, from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa and United States in alphabetic order.

In late August the negotiations for a cease fire and an armistice, which had been accomplished nothing during the first half of 1951, were broken off by the Communists.

After they had lost critical hills in the center-east, the enemy forces suddenly launched the attacks supported by tanks on 6 September in Yonchon area in the western front. Facing the enemy envelopment onslaught, the 1st US Cavalry Division successfully escaped the enemy seizure, and then mounted a counterattack, regaining the lost positions on 9 September. Taking the initiative, the UN allies has thus started a series of limited drives aimed at forcing the Reds back to the truce talk table.

Following the capture of dominant hills among the Heartbreak Ridge by the 2nd US Division on 18 September, the battles became further severe in and around the ridge. The Heartbreak Ridge lay on a mountain range extending some 12 kilometers situating a corridor on the right of Mundung-ni. The seizure of the ridge would allow the friendly forces to command the enemy’s rear bases from Mundung-ni valley to Kumsong and also to control Kachilbong on its right. With the hard-won capture of the Hill 851 by the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd US Division and French Battalion in hand-to-hand fighting on 13 October, a series of bloody battles along the ridge for a month-long eventually
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came to an end. The fiercest battle claimed enormous casualties on both sides. The fact that there were no prisoners of war spoke for the intensity of the fight. Meanwhile, on 1 September, the 1st ROK Marine Regiment attached to the 1st US Marine Division captured the Hill 924 immediate left side of Kachil-bong after encountering a three-day long savage fighting, and seized the Hills 1026 and 1056 on 3 September.

In the east, meantime, the I ROK Corps moved up the coast forward Kansong. In the west and west-center, five divisions of the 1st British Commonwealth, the 1st ROK and 1st US Cavalry, 3rd and 25th Infantry struck north along a sixty-four kilometers front from Kassong to Chorwon, jumping halfway up the Iron Triangle, and establishing a new Jamestown Line above the old Kansas Line. By the second week in October, the Communists, having been beaten once more, came back to the truce talk table. Thenceforth, the I ROK Corps on the east secured Sojakbong, Kun-Dong, and the Hill 884 until the end of November, while the 3rd ROK Division, 2nd US Division and the 8th ROK Division had linked the lines in the center-east with their positions on the Hill 1211 north of Kachilbong, Hill 851 on the Heartbreak Ridge, and Hill 1090 six kilometers east of Mundung-ni respectively.

In the center front, the 6th ROK Division advanced to the Hill 949 and Kyoam Mountain while the 2nd ROK Division reached south of Kumsong.

In fact, the objective of the autumn operations was to take Kumsong. The 2nd, 6th and 8th ROK Divisions advanced almost to the southern edge of Kumsong, neutralizing the town no longer to be the enemy bases. The armored unit of the 24th US Division had also entered into Kumsong on 22 October and withdrew temporarily(See Situation Map 9).

These gains by the UN allies had significant effect on pressing the enemy to come back to the peace talk table. In October 1951, the successful pressure by the UN forces on the Red Chinese line had been duplicated elsewhere along the UN front and on 25 October the negotiators renewed the talks, this time at Panmunjom approximately ten kilometers southeast of Kaesong. There was more progress, and on 31 October the Communists submitted a map showing a slight change on their line of demarcation and insisting that it be made permanent. It was on 23 November that agreement was reached in principle regarding the demarcation line. This represented a concession by the Communists who had previously insisted on the 38th Parallel.

By 27 November the disputed points were settled and a thirty day demarcation line was agreed upon. The little armistice was in effect, the front became quiet. December 27 passed without the slightest agreement on the issues at Panmunjom. Artillery boomed once more and combat patrolling recom-
menced all along the front. The war was on again but with a big difference. The Red Chinese had used the October-November delays at Panmunjom and the thirty days of the little armistice to rebuild their battered army. They had dug in so deeply, strengthening its defenses in depth with intricate series of fortified trenches. By the spring of 1953, incidentally, the CCF main line of resistance would be among the most formidable fortification in the history of the world.

By the end of 1951 in this way, there was a lull over the battlefield. There were still small, vicious clashes between patrols and sudden bitter battles between units struggling for key positions and better ground. But there were no large-scale assaults. The UN forces were ordered to halt all major offensive ground operations. During the period of the prolonged peace talks, the Communists built the most elaborate system of defense along the front. They were forced to do so because of the UN air and artillery superiority. Thus, 1951 ended with the prospects of an actual cease-fire as poor as ever, with the negotiations deadlocked over the methods to be used to supervise an armistice and the repatriation of prisoners of war.
CHAPTER IV STALEMATE AND THE LIMITED WAR

Section 1. Lull in January—June 1952

The Chinese Communist forces had received fatal blows twice in the previous spring offensives in April and May 1951. They were fully aware of that further continuation of invasions would invite only reckless losses. This sentiment was to bring about an armistice negotiation and finally to put an end to the fighting on 27 July 1953. This peace effort dictated more or less the activity on the fighting front to the effect that the military actions in the latter half of the war could best be summarized as "STALEMATE."

As soon as the war settled down into its static phase, the number of casualties dropped dramatically. And the Communists devoted to improve their strength both in positions and numbers. From a low of 377,000 men on 1 November 1951, the CCF grew to an estimated 570,000 on 1 December and a total of 642,000 by the first of the year. The North Korean Communists evidently were not required to do more than maintain their forces at about 225,000 men during the last month of 1951.

The United Nations Command, on the other hand, each month between 16,000 and 28,000 replacements of the US ground forces were come in from the United States and men who had served enough time at the front to qualify for rotation were sent home. This policy helped to sustain morale but it also served to depress the relative strength of the UNC ground forces vis-a-vis the Communists. Despite a small increase in the contribution of the other UN countries, from 33,000 to 36,000 and an almost 60,000-man rise in the ROK ground force strength, from 281,000 to 341,000, during the same six months' span, enemy superiority in manpower continued to mount.

In the air a similar development had taken place. Roughly estimated that the Communists had raised their forces in Manchuria from about 500 planes in July to approximately 1,250 in April 1952, of which about 800 were Russian jets. The front line extended from Imjin River southeast of Kaesong, through the west of Panmunjom, the north of Saknyong, the northwest of Chorwon and Kumhwa, the south of Kumsong and to the southeast of Kosong in the east coast.

Since the negotiations at Panmunjom were making some progress by the
end of February 1952, the United Nations Command did not favor any operation that would lead to a rise in casualties. Pending further orders, the UN allies were directed in early March that offensive action will be limited such reconnaissance as necessary to provide for the security of forces.

Taking as a whole the ground war from November 1951 to April 1952 produced few surprises and little change in the defensive positions held by either side. The Red Chinese kept to their trenches and bunkers and appeared chiefly at night, the UN air forces devoted their efforts mostly by day. At the pressure on the ground subsided the emphasis on the war in the air mounted. By striking at enemy communication lines and supply routes, the UN forces could take advantage of the dominance of the air over North Korea and make good use of the mobile fire-power represented in its air forces.

The rotation problem also struck some of the United Nations units that had been in Korea for a year or more. For instance, in late March 1952 the first increment of an Ethiopian replacement battalion reached Korea and the Ethiopian rotatees returned home on the same ships. And in April the Australian Government sent a second infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, to join its sister 3rd Battalion.

The lull on the battlefield also permitted the ROK Army to reconstitute in early April its II Corps which had been eliminated after the Communists had twice overrun it, once in the fall of 1950 and then again in early 1951. The new ROK Corps consisted of the 3rd, 6th and Capital Divisions. The corps boundaries between the IX and X US Corps were redrawn and the II ROK Corps assumed control of a sector from Kumsong to Tongsonggol, in between the IX and X US Corps. The X Corps with the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions attached was then deployed on the left of the I ROK Corps which covered the frontline leading to the east coast with the 5th and 11th Divisions under the command. Incidentally, in March the 8th ROK Division completed its role in the antiguerrilla campaign and relieved the 1st US Marine Division on the X US Corps front. The Marines were shifted to the west flank on 25 March and the 1st ROK Division was pulled back.

To the west of the II ROK Corps, the US IX Corps with the 2nd and 9th ROK Divisions attached was disposed on the right side of the I US Corps that charged with the west front.

On the other hand, the enemy had improved his defenses, increased his forces, and stockpiled supplies. Six months of the active defense had produced a monotonous war of position with the Communists now firmly ensconced behind well-prepared and fortified defense lines. Henceforth, the enemy was stronger and better prepared by April 1952, but still not eager to change the tenor
of the war. As long as there was no break in the negotiations and there were no outstanding pressures on the battlefield, the Communists appeared ready to continue their present tactics of defense at the battle front and attack in the discussions and in the propaganda field.

In May the Chinese Forces made a total of thirty attempts to penetrate into the outposts of the 1st ROK Division in the west but the attempts were frustrated after bloody battles. Along the frontlines the Reds poured some 102,000 shells against UN Forces, demonstrating their artillery ability. There were no particular activities in June.

Section 2. Outpost and Hill Battles
(July-December 1952)

In the summer and fall of 1952, after along the military stalemate, the Communist forces attempted to seize a number of hill outposts. Stubborn fighting resulted, during which mountain peaks given fanciful names by the UN troops and war correspondents changed hands frequently. In those bloody battles, the US Marine Division fought for Bunker Hill; the 3rd US Infantry Division with attached Greek and Belgian Battalions, defended Big Nori and Kelly; the 2nd US Division and its French Battalion held Old Baldy and Arrowhead Hills, while the Thailand Battalion withstood Porkchop Hill; the 7th US Division was on Triangle Hill, 2nd ROK Division on Sniper Ridge, the Capital ROK Division on Finger Ridge and Capital Hill, and the 25th US Division with the Turkish Brigade on Heartbreak Ridge, while the 8th ROK Division was brought to battle in the Punchbowl area. During the summer assaults around these hill positions the Communist forces were only moderately successful, but they continued to exert pressure on the UN positions until the torrential rains of July-August turned the battle field into the customary mire.

Meanwhile, on 23 July Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup then commanding the II ROK Corps, assumed the Chief of Staff of the ROKA, taking over from Lieutenant General Lee Jong Chan and the Corps met Lieutenant General Yu Jae Hung as commanding general.

In July the 5th ROK Division recaptured Hill 351 on the East Coast. Hot scrambling on the outpost hills began as the Reds pulled the trigger aimed at Capital Hill and Finger Ridge north of Kumsong on 6 September. The close fight, using hand grenades, lasting till 20 September, rendered a toll of 1,500 casualties on both sides. The Capital ROK Division secured the outposts.

In September the rains stopped and then Communist artillery began to fire
with remarkable weight and accuracy. On a single day in September alone, a record high of 45,000 shells fell on the UN front. Enemy foot-forces were now able to attack behind barrages which kept the UN troops pinned down in their trenches and bunkers. But the Communists renewal of battle during September—October came to the same futile end as had previous offensives. The UN line had stood during fighting distinguished by the efforts of the allied forces. The 45th US Division also saw action about this time, after relieving the 1st US Cavalry Division, which returned to Japan. Most important, the ROK Army emerged as a dependable and great powerful force. The ROK divisions held firm in the face of the Chinese Communist forces and also counterattacked so frequently.

Meanwhile, in early September as the weather improved, Red Chinese attacked again Capital Hill in the center-east sector. Up to three CCF companies sought to fight their way back to the top of the hill at a time, but elements of the Capital ROK Division refused to be dislodged again. Some three kilometers west of Capital Hill lay a long, finger-shaped ridge, which soon came to be known as Finger Ridge held by the regiment of the Capital Division also. On 6 September, the same day the enemy launched its assault on Capital Hill, the CCF elements made a determined attack toward the ridge. Since then, up the hill, down the hill went friendly and enemy forces as they wrestled for control during the rest of the month and well into October. By mid-October,
Finger Ridge was once more in hands of the Capital Division.

In the eastern sector, from 21 to 25 September, the 45th NK Division attacked on Hills 854 and 812 and also the main citadels of the 8th ROK Division in the north of Sohwa-ri. In the counterattack under the cover of the tanks the ROK units repelled the attack sustaining casualties of 340 men while the enemy suffered 1,330 in addition to those of 93 NK surrendered themselves to the ROKs.

At the time, the concern of the United Nations commander over the merit in seizing terrain features like Old Baldy (Hill 275), southwest of Iron Triangle, was caused by the resurgence of activity in that area. On 18 September, the Red Chinese employed two reinforced companies, supported by artillery and mortar fire as well as tanks in a desperate effort to regain control of the hill. Elements of the 2nd US Division, I US Corps, however, succeeded to force the enemy to retreat after encountering hand-to-hand fighting.

The fight for Old Baldy was typical of the battles waged during the summer and fall of 1952, savagely contested, seemingly endless struggle for control of another hill.

On 29 September, on the other hand, one Chinese battalion attacked Rocky Point and Hill A in front of the 2nd Regiment of the 6th Division southeast of Kumsong. The Hills were defended after three day's battle.

The Communist activity along the front increased in the early fall of 1952 as the enemy sought to improve his defensive positions before the onset of winter. In October the hill battles reached its climax.

Perhaps one of the dramatic and savagest hill battles came in early October in the IX US Corps sector. That was White Horse Hill (Hill 395) which was some eight kilometers northwest of Chorwon on the 9th ROK Division front. It dominated the western approaches to Chorwon, and loss of the hill would force the entire corps to withdraw to the south of Yokkok-Chon.

The battles at the White Horse Hill were on a division-scale, with the changing hands twelve times between the 9th ROK Division and the 114th and 112th Divisions of the 38th CCF Army during ten full consecutive days from 6 to 15 October. Regardless of casualties which reached astronomical figures, the Red Chinese continued to send masses of force to take the objective. Evidently, once given a mission, the Reds adhered to it despite their losses. Throughout the battle, the ROK Division withstood the determined CCF drive, inflicting the tremendous losses upon the Chinese Communist forces, more than one full division in numbers at the cost of approximately one regiment. In the fighting, the ROK division received outstanding support from the friendly air, armor and artillery units. The intensity of the battle is strikingly vivid by some
93,000 rounds of enemy artillery shells had been landed in the ROK positions in a day. On the contrary, in ten days, 185,000 shells of artillery had been hurled upon the enemy from the IX US Corps alone.

The battle on the Sniper Ridge in the northeast of Kumhwa lasted for 43 days from 14 October to 25 November. The enemy used this ridge as commanding ground connected to Osong Mountain a most impregnable stronghold in the enemy held territory. The strategic importance of this particular mountain-fortress was well explained by the fact that Lieutenant General Chung II Kwon, former Chief of Staff of the Army, assumed the command of the 2nd ROK Division to bring the victory with casualties of 4,700 while the enemy suffered 14,600. The Reds had employed the 29th, 31st and 45th CCF Divisions in this action. The 2nd ROK Division which had taken over the 7th US Division's positions on 25 October, had engaged in a bitter and frustrating battle for Finger Ridge. Attack and counterattack had followed as the Red Chinese and ROK had struggled for possession. Thus, when the 2nd ROK Division assumed responsibility for Triangle Hill (Hill 598), it was still engaged on Sniper Ridge. The Sniper Ridge battle continued until 18 November when the ROK units took part of the ridge for the fourteenth time since the initiation of so-called “Operation Showdown.” Afterward the CCF attacks against the ROK forces for the ridge during the remainder of the month were repulsed.

As the fall of 1952 came to close, the front settled back to the previous pattern of patrolling, probes, and small-scale attacks. The objective of the patrolling was to capture as many prisoners of war as possible to find out the enemy’s state.

Thus, after the descent of winter brought an end to the Communist assaults. The United Nations Command turned 75 per cent of the line over to the ROK Army.

By year’s end, the UN ground forces had sixteen divisions manning the frontline. This force consisted of eleven ROK divisions, one British Commonwealth division and one US marine division and three US Army divisions, with one ROK and three US divisions in reserve. Attached to the US divisions were all those battalions and brigades from the other UN members with troops in Korea, and there was a ROK marine regiment attached to the US marine division.

As for the Panmunjom negotiations, meanwhile, with great losses of human life for which the Communists had little respect, on account of continued striking by the UN air forces, the truce talks were growing increasingly acrimonious. Such recrimination began when the delegates from both sides dis-
cussed the agenda which called for concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authorities, and function of a supervisory organ for carrying out the truce terms.

The supervisory organ was to be known as the Neutral Supervisory Commission, to be composed of six nations, three to be proposed by each side. Its job would be to oversee the armistice, that is, to make sure that neither side was secretly building up its forces.

Henceforth, until the second breakoff of truce talks in September 1952, the Communists came to the conference table chiefly to inveigh, to spread the record in scurrilous language those charges which would be trumpeted throughout the world by Communist propaganda media.
CHAPTER V   LAST DISPUTES AND ARMISTICE

Section 1. Last Disputes  
(\text{January-July 1953})

As long as the desire to negotiate for an armistice was not matched by a willingness to concede, the future course of the war seemed likely to be a repetition of what had gone before.

Between the onset of winter in November-December of 1952 and arrival of the spring of 1953, the battlefront was characterized by artillery exchanges, sporadic small-scale fighting, constant patrolling, and a propaganda war carried on through loudspeakers setup at the front by both sides.

The war had become so stabilized that many of the units began to regard their own positions on the line with proprietary eye.

Meanwhile, even with rotation, the strength of the UN forces rose to 768,000 men. The ROK Army now reached twelve divisions with the activation of the 12th and 15th Divisions in November 1952, in a link of ten more division augmentation program. The arrival of the 40th Division increased the US contribution to seven 20,000-man Army divisions and one even larger Marine division. Besides, the British Commonwealth Nations had one 15,000-man division, the Turks one 5,000-man brigade, and the remaining nations from 1,000 to 1,500 men apiece, distributed among the UN divisions. To add more about the expansion of the ROK Army, the 22nd and the 25th Infantry Divisions were established in April 1953, and June saw the activation of the 26th and 27th Divisions, bringing the total number of divisions to eighteen. They were distributed to the I, II and III ROK Corps. Activation of the 28th and the 29th Infantry Divisions were materialized after the truce was coming into effect.

Opposing the UN forces were a Communist force of well over a million men. Of these, 270,000 men manned the first line of defense, while an estimated 531,000 were deployed in reserve behind them. The North Korean Communist Army (NKCA) anchored only the extreme eastern quarter with its two corps from Suip-chon or Suip River to the coast, while the Chinese Communist Force (CCF) manned the rest of the entire line.

On the battle ground, meanwhile, the pattern held steadily through January 1953 as the Red Chinese sent frequent probes of up to a company in force
against the key outposts with no success. The enemy intended to occupy better ground along the main line of resistance of the UN forces before the truce settled down.

As of 1 March the CCF had at its disposal 121 MIG-15 jet fighters and 536 fighter-bombers and its army force reaching 846,650 in line with NK troops totaling 357,650.

In early spring of 1953, the situation was abruptly changed when, on 28 March, the Communists at last agreed to negotiate exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners. And, the negotiations resumed on 6 April, lasting for two months. On 8 June the agreement on exchange of prisoners of war was reached, but the rest of the agenda was left under further negotiations.

Of some significance was the fact, that, following this agreement, the enemy used mainly Red Chinese rather than North Korean forces during the most important attacks and that the bulk of the offense was directed against the ROK forces. And, the biggest attack the Communists mounted since the spring of 1951 fell on 10—17 June in the eastern and central sectors of the line, where the ROK forces were concentrated.

Since the ROK Army had been the chief target of the enemy attack and might also have to bear the brunt of future Communist offensive, the question of its efficiency and reliability under fire was of considerable significance. During the course of the enemy assaults, many UN commanders had ample opportunity to observe the progress of the ROK forces under heavy enemy attacks. They praised in their highest terms the brave battle of the ROKs, and commented that in all cases the ROK units had continued to fight gallantly and had inflicted heavy casualties upon the foe. When the enemy pressure had increased, they had promptly taken up blocking positions behind the line to stem further advances, and then they took desperate and successful counterattacks, thus forcing the enemy to retreat carrying heavy casualties with him.

During the period, one of the most remarkable incidents happened throughout the war was that the Communist forces established two artillery records for themselves in July, the highest total for any month and also the highest total for a ten-day period 197,550 rounds during the 11—20 July span. The freedom with which enemy troops expended artillery and mortar shells demonstrated clearly that their supply situation had improved greatly during the talking war at Panmunjom.

The following table of casualties and artillery expenditures serves to depict more graphically the intensification of combat activity between April and July 1953(See Situation Map 10).
### Table: Casualties and Artillery Rounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Communist Casualties</th>
<th>Communist Artillery Rounds</th>
<th>UNC Casualties</th>
<th>UNC Artillery Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>51,690</td>
<td>4,343</td>
<td>1,255,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>16,454</td>
<td>99,340</td>
<td>7,570</td>
<td>1,747,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>36,346</td>
<td>329,130</td>
<td>23,161</td>
<td>*2,710,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>72,112</td>
<td>*375,565</td>
<td>29,629</td>
<td>2,000,982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Highest total during the Korean war.

At the close of the shooting war, despite the large manpower losses of June and July, there were a million CCF and North Korean Communists under arms in Korea.

### Western Front

Taking advantage of the talking war, the enemy on the front prepared themselves against the UN attacks by making tunnels which were invulnerable to both air and ground efforts. Over on the western flank, opposing the 65th, 42nd, 1st and 23rd CCF Armies, the 1st US Corps was defending from the lower stream of the Imjin River to Chorwon with the 25th US Division, 1st Commonwealth Division, 1st ROK and 7th US Divisions, from left to right, keeping the 1st US Marine Division in reserve.

As January and February progressed there were no noticeable enemy actions developed in the corps front. On 23 March the Red Chinese staged a double-barreled attack on both Old Baldy and Porkchop. A mixed battalion from the 141st Division of the 47th CCF Army, attacked Old Baldy and caught the Colombian Battalion in the middle of relieving the company outpost on the hill. But the Red attackers were defeated back in the end, on account of Colombian's stubborn counteraction. In the next-door sector on Porkchop Hill, following heavy artillery and mortar concentration fire as in the Old Baldy attack, Communist elements from the 67th Division, 23rd CCF Army raided into the friendly outpost. On the morning of 27 March, the 7th US Division's elements had cleared the hill with the support of air strikes. Thereafter, with exception of few other outposts in minor activity, only routine patrollings continued there until the two regiments from the 7th Division of the 1st CCF Army struck the outposts on Big Nori, Bak, Hannah, and Hill 179 and mounted diversionary attacks against other strong points on 25 June. The 1st ROK Division units fought off these attempts to pierce their lines until the Communists broke off the fight and withdrew to north, suffering heavy casualties.

In July, seizing an opportunity when the relief was taking place between the 1st US Marine Division and the 25th Infantry Division with the Turkish
Brigade attached, one enemy company in strength invaded Berfin Hill in the Nevada Complex west of Yonchon. Again this attack was repelled. The new 25th US Division sector was generally east of Panmunjom and north of Munsan.

On low hills, approximately sixteen kilometers northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance north of Munsan, lay a series of outposts called the Nevada Complex facing the 120th Division, 46th CCF Army. In the Porkchop Hill near Yokkok River, meanwhile, the 7th US Division met an attack from the two CCF battalions during 6–9 July, and had to move back 11 July.

The enemy continued to attack Betty Hill manned by the 1st ROK Division also in the west of Yonchon. After repeated defeats, the enemy shifted direction on 24 July to attack upon the defense line of the 1st US Marine Division, but his attempts were thwarted before truce came.

Central Front

Enemy offensives began in mid-May of 1953 in the central front held by the IX US and II ROK Corps. The 60th and 70th CCF Armies attacked so-called the MI and Texas Hills in the 5th ROK Division sector while the 70th Army struck the 8th ROK Division with its main objectives on Horse-shoe Hill and Hill 647. Exploiting these hills as springboards thereafter the CCF further seized Hill 973 guarded by the 5th ROK Division in mid-June, and Capital Hill, Finger Ridge, and its adjacent high ground in the 8th ROK Division zone. After Capital Hill and Finger Ridge had fallen, the 8th ROK Division was relieved by the 3rd ROK Division. On 27 June, the ROK Division received again the Red attack and moved further back.

For the first ten days of June the enemy had been deceptively quiet on the central front. Then, on the evening of 10 June, the enemy directed its attacks ranging from a battalion to a regiment in strength, employing elements of both the 68th and 60th CCF Armies, toward the Kumsong salient on the sector held by the 6th ROK Division. The salient, being unique along the entire front, was a pain in the neck for the enemy. But it did not fall to him.

The 3rd ROK Division also desperately withstood the main line of resistance on the Kwanmang Mountain southeast of Kumsong, after encountering a week-long vicious battle beginning from 25 June against the 202nd CCF Division.

The brief respite of the battlefield ended on 24 June and the Communists disclosed their decision to devote special attention to the ROK divisions along the front. Concentrating on the eastern and central sectors of the line, they evidenced their intention to demonstrate to the ROK forces that continuation of the war would be a costly contest.

First to feel the effects of the resumption of operations was the 9th ROK.
Division. In the Boomerang area, northwest of Kumwa, the 70th CCF Division sent a battalion-sized attack against the main line positions of the ROK Division during the night of 24—25 June. The ROK units clung tenaciously their positions and repulsed the enemy drive, inflicting the Chinese casualties more than double their own.

Again the chief targets of the enemy attacks were the fronts defended by the ROK forces. On the night of 13—14 July, the 24th, 67th, and 68th CCF Armies launched one of the biggest blows since the armistice talks started against the II ROK Corps. The enemy broke through the main line of resistance on the Capital and 6th ROK Division sectors, exploiting his penetrations. To meet this overwhelming force in numbers, the II ROK Corps committed the 11th Division from reserve into the 6th Division zone and the 8th Division on its right flank. Upon rapid reorganization, the 6th Division was recommitted in the line, relieving the 3rd and 5th ROK Divisions in zone on the right shoulder of the Kumsong salient.

The 7th ROK Division was also shifted from the mid-center to the right flank of the II ROK Corps. On 17 July, the II ROK Corps now turned to begin a counteroffensive attacking abreast with the 11th, 8th and 5th Divisions, and frustrated the enemy from gaining the Hwachon Reservoir, even though the corps lost approximately eight kilometers of the salient in depth south of Kumsong. With the rising of water level of the Kumsongchon, the Red Chinese suffered fatal blows by the ROK Corps in fighting. Whereupon, the enemy offensive had slowed and the Red Chinese were engaged in the task of reorganizing the defense of the terrain they had taken and in replacing the heavy casualties they had suffered in the frantic assault actions. Now the enemy seemed to maintain the current line, thus being greatly battered in its combat power.

In the IX US Corps front, meanwhile, the 3rd US Division had now been deployed on the right flank in an attempt to restore the area abandoned by the Capital ROK Division, while the 2nd US Division and the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team were employed to fill the gap resulted from the commitment of the 3rd US Division. The Sniper Ridge which the 2nd ROK Division secured in a fierce struggle, was lost to the enemy with the collapse of the Capital Division’s sector. The enemy toll during the month of July exceeded 72,000 including 25,000 killed.

**Mid-Eastern Front**

The 20th ROK Infantry Division, which had been newly activated on 9 February 1953 at Yangyang in the east coast, now moved to Yanggu below Punchbowl on the 17th of the month. The 62nd Regiment of the new division was soon attached to the 45th US Division on its immediate left, while the 60th
Regiment was placed under operational control of the 7th ROK Division further left to the 45th US Division. At the end of March the 62nd Regiment was relieved by the 61st Regiment in place.

Thus, the 20th ROK Division completed the relief of the 7th ROK Division on 16 May, taking charge of a whole sector in and around the Christmas Hill.

In May the Red elements of the 33rd CCF Division attempted to raid the outposts of the 20th ROK Division, in a company strength on the 18th and in a battalion-size on the following day, aiming its objective at the Christmas Hill (Hill 1090). But they were repelled by a counterattack of the 60th Regiment. Notwithstanding, supported by a heavy volume of artillery fire, the enemy resumed the attack on the 20th, and overran the friendly outposts in part on the 24th of May. During the period from 10th to 14th June, the regiment competed with the Reds for the Christmas Hill to gain and regain, and it finally defeated the enemy after a series of severe battle.

In the meantime, on 1 June, the two enemy columns, estimatedly a reinforced battalion in each size, began to attack simultaneously the Hills 812 and 864, northeast of Punchbowl, in the 12th ROK Division sector. Henceforth, the bloody battles continued until the Hill 812 fell to the enemy’s hands. Despite heavy counterattacks of the ROK elements, the North Korean Communists continued to reinforce the holding forces paying no attention on their heavy casualties. In view of unfavourable terrain conditions, the ROK forces sealed off the hill on 9 June.

In concert with a large-scale offensive which mounted on 13 July in the Kumsong area in the center-east, assaulting waves of the Red Chinese flowed over the 12th ROK Division again on 17 July, but were repelled with ease in a counterattack on the following day. It seemed a camouflaged tactic of the CCF to threaten and to get the upper hand of the UN allies at the armistice negotiation table. Since then, no more conspicuous activities on the part of the Reds could be noticed in that sector.

**Eastern Front**

The North Korean forces had meanwhile been more active on the 1 ROK Corps front along the east coast, where the 11th ROK Division opposed on the left flank, while the newly activated 15th ROK Division on the right against the 7th NK Division. In spite of the downpour of air raids in addition to the endless bombardment from the naval guns of the UN allies, the North Korean Communists, taking advantage of concrete defensive fortifications, continued to make the importunate challenges for more ground. Beginning from mid-February 1953, the enemy attempted to raid the outpost line of the 15th ROK
Division putting company-sized groups to assault the key hills. The bitter and endless scrambles for the possession of the Hill 351, better known to UN troops later as “Anchor Hill” had been taken place since when one NKA battalion struck the hill approximately six kilometers south of Kosong. In the long run, the friendly units abandoned the hill on 6 June because the enemy dominated over the hill area from the Wolbi-San (Hill 149).

On 17 July, the North Korean elements renewed the attack with a company in strength forward Hills 339 and 345 three kilometers south of the Anchor Hill. But the enemy attack failed as the ROK units threw back the enemy assault inflicting great losses.

Meanwhile, the 21st ROK Division, which had been activated in February 1953 at Yangyang in the east, was now ordered, on 12 June, to commit into the area around Juk-Bong or Hill 1042, southwest of Kosong on the left flank of the I ROK Corps. Upon relieving by the 21st ROK Division in zone, 11th ROK Division was moved to the center front, becoming an EUSAK reserve. The enemy attempt became inactive thereafter in front of the 21st ROK Division until a cease-fire.

Section 2. Activity of the Republic of Korea Navy

At sea on 25 June 1950 the North Korean invasion was accompanied by a number of small unopposed landings along the east coast. These maritime efforts were carried out by their substantial sea force of 110 craft and crews of 13,700 men.

Until the arrival of the United Nations naval forces, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), then composed of 71 vessels and 6,956 men, had to stand the first crucial hours of the war. The ROK Navy had its principal establishment at Chinhae, west of Pusan. Next in importance was the base at Inchon, seaport of the capital city Seoul, and rudimentary facilities had been established at Mukho and Pohang on the east coast, at Pusan and Yosu on the south, and at Mokpo and Kunsan on the shore of the Western Sea. At Inchon on 25 June there were four YMS, two JMS (minesweepers), and the ROK Navy’s single Landing Ship Tank (LST). At Mokpo, at the southwestern tip of the peninsula, there were two YMS and some small craft. Nine YMS were in the Pusan-Chinhae area along with some small craft, as was also the recently arrived Submarine Chaser (PC) 701 (named Paikdu-san), purchased by subscription of naval personnel. With all ships on the western and southern coasts, no strength was immediately available to oppose the east coast landings, which extended as far south as Samchok.
Under the circumstances, the ROK Navy, at the early stage of the NK forces invasion, immediately took emergency measures to formulate the following operational objectives in cooperation with the UN naval forces.

1) To exterminate enemy units on the sea at the earliest possible date.
2) To blockade the enemy attempts to carry out landing operations.
3) To secure superiority at sea and enter into a joint operation with the ground forces.
4) To destroy enemy positions, supply routes, and facilities along the coasts.
5) To patrol and blockade against coastal areas.
6) To carry out operations at islands and secure marine transport routes.
7) To carry out joint operations with the UN naval forces.

After establishing these operations, the ROK Navy initiated actions in the Korean waters along the coast.

There took place the first important surface engagement with the NK Navy on the evening of 25 June. On the Korea Strait, FC 701 encountered a 1,000 ton armored steamer with some 600 troops embarked, and sank it after a running fight. Since Pusan, the only major port of entry available for the movement of supplies and reinforcements to South Korea, was at the time almost wholly defenseless, the drowning of the 600 enemy troops was an event of profound strategic importance.

With the participation of the UN naval forces, the operational control of the ROK Navy was turned over to the UN Commander on 14 July. The ROK Navy operated under orders of the Task Group(TG) 96.7 under the Commander Task Force(CTF) 96 in the United States Commander Naval Forces Far East(ComNavFE). Blockade and in-shore work south of latitude 37° was mainly assigned to the ROK Navy, with such assistance as might become available from the United States Far East Air Forces (FEAF) and from NavFE units that happened by. For the coastline north of 37° separate east and west coast support groups were established; in the east the job was entrusted to US TG 96.5, in the west to the British Commonwealth units of TG 96.8.

And it seemed the situation was emerging from chaos little by little by the time when Admiral Sohn Won Il, Chief of Naval Operations who had gone to the United States to purchase craft before NK's invasion, arrived with three PC's on 17 July. By late July, coordination with the British Commonwealth west coast element had been established and the Korean Navy was back in action.

On 27 July an important encounter took place to the northward as the newly acquired PC's 702 and 703 bombarded the islands of Palmi and Wolmi near Incheon Harbor, and then during their retirement, encountered a flotilla of
southbound sampans loaded with ammunition and proceeded to sink 12 of them.

Meanwhile the week from 29 July to 5 August saw the UN and ROK Forces retiring on the ground. In the northwest, the Reds advanced some 56 kilometers, steaming over the mountain wall and down into the Naktong Valley north of Taegu to reach the river opposite Waegwan. In the south, at Hadong, the situation went badly and the friendly forces moved further back, while about 160 survivors were evacuated by ROK small craft from the Chinhae naval base and others took their ways overland.

The ROK Navy, however, was already fully occupied in the west and the blockade became increasingly effective. On 3 August the ROK YMS 502 sank seven sailboats which were loading off Kunsan; four days later 48 kilometers to the north, she sank two motor boats, while other Korean units destroyed four small junks in the Haeju Bay approaches above Inchon. On the 9th an important step was taken in support of west coast operations as an LST sailed for Ochong Island, 60 kilometers off Kunsan, to establish an advanced ROK Navy supply base which eliminates the 480 kilometers round trip to Pusan.

Meanwhile the forces of the United Nations were grappling with the crisis at Pohang and on the Naktong, the southern end of the perimeter remained quiescent. While land action had diminished, activity in coastal waters was on the rise; the increasing unpleasantness of highway travel had stimulated diligent efforts by the Communists to improve their seaborne logistics, and between 13 and 20 August the Korean Navy fought five engagements in the arc between Kunsan and the peninsula's southwestern tip.

By this time the activities of the ROK navy were no longer limited to inshore blockade. Evacuation of refugees from the south coast and by raft and barge from the Naktong Valley, were calling forth a major effort, and on the 17th, 600 Korean Marines landed on the Tongyong peninsula south of Kosong on the south coast. There, by seizing and holding the isthmus north of Tongyong City, the ROK Marines effectively battled enemy troops on the landward side, and prevented their movement across the narrow water to Koje Island, below Chinhae. Concurrently, at ROK Navy headquarters, plans were being made to carry the war back north. On 18 August, in the meantime, "Operation Lee", named for the commanding officer of PC 702, was begun. With two YMS' in company, Lee put a 110-men force ashore on Tokchok Island southwest of Inchon; on the next day, the island was secured. On the 19th, Lee's force landed on Yonghung Island, in the Inchon approach channel and in the days that followed expanded its control to other islands on the west coast. The seizure of the islands, Tokchok and Yonghung was an event of profound strategic importance as a prelude
to the Inchon landing operations.

Here comes the highlight of the ROK Navy contribution to the success of the "Inchon Landing Operation," though it must be admitted not so large. The ROK Navy ships (15 vessels in all), as a member of the UN Fleet, had mainly carried out the minesweeping and patrolling in the sea area off Inchon, as well as reconnaissance of the enemy, starting 13 September prior to D Day. This operation of protecting UN vessels, since then, had been successfully performed by the ROK Navy for a month.

During the landing operation by the UN Fleet, specifically, the responsibility for enforcing the blockade rested mainly on the ROK vessels; PC's 701, 702, 703, 704, JMS' 302, 303, 306, 307, YMS' 501, 502, 503, 510, 512, 513 515 and other craft. These ROK Navy craft merited the responsibilities placed on them; not only did they perform their duties with enthusiasm and efficiency, they also contributed much valuable information about enemy activities on the islands and mainland.

On D-Day, 15 September, as the Attack Force pushed forward through heavy seas with Marines, in troops compartments, the tempo of operations in the objective area began to increase. Inchon was not strongly garrisoned. Enemy strength within the city amounted only to some two thousand men of a regiment. Weak to begin with, the forces defending the objective area had been further weakened by their southward displacement in response to "Operation Lee" and the ROK Navy landing on Yonghung Island.

By this time, the ground situation was both fluid and favorable in the extreme as planned UN ground forces counterattacked all along the line. On the east coast, on 17 September, ROK troops crossed the Hyongsan River south of Pohang, captured the city and pressed onward toward Yongdok.

As the UN ground forces captured Seoul on 28 September, they started their northward march and swept over the whole of North Korea. The ROK Navy had also in conjunction with the UN naval forces, advanced into the northern sea area, establishing the advance bases at Wonsan, Changjon in the east and Chinnampo in the west during October. The ROK Navy vessels had completely carried out minesweeping operations off the above-mentioned ports from 14 October to early November.

When it became obvious that the NK had suffered a decisive defeat and the entire peninsula would soon be in UN hands by November, all of a sudden, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) intervened in the war. The suddenness of the outnumbered CCF intervention had inevitably caused the all-out withdrawal of the UN ground forces. The retrograde movement was performed by ROK
Navy vessels in cooperation with UN craft from the advance bases of Hungnam and Wonsan in the east and Chinnampo in the west. In particular, the largest-scale withdrawal was the pull-out operation of Hungnam. The ROK Navy, mobilizing all its vessels, had transported masses of troops and refugees together with UN naval craft during December. The statistics of the evacuation follows below: 105,000 ROK and US military personnel, 91,000 refugees, 350,000 measurement tons of cargo, 17,500 vehicles.

In early 1951, the organized ground units out of the members of its fleets were joined by the 2nd Inchon landing operation by UN naval forces. These troops aboard JMS 302 landed at Inchon. The enemy mistook the action for a large-scale operation and took to its heels. On the afternoon of 10 February, Inchon was occupied by a party of ROK Marines from Tokchok Island, and by nightfall UN troops had reached the banks of the Han River. At this time, on the east coast, ROK Marine Corps(MC) landed on Yo-do Island in Yonghung Bay off Wonsan on the 14th. They continued capturing the islands of Sin, So, and Hwangto off Wonsan by the end of the month.

For the minesweepers, however, nothing had altered. There was always the chance of new minefields or of the replenishment of those previously swept; the continued possibility of influence mines increased the load; intelli-
gence reports indicated that the enemy was preparing a new mining campaign. With the completion of this sweep, fire support activities were stepped up. Along the eastern coast with one pair patrolling the 100-fathom curve north to the limit of the blockade, while the second provided fire support to the UN ground troops.

Although the hydrography of Korea's western shore greatly limited the possibilities of naval gunfire, TG 95.1 of the NavFE was also active. The prevalence of islands permitted the establishment of useful advance bases, off Inchon and Haeju, of the Sir James Hall Group near the 38th Parallel, the islands of Cho and Sok off the Taedong estuary, and of islands in the Yalu Gulf. Most of these islands were informally controlled by friendly special ranger groups and employed as bases for intelligence activities and for raids behind enemy lines.

On 3 April all UN heavy ships were absorbed into Task Force(TF) 77, with ROK Navy ships newly attached to TF 95. And notice should be taken of the accomplishments of the ROK Navy and Marine Corps in developing, in circumstances that were tragic and amidst indescribable difficulties, into forces of considerable size and efficiency thenceforth. The US provided the largest of the UN naval forces, the units from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand and the United Kingdom also participated in that theater.

At Kaesong, on July 1951, the first few days of talk were not auspicious, occupied as they were by UN efforts to control Communist propaganda activity. Nevertheless, in the course of little more than two weeks, an agenda was adopted and the delegates proceeded the address themselves to the questions of the cease-fire.

Ground action, continued to diminish: six months of grinding frontline warfare had ended, the battleline had been stabilized on the ground, UN activity was limited to patrolling. But the enemy was busily engaged in bringing down new units to replace those chewed up in the spring offensives of 1951, and was bending every effort to improve their logistic position.

Thus the burden of enemy rear interdiction was to lie upon the UN naval and air forces; on the western shore ROK, US and British Commonwealth units carried out a number of small bombardments and raids. At Wonsan in the east, activity increased as the enemy worked to expand his truck traffic and to develop his coastal defenses. There the UN navy was called upon for air support, and challenged to deliver a long-range rocket bombardment against enemy positions.

During September, on orders from US Seventh Fleet, CTF 95 instructed the minesweepers to clear a lane between Wonsan and Hungnam to bring the
eastern shore of the Korean Gulf within gunfire range.

On 25 October, as the enemy returned to the truce table, the UN negotiators proposed the establishment of a four-kilometers demilitarized zone based generally on the existing line of contact. On 5 November the proposal was accepted, together with a UN proviso that the line be that existing when final agreement was reached.

As the war continued among the islands, along the coast, and in the air over North Korea, so did the talks at Panmunjom. There, with agreement on the Demarcation Line, discussion had turned to arrangements for a cease-fire and to the question of prisoners of war.

December and January brought abandonment by the UN of the northern islands, of the right to air reconnaissance over North Korea and of a previously proposed limitation on Communist rehabilitation of airfields. But with the New Year the striking point appeared in the question of forced repatriation of prisoners. Despite further UN concessions all progress ceased, while continued enemy pressure against the islands was indicative of no speedy peace.

Through the winter cold and winds and snows, naval operations went on. The units of TF 95 continued as before, the monotony interrupted only by rumors of a Soviet submarine in the northeastern coastal area, and by the loss with all hands of a ROK PC, by mining, at Wonsan.

This situation called for the intensification of various operations of minesweeping and patrolling including the assault operation “Haeyon”(Sea-Swallow)” from April to December 1952 and “Paekgu(White Gull)” January to July 1953; to sweep the mines in the offshore Wonsan area in the east and to blockade the enemy intrusion on the islands in the Yellow Sea. Bombardment of the artillery positions and supply routes were followed by UN naval forces in coordination with air power. On the other hand, ROK PF’s 61,62,63, 65 and 66 had convoyed oil tankers and other transport vessels carrying ammunitions, personnel, supplies and refugees. Based in Sasebo in Japan, these PF’s had operated a total of 1692 days’ mission tour.

During this periods, the ROK Navy contributed as a member of NavFE to clear the ways with minesweeping, blockading the infiltration of the enemy by sea and patrolling, thus enabled “Operation Strangle” an interdiction in the rear of the enemy by the UN Forces by sea and air power based on the carriers permitting them access in-shore and this caused the Reds to be pushed back to the truce tent in retribution for their tactics, not by talks but by force only, as witnessed during the war.

Not the size but the enthusiasm and loyalty of the ROK Naval Forces left
12,962 enemy troops killed, 1,194 prisoners of war and 2,148 defectors secured, one aircraft shot down, one aircraft damaged, 72 vessels captured, 171 ships sunk, 218 ships damaged, two warships sunk, 12 cargo ships (including junks and fishing boats) sunk, some 200 mines removed, some 1,010 mines exploded, 336 barracks (including buildings) destroyed, 137 bunkers (including 37 posts) destroyed, and 1,644 heavy and light machine-guns captured during the war.

Section 3. Activity of the Republic of Korea Air Force

The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF), though officially activated on 1 October 1949, had only trainers and liaison planes (8 L-4’s, 6 L-5’s and 10 T-6’s) at the time of the North Korean (NK) invasion on 25 June 1950. A little look into the background of how the ROKAF was in this condition is necessary at this point.

When Korea was liberated from Japan on 15 August 1945, there were ten Japanese-used main operational air bases: Pyongyang, Mirim, Hamhung, Yoipoc, Wonsan, Kimpo, Seoul, Kunsan, Taegu and Kimhae. And there were about one thousand personnel, including aircraft engineers and mechanics, who had served under the Japanese rule in the military or civilian air services in Japan, China and Korea. When Korea was divided south and north, the numbers of the personnel were also split in half.

In the south there were about one hundred pilots and about six hundred service personnel that included aircraft engineers and mechanics together with the men qualified in the fields of communication, armor and other ground equipment. All of them looked forward to the establishment of an aviation group in Korea. But there were no aircraft.

While the South Korean Coast Guard was organized in December 1945 and the Constabulary followed in January next year, the US Military Government in Korea did not pay attention to the suggestions of the Koreans to build an air power. The strongest suggestions came especially from those who had served in the aviation services, for they understood the importance of air power in an independent country of the 20th century.

In the north, there were about same numbers of pilots, engineers and mechanics, as mentioned above. But different from the south, an air force corps was established right after the liberation. And under the Russian tutelage, preparing for the invasion to the south, some nine hundred persons were sent near Moscow to have pilot, maintenance and other technical training by the year of 1947. The north Koreans came to possess 200 aircraft, including Yak-3’s Yak-7B’s and IL-10’s for fighters and light raiders and, further, built advance
airfields in Sinmak and Pyonggang along the 38th Parallel in 1949. The numbers of flying sorties were up to four hundred everyday. It became clear that they were organized and trained for the purpose of aggression to the south.

The Koreans continued asking the United States for more modern weapons including aircraft to balance military strength. The United States considered such strength was not essential to the maintenance of internal order in Korea; and, would lend credence to Communist charges that the United States was fostering an armaments race in Korea. Also the United States could not think of the impending war on the ground that as long as even a United States personnel stay in Korea, the NK's would not pull the trigger aimed at the south.

When the Republic of Korea (ROK) was founded in August 1948, an Army aviation corps was augmented with the ten liaison type planes (L-4's) received when the US forces left Korea and seven newly commissioned officers out of those aviators, who had served in foreign land before liberation, as cadres. This corps joined to suppress Yosu and Sunchon area riots, instigated by the agitprop of the Communist partisans. Through this operation ROK authority understood the necessity of an air force more strongly. And the establishment of Army Air Academy followed for the purpose of training air officers at Kimpo on 14 January 1949. The ROK asked the United States Government to support more advanced trainers or fighter type planes, if available, but could not succeed because of the American policy, mentioned before. Even attempts to buy the aircraft also resulted in failure.

Under the premise to be a force of air defense in the future, the Army air corps came to be independent from the Army as a separate service of the ROK Armed Forces on 1 October 1949. The first Chief of Staff was Colonel Kim Chung Yul.

The yearning of Koreans to enforce air power in this situation resulted in a decision to purchase ten T-6's from Canada since it was not possible to buy from the States. The funds for these aircraft came from donations of people throughout Korea. The donation ceremony of the aircraft was held on 10 May 1950. That was around forty days prior to the North Korean invasion. The aircraft were called Aegook-ki (meaning the patriotic aircraft).

But, aggression of 25 June came too early for the fledgling air force to fight with much impact. To make the situation even worse, the airfields of Kimpo and Seoul were raided and one T-6 lost on the very morning of the invasion. The ROK Army had neither one tank nor an anti-tank gun on the ground. And because of the lack of strong outside support or assistance for Korean Air Power, in the early stages of the enemy invasion, the ROK Air Force was almost helpless. This defenselessness allowed the Reds, with 300
tanks in advance, to flow south at high speed. This emergency could not permit much time for shipment and transportation of tanks and anti-tank guns from overseas.

At the request of the ROK Government to provide the new Air Force with F-51's (Mustangs) to meet the immediate needs against the enemy tanks, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander, United States Far East Command, sent Lieutenant General Stratemeyer, from the US Far East Air Forces in Japan, to Suwon on the twenty-sixth. The latter met with the Chief of staff, ROK Air Force and discussed the augmentation of Korean Air Power.

As a result, the ROKAF selected ten from among one hundred available pilots and sent them to Itazuke Air base in Japan for training and to ferry the aircraft. Bad weather prevented them from flying till 2 July. Without training they flew to Taegu from Japan. Never before in aviation history had pilots made such a flight without even a single prior take-off or landing. Some twenty US Air Force personnel, including pilots, armor engineers and aircraft mechanics followed the arrival of the Mustangs later were organized as an advisory group in two years.

The Reds on the ground already crossed the Han River and pressed the ROK Army southward. This emergency called for the participation of the ten Mustangs without training in combat on the day following their arrival. Misfortune fell on to the first Mustang group. The Mustang of Colonel Lee, Keun Sok, the best air ace Korea ever had, was hit while leading the attack against enemy tanks in the Anyang area, south of Seoul on 3 July. He understood that his craft was badly damaged and nevertheless he attacked the van of the tanks. During this attack he crashed and was killed.

Since the UN air forces, participated in the theater from 28 June, mainly began strategic sorties, ROK Air Force Mustangs flew in close support of friendly ground forces. But, on the ground, pressed on by the overwhelming numbers and heavy arms of the Reds, the ROK Army had to pull out further and further to the south.

In early July the ROK Air Force Mustangs inflicted over 270 enemy personnel casualties and destroyed or left in flames, six oil dumps, five tanks, 16 vehicles, and six ammunition dumps in operations around Seoul, Suwon, Kimpo, Munsan, Pyongtaek, Osan and Chochiwon in the central region of the peninsula and in Mukho and Samchok areas on the east coast.

Along the Kum River resistance line, the ROK Air Force was hampering enemy approach in coordination with ground forces in mid-June.

Bad weather from 19 to 22 July saw the Reds pass Taegun and push southward without air interdiction. And they crossed the Nakdong River on 5 August and built a bridgehead at Waegwan, north of Taegu, thus threatening
Taegu. This development resulted in a UN call for more significant support and 99 B-29 bombers were ordered to the theater of operation.

By the time of the Pusan Perimeter ROK Air Force vacated the Taegu airfield, major operational base, for UN air forces and moved to Chinhae(K-10) on 30 August 1950. ROK Air Force began close support to the friendly ground forces around the Perimeter.

In the meantime, UN Amphibious Forces under the Command of General MacArthur landed in the Inchon area on 15 September 1950.

With the advance of the UN forces northward, the F-51's of the group moved to the Mirim Air base(K-23) near Pyongyang from Chinhae. The Mirim base used to be one of major operational bases of the North Korean Air Force.

Communist Chinese intervention in the winter of 1950 prevented the ROKAF from moving main portions further north. The Headquarters, Air Base Command, Communication Group, Weather Group and Gendarmerie Group remained in Taegu.
Next, the fighter group as the result of the Communist Chinese pressure left Pyongyang for Taegon base(K-5) on 30 November, and further south to Cheju Island on 20 December. Upon the completion of combat training and aircraft replacements, ROK Air Force advanced to Sachon airfield(K-4) near Chinju and returned to close support of the ground forces at the front.

The ROK Air Force received the approval to increase the Mustang fleet to 20 in June 1951. These F-51's served as the cadre for the Korean's first fighter wing that was founded at Sachon Air base on 1 August. With the birth of the 1st Fighter Wing, the mopping up of the Communist partisans at Mt. Chiri, east of Kwangju, followed on 17 and 18 August. This was a successful operation and resulted in several hundred Red casualties on account of ROK Air action alone. The National Police were very helpful in locating and identifying routes the enemy were taking. In spite of ground-to-air communication deficiencies the results were productive but pointed out the need for improved ground-to-air coordination. The most significant accomplishment was demonstration of the ability of the ROK Air Force to operate independently. And, from that time on they continued to operate as a separate unit attached to the UN air forces.

The Tenth Fighter Group and core members from the 101st Base Group of the 1st Fighter Wing moved to Kangnung base(K-18) on the east coast on 17 September and finished the readjustment work by 11 October 1951. The first independent sorties from the new base covered Pyonggang, Chorwon area in the central-front and Wonsan area on the east coast, from 11 to 28 October 1951.

During these periods the Tenth Group destroyed 20 bunkers, 98 enemy shelters, 33 ammunition dumps, 57 supply and three oil dumps, 20 roads, 142 railways, 66 artillery emplacements, six bridges, 18 rail bridges, one marshalling yard, 47 rolling stocks, 32 carts and one tunnel.

As the result of this close interdiction of the enemy supply system, the rate of supplies reaching the front was only 20-30%, and 20% of personnel replacements. This caused the I ROK Corps to emerge victorious in skirmishes in this area, and furthermore make a sizeable contribution toward ultimately driving the Reds onto the truce table.

The Tenth Fighter Group in Kangung stopped interdiction operations of the enemy's rear supply route on the east coast area on 28 November. They moved to Sachon base temporarily to support again the ROK Army and National Police in mopping up the Reds partisan operation in the Mt. Chiri, Unchang, Sungsu, Chonsong and Changan areas of the south and southwestern part of the peninsula. They remained there from 3 to 24 December 1951. The Group returned to the Kangnung base on 30 December of that year and concentrated on covering the northeastern areas.
One of the really memorable achievements of the ROK Air Force was the bomb destruction of the Seungho-ri rail bridge, ten kilometers east of Pyongyang, which still stood even after some hundred sorties by UN Air forces. It was wiped out by a concentration of eleven ROKAF attacks in one day on 15 January 1952.

On the ground, after the two Communist Chinese spring offensives were frustrated in 1951, there were no more of these all-out thrusts. The war became one of each side tenaciously fighting for strategic defensive positions until the truce on 27 July 1953.

Although there was a virtual stalemate on the ground, the battle for air superiority continued as well as interdiction of the enemy supply lines.

In response, the Reds concentrated their anti-aircraft effort along their supply routes and began to inflict heavy flak damage on allied air power. Additionally the Reds moved their air bases to more forward operating locations, from Manchuria, which had been used as sanctuary. Political considerations let the sanctuary continue in effect. When they moved they began to counterattack in the northeastern part of Sinanju-Sinuiju axis, called MIG alley because of their concentration of MIG's.

On 11 July 1952, the ROK Air Force joined the "Operation Pressure Pump" a bombing assault as avant-garde with 20 Mustangs against 30 targets designated in the capital city of North Korea, Pyongyang, at 1000, 1400 and 1800 hours. This was the biggest air attack so far in the Korean war, for 1,254 UN aircraft sorties had been committed to the operation. The strikes went off well.

With the improvement of air tactics through actual combat, the ROK Air Force began to attempt more air-to-ground operations in support of the I ROK Corps, in addition to the enemy rear interdiction in the autumn 1952.

By February 1953, the ROK Air Force came to own some 70 aircraft and with a corresponding increase of technically experienced personnel saw the foundation of the 10th Fighter Wing on 15 February at Kangnung base. This was the second ROK Air Force Fighter Wing. The 1st Fighter Wing became a training wing.

While on the ground, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) arrayed themselves from the west coast to the mid-eastern front and NK's covered the eastern-front. They faced UN forces in the west, the I and II ROK Corps on the eastern and mid-eastern fronts.

The stalemate with only patrolling and probing in small-scale continued till 13 July when the CCF made an all-out effort along the 48 kilometers of the If ROK Corps on the mid-eastern front. They started with a night attack to achieve the element of surprise and accomplish blitzkrieg results. But the attempt was again frustrated by the joint efforts of air and ground forces on 20
July.

The ROK Air Force continued flying interdiction in the rear of the enemy.

On the other hand, the role of the reconnaissance aircraft was not minor compared to the fighters.

During the intervals between enemy airstrikes, in the early stages of war these planes dropped about 300 homemade 30 pound bombs on enemy concentrations by eyesight in the area north of Seoul prior to its fall. The effort helped some to halt the enemy approach for a time, but it was a feeble effort against well organized NK air power and ground to air fire power.

The Reds flowed on south of Seoul and pressed ROK Air Force in retrograde movement southward from Seoul to Suwon base on 27 June.

T-6’s, also serving as reconnaissance planes together with liaison types, flew over Inchon, Seoul to the west and Hongchon, Hoengsong to the central front and directed the fires of ground forces. The requirement for this kind of reconnaissance flying increased and later resulted in the organization of a separate Reconnaissance Squadron on 1 July 1950. This squadron, attached to the ROK Army, also served in transportation of the field commanders. These planes were given the duty of basic training for both Army and Air Force pilots later.

Meanwhile ROK Air Force Intelligence Group, founded in 1948, in coordination with the United States Air Force counterpart gathered information for both air and ground forces, through the actions on the foremost lines and in the rear of the enemy.

They began the communication intelligence for the first time in Korea.

The air superiority never fell to the enemy till armistice. This was a direct result of UN air forces contributions; particularly the United States who provided by far the largest part of the air force contingent; units from Australia, Canada, Greece, South Africa and Thailand also took part in the theater.

The ROK Air Force flew a total of 5,003 sorties for interdiction of enemy rear supply routes and a total of 2,851 sorties in joint operations from when they started combat at Kangnung until the signing of armistice on 27 July 1953. These sorties constituted the second largest number among all UN air forces during the war.

Section 4. Armistice

On 30 March 1953, Chou En-lai, Red Chinese Foreign Minister, returning from Stalin’s funeral in Moscow, announced that men who refused repatriation
might be handed over to a neutral state and the explanation be given them by parties concerned. Another came after Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov endorsed Chou's statement on 10 April.

The truce talks which had been stalled by the prisoner exchange deadlock at Panmunjom made rapid headway following the signing of the agreement for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war on the next day, 11 April 1953. And, on 20 April, the exchange known as "Operation Little Switch" began, lasting until 26 April. During it the UN Command handed over 5,194 NKA prisoners, 1,030 CCF and 446 North Korean civilian internees, or a total of 6,670 sick and wounded prisoners. The Communists returned 684 UN prisoners, among them 471 ROKs, 149 US, 32 British, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, and one each of Greek, South African, Philipino, and Netherlander.

On 8 June, an agreement on the "Terms of Reference" for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was reached, the Government of India being invited to provide a Custodian Force for prisoners, a responsibility which was accepted. The signing of the armistice was, however, delayed, as on 18 June President Syngman Rhee, who from the beginning had protested against the conclusion of an armistice which left Korea divided, ordered, without consulting the United
Nations Command, the release of all North Korean prisoners of war refusing repatriation. This dramatic action reintroduced the elements of uncertainty into the situation and ground operation again declined until the truce meetings resumed on 10 July. Then the enemy launched most determined offensives chiefly upon the ROK force defense as already described in the earlier sections.

On 10 July 1953, the second anniversary of the start of truce talks at Kaesong, the plenary sessions were resumed. On 13 July, in the meantime, five CCF armies struck savagely at three ROK divisions holding Kunsong Bulge between the Iron Triangle and the Punchbowl. It was a far larger attack than the assault of 13-14 June, and the objective was seemingly to show President Syngman Rhee who objected the armistice with the support of a whole nation. The representative of the Republic of Korea forces attended the meetings merely as an observer. On 25 May Major General Choi Duk Shin expressed his dissatisfaction regarding UN delegate's compromise, over a provision to hand over the prisoners who do not want repatriation to neutral nations, to the Repatriation Commission which comprised representatives of Communist satellite-states. He did not attend any further sessions of the meeting. It saw thereafter the release of 27,000 anti-Communist prisoners of war on 18 June as mentioned earlier.

The tragic war of three years, one months and two days eventually came to an end with the signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953. At ten o'clock in the morning at Panmunjom, Lieutenant General William Harrison and Nam Il signed the eighteen copies of the agreement.

Surrounded by the representatives from all nations participated in the United Nations Command, General Mark W. Clark countersigned the agreement on the afternoon at Munsan. The representative of the Republic of Korea forces did not attend the occasion however. In the speeches that followed, General Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, cautioned that the armistice was only a military agreement to cease fire while the opposing sides sought a political solution to the conflict. Until the diplomats negotiated a permanent conclusion, the General warned, there could be no United Nations Command withdrawal from Korea nor any lessening of alertness and preparedness.

The following is a summary of the Armistice terms:

1. The Demarcation Line was defined and ran approximately along the front lines of the opposing forces. Both sides were to withdraw two kilometers from the Demarcation Line in order to establish a Demilitarized Zone.

2. Hostilities were to cease twelve hours after the signing of the armistice. Within seventy-two hours all troops were to be withdrawn from the Demilitarized Zone. Neither side was to reinforce its troops, but normal rotation reliefs were permitted. Both sides were to afford help and protection for the various Commissions and Inspection Team set up by the Agreement.
3. All prisoners who wished to be repatriated were to be handed over within sixty days.

4. The Military Commanders on both sides recommended to their Governments that a Political Conference be set up within 90 days to draw up a Korean Peace Treaty.

On the other hand, on 27 July, the day the armistice was signed in Korea, the sixteen UN allies who fought there worked out a joint statement which, as it was made public two weeks later, declared:

"We affirm, in the interest of the world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attacks, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should(be) again united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

"Operation Big Switch" began on 5 August and lasted through the first week of September. The United Nations Command returned to the Communists 70,159 NKA and 5,640 CCF seeking repatriation, a total of 75,799. The Communists sent back 12,757 prisoner, or 3,597 US, 1,312 other UN comrades-in-arms and 7,848 of the 65,000 ROKs whom North Korean Communists had once boasted of capturing. These troops were brought to the Freedom Village constructed near Panmunjom, given medical treatment, food and new clothes, and then subjected to extensive questioning about life in the Communist prison camps.

As for the Communist casualties, the Chinese Communist forces lost estimatedly 900,000 dead and wounded during the war, while the North Korean Communists lost 520,000 dead and wounded. Of these totals, the Communist forces suffered 479,000 killed and wounded, 89,800 prisoners of war, and 3,500 defectors by the effort of the Republic of Korea forces alone. The actual cost of the war is not known. Something like 400,000 homes were destroyed up and down the peninsula.

Section 5. Retrospect

Twenty years have passed since the end of the Korean War at 2000 hours on the night of 27 July 1953, leaving Korea still divided. During the war of thirty-seven months and two days, the attempt of North Korean Communists assisted by Soviet Russia to conquest the peninsula by force was blocked and defeated by the Republic of Korea with support of the United Nations. The
United Nations effort to unify Korea by collective security action was stopped by the intervention of Communist China, and the Communist Chinese attempt was thwarted by the United Nations, after which a stalemate obtained while both sides struggled for negotiations at Panmunjom. The stalemate then settled down to eighteen months of positional warfare until the United Nations principle of voluntary repatriation was finally upheld.

United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Pusan.

U.N. Collective Security Action

The Korean War waged in the remote "Land of the Morning Calm" on 25 June 1950 was not only because of warmongering North Korean Communists, but was a result of an ideological struggle being waged between two global adversaries, the Free loving nations versus the Communist dominated countries and satellites.

The war was piled an international one in nature, which involved, on the United Nations part, twenty-one nations in physical support of the Republic of Korea either with the military troops or non-combatant elements. They are
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States in alphabetic order. They offered great contribution from around the globe as the crusades for common cause under the flag of the United Nations, to a small Asian peninsula. In no sense was it a small war, rather it was a major war confined to a small and limited area. The war was outwardly ignited by the North Korean Communists whose strings were actually responsive to Soviet Russia and Red China's hands.

Nothing could be further from the truth. It is true that the Korean War was artificial and unique in many respects. At the time of writing this history, the United Nations Command is still remained here in Korea, with the same mission as was demonstrated in fighting against the Communist aggressors before the Armistice.

What had been gained by the United Nations Forces in Korea? It is no doubt that the war represented a victory for the UN allies since the free world able to demonstrate the real value of collective security; and furthermore, it was able to accomplish what it set out to do; to punish aggression, to drive the invader back to his lair, and to warn him that future forays would be met with even further greater forces.

Predatory nations were always eager to plunder their weaker neighbours. Like any other resort to armed forces, the Korean War was not only a national tragedy, but was a world tragedy. There were some good resulted from this, however. The staunch United Nations' support for the Republic of Korea must have given pause to the aggressors. The people of the free world could now clearly see that world peace would come through strength and not through weakness.

Nevertheless, the United Nations Forces had been successfully carried out its original objective of the participation in the Korean War for halting Communist aggression and also for preserving the independence and freedom of the Republic of Korea.

**Republic of Korea—Today**

In conclusion, the Korean War showed once again that difference between the Democracy and the Communism is the difference of means. And, by the invasion of Korea itself, the Communists showed that they will use any means to attain their ends. The Korean War did halt Communist armed aggression by
alied effort of the United Nations in addition to an indomitable spirit of anti-Communism demonstrated by the people of the Republic of Korea.

The end of the Korean War may have brought about that shift to economic warfare, at least on the part of the Republic of Korea.

In the Republic of Korea, thanks to the leadership of President Park Chung Hee, two successive Five-Year Economic Development Plans (1962-1971) spurred the economic progress to rapid growth, and achieved resounding success. Industrialization boomed, exports expanded drastically, domestic savings increased, and a high degree of development was attained in the fields of agriculture and social overhead capital. The groundwork for economic stability had been laid.

Industrial expansion in general was much head of the schedule during the Second Plan period. The construction and dedication of modern super-highways, which enabled major population and industrial centers of the nations to link up with one another in a one-day travel range, may be regarded as another milestone in the course of the nation's effort for sufficient economical stand on its own account.

Now, the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1972-1976) is being in progress steadily, toward the objectives of economic self-sufficiency and modernization and further for national prosperity and unification.
PURSUIT TO NORTH KOREA (5 OCT - 24 NOV 1950)

LEGEND:
- UN FORCES' AXIS OF DRIVE
- ROK AXIS OF DRIVE
- ADVANCE LINE 5 OCT
- " " = "19 OCT"
- " " = "26 OCT"
- " " = "24 NOV"

WESTERN SEA

SITUATION MAP 6

Scale 0 50 100km
PART THREE

THE ETHIOPIAN BATTALION
IN THE KOREAN WAR
His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia.
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CHAPTER I GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Section 1. Introduction to Ethiopia

a. General

Ethiopia is a northeastern African country, bordered on the east by Somaliland and Somalia, on the south by Kenya, and on the west by Sudan. Access to the Red Sea on the north including the former French Somaliland ports of Mewesa, Aseb was attained through the federation with Eritrea in 1952.

The area is 1,031,730 square kilometers including Eritrea, and the population of the Ethiopian proper in 1967 was estimated at 23,023,200 largely composed of mixture of Hamites, Semites and Negroids. Their culture, influenced by Greece and Egypt, flourished on the famous River Abbai, the Blue Nile.

Though industrial resources are potentially great, the economy is some 70 per cent agricultural. Under temperate climate, with rainy season ranging from June to September, its fertile soil produces two crops annually, principal crops being coffee, wheat, barley, millet, tobacco, and sugar.

Ethiopia is a constitutional monarchy derived from a number of earlier kingdoms, descendants of ancient Hamite and Semite tribes. The head of state since 1930 has been Emperor Haile Selassie I (born in 1892), the 225th ruler in the Solomonid line after Menelik I. There are no political parties, and the emperor is the primary political force who exercises wide powers and prerogatives.

b. Brief History

One of the oldest nations in the world, Ethiopia has its history shrouded in deep obscurity. The first Hamitic migrations to Ethiopia are generally believed to have begun about 3,000 B.C., and the Semitic migrations followed some 2,000 years later. Both of these migrations arrived in Ethiopia through Eritrea. The monumental and archeological evidences of the ancient capital of Aksum testify to its great pre-Christian civilization. That civilization received Christianity in the fourth century A.D. and the Coptic Church thus established began to play a significant role of a political institution. Comparable to ecclesiastic influence in medieval Europe, the church provided a cohesion for Ethiopian life which transcended the political authorities. Appointment of an Egyptian as
sole bishop of Ethiopia by the patriarch in Alexandria ensued, and in 1932 Egyptian was replaced by native Ethiopian as the bishop of the Coptic Church.

Throughout centuries, Ethiopians had struggled to stabilize their national boundaries and to maintain freedom, for which Ethiopia had been named “The Land of Freeman.” To these freemen, the first critical threat of modern time came in 1800, when Colonialist Italy invaded the country and acquired a sphere of influence that later was organized into its colony of Eritrea. In October 1935, the threat recurred when Fascist Italy marched its troops into the Ethiopian proper from its colony of Eritrea. The Emperor Haile Selassie and his people fought until forced to take flight in April 1936. During this incident, the League of Nations applied sanctions against the Mussolini regime of Fascist Italy.

However, Mussolini added Ethiopia to Italy with Victor Emmanuel III Emperor. Five years lapsed for the Emperor Haile Selassie in exile until the British forces freed Ethiopia in 1941 in the course of the World War II.

The major post-war concern of Addis Ababa was its attempt to prevent the return to Italy of its former colonies, and, if possible to assimilate these areas to the Ethiopian proper. The Eritrean question was vital for the future of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Nevertheless, the United Nations General Assembly has granted Italy a trusteeship over Somaliland.

Ethiopia, having signed the original declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1945, and becoming a charter member of U.N. at San Francisco, June 25, 1945, subsequently, made strong demands for the former Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. In the peace treaty signed between “the Allied and Associated Powers” and Italy on February 10, 1947, to which Ethiopia was a signatory, the full “sovereignty and independence of the State of Ethiopia” was recognized.

c. Military Establishment

Despite the prevalence of warfare in the history of the country and the great importance society placed on traditional military virtues, an armed force wholly controlled and regularly paid in money by the central government did not exist until after the end of the Italian occupation in 1941. In its effort to provide the country with a modern military force, the government subsequently sought the advice and assistance of foreign nations on a broad scale. At various times military missions from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, India, Israel, and the United States were to assist in organizing and training various elements of the Ethiopian armed forces.

In 1950 Emperor Haile Selassie signed a military convention with the United Kingdom, under which the British, with Ethiopian government funds,
General Introduction

trained and equipped ten infantry battalions and support units. Most of the recipients of this British training were the Imperial Security Guard, which was stationed in the national capital and had responsibility for the safety of the Emperor. The oldest unit of the national military establishment, it was first formed in 1917 when Haile Selassie was regent. Its formation marked the first of series of measures instituted to provide the country with a defense force in the modern skills of the military profession. Although technically part of the army chain of command, the Commander of the Imperial Security Guard generally received his orders directly from the Emperor. It was among these British-trained men of the Imperial Security Guard that in 1951 the Kagne Battalion was raised and offered to the United Nations forces to Korea.

The United States influence on the Ethiopian armed forces first came into play through its association with the Kagne Battalion of the Imperial Security Guard, which served with the United States troops in Korea during the 1950s. A military assistance agreement was signed with the US in 1953, and since then the US military advisers have been present in Ethiopia. As an outgrowth of the military assistance agreement, the US Army was permitted to establish a large communications base outside Asmara, known as the Kagne Station after the Kagne Battalion’s service in Korea with the US forces.

Throughout the decade of the 1960s, modernization and expansion of the armed forces continued. In 1960, the Emperor dispatched army units and part of an air squadron for the second time to assist United Nations forces in the Congo. During this operation approximately 3,300 Ethiopian military men participated in military action.

In mid 1960 the armed forces consisted of approximately 45,000 officers and men organized into a relatively large army, a small but expanding air force, and a modest navy. Although not an integral part of the defense establishment, a national police force of about 28,000 was capable of assisting the armed forces in the event of a national emergency. There were no organized reserves except a 5,000-man national militia assigned to the Ministry of Interior. The army is the oldest element of the national military establishment and since 1955 has been known officially as the Ethiopian Ground Force. Its principal elements are four infantry divisions (one of these divisions is Imperial Security Guard), each nominally composed of three brigades (three battalions each) and supporting elements.

Section 2. Commitment

a. Behind Decision

The Korean struggle against the aggressor was undoubtedly an inviolable
one for the Ethiopians. No other nation understood better the true meaning of a war, and no one perceived better the importance of military help to the people of an invaded country. When the United Nations resolved to an application of the ideal of collective security, the Ethiopians remembered well: Ethiopia had suffered the horrors of a cruel war and had sacrificed five years of its independence because of the lack of collective security. A country which had undergone such a struggle was certainly in a better position to judge than those who knew the subject only theoretically.

Ethiopia’s plight in 1935 had been the most tragic occasion to cut deep into the memories of the Ethiopians. Their despair and indignation came to climax when they learned that they had but warned in vain the danger of the threat to all the free world deprived of collective security, and had to fight alone against an invader, so well prepared in superior strength. This was a tragic event that preceded the Second World War.

In October 1935, the forces of Fascist faction that had risen in Italy attacked Ethiopia. The invasion completely disarmed the Ethiopians. Ethiopia was unprepared for the assault because it had the complete faith in all the pacts of friendship into which she had entered with other nations, and the complete trust in the League of Nations, to which Ethiopia had been a member.

Now Ethiopia having become the nation in need of a collective measure, the Emperor, himself, went to Geneva to request the 52-members of the League to apply the principles of the Charter.

In his dramatic, meaningful speech, Haile Selassie rang the bell of danger, summoning the free and democratic nations to a united effort. The Emperor foresaw the menace to international peace and spoke from the depth of his heart in expressing his beliefs. Unfortunately for humanity, Haile Selassie was not heard then. His desperate appeal to the League had no results Ethiopia was abandoned, left without assistance, and her people after fighting heroically for eight months, in April 1936, were overcome by the Fascist Italians. The ensuing years saw the rapid growth of the Fascist, which on the part eventually rolled the globe into the disaster that demanded the sacrifice of millions of lives and the destruction of properties.

b. Kagneus Underway

It was no surprise for the Ethiopian people and its military circle to learn that upon the UN request for the Ethiopian participation, Emperor Haile Selassie, manifesting his strong desire for the success of the military plan of the United Nations, instantly had decided the Ethiopian commitment.

The Emperor’s enthusiasm for the Ethiopian participation was so great that he readily came to a decision to send his own Security Guard. The only
procedure left now was the selection of the best men to represent the country and the Emperor.

In August 1950, the formal order was issued in Ethiopia for the formation of the first Kagnew Battalion. Under the previous instructions and ardent wish of Emperor Haile Selassie, the order mentioned that the Battalion should be composed of volunteers of men of the Imperial Security Guard. Brigadier General Mulugetta Buli, the Commander of the Imperial Security Guard, requested this men to declare freely, which of them wanted to be a component of the Korea-bound Battalion to fight against the Communist aggressors. The surprising phenomenon was that every man of the Imperial Security Guard wanted to participate in the expedition to Korea.

This occurrence of the formation of an Ethiopian Force to Korea was unique. The enthusiasm of the men of the Imperial Security Guard was not restrainable, as all of them wanted to offer their services in the sacred struggle in a far-off land as a part of duty for their own country. General Mulugetta Buli saw no alternative but to oblige to form the first Kagnew Battalion from the various trades of the Imperial Security Guard as a whole, so that no complaint would arise among the men that one unit was preferred over another.

The organization of the first Kagnew Battalion took place with an exceptional speed in the military annals of Ethiopia. Within twenty-four hours of the issuance of the order for the formation, the Battalion had been formed and Lieutenant Colonel Teshome Igetu had assumed the command.

One mention should be made to the seriousness with which the command of the Imperial Guard confronted the matter of military representation of Ethiopia in Korea, where each nation vied with one another in appearance and fighting ability.

The men of the Kagnew Battalion were therefore placed in an intense training at a specially designed camp in the mountainous region around Addis Ababa, not unlike the Korean terrain. They paid particular attention to the training in the combat patrol and ambush actions in the field. During eight months of their training, the tide in Korean war saw the ebb and flow, each turn dictating minor modification of training schedule. It should be also remembered that the training was being conducted largely by British instructors under the military convention entered in 1950.

In early April of 1951, however, the special training of the Kagnew Battalion was declared complete. On the 13th of April, the Battalion paraded in front of the Imperial Palace in Addis Ababa. The Emperor and members of his suite inspected this first fighting team to Korea. The Emperor was entirely satisfied with their appearance and high spirit.
In this farewell ceremony, the Emperor addressed them stressing the importance of the principle of the collective security and emphasizing their obligations towards their country, the free world and posterity.

His remark said in part: "You are departing on a long crusade in defense of that very principle for which we have so long fought... You are fighting not only for freedom as we know it in Ethiopia, but also for the right of each people to its freedom. You are also representing and defending in far corners of the earth the most sacred principle of modern international policy... that principle of collective security with which the name of Ethiopia is imperishably associated..."

In this ceremony, the Emperor gave the Battalion the name "Kagnew," which has a meaning as "Something hard to penetrate, or something that gives a hard blow or disorganizes the opponent."

Later, the Battalion paraded through the streets of the capital to the railway station. There were awaiting them members of the Ethiopian Government, diplomats and military attachés, and a great number of people to bid farewell to the fighters and to wish them good luck and a prompt return to their country. With the sounding of the Ethiopian National Anthem played by the military band of the Imperial Guard, amidst the applause and the wishes of all those who were present, they departed by train for Djibouti to embark for Korea. During the twenty-four hour trip from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, thousands of people in the intermediate railway stations paraded along to cheer and wish them good luck.

On the night of 16th of April 1951, the Ethiopian fighters embarked on the American transport General Macrea and departed for Korea. As the ship raised her anchor and slowly cut through the calm waters of the port of Djibouti, the Ethiopian fighters on the deck of the ship observed with mixed emotions the masses which were at the dock side. Thousands of hands waved high while animated applause and cheers arose; but many eyes were moist at that moment. The flower of Ethiopian youth was leaving for a remote country; leaving their native soil to fight, and perhaps spill their blood, in a far corner of the earth. They were on the way to sacrifice themselves on the altar of human ideals.

The troopship, General Macrea, slowly moved out of the port of Djibouti and through the Red Sea toward the destination, where Freedom needed her valuable cargo.

The Ethiopian fighters then had to abandon their sentiments for the oblivion to take charge, and to live up to only one determination: the fulfilment of their missions in Korea. To be worthy of wishes and traditions of the
General Introduction

Imperial Security Guard, and to achieve what the home folks wished and prayed was uppermost in their minds. During the occasional Coptic Services conducted by the battalion chaplain, each of them, from the commander of the battalion to the last fighter, remained serious, their mien disclosing that they were well aware of their mission.

Nevertheless, at the time when the ship's regulations provided for recreation, they manifested the instinctive joy and exuberant feelings that reigned in their hearts. The crew of the troopship and the soldiers of the other nations, traveling on the same ship with the Ethiopians, were touched many times by the nostalgic songs of the fighters of the Kagnew Battalion. At other times they were entertained with the rhythmic Ethiopian dances. The popular songs and dances of Tizita, Gansebie, Ambassel, Anchilige, Aman Baman, were heard and they danced frequently during the long ocean voyage. At the end of voyage, the captain of the ship, not only for a compliment, praised the Ethiopian troops for their exemplary discipline, and congratulated Colonel Kebede Gubre the Commander of the Ethiopian Force to Korea for the irreproachable behavior of his men.

Dedicated to the Ethiopian fighters who fought gallantly on this soil for the cause of world peace and freedom during the Korean War.
CHAPTER II THE 1ST KAGNEW BATTALION

Section 1. Deployment to Korea

The General Macrea arrived in the port of Pusan, on the 7th of May 1951, where the Ethiopian soldiers were heartily welcomed by President of the Republic of Korea Syngman Rhee, who presented a bouquet to the Commander of the Battalion Lieutenant Colonel Teshome Irgetu, the US Ambassador John J. Muccio, the Commanding General of the 2nd Logistical Command and other officers of Korea and UN Command, and crowds of Korean people. After the welcome ceremony, they were transported to the United Nations Reception Center at Tongnae in northern outskirts of Pusan.

The United Nations Reception Center now at Tongnae was originally a conception of General Walker, the Commander of the Eighth US Army, to forge an heterogeneous international army into a more unified, efficient one. Since its establishment at Taegu in October 1950, its mission had been to clothe, equip, and provide familiarization training with US Army weapons and equipment to UN troops as determined essential for operations in Korea by the Reception Center Commander.

Now the Kagniew Battalion was put to a hectic training in this center. Its British rifles were soon replaced by US type. To Ethiopian fighters, the customs and summer of Korea were not so unbearable, as they were with other previous trainees of other nations.

The Korean summer was similar to their home climate even though they were to suffer subzero winter of this foreign land. Moreover, there existed practically no language barrier between US instructors and the Battalion because all Kagniew officers spoke fluent English. By the time the Kagniew Battalion was jostling halfway in the strenuous training, the Colombian Battalion arrived on June 16 at this camp to undergo the same preparation for advent into the battle front.

On July 6, when the training was almost at a close, there came the orders from the Eighth US Army which in part read...... "To CG 2nd Logistical Command: Beginning 9 July move Kagniew Battalion to Kapyong. Upon arrival subject unit detached your command. Move Hqs Kagniew to Taegu...

To CG 7th US Division: Upon arrival in Kapyong Kagniew is attached
to your command for further attachment to 32nd Regiment.

At the moment, the 7th US Division to which now the Kagnew Battalion was to be attached was in the IX US Corps reserve at Kapyong, awaiting an important assignment to the central front on Kansas Line. Three days later, at 1645 on the 9th of July, the train loaded with the train-hardened Kagnew Battalion cleared out of the Pusan Railway Station for Kapyong. The dreary and painstaking two-month training was now ended. In every face of the Kagnew Battalion was a look of grim resolution and courage for fighting.

Section 2. General Situation of the Theater

At the time the first Kagnew Battalion was being transported to Kapyong for the first commitment in actual fighting, let us have a brief look at the general picture of the war with the eye focused on the 7th US Division under which the Kagnew Battalion was to operate.

In September 1945, a composite company of the 7th Division (the division was composed of 3 regiments—17th, 31st, and 32nd) paraded in Seoul observing the receipt of the Japanese surrender and the end of the 36-year annexation of Japanese military imperialism. But five years later in September, this same division came to Korea from stations in Japan. This time it was to participate in General MacArthur’s giant amphibious landing at Inchon and to assault this same capital of Seoul. After its first Inchon landing, the augmented 7th Division of now 18,873 men moved overland to Pusan for another landing at Wonsan. Departing from Pusan harbor on October 28, the mission of the 7th Division was changed to land at Iwon and advance to the Manchurian border. In November the elements of the 7th Division reached Hyesanjin along the Yalu River. This military achievement under the command of Major General David Barr was so outstanding and impressive that General MacArthur immediately sent a message to the X US Corps Commander, General Almond. The message stated “Heartiest congratulations, Ned, and tell Dave Barr that the 7th hit the jack pot.”

At that point definite indications of Chinese Communist intervention became evident. Information that three CCF divisions had arrived at Yudam-ni on November 20 reached intelligence personnel via POWs. But on the ground no contact was made in the Changjin Reservoir area. On November 28, 1950, when the full force of the CCF struck the UN forces, the 7th Division had to make an orderly withdrawal from the Pujon and Changjin Reservoirs area. After completing defensive preparations in the Hungnam sector and repulsing
numerous unsuccessful attacks by the swarming Chinese Communists, the 7th Division once again climbed aboard ships, this time south-bound to Pusan.

In early January, the enemy retook Seoul and by mid-January 1951, the tempo of the enemy offensive slackened. The CCF had outdistanced their suppliers and began to suffer heavier casualties. Under a new commander, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Eighth US Army stiffened and struck back at the enemy. But the question of the military victory was no longer dominant, leaving unheeded the war-cry of the Chief-in-charge of the United Nations Command, General MacArthur. The CCF’s immense manpower potentialities seemed to present the prospect of a long, costly, and expanded war that the major contributors of the United Nations forces desired not. So as the battle lines became more stable, the United Nations started to look upon a negotiated settlement of the Korean problem as the best method of ending the war.

The initial approach of the United Nations to the Peking Government on arranging a cease-fire met with no encouragement. Moving forward cautiously the Eighth US Army advanced for the second time toward the 38th Parallel inflicting heavy losses upon the Communist troops. Seoul was taken again in March and constant pressure was applied upon the enemy forces. As the United Nations troops edged closer to the old boundary line, resistance stiffened. But the general situation had improved in favor of the United Nations.

On June 23, 1951, while newly arrived Ethiopians were still under training, the Soviet representative to the United Nations hinted a Communist disposition to negotiate the Korean problem. Thus the first session of military armistice conference was held on July 10, at Kaesong between Vice Admiral Turner Joy on the United Nations side and the North Korean General Nam Il on the Communist side.

Meanwhile, landing back at Pusan the 7th US Division assembled in Yonchon and started a march to the north. The 7th Division came back to the front on February 17, 1951, with the launch of the UN’s counter-offensive. On April 1 of 1951, the 7th Infantry crossed the parallel again and took back Yanggu on the 23rd of April. At the end of May, the division closed in Hwachon area. For the first time since the Incheon Landing in September 1950, the weary 7th Division went into the IX Corps reserve on June 23, 1951. During the reserve period which lasted until August, main assignment was construction and fortification of a defensive position along Kansas Line.

As the UN’s objective in Korean conflict shifted from military victory to political settlement, this policy also carried with restriction on military operations. In June 1951 General Van Fleet, the Commanding General of the Eighth US Army, further confirmed this attitude. For he believed that continued pursuit of the enemy would be neither practical nor expedient, and
the most profitable employment of the forces, therefore, would be to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain north of the 38th Parallel, and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum effort to the integrity of the United Nations forces.

The decision to strengthen the defensive lines of the United Nations forces and to confine offensive action at the front to limited advances marked the end of fluid phase of the Korean War and the start of the new war.

With this principle in his mind, General Van Fleet selected the Kansas—Wyoming defense lines as a main line of UN resistance. Line Kansas began near the mouth of the Imjin River 30 kilometers north of Seoul and snaked its way to the northeast on the south side of the river through low barren elevations which gradually gave way to higher, moderately wooded hills. Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, Kansas veered eastward and upward toward the Hwachon Reservoir and then angled northeastward again across the steep, forested southern Taebaek Mountains until it reached the east coast some 40 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel.

The terrain from the Hwachon Reservoir to the east coast was particularly rugged. The mountain slopes rise sharply, especially on the west and south faces, and good roads were almost non-existent. The defense strength of the Kansas was increased by full use of the dominating terrain and the numerous water barriers along the route.

Guarding the approaches to Kansas on the western front, line Wyoming looped northeastward from the mouth of the Imjin towards Chorwon, swung east to Kumhwa, and then fell off the southeast until it rejoined Kansas near the Hwachon Reservoir. In the spring of 1951 it served as an outpost line screening Kansas. Although line Kansas permitted the enemy to retain control of the communication complex of the area called the Iron Triangle (Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonggang), the line afforded the UN forces the advantages of a defensible terrain, a satisfactory road and railroad net, and logistical support.

In the meantime, Van Fleet instructed his subordinate units to fortify Kansas Line in depth and to build hasty field fortifications along the advance Wyoming Line to delay and blunt the forces of enemy assaults before they reached Kansas.

Since the terrain became more mountainous in the east and was served by a poor communications network, Van Fleet had deployed his four corps accordingly, with the I ROK Corps forming the eastern anchor, flanked by the X US Corps in the east central sector, the IX US Corps in the west central area, and the I US Corps defending the broadest sector on the west.

As of July 11, the 7th US Division was in the IX US Corps reserve at Kapyong. Remaining just 11 kilometers below Kansas line, it was busy construct-
ing fortification and defensive position awaiting the arrival of the Kagnew Battalion. It also conducted occasional trainings in preparation for the coming move to the front. Across the Hwachon Reservoir, it was flanked by the 7th ROK Division deployed along the eastern side of Kansas. Deployed over the Wyoming loop was the 24th US Division flanked to the west by the 2nd ROK Division. This was the set up into which the Kagnew Battalion was soon called and fought.

Turning our look towards the opponent forces operating in the Korean theater, as of July the Communist forces in Korea totaled 459,200 men, according to the Eighth US Army intelligence estimates. Of these 248,100 were Chinese and the remainder North Koreans.

Among the seven enemy army groups assigned to the front (each of which controlled two or more armies with three approximately 3,000-man divisions), the 2nd, 13th and 27th of the II NK Corps and 202nd, 203rd, and 204th Divisions of the CCF 68th Army manned the enemy line of resistance facing the 7th US Division’s sector of Kansas line. They were usually armed with a miscellaneous collection of Russian, Japanese, American, and domestically manufactured copies of foreign weapons.

Section 3. Battle Orientation at Kapyong

At 1015, July 11, 1951 the operational control of the Kagnew Battalion was officially transferred to the 32nd Regiment (Commanded by Colonel John M. Hightower II), 7th US Division. The three-day travel across rough terrain of Korea, making Seoul at 2320 of the 10th (the Battalion’s advance party already reached just 3 kilometers below the destination Kapyong at midnight of the same day) had now came to an end. To the detraining Ethiopians, pouring rain of Korean summer was only adding strangeness to this bizarre battlefield. While being transported to reserve camps of the 32nd Regiment, nevertheless, they clutched their hands remembering the solemn blessings of the H.I.M. Haile Selassie I on their departure.

The 7th US Division was then commanded by Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh. As indicated before, the 7th Division mainly fortified its positions and aside from patrolling and clashing locally with the enemy screening forces, the remainder of the respite was spent in sharpening combat effectiveness and developing skills in aggressive patrol and raid. This period of comparative lull was also used by the enemy as precious time to reorganize and refresh his strength. Indeed, this spell well represented the end of the first year of the conflict, and the start of the apparent stalemate of the fighting.
Although the Kagnew Battalion boasted its combat ability and everyone was considered as a outstanding recipient of effective trainings both at home and in Pusan, the 7th Division suggested its retraining until the end of July by combat-wise hands of the 32nd Regiment. It was a set of routine course specially designed to front-duty combat until July 27 namely patrol and probe tactics, assault maneuver and blocking exercises, and supplementary orientation in Korean terrain features. On July 27, the 7th Division conducted an overall combat exercise with its all subordinate units, which was supposedly to finish off the reorientation of the Kagnew Battalion. As a part of the exercise it advanced about 15 kilometers to a hill position near Mapyong-ni, and dug in a defense position until August 2, sending out patrols and using the lessons learned so far in coordination with other units of the 7th Division.

On August 2, this exercise ended, though uneventful, and the Kagnew returned to Kapyong. Most veteran instructors of the 32nd Regiment expressed their surprise at the Kagnew’s fighting ability and progress in learning. Now the Kagnew Battalion was fully ready to fight.

During the summer and early fall of the second year of the Korean conflict, the United Nations forces in Korea adopted a double-barreled approach to the problem of ending the war in Korea. The negotiations at Kaesong provided a politico-diplomatic method of reaching agreement. The limited offensives at the front coupled with air and naval action exerted United Nations military pressures upon the Communists to conclude an armistice before their position deteriorated further. It was evident that the UN Command had seized the battlefield initiative and disabled the enemy to take offensive.

By keeping the Communists off balance by raids, probing attacks, and small offensive, the UN Command had neutralized the enemy’s ability to mount a large scale drive and in the process had destroyed thousands of the North Korean and Chinese soldiers.

Section 4. The First Encounter at Pandangdong-ni

The Kagnew Battalion advanced north to a new position near Sanyang-ni at 1500 of the 9th of August for active defensive mission. One day earlier, the 7th US Division was ordered by IX Corps to advance to relieve the 24th US Division at Hwachon being assigned to a new sector on Kansas line. Now the 7th Division with the CP moved from Kapyong to Hwachon, and elements of the 32nd Infantry near Pandangdong-ni with the Kagnew Battalion, and the 31st Infantry near at Chunchon Reservoir. As of August 7, they relieved the 24th US Division remained near Hwachon with the Colombian Battalion staging necessary training.
Sanyang-ni, now the Kagnew Battalion occupied on the 7th US Division sector, was halfway on the highway connecting Hwachon and one point of Iron Triangle, Kumhwa. About 10 kilometers north-northwest of this town was Pandangdong-ni, one of the most important strategic positions in the central section of the front held by the 7th Division. To the south of the town was situated the mountain mass called Chokkun-san which reached its peak at Hill 1073. Being the highest among the hills and mountain pinnacles in the division sector, this Hill 1073 was an outstanding observation site and so of grave importance to friendly and enemy forces alike. A strong patrol base was set up on this hill manned by the Kagnew Battalion and the elements of the 32nd Regiment.

The Kagnew Battalion was then commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Teshome Irgetu. Born in Addis Ababa in 1914, he was a brilliant 1936-graduate of the Haile Selassie Military Academy with the rank of First Lieutenant.

For his exceptional service he was to win later at home the title of Knight of the Order of Emperor Manelik I from the Emperor Haile Selassie I.

The 2nd Company of the Kagnew Battalion upon arrival at Sanyang-ni, took up painstaking mission of the fortification of the patrol base on Hill 1073. During this construction, they, nevertheless, put out uneventful patrols into surrounding wooded hills.

At 1230 of the 12th of August, however, a patrol from Hill 1073 contacted its first enemy near Hill 579 west of Pandangdong-ni. Estimated 10 enemy fired automatic weapons against the Kagnew patrol. Responding skillfully to this sudden assault, the patrol returned safely to the patrol base at 1800 with unknown enemy casualty left behind.

On August 14, one platoon led by 2nd Lieutenant Gebresus set out at 1600 from Hill 1073 with a mission of inflicting casualties on the CCF forces and taking prisoners. At 0145 the next morning, segments of the platoon which had been broken down into squads were brought under enemy mortar fire in the area 3 kilometers northeast of Hill 1073. The platoon assembled at the rally point and under the directions of Lieutenant Gebresus set up its defensive positions so as to prevent the enemy from gaining the hill it was defending. Intense enemy fire and mortar barrages pounded the area. Lieutenant Gebresus directed mortar fire upon the enemy positions inflicting numerous casualties on the enemy.

In the action the platoon leader exposed himself to enemy fire in going from position to position in order to relay fire missions back to K Company, the 32nd Regiment. At the height of the battle a comrade of Private Figar was killed, and Private Gifar took it upon himself to dash fifty meters from his position to take over the defenseless area. Private Gifar took the BAR of his fallen
comrade and sprayed the area to his direct front killing the enemy who attempted to take advantage of the lack of opposition in that sector after one of the defenders was killed. Upon the report of the platoon leader Lieutenant Gebresus, K Company of the 32nd Regiment delivered support artillery fire. The action lasted for four hours. The enemy, who was repulsed in each of its attempts to breach the defensive area, withdrew. The CCF casualty, as verified by the Regiment, was over 30 killed and undeterminable number wounded. For this valiant actions, Private Gifar later won the Bronze Star Medal and Lieutenant Gebresus was decorated with one of the same.

At 1711 of the 15th, the Kagnew Battalion was ordered to move 10 kilometers northwest of the current position. This new site was surrounded by numerous hills; Hill 690 to northeast near Mal-kogae, Hill 697 to south and Hill 683 to southwest, and considered an important traffic route of friendly and enemy forces. On this day, elements of the 32nd Infantry also moved to a line which was just 2.5 kilometers north of Hill 1073.

On 16 August, a patrol from the 2nd Company on Hill 1073 led by 2nd Lieutenant Abeba Kasasionsun left to set up ambush and to capture the enemy. The patrol proceeded to the river junction at the base of the Hill 1073. Mortar fire from estimated two CCF platoons pummelled the area from flanks and rear compelling the platoon to take cover in the immediate area. After the mortar barrage lifted, Lieutenant Abeba moved from position to position checking on the men and procuring information from his men as to enemy positions. His platoon engaged the enemy for three and half hours suffering one casualty. He ordered a withdrawal at 2400 under friendly artillery cover through the enemy ranks. In spite of darkness of the night and the burden of a wounded comrade who had to be carried from the area, Lieutenant Abeba effected artillery concentrations on the hills that lay on the platoon’s route of escape.

In this withdrawal, the bravery of the platoon Sergeant Molla was further to note. As the platoon was ordered to advance up the former positions, he chose to remain as the rear guard. Assaulting the enemy position which was in their path, Sergeant Molla engaged the enemy in a hand-to-hand battle making four of the enemy incapable of future participation against the platoon. This gave the men in the platoon, who carried the wounded comrade, and the remainder of the men in the platoon ample time to climb up the hill to a place of comparative safety. No doubt his action and that of Lieutenant Abeba reflected great credit on themselves and on the Kagnew Battalion. Later they were awarded each with the Bronze Star Medal.

On August 21, Captain Negatu Wandemnu led his company on the patrol of hill masses. When this patrol reached the area near Samhyon at 1010,
a sudden fusillade of hostile small-arms and automatic weapons fire forced the company to halt. The enemy, estimated two CCF platoons, seemed to be using his maximum fire power he had. Quickly organizing itself, the Kagnew company attacked against the enemy. The company maneuvered up the enemy-held hill and routed the hostile force.

Realizing that the enemy would launch an immediate counterattack, the captain deployed his men in position of advantage. As the hostile troops attacked, Captain Negatu came out into an open field and directed friendly mortar and artillery fire against them. So effective was the coordinated fire of the Ethiopian Company and regiment support fire that inflicted the onrushing masses of the CCF forces with extremely heavy casualties. In this successful battle, 36 enemy killed and 19 wounded were reported in exchange for the Kagnew, none killed and some wounded.

On August 24, 1951, the 1st Platoon of the Kagnew’s 1st Company was attached to the A Company of the 17th Regiment as an assault element of a patrol. The platoon led by Lieutenant Desta Gemeda moved forward aggressively until it reached Naesongdong-ni. There it was attacked by a heavy enemy barrage of small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fires. Gemeda, then, completely disregarding the intense fire, remained exposed so as to spot the enemy fire positions while the platoon skillfully took to nearby cover. He located several enemy automatic weapons emplacements and, using his radio, relayed this for an artillery barrage.

But while the artillery support fire was acting on the spotted enemy positions, the communication system failed between the Platoon and the Company CP. Captain Tefera Waldetensye was at that moment at his Company’s observation post to receive and translate the messages. He made the decision rather swiftly to move forward to the embattled platoon by himself endangering his life in torrential hostile fire. Upon arriving at the platoon, fortunately, he directed and supervised the repair of communication facilities.

He hurriedly returned and pin-pointed the artillery support fire on the enemy, making scores of hits on the enemy positions. Now after this effective bombardment on the hostile barrage positions, the platoon leader First Lieutenant Gemeda advanced his platoon forward so perfectly that dozens enemy succumbed without offering counter measure of any kind. Though this hostile force was not identified, the Commanders of 17th Regiment and its A Company were once more surprised at the exceptional Ethiopian fighters. At their heart-felt suggestion to higher commands, Captain Waldetensye and Lieutenant Gemeda received the Bronze Star Medals for their outstanding achievements,
Section 5. Patrol Activity in Samhyon Area

Several uneventful days passed. The fortification of the Kagnew Battalion’s new site near Mal-kogae was completed. The patrol base on Hill 1073 continued to send out patrols of lesser or no results.

But this comparatively quiescent period ended on the 29th of August. The Kagnew Battalion was ordered by the 32nd Regiment to advance six kilometers northeast to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment. This position at the northeastern base of Hill 1073, had been fortified since August 12 by the 2nd Battalion with the construction of several important patrol bases on the neighboring hills. Upon relief, the 2nd Battalion moved south near Sanyang-ni, a position just three kilometers north of the 7th US Division’s new CP at Puchon-ni.

By the end of August, the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division had deployed all its four battalions along the Wyoming line about 40 kilometers northwest of Hwachon near Pandangdong-ni. The Kagnew Battalion, as described above, occupied the north eastern base of Hill 1073 in Samhyon area. On the left was the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry which after the relief on the 29th of August by the Kagnew, had moved up again two days later, being deployed at Pandangdong-ni. The Kagnew Battalion was flanked on the right near Chudong by the 1st Battalion. Being in reserve of the 32nd, the 3rd Battalion dug in the defensive position at the southern base of Hill 1073 near Taegong-ni.

The Kagnew Battalion was to engage until September 25, on this new position in a series of notable which resulted in not only a defense of its lines from the furious enemy assaults, but finally in violent, heavy attacks to drive the enemy from strategic positions.

At 1330 on the 30th, a patrol was fired upon by an estimated CCF platoon near Samhyon. The Kagnew patrol soon counterattacked this enemy force and covered themselves in adjacent scrub hills. As well expected by the platoon leader at 1400 another undeterminable enemy made his way into an open lot just below the waiting Kagnew members. In a split second or so, the enemy was decimated. Later a confirmed report declared 25 enemy killed in this battle and countless wounded.

Samhyon, three kilometers northeast of Pandangdong-ni near Hill 602, had been a frequent friendly and enemy patrol route so that many other contacts were made besides the one on the 30th. Among them, the patrol on September 10 raged probably the heaviest engagement.

In the morning of the 10th, a company size patrol put out Samhyon when reached the area near Hill 602, it was spotted by a strong CCF counterpatrol
and caught under torrential hostile fire. As soon as the patrol withdrew to a more advantageous position, the Kagniew soldiers began to deal with this flooding enemy with mortars and small arms. Forward observer with the patrol did not stand shocked, but he was the first to regain himself from this sudden enemy assault. He radioed to K Company, 32nd Regiment, giving the exact locations of the enemy heavy and automatic weapons. Soon the artillery began to strike the enemy troops and weapons emplacements. Overwhelmed by the Kagniew patrol's stubborn resistance and approximate 2,500 rounds of the friendly artillery fire, the enemy commenced to retreat at 1500. In this battle, 100 enemy were killed by the patrol alone in addition to another 150 by the artillery action. The Kagniew losses were simply beyond comparison—three killed and three wounded.

On September 11, an Ethiopian platoon led by 1st Lieutenant Wolds Sadic Tesfaye made an ambush assault near Hill 600 at 2030, when the ambush patrol reached the vicinity west of the hill, the platoon encountered devastating automatic-weapons fire. The enemy numbering about 20 CCF was attacking from a tactically emplaced bunker on the ridgeline of Hill 600. Ordering his men to take cover and directing riflemen to harass the enemy by firing on the enemy position, the platoon leader, Lieutenant Tesfaye, maneuvered to the right flank of the enemy. Lieutenant Tesfaye then fearlessly ran through the fireswept impact area to within a few meters of the emplacement and silenced the CCF defenders with a grenade. The platoon safely returned at 2100, Lieutenant Tesfaye's fearless heroism later obtained the Bronze Star Medal from the US Command.

In the morning of September 12, the 1st Company of the Kagniew Battalion was ordered to launch an attack with one platoon against the hill Devil, near Hill 600 with a mission to inflict casualties upon the defending CCF forces. Captain Tefera selected 2nd Lieutenant Eyob as leader of the force for the assault against the enemy. It was still dark at 0630 when the Ethiopian fighters departed on their mission. Hardly had the patrols reached their objectives at 0930, when they were attacked by a strong enemy force. The CCF had well estimated the importance of that hill for the defense of their MLR and had fortified it strongly, while enemy reserve forces were behind the hill ready to counterattack. Strenuous fighting took place on that hill between the Reds and Ethiopians. Finally the Ethiopians broke the CCF defense and succeeded in climbing the hill. But immediately the reserve forces of the Reds counterattacked in many points, and a new struggle started between the Ethiopians and Reds. The aim of the CCF, who were numerically superior to the Ethiopians, was to encircle the platoon of the Kagniew Battalion. In the most critical point of the struggle, valiant 2nd Lieutenant Eyob was
seriously wounded.

It was impossible for him to continue conducting the battle. His men were in a crucial situation and the danger of encirclement of the platoon was great. At this moment a brave Ethiopian soldier, Private Lema Morra, on his own initiative, occupied one position on the hill and with his machine gun kept the enemy at bay, opening a road for the men of the platoon to withdraw. At nearly the same moment, he radioed the situation to his company, calling for assistance. Soon 1st Lieutenant Tariku Berhanu arrived with his platoon. He deployed his men in quickly prepared positions on the slope of the hill along the retreat route of the Kagnew Platoon. Constantly vulnerable to intense hostile fire, he plotted mortar concentrations upon the enemy and moved fearlessly about the perimeter to direct the defense. The hero, Lema Morra, remained in that position, restraining the enemy until the moment that the Ethiopian platoon returned with its wounded leader to the Kagnew Battalion. All returned after a fierce one and a half hours of battle but Lema Morra. He remained in that position on top of the hill, faithful to the silent faith that he had given; one for all, and all for one.

Section 6. Operation Cleaver

In the late September from the 16th to the 26th of the month the Battalion prepared, conducted, and consolidated what had been code-named Operation Cleaver, a limited battalion offensive to take Hills 602 and 700 in Samhyon area. The fighters of the Kagnew Battalion during this period wrote the most glorious pages of their history in Korea. The Ethiopians gave the opponent an inkling of their hot temperament and their use of bayonet. It was for this action that the Battalion won the US Presidential Unit Citation on 15 October 1952, the highest award that the US could bestow on the United Nations units.

Hill 700 stood about two kilometers northwest of the Kagnew Battalion's position and further to the north of it was Hill 602. Those two hills and another, Hill 600 to the south, were all ahead of the friendly line and considered as CCF's important defense positions. The weight of these hills to friendly operations was so great that mandatory orders were given to the Kagnew Battalion to take them. Now the Kagnew Battalion had to seize hills at any cost.

From September 16 to 20, prior to the onset of the operation, the Kagnew Battalion conducted intensive and extraordinary aggressive patrol activities in the objective area with the intention of securing vital information for the
impending assaults on the objectives. The activities of these patrols provided the officers of the Battalion with a clear picture of the situation, disposition of enemy troops, emplacements of enemy weapons and other defense installations of the enemy. In addition to the vital information secured, the enemy was constantly harassed and weakened.

Followings are the detailed activity of these preparatory patrols of the Kagnev Battalion before 21 September 1951, D-Day for the Operation Cleaver.

On September 17, Sergeant Major Teguegu Aneleye and his platoon was engaged against a well-entrenched hostile force on the commanding terrain along the ridge of Hill 602. The assault platoon, coming under devastating small arms and automatic weapons fire from the summit of Hill 602, was forced to seek cover. Constantly vulnerable, while evacuating the wounded, and then, rallying and urging the men forward, he led them in a daring charge up the hill. Although wounded in this action, Sergeant Aneleye refused aid. The platoon soon seized the hill and began preparations to meet counterattacks. Soon the counterattack came with the amazing number of CCF forces. The Kagnev fighters struggled to repel two counterattacks in a row. Utterly destroyed and disappointed, the enemy began to pull out.

One Company of the Kagnev Battalion (commanded by Captain Mesheshe Assefa) was ordered on the 19th of September by the Battalion to attack and capture the area near Hill 602. The objective had been well fortified by the enemy. After deploying most of the company in tactical positions to provide flanking fire, he ordered the leading platoon forward. But the enemy repulsed the assault with heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire. While the supporting units dealing with the enemy in a fire fight as a diverting maneuver, the attacking platoon rushed in a daring frontal assault against the hostile positions. When the platoon barely succeeded in reaching the summit of the hill, the two sides engaged in close quarter. At this moment, the air strike, he had called in previously, placed a heavy bombardment on the enemy-held position. A bloody battle continued. When the Kagnev assault platoon finally silenced the enemy after three hours’ fighting, the hill reeked of blood and was deformed by bomb-blasts. The striking contrast in the number of casualty bore witness to the combat efficiency of the Ethiopian fighters; the Kagnev patrol killed 35 enemy and wounded 50 in exchange for a few friendly wounded in addition to 6 enemy bunkers smashed.

Another personal prowess of the Kagnev members was exhibited in a patrol on the 20th. In the early morning, one platoon from the Kagnev Battalion departed again. When this passed through one valley in the southern edge of Hill 602, it was caught under a surprise attack by grenades and auto-
matic weapons. After the unit had taken cover on the slope of the nearby hill, it was discovered that two men were missing. Private Abitew, voluntarily leaving his position, went forward to bring them back. About two estimated CCF squads of the attacking force soon grew to a company. Private Abitew crept approximately one hundred meters through intense enemy fire, only to discover that both of his comrades had been killed. Fearlessly, he maintained a single-handed stand until his company renewed the assault and then, joining the leading unit, fought courageously until the enemy was driven away from the commanding ground.

On the 21st of September, D-Day came. The task of these difficult assignments were given to the 1st and 2nd Companies. The 2nd Company commanded by Captain Merid Gizaw given the job of taking Hill 700 while the objective Hill 602 was to be taken subsequently by the 1st Company then commanded by Captain Tefera.

Captain Merid went ahead first, moving his company toward Hill 700, defended by approximately a battalion of Chinese troops. The company attack progressed, and after one and a half hours closed-in fight succeeded in dislodging the enemy from the frontal part of the hill. Then the enemy remainder withdrew toward an outpost that they had established in front of Hill 602. It was apparent that the enemy rather decided to duel on Hill 602.

Following this initial success, the 1st Company was immediately ordered to attack Hill 602. Under the command of Captain Tefera Waldetensye, the 1st Company jumped off Hill 700 through the newly-won 2nd Company position and started up Hill 602, destroying remnants of platoon supposedly placed near the hill to slow down the Kagnew attack.

Hill 602 was then defended by a reinforced CCF battalion. As usual, the defense position was well fortified and camouflaged. The enemy, moreover, was one of the best fighting units that the CCF boasted.

As the 1st Company neared the crest of the objective, it was under heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the unknown enemy bunkers and well covered positions. Realizing that his men were threatened with annihilation in their present untenable positions, Captain Tefera moved among them to reorganize and speak the words of encouragement. Then, shouting directions to the friendly troops, he led his men and charged directly into the intense hostile fire. The company soon swept up the hill where formidable enemy bunkers and weapons emplacements were dotted. The battle became a bloody hand-to-hand fight as more and more CCF forces were committed out of reserve. The Ethiopian fighters tried desperately to take the hill and so did the enemy not to lose it with apparent superiority in number.
It was this peak of the battle that Captain Tefera was critically wounded. Bleeding profusely and in great pain, the heroic captain refused to abandon the fight. Inspired by his courageous action, his men inflicted numerous enemy casualties. But the enemy artillery and mortar fire also grew stronger as the evening set in. Judging continued attack would result in many casualties by the unusual enemy artillery fire, the Battalion ordered withdrawal at 1700.

Early in the following morning, the 1st Company resumed attack. This time the attack was backed up by maximum fire power; the Battalion secured artillery and a tank platoon from the 32nd Regiment. Tank-infantry columns spearheaded the assault just below the hill and thence infantry crept up under support of the division artillery fire. At 1400 hours the 1st Company succeeded to bring two platoons on the top of the hill where they met enemy main strength in close quarters fight.

At 1500 hours the enemy began to retreat from the hill. The Reds, hastily abandoning their positions in order to escape the fierce onslaught and terrifying bayonets of the Ethiopians, were simultaneously attacked from the air. The scene of the Reds pursued by the Ethiopians and checked in their escape by US air strikes was tragic for the enemy. The Reds were in such confusion, that they were unable to protect themselves. If they remained on the spot, they were killed by the Ethiopians, and if they attempted to flee, they were strafed from the air. The number of Red casualties was impossible to estimate but 208 CCF were believed to be killed and 21 others wounded plus one CCF captured.

The total losses inflicted upon the enemy by the Ethiopians while on active front from August 2 to September 26 were estimated at 587 killed, 656 wounded, and 10 CCF captured. In addition, 6 machine guns, 24 submachine guns, numerous rifles, and hundreds of grenades were captured and several bunkers and mortars were destroyed. At 1005 on the 25th of September, the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment relieved the 2nd Battalion, which four hours later on the same day relieved the Kagnew Battalion. The Ethiopians, first time since their arrival in May, were in reserve and moved to the 3rd Battalion’s old site near the southern base of Hill 1073. It was a precious spell for the Kagnew Battalion healing off the combat weariness on one hand and sharpening their battle skills on the other.

Section 7. Active Defense Mission at Heartbreak Ridge

The long recessed truce negotiation since late August was brought to life on October 24. This resumption of the armistice talk at Panmunjom effected
another lull on the battlefield at the end of October. General Van Fleet, the
Commander of the Eighth US Army, took advantage of the respite by trans-
ferring several of his battered X Corps divisions into reserve positions. The 7th
US Division on the central front with its attached Ethiopian Battalion was to
be released from the IX US Corps to relieve the 2nd US Division on the eastern
front and the French Battalion in the X US Corps zone.

The 7th Division thus was relieved first by the 24th US Division and
was placed at Kapyong under the direct command of the Eighth US Army
Headquarters. The Kagnew Battalion while in reserve saw a short time attach-
ment together with the 31st Infantry of the 7th Division to the 24th US Division
during this relief. On the 6th October the battalion commenced movement down
to near Kapyong for another training. Upon arrival on the 7th at Kaegong-ni in
the northern vicinity of Kapyong, the Kagnew Battalion was reverted the
operational control to the parent regiment, 32nd Infantry at 1200. At the
moment, 7th Division's CP was established at Kapyong and its 32nd Regiment
was deployed over the field ahead of the Kagnew Battalion.

On October 20, the 7th US Division was ordered to relieve 2nd US Division
of the X Corps sector. Next day the Kagnew Battalion began to move to
Heartbreak Ridge along with the 32nd Regiment, 7th Division.

Upon arrival at 2105 on the same day, the retrained and well recuperated
Ethiopians relieved the French Battalion of the 2nd Division on the position just
2 kilometers west of Satae-ri. In the early morning of the next day, other
elements of the 32nd Regiment started to relieve elements of the 23rd Regiment of
the 2nd Division. Its 3rd Battalion, relieving the 1st Battalion of the 23rd
Regiment, was assigned to the left flank of the regimental defense line which
reached westernmost to Hill 520 near the Suip-chon River. While the Kagnew
Battalion was responsible for the central axis of the regiment's defense line,
the 2nd Battalion formed the right echelon of the regiment when this relieved
the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry near Hill 600 along the Sochon River.
At the time the 1st Battalion remained assembled just north of the division CP.

Heartbreak Ridge is the southern tip of a long, narrow ridge running
north and south between the Mundung-ni valley on the east; spur ridges arch-
ing east and west from the main ridge caused one observer to describe the
ridge as the "spinal column of a fish, with hundreds of vertebrae." Possession
of the central ridge would prevent the enemy from using the adjacent valleys
to attack the X Corps defense lines west of the Punchbowl. Heartbreak Ridge
had three main peaks. At the southern terminus was Hill 894, which commanded
the approach from Bloody Ridge, five kilometers to south: Hill 931, the highest
peak in the ridge, lay 1,300 meters to the north; and 2,000 meters north of Hill
931 rose the needlelike projection of Hill 851.

The 7th US Division in the X Corps sector opened up its CP near Songumang. It was bounded on the right near Hill 1227 by the 8th ROK Division and on the left by the 3rd ROK Division. Opposed to this friendly build-up were the III NK Corps and the 68th CCF Army. In the Mundung-ni Valley the 12th NK Division of the III Corps controlled the hills on the western side of the Suip-chon River and the 6th Division of the same corps was responsible for the ridge and Satae-ri sectors.

On 28 October, another partrol emplaced along the ridgeline south of Soksa-ri on the east of Mundung-ni, was attacked by estimated two platoons of the Chinese forces.

This ridgeline overlooking the Suip-chon River was then defended by the Ethiopian one Company. The enemy apparently advanced near the friendly positions under the cover of the pre-dawn. Remaining covered until sunrise in the woods of the opposite ridge across the river, it well planned its attack. The assault started at 0800 with heavy mortars and automatic fires aimed at the friendly ridge positions. The brunt of this attack centered on the avenue of approach to two positions occupied by the Ethiopian squad. Squad members, Privates Negga Tessema, Hailemarial Isheta, and Bayesa were fighting with great courage and skill, the squad repulsed the initial thrust. The three men maintained their valiant stand throughout two hours of bitter fighting. The three consecutive attacks were finally contained contributing significantly to thwarting the enemy’s attempt to breach the friendly perimeter.

From the end of October through February 1952, the activity of the Kagnew Battalion on this ridge was confined to routine patrol and the fortification of bunkers along the forward slope of the front line positions. This inactivity in fighting also timed with the onset of second Korean winter. The Korean winter was bitingly cold, the temperature dropping 30°C below zero. Rivers froze over like white highways for any vehicle; and snow covered vast areas, strong winds blowing directly from Siberia bringing destruction and desolation. Never in their lives had the Ethiopian fighters experienced such penetrating cold. Inhabitants of a warm climate, they felt the Korean cold more than any other UN troops. However, the men of the Kagnew Battalion, although suffering intensely from the cold, remained unmoved in the bulwark of the struggle, fighting heroically not only against the enemy but against nature.

Despite this apparent lull in the front, the Ethiopians kept constant alert and sent out frequent patrols, some of which contacted minor enemy forces of usually platoon-size.
On November 2, another patrol was sent out. While being ambushed 200 meters in front of center of the position on Hill 851 at 0850, it was subject to intense mortar and anti-tank fire from the neighboring commanding positions. The patrol had to retreat at 1400 with unknown results of the friendly and enemy casualties.

For the period of eight days from November 10th to the 18th, the Kagnew Battalion was in regiment reserve relieved by the 2nd Battalion. At 0600, November 10, the Battalion closed the reserve camps north of Chipo-ri.

On 19th of November 1951, the Kagnew Battalion was ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment on the position at Naedong. The new battalion's boundary was stretched along the high terrains and was responsible for the eastern sector of the division's main line of resistance.

This territory was difficult to defend because of the land contours and thickly wooded hills. All the more, as it lacked good lookout points, the enemy could approach the line without being detected. During the first few days that the Ethiopian Battalion was in this position, the enemy attacked on several occasions in company and platoon strength. The contacts with the Ethiopian fighters during this period convinced the enemy to drop all his intentions of attack and to concentrate on defense.

The enemy losses up until December 1, 1951, when the Kagnew Battalion went into reserve, upon relief by the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment, totaled 200 killed, 86 POWs and 40 emplacements destroyed. In addition, the battalion captured a large numbers of automatic weapons, guns, and grenades. After being in regimental reserve from the 1st to the 14th of December, the Kagnew was again ordered to the Heartbreak Ridge area.

On the 14th of December, the Kagnew Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd on the position the same site at Naedong occupied from November 19. This time the battalion was attached to the 31st Regiment. Now the elements of the 32nd Regiment were remained in the assembly area Chisong-ni near northeast of Yanggu.

Remaining at Heartbreak Ridge, on the 18th of December 1951, the Imperial Security Guard of Haile Selassie I had its first officer killed in action in Korea. Leading a patrol of the 2nd Company, he and his men departed from the MLR of the Kagnew Battalion to observe enemy positions. On that day thick and heavy snow had covered the whole Korean front. As they were approaching the enemy positions they passed, unnoticed, an ambush of the Chinese Reds camouflaged by special white snow-uniforms. They approached the position quietly when suddenly the Reds opened fire against the Ethiopian patrol. Second Lieutenant Delenie was killed instantly.

On the 27th of December the Kagnew Battalion was stationed at Punch-
bowl along with the elements of the 7th Division in the Mandae-ri with offensive and defensive missions.

Punchbowl lay east of the Heartbreak Ridge and 30 kilometers northeast of the Hwachon Reservoir. This circular valley was rimmed by hills rising sharply to heights of 300 and 700 meters above the valley floor. The Soyang River ran south in the valley to the east of the Punchbowl, and on the west the Sochon River and one of its branches separated the Punchbowl from the next series of ridges.

During December ground patrols of all types of the Kangew Battalion as well as those of other friendly units were forbidden to pass north of a line approximately 500 meters forward of the front line. Enemy night patrolling also decreased as the bitter cold snow settled on the front line.

The most significant battle of the Kangew Battalion in the closing days of 1951 was the continuous two-day battle at Mandae-ri from December 28th to the 29th, when the main line of resistance was attacked by the CCF, at the same time a patrol on reconnaissance duty was also caught in a fierce battle.

On New Year’s Day of 1952, the Kangew Battalion was relieved on the positions by the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry. Then the Battalion spent a fortnight at the regiment reserve camps near northwest of Yanggu.

During this period, characteristic was the action of the combat patrol on the morning of January 12th 1952. The Ethiopian Battalion received orders to reconnoiter a suspected enemy post in the vicinity of Huhang-gol, and to engage the enemy if encountered. The patrol set out from its base, and was proceeding to the enemy point, when it was suddenly subjected to a heavy small-arms and automatic-weapons fire by a larger force occupying heavily fortified position. The Ethiopians sought cover but, because of the open nature of the terrain, faced annihilation unless immediate, aggressive action was taken. Sergeant Woldmichael Mammo and Privates Kassays Welde and Mesheta Haile, without regard for their personal safety, left their position of cover and charged directly into the enemy fire, and, upon reaching the first interlocking trenches, unhesitatingly leaped inside and engaged the foe. Their fearless action forced the hostile troops to slacken the fire which they had concentrated on the Ethiopians in defending their position. As the heavy enemy fire abated, the Ethiopians charged up the slope and drove the hostile troops away from their positions with heavy casualties.

The losses inflicted upon the enemy from the 27th of December 1951 to the 14th of February 1952 were 150 killed, 280 wounded, and 40 prisoners captured.

In March 1952, the 7th US Division was relieved by the 2nd US Division in
The 1st Kagnew Battalion

Punchbowl area. It moved to Kapyong resting for another mission that was to come in May. The Kagnew Battalion along with the units of the 7th Division further sharpened the combat effectiveness in training programs at the Kapyong reserve camps until the end of its Korean tour on March 25. Meanwhile the 7th Division continued to remain in reserve until the end of April when it moved into the positions on the MLR in the central sector, named Missouri line.

Section 8. End of Tour

On the 25th of March 1952, the initial mission undertaken by the 1st Kagnew Battalion in Korea had ended. On 27 March, after a parade at Kapyong in honor of the Commanding General of the IX US Corps, Lieutenant General Williard Wyman and of the 7th US Division, Major General L.L. Lemintzer, and other senior officers, the First Kagnew Battalion left the battlefield from Kapyong to Pusan, where the first party was to embark for home, and the second party was to stay pending arrival of the 2nd Kagnew Battalion.

On the 30th of March at 1100, the first party went aboard the US transport General Macrea, which had shipped the 2nd Kagnew Battalion on the preceding day. Now the voyage in the reverse direction began with other United Nations troops also aboard.

It had been a year’s absence when they debarked at Djibouti and entrained for Addis Ababa, arriving there on the 23rd of April. There they were crowned with glory, but calm and proud of how they had fulfilled their duty to their country, to their Emperor and mankind.

On the occasion of the departure to Ethiopia of the second party of the first Kagnew Battalion in June 1952, the Supreme Commander of the UN forces in Korea, General Mark W. Clark, dispatched to the Commander of the Ethiopian Battalion to Korea, a letter which shows the characteristic admiration of the Americans for the men of the Kagnew Battalion. It read in part:

"It has been a genuine pleasure to have had your valiant organization in my command, and I request that you convey the respect and admiration of their comrades in arms in Korea to the members of the Kagnew Battalion who are leaving, as well as to those who have already returned to their homeland."
CHAPTER III  THE 2ND KAGNEW BATTALION

Section 1. Deployment to Korea

The second Kagnew Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue, and with Executive Officer Major Kebbede, arrived in Korea on the 29th March 1952, after a twenty-day voyage by the US transport General Macrea. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue, was a graduate in the 1941 class of the Military Academy of Haile Selassie I, promoted to the present rank for his excellent service as the Commander of the 1st Battalion of the Imperial Guard, and ordered on the 1st of March 1952 to lead this 2nd Kagnew Battalion to Korea.

Alongside the ship, which was also to take the men of the 1st Kagnew Battalion back home on the following day, the old and the new soldiers of the Kagnew Battalion met at Pusan. One could read in the faces of the returning fighters the satisfaction of having accomplished faithfully their duties and in the faces of the new arrivals, a promise to prove themselves worthy successors of those battle-scared fighters and to continue the glorious history.

After the disembarkation they were directly transported by US trucks to the UN Replacement Center near Pusan. There they were to be issued with the American arms and given familiarization training in their use. The training lasted till 12 April, during which time the 2nd Kagnews presented few difficulties. This could be attributed not only to the fact that the 2nd Kagnews had the exceptional perception and English-speaking officers who would immediately clarify the training programs for the troops, but also to the fact that they were of the regular army of the Imperial Security Guard who had accomplished Van Fleet's rotation requirement back at home.

Van Fleet’s rotation requirement, it should be noted, had arisen in the preceding year when the rotation problem struck some of the United Nations units that had been in Korea for a year or more. The French Government, for instance, wished to withdraw its battalion from the line for three months while replacements were brought in and the battalion was reorganized. But the Eighth Army Commander, General Van Fleet, strongly opposed to this procedure. Instead he urged that the participating nations send a trained replacement unit to Korea and upon its arrival the exchange could be carried out in
the immediate rear area with no loss of combat effectiveness to his army. Van Fleet’s recommendations were approved and from November 1951 on rotations of the United Nations units followed this method of relief.

On 13 April, the last train loaded with the full-fledged Kagnew Battalion cleared out of Pusan. Arriving at the Training Center in Kapyong, the Ethiopian fighters were directed into another training, this time on a coordinated unit maneuver, until 2 June, placed as the 32nd regimental reserve.

Section 2. General Situation

While the 2nd Kagnew Battalion was at Kapyong being reorganized and readied for actual fightings, it seems necessary to review the general situation of the second year of the fighting in which this Battalion would operate.

On the ground, the tactical situation remained largely unchanged. The front line lay well north of the 38th Parallel, except in the extreme west where it descended below the parallel to the area of the Han-Imjin junction. From this point, the line ran practically due northeast, curving around north of Chorwon and continuing east to Kunhwa, a town which marked the western flank of a salient, approximately 30 kilometers in width, rising almost to Kumsong. From the eastern flank of this salient, the front curved upward to positions on the east coast north of Chodo-ri.

The representatives of the opposing military commanders had been meeting at Panmunjom for nearly nine months, in an attempt to negotiate an armistice. Although these negotiations had not resulted in a settlement and earlier hopes for an end to the fighting had consequently abated somewhat, the public utterances of the leading figures involved did not contain any suggestion that either side was prepared to abandon negotiations in favor of an attempt to settle the Korean question by force of arms. At the same time each side made it equally clear that neither would surrender the field to the other. Thus the soldiers of both armies in Korea faced the prospect of an indefinite continuation of the sort of action they had experienced since the latter part of November 1951.

During the winter of 1951-1952, the pattern of future operations of the UN forces in Korea had begun to emerge. Already defensive layouts were assuming forms which were to remain substantially unchanged for months. There were to be no long movements, no great concentrations for large operations, no deep penetrations of the opponent front, thus no “victory.” It seemed that the termination of the conflict rested more in the hands of the negotiators at Panmunjom than in the courage and military skills of the soldiers.
The extent to which a realization of this fact influenced the minds of the commanders and troops in Korea could not be measured. There could be little doubt, however, that it reduced the willingness to take risks.

At the same time the weather began to change as the Korean winter gave way to spring. The soft snows of March were dissolved by frequent heavy rains and mud became a problem as roofs and dugouts collapsed, streams coursed across the floors of mess tents, and roads became difficult. Gradually, however, the rains slowed to be replaced by choking dust.

By mid-April 1952 the 7th US Division had been in X US Corps reserve at Kapyong conducting training and recuperation activity. Soon this division was to move to the central front on line Missouri and its attached Kagnew Battalion was to follow in early June upon completion of the training course.

Section 3. On Line Missouri

On June 2, 1952, retraining of the Kagnew Battalion in the 32nd Regiment's reserve camp at Kapyong was completed. On the next day, the battalion advanced on orders to Haggal-li. The assignment of this Ethiopian Battalion was the defense line forming a front of 4 kilometers on line Missouri about 11 kilometers northeast of Chorwon. The 1st Company was commanded by Captain Bellette Haile and the 2nd Company by Captain Melaku Bakele and the 3rd Company by Captain Haile Mariam Lencho.

Line Missouri constituted the central MLR of the UN defense line. It crossed about the heart of Iron Triangle that connected Pyonggang on the apex and Chorwon and Kumhwa on its left and right bases. Since its movement in late April, the 7th Division under the command of Brigadier General Wayne C. Smith was bordered by the 9th ROK Division on its left and on the right by the 40th US Division. The 32nd Regiment was then under the command of Colonel William A. Dodds.

On the 6th of June, the second Kagnew Battalion began its active defense. Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue ordered the 1st Company to patrol during the night. Its objective was Hill 412 and to engage the enemy if encountered. The patrol team, composed of 14 men under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Asfaa Getahun, started off on its mission at 2030. As the patrol left the MLR of the battalion, it proceeded under precautions to surprise the enemy. However, a CCF platoon which had apparently observed from the departure of the Ethiopian patrol, allowed it to approach closer Hill 472, and then opened fire with automatic weapons.

The Ethiopian fighters were not to be taken completely by surprise. On
the contrary, the patrol had discovered the enemy's presence, and after reaching the position, attacked the enemy with hand grenades. The enemy outnumbered the Ethiopians in a counterattack that followed and the struggle took the form of a fierce hand-to-hand fight. A few courageous Ethiopian fighters of the patrol used their famous bayonets fearlessly, and after a thirty-minute battle, forced the enemy to withdraw, leaving on the battlefield 7 dead. Having accomplished their mission, the men returned to the MLR at 2300 with no losses.

This was the first contact of the second Kangnew Battalion with the enemy. The first contact was a success. The second Ethiopian Battalion commenced the writing of its history in Korea victoriously.

On the morning of 7 June, the forward observer for the heavy mortar company of the Kangnew Battalion discovered an enemy group, of undetermined number, building bunkers on Hill 472. The company's 81-mm mortars immediately engaged, but did not have the necessary range. The Kangnew Battalion radioed this to the Fire Direction Center in the Regiment and soon the artillery took over. The successful relay of the fire mission resulted in 8 Chinese killed and the evacuation of the entire hill by the enemy. From the encounter of the previous day the Chinese seemed to have decided to resume the initiative on this line, to force the Ethiopians to a passive defense.

On the night of the same day, an estimated CCF platoon at 2330 hours, attacked locally the advanced section of the 1st Company of the Kangnew Battalion on Chungga-san. The Ethiopian fighters repelled the attack with automatic weapons and machine gun fire, while heavy mortar and American artillery supported them with excellent targeting. The battle was brief, lasting only fifteen minutes. The enemy failed in the attempt, and, facing the heavy artillery barrage, was forced to withdraw hastily, returning to his line with an unestimated number of losses.

On the night of the 9th of June, elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment established an ambush point on the hill, Star, which was near the Main Line of Resistance of Kangnew Battalion. As was customarily done, the American administration officer notified accordingly the Ethiopian Battalion's administration of the ambush, in order to prevent any tragic misunderstanding between the Americans and Ethiopians. Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue, not only acknowledged the information in order to avoid a misunderstanding, but ordered the 60-mm mortar of the battalion to cover the position where the American ambush was to take place, and to be on the alert if necessary to support the ambush.

Indeed this need arose. Just before midnight, a strong CCF force of undeterminable number arrived at the position of the American ambush. The American ambush surprised the Reds causing confusion in their lines as
well as casualties. The enemy force, however, was stronger and after the initial surprise reorganized their men and counterattacked. In that difficult moment for the American fighters, the 60-mm mortar of the 4th Company, Kagnew Battalion, interfered in the battle. With perfect targeting, they slowed the enemy attack. They made it possible for the American ambush to accomplish its mission and to capture a Chinese prisoner. This incident was a clear indication that an excellent cooperation existed between the UN forces in Korea.

On the morning of the 11th of June, enemy soldiers were observed organizing bunkers. Immediately the battalion's 81-mm mortars fired 18 rounds on the enemy digging trenches. The result was the annihilation of two enemy bunkers and two Chinese Communists killed.

On the 12th of June, the forward observer of the Kagnew Battalion reported that an enemy force was moving toward the advance Ethiopian sector. The 81-mm mortars were ordered to prevent the enemy force from reaching the MLR of the battalion. The Ethiopian mortar men, with an astonishing skill, forced the enemy with 16 rounds to withdraw to its base, leaving behind five dead.

On the 14th of June, the men of Kagnew had been trying to lay telephone wires between the sector of the Kagnew Battalion's MLR and an advanced platoon of the Kagnew Battalion. When these men were threatened by an enemy machine gun, the mortar men went into action. The sound of Kagnew Battalion's mortars disturbed the calm as they destroyed the enemy machine gun nest.

During these days, the 81-mm mortars of the battalion were in continuous action, beginning to show the proficiency of the crew. They were awake day and night.

On the night of 18 June, 2nd Lieutenant Y. Belachew was ordered by the Commander of 1st Company, Captain Bellette Haile, to take out a patrol in order to determine the Chinese Communist strength and position. Lieutenant Belachew prepared the patrol and set out for the objective which was 3,000 meters from the MLR of the Kagnew Battalion. After an approximate two hours' course, they arrived at the objective. Approaching the enemy position cautiously, the patrol surprised the Chinese with a small arms and hand grenade raid. After recovering from the surprise, the enemy force, which amounted to a platoon, counterattacked the patrol. A bitter close-quarter struggle developed, and there again the famed Ethiopian bayonet caused heavy losses to the enemy and forced them to retreat. Lieutenant Belachew, enthused by his success, ordered his men to pursue the enemy. The sight of the bodies of the dead CCF spurred them on to deal with the remaining enemy in the same manner. Darkness, however, prevented the Ethiopians from continuing the pursuit. They were forced to
limit their efforts to searching thoroughly this vicinity for hidden Chinese or their own wounded.

During the search, a strong enemy force, supported by heavy artillery fire, approached the Ethiopians. As the men of Kagnew Battalion struggled heroically to repel the Chinese counterattack, they discovered that additional enemy forces had moved in from another position, completely encircling them. Calm and determined, the Kagnew fighters began a bitter struggle to break the encirclement. The enemy force unfortunately, was stronger, and a break-through by the few Ethiopian men (fourteen in all) was impossible. The Ethiopian patrol leader immediately got in touch with the Company Commander by telephone and reported the situation. Without delay, the American artillery was informed, whereupon, they began their masterly targeting against the enemy ring. Consequently, they formed a semicircle of heavy fire upon the Chinese force, enabling the Ethiopian patrol to withdraw through the spot in the circle upon which the artillery was not firing. Fighting with a heroic fanaticism, the men of the patrol decimated the CCF encirclement. It was midnight when the patrol returned to its base reporting that approximately ten Chinese had been killed and about 25 wounded. No Ethiopian losses were reported.

The Company Commander ordered the patrol to return to the site of the encirclement to look for Chinese bodies, making it clear that what they wanted was an information concerning the strength of the enemy. The patrol, after a thorough preparation and excellent planning, proceeded to the objective. While searching the area they received direct enemy fire, but disregarding it, continued with their search. Unfortunately they searched without results, as the enemy had already removed the bodies. The Ethiopians, however, found the traces of blood, and several enemy helmets. Reporting this to the Commanding Officer, who had ordered them to their line, the men of the patrol requested permission for a continued search. As the day light was breaking, the request was rejected and the men returned at 0400 hours.

At this time, a notable incident occurred in the Kagnew Battalion—a sign of the humanitarian feeling and to what point the feeling of solidarity had developed towards their fellow men:

On the morning of the 21st of June, a group of Koreans attached to the unit for miscellaneous jobs, was laying wires for defensive reinforcement in front of the 1st Company of the Kagnew Battalion. In a while, the Korean civilians attracted enemy observation and soon enemy heavy mortar shells began to drop. Two of these men did not have enough time to get under cover. One man was fatally wounded, and the other critically. Private Melese Berhanu, of the 1st Company left his bunker to determine the site of the falling
shells. There in the pandemonium, he heard cries of pain from the Korean civilian in his own language. The Ethiopian soldier did not understand what the wounded Korean was saying, but the painful cries were directed not to his ears, but to his heart. The Ethiopian soldier dashed out in no time. When he was lifting the man in his arms, a shell blew up nearby, instantly killing them both. They died in each other's arms. That was how they were found. That was how they were buried at the UN Cemetery in Pusan—in a common grave, a symbol of their common sacrifice, in a common struggle for a common goal.

On the 25th of June, the Kagne new Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment and moved to the rear as a reserve for the 32nd US Regiment. During the period in which the Kagne new Battalion was in reserve at Kapyong, they continued their training and took part in occasional fightings to capture enemy prisoners and to obtain information on the enemy strength, such as reconnaissance patrols.

On the night of the 3rd of July, a patrol of 14 men with 2nd Lieutenant Beniyam Bulbula as its leader was ordered to probe enemy positions on Hill 358, 2,000 meters north of the MLR. The patrol team left the MLR at 2300 and arrived at Hill 358 just before midnight. Though the patrol had taken necessary precautions, the enemy had observed the movement and attacked the patrol with a platoon strength from the east of the hill. The Kagne ws laid low until 0100 the following day. By then a few Ethiopian fighters succeeded in closing on the Reds. Lieutenant Beniyam Bulbula called out his men to work on the enemy. The men of the patrol now attacked the enemy, and after a 45 minute battle, forced the Chinese to run, leaving behind 20 dead. The Ethiopian fighters pursued the enemy for several hundred meters while the Kagne new Battalion’s mortars and American artillery fired at the retreating enemy, causing additional casualties. The results were entirely satisfactory. At 0400, the Ethiopians returned to their line in jubilation and with their morale soaring high. The casualties of the patrol were two wounded, who nevertheless had fought to the last minute.

At times, the enemy played tricks on the United Nations troops. Though they had no intention to attack at all, he would make preparation for one. It was to embarrass and antagonize his opponent, the enemy took pains to try a show.

One day when the Kagne ws were still in reserve, the 32nd Regiment was fed by its line-crosser agents with intelligence indications that the CCF had been planning to raid the 2nd Battalion. The Regiment then alerted its subordinate units to prevent a surprise attack and ordered the Ethiopian Battalion to prepare for a counterattack. But the enemy attack never came.

On the night of the 8th of July, the Kagne new Battalion sent out four ambush
patrols simultaneously. The first patrol led by 2nd Lieutenant Bekele Gebrekidane, had a mission to proceed to a position 2,500 meters from the MLR; the second led by 1st Lieutenant Abate Gelano to approach Hill 472; the third led by 1st Lieutenant Metafera Ayelle to Camel Hill, near Todong; and the fourth led by 2nd Lieutenant Mellese Tessema to Hill 358. By 2100, the four patrols had already left the Main Line of Resistance and reached their respective objectives by 2300.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue’s plan, the main ambushes were to take place at Hills 358, 472, and Camel Hill, with six men each, and the rest of the men of an almost equal strength were to remain as reserves in the first patrol position between the ambush groups. Lieutenants Metafera Ayelle and Abate Gelano spared most of their men in support for the ambush of Hill 358, in view of the possibilities of entangling the enemy. The plan as a whole was excellent and was dependent upon the cooperation between each patrol team.

It was past midnight when, directly in front of the four patrols, there appeared a CCF force of company strength. It first attacked with mortars, followed by infantry, the ambush team of Lieutenant Gelano on Hill 472, whereupon 2nd Lieutenant Bekele Gebrekidane with his men rushed to reinforce Lieutenant Gelano. But the reinforcements were attacked on its way by other communist troops that had been apparently attempting to encircle Hill 472. Fighting erupted and 2nd Lieutenant Gebrekidane was wounded by a hand grenade. In a short time, and according to the plan only deprived of surprise effect, all four patrols were to engage the enemy. The struggle was intense. Despite the numerical inferiority, the Ethiopian fighters finally, assisted by friendly mortar and artillery fire, succeeded in breaking off the enemy forces. The Chinese casualties were later estimated at 90 dead and more than 130 wounded. The Ethiopian losses were eleven dead and two wounded. The result of the attacks by these four patrols against heavy enemy forces, has remained an outstanding example in the chronicles of the Korean War.

During the months of July, August, and September 1952, the Kagnew Battalion took part in strenuous patrols and ambushes. Worthy of particular mention was the action of a company size combat patrol, on the night of July 24, under 1st Lieutenant Tilaye Wondimagegnehu by the 1st Company.

This patrol received orders to operate against Hill 358 with the aim to inflict casualties upon the fortified enemy positions and to capture prisoners. At 2230, the patrol departed in company column and advanced toward the objective. But as the patrol approached Hill 358, it received violent fire from near-by Hill 472. 1st Lieutenant Tilaye Wondimagegnehu and his men deployed to positions in accordance with their prepared plan. The fighting began in earnest. They were nearing the enemy positions and there remained only the last push forward. But, just as he shouted the order for the final charge, 1st Lieutenant Tilaye
Wondimagegnehu was shot down. Almost at the same time, his Sergeant was also killed, leaving the Ethiopian fighters without a leader at this critical moment. The Kagnews now commenced individual fighting, only encouraged by Corporal Berhanou Degagga. Each man of the patrol fought alone, according to his special trait. They withdrew to a sheltered area in order to avoid the continuing enemy artillery and mortar fire. From there they returned to the battalion. The continued enemy artillery and mortar shelling plotted along the path of retreat of the company, and its evacuation of the dead and wounded at that moment could not be imagined.

On the other hand, the news of the death of 1st Lieutenant Tilaye Wondimagegnehu had been transmitted to the remainder of the Kagnew Battalion. When the report reached the Command Post of the Kagnew Battalion, Colonel Asfaw Andargue ordered the Operations Officer to commit the 2nd Company. When the order was being communicated to Captain Melaku Bakele of the 2nd Company, Colonel Asfaw Andargue specified that the 2nd Company dispatch one squad near the enemy positions to fetch the dead and wounded, while the rest of the force cover with its fire the withdrawal of the 1st Company.

Men of the 2nd Company commenced action at 0200. As the collecting party led by 2nd Lieutenant Yilma Woldemariam and Debebe Woldemarian approached the point where the fight had taken place, they found some men of the unit still isolated from one another. They also found six Ethiopians unable to move because of critical wounds. By this time, the enemy perceived the movement of the Kagnews, and directed artillery and mortar fire. The Ethiopian collecting party came within 100 meters of the enemy positions on Hill 358. It was impossible, however, for them to advance further to reach the bodies of those who had been killed there. This was reported to the Commander of the Kagnew Battalion. Thus he conceived a plan to operate a combined infantry and tank attack against the enemy to recover the dead Ethiopians. His plan was immediately reported to the Commander of the 32nd US Regiment, Colonel William A. Dodds, who gave it a ready consent.

At daybreak, four American tanks with a group of sixteen men of the Ethiopian Battalion and nine men of the US mine detection squad, under the command of 1st Lieutenant Duffera Obssa, set out to collect the dead. As the tank cannon covered the advance of the infantry, they approached the area where the bodies were lying. With extreme daring they collected and transported the dead Ethiopians to the battalion under intermittent shelling by the enemy.

During this operation, the Commander of the Kagnew Battalion remained in the outpost giving the necessary orders, and awaiting the results. It was about 0900 when the operation was over, and the tanks and infantry returned to their base. The result of the entire encounter, which lasted about twelve
hours, was that four Ethiopians including Lieutenant Tilaye and his sergeant were killed and six wounded. The enemy casualties amounted to 25 known killed, and 40 estimatedly wounded.

On the 26th of August, the Kagnew Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment. In the reserve camp at Kapyong the battalion mainly conducted road blocks, probing and patrol activities.

In the Korean battle front, generally, with the action on the battle field still at a low ebb and with little hope of accelerating the pace, the sharpest clashes took place over the conference table. While the negotiators at Panmunjom were meeting once a week in August and the Korean rain season continued, activity along the front once again eased.

On the 25th of September, a combat patrol manned by 20 members of the 4th Company of the Kagnew Battalion under 2nd Lieutenant Mellesse Tessema, contacted the enemy in a hand-grenade encounter at 2005. This contact lasted only for five minutes. Lieutenant Mellesse Tessema had requested the Regiment assistance of artillery and mortar fire. Even after the enemy troops disappeared, one particular enemy machine gun remained to continue firing, to produce a distinctive target for the friendly artillery and 4.2 inch mortar fires. The total enemy casualties were estimated to be 25 killed and 50 wounded. The Ethiopian patrol suffered two wounded.

On the 30th of September, the Kagnew Battalion received the attachment of the 1st platoon, 2nd Battery of the 15th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion.

On the 11th of October, 1st Lieutenant Adamsu Audentew was ordered to lead a platoon of 30 men from the 2nd Company in attack on Hill 50, which had been reportedly manned by a company-size enemy force in the night and by a reinforced squad-size during daylight when the friendly artillery could deliver effective fires. The reconnaissance platoon departed at 1820, receiving friendly fire support at times on its way. Upon reaching the objective area, the platoon commenced its attack on the enemy force who later was to be identified as a CCF unit of approximately 30 men. The first 15 minutes of the opposition were a tough one, but eventually it subdued to the small arms and hand grenades of the attacking force. The enemy withdrew to his MLR, suffering 2 killed and 7 wounded.

On the 14th of October, a platoon of thirty men of the 2nd Company, led by 1st Lieutenant Adamsu Audentew, attacked Hill 250. This position had been occupied by a CCF company during the night and by a reinforced squad the next morning. The attack of Ethiopian fighters on Hill 250 started at 2100. The enemy was surprised, but upon recovering, attempted a strong resistance against the attackers. But not for long, the Reds could not stand the fierce attack
of the determined Ethiopian fighters. The enemy was forced to abandon the hill immediately and to retreat to their MLR. The Ethiopian patrol returned to its base with no casualties. The enemy casualties that night amounted to 5 killed and 14 wounded.

Section 4. Operation Showdown

Before proceeding to the description of the Kagnew actions near Triangle Hill, proper accounts are deemed necessary on the activity of the 7th US Division, and its backbreaking Operation Showdown, initially a planned five-day operation starting October 14 which eventually became a bloody nightmare that extended to 14 days and nights and spasmodically thereafter for another month with a random estimated casualty of 20,000 friends and foes all told.

As the indications that the Communists were seizing the initiative on the ground became more apparent in late September and early October, General Van Fleet grew concerned. To offset this trend, he recommended the adoption of the IX Corps plan, called Showdown, that was designed to improve the Corps defense lines north of Kumhwa. The 7th US Division was responsible for the central axis of the corps sector north of Kumhwa and was bounded by the 3rd US Division near Chorwon and the 2nd ROK Division on its right and left flank respectively. Less than five kilometers from this city IX Corps and enemy troops manned positions that were but 200 meters apart. On Hill 598, better known as Triangle Hill, and Sniper Ridge, which ran northwest to southeast to a little over two kilometers northeast of Hill 598, the opposing forces looked down each other’s throat and casualties were correspondingly high.

Hill 598, now the objective of the US troops and later on the 23rd the Kagnew Battalion was to defend, was V-shaped with its apex at the south. At the left were smaller hills christened Jane Russel Hill and Sandy Ridge, from north to south. The resemblance of the Hill 598 soon led to the designation of the area as Triangle Hill. Around this time, the hill mass was defended by a battalion of the 135th Regiment, 45th Division, CCF 15th Army, one of the Chinese elite armies. As usual, the enemy was well dug in, had adequate ammunition supplies, and deflected reinforcement routes.

Major General Wayne C. Smith, the 7th Division Commander, assigned the mission of taking Triangle Hill to the 31st Regiment, under Colonel Lloyd R. Moses. As the initial attack from the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 31st Infantry bogged down, on the 14th the 7th Division committed the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry and 1st Battalion of 31st Infantry. Later on 15 October, operational control of the 2nd Battalion, passed to the 32nd Regiment, commanded by
Colonel Joseph R. Russ. Thus the 32nd Infantry directed the reinforced attack on Triangle Hill at this point. Bitter fighting continued. The situation on the 17th of October, found Colonel Russ with three battalions atop Triangle Hill. His own 1st Battalion was on Hill 598; the 2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment, was facing Pike's Peak; and the 2nd Battalion (minus), 17th Regiment, occupied Jane Russel Hill. Pike's Peak was also taken the next day by the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Regiment. In the lull that followed, the 1st and 3rd Battalion, 32nd Regiment, relieved the 17th Regiment's forces. On 22 October, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment, under Major Szares, relieved the 1st Battalion on the left arm of Triangle Hill. The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Major Brown, defended the right arm.

Section 5. Defensive Mission on Iron Triangle

In the second week of October 1952, the battalion received orders assigning it to a strategically vital point on the Kumhwa base of the Iron Triangle. It was to defend the valley leading up to Hill 598, or the well-known Triangle Hill, where the main event of the Operation Showdown was to take place. Accordingly the Commander of the Ethiopian Battalion established there, on the critical terrain feature the 4th Company under Captain Belle Platte Haile. Captain Belle Platte in turn placed two of his platoons on line under 2nd Lieutenant Gulilat Abrel. With the 2nd Company in reserve, the Battalion Commander placed his other companies on the defensible positions in depth.

The Showdown touched off on the 14th of October, and bloody battles ensued. But, no contact had been made on the Kagnew line until the night of 23 October. The enemy attack started with twenty minutes of well prepared artillery and mortar fire on the positions manned by the two platoons of the 4th Company, followed by an infantry assault of a reinforced battalion size of the CCF.

The Ethiopian fighters waited and allowed the Communists to approach as near as one hundred and fifty meters from their positions. They then opened fire with automatic weapons, while the mortars of the battalion and the American artillery delivered their barrages. The friendly fire dispensed destruction and disaster to the attacking CCF but the Reds were virtually of a human sea.

As soon as the enemy attack was manifested, Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue rushed to the position of the 4th Company. He was determined to maintain the position at any cost. The men of the two platoons, far outnumbered by the enemy forces, had been fighting in an unequal struggle. Their leader,
Lieutenant Gulilat Aberal, had been wounded critically, leaving Sergeant Yutigan in the command of the two platoons. Immediately, Colonel Asfaw rushed to the most critical point of the front, reorganized the defense, and urged the Ethiopian fighters to maintain their positions. Notwithstanding the awesome defense of the Ethiopians, the human sea of the Reds flowed with sole aim to break through the valley. In an instant, the struggle became jeopardized, and the situation was uneasy for the Ethiopians. The Communists had penetrated deep into the valley. Lieutenant Colonel Asfaw Andargue, who was now personally directing the artillery fire, asked for a barrage on a point twenty five meters from the positions of the Ethiopian fighters. The order astonished the Americans. Seldom was the target of artillery fire less than 70-80 meters from friendly positions. However, Colonel Asfaw's request was granted and the Chinese failed to overrun the Ethiopian positions entirely.

By that moment, the 2nd Company of the Kagnew Battalion under Captain Bekelle had launched a counterattack against the Chinese flank. The remnants of the 4th Company immediately followed in the counterattack and cleared the defense positions. The subsequent barrage of the American artillery kept them at a distance. After that, the Reds stopped temporarily their penetration effort into the valley. They began, instead, to shell with heavy weapons from stable positions, preparing their second attempt to overrun the Kagnew Battalion.

The American artillery and the Ethiopian heavy mortars then engaged in counter-battery. The result was that the enemy suffered heavy casualties and was forced to abandon immediate execution of his second trial in order to salvage the remainder of his force.

Victory and glory crowned once more the honored weapons of Ethiopians. The fighters of the second Kagnew Battalion accomplished gallant deeds in those battles, and proved that they were worthy successors of the first Kagnew Battalion. In acknowledgement of the fighting ability of Ethiopians and their determined influence upon the whole development of struggle in the central front, practically the battle of Triangle Hill, the Commanding General of the 7th Division dispatched two letters to the Commander of the Kagnew Battalion. One stated: "The Corps commander has requested I convey his congratulation to the EEFK to its magnificent action on the 23rd of October, 1952, in defending the highly important Hill 598 area against repeated determined attack of the enemy to regain possession......The unyielding stand made by the Kagnew assuring the security of the 7th Division and IX Corps in that sector, this clearly demonstrates outstanding proficiency and unfaltering dependability in combat."

On the 30th of October, the enemy repeated his efforts to break through
the line of the Kagnew Battalion. At 1700, the enemy artillery and mortars began to shell the MLR and their concentration fell on the 2nd and 4th Companies positions. During this bombardment, the CCF sent forth small units in an apparent attempt to prepare for a night attack.

That night, the enemy attacked with a force of two battalions. The CCF at that time conducted simultaneous attack against both the 2nd and 4th Companies of the Kagnew Battalion. The preparatory bombardment of the enemy artillery lasted one hour, and destroyed most of the Ethiopian bunkers causing a few casualties among the occupants. The main effort of the enemy was directed toward the 2nd Company positions at 1800, the outpost of which fought a hand-to-hand battle. The legendary bayonets of the Ethiopians, again, worked its miracle. After this wild struggle, which had lasted about four hours, the Ethiopian fighters proclaimed themselves invincible against numerically superior enemy forces.

On the 1st of November, the enemy launched again a strong attack against the Kagnew Battalion with a force of two reinforced battalions. The enemy main effort was on the 2nd Company for which the whole bulk of his force was thrown in. At the same time, the enemy attacked, for diversion, the 1st Company of the Kagnew Battalion with a force of two companies. Before the infantry attack, the Chinese preparatory shelling lasted from 1400 to 2200 and then suddenly stopped.

About an hour later, the enemy infantry attacked in successive waves. The 2nd Company was attacked three times in succession, the 1st Company, twice. But all the enemy efforts were in vain. The heroic men of the 1st and 2nd Companies fought valiantly to repulse the CCF attack. The result of this battle was that four Ethiopians were killed and nineteen wounded. The losses of the enemy were 100 killed in the actual fighting against the two companies of the Kagnew Battalion. An additional 100 were estimated killed owing to stubborn attempts to recover their dead.

On the 2nd of November, an order was given to the 3rd Company of the Kagnew Battalion to destroy the fortifications on Hill 400 manned by a CCF company. The Commander of the 3rd Company, Captain Haile Marian Lencho, ordered 1st Lieutenant Getaneh Rebi to attack with one reinforced platoon. He also ordered 2nd Lieutenant Feshiha Gebre Micael to support the attack of 1st Lieutenant Getaneh Rebi. At 2000, the Ethiopian fighters departed from the MLR. By 2100, Lieutenant Getaneh Rebi and his men were about 150 meters from the objective, while Lieutenant Feshiha Gebre Micael's unit was in position ready to support the attack of the platoon. At 2100, Lieutenant Getaneh Rebi's platoon started the attack. His men leaped into enemy trenches contacting the Chinese in a hand-to-hand battle.
Lieutenant Getaneh, though wounded, continued to conduct the attack, exhorting his men not to yield. The enemy in the trenches was taken by surprise and could not resist the Ethiopian violence. After a struggle of about ten minutes, the enemy abandoned the hill in disorder, retreating to their MLR. At 2300, the Ethiopian fighters after destroying the enemy fortifications on Hill 400 returned to the MLR of the battalion. The casualties of the Ethiopian platoon were one killed and three wounded. The casualties of the enemy company on the hill were 45 killed and 75 wounded.

On the 9th of November, a combat patrol of 30 men from the 1st and 4th Companies attacked Hill 400. But this time, the enemy abandoned the hill without resistance. A unit of the Ethiopian patrol men from the 1st Company was ordered to move from the north side of the hill to cut off the enemy retreat. The patrol contacted the enemy and inflicted heavy casualties in a quick but arduous hand-to-hand battle. Outstanding in this battle was the leader of the patrol, Sergeant Gebre Sadik, wounded seriously in his hands and legs, continued the fight, killing five Chinese with hand grenades.

As his comrades were transporting him to the MLR later, the Chinese counterattacked the patrol. Sergeant Gebre Sadik ordered his men to leave him in order to save themselves and began to throw hand grenades at the enemy. His men did not obey his order this time, but fought on to carry their leader out of the havoc. The enemy casualties were 10 killed and 25 wounded, while the Ethiopian casualties were four wounded. The Ethiopian fighters also destroyed eight fortified enemy positions on Hill 400.

After the bitter fighting of October and early November 1952, the approach of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the scale of operations at the front. The winter was intensely cold, the temperature reaching 30°C below zero. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves, and the action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols and small unit skirmishes as the weather permitted. Thus most of the time both sides waited, content to watch each other warily along the battle lines and to conserve their energy. During this winter the enemy replenished his supplies and brought up replacements, despite the efforts of the United Nations air forces to destroy Communist depots and communications lines.

The Ethiopian Battalion had been no exception. It dispatched patrols and raid teams with an identical mission of capturing prisoners and destroying fortified positions. It also defended with fierce actions against enemy raids especially at the outposts of the 1st and 3rd Companies. Of numerous abortive patrol actions, those led by 1st Lieutenants Fissena G. Micael, Deffera Obbas Siyum, Semu Tesfaneh and Sergeant Telahun Eshete were notable with their
heavy infliction of casualties upon the enemy.

Meanwhile, the 7th Division was relieved on November 2 by the 25th US Division and came off the line and went into reserve at Kapyong. On November 7, 1952, its 17th Regiment began one of its most unusual assignments as it moved to the islands of Koje-do and Cheju-do on a POW security mission.

The Kagnew Battalion was ordered to move to Kapyong reserve camps from the Triangle Hill positions. In the closing days of 1952, the 7th Division began a move with the Ethiopian Battalion during which they relieved the 2nd US Division in the I US Corps sector which was occupying the Forkchop-Old Baldy area. In mid-January the 7th Division launched one of the infrequent UN raids against the enemy, with the primary purpose of taking prisoners. Moving a company over frozen ground toward the icy CCF fortifications, in open daylight, the US Division took a severe black eye from what it had code-named Operation Smack.

One of the typical "jab and guard" patterns was seen on the night of 11-12 January 1953. A Kagnew Platoon led by 2nd Lieutenant Fissaena G. Micael was participating in a raid of Hill 180. This patrol succeeded in destroying the enemy position, inflicted heavy casualties and captured two prisoners. But on the same night, while the patrol was working on the Hill 180, the enemy raid party attacked the position of the 1st Company commanded by Captain Haile. After an unsuccessful struggle of one hour, the enemy withdrew abandoning their dead.

Another exemplary valor happened on 24 January when two platoons of the Ethiopian Battalion seized a hill south of Old Baldy after a 45 minute battle and fought off a counterattack. Both the enemy and the Ethiopians built their forces the following day, as two Chinese companies tried to win back the hill from four platoons of Ethiopians. The latter made a good showing and did not break contact and withdraw until they were ordered to.

The Kagnew Battalion was on the line through the months of December 1952, January and February 1953, with a now-customary routine break of a fortnight at Yonchon relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment.

In March, the battalion was once again dislocated from the line, and this time for good. The next month the 2nd Kagnew Battalion left Pusan for home, leaving it all to its worthy successor the 3rd Kagnew Battalion.
CHAPTER IV  THE 3RD KAGNEW BATTALION

Section 1.  Deployment to Korea

Early in December 1952, an order was issued in Ethiopia for the formation of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion. As it had been with the formation of the preceding two Kagnew Battalions, the 3rd Battalion was also to be composed of men of the Imperial Guard. Again the same surprising phenomenon: Every man of the Imperial Guard wanted to take part in the expedition to Korea.

As the Commander of the Battalion was appointed Lieutenant Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta, a graduate of Haile Selassie School, the French Allied School, and the Military Academy Holeta of Addis Ababa.

On December 24, 1952, the training of the men of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion, foreseeing the action in Korea, began. Guard Commander, Brigadier General Mulugetta Bulli, ordered the Korean War veteran officers of the 1st Kagnew Battalion to assume the special training of the fighters of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion. This step surely was important. The officers of the 1st Kagnew Battalion, having fought against the enemy successfully for one year, returned to their country with valuable fighting experience. These officers knew well the Korean terrain as well as the methods employed by the enemy in each type of encounter. Based on this experience, together with regular field training, they started training the fighters of the Korea-bound battalion.

The end of March 1953 saw the last stage of the special training of the Kagnew Battalion. On the morning of the 24th March, the train-hardened men of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion marched in the parade field of the Imperial Palace before Emperor Haile Selassie I and other distinguished guests and officials.

The US transport General Blatchford departed by March 26, 1953, with the 3rd Kagnew Battalion on board. Through the Red Sea on April 16, after a twenty-one-day voyage, the General Blatchford arrived in Korea, where the Ethiopian fighters disembarked in the port of Pusan. There, high ranking officers of the American and Korean Army, and also masses of Korean citizen, welcomed the new fighters with enthusiasm. Before the disembarkation, the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, who was at the dock to welcome the the United Nations Forces greeted the Kagnew Battalion and extended the "Welcome" of the Republic of Korea.
The disembarkation of the men of the Ethiopian Battalion took place at noon. The men were directly transported by military buses to the UN Reception Center at Pusan to rest after the long voyage and also to be provided with combat clothing and personal equipment. Within 72 hours the fighters of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion were to ready themselves to move to the front.

On the next morning, the 17th of April, Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta, accompanied by a delegation of officers and soldiers of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion, marched solemnly to the UN Cemetery in the eastern side of Pusan to place upon the graves of those heroic dead, a wreath of flowers brought from the fatherland.

The 72 hours of preparation period was running out and on the morning of 19 April the 3rd Kagnew Battalion boarded the train en route to Yonchon where the 2nd Kagnew Battalion was stationed. The train ride, departing Pusan at 1400 hours, lasted twenty hours.

The train arrived at Yonchon at 1000 the next day. There to greet these well known fighters, Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, the Commanding General of the 7th Division; and Colonel George L. Van Way, the Commanding Officer of the 32nd Regiment; and other staff members were awaiting. The official change-over ceremony was held on the 25th between the 2nd and 3rd Kagnew Battalions on the 7th Division’s parade field. Everyone present there, wished a heartfelt farewell for the returning Ethiopians and good luck for their successors.

Until May 10, a two-week supplementary training was given to the Kagnew Battalion, and this training specially designed to forge front-duty combatants was rather proven helpful in later fightings by the Kagnew Battalion.

Section 2. General Situation

It is necessary now, when the 3rd Kagnew Battalion was at Yonchon training, to take a short glance at the general flow of the war and the activity of the 7th US Division in the final year of the Korean conflict.

In the spring of 1953 the future course of the war seemed likely to be a repetition of what had gone before as long as the desire to negotiate was not matched by a willingness to concede.

Since 29 December 1952, relief of the 2nd US Division in the extreme right position of the I US Corps sector on the western front, the 7th US Division still defended Porkchop area about 20 kilometers north of Yonchon. After Operation Smack in January, the 7th US Division in March saw the Chinese attacking Old Baldy, then held by its attached Colombian Battalion, and in a flaming debacle,
took it. But after a violent effort, Generals Trudeau and Taylor decided the price of Old Baldy was too high. The Chinese were left in possession. With Old Baldy gone, Porkchop was flanked and by military logic should have been abandoned, too.

Stubbornly, however, the UN Command refused to give up Porkchop, and then in April, American troops engaged in their heaviest fighting of 1953. On April 16, the day that General Blatchford with the 3rd Kangnew Battalion aboard slowly docked in Pusan, and while the eyes of the world and most of the correspondents were at Panmunjom, where the Communist side had just agreed to exchange sick and wounded POWs, the CCF struck to destroy the 7th Division’s outpost line.

The Chinese hit Eerie, Arsenal, and swamped Dale. Then the Porkchop was defended by elements of the 31st Regiment. After sunset of 18 April, the bitter sound of guns ceased. The US Army had expended more than 130,000 rounds of artillery ammunition within twenty-four hours and had expended several hundred men.

Later on 6 July, again on this position, the CCF was to initiate a coordinated attack against outpost Porkchop, which was the largest display of enemy force against the 7th Division since it had assumed sector responsibility. On the morning of 11 July, however, after its tactical value deemed lost, the order would be given to withdraw all the 7th Division’s forces.

So much for the fighting war, and let us turn our look to the negotiation effort to bring the shooting to an end. On 22 February, the United Nations Command stated that it was prepared to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners according to the Geneva Convention, and on 30 March, over Peking radio, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, agreed to discuss this. The meetings followed were successful, and a plan for the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war was approved on 11 April. On 14 April, just two days before the CCF heavy attack on the 7th Division on Porkchop—Old Baldy area, at Freedom Village at Panmunjom, just 110 kilometers apart, the first UNC sick and wounded were turned over under Operation Little Switch.

Section 3. Defense on Yoke–Uncle Ridge

In the spring of 1953, the 7th US Division, shifted into the Corps sector in the previous December, was manning positions of a 10 kilometer-front. The line southwest from the road west of Hill 281 (the Arrow Head), 8 kilometers northwest of Chorwon, to the village of Togun-gol. Elements of two Chinese armies faced the 7th Division. The 141st Division, CCF 47th Army, manned
the enemy positions on Old Baldy and to the west, and the 67th Division, CCF 23rd Army, defended the Porkchop Hill area to the east.

On 10 May, the Ethiopians passed from the reserve status to its first duty on the front line, replacing the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment at the Yoke—Uncle ridge positions.

This ridge rose about 300 meters above the valley floor, forward of which approximately 750 meters were the outpost hillocks, Yoke and Uncle. The Yoke was just large enough to accommodate a platoon. As with a hundred other such small hill positions forward of the Eighth Army’s main line, the two fold objective in garrisoning Yoke was to parry any attack before the Chinese could reach the big trench, and, also to lure the enemy into the open where he could be blasted by the markedly superior UN artillery. It was wearing duty, for it made troops feel like the bait in a trap. So the garrisons were rotated every five days. From the T-Bone hill in the north extending due south to the Ethiopian positions was a spur on which the outposts Arsenal and Eerie was located.

Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta placed his Ist Company commanded by Captain Behanu Tariau on his right to the northernmost, with 2nd and 3rd Companies on line in that order to the left. His Battalion Command Post was located at Toksan-ni with the 4th Company.

On this first night of its establishment on the front line, men of the Ist Company was attacked by the enemy. The CCF attack had been organized on a scale of a reinforced company, aiming to take the adversary by surprise, and to inflict upon the Ethiopians as many casualties as possible. But the Commander of the Kagnew Battalion, Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta, was prepared for any eventuality. When it became dark, he ordered the Ist Company to place an ambush in front of the MLR of the battalion. The enemy, not expecting to meet an Ethiopian ambush, were stunned. With the first burst of fire from the Ethiopian fighters, the Reds dispersed, and returned to their lines in disorder. That was the first contact of the fighters of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion with the enemy.

Now the patrol on 13 May from the 2nd Company was typical enough to deserve a detailed description. This patrol also gave ample lessons to other fighting teams in Korea. That night was formidably dark with the stars blackened out. The objective was the Alligator Jaws. Second Lieutenant Wongele Costa led this 22-man patrol, departing the company line at exactly 2000. In less than a half hour, in dark and over rough country, it had progressed as far as average infantry would go in twice the time. The advance had been without incident and in an express-like speed.
At 2028 hours, Lieutenant Wongele Costa reported by radio that he had arrived at the designated ground on the tip of the Alligator Jaws and his men had already set up their weapons and were ready to fight.

The ridges which bound the Yokkol Valley are exceptionally rugged and deeply eroded. From 2nd Company's position on the big ridge to the patrol's rendezvous at the extreme end of the forked, low-lying ridge called the Alligator Jaws the distance was 2,000 meters air line. But as the trail cut obliquely across country, dipping into three draws and rising steeply over as many sprangling ridge fingers, the actual walk to the objective approximately doubled the air distance.

Where they had decided to rig their intended deadfall, the upper end of the Alligator Jaws tapered down to the valley floor. An irrigation ditch looped around this extreme finger-like projection of the ridge. Atop the finger, approximately 100 meters from the ditch, and rising not more than 10 meters above the valley floor, was a last knob, shaped like a camel's hump, with space enough to seat at least half the patrol.

His assault group was put on the high ground. Ten men were put on the knob, nine armed with M-1's, one with a carbine. All carried four grenades apiece.

Corporal Raffi Degene was left in charge of the assault group. They sought rock cover and did not dig in. Lieutenant Wongele Costa then led the support party to the ditch, a dirt-banked structure raised a foot or so above the flat confronting it. The ditch turned sharply at the point where he gathered the force. There were but seven men to be deployed. The weapons available to hold the ditch were three M-1's, two BARs, two carbines, and forty hand grenades. He split his forces in two wings, so that three men faced north on the right of the turn and four men faced west to left of it.

In so doing, his thinking was that the two flanks would be mutually supporting along the ditch, if either got hit. The chance of enfilade had been reduced. The approaches to the hill were covered from two directions. He did not calculate, however, that the group on the low ground was more likely to figure in an initial interception than the men on the heights. No trail led directly to the ditch position, though several paths skirted it and merged where the ditch rounded the finger end just north of assault position. Hence, as Wongele Costa envisaged the main possibilities of his ambush, the Chinese might start grouping, and in fight to their own country, be taken by flanking fire from the support. That was why he put both BARs in the ditch. He had been ordered to take prisoners if possible. Because of the low visibility, he saw little chance of doing it unless the enemy virtually stumbled over his men.

One BAR man, Corporal Tiggu Waldetekle, was left in direct charge of the
support. Taking along his runner and the two aid men, the leader then moved upslope to a point halfway between assault and support. He was connected with both groups by phone and with higher levels by phone and radio. His preparations were complete as he waited.

Until exactly 0300, the hill was absolutely quiet. Wongele Costa had just looked at his watch. His men had been on position six hours and 32 minutes. During that time, the only sounds he had heard were his own voice making the hourly report by radio to the company: “Everything negative.” But he knew that the men were awake and watchful. Corporal Degene and Waldeteke had seen to that. At fifteen-minute intervals, each junior leader made his rounds, crawling from man to man. He pressed the man’s hand. The man pressed twice in response. It was their way of assuring an alerted unity.

Both corporals had just crawled to his position and completed their hand check. Wongele Costa had called company and his two assistants were already back with their men.

As Corporal Waldeteke slid back into his position with the support group, he saw the men on the left, pointing vigorously out into the enveloping darkness with their rifles. It was the signal that they detected enemy movement. He moved to them. Then he could see a figure in clear silhouette standing not more than 20 meters beyond the ditch.

Corporal Waldeteke backtracked along the ditch, then crawled again to Wongele Costa, saying nothing; but pointing with his rifle as his men had done. The Lieutenant sent Private Tilahullninguse crawling uphill to give the same signal to Degene and his men. The whole alert had been carried out soundlessly. All weapons were now pointed in the direction where the one Chinese had been seen. Then, for a few seconds, Wongele Costa waited, confident that his own presence and preparations had not been detected.

Corporal Waldeteke crawled to him again, gesturing still more vigorously with the rifle. It was the sign that he had seen several other Chinese moving, along the same axis.

To Wongele Costa’s left, a shallow gully ran unevenly toward the ditch. Using hand signals, he told Tilahullninguse to unpin a grenade, crawl down the gully and bomb into the enemy group. It was done as directed. Wongele Costa was still certain that the Chinese were unalerted and wholly within his fire. But he was bent on capturing prisoners and he figured—wrongly, as developments were to prove—that one grenade would hardly more than momentarily upset them and enable the support group to bag them before they could recoil.

Tilahullninguse was 13 meters uphill from the nearest Chinese when he loosed his throw. As the grenade exploded, by its light, Wongele Costa could
see about twenty of the enemy. More than that, they were deployed, lying flat and with weapons pointed straight toward his support line, which so far hadn’t fired a shot.

As the scene went dark again, the enemy opened fire against the ditch with grenades, rifles, and submachine guns. Not more than five seconds elapsed between the explosion and the answering volley. Before Wongele Costa had time to shout an order, the left wing of the support group had joined the fight with full blast of their rifles and BARs.

In this way began a duel almost without parallel in modern war. The opposing lines were just a little less than 13 meters apart. The distance was tape measured on the following day. At that range, as the shooting began, the odds were four riflemen against twenty. Only Waldetekle’s left wing was free to trade fire with the enemy. His right flank weapons were interdicted fire by the turn in the ditch. From its position on the knob, the assault group could not bring weapons to bear on the Chinese without risking that the volley would slaughter the four Ethiopians who were fighting. These things, Wongele Costa weighed within the first few seconds while watching the fire flash. He made his decision.

There was just time to call the assault group on the sound power phone and say, “Don’t move! Don’t fire! Now send a man down to the right flank of the support and give them that same message.” Then he turned to Tilahullninguse and his two aid men and said, “Follow me!” On hands, and knees, he moved down the gully which cut through Waldetekles position, stopping every few feet to fire his carbine. The three men behind him did the same.

Their entry into the ditch was timed precisely to save the position, though the reinforcement did no more than plug the gaps cut into ranks. The ditch, which was running about one foot of water, was deep enough to provide full body cover for the line of riflemen. But to fire, a man had to come head and shoulder above the embankment, and Waldetekle’s half squad had chosen to face it, though bullets beat like hail against the bank.

A grenade sailed in, bounced off the bank and exploded as it struck just above Waldetekle’s elbow. His right arm was completely blown off just below the shoulder socket. He uttered neither cry nor groan. The others didn’t know he was hurt until with his left hand he passed the BAR to Private Yukonsi, saying, “Fire, and keep it low.”

Private Yukonsi triggered the weapon for only a few seconds. Then a burp gun burst hit him in the left arm, shredding it from wrist to shoulder. The BAR was still in working order. Yukonsi handed it to Tilahullninguse without a word, then collapsed in the ditch unconscious from loss of blood.

On the extreme left of the line, Private Mano Waldemarian took three bullets
through his brain. But in the frenzy of the action, no one saw him fall.

Wongele Costa yelled to the two aid men to take over the grenading. Then he propped against the ditch bank and let go with the carbine, firing full automatic. During the remainder of the duel, he worked as a rifleman, leaving the directing to Waldetekle. The point-blank exchange continued for another fifteen minutes. Wongele Costa, a precise man, timed it with his wrist watch. But once all five weapons were brought to bear in volume, the enemy fire ranged increasingly higher, and there were no more casualties in the ditch.

A messenger from the assault group came crawling down the gully. Word of the action had been sent by the Battalion Commander, Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shittha. He was asking, "Shall I send help?"

Wongele Costa replied, "Tell him no. Tell him I can hold this field with my own men." The messenger left and the lieutenant resumed fire.

Action was temporarily suspended when at last Waldetekle cried, "There's nothing coming back." Wongele Costa called, "Hold fire!" and then listened. It was true. Either the enemy had been wholly destroyed or its discouraged remnant had been driven off. There was not then time to look. The BAR had gone dry. The carbine was empty and the aid men had thrown their last grenades.

By radio Wongele Costa called for illuminating fire over the position, as had been prearranged with the 48th Field Artillery Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Kimmitt. Within the next minute he got four rounds. They lighted the hill and the ditch bright as day, and, in so doing, diverted attention from what had transpired in the foreground.

As the lights came on Wongele Costa platoon, deployed in skirmish order, was advancing up the nose of the ridge. The line of approximately fifty men was in that second still upright and marching straight toward the assault group. In the next second, the line had gone flat, thereby foiling the lights. The Chinese were still about 90 meters short of the position on the knob.

"VT fire on White, all you can give me." That was the radio message from Wongele Costa to the artillery. If the proximity fuse shells came in as directed, they would just miss his own men and stonk the enemy in the "White" area.

He got his barrage in exactly thirty seconds and it landed right on the button. From his post in the ditch, he could see the rounds exploding into the enemy line and he could hear the outcries of the wounded. In less than one minute the formation was broken. Some of the Chinese ran for the base of the hill. Others ran forward looking for a hole or a rock.

In that interval, Wongele Costa abandoned his position on the left side of the ditch. The casualties were carried to the position on the right flank. But
in the darkness, he missed one man, not knowing that Waldemarian was dead. So he called for lights again to assist the search. When the flare came on, he could see Waldemarian in the ditch. He sat there in a natural position, the rifle folded close in his arms. Wongele Costa crawled over to him, found that he was dead and so returned, carrying the body. Thereby he simply followed the tradition of his corps. Fiercely proud of the loyalty of their men, officers of the Imperial Guard are likely to say to a stranger, "Should trouble come, stay with me. I'll be the last man to die." But in battle, it is the officer invariably who takes the extra risk to save one of his own.

There had been no letup in the VT barraging of the nose of the ridge. Costa simply had it shifted forward a short space to choke off escape. Then Corporal Degene called him to say that from the knob, he could hear the Chinese reassembling on the other side of the finger, downslope 60 or 70 meters from his position. Wongele Costa again called the artillery, "Keep the fires going on White. But give me more VT and put it on Red." Fifty-five seconds later, the new barrage dropped on the far flank of the hill. Thereafter, for 65 minutes, the fires were continued unrelentingly against the "White" nose of the hill and the "Red" slope.

The patrol merely continued to hold ground. Degene's men neither shifted position nor fired a shot. Unassisted, the artillery broke the back of the Chinese attack. Wongele Costa and assistants had long since returned to their position between the two groups. The aid men had tourniqueted and quieted the wounded. They would have to last it with the others. At 0430 Colonel Shitta called the lieutenant to ask how things were going. Wongele Costa replied, "The only live Chinese in this valley are in our hands." Said Shitta, "If that's it, you might as well return."

So Wongele Costa got the patrol reassembled and on the trail. To the number of 22 they had counted enemy dead in their foreground. They were confident that with the help of the artillery, they had wounded at least as many more. Two badly shot-up prisoners had been taken. The wounded and dead were put in the van of the column. Costa helped bear Waldemarian's body started uptrail and at last closed on the company lines at 0535. They still looked fresh in the full light of a lovely dawn.

The start of their debriefing followed the combat by less than two hours. Wongele Costa said, "Every detail of that ground had become part of a print in my mind. It was like moving in my own house. I could see in the dark."

On the 14th of May, Lieutenant Fasika Hailemariam was leading a patrol of twenty one men toward a position where to set an ambush. Upon arrival of the patrol at the objective at 0100, it was engaged by an enemy platoon in a
surprise attack. But 2nd Lieutenant Fasika led a spirited counterattack against the enemy with small arms and grenades in a close fight. The tactful leadership of 2nd Lieutenant Fasika and the dauntless attack of his men dispersed the enemy. As a result of this action, the enemy suffered 8 killed, while the Ethiopian patrol suffered one wounded.

On the same night, the opposing Chinese had organized a company-strength attack against the 1st Company of the Kagnew Battalion. The CCF company moved from its position at about 2200, toward the defense positions of the 1st Company, a vital point of the Kagnew's MLR. The Commander of the 2nd Company, Captain Taddesse Sendeku, had also dispatched an ambush of eighteen men led by 2nd Lieutenant Mamo, to frustrate any enemy attempt to approach the positions, without an exact knowledge on the enemy intention.

At about 2300, 2nd Lieutenant Mamo observed the enemy approaching the ambush positions. He allowed the enemy to approach within a few meters and then ordered his men to hurl their hand grenades simultaneously. As a fierce battle ensued, the Reds were completely taken aback. At the same time, 2nd Lieutenant Mamo called for the help of the division artillery, which was rendered at once. The casualties of the enemy that night amounted to 25 killed, and about 40 wounded. The ambush suffered three wounded.

Section 4. Patrol Decimates Enemy Big Offensive

The patrol on 19th May, as a feat of arms by a small body of men, it was matchless. No other entry in the book of war more clearly attests that miracles are made when a leader is attended by a few steady men, and whose coolness of head is balanced by his reckless daring. Done by an Ethiopian 2nd Lieutenant, it is a case study for generals pondering for the improved patrol tactics. Here is the detailed account of the patrol which had effectively eliminated one Chinese battalion and thus won the Presidential Unit Citation from the Republic of Korea.

2nd Lieutenant Zenebe Asfaw was ordered on the 19th by the Commander of the 3rd Company, to patrol with his 15 men. His mission on the night was to descend into the main valley about 700 meters to the right front of Yoke and in this disputed ground to attempt to ambush a Chinese patrol and return with prisoners.

At the time, the 1st Company of the Kagnew Battalion, under Captain
Behanu Tariau, was garrisoning two outpost hillocks flanking the narrow draw via which Asfaw's party moved toward enemy territory.

The patrol departed at 2300, with second in command Arage Afhere leading the single column. In exactly thirty-five minutes, they moved 2,400 meters at the bottom, where the route traversed two ridge fingers.

At twenty minutes before midnight, having seen nothing of the enemy, Asfaw decided to halt. The patrol had come to a concrete-walled irrigation ditch. Where Asfaw stood, the ditch did a 90-degree turn, with the elbow pointing directly at T-Bone Hill. To the younger came a flash inspiration that here was the tailor-made deadfall. Three trails crossed within a few yards of the bank in the ditch. He could deploy his men within the protecting walls and await the enemy. Within the next five minutes he distributed his men evenly around the angle with one BAR on each flank.

It was done quickly. At ten minutes before midnight, Asfaw, straining his eyes to catch any movement in the darkness, saw standing in the clear, 300 meters to his front, a lone Chinese. While he looked, approximately one platoon built up on the motionless scout and simply stood there, as if waiting a signal. It was a tempting target; though too distant for his automatic weapons to have more than a scattering effect upon the enemy force, it was still vulnerable to the American artillery fires which could be massed at his call.

Asfaw switched on his radio to call Battalion. But his radio developed a technical failure, although, which was to be proven fortunate during the later half-hour. The whole pattern of this strange fight developed out of the accidental circumstance that during the next half hour, the Chinese felt free to extend their maneuver, and Asfaw, being without radio contact, had to keep telling himself that he had been sent forth to capture prisoners.

In that time, the body confronting him rapidly swelled to two platoons, but still did not move. That meant that close to 100 men would be opposing his group of 15. So he crawled along the ditch cautioning his men to maintain silence and retain fire until ordered.

When at last the Chinese moved toward him, it was not in columns, but in V-shape, with the point marching directly toward the apex of the ditch. All of this time Asfaw had been concentrating attention on the enemy directly to his front. Now as he turned his gaze toward the files at the far ends of the V, he caught what all along his eyes had missed, 450 meters to his left, another Chinese company, marching single file, had passed his flanks and was advancing directly on Outpost Yoke. He looked to his right. Another body of the same size had outflanked him and was marching against the ridge seating 1st Company. With that, he saw the problem as a whole. He was in the middle of a Communist battalion launched in a general attack.
Its massive deployment was in the close columns and the V-shaped body advancing on his ditch was simply a sweep which tied together the two assault columns on both sides.

By now they were within 200 meters of him and the column on his left was almost at the foot of Yoke. His radio was still out. To his immediate rear was an earth mound perhaps three-meter high. Thinking that the mound might cause interdiction, he moved leftward along the ditch, whispering to his men to stand steady and testing his radio every few feet.

The eight Chinese forming the point of the V were within 10 meters of the ditch when Asfaw ordered to commence fire. He already had arranged it that the fire from his two flanks would cross so that both sides of the V would be taken in enfilade. The eight-man point was cut down as by a scythe. The two wings which followed at a distance of 15 meters lost another dozen men to the BARs before the surprised Chinese could counterattack. At that moment Asfaw's radio sparked. He shouted out a simple message and call for artillery support on the ground to left and rear of the patrol. The patrol disregarded the enemy force to his front hoping that it could still shatter the enemy moving against Yoke and Uncle.

No sooner had he given the direction when he saw the smashed company in his foreground start skirmishes around his left flank. He felt this was the beginning of an envelopment. He shifted more of his men leftward in the ditch, figuring that with grazing fire he could slow the movement.

In three minutes, the US barrage landed accurately where Asfaw had directed it. Illuminating shells began to floodlight the valley. By their glare, Asfaw could see the artillery rounds biting into the column, killing some Chinese, scattering others. But he could also see figures in silhouette moving against Yoke's skyline and he guessed that the enemy had penetrated the fortification, which he reported on radio.

Now the patrol clearly knew what really happened. The small arms fire all about them had made imperceptible to the patrol that the Chinese artillery had massed fires against Yoke and the big ridge almost coincidentally with the opening of their own engagement.

On Yoke, 2nd Lieutenant Bezaib Ayela and his 56 men had heard the first volley of Asfaw's skirmish, but it sounded far away. The impression it made was swiftly erased when the enemy artillery deluged their own hill. Both of Ayela's radios were hit and his field phone went dead. Ayela moved from post to post ordering to stand by, but for all the noise he had no forewarning of what was coming.

Realization came when three red flares cut the night above Yoke's
rear slope. Ayela ran that way along the trench, knowing they had been small arms fire by the enemy. At the rear parapet, he could hear voices chattering from downslope. Yoke's rear was lighted by a searchlight beamed from the battalion ridge. Raising himself to the embankment, Ayela could see at least a squad of Chinese working up through the rocks not more than 30 meters away.

Within call of Ayela were thirteen riflemen and one machine gunner, covering the backslope, but all in the wrong spot to see the approach. Before Ayela could either fire or cry out, he was drawn back the way he had come by the sounds of shooting and a piercing scream right behind him. Two squads of Chinese had come up the side of Yoke, killed a BAR man, and jumped into the main trench.

Ayela ran for them with a rifle in hand. In full stride he was blown up by a bomb—an ordinary grenade with TNT strapped around it used by the Communists to clean out bunkers. Then Corporal Shivashe with him went flat in the trench and emptied his M-1 into the enemy group. He saw three men drop. Now that Ayela was dead, Sergeant Major Awilachen Moulte took command. The Chinese at the rear slope came over the parapet and occupied the trench unopposed. The machine gunner, Private Kassa Misgina, had heard the noise and rushed to the breach, cutting down the first three men.

At this moment, Lieutenant Asfaw in the patrol team had watched for fifteen minutes the artillery stonk the Chinese on the lower slope of Yoke while doing nothing about the enemy column attacking 1st Company's ridge. The reason was that the latter force had made slower progress and was still toiling toward the hill. During the same interval the Chinese Platoons to his front had continued the crawl around his left flank and were now even with his position. He took at the enemy's solid column on his own right rear: It was just 50 meters short of the main incline. At that point he gave his directions, calling for the fire to be placed where it would catch the attack head-on. Now the enemy column attacking 1st Company began to dissolve and recoil toward Asfaw's patrol.

In this manner, while his withdrawal route was still open, he made his decision to fight it out on the original line. The Chinese nearest him continued to extend their outflanking maneuver; but he shifted a few more riflemen to the left to slow them with grazing fire.

On Yoke, Sergeant Major Moulte's first act after taking command was to run to Ayela's body to make certain he was dead. Two enlisted men had fallen by the same bomb which killed the lieutenant. Moulte yelled for stretcher bearers. Then, gathering six men and passing each an armful of grenades, he moved along the trench toward the front of Yoke on the heels of the Chinese group that had entered the position after killing Ayela. Moulte saw at
least six Chinese in clear silhouette as they climbed up from the trench wall. Ordering others in his party to carry on and hunt down the invaders in detail, Moulte doubled back to see how things were going at the rear slope. Looking downslope, Moulte counted ten dead Chinese in front of one machine gun. Beyond them, he could count at least thirty of the enemy among the rocks. They became revealed momentarily as they grenaded upward. But the distance was too great and the grenades exploded among their own dead.

At that point the action was taken out of Moulte’s hands for reasons requiring a brief recapitulation. Because of broken communications, Asfaw’s fight had been underway thirty minutes before the Kagnew Battalion knew the patrol was in serious trouble. Asfaw’s first radio message had gone to the platoon of 1st Company on Uncle and his call for artillery on Yoke had perforce bypassed the battalion because 1st Company radio wentg tempera-
mental at the wrong moment. As relayed from Outpost Uncle, the message taken by Captain Addis Aleu, the battalion S-2, was merely a brief warning, “Main movement against Yoke——fire While Right.” Then the Uncle radio cut out and Battalion CP then could only guess about developments.

But from his hilltop on OP, 1st Company’s Commander Captain Behanu Tariau, could eyewitness the skirmishing on Yoke’s rear slope. He had received the relayed message that the patrol had engaged; it came to him from Uncle during the period when 1st Company could no longer raise the battalion. Then for fifteen minutes—the critical period when Moulte was rallying his men to repel boarders—his own radio cut out. His anxieties mounted because of his helplessness. By the searchlight’s glare he could see Chinese massing against Yoke’s back door but he was in touch with no one. When quite suddenly his radio cut through again, he told 2nd Lieutenant William W. De Witt, his artillery forward observer, to hit Yoke directly with VT fire and illuminating shells. Five minutes later Yoke was under torrential artillery fire. The effect of the fire was to drive Moulte’s men back to their bunkers for protection while transfixing the Chinese in the open. This lasted about thirty minutes. Then Tariau asked for a curtain barrage on both sides of Yoke to box in the enemy survivors. He pondered extending the barrage to across the forward slope, then rejected the idea, apprehensive that Asfaw’s men might be falling back on Yoke.

For Asfaw’s patrol, by now the Chinese who had been to his front had completed the half-circle and were spread across his rear. Their skirmish line, near 100 meters from him, had already been joined by the first stragglers from the fires on Yoke, Uncle and 1st Company’s hill. To Uncle, he gave the support request, relayed from there to Captain Tariau and from him to the artillery.
Soon the barrage crushed the Chinese to his rear and fell just short of his own position, braying the enemy line from end to end. When it lifted, there was no more fire from his foreground or immediate rear.

There were also times when he asked and got barrage fire on all four sides of his patrol, thereby to close the enemy escape routes leading to T-Bone Hill. But note the fact that at the moment when Asfaw asked for artillery support his own patrol was wholly out of ammunition, save for the clips in the magazines of three M-1’s. The fragments of the two main enemy columns continued to drift back toward him. He knew that the patrol’s survival from that point on would pivot on the radio and the accuracy of his call to the artillery.

By four o’clock in the morning the battlefield was at last quiet and Asfaw could see no sign of a live enemy. The patrol arose and stretched, satisfied that it had done a good night’s work. Asfaw radioed the message, “Enemy destroyed. My men are still unhurt. We have spent our last bullet.” Being now unarmed, the patrol expected a recall.

What came back proved with finality that Ethiopians prefer to fight the hard way. This was Captain Aelu’s message to Asfaw: “Since you have won and are unhurt and the enemy is finished, you are given the further mission of screening the battlefield, examining bodies for documents and seeking to capture any enemy wounded.”

That task, which entailed another six to eight kilometers of marching, pre-occupied the next two hours. Finally when the patrol returned at 0700, Asfaw went briefly into the statistics of the fight. On the ground within 150 meters of the ditch he had counted 73 dead Chinese. On the slopes of Yoke and within the trenches were 37 more enemy bodies. There were other bodies among the paddies forward of Uncle, still not counted. But assuming the usual battle ratio of four men wounded for every one mortally hit, the score said that he had effectively eliminated one Chinese battalion. In addition to the personnel loss of the enemy, fifteen machine guns, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and hundreds of hand grenades were abandoned by the CCF.

On the night of May 22, at 2300, again an enemy probing attack was launched against the outpost Yoke with a minor strength of one reinforced platoon. At midnight, after arduous fighting with small arms and suffering many casualties, the enemy withdrew. In this action, the enemy suffered the following casualties: 15 estimated killed; 14 known killed; 26 estimated wounded. The Ethiopians suffered four wounded.

On May 23rd, a patrol consisting of five men led by Sergeant Yimer Yamale was dispatched to reconnaissance the enemy positions. When the patrol arrived at the designated spot, it was observed by the enemy. A reinforced
squad of Chinese moved into the area and attacked the Ethiopian patrol from several directions. The patrol informed the battalion by radio that they were fighting against a numerically stronger enemy force. Reinforcements were sent forward immediately to support the five men of the patrol, and so were the Chinese to match the Ethiopians. As the result of the strenuous fighting of the patrol and the supporting units, the enemy suffered 14 known killed, 20 estimated killed, and one mortar destroyed. There were no Ethiopian casualties.

Early in the evening of the 28th of May, an ambush patrol of the 1st Company sent out sixteen men led by 2nd Lieutenant Mamo Haptewold with a mission to set an ambush near the enemy positions in the area of Toksan-ni. But as they were getting into position, a strong enemy force attacked them by surprise. The enemy force, consisting of three hundred men, attacked the patrol of sixteen men from three different points. A furious battle started between the outnumbered Ethiopians and the CCF. In this unequal struggle, three Ethiopians were killed, and the remaining thirteen men of the patrol were wounded.

Meanwhile at 0300, the battalion reinforced the patrol by sixteen men commanded by Lieutenant Zenebe Asfaw from the 3rd Company. Realizing the danger to the patrol of Lieutenant Mamo, Lieutenant Zenebe arrived at the position without delay to help the wounded men return to the Battalion Aid Station. Because of the heroic action of this patrol, and owing to the inspired and courageous leadership of Lieutenant Mamo Haptewold, the enemy, that night, suffered heavy casualties estimated at more than 100 men, of which 35 were counted killed. For this courageous action, Lieutenant Mamo was awarded the highest Ethiopian medal for valor.

At the next night, Second Lieutenant Mamo, again set out for an ambush with his 13 men from the 1st Company. At 2325, that night, the patrol reached the designated objective. When the enemy realized that the patrol was small in strength, one enemy company launched an attack. Thus, battle ensued, and Lieutenant Mamo was the only one that was spared from wound. Lieutenant Mamo led the wounded patrol members, some already dead, to evacuate to safety, though he himself was finally wounded, covering the evacuation from the enemy pursuit. At about noon, the following day, the friendly rescue unit came and evacuated all the dead and wounded. Lieutenant Mamo was later given the Ethiopians top military merit medal for his exceptional gallantry, and he was recommended by the Battalion Headquarters for a US Distinguished Service Cross Medal. During this mission, the patrol team inflicted upon the enemy 28 confirmed dead and 15 unconfirmed dead.

On the 4th of June, the last enemy effort to occupy the outpost Yoke took place. One reinforced enemy company attacked the Yoke outpost which was
defended by a platoon under the command of Lieutenant Workinet Makko from the 4th Company of Kagnew Battalion.

At 2120, the enemy attacked the outpost Uncle. While Yoke and Uncle were engaged in strenuous fighting, an unidentified number of enemy forces attacked the entire front of the battalion. However, the gallant Ethiopians staved off the enemy forces and thwarted their attempt to overrun the position of the Kagnew Battalion, which was assisted by friendly artillery and mortar fire.

In this intense fight, the enemy suffered 15 counted killed and 25 estimated killed, while the Ethiopians suffered two killed, and six wounded.

Yoke became, for the 3rd Kagnew Battalion, the outpost of glory. The bravery in the execution of duty of the Ethiopian fighters and the inspired leadership of the Commander of the Ethiopian forces, Lieutenant Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta created the epic of the outpost Yoke.

During this period in this area, the battalion executed seventy one night patrols, sixty four day patrols, and repulsed successfully repeated strong enemy attacks. Without any difficulties, the 3rd Kagnew Battalion had fought so markedly that it almost outshined the old two Kagnew Battalions. But the Korean conflict was thereafter doomed to end soon on July 27.

Having remained approximately three months on the front line, the Kagnew Battalion was relieved on July 1st by the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd US Regiment. The Ethiopian fighters were ordered to 32nd's reserve camps at Yonchon.

On 11 April, as we have seen, an agreement for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners had been reached. On 7 June, the most serious obstacle in the way of an armistice was removed when agreement was reached on a plan for repatriating prisoners of war. But on 6 July the Chinese began to launch very strong attacks against Porkchop. While the Kagnew Battalion was at Yonchon in 32nd's reserve, the battle raged until the following day when the order was given to withdraw all forces.

Eight days after it was transferred to the reserve position, the Kagnew Battalion was ordered on July 8th to move to occupy position on the front line, but this time, near Porkchop area.

Except for a few minor patrol contacts and the operational moves arising from reliefs in the line, there was little else to record of the Kagnew Battalion.

Then, at last, on 27 July the armistice agreement was signed.

The armistice found the Kagnew Battalion near Porkchop Hill. On 27 July at 2200, the guns and mortars which had so long pulverized the Korean soil
along the Jamestown line fell silent. The armistice had become effective. The event was celebrated casually and briefly: There was a great deal to be done in the 72 hours given each side to withdraw from the Demilitarized Zone.

The Demarcation Line had been located along the actual line of contact. In the 7th Division's sector, the line divided two opposing forces near Porkchop area. The Kagneu Battalion, in common with the other UN formations in Korea, had to complete withdrawal to positions south of the Demilitarized Zone by 2200 on 30 July.

There is a strong feeling of anti-climax about the last days of the Korean War. The Ethiopian troops continued to participate in a UN "presence" in Korea in gradually diminishing strength until the last unit embarked for home on 3 January 1965.

Section 5. Brigadier Bulli in Korea

In May 1953 while they were fighting valiantly to repulse the enemy's attacks against the outpost Yoke and the main line of their defense in the area of Toksan-ni, they were informed that the Commander of the Imperial Security
Guard, General Mulugetta Bulli, was to visit in Korea. The news was communicated in a few minutes. The Ethiopian fighters, knowing the great distance between Korea and Ethiopia and the many responsibilities of General Mulugetta Bulli, realized that the visit of General Mulugetta Bulli constituted a particular manifestation of the General's interest in the Ethiopian fighters.

On the 27th of May, General Mulugetta Bulli arrived by plane at Haneda Airbase, Tokyo, Japan, where he was welcomed by high ranking officers of the US Army, on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, General Mark W. Clark, and by the members of the Ethiopian Liaison Group, United Nations Command, headed by Captain Immeru Wondie.

On the next day, General Mulugetta Bulli inspected the offices of the Ethiopian Liaison Group and later visited American hospitals. He visited the heroic wounded of the recent battles of the Kagnew Battalion, and showed animated interest in the conditions of the wounded, the course of their health and the living conditions in the hospital. The wounded fighters of the Kagnew Battalion were so touched by the unexpected visit of General Mulugetta Bulli, that they were unable to express their joy as he mingled among them. After relating the conditions under which they were treated, the Ethiopian patients assured him of their satisfaction with the general treatment received. General Mulugetta Bulli then proceeded to thank individually the directors of the US hospitals, as well as the doctors responsible for the care of the wounded Ethiopians.

On the occasion of his visit to Tokyo, General Mulugetta Bulli, decorated with Ethiopian medals several American officers, among whom were Colonel E. E. Earnsworth, Chief of the Liaison Groups, United Nations Command, and Colonel Joseph R. Russ of the same office, for meritorious services rendered in support of the success of the Kagnew Battalion.

At noon, on the 29th of May, General Mulugetta Bulli flew to Kimpo, Korea, where he was welcomed by representatives of the Commander of the Eighth US Army, General Maxwell D. Taylor; the Commander of the Ethiopian Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta; and other American and Ethiopian officers. From the air base General Mulugetta Bulli proceeded to the Headquarters of the Eighth Army, where General Maxwell D. Taylor, accompanied by his staff, awaited to extend their welcome. Accompanied by General Taylor, he then inspected the United Nations Honor Guard that drew up in front of the Headquarters to honor the Ethiopian general.

During the luncheon given by General Taylor in honor of General Mulugetta Bulli, General Taylor gave his high account of the Kagnew Battalion in Korea. He stressed particularly its recent action at the front, near Toksan-ni,
when the enemy stubbornly attempted to oust the Ethiopians from their positions, without success. General Taylor expressed to General Mulugetta Bulli his sincere admiration for the Ethiopian fighters, stressing that he considered it an honor to have these fighters under his command.

According to the program prepared by the Eighth US Army, General Mulugetta Bulli visited several American units on the front line as well as at the rear. He understood well the gigantic task of the United Nations Forces, at the front, as well as behind the lines in support of the fighting forces.

On the morning of June 3rd, General Mulugetta Bulli arrived at the Headquarters of the Kagnew Battalion at Toksan-ni, proud of what he had heard from Americans and other Allied officers concerning the action of the Ethiopian fighters on the outpost Yoke. A company of Ethiopian fighters, composed of men from each company of the Kagnew Battalion was drawn up before the headquarters in his honor. General Mulugetta Bulli stood at attention and proudly returned their salute. He shook hands with the assembled officers, congratulating them for their outstanding achievements. Then he inspected the men of the Battalion who had paid tribute to him. These men, with heads erect, steady and clear-eyed, gazed at General Mulugetta Bulli, knowing they had done their duty. It was certain too, that they would continue to do so in the future. And General Mulugetta Bulli knew that their eyes were saying: "General, be sure that we will return to Ethiopia victorious. You can assure our Emperor and the Ethiopian people of this. We shall not disgrace our flag."

Later, on the same day General Mulugetta Bulli, together with Lieutenant Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta, visited the entire Kagnew Battalion. He met and talked with each of the Ethiopian fighters in positions. On this occasion he was briefed by the commander of the battalion and other officers, concerning the tactics of the enemy and the situation at the front. While observing with binoculars the enemy positions, he exchanged views with Lieutenant Colonel Wolde Yohannis Shitta on the overall tactical situation.

In the afternoon, General Mulugetta Bulli decorated those who had participated in the gallant and meritorious actions of the Ethiopian Battalion. He also decorated American officers who had contributed exceptional service to the Kagnew Battalion.

General Mulugetta Bulli remained in Korea for three days. During this period the General noted on the spot the needs of his men, so that he could remedy them upon his return to Ethiopia. This visit of General Mulugetta Bulli raised their morale, and left a deep impression upon the men of the Kagnew Battalion. The love, which the Ethiopian fighters had felt for General Mulugetta Bulli, upon his visit to them at the front in Korea was literally transformed into adoration.
The people of Ethiopia, with wit which distinguishes them, believe among other things, that, which the Romans believed concerning the wife of Caesar; “It was not enough for her only to be honest, but she must show that she is honest.” That is to say, that the people of Ethiopia believe that a genuine interest in one’s vocation should not only exist, but he must confirm. General Mulugetta Bulli, by his visit to the Kagneb Battalion in Korea, exhibited once more his sincere interest in his men. The worthy Commander of the Imperial Security Guard of Scarsec I, has endeared himself to the hearts of his men.

Section 6. Liaison Group and Ethiopian Nurses

In addition to the members of the Ethiopian Force comprising the Kagneb Battalion, there was Liaison Group of Ethiopia, United Nations Command, which served in Tokyo, Japan. The mission of these officers was the representation of the Ethiopian fighting forces, particularly the Kagneb Battalion, in the General Headquarters of the United Nations Command, Far East, located in Tokyo.

The first Ethiopian Liaison Officers in the General Headquarters of the United Nations Command, Far East, were Captain Tamrat Tessema; and his assistant, Captain Sium Worknew. They arrived in Tokyo in June 1951, after having served in Korea with the Kagneb Battalion for a short time. The work of the Liaison Group, though an important element in the contribution of the Ethiopian Force, is obscure. The reason is that the work of these officers was not publicized to any extent because of the nature of the problems which arose between the United Nations Command and the Headquarters of the nations which had fighting units in Korea. The matters which occupied each Liaison Group of Ethiopia, as well as of the other nations, were matters of internal character, which did not have the advantage of publicity by letting it known.

The effort and concern of the Ethiopian Liaison Group was aimed at the strengthening and the success of the struggle of military force of their country fighting in Korea, as well as the success of the overall struggle of the United Nations. The first Ethiopian Liaison Group worked zealously for the success of their mission and succeeded in winning the esteem and the respect of the United Nations Command, including high-ranking American officers of the Headquarters, as well as of the other Liaison Groups of the United Nations. Captain Tamrat Tessema, as Chief of the Ethiopian Liaison Group, was instrumental in the establishing of a sound working basis for the groups which led to the eventual successful accomplishment of the mission of the
The 3rd Kagnew Battalion

Ethiopian Liaison Group.

Captain Tamrat was honored with the American award of the Bronze Star. The citation for his effort from June 1951 to November 1952, describes him as follows:

"Captain Tamrat Tessema, Infantry, Imperial Ethiopian Army, distinguished himself by meritorious service as Chief, Liaison Group for Ethiopia to the United Nations Command, from 17 June 1951 to 1 November 1952. As Liaison Officer between the Imperial Ethiopian Forces and the United Nations Command, Captain Tamrat, demonstrating outstanding professional competence and rare initiative, formulated sound plans and procedures for the successful integration and participation of the Imperial Ethiopian Forces in the United Nations' campaign against overt aggression. With rare diplomacy and keen foresight he maintained close, harmonious relations between the groups, kept the United Nations Command thoroughly informed on the training, efficiency combat requirements and morale of the command, orientated the field commanding officer on current policies and procedures, and was instrumental in reconciling differences in staff procedures and employment of combat forces. Captain Tamrat's meticulous planning contributed significantly to the superior combat effectiveness of the Imperial Ethiopian Forces and his exemplary achievements reflected credit on himself and the military service."

From November 1952 until May 1953, the duties of Chief of the Ethiopian Liaison Group, were discharged by Captain Siyum Worknew, with assistant 1st Lieutenant Getane Rebhi. Captain Siyum Worknew was awarded the Bronze Star in May 1953, for his outstanding contribution.

Captain Immeru Wondie, with assistant 1st Lieutenant Assefa Getahun, was appointed Chief of the Liaison Group in May 1953. Both of these officers had served in Korea with the Kagnew Battalion.

Captain Immeru Wondie served with the Kagnew Battalion in Korea from July 1951 until July 1952. His initial assignment then in Korea was that of a liaison officer between the Kagnew Battalion and the 32nd US Regiment. After three months he was transferred to the position of Training and Operations Officer for the Kagnew Battalion. As Training and Operations Officer, he rendered exceptional service to the Kagnew Battalion and contributed to the success of the battalion in Korea.

Back in August 1952, when Captain Immeru Wondie had returned from Korea to Ethiopia, Brigadier General Mulugeta Buli appraising his abilities entrusted him with the training of the men of the 3rd Kagnew Battalion. With the experience obtained of the tactics employed by the enemy in the Korean War, Captain Immeru Wondie became a valuable collaborator of Brigadier
General Mulugetta Bulli in the organization of the Kagnew Battalion. He rendered a great service to the furtherance of the special training of the Ethiopian fighters in the Korean War.

When in March 1953, this training mission of Captain Immeru Wondie was completed, Brigadier General Mulugetta Bulli ordered him a second overseas duty, now as Chief of the Ethiopian Liaison Group, United Nations Command. During the period of his Liaison Group, he displayed once more the excellent qualities with which he was endowed. He supported the aim of the Kagnew Battalion in Korea as well as the general goal of the United Nations. Captain Immeru Wondie, an officer with sound judgement, unusual talent, and unbounded enthusiasm, would promise a significant role in the higher ranks of the Ethiopian Army.

The Ethiopian Force to Korea included also the Ethiopian nurses, who worked so zealously to relieve the sufferings of the wounded of the Kagnew Battalion. These wounded were treated in various American hospitals in Japan. There the Ethiopian nurses were required, not only from the professional viewpoint of the hospital, but from the wider boundaries of their humanitarian and social mission.

Under circumstances otherwise, the wounded Ethiopian fighters in American hospitals would find themselves in a strange bed, racked with pain but surrounded by strange doctors and strange nurses. Although willing to attend them, the American doctors and nurses would not be able to break the language barrier. Thus the above supposition suffices to account for the role of the Ethiopian nurses.

Let it be noted, that they, too, were volunteers in this struggle. Their service to the wounded of the Kagnew Battalion exalts the Ethiopian nurses to a high position. The Ethiopian Red Cross, whose graduates they had been, must have felt a deep satisfaction and pride in them.

Section 7. Postlude

a. War Account

To the end of fighting, Ethiopia sent to Korea in total 3,518 men of its excellent troops of the Imperial Security Guard in three rotations. They staged a total of 253 battles, mostly in close-quarters, suffering 121 KIA and 536 WIA.

Number-wise, the Ethiopian Force to Korea might rank in the minor contribution of forces among the United Nations to the Korean War efforts, but its record of never having lost an inch of ground and letting none of its men be taken prisoner was second to none. The Kagnews, inhabitants of
a moderate climate, having experienced no such penetrating cold as that of Korea, were fighting not only against the outnumbering enemy, but also against the unsurmountable nature. Yet they displayed the extraordinary fighting ability of their nation and confirmed the idea that the Ethiopians were born fighters.

The Kagnews were one of, if not the sole, unpublicized forces during and after the Korean War. Other nations' troops got the notice of the itinerant war-correspondents in the medley, but the Kagnews found none other than themselves standing on guard along their assigned ridges. It was not that they were hesitant to tell strangers how they did it, but that no one ever asked. Even to the friendly side, at the end as in the beginning, they were the unknown battalion, and to the Communists they were a still greater mystery.

Now that the Kagnews lay low their handy bayonets and evacuated out of their familiar lines a retrospect should be directed on their identity and trait.

b. Morale

The bravery and outstanding accomplishment of the Kagnew Battalion in the hazard of the war was well known to all of the allied comrades-in-arms. The Ethiopians stood highest in the quality of their officer-man relationships, the evenness of their performance under fire and the mastery of techniques. They well adapted to a new environment and to new weapons, by which they achieved near perfect unity of action. These all account for their high morale. And this morale was engendered by their sense of responsibility for their country and the king coupled with their philosophy of life. Every act was engaged with the sense of glory for their beloved always in heart. And knowing how to deal with death, they treated it lightly as a flower.

On night patrol, as he crossed the valley and prowled toward the enemy build-ups, the Ethiopian soldier knew that his chance of death was near perfect. When surrounded beyond possibility of extrication, a patrol knew that the supporting artillery would be ordered to destroy the patrol as well as the enemy to the last man, though this terrible alternative, the Battalion's standing procedure, was never realized. If there were dead or wounded to be carried, the officer or NCO was the first to volunteer. When they engaged the higher headquarters invariably knew what they were doing. The information which they fed back by wire and radio was far great in volume and much more accurate than anything expectable under the circumstances.

c. Behavior

Their capacities excelled in some diversionary aspects of soldiery acts. There are no better whiskey drinkers under the sun. But they took it neat, a
full tumbler at a time, without pause or chaser, and seemed abashed that other UN troops could not follow suit. And in most of the races of man, superstition unfolds with night, tricking the imagination and stifling courage. But it was not so with the Ethiopians. The dark held no extra terror, but it was their element.

Of this in part came their utter superiority in night operations that transfixed the Red Chinese. The Chinese also were once time suspected by the UN troops of having cat-eyes, but not after their encounter with the Ethiopians who had an especial affinity of moving and fighting in the dark. Further to it, the Ethiopians left no tracks, seemingly shed no blood and spoke always in an unknown tongue. This hexed the enemy as if he was fighting a phantom.

d. Patrol Tactics

Their patrol tactics was further to note. They went single file, with the usual column of around twenty men each strung out over approximately 65 meters of trail space. This was their normal way of going when operating conditions, by their standards, seemed reasonably good.

But when fogs, rain or dark reduced visibility, with consequent danger that the column might split at a trail fork, they locked hands from front to
rear. Then, in the manner of a daisy chain, they would advance into enemy territory. This practice, which western troops would be disposed to scorn, they accepted gladly as an extra safeguard against danger. When close to the enemy, they linked themselves with wire to signal what came.

Other than arms, they usually carried one radio, a sound power phone, one red flare to signal for the arranged fires, one green flare to request help from the main line, and one amber star cluster to message that they were returning. Their ranks being unable to use map coordinates, the Ethiopians achieved artillery fire control by blocking out in colors the map area where they were likely to need help. Thus, they simply called for fire on “Blue Left” or “Red Right” etc. Each flare was handled by a different man; he would not fire it except on order from the patrol leader. It was an extra precaution taken by the Ethiopians while on patrol but not well observed by other troops. They considered not exactly themselves too weak in radio technicians, but they anyhow put greater reliance on old-fashioned signals.
ANNEX CHRONOLOGY

1951

13 Apr  Training of the 1st Kagnew ends at Addis Ababa.
16 Apr  Ethiopians embark at Djibouti.
 7 May  The battalion arrives at Pusan and trucked to the UN Reception Center at Tongnae for training.
 9 Jul  Kagnew Battalion clears out of Pusan for Kapyong.
11 Jul  Upon arrival at Kapyong, Kagnew transferred to 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division and put to supplementary training.
29 Aug  Active defense at Samhyon area.
16 Sep  Operation Cleaver
26 Sep  In the division reserve near Hill 1073.
 6 Oct  Kagnew moves for Kapyong before Heartbreak Ridge mission.
 7 Oct  Fortnight refresher training.
21 Oct  Arrives at Heartbreak Ridge and relieves French Battalion.
 1 Dec  Ordered into division reserve.
14 Dec  Again at Heartbreak Ridge.
27 Dec  Punchbowl defense mission.

1952

Mar 7th US Division relieved by the 2nd US Division and Kagnew begins to stay at Kapyong for change-over with the 2nd Kagnew Battalion.
27 Mar 1st Kagnew Battalion holds farewell ceremony at Kapyong and leaves for Pusan.
29 Mar 1st and 2nd Kagnew Battalions meet at Pusan and the 2nd transported to the Reception Center.
 3 Apr  2nd Kagnew leaves Pusan for Yonchon.
 2 Jun  Training ends at Kapyong.
 6 Jun  On line Missouri.
14 Oct  Operation Showdown flared on Iron Triangle.
23 Oct  Kagnew attacks on Hill 598.
 7 Nov  Kagnew moves to Kapyong in reserve.
25 Dec  7th US Division relieves the 2nd US Division in Porkchop—Old Baldy area along with the Kagnew Battalion.
### Annex

1953

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<th>Event</th>
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<td>Ordered into reserve at Yonchon pending the arrival of the 3rd Kagenew Battalion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>Kagenew Battalion arrives at Pusan and goes into the Reception Center.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Apr</td>
<td>Official change-over ceremony, the 3rd Battalion undertakes training course.</td>
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<td>10 May</td>
<td>Ordered to Porkchop—Old Baldy area.</td>
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<td>13 May</td>
<td>Patrol contacts the enemy.</td>
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<td>19 May</td>
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<td>29 May</td>
<td>General Bulli comes to Korea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Jul</td>
<td>Kagenew goes into regiment reserve at Yonchon.</td>
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to the Philippines

The Republic of Philippines occupies an archipelago in the western Pacific, with the area of 299,770 square kilometers. Of 7,100 islands only 462 have more than 2.6 square kilometers and eleven comprise the bulk of the area inhabited by the recent population of estimatedly 35,000,000.

The people of the Philippines belong to the Malay, a subdivision of the great Mongoloid stock. Their ancestor came from southeast Asia, followed by Chinese traders who subsequently remained in the islands. In the southern islands Arab and Indian traders added their blood to the Moslem and Pagan population. The Spanish and American rulers also contributed in part in forming the present populations. About 83 per cent of the inhabitants are Roman Catholics and about 10 per cent belong to the Philippine Independent Church, organized by a Filipino Priest, Fr. Gregorio Aglipay.

Agriculture, livestock, mining, lumbering and fishing lead activities. Quezon city is the official capital, but pending completion many government offices remain in Manila, both on the Island of Luzon. The official language is Filipino (Filipino), based on Tagalog, a Malayan dialect. English and Spanish, also official, are commonly used in government and commerce. Instruction in schools is in English.

The archipelago was visited by Magellan in 1521. The Spanish founded Manila in 1571 and began their conquest. The islands were ceded to the US by the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898, following the Spanish-American War, the US paying Spain $20,000,000 for the territory.

In 1935 US President Roosevelt sent to Manila his ex-Army Chief of Staff named Douglas MacArthur to organize the islands defense. He was made a field marshal in the Philippine commonwealth army the following year, and was separated from the US Army the year after, effective 31 December.

With tension mounting in the Pacific, General MacArthur was recalled to active duty in the US Army on 26 July 1941, to command both Philippine and US troops. When the Japanese attack came on 8 December 1941, his force (40,000 in Filipino Army and 1,000,000 Filipino Reservists in addition to 15,000 American soldiers) was capitulated in May the following year. This put an end to the existence of any organized armed forces in the Philippine until July 1945,
The new bill, known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act passed both Houses of US Congress, and was ratified by the Philippine legislature in 1934. It established a Philippine commonwealth, provided for independence in 1946. On 4 July, 1946, the government was proclaimed in form founded on democratic principles. The constitution provides a Congress of 6-year term, and a House of Representative of 4-year term, and the President and Vice President having 4-year term.

An independent state, the Philippines signed in March 1947 with the former ruler a military base agreement, granting the latter the use of designated military, naval and air bases for a period of 99 years. In 1951 the two nations agreed into a military defense treaty, and before the close of 1950's the military bases' lease term of 99-year was shortened to a 25-year.

In the meantime, the Japanese surrender left the Filipino anti-Japanese guerrillas deprived of their offensive direction, and soon the guerrillas deviated toward anti-government moves. In consequence, this young republic had to raise a security force to cope with the interior threat. And at the opening of 1950's it saw 10 battalions of a constabulary army stationed in threatened areas, with token naval and air components.

The republic is a member of the United Nations and SEATO, and maintains treaties for US military and naval bases and a 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.

Section 2. Formation of the 10th BCT

When the Republic of Korea was invaded at the dawn of June 25, 1950, the United Nations promptly warned the invaders to stop the war. But the invaders redoubled the attack, taking no heed of the warning. The UN as an instrument for world peace thus requested all member nations to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." Beginning with the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, Australia, and France immediately responded to the call, soon to be followed by other nations.

Meanwhile, General MacArthur flew an under-strength infantry battalion and shipped a field artillery battery to Korea, and in early July the both units were aligning their scanty fire arms near Osan. They saw no necessity merely to wait for the arrival of other nations forces. On July 5, at sixteen minutes past 8 o'clock in the morning, the first United Nations shot was fired on the miles-long enemy columns on the road.

Barely four years old, the Republic of the Philippines was at the time in action against a serious internal threat. Despite this the republic did not hesi-
tate to do its part in the United Nations. In July seventeen medium Sherman tanks and one tank retriever were shipped to Korea, and on August 7, she announced her intention to send troops to the Korean front. The announcement did not call for volunteers. Nevertheless, thousands of ex-servicemen and former anti-Japanese guerrillas, as well as a large number of civilians even with no military training or battle experience offered their services.

In a conference in Washington on August 23, 1950, the United States took official cognizance of the move and thanked the Filipinos for their exemplary spirit. The US Government, however, in accepting the proffered assistance from the Philippines, signified its preference for a unit already trained for battle because the situation called for seasoned troop. At the time the Armed Forces of the Philippines had ten battalion combat teams. Among these, the 10th Battalion Combat Team was the only trained military unit. The choice of the country’s military authorities easily fell upon it.

This battalion had been known as the 3rd Battalion on its activation on 29 April 1949, with mission to provide security to the Manila Railroad (now the Philippine National Railways). Its redesignation as the 10th BCT (motorized) came on 24 January 1950 and it was thrown into the campaign against the Huk. The 10th BCT had a full complement of 64 officers and 1,303 enlisted men, consisted of an infantry battalion, a company of medium tanks, a company of light tanks, armored personnel carriers, a battery of self-propelled artillery, and medical, engineers, signal corps and supply units, considered adequate to operate independently.

On September 9, 1950, the 10th BCT stood in full battle gear before a multitude of 60,000 cheering people on the Rizal Memorial Stadium.

The rally for the battalion was sponsored by the Manila Jaycees. It had no parallel in the history of the nation. In it, Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, who, later, was to become the president of the republic, addressed the soldiers. In it, too, the people saw Dr. Carlos P. Romulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly, handed to the battalion the United Nations flag which it was to carry.

The rally commenced at 9 o'clock in the morning. At about 10 o'clock, its main feature took place, with President Elpidio Quirino, handing the Philippine flag, amidst a thunderous ovation, to Colonel Mariano Azurin, Commanding Officer of the battalion. He stated:

"Today we begin to write a wonderful page in our history, many of you have fought on our own soil to secure our freedom, you now go forth to a foreign land to fight for the preservation of that freedom......but you who are to go now will be first to carry the flag of your own sovereign nation abroad in the war for freedom. What you will do will prove to all the world that this
republic and all of you who are part of it have the will and power to survive...

to make our own lives as we want them to be, and to keep them that way."

"Poor as we are," he went on, "this country is making a great sacrifice
in sending you Korea, but every peso invested in you is a sound investment
for the perpetuation of our liberty and freedom. Your valor, your achievement,
will show that free nations faced by a common menace of losing their
civilization have the will and the strength to join together to remove this
menace forever...It is not for us who will stay behind to urge you to be
valorous, to be chivalrous, to be strong. It is rather for you to show us how to
follow you in the valor, the chivalry, the strength with which you go forth."

The unprecedented rally closed with the battalion marching in review before
public. As it passed before the jampacked grandstand, the people broke into great
roar. Towards noon, when all was over, the battalion returned, in a long columns
of roaring trucks, armored cars, and tanks, to Camp Murphy to await the
ship that was to take it to the war. It was about 4 o’clock in the morning of
15 September 1960, that the officers and men—there were 1,375 of them—were
boarding a string of army buses in Camp Murphy, Quezon City.

It did not take long. At daybreak, the whole battalion was at Pier 5 board-
ing the United States Navy transport, Sergeant Sylvester Antolak, which had
been dispatched to the Philippines to fetch the unit.

Ashore to see the ship go were Ramon Magsaysay, then Secretary of Na-
tional Defense; Major General Mariano N. Castaneda, then Commanding General
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Major General Leland Hobbs, at the
time the Chief of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group; and be-
sides a few other high-ranking officers, the commanders of the four major com-
mands of the Armed Forces.

The ship was alone when it sailed off. At about two o’clock, when it was
approaching the historic island of Corregidor, two Philippine Navy submarine
chasers emerged from the direction of the Rock, and as these cruised towards
the speeding transport, two Philippine Air Force fighter planes burst out of
the clouds over the Manila Bay to escort the ship into the China Sea.

The transport moved fast. It gave the feeling to one watching it that it
was in a great hurry to get to where it was going. At three, the ship had re-
ceded so far into the horizon that no longer it was within sight.
CHAPTER II  DEPLOYMENT

Section 1.  The Arrival and the Pusan Perimeter

On September 19, 1950, at the close of what seemed four eternal days and three nights, the men finally caught sight of the land on which they were to fight. Because the sun was not yet up at the time, what the men saw was nothing but a black mass in the distance. But they knew this was it. Because two American destroyers had met the Antolak and were now escorting it.

The sky was overcast when the ship slipped into the harbor at Pusan. As the dawn broke over the port, the transport docked; and soon thereafter, President Syngman Rhee, those of the cabinet of the Republic of Korea, members of the United Nations Commission, some municipal representatives boarded the Antolak.
Ashore to welcome were the flags of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations countries. Ashore, also, were Korean ladies and school children, all waiting to throw flowers and their “Welcome” around the necks of the arriving soldiers.

In a brief ceremony, aboard, the Chairman of the United Nations Commission called attention to one significant fact: that “in joining the great brotherhood of nations fighting in Korea for a decent and enforceable code of international behavior,” the Philippines force was carrying with it into the raging war “the Filipino ideals, the Filipino courage, and the Filipino devotion to duty.”

The tribute was a high one. It was the first ever paid to the Filipino warriors on the Korean soil. In response, the Filipino troops did not say a word. They raised their voices, instead, to the tune of their country’s stirring national anthem.

Before proceeding further to the 10th BCT, a brief presentation of the military situation of the Korean War would be necessary.

The untrammeled North Korean invaders’ advancing confronted early in September fervent resistance and decisive counter-blows of the UN forces in the Nakto River Defense Line. After the North Koreans having failed in the last all-out offensive, the UN forces, composed of the X US Corps and US Marines and the 17th ROK Regiment and Marines, landed on Inchon on September 15, and the next day the ROK and Eighth US Armies launched counteroffensive from the Nakto River Perimeter. On the day when the Filipinos arrived in Korea, the enemy encircling offensive line with two corps and fourteen divisions of the North Koreans was destroyed in pieces and the whole enemy’s line promised to collapse in defeat. On September 18, the X US Corps occupied Kimpo Airfield and headed for Seoul which was to fall on September 28.

On its arrival in Korea, the 10th BCT was ordered to be attached to the 25th US Division which was then deployed along the Nakto River Perimeter. Gathering strength, the Eighth US Army including its 25th Division was then on the brink of pushing through northward. It was this change of the course of the war that the Filipinos were to experience in the immediate Korean theater.

Shortly after the welcome ceremonies aboard the Sergeant Sylvestor Antolak in Pusan, the 10th BCT began to disembark. At ten o’clock, when the debarkation of the Headquarters and Headquarters Service Company, including all its equipment, had been completed, the men were ordered back to the ship.

The orders bewildered the men; on the following morning, just when the men were wondering where the transport was to take them, the battalion was ordered to disembark at last, and aboard a long chain of train of coaches, headed northward.

As in other military operations, the men were not told where they were
The Filipinos in bayonet training at Miryang.

going. At about midnight, however, when the long train had come to a stop, they were informed that the battalion was in Miryang.

For the train, this was the end of the road. Miryang is a typical Korean town nestling between two hills 56 kilometers north of Pusan and sloping gently down the Nakdong River. But for the battalion, it was not, for when the men had disembarked, they found out that between them and the area where they were to bivouac, lay a three-kilometer march in the dark.

Intelligence reports having reached the 10th BCT that Communist guerrilla forces were infesting the mountain areas around them, the Filipinos devoted their time in Miryang to guerrilla warfare exercises. The exercises usually took all morning. In the afternoon, the men played games, and inbetween they were free to gather chestnuts and apples in neighbouring orchards.

The men enjoyed their time immensely, but when the ice-cold nights came, because they had no winter clothing, they had to build bonfires under the over-spreading chestnuts. They had movies, they held informal programs, too, to make the nights easier; and to transport themselves back home at such hours, they contrived to sing Kundimans.

It will be recalled the 10th BCT was scheduled to train in the Philippines for eight weeks before sailing for Korea. Before two weeks were over, however,
the force was pulled out of its training ground in Marikina to stand by for shipment to the battle front. In Korea, the battalion was expected to train for eight weeks before being committed. The training was to include acclimatization, familiarization with modern weapons, and hardening of the men for rough combat duty. Here again, however, the training of the battalion was cut short, for before two weeks passed, the Filipinos were pronounced ripe for combat.

Officers of the Eighth US Army who saw the boys in their combat exercises admired them. One of them, Colonel Alex Lancaster, assistant G-3 of the Eighth US Army, was so impressed, said "Give me the Filipino combat team and I will fight anywhere above the 38th Parallel."

Section 2. Defense Mission at Taegu

On September 29, after ten-day stay at Miryang, the Battalion received orders from the 25th US Division which told it to move to Sachon 130 kilometers to the southwest. On the same morning, the Filipinos struck tent.

It took the whole morning to load. At nightfall, the Battalion could make at Masan, where it passed overnight.

In the following morning the march was resumed. At Kumbuk, a railway station, the train trip was cut short by a broken bridge which rendered the track across a river in the village impassable. The troops and the battalion's impedimenta had to be transferred by trucks across the river. That done, commenced a long, rough trip through a narrow, dusty, bumpy road winding around what seemed to be an interminable range of mountains. The shuttling of troops from Kumbuk to Sachon took time. Two companies, namely, Captain Tenaza's C Company and A Battery could not reach until the next day. They bivouaced the night at Kumbuk with inadequate food and no winter clothing. Farther back, right in Miryang, where the battalion came from, were a group of men and officers, left behind to guard the battalion's supply. They reached Sachon still much later.

At Sachon the battalion was given the mission of providing security for the airfield. Thus, outposts were established around the area and patrolling was conducted. The stay at the village, however, was not long.

The battalion was, in the morning of the 7th, ordered to move to Waegwan north of Taegu. The following morning saw the battalion on the way to Masan. At 0830 of the 10th October, it found itself roaring into Waegwan, a shattered city, with block after block of buildings destroyed by the war.

After arriving at the city, the battalion marched again towards the camp site. Tired and hungry, they came to a scenic apple orchard. They were lucky, they always got orchards for camps. Back in Miryang they had enjoyed a field
of chestnuts.

At Waegwan, the battalion was given the mission of securing the main supply route from Taegu to Kimchon and of clearing enemy guerrillas in the area which was about 2,000 square kilometers. Along this line, a camp site was immediately established and perimeter defense was provided. Liaison was also set up with the Headquarters, 65th US Regimental Combat Team at Waegwan. To cope with its new mission, the battalion assigned its subordinate company sectors of responsibilities, and by 11 October the 10th BCT became operational with a definite sector of tactical responsibility within the US Army's 25th Infantry Division sector. While tactical disposition of troops was taking place, Major General John B. Coulter, Commanding General of the IX US Corps, and Major General William B. Kean, Commanding General of the 25th US Infantry Division, visited the 10th BCT in its new camp. To them Colonel Mariano Azurin reiterated the necessity of training his men for at least eight weeks before being committed in battle. With this request pending further consideration, it had been by now decided that the Battalion area lay 16 kilometers to the west of the city, eight kilometers to the north, and 16 kilometers to the south.

While at Waegwan securing UN supply routes, the unit received most of its vehicles, six 105-mm howitzers and its first complement of seven light tanks. The principal mission of the 10th BCT being to protect all vital bridges and tunnels along the main United Nations supply route running from Taegu to Waegwan and from there to Kimchon, the 10th BCT soon realized it might have no time to train, or it would have to combine its training with actual fighting in the field.

At 1400, 11 October, A Company under Captain Maximo Dumlao left Waegwan by motor for Songju to take over the former sector of the 1st Battalion, the 65th US Regiment. In view of the impending movement of the 3rd Battalion, the 65th US Regiment from Waegwan, reconnaissance was sent off to Waegwan proper. Its two reconnaissance platoons were responsible for the security of the bridges and tunnels along the Kimchon-Waegwan road and railroad. Frequent motorized patrols along the MSR were conducted. The Battalion, less A Company and two platoons of Reconnaissance Company was still at Waegwan.

At 1000, 12 October as soon as all the 65th Regiment units had cleared Waegwan, training on the job began to take effect. The rifle units conducted intensive and vigorous patrolling in their respective sector.

At 0930, 12 October, B Company under Captain Paulino E. Sanchez left Waegwan on motor for Songgok-tong with missions to feel out guerrillas and enemy stragglers at a hill situated between the MSR and railroad in the northern part of the sector.

In the Waegwan area the Communist guerrillas were so aggressive that the
Filipinos had to conduct continuous patrolling. Intelligence gathered by the UN forces indicated that the guerrillas in the area had the strength of two full regiments, and the new sector of the 10th BCT was so vast, exposing it vulnerable to frequent guerrillas harassments on the allied communication lines and convoys along the main supply routes. Most of these enemies had been left behind by retreating Communist forces. The rest were part of a unit cut off from its division due to the allied landing at Inchon in mid-September. A Company which had been assigned to this area failed to establish contacts with the enemy within the first two days (See Situation Map 1).

On 14 October 1950, however, the first clash of the 10th BCT with North Koreans took place southwest of Waegwan, when a patrol of A Company finally caught up with Communists in the village of Kuryong in the Songju area. It ended with the patrol capturing two tons of artillery ammunition, and two North Koreans, the first Communists ever to be captured by Filipinos in Korea. The two Communists were very young and scared. One was barely eighteen years of age, the other, hardly twenty two. Subjected to a thorough interrogation, the prisoners disclosed the number of guerrillas in the area in which they were captured and pointed out to A Company in straggler’s hideout. The next few days yielded no results, but the patrols kept on.

On 23 October, a pre-dawn patrol was ascending a hill north of Waegwan. As the patrols approached a steel bridge spanning the Naktong River, the stragglers opened up strong fire. At exactly three o’clock in the morning of October 23, 1950, Private Alipio S. Secillano, of Liboy, died instantly by a burst of automatic rifle fire at the outskirts of Waegwan.

Secillano was the Filipinos’ first loss on the Korean soil. His comrades bore his remains back to their camp after repulsing the Communists. They wanted him brought back to the Philippines so that he might rest in his hometown. However, due to the non-availability of shipping facilities to transport his remains to the homeland, he was buried in the UN cemetery in Pusan beside the other UN soldiers who, like him, had fallen in the fight for peace on this foreign soil.

After that incident, the unit’s area of responsibility was extended to Songju. On October 24 the Filipinos were on a high ground commanding the road to Seoul. Like Waegwan when the battalion got there, Kimchon had just been recaptured from the defeated North Korean remnants who were left behind, by retreating Communists to conduct guerrilla fighting, blast bridges, mine roads, harass advancing United Nations forces. At Kimchon the battalion continued its mission of securing the MSR and clearing the area of enemy guerrillas.
CHAPTER III ADVANCE TO NORTH

Section 1. Advance to North

On October 29, the 10th BCT assembled at Kimchon for 400-kilometer train ride north to Anju, where now was the western anchor of the MacArthur’s line in the United Nations’ advance to the border of Manchuria.

To account for this rapid turn of the war, a brief explanation of the general situation seems necessary.

Provided with a very broad authority from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to use his own discretion about advancing into North Korea, General MacArthur had begun operations north of the 38th Parallel on 7 October 1950. On this date, the 1st US Cavalry crossed the line in an advance on Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, which it entered twelve days later. The X US Corps, relieved of its role around Inchon and Seoul, put to sea once more and on 26 October commenced landing on the east coast at the port of Wonsan, which had been already captured by the 3rd ROK Division on 10 October 1950. Thus two powerful formations thrust deep into North Korea, the General Walker’s Eighth US Army plus II ROK Corps up to the west coast and General Almond’s X US Corps and I ROK Corps on the east coast.

Thus all the ROK and UN forces rushed into the north and huge volume of the UN naval and air bombardment also joined this ground effort. In the meantime, the routed enemy built up a desperate resistance line connecting Anju Kaechon, and Tokchon. But when the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team under Brigadier General Frank Bowen raided on October 20 into Sukchon and Sunchon districts, the rear of the Anju—Kaechon line, the enemy ran away toward Huichon, north of the Chongchon River.

Now in the south at Kimchon Colonel Azurin, the Commander of the 10th BCT, got the orders from the 25th US Division to clear out of the city on October 31. Already his advance party, composed of three officers and twenty enlisted men, had left Kimchon in a convoy of trucks at 0700, 30 October, and first set foot on the 38th Parallel at 1617 next day. His main party cleared out by the train as scheduled and at 0700, next morning, the Filipinos could see themselves thrust into the North Korea. Later in the same day, the battalion took off the train at Pyongyang and entered the city, where it was
quartered overnight in the abandoned armored school of the North Korean Army.

In the following morning at Pyongyang, the Battalion picked up the I US Corps orders which directed it to be attached to the 187th US Regimental Combat Team giving a new mission. The Battalion’s new assignment was to secure the MSR from Kaesong to Pyongyang, exclusive of the city, and the clearing the area of guerrillas. The mission, thus changing the Battalion’s destination to southward, was considered very pressing and important. Since the regular North Korean Army collapsed, they had formed a second front of guerrillas composed of the vanquished soldiers. One unit of 20,000, the defeated NK II Corps, squirmed in the rear of the UN front line, and the other 20,000 were active in the Honam district (southwest district of Korea) based on Mt. Chiri. They raided friendly supply routes, oil dumps, communication networks and installations, rail cars and other military facilities.

In the morning of the 3rd November the Battalion left Pyongyang. Tank Company proceeded to Haeja, 110 air kilometers south of Pyongyang; Reconnaissance Company to Hanpo-ri, 105 air kilometers southeast of Pyongyang; B Company to Namchonjom, 13 air kilometers north of Hanpo-ri; C Company to Chungwha and relieved A Battery of the 67th US Airborne Battalion. The rest of the Battalion proceeded to Hwangju, 40 air kilometers south of Pyongyang. The Battalion established its Headquarters at Hwangju and was given a sector twice as vast as its area in Kimchon. Intense patrolling was then carried out, and the unit provided security measures for the establishment of civil administration.

On arrival at Hwangju, at 1400, 3 November, the Filipinos unexpectedly got into action in a residential district a few blocks from their headquarters. The Battalion noticed many armed men. To ensure security of the camp vicinity, Colonel Azurin ordered the town searched, designating A Company and a platoon of Tank Company to do the task. While searching the town, Lieutenant Serrano noticed an unusual movement in a nearby village. The first to enter the enemy area was 1st Lieutenant Bonny Serrano, who was later to earn the distinction of being the most decorated member of the Filipinos.

Serrano was prompted to look into it. With five men, the officer encircled the village, passing behind it across a hill. On reaching the village, he found out that a big house surrounded by a high stone wall was closed and heavily guarded. In it were two machine gun emplacements. With precaution, two Filipino troopers scaled the wall which had one gun emplacement on its top. Two others with Serrano aimed at the other emplacement. They decided to attack at once rather than to wait for the main force lest the North Koreans would escape.

Simultaneously they jumped into the emplacements, using their rifle butts
on the gunners' heads and yanked the guns out of the emplacements and rushed into the building. Serrano shot the lock off the door and surprised to meet a cluster of Communist youths and stragglers. It was a spectacular raid which was later to give the Filipinos a name for their daring. Without any opposition the enemy raised their hands.

The Filipinos quickly pushed the North Koreans to a corner of the hall and started to search opening compartments, cabinets, boxes, etc. and found therein as they had expected, more Communists. Corporal Facto kicked a wardrobe open and found inside it a shivering Communist. In a similar case, Serrano pumped a bullet into a big chest and out came a North Korean, unhurt. The raid was fast. As it moved toward a dramatic climax, the other units rounded up the guerrillas in the district. By nightfall, the three 10th BCT companies had a total haul of 167 NK stragglers, 68 Russian rifles, two Russian machine guns, several boxes of ammunition, and three sacks of North Korean money. In the group of prisoners were two lieutenants and five sergeants.

Meanwhile, in the vicinity of Chunghwa, assorted fire-arms of various calibers were captured. The 10th BCT rushed into the scene and came to set off on a campaign the first major engagement of which was to see the Battalion...
fight in force for the first time on Korean soil. The Battalion was fought against two NK battalions well-entrenched in the mountain village of Singye.

On 10 November, the Battalion CP was moved to the vicinity of Sinnak, 28 kilometers southwest of Singye, preparatory to a large-scale operation. When evening came, A and B Companies, Artillery Battery and the reinforced reconnaissance platoon assembled at Namchonjom, 18 kilometers southeast of Sinnak.

At 0600, 11 November, the Battalion moved out with a mission of reconnaissance in force towards Singye, instead of going eastward direct to Singye to give the enemy the impression that it was heading for another objective. At 0700, the Battalion, under the protection of heavy snow, headed for Miudong, a strange-looking village whose fortified hills guarded the southern approaches to Singye. On the Miudong hills it was impossible to observe the enemy due to the thick mantle of snow covering the village. Therefore, three forward observers, moved ahead of the column. Then the Battalion followed cautiously.

At about 0900, when the combat team came within firing distance from the fortified hills, a land mine exploded, hurling a truck into splinters right at the head of B Company column. The explosion set the battle off, for even as the 10th BCT tanks and howitzers were detouring to the left side of the road to evade minefields, the enemy opened up from their entrenchment on the Miudong hills and pinned down the whole battalion. Miudong was occupied by two NK battalions, the 10th BCT found it hard to approach. The Battalion’s tanks and howitzers, having been caught in a position from which they could not effectively fire, there was only one thing to do. 1st Lieutenant Bonny Serrano, and a squad of his 81-mm mortar crews crawled precariously through the ceaseless enemy fire to the foot of a ridge overlooking the enemy hills, and as they embarked on the foolhardy mission of climbing the steep height. Battery Commander, Captain Mariano Robles, ascended a neighboring hill, and succeeding to locate some of the enemy emplacements in spite of fire, pulled his battery into position to counter.

Before the bewildered enemy could figure out what had happened, Miudong was under a terrific fire from Robles’ hill and Serrano’s ridge. Losing some of their emplacements, the enemy was forced to slacken their fire, and quickly exploiting the situation, the Filipino Battalion deployed for the battle.

In the afternoon, Lieutenant Serrano and his men, still firing from atop their ridge, trained their guns on an enemy concentration in the heart of Miudong and conveniently using phosphorous shells this time, set the village a fire. Flushed out, the enemy troops rushed southward in a desperate attempt to occupy a new position. As the fortune of battle would have it, however, they committed the fatal mistake of coming right in front of the position of
A Company and were quickly moved down. The Filipinos put in one last attack and achieved complete success. They counted 50 enemy dead. The Battalion lost only one man killed and several wounded. It was a brilliant triumph for the Battalion. At dusk, when all was over, the Battalion marched back to Namchonjom.

But before the 10th BCT came to rest in Namchonjom from the day’s battle in Miudong, it received orders to attack an enemy concentration in Unjom-ni, a village, 8 kilometers west of Singye, and dispatched forthwith a task force to the new objective.

On 12 November, that very day it set off, the task force, composed of A Company under Captain Maximo Dumlao, and a section of Reconnaissance Company under Lieutenant Bonny Serrano, mounted the attack and in its initial engagement killed 12 Communists. The enemy defending the village, being too big, the force withdrew shortly thereafter. To take its place, a battalion of Americans was thrown in. The American battalion desperately engaged the enemy several times.

Apparently of no extraordinary significance, the events, at any rate, disclosed the might of the NK forces against which the BCT had to fight. In spite of the fact that in the fight in Miudong, which preceded the Unjomni battle, the 10th BCT was pitched against a well-entrenched enemy force more than twice its strength, the Filipinos fought on and were next ordered to wrest Singye, which at the time, was being held by two full NK regiments. Unfortunately for the Filipinos, however, the winter winds in the area had already become so severe, the temperature so low—it dropped to 22 degrees below zero on one occasion—that even the rivers had already turned into ice road when the directive for the attack was issued. Not clad for the weather, the winter clothing previously issued to them was not for the climate above the 38th Parallel, the unaccustomed Filipino troops chilled so much that there were some who could hardly squeeze their triggers. More over the Battalion was badly depleted by men confined in hospitals for various ailments, mostly respiratory. However, Colonel Azurin took measures to implement the order to attack, and as the Battalion prepared to move out, he brought the unit’s situation to the attention of higher authorities. Hurried consultations followed and before long, a decision was reached to dismember the Battalion and attach its assigned companies to different American units temporarily.

A Company was attached to the 67th Field Artillery Battalion at Kunu-ri and assigned the mission of guarding ammunition dumps and to secure Kunu-ri—Sinanju route. C Company was stationed at the vicinity of Sinanju to secure Sinanju—Anju—Sukchon route. The tankless Tank Company then attached to the 67th Field Artillery Battalion was disposed at the vicinity of Chunghwa to
secure the Chunghwa—Sariwon MSR. Field Artillery Battery attached to the 67th Field Artillery Battalion was in the vicinity of Pyongyang securing Pyongyang airstrip. Reconnaissance Company was at Hanpo-ri, securing the bridges there. The Battalion forward CP, Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Medical Detachment were in the vicinity of Sariwon with the reserve units securing Sariwon—Hanpo-ri route.

Colonel Azurin naturally wanted to hold his Battalion together and therefore made desperate attempts to seek the revocation of the directive. On 24 November, however, the colonel, having been recalled by the Philippine government for a new assignment, had to abandon his attempt.

Section 2. Encounter with the CCF

Early in November 1950, the allied forces first witnessed the presence of Chinese troops in the fight. Several were captured, together with North Korean Communists, in MacArthur's drive towards the Manchurian border. These asserted that they had joined the North Korean forces as so-called "volunteers." However it soon became evident that the war had assumed a new, unexpected face, for within a matter of days, a Korean regiment met in combat a strange, superior force which allied intelligence outfits could not believe was a North Korean unit. As the war continued to rage, more and more Chinese Communists were captured, and pretty soon, the Fifth US Air Force on a mission to attack enemy supply bases had observed unusual activity above the Manchurian border. Still a little later, the same air force reported having sighted an endless line of vehicles loaded with troops and equipment moving southward along the border.

On Sunday, 26 November it was learned that a Red Chinese offensive had developed 60 kilometers east of the Pakchon-Sinanju and threatened the 25th and 2nd US Infantry divisions in the center. The Red Chinese objective was soon clear. The main weight of their offensive had broken through in the Tokchon area, and they were now swinging west to cut off from the south, jammed in the narrow, overcrowded valley between the central mountains and the Yellow Sea. The immediate object of the CCF drive was the Kunu-ri—Sunchon—Pyongyang road.

The command post of the dismembered 10th BCT was at the time in Suwon. When Lieutenant Colonel Gamaliel Manikan, then acting commander, received the report that C Company was heading towards the Chongchon River, where the CCF hordes were breaking through, and that A Company, under Captain Maximo Dumlao, was on the way to Kunu-ri, near the scene of the Commu-
nist offensive, an ominous silence fell upon the Headquarters.

Both A and C Companies were being attacked from the air then. They pushed on to their new positions, however on the 26th, at which time the Red Chinese onslaught had widened to a 140-kilometer frontline, the main body of C Company hit Sinanju, on the mouth of Chongchon River, after placing a platoon at Sukchon and another platoon not far from Sinanju proper. The Chinese forces had not yet crossed on the Sinanju portion of the critical river, but all night long on the 26th, the town’s big guns roared incessantly in an effort to hold back the onrushing Communist forces on the opposite side.

On the following day, when the tide could no longer be held at bay, the UN forces started rolling back, with the Filipinos keeping their routes safe for them.

The withdrawal continued all day. On the 29th, A Company had finally pulled out of Kunu-ri, but C Company, having received no orders to move out, stood its ground in Sinanju. The town then was roaring desperately to protect the seemingly endless caravan of withdrawing troops, but two hours after midnight, the gun ceased firing altogether. Captain Tenazas, sensing something serious, dispatched a few men to find out what had happened. When the men returned, they reported waringly that the Filipinos were the only friendly troops left in the town.

It appeared that since even the allied airplanes which a platoon of C Company had been guarding at the outskirts of the town had flown away, somebody suggested that the company withdrew, too. Instead of moving out, however, Captain Tenazas and his officers quickly drew up a plan to defend the area, and soon had all the men ready to meet the enemy forces on the outskirts of the abandoned town. Fortunately, the UN Command did not intend to hold Sinanju.

On 30 November, when Communist tanks began roaring towards Sinanju from Kunu-ri, which up to the previous day, 29 November, had been held by A Company, Captain Tenazas’ C Company was ordered to move out, too, thus averting, in the nick of time, what would have been a tragic though perhaps heroic, end for the Filipinos.

At the time C Company, which had intended to defend the Chongchon River alone against the Chinese hordes who were breaking through it was finally ordered to abandon Sinanju on 30 November, advance elements of a large CCF entered the village of Yul-li, approximately 30 kilometers east of Pyongyang, with the intention, evidently, to attack the city. An allied battery was called upon to shell the CCF fortification in the village to delay the main body of the advancing Communist forces, but this failed to destroy the objective. On December 1, when the situation had become precarious, Brigadier General
Frank Bowen of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team called on the Filipino battery to rush to the vicinity of the enemy occupied village to support the 3rd Battalion of his airborne outfit, and in compliance therewith, four of the 10th BCT’s howitzers proceeded to the objective.

Captain Mariano C. Robles, Commander of the Filipino battery, himself headed the group. With him were four other officers: Lieutenant Guillermo S. Moreno, executive officer of the battery; and Lieutenants Enrique Albano, David V. Sanchez, and Victoriano del Pilar. They got to as close as 8 kilometers from the enemy position. At one o’clock in the same afternoon, the Filipinos’ first shot was on its way to the target.

A US observation plane hovering over the area to watch the firing reported that the shell hit the very heart of the village. The information was all the Filipinos needed. In a minute, the four Filipino artillery pieces started blazing in a tempo that amazed the Americans who saw the actions. They said frankly that the action was the fastest firing of howitzers they had ever seen. Speed, however, was not all there was to the attack, for even as the smoke rose up to the skies, the observation plane reported that the entire Yul-li village had been leveled to the ground. The exploit delayed the enemy advance considerably. In a very critical hour, it won for the allied forces in the area added time to slip out of the Red noose fast tightening upon them.

Later in the evening of 1 December, A and C Companies joined the Battalion at Pyongyang. The Tank Company which had established a blocking position north of Pyongyang was withdrawn late in the evening, too.

The Battalion moved back by motor and foot to Sariwon on 3 December and FA Battery which had been assigned to a security mission in the vicinity of Pyongyang airstrip moved by motor to Sariwon and closed in on 4 December. The Tank Company relieved Reconnaissance Company which continued to secure bridges in the vicinity of Hanpo-ri.
CHAPTER IV REALIGNMENT OF THE FRONT

Section 1. General Retreat

As the new CCF offensive threw back the UN forces, the Filipinos, too, started moving southward. A good 130 kilometers were before them, all of which they had to cover on foot because the Battalion had only left two trucks.

The combatants were already weary. Delay in their movement would have meant capture or death. To enable them to get to Kumchon, their company commanders, at least some of them, had to order the men to discard their loads. The soldiers, on weary, frost-bitten feet, plugged on. When at last it had become inevitable for them to choose between their bulky clothing and their heavy equipment, they hugged what they said would keep them warmer. Their guns!

At 0900, 6 December, the 187th US Airborne RCT ordered the 10th BCT for tactical employment in the Kumchon—Kaesong area to clear up North Korean guerrillas reportedly planning to stage an attack.

At 0900, 8 December, the Battalion, less FA Battery, Tank Company, and reserve units, left Kumchon for operations through the hills of Taedun-dong, 21 kilometers northeast of Kumchon, Chudong, and Kilsu-ri 10 kilometers northeast of Kumchon. Very little resistance was encountered in these operations. In five days however, two encounters took place. One in the hills of Sindae-dong, and the other, in a hill area north of Kumchon.

On 9 December, the engagement in Sindae-dong flared up, when elements of Captain Dumlao’s A Company were attacked as they headed towards Sindae-dong 8 kilometers east of Kumchon on a mission to flush out guerrilla forces. The Filipinos braved the attack, and throwing the enemy unit off balance, quickly reduced the encounter into a running battle in which the Communists left behind them nine bodies.

In the encounter north of Kumchon, elements of Captain Sanchez’s B Company proved as effective. At 1000, 10 December, B Company engaged an estimated forty to fifty enemy group; three were killed, and the rest dispersed towards the mountains to the north.

On the same day the Battalion reassembled at Wichon-ni 19 kilometers east of Kumchon to cover the withdrawal of allied units. At 1330, a force
spearheaded by Reconnaissance Platoon passed through Kumchon—Kilsuri—Wichon-ni. At 1400, rear elements of the Battalion and FA Battery left Kumchon by motor, and arrived in Wichon at 1630. The Tank Company was still at Hanpo-ri.

At the time this engagement took place, however, civilian refugees started streaming southward through the area of the 10th BCT and soon thereafter, a train of trucks began roaring down the same road, also southward. The flow of vehicles was ceaseless. In the evening, Filipino officers dispatched to check up on the heavy traffic to the south informed Colonel Ojeda that the other allied forces in the area were withdrawing. He came to know that the BCT was now the blocking force for the allied retreat.

At 1330 of the 11th, the Tank Company and reserve units arrived in Wichon-ni and joined the Battalion. Commencing from 0900 till 1800, FA Battery fired harassing fires towards the north and northeast of Wichon-ni against a reported CCF concentration. A war correspondent who was then with the Filipinos' outfit considered that night "most crucial moment" the Battalion had ever had in Korea. According to the correspondent, Colonel Ojeda had foreseen that the days of the BCT in Wichon-ni would be fraught with danger and in preparation therefore, the Colonel had his men clean their rifles.
At about ten o'clock on the night of 11 December, a message came. The message was an urgent radiogram from General Bowen. "To 10th BCT: Friendly units report enemy advancing southward your direction. Your northern flank completely exposed. Imperative you hold approaches Wichon-ni at all cost. Liaison officer enroute with complete particulars, CG 187th RCT."

Colonel Ojeda immediately summoned his officers to a conference and a plan had been drawn up for what was going to be the Battalion's last stand. Every Filipino in the line was tense all night. As it came to pass, however, the road along which the Communist forces were advancing had a fork at a point not far from Wichon-ni, and on getting to it, the Reds, instead of taking the route leading to the position of the Filipinos, took the road that led to an area occupied by ROKs. As it came to pass again, however, the defense of Wichon-ni was not over yet, for even before the men could rest, reports were received that two big groups of guerrillas were poised to attack the place. Filipino observers promptly located these. At 0900, 12 December, the 10th BCT opened up with its artillery. The firing continued throughout the day. Towards evening, Wichon-ni was finally free from all threats.

When all other UN forces had gone beyond Wichon-ni, the Filipinos began to pull out of the village, and proceeded to cross the 38th Parallel southward, called ruefully by the Filipinos "the wrong way," down to Munsan, north of Seoul. The retreat took all day on foot. The march was to end at sunset. But before the unit could begin digging in its new area, it was directed to withdraw through a stretch of 30 more kilometers.

It was 14 December when the 10th BCT reached Suwon some 30 kilometers south of Seoul. When the Filipinos got to the city, there were all the UN reserves: The Greeks, the French, the Thailanders, the Dutch, and the British. Moreover they were to find out that they were attached to the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

On their second day reports were received by the Battalion that large bands of Communists were operating in the villages not far from the city. The Filipinos had not had a day of rest up to then. Since the area involved had to be probed, however, Filipino patrols were soon on the road to the villages. One of the patrols was made up of elements of B Company. Heading towards Chudong, it got into action against fifty enemy and inflicted fourteen casualties on its fleeing foe. In the village of Suhoe-dong, another patrol, composed of elements of Reconnaissance and B Companies meanwhile ran into trouble with a Communist band which, as the combined patrol was later to discover in course of the encounter, was made up of 200 men equipped with mortars and machine guns. It was not so easy to subdue the enemy, but with superior fire power, the patrol of the Filipinos finally routed the Communists fleeing towards
On snow-covered ground, the Filipinos shivered as they aimed at the enemy.

the village of Hwangdu-san. The enemy left behind them 20 of their dead.

Because of the day’s unusual activities, the Filipinos had expected their succeeding days in this city to be another busy period. The days ahead of them, as they were to know soon enough, however, were to be days of rest—their first since the great withdrawal from the North Korea. The men enjoyed themselves in the area and they were more than happy.

During the withdrawal from northern Korea in December of 1950, the United Nations allied forces was in one of their worst crisis. Countless Communist Chinese continued streaming from the Manchurian border. Sweeping southward like a furious sea, they kept hurling the allied forces back to the south of Korea. But the US Army outdistanced the pursuing Chinese and North Koreans and broke contact with the enemy. Launched on New Year’s eve, the Chinese offensive was directed at Seoul and Kapyong in the west and Wonju in the center. Four Chinese divisions and three reorganized North Korean divisions led the assault. By the afternoon of 1 January the enemy had crossed the Imjin River and penetrated to within 15 kilometers of Uijongbu in the I US Corps sector, and reached Kapyong in the III ROK Corps’ rear area. Directing their attacks along corps and divisional boundaries, and on the high ground flanking the
main road to Seoul, the Communist troops made rapid progress. This time, however, the UN Command had ample warning. Knowing that the enemy had a limited capacity for sustained operations due to that the Chinese uncommitted reserves were large, the decision was made to evacuate Seoul and withdraw south of the Han River. The withdrawal was not accomplished without bitter fighting as the enemy to the south cut off the retiring troops of the UN Command by infiltration, encirclement and ambush.

On 1 January 1951, the 10th BCT was no longer in Suwon. The unit had left for Kwangdong-ni a town along the south bank of the Han River, with the 8th US Cavalry Regiment to which it was attached. The Chinese offensive continued to tear the defense line on the 30 kilometers stretch above Seoul. Because at the beginning of the mass offensive it appeared that hordes of Reds might attempt to cross the Han River, a unit had to be strung along the river bank to block the enemy.

The mission of the Filipinos and the 8th Cavalry Regiment was ordered into this blocking mission. Both units hurriedly dug in. The Battalion occupied the left portion of the 6th ROK Division. However the Han River, like the strategic Imjin, across which countless enemy troops, tanks, and artillery, were at the time freely streaming, was a long winding mass of ice at the time. To prevent the enemy from getting to the south by merely walking across, the 10th BCT blasted the river with its artillery. The work took a few hours. And then, the 10th BCT took to its hastily-dug foxholes along the south bank to await the enemy. From 3 January, the Battalion maintained its defensive positions and screened its sector during this period with no reported enemy contact.

Within the first five days of the enemy offensive the allies lost so much ground that on January 6, the Red Chinese and North Korean hordes came to within striking distance from the city of Wonju, a transportation hub 70 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel.

Seven full red divisions, sweeping across the central mountains, swooped down upon the city. On January 7, when the city fell, the 10th BCT moved through roads and trails one-foot thick with snow to the village of Oksan-dong, a few kilometers north of Chochiwon, and therefrom, when the enemy vanguards had gotten to within 130 kilometers from Waegwan, to Yongdong, 80 kilometers or so northwest of the endangered city.

The outfit was then detached from the 8th Cavalry Regiment, and was next attached to the hard-pressed Eighth US Army, with the mission, this time, to secure a vast area extending from Kimchon to Taegon, a distance of 95 kilometers; and from Poun to a point 50 kilometers from Yongdong proper.
Relieved from the 1st US Cavalry Division on 14 January, Battalion CP with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Reconnaissance and Tank Companies moved to the vicinity of Yongdong, and the Battalion was placed under the direct control of the Eighth US Army's Headquarters. A Company proceeded to Okchon, B Company moved to Hwanggan, and C Company proceeded to Kimchon.

Section 2. UN Counteroffensive

As early as mid-January, the redeployed UN forces, having gained sufficiently in precious time, started meeting the Reds squarely. Through blinding snowstorms, they fought back enemy forces in the Wonju area and in the Seoul sector; and in mid-February, after a titanic seesaw struggle through a period of about forty days, they finally appeared to have stalled the "Human Tide" throughout the whole front line.

General MacArthur inspected the frontline units then; and seeing that the time was ripe --- the enemy now appeared to have finally spent itself --- briefed his commanders himself and finally gave them the go-signal for his "Operation Killer."

The huge offensive commenced on February 21. On 3 March, when the entire breadth of the Korean peninsula was already raging, the call to the frontline was pronounced on the 10th BCT. They moved out of Yongdong for their encounter with the enemy.

Effective at 1200, 3 March, the Battalion was relieved from security assignment at the Taegu—Kimchon MSR and moved by motor and rail to the vicinity of Pankyo-ri, 8 kilometers southeast of Seoul on 4 March. At 0500 next day, the Battalion was further attached to the 3rd US Infantry Division and assumed a defensive position along the south bank of the Han River with an American battalion on the right and the Belgian Battalion on the left. Commencing at 0900, on the 8th, the Battalion effected the relief of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th US Regiment in the position and directed to hold on its foxholes under the condition of the sub-zero temperature and heavy, lashing rain. There, Colonel James Boswell, Commanding Officer of the 7th US Regiment visited the Battalion. He was impressed with the enthusiasm which they had camouflaged their position and praised the Filipinos commenting "I cannot see how the Chinks can infiltrate here."

After a few days of anxious waiting, in damp foxholes, for the much expected Communist breakthrough on the left flank of the UN forces, the 10th BCT was finally alerted for the projected crossing of the Han River. In preparation for the crossing, patrols were dispatched to probe the areas involved.
In the afternoon of 7 March, a member of the patrols was brought back—dead. The incident rendered the Filipinos restless, they wanted to go out and fight anywhere.

Meanwhile, the enemy guns from across the Han River had defied the 10th BCT’s battery for the past five days and no amount of air and artillery pounding could dislodge the hostile gun positions.

At 2200, 12 March, under cover of darkness, a nine-man patrol led by Lieutenant Serrano rowed across the river in a small crash boat. Supported by elements of Tank Company, it deployed along the north bank with mortars and machine gun fire. Crawling along the sandy beach, the patrol succeeded in penetrating the nearby enemy held village, where they flushed out foxholes to discover enemy gun emplacements. At exactly midnight, after staying for over two hours, the patrol rowed back to the south bank of the river without suffering any casualty.

Early in the morning of March 13, enemy positions were under fire again. With the exact location of the defenders’ emplacements now known, the Filipino battery this time silenced the enemy guns. Colonel Ojeda then ordered one squad of C Company to cross the river. Before noon, under the command of Lieutenant Erdufo Pagala and with the support of Lieutenant Nicanor Garcia and his 81-mm mortars on the beach, the squad set off. As it landed on the island, Lieutenant Colonel Delfin Argao and Captain Dominador Tenazas, who were directing the crossing operations, shoved off two other squads, under the command of Lieutenant Jose Dimalanta. These occupied safely, too. As they hit the beach, Captain Tenazas himself and two non-commissioned officers and one Private First Class Juan Navarro followed.

The raiders wrecked all the enemy pillboxes and dugouts they could find and after all the men in the island had been rounded up, B Company landed.

On the 20th, the Battalion advanced to the north and occupied Chonnong-dong area, eastern part of Seoul. Two enlisted men from B Company were killed in action when an enemy patrol attacked a listening post during the night of 20 March. The following day the Battalion was withdrawn from out-post positions and attached to the 64th US Medium Tank Battalion which was in division reserve.

The unit, however, did not stay long in reserve. On the 22nd, it was attached to the 65th US Infantry Regiment and two days later the Battalion again joined the assault northward. Elements of the 65th US Regiment and the BCT moved into positions west of the 187th US RCT and continued the attack to the north in the afternoon of 27 March. Resuming the attack, the Filipinos engaged and quickly dispersed ten to fifteen enemy groups 10 kilometers northeast of Tokchon, and advanced 4,000 meters. A small probing attack was
abruptly repulsed after the enemy had lost two lives. Likewise, the Battalion contacted fifty enemies at the vicinity of Pongam-sa, 10 kilometers northwest of Tongduchon, and other elements of the Battalion contacted enemies at Kamaksan, two kilometers due south of Pongam-sa.

On 26 March, the Battalion contacted elements of the 67th US Field Artillery Battalion which was dropped behind enemy lines. The reunion between the Filipinos and Americans was a very happy one. Officers and men exchanged patches in commemoration of the achievement and together recalled their hard days in Hwangju and Miudong.

On the 28th, a daring Chinese Communist horse-cavalry unit launched a probing attack on the Battalion’s position along the southern bank of the Imjin River some north of Seoul. Elements of the Battalion met the attack squarely, and after a brief exchange of fire in which they killed two Reds and captured two others, the Filipinos had the pleasure of seeing the much-feared cavalry fleeing to the nearest hills.

On 30 March, the Battalion reached as far as the bank of the Imjin River, in line with other UN forces. Elements of C Company, operating on enemy territory at the Battalion’s right flank, liberated two American POWs and at the same time picked up four North Korean soldiers.

On 31, March, the 10th was reverted operationally to the British 29th Brigade. On the same day, the Battalion advanced to the vicinity of Choksong on the main highway northeast of Munsan and occupied blocking positions south of the Imjin River. The Red Chinese along the north bank of the river attempted as desperately to hold back the 10th BCT; but the Filipinos stubbornly stabbed their way inward, usually ahead of the other UN forces along the western front.

On 4 April, the Belgian Battalion relieved the 10th BCT in its zone of responsibility. The Battalion then moved to Songna-ri and rejoined the 65th US Infantry Regiment, then into division reserve. However, to meet the situation, the Battalion quickly passed into the operational control of the 65th US Infantry Regiment, a Puerto Rican unit and was once more on its way to the frontline, with its own tanks spearheading.

On 10 April 1951, the Battalion crossed the line again, and this time in pursuit of the invaders, drove straight into North Korea. At about sunset on the same day, it halted. It had come face to face with two battalions of Chinese Communists thrown across its road to block it. The Filipinos were barely 900 meters from the enemy when night fell upon them on April 10. Taking full advantage of the effect of an air raid delivered by the UN Air Force in the afternoon of that day, they maneuvered into position to strike. When morning
came, next day, they found themselves in the vicinity of the village of Sango-ri, 4 kilometers southwest of Yonchon. In spite of the mounting danger around them, the Filipinos could not help wondering. To them it seemed strange that a place so lavishly endowed with grandeur should be involved in bloodshed. And yet, ironically enough, here it was where some of them were to die that very day.

The battle in the area broke out with the Filipinos taking the offensive. They approached in two prongs, with C Company supported by B Company, and A Company supported by the Reconnaissance Company spearheading the offensive. At first C Company under Lieutenant Erduifo Pagala struck on the left. As the unit held off enemy forces attempting to break in, the 3rd platoon under Lieutenant Jose Dimalanta advanced along the road and lost one of the tanks supporting it. Meanwhile A Company smashed inward from the right and as the enemy rained mortar shells on the advancing forces, Colonel Ojeda threw in his Reconnaissance Company.

The battle raged almost all day. In the afternoon, when the Filipinos started closing in despite heavy mortar and machine gun fire, the enemy gave up finally, and in its hasty retreat, left behind them the bodies of 28 of their casualties. The Filipinos lost two and three were seriously wounded, two others were saved from serious injury by the equipment they had on their bodies.

After relieving the elements of the 65th US Infantry to score triumphs the Battalion jumped off again the following morning and fought several more days. At that time it had gotten deeper into the enemy territory than it was expected to in one week, so it was ordered on the 17th of April to break contact with the enemy and proceed to an area near Polmal 4 kilometers northwest of Chonkak near the Imjin River to rest. The Battalion soon found itself resting quietly along the bank of the Imjin River. Officers and men drew equipment and clothing to replace what they had lost in battle (See Situation Map 2).

Section 3. Along the 38th Parallel

The victory of April 11, 1951 was the beginning of the Filipinos’ triumph in Korea. Therewith the 10th was taken deep into Naktae-dong. In the morning, April 12, the Battalion jumped off again and wrested another cluster of hills. The day’s offensive was spearheaded by A Company. As in the previous day, the enemy’s reaction was immediate and furious. With sustained mortar fire, the Communists took full advantage of their terrain and immobilized the Filipinos for some time. The Battalion’s leading company succeeded to break through later in the day, however, and when the other units of the Battalion commenced to inch their way through a heavy mortar fire, flights of US
bombers soared into the fight. As these attacked the enemy defense, the Filipinos, fighting very aggressively, got so close to the enemy line that one of the American airman got confused and started attacking A Company with napalm bombs. The pilot, fortunately realized the mistake soon enough, and wasting no time he winged his way back.

The Filipinos took the mistake understandingly and resumed the attack with an aggressiveness which surprised, as they said, the Americans, who themselves were now giving the enemy all they had. Before sundown, the Filipinos were astride their objective.

Late in the afternoon, on 12 April 1951, the Filipinos finally stormed their objective. On the slopes of the enemy hills they found only dead Communists; 54 in all and they were Chinese. The rest of the enemy had fled deeper into the Naktae-dong area and its hills. On the side of the Filipinos, several had been wounded, too, in the day’s fight.

The hill-to-hill operation in Naktae-dong entered its third day, April 13, with Colonel Dionisio Ojeda launching his battalion in a full offensive. He had A Company, B Company, and Tank Company abreast, and C Company and Reconnaissance Company in support.

All three forward companies were met with mortar fire and for a while it looked like Filipinos had struck a wall that time. The resistance was particularly heavy in the area of Tank Company. Firing from positions concealed in craggy hills, the enemy swept the area so devastatingly that the men, in order to get closer, had to inch their way toward their objective. Airplanes, tanks and artillery all had to be thrown into the fight to relieve the situation. But even after the enemy mortars had been silenced, the Filipinos had to engage the Communists in bitter rifle and grenade duels to be able to get to the peaks. When they did finally get to the top shortly before evening, they captured two Chinese and found abandoned in the battered enemy position the bodies of 28 others.

The Filipinos, despite their air and artillery support, lost two men that day. Ten others were wounded. As the battle raged, American helicopters flew into the area to evacuate them. The fight on April 13 could be described with one word, “savage.”

On 17 April, the Battalion was relieved from the line and reverted as reserve of the 65th US Infantry Regiment. In the evening, when the Filipinos moved out, Lieutenant General Frank Milburn, Commanding General of the I US Corps, was on hand to see the Battalion off. He had seen other contingents, too, in the week-long operations in the 200-kilometer front. In Naktae-dong, infantry men boldly closing in on the Communists as supporting artillery roared to wreak havoc upon the enemy. The I US Corps commander
praised the Filipinos candidly and spoke highly of the Filipinos aggressive spirit.

After being relieved in the frontline, the 10th BCT settled down along the Imjin River. On their right flank were the plucky Turks, and to their left were the Puerto Ricans of the 2nd Battalion of the 65th US Regiment. Far to the left was the Gloucestershire Battalion of the British Commonwealth Brigade and the Belgian battalion. Early in the morning of April 20, an incident took place: The American tank men were on reconnaissance above the area of the BCT early that morning. Their tanks bogged down in the middle of a stream and before they could do anything about it, they became the target of enemy artillery fire. Finding themselves as helpless as their prostrate tanks, the Americans contrived to get to the bank and proceeded afoot to the BCT for assistance.

The incident aroused the Filipinos. At about 0900 a rescue team, under the command of Lieutenant Victoriano Yapchango, was on the road. It consisted of two platoons of the Reconnaissance Company and two tanks. As this team was being dispatched, however, a Communist team was also being sent to the stream to capture the tanks. A clash was inevitable. At about 1000, when the Filipinos were approaching the stream, the Communists opened up. The Filipinos fought back and after overcoming their disadvantage in terrain, routed the Chinese forces. The Filipinos killed eight of the Communists in the encounter. At 1700 they finally rescued the hopeless tanks in a fierce encounter with Chinese forces, and drove back to their camp.

As the BCT settled down along the Imjin River, after a full week of battle, officers and men drew equipment and clothing to replace what they had lost in battle. Before they knew it, they had map-reading and took up weapons maintenance. The medical men took up practical exercises, particularly along a line they most needed; the administration of blood plasma. Reports were relayed to all units that the Chinese were building up an enormous concentration of equipment and manpower behind the lines. Observers were elated.

The Filipinos had more than seven months in the fight in Korea and had not received any replacements. In the battles in Naktalae-dong, where it burned the trail for 3rd US Division, it had sustained casualties. So many had fallen that out of the original 1,200 officers and men, only 900 had remained. In spite of all that, the Filipinos were in high spirits.

On the night of April 21, their fifth day along the Imjin River, they had entertainment, and they got a pleasant surprise in the form of familiar voices floating into their camp straight from the Philippines. “P. I. Calling Korea,” a radio program conceived by the Civil Affairs Office, headed by then Major Jose M. Crisol was in the air for the first time. In pup tents, dugouts, and fox-
holes, officers and men crowded about radios to listen to the program over Radio Station DZPI. There were tears in their eyes. Then Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay and then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Philippines Calixto Duque addressed the BCT over the same radio station from across the sea that night.

On 22 April, bags of letters arrived. Even as the soldiers read and reread the messages from anxious ones in the Philippines, artillery pieces were booming out an entirely another message in the distance. Yultong, although the soldiers did not know it then, was barely a day ahead, 20 kilometers southwest of Chorwon. It was there that a tragedy was to be enacted.

In the Sunday morning of 22 April, the Filipinos, who, up to then had been by the Imjin, were in a long convoy of trucks roaring angrily northward. They crossed the 38th Parallel again, and at a point several kilometers above, halted. As they disembarked, they started digging in along a five-kilometer stretch of rugged terrain.

Section 4. Battle of Yultong Ridge

On 22 April the first step of the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive had been at the west end of the Eighth US Army’s line. Its mission was the capture of Seoul and the encirclement of UN troops in that area. Although this offensive failed to gain its announced objective, it did force a major withdrawal at the west end of the UN line and, because of the necessity of shifting troops for the defense of Seoul, a readjustment of front lines everywhere.

On Sunday, April 22, when the BCT got to its position at Yultong, the first signs of Chinese Communist Forces’ spring offensive were felt. The 10th BCT had come to move up to Yultong on “Utah Line” relieving the 1st Battalion, 65th US Infantry Regiment. The unit was some 11 kilometers from its last bivouac area. That afternoon, the Turks captured a Chinese battery commander who was plotting the terrain for his guns. After a gruelling interrogation, he broke down and confessed that the entire Chinese Communist forces were to launch their much-awaited spring offensive that evening throughout the whole front. The news was immediately relayed to frontline units. Many took it as one of “those false alarms” again, but unit commanders busied defenses. At their men began digging trenches and putting up barbed wire themselves and twilight, reports came in as usual Chinese forces in small bands were seen probing allied positions, more determined this time.

The Chinese hordes jumped off from their fortified positions. The sun barely disappeared from the horizons that Sunday evening when CCF hordes
descended from their hilly redoubts and began unleashing their spring offensive. Bugles, whistles and cymbals sounded again. This time was the first round.

That is to say, the enemy thousands upon thousands of them approached warily at first, and then, suddenly rushed inward. Wave after wave, they were mowed down.

The BCT and the Turkish Brigade were on the tip of the United Nations' most advanced position when the enemy unleashed his sea of men. The intrepid Turks, who were on the right of the Filipinos at the time, were the first to feel the impact of the incredible onslaught. The Communists penetrated their reserve battalion and used the Turks' communications system to direct UN artillery fire right on the frontline positions. The ruse was considered the brightest trick ever pulled by Chinese forces.

At that critical moment, the UN batteries were waiting tensely for a call to fire from the Turks. The Chinese quickly put in the call and in a few minutes shells began raining on the defense position of the Turks themselves. The UN artillery lobbed shells right into the Turkish main line of defense, so that the Turkish Brigade took a beating, forcing them to disperse and left the 10th BCT's right flank exposed to the enemy.

The battle raged for several hours in the moonlight. Towards midnight, the situation became so confused that both sides occasionally mistook enemies for their own comrades.

The Filipinos were so disposed at the time that three companies were abreast on the line. The Special Weapons Company was in the center, A Company was on its right, B Company, on the left. The two remaining companies of the Battalion, C and Reconnaissance, were behind. Filipinos likened the Battalion to a coiled spring. If the enemy hit that spring, they said, it would recoil. It was Captain Sanchez, Commander of B Company, who announced the commencement of the offensive. He informed Colonel Ojeda that the bugle-tooting, whistle-blowing enemy troops were in their front and now attacking them. It was then that the Turkish brigade, after being subjected to a terrific pressure, caved in. The right flank of the BCT was exposed completely, and to exploit the situation the Communists began throwing the bulk of their force between B Company and Captain Conrado Yap’s tankless Tank Company. A full regiment attempted to drive a wedge between both units, but the Filipinos, although fighting along now, refused to yield an inch.

In the fury of the onslaught, the Filipinos were holding their lines, in spite of the human sea waves that kept lashing in.

The battle raged throughout the night. So bad was the situation in the night, that Colonel Ojeda lost contact with the companies in his outfit.

Throughout the fateful night of April 22, 1951, the BCT clung to its line
in spite of terrific enemy onslaughts. Many human beings laid down their lives, death over death in the moonlight.

The BCT stood like a stone wall against the continuous torrent of Communists which tried to sweep it off in the night from the UN defense lines.

Colonel Ojeda visited his forward companies not very long after midnight, and found that even the typists, clerks, drivers, and cooks were in the fight. Colonel Ojeda had hoped his forward units would hold out until dawn. Unfortunately, shortly after his departure, the enemy threw in two battalions, and finding the Filipinos unbending, maneuvered this time to widen the gaps between the defending companies.

The new onslaught tore off one of the platoons of B Company, and now exposed, Captain Conrado Yap's Special Weapons company, was quickly hemmed in. In the confusion, contact among the forward companies and between them and Ojeda's command post ceased. Signal men dashed in desperate attempts to restore it. But in spite of frantic efforts on the part of the units to call each other, contact could no longer be reestablished.

The situation was critical. At about 0300 the next morning, the weary Filipinos reached the limit of their endurance. A platoon of B Company was literally pushed back from a strategic hill, opening a major breakthrough after four hours of furious combat. C Company was hit in its reserve position. The combat companies were separated and were forced to fight their own battles against a numerically superior enemy estimated to be of divisional strength. The 10th BCT's CP also became the target of small arms fire. The cooks, the chaplain, the medics and the truck drivers all came to pick up guns and deployed for the last stand. In Captain Yap's sector, the attackers fell at the rate of 17 to 1, but the Filipinos were getting weary and the Chinese forces continued lashing in. In the UN rear echelon, the 10th BCT was written off as lost. Despite the overwhelming odds, the 10th BCT still managed to counter-attack, and it was while the 10th BCT was attacking when Brigadier General Armistead Mead, Deputy CG of the 3rd US Division paid a hurried visit to the 10th BCT to encourage them "for their gallant stand."

Upon receiving the orders to withdraw, Ojeda ordered his unit to tactically disengage from the enemy. Three rifle companies pulled off from their high ground positions after killing at least 600 enemies, with Reconnaissance Company closely following. Tank Company, however, could not be contacted. Meanwhile, the missing Captain Yap's Tank Company, was still fighting desperately for their lives and for the hour to counter.

Repeated assaults that night had caused the unit to sustain several casualties. The enemy forces cut it to pieces, and almost wiped out one of its platoons. Lieutenant José Artiaga, Jr., was defending a strategic hill. He and
his men knew that the hill was vital to the defense of the whole Battalion and were determined to hold it.

The CCF equally knew the value of the hill, and ignoring the fire of Lieutenant Artiaga and his men, rushed to overrun it. The youthful officer would not give up. He fell defending it. Because contact with Lieutenant Artiaga's platoon had ceased at the time, Captain Conrado Yap did not know what happened to Lieutenant Artiaga and his hill. When the dawn came, a brief lull fell upon the battlefield. It was C Company that struck first, supported by a part of Reconnaissance Company. The other companies after quickly reorganizing, followed it. "In a matter of minutes," Juan Villasanta, a UN correspondent said, "hundreds of enemy dead lay in the path of the swift Filipino counter punch."

It was high noon already when Captain Conrado Yap was contacted by radio, "Disengage immediately" shouted Ojeda. Yap answered that his men were still counterattacking, trying to recover the bodies of their comrades who fell during the encounter. The crisis was, however, well over for the BCT. The human sea which had attempted to sweep away the unit had ebbed. And yet, Captain Conrado Yap could not retreat. He was thinking of his soldiers who, perhaps wounded, could not withdraw because they were surrounded. He wanted to bring his men back or die. Shortly after the BCT had started counterattacking he was informed that the hill had been captured in the night and that Lieutenant Jose Artiaga Jr. himself had died in the fight.

When the Captain took a look at Lieutenant Artiaga's hill again, it was well past 1200. Not very far away, two machine guns chattered. He thought that there might still be some people over there, wounded men who could not get out. Machine guns chattered again in the distance. In a second, Captain Yap had made up his mind. He was going to wrest back the hill and rescue his men who were there. When he called out for volunteers, several offered to go with him. Among them were Lieutenant B. V. Baquirin and Lieutenant B. Serrano.

There was a gully leading conveniently to another hill just beside the hill Lieutenant Jose Artiaga and his men defended in the night. Captain Yap took that gully, and with a handful of men succeeded to approach his objective without drawing fire. On crossing a narrow strip of flat terrain from the gully, to the hill, however, enemy guns commenced firing. Captain Yap's 2nd platoon countered. The enemy fire would not relent. Captain Yap and his courageous volunteers had to run, drop down, crawl, run again.

Meanwhile, Captain Yap's 3rd platoon, or what was left of it, inched its way to the top of the hill. When the platoon had reached the hilltop, Captain Yap and his volunteers, who were now at the foot of the objective, began
creeping up the slope of it. The 2nd platoon watched Captain Yap and his assault group tensely. The officer leading the platoon, Lieutenant Baquirin, saw the Captain raise his hand for a signal. In a second, the 2nd platoon started firing over to support the assaulting platoon by keeping whoever were in the foxholes therein ducking.

It did not take very long. As the fire from the 3rd platoon began moving slowly to the right on Captain Yap’s signal, the Captain and two of his brave men—Corporals Oscar Peralta and Sergio Zafra undertook the most dangerous phase of the mission, and that was, to peep into each foxhole for those who had defended the hill in the night. It was an extremely perilous job. If the occupant of a foxhole was a Communist, life or death became a matter of who fired first. It happened. As Corporal Peralta, looked into a hole, he was met by the staring eye of a Chinese. Peralta hurled in his grenade before the murderous eye could wink. Captain Yap signalled to Lieutenant Bonny Serrano and his men, and these moved closer to the assault team.

As Captain Yap had thought all along, he had men in that hill who could not escape because they were wounded. PFCs Saludares, Baclayon—were found first. Sergeant Jose Ibay and PFC Domingo Ramos were extracted next. They were both dead. A little farther, the body of Lieutenant Artiaga
was discovered. There were tears in his eyes as Captain Yap gazed at his friend's still form. Lieutenant Bonny Serrano was beside him. So was Lieutenant Baquirin, Corporal Peralta, and a few others. Not a word passed among them. Suddenly a burst of fire stabbed the air. When, after dropping to the ground, they looked around to check up on each other, they saw Peralta bleeding. When they were preparing to leave the hill, Captain Yap asked if all of Lieutenant Artiaga's men had been recovered. The answer was yes, but one in the group mentioned the name Bengala, and outright, Captain Yap moved out to resume the search. A burst of fire from a concealed CCF nest had caught him squarely on the front. It was two hours before sunset then. The grieving men bore the wounded Captain downhill under fire in a gallant attempt to save the Captain's life.

Late in the afternoon, Balag and some medical man drove off from the hill with the wounded captain. The mission of rescuing the men trapped on the hill had been accomplished. The problem now was for Captain Yap's remaining men to withdraw through the maze of enemy positions and rejoin the rest of the 10th BCT. The bulk of the Battalion were then no longer anywhere within sight. Along now, Captain Yap's men had to break through or face annihilation. They knew there was a wide gap somewhere, but the Communists know that, too, and an enemy force was advancing to seal it. The problem had become a question of who could get to the opening first. Lieutenant Bonny Serrano and his men got to the opening ahead of the Chinese advancing forces and held the gap for the rest of Captain Yap's outfit. Passing through without much difficulty, the battle-worn men regrouped and in a short time, were finally heading towards the new UN line.

The general situation in the area was still confused at the time. The portion of the battlefield through which Yap's men passed in their escape was so littered with dead bodies that some Filipinos had remarked that never was a battlefield more gory and more filled with the horrors of war.

Captain Yap's remaining officers and men were almost literally dragging themselves and their rifles when they came within sight of the elements of the Battalion who had withdrawn ahead. The less exhausted could be seen in the distance, helping the wounded, although they themselves could barely carry their own weight. There were those who lay helpless in stretchers borne on the shoulders of the less unfortunate. As they approached the end of their strange journey, their comrades on recognizing them, rushed forward. As the survivors were to learn on their arrival, Captain Yap was dead.

Together with all the tankmen whom they brought along in that furious fight they will be remembered in their military history as soldiers who really served their country beyond the call of duty. In fact, the Tank Company was
not really designed for the mission it was called upon to perform in Yultong on 23 April. It was then employed as a machine gun company (special weapons company).

At 1800, 23 April, Ojeda executed the retrograde movement. The unit disengaged with the enemy, and moved southward to Dusong-ni, and reverted to the operational control of the 29th British Independent Brigade. After having been reverted to the operational control of the 29th British Brigade, the Battalion was given the mission of securing the surrounded Gloucestershire battalion of the British brigade.

Next dawn, the whole Battalion, still very tired, was off again. The whole United Nations front was still raging at the time. On the British sector, a part of the human sea had succeeded in breaking through during the night, and in the confusion that ensued, one of the battalions of the 29th British Brigade was encircled. A withdrawal had been ordered, but before the beleaguered Gloucestershire battalion could disengage the enemy, its only route of escape was sealed.

To save the Battalion, there was only one action left, and that was, for a rescue to break through and create an opening. With other units the Filipino Battalion was thrown in without the field artillery battery. The Battalion set out with Reconnaissance Company leading the column. Following it were A Company, and C Company. In the rear as reserve were Tank Company and B Company.

At 0730 the 10th BCT attacked through Kwangsuwon eight kilometers due west of Tongduchon without enemy contact. The line of defense was a stream running east to west through Kwangsuwon.

At 1000, A and C Companies continued attacking north towards their objectives. C Company on the right, attacked Hill 349 and drove an estimated two platoons of enemy to the north at Hill 255. Hill 349 was secured at 1100. C Company continued attacking Hill 255, but the enemy offered heavy resistance.

Meanwhile, A Company was encountering automatic weapons fire from Hill 366(Kamgol) three kilometers northwest of Kwangsuwon. An estimated one company-size enemy had dug in the area. Three M-24 tanks of Reconnaissance Company leading, followed by a squadron of British brigade’s Centurion tanks, attacked along Kwangsuwon-Solma-ri road and was supported by fire from C Company. A tank column proceeding past Hill 255 to 1,600 meters past Solmaryong received heavy small arms, automatic weapons and artillery fire. A and B Companies and foot troops of Reconnaissance Company assisted the tank column. The men edged their way forward on the high grounds but failed to contact the Gloucestershires.
The terrain was rough; the road, very narrow, winding. Dug in on the slopes of the hills guarding the road were two regiments of Communists. To get through looked like suicide to everyone. That was what the BCT had to do. As the column advanced, the Communist forces rained a storm of fire upon them. The leading M-24 tank of Reconnaissance Company was hit by an antitank fire and burst into flames. In the first two minutes of the advance, five men of the BCT were killed.

The unit tried three times to run the gauntlet of fire from atop the hills, but each attempt was frustrated. It did it again and got to within only 2,500 meters from the Gloucestershire battalion, the closest ever reached by any assisting unit. But when it got to that point, the Communists let go a tremendous artillery fire and stalled the Filipinos completely.

At 1730, at which time the BCT in spite of losses, was still vainly pounding at the massive wall which the Chinese had put up to stop it from getting closer to the Gloucestershire battalion, Colonel Ojeda was ordered to withdraw the unit. As the BCT withdrew from its attempt to rescue the Gloucestershires the enemy maneuvered to close its route.

In its attempt to save the Gloucestershires, the BCT ran the risk of being encircled. It was in grave danger of being cut to pieces when it was ordered to withdraw. The Communist forces maneuvered into a pincer in a last attempt to close its route of escape. To squeeze the unit out, Colonel Ojeda hurled his tanks against the Chinese, and as these roared away, A, B, and Tank Companies wiggled out.

On 25 April, the Battalion reverted to the control of the 65th US Infantry Regiment and was given the mission of establishing a blocking position in Hill 203 in the vicinity of Masan-ni seven kilometers northeast of Munsan. At 1100, the town of Masan-ni was secured. A Company supported by Reconnaissance Company attacked Hill 203, meeting heavy enemy resistance. Then on orders, the Battalion disengaged from the enemy and withdrew south to establish a blocking position on Hill 194 and Hill 106. The Battalion deployed the A, B, and C Companies on Hill 194 and the Reconnaissance Company on Hill 106. But the blocking positions became untenable and units were ordered to withdraw southeastward at 0130, 26 April. When the Battalion was under way to move, the column of rifle companies was hit from the north and southeast by an estimated enemy regiment. The enemy isolated A Company and cut off the other companies. At 0730 the Battalion could wiggled out of the envelopment. In this engagement the Battalion sustained heavy losses, it lost one killed, three wounded, and forty four missing.

On 27, the Battalion moved to Uidong and established blocking positions on
the high grounds at the vicinity of Sangbong-ni. Next day, the Battalion was relieved from the 65th US Regiment and reverted to the operational control of the 7th US Cavalry Regiment. At 0800, Reconnaissance and B Companies moved by motor to Nuwon to occupy blocking positions and screen the withdrawal of the 7th Regiment.

The Communist forces were still pursuing their offensive at that time, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment was itself withdrawing. The BCT having come to a point where it could very well do it, was made to cover the withdrawing of the 7th US Cavalry. After that, it withdrew in the direction of the city of Seoul, where it spent a night.

In the morning, 29 April, the Battalion proceeded to the Han River, where, Puwon-ni, southern bank of the Han River, it was made to relieve the Turkish Brigade from its zone of responsibility. Here, the BCT passed into the operational control of the 25th US Infantry Division, to which it was attached when in Miryang.
CHAPTER V  OPERATION AT IRON TRIANGLE

Section 1.  Han River Defense

As of May the BCT was, only half of what it was when it entered the fight. Some 150 of the officers and men of the unit had been officially reported killed, wounded, or missing. Eleven days back, 104 disabled troops had been sent back to the Philippines. Of those left behind, 182 others had been rendered unfit for battle by combat exhaustion and continuous exposure to the rough winter. These had waited, through long days and nights, for the time when they would be taken back home. When the hour of parting came, however, they found it hard to leave the Battalion, knowing as they did, that there awaited them were more hardships. Some of those who felt they could still fight asked Colonel Ojeda to let them stay. Deep within him, Colonel Ojeda felt extremely proud of the men. He would say, “You are due back home—we will carry on with what we have.” A few minutes later, he was on the road watching his men board their vehicles. The first to close their combat tours, were on the way home. The group finally left on May 10, 1951.

In the next morning the Battalion was, however, in a great celebration. General James Van Fleet, Commanding General of the Eighth US Army was to visit the 10th BCT advance CP. He was accompanied by General Milburn, Commanding General of the I US Corps under which the 10th BCT was operating in the west central Korean front.

“Many foreign armies have proven their worth here in Korea and the Filipinos are among the bravest.” Van Fleet first greeted the Filipinos with these words.

“I have heard a lot about your exploits and achievements, especially during the initial enemy offensive from units to which you have been attached. I feel proud to be associated with real foxhole soldiers.” The appellation was attached to the Filipino soldiers by General Van Fleet when he was informed by General Milburn in front of Colonel Ojeda of their exploits.

The Eighth US Army Commander went on to the needs of Philippine troops with respect to clothing, food, and replacement. Colonel Ojeda informed him that replacements to fill company vacancies were due in a few days. To this General Van Fleet responded, “I wish I had a regiment of Filipino soldiers
here.” In the course of his talk in reference to the bravery of the Filipino soldiers, the Eighth US Army Commander spoke of the great help contributed by the Filipinos in neutralizing a great bulk of the “Human Sea” Chinese attack and of the 10th BCT serving as shock absorber for other UN troops.

On 23 May 1951, the Filipino’s last day on the bank of the Han River, the BCT was attached to the 25th Royal Canadian Brigade. On May 24, the unit moved out with the Canadians to join other United Nations units in the frontline and crossed the Han River to Sunae-ri. On the same day the Filipinos were employed as reserve of the 25th.

In spite of the frustration of the Communists’ April offensive, the enemy mounted still another offensive in the latter part of May. The UN forces were already pushing the Communists. As the massive Reds reeled back in the face of the onslaught, the BCT in a series of attacks swept northward and in a period of seven days got to the bank of the Hantan River, northeast of Seoul, where it almost wiped out a Chinese force left behind by the retreating Communists to block it.

On 26 May the unit moved up and occupied blocking positions in the vicinity of Chajang-ri. While in blocking positions, a replacement of seven officers and 134 enlisted men arrived and were immediately distributed to the line companies to fill up their depleted strength.

The Battalion displaced forward with the advance of the 25th Royal Canadian Brigade, and on 27 May the Filipino Battalion was committed in an assault in the vicinity of Singa-ri. Reconnaissance and B Companies captured a cache of assorted ammunition and one communist soldier.

On 29 May, the Battalion continued the assault. At 1000, 30 May the unit secured the objective along the Hantan River. During this period the unit accounted for 8 CCF killed and 10 prisoners of war captured.

On 1 June, the Battalion was detached from the Canadian Brigade, and on the same day, it was placed under the operational control of the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd US Division. The 7th Infantry dug in on the right of the Battalion that day, in anticipation of enemy attempt to counter. At sundown, the expected enemy push came, with the Communist forces opening up with a heavy mortar fire. Later in the night, enemy infantry units pressed the left flank of the 7th Infantry Regiment and to relieve the pressure on the Americans, the BCT with A, B, Reconnaissance, and Tank Companies advancing abreast, launched a diversionary attack.

The enemy force offered a stiff resistance to the Filipinos’ onslaught, but collapsing finally, it withdrew hastily to avert disaster.

On 2 June, both the BCT and the 7th US Infantry Regiment resumed push-
ing northward. One hill after another fell without much resistance on the first few days. The BCT remained on this defense line along the Hantan River until 6 June when it continued with its attack northward.

On 5 June, C Company of the BCT got caught in an unusually heavy mortar fire and barely escaped being massacred. Eight Filipinos were wounded and one was killed in the action. More would have fallen in that encounter had it not been for the timely arrival of reinforcements. Blazing onto the scene, the rescuers forced the attackers back. Thereafter, all the friendly UN forces resumed sweeping northward.

Section 2. Operations at Iron Triangle

On 8 June, leading in the drive, the 10th moved on to the branch of the Hantan River, near Chorwon, and in a bank to bank encounter, killed 65 CCF. The 7th Infantry Regiment caught up with the Philippines Battalion after the fight, and with the way now cleared, both units advanced abreast towards a cluster of hills below the Chorwon water dam.

The Filipinos displayed their usual aggressiveness in the drive. Slashing through the enemy line defending the dam, they advanced so far ahead of the other United Nations units that before the 2nd Battalion of the 7th US Infantry Regiment could get to its objective, which was closer than that of the Philippine contingent, the Filipinos had secured the Chorwon water reservoir.

Having completed another twenty full day’s action, the Filipinos were once more reverted to division reserve to enable them to have another rest. By 12 June the unit was in the vicinity of Sajong-ni, near Chorwon.

13 June, found the Filipinos, many of them still limping from fatigue, trooping to a green hillside where their chaplain awaited them to say a prayer for the repose of their dead comrades.

Dusk on June 17, 1951, brought to the BCT a visitor from the Philippines: Brigadier General Claro B. Lizardo, Commanding General of the Philippine Army Training Command.

As the general entered the camp, the band of the 3rd US Division, which happened to be with the Filipinos at the time, rendered honors to the visiting officer, three ruffles and the national anthem.

The arrival of the general caused a great excitement. He had come to look into the problems of the BCT and confer with the UN Command. The general told the anxious soldiers their return would be expedited. When he told
the men they were to be relieved in September, the Battalion applauded. With him were the G-1 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the head of the Filipino liaison group to the Eighth US Army and the head of the liaison group to Tokyo.

General Claro B. Lizardo spent his first night in the frontline studying the records of the members of the Battalion.

On 18 June he had the troops assembled on flat ground protected by two hills, and in simple ceremonies, decorated many of the officers and enlisted men of the unit for gallantry beyond the call of duty, for "high devotion", for "exemplary efficiency" and for "refusal to be evacuated despite wounds received in Combat." This time the gallantry of these officers and enlisted men was rewarded by the headquarters of their own armed forces. General Lizardo told the Battalion that people of the Philippines were very proud of the unit and its achievements. He told the outfit also that the training of the Battalion which was to relieve them was being expedited and that as soon as the relieving unit was ready to carry on where the BCT were to leave off, they all would return home.

On 21 June, he left the Korean front and proceeded to Taegu. Before his departure, he called on Major General Robert H. Soule, Commanding General of the 3rd US Infantry Division.

On 27 June, after a fortnight of rest in the reserve area, the Battalion moved up to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 15th US Infantry Regiment on the Wyoming Line in the vicinity of Sindae-dong and completed at 1255. The battalion then continued to maintain and improve its defense positions along this line and patrolled aggressively in the zone.

When they got to the frontline, however, they discovered that the war had deteriorated into what looked like a long stalemate. Neither the United Nations forces nor the CCF would take offensive and neither would yield ground. The truce negotiations, which were to drag on for 2 years had begun.

The Filipinos on arriving in the frontline, occupied a portion of the Wyoming Line close to the Iron Triangle, a well-guarded supply area bounded by Chorwon, Pyonggang, and Kumhwa. To penetrate this triangle and probe the supply base, they adopted the system of dispatching patrols into the area in order to ambush designated places at a designated time, and were to be picked up by a convoy of jeeps or trucks at a certain hour of the day.

The scheme worked for sometime but was later discovered by the Communists, who immediately maneuvered a force to counter-ambush the Filipinos who, unaware of the discovery of their mode of operations, got caught in the act of pulling the trick.
On 9 July, when a party of ten jeeps dispatched to pick up a patrol which had been thrown into a part of the triangle in the vicinity of Pyong-gang, the party was ambushed by an enemy patrol resulting in the capture of one of the 10th BCT’s drivers.

The incident still carries much mystery unfolded. In detail, on that night, the convoy was to wait in the village of Soyang-gang. On arriving at the designated area at 0230, the head of the convoy rolled into a site at the foot of a row of hills where he thought the vehicles would be well concealed.

Immediately upon arrival, all of a sudden, a swarm of Chinese issued out of the hills, and yelling at the top of their voices, attacked the unsuspecting drivers. Caught off guard Sergeant Raagas made a desperate attempt to get to his jeep for his Browning Automatic Rifle. The BAR was the only weapon the convoy had, besides pistols and carbines. But before he could get halfway, a squad of Chinese advanced towards him. Thus hopelessly blocked, the sergeant ordered a withdrawal to the nearest jeeps, but even before he himself could begin crawling back, two of his men got pinned down by a deafening rifle fire. As four Chinese crept towards the two helpless sergeants, Raagas and his other men opened fire. One of the two men, Manalo succeeded in pulling out, but Jimenez, the other, could not make it. At the moment, Raagas fled to the rear with only one bullet left in his pistol. But as he crept to where his other men were, he himself was confronted by a Chinese. Like Jimenez, Raagas flung his hands heavenward, and the bulky Chinese began stalking him. To Raagas’ surprise, the Chinese, on getting to about a meter or two from the sergeant, suddenly fell, as if by a miracle, before him. As Raagas was to know later, one of his men, Sergeant Maceda did it with one shot.

Saved, Raagas jumped from the cliff where he had been cornered, and with one Sergeant Macastor, rejoined the other men, who were at that time already at a safe distance to the rear.

At 1630 fleeing in two jeeps, they got to the battalion command post and before long two tanks and a platoon of B Company were on the way to the scene of fight. They succeeded in recovering the vehicles, but not the missing drivers. In a nearby village, where they had expected to find the Red Chinese, they came upon fresh blood stains instead.

On 14 July 1951, not very many days before the Filipinos were to go home, another tragic Chorwon event took place. Colonel Ojeda had a hunch that the Communists would attack the battalion by surprise, and acting on that hunch, he ordered a reinforced platoon of A Company and an artillery observer team to reconnoiter an area north of the battalion line. Lieutenant Bienvenido Salting was placed at the head of the patrol. And another young
officer, Lieutenant David Sanchez, headed the artillery team. Elements from B and Reconnaissance Companies were dispatched to reinforce the patrol but the enemy had withdrawn before being contacted by these troops.

The patrol left at 0900 and passed uneventfully through a deserted village, near Pyonggang, and proceeded to Sagimak, another village lying in an area bounded by three hills. Salting halted the patrol in a plain below the village, and on learning from his scouts that the people of the village surrounding Sagimak were hurriedly evacuating, he divided his 32-man patrol into two groups, and himself proceeded to Sagimak with twelve soldiers. As he was scaling a hill close to the village, the artillery observer team, which had earlier left the main body, spotted Chinese troops moving by the hundreds from the slope of the hills on the right, towards the village. The patrol knew then that it had walked into a trap.

At 1300, the attack commenced. Salting's group which was closest to the attacking Chinese, withstood the onslaught and maneuvering to a nearby ditch as the attack mounted continued meeting the enemy fire to permit Lieutenant Sanchez' group to squeeze itself out. Sanchez succeeded, but when Salting and his men began to fall back, they found out that the Chinese had already come so close there was no more way out. Blocked, they had to fight it out. They met-wave after wave of Chinese, but they kept charging in, evidently determined to get the Filipinos alive. To their great consternation, Salting and his remaining men engaged them in a bloody bayonet fight.

Overpowered, the Filipinos were dragged to a Communist command post where they were grilled, Communist fashion, day and night. Ten days later, while enroute to a prison camp, four of them succeeded in escaping. They were taken to the headquarters of the BCT by a group of Puerto Rican soldiers who had met them. The men, among them one Private First Class Victoriano Galven, of Agoo, La Union, reported to Colonel Ojeda with nothing on but their drawers. It was from them that Colonel Ojeda learned that not one of his handful of boys under Salting raised his hands in surrender. The boys killed 32 Chinese right on the hill. Of the many they had wounded fifty died while enroute to the rear with Salting's four men. Of Salting, the men knew nothing, except that when the patrol was finally subdued, the officer made a desperate attempt to escape by rolling down a hill only to be overpowered by another group of Chinese. Thus, this encounter with A Company resulted in 32 enemies killed, with 10 killed, 3 wounded and 9 missing in action on the side of the Filipino troops.

On 15 July the Battalion CP moved to Hari-dong, where two days later the unit received the first batch of the 20th BCT comprising of eight officers and 350 men. Some 208 rottees left on 26 June by motor for Pusan subsequent
to their return to the Philippines.

On 27 July the Battalion was relieved from the frontline and moved to the vicinity of Pyonggang occupying blocking positions. Two Platoons from the rifle companies occupied advance division outpost on Hill 717 and Hill 682 just overlooking Pyonggang.

On 6 August, the Battalion moved up to front and relieved the 3rd Battalion, 65th Infantry Regiment. The unit occupied this position until 11 August when it was relieved by elements of the 65th Infantry.

On 31 August, it then moved up to Nung-gol east of Chorwon to relieve the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry from frontline duty.

Section 3. On the Way Home

At the time of the Communists later April offensive, the 10th BCT was confronted with a serious replacement problem. The strength of the Battalion was hardly half what it had been. Therefore a party of replacement forces, the 20th BCT composed of 6 officers and 128 enlisted men was shipping for Korea in April 1951. In June another batch of 8 officers and 350 enlisted men followed it.

On 16 August, Colonel Salvador Abcede, 20th BCT Commander, joined the Battalion with 10 other officers at Sinpo-dong. Four days later of his arrival a contingent of 9 officers and 468 enlisted men of the 20th BCT also joined the Battalion. The new arrivals were immediately assigned to the different companies to replace 9 officers and 313 enlisted men who were sent to the rear for return to the Philippines. On 31 August, the bulk of the personnel from the 20th BCT had already occupied frontline positions.

On 5 September 1951, a simple ceremony took place. It was a big event for the Filipinos. In their best combat uniforms, officers and men of the two Battalions assembled on a flat ground surrounded by hills in the village of Munjal, 11 kilometers from Chorwon, and in the ceremony Colonel Ojeda officially turned over the field to Colonel Abcede and the 20th BCT.

High ranking United Nations commanders attended the ceremony. General Robert Soule the commander of the 3rd US Division and Colonel Jim Boswel attended it. In ending his command, Colonel Ojeda expressed his confidence that the new Battalion would prove equal to its heavy responsibilities. Colonel Abcede, in accepting the command, assured the outgoing commander that he and the 20th BCT would do their best to live up to record of the BCT. Both commanders stood solemnly before the Philippine flag and the emblem of the United Nations as Major General Robert Soule, commanding general of the 3rd
Infantry Division, which held the Wyoming defense line, welcomed the new Battalion into the United Nations Command. The relief of the 10th BCT by the 20th was thus effected at 2200, 5 September. However, the personnel of the 10th BCT remained with the 20th to orient members of the relieving battalion. The last batch of the 10th BCT officers and men left the frontline for Pusan on 27 September (See Situation Map 3).

When Colonel Ojeda and his party arrived at Pusan, he had still another duty in Korea before going away to the homeland. Being informed that his homeward voyage would start on 30 September, he led the party to United Nations Cemetery in the outskirts of Pusan to pay the last tribute to the fallen comrades.

At 1300, they entered the hallowed ground. In the broad green area, there were the innumerable white crosses and silence of those who lay beneath them. They went from one cross to another to read the names on them. There, among the departed were Captain Conrado Yap and Lieutenant Jose Arriaga. There, too, were all the soldiers—41 of them—who had laid down their lives. Above their graves, at half mast, the Philippine flag was waving over them. After placing upon each grave either a bouquet or a cross of green leaves, they assembled under the flag, and the battalion chaplain, Father Jadefa uttered the prayer. Eight

The Commander stood solemnly as his men conducted last march in Korea.
resounding shots after the prayer were the last ever to be fired by the 10th BCT in Korea.

At 1900, 30 September 1951, Colonel Ojeda and his batch boarded the LST 75 of the Philippine Navy. As the ship moved farther away, the departing Filipinos could only hope that those 58 officers and men, which lost their lives in Korea, were still alive and that some day they, too, would return to their home country.

In the open sea, the LST headed for the Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan. It set anchor at that port after four days, and after undergoing repair, the ship readied for home voyage.

On 15 October, just when it was about to set off for the Philippines, a storm overtook it. The ship battled the gales for five full hours. The LST 75 sought refuge in the Kagoshima Bay from the ruthless typhoon Ruth which had almost sunk the ship, and at midnight on the following day, October 16, when the furious winds had finally spent themselves, the ship set off again.

On 23 October 1951, after thirteen months, one week, one day of the fighting in Korea, the 10th BCT entered Manila Bay. Decorated small craft bearing important people met the boat at the breakwater. Over them, in magnificent formation, Philippines Air Force Mustang fighter planes dipped their wings in salute, not once but several times. Colonel Ojeda was with the men as the ship approached Pier 13. He was standing on the bridge and waved his hand to acknowledge the cheers from the shore. Most of the soldiers aboard were seasick on account of the rough weather over the China Sea. But sick or not, they were all on their feet and all on deck as the ship drew closer to behold their countrymen, thousands of them, waving their hands from the shore.

It was 9 o’clock in the morning. Among the first to set foot on the gangplank was Mrs. Dionisio Ojeda, who rushed up the ship to meet her husband. As the two got lost in each others arms, the Battalion began to descend.

At the foot of the gangplank were two long rows of pretty young women. The pretty women threw garlands around the neck of each fighter. The heroes disappeared into the crowd and within a matter of moments were finally in what they had yearned for through 398 days the arms of their mothers, friends .... All of them and the people were grateful.

The returning soldiers were officially welcomed right at the waterfront. Then President Ramon Magsaysay, Major General Calixto Duque, and Major General Albert Pierson addressed the Battalion. And so did Mayor Manuel de la Fuente of Manila who, after paying a tribute to the outfit, presented to Colonel Ojeda a resolution of the city board making the soldiers adopted sons of the city of Manila. After that, the Battalion and the people proceeded to
the ancient St. Augustine Church in Intramuros. A Te Deum was sung in the historic Church. It was the nation's thanksgiving for the heroes' deliverance from the war, and for the repose of the souls of those who had not had the fortune of coming back. The rites were long, but the people in many places in Manila patiently waited. Thousands upon thousands filled the streets where the Battalion was expected to pass. Shortly after noon, the Battalion emerged from the ruins of Intramuros and took part in a triumphal parade such as had never been in Manila. With Colonel Ojeda leading in an open car, the unit headed towards the Escolta and as it marched through the streets, confetti, leaflets, streamers, flowers, and other tokens filled the air.

From the Escolta the home coming Battalion was way to Avenida Rizal, and on to the right on Azcarraga. In these streets and wherever else it passed, there were countless people applauding them. Finally, the 10th BCT had come back to the homeland.

Meanwhile, a batch of many wounded soldiers arrived at 1235, 23 August 1951 and another group of casualties were coming home in May, the year following.

In its Korean mission, the 10th BCT, however, suffered 43 casualties. Two officers and forty one enlisted personnel were killed. It had earned one Medal for Valor, six Distinguished Conduct Stars, one Distinguished Service Star, eleven Gold Cross Medals, ten Bronze Cross, fifty Military Merit Medals, 300 Military Commendation Medals and 145 Wounded Soldiers Medals.
CHAPTER VI ATTACK ON HILL EERIE

Section 1. Major Accomplishments

Effective 2400 hours, 5 September 1951, the 20th BCT took over the mission from the 10th BCT.

Between 6 and 26 September 1951, the 20th BCT was committed at different times with the UN counteroffensive in the 38th Parallel north and northeast of Chorwon (Iron Triangle in the western front) with other US troops under the I US Corps. After the occupation of the Chorwon-Pyonggang plain, the Battalion secured the area through extensive patrolling. During the UN offensive in the fall of the year, the unit attacked and occupied Hills 277, 321, 300 and 313. Among the Battalion’s captured list for the period was a CCF air force squadron commander. Meanwhile strong patrols continued the push at Wolchong-ni and conducted the penetration into the north toward Pyonggang. Between 26 and 27 September, advance elements of the Battalion retook Hill 284 as part of the UN fall offensive north of Chorwon.

With the UN fall offensive between 28 September and 24 October, the 20th BCT participated in the fight for the Bloody Angle and advancing 10 kilometers north, took Twin Peaks (Hills 324 and 360) then down to Namyon-dong (coded Alligator Jaws) stalling enemy armor from Sibyon-ni. At this time advance elements of the 20th BCT were the northernmost UN forces in the Korean theater. Its combat patrols secured Orijong and T-Bone hills. Advancing in line, the companies fought their way to the various outposts code-named Agok, west of Little Gibraltar, Arrowhead and Whitehorse Mountain.

At Kunhwha, the 20th BCT, attached to the 25th Division of the IX US Corps, attacked and took Hill 608 on 29 October. On the first week of November, the unit launched a scaling assault on Hill 1062 from Sniper Ridge under the IX US Corps’ Persuader Operations.

On 22 November, the 20th BCT was at Kojan-hari, west of the Imjin River, and south of Hill 317. It was part of the UN forces that established the truce demarkation line after repelling CCF assaults on the line. With the 7th US Infantry Regiment, the 20th BCT repelled the 64th CCF Army which threw its three divisions against the UN lines west of the Imjin River for three successive nights from the 23rd to 25th of November. This battle forced the Communist to accept the truce demarkation line. On the 26th to
the 27th of November, the 20th BCT attacked and took Hill 317, Kelly, Nick, Tessie, Nori, and Crete outposts were finally overtaken by the armistice.

Between November 1951 and 3 February 1952, the 20th BCT defended OPLR Kelly, Nick and Tessie and Nori and Rusty despite repeated CCF attacks. Meanwhile, “Patrols to contact” of the Filipino Battalion, raided enemy positions as far as Old Baldy, Hoesong-dong, Hill 168 and Hill 135 further clearing “Cavite” during the UN winter campaign.

From March 2 through April 11, 1952, the 20th was committed east of the Imjin River. Patrol actions reached Hills 171, 165 and 223; knocking out several enemy tanks and artillery pieces, accounting for 360 CCF on VT Alley.

When the Greek Battalion was attacked on 16 March, the 20th shifted some of its forces to the left of the Battalion sector and assisted the assaulted UN force on its left.

At Karhwan-gol, west of Chorwon, during May 8-21, 1952 the 20th engaged the Chinese in nine separate combats. Six of which were hand-to-hand and close-quarter fight at Hills Eerie, 18, and 200, Hill 19, Yoke, Uncle, Old Baldy, all in T-Bone Hill. Still later the Battalion was committed at Porkchop Hill and in Alligator Jaws.

Section 2. Attack on Hill Eerie

The final Filipino attack on Hill Eerie was launched in the early morning of May 21, 1952. It was led by a young Filipino officer, a 1950 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, Second Lieutenant Fidel V. Ramos.

Lieutenant Ramos was given the mission to capture or destroy enemy personnel, material and installations on Hill Eerie. Designated to accomplish the mission was the 2nd Reconnaissance Platoon of the 20th BCT, reinforced by some engineer demolition specialists and an artillery forward observer team.

With three officers and 41 enlisted men, Lieutenant Ramos organized his men into four teams: (1) a Sniper Team led by 2nd Lieutenant Armando Dizon with nine men, (2) a Rifle Team led by Sergeant C. Drapeza with 13 men, (3) a Scout Team led by Corporal J. Palis with 10 men, and (4) a Forward Observer Team led by 2nd Lieutenant Cosme Acosta with 2 men. Besides these personnel, Ramos also had one radio operator, one messenger, and one medical aid man.

The objective—Hill Eerie—had been well fortified by the Chinese Red troops.
It had several bunkers arranged in a semicircle around the top of the hill and trenches connecting the hill to nearby enemy supporting positions.

At 0407 of 21 May Lieutenant Ramos and his platoon-sized combat unit crossed their designated line of departure in full battle gear. Observing all necessary precaution to escape detection, the three officers and 41 enlisted men crept and crawled through rice paddies with widely scattered small trees. The march toward the objective continued for about two hours until the platoon reached its attack position along an irrigation ditch near a three-meter wide creek with knee-deep water and banks about 1-meter high about 400 meters from the top of Hill Eerie.

The enemy strength on Eerie was estimated to be one reinforced platoon, well dug-in. Accordingly, prior to the actual infantry assault on the hill, air, artillery, and tank preparation fires were directed at the objective.

From 0700 to 0710, Lieutenant Ramos' four teams (scout, rifle, sniper and forward observer), moved by fire and maneuver up to the crest of the hill. As soon as the assault teams reached the barbed wire entanglements of Eerie at 0710 two tanks lifted their fire.

Without delay the 11-man, Scout Team led by Corporal Palis with one automatic rifleman, one rifleman and one grenadier, advanced following the trench to the right of the hill. On Point M to the east of Bunker No. 1 on top of Eerie (See Situation Map 4) Palis emplaced his automatic rifleman and then deployed the rest of his men on a line to fully cover by fire the north edge of the hill.

At this instant when Palis emplaced his automatic rifleman on Point M, the Chinese defending the hill began to throw hand grenades, but failed to hit any of the Filipino soldiers. Suddenly, two enemy soldiers ran out of Bunker No. 2 Corporal Palis' rifleman fired several rounds at them killing the two immediately. As his automatic rifleman kept firing, Palis and two other men rushed toward bunker No. 2, dropped several grenades through at top opening of the Bunker, and fired into the slits of the bunker, killing four Chinese soldiers inside.

A little later, enemy hand grenades started flying out of Bunker No. 3 through a top opening. In a flash, Lieutenant Ramos joined Corporal Palis near Bunker No. 3, even as the other grenadier worked his way to the top of the bunker dropping several grenades into it. As two enemy soldiers ran out of their bunker, Lieutenant Ramos who was about 4 meters away, fired his carbine at them killing the two instantly.

By this time the scout team had exhausted its supply of hand grenades. Ramos ordered two engineer men of the team to blast and seal bunkers 2 and 3. Enemy automatic fire began hitting Eerie from a connecting trench
about 200 meters north of Eerie. The enemy fire, however, was ineffective and did not hamper the accomplishment of the scout team’s mission.

Meanwhile, at about the time the Scout Team was moving up the southern crest of Eerie, the Rifle Team led by Sergeant Drapeza, worked its way on the left side of the hill toward the north till it established physical contact with the Scout Team on the right. Drapeza deployed an automatic rifleman at Point N and on the left(west) side of Eerie and the rest of his team eastward, with another automatic rifleman at Point F.

From his position, Sergeant Drapeza suddenly saw three enemy soldiers run out of Bunker No. 4 to throw hand grenades. Immediately, Drapeza, his grenadier, and rifleman engaged the enemy with grenades and rifle fire killing all of them. The Chinese made several attempts to throw hand grenades and four more of them were killed as they ran out of their bunkers. Some of Drapeza’s men ran to the bunkers, threw hand grenades into them and then ran back to the top of Eerie. At this time, the left side of the hill (Drapeza’s team sector) began receiving enemy fire from positions on the northwest. Drapeza’s automatic rifleman and the rest of the team engaged the enemy in a continuous fire fight while the engineers blasted and sealed the five bunkers (4 to 8). As the engineers busied themselves in blasting the bunkers, enemy fire kept falling on the hill. Fortunately, not a single Filipino soldier was hit or wounded.

Lieutenant Dizon’s sniper team was at their designated battle position on the southwest side of the Eerie by the time the Scout and Rifle Teams reached the top of Eerie. The sniper team was tasked to prevent or neutralize enemy supporting fires from the west. The Chinese fired from positions to the west along nearby Hill 191 but Dizon’s team kept on with all the fire power they could muster.

At 0728, while Drapeza’s team was demolishing the rest of the Chinese bunkers, enemy mortar shells began to hit the hill. But the enemy’s mortar fire was too late to be of any help to their beleaguered comrades. The Filipino soldiers had practically demolished all the bunkers. The enemy was apparently out-witted throughout the infantry firefight that lasted for fully twenty torrid minutes. It took the Chinese sixteen minutes, from the time the lead elements of Filipino assault teams reached the top of Eerie Hill, before they could deliver their first mortar shell on the doomed hill.

Their mission accomplished, Lieutenant Ramos fired the signal to withdraw at exactly 0730. As soon as the platoon cleared the top of the hill friendly tanks resumed their bombardment of Eerie. All the three Filipino officers and 41 enlisted men who participated in the final assault on Eerie Hill were able to return to their base without a single casualty. With exceptional gallantry
and intrepidity they were able to destroy seven enemy bunkers, each large enough for five or six men while six other bunkers were destroyed by air, artillery, and tank fires that supported the operation.

The assault teams definitely killed 11 Chinese soldiers and wounded 10 others. Estimated number of enemy killed by supporting artillery fire was 2, while the air strikes and tank fire, accounted one each. Enemy casualties inside the bunkers could not be determined. Lieutenant Ramos’ unit sustained not a single casualty. However, one of his men was hit by mortar fragments that were found embedded in his nylon vest.

In 350 days of continuous combat duty, the 20th BCT suffered thirteen KIA, 100 WIA and one MIA but the unit suffered more from the freezing weather which was feared more by the Filipinos than actual combat.
CHAPTER VII STAEMATE

Section 1. Deployment to Korea

Activated on 1 January 1951, the 19th Battalion Combat Team was a Headquarter’s reserve in Camp Murphy in the Philippines. On 16 January 1952, it was alerted to replace the 20th BCT in Korea. Pursuant to the alert order, it was transferred to Fort McKinley of Rizal in the country on 1 February, where it had undergone intensive training preparatory to its mission to Korea.

The Battalion, consisted of 37 officers and 921 men initially, was command ed by Colonel Ramon Z. Aguirre, and had four rifle companies, a medical unit, and a signal company. Colonel Aguirre was a Bataan veteran and graduated from US Infantry School. Most of the officers in the Battalion also graduated from various courses of US Infantry School. Composed of combat-tested veterans of the Second World War and of the Huk Campaign, the 19th BCT after undergoing 16 weeks of intensive training was shipped to Korea.

On 28 April the first batch of its personnel composed of 9 officers and 390 men headed by Major Zoilo M. Perez, Battalion executive officer, left Manila on board the LST 842 and arrived in Pusan, Korea on 8 May. Three days later it was already at the frontline CP of the 20th BCT at Chobakkol, Chorwon.

On arrival, the personnel were assigned to staff sections and companies of the 20th BCT corresponding to their assignments in the 19th BCT. The main purpose of such assignments was for familiarization and on-the-job training. Moreover, this permitted the release from frontline duty of an equal number of officers and men of the 20th BCT.

In May Colonel Abcede caused the first contingent to undergo reorganization and training before the arrival of the command group of the 19th BCT in Korea. Colonel Abcede issued the orders to coincide with the relief of the 20th BCT from the line on midnight of 31 May. The 19th BCT’s first contingent began its operation at 0100 on 1 June under Major Zoilo Perez, and its headquarters at Camp Casey, the training area of the 45th US Infantry Division about 10 kilometers below the 38th Parallel.

On 6 June the command group of the 19th BCT, headed by Colonel Ramon Z. Aguirre, arrived at Camp Casey. The following day, the rest of the second group left Pusan also arrived at Camp Casey, at 1000, 10 June, and
the turn-over ceremony was held at the parade ground of Camp Casey, where Colonel Abcede relinquished command of the Philippine Forces to Korea to Colonel Aguirre. Colonel Aguirre officially assumed the command effective on 10 June. As of 1200, the CP of the 19th BCT was officially opened. At 1530, Colonel Abcede and his 20th BCT, less those reassigned to the 19th BCT, entrained for Pusan where they boarded two Philippine Navy vessels for the Philippines. From that day on, the 19th BCT became part of the United Nations Command in Korea. During the turn-over the Battalion had a strength of 60 officers and 1,130 men, 12 officers and 154 enlisted men of which came from the 20th BCT.

At 0900, 11 June, Colonel Aguirre and his staff were briefed at the CP of the 179th Infantry at Sindam-ni on current enemy and friendly situation at the division MLR. Of the enemy situation, stress was laid on his numerical capabilities to launch strong sorties against friendly positions at the newly gained outposts and the MLR. The build-up of a huge reservoir of long range weapons and armor by the enemy in front of the 45th US Infantry Division was likewise emphasized.

While attached to the I US Corps from 19 July 1951 to the time of replacement on 3 April 1952, it was operationally attached to the 45th US Infantry Division which operated in the east sector of Korea.

Section 2. Major Accomplishments

On 15 June, five days after it had taken over the operational responsibility in Korea, the 19th BCT was committed into the line, the Chorwon-Sibyon-ni corridor (west central sector of Korea), the most vulnerable sector in line Jamestown.

The next day, in addition to its mission on the MLR, the 19th BCT was directed to man Combat Outpost No. 7 on Hills Uncle and Yoke. Still later, on 17 June, the Battalion was ordered to man Combat Outpost No. 8 on Hills 191 and Eerie. One Company from 179th US Infantry Regiment was, then, attached to the Battalion and 2nd Battalion, the 279th US Infantry Regiment was to reinforce the 19th Battalion Combat Team whenever it was smashed by enemies. One tank platoon of the 245th US Infantry Battalion and the 158th US Artillery Battalion which was reinforced by the 160th US Artillery Battalion supported it directly. The men-transport detachment came to be under the command of the Battalion. The control and coordination of the supporting weapons for the Battalion was devolved upon Captain Davic B. Baga, the Heavy Weapons Company Commander.
The reliefs of combat outposts were took up on 17 June with penetration under the cover of smoke-screen. I Company occupied in the first place, Outpost Eerie and hastily looked after the fortifications and either defense works.

At 1800, the same day, K Company under the command of Captain Jose Carandang occupied Hill 191. The Battalion kept three observation posts all along, while each company kept forward artillery observer. At one of the observation post, the Filipinos observed a Red Chinese force by a broke near Hill 191, and the CCF were taken prisoners by Filipino K Company upon the observation, and were led to the Battalion advanced command post. Thereon the prisoners were transferred again to the battalion CP.

As the day was drawing to a close, the enemy resumed attack on Hill 191 and Eerie. The Filipinos counterattacked heavily.

The enemy patrolled with an estimated platoon in strength on the front slope of Hill 191. Filipinos threw grenades and shelled with artillery and mortars upon the penetrating enemies. Heavy casualties being inflicted on them, the enemies couldn't help withdrawing.

On 18 June 1952, the Filipinos repaired the Battalion and the major fire point while the enemy snipers continued to fire from Hill 206. The selected snipers of the K Company shot the enemy snipers. As a result, two enemy snipers were killed. This provoked the enemy to launch a heavy artillery attack upon the whole span of Hill 191, Eerie, and the other positions at the rate of one shell per minute. The defenders of these hills counterfired with their own artillery and mortars. The day's action resulted in the death of two 19th BCT soldiers and four wounded. The enemy was routed, suffering 8 wounded and 6 killed. But the enemy continuously shelled the Filipino position for the entire night.

By 1600, 19 June the enemy resumed their bombardment. Amidst this pounding, without the cover of smoke-screen, K and I Companies were relieved by F and Reconnaissance Companies. To ease this relief and to neutralize hostile artillery, air power was called in which bombed infantry concentrations and artillery.

The hostile regiment which had been reinforced on the same day was preparing to renew the offensive for the night on the 179th US Infantry Regiment including Filipino outpost troops. All friendly units were making their preparations to counterattack. Though no offensive was on, an estimated platoon of enemies reconnoitered the west sector of the Hill 191 which the 2nd platoon, L Company was occupying. At 2015, the enemy began the offensive with 28 shells on the hill and crept into within grenade throwing distance.

Hand grenades were exchanged between the two armies. The Filipino
Company heavily counterattacked with rifles and on the other hand requested supporting fire. After about a fifteen minutes' encounter the enemy gave up his attack and pulled back. The enemy losses were not known. The last patrol clashes occurred during the two days, 19-20 June. But the enemy artillery and trench mortar fires upon the 8th outpost were not suspended.

However, preparation for the projected attack continued. Colonel Aguirre and his staff officers worked over the plans for the defense and counterattack.

On 19 June, the BCT lost an officer, 2nd Lieutenant Cosme Acosta and 8 others were wounded. Intelligence reports revealed that on that day the enemy intended to launch a massive attack and break through the MLR, but the plan did not materialize.

On 20 June the situation was not changed. Defense positions of the 8th outpost and the main line of resistance came to be readjusted. Even during the daytime the enemy mortar's fire was heavy. As air support was requested, UN airplanes were mobilized and the hostile facilities of the T-bone hill and Pokkae ridge came under machine gunning and bombing. By nightfall, Filipinos had sufficient time to prepare for action. Under the command of Ramon Z. Aguirre, all staff members were effective in accomplishing
their mission. Major Zoilo M. Perez was active to prepare for the night defense with Captain Vicente Berenguer, and Lieutenant Lucendo Galang acted to be closely connected with adjacent unit and tank unit attached. The battalion S-2 officer, Robustiano Javier caught hold of intelligence with considerable accuracy, while the S-3 assistant, Reynaldo B. Perez simultaneously reexamined the program of battle practice and distributed HQ personnel to the outposts and the main line of resistance. At the same time, S-4 officer Eusebio C. Alpay supplemented ammunition and construction materials for the other defense positions. The other officers acted to prepare for the defensive operations as Rufino Santiago and Teodoro Directo for communication channel, Jaime V. De Leon for medical treatment, Davic B. Baga for the supporting fire. While the Filipinos were making preparations, so were the enemy.

It was 2205 when the enemy began his attack with intense artillery and mortar concentrations. Flares fired revealed hordes of the enemy in waves coming from all directions towards Hills Berie and 191. Bombardments in all positions of these hills were terrific. The fight continued till morning of the following day.

At 2205, the enemy fire power was greatly increased. Some seventy or eighty shells were dropped every minute upon the Hill 191 of the 8th outpost.

On the whole supporting fire focused on the battleground so that Hill 191 flared up and the vicinity was brightened. The commander of L Company reported to the battalion CP that the enemy of a battalion strength was attacking the company position from three directions. L Company repelled the enemy after a desperate fight by BARs and machine guns. In the meantime, Lieutenant Galang employed a tank at the left of L Company, holding it in readiness for action. The tank used flare shells and machine guns in action. As a 76-mm tank gun was destroyed by a hostile anti-tank gun's fire, faced with the growing threat of being ensnared, it was substituted by another tank for the operation. The other two tanks were ordered to crush any objects whenever they appear.

The friendly unit's artillery and mortars formed a barrage 50 meters forward of L Company's position on the order of battalion Commander. The fire fight was, however, continued. Lieutenant Galang requested not only the supporting fire of adjacent units but also the other necessary action. In accordance with the request, flare bombs brightened all around of the battlefield of Hill 232. This time, the hostile artillery continued to shell till the enemy could get Hill 225. The enemy turned the direction of shelling to Hill 255, the west outpost of the Filipinos. At Battalion OP Major Zoilo M. Perez controlled and coordinated for the countershelling on the target which abruptly appeared during the fire fight. Major Perez manipulated the 155-mm artillery toward a hill situated at the right side of the Filipino position in accordance with
the presumption that the enemy automatic guns battery was set up in the
hill.

At 2317, the hostile shelling was lulled, and the bursting of the accumulated ammunition was observed over Hill 206. At the same time the hostile green flare shells were fired over Hill 206. At 2357, at the opposite side of Hill 151, the hostile red flare shells were fired.

At 0005, 21 June, the hostile shelling was increased again. The enemy shells were dropped on Hills 191, Erie and the main line of resistance behind the hills as well. Hills 200 and 225 were also under enemy shelling.

Five minutes later, the two company-strength enemy attacked hill 191 from three directions, and a desperate fire fight got underway. All of the defensive fire including supporting fire and the adjacent unit’s fire were concentrated on the front of the L Company where bombs brightened.

At 0045, B-29 bombers made a bombing raid on Hill 290. Rifle fire went on till the fire of the front of L Company lulled. The fire fight to the right in the direction of Hill 205 continued without interruption. The enemy moved to the right side of L Company and attacked the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon could not request any supporting fire on account of telegraph line trouble. As the enemy penetrated to the Filipino position, Lieutenant Tiano the platoon leader ordered his men to defend their position to the last. When the enemies rushed he took the lead in a bayonet fight amidst the rain of fire. Unfortunately he was hit by a shell fragment in the left shoulder. In spite of his wound, he spurred his men to fight. Stimulated by his aggressive spirit, all the Filipinos repelled the enemy.

At 0300, the fight was silenced. The Filipinos stubbornly defended their position while heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The enemy shelling was continued, however, till 0500 on the Filipino position. As it was clear the next morning, UN bombers made a raid on the escaping enemies with machine guns and bombs. When the air raids were over, the morning was returned to silence.

The attempt of the well-trained enemy of two regiments ended in an utter failure. The after-action-report on Hills Erie and 191 revealed that the enemy attack was conducted by two regiments supported by tanks. The BCT had smashed 2 enemy tanks. The estimated number of enemy dead was 500 while on the Filipino side 8 were KIA and 16 were WIA. The valiant Reconnaissance Company’s 2nd Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Apollo B. Tiano died in this battle.

In the morning of 21 June, after the smoke and blood of battle had subsided, the 19th BCT received immediate congratulations from their American counterparts for their spectacular stand on Hills Erie and 191.

On 22 June, the officers and men of the 19th BCT received the reward
they really cared for—much needed sleep, and then to battle again. The 19th BCT received the Korean Presidential Unit Citation before it had finished its tour of duty.

Besides the Korean Presidential Unit Citation it was also awarded a Battle Citation by X US Corps, under which the 45th US Infantry Division served in the east sector of Korea.

Section 3. Stalemate

So far the narrative has centered around the activity of the Philippines' battalions without looking into any other matters than the fighting. But early in 1951, the both opposing forces in Korea began to see that continued shooting and pulverizing the land to achieve the end for either side demanded the cost of the personnel and material much greater than first considered. This sentiment was to bring about an armistice negotiation and finally to put the fighting to an end on July 27, 1953. This peace effort meanwhile as progressed dictated more or less the activity on the fighting front to the effect that the military actions in the latter half of the war could best be summarized as stalemate. Now a little digression into this matter would not be out of place.

In summer of 1951 the United Nations forces in Korea seemed to be growing stronger by the day, while the Chinese Communists grew weaker. On Sunday, June 23, at the very moment when the Reds were once again faced with military defeat, Russia's delegate to the United Nations, Jacob Malik, suggested in a radio talk in New York that discussions should begin for a cease fire in Korea. The Reds had balked at earlier attempts at peace talk, but now they seemed eager to have them begin.

In reply to this on June 30, General Ridgway offered to discuss a cease fire with the top commanders of the Communist forces. The talks began on July 10 at Kaesong, a town near the 38th Parallel and between the front lines of the opposing armies. Admiral C. Turner Joy, Far East naval commander, was the chief delegate for the United Nations. General Num Il was in charge of the enemy delegation.

As soon as truce talks started in 1951, the Communist began to stall negotiations. They insisted that the 38th Parallel should remain the dividing or demarcation line between the two opposing forces after an armistice was signed. Since the United Nations troops had already driven north of the parallel in many places, Admiral Joy insisted that the truce line be located wherever the battle line was when an armistice was signed. All during the long, hot summer
the peace talks dragged on, with the Communist continuing to stall every step of the way.

In late August of 1951 the truce talks were broken off by the Communists. Van Fleet's plan had been to keep the military pressure on the Reds but not to engage in any full-scale action that might endanger the peace negotiation. As soon as they called off, however, the Eighth Army Commander launched a series of limited drives aimed at forcing the Reds back to the peace table.

Nevertheless after the armistice effort was set in motion, again November 1951, all future military undertakings were doomed to receive their cue from the negotiation table. As most contemporary observer noted, for all practical purposes the Korean War ended 30 June, 1951, when United Nations Commander Matthew Ridgway radioed his willingness to discuss truce terms with Communist forces.

The end was stalemate. From then, such military pressure was applied that there was no intention of striking for the Yalu or of opening up the battle front for a new war of maneuver. The new attacks would be limited in zone, for limited objectives, a hill here, or to erase a bulge there, or to deny enemy observation in yet another place. Typical type of the maneuver was patrol of a platoon size, that also was limited in a day's excursion.

On 7 May an incident occurred on the offshore island of Koje that had world-wide repercussions. The island had been opened as a prisoner of war camp several months after the Chinese entry into the war had turned the 100,000 North Korean captured in the drive to the Yalu.

On the day, the prisoners actually seized the Camp Commander Brigadier General, F.T. Dodd, US Army as he was talking with them at the gate of their compound. One of Ridgway's last acts was to relieve Dodd of his command and appoint a successor, to whom the prisoners presented a series of demands. These demands, implying brutality and coercions of the keepers, were more propaganda devices, and grist to the mill of the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom.

While the prisoners of war problem on Koje-do was being discussed, another challenge came in May to vex the United Nations forces in Korea. The Soviet Union had announced over its radio system that the United Nations forces were using bacteriological weapons against North Korea and the Chinese mainland. In the months that followed, these charges were repeated by Communist-front organizations, Peking radio and the various Communist delegations at the UN. In the meantime the United States replied that the charges were false and attempted, quite unsuccessfully, to have an impartial agency, such as the International Red Cross, investigate the charges.
On the front, stalemate and inactivity continued throughout 1952. Although the United Nations forces launched several large-scale offensives, however, these were far short of the intention of general advance. Receiving their cue from the fluctuations of the armistice table, the military operations were largely confined to hill battles and customary patrols into no-man's-land.

In the latter half of the 1952, the activity of the 19th BCT was also limited: Patrols of the fixed scheme usually with long-announced roster and designated territory were conducted. Chores of building field fortifications and earthworks went on keeping the Filipinos still busy. The period was also marked by less movements and units upon relief customarily occupied the fixed positions attending more to the amenity of the average combatant. Winter came, which reduced the fighting more to lull. The Filipinos passed through another bitter winter of Korea never loosening the firm stand on their sectors. Soon, they heard, the 14th BCT would arrive on the scene to relieve them of the Korean tour.
CHAPTER VIII  ARMISTICE AND THEREAFTER

Section 1. Activity of the 14th BCT

Activated on 27 July 1950, the 14th BCT was stationed at Baras, Rizal. Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay named it “Avengers” for its striking power and its splendid record during the Huk Campaign. On 26 March 1953, the Battalion under Colonel Nicanor Jimenez arrived at Pusan.

From the sea port the Avengers proceeded to Chunchon by train, then by truck to Inje Valley where the battle-weary 19th BCT were bivouacked in reserve.

On May 15, 1953, the Battalion hit the front lines. The 14th BCT sector stretched for 1.5 kilometers across Satae-ri Valley. B Company occupied the ridge and immediately left for sand-bagged fortress area with a chain of outposts hinged on Outpost No. 4. Decked at the valley floor were elements of A Company supported by a platoon of tanks. Perched along Heartbreak Ridge were elements of C Company extending about 600 meters to the left.

Satae-ri Valley was one of the main invasion routes in the East Central front. The mission of the Battalion was to deny the enemy use of the valley below and to secure the commanding terrain and Heartbreak Ridge.

To accomplish the mission, the enemy had to be always placed on the defensive. The 14th BCT accomplished this by aggressive patrol action, harassing the enemy lines both with artillery fire, small arms firefight and combat patrols into enemy territory. During one such patrol, a squad under Sergeant Ponciano Agno, D Company distinguished themselves. In close combat with the enemy, Sergeant Agno and his men extricated a surrounded squad resulting in the recovery of Pfc. Agustin. While being dragged away by Red Chinese, Agustin exploded 2 grenades in the face of his captors. The Chinese were killed, but he was riddled with shrapnel inspite of his armor vest and steel helmet. Pfc Agustin was later awarded the US Silver Star.

Between 15 May and 6 July, when the unit was relieved by the elements of the 40th US Division, the 14th BCT suffered 4 KIA and 27 WIA.

The 14th BCT was designed to establish blocking positions at Paeksuk-san. For 8 days, the 14th secured the MSR while maintaining two companies under alert for immediate deployment. Then suddenly on 14 June, the Reds zeroed in on the blocking positions. For one night, the areas of the whole Battalion were
heavily socked. The Battalion sat like toy ducks in a shooting gallery. For more than 12 hours enemy artillery rained on the sector, so that in one night of Red artillery assault, the BCT lost 1 KIA and 6 WIA. The Avengers lost 2 officers in this action. Lieutenant Dominado was killed, while Lieutenant Miravite was permanently paralyzed.

At dawn A and B Companies were ordered to Christmas Hill. B Company went ahead at 0530. Two CCF battalions overran K Company, 180th US Infantry Regiment. B Company, 14th BCT was designated to counterattack. Rain and Korean silt delayed the movement. When B Company finally reached Christmas Hill, I Company of the 180th US Regiment had already cleared up to the jump-off point so, they counterattacked and reoccupied the left finger ridge of the 2nd Battalion outpost. A portion of the outpost was not thoroughly cleared until 16 July. In this action, CCF casualties were counted at 200 killed and 350 wounded. A CCF probing company assaulted G Company of 180th US Infantry Regiment. B Company of the 14th BCT provided the fire power that repelled the enemy on the night of 15 July.

In the afternoon of 12 July, A Company of the 14th BCT moved to the front and relieved the G Company of 279th US Infantry Regiment of the 40th Division. Relief was completed without casualty late in the evening. B Company moved to the main line of resistance. The rest of 2nd Battalion, 279th Infantry Regiment was taken over by the other elements of the 14th BCT. In time the Reconnaissance Company reinforced A Company at the OPLR. The opposite A Company (plus reinforcements from Reconnaissance Company) was the ridge where some 200 meters away the readied CCF towered over A Company.

Enemy movement was first noticed in front of an machine gun positions at 0930, 18 July. Flares were requested. In front of the Reconnaissance platoons, an enemy company was reported striking the concertina wires. Orders were passed along line not to waste ammunition and wait until they came nearer. Machine gun positions reported CCF probing elements at thirty meters up front. A prearranged flare was fired and all the guns opened up. The attacking force pulled back. The enemy from the opposite hill retaliated with small arms fire followed by mortar and artillery barrages which were countered by the friendly artillery. Under the light of artillery illumination fire, bodies could be silhouetted strangled on the barbed wire, while down below, the remnants could be seen on the defiles. Another mock assault was conducted at 2330 after the fire-fight. The dead were no longer on the forward slope.

Even at Hill 500 on the Satae-ri front, the Chinese tried to persuade the battalion "Go home! We are not your enemies!" they announced on the loud speakers. This would be followed by "Manseh" screaming. These would be
Filipino 105 mm howitzer crews readying for next round.

answered by the OPs by opening their radios full volume accompanied by singing.

This happened again on Christmas Hill. Sometime after midnight of 22 July light blinkers were observed blinking in the darkness in front. Then the night was disturbed with cacophonous Chinese music accompanied by rifle and automatic stacato. Friendly forces on the other ridges provided the beating sniper fire, peppering the A Company zone of defense with lead. The entire show only stopped after artillery fire which sent them hurrying for cover. All the while, A Company held their fire.

Between the 24th and the 26th, A Company was receiving 500 rounds of enemy artillery shells a day, disrupting communications and resupply. For three days, for short of ammunition stock, A Company had to spare what they had and cling close to their fox-holes. Rumors said that the truce was brewing up at Panmunjom. Meanwhile on the 14th BCT sector, there was marked increase in enemy barrage; the heaviest of which was on the 27th of July.

Enemy barrage started hammering the entire Filipino line immediately after news was received that the truce would be at 2200 hours, 27 July. From 1100 hours, instructions were passed along the line to cease fire on the time set,
2200 hours, but they must reserve ammunitions just in case. Between 1200 hours and 2200 hours the entire Battalion line received more than 1,000 rounds. Scores were wounded as the Korean War was thrashing on its death row. The line held before the artillery onslaught. The 14th BCT Artillery Battery engaged the Communist artillery in an all-out-duel. By the 1800 hours, the hill in front of A Company was in shambles, battery records show that the artillery threw thousands of rounds into that hill with great efficiency.

At 2200 hours, the entire front suddenly became silent almost in unison. The uneasy peace was on. The following day, 28 July, the Battalion dismantled its fortifications, blasted its mines and rolled up the concertina wires. On the second day, the Battalion moved to Yanggu valley where it set up camp on 28 July 1953 at Camp Dominado, named in honor of Lieutenant Teodorico Dominado Jr. of Dumaguete City who lost his life at Paeksuk-san.

From the time it occupied Yanggu, the 14th BCT embarked on an intensive training program. Then it joined the effort of reconstructing the ravaged villages along Yanggu Valley. For its efforts, the 14th BCT received the Korean Presidential Unit Citation on 15 December 1953 and the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation upon return to the Philippines on the last week of March 1954.

Section 2. Activity of the 2nd BCT

Activated on 10 July 1946, the 2nd BCT, then 2nd Infantry Regiment was subsequently thrown into tactical operations against the dissidents in Central and Southern Luzon. In the middle of 1953, when the tour of duty of the 14th BCT was about to terminate, the 2nd BCT was alerted for training preparatory for an eventual overseas duty in Korea. On the last phase of the training in Marikina, Rizal, the personnel of the Battalion were briefed by Colonel Nicanor Jimenez, outgoing Battalion Commander. But when the training was almost through, peace negotiations were already in the offing.

Aware of the truce, the Philippine Government, nevertheless, sent advance elements of this Battalion in December 1953. Upon completion of training on 12 April 1954, the main bulk of the unit began the last voyage to Korea. Hitting the port of Sasebo, Japan, four days thereafter, the men were issued clothing and supplies, and briefed over the situation in Korea. Colonel Antonio de Veyra assumed command of the Battalion, and after the turn-over ceremonies, the Battalion proceeded to Pusan on board a USS transport. From Pusan, the Filipino troops finally headed for Yanggu Valley, and arrived there at noon time.

For thirteen months the Battalion maintained alert duty in their camp. On 13 May 1955 the 2nd BCT returned still clothed with the same glory set by
her predecessors that fought in the freezing snow.

The Most significant feature of the participation in the UN operations in Korea was the establishment of a precedent as not a fiction but a fact. The isolationist sentiment that had dominated many nations' foreign policy in peacetime was abandoned in 1950.

The reality of the Korean War was a reflection of a change of official attitude and policy. This war had been fought not to secure the unification of Korea but to establish the principle of collective resistance to aggression, and the objectives of the war had been achieved when the invading armies of North Korea and Chinese Communists had been thrown back from the Republic of Korea.

However, the policy remained the eternal tragedy. The much-touted terrors of the Korean winter the Filipinos had suffered would not constitute a serious problem today. But the demarcation line was stabilized and Koreans were separated by the DMZ. The torments Korean people have suffered because of the line will not be easily removed.

Section 3. Filipino Prisoners of War

The exact number of the Filipinos who were captured in the Korean War is very hard to establish. It is only possible to presume that some, after their missing report, died before the capture and also others might have perished during captivity.

But it was very obvious, when the Communist announced the names of 359 UN prisoners of war who refused repatriation, that no single Filipino turned his back against his country.

The prisoners of war during the Korean War were exchanged on two occasions. The first one was to switch the sick and wounded under Operation Little Switch which took place on 20 April 1953 at Panmunjom. The United Nations Command turned over 6,670 Communists in exchange for 684 men. On 24 August of the year Operation Big Switch brought 12,773 more to the UNC while 75,823 were turned to the Red side.

Among the Filipino prisoners of war the first to come home was Juanito C. Magno. Repatriated under Operation Little Switch, the 31-year-old Sergeant was flown to the Philippines' Nichols Airfield and later given a most welcome in a motorcade.

Magno was captured in the battle of Yultong on April 22, 1951, when his platoon was trapped in a fierce engagement in Hangsangsang-ni. He recounted
that he was made to join a "death march" covering 350 kilometers, during which, for lack of food, he had to eat a tube of toothpaste. He related, too, that he occasionally heard the moribund cries of other prisoners of war pleading for compassion with Lord as they plodded over mountains in the seemingly endless march to the camps. Magno himself had been so maltreated that he was both a lame man and a nervous wreck when he arrived.

On August 24, 1953, the Communists returned 40 Filipino prisoners of war under Operation Big Switch. Despite long captivity and maltreatment, all returned healthy except two, Sergeant Mauricio Rivera and PFC Moises Cabjuan, who were afflicted with acute tuberculosis.

The arrivals included two officers, Lieutenant Tomas Batilo and 2nd Lieutenant Bienvenido Salting. The former was captured, together with sixteen other enlisted men, in a fierce hand-to-hand fight on 24 April 1951, when the 10th BCT made a desperate attempt to save the doomed Gloucestershire Battalion not far from Yultong. The latter, on the other hand, was captured in a close quarters encounter in the village of Sagimak on 14 July 1951. He made a daring attempt to evade capture when his remaining men had been overpowered, but was nevertheless captured. He made another attempt to escape, together with four of his men, much later. Recaptured, he and his men were sent to a mining camp, where they were made to carry rocks and wood.

Like those from the other free nations that participated in the Korean War, the Filipino prisoners of war had been subjected to a long, intensive, systematic process of indoctrination in Communist concentration camps. To their great credit, however, they have not given even the slightest ground for any doubt on their loyalty. In conclusion, it can be said that both in combat and in torture the Filipinos in Korea had acquitted themselves so well that the Filipino people and her history may well be proud of them.
ANNEX CHRONOLOGY

1950

7 Aug  The Philippines announces to send troops to Korea and subsequently chooses the 10th BCT as the first contingent.
23 Aug  The United States officially appreciates the Philippines for decision to commitment.
9 Sep   The Battalion finishes preparation for Korea and parades before the countrymen.
15 Sep  The first Philippine Battalion sails off the country.
19 Sep  The Battalion arrives at Pusan.
20 Sep  The Battalion exercises and rests at Miryang.
29 Sep  The Battalion departs Miryang for Sacheon securing an airfield.
10 Oct  The Battalion arrives at Waegwan for the security mission of the MSR plus on the job training.
31 Oct  The Battalion departs Kimchon for Anju by train for active mission in North Korea.
1 Nov   The I US Corps changes the Battalion's mission to secure the MSR from Kaesong to Pyongyang and to clear of the guerrillas.
10 Nov  The Battalion moves to Simmak.
Mid-Nov The Battalion temporarily dismembered and A and C Companies move up to Kunu-ri and Sinanju for security mission.
25 Nov  A and C Companies near Kunu-ri contact with CCF thrust and retreat along with other allied units.
1 Dec   A and C Companies join the Battalion at Pyongyang.
14 Dec  The Battalion withdraws south to Suwon executing blocking and supporting missions on the way down. The retrograde further continues towards south until the Battalion reaches on 7 January Kimchon-Taegu area assigned for security mission.

1951

3 Mar   Security mission ended with the Battalion clearing out of Yongdong on the day to make 8 kilometers short of Seoul on the next.
30 Mar  The Battalion, in line with the UN's realignment operations, pushes up to reach along the Imjin River.
4 Apr   The Battalion relieved by the Belgian Battalion to go into the division reserve near Chongok.
10 Apr  The Battalion fights at Naktaedong area.
17 Apr  The Battalion goes into the 65th US Regiment reserve at Imjin River area.
22 Apr  Chinese Fifth-phase Offensive launched. The Battalion counters CCF at Yuilong and launches abortive attempt to save the Gloucester shire Battalion.
29 Apr  The Battalion retreats down to the Han River line and attaches itself to the 25th US Division.
The Battalion carries out the Han River defense. During this period it repatriates 286 combat-disabled troops to the Philippines.

The Battalion now under the Canadian brigade clears out of the Han and advances up to the Hantan River on the 29th.

Reverted to the 3rd US Division’s control, the Battalion moves near to Chorwon (Iron Triangle).

The Battalion rests in the division reserve at Sajon-ri near Chorwon.

The Battalion completes the relief of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Inf. Regts, 3rd US Inf.Div. on Wyoming line.

The 10th BCT is replaced by the 20th BCT in zone at Iron Triangle.

The 20th BCT is replaced by the 19th BCT at Tongdu-chon (Camp Casey) and upon relief the new Battalion is committed into Chorwon-Sibyon, corridor on Jametown line.

The Battalion engages CCF on Hills 191 and Erie.

The 14th BCT relieves the 20th BCT.

The Battalion executes defense mission at Heartbreak Ridge.

Armistice signed and the Battalion pulls out of the Demilitarized Zone.

The 14th BCT returns replaced by the 2nd BCT.

The 2nd Battalion returns home closing down the Philippine participation in the Korean war.
PART FIVE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE SQUADRON IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to the Republic of South Africa

South Africa is the southernmost country in Africa. It lies almost wholly within the South Temperate Zone. South, east, and west it is bounded by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The country is bordered by South West Africa and Botswana to the northwest; Rhodesia to the north and Mozambique on the northeastern side. In area it is 1,223,409 square kilometers about one-sixth the size of the United States, five and a quarter times larger than Great Britain, and larger than France, Germany, Italy and Portugal put together.

This southernmost country on the African Continent is a fully autonomous, self-governing state. In the constitutional sense it is as independent as the Republic of the United States or the Republic of France. It is the historic homeland of the oldest and largest European settlement on the African Continent and in every sphere of modern civilized activity highly developed. Its natural resources also far outstrip those of any other African country.

The origins of the Europeans in South Africa are predominantly Dutch and English. France and Germany also contributed to a lesser degree to the composition of the present South African of European descent.

The constitutional head of the Republic of South Africa is the State President who is elected by a democratic electoral process. The executive power is vested in the President acting on the advice of his Ministers of State. The supreme legislative power is the South African Parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The State comprises four Provinces, the Cape, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Natal. The Western contiguous area of South West Africa, designated a mandated territory after World War I, is administered as an integral part of the Republic and has representatives in the South African Parliament. The Cape is the largest Province, 721,223 square kilometers, and Natal the smallest, 86,967 square kilometers. The area of the Transvaal is 286,066 square kilometers and the territory of the Orange Free State covers 129,153 square kilometers. The territory of South West Africa embraces an area of 823,327 square kilometers about three-fifths the area of South Africa.

The pattern of the European population of South Africa is mainly on the lines of the European languages spoken, namely Afrikaans(rooted on Dutch,
the language of the Netherlands) and English. If language is taken as a guide to racial origin then Afrikaans is spoken to English on the broad comparison of 60 per cent to 40 per cent. There is no marked territorial division between the two language groups and since the study of both languages is compulsory at school the result is that most South Africans are bilingual.

The non-European population of the Republic can be divided into three main groups, namely the Bantu, the Coloured and the Asiatic.

The Bantu migrated to Southern Africa at about the same time as the European settlers rooted the western civilization at the southernmost tip of the continent. The Bantu are a highly diversified people of many tribes which can be divided into four main groups, namely the Nguni, the Sotho, the Venda and the Shangana-Tsonga groups. These peoples use at least half-a-dozen languages and to understand the situation it can be compared with the peoples of Europe like the Germans, French, Italians etc. which, although all Europeans, have different languages, cultural backgrounds and customs. These Bantu tribes have about 45 per cent of South Africa's most fertile agricultural ground allocated to them as their homelands. In spite of this more than one-third of the Bantu population is resident in the industrial urban areas.

In 1962 self-government was granted to the Transkei where the Bantu received the right to govern its own territory according to a constitution providing a cabinet with a Chief Minister and five Ministers. The Legislative Assembly consists of 64 chiefs and 45 members elected by the adult Xhosa taxpayers. The following Departments of State were also transferred from the Republic of South Africa to the Transkei Government: Justice, Interior, Finance, Lands, Agriculture and Forestry, Education, Social Welfare and Labour. Since this experiment proved a success, the aim of the Republican Government is to grant self-government to all homelands as their respective stages of development reach the required level.

The Coloureds are a hybrid group of two million people chiefly immigrated from the east. This people mixed to a certain degree with some of the European settlers and also with the Hottentots, a nearly extinct aboriginal race.

The third population group in South Africa is the Asians, the majority of which are Indians. These people showed a natural aptitude for the economic life and the majority are well established traders and owners of various business concerns.

The geography of the country is as diversified as its inhabitants. The greater part of the country has an elevation of more than 1,200 meters. The climatic zones vary from sub-tropical vegetation on the eastern coast to arid
desert regions on the west coast. From winter rains in the South-Wester
Cape with its vineyards and orchards to savannah grass lands in the north.

These differences in climatic zones result in an agriculture with as
many faces. The country began as an agricultural settlement and for two and
a half centuries remained as such. Even in the past sixty years when mining
and industry developed rapidly, agriculture remained important. South Africa
cannot, however, be described as a wealthy agricultural and pastoral country
since only about 25 per cent of the country has an annual precipitation of
more than 63.5 centimeters.

The natural resources of the country are responsible for the fact that
South Africa has been called the treasure house of the world. It has the largest
deposits or ranks among the world’s leading producers of gold, diamonds, plati-
num, uranium, coal, iron ore, chromite, manganese, asbestos, antimony and
corundum. In addition to this South Africa possesses a large variety of other
minerals such as copper, silver, magnesite, nickel, tungsten, fluor spar, zinc,
mica, talc, tin, lead, titanium, graphite, kaolin, kiesgelruhr, feldspar, gypsum,
lime, marble, phosphates, pigments, silicate, salt, arsenic, molybdenum, tanta-
lum, monazite, mercury, beryllium, barytes and zirconium. Although some of
these deposits are small it is sufficient to provide in the country’s domestic
needs.

According to statistics collected during 1970 the total South African
population is 21,448,169 consisting of 3,751,328 South Africans of European
descent, 15,057,952 Bantu, 2,018,453 Coloureds and 620,436 Asians.

Section 2. World War II and After

When World War II broke out the South African Government declared war
on Germany. The Government concentrated its energies on the war.

About 200,000 white men (more than half of them Afrikaners) and 125,000
non-white (mainly Africans and Coloured men) joined the forces, and many of
them served with distinction in the Abyssinian, Mediterranean, and Madagascan
theaters of war. Industry was efficiently switched to the production of munitions
and clothing for military purposes.

South Africa’s achievements were impressive, considering the strength of
the opposition to the war.

As the war drew to a close the Government drafted the preamble to the
United Nations Charter signed at San Francisco in 1945 and returned to mold
postwar South Africa along the lines of a generous demobilization scheme, an
expansion in the social services for all races, a planned development of agri-
culture, mineral, and industrial resources, and large-scale white immigration,
South Africa became a republic on May 31, 1961 and subsequently it left the Commonwealth. The republican constitution was substantially the same as the constitution of the Union, except that an indirectly elected State President replaced the Queen, and her representative, the Governor-General, as head of state.

South Africa had well-equipped and well-trained military forces, consisting of about 125,000 white men, who could be rapidly mobilized and who were capable of overcoming any but a very large-scale attack.
CHAPTER II  NO QUESTION OF STANDING ASIDE

Section 1. Formation of a Squadron to Korea

The Government of the Union of South Africa announced on the 4th August, 1950 its intention to render military aid in the form of a fighter squadron of the South African Air Force (SAAF) for service in the Korean War. In an official statement, issued after a Cabinet meeting, it was declared that:

"The Union Government had given further consideration to the Korean situation in the light of the latest developments. In the statement issued to the Press on July 1, the Government indicated that it was prepared to give sympathetic consideration to any appeal for assistance in dire need, which might be received, either from the United Nations or from those Western nations which associate themselves with the Security Council's resolutions.

In this statement, and also in a further statement issued on July 20, a reference was made to the practical difficulties, chiefly on account of geographical considerations, connected with the provision of direct military assistance.

Liaison has been maintained with the United States of America with the object of ascertaining whether there was any assistance other than of a military character which the Union could make available.

Since, from discussions with the United States, it now appears that there is no alternative assistance which the Union can render, the Government have decided that special efforts should be made to render military aid. This will be offered in the form of a fighter squadron with ground personnel. The air crews and ground personnel will be drawn from the South African Permanent Force.

As members of the Permanent Force are liable for service only in South Africa, service the Far East will be on a voluntary basis. The military authorities will take steps to implement this decision as soon as possible. At the next session of Parliament such legislation will be introduced as may be necessary properly to legalize the dispatch of volunteers out of South Africa.

In view of the present conditions of international tension and the necessity that South Africa should be prepared for any eventuality, the Cabinet is considering a program to further modernization and expansion of our armed forces."
This will naturally mean expenditure over and above what has been authorized by Parliament to authorize such additional expenditure when this may appear necessary."

By then in Korea, the Republic of Korea forces and the Eighth United States Army had been pushed into the Pusan Perimeter, a desolate sweep of mountains, rivers and rice paddies in the extreme south-ravaged peninsula. The defense line stretched from Masan in the south, through Waegwan in the center to Pohang on the eastern coast. Along the perimeter desperate battles were fought by the ground forces, while the United States and Australian Mustangs were effectively employed in assistance.

This was the position when a call for volunteers was made by Brigadier J. T. Durrant, CB, DFC, Director General of the Air Force in South Africa. Members of the South African Permanent Force, officers and others from the Reserve and even civilians answered in overwhelming numbers.

In spite of the original intention to send only members of the Permanent Force, large numbers of ex-servicemen also volunteered. The decision was then made to send No 2 Squadron, SAAF and that it would be brought to operational strength.

In addition it was decided that no aircraft or equipment would be sent from South Africa, but that aircraft and technical equipment would be purchased and made available to the Squadron upon its arrival in the Far East.

The Chief of the General Staff(S.A.) announced on 27 August, 1950 that the United States Government, on behalf of the Unified Command, accepted the Union’s offer. On the same and the following day the names of the officers and other ranks, selected to serve in Korea were announced.

The month following these announcements was highlighted by the assembling of all the members of the Squadron at Waterkloof Air Station near Pretoria. While administrative details were being finalized, the pilots were subjected to a strenuous battle-training program.

This period of preparation in South Africa coincided with a turn in the tide of the hostilities in Korea. The United Nations forces had complete command in the air and on the sea resulting in troops and supplies being poured into the Pusan Perimeter from the United States and Japan. Of interest is also the fact that the Headquarters and two battalions of the 27th British Infantry Brigade arrived at Pusan and engaged in the defense of the Perimeter. This Brigade was the first of the ground forces on the side of the United Nations which did not come from the Republic of Korea or the United States.

This period was also characterized by a policy change on the side of
the United Nations Air Force. Instead of emphasis on air-ground support, a planned interdiction program, designed to cut the North Korean supply routes, took place.

With the landing of the X US Corps at Inchon on 15 September, troops in the Perimeter eventually began a sustained attack on the North Korean armies which had confined them for two months of bitter fighting. The link-up of the Eighth US Army and X US Corps was effected on 26 September to the south of Suwon near the west coast when a Unit of the 1st US Cavalry Division of the Hammer Force met elements of the 7th US Infantry Division of the Anvil.

Section 2. En Route to the Far East
(27 September-5 November 1950)

With the exception of a few members of No 2 Squadron who had permission to join the Squadron at Durban, the entire Squadron left Pretoria on 27 September by rail for Durban where they were to sail to Japan. A liaison staff had already left by air on 10 September and was in Japan at the Headquarters of the United States Far East Air Forces, effecting the necessary arrangements to enable the Squadron to become operative with the minimum of delay.
On 28 September the 49 officers and 157 other ranks of the initial draft of the Squadron embarked on the M.V. Tjisudane in Durban harbor. It was the first time in the history of the defense forces of South Africa that members of SADF were to the Far East.

Parade of No 2 Squadron on arrival by sea in Japan.

At 0130 hours on 5 November, 1950, the ship arrived at Yokohama and the Squadron left at 1430 hours for Johnson Air Base, about 32 kilometers outside Tokyo. On arrival at Johnson Air Base it was found that only certain commodities to the personnel would be provided as a charge against the Union Government. Officers were required to pay cash for their meals and refreshments, bed linen charges, accommodation maintenance and hire of blankets. Other ranks were required to pay for refreshments between meals and for laundry. Since none of the personnel were prepared for such a contingency and no authorization existed for such extra allowances, the credits due to the members on their paybooks had immediately to be paid out—resulting in the first pay parade in which dollars were used.
Johnson Air Base was one of the vast airfields built by the United States around Tokyo. It extended for many square kilometers and had tarred roads and semi-permanent buildings, including clubs, gymnasiums and cinemas. It was, in fact, like a town in itself. The Base was situated on a broad plain from which, on a clear day, a magnificent view of Mountain Fuji with its steep snow capped cone could be obtained (See Situation Map 5).

A certain amount of difficulty was experienced when, on 6 November, the administrative staff had to start taking over aircraft and equipment from the United States Air Force. This was the result of the fact that the United States Air Force (USAF) accounting system was completely foreign to the SAAF administrative personnel. Technical equipment was in short supply and tool-kits had to be built up. All this delayed the starting of the actual flying training program. Contrary to expectations of the intended 25 only 16 used Mustang F-51 aircraft were available.

On 6 November all sections were in operation and were adapting themselves to the new conditions. At 1400 hours of that day Colonel Low, Command-
ing officer of 6002nd US Wing, under whose control the Squadron would fall, gave the officers a lecture on the organization of that wing. This was followed by lectures on escape and evasion and so starting the period of training and orientation for the Squadron.

The operational order for 13 officers and 21 other ranks to move to Korea was issued on 15 November and followed by the move the next day when the personnel left by two C-47 aircraft, followed by Commandant S.v.B. Theron, Commanding Officer of No 2 Squadron, and four other pilots in F-51 aircraft. All aircraft arrived at K-9 Airfield at Pusan, Korea at approximately 1600 hours of the same day.

The officers and other ranks were all accommodated in tents, and, although the tents were equipped with stoves, all personnel were well aware of the intense cold.

Meanwhile, during the stay of No 2 Squadron at Johnson Air Base, the United Nations forces retook Seoul and liberated Pyongyang by 19 October. It therefore appeared almost as if the war was drawing to a close before the South Africans had a chance of showing their willingness to help their allies.

Section 3. Synopsis of SAAF in the Korean War

When the Korean War, the conflict in a remote corner of the globe, caused the UN to call for assistance, the South African Government announced in August 1950 that it would help the United Nations effort in Korea. The announcement brought such a flood of volunteers from regular personnel, members of Active Citizen Force squadrons and of the Reserve that it was decided to send initially only members of the permanent force and No 2 Squadron.

They were so rapidly assembled and put through battle training that the first draft of 49 officers and 157 of other ranks was sent off by sea by late September 1950. Their destination was Johnson Air Base near Tokyo where they swiftly acquainted themselves with the operation and maintenance of Mustangs. By mid-November, the advance unit were in Korea and operational.

The Squadron was attached to the 18th US Fighter Bomber Wing based at K-24 Airfield near Pyongyang, held at that stage by the United Nations forces. It was a short lived stay for, within days the tide of war was rolling south threatening to engulf the area and so that the Squadron was moved initially to K-13 near Suwon on 2 December, and a fortnight later,
it was moved to K-10 Airfield near Chinhac where, with the arrival of the rest of the force from Japan, the Cheetahs came to full strength for the first time (See Situation Map 1).

These early days in Korea provided a brutal change from South Africa’s climate. The Korean winter was beginning to show its teeth. Blizzards and snow were the order of the day. The Cheetahs arrived to find they were in a make-shift tent camp gripped by 10 degrees of frost in daytime. There was one hut with a dank earth floor for a mess and unless water was kept near a stove it turned to ice. Food served hot was cold in a minute.

From K-24, to K-13, and then to K-10 the Cheetahs were flung into action to stem the hordes swarming from the north. It was a torrid baptism into Korean warfare but by the spring the Communist North Koreans and Chinese were brought to a halt. Life settled down to routine operational sorties and the Squadron personnel found time to improve their living conditions.

With their reputation firmly established, the Cheetahs were frequently called upon to lead mass attacks not only by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing but by the Fifth Air Force as well.

The Squadron was mainly responsible for interdictor and close support missions sealing off supplies, support and communications from sectors of the Communist troops, a task which was almost invariably performed in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire, besides the hazard of encountering MIG’s. Although rarely up to full strength through casualties and the needs of maintenance and repairs, the Squadron kept up an average of 24 sorties daily.

The fitters and maintenance crews in particular were often called on to work around the clock. So devoted were they to their jobs, that in March 1952, when the supply of serviceable aircraft was limited, ground crews pulled into the work shops three aircraft which had been damaged beyond repair. They cannibalized the three and, through putting in 1,200 hours of their spare time, assembled a new aircraft from them. They did such a great job that, when the machine was test-flown, it was found to be 25 m.p.h. faster than any other aircraft in the Squadron.

In this war, the South African Air Force had its baptism of fire from Russian MIG jets and in turn, converted from piston engined-aircraft F-5I to F-86 Sabre jets. Although it was soon apparent that this faraway Korean War was one fought against an enemy who had little mercy for its adversaries there was never a shortage of volunteers. All-in-all, the Cheetahs, with their ancillary and support personnel, during almost three years in Korea, put more than 800 men into the field---243 officers, 545 ground personnel and 38 army officers and men---a considerable effort for a small country. Besides the gallantry and fighting courage which earned their medals and citations, the Cheetahs
took with them something else which evoked the admiration of all other air forces which flew for the United Nations.

In late January 1953, F-86 Sabre jets were delivered to the Squadron. Conversion training was quickly put under way and in mid-March 1953, for the first time in the history of South African Air Force one of its Squadrons went into action flying jet aircraft.

Shortly afterwards, the Squadron, as a part of 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, was awarded the United States Presidential Citation for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service in action against the brutal enemy.

Later in March 1953, the North Koreans said they were ready to reopen peace talks and to exchange prisoners. The first South African was released on 20 April and seven others also were let out in August 1953, one month later the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953.

When the Cheetahs left Korea on 29 October 1953, they left behind a record which compared with the best of the United Nations forces. In Mustangs, they flew 10,597 sorties. The effort was at a cost of 74 aircraft being lost in enemy action or in accidents, out of the total of the 95 that the Squadron used. In the bombing, strafing, and rocket the Squadron destroyed or badly damaged 801 vehicles, 44 tanks, 221 field guns, 147 flak positions, 11 locomotives, 553 railroad cars, 441 dumps of various kind, 152 road and rail bridges, and some 10,000 buildings. It was also credited with killing 2,776 enemy troops.

For the limited flying strength of a squadron, the cost to the South Africans was heavy: It lost 34 pilots in action. A measure of American appreciation of the Squadron’s gallant effort in Korea came as the last of them was about to embark for home. The Commander of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, with whom they had served throughout, issued a Policy Order which said:

“In memory of our gallant South African Comrades, it is hereby established, as a new policy that at all Retreat Ceremonies held by this wing will include the playing of your National Anthem, ‘Die Stem van Suid African.’ All personnel of this wing will render the same honours to this anthem as our own.”

Such was the prestige the South African Air Force No 2 Squadron gained in Korea.
CHAPTER III   PIONEERS

Section 1.  First Mission and First Korean Base
(19-21 November 1950)

An advance element of No 2 South African Air Force Squadron entered the Korean War for the first time on Sunday, 19 November 1950, when four officers of the No 2 Squadron flew as “wingmen” to the most experienced pilots of the Fighter Squadrons of 6002nd Tactical Support Wing of the Fifth Air Force, flying Mustangs in close support of attacks along the battle line. They took part in strafing, bombing and rocket attacks against Communist supply lines and rolling stocks, mainly over the central sector in North Korea.

The Officers were Commandant S. van Breda Theron, Commanding Officer of the SAAF Squadron, Captain G.B. Lipawsky, Captain J.F.O. Davis and
Captain W.J.J. Badenhost. For this mission initially five South African Mustangs and a detachment of ground personnel in two C-47 had flown from Tokyo to Pusan, at the tip of the Korean peninsula. Pusan Airfield was not yet considered to be operational, the 18th US Fighter Bomber Wing had landed there in September. From this forward airfield the 18th Wing Mustangs were able to give close support in the foulest weather.

As only four pilots were required for two flights of four aircraft each on Sunday, lots had to be drawn for the privilege of being first to show the “Springbok” identification markings in the Korean sky; Captain H.O.M. Odendaal, the fifth pilot, was unlucky.

Commandant Pretorius, the Senior SAAF liaison officer, who had returned to Tokyo after accompanying the advance party to Korea, said, “We were welcomed at Pusan by Colonel Low commanding the American wing to which we are to be attached, and were quartered in tents on the famous K-9 ‘Dog patch’ Airfield, kilometers from Pusan. We try to utilize the natural talents of a man and fit his training to his personality.”

While the South African Squadron was undergoing the final phase of familiarization training with the American Mustangs at Johnson Air Base, the Korean War also seemed to be nearing its end. On 24 October General MacArthur, Commander of United Nations Command, directed his commanders to move forward with all possible speed, using all their forces. He removed all the bans on forward movement, even of non-Korean forces against his superiors’ directive.

On the west coast the British 27th Brigade crossed the Chongchon River on 24 October. And on 26 October the X US Corps, which had pulled out of the Seoul area, landed at the east coast port of Wonsan. Since the city had fallen previously to the I ROK Corps, the Yalu River border was the last major objective of the X US Corps landing elements. And on this same day, the 6th Division of the II ROK Corps reached the Yalu at Chosan, but the most significant event of this particular day was the capture of the first Chinese Communist by the elements of the I ROK Corps. This was soon to indicate another turn of the tide.

On the next day, 27 October, the long suspected Chinese Communist forces launched their first-phase offensive from the Yalu against the recklessly extended United Nations columns in North Korea. The first to experience portent was the Regiment of the most advanced 6th ROK Division, which was tragically mauled by strong Chinese forces near the Yalu. The Chinese onslaught recurred and on the last day of that month it hit at Unsan on the west to finally force the Eighth US Army to withdraw across the Chongchon River on 2 November.
Reports of the first ten days of November indicated the presence of at least eleven CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) divisions in the forward area. Contact with these units by the United Nations forces had been brief, but a constant build-up of this new enemy had been now reported by aerial observers.

However, the Chinese Communist forces thereafter would segregate themselves from contact with the United Nations forces so successfully that General MacArthur came to announce on 24 November, when he was giving the signal for the opening of another drive to the Yalu: "The Chinese are not coming in." By 20 November, the 7th US Infantry Division had reached the Yalu at Hyesanjin to become the first American unit to witness the Sino-Korean frontier.

Section 2. Air Base at North Korean Capital
(19 November-4 December 1950)

In due consequence of General MacArthur's Order on 24 November, the Eighth US Army jumped off all along the front to bring about a show-down with the CCF troops over whose identity there was still controversy. The show-down was not long in coming, and the second-phase of the CCF offensive was launched on the following day.

In the bitter cold of that North Korean November, the Chinese Communists joined with the remnants of the North Korean armies in a counter-offensive which stretched all along the Eighth Army front. A heavy engagement was met in the vicinity of Tokchon in the central Korea by II ROK Corps. And on the morning of 26 November, the 2nd US Division was subjected to the full fury of the Chinese attack.

On 19 November the 168th Fighter Bomber Wing, the 6002nd Tactical Support Wing, and a detachment of the SAAF Squadron moved to K-24 Airfield at Pyongyang. The South African Air Force's movement to K-24 Airfield (Pyongyang) north of the 38th Parallel brought it more range of the battle line. While flying missions from the K-9 Air Base (Pusan) early in November, for example, the 18th Wing's Mustangs had trouble reaching the bomb line, finding targets, and returning to base with sufficient fuel after four or five hours flying. From Pyongyang missions were much shorter, targets were more effectively identified in the greater time allowed, and external fuel tanks (in short supply) were unnecessary.

Such advantages of range were partly offset by the primitive operating facilities at the captured bases with facilities barely adequate for the rugged Mustangs. Buildings at the Pyongyang airfields had been badly damaged by United
Nations’ air attack, and the retreating North Koreans had burned as many as they could. Nevertheless, laborers and construction materials were rounded up in Pyongyang for the repair of these fields, payments being made in rice, and the air installations personnel succeeded in repairing the K-24 as well as another base, K-23, so that they fulfilled most of the No 2 Squadron and 18th Wing’s requirements. But they met with difficulties in flying off the sod field at Pyongyang East(K-24) for the alternately dusty and muddy landing strip presented hazards on take-off and landing reduced visibility on one day caused the loss of two aircraft when one Mustang crashed into a truck towing another damaged plane off the runway. Although the Pyongyang fields were connected with the JOC(Joint Operation Center) in Seoul by a land line and VHF(Very High Frequency) radio, communications were generally unreliable and intelligence information from Fifth Air Force was sparse and lacking in timeliness.

During this period, more and more Springboks—South African Air Force pilots—flew in from Japan in their F-51s. As they arrived they immediately went into battle in an all-out effort to stem the southward advance of the Chinese Communist forces which had recently entered the war. For the young pilots in the squadron who had not seen service in World War II, this was getting experience the hard way.

It was also during this period that the pilots met still another enemy with the coming of the Korean winter, which was already causing temperatures to drop below those to which they were accustomed. Poor planning for winter operations hit at the flyers almost as hard as it did ground troops in the foxholes.

The K-24 Airfield had a bumpy grass runway, and there were no hangars. When the members of the South African Squadron moved to this nearly unoperational base, they had not had time to install the comforts they enjoyed at their previous base. Lieutenant Tinky Jones said that the only time the South African pilots were warm in Korea was when they were flying in their F-51 Mustang fighters, with heated cockpits. In spite of the cold, the men kept up their South African humor. “It’s a pity we did not bring a refrigerator along so that we could take turns sitting in it to keep warm,” said Captain Badie Baden Horst, of Johannesburg.

The ground crews, who could not be praised too highly by the pilots, didn’t have much of this comfort. They had to repair planes, load petrol and machine-guns, and attach rockets and napalm bombs to the planes in the freezing weather.

Difficult living conditions were added to the discomforts of South African airmen in the severe winter. Lieutenant Jones said that their mess room was very much like a South African cowshed, with mud floors and rough
wooden walls. "We get no beer, and our American rations provide coffee instead of tea. Water comes in five different shades of brown. For drinking it has to be so chlorinated as to be almost nauseating." The men had to stand up to eat, and the only way they could get a bath was to cut a petrol "drop tank" in half. This was then filled with hot water inside a tent.

Lieutenant Jones was a veteran fighter pilot who had taken part in the North African and Italian campaigns. He said the missions on which South Africans were employed took from one to three hours. They seldom saw the Communist forces from the air but when they dived low to drop napalm bombs they often came under small arms fire. "The other day I was burning up some vehicles that had to be abandoned during the retreat. Five of the enemy stood out in the open shooting at me," he said. "I turned my guns on them and got the lot." He emphasized the ingenuity with which the North Korean and Chinese forces used camouflage to hide their tanks and transport during the day. "We had grown suspicious of every haystack. So many of them blow up when our rockets hit them." Lieutenant Jones said he and his colleagues had seen no Communist aircraft, though they "would like to have a look" at the MIG-15's, which were credited with very much greater speed than the Mustangs flown by the South African Squadron.

Section 3. Operations and Withdrawal from Pyongyang
(19 November-4 December 1950)

A general withdrawal of United Nations troops began, following the second CCF offensive. It was a retreat which rolled with the punch of an estimated 200,000 of the enemy for almost 300 kilometers to the south.

As the Chinese Communists poured down upon Pyongyang, the SAAF Squadron which had come northward a few days before to operate from Pyongyang's Airfield, were permitted three days for their withdrawal. The 18th Fighter Bomber Group with the SAAF Squadron attached began evacuating Pyongyang East(K-24) early on the morning of 2 December, when the first C-119 took off with personnel, baggage, tents and stores, and it completed its move to Suwon airfield(K-13) on 4 December, only a few hours before enemy troops reached Pyongyang. Moving the heavier items of Air Force and engineer equipment at such short notice was a virtually impossible task. Some of this equipment was evacuated from Chinnampo aboard two LST's. Other equipment was loaded aboard trucks and sent southward by road,
where a considerable amount was lost on the way. From Pyongyang southward to Seoul the mountain roads were jammed by columns of Army and Air Force vehicles. Utilizing air transport, the Squadron managed hurried but orderly movement to K-13, Suwon Airfield in the three days following 1 December.

The Mustangs, in fact, never missed a single day’s operations. The pilots continued to attack enemy troops, trucks, and supplies daily from dawn to dusk.

During the first week of December the advanced flight of the South African Squadron flew an average of eight missions a day in armed reconnaissance or in close support of the infantry. This regular service had been maintained by 11 pilots, 20 ground personnel and six Mustang aircraft. The pilots, including Commandant Theron, the Commanding Officer, and Flight Commanders were gaining invaluable experience, from which the rest of the squadron benefited when it arrived in the war area from the training quarters at Johnson Air base in Japan. Six planes which were already showing the Springbok emblem in the cold Korean air had done much damage to the enemy, attacking ground forces, buildings and road transport, using rockets, napalm and fifty caliber machine-guns.

Section 4. Operations from Suwon Air Base
(5-16 December 1950)

The Suwon Airfield, already judged unfit for jet operation, possessed a badly damaged concrete runway, and the 822nd US Engineer Aviation Battalion was evacuated from Pyongyang to construct the necessary PSP (Pierced Steel Plank) taxiways and a perimeter road. But in the middle of December, the units at Suwon were again ordered to fall back: The 822nd Battalion going to Pusan(K-1) while the No 2 Squadron and the 18th Group moved by rail to Chinhae(K-10) Airfield on the south coast of Korea, leaving a servicing detachment at Suwon to stage Mustang missions.

On 5 December 1950 South African Air Force pilots attacked Communist troops and supply lines near Anju, a former Eighth US Army supply center on the south banks of the Chongchon River. They destroyed a train carrying petrol and lubrication oil, which went up in fierce flames and dense black smoke.

The SAAF Squadron’s first battle casualty occurred on 5 December 1950. The circumstances surrounding this event were rather ironical. Apparently
United Nations railway cars loaded with explosives had fallen into the hands of the enemy about 10 kilometers north of Pyongyang. The South African Air Force detachment was detailed to demolish these cars. Armed with six rockets each and a maximum load of fifty caliber ammunition, Captains J.F.O. Davis and G.B. Lipawsky set out for the mission. The railcars were soon sighted and the attack began. While Captain Lipawsky remained on guard at 1,700 meters, Captain Davis dived to attack, firing rockets. In making assurance doubly sure he pressed his final button with deadly accuracy, but too low, at 170 meters altitude! His rockets struck one of the cars amidships and caused a terrific explosion which, in turn, severely damaged Captain Davis’ aircraft and knocked him unconscious for a few seconds. “Something big tore a hole in the cockpit passing right between my leg,” said Captain Davis. Fortunately, the plane had been trimmed tail heavy in the attacking dive, which, when the pilot was knocked out, caused the aircraft to gain enough altitude to clear some high hills which lay directly ahead.

Upon regaining consciousness the pilot found that his aileron and elevator controls were inoperative, the engine was streaming glycol, the windscreen and canopy had been blown off, and the fuselage was a mass of holes. Anxious
moments followed these discoveries, but by calmness and sound judgement Captain Davis crashlanded the striken F-51 when the engine ceased completely. When the Mustang hit the ground the wings cut down two trees with trunks twenty centimeters thick. The plane was completely wrecked.

While this little drama was being played out below, Captain Lipawsky kept upstairs toward off any surprise attacks by enemy aircraft. On being advised of events and the intentions of Captain Davis over the radio, which was still, by some miracle, operational, Captain Lipawsky alerted rescue facilities and continued to fly combat air patrol over the downed pilot. Unfortunately, at that time no rescue facilities were readily available so that it became a case of waiting and hoping.

Fate, however, was kind, for a USAF (United States Air Force) L-4 aircraft with Captain Lawrence as pilot and Captain Lewis Millit as observer of the 25th US Division, happened to be in the vicinity on a routine observation flight and, appreciating the situation, decided to try to be of assistance. Skillfully the L-4 aircraft was landed on a narrow twisting road. Captain Millit climbed out and gave his seat to Captain Davis who, though not injured, was shaken up by his emergency landing. This act of Captain Millit was all the more noteworthy when it was considered that he remained in the area unarmed, and well aware that there were enemy troops in the area. In fact, before the L-4 was able to return to pick Captain Millit up, he had been under artillery fire. He was picked up by Captain Lawrence minutes before darkness set in. With this act another courageous deed was written in the annals of the war as a symbol of true comradeship.

In the meantime, on 7 December an enemy MIG circled K-13 Airfield at 400 meters but no bombs were dropped. Two unidentified aircraft approached the Airfield on 9 December and dropped bombs in the vicinity, but causing no damage.

The Officer Commanding No 2 Squadron, Commandant S.v.B. Theron, led a mission on 10 December and witnessed an attack by nine MIG 15’s on nine USAF F-51’s escorting B-29 Bombers to their Yalu targets. One B-29 was badly damaged and the F-51 did not shape at all well against the small, fast jet fighters of the enemy.

On 13 December No 2 Squadron, SAAF had its status changed from a Squadron working under the 18th Fighter Bomber Group to a Squadron operating as a Group under the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.
Section 5. Home Base at Chinhæ
(17-30 December 1950)

Meanwhile arrangements had been made for the Squadron to have a permanent base in South Korea and on 17th of December all the personnel still remaining in Japan were flown over to K-10 Airfield. This airfield was situated on the edge of a pleasant little bay close to the town of Chinhæ. Soon the detachment at K-13 was also evacuated to K-10 and the whole squadron was together once more. K-10 was to become the squadron's home for two full years, right up to the time when it was re-equipped with F-86 Sabre aircraft in January 1953.

![The flight line at K-10, Chinhæ, on a wintry day.](image)

Although Chinhæ's short sod runway was surrounded by such hazards to flight, low hangars, a sea wall, and nearby mountains, the new base proved such "a veritable heaven" after the cold and mud at Pyongyang and Suwon that the servicing detachment began to call it the "Riviera."

As soon as the Republic of Korea Army, and X US Corps broke contact and retreated southward to form new defense lines, the Far East Air Forces
launched a determined air campaign designed to slow the forward progress of the Chinese Communist Armies and to destroy their personnel, supplies, and equipment.

During the first week of December the Fifth Air Force did not neglect armed reconnaissance and interdiction sorties, for air strikes at the rear of the Chinese lightened the pressure on the United Nations forces. After first several days of the month, the Eighth Army was largely out of contact with the Chinese, and General Partridge, Commander of the Fifth Air Force, was able to fill the air with armed reconnaissance and interdiction sorties. The Fifth Air Force launched intensive armed reconnaissance strike efforts for the interdiction of enemy rail lines in North Korea.

For more than three weeks on December, the South Africans inflicted heavy damage upon the Chinese. Virtually every armed reconnaissance mission claimed the destruction of Chinese personnel and equipment, and it was obvious that the South African Air Force No 2 Squadron was wreaking heavy casualties on the enemy. For example, the South African 'Flying Cheetahs' Squadron flew 20 sorties on 29 December, and claimed the destruction of 57 Communist-occupied buildings, one railway station and 15 trucks. The Communist troop positions were also attacked. Chinese Communist troops massed along the 38th Parallel, and began a menacing shift to the east soon after it was reported that United Nations troops had been thrown back between ten and fifteen kilometers near the east coast.

This menacing move followed the same pattern as that which preceded the big Chinese offensive in North Korea and caused the United States Eighth Army to retreat 320 kilometers to Seoul. This Chinese maneuver came after ten days of probing attacks, which were repelled all along the 60-kilometer United Nations front except in the area between 60 and 80 kilometers inland from the east coast. The Republic of Korea army along the section of the front was forced to retreat about 12 kilometers under a strong Communist attack.
CHAPTER IV  U.N. COUNTERATTACK

Section 1. South Africans Inflict Heavy Damage
(31 December 1950-11 February 1951)

On 31 December the Communists launched a nine division main thrust southward across the Imjin River against Seoul. United Nations forces fell back to the southern bank of the frozen Han River, and on 6 January, again abandoned Suwon and its airfield, taking up pre-arranged positions along a defense line which ran across the peninsula through Pyongtaek-Ansong-Wonju-Hungjonsan to Wonpo-ri. After a five-day offensive, the Chinese suddenly ran out of power and by 7 January, permitted the new United Nations defense line to stabilize from Pyongtaek through Wonju to the east coast.

United Nations air defied exceedingly bad weather low ceilings with rain and snow storms to contribute heavily to the stemming of the Red “human wave” attacks. Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers led the close support sorties on the western portion of the battle line, furnishing an average of 105 close support sorties during the period 31 December and 1 January. During the enemy offensive, targets for the fighters were once again plentiful, and the Chinese Communist forces suffered tremendous losses from strafing, rockets, and napalm, and General Stratemeyer, Commander of Far East Air Forces, correctly perceived that the Fourth CCF Field Army's third phase offensive had collapsed for want of logistical support. After initial victory, the Red Chinese had been compelled to pause, fall back, regroup and prepare for another forward lunge.

After the first week of January 1951, when the Communist ground offensive was dwindling, General Stratemeyer directed the Fifth Air Force and the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command to concentrate on attacking enemy's lifelines. The plan of attack was already outlined in the directive for Far East Air Forces “Interdiction Campaign No. 4,” which divided North Korea into 11 zones and named for destruction 172 targets—45 railway bridges, 12 highway bridges, 13 tunnels, 39 marshalling yards, and 63 supply centers.

The pattern of the January communication attacks shaped up quickly. Since most North Korean streams were in the low-water season and many of them were frozen solidly enough to permit troops and vehicles to cross them,
even if road bridges were cut, Stratemeyer ordered Bomber Command to use its whole striking force against railway bridges and marshalling yards in the upper reaches northwestern and central Korea. The Fifth Air Force was expected to employ its light bombers and fighters against rail and highway bridges on the principal routes converging towards central Korea.

The communication attacks carried out by the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command and Fifth Air Force against northwestern and central Korean targets between 19 and 31 January, were described as the most massive and sustained air effort yet employed in Korea. On one day, 26 January, Far East Air Forces planes attacked 16 separate key bridges, and in the thirteen-day period intensified air attacks were mounted against more than 80 key rail and highway bridges as well as marshalling yards and other primary communication targets.

In the meantime on 25 January 1951, the South African Air Force destroyed 12 buildings, 8 villages, 1 bridge and an unknown number of vehicles in Chunchon area.

The next day was a typical day during this period.

A review of the Squadron’s activities on that date reveals the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Fuel Dumps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Vehicles</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Buildings</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Villages (Kumhwa area)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Troops</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Ammunition Dump</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Flak Position</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of No 2 Squadron’s activities since arrival in Japan and Korea up to 31 January 1951:

| a. Missions | 278 |
| b. Sorties | 868 |
| c. Operational Hours | 1948.20 |
| d. Non-operational Hours | 682.15 |

The high degree of cooperation between the Fifth Air Force and Eighth Army meant that air resources could be concentrated wherever General Ridgway desired and thought necessary. Thus on 25 January 1951, the Republic of Korea Army and I and IX US Corps initiated “Operation Thunderbolt,” the reconnaissance-in-force designed to push through to the Han River, and the Fifth Air Force’s close support effort was centered behind these Corps.
UN Counterattack

On the other hand United Nations air attacks at the rear of the Communists also deprived these masses of manpower of their logistic support and their mobility, as well as inflicting great numbers of personnel casualties. Over a period of time the trickle of Red supplies which got through would be built up at their front lines to enable the Communists to launch short and fierce ground offensives, but each time that Red troops and vehicles came out into the open during an offensive they could be subjected to heavy casualties by air attack.

As the operation thrust northward against the Red screening force provided by two divisions of the Chinese 50th Army, a full-scale attack was launched on the ground troops. The I and IX US Corps witnessed that the close air support they received was most effective. Air strikes softened points of enemy resistance almost as fast as they developed, and as the Eighth Army soldiers flushed enemy troops into the open United Nations aircraft swooped into slaughter them. Aircraft saturated the enemy's positions in the Anyang-Yongdumgo area. Survivors of the Chinese 50th Army continued to resist until 9 February, but then the Red defenses broke, and United Nations forces raced northward to the Han River. Kimpo Airfield and the port of Inchon again belonged to United Nations forces by dusk on 10 February.

Heartened by success in the west at the end of January, General Ridgway ordered the X Corps to implement "Operation Roundup," an advance toward Hongchon after capturing Hoengsong on 5 February. Now, however, United Nations forces were pressing the Communists too hard, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of CCF felt compelled to counterattack and launched attacks along the Hoengsong again had been captured by Reds and another attack was centered in the mountains surrounding the village of Chipyong-ni which lay northwest of Wonju and was held by elements of the 2nd US Infantry Division. The highest air priority was given to the area. Each day from 14 through to 16 ten flights of Mosquito control aircraft maintained constant daylight air patrols over the area, receiving and directing fighter aircraft of all kinds. The air support was not only generous but it was highly effective. Concurrently with the main assault along the Hoengsong-Wonju axis, the Communists made probing attacks which sought to dislodge United Nations troops from the ground gained in the west.

When the battle was over, General Almond, the X Corps Commander, acknowledged that at Chipyong-ni our air support and our flying in of ammunition into that circle about a kilometer in diameter, sustained those men in that position, and they held it.

When the initiative passed to the United Nations on 21 February, General
Ridgway ordered the I and IX US Corps to swing eastward and execute "Operation Killer," a maneuver designed to cut off and destroy the enemy troops who had penetrated into South Korea. The smartly mounted United Nations ground attack took the Reds off balance, and supporting air strikes brought heavy casualties on the over extended Communist forces. The excellent results of air strikes enabled the taking of objectives with a minimum of casualties.

Section 2. Truck Hunting Operations
(12 February-31 March 1951)

Air Commanders of the Far East Air Forces did not understand the full extent of the Communists' air war plan in January, but they knew the importance of air superiority and labored to meet each Red air threat as it developed. The Fifth Air Force generally avoided air combat over northwestern Korea during February, and in the area between the Chongchon and Yalu Rivers Communist pilots reigned so nearly supreme that Fifth Air Force men called the area "MIG Alley," a name it would keep throughout the Korea War.

So the Fifth Air Force was afforded excellent targets for armed reconnaissance in February. Noting heavy troop movements in northeastern Korea, specific sorties and areas for continuous surveillance were assigned each fighter wing, the idea being that the pilots would become intimately familiar with a single zone and could readily identify camouflaged objectives. The Mustang groups, which subdivided their areas to squadrons and then to flights, hailed the policy as a change long overdue.

As a routine practice, South African Air Force Mustang fighters attacked the enemy's lines of communication. But the Chinese Communists were clever opponents, and before coming to Korea, Chinese troops had received special training in camouflage. Even if tracks of men and vehicles in the snow sometimes gave away their locations, the Reds were hard to discover from the air. In an effort to come to grips with the elusive Red truckers, the Fifth Air Force implemented a new plan of action in the second week of February. It established three armed reconnaissance areas covering the band of territory 80 kilometers north of the bombline, and it assigned one each of the areas to the 18th, 35th, and 1st Marine Air Wings. According to the concept of the operation, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, including No 2 South African Squadron, kept relays of Mustangs constantly on air patrol over the areas, locating and attacking targets of opportunity.

On 12 February, just as the new armed reconnaissance zones were being established, the Communists launched their fourth phase offensive along the
Hoengsong-Wonju axis, and, desperate to get supplies forward, the Reds moved in daylight. Quick to react, all available fighters were thrown into the area. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing including the No 2 SAAF Squadron soon settled down to highly effective “Saturation” armed reconnaissance coverage of the assigned area between Sariwon and Kaesong, and between Chunchon and Kumhwa. Flying over the same terrain day after day, a pair of Mustang pilots were soon able to pick out small changes and to find more and more camouflaged equipment. Benefiting from the new techniques of armed reconnaissance, No 2 Squadron and 18th Wing destroyed 728 buildings and damaged 137 enemy vehicles in February (See Situation Map 7).

Before a day’s mission, Mustang intelligence officers analyzed the preceding night’s vehicle sightings and, figuring enemy vehicle movement at 24 kilometers per hour, calculated the areas where the enemy convoys would have had to take cover before dawn. The first flight of two Mustangs in the morning swept areas of suspected enemy activity both to pick up any vehicles damaged by night intruders, and to force the enemy to camouflage before day-break. Subsequent flights patrolled small sections of the assigned area or route and searched them methodically. “There is only one way to detect camouflaged vehicles,” reported the No 2 Squadron, “and that is by flying low and slow and thoroughly searching every foot of ground. Every building, haystack, ravine, wooded area, and side road must be checked and then double-checked.”

Adopting this system and also emphasizing pilot evaluations of enemy camouflage discipline, the South African Air Force employed two aircraft flights on armed reconnaissance, each flight being relieved by another after an hour in the target area. One aircraft flew at 30 to 100-meter altitude, inspecting the terrain, while the second aircraft remained at 150 to 300-meter altitude to provide top cover.

The standard truck hunting armament load for the Mustangs was maximum rocket and fifty caliber, the former being useful for suppressing flak and the latter lethal against vehicles. The carrying of napalm on armed reconnaissance had proved a wasteful practice during January. Pilots were reluctant to retain the incendiary weapon when flying close to the ground and usually expended their tanks on the first likely targets.

In February the Chinese Reds sought to protect their vehicles and troops against United Nations air attacks. Especially while flying armed reconnaissance missions, No 2 Squadron crews encountered an increasing amount of ground fire. This ground fire was particularly effective at the low altitudes needed for effective napalm drops and strafing runs. For example, on 15 February, 1951, Lieutenant G. D. Doveton’s aircraft crashed by the enemy ground fire after strafing enemy positions in the Kaesong area. No move-
ment was seen after the crash.

Meanwhile, on 24 February, 1951, first 7 replacement pilots arrived at K-10 from the Union of South Africa. Throughout the month the South African Air Force did not miss a single day’s operations. The pilots continued attacks against enemy trucks, troops and supplies daily. On 27 February, for their highly praised works and courage, DFC awarded to the following:

Commandant S.v.B. Theron
Captain J.F.O. Davis
Captain H.O.M. Odendaal
Captain G.B. Lipawsyky
Captain W.J.J. Badenhorst

On 1 March the Squadron flew 32 sorties and established a new record in the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing. On that day South Africans destroyed 7 vehicles, 1 village, 2 tanks, and unknown number of troops and damaged 7 villages and 6 vehicles. But unfortunately Captain W.J.J. Badenhorst was shot down over Sianju and Lieutenant D.A. Ruiter was also hit by enemy fire and attempted to land on a friendly island in Wonsan Harbor, but soon disappeared into the sea. The Squadron continued to use large quantities of napalm during this period and made efforts to mask enemy movements. After 16
sorties, on 4 March, the Squadron destroyed 2 villages, 12 vehicles, 2 warehouses, and damaged 11 villages, 2 vehicles and 1 warehouse. The following day's claims after 20 sorties were:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Roadbridges</td>
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<td>Mine and Tunnel Entrances</td>
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Rather than attempt a frontal assault across the wide and thawing Han River at Seoul, General Ridgway, on 7 March, ordered the United Nations forces to attack northward in central Korea. This attack, called "Operation Ripper," was designed a bulge east of Seoul, which would permit United Nations forces to envelop the capital city at their leisure.

The Fifth Air Force in the week following 7 March flew an average of 182 close support sorties a day, a number slightly in excess of the Month's average of 175 close support sorties each day. Demonstrating air power's ability to concentrate where it was most needed, the Fifth Air Force and its attached pilots on 7 March mounted some 575 sorties as the 25th US Division began to cross the Han River. On 8 March the Fifth Air Force and Marine fighter bombers again assisted at the bridgehead, while B-29's hit the major Red supply center at nearby Chuncheon. Bad flying weather on 9 March reduced the air effort, but the Fifth Air Force's Mustang groups carried out effective strikes. The South African Air Force and 18th Group pilots concentrated their sorties on the enemy near Chorwon and destroyed 22 vehicles.

Quite suddenly, on the night of 14 March, Communists forces abandoned Seoul without a fight, and on 15 March the Eighth US Army drove into Hongchon in the central area. As the Reds broke cover and began to retreat, Far East Air Forces flew more than 1,000 sorties almost every day to harass them unmercifully.

Coincidental with the increase in hostile ground fire, the South African Air Force noted in late March that it was increasingly difficult to find vehicles hidden in villages, woods, or disguised as straw stacks. Instead, the Reds had begun to conceal many of their vehicles in tunnels, and, where no tunnels were available, the enemy was building log reinforced bunkers in inaccessible ravines in order to shelter their vehicles against daylight air attack. The Reds had also worked out some effective trucking schedules. They began to drive their convoys from flak protected areas in the north to the bunker zone in one night, to the front lines and return to the bunkers the next, and back to the flak surrounded areas the third night.
In the early months of 1951 United Nations air attacks never completely interdicted the flow of logistical support to Communist front line troops, but the pressure of air strikes to the rear of Communists lines prevented the Reds from developing the combat effectiveness and mobility they needed to win in Korea. North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war captured during the spring offensives testified to the low morale among their rank and file, and to its cause. A second, and probably more realistic, cause for the low morale was United Nations air bombardment. A third cause for troop inefficiency was the fatigue of long marches, night marches, poor physical condition, lack of rest and long hours of work.

In the spring of 1951, as the Chinese offensive was slowly brought to a halt by the United Nations armies, so the Squadron settled down to a routine operational life at K-10 Air Base. New faces appeared in the cockpits of F-51’s. Among these new faces were those of Reserve pilots and newly trained short service officers who were now being encouraged to do an operational tour in Korea. The South Africans found time to improve their living conditions, and an innovation had appeared in the form of an officers’ club known as “Rorke’s Inn.”

This club, named after Lieutenant Micky Rorke, was formed by him when
he decided that the base officers' club did not have sufficient squadron atmosphere. He purchased supplies of liquor from NAAFI, set up business in a tent, and later in portion of the pilots' crew room, and the Squadron had an officers club! It was a club which was to become famous throughout Korea, and it perpetuated the memory of its founder after his untimely death in a flying accident at K-16.

Section 3. **Fighters Build up Reputation**  
(1 April-10 May 1951)

At the beginning of April 1951 all signs pointed to the fact that the all but Communist offensive would be launched within a few weeks. Inclement weather hampered United Nations air operations and also presented the Red armies on foot with the advantages of maneuver over motorized United Nations ground troops. Communist ground opposition had begun to stiffen, but the United Nations forces were still moving ahead toward the enemy's vital Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonggang communications and supply area at a rate approaching three kilometers a day.

During the first week of April the majority of the South African Air Force F-51 missions were two-ship flights on armed reconnaissance, seeking and destroying enemy troops, vehicles and supplies, and using 500-pound bombs to pot-hole the enemy's waterlogged roads and rail tracks. When the Communists attacked, No 2 Squadron immediately switched from two-ship to four-ship flights for close support missions in cooperation with ground controllers.

In that time the South African Air Force pilots were building up a tremendous reputation for themselves as spirited fighters. The number of combat sorties flown by the South African pilots had also been increasing, and it was with deep satisfaction that the Squadron Commander, Commandant Armstrong, received a letter of appreciation through Headquarters, from the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, the Commanding General Far East Air Forces.

General Stratemeyer wrote as follows:

"On 12 April 1951, just two months after flying its 1,000 sorties, No 2 Squadron, South African Air Force, completed 2,000 sorties in support of United Nations forces in Korea. This continuing high rate is most noteworthy. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the personnel of No 2 Squadron who have contributed to this commendable effort."
The Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force, Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge, added his endorsement to that letter by saying:

"The above compliments of the Commanding General Far East Air Forces, carry the enthusiastic endorsement of this headquarters. The enviable combat record of the 2nd South African Air Force Squadron in the Korean War is a splendid tribute to the fighting spirit of the freedom-loving people of your nation. My congratulations to you and the members of your command for the outstanding performance demonstrated. The aerial achievements of your organization have reflected great credit upon yourself and the United Nations....."

The squadron Chaplain wishes a pilot God-speed for his mission.

Added to the strength of North Korean and Fourth Field Army (CCF) units already at the battle line, the Communists were poised something of the order of 70 divisions for the attack. The Reds were evidently going to try to overwhelm and destroy the United Nations forces. On 22 April 1951 the Reds attacked everywhere across the front, but the major offensive, mounted by an estimated 337,000 Red soldiers was a double envelopment aimed against the United Nations forces, obviously designed to cut the trans-peninsula Seoul to Kansong highway and to capture the ROK capital.

In the same period UN air force warplanes flew more than 1,100 sorties
a day, in an effort to mask their movements against day flying aircraft, the Reds started woods fire and used smoke producing chemicals along the battle-line, and the smoke and haze did in fact impede low level strafing attack. But there were too many Red soldiers and not enough cover, and the fighters and light bombers flew all-out schedules to slaughter the enemy. Although friendly troops fought valiantly, the Red tide was too strong, and south of Kumhwa the 6th ROK Division collapsed. The I and IX US Corps withdrew to defensive positions five kilometers north of Seoul. In one last dying gasp before the offensive collapsed, the Reds attempted to ferry troops across the Han River to the Kimpo peninsula and outflank Seoul.

United Nations airmen strafed an estimated 6,000 enemy troops trying to cross the Han, and such as got ashore were easily handled by Republic of Korea Marines. The Communists reckoned that the Second Impulse of their fifth phase offensive ended on 29 April. The Communist offensive had been halted short of Seoul and north of the Han River, Red prisoners explained that General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of CCF, meant to launch another impulse attack very soon.

Intending to keep the Reds off balance, General Patridge, Commander of Fifth Air Force, ordered his air wings to concentrate on armed reconnaissance. Through a proper exploitation of the flexibility of air power, General Patridge was able to increase the close support sorties when the Eighth Army was under ground attack and to direct planes to armed reconnaissance and interdiction missions during those intervals when the Communists were regrouping and resupplying their forces.

Fifth US Air Force pilots demonstrated great versatility in transferring their efforts from armed reconnaissance to close support as the ground situation determined.

Meanwhile Communist vehicle sightings during the first week of May 1951 strongly indicated that the enemy was making extreme efforts to alleviate the logistical limitations which had long plagued him. Both in the forward areas and back along the main supply routes, moreover, the Reds were significantly increasing their flak batteries. In may, for example, Far East Air Forces intelligence officers plotted the locations of 252 flak guns and 673 automatic weapons. The anti-aircraft guns were mostly deployed in fixed defenses, but truck-towed Soviet 37-mm M-1939 automatic which were effective against planes at altitudes up to 4,500 feet, were now encountered along the main supply routes (See Situation Map 3).

The degree of United Nations air superiority which had been won over North Korea was measured best by the fact that the Communist ground of-
offensive, begun on the night of 22 April, received no support from the Red air force. But early in May Fifth Air Force reconnaissance crews reported a frenzy of activity in North Korea. The Reds air threat had another even more sinister manifestation. The Reds were almost ready to move aircraft on to the North Korean air fields. Reasoning thus, General Stratemeyer ordered that a major effort be put into airfield strikes beginning on 17 April.

According to order, at 0900 hours 7 May, the "R & R" (Rearmament and Refuel) Detachment at K-13 moved to K-16, the airfield of Seoul. From that day 4 aircraft of the Squadron daily left from K-10 on an operational sortie, landed and refueled at K-16, flew another two missions during that day and returned to K-10 the following day.

With careful attention to scheduled times of attacks, beginning promptly at 1400 hours on 9 May, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the 1st Marine Corsairs launched bombs, rockets, and napalm against prebriefed targets in the 26 square-kilometer airfield area at Sinuiju. The crushing air attacks knocked out all the Red aircraft on the field, destroyed buildings, caused an unusually large fire in the aviation fuel dump, exploded other ammunition and supply dumps, undoubtedly inflicted heavy casualties among the ranks of the enemy personnel who streamed out of the buildings into the open (See Situation Map 6).

On that day 16 aircraft of No 2 Squadron, led by Major J.P.D. Blaauw, took off at 1110 hours to carry out a mission of close escort of surface vessels and rescue flying boats which were standing by for emergency landings and ditchings during the greatest single air strike of the Korean War by four wings on the Communist air base at Sinuiju on the Yalu River. More than 300 Allied fighter planes bombed and strafed the North Korean airfield, despite MIG interception. For weeks aircraft fuel and supplies were assembled at this airfield by the enemy. From available reports it appeared that the strike had been a success.

In the meantime, an administrative change undertaken to bolster the air defence forces in Japan, caused the 35th Fighter Interceptor Wing to be transferred back to Johnson Air Base effective 25 May 1951; preparatory to this change the 18th Wing took over the 39th Squadron and the staging detachment at Seoul municipal airfield (K-16) (the original grass strip) located on the Han River flood plain across from Seoul. After 9 May 1951 the augmented 18th Wing and South African Air Force staged their Mustangs through the Seoul airport.
Section 4. Another Act of Gallantry
(11 May-30 June 1951)

South African Air Force’s sorties were now directed against railway bridges, marshalling yards and other miscellaneous targets.

On 11 May 1951 another act of gallantry occurred with Major J.P.D. Blaauw the principal actor. He later was awarded the US Silver Star.

At 1640 hours, while four F-51’s of the Squadron were on an interdiction mission 10 kilometers west of Singe, the aircraft of Lieutenant V.R. Kruger was hit in the main plane by enemy ground fire. The F-51 caught fire and the wing collapsed, but the pilot fortunately abandoned his crippled machine by parachute before it was too late. Lieutenant Kruger had been injured and suffered a dislocated shoulder, a fracture of the right scapula, second degree burns of the left hand and face. As the pilot floated earthwards his comrades above set about flying a combat air patrol over him. Captain Clulow tried without success to alert rescue facilities, while Major Blaauw and Lieutenant M. Mentz remained close to the downed pilot. After a while shortage of fuel
compelled the pilots to make a final decision. Captain Clulow and Lieutenant Mentz were ordered to return to K-16, while Major Blaauw continued to provide cover to his comrade on the ground.

At 1845 hours, shortly after the arrival of a flight of aircraft to take over the "Capping," Major Blaauw's F-51 run out of fuel, and he decided to crashland his aircraft with wheels retracted next to Lieutenant Kruger. Major Blaauw sustained abrasions and bruises to his nose and eyes in the crash landing but immediately went to the assistance of the wounded officer.

At 1915 hours, a helicopter arrived and rescued both Major Blaauw and Lieutenant Kruger. As result of the injuries sustained, and combined with the fact that Lieutenant Kruger had completed 74 effective combat sorties in Korea, it was decided to consider this pilot as having completed his full tour of operation in the Far East.

During the first sixteen days of May, as the Reds attempted to resupply and regroup for the Second Impulse of their fifth offensive, Far East Air Forces aircraft flew an average of 287 interdiction sorties each day. Because of the increased anti-aircraft defenses, however, No 2 Squadron flew armed reconnaissance flights with higher engine power settings. The Mustangs no longer made missions with less than a complete flight of four aircraft.

Everywhere along the United Nations lines in Korea the Communists Second Impulse offensive had collapsed on 22 May in a blood-soaked defeat so costly as to approach disaster. Always before, when their offensive spent themselves, the Reds had withdrawn beyond artillery range to reorganize and resupply. According to the Commander of Eighth Army, General Van Fleet’s order, the United Nations forces launched a coordinated counter-offensive on 23 May, designed to cut the enemy’s main supply routes and destroy them. By the end of May, United Nations forces had again advanced to the 38th Parallel and had reconquered the ground given up in the Communist spring offensive. On all fronts the Reds showed their demoralization.

Although unfavorable weather conditions during that time would hamper both close air support and armed reconnaissance, the Joint Operation Center nevertheless managed lucrative attacks against Red troops who were desperately attempting to escape from the battlefield. If enemy troops or vehicles were reported in the open, the JOC gave the highest priority to attacks against them, diverting pilots from other missions if necessary.

In addition to the heavy casualties inflicted upon the Reds, a total of 11,562 Chinese and North Korean troops surrendered. Not since the period following Inchon had so many Communist soldiers given up the fight. When the pursuit phase of United Nations ground operations ended on 2 June, the Eighth US Army was in full possession of South Korea soil except in a defensi-
ble area around Kaesong on the western front. General Van Fleet again ordered the United Nations forces to advance to Chorwon and Kumhwa and breach the southern limits of the Red Iron Triangle, the fortified area which retarded the progress of United Nations forces. However, the Reds kept in entrenched positions during the day, and the fighter bombers scored no spectacular results other than a steady pounding against caves and bunkers.

Meanwhile at the end of May and early June when the Fifth Air Force assumed the primary responsibility for interdiction of the enemy’s lines of communications, General Timberlake, Commander of Fifth Air Force, ordered the execution of an operation which he called “Strangle”—the name being devised to glamorize the task for the benefit of ground officers who had never been charmed by “interdiction.” Proposing to Paralyze enemy transportation in the zone between the railheads at the 38th Parallel and the front line, the Fifth Air Force program divided the key north-south traffic arteries into three sections for intensive attack by units of the Fifth Air Force, the Ist Marine Wing, and Task Force 77. The Fifth Air Force intended to systematically exploit all means of interdiction; bridge attacks, tunnel attacks, cratered roadbeds, delayed-action bombs. In addition to the “Strangle” attacks, the Fifth Air Force and Task Force 77 intended to keep key rail and highway bridges unusable by appropriately-timed fighter bomber attacks.

Beginning on 31 May in the west, the South African Air Force and 18th Wing Mustangs reconnoitered sections of roads and rail ways where repairs or bypasses would be difficult and potholed them with 500 pound bombs, some contact-fused and some fused for delayed explosion. The South African Air Force found that filled roadbeds running through low, wet ground(such as rice paddies) were particularly vulnerable to being cut by bombs in the southward.

But on the other hand, the conventional Mustangs had suffered the heaviest losses from enemy ground fire, and the 18th Wing and the South African Air Force again modified their armed reconnaissance tactics.

Test flights flown against friendly flak batteries at Seoul Airfield showed that the trailing wingmen in the low-level element of their armed reconnaissance flights were sitting ducks to enemy gunners. In a change of tactics, the South African Air Force and the 18th Wing kept the flight leader on the deck to search for targets of opportunity, while the element leader flew at 1,200 meters and looked for flak areas and the number two and number four men followed the element leader and kept a sharp watch for enemy fighters. Now, three men were covering the one pilot who was flying armed reconnaissance.

Although the Fifth Air Force fighter bomber wings would continue to use large quantities of napalm during the spring of 1951, the tactical air units
also made efforts to equip their bombs with proximity fuses. The fusing delay
devices which worked for the bombers were not applicable to the externally-
carried ordnance which the fighters stowed on their wing racks. Working in
conjunction with the 7th Fighter Bomber Squadron, the Fifth Air Force office
of operational engineering soon developed an "L" shaped metal bracket, which
fitted on an F-80's wing racks and extended downward, positively preventing
a bomb's fuse vane from moving before the bomb was dropped. In February
the Far East Air Material Command fabricated enough of these safety devices
to equip the Shooting Star fighter bombers. In May similar devices were made
for Thunder-jets, and in June the South African Air Force and 18th Wing
Mustangs obtained the brackets which enabled them to carry proximity-
fused bombs. The use of proximity-fused 260 pound fragmentation and 500
pound general purpose bombs proved beneficial to South African fighters.
Such munitions were not only effective against the enemy, but the fighter
bomber pilots could launch their attacks from higher altitudes, out of reach
of enemy ground fire, and still make their bombs explode at heights best calcu-
lated to kill the enemy's troops, destroy his equipment, or suppress his flak.

On 24 June 1951 the Squadron flew 22 sorties and the outstanding mission
of the day, was led by Lieutenant G.H. Marshall. This flight took off at 1945
hours on an interdiction mission in the area northwest of Kaesong, North
Korea. On the way out to the target Lieutenant Marshall was contacted by radio
and diverted by the Controller to attack a concentration of enemy troops situ-
ated in practically inaccessible location. The surrounding terrain was defended
by numerous enemy automatic weapons and heavy anti-aircraft guns. Without
hesitation and with complete disregard for personal safety Lieutenant Marshall
led his flight through the screen of intense and accurate enemy fire to deliver
repeated attacks on the target. In an exceptional display of aggressiveness the
flight strafed and rocketed the enemy gun positions and destroyed one 40-mm
gun, two automatic gun positions, many enemy troops and damaged one 40-mm
gun.

During July 1951 a letter was received from a member of the 1st US
Marine Division in G Company of the 3rd Battalion. This letter was addressed
to the Flying Cheetahs with the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.

It speaks for itself:

"About two weeks ago this date, though dates are sceptical, I'll ever recall
with minute detail the most spectacular feat I've ever lived to witness and
tell about.
We had gained the ridge line of our objective, upon which we were catch-
ing all hell because of an overwhelming Coak counter-attack. The tide
of battle was leaving casualties in its wake like sea-shells cast upon beach's sands. The going was not easy nor to us did it appear that it had any premonition of doing so until a spotter made a suicidal dive to our front. It was then we saw four silvery streaks plummet from the skies above with guns blazing. It was so wonderous a sight we completely forgot out whereabouts or line and just stood up in our foxholes and cheered. I'll never forget the astonishment on the Men's faces, nor their remarks of 'Those c-r-a-z-y bastards,' as these four mighty F-51's barely cleared the tree tops. Our carelessness of standing and cheering from our foxholes was 'offset by the fact that every 'Gook' was turned to rout. To us it was a miracle and a blessing from above.

The 'Hall of Fame' does not possess any greater man than those who flew that day for the United Nations-- and George Company. My gratitude."

At a later date Headquarters, Fifth Air Force announced that Lieutenant Marshall had been awarded the United States Distinguished Flying Cross for his leadership during this attack, and the other three pilots on this mission were each awarded the United States Air Medal for their part in the attack.
CHAPTER V  A NEW PHASE OF WAR

Section 1. First Encounter with MIG's
(1 July-22 July 1951)

In a radio address delivered in New York on 23 May 1951 Soviet Russia's delegate to the United Nations, Jacob A. Malik, suggested that the time had come for a peaceful solution to the Korean Problem.

In view of Russia's suggestion, General Ridgway on 30 June broadcasted another proposal to the Commander of the Communist forces in Korea, looking toward cease-fire meetings to be held aboard a hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.

On 1 July Radio Peking addressed a reply to Ridgway that the Communists were authorized to suspend military activities and to hold peace negotiations. The Reds suggested that the Korean town of Kaesong should serve as the place of conference.

As United Nations and Communist leaders moved towards cease-fire talks, the war in Korea entered a new phase, but United Nations air operations went ahead unabated. "Combat operations," enjoined General Otto P. Weyland, Commanding General of Far East Air Forces, on 1 July, "will continue at the normal rate until otherwise directed." As Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Senior delegate of United Nations Command, led United Nations armistice delegates to meet the Communist truce talk delegation at the town of Kaesong on 10 July 1951, a new phase of hostilities—so far different from what had gone before as to constitute virtually a new war—was beginning in Korea.

As the ground war along the 38th Parallel approached a stalemate and the peace talks were under way at Kaesong, the Far East Air Forces possessed a unique opportunity, as General Weyland expressed it, to demonstrate "the innumerable advantages of air power as a predominant weapon for the destruction of the enemy fighting machine."

If the war continued, he reasoned on 12 July 1951, the success of the United Nations campaign would be determined by a struggle between the Chinese air forces and Far East Air Forces; thus far the Korean war had demonstrated that air superiority was the key to military success, regardless of the numerical strength to absorb initial Chinese air attacks and to launch immediately effective counterattacks. An armistice, if achieved, would be effective only as Far East Air Forces retained the capability of achieving air
superiority.

Thereupon, at the beginning of July, fighter bombers continued day-night strikes against Communist airfields in northeastern Korea. Where enemy defenses warranted, the planes coordinated their attacks. Except on rare occasions, the MIG’s did not show themselves, and when they did the Sabres made them suffer.

But on 8 July South African Air Force’s first encounter with MIG’s occurred. Commandant Armstrong led two flights of four South African Air Force F-51’s as a squadron, in a 32 aircraft strike against Kangdong Airfield northeast of Pyongyang. They were briefed to dive-bomb the airfield immediately after the last United States Air Force aircraft had left the targets. The Americans attacked in flights of four in a line abreast tracking across the airfield. The South African Air Force flights were ordered into the right echelon by their Squadron Commander and were led down the length of the runway. This simplified their sighting problems. Fifteen of their sixteen bombs dropped hit the runway. After bombing, each aircraft broke right and climbed away, reforming in battle formation.

Shortly after forming up the leader heard an American pilot report “MIG.” He saw the United States Air Force aircraft orbiting to the north of the South African Air Force formation. One MIG was seen trying to turn with an American F-51 and fired a few bursts of machine gun fire. A few seconds later the MIG’s shifted their attention to the South Africans.

The South African Air Force formations were flying east at 7,000 feet at the time that two MIG’s came in on a quarter attack from the north. Two other MIG’s came in from the south. Two were seen flying top cover above the formation. As the MIG’s came in astern of the South Africans the leader gave a turn-about and each aircraft turned 180 degrees. This enabled the formation to reverse the lead and turn in towards the MIG’s who pulled up almost vertically without firing. The MIG’s attempted another attack which was dealt with as before. After about five minutes the enemy pilots decided that they had enough, broke off the engagement and headed north.

During the action several bursts of 37-mm anti-aircraft fire were observed. The Mustangs called in 35 Sabres, who soon shot down three of the MIG’s.

On 22 July 1951, after five days of rain, patches of blue sky began to reappear permitting the Squadron to fly 15 effective sorties, 12 being directed at interdiction of enemy targets, and three on close support of friendly ground elements.

Second Lieutenant Staats was nearing the end of his tour in Korea and was flying his 74th sortie.
On this mission it appeared that the enemy singled him out for a particularly hot reception as a parting gesture. At approximately 1440 hours on the 22nd, the F-51 piloted by Second Lieutenant Staats was hit by enemy ground fire during a dive bombing attack five kilometers east of Onjong-ni. Knowing that the sea would be reasonably warm during the summer, the pilot immediately headed for Wonsan harbor area where he was able to identify a friendly destroyer. By this time with the engine of his F-51 on fire, he was able to abandon the stricken aircraft by parachute.

The remaining members of his flight saw him land successfully and climb into his dinghy from where he waved his arms and legs at them to indicate that he was uninjured. The flight also saw a launch pick up Second Lieutenant Staats, and transfer him to the friendly destroyer, from where he returned to the Squadron on the 26th after being taken to Sasebo in Japan, the home base of the destroyer.

Section 2. A Sad Day for No 2 Squadron

The 23rd of July 1951 was a sad day for the Squadron and will be long remembered in its history in the Far East.

On that day three pilots in one flight of four F-51's were reported missing in action. The ill-fated flight was led by Captain F.M. Bekker with Lieutenant du Plooy as his No. 3 and with Second Lieutenants D.A.R. Green and M.I.B. Halley as wingmen. The flight was briefed to carry out weather reconnaissance of the west coast. Each F-51 was loaded with two 500-pound bombs (10-15 second delayed fuses), six rockets and maximum fifty caliber ammunition.

The flight became airborne at 1505 hours and proceeded up the Han River in battle formation at approximately 450 meters. At the mouth of the Han River the flight turned west and found that the weather was deteriorating steadily for the cloud base had descended to 180 meters above the ground.

After repeated attempts had been made to get through to the north, the leader decided to abandon the idea and started searching for targets in the area east of Haeju. As no suitable targets were found there the flight proceeded farther east along the Han River and then along the Imjin River. The aircraft were flying in a line astern formation with the cloud base alternating between 200 to 450 meters above ground level. The flight then headed north by northwest and kept more or less to the river area apparently making for the secondary target at Sibyoni.

The time was then 1530 hours and due to the adverse weather encountered there, it became impossible for the flight to proceed farther north for the
cloud ceiling was 8/8th at 1,500 feet with low clouds and rain covering about 4/8th down to 700 feet. The air itself was very unstable, causing the wingmen difficulty in keeping station. Their perseverance was rewarded and at 1540 hours the leader found a suitable road bridge over the river. The flight proceeded to bomb the bridge by carrying out a glide from approximately 550 meters down to a release height of about 15 meters. After completely destroying the bridge the flight formed up in close formation in line astern, echelon starboard and continued searching for more targets.

As the flight passed over a small hill estimated at 90 meters high, the right inner main plane of the F-51 piloted by Captain Bekker was seen to burst into flames and as the canopy of the stricken aircraft came off so the whole of the starboard side of the fuselage became enveloped in fire.

Captain Bekker was seen quite clearly in the cockpit as the flames were sucked in. The burning F-51 porpoised twice, lost altitude and plunged into the ground. Just prior to the crash the wingman flying No. 2 position was forced to break right to avoid a piece of flaming wing which had broken off in the air.

This bit of violent evasive action took Second Lieutenant Green into a cloud and caused his instruments to become inaccurate due to the toppling of the gyro. He managed to keep control and descended in a steep diving turn to port; and as he broke cloud, he passed over Captain Bekker’s burning F-51.

The wreckage was strewn over 60 meters on the downward slope of the hill and was burning furiously. Second Lieutenant Green kept his F-51 in a tight turn and descended to about six meters over the destroyed aircraft to see whether there were any signs of life. In doing so, he observed a parachute descending directly over the position at a height of about 60 meters.

Radio contact was immediately made with the rest of the flight and it was then discovered that the parachute was that of Second Lieutenant Halley who had been forced to abandon his aircraft. The remaining members of this flight, Lieutenant R.M. du Plooy and Second Lieutenant Green watched Lieutenant Halley landed safely and it was assumed that he was uninjured, for he waved to his comrades overhead.

The weather by now had worsened considerably, and poor radio conditions made it almost impossible to pass messages. It was then decided that Lieutenant du Plooy would remain over the area and fly a combat air patrol over the downed pilot, while Lieutenant Green ascended to establish better contact with the rescue organization. As Lieutenant Green pulled up he came under fire and noticed tracers pouring past his wings and bursts of 20-mm fire forward and above his port main plane.
Rescue facilities were eventually contacted on the radio and instructed to proceed to a rendezvous 16 kilometers east of Kaesong for the downed pilot's position was difficult to find in the adverse weather. While the helicopter was on route to the scene Lieutenant Green alternated his position between the downed pilot and the rendezvous point but found that the weather was closing in rapidly. Further he was forced to fly low for on every occasion on which he attempted to ascend he was fired on from the surrounding area.

During this period regular contact was kept with Lieutenant du Plooy over the radio and it was learned that this officer was being kept fully occupied preventing the enemy troops from capturing the downed pilot. The enemy was kept at bay by means of fifty caliber ammunition fire from the over-heated guns of Lieutenant du Plooy's F-51.

Two unidentified flights heard the reports over their radios and offered their assistance, but they did not locate the scene possibly due to the adverse weather prevailing over the area. For 45 minutes Lieutenant du Plooy put up an heroic fight against the enemy, but at 1630 hours he reported that his ammunition was exhausted and that the enemy was closing in on Lieutenant Halley.

Visual contact had now been made with the rescue helicopter and Lieutenant Green was escorting it in when Lieutenant du Plooy reported that the enemy had at last succeeded in capturing the downed pilot. The helicopter pilot was informed and told to return to base. He, however, refused to comply and stated that he would stand by in case of a further emergency. Approximately one minute after last hearing from Lieutenant du Plooy, Lieutenant Green sighted the wreckage of another smouldering aircraft, as well as a parachute. Lieutenant Green called Lieutenant du Plooy on the radio but received no reply.

While circling the area Lieutenant Green met with intense and accurate fire from the ground and was obliged to take evasive action in and out of the low-lying clouds. The smouldering wreck was not identified for the helicopter had entered the flak area and it was necessary to escort it out safely before Lieutenant Green's F-51 ran out of fuel, for he had but 15 gallons left in his tanks. Lieutenant Green landed safely at base, but Lieutenant du Plooy never returned from this action. This ended with everybody in the Squadron feeling the gravity of the event for three pilots had been reported missing in action in one day.

Months later it was reported officially that Second Lieutenant M.I.B. Halley was a prisoner of war in Communist hands and that Lieutenant R.M. du Plooy, although still missing, had received the high American Award of the Silver Star for his outstanding bravery and determination in attempting to protect a comrade from capture in the face of intense and accurate enemy ground fire.
Lieutenant du Plooy thus became the first South African in Korea to be awarded the Silver Star.

Section 3. Letter of Appreciation

During July and early August 1951 the ground fighting was slack and not much close air support was needed. So the Fifth Air Force and Eighth Army Commanders agreed to establish the Eighth Army's requirement for close air support at 96 sorties each day. In case of emergency, the Fifth Air Force would of course give the Eighth Army as much as support as it required. With this amount of air support, the Eighth Army would be able to handle special targets, and the Fifth Air Force normally committed most of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing, South African Air Force and 1st Marine Wing to the close support effort. At their airdromes Mustangs and Corsairs were held on strip alert awaiting scrambling orders from the Joint Operation Center.

The Squadron had flown a record number of sorties on 14 August 1951, and it was with deep satisfaction that it received a letter of appreciation from the office of the Commanding General, 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing.

Colonel T.C. Rogers wrote saying:

"The entire 18th Wing did an excellent job in mounting the attacks on 14 August 1951. However, I wish particularly to commend the officers and airmen of No 2 Squadron for the outstanding manner in which they executed their portion of this maximum effort mission. Your unit turned in an enviable performance both in the air and on the ground. The esprit de corps displayed and effectiveness of effort in mounting thirty-five combat sorties without an abort and in preparing your aircraft for the second portion of the mission by refueling and rearming in the minimum time of thirty minutes reflects the greatest credit upon your unit and upon the South African Air Force. My hearty congratulations for a job well done."
CHAPTER VI  RAILWAY INTERDICATION

Section 1. No Success without Sacrifice
(18 August-5 November 1951)

In early August it was noted by air force officers that due to the effectiveness of the air attacks against the enemy roads, movements had been declining and this observation led to studies of the enemy’s logistical system and a search for more effective interdiction targets. The Communists were not capable of supporting a war effort, and, except for a few arms factories at Pyongyang, had to bring their war supplies from Manchuria or Siberia. They depended heavily upon trucks and trains for long hauls, and had always attempted to use their railways to the maximum.

The Fifth Air Force therefore undertook to interdict the predominantly used North Korean railway lines. Close support for the ground forces was limited in order to release the maximum Fifth Air Force capability for the execution of the interdiction program.

On 18 August 1951, the United Nations airmen launched, suddenly and without warning, air interdiction campaign “Strangle” against North Korea’s railroads. Day after day, the South African Air Force ordinarily attacked its sections of rail lines twice each day. Recognizing that lateral rail routes on the “H” shaped rail network would be useless if the main north-south routes were destroyed, No 2 Squadron aimed its heaviest air attacks against the double tracked rail lines between Sonchon and Sariwon, and also attacked the single track rail lines which connected Huichon and Kunu-ri and Kunu-ri and Sunchon, under the cover of Sabre screen. They used glide and dive bombing attacks, the former being more accurate and the latter offering the advantages of lower losses and damages from enemy ground fire (See Situation Map 4).

While South African Air Force fighter bombers had been hammering North Korea’s railway lines of communication, the truce talks had broken down at Kaesong on 23 August. And then, the Communist air forces launched into a bitter and all out air campaign on September. As many as 90 MIG’s now entered North Korea at one time, and with so many aircraft in the skies the Communists employed practically any formation they desired. Aerial combats were underway. Evaluation of the patterns of Communists air activities clearly indicated that the Reds had begun to implement a new air campaign designed
to establish air superiority over MIG Alley.

September opened with the No 2 Squadron losing both another pilot and aircraft. On the first, Second Lieutenant M.O. Grunder led four F-51's on a rail interdiction mission. After making three rail cuts the flight proceeded with its reconnaissance of the enemy's supply routes. Throughout the mission the flight experienced moderate and accurate anti-aircraft fire when passing over sensitive areas, but it was not until after completing the road and rail reconnaissance and while they were heading south over Youngdong that Lieutenant Grunder sighted a small wooded area which he wanted to investigate closer.

Flying low over the area a burst of anti-aircraft fire was observed behind him, and he called on the radio and reported that he thought that he had been hit; however, he still proceeded to rocket and strafe the position and then called the remainder of the flight down to do likewise. In all, six anti-aircraft positions were observed, attacked and silenced, but while pulling up into the sun from one strafing run, one pilot observed an aircraft canopy and some papers stream past him. A radio check-in was immediately carried out, but no response was received from Lieutenant Grunder. On the ground the pilots noticed two fires; one of grass, the other from a crashed aircraft.

The remainder of the flight searched the area for 20 minutes but did not observe a parachute, either on the ground or in the air or any signs of life near the wrecked aircraft. Lieutenant Grunder was reported missing in action.

Exactly one year after leaving the shores of South Africa the Squadron flew its highest number of sorties flown in any one day. On 25 September 1951, the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing mounted 122 sorties of which 40 were flown by the South Africans.

A review of the Squadron's personnel, aircraft and activities on that date reveals the following:

1. Only two officers and 39 other ranks of the original draft which arrived in the Far East were still in Korea.
2. 15 other ranks had volunteered for a second tour of duty with the Squadron in Korea.
3. 61 aircraft had been acquired of which 36 had been lost.

During the period covered, the South African Air Force ran up a total of 4,920 sorties (1,320 missions) and accounted for the following claims:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Probably Damaged</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>4,650</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshalling Yards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Bridges</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Vehicles 458 248 18
Supply Dumps 159 66 0
Tanks 14 22 6
Field Guns 24 21 2
AA Positions 83 18 7
POL Dumps 29 21 2
Locomotives 4 5 3
Rolling stocks 173 322 20
Main Entrances 2 74 9
Shipping 33 28 4
Dams 0 4 0
Troops 1,634 0 0

A total of 11,052.20 operational hours (non-operational hours totaled 2,191.05) was required to accomplish the above claims with the expenditures of the following material:

Napalm 5,097
250 lb. Bombs 4
500 lb. Bombs 3,303
Rockets 21,169
50 Cal. Ammo (Rds) 3,051,468
Fire Bombs 3
260 lb. Bombs 17
Butterfly Bombs 8

At this time No 2 Squadron with 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing continued to be based on the south coast of Korea at Chinhae Airfield (K-10). But on 22 September 1961, Squadron and the Wing cleared the way for an extensive rebuilding of Seoul Airfield (K-16) by moving its staging detachment (R & R detachment) from this field to Hoengsong Airfield (K-46) in central Korea. This Airfield (K-46) was the advanced operating base of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing's Mustangs, and as such served the 18th Group during the latter half of 1951. From this field the South Africans were only 200 kilometers behind the front lines and could reduce their flying hours.

The South African Air Force was not only meeting with success in its efforts to block rail traffic, but was enjoying a bonus effect of attacks against enemy vehicular traffic. They destroyed North Korea's railways faster than the Reds could repair them in October.

But the Communists were beginning to effect countermeasures to the railway attacks. South of Chongchon River the Reds concentrated automatic weapons along their rail lines and moved them to meet fighter bomber objectives. To
counteract the growing flak, the airmen of No 2 Squadron armed up to 20
per cent of their sorties with proximity-fused bombs. Dive-bombing became the
rule for all rail attacks. But anti-flak loadings reduced rail cut potential, and
bombing accuracy fell off.

Section 2. A Successful Pick-up
(6 November- 4 December 1951)

Concurrent with the South African Air Force’s rail interdiction operations,
close support sorties were carried out during the months of November and
December. Always South Africans demonstrated their great versatility in
transferring their efforts from interdiction missions to close support as the
ground situation determined.

However, the static ground situation was limited to clashes between
opposing patrols and allowed few opportunities for effective close support.
Under such circumstances, the growing order of Communist automatic weapons
in the front lines took a toll of fighter bombers and Mosquito Contollers.

For example 1951, during an interdiction mission, a flight of four F-51’s
were instructed by a Mosquito aircraft to attack an enemy held bridge where
dug-in troops were reported to be.

After the first attack, the leader of the flight, Lieutenant F. J. Grobler,
reported over the radio that his aircraft had been hit by enemy fire and that
his elevator controls were jammed. The pilot climbed south, and orbited the
target with his wingman escorting him, while the rest of the flight continued
the attack.

Turning the damaged F-51 became more and more difficult, and during
the final turn, which was intended to put the aircraft on a route for base the
aileron became inoperative. Even so, the pilot managed to get the F-51 back
on an even keel to allow him just enough time to bail out.

Lieutenant Grobler landed safely and waited under the protective coverage
provided by the rest of his flight for about ten minutes when a helicopter of
the 25th US Division picked him up and landed him at a nearby airstrip from
where he was taken by an L-19 back to Hoengsong Airfield(K-46).

Just when victory for the comprehensive rail attacks seemed to be in sight,
Communist counter-measures to the rail campaign began to work against the
United Nations cause, and the Communists substantially lessened Far East Air
Forces’ interdiction capabilities.

Despite the almost undivided efforts of the peerless fighter bombers,
Communist repair troops filled the bombs craters as fast as the pilots could make them. No doubt assisted by frozen ground which caused some delay-fused bombs to skip off the target and which reduced the dimensions of craters of those bombs hit the targets, the Reds in November seldom left rail cuts unrepaired for more than twenty four hours.

Section 3. ROK Officers Aid in Attempted Rescue
(5 December 1951–19 March 1952)

Throughout October 1951 the United Nations' desultory ground probes were virtually halted by General Ridgway's order. Reasoning that the reopened truce negotiations at Panmunjom offered such a good prospect for peace as to rule out large-scale ground offensives by either side, and noting that the cost of major attacks against Red defenses could not be justified in terms of the limited results which would ensue, General Ridgway directed the United Nations forces to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of their front.

The beginning of the truce talks and Ridgway's order allowed a short breathing spell to No 2 Squadron and also gave time to consolidate their tactics. Thus the Squadron attempted to effect a rescue of one of its pilots who had previously been reported as missing in action. Reports had come through that Lieutenant C. Lombard, whose aircraft had crashed on 7 October, had not yet been captured by the enemy, and that a rescue was possible.

Lieutenant F.J. Grobler was entrusted with this delicate operation and repeatedly led the Squadron aircraft on a pre-briefed search and possible combat air patrol.

On 5 December, four of the F-51's searched the area for one and a half hours but, owing to fuel shortage, finally had to return to base. Pilots reported that on this mission they were sure that they had received a shrill radio signal while over the crash area, but saw no sign of the missing pilot.

The following day another attempt was made with the aid of a Korean Army Officer who was flown in a specially designed, two seat F-51. Once again the area was searched, and on this occasion contact was established with a ROK guerrilla force in that area which, though rather noncommittal, agreed to assist with a rescue at 0800 hours the following day.

At the appointed time the Squadron's aircraft were over the area, but the weather proved to be too bad for the helicopter which had come along, to be escorted in. On 9 and 11 December Lieutenant Grobler attempted the rescue again, but still, because of the weather, with negative results. After this, the idea was given up completely, but with the hope that Lieutenant Lombard
would be safe with the guerrillas who had previously been contacted.

From the later part of December 1951 and early January 1952 Fifth Air Force operations officers acknowledged that Communist flak was getting too concentrated south of the Chongchon and directed changes in the rail interdiction area. A few months earlier MIG's had driven the fighter bombers south of the Chongchon, but now the MIG's were not aggressive, and the Reds had not yet emplaced much flak along the rail lines between the Yalu and the Chongchon. The Fifth Air Force accordingly assigned the Thunderjet wing's target areas on the main railway line northward from Sinanju to Sonchon, and ordered the Shooting Star wing to attack the rail line between Kunu-ri and Huichon.

After this change, the fighter bombers encountered less flak and scored a larger percentage of rail cuts, but the ground was frozen so hard that bombs often skipped off the ground and exploded in the air. Other bomb blasts in the frozen ground deflected debris upward. As a result of both phenomena, many planes were damaged by their own bomb blasts as they made low level attacks.

During February, the fighter bomber groups continued to attack rail targets north of the Chongchon, but they attempted to avoid the enemy's growing flak
by moving from one rail line to another. Each day the fighter bombers were cutting North Korea's railroads at many points, but with enemy repair crews stationed at regular intervals along all major rail lines, and the use of impressed local laborers, the Reds could repair several rail cuts simultaneously. The scattered air attacks which resulted when wing commanders were permitted to select their own objectives on given stretches of rail way worked to the detriment of good flak intelligence planning, with the result that each fighter bomber formation used a part of its ordnance for flak suppression.

After surveying these deficiencies in the attack, unlike the earlier operational pattern, the Fifth Air Force put Operation "Saturate" into effect on 3 March. Fifth Air Force Joint Operation Center now picked exact targets and closely controlled all flights of aircraft, directing routes of approach, initial points, withdrawal procedures, and altitudes to be flown to and from each target, the purpose being to compress the time interval of the attacks and to shift targets when weather or flak dictated.

Section 4. Second Encounter with MIG’s
(20 March-22 June 1952)

March the 20th, 1952, will remain an important date in the annals of the South African Air Force, for on that day the propeller-driven F-51’s had their second taste of aerial combat with the speedy enemy MIG type aircraft.

The day opened with eight of the Squadron’s aircraft taking part in an 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing attack on the enemy’s rail communications in MIG Alley, close to the Yalu River.

As the flight pulled off the target, after an attack carried out in the face of heavy and intensely accurate flak, it was attacked by five MIG-15’s. The F-51 piloted by Lieutenant D. L. Taylor was the first that the MIG’s hit, and it was not long before this aircraft was seen to be streaming glycol and black smoke. The F-51 appeared to remain under control, and the pilot headed south, with the remainder of his comrades trying to provide a protective screen. It was soon found that this would be impossible, for the members of the flight had to defend themselves time and again by turning into the repeated attacks of the MIG’s which were making passes anywhere from three through nine o’clock.

In an apparent attempt to reduce their speed enough to keep from overshooting the South African Air Force planes, the faster MIG’s were seen to lower their dive brakes. As one of these MIG’s did this, Lieutenant J. S. Enslin managed to maneuver his plane into position for an attack and fired a long
burst at the slowed-up MIG. The bullets were seen to strike the right wing of the MIG which then emitted a large puff of black smoke, broke away from the attack, dove toward the ground and headed north to the Yalu River. The damage to the MIG was later confirmed when the gun camera film of Lieutenant Ensln's F-51 was developed.

In the meantime, Lieutenant V. F. Kuhn had been separated from the rest of his flight and was attacked three times by two MIG's. Again because of the slower speed of the F-51's, he was able to send a few bursts towards on of the attackers, and finally succeeded in evading the enemy jets by entering a cloud bank.

This day's action against the enemy jets greatly enhanced the morale of the Squadron pilots, though this was naturally somewhat offset by the loss of Lieutenant D. L. Taylor who was officially listed as Missing in Action.

Since the tactics of the "Saturate" operation had proven practicable, the Fifth Air Force continued the "Saturate" attacks during April and May. At first, when the Fifth Air Force was able to outguess the Reds and strike where the enemy had little flak, bombing accuracy was good and damage to aircraft was slight. But by the end of April the Reds had emplaced flak batteries along nearly all of their rail lines and there were virtually no flak-free targets to be found (See Situation Map 3).

During April, "Saturate" attacks kept the enemy's rail line system under attack, but the Fifth Air Force reached a nadir of fighter bomber strength. Chiefly during railway interdiction strikes it had lost 243 fighter bombers and had sustained major damage to 290 other tactical airplanes.

Despite recognition that it lacked the requisite strength to fully exploit the "Saturate" tactics, the Fifth Air Force continued to effect a partial blockade of North Korean rail routes in May.

In the end, the United Nations air forces failed in their efforts to interdict North Korean rail transportation because they lacked sufficient aircraft strength to maintain by day and night, the intensive rail cuts required to keep all rail lines out of operational.

Closely related to the failure of the Fifth Air Force's operational planners to correctly calculate the friendly forces which would be required to interdict North Korean railways, was the failure of intelligence officers to assess the enemy's countermeasures to the planned air attacks. Since operations officers very seldom asked for enemy reaction studies, air intelligence officers very seldom carried out such studies. Despite the fact that the success of the railway interdiction program would depend upon the enemy's countermeasures, Fifth Air Force operations officers called for no enemy reaction estimates.
According to Far East Air Forces surveillance studies, the Reds fixed railcuts in from two to six hours, and made bridge repairs in from four to seven days. The United Nations railway interdiction campaign was defensive and preventive rather than offensive and positive.

Already, however, air operations planners were seeking an application of effort which would be more profitable than interdiction had been.
CHAPTER VII  AIR PRESSURE STRATEGY

Section 1.  Attack against Hydroelectric Facilities
(23 June-10 July 1952)

The Fifth Air Force was continuing railway interdiction on a top priority basis in early spring. The months of comprehensive railway interdiction had not been wasted, for North Korean railways had been so badly mauled that they could not be easily rehabilitated. In the future, small but periodic air attacks would keep the rail lines in marginal operating condition.

But tried against the desired standard of air effort, however, the railway interdiction program was no longer practicable. Economically, repairing railway tracks not as expensive to the enemy, as was USAF’s effort to destroy them in December 1951, moreover, United Nations air attacks against the North Korean railway system had reached a virtual state of balance wherein the United Nations' ability to inflict damage was roughly equalled by the enemy’s ability to repair the damage.

To continue the rail attacks would be, in effect, to pit skilled pilots, equipped with modern, expensive aircraft, against unskilled coolie laborers armed with picks and shovels. Even if United Nations air action did delay or diminish the flow of hostile supplies to the enemy, such action could not place intolerable military pressure upon the Reds as long as they maintained a static ground front.

From the study of alternative courses of action it was recommended that the first priority of air action should be given to United Nations air superiority tasks, and that such effort as remained should be employed to accomplish the maximum amount of selected destruction, thus making the Korean conflict as costly as possible to the enemy in terms of equipment, supplies, and personnel.

But finding lucrative targets in war-torn North Korea did not promise to be easy. Other than North Korean hydroelectric facilities areas which should be attacked were scarce in North Korea.

When the request was laid before him on 3 March 1952, however, General Ridgway refused to approve the proposal of attacks on hydroelectric facilities. He informed General Weyland that he would consider the proposal “In the event that the decision is reached that the Communists are deliberately delaying armistice negotiations and are increasing their offensive capabilities.”

At this time the Panmunjom truce negotiations were approaching a complete
impasse. The United Nations Command had attempted to negotiate with the Reds for almost a year and had compromised on point after point in the discussions. In order to attain its objectives, the United Nations could no longer afford to yield to the implacable Reds. The time had come to apply additional military force.

In June the significance of North Korean hydroelectric power complex was emphasized. General Clark worked on plans to attack all of North Korean hydroelectric power complexes. It was the most outstanding aerial event of June 1952. The operation was kept top secret until a few hours before take-off, as the target was considered a "Sticky" one and the less the Communists knew of the impending strike, the better. The bombing of these hydroelectric plants came as a surprise not only to the Communists, but also to the rest of the world as well (See Situation Map 2).

In the afternoon of the 23rd, every available aircraft of the Fifth Air Force, as well as those from the Far East Bomber Command, was airborne for one of the greatest aerial strikes of the Korean War.

At 1600 hours on 23 June 1952, General Weyland flashed orders for the strike. Promptly at the appointed time, as Sabres patrolled watchfully overhead, the Navy bombers attacked the Supung generating plant. In succession, between 1610 hours and 1700 hours, a total of 145 tons of bombs were poured onto the targets. It was learned from reconnaissance planes that the strike went off to perfection. Strangely enough, the 250 MIG fighters based at Antung and Ta-tung-kou made no attempt to resist the raid.

Mustangs attacked Pujon No.3 and No.4, while 1st Marine wing pilots hit Changjin No.3 and No.4. Navy bombers attacked Pujon No. 1 and No. 2 and Hwangsuwon complex.

On the following day these same targets were attacked, and in the heat of the moment, Fifth Air Force planes also attacked Changjin No. 1 and No. 2, which were to have been saved for Bomber Command targets that night.

At that time South African Air Force and 18th Wing joined in. The power installations were close by the Yalu River, just south of the Pujon reservoir. Commandant Burger, then Commanding Officer of No 2 Squadron, led six of the South African Air Force's F-51's along with the aircraft of the 67th United States Air Force Squadron, against one of the hydroelectric installations. This power plant was completely destroyed.

The remainder of the Squadron, led by Captain Grove and Lieutenant Bosch attacked another plant eight kilometers to the south. When reconnaissance photography had been developed, it showed this plant to be completely destroyed without loss to the United Nations Air Force.
Air Pressure Strategy

On the morning of the 24th, the hydroelectric plant south of Changjin was the target. Unfortunately, bad weather over the target area made it necessary for the aircraft to return to base. In the afternoon, however, 11 South African Air Force F-51's led by Lieutenant McClure set out again to destroy this plant. Although low clouds made it impossible to observe the actual results, they were expected to be good.

The following message of congratulations was received from General Weyland, Commander, Far East Air Forces, through General Barcus, Commander Fifth Air Force:

"Pass to all Fifth Air Force staff and participating units my heartiest congratulations for an outstanding successful air operation without loss against the North Korean hydroelectric power complex. This constitutes a fine climax of two years coordinated and applied air power, and is a fitting hint of more to come if the Commies want it that way."

Despite the large raids and the numerous other interdiction and close support missions flown by the Squadron, June became a casualty-free month for the South African Air Force. The results obtained from the sustained strikes against such a vital target system as the North Korean hydroelectric plants were especially pleasing. Something more than 90 per cent of North Korean electric power potential had been knocked out.

There was no doubt that the attacks against North Korean hydroelectric facilities put military pressure upon the Communists. Intelligence agent reports confirmed Far East Air Forces' prediction the loss of electric power would curtail war production in many small factories, themselves so dispersed as to be impracticable air targets. Intelligence reports received from Manchuria indicated that the neutralization of Supung's generators represented a loss of 23 per cent of the 1952 electric power requirement of northeast China. Because of power shortages, 30 out of 51 key industries at Port Arthur, Dairen, Funchen, and Anshan failed to meet annual production quotas prescribed by Peking.

Meanwhile during June 1952, the 2nd South African Air Force and the 18th Fighter Bomber Group leaving the 18th Wing as the rear echelon at Chinhoe Airfield (K-10), moved up to Hoengsong Airfield (K-46). At this airfield the Mustangs only 100 kilometers behind the front lines and they could reduce their flying time to enemy territory.

On 4 July again, fighter bombers attacked North Korean Military Academy, near the Yalu and some 80 kilometers northeast of Antung. The fighter bombers successfully evaded MIG interceptors who got through the Sabre screen but they turned in relatively poor bombing results.
On 8 July, fighter-bombers attacked bridges on the rail between Kanggye and Kunnu-ri, while others, transformer yards, and penstocks as Changjin No 1 and No 2, which were still possibly useful to the enemy. On 9 July, Lieutenant Scott went into a very steep dive over the target in this area at 900 meters and pieces of his aircraft could be seen coming. He crashed and was killed.

But for several months prior to July 1952 the Fifth Air Force had been losing more aircraft to enemy action than were being replaced. Even more serious was a high damage rate which placed a burden on the Fifth Air Force's combat capabilities. Operations analysis studies showed that the fighter bombers were sustaining most of their losses and damage from ground-fire hits received at altitudes below 750 meters. During the daylong strikes against Pyongyang, Fifth Air Force fighter bombers sustained damage at a rate of 27 per 1,000 sorties. So a minimum altitude of 900 meters for fighter-bombers was ordered.

Despite extensive continuation dive-bombing training effected by squadrons in rotation between August and October 1952, the Fifth Air Force fighter bomber wings did not regain their earlier bombing accuracy.

In order to pull out at 900 meters the fighter bombers had to release their bombs from about 1,300 meters and the over-all results scored in the continuation training program were an average circular error probability of 70 meters.

Operations analysts doubted that any group of United States Air Force pilots could have done better than this when they released bombs from such altitudes. Strangely enough, the minimum altitude restrictions, which accepted lowered bombing accuracy, were distasteful to a good many pilot.

Section 2. Attacks against Military Targets
(11 July–25 December 1952)

When the air pressure attacks were about to get under way in June and early July 1952, the massive assault against Pyongyang and the attacks against town and village communications centers became the military objective.

Attacks were scheduled against targets of military significance which were so situated that their destruction would have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively engaged in the logistic support of the enemy forces.

Every operational air unit in the Far East, aircraft from the Republic of Korea, the Fifth Air Force, the South African Air Force, the First US Marine Wing and Seventh Fleet, savagely assaulted 30 targets designated in Pyongyang on 11 July 1952.

Photographs showed that the aerial blow was quite successful against the
command posts, supply concentrations, factories, troops billets, railway facilities, and gun positions marked for destruction in Pyongyang. Radio Pyongyang announced that the strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had inflicted 7,000 casualties.

In the early summer of 1952, the United Nations forces and the Communist field armies maintained an active defense of front line positions which had been dug deeper and deeper into the earth.

In June, at the western end of the battle line, the Eighth Army staged several hard-fought attacks to wrest forward positions from the enemy. Each time the Reds invariably launched counter attacks against the newly-won outposts. In the west central sections of the front lines in July, the Communists launched attacks which captured Hill 275 (Old Baldy) after a battle that saw the land mass change hands several times.

In the same period foreign air units provided an additional 114 and 98 close sorties. As low cloud continued to blank out the front lines in July, the radar controllers worked day and night to guide fighter bombers.

Night flying B-26's and B-29's provided the bulk of these missions, but Mustang flights of the South African Air Force and 18th Fighter Bomber Wing flew formations of fours and salvoed their ordnance on the order of the ground controller.

In the meantime during this period, Captain L.P.J. Hechter was highly praised the work and courage of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and received the US Bronze Star on 29 July, 1952.

Taking advantage of good flying weather early in August, the Fifth Air Force directed heavy attacks at Communist troop concentrations and industrial remnants. Targets for United Nations air attack were selected on a strictly military basis and air action was not aimed at the civilian population.

One of the major objectives of the United Nations air pressure strategy was to hurt the Communists as badly as possible while denying them an ability to retaliate.

Dividing the objective area into targets for nine wings, the Fifth Air Force sent 273 sorties there in two strikes on 4 August. Later on the afternoon of 5 August, 11 fighter bomber aircraft attacked a tungsten mine at Kilchu, a troop concentration and a chemical plant near Inhung-ni were attacked by 145 fighter aircraft on 11 August.

The Fifth Air Force began to attack sensitive targets along the Yalu. Because industrial targets were becoming scarce, the Fifth Air Force intended to begin to inflict punishment upon Communist military personnel. The massed raids against military targets in Pyongyang had the highest priority, and on 29 August an operation against Pyongyang marked the initiation of attacks
which were designed to cause a noise both in Moscow and Peking.

In order to permit turn-arounds of all attacking planes, the Fifth Air Force began the assault at 0930 hours and allowed four-hour intervals between strikes so that the additional attacks took place at 1330 hours and 1730 hours. All known flak positions had been plotted, and one flight of each attack group was briefed to hit gun positions in the group’s target area. They hit public offices in Pyongyang and such points as the Ministry of Rail Transportation, the Munitions Bureau, Radio Pyongyang, plus many factories, warehouses, and troop billets. United Nations aircraft flew 1,254 sorties in the Pyongyang raid.

The Far East Air Forces operational policy directive of 10 July 1952 shifted emphasis from all-out interdiction attacks to destruction strikes, designed to make the war costly to the Communists, but it was never intended to abandon interdiction attacks completely. However, Far East Air Forces devoted less effort to interdiction activities, and the Communists were able to make some progress in restoring the serviceability of their lines of communication.

During August, the key railway lines from Sinuju to Sinanju and from Manpojin to Kuntu-ri were operational for through-traffic about 87 per cent of the time. It had been noted at that time that there was a direct relationship between the relaxation of railway attacks and the steadily improving enemy supply situation, which was detrimental to United Nations ground forces. Hostile artillery and mortar fire had increased in a direct ratio to the increased serviceability of the enemy’s rail lines. United Nations casualties had increased in proportion to the growing volume of hostile fire.

Later in August 1952, the Fifth Air Force accordingly attempted to develop a new technique which would concentrate on hostile vehicles and make them more profitable targets for the fragmentation bombs which operations analysis tests indicated to be the optimum weapon against hostile vehicles.

Radar directed bombing effort contributed to August’s total of 1,078 tons of bombs dropped with improving weather, the bulk of close support effort was again furnished by fighter-bombers. In support of ground action, generally characterized by numerous clashes up to battalion sized troop units, and a successful United Nations recapture of “Old Baldy” Far East Air Forces planes flew 1,836 effective close support sorties, while attached friendly foreign units and US Marine flew an additional 1,466 sorties to swell the monthly total to 3,302 sorties.

During this period the close air support afforded by the No 2 Squadron SAAF pilots was substantial in volume, but it was occasionally directed against really lucrative targets. The Communists always launched their outpost attacks under the cover of darkness and nearly always completed their raids before
dawn, by which time they were usually safe and secure against air attacks, deep within their tunnels, caves, and bunkers. The Republic of Korea Air Force and the South African Air Force aircraft flew 1,111 close support sorties.

Captain W.G. van Rensburg and Warrant Officer I.F. Millard awarded Bronze Star on 7 August for their gallant action during the period and also Captain A.Q. de Wet was presented the same on 19 August.

On 22 August 1952, Major R.C.P. Kotzenberg, Second in Command of No 2 Squadron, failed to return from an attack on artillery positions. He was not seen to crash but was missing when the formation reformed at the rendezvous point.

On other hand, in September United Nations air forces’ aerial interdiction campaign continued. The Fifth Air Force committed a much greater portion of its effort to rail interdiction, but the fighter bombers devoted most of their attention to the “Item” line between Kichang and Kowon and between Pyongyang and Sariwon. The more important of these lines were heavily defended by hostile flak.

Again the armistice negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Red delegates were using Panmunjom solely as a forum for venting scandalously false charges of germ warefare and the like.

In order to intensify military pressure on the Communists following the recess in armistice talks, an amphibious demonstration had been planned which would involve redoubled activity by all forces.

In preparation for the Far East Command amphibious demonstration off Kojo, eastern Korea, the Fifth Air Force and Task Force 77 executed front line air attacks which were a mixture of close and general air support, working against Red troops who had long felt safe from air attack because of the closeness of their positions to the neutral ground at Kaesong. Unfavorable flying weather curtailed the Fifth Air Force’s planned operations on seven out of the ten days beginning on 9 October, but the fighter-bombers nevertheless flew 2,938 sorties.

During this period the South African Air Force, in fact, never missed a single day’s operations. The pilots continued to attack enemy troops, trucks, and supplies daily from dawn to dusk. The Squadron carried out particularly successful attacks on enemy.

On 8 October, 1952, for their achievements DFC awarded to:

a. Major D.L. Hefer
b. Captain G.C.S. Dodson
c. Lieutenant W.F. Church
d. Lieutenant S.S. Enslin

e. Second Lieutenant B.W. Singleton

On 10 October, in order to support the renewed ground operations taking place in the IX US Corps' area, General Weyland made up to three B-29's available for radar directed close support missions each night. During the month, moreover, the Fifth Air Force and its attached units flew a total of 4,488 close support sorties, of which 2,217 were in support of the IX US Corps' "Operation Showdown" fight at Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge.

Callous to the slaughter of their troops, Communist field commanders pressed attacks against Sniper Ridge and Triangle Hill early in November and finally regained possession of the latter terrain mass.

In support of the IX US Corps and other United Nations troops, the Fifth Air Force flew 2,374 close support sorties and its attached units flew 1,172 additional close support sorties during November. Ground officers testified that this air support gave a "Tremendous lift" to the infantry.
CHAPTER VIII CHEETAHS’ PROUD OF SABRES

Section 1. Aircraft Conversion
(26 December 1952-30 April 1953)

In October 1952, South Africa’s Minister of Defense, the Hon. F.C. Erasmus, visited the Squadron and told its members, “we have always been proud of our armed forces and now have reason to be even more proud of them. The achievements of our air squadron have been recognized again and again by our American friends.”

During Mr. Erasmus’ visit, the Squadron’s Senior Air Liaison Officer, Colonel D.A. du Toit, made a plea for the Squadron to be equipped with jets and promised that, should this be done, it would write a new chapter, “just as glorious as the previous one” in the Squadron’s history.

When the aircraft conversion announcement was first made, initial reactions were that the F-86 would prove too successful as a fighter bomber.

Test flights in four dive-bombing missions showed that the Sabres carried one 1,000-pound bomb on wing pylons opposite a full wing tank and dropped the ordnance satisfactorily from an altitude of 1,500 meters down to 600 meters. When carrying a maximum load of $2 \times 1,000$ pound bombs, an F-86 Sabre had a safe radius of only 220 kilometers but when it carried one bomb and one wing tank it could extend its radius to 300 kilometers. Despite these range limitations, the F-86 Fighter-Bomber possessed operational advantages.

Since they could defend themselves, flights of four Sabres enjoyed a great freedom of action; the F-86 proved to be a desirable gun platform and had one decided advantage over other fighter bombers in that it could sustain prolonged high angle dives without exceeding its critical Mach number.

Many pilots were not completely convinced that the Sabre would be satisfactory as a fighter bomber. “It’s much too fast!” said some. “It’s bound to be unstable,” thought others.

Despite such pessimism, the South African Air Force planned that this conversion would begin at the new airfield being built at Osan Airfield(K-55), about November 1952. Given this initial date, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and No 2 Squadron combat-ready on or about 20 November, 20 December, and 20 January 1953.

Pending receipt of Sabres, South African Air Force No 2 Squadron and the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing were expected to keep their old Mustangs going,
if necessary by cannibalization. The Squadron did keep the F-51's flying, but shortages of radiators, spark plugs, brake assemblies, and hydraulic fluid contributed to an AOCP rate which varied from 20 per cent to a high of 40 per cent in December 1952.

On 2 November, 1952, twenty one non-commissioned officers attended a familiarization course at Tsuiki, Japan, on F-86F aircraft and a week later one officer and sixteen other ranks also left for Tsuiki, to be followed on 23 November by four other ranks. No 2 Squadron flew its last operational sortie with F-51 Mustang aircraft on 27 December, 1952. On this day all operational aircraft were flown from the various advanced bases to K-10, Chinhae for handing over to the United States Air Force.

Slippage in programmed deliveries of the Sabre fighter-bombers delayed initiation of the South African Air Force and the 18th Wing's conversion. On 30 December 1952, however, the No 2 Squadron and 18th Wing moved from Chinhae Airfield(K-10) to the new base K-55 Airfield still under construction at Osan, 65 kilometers south of Seoul. In the middle of winter, it was very hard for No 2 Squadron to move to an unfinished airfield where construction of maintenance shelters had not even commenced and where, with the exception of concrete flight surfaces, the whole area was "one big mud hole."

On 2 January 1953 the forward detachments of No 2 Squadron and 18th Wing came in from Hoengsong Airfield(K-46). The 315th US Air Division lifted a large portion of the personnel and equipment of the Squadron and the 18th Wing.

First to stand down from combat was the 12th Squadron of the 18th Wing and shortly thereafter the 2nd South African Air Force Squadron flew their F-51's to Japan 1 Jan., 1953 and returned to K-55 for transition training.

Conversion to aircraft of a radically different type was never an easy task, and a number of unforeseen developments made the Sabre fighter bomber conversion program even more difficult. Concerned with the growth of Red air capabilities, the new Sabre airmen had to become proficient in fighter interceptor tactics before beginning fighter bomber training.

The task facing No 2 Squadron was tremendous. Airmen who had been maintaining conventional Mustangs had to be trained for more complicated jet maintenance which had to be done in the open under conditions of severe cold which sapped vitality and caused illness. In the maintenance training, however, an F-86 mobile training detachment was of great assistance, beginning on 7 January this detachment held classes eight hours a day, seven days a week, and trained pilots and maintenance men in the operation and care of the Sabre.

While, to meet the situation the Squadron was reorganized in two flights instead of the former four flights on 11 January, 1953. In addition to Flight
Commanders, Deputy Commanders were also appointed:

- A-Flight: Captain A.D. Lawrenson (Flight Commander)
  Captain E.A.C. Pienaar (Deputy Flight Commander)
- B-Flight: Captain J.F. Nortje (Flight Commander)
  Captain J.J. Kruger (Deputy Flight Commander)

On 28 January the South African Air Force and 18th Wing received their first three Sabres, and pilot training programs, beginning on 3 February assumed the task of providing transition for 28 South African Air Force and 56 United States Air Force crews.

On 30 January 1953, the Commanding Officer, Commandant Gerneke, and the Second-in-Command, Major J.S.R. Wells became the first members of No 2 Squadron who watched the event were impressed by rate of climb of the two aircraft. The two Flight Commanders flew the aircraft on 31 January 1953. This was followed the next day by four more pilots who flew solo flight in the new aircraft. All commented favourably on the new aircraft.

Major J.S.R. Wells flew one of the aircraft after dusk on 14 February and added another word of praise when he expressed his satisfaction with the excellent interior lighting system of the aircraft. All time was now spent on intensive training consisting of cockpit drill, battle formation exercises and instrument flying practices. Air-to-air cine-firing was also incorporated in the training and pilots had the chance to study their own films to determine what their results would have been if it were real combat flying.

On this day the old F-51’s...... once pride of the South African Air Force but now sadly obsolete......were withdrawn from combat wing. On 12 March 1953, operational flying was resumed......the first in the history of the South African Air Force that a squadron went into action flying jet aircraft.

On 11 March, Major J.S.R. Wells and Captain J.F. Nortje were the first SAAF pilots to fly Sabre aircraft in an operational sortie when they accompanied 2 United States Air Force pilots. On 12 March, the Squadron started its operational tour with Sabres when four missions on the Yalu were completed.

Dive-bombing training was accordingly begun in the Squadron on 1 April and 14 April the Squadron and 18th Wing made their first combined combat attack using jet aircraft against a common target.

On 27 April the South African Air Force with 18th Group flew the first close support mission with the new Sabre.
Section 2. Flying Jet Aircraft
(1 May-26 July 1953)

The new Sabre jets of South African Air Force No 2 Squadron, 18th, and 8th Wing greatly increased the Fifth Air Force counter-air capabilities, and permitted the Royal Australian Air Force No 77 Squadron to convert to fighter-bomber work. The Australian Air Force showed its versatility with the powerfully engined, straight-wing Meteor-8 jet, but they had never measured up to the swept-wing MIG's.

Assured by the possession of new Sabres and the improved performance of these planes, the South African Air Force was ready for its pilots to fight it out with the men who flew the Communist interceptors. Relatively favorable flying weather allowed the South African Air Force's Sabre Squadron of fly on most days in the later part of April, but the MIG's were not yet willing to fight.

In the same period, the United Nations Command was seeking to ground the Communist air forces, for Far East Air Forces had been planning a May Day attack to rile the Reds into fighting. In January the B-29's had been unable to knock out the underground facilities of Radio Pyongyang, but the propaganda station had wavered and gone off the air on 15 February when B-29's had attacked a nearby communications center. Evidently the B-29's had cut the power lines to the station, and Far East Air Forces had planned a repeat fighter bomber attack against the power lines to take Radio Pyongyang off the air on May Day.

According to the order, the 4th and 51st Wings screened and covered, the South African Air Force 2nd Squadron, 18th and 8th Wings which passed over Pyongyang as if heading toward a Yalu patrol and then suddenly let down to bomb the radio station and its power supply. Surprised Red flak batteries managed to damage one Sabre, but its pilot brought it home.

In spite of the cloudy skies, which cloaked Communist movements in May, Fifth Air Force pilots maintained steady pressure against enemy personnel, supply dumps, and transportation routes.

Starting on the night of 28 May, the Reds launched a feinting attack against I US Corps outposts in western Korea, but the main Red assault was directed against the II ROK Corps on June 10. This attack centered in central Korea, where the II ROK Corps held a bulge in the United Nations lines around Kumsong.
Beginning on the 12th, Fifth Air Force and Navy pilots employed ground situation worsened on the II ROK Corps front. The Fifth Air Force’s new commander, Lt. General Samuel E. Anderson, waived the minimum altitude restrictions on his fighter bombers and ordered his wings to give all-out support to the II ROK Corps.

Once again the Communists evidently expected frontal weather to cover their ground offensives, but ground radar control allowed United Nations pilots to attack targets they could not see. Fifth Air Force hit the advancing Red ground troops and continued to give all-out support to friendly ground troops until they got their lines stabilized on 19 June.

Directed by day Mosquito airborne controllers and by tactical air control parties and at night or in bad weather by tactical air direction post radars, the United Nations close support effort was at a high level all during June and was large enough to swamp all of the control facilities on 15, 16, 26, and 30 June. On these days some pilots could not remain long enough for air controllers to direct them to targets and had to make “free drops” against targets of opportunity behind enemy lines.

In order to blunt the force of the expected Communist ground offensive the Fifth Air Force began interdiction strikes early in July, but marginal flying weather did not allow the airmen to get off attacks. After losing days because of weather, fighter bombers attacked the road bridges around Chongchon and Huichon. The heavy rains and low clouds over the area which prevented interdiction attacks permitted the Communists to prepare for another all-out ground offensive in the Kumhwa River Valley of central Korea, where the II ROK Corps and IX US Corps joined flanks.

On the night of 13 July, Chinese divisions crashed against the right flank of the IX US Corps and began an assault which forced the II ROK Corps to retreat. All United Nations air commanders reacted swiftly.

The curtain of fire laid down by Far East Air Forces planes on the Communist aggressors during July 1953 utilized 43 percent of the month’s combat effort in close support of ground troops.

While the Communist ground armies were attacking, Communist functionaries at Panmunjom continued to haggle about the matter of prisoners of war.

As soon as the Communist ground offensive came to a halt, the Communist delegates appeared at the truce table on 19 July with an obvious determination to end the fighting as possible. When this meeting adjourned, General Clark alerted all commanders that only administrative details remained to be ironed out before the armistice would be signed. According to the plan, the United Nations air forces were now expected to neutralize North Korea’s airfields so
completely that the Reds would be unable to reconstitute an air order of battle on Korean soil before the armistice went into effect.

Acting on an assumption that an armistice might be imminent and wanting to take no chances that the bad flying weather would disrupt the work, General Weyland called on all air commands to reinstate the joint airfield neutralization program.

Getting under way, the South African Air Force No 2 Squadron, 18th, and 8th fighter bombers began to attack the dispersed aircraft at Sinuiju and Uiju airfields on 18 July, and they continued to make raids against these objectives until 23 July. The attacks at Sinuiju destroyed at least six conventional aircraft, and the B-29 fragmentation attacks and the Sabre fighter bomber strikes against Uiju destroyed at least 21 MIG’s. More of these planes were probably destroyed, but clouds obscured parts of the dispersal areas on the final reconnaissance photographs. On 27 July photography revealed that every airfield in North Korea was unserviceable for jet operations.

By the time the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, four Sabres had been lost and one pilot shot down, but he was later released under “Operation Big Switch” with other South African Prisoners of War.
CHATER IX  GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS

Section 1. The Day the War Ended
(27 July, 1953)

Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command and General Nam Il, Senior Delegate of the Communist North Korean and Chinese Army met at Panmunjom at 1000 hours on 27 July and promptly fixed their signatures upon the armistice agreement.

Later that afternoon, at Munsan, truce team base camp, flanked by General Taylor, Commander of Eighth US Army; General Weyland, Commander of Far East Air Forces; and General Anderson, and Vice Admiral Briscoe, General Clark signed the truce as the chief representative of the United Nations. The Communist leaders, Kim Il Sung Supreme Commander of North Korean Army and Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of Chinese Communist Army, who had refused to meet General Clark unless representatives of the Republic of Korea barred, signed at their own headquarters.

According to agreements, the armistice would become effective twelve hours after it was signed, or at 2201 hours on 27 July 1953.

With a full day of work ahead of them, the Fifth Air Force's aircraft acted swiftly to neutralize the few airfields which the enemy might possibly use to receive aircraft in the last hours after the truce was signed.

At 2201 hours, on 27 July 1953, all of the UN air forces' aircraft were either south of the bombline or more than 5 kilometers from North Korean coast. The Armistice marked the end of the shooting war in Korea, but the airmen's duties were not yet completed. As the battles were ending in Korea on 27 July, the United States and the other 15 nations that had fought with the United Nations Command in Korea, subscribed to a joint-policy declaration concerning the Korean Armistice. The United Nations affirmed that if the Communists renewed armed attack they would be prompt in resisting aggression.

"The consequence of such a breach of the armistice," warned the United Nations supporters, "would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

On that day, fifteen of the sixteen South African Air Force's aircraft were
serviceable and one replacement aircraft arrived. South Africans raced against
time to accomplish needful tasks before the cease fire. Flying maximum effort,
Sabre fighter-bombers executed swiftly patrol missions over Yalu and Chongchon
Rivers. Weather conditions permitted limited visibility, and not many Communist
vehicles stirring. But South Africans had wanted to be sure that no last-minute
Communist air attacks reduced the effectiveness of their aircraft.

Four patrol missions totally 41 sorties were a record number for one day
in F-86F aircraft. Major Nortjé completed his 100th sortie and Second Lieu-
tenant Wilmans flew the last South African Air Force sortie prior to the cease
fire. South African Air Force's total sorties in Korea marked 12,067.

Section 2. Post Armistice Activities

On 28 July 1953, no operational or training flying were carried out except
only one sortie as a Fly Past during the Demobilization Ceremony. A parade was
held for all ranks of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the members were
addressed by the Group O.C. Colonel Martin.

The post-Korean war training program commenced on 29 July 1953 and
accordingly 10 combat formation sorties were carried out by No 2 Squadron,
and 16 similar sorties were flown on the following day. The month was ended
by another six training missions on the 31st incorporating both battle formation
flying and air-to-air attacks.

On the 1st August, 1953, training was temporarily stopped due to un-
serviceability of aircraft, because four aircraft were on morning and evening
standby with another four as a "back-up." Training flying however again
 commenced on the following day.

On 4 August, Commandant Wells and Captain Brown left for K-16(Seoul)
to meet Colonel du Toit and Major Thackwray to proceed to Munsan-ni in
order to welcome the first South African POW returnees. Colonel du Toit and
Commandant Wells returned the next day with the news that Lieutenant
Hector Mac-Donald was the first South African to be released by the Communist
in Operation "Big Switch."

Amidst all these proceedings operational training was carried out every day
except when thunderstorms or bad weather prevented flying. On 13 and 14
August all the pilots were sent in two groups to K-2(Taegu) for ejection
seat training. On 15, four aircraft of No 2 Squadron were again on standby
duty with four more aircraft as a "back-up." Authority was granted on that
day for Major Nortjé to return to South Africa and Major Rogers was appointed
as Second in Command. On 22, a new field of training was introduced when
low angle strafing exercises commenced and four aircraft briefed for a level attack on K-3 (Pohang) Airfield as a part of operation "Spyglass."

On 27 August, Colonel A.P. Tacon, O.C of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing attached himself with his aircraft to the Squadron for a period of one month to join the Squadron training program. Notification was received that two more South African POW's would be released and Major Rogers and Lieutenant de Wet left for Munsan-ni on the same date.

On 28 August, Lieutenant M.C. Botha was seen to bail out after experiencing normal and alternate hydraulic system failures. He was seen to hit the water to the west of K-55, but no trace of him could be found despite intensive search by numerous types of aircraft and two surface vessels. The search for Lieutenant Botha was abandoned on 30 August without any trace of him being found.

On 3 September, Commandant Wells informed the Squadron that the members would be returned to the Union of South Africa in three batches, the first batch to leave on 7 September and to consist of one officer and 14 other ranks. This announcement was followed the next day by the first administrative steps to enable the first 15 South Africans to leave Korea.

On 6 September, Lieutenant Thom was released by the Communists. On 7
September, Captain le Grange and 14 other ranks left K-55 as planned. On 22 September, the second batch of 22 consisting of one officer and 21 other ranks left for Japan en route to the Union of South Africa.

All operational flying ceased on 1 October. From that date only air tests were carried out. Then the Squadron started to return all equipment to their American allies. On 3 October a start was made to give all aircraft their 100 hours inspection before handing them over to the Americans and on 6 October four Sabres were handed over to the Fighter Interceptor Wing, followed by another three on the next day.

7th October was highlighted by a farewell dinner given to the officers of No 2 Squadron by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.

One aircraft was handed to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and the other to the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing on 8 October. The Squadron held its last Squadron party the same night at Rorke's Inn. Four more aircraft were handed over the next day, to be followed by another the day after.

On 11 October the last two aircraft were test flown by Commandant Wells and Captain Koekemoer and handed over to the USAF.

The remainder of the Squadron left in batches until the last four officers and 19 other ranks departed on 29 October. A parade of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing Group had been ordered by the Group Commander for the final demobilization ceremony during which the Commanding Officer would lower the Squadron flag. Owing to heavy rain the parade was cancelled.

In order to perpetuate No 2 Squadron's association with the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing an order was issued that a part of the South African National Anthem would be played at all Wing demobilization ceremonies.

Section 3. Epilogue

At the start of the fighting the South African Air Force had much to learn in a conflict which would be a strange mixture of last conventional air war. When the shooting stopped on 27 July 1953 the South African Air Force could look backward on the outstanding accomplishments of its mission. There was much to be learned from the experiences of combat, but nearly every lesson of the Korean conflict had to be qualified by the fact that the Korean War had been a peculiar war, which was unlike wars in the past and was not necessarily typical of the future.

The most significant feature of the South African participation in the United Nations operation in Korea was the establishment of a firm resolution, which, if subsequent international crises arose, there was no question of standing aside.
As for the air force, the action in Korea was a positive blessing from the standpoint of professional efficiency. There is no substitute for battle-field experience. When it was found that the torments suffered by the South Africans in the first winter of the war were due to insufficient training, inadequate clothing and lack of facilities, the much-touted terrors of the Korean winter came in to more reasonable focus and were not again a serious problem. Men still fought the monsoon rains and cursed the heat of July and August but winter came almost as fast.

In spite of frequent and heavy air interdiction of Communist communications the enemy was able to mount massive attacks on the United Nations line with varying degree of success, provided they did so at night. The South Africans learned valuable lessons in the night fighting, while at no time approaching the enemy in night skills.

They conducted a campaign of audacity and determination against Communist aggressors although outnumbered and operating obsolete, cumbersome aircraft against the more modern machines of their adversaries. They set about putting the aggressors' air forces out of business knowing that, if they failed, the Communists had the ability to destroy the whole free world.

The principle of collective resistance to aggression was established, and the objectives of the area had been achieved when the invading armies of North Koreans and Chinese had been thrown back from the Republic of Korea. In the process, the South Africans displayed a spirit of adventure and daring that was to act as a gallant example to those who were to follow.

The combat record of the South African Air Force in Korea revealed a magnitude of effort which was unequalled by any similar-sized force in previous conflicts.

The South African Air Force No 2 Squadron possessed an average of 20 aircraft in the thirty six months of combat, of which an average of 14 were kept combat-ready. At the war's end, in July 1953, the South Africans possessed 17 aircraft. During the Korean War the Squadron flew a total of 12,067 sorties, which included counter air, interdiction, close support, and miscellaneous sorties. The category of "miscellaneous" sorties included such efforts as reconnaissance, air control, and training. In Mustangs they flew 10,373 sorties and in the short period the South Africans had Sabres they flew 1,694 sorties.

The circumstances under which the Communists fought the Korean War in the face of an accomplished United Nations Command air superiority allowed the South African Air Force to operate at a greater rate than would otherwise have been possible.
The South Africans possessed infinite spirit, a spirit of resolution, adventure and enthusiasm that was to carry them through that early period of difficulties, writing a remarkable page in the history of aerial warfare in the process, and to continue like an ever-growing stream until it became a powerful catalyst binding a huge force.

It was the pilots and servicing crews of the Squadron going into action in Korea who set the pattern of what was to follow.

Between November 1951 and July 1953, South African Air Force aircrews claimed to have destroyed or badly damaged 891 vehicles, 44 tanks, 221 field guns, 147 flak positions, 11 locomotives, 553 railroad cars, 408 dumps of various kinds, 152 road and rail bridges, and 9,837 buildings. The aircrews claimed to have killed 2,276 enemy troops.

In the course of its operations against the enemy South African Air Force lost 74 F-51 Mustang aircraft due to enemy action or in accidents out of the total of 95 the Squadron purchased.

From the time the South Africans first entered Korea until the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, 828 South Africans served in Korea. This was not so small a contribution on a basis of comparison by population.

For the limited flying strength of a Squadron, the cost to the Squadron was heavy. All losses are regrettable, and South African Air Force lost many of its finest men, but considering the destruction wrought upon the Red aggressors by air attack, South Africans’ losses of men and planes were amazingly light. In air operations, South Africa lost 34 pilots including those missing, declared dead, and 8 prisoners of war who were repatriated under the armistice agreement. Two ground staff died, one on the ship to Korea and the other as a result of a motor accident.

While propeller driven aircraft were successfully employed for a time in Korea, such equipment was not suitable for global conflict in a jet age. In the initial stages of future conflicts all aircrews would probably be engaged in the winning of the battle for air superiority.

While airlift was provided on a luxurious scale in Korea, the same concentration of air-lift effort would be unavailable to any one theater during a global war. Because the Far East Air Forces were able to win and maintain air superiority many novel improvisations were permitted.

In retrospect, the Korean War was a world tragedy like any other resort to armed force. But some good resulted from the tragic experience. The staunch South Africans’ support as a member of United Nations for the Republic of Korea gave pause to the aggressor nations. The South African people could
again clearly see after World War II that world peace would come through strength and not through weakness. To other South Africans the Korean War emphasized the age-old lesson that the price of peace is eternal vigilance—vigilance to detect and halt aggression wherever it appears. From its growth and experience during the Korean War the South African Air Force emerged as a power better able to maintain peace through preparedness.
ANNEX CHRONOLOGY

1950

4 Aug  The Government of the Union of South Africa announced to render military aid in the form of a fighter squadron SAAF.
10 Sep  A liaison staff left for Japan.
28 Sep  The 49 officers and 157 other ranks of initial draft left for Japan.
5 Nov  The initial draft arrived at Johnson Air Base in Japan.
6 Nov  The administrative staff took over aircraft and equipment from the United States Air Force.
15 Nov  The operational order for 13 officers and 21 other ranks to move to Korea was issued.
16 Nov  An advance elements of No 2 Squadron arrived at K-9, Pusan Airfield.
19 Nov  The elements moved to K-24, Pyongyang Airfield.
19 Nov  South African entered the war for the first time.
2 Dec  This party moved to Suwon Airfield, K-13.
5 Dec  First battle casualty occurred.
17 Dec  This party moved to K-10, Chihahce Airfield.
        Remainder of Squadron still in Japan moved to K-10.

1951

4, Jan  A staging detachment at Suwon moved to K-10.
23 Mar  The squadron moved to K-9, Pusan Airfield.
23 Apr  The Squadron moved to K-10.
1 May  R & R (Rearmament and Refuel) detachment moved to K-13, Suwon.
7 May  R & R detachment moved to K-16, Seoul Airfield.
8 Jul  SAAF's first encounter with MIG's occurred.
23 Jul  Three pilots in one flight of four F-51's were reported missing in action.
22 Sep  R & R detachment moved to K-46, Hoengsong Airfield.

1952

20, Mar  SAAF's second encounter with MIG's occurred.
2 Nov  Twenty one non-commissioned officers attended a familiarization course of F-86F aircraft at Tsuiki, Japan.
27 Dec  The Squadron flew its last operation sortie with F-51 Mustang aircraft.
30 Dec  An advance party moved to K-55, Osan Airfield.

1953

30, Jan  The Squadron flew the new jet aircraft for the first time.
12 Mar  The Squadron went into action flying jet aircraft.
27 Apr  The Squadron flew the first close support mission with the new Sabre.
27 Jul  The Armistice Agreement signed at Panmunjon.
29 Oct  The last party of the Squadron left Korea.
SAAF BASE MOVEMENT

[Map of Korea showing bases and locations]

U.S. SCR
MANCHURIA

KOREAN BAY
KOREA
WESTERN SEA

EASTERN SEA

LEGEND

.advance element
.forward detachment
.main body of the squadron

Situations Map 1
Situation Map 4
KOREAN AIRFIELD & FEAF BASES IN JAPAN

Scale
0 200 400KM

Situation Map 5
NORTH KOREAN MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE

MANCHURIA

LEGEND
- PURPLE ROUTES
- RED ROUTES
- GREEN ROUTES
- TERMINAL POINTS PURPLE, RED AND GREEN ROUTES
SAAF ROAD INTERDROION
(FEB–JUN 1951)

EASTERN SEA

WESTERN SEA

Situation Map 7
PART SIX

THE THAILAND FORCES
IN THE KOREAN WAR
His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand.
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CHAPTER I   GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1. Introduction to Thailand

a. General

Thailand, formerly known as Siam, is a constitutional Kingdom with an estimated population of approximately 34,000,000 in 1971 occupying an area of 506,000 square kilometers in the center of continental Southeast Asia. The country lies to the west, north, and east of the Gulf of Siam, an arm of the South China Sea. On the southeast it is bounded by Cambodia; on the east and northeast by Laos, on the west, north, and northwest by Burma; on the southwest by the Andaman Sea.

For the national defense, a law in 1937 made all males between the age of eighteen and thirty liable for military service. From 1960 the Supreme Command Headquarters, just below the Ministry of Defense level, had intermediate command of the three armed forces—Army, Navy and Air Force.

Peculiarly, Buddhism is the established religion of the Thailand people, and is indeed at the core of Thai culture. More than 93% of the Thai ethnic group were adherents of Buddhism wats, temple-inmonastery complexes. The local wat is the hub of community life of every village.

b. World War II and After

Japanese pressure on French Indochina in 1941 caused Thailand to revive its claims to these territories it had ceded to the French between 1893 and 1907. Yet the sudden Japanese invasion on 8 December 1941 caused the Thailand people to stop resistance and permitted the passage of Japanese troops through the country. The Japanese quickly occupied Thailand and launched powerful attacks against British forces in Burma and Malaya. After the defeat of Japan the Thai Government convinced and declared that the 1942 declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States was null and void, as it did not represent the will of the Thai people. In 1946 Thailand signed the peace treaties with Great Britain and France, and the territories acquired during the Japanese occupation were returned. Soon after the end of World War II Thailand actively began her efforts to become a member of the United Nations and the
same year joined the new international body, on 15 December 1946, which embodied the primary objective of the maintenance of international peace and security.

In 1950, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Thailand sent the military forces to assist the United Nations action against the Communist aggression in Korea during which the Thais won abiding admiration of all the men of the other lands with whom they joined in the common cause of freedom and human decency with the greatest distinction through the Korean War. In September 1954 the nation became one of the members of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a regional collective defense organization formed as a response to demand that the area be protected against Communist aggressionism, especially as manifested through military aggression in Korea and Indochina. The Thai Government also supported the policy of the United States in Vietnam, air bases within the Kingdom were used by the United States Air Forces to attack the military targets in North Vietnam, and Thailand sent Army troops to free Vietnam in an effort to share a collective security against Communist aggression in the neighbouring region. Also in 1966 Thailand became a member country of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) established as an inter-governmental organ with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and cooperation among the people of the region.

Section 2. Commitment of Thailand to the UN Actions

On June 30, the Thai Foreign Minister cabled a reply to the Secretary General Lie of the United Nations wherein stated that the Royal Thailand unanimously agreed with the Security Council’s resolution and would furnish whatever assistance in support of the United Nations effort in Korea within such resources available as rice or foodstuff, the chief product of the nation in particular. On 14 July, the Secretary General Trygve Lie forwarded his memorandum to the member countries backing up the United Nations resolution on Korea. The memorandum to the Royal Thailand read, “... I am greatly delighted to be informed that the Thai Government decided to support the United Nation’s resolution whatever said. Your willingness to the immediate determination of any form of assistance particularly of foodstuff, helped this world organization make that swift decision in support of the Republic of Korea. I have already kept the United Nations Organization and the Government of the Republic of Korea informed of your intention to render necessary assistance. With my knowledge, the United States will undertake all the required obligations, in consonance with the resolutions of the United
Nations, during the employment of the international forces in and around Korea. But my further suggestion is that all assistant efforts would be materialized through a joint organization to insure better and more effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions and in an effort to facilitate closer framework of coordinated efforts as well. In addition, it shall be highly appreciated if the Thai Government could dispatch the armed forces, more preferably the ground forces so as to reinforce the defending power in Korea. With this regard, the Thai Government may keep in touch with the United Nations for appropriate arrangement and coordinate with the United Nations Command for further details in due course.”

Upon receipt of the memorandum, the Thai Government immediately referred this proposal to the National Security Council where in turn came to the conclusion at its emergency session on 20 July 1950, to deploy to Korea one infantry brigade on the following grounds: In the first place, it was with regards to respect the spirit of the United Nations and principles of democracy, and also, in the second place, that the Thailand constitution, evidently manifested in support of democracy and the United Nations Charters, encouraged the Council so doing. This conclusion, of which the Thai Cabinet Council approved on 22 July, had to undergo another test in the Houses of the Representatives, before the final sanction by the King since this was the grave matter to their own national security. The Royal Thai Houses of the Representatives ratified the cabinet decision without dissent and the final royal endorsement came on the same day, 22 July 1950, to deploy one Thailand brigade over the Korean soil shouldering with the United Nations forces there.

Upon the completion of all appropriate administrative actions, the Government of Thailand cabled a reply on 23 July to the Secretary General of the United Nations which follows, “...referred to your message number 68 requesting the additional aid to halt the Communist aggression in Korea. I, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has the honour to inform you that the Government of Thailand is being firmly set to participate in the United Nations allies with 4,000 men of ground troops. Everything is ready to confer about the detailed pursuits with the United Nations Command as His Majesty’s final approval according to the constitutional procedures is over.”

When this news, to dispatch first among the member nations one brigade to Korea, the United Nations were all unsparingly appreciative.

Section 3. Deployment to Korea

Meanwhile, in carrying out the commitment made to the United Nations,
the Thai Government undertook prompt actions necessitated for deployment of armed forces to be known as the Royal Thai Expeditionary Forces to Korea under the centralized administrative command of Major General Pisit Disponsa-Diskul, Prince, while its operational control was to be placed in the hand of the United Nations Command.

On 22 September 1950, the Royal Thai Army activated the 21st Regimental Combat Team, naming Colonel Boriboon Chulacharita as its parent regimental commander at home, and Major General Pisit Disponsa-Diskul assumed the command of the Korea-bound regiment in the other hand. The Royal Thai Navy also activated the Thai Corvettes Unit composing of two corvettes plus one transport vessel on 1 October 1950, whose first mission was to transport and escort the initial deploying echelon of the 21st Regimental Combat Team to the Korean shore, and Commander Ulichalmarp Wathichai, was appointed on 13 October as officer in command of the Thai frigates unit. In the meantime, on 16 October, the Secretary of Defense of the United States invited the Royal Thai Ambassador to Washington, D.C. to a press interview. Speaking to the press the ambassador stressed that unless Thais went in for this remote battle in Korea to preserve the freedom, peace, and justice of Korea and the world, weakly defended nations in the world would be exposed to more hostile Communist threat.

Thereabout Major General Pisit Disponsa-Diskul came to Korea, in the capacity of commanding general of the Royal Thai Expeditionary Forces, accompanied by a group of the representatives from Thai three services in advance of the main body for precoordination with the United Nations Command. Incidentally, General Pisit became the Chief of the Thai Liaison Officers Group to the United Nations Command upon his arrival.

The Thai Frigates Fleet embarked Bangkok on 22 October 1950, heading for Korea, with troops of an Army battalion and personnel of the Red Cross Medical Detachment on board, and they finally arrived at Pusan, southern edge of the peninsula on 7 November 1950, meeting with heartedly welcome by the ranking government officials and crowds of Korean people as well as their comrades in arms of allies.

Furthermore, the Royal Thai Air Force, in pursuance of the request of the United Nations, dispatched to the Korean theater of operation a flight of twin-engined C-43’s organized with three cargo planes and an air medical team composed of two surgeons and three nurses. The flight led by Squadron Leader Paramote Pulipan, left the Thai Donmung Air Base on 18 January 1951, heading to a distant country.

During the Korean War, the Royal Thai Infantry Battalion plus the Regimental Headquarters of which the later returned back to homeland in May
1951 participated in the Korean War under the flag of the United Nations with brilliant battle account, while initial plan of the Thai Government was to deploy one full size brigade regimental combat team. Upon accomplishment of its initial mission transporting the first contingent of the 21st Regimental Combat Team and the Red Cross personnel, the Thai naval frigates unit consisting of two HMTS’s remained under operational control of the Task Force 95 under the United States Naval Forces in the Far East (COMNavFE), at Sasebo in Japan as its operational home base until returning back to Thailand on 21 January 1955, well after the truce treaty being effected. The Royal Thai Air Transport Flight took part with its medical team in the Korean War from 18 January 1951, with the 374th Air Wing of 315th US Air Division based at Tachikawa, Japan.

Participating the armed forces in the Korean War in a determined effort to restore the international peace and security, the Royal Kingdom of Thailand embodied in herself the spirit of the United Nations Charters, during which the Thailanders fought with traditional bravery and professional skills against the Communist aggressors. The loss of the Thailand armed forces totalled to 127 soldiers by 27 July 1953, the day the Armistice Agreement was signed.
CHAPTER II  THE OUTLINE

The Kingdom of Thailand, in response to the request of the United Nations Security Council, quickly took steps to participate in the Korean War in order to preserve the prestige and reputation of the United Nations. She was among the first to pledge the whole support for the United Nations action in Korea. In her view, it was a clear act of aggression and a grave threat to international peace and security by the North Korean Communists. Thailand initially decided to deploy a brigade size of the ground forces into the theater of the Korean War in support of the United Nations effort. This pledge, however, came to some changes subsequently by dispatching elements of three services, army, navy, and air forces in the terms of the Royal Thai Expeditionary Forces to Korea commanded by Major General Prince Pisit Dispongsa Diskul in the initial phase. Soon after he came to Korea with his liaison officers team to engage in the prior-coordination effort aheading arrival of the main forces, Major General Pisit Dispongsa Diskul assumed the additional post as Chief Liaison Officer to the United Nations Command, concurrently being Commander of the Thai Expeditionary Forces, in an effort to ascertain closer coordinated operation as a member of the Korean War allies. The Liaison Group was then composed of Major General Pisit, himself as army representative, Captain Nainopkun and Wing Commander Suan Jitpaipan as the representatives of the navy and air forces respectively. Later, this was changed, in 1951, to function under the direction of the military attache to the Royal Thai Embassy in Tokyo having the liaison office with the Headquarters of the United Nations Command. Thereafter such a liaison officers system remained to function on permanent basis as long as the United Nations Command was standing, having the military attache to the Royal Thai Embassy in Seoul as in charge of it.

During and after the Korean War, Thailand sent officers and men, twenty nurses, two corvettes, and one transport vessel besides three air transport planes to serve under the flag of the United Nations. Furthermore Thailand sent several shipments of rice to aid the Korean people, a total which mounted to 40,000 tons, at an estimated value of about 4,368,000 US dollars. On the other hand, the Thai Red Cross Medical Detachment returned home on 13 November 1953, after successful medical service for the Thai armed forces under the operational supervision of major General E. E. Hume, the Director of the American Red Cross Corps since November 1950. In addition, incidentally,
on 19 February 1953, the Thai Mobile Air Surgical Hospital personnel led by First Lieutenant Israpng Udomsir were dispatched tentatively to the Korean front where they engaged in on-the-job training as well as occasional medical service with the United States mobile army hospitals in Korea.

Throughout the Korean campaign, the Thai forces fought so bravely and with such distinction, that, undoubtedly all the comrades in arms of the United Nations were deeply impressed with brilliant merits of the Royal Thaislanders having immeasurably helped to restore the international peace and security. The official casualty figures of the Thai troops during the Korean War were 125 dead, 1,139 wounded and 5 missing in action, forming the total of 1,269 casualties.

Thailand constantly maintained a token force in Korea up to June 1972. Here is their historical war records as a living evidence of our united determination and effort of the United Nations that Communists shall encroach no further upon free people in the world.
CHAPTER III  ARMY BATTALION

Most of Korea is mountainous, which made roads and other communications poor during the Korean War, and the country was then intersected by the rivers and streams with inadequate bridges. At times the rain is torrential and during the winters it snows very frequently. In these circumstances the infantry troops were supreme. Only the infantryman could climb the hills, ford the rivers and wade through the swampy rice paddies and snow. The Korean War, therefore, all other arms were subordinated to the infantryman, and their efforts devoted to his support.

As a result of these conditions the narrative of the land fighting in Korea is largely, perhaps most of all, the battle records of the infantry. No exception for this edition.

Furthermore, the narrative is told on a battalion basis although on occasions the actions of such smaller levels as the company or platoon, when engaged in special significant events and or areas, are described in detail. Hereafter the account is mainly concerned with combat activities of the 1st Battalion of the 21st Royal Thailand Regiment in the Korean War.

Section 1. Introduction

The initial strength of the Royal Thai 21st Regimental Combat Team deployed in the Korean War since its first commitment in November 1950, was consisted with the Regimental Headquarters and one infantry battalion, namely 1st Battalion of the Regiment. From then on to 1955 a battalion size of troops rotated every year while the Regimental Headquarters elements returned home in May 1951. The 6th echelon of its rotation in 1955, was also a battalion but ordered to return back to the homeland leaving one company of troops behind as the truce had been well pursued. Thereafter, periodic rotation, stationing at a camp located in Unchon about 55 kilometers northeast of Seoul and later garrisoning at Camp Mermaid in Uijongbu, approximately 10 kilometers north of Seoul, took place in every July as planned by the Thai Government until the final demobilization to their homeland in June 1972.

The Thai foot troops fought out the important and major battle so bravely for the common cause of the United Nations effort in Korea to preserve peace and security in this region and in the world as well. Since commitment
of its action at the Pyongyang front during the first Korean winter through the defense of Kaesong to the gallant stand on Porkchop Hill where the Thailanders honoured the famous title Little Tigers, meant fight like wild tigers, and the final phase in Boomerang battle, thus inviting the respects of all of their comrades in arms associated in the United Nations war against Communist aggressors.

As the Armistice was signed, the Royal Thai Army suffered the total of 1,269 casualties till its 4th rotation; 125 deads of which 34 were killed in non-combat actions, 1,139 were wounded among which 721 were in non-combat actions, and 5 missing in action.

Section 2. Deployment

a. Communist Forces Invade free Korea

At the dawn of 25 June 1950, the North Korean Communist forces unleashed the bulk of its armed forces to smash south across the 38th Parallel into the Republic of Korea. Apparently the Communists wanted control of all Korea at any price under the leadership of the iron curtain. This invasion
threw the open challenge to the United Nations and the world organization met this challenge by prompt decisions to send immediately the United Nations forces to Korea and to request assistance of the member nations, particularly the armed forces.

The Kingdom of Thailand agreed upon the United Nations resolutions and determined without delay to support the resolutions against Communist attack by dispatching an infantry battalion as the Thailand contribution. Significantly, Thailand was the first among the other nations that gave a definite reply to the United Nations. As all other member nations see it, it was rather honourable for Thailand by taking the initiative to give certain incentives to other less determined nations to back up the United Nations in forming the international forces in support of Korea.

b. Activation and Movement of the 21st Regiment

The Royal Thai 21st Infantry Regiment was activated on 22 September 1950 as a combat team to be deployed to Korea pursuant to the Army Regulations Number 5. Colonel Borriboon Chulacharitita, being previously appointed the post of the Regimental Commander since 21 August 1950, made every preparation for deployment to the Korean theater. On 2 October, Lieutenant Colonel Kriengkrai Atanantqua then the 2nd Battalion Commander of the Regiment, was reassigned to take over the 1st Battalion, the first Korea bound ground troop. The advance party of 31 personnel led by Major Surakit Mayalarp, one of the regimental staff, flew to Korea on 10 October to make rearrangement before arrival of the main body.

On 22 October 1950, 1st Battalion and Headquarters of the 21st Regimental Combat Team embarked Bangkok for an alien land Korea. In the presence of the congested Thai people sending them off with hearty cheers for success in the war, they left on board the chartered commercial vessel Herta Maersk and the transport HMTS Sichang with an escort of two frigates HMTS Prasae and Bangpakong.

c. The First Thai Contingent Arrived in Korea
(7—22 November 1950)

When the 1st Battalion of the 21st Thai Regimental Combat Team, King's Guard, later further famed by being designated as Queen's Guard Unit, disembarked at Pusan Port in Korea on 7 November 1950, which was past four months after the United Nations forces had commenced to take the operational actions against the Communist aggressors. After they came on the shore of Pusan, the Thai troops entrained for Taegu where they took a three-week course of intensive training in order to familiarize themselves with newly
issued weapons and equipment at Camp Walker, a Reception Center for the United Nations allies before committing into the battle areas. Throughout the Korean campaign, the only reliable weapons for the Thailaniders were the soaring guts of bravery and perseverance. For they had to confront one hand with the enemy, in comparably superior in number and had to on the other hand, cope with the bitter cold, while harassed with endless trainings to keep up with constant flow of newly developed equipment. With all these hardships, they brought another pride and prestige to Thailand by producing the exceptional combat results.

At the close of the training in Taegu, on 22 November, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regimental Combat Team received the orders from Headquarters of the Eighth United States Army (EUSA), then a combined command of the United Nations ground forces in Korea, to move to the Pyongyang front, the capital of North Korea then held by the friendly forces.
CHAPTER IV INITIAL COMMITMENT INTO ACTIONS

It was the first winter of 1950—1951 when the Thai Battalion committed into the front lines. Subfreezing temperatures had already reached Korea. Weather was cold at below zero levels with roads glazed with ice, the bare brown hill blotched with snow, and a savage northwind biting the soldiers faces in a terrain that was rugged and barren.

Section 1.  Pyongyang-Kaesong front with the 187th RCT (22 November—31 December 1950)

At 0700 on 22 November 1950, the advance party of the Thai Battalion left Taegu by train heading for Pyongyang. The main body of the Battalion followed two hours later getting aboard two other trains, arriving safely at Pyongyang at 11 a.m. on 28 November. The advance party, immediately after arrival, took up a defensive task in the given area from 1900 hours 26 November. Whereupon the Thai Battalion was attached to the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team commanded by Brigadier General F.S. Bowen, Jr., whose mission then was to secure the cities of Pyongyang and Chinnampo, airhead, and the EUSAK main supply route which extended to include the entire Army service area. Besides the Thai Battalion, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team had under its operational control, the 10th Philippines Battalion Combat Team, the 29th British Infantry Brigade, and elements of the 5th ROK Infantry Division to meet such a wide zone of responsibility.

The enemy facing the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team on the Pyongyang front was identified as the Fourth Chinese Field Army consisting of the 39th, 40th, 50th and 66th Armies.

At 0400 hours, 2 December 1950, the 1st Battalion of the Thai 21st Regimental Combat Team received the orders to pull back to the east bank of the Taedong River south of Pyongyang, and the battalion closed this withdrawal by 1630 on 4 December as ordered. The Battalion thereafter moved further back to Kaesong by motor transportation leaving one squad led by a junior officer which joined the battalion on the next day, just a few hours after Pyongyang had fallen in the Reds hand. Before leaving Pyongyang the friendly forces blew up the bridges on the Taedong a few hours ahead of the advancing Chinese who occupied the city as the UN forces had pulled out. At the moment
the mass retrograde movement began as the 187th RCT and its attachments were set to guard the rear and flanks of the withdrawing UN ground forces, when the Headquarters of the 187th was located at Suhung approximately 60 kilometers north of Kaesong.

The Thai Battalion now in Kaesong was assigned the mission of securing the city in addition to take part in adopting successive delaying positions to cover the general withdrawal of the friendly ground forces, and securing the line to the south of the UN main line of resistance as dictated by the situation. The Thai troops further underwent an eventual field training of familiarization course for the mechanical functions of new weapons.

The 187th RCT on 12 December received the orders from the Eighth US Army outlining the withdrawal from the present area. The plan assigned the 187th RCT the mission of moving south of the Han River to act as a unit of the Eighth Army reserve and ordered it to prepare to execute one of the followings: To utilize the necessary forces to provide security of the Han River crossing and insure uninterrupted flow of traffic in the Seoul area until all the combat units of the I and IX US Corps could withdraw; conduct operations in the elsewhere on order; and to provide protection and assistance in the evacuation of the Kimpo airhead and Inchon as required. Elements of the Combat Team continued to move south in combat groups, first to Munsan, then to Suwon.

On 13 December, the Thai Battalion was ordered by the 187th RCT to withdraw from Kaesong to Munsan in order to join the elements of the main body of the Airborne Regimental Combat Team. The following day the Thai troops moved to the Army staging area in Suwon and Osan 50 kilometers south of Seoul becoming a reserve unit of the 187th RCT for the time being. By this time the full rigor of the Korean winter was being experienced. In the new area, the ground was covered with thick snow and it was bitterly cold, temperatures reaching even down to 20-25 degrees below zero quite often.

Section 2. With the 29th British Brigade
(1—18 January 1951)

The Royal Thai Battalion was ordered by the Headquarters of the Eighth US Army to detach from the 187th RCT and attach to the I US Corps in Yongdungpo, southern part of Seoul effective 1 January 1951, when the enemy had caught up with the UN forces and just begun the second phase of his offensive. At dawn 0500 the next day, the Battalion departed its camp at Suwon and Osan destinating for Yongdungpo, whereupon it was further attached to the 29th British Infantry Brigade, who had journeyed to Korea from an
opposite end of the world disembarking at Pusan on 3 November 1950. As prescribed in the preceding section, during the later part of December 1950, the 29th Brigade was along under operational control of the 187th US Airborne RCT, covering the withdrawal of the UN ground forces at a Taedong River bridgehead.

At this time, the 29th British Brigade was in the I US Corps reserve locating at Kupabal-li only 16 kilometers north of Seoul, with the role of covering Seoul by securing the main line of communication, Route Number 1, leading to Kaesong to the north and Seoul down to the south. It was imminent then that the CCF would take all-out offensive to this area.

Coping with this growing expectation of the CCF mass attack, Thai Battalion was assigned to cover the retirement of the friendly forces by occupying the defensive positions in and around Kupabal-li on Route 1 and concurrently to protect the left flank and rear of the Brigade which was to become heavily involved in the fighting in the next few days. The enemy attack at last came, concentrating a great blow on the Brigade sector. The enemy had penetrated the positions, to a considerable depth starting at about 0400 in the early morning of 3 January, when a friendly US patrol team was driven in from Koyang but the positions had been regained by a counterattack with tank support after several confused engagement. Reluctantly, orders were issued at 1630 on 3 January for the Thai troops with the 29th Brigade to withdraw under cover of darkness to Suwon south of the Han River for reorganization. This proved a difficult operation in the dark, as the enemy followed up closely and troops were encumbered by their transport, which was difficult to move along the bad tracks and very vulnerable. The withdrawal began at 1830 hours, when some units of the Brigade became involved in heavy fighting and suffered severely. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place in which hundreds of the enemy were killed. Contact was broken just before midnight, and before dawn on 4 January they had crossed Han River. Here transport was in readiness to take them south to Suwon.

After two days in Suwon, the Thai Battalion moved again 32 kilometers south of Pyongtaek together with the 29th Brigade and took up there new defensive positions, in charge of left flank of the Brigade, ranging 29 kilometers from the main supply route (Route 1) to westward up to the coast line, the extreme left of the Eighth US Army’s new defense line.

It was all more difficult for the Thailänders to carry out the duty in such a cold battle field, usually the temperature being 20 degrees below zero. Those who have never campaigned in really cold weather can hardly realize the difficulties, especially when arrangements have been hastily made and there is a lack of proper winter clothings and equipment designed for a cold climate.
In those days there were no attacks attempted by the enemy though the Thai Battalion kept remained with him somewhat closely. Accordingly there was to be a brief period of comparative rest for the Thailanders with the 29th Brigade. Therefore we need not dwell on this phase of activities as the Thai unit made no contact with the enemy during such a shortwhile in which it covered the rear security incidentally.

By mid-January the UN forces retreat reached its limit, and the line ran from the coast near Pyongtaek, where the Thai troops being in security mission, about the 37th Parallel, to near Wonju in the center, and thence to the east coast at Samchok. In the west there was no contact with enemy. In the central area the CCF continued to attack, but were repulsed.

Section 3. Local Security and Anti-Guerrilla Actions  
(18 January—9 March 1951)

Two weeks later on 18 January, the Thai Battalion was transferred to the IX US Corps in Sangju, relieving the present mission by the Turkish Infantry Brigade in zone. When the Battalion reported to the IX US Corps Commander, Major General Coulter, of its arrival; it was assigned to secure Route Number 13, a main line of communication under operational control of the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

About this stage there was a number of reports of the enemy guerrilla bands operating behind the UN lines. These guerrillas were the bypassed forces when the UN forces launched the general counteroffensive and continued rapid advance to the north in September and October.

The Thai Battalion was assigned the new mission against the local Communist guerrillas with a particular emphasis on Mungyong—Sangju road, namely Route 13 and 31, running northward to Chungju—Seoul and Kimchon—Taegu to south, where the high ground with precipitous mountains around the Sopaik Mountain Range in which thousands of Red guerrillas made frequent wriggling and ambush to plunder the UN supply lines.

On 21 January, the Thai Battalion again moved to the center of its security zone, and continued on the mission of securing Route 13, which was the most critical supply route to the UN forces and also to mop up the Red guerrillas in the north of Mungyong. It further moved to Mungyong where rugged terrain with treacherous mountains and guerrillas were expected. During this period the Thailanders had engaged in reconnoitering the areas and clearing up the guerrilla bands in close coordination with the ROK security battalion as well as the ROK youth defense corps troops.
In the meantime, the lst US Cavalry Division drove the enemy back to further north and consequently the communication line between the Thai Battalion and its parent unit was so extended, finally stretching as long as 200 kilometers in distance. This resulted in many problems like delay of orders sometimes disrupting the entire span of control. Taking into consideration these difficulties, the IX US Corps placed the Thai Battalion under its direct control, the mission remaining unchanged.

As the guerrilla activities grew to such an intolerable extent as looting and brutalizing the innocent villages, particularly in the Taebak and Sobaek Mountains and its adjacent areas, considerable strength of forces was committed into such areas to clean them up. These were the Thai Battalion, 10th Philippine Battalion Combat Team, Belgian Battalion in addition to the ROK troops including elements of 2nd, 5th, and 11th Infantry Division, a number of separate Security Battalions, also the National Defense Youth Corps. When the ROK troops were on the contrary attacked by the Reds, they called upon for support. The Thai Battalion replied this call by sending one company plus a weapons platoon, two times on the 5th and 25th of February. However, no contacts were made on the both occasions because the enemy somehow detected the intelligence of the Thai reinforcements. During these two fruitless operations, the Battalion on the contrary, encountered a far worse enemy, namely the natural obstacles worsened by the freezing weather, which incidentally, gave all more advantage to the guerrilla bands. They had to stumble all through the nights up and down the thick snow covered ridgelines walled by the steep hills braving through the blinding snow storms, in search of the uncertain enemy. The Thai Battalion continued the security mission of the main supply route between Mungyong and Yongpung, engaging anti-guerrilla actions in the area.

When the Thai Battalion troops continued the security mission of the main supply route 13, the 1oth Philippine Battalion Combat Team, who had also been engaged in the similar type with the 3rd ROK Security Battalion, relieved on 3 March of security task of the main supply route 1 between Kimchon and Taejon, then it moved by rail and organic transportation to Pan-yo-ri to be placed under the IX US Corps. At 1200 hours on the same day, the Belgian Battalion, who had been taking part in securing the main supply route 1 between Kimchon and Taegu was completely relieved by the 5th ROK Security Battalion. On 7 March, the 9th ROK Security Battalion being attached to the 11th ROK Infantry Division closed its troops in assembly area vicinity of Mungyong, who was likely to be a successor of the Thai Battalion's mission. In the east-north sector the Special Activities Group was continuing the antiguerrilla operations and security of MSR 29 between Punggi and Tanyang Pass area.
By the time the Red guerrilla activities were considerably dropped, the IX US Corps began consideration to employ the Thai Battalion on the frontline. In the end four ROK regiments had at last polished off the North Korean guerrillas who had been a headache problem since the breakthrough from the Pusan Perimeter in September 1950.
CHAPTER V  OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section 1. The Actions in Chunchon–Hwachon
(9 March–10 April 1951)

a. With the 1st US Cavalry Division

In the afternoon of 9 March, the Thai Battalion was ordered to be relieved of the security mission of MSR 13, between Mungyong and Yongpung by the 9th ROK Security Battalion, and it moved by motor column movement to the 1st US Cavalry Division area in the vicinity of Kwangyang about two and a half kilometers south of Chipyong-ni. Effective 1800 hours of 9 March, the Thai Battalion was released of operational control from the IX US Corps and reverted to the 1st US Cavalry Division upon arrival at the new assembly area as scheduled. Hence it was placed again under the 5th US Cavalry Regiment of the Division. However it had long been doubted that whether this relatively half-fledged troops could be committed to active combat line with such insufficient training status. Accordingly, the Battalion remained in the assembly area until 25 March as a division reserve for a while during which it took up the additional training in company with the elements of the 5th Cavalry, with a particular emphasis on physical fitness in the tactical actions to accustom themselves to inherent Korean terrain features surrounded with rugged mountains. During severe training all related US commanders, from the corps, division, and down to the regiment, made frequent visits to inspect the progress of the training with deep concern.

While being trained in the reserve area, the Thai troops also took part concurrently in securing the critical bridge across the Namhan River near Yoji. On 14 March the Thailanders remained in the assembly area in the vicinity Koksu west of Pyongchang with its elements securing the foregoing bridge until 25 March.

During the period the 1st US Cavalry Division had been engaged in preparation task for an offensive operation to seize the line Kansas along the south edge of the Hwachon Reservoir on Corps order.

Finally the Battalion was ordered by the 1st US Cavalry Division to move to the frontline on 26 March starting at 0730. Then it closed the movement at the assembly area, in the vicinity of Chunchon at 1500 hours, and was attached to the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the Division, instead of the 5th Cavalry Regiment then in reserve for reconditioning after heavy commitment against a most determined effort made by CCF in February. The 8th Cavalry Regiment in turn,
giving credit to its combat readiness and bravery of the newly arrived battalion, assigned rather an important role to take an offensive mission in and around Chunchon, about 100 kilometers northeast of Seoul, a communication center in the central sector. For the sake of advantage in the command hierarchy, it became the 4th Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and was named “Scrap Cold” unit in the US style. This attachment to the 8th Cavalry Regiment bears a little difference in its nature from other previous operations. In the past, attachment to the others meant just a nominal operational control where such authorities as disciplinary and administrative jurisdiction were still kept within the latitude of the Thai Battalion Commander. Quite contrary to them, the 8th Cavalry Regiment was now in charge of every detail of the Thai Battalion covering from the operational problems down to the disciplinary delinquents.

Thereafter the Thai Battalion joined the US tank units in the reconnaissance operations north of Chunchon. Initially it was rather a series of routine patrolling activities designed to get the Battalion troops acquainted with the terrain features and to learn necessary tactics in order to meet forthcoming battles where it would be moved to.

b. In Chunchon Sector

The Thailanders had been committed to patrolling in the zone upon closing of the movement at the vicinity of Hakkong-ni five kilometers south of Chunchon on 26 March. On 28 March, the Thai elements received small arms and mortar fire from the high ground held by the unknown enemy in the vicinity of a defile and trail junction, 29 kilometers northwest of Chunchon and after broken contact they returned to the assembly area in the vicinity of Hakkong-ni. On the same day the Greek Battalion, being also attached to the 8th Cavalry Regiment, moved by order of the Regimental Commander from its assembly area in Chaechwi-dong and established new positions in the vicinity of Choak-kol with its elements in the vicinity of Nolmok and no enemy contact was reported. The following day the 8th Cavalry advanced to positions in the vicinity of Saem-kol—Manchon-ni with other elements manned on the right side of Chunchon without having enemy contact, while the Thai elements occupied the river side positions along Tolgogal and left flank of Chunchon. In the morning of the same day the Thai patrolling troops engaged with an estimated platoon enemy at the vicinity of Sokkat village across the Pukhan River 6 kilometers north of Chunchon and there were no casualties on either sides. On 30 March, the 1st US Cavalry Division, with the Thai and Greek Battalions attached, continued patrolling with the subordinate regiments during which the 8th Cavalry and the Thai Battalion patrols engaged with the unknown
enemy strength in the vicinity of Chilhan-ni, Mansan-ni just below a road junction on MSR 17, and Wolgul-li approximately 6–8 kilometers north and northwest of Chunchon. While the 7th Cavalry and the Greek elements engaged with the small enemy group at Sugu-dong in the vicinity of a road junction on MSR 29 and 103 north bank of Soyang River and in the vicinity of Hill 365 due north of Podulgae.

On the last day of the month, the 7th Cavalry with the Greek Battalion attached and the 8th Cavalry with the Thai Battalion attached maintained the present positions and sent out patrols in which the Greek elements received enemy small arms and mortar fire in the vicinity of Onggijonmal about 35 kilometers northeast of Chunchon at 1400 hours but no casualties were reported.

The enemy opposing the friendly units on this front were the CCF Twentieth Army forces, overwhelming in strength that apparently attempted to resist the advance of the friendly forces at any cost, by organizing the heavily fortified defensive line north of the Hwachon Reservoir, one of the most vital and commanding territories from the strategic and tactical standpoints.

Thailanders push ahead mounting on the armored vehicle with AAA guns.
e. Toward Hwachon

The 1st Cavalry Division commenced a deliberate offensive on 3 April, two regiments(reinforced) abreast under the heavy support of the tank and artillery units, with the 8th Cavalry plus the Thai unit on the left and the 7th Cavalry to which the Greek Battalion attached on the right as main effort of the Division attack, directing its axis of attack northward to the Hwachon Reservoir, a critical objective area of the entire UN ground forces. Simultaneously the 7th Marine Regimental Combat Team as secondary effort also attacked to the north in zone, maneuvering from the extreme left of the Division sector with the tank unit in support, to link up with the 8th Cavalry and the Thai unit at the objective area.

The Battalion, as left wing of the 8th Cavalry, jumped off at 0730 on D-Day, 3 April, deploying 1st and 2nd Companies on the line and remaining 3rd Company in reserve to follow up the 1st Company right behind, to the general direction along the east bank of the Pukhan River, and passing through the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry, it quickly advanced through the ridgeline to Yongsan-ni as of 0745 without having any enemy resistance, while other elements of the regiment after attacked from the vicinity of Saemdurok, reached to Sang-ni and Chung-ni about the same time with no enemy contacted. The 8th Cavalry with the Thai troops further moved to the general line along Karak—Kotan-ni—Hill 527 at 1800 hours, while the 7th Cavalry with the Greek Battalion after started off from Chonjon-ni across the Soyang River at the same time, advanced to the general line of Yongtong pass Hill 522—Hill 642 at 1730. Enroute these points the 7th Cavalry encountered with a company size enemy patrol on the high ground at Hill 785 and soon after the Division Artillery placed the mass fire upon the enemy which forced him to disperse and retreat to the north. The 7th Marine RCT, meanwhile, also rapidly advanced after starting off at 0730 to the west bank of Pukhan River near Karak at 1700 without meeting opposition.

On the following day, 4 April, the 8th Cavalry elements prepared to continue the attacking momentum and concurrently sent out the scouting troops deeply into the forward zone. By this time Cavalry Division moved its forward Command Post to Saemaul on Route 29 closing the movement at 1100, 3 April, and the 8th Cavalry’s Command Post was located in the vicinity of bench mark 75 opening at 1015 on 5 April.

On 5 April, the 8th Cavalry continued the attack and advanced 4,000 more meters against the heavy resistance, and inevitably withdrew about 1,000 meters to the positions in the vicinity of Tojang-kol and Saenamu-kol for the night. The Thai Battalion on the other hand advanced further 2,000 meters to the
ridgeline on the east bank of the Pukhan River in the vicinity of Hill 352 against the strong resistance under heavy fire barrage. On the right, the 7th Cavalry resumed the attack in the morning of the 5th and advanced about three kilometers to Paehu-ryong pass before dark, and the Greek unit also advanced to Hill 765 with support of artillery fire.

At any rate the Division continued the attack on 6 April, towards Hwa-chon. To the left flank of the Division sector, the 7th US Marine Regimental Combat Team attacked to the north in zone at 0730 hours in the morning, and advanced to the general line of the Hill 722 and Konnon-kol left to right by 1400 hours slashing against light to moderate resistance. The Marine RCT seized a very vital area covering Route 17A and Chunghon Corridor surrounded a critical terrain feature. In the center where the Thailanders committed, the 8th Cavalry in combination effort with the Thai Battalion constantly advanced northward through the high ground heights of 200-500 meters with the sufficient fire from the division artillery and the tank units, reaching the leading elements along the line from Kail-li to Puttari-kogae by 1851 despite they encountered a massive barrage of automatic weapons enroute. Looking back at the right flank, the 7th Cavalry with the Greek Battalion attached, simultaneously attacked by linking up with the 8th Cavalry elements and seized the dominant high ground along the general line from Yonghwa-san or Hill 878 to the east slope of Hill 765 by 1715 dispersing an estimated enemy at two companies with the artillery fire, inflicting estimated 200 enemy casualties on the same day. The next day all the attackers, the 7th Cavalry plus Greek, the 8th with the Thai, and the 7th Marine, reorganized the combat formation and prepared to continue the attack to the north in zone.

The Thai elements then resumed the attack maneuvering cross country jointly with the 8th Cavalry starting at 0730 hours on 8 April, and advanced to the general line in the vicinity of Kail-li, the bottom of Hill 282, through the top of Hill 315 to the military crest of Pudari-pass by 1830 hours, receiving light small arms fire enroute. The 7th Marine RCT, immediately left neighbour of the Thailanders, consolidated the present positions and patrolled in the zone but there was no enemy contact reported during the period. The 7th Cavalry with the Greek troops also advanced with the tank support to the general line of Yongwha-san—Sinchon as of 1825, seizing the high ground including Yonghwa Mountain(Hill 878) and the outskirts of Yuchon-ni. At dark all units were kept busy in preparation for further attack on the following day (See Situation Map 2).

By this time on 9 April, a movement plan was reached to the 1st Cavalry Division from the EUSAJK that the Division will move and assemble in the vicinity of Kungok very shortly as an Army reserve.
d. Seized the Objectives

On 9 April, the Thai troops with its parent unit, the 8th Cavalry, resumed the attack, and after repulsing an enemy counterattack on the right flank of the Regiment they further advanced the ridge line on the east bank of the Pukhan River up to the general line marking from Tunji to Hill 389 despite they encountered with heavy enemy resistance enroute. The 8th Cavalry elements further seized the southern skirt of Hill 350 near Kun-mal through Hill 389 to Uk-kol while the Thailanders were being busy with the consolidation of their positions in and around the vicinity of Chagunmaeji—Korye-ri along the Pukhan River. Thus the 8th Cavalry and the Thai Battalion finally reached their objectives, the line of Kansas.

During the past eight days in action, 3-10 April, the mission had been to attack the enemy, defend the occupied positions, and resume the attack continuously without a pause. The Battalion suffered one enlisted man killed plus one officer and ten men wounded in action. Incidentally it rescued four US soldiers then being in captive by the enemy and caught a considerable number of prisoners.

Noteworthiness in this connection is that First Lieutenant Pirapul Chotchong, two enlisted men, namely Private First Class Satim Kauetong and Private Chuopol Siita were awarded later the Bronze Star Medals from the US Government through the UNC for their exceptionally distinguished service demonstrated during the recent combat actions.

On 10 April the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered by the EUSAK through the IX Corps to move to the assembly area in the vicinity of Kumgong-ni upon the relief in the present zone by the 1st US Marine Division.

Upon seizure of the assigned objective, the Thai Battalion was relieved in place by the elements of the 5th Regiment of the 1st US Marine Division, and ordered by the 1st Cavalry Division on 10 April to move to the new assembly area near Karak village across the Pukhan River, closing at 2100 in the night. The 7th Cavalry and the Greek Battalion also prepared to move to the Division assembly area in the vicinity of Changnae-ri upon being relieved in the current zone by the elements of the 1st ROK Marine Regiment then being attached to the 1st US Marine Division.

Section 2. Operations in Uijongbu and Tongduchon
(11 April—30 June 1951)

a. CCF Spring Offensive

It had been known for some time that the Chinese Communist Forces
were preparing another large-scale offensive, designed to check the UN forces advance. In order to interrupt the enemy preparations for attack, the I and IX US Corps on 9 April launched an offensive south of 'Triangle'. Resistance was stiff and progress slow, but by 21 April the friendly forces had secured an intermediate line, and arrangements were made to push forward along the whole UN front. This offensive move may have hindered the enemy preparations, and possibly delayed him, but it did not prevent the launching of his attack, which began on 22 April.

On 11 April, the Thai Battalion together with the 8th Cavalry Regiment moved by the Division's organic transportation to a new location designated in the vicinity of Kumgok about 20 kilometers northeast of Seoul, closing the motor columns at 1600 hours. Whereupon the Thai troops received some sort of a refresher training as to the tactical skills and the mechanical functions of the new weapons, being remained in an administrative bivouac under the command of the 8th US Cavalry. The 1st Cavalry Division remained in the new assembly area as an Eighth US Army reserve, opening the Command Post in the vicinity of Sorung-ni effective on 11 April, locating the 5th Cavalry in the vicinity of Ilpae-ri, the 7th Cavalry plus the Greek Battalion at Changnane-ri, and the 8th Cavalry with the Thai Battalion attached in and around Kumgok along the Route Number 18.

Upon arrival in the bivouac area located in Kumgok on 11 April, the Thai Battalion had been trained while reconditioning for the forthcoming commitment until the 26th, under direct control of the 8th Cavalry of the 1st US Cavalry Division.

Here, for the time being, the Thais remained comparatively inactive except for training until 26 April, as they deployed on the defensive lines around the outside of Seoul.

As described earlier the meritorious combat deeds achieved by the Thai troops during the last battles in Chunchon not merely won the credit unmatched fame from the 1st US Cavalry Division, but this time, the Division further honoured the Thai Battalion by granting to wear the Division insignia which was exceptionally a great privilege for a third national force.

In the meantime, on 24 April, EUSAK ordered the ground forces instructing that (1) Effective immediately will stabilize and organize positions in depth, taking the advantage of the most favourable terrain, along the Kansas line and (2) Conduct the strong armored combat patrols into the enemy territory to locate and destroy the enemy concentrations.

On 25 April, the day after the 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division was attached to the 27th British Brigade under the IX US Corps in Kapyong area, the 1st Cavalry Division(minus) was released from control of EUSAK's
hand and attached to the I US Corps commanded by Major General Frank W. Milburn. At the same time the Division (5th Cavalry detached) was ordered to prepare for possible employment at a short notice, when the friendly forces north of Uijongbu were withdrawing generally down to Delta Line due to the heavy enemy pressure, utilizing the best terrain to establish the respective zones, and also effecting maximum destruction upon the enemy troops.

On 26 April, the Corps orders directed the 1st Cavalry Division to assume at once the responsibility for securing the bridge across the Han River, named Kwangjin-kyo on Route 13 against the enemy air and ground attack. The Thai Battalion with the 8th Cavalry, however, still remained in the present bivouac area in the vicinity of Kumgok while the 5th Cavalry returned from the IX US Corps to the parent division, and the 7th Cavalry with the Greek Battalion was attached contrary to the 3rd US Infantry Division effective on this date.

On the following day the Thai Battalion moved on the division orders by the motor columns, following up the main body of the 8th Cavalry, to the vicinity of Chang-dong, the northern outskirts of Seoul. Meanwhile, the 5th Cavalry was enroute, from Kapyong in the IX Corps area, to join the parent division in the vicinity of Chongam-dong. Then the tactical command post of the division was located at Nung-dong just outside Seoul. On 28 April, the Thai Battalion and the 8th Cavalry maneuvered in the motor serials to the vicinity of the southern bottom of Hill 716, named Namjang-daeg, and thereupon prepared the block positions upon arrival. At 0600 hours in the morning of 28 April the I US Corps ordered the subordinate units to initiate the withdrawal and to defend the capital at the general line running from the vicinity of the east bank of the Han River south of Changsan-ni (about 23 kilometers southwest of Munsan)-Pisokko-ri about 10 kilometers northeast of Seoul—Yokchon thence by the IX US Corps. The Thai and the 8th Cavalry elements adjusted their positions in the general areas covering the Hill 716 or Namjang-daeg through Pukhan-san to Hwagye-dong with its elements establishing an outpost line of resistance along a line from Nojok-pong to Tongjang-daeg to Chang-dong.

During the night of the 28th—29th, the 8th Cavalry outpost line of resistance manned with elements of the Thai unit in addition to the cavalry regiment, was also penetrated by an estimated enemy company at Uri-dong 8 kilometers due north of Seoul at 1930 hours. However, the attack was repulsed later by a counterattack restoring the line in the morning of the 29th. The 7th Cavalry, on the other hand, had closed its positions at Yongsan located in Seoul, having the main elements at Tonam-dong and Muhak pass on the same day. The 5th Cavalry maintained the positions on the left flank of the Cavalry Division generally around Pulgwang-dong, southwest crest of the Hill 716(Nam-
jangdae), manning its elements an outpost line of resistance(OPLR) from Chingwan-oeri to the left bottom of Wontkyo-bong and during the night about 2130, the Cavalry withdrew OPLR due to the heavier pressure by an unknown number of the Red Chinese.

By the end of April, the enemy spring offensive had ended and the UN forces completed its withdrawal to the prepared positions just north of Seoul, and the enemy spring offensive had been contained.

On the last day of the month, the I US Corps launched a strong counter-attack against the main effort of the CCF 19th Army, being driven by a deep salient of penetrations into the outskirts of Uidong just eight kilometers from Seoul, imposing this enemy to retreat more than 16 kilometers to the North.

b. Secured Kansas Line

At 2045 on the night of 4 May, the right flank of the 8th Cavalry was raided by an estimated CCF platoon at an outpost near Suyu-dong about 1,000 meters east from the Hwagye-sa or Hwagye Temple, but it was repulsed after a fire fight for a little longer than an hour with no casualty reported thereof. On the next day, when maintained the present positions and augmented the patrol bases, the Thai elements patrolled into the forward area and met no contact with the enemy enroute. At 1430 on 6 May, the Thai patrol teams also went out to the high ground roughly 1,400 meters southwest of Ui-dong. The Thai Battalion sent out the patrols every day from its patrol bases to make contact with the enemy while being maintained the defensive positions. On 10 May the Thai patrol party received sniper fire enroute in the vicinity of Ponghak-dong near the MSR 3 and returned to the friendly lines for the night. Another patrol was sent out from the Thai Battalion with the 8th Cavalry to the high ground, a ridgeline of Hill 452 below Sogwi-kogae or Sogwi Pass.

By 11 May, there were clear indications, according to the intelligence estimate of the higher command, that the enemy had completed his preparations for the continuation of the offensive, and another determined enemy attack would be expected within the next few days. The Thai Battalion devoted to maintain the defensive positions under the supervision of the 8th Cavalry, sending the combat patrols out to seize the outlook of the enemy action. The Thai patrol team moved to the high ground during the daylight hours in the forward area, when the friendly patrols from the 8th Cavalry captured one CCF soldier in the vicinity of a valley trail on the southeastern bottom of Insu-bong. There were no noticeable activities for the Thai troops during the recent days except they engaged in maintaining the defensive positions besides the routine patrolling. On the other hand, the 5th Cavalry, being established in a battalion size patrol base in the vicinity of Koyang dispatched its patrols on
14 May to the high ground, north of Kisan-ni where they engaged with forty Red Chinese in the afternoon. The patrollers broke contact and returned to their own patrol base before dark. The patrol team from the 7th Cavalry captured nine Red Chinese, eight of whom surrendered voluntarily on the same date.

Meanwhile some alteration was taking place in the Thai command in Korea. The 21st Royal Thai Regimental Headquarters was preparing for demobilization to Thailand, with the authorization of the UNC. And on 12 May the Headquarters took action to transfer some of cadre personnel to fill up the Battalion to the full strength. Thereafter, the remainders returned back to the homeland by surface transportation arriving at Bangkok on 3 July 1951, after experiencing somewhat of a long delay due to the transport schedule.

On 16 May the enemy began to launch the second phase of their spring offensive along all the frontlines. In the sector of I US Corps, the 1st US Cavalry Division and 1st ROK Division were ordered to withdraw the patrol bases within the main line of resistance (MLR) but were to continue aggressive patrolling to determine the enemy strength and dispositions and to obtain enemy prisoners as possible. During these days the Thai Battalion as well as the 8th Cavalry sent out patrol parties in force and placed the friendly artillery fire upon the enemy whenever they spotted him. On 19 May, the elements of the 8th Cavalry observed ten to fifteen enemy probing defensive wire entanglements in the vicinity of the hill ridge and killed the enemy group with the artillery fire immediately. On 19 May, all units were ordered from the higher command to increase the patrol activity in the respective front to the maximum extent practicable in an effort to watch the enemy movements. On the same day the Thai Battalion maintained the present assigned positions and dispatched the patrol teams with elements of the 8th Cavalry to Nojok-bong where the artillery fire was placed on an estimated CCF platoon in the vicinity of Ansu-bong at 1400. As the patrol was returning they directed artillery on an unknown number of enemy in the vicinity of a cross-trail, west and below of Nojok-bong, with unreported results. Thirty five enemy wounded in action were picked up in front of the 8th Cavalry Regiment positions. On 20 May, the 8th Cavalry with the Thai Battalion attached, crossed the line of departure at 0515 to attack north in zone, and advanced to the vicinity of Chung-kol and Ssangmun-ni by 0700 without having enemy contact. The Battalion further advanced to Hill 143 vicinity of Paegun-dong, while the main force of the 8th Cavalry advanced to the general line of the southern crest of Sogwi-kogae or Sogwi Pass to Hill 675 thence the right crest of Tobong-san or Tobong Mountain (Hill 717) without meeting any noticeable
resistance by 1600. Then the Thai and the 8th Cavalry prepared to attack on the next morning towards the north. As of 2100 on 21 May the Thai Battalion already reached the general line of MSR 3, Hill 204 east of Tongmak village after being started off in the morning. The 8th Cavalry also continued its attack, starting at 0900 and as of 2100 had advanced to the line along Heungyong Temple—Southern entry of Uijongbu—northern bottom of U-bong or south of MSR 2X—southwest of Sapae-san, or Hill 549, without encountering enemy resistance. By the evening on the following day, the Thai elements with the 8th Cavalry continued the attack at 0700 from the positions north of U-bong—Hill 204 near Tongmak and seized the Sapae—Saemal east of Uijongbu(See Situation Map 3).

In the meantime, the UN forces had taken a decisive counteraction on 21 May, which succeeded in driving the enemy north of the 38th Parallel.

By 2100 hours on 22 May, the Thai Battalion further advanced to positions near Hill 337 and Tap-kogae, about a little more than two and a half kilometers northeast of Uijongbu city. Uijongbu was one of the vital communication centers in the area and now restored under the friendly hand. On 23 May, the 8th Cavalry and Thai elements continued to advance further to the north, and by 1820 they occupied the positions in the general areas of Chorume-gi village—Hill 341 and the town of Yangju keeping its reserve elements in the northern outskirts of Uijongbu. A patrol party captured six CCF prisoners at 1545 hours at the copse, behind the Paehwaam temple located half way up the Puiguk-san or Hill 361. The Thai Battalion occupied the positions extending about 1,500 meters from left to right, along the village of Majajoni through the right side of Route 333, Sapsa-dong, and Songnam-ni. They continued the attack on 24 May and seized the positions around Tokchong-ni for the night after advancing to the north of Polmoru Village having contact with the Red Chinese lightly on the left flank. On the far left of the division sector, the Greek Battalion being attached to the 5th Cavalry, advanced to the vicinity of Chonmi-san or Chonmi Mountain by 1700 hours. Next day, the Thai troops secured the area around Chohae-dong village just off right side of MSR 3 by 1900 for the night, after giving the fire support to the friendly troops deployed in the west of Tokchong-ni.

On the morning of 26 May, the Thai Battalion was relieved by elements of the 8th Cavalry and closed in the assembly area vicinity of Chohae-dong a little over 3-kilometer due south of Tongduchon at 0950, and moved to the blocking positions near the public cemetery just east of Tongduchon by that evening.

At the time the operational plan of the I US Corps was to continue the
advance and seize the objective Camel, an area bounded by Kumhwa, Sange-san, Chorwon and Hung-gol. On 28 May the I US Corps Commander ordered the 29th British Brigade Commander to move the Brigade commencing at 0800 to the zone of the 1st US Cavalry Division to effect relief of the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

The Thai Battalion then positioned in the vicinity of Tongmak-kol about 8 kilometers north of Tongduchon as of 1735, 27 May, further advanced to Kuksabong at 1020 on the next day and soon crossed the Hantan-gang or Hantan River in the afternoon to establish a strong patrol base. On the 29th while occupying the positions covering the left flank along the river side, the Thai Battalion sent out patrols. In the early morning, between 0330 and 0500 hours, the Battalion received forty rounds of the enemy artillery of mortar fire. And also at 0400 they received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the north direction which did not incur any casualties or damage. By noon on the same day, the 29th Brigade relieved the elements of the 7th Cavalry and the Greek Battalion along the line from Mari-ri. On the last day of the month, the Thai Battalion maintained the blocking positions in and around the west of Chongok with the 8th Cavalry in the general area of Mokchok-kol an inactive coal mine and Hill 266-Hill 367 north of Sumuk-kol.

From 28 May until 4 June, the Thai Battalion remained in the vicinity of Chongung-ni during which it patrolled the forward area in addition to the conventional role of preparing plans for action in the event of an enemy attack.

Meanwhile, On 4 June, the 8th Cavalry Regiment maintained its positions around Kyonno-ri village east of the Imjin River and high ground situated on the east of Yonchon reconnoitering in force. Shortly after midnight on the following day, the 8th Cavalry relieved the element of the 5th Cavalry in the general area of Yul-tong—Chaegung-dong. Other elements relieved the 5th Cavalry at the no-named high ground between Komipo and Samgwan-ni on the east bank of the Imjin River in the morning of 6 June. The Thai battalion, early morning on the same day, repulsed the enemy probing attack in a company size at the ridge line laying down on the west of Yul-tong. Next day, the Battalion attacked in a company strength after daybreak and advanced to the San-kol area, a hill mass complex, by 1000, against the moderate enemy resistance with small arms. About an hour after midnight of 9 June, the Thai troops beat back the CCF probing attack with a size of two platoons. A Thai night patrol party contacted with an unknown number of enemy in the vicinity of a mountain trail approximately 800 meters south of Hill 213 at 0430, while the main force maintained its positions in the high
ground area along the south bank of a branch river of the Imjin River throughout the day. During the daylight another patrol team observed an enemy ammunition dump and estimated 300 Red Chinese in the forest south of Sangmaedong and called immediately for artillery fire and air strike. The combined fires followed within a short while that was estimated to be very effective. However, the patrol team continuously advanced approximately 2,000 to 4,000 meters northwest of the present positions without meeting the enemy during these few days. Now the troops had been kept busy in organizing the strong patrol bases and employing the combat patrols in force to the forward zone for the purposes of detecting strength, disposition, identification, intention, and equipment of the enemy forces.

By 18 June, the eastern end of the I US Corps had advanced to the southern outskirts of Chorwon, one of the most vital communication centers in the “Iron Triangle.” On the 18th June, the Thai troops adjusted their positions to the general area of a riverside hill through the high ground northeast of Hill 167, stretching for approximately 1,500 meters. The 8th Cavalry also adjusted the main positions to the vicinity of the east bank of the Imjin River through the left end of the Thai Battalion position. Another battalion was also deployed along the left slope of Hill 218 and a hill mass
area while the other elements maintained the patrol bases at the high ground about 900 meters north of Hill 227. Now 18 June, the 1st US Cavalry Division, in addition to its organic Regiments of the 5th, 7th, and 8th Cavalry, had under operational control the 25th Canadian Brigade, the 25th Canadian Brigade, the Thai Battalion, and the Greek Battalion. The 25th Canadian Brigade relieved the elements of the 3rd US Infantry Division and established the positions in the general area covering from Sintan-ni village to the northeast finger edge of Hill 308 along the east bank of the Chatan River thence northeast to and inclusive Soi-san or Hill 362 roughly two kilometers northwest of Chorwon. The reserve elements were then kept on the high ground, in the vicinity of a road junction just to the west outskirts of Chorwon city. The Greek Battalion, then being attached to the 7th Cavalry, maintained the positions around Pangada-ri and Taegwang-ni railway station astride the Chatan River.

The Thai Battalion, maintaining the present positions, sent out patrols into the hill complex three kilometers north from the patrol bases on 20 June where the patrol observed, estimated, two squads of the Red Chinese at Tokhyon-kol across the valley. In the night, they again adjusted their positions to the east bank of the stream and Chwachan-dong from left to right. At 1100 the next morning, the Thai Battalion occupied the patrol base around the high ground north of Hill 227 while elements of the 8th Cavalry moved into the positions vacated by the Thai troops.

Before the end of nautical twilight on the evening of 25 June, the Thai Battalion readjusted the positions to the area covering Taechongchon just north of Route 326 and Sangchon left of a stream flowing down to the Imjin River. On 28 June, the 8th Cavalry patrols proceeded to the vicinity of Onnamu-kol where they observed an estimated 150 to 200 enemy; and requested to place automatic weapons and artillery fire and also air strikes on. The patrol party failed to dislodge the Reds and so they disengaged at 1620 and returned to their home base. At 1130 another patrol from the Thai Battalion also moved into Sangok-tong about 4 kilometers from its base, where it placed mortar fire upon approximately two squads of enemy troops which developed into an estimated company size battle that cut off the route of withdrawal of the patrol. The patrol fought its way out and returned suffering one friendly killed and three wounded in action. Furthermore, the Thai troops in the patrol base received 23 rounds of heavy mortar fire shortly before noon on 29 June with no further report as to damage.
CHAPTER VI  THE ACTIVE DEFENSE

Section 1. In Yonchon and Jamestown Line
(1 July-26 December 1951)

During June and July the Communist forces had built their strength up steadily. Instead of launching a large-scale offensive, the enemy continued to bring up supplies by rail and to strengthen his defensive positions. Owing to battle losses during the spring offensive, the Communists had been devoted to maintaining a high flow of replacements and their offensive capabilities.

On 1 July, the Thai Battalion maintained patrol bases in the high ground near Sangchon and sent out strong patrol team. A patrol directed artillery fire on an unknown number of enemy troops on Hill 242 about 1,000 meters east of Kojak-kol at 1520 hours and dispersed the enemy to the north after a fire fight, returning to the patrol base at 2045.

On 3 July, the 8th Cavalry maintained its positions in the area between Okkye-ri, high ground along the east flank of the Imjin River, forward slope of Hill 218, and patrolled the forward area. One battalion of the 8th Regiment departed the present position located in the river side area along Sammyochon through west of Hill 266 below Torang-ni and then relieved the Thai Battalion at its patrol base located on the high ground north of Hill 227, at 1700. The Thai Battalion also patrolled during the daylight hours to the ridge finger situated southeast of Kojak-kol where it received enemy artillery and mortar fire from Hill 230, about little more than 3,000 meters in distance, and the patrol requested for direct artillery fire on the enemy positions without delay with unreported results. The Thai Battalion, upon being relieved by the 8th Cavalry elements, moved to the position vacated by the relieving elements.

On the following day, maintaining the positions along the general line from the high ground north of Chaegung-dong to the high land north of Chungsa-ri, the Thai Battalion patrolled with two infantry platoons and one tank platoon from the 70th Tank Battalion near the hill mass area approximately 3,000 meters north from the base routing through a long corridor type of the mountain road, and they engaged with two enemy platoons at 1630. No further report was reached however.

On 6 July when the Thai Battalion maintained the present positions, preplanned air strikes were directed by the friendly air forces on the Red
Chinese fortified positions in the general area of Sadong high ground east side of Yanginal west of On-gogae or On Pass which resulted in the serious damage on the enemy.

On 7 July, a company size patrol from the Thai Battalion engaged with an enemy company at 1240 in the forward slope of Hill 266, about 4,000 meters from the patrol base. The patrol requested for artillery and mortar bombardment on the enemy to the 8th Cavalry through the Battalion Commander. The fire support was soon followed. The patrol party withdrew at 1900 and all closed safely the friendly position at 2015. On 9 July, the Thailand company size patrol reinforced with a platoon of tanks proceeded to the vicinity of a trail running between hills and a hill mass area north of Onnamu-kol where they placed the friendly artillery fire upon the enemy groups seizing an opportunity of target they observed such enemy movements.

All patrols returned safely by 1930. Next day, a tank-Thailand infantry patrol observed an unknown number of the enemy and placed the artillery fire at a forest defile and upon a company size enemy in the hill mass area, the same place where they had seen in the preceding day, with unidentified results. In the meantime, the outpost elements of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion engaged with and repulsed a probing attack by an unknown number of the enemy in the vicinity of Yongdam, a cross road center in the US Cavalry Division sector. On 11 July, a patrol party from the 8th Cavalry received twenty rounds of the enemy 105-mm artillery fire at the hill area about 1,000 meters west of Chokko-ri, resulting in one friendly killed and three wounded in this action, while the Thai troops patrolled with no enemy contact throughout the day. A noticeable incident happened in the 8th Cavalry in the early morning of 14 July. A platoon sized patrol party, ambushed over night in the vicinity of Hill 202, suddenly made an engagement with the two reinforced enemy companies in strength nearly for an hour and a half, from 0520 to 0640. Soon the enemy was forced to retreat due to the heavy fire from the friendly organic weapons and supporting artillery. During the fight the friendly patrol received 80 to 100 rounds of enemy mortar fire.

On 16 July, the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered by the I US Corps to become the Corps reserve effective 1800 hours upon being relieved by the 25th US Infantry Division in the sector. The Thai Battalion and the 8th Cavalry were relieved by the 35th Infantry Regiment on the positions at 1500 and closed at the assembly area located in the valley south of Hwabong-chon village by 1600.

In early August 1951 meanwhile, the Thai Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Kriengkrai Attanantna was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Pryauth Nuckakanjonkul. Lieutenant Colonel Kriengkrai, as the first commander of the
first Royal Thai Army contingent troops, had been exhibited exceptional leadership and performed a marked distinction by developing closer relationship between the ROK and other UN forces, fighting together with the 187th US Regimental Combat Team and the 1st US Cavalry Division since being joined the UN action in the Korea War against Communist aggressors.

On 18 August the Cavalry Division was ordered to continue the current mission on the Wyoming, and to conduct the raid on the objective, a hill mass area north of Onnamu-kol. In turn, the 8th Cavalry was ordered to attack on order on the division objective, while the 7th Cavalry was to protect the right flank of the 8th Cavalry. In the very morning of 18 August, however, the Thai and Greek Battalion were engaged with an unknown number of the enemy at 0330 in the vicinity of crest of the high ground which resulted in the enemy’s withdrawal a half hour later. A platoon patrol from the 8th Cavalry also engaged with an estimated enemy platoon on the Hill 216 at 0200. The enemy retreated back at 0400 after directing 90 to 100 rounds of artillery fire on the friendly forces. There was no casualty recorded however.

On 20 August the Thai troops patrolled to the high ground in the vicinity of Chokko-ri and received the artillery fire at 1530 from the suspected enemy position west of Kaldong. The patrol immediately called for the friendly artillery and mortar fire on the spotted positions. The Thai elements relieved the element of the 8th Cavalry on the patrol base in the vicinity of Hill 213 at 1000.

On the last day of August, the Thai elements patrolled to Kaldong area at 1440 where the patrol engaged with the platoon size enemy using small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. The Thailanders disengaged after a short fire fight and withdrew slightly. They returned to their base before dark, following the friendly artillery massed its fire on the enemy positions (See Situation Map 4).

The Thai Battalion had been remained in the same positions for a considerable period of the time carrying the line along the area from the high ground east of sub-stream of the Imjin River to the south of Sammyohon with its element on a patrol base near Route 326, and conducted routine patrolling. What was often described at the higher levels as “routine patrolling” at this stage could be anything but routine when one got down to company for battalion level. Such operation was carried out by the Thailanders during these days.

A similar pattern of warfare in this sector lasted till early September.

On 8 September, the Thai Battalion assembled on orders at the vicinity of Kusok-tong, 1,500 meters west of Chonggong-ni as a division reserve with the 8th Cavalry, while the 8th Cavalry (minus 3rd Battalion) closed at the assembly
area vicinity of Nopumyoul by the same time.

On the following day, the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to attack to seize and secure new MLR positions along the line from Tongjung-ni to Ankol to Saemal in conjunction with the attacks of the 1st ROK and 1st Commonwealth Divisions.

On 13 September, the Thai Battalion troops remained in the assembly area near the east bank of the Changjin River, while the 8th Cavalry Regiment adjusted the assembled positions with the 2nd Battalion in the vicinity of Moean and the 1st Battalion in Tongmang-ni with A Company in the blocking position on the Hill 158.

On 18 September, the Thai Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry closed their troops in the general areas north of Chonggong-ni, remaining there until 3 October.

October 1951 was a good month of operations in the west central part of Korea, since the weather was usually dry. This permitted full air support and eliminated the problems of flash floods and heavy mud. Terrain in the I US Corps sector varied from low lands in the west to small, steep hills in the center and low rolling hills on the eastern fringes of the Corps boundary.

On 2 October, the I US Corps was ordered to resume the attacks and seize the critical terrain, to organize, occupy, and defend along the Jamestown line. The operation was to be known as Commando and D-Day was to be 3 October 1951, which was a rather complicated and ambitious undertaking, involving all four divisions of the I US Corps, Lieutenant General J.W. O'Daniel in command.

At 0600 on D-Day, the 1st Cavalry Division attacked with two regiments abreast, the 5th Cavalry on the left and the 7th Cavalry with the Greek Battalion on the right, keeping the 8th Cavalry(minus) and the Thai Battalion in reserve, advancing further north in considerable distance in spite of stubborn enemy resistance encountered.

On 4 October, the Thai Battalion was ordered to move to the new assembly area in the vicinity of Yul-tong, while the main body of the 8th Cavalry(minus 3rd Battalion) maintained the positions along the outpost line of resistance carrying Nae-dong near north bank of the Imjin River—Changgun-ni—Yajon-ni north of Chaegung-dong.

As of 2400 hours on 8 October, the 8th Cavalry elements with the Thai Battalion maintained the positions, deploying from left to right, the 2nd Battalion along the high ground between a road junction and Sokkogae; the Thai Battalion on a finger ridge coming down from the Hill 327—Karhyon-ni across the branch stream of the Yokkok River; and the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of high terrain west of the Hill 420. The 3rd Battalion was then in reserve
protecting the left flank and rear along Chokko-ri to a mountain defile in the high ground complex.

In the afternoon of 11 October, the Thai Battalion adjusted positions to the right to include the old position of 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry and assumed responsibility for that zone stretching approximately 3,500 meters. The next day, on 12 October, a patrol from the Thai Battalion engaged with an unknown enemy strength in the ridgeline laying on the hill, later well known as the T-Bone Hill not only because of its geographical shape but also endless bloody battles waged on and around it. The patrol returned safely to own position before sunset. On the following day, a Thailand patrol received long range small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy at the vicinity of the T-Bone Hill ridge, exactly the same location where the Thai patrol party experienced in the preceding day. Another patrol from the Greek Battalion also encountered the small arms fire from the Reds somewhere in the vicinity of Changgun-kol, better known later date as the Porkchop.

On 14 October, the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry was relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, while the Thai Battalion and Greek Battalion were attached to the 7th Cavalry for operational control just for a time being effective 1500.

During the past week, there were no particular incident or action to be recorded for the Thailand Battalion. On 18 October, the Thai troops patrolled to the area of the Hill 200 situated on the T-Bone Hill ridge, while the main elements engaged in consolidation of the defensive positions along a finger ridge, a country road and high ground, where the patrol received the gun and automatic weapons fire from the enemy platoon. They called for the friendly artillery fire which followed immediately on the spotted enemy.

On 19 October, the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to relieve the left elements of the 3rd US Infantry Division not later than 1800, next day, and to assume the responsibility for the new zone when the relief was completed. At 1750, 20 October, the Thai Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment under the 3rd US Division on position and occupied the positions along then northwestern outskirts of the Choundok-san(Hill 477)—Toksan-ni, thus returning to the 9th Cavalry Regiment for operational control. The 1st Cavalry Division assumed the responsibility for the new zone created by a boundary change between the 1st Cavalry Division and the 3rd US Division on the date.

On 30 October the Belgian Battalion was attached to the 8th Cavalry Regiment from the 3rd US Division. The following day, the outpost elements of the Cavalry, disposed on the forward slope of the Hill 234, later more known as the Porkchop Hill, were probed by an unknown number of Red Chinese at
0230. The enemy eventually withdrew, a half hour later under the fire of the Division's artillery, back to Hasak-kol across the valley. The elements of the 2nd Battalion positioned in the vicinity of a finger ridge just south of the river reported that seven rockets fell 100 meters to their front at the time.

Meanwhile, on 25 October 1951, as the enemy returned to the truce table, the UN negotiators proposed the establishment of a four-kilometer Demilitarized Zone based generally on the existing line of contact. On 4 November the proposal was accepted with a UN provision that the line be that existing when final agreement was reached. A week later Hqs EUSA K was directed by the General Ridgway, to commence an active defense of existing positions but offensive operations.

On 12 November, the Belgian Battalion was ordered and departed the present position early morning for the new assembly area in Pisokko-ri, a road junction of Route 325 and 391 about 13 kilometers south of Pochon, and attached back to the 3rd US Infantry Division upon arrival there at 1400 for further attachment to the 1st Commonwealth Division.

On 13 November, an outpost manned with one Thailand platoon at a

With the supporting tanks,
sallent on the southern edge of the T-Bone Hill was attacked again from
north and northeast by estimatedly two Red Chinese companies under tank
support at 2230 hours. Soon hand-to-hand fighting was in progress and com-
munication was out. The enemy disappeared when daylight came, and
another Thai platoon was committed in the morning to relieve the outpost
platoon. It was one of the most remarkable actions for the Thailander led
by First Lieutenant Damrong Yuo of 2nd Company who was honoured with
the US and Thai Distinguished Service Medals after killed in this action
for his outstanding leadership, determination, and personal courage. When
Lieutenant Damrong saw his men dug in were being attacked by the Reds in
overwhelming strength with support of tank fire, he led his men and fought
a brave battle until he fell in the lead of the Thai troops. The Platoon suffered
8 killed, 15 missing, and others wounded. Thus this bloody battle hindered
the enemy attempt to take and control the disputed ground.

This battle ground, later designated by the UN troops as Outpost Eerie
for its unusual and strange landscape like a spur of the UN defense line, was
about 16 kilometers west of the rubble piles of Chorwon, located in the vicinity
of the village of Tumyong-dong across the valley and on the southwest of
Alligator Jaws two kilometers in distance. The Thailand Platoon had the
mission of furnishing security for the main line of resistance and maintaining
a base from which patrols could operate. Outpost Eerie was then consisted of
defensive trenches and bunkers encircling the point peak of this ridge tip,
which rose about 40 meters above the valley floor. A rocky hill dug up by shell
bursts, it had a few scrub trees and bushes and patches of thin grass.

At the time the 1st US Cavalry Division was ordered on 13 November
to be relieved by the 3rd US Infantry Division effective the beginning of 19
November and to be assembled in the general area of Pochon becoming Corps
reserve, because the Cavalry Division was to be moved to Japan very soon
upon being replaced by the 45th US Infantry Division.

Effective 1100 on 20 November, operational control of the 8th Cavalry with
the Thai Battalion passed from the 1st Cavalry Division to the 3rd US Division.
The 3rd Division immediately opened the new Command Post at the vicinity of
Hill 116 west side of the Chatan River.

On 22 November, action across the 8th Cavalry Regiment sector with the
Thai Battalion attached, was heavy to moderate through early morning hours
and by daybreak was reduced to sporadic. The new boundary between the
3rd US Division and 1st Commonwealth Division was assigned on this date to
define from a point at Sowonmal north to Samge-ri to high ground generally
northwest to Wooltong-mok to north of Chaktong-ni, thence generally north
to a limiting point at Mansok-tong thence north west to Tokkol to near Kasi-
nae to Kwanghae-dong.

Incidentally, the 1st US Cavalry Division, which had been exercised enthusiastic friendly leadership over the Thai Battalion as the operational parent command for a considerable long period, was now scheduled to move to Hokkaido, Japan, upon being replaced by the 45th US Infantry Division. The 1st echelon of the Cavalry Division including the 5th Cavalry Regiment had already departed Inchon by water on 7 December.

Looking into the truce tent at Panmunjom on the other hand, on 27 November, the armistice delegates arranged for a Demarcation Line from which both sides were to withdraw two kilometers at a time to be specified in the armistice agreement. Theoretically this line should have had no influence on the fighting, as it had no significance until a formal agreement was actually signed, an event which did not take place for another twelve months. In practice it did have some influence on operations, and the UNC issued orders that further operations would be confined to those necessary to maintain existing positions. However, as the talks continued month after month, the fighting gradually resumed its normal course, although perhaps not again at quite the same pressure and tempo as before the talks.

On 15 December 1951, the Thai Battalion was relieved in position by the 3rd Battalion of the 180th US Regiment in the morning and closed in the assembly area near Chonggong-ni shortly after noon. But 19 December, the Thai Battalion and the 8th Cavalry (minus 1st Battalion) remained in the assembly area without incident with the 2nd, 3rd, and the Thai Battalions in the vicinity of the transformer station, Hill 61 and Chonggong-ni respectively. Effective midnight the 8th Cavalry exclusive the Thai Battalion, was passed to operational control of the I US Corps detaching from the 1st Cavalry Division for further attachment to the 3rd US Division next day, when it assembled around the Tobyonggy village about three kilometers east from Chongok.

On the morning of 26 December 1951, the Thai Battalion was ordered by the EUSAK through the command channel to be released from the attached 1st US Cavalry Division as well as operational control of the 3rd US Division and newly attached to the 2nd US Infantry Division under the IX US Corps for further attachment to the 9th US Infantry Regiment effective 1745 hours on that date. This marked an end for the Thaiander’s friendly, long and intimate association with the 1st Cavalry Division in the Korean battlefield since 18 January 1951.
Section 2. Action at Kumhwa
(26 Dec 1951–16 July 1952)

Early in the afternoon of 26 December 1951, the Thailand Battalion started the assembled area in Chongok in the west central front by the organic and supporting motor vehicles provided by the I US Corps and arrived evening at the new assembly area near Wasu-ri in the 2nd US Division sector, taking Routes 322—43—464.

The Korean winter of 1951—1952 had now already fell on the battlefield being covered with snow, when Thai Battalion closed its movement in the new sector. About this time of season the central sector was so famed with name of snow fall area in particular. The area was crowed with steep sided hills and valleys running in every direction. Most of valleys were wide enough for only a stream, a footpath, or narrow road and a few tiny rice paddies terraced in the draws like stair steps. There was not much land suitable for growing rice, and the houses were few, the settlements scattered except a few localities. There were uncountable numbers of hills with heights of 300 to 600 meters all over the area.

At the time the 2nd US Division to which the Thai Battalion attached was responsible for the Kumhwa sector in the Iron Triangle, formed by three towns of Chorwon, Kumhwa, and Pyonggang, very and most important strategic and tactical locality at this stage of war. The frontage covered by the Division, was ranged approximately 22,000 meters from the Hill 376 on the left to the Hill 424 inclusive of the west bank of the Namdaechon on the right. The Division Commander, Major General Robert Young, then had the 14th Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Division, Thai, French, and Netherlands Battalions under his operational control besides three assigned Regiments; 9th, 23rd and 38th Infantry, with its Command Post at the vicinity of Sago-ri (means cross-road) village about four kilometers north from Chipo-ri.

The Thai Battalion, upon arrival at Wasu-ri in the reserve area of the 2nd US Division, spent the first half of January in developing field shelters and winterizing accommodation and equipment. Soon, however, training began and by the middle of the month it was in full swing. Between the 15th and the 17th January, in weather that the diaries of the period described as sunny, clear and cold, the Thai troops remained in reserve.

To wit the patrolling actions that characterized a peculiar warfare in this static war stage, all front line elements dispatched the patrols day and night.

On 1 January, the division reconnaissance party patrolled to the vicinity of Yangjimal where it met with an enemy squad and beaten him off, and
continued to move towards north further 900 meters where it killed six Red Chinese.

Shortly after midnight of 2 January, the elements of the 9th Infantry patrolled to the high ground, approximately 900 meters north of Yangjimal, where it engaged with an unknown number of enemy for twenty minutes and forced him to run away to the north. On 7 January the night patrolling troops from the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry deployed on the left flank of the division sector also engaged with two CCF squads at high terrain northeast of Mirok-tong at midnight and forty minutes later it became under full of danger since the patrollers were completely encircled by one CCF Battalion in strength. Sufficient reinforcements were dispatched from the same Battalion without delay and heavy fire fighting was underwent for an hour long which resulted in safely returning of the friendly troops.

In the morning of 8 January, the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion in position and occupied the defense positions along the line from the east bank of the Hantan River to the high feature north of Ugu-dong overlooking the wide valley, with its combat outpost on the Hill 351 near Sangdong-ni. Incidentally, the hill was soon to be well known to the UN troops as Outpost Harry owing to its strategic weight henceforth.

On 25 January, the Thai Battalion was ordered to relieve the French Battalion on the MLR and succeeded the main defense positions in and around the area of Tap-kol on the left flank of the 9th Infantry sector about five kilometers northwest of Kumhwa, braving snowstorms and the CCF thrust towards the dawn notwithstanding. Henceforth, the Thai Battalion had been in the line continuously, and all went lull except for manning the combat outposts, patrolling and counter-reconnaissance actions until mid-April.

On completion of the adjustment of positions and the change in the divisional boundaries, the 2nd US Division had three regiments in the line, the 38th Infantry on the left, the 23rd Infantry on the center and the 9th Infantry on the right, with its tactical command post at the vicinity of Sago-ri village, approximately four kilometers due north of Chipo-ri. The 9th Infantry then occupied and held the positions across the general line from the right flank of the 23rd Infantry to the south of the Triangle Hill (Hill 598).

In April 1952 all regiments at the front usually sent out at least one patrol and set up several ambushes for the enemy every night. The assignment to carry out the daily patrol was rotated among the battalions and companies, customary by a pre-arranged plan and roster indicating the responsibility for each patrol to be conducted at night, and the riflemen selected for the mission were given intensive training in night firing techniques. The patrol
route and objective were carefully studied and the patrol leaders were flown over the whole area to familiar themselves with the terrain. Although few prisoners were taken and frequently no enemy contact was effected, carrying out such patrol activities kept the front-line troops alert and gave them valuable experience and training under combat conditions.

During the period, Lieutenant Colonel Prayuth Nuchakanjonkul had been rotated to the home country and Lieutenant Colonel Oang Potikanita had taken over the command of the Royal Thai Battalion in May.

In late May, the Thai Battalion was relieved in position, together with the 9th US Infantry Regiment, by the elements of the 7th US Division, recently came under the command of the IX US Corps, of the main defense positions on the Iron Triangle sector. On the relief the Battalion moved back to rear in corps reserve, where it had taken field refresher training for two and a half months. In addition, those eleven month old timers were rotated to home during this period.

Section 3. Again in the Jamestown Line
(16 July-21 October 1952)

In mid-July 1952, the Thai Battalion was due to return to the same sector, where First Lieutenant Damtong of the 2nd Company and his fellow men lost their noble lives during the heroic defense battle eight months ago, the Jamestown Line in the west of Chorwon.

The 2nd US Infantry Division was ordered to relieve the 45th US Infantry Division, then deployed on the right of the I US Corps front along the Yokkok River which flows laterally across the long cross compartment valley to the west. The divisional relief was commenced early in the morning of 16 July, and completed by the morning of 18 July. It was the Eighth US Army Headquarters’s policy at the time that all of the friendly divisions had to be rotated periodically on the line after they had spent certain period at the front.

On the first day of the relief period, the Thai Battalion relieved together with the 9th Infantry, the elements of the 179th Regiment of the 45th US Division in position. Initially, upon relief the Thai Battalion remained in regimental reserve, where it was engaged in planning and strengthening a reserve positions in the vicinity of Chobat-kol immediately behind the main line of resistance. Since the Thailaders were already being well acquainted with the terrain feature in the area, they were to be committed in the line soon.
The enemy opposing the Thai Battalion with the 9th US Regiment at this time were the 338th and 339th Regiments of CCF 113th Division under the CCF 38th Army.

Toward the end of July considerable digging by the enemy was noticed close to the 2nd US Division’s forward positions. And the same time the Red Chinese were seemingly liable to become very bold and carry out desperate actions soon.

During the night of 17-18 July, in the middle of the relieving movement, the Red Chinese took advantage of the relief as they mounted two attacks on the outpost positions of the Hill 275 in a reinforced battalion strength. In spite of stubborn and bloody counteractions by the elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd US Division, supported by air strikes and artillery fire, the hill of Old Baldy was seized by the enemy. Two days later, elements of the 23rd Regiment had regained by counterattacks only a portion of the east finger of the hill. To make the friendly forces more disadvantage, the onset of the rainy season made operations exceedingly difficult to carry out during the rest of the month.

The last six consecutive days of July was a period of continuous heavy rain. In the infantry positions on the front many trenches collapsed, and for a period many units were completely cut off by flood water in the river valleys. Since the enemy had to cope with the same problems, tactical operations on the ground were strictly limited.

When the rain ceased off at the last day of the month from the afternoon, the 23rd Regiment elements launched a decisive attack with two reinforced companies, in an effort to secure complete control of the Old Baldy Hill, following artillery and mortar preparatory fire on the enemy held positions. In the end, attacking echelons seized the crest early morning on 1 August after bitter hand-to-hand battle. After having failed another assault on 4 August, the Red Chinese refrained from further attempts on the Old Baldy for the remainder of the month.

During the summer of 1952, in general, the enemy gradually became more aggressive. He moved into so-called No Man’s Land in same strength, attacking patrols, raiding forward positions and making his presence felt in areas where he had previously moved very quietly, if at all. At the same time, the enemy increased far more the volume of his harassing fire on the forward positions of the UN forces, and supported his raids by powerful concentrations of mortar and artillery fire.

Then in early September the weather improved and the Red Chinese began again to raid the frontline positions, chiefly sensitive outposts on the
critical terrain features. These battles were sort of hill warfare that had characterized this stage of the Korean War.

On 1 October in the meantime, the Thai Battalion was ordered to pull out from the outpost line positions in the vicinity of the Alligator Jaws due east of the T-Bone Hill and moved to the Camp Casey, a staging area of the I US Corps about 2 kilometers northeast of Tongduchon and about 20 kilometers north from Uijong-bu. The Battalion, henceforth, had taken delight in rest and recuperation for a twenty day period until redeployed on the Porkchop sector.
CHAPTER VII  BATTLES AT PORKCHOP
(22 October—11 November 1952)

Section 1.  Prelude

Late in 1952, as the third winter of the Korean War began, the truce talks at Panmunjom were recessed indefinitely. In the battle front, the UN forces launched a series of limited drives aimed at forcing the Reds back to the peace talk table. And despite the United Nations Command’s determined effort to avoid costly hill fighting, there were savage battles at Porkchop and T-Bone Hills. The fight for Porkchop, T-Bone, and Old Baldy was typical of the battles waged during the fall of 1952, a savagely contested, seemingly endless struggle for control of hills. The bitter hand-to-hand fightings were of characteristics of these days. Thus, time at the peace table was bought and paid for with the blood of hundreds of heroic yet unsung rifle men.

The infighting which took place in entrenched positions of the outposts at and around Porkchop Hill was as hard pressed and bloody as ever seen before. The Thailander won, not simply by the superior weight of the friendly air and artillery power, but because the infantry, man for man in the hand-to-hand battle, outgamed the Red Chinese at Porkchop.

Terrain Surrounding Porkchop Hill

Looking into the specific terrain features, primarily dealing with the Porkchop Hill and its vicinity, the Porkchop Hill was located at just north of a lateral branch of Yokkok River flowing on the western central front, about 19 kilometers west of Chorwon.

Porkchop itself was a contemptible hill, ill-formed for all around defense and the loosely tied in to the supporting neighborhood. Only 234 meters above sea level at its sharply peaked summit, the outpost was not only dominated by the Reds held ridges, but in fact extended into their territory, being of the wrong side of the valley. It was more like an isolated hill ridge surrounded by a hill mass complex overlooking the Yokkok-chon valley. These small but tactically critical hills of Porkchop, Old Baldy, and T-Bone dominated the main avenues of approach to Chorwon to east, Yonchon to southeast, and the Imjin River defense sector to the southwest.

Old Baldy (Hill 275) was on just below Porkchop across the Yokkok-chon
stream valley, a hill like refuse dump, more cheat-
ed by nature than abuse by man, was unsuited to
the mounting of an attack. While its superior hei-
ghts outflanked Porkchop and made the Westerview
finger seen like wanton defiance, it was too naked
to afford a concealed approach. The companion
peak, Chink Baldy, was more suitable. Tree
growth, rock outcroppings and conveniently spread
fingers which descend-
ed evenly to the low
ground gave it tactical privacy.

Dale is an unimpressive bump at the terminus
of the big ridges' farthest extended finger. It rose
not more than 80 meters above the valley floor
and was connected with the main line by a com-
munication trench, slotted
along the straight run-
nig crest line of the finger. Because of the intense glare above Dale, the valley
on both sides of it was impenetrably shaded, CCF would be certain to cover
their back door. Hill 200 near Sok pass was on southeast of Porkchop across
the Yokkok-chon valley and the ridge climbs up to Hill 347, one of the
highest heights in the surroundings.

Another Hill 200, a finger coming down from Hill 327, overlooking
Pokkae and Kama-kol valleys, was on the immediate right side of Porkchop
Hill.

Snook(Hill 187) was located on the finger ridge pointing to Yokkok River
valley through the corridor between Hasak-kol and T-Bone Hill. The ridge
was also originated from Hill 327 same as Hill 200 and neighbored to Porkchop Hill about one and a half kilometers on the northeast across the rice paddies. It provided good ground observation in the area. According to the Webster’s dictionary, “Snook” means to smell, to nose about, to lurk and to be in ambush. It can also mean “a thumping of the nose.”

Summarizing about the terrain feature that the Thailanders involved at this particular moment, the ridges around Porkchop and the Yokkok River valley are exceptionally rugged and deeply eroded (See Situation Map 6).

**Before Action**

On 22 October 1952, the Thai Battalion was ordered by the 2nd US Division Commander Major General James C. Fry to move to the Porkchop area from the Camp Casey where it had taken a twenty day recuperation. It then made a troop movement in columns on the following morning to the assigned area. Initially it took up the defensive positions on the high ground deploying its troops generally on the reverse slopes of Hill 347 and 327 southern high ground of Harhyon-ni. But its primary mission was to defend the Porkchop Hill under operational control of the 9th US Infantry Regiment. Consequently, the Battalion was ordered to relieve the 38th Infantry in place on and around the hill. The Battalion Commander ordered the 1st Company Commander, Captain Juan Vanarat, to take charge of the hill defense.

“Porkchop” derives its name from a peculiar shape of terrain feature bearing the look of a sort of swine leg. Being located in the middle of the surrounding heights, it had vitally a tactical weight for the UN main line of resistance, because it would greatly aid in establishing a chain of strong outposts in and around the Yokkok-chon valley and could provide the additional defensive depth to the friendly front. Thus, the hill had been the sole object for the two opponents to capture and hold.

The Thai Battalion, upon taking over the new defense mission, deployed its troops on the outpost line of resistance (OPLR), with two rifle companies all on the battalion sector, extending approximately 4,000 meters corresponded to sixty per cent of the 9th Infantry Regimental front. In an effort to strengthen the defense positions so as to contribute to the 2nd US Division defense line in stronger depth, these two companies were employed for the two separate areas, one for Porkchop Hill and the other for the Snook Hill (Hill 187) about 1,000 meters east from the east edge of Porkchop.

Initially, Porkchop was garrisoned by the 1st company composed of one rifle platoon and an additional rifle squad reinforced with HMGs and LMGs from the weapons platoon besides the bulk of both hand and rifle grenades,
while Snook was manned only with two rifle squads from the 2nd Company. It is easy to visualize their differences in the tactical significance by weighing the strength of two defense powers. The Battalion Commander further ordered the Snook troops to occupy the forward slope in strength of two squads at night and garrison it with a skeleton force of not more than one squad with the automatic weapons during daylight.

Section 2. Enemy and Friendly Situation

The enemy deployed in front of the Battalion sector, particularly to seize the Porkchop Hill, was the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 337th Regiment of the 11th Division under the CCF 38th Army, keeping 3rd Battalion in reserve. Each CCF battalion was then comprised of three companies with one heavy weapons platoon attached. The CCF 38th Army had the 112th and 114th Divisions under his command besides the 113th consisted of the 337th, 338th, and 339th Regiments. In addition, it had a tremendous power of organic and supporting artillery forces. Furthermore, superior heights held by the Red Chinese concealed from ground observation a still more formidable characteristic in the CCF defense front. They had organized their higher ground in true depth by sweating their soldiery and making the most of their press gang labor. Friendly aerial photo could not provide good picture of the enemy trenches, because he was so clever at camouflage.

Since being assigned the new mission to defend the Porkchop Hill at any cost, the Thailaners were kept busy during these days with the tasks of the defense organization. They devoted themselves for full use of obstacles and demolitions to canalize and limit the areas in which the enemy can operate. The fields of fire were cleared upon arranging close defensive fire barrage to destroy the integrity of the attacking echelon through the possible avenues of approach. To compensate for the dead angles spots to which the friendly fire could not be reached, anti-personnel mines and high explosive demolitions were layed out. A particular emphasis was placed on the fire plans to take advantage of terrain and to gain the maximum effect from all weapons in a coordinated effort. Dead spaces in bands of the machine gun fire were covered by the fire of other weapons. Fire effect was also to be increased by obstacles which hold the enemy if approached in under frontal and flanking fire. The fire barrage of supporting field artillery, and heavy mortar was arranged to impede the enemy attack with fire in width and depth throughout the defensive sector and also to jeopardize the ability of his fire.

At the time the Command Posts of the 2nd US Division and the Thai
Battalion were locating at Taegwang-ni and Homang-ni respectively.

Those brave warriors fought with the Red Chinese during the actions on and around the Porkchop Hill were those third rotation-contingent of the Thai Battalion under the following Order of Battle.

Battalion Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Prayuth Nuchakanjonkul
Acting Battalion Commander: Major Kriengsak Chomananta
1st Rifle Company Commander: Captain Juan Vanarat
2nd Rifle Company Commander: Captain Aporn Uthikanok
3rd Rifle Company Commander: Captain Chaiyuth Kanissangkas
Heavy Weapons Platoon Leader: Captain Chuvit Kengthanomma

All information available from the higher units as well as own patrol teams predicted that the CCF would attempt a determined attack on the Porkchop Hill before long. To meet with such imminent attack, the Thai troops hurried to complete all preparations in rearranging the automatic weapon positions to provide grazing and flanking fires, placing signal interdiction devices, laying seven circuits of telephone line to connect each outpost and command echelons, and reconstructing the bunkers and communication trenches.

The previous experiences at Alligator Jaws of destruction of four wire-lines by the enemy battery helped in various ways: This time, the Battalion buried some of the lines under the ground to secure the important communication net from being hampered. Moreover, they also set a few additional wire aprons to strengthen the two existing barbed wires. Most of men, thinking in terms of concealment and protection from the enemy observation and small arms fire, dug their foxholes and bunkers in the usual fashion covering them with ponchos, leaves, sand bags, and dirt. The most probable routes of the enemy attack were blocked by two or more double-apron wire barriers, in addition to trap mines and sensitive demolitions. In the meantime, a security force consisting of a series of listening posts and outpost guards in the forward edge of the defense area was manned to provide early warning of the enemy approach, of providing time for the main defense force to prepare for combat, of receiving him as to the exact location of the main defense positions, and also of observing the enemy advance. And now all the preparations against the imminent enemy probes and attacks were well done except for the only access route to the Porkchop Hill from rear slope still being incapable of motor traffic though the river was then fordable on foot. The engineer troops were shifted to fix the more vital main supply route(MSR) blocked or swept away by the heavy rainfall in the rear area, and the Korean Service Corps (KSC) personnel dispatched by the Korean Government were unable to take the works due to incessant enemy artillery and mortar fire,
In view of such situation, the Battalion requested to the 9th Infantry to provide four armored personnel carrier (APC) in support so that it would utilize them in transporting troops, weapons, ammunition, other equipment, and materials. Later they were also used as a means in evacuating the casualties. It received also the smoke shells from the 9th Regiment for use in making the smoke defilade or blanket if the troop movement is necessitated during the daylight.

Section 3. In Action

On 27 October, the Ranger Platoon, upon the completion of intensive specialized training course, was ordered by the Battalion to make a surprise raid into the Pokkae Hill, an important enemy held hill in the forward area of the assigned sector, and if possible, to capture prisoners.

Pokkae was more like a inland island being located in the center of a long and wide valley corridor between Hasak-kol and T-Bone Hill. And it was well worth threatening the Battalion defensive positions, thus close enough to check all movements in the area.

Prior to venture a deliberate raid, the platoon and squad leaders carefully checked and studied every detailed terrain aspect as well as the enemy information how the situation stood around the objective area. And at the same time the Battalion requested for the aerial strikes on the hill to the Division Headquarters through the 9th Infantry before the infiltration.

At 2100, the Rangers moved out for the objective keeping their eyes open under cover of darkness. The Platoon met with the Red Chinese on the crest and engaged in the battle. The defender of this Pokkae Hill was about a company strength of the CCF, and the contact continued for approximately fifteen minutes with small arms and hand grenades. When the contact was broke off, Battalion orders by radio, the friendly artillery as well as mortars began pounding the concentration fire upon the spotted enemy in support of the withdrawing Platoon. All the Rangers thereafter returned safely to their own positions in the next morning at 0550 with only one wounded. The outcome of this successful reconnaissance type of raid was an immeasurable help to the future defense plans of the Battalion.

Following the first surprise raid made by the Ranger Platoon into the Pokkae Hill during the night of 27-28 October, the enemy counter reconnaissance and patrols began to probe the defense power of the Porkchop Hill. As a reaction to such intensified enemy activities, the extreme caution and alert was required because each side competed to show off in capturing more
prisoners.

In the midnight of 31 October, the cat-eyed enemy patrol of a reinforced platoon in size slipped out of the Hasak-kol high ground and crossed the valley, and silently but quickly approached to the 8th Bunker in the west outposts of the Porkchop and raided surprisingly on it at 0100 where only eight Thailanders garrisoned. The defender fought with this unpleasant strangers which soon put the attacker to rout abandoning a machine gun and other equipment. At 0235, the Reds dared again to get close to the same bunker shortly after the preceding probe was failed. This time, they tried more aggressively to make the second raid success under strengthened covering fire of 122-mm field artillery and 82-mm mortars for which the eight men had to move back to the main Porkchop positions for that once giving up the bunker. The fire fight continued until 0510 before the attacker withdrew towards Chink Baldy on the left of the 8th Bunker. At last, the Battalion suffered three wounded, and on the other hand, confirmed ten enemy deads. Approximately four hundred rounds of the enemy artillery and mortar shells were landed upon the action area.

First CCF Attack on Porkchop Hill
(During the night of 1-2 November)

After probing the 8th bunker position as their experimental stand, the Reds
finally attempted a vigorous attack with the bulk of forces on the first day of November, keeping on an intimidating fire nearly for four hours from 1335 with 155-mm and 122-mm field artillery and 82-mm mortars like a torrential rain until 1730 right after sunset. The Thai Battalion was very much embarrassed at this initial moment of the enemy concentration fire in enormous number of pieces from cleverly deceived positions that even the detecting device could not spot them where the shells came from. For these reasons, the friendly air strikes and counter-battery fire could not neutralize such fury Red bombardment. Therefore a series of the prolonged fire storm was seemed to be successful in the first place. It destroyed about half of the defense fortifications on the Porkchop Hill and took a toll of casualties. However, the morale, combat readiness, and will to fight of the Thailanders were far from being effected by this seemingly strong Reds. The 1st Company Commander Captain Juan Vanarat commanded at the head of troops by stiffening the morale and encouraging the fighting spirit and directed the reconstruction works without missing a good opportunity when the enemy artillery fire lulled for little while.

Just about later when the troops were still in the midway of reorganizing the damaged positions, estimatedly two enemy companies resumed the attack on a large scale onto the Porkchop Hill flooding bilaterally with two attacking echelons abreast, one towards the 8th Bunker in the west and the other directing its axis to the 4th Bunker on the forward slope. An aggressive counteraction was immediately followed. The Thai defenders took up the defensive battle rather offensively as the attacking Reds closed in upon the bunker positions, even with bayonets, in which Captain Juan Vanarat was unfortunately wounded and evacuated. The Battalion Commander now ordered the Ranger Platoon to reinforce the embattled positions. The Platoon led by Lieutenant Chalern joined the brother fighters at 1950 after encountering all sorts of hardships and probations being under a down pour of the enemy bombardment en route. Eventually, the Reds broke off and retreated at 2030 on account of stronger and harder resistance than they expected.

Of 22 casualties in total, eight Thailanders were killed and 14 men wounded including Captain Juan in this bloody action the Thailanders had never met before in the Korean battlefield. Besides, eleven bunkers on the Porkchop were totally destructed mostly by a four hour long volley of the enemy artillery and mortar fires, 600 rounds of the artillery shells were solely landed on the Porkchop Hill. On the contrary the Thai troops identified 50 enemy deads.

The Thailanders demonstrated themselves as the soldiers of courage who never retreat in the battles without being agitated a hair.

The next morning Major General Fry, the 2nd US Infantry Division
Commander, visited the Thai Battalion and inspected physically the battle hill of Porkchop where still presented a ghostly sight, holding up a true mirror to the bitter fighting, thus, the enemy dead bodies were here and there besides their abandoned weapons and equipment were scattered around. The shell craters changed the battle area in ruins. He seemed to have been deeply impressed by the tough spirit of the Thailanders to hold the hill (See Situation Map 6).

Meantime, upon learning of the Battalion's first incident at the Porkchop, Colonel Chan Angsucote then the Military Attache with the Royal Thai Embassy in Japan came to the Battalion in the capacity of the Chief, Thai Liaison Officers Group to the UNC at 1430 on 4 November by airlift, for the purposes of getting first hand information as well as inspiring the troop morale. He was escorted by Major Pralong Virapriya, Liaison Officer to the Headquarters, Eighth US Army and left the Battalion for Tokyo at 0830 on the following morning, after having a thorough observation.

**Second CCF Attack on Porkchop Hill**
(The night of 6-7 November)

During the night of 4 November, an enemy patrol party attempted again a surprise probe with one reinforced platoon in force upon the outpost of Porkchop but failed. Seemingly it was to check the conditions of the Thai defense positions prior to another determined attack. The Thai troops had been in alert for any possible future attack thereafter.

The second attack was launched before midnight on 6 November also aiming at the two objectives: One CCF company (reinforced) closed in under support of the heavy weapons towards the 4th Bunker just in front of the main position while another attacking echelon fell on the 8th Bunker. But this time the Red Chinese approached cautiously under cover of darkness not employing intimidation fire by artillery to effect the surprised raid. It was not long before the Reds came in a bloody assault. After a while, shortly passed the midnight, they centered their main effort at the 4th Bunker following a massive artillery blow. And just then charged in with a reinforced company strength like the tenacious beast upon the bunker all at once. Troops were ablazed with anger and offered stubborn resistance in the pattern of all round defense supported by heavy weapons firing, forced to hold the attacker in check a little later.

It was obvious that the enemy would assault again during the night that still remained long hours. The Thai Battalion decided about half an hour after the enemy recess, to commit the Ranger Platoon being reinforced with some reserve troops into the embattled hill. Just at the moment when these reinforce-
ments took positions at 0250 after an hour long strenuous climbing, a heavy artillery and mortar concentration on the Porkchop again became active, heralding renewal of the assault. This time, the assault came from two directions simultaneously at three o'clock on the morning of 7 November; about one CCF battalion in strength flooded in towards the 8th Bunker, while an estimated company, once beaten off and retreated, rushed again at the 4th Bunker concealing its movement by the smoke screen. It was very seldom to see that the Reds used the smoke blanket in the night attack although the sky was under moonlight. On the verge of the enemy attack, the Battalion Headquarters requested for the maximum fire support to the higher command without delay. A bloody contest was raged between the defender and attacker thereafter hurling grenades and close-fighting with the bayonets and covered by chattering automatics each other.

After all, this second attack was resulted in the enemy withdrawal to the Pokkae Hill and Chink Baldy directions at 0320 during which the friendly artillery continued its bombardment keeping track of the Reds retreat routes extending the firing ranges.

To sum up the casualties, the Red Chinese suffered during the action with the least identified 58 deads, let alone the countless captured weapons and ammunitions; for the Thailander's loss of four each killed and wounded. The shells of artillery and heavy mortar delivered by the friendly supporting units during the second battle counted to: 3,098 rounds of 105-mm field artillery, 405 rounds of 155-mm guns, 650 rounds of 4.2 inches mortar, and 693 rounds of 81-mm mortar. These figures are plenty enough to exhibit how the battle was pitched.

It seemed to be subfreezing temperatures had already reached Korea. The battle field was caught in the first snow of the season shortly before the midnight of 7 November throughout the frontline.

**Third CCF Attack on Porkchop Hill**
(During the night of 10—11 November)

It was highly predicted, during these days after the first battle, according to the intelligence estimate based on the information supplied by the friendly aerial observation, ground patrols and many other sources, that another enemy attack would come very soon, considering specially the frequent movements of the enemy troops in the recent days. Faced with the growing tension, all company commanders made strenuous efforts to rebuild and supplement quickly their badly damaged fortifications while intensifying the reconnaissance activities. In the mean time, the 3rd Company troops that was mostly exposed to the second attack on 7 November was relieved in position by the partial
elements of the 2nd Company, then in charge of the right flank of the Porkchop Hill. But the hill was still remained under the responsibility of the 1st Company as a whole. By 8 November, the hill defense reorganization including the troop relief was brought to an end and hospitalized Captain Juan Vanarat came back to his company. He became later the first military attache with the Royal Thai Embassy in Seoul, Korea in 1964.

Notwithstanding the wholesale defeats of the previous two attacks, the Red Chinese third attack fell at the night of 10-11 November as looked for, distinctly different this time in far strengthened number than ever before. The enemy had been spent nearly four days in preparing for the new attack in the firm belief that it would succeed in that determined task of seizing the Porkchop.

The Red Chinese put in for the third attack estimatedly two battalions inclusive of reinforcements to be followed up, in incomparable degree to the originally garrisoned one platoon plus a squad of the Thai defense strength. This sharp difference in number greatly effected on the morale of the attacking enemy but not in the least to that of the defender. It was a prevailing general concept of the Red Chinese at the time that their attacking echelon was usually composed of one each of assault, weapons, demolition, and support team.

At about 1900 in the early evening of 10 November, the Reds began to pound their artillery and heavy mortar fire at the adjacent friendly positions somewhere inbetween Arsenal and Eerie on the southern edge of the T-Bone Hill ridgeline, northeast of Snook, in an obvious feint to distract the Thai Battalion’s alertness. An hour later the Reds made a keen raid with some of their troops onto the Old Baldy Hill on the immediate southwest of the Porkchop, seemingly also as a feinting tactic hoping to convert the Thailander’s attention. These two deceiving actions had come to an end at about 2200 without fruits after a series of fire fight. But abruptly gaining strength, the CCF artillery and mortars finally began to volley at the Porkchop Hill at 2300 an hour ahead of midnight. Following twenty five minute long preparatory fire, the Reds finally started off at 2330 to rush at the 8th and 4th Bunkers primarily manned by the 1st Company all at once as was expected, with the 3rd Battalion plus the Reconnaissance Company of the CCF 337th Regiment.

The massive Reds were getting closer through the most expected avenues of approach by breaking through the repeated obstacles and the successive barriers. Immediately after all the outposts including the listening posts garrisoned at the forward edge of the battle area(FEBA) were withdrawn back to the main defense positions, the Battalion Headquarters requested the
supporting artillery to stem the Red Chinese approach. Hence bloody bombardment poured like a storm of rain upon the Porkchop. All the routes of the enemy attack were hit by a barrage of the torrential gun fires leaving no inch of space gap. Some of the attacking Reds already reached to the bottom of the defense positions taking advantages of the dead angles whereupon no gun fire could hit. These were undoubtedly infiltrated into the area through the safety lane in the mine field following the immediate behind when the forward outposts withdrew, while some others were came through the defense barriers by exploding the successive obstacles with demolitions or routes casually opened by artillery or mortar fires. Nevertheless the defending Thailanders concentrated their all efforts to repel the Red attacker taking every opportunity of firing weapons to the maximum extent.

As the situation became a heated battle every moment, the Battalion Commander committed his Ranger Platoon in an effort to reinforce the hill defender being under the dark hours, during which some of the enemy artillery shells landed even on and around the Command Post of the 9th US Regiment that resulted in two US soldiers killed. Meanwhile, the wire communication net connecting between the frontline company through the Battalion Headquarters to the Regimental Command Post were deadlined due to the enemy battery fires.

The only available line was that between the Battalion CP and the Ranger Platoon. Now the Platoon reported, upon joining the brothers on the hill after overcoming the extreme difficulties, thus losing two men on the way up by the enemy bombardment, that the Reds had already raided upon the main defense positions by flanking through the rear slope which meant that the Porkchop Hill was completely enveloped. Bloody hand-to-hand fight with the bayonets and hand grenades was already being at its height to such extend that hardly distinct whether enemy or friends, even though the moon lighted on the ground from the cloudy night sky. The Thaipler's existence was at the stake. It was the enemy trend then that the Reds never retreat back even an inch regardless of their casualties, so called the human-wave tactics. Yet, at 0130, the Reds at last began retreating, as the Ranger troops took sides with, by experiencing no prospects of seizing the Porkchop Hill by death defying resistance of the brave Thailanders. The Thai troops fought gallantly and finally beat off the CCF with unyielding courage and brazeness against the extremely overwhelming Red Chinese forces. Through this fierce battle it was fully exhibited to the Reds that the Thailanders never abandon the controlled hill whatsoever, thus saving the friendly main defense line in the sector.

At that time, a report came to the Battalion CP from the battled hill that
the outpost Platoon Leader Second Lieutenant Pilis Kamvilai and Reconnaiss-
sance Officer First Lieutenant Vichien Sangkapranwan were seriously wounded
during the action. The Battalion Commander ordered First Lieutenant Chalermsiriboom, the Ranger Platoon Leader then on the hill, to take charge of the
Porkchop Hill defense troops without delay.

Just at the moment while there were a lull in the enemy artillery fire, the Battalion Headquarters was excited by a grim warning given by the 2nd US Division that the Reds, according to the intelligence monitored at the div-
ision radio intercept station, would resume its attack very soon, committing three company strength from the 2nd Battalion of the CCF 337th Regiment which employed on the Porkchop Hill just a short while ago. Nevertheless, this information was vitally valuable to the Thai Battalion, for at least it gave
time to prepare for an actual situation. The troops were all in a hurry at
their works, supplementing and rearranging the terribly damaged bunkers and
the crew-served weapon positions, replenishing equipment, ammunitions, and
other supplies, and restoring the communication line, no matter how difficulties
encountered with restless enemy gunfiring during the dark-screen. The
Battalion also committed a part of its reserve troops composed of Headquarters
Company personnel taking advantage of a lull.

At about 0310. after laboring approximately for an hour and a half to set
the men to reorganize their positions with logs, sand bags, and any other
haste materials whatever available in the spots, the Red Chinese artillery and
mortar shells again began to land in the vicinity of the Battalion CP, concen-
trating its bulk of bombardment on the Porkchop Hill. The enemy battery
kept pouring in far more densely ever before at the rate of twenty rounds a
minute. However, the Thailanders had well prepared themselves in their minds
to meet with and repel the Reds by all means. Their morale was consider-
ably high although physically so exhausted by the bloody fight a few hours
ago.

Before having latitude of mind to take breath, soon the Reds again at-
tempted an abuse attack, following the mass of their gun fires, nearly in the
same fashion as predicted by the monitored information, with three attacking
echelons abreast aiming at the 8th, 4th, and 2nd Bunkers, committing estimated-
ly two battalion in size while the Thai Battalion in defense was actually
no more than one fifth of the Reds in strength. Notwithstanding, the Battalion
could counteract early enough with the supporting artillery fire when the CCF
crept into the effective range, as it had already learned the enemy would be
certain to come. All bunker men rechecked their rifles, machine guns, and
waited quietly as the strain became a high tide, pointing the muzzles of their
guns and rifles to the directions of the enemy advancing, until such time they
could see the Reds within the effective firing ranges. The air became damp and noticeably cold. Within a minute or two, the enemy shells landed squarely on and around the top of the command post bunker, and several minutes later, sounded like a few of the anti-personnel mines exploded. At the same time the Chinese opened close fire. The defending men could see none of the enemy yet, but from the steady sound of the enemy fire, they could measure the Reds advance. Then the enemy fire increased gradually as the attacking momentum became faster raising more noise. The Thailander wondered why more of the mines had not exploded. Meanwhile, other Thai companies close to the 1st Company also provided all-out fire support in order to contain the enemy approach.

Unfortunately, however, the Thailander’s defensive efforts were failed to check the flooding human wave in the long run. Some of the Reds assaulted into the main defense area on the controversial hill, nonetheless it had suffered the terrible losses. The barbed wire barriers and the mine field installed by the Thailander did not seem to have worked out. The enemy broke through in the face of numerous obstacles fighting it way up by destroying and cutting them with the heavy weapons fire and demolitions. In an instant, the bloody stink fight was engaged.

In this night defense, the Thailander applied somewhat different tactics grounded on the preceding battle experiences which was to be quite effective. To wit, all machine gunners either in the bunkers or at the fixed emplacements, delivered the maximum grazing, flanking, and converging fires, keeping their present positions, upon the assaulting enemy, while the riflemen were ordered out of bunkers and dealt with the assailants by the final protective in the formation of all-round defense, particularly massing their covering fires on those Reds charging onto the bunkers so as to protect the crew-served weapons. The riflemen fought with the bayonets and grenades if the Reds closed in. During the course of decisive battle, the 1st Company radio equipment and the only existing telephone line were destroyed by the enemy battery. To overcome this signal failure the Battalion Headquarters dispatched without delay its Operations Officer(S-3) with a portable radio equipment so that he could report to the Battalion Commander the battle situation.

By the time a platoon from the 1st Company and the Ranger Platoon were battled under the control of First Lieutenant Chalerm Siriboon with the raided Reds, the Battalion Commander now ordered all the remaining reserve troops, mainly the administrative overhead personnel being kept for the worst, to reinforce the hill defenders considering the dawn would soon be breaking. At just before the beginning of the morning twilight when the reinforcement arrived there, the Red Chinese already fell back to retreat. Had the dawn
broken one hour later, it should have been hard to tell what was to happen with its last minute reserve force committed.

As the Reds retreating, the friendly artillery joined to chase them with the massive fire power, lifting successively further ranges to correspond with the fleeing enemy, along the retreating routes. Then the Ranger Platoon, seizing an opportunity by the forelock, pursued the retreaters in a terrific speed, following closely the friendly artillery fires in order to take immediate advantage of a great volume of fire effect to gain the prisoners. The Rangers had captured two prisoners while two others were gained within the battle positions. At the moment, the Battalion Headquarters learned its casualties of two missing, ten killed, and forty seven wounded of which most were slight except two serious cases. The bullet-proof jacket worn by the Thailanders might partly account for such a considerable low number of casualty. About the two missing in action, because other comrades verified recalling that they had failed in pulling out of the 8th Bunker, a searching partyransacked through every corner of the battle area, which at last several days later found them in shot to death in the behind of rock south of the 8th Bunker. This brought the total casualties to 12 killed and 47 wounded inclusive of two officers, Lieutenant Vichien and Pilis.

In the morning when the battle area was still being remained intact, Lieutenant General Poul W. Kendall, I US Corps Commander and Major General James C. Fry, the 2nd US Infantry Division Commander, visited the Royal Thai Battalion to encourage. The Battalion Commander led them the way to the Porkchop Hill where the bunkers, trenches, and shell fragments were torn to ribbons by the bombardment and 204 enemy bodies were exposed on the ground explaining itself for a bloody fight throughout the night. It was really an appalling scene beyond description. Having inspected through, General Fry made a comment before the Thai troops praising them highly for their heroic action that “I am sure that strongminded Thai soldiers will gain victories at any battle because you have sufficient potential combat profession.” Next, they talked about the size of garrisoning troops, reorganization of positions, and the future courses of defense action exchanging views earnestly each other. After all, they arrived at a conclusion to continue to defend the controversial hill as recommended by the Thai Battalion Commander, by manning with one more rifle squad in addition to the original strength of one rifle platoon plus a squad. Now all were kept busy in evacuating casualties, consolidating the positions together with two platoons of the Division Engineer and two Korean Service Corps(KSC) companies in support.

Turning to the enemy losses, the Thai Battalion confirmed of 204 killed and 4 captured, which was farther increased by the estimate of the 2nd US
Division G-3 with additional 150 killed and more than 250 wounded, during a series of the recent battles at the Porkchop. Apart from the heavy losses, the prisoners disclosed that the CCF 337th Regiment of the 113th CCF Division lost its combat capability being suffered a fatal blow at the Porkchop and would no longer be committed into the battle unless fully reorganized with the new replacements as a whole. Furthermore, the Battalion captured almost every type of weapons the Red Chinese infantry then had such as heavy and light machine guns, rifles, pistols, medical care equipments, and a tremendous quantity of ammunition. Also among the captured items were the individual identification cards and certificates, Red Chinese currency of one million Won value and various decorations. These captured items were sent back to the 2nd US Division G-2 Section in accordance with the standing operating procedures issued by the higher command.

Just about the noon time on 15 November, Colonel Chan Ansuchote, Chief of the Thai Liaison Delegations to the UNC in Tokyo, visited the Battalion again. He was accompanied this time with Colonel Amporn Chintakanon and Polpath Suwannachote both on official observation tour to Korea and Captain Deepradis, Liaison Officer to the EUSAK. Having inspection completed, he departed the Battalion area at 1700 in the afternoon because he had to return immediately to his office in Tokyo for arranging the detailed itinerary for the imminent visit of the Minister of Home Affairs Major General Banyath Thephasdin to Korea from Thailand. In this connection it may be added that Colonel Chan Ansuchote became later the first Royal Thai Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Colonels Amporn and Polpath were allegedly planning to return home very shortly.

Section 4. Epilogue

Looking back to the battle of the Porkchop Hill during the period from 31 October through 11 November, the Red Chinese attempted two times, to probe the disposition of strength and the defense organization and contemplated three times the determined attacks of up to a reinforced battalion in strength to gain control of the hill. It was a typical position defense in the perimeter pattern similar to those Old Baldy and T-Bone Hills. Throughout a series of the battle during the recent days, according to G-3 and G-2 reports of the 2nd US Division, the Thailanders inflicted the enormous losses upon the Reds including at least 132 identified deads and numerous combat equipments besides countless wounded at cost of 25 killed and 76 wounded. It must not be forgotten however that the friendly supporting fires had shared much in repulsing the enemy onslaughts. At any rate, the most part of account owed
to the outstanding combat ability of the individual Thai soldier who fought hand-to-hand furiously which brought the victory in the end.

Later, the Thai soldiers were awarded the Distinguished Service Medals from the UNC, twelve Silver Stars, one Region of Merit and twenty six Bronze Stars, in recognition of their exceptional combat performance at the battles of the Porkchop Hill. They were further honoured with the nick-name of “Little Tigers” given by the Eighth US Army (EUSAK) as an endorsement for combat power of the Thai Battalion in full of the conviction of sure victory.

Incidentally, the Porkchop Hill reverted later into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) locating just above the Military Demarcation Line which runs center of the zone, as a cease fire came into effect on 27 July 1953.
CHAPTER VIII  THE LIMITED BATTLES

Section 1. Patrolling Actions in Fall of 1952
(11 November—29 December 1952)

During the last two years of the Korean War, the main activities of the infantry were patrolling and laying ambushes, usually by night. Actions of this type had to be carefully planned and conducted by very well trained men if they were to succeed. There were no easy success to be gained in No Man’s Land, and a badly planned patrol or raid, carried out by imperfectly trained men, invited disaster. Therefore every tactical unit was forced to be trained whenever opportunity available, particularly during the reserve period.

It would seem that night action of this kind is one of those activities that comes with it ability in other directions. Naturally, the importance of patrolling was constantly emphasized.

The remaining days of November 1952 passed without any major incidents but much patrolling. Summarized, it may be said that the fall of 1952 had been a quiet period for the Thai Battalion. During the period, the Thai Battalion was faced by the elements of the CCF 115th, 116th and 117th Divisions under the CCF 39th Army. The enemy divisions changed as relief took place, but included at one time or another, CCF 115th, 116th and 117th Divisions.

It will have been apparent that the main activity during the past few months had been patrolling and ambushes with the main aim of dominating No Man’s Land, but also with the object of securing prisoners. Prisoners were a constant demand from the higher command.

It is necessary to emphasize that, as a general rule in describing patrol activities, only those patrols which made contact with the enemy have been mentioned. By the fortunes of war some units made contact more frequently than others. It would be quite wrong, however, to think that those units who were not engaged, and are in consequence not mentioned in the narrative, were less active than others. All infantry units patrolled very actively whenever the circumstances were suitable.

The Little Tigers—the Thai Battalion, upon relief of the Porkchop defense mission, late in November 1952, moved to the area immediately behind forward positions where it manned the blocking positions around the Hill 287—Churadong, and the mountain road along the Route 46.

On 30 November the reconnaissance elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment
patrolled to the vicinity of Yokkok River during the night where they engaged with an enemy platoon for a half hour and killed ten CCF at a cost of six wounded. During the mid-night of 1 December, the reconnaissance troops of the 9th Infantry met with an unknown number of enemy at the vicinity of the Hill 168 while the 38th Infantry patrol team engaged with an enemy squad about at the same time at the valley east of Alligator Jaws.

Meanwhile, on the morning of 3 December, the Thai Battalion was ordered to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry. The Little Tigers now took up the positions along the high ground east of Yangimal and Dogu-kol. Upon relief, the 3rd Battalion was assembled in the village of Chuam-dong. There were no noticeable incidents for a while except customary patrollings and changes of boundaries. On 9 December the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry was relieved in place by the 3rd Battalion of the Infantry arriving at the assembly area in the village of Chongwanggok by midnight. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 38th Infantry were also relieved by the 7th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on the same day. On 10 December, the patrollers from the Netherlands Battalion met with two CCF squads at the middle of the T-Bone Hill ridge and defeated the enemy off after fire fight under support of the friendly artillery fire.

Looking into the frontage of the 2nd US Division, as of 13 December 1952, two regiments were deployed on the main line of resistance with the 9th and 38th Infantry from left to right, when the 23rd Infantry (less 1st Battalion and with the French Battalion attached) was in reserve. The 9th Infantry had then three battalions on the line ranging about 9,000 meters and with the 3rd Battalion in reserve.

The center of the regimental sector was defended by the Thai Battalion along the line carrying from the village of Yangimal to the east of Togun-kol with the Battalion Command Post at Naecheon by the side of a tributary of the Imjin River. To the left of the Thailanders, the 1st Battalion maintained the main defense positions on the high ground along the southeast of the Yokkok River from south of San-kol to the immediate left of the Thai Battalion, and to the right, the 2nd Battalion had deployed from the right side of Togun-kol through the Hill 347 to a finger ridge near the Yokkok River. Thence northeastward the 3rd, the Netherlands, and the 2nd Battalions of the 38th Infantry were on the outpost line including the high heights in Karhwa-kol, the Hill 324—Alligator Jaws, and the west bank of the Yokkok River.

Just before midnight of 13 December, the left flank of the outpost line of resistance of the Thai Battalion was probed by a CCF company under support of artillery and heavy mortar fire. But the enemy probing attack was repelled killing thirty enemy during thirty minutes long engagement. At 2200 hours on
the same night, the patrol team from the Netherlands Battalion also engaged with an unknown number of enemy at the Hill 179 situated in the wide valley and forced the enemy to retreat to the T-Bone Hill direction after ten-minute fire fight. About a half hour later it again met with an enemy platoon in strength in the vicinity of the same area and fought for a short while and withdrew when the friendly artillery shells poured upon the enemy. On 16 December the 9th Infantry’s reconnaissance platoon encountered with a CCF platoon at 2210 hours at the vicinity of Hasa-kol north of the Porkchop Hill and disengaged after fifteen minutes fighting.

During the night of 20-21 December, the left flank of the Thai Battalion’s main defense line in the vicinity of Yangimal was again attacked by a reinforced enemy company to overrun the outpost. Approximately an hour later the Thai elements launched a determined counterattack and regained the outpost as the night was over. The Red Chinese were retreated back to the direction of the Hill 168 and also to Mogyak-kol across the Yokkok River, under fire of the friendly artillery enroute.

On 29 December, the Indianhead Division (Plus the Thai, French, and Netherlands Battalions) was ordered by the I US Corps to be in Corps reserve upon the completion of relief on positions by the 7th US Division. In turn, the 9th Infantry, to which the Thai Battalion attached, was completely relieved in place by the 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th US Division by 1200 hours of the day. The Ethiopian Battalion then being attached to the 32nd Infantry took over the Little Tigers positions. Upon relief, withdrawing out of contact with the enemy, the Thai Battalion moved to the village of Pisokkori about 13 kilometers south of Pochon, while the 9th Infantry assembled in and around Kuchaemal near Route 391, further 3 kilometers south from Pisokkori where the Little Tigers were bivouacking. During the period in reserve the Thai Battalion Commander and Staff officers had, of course, kept in close touch with operational matters.

An unexpected incident was occurred in the area where the Indianhead Division just moved out. The day when the 7th US Division completed the relief of the 2nd US Division in the sector, the Chinese Communist forces evidently decided to take advantage of the change-over. A reinforced enemy company that night raided an outpost at Chongjamal, four kilometers south west of the Old Baldy Hill, and forced the defenders to pull back. However, since the friendly artillery units had the coordinated fire barrage plans, they began to zero in on the Reds and the punishment finally forced the enemy to retire to his position.
Section 2. At Naechon in Imjin River Sector
(29 December 1952—14 July 1953)

In the fall of 1952, meanwhile, of course, the fighting went on, but in a reduced tempo. The heavy CCF attacks and raids of October and November were not renewed in the following two months, and patrollings were the principal activities during this period. Standing, reconnaissance, ambush and fighting patrols, together with frequent alert under warning of the Red Chinese attack, provided constant employment.

As the year 1953 came in across the frozen hills of Korea, the Thai Battalion was in reserve together with the 9th US Infantry Regiment of the 2nd US Division at Pupyong-ni near Uijongbu and about 25 kilometers northeast from Seoul. As the chill of approaching winter slowly hardened the ground into iron, the men of the Thai Battalion stood up well in the struggle against the weather, terrain, and enemy.

The first few days at Pupyong-ni were occupied with preparation for training program that was scheduled to begin in the first part of January. The training began with basic military subjects, such as map reading, use of compass, foot marches, small units tactics, and soon included attack and defense problems on the snow hills made more realistic by the battle of machine guns and mortars. The later half of a four week training course was discontinued and the Battalion was alerted to relieve the elements of the British Commonwealth Division in the line.

Meanwhile, in late January 1953 orders were received that the 2nd US Division and its subordinate units would relieve the 1st Commonwealth Division in the Hook and Little Gibraltar sector in the west of the Imjin River at the end of the month. On 27 January, preparations and arrangements in the divisional layout began, with object of facilitating the impending relief. The divisional relief itself began on the 29th and was completed by the 30th.

The Thai Battalion moved from the bivouac area in Pupyong-ni to the new area vacated by the elements of the Commonwealth Division in the southwest zone of the Imjin River, where it remained in reserve of the 9th Infantry Regiment until 13 February, while the Regiment went back on the line on 29 January, taking over the 28th British Brigade positions.

In the 9th regimental sector, the 1st Battalion was on the left, the 2nd on the right in the Little Gibraltar sector, and the 3rd Battalion occupied the
center of the line. The 2nd US Division immediately opened its Command Post at Munak along the east bank of the Imjin River.

For the first two weeks there was little activity except for the steady exchange of artillery and mortar fire and patrolling in No Man's Land in the 9th regimental sector. During the early morning of 13 February, with E Company providing the attacking force, a reinforced platoon of the 2nd Battalion was sent out to raid the Hill 217. The leading raiders moved through the outpost of the left flank at 0430 hours while the main body passed through the frontal zone toward objective. At 0515 hours, just as the lead elements of the raiders reached their objective, they were spotted by an enemy outpost. A single warning scream broke the silence and echoed across the valley to the friendly lines. Then all guns opened fire in support of the attacking forces, and raiders surged forward into the enemy position yelling and shooting as they advanced. As quickly as they had hit it was over and the raiders were withdrawing to their own lines. Soon only the distant rumble of exploding shells broke the silence as the patrol worked its way back toward the friendly lines in the first grey light of dawn of another day.

13 February was also the date that the Thailanders relieved the 1st Battalion in the left sector of the 9th Infantry, and now redeployed on the high ground in the west and northwest of Nabu-ri or Naechon in another name including the Hill 166, Pukchang, and the Hill 156 with its tactical command post at Naburi (or Na-chon). The Little Tigers took the defensive role there until 8 April 1953. This sector was the typical complex of the hills where a series of struggle continued to control the high terrain during the armistice talk period, thus faming with the names of Little Gibraltar and Hook.

The Hill 355 or Kowang-san, most dominant hill in the sector, was too well known to the UN troops as Little Gibraltar and from the rear it bore a striking resemblance to its name sake. To the north and west, however, the descent was more gradual.

The lower slopes of the hill were bounded on the north and south by two eastwest valleys and on the west by a draw which contained two saddles. The first of these saddles lay due west of the Hill 355, and connected with the Hill 277, the second lay to the north and south were continuous with developed tracks running along them. The Hill 355 and the adjacent features to the west and northwest had been the scene of bitter fighting, on varying scales, since the area was first occupied by the UN forces during "Operation Commando" in October 1951.

In the meantime, on 11 February, General James Van Fleet handed over command of the Eighth US Army to General Maxwell Taylor, a paratrooper
who had led the 101st US Airborne Division in the campaign in north west Europe during the World War II.

A characteristic of grand warfare at this stage was patrolling and ambushes in an effort to capture prisoners with a primarily emphasis on controlling of critical terrain features. For the Little Tigers, the Thai Battalion, upon being committed on the new battleline in the vicinity of Nae-chon or Naburi, located in about 5 kilometers southwest from Little Gibraltar, aggressive patrolling and alert defense brought to mind earlier exploits on Forkchop and the T-Bone sector.

During the period there was a drive throughout the UN line to get more prisoners. To forestall this the Thai Battalion Commander issued an order deprecating the practice of laying down an arbitrary number to be carried out by the forward companies. Some night, a patrol to the enemy high ground across the valley had several of its members wounded by a grenade a CCF soldier threw at the raiding group, just as it was approaching a trench on the southern end of the feature. The explosion wounded the patrol leader and prompted a withdrawal, which the enemy followed with mortar and automatic weapons fire. Except for few similar incidents, the month's patrolling was uneventful, nor did the enemy beset himself actively in the immediate vicinity of the Thailanders positions.

The third day on the line, on 15 February, a ranger type patrol made contact with a strong enemy force at the eastern slope of the Hill 166 across the valley that pushed the Thailanders back to within 200 meters of the friendly line. Reinforced by the regular outpost security troops in the area and later by a special patrol, the Thailanders contained the Red Chinese and forced the enemy to retreat. The center sector just left of the Hill 355, manned by the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry, exploded during the early morning of 18 February. A patrol party in platoon strength from the K Company, returning from an uneventful sweep of the valley encountered four dozing Red Chinese blocking the trail less than 200 meters from the friendly line. Hoping to catch a prisoner, the patrol immediately deployed in a skirmish line and began a sweep up the narrow steep-sided finger. Almost at once a fire started with both sides throwing hand grenades and exchanging blasts of automatic weapons fire at close range. The Red force, an estimated platoon, decided to retire using side slopes of the finger ridge as an escape route, while the friendly patrol began an aggressive push up the right half on the finger, resulting in a deadlock. The enemy now held both the high ground to the front and the reverse slope of the finger on the left, a frozen mine field blocked the right flank. With no other way open, a successful withdrawal was made through the mine field. At dawn
a special patrol of the volunteers from I and K Companies returned to
the scene of the action and with the support of tank fire, inflicted additional
casualties on the enemy stragglers. Still the K Company's predilection for
making contact with the enemy came to the fore again the next night when a
patrol was ambushed by a large Red Chinese force in the Bowling Alley, more
like a cross compartment valley laying on the bottom of the Hill 227 through
Kowang-ni south of the Hill 355 to Kyemyong-ni. For the Thailan
ders the remaining days of the month of February had been passed without major
incidents except for customary patrolling.

As March began, the Red Chinese went over to the offensive again, on a
limited scale, to be sure, particularly in the I US Corps front in an effort to
regain the initiative.

On 1 March, beginning at 0300 hours, the enemy employed heavy weight
of artillery and mortar fire into the area of the 1st and 2nd Companies of the
Thai Battalion, indicating the imminent probing attack. The enemy attacking
echelon in two company size, could not infiltrate into the main defense posi-
tions of the Thailanders, encountering strong resistance. Meanwhile, the Little
Tigers Battalion sent out a special combat patrol party to wipe out the
enemy, under cover of supporting fire of 4.2 inch mortar and artillery. The
enemy soon moved back to the north west direction giving up further attempt.
It had not been achieved without cost, the Thailanders, with 6 killed, 23
wounded, and 1 missing, had escaped lightly. The enemy losses were presumed
great.

On the other hand, the enemy launched his major attack in the 9th regi-
mental sector on the same day. Early morning of 1 March, a thunderous barrage
of artillery and mortar rounds started to fall on the positions of E Company
of the 2nd Battalion, the low left finger of Little Gibraltor, and fifteen
minutes later an enemy force estimated as battalion sized strength dashed
onto the outpost positions. Storming through its own artillery and mortar
fire, the enemy then swept up into the left flank of the 2nd platoon
of the Company. A period of confused and vicious hand-to-hand battle took
place with the enemy and the men of E Company combined with the elements of
F Company, under the direct command of Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Cleak, the
Battalion Commander, who launched a counterattack that succeeded in throwing
the Red Chinese from the position. The enemy was pinched between the coun-
terattack and artillery that was falling on its escape route toward the hill. Over
50 per cent of the enemy's original attacking force of approximately 500 was
estimated to have become casualties in the battle.

The next day was moving day for the 9th Infantry Regiment. The 1st
Battalion, which had been in regimental reserve upon being relieved by the Thai Battalion on the line in mid-February, now returned back to the line on 2 March, thus taking over the defense positions of the 3rd Battalion in the center sector. The Thailanders in the left sector of the 9th Infantry remained in their positions.

During the night of 11-12 March, a special patrol force of the Thai Battalion infiltrated in surprise into the enemy defense position on the east slope of the Hill 156. In the course of raiding, the Thailanders were counterattacked by the enemy in an estimated platoon. The patrol troops withdrew after a short while engagement, and artillery and mortar fire pounded the enemy positions from the supporting friendly units. There was a brief lull along the front. Mud restricted mobility of action with the advent of the late winter rains but did not deter the enemy from resuming the attack shortly after the middle of March.

The situation in the 2nd US Division front saw a bit more action four days later when two enemy companies fell on a patrol from the 38th Infantry near the Hook, southwest of the Samichon. While the patrol tenaciously fought off the Red Chinese attackers, artillery and mortar fire were called in and reinforcements rushed up. Finally the enemy pulled back the next morning.

Heavy rain fell during the last ten days of March, this being much heavier than is normal for the time of year. Road conditions became very bad and operational action was considerably curtailed. The enemy probes of outpost positions continued on the nights of the 24th, 25th, and 26th of March. But the Red Chinese were stymied as the friendly units were alert and ready for their stabs.

During the night of 24-25 March, an outpost of the Thai Battalion was attacked by a numerically superior foe, estimated a reinforced battalion. Soon, hand-to-hand combat and a frisk fire fight ensued for forty minutes before the enemy began to disengage. The Battalion sent out immediately a special reconnaissance group in force to the enemy held area where it could not contact with the enemy.

The early days of April was devoted preparations for the relief in the line by the elements of the Commonwealth Division. The preliminary moves of the 2nd US Division began on 6 April in the fine weather. The Thai Battalion together with the 9th US Infantry was relieved by the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on 8 April beginning from 0600 hours. Upon relief, the Thai Battalion moved to Pupypong-ni, about 10 kilometers east of Uijongbu on Route 314, where it was to be retrained for another twenty days while being remain-
ed in reserve of the 2nd US Division thereafter.

By now, the spring thaw had begun to loosen the frozen ground, bunkers were leaking and in some cases even collapsing, and the trenches were rapidly becoming a sea of red mud of glue-like consistency and incredible depth. The relief of the 9th Infantry was practically completed early in the morning of 9 April when the last Commonwealth unit came up to Little Gibraltar to replace the 3rd Battalion in position. The first days after the Thai Battalion and the 9th Infantry closed back into their old January reserve area at Pupyong-ni were devoted to resting and reequipping, with training resuming on 14 April.

With the 2nd US Division changing from the I US Corps to the IX US Corps on 27 April, the Thai Battalion moved from the field training center at Pupyong-ni to the Kansas Line starting at 0600 hours in the morning, where the Thailanders started improving the positions on the line upon arrival. The command post exercise, large problems such as individual training in basic military subjects and combat specialist, unit training in various phases of tactics and employment of offensive and defensive fire, occupied most of the time while there.

On 4 May the Thai Battalion was ordered to move from the Kansas Line to Kyo-dong roughly 5 kilometers west of Unchon and also eleven kilometers due south from Chorwon where the 2nd US Division's staging area was located. While there remaining in US IX Corps reserve, the Little Tigers had been able to carry on a limited training program, rotating the rifle companies within the battalion, in addition to took up the blocking positions on the Wyoming Line until early July.

The period of 4 May 1952 through 21 June 1953 was served by the contingents of the 5th rotation-echelon of the Royal Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Parti Yosakrai succeeded the command from Major Boon Rangaratna on 21 June 1953.

During the first week in June many air strikes were carried out behind the enemy facing Boomerang and Iron Triangle. Some friendly raiding troops blew up some enemy caves and fortified strong points in the forward area of the present line of contact, but unfortunately ran into the minefields in many instances and had resulted in casualties.

The rest of the month was an exceptionally quiet period, there being no aggressive actions other than some light shelling and mortaring and a few minor patrol clashes.

By this time the cease fire talks had got a stage where it seemed likely that an early armistice would result. The Communist Chinese forces concentrated against weak forward positions in order to eliminate isolated outposts. These
operations were carried out chiefly against the ROK forces, mainly with the object of pushing the armistice demarcation line as far south as possible and to get the Government of the Republic of Korea into a frame of mind receptive to an armistice on terms favourable to the Communist forces.

On 12 July the Thai Battalion under command of Lieutenant Colonel Parti Yosakrai was again alerted for tactical commitment, with instructions to relieve the elements of the 7th and 65th US Infantry Regiments of the 3rd US Division in the Boomerang sector northwest of Kumhwa one of the Iron Triangle bases, where the Thailan.ders had previously battled during the period from 26 December 1951 to 20 May 1952.

It would be appropriate at this time to note about the armistice talks development.
In March and April, 1953, the situation was abruptly changed when, on 28 March, the Communist aggressors at last agreed to negotiate an immediate exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners. In the succeeding days the details were gradually worked out. The agreement that was signed on 11 April completed the general arrangements. Finally, 20 April was established
as the date for initiating the exchange of the said prisoners, so-called Little Switch at Panmunjom under supervision of a Custodian Forces provided by the Government of India.
CHAPTER IX  BEFORE AND AFTER ARMISTICE

Section 1.  End of Hostile Action  
(14—27 July 1953)

Upon receiving a warning order, on 12 July, Lieutenant Colonel Parti Yosakrai, the Battalion Commander, accompanied by the Battalion Operations Officer, made the terrain reconnaissance to and around Ugu-dong where to be the new defense area for the Thailanders. At 1700 hours during the course, 10 rounds of the enemy mortar shells were landed in the area all at once. At about midnight, the advance party led by the Battalion Operations Officer together with First Lieutenant Anderson, a liaison officer from the 2nd US Division, started out from Kyo-dong in the IX US Corps reserve area, and arrived at the designated area in the early afternoon of the following day. On the early morning of 14 July, the main body of the Thailanders moved out from the present assembly area in Kyo-dong in motor columns, the 2nd, 3rd and 1st Companies in order, and reached by noon its new positions in the vicinity of Ugu-dong, about 6 kilometers southwest of Kumgong-ni in the Boomerang area inbetween Chorwon and Kumhwa. The motor movement had been hampered by mud and the pitch dark night with moonlight and vehicle headlights absent. Furthermore, 20 rounds of the enemy mortar were directed when the 1st Company assembly just took place at the new area, which resulted in no casualty however.

The Little Tigers were assigned the left sector of the 9th Infantry’s front, the 2nd Battalion in the center, and 3rd Battalion on the right flank of the Boomerang where it tied in with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team which was just rushed to Korea from Japan on 14 July to bolster the front. The 1st Battalion was in reserve remaining in the assembly area vacated by the outgoing elements of the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd US Division.

The Little Tigers Battalion disposed its three companies in the outpost line of resistance, as a forward security force of the 2nd US Division front; the 1st Company on the left southwest, occupying the positions around a finger ridge inclusive of Hadong-ni, which was then better known as Outpost Harry, where the friendly 3rd US Division units desperately fought with the CCF 74th Division during the nine-day period from 10 to 18 June a month ago, the 2nd on the center around the Hill 351 and Sangdong-ni, and the 3rd on the right and northeast around Paem-kol and Naechon. The 4th Company
manned in depth behind the 1st and 2nd Companies to provide rear protection.

To the immediate left of the Thai Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry of the 2nd US Division deployed along the hill mass on the opposite side of the Hantan River valley, while the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry held the positions on the right. The Thai soldiers then had one Tank Platoon from the division tank battalion and a 4.2 inch heavy mortar section in direct support besides the field and anti-aircraft artillery units in general support.

The Thai Battalion was to organize and strengthen the outposts, taking advantage of key terrain features within the assigned area, as its first task. The ground the Battalion occupied was typical of that along the Iron Triangle sector. The area fronted on the Hantan River, the dominant hill complex lay both in the northwest and northeast, overlooking the valleys.

Looking into the enemy situation, there were three division sized CCF forces facing the Thai Battalion and the 9th Infantry US Regiment, namely the 46th, 47th, and 48th Divisions under the CCF 16th Army with the 70th, 71st and 72nd of the CCF Army as their adjacent forces in the central front. At this stage of war, the intensity and determined effort of the CCF offensive impressively centered on the ROK forces in distinction from the other UN allies. The pattern of the Red offensive attack had developed as the enemy increased the weight of his pressure mostly upon the ROK divisions. Usually, a reinforced battalion and two or more battalion attacks accompanied by heavy artillery and mortar support broke through the outpost system and drove into the main line positions. Yet, there had been waged the bloody contest elsewhere as the cease fire negotiations seemed to be in well progress at Panmunjom.

In order to keep contact with the enemy, the Battalion sent out the patrols day and night. It was customary jobs to carry out a rehearsal training using the modeled sand-table to familiarize the terrain conditions and the friendly mine fields prior to the patrolling actions. Because of the heavy rain during the night of 14-15 July, a lot of damage was done to signal communication facilities and various obstacles. Thus no distinction could be made to the safety lane laid out in the mine fields. The Thailiders devoted themselves to restore the damage with the support of the engineer unit dispatched from the 2nd US Division Engineer Battalion.

On 15 July, the first action took place in the Thai Battalion since the occupation of the new sector. The 2nd platoon of the 1st Company began receiving enemy fire of the 82-mm mortars and small arms along the outpost positions in the morning at 1005 hours. The fire continued to come until 1200 hours, but although the line was fully alert for the possible enemy probes, there was no physical or short range contact. During the period, the bulk
volume of the friendly artillery fire was concentrated on the Hill 325 upon
the request of fire support by First Lieutenant Adul Chaisiri, the Platoon
Leader.

At 1800 hours in the evening, the Battalion was instructed by the Colonel
Richard Stenbach, the 9th US Regimental Commander, that a friendly special
ranger force was scheduled to infiltrate into the enemy held area through the
Battalion defense area. About one and a half hours later, four friendly rangers,
one US and three ROK agents equipped with full armament in the CCF uni-
forms, arrived at the 1st Company Headquarters when the front activity was
lulled except for occasional exchange of artillery and mortar fire. At about
2100 hours, there happened a misfortune by the explosion of a buried mine
causing one agent killed and two wounded. The 1st Company sent out four
men to evacuate and give first-aid to the two wounded immediately following the
accident. At the moment the enemy poured 100 rounds of mortars on the 2nd
and 3rd Platoon areas of the 1st Company, and two platoon sized CCF forces
made their approaches to the 2nd Platoon’s positions. The Platoon reacted strong
resistance to pin down the enemy infiltration, and Captain Pryoon Ploinukda,
the 1st Company Commander, ordered the 1st and 3rd Platoons to provide
the fire support to the attacked platoon based on the pre-arranged barrage
plan. Captain Pryoon also ordered the Heavy Weapons Platoon to strike with
the mortars the enemy positions, a spur of the Hill 325 across the valley, and
to launch the flare shells at every ten minutes to the river crossing point to
illuminate the enemy advance. The 1st Company had engaged with the enemy
until 0140 hours early next morning, while receiving the fire support from
the artillery and mortar units. The enemy attempt was failed by a deter-
mined counter action of the defenders. Less than ten minutes later, a Thai
patrol party repelled one enemy platoon after exchanging rifle and machine
gun fire at Yulmong-ni about 600 meters forward of the 3rd Battalion outpost
position. At about 0240 hours, another two platoon sized enemy attempted
to occupy the outpost of the 2nd Company near Naechon, but the Thai
defenders stood stubbornly until the enemy retired. At 1000 hours, Lieutenant
Colonel Parti, the Battalion Commander, after having through inspection over
the terrain feature with his staff Major Bamroong Starom, issued an order
to subordinate companies to reconstruct and augment the bunkers and
trenches which had been caused by the heavy rain during the night of 14-15
July. Meanwhile, the patrol team from the 2nd Company spotted two enemy
tanks, at the vicinity of the Hill 250 and destroyed them with supporting
artillery fire. At 1600 hours, nine rounds of the enemy artillery shells
landed around Homsaek-tong in the rear of the 1st Company when the Company
was busy in test-firing of mortars from the new emplacement.
At 2130 hours the Battalion Headquarters informed of its subordinate commanders that the support of a mobile tank-infantry unit was available within 10 minutes upon request. The Battalion Commander further instructed that the enemy, according to information disseminated by the higher command, was likely to attack the 2nd and 3rd Company areas so that the illumination shells would be dropped over the Thai sector by the friendly aircraft. A half hour later approximately 80 rounds of the enemy mortars shelled on the northeast flank of the 3rd Company. The enemy fire slightly wounded two crews of the recoilless rifle section emplaced in an exposed position. Private First Class Snit, a cook, was also wounded seriously caused by a shell exploded near the mess tent. Shortly after midnight, the 2nd Platoon of the 1st Company, after being received the enemy mortar fire from the Hill 325, responded heavy fire with 4.2 inch mortars. After a while the enemy gun position became silent.

On the early morning of 16 July the enemy mortar shells began to drop 100 meters in front of the 1st Company and fire continued on all along the Battalion sector. Ten minutes later, the outpost troops of the 3rd Company could observe the trip flare detonated at the outpost of the 2nd Battalion of the 9th US Infantry. Judging from the sounds of explosion and fire, it was certain that the Red Chinese were attacking the US battalion in the right flank of the Little Tigers. In fact, the enemy forces in a reinforced battalion strength had hit both F and G Companies of the 2nd Battalion, the 9th US Regiment but were immediately driven off.

L Company, holding the most dangerous positions in the Boomerang sector, was attacked in the afternoon of 16 July by another CCF battalion. On the other hand, the Thai Battalion Commander ordered the 3rd Company which had been immediate adjacent to the embattled US Companies, to disperse the enemy attacking elements. The 3rd Thai Company Commander made his 2nd Platoon, which was close to the US Company, fire support with 60-mm mortars and all other weapons they had, to provide flank fire. Finally the enemy were beaten off without having reached the friendly US positions. Colonel Stenbach, the 9th US Regimental Commander telephoned soon Lieutenant Colonel Parti to express his appreciation and the next morning he further extended his gratitude by dispatching a group of his staff officers to the Thai Battalion.

Colonel Stenbach, the 9th US Regimental Commander informed the Battalion Commander, at the briefing conference held in the afternoon of 18 July at the Regimental Headquarters, that the recent brilliant battles should be reported to the 2nd US Division Commander and also the Eighth
US Army Commander, and he further went on to instruct that each commander should report on the meritorious soldiers who defended the Boomerang sector to the last. He also admitted that the successful actions were resulted from the strong resistance by US troops and adjoining Thailanders' close support. Indeed, the decisive factor attributable to the latest victory was the strict morale and will to fight of the Little Tigers.

In the morning of 17 July, Colonel Julian J. Ewell, the successor of Colonel Stenbach to command the 9th US Infantry effective on 20 July, visited the Thai Battalion to get first hand situation.

On the afternoon of 17 July, the Battalion Intelligence Officer informed all Companies that the CCF opposing the Thai Battalion was likely to be about two CCF Divisions, deployed on the Hill 689 or Turyu-bong and the Hill 612 and might assume offensive on the very night. Starting from 1800 hours the enemy mortar fire began to land all over the Thai sector. Several mortar shells hit the KSC bunker, 50 meters away from the command post bunker of the 3rd Company in the evening. Ten more rounds of the enemy shells dropped on the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of the Company but no casualty was reported. The 2nd Platoon Leader reported that the launching point of the enemy mortars was located on the eastern slope of the Hill 325. Consequently, the 3rd Company Commander called for fire support of the artillery unit which delivered the continued concentration until the enemy gun position became silent. The friendly mortars in direct support bombed during the same period the enemy positions on the Hill 250 for an hour long. In late evening of 17 July, Lieutenant Colonel Parti, taking consideration into the enemy movement, ordered his subordinate commanders to report the respective unit situation at every 30 minutes. At about 2135 hours, the 2nd Platoon Leader of the 1st Company reported to the Company Commander that simultaneously with launching of the three red flare-bombs, the Red Chinese opened intense fire on the platoon position with the machine guns and rifles from the Hill 325. Upon the receipt of the report, the Company Commander ordered without delay his reconnaissance team to move out and screen the patrolling routes. In the mean time, the Company Commander further reported the strained situation to the Battalion Command Post in detail and requested permission for the withdrawal of his patrols from that area.

The Red enemy made an assault from the two directions as was expected before long. The main enemy forces in an estimated two company sized strength began to move in along the east bank of the Hantan River, taking cover of rocks and concealments, also a few enemy forces crossed the swamp and rice paddies, and rushed onto the left flank of the 1st Company without missing
momentum. The 2nd Platoon of the Company resisted strongly with all fire power available against the enemy attack, but the Platoon became in a most perilous situation encountering with such outnumbered odds. The 1st Company Commander, in accordance with the Battalion Commander’s order, ordered his reconnaissance party to withdraw from the present patrolling area, and the 1st, 3rd, and the Heavy Weapons Platoons to support the 2nd Platoon. At the same time he also ordered each Platoon to cover the reconnaissance party which was to be enrouled through the valley. The Thai troops fired 60-mm mortars over the enemy heads, and launched illumination flare onto a river-crossing point at every five minutes. On the other hand, the division artillery poured a shower of bombs on the Hill 325 where the enemy mortars and heavy machine guns were emplaced. In addition, the friendly 81-mm and 4.2 inch mortars fired along the river side. Soon the enemy battery became silent on account of the friendly artillery concentration fire. Nevertheless, it was sighted that the enemy was still approaching disregarding their heavy casualties. After a short while, however, the enemy advance had been entirely curbed due to the stubborn opposition of the Thainlanders.

At about 2200 hours, the Red Chinese attempted again toward the left flank of the 1st Company position by breaking through the mine fields. The leading attackers reached within 100 meters from the outpost position, just before the Company Commander requested for fire support hurriedly. Less than a half hour later, the enemy retreated back after being beaten by the 450 rounds of friendly artillery shells. As the flare bombs were out of stock within the Battalion, an aircraft was employed to illuminate the action area around the crossing point at the time. Fifteen minutes later, the 2nd Company Commander, in order to support the 1st Company, ordered his two platoons to be alerted and further to infiltrate into the flank and rear of the enemy held positions. The infiltrators closed in along the Hantan River, firing the automatic weapons to the concealments where the enemy might be in ambush. The Thai troops kept the raido turned on all the time for reporting the situation to the outpost defenders. At 2230 hours, the enemy resumed the attack toward the 1st Company position with mortars and laid down a smoke screen throughout the forward area of the Thai defense line. Ten minutes later or so, the enemy attacking momentum slowed down when the enemy launched three blue flare bombs from the Hill 325. The enemy was retreating once again.

In the meantime, Major Chaweng Yangchaloen, the Thailand Liaison Officer to the United Nations Command in Tokyo came to Korea on 8 July 1953
to take his tenure as the member of the Prisoners Repatriation Supervisory Commission and he had been mainly involved with the enemy prisoners at the Taejon POW Camp.

On 25 July, Major General Thanom Kittikachorn, incidentally promoted later to Field Marshal and became the Prime Minister, flew to Seoul via Tokyo from Thailand, accompanied by Major Porn Thanpoom, with the intention to attend the armistice table, and they proceeded directly to Mun-san where the base camp of the friendly delegates was located. On the next day, Colonel Chan Angsuchote, Chief Liaison Officer to the United Nations Command in Tokyo, and a party of UNC liaison officers of other lands, arrived in Seoul to witness the signing of the armistice if it took place in a few days.

Shortly before midnight of 26 July, considerable rounds of the enemy mortar shells hit the right flank of the 2nd Company outpost positions and the intensity of firing grew up for an half hour period. The Company requested immediately the supporting artillery to pound the area which followed within a few minutes. This became the last action in the Korean War for the Thailands.

At 0100 hours of 27 July, the 3rd outpost of the 2nd Company reported that the shouting and yelling of the Red Chinese were heard out from the Hill 325 west of the Hantan River. The rest of the night was unusually quiet one. At about 0300 hours after day break, the Battalion Commander ordered each of the company commanders to halt all the hostile actions at 2145 hours of the night since the truce would become effective at 2200 hours.

The truce was finally signed by the both delegates at Panmunjom at 1000 hours on 27 July 1953. General Mark Clark, the UNC Commander signed the documents at Munsan at 1300 hours, and hostilities ceased at 2201 hours. Briefly, the armistice agreement provided for a military demarcation line alongside existing front with a demilitarized buffer zone between the forces. The zone was four kilometers wide and included most of the outposts fought over during the period of static war but not the main defense lines. The 248-kilometer demarcation line ran from the mouth of the Imjin River, just west of Munsan, to a point almost directly north of Panmunjom, from where it proceeded northeast to a point some eight kilometers north of Chorwon. After running almost due east to a point 22 kilometers north of Yanggu, the line reached the Eastern Sea about eight kilometers south of Kosong. After three years' fighting the Communists held about 850 square kilometers of territory that the Republic of Korea had and the United Nations forces 2,350 square kilometers of territory which the north Korean Communists occupied before cease fire.

As of 2045 hours in the night of 27 July, all the Thai Battalion troops moved
to the PAMB(Post Armistice Main Battle Position) to halt the hostile activities and began every preparation to meet the conditions in accordance with the truce agreement. In the meantime, the opponent forces also kept silent during the night, and all hostilities ceased at 2200 hours when all front became silent.

So the fighting in Korea for three years and one month ended after hostilities began on 25 June 1950, and two years and eight months from the time the first Thailand contingent had landed at Pusan on 7 November 1950.

As of 27 July 1953, the casualties in the 1st Battalion of the 21st Royal Thai Battalion since it committed into the battle line were as follows:

Killed in Action 91  
Wounded in Action 418  
Missing in Action 5  
**Sub-total** 514  
Killed or Dead in Non-combat 34  
Injured in Non-combat 721  
**Total** 1,269

Section 2. After Cease-Fire  
(28 July 1953–21 June 1972)

The next day, on 28 July, some portion of the Battalion forces deployed over the PAMB, starting at 0600 hours in the morning, down to the rear by two kilometers from the current defense positions and completed by 0600 hours on 30 July. During the period of this new phase, the Thailands continued to set out their routine patrolling teams, posting the security guards in force throughout the sentry line, though the hot fighting was halted, without being distracted, for the enemy violation of the truce agreement was still possible. At the time the security aspect was most important and strict measures were taken to prevent unauthorized people from entering the Battalion area. The main body of the Battalion engaged themselves in removing of equipment, demolitions, and installations in the old defense area to relocate on the new positions by the morning of the last day of the month. Then it proceeded to the new defense line and began to fortify around the high ground north of Ugodong as the main forward positions, and remained there until 18 August 1953. Eventually, Paem-kol, Hill 351 and Hadong-ni in the northwest of Boomerang sector where the Thailands had defended until the last minute of the ceasefire became the southern portion of the Demilitarized Zone.
To the left of the Battalion, the elements of the 38th US Infantry Regiment took up the new positions, while the 2nd Battalion of the 9th US Infantry of the 2nd US Division redeployed on the right. (See Situation Map 7).

Meanwhile, Major General Thanom Kittikachorn visited the Thai Battalion on 2 August on the way of his official inspection tour in the capacity of the Standing Member of the Military Armistice Commission.

On 9 August 1953, meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Parti Yoskrai, the Commander of the Little Tigers Battalion, was honoured with the Letter of Commendation by Lieutenant General Reuben E Jenkins, Commanding General of the IX US Corps, for whole hearted joint effort of the Thai soldiers and distinguished service as an effective combat unit under his leadership. Six days later, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Royal Thai Regimental Combat Team was further honoured with a unit citation by Field Marshal Praek Pibulsongkram, Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of Thailand on 15 August 1953, on account of meritorious combat deeds demonstrated by the Thailand soldiers during the Korean War.

On 18 August the Royal Thai Battalion was ordered by the 2nd US Division, Major General W.L. Berriger in command, to move back to Sagumhak, roughly 5 kilometers south of Ugu-dong and 7 kilometers south of the southern boundary of Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where it remained until 25 September in the division reserve, having the troops assembled in the following locations.

- 1st Company
  - Eastern outskirts of Sagumhak village.
- 2nd Company
  - 500 meters north from the Battalion CP.
- 3rd Company
  - 400 meters west of the Battalion CP.
- 4th Company
  - 400 meters northwest of the Battalion CP.
- Service Company
  - 700 meters north of the Battalion CP.
- Battalion Hqs and CP
  - Just west of the Battalion Headquarters.

The Thailands enjoyed themselves with a warmest letter of appreciation written by Major General W.L. Barriger, the 2nd US Division Commander, dated 30 August 1953, paying a high tribute to the Thai troops for their glorious battle accounts whenever they had committed in actions. Colonel Julian J. Ewell, the Commander of the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd US Division, also wrote to the Thai Battalion Commander on 17 September, admiring the Thailands in highest praise not only for their aggressiveness in combat and operational proficiency as their nick name, Little Tigers—explains itself, but also on their extremely excellent disciplinary record during the past tenure.

On 25 September the Thai Battalion received the orders from the 2nd US Division Commander to become the reserve unit of the 9th US Infantry Regiment upon relieving of the current role by the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry.
In the morning of the following day, the movement commenced to proceed to Choom-ni, about three kilometers northwest of Sagumphak, where the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry just vacated out, and the relief was completed by 1900 hours. Henceforth the Thai Unit remained in the 9th regimental reserve area for one and a half month with its command post in the vicinity of Choom-ni 500 meters east of Soyom-ni.

Before sun down on that day, the Royal Thai Battalion Commander received a Letter of Appreciation from the Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Korea, wherein expressed the great gratitude to the Thai Battalion that donated a great amount of relief supplies for the homeless people and students.

On the late evening of 14 November, the Thai Battalion shifted back to the PAMBP (Post Armistice Main Battle Position) on orders, relieving the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry in position on the left flank of the Regimental defense sector. The Battalion defense line ranged approximately 4,000 meters covering from the west bank of the Hantar River, northeast of the village of Hate-dong to the high feature northeast of Ugu-dong, the same area the 1st Company had manned right after the armistice effected. Initially, the Battalion Commander disposed two companies on the PAMBP line with the 2nd and 3rd from left to right, keeping the Headquarters and Service Companies still

CP bunker of the Thailand Battalion.
in Choom-ni. The Thai defense sector was in the middle of the 38th and the 9th Infantry Regiments.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Eighth US Army Commander, also commended the Thai Battalion in his personal letter of 12 December 1953, stating that "...the Royal Thai troops had represented the Thai nation with the greatest distinction throughout the Korean War, and if the UN allies are called upon to fight again, the "Little Tigers" will be ready to take up the combat action at the point where the aggressors fell back frustrated from the allied battle front."

The Battalion was further honoured on the same date, 12 December, that General J. E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, sent to it a commendation message, saying in glowing terms that "the Thai Battalion have won, by virtue of meritorious deeds during the Korean War, the warmest and abiding admiration of all the comrades-in-arms of the other lands with whom the Thailanders joined in the common cause of the freedom and human decency."

The day of 26 December marked the second anniversary of the attachment of the Royal Thai Battalion to the 2nd US Infantry Division famed with the nick name of "Indian Head." In commemoration of long association by some fatality, Major General W. L. Barriger, the Division Commander, handed over the Letter of Appreciation dated 17 December 1953 to Lieutenant Colonel Parti Yosakrai, commending the efforts of the Little Tigers that had contributed materially to the successful accomplishment of all missions assigned to the Division and to the cause for which the United Nations forces had been fighting. He further cited that all ranks, officers and men, of the Royal Thai Battalion had achieved great tasks in the excellent spirit of comradeship and fighting.

8 April of 1954, was the most honourable day for the Thai Battalion. It was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation by the President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea for at most glorious battle merits that the Battalion had greatly contributed to the United Nations cause in defending the Republic against the Communist aggressors in Kaesong, Munsan, Chuncheon, Uijongbu, and Chorwon areas during the period from 28 November 1950 to date. It further cited in particular that the 1st Company of the Thai Battalion fought bravely at the battle of Nacchon or Nabu-ri in the Imjin River sector in the early part of March 1953, when the outnumbered Chinese Communist forces made a decisive attack, thus inflicting a fatal casualties upon the Reds. All the Thai troops those who had been participated in the war during these bitter days of fighting were now being entitled to wear the Presidential Citation Ribbon.
Moreover, the Royal Thai Battalion was honoured again with the second Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea, dated 20 May 1954, for its distinguished service during the period from 21 June 1953 through 2 May 1954, particularly for a fighting spirit exhibited by the Thailanders at the defense battle of the Hill 351 and its vicinity in the west of Boomerang and Kumhwa sector from 14 through 27 July 1953. The Red Chinese suffered more than 100 killed and 300 wounded in that action.

Since the signing of the Armistice, and the subsequent cessation of hostilities, the Little Tigers had stood alert, working long, hard hours in the preparation of new defensive positions, and guarding against any further possible outbreak of war.

Thereafter, as the truce agreement had been pursued considerably in order encountering no serious problems, the Little Tigers moved on order of the Eighth US Army Commander to a camp in Unchon, approximately 56 kilometers northeast from Seoul as its semi-permanent station while in Korea. Afterward the Thai troops again moved to Camp Mermaid near Camp Red Cloud in Uijongbu about ten kilometers north of Seoul where it had been remained until June 1972 when the last contingent troops of the Royal Thailand Forces in Korea finally demobilized back to the homeland, thus marking the end of 12 years and 7 months of prolonged service in Korea.

During the period, the Thai troops maintained in Korea one company sized strength, since the 7th echelon of troop rotation took place in July 1956, until the 23rd and last rotation troops had left Korea under the command of Major Eusamsak Chulacharitta in June 1972.

Throughout the post-truce period the morale of the Thai troops remained high, and the anti-climax which follows the end of the most wars was noticeably lacking in Korea. The requirement of preparing for the new defense lines all available time, and when this work was completed the Thai troops embarked upon a strenuous period of training in mobile warfare in mountainous country. All ranks of the Thailanders had been maintained the high standard set by their predecessors and were ready for any eventuality. All went about their tasks with the same sense of duty as was displayed fighting the Communist aggressors before the armistice.
Section 3. Epilogue

From the time of its arrival in Korea the 1st Battalion of the 21st Royal Thailand Regimental Combat Team had made a distinct contribution to the United Nations effort. Since 7 November 1950, when the first contingent of the Thai Army forces landed at Pusan, the Battalion formed an important part of the UN ground forces in Korea, and in no small part, it had rendered to the successful operations of the United Nations forces: From its first action at Pyongyang front during the first Korean winter through the defense of Kaesong, mop-up operations for the Red guerrillas and remnants of defeated enemy troops in Mungyang, offensive actions in Chunchon and Hwachon sector to seize and secure the Kansas Line, and defensive and counteroffensive actions in Uljangebu—Tongduchon front to the gallant stand on the dominant terrains in Kumbwra and Iron Triangle, Porkchop Hill, T-Bone Hill ridge, Naechon—Little Gibraltar sector in the Jamestown Line and the final phase in the Boomerang.

Famed for their nickname, Little Tigers, the soldiers of the Royal Thai Battalion had demonstrated themselves as a respected member of the United Nations forces, serving with the 187th US Airborne Regimental Combat Team, the 29th British Infantry Brigade, the 1st US Cavalry Division, and the 2nd US Infantry Division. Particularly, subjected to vicious attacks in the Porkchop, Outpost Eerie, Naechon in the Imjin River sector, and Outpost Harry and its vicinity in the Boomerang sector, the Little Tigers held and controlled the positions desperately, thus no enemy forces reached the Thai Battalion lines.

In such bitter fighting, during their tenacious defense of critical terrain and key outpost positions against the determined CCF attacks in overwhelming forces, over prolonged periods, the Thainlanders stood their ground, battling with bayonets and knives in bloody hand-to-hand combat. To conclude, the men of the Thailand Battalion had played an important and great role in the success attained by the United Nations forces in Korea.

The operational efficiency, esprit de corps, cooperative attitude, and courage exhibited by the Thai soldiers throughout the Korean battle, had established an excellent example for all the UN forces, which reflects great credit upon themselves, the Royal Thailand Army, and their Homeland.

Immortal distinguished services of the Royal Thai Expeditionary Forces in the Korean War and outstanding contribution to the cause of freedom shall be recorded externally and perpetuated with its name in the authentic history of the Korean War.

Let all who read this battle history salute to and remember those soldiers
of the Kingdom of Thailand who left their homeland to fight in Korea against the Communist aggressor, and will not return forever.

Section 4. Post-Scripts

**Last Contingent**

By the way, the last contingent of the Thai Army Force was finally set out on a journey way back to their dear old homeland in June 1972.

A joint farewell ceremony was splendidly held on 21 June 1972 at the parade ground of the United Nations Command under the co-sponsorship of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the UN Command. The ceremony started at ten o'clock in the morning in the presence of the Prime-Minister Kim Jong Pil, Defense Vice Minister Ryu Kun Chang, ranking representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Marine Corps of the Republic of Korea; General John H. Michaelis, Commander-in-Chief of the UNC; General Surakis Maylarp, Chief of Staff, the Royal Thai Army Command; and many other generals and ranking officials from both Governments,

A scene of field tents in early thawing season
Korea and Thailand, and UNC. General Chote Klongvicha, Royal Thai Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Lieutenant General Kriangsak Chomanant, Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters, Major General Parti Yotesakrai, Senior Assistant to General Surakis, Major General Boon Rangkarat, Superintendent of the Royal Thai Military Academy were among the dignitaries and distinguished guests.

On this historical occasion, the Prime Minister Kim, after awarding a Unit Citation to the outgoing Thai Company, admired the Thailanders in the highest terms in his farewell address for their brilliant combat records that beyond all praise, and also for the tasks well done during the armistice period which exemplifies to the fullest extent (See Attached Photograph).

The Height of Honours

The honourable and courteous reception for the 21st Royal Thai Regiment was at its summit at home.

In 1955, the Thailand Government ordered to reorganize the 21st Infantry Regiment in order to impress the significance and also to preserve the famous reputation and impressional tradition of the Regiment forever. Namely, the 2nd Battalion was redesignated as the 4th Battalion of the 11th King’s Guard Regiment, and the whole Regiment was renamed as the 21st Regiment for the Queen’s Guard. The Honourable Battalion, being stationed in the Petchburi Province, often would have the honour to escort the frequent visits of the King and Queen to the ancient capital in the Hua-Hin County in the Province. The Royal Government came to a further resolution that, with regards to its continued brilliant accomplishments, the Regiment be nominated as the 21st Regiment of the Queen’s Guard, in order to commemorate its ever lasting fame. The King gave the hearted ratification to the resolution of the Government and the Queen personally became the Honourary Commander of the Regiment.

Later, on 1 December 1959, the Regiment was formerly reorganized into the 21st Infantry Regiment of the Queen’s Guard. And, on 24 February 1960, Field Marshal Sris Dhanarajata, General Thanom Kittikachorn, General Prapass Charasathiara, and Major General Kris Sivara were appointed by the Queen as the Honourary Commanders of the Regiment. The most honourable occasion was that, on 21 August 1961, the Queen Sirikit, the Honourable Commander of the 21st Queen’s Guard Regiment, paid Royal visit to the Regiment. The day was enacted thereafter as the annual celebration day in commemoration of the Queen’s visit.
CHAPTER X NAVAL CORVETTES UNIT

Section 1. Introduction

The principal sources for this account of the Thai Naval Corvettes Unit in the Korean War waters have been the frigate diaries and operation reports provided by the Government of Thailand. In addition, the files of war diaries and relevant records available at the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea were also very useful.

Under the circumstance that existed in the Korean theatre during the entire period of active hostilities, it would often have been most inconvenient to maintain the two Thailand frigates as a single operational formation, and hence it came about that seldom did HMTS ships there operate as a unit under their own frigate commander. Therefore, when writing of the role of the Thai Navy Forces in the Korean water operations, instead of dealing with the activities of a single force, tells the operation diaries and records of all the individual ships. Since the ships' time was taking up in entirely uneventful escort duties, carrier screening, and inshore patrol missions, the narrative has been consisted a series of descriptions of the more noteworthy account in which the Thai ships were involved.

After all, four ships, one transport, 204 officers and 2,281 men of the Royal Thai Navy in total had engaged in the Korean War during the period from November 1950 to January 1955. The eagerness and enthusiasm of the Thai crews had been highly courageous, and all the ranks of the joint task groups and elements in which the Thai units operated had paid a high tribute to them on the splendid accomplishments tied with the fighting spirit.

Section 2. Initial Deployment
(22 October-13 November 1950)

Voyage to Korea.

In carrying out the commitment made to the United Nations by the Government of Thailand, the Royal Thai Naval Forces Command activated the Thai Corvettes Unit consisting of two frigates, HMTS Prasae and Bangpakong and one transport 'HMTS Sichang, effective 1 October 1950. On 13 October
Commander Uthaichalermlarp Uthichai, Captain of HMTS Prasae, was appointed as Officer in Command of the Royal Thai Corvettes Unit to be deployed in the Korean theatre.

The Ministry of the Thai National Defense ordered on 16 October the Naval Forces Command to transport the first contingents of the 21st Royal Thai Regiment to Korea, and to remain there to join the United Nations Naval Forces operating around the Korean peninsula.

The Thai Corvettes Unit composed of HMTS Prasae, Bangpakong, and Sichang and the Danish commercial vessel Hertamaersk hired by the Naval Forces Command for carrying the ground troops, left Bangkok at 1200 hours on 22 October 1950 and touched at Sattahip Naval Base to refuel. The Naval Unit steamed from Sattahip next day fixing the course for Pusan, Korea. On the voyage to Korea, heavy storm and waves hit the fleet. Notably, the small HMTS Sichang suffered leaking waters through most part of the voyage and it had to stop halfway at the Buckner Bay in Okinawa, where the damage was repaired and the fresh water, food, and fuel were replenished. The fleet left the Buckner Bay on 4 November and finally arrived at the Pier Number 1 of Pusan port at 1100 hours on 7 November 1950, just seventeen days after it sailed from Bangkok. At Pusan, the Army troops entrained for Taegu upon disembarkation and the Danish vessel sailed for the returning voyage immediately after the port clearance was processed. The Thai frigates left Pusan two days later at 1630 hours on 9 November, anchoring next day, at the Dock Number X5 in Sasebo, Japan. So the initial mission was ended and the frigates unit waited there for future employment. At Sasebo in western Kyushu, where the Imperial Japanese Navy had formerly maintained a major base during the World War II, there was the Headquarters of the United States Naval Task Force 95 commanded by Rear Admiral Allen E. Smith under which the Thai frigates were to be operated henceforth.

Transfer of Command.

At 1700 hours on 13 November 1950, Major General Pisit Diskul, Prince, Commanding General of the Thai Expeditionary Forces in the Korean War and his party called on the Rear Admiral Smith at his flagship, the destroyer Dixie, and there held a ceremony, in the presence of Captain Nai Nopkun, Naval Liaison Officer to the United Nations Command (UNC), Commander Uthaichalermlarp, Officer in Command of the Thai Corvettes Unit concurrently being Captain of HMTS Prasae, Commander Uoab Sunthrasima, Captain of HMTS Bangpakong, Lieutenant Praersert Chun-Nagarm, Captain of HMTS Sichang besides two representatives, to transfer the command of the Thai
Corvettes Unit to Admiral Smith, representing the United Nations Command. The Task Force 95 was then operating in the Korean waters under the Commander of the Naval Forces, Far East(ComNavFE) with the missions of blockading, escorting, minesweeping, patrolling, and bombarding.

Section 3. Preparatory Phase
(14 November 1950-2 January 1951)

During the early stage various difficulties arose to the Thai Corvettes Unit. November of that year 1950, was wasted in repairing the damage and HMTS Sichang had to put up with the mixed fuel because the sources of fuel supply were not available. They had also to undergo a training to acquaint themselves with the US radio operations and codes. The impediments in the armament were also imperative. The 20-mm anti-aircraft guns were badly in need. They could not provide even self-defense in case of the enemy air attack. The worst of all, the 102-mm guns now equipped in the Thai ships were so outdated that neither the guns nor the ammunition itself were presently in production in England. The request for replacement with the US 76-mm guns reached the US naval authorities. It had to be postponed, however, until such time that the trial mission had been finished before everything.

On 4 December 1950, Captain Nai Nopkun, the Thai Navy Liaison Officer with the United Nations Command, informed US Rear Admiral Smith that a great deal of repair and maintenance work was done, and when the ships left Bangkok practically all of the damage suffered in storm had been remedied, thus set fully in readiness for operations, though the radar and asdic systems were a little incomplete.

Meanwhile, as no ships were available for the security and patrolling the entrance water to the Sasebo Naval Base, Admiral Smith assigned the Thai Naval Unit to patrol the coastal water around Sasebo to deal with the enemy submarines in the likely event that they made their appearance in the area, and also to carry out immediate bombardment and simultaneously report to the Command of the Task Force 95, in case where the enemy submarines came into being. Under these instructions, HMTS Bangpakong was at once deployed on picket duty, harbor defenses, and patrolling.

At the moment, at Sasebo an immediate expansion was undertaken, and effort made to provide more forces. For instance, the lack of administrative defense brought urgent action to provide at least a token patrol off the entrance, and the Thai frigates were assigned to take this part for a trial period. Based in Sasebo in Kyushu, two Thai frigates patrolled customary the entrance
waterways during the dark hours and returned to the base in the following morning in shifts until the end of the year, since HMTS Bangpakong sailed out for the first mission on 4 December 1950. During the new year eve, HMTS Prasae performed its last patrol task in the Sasebo waters, as the Thai Corvettes Unit was ordered to prepare for the new mission, bombardment along the coastal area in North Korea starting on 3 January 1951. The Thai naval unit, thus, completed the total of 27 days missions for picketing duties; 12 days by HMTS Prasae and 15 days by HMTS Bangpakong.

Section 4. Operations in the Eastern Waters
(3 January–31 December 1951)

a. First Bombardment and Loss of HMTS Prasae

On orders of the Commander of the Task Force 95, a fleet of HMTS Prasae and Bangpakong, and destroyer USS English sailed from Sasebo at 0600 hours, 3 January 1951, heading for Yangyang and Changjon between the 38th and 39th Parallel with the mission of bombarding the east coast areas. In the afternoon of the 5th and 6th, the Thai Corvettes Unit pounded such targets as the military installations and the railroad stations in the vicinity of Chodo-ri. The outcome of this action was very successful for which the unit enjoyed later credit with the citation from the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the US Navy.

At the night, the US destroyer English seceded from the ship group for another mission and HMTS Prasae and Bangpakong were to rejoin her next morning at the designated point. Later at the very night the two Thai frigates set out to catch up with the destroyer English, when they reached the objective water, the stormy weather with blinding snow and gales raged over the water area so heavily that they could not plot even their own location. The corvettes, losing the balance, were helplessly blown afloat rapidly in the unexpected direction, and leading ship Prasae finally struck the reef in the shallow shore near the hostile land next morning, at 0700 hours 7 January 1951. It was a point about 16 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel in the east coast.

Upon this grounding occurred, the US ships came hurriedly in rescue. They exerted every effort to tow disabled HMTS Prasae, in poor visibility and heavy seas while she was endeavoring the maneuver into the favourable gun range of the hostile shore positions. The efforts were abortive, however, only with the damage on her growing more serious, and the heavy weather and squalls worsening the incident. The violent sea now carried the disabled craft into shallower shore, causing more vital damage to her body beyond
recovery. The salvage force, which had been quickly assembled and which labored continuously to free the stricken vessel, gained inspiration from the valiant spirit of the Prasae's crews. Only the continuing heavy weather which ultimately rendered the ship totally unseaworthy caused the cessation of these efforts on 13 January. As a week long rescue operation became fruitless, the Commander of the US fleet declared reluctantly the abandonment because there being still existed a great danger of the enemy coastal gun fire. Consequently, all the crews aboard the wrecked craft were evacuated by heli-lift to the US cruiser Manchester, and the ship was smashed to sink by the bombardment of the US destroyer English at 1800 hours. The entire destruction of the ship was to prevent the equipment from the enemy for his use. It was most unpleasant circumstance as well as a source of keen regret for all who have had the privilege of close association with the HMTS Prasae(First) during the past period. In the days just preceding her loss, HMTS Prasae, in company with sister ship HMTS Bangpakong, had participated in a highly effective gunfire support mission, bombarding the Red Chinese and North Korean Communists targets near Chodo-ri.

On this particular unfortunate incident, Vice Admiral C.T. Joy, the Commander of the US Naval Forces, Far East, wrote very sympathetic letter to Admiral Sindhu Songgram Chai, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thailand Navy, informing officially the loss of HMTS Prasae during action against the enemy off the east coast of Korea. Admiral Joy stated in the letter of 17 January 1951 that the Prasae had distinguished herself in action since her arrival in the theatre of the Korean War operation early in November 1950 to join the United Nations naval forces. He further added that "Throughout the attempted salvage operations which took place under extremely hazardous conditions the courage and devotion to duty displayed by HMTS Prasae's crewmembers were of the highest order. All hands exhibited remarkably endurance and steadfastness of purpose, and their efforts to save their ship were marked many individual acts of heroism."

This wreckage of HMTS Prasae took the heavy toll of not only a corvette itself but also the casualties of Thaianders, 2 killed and 23 wounded. All other crews of HMTS Prasae, however, returned safely homeland two months later aboard on the vessel of Kirsten Maersk on 9 March 1951.

In the meantime, since the 102-mm guns equipped on HMTS Bangpakong were so old-fashioned and had no ammunition available from the UN supply sources, they had to be substituted with the US 76-mm guns. As promised earlier by the US navy authorities, this necessary replacement was now to take place after the first bombardment mission, even though being too late. After returning to the Sasebo base from the first mission in the eastern
waters of Korea, HMTS Bangpakong and Sichang set sail on 27 January to Yokohama where HMTS Bangpakong revolutionized with new guns and radio equipment. Having necessary crew training on the new equipment, HMTS Bangpakong returned to Sasebo on 24 March, while HMTS Sichang remained there for further repair until returning to Sasebo on 19 April 1951.

b. HMTS Bangpakong in the Wonsan Water

On 6 April 1951, HMTS Bangpakong left Sasebo together with the USS Sausalito to patrol and bombard off Wonsan Bay, under the operational control of the Task Element 95.21 commanded by Captain Yager of the US Navy. The Task Element was then a subordinate of the Task Group 95.2 initially known as Blockade, Escort and Minesweeping Group and later became the East Coast Support Group.

On 30 April 1951, HMTS Bangpakong, with two gunnery and two more patrol ships in company, engaged in bombardment on each different targets of the enemy coastal battery positions in and around Wonsan Harbor, the target for Bangpakong being the enemy gun emplacements in Kalma-kap, a headland of the Kalma peninsula in front of Wonsan city, about 8,000 to 11,000 meters away from the frigate. The enemy immediately returned heavy counter-battery fire with the 75-mm and 88-mm coastal guns which Bangpakong saturated the enemy reaction with 75 rounds.

In the very nick of time on this action when the HMTS Bangpakong commanded by Commander Ouab Sundrasima, was heavily involved in an engagement with the enemy shore batteries, Lieutenant Commander F.W. Delly, Commanding Officer of the USS Sausalito (PF4), was on board the Thai frigate as an observer on a bombardment mission. Quoting the situation more further from his observation, HMTS Bangpakong got underway, when directed by the Task Element 95.21, from her anchorage and stood in toward Kalma-Pando or Kalma Peninsula to engage in a shore bombardment mission, having been assigned the targets on Kalma-Kap. At 1722 hours splashes were observed in the water close aboard the USS Manchester, then lying in the eastern water of Kalma-Pando. The Bangpakong being at general quarters commenced fire immediately on the assigned targets with fifteen rounds before being directed to retire. While retiring she continued to fire at the targets on Kalma-kap and also on a target located in Nangsong-ni. Pouring this engagement splashes were observed close aboard, the closest being about 100 meters. In all, about 24 splashes were observed. At 1815 hours the Bangpakong again directed to stand in and fire counter battery on her assigned targets, HMTS Bangpakong stood in to 7,000 meters range and commenced fire on
targets of Kalma-kap, expending 630 rounds. Several hits were observed on the targets assigned. Upon completion of her mission the Bangpakong retired and anchored in her assigned berth.

While under the enemy battery fire, the crews of HMTS Bangpakong behaved calmly and with courage. The US Navy Lieutenant, Junior Grade, W. S. Gabriel was also on board the Bangpakong at the time as gunnery observer as ordered by CTE 95.21. US Navy Captain Yager, the Commander of the Task Element 95.21, praised the successful operations of the Thai ship after the action. Later, Rear Admiral Smith, the Commander of the Task Force 95, also honoured the Thai naval forces with commendation for exceptional achievement in this surface action.

On 12 May, HMTS Bangpakong again pounded the enemy gun positions on the same area (Kalma-kap) with 67 rounds from 9,000 meters range, and returned to original formation at 1640 hours on the day. HMTS Bangpakong and the US PF5, then, returned from 18-day mission tour to the Task Force 95 in Sasebo at 0935 hours, 13 May, carrying out patrol and escort tasks en route to the home base.

Four days after HMTS Bangpakong had returned from the Wonsan water, 107 sailors of the first Thai naval rotation group arrived at Sasebo on 17 May 1951, headed by Commander Jueb Hongsakul to rotate the manning of the Corvettes Unit. Commander Uoab Sundrasima, former Officer in Command, and his fellow-seamen went back home upon the relief. It was the first echelon of the first rotation group and the second echelon was to arrive in August.

On 13 June 1951, HMTS Bangpakong and USS Gloucester left Sasebo and arrived at Wonsan Bay on 15 June where it came under the operational control of the Task Group 95.2, the Blockade Group East Coast. Starting from the next day, the Bangpakong committed in the bombard actions in the Wonsan waters until 21 June.

During the hours of 1025 through 1900 16 June, she pounded the enemy coastal gun positions along the supply routes in the vicinity of Yondong-ni and Hapchin-ni east of Wonsan with 26 rounds within 6,000-6,500 meters range. On the following day, she pounded 57 rounds on the same targets for a ten hour long period commencing at 0802 hours. The bombardment actions continued day after day. On 18 June, between 0845-1400 hours, HMTS Bangpakong was engaged in the same targets as the first day, the enemy gun positions and the military installations in the Yondong-ni and Hapchin-ni areas, in an effort to spot the exact locations of gun emplacements, when the enemy commenced a counter action by firing from the coastal artillery positions at Kalma-kap and Hapchin-ni. Upon this sudden enemy reaction, HMTS Bangpa-
kong, under escort and cover of a destroyer and other frigate, smashed the enemy areas placing 31 rounds, which estimatedly resulted serious damage upon the enemy. In the afternoon of the next day, the other UN destroyer camouflaged by setting far out of the Wonsan Bay at 1500 hours, leaving HMTS Bangpakong alone in the hope that the enemy would be trapped into firing the isolated Thai vessel. As expected he would come and sure enough there he was. The enemy began to fire at 1825 hours. Both HMTS Bangpakong and the US DD 466, which lost no time in approaching within the effective range from the Wonsan Bay, struck heavily now spotted enemy positions. HMTS Bangpakong used 39 rounds this time. On 20 June, Bangpakong pounded 30 rounds on the mobile battery positions near Hodo for eight-hour long starting at 1200 hours from 8,000 meters range. The following day, HMTS Bangpakong and the US PF 22 started from the Wonsan waters and arrived at Sasebo on 23 June, escorting USS Ashtabula, an oil tanker, enroute.

Meanwhile, taking consideration into the nature of the UN naval operations in the Korean theatre, the Navy Command in Thailand requested the UN Command to demobilize one transport, namely HMTS Sichang. Thus, the transport ship sailed from Sasebo at 1400 hours, 15 July 1951 on the homeward voyage.

The second echelon of the first rotation group was arrived at Sasebo in mid-August as expected and the remainder of the first contingent returned to Thailand.

On 4 September, HMTS Bangpakong was proceeded on order at 1650 hours from the Wonsan Bay to Chongjin water. Upon arrival there on the following morning, she was ordered by the Task Element 95.22 to strike the strategically important areas on shore. From 1415 to 1700 hours of that day, 5 September, Bangpakong shelled 36 rounds on the railways and the railway bridges in the Songjin area. On her way back to the Wonsan water, she also performed the patrol mission. As HMTS Bangpakong arrived at the Wonsan Bay at 0900 hours on 6 September, she immediately went into patrolling the Fifth Area. From the midnight to the next morning, she again set out to north to hit the enemy rear supply line in the north of Hodo-Pando, a peninsula right opposite to Wonsan. During the period from 9 to 12 September, she operated in bombarding the enemy coastal gun positions, railroad bridges, supply route targets off Wonsan and Songjin. It also directed heavy fire on the hidden battery positions in the tunnel in Taegang-got, a promontory on the Hodo Peninsula, performing the patrol mission around Ung-do and Yo-do islands in the Yonghung-Bay.

After twenty days reconditioning, HMTS Bangpakong returned to action
on the afternoon of 9 October. At 1415 hours the Thai ship weighed anchor from Sasebo under another mission off Wonsan. She reached the Wonsan waters on 12 October, and this time also was assigned the patrol mission to blockade the enemy sea traffic and to interrupt minelaying activities, under the command of the Task Group 95.2, the UN Blockade Group East Coast. During the eleven days between 12 through 23 October, she patrolled to secure the water area east of Hodo-pando where it cleared the floating mines once before. She sailed from the Wonsan waters at 1500 hours, 24 October 1951, arriving at Sasebo on the 27th. And it returned in the same waters until early December.

Section 5. Frigate Replacement
(14 September-29 December 1951)

As it may be noticed in the preceding Section, HMTS Bangpakong alone had been committed to the UN naval actions, since HMTS Prasae was lost in the wreckage on 13 January. Consequently, the Headquarters of the Royal Thai Navy Command initiated thereafter to procure two new frigates from the United States in order to replace the present vessels. Eventually, the US Government proposed to select two best frigates out of the similar types available within the US Pacific Fleet for the Thailand use in the Korcan War. These two ships of USS Glendale(PF 36) and USS Gallup(PF 47), later named by the Thai Government as HMTS Tachin and HMTS Prasae Second, respectively, were to be delivered to the Thai Navy at Yokosuka Base in Japan.

In the meantime, Captain Vichien Pantpoka came to Japan on 14 September 1951 as the Royal Thai Navy Command appointed him as the Chief Representative for receiving of two frigates and also Commander of the Thai Frigates Unit. The two new ships would be commanded by Commander Charoon Osrothroop and Lieutenant Commander Amorn Sirikaya respectively. The crews, who would operate these crafts, left Thailand on 3 October on board the commercial vessel “Hertamas” which arrived in Yokosuka a half month later on 18 October.

Official delivery of two frigates took place on 29 October at Yokosuka Naval Base, with the Royal Thai Ambassador Sa-Nga Niknamhanong in Japan and Rear Admiral McMenit, Commander of the US Naval Base in Yokosuka in attendance. Right after clearance of all delivery procedures, a test run of the two frigates was conducted by the Thailand crews in the sea near off Yokosuka. Through this trial voyage, the Thai crews were trained to adapt to the new crafts. The eagerness of the Thai crews to relieve HMTS Bangpakong
and to participate in the UN operation at the earliest time possible lightened the hardships of the painstaking training. The training ended on 20 December.

Finally, HMTS Prasae(Second) and Tachin left Yokosuka and arrived in Sasebo Naval Base on 26 December 1951. Three days later HMTS Bangpakong was officially relieved by the two frigates, HMTS Prasae Second and HMTS Tachin on 29 December and returned back to the homeland on 16 February, next year.

Section 6. Operations of the New Frigates.  
(1 January-29 May 1952)

On 11 January 1952, on orders of the UN Naval Task Group 95.5, the new Thai Frigates Unit composed of HMTS Tachin and Prasae(Second) set sail from Sasebo together with the USS Bisbee(PF 46), to assume the escorting USS Taluga, a fuel tanker, as its first mission from 13 to 23 January, under the command of Task Element 95.12, the surface patrol and blockade element in the Eastern Sea of Korea. The task of the tanker was to replenish the friendly vessels operating in the coastal waters off Wonsan and Songjin with fuel. In the afternoon of 23 January, a fleet of vessels, namely USS Cmara, the Republic of Korea Navy(ROKN) frigate PF 62, and two Thai crafts sailed from the "Bombline" to the direction of Sasebo. The fleet arrived at the naval base at 1400 hours on 24 January without mishap on the way back. Incidentally, there was a bombline element in the UN naval forces to support the ground troops on the eastern flank of the UN front line at that time.

The second mission assigned to HMTS Prasae on 13 February was to escort an oil tanker to the Wonsan water. She left Sasebo at 0900 hours in the morning together with the fuel tanker, and returned to the home base three days later on the 16th upon accomplishment of the assigned job. On the other hand, HMTS Tachin also left from Sasebo base at about 1600 hours on the 13th, the same day Prasae sailed for her second mission, to take part in escort duties for the UN vessels operating in the Songjin waters. On 17 February, she was employed with the duty of picketing the coastal waters off Songjin pending duties of blockading and picketing the coast off Songjin, while the US destroyer was absent for refueling. On the next day, she left the bombline area at 1900 hours and returned to Sasebo on the 20th.

The Thai Frigate went back to off Songjin on 2 March and remained in the patrol area far up to 41°35' for the next four days. The patrol usually followed the same routine from day to day. In daylight hours the ship cruised
the waterways, bombarding railways, road bridges, coastal gun emplacements, picketing the Mayang-do isl(land) and numerous other targets, including the city of Songjin itself. In the evening she usually set course south along the coast, pausing occasionally to take some target or other under fire, until she came back off Wonsan on 6 March which she then subjected to engage in the tasks of escort and patrol for another five days. Fuel, ammunition and other necessities were obtained from the UN naval supply ships lying in the task group's replenishment area off Wonsan.

After a week long recuperation at the operational home base, HMTS Tachin was returned on 19 March to an escort duty for four coastal transports operating 180 kilometers off the 38th Parallel in the Eastern Sea of Korea. These transports were to provide the two to three carriers and nine to ten cruisers with the logistical support, such as fuel, ammunition and other necessities, as a UN naval support element. One US destroyer was reinforced on 2 April for this escort mission. On 5 April the present duty was turned over to the sister ship HMTS Prasae, then operating under the UN naval logistic support element. HMTS Tachin then escorted a tanker USS Manatee from Ullung-do, an island in the eastern sea, to the Songjin water in the far north. On 6 April, the next day, she started on her way home base from Songjin and arrived in Sasebo on the following day, escorting the USS Platte en route.

Returning to Tachin's activities, she sailed from Sasebo base to Pusan this time, on 26 April, escorting the USS Alatede. It was her first tour to Pusan since being deployed in the Korean waters. In the next day afternoon, she left Pusan port for off Ullung-do to take another escort mission under the Task Element 92.11. Thereafter she was employed on another escort task for two US frigates, Cacapon and Alatede on her way back to Sasebo base during 30 April—1 May. The first half of May was also the escort missions for HMTS Tachin. She set out on 2 May for the North Korean waters where she escorted the UN transports under the Task Element 92.11 until mid-month. Later she acted the role of body guard for the US transport vessel Mispillion to Wonsan from where she escorted the US frigate Cacapon again to Sasebo arriving in the base on 17 May.

Section 7. Rotation of the Crews
(30 May 1952—27 July 1953)

On 30 May 1952, 163 seamen of the 4th Thai naval contingent, led by Lieutenant Commander Suvichien Fungladda and Chedchai Tomya, arrived at the Sasebo Naval Base to relieve the current crews, Two Lieutenant Command-
ers took over the captains of HMTS Tachin and Prasae respectively. Necessary training of orientation and familiarization courses were immediately given to all the new comers before taking over the crew duty and the relieved members went back to Thailand.

On 5 June, HMTS Prasae having the new crews aboard set sail to join the other escort vessels in the Ullung-do waters where she relieved the USS Burlington. She was returned Sasebo on the 13th. HMTS Prasae returned to the escort operation in between Wonsan and Songjin waters on 21 June and remained there until the end of the month.

On 4 November, upon returning to the operational base in Sasebo from Yokosuka, HMTS Tachin, in the meanwhile, deployed in the North Korean waters, primarily for escort mission. She escorted a convoy of supply transports between 7 through 11 November off Songjin and Wonsan, the transport USS Titania to Pohang and Wonsan between 15-21 November, and again supply ships and the oiler USS Taluga to the Wonsan and Songjin waters between 21 November through 2 December 1952. The same type of escorting tasks continued in December as usual. From 11 December to the first half of January, HMTS Tachin returned back to the waters off Wonsan and Songjin.

Winter by now had come again bringing strong winds, cold, and the first snow to the northern sea of Korea. On the east coast, as well, the growth in enemy capabilities was apparent. There, where the ships of the Task Force 95 continued to patrol, bombard, and minesweep, enemy gunfire steadily increased. HMTS Tachin spent the rest of February for the same tasks in the northern waters of the Korean east coast.

At 0050 hours on 6 July, HMTS Tachin set sail for the northern waters with the mission of escorting the USS Firedrake and came back to Sasebo ten days later without mishap. HMTS Prasae left Sasebo at 0510 hours on 17 July and returned to the base seven days later upon accomplishment of the normal escort mission. She then proceeded on 23 July to Yokosuka for further repair and maintenance. HMTS Tachin remained in the same tasks as usual until the armistice was officially signed at the negotiation table. It was her last job before a cease-fire. She sailed out the Sasebo naval base at 0700 hours on 21 July and escorted a fleet of the UN transport vessels until 2 August in the east coastal waters. Upon arrival at Sasebo on the 2nd from the last operational trip during the Korean War, she was subjected to repair works for the next two months, August through September 1953.
Section 8. Came to Armistice

At 2200 hours of 27 July 1953, as the ground troops came out of their bunkers and trenches across the Korean peninsula, the UN ships in the northern waters of Korea turned on their lights. Three years, one month, and two days after the North Korean Communist Forces invaded the Republic of Korea before dawn on 25 June 1950, the war was over. Although the communist aggression had been repelled by the collective police action of the United Nations, Korea is still remained divided.

With the effectuation of the Armistice Agreement, the UN naval forces had been devoted most of their efforts in patrolling the waters both in the Eastern and Western Seas of Korea. There was no exception for the Thai frigates. They remained in the Korean waters until February 1955, taking part in escort and patrol tasks, under the command of the UN Task Force 95 based in Sasebo, Japan.

Since the situation in Korea seemed to be negative as the truce agreement became effective between the opposing sides, the United Nation forces began demobilization from the Korean theatre to their respective home countries in part. Coincidentally, another regional crisis broke out in Indo China, looming as the threat to the home defense of Thailand. The Thai Government, accordingly, requested the United Nations Command the withdrawal of the existing Thai forces—army and navy, which was agreed upon except for one token army company remaining.

In the meantime, on 6 January, shortly before their departure from the Korean waters, the Thai Corvette Forces were honoured with a letter of commendation by General John E. Full, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, wherein the general praised highly the Royal Thai Naval Unit for the meritorious service in the Korean waters (See Situation Map 8).

On the morning of 21 January 1955, HMTS Tachin and Prasae started out from Sasebo, in the western Kyushu, Japan on a journey to the homeland. After calling at Pusan port on their route, the two vessels finally arrived at Bangkok, Thailand on the last day of the month. So, their participation in the Korean War against the Communist aggressors ended on 8 February 1955, after which they were engaged in the home waters with the submarine detection assignment.

To conclude, during the long period of four years and three months in the Korean water service until the final return on 31 January 1955, the total
of four ships (HMTS Prasae First, Bangpakong, Tachin, and Prasae Second) and one transport, 2,485 seamen (204 officers and 2,281 men) inclusive of the commanders and five liaison officers, had participated in the Korean War, since the initial frigates unit arrived at Pusan on 7 November 1950, carrying the first contingents of the 1st Battalion of the 21st Royal Thai Regiment aboard. On the other hand, the Thai Navy Forces suffered the loss of one frigate, namely HMTS Prasae (First) and four lives, two each in action and disease.

The number of decorations awarded to the ranks of the Thai naval units mounted up to 2,026 of the Korean Campaign Ribbon of Thailand, 4 Bronze Star Medals of USA, 1 Chungmu Distinguished Service Medal of Korea, and 1,679 of Korean Campaign Ribbon of the UN Forces.

The gallant service of the Thai Navy Forces throughout the Korean War reflects a great credit upon themselves and to their home country.
CHAPTER XI  AIR TRANSPORT DETACHMENT

Section 1. Introduction

Since much attention has necessarily been given to the activities of the ground forces, most of the United Nations history in the Korean War therefore seeks to follow the course of events chiefly experienced by the ground troops. Among many others it is a matter of regret and only too true that no sources of record available to obtain elsewhere for such a unit operated in faraway behind the combat zone as the Thai Air Force Detachment, because its role in the Korean War has been overshadowed by the more glamorous achievements of the striking air forces and ground forces. Above all, total absence of records and scarce information available to the Thai air transport unit, none the less its meritorious service during the war was beyond expression, in a sense, brought about a result of abstract narrative in this writing.

Section 2. Came in the War

The three C-47’s of the Thai Air Force taxied off the runway of Don Muang International Airport in the outskirts of Bangkok. It was on 18 June 1951, and the destination was Tachikawa Air Base in Japan about 6,400 kilometers away to join the United Nations actions in the Korean War.

After several stops midway at Danang Air Base in Vietnam, Clark in the Philippines, Taipei in Taiwan, Naha in Okinawa, and Itazuke in Kyushu, Japan, the formation flight of the twin-engined aircrafts with the personnel of thirteen officers and six enlisted men led by Major Peramote Puthipan finally arrived at Tachikawa Air Base at 0900 hours on 23 June 1951. Upon arrival at Tachikawa, the Royal Thai Air Force Detachment was attached to the 21st Squadron of the 374th Troop Carrier Wing, US 315th Air Division. The Squadron had been operated all 27 planes of C-47’s that the 315th Division possessed by then.

In the meantime, the day just when the Thai Air Force Flight arrived at Tachikawa on 23 June, the Soviet Russia’s delegate to the United Nations, Yakov A. Malik, suggested in a radio address in New York, to hold the cease-
fire negotiation talks. At length, the first session of the military armistice conference was held at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. Entirely a new phase of war, so far different from what had gone before as to constitute a virtually new war, was beginning in Korea. But the United Nations air operations were going to progress unabated.

Tachikawa’s importance to the airlift effort lay in the fact that it was the primary aerial port of embarkation for priority supplies, equipment, and personnel which poured into the port of Yokohama and into Haneda Airfield and also for other supplies and equipment stored or repaired in the logistical installations in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. The air base, with the excellent runways and all necessary annexations, has long served as the home base of the 374th Wing under which the newly arrived Thai Air Force Detachment was to operate.

As of June 1951, the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron had then under its command the Forward Echelon in Kimpo Air Base(K-16), RTAF Detachment in Tachikawa, Rear Echelon and the Royal Hellenic Air Force Flight in Ashiya Air Base, Kyushu. In July 1951, when the Thai Detachment was physically committed in operation, there was a heartening decline in the number of the sick and wounded requiring evacuation from Korea each month. With the beginning of the truce talks, concurrently, there was a decreased cargo-load of air lift into Korea, and much of the outbound space could now be utilized for an expanded rest and recuperation(R and R) troop movement to Japan. This tactical situation in Korea made for regularity in movement of airdropped and airdropped supplies to Korea. Accordingly, the C-47’s of the 21st Squadron customarily hauled cargo to the small field strips of Korea. In the aeromedical evacuation activity, this reduced emergency was also advantageous to effect more regular aeromedical procedures for a while than had been possible in the days of active ground fighting. In the latter part of 1951, most of C-46’s still lacked litter straps and sanitary facilities, so the maximum use of the Thai Detachment C-47’s was called forth. Only C-47’s, which could handle 26 patients, or C-54’s, which could accommodate 36 patients, were to be used for aeromedical lift. Whenever possible, the C-54’s would handle the patient lift, but if front line airstrips were too small for the four engine planes, C-47’s would shuttle patients to the Korean hospitals. At this time, usually the patients were picked up at forward airstrips by C-47’s or C-54’s and lifted to Taegu (K-2) or Pusan (K-9) where the field station hospitals were located. Under the Eighth US Army regulation, patients requiring hospitalization in excess of 30 days or specialized treatment were airlifted to Japan, classifying in such ways that head and chest cases to the Tokyo area,
frostbite and hepatitis to the Osaka area, and miscellaneous cases to the Fukuoka area. Within Japan, shifts were made by air from the station hospitals to the general hospitals.

In August when the Thai Air Force Detachment was entering its fifth month of service in the war, one encouraging event happened that Major Peramote Puthipan, Commander of the Royal Thai Air Force Detachment was invited to participate in the UN Day Ceremony for 1951. Though the invitation was extended to the other comrades-in-arms of the UN forces under the auspices of the Department of Defense of the United States, this nonetheless carried significant weight with the Thais when one remembers its unusual past with the United Nations. This delegation including a Thai representative and 17 other nations' 48 invitees paid a visit to then US President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the morning of 24 October. The ceremony of the UN Day was rather symbolic for the Thailand representative a nation, outside of the UN membership four years ago in 1946, now under the banner of this very organization whose men were fighting in Korea. Later the delegation had the opportunity to observe the various US military installations.

Section 3. In 1952

In the meantime the UN air forces took advantage of the lull to reorganize to a certain degree, bring new squadrons onto operations and to train. To follow close after a troop carrier reorganization plan of the 315th Air Division was perceived by the US Far East Air Force Command in October of the previous year to meet many of airlift problems.

Entering the second year of its service in the Korean theater while the reshuffle scheme of the 315th US Air Division was taking place, the three C-47's of the Royal Thai Air Force Detachment nevertheless did not stand idle. The conversion of the two squadrons of the 374th Wing from C-54's to the better type of C-124's, far from lowering the commitment of the Thai C-47's to secondary importance, made C-47's to assume more vital role. With new C-124 Globemasters having access to only about four airstrips in the theater, the C-47's of the Thai Detachment proved invaluable for frontline and feederline employment and shuttle runs into rough forward area airstrips. To this increased serviceability of the small crafts, the words of the one higher command report further give evidence; Employing Globemasters would all the more require a balancing capability of small type cargo aircrafts which could move or
transport small but urgently needed qualities of supplies to airstrips which did not have large airlift requirements.

Meanwhile, on 1 May 1952, 26 aircrews arrived Tachikawa Air Base to relieve the first contingent of the Thai Air Detachment. Lieutenant Colonel Kaiwai Tawothan succeeded Major Peramote Puthipan to command the Thai Air Force Detachment. And after busy homeward preparation, the old crew members left Tachikawa for Thailand on 18 July of that year. Henceforth, based in Tachikawa, Japan, the Thailand aircrafts had primarily been employed in hauling supplies and troop lift between the air bases within Japan throughout the rest of the Korean War, while the Royal Hellenic Air Force Detachment moved to Kimpo, Korea on 1 February 1953 to serve jointly with the 6461st Squadron(old 21st Squadron) as a feeder line for the Globemaster route.

During the period, particularly noteworthy was that the Royal Thailand Air Force Detachment was honoured with the commendation plaque by the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing for its distinguished air service while flying to the UN allied forces in Korea delivering urgently needed equipment and supplies. The commendation emphasized in particular that despite the fact that flights were often over hazardous terrain and landing were made on short and dangerous airstrips, the safety record of the Thailand Detachment had been one hundred per cent perfect during these continuous flights covering from June 1950 to 1 March 1953.

Section 4. Armistice

At 2201 hours of 27th July, all of the United Nations forces aircrafts were either south of the bombline or more than five kilometers from the Communist held coast, while shooting was silenced along the front lines and the ground troops began to fall back behind the four kilometers wide buffer zone. This marked the end of the three years of hostilities in which countless foreign souls from the UN member nations came and fought as the international crusades. But an invaluable lesson to the Communists was how the collective arms of the free nations could well keep the evil aggression at bay.

The operational record of the UN air forces in the Korean War revealed a magnitude of effort which was unequaled by similar sized forces in previous campaigns. The circumstance under which the Communist forces fought the Korean War in the face of an accomplished UN Command air superiority allowed the UN air forces to operate at a greater rate than would otherwise have been possible. Their disadvantageous lack of air superiority also cost the Communists delay, as attested by the total combat claims of the UN air
forces's possessed and controlled units.

While the war record of the UN air forces was highly meritorious, three C-47's of the Royal Thai Air Force Detachment did their share with distinction in the Korean War, although operating mostly in Japan and not actually fighting but evacuating the wounded comrades and transporting supplies.

Remaining at the Tachikawa Air Base in Japan under the operational control of the 374th Troop Carrier Wing of the 315th US Air Division, the Royal Thai Air Force Detachment with three C-47's continued post-armistice service, playing a notable part in the United Nations Command's effort until 6 November 1964, the day when the last contingent aircrews left for Thailand. During the period, the Thai C-47 air-transport unit performed customarily their airlift missions, going between Tachikawa and the other local air bases in Japan and also K-sites in Korea.

For their spirit of sacrifice, sense of responsibility, and individual courage, the Royal Thai Air Force Transport Flight in the Korean War won 4 Bronze Stars, 3 Legion of Merits and 3 Air Medals apart from other numerous citations, honours and decorations from the United Nations Command and the Thai Government.
CHAPTER XII MEDICAL SERVICE DETACHMENTS

Section 1. Air Medical Detachment

In addition to the armed forces of three services, army, navy, and air force, the Thailand Government also dispatched the three separate medical service detachments to assist the United Nations effort in the conduct of the Korean War. These noncombatant elements are the Thai Air Force Medical Detachment, Red Cross Medical Service Detachment, and Mobile Surgical Hospital personnel. In spite of fact that they made a great contribution towards the success of the joint effort, few records are available but in name only, because their achievements in medical service are outshined by far more splendid battle account of the combat forces.

The Royal Thailand Air Force Command also organized and sent to the Korean theater an Air Force Medical Detachment, besides the C-47 transport flight, whose mission was to treat the wounded while in flight and to take part in treating and nursing at the UN forces hospitals, including evacuation of the wounded to Thailand. Prior to engage in the medical service, they were trained in the US military hospitals operating in Tokyo and Yokohama, Japan.

This Air Medical Detachment which served with other UN allies in the Korean War, underwent 16 contingent-rotations till 1954. It earned the high respects from all with whom it had been associated in the common effort, particularly from the higher commands of the US Air Forces in Japan and many other medical establishments, for their exceptional services.

Section 2. Red Cross Medical Detachment

Another assistance element offered by Thailand was the Royal Thai Red Cross Medical Service Detachment consisted of the medical doctors and nurses. The primary mission of this detachment was to provide medical treatment for the Thai armed forces operating in the Korean War, though the nationality of the patients they attended was not necessarily confined.

The first team was dispatched by the Royal Thai Red Cross boarding on
the same ship with the first contingent of the Thai army troops which left Bangkok on 22 October 1950. Since arrival at Pusan port on 7 November next month, the detachment served in the war until the last team returned to Thailand on 13 November 1953. During the period, this peculiar medical service detachment saw the service of 66 doctors and nurses in four rotations. The initial coordination and liaison work with the United Nations Command was performed by a professor Kesthorn Smitwong of the Royal Family.

Initially, the Thai medical team was placed under the control of Major General E. E. Hume, US Army retired, the Director of the US Red Cross in Far East, and the members received specific assignments when they arrived in Japan, taking into consideration the proportion in which the Thai wounded were accommodated, in such a way that 5-6 members to the US station hospital in Tokyo, 1-2 in Yokohama, 2-3 in Osaka, 1-2 Hukuoka and 2-3 to Korea. In Korea they served with the UN medical facilities in Pusan and Seoul alternately. The station hospital in Tokyo gave a long term treatment as a general rule and the Thai wounded hospitalized there until complete recovery. Each member was also rotated to the other hospitals with two to three-month period of tour.
Medical Service Detachment

Working under the direction of the chief nurse of their assigned medical installations, the duties of the Thai nurses varied but the important role was to act as an interpreter between the US doctors and the Thai patients, though unable to overcome the existing language barriers. The Thai doctors were given the job by the commanding officer of the hospital installation with chief consideration given to individual preference. In addition to the assigned duties, these Thai Red Cross personnel frequently visited the Thai troops in an effort to stiffen the morale.

The Thai Red Cross personnel earned an enviable reputation for the efficiency and cooperation with which their jobs had been accomplished. They awarded many letters of appreciation from their assigned medical corps. Furthermore, doctor Kasem Chinprahas and nurse Praneet Intuset were honored with the US Medals of Freedom for their exceptionally distinguished service during the period from 1 March 1952 to 22 March 1953 and from 25 July 1951 to 20 February 1953 respectively.

Section 3. Mobile Surgical Hospital Personnel

In the meantime, another medical service element, quite different in nature, was in Korea. This peculiar service element composed of an air force surgeon First Lieutenant Israpong Udomsirim and two nurses Orapin Chunpratum and Themsiri Langtapant was dispatched to Korea as well as to Japan on 19 February 1953 for on-the-job training at the various UN forces hospitals. While in Korea they learned the system and operations of the hospital installations in the field and also engaged in occasional medical services. The primary function of a mobile surgical hospital was to do emergency, life-saving surgery, and to make the patients transportable to rear medical installations.

These Thai mobile surgical personnel received a deep appreciation for their service well done from the UN allied troops throughout their tour in Korea.
ANNEX CHRONOLOGY

1950

20 Jul Thai National Security Council decides to send an Army Brigade to Korea.
22 Sep The Thai Army activates the 21st Infantry Regimental Combat Team to be deployed to Korea.
1 Oct Navy activates a Thai Corvette Unit to be deployed to Korea.
10 Oct The advance party flies to Korea for pre-coordination.
Major General Pisit Dispongse, Prince, assumes the command of the Korea-bound Thai forces.
22 Oct The 1st Battalion and Red Cross Medical personnel embark for Korea boarding on a commercial vessel Herta Maersk.
The Corvette Unit composed of HMTS Prasae, Bangpakong and Sichang, together with the Danish commercial vessel Herta Maersk leaves Bangkok for Korea.
7 Nov The Thai ground force and Corvette Unit arrive at Pusan.
10 Nov The Thai Frigates arrive at Sasebo naval base in Kyushu, Japan.
13 Nov The Thai Frigates placed under the Task Forces 95.
22 Nov The Thai Battalion receives orders to move to Pyongyang.
26 Nov Thai advance party arrives in Pyongyang and joins the 187th US RCT.
28 Nov The main body arrives at Pyongyang and assumes the security mission.
2 Dec Moves back to the Taedong River defense line in the face of CCF pressure.
13 Dec Moves from Kaesong further back to Munsan north of Seoul.
14 Dec Withdraws to Suwon and Osan south of Seoul.

1951

1 Jan Shifts attachment to the 29th British Brigade in Kupabal-ri north of Seoul.
3 Jan Moves back to Suwon.
HMTS Prasae and Bangpakong sail from Sasebo heading for Yangyang and Changjin in the east coast of Korea.
5 Jan Withdraws to Pyongtaek.
13 Jan Abandonment of HMTS Prasae at 1800 hours. Three killed and twenty three wounded during the salvage operations.
18 Jan Attaches to the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the Cavalry Division and assumes the security mission for Sangju-Mungyong road and also for guerrilla hunting.
26 Mar Changes attachment to the 8th Cavalry Regiment and moves to the vicinity of Chunchon to take part in offensive actions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Apr</td>
<td>Attacks towards Hwachon Reservoir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr</td>
<td>Moves to the vicinity of Cheng-dong, northern outskirts of Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr</td>
<td>HMTC Bangpukong engages in heavy bombardment on the enemy coastal gun positions in and around Wonsan harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>Attack begins towards Uijongbu and further reaches to Tongduchon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Remains in the vicinity of Chongok until 4 June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jun</td>
<td>Attacks towards the Hantian River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jun</td>
<td>Ground force seizes the positions along the east bank of the Imjin River. Air Force Transport Flight, consisted of three C-47's, takes off Don Muang airport near Bangkok to join the UN actions in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jun</td>
<td>Air Transport Flight arrives at Tachikawa Air Base in Japan and attaches to the 21st Squadron of the 374th US Troop Carrier Wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jul</td>
<td>Ground force becomes reserve upon relief of the elements of the 35th Regiment, 25th US Division at Hwangbong-dong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>Returns to Samichon area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Sep</td>
<td>Remains in the assembly area at Kureok-dong as the 8th US Cavalry Regiment reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Oct</td>
<td>Moves to Yultong near the Imjin River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Oct</td>
<td>Attacks along the branch stream of the Yokkok River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Oct</td>
<td>Patrols around the T-Bone Hill and Alligator Jaws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>Official delivery of the new Thai Frigates, namely HMTC Tachin and Frasse Second, takes place at Yokosuka naval base in Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Nov</td>
<td>Thai Outpost on the southern edge of the T-Bone Hill suffers CCF attack in two company sized strength. First Lieutenant Damjong Yupo honours with the Distinguished Service Medal on account of his outstanding leadership. He was killed in this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Dec</td>
<td>Relieves the 3rd Battalion of the 180th US Regiment at Chongok.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Dec</td>
<td>Attached to the 9th Regiment and moves to Wasu-ri south of Kumhwa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Jan</td>
<td>Relieves the French Battalion at Tap-kol northwest of Kumhwa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Relieves the elements of the 7th US Division and goes into Corps reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>Returns to T-Bone Hill again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Oct</td>
<td>Moves to Camp Casay, a staging area of the 1 US Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct</td>
<td>Moves to the Porkchop area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>Fights against CCF attacks at the Porkchop Hill until 11 November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Engages in patrolling actions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Remains in reserve at Pupyong-ni near Uijongbu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jan</td>
<td>Moves to the southwest zone of the Imjin River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb</td>
<td>Redeploys on the high ground near Naechon, southwest of the Little Gibraltar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8 Apr  Moves to Pupyong-ni becoming reserve.
27 Apr  Moves to the Kansas line area.
 4 May  Moves again to Kyo-dong west of Unchon and remains there until early July.
 4 Jul  Engages last battle in the Triangle area.
27 Jul  The Armistice Agreement takes effect and the Battalion moves to post armistice position.

1954

 6 Nov  Thai Air Transport Detachment leaves for homeland.

1955

 21 Jan  Corvettes Unit starts out and arrives at Bangkok 31 January.

1972

Jun  The last contingent of the Thai Company leaves Korea.
IN JAMESTOWN LINE (3 OCT-8 NOV 1951)

Situation Map 5
PART SEVEN

THE TURKISH BRIGADE
IN THE KOREAN WAR
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CHAPTER I  GENERAL BACKGROUND

Section 1.  Introduction to Turkey

a. General

Bordering two continents, Turkey has the area of 2,316,000 square kilometers with 35,000,000 population, the capital being Ankara. About 90% of Turkey's population lives in the Asian portion of the country on the Anatolian Peninsula—an area of 719,000 square kilometers. The remainder live in the European part which is bordered by Bulgaria and Greece. Turkey has extensive coast lines on the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Its Asian neighbors are the USSR, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Central Turkey is a great plateau, with hot dry summers and cold winters with snow remaining until May. High mountains ring the plateau on all but the west side, more than 20 peaks topping 3,000 meters. Izmir (Ancient Smyrna) is the principal export outlet. Ports on the Black Sea include Samsun, Trabzon (Classical Trapezus), Sinop, Amasra, and Eregli.

Approximately 72% of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, the products including tobacco, cereal, cotton, olive, oil, wool, silk, figs; nuts, fruits, sugar, opium for medical purposes, and gums.

Up to World War I, Turkey, or the Ottoman Empire, included European Turkey, Anatolia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Arabia, Yemen, and islands in the Aegean Sea. Its defeat in the World War I resulted in the loss of much territory and fall of the sultanate. A republic was declared on October 29, 1923, with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk first president. The Caliphate (spiritual leadership of Islam) was renounced in 1924.

After the death of Mustafa Kemal on November 10, 1938, Ismet Inonu was elected president and was soon faced with the imminence of the World War II in Europe. Turkish statesmen were determined not to be involved this time. In foreign affairs after World War II, the Turkish government followed a pro-Western policy. Relations with the U.S.S.R. were at times very strained, though they improved after the death of Stalin in 1953.

The present constitution, adopted on July 9, 1961, provides for a civilian parliamentary government, and a bicameral legislature composed of a Senate of 185 and a National Assembly of 450 deputies. The president is elected by Parliament to a 7-year term and is ineligible for reelection.
b. Defense Forces

A law of 1930 established the gendarmerie as a military force; administratively under the minister of the interior, which reinforces the police mainly in rural districts and is subject to the same local authorities, administrative or judicial. Turkey was permitted in 1936 to refortify the Dardanelles and Bosporus, to close them if threatened, but to permit free passage of merchant vessels in peace or war. The Turkish Army was then largely a bayonet army and had little modern equipment. The German Army would have gone through Turkey easily and could have cut the Allies' life lines in the Middle East.

The armed forces were reorganized in 1949 with a Ministry of National Defense and a Supreme Council of National Defense that included the chief of the general staff. Turkey is a member of NATO since 1951 and of CENTO (Baghdad pact 1955, CENTO 1959).

In the mid-1960s there was compulsory military service for two years in all the services (liable to be increased to four years in case of need); it begins from the age of 20. The army had 16 infantry, 6 armoured, and 3 cavalry units, and all arms were partly motorized. Turkey contributed ground forces to NATO's Southeastern Command, whose headquarters were at Izmir, Iskenderun, and Golcuk (in the Gulf of Izmir). Its personnel exceeded 37,000 officers and men. The Air Force was equipped with American aircraft (including fighter bomber, reconnaissance, transport, and training types), and its personnel numbered more than 40,000. The total serving strength of the armed forces exceeded 350,000.

Section 2. Turkish Brigade to Korea

a. Activation

When the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of 27 June 1950 was passed out to the Turkish Government, it took no time to resolve to the dispatch of the ground force, the most needed form of assistance, to the Republic of Korea that was under the Communist invasion. Within a month, on 25 July, Ankara announced the activation of the first Korea-bound Turkish Brigade, which consisted of the 241st Infantry Regiment, reinforced with one field artillery battalion, one engineer company, one transportation company, one medical company, one ordnance company, one signal platoon, and an aviation section equipped with 2 modern L-18's as its supporting elements.

This contingent was made up of volunteers selected from the officers and enlisted men of all level units of the Turkish Army and; in strength they were composed of 259 officers, 395 non-commissioned officers, 4,414 enlisted
men, 4 army civilians and 18 military-attached personnel, totalling approximately 5,090 troops. Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici and Colonel Celal Dora were appointed as Brigade’s Commanding General and 241st Infantry Regiment’s Commander respectively.

On the following day, the newly activated Brigade went into a eight-week intensive training at the artillery school in Ankara and then in Polathhlar to test out the field mobility as a tactical unit. This war-preparation kept the Brigade occupied during the period of 26 July through 13 September.

As soon as a unit had completed its basic training, the proud soldiers of each unit would march in parade on the streets of the capital city. By the time all the elements of the Brigade had completed their pre-requisite training, there ensued the military parades which were to last for several days. Military families gathered there from all over the country, so did their relatives and even remote kins. Their untiring interests in this expedient gave the capital city the air of a national festival.

b. Destination: Korea

With the date of departure for Korea unannounced for the security reason, the troops of the Brigade were being moved to Iskenderun, about 500 kilometers from the capital by train for two days beginning on September 23. Again crowds gathered along the railway, evoking in turn the hot cheering across the country, and finally turning the Port of Iskenderun into a hub of national celebrations. The stern military schedule, however, did not let it go endless. Aboard three transports provided by the United States, the first echelon of the Brigade slid out of Iskenderun on September 25 and followed the second team on the 27th. The other two US ships sailed out on the 30th of September and the 2nd of the next month respectively carrying the equipment and supplies for the Brigade.

The ocean voyage aboard the unarmed vessel took extreme caution against any surprise ambush or probable sabotage by the Communist block along the sea route. The troop transports went on incognito until they reached Port Said on Suez Canal, whence the British Navy took over the escorting responsibilities from the Turkish Command.

The soldiers of the 1st Turkish Brigade to Korea, the formal address of the Turkish contingent, were now able to find time to surmise their tough days of training and start writing to their home folks. They recalled many heart-felt scenes that their countrymen had shown to them in the course of training and departure. One would volunteer to reveal his treasured memory, and soon find out to his dismay that he had not been alone in the experience, that the car owners had been always at alert to give ride to soldiers on the town.
The first Korea-bound Turks depart for battle.

These gratifying offers sometimes resulted in premature returns to camps of the soldiers who had no heart to turn them down. It would attract certainly a crowd to the public bulletins where the activities of the Brigade were placed. And the roaring cheers and darting flowers that encountered the marching soldier on parade at the send-off ceremony were things that lingered all the way to Korea. The Turks thought they knew how to reciprocate the hospitality of their countrymen whatever awaited them in the fighting.

The sea-going continued. Cruising on the Red Sea, the soldiers looked about the near and far shores and wondered which fold of the terrain would be the old battle area that had the stint of their ancestry blood. Their geographical observations, however, were not allowed to go on for long. The members of the Brigade were often, so often, had to undergo map exercises over the countries that they were destined to, and lessons on the manipulation and marksmanship of the American weapons that they would soon have to be dependent upon for a soldierly profession.

c. Arrival at Pusan.

The ships sailed on, but now with some air of ease as the war in Korea had turned favorable, though only temporarily, to the United Nations forces.
At their second stopover at Colombo on Ceylon, the ships were replenished and the mails sent out, and more to it the soldiers were given shore passes. Thus on 17 October, the ships came to anchor in Pusan after a 21-day voyage across the other side of the globe, while the other parties would arrive until 19 October.

At the contact with the land, the Turks learned that their comrades—other United Nations forces—had either already arrived or were due. Though uncertain about the details at the moment, they were to learn eventually that— the advance party of the Thai Battalion had arrived on 3 October and its main body on 7 November; the advance party of the Netherlands and the British 29th Brigade on 24 October; and that of Canada’s 10,000 troops on 7 November.

General Yazici called up the Turkish liaison office in Tokyo, and the ensuing telephone conversation informed him that the United Nations forces were then successfully operating in North Korea in its final drive.

In the rear area, however, a number of bypassed North Korean units with local Communist guerrillas began to harass the United Nations rear communication lines. Reportedly it was coordinated and directed by Kim Chaek, the Commander of the North Korean Front Headquarters. The guerrillas harassed the allied troop movements and at night raided isolated villages for food, clothings, hostages, and ambushed patrols, fired on trains, cut telephone lines and attacked ROK police stations.

The debarkation of the Turkish troops, however, did not commence immediately. During this one more day afloat, there took place a casual ceremony in which token appreciations were exchanged between the captain of the ocean-goer and the head of the passengers: The United States flag that had been flown atop the mast at Iskenderun and a silver cup that bore the Turkish coat of arms.

Next day the ships began unloading the Turkish command party with the customary band plays at the quay before the attendance of ROK and US high ranking officials and flag-waving local children, that flushed a momentary thought of the folks back home. Yet the Turkish troops had to wait another day to witness a real welcoming ceremony of Korean people.

The city plaza had its full capacity of thankful crowds on 19 October, where the Turkish Brigade was accorded with the governmental welcome. The people on the railway hailed as the Turks passed on train bound to their next stopover en route to battleground. They felt at home and realized that they had to do something that would please the folks both back home and over here.
CHAPTER II DEPLOYMENT IN THE THEATER

Section 1. Training through Anti-guerrilla Warfare

Upon arrival at Taegu on the afternoon of 19 October 1950, the Turkish troops were accommodated in the United Nations Reception Center, where the troops rejoined the 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command that had come there one day ahead. The facility had been recently established by the 2nd US Logistical Command to meet the differing needs for the armed forces of heterogeneous nations, and the Turks were the first unit to make use of it. While troops busyng with unpacking in the assigned billets, there came the first visitors to the Turkish Force to Korea. The Turkish Liaison Group stationed with General MacArthur’s Headquarters in Tokyo flew in with advice that the Turkish Brigade were being attached to the IX US Corps for the operational control and that the American weapons and equipment were in line for the Turkish troops.

An agreement had existed ever since between the United States and Turkish Governments that the Turkish contingent in Korea would receive their entire logistical support from the Eighth US Army, including weapons, equipment, ammunitions, clothings and rations. This arrangement had been purported to the logistical simplicity in the items of issues in order thereby to alleviate supply difficulties.

For the purpose of providing familiarization courses for the troops on newly-issued items of war, a group of the United States liaison officers had been with the Brigade from the time of embarkation. The five men US liaison officers, headed by Colonel Gamby, represented artillery, infantry, engineer, signal and ordnance corps of the United States Army. They were the instructors who had already began to orient the Turks aboard toward US weapons and equipment throughout their 21 days’ voyage. Now for the first thing in the camp, these instructors offered plenty of advice on the US Army rations so that the Turks could prepare them to their likings as much as possible. And these liaison officers would become the comrades-in-arms throughout the fierce fightings on the consecutive battlegrounds soon they were to be committed.

Next day, on 20 October, Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici set out in an escorted jeep convoy to meet Major General John B. Coulter in the latter’s IX
US Corps Command Post in Taejon. Along the road there lay a continuing line of the enemy T-34 tanks, once formidable but now reduced to scrap iron. Bad road surface and detours around destructed bridges took more than four hours over otherwise a three-hour drive distance.

During the meeting, General Coulter formally instructed the Turkish Commander that the Brigade expedite replacing its battle gears on hand with the US Army’s and that it undertake a series of unit maneuver, with new gears, as early as practicable. The Corps Commander further assigned the Brigade with part of the IX US Corps mission of the rear area security—guarding of the main supply route initially between Taegu and Taejon, and conducting of the mopping-up operations of the enemy guerrillas in the vicinity. In this arrangement, General Coulter was sure that the unit reorientation training with new weapons and equipment and war requirements in time for this added United Nations strength could be most effectively incorporated.

At the end of the session General Coulter did not leave it unsaid that his initial plan had been to commit the Brigade “north,” if practicable, after a brief one week recuperation for the troops. General Coulter’s last minute comment touched the realization that the Turks would have to prepare for offensive actions and should better hurry up.

One diversionary moment of the Turks.
At the United Nations Reception Center in Taegu, a busy day was followed by another with the Turkish soldiers scurrying around in and out of the camps. It began with the replacement of hand weapons and ended up with that of artillery pieces. While one unit was conducting a combat maneuver exercise along the Taegun supply route, the next unit was sweating out on the familiarization course with the US battle gears around the compound. And while one detachment was out at Pusan to receive new war-items, another was busy packing up the collection of discarded weapons and equipment for shipping back home.

Breaks, however, would come for the tired Turkish soldiers in the form of celebrations. On 24 October the Brigade joined in the ROK sponsoring United Nations Day celebration, and on 29 October the Brigade sponsored the 27th Anniversary of the Turkish Independence Day. On both occasions, there gathered many civilian and military dignitaries from all over the world as well as from the hosting country. It was the sense of togetherness, in the face of hardship ahead, that consoled the Turks most.

Section 2. Turkish Movement to North

Before going further into the activity of the Turkish Brigade, a brief look at the general situation of the war deems necessary with special notes on the formidable new opponent, the Chinese Communist forces, and its far-reaching overtones on the future operations of the war.

The United Nations' Day of 1950 bore significant meanings to all comrades-in-arms in Korea who wore the UN patches as well as their own countries. By the day, only four months after the untrammelled Communist invasion, the UN forces were throwing a big celebration in the invader's capital, Pyongyang (at the time the Turks joined this far south at Taegu). The X US Corps, after September 15 Inchon Landing, cut the enemy's throat and regained Seoul. This corps had been further sea-bound and this time on October 25 landed on the east coast at the port of Wonsan, which had been already captured by the rapid overland advance of the 3rd ROK Division. In the meantime, given a momentum by the Inchon Landing; the Eighth US Army broke through the Naktong last defense line and raced northward. Thus two powerful formations thrust deep into North Korea, the General Walker's Eighth Army up the west coast and the General Almond's X Corps on the east coast.

Till the end of October the drive seemed to encounter no mentionable enemy and the advance elements of the ROK forces reached as far north as the Yalu River. Some of the higher commanders were even contended, predict-
ing by the pace of the race, that they could promise to their jaded men "Home by Christmas." But in November, when the Turks were still at Taegu, the picture had abruptly changed: The Chinese Communist Forces had intervened in North Korea, completely surprising the United Nations Command.

Through the last weeks in October, as the UN forces pursued the remnants of the North Korean Army towards the Yalu, the burning question of the Chinese Communist intervention was constantly reviewed at all levels of the UN Command. But on 27 October, at a time when thousands of organized Chinese troops were pouring across the Yalu, General Headquarters, United Nations and Far East Command in Tokyo assured them to be still poised for action in Manchuria, and stated that "the auspicious time for such intervention has long since passed."

In fact, the Chinese Communist Government may have decided to intervene in North Korea early in October when it was learned that US troops had crossed the 38th Parallel. By the end of October six Chinese armies, each of three divisions of 10,000 men, had crossed the Yalu River. The 39th and 4th Armies entered North Korea at Sinuiju; the 38th and 42nd passed through Manpojin. These four armies, components of General Lin Piao's celebrated Field Army, the conquerors of the Nationalist Forces in 1949, were the first Chinese Communist formations, to enter the fighting against the UN. Within two weeks, two more Armies, the 50th and 66th, had entered the battle zone. Together with four artillery divisions, several transport regiments, these forces had an approximate strength of 180,000. Five armies concentrated in front of the Eighth US Army, while six moved east against the X US Corps.

Neither the advancing columns of the UN nor their air reconnaissance units were able to detect these large scale moves, conducted as they were at night with great secrecy. Their prisoners captured by the 1st ROK Division talked freely and at length, the Eighth US Army intelligence was reluctant to announce such a build-up as their statements indicated when this information was unsupported by any other source. From the first the North Korean Army had contained numbers of troops who had been trained in Manchuria by the Chinese Communists had it seemed logical to assume that the Chinese were sending more reinforcements of this kind across the Yalu to bolster the shattered divisions of the North Korean Army.

By the end of the first week in November it became obvious that a massive intervention was underway. Night reconnaissance planes now reported a heavy movement of vehicles on all roads leading into North Korea, particularly in the direction of the Eighth US Army.

General Walker, in sudden alarm, as Chinese were positively identified as having entered the war, realized the extreme vulnerability of his strung-out
divisions. In subsequent actions, he ordered the advance halted, while the Eighth US Army consolidated along the Chongchon River. His 24th Division and the 7th ROK Regiment were ordered to return south of the river and the 1st US Cavalry Division to hold the bridgehead. His another concern was his 2rd and 25th Divisions, which were to the south beyond supporting range of the van of the army. He ordered both divisions to move north onto line.

Now let us return to the Turkish Brigade remaining at Taegu. While in higher command, the month of November opened with worry and argument over the CCF intervention, the Turkish Brigade received its first movement orders on 10 November from the IX US Corps which told the Turks to move north to guard along the MSR between Changdan and Munsan and to be attached to the 25th US Division. The sick and part of the equipment were moved by train as far as to Munsan and the main body of the Brigade was transported by trucks. This truck movement of entire troops over 250 kilometers in air distance continued for the following three days.

On 13 November, upon completion of the Brigade’s movement, General Tahsin Yazici reported in to Major General William B. Kean, the 25th US Infantry Division Commander, at his command post in Kaesong. The Division orders arrived the next day, giving the Brigade the extensive sector of some 25 kilometers
in width and 50 kilometers in depth, astride the route connecting the Imjin Bridge north to Sibyon-ni. The Brigade immediately started to deploy in the central section of the 25th Division's zone with the 27th Infantry to the left and the 24th Infantry to the right. This troop disposition resulted in the Turk's units spreading out apart, somewhat deemed vulnerable to the enemy guerrilla attacks, but not quite sensitive enough to undermine the pride that the Turks felt in their fighting formation abreast with the allied troops. According to the information furnished by the 25th US Division on 14 November, estimated 3,500 guerrillas operated and spoiled the area of the Turkish Brigade and its vicinities in various groupings.

At this moment, a noteworthy addition was made to the Brigade which gave the Turks their own air reconnaissance tool indispensable in its mission of clearing the guerrillas. This was the two L-18 Army aircraft and two pilots which took their place on the line with other UN light aircraft in mid-November. These planes were the most modern to appear on the aviation scene up to this time and later for months to come. Equipped with flaps and electric starters, they were an improved model of the sturdy L-4's of the World War II and thus became the object of envy to other similar teams.

Around Kaesong, the terrain was a hilly, thickly wooded area which afforded perfect condition for a build-up of guerrillas which could easily be hidden from ground observation posts. The Turkish aviation section was busy from the beginning keeping the area under thorough surveillance. But the enemy gradually devised a new plan to neutralize the effectiveness of the spotting planes. By setting fire to scattered woodlands, the enemy was able to cut down visibility to 500 meters in many areas. However, despite this clever smoke screen, the two L-18's established famed record only possibly matched by the Turkish ground team which unmistakably put an end to the spotted enemy nests.

On 22 November 1950, on the orders of the 25th US Division, the Turkish Brigade Headquarters cleared out of Changdan area and headed north toward Kumu-ri and marshalled its troops on the IX US Corps' right flank. The Brigade's field artillery battalion had been already advanced and positioned during the night of 22-23 November in time to support the elements of the 25th US Division in line with other artillery units.

But as November passed on, and the Chinese did not appear again, gradually the fear and suspicion died. More and more, intelligence officers reached the conclusion that the Chinese action was limited and confined to a mere bluff to deter the UN final victory. MacArthur ordered the offensive resumed on 24 November. He flew to Korea, and sent a message to the fighting men, assuring
them that the war was almost won and that a final effort would see them home before Christmas.

"The giant UN pincer moved according to schedule today. The air forces in full strength completely interdicted the rear areas, and an air reconnaissance behind the enemy line, and along the entire length of the Yalu River border, showed little sign of hostile military activity."

For the following two days the I US Corps advanced without encountering particularly heavy resistance, but the II ROK Corps, which formed the right wing of the Eighth US Army in the mountainous central Korea, reported strong opposition and was generally held down. During the period the UN air force flew more than 300 close support sorties and reported good scores beyond the advanced line of the Eighth US Army.

General MacArthur, cognizant of favorable progress of the Eighth US Army drive, ordered his another force to attack toward Mupyong-ni to squeeze the enemy between the advancing elements of the two major commands. He wanted the swift attainment of his objective—the destruction of the last remnants of the NKA and the pacification of the entire peninsula.
CHAPTER III KUNU-RI BATTLE

Section 1. Encounter with the Chinese

On 26 November, however, Lin Piao’s CCF Fourth Field Army launched strong counterattacks against the I and IX US Corps, while its main force poured down the central mountain ranges to disanchor the II ROK Corps from Tokchon. Next day the ROK’s collapsed and the Communists continued south to Kaechon apparently to pierce the IX US Corps flank and then to turn west to join the North Korean guerrillas and sever the Eighth US Army communications. It was now the IX US Corps to meet with the Chinese onrush.

The Chinese troops soon struck the 2nd US Division, and in subsequent action this division lost over 4,000 men and much of its artillery, signal, and engineer equipment. General Walker reported to General MacArthur that the situation was close to desperate, warning that it was not a CCF counterattack but a major offensive. He estimated that there were 200,000 Chinese troops.

At 1400 hours, 26 November, General Yazici received a call from the IX US Corps that ordered him to report to the Corps Command Post located at Unhung-ni, about twelve kilometers southwest of Koun-ri. In the Corps CP, General Yazici was shown to the situation map that was indicating approximately 4,000 strong CCF on Tokchon which had smashed the II ROK Corps there. General Coulter, the Corps Commander, explained to General Yazici that he had just talked over phone with General Walker and obtained permission to commit the Turkish Brigade in action.

General Coulter elaborated his orders: The Turks were to proceed on the Kunu-ri road to Tokchon in order to block the CCF spearhead surging from Tokchon. His hope was that by regaining possession of this route they would temper the 2nd US Division’s right flank that had arisen from the collapse of the II ROK Corps. It was in the words of a well known observer of this battle, like applying an aspirin bottle cork to the bunghole in a beer barrel.

On the march north there had been warnings that Tokchon might be the spot toward which the enemy would loose his thunderbolt. Air observers had reported seeing “hundreds of men” working on the Huichon—Tokchon road. Almost overnight it was transformed from a cart track to a broad highway. Through this route the enemy was to thrust forward its armies to flank the UN forces.

Still, at the hour when General Yazici was given this long-shot assignment,
the extent of the disaster to the II ROK Corps and the resultant jeopardy to
the 2nd US Division’s dangling flank were beyond full appraisal at higher
headquarters. The enemy blow had landed with full speed, full surprise, and full
shock. The physical damage to communications in the US sector was such as
to prevent any immediate and accurate reckoning of the magnitude of the
assault and the wreckage. This communicational vacuum was no exception to
the ROK sector. The Americans to the left of it had no news of its fate until
late on 26 November, and even then the information was fragmentary. Shortly
after midday, the remnants of the retreating 3rd ROK Regiment began to appear
within the 38th US Regiment’s lines. Soon the 38th Regiment was called upon
to thwart the outflanking of the 2nd Division.

The Turks were to be sent forward as extra insurance against just such a
happening. The only support General Yazici received at the Corps CP was a
tank platoon and truck transportation in addition to the reversion to him of
the brigade’s artillery from the 25th US Division.

General Yazici jeeped back to his Brigade in Kunu-ri and ordered his men
immediately to move toward Wawon, about 18 kilometers northeast. Before
the nightfall, the Turks reached Songbul-gol, about one kilometer to Wawon
village, blocking a path leading out of Tokchon. The Brigade was set to bivouac
the night. But it was there to engage in what was to be a grim tragedy of
mistaken identity.

What precisely happened in the first few hours at Songbul-gol is still an
open question. The Brigade reported the capture of considerable enemy prisoners
from the first Chinese attack. The interrogation officer from the 2nd Division,
however, arrived only to find mistaken 200 ROKs who had made a wrong
way into the Turkish column while beating their way back from the fight at
Tokchon.

But if the first fight at Wawon, instead of being an epic for both forces
concerned, was a severe case of blundered identity, it was still nobody’s fault.
They were doing the best they could with very little light to guide them.

At the daybreak following, the Brigade resumed its march toward Tokchon.
No enemy was contacted, and nor was there any message from the Corps.
Captain Lorenzo, the US signal liaison officer to the Brigade, was in charge of
the signal radio truck. And the Brigade itself was hardly motorized, since the
trucks furnished by the Corps in the preceding day had turned around after
they transported the Turks from Kunu-ri to Wawon. The point cars led the
infantry foot column, followed by interspersed artillery, anti-aircraft gun, mortar,
engineer, and signal units. The path was steep and narrow, limiting column
mobility and vitiating mutual support.

At 1430 hours, Captain Lorenzo’s radio car picked up a Corps’ message in
which the Corps Commander wanted the Brigade to turn around to the village of Wawon instead of advancing east toward Tokchon against the Chinese human flood. His instruction also suggested that it tie in with the 38th Regiment's right flank and secure an escape route to the west. The first report of Wawon mishap obviously was taken at face value by the high command; it was accepted as confirmation that the enemy turning movement was already embracing decisive ground. To bolster this assumption the message also informed of one regiment of CCF build-up at Changsong-ni.

The relay of the message was delayed with the congestion of the road, and two hours had passed when General Yazici learned of the Corps orders. By then the lead column was on the path 10 kilometers south of the reported enemy area and 6 kilometers, though 16 kilometers in road distance, east of Wawon. General Yazici studied the Corps orders against the current situation. If he wanted to occupy the position designated by the Corps orders, he did not have to turn around, but to push up. He had now two choices; whether he should move three more kilometers ahead to occupy the Corps-designated position with all his rear columns arriving desirably in time to meet the Chinese spearhead, or he should return to the previous blocking position with which his troops were more familiar. He took to the latter choice and ordered his column to turn about.

Again the narrow path came in to obstruct. Vehicles, individual or in group, had to fight for a space to turn about, and time was running with the winter sun rapidly declining beyond the steep mountain ridges. It was beginning to darken when the advance element in backward orders began to arrive in Wawon. And the worst came when Captain Lorenzo's radio car broke down short of 3 air kilometers (6.5 kilometers in road distance) to Wawon and held down the vehicles of the Brigade's rear echelon. After a futile effort of the radio-car crew to repair the contraption, foot soldiers joined with the former to push and pull to save this indispensable signal equipment.

Their wrist watches clicked past zero hour into another day and enemy small arms began to spit fire upon the Turks. Enemy machine guns chirped and mortars banged. It was now obvious that the enemy regiment had caught up with the Turkish Brigade before the Brigade completely curled back into its defensive position in Wawon. The Brigade's reconnaissance elements in the rearmost desperately attempted to hold down the enemy pursuit, but not for long. The Turk's first encounter with the adversity thus lasted one hour, and during which time the Turks were inflicted with a bitter toll. The Turkish casualties included the wire communication and engineer platoon leader and the US signal liaison officer both of whom were killed along with that radio car.
Section 2. Battle of Wawon

At the first sound of the enemy fire on the Brigade’s rear column, General Yazici was sure what he had feared most was at hand—being caught up by the enemy inbetween his troop movement. He once again ordered his Brigade column to turn about, and ordered his 3rd Battalion to become the frontmost in order to counter the enemy. Its 10th Company was ordered to form the Brigade’s general outpost line on an extensive frontage, inevitably. With survivors trickling back into the Turkish area, the picture of the enemy scheme became clearer; during the dark, the enemy had never loosened his pursuit but built up his attack echelons along on the path approach where the Turk’s 10th Company had been manning (See Situation Map 3).

As the November 28th broke clear, the enemy began to fire on the besieged Turks in Wawon position.

Aware of the Turk’s determination to defend the path approach, the enemy took to the wooded area in an attempt to outflank his opponent. Turkish 3rd Battalion Commander unleashed his 9th Company to defend the 10th left flank and 11th Company on the 10th right. This soon proved to be a timely deployment; the enemy push on 10th front eased but his pressure on the 9th and 11th stiffened.

In the mid-morning the enemy mounted thrust on the 3rd Battalion left and fell on the 9th Company position, soon breaking through the 9th left and eventually overrunning the whole company position. The enemy reinforcement was coming from Tarik-kol, northwest of Songbul-gol (bridge-ford). The 2nd Battalion rushed into counterattack and towards noon it succeeded under fire support from the Communist tide, though leaving a wide gap between positions of 9th and 10th Companies. This gap was later covered by the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion had been placed to protect the Brigade’s right and rear under artillery support. In the battalion sector there had been intermittent skirmishes also, with the supporting artillery firing upon enemy reinforcements that dashed from north and attempted to encircle the whole Brigade position. The enemy, however, disengaged towards noon, as his attack was blunted at the 3rd Battalion area.

During the hot session at the 3rd Battalion front, Colonel Gamby, Chief US Liaison Officer, went too far away from the 10th Company position to observe battle situations and was soon pinned down in a ditch by small arms fire. He was brought to safety only after the 3rd Company had arrived in the scene.
Section 3. Battle of Sillim-ni

At his new CP at Pongmyong-ni some 6 kilometers west from Sillim-ni, General Yazici could clearly see the whole problem. To the right, 30 kilometers east at Tokchon, there was no flank for the Brigade by the moment, only leaving that gaping void brought about by the destruction of the II ROK Corps. And Chinese were pouring through it in great numbers. Their intention was obvious; they would wheel to their right or west and pin the entire UN forces back against the Yellow Sea. His Brigade was now in the trap which the Chinese began to close by advancing troops southwest from Tokchon, thus threatening to cut off the 2nd US Division to the northwest of that city. If the threat was effected, the Communist could then race due west to the Yellow Sea undeterred and seal off escape routes at some point below Sinanju Airfield (See Situation Map 4).

The Turkish Brigade made the village of Sillim-ni at 2000 hours of 28 November. Its position was extended about 10 kilometers in road distance over Kaechon—Sillim-ni path. Since Wawon battle, General Yazici ordered some shifts in the Brigade's formation: The battered 10th Company, so far exposed most to the enemy in the rear, was relieved by the 1st Company. Along with this he exchanged the position of the 1st and 2nd Battalions so that the former was responsible for the Brigade's rearmost and the latter for its frontage right behind the Brigade's CP. Inbetween them was the 3rd Battalion with artillery and mortar company positioned around Sillim-ni and its east. Geographical conditions, however, hampered each battalion much to form coherent position and thus each was held together somewhat loosely scattered around tenable spots.

At midnight, the predicted enemy attack fell on the 3rd Battalion. He had evidently bypassed the 1st Battalion and rushed into the village, where this surprised attack struck the emplacement of artillery and mortar pieces and men of the 3rd Battalion. Enemy burp guns, mortars and rockets broke the silence of the frosty night. Soon increasing number of reinforcements descended upon the village from behind northern hills. Among them were seen local guerrillas spearheading the attack as path-finders. The 3rd Battalion immediately launched counterattack and succeeded in halting the first Communist tide, but already the enemy had reached so close to the village that the artillery could not be employed. At this moment, the 7th Company, which had been sent before this attack to relieve the 1st Company, radioed that it was on the brink of being encircled by the swarming enemy on the way. When this was reported to the
On snow-covered ground, the Turkish crews ready the 105-mm howitzer.

Brigade’s CP, General Yazici saw that his worst fate was nearby. He knew what the enemy had in mind: To gash deep the road in order to destroy the 1st Battalion by encirclement. Apart from this, he had to face inevitable quandary of endangered artillery and the 3rd Battalion. In the nick of time his thoughts oscillated between saving artillery and other heavy weapons at the cost of more casualty, and abandoning his indispensable weapons by pulling out the 3rd Battalion first.

Time was running out on the fate of the 3rd Battalion and finally he held firm the radio ordering the withdrawal to west regardless of artillery damage. But before this order was flashed, pandemonium already took hold of Sillim-ni. At dawn, another enemy columns joined the attack from the south and pushed its way into the village. Towards morning saw the 3rd Battalion struggling to open escape routes to west and at noon breaking the encirclement. But unattended many Turks were gone in the battle with many of its artillery, mortars and ammunitions carts. Easing the Turkish attempt to retreat the US planes bombed the pursuing enemy infantry.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion was under diversionary attack right
after the 3rd Battalion. The 1st Company in rearmost suffered full weight of
the pressure. About noon, the battalion was also ordered to retreat to Kaechon.

On the Kaechon-Tokchon road, the Turks had gained precious 3 days for
the 2nd US Division by blocking and stemming the CCF rushing tide. But
General Yazici lost many of his men and equipment. When the Brigade closed
in Kaechon at 1400 hours only a few of its companies were combat-fit.

It is even now impossible to establish exact estimate of the casualty of the
battles at Wawon and Sillim-ni. Although the first contemporary report said
that the 4,000-strong Brigade had been virtually wiped out, but its total
casualties were later estimated at close to 1,000. Besides that some hundreds
were taken prisoners.

Some observers of other nation claims that this failure resulted from faulty
intelligence reports. Also one argues that the 2nd US Division was responsible
in some sense. General Keiser, Commander of the 2nd Division, was too
overburdened by his own fighting problem to give proper instructions to the
Turks nor any other senior officer managed to undertake the task for him. In
consequence, the Turks, in its first engagement on Korean soil, were tossed into
the center of the caldron and left alone, unheeded and unguided, in a situation
which was critical and obscure.

Tall, pale-eyed men with dark faces, in heavy greatcoats, wielding long
bayonets, the Turks had nevertheless refused to lose at Wawon and Sillim-ni.
There were observers who said some officers threw their hats to the ground, mark-
ing a spot beyond which they would not retreat, and, surrounded by the enemy,
died "upon their fur." There were others, all else failing, who threw cold steel
at the enemy in bayonet charges.

Section 4. The Gauntlet

Yet in this frozen land, the horror was to continue. Already at the
cold and foggy dawn of this day one incident had foreboded the tragedy. This
was a Turkish motor convoy which drove north from Sunchon, some fifty
kilometers below Kunu-ri, bound for the Turkish Brigade. The trucks carried
supplies intended for the Brigade, fighting then their way out of Sillim-ni and the
convoy proceeded north on the single road toward the 25th US Division’s rear.

The convoy never arrived. Near the straggling little village of Yangwan-ni
it met a storm of fire from both sides of the road. Turks exploded and slued
off the road. Others stopped, burning. Men fell from the cabs, riddled by ma-
chine gun bullets fired at close range. Some died in the ditches beside the road;
a few ran or crawled north into the friendly line.
Because of language barriers, perhaps because of shock, the Turkish survivors were not able to get their story fully across and one fact of extreme importance was omitted from their story altogether; three kilometers south of the area where they had been ambushed, the supply trucks had been stuck up by the corpses and burned-out vehicles of an even earlier ambush.

The evidence, then, indicated that a vast of the 2nd Division’s lifeline south was already interdicted, but only the evidence did not get into the right hands. Such of it that did, in the fury and desperation of the moment, seemed to indicate only one more small pinprick among the proliferating wounds from which the division already bleeding.

Two squads of the 2nd US Division MP’s were dispatched south on the road. They never returned. However, a platoon of tanks, IX US Corps from reserve, went down the road in complete peace. Near Sunchon they joined elements of the British Brigade moving north under the code name Operation Nottingham, and radioed back that the road was clear. Two other parties each from the 2nd Division reported at midafternoon they were hit by heavy automatic weapons fire and unable to move.

Awaken by these incidents the IX Corps finally had to admit the possible encirclement and ordered the 2nd Division’s withdrawal to Sunchon. Then there were only two possibilities for the 2nd Division; the north-south road between Kunu-ri and Sunchon, and the lateral road leading west from Kunu-ri to junction with the main coastal highway at Sinanju. Although General Keiser, Commander of the 2nd US Division, was aware of the roadblock on the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road, he did not consider it yet of major importance.

At 1800 the Brigade’s last radio picked up the 25th US Division’s orders which directed it to build up the right flank of the 38th US Regiment. General Keiser also told General Yazici that he had obtained the Corps’ orders to withdraw to Sunchon via the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road using his 23rd Regiment as spearhead. In addition, informing him of the destruction of the Turkish convoy, he assured him that his own reconnaissance flight had found no enemy on the way except fleeing refugees. He added that he would put his 9th Regiment on the following morning to wipe out the blocking force around Yangwan-ni.

In the Turkish Brigade’s sector, there had been no easing of the enemy pursuit. The enemy was still driving hard out of the northeast, and his fire build-up was now strengthening steadily against the rear elements of the 1st Battalion.

General Yazici immediately assembled his battalion commanders and instructed them to push forward as ordered by the division in an attempt to link up with the 38th. The moon came up high when the columns started. Each battalion sent out flanking patrols up the ridgetops on both sides of the road.
Kunu-ri Battle

About midnight of 29-30 November the Brigade linked up with the 38th Regiment near northeast of Kunu-ri. From here the march was much hampered by the traffic of troops and vehicles. Abandoned tanks and trucks blocked the columns movements and corpses of friendly and enemy alike lay along infantry path. Strangely enough, the enemy loosened his pursuit so that only clanking sounds of the various vehicles and foot-march on icy roads broke the silence of wintry night. In the air, four US planes dropped illuminations on its way towards Kunu-ri.

At 0300, the Turks were to descend into a valley which was to be a last stage of the passage to the destination. Two enemy machine gun positions were sighted under brightly shone ridgetops and Turkish antiaircraft gunners instantly put an end to them. At 0400, the Turkish Brigade finally arrived at Kunu-ri.

At Kunu-ri, the 2nd US Division was hectic in preparation for the ride-out. According to General Keiser's prescription, as soon as roadblock would be open, the 38th Regiment, the Division Headquarters, artillery, the 23rd Regiment would follow in that priority. The 9th Regiment had already gone down the road to clear the pass little after midnight and it expected nothing other than small pockets of enemy road block.

At 1430 in the war room of General Keiser about one kilometer southeast of Kunu-ri at Chichon, General Yazici and the former got down to the Brigade's withdrawal plan. The results of an hour's discussion were: General Yazici himself would lead his CP and artillery battalion via the Anju road along with the 25th US Division, while the Brigade's infantry battalions would retreat through the Kunu-ri—Sunchon route to link up with the 9th US Regiment. The American general suggested in addition that the severely wounded Turks evacuate aboard the medical trains slated to clear out the town via Anju route at 0500.

At 0700 General Yazici found himself standing on snow-covered truck deck to bid temporary farewell to his infantry men. In deep corner of his heart he was sorry about his men; his men had been fighting incessantly since 26 November for more than seventy two hours. There had been occasions in bitterly cold night, when ordered to stop, men fell down on the frozen earth and lay stiff in little clumps, unmoving. His message also comprised the priority in march—the 3rd Battalion in the lead, followed by the 2nd and the 1st. The lucky were to find room aboard the armor and trucks and others would walk on icy road. By then his battalions averaged hardly over 200 men apiece; some worst rifle companies counted between twenty and thirty five men. When the infantry columns moved out for the march, no one in the Brigade expected that they would end up other than a road march into friendly ground.
In the meantime, Colonel Sloane's 9th US Regiment were startled to find enemy more than 2 kilometers north than expected but succeeded to beat him off under air strike. Around 0800 a platoon of tanks rumbled down some ten kilometers to an area called the Pass, a narrow defile half a kilometer in length where the road cut between twenty-meter-high rock embankments. South of this defile, they made contact with elements of the British Brigade. They radioed back this good news to the 25th Division; their way seemed clear.

Over the icy and foggy terrain, the Brigade's infantry proceeded with no enemy contact. At midmorning when the Turks reached the 9th US Regiment's columns, the party, however, found a great confusion. The regiment was in full contact with the unknown enemy. Even the leading vehicle was hard to proceed to locate Colonel Sloane's outfit, for machine guns and mortars spattered over the columns from above. Colonel Sloane raced up, out of nowhere, and briefly explained the situation. Immediately after the first report of the tank platoon's success, it came under fire from both machine guns and mortars. The hour-long struggle to break through the roadblock had been so far abortive while the Turks and other elements of the division ran down the road.

In the meantime, the other elements of the 2nd Division followed up in time to see this confusion. This rapid follow-up was due to another development in the rear. To the north, Chinese pressure on the division's rearguard was mounting steadily. The 23rd Regiment could not hold the door indefinitely: The division would soon be overrun from the north and east, regardless of what lay to its south. It was to prove that only the 23rd Regiment, cut off and attacked from the rear, took to the Anju route, which was to save the regiment from the bloodbath on the Sunchon road. So far the one thing neither Turks nor Americans knew was that the CCF had already sidestepped a full division south and east and had already enveloped the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road. The British brigade, brought to full battle thirty kilometers to the south, was in no position to move north to assist.

Rushed into this pass was also the 3rd ROK Regiment besides the Turkish Brigade and the 2nd US Division. They had come out, but they were in serious peril of being trapped. In sending them down the Sunchon road, not disposed for battle but organized only for a motor march, General Keiser, unknowingly, was sending it unprepared into the gauntlet.

Towards noon after the two-kilometer-long column having halted about 2 hours, General Keiser at last reached a final decision: He would form a tank-ridden point column out of the 38th Regiment and throw it to break open the pass. At the same time he ordered the Turks to give infantry back-up to the spearheading tanks.
The Turks fixed up their bayonets and charged up the left ridges. Ponderously, like a great snake uncoiling, the two-kilometer-long column thrust its head between the hostile hills, picking up speed. All of the 9th Regiment was ordered to break up and to catch a ride on the convoys as they came through. After the Turks routed the enemy on the left side of the passage, there were given the similar orders. So there was no organizational experience in the passage through the fire block. The Brigade dissolved into its individuals, and they were as scattered as bird-shot dropped from a hand.

However, the first to find that these columns were moving into a dire enemy trap was the head column riding the tanks. Approximately three kilometers from the 38th Regiment’s position in the midtrail it ran into a damaged tank, a truck, and an M-39 carrier, all pointed north. As the lead tank stopped, machine gun fire poured upon it from all sides. Tank crew chief Lieutenant Heath of the regiment instantly knew, from all the evidences around the damaged vehicles, that the enemy had already built up at least a division-strength roadblock. In a second, he knew the whole party was speeding into a trap.

But it was too late to stop, too late to do anything except to try to barrel through. The head column lost only a few minutes, but these were enough to stop the entire convoy behind them. And from this halt, it would never completely recover. Once irreversibly committed in motion, the single forlorn hope of the entire motor column to clear the gauntlet sprang about it rested on its momentum. Once begun, there was gigantic power in the mechanized onrush difficult even for machine guns to stop.

But the single roadblock by the vehicles, which delayed head column for half a dozen minutes, dealt this slender hope a fatal wound. For as the long, serpentine column braked to a half behind the lead tank, a hail of gunfire beat against its exposed sides like rain, killing men, exploding trucks, driving riders into the ditches. Still moving, stricken vehicles could have sluiced off right away. Destroyed while at the halt, they plugged the narrow road for those pressing on behind.

Wounded and dead clogged the ditches. Some lay apathetically, while others ran along in the column’s dust, desperately trying to hitch a new ride. Some vehicles stopped, loaded hale and hurt alike. Men grabbed hold of others as they raced by. And each stop, when it occurred, only delayed the column more. No longer was there any national identity to set up easily. The troops were so intermingled and mixed up that there could be no turning back. It was like going into ten kilometers of hell. The greater part of the leading serials came through safely, though blooded. Their momentum and the furious strafing of the encircling hills by the US Air Force took them through. Then, as the
road became more clogged with broken and burning vehicles, and Chinese fire increased at the final defile, the movement became more and more sluggish. Finally, about midafternoon, the pass itself was blocked and closed.

The major trouble, all that bloody afternoon, was that a strung-out motor convoy could have no unity of command. Tankers, who could move freely up and down the road, had no orders. Some stopped to fight; others blared through to the south. Senior officers filled their own vehicles with wounded and walked out. Some fought off encircling Chinese with rifles. No one had command; no one had control.

In the pass, a great heap of debris from exploded trucks lay across the road. In the subzero weather, Turks were becoming exhausted and apathetic. Americans, Koreans as well as Turks lay on the ground, shocked, uncaring, while Chinese fire beat the earth about them. Their faces were dustgrimed, their eyes watering, their jaws slack.

Over the pass now, friendly jets were strumming in full fury, rocketing napalm, stinging the rocks with machine gun fire. They did a great deal to ease the burdens of those below. So went the dreadful of the motor convoy of the Turkish infantry, the 2nd US Division, and the ROK regiment moving through the enemy’s 8-kilometer ambush. No one on the Anju route, only meeting feeble opposition, knew what was taking place on the Sunchon road. By the end of the day, roughly 3,000 of the 7,000 men who had run the gauntlet were dead or wounded—and the loss of vehicles was enormous. And it might have been worse, but for the intervention of the air support, and the inexplicable, but fortunate, failure of the Communist to exploit the temporary aerial advantage.
CHAPTER IV  HAN RIVER DEFENSE LINE

Section 1. General Retreat

On December 1 marked the reunion of General Yazici’s party and the Turkish infantry battalions at Pyongyang. The Brigade spent two days there in reorganization and had a brief rest. Next day it resumed march towards south.

Since the enemy could not outpace the withdrawal of the UN forces, the retrograde movement from Pyongyang was largely uneventful. Prodigious number of refugees also joined the military movement southward resulting in congestions and traffic jams in every highway and crossroad. The Turks marched through Kaesong and went into the Eighth Army reserve at Sosa, a little village midway between Seoul and Inchon. Here, for the time being, the conditions were peaceful.

General retreat of the UN forces continued. By 12 December the friendly forces withdrew as far down south as along the Imjin River. Here Lieutenant General Walton Walker, Commander of the Eighth US Army envisioned his defense line of Seoul.

In the meantime, the Turkish Brigade continued to train and equip themselves at Sosa. On 13 December the Turks were told of good news that General Walker would visit them on the next day. In the following morning General Yazici proudly ushered the visiting general into the inspecting columns. When he addressed to the Turks, General Walker hardly believed this good-shaped and well-organized Brigade was the one utterly battered two weeks ago at Kuru-ri. He emphatically stated that the Turks’ unique bravery and the die-hard fighting spirit displayed at Kuru-ri battle had been unprecedented military valor and that he once more felt proud to command them.

After the luncheon hosted by General Yazici he proceeded to the Brigade’s new assignment he had in mind. As his new line along the Imjin River exposed a gap on the west around Kimpo Peninsula, he wanted to assign this sector to the Turks along with his 25th Division. He added although he had worried before the visit that some 15-kilometer northern bank was too great a burden for the battered Brigade, he now understood he had been wrong.

At Kimpo Peninsula, however, the Brigade remained not very long. Around New Year’s Day as the CCF began the general offensive towards entire front,
and soon the United Nations forces abandoned Seoul. The Turkish Brigade protected the allied forces' retrograde movement and on 3 January pulled out lastly from the Seoul vicinity.

When the Korean War turned into the second year, the CCF push along the Seoul front did anything but slowed down. This enemy concentration resulted in loss of the ROK capital and the UN forces were seen retreating south of the Han River. In line with this retreat, the Turkish Brigade released the operational control of the 25th US Division to be attached to the I US Corps on 3 January, and fell back and marched southeast about 70 kilometers to Ansong on the 3rd. Thence it moved on some 15 kilometers south again to go into the Corps reserve on the 6th.

About three weeks in reserve at Chonan, the Turks saw little action. Various programs of training kept going on and men were also allowed to erase his combat fatigue. The Chinese Communist, now tired, slowed down his drive. As the enemy lost his momentum, the UN forces gathered strength to push up and relocate the line.

Section 2. Battle of Kumyangjang-ni

Although the Eighth US Army had successfully retreated southward, General Ridgway did not wish to wait passively for the Communists to renew the battle. On 20 January he told his commanders that they must maintain pressure on the Reds. Taking and holding ground was not important, he said. The main objective was to destroy the Red armies. To this end Ridgway instructed his corps commanders to inflict maximum losses on the enemy consistent with the maintenance of the integrity of friendly units. When air and ground reconnaissance reported that Chinese strength on the western front was mushy, Eighth Army planners outlined "Operation Thunderbolt," a limited objective attack to be mounted by the I and IX US Corps with the design of clearing the Reds out of the area south of the Han River.

General Ridgway favoured such offensive strategy, but he feared that the Reds might be leading his forces into a trap. To retreat and then to lie in waiting for ambush pursuers was a known Red stratagem. To explore the possibilities of such a trap General Ridgway personally reconnoitered the enemy's front line. Neither commander saw much trace of enemy activity on the snowy landscape, and Ridgway of longer feared that he might be risking the lives of the United Nations soldiers.

At dawn on 25 January the I and IX US Corps task forces launched northward against the Communists. As "Operation Thunderbolt" thrust north-
ward against the Red screening force provided by two divisions of the Chinese 50th Army, situations no longer allowed the Turks to rest at Ansong.

In the Brigade's sector this drive north was directed towards Suwon some 40 kilometers due south of Seoul. The Turkish Brigade cleared out of Ansong on the 24th. It effected unopposed march of about 16 kilometers (in air distance) to reach Songjon-ni the next dawn. After opening his CP at Namsang-dong east of the village, General Yazici called together his battalion commanders at 0800 for further instructions.

From Songjon-ni, the road forked in two directions; one leads due north 9 kilometers to Kumyangjang-ni and then turn east to Suwon and the other stretches about same distance west to Osan and leads up to the objective. Based upon this geographical peculiarity, the Brigadier decided to send his 2nd Battalion via Kumyangjang-ni and the 1st and 3rd Battalions through the Osan road. Meanwhile in the neighbourhood, the 35th Regiment of the 25th US Division was west of Osan to attack on the left and the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st US Cavalry Division on the right to push up from the east of the 1st Battalion's attack route.

Now turn our look first to the 2nd Battalion which would attack Kumyangjang-ni. In the midafternoon, the 2nd Battalion succeeded to approach within 8 kilometers of the town. The advance so far had been typical of tank-infantry movement with the US tanks (attached to the battalion for the mission) spearheading the advance followed by infantry under mortar support fire. As the attack sign flared, two Companies, 5th and 7th rushed to Kumyangjang-ni. The 5th Company advanced in combination with the infantry-tank teams on the left route between Songjon-ni and Kumyangjang-ni and the 7th Company in the same way through Maerung-dong. By the evening of the day the 7th could close in about 1.5 kilometers to the village but the 5th was blocked by the enemy antitank mines and halted. As the day was drawing to an end, the battalion ordered two companies to join hands and stay overnight.

At daybreak following, the 7th and the 5th Companies tried in the same way, but the 5th's tanks got wrecked again. The path was severely mined and the effort of the company's mine-clearing crew was useless. At 1400 the battalion was to make an infantry attack into the village. Two platoons from the 5th Company dashed into the village. Two platoons from the 5th Company dashed into a frontal attack and fought its way through thick defense fortifications of the enemy. But towards the 1600 the attack was jeopardized when one CCF company was committed from the rear. In the meantime the 7th Company made a good score on the left and cut deep into the village. Finally at
1630 the company could deal the enemy from the rear. Endangered by encirclement, the enemy began to disengage at 1700.

Here let us turn to the 1st and 3rd Battalions which were to push up from the Osan road. After the 2nd Battalion's departure from Songjon-ni on the 25th, the 3d Battalion marched eastmost to Osan and the 1st Battalion stopped at Changjin. By 1200 of the day, the 3rd Battalion could easily make to Hill 143 and the 1st with little opposition, to Hill 348 in the north. But ahead of the 3rd Battalion lay Hill 185 which was not an easy objective.

At 1300 the 3rd Battalion asked for strong artillery bombardment, which began to fall heavily at 1330. The battalion ordered its 10th Company to attack first. Two platoons from the 10th turned about and began to creep up Hill 185 giving cover to the other platoons on the front. In the course of the attack, the advance by the forward platoon was interdicted several times by the stubborn enemy resistance from his strong bunkers but each time two platoons flanked successfully to bring the frontal platoon on top of the hill. The struggle continued even though the night already fell dark. Towards 2100 hours when 9th and 11th Companies were committed, the enemy now began to pull out. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion came up alongside Hill 185 to fend off the possible enemy infiltrations on the 3rd Battalion's right.

On 26 January the 3rd Battalion was to engage on Hill 151 the biggest battle since the Kunu-ri fight. Hill 151 was some four kilometers north of Hill 185 and estimated CCF battalion defended the hill in strongly dug-in positions.

In the early morning 9th Company set out as leading column, some aboard the US tanks and others marching on foot. Around Nongso-ni on Yongchon-road the head-column, however, ran into strong enemy resistance and were fired upon heavily. Turks soon dashed into a counterattack and wiped out the resistance around Hill 100 and further seized Hill 81 southwest of the objective.

When the battalion approached the objective, already well-coordinated air strike from the US fighter bombers and artillery bombardment from the brigade was taking place.

Soon the 10th Company advanced up to Hill 119 without enemy contact, but as it closed in the threshold of Hill 151, it met stubborn enemy resistance from the other hill east. Fearlessly the 10th Company charged up the hill and destroyed the defender.

In the meantime, the 2nd and 11th Companies who were supposed to advance and attack toward the east flank of Hill 151, were blocked by the intense enemy firing from an unknown hill around Sagimak, hampering the planned head-on attack by the 9th and 10th Companies.

The enemy counterattack also grew in the 9th and 10th Companies area,
However, as the day was getting dark and putting off the attack would bring more casualty to the battalion, the 3rd Battalion decided to push forward with those companies. Regaining strength, 9th and 10th Companies made a direct frontal attack which resulted in hand-to-hand fight. As the time wore on, the enemy persistently clung to now remaining 18 trench positions, in each of which the Turks wielded desperately their bayonets. Meanwhile the stalled 2nd and 11th Companies finally cleared the enemy opposition, and joined the battle in close quarters. Towards the midnight the enemy began to disengage. Over fleeing enemy the air and ground bombardment punished them with marked efficiency. Although many were killed by air and artillery actions, the battalion found 474 enemy dead and countless wounded in addition to 23 captured.

The enemy casualty of the day on Hill 151 attested to the bloodiness of the battle as well as Turks’ valor. On the Brigade’s side, it lost one officer and 11 other ranks and one NCO and 29 other ranks wounded in the day.

An eye-witness, US Lieutenant Colonel Blair, dispatched by the US authorities to make an on-the-spot observation of this battle and to be later released to the I US Corps gazette, recorded: "The general counteroffensive is in progress but favorably. The Turkish force this week has given birth to the bravest myth in the Korean War. The CCF facing the Turkish force had no chance to flee from their positions but were just killed. They were seemingly doomed as if they had received the order of defending and holding their trenches to the death. To my experience I found that I would assert that the Turkish attack operation at Hill 151 is the most appalling and desperate hand-to-hand combat in the all fronts during Korean War."

After clearing the enemy opposition in Osan and Kumyangjang-ni area, the Brigade went into Suwon on 27 January.

Section 3. Battle of Suri-san

After a day’s stop-over at Suwon, the Brigade set out again in the morning hours of 28 November. As expected by the Turks the Corps orders said that the Brigade advance northwest and secure Suri-san in the first place.

Since Hill 431, Suri-san, dominated the I US Corps axis of advance, the enemy strength on the hill gave much trouble to the UN’s march to Seoul.

Except the unusual concentration of the enemy infantry and artillery, the hill is typical of those along the greater part of the Brigade’s path. Irregular fingers of high ground radiated out from this to the south, to the west and to the east. The ridges, including Hill 109, running south were open to observa-
tion from Hill 431 and were steep-sided, and these depressions made it difficult to cover the slopes by small arms fire.

Early in the morning of 29 January, the 2nd Battalion began to climb up rocky slopes, clearing the heights on either side after artillery preparation fire. The steep hill sides were treacherous with ice and the weather was bitter cold. The men's parkas froze to their bodies. In spite of these difficulties the Battalion made progress. The 7th Company made the first contact with the enemy when its leading elements came under fire from high ground to the north. This burst was the only opposition encountered, but as the advance neared Hill 431, the whole company came under intense machine gun and small arms fire from the fortified positions in the rocks.

Air strikes, artillery and other fire were added to the steady bombardment, but the company was forced to halt. On the right, the 6th Company also was heavily encountered and no troops succeeded in advancing. After air strikes from the USAF and battalion mortars were poured in, the whole battalion reinforced by the 1st Battalion attempted again to reach the crest near Hill 431. But Chinese were well dug in and camouflaged. Here it came under intense fire from the front as well as from both flanks. The enemy offered maximum resistance on each of the natural lines of defense and the battalion was forced to retire.

The 3rd Battalion's objective was Hill 109 and the Battalion Commander sent his three companies against it. The 9th Company moved up the ridge lines further northward, but met increasing opposition along its ridge line and was forced to halt. To beat off the stubbornly resisting enemy, the Battalion sent its 11th Company to attack from the west, the 10th Company from the front, and the 1st Company reinforced with tanks from the east. The attack poured in again with fresh fury against enemy. A shower of tank and artillery fire was concentrated on the enemy bunkers, with a determined rush gunners and riflemen engaged the defenders viciously. The battle raged severely for several hours. The battalion finally gained a commanding height, after a bayonet charge and a fierce hand-to-hand fight in which it killed many Chinese.

In a while the 9th Company passed Hill 109 and advanced further to block the Chinese attempts to retake its lost Hill 109. However, with the night wearing on, the situation did not progress to the Turk's satisfaction. Judging from the fact that Hill 109 was exposed to the enemy on Hills 246 and 431, it could be hardly expected to render mutual cross supports between the battalions. Finally they withdrew on orders to the line of departure and tightened the perimeter for the night in severe cold.

On the morning of 31 January, the Brigade attempted again to attack Hills
109 and 431. Each battalion began to push up to the objectives with the same attacking echelon of the day before. The Turks made good progress with an easy beginning. The 3rd Company captured Hill 277, a reconnaissance team from the 6th and 7th Companies climbed rocky slopes and neared crest of Hill 431 at noon. However at this time the advance soon came under heavy fire from mortars, machine guns and small arms located on the high features. They attempted to reach within grenade range of the enemy positions but there was no cover on the steep approach. They had to withdraw. The 3rd Battalion, on the other hand, advanced and mopped up the Hill 109 that had been captured by the enemy during the night. But taking the tactical situations into consideration, the Brigade withdrew to the prearranged positions (See Situation Map 5).

The third day's attack on Hills 109 and 431 began at daybreak on 1 February. The 2nd Battalion tried another approach route to Hill 431, but enemy fire from the front was as concentrated as before. The battalion called up air strikes, artillery cover and mortar fire, and tried to push the way up the main enemy hill positions, but heavy fire there pinned down the Turks on the slopes. American jet fighters repeatedly shot up the enemy-held ridges but it also failed to destroy the hidden positions. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion seized Hill 109 a third time but the Battalion had to withdraw it again with the night coming on under the same considerations.

On 2 February, the Brigade resumed the dogged attack. The 7th Company was in the center with the 3rd Company on the left flank. The enemy was well dug in and had ample small arms and artillery protection. Supported by air bombardment and artillery fire the 3rd Company could reach the summit of the Hill 431 across the enemy's fortified positions in the rocks.

At this very moment everything started to go worse again. Chinese abruptly appeared out of their bunkers behind the company and began to give a maximum fire power with a determined attempt to engulf the men on the crest. Mortars and small arms, from the well-concealed gun positions were poured down in the midst of the Turks. It came—the heaviest and most concentrated fire—that Chinese had not yet produced. When the shelling eased, the enemy infantry attacked the company along the ridge line to throw off the Turkish climbing.

A sharp fire fight continued for an hour, but unfavorable condition developed when harsh reinforced group on the hilltop prevented the Turks to link up with a rescue team. There was nothing for the men but confusion. This forced the company to shutter in its attempt to escape encirclement. During all this while, the 3rd Company tried to clamber up to the scene, but the Chinese hit on a wider front. The attack opened with a shower of hand gre-
nades, followed by a wild determined rush. The company engaged the attacker viciously, filling the air with bullets and grenades, but the Chinese kept coming on over their dead and wounded in an attempt to overcome. The company also was shattered and hardly could withdraw Hill 277 at 2200. The Brigade suffered heavy casualties.

The next day the 2nd Battalion kept up the pressure on the enemy, suffering several wounded, but it was unable to dislodge the Reds on Hill 431. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion occupied Hill 109 without opposition. By late afternoon of 1 February enemy attempt slackened, and the battalion decided to hold the hill during that night. Whole battalion stood in its positions, ready for anything— that might happen during the Chinese favorite times of attack. That night the enemy of estimated 2 companies launched four attacks on the frontal positions of the 9th Company—each time without success. Before dawn the enemy gave up and withdrew, leaving 27 dead and seriously wounded.

To the left, the 24th US Regiment that assumed operational control of the Turks area placed the Turk's 9th Company in its zone to take over one of its Company positions. At about 1700 Chinese began abruptly to harass the right flank of the 24th US Regiment. Command of this area would be of great advantage to the enemy in his attempt to capture the Hill 109. The Chinese with a whole battalion swam up to the 24th's right flank with artillery and mortar support. During the repeated enemy attacks the US Air Force flew close support missions and caused great slaughter to the enemy. Captain Edwin W. LaVigne, USAF, flying "Mosquito Cobalt," located a large body of enemy troops and directed ten flights of the fighter-bombers against enemy positions. The battle raged into night and the illuminations from the aircraft and artillery were fired to give the riflemen more visibilities.

After a long struggle the 2nd Battalion overcame the enemy onslaught. But Turks' casualties were heavy. During the day the battalion lost 7 killed and 30 wounded including two officers. In comparison, 244 enemy dead were counted.

Next day General Yazici cancelled the attack on the Hill 431 because of reported enemy mass concentrations on the hill. Throughout the day sporadic enemy mortar fire fell on the battalion area without casualties.

Section 4. Advance North to Seoul

On 5 February the Turkish Brigade once again took the lead supported by one battalion of the 27th US Regiment and 40 tanks. Their objective was to break through the main supply route to Sosa, Chinese-held town south west of
Seoul. To do this they captured high ground which dominated this road from the both flanks. The Turks then took neighbouring hills against comparatively light opposition and discovered that the Chinese had hurriedly taken to their heels, leaving behind grenades, weapons, ammunitions and foodstuff in their pits. The 27th US Infantry Regiment captured Hill 431 without any problems.

This time the Turks took cautions and advanced to a wide front through a series of pre-determined phase lines. They remembered bitter lessons on the Hill 431 in the previous operations and thus every possible care was taken not to bypass even a small enemy pocket. The troops made sure of one position before advancing to the next and spread out into the hills away from the roads. Supported by air and artillery cover, the infantry men settled down to the slow business of driving the enemy from the ridges and mountain tops with mortars, grenades, rifles and bayonets.

On 11 February the Turks, beating off the slight resistance, continued to advance and finally reached the southern bank of the Han River. During the attack they discovered that the enemy had hastily abandoned their positions, leaving two field artillery pieces and a great deal of ammunitions behind. The Brigade was located around the town of Yongdungpo and dug in defensive positions. Patrols thoroughly reconnoitered the whole area but could make no contact with the enemy.

Meanwhile as the Reds defense broke, the I US Corps task forces raced northward to the Han. By dusk on 10 February the Kimpo Airfield and the port of Inchon again belonged to UN forces. Heartened by success in the west at the end of January, General Ridgway ordered his X Corps to move northward in central Korea. Although opposed by the North Korean II and V Corps, the X US Corps troops captured Hoengsong on 2 February. Three days later General Ridgway ordered the X Corps to implement "Operation Roundup," designed to advance toward Hongchon.

In its desperate attempt to escape this friendly pressure, the Communists launched the CCF 40th and 66th Armies and the NK V Corps in an attack along the Hoengsong—Wonju axis, beginning after the nightfall of 11 February. Along with this main assault along the northeastern section, the Communists made probing attacks which sought to dislodge UN troops from their gains in the west. To meet Chinese concentrations, now developed into a serious threat, the UN forces sought the inevitable countermeasure.

At this junction, the 25th US Infantry Division went into the Corps reserve near Anyang, about 12 kilometers south of Seoul, on 14 February, and the Turks relieved the elements of the 1st-ROK Division in the reserve area. The new rest area was on a small hill south of Anyang. Here, the whole
Brigade, except the 3rd Battalion which assumed a responsibility of patrolling Sosa north west of Anyang relieving the 12th ROK Regiment, enjoyed 7 days’ recreation, hot shower, films and well-earned rest after a long drudgery of combat.

On 21 February, the Turkish Brigade joined again the 25th US Infantry Division in Anyang. For the next fortnight the Turks were to experience the monotony of a rather uneventful general advance in force. The Turks were still in rough terrain, screened by mountains and they made the advance mostly on foot, scrabbling over slippery grass along high ridges, mopping up small pockets of Chinese here and there, helping to consolidate a new line which extended from Anyang to the confluence of the Han and Pukhan Rivers.

By 2 March the Turks stood firm on the southern bank of the Han River about 30 kilometers northeast of Seoul and were assigned to defensive missions. However, the general lull on the battle field was not exception in the Turkish sector. Frequent patrols deep into 4 kilometers within the enemy territory neither brought back prisoners nor met any enemy of significance. During the few days Brigade patrols systematically combed the features surrounding the confluence of the Han and the Pukhan Rivers.

On 7 March the Brigade began a cautious, probing advance northward along the left side of the Pukhan River. Generally speaking, the advance was made against only light opposition. With the spring thaw melting the ice, the winter-wise Chinese were apparently reluctant to commit large numbers of troops, They were not dug in and appeared to be withdrawing in small disorganized groups. At the first stage their objective was to establish position along the line of Cairo, a line drawn from Anmal, about 4 kilometers north of Nasogu-ri, to Hill 678, southwest of Chongpyong. Intermittent small arms fire troubled the advance but caused no casualties. The Brigade continued to move forward, spreading across a wide front with the 5th US Infantry Regiment on its right flank and the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th US Infantry Division on its left.

During this period, the Turks kept pressure on the defeated enemy, advancing day and night. The Turks’ casualties decreased. Friendly air strikes and artillery fire discouraged enemy attempt to counterattack. By 31 March the Turkish Brigade reached at the Ankol road juncture about 12 kilometers south of Pochon and then went into the 25th US Infantry Division’s reserve.
CHAPTER V CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE

Section 1. Advance to the 38th Parallel

By the first of April, the UN forces, now half a million strong, had crossed the parallel in most places. The CCF, bleeding badly from triple wounds inflicted by air, sea, and ground action, were hurrying more and more troops into North Korea, until their strength reached three-quarters of a million. The Chinese still had numerical superiority, and they thought they had the initiative, too. They began to plan what they called First Step "Fifth Phase Offensive." This offensive would concentrate on the western portion of the battle line, and its objective was the Korean capital of Seoul.

Upon taking over the position on 5 April from the 27th Regiment of the 25th US Division, the Brigade put its 1st Battalion around the hills extending to the Sotumun-kol from Sinhung-ni along the southern bank of the Hantan river, and the 3rd Battalion around Nungnae-dong and Yonchon areas and the 2nd Battalion to the rear of the 3rd Battalion. The brigade also opened its CP at Imbong-dong where south of one fork of the river called Yongpyong-chon, flat rice paddies gave a favorable site. Meanwhile the Brigade's artillery readied itself at Saetto northeast of the Brigade's CP.

On April 10 saw the launch of the Brigade’s crossing operation. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to take the lead. Prior to the crossing, the US air strike gave well-coordinated strike around north of the crossing point while on the ground the Brigade’s battery fired to neutralize the enemy defense. During the previous night the Brigade’s Engineering Company had effected strenuously the spanning of the river by laying a pontoon. Due to all these impeccable preparations, men of the 10th Company met only scattered enemy resistance of a squad size and destroyed it to open the way for the following 9th Company. The 9th Company crossed without encountering resistance of any strength. As soon as the bridgehead was secured, the two companies went into bivouac.

Although the intelligence reports had kept warning the imminence of the CCF general offensive, the advance until April 22 met scattered resistance along the Brigade line. The Hantan River in this area was not very formidable
and at this season of the year it was usually fordable to infantry and light equipment with the depth ranging from 50 centimeters to one meter and the average 20 meters width. With a few steep hills in the area, the country was, in many places, flat; there were scanty trees but much scrub, and the hills were not unduly high, Hill 411, north of the river near Komun-ni, being the highest.

Although the river in itself presented little difficulty in the crossing, most of good look-out points were located on the other side of it due to the natural terrain features. The elements of the 76th Division, 26th CCF Army, then responsible for this sector, well knew this advantage of observation and was ready to make the most of it. The enemy built on the commanding hills defensive bunkers and gun positions and on good observatory positions were usually fortified well-manned OPs looking down the friendly camps across the river. Although the opponent was evidently on the defensive, it strained every means to block the Turkish crossing.

In the morning of the 11th of April, the 2nd Battalion began to advance through the 3rd Battalion's former site and crossed the river approximately in the same method as the 3rd, Spearheading the crossing, the 7th Company made a frontal attack on Hill 152 which was then defended by a CCF company. But the 7th was to suffer many difficulties from the onset of the attack. The only avenue of approach to Hill 152 being low-lying rice paddies was ominously exposed to the enemy. Despite that the well-coordinated ground and air bombardment nearly pounded every inch of the enemy territory, the countering fire of artillery and mortar together with the natural disadvantage was hard to overcome.

Finally the 2nd Battalion requested to the 3rd US Division of support of a tank platoon which was doomed to bring more of discouragement. The US tank platoon while on the way from Tonghyon was wrecked by the enemy laid antitank mines in the vicinity of Sinchon and its platoon leader was severely wounded. Being interrupted as such, the other tanks designed at first to hit from the rear of Hill 152 had to pull back. The remainder of the day saw the lone but brave struggle towards the objective which fell in mid-afternoon in exchange of the life of the 7th Company Commander and considerable other casualties.

Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion pushed forward to Pandok-kol and disregarding intense enemy artillery and mortar barrage took Hill 351 and further seized Hill 411. The only failure on the Brigade sector was to be revealed when the 1st Battalion crossed the river. From the initial launch of the crossing it had been decided that the 24th Regiment was to open the way for the battalion by taking Hill 643. But the 24th unfortunately failed and one CCF battalion was shifted leftward guarding Hills 472 and 282. On the calculations that the risk
lay not only in the unexpected strong opposition but also in the impending approach of the night, the Brigade ordered the 1st Battalion to withdraw south of the river.

The debriefing of 11 April disclosed that the Turkish Artillery alone consumed nearly 3,000 rounds and supporting US artillery fired about 900 rounds. The enemy's casualty was estimated at 65 killed and 8 POWs while that of the Brigade stood at 1 officer and 5 enlisted men killed and 1 officer and 29 other ranks wounded.

At daybreak next day, the 1st Battalion recrossed the river and rushed to the objective Hill 282. Bloody battles ensued and the owner of the hill shifted several times throughout the day. But at the close of the day the battalion found itself on the top of the hill still dealing with pockets of the dispersing enemy. The hill was deformed ugly and stinking with 31 CCF dead. On the 13th as the 24th Regiment took Hill 643, the Turkish 1st Battalion easily advanced onto Hill 472.

In the meantime on other fronts, the 2nd Battalion crept up Hill 359 whose defender had been so utterly destroyed by artillery and air actions that it was virtually defenseless. The 3rd Battalion slowed down its tempo of advance and remained at Hill 411.

The advance was resumed. By the 21st of April, just a day before the CCF's full-scale offensive, the Brigade could advance north about 15 kilometers from the Hantan River and 10 kilometers southwest of Chorwon. Only light and moderate enemy resistance marked the advance of the Brigade and several operational failures were far short of losing the initiative of the Turkish advance.

The Eighth US Army kept making limited attacks, until in the third week of April when its forces were 15 kilometers above the parallel everywhere except at Kaesong. In the center of the line, the UN forces were striking toward the Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonngang complex, an important communication and supply area called the Iron Triangle. On the west front this advance was carried out by the I US Corps deployed from the east to west in line: The 25th US Division (the Turkish Brigade attached), the 3rd US Division (the Philippine Battalion, the 29th British Brigade, and the Belgian Battalion attached) and the 1st ROK Division.

In the 25th Division's sector, the Brigade was bounded on the right by the 24th Regiment of the 25th and on the left somewhat perpendicularly west of Yonchon by the 3rd US Division. Among the elements of the 3rd Division, the Philippine battalion was racing at the same speed on the Brigade's left and on its right across the Imjin River, the 29th British Brigade was on the south with the attached Belgian battalion.
Section 2. Chinese Spring Offensive

It should be noted that the UN's general advance so far served another object besides gaining ground. The drive had been to interrupt the widely rumored CCF preparations for the general attack and force him to drop the intention. These friendly offensive doubtlessly hindered the enemy preparations, and possibly delayed him; but it did not prevent the launching of his attack, which began on 22 April. By April 21, the UN line stood from Munsan below the 38th Parallel, and taking advantage of natural barrier of the Imjin proceeded northeast to Youchon about 15 kilometers above the parallel and then ran virtually due east to Taepo-ri on the Eastern Sea. In the late afternoon of April 22, it was struck by enemy artillery concentrations. Four hours later, by the light of a full moon, the Communist attacked.

The weight of this attack fell on the left of the 25th Division. The 3rd Division with its attached 27th British Brigade was driven back. Thus the central line was cracked exposing both flanks of the Turkish Brigade. At this point General Van Fleet ordered the I and IX US Corps to fall back, surrendering all ground gained in the offensives, while artillery and air hampered the pursuing Communists. The Turkish Brigade withdrew as far as south of the Han River. Enemy attempts to outflank Seoul were beaten back on both sides, and by April 29 the highly heralded Communist offensive had been stopped cold. With the halting of the Chinese offensive, the UN's line ran from the west just north of Seoul, then due east to about Kapyong and thence northeast to the east coast near to Yangyang, just north of the 38th Parallel.

The eve of the Chinese attack saw the Turkish Brigade deployed about 11 kilometers southeast of Chorwon. The 9th Company attached to the 1st Battalion was positioned on Hill 425 just below Mungmuk-kol as the right echelon of the Brigade. The battalion's 2nd Company on the unknown hill north of Kwau, the 3rd Company on the battalion's left on Hill 350 and the 1st Company in battalion's reserve at the rear of the attached 9th Company. Flanking the Brigade's left, the 2nd Battalion approached Chomchon area with its 5th on the right, 6th on the center and 7th Company on the left respectively. The 3rd Battalion was in brigade's reserve between Toridul and Naesan-ni. The Brigade artillery battalion equipped with 105-mm howitzers took firm stand on the right of Brigade CP.

No sign of the grave attack was seen in the evening of the 22nd on the Turkish formations. But the first to feel vaguely the enemy thrust was the patrol from the 6th Company which encountered 25-man CCF patrol and took
A glimpse at the enemy, haggard and panic-stricken as interrogated by the Turks. 

hold of some of them. Equipped with a variety of modern detecting gear, one captain among the captive confessed to the friendly interrogation that they had come out to study the friendly artillery and infantry build-up for midnight onrush. Soon the CCF artillery bombardment fell. This pre-attack fire went on for 2 hours with unusual precision and magnitude. The 25th Division ordered the Turks to fall back 5-6 kilometers if necessary and to hang on from there.

Already before midnight the enemy infantry swarmed under mortar and artillery cover towards the 9th Company’s Hill 425 and its rear, the reserved 1st Company. Well before this, the CCF wave had washed off the resistance of the 24th US Regiment on its way to Hill 425. The 9th and 1st Companies were nearly engulfed by the endless wave of the CCF raids. Here well-famed bayonet and close-quarters tactics of the Turks were to create another legend. The artillery liaison officer stuck faithfully to the transmission of fire mission until he lost his own life. By the time Hill 425 was under full weight of the attack, the whole Brigade was committed in the general CCF offensive except the 3rd Battalion(minus 9th Company). But slowly the numerical superiority played dominance over the courage and toughness of the Turks.
Embattled company commanders radioed to the Regiment Commander the cry-out for the withdrawal from the line in order to minimize the casualties. At the time of the battle, Brigadier Yazıcı was on leave in Japan and thus command jurisdiction fell next in line on the Regiment Commander. However one reason prevented him from granting this urgent request. He thought the 1st and 2nd Battalions had to hold the present line several hours more to give time to pull out the Brigade’s artillery first. Although the 3rd Battalion (minus 9th Company) in reserve could be called upon readily, the slow movement of the artillery pieces and rugged terrains on its retreat route along Puhung-dong demanded the lengthy time all the more necessary.

Right after the midnight the Philippine Battalion attached to the 65th Regiment of the 3rd US Division offered its help to the Turkish 2nd Battalion but the situations made it hard to realize. Meanwhile the Brigade’s artillerymen hurried for the pullout. The 65th US Artillery took the place of the retreating Turkish artillery in order not to create a dangerous vacuum of support fire. The Turk’s artillery finished off the retreat at 0200 of the next morning closing down one of the busiest day pounding 2,554 rounds. At 0230 rattled through the radios the withdrawal orders to the beleaguered front companies. The pulling out was effected under strict precautions. Turks were neither allowed to make noise of any kind and nor to fire unless massive encirclement was involved.

But the fate was not with the Turkish Brigade. The full moon matched with the cloudless canopy (incidentally, by the lunar calender the attack fell on March 16, one day after the fullest moon) shone so brightly that the attacker needed no illuminations. The casualties were steep despite desperate efforts of the Turks. The worst of it was met by a reinforced platoon of the 1st Company, which in the course of pulling out was decimated save 4 men by the CCF enveloping blow. The 2nd Company lost its commanding officer as well as many of its men. Other companies suffered heavy losses of their personnel and equipment. By the daybreak elements of the Brigade began to cross back the Hantan River. In the same afternoon the Brigade opened its CP near Omaek-kol bringing whole of its men south of the river near Kayang-ni. During the night it had come all the way down south about 15 kilometers. The casualty count revealed that the Brigade lost 5 officers, 3 NCOs and 58 other ranks. In addition 35 were wounded and estimated 105 were missing in the previous night. To the enemy the attack cost nearly 1,000 estimated killed and double the number wounded.

Situation on the 3rd Division were the same as the Brigade. It was attacked and fell back to the south of the Imjin River. Meanwhile the 24th Regiment of the 25th US Division, swamped before the CCF attack on the
Turkish 9th Company, also slid down to the right of the Brigade’s position. So far the Chinese had succeeded to push the west and central UN premises down some 15 kilometers. Still intact was the east which would meet another CCF thrust from May 16.

The Brigade continued to retreat. Very few contacts were made during the period except a few skirmishes. It was a typical retrograde movement in line with the general setback of the UN front line. By the 29th of April the Brigade reached 5 kilometers southeast of Seoul. The Chinese so called Fifth Phase Offensive was failing by the time. At least fifteen thousand Chinese were killed along the Imjin in the 3rd Division’s sector. In the Brigade’s area saw another thousand enemy dead.

The best the CCF offensive had achieved was a realignment of the UN lines. In the west, UN troops pulled back, and more units were sent to reinforce the vital Seoul corridor. Ridgway, the Eighth Army Commander, was not interested in real estate; he had given up ground to ensure that no units would be exposed or trapped. A new line was formed, still north of the parallel in the east, but running just above Inchon, Seoul, in the west. It was now heavily fortified. By the dark of 30 April, the CCF exhausted, turned and reeled back north once more.

Section 3. Consolidation of the Front Line

When the eight-day Chinese offensive ended, the 25th US Division found itself on the I Corps right around Toegyewon-ni, northeast of Seoul. On the 29th of April the Turkish Brigade was ordered to Kwangam-ni, some 5 kilometers southeast of Seoul as the Division’s reserve. Next day the Brigade crossed the Kwangjin Bridge for reserve camps on the northern bank of the Han River. Turks were to stay there until May 12, where the site, though now incorporated into the growing capital of Seoul, the area then was farm area dotted with low-lying hills. The 1st Battalion camped north around Myonmok-tong and Kyomun-ni forward of the 3rd Battalion near Yongma-dong while the 2nd stood south near Chunggok-dong. Meanwhile the 24th Regiment of the 25th US Division was on the right and the 35th and 27th Infantry occupied forward left of the Brigade.

When the reserve period ended on the 13th May, the Brigade moved 8 kilometers north near Toegyewon-ni and formed a blocking position. Until 20th the Brigade experienced apparent lull in action. Although the reconnaissance from the 2nd Battalion met enemy opposition on the 17th, the Brigade’s artillery made a good work on it.
Now for the second step of the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive. Early in May ROK forces in the east took the offensive with the objective of securing the port of Kansong, 30 kilometers north of Yangyang. This offensive was accompanied by an attack on the western flank by the 1st ROK Division. Soon after these operations had started the Chinese began a counteroffensive of their own. On 16 May they attacked and routed the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions in the neighbourhood of Inje, immediately north of the 38th Parallel and about 40 kilometers from the east coast.

On the evening of 20 May, however, the situation was in the hand of UN troops as the enemy offensive died out. This meant an immediate UN counteroffensive. The friendly offensive touched off on May 20 by the I, IX and X US Corps in the central sector. This was to result in the recapture of Inje and eventually, by mid-June, Pyonggang; and more than 10,000 prisoners and much equipment were to be captured in these operations. With this UN counteroffensive commenced the Turkish push up was to resume from the current position at Toegyewon-ni.

On the right column of the advance was the 1st Battalion which leaped forward 3 kilometers to attack Hill 218. It seized the hill under minor resistance of the jaded CCF and jumped towards two other northern hills in line. Spearheading on the left the 3rd Battalion also met light opposition. By May 22 it cleared the enemy on Hills 54, 188 and 316. Although men of the 2nd Battalion were in reserve status they dealt with pockets of the enemy on the way north. Thereafter some 13-kilometer advance was practically unopposed. By May 24 the Brigade made just above Uijongbu. During the period, the Brigade had been much annoyed by mines laid by the retreating enemy or still active guerrillas, and the Brigade's mine detecting team made a good deal of effort to this. However, victims were unavoidable.

The 3d Battalion's Commander unfortunately became one of them when his battalion on 24th passed through a narrow gully near Malgu-ri. His party hit one and he was killed instantly with severals others wounded.

On May 25 the Turks fell out of the line turning this race over to the 25th Canadian Brigade (with the attached Philippine Battalion). Upon relief the Brigade moved down to near Uijongbu as I US Corps reserve. The rest was welcome to all Turks: For the first time, they could forget the fighting chores, writing home folks leisurely, and being sometimes tight on beer with their buddies.

Section 4. Defense Mission at Kumhwa

The respite ended on June 4. The Turks were then ordered to advance
north into Kumhwa area. Three days later on the 7th, the Brigade relieved the 35th Regiment of the 25th Division around Hill 800(Paktal-san) and Hill 445(at Tapyong-ni) enroute Kumhwa. The Brigade’s advance was characterized by scattered opposition and thus unusual rapidity. Tanks from the 25th Division achieved a good coordination with the Turkish infantry patrols. Keeping pace with the Turks on the right the 32nd Regiment of the 2nd ROK Division dashed north while the 27th Regiment of the 25th US Division flanked on the left.

June 12 saw the Brigade standing several kilometers south of Kumhwa. The enemy for long had prepared strong resistance not to lose this important city. The 1st Battalion on the right advanced to Nung-kogae, Notchom and Asa-ri. The 2nd Battalion readied around Songju-kogae, some 2 kilometers from the southwest of Kumhwa, and the 3rd Battalion was in reserve. Reconnaissance intelligence had warned already that strong fortifications and concentrations of troops and artillery accounted for the enemy’s resolution to defend the city. One CCF battalion built its main line of resistance around Kyoung-san, north of Kumhwa and Paejae areas (See Situation Map 9).

The first attack on Kumhwa was launched by the 1st Battalion. On the 13th the Brigade’s artillery and mortars began mass strikes on Hill 507 where the battalion’s main effort was to take place. Then the 2nd Company led the three-pronged assault each flanked by the 1st and 3rd Companies. However the strong opposition barred the way. The enemy’s artillery placed massive bombardment on the attacking columns. The 1st Battalion had to pull back putting off the task until the next day.

The following effort was also fruitless due to endless concentrations of the reserves and unceasing artillery. Thinking that the Brigade had better chance when the 32nd US Regiment reached ahead enough to give support from the right, the 1st Battalion again withdrew. The judgement was to prove right when the next morning the battalion, at a stroke seized the town under efficient support of the 32nd Regiment.

After the clearance of the city, the Brigade was ordered on June 20 into the 25th Division’s reserve. The Brigade moved to Naegong-ni some 25 kilometers northeast of Seoul remaining there until July 17th. Soon the 2nd Turkish Brigade would arrive and the men of the first team would leave Korean battlefields.
CHAPTER VI STALEMATE

Section 1. General Situation

Mid-July the 1st and 2nd Turkish Brigade met in Korea. Although men of the 2nd Brigade were fresh in actual fighting, they were well trained and prepared. Upon relief at Naegong-ni, 15 kilometers northeast of Seoul, two thirds of the 1st Brigade left for Pusan to embark for home. The remainder was to stay as a follow-up party waiting for full reorganization of the new brigade.

Following the completion of the necessary procedures, the Brigade was ordered northwest to Chorwon on July 18 and further to be attached also to the 25th US Division. As soon as it would arrive it would relieve the Canadian Brigade on position.

Now it may be necessary to turn our look to the general situation of the conflict and the new effort on both sides to bring an political end to the fighting. Communist counterattacks in late April and May had been repulsed, but the UN forces were inclined to proceed cautiously. Although the UN Commander still had the mission of destroying the Communist armed forces in Korea, he was instructed to accomplish this objective to the overriding considerations of the security of his forces. By June the UN forces returned to the same line that existed before the CCF spring offensive.

Along the newly formed defense lines Kansas and Wyoming, the elements of I US Corps were still responsible for the western sector: From the left the 1st ROK Division stood just south of Munsan, the 26th British Brigade south of Imjin, the 1st US Cavalry Division south of Yonchon, and the Corps' rightmost was defended by the 3rd US Division. From Kumsan to Hwachon Reservoir, in charge of the central sector was the IX US Corps deploying the 2nd ROK Division, the 24th US Division and 6th ROK Division in line from the left respectively. On the east front the X US and the I ROK Corps deployed its elements to guard Kansas line.

Despite a long effort of the United Nations to bring the Korean conflict to a close by negotiations, the prospects for peaceful settlement based on a unified, democratic, and independent Korea appeared dim in the late spring of 1951. But the first sign of a change in the Communist position came from a radio address by the Soviet representative to the United Nations on June 23. Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik, speaking in the UN stated that the Soviet peoples
sance along the Wyoming line. Across the UN front, this period of comparative quiescence was used to fortify line Kansas in depth and to build hasty field fortifications along the advance line Wyoming to delay and blunt the force of enemy assaults before they reached Kansas. To delay enemy offensive barbed wire fences were laid out and mines were planted in patterns that would funnel attackers into the heaviest defense fires. During this period of apparent quiescence two events of ceremony took place in the Turkish Brigade. On August 30, the day commemorating the Turkish victory saw the ceremony for the promotion, among others, of Brigadier Yazici to Major General. He was also relieved of the Korean service and the other renowned commander Sirri Acar took over the command.

However, on October 3, the Brigade were ordered to fight when the I and IX US Corps' Operation Commando got under way. Using four of the I US Corps' divisions including the 25th Division and plus one from the neighbouring US IX Corps this operation was designed to improve the corps' front by advancing some 10 kilometers. In addition, the offensive would keep the enemy off balance and prevent the friendly forces from getting stale (See Situation Map 10).

Along with the 25th Division the Turkish Brigade participated in this operation. Racing in between the 7th Regiment of the 3rd US Division on the left at Chorwon and the 24th Regiment of the 25th Division on the right, the Brigade's advance was directed halfway towards the apex of the Iron Triangle, Pyonggang.

The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion spearheaded the advance under light resistance and seized Hill 372. The battalion spurred by this rapid progress wiped out enemy opposition guarding Hill 438. The advance on the left of the Brigade was also successful. Men of the 3rd Battalion cleared the way to Hill 358 and easily took it. As initially assigned to the Brigade, it linked up with the 3rd US Division on Jamestown line which cut half of the Iron Triangle.

After the adjustment of the line by Operation Commando, the Brigade deployed its 1st Battalion on the right from Hills 430 and 438 and the 3rd on the left around Sagimal through Hill 358 along Mirok-dong and the reserved 2nd Battalion occupied Kirinkol and Hill 372.

Again lull had set in the fighting. After two weeks of discussion between liaison officers, long-deadlocked truce talks resumed. Operations on the front all the more received its cue from the fluctuations of truce negotiations.

On November 11, the Brigade also took Hills 412, 533 and 450 (called "Star Hill") and built on each of them a patrol base. Until mid-November the most popular activity on the front was countless patrols and probes of both sides.
believed that a peaceful settlement could be achieved in Korea. A week later it was stated in Washington that the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command had been authorized to attempt to open negotiations for a cease fire, and on 10 July the official representatives of the opposing supreme commanders met at Kaesong (a town along the 38th Parallel about 55 kilometers northwest of Seoul) for the first session of the Military Armistice Conference. The delegation representing the United Nations Command was led by Vice-Admiral C.T. Joy, and included a representative from the Republic of Korea Army. The Chinese and North Korean delegation was headed by Lieutenant General Nam Il of the North Korean army and included two Chinese delegates.

Dictated and influenced by this peace effort, the fighting on the front took the form of the stalemate as one source aptly defined: "For all practical purposes the Korean War ended 30 June 1951, when the United Nations Supreme Commander Matthew Ridgway radioed his willingness to discuss truce terms with Communist forces." With this stalemate hanging over on the battlefield, both sides made neither big moves to provoke the line nor put on whole-scale offensives.

In June 1951 Van Fleet, the Eighth US Army Commander, concluded what may be the best recapitulation of the situation: "Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the Eighth Army, therefore, was to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain north of Parallel 38 and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the Eighth Army."

Section 2. Chorwon Area Defense

The Turks had seen little actions in northwest of Chorwon since they moved on July 18. This was coincided with the opening of the first armistice negotiation on July 10 and subsequent lull in the fighting. The fortnight passed with construction of field bunkers and relocations of gun-positions and daily patrols.

On August 3 the 15th Regiment of the 3rd US Division relieved the Brigade and next day moving east of Chorwon the Brigade relieved the 7th Regiment of the 3rd Division along the river junction of the Hantan-Namadaechon. Upon arrival the 1st Battalion sat on the hills around Hato-dong and Tongmang-ni, and the 3rd Battalion on Hills 282 and 291 and in reserve of the Brigade was the 2nd Battalion around the west of Oe-dong and Hill 294.

The line was quiet except building trench and defense works and reconnaiss-
This reciprocal activity sometimes resulted in minor local clashes or further developed into exchange of artillery barrage. But each side stopped when the battle threatened to become big offensive.

On November 16, 1951, the remaining one third of the 1st Brigade was finally relieved bringing the 2nd Turkish Brigade to full reorganized strength. On December 20 saw the brigade's movement to the corps reserve camps at Sindang-ni, some 15 kilometers northwest of Chunchon to remain past winter until 24 February 1952.

The Korean winter had now begun. The advent of another winter also contributed to rapid decline in the scale of operations at the front. It was extremely cold and snow was falling. This is, therefore, an appropriate place to turn to matters of a domestic nature. Military history is too often confined to strategic and tactical affairs, moves and countermoves, to the exclusion of more intimate subjects affecting the daily lives of the troops. A short digression into the manner in which the men lived during the Korean winter will not be out of place.

During the first winter of 1950-1951 operations had been generally fluid and the troops frequently on the move. Accommodation, in the normal meaning of the words, was unknown. For the fighting troops, buildings and tents were very rare luxuries, even during periods of inactivity out of contacts with the enemy. In the front line the men occupied slit trenches, or bunkers, with some overhead cover as protection against the elements. More often than not these were still incomplete when the next move took place. Small fires, maintained with wood collected locally, were used by some units to keep warm in these trenches. In rear areas bonfires were lit—when the tactical situation permitted—round which the men crowded. Otherwise bivouac of a very crude type were constructed.

During the first Christmas period tents on a scale of about one per company, with one stove per tent, were issued as a special luxury. It was towards the end of the winter that what were known as “pup” tents because available for some troops, these being small American tents of bivouac type. Each held two men and on the move were a two-man load—one man carrying the poles and the other the fabric. Most men preferred a slit trench, using the tent fabric as part of the overhead cover.

It cannot be said that these conditions had very greatly improved by the winter of 1951-1952. Accommodation remained on an improvised basis, and earth the chief means of insulation against the bitter cold. The war was, however, now semi-static, and more elaborate protection was possible as troops
remained in the same localities for a considerable time.

The infantry in forward areas lived in slit trenches, bunkers and dug-outs, with overhead cover constructed of timber, sandbags and sometimes tent fabric. The artillery and others located around the gun area, had few tents, which were usually dug in. Empty ammunition boxes, filled with earth, were often used to construct walls.

Summarized, it may be said that no accommodation which was not provided by the army, or constructed by the troops, existed. Practically all shelter was improvised, and the tendency was to get below ground rather than remain at ground level. Lorries and other vehicles were found to be too cold to sleep in.

Nevertheless, the health and spirits of the troops remained good. Undoubtedly a contributing influence was that there was a general feeling that everything possible was being done to mitigate hardship and that whatever perils and discomforts existed were unavoidable.

Section 3. Heartbreak Ridge

Now when the Korean conflict rolled into the third year, before returning
Stalemate

to the Turkish Brigade, we had better look at the general situation both at the fighting front and at the negotiation table.

On the ground, the general tactical situation remained largely unchanged. The frontline lay well north of the 38th parallel, except in the extreme west, where it descended below the parallel to the area of the Han-Imjin junction. From this point, the line ran practically due northeast, curving around north of Chorwon and continuing east to Kumhwa, a town which marked the western flank of a salient, approximately 30 kilometers in width, rising almost to Kumsong. From the eastern flank of this salient the front curved upward to positions on the east coast north of Chodo-ri.

The representatives of the opposing military commanders had been meeting at Panmunjom for nearly nine months, in an attempt to negotiate an armistice. Although these negotiations had not resulted in a settlement and earlier hopes for an end to the fighting had consequently abated somewhat, the public utterances of the leading figures involved did not contain any suggestion that either side was prepared to abandon negotiations in favor of an attempt to settle the Korean question by force of arms. At the same time each side made it equally clear that neither would surrender the field to the other. Thus the soldiers of both armies in Korea faced the prospect of an indefinite continuation of the sort of action they had experienced since the latter part of November 1951.

Already defensive layouts were assuming forms which were to remain substantially unchanged for months on end. There were to be no long movements, no great concentrations for large operations, no deep penetrations of the enemy’s front. Most important of all, the termination of the conflict appeared to rest more in the hands of the negotiators at Panmunjom than in the courage and military skill of the soldiers. The extent to which a realization of this fact influenced the minds of the commanders and troops in Korea could not be measured, but there could be little doubt, however, that it reduced the willingness to take risks.

Two months’ rest ended on 24 February 1952 when the Brigade was ordered to move east of Heartbreak Ridge. This event was preceded by the 25th US Division’s shift from the I Corps in the central front to the X US Corps in the east. Together with the 25th Division, the Turks moved some 50 kilometers northeast from Chunchon and the latter relieved on the next day the 32nd US Regiment with its attached Ethiopian battalion of the 7th Division. Here the Brigade was to stay for eight months until the end of October 1952.

Heartbreak and Bloody Ridges separated north and south through the So-chon River and the circular valley on the right of it called Punchbowl marked one of the bloodiest battle area. Some 30 kilometers northeast of the
Hwachon Reservoir this had been objects of attacks and counterattacks by the 2nd US and 1st US Marine Divisions in last September.

After difficult possession of initial objectives by the two divisions in October, the 7th US Division moved in and effected the fortifications of the enemy-cleared area. However, across the ridge starting from Kachilbong being the Brigade’s current line of contact, both armies cut throat of each other as closely as 100-150 meters.

On 25 February the Brigade established CP near south of Piduk-kogae where two steep ridges provided sheltered lot and put its artillery plus the US tank company at Piari two and half kilometers forward of it. The other elements of the Brigade was deployed along the Satae-ri and Kachil-bong line. The 1st Battalion on the right occupied along Hills 1065 and 841 while the 2nd Battalion around Hill 750 and the western ridge of Hill 841 and the 3rd Battalion was in Brigade’s reserve near Yao-dong. Flanking the Brigade’s right, the 35th US Division positioned south of Kachil-bong and the 14th Regiment of the 7th ROK Division guarded the left from south of Satae-ri.

The first thing to occupy the Turks was to reconstruct field fortifications including bunkers and barbed wires along vulnerable ridges and possible avenues of an enemy attack. Although the former occupant of this position, the 32nd Regiment of the 7th US Division, made a good improvised work on this, but it was far from being permanent standard. In the ensuing days the diligent hands

Fortifications during the latter stalemate period.
of the Turks worked painstakingly through every ridge of the Brigade's sector so that at the end of the period it was fortified to meet the enemy of any strength. This toil was to prove its worth because the Brigade would stay here as long as 8 months and the main activity of probes and minor penetrations meanwhile would have demanded this a necessity.

Here we have to note in particular that although constant harassments and minor probes were exchanged between both sides, the activity of the Turks until October 1952 reflects little to record. It was evident that the thirty day acceptance of the demarcation line late in 1951 had resulted in a de facto cease-fire that lasted until October 1952. The low casualty rate on both sides during the December 1951–September 1952 period attested to this fact, with the UNC averaging less than 3,500 and the enemy less than 15,000 (estimated) per month. By way of comparison, the totals in October 1951 showed almost 20,000 for the UN Command and over 80,000 for the Communist forces. With both parties keeping one eye on the trace tent, the attritional battles at the front, punctuated by long and frequent pauses between the rounds, went on inconclusively.

During this period the most routine and important activity of the Brigade was, as with other UN forces on the line, patrol and ambush. The Brigade usually sent out at least one patrol and set up several ambushes for the enemy every night. The assignment to carry out the daily patrol was rotated among the battalions and companies of the Brigade, customarily by a prepared roster indicating the responsibility for patrols some two to three weeks in advance. Usually the patrol mission was to bring back prisoners and to harass the enemy line and the choice of objectives was extremely limited.

Since the patrol was to be conducted at night, the rifleman selected to go on the mission were given intensive training in night fire techniques. Using battery-operated lights to simulate enemy fire, the riflemen were taught to aim low and take advantage of ricochets. Sand-table models of the patrol route and objective were carefully studied and the patrol leaders were flown over the whole area to familiarize themselves with the terrain if possible. But many returned with negative reports, for they had found no one to capture or even to shoot at. Patrol, raid, and ambush by the Brigade was matched by similar actions by the Communists, for this was the pattern of ground fighting for the period.

Nevertheless some contacts and assaults did take place, if in minor scope, which deserve some explanation.

On 18 April, the 1st Battalion attempted to attack Hill 1065. Among many volunteered, 11 men were picked forming an attacking squad. These Turks famed themselves by taking the objective regardless their wound in the process.
The ugly case of Colonel Nuripamir among others, however, shows still omnipresent dangers on the front and a unpredictable nature of the fighting thereabout. In late afternoon of June 5, the Brigade Commander and the Assistant Commander Colonel Nuripamir were on customary inspection tour. On the way back from Hill 1065, the party ran into an enemy daytime patrol which clearly recognized the importance of the team and started to concentrate mortars and automatic fires. Colonel Nuripamir unfortunately was wound up in mortar fire ring and met his grave fate.

The stalemate continued along battle fronts while truce talks deadlocked on POW repatriation question. Early in April this year the screening of the Communist prisoners provoked unprecedented turmoil at Kojedo prison camp in which the rioters held US General Dodd, the Superintendent, as hostage. The subsequent release of General Dodd on May 11 and the success in bringing the island under control did not however put an end to the POW problem. The truce negotiation was to suffer the outcome of it.

Meanwhile the first party of the 3rd Turkish Brigade arrived at Pusan on 5 July hugging the men of the 1st Battalion who were to clear out of Korea on the same ship, first among the present Brigade. The relief of the 2nd Brigade completed on 20 August 1952. On the same day, the newly arrived Turks were ordered into the Division reserve for the necessary preparations.

The spell of rest and recreation ended on 30 October. On the next day, the 25th US Division then commanded by Major General Samuel T. Williams started to relieve the 7th US Division then under Major General Wayne C. Smith on the central front. In line with this the Brigade went into the position of one regiment of the 7th Division.

This position was not unfamiliar to its old timers because from 3 October to the year’s end the 2nd Brigade had defended this area. It was situated west of Kumhwa where the Hantan-chon and Namdae-chon crossed each other east of the Brigade.

Turks saw Christmas holidays and met their new year on this position. However, activity on this line was also confined to limited skirmishes resulted from patrols and ambushes. In addition, constant chores of fortification of trenches and bunkers kept them busy. On 29 January the Brigade dropped out of the battleline as the division reserve. However, upon request from the division, the Turkish artillery remained on the front line to carry out support fire mission.

The reserve period lasted until May 1953: Except frequent training programs and taking care of the field fortifications collapsed by the melting of snow,
it was quiet and eventless.

Section 4. At Nevada Complex

From May to the end of the fighting in July, the Turkish Brigade defended the Nevada Complex, a series of outposts east of Panmunjom. When the 25th US Division, commanded by Major General Samuel T. Williams, had shifted over from the IX US Corps to the I US Corps in early May in exchange for the 2nd US Division, it had promptly relieved the 1st US Marine Division on the line. On 3 May the Turks relieved the 7th Marine Regiment on the Nevada Complex after assembling at the village called Hakoryangpo.

The series of outposts called the Nevada Complex, lay on low hills approximately 15 kilometers northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance north of Munsan-ni. Outpost Vegas was on Hill 157; Outpost Reno was on Hill 148, less than a kilometer to the west; and Outpost Carson was on an unnumbered hill 600 meters south of Reno. The British Commonwealth Division was on the right of the Brigade manning another outpost named "the Hook" while it was bounded by the 35th Regiment of the 25th Division on the left.

Brigadier General Sirri Acar, the Commander of the Turkish Brigade, laid out the defense plan: He placed his 3rd Battalion on its right whose 9th Company sent one squad each to man Berlin and East Berlin outposts (27 men at the former and 16 at the latter). His 2nd Battalion in the center was reinforced by the 3rd Company from the 1st Battalion in charge of the Vegas (140 men) and its 6th Company sent one platoon each to the Carson and Elko (44 men and 33 respectively). The 1st Battalion (minus the 3rd Company) was responsible for the Brigade's left from Toryon to Hwajoun-dong. In addition to the Brigade's organic artillery and mortar, and that of the 25th Division, he also secured artillery support from the I US Corps and 1st US Marine Division.

Facing the Turkish forces were the three regiments-385th, 395th and 30th of the 120th Division, 45th CCF Army. Since the enemy seizure of Outpost Reno in March, the area had remained quiet except for the customary probes and patrols. But the Chinese capability of mounting a large-scale attack upon Outposts Vegas, Elko, and Carson from Reno and other nearby hills posed a threat that demanded constant vigilance.

Tactically, possession of Nevada Complex by the enemy would mean improved observation of the I Corps main line of resistance positions that lay south and east of the outposts. Since I Corps regarded these defensive positions as critical, the Turks were given mandatory orders to hold them against all enemy attacks at any price. This promised to be a difficult task if the Chinese were
determined to take the outposts, for the latter were at a considerable distance from the main line of resistance and the enemy's approach routes were easier than those of I Corps.

General Acar well recognized importance of these outposts and difficulties involved to hold them. His first thought was to fortify the line and to keep in stock sufficient ammunition of all kinds. After a week's preparation, subordinate commanders reported satisfactions in readiness. The Turks were well dug in and adequately armed. Barbed wire, trip flares, and mines were in place and automatic weapons sited to cover enemy approach routes.

The first attack came at 0220 of May 15. The enemy artillery which kept quiet for a week began to pound the area with full magnitude. The preparation fire was directed at Vegas where 140 Turks were stuck to meet the CCF infantry. The Brigade's artillery and mortars saturated the predicted avenues of the enemy approaches. During this artillery exchange, the British Commonwealth Division's artillery and the mortars of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment on brigade's right also took good parts. Some thirty minutes later the CCF rushed into the Vegas firing with their automatic rifles. The illuminating shells were launched by the Turks. Resolved strongly not to lose an inch of ground and not to let a single enemy into their camps, they stopped
and broke every enemy efforts. At 0315 the enemy began to pull out concealed by the smoke screen.

Right after bitter failure on Vegas, now the CCF, one company each, spearheaded against Berlin and East Berlin. Two squads on those outposts threw off the attackers in close quarters.

Remarkable amount of ammunition consumption bears witness to the scale of attack on the night: The Brigade used 9,401 rounds of mortars, 276 rounds of recoilless rifle, 4,380 grenades, 155 rifle grenades, nearly 300,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunitions. On the artillery side, the Brigade used up some 5,700 rounds and 2,000 heavy mortar in exchange for 10,000 rounds of the enemy artillery. Meanwhile the casualty estimates put the enemy's at 500 approximately in striking comparison to the Brigade's 3 men killed and 23 wounded.

By the 24th of May after the first failure there were signs that another expected attack was imminent and that it would be on a bigger scale than any which had taken place for some time. Further measures were taken to strengthen the position, and new ammunitions were issued.

It was on 25 May that the Chinese artillery opened up on the Nevada Complex signalling the launch of another attack. For the next three days the shells came in with growing frequency and enemy troop movements in the area increased. Artillery supports from the 1 US Corps and the 1st Marine Division, in addition to that the 25th US Division and the Brigade itself provided, responded to counter the Communist concentrations. From the 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 34 tanks rolled into position to the outposts.

The second attack came late on 28 May. On the heels of an intense artillery and mortar preparation, the 120th CCF Division sent four battalions forward -two to the east against the main objective, Vegas, one to the south against Carson and Elko, and one in a diversionary attack against Berlin and East Berlin. The last was halted and broken off early in the evening.

Over on Vegas the Chinese succeeded in taking one small finger of the hill from the 3rd Company and clung tenaciously despite the heavy automatic weapons, small arms, artillery, and mortar fire at them. The Turks sent a reinforcing platoon commanded by the 7th Company Commander to bolster the defender and it arrived in time to help throw back a three-pronged enemy assault on the outpost. After reorganizing, the Chinese again sent a force estimated at two battalions to take the position. Ammunitions began to run low and the Turkish 2nd Battalion Commander sent another platoon accompanied by Korean Service Corps personnel to resupply the embattled troops. After a brief respite in the fighting, the enemy tried again and this time the Chinese pushed
through and hand-to-hand combat broke out in the trenches.

Meanwhile the Chinese had added a second battalion to the assault on Carson and Elko and closed upon the Turkish positions. Bayonets and hand grenades were used freely as the 6th Company managed to throw back the attack. The battalion commander sent an engineer company to the defense of Carson. Shortly after midnight the pace slackened, but observers reported that a third enemy battalion was assembling to join in the assault. Fire support from the 1st Battalion of the Turkish Brigade and the 35th US Regiment helped to disperse this reinforcing enemy battalion.

As the night wore on, Elko held out against continuing Chinese attacks, but the Turks on Carson were dying one by one. A few managed to slip over and join their comrades on Elko, but the majority died in the trenches and bunkers from enemy fire. By morning Carson belonged to the Chinese.

Convinced of the Chinese determination to take the Nevada outposts, General Williams placed the 1st Battalion of the 14th US Infantry Regiment under General Acar so that the latter could commit his reserves to the counterattack.

Gradually the enemy gained control of the northwest portion of Vegas and Turkish casualties were increasing. In a desperate effort to blunt the Chinese drive, the Turks began a counterattack to clear the hill. Savage infighting followed as the Turks slowly swept the enemy off Vegas.

Nothing daunted, the Chinese regrouped and reinforced their offensive units, then came back again. They edged their way up Vegas and met the indomitable Turks, who refused to be budged. Late in the morning of 29 May, the Turks launched a four-platoon attack that cleared Vegas with cold steel. But the enemy in turn would not accept defeat and sent wave after wave of men against the Turkish stone wall, as casualties on both sides increased sharply.

The struggle for Elko continued throughout the night of 28–29 May, as the enemy increased his pressure against the remnants of the Turkish force on the hill. General Acar ordered Lieutenant Colonel Carl E. Mann, the Commander of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, to send one of his companies to reinforce Elko and to retake Carson on the morning of 29 May. Company B approached Elko from the southeast, overran the Chinese holding around the outpost, and secured the objective after 25-minute fight.

Using two platoons in the attack and two in the support roles, Company B then advanced west on Carson. Midway between Elko and Carson, the company began to receive heavy automatic weapons, artillery, and mortar fire, and the assault slowed, then halted. Withdrawing to Elko, Company B tried twice to gather momentum enough to break through the Chinese wall of fire on
Stalemate

Carson. Each time it failed and had to turn back. United effort of artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons could not silence the Chinese weapons nor dislodge the enemy defender.

After the third assault ground to a halt, the Chinese retaliated. Six times they crossed from Carson to Elko and on several occasions managed to advance within hand grenade range. The 6th Company reinforced by Company B, stoutly supported by artillery, tank, mortar, and automatic weapons fire, forced the enemy to break off the attack each time and Elko remained in the UN possession.

By midafternoon, General Williams and I US Corps Commander Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clark, in a radio conversation with General Acar, evidently felt that the Chinese intended to remain on the offensive until the outposts were taken. The strength on Vegas was down to 40-odd men, many of them wounded, and to 20-odd on Elko. Over 150 men had been killed and 245 had been wounded in the defense of the Nevada Complex. On the other hand, the Chinese casualties were estimated roughly at 3,000 men. The question was: Should the Brigade hang on to the outposts or should the terrain be evacuated and more lives be conserved? Under the circumstances it was decided that the outposts had served their main purpose in uncovering and delaying the enemy attack. Early in the evening of 29 May orders went out for the Turks to withdraw from Vegas and for the US troops to leave Elko.

It had been a bitter struggle as the losses on each side attested. Over 117,000 rounds of artillery fire and 67 close air support sorties had aided the Turks in withstanding the determined assaults of the Chinese. The enemy had sent 65,000 rounds artillery and mortar fire in return, up to this point an unprecedented volume in the Korean War.

On 6 July the leading elements of the 4th Turkish Brigade arrived at Uijongbu north of Seoul to relieve one battalion of the 3rd Brigade. In the ensuing days nevertheless, the activity of the Brigade was very little to record since the war was to end on July 27 when both sides agreed on the armistice.

Section 5. Armistice

Here it is convenient to follow the events which finally led to the end of the shooting. On 22 February 1953, the United Nations Command stated that it was prepared to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners according to the Geneva Convention, and on 30 March, over Peking radio, the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai agreed to discuss this. His statement went on at some length in a tone of conciliation, to suggest that all prisoners should be repatri-
ated. The meetings which followed were successful, and a plan for the repatriation of the sick and wounded prisoners of war was agreed on 11 April. Under this agreement Operation Little Switch began at Panmunjom in which 684 first UN prisoners including 15 Turks were exchanged with the 6,670 enemy internees.

On 8 June an agreement was reached, the Government of India being invited to provide a Custodian Force for prisoners-responsibility which was accepted. The signing of the armistice was, however, delayed, as on 18 June President Syngman Rhee—who from the beginning had protested against the conclusion of an armistice which left Korea divided—ordered, without consulting the United Nations Command, the release of all North Korean prisoners of war refusing repatriation. On that and subsequent days between 26,000 and 27,000 North Korean prisoners (out of a total of about 33,000) broke out of their camps. However, this incident did not have crucial effect on the peace effort.

Following a very quiet night, the truce was signed at Panmunjom at 1000 on 27 July 1953, and hostilities ceased at 2200. So the fighting in Korea ended—three years and one month after hostilities began, 2 years and 9 months from the time the first Turk set foot on the Korean battlefield. On the 28th Operation Swanlake—the withdrawal from the Demilitarized Zone to post armistice positions—began and was completed on the 31st.

By the terms of the Armistice Agreement unarmed parties were permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for various defined purposes for a period of forty-five days after the Zone had been cleared.

On 12 September Operation Finder began. The object was to locate bodies in the Zone and to see that they were properly buried. This is a fitting place to describe the United Nations Cemetery in Korea, which, whenever circumstances permitted, was the last resting place of all men who were killed in action, or died of sickness or by accident, in Korea. This cemetery, which opened in January 1951, and officially dedicated to the United Nations following April, is just outside of Pusan on a hill overlooking sea. It is divided into a series of smooth green lawns, rising in tiers on the hillside. There are twenty-one lawns in all, of varying sizes, each dedicated to one of the United Nations with forces in Korea. Here on these lawns buried silently are 462 Turks, who left homeland but would never return. Each grave consists of a slight mound and a white wooden cross bearing the name and other particulars of the man buried there. In the center of the cemetery is a special lawn, dedicated to the United Nations as a whole, on which are six representative graves from every country fighting in Korea. This cemetery, with its graves of men of so many races and religions, from far and wide,
is a most impressive place.

Throughout the post-truce period the morale of the troops remained unchanged and the anti-climax which follows the end of most wars was noticeably lacking in Korea. The requirement of preparing for the winter absorbed all available time; when this work was completed the Brigade embarked upon a strenuous period of training in mobile warfare in mountainous country. The Turks maintained the high standard set by their predecessors and were ready for any eventuality. After winter in Korea the 4th Turkish Brigade left Korea mid-summer of the next year.
CHAPTER VII RETROSPECT

Section 1. War Account

a. General

From the time the first Turkish soldier set foot in Korea on 19 October 1950 until the armistice was signed 14,936 of the Turkish Armed Forces served in Korea in three batches. The number of the Turkish Brigade reached its peak in 1953 totaling 5,455 men, 853 men more than the 1st Brigade and 577 men than the second. This was not a small contribution, especially so in comparison of the population. Except the number of the ROK and US and the Commonwealth forces, it was the largest body among other nations.

Throughout its stay in Korea, the Brigade on the whole set another legend as the first-class fighting force whose quality was unanimously expressed in
the words of other observers as rough, tough bayonet-wielding Turks. Nevertheless the Brigade suffered a great deal of casualty. At Kunu-ri the Brigade had more casualties in two days than the greater part of 1952-1953 when the static war brought about a very low casualty rate.

b. Problems of the Difference

The bulk of the national contingents operating in Korea were fed, equipped, housed and administered by the US sources. Differences in clothing, ammunition and equipment created problems, as did the differences in food. Turks could not simply enjoy the US meals, as the French soldiers preferred wine to tea.

One good example of this kind of problem created by differences is still remembered by General Samuel T. Williams, once the Commander of the 25th US Division under which the Brigade mostly fought.

From the beginning the Turks were reluctant to bathe. To an American general, that was a real curiosity as well as a problem of hygiene of the Turks. The general had fine shower units but the Turks would not use them. A shower unit then consisted on two tents, one for bathing and the other for dressing. The water was kept hot and Korean boys gathered around to do the men’s laundry while they showered.

He made efforts to learn why the Turks did not use the showers. He learned finally that Turkish men do not disrobe in public and the shower units were pretty public, with a dozen men or more showering in the tent at the same time. Sometimes, under orders, the Turks did go the shower units but they bathed in their under wear. He finally solved the problem by setting up separate showers for the Turks. After that they were as clean as all the others.

He had other problems with the Turks, though somewhat religious. He had trouble getting them to begin fighting on time in operations in which coordination between unit were essential. Each time he complained about the Turks lagging he was told by the Turks, who most believed in Allah, “Allah was not willing, or we would not have been late.” Finally he put his foot down and told the Turkish commander, “There are two men now; one is Allah and the other me, and I have to be satisfied and Allah wants me satisfied.” The Turks ever after hit their objectives on time.

Although they suffered this differences in food, climate and many other things, most allied observers would stand to the attestation of the Turkish valor and courage and merits.

A story that made the rounds illustrated the respect with which the Turks
were held by their allies. The story was that a badly wounded Turkish soldier was asked by a surgeon at an American hospital whether the treatment hurt. The answer was a simple "Me Turks!" Hospital orderlies, too, often found themselves dismissed with the same phrase, uttered by men who deeply resented the fact that they were out of the fighting.

The durability of these dark young men were fantastic; they rarely worried about minor injuries, and some of them were known to have treated bullet wounds by simply dabbing mercurochrome over the point of entrance. After one skirmish a Turkish commander pointed out proudly to a bunch of his men who were walking around with variously-sized chunks of metal inside them and told correspondents: "Some of our men are walking arsenals." It was not a very great exaggeration.

After the battle at Kunu-ri, General Van Fleet came and presented a citation which called the action "a savage battle against a fanatical defense—in which Turkish infantry men literally dragged the enemy from their foxholes."

In one action, they are on record as having complained bitterly that the artillery barrage put in to soften up an enemy position before their charge was
too heavy—there were not enough live Chinese left to make it a decent fight. One of the classic messages that they frequently dispatched when attacked is: "Enemy attacked. We attacked. Send more bread."

Major Carl A. Pollock, who served long with the Turks as the United Nations Command Liaison Officer also cheerfully recalls something about them. According to his recollections, one day before the assault crossing, the Turks were supplied with 100 meters of M38 infantry foot-bridging and instructions for its assembly. The crossing site was under heavy artillery and mortar fire. The Turkish Engineer Commander decided it would cost many lives to have his men work in the open, so had the bridge assembled behind a small crest—150 meters from the river’s edge. Once the bridge was assembled, several hundred troops picked it up and hand-carried it to the water’s edge. During the carry, the bridge broke several times, whereupon everyone lowered it. When it was put back together, all lifted and moved on. The bridge was put into the river at a 35 to 45 degree angle in the same direction as the current. At this angle it did not reach the opposite shore, but the men walked its length and jumped into the water to pull on ropes and bring the bridge astride the current. It was a smooth operation, quickly executed.

On the whole, the Turks’ relish for hand-to-hand fighting, their first-class leadership, their discipline under fire—these were attributes of the Turkish fighting men which the fighters of the other nations admired much.

Section 2. Turkish Prisoners of War

It is, of course, only possible to generalize in this matter and give a picture of how the average man fared in a Communist prison camp.

The exact number of the Turkish Brigade officers and soldiers captured by the Communists is not known, and never will be known, as not all of those reported missing were prisoners. Some were killed, but their fate was unknown at the time. It is probable that the number of prisoners was about 300 or slight less. The Turkish prisoners were repatriated in two batches:

Before hostilities ended under "Little Switch," between 20th and 25th April 1953: Sick and wounded prisoners ..................................................15

After the signing of the Armistice, under "Big Switch," between 5 August and 5 September 1953 .................................................................229

Total(all ranks) 244

Some—but not as many as might have been expected—are known to have died in captivity.
The main group of the Turkish prisoners were those who were taken at Kum-ri at the end of November 1950. They were captured in the middle of winter and before the enemy prison camps, in the extreme north of Korea, had been properly organized. Conditions were not much better in the next spring except in the warmth of natural climate. Up to then only the bare necessities of life were provided, and the food was not only lacking in quantity, but was unsuitable for Turks. Beri-Beri became common, as did other diseases due to vitamin deficiency.

By the winter of 1951-1952 most prisoners were warmly clad and the food had improved, although it could not compare with a normal friendly diet. Accommodation was crowded and comforts and amenities non-existent.

By the time they were released in the late summer of 1953, conditions for the average prisoner were reasonably good. There is ample evidence, however, that the undoubted efforts which the Chinese made to improve the lot of prisoners was not due to altruistic motives. This was in accordance with what became known as the "Lenient Policy." This had a political motive, which was the hope that the prisoners would more readily accept Communist propaganda. They followed the line adopted on the radio, in the Communist press and on the platform.

In most camps the enjoyment of the lenient policy did not depend to any great extent on the success of the propaganda. The Chinese were on the whole patient and satisfied with small results. At first the study program consisted of lectures and discussions; but these caused a lot of hostility and certainly did not produce many converts. In the spring of 1952 the policy changed and more insidious methods of indoctrination started by means of books, papers and magazines.

During the period immediately following their capture, prisoners were not usually segregated by ranks. On arrival in the fixed camps, however, officers were put into one compound and sergeants into another. By this means the lower ranks were deprived of their leaders and for a short time this had a depressing, and generally bad, effect. It was not long, however, before the natural leaders among the rank and file asserted themselves. The standard of leadership naturally varied in different compounds; but in all there was some organization and in some it was highly efficient. It was however, the policy of the Chinese to discourage the emergence of thrustful leaders in the junior ranks compounds. Consequently, clandestine, rather than open, leadership was usual. If this was not so the leader usually found himself on a charge, followed by punishment which involved long separation from his comrades.

The Chinese methods of punishment were usually primitive. Some prisoners, mostly officers and the more senior among the other ranks, had unpleasant
and sometimes terrible, experiences. On the whole, however, punishment did not take the form of violent torture, but less drastic methods, such as solitary confinement, prolonged interrogation and a reduced diet. In some cases, the thought of punishment provided indirect pressure on prisoners. In a very few cases this resulted in conversion, or professed conversion, to Communism; but with most men their treatment as prisoners, and what they saw of the life and outlook of their captors, produced a hardening against Communism. They were not impressed by a system based on fanatical political prejudice rather than on laws and regulations based on justice and logic.

Summarized, it can be said that all Turkish prisoners maintained their loyalty and morale in captivity, and showed proper pride in defying Communist indoctrination and attempts at conversion. Very few prisoners died in captivity and most returned in reasonably good health.
ANNEX CHRONOLOGY

1950

25 Jul Turkey announces the activation of the Brigade to send to Korea.
26 Jul The Brigade prepares for the Korean mission.
23 Sep The Brigade entraigned from Ankara to Askenderun for embarkation.
25 Sep The embarkation commences, which ends on October 2.
17 Oct The first echelon arrives at Pusan.
19 Oct Battle orientation started.
13 Nov The Brigade completes movement to the Imjin River under the 25th US Division upon orders from the IX Corps.
26-30 Nov Kumurri Battle.
26 Nov The Brigade ordered to move to Tokchun.
28 Nov Battle at Wawon.
29 Nov Battle at Sillim-ni.
30 Nov The Brigade runs the gauntlet.
1 Dec General Yazici reunites his infantry at Pyongyang.
12 Dec The Turks at Sosa struggle to reorganize.
13 Dec General Walker visits the Brigade at Sosa and assigns Kimpo Peninsula to the Turks.

1951

3 Jan The Brigade pulled out of the Han River line along with the UN general retreat south to Ansong.
6-24 Jan The Turks rest in IX US Corps reserve.
25 Jan Operation Thunderbolt flared as UN's counteroffensive and the Brigade advances toward Kumyangjang-ni.
26 Jan Battle at Hill 151.
30 Jan Battle at Suri-san.
11 Feb The Brigade reaches the southern bank of the Han River.
14-21 Feb The Turks in the Corps reserve at Anyang.
2 Mar The Brigade resumes advance north.
5 Apr The Brigade reaches Hantan River.
10 Apr Turks cross the Hantan River.
22 Apr CCF Spring Offensive fell on the Brigade southeast of Chorwon and the Turks retreat to the Seoul defense line.
29 Apr  Turks ordered into the 25th Division reserve in the vicinity of Seoul.
13-20 May  The Brigade defends Toogyeowon-ni.
21 May  Turks counteroffensive begins from the Seoul defense line.
25 May  The Brigade relieved by the Canadian brigade and moves to Uijongbu as corps reserve, which is to continue until June 4.

7 Jun  The Turks move to Kumbwa area and the defense mission begins.
20 Jun  Ordered to the division reserve in the northern outskirts of Seoul. The 1st Brigade here rotated by the 2nd.
18 Jul  The Brigade occupies Chorwon and experiences lull in action.
4 Aug  The Brigade relieved by the 15th Regiment of the US 3rd Division and in turn relieves the 7th Infantry of the 3rd Division along the Hantan- Namdu-e-chon.
3 Oct  Operation Commando gets under way and the Turks advance toward halfway Pyongyang.
20 Dec  The Brigade stays in the corps reserve north of Chunchon.

1952

24 Feb  The Brigade relieves the 32nd Regiment of the US 7th Division at Heartbreak Ridge.
5 Jul  The 2nd Brigade rotated by the 3rd; the new comers move to the same mission at Heartbreak Ridge.

1953

29 Jan  The Brigade goes into the division reserve.
3 May  The Turks relieve the 7th US Marine Regiment on Nevada Complex.
15 May  The first CCF attack falls on Nevada Complex.
28 May  The second CCF attack on Nevada Complex.
29 May  Nevada Complex abandoned for tactical reasons.
6 Jul  The 3rd Brigade rotated by the 4th.
27 Jul  The armistice signed.
APPENDIX
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### APPENDIX I

**KOREAN WAR DIARY**

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<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>UN Security Council adopts US resolution taking note of NK refusal to heed June 25 resolution and calls upon members to assist the Republic of Korea. President Truman orders US air and sea forces to support Korea and orders US Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Formosa Strait. Gen Church’s survey group arrives at Suwon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jun</td>
<td>NKCF seizes Seoul.</td>
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<td>29 Jun</td>
<td>British naval fleet arrives in the Korean waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>President Truman commits US ground forces to Korea. Australian air squadron joins in US forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jul</td>
<td>President Truman declares a blockade of the entire Korean coast-line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul</td>
<td>US Task Force Smith makes first contact with NK forces near Osan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>UN Command for the Korean War established: General MacArthur appointed Supreme Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>Nakdong River defense established. Canadian destroyers enter Sasebo to proceed to the theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug</td>
<td>Chinju falls: Gen Walker announces “There will be no more retreating.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>Russia ends the boycotting of UN Security Council as Jacob Malik assumes the council presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>Soviet delegate Malik calls Korean fighting an “internal civil war” and demands withdrawal of “all foreign troops from Korea.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–19 Aug</td>
<td>First battle of Nakdong bulge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–8 Aug</td>
<td>General MacArthur meets top planners in discuss Inchon Landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>US manifests in the UN General Assembly that goal of UN in Korea is the unification of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Aug</td>
<td>US Marine scores the UN’s first victory at No Name Ridge giving momentum to the collapse of NK forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug</td>
<td>British brigade arrives at Pusan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug</td>
<td>Pusan Perimeter rages with heaviest fighting of the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–5 Sep</td>
<td>NK great Nakdong Offensive; enemy opens all out offensive to thrust Pusan Perimeter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep</td>
<td>Inchon Landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sep</td>
<td>Eighth US Army pushes up cautiously from Pusan Perimeter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>Enemy forces at Pusan Perimeter begin collapsing. Philippine force enters the theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sep</td>
<td>Walker’s forces breakout of Pusan Perimeter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Sep</td>
<td>Swedish field hospital unit arrives in Korea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NKCF in full retreat and UN pursuit begins.

UN forces moving north link up near Osan with allied amphibious forces.

Australian infantry battalion enters the theater.

UN forces take back Seoul.

General MacArthur calls upon the aggressors to surrender. Communist China's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warns: "The Chinese people will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded by the imperialists."

Gen MacArthur orders the UN forces to cross the 38th Parallel in pursuit of retreating NK; the 3rd ROK Div crosses the parallel north.

Chou En-lai implies to Indian Ambassador in Peking that Communist China will intervene in the war in case of US entry into North Korea.

UN General Assembly authorizes UN forces to pursue the enemy across the 38th Parallel.

1-9 Oct 1st US Cav Div crosses 35th Parallel.

10 Oct Wonsan captured by 3rd ROK Div. Communist China reiterates the threats of warning intervention in Korean War.

15 Oct Truman and MacArthur confer at Wake Island.

16 Oct First CCF--"People's Volunteers"--secretly enter Korea from Manchuria.

17 Oct Turkish brigade enters the theater.

19 Oct 1st ROK Division takes Pyongyang.

26 Oct 5th Div of the II ROK Corps reaches Yalu. First CCF prisoners captured by ROK forces. X US Corps lands at Wonsan. CCF attack ROK advance unit along Yalu.

27-31 Oct CCF First-phase Offensive commences.

27 Oct 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division badly mauled by strong CCF attack near Yalu.

29 Oct 7th US Division lands at Iwon.

30 Oct Elements of the 24th US Division reach within 70km of Yalu.

31 Oct Strong CCF attack Eighth US Army at Unsan.

1 Nov First enemy MiGs appear along Yalu to counter UN air forces.

2 Nov CCF with NKCF strike at UN front.

5 Nov Gen MacArthur informs UN that Chinese Communist are operating in Korea. South African fighter squadron arrives at Johnson Air Base, in Japan.

6 Nov MacArthur warns US JCS that movement of Chinese forces across Yalu "threatens the ultimate destruction of my command."

7 Nov Thai battalion disembarks at Pusan. The advance party of Canadian brigade lands at Pusan.

10-26 Nov X Corps advances toward Yalu in east. Eighth US Army in west.

13 Nov Greek air transport detachment arrives in the theater.

20 Nov Indian field ambulance unit arrives in Korea.

23 Nov Netherlands infantry battalion arrives in Korea.


25 Nov CCF Second-phase Offensive launches. The II ROK Corps at Tokchon is smashed by CCF drive.

26 Nov 20,000 CCF attack the Eighth US Army north of Changchon.

26-27 Nov CCF offensive in full swing on both fronts; in the west Eighth US Army suf-
fers deep penetration around Tokchon and in the east 1st US Marine Div cut off at Changjin Reservoir.

27 Nov

27 Nov
X US Corps retreats toward Hungnam in east, Marines fight back from Kotori.

29 Nov
French battalion lands at Pusan.

4 Dec
UN forces in full retreat and Pyongyang recaptured by the Communists.

4-6 Dec
Chinnampo evacuated.

9 Dec
Greek forces land at Pusan.

10 Dec
1st US Marine Div breaks out of Changjin Reservoir and begins march to join rest of X Corps at Hungnam.

11 Dec
1st Marine and 7th US Divisions converge towards Hungnam beachhead.

15 Dec
1st US Marine Div evacuates from Hungnam, bound to Pusan. Evacuation from Wonsan completed. UN forces form defensive line along the 38th Parallel.

23 Dec
Gen Walker killed in accident and Gen Ridgway succeeds on the 26th.

24 Dec
The X US Corps completes evacuation of Hungnam.

31 Dec
New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment enters the war.

31 Dec
CCF Third-phase Offensive launches.

1951

3-4 Jan
UN forces abandon Seoul and withdraw to general line along Pyongtaek-Wonju-Samchok.

7 Jan
The Eighth US Army initiates strong reconnaissance probes northward.

15 Jan
Operation Wolfhound, reconnaissance by a reinforced regimental combat team, re-establishes contact with enemy near Osan. Enemy offensive halted.

25 Jan
Operation Thunderbolt begins, with advance north toward Han River by the I and IX US Corps.

31 Jan
Belgian and Luxemburg forces arrive in Korea. 2nd US Div heavily engaged; 3rd US RCT with French Bn blunts attacks of five CCF divisions at Chipyong-ni.

1 Feb
UN resolves to end Korean conflict by "peaceful means."

5 Feb
Operation Roundup, general advance by the X US Corps begins on eastern flank.

10 Feb
UN forces retake Inchon and Kimpo.

11 Feb
CCF Fourth-phase Offensive begins with main effort in 2nd US Division sector.

21 Feb
Operation Killer, general advance by the IX and X US Corps, begins.

28 Feb
Last enemy resistance south of the Han River collapsed.

7 Mar
Operation Ripper begins in central and eastern zones with advance across the Han by the IX and X US Corps.

14-15 Mar
Seoul retaken by the ROK and UN troops.

31 Mar
UN Advance reaches the 38th Parallel.

5 Apr
Operation Rugged, general advance to the Kansas Line, begins.

11 Apr
Gen MacArthur relieved from the UN Command and Gen Ridgway appointed in his place.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 14</td>
<td>General Van Fleet succeeds Ridgway to command the Eighth US Army. All UN forces on Kansas Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 19</td>
<td>The I and IX US Corps on the Utah Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 22-28</td>
<td>First effort of CCF Fifth-phase Offensive begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 30</td>
<td>UN forces, after withdrawing to new defense line, halt CCF offensive north of Seoul and north of Han River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>Ethiopian battalion enters the theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16-23</td>
<td>Second and final effort of CCF Fifth-phase Offensive begins. UN forces halt CCF Soyang offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20</td>
<td>CCF offensive halted. UN forces resume advance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23</td>
<td>UN forces drive north.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30</td>
<td>The Eighth US Army back on Kansas Line once more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1</td>
<td>Operation Piledriver begins, with elements of the I and IX US Corps advancing toward the Wyoming Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 13</td>
<td>UN forces capture Chorwon and Kumbwa in the Iron Triangle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 15</td>
<td>Colombian battalion enters the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 23</td>
<td>Jacob Malik, Deputy Foreign Commissar of Soviet Union, proposes cease-fire talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 30</td>
<td>General Ridgway, announces the UN's readiness to discuss an armistice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 10</td>
<td>Negotiations between UN forces and Communists first opened at Kaesong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 27</td>
<td>Negotiators at Kaesong agree on agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 28</td>
<td>Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1</td>
<td>UN launches limited attempts to straighten lines at Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 31</td>
<td>UN Command breaks off truce talks because of illegal armed troops in the neutral area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 10</td>
<td>Truce talks resumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 23</td>
<td>Communists suspended negotiation alleging the “bombing” of their delegation at Kaesong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 31</td>
<td>1st US Marine Division opens assault at Punchbowl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2</td>
<td>2nd US Division opens fire against Heartbreak and Bloody Ridges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 18</td>
<td>US Marine advances to Soyang River, north of Punchbowl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 12</td>
<td>IX US Corps advances to the Jamestown Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 12</td>
<td>Ridgway orders Van Fleet to confine operations to active defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 27</td>
<td>Truce Talks resume at Panmunjom; Stalemate dominates the fighting fronts while the talks continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 18</td>
<td>Prisoner of war lists exchanged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1</td>
<td>Artillery and air pressure against Communist positions continue throughout the month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2</td>
<td>The screening of Communist POW's begins. Koje-do riots break out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>Prisoners at Koje-do seize Gen Dodd and hold him hostage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>Gen Mark Clark arrives in Tokyo to succeed Gen Ridgway as Supreme Com-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Korean War Diary

mander of UN forces.
12 May Gen Boatner begins to quell disturbances on Koje-do.
6 Jun Operation Courier begins, to occupy eleven patrol bases.
Jun Stalemate along battlefront except on Old Baldy. White Horse, and several other outposts, while truce talks deadlocked on POW repatriation question.
17 Nov Indian proposal on POW’s in UN. (Compromised truce plan)
20 Nov Danish hospital ship “Jutlandia” docks at Inchon.
2 Dec Gen Dwight Eisenhower, President-elect, inspects Korean military situations.
15 Dec Peking Radio announces Communist China’s rejection of Indian compromise plan.
Dec Breakout attempt by prisoners at Pongam-do suppressed.

1953

Feb Gen Van Fleet retired, upon which General Maxwell D. Taylor assumes command of the Eighth US Army.
5 Mar Death of Joseph Stalin; struggle for power in Kremlin.
30 Mar Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian UN proposal of November 17, 1952. Resumption of truce talks at Panmunjom.
6 Apr The first meeting of the liaison groups held at Panmunjom after Gen Clark’s proposal.
11 Apr Agreement on an exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners to begin April 20 reached.
16-18 Apr Battle for Porkchop Hill.
20 Apr Operation “Little Switch” begins at Panmunjom.
25 Apr The Armistice negotiations were resumed after a recess of six and a half months.
27 Apr Resumption of plenary sessions at Panmunjom.
May Savage fighting along stalemate line while details of truce ironed out at Panmunjom.
25 May New proposals for ending prisoner deadlock offered at Panmunjom, but ROK observer boycotts meetings. Beginning of President Rhee’s campaign to block the cease-fire is indicated.
28 May Chinese, in regimental strength, attack five outposts of US 25th Division.
9 Jun ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms.
10 Jun Chinese open assault against the II ROK Corps near Kumsong.
18 Jun President Syngman Rhee releases approximately 27,600 anti-communist NK prisoners of war.
20 Jun Communists accuse UN Command of complicity in the freeing of prisoners, and suspend talks.
23 Jun President Rhee reiterates opposition to truce terms.
25 Jun Robertson begins “Little Truce Talks” with President Rhee to secure ROK acceptance of armistice; CCF launches massive attacks against ROK divisions.
8 Jul Communist agrees to resumption of the Armistice talks; Gen Clark’s proposal to proceed with final arrangements without ROK participation.
11 Jul Robertson and President Rhee announce agreement; President Rhee will no
longer oppose truce terms.

13 Jul Final Chinese offensive begins in the IX US and II ROK Corps sectors.
19 Jul Negotiators at Panmunjom reach agreement on all points.
20 Jul New MLR established by the IX US Corps and the II ROK Corps along south bank of the Kumsong River.
27 Jul Armistice signed, ending three years of the war.
5 Aug Operation "Big Switch" begins at Panmunjom.
APPENDIX II

U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON KOREAN PROBLEM

(1) Establishing the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea(112-II)
(November 14, 1947)

A

Inasmuch as the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself and concerns its freedom and independence, and
Recognizing that this question cannot be correctly and fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population,

The General Assembly,

1. Resolves that elected representatives of the Korean people be invited to take part in the consideration of the question;
2. Further resolves that in order to facilitate and expedite such participation and to observe that the Korean representatives are in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees by military authorities in Korea, there be forthwith established a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to be present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea.

B

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea;
Believing that the national independence of Korea should be re-established and all occupying forces then withdrawn at the earliest practicable date;
Recalling its previous conclusion that the freedom and independence of the Korean people cannot be correctly or fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the Korean people, and its decision to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea(thereinafter called the “Commission”) for the purpose of facilitating and expediting such participation by elected representatives of the Korean people,

1. Decides that the Commission shall consist of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syrie, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic;
2. Recommends that elections be held not later than 31 March 1948 on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to choose representatives with whom the Commission may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and which representatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National Government of Korea. The number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population, and the elections should be under the observation of the Commission;
3. Further recommends that as soon as possible after the elections, the National Assembly should convene and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation;
4. Further recommends that immediately upon the establishment of a National Government, that Government should, in consultation with the Commission:

(a) Constitute its own national security forces and dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein;

(b) Take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea, and

(c) Arrange with the occupying Powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within ninety days;

5. Resolves that the Commission shall facilitate and expedite the fulfilment of the foregoing programme for the attainment of the national independence of Korea and withdrawal of occupying forces, taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea. The Commission shall report, with its conclusions, to the General Assembly and may consult with the Interim Committee (if one be established) with respect to the application of this resolution in the light of developments;

6. Calls upon the Member States concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its responsibilities;

7. Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from interfering in the affairs of the Korean people during the interim period preparatory to the establishment of Korean independence, except in pursuance of the decisions of the General Assembly; and thereafter, to refrain completely from any and all acts derogatory to the independence and sovereignty of Korea.

(2) Authorizing UNTCOK to Observe Elections in South Korea(583-A)

(February 26, 1948)

The Interim Committee,

Bearing in mind the views expressed by the Chairman of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea;

Deeming it necessary that the programme set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 be carried out and as a necessary step therein that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea proceed with the observance of elections in all Korea, and if that is impossible, in as much of Korea as is accessible to it; and

Considering it important the elections be held to choose representatives of the Korean people, with whom the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may consult regarding the prompt attainment of freedom and independence of the Korean people, which representatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National Government of Korea;

Resolves

That in its view it is incumbent upon the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, under the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947, and in the light of developments in the situation with respect to Korea since that date, to implement the programme as outlined in resolution II, in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission.
(3) Establishment of the Republic of Korea and the Withdrawal of the Occupying Powers (195-III) (December 12, 1948)

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolution 112(II) of 14 November 1947 concerning the problem of the independence of Korea,

Having considered the reports of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (hereinafter referred to as the "Temporary Commission"), and the report of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly regarding its consultation with the Temporary Commission,

Mindful of the fact that, due to difficulties referred to in the report of the Temporary Commission, the objectives set forth in the resolution of 14 November 1947 have not been fully accomplished, and in particular that unification of Korea has not yet been achieved,

1. Approves the conclusions of the reports of the Temporary Commission;

2. Declares that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

3. Recommends that the occupying Powers should withdraw their occupying forces from Korea as early as practicable;

4. Resolves that, as a means to the full accomplishment of the objectives set forth in the resolution of 14 November 1947, a Commission on Korea consisting of Australia, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria, shall be established to continue the work of the Temporary Commission and carry out the provisions of the present resolution, having in mind the status of the Government of Korea as herein defined, and in particular to;

(a) Lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korean security forces in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947;

(b) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea;

(c) Be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people;

(d) Observe the actual withdrawal of the occupying forces and verify the fact of withdrawal when such has occurred; and for this purpose, if it so desires, request the assistance of military experts of the two occupying Powers;

5. Decides that the Commission:

(a) Shall, within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution, proceed to Korea, where it shall maintain its seat;

(b) Shall be regarded as having superseded the Temporary Commission established by the resolution of 14 November 1947;

(c) Is authorized to travel, consult and observe throughout Korea;

(d) Shall determine its own procedures;
(c) May consult with the Interim Committee with respect to the discharge of its duties in
the light of developments, and within the terms of the present resolution;
(f) Shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any
prior special session which might be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution,
and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for
distribution to Members;
6. Requests that the Secretary-General shall provide the Commission with adequate staff and
facilities, including technical advisors as required; and authorized the Secretary-General to
pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and an alternate from each of the States
members of the Commission;
7. Calls upon the Member States concerned, the Government of the Republic of Korea, and
all Koreans to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its
responsibilities;
8. Calls upon the Member States to refrain from any acts derogatory to the results achieved
and to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and
unity of Korea;
9. Recommends that Member States and other nations, in establishing their relations with
the Government of the Republic of Korea, take into consideration the facts set out in paragraph
2 of the present resolution.

(4) Defining Responsibilities of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea
(293-IV) (October 21, 1949)

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions 112(II) of 14 November 1947 and 195(III) of 12 December
1948 concerning the problem of the independence of Korea,
Having considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, and having taken
note of the conclusions reached therein,
Mindful of the fact that, due to difficulties referred to in the report of the Commission, the
objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished, and in
particular that the unification of Korea and the removal of the barriers to economic, social and
other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea have not yet been achieved,
Having noted that the Commission has observed and verified the withdrawal of United States
occupation forces, but that it has not been accorded the opportunity to observe or verify the
reported withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces,
Recalling its declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful
government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction
over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able
to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this
Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate
of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

Concerned lest the situation described by the Commission in its report menace the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and lead to open military conflict in Korea,

1. Resolves that the United Nations Commission on Korea shall continue in being with the following membership: Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines and Turkey and, having in mind the objectives set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 12 December 1948 and also the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea as defined in the latter resolution, shall:

(a) Observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea;
(b) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea; and make available its good offices and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgement a favourable opportunity arises, in bringing about the unification of Korea in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947;
(c) Have authority, in order to accomplish the aims defined under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the present paragraph, in its discretion to appoint observers, and to utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not representatives on the Commission;
(d) Be available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people, including elections of national scope;
(e) Verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces in so far as it is in a position to do so;

2. Decides that the Commission:
(a) Shall meet in Korea within thirty days from the date of the present resolution;
(b) Shall continue to maintain its seat in Korea;
(c) Is authorized to travel, consult and observe throughout Korea;
(d) Shall continue to determine its own procedures;
(e) May consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly (if it be continued) with respect to the discharge of its duties in the light of developments and within the terms of the present resolution;
(f) Shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;
(g) Shall remain in existence pending a new decision by the General Assembly;

3. Calls upon Member States, the Government of the Republic of Korea, and all Koreans to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its responsibilities, and to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers and observers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and an alternate from each of the States members of the Commission and of such persons as may be appointed in accordance with
paragraph 1 (c) of the present resolution.

(5) Requestment of the Cessation of Hostilities in Korea (June 25, 1950)

The Security Council,

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

1. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;

2. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea;

(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay,

(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel, and

(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

3. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

(6) Military Assistance to Korea (June 27, 1950)

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and
Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to 38th Parallel, and

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th Parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

(7) Creation and Operation of the Unified Command (July 7, 1950)

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

(8) Setting up the UNCURK (376-V) (October 7, 1950)

The General Assembly,
Having regard to its resolutions of 14 November 1947(112(II)), of 12 December 1948(195 (III)), and of 21 October 1949(293(IV)),

Having received and considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea,

Recalling the General Assembly declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea,

Having in mind that the United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea,

1. Recommends that
   (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;
   (b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea;
   (c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government;
   (d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in sub-paragraph (a) and (b) above;
   (e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

2. Resolves that
   (a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be established to
      (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission on Korea;
      (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea;
      (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;
   (b) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and
Rehabilitation of Korea, the governments of the States represented on the Commission should form an Interim Committee composed of representatives meeting at the seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations; the Interim Committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

(c) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

The General Assembly furthermore,

Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude,

3. Requests the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within three weeks of the adoption of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

4. Also recommends the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

5. Expresses its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisors as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and an alternate from each of States members of the Commission.

(9) Setting up a Cease-Fire Group of 3 Persons (384-V) (December 14, 1950)

The General Assembly,

Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.
(10) The Provision of a United Nations Distinguishing Ribbon or other Insignia for Personnel Which Has Participated in the Korean War (483-V) (December 12, 1950)

The General Assembly,

Desiring to symbolize the valour and sacrifices of the men and women who have served on behalf of the United Nations in repelling aggression in Korea,

Recalling its resolution 92 (1) on the official seal and emblem of the United Nations, its resolution 167 (II) on the United Nations flag, and the resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950 authorizing the Unified Command to use the United Nations flag,

Resolves that the Secretary-General be requested to make arrangement with the Unified Command, established pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950, for the design and award, under such regulations as the Secretary-General shall prescribe, of a distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel which has participated in Korea in the defence of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(11) Branding Communist China as Aggressor (February 1, 1951)

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea,

Noting that the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China has not accepted United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,

1. Finds that the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

2. Calls upon the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China to cease its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

3. Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

4. Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;
5. Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

6. Requests a Committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee referred to in the following paragraph reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

7. Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

(12) Application of an Embargo against Communist China and North Korea
(May 18, 1951)

The General Assembly,

Noting the report of the Additional Measures Committee dated 14 May 1951,

Recalling its resolution 498(V) of 1 February 1951,

Noting that:

(a) The Additional Measures Committee established by that resolution has considered additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea,

(b) The Additional Measures Committee has reported that a number of states have already taken measures designed to deny contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the United Nations in Korea,

(c) The Additional Measures Committee has also reported that certain economic measures designed further to deny such contributions would support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea and would assist in putting an end to the aggression,

1. Recommends that every State:

(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Republic of China and of the North Korea authorities of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials, of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war;

(b) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo;

(c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution;

(d) Cooperate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo;

(e) Report to the Additional Measures Committee within thirty days and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution;

2. Requests the Additional Measures Committee:
(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as appropriate, on the
general effectiveness of the embargo and the desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it;
(b) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be employed to meet the ag-
gression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly, it being understood that
the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory
progress in its efforts;
3. Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a ces-
sation of hostilities in Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful
means, and requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its good offices.

(13) The Convening of a Political Conference on Korea (711-VII) (August 28, 1953)

A

--Implementation of paragraph 60 the Korean Armistice Agreement--
The General Assembly:
1. Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July 1953, the
fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major step has thus been taken towards the full
restoration of international peace and security in the area;
2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful
means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government
and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;
3. Notes the recommendation contained in the Armistice Agreement that "in order to ensure
the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby
recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3)
months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of
a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through
negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settle-
ment of the Korean question, etc."
4. Welcomes the holding of such a conference;
5. Recommends that:
   (a) The side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea shall have as
       participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to
       the call of the United Nations which desire to be represented, together with Republic of Korea.
       The participating governments shall act independently at the conference with full freedom of
       action and shall be bound only by decisions or agreements to which they adhere;
   (b) The United States Government, after consultation with the other participating countries
       referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, shall arrange with the other side for the political confer-
       ence to be held as soon as possible, but not later than 28 October 1953, at a place and on a
date satisfactory to both sides;
   (c) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, if this is agreeable to both sides, provide the political conference with such services and facilities as may be feasible;
(d) The Member States participating pursuant to sub-paragraph(a) above shall inform the United Nations when agreement is reached at the conference and keep the United Nations informed at other appropriate times;

6. Reaffirms its intention to carry out its programme for relief and rehabilitation in Korea, and appeals to the governments of all Member States to contribute to this task.

B

The General Assembly,

Having adopted the resolution entitled "Implementation of paragraph 60 the Korean Armistice Agreement,"

Recommends that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires it.

C

The General Assembly,

Requests the Secretary-General to communicate the proposals on the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the seventh session and recommended by the Assembly, together with the records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly, to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and to report as appropriate.

(14) Paying Tribute to the Armed Forces Who fought in Korea (712-VII)
(August 28, 1953)

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of 25 June, 27 June and 7 July 1950 and the resolutions of the General Assembly of 7 October 1950, 1 December 1950, 1 February 1951, 18 May 1951 and 3 December 1952, Having received the report of the Unified Command dated 7 August 1953, Noting with profound satisfaction that fighting has now ceased in Korea on the basis of an honourable armistice,

1. Salutes the heroic soldiers of the Republic of Korea and of all those countries which sent armed forces to its assistance;

2. Pays tribute to all those who died in resisting aggression and thus in upholding the cause of freedom and peace;

3. Expresses its satisfaction that the first efforts pursuant to the call of the United Nations to repel armed aggression by collective military measures have been successful, and expresses its firm conviction that this proof of the effectiveness of collective security under the United Nations Charter will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.
(15) The Inhuman Treatment of the United Nations Prisoners of War
(804-VIII) (December 3, 1953)

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item "Question of atrocities committed by the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea" proposed by the United States of America in documents A/2531 and A/2531/Add. 1 of 30 and 31 October 1953.

Recalling that the basic legal requirements for human treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in connection with the conduct of hostilities are established by general international law and find authoritative reaffirmation in the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and in the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war,

Recalling that these Conventions also embody a precise and detailed provisions for giving effect to the basic legal requirements referred to above and that these provisions, to the extent that they have not become binding as treaty law, have been accorded most general support by the international community,

Desiring to secure general and full observance of the requirements of international law and of universal standards of human decency,

1. Expresses its grave concern at reports and information that North Korean and Chinese Communist forces have, in a large number of instances, employed inhuman practices against the heroic soldiers of forces under the United Nations Command in Korea and against the civilian population of Korea;

2. Condemns the Commission by any governments or authorities of murder, mutilation, torture and other atrocious acts against captured military personnel or civilian populations, as a violation of the rules of international law and basic standards of conduct and morality and as affronting the human rights and dignity and worth of the human person.

(16) Resolution on the Korean Question (811-IX) (December 11, 1954)

The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea signed at Seoul, Korea, 17 August 1954,

Having received the report on the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva from 25 April to 15 June 1954, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 26 August 1953,

Noting that the negotiations in Geneva have not resulted in agreement on a final settlement of the Korean question in accordance with the United Nations objectives in Korea,

Recognizing that these objectives should be achieved by peaceful methods and by constructive
efforts on the part of the Governments concerned,

Noting that paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 provides that the Agreement "shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides."

1. Approves the report on the Korean Political Conference;

2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

3. Expresses the hope that it will soon prove possible to make progress towards these objectives;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to place the item on the provisional agenda of its tenth session.

(17) The Establishment and Maintenance of a United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea (977-X) (December 15, 1955)

The General Assembly,

Desiring to pay tribute to all those who, pursuant to the call of the United Nations, laid down their lives in resisting aggression in Korea and in upholding the cause of peace and freedom,

Noting that, in a cemetery at Tanggok, near Pusan, in the Republic of Korea, there are the graves of nearly two thousand men who served with forces which fought under the United Nations Command,

Noting further that up to the present time this cemetery has been cared for by the United Nations Command but that permanent arrangements have not yet been made for its maintenance,

1. Decides that the cemetery at Tanggok, near Pusan, in the Republic of Korea should be established and maintained as a United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea in honour of the dead;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, acting on the advice of a Committee consisting of representatives of those countries whose men still lie in graves in the cemetery:

(a) To arrange for the negotiation of an agreement with the Republic of Korea in order to secure the permanent use of the site of the memorial cemetery;

(b) To make all necessary arrangements for the establishment and permanent maintenance of the cemetery;

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to make provision in the budget of the United Nations for the allocation of the necessary funds for this purpose.
Resolution on the Korean Question (1968)

The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, signed at Seoul, Korea, on 24 August 1968 (A/7212),

Reaffirming its resolution 2269 (XXII) of 16 November 1967, and previous resolutions on the Korean question noted therein,

Recognizing that the continued division of Korea does not correspond to the wishes of the Korean people and constitutes a source of tension which prevents the full restoration of international peace and security in the area,

Recalling that the United Nations, under the Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to maintain peace and security and to extend its good offices in seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter,

Anxious that progress be made toward creating conditions which would facilitate the reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people,

Concerned at reports of recent events in Korea which, if continued, could hamper efforts to create the peaceful conditions which are one of the prerequisites of the establishment of a unified and independent Korea:

1. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea are to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Expresses the belief that arrangements should be made to achieve these objectives through genuinely free elections held in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

3. Calls for co-operation in the easing of tensions in the area and, in particular, for the avoidance of incidents and activities in violation of the Armistice Agreement of 1953;

4. Notes with approval the efforts made by the UNCURK, in pursuit of its mandate, to encourage the exercise of restraint and the easing of tensions in the area and to secure maximum support, assistance and co-operation in the realization of the peaceful reunification of Korea;

5. Requests UNCURK to pursue these and other efforts to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to continue to carry out the tasks previously assigned to it by the Assembly, and to keep members of the Assembly informed on the situation in the area and on the results of these efforts through regular reports to be submitted to the Secretary-General, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, with the first report to be submitted to the Secretary-General no later than four months after the adoption of this resolution;

6. Notes that the United Nations forces which were sent to Korea in accordance with United Nations resolutions have in greater part already been withdrawn; that the sole objective of the United Nations forces presently in Korea is to preserve the peace and security of the area, and that the Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea whenever such action is requested by the Republic of Korea or wherever the conditions for a lasting settlement formulated by the General Assembly have been fulfilled.
APPENDIX III

ASSIGNMENT OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

(1) Letter from President Rhee to General MacArthur (July 15, 1950)

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
GHQ FEC Tokyo,

Dear General MacArthur:

In view of the joint military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander, United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities; such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.

The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier, who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have joined together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land.

With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal regard.

Sincerely yours,

S[y] SYNGMAN RHEE

(2) Reply of General MacArthur to President Rhee through U.S. Ambassador Muccio (July 18, 1950)

Please express to President Rhee my thanks and deepest appreciation for the action taken in his letter of 15 July. It cannot fail to increase the co-ordinated power of the United Nations forces operating in Korea. I am proud indeed to have the gallant Republic of Korea forces under my command. Tell him I am grateful for his generous references to me personally and how sincerely I reciprocate his sentiments of regard. Tell him also not to lose heart, that the way be long and hard, but ultimate result cannot fail to be victory.

S[y] MacArthur
(3) President Rhee's Order to Chief of Staff, ROK Army

TO: Chief of Staff, Korean Army
THROUGH: Minister of Defense
SUBJECT: Assignment of Command Authority over all Korean Forces to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

1. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been designated Supreme Commander of all United Nations Forces fighting in or near Korea, on behalf of all United Nations supporting the Republic of Korea against communist aggression. At the present time these Forces include land, sea and air forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands and Canada and others have been offered.

2. The establishment of the principle of unity of command is essential to the winning of this war against the communists, and hence to the liberation of our country.

3. I have assigned to General MacArthur Command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present hostilities, to exercise this command either personally or through such military commander or commanders in Korea to whom he may delegate the exercise of this authority within or over Korea or in adjacent seas.

4. You are directed to take appropriate action to receive, transmit and execute such orders as may be received directly from General MacArthur's designated commander or commanders in Korea.

5. The Supreme Commander will maintain the organic and organizational integrity of the units of the Korean military forces, and of the Korean Army itself.

6. As previously directed, the activities of the police, youth corps and other semi-military organizations are to be coordinated through you.

7. It is a great privilege for the Republic of Korea and the Korean Army, Navy and Air Force to serve alongside all the combat forces of the United Nations under the command of an able and distinguished who also is such a longtime friend of Korea.

[Signature]
SYNGMAN RHEE
## APPENDIX IV
### ASSISTANCES PROVIDED BY THE U.N. ALLIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army &amp; Marine</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>7 inf divs, 1 marine div; logistical, &amp; support forces</td>
<td>1 naval fleet; carrier task group, blockade &amp; escort forces, various support units</td>
<td>1 tactical air force &amp; 1 air combat cargo command; 2 medium bombardment wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2 inf brigs, 1 tank regt, 2 FA regts, 1 armored regt, 1 marine co &amp; support units</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 3 frigates &amp; several auxiliary ships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2 inf bns</td>
<td>1 carrier, 2 destroyers, 1 frigate</td>
<td>1 fighter sqd, 1 air trans unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1 inf brig, 1 FA regt, 1 armored regt &amp; support units</td>
<td>3 destroyers</td>
<td>1 air trans sqd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1 FAregt and support units</td>
<td>2 frigates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 inf brig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 air trans sqd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 destroyar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 inf bn</td>
<td>2 corvettes</td>
<td>1 troop carrier flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1 inf co(—)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 transport ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 fighter bomber sqd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 hospital ship &amp; medical team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 field ambulance unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 field hospital unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 MASH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2 field hospital unit</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX  V
OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE FOR KOREA

By January 2, 1951, 40 countries had offered assistance, military and otherwise, to the United Nations forces in Korea. The offers are listed below, even though all could not be accepted by the UN. For example, Chinese military aid was declined for political reasons, and Turkish serum and vaccines because of transportation difficulties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Offer</th>
<th>Details of offer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Oct 5, 1950</td>
<td>Canned and frozen meat for troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Jun 30, 1950</td>
<td>1 Royal Australian Air Force squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul 28, 1950</td>
<td>3 naval vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 3, 1950</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 6, 1950</td>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 28, 1950</td>
<td>Penicillin crystalline 116,000 lbs. Laundry soap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 14, 1950</td>
<td>Distilled water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Jul 22, 1950</td>
<td>Air transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 13, 1950</td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 7, 1950</td>
<td>400 tons sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Jul 15, 1950</td>
<td>30 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Sep 22, 1950</td>
<td>50,000,000 cruzeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Jul 12, 1950</td>
<td>3 naval vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul 21, 1950</td>
<td>1 Royal Canadian Air Force transport squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 11, 1950</td>
<td>Canadian-Pacific Airlines (commercial facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 26, 1950</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Jun 30, 1950</td>
<td>Strategic materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Jul 3, 1950</td>
<td>3 infantry divisions and 20 C-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 4, 1950</td>
<td>10,000 tons coal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000 tons rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000 tons salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 tons DDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Jul 27, 1950</td>
<td>General economic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 16, 1950</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 16, 1950</td>
<td>Infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Jul 27, 1950</td>
<td>Sea and air bases, Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date of Offer</td>
<td>Details of Offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Oct 2, 1950</td>
<td>2,000 tons sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 gallons alcohol, Human plasma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Jul 5, 1950</td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 18, 1950</td>
<td>Hospital ship, JUTLANDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 28, 1950</td>
<td>Motorship, Bella Dan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 25, 1950</td>
<td>500 tons sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Aug 1, 1950</td>
<td>Medicinal substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 13, 1950</td>
<td>10,000 quintals(500 tons) rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Aug 15, 1950</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Aug 5, 1950</td>
<td>$100,000 (Ethiopian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 2, 1950</td>
<td>Infantry contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Jul 19, 1950</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 20, 1950</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 9, 1950</td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 29, 1950</td>
<td>Additional medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Jul 20, 1950</td>
<td>6 Dakoda transport aircrafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 1, 1950</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 20, 1950</td>
<td>100 tons soap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 30, 1950</td>
<td>25,000 notebooks and pencils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 27, 1950</td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Sep 14, 1950</td>
<td>125 tons cod liver oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Jul 29, 1950</td>
<td>Field ambulance unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 2, 1950</td>
<td>400,000 jute bags(for transport Thailand rice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 11, 1950</td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Aug 22, 1950</td>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Sep 27, 1950</td>
<td>Field hospital unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jul 26, 1950</td>
<td>$50,000 (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Jul 17, 1950</td>
<td>22,400 lbs natural rubber, valued at $10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Sep 30, 1950</td>
<td>Beans, chickpeas, etc., valued at 3,000,000 pesos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Jul 5, 1950</td>
<td>1 destroyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 8, 1950</td>
<td>2 or 3 infantry companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Jul 1, 1950</td>
<td>2 frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul 26, 1950</td>
<td>1 combat unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 6, 1950</td>
<td>200-500 tons dried peas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 20, 1950</td>
<td>150 tons milk powder</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200 tons soap</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Nov 16, 1950</td>
<td>1,000 quintals rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 16, 1950</td>
<td>2,000 quintals rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000 qts. alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date of Offer</strong></td>
<td><strong>Details of Offer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Jul 18, 1950</td>
<td>Merchant ship tonnage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Aug 29, 1950</td>
<td>5,000 tons wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Aug 3, 1950</td>
<td>Contingent of volunteers, Bases for training, Use of Merchant Marine, Free use of highways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Nov 3, 1950</td>
<td>Medical supplies, valued at $10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Nov 21, 1950</td>
<td>1 million soles ($65,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Jul 7, 1950</td>
<td>50,000 cakes soap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 3, 1950</td>
<td>17 Sherman tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 10, 1950</td>
<td>1 tank destroyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 7, 1950</td>
<td>Regimental combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 29, 1950</td>
<td>500 units fresh blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Jul 20, 1950</td>
<td>Field hospital unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Jul 23, 1950</td>
<td>1 infantry combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 20, 1950</td>
<td>40,000 tons rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 3, 1950</td>
<td>2 corvettes and naval transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jul 25, 1950</td>
<td>1 infantry combat force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 29, 1950</td>
<td>Vaccines and serums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of South Africa</td>
<td>Aug 4, 1950</td>
<td>1 fighter squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Jul 26, 1950</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul 28, 1950</td>
<td>Naval forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 19, 1950</td>
<td>Air forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 20, 1950</td>
<td>6,000 tons salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 22, 1950</td>
<td>Sulfur drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Sep 14, 1950</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oct 26, 1950</td>
<td>70,000 blankets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Sep 14, 1950</td>
<td>Medical supplies, blankets, soap, food, valued at $100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Battle</td>
<td>Date/Period</td>
<td>Friendly Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1950</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongjin</td>
<td>25-26 Jun</td>
<td>17, ROK Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongdusen</td>
<td>25-27 Jun</td>
<td>2, 3, 7 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munsan</td>
<td>25-28 Jun</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunchon</td>
<td>25-29 Jun</td>
<td>6 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangnung</td>
<td>25 Jun-1 Jul</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul Area Defense</td>
<td>28 Jun-4 Jul</td>
<td>Capital, 1, 2, 3, 5 &amp; 7 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechon</td>
<td>2-12 Jul</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umsong</td>
<td>4-10 Jul</td>
<td>1, 6 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungju</td>
<td>7-12 Jul</td>
<td>6 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosan</td>
<td>10-23 Jul</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoqdok</td>
<td>12 Jul-27 Aug</td>
<td>3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punggi</td>
<td>13-27 Jul</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mungyong</td>
<td>13-30 Jul</td>
<td>Capital, 1, 6 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taejon</td>
<td>17-20 Jul</td>
<td>24 US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwaryongjang</td>
<td>17-25 Jul</td>
<td>Capital, 1 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongdong</td>
<td>22-31 Jul</td>
<td>1 US Cav Div, 27 US Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadong</td>
<td>25-27 Jul</td>
<td>3 Bn of 29 US Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinju</td>
<td>28-31 Jul</td>
<td>19, 27 US Regt, KMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andong</td>
<td>29 Jul-6 Aug</td>
<td>Capital, 8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masan</td>
<td>2-31 Aug</td>
<td>25 US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uisong</td>
<td>5-13 Aug</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changnyong</td>
<td>5-18 Aug</td>
<td>24 US Div, 5 USMC Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinha</td>
<td>7-13 Aug</td>
<td>Kean Task Force(US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohyunsan</td>
<td>7 Aug-4 Sep</td>
<td>Capital, 8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hapchon</td>
<td>9 Aug</td>
<td>2 US Div, 17 ROK Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angang</td>
<td>10 Aug-20 Sep</td>
<td>Capital, 3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigye</td>
<td>10 Aug-20 Sep</td>
<td>Capital, 3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabudong</td>
<td>13-30 Aug</td>
<td>1 ROK Div, 27 US Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koryong</td>
<td>13 Aug-17 Sep</td>
<td>27 CW Brig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waegwan</td>
<td>14-30 Aug</td>
<td>1 US Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohang</td>
<td>16 Aug-18 Sep</td>
<td>3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongyong</td>
<td>17-19 Aug</td>
<td>KMC Ba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakdong Perimeter Defense</td>
<td>20 Aug-15 Sep</td>
<td>Capital, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 ROK Div, 2, 24, 25 US Inf Div, 1 US Cav Div, 1 USMC Div, 27 CW Brig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Battle</td>
<td>Date/Period</td>
<td>Friendly Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sillyong</td>
<td>30 Aug-15 Sep</td>
<td>6 ROK Div, 1 ROK Div, Capital, 3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palgongran</td>
<td>31 Aug-15 Sep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyongju</td>
<td>4-22 Sep</td>
<td>Capital, 1, 6, 7, 8 ROK Div, (7 regts)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yongchon</td>
<td>5-13 Sep</td>
<td>X US Corps, 17 ROK Regt, KMC BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inchon Landing</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>X US Corps, 17 ROK Regt, KMC BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul Area</td>
<td>20-28 Sep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poun</td>
<td>29 Sep-5 Oct</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongchon</td>
<td>6 Oct</td>
<td>3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>8-10 Oct</td>
<td>Capital, 3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ichon</td>
<td>13 Oct</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kowon</td>
<td>13-14 Oct</td>
<td>3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namchon</td>
<td>15 Oct</td>
<td>1 US Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangdok</td>
<td>16-18 Oct</td>
<td>6 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>18-20 Oct</td>
<td>1 ROK Div, 8 Regt of 7 ROK Div, 1 US Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunchon-Sukchon</td>
<td>20-22 Oct</td>
<td>187 US ARCT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huicheon</td>
<td>23 Oct</td>
<td>5 NK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kujangdong</td>
<td>24-25 Oct</td>
<td>6 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosaen</td>
<td>26 Oct</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taechon</td>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>7 Regt of 5 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusong</td>
<td>29-31 Oct</td>
<td>5 US RCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonchon</td>
<td>31 Oct-1 Nov</td>
<td>24 US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongwon</td>
<td>2-25 Nov</td>
<td>II ROK Corps, 32 CCF Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokchon</td>
<td>2-25 Nov</td>
<td>2 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakchon</td>
<td>8-15 Nov</td>
<td>6 ROK Div, 24 US Div, Uncertain CCF Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongbyon</td>
<td>13 Nov</td>
<td>1 US Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonnim</td>
<td>17-25 Nov</td>
<td>II ROK Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapsan</td>
<td>18 Nov</td>
<td>7 US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyesanjin</td>
<td>21 Nov-9 Dec</td>
<td>17 Regt of 7 US Div, 42 NK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changjin Reservoir</td>
<td>22 Nov-11 Dec</td>
<td>1 USMC Div, Elements of 3, 7 US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongju</td>
<td>23 Nov</td>
<td>24 US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Mas Offense</td>
<td>24-25 Nov</td>
<td>1, 6, 7, 8 ROK Div, 24, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chongjin</td>
<td>25 Nov</td>
<td>Capital ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunchon</td>
<td>25 Nov-2 Jan '51</td>
<td>5 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Battle</td>
<td>Date/Period</td>
<td>Friendly Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuru-ri</td>
<td>26 Nov-30 Nov</td>
<td>2 US Div, Turkish Brig</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pungsan</td>
<td>29 Nov</td>
<td>3 ROK Div, 7 US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maengsan</td>
<td>30 Nov-2 Dec</td>
<td>II ROK Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukchon</td>
<td>2 Dec</td>
<td>I US Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunchon</td>
<td>2 Dec</td>
<td>II ROK Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'yongyang</td>
<td>4 Dec</td>
<td>II ROK Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td>I US Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samdung</td>
<td>4 Dec</td>
<td>I US Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangdung</td>
<td>4-5 Dec</td>
<td>II ROK Corps, I US Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilju</td>
<td>4-5 Dec</td>
<td>Capital ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungnam</td>
<td>10-24 Dec</td>
<td>120,000 ROK &amp; US Troops, 10,000 Refugees Removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
<td>X US Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hambung</td>
<td>13-16 Dec</td>
<td>3, 5, 8 ROK Div, 1 US MC Div, Canadian Bn (PPCLI), New Zealand FA Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koksan</td>
<td>16 Dec</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongchon</td>
<td>13 Dec-12 Feb '51</td>
<td>3, 5, 8 ROK Div, 1 US MC Div, Canadian Bn (PPCLI), New Zealand FA Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1951</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyouru</td>
<td>1-2 Jan</td>
<td>9 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uijongbu</td>
<td>1-3 Jan</td>
<td>27 CW Brig, N.Z. FA Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>1, 3 Jan</td>
<td>I US Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongsan</td>
<td>6 Jan-3 Feb</td>
<td>9 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongwol</td>
<td>6-25 Jan</td>
<td>7 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wonju</td>
<td>7-15 Jan</td>
<td>3 ROK Div, 2 US Div, French &amp; Netherlands Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'yongyang</td>
<td>26 Jan-7 Mar</td>
<td>7, 9 ROK, 7 US Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suriwon</td>
<td>31 Jan-5 Feb</td>
<td>25 US Div, Turkish Brig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoengsong</td>
<td>2-22 Feb</td>
<td>5, 8 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chipyongni</td>
<td>3-16 Feb</td>
<td>23 Regt of 2 US Div, French Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seoul Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offense</td>
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<td>LIX US Corps, 1 ROK Div</td>
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<td>Ch'ongdong</td>
<td>3-18 Mar</td>
<td>7 US, 7 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ichon</td>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>Greek Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachangni</td>
<td>22-24 Apr</td>
<td>6 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inje</td>
<td>22-28 Apr</td>
<td>5 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapyong</td>
<td>23-25 Apr</td>
<td>6 ROK Div, 27 CW Brig Australian Bn, Canadian Bn, N.Z. FA Regt</td>
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<td>Soraksan</td>
<td>7-12 May</td>
<td>11 ROK Div</td>
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<td>Name of Battle</td>
<td>Date/Period</td>
<td>Friendly Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Bongilchon</td>
<td>10-23 May</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yongnunson</td>
<td>16-27 May</td>
<td>6 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soyanggang</td>
<td>16-18 May</td>
<td>7 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Capital ROK Div</td>
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<td>Taegwallyong</td>
<td>18-25 May</td>
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<td>Hyangnubong</td>
<td>3-12 Jun</td>
<td>Capital ROK Div</td>
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<td>6-11 Jun</td>
<td>6 ROK Div, 31 Regt of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7 US Div</td>
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<td>Hill 734</td>
<td>2-8 Aug</td>
<td>2 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hill 924</td>
<td>18-23 Aug</td>
<td>7 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>“J” Ridge</td>
<td>18-29 Aug</td>
<td>Capital, 8, 11, ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bloody Ridge</td>
<td>18 Aug-5 Sep</td>
<td>2 US Div, 36 Regt of</td>
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<td>5 ROK Div, French &amp;</td>
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<td>Heartbreak Ridge</td>
<td>13 Sep-15 Oct</td>
<td>2 US Div, French &amp;</td>
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<td>Netherland Bns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paeksoksan</td>
<td>24-29 Sep</td>
<td>7 ROK, 7 US Div,</td>
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<td>Ethiopian Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation “Commando”</td>
<td>3-19 Oct</td>
<td>I US Corps</td>
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<td>Mundungni</td>
<td>6-27 Oct</td>
<td>8 ROK Div</td>
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<td>Kim II Sung Hill</td>
<td>12-15 Oct</td>
<td>38 Regt of 2 US Div,</td>
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<td>Netherland Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kumsong</td>
<td>12-23 Oct</td>
<td>2, 6 ROK, 24 US Div,</td>
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<td>Colombian Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mao Tse Tung Hill</td>
<td>22 Oct-2 Nov</td>
<td>3 ROK Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumeri Hill</td>
<td>28 Dec-5 Jan ’52</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-guerrillas in</td>
<td>1 Dec-15 Mar ’52</td>
<td>Capital, 8 ROK Div</td>
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<td>Chiri Mt.</td>
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**1952**

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<tr>
<th>Name of Battle</th>
<th>Date/Period</th>
<th>Friendly Forces</th>
<th>Enemy Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td>Old Baldy</td>
<td>6 Jun-4 Jul</td>
<td>45 US Div</td>
<td>38, 39 CCF Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hill 351</td>
<td>26 Jun-24 Jul</td>
<td>5 ROK Div</td>
<td>9 NK Div</td>
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<td>Old Baldy (2nd)</td>
<td>17 Jul-7 Aug</td>
<td>2 US Div, French Bn</td>
<td>39, 40 CCF Army</td>
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<td>Finger Ridge</td>
<td>5 Aug-15 Oct</td>
<td>Capital ROK Div</td>
<td>34, 35 CCF Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudo (Capital) Hill</td>
<td>5 Aug-15 Oct</td>
<td>Capital ROK Div</td>
<td>34, 35 CCF Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunker Hill</td>
<td>12-25 Aug</td>
<td>1 US MC Div</td>
<td>63 CCF Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kelly Outpost</td>
<td>17-24 Sep</td>
<td>3 US Div</td>
<td>39 CCF Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toksurig (Eagle) Hill</td>
<td>28 Sep-3 Oct</td>
<td>3 ROK Div</td>
<td>68 CCF Army</td>
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<td>Paengma (White Horse)</td>
<td>6-15 Oct</td>
<td>9 ROK Div</td>
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<td>Snake Ridge</td>
<td>14 Oct-18 Nov</td>
<td>2 ROK Div</td>
<td>45 CCF Div</td>
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<td>Triangle Hill</td>
<td>14 Oct-5 Nov</td>
<td>2 ROK, 7 US Div,</td>
<td>15 CCF Army</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopian Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Russel Hill</td>
<td>14 Oct-1 Nov</td>
<td>7 US Div, Colombian Bn</td>
<td>15 CCF Army</td>
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<td>Name of Battle</td>
<td>Date/Period</td>
<td>Friendly Forces</td>
<td>Enemy Forces</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Jackson Height</td>
<td>24–31 Oct</td>
<td>65 Regt of 3 US Div</td>
<td>29 CCF Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hill 851</td>
<td>3 Nov</td>
<td>160 Regt of 49 US Div</td>
<td>1 Div of III NK Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porkchop Hill</td>
<td>7–11 Nov</td>
<td>Thai Bn</td>
<td>38 CCF Army</td>
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<td>Anchor Hill</td>
<td>9–11 Nov</td>
<td>5 ROK Div</td>
<td>1 NK Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sniper Ridge</td>
<td>2–12 Dec</td>
<td>9 ROK Div</td>
<td>15 CCF Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Neri</td>
<td>11–14 Dec</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
<td>140 CCF Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hook Heights</td>
<td>18–19 Dec</td>
<td>1 CW Div</td>
<td>38 CCF Army</td>
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<td>Arsenal-Eric Hill</td>
<td>23–24 Dec</td>
<td>35 Regt of 2 US Div, Netherland Bn</td>
<td>338 Regt of 113 CCF Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hill 812</td>
<td>25 Dec</td>
<td>179 Regt of 48 US Div, 45 NK Div</td>
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### 1953

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<td>12 Jan</td>
<td>12 ROK Div</td>
<td>45 NK Div</td>
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<td>Hill 394</td>
<td>17 Jan</td>
<td>6 ROK Div</td>
<td>12 CCF Army</td>
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<td>T-Bone</td>
<td>24–25 Jan</td>
<td>31 Regt of 7 US Div, Colombian Bn</td>
<td>38 CCF Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old Baldy</td>
<td>24–25 Jan</td>
<td>7 US Div, Ethiopian Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hill 812</td>
<td>2–3 Feb</td>
<td>12 ROK Div</td>
<td>II NK Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chorwon</td>
<td>8–20 Feb</td>
<td>2 ROK Div</td>
<td>114 CCF Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hook Heights</td>
<td>23 Feb–1 Mar</td>
<td>1 USMC, 2 US Div, French &amp; Netherland Bn</td>
<td>40 CCF Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porkchop</td>
<td>6 Mar</td>
<td>31 Regt of 7 US Div, Colombian Bn</td>
<td>47 CCF Army</td>
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<td>Little Gibraltar</td>
<td>17–21 Mar</td>
<td>9 Regt of 2 US Div, 7 US Div, Colombian Bn, Ethiopian Bn</td>
<td>40 CCF Army, 141, 67 CCF Div</td>
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<td>Old Baldy &amp; Porkchop</td>
<td>23–26 Mar</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
<td>47 CCF Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty Hill</td>
<td>28–31 Mar</td>
<td>Turkish Brig, 25 US Div</td>
<td>120 CCF Div</td>
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<td>Nevada Complex</td>
<td>25–29 May</td>
<td>Capital, 3, 5, 6, 8, 20 ROK Div</td>
<td>60, 67, 68 CCF, Army &amp; 33 CCF Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kumsong</td>
<td>10–18 Jun</td>
<td>20 ROK Div</td>
<td>33 CCF Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-I Hill</td>
<td>10–23 Jun</td>
<td>9 ROK Div</td>
<td>70 CCF Div</td>
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<td>Boomerang</td>
<td>13–15 Jun</td>
<td>20 ROK Div</td>
<td>33 CCF Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christmas Hill</td>
<td>14–18 Jun</td>
<td>9 ROK Div</td>
<td>70 CCF Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boomerang(2nd)</td>
<td>24–25 Jun</td>
<td>1 ROK Div</td>
<td>7 CCDF Div</td>
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<td>Yookkokhun</td>
<td>25–29 Jun</td>
<td>7 ROK Div</td>
<td>179 CCF Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 1220</td>
<td>26 Jun–4 Jul</td>
<td>2 ROK Div</td>
<td>73 CCF Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrowhead</td>
<td>6–11 Jul</td>
<td>7 US Div, Colombian Bn</td>
<td>Unknown CCF Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porkchop</td>
<td>6–11 Jul</td>
<td>Capital, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 ROK Div</td>
<td>24, 68 and three more CCF Armies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kumsong Salient</td>
<td>13–20 Jul</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX VII

RELEVANT INCIDENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

**American Mission in Korea (AMIK):** A general term of the US elements in Korea, it includes KMAG, US Embassy in Seoul, ECA and JAS.

**Atlantic Charter:** It was drawn up between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August 14, 1941, which declared sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them. Later it served as catalyst to Korean independence movement.

**Cairo Conference:** The conference was held in Cairo, November 27, 1943, by US President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill and China’s Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. In this the heads of the three big powers determined that in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.

**Geneva Conference:** The conference opened on April 26, 1954, seated by the foreign ministers of the Big Fours (US, UK, France and USSR), in addition to those all other nations represented in the United Nations Command in Korea--with the exception of South Africa, and those of Communist China and North Korea. The agenda was Far Eastern problems and the means to end the hostilities between the French and the Vietminh in Indochina in focus. No agreement was reached on the Korean question, but they resolved for a cease fire line in Vietnam along the 17th Parallel.

**Moscow Agreement:** The US State Secretary Byrnes, the Foreign Ministers of Britain Ernest Bevin and USSR V.M. Molotov convened in Moscow on December 16, 1945, in order to avoid permanent division of Korea, and to specify definite plans for her future as pledged previously. The Moscow agreement of a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to 5 years provoked strong opposition among Koreans.

**Potsdam Conference:** Being last inter-Allied conference of the World War II, it was held at Potsdam, outside Berlin, from July 17 to August 2, 1945, among new US President Harry S. Truman, and the new US State Secretary, James F. Byrnes, and Britain’s Churchill and Eden and Russian Stalin and Molotov. The chief agenda included the status post bellum of Japan and the means of the peace settlement. Among the Korean issue, the Soviet suggestion of multipower trusteeship was first uttered.

**United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK):** Spurred urgent request for a medical and welfare groups to eradicate wartime disease and unrest in Korea, the personnel composed of medical doctors, welfare workers and technicians sponsored by 10 nations joined the military hands in various Korean provinces. Begun as an exclusive American
endeavor, it soon became a multi-national undertaking, and raised to the level of a command under the Eighth US Army by the end of 1950.

United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK): Established on October 7, 1950, it implemented the effort of the United Nations towards the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea and the rehabilitation of relief of Korea. This commission composing of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey is still in existence.

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA): As UN's multilateral agency for Korean reconstruction, it saw the light on December 1, 1950, for the purpose of operating under military supervision in the fields of technical assistance and long-range planning on one hand while continuing to supply medical and welfare staff for the civilian relief program on the other.

United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK): Being composed of 72 members from 9 UN nations, its chief mission was to supervise the general election and to act as consultants to the Koreans in setting up the governmental machinery and in arranging for the end to the occupation. Its first meeting was held at Seoul on January 12, 1948.

Yalta Conference: US President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill and Russian Josef V. Stalin convened from February 2—12, 1945 at Yalta. In this conference, the three big powers consulted about the postwar problems and also confirmed the Korean independence which had been promised at the Cairo Declaration.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Switch</td>
<td>Operation for repatriation of POW's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaver</td>
<td>A limited battalion offensive to take Hills 692 and 703 in Samhyon area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commando</td>
<td>Operation plan for offensive to establish the Jamestown Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter</td>
<td>Plan for 45th Division, 1 US Corps, to capture strategic outpost sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duluth</td>
<td>Line of defense to be established by Operation Sundial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finder</td>
<td>Operation to locate the bodies in the DMZ and to see that they were properly buried.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamestown</td>
<td>Defensive line to be established by Operation Commando.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas-Wyoming</td>
<td>Defense lines in the vicinity of 38th Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killer</td>
<td>Operation Plan to cut off Hoengsong and trap large numbers of the enemy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Switch</td>
<td>Operation for repatriation of sick and wounded POW's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuader</td>
<td>Operation to erase the enemy opposition from Sniper Ridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piledriver</td>
<td>Operation plan which the X US Corps and 1 ROK Corps were to make limited advances while the 1 US Corps would secure the vital Chorwon-Kumhwa area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratkiller</td>
<td>Anti-guerrilla Operation to wipe out the Communist remnants scattered around the Chiri-san area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripper</td>
<td>Operation to create a bulge east of Seoul, which would permit UN forces to envelop the Capital City at their leisure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundup</td>
<td>Operation plan to drive northward against the rejuvenated II and V NK Corps at Hengchon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugged</td>
<td>Operation plan to establish the Kansas Line roughly along the 38th Parallel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Showdown</td>
<td>Operation plan designed to improve IX US Corps defensive line positions north of Kumhwa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smack</td>
<td>Operation plan for combined air-tank-infantry-artillery test strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundial</td>
<td>Operation plan to establish Duluth defense line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swanlake</td>
<td>Operation to withdraw from the DMZ to post-armistice positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thunderbolt</td>
<td>Operation to reconnaissance in force which, if enemy resistance proved weak, would also clear the area south of the Han River.</td>
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APPENDIX IX
MILITARY SYMBOLS

Antiaircraft Artillery ........................................... A
Armor(Tank) .................................................. 08
Army Aviation .................................................. 8X
Artillery ......................................................... EX
Engineer .......................................................... X
Infantry ........................................................... X
Medical Corps. .................................................... X
Airborne Infantry ................................................ X
Squad ..............................................................
Section ...............................................................
Platoon ..............................................................
Company ...........................................................
Battalion ...........................................................
Regiment ..........................................................
Brigade .............................................................
Division ............................................................
Corps ...............................................................
Field Army

Army Group

Company B, 22nd Infantry Regiment

Command Post, 7th Infantry Division

Boundary between 23rd and 38th Infantry Regiment
### APPENDIX X

**LIST OF ABBREVIATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti aircraft artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abn</td>
<td>Airborne</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCOM</td>
<td>Advance Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALO</td>
<td>Air Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Armor-piercing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
<td>Armored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
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<td>ASN</td>
<td>Army Serial Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/W</td>
<td>All-weather</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>Browning Automatic Rifle</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Battalion Combat Team</td>
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<td>Bn</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
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<td>BomCom</td>
<td>Bomber Command</td>
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<td>Brig</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
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<td>Btry</td>
<td>Battery</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combat Air Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
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<tr>
<td>CmC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operation</td>
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<td>CofS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>CO</td>
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<td>ComCarCom</td>
<td>Combat Cargo Command</td>
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<td>Cmd</td>
<td>Command</td>
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<td>Cdr</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>ComNavFE</td>
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